[Federal Register Volume 71, Number 207 (Thursday, October 26, 2006)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Pages 62664-62874]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 06-8678]
[[Page 62663]]
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Part II
Nuclear Regulatory Commission
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10 CFR Parts 50, 72, and 73
Power Reactor Security Requirements; Proposed Rule
Federal Register / Vol. 71, No. 207 / Thursday, October 26, 2006 /
Proposed Rules
[[Page 62664]]
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
10 CFR Parts 50, 72, and 73
RIN 3150-AG63
Power Reactor Security Requirements
AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
ACTION: Proposed rule.
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SUMMARY: The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is proposing to amend
the current security regulations and add new security requirements
pertaining to nuclear power reactors. Additionally, this rulemaking
includes new security requirements for Category I strategic special
nuclear material (SSNM) facilities for access to enhanced weapons and
firearms background checks. The proposed rulemaking would: Make
generically applicable security requirements imposed by Commission
orders issued after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, based
upon experience and insights gained by the Commission during
implementation; fulfill certain provisions of the Energy Policy Act of
2005; add several new requirements that resulted from insights from
implementation of the security orders, review of site security plans,
and implementation of the enhanced baseline inspection program and
force-on-force exercises; update the regulatory framework in
preparation for receiving license applications for new reactors; and
impose requirements to assess and manage site activities that can
adversely affect safety and security. The proposed safety and security
requirements would address, in part, a petition for rulemaking (PRM 50-
80) that requests the establishment of regulations governing proposed
changes to facilities which could adversely affect the protection
against radiological sabotage.
DATES: Submit comments by January 9, 2007. Submit comments specific to
the information collection aspects of this rule by November 27, 2006.
Comments received after the above dates will be considered if it is
practical to do so, but assurance of consideration cannot be given to
comments received after these dates.
ADDRESSES: You may submit comments by any one of the following methods.
Please include the following number ``RIN 3150-AG63'' in the subject
line of your comments. Comments on rulemakings submitted in writing or
in electronic form will be made available for public inspection.
Because your comments will not be edited to remove any identifying or
contact information, the NRC cautions you against including any
information in your submission that you do not want to be publicly
disclosed.
Mail comments to: Secretary, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission,
Washington, DC 20555-0001, Attn: Rulemakings and Adjudications Staff.
E-mail comments to: SECY@nrc.gov. If you do not receive a reply e-
mail confirming that we have received your comments, contact us
directly at (301) 415-1966. You may also submit comments via the NRC's
rulemaking Web site at http://ruleforum.llnl.gov. Address questions
about our rulemaking Web site to Carol Gallagher (301) 415-5905; E-mail
CAG@nrc.gov. Comments can also be submitted via the Federal e-
Rulemaking Portal http://www.regulations.gov.
Hand deliver comments to: 11555 Rockville Pike, Rockville, Maryland
20852, between 7:30 a.m. and 4:15 p.m. Federal workdays (telephone
(301) 415-1966).
Fax comments to: Secretary, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission at
(301) 415-1101.
You may submit comments on the information collections by the
methods indicated in the Paperwork Reduction Act Statement.
Publicly available documents related to this rulemaking may be
viewed electronically on the public computers located at the NRC's
Public Document Room (PDR), O1-F21, One White Flint North, 11555
Rockville Pike, Rockville, MD 20852-2738. The PDR reproduction
contractor will copy documents for a fee. Selected documents, including
comments, may be viewed and downloaded electronically via the NRC
rulemaking Web site at http://ruleforum.llnl.gov.
Publicly available documents created or received at the NRC after
November 1, 1999, are available electronically at the NRC's Electronic
Reading Room at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html. From this
site, the public can gain entry into the NRC's Agencywide Document
Access and Management System (ADAMS), which provides text and image
files of NRC's public documents. If you do not have access to ADAMS or
if there are problems in accessing the documents located in ADAMS,
contact the NRC PDR Reference staff at 1-800-397-4209, 301-415-4737, or
by e-mail to PDR@nrc.gov.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Mr. Richard Rasmussen, Office of
Nuclear Security and Incident Response, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001; telephone (301) 415-0610; e-
mail: RAR@nrc.gov or Mr. Timothy Reed, Office of Nuclear Reactor
Regulation, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-
0001; telephone (301) 415-1462; e-mail: TAR@nrc.gov.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Table of Contents
I. Background
II. Rulemaking Initiation
III. Proposed Regulations
IV. Section-by-Section Analysis
V. Guidance
VI. Criminal Penalties
VII. Compatibility of Agreement State Regulations
VIII. Availability of Documents
IX. Plain Language
X. Voluntary Consensus Standards
XI. Finding of No Significant Environmental Impact
XII. Paperwork Reduction Act Statement
XIII. Public Protection Notification
XIV. Regulatory Analysis
XV. Regulatory Flexibility Certification
XVI. Backfit Analysis
I. Background
Following the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, the NRC
conducted a thorough review of security to ensure that nuclear power
plants and other licensed facilities continued to have effective
security measures in place given the changing threat environment.
Through a series of orders, the Commission specified a supplement to
the Design Basis Threat (DBT), as well as requirements for specific
training enhancements, access authorization enhancements, security
officer work hours, and enhancements to defensive strategies,
mitigative measures, and integrated response. Additionally, in generic
communications, the Commission specified expectations for enhanced
notifications to the NRC for certain security events or suspicious
activities.
Most of the requirements in this proposed rulemaking are derived
directly from, or through implementation of, the following four
security orders:
EA-02-026, ``Interim Compensatory Measures (ICM) Order,''
dated February 25, 2002 (March 4, 2002; 67 FR 9792).
EA-02-261, ``Access Authorization Order,'' dated January
7, 2003 (January 13, 2003; 68 FR 1643).
EA-03-039, ``Security Personnel Training and Qualification
Requirements (Training) Order,'' dated April 29, 2003 (May 7, 2003; 68
FR 24514), and
EA-03-086, ``Revised Design Basis Threat Order,'' dated
April 29, 2003 (May 7, 2003; 68 FR 24517).
[[Page 62665]]
Nuclear power plant licensees revised their security plans,
training and qualification plans, and safeguards contingency plans in
response to these orders. The NRC completed its review and approval of
all of the revised security plans, training and qualification plans,
and safeguards contingency plans on October 29, 2004. These plans
incorporated the enhancements instituted through the orders. While the
specifics of these changes are Safeguards Information, in general, the
changes resulted in enhancements such as increased patrols, augmented
security forces and capabilities, additional security posts, additional
physical barriers, vehicle checks at greater standoff distances,
enhanced coordination with law enforcement and military authorities,
augmented security and emergency response training, equipment, and
communication, and more restrictive site access controls for personnel,
including expanded, expedited, and more thorough employee background
checks.
The Energy Policy Act of 2005 (EPAct 2005), signed into law on
August 8, 2005, is another source of some of the proposed requirements
reflected in this rulemaking. Section 653, for instance, allows the NRC
to authorize licensees to use, as part of their protective strategies,
an expanded arsenal of weapons, including machine guns and semi-
automatic assault weapons. Section 653 also requires that all security
personnel with access to any weapons undergo a background check that
would include fingerprinting and a check against the Federal Bureau of
Investigation's (FBI) National Instant Criminal Background Check System
(NICS) database. These provisions of EPAct 2005 would be reflected in
the newly proposed Sec. Sec. 73.18 and 73.19, and the proposed NRC
Form 754. Though this rulemaking primarily affects power reactor
security requirements, to implement the EPAct 2005 provisions
efficiently, the NRC expanded the rulemaking's scope in newly proposed
Sec. Sec. 73.18 and 73.19 to include facilities authorized to possess
formula quantities or greater of strategic special nuclear material,
i.e., Category I SSNM facilities. Such facilities would include
production facilities, spent fuel reprocessing facilities, fuel
processing facilities, and uranium enrichment facilities. Additionally,
Section 651 of the EPAct 2005 requires the NRC to conduct security
evaluations at selected licensed facilities, including periodic force-
on-force exercises. That provision also requires the NRC to mitigate
any potential conflict of interest that could influence the results of
force-on-force exercises. These provisions would be reflected in
proposed Sec. 73.55.
Through implementing the security orders, reviewing the revised
site security plans across the fleet of reactors, conducting the
enhanced baseline inspection program, and evaluating force-on-force
exercises, the NRC has identified some additional security measures
that would provide additional assurance of a licensee's capability to
protect against the DBT.
Finally, a petition for rulemaking submitted by the Union of
Concerned Scientists and San Luis Obispo Mothers for Peace (PRM 50-80),
requested the establishment of regulations governing proposed changes
to facilities which could adversely affect their protection against
radiological sabotage. This petition was partially granted on November
17, 2005 (70 FR 69690). The proposed new Sec. 73.58 contains
requirements to address the remaining issues.
The proposed amendments to the security requirements for power
reactors, and for enhanced weapons requirements for power reactor and
Category I SSNM facilities, would result in changes to the following
existing sections and appendices in 10 CFR part 73:
10 CFR 73.2, Definitions.
10 CFR 73.55, Requirements for physical protection of
licensed activities in nuclear power reactors against radiological
sabotage.
10 CFR 73.56, Personnel access authorization requirements
for nuclear power plants.
10 CFR 73.71, Reporting of safeguards events.
10 CFR 73, Appendix B, General criteria for security
personnel.
10 CFR 73, Appendix C, Licensee safeguards contingency
plans.
10 CFR 73, Appendix G, Reportable safeguards events.
The proposed amendments would also add three new sections to part
73:
Proposed Sec. 73.18, Firearms background checks for armed
security personnel.
Proposed Sec. 73.19, Authorization for use of enhanced
weapons.
Proposed Sec. 73.58, Safety/security interface
requirements for nuclear power reactors.
The proposed rule would also add a new NRC Form 754 under the newly
proposed Sec. 73.18.
EPAct 2005 Weapons Guidelines
In order to accomplish Sec. 161A. of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954,
as amended (AEA), concerning the transfer, receipt, possession,
transport, import, and use of enhanced weapons and the requirements for
firearms background checks, the NRC has engaged with representatives
from the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ), the FBI, and the U.S. Bureau
of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (ATF), to develop
guidelines required by Sec. 161A.d of the AEA. The provisions of
Sec.161A. of the AEA take effect upon the issuance of these guidelines
by the Commission, with the approval of the Attorney General. The
Commission will publish a separate Federal Register notice on the
issuance of these guidelines. This proposed rule would not rescind the
authority of certain NRC licensees, currently possessing automatic
weapons through alternate processes, to possess such enhanced weapons;
however, these licensees would be subject to the new firearms
background check requirements of Sec. 161A. of the AEA. Information on
new provisions (Sec. Sec. 73.18 and 73.19) that would implement Sec.
161A. may be found in Section III.
Conforming and Corrective Changes
Conforming changes to the requirements listed below are proposed in
order to ensure that cross-referencing between the various security
regulations in part 73 is preserved, and to avoid revising requirements
for licensees who are not within the scope of this proposed rule. The
following requirements contain conforming changes:
Section 50.34, ``Contents of applications; technical
information'' would be revised to align the application requirements
with the proposed revisions to appendix C to 10 CFR part 73.
Section 50.54, ``Conditions of licenses'' would be revised
to conform with the proposed revisions to sections in appendix C to 10
CFR part 73.
Section 50.72, ``Immediate notification requirements for
operating nuclear power reactors'' would be revised to state (in
footnote 1) that immediate notification to the NRC may be required (per
the proposed Sec. 73.71 requirements) prior to the notification
requirements under the current Sec. 50.72.
Section 72.212, ``Conditions of general license issued
under Sec. 72.210'' would be revised to reference the appropriate
revised paragraph designations in proposed Sec. 73.55.
Section 73.8, ``Information collection requirements: OMB
approval'' would be revised to add the newly proposed requirements
(Sec. Sec. 73.18, 73.19, 73.58, and NRC Form 754) to the list of
sections and forms with Office of Management and Budget (OMB)
[[Page 62666]]
information collection requirements. A corrective revision to Sec.
73.8 would also be made to reflect OMB approval of existing information
collection requirements for NRC Form 366 under existing Sec. 73.71.
Section 73.70, ``Records'' would be revised to reference
the appropriate revised paragraph designations in proposed Sec. 73.55
regarding the need to retain a record of the registry of visitors.
Additionally, Sec. 73.81, ``Criminal penalties'' which sets forth
the sections within part 73 that are not subject to criminal sanctions
under the AEA, would remain unchanged since willful violations of the
newly proposed Sec. Sec. 73.18, 73.19, and 73.58 may be subject to
criminal sanctions.
Appendix B and appendix C to part 73 require special treatment in
this rulemaking to preserve, with a minimum of conforming changes, the
current requirements for licensees and applicants to whom this proposed
rule would not apply. Accordingly, sections I through V of appendix B
would remain unchanged, and the proposed new language for power
reactors would be added as section VI. Appendix C would be divided into
two sections, with Section I maintaining all current requirements, and
Section II containing all proposed requirements related to power
reactors.
II. Rulemaking Initiation
On July 19, 2004, NRC staff issued a memorandum entitled ``Status
of Security-Related Rulemaking'' (accession number ML041180532) to
inform the Commission of plans to close former security-related actions
and replace them with a comprehensive rulemaking plan to modify
physical protection requirements for power reactors. This memorandum
described rulemaking efforts that were suspended by the terrorist
activities of September 11, 2001, and summarized the security-related
actions taken following the attack. In response to this memorandum, the
Commission directed the staff in an August 23, 2004, Staff Requirements
Memorandum (SRM) (COMSECY-04-0047, accession number ML042360548) to
forego the development of a rulemaking plan, and provide a schedule for
the completion of security-related rulemakings. The staff provided this
schedule to the Commission by memorandum dated November 16, 2004
(accession number ML043060572). Subsequently, the staff revised its
plans to amend the part 73 security requirements to include a
requirement for licensees to assess and manage site activities that
could compromise either safety or security (i.e., the safety/security
interface requirements). This revision is discussed in a memorandum
dated July 29, 2005 (accession number ML051800350). Finally, by
memorandum dated September 29, 2005 (COMSECY-05-0046, accession number
ML052710167), the staff discussed its plans to incorporate select
provisions of the EPAct 2005 into the power reactor security
requirements rulemaking. In COMSECY-05-0046, dated November 1, 2005
(accession number ML053050439), the Commission approved the staff's
approach in incorporating the select provisions of EPAct 2005.
III. Proposed Regulations
This section describes significant provisions of this rulemaking:
1. EPAct 2005 weapons requirements. The new Sec. Sec. 73.18 and
73.19 would contain requirements to implement provisions of section
161A of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (AEA). Section 653 of
the EPAct amended the AEA by adding section 161A, ``Use of Firearms by
Security Personnel.'' Section 161A provides new authority to the
Commission to enhance security at certain NRC licensee and certificate
holder facilities by authorizing the security personnel of those
licensees or certificate holders to transfer, receive, possess,
transport, import, and use an expanded arsenal of weapons, to include:
Short-barreled shotguns, short-barreled rifles, and machine guns. In
addition, section 161A also provides that NRC-designated licensees and
certificate holders may apply to the NRC for authority to preempt
local, State, or certain Federal firearms laws (including regulations)
that prohibits the transfer, receipt, possession, transportation,
importation, or use of handguns, rifles, shotguns, short-barreled
shotguns, short-barreled rifles, machine guns, semiautomatic assault
weapons, ammunition for such guns or weapons, and large capacity
ammunition feeding devices. Prior to granting either authority,
however, the Commission must determine that the proposed use of this
authority is necessary in the discharge of official duties by security
personnel engaged in protecting: (1) Facilities owned or operated by an
NRC licensee or certificate holder and designated by the Commission, or
(2) radioactive material or other property that is owned or possessed
by an NRC licensee or certificate holder, or that is being transported
to or from an NRC-regulated facility, if the Commission has determined
the radioactive material or other property to be of significance to the
common defense and security or public health and safety. Licensees and
certificate holders must receive preemption authority before receiving
NRC approval for enhanced weapons authority. Finally, the NRC may
consider making preemption authority or enhanced-weapons authority
available to other types of licensees or certificate holders in future
rulemakings.
Under the provisions of section 161A.d, section 161A takes effect
on the date that implementing guidelines are issued by the Commission
after being approved by the U.S. Attorney General. Following enactment
of the EPAct 2005, NRC staff began discussions with staffs from the
U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) and its subordinate agencies the
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the U.S. Bureau of Alcohol,
Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (ATF) to develop these guidelines.
Issuance of these guidelines is a prerequisite for the issuance of a
final rule on Sec. Sec. 73.18 and 73.19, and the conforming changes in
Sec. 73.2. The proposed language for Sec. Sec. 73.18 and 73.19, and
the conforming changes in Sec. 73.2, set forth in this proposed rule
is consistent, to the extent possible, with the discussions between NRC
and DOJ. However, because NRC and DOJ staffs continue to work to
resolve the remaining issues, the guidelines have not been finalized as
of the issuance of this notice. Once the final guidelines are issued,
the Commission will, if necessary, take the appropriate actions to
ensure that the language of proposed Sec. Sec. 73.18, 73.19, and 73.2,
conforms with the guidelines. The Commission is utilizing this parallel
approach to provide the most expeditious process for promulgating the
necessary regulations implementing section 161A; thereby enhancing the
security (i.e., weapons) capabilities of NRC-licensed facilities, while
being mindful of our obligations to provide stakeholders an opportunity
to comment on proposed regulations.
2. Safety/Security interface requirements. These requirements are
located in proposed Sec. 73.58. The safety/security requirements are
intended to explicitly require licensee coordination of potential
adverse interactions between security activities and other plant
activities that could compromise either plant security or plant safety.
The proposed requirements would direct licensees to assess and manage
these interactions so that neither safety nor security is compromised.
These proposed requirements address, in part, a Petition for Rulemaking
(PRM 50-80) that requested the establishment of regulations governing
proposed changes
[[Page 62667]]
to the facilities which could adversely affect the protection against
radiological sabotage.
3. EPAct 2005 additional requirements. The EPAct 2005 requirements
that would be implemented by this proposed rulemaking, in addition to
the weapons-related additions described previously, consist of new
requirements to perform force-on-force exercises, and to mitigate
potential conflicts of interest that could influence the results of
NRC-conducted force-on-force exercises. These proposed new requirements
would be included in proposed Sec. 73.55 and appendix C to part 73.
4. Accelerated notification and revised four-hour reporting
requirements. This proposed rule contains accelerated security
notification requirements (i.e., within 15 minutes) in proposed Sec.
73.71 and appendix G to part 73 for attacks and imminent threats to
power reactors. The proposed accelerated notification requirements are
similar to what was provided to the industry in NRC Bulletin 2005-02,
``Emergency Preparedness and Response Actions for Security-Based
Events,'' dated July 18, 2005. The proposed rule also contains two new
four-hour reporting requirements. The proposed rule would direct
licensees to report to the NRC information pertaining to suspicious
activities as described in the proposed requirement. The proposed rule
would also include a new four-hour reporting requirement for tampering
events that do not meet the current threshold for one-hour reporting.
5. Mixed-oxide (MOX) fuel requirements. These requirements would be
incorporated into proposed Sec. 73.55 for licensees who propose to use
MOX fuel in their reactor(s). These proposed requirements are in lieu
of unnecessarily rigorous part 73 requirements (e.g., Sec. Sec. 73.45
and 73.46), which would otherwise apply because of the MOX fuel's low
plutonium content and the weight and size of the MOX fuel assemblies.
The proposed MOX fuel security requirements are intended to be
consistent with the approach implemented at Catawba Nuclear Station
through the MOX lead test assembly effort.
6. Cyber-security requirements. This proposed rule would contain
more detailed programmatic requirements for addressing cyber security
at power reactors, which build on the requirements imposed by the
February 2002 order. The proposed cyber-security requirements are
designed to be consistent with ongoing industry cyber-security efforts.
7. Mitigating strategies. The proposed rule would require licensees
to develop specific guidance and strategies to maintain or restore core
cooling, containment, and spent fuel pool cooling capabilities using
existing or readily available resources (equipment and personnel) that
can be effectively implemented under the circumstances associated with
the loss of large areas of the plant due to explosions or fire. These
proposed requirements would be incorporated into the proposed appendix
C to part 73.
8. Access authorization enhancements. The proposed changes would
improve the integration of the access authorization requirements,
fitness-for-duty requirements, and security program requirements. The
proposed rule would include an increase in the rigor for some elements
of the access authorization program including requirements for the
conduct of psychological assessments, requirements for individuals to
report arrests to the reviewing official, and requirements to clarify
the responsibility for the acceptance of shared information. The
proposed rule would also add requirements to allow NRC inspection of
licensee information sharing records and requirements that subject
additional individuals, such as those who have electronic access via
computer systems or those who administer the access authorization
program, to the access authorization requirements.
9. Training and qualification enhancements. The proposed rule
includes modifications to the training and qualification requirements
that are based on insights from implementation of the security orders,
review of site security plans, and implementation of the enhanced
baseline inspection program and force-on-force exercises. These new
requirements would include additional physical requirements for unarmed
security personnel to assure that personnel performing these functions
meet physical requirements commensurate with their duties. Proposed new
requirements also include a minimum age requirement of 18 years for
unarmed responders, qualification scores for testing required by the
training and qualification plan, qualification requirements for
security trainers, qualification requirements of personnel assessing
psychological qualifications, armorer certification requirements, and
program requirements for on-the-job training.
10. Security Program Implementation insights. The proposed rule
would impose new enhancements identified from implementation of the
security orders, review of site security plans, and implementation of
the enhanced baseline inspection program and force-on-force exercises.
These new requirements would include changes to specifically require
that the central alarm station (CAS) and secondary alarm station (SAS)
have functionally equivalent capabilities such that no single act can
disable the key functions of both CAS and SAS. The proposed additions
would also include requirements for new reactor licensees to position
the SAS within the protected area, add bullet resistance and limit the
visibility into SAS. Proposed additions also require uninterruptible
backup power supplies for detection and assessment equipment, ``video-
capture'' capability, and qualification requirements for drill and
exercise controllers.
11. Miscellaneous. The proposed rule would eliminate some
requirements that the staff found to be unnecessary, while still
providing high assurance that activities involving special nuclear
material are not inimical to the common defense and security and do not
constitute an unreasonable risk to the public health and safety. One
such requirement to be eliminated provides for guards to escort
operators of motor vehicles within the protected area if the operators
are cleared for unescorted access. The proposed rule would also add new
requirements, including predefined provisions for the suspension of
safeguards measures for severe weather conditions that could result in
life-threatening situations for security personnel (e.g., tornadoes,
floods, and hurricanes), and reduced overly-prescriptive requirements
through the inclusion of performance-based language to allow
flexibility in the methods used to accomplish requirements.
IV. Section-by-Section Analysis
IV.1. New Weapons Requirements
This proposed rulemaking would implement new weapons requirements
that stem from the EPAct 2005. This is the only portion of this
proposed rulemaking that involves facilities other than nuclear power
reactors. The newly proposed weapons requirements would apply to power
reactors and facilities authorized to possess a formula quantity or
greater of strategic special nuclear material whose security plans are
governed by Sec. Sec. 73.20, 73.45, and 73.46. The new requirements
would be in three different sections and would include the utilization
of an NRC Form:
Revised proposed Sec. 73.2, ``Definitions''.
[[Page 62668]]
Proposed Sec. 73.18, ``Firearms background checks for
armed security personnel''.
Proposed Sec. 73.19, ``Authorization for use of enhanced
weapons''.
Proposed NRC Form 754, ``Armed Security Personnel
Background Check''.
Under proposed Sec. 73.18, after the NRC approves the licensee's
or certificate holder's application, all security personnel must have a
satisfactorily completed firearms background check to have access to
covered weapons. Licensees and certificate holders would be required
under proposed Sec. 73.19 to notify the NRC that they have
satisfactorily completed a sufficient number of firearms background
checks to staff their security organization. The firearms background
checks required by proposed Sec. 73.18 would be intended to verify
that armed security personnel are not prohibited from receiving,
possessing, transporting, or using firearms under Federal or State law.
A firearms background check would consist of two parts, a check of an
individual's fingerprints against the FBI's fingerprint system and a
check of the individual's identity against the FBI's National Instant
Criminal Background Check System (NICS). The NRC would propose a new
NRC Form 754 for licensee or certificate holder security personnel to
submit the necessary information to the NRC for forwarding to the FBI
to perform the NICS portion of the firearms background check. The
requirement to satisfactorily complete a firearms background check
would apply to security personnel either directly employed by the
licensee or certificate holder or employed by a security contractor to
the licensee or certificate holder and whose official duties require
access to covered weapons (i.e., armed security personnel) [see also
new definitions for covered weapons, enhanced weapons, and standard
weapons in Sec. 73.2]. Additionally, the requirement for licensees or
certificate holders to ensure that their security personnel have
satisfactorily completed a firearms background check would apply to
licensees and certificate holders who have applied for and received NRC
approval of preemption authority or enhanced-weapons authority. In
order to simplify the rule language, Sec. 73.18 would only refer to
applications for preemption authority because preemption authority
would always be a necessary prerequisite for the receipt of enhanced
weapons authority.
The NRC would propose that a licensee or certificate holder may
begin firearms background checks on armed security personnel after the
licensee or certificate holder has applied to the NRC for the
preemption authority section 161A of the AEA. Because the NRC has not
previously had the authority to require its licensees or certificate
holders to complete firearms background checks on security personnel,
in most instances these requirements would be new to licensees and
uncertainties exist over the amount of time to complete these checks.
Thus delays in completing the checks (e.g., the time necessary to
resolve any errors of fact in the FBI's NICS databases) could reduce
the number of available security officers and create fatigue or minimum
staffing level issues. Therefore, the NRC envisions working with
licensees and certificate holders on a case-by-case basis to establish
the date for NRC approval of an application for preemption authority;
and thereby ensure that the licensee's or certificate holder's security
organizations can continue to adequately protect the facility when the
approval is issued.
The Commission has not yet determined whether licensees and
certificate holders may apply for preemption authority alone or
combined preemption and enhanced-weapons authority prior to issuance of
a final rule. In anticipation that the Commission does permit
applications for section 161A authority prior to promulgation of a
final rule, the proposed rule would include language to support a
transition to these regulations from requirements imposed by Commission
orders granting section 161A authority. The proposed rule would not,
however, require a licensee or certificate holder to repeat a firearms
background check for security personnel who previously satisfactorily
completed a firearms background check that was required under
Commission order. Consequently, this approach would provide both the
Commission and industry with the maximum flexibility to expeditiously
implement the security enhancements authorized by section 161A. The
exception to this requirement would be for security personnel who have
had a break in employment with the licensee or certificate holder or
their security contractor, or who have transferred from another
licensee or certificate holder (who previously completed a firearms
background check on them). In either case these security personnel
would be treated as new security personnel and they would be subject to
a new firearms background check.
The proposed rule would also provide direction on how security
personnel who have received an adverse firearms background check (i.e.,
a ``denied'' or ``delayed'' NICS response) may: (1) Obtain further
information from the FBI on the reason for the adverse response, (2)
appeal a ``denied'' response, or (3) provide additional information to
resolve a ``delayed'' response. Security personnel would be required to
apply directly to the FBI for these actions (i.e., the licensee or
certificate holder may not appeal to the FBI on behalf of the security
personnel). Only after such personnel have successfully appealed their
``denied'' response, and have subsequently received a ``proceed'' NICS
response, would they be permitted access to covered weapons.
Security personnel who receive a ``denied'' NICS response are
presumed by ATF to be prohibited from possessing or receiving a firearm
under federal law (see 18 U.S.C. 922) and may not have access to
covered weapons unless they have successfully appealed the ``denied''
NICS response and received a ``proceed'' NICS response. Because of the
structure of section 161A, the proposed rule would not require
licensees or certificate holders to remove personnel with a ``denied''
response until after the NRC has approved the licensee's or certificate
holder's application for preemption authority (i.e., licensee's and
certificate holders would not be subject to the requirements of Sec.
73.18 until after the NRC's approval of their application for
preemption authority is issued). However, the NRC's expectation is that
current licensees or certificate holders who receive a ``denied''
response for current security personnel would remove those personnel
from any security duties requiring possession of firearms to comport
with applicable Federal law and ATF regulations.
The NRC would propose to charge the same fee for fingerprints
submitted for a firearms background check as is currently imposed for
fingerprints submitted for other NRC-required criminal history checks
including fingerprints (i.e., an NRC administrative fee plus the FBI's
processing fee). In addition, the NRC would charge an administrative
fee for processing the NICS check information; however, no FBI fee
would be charged for the NICS check.
The proposed Sec. 73.19 would only apply to power reactor
licensees and Category I special nuclear material licensees; therefore,
only these two classes of licensees would be subject to the firearms
background check provisions of Sec. 73.18. The NRC may, however,
consider making stand-alone preemption authority or combined enhanced-
weapons authority and preemption authority available to other
[[Page 62669]]
types of licensees or certificate holders in future rulemakings.
In Sec. 73.19, the NRC would propose requirements for a licensee
or certificate holder to apply for stand-alone preemption authority or
to apply for combined enhanced-weapons authority and preemption
authority. Licensees and certificate holders who apply for enhanced-
weapons authority, must also apply for and receive NRC approval of
preemption authority as a necessary prerequisite to receiving enhanced-
weapons authority. The NRC would propose limiting either authority to
power reactor licensees and Category I SSNM licensees at this time. The
NRC may consider applying this authority to other types of licensees,
certificate holders, radioactive material, or other property (as
authorized under section 161A) in future rulemakings. Obtaining
enhanced-weapons authority from the NRC would be a necessary
prerequisite for a licensee or certificate holder to apply under ATF's
regulations for a Federal firearms license for these weapons. The NRC
would propose that licensees and certificate holders who want to apply
for enhanced-weapons authority must provide the NRC, for prior review
and approval, a new or revised security plan, training and
qualification plan, and safeguards contingency plan to reflect the use
of these specific new weapons the licensee or certificate holder
intends to employ and to provide a safety assessment of the onsite and
offsite impact of these specific enhanced weapons.
The proposed rule would also provide direction on acceptable
training standards for training and qualification on enhanced weapons.
The NRC would require licensees and certificate holders to complete
training and qualification of security personnel on any enhanced
weapons, before these personnel employ those weapons to protect the
facility. The NRC would also require Commission licensees and
certificate holders to notify the NRC of any adverse ATF findings
associated with ATF's inspections, audits, or reviews of their Federal
firearms license (FFL) (i.e., an FFL held by an NRC licensee or
certificate holder).
Finally, the NRC would propose to treat enhanced weapons the same
as existing weapons for the purpose of ``use'' of these weapons; and
therefore Sec. 73.19 would cross reference to existing regulation in
Sec. Sec. 73.55 and 73.46 on the use of weapons by reactor licensees
and by Category I SSNM licensees ( i.e., the NRC is not proposing
separate requirements on enhanced weapons versus standard weapons;
rather, requirements on the use of any weaponry possessed by the
licensee or certificate holder should be appropriate for the facility).
To implement the new weapons provisions, three new terms would be
added to Sec. 73.2: covered weapon, enhanced weapon, and standard
weapon.
The proposed new weapons requirements and supporting discussion for
the proposed language are set forth in more detail (including the
proposed new definitions) in Table 1.
IV.2. Section 73.55, ``Requirements for Physical Protection of Licensed
Activities in Nuclear Power Reactors Against Radiological Sabotage''
Proposed Sec. 73.55 contains security program requirements for
power reactor licensees. The security program requirements in Sec.
73.55 would apply to all nuclear power plant licensees that hold a 10
CFR part 50 license and to applicants who are applying for either a
part 50 license or a part 52 combined license. Paragraph (a) of Sec.
73.55 would identify the licensees and applicants for which the
requirements apply, and the need for submitting to NRC (for review and
approval) a ``Physical Security Plan,'' a ``Training and Qualification
Plan,'' and a ``Safeguards Contingency Plan.'' Paragraph (b) of Sec.
73.55 would set forth the performance objectives that govern power
reactor security programs. The remaining paragraphs of Sec. 73.55
would implement the detailed requirements for each of the security
plans, as well as for the various features of physical security.
This section would be extensively revised in an effort to make
generically applicable security requirements imposed by Commission
orders issued after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, based
upon experience and insights gained by the Commission during
implementation, fulfill certain provisions of the EPAct of 2005, and
add several new requirements that resulted from evaluation insights
from implementation of the security orders, review of site security
plans, and implementation of the enhanced baseline inspection program
and force-on-force exercises. The proposed regulations would require an
integrated security plan that begins at the owner controlled area
boundary and would implement defense-in-depth concepts and protective
strategies based on protecting target sets from the various attributes
of the design basis threat. Notable additions to the proposed Sec.
73.55 are summarized below.
Cyber Security Requirements
The current security regulations do not contain requirements
related to cyber security. Subsequent to the events of September 11,
2001, the NRC issued orders to require power reactor licensees to
implement measures to enhance cyber security. These security measures
required an assessment of cyber systems and the implementation of
corrective measures sufficient to provide protection against the cyber
threats at the time the orders were issued.
The proposed requirements maintain the intent of the security
orders by establishing the requirement for a cyber security program to
protect any system that, if compromised, can adversely impact safety,
security, or emergency preparedness.
Requirements for CAS and SAS To Have Functionally Equivalent
Capabilities Such That No Single Act Can Disable the Function of CAS
and SAS
Current regulatory requirements ensure that both CAS and SAS have
equivalent alarm annunciation and communication capabilities, but do
not explicitly require equivalent assessment, monitoring, observation,
and surveillance capabilities. Further, the current requirement of
Sec. 73.55(e)(1) states ``All alarms required pursuant to this part
must annunciate in a continuously manned central alarm station located
within the protected area and in at least one other continuously manned
station not necessarily onsite, so that a single act cannot remove the
capability of calling for assistance or otherwise responding to an
alarm.'' The Commission orders added enhanced detection and assessment
capabilities, but did not require equivalent capabilities for both CAS
and SAS. The security plans approved by the Commission on October 29,
2004, varied, due to the performance-based nature of the requirements,
with respect to how the individual licensees implemented these
requirements, but all sites were required to provide a CAS and SAS with
functionally equivalent capabilities to support the implementation of
the site protective strategy.
The proposed rule would extend the requirement for no single act to
remove capabilities to the key functions of the alarm stations and
would require licensees to implement protective measures such that a
single act would not disable the intrusion detection, assessment, and
communications capabilities of both the CAS and SAS. This proposed
requirement would ensure continuity of response
[[Page 62670]]
operations during a security event by ensuring that the detection,
assessment, and communications functions required to effectively
implement the licensee's protective strategy are maintained despite the
loss of one or the other alarm station. For the purposes of assessing
the regulatory burden of this proposed rule, the NRC assumed that all
licensees would require assessments and approximately one third of the
licensees would choose to implement hardware modifications.
The NRC has concluded that protecting the alarm stations such that
a single act does not disable the key functions would provide an
enhanced level of assurance that a licensee can maintain detection,
assessment and communications capabilities required to protect the
facility against the design basis threat of radiological sabotage. For
new reactor licensees, licensed after the publication of this rule, the
Commission would require CAS and SAS to be designed, constructed, and
equipped with equivalent standards.
Uninterruptible Power for Intrusion Detection and Assessment Systems
Current regulatory requirements require back-up power for alarm
annunciation and non-portable communication equipment, but do not
require this back-up power to be uninterruptible. Although not
specifically required, many licensees have installed uninterruptible
power to their security systems for added reliability of these
electronic systems. However, the Commission had not required
uninterruptible power for assessment systems. For the purposes of
assessing the regulatory burden of this proposed rule, the NRC assumed
that only a small number of licensees would require hardware
modifications to meet this proposed requirement.
Through implementation of the Commission-approved security plans,
baseline inspections, and force-on-force testing, the NRC has concluded
that uninterruptible back-up power would provide an enhanced level of
assurance that a licensee can maintain detection, assessment and
communication capabilities required to protect the facility against the
design basis threat of radiological sabotage. This new requirement
would reduce the risk of losing detection, assessment, and
communication capabilities during a loss of the normal power supply.
``Video-Capture'' Capability
Current regulatory requirements address the use of closed circuit
television systems, but do not explicitly require them. Although not
specifically required, all licensees have adopted the use of video
surveillance in their site security plans. Many of the licensees have
adopted advanced video surveillance technology to provide real-time and
play-back/recorded video images to assist security personnel in
determining the cause of an alarm annunciation. For the purposes of
assessing the regulatory burden of this proposed rule, the NRC assumed
that a small percentage of licensees would require hardware
modifications to comply with this proposed requirement for advanced
video surveillance technology.
Through implementation of the Commission-approved security plans,
baseline inspections, and force-on-force testing, the NRC has concluded
that advanced video technology would provide an enhanced level of
assurance that a licensee can assess the cause of an alarm annunciation
and initiate a timely response capable of defending the facility
against the threat up to and including the design basis threat of
radiological sabotage. Therefore the proposed rule would require
advanced video surveillance technology.
Implementation of Sec. 73.55 is linked principally to the
application of appendix B to part 73, ``General criteria for security
personnel,'' and appendix C to part 73, ``Licensee safeguards
contingency plans,'' both of which would be revised in this proposed
rulemaking. Proposed changes to these appendices are discussed in
Sections IV.6 and IV.7 of this document.
Table 2 sets forth the proposed Sec. 73.55 language as compared to
the current language, and provides the supporting discussion for the
proposed language including new definitions for security officer and
target set that would be added to Sec. 73.2. Because Sec. 73.55 would
be restructured extensively, Table 9 (See Section VIII) provides a
cross reference to locate individual requirements of the current
regulation within the proposed regulation.
The Commission is interested in obtaining specific stakeholder
input on the impacts and burdens for certain areas of proposed changes
to Sec. 73.55. Due to the accelerated rulemaking schedule, the NRC
staff's assessments of impacts to individual licensees as a result of
the proposed new requirements have not been informed by stakeholder
insights on potential implementation issues. Consequently, the
Commission recognizes that its views on the feasability, costs, and
time necessary to fully implement certain portions of this proposed
rule (e.g., alarm station, supporting systems, video systems, and cyber
security issues) by selected licensees may not be fully informed.
Accordingly, the Commission is requesting persons commenting on this
proposed rule to address the following questions:
1. What insights and estimates can stakeholders provide on the
feasability, costs, and time necessary to implement the proposed rule's
changes to existing alarm stations, supporting systems, video systems,
and cyber security?
2. Are there any actions that should be considered, such as
authorizing alternative measures, exemptions, extended implementation
schedules, etc., that would allow the NRC to mitigate any unnecessary
regulatory burden created by these requirements?
IV.3. Section 73.56, ``Personnel Access Authorization Requirements for
Nuclear Power Plants''
This section would continue to apply to all current part 50
licensees and to all applicants who are applying for a new reactor
license under parts 50 or 52, but would be extensively revised.
Proposed Sec. 73.56 would retain the requirement for a licensee to
determine that an individual is trustworthy and reliable before
permitting the individual to have unescorted access to nuclear power
plant protected areas and vital areas. The majority of the revisions in
proposed Sec. 73.56 reflect several fundamental changes to the NRC's
approach to access authorization requirements since the terrorist
attacks of September 11, 2001, and the NRC's concern with the threat of
an active or passive insider who may collude with adversaries to commit
radiological sabotage. These changes would include: (1) An increase in
the rigor of some elements of the access authorization program to
provide increased assurance that individuals who have unescorted access
authorization are trustworthy and reliable; (2) an elimination of
temporary unescorted access provisions [prior to the completion of the
full background check]; (3) an elimination of the provisions that
permit relaxation of the program when a reactor is in cold shutdown;
and (4) the addition of a new category of individuals who would be
subject to Sec. 73.56.
Proposed Sec. 73.56(b)(ii) would require licensees' access
authorization programs to cover individuals whose job duties and
responsibilities permit them to access or use digital computer systems
that may affect licensees' operational safety and security systems, and
emergency response capabilities. Historically digital computer systems
have played a limited role in the operation of nuclear power plants.
However, the role of computer systems
[[Page 62671]]
at nuclear power plants is increasing, as licensees take advantage of
computer technology to maximize plant productivity. In general,
licensees currently exclude from their access authorization programs,
individuals who may electronically access equipment in the protected
areas of nuclear power plants to perform their job functions, if their
duties and responsibilities do not require physical unescorted access
to the equipment located within protected or vital areas. However,
because these individuals manage and maintain the networks that connect
to equipment located within protected or vital areas and are
responsible for permitting authorized and/or trusted personnel to gain
electronic access to equipment and systems, they are often granted
greater electronic privileges than the trusted and authorized
personnel. With advancements in electronic technology and
telecommunications, differences in the potential adverse impacts of a
saboteur's actions through physical access and electronic access are
lessening. Thus, the proposed rule would require those individuals who
have authority to electronically access equipment that, if compromised,
can adversely impact operational safety, security or emergency
preparedness of the nuclear power plants, to be determined to be
trustworthy and reliable.
The proposed revisions to Sec. 73.56 would also address changes in
the nuclear industry's structure and business practices since this rule
was originally promulgated. At the time the current Sec. 73.56 was
developed, personnel transfers between licensees (i.e., leaving the
employment of one licensee to work for another licensee) with
interruptions in unescorted access authorization were less common. Most
licensees operated plants at a single site and maintained an access
authorization program that applied only to that site. When an
individual left employment at one site and began working for another
licensee, the individual was subject to a different access
authorization program that often had different requirements. Because
some licensees were reluctant to share information about previous
employees with the new employer, licensees often did not have access to
the information the previous licensee had gathered about the individual
and so were required to gather the necessary information again. The
additional effort to collect information that another licensee held
created a burden on both licensees and applicants for unescorted access
authorization. But, because few individuals transferred, the burden was
not excessive.
However, since 1991, the industry has undergone significant
consolidation and developed new business practices to use its workforce
more efficiently. Industry efforts to better use staffing resources
have resulted in the development of a transient workforce that travels
from site to site as needed, such as roving outage crews. Although the
industry has always relied on contractors and vendors (C/V) for special
expertise and staff for outages, the number of transient personnel who
work solely in the nuclear industry has increased and the length of
time they are on site has decreased. Because the current regulations
were written on the basis that the majority of nuclear personnel would
remain at one site for years, and that licensees would maintain
independent, site-specific access authorization programs and share
limited information, the current regulations do not adequately address
the transfer of personnel between sites.
In light of the NRC's increased concern with an insider threat
since September 11, 2001, the increasingly mobile nuclear industry
workforce has heightened the need for information sharing among
licensee access authorization programs, including C/V authorization
programs upon which licensees rely, to ensure that licensees have
information that is as complete as possible about an individual when
making an unescorted access authorization decision. To address this
need, the access authorization orders issued by the NRC to nuclear
power plant licensees on January 7, 2003, mandated increased sharing of
information. In addition, proposed Sec. 73.56 would require licensees
and C/V to collect and share greater amounts of information than under
the current rule, subject to the protections of individuals' privacy
that would be specified in proposed Sec. 73.56(m) [Protection of
information]. As a result, individuals who are subject to this section
would establish a detailed ``track record'' within the industry that
would potentially cover their activities over long periods of time and
would follow them if they change jobs and move to a new position that
requires them to be granted unescorted access authorization by another
licensee. The proposed requirement acknowledges the industry initiative
to develop and utilize a database to ensure accurate information
sharing between sites. This increased information sharing is necessary
to provide high assurance that individuals who are granted and maintain
unescorted access authorization are trustworthy and reliable when
individuals move between access authorization programs. In addition,
the increased information sharing would reduce regulatory burden on
licensees when processing individuals who have had only short breaks
between periods of unescorted access authorization.
Another change in the NRC's proposed approach to access
authorization requirements is the result of a series of public meetings
that were held with stakeholders during 2001-2004 to discuss potential
revisions to 10 CFR part, 26, ``Fitness-for-Duty Programs.'' Part 26
establishes additional steps that the licensees who are subject to
Sec. 73.56 must take as part of the process of determining whether to
grant unescorted access authorization to an individual or permit an
individual to maintain unescorted access authorization. These
additional requirements focus on aspects of an individual's behavior,
character, and reputation related to substance abuse. They require the
licensee and other entities who are subject to part 26 to conduct drug
and alcohol testing of individuals and an inquiry into the individual's
past behavior with respect to illegal drug use or consumption of
alcohol to excess, as part of determining whether the individual may be
granted unescorted access authorization. However, historically there
have been some inconsistencies and redundancies between the Sec. 73.56
access authorization requirements and the related requirements in part
26. These inconsistencies have led to implementation questions from
licensees, as well as inconsistencies in how licensees have implemented
the requirements. The redundancies have, in other cases, imposed an
unnecessary regulatory burden on licensees.
During public meetings held to discuss potential changes to part
26, the stakeholders pointed out ambiguities in the terms used in both
part 26 and Sec. 73.56, apparent inconsistencies and redundancies in
the related requirements, and reported many experiences in which the
ambiguities and lack of specificity and clarity in current Sec. 73.56
had resulted in unintended consequences. Although these meetings did
not focus on Sec. 73.56, many of the stakeholders' comments directly
resulted in some of the proposed changes to Sec. 73.56. (Summaries of
these meetings, and any comments provided through the Web site, are
available at http://ruleforum.llnl.gov/cgi-bin/rulemake?source=Part26_
risk&st=risk.) In response to stakeholder requests, the
[[Page 62672]]
NRC has proposed language changes to improve the clarity and
specificity of the requirements in proposed Sec. 73.56 and
substantially reorganized the section to present the requirements
generally in the order in which they would apply to licensees' access
authorization processes. The proposed changes are expected to result in
more uniform implementation of the requirements, and, consequently,
greater consistency in achieving the goals of Sec. 73.56. Table 3 sets
forth the proposed Sec. 73.56 language as compared to the current
language, and discusses the proposed language.
The Commission is interested in obtaining specific stakeholder
input on the following two issues:
1. The Commission requests public comment specific to the
appropriateness of the framework for the Insider Mitigation Program as
specified by the proposed 10 CFR 73.55(b)(7)(i) and 73.55(b)(7)(ii).
The proposed rule specifies that the Insider Mitigation Program include
elements of the access authorization program, fitness-for-duty program,
behavioral observation program, and various physical security measures
for the purpose of providing assurance that insider activities would be
detected before adverse affects could be realized.
2. The Commission requests public comment on the feasibility of
adding a requirement to the proposed rule to require a modified
escorted visitor access provision which would allow site visits by
members of the public to limited areas of the facility for the purpose
of enhancing public education and awareness through informational
briefings and tours at the facility.
IV.4. Section 73.58 ``Safety/Security Interface Requirements for
Nuclear Power Reactors''
The NRC is proposing to add a new requirement to part 73 addressing
the safety/security interface for nuclear power reactor licensees. The
need for the proposed new requirement is based upon the NRC's
experience in reviewing licensees' implementation of a significant
number of new security requirements since the terrorist attacks of
September 11, 2001. Licensees have always been required to ensure that
any changes to safety functions, systems, programs, and activities do
not have unintended consequences on other facility safety functions,
systems, programs, and activities. Likewise, licensees have been
required to ensure that any changes to security functions, systems,
programs, and activities do not have unintended consequences on other
facility security functions, systems, programs, and activities.
However, the Commission has concluded that the pace, number, and
complexity of these security changes warrant the establishment of a
more formal program to ensure licensees properly assess the safety/
security interface in implementing these changes.
On April 28, 2003, the Union of Concerned Scientists and the San
Luis Obispo Mothers for Peace submitted a petition for rulemaking (PRM-
50-80) requesting that, in part, the NRC's regulations establishing
conditions of licenses and requirements for evaluating proposed
changes, tests, and experiments for nuclear power plants be amended to
require licensee evaluation of whether the proposed changes, tests, and
experiments cause protection against radiological sabotage to be
decreased and, if so, that the changes, tests, and experiments only be
conducted with prior NRC approval. In SECY-05-0048, dated March 28,
2005, the NRC staff recommended that the Commission approve rulemaking
for the requested action, but did not necessarily endorse the specific
amendments suggested by the petition. In SECY-05-0048, dated June 28,
2005, the Commission directed the staff to develop the technical basis
for such a rule and to incorporate its provisions within the ongoing
power reactor security requirements rulemaking. This proposed rule
addresses, in part, the petitioner's request by incorporating proposed
Sec. 73.58 within this rulemaking.
The Commission has determined that the proposed safety/security
interface rule requirements are necessary because the current
regulations do not specifically require evaluation of the effects of
plant changes on security or the effects of security changes on plant
safety. Further, current regulations do not require communication about
the implementation and timing of changes, which would promote awareness
of the effects of changing facility conditions and result in
appropriate assessment and response.
The NRC is aware of a number of occurrences of adverse safety/
security interactions at nuclear power plants over the years to justify
consideration of a new rule. Examples of adverse interactions include:
(1) Inadvertent security barrier breaches while performing maintenance
activities (e.g., cutting of pipes that provided uncontrolled access to
vital areas, removing ventilation fans or other equipment from vital
area boundary walls without taking compensatory measures to prevent
uncontrolled access into vital areas); (2) Blockage of bullet resisting
enclosure's (or other defensive firing position's) fields of fire; (3)
Erection of scaffolding and other equipment without due consideration
of its impact on the site's applicable physical protection strategy;
and (4) Staging of temporary equipment within security isolation zones.
Security could also adversely affect operations because of
inadequate staffing of security force personnel on backshifts,
weekends, and holidays, to support operations during emergencies (e.g.,
opening and securing vital area access doors to allow operations
personnel timely access to safety-related equipment). Also, security
structures, such as vehicle barriers, delay barriers, rerouted
isolation zones, or defensive shields could adversely affect plant
equipment such as valve pits, fire stations, other prepositioned
emergency equipment, blowout panels, or otherwise interfere with
operators responding to plant events.
The NRC considered many factors in developing this proposed new
requirement. One of the factors considered is that existing change
processes are focused on specific areas of plant activities, and that
implementation of these processes is generally well understood by
licensees. An example is found in Sec. 50.54(p), which provides that a
reactor licensee may make changes to its safeguards contingency plans
without Commission approval provided that the changes do not decrease
the safeguards effectiveness of the plan. Similarly, Sec. 50.65(a)(4)
provides that a reactor licensee shall assess and manage the increase
in risk that may result from proposed maintenance activities. However,
neither Sec. Sec. 50.54(p) (security) nor 50.65(a)(4) (safety) require
that an assessment for potential adverse impacts on safety/security
interface be made before the proposed changes are implemented. The
proposed Sec. 73.58 would address this gap by requiring that, before
implementing allowed changes, licensees must assess the changes with
respect to the safety/security interface and, if potential adverse
interactions are identified, take appropriate compensatory and/or
mitigative action before making the changes.
The proposed rule reflects a performance-based approach and
language which is sufficiently broad that, in addition to operating
power reactors, it could be applied to other classes of licensees in
separate rulemaking(s), if conditions warrant. In addition to the
requirements in proposed Sec. 73.58, a new definition for
[[Page 62673]]
safety/security interface would be added to Sec. 73.2.
Table 4 sets forth the proposed Sec. 73.58 language and provides
the supporting discussion for the proposed language, including a new
definition for safety/security interface that would be added to Sec.
73.2.
IV.5. Section 73.71 ``Reporting of Safeguards Events''
The events of September 11, 2001, emphasized the need for the
capability to respond to coordinated attacks that could pose an
imminent threat to national infrastructure such as nuclear power
reactor sites. Prompt licensee notification to the NRC of a security
event involving an actual or imminent threat would initiate the NRC's
alerting mechanism for other nuclear facilities in recognition that an
attack or threat against a single facility may be the prelude to
attacks or threats against multiple facilities. In either case, timely
communication of this event to the NRC, and the NRC's communication of
the threat or attack to other licensees could reduce the adversaries'
ability to engage in coordinated attacks and would strengthen the
licensees' response posture. NRC would also initiate notifications to
the Homeland Security/Federal response networks for an ``Incident of
National Significance,'' as defined by the National Response Plan
(NRP).
Currently, Sec. 73.71(b)(1) requires power reactor licensees to
notify the NRC within one hour of discovery, as described in Paragraph
I of appendix G to 10 CFR part 73, ``Reportable safeguards events.'' In
addition, Sec. 50.72 establishes reporting requirements for events
requiring an emergency declaration in accordance with a licensee's
emergency plan. Licensee notification under Sec. 50.72(a)(3) is
required only after the threat is assessed, an ``Emergency Class'' is
declared, and initial notification of appropriate State and local
agencies are completed first (i.e., not upon discovery). The current
timing of requirements of this notification would not allow the NRC to
warn other licensees of a potential threat to their facilities in a
prompt manner to allow other licensees to change their security posture
in advance of a threat or potential attack. The Commission has
previously advised licensees of the need to expedite their initial
notification to the NRC. The proposed accelerated notification
requirements are similar to those provided to licensees in NRC Bulletin
2005-02, ``Emergency Preparedness and Response Actions for Security-
Based Events,'' dated July 18, 2005.
The proposed amendments to Sec. 73.71 would add a new expedited
notification requirement for licensees subject to the provisions of
Sec. 73.55 to notify the NRC Operations Center as soon as possible
after the discovery of an imminent or actual threat against the
facility as described in appendix G to part 73, but not later than 15
minutes after discovery. The proposed amendments to Sec. 73.71 and
appendix G to part 73 would also add two additional four-hour
notification requirements for suspicious events and tampering events
not otherwise covered under appendix G to part 73. The proposed Sec.
73.71 would retain the requirement for the licensee to maintain a
continuous communications channel for one-hour notifications upon
request of the NRC. The proposed rule would not require a continuous
communications channel for four-hour notifications, because of the
lesser degree of urgency of these events. For 15-minute notifications,
the NRC may request the licensee establish a continuous communications
channel after the licensee has made any emergency notifications to
State officials or local law enforcement and if the licensee has taken
action to stabilize the plant following any transient [associated with
the 15-minute notification]. In NRC Bulletin 2005-02, ``Emergency
Preparedness and Response Actions for Security-Based Events,'' dated
July 18, 2005, the NRC had indicated a continuous communications
channel was not necessary for the new 15-minute notifications. However,
in developing this proposed rule the Commission has evaluated the need
to promptly obtain information of an unfolding event versus imposing an
unreasonable burden on licensees in the midst of a rapidly unfolding
event and possible plant transient. The Commission considers that the
proposed regulation would provide a reasonable balance between these
two objectives. Table 5 sets forth the proposed amendments to Sec.
73.71 language as compared to the current language, and provides the
supporting discussion for the proposed language. Table 8 sets forth the
proposed amendments to the appendix G to part 73 language as compared
to the current language, and provides the supporting discussion for the
proposed language.
The Commission is interested in obtaining specific stakeholder
input on the proposed changes to Sec. 73.71 and appendix G to part 73
. Accordingly, the Commission is requesting persons commenting on this
proposed rule to address the following question:
1. For the types of events covered by the proposed four-hour
notification requirements in Sec. 73.71 and appendix G to part 73,
should the notification time interval of all or some of these
notifications be different (e.g., a 1-hour, 2-hour, 8-hour, 24-hour
notification)? If so, what notification time interval is appropriate?
``Notification time interval'' is meant to be the time from when a
licensee recognizes that an event has occurred or is occurring to the
time that the licensee reports the event to the NRC.
IV.6. Appendix B to Part 73, ``General Criteria for Security
Personnel''
Appendix B to part 73 provides requirements for the training and
qualification of security personnel to ensure that security personnel
can execute their duties. Following the events of September 11, 2001,
the Commission determined that tactical proficiency and physical
fitness requirements governing licensees' armed security force
personnel needed to be enhanced. The proposed amendments to appendix B
to part 73 make generically applicable security requirements imposed by
Commission orders issued after the terrorist attacks of September 11,
2001, based upon experience and insights gained by the Commission
during implementation and add several new requirements that resulted
from evaluation insights from force-on-force exercises.
Notable additions to the proposed appendix B to part 73
requirements are summarized as follows:
Additional Physical Requirements and Minimum Age Requirements for
Unarmed Members of the Security Organization
Unarmed security personnel perform duties similar to armed security
personnel, such as detection, assessment, vehicle and personnel escort,
and vital area controls. The current requirements for unarmed members
of the security organization state, in part, that these individuals
shall have no physical weaknesses or abnormalities that would affect
their performance of assigned duties. However, the current rule does
not require unarmed personnel to pass a physical examination to verify
that they meet standards for vision, hearing, or some portions of
psychological qualifications. The proposed rule would include a
requirement to assure that unarmed security personnel are physically
capable of performing their assigned duties.
Additionally, the current rule specifies a minimum age of 21 years
old
[[Page 62674]]
for armed security personnel, but does not specify a minimum age
requirement for unarmed security personnel. The proposed rule would
require that unarmed members attain the age of 18 prior to assignment
to establish a minimum age requirement for unarmed members of the
security organization at a power reactor facility.
These proposed additional requirements would assure that personnel
performing security functions, whether armed or unarmed, meet
appropriate age, vision, hearing and psychological requirements
commensurate with their assigned security duties.
Qualification Scores for Program Elements Required by the Training and
Qualification Plan
The current rule includes daylight qualification scores of 70
percent for handguns, 80 percent for semiautomatic rifles, 50 percent
for shotguns and a requirement for night fire familiarization with
assigned weapons. The April 29, 2003, Training Order imposed new
requirements for the firearms training and qualification programs at
power reactor licensees. The Training Order retained the current
daylight qualification scores of 70 percent for handguns, 80 percent
for semiautomatic rifles and superceded the daylight qualification
score of 50 percent for the shotgun. The order did not specify a
qualification score for the daylight course of fire for the shotgun,
only an acceptable level of proficiency. The order superceded the
current rule for night fire familiarization and added courses of fire
for night fire and tactical training with assigned weapons.
The proposed rule would retain the qualification scores of the
existing regulations and add specific qualification scores for the
daylight course of fire for the shotgun and/or enhanced weapons, the
night fire qualification for shotguns, handguns, semiautomatic rifles
and/or enhanced weapons and the tactical course of fire for all
assigned weapons to remain consistent with the qualification scoring
methodology contained in the current rule. The scoring methodology for
the current rule and the proposed rule is consistent with the scoring
methodology used for firearms programs at the local, State and Federal
levels and is consistent with approved courses of fire from the law
enforcement community and recognized national entities.
The proposed rule would also include a requirement for a
qualification score of 80 percent for the annual written exam. The
current rule does not provide a requirement for an annual written exam
score. Likewise, the April 29, 2003, Training Order that required
licensees to develop and implement an annual written exam also did not
specify a qualification score. The Commission has determined that a
score of 80 percent demonstrates a minimum level of understanding and
familiarity of the material necessary to adequately perform security-
related tasks. The 80-percent score would be consistent with minimum
scores commonly utilized throughout the nuclear industry.
Qualification Requirements for Security Trainers, Personnel Assessing
Psychological Qualifications and Armorer Certifications
The current rule and the security orders do not specifically
address the qualification or certification of instructors, or other
personnel that have assigned duties and responsibilities for
implementation of training and qualification programs of power reactor
licensees.
The proposed rule includes specific references to personnel that
have assigned duties and responsibilities for implementation of
training and qualification programs to ensure these persons are
qualified and/or certified to make determinations of security personnel
suitability, working condition of security equipment, and overall
determinations that security personnel are trained and qualified to
execute their assigned duties.
On-the-Job Training
The current rule states in part that each individual who requires
training to perform assigned security duties shall, prior to
assignment, be trained to perform these tasks and duties. Each
individual shall demonstrate the required knowledge, skill and ability
in accordance with specific standards of each task.
The proposed rule would specify the new requirement that the
licensee include on-the-job training as part of the training and
qualification program prior to assigning an individual to an
unsupervised security position. This requirement is in addition to
formal and informal classroom training. The on-the-job training program
would provide the licensee the ability to assess an individual's
knowledge, skill and ability to effectively carry-out assigned duties,
in a supervised manner, within the actual work environment, before
assignment, to an unsupervised position.
The proposed revision to appendix B of part 73 required special
treatment in this rulemaking to preserve, with a minimum of conforming
changes, the current requirements for licensees and applicants to whom
this proposed rule would not apply. Accordingly, Section I through V of
appendix B to part 73 would remain unchanged, and the proposed new
language for power reactors would be added as Section VI.
Table 6 sets forth the proposed amendments to appendix B to part 73
and provides the supporting discussion for the proposed language.
Because this section would be extensively restructured, Table 10 (See
Section VIII) provides a cross-reference to locate individual
requirements of the current regulation within the proposed regulation.
IV.7. Appendix C to Part 73, ``Licensee Safeguards Contingency Plans''
Appendix C to part 73 provides requirements that govern the
development of safeguards contingency plans. Following the terrorist
attacks of September 11, 2001, the NRC conducted a thorough review of
security to continue to ensure that nuclear power plants had effective
security measures in place given the changing threat environment. The
proposed appendix C would increase the information required in the
safeguards contingency plans for responses to threats, up to and
including, design basis threats, as described in Sec. 73.1. Notable
additions to the proposed appendix C to part 73 requirements are
summarized below:
Mitigating Strategies
Current regulations do not include requirements to develop
mitigating strategies for events beyond the scope of the design basis
threat. The orders issued after September 11, 2001, included a
requirement to preplan strategies for coping with such events. The
proposed appendix C to part 73 would contain this element of the orders
to require that licensees preplan strategies to respond to and mitigate
the consequences of potential events, including those that may result
in the loss of large areas of the plant due to explosions or fire.
Qualification Requirements for Drill and Exercise Controllers
The current rule and the security orders do not specifically
address the qualification of personnel that are assigned duties and
responsibilities for implementation of training and qualification
drills and exercises at power reactor licensees.
The proposed rule includes specific references to personnel who
function as drill and exercise controllers to ensure these persons are
trained and qualified to execute their assigned duties. Drills
[[Page 62675]]
and exercises are key elements to assuring the preparedness of the
licensee security force and must be conducted in a manner that
demonstrates the licensee's ability to execute the protective strategy
as described in the site security plans. Additionally, drills and
exercises must be performed properly to assure they do not negatively
impact personnel or plant safety.
The proposed revision to appendix C of part 73 required special
treatment in this rulemaking to preserve, with a minimum of conforming
changes, the current requirements for licensees and applicants to whom
this proposed rule would not apply. Accordingly, appendix C to part 73
would be divided into two sections, with Section I maintaining all
current requirements, and Section II containing all proposed
requirements related to nuclear power reactors.
Table 7 sets forth the proposed amendments to appendix C to part 73
and provides the supporting discussion for the proposed language.
Because this section would be extensively restructured, Table 11 (See
Section VIII) is a cross-reference showing where individual
requirements of the current regulation would be in the proposed
regulation.
IV.8. Appendix G to Part 73, ``Reportable Safeguards Events''
Proposed appendix G to part 73 provides requirements regarding the
reporting of safeguards events. Proposed appendix G would contain
changes to support the revised and accelerated reporting requirements
which would be incorporated into this rulemaking. Proposed appendix G
to part 73 would also contain revised four-hour reporting requirements
that would require licensees to report to the NRC information of
suspicious surveillance activities, attempts at access, or other
similar information as addressed in Appendix G, section III (a)(1) and
(2). Following September 11, 2001, the NRC issued guidance requesting
that licensees report suspicious activities near their facilities to
allow assessment by the NRC and other appropriate agencies. The
proposed new reporting requirement would clarify this expectation to
assure consistent reporting of this important information.
Additionally, the proposed rule would contain an additional four-hour
reporting requirement for tampering events that do not meet the
threshold for reporting under the current one-hour requirements. The
proposed reporting requirements for tampering events would allow NRC
assessment of these events. Table 8 sets forth the proposed amendments
to appendix G to part 73 and provides the supporting discussion for the
proposed language.
The Commission is interested in obtaining specific stakeholder
input on the following issue:
1. The Commission requests public comment on the need to establish
an additional requirement for licensees to establish and maintain
predetermined communication protocols, such as passwords, with the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission in order to verify the authenticity of
communications during a security event, to include requirements for
uniform protocols to verify the authenticity of reports required under
this proposed rule.
IV.9. Conforming and Corrective Changes
The following conforming changes would also be made: Sec. Sec.
50.34 and 50.54 (references to the correct paragraphs of revised
appendix C of part 73), Sec. 50.72 (changes to Sec. 73.71 reports),
Sec. Sec. 72.212 and 73.70 (references to the correct paragraphs due
to renumbering of Sec. 73.55), and Sec. 73.8 (adding Sec. 73.18,
Sec. 73.19, and revised to reflect new NRC form 754 to reflect
recordkeeping or reporting burden). A corrective change would also be
made to Sec. 73.8 to reflect an existing recordkeeping or reporting
burden for NRC Form 366 under Sec. 73.71. However, no changes would be
made to Sec. 73.81(b) (due to the new Sec. Sec. 73.18, 73.19, and
73.58), because willful violations of Sec. Sec. 73.18, 73.19, and
73.58 may be subject to criminal penalties.
Table 1.--Proposed Part 73.18 and 73.19 and Conforming Changes to Part
73.2
[Firearms background checks for armed security personnel and
authorization for preemption of firearms laws and use of enhanced
weapons]
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Proposed language Considerations
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Sec. 73.18 Firearms background checks This new section would
for armed security personnel. implement the firearms
(a) Purpose. This section sets forth background check requirements
the requirements for completion of of new section 161A of the
firearms background checks on armed Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as
security personnel at selected NRC- amended. Section 161A was
regulated facilities. Firearms added by section 653 of the
background checks are intended to Energy Policy Act of 2005.
verify that security personnel whose The proposed rule language in
duties require access to covered Sec. Sec. 73.18 and 73.19,
weapons are not prohibited from and conforming changes to Sec.
receiving, possessing, transporting, 73.2 would be consistent
importing, or using such weapons under with the guidelines required
applicable Federal or State law. by section 161A.d to implement
Licensees and certificate holders the provisions of section
listed under paragraph (c) of this 161A. Section 161A.d requires
section who have applied for the Commission to issue
preemption authority under Sec. guidelines, with the approval
73.19 (i.e., Sec. 73.19 authority), of the Attorney General, for
or who have been granted preemption section 161A to take effect.
authority by Commission order, are In parallel and separate from
subject to the requirements of this this rulemaking effort,
section. guidelines are being developed
by staffs from the NRC and the
Department of Justice (DOJ),
[including staffs from the FBI
and ATF].
During development of these
guidelines, the DOJ indicated
that the firearms background
check provisions of section
161A only take effect if a
triggering event occurs. A
triggering event would occur
when a licensee or certificate
holder applies to the NRC to
use the stand-alone preemption
authority or the combined
enhanced-weapons and
preemption authority of
section 161A. Therefore, armed
security personnel of both
current and future licensees
and certificate holders would
not be subject to the firearms
background check provisions of
the proposed Sec. 73.18,
unless their employing
licensee or certificate holder
applies for and receives Sec.
73.19 authority from the NRC.
[[Page 62676]]
Sec. 73.18(b) General Requirements. Paragraph (b)(1) would require
(1) Licensees and certificate holders current and future licensees
listed in paragraph (c) of this and certificate holders who
section who have received NRC approval have received NRC approval of
of their application for preemption their application for
authority shall ensure that a firearms preemption authority to ensure
background check has been that all security personnel
satisfactorily completed for all whose official duties require
security personnel requiring access to access to covered weapons
covered weapons as part of their satisfactorily complete a
official security duties prior to firearms background check. The
granting access to any covered weapons firearms background check must
to those personnel. Security personnel be satisfactorily completed to
who have satisfactorily completed a permit access to covered
firearms background check, but who weapons. The Commission
have had a break in employment with intends for duties ``requiring
the licensee, certificate holder, or access to a covered weapon''
their security contractor of greater to include such duties as:
than one (1) week subsequent to their Security operations
most recent firearms background check, activities; training and
or who have transferred from a qualification activities; and
different licensee or certificate weapons' maintenance,
holder (even though the other licensee handling, accountability,
or certificate holder satisfactorily transport, and use activities.
completed a firearms background check [See also new definitions for
on such individuals), are not excepted covered weapons, enhanced
from the requirements of this section. weapons, and standard weapons
in Sec. 73.2 at the end of
Table 1]. A new firearms
background check would be
required for security
personnel who have a break in
employment or who have
transferred from another
licensee or certificate holder
irrespective of whether the
individual previously
satisfactorily completed a
firearms background check
(i.e., such individuals would
be treated as new security
personnel and subject to a new
firearms background check).
Sec. 73.18(b)(2) Security personnel The NRC staff recognizes that
who have satisfactorily completed a the Commission has not yet
firearms background check pursuant to made a final decision on
Commission orders are not subject to a whether licensees and
further firearms background check certificate holders may apply
under this section, unless these for preemption authority alone
personnel have a break in service or or combined preemption and
transfer as set forth in paragraph enhanced-weapons authority
(b)(1) of this section. prior to issuance of a final
rule; however, the proposed
rule would include language to
support a transfer from any
orders associated with such
applications for section 161A
authority to regulations and
thereby provide both the
Commission and industry with
the maximum flexibility to
expeditiously implement the
security enhancements of
section 161A.
Paragraph (b)(2) would exempt
previously checked personnel
from a recheck, except in the
case of a break in service or
transfer [as in paragraph
(b)(1)].
Sec. 73.18(b)(3) A change in the Paragraph (b)(3) would indicate
licensee, certificate holder, or that changes in the security
ownership of a facility, radioactive contractor or ownership of the
material, or other property designated licensee or certificate holder
under Sec. 73.19, or a change in the are not triggering events that
security contractor that provides require a new firearms
security personnel responsible for background check.
protecting such facilities, Paragraph (b)(4) would indicate
radioactive material, or other that Licensee and certificate
property, shall not constitute `a holders may begin submitting
break in service' or `transfer,' as their security personnel for
those terms are used in paragraph firearms background checks
(b)(2) of this section. after the licensee or
(4) Licensees and certificate holders certificate holder has applied
listed in paragraph (c) of this to the NRC for preemption
section may begin the application authority alone or combined
process for firearms background checks preemption and enhanced
under this section for security weapons authority (i.e., Sec.
personnel whose duties require access 73.19 authority).
to covered weapons immediately on Paragraph (b)(5) would indicate
application to the NRC for preemption that firearms background
authority. checks are in addition to
(5) Firearms background checks do not access authorization or
replace any other background checks or security clearance checks that
criminal history checks required for security personnel currently
the licensee's or certificate holder's undergo under other NRC
security personnel under this chapter. regulations (e.g., Sec. Sec.
11.15, 25.17 or 73.57). The
NRC expects licensees and
certificate holders who become
aware of any new potentially
derogatory information on
current security personnel
(through the completion of a
firearms background check), to
evaluate any such information
for applicability as required
by the licensee's or
certificate holder's access
authorization or security
clearance programs.
Sec. 73.18(c) Applicability. This Paragraph (c) would define the
section applies to licensees or applicability of Sec. 73.18
certificate holders who have applied to licensees or certificate
for or received NRC approval of their holders who have applied for
application for Sec. 73.19 authority or received Commission
or were issued Commission orders approval of stand-alone
requiring firearms background checks. preemption authority or
combined enhanced-weapons and
preemption authority [see
considerations below for Sec.
73.19(c) on the applicability
of licensee and certificate
holder under this proposed
rule].
Note: portions of this section
would apply to licensee or
certificate holder who has
applied for, but not yet
received preemption authority
(e.g., requirements for
submission of fingerprints) or
those portions that would only
apply to licensees or
certificate holders who have
received NRC approval of their
application (e.g.,
requirements for removal of
security personnel who have
not yet satisfactorily
completed a firearms
background check). This
section would also apply to
power reactor and Category I
SSNM licensees or certificate
holders issued Commission
orders requiring completion of
firearms background checks
[see consideration for
paragraph (b)(2) above].
Sec. 73.18(d) Firearms background Paragraph (d) would identify
check requirements. A firearms the two components of a
background check for security firearms background check that
personnel must include-- are required by section 161A
(1) A check of the individual's (i.e., a fingerprint check and
fingerprints against the Federal a NICS check).
Bureau of Investigation's (FBI's) The NICS was established
fingerprint system; and pursuant to section 103.(b) of
(2) A check of the individual's the Brady Handgun Violence
identifying information against the Prevention Act (Pub. L. 103-
FBI's National Instant Criminal 159) and is maintained by the
Background Check System (NICS). FBI.
[[Page 62677]]
Sec. 73.18(e) Firearms background Paragraph (e) would indicate
check submittals. the process for submitting to
(1) Licensees and certificate holders the NRC the two components of
shall submit to the NRC, in accordance the firearms background check.
with Sec. 73.4, for all security Accomplishment of the NICS
personnel requiring a firearms check would be based upon
background check under this section-- information submitted by the
(i) A set of fingerprints, in licensee or certificate holder
accordance with paragraph (n) of this to the NRC under new NRC Form
section, and 754 (see Section VIII of this
(ii) A completed NRC Form 754. notice for further information
on this NRC Form).
Sec. 73.18(e)(2) Licensees and Paragraph (e)(2) would
certificate holders shall retain a establish the records
copy of all NRC Forms 754 submitted to retention requirements for
the NRC for a period of one (1) year submitted NRC Forms 754.
subsequent to the termination of an
individual's access to covered weapons
or to the denial of an individual's
access to covered weapons.
Sec. 73.18(f) NICS portion of a Paragraph (f) would indicate
firearms background check. The NRC that the NRC is forwarding the
will forward the information contained information from submitted NRC
in the submitted NRC Forms 754 to the Forms 754 to the FBI for
FBI for evaluation against the NICS. evaluation against the NICS.
Upon completion of the NICS check, the The FBI will return one of the
FBI will inform the NRC of the results three results from the NICS
with one of three responses under 28 check (per the FBI's
CFR part 25; ``proceed,'' ``denied,'' regulations) and a NICS
or ``delayed,'' and the associated transaction number. The NRC
NICS transaction number. The NRC will will forward this returned
forward these results and the information to the submitting
associated NICS transaction number to licensee or certificate holder
the submitting licensee or certificate for forwarding to the
holder. The licensee or certificate individual security officer.
holder shall provide these results to The NICS transaction number is
the individual who completed the NRC necessary for any future
Form 754. communications with the FBI on
the NICS check (e.g., an
individual's appeal of a
``denied'' NICS response).
Sec. 73.18(g) Satisfactory and Paragraph (g) would set forth
adverse firearms background checks. the criteria for a
(1) A satisfactorily completed firearms satisfactory firearms
background check means a ``proceed'' background check based upon
response for the individual from the the specific NICS response.
NICS. The fingerprint checks
(2) An adversely completed firearms mandated by section 161A
background check means a ``denied'' or support the accomplishment of
``delayed'' response from the NICS. the NICS check and resolution
of any adverse NICS records;
therefore, the NRC would not
specify a [satisfactory or
adverse] completion criteria
for the fingerprint portion of
the firearms background check.
Sec. 73.18(h) Removal from access to Paragraph (h) would require the
covered weapons. Licensees or licensee or certificate holder
certificate holders who have received to remove personnel who are
NRC approval of their application for prohibited from possessing or
Sec. 73.19 authority shall ensure receiving firearms from duties
security personnel are removed from requiring access to covered
duties requiring access to covered weapons. Disqualifying status
weapons upon the licensee's or or occurrences are found under
certificate holder's knowledge of any the United States Code, Title
disqualifying status or the occurrence 18, Section 922 and ATF's
of any disqualifying events under 18 implementing regulations (see
U.S.C. 922(g) or (n), and the ATF's 27 CFR 478.32 and 478.11). See
implementing regulations in 27 CFR also considerations for Sec.
part 478. 73.18(b)(5).
Sec. 73.18(i) [Reserved]............. Paragraph (i) would not be used
to avoid confusion with the
use of sub-sub paragraph (i).
Sec. 73.18(j) Security personnel Paragraph (j) would require
responsibilities. Security personnel security personnel who become
assigned duties requiring access to prohibited from possessing or
covered weapons shall promptly [within receiving firearms due to a
three (3) working days] notify their disqualifying status or
employing licensee's or certificate occurrence of a disqualifying
holder's security management (whether event to notify their licensee
directly employed by the licensee or or certificate holder within
certificate holder or employed by a three (3) days of this fact.
security contractor to the licensee or This paragraph would work in
certificate holder) of the existence conjunction with the
of any disqualifying status or upon requirements of paragraphs
the occurrence of any disqualifying (k), (m), and (n) and would
events listed under 18 U.S.C. 922(g) require security personnel to
or (n), and the ATF's implementing self report the occurrence of
regulations in 27 CFR part 478 that any disqualifying status or
would prohibit them from possessing or events.
receiving a covered weapon.
Sec. 73.18(k) Awareness of Paragraph (k) would require
disqualifying events. Licensees and licensees and certificate
certificate holders who have received holders to train security
NRC approval of Sec. 73.19 authority personnel on disqualifying
shall include within their NRC- status or events to facilitate
approved security training and self reporting of such status
qualification plans instruction on-- or events by security
(1) Disqualifying status or events personnel under paragraph (j).
specified in 18 U.S.C. 922(g) and (n), And to train security
and ATF's implementing regulations in personnel on their ongoing
27 CFR part 478 (including any responsibility to report
applicable definitions) identifying disqualifying status or events
categories of persons who are to their licensee or
prohibited from possessing or certificate holder.
receiving any covered weapons; and
(2) The continuing responsibility of
security personnel assigned duties
requiring access to covered weapons to
promptly notify their employing
licensee or certificate holder of the
occurrence of any disqualifying
events.
Sec. 73.18(l) [Reserved]............. Paragraph (l) would not be used
to avoid confusion with the
use of sub-paragraph (1) [see
also paragraph (i) above].
[[Page 62678]]
Sec. 73.18(m) Notification of Paragraph (m) would require
removal. Within 72 hours after taking licensees or certificate
action to remove security personnel holders to report instances
from duties requiring access to where security personnel (with
covered weapons, because of the current access to weapons) are
existence of any disqualifying status removed from armed duties
or the occurrence of any disqualifying because of the occurrence of
event--other than due to the prompt any disqualifying status or
notification by the security officer event. The timeliness of this
under paragraph (j) of this section-- notification would be based
licensees and certificate holders who upon the need for appropriate
have received NRC approval of Sec. NRC followup of a potential
73.19 authority shall notify the NRC criminal violation, rather
Operations Center of such removal than the followup necessary
actions, in accordance with appendix A for an ongoing security event
of this part. (i.e., the individual no
longer has access to covered
weapons). Appendix A provides
contact information for the
NRC Operations Center.
Sec. 73.18(n) Reporting violations of Paragraph (n) would indicate
law. The NRC will promptly report that if the NRC becomes aware
suspected violations of Federal law to of suspected violations of
the appropriate Federal agency or criminal law (e.g., a
suspected violations of State law to prohibited person actually
the appropriate State agency. possessing weapons as a
security officer) it is
obligated to report suspected
violations of Federal or State
law to the appropriate
government agency or agencies.
Sec. 73.18(o) Procedures for Paragraph (o) would prescribe
processing of fingerprint checks. (1) the location, method, and
Licensees and certificate holders who requirements for submission of
have applied for Sec. 73.19 fingerprints to the NRC as
authority, using an appropriate method part of a firearms background
listed in Sec. 73.4, shall submit to check.
the NRC's Division of Facilities and The proposed language would be
Security one (1) completed, legible essentially identical to that
standard fingerprint card (Form FD- contained to the current
258, ORIMDNRCOOOZ) or, where fingerprint submission
practicable, other fingerprint record requirements under the current
for each individual requiring a access authorization
firearms background check, to the regulations in Sec.
NRC's Director, Division of Facilities 73.57(d).
and Security, Mail Stop T6-E46, ATTN:
Criminal History Check. Copies of this
form may be obtained by writing the
Office of Information Services, U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission,
Washington, DC 20555-0001, by calling
(301) 415-5877, or by e-mail to
FORMS@nrc.gov. Guidance on what
alternative formats, including
electronic submissions, may be
practicable are referenced in Sec.
73.4.
Sec. 73.18(o)(2) Licensees and See considerations for Sec.
certificate holders shall indicate on 73.18(o). This provision will
the fingerprint card or other permit proper internal routing
fingerprint record that the purpose of fingerprints within the
for this fingerprint check is the FBI's Criminal Justice
accomplishment of a firearms Information Services Division
background check. to support the NICS checks.
Sec. 73.18(o)(3) Licensees and See considerations for Sec.
certificate holders shall establish 73.18(o).
procedures to ensure that the quality
of the fingerprints taken results in
minimizing the rejection rate of
fingerprint cards or records due to
illegible or incomplete information.
Sec. 73.18(o)(4) The Commission will See considerations for Sec.
review fingerprints for firearms 73.18(o).
background checks for completeness.
Any Form FD-258 or other fingerprint
record containing omissions or evident
errors will be returned to the
licensee or certificate holder for
corrections. The fee for processing
fingerprint checks includes one (1)
free re-submission if the initial
submission is returned by the FBI
because the fingerprint impressions
cannot be classified. The one (1) free
re-submission must have the FBI
Transaction Control Number reflected
on the re-submission. If additional
submissions are necessary, they will
be treated as an initial submittal and
require a second payment of the
processing fee. The payment of a new
processing fee entitles the submitter
to an additional free re-submittal, if
necessary. Previously rejected
submissions may not be included with
the third submission because the
submittal will be rejected
automatically. Licensees and
certificate holders may wish to
consider using different methods for
recording fingerprints for
resubmissions, if difficulty occurs
with obtaining a legible set of
impressions.
Sec. 73.18(o)(5)(i) Fees for the See considerations for Sec.
processing of fingerprint checks are 73.18(o).
due upon application. Licensees and
certificate holders shall submit
payment with the application for the
processing of fingerprints, and
payment must be made by corporate
check, certified check, cashier's
check, money order, or electronic
payment, made payable to ``U.S. NRC.''
a Combined payment for multiple
applications is acceptable.
(ii) The application fee is the sum of
the user fee charged by the FBI for
each fingerprint card or other
fingerprint record submitted by the
NRC on behalf of a licensee or
certificate holder, and an
administrative processing fee assessed
by the NRC. The NRC processing fee
covers administrative costs associated
with NRC handling of licensee and
certificate holder fingerprint
submissions. The Commission publishes
the amount of the fingerprint check
application fee on the NRC's public
Web site.b The Commission will
directly notify licensees and
certificate holders who are subject to
this regulation of any fee changes.
[[Page 62679]]
Footnotes:
a For guidance on making electronic
payments, contact the NRC's Security
Branch, Division of Facilities and
Security, Office of Administration at
(301) 415-7404.
b For information on the current fee
amount, refer to the Electronic
Submittals page at http://www.nrc.gov/
site-help/eie.html and select the link
for the Criminal History Program.
Sec. 73.18(o)(6) The Commission will See considerations for Sec.
forward to the submitting licensee or 73.18(o).
certificate holder all data received
from the FBI as a result of the
licensee's or certificate holder's
application(s) for fingerprint
background checks, including the FBI's
fingerprint record.
Sec. 73.18(p) Appeals and correction Paragraph (p)(1) would indicate
of erroneous system information. that individuals who have
(1) Individuals who require a firearms received a ``denied'' response
background check under this section or a ``delayed'' response may
and who receive a ``denied'' NICS not be assigned duties
response or a ``delayed'' NICS requiring access to covered
response may not be assigned duties weapons during their appeal of
requiring access to covered weapons the denial or resolution of
during the pendency of an appeal of the delay.
the results of the check or during the Paragraph (p)(2) would indicate
pendency of providing and evaluating that the licensee or
any necessary additional information certificate holder will
to the FBI to resolve the ``delayed'' provide information on the
response, respectively. FBI's appeals process to the
(2) Licensees and certificate holders denied individual. The NRC and
shall provide information on the FBI's FBI are considering creating a
procedures for appealing a ``denied'' brochure describing the
response to the denied individual or appeals process or resolution
on providing additional information to process that would be similar
the FBI to resolve a ``delayed'' to the FBI's current brochure
response. [describing the NICS appeals
(3) An individual who receives a process] provided by federal
``denied'' or ``delayed'' NICS firearms licensees to
response to a firearms background individuals receiving a
check under this section may request ``denied'' NICS response (see
the reason for the response from the example at the FBI's NICS
FBI. The licensee or certificate information website at http://
holder shall provide to the individual www.fbi.gov/hq/cjisd/nics/
who has received the ``denied'' or index.htm).
``delayed'' response the unique NICS Paragraph (p)(3) would indicate
transaction number associated with the that the individual who
specific firearms background check. receives a ``denied'' or
(4) These requests for the reason for a ``delayed'' response must
``denied'' or ``delayed'' NICS personally make any requests
response must be made in writing, and to the FBI on the reason for
must include the NICS transaction the NICS response; and the
number. The request must be sent to licensee or certificate holder
the Federal Bureau of Investigation; may not make such requests
NICS Section; Appeals Service Team, upon the individual's behalf.
Module A-1; PO Box 4278; Clarksburg, Paragraph (p)(4) would provide
WV 26302-9922. The FBI will provide the FBI's address for
the individual with the reasons for correspondence. Additionally,
the ``denied'' response or ``delayed'' in response to the
response. The FBI will also indicate individual's request the FBI
whether additional information or would provide the person the
documents are required to support an reason for the denial or the
appeal or resolution, for example, delay to facilitate any
where there is a claim that the record appeals or to facilitate
in question does not pertain to the providing supplemental
individual who was denied. information to resolve a
``delayed'' response.
Sec. 73.18(p)(5) If the individual Paragraph (p)(5) would set a
wishes to challenge the accuracy of time limit for filing an
the record upon which the ``denied'' initial appeal of a ``denied''
or ``delayed'' response is based, or response or to request
if the individual wishes to assert resolution of a ``delayed''
that his or her rights to possess or response to encourage timely
receive a firearm have been restored resolution of such cases and
by lawful process, he or she may make facilitate FBI disposition of
application first to the FBI. The interim records. The
individual shall file an appeal of a individual filing the appeal
``denied'' response or file a request would be required to set forth
to resolve a ``delayed'' response the basis for the appeal and
within 45 calender days of the date provide information supporting
the NRC forwards the results of the their claim. Copies of records
firearms background check to the would be required to be true
licensee or certificate holder. The copies (i.e., certified by a
appeal or request must include court or other government
appropriate documentation or record(s) entity). Because some
establishing the legal and/or factual supplemental information may
basis for the challenge. Any record or take longer than 45 days to
document of a court or other obtain, individuals filling an
government entity or official appeal or requesting
furnished in support of an appeal must resolution should not delay
be certified by the court or other their filing in order to
government entity or official as a gather all necessary
true copy. The individual may information, but would
supplement their initial appeal or indicate that additional
request--subsequent to the 45 day supporting information will be
filing deadline--with additional forthcoming.
information as it becomes available, Paragraph (p)(6) would indicate
for example, where obtaining a true that if an individual cannot
copy of a court transcript may take resolve a record with the FBI,
longer than 45 days. The individual the individual may apply to
should note in their appeal or request the originating agency to
any information or records that are correct the record and notify
being obtained, but are not yet the FBI of those results.
available. The originating agency may
(6) If the individual is notified that respond to the individual's
the FBI is unable to resolve the application by addressing the
appeal, the individual may then apply individual's specific reasons
for correction of the record directly for the challenge, and by
to the agency from which the indicating whether additional
information forming the basis of the information or documents are
denial was originated. If the required. If the record is
individual is notified by the corrected as a result of the
originating agency, that additional appeal to the originating
information or documents are required agency, the individual may so
the individual may provide them to the notify the FBI, which would,
originating agency. If the record is in turn, verify the record
corrected as a result of the appeal to correction with the
the originating agency, the individual originating agency (assuming
may so notify the FBI and submit the originating agency has not
written proof of the correction. already notified the FBI of
the correction) and take all
necessary steps to correct the
record in the NICS system.
[[Page 62680]]
Sec. 73.18(p)(7) An individual who Paragraph (p)(7) would indicate
has satisfactorily appealed a that an individual who has
``denied'' response or resolved a successfully resolved a
``delayed'' response may provide ``denied'' or ``delayed''
written consent to the FBI to maintain response may consent to the
information about himself or herself FBI maintaining information
in a Voluntary Appeal File (VAF) to be about himself or herself in
established by the FBI and checked by the FBI's VAF (i.e., the basis
the NICS for the purpose of preventing for the successful
the erroneous denial or extended delay resolution). The FBI will
by the NICS of any future NICS checks. issue such individuals a VAF
(8) Individuals appealing a ``denied'' number that can be entered on
response or resolving a ``delayed'' an NRC Form 754 or ATF Form
response are responsible for providing 4417 to prevent repetition of
the FBI any additional information the excessive delays in completing
FBI requires to resolve the any future NICS checks (both
``delayed'' response. for checks as security
personnel and for checks of
individuals engaging in a
firearms transaction as a
private person).
A VAF file would be used only
by the NICS for this purpose.
The FBI would remove all
information in the VAF
pertaining to an individual
upon receipt of a written
request by that individual.
However, the FBI may retain
such information contained in
the VAF as long as needed to
pursue cases of identified
misuse of the system. If the
FBI finds a disqualifying
record on the individual after
his or her entry into the VAF,
the FBI may remove the
individual's information from
the file. Paragraph (p)(8)
would indicate that the
responsibility for providing
any necessary additional
information to the FBI to
appeal the ``denied'' response
or resolve the ``delayed''
rests with the individual, not
with the FBI.
Sec. 73.19 Authorization for This new section would
preemption of firearms laws and use of implement the provisions of
enhanced weapons. new section 161A of the AEA
(a) Purpose. This section sets forth with respect to preemption
the requirements for licensees and authority alone or combined
certificate holders to obtain NRC enhanced-weapons authority and
approval to use the expanded preemption authority. This
authorities provided under section section would permit, but not
161A of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, require, selected classes of
as amended (AEA), in protecting NRC- licensees and certificate
designated facilities, radioactive holders to apply to the NRC
material, or other property. These for these authorities.
authorities include ``preemption Paragraph (a) would provide the
authority'' and ``enhanced-weapons overall purpose and indicate
authority.'' that this section applies to
defending NRC-designated
facilities, radioactive
material, or other property.
Sec. 73.19(b) General Requirements. Paragraph (b) would contain
Licensees and certificate holders general requirements and
listed in paragraph (c) of this overview of the advantages of
section may apply to the NRC, in these two authorities. The
accordance with the provisions of this ability of licensees and
section, to receive stand-alone certificate holders to apply
preemption authority or combined to the NRC for stand-alone
enhanced weapons authority and preemption authority or
preemption authority. combined enhanced-weapons
(1) Preemption authority, as provided authority and preemption
in section 161A of the AEA, means the authority would be limited to
authority of the Commission to permit the classes of licensees set
licensees or certificate holders, or forth in paragraph (c) of this
the designated security personnel of section.
the licensee or certificate holder, to Licensees and certificate
transfer, receive, possess, transport, holders may apply for
import, or use one (1) or more preemption authority alone.
category of standard and enhanced However, licensees and
weapons, as defined in Sec. 73.2, certificate holders who apply
notwithstanding any local, State, or for enhanced-weapons authority
certain Federal firearms laws would also be required to
(including regulations). apply for preemption
(2) Enhanced weapons authority, as authority, because of
provided in section 161A of the AEA, restrictions on the possession
means the authority of the Commission of enhanced weapons require
to permit licensees or certificate the preemption of certain
holders, or the designated security regulations. The NRC would
personnel of the licensee or create this separate, but
certificate holder, to transfer, parallel, structure to provide
receive, possess, transport, import, licensees with flexibility in
and use one (1) or more category of choosing security capabilities
enhanced weapons, as defined in Sec. versus security costs.
73.2, notwithstanding any local, Paragraphs (b)(1) and (b)(2)
State, or certain Federal firearms provide definitions of these
laws (including regulations). two authorities.
Sec. 73.19(b)(3) Prior to receiving Paragraph (b)(3) would indicate
NRC approval of enhanced-weapons that to receive enhanced-
authority, the licensee or certificate weapons authority, a licensee
holder must have applied for and or certificate holder must
received NRC approval for preemption also have received preemption
authority, in accordance with this authority.
section or under Commission orders. Paragraph (b)(4) would describe
(4) Prior to granting either authority the criteria of section 161A
the NRC must determine that the the Commission must determine
proposed use of this authority is are present for a licensee or
necessary in the discharge of official certificate holder to apply to
duties by security personnel engaged the NRC for stand-alone
in protecting--. preemption authority or
(i) Facilities owned or operated by a combined enhanced-weapons
licensee or certificate holder and authority and preemption
designated by the Commission under authority for other types of
paragraph (c) of this section, or. facilities, radioactive
(ii) Radioactive material or other material, or other property.
property that is owned or possessed by
a licensee or certificate holder, or
that is being transported to or from
an NRC-regulated facility. Before
granting such approval, the Commission
must determined that the radioactive
material or other property is of
significance to the common defense and
security or public health and safety
and has designated such radioactive
material or other property under
paragraph (c) of this section.
[[Page 62681]]
Sec. 73.19(c) Applicability. (1) The Paragraph (c)(1) would limit
following classes of licensees or the types of licensees who
certificate holders may apply for could apply for stand-alone
stand-alone preemption authority-- preemption authority alone to
(i) Power reactor facilities; and two classes of NRC-regulated
(ii) Facilities authorized to possess a facilities--power reactor
formula quantity or greater of facilities and fuel cycle
strategic special nuclear material facilities authorized to
with security plans subject to Sec. possess Category I quantities
Sec. 73.20, 73.45, and 73.46. of SSNM. Such SSNM fuel cycle
(2) The following classes of licensees facilities would include:
or certificate holders may apply for production facilities, spent
combined enhanced-weapons authority fuel reprocessing facilities,
and preemption authority-- fuel fabrication facilities,
(i) Power reactor facilities; and and uranium enrichment
(ii) Facilities authorized to possess a facilities. However, they
formula quantity or greater of would not include hot cell
strategic special nuclear material facilities, independent spent
with security plans subject to Sec. fuel storage installations,
Sec. 73.20, 73.45, and 73.46. monitored retrievable storage
installations, geologic
repository operations areas,
non-power reactors, byproduct
material facilities, and the
transportation of spent fuel,
high level waste, and special
nuclear material.
Paragraph (c)(2) would also
limit the types of licensees
who could apply for combined
enhanced-weapons authority and
preemption authority to these
same two classes of licensed
facilities.
The Commission is proposing
under this rulemaking to limit
the range of facilities,
radioactive material, or other
property [for which these
authorities are appropriate]
to power reactor facilities
and fuel cycle facilities
authorized to possess Category
I quantities of strategic
special nuclear material. The
Commission would take this
approach to be consistent with
the scope of this rulemaking.
The Commission may consider
other types of facilities,
radioactive material, or other
property as appropriate for
these authorities in future
rulemakings. Additionally, the
Commission would use the
parallel structure in
paragraph (c) to facilitate
future rulemakings.
Specifically, the Commission
recognizes that enhanced-
weapons authority may not be
appropriate for all present
and future classes of
licensees with armed security
programs; whereas the
applicability of preemption
authority to all present and
future classes of licensees
with armed security programs
may be much broader.
Sec. 73.19(c)(3) With respect to the Paragraph (b)(3) would indicate
possession and use of firearms by all that the provisions of this
other NRC licensees or certificate section do not supersede
holders, the Commission's requirements existing Commission
in effect before [effective date of regulations or orders for non-
final rule] remain applicable, except power reactor and non-Category
to the extent those requirements are I SSNM licensees, unless
modified by Commission order or specifically indicated.
regulations applicable to such
licensees and certificate holders.
Sec. 73.19(d) Authorization for stand- Paragraph (d)(1) would describe
alone preemption of firearms laws. (1) the process for a licensee or
Licensees and certificate holders certificate holder to apply
listed in paragraph (c) of this for preemption authority. This
section may apply to the NRC for the would be a voluntary action.
preemption authority described in Based upon the Commission's
paragraph (b)(1) of this section. conclusion that the classes of
Licensees and certificate holders facilities listed under
seeking such authority shall submit an paragraph (c) are appropriate
application to the NRC in writing, in for the use of such preemption
accordance with Sec. 73.4, and authority, no additional
indicate that the licensee or documentation or supporting
certificate holder is requesting information would be required
preemption authority under section by a licensee or certificate
161A of the AEA. holder to apply for preemption
(2) Licensees and certificate holders authority other than the
who have applied for preemption licensee or certificate holder
authority under this section may begin is included within the list of
firearms background checks under Sec. licenses and certificate
73.18 for their armed security holders in paragraph (c).
personnel. Paragraph (d)(2) would permit
(3) Licensees and certificate holders licensees and certificate
who have applied for preemption holders who have applied for
authority under this section and who preemption authority to begin
have satisfactorily completed firearms submitting their security
background checks for a sufficient personnel for firearms
number of security personnel (to background checks under Sec.
implement their security plan while 73.18.
meeting security personnel fatigue Paragraph (c)(3) would require
requirements of this chapter or licensees and certificate
Commission order) shall notify the holders who applied for
NRC, in accordance with Sec. 73.4, preemption authority to
of their readiness to receive NRC subsequently notify the NRC of
approval of preemption authority and their readiness to fully
implement all the provisions of Sec. implement Sec. 73.18 without
73.18. adverse impact on the security
organization (i.e., the
provisions in Sec. 73.18
requiring removal from armed
duties of personnel with a
``denied'' or ``delayed''
response would not adversely
affect the licensee's or
certificate holder's security
organization).
Sec. 73.19(d)(4) Based upon the Paragraph (d)(4) would indicate
licensee's or certificate holder's that the NRC will rely upon
readiness notification and any the licensee's or certificate
discussions with the licensee or holder's determination that
certificate holder, the NRC will sufficient numbers of its
document in writing to the licensee or security personnel have
certificate holder that the Commission satisfactorily passed the
has approved or disapproved the firearms background check to
licensee's or certificate holder's fully implement the provisions
application for preemption authority. of Sec. 73.18. The NRC would
document in writing its
approval or disapproval of the
licensee's or certificate
holder's application for
preemption authority. The NRC
may also rely upon discussions
with the licensee or
certificate holder to reach a
conclusion.
[[Page 62682]]
Sec. 73.19(e) Authorization for use Paragraph (e)(1) would describe
of enhanced weapons. (1) Licensees and the process for a licensee or
certificate holders listed in certificate holder to apply
paragraph (c)(2) of this section may for combined enhanced-weapons
apply to the NRC for enhanced-weapons authority and preemption
authority described in paragraph authority. A licensee or
(a)(2) of this section. Licensees and certificate holder would be
certificate holders applying for permitted to apply for
enhanced-weapons authority shall have preemption authority in
also applied for preemption authority. conjunction with an
Licensees and certificate holders may application for enhanced-
make these applications concurrently. weapons authority, or the
(2) Licensees and certificate holders licensee or certificate holder
seeking enhanced-weapons authority may apply for preemption
shall submit an application to the authority first. Only the
NRC, in accordance with Sec. 73.4, classes of licensees and
indicating that the licensee or certificate holders listed
certificate holder is requesting under paragraph (c)(2) would
enhanced-weapons authority under be permitted to apply for
section 161A of the AEA. Licensees and combined enhanced-weapons
certificate holders shall also include authority and preemption
with their application--. authority.
(i) The additional information required Paragraph (e)(2) would require
by paragraph (f) of this section;. a licensee or certificate
(ii) The date they applied to the NRC holder to include specific
for preemption authority (if not information with their
concurrent with the application for application as set forth in
enhanced weapons authority); and. Sec. 73.19(f). The licensee
(iii) If applicable, the date when the or certificate holder would
licensee or certificate holder also be required to include
received NRC approval of their information on the date they
application for preemption authority applied for, and/or received
under this section or via Commission NRC approval of their
order.. application for preemption
authority under Sec. 73.19,
or under Commission order
prior to the effective date of
a final rule.
Sec. 73.19(e)(3) The NRC will Paragraph (e)(3) would indicate
document in writing to the licensee or that the NRC would document in
certificate holder that the Commission writing the approval or
has approved or disapproved the disapproval of an application
licensee's or certificate holder's for combined enhanced-weapons
application for enhanced-weapons authority and preemption
authority. The NRC must approve, or authority. The NRC's approval
have previously approved, a licensee's would also indicate the total
or certificate holder's application numbers, types, and calibers
for preemption authority under of enhanced weapons that are
paragraph (d) of this section, or via approved for a specific
Commission order, to approve the licensee or certificate
application for enhanced weapons holder.
authority.
Sec. 73.19(e)(4) Licensees and Paragraph (e)(4) would indicate
certificate holders who have applied that after the licensee or
to the NRC for and received enhanced- certificate holder has
weapons authority shall then apply to received NRC approval of its
the U.S. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, application to use enhanced
Firearms, and Explosives (ATF) for a weapons, it must then apply to
federal firearms license (FFL) and ATF to obtain a FFL and also
also register under the National register under the NFA to
Firearms Act (NFA) in accordance with obtain these weapons. Because
ATF regulations under 27 CFR parts 478 ATF has indicated it would
and 479 to obtain the enhanced rely upon the NRC's technical
weapons. Licensees and certificate evaluation [on whether the
holders shall include a copy of the specific weapons listed in the
NRC's written approval with their NFA NRC's approval are appropriate
registration application. for the licensee or
certificate holder] in
processing the licensee's or
certificate holder's NFA
registration application,
licensees and certificate
holders would include a copy
of the NRC's approval with
their NFA registration
application.
This paragraph would require
licensees to obtain a FFL in
addition to registering under
the NFA. Based upon
conversations with ATF, the
NRC understands that while
ATF's regulations do not
mandate that persons who
obtain NFA weapons also have
an FFL, NRC licensees and
certificate holders desiring
to obtain enhanced weapons
would benefit from status an
ATF FFL. Advantages would
include reduced time to
process requests to transfer
NFA weapons to or from the
licensee or certificate holder
(e.g., initial receipt,
repair, or disposition),
simplification of the ATF's
review of an NFA registration
application, and elimination
of transfer taxes for NFA-
weapons transactions. The NRC
also understands that status
as an FFL would create
obligations for such
licensee's and certificate
holders. Obligations would
include payment of an annual
special occupational tax,
additional recordkeeping
requirements, and a
requirement to permit ATF
inspectors access to the
licensee's or certificate
holder's facilities possessing
enhanced weapons to inspect
ATF-licensed weapons and
corresponding records.
Sec. 73.19(f) Application for Paragraph (f)(1) would describe
enhanced-weapons authority additional the additional information a
information. (1) Licensees and licensee or certificate holder
certificate holders applying to the would be required to submit
Commission for enhanced-weapons along with their application
authority under paragraph (e) of this for preemption and enhanced-
section shall also submit to the NRC weapons authority. This
for prior review and written approval information would be submitted
new, or revised, physical security to the NRC for prior review
plans, security personnel training and and approval and would
qualification plans, safeguards describe and address the
contingency plans, and safety specific weapons to be
assessments incorporating the use of employed. In addition to
the specific enhanced weapons the addressing the enhanced
licensee or certificate holder intends weapons in the security,
to use. These plans and assessments training and qualification,
must be specific to the facility, and safeguards contingency
radioactive material, or other plans, a licensee or
property being protected. certificate holder would also
provide a safety assessment on
the use of the specific
enhanced weapons to be
employed. Licensees and
certificate holders who apply
for authority alone under
paragraph (d) would not be
subject to the requirements of
paragraph (f).
[[Page 62683]]
Sec. 73.19(f)(2) In addition to other Paragraph (e)(2) would describe
requirements set forth in this part, specific information the
these plans and assessments must-- license or certificate holder
(i) For the physical security plan, would include in the plans and
identify the specific types or models, assessments accompanying the
calibers, and numbers of enhanced application for enhanced-
weapons to be used; weapons authority. The
(ii) For the training and qualification paragraph would also describe
plan, address the training and the scope of the safety
qualification requirements to use assessments and would require
these specific enhanced weapons; and evaluation of both onsite and
(iii) For the safeguards contingency offsite impacts from the use
plan, address how these enhanced and of the specific enhanced
any standard weapons will be employed weapons to be employed. The
by the licensee's or certificate safety assessment would be
holder's security personnel in meeting required to only address the
the NRC-required protective strategy, enhanced weapons the license
including tactical approaches and or certificate holder intends
maneuvers. to employ.
Sec. 73.19(f)(2)(iv) For the safety See considerations for Sec.
assessment-- 73.19(f)(2).
(A) Assess any potential safety impact
on the facility, radioactive material,
or other property from the use of
these enhanced weapons;
(B) Assess any potential safety impact
on public or private facilities,
public or private property, or on
members of the public in areas outside
of the site boundary from the use of
these enhanced weapons; and
(C) Assess any potential safety impact
on public or private facilities,
public or private property, or on
members of the public from the use of
these enhanced weapons at training
facilities intended for proficiency
demonstration and qualification
purposes.
Sec. 73.19(f)(3) The licensee's or Paragraph (f)(3) would specify
certificate holder's training and acceptable standards for the
qualification plan on possessing, licensee or certificate holder
storing, maintaining, qualifying on, to use in creating a training
and using enhanced weapons must and qualification plan for
include information from applicable enhanced weapons. This
firearms standards developed by paragraph would not create any
nationally-recognized firearms new requirements for training
organizations or standard setting standards for standard
bodies or standards developed by weapons.
Federal agencies, such as: the U.S. Paragraph (f)(4) would require
Department of Homeland Security's the submission of revised
Federal Law Enforcement Training plans for prior NRC review and
Center, the U.S. Department of approval, irrespective of
Energy's National Training Center, and whether the licensee or
the U.S. Department of Defense. certificate holder concludes
(4) Licensees or certificate holders that the use of these enhanced
shall submit any new or revised plans weapons would not cause ``a
and assessments for prior NRC review decrease in security
and written approval notwithstanding effectiveness'' under the
the provisions of Sec. Sec. applicable NRC regulation.
50.54(p), 70.32(e), and 76.60 of this
chapter which otherwise permit a
license or certificate holder to make
changes to such plans ``that would not
decrease their effectiveness'' without
prior NRC review.
Sec. 73.19(g) Completion of training Paragraph (g) would require
and qualification prior to use of licensees and certificate
enhanced weapons. holders to ensure security
Licensees and certificate holders who personnel are trained and
have applied for and received enhanced- qualified on the use and
weapons authority under paragraph (e) employment of enhanced weapons
of this section shall ensure security before the licensee or
personnel complete required firearms certificate holder deploys
training and qualification in these enhanced weapons to
accordance with the licensee's or defend the facility,
certificate holder's NRC-approved radioactive material, or other
training and qualification plan. Such property.
training must be completed prior to Documentation of completion of
security personnel's use of enhanced this training would be
weapons to protect NRC-designated consistent with the licensee's
facilities, radioactive material, or or certificate holder's
other property and must be documented approved training and
in accordance with the requirements of qualification plan.
the licensee's or certificate holder's
training and qualification plan.
Sec. 73.19(h) Use of enhanced Paragraph (h) would indicate
weapons. Requirements regarding the that Sec. 73.19 does not
use of enhanced weapons by security supercede requirements on the
personnel in the performance of their use of weapons under the power
official duties are contained in Sec. reactor and Category I fuel
Sec. 73.46 and 73.55 and in cycle facility security
appendices B and C of this part, as regulations found in Part 73.
applicable.
Sec. 73.19(i) [Reserved]............. Paragraph (i) would not be used
to avoid confusion with the
use of sub-sub paragraph (i).
Sec. 73.19(j) Notification of adverse Paragraph (j) would require NRC
ATF findings or notices. NRC licensees licensees or certificate
and certificate holders with an ATF holders to notify NRC, should
federal firearms license (FFL) and/or the licensee or certificate
enhanced weapons shall notify the NRC, holder receive any adverse
in accordance with Sec. 73.4, of findings based upon an ATF
instances involving any adverse ATF inspection, audit, or review
findings or ATF notices related to of the enhanced weapons
their FFL or such weapons. possessed by the licensee or
certificate holder under an
ATF FFL. This would allow the
NRC to appropriately respond
to any public or media
inquiries associated with such
findings in a timely manner.
Sec. 73.2 Definitions................ Three new definitions would be
added to this section as
conforming changes supporting
the new Sec. Sec. 73.18 and
73.19 that would include:
covered weapon, enhanced
weapon, and standard weapon.
The NRC would use these three
terms to envelope the weapons,
ammunition, and devices listed
under section 161A of the AEA.
[[Page 62684]]
Other new definitions that
would be added as conforming
changes to this section in
support of other regulations
(e.g., safety/security
interface and target set) are
discussed in other tables in
this proposed rule.
Covered weapon means any handgun, A definition for covered weapon
rifle, shotgun, short-barreled would be used as an overall
shotgun, short-barreled rifle, semi- term to encompass the firearms
automatic assault weapon, machinegun, (weapons), ammunition, and
ammunition for any such gun or weapon, devices listed in section
or large capacity ammunition feeding 161A. The meanings of the
device as specified under section 161A specific terms for the
of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as firearms, ammunition, or
amended. As used here, the terms devices encompassed within
``handgun, rifle, shotgun, short- this definition would have the
barreled shotgun, short-barreled same meaning for those terms
rifle, semi-automatic assault weapon, as is those found under Title
machinegun, ammunition, or large 18 of the United States Code,
capacity ammunition feeding device'' Section 921(a) [18 U.S.C.
have the same meaning as set forth for 921(a)].
those terms under 18 U.S.C. 921(a).
Covered weapons include both enhanced
weapons and standard weapons. However,
enhanced weapons do not include
standard weapons.
Enhanced weapon means any short- Definitions for enhanced weapon
barreled shotgun, short-barreled and standard weapon would be
rifle, or machinegun. Enhanced weapons added to support the differing
do not include destructive devices, scope of these new sections.
including explosives or weapons The relationship between
greater than 50 caliber (i.e., weapons covered weapon, enhanced
with a bore greater than 1.27 cm [0.5 weapon, and standard weapon
in] diameter). would be explained.
Standard weapon means any handgun, Also, the definition for
rifle, shotgun, semi-automatic assault enhanced weapons would not
weapon, or a large capacity ammunition include destructive devices as
feeding device. defined under ATF's
regulations, since the NRC's
authority under section 161A
of the AEA does not permit
licensees or certificate
holders to possess destructive
devices.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Table 2.--Part 73 Section 73.55
[Requirements for physical protection of licensed activities in nuclear
power reactors against radiological sabotage]
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Current language Proposed language Considerations
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Requirements for physical Requirements for This title would be
protection of licensed physical protection retained.
activities in nuclear power of licensed
reactors against activities in
radiological sabotage. nuclear power
reactors against
radiological
sabotage.
(a) Introduction.... This header would be
added for
formatting
purposes.
Sec. 73.55 By December 2, (a)(1) By [date--180 This requirement
1986, each licensee, as days--after the would be added to
appropriate, shall submit effective date of discuss the types
proposed amendments to its the final rule of Commission
security plan which define published in the licensees to whom
how the amended Federal Register], the proposed
requirements of Paragraphs each nuclear power requirements of
(a), (d)(7), (d)(9), and reactor licensee, this section would
(e)(1) will be met. licensed under 10 apply and the
CFR part 50, shall schedule for
incorporate the submitting the
revised amended security
requirements of plans. The
this section Commission intends
through amendments to delete the
to its Commission- current language,
approved Physical because it applies
Security Plan, only to a past rule
Training and change that is
Qualification Plan, completed. The
and Safeguards proposed
Contingency Plan, requirements of
referred to this section would
collectively as be applicable to
``approved security decommissioned/ing
plans,'' and shall reactors unless
submit the amended otherwise exempted.
security plans to
the Commission for
review and approval.
Sec. 73.55 Each submittal (a)(2) The amended This requirement
must include a proposed security plans must would be added to
implementation schedule for be submitted as provide a reference
Commission approval. specified in Sec. to the current Sec.
50.4 of this 50.4(b)(4) which
chapter and must describes
describe how the procedural details
revised relative to the
requirements of proposed security
this section will plan submission
be implemented by requirement.
the licensee, to
include a proposed
implementation
schedule.
Sec. 73.55 The amended (a)(3) The licensee This requirement
safeguards requirements of shall implement the would be added to
these paragraphs must be existing approved clarify that the
implemented by the licensee security plans and licensee must
within 180 days after associated continue to
Commission approval of the Commission orders implement the
proposed security plan in until Commission current Commission-
accordance with the approval of the approved security
approved schedule. amended security plans until the
plans, unless Commission approves
otherwise the amended plans.
authorized by the The phrase ``unless
Commission. otherwise
authorized by the
Commission'' would
provide flexibility
to account for
unanticipated
situations that may
affect the
licensee's ability
to comply with this
proposed
requirement.
[[Page 62685]]
Sec. 73.55(b)(1)(i) The (a)(4) The licensee This requirement
licensee is responsible to is responsible for would retain the
the Commission for maintaining the current requirement
maintaining safeguards in onsite physical that the licensee
accordance with Commission protection program is responsible for
regulations and the in accordance with meeting Commission
licensee's security plan. Commission regulations and the
regulations and approved security
related Commission- plans. The phrase
directed orders ``through the
through the implementation of
implementation of the approved
the approved security plans and
security plans and site implementing
site implementing procedures'' would
procedures. be added to
describe the
relationship
between Commission
regulations, the
approved security
plans, and
implementing
procedures. The
word ``safeguards''
would be replaced
with the phrase
``physical
protection
program'' to more
accurately focus
this requirement to
the security
program rather than
the broad
``safeguards''
which includes
safety.
The Commission views
the approved
security plans as
the mechanism
through which the
licensee meets
Commission
requirements
through
implementation,
therefore, the
licensee is
responsible to the
Commission for this
performance.
(a)(5) Applicants This requirement
for an operating would be added to
license under the describe the
provisions of part proposed
50 of this chapter, requirements for
or holders of a applicants and to
combined license specify that these
under the proposed
provisions of part requirements must
52 of this chapter, be met before an
shall satisfy the applicant's receipt
requirements of of special nuclear
this section before material in the
the receipt of form of fuel
special nuclear assemblies.
material in the
form of fuel
assemblies.
(a)(6) For licenses This requirement
issued after would be added to
[effective date of describe the
this rule], Commission
licensees shall expectations for
design, construct, new reactors. Based
and equip the on changes to the
central alarm threat environment
station and the Commission has
secondary alarm determined that the
station to functions required
equivalent to be performed by
standards. the central alarm
station are a
critical element of
the licensee
capability to
satisfy the
performance
objective and
requirements of the
proposed paragraph
(b) of this
section.
Therefore, to ensure
that these critical
capabilities are
maintained, the
Commission has
determined that
this proposed
requirement would
be a prudent and
necessary measure
to ensure the
licensee's ability
to summon
assistance or
otherwise respond
to an alarm as is
currently required
by Sec.
73.55(e)(1) and
therefore satisfy
the performance
objective and
requirements of the
proposed paragraph
(b) of this
section.
(a)(6)(i) Licensees This requirement
shall apply the would be added for
requirements for consistency with
the central alarm and clarification
station listed in of the proposed
paragraphs requirement of
(e)(6)(v), paragraph (a)(6) of
(e)(7)(iii), and this section. The
(i)(8)(ii) of this Commission has
section to the determined that
secondary alarm these construction
station as well as standards that were
the central alarm previously applied
station. to only the central
alarm station
should also be
built into the
secondary alarm
station for new
reactor licensees.
(a)(6)(ii) Licensees This requirement
shall comply with would be added for
the requirements of consistency with
paragraph (i)(4) of and clarification
this section such of the proposed
that both alarm requirement of
stations are paragraph (i)(4) of
provided with this section and to
equivalent clarify that for
capabilities for new reactors, both
detection, the central and
assessment, secondary alarm
monitoring, stations must be
observation, provided
surveillance, and ``equivalent
communications. capabilities'' and
not simply
equivalent
``functional''
capabilities as is
stated in the
proposed paragraph
(i)(4) of this
section. The
Commission has
determined that
these capabilities
must be equivalent
for new reactors to
ensure that the
secondary alarm
station is
redundant to the
central alarm
station.
[[Page 62686]]
Sec. 73.55(a) General (b) General This header would be
performance objective and performance retained. The
requirements. objective and proposed
requirements. requirements of
this section are
intended to
represent the
general outline for
a physical
protection program
that would provide
an acceptable level
of protection if
effectively
implemented. The
proposed actions,
standards,
criteria, and
requirements of
this section are
intended to be
bounded by the
description of the
design basis threat
identified by the
Commission in Sec.
73.1.
Sec. 73.55(a) The licensee (b)(1) The licensee This requirement
shall establish and shall establish and would retain the
maintain an onsite physical maintain a physical current performance
protection system and protection program, objective of Sec.
security organization which to include a 73.55(a) with two
will have as its objective security minor changes.
to provide high assurance organization which First, the phrase
that activities involving will have as its ``an onsite
special nuclear material objective to physical protection
are not inimical to the provide high system'' would be
common defense and security assurance that replaced with the
and do not constitute an activities phrase ``a physical
unreasonable risk to the involving special protection
public health and safety. nuclear material program'' to more
are not inimical to clearly state the
the common defense Commission's view
and security and do that the physical
not constitute an protection system
unreasonable risk elements described
to the public in this proposed
health and safety. rule combine to
make the licensee
physical protection
program. Second,
the word ``and''
would be replaced
with the phrase
``to include a'' to
clarify the
Commission's view
that the security
organization is not
considered to be
independent of the
licensee physical
protection program
but rather, is a
component of that
program.
Sec. 73.55(a) The physical (b)(2) The physical This requirement
protection system shall be protection program would contain a
designed to protect against must be designed to substantial
the design basis threat of detect, assess, revision to provide
radiological sabotage as intercept, a more detailed and
stated in Sec. 73.1(a). challenge, delay, performance based
Sec. 73.55(h)(4)(iii)(A) and neutralize requirement for the
Requiring responding guards threats up to and design of the
or other armed response including the licensee physical
personnel to interpose design basis threat protection program.
themselves * * *.. of radiological Most significantly,
sabotage as stated the word
in Sec. 73.1(a), ``interpose'' would
at all times. be replaced with
the words ``detect,
assess, intercept,
challenge, delay,
and neutralize''.
The current
requirement of Sec.
73.55(h)(4)(iii)(A)
requires the
licensee to
``interpose'' for
the purpose of
preventing
radiological
sabotage, however,
the definition of
``radiological
sabotage'' stated
in Sec. 73.2 does
not contain a
performance based
element by which
the Commission can
measure this
capability and
therefore, this
proposed
requirement would
provide the six
performance based
elements or
capabilities
``detect, assess,
intercept,
challenge, delay,
and neutralize.''
The first element,
``detect'', would
be provided through
the use of
detection
equipment, patrols,
access controls,
and other program
elements required
by this proposed
rule and would
provide
notification to the
licensee that a
potential threat is
present and where
the threat is
located.
[[Page 62687]]
The second element,
``assess'', would
provide a mechanism
through which the
licensee would
identify the nature
of the threat
detected. This
would be
accomplished
through the use of
video equipment,
patrols, and other
program elements
that would be
required by this
proposed rule and
would provide the
licensee with
information about
the threat upon
which the licensee
would determine how
to respond. The
third, fourth, and
fifth elements
would comprise the
component actions
of response and
would be provided
by personnel
trained and
equipped in
accordance with a
response strategy.
The third element
``intercept'' would
be the act of
placing a person at
an intersecting
defensive position
directly in the
path of advancement
taken by the
threat, and between
the threat and the
protected target or
target set element.
The fourth element
``challenge'' would
be to verbally or
physically confront
the threat to
impede, halt, or
otherwise interact
with the threat
with the intent of
preventing further
advancement of the
threat towards the
protected target or
target set element.
The fifth element
``delay'' would be
to take necessary
actions to counter
any attempt by the
threat to advance
towards the
protected target or
target set element.
The sixth element
``neutralize''
would be to place
the threat in a
condition from
which the threat no
longer has the
potential to, or
capability of,
doing harm to the
protected item. The
Commission does not
intend to suggest
that the action,
``neutralize'',
would require the
application of
``deadly force'' in
all instances. The
phrase ``threat of
radiological
sabotage'' would be
replaced with the
phrase ``threats up
to and including
the design basis
threat of
radiological
sabotage'' to
clarify the
Commission's view
that the licensee
must provide
protection against
any element of the
design basis
threat, to include
those that do not
rise to the full
capability of the
design basis
threat.
[[Page 62688]]
Sec. 73.55(a) To achieve (b)(3) The licensee This requirement
this general performance physical protection would retain and
objective, the onsite program must be revise two current
physical protection system designed and requirements to
and security organization implemented to provide a
must include, but not satisfy the performance based
necessarily be limited to, requirements of requirement for the
the capabilities to meet this section and design of the
the specific requirements ensure that no physical protection
contained in paragraphs (b) single act, as program. The first
through (h) of this section. bounded by the significant
Sec. 73.55(e)(1) * * * so design basis revision would
that a single act cannot threat, can disable expand the current
remove the capability of the personnel, requirement for
calling for assistance or equipment, or alarm stations to
otherwise responding to an systems necessary be protected
alarm.. to prevent against a single
significant core act, and would
damage and spent require that the
fuel sabotage. licensee physical
protection program
be designed to
ensure that a
single act can not
disable the
personnel,
equipment, or
systems necessary
to prevent
significant core
damage and spent
fuel sabotage which
would result in the
loss of the
capability to
prevent
radiological
sabotage. The
Commission's view
is that because of
changes to the
threat environment,
it is necessary to
emphasize the
``remove the
capability''
requirement of the
current Sec.
73.55(e)(1) such
that the single act
protection
requirement would
apply to personnel,
equipment, and
systems required to
perform specific
functions that if
disabled would
remove the licensee
capability to
prevent
radiological
sabotage. The
second significant
revision would
provide a
measurable and
performance based
requirement against
which the
Commission would
measure the
effectiveness of
the licensee's
physical protection
program to prevent
radiological
sabotage.
The Commission's
view is that the
goal of the
licensee's physical
protection program
must include an
acceptable safety
margin to assure
that the
performance
objective of public
health and safety
is met. This safety
margin would be
established by
designing and
implementing a
physical protection
program that
protects against
radiological
sabotage by
preventing
significant core
damage and spent
fuel sabotage which
describes the
undesirable
consequences that
could result from
the destruction of
a target set or all
elements of a
target set and
would be a
precursor to
radiological
sabotage. The
Commission's view
is that significant
damage to the core
or sabotage to
spent fuel would
result in a
condition in which
the performance
objective of ``High
Assurance'' could
no longer be
provided and
therefore,
prevention of
significant core
damage and spent
fuel sabotage are a
measurable
performance
criteria against
which the
Commission would
evaluate the
effectiveness of
the licensee
physical protection
program.
[[Page 62689]]
The phrase ``as
bounded by the
design basis
threat'' would be
used to clarify the
Commission's view
that the licensee
must ensure that
the physical
protection program
is designed to
protect against the
design basis threat
and all other
threats that do not
rise to the level
of the design basis
threat. The phrase
``the capabilities
to meet the
specific
requirements
contained in
paragraphs (b)
through (h) of this
section'' would be
replaced by the
phase ``implemented
to satisfy the
requirements of
this section'' to
account for the
reformatting of
this proposed rule
and to describe the
Commission view
that the licensee
is responsible to
implement
Commission
requirements
through the
approved security
plans and
procedures.
(b)(4) The physical This requirement
protection program would be added to
must include apply defense-in-
diverse and depth concepts as
redundant part of the
equipment, systems, physical protection
technology, program to ensure
programs, the capability to
supporting meet the
processes, and performance
implementing objective of the
procedures. proposed paragraph
(b)(1) of this
section is
maintained in the
changing threat
environment. The
terms ``diverse and
redundant'' are
intended to
describe defense-in-
depth in a
performance based
manner and would be
a critical element
for meeting the
proposed
requirement for
protection against
a single act
described in the
proposed paragraph
(b)(3) of this
section.
Sec. 73.55(b)(4)(i) Upon (b)(5) Upon the This requirement
the request of an request of an would retain the
authorized representative authorized current requirement
of the Commission, the representative of for demonstration
licensee shall demonstrate the Commission, the and would contain
the ability of the physical licensee shall minor revisions to
security personnel to carry demonstrate the apply this
out their assigned duties ability to meet requirement to the
and responsibilities. Commission licensee's ability
requirements to implement the
through the physical protection
implementation of program and not be
the physical limited to only the
protection program, ability of security
including the personnel to carry
ability of armed out their duties.
and unarmed This proposed
personnel to requirement would
perform assigned clarify the
duties and Commission's view
responsibilities that the licensee
required by the must also
approved security demonstrate the
plans and licensee effectiveness of
procedures. plans, procedures,
and equipment to
accomplish their
intended function
within the physical
protection program.
(b)(6) The licensee This requirement
shall establish and would be added to
maintain a written specify that this
performance performance
evaluation program evaluation program
in accordance with would be the
appendix B and mechanism by which
appendix C to this the licensee would
part, to demonstrate the
demonstrate and capabilities
assess the described by the
effectiveness of performance based
armed responders requirements of the
and armed security proposed paragraphs
officers to perform (b)(2) through (4)
their assigned of this section.
duties and The phrase ``target
responsibilities to sets'' would be
protect target sets used consistent
described in with the proposed
paragraph (f) of (b)(3) of this
this section and section to describe
appendix C to this the combination of
part, through equipment and
implementation of operator actions
the licensee which, if all are
protective strategy. prevented from
performing their
intended safety
function or
prevented from
being accomplished,
would likely result
in significant core
damage (e.g., non-
incipient, non-
localized fuel
melting, and/or
core disruption)
barring
extraordinary
action by plant
operators.
A target set with
respect to spent
fuel sabotage is
draining the spent
fuel pool leaving
the spent fuel
uncovered for a
period of time,
allowing spent fuel
heat up and the
associated
potential for
release of fission
products.
[[Page 62690]]
Sec. 73.55(d)(7) The (b)(7) The licensee This requirement
licensee shall: shall establish, would be retained
(i) Establish an access maintain, and and revised to
authorization system * * *. follow an access require the
authorization licensee to provide
program in an Access
accordance with Authorization
Sec. 73.56. Program.
(b)(7)(i) In This proposed
addition to the requirement would
access be added to
authorization establish the
program required insider mitigation
above, and the program (IMP). The
fitness-for-duty licensee's IMP
program required in should integrate
part 26 of this specific elements
chapter, each of the licensee AA
licensee shall and FFD programs to
develop, implement, focus those
and maintain an elements on
insider mitigation identifying
program. potential insider
threats and denying
the opportunity for
an insider to gain
or retain access at
an NRC licensed
facility.
(b)(7)(ii) The This proposed
insider mitigation requirement would
program must be be added to provide
designed to oversee a performance based
and monitor the requirement for the
initial and design and content
continuing of the IMP. The
trustworthiness and Commission has
reliability of concluded that, by
individuals granted itself, the initial
or retaining determination of
unescorted access trustworthiness and
authorization to a reliability is not
protected or vital adequate to
area and implement minimize the
defense-in-depth potential
methodologies to opportunity for an
minimize the insider to gain or
potential for an retain access, and
insider to that only through
adversely affect, continual re-
either directly or evaluation of the
indirectly, the information
licensee capability obtained through
to prevent these processes can
significant core the licensee
damage or spent provide the level
fuel sabotage. of assurance
necessary. The
Commission has also
determined that
defense-in-depth
would be provided
through the
integration of
physical protection
measures with
access
authorization and
fitness-for-duty
program elements,
to ensure the
licensee capability
to identify and
mitigate the
potential
activities of an
insider, such as,
but not limited to,
tampering. The
Commission does not
intend that a
licensee would
limit the IMP to
any one or more
elements, but
rather that the
licensee would
identify and add
additional elements
as necessary to
ensure the site's
IMP satisfies the
performance
requirements
specified by the
Commission.
The Commission has
determined that no
one element of the
physical protection
program, access
authorization
program, or fitness-
for-duty program
would, by itself,
provide the level
of protection
against the insider
necessary to meet
the performance
objective of the
proposed paragraph
(b) and therefore,
the effective
integration of
these three
programs is a
necessary
requirement to
achieve defense-in-
depth against the
potential insider.
(b)(8) The licensee This requirement
shall ensure that would be added to
its corrective provide a
action program performance based
assures that requirement to
failures, ensure that the
malfunctions, licensee implements
deficiencies, and completes the
deviations, required corrective
defective equipment actions in a timely
and nonconformances manner and that
in security program actions would be
components, taken to correct
functions, or the cause of the
personnel are problem to ensure
promptly identified that the problem
and corrected. would not be
Measures shall repeated.
ensure that the
cause of any of
these conditions is
determined and that
corrective action
is taken to
preclude repetition.
(c) Security plans.. This header would be
added for
formatting
purposes.
(c)(1) Licensee This requirement
security plans. would be added to
Licensee security describe the
plans must purpose of the
implement licensee Physical
Commission Security Plan,
requirements and Training and
must describe: Qualification Plan,
and Safeguards
Contingency Plan in
a performance based
requirement and to
introduce the
general types of
information to be
discussed.
[[Page 62691]]
(c)(1)(i) How the This requirement
physical protection would be added to
program will describe the
prevent significant performance based
core damage and requirement to be
spent fuel sabotage met by the physical
through the protection program
establishment and and the basic
maintenance of a elements of the
security system that must be
organization, the described in the
use of security security plans.
equipment and
technology, the
training and
qualification of
security personnel,
and the
implementation of
predetermined
response plans and
strategies; and
(c)(1)(ii) Site- This requirement
specific conditions would be added to
that affect reflect the
implementation of Commission's view
Commission that licensees must
requirements. focus attention on
site-specific
conditions in the
development and
implementation of
site plans,
procedures,
processes, response
strategies, and
ultimately, the
licensee capability
to achieve the
performance
objective of the
proposed paragraph
(b)(1) of this
section.
(c)(2) Protection of This requirement
security plans. The would be added to
licensee shall emphasize the
protect the requirements for
approved security the protection of
plans and other safeguards
related safeguards information in
information against accordance with the
unauthorized requirements of
disclosure in Sec. 73.21.
accordance with the
requirements of
Sec. 73.21.
(c)(3) Physical This header would be
security plan. added for
formatting
purposes.
(c)(3)(i) The This requirement
licensee shall would be added to
establish, specify the
maintain, and requirement for a
implement a physical security
Commission-approved plan.
physical security
plan that describes
how the performance
objective and
requirements set
forth in this
section will be
implemented.
(c)(3)(ii) The This requirement
physical security would be added to
plan must describe describe the
the facility general content of
location and the physical
layout, the security plan and
security specify the general
organization and types of
structure, duties information to be
and addressed. Because
responsibilities of the specifics of
personnel, defense- defense-in-depth
in-depth required by the
implementation that proposed Sec.
describes 73.55(b)(4) would
components, vary from site-to-
equipment and site, the terms
technology used. ``components,''
``equipment'' and
``technology''
would be used to
provide
flexibility.
(c)(4) Training and This header would be
qualification plan. added for
formatting
purposes.
Sec. 73.55(b)(4)(ii) Each (c)(4)(i) The This requirement
licensee shall establish, licensee shall would retain and
maintain, and follow an NRC- establish, separate two
approved training and maintain, and current
qualifications plan * * *. follow a Commission- requirements of
approved training Sec.
and qualification 73.55(b)(4)(ii).
plan that describes This proposed
how the criteria requirement would
set forth in require the
appendix B licensee to provide
``General Criteria a training and
for Security qualification plan.
Personnel,'' to
this part will be
implemented.
Sec. 73.55(b)(4)(ii) * * * (c)(4)(ii) The This requirement
outlining the processes by training and would retain the
which guards, watchmen, qualification plan requirement for the
armed response persons, and must describe the licensee to outline
other members of the process by which the processes in
security organization will armed and unarmed this plan with
be selected, trained, security personnel, minor revisions.
equipped, tested, and watchpersons, and The phrase
qualified to ensure that other members of ``guards, watchmen,
these individuals meet the the security armed response
requirements of this organization will persons'' would be
paragraph. be selected, replaced by the
trained, equipped, phrase ``armed and
tested, qualified, unarmed security
and re-qualified to personnel,
ensure that these watchpersons'' to
individuals possess generically
and maintain the identify all
knowledge, skills, members of the
and abilities security
required to carry organization. The
out their assigned Commission does not
duties and intend that
responsibilities administrative
effectively. staff be included
except as these
personnel would be
used to perform
duties required to
detect, assess,
intercept,
challenge, delay,
and neutralize a
threat, to include
compensatory
measures used to
maintain these
capabilities in the
event of a failed
component.
[[Page 62692]]
The phrase ``meet
the requirements of
this paragraph''
would be replaced
by the phrase
``possess the
knowledge, skills,
and abilities
required to
effectively carry
out their assigned
duties and
responsibilities''
to clarify that the
focus of this
proposed
requirement would
be to ensure these
individuals possess
these capabilities.
(c)(5) Safeguards This header would be
contingency plan. added for
formatting
purposes.
Sec. 73.55(h)(1) (c)(5)(i) The This requirement
Safeguards contingency licensee shall would retain the
plans must be in accordance establish, current requirement
with the criteria in maintain, and of Sec.
appendix C to this part, implement a 73.55(h)(1) to
``Licensee Safeguards Commission-approved provide a
Contingency Plans''. safeguards safeguards
contingency plan contingency plan
that describes how with minor
the criteria set revisions. Most
forth in section II significantly, the
of appendix C, reference to
``Licensee appendix C to part
Safeguards 73 would be revised
Contingency to reflect the
Plans,'' to this reformatting of the
part will be proposed appendix C
implemented. to part 73 which
would have a
section II that
applies only to
power reactors.
(c)(5)(ii) The This requirement
safeguards would be added to
contingency plan generally describe
must describe the content of the
predetermined Safeguards
actions, plans, and Contingency Plan.
strategies designed
to intercept,
challenge, delay,
and neutralize
threats up to and
including the
design basis threat
of radiological
sabotage.
(c)(6) Implementing This header would be
procedures. added for
formatting
purposes.
Sec. 73.55(b)(3)(i) (c)(6)(i) The This requirement
Written security procedures licensee shall would retain the
that document the structure establish, requirement for
of the security maintain, and written security
organization and detail the implement written procedures with
duties of guards, watchmen, procedures that minor revisions.
and other individuals document the The phrase ``and
responsible for security. structure of the implement
security Commission
organization, requirements
detail the specific through the
duties and approved security
responsibilities of plans'' would be
each position, and added to clarify
implement the requirement
Commission that the licensee
requirements implements
through the Commission
approved security requirements
plans. through procedures
as well as the
approved security
plans.
(c)(6)(ii) This requirement
Implementing would be added to
procedures need not address the current
be submitted to the and proposed
Commission for procedural details
prior approval, but for implementing
are subject to procedures.
inspection by the
Commission.
(c)(6)(iii) This requirement
Implementing would be added to
procedures must describe the
detail the specific content of
actions to be taken implementing
and decisions to be procedures to
made by each clarify the current
position of the requirement
security ``detail the duties
organization to of guards,
implement the watchmen, and other
approved security individuals
plans. responsible for
security.''
Sec. 73.55(b)(3) The (c)(6)(iv) The This requirement
licensee shall have a licensee shall: would be retained
management system to and would separate
provide for * * *. the two current
requirements of
Sec. 73.55(b)(3)
with minor
revisions. The
phrase ``management
system'' would be
replaced with the
word ``process.''
The current
requirement to have
a management system
would be addressed
in the proposed
Sec. 73.55(d)(2).
Sec. 73.55(b)(3) * * * the (c)(6)(iv)(A) This requirement
development, revision, Develop, maintain, would retain the
implementation, and enforce, review, requirement to
enforcement of security and revise security develop, revise,
procedures. implementing implement, and
procedures. enforce security
procedures. The
words ``maintenance
and review'' would
be added to clarify
these tasks as
necessary
functions. The word
``implementation''
would be deleted
because
implementation is
addressed in the
proposed paragraphs
(c)(6)(i) through
(iii) of this
section.
Sec. 73.55(b)(3)(ii) (c)(6)(iv)(B) This requirement
Provision for written Provide a process would retain the
approval of these for the written current requirement
procedures and any approval of for written
revisions to the procedures implementing approval with minor
by the individual with procedures and revisions.
overall responsibility for revisions by the
the security functions. individual with
overall
responsibility for
the security
functions.
[[Page 62693]]
(c)(6)(iv)(C) Ensure This requirement
that changes made would be added to
to implementing ensure that the
procedures do not licensee process
decrease the for making changes
effectiveness of to implementing
any procedure to procedures includes
implement and a process to ensure
satisfy Commission that changes do not
requirements. result in a
reduction of
effectiveness or
result in a
conflict with other
site procedures.
(c)(7) Plan This requirement
revisions. The would be added to
licensee shall outline the three
revise approved methodologies for
security plans as making changes to
necessary to ensure the Commission-
the effective approved security
implementation of plans and clarify
Commission that the licensee
regulations and the would make
licensee's necessary plan
protective changes to account
strategy. for changes to site
Commission approval specific conditions
of revisions made and lessons learned
pursuant to this from implementing
paragraph is not the approved
required, provided security plans.
that revisions meet
the requirements of
Sec. 50.54(p) of
this chapter.
Changes that are
beyond the scope
allowed per Sec.
50.54(p) of this
chapter shall be
submitted as
required by Sec.
Sec. 50.90 of
this chapter or
Sec. 73.5.
Sec. 73.55(b) Physical (d) Security This header would be
Security Organization. organization. retained with a
minor revision.
Sec. 73.55(b)(1) The (d)(1) The licensee This requirement
licensee shall establish a shall establish and would retain the
security organization, maintain a security current requirement
including guards, to organization for a security
protect his facility designed, staffed, organization to
against radiological trained, and protect against
sabotage. equipped to provide radiological
early detection, sabotage. This
assessment, and proposed
response to requirement would
unauthorized be revised to
activities within describe a more
any area of the performance based
facility. requirement
consistent with the
proposed paragraphs
(b)(2) through (4)
of this section.
The phrase
``including guards,
to protect his
facility against
radiological
sabotage'' would be
replaced with the
phrase ``designed,
staffed, trained,
and equipped to
provide early
detection,
assessment, and
response to
unauthorized
activities'' to
describe those
elements of the
security
organization needed
to provide the
capabilities
described in the
proposed paragraph
(b). The phrase
``within any area
of the facility''
would be added to
clarify the
Commission's
expectation that
the licensee must
implement measures
consistent with
site security
assessments and the
licensee response
strategy, to
facilitate the
identification of a
threat before an
attempt to
penetrate the
protected area
would be made.
Sec. 73.55(b)(3) The (d)(2) The security This requirement
system shall include: organization must would be retained
include: with minor
revisions. The word
``system'' would be
replaced by the
phrase ``security
organization.''
Although, the
security ``system''
would include the
security
organization, this
proposed
requirement focuses
only on the
security
organization.
Sec. 73.55(b)(3) The (d)(2)(i) A This requirement
licensee shall have a management system would retain the
management system * * *. that provides requirement for a
oversight of the management system
onsite physical with minor
protection program. revisions. Most
significantly this
proposed
requirement would
not limit the
licensee management
system to only
provide for the
development,
revision,
implementation, and
enforcement of
security procedures
which are addressed
in the proposed
paragraph
(c)(6)(iv) of this
section. The
Commission
expectation would
be that the
licensee management
system oversees all
aspects of the
onsite physical
protection program
to ensure the
effective
implementation of
Commission
requirements
through the
approved security
plans and
implementing
procedures.
[[Page 62694]]
Sec. 73.55(b)(2) At least (d)(2)(ii) At least This requirement
one full time member of the one member, onsite would be retained
security organization who and available at with minor
has the authority to direct all times, who has revisions. The
the physical protection the authority to phrase ``who is
activities of the security direct the assigned no other
organization shall be activities of the duties which would
onsite at all times. security interfere with''
organization and would be added to
who is assigned no ensure that the
other duties that designated
would interfere individual would
with this not be assigned any
individual's duties that would
ability to perform prevent or
these duties in interfere with the
accordance with the ability to direct
approved security these activities
plans and licensee when needed.
protective strategy.
Sec. 73.55(b)(4)(i) The (d)(3) The licensee This requirement
licensee may not permit an may not permit any would be retained
individual to act as a individual to act with minor
guard, watchman, armed as a member of the revisions.
response person, or other security
member of the security organization unless
organization unless the the individual has
individual has been been trained,
trained, equipped, and equipped, and
qualified to perform each qualified to
assigned security job duty perform assigned
in accordance with appendix duties and
B, ``General Criteria for responsibilities in
Security Personnel,'' to accordance with the
this part. requirements of
appendix B to part
73 and the
Commission-approved
training and
qualification plan.
(d)(4) The licensee This requirement
may not assign an would be added to
individual to any clarify the
position involving prerequisite
detection, qualifications for
assessment, or assignment to any
response to position involving
unauthorized a function upon
activities unless which detection,
that individual has assessment, or
satisfied the response
requirements of capabilities
Sec. 73.56. depend.
Sec. 73.55(b)(1) If a (d)(5) If a This requirement
contract guard force is contracted security would be retained
utilized for site security, force is used to with minor
the licensee's written implement the revision. The
agreement with the onsite physical phrase ``utilized
contractor that must be protection program, for site security''
retained by the licensee as the licensee's would be replaced
a record for the duration written agreement with the phrase
of the contract will with the contractor ``used to implement
clearly show that: must be retained by the onsite physical
the licensee as a protection
record for the program'' to focus
duration of the on the
contract and must implementation of
clearly state the the onsite physical
following protection program.
conditions:
Sec. 73.55(b)(1)(i) The (d)(5)(i) The This requirement
licensee is responsible to licensee is would be retained
the Commission for responsible for with minor
maintaining safeguards in maintaining the revisions. Most
accordance with Commission onsite physical significantly, the
regulations and the protection program word ``safeguards''
licensee's security plan. in accordance with would be replaced
Commission orders, with the phrase''
Commission onsite physical
regulations, and protection
the approved program'' to more
security plans. accurately describe
the focus of this
requirement.
Sec. 73.55(b)(1)(ii) The (d)(5)(ii) The This requirement
NRC may inspect, copy, and Commission may would be retained
take away copies of all inspect, copy, with minor
reports and documents retain, and remove revisions.
required to be kept by all reports and
Commission regulations, documents required
orders, or applicable to be kept by
license conditions whether Commission
the reports and documents regulations,
are kept by the licensee or orders, or
the contractor. applicable license
conditions whether
the reports and
documents are kept
by the licensee or
the contractor.
(d)(5)(iii) An This requirement
individual may not would be added for
be assigned to any consistency with
position involving the proposed
detection, requirements of the
assessment, or proposed paragraph
response to (d)(4) of this
unauthorized section. This
activities unless proposed
that individual has requirement would
satisfied the be stipulated in a
requirements of contract because it
Sec. 73.56. relates to a
function of the
contract.
Sec. 73.55(b)(1)(iv) The (d)(5)(iv) An This requirement
contractor will not assign individual may not would retain and
any personnel to the site be assigned duties combine two current
who have not first been and requirements of
made aware of these responsibilities Sec.
responsibilities. required to 73.55(b)(1)(iv) and
Sec. 73.55(b)(4)(i) The implement the Sec.
licensee may not permit an approved security 73.55(b)(4)(i) with
individual to act as a plans or licensee minor revisions
guard, watchman, armed protective strategy necessary for
response person, or other unless that consistency with
member of the security individual has been the proposed rule.
organization unless the properly trained,
individual has been equipped, and
trained, equipped, and qualified to
qualified to perform each perform their
assigned security job duty assigned duties and
in accordance with appendix responsibilities in
B * * *.. accordance with
appendix B to part
73 and the
Commission-approved
training and
qualification plan.
Sec. 73.55(b)(1)(iii) The (d)(5)(v) Upon the This requirement
requirement in paragraph request of an would be retained
(b)(4) of this section that authorized to describe the
the licensee demonstrate representative of current requirement
the ability of physical the Commission, the for demonstration
security personnel to contractor security by contract
perform their assigned employees shall security personnel.
duties and responsibilities demonstrate the The language of
includes demonstration of ability to perform this current
the ability of the their assigned requirement would
contractor's physical duties and be deleted and
security personnel to responsibilities replaced by the
perform their assigned effectively. proposed language
duties and responsibilities of the proposed
in carrying out the Sec. 73.55(b)(5).
provisions of the Security
Plan and these regulations,
and * * *.
[[Page 62695]]
(d)(5)(vi) Any This requirement
license for would be added to
possession and implement
ownership of applicable portions
enhanced weapons of the EPAct 2005,
will reside with and to require any
the licensee. security force
contract to include
a statement that
would ensure that
all licenses
relative to
firearms and
enhanced weapons
reside with the
licensee, not the
contractor.
Sec. 73.55(c) Physical (e) Physical This requirement
barriers. barriers. Based would be added to
upon the licensee's provide a
protective performance based
strategy, analyses, requirement for
and site conditions determining the use
that affect the use and placement of
and placement of physical barriers
physical barriers, required for
the licensee shall protection of
install and personnel,
maintain physical equipment, and
barriers that are systems, the
designed and failure of which
constructed as could directly or
necessary to deter, indirectly endanger
delay, and prevent public health and
the introduction of safety.
unauthorized
personnel,
vehicles, or
materials into
areas for which
access must be
controlled or
restricted.
The phrase ``Based
upon the licensee
protective
strategy, analyses,
and site specific
conditions'', would
be used to ensure
that licensees
consider protective
strategy
requirements and
needs, as well as
any analyses
conducted by the
licensee or
required by the
Commission to
determine the
effects the design
basis threat could
have on personnel,
equipment, and
systems, and any
site specific
condition that
could have an
impact on the
capability to
prevent significant
core damage and
spent fuel
sabotage. The
Commission
considers these
factors to be
necessary
considerations when
determining the
appropriate use and
placement of
barriers in any
area.
(e)(1) The licensee This requirement
shall describe in would be added to
the approved provide a mechanism
security plans, the by which the
design, licensee would
construction, and confirm information
function of regarding the use,
physical barriers placement, and
and barrier systems construction of
used and shall barriers to include
ensure that each the intended
barrier and barrier function of
system is designed specific barriers
and constructed to as they relate to
satisfy the stated satisfying the
function of the proposed
barrier and barrier requirements of
system. this section.
Sec. 73.55(c)(9)(iii) (e)(2) The licensee This requirement
Protect as Safeguards shall retain in would retain and
Information, information accordance with combine the current
required by the Commission Sec. 73.70, all requirements of
pursuant to Sec. analyses, Sec.
73.55(c)(8) and (9). comparisons, and 73.55(c)(9)(iii)
Sec. 73.55(c)(9)(iv) descriptions of the and (9)(iv) with
Retain, in accordance with physical barriers minor revisions.
Sec. 73.70, all and barrier systems
comparisons and analyses used to satisfy the
prepared pursuant to Sec. requirements of
73.55(c)(7) and (8).. this section, and
shall protect these
records as
safeguards
information in
accordance with the
requirements of
Sec. 73.21.
(e)(3) Physical This header would be
barriers must: added for
formatting
purposes.
(e)(3)(i) Clearly This requirement
delineate the would be added to
boundaries of the provide a
area(s) for which performance based
the physical requirement for the
barrier provides use of barriers.
protection or a
function, such as
protected and vital
area boundaries and
stand-off distance.
Sec. 73.55(c)(8) Each (e)(3)(ii) Be This requirement
licensee shall compare the designed and would be added to
vehicle control measures constructed to apply the current
established in accordance protect against the requirement of Sec.
with Sec. 73.55(c)(7) to design basis threat 73.55(c)(8) to
the Commission's design commensurate to the compare vehicle
goals (i.e., to protect required function control measures
equipment, systems, of each barrier and against Commission
devices, or material, the in support of the design goals, to
failure of which could licensee protective all barriers, such
directly or indirectly strategy. as but not limited
endanger public health and to, channeling
safety by exposure to barriers, delay
radiation) and criteria for barriers, and
protection against a land bullet resisting
vehicle bomb. enclosures, and not
limit this
comparison to only
vehicle barriers.
The Commission's
view is that the
physical
construction,
materials, and
design of any
barrier must be
sufficient to
perform the
intended function
and therefore, the
licensee must meet
these standards.
[[Page 62696]]
(e)(3)(iii) Provide This requirement
visual deterrence, would be added to
delay, and support provide a
access control performance based
measures. requirement for
physical barriers.
Because of changes
to the threat
environment the
Commission believes
emphasis on the use
of physical
barriers would be
appropriate.
(e)(3)(iv) Support This requirement
effective would be added to
implementation of provide a
the licensee's performance based
protective strategy. requirement for
physical barriers.
Because of changes
to the threat
environment the use
of physical
barriers within the
licensee protective
strategy would be
considered
essential.
(e)(4) Owner This requirement
controlled area. would be added to
The licensee shall provide a
establish and performance based
maintain physical requirement to
barriers in the provide enhanced
owner controlled protection outside
area to deter, the protected area
delay, or prevent relative to
unauthorized detecting and
access, facilitate delaying a threat
the early detection before reaching any
of unauthorized area from which the
activities, and threat could
control approach disable the
routes to the personnel,
facility. equipment, or
systems required to
meet the
performance
objective and
requirements
described in the
proposed paragraph
(b) of this
section.
(e)(5) Isolation This header would be
zone. added for
formatting
purposes.
Sec. 73.55(c)(3) Isolation (e)(5)(i) An This requirement
zones shall be maintained isolation zone must would retain the
in outdoor areas adjacent be maintained in current requirement
to the physical barrier at outdoor areas for an isolation
the perimeter of the adjacent to the zone.
protected area * * *. protected area
perimeter barrier.
The isolation zone
shall be:
Sec. 73.55(c)(3) Isolation (e)(5)(i)(A) This requirement
zones * * * and shall be of Designed and of would retain and
sufficient size to permit sufficient size to revise the current
observation of the permit unobstructed requirement for
activities of people on observation and isolation zone
either side of that barrier assessment of design to provide
in the event of its activities on observation. Most
penetration. either side of the significantly, the
protected area words ``designed''
barrier. and
``unobstructed''
would be added to
provide a more
performance based
requirement. The
phrase ``of
people'' would be
deleted to focus
the proposed
requirement on
``activities''.
Sec. 73.55(c)(4) Detection (e)(5)(i)(B) This requirement
of penetration or attempted Equipped with would be retained
penetration of the intrusion detection and revised to
protected area or the equipment capable require intrusion
isolation zone adjacent to of detecting both detection equipment
the protected area barrier attempted and within an isolation
shall assure that adequate actual penetration zone and provide a
response by the security of the protected performance based
organization can be area perimeter requirement for
initiated. barrier and that equipment. The
assessment phrase ``shall
equipment capable assure that
of facilitating adequate response
timely evaluation by the security
of the detected organization can be
unauthorized initiated'' would
activities before be moved from this
completed proposed
penetration of the requirement to the
protected area proposed Sec.
perimeter barrier. 73.55(i)(9)(v).
(e)(5)(ii) This requirement
Assessment would be added to
equipment in the provide a
isolation zone must performance based
provide real-time requirement for
and play-back/ assessment
recorded video equipment utilized
images in a manner for the isolation
that allows timely zone. The
evaluation of the Commission has
detected determined that
unauthorized based on changes to
activities before threat environment
and after each the use of
alarm annunciation. technology that
allows for the
assessment of
activities before
and after an alarm
annunciation is
necessary to
facilitate a
determination of
the level of
response needed to
satisfy the
performance
objective and
requirements of the
proposed paragraph
(b) of this
section. The
Commission believes
the application of
this commonly used
technology would be
an appropriate use
of technological
advancements that
would effectively
enhance licensee
capabilities to
achieve the
performance
objective and
requirements of the
proposed paragraph
(b) of this
section.
[[Page 62697]]
Sec. 73.55(c)(3) If (e)(5)(iii) Parking This requirement
parking facilities are facilities, storage would be retained
provided for employees or areas, or other and revised to
visitors, they shall be obstructions that provide a
located outside the could provide performance based
isolation zone and exterior concealment or requirement for the
to the protected area otherwise interfere areas outside the
barrier. with the licensee's isolation zone.
capability to meet Most significantly,
the requirements of the phrase
paragraphs ``storage areas, or
(e)(5)(i)(A) and other obstructions
(B) of this which could provide
section, must be concealment or
located outside of otherwise
the isolation zone. interfere'' would
be added to ensure
that areas inside,
outside, and
adjacent to the
protected area
barrier would be
maintained clear of
obstructions to
ensure observation
and assessment
capabilities.
(e)(6) Protected This header would be
area. added for
formatting
purposes.
(e)(6)(i) The This requirement
protected area would be added to
perimeter must be provide a
protected by performance based
physical barriers requirement for
designed and physical barriers
constructed to meet and penetrations
Commission though the
requirements and protected area
all penetrations barrier to be
through this secured to prevent
barrier must be and detect
secured in a manner attempted or actual
that prevents or exploitation of the
delays, and detects penetration. The
the exploitation of Commission's view
any penetration. is that
penetrations must
be secured equal to
the strength of the
barrier of which it
is a part and that
attempts to exploit
a penetration must
be detected and
response initiated.
Sec. 73.55(c)(2) The (e)(6)(ii) The This requirement
physical barriers at the protected area would be retained
perimeter of the protected perimeter physical with minor
area shall be separated barriers must be revision. The
from any other barrier separated from any phrase ``unless
designated as a physical other barrier otherwise
barrier for a vital area designated as a identified in the
within the protected area. vital area physical approved physical
barrier, unless security plan''
otherwise would be added to
identified in the provide flexibility
approved physical for an alternate
security plan. methodology to be
described in the
Commission-approved
security plans.
Sec. 73.55(e)(3) All (e)(6)(iii) All This requirement
emergency exits in each emergency exits in would retain and
protected area and each the protected area separate the two
vital area shall be alarmed. must be secured by current
locking devices requirements with
that allow exit minor revision. The
only and alarmed. phrase ``secured by
locking devices
which allow exit
only'' would be
added to provide a
performance based
requirement
relative to the
function of locking
devices with
emergency exit
design to prevent
entry. Vital areas
would be addressed
in the proposed
Sec.
73.55(e)(8)(vii).
(e)(6)(iv) Where This requirement
building walls, would be added to
roofs, or provide a
penetrations performance based
comprise a portion requirement for
of the protected instances where
area perimeter this site condition
barrier, an would exist.
isolation zone is
not necessary,
provided that the
detection,
assessment,
observation,
monitoring, and
surveillance
requirements of
this section are
met, appropriately
designed and
constructed
barriers are
installed, and the
area is described
in the approved
security plans.
Sec. 73.55(c)(6) The (e)(6)(v) The This requirement
walls, doors, ceiling, reactor control would retain the
floor, and any windows in room, the central locations
the walls and in the doors alarm station, and identified in the
of the reactor control room the location within current Sec.
shall be bullet-resisting. which the last 73.55(c)(6),
Sec. 73.55(d)(1) The access control (d)(1), and (e)(1).
individual responsible for function for access Specific reference
the last access control to the protected to walls, doors,
function (controlling area is performed, ceiling, floor, and
admission to the protected must be bullet- any windows in the
area) must be isolated resisting. walls, doors,
within a bullet-resisting ceiling, and floor
structure as described in would be deleted to
Paragraph (c)(6) of this clarify that all
section to assure his or construction
her ability to respond or features would be
summon assistance. required to meet
Sec. 73.55(e)(1) The the bullet
onsite central alarm resisting
station must be considered requirement, and
a vital area and its walls, therefore remove
doors, ceiling, floor, and the potential for
any windows in the walls confusion where a
and in the doors must be structural feature
bullet-resisting.. such as sky-lights
would not be
listed. The
Commission does not
intend to suggest
that penetrations,
such as heating/
cooling ducts be
made bullet-
resistant, but
rather that the
licensee implement
appropriate
measures to prevent
the exploitation of
such features in a
manner consistent
with the intent of
the bullet-
resisting
requirement to
ensure the required
functions performed
in these locations
are protected and
maintained.
[[Page 62698]]
(e)(6)(vi) All This requirement
exterior areas would be added to
within the provide a
protected area must performance based
be periodically requirement for
checked to detect monitoring exterior
and deter areas of the
unauthorized protected area to
activities, facilitate
personnel, achievement of the
vehicles, and requirements
materials. described by the
proposed paragraph
(b).
(e)(7) Vital areas.. This header would be
added for
formatting
purposes.
Sec. 73.55(c)(1) The (e)(7)(i) Vital This requirement
licensee shall locate vital equipment must be would be retained
equipment only within a located only within with minor
vital area, which in turn, vital areas, which revision. The
shall be located within a in turn must be phrase ``of
protected area such that located within sufficient strength
access to vital equipment protected areas so to meet the
requires passage through at that access to performance
least two physical barriers vital equipment requirements of
of sufficient strength to requires passage paragraph (a) of
meet the performance through at least this section''
requirements of paragraph two physical would be replaced
(a) of this section. barriers designed with the phrase
and constructed to ``designed and
perform the constructed to
required function, perform the
except as otherwise required function''
approved by the for consistency
Commission in with the proposed
accordance with requirements for
paragraph (f)(2) of physical barriers
this section. discussed
throughout this
proposed Sec.
73.55(e). The
phrase ``except as
otherwise approved
by the Commission
in accordance with
paragraph (f)(2) of
this section''
would be added to
account for the
condition addressed
by paragraph
(f)(2).
Sec. 73.55(c)(1) More than (e)(7)(ii) More than This requirement
one vital area may be one vital area may would be retained.
located within a single be located within a
protected area. single protected
area.
Sec. 73.55(e)(1) The (e)(7)(iii) The This requirement
onsite central alarm reactor control would retain and
station must be considered room, the spent combine two current
a vital area and * * *. fuel pool, requirements from
Sec. 73.55(e)(1) Onsite secondary power 10 CFR 73.55(e)(1),
secondary power supply supply systems for for protecting
systems for alarm intrusion detection these areas
annunciator equipment and and assessment equivalent to a
non-portable communications equipment, non- vital area. The
equipment as required in portable Commission added
paragraph (f) of this communications the ``spent fuel
section must be located equipment, and the pool'' to emphasize
within vital areas.. central alarm the Commission view
station, must be that because of
provided protection changes to the
equivalent to vital threat environment
equipment located the spent fuel pool
within a vital area. must also be
provided this
protection. The
phrase ``alarm
annunciator'' would
be replaced with
``intrusion
detection and
assessment'' to
clarify the
application of this
proposed
requirement to
intrusion detection
sensors and video
assessment
equipment as well
as the alarm
annunciation
equipment.
(e)(7)(iv) Vital This requirement
equipment that is would be added to
undergoing provide a
maintenance or is performance based
out of service, or requirement
any other change to consistent with the
site conditions proposed Sec.
that could 73.58 Safety/
adversely affect Security Program.
plant safety or
security, must be
identified in
accordance with
Sec. 73.58, and
adjustments must be
made to the site
protective
strategy, site
procedures, and
approved security
plans, as necessary.
Sec. 73.55(e)(3) All (e)(7)(v) The This requirement
emergency exits in each licensee shall would retain and
protected area and each protect all vital combine two current
vital area shall be alarmed. areas, vital area requirements 10 CFR
Sec. 73.55(d)(7)(D) Lock access portals, and 73.55(e)(3) and
and protect by an activated vital area (d)(7)(D) with
intrusion alarm system all emergency exits minor revision for
unoccupied vital areas.. with intrusion formatting
detection equipment purposes. The
and locking phrase ``Emergency
devices. Emergency exit locking
exit locking devices shall be
devices shall be designed to permit
designed to permit exit only'' would
exit only. be added to provide
a performance based
requirement to
describe the
function to be
provided by
emergency exit
locking devices.
Sec. 73.55(d)(7)(D) Lock (e)(7)(vi) This requirement
and protect by an activated Unoccupied vital would retain the
intrusion alarm system all areas must be current requirement
unoccupied vital areas. locked. to lock unoccupied
vital areas with
minor revision for
formatting
purposes. The
current requirement
to alarm all vital
areas would be
moved to the
proposed paragraph
(e)(7)(v) of this
section.
(e)(8) Vehicle This header would be
barrier system. The added for
licensee must: formatting
purposes.
[[Page 62699]]
Sec. 73.55(c)(7) Vehicle (e)(8)(i) Prevent This requirement
control measures, including unauthorized would be retained
vehicle barrier systems, vehicle access or and revised to
must be established to proximity to any provide a
protect against use of a area from which any requirement for
land vehicle, as specified vehicle, its protection against
by the Commission, as a personnel, or its any vehicle within
means of transportation to contents could the context of the
gain unauthorized proximity disable the design basis threat
to vital areas. personnel, described in Sec.
equipment, or 73.1. Because of
systems necessary changes to the
to meet the threat environment,
performance the meaning of the
objective and word ``proximity''
requirements remains the same
described in but is applied to
paragraph (b) of include all
this section. locations from
which the design
basis threat could
disable the
personnel,
equipment, or
systems required to
prevent
radiological
sabotage.
(e)(8)(ii) Limit and This requirement
control all vehicle would be added to
approach routes. provide a
requirement for
limiting and
controlling vehicle
access routes to
the site for the
purpose of
protecting the
facility against
vehicle bomb
attacks and the use
of vehicles as a
means of
transporting
personnel and
materials that
would be considered
a threat. Because
of changes to the
threat environment
the Commission has
determined that
control of all
vehicle approach
routes is a
critical element of
the onsite physical
protection program.
(e)(8)(iii) Design This requirement
and install a would be added to
vehicle barrier require the
system, to include licensee to
passive and active determine the
barriers, at a potential effects a
stand-off distance vehicle bomb could
adequate to protect have on the
personnel, facility and to
equipment, and establish a barrier
systems against the system at a stand-
design basis threat. off distance
sufficient to
protect personnel,
equipment and
systems. Because of
changes to the
threat environment,
the Commission
views stand-off
distances to be a
critical element of
the onsite physical
protection program
and which require
continuing analysis
and evaluation to
maintain
effectiveness.
(e)(8)(iv) Deter, This requirement
detect, delay, or would be added to
prevent vehicle use ensure the licensee
as a means of maintains the
transporting capability to
unauthorized deter, detect,
personnel or delay, or prevent
materials to gain unauthorized access
unauthorized access beyond a vehicle
beyond a vehicle barrier system.
barrier system, Because of changes
gain proximity to a to the threat
protected area or environment, the
vital area, or Commission views
otherwise penetrate the vehicle threat
the protected area to be a critical
perimeter. element of the
onsite physical
protection program
that requires
continual analysis
and evaluation to
maintain
effectiveness. This
proposed
requirement would
include vehicles
that do not reach
the full capability
of the design basis
threat.
(e)(8)(v) This requirement
Periodically check would be added
the operation of consistent with the
active vehicle current requirement
barriers and of Sec.
provide a secondary 73.55(g)(1) and
power source or a would apply to the
means of mechanical operation of active
or manual vehicle barriers
operation, in the within time lines
event of a power required to prevent
failure to ensure unauthorized
that the active vehicle access,
barrier can be despite the loss of
placed in the the primary power
denial position source. The term
within the time ``periodically''
line required to would be intended
prevent to allow the
unauthorized licensees to
vehicle access establish checks at
beyond the required a frequency
standoff distance. necessary to ensure
active barriers
remain effective
for both denial and
non-denial
operation.
(e)(8)(vi) Provide This requirement
surveillance and would be added to
observation of provide a
vehicle barriers requirement for the
and barrier systems licensee to monitor
to detect the integrity of
unauthorized barriers to verify
activities and to availability when
ensure the needed and to
integrity of each prevent or detect
vehicle barrier and tampering. Because
barrier system. of changes to the
threat environment,
the Commission
views the vehicle
bomb consideration
to be a critical
element of the
onsite physical
protection program
which requires
continuing analysis
and evaluation to
maintain
effectiveness.
[[Page 62700]]
(e)(9) Waterways.... This header would be
added for
formatting
purposes.
(e)(9)(i) The This requirement
licensee shall would be added to
control waterway provide a
approach routes or requirement for
proximity to any controlling
area from which a waterway approach
waterborne vehicle, routes consistent
its personnel, or with the
its contents could requirement of the
disable the proposed paragraph
personnel, (e)(9)(ii) of this
equipment, or section. Because of
systems necessary changes to the
to meet the threat environment,
performance the Commission
objective and views waterway
requirements approach routes and
described in control measures to
paragraph (b) of be a critical
this section. element of the
onsite physical
protection program
and one that
requires continual
analysis and
evaluation to
maintain
effectiveness.
(e)(9)(ii) The This requirement
licensee shall would be added to
delineate areas provide a
from which a requirement for
waterborne vehicle notifying
must be restricted unauthorized
and install individuals that
waterborne vehicle access is not
control measures, permitted, and the
where applicable. installation of
barriers where
appropriate.
(e)(9)(iii) The This requirement
licensee shall would be added to
monitor waterway provide a
approaches and requirement for
adjacent areas to monitoring waterway
ensure early approaches
detection, consistent with
assessment, and other monitoring
response to and surveillance
unauthorized requirements of
activity or this proposed
proximity, and to section.
ensure the
integrity of
installed
waterborne vehicle
control measures.
(e)(9)(iv) Where This requirement
necessary to meet would be added to
the requirements of provide a
this section, requirement to
licensees shall coordinate where
coordinate with necessary with
local, State, and other agencies
Federal agencies having
having jurisdiction jurisdictional
over waterway authority over
approaches. waterways to ensure
that the proposed
requirements of
this section would
be met.
(e)(10) Unattended This requirement
openings in any would be added to
barrier established provide a
to meet the requirement for all
requirements of openings in any
this section that OCA, PA, or VA
are 620 cm\2\ (96.1 barrier to ensure
in\2\) or greater that the intended
in total area and function of the
have a smallest barrier is met. The
dimension of 15 cm phrase ``consistent
(5.9 in) or with the intended
greater, must be function of each
secured and barrier'' would
monitored at a describe the
frequency that criteria for making
would prevent a determination to
exploitation of the secure or monitor
opening consistent openings of this
with the intended size where the
function of each intended function
barrier. of the barrier
would be
compromised if the
opening is not
secured or
monitored. The size
of the opening
described is a
commonly accepted
standard throughout
the security
profession for
application to any
security program
and one that
represents an
opening large
enough for a person
to exploit.
Therefore, the
Commission has
determined that
openings meeting
the stated criteria
require measures to
prevent
exploitation.
(f) Target sets..... This header would be
added for
formatting
purposes.
(f)(1) The licensee This requirement
shall document in would be added to
site procedures the provide a
process used to performance based
develop and requirement for the
identify target licensee to
sets, to include document how each
analyses and target set was
methodologies used developed to
to determine and facilitate review
group the target of the licensee
set equipment or methodology by the
elements. Commission. The
Commission has
determined that
because of changes
to the threat
environment the
identification and
protection of all
target sets would
be a critical
component for the
development and
implementation of
the licensee
protective strategy
and the capability
of the licensee to
prevent significant
core damage and
spent fuel
sabotage,
therefore,
providing
protection against
radiological
sabotage and
satisfying the
performance
objective and
requirements stated
in the proposed
paragraph (b) of
this section.
[[Page 62701]]
(f)(2) The licensee This requirement
shall consider the would be added to
effects that cyber ensure cyber
attacks may have attacks associated
upon individual with advancements
equipment or in the area of
elements of each automated computer
target set or technology are
grouping. considered and the
affects that such
attacks may have on
the integrity of
individual target
set equipment and
elements is
accounted for in
the licensee
protective
strategy.
(f)(3) Target set This requirement
equipment or would be added to
elements that are provide a
not contained performance based
within a protected requirement to
or vital area must identify and
be explicitly account for this
identified in the condition in the
approved security approved security
plans and plans, if it exists
protective measures at a site.
for such equipment
or elements must be
addressed by the
licensee's
protective strategy
in accordance with
appendix C to this
part.
(f)(4) The licensee This requirement
shall implement a would be added to
program for the require the
oversight of plant licensee to
equipment and establish and
systems documented implement a program
as part of the that focuses on
licensee protective ensuring that
strategy to ensure certain plant
that changes to the equipment and
configuration of systems are
the identified periodically
equipment and checked to ensure
systems do not that unauthorized
compromise the configuration
licensee's changes or
capability to tampering would be
prevent significant identified and an
core damage and appropriate
spent fuel sabotage. response initiated.
Based on changes to
the threat
environment, the
Commission has
determined this
would be an
appropriate
enhancement to the
licensee onsite
physical protection
program.
(g) Access control.. This header would be
added for
formatting
purposes.
(g)(1) The licensee This header would be
shall: added for
formatting
purposes.
Sec. 73.55(d)(1) The (g)(1)(i) Control This requirement
licensee shall control all all points of would be retained
points of personnel and personnel, vehicle, and revised with
vehicle access into a and material access minor revisions.
protected area. into any area, or Most significantly,
beyond any physical the phrase ``a
barrier or barrier protected area''
system, established would be replaced
to meet the by the phrase ``any
requirements of area, or beyond any
this section. physical barrier or
barrier system,
established to meet
the requirements of
this section'' to
clarify that the
focus of this
proposed
requirement would
not be limited to
only protected area
access but would
apply to any area
for which access
must be controlled
to meet
complimentary
requirements
addressed in this
proposed rule. In
addition, the word
``material'' would
be added to
emphasize that the
control of material
into these areas
would also be a
critical element of
the onsite physical
protection program
to facilitate
achievement of the
performance
objective of the
proposed paragraph
(b) of this
section.
Sec. 73.55(d)(7)(i)(B) (g)(1)(ii) Control This requirement
Positively control, in all points of would be retained
accordance with the access personnel and with minor
list established pursuant vehicle access into revisions.
to paragraph (d)(7)(i) of vital areas in
this section, all points of accordance with
personnel and vehicle access
access to vital areas. authorization lists.
Sec. 73.55(d)(7)(i) * * * (g)(1)(iii) During This requirement
limit unescorted access to non-emergency would be retained
vital areas during conditions, limit and revised with
nonemergency conditions to unescorted access minor revisions.
individuals who require to the protected Most significantly,
access in order to perform area and vital the phrase
their duties. To achieve areas to only those ``protected area''
this, the licensee shall: individuals who would be added to
require unescorted emphasize that the
access to perform same ``assigned
assigned duties and duties and
responsibilities. responsibilities''
criteria apply to
both vital and
protected areas.
[[Page 62702]]
(g)(1)(iv) Monitor This requirement
and ensure the would be added to
integrity of access provide a
control systems. requirement for
ensuring the
integrity of the
access control
system and prevent
its unauthorized
bypass. Based on
changes to the
threat environment,
the Commission has
determined that
emphasis would be
necessary to ensure
that the integrity
of the access
control system is
maintained through
oversight and that
attempts to
circumvent or
bypass the
established process
will be detected
and access denied.
(g)(1)(v) Provide This requirement
supervision and would be added to
control over the provide a
badging process to requirement for
prevent ensuring the
unauthorized bypass integrity of the
of access control access control
equipment located process. Based on
at or outside of changes to the
the protected area. threat environment,
the Commission has
determined that
specific emphasis
on access control
equipment outside
the protected area
would be necessary
to ensure that the
integrity of the
access control
system is
maintained for
those process
elements that are
not contained
within the
protected area.
Sec. 73.55(d)(1) The (g)(1)(vi) Isolate This requirement
individual responsible for the individual would be retained
the last access control responsible for the and revised with
function (controlling last access control minor revisions.
admission to the protected function Most significantly,
area) must be isolated (controlling the phrase ``as
within a bullet-resisting admission to the described in
structure as described in protected area) paragraph (c)(6) of
paragraph (c)(6) of this within a bullet- this section''
section to assure his or resisting structure would be deleted
her ability to respond or to assure the because the
to summon assistance. ability to respond specific criteria
or to summon for bullet-
assistance in resisting would no
response to longer be addressed
unauthorized in the referenced
activities. paragraph. Specific
criteria would be
addressed in
standards published
by the Underwriters
Laboratory (UL).
(g)(1)(vii) In This requirement
response to would be added to
specific threat and require two
security specific actions to
information, be taken by the
implement a two- licensee where
person (line-of- credible threat
sight) rule for all information is
personnel in vital provided. This
areas so that no proposed
one individual is requirement would
permitted first require that
unescorted access the two-person rule
to vital areas. be implemented, and
Under these second, that
conditions the measures be
licensee shall implemented to
implement measures verify that the two-
to verify that the person rule is met
two person rule has when access to a
been met when a vital area is
vital area is gained. This
accessed. proposed
requirement would
include those areas
identified in the
proposed (e)(8)(iv)
of this section to
be protected as
vital areas. Based
on changes to the
threat environment,
the Commission has
determined that the
proposed
requirement is
necessary to
facilitate licensee
achievement of the
performance
objective of the
proposed paragraph
(b) of this
section.
(g)(2) In accordance This requirement
with the approved would be added to
security plans and specify the basic
before granting functions that must
unescorted access be satisfied to
through an access meet the current
control point, the and proposed
licensee shall: requirements for
controlling access
into any area for
which access
controls are
implemented.
Sec. 73.55(d)(1) (g)(2)(i) Confirm This requirement
Identification * * * of all the identity of would retain the
individuals unless individuals. current requirement
otherwise provided herein with minor
must be made and * * *. revisions for
formatting
purposes.
Sec. 73.55(d)(1) * * * (g)(2)(ii) Verify This requirement
authorization must be the authorization would retain the
checked at these points. for access of current requirement
individuals, with minor
vehicles, and revisions for
materials. formatting
purposes.
Sec. 73.55(d)(1) * * * (g)(2)(iii) Search This requirement
search of all individuals individuals, would retain the
unless otherwise provided vehicles, packages, current requirement
herein must be made and * * deliveries, and with minor
*. materials in revisions for
accordance with formatting
paragraph (h) of purposes.
this section.
[[Page 62703]]
(g)(2)(iv) Confirm, This requirement
in accordance with would be added to
industry shared describe an
lists and acceptable
databases, that information sharing
individuals have mechanism used by
not been denied licensees to share
access to another information about
licensed facility. visitors and
employees who have
requested either
escorted or
unescorted access
to at least one
site. Based on
changes to the
threat environment,
the Commission has
determined that
this proposed
requirement would
be a prudent
enhancement to the
licensee
capabilities.
(g)(3) Access This header would be
control points must added for
be: formatting
purposes.
(g)(3)(i) Equipped This requirement
with locking would be added to
devices, intrusion describe the types
detection of equipment
equipment, and determined to be
monitoring, acceptable to
observation, and satisfy the desired
surveillance level of
equipment, as performance
appropriate. intended by the
proposed
requirements of
this section. The
phrase ``as
appropriate'' would
be used to provide
the flexibility
needed to provide
only that equipment
that is required to
accomplish the
desired function of
the specific access
control point.
Sec. 73.55(d)(1) The (g)(3)(ii) Located This requirement
licensee shall control all outside or would be added to
points of personnel and concurrent with, clarify the
vehicle access into a the physical location of access
protected area. barrier system control points to
through which it ensure personnel
controls access. and vehicles do not
gain access beyond
a barrier (i.e.,
stand-off distance)
before being
searched.
(g)(4) Emergency This header would be
conditions. added for
formatting
purposes.
Sec. 73.55(d)(7)(ii) (g)(4)(i) The This requirement
Design the access licensee shall would be retained
authorization system to design the access with minor
accommodate the potential control system to revision. Most
need for rapid ingress or accommodate the significantly, the
egress of individuals potential need for phrase ``access
during emergency conditions rapid ingress or authorization
or situations that could egress of system'' would be
lead to emergency authorized replaced with the
conditions. To help assure individuals during phrase ``access
this, the licensee shall: emergency control system'' to
conditions or clarify that the
situations that focus of this
could lead to proposed
emergency requirement is on
conditions. controlling access
during emergency
conditions. The
need for rapid
ingress and egress
is a physical
action and would
more appropriately
be addressed
through access
controls.
Also, the phrase
``authorized
individuals'' would
be added to
indicate that
access
authorization
requirements are
satisfied by the
individual in
advance of the need
for access. In
addition, the
phrase ``To help
assure this, the
licensee shall:''
would be deleted
because it would no
longer be needed.
Sec. 73.55(d)(7)(ii)(A) (g)(4)(ii) Under This requirement
Ensure prompt access to emergency would be retained
vital equipment. conditions, the and revised to add
licensee shall a performance based
implement requirement that
procedures to the licensee
ensure that: develop and
(g)(4)(ii)(A) maintain a process
Authorized by which prompt
emergency personnel access to vital
are provided prompt equipment is
access to affected assured while at
areas and the same time
equipment.. ensuring the
(g)(4)(ii)(B) detection of
Attempted or actual unauthorized entry,
unauthorized entry and that this
to vital equipment process would be
is detected.. implemented in a
(g)(4)(ii)(C) The manner that is
capability to consistent with the
prevent significant proposed
core damage and requirements of
spent fuel sabotage this section and
is maintained.. ensures the
licensee capability
to satisfy the
performance
objective of the
proposed paragraph
(b) of this
section.
[[Page 62704]]
(g)(4)(iii) The This requirement
licensee shall would be added to
ensure that provide a
restrictions for performance based
site access and requirement for
egress during coordination of
emergency security access
conditions are controls during
coordinated with emergencies with
responses by the access needs of
offsite emergency emergency response
support agencies personnel. This
identified in the proposed
site emergency requirement is
plans. intended to provide
the necessary level
of flexibility to
the licensee to
ensure access by
appropriate
personnel while
maintaining the
necessary security
posture for
controlling access
to areas where
dangerous
conditions exist,
such as violent
conflict involving
weapons.
(g)(5) Vehicles..... This header would be
added for
formatting
purposes.
Sec. 73.55(d)(4) The (g)(5)(i) The This requirement
licensee shall exercise licensee shall would be retained
positive control over all exercise control and revised to
such designated vehicles to over all vehicles apply to all
assure that they are used while inside the vehicles and not be
only by authorized persons protected area and limited to only
and for authorized purposes. vital areas to designated
ensure they are vehicles. Most
used only by significantly, the
authorized persons phrase ``all such
and for authorized designated
purposes. vehicles'' would be
deleted to remove
this limitation and
clarify that the
proposed
requirement applies
to any vehicle
granted access. The
word ``positive''
would be deleted to
remove
uncertainties
regarding the
meaning of this
word.
Sec. 73.55(d)(4) All (g)(5)(ii) Vehicles This requirement
vehicles, except designated inside the would be retained
licensee vehicles, protected area or and would contain a
requiring entry into the vital areas must be significant
protected area shall be operated by an revision to relieve
escorted by a member of the individual the licensee from
security organization while authorized the current
within the protected area, unescorted access requirement to
and * * *. to the area, or escort a vehicle
must be escorted by operated by an
an individual individual who
trained, qualified, otherwise has
and equipped to unescorted access
perform vehicle and relief from the
escort duties, requirement that a
while inside the member of the
area. security
organization must
escort vehicles.
The phrase
``escorted by a
member of the
security
organization''
would be replaced
with the phrase
``operated by an
individual
authorized
unescorted access
to the area, or
must be escorted
while inside the
area'' to allow
personnel
authorized
unescorted access,
to operate the
vehicle without
escort and to allow
a vehicle to be
escorted by an
individual other
than a member of
the security
organization if the
operator is not
authorized
unescorted access.
Training and
qualification
requirements for
escorts would be
addressed in the
proposed Sec.
73.55(g)(7) and
(g)(8).
Sec. 73.55(d)(4) (g)(5)(iii) Vehicles This requirement
Designated licensee inside the would be retained
vehicles shall be limited protected area must and revised. Most
in their use to onsite be limited to plant significantly, the
plant functions and shall functions or phrase ``Designated
remain in the protected emergencies, and licensee'' would be
area except for must be disabled deleted to broaden
operational, maintenance, when not in use. the scope of this
repair security and proposed
emergency purposes. requirement to all
vehicles. Also, the
phrase ``shall
remain in the
protected area
except for
operational,
maintenance, repair
security and
emergency
purposes'' would be
deleted because it
would no longer be
needed. The word
``disabled'' would
be added to specify
that when not in
use all vehicles
must be rendered
non-operational
such that the
vehicle would not
be in a ready-to-
use configuration.
(g)(5)(iv) Vehicles This requirement
transporting would be added to
hazardous materials ensure the control
inside the of hazardous
protected area must material
be escorted by an deliveries. The
armed member of the Commission has
security determined that the
organization. level of control
described by this
proposed
requirement is
prudent and
necessary to
satisfy the
performance
objective of the
proposed paragraph
(b) of this
section.
(g)(6) Access This header would be
control devices. added for
formatting
purposes.
[[Page 62705]]
Sec. 73.55(d)(5) A (g)(6)(i) This requirement
numbered picture badge Identification would be retained
identification system shall badges. The and revised with
be used for all individuals licensee shall minor revisions.
who are authorized access implement a Most significantly,
to protected areas without numbered photo the phrase ``and
escort. identification vital areas'' is
badge/key-card added to provide
system for all necessary focus
individuals that badges apply
authorized to both the
unescorted access protected area and
to the protected vital areas. Access
area and vital to the protected
areas. area does not
include access to a
vital area except
as required to
perform duties.
Sec. 73.55(d)(5)(ii) (g)(6)(i)(A) This requirement
Badges may be removed from Identification would be retained
the protected area when badges may be and revised with
measures are in place to removed from the minor revisions.
confirm the true identity protected area only Most significantly,
and authorization for when measures are the phrase ``upon
access of the badge holder in place to confirm entry to the
upon entry to the protected the true identity protected area''
area. and authorization would be replaced
for unescorted with the phrase
access of the badge ``before allowing
holder before unescorted access
allowing unescorted to the protected
access to the area'' to clarify
protected area. that the
performance to be
achieved would be
to confirm and
verify access
authorization
before granting
access to any
individual.
Sec. 73.55(d)(5)(ii) (g)(6)(i)(B) Except This requirement
Badges shall be displayed where operational would retain the
by all individuals while safety concerns current requirement
inside the protected area. require otherwise, to display badges
identification at all times and
badges must be would be revised to
clearly displayed address the
by all individuals exception to this
while inside the proposed
protected area and requirement. The
vital areas. phrase ``Except
where operational
safety concerns
require
otherwise,'' would
be added to account
for considerations
such as
radiological
control
requirements or
foreign material
exclusion
requirements, that
may preclude this
requirement. In
addition, the word
``clearly'' would
be added to
describe the
expected
performance that
badges would be
visible to provide
an indication of
authorization to be
in the area.
(g)(6)(i)(C) The This requirement
licensee shall would be added to
maintain a record, account for
to include the name technological
and areas to which advancements
unescorted access commonly associated
is granted, of all with electronically
individuals to whom based badging
photo systems used by
identification licensees. The
badge/key-cards Commission has
have been issued. determined that
this proposed
requirement is
prudent and
necessary because
such a record would
be automatically
made as a standard
function and intent
of this type of
system. In
addition, badging
systems commonly
used by licensees
include the ability
to program remote
card-readers which
are designed to
grant or deny
access to specific
areas based upon
the information
electronically
associated with
specific badges/key-
cards. This
proposed
requirement would
not specify the
media in which this
record must be
maintained to allow
for electronic
storage.
Sec. 73.55(d)(8) All keys, (g)(6)(ii) Keys, This requirement
locks, combinations, and locks, would be retained
related access control combinations, and and revised with
devices used to control passwords. All minor revisions.
access to protected areas keys, locks, Most significantly,
and vital areas must be combinations, the word
controlled to reduce the passwords, and ``passwords'' would
probability of compromise. related access be added to account
control devices for technological
used to control advancements
access to protected associated with the
areas, vital areas, use of computers.
security systems, The phrase
and safeguards ``security systems,
information must be and safeguards
controlled and information'' would
accounted for to be added to
reduce the emphasize the need
probability of to control access
compromise. The to these items. The
licensee shall: phrase ``and
accounted for''
would be added to
confirm possession
by the individual
to whom the access
control device has
been issued.
[[Page 62706]]
Sec. 73.55(d)(8) The (g)(6)(ii)(A) Issue This requirement
licensee shall issue keys, access control would be retained
locks, combinations, and devices only to and revised with
other access control individuals who minor revisions.
devices to protected areas require unescorted Most significantly,
and vital areas only to access to perform the phrase
persons granted unescorted official duties and ``protected areas
facility access. responsibilities. and vital areas''
would be replaced
with the phrase
``to perform
official duties and
responsibilities''
to account for
access control
devices to items or
systems that may be
located outside of
protected and vital
areas, such as to
computer systems
and safeguards
information storage
cabinets. The
phrase ``keys,
locks,
combinations, and
other access
control devices''
would be replaced
by the phrase
``access control
devices'' to
generically
describe these
items and account
for other
technological
advancements that
may occur in the
future.
(g)(6)(ii)(B) This requirement
Maintain a record, would be added to
to include name and facilitate
affiliation, of all achievement of the
individuals to whom current requirement
access control to control access
devices have been control devices to
issued, and reduce the
implement a process probability of
to account for compromise. The use
access control of key control logs
devices at least and annual
annually. inventories is a
commonly used
mechanism for any
security system and
therefore, the
Commission has
determined that
this proposed
requirement is a
prudent and
necessary
enhancement to
facilitate the
licensee's
capability to
achieve the
performance
objective of the
proposed paragraph
(b) of this
section.
Sec. 73.55(d)(8) Whenever (g)(6)(ii)(C) This requirement
there is evidence or Implement would be retained
suspicion that any key, compensatory and revised to
lock, combination, or measures upon provide a
related access control discovery or performance based
device may have been suspicion that any requirement for
compromised, it must be access control compensatory
changed or rotated. device may have measures taken in
been compromised. response to
Compensatory compromise. Most
measures must significantly, the
remain in effect phrase ``it must be
until the changed or
compromise is rotated'' would be
corrected. captured in the
proposed Sec.
73.55(g)(6)(ii) (D)
and (E). The phrase
``Compensatory
Measures must
remain in effect
until the
compromise is
corrected'' would
be added to provide
focus specific to
when compensatory
measures would no
longer apply.
Sec. 73.55(d)(8) Whenever (g)(6)(ii)(D) This requirement
there is evidence or Retrieve, change, would be retained
suspicion that any key, rotate, deactivate, and revised with
lock, combination, or or otherwise minor revisions.
related access control disable access Most significantly,
devices may have been control devices the words
compromised, it must be that have been, or ``retrieve'',
changed or rotated. may have been ``deactivate'', and
compromised. ``disable'' would
be added to ensure
focus is provided
on these actions
relative to
ensuring control of
access control
devices and to
account for
electronic devices.
Sec. 73.55(d)(7)(C) (g)(6)(ii)(E) This requirement
Revoke, in the case of an Retrieve, change, would retain and
individual's involuntary rotate, deactivate, combine two current
termination for cause, the or otherwise requirements to
individual's unescorted disable all access specify the actions
facility access and control devices required to control
retrieve his or her issued to access control
identification badge and individuals who no devices issued to
other entry devices, as longer require personnel who no
applicable, prior to or unescorted access longer possess a
simultaneously with to the areas for need for access.
notifying this individual which the devices The Commission has
of his or her termination. were designed. determined that the
Sec. 73.55(d)(8) Whenever cause for
an individual's unescorted revocation of
access is revoked due to unescorted access
his or her lack of authorization does
trustworthiness, not effect the
reliability, or inadequate actions needed to
work performance, keys, reduce the
locks, combinations, and probability of
related access control compromise.
devices to which that Therefore, the same
person had access must be actions are
changed or rotated. necessary whether
access is revoked
under favorable or
unfavorable
conditions.
Whenever an
individual no
longer requires
access to an area
the access control
devices issued to
that individual
would be retrieved,
changed, rotated,
deactivated, or
otherwise disabled
to provide high
assurance that the
individual would
not continue to
have access to the
item or location.
(g)(7) Visitors..... This header would be
added for
formatting
purposes.
[[Page 62707]]
Sec. 73.55(d)(6) (g)(7)(i) The This requirement
Individuals not authorized licensee may permit would retain the
by the licensee to enter escorted access to current requirement
protected areas without the protected area to provide escorted
escort shall be escorted by to individuals who access with minor
a watchman or other do not have revisions. This
individual designated by unescorted access proposed
the licensee while in a authorization in requirement would
protected area and shall be accordance with the address visitor
badged to indicate that an requirements of access and would
escort is required. Sec. 73.56 and specify that anyone
part 26 of this who has not
chapter. The satisfied the
licensee shall: requirements of
Sec. 73.56 and
part 26 of this
chapter would be
considered to be a
visitor. The
current requirement
for escorts would
be addressed in
proposed Sec.
73.55(g)(8).
(g)(7)(i)(A) This requirement
Implement would be added to
procedures for require
processing, implementing
escorting, and procedures that
controlling describe how
visitors. visitors would be
processed,
escorted, and
controlled.
(g)(7)(i)(B) Confirm This requirement
the identity of would be added to
each visitor require the
through physical verification of the
presentation of a true identity of
recognized non-employee
identification card individuals through
issued by a local, the presentation of
State, or Federal photographic
Government agency government issued
that includes a identification
photo or contains (i.e., driver's
physical license) which
characteristics of provides physical
the individual characteristics
requesting escorted that can be
access. compared to the
holder. The word
``recognized''
would be used to
provide flexibility
for other types of
identification that
may be issued by
local, State or
Federal
Governments.
Sec. 73.55(d)(6) In (g)(7)(i)(C) This requirement
addition, the licensee Maintain a visitor would be retained
shall require that each control register in with minor
individual register his or which all visitors revision.
her name, date, time, shall register
purpose of visit, their name, date,
employment affiliation, time, purpose of
citizenship, and name of visit, employment
the individual to be affiliation,
visited. citizenship, and
name of the
individual to be
visited before
being escorted into
any protected or
vital area.
Sec. 73.55(d)(6) (g)(7)(i)(D) Issue a This requirement
Individuals not authorized visitor badge to would be retained
by the licensee to enter all visitors that with minor revision
protected areas without clearly indicates for formatting
escort shall * * * be that an escort is purposes. Most
badged to indicate that an required. significantly, the
escort is required. word ``clearly''
would be added to
focus on display of
the badge in a
manner that easily
identifies the
individual as
requiring an
escort.
Sec. 73.55(d)(6) (g)(7)(i)(E) Escort This requirement
Individuals not authorized all visitors, at would retain the
by the licensee to enter all times, while requirement for
protected areas without inside the escort with minor
escort shall be escorted by protected area and revision for
a watchman or other vital areas. formatting
individual designated by purposes. Most
the licensee while in a significantly, the
protected area and * * *. requirement for who
performs these
escort duties is
moved to the
proposed paragraph
(g)(8) of this
section.
Sec. 73.55(d)(5)(i) An (g)(7)(ii) This requirement
individual not employed by Individuals not would be retained
the licensee but who employed by the with minor
requires frequent and licensee but who revisions. Most
extended access to require frequent significantly, the
protected and vital areas and extended phrase ``shall
may be authorized access to unescorted access satisfy the access
such areas without escort to the protected authorization
provided that he receives a area and vital requirements of
picture badge upon entrance areas shall satisfy Sec. 73.56 and
into the protected area the access part 26 of this
which must be returned upon authorization chapter'' would be
exit from the protected requirements of added to clarify
area and which indicates: Sec. 73.56 and the requirement
part 26 of this that these
chapter and shall individual's
be issued a non- satisfy the same
employee photo background check
identification requirements and
badge that is Behavior
easily Observation Program
distinguished from participation that
other would be applied to
identification any other licensee
badges before being employee for
allowed unescorted unescorted access
access to the authorization. In
protected area. Non- addition, the
employee photo phrase ``which must
identification be returned upon
badges must exit from the
indicate: protected area''
would be deleted
because removal of
badges from the
protected area
would be addressed
in the proposed
paragraph
(g)(6)(i)(A).
Sec. 73.55(d)(5)(i)(A) Non- (g)(7)(ii)(A) Non- This requirement
employee, no escort employee, no escort would be retained
required; required. with minor revision
for formatting
purposes.
Sec. 73.55(d)(5)(i)(B) (g)(7)(ii)(B) Areas This requirement
Areas to which access is to which access is would be retained
authorized; and authorized. with minor revision
for formatting
purposes.
Sec. 73.55(d)(5)(i)(c) The (g)(7)(ii)(C) The This requirement
period for which access has period for which would be retained
been authorized. access is with minor revision
authorized. for formatting
purposes.
(g)(7)(ii)(D) The This requirement
individual's would be added to
employer. facilitate
identification of
this type of non-
employee and the
type of activities
this individual
should be
performing.
[[Page 62708]]
(g)(7)(ii)(E) A This requirement
means to determine would be added for
the individual's emergency planning
emergency plan purposes.
assembly area.
(g)(8) Escorts. The This requirement
licensee shall would be added to
ensure that all provided
escorts are trained performance based
in accordance with requirements for
appendix B to this satisfying the
part, the approved escort requirements
training and of this proposed
qualification plan, rule and would
and licensee provide regulatory
policies and stability through
procedures. the consistent
application of
visitor controls at
all sites. Based on
changes to the
threat environment,
the Commission has
determined that
emphasis on the
identification and
control of visitors
is a prudent and
necessary
enhancement to
facilitate licensee
achievement of the
performance basis
of the proposed
paragraph (b)(1) of
this section.
(g)(8)(i) Escorts This requirement
shall be authorized would be added to
unescorted access establish a basic
to all areas in qualification
which they will criteria for
perform escort individuals
duties. performing escort
duties. Individuals
not authorized
unescorted access
to an area must be
escorted and
therefore, would
not be qualified to
perform escort
duties in that
area.
(g)(8)(ii) This requirement
Individuals would be added to
assigned to escort establish a basic
visitors shall be qualification
provided a means of criteria for
timely individuals
communication with performing escort
both alarm stations duties. The phrase
in a manner that ``timely
ensures the ability communication''
to summon would mean the
assistance when ability to call for
needed. assistance before
that ability can be
taken away.
(g)(8)(iii) This requirement
Individuals would be added to
assigned to vehicle establish a basic
escort duties shall qualification
be provided a means criteria for
of continuous individuals
communication with performing escort
both alarm stations duties. The word
to ensure the ``continuous
ability to summon communication''
assistance when would mean
needed. possession of a
direct line of
communication for
immediate
notification, such
as a radio.
(g)(8)(iv) Escorts This requirement
shall be would be added to
knowledgeable of establish a basic
those activities qualification
that are authorized criteria for
to be performed individuals
within the areas performing escort
for which they are duties. The primary
assigned to perform responsibility of
escort duties and an escort would be
must also be the identification
knowledgeable of and reporting of
those activities unauthorized
that are authorized activities,
to be performed by therefore, to
any individual for perform escort
which the escort is duties the
assigned individual must
responsibility. possess this
knowledge in order
to be an effective
escort and
recognize an event
involving an
unauthorized
activity.
(g)(8)(v) Visitor to This requirement
escort ratios shall would be added to
be limited to 10 to establish a basic
1 in the protected restriction to
area and 5 to 1 in ensure that
vital areas, individuals
provided that the performing escort
necessary duties are able to
observation and maintain control
control over the personnel
requirements of being escorted. The
this section can be phrase ``provided
maintained by the that the necessary
assigned escort observation and
over all visitor control
activities. requirements of
this section can be
maintained'' would
provide flexibility
for the licensee to
reduce the
specified ratios to
facilitate
achievement of the
performance
objective of the
proposed paragraph
(b).
(h) Search programs. This header would be
added for
formatting
purposes.
Sec. 73.55(d)(2) At the (h)(1) At each This requirement
point of personnel and designated access would be retained
vehicle access into a control point into with minor
protected area, all hand- the owner revisions. Most
carried packages shall be controlled area and significantly, the
searched for devices such protected area, the phrase ``for
as firearms, explosives, licensee shall devices such as
and incendiary devices, or search individuals, firearms,
other items which could be vehicles, packages, explosives, and
used for radiological deliveries, and incendiary devices,
sabotage. materials in or other items
accordance with the which could be used
requirements of for radiological
this section and sabotage'' would be
the approved replaced with the
security plans, phrase ``in
before granting accordance with the
access. requirements of
this section and
the approved
security plans'' to
provide language
that would make
this proposed
requirement
generically
applicable to all
searches.
[[Page 62709]]
Sec. 73.55(d)(2) At the (h)(1)(i) The This requirement
point of personnel and objective of the would be retained
vehicle access into a search program must and revised to
protected area, all hand- be to deter, focus this proposed
carried packages shall be detect, and prevent requirement on the
searched for devices such the introduction of objective of the
as firearms, explosives, unauthorized search program for
and incendiary devices, or firearms, all areas and not
other items which could be explosives, limit the search
used for radiological incendiary devices, function to only
sabotage. or other protected and vital
unauthorized areas. The
materials and Commission has
devices into determined that
designated areas in because of changes
which the to the threat
unauthorized items environment, the
could be used to focus of protective
disable personnel, measures must be to
equipment, and protect any area
systems necessary from which the
to meet the licensee capability
performance to meet the
objective and performance
requirements of objective and
paragraph (b) of requirements of the
this section. proposed paragraph
(b) of this section
could be disabled
or destroyed.
Sec. 73.55(d)(1) The (h)(1)(ii) The This requirement
search function for search requirements would be retained
detection of firearms, for unauthorized with minor
explosives, and incendiary firearms, revisions. The
devices must be explosives, phrase ``or other
accomplished through the incendiary devices, unauthorized
use of both firearms and or other materials and
explosive detection unauthorized devices'' would be
equipment capable of materials and added to account
detecting those devices. devices must be for future
accomplished technological
through the use of advancements. The
equipment capable phrase ``and
of detecting these through visual and
unauthorized items hands-on physical
and through visual searches'' would be
and hands-on added to ensure
physical searches, these aspects of
as needed to ensure the search process
all items are are considered and
identified before applied when
granting access. needed.
(h)(1)(iii) Only This requirement
trained and would be added for
qualified members consistency with
of the security the current Sec.
organization, and 73.55(b)(4)(i), and
other trained and clarification for
qualified personnel ``observation'' of
designated by the search activities
licensee, shall by personnel. The
perform search phrase ``other
activities or be trained and
assigned duties and qualified personnel
responsibilities designated by the
required to satisfy licensee'' would be
observation used to account for
requirements for non-security
the search personnel who would
activities. be assigned search
duties relative to
supply or warehouse
functions or other
types of bulk
shipments.
(h)(2) The licensee This requirement
shall establish and would be added for
implement written consistency with
search procedures the current Sec.
for all access 73.55(b)(3)(i).
control points
before granting
access to any
individual,
vehicle, package,
delivery, or
material.
(h)(2)(i) Search This requirement
procedures must would be added for
ensure that items consistency with
possessed by an the current Sec.
individual, or 73.55(d)(1)
contained within a relative to the use
vehicle or package, of search equipment
must be clearly and to specify a
identified as not requirement for the
being a prohibited licensee to
item before identify items that
granting access may be obscured
beyond the access from observation by
control point for equipment such as X-
which the search is ray equipment. This
conducted. requirement would
ensure that human
interaction with
search equipment is
effective and that
assigned personnel
are aware of all
items observed or
are not identified
by search
equipment.
(h)(2)(ii) The This requirement
licensee shall would be added for
visually and consistency with
physically hand the current Sec.
search all 73.55(d)(1),
individuals, relative to the
vehicles, and purpose of the
packages containing search function to
items that cannot identify items that
be or are not may be obscured
clearly identified from observation by
by search equipment. equipment such as X-
ray equipment. This
proposed
requirement intends
to ensure that the
licensee take
appropriate actions
to ensure all items
granted access to
the PA would be
identified before
granting access.
Sec. 73.55(d)(1) Whenever (h)(3) Whenever This requirement
firearms or explosives search equipment is would be retained
detection equipment at a out of service or with minor
portal is out of service or is not operating revisions. The
not operating satisfactorily, phrase ``firearms
satisfactorily, the trained and or explosives
licensee shall conduct a qualified members detection equipment
physical pat-down search of of the security at a portal'' would
all persons who would organization shall be replaced with
otherwise have been subject conduct a hands-on the phrase ``search
to equipment searches. physical search of equipment `` to
all individuals, generically
vehicles, packages, describe this
deliveries, and equipment. The
materials that phrase ``a physical
would otherwise pat-down search''
have been subject would be replaced
to equipment with the phrase ``a
searches. hands-on physical
search'' to update
the language
commonly used to
describe this
activity.
[[Page 62710]]
Sec. 73.55(d)(1) When the (h)(4) When an This requirement
licensee has cause to attempt to would be retained
suspect that an individual introduce with minor
is attempting to introduce unauthorized items revisions to
firearms, explosives, or has occurred or is provide additional
incendiary devices into suspected, the performance based
protected areas, the licensee shall requirements
licensee shall conduct a implement actions relative to
physical pat-down search of to ensure that the achieving the
that individual. suspect desired results.
individuals,
vehicles, packages,
deliveries, and
materials are
denied access and
shall perform a
visual and hands-on
physical search to
determine the
absence or
existence of a
threat.
(h)(5) Vehicle This requirement
search procedures would be added to
must be performed provide a
by at least two (2) performance based
properly trained requirement for
and equipped performing vehicle
security personnel, searches. This
at least one of proposed
whom is positioned requirement would
to observe the ensure that
search process and unauthorized
provide a timely activities would be
response to identified and a
unauthorized timely response
activities if would be initiated
necessary. at a vehicle search
area, to include an
armed response.
Based on changes to
the threat
environment, the
Commission has
determined that
this requirement
would facilitate
achievement of the
performance
objective and
requirements of the
proposed paragraph
(b) of this
section.
Sec. 73.55(d)(4) Vehicle (h)(6) Vehicle areas This requirement
areas to be searched shall to be searched must would be retained
include the cab, engine include, but are with minor
compartment, undercarriage, not limited to, the revisions.
and cargo area. cab, engine
compartment,
undercarriage, and
cargo area.
(h)(7) Vehicle This requirement
search checkpoints would be added to
must be equipped provide additional
with video performance based
surveillance requirements
equipment that must relative to
be monitored by an achieving the
individual capable desired results for
of initiating and vehicle searches at
directing a timely any location
response to designated for the
unauthorized performance of
activity. vehicle searches.
To satisfy this
proposed
requirement, the
individual assigned
to monitor search
activities need not
be located in the
CAS or SAS, but
rather may be
located in any
position from which
the monitoring and
notification
requirements of
this section could
be assured.
Sec. 73.55(d)(1) * * * (h)(8) Exceptions to This requirement
except bona fide Federal, the search would retain,
State, and local law requirements of combine, and revise
enforcement personnel on this section must two current
official duty to these be submitted to the requirements Sec.
equipment searches upon Commission for 73.55(d)(1) and (4)
entry into a protected area. prior review and to generically
Sec. 73.55(d)(4) * * * approval and must account for those
except under emergency be identified in instances where
conditions, shall be the approved search requirements
searched for items which security plans. would not be met
could be used for sabotage before granting
purposes prior to entry access beyond a
into the protected area. physical barrier.
This proposed
requirement would
require that the
licensee specify in
the approved plans
the specific
circumstances under
which search
requirements would
not be satisfied.
Sec. 73.55(d)(3) * * * (h)(8)(i) Vehicles This requirement
except those Commission and items that may would be retained
approved delivery and be excepted from and revised. Most
inspection activities the search significantly, this
specifically designated by requirements of requirement would
the licensee to be carried this section must be revised to
out within vital or be escorted by an ensure that
protected areas for reasons armed individual vehicles and items
of safety, security or who is trained and excepted from
operational necessity. equipped to observe search requirements
offloading and before entry into
perform search the protected area
activities at the are escorted by an
final destination armed individual
within the and searched when
protected area. offloaded to
provide assurance
that unauthorized
personnel and items
would be detected
and reported.
Sec. 73.55(d)(4) * * * to (h)(8)(ii) To the This requirement
the extent practicable, extent practicable, would be retained
shall be off loaded in the items excepted from with minor
protected area at a search must be off revision.
specific designated loaded only at
materials receiving area specified receiving
that is not adjacent to a areas that are not
vital area. adjacent to a vital
area.
(h)(8)(iii) The This requirement
excepted items must would be added to
be searched at the provide a
receiving area and performance based
opened at the final requirement that
destination by an would ensure that
individual familiar the proposed
with the items. requirement for
search is met at
the receiving area.
Sec. 73.55(i) This header would be
Detection and added for
assessment systems.. formatting
purposes.
[[Page 62711]]
(i)(1) The licensee This requirement
shall establish and would be added for
maintain an consistency with
intrusion detection the current
and assessment requirement of 10
system that must CFR 73.55(e)(1) and
provide, at all the proposed Sec.
times, the 73.55(b)(2) through
capability for (4). The phrase
early detection and ``intrusion
assessment of detection and
unauthorized assessment system''
persons and would be intended
activities. to describe all
components (i.e.,
personnel,
procedures, and
equipment)
designated by the
licensee as
performing a
function(s)
required to detect
or assess
unauthorized
activities in any
area to which
access must be
controlled to meet
Commission
requirements. The
term ``system''
refers to how these
components interact
to satisfy
Commission
requirements. This
proposed
requirement does
not mandate
specific intrusion
detection equipment
for any specific
area, but rather
requires that the
system provide
detection and
assessment
capabilities that
meet Commission
requirements. The
phrase ``at all
times'' is used to
describe the
Commission's view
that the licensee
must have in place
and operational a
mechanism by which
all threats will be
detected and an
appropriate
response initiated,
at any time.
The Commission does
not mean to suggest
that a failure of
any component of a
system would
constitute an
automatic non-
compliance with
this proposed
requirement
provided the
failure is
identified and
compensatory
measures are
implemented within
a time frame
consistent with the
time lines
necessary to
prevent
exploitation of the
failure, beginning
at the time of the
failure.
Sec. 73.55(e)(1) All (i)(2) Intrusion This requirement
alarms required pursuant to detection equipment would be retained
this part must annunciate must annunciate, with three
in a continuously manned and video significant
central alarm station assessment revisions. The most
located within the equipment images significant
protected area and in at shall display, revision would be
least one other concurrently in at the deletion of the
continuously manned station least two current language
not necessarily onsite, so continuously that describes
that a single act cannot staffed onsite where the secondary
remove the capability of alarm stations, at alarm station may
calling for assistance or least one of which be located. Because
otherwise responding to an must be protected of changes to the
alarm. in accordance with threat environment
the requirements of the Commission has
paragraphs determined that to
(e)(6)(v), ensure the
(e)(7)(iii), and functions required
(i)(8)(ii) of this to be performed by
section. the central alarm
are maintained,
both alarm stations
must be located
onsite. As all
current licensees
have their
secondary alarm
station onsite, the
Commission has
determined that
deletion of the
``not necessarily
onsite'' provision,
would have no
impact.
The second
significant
revision is the
addition of the
word
``concurrently'' to
provide a
performance based
requirement that
focuses on the need
to ensure that both
alarm station
operators are
notified of a
potential threat,
are capable of
making a timely and
independent
assessment, and
have equal
capabilities to
ensure that a
timely response is
made. This proposed
requirement would
be necessary for
consistency with
the current
requirement to
protect against a
single act. The
third significant
revision would be
the addition of the
phrase ``and video
assessment
equipment images
shall display'' to
add a performance
based requirement
that focuses on the
relationship
between detection
and assessment.
[[Page 62712]]
(i)(3) The This requirement
licensee's would be added to
intrusion detection provide performance
system must be based requirements
designed to ensure consistent with the
that both alarm current Sec.
station operators: 73.55(e)(1), and
(i)(3)(i) Are the proposed
concurrently requirements of
notified of the this proposed
alarm annunciation. section. The
(i)(3)(ii) Are proposed
capable of making a requirement for
timely assessment dual knowledge and
of the cause of dual capability
each alarm within both alarm
annunciation. stations provides a
(i)(3)(iii) Possess defense-in-depth
the capability to component
initiate a timely consistent with the
response in proposed
accordance with the requirement for
approved security protection against
plans, licensee a single act.
protective
strategy, and
implementing
procedures.
Based on changes to
the threat
environment the
Commission has
determined this
proposed
requirement is a
prudent
clarification of
current
requirements
necessary to
facilitate the
licensee capability
to achieve the
performance
objective of the
proposed paragraph
(b)(1) of this
section.
(i)(4) Both alarm This requirement
stations must be would be added for
equipped with consistency with
equivalent the current Sec.
capabilities for 73.55(e)(1) and the
detection and proposed
communication, and requirements for
must be equipped defense-in-depth
with functionally and protection
equivalent against a single
assessment, act. The word
monitoring, ``equivalent''
observation, and would require the
surveillance licensee to provide
capabilities to both alarm stations
support the with detection and
effective communication
implementation of equipment that
the approved ensures each alarm
security plans and station operator is
the licensee knowledgeable of an
protective strategy alarm annunciation
in the event that at each alarm point
either alarm and zone, and can
station is disabled. communicate the
initiation of an
appropriate
response to include
the disposition of
each alarm. The
phrase
``functionally
equivalent'' would
require that both
alarm stations be
equally equipped to
perform those
assessment,
surveillance,
observation, and
monitoring
functions needed to
support the
effective
implementation of
the licensee
protective
strategy.
This proposed
requirement would
clarify the
Commission
expectation that
those video
technologies and
capabilities used
to support the
effective
implementation of
the approved
security plans and
the licensee
protective strategy
are equally
available for use
by both alarm
station operators
to ensure that the
functions of
detection,
assessment, and
communications can
be effectively
maintained and
utilized in the
event that one or
the other alarm
station is
disabled. Based on
changes to the
threat environment
the Commission has
determined that
this proposed
requirement is a
prudent and
necessary
clarification of
current
requirements and
Commission Orders
necessary to ensure
the performance
objective and
requirements of the
proposed paragraph
(b) of this section
are met.
Sec. 73.55(e)(1) * * * so (i)(4)(i) The This requirement
that a single act cannot licensee shall would be retained
remove the capability of ensure that a and revised to
calling for assistance or single act cannot provide additional
otherwise responding to an remove the clarification
alarm. capability of both regarding the
alarm stations to critical functions
detect and assess determined
unauthorized essential and which
activities, respond must be maintained
to an alarm, summon to carry out an
offsite assistance, effective response
implement the to threats
protective consistent with the
strategy, provide proposed
command and performance
control, or objective and
otherwise prevent requirements of
significant core paragraph (b) of
damage and spent this section.
fuel sabotage.
[[Page 62713]]
Sec. 73.55(e)(1) Onsite (i)(4)(ii) The alarm This requirement
secondary power supply station functions would retain the
systems for alarm in paragraph (i)(4) current requirement
annunciator equipment * * *. of this section for secondary power
must remain with two
operable from an significant
uninterruptible revisions. First,
backup power supply the phrase
in the event of the ``annunciator
loss of normal equipment'' would
power. be replaced with
the phrase ``alarm
station functions''
to ensure that the
equipment required
by each alarm
station to fulfill
its assigned
functions, are
available and
operational without
interruption due to
a loss of normal
power. Second, the
word
``uninterruptible''
would be added to
clarify the
Commission's view
that the operation
of detection and
assessment
equipment must be
maintained without
interruption, in
the event of a loss
of normal power.
Backup power supply
for non-portable
communication
equipment is
addressed in the
proposed paragraph
(j)(5) of this
section. Based on
changes to the
threat environment,
the Commission has
determined that
this proposed
requirement is
prudent and
necessary to
facilitate
achievement of the
performance
objective and
requirements of the
proposed paragraph
(b) of this
section.
(i)(5) Detection. This requirement
Detection would be added for
capabilities must consistency with
be provided by the current Sec.
security 73.55(c)(4) and to
organization provide a
personnel and performance based
intrusion detection requirement for
equipment, and detection equipment
shall be defined in to be capable of
implementing operating under
procedures. known/normal site
Intrusion detection conditions such as
equipment must be heat, wind,
capable of humidity, fog,
operating as cold, snowfall,
intended under the etc. Equipment
conditions failure and
encountered at the abnormal or severe
facility. weather cannot
always be predicted
but compensatory
measures would be
required in
accordance with the
proposed
requirements of
this section to
ensure compliance.
(i)(6) Assessment. This requirement
Assessment would be added for
capabilities must consistency with
be provided by the current Sec.
security 73.55(c)(4) and to
organization provide a
personnel and video performance based
assessment requirement for
equipment, and assessment
shall be described equipment to be
in implementing capable of
procedures. Video operating under
assessment known/normal site
equipment must be conditions such as
capable of heat, wind,
operating as humidity, fog,
intended under the cold, snowfall,
conditions etc. Equipment
encountered at the failure and
facility and must abnormal or severe
provide video weather cannot
images from which always be predicted
accurate and timely but compensatory
assessments can be measures would be
made in response to required in
an alarm accordance with the
annunciation or proposed
other notification requirements of
of unauthorized this section to
activity. ensure compliance.
(i)(7) The licensee This requirement
intrusion detection would be added for
and assessment formatting
system must: purposes.
(i)(7)(i) Ensure This requirement
that the duties and would be added to
responsibilities provide a
assigned to performance based
personnel, the use requirement
of equipment, and relative to the
the implementation design of the
of procedures licensee detection
provides the and assessment
detection and system and to
assessment clarify that this
capabilities system would
necessary to meet include all three
the requirements of components.
paragraph (b) of
this section.
Sec. 73.55(e)(2) The (i)(7)(ii) Ensure This requirement
annunciation of an alarm at that annunciation would be retained
the alarm stations shall of an alarm with minor
indicate the type of alarm indicates the type revision. The
(e.g., intrusion alarms, and location of the phrase ``at the
emergency exit alarm, etc.) alarm. alarm stations''
and location. and the listed
examples would be
deleted because
they would no
longer be needed.
Sec. 73.55(e)(2) All alarm (i)(7)(iii) Ensure This requirement
devices including that alarm devices, would be retained
transmission lines to to include with minor revision
annunciators shall be transmission lines for formatting
tamper indicating and self- to annunciators, purposes.
checking. are tamper
indicating and self-
checking.
[[Page 62714]]
(i)(7)(iv) Provide This requirement
visual and audible would be added for
alarm annunciation consistency with
and concurrent the proposed
video assessment requirement for
capability to both equivalent
alarm stations in a capabilities in
manner that ensures both alarm
timely recognition, stations. The
acknowledgment and phrase ``visual and
response by each audible'' would
alarm station provide redundancy
operator in to ensure that each
accordance with alarm would be
written response recognized and
procedures. acknowledged when
received.
Sec. 73.55(e)(2) * * * (i)(7)(v) Provide an This requirement
e.g., an automatic automatic would be retained
indication is provided when indication when the with minor revision
failure of the alarm system alarm system or a for formatting
or a component occurs, or component of the purposes.
when the system is on alarm system fails,
standby power. or when the system
is operating on the
backup power supply.
Sec. 73.70(f) A record at (i)(7)(vi) Maintain This requirement
each onsite alarm a record of all would be added for
annunciation location of alarm consistency with
each alarm, false alarm, annunciations, the Sec. 73.70(f).
alarm check, and tamper cause of each The Commission
indication that identifies alarm, and the expects that this
the type of alarm, disposition of each record would be a
location, circuit, date, alarm. commonly maintained
and time. In addition, record in
details of response by electronic form
facility guards and which is generated
watchmen to each alarm, as an automatic
intrusion, or other function of the
incident shall be recorded. intrusion detection
system.
(i)(8) Alarm This header would be
stations. added for
formatting
purposes.
Sec. 73.55(e)(1) All (i)(8)(i) Both alarm This requirement
alarms required pursuant to stations must be would retain the
this part must annunciate continuously current requirement
in a continuously manned staffed by at least Sec. 73.55(e)(1)
central alarm station one trained and for continuously
located within the qualified member of staffed alarm
protected area and in at the security stations and would
least one other organization. be revised to
continuously manned station describe the
* * *. necessary
qualifications that
would be required
of the assigned
individuals.
Sec. 73.55(e)(1) The (i)(8)(ii) The This requirement
onsite central alarm interior of the would be retained
station must be located central alarm with minor
within a building in such a station must not be revision. Most
manner that the interior of visible from the significantly, the
the central alarm station perimeter of the phrase ``located
is not visible from the protected area. within a building''
perimeter of the protected would be deleted
area. because it would be
considered
unnecessary.
Sec. 73.55(e)(1) This (i)(8)(iii) The This requirement
station must not contain licensee may not would be retained
any operational activities permit any with minor
that would interfere with activities to be revisions to
the execution of the alarm performed within provide a
response function. either alarm performance based
station that would requirement
interfere with an regarding the
alarm station primary duties
operator's ability required to satisfy
to effectively the current
execute assigned requirement
detection, ``execution of the
assessment, alarm response
surveillance, and function.''
communication
duties and
responsibilities.
(i)(8)(iv) The This requirement
licensee shall would be added for
assess and respond consistency with
to all alarms and current
other indications requirements. The
of unauthorized specific
activities in requirements of the
accordance with the current Sec.
approved security 73.55(h)(4) are
plans and retained in detail
implementing in the proposed
procedures. appendix C to part
73.
(i)(8)(v) The This requirement
licensee would be added for
implementing consistency with
procedures must related
ensure that both requirements of
alarm station this proposed
operators are section and to
knowledgeable of ensure that the
all alarm licensee provides a
annunciations, process by which
assessments, and both alarm station
final disposition operators are
of all alarms, to concurrently made
include but not aware of each alarm
limited to a and are
prohibition from knowledgeable of
changing the status how each alarm is
of a detection resolved and that
point or no one alarm
deactivating a station operator
locking or access can manipulate
control device at a alarm station
protected or vital equipment,
area portal, communications, or
without the procedures without
knowledge and the knowledge and
concurrence of the concurrence of the
other alarm station other.
operator.
(i)(9) Surveillance, This header would be
observation, and added for
monitoring. formatting
purposes.
(i)(9)(i) The onsite This requirement
physical protection would be added to
program must provide a
include the performance based
capability for requirement for
surveillance, ensuring
observation, and surveillance,
monitoring in a observation, and
manner that monitoring
provides early capabilities in any
detection and area for which
assessment of these measures are
unauthorized necessary to meet
activities. the requirements of
this proposed
section.
[[Page 62715]]
(i)(9)(ii) The This requirement
licensee shall would be added to
provide continual provide a
surveillance, performance based
observation, and requirement for
monitoring of all ensuring
areas identified in surveillance,
the approved observation, and
security plans as monitoring
requiring capabilities in any
surveillance, area for which
observation, and these measures are
monitoring to necessary to meet
ensure early the requirements of
detection of this proposed
unauthorized section. The word
activities and to ``continual'' would
ensure the mean regularly
integrity of recurring actions
physical barriers such that
or other components designated areas
of the onsite would be checked at
physical protection intervals
program. sufficient to
ensure the
detection of
unauthorized
activities.
(i)(9)(ii)(A) This requirement
Continual would be added to
surveillance, provide necessary
observation, and qualifying
monitoring requirements for
responsibilities performance of
must be performed observation and
by security monitoring
personnel during activities. The
routine patrols or word ``continual''
by other trained would mean the same
and equipped as used in the
personnel proposed paragraph
designated as a (i)(9)(ii) of this
component of the section.
protective strategy.
(i)(9)(ii)(B) This requirement
Surveillance, would be added to
observation, and provide a
monitoring performance based
requirements may be requirement for
accomplished by ensuring that
direct observation surveillance,
or video technology. observation, and
monitoring
capabilities that
may be met through
the use of video
technology or
direct human
observation.
(i)(9)(iii) The This requirement
licensee shall would be added to
provide random focus a performance
patrols of all based requirement
accessible areas on the protection
containing target of target set
set equipment. equipment. Target
set equipment would
be addressed in
detail in the
proposed paragraph
(f) of this
section. The term
``random'' provides
flexibility to the
licensee and
requires patrols at
unpredictable times
within
predetermined
intervals to deter
exploitation of
periods between
patrols. The phrase
``accessible
areas'' would
exclude areas such
as locked high
radiation areas or
other such areas
containing a
significant safety
concern that would
preclude the
conduct of the
patrol function.
(i)(9)(iii)(A) Armed This requirement
security patrols would be added to
shall periodically focus on the items
check designated that, because of
areas and shall changes to the
inspect vital area threat environment,
entrances, portals, the Commission has
and external determined would
barriers. require focus by
armed security
patrols. The term
``periodically''
provides
flexibility to the
licensee. The
phrase ``designated
areas'' means any
area identified by
the licensee as
requiring an action
to meet the
proposed
requirements of
this section.
(i)(9)(iii)(B) This requirement
Physical barriers would be added for
must be inspected consistency with
at random intervals the current
to identify requirement Sec.
tampering and 73.55(g)(1) and to
degradation. focus on verifying
the integrity of
physical barriers
to ensure that the
barrier would
perform as
expected. The word
``random'' would
mean that the
required inspection
would be performed
at unpredictable
times to deter
exploitation of
periods between
inspections.
Sec. 73.55(b)(4)(i) The (i)(9)(iii)(C) This requirement
licensee may not permit an Security personnel would be added for
individual to act as a shall be trained to consistency with
guard, watchman, armed recognize the current
response person, or other indications of requirement Sec.
member of the security tampering as 73.55(b)(4)(i) to
organization unless the necessary to provide necessary
individual has been perform assigned focus on the threat
trained, equipped, and duties and of tampering and
qualified to perform each responsibilities as the need to ensure
assigned security job duty. they relate to that personnel are
safety and security trained to
systems and recognize it.
equipment.
(i)(9)(iv) This requirement
Unattended openings would be added to
that are not provide a
monitored by performance based
intrusion detection requirement to
equipment must be ensure that
observed by unattended openings
security personnel that cross a
at a frequency that security boundary
would prevent established to meet
exploitation of the proposed
that opening. requirements of
this section would
not be exploited by
the design basis
threat of
radiological
sabotage to include
the use of tools to
enlarge the
opening.
[[Page 62716]]
Sec. 73.55(h)(4) Upon (i)(9)(v) Upon This requirement
detection of abnormal detection of would be retained
presence or activity of unauthorized with minor revision
persons or vehicles * * *, activities, to provide
the licensee security tampering, or other flexibility for the
organization shall * * *. threats, the licensee to
licensee shall determine if all or
initiate actions only part of the
consistent with the protective strategy
approved security capabilities would
plans, the licensee be needed for a
protective specific event. The
strategy, and phrase ``abnormal
implementing presence or
procedures. activity of persons
or vehicles'' would
be replaced with
the phrase
``unauthorized
activities,
tampering, or other
threats'' to
clarify the types
of activities that
would be expected
to warrant a
response by the
licensee.
(i)(10) Video This header would be
technology. added for
formatting
purposes.
(i)(10)(i) The This requirement
licensee shall would be added for
maintain in consistency with
operable condition the current
all video requirement Sec.
technology used to 73.55(g)(1) and
satisfy the would provide a
monitoring, performance based
observation, requirement for
surveillance, and ensuring video
assessment technology is
requirements of operating and
this section. available when
needed.
(i)(10)(ii) Video This header would be
technology must be: added for
formatting
purposes.
(i)(10)(ii)(A) This requirement
Displayed would be added for
concurrently at consistency with
both alarm stations. the other proposed
requirements for
dual alarm stations
and would focus on
the need for video
technology to be
provided to both
alarm stations at
the same time to
ensure that an
assessment would be
made and a timely
response would be
initiated.
(i)(10)(ii)(B) This requirement
Designed to provide would be added for
concurrent consistency with
observation, the other proposed
monitoring, and requirements for
surveillance of dual alarm stations
designated areas and would focus on
from which an alarm the need for the
annunciation or a same capabilities
notification of to be provided to
unauthorized both to ensure
activity is observation,
received. monitoring, and
surveillance
requirements are
met.
(i)(10)(ii)(C) This requirement
Capable of would be added to
providing a timely provide a
visual display from performance based
which positive requirement for
recognition and video technology
assessment of the which focuses on
detected activity the need for clear
can be made and a visual images from
timely response which accurate and
initiated. timely assessment
can be made in
response to alarm
annunciations.
Sec. 73.55(h)(6) To (i)(10)(ii)(D) Used This requirement
facilitate initial response to supplement and would retain the
to detection of penetration limit the exposure current requirement
* * * preferably by means of security to use video
of closed circuit personnel to technology to limit
television or by other possible attack. the exposure of
suitable means which limit security personnel
exposure of responding while performing
personnel to possible security duties
attack. with minor revision
to add patrols.
(i)(10)(iii) The This requirement
licensee shall would be added to
implement controls provide a
for personnel performance based
assigned to monitor requirement
video technology to relative to
ensure that controlling
assigned personnel personnel fatigue
maintain the level related to extended
of alertness periods of
required to monitoring video
effectively perform technology. The
the assigned duties Commission has
and determined that
responsibilities. each individual's
alertness is
critical to the
effective use of
video technology
and the licensee
capability to
achieve the
performance
objective of this
proposed section.
Therefore, licensee
work hour controls
should ensure that
assigned personnel
are relieved of
these duties and
assigned other
duties at intervals
sufficient to
ensure the
individual's
ability to
effectively carry
out assigned duties
and
responsibilities.
(i)(11) Illumination This header would be
added for
formatting
purposes.
[[Page 62717]]
Sec. 73.55(c)(5) Isolation (i)(11)(i) The This requirement
zones and all exterior licensee shall would be retained
areas within the protected ensure that all and revised. Most
area shall be provided with areas of the significantly, this
illumination sufficient for facility, to proposed
the monitoring and include appropriate requirement would
observation requirements of portions of the expand a
paragraphs (c)(3), (c)(4), owner controlled performance based
and (h)(4) of this section, area, are provided lighting
but * * *. with illumination requirement to all
necessary to areas designated by
satisfy the the licensee as
requirements of having a need for
this section. detection,
assessment,
surveillance,
observation, and
monitoring
capabilities in
support of the
protective strategy
and not limit it to
only the isolation
zone and all
exterior areas
within the
protected area.
This requirement
would not require
deterministic
illumination levels
but rather would
require that
illumination levels
be sufficient to
provide the
detection,
assessment,
surveillance,
observation, and
monitoring
capabilities
described by the
licensee in the
approved security
plans. This
description would
be required to
consider the
requirements of the
proposed
(i)(11)(ii) and
(iii).
Sec. 73.55(c)(5) Isolation (i)(11)(ii) The This requirement
zones and all exterior licensee shall would be retained
areas within the protected provide a minimum and revised to
area shall be provided with illumination level provide a
illumination * * * not less of 0.2 footcandle performance based
than 0.2 footcandle measured requirement for
measured horizontally at horizontally at illumination. Most
ground level. ground level, in significantly, this
the isolation zones proposed
and all exterior requirement would
areas within the maintain the
protected area, or current 0.2
may augment the footcandle lighting
facility requirement but
illumination would also provide
system, to include flexibility to a
patrols, licensee to provide
responders, and less than the 0.2
video technology footcandle where
with low-light low-light
technology capable technology would be
of meeting the used to maintain
detection, the capability to
assessment, meet the
surveillance, performance level
observation, for detection,
monitoring, and assessment,
response surveillance,
requirements of observation,
this section. monitoring, and
response. The word
``or'' would be
used specifically
to mean that the
licensee need
satisfy only one of
the two options
such that the 0.2
footcandle
requirement must be
met in the
isolation zone and
all exterior areas
within the
protected area
unless low-light
technology is used.
However, the word
``augment'' would
be used to
represent the
Commission's view
that sole use of
low-light
technology is not
authorized as this
approach would be
contrary to defense-
in-depth and could
be susceptible to
single failure
where a counter
technology is
developed or used.
(i)(11)(iii) The This requirement
licensee shall would be added to
describe in the clarify the need
approved security for lighting to be
plans how the described in the
lighting approved security
requirements of plans and how the
this section are lighting ``system''
met and, if used, would be used to
the type(s) and achieve the
application of low- performance
light technology objective.
used.
Sec. 73.55(f) (j) Communication This header would be
Communication requirements. requirements. retained. The
current
requirements under
this header are
retained and
reformatted to
individually
address each
current
requirement.
Significant
revisions would be
specifically
identified as each
current requirement
is addressed.
Sec. 73.55(f)(1) Each (j)(1) The licensee This requirement
guard, watchman or armed shall establish and would be retained
response individual on duty maintain, with minor
shall be capable of continuous revision. Most
maintaining continuous communication significantly, the
communication with an capability with specific language
individual in each onsite and offsite of the current
continuously manned alarm resources to ensure requirement would
station required by effective command be revised to a
paragraph (e)(1) of this and control during more performance
section * * *. both normal and based requirement.
emergency The word
situations. ``continuous''
would be used to
mean that a
communication
method would be
available and
operating any time
it would be needed
to communicate
information.
[[Page 62718]]
Sec. 73.55(f)(1) * * * who (j)(2) Individuals This requirement
shall be capable of calling assigned to each would be retained
for assistance from other alarm station shall with minor
guards, watchmen, and armed be capable of revision. Most
response personnel and from calling for significantly, in
local law enforcement assistance in order to provide
authorities. accordance with the flexibility and to
approved security capture the
plans, licensee proposed
integrated response requirements of
plan, and licensee appendix C to part
procedures. 73 for an
Integrated Response
Plan, this proposed
requirement
replaces the
specific list of
support entities to
be called with a
performance based
requirement to
follow
predetermined
actions.
Sec. 73.55(f)(1) Each (j)(3) Each on-duty This requirement
guard, watchman or armed security officer, would be retained
response individual on duty watchperson, with minor
shall be capable of vehicle escort, and revisions. Most
maintaining continuous armed response significantly, this
communication with an force member shall proposed
individual in each be capable of requirement would
continuously manned alarm maintaining update the titles
station required by continuous used to identify
paragraph (e)(1) of this communication with the listed
section * * *. an individual in positions and would
each alarm station. add ``vehicle
escorts'' for
consistency with
the proposed
paragraph (g)(8) of
this section.
Sec. 73.55(f)(3) To (j)(4) The following This requirement
provide the capability of continuous would be retained
continuous communication * communication with minor revision
* * and shall terminate in capabilities must for formatting
each continuously manned terminate in both purposes.
alarm station required by alarm stations
paragraph (e)(1) of this required by this
section. section:
Sec. 73.55(f)(2) The alarm (j)(4)(i) This requirement
stations required by Conventional would be retained
paragraph (e)(1) of this telephone service. with minor
section shall have revision. Most
conventional telephone significantly, the
service for communication phrase ``with the
with the law enforcement law enforcement
authorities as described in authorities as
paragraph (f)(1) of this described in
section. paragraph (f)(1) of
this section''
would be deleted
because site plans
and procedures
would contain
protocols for
contacting support
personnel and
agencies.
Sec. 73.55(f)(3) To (j)(4)(ii) Radio or This requirement
provide the capability of microwave would be retained
continuous communication, transmitted two-way with minor
radio or microwave voice revision. Most
transmitted two-way voice communication, significantly, the
communication, either either directly or phrase ``shall be
directly or through an through an established, in
intermediary, shall be intermediary. addition to
established, in addition to conventional
conventional telephone telephone service,
service, between local law between local law
enforcement authorities and enforcement
the facility and * * *. authorities and the
facility and''
would be deleted
because site plans
and procedures
would contain
protocols for
contacting support
personnel and
agencies.
(j)(4)(iii) A system This requirement
for communication would be added for
with all control consistency with
rooms, on-duty the proposed
operations requirements of
personnel, escorts, this section and to
local, State, and provide a
Federal law performance based
enforcement requirement for
agencies, and all communications
other personnel consistent with the
necessary to proposed Integrated
coordinate both Response Plan
onsite and offsite addressed in the
responses. proposed appendix C
to part 73.
Sec. 73.55(f)(4) Non- (j)(5) Non-portable This requirement
portable communications communications would be retained
equipment controlled by the equipment must with minor
licensee and required by remain operable revision. Most
this section shall remain from independent significantly, the
operable from independent power sources in phrase ``controlled
power sources in the event the event of the by the licensee and
of the loss of normal power. loss of normal required by this
power. section'' would be
deleted because
there would be no
requirement for non-
portable
communications
equipment that is
not under licensee
control or not
required by this
section.
(j)(6) The licensee This requirement
shall identify site would be added to
areas where ensure the
communication could capability to
be interrupted or communicate during
cannot be both normal and
maintained and emergency
shall establish conditions, and to
alternative focus attention on
communication the requirement
measures for these that the licensee
areas in must identify site
implementing areas in which
procedures. communications
could be lost and
account for those
areas in their
procedures.
73.55(h) Response (k) Response This header would be
requirement. requirements. retained.
(k)(1) Personnel and This header would be
equipment. added for
formatting
purposes.
[[Page 62719]]
(k)(1)(i) The This requirement
licensee shall would be added to
establish and provide a
maintain, at all performance based
times, the minimum requirement for
number of properly determining the
trained and minimum number of
equipped personnel armed responders
required to needed to protect
intercept, the facility
challenge, delay, against the full
and neutralize capability of the
threats up to and design basis
including the threat. The phrase
design basis threat ``to intercept,
of radiological challenge, delay,
sabotage as defined and neutralize
in Sec. 73.1, to threats up to and
prevent significant including the
core damage and design basis threat
spent fuel sabotage. of radiological
sabotage as defined
in Sec. 73.1, to
prevent significant
core damage and
spent fuel
sabotage'' would be
used for
consistency with
the proposed
paragraphs (b)(2)
through (4) of this
section.
(k)(1)(ii) The This requirement
licensee shall would be added to
provide and provide a
maintain firearms, performance based
ammunition, and requirement to
equipment capable ensure that the
of performing licensee provides
functions weapons that are
commensurate to the capable of
needs of each armed performing the
member of the functions required
security for each armed
organization to individual to
carry out their fulfill their
assigned duties and assigned duties per
responsibilities in the licensee
accordance with the protective
approved security strategy. For
plans, the licensee example, if an
protective individual is
strategy, assigned to a
implementing position for which
procedures, and the the protective
site specific strategy requires
conditions under weapons use at 200
which the firearms, meters, then the
ammunition, and assigned weapon
equipment will be must be capable of
used. that performance as
well as the
individual.
(k)(1)(iii) The This requirement
licensee shall would be added to
describe in the ensure that the
approved security licensee provides,
plans, all firearms in the approved
and equipment to be security plans, a
possessed by and description of the
readily available weapons to be used
to, armed personnel and those equipment
to implement the designated as
protective strategy readily available.
and carry out all
assigned duties and
responsibilities.
This description
must include the
general
distribution and
assignment of
firearms,
ammunition, body
armor, and other
equipment used.
(k)(1)(iv) The This requirement
licensee shall would be added to
ensure that all provide a
firearms, performance based
ammunition, and requirement to
equipment required ensure the
by the protective availability and
strategy are in operability of
sufficient supply, equipment needed to
are in working accomplish response
condition, and are goals and
readily available objectives during
for use in postulated events.
accordance with the The term ``readily
licensee protective available'' would
strategy and mean that required
predetermined time firearms and
lines. equipment are
either in the
individuals
possession or at
pre-staged
locations such that
required response
time lines are met.
(k)(1)(v) The This requirement
licensee shall would be added to
ensure that all provide a
armed members of performance based
the security requirement to
organization are ensure that all
trained in the armed personnel
proper use and meet standard
maintenance of training program
assigned weapons requirements and
and equipment in specific training
accordance with requirements
appendix B to part applicable to the
73. specific weapons
they are assigned,
to include the
maintenance
required for each
to ensure
operability. The
ability for armed
personnel to
trouble-shoot a
problem, such as a
jammed round during
an actual event,
would be considered
a critical function
necessary to
achieve the
performance
objective.
[[Page 62720]]
Sec. 73.55(h)(5) The (k)(2) The licensee This requirement
licensee shall instruct shall instruct each would be retained
every guard and all armed armed response with some revision.
response personnel to person to prevent The term ``guard''
prevent or impede attempted or impede attempted was removed as the
acts of theft or acts of theft or term is no longer
radiological sabotage by radiological used. The phrase
using force sufficient to sabotage by using ``or any other
counter the force directed force sufficient to circumstances as
at him including the use of counter the force authorized by
deadly force when the guard directed at that applicable state
or other armed response person including law'' would be
person has a reasonable the use of deadly added to clarify
belief it is necessary in force when the that applicable
self-defense or in the armed response state law specifies
defense of others. person has a the conditions
reasonable belief under which deadly
that the use of force may be
deadly force is applied. It is
necessary in self- important to note
defense or in the that the use of
defense of others, deadly force should
or any other be a last resort
circumstances as when all other
authorized by lesser measures to
applicable state neutralize the
law. threat have failed.
The conditions
under which deadly
force would be
authorized are
governed by state
laws and nothing in
this proposed rule
should be
interpreted to mean
or require anything
that would
contradict such
state law. The term
``it'' is replaced
with the phrase
``deadly force'' to
more clearly
describe the
action.
(k)(3) The licensee This requirement
shall provide an would be added to
armed response team provide a
consisting of both performance based
armed responders requirement that
and armed security would retain the
officers to carry current requirement
out response for armed
duties, within responders and add
predetermined time a category of armed
lines. security officer to
clarify the
division of types
of armed response
personnel and their
roles.
(k)(3)(i) Armed This header would be
responders. added for
formatting
purposes.
Sec. 73.55(h)(3) The total (k)(3)(i)(A) The This requirement
number of guards, and licensee shall would be retained
armed, trained personnel determine the and revised to
immediately available at minimum number of remove the specific
the facility to fulfill armed responders minimum numbers of
these response requirements necessary to 10, but no less
shall nominally be ten protect against the than 5, to provide
(10), unless specifically design basis threat a performance based
required otherwise on a described in Sec. requirement that
case by case basis by the 73.1(a), subject to meets the proposed
Commission; however, this Commission requirement of
number may not be reduced approval, and shall paragraph (k)(1)(i)
to less than five (5) document this of this section.
guards. number in the This proposed
approved security requirement would
plans. ensure that the
licensee would
provide the
requisite number of
armed responders
needed to carry-out
the protective
strategy, the
effectiveness of
which would be
evaluated through
annual exercises
and triennial
exercises observed
by the Commission.
Sec. 73.55(h)(3) The total (k)(3)(i)(B) Armed This requirement
number of guards, and responders shall be would be retained
armed, trained personnel available at all and revised. Most
immediately available at times inside the significantly, this
the facility to fulfill protected area and proposed
these response requirements may not be assigned requirement would
* * *. any other duties or specify the
responsibilities conditions that
that could must be met to
interfere with satisfy the meaning
assigned response of the word
duties. ``available'' as
used.
(k)(3)(ii) Armed This header would be
security officers. added for
formatting
purposes.
(k)(3)(ii)(A) Armed This requirement
security officers would be added to
designated to provide a
strengthen response performance based
capabilities shall requirement for the
be onsite and licensee to
available at all identify a new
times to carry out category of armed
assigned response personnel to be
duties. used to supplement
and support the
armed responders
identified in the
proposed paragraph
(k)(3)(ii)(A) of
this section.
Sec. 73.55(h)(3) The total (k)(3)(ii)(B) The This requirement
number of guards, and minimum number of would be added to
armed, trained personnel armed security require licensees
immediately available at officers must be to document the
the facility to fulfill documented in the number of armed
these response requirements approved security security officers
shall nominally be * * *. plans. to be used.
(k)(3)((iii) The This requirement
licensee shall would be added for
ensure that consistency with
training and the current
qualification requirement Sec.
requirements 73.55(b)(4)(ii) for
accurately reflect an approved T&Q
the duties and plan and the
responsibilities to current requirement
be performed. for licensees to
document how these
personnel are to be
trained and
qualified.
[[Page 62721]]
(k)(3)(iv) The This requirement
licensee shall would be added for
ensure that all consistency with
firearms, the current Sec.
ammunition, and 73.55(g)(1) to
equipment needed ensure that all
for completing the firearms and
actions described equipment required
in the approved by each member of
security plans and the armed response
licensee protective team would be
strategy are operable and in the
readily available possession of or
and in working available at pre-
condition. staged locations,
to ensure that each
individual is able
to meet the time
lines specified by
the protective
strategy. This
includes those
equipment
designated as
readily available.
(k)(4) The licensee This requirement
shall describe in would be added to
the approved provide regulatory
security plans, consistency for the
procedures for period of time a
responding to an licensee may not
unplanned incident meet the minimum
that reduces the numbers stated in
number of available the approved plans
armed response team because of illness
members below the or injury to an
minimum number assigned individual
documented by the or individuals
licensee in the while on-duty.
approved security
plans.
(k)(5) Protective This requirement
Strategy. Licensees would be added to
shall develop, provide a
maintain, and performance based
implement a written requirement for the
protective strategy development of a
in accordance with protective strategy
the requirements of that specifies how
this section and the licensee will
appendix C to this utilize onsite and
part. offsite, the
resources to ensure
the performance
objective of how
the proposed
paragraph (b) of
this section is
met.
(k)(6) The licensee This proposed
shall ensure that requirement would
all personnel be added to ensure
authorized that both security
unescorted access and non-security
to the protected organization
area are trained personnel are
and understand trained to
their roles and recognize and
responsibilities respond to hostage
during security and duress
incidents, to situations. This
include hostage and proposed training
duress situations. would also include
the specific
actions to be
performed during
these postulated
security events.
Sec. 73.55(h)(4) Upon (k)(7) Upon receipt This requirement
detection of abnormal of an alarm or would be retained
presence or activity of other indication of and revised for
persons or vehicles within threat, the consistency with
an isolation zone, a licensee shall: the proposed
protected area, material requirements of
access area, or a vital this section.
area; or upon evidence or Reference to the
indication of intrusion specific site areas
into a protected area, a would be deleted
material access area, or a because the
vital area, the licensee performance based
security organization requirements of
shall: this proposed
section would be
applicable to all
facility areas, and
therefore such
reference would not
be needed.
Sec. 73.55(h)(4)(i) (k)(7)(i) Determine This requirement
Determine whether or not a the existence of a would be retained
threat exists, threat in with minor
accordance with revision.
assessment
procedures.
Sec. 73.55(h)(4)(ii) (k)(7)(ii) Identify This requirement
Assess the extent of the the level of threat would be retained
threat, if any, present through the with minor
use of assessment revision.
methodologies and
procedures.
Sec. 73.55(h)(4)(iii)(A) (k)(7)(iii) This requirement
Requiring responding guards Determine the would be retained
or other armed response response necessary with revision for
personnel to interpose to intercept, consistency with
themselves * * *. challenge, delay, the proposed
and neutralize the paragraph (b) of
threat in this section.
accordance with the
requirements of
appendix C to part
73, the Commission-
approved safeguards
contingency plan,
and the licensee
response strategy.
Sec. 73.55(h)(4)(iii)(B) (k)(7)(iv) Notify This requirement
Informing local law offsite support would be retained
enforcement agencies of the agencies such as with revision for
threat and requesting local law consistency with
assistance. enforcement, in the Integrated
accordance with Response Plan.
site procedures.
Sec. 73.55(h)(2) The (k)(8) Law This requirement
licensee shall establish enforcement would be retained
and document liaison with liaison. The with minor
local law enforcement licensee shall revision. Most
authorities. document and significantly, this
maintain current proposed
agreements with requirement
local, state, and addresses the need
Federal law to identify the
enforcement resources and
agencies, to response times to
include estimated be expected in
response times and order to facilitate
capabilities. planning
development.
[[Page 62722]]
(l) Facilities using This paragraph would
mixed-oxide (MOX) be added to provide
fuel assemblies. In general provisions
addition to the for the onsite
requirements physical protection
described in this of unirradiated
section for mixed oxide (MOX)
protection against fuel assemblies in
radiological recognition of the
sabotage, operating fact that some
commercial nuclear nuclear power
power reactors reactor facilities
licensed under 10 currently have
CFR parts 50 or 52 chosen or may
and using special choose to possess
nuclear material in and utilize this
the form of MOX type of special
fuel assemblies nuclear material at
shall protect their sites.
unirradiated MOX Because weapons
fuel assemblies grade plutonium is
against theft or utilized in the
diversion. fabrication of MOX
fuel assemblies,
the Commission has
determined that a
threat of theft
applies and that it
is prudent and
necessary to apply
certain security
measures for MOX
fuel that are in
addition to those
that are currently
required at other
nuclear power
reactor facilities.
Therefore, the
requirements
proposed in this
paragraph are
provided to ensure
that these
additional
requirements are
identified and met
by those licensees
who have chosen or
may choose to
utilize MOX fuel.
(l)(1) Licensees This requirement
shall protect the would be added to
unirradiated MOX identify
fuel assemblies applicability of
against theft or this paragraph.
diversion in
accordance with the
requirements of
this section and
the approved
security plans.
(l)(2) Commercial This requirement
nuclear power would be added
reactors using MOX because the
fuel assemblies are Commission has
exempt from the determined that due
requirements of to the low
Sec. Sec. 73.20, plutonium
73.45, and 73.46 concentration,
for the onsite composition of the
physical protection MOX fuel, and
of unirradiated MOX configuration (size
fuel assemblies. and weight) of the
assemblies, the
physical security
protection measures
identified in the
listed regulations
are superceded by
those requirements
addressed in this
proposed section
for unirradiated
MOX fuel assemblies
at nuclear power
reactor facilities.
(l)(3) This header would be
Administrative added for
controls. formatting
purposes.
(l)(3)(i) The This requirement
licensee shall would be added to
describe in the ensure that the
approved security licensee describes
plans, the the onsite physical
operational and protection measures
administrative in the approved
controls to be security plans.
implemented for the
receipt,
inspection,
movement, storage,
and protection of
unirradiated MOX
fuel assemblies.
(l)(3)(ii) The This requirement
licensee shall would be added to
implement the use provide assurance
of tamper- that the
indicating devices unirradiated fuel
for unirradiated assemblies were not
MOX fuel assembly accessed during
transport and shall transport.
verify their use
and integrity
before receipt.
(l)(3)(iii) Upon This requirement
delivery of would be added for
unirradiated MOX formatting
fuel assemblies, purposes.
the licensee shall:
(l)(3)(iii)(A) This requirement
Inspect would be added to
unirradiated MOX ensure that
fuel assemblies for unirradiated MOX
damage. fuel assemblies are
in an acceptable
condition before
use or storage.
(l)(3)(iii)(B) This requirement
Search unirradiated would be added to
MOX fuel assemblies ensure that no
for unauthorized unauthorized
materials. materials were
introduced within
the unirradiated
MOX fuel assembly
during transport.
(l)(3)(iv) The This requirement
licensee may would be added to
conduct the provide a
required inspection performance based
and search requirement that
functions provides
simultaneously. flexibility for
accomplishment of
the proposed
requirements.
(l)(3)(v) The This requirement
licensee shall would be added for
ensure the proper formatting
placement and purposes.
control of
unirradiated MOX
fuel assemblies as
follows:
[[Page 62723]]
(l)(3)(v)(A) At This requirement
least one armed would be added to
security officer, provide deterrence
in addition to the and immediate armed
armed response team response to
required by attempts of theft
paragraphs (h)(4) or tampering. This
and (h)(5) of proposed armed
appendix C to part responder's duty
73, shall be would be solely to
present during the observe and protect
receipt and the unirradiated
inspection of MOX fuel assemblies
unirradiated MOX upon receipt and
fuel assemblies. before storage.
(l)(3)(v)(B) The This requirement
licensee shall would be added to
store unirradiated reduce the risk of
MOX fuel assemblies theft by providing
only within a spent three delay
fuel pool, located barriers before
within a vital gaining
area, so that unauthorized access
access to the to the MOX fuel
unirradiated MOX assembles while in
fuel assemblies storage.
requires passage
through at least
three physical
barriers.
(l)(3)(vi) The This requirement
licensee shall would be added to
implement a ensure that a
material control material control
and accountability and accountability
program for the program would be
unirradiated MOX established and
fuel assemblies implemented and
that includes a would focus on
predetermined and recordkeeping which
documented storage describes the
location for each inventory and
unirradiated MOX location of the
fuel assembly. SSNM within the
assemblies.
(l)(3)(vii) Records This requirement
that identify the would be added to
storage locations ensure restricted
of unirradiated MOX access to records
fuel assemblies are which describe or
considered identify the
safeguards location of
information and unirradiated MOX
must be protected fuel assemblies
and stored in within the spent
accordance with fuel pool.
Sec. 73.21.
(l)(4) Physical This header would be
controls. added for
formatting
purposes.
(l)(4)(i) The This requirement
licensee shall lock would be added to
or disable all provide a
equipment and power performance based
supplies to requirement for
equipment required administrative
for the movement controls over
and handling of equipment and power
unirradiated MOX supplies to
fuel assemblies. equipment required
to physically move
the unirradiated
MOX fuel assemblies
to ensure that at
least two security
measures must be
disabled before
this equipment
could be used.
(l)(4)(ii) The This requirement
licensee shall would be added to
implement a two- provide an
person line-of- administrative
sight rule whenever control to reduce
control systems or the risk of the
equipment required insider threat and
for the movement or theft.
handling of
unirradiated MOX
fuel assemblies
must be accessed.
(l)(4)(iii) The This requirement
licensee shall would be added to
conduct random provide
patrols of areas surveillance
containing activities for the
unirradiated MOX detection of
fuel assemblies to unauthorized
ensure the activities that
integrity of would pose a threat
barriers and locks, to MOX fuel
deter unauthorized assemblies in
activities, and to addition to any
identify similar
indications of requirements of
tampering. this proposed
section.
(l)(4)(iv) Locks, This requirement
keys, and any other would be added to
access control ensure that the
device used to security
secure equipment organization would
and power sources be responsible for
required for the the administrative
movement of controls over
unirradiated MOX access control
fuel assemblies or devices.
openings to areas
containing
unirradiated MOX
fuel assemblies
must be controlled
by the security
organization.
(l)(4)(v) Removal of This requirement
locks used to would be added to
secure equipment ensure that both
and power sources the licensee
required for the security and
movement of operations
unirradiated MOX management level
fuel assemblies or personnel would be
openings to areas responsible for the
containing removal of locks
unirradiated MOX securing MOX fuel
fuel assemblies assemblies.
must require
approval by both
the on-duty
security shift
supervisor and the
operations shift
manager.
(l)(4)(v)(A) At This requirement
least one armed would be added to
security officer ensure that
shall be present to immediate armed
observe activities response capability
involving the is provided before
movement of accessing equipment
unirradiated MOX used to move
fuel assemblies unirradiated MOX
before the removal fuel assemblies.
of the locks and
providing power to
equipment required
for the movement or
handling of
unirradiated MOX
fuel assemblies.
[[Page 62724]]
(l)(4)(v)(B) At This requirement
least one armed would be added to
security officer ensure that
shall be present at immediate armed
all times until response capability
power is removed is provided during
from equipment and any activity
locks are secured. involving the use
of equipment used
to move
unirradiated MOX
fuel assemblies.
(l)(4)(v)(C) This requirement
Security officers would be added to
shall be trained ensure that
and knowledgeable assigned security
of authorized and officers possess
unauthorized the capability to
activities immediately
involving recognize, report,
unirradiated MOX and respond to
fuel assemblies. unauthorized
activities
involving
unirradiated MOX
fuel assemblies.
(l)(5) At least one This requirement
armed security would be added to
officer shall be ensure physical
present and shall protection of
maintain constant unirradiated MOX
surveillance of fuel assemblies
unirradiated MOX when not located
fuel assemblies within an area that
when the assemblies meets the three
are not located in barrier requirement
the spent fuel pool of this proposed
or reactor. rule.
(l)(6) The licensee This requirement
shall maintain at would be added for
all times the consistency with
capability to the proposed
detect, assess, paragraph (b) of
intercept, this section.
challenge, delay,
and neutralize
threats to
unirradiated MOX
fuel assemblies in
accordance with the
requirements of
this section.
(m) Digital computer This header would be
and communication added for
networks. formatting
purposes.
(m)(1) The licensee This requirement
shall implement a would be to ensure
cyber-security that nuclear power
program that plants are
provides high protected from
assurance that cyber attacks via
computer systems, minimizing the
which if potential attack
compromised would pathway and the
likely adversely consequences
impact safety, arising from a
security, and successful cyber
emergency attack.
preparedness, are
protected from
cyber attacks.
(m)(1)(i) The This requirement
licensee shall would be added to
describe the cyber- ensure licensees
security program have a
requirements in the comprehensive
approved security security plan by
plans. integrating cyber-
security into the
overall onsite
physical protection
program. As
licensees take
advantage of
computer technology
to maximize plant
productivity, the
role of computer
systems at nuclear
power plants is
increasing.
Therefore, the
Commission has
determined that
incorporation of a
cyber-security
program into the
Commission-approved
security plans
would be a prudent
and necessary
security
enhancement.
(m)(1)(ii) The This requirement
licensee shall would be added to
incorporate the ensure that the
cyber-security computer systems
program into the used in onsite
onsite physical physical protection
protection program. systems are
protected from
cyber attacks. With
advancements in
computer
technology, many
systems in nuclear
power plants rely
on computers to
perform their
functions,
including some
security functions.
Therefore, the
Commission has
determined that the
integration of
security measures
covering these
systems would be a
prudent and
necessary action.
(m)(1)(iii) The This requirement
cyber-security would be added to
program must be ensure licensees
designed to detect actively and
and prevent cyber proactively secure
attacks on their plants from
protected computer cyber attacks. The
systems. Commission has
determined that
because specific
cyber threats and
the people who seek
unauthorized access
to, or use of
computers are
constantly
changing, protected
computer systems
must be protected
against these
attacks and
mitigation measures
implemented.
(m)(2) Cyber- This requirement
security would be added to
assessment. The require licensees
licensee shall to systematically
implement a cyber- determine the
security assessment status of their
program to plant's cyber risks
systematically and identify
assess and manage vulnerabilities
cyber risks. that need to be
mitigated to reduce
risks to acceptable
levels.
(m)(3) Policies, This header would be
requirements, and added for
procedures. formatting
purposes.
[[Page 62725]]
(m)(3)(i) The This requirement
licensee shall would be added to
apply cyber- create a computer
security security program
requirements and that establishes
policies that specific goals and
identify management assigns
expectations and responsibilities to
requirements for employees to meet
the protection of those goals.
computer systems.
(m)(3)(ii) The This requirement
licensee shall would be added to
develop and ensure the licensee
maintain develops,
implementing implements, and
procedures to enforces, detailed
ensure cyber- guidance documents
security that licensee
requirements and employees would be
policies are required to follow
implemented to meet the stated
effectively. security goals.
(m)(4) Incident This header would be
response and added for
recovery. formatting
purposes.
(m)(4)(i) The This requirement
licensee shall would be added to
implement a cyber- ensure that each
security incident licensee would be
response and prepared to respond
recovery plan to to computer
minimize the security incidents
adverse impact of a in a manner that
cyber-security ensures that plants
incident on safety, are safe and
security, or secure. A computer
emergency security incident
preparedness could result from a
systems. computer virus,
other malicious
code, or a system
intruder, either an
insider or as a
result of an
external attack and
could adversely
impact the
licensee's ability
to effectively
maintain safety,
security, or
emergency
preparedness.
Without an incident
response and
recovery plan,
licensees would
respond to a
computer security
incident in an ad
hoc manner. However
with an incident
response and
recovery plan,
licensees would
respond to an
incident in a quick
and organized
manner. This would
minimize the
adverse impact
caused by a
computer security
incident.
(m)(4)(ii) The cyber- This requirement
security incident would be added to
response and ensure licensees
recovery plan must have a
be described in the comprehensive
integrated response incident response
plan required by plan by integrating
appendix C to this cyber-security into
part. the overall
security of their
plants. As
licensees take
advantage of
computer technology
to maximize plant
productivity, the
role of computer
systems at nuclear
power plants is
increasing as well
as the possibility
for adverse impact
from a computer
mishap. Therefore,
the Commission has
determined that it
would be a prudent
and necessary
action for
licensees to
develop and
implement a
comprehensive
response plan that
includes a cyber
incident response
and recovery plan.
(m)(4)(iii) The This requirement
cyber-security would be added to
incident response ensure that
and recovery plan licensees acquire
must ensure the the capability to
capability to respond to cyber
respond to cyber- incidents in a
security incidents, manner that
minimize loss and contains and
destruction, repairs damage from
mitigate and incidents, and
correct the prevents future
weaknesses that damage. An incident
were exploited, and handling capability
restore systems and/ provides a way for
or equipment plant personnel to
affected by a cyber- report incidents
security incident. and the appropriate
response and
assistance to be
provided to aid in
recovery.
(m)(5) Protective This requirement
strategies. The would be added to
licensee shall incorporate the
implement defense- approach of delay,
in-depth protective detect, and
strategies to respond. The use of
protect computer multiple and
systems from cyber diverse layers of
attacks, detecting, defense would delay
isolating, and the threat from
neutralizing reaching those
unauthorized systems that, if
activities in a compromised, can
timely manner. adversely impact
safety, security,
or emergency
preparedness of the
nuclear power
plants. This delay
in attack would
allow more time to
detect the attack
and would allow
time to respond.
[[Page 62726]]
(m)(6) Configuration This requirement
and control would be added to
management program. implement
The licensee shall configuration
implement a management to
configuration and ensure that the
control management system in operation
program, to include is the correct
cyber risk version
analysis, to ensure (configuration) of
that modifications the system and that
to computer system any changes to be
designs, access made are reviewed
control measures, for security
configuration, implications.
operational Configuration
integrity, and management can be
management process used to help ensure
do not adversely that changes take
impact facility place in an
safety, security, identifiable and
and emergency controlled
preparedness environment and
systems before that they do not
implementation of unintentionally
those modifications. harm any of the
system's
properties,
including its
security.
(m)(7) Cyber- This header would be
security awareness added for
and training.. formatting
purposes.
(m)(7)(i) The This requirement
licensee shall would be added to
implement a cyber- ensure licensees
security awareness implement cyber-
and training security awareness
program. and training
programs to ensure
that appropriate
personnel are aware
of cyber-security
requirements and
have the cyber-
security skills and
competencies
necessary to secure
affected plant
systems and
equipment.
(m)(7)(ii) The cyber- This requirement
security awareness would be added to
and training implement a cyber-
program must ensure security awareness
that appropriate and training
plant personnel, program to:
including 1. Improve employee
contractors, are awareness of the
aware of cyber- need to protect
security computer systems;
requirements and 2. Develop employee
that they receive skills and
the training knowledge so
required to computer users can
effectively perform perform their jobs
their assigned more securely; and
duties and 3. Build in-depth
responsibilities. knowledge, as
needed, to design,
implement, or
operate security
programs for
organizations and
systems.
(n) Security program This header would be
reviews and audits. added for
formatting
purposes.
Sec. 73.55(g)(4)(i)(A) At (n)(1) The licensee This requirement
intervals not to exceed 12 shall review the would be retained
months or * * *. onsite physical with minor revision
protection program for formatting
at intervals not to purposes.
exceed 12 months,
or
Sec. 73.55(g)(4)(i)(B) As (n)(1)(i) As This requirement
necessary, based on an necessary based would be retained
assessment by the licensee upon assessments or with minor
against performance other performance revision.
indicators * * *. indicators.
Sec. 73.55(g)(4)(i)(B) * * (n)(1)(ii) Within 12 This requirement
* as soon as reasonably months after a would be retained
practicable after a change change occurs in and revised. Most
occurs in personnel, personnel, significantly, the
procedures, equipment, or procedures, phrase ``as soon as
facilities that potentially equipment, or reasonably
could adversely affect facilities that practicable'' would
security but no longer than potentially could be deleted and the
12 months after the change. adversely affect current requirement
security. ``12 months'' would
be moved to the
beginning of the
sentence to
eliminate potential
for
misunderstanding
and improve
consistency.
Sec. 73.55(g)(4)(i)(B) In (n)(2) As a minimum, This requirement
any case, each element of each element of the would be retained
the security program must onsite physical with minor
be reviewed at least every protection program revision.
24 months. must be reviewed at
least every twenty-
four (24) months.
Sec. 73.55(g)(4)(i) The (n)(2)(i) The onsite This requirement
licensee shall review physical protection would be retained
implementation of the program review must and revised to
security program by be documented and combine two current
individuals who have no performed by requirements. Most
direct responsibility for individuals significantly, the
the security program independent of word ``documented''
either: those personnel would be added for
Sec. 73.55(g)(4)(ii) The responsible for consistency with
results and recommendations program management the current Sec.
of the security program and any individual 73.55(g)(4)(ii).
review * * * must be who has direct The phrase
documented * * *. responsibility for ``security
implementing the program'' would be
onsite physical replaced with the
protection program. phrase ``program''
for consistency
with use of the
phrase ``onsite
physical protection
program''.
Sec. 73.55(g)(4)(ii) The (n)(2)(ii) Onsite This requirement
security program review physical protection would be retained
must include an audit of program reviews and and revised to
security procedures and audits must provide additional
practices, an evaluation of include, but not be examples. Most
the effectiveness of the limited to, an significantly, the
physical protection system, evaluation of the phrase ``but not be
an audit of the physical effectiveness of limited to'' would
protection system testing the approved be added to clarify
and maintenance program, security plans, that the proposed
and an audit of commitments implementing examples are not
established for response by procedures, all inclusive.
local law enforcement response
authorities. commitments by
local, State, and
Federal law
enforcement
authorities, cyber-
security programs,
safety/security
interface, and the
testing,
maintenance, and
calibration program.
[[Page 62727]]
Sec. 73.55(d)(7)(ii)(B) (n)(3) The licensee This requirement
Periodically review shall periodically would be retained
physical security plans and review the approved with minor
contingency plans and security plans, the revision. The
procedures to evaluate integrated response phrase ``Integrated
their potential impact on plan, the licensee Response Plan''
plant and personnel safety. protective would be added to
strategy, and emphasize the
licensee importance of this
implementing proposed plan and
procedures to to emphasize its
evaluate their relationship to
effectiveness and other site plans.
potential impact on The term
plant and personnel ``implementing''
safety. procedures would be
added for
consistency with
this proposed
section.
(n)(4) The licensee This requirement
shall periodically would be added to
evaluate the cyber- account for the use
security program of computers and
for effectiveness the need to ensure
and shall update that required
the cyber-security protective measures
program as needed are being met and
to ensure to evaluate the
protection against effects that
changes to internal changes or other
and external technological
threats. advancements would
have on systems
used at nuclear
power plants.
(n)(5) The licensee This requirement
shall conduct would be added to
quarterly drills provide a
and annual force-on- performance based
force exercises in requirement for the
accordance with conduct of force-on-
appendix C to part force drills and
73 and the licensee exercises.
performance
evaluation program.
Sec. 73.55(g)(4)(ii) The (n)(6) The results This requirement
results and recommendations and recommendations would be retained
of the security program of the onsite with minor
review, management's physical protection revision. The
findings on whether the program reviews and phrase ``security
security program is audits, program review''
currently effective, and management's would be replaced
any actions taken as a findings regarding with the phrase''
result of recommendations program onsite physical
from prior program reviews effectiveness, and protection program
must be documented in a any actions taken reviews and
report to the licensee's as a result of audits'' for
plant manager and to recommendations consistency with
corporate management at from prior program the format of the
least one level higher than reviews, must be proposed rule. The
that having responsibility documented in a phrase ``on whether
for the day-to-day plant report to the the security
operation. licensee's plant program is
manager and to currently
corporate effective'' would
management at least be replaced with
one level higher the phrase
than that having ``regarding program
responsibility for effectiveness'' for
day-to-day plant plain language
operation. purposes.
(n)(7) Findings from This requirement
onsite physical would be added to
protection program ensure that
reviews, audits, security
and assessments deficiencies and
must be entered findings would be
into the site tracked through the
corrective action site corrective
program and action program
protected as until corrected,
safeguards and information
information, if regarding specific
applicable. findings would be
protected in
accordance with the
sensitivity and
potential for
exploitation of the
information.
(n)(8) The licensee This requirement
shall make changes would be added to
to the approved provide a
security plans and performance based
implementing requirement for the
procedures as a revision of
result of findings approved security
from security plans where plan
program reviews, changes are
audits, and necessary to
assessments, where account for
necessary to ensure implementation
the effective problems, changes
implementation of to site conditions,
Commission or other problems
regulations and the that adversely
licensee protective affect the licensee
strategy. capability to
effectively
implement
Commission
requirements.
(n)(9) Unless This requirement
otherwise specified would be added to
by the Commission, provide necessary
onsite physical flexibility to
protection program allow licensees to
reviews, audits, conduct audits/
and assessments may reviews within a
be conducted up to specified time
thirty days prior period without
to, but no later changing future
than thirty days scheduled audit/
after the scheduled review dates. This
date without requirement
adverse impact upon provides regulatory
the next scheduled stability and
annual audit date. flexibility to
account for
unforseen
circumstances that
may interfere with
regularly scheduled
dates, such as
forced outages.
Sec. 73.55(g) Testing and (o) Maintenance, This header would be
maintenance. testing, and retained and
calibration. revised to include
``calibration'' of
equipment to ensure
the accuracy of
readings provided
from such
equipment.
(o)(1) The licensee This header would be
shall: added for
formatting
purposes.
(o)(1)(i) Implement This requirement
a maintenance, would be added to
testing and comprehensively
calibration program address all
to ensure that security equipment
security systems in consistent
and equipment are terms. This
tested for proposed
operability and requirement would
performance at clarify the current
predetermined requirement for
intervals, are ensuring that
maintained in security equipment
operable condition, operates and
and are capable of performs as stated
performing their in the approved
intended function security plans.
when needed.
[[Page 62728]]
(o)(1)(ii) Describe This requirement
the maintenance, would be added to
testing and address the
calibration program maintenance,
in the approved testing and
physical security calibration of
plan. Implementing security equipment
procedures must in non-specific
specify operational terms and describe
and technical the types of
details required to documentation and
perform level of detail
maintenance, needed.
testing, and
calibration
activities to
include, but not
limited to, purpose
of activity,
actions to be
taken, acceptance
criteria, the
intervals or
frequency at which
the activity will
be performed, and
compensatory
actions required.
(o)(1)(iii) Document This requirement
problems, failures, would be added for
deficiencies, and consistency with
other findings, to the proposed
include the cause requirement for
of each, and enter addressing findings
each into the site from security
corrective action program reviews and
program. The audits and how
licensee shall specific
protect this information
information as concerning security
safeguards deficiencies and
information, if findings must be
applicable. protected so that
noted deficiencies
could not be
exploited.
Sec. 73.55(g)(1) The (o)(1)(iv) Implement This requirement
licensee shall develop and compensatory would be retained
employ compensatory measures in a with minor
measures including timely manner to revision.
equipment, additional ensure that the
security personnel and effectiveness of
specific procedures to the onsite physical
assure that the protection program
effectiveness of the is not reduced by
security system is not failure or degraded
reduced by failure or other operation of
contingencies affecting the security-related
operation of the security components or
related equipment or equipment.
structures.
Sec. 73.55(g)(2) Each (o)(2) Each This requirement
intrusion alarm shall be intrusion alarm would be retained
tested for performance at must be tested for and revised to
the beginning and end of operability at the correct the use of
any period that it is used beginning and end the phrase ``tested
for security. If the period of any period that for performance'',
of continuous use is longer it is used for as stated in the
than seven days, the security, or if the current Sec.
intrusion alarm shall also period of 73.55(g)(2). The
be tested at least once continuous use testing performed
every seven (7) days. exceeds seven (7) at the beginning
days, the intrusion and end of any
alarm must be period is intended
tested at least to be a ``go, no-
once every seven go'' test or
(7) days. operational test
that is used to
simply indicate
that the equipment
functions in
response to
predetermined
stimuli. A
performance test is
a more elaborate
test that would
test a system
through the entire
range of its
intended function
or stimuli.
Sec. 73.55(g)(2) Each (o)(3) Intrusion This requirement
intrusion alarm shall be detection and would be retained
tested for performance at access control and revised to
the beginning and end of equipment must be correct the
any period that it is used performance tested periodicity of
for security. in accordance with performance testing
the approved stated in the
security plans. current Sec.
73.55(g)(2) and to
add ``access
control equipment''
due to the
widespread use of
access control
technologies and to
focus on the need
to ensure that this
equipment is
functioning as
intended in
response to the
predetermined
stimuli (e.g.,
biometrics). The
phrase ``each
intrusion alarm''
would be replaced
with the phrase
``Intrusion
detection and
access control
equipment'' to more
accurately describe
the equipment to be
performance tested.
Sec. 73.55(g)(3) (o)(4) Equipment This proposed
Communications equipment required for requirement would
required for communications communications be retained and
onsite shall be tested for onsite must be revised to correct
performance not less tested for the use of the
frequently than once at the operability not phrase ``tested for
beginning of each security less frequently performance'', as
personnel work shift. than once at the stated in the
beginning of each current Sec.
security personnel 73.55(g)(3). The
work shift. testing performed
at the beginning
and end of any
period is intended
to be a ``go, no-
go'' test or
operational test
that is used to
simply indicate
that the equipment
functions in
response to
predetermined
stimuli.
[[Page 62729]]
Sec. 73.55(g)(3) (o)(5) Communication This requirement
Communications equipment systems between the would be retained
required for communications alarm stations and and revised to
offsite shall be tested for each control room, include both
performance not less than and between the ``onsite'' and
once a day. alarm stations and offsite
offsite support communication
agencies, to equipment
include back-up associated with
communication integrated response
equipment, must be and to correct the
tested for use of the term
operability at ``performance
least once each day. test,'' as stated
in the current Sec.
73.55(g)(3). The
testing performed
at least once each
day is intended to
be a ``go, no-go''
test or operational
test that is used
to simply indicate
that the equipment
functions.
(o)(6) Search This requirement
equipment must be would be added to
tested for ensure that search
operability at equipment is tested
least once each day for operability and
and tested for performance at
performance at intervals that
least once during provide assurance
each seven (7) day that unauthorized
period and before items would be
being placed back detected as
in service after required. This
each repair or proposed
inoperative state. requirement is
added to address
the widespread use
of search equipment
technologies, such
as explosives and
metal detectors,
and x-ray equipment
and to provide a
performance based
requirement that
focuses on the
importance for
accurate
performance of this
equipment.
Sec. 73.55(g)(1) All (o)(7) All intrusion This requirement
alarms, communication detection would be retained
equipment, physical equipment, with minor
barriers, and other communication revision. Most
security related devices or equipment, physical significantly, back-
equipment shall be barriers, and other up power supplies
maintained in operable security-related are added to ensure
condition. devices or this critical
equipment, to element is
include back-up maintained in
power supplies must operable condition.
be maintained in
operable condition.
(o)(8) A program for This requirement
testing or would be added to
verifying the account for those
operability of circumstances when
devices or a licensee cannot
equipment located satisfy testing
in hazardous areas requirements due to
must be specified safety hazards or
in the approved radiation
security plans and restrictions. Vital
must define component area
alternate measures portals located
to be taken to within facility
ensure the timely radiological
completion of controlled areas
testing or that are
maintenance when inaccessible due to
the hazardous safety hazards or
condition or established
radiation radiation
restrictions are no restrictions may be
longer applicable. excluded from the
testing
requirements of
this section.
(p) Compensatory This header would be
measures. added for
formatting
purposes.
Sec. 73.55(g)(1) The (p)(1) The licensee This requirement
licensee shall develop and shall identify would be retained
employ compensatory measures and with minor
measures * * *. criteria needed to revision. The word
compensate for the ``compensate'' is
loss or reduced used to provide a
performance of performance based
personnel, requirement that
equipment, systems, requires the
and components, identified
that are required compensatory
to meet the measure to be
requirements of ``developed and
this section. employed''.
Sec. 73.55(g)(1) The (p)(2) Compensatory This requirement
licensee shall develop and measures must be would be retained
employ compensatory designed and and revised to
measures including implemented to focus on the
equipment, additional provide a level of Commission's view
security personnel and protection that is that compensatory
specific procedures to equivalent to the measures must
assure that the protection that was provide a level of
effectiveness of the provided by the protection that
security system is not degraded or satisfies the
reduced by failure or other inoperable Commission
contingencies affecting the personnel, requirement which
operation of the security equipment, system, was otherwise
related equipment or or components. satisfied through
structures. use or
implementation of
the failed
component of the
onsite physical
protection program.
(p)(3) Compensatory This requirement
measures must be would be added to
implemented within provide a
specific time lines performance based
necessary to meet requirement for
the requirements timely
stated in paragraph implementation of
(b) of this section compensatory
and described in measures. The
the approved phrase ``within
security plans. specific time lines
necessary to meet
the requirements
stated in paragraph
(b)'' would provide
qualifying details
against which
specific time lines
would be developed.
(q) Suspension of This header would be
safeguards measures. added for
formatting
purposes.
(q)(1) The licensee This requirement
may suspend would be added for
implementation of formatting
affected purposes. The
requirements of phrase
this section under ``implementation of
the following affected
conditions: requirements''
would be used to
ensure the licensee
only suspends those
measures that
cannot be met as a
direct result of
the condition.
[[Page 62730]]
Sec. 73.55(a) In (q)(1)(i) In This requirement
accordance with Sec. Sec. accordance with would be retained
50.54(x) and 50.54(y) of Sec. Sec. with minor
this chapter, the licensee 50.54(x) and revision.
may suspend any safeguards 50.54(y) of this
measures pursuant to Sec. chapter, the
73.55 in an emergency when licensee may
this action is immediately suspend any
needed to protect the safeguards measures
public health and safety pursuant to this
and no action consistent section in an
with license conditions and emergency when this
technical specification action is
that can provide adequate immediately needed
or equivalent protection is to protect the
immediately apparent. public health and
safety and no
action consistent
with license
conditions and
technical
specifications that
can provide
adequate or
equivalent
protection is
immediately
apparent.
Sec. 73.55(a) This This suspension of This requirement
suspension must be approved safeguards measures would be retained
as a minimum by a licensed must be approved as with minor revision
senior operator prior to a minimum by a to report this
taking the action. licensed senior information to the
operator prior to control room. This
taking this action. proposed
requirement is
intended to ensure
that at least one
onsite, licensee
management level
person who is
knowledgeable and
aware of reactor
operations and
reactor status at
the time, is the
individual who
would approve the
suspension and has
the knowledge to
determine and the
authority to direct
appropriate
compensatory
measures to
include, but not
limited to,
modifications to
the licensee
protective strategy
during the
suspension period.
(q)(1)(ii) During This requirement
severe weather when would be added to
the suspension is provide a
immediately needed performance based
to protect requirement that
personnel whose accounts for the
assigned duties and suspension of
responsibilities in safeguards measures
meeting the during severe
requirements of weather conditions
this section would that could result
otherwise in life threatening
constitute a life situations such as
threatening tornadoes, floods,
situation and no hurricanes, etc.,
action consistent for those
with the individuals
requirements of assigned to carry
this section that out certain duties
can provide and
equivalent responsibilities
protection is required by
immediately Commission
apparent. regulations, and
the approved
security plans and
procedures.
Suspension of This requirement
safeguards due to would be added to
severe weather must provide a
be initiated by the requirement for who
security supervisor is authorized to
and approved by a approve suspensions
licensed senior under severe
operator prior to weather conditions.
taking this action.
(q)(2) Suspended This requirement
security measures would be added to
must be provide a
reimplemented as performance based
soon as conditions requirement for
permit. reimplementing
suspended security
measures.
Sec. 73.55(a) The (q)(3) The This requirement
suspension of safeguards suspension of would be retained
measures must be reported safeguards measures with minor revision
in accordance with the must be reported for documenting
provisions of Sec. 73.71. and documented in suspended security
accordance with the measures.
provisions of Sec.
73.71.
Sec. 73.55(a) Reports made (q)(4) Reports made This requirement
under Section Sec. 50.72 under Sec. 50.72 would be retained.
need not be duplicated of this chapter
under Sec. 73.71. need not be
duplicated under
Sec. 73.71.
(r) Records......... This header would be
added for
formatting
purposes.
Sec. 73.55(b)(1)(ii) The (r)(1) The This requirement
NRC may inspect, copy, and Commission may would be retained
take away copies of all inspect, copy, with minor
reports and documents retain, and remove revision. The
required to be kept by copies of all phrase ``reports
Commission regulations, records required to and documents''
orders, or applicable be kept by would be replaced
license conditions whether Commission with the word
the reports and documents regulations, ``records'' to
are kept by the licensee or orders, or license account for all
the contractor. conditions whether information
the records are collection
kept by the requirements
licensee or a regardless of
contractor. media, to include
electronic record
keeping systems.
Sec. 73.55(g)(4) These (r)(2) The licensee This requirement
reports must be maintained shall maintain all would be retained
in an auditable form, records required to and revised to
available for inspection, be kept by consolidate
for a period of 3 years. Commission multiple current
regulations, records retention
orders, or license requirements rather
conditions, as a than state the same
record until the requirement
Commission multiple times for
terminates the each record
license for which throughout this
the records were rule. The phrase
developed and shall ``unless otherwise
maintain superceded specified by the
portions of these Commission'' would
records for at be used to address
least three (3) any conflict that
years after the may arise between
record is other records
superseded, unless retention
otherwise specified requirements such
by the Commission. that the more
restrictive
requirement would
take precedence.
[[Page 62731]]
(s) Safety/security This requirement
interface. In would be added to
accordance with the provide specific
requirements of reference to the
Sec. 73.58, the proposed Sec.
licensee shall 73.58 for Safety
develop and and Security
implement a process Interface
to inform and requirements.
coordinate safety
and security
activities to
ensure that these
activities do not
adversely affect
the capabilities of
the security
organization to
satisfy the
requirements of
this section, or
overall plant
safety.
(t) Alternative This header would be
measures. added for
formatting
purposes.
Sec. 73.55(a) The (t)(1) The This requirement
Commission may authorize an Commission may would be retained
applicant or licensee to authorize an and revised to
provide measures for applicant or provide a
protection against licensee to provide performance based
radiological sabotage other a measure for requirement for
than those required by this protection against alternative
section if the applicant or radiological measures that focus
licensee demonstrates that sabotage other than attention on the
the measures have the same one required by Commission's view
high assurance objective as this section if the that an alternative
specified in this paragraph applicant or measure is an
and that the overall level licensee unanalyzed
of system performance demonstrates that: substitute for a
provides protection against (i) The measure specific Commission
radiological sabotage meets the same requirement of this
equivalent to that which performance proposed section
would be provided by objective and and therefore, must
Paragraphs (b) through (h) requirements as be individually and
of this section and meets specified in knowingly reviewed
the general performance paragraph (b) of and approved by the
requirements of this this section, and. Commission before
section. (ii) The proposed implementation to
alternative measure ensure consistency
provides protection with these proposed
against Commission
radiological regulations. The
sabotage or theft Commission has
of unirradiated MOX determined that the
fuel assemblies, requirements
equivalent to that described in this
which would be proposed section
provided by the have been carefully
specific analyzed by the
requirement for Commission and
which it would therefore, an
substitute. alternative measure
to a proposed
requirement of this
section must also
be carefully
analyzed through
the process
addressed in 10 CFR
50.90 before
implementation.
Specifically, the
language used by
this proposed
requirement
addresses
alternative
measures
``individually''
rather than
collectively to
clarify that each
proposed
alternative measure
is unique by itself
and must be
analyzed as such.
In addition, the
phrase ``have the
same high assurance
objective'' is
replaced with the
phrase ``meets the
same performance
objective and
requirements as
specified in
paragraph (b) of
this section''.
The proposed
paragraph (b) of
this section
retains the same
``high assurance
objective''
referred to by the
current requirement
and incorporates by
reference the
performance based
requirements of
this proposed
section that
facilitate licensee
achievement of the
intended high
assurance
objective.
Sec. 73.55(c)(9)(i) For (t)(2) The licensee This requirement
licensees who choose to shall submit each would be retained
propose alternative proposed and revised to
measures as provided for in alternative measure expand the
10 CFR 73.55(c)(8), the to the Commission application of the
proposal must be submitted for review and current provision
in accordance with 10 CFR approval in for alternative
50.90 and include the accordance with measures to all
analysis and justification Sec. Sec. 50.4 proposed
for the proposed and 50.90 of this requirements of
alternatives. chapter before this section and
implementation. would provide the
process by which
alternative
measures would be
submitted for
Commission review
and approval.
Sec. 73.55(c)(8)(ii) (t)(3) The licensee This requirement
Propose alternative shall submit a would be retained
measures, in addition to technical basis for and revised to
the measures established in each proposed expand the
accordance with 10 CFR alternative application of the
73.55(c)(7), describe the measure, to include current provision
level of protection that any analysis or for alternative
these measures would assessment measures to all
provide against a land conducted in proposed
vehicle bomb, and compare support of a requirements of
the costs of the determination that this section and to
alternative measures with the proposed provide a
the costs of measures alternative measure description of the
necessary to fully meet the provides a level of detailed
design goals and criteria. protection that is information needed
at least equal to to support the
that which would technical basis for
otherwise be a request for
provided by the Commission approval
specific of an alternative
requirement of this measure.
section.
[[Page 62732]]
Sec. 73.55(c)(8)(ii) The (t)(4) Alternative This requirement
Commission will approve the vehicle barrier would be retained
proposed alternative systems. In the with minor
measures if they provide case of alternative revision. The
substantial protection vehicle barrier phrase ``The
against a land vehicle systems required by Commission will
bomb, and it is determined Sec. 73.55(e)(8), approve the
by an analysis, using the the licensee shall proposed
essential elements of 10 demonstrate that: alternative
CFR 50.109, that the costs (i) The alternative measures'' would be
of fully meeting the design measure provides deleted because
goals and criteria are not substantial approval would be
justified by the added protection against based on NRC
protection that would be a vehicle bomb, and. review. The
provided. (ii) Based on proposed language
comparison of the clearly stipulates
costs of the that alternative
alternative measures will be
measures to the reviewed by the
costs of meeting staff and approval
the Commission's would be contingent
requirements using upon the
the essential justification
elements of 10 CFR provided by the
50.109, the costs licensee to include
of fully meeting an analysis that
the Commission's examines the costs
requirements are and benefits of the
not justified by alternative measure
the protection that consistent with 10
would be provided. CFR 50.109.
Sec. 73.55 This requirement
Definitions. would be added to
clarify the use of
the listed terms
used in this
proposed rule.
Security Officer This definition
means a uniformed would be added to
individual, either clarify what is
armed with a meant by the term
covered weapon or ``Security
unarmed, whose Officer'' as used
primary duty is the in this document.
protection of a
facility, of
radioactive
material, or of
other property
against theft or
diversion or
against
radiological
sabotage.
Target Set means the This definition
combination of would be added to
equipment or clarify what is
operator actions meant by the term
which, if all are ``Target Set'' as
prevented from used in this
performing their document.
intended safety
function or
prevented from
being accomplished,
would likely result
in significant core
damage (e.g., non-
incipient, non-
localized fuel
melting, and/or
core disruption)
barring
extraordinary
action by plant
operators. A target
set with respect to
spent fuel sabotage
is draining the
spent fuel pool
leaving the spent
fuel uncovered for
a period of time,
allowing spent fuel
heat-up and the
associated
potential for
release of fission
products.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Table 3.--Proposed Part 73 Section 73.56
[Personnel access authorization requirements for nuclear power plants]
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Current language Proposed language Considerations
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Sec. 73.56(a) General..... (a) Introduction.... This header would be
added for
formatting
purposes. This
proposed Sec.
73.56(a) would
amend and
reorganize current
Sec. 73.56(a)
[General]. The
current Sec.
73.56(a) required
licensees to
develop and
implement access
authorization (AA)
programs. The
proposed Sec.
73.56(a) would
update these
requirements. The
title of this
paragraph would be
revised to more
accurately capture
the topics
addressed in the
proposed Sec.
73.56(a), which
would include a
description of the
NRC-regulated
entities who would
be subject to the
section and the
methods by which
the NRC intends
that licensees
would implement the
amended AA
programs. These
proposed changes to
the language and
organization of
current Sec.
73.56(a) would be
made to enhance the
clarity of the
requirements in
this section, for
the reasons
discussed in
Section IV.
[[Page 62733]]
Sec. 73.56(a) General. (1) (a)(1) By [date--180 This requirement
Each licensee who is days--after the would be added to
authorized on April 25, effective date of discuss the types
1991, to operate a nuclear the final rule of Commission
power reactor pursuant to published in the licensees to whom
Sec. Sec. 50.21(b) or Federal Register], the proposed
50.22 of this chapter shall each nuclear power requirements of
comply with the reactor licensee, this section would
requirements of this licensed under 10 apply and the
section. By April 27, 1992, CFR part 50, shall schedule for
the required access incorporate the submitting the
authorization program must revised amended access
be incorporated into the requirements of authorization
site Physical Security Plan this section program. The
as provided for by 10 CFR through amendments Commission intends
50.54(p)(2) and to its Commission- to delete the
implemented. By April 27, approved access current language,
1992, each licensee shall authorization because it applies
certify to the NRC that it program and shall only to a past rule
has implemented an access submit the amended change that is
authorization program that program to the completed. The
meets the requirements of Commission for proposed
this part. review and approval. requirements of
this section would
be applicable to
decommissioned/ing
reactors unless
otherwise approved
by the Commission.
This proposed
requirement would
add a requirement
for Commission
review and approval
of the amended
access
authorization
program to ensure
that access
authorization
programs meet the
objective of
providing high
assurance that
individuals who are
subject to the
requirements of
this section are
trustworthy and
reliable, and do
not constitute an
unreasonable risk
to public health
and safety or the
common defense and
security, including
the potential to
commit radiological
sabotage.
(a)(2) The amended This requirement
program must be would be added to
submitted as provide a reference
specified in Sec. to the current Sec.
50.4 and must 50.4(b)(4) which
describe how the describes
revised procedural details
requirements of relative to the
this section will proposed security
be implemented by plan submission
the licensee, to requirement.
include a proposed
implementation
schedule.
(a)(3) The licensee This requirement
shall implement the would be added to
existing approved clarify that the
access licensee must
authorization continue to
program and implement the
associated current Commission-
Commission orders approved security
until Commission plans until the
approval of the Commission approves
amended program, the amended plans.
unless otherwise The phrase ``unless
authorized by the otherwise
Commission. authorized by the
Commission'' would
provide flexibility
to account for
unanticipated
situations that may
affect the
licensee's ability
to comply with this
proposed
requirement.
(a)(4) The licensee This requirement
is responsible to would be added to
the Commission for clarify that the
maintaining the licensee is
authorization responsible for
program in meeting Commission
accordance with regulations and the
Commission approved security
regulations and plans. The phrase
related Commission- ``through the
directed orders implementation of
through the the approved
implementation of program and site
the approved implementing
program and site procedures'' would
implementing be added to
procedures. describe the
relationship
between Commission
regulations, the
approved
authorization
program, and
implementing
procedures. The
Commission views
the approved
security plans as
the mechanism
through which the
licensee implements
Commission
requirements.
[[Page 62734]]
Sec. 73.56(a)(2) Each (a)(5) Applicants This requirement
applicant for a license to for an operating would be added to
operate a nuclear power license under the describe the
reactor pursuant to Sec. provisions of part proposed
Sec. 50.21(b) or 50.22 of 50 of this chapter, requirements for
this chapter, whose or holders of a applicants and to
application was submitted combined license specify that the
prior to April 25, 1991, under the proposed
shall either by April 27, provisions of part requirements of
1992, or the date of 52 of this chapter, this section must
receipt of the operating shall satisfy the be met upon receipt
license, whichever is requirements of of an operating
later, incorporate the this section upon license or upon
required access receipt of an notice of the
authorization program into operating license Commission's
the site Physical Security or upon notice of finding under Sec.
Plan and implement it. the Commission's 52.103(g) of this
Sec. 73.56(a)(3) Each finding under Sec. chapter. This
applicant for a license to 52.103(g) of this proposed
operate a nuclear power chapter. requirement would
reactor pursuant to Sec. retain the meaning
Sec. 50.21(b) or 50.22 of of the current Sec.
this chapter and each 73.56(a)(3),
applicant for a combined which requires
construction permit and applicants for a
operating license pursuant license to operate
to part 52 of this chapter, a nuclear power
whose application is plant to
submitted after April 25, incorporate an
1991, shall include the access
required access authorization
authorization program as program in their
part of its Physical Physical Security
Security Plan. The Plan and implement
applicant, upon receipt of the approved access
an operating license or authorization
upon receipt of operating program when
authorization, shall approval to begin
implement the required operating is
access authorization received. This
program as part of its site proposed
Physical Security Plan.. requirement would
also add a
requirement for
Commission review
and approval of an
applicant's
Physical Security
Plan incorporating
the requirements of
this proposed
section for the
reasons discussed
with respect to
proposed Sec.
73.56(a)(1). The
Commission intends
to delete the
current Sec.
73.56(a)(2) because
there are no
remaining
applicants for an
operating license
under Sec. Sec.
50.21(b) or 50.22
of this chapter who
have not
implemented an AA
program under the
current
requirements.
Therefore, the
current paragraph
is no longer
necessary.
The proposed
paragraph would
retain the current
requirement for
licensees and
applicants to
implement access
authorization
programs upon
receipt of an
operating license
or operating
authorization,
respectively, and
add a requirement
for these entities
to maintain their
access
authorization
programs. The
requirement to
maintain AA
programs would be
added to convey
more accurately
that Sec. 73.56
includes
requirements for
maintaining AA
programs, in
addition to
requirements for
implementing them.
Sec. 73.56(a)(4) The (a)(6) Contractors Proposed Sec.
licensee may accept part of and vendors (C/Vs) 73.56(a)(6) would
an access authorization who implement amend current Sec.
program used by its authorization 73.56(a)(4), which
contractors, vendors, or programs or program permits licensees
other affected elements shall to accept a C/V
organizations and develop, implement, authorization
substitute, supplement, or and maintain program to meet the
duplicate any portion of authorization standards of this
the program as necessary to programs or program section. The
meet the requirements of elements that meet proposed paragraph
this section. In any case, the requirements of would retain the
the licensee is responsible this section, to current permission
for granting, denying, or the extent that the for licensees to
revoking unescorted access licensees and accept C/V
authorization to any applicants authorization
contractor, vendor, or specified in programs, in full
other affected organization paragraphs (a)(1) or in part, but
employee. and (a)(5) of this would also add C/Vs
section rely upon to the list of
those C/V entities who are
authorization subject to proposed
programs or program Sec. 73.56 in
elements to meet order to convey
the requirements of more clearly that C/
this section. In Vs may be directly
any case, only a subject to NRC
licensee or inspection and
applicant shall enforcement actions
grant or permit an than the current
individual to rule language
maintain unescorted implies.
access to nuclear
power plant
protected and vital
areas.
[[Page 62735]]
This change is
necessary to
clarify the
applicability of
the rule's
requirements to a C/
V's authorization
program because
several
requirements in the
current section
could be
interpreted as
implying that a C/V
is accountable to
the licensee but
not to the NRC,
should significant
weaknesses be
identified in the C/
V's authorization
program upon which
one or more
licensees rely.
However, this
interpretation
would be incorrect.
Therefore, proposed
Sec. 73.56(a)(6)
would include C/V
authorization
programs and
program elements
upon which
licensees and
applicants rely
within the scope of
this section to
convey more
accurately that
these C/Vs are
directly
accountable to the
NRC for meeting the
applicable
requirements of
Sec. 73.56. This
clarification is
also necessary to
maintain the
internal
consistency of the
proposed rule
because some
provisions of the
proposed section
apply only to C/Vs,
including, but not
limited to, the
second sentence of
proposed Sec.
73.56(n)(7). The
proposed paragraph
would also retain
the intent of the
current requirement
that only licensees
and applicants have
the authority to
grant or permit an
individual to
maintain unescorted
access to nuclear
power plant
protected and vital
areas.
The phrases,
``program
elements'' and ``to
the extent that * *
*,'' would replace
the second sentence
of current Sec.
73.56(a)(4), which
permits licensees
to accept part of
an authorization
program used by its
contractors,
vendors, or other
affected
organizations and
substitute,
supplement, or
duplicate any
portion of the
program as
necessary to meet
the requirements of
this section. The
proposed change
would retain the
meaning of the
current provision,
but would clarify
the intent of the
provision in
response to
implementation
questions from
licensees. The
phrase, ``program
elements,'' would
replace ``part of
an access
authorization
program,'' to more
clearly convey that
the parts of an
authorization
program to which
this provision
refers are the
program elements
that are required
under current and
proposed Sec.
73.56, including a
background
investigation;
psychological
assessment;
behavioral
observation; a
review procedure
for adverse
determinations
regarding an
individual's
trustworthiness and
reliability;
audits; the
protection of
information; and
retaining and
sharing records.
[[Page 62736]]
The phrase, ``to the
extent that the
licensees and
applicants rely
upon C/V
authorization
programs or program
elements,'' would
be used in proposed
Sec. 73.56(a)(6)
to clarify that C/
Vs need only meet
the requirements of
this section for
those authorization
program elements
upon which
licensees and
applicants who are
subject to this
section rely. This
change would be
made to address two
issues. First, ``to
the extent that''
would be used to
indicate that C/Vs
need not implement
every element of an
AA program in order
for licensees to
rely on the program
elements that a C/V
does implement in
accordance with the
requirements of
this section. For
example, if a C/V
conducts background
investigations upon
which licensees
rely in making
unescorted access
authorization
determinations, the
background
investigations must
meet the
requirements of
current Sec.
73.56(b)(2)(i) [or
proposed Sec.
73.56(d)]. However,
the C/V need not
also perform
psychological
assessments or any
other services for
licensees in order
for licensees to
rely on the
background
investigations that
the C/V performs.
Second, the phrase,
``to the extent
that,'' would also
indicate that any
elements of an
authorization
program that a C/V
implements that are
not relied upon by
licensees need not
meet the
requirements of
this section.
For example, if the
same C/V in the
previous example
also offers
psychological
assessment
services, in
addition to
conducting
background
investigations for
licensees, but no
licensees or
applicants who are
subject to this
section rely on
those psychological
assessment services
to make unescorted
access
authorization
decisions, then the
C/V need not meet
the requirements of
current Sec.
73.56(b)(2)(ii) [or
proposed Sec.
73.56(e)] for
conducting those
psychological
assessments. These
proposed changes to
the terms used in
current Sec.
73.56(a)(4) would
be made for
increased clarity
in the language of
the rule.
(b) Individuals who A new Sec.
are subject to an 73.56(b)
authorization [Individuals who
program. are subject to an
(b)(1) The following AA program] would
individuals shall specify the
be subject to an individuals who
authorization must be subject to
program:. an AA program,
based on their job
duties and
responsibilities.
Current Sec.
73.56 requires only
that individuals
who have unescorted
access to protected
and vital areas
shall be subject to
an AA program. The
proposed rule would
add several
categories of
individuals who
would be subject to
the proposed AA
program, for the
reasons discussed
with respect to
each paragraph that
addresses the
additional
categories of
individuals who
would be covered.
Proposed Sec.
73.56(b) would be
added for clarity
in the organization
of the proposed
section by grouping
together in one
list the
individuals who
would be subject to
the proposed
regulations.
[[Page 62737]]
Sec. 73.56(b) General (b)(1)(i) Any Proposed Sec.
performance objective and individual to whom 73.56(b)(1)(i)
requirements. (1) The a licensee or would retain the
licensee shall establish applicant grants current requirement
and maintain an access unescorted access that any individual
authorization program to nuclear power who has unescorted
granting individuals plant protected and access to nuclear
unescorted access to vital areas. power plant
protected and vital areas * protected and vital
* *. areas shall be
subject to an AA
program that meets
the requirements of
this section. The
current requirement
is embedded in the
first sentence of
current Sec.
73.56(b) [General
performance
objective and
requirements]. The
proposed paragraph
would list this
category of
individuals
separately for
organizational
clarity in the
rule.
(b)(1)(ii) Any A new Sec.
individual whose 73.56(b)(1)(ii)
assigned duties and would require that
responsibilities individuals who are
permit the assigned duties and
individual to take responsibilities
actions by that permit them to
electronic means, take actions by
either onsite or electronic means
remotely, that that could
could adversely adversely impact a
impact a licensee's licensee's or
or applicant's applicant's
operational safety, operational safety,
security, or security, or
emergency response emergency response
capabilities; and capabilities would
be subject to an AA
program.
The proposed
provision would be
consistent with the
intent of current
Sec. 73.56, which
is to ensure that
anyone who has
unescorted access
to equipment that
is important to the
operational safety
and security of
plant operations
must be trustworthy
and reliable. As
discussed in
Section IV.3,
because of the
increased use of
digital systems and
advanced
communications
technologies in
nuclear power
plants, the current
regulations, which
focus on
individuals who
have physical
access to equipment
within protected
and vital areas, do
not provide
adequate assurance
of the
trustworthiness and
reliability of
persons whose job
duties and
responsibilities
permit them to take
actions through
electronic means
that can affect
operational safety,
security, and
emergency response
capabilities, but
who, because of
advances in
electronic
communications, may
not require
physical access to
protected and vital
areas. For example,
some licensees have
installed systems
that permit
engineers or
information
technology
technicians to take
actions from remote
locations that may
affect the
operability of
safety-related
components, or
affect the
functionality of
operating systems.
Because the
potential impact of
actions taken
through electronic
means may be as
serious as actions
taken by an
individual who is
physically present
within a protected
or vital area, the
NRC has determined
that subjecting
this additional
category of
individuals to the
AA program is
necessary.
[[Page 62738]]
(b)(1)(iii) Any Proposed Sec.
individual who has 73.56(b)(1)(iii)
responsibilities would require that
for implementing a certain individuals
licensee's or who are members of
applicant's the licensee's or
protective applicant's
strategy, security
including, but not organization shall
limited to, armed be subject to an AA
security force program, based on
officers, alarm their
station operators, responsibilities
and tactical for implementing a
response team licensee's
leaders; and protective
strategy. Current
Sec. 73.55
requires that any
armed members of
the security
organization must
be subject to an AA
program, but the
proposed rule would
also list them here
for clarity and
completeness in the
requirements of
this section. The
proposed paragraph
would also include
any individual who
has
responsibilities
for implementing
the licensee's
protective
strategy, which may
include individuals
who are not armed.
In practice, the
NRC is not aware of
any licensees,
applicants, or C/Vs
who do not subject
this broader
category of
individuals to an
AA program.
However, the
proposed rule would
specify that these
individuals shall
be subject to an AA
program because of
their critical
responsibilities
with respect to
plant security and,
therefore, the need
for high assurance
that they are
trustworthy and
reliable.
(b)(1)(iv) The Proposed Sec.
licensee's, 73.56(b)(1)(iv)
applicant's, or C/ would introduce a
V's reviewing new term,
official. ``reviewing
official,'' to Sec.
73.56 to refer to
an individual who
is designated by a
licensee,
applicant, or C/V
to be responsible
for reviewing and
evaluating
information about
persons who are
applying for
unescorted access
authorization and
determining whether
to grant, deny,
maintain, or
unfavorably
terminate
unescorted access
authorization. The
proposed paragraph
would require
reviewing officials
to be subject to
the AA program
because of the key
role these
individuals play in
providing high
assurance that
persons who are
granted unescorted
access to protected
areas and
electronic access
to operational
safety, security,
or emergency
response systems
within protected or
vital areas are
trustworthy and
reliable.
In addition,
reviewing
officials' actions
affect the
confidence that the
public, management,
the NRC, and
individuals who are
subject to the AA
program have in the
integrity of the
program and the
accuracy and
reliability of the
authorization
decisions that are
made under the
program. Therefore,
the NRC believes
that reviewing
officials must meet
the highest
standards for
trustworthiness and
reliability,
including the
requirements of an
AA program.
[[Page 62739]]
(b)(2) At the Proposed Sec.
licensee's, 73.56(b)(2) would
applicant's, or C/ recognize the long-
V's discretion, standing industry
other individuals practice, which has
who are designated been endorsed by
in access the NRC, of
authorization subjecting
program procedures additional
may be subject to individuals to
an authorization authorization
program that meets requirements during
the requirements of periods when those
this section. individuals do not
require and have
not been granted
unescorted access
to protected or
vital areas. For
example, some C/Vs,
whose personnel may
be called upon by a
licensee to work at
a licensee's site
under contract,
implement full
authorization
programs to cover
those personnel.
Similarly, some
licensees require
employees who are
normally stationed
at their corporate
headquarters to be
subject to an
authorization
program, for such
access, is referred
to as having
``unescorted
access'' (UA).
The proposed
paragraph would be
added to give
licensees,
applicants, and C/
Vs who implement
authorization
programs that meet
the requirements of
this part the
authority to do so
under the proposed
rule.
Sec. 73.56(b) General (c) General Proposed Sec.
performance objective and performance 73.56(c) would
requirements. (1) The objective. Access retain the meaning
licensee shall establish authorization of the current
and maintain an access programs must program performance
authorization program provide high objective, which is
granting individuals assurance that the embedded in current
unescorted access to individuals who are Sec. 73.56(b),
protected and vital areas specified in but would separate
with the objective of paragraph (b)(1) of it from the
providing high assurance this section, and, requirement in the
that individuals granted if applicable, current paragraph
unescorted access are (b)(2) of this for licensees to
trustworthy and reliable, section are establish and
and do not constitute an trustworthy and maintain an AA
unreasonable risk to the reliable, such that program. The
health and safety of the they do not requirement to
public including a constitute an establish and
potential to commit unreasonable risk maintain AA
radiological sabotage. to public health programs would be
and safety or the moved to proposed
common defense and Sec. 73.56(a),
security, including where it would be
the potential to imposed on each
commit radiological entity who would be
sabotage. subject to the
section, for
organizational
clarity. The
performance
objective would be
revised to add
cross-references to
the categories of
individuals who
must be subject to
an authorization
program, as
specified in
proposed Sec.
73.56(b), because
the proposed rule
would require that
certain
individuals, in
addition to those
who have unescorted
physical access to
protected and vital
areas of a nuclear
power plant, would
be subject to the
AA program, as
discussed with
respect to Sec.
73.56(b).
In addition, the
phrase, ``common
defense and
security,'' would
be added to the
proposed paragraph
to convey the
purpose of
authorization
programs more
specifically, which
would include
protection of the
public from the
potential insider
activities defined
in current Sec.
73.1(a)(1)(B) and
(a)(2)(B).
[[Page 62740]]
Sec. 73.56(2) Except as (d) Background Proposed Sec.
provided for in paragraphs investigation. In 73.56(d) would
(c) and (d) of this order to grant amend current Sec.
section, the unescorted unescorted access 73.56(b)(2)(i),
access authorization authorization to an which requires
program must include the individual, the authorization
following: (i) A background licensees, programs to include
investigation designed to applicants and C/Vs a background
identify past actions which specified in investigation and
are indicative of an paragraph (a) of describes the
individual's future this section shall aspects of an
reliability within a ensure that the individual's
protected or vital area of individual has been background to be
a nuclear power reactor. As subject to a investigated.
a minimum, the background background Proposed Sec.
investigation must verify investigation. The 73.56(d) would
an individual's * * *. background retain the
investigation must requirements of the
include, but is not current paragraph,
limited to, the but increase the
following elements: level of detail
with which they are
specified in
response to
implementation
questions from
licensees and in
order to increase
consistency among
authorization
programs, as
discussed in
Section IV.3.
Because the
requirements in the
proposed rule would
be more detailed,
the current
paragraph would be
restructured and
subdivided to
present
requirements for
each element of the
background
investigation in a
separate paragraph.
This change would
be made for
increased clarity
in the organization
of the rule. The
cross-references to
paragraphs (c) and
(d) in the current
provision would be
deleted because
they would no
longer apply in the
reorganized
section.
The proposed
provision would use
the phrase,
``ensure that the
individual has been
subject to a
background
investigation,''
because completion
of every element of
a background
investigation may
not be required
each time an
individual applies
for UAA. As
discussed with
respect to proposed
Sec. 73.46(h)(1)
and (h)(2), the
proposed rule would
permit licensees,
applicants, and C/
Vs, in order to
meet the
requirements of
this section, to
accept and rely on
certain background
investigation
elements,
psychological
assessments, and
behavioral
observation
training conducted
by other licensees,
applicants, and C/
Vs who are subject
this section. This
permission would
reduce unnecessary
regulatory burden
by eliminating
redundancies in
authorization
program elements
that cover the same
subject matter and
periods of time.
However, as
discussed with
respect to proposed
paragraphs (h) and
(i)(1) of this
section, the
proposed rule would
establish time
limits on the
permission to
accept and rely on
authorization
program elements to
which the
individual was
previously subject,
based upon how far
in the past the
background
investigation
element,
psychological
assessment, and
behavioral
observation
training was
conducted.
These time limits
are discussed in
more detail with
respect to the
specific provisions
in the proposed
rule that address
them.
[[Page 62741]]
(d)(1) Informed Proposed Sec.
consent. The 73.56(d)(1) would
licensees, require the
applicants, and C/ entities who are
Vs specified in subject to this
paragraph (a) of section to obtain
this section may written consent
not initiate any from any individual
element of a who is applying for
background UAA before the
investigation licensee,
without the applicant, or C/V
knowledge and initiates any
written consent of element of the
the subject background
individual. investigation that
Licensees, is required in this
applicants, and C/ section. The
Vs shall inform the practice of
individual of his obtaining the
or her right to individual's
review information written consent for
collected to assure the background
its accuracy and investigation has
provide the been endorsed by
individual with an the NRC and
opportunity to incorporated into
correct any licensees' Physical
inaccurate or Security Plans
incomplete since Sec. 73.56
information that is was first
developed by promulgated. It is
licensees, necessary to
applicants, and C/ protect the privacy
Vs about the rights of
individual. individuals who are
applying for UAA.
The proposed
paragraph would
also require
licensees,
applicants, and C/
Vs to inform the
individual of his
or her right to
review information
that is developed
by the licensee,
applicant, or C/V
to verify its
accuracy, and have
the opportunity to
correct any
misinformation.
Proposed Sec.
73.56(o)(6) would
further require the
licensee,
applicant, or C/V
to ensure that any
necessary
corrections are
made to information
about the
individual that has
been recorded in
the information-
sharing mechanism
that would be
required under
proposed Sec.
73.56(o)(6), as
discussed with
respect to that
paragraph. These
are also industry
practices that have
been endorsed by
the NRC and
incorporated into
licensees' Physical
Security Plans.
Permitting the
individual to
review and have the
opportunity to
correct personal
information that is
collected about him
or her is necessary
to maintain
individuals'
confidence in the
fairness of
authorization
programs by
protecting
individuals from
possible adverse
employment actions
that may result
from an inability
to gain unescorted
access to protected
areas, based upon
incorrect
information.
Requiring the
entities who are
subject to this
section to correct
information
contained in the
information-sharing
mechanism, as would
be required under
proposed Sec.
73.56(o)(6), is
necessary to
maintain the
integrity of the
personal
information shared
among the entities
who would be
subject to the
proposed section,
and the
effectiveness of AA
programs.
[[Page 62742]]
(d)(1)(i) The Proposed Sec.
subject individual 73.56(d)(1)(i)
may withdraw his or would specify that
her consent at any an individual who
time. The licensee, has given his or
applicant or C/V to her written consent
whom the individual for a background
has applied for investigation under
unescorted access proposed Sec.
authorization shall 73.56(d)(1) may
inform the withdraw that
individual that-- consent at any
(A) Withdrawal of time. However,
his or her consent because a
will withdraw the background
individual's investigation is
current application one of the
for access requirements for
authorization under granting UAA, and
the licensee's, because the
applicant's or C/ background
V's authorization investigation
program; and. cannot be completed
(B) Other licensees, without the subject
applicants and C/Vs individual's
will have access to consent, proposed
information Sec.
documenting the 73.56(d)(1)(i)(A)
withdrawal through would specify that
the information- the licensee,
sharing mechanism applicant, or C/V
required under to whom the
paragraph (o)(6) of individual has
this section.. applied for UAA
must inform the
individual who has
withdrawn consent
that withdrawal of
consent will
terminate the
individual's
current application
for UAA. In
addition, the
licensee,
applicant, or C/V
would be required
by proposed Sec.
73.56(d)(1)(i)(B)
to notify the
individual that
other licensees,
applicants, and C/
Vs will have access
to information
documenting the
withdrawal through
the information-
sharing mechanism
required under
proposed Sec.
73.56(o)(6). That
proposed paragraph
would require that
information
specified in the
licensee's or
applicant's
Physical Security
Plan about
individuals who
have applied for
UAA, must be
recorded and
retained in a
database that is
administered as an
information-sharing
mechanism by
licensees and
applicants subject
to Sec. 73.56.
(d)(1)(ii) If an Proposed Sec.
individual 73.56(d)(1)(ii)
withdraws his or would establish
her consent, the several
licensees, requirements
applicants and C/Vs related to a
specified in withdrawal of
paragraph (a) of consent by an
this section may individual who has
not initiate any applied for UAA.
elements of the The proposed
background paragraph would
investigation that require the
were not in entities who are
progress at the subject to this
time the individual section to document
withdrew his or her the individual's
consent, but shall withdrawal of
complete any consent, and
background complete and
investigation document any
elements that are elements of the
in progress at the background
time consent is investigation that
withdrawn. In the had been initiated
information-sharing before the time at
mechanism required which an individual
under paragraph withdraws his or
(o)(6) of this her consent, and
section, the would prohibit the
licensee, initiation of any
applicant, or C/V element that was
shall record the not in progress.
individual's For example, if a
application for licensee had
unescorted access submitted a request
authorization; his to a credit history
or her withdrawal reporting agency
of consent for the before an
background individual withdrew
investigation; the his or her consent,
reason given by the the proposed
individual for the paragraph would
withdrawal, if any; require the
and any pertinent licensee to
information document the credit
collected from the history information
background that is obtained
investigation about the
elements that were individual, even if
completed. the licensee
receives the credit
history report
after the date on
which the
individual withdrew
his or her consent.
However, if the
licensee had not
yet requested
information about
the individual's
military service
history at the time
the individual
withdraws consent,
the proposed
provision would
prohibit the
licensee from
initiating a
request for
military service
history
information. There
are many reasons
that an individual
may withdraw his or
her consent for the
background
investigation.
[[Page 62743]]
In most instances,
the reason that an
individual
withdraws his or
her consent is
legitimate, such as
a change in the
individual's work
assignment.
However, in some
instances, the NRC
is aware that
individuals have
withdrawn consent
for the background
investigation in
order to attempt to
prevent the
discovery of
adverse information
or the sharing of
adverse information
already discovered
about the
individual by the
licensee with other
licensees. If the
licensee were to
stop all
information
gathering at the
time at which the
individual withdrew
his or her consent,
the likelihood that
the adverse
information would
be discovered would
be reduced. As a
result, the
individual could be
afforded an
opportunity to
create a risk to
public health and
safety and the
common defense and
security by having
physical access to
a protected or
vital area, and
most importantly,
be in a position to
observe the
licensee's security
posture by
obtaining access to
a licensee facility
under escort,
because a rigorous
background
investigation is
not required for
individuals who
``visit'' a nuclear
power plant under
escort.
Similarly, if
information that
had been requested
by the licensee,
such as a criminal
history report
under proposed Sec.
73.57
[Requirements for
criminal history
checks of
individuals granted
unescorted access
to a nuclear power
facility or access
to safeguards
information by
power reactor
licensees] of this
chapter or the
credit history
report under
proposed Sec.
73.56(d)(5), was
received by the
licensee after the
time the individual
withdrew consent
and contained
adverse
information, but
that adverse
information was not
documented in the
information-sharing
mechanism required
under proposed
paragraph (o)(6) of
this section, the
individual also
could be
inappropriately
permitted to visit
under escort the
same or another
site because the
adverse information
would not be
available for
review. Therefore,
the proposed
provisions would be
necessary to
maintain the
effectiveness of AA
programs in
protecting public
health and safety
and the common
defense and
security by
ensuring that all
available
information about
individuals who
have applied for
UAA is documented
and shared, while
also protecting the
privacy rights of
individuals by
initiating no
further elements of
the background
investigation when
an individual
withdraws his or
her consent.
The proposed
paragraph would
also require
licensees,
applicants, and C/
Vs to create a
record, accessible
to other licensees,
applicants, and C/
Vs, of the fact
that an individual
withdrew his or her
consent to the
background
investigation and
the reason for the
withdrawal. This
record would need
to be created in
the information-
sharing mechanism
required by
proposed Sec.
73.56(o)(6), in
order for
licensees,
applicants, and C/
Vs to carry out the
notice requirement
in proposed Sec.
73.56(d)(1)(i)(B).
[[Page 62744]]
Sec. 73.56(4) Failure by (d)(1)(iii) The
an individual to report any licensees,
previous suspension, applicants, and C/
revocation, or denial of Vs specified in
unescorted access to paragraph (a) of
nuclear power reactors is this section shall
considered sufficient cause inform, in writing,
for denial of unescorted any individual who
access authorization. is applying for
unescorted access
authorization that
the following
actions related to
providing and
sharing the
personal
information under
this section are
sufficient cause
for denial or
unfavorable
termination of
unescorted access
authorization:
(A) Refusal to
provide written
consent for the
background
investigation;.
(B) Refusal to
provide or the
falsification of
any personal
history information
required under this
section, including
the failure to
report any previous
denial or
unfavorable
termination of
unescorted access
authorization;
Proposed Sec.
73.56(d)(1)(iii)
would replace
current Sec.
73.56(b)(4). The
proposed paragraph
would retain the
intent of the
current provision
in proposed Sec.
73.56(d)(4), but
would add other
actions related to
providing and
sharing personal
information that
would be sufficient
cause for a
reviewing official
to deny or
unfavorably
terminate an
individual's UAA.
Proposed paragraph
(d)(1)(iii)(B) of
this section would
add falsification
of any personal
history information
as a sufficient
reason to deny or
unfavorably
terminate UAA in
order to deter
falsification
attempts..
(C) Refusal to Proposed paragraph
provide written (d)(1)(iii)(D) of
consent for the this section would
sharing of personal add failure to
information with comply with the
other licensees, arrest-reporting
applicants, or C/Vs requirements of
required under proposed paragraph
paragraph (d)(4)(v) (g) of this section
of this section; as a sufficient
and reason to deny or
(D) Failure to unfavorably
report any arrests terminate UAA in
or formal actions order to deter
specified in individuals from
paragraph (g) of delaying or failing
this section.. to report such
incidents. The
additional actions
that would be
sufficient cause
for denial or
unfavorable
termination would
include: refusing
to provide written
consent for the
background
investigation that
would be required
under proposed
paragraph
(d)(1)(iii)(A) of
this section;
refusing to provide
personal history
information
required under
paragraph (d)(2) of
this section, in
proposed
(d)(1)(iii)(B); and
refusing to provide
written consent for
the individual's
personal
information to be
shared among the
entities who would
be subject to this
section that would
be required under
paragraph (d)(4)(v)
of this section, in
proposed paragraph
(d)(1)(iii)(C).
[[Page 62745]]
The proposed rule
would specify these
requirements for
the disclosure and
sharing of personal
information because
implementation of
the AA programs
required under this
section requires
individuals to
disclose and permit
the sharing of such
personal
information,
subject to the
protections of such
information that
would be provided
in proposed Sec.
73.56(m). The
proposed paragraph
would also require
the entities who
are subject to this
section to inform
individuals of the
potential
consequences of
these actions so
that individuals
understand the
requirements to
which they are
subject and,
therefore, would be
more likely to
comply with them.
The proposed
paragraph would
delete the terms,
``suspension'' and
``revocation,'' and
replace them with
the term,
``unfavorable
termination.''
Historically, there
have been some
inconsistencies
between Sec.
73.56 access
authorization
requirements and
related
requirements in 10
CFR part 26 that
have led to
implementation
questions from
licensees, as well
as inconsistencies
in how the
licensees have
implemented the
requirements.
During the public
meetings discussed
in Section IV.3,
the stakeholders
provided examples
of ambiguities in
the terms used in
Sec. 73.56 and
how these
ambiguities and
lack of clarity in
Sec. 73.56 had
resulted in
unintended
consequences.
Therefore, to
address stakeholder
requests for
clarity and
consistently
describe the
actions of denying
UAA to an
individual and
terminating an
individual's UAA
for cause in
proposed Sec.
73.56, only the
terms, ``deny or
denial'' and
``unfavorably
terminate or
unfavorable
termination,''
would be used in
the proposed
paragraph and
throughout the
proposed section.
(d)(2) Personal Proposed Sec.
history disclosure. 73.56(d)(2) would
(i) Any individual require an
who is applying for individual who is
unescorted access applying for UAA to
authorization shall provide the
disclose the personal
personal history information that is
information that is required under the
required by the licensee's,
licensee's, applicant's, or C/
applicant's, or C/ V's authorization
V's authorization program, and any
program and any information that
information that may be necessary
may be necessary for the reviewing
for the reviewing official to
official to make a evaluate the
determination of individual's
the individual's trustworthiness and
trustworthiness and reliability. The
reliability.. proposed provision
would be added to
impose a
requirement on
individuals to
divulge personal
information in
order to be granted
UAA, in response to
stakeholder
requests at the
public meetings
discussed in
Section IV.3.
[[Page 62746]]
The proposed
paragraph would not
specify the nature
of the information
that individuals
may be required to
disclose because
the information may
vary widely,
depending upon a
number of factors,
including, but not
limited to, whether
or not the
individual has
previously held
UAA; the length of
time that has
elapsed since his
or her last period
of UAA was
terminated; the job
duties and
responsibilities
that the individual
would perform for
which UAA is
required; and
whether any adverse
information about
the individual is
disclosed or
discovered as a
result of the
background
investigation,
psychological
assessment, or the
suitable inquiry
and drug and
alcohol testing
required under part
26 of this chapter.
Although the amount
and nature of
information to be
disclosed would
vary depending on
the factors
described,
individuals
applying for UAA
would be required
to disclose some
personal history
information each
time he or she
applies for UAA, as
discussed with
respect to proposed
Sec. 73.56(h)
[Granting
unescorted access
authorization].
(d)(2)(ii) Proposed Sec.
Licensees, 73.56(d)(2)(ii)
applicants, and C/ would prohibit a
Vs may not require licensee,
an individual to applicant, or C/V
disclose an from requiring an
administrative individual to
withdrawal of report an
unescorted access administrative
authorization under withdrawal of UAA
the requirements of that may be
paragraphs (g), required under
(h)(7), or proposed Sec.
(i)(1)(v) of this 73.56(g), (h)(7),
section, if the or (i)(1)(v),
individual's except if the
unescorted access information
authorization was developed or
not subsequently discovered about
denied or the individual
terminated during the period
unfavorably by a of the
licensee, administrative
applicant, or C/V. withdrawal resulted
in a denial or
unfavorable
termination of the
individual's UAA.
The proposed
paragraph would
ensure that a
temporary
administrative
withdrawal of an
individual's UAA,
caused by an
administrative
delay in completing
an evaluation of
any formal legal
action, or any
portion of a
background
investigation, re-
investigation, or
psychological
assessment or re-
assessment that is
not under the
individual's
control, would not
be treated as an
unfavorable
termination, except
if the reviewing
official determines
that the delayed
information
requires denial or
unfavorable
termination of the
individual's UAA.
This proposed
provision would be
necessary to
maintain the
public's and
individuals'
confidence in the
fairness of AA
programs by
protecting
individuals from
possible adverse
employment actions
that may be based
upon administrative
delays for which
they are not
responsible.
[[Page 62747]]
Sec. 73.56(b)(2)(i) * * * (d)(3) Verification Proposed Sec.
true identity, and develop of true identity. 73.56(d)(3) would
information concerning an Licensees, expand on the
individual's employment applicants, and C/ portion of current
history, education history, Vs shall verify the Sec.
credit history, criminal true identity of an 73.56(b)(2)(i) that
history, military service, individual who is requires licensees
and verify an individual's applying for to verify an
character and reputation. unescorted access individual's true
authorization in identity. The
order to ensure proposed paragraph
that the applicant would require the
is the person that entities who are
he or she has subject to this
claimed to be. At a section, at a
minimum, licensees, minimum, to
applicants, and C/ validate the social
Vs shall validate security number, or
the social security in the case of
number that the foreign nationals,
individual has the alien
provided, and, in registration
the case of foreign number, that the
nationals, the individual has
alien registration provided to the
number that the licensee, applicant
individual or C/V. The term,
provides. In ``validation,''
addition, would be used in
licensees, the proposed
applicants, and C/ paragraph to
Vs shall also indicate that
determine whether licensees,
the results of the applicants and C/Vs
fingerprinting would be required
required under Sec. to take steps to
73.21 confirm the access information
individual's in addition to that
claimed identity, provided by the
if such results are individual from
available. other reliable
sources to ensure
that the personal
identifying
information the
individual has
provided to the
licensee is
authentic. This
validation could be
achieved through a
variety of means,
including, but not
limited to,
accessing
information from
databases that are
maintained by the
Federal Government,
or evaluating an
accumulation of
information, such
as comparing the
social security
number the
individual provided
to the social
security number(s)
included in a
credit history
report and
information
obtained from other
sources.
The proposed
paragraph would
also require using
the information
obtained from
fingerprinting
individuals, as
required under
proposed Sec.
73.21, to confirm
an individual's
identity, if that
information is
available. The
proposed
requirement
clarifies the NRC's
intent with respect
to this portion of
the background
investigation.
Sec. 73.56(b)(2)(i) * * * (d)(4) Employment Proposed Sec.
and develop information history evaluation. 73.56(d)(4) would
concerning an individual's Licensees, amend the portion
employment history * * *. applicants, and C/ of current Sec.
Vs shall ensure 73.56(b)(2)(i) that
that an employment requires licensees
history evaluation to develop
has been completed, information
by questioning the concerning an
individual's individual's
present and former employment history,
employers, and by education history,
determining the and military
activities of service. This
individuals while paragraph would be
unemployed. added in response
to many
implementation
questions about
these requirements
from licensees.
Because the
proposed paragraph
would add several
clarifications of
the current
requirements, it
would be subdivided
to present each
requirement
separately for
organizational
clarity in the
rule. Considered
together, the
requirements of
proposed Sec.
73.56(d)(4) would
clarify the NRC's
intent that periods
of unemployment,
education, and
military service
must be evaluated
only if the
individual claims
them instead of
typical civilian
employment.
[[Page 62748]]
Proposed Sec.
73.56(d)(4) would
require licensees,
applicants, and C/
Vs to demonstrate a
best effort to
complete the
employment history
evaluation. The
term, ``best
effort,'' would be
added to clarify
the requirements
and increase
consistency between
Sec. 73.56 and
related
requirements in 10
CFR 26.27(a). The
best effort
criterion
recognizes
licensees',
applicants', and C/
Vs' status as
commercial entities
with no legal
authority to
require the release
of the information
from other private
employers and
educational
institutions.
Because of privacy
and potential
litigation
concerns, some
private employers
and educational
institutions may be
unable or unwilling
to release
qualitative
information about a
former employee or
student. Therefore,
the best effort
criterion would
first require
licensees,
applicants, and C/
Vs to seek
employment
information from
the primary source
(e.g. a company,
private employer,
or educational
institution that
the applicant has
listed on his or
her employment
history), but
recognizes that it
may not be
forthcoming. In
this case a
licensee,
applicant, or C/V
would be required
to seek information
from an alternate,
secondary source
when the
information from
the primary source
is unavailable.
The proposed
provision would use
the phrase,
``ensure that the
employment history
evaluation has been
completed,''
because a licensee,
applicant, or C/V
may not be required
to conduct an
employment history
evaluation for
every individual
who applies for
UAA. As discussed
with respect to
proposed Sec.
73.56(h)(3) and
(h)(4), the
proposed rule would
permit licensees,
applicants, and C/
Vs to accept and
rely on elements of
the background
investigations,
psychological
assessments, and
behavioral
observation
training conducted
by other entities
who are subject to
this section to
meet the
requirements of
this section.
Therefore, the need
for and extent of
the employment
history evaluation
would vary,
depending upon how
much recent
information was
available to the
licensee,
applicant, or C/V
from any previous
periods during
which the
individual may have
held UAA. In the
case of individuals
whose UAA has been
interrupted for 30
or fewer days,
proposed Sec.
73.56(h) would not
require an
employment history
evaluation for the
reasons discussed
with respect to
that paragraph.
[[Page 62749]]
However, proposed
Sec. 73.56(h)
would establish
time limits on the
permission to
accept and rely on
AA program elements
to which the
individual was
previously subject,
based upon how far
in the past the
background
investigation,
psychological
assessment, and
behavioral
observation
training elements
were completed.
These time limits
are discussed in
more detail with
respect to the
specific provisions
in the proposed
rule that address
them. The proposed
provision would
also require
licensees,
applicants, and C/
Vs to determine the
activities of
individuals during
periods in which
the individual was
unemployed. The
proposed rule would
add this
requirement to make
certain that,
during the periods
that individuals
claim to have been
unemployed, (1)
they were not
engaged in
activities that may
reflect adversely
on their
trustworthiness and
reliability, such
as confinement for
periods of
incarceration or in-
patient drug or
alcohol treatment,
or (2) they
intentionally
failed to disclose
periods of
employment that
were ended
unfavorably.
(d)(4)(i) For the A new Sec.
claimed employment 73.56(d)(4)(i)
period, the would specify the
employment history purpose of the
evaluation must employment history
ascertain the evaluation, which
reason for would be to
termination, ascertain
eligibility for information about
rehire, and other the individual's
information that trustworthiness and
could reflect on reliability, and
the individual's the types of
trustworthiness and information that
reliability. the licensee,
applicant, or C/V
would seek from
employers regarding
an individual who
is applying for
UAA. The proposed
paragraph would
require the
entities who are
subject to this
section to
ascertain,
consistent with the
``best effort''
criterion
established in
proposed Sec.
73.56(d)(4), the
reason that the
individual's
employment was
terminated, his or
her eligibility for
rehire, and other
information that
could reflect on
the individual's
trustworthiness and
reliability. The
term,
``ascertain,''
would be used in
the proposed
paragraph because
it is consistent
with the
terminology used by
the industry to
refer to the
actions taken with
respect to
conducting the
employment history
evaluation and
would, therefore,
improve the clarity
of this requirement
for those who must
implement it.
In addition, there
may be instances in
which it is
unnecessary for a
licensee,
applicant, or C/V
to conduct the
employment history
evaluation, as
discussed with
respect to proposed
Sec. 73.56(d)(4),
because proposed
Sec. 73.56(h)(2)
would permit the
entities who
implement
authorization
programs to rely on
employment history
evaluations
conducted by other
entities who are
subject to this
section. In such
cases, the
licensee's,
applicant's, or C/
V's reviewing
official would not
review information
that was developed
under his or her AA
program, but would
ascertain the
subject
individual's
employment history
by reviewing
information that
had been collected
by others. The
proposed
requirement would
be added in
response to
implementation
questions that have
arisen about the
employment history
check that is
required in current
Sec.
73.56(b)(2)(i).
[[Page 62750]]
Sec. 73.56(b)(2)(i) * * * (d)(4)(ii) If the Proposed Sec.
the background claimed employment 73.56(d)(4)(ii)
investigation must * * * was military would amend the
develop information service, the portion of current
concerning an individual's licensee, Sec. 73.56(2)(i)
* * * military service * * applicant, or C/V that requires
*. who is conducting licensees to
the employment develop information
history evaluation about an
shall request a individual's
characterization of military service.
service, reason for The proposed
separation, and any paragraph would
disciplinary clarify the NRC's
actions that could intent that
affect a verification and
trustworthiness and characterization of
reliability the individual's
determination. military service
would be required
only if the
individual claims
military service as
employment within
the periods during
which the
individual would be
required to
disclose his or her
employment history,
as specified in
proposed Sec.
73.56(h) [Granting
unescorted access
authorization].
This clarification
would respond to
implementation
questions from
licensees and
stakeholder
requests at the
public meetings
discussed in
Section IV.3.
Sec. 73.56(b)(2)(i) * * * (d)(4)(iii) Periods Proposed Sec.
and develop information of self-employment 73.56(d)(4)(iii)
concerning an individual's or unemployment may would be added at
* * * education history, * be verified by any the request of
* *. reasonable method. stakeholders at the
If education is public meetings
claimed in lieu of discussed in
employment, the Section IV.3 to
licensee, clarify the NRC's
applicant, or C/V intent with respect
shall request to periods of self-
information that employment,
could reflect on unemployment, or
the individual's education, if the
trustworthiness and individual claims
reliability and, at such activities
a minimum, verify within the periods
that the individual during which the
was actively individual would be
participating in required to
the educational disclose his or her
process during the employment history,
claimed period. as specified in
proposed Sec.
73.56(h).
The proposed
paragraph would
permit licensees,
applicants, and C/
Vs to use any
reasonable means,
consistent with the
``best effort''
criterion discussed
with respect to
proposed Sec.
73.56(d)(4), to
verify the
individual's
activities during
claimed periods of
self-employment and
unemployment.
Reasonable means to
verify the
individual's
activities may
include, but would
not be limited to,
a review of
business or tax
records documenting
the individual's
self-employment,
copies of
unemployment
compensation
checks, or
interviews with
business associates
or acquaintances.
To verify education
in lieu of
employment, the
proposed paragraph
would require the
entities who are
subject to this
section to request
information from
the claimed
educational
institution that
could reflect on
the individual's
trustworthiness and
reliability.
However, for
reasons that are
similar to those
discussed with
respect to proposed
Sec. 73.56(d)(4),
the NRC recognizes
that it may be
difficult to obtain
information from an
educational
institution about
the individual's
behavior while a
student. Therefore,
the proposed
paragraph would
permit licensees,
applicants, and C/
Vs to verify, at a
minimum, that the
applicant was
attending and
actively
participating in
school during the
claimed period(s).
[[Page 62751]]
(d)(4)(iv) If a Proposed Sec.
company, previous 73.56(d)(4)(iv)
employer, or would further
educational clarify the NRC's
institution to whom intent with respect
the licensee, to the actions that
applicant, or C/V licensees,
has directed a applicants, and C/
request for Vs would take to
information refuses meet the best
to provide effort criterion in
information or proposed Sec.
indicates an 73.56(d)(4), in
inability or response to many
unwillingness to implementation
provide information questions received
within 3 business from licensees. The
days of the proposed paragraph
request, the would address
licensee, circumstances in
applicant, or C/V which a primary
shall document this source of
refusal, inability, information refuses
or unwillingness in to provide
the licensee's, employment
applicant's, or C/ information or
V's record of the indicates an
investigation, and inability or
obtain a unwillingness to
confirmation of provide it within 3
employment or days of the
educational request. Licensees
enrollment and and other entities
attendance from at would be required
least one alternate to document that
source, with the request for
questions answered information was
to the best of the directed to the
alternate source's primary source and
ability. This the nature of the
alternate source response (i.e., a
may not have been refusal, inability,
previously used by or unwillingness).
the licensee, If a licensee,
applicant, or C/V applicant, or C/V
to obtain encounters such
information about circumstances, the
the individual's proposed paragraph
character and would require the
reputation. If the licensee,
licensee, applicant, permit,
applicant, or C/V or C/V to seek
uses an alternate employment history
source because information from an
employment alternate source,
information is not to the extent of
forthcoming within the alternate
3 business days of source's ability to
the request, the provide the
licensee, information. An
applicant, or C/V alternate source
need not delay may include, but
granting unescorted would not be
access limited to, a co-
authorization to worker or
wait for any supervisor at the
employer response, same company who
but shall evaluate had personal
and document the knowledge of the
response if it is applicant, if such
received. an individual could
be located.
However, the
proposed rule would
prohibit the
licensee,
applicant, or C/V
from using the
alternate source of
employment
information to meet
the requirements in
proposed Sec.
73.56(d)(6) for a
character
reference, in order
to ensure that the
scope of the
background
investigation is
sufficiently broad
to provide high
assurance that
individuals who are
granted UAA are
trustworthy and
reliable. The
proposed paragraph
would permit
licensees and other
entities to grant
UAA, if warranted,
when a response has
been obtained from
an alternate
source, without
waiting more than 3
days after the
request for
information was
directed to a
primary source. The
3-day period would
be established
because industry
and NRC experience
in implementing
current Sec.
73.56 has shown
that if an employer
or educational
institution intends
to respond to the
request for
information, the
response will be
forthcoming within
this period.
Therefore, there is
no added benefit to
public health and
safety or the
common defense and
security in
requiring
licensees,
applicants, or C/Vs
to wait longer than
3 days before
implementing the
alternative methods
of meeting the
employment history
evaluation
requirements that
would be permitted
in the proposed
paragraph.
[[Page 62752]]
However, should the
licensee,
applicant, or C/V
receive an employer
response to the
request for
information after
the 3-day period,
the proposed
paragraph would
require that the
implications of the
information must be
evaluated with
respect to the
individual's
trustworthiness and
reliability and the
information
documented, so that
it is available to
other licensees,
applicants, and C/
Vs. These changes
would be made to
reduce unnecessary
regulatory burden
while maintaining
high assurance that
individuals who are
subject to an AA
program are
trustworthy and
reliable.
(d)(4)(v) When any Proposed Sec.
licensee, 73.56(d)(v) would
applicant, or C/V require licensees,
specified in applicants, and C/
paragraph (a) of Vs who are subject
this section is to this section to
legitimately share employment
seeking the history information
information that they have
required for an collected, if
unescorted access contacted by
authorization another licensee,
decision under this applicant, or C/V
section and has who has a release
obtained a signed signed by the
release from the individual who is
subject individual applying for UAA
authorizing the that would permit
disclosure of such the sharing of that
information, a information. This
licensee, proposed provision
applicant, or C/V would amend the
who is subject to requirement to
this section shall release employment
disclose whether history information
the subject in current Sec.
individual's 73.56(f)(2) and
unescorted access would be consistent
authorization was with related
denied or requirements in 10
terminated CFR part 26. The
unfavorably. The proposed provision
licensee, would also clarify
applicant, or C/V that the
who receives the information must
request for also be released to
information shall C/Vs who have
make available the authorization to
information upon programs when the C/
which the denial or V has obtained the
unfavorable required signed
termination of release from the
unescorted access applicant. This
authorization was proposed
based. clarification is
necessary because
some licensees have
misinterpreted
current Sec.
73.56(f)(2) as
prohibiting the
release of
employment history
information to C/Vs
who administer
authorization
programs under this
section. These
requirements are
necessary to ensure
that adequate
information to
serve as a basis
for UAA decisions
can be obtained by
a licensee,
applicant, or C/V.
(d)(4)(vi) In Proposed Sec.
conducting an 73.56(d)(4)(vi)
employment history would permit
evaluation, the licensees,
licensee, applicants, and C/
applicant, or C/V Vs to use
may obtain electronic means of
information and obtaining the
documents by employment history
electronic means, information to
including, but not increase the
limited to, efficiency with
telephone, which licensees,
facsimile, or applicants, and C/V
email. The could obtain the
licensee, employment history
applicant, or C/V information. The
shall make a record proposed paragraph
of the contents of would be added in
the telephone call response to
and shall retain stakeholder
that record, and requests at the
any documents or public meetings
files obtained discussed in
electronically, in Section IV.3, and
accordance with would be consistent
paragraph (o) of with related
this section. requirements in 10
CFR part 26. The
proposed paragraph
would also add a
cross-reference to
the applicable
records retention
requirement in
proposed Sec.
73.56(o) [Records]
to ensure that
licensees,
applicants, and C/
Vs are aware of the
applicability of
these requirements
to the employment
history information
obtained
electronically.
[[Page 62753]]
Sec. 73.56(b)(2)(i) * * * (d)(5) Credit Proposed Sec.
and develop information history evaluation. 73.56(d)(5) would
concerning an individual's The licensees, retain the
* * * credit history, * * *. applicants, and C/ requirement for a
Vs specified in credit history
paragraph (a) of evaluation that is
this section shall embedded in current
ensure that the Sec.
full credit history 73.56(b)(2)(i) and
of any individual provide more
who is applying for detailed
unescorted access requirements, in
authorization has response to
been evaluated. A stakeholder
full credit history requests at the
evaluation must public meetings
include, but would discussed in
not be limited to, Section IV.3. The
an inquiry to proposed paragraph
detect potential would require the
fraud or misuse of credit history
social security evaluation to
numbers or other include an inquiry
financial to detect any past
identifiers, and a instances of fraud
review and or misuse of social
evaluation of all security numbers or
of the information other financial
that is provided by identifiers. This
a national credit- requirement would
reporting agency be added because
about the most credit-
individual's credit reporting agencies
history. require a specific
request for this
information before
they report it, and
the NRC has
determined that
instances of fraud
or misuse of
financial
identifiers, such
as social security
numbers or the
names that an
individual has
used, may provide
important
information about
an individual's
trustworthiness and
reliability. The
proposed paragraph
would also require
the entities who
are subject to this
section to review
all of the
information that is
provided by the
national credit-
reporting agency,
as part of the
background
investigation
process.
The proposed
paragraph would use
the term, ``full''
to convey that
there is no time
limit on the number
of years of credit
history information
that the reviewing
official would
consider or other
limitations on
using information
contained in the
credit history
report to assist in
determining the
individual's
trustworthiness and
reliability. In the
past, licensees' AA
program procedures
limited the number
of years of the
individual's credit
history that
reviewing officials
were required to
consider in
determining an
individual's
trustworthiness and
reliability. As a
result, some
reviewing officials
may not have
considered credit
history information
for several years,
even if the
reporting agency
provided it. As a
result, individuals
who were subject to
different
authorization
programs were
evaluated
inconsistently.
Furthermore, credit
history reporting
agencies also
provide employment
data that can be
compared to the
information
disclosed by the
applicant for UAA
to validate the
individual's
disclosure.
However, some AA
program procedures
did not require the
reviewing official
to make this
comparison.
Therefore, the
proposed paragraph
would require the
reviewing official
to consider the
``full'' credit
history report, in
order to strengthen
the effectiveness
of the credit
history evaluation
element of AA
programs and
increase the
consistency with
which licensees,
applicants, and C/
Vs would conduct
the credit history
evaluation.
[[Page 62754]]
Sec. 73.56(b)(2)(i) * * * (d)(6) Character and Proposed Sec.
and develop information reputation. The 73.56(d)(6) would
concerning an individual's licensees, expand on the
* * * character and applicants, and C/ requirement in
reputation. Vs specified in current Sec.
paragraph (a) of 73.56(b)(2)(i) for
this section shall licensees to verify
ascertain the an individual's
character and character and
reputation of an reputation. The
individual who has proposed provision
applied for would require the
unescorted access entities who
authorization by implement AA
conducting programs to develop
reference checks. information about
Reference checks an individual's
may not be trustworthiness and
conducted with any reliability by
person who is known contacting and
to be a close interviewing
member of the associates of the
individual's individual who
family, including would have
but not limited to, knowledge of his or
the individual's her character and
spouse, parents, reputation, but who
siblings, or would not be a
children, or any member of the
individual who individual's
resides in the immediate family or
individual's reside in his or
permanent her household.
household. The Family and
reference checks household members
must focus on the would be excluded
individual's because these
reputation for individuals are
trustworthiness and typically reluctant
reliability. to reveal any
adverse
information, if it
exists. The term,
``ascertain,''
would replace
``verify,'' in the
proposed paragraph
because it is
consistent with the
terminology used by
the industry to
refer to the
actions taken with
respect to
determining an
individual's
character and
reputation and
would, therefore,
improve the clarity
of this requirement
for those who must
implement it.
In addition, there
would be instances
in which it is
unnecessary for a
licensee,
applicant, or C/V
to conduct the
character and
reputation
evaluation because
proposed Sec.
73.56(h)(4) would
permit the entities
who implement AA
programs to rely on
the background
investigations
conducted by other
entities who are
subject to this
section. In such
cases, the
licensee's,
applicant's, or C/
V's reviewing
official would not
review information
that was collected
under his or her AA
program, but would
ascertain the
subject
individual's
character and
reputation by
reviewing
information that
had been collected
by others. The last
sentence of the
proposed paragraph
would clarify that
the scope of the
reference checks
would be limited to
developing
information that
would be useful to
the reviewing
official in
determining the
individual's
trustworthiness and
reliability for the
UAA decision. This
requirement would
be added in
response to
stakeholder
requests at the
public meetings
discussed in
Section IV.3 for
increased clarity
and specificity in
the regulation's
requirements.
[[Page 62755]]
Sec. 73.56(b)(2)(i) * * * (d)(7) Criminal Proposed Sec.
and develop information history review. The 73.56(d)(7) would
concerning an individual's licensee's, amend the
* * * criminal history * * applicant's, or C/ requirement in
*. V's reviewing current Sec.
official shall 73.56(b)(2)(i) for
evaluate the entire licensees to
criminal history develop information
record of an about an
individual who is individual's
applying for criminal history.
unescorted access The proposed
authorization to provision would
assist in eliminate the
determining whether current requirement
the individual has to develop criminal
a record of history information
criminal activity because proposed
that may adversely Sec. 73.57
impact his or her [Requirements for
trustworthiness and criminal history
reliability. The checks of
criminal history individuals granted
record must be unescorted access
obtained in to a nuclear power
accordance with the facility or access
requirements of to Safeguards
Sec. 73.57. Information by
power reactor
licensees] would
establish the
methods by which
criminal history
information about
individuals who are
applying for UAA
would be obtained
and it is
unnecessary to
repeat those
requirements in
this section. The
proposed paragraph
would require the
reviewing official
to review the
individual's entire
criminal history
record. This
requirement would
be necessary
because, in the
past, some
licensees limited
the criminal
history review to
the individual's
history over the
past 5 or fewer
years, but did not
consider criminal
history information
from earlier years,
even if the
reporting agency
provided it.
However, the NRC
has determined that
a review of all of
the criminal
history information
that is provided in
a criminal history
record provides
higher assurance
that any instances
or patterns of
lawlessness are
considered when
determining whether
an individual is
trustworthy and
reliable.
Therefore, the
proposed rule would
incorporate this
requirement in
order to strengthen
the effectiveness
of AA programs.
Sec. 73.56(d) Requirements Deleted............. Current Sec.
during cold shutdown. (1) 73.56(d)
The licensee may grant [Requirements
unescorted access during during cold
cold shutdown to an shutdown] would be
individual who does not eliminated from the
possess an access proposed rule.
authorization granted in Because of an
accordance with paragraph increased concern
(b) of this section with a potential
provided the licensee insider threat, as
develops and incorporates discussed in
into its Physical Security Section IV.3, the
Plan measures to be taken NRC has determined
to ensure that the that the relaxation
functional capability of of UAA requirements
equipment in areas for permitted in the
which the access current provision
authorization requirement does not meet the
has been relaxed has not Commission's
been impaired by relaxation objective of
of that requirement. (2) providing high
Prior to incorporating such assurance that
measures into its Physical individuals who
Security Plan the licensee have unescorted
shall submit those plan access to protected
changes to the NRC for areas in nuclear
review and approval power plants are
pursuant to Sec. 50.90. trustworthy and
(3) Any provisions in reliable.
licensees' security plans Therefore, the
that allow for relaxation current permission
of access authorization to grant unescorted
requirements during cold access to an
shutdown are superseded by individual without
this rule. Provisions in meeting all of the
licensees' Physical requirements of
Security Plans on April 25, proposed Sec.
1991 that provide for 73.56 would be
devitalization (that is, a eliminated from the
change from vital to proposed rule.
protected area status) Licensees and
during cold shutdown are applicants would
not affected. continue to be
permitted to seek
an exemption from
the requirements of
proposed Sec.
73.56 under current
Sec. 73.5
[Specific
exemptions].
[[Page 62756]]
Sec. 73.56(b)(2)(ii) A (e) Psychological Proposed Sec.
psychological assessment assessment. In 73.56(e) would
designed to evaluate the order to assist in amend current Sec.
possible impact of any determining an 73.56(b)(2)(ii),
noted psychological individual's which requires AA
characteristics which may trustworthiness and programs to include
have a bearing on reliability, the a psychological
trustworthiness and licensees, assessment, by
reliability. applicants, and C/ adding several
Vs specified in requirements to the
paragraph (a) of current rule.
this section shall Because the
ensure that a requirements in the
psychological proposed rule would
assessment has been be more detailed,
completed of the the current
individual who is paragraph would be
applying for restructured and
unescorted access subdivided to
authorization. The present the new
psychological requirements in
assessment must be separate
designed to paragraphs. This
evaluate the change would be
possible adverse made for increased
impact of any noted clarity in the
psychological organization of the
characteristics on rule. The proposed
the individual's paragraph would
trustworthiness and retain the current
reliability. requirement for the
psychological
assessment to be
designed to
evaluate the
implications of the
individual's
psychological
characteristics on
his or her
trustworthiness and
reliability in a
separate sentence
for clarity. For
the same reason,
``adverse'' would
be added to more
clearly describe
the intended
purpose of the
psychological
assessment. The
proposed provision
would retain the
intent of the
current requirement
for AA programs to
include a
psychological
assessment, but
would use the
phrase, ``has been
completed,''
because licensees,
applicants, and C/
Vs may not be
required to
complete the
psychological
assessment each
time that an
individual applies
for UAA.
As discussed with
respect to proposed
Sec. 73.56(h)(1),
AA programs would
be permitted to
rely on
psychological
assessments that
were completed by
other AA programs.
Individuals who
have been subject
to a psychological
assessment, which
was conducted in
accordance with
requirements of
this proposed
section and
resulted in the
granting of UAA,
within the time
period specified in
the licensee's or
applicant's
Physical Security
Plan [as discussed
with respect to
proposed Sec.
73.56(i)(1)(v)],
would not be
required to be
assessed again in
order to be granted
UAA.
(e)(1) A licensed Proposed Sec.
clinical 73.56(e)(1) would
psychologist or establish minimum
psychiatrist shall requirements for
conduct the the credentials of
psychological individuals who
assessment. perform the
psychological
assessments that
are required under
current Sec.
73.56(b)(2)(ii),
which are not
addressed in the
current rule. The
proposed provision
would require a
licensed clinical
psychologist or
psychiatrist to
conduct the
psychological
assessment, because
the extensive
education,
training, and
supervised clinical
experience that
these professionals
must possess in
order to be
licensed under
State laws would
provide high
assurance that they
are qualified to
conduct the
psychological
assessments that
are required under
the rule.
The proposed rule
would impose this
new requirement
because of the key
role that the
psychological
assessment element
of AA programs
plays in assuring
the public health
and safety and
common defense and
security when
determining whether
an individual is
trustworthy and
reliable.
Therefore, the
proposed provision
would be added to
strengthen the
effectiveness of AA
programs.
[[Page 62757]]
(e)(2) The A new Sec.
psychological 73.56(e)(2) would
assessment must be require
conducted in psychological
accordance with the assessments to be
applicable ethical conducted in
principles for accordance with
conducting such ethical principles
assessments for conducting such
established by the assessments that
American are established by
Psychological the American
Association or Psychological
American Association or the
Psychiatric American
Association. Psychiatric
Association, as
applicable. In
order to meet State
licensure
requirements,
clinical
psychologists and
psychiatrists are
required to
practice in
accordance with the
applicable
professional
standards. However,
the proposed rule
would add a
reference to these
professional
standards to
emphasize the
importance that the
NRC places on the
proper conduct of
psychological
assessments, in
order to ensure the
rights of
individuals,
consistent
treatment, and the
effectiveness of
the psychological
assessment
component of AA
programs.
(e)(3) At a minimum, Proposed Sec.
the psychological 73.56(e)(3) would
assessment must establish new
include the requirements for
administration and the psychological
interpretation of a testing that
standardized, licensees,
objective, applicants, and C/
professionally Vs would conduct as
accepted part of the
psychological test psychological
that provides assessment. The
information to proposed paragraph
identify would require the
indications of administration and
disturbances in interpretation of
personality or an objective
psychopathology psychological test
that may have that provides
implications for an information to aid
individual's in identifying
trustworthiness and personality
reliability. disturbances and
Predetermined psychopathology.
thresholds must be The proposed rule
applied in would specify
interpreting the psychological tests
results of the that are designed
psychological test, to identify
to determine indications of
whether an personality
individual shall be disturbances and
interviewed by a psychopathology
psychiatrist or because some of
licensed clinical these conditions
psychologist under may reflect
paragraph (e)(4)(i) adversely on an
of this section. individual's
trustworthiness and
reliability. The
proposed rule would
not prohibit the
use of other types
of psychological
tests, such as
personality
inventories and
tests of abilities,
in the
psychological
assessment process,
but would establish
the minimum
requirement for a
test that
identifies
indications of
personality
disturbances and
psychopathology
because the
identification of
these conditions is
most relevant to
the purpose of the
psychological
assessment element
of AA programs. The
proposed provision
would also require
the use of
standardized,
objective
psychological tests
to reduce potential
variability in the
testing that is
conducted under
this section.
[[Page 62758]]
Decreasing potential
variability in
testing is
important to
provide greater
assurance than in
the past that
individuals who are
applying for or
maintaining UAA are
treated
consistently under
the proposed rule.
The proposed rule
would not prohibit
the use of other
types of
psychological
tests, such as
projective tests,
in the
psychological
assessment process,
but would establish
the minimum
requirement for a
standardized,
objective test to
facilitate the
psychological re-
assessments that
would be required
under proposed Sec.
73.56(i)(1)(v).
Comparing scores on
a standardized,
objective test to
identify
indications of any
adverse changes in
the individual's
psychological
status is
simplified when the
testing that is
performed for a re-
assessment is
similar to or the
same as previous
testing that was
conducted under
this section,
particularly when
the clinician who
conducts the re-
assessment did not
conduct the
previous testing.
The proposed
paragraph would
also require
licensees,
applicants, and C/
Vs to establish
thresholds in
interpreting the
results of the
psychological test,
to aid in
determining whether
an individual would
be required to be
interviewed by a
psychiatrist or
licensed clinical
psychologist under
proposed paragraph
(e)(4)(ii) of this
section.
The NRC is aware of
substantial
variability in the
thresholds used by
authorization
programs in the
past to determine
whether an
individual's test
results provided
indications of
personality
disturbances or
psychopathology.
Different clinical
psychologists
providing services
to the same or
different AA
programs would vary
in the thresholds
they applied in
determining whether
an individual's
test results
indicated the need
for further
evaluation in a
clinical interview.
As a consequence,
whether or not
individuals who had
the same patterns
of scores on the
psychological test
would be subject to
a clinical
interview would
vary both within
and between AA
programs. The
proposed rule would
add a requirement
for predetermined
thresholds to
reduce this
variability in
order to protect
the rights of
individuals who are
subject to AA
programs to fair
and consistent
treatment.
[[Page 62759]]
(e)(4) The A new Sec.
psychological 73.56(e)(4) would
assessment must establish
include a clinical requirements for
interview-- the conditions
(i) If an under which the
individual's scores psychological
on the assessment must
psychological test include a clinical
in paragraph (e)(3) interview. Proposed
of this section Sec.
identify 73.56(e)(4)(i)
indications of would require a
disturbances in clinical interview
personality or if an individual's
psychopathology scores on the
that may have psychological test
implications for an identified
individual's indications of
trustworthiness and disturbances in
reliability; or. personality or
(ii) If the psychopathology
licensee's or that would
applicant's necessitate further
Physical Security assessment. The
Plan requires a clinical interview
clinical interview would be performed
based on job by a licensed
assignments.. clinical
psychologist or
psychiatrist,
consistent with the
ethical principles
for conducting
psychological
assessments that
are established by
the American
Psychological
Association or the
American
Psychiatric
Association. The
purposes of the
clinical interview
would include, but
would not be
limited to,
validating the test
results and
assessing their
implications for
the individual's
trustworthiness and
reliability.
Proposed Sec.
73.56(e)(4)(ii)
would also require
a clinical
interview for some
individuals who
would be identified
in the licensee's
or applicant's
Physical Security
Plan. In general,
the individuals who
would always
receive a clinical
interview before
being granted UAA
would be those who
perform critical
operational and
security-related
functions at the
licensee's site.
The proposed
requirements are
necessary to ensure
that any noted
psychological
characteristics of
individuals who are
applying for or
maintaining UAA do
not adversely
affect their
trustworthiness and
reliability.
(e)(5) If, in the A new Sec.
course of 73.56(e)(5) would
conducting the require the
psychological psychologist or
assessment, the psychiatrist who
licensed clinical conducts the
psychologist or psychological
psychiatrist assessment to
identifies report to the
indications of, or reviewing official
information related any information
to, a medical obtained through
condition that conducting the
could adversely assessment that
impact the indicates the
individual's individual may have
fitness for duty or a medical condition
trustworthiness and that could
reliability, the adversely affect
psychologist or his or her fitness
psychiatrist shall for duty or
inform the trustworthiness and
reviewing official, reliability. For
who shall ensure example, some
that an appropriate psychological tests
evaluation of the identify
possible medical indications of a
condition is substance abuse
conducted under the problem. Or, an
requirements of individual may
part 26 of this disclose during the
chapter. clinical interview
that he or she is
taking prescription
medications that
could cause
impairment. In
these instances,
the proposed rule
would require the
reviewing official
to ensure that the
potential impact of
any possible
medical condition
on the individual's
fitness for duty or
trustworthiness and
reliability is
evaluated. The
term,
``appropriate,''
would be used with
respect to the
medical evaluation
to recognize that
healthcare
professionals vary
in their
qualifications.
[[Page 62760]]
For example, a
psychiatrist who
conducts the
assessment would be
qualified to assess
the potential
impacts on an
individual's
fitness for duty of
any psychoactive
medications the
individual may be
taking, whereas a
substance abuse
professional, nurse
practitioner, or
other licensed
physician may not.
The NRC is aware of
instances in which
indications of a
substance problem
or other medical
condition that
could adversely
affect an
individual's
fitness for duty or
trustworthiness and
reliability were
identified during
the psychological
assessment, but
were not
communicated to
fitness-for-duty
program personnel
and, therefore,
were not evaluated
as part of the
access
authorization
decision. The
proposed paragraph
would be added to
ensure that
information about
potential medical
conditions is
communicated and
evaluated. This
provision would be
added to strengthen
the effectiveness
of the access
authorization
process.
Sec. 73.56(b)(2)(iii) (f) Behavioral Proposed Sec.
Behavioral observation, observation. Access 73.56(f)
conducted by supervisors authorization [Behavioral
and management personnel, programs must observation] would
designed to detect include a replace current
individual behavioral behavioral Sec.
changes which, if left observation element 73.56(b)(2)(iii),
unattended, could lead to that is designed to which requires
acts detrimental to the detect behaviors or licensees' AA
public health and safety. activities that may programs to include
constitute an a behavioral
unreasonable risk observation
to the health and element, to be
safety of the conducted by
public and common supervisors and
defense and management
security, including personnel, and
a potential threat designed to detect
to commit individual
radiological behavioral changes
sabotage. which, if left
unattended, could
lead to acts
detrimental to the
public health and
safety. The
proposed paragraph
would amend the
requirements of the
current paragraph
and add others.
Proposed Sec.
73.56(f) would
amend the objective
of the behavioral
observation element
of AA programs in
the current
provision. The
proposed paragraph
would eliminate the
current reference
to behavior changes
which, if left
unattended, could
lead to detrimental
acts. Although
detecting and
evaluating behavior
changes in order to
determine whether
they may lead to
acts detrimental to
the public health
and safety is
important, the
behavioral
observation element
of fitness-for-duty
programs that is
required under 10
CFR 26.22(a)(4)
also addresses this
objective.
Therefore, the
proposed paragraph
would be revised,
in part, to
eliminate this
redundancy.
[[Page 62761]]
In addition, the
current provision's
requirement for
behavioral
observation to
focus only on
detecting behavior
changes is too
narrow. The NRC
intends that
behavioral
observation must
also be conducted
in order to
increase the
likelihood that
potentially adverse
behavior patterns
and actions will be
detected and
evaluated before
there is an
opportunity for
such behavior
patterns or acts to
result in
detrimental
consequences. For
example, experience
in other industries
has shown that an
individual's
unusual interest in
an organization's
security activities
and operations that
are outside the
scope of the
individual's normal
work assignments
may be an
indication that the
individual is
gathering
intelligence for
adversarial
purposes. If the
behavioral
observation element
of AA programs
focuses only on
behavior changes,
and an individual
has demonstrated a
pattern of
``unusual
interest'' since
starting work for
the licensee, other
persons who are
aware of the
individual's
behavior pattern
may not consider
the behavior to be
a potential concern
and, therefore, may
not raise the
concern. As a
result, an
opportunity to
detect and evaluate
this behavior
pattern would be
lost.
Therefore, in order
to increase the
effectiveness of
the behavioral
observation element
of AA programs and
more clearly convey
the NRC's intent,
the proposed
paragraph would be
revised to clarify
that the objective
of behavioral
observation is to
detect behavior or
activities that
have the potential
to constitute an
unreasonable risk
to the health and
safety of the
public and common
defense and
security, including
a potential threat
to commit
radiological
sabotage. The
portion of current
Sec.
73.56(b)(2)(iii)
that addresses who
must conduct
behavioral
observation (i.e.,
supervisors and
management
personnel) would be
moved to a separate
paragraph for
increased
organizational
clarity in this
section, and would
be amended for the
reasons discussed
with respect to
proposed Sec.
73.56(f)(2).
(f)(1) The Proposed Sec.
licensees, 73.56(f)(1) would
applicants, and C/ clarify the intent
Vs specified in of the current
paragraph (a) of requirement by
this section shall specifying the
ensure that the individuals who
individuals must be subject to
specified in behavioral
paragraph (b)(1) of observation. The
this section and, proposed paragraph
if applicable, would be added to
(b)(2) of this address stakeholder
section are subject requests at the
to behavioral public meetings
observation. discussed in
Section IV.3, for
increased
specificity in the
language of the
rule.
[[Page 62762]]
(f)(2) The The proposed
individuals paragraph would
specified in amend the portion
paragraph (b)(1) of current Sec.
and, if applicable, 73.56(b)(2)(iii)
(b)(2) of this that requires only
section shall supervisors and
observe the management
behavior of other personnel to
individuals. The conduct behavioral
licensees, observation by
applicants, and C/ requiring all
Vs specified in individuals who are
paragraph (a) of subject to an
this section shall authorization
ensure that program to conduct
individuals who are behavioral
subject to this observation.
section also Increasing the
successfully number of
complete behavioral individuals who
observation conduct behavioral
training. observation would
enhance the
effectiveness of AA
programs by
increasing the
likelihood of
detecting behavior
or activities that
may be adverse to
the safe operation
and security of the
facility and may,
therefore,
constitute an
unreasonable risk
to the health and
safety and common
defense and
security. This
change is necessary
to address the
NRC's increased
concern with a
potential insider
threat discussed in
Section IV.3.
Proposed Sec.
73.56(f)(2) also
would require
licensees,
applicants, and C/
Vs to ensure that
individuals who are
subject to an
authorization
program
successfully
complete behavioral
observation
training. The means
by which licensees,
applicants, and C/
Vs would
demonstrate that an
individual has
successfully
completed the
training would be
through the
administration of
the comprehensive
examination
discussed with
respect to proposed
Sec.
73.56(f)(2)(iii).
Because all
individuals who are
subject to the AA
program would be
required to conduct
behavioral
observation,
training is
necessary to ensure
that individuals
have the knowledge,
skills, and
abilities necessary
to do so.
(f)(2)(i) Behavioral Proposed Sec.
observation 73.56(f)(2)(i)
training must be would require all
completed before personnel who are
the licensee, subject to this
applicant, or C/V section to complete
grants an initial behavioral
unescorted access observation
authorization, as training before the
defined in licensee,
paragraph (h)(5) of applicant, or C/V
this section, and grants initial
must be current unescorted access
before the authorization to
licensee, the individual, as
applicant, or C/V defined in proposed
grants an paragraph (h)(5)
unescorted access [Initial unescorted
authorization access
update, as defined authorization]. The
in paragraph (h)(6) proposed rule would
of this section, or also require that
an unescorted an individual's
access training must be
authorization current before the
reinstatement, as licensee,
defined in applicant, or C/V
paragraph (h)(7) of grants an
this section; unescorted access
authorization
update or
reinstatement to
the individual, as
defined in proposed
paragraphs (h)(6)
[Updated unescorted
access
authorization] and
(h)(7)
[Reinstatement of
unescorted access
authorization
reinstatement] of
this section,
respectively.
Annual refresher
training, which
would be the means
by which licensees,
applicants, and C/
Vs would meet the
requirement for
training to be
``current,'' would
be addressed in
proposed Sec.
73.56(f)(2)(ii).
The proposed
requirement to
complete behavioral
observation
training before
initial unescorted
access
authorization is
granted is
necessary to ensure
that individuals
have the knowledge,
skills, and
abilities required
to meet their
responsibilities
for conducting
behavioral
observation under
proposed paragraph
(f)(2)(i). The
basis for requiring
refresher training
is discussed with
respect to proposed
paragraph
(f)(2)(ii) of this
section.
[[Page 62763]]
(f)(2)(ii) Proposed Sec.
Individuals shall 73.45(f)(2)(ii)
complete refresher would require
training on a annual refresher
nominal 12-month training in
frequency, or more behavioral
frequently where observation, at a
the need is minimum, with more
indicated. frequent refresher
Individuals may training when the
take and pass a need is indicated.
comprehensive The proposed
examination that paragraph would
meets the require annual or
requirements of more frequent
paragraph refresher training
(f)(2)(iii) of this in order to ensure
section in lieu of that individuals
completing annual retain the
refresher training; knowledge, skills,
and abilities
gained through
initial training.
Refresher training
may also be
necessary if an
individual
demonstrates a
failure to
implement
behavioral
observation
requirements in
accordance with AA
program procedures
or new information
is added to the
behavioral
observation
training
curriculum.
The proposed
paragraph would
also permit
individuals who
pass a
comprehensive
``challenge''
examination that
demonstrates their
continued
understanding of
behavioral
observation to be
excused from the
refresher training
that would
otherwise be
required under the
proposed paragraph.
The proposed rule
would require that
the ``challenge''
examination must
meet the
examination
requirements
specified in
proposed paragraph
(f)(2)(iii) of this
section and
individuals who did
not pass would
undergo remedial
training.
Permitting
individuals to pass
a comprehensive
``challenge''
examination rather
than take refresher
training each year
would ensure that
they are retaining
their knowledge,
skills, and
abilities while
reducing some costs
associated with
meeting the annual
refresher training
requirement.
(f)(2)(iii) Proposed Sec.
Individuals shall 73.56(f)(2)(iii)
demonstrate the would require
successful individuals to
completion of demonstrate that
behavioral they have
observation successfully
training by passing completed
a comprehensive behavioral
examination that observation
addresses the training by passing
knowledge and a comprehensive
abilities necessary examination. The
to detect behavior proposed provision
or activities that would require
have the potential remedial training
to constitute an and re-testing for
unreasonable risk individuals who
to the health and fail to achieve a
safety of the passing score on
public and common the examination.
defense and These proposed
security, including requirements would
a potential threat be modeled on other
to commit required training
radiological programs that have
sabotage. Remedial been successful in
training and re- ensuring that
testing are examinations are
required for valid and
individuals who individuals have
fail to achieved an
satisfactorily adequate
complete the understanding of
examination. the subject matter.
(f)(2)(iv) Initial Proposed Sec.
and refresher 73.56(f)(2)(iv)
training may be would permit the
delivered using a use of various
variety of media media for
(including, but not administering
limited to, training in order
classroom lectures, to achieve the
required reading, efficiencies
video, or computer- associated with
based training computer-based
systems). The training, for
licensee, example, and other
applicant, or C/V new training
shall monitor the delivery
completion of technologies that
training. may become
available.
Permitting the use
of various media to
administer the
training would
improve the
efficiency of AA
programs and reduce
regulatory burden,
by providing
flexibility in the
methods that
licensees and other
entities may use to
administer the
required training.
The proposed
paragraph would
also require the
completion of
training to be
monitored by the
licensee,
applicant, or C/V.
[[Page 62764]]
This requirement is
necessary to ensure
that individuals
who are subject to
an authorization
program actively
participate in and
receive the
required training.
The NRC is aware
that some
individuals have
engaged in
successful
litigation against
licensees on the
basis that they
were not aware of
the requirements to
which they were
subject, in part,
because of
deficiencies in
licensee processes
for ensuring that
individuals are
trained. Therefore,
the proposed rule
would add this
requirement to
improve the
effectiveness of
the training
element of AA
programs.
(f)(3) Individuals Proposed Sec.
who are subject to 73.56(f)(3) would
an authorization require individuals
program under this to report any
section shall concerns arising
report to the from behavioral
reviewing official observation to the
any concerns licensee's,
arising from applicant's, or C/
behavioral V's reviewing
observation, official. This
including, but not specificity is
limited to, necessary because
concerns related to the NRC is aware of
any questionable past instances in
behavior patterns which individuals
or activities of reported concerns
others. to supervisors or
other licensee
personnel who did
not then inform the
reviewing official
of the concern. As
a result, the
concern was not
addressed and any
implications of the
concern for the
individual's
trustworthiness and
reliability were
not evaluated.
Therefore, the
proposed rule would
require individuals
to report directly
to the reviewing
official, to ensure
that the reviewing
official is made
aware of the
concern, has the
opportunity to
evaluate it, and
determine whether
to grant, maintain,
administratively
withdraw, deny, or
terminate UAA. The
proposed provision
would be added to
clarify and
strengthen the
behavioral
observation element
of AA programs by
increasing the
likelihood that
questionable
behaviors or
activities are
appropriately
addressed by the
licensees and other
entities who are
subject to the
rule.
(g) Arrest A new Sec.
reporting. Any 73.56(g) would
individual who has establish
applied for or is requirements
maintaining related to the
unescorted access arrest, indictment,
authorization under filing of charges,
this section shall or conviction of
promptly report to any individual who
the reviewing is applying for or
official any formal maintaining UAA
action(s) taken by under this section.
a law enforcement The proposed
authority or court paragraph would
of law to which the require individuals
individual has been to promptly report
subject, including to the reviewing
an arrest, an official any such
indictment, the formal action(s) to
filing of charges, ensure that the
or a conviction. On reviewing official
the day that the has an opportunity
report is received, to evaluate the
the reviewing implications of the
official shall formal action(s)
evaluate the with respect to the
circumstances individual's
related to the trustworthiness and
formal action(s) reliability.
and determine
whether to grant,
maintain,
administratively
withdraw, deny, or
unfavorably
terminate the
individual's
unescorted access
authorization.
[[Page 62765]]
The proposed rule
includes other
provisions that
would also ensure
that the reviewing
official is aware
of and evaluates
the implications of
any formal
action(s) to which
an individual may
be subject,
including the
requirement for a
criminal history
review under
proposed Sec.
73.56(d)(7) and
regular updates to
the criminal
history review
under proposed Sec.
73.56(i)(1)(v).
However, these
proposed provisions
would not provide
for prompt
evaluation of any
formal action(s)
that arise in the
intervening time
period since a
criminal history
review was last
conducted.
Therefore, this
requirement would
be added to ensure
that the reviewing
official is made
aware of formal
actions at the time
that they occur,
has the opportunity
to evaluate the
implications of
these formal
actions with
respect to the
individual's
trustworthiness and
reliability, and,
if necessary, take
timely action to
deny or unfavorably
terminate the
individual's UAA,
if the reviewing
official determines
that the formal
actions cast doubt
on the individual's
trustworthiness and
reliability. The
proposed rule would
also specifically
require the formal
action(s) to be
reported to the
licensee's,
applicant's, or C/
V's reviewing
official.
This specificity is
necessary because
the NRC is aware of
past instances in
which individuals
reported formal
actions to
supervisors who did
not then inform the
reviewing official.
As a result, some
individuals were
granted or
maintained UAA
without the high
assurance that they
are trustworthy and
reliable that AA
programs must
provide, as
discussed with
respect to proposed
Sec. 73.56(c)
[General
performance
objective].
Therefore, a
specific
requirement for
individuals to
report directly to
the reviewing
official is
necessary to ensure
that the reviewing
official is aware
of the actions, has
the opportunity to
evaluate the
circumstances
surrounding the
actions, and
determine whether
to grant, maintain,
administratively
withdraw, deny, or
terminate UAA. The
proposed paragraph
would not establish
a specific time
limit within which
an individual would
be required to
report a formal
action because the
time frames within
which different
formal actions
occur may vary
widely, depending
on the nature of
the formal action
and characteristics
of the locality in
which the formal
action is taken.
However, nothing in
the proposed
provision would
prohibit licensees,
applicants, and C/
Vs from
establishing, in
program procedures,
reporting time
limits that are
appropriate for
their local
circumstances.
[[Page 62766]]
The proposed rule
would use the term,
``promptly,'' to
clarify the NRC's
intent that
individuals are
responsible for
reporting any
formal action(s) of
the type specified
in the proposed
paragraph without
delay. The proposed
paragraph would
also require the
reviewing official
to evaluate the
circumstances
related to the
formal action and
decide whether to
grant, maintain,
administratively
withdraw, deny, or
unfavorably
terminate the
individual's UAA on
the day that he or
she receives the
report of an
arrest, indictment,
the filing of
charges, or
conviction. The
proposed
requirement is
necessary because
the NRC is aware of
past instances in
which reviewing
officials have been
informed of a
formal action, but
have not acted
promptly to
evaluate the
information and
determine its
implications with
respect to the
individual's
trustworthiness and
reliability. As a
result, some
individuals were
granted or
maintained UAA
without the high
assurance that they
are trustworthy and
reliable that AA
programs must
provide, as
discussed with
respect to proposed
Sec. 73.56(c)
[General
performance
objective].
The proposed
paragraph would
provide for the
administrative
withdrawal of UAA
without a positive
determination that
the individual is
trustworthy and
reliable (which
would permit the
granting or
maintaining of UAA)
or a negative
determination of
the individual's
trustworthiness and
reliability (which
would require the
denial or
unfavorable
termination of
UAA), because the
reviewing official
may not have
sufficient
information on the
day that the report
is received to make
the determination.
However, if, based
on the information
available to the
reviewing official,
he or she is unable
to make either a
positive or
negative
determination, the
proposed rule would
require the
administrative
withdrawal of UAA
until such a
determination can
be made. The
administrative
withdrawal of the
individual's UAA
would be necessary
to protect public
health and safety
and the common
defense and
security when the
trustworthiness and
reliability of an
individual cannot
be positively
determined.
Sec. 73.56(c) Existing, (c)(1) Deleted...... The proposed rule
reinstated, transferred, would eliminate
and temporary access current Sec.
authorization. (1) 73.56(c)(1), which
Individuals who have had an permitted
uninterrupted unescorted individuals who had
access authorization for at an uninterrupted
least 180 days on April 25, unescorted access
1991 need not be further authorization for
evaluated. Such individuals at least 180 days
shall be subject to the on April 25, 1991,
behavioral observation to retain
requirements of this unescorted access
section. authorization and
required them to be
subject to
behavioral
observation. The
current paragraph
would be eliminated
because these
requirements no
longer apply.
[[Page 62767]]
Sec. 73.56(c) Existing, (h) Granting Proposed Sec.
reinstated, transferred, unescorted access 73.56(h) would
and temporary access authorization. The replace and amend
authorization. licensees, current Sec.
applicants, and C/ 73.56(c), which
Vs specified in permits AA programs
paragraph (a) of to specify
this section shall conditions for
implement the reinstating an
requirements of interrupted UAA,
this paragraph for for transferring
granting initial UAA from another
unescorted access licensee, and for
authorization, permitting
updated unescorted temporary UAA. As
access discussed in
authorization, and Section IV.3, the
reinstatement of requirements in
unescorted access proposed Sec.
authorization. 73.56 are based
upon several
fundamental changes
to the NRC's
approach to access
authorization since
the terrorist
attacks of
September 11, 2001,
and an increased
concern for an
active or passive
insider who may
collude with
adversaries to
commit radiological
sabotage.
The primary concern,
which many of the
amendments to Sec.
73.56 are designed
to address, is the
necessity of
increasing the
rigor of the access
authorization
process to provide
high assurance that
any individual who
is granted and
maintains UAA is
trustworthy and
reliable. Proposed
Sec. 73.56(h)
would identify
three categories of
proposed
requirements for
granting UAA: (1)
Initial unescorted
access
authorization, (2)
updated unescorted
access
authorization, and
(3) reinstatement
of unescorted
access
authorization. The
proposed
categories, which
are based upon
whether an
individual who has
applied for UAA has
previously held UAA
under Sec. 73.56
and the length of
time that has
elapsed since the
individual's last
period of UAA
ended, would be
defined in proposed
Sec. 73.56(h)(5)
[Initial unescorted
access
authorization],
proposed Sec.
73.56(h)(6)
[Updated unescorted
access
authorization], and
proposed Sec.
73.56(h)(7)
[Reinstatement of
unescorted access
authorization].
Proposed Sec.
73.56(h) would
direct licensees,
applicants, and C/
Vs to use the
criteria for
granting UAA that
are found in
proposed Sec.
73.56(h)(5),
(h)(6), and (h)(7),
depending on which
of the proposed
paragraphs would
apply to the
individual seeking
UAA. Current Sec.
73.56 permits
authorization
programs to specify
conditions for
reinstating an
interrupted UAA or
transferring UAA
from another
licensee, but it
does not use the
concepts of
``initial
unescorted access
authorization,''
``updated
unescorted access
authorization,'' or
``reinstatement of
unescorted access
authorization.''
These concepts
would be used in
proposed Sec.
73.56 to focus the
requirements for
UAA more precisely
on whether the
individual has
established a
``track record'' in
the industry, and
to specify the
amount of original
information-
gathering that
licensees,
applicants, and C/
Vs would be
required to
perform, based on
whether previous AA
programs have
collected
information about
the individual.
[[Page 62768]]
For individuals who
have established a
favorable track
record in the
industry, the steps
that licensees,
applicants, and C/
Vs would complete
in order to grant
UAA to an
individual would
also depend upon
the length of time
that has elapsed
since the
individual's last
period of UAA was
terminated and the
amount of
supervision to
which the
individual was
subject during the
interruption. (the
term,
``interruption,''
refers to the
interval of time
between periods
during which an