[Federal Register Volume 71, Number 207 (Thursday, October 26, 2006)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Pages 62664-62874]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 06-8678]



[[Page 62663]]

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Part II





Nuclear Regulatory Commission





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10 CFR Parts 50, 72, and 73



Power Reactor Security Requirements; Proposed Rule

Federal Register / Vol. 71, No. 207 / Thursday, October 26, 2006 / 
Proposed Rules

[[Page 62664]]


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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

10 CFR Parts 50, 72, and 73

RIN 3150-AG63


Power Reactor Security Requirements

AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

ACTION: Proposed rule.

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SUMMARY: The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is proposing to amend 
the current security regulations and add new security requirements 
pertaining to nuclear power reactors. Additionally, this rulemaking 
includes new security requirements for Category I strategic special 
nuclear material (SSNM) facilities for access to enhanced weapons and 
firearms background checks. The proposed rulemaking would: Make 
generically applicable security requirements imposed by Commission 
orders issued after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, based 
upon experience and insights gained by the Commission during 
implementation; fulfill certain provisions of the Energy Policy Act of 
2005; add several new requirements that resulted from insights from 
implementation of the security orders, review of site security plans, 
and implementation of the enhanced baseline inspection program and 
force-on-force exercises; update the regulatory framework in 
preparation for receiving license applications for new reactors; and 
impose requirements to assess and manage site activities that can 
adversely affect safety and security. The proposed safety and security 
requirements would address, in part, a petition for rulemaking (PRM 50-
80) that requests the establishment of regulations governing proposed 
changes to facilities which could adversely affect the protection 
against radiological sabotage.

DATES: Submit comments by January 9, 2007. Submit comments specific to 
the information collection aspects of this rule by November 27, 2006. 
Comments received after the above dates will be considered if it is 
practical to do so, but assurance of consideration cannot be given to 
comments received after these dates.

ADDRESSES: You may submit comments by any one of the following methods. 
Please include the following number ``RIN 3150-AG63'' in the subject 
line of your comments. Comments on rulemakings submitted in writing or 
in electronic form will be made available for public inspection. 
Because your comments will not be edited to remove any identifying or 
contact information, the NRC cautions you against including any 
information in your submission that you do not want to be publicly 
disclosed.
    Mail comments to: Secretary, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 
Washington, DC 20555-0001, Attn: Rulemakings and Adjudications Staff.
    E-mail comments to: SECY@nrc.gov. If you do not receive a reply e-
mail confirming that we have received your comments, contact us 
directly at (301) 415-1966. You may also submit comments via the NRC's 
rulemaking Web site at http://ruleforum.llnl.gov. Address questions 
about our rulemaking Web site to Carol Gallagher (301) 415-5905; E-mail 
CAG@nrc.gov. Comments can also be submitted via the Federal e-
Rulemaking Portal http://www.regulations.gov.
    Hand deliver comments to: 11555 Rockville Pike, Rockville, Maryland 
20852, between 7:30 a.m. and 4:15 p.m. Federal workdays (telephone 
(301) 415-1966).
    Fax comments to: Secretary, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission at 
(301) 415-1101.
    You may submit comments on the information collections by the 
methods indicated in the Paperwork Reduction Act Statement.
    Publicly available documents related to this rulemaking may be 
viewed electronically on the public computers located at the NRC's 
Public Document Room (PDR), O1-F21, One White Flint North, 11555 
Rockville Pike, Rockville, MD 20852-2738. The PDR reproduction 
contractor will copy documents for a fee. Selected documents, including 
comments, may be viewed and downloaded electronically via the NRC 
rulemaking Web site at http://ruleforum.llnl.gov.
    Publicly available documents created or received at the NRC after 
November 1, 1999, are available electronically at the NRC's Electronic 
Reading Room at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html. From this 
site, the public can gain entry into the NRC's Agencywide Document 
Access and Management System (ADAMS), which provides text and image 
files of NRC's public documents. If you do not have access to ADAMS or 
if there are problems in accessing the documents located in ADAMS, 
contact the NRC PDR Reference staff at 1-800-397-4209, 301-415-4737, or 
by e-mail to PDR@nrc.gov.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Mr. Richard Rasmussen, Office of 
Nuclear Security and Incident Response, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001; telephone (301) 415-0610; e-
mail: RAR@nrc.gov or Mr. Timothy Reed, Office of Nuclear Reactor 
Regulation, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-
0001; telephone (301) 415-1462; e-mail: TAR@nrc.gov.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Table of Contents

I. Background
II. Rulemaking Initiation
III. Proposed Regulations
IV. Section-by-Section Analysis
V. Guidance
VI. Criminal Penalties
VII. Compatibility of Agreement State Regulations
VIII. Availability of Documents
IX. Plain Language
X. Voluntary Consensus Standards
XI. Finding of No Significant Environmental Impact
XII. Paperwork Reduction Act Statement
XIII. Public Protection Notification
XIV. Regulatory Analysis
XV. Regulatory Flexibility Certification
XVI. Backfit Analysis

I. Background

    Following the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, the NRC 
conducted a thorough review of security to ensure that nuclear power 
plants and other licensed facilities continued to have effective 
security measures in place given the changing threat environment. 
Through a series of orders, the Commission specified a supplement to 
the Design Basis Threat (DBT), as well as requirements for specific 
training enhancements, access authorization enhancements, security 
officer work hours, and enhancements to defensive strategies, 
mitigative measures, and integrated response. Additionally, in generic 
communications, the Commission specified expectations for enhanced 
notifications to the NRC for certain security events or suspicious 
activities.
    Most of the requirements in this proposed rulemaking are derived 
directly from, or through implementation of, the following four 
security orders:
     EA-02-026, ``Interim Compensatory Measures (ICM) Order,'' 
dated February 25, 2002 (March 4, 2002; 67 FR 9792).
     EA-02-261, ``Access Authorization Order,'' dated January 
7, 2003 (January 13, 2003; 68 FR 1643).
     EA-03-039, ``Security Personnel Training and Qualification 
Requirements (Training) Order,'' dated April 29, 2003 (May 7, 2003; 68 
FR 24514), and
     EA-03-086, ``Revised Design Basis Threat Order,'' dated 
April 29, 2003 (May 7, 2003; 68 FR 24517).

[[Page 62665]]

    Nuclear power plant licensees revised their security plans, 
training and qualification plans, and safeguards contingency plans in 
response to these orders. The NRC completed its review and approval of 
all of the revised security plans, training and qualification plans, 
and safeguards contingency plans on October 29, 2004. These plans 
incorporated the enhancements instituted through the orders. While the 
specifics of these changes are Safeguards Information, in general, the 
changes resulted in enhancements such as increased patrols, augmented 
security forces and capabilities, additional security posts, additional 
physical barriers, vehicle checks at greater standoff distances, 
enhanced coordination with law enforcement and military authorities, 
augmented security and emergency response training, equipment, and 
communication, and more restrictive site access controls for personnel, 
including expanded, expedited, and more thorough employee background 
checks.
    The Energy Policy Act of 2005 (EPAct 2005), signed into law on 
August 8, 2005, is another source of some of the proposed requirements 
reflected in this rulemaking. Section 653, for instance, allows the NRC 
to authorize licensees to use, as part of their protective strategies, 
an expanded arsenal of weapons, including machine guns and semi-
automatic assault weapons. Section 653 also requires that all security 
personnel with access to any weapons undergo a background check that 
would include fingerprinting and a check against the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation's (FBI) National Instant Criminal Background Check System 
(NICS) database. These provisions of EPAct 2005 would be reflected in 
the newly proposed Sec. Sec.  73.18 and 73.19, and the proposed NRC 
Form 754. Though this rulemaking primarily affects power reactor 
security requirements, to implement the EPAct 2005 provisions 
efficiently, the NRC expanded the rulemaking's scope in newly proposed 
Sec. Sec.  73.18 and 73.19 to include facilities authorized to possess 
formula quantities or greater of strategic special nuclear material, 
i.e., Category I SSNM facilities. Such facilities would include 
production facilities, spent fuel reprocessing facilities, fuel 
processing facilities, and uranium enrichment facilities. Additionally, 
Section 651 of the EPAct 2005 requires the NRC to conduct security 
evaluations at selected licensed facilities, including periodic force-
on-force exercises. That provision also requires the NRC to mitigate 
any potential conflict of interest that could influence the results of 
force-on-force exercises. These provisions would be reflected in 
proposed Sec.  73.55.
    Through implementing the security orders, reviewing the revised 
site security plans across the fleet of reactors, conducting the 
enhanced baseline inspection program, and evaluating force-on-force 
exercises, the NRC has identified some additional security measures 
that would provide additional assurance of a licensee's capability to 
protect against the DBT.
    Finally, a petition for rulemaking submitted by the Union of 
Concerned Scientists and San Luis Obispo Mothers for Peace (PRM 50-80), 
requested the establishment of regulations governing proposed changes 
to facilities which could adversely affect their protection against 
radiological sabotage. This petition was partially granted on November 
17, 2005 (70 FR 69690). The proposed new Sec.  73.58 contains 
requirements to address the remaining issues.
    The proposed amendments to the security requirements for power 
reactors, and for enhanced weapons requirements for power reactor and 
Category I SSNM facilities, would result in changes to the following 
existing sections and appendices in 10 CFR part 73:
     10 CFR 73.2, Definitions.
     10 CFR 73.55, Requirements for physical protection of 
licensed activities in nuclear power reactors against radiological 
sabotage.
     10 CFR 73.56, Personnel access authorization requirements 
for nuclear power plants.
     10 CFR 73.71, Reporting of safeguards events.
     10 CFR 73, Appendix B, General criteria for security 
personnel.
     10 CFR 73, Appendix C, Licensee safeguards contingency 
plans.
     10 CFR 73, Appendix G, Reportable safeguards events.
    The proposed amendments would also add three new sections to part 
73:
     Proposed Sec.  73.18, Firearms background checks for armed 
security personnel.
     Proposed Sec.  73.19, Authorization for use of enhanced 
weapons.
     Proposed Sec.  73.58, Safety/security interface 
requirements for nuclear power reactors.
    The proposed rule would also add a new NRC Form 754 under the newly 
proposed Sec.  73.18.

EPAct 2005 Weapons Guidelines

    In order to accomplish Sec. 161A. of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, 
as amended (AEA), concerning the transfer, receipt, possession, 
transport, import, and use of enhanced weapons and the requirements for 
firearms background checks, the NRC has engaged with representatives 
from the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ), the FBI, and the U.S. Bureau 
of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (ATF), to develop 
guidelines required by Sec. 161A.d of the AEA. The provisions of 
Sec.161A. of the AEA take effect upon the issuance of these guidelines 
by the Commission, with the approval of the Attorney General. The 
Commission will publish a separate Federal Register notice on the 
issuance of these guidelines. This proposed rule would not rescind the 
authority of certain NRC licensees, currently possessing automatic 
weapons through alternate processes, to possess such enhanced weapons; 
however, these licensees would be subject to the new firearms 
background check requirements of Sec. 161A. of the AEA. Information on 
new provisions (Sec. Sec.  73.18 and 73.19) that would implement Sec. 
161A. may be found in Section III.

Conforming and Corrective Changes

    Conforming changes to the requirements listed below are proposed in 
order to ensure that cross-referencing between the various security 
regulations in part 73 is preserved, and to avoid revising requirements 
for licensees who are not within the scope of this proposed rule. The 
following requirements contain conforming changes:
     Section 50.34, ``Contents of applications; technical 
information'' would be revised to align the application requirements 
with the proposed revisions to appendix C to 10 CFR part 73.
     Section 50.54, ``Conditions of licenses'' would be revised 
to conform with the proposed revisions to sections in appendix C to 10 
CFR part 73.
     Section 50.72, ``Immediate notification requirements for 
operating nuclear power reactors'' would be revised to state (in 
footnote 1) that immediate notification to the NRC may be required (per 
the proposed Sec.  73.71 requirements) prior to the notification 
requirements under the current Sec.  50.72.
     Section 72.212, ``Conditions of general license issued 
under Sec.  72.210'' would be revised to reference the appropriate 
revised paragraph designations in proposed Sec.  73.55.
     Section 73.8, ``Information collection requirements: OMB 
approval'' would be revised to add the newly proposed requirements 
(Sec. Sec.  73.18, 73.19, 73.58, and NRC Form 754) to the list of 
sections and forms with Office of Management and Budget (OMB)

[[Page 62666]]

information collection requirements. A corrective revision to Sec.  
73.8 would also be made to reflect OMB approval of existing information 
collection requirements for NRC Form 366 under existing Sec.  73.71.
     Section 73.70, ``Records'' would be revised to reference 
the appropriate revised paragraph designations in proposed Sec.  73.55 
regarding the need to retain a record of the registry of visitors.
    Additionally, Sec.  73.81, ``Criminal penalties'' which sets forth 
the sections within part 73 that are not subject to criminal sanctions 
under the AEA, would remain unchanged since willful violations of the 
newly proposed Sec. Sec.  73.18, 73.19, and 73.58 may be subject to 
criminal sanctions.
    Appendix B and appendix C to part 73 require special treatment in 
this rulemaking to preserve, with a minimum of conforming changes, the 
current requirements for licensees and applicants to whom this proposed 
rule would not apply. Accordingly, sections I through V of appendix B 
would remain unchanged, and the proposed new language for power 
reactors would be added as section VI. Appendix C would be divided into 
two sections, with Section I maintaining all current requirements, and 
Section II containing all proposed requirements related to power 
reactors.

II. Rulemaking Initiation

    On July 19, 2004, NRC staff issued a memorandum entitled ``Status 
of Security-Related Rulemaking'' (accession number ML041180532) to 
inform the Commission of plans to close former security-related actions 
and replace them with a comprehensive rulemaking plan to modify 
physical protection requirements for power reactors. This memorandum 
described rulemaking efforts that were suspended by the terrorist 
activities of September 11, 2001, and summarized the security-related 
actions taken following the attack. In response to this memorandum, the 
Commission directed the staff in an August 23, 2004, Staff Requirements 
Memorandum (SRM) (COMSECY-04-0047, accession number ML042360548) to 
forego the development of a rulemaking plan, and provide a schedule for 
the completion of security-related rulemakings. The staff provided this 
schedule to the Commission by memorandum dated November 16, 2004 
(accession number ML043060572). Subsequently, the staff revised its 
plans to amend the part 73 security requirements to include a 
requirement for licensees to assess and manage site activities that 
could compromise either safety or security (i.e., the safety/security 
interface requirements). This revision is discussed in a memorandum 
dated July 29, 2005 (accession number ML051800350). Finally, by 
memorandum dated September 29, 2005 (COMSECY-05-0046, accession number 
ML052710167), the staff discussed its plans to incorporate select 
provisions of the EPAct 2005 into the power reactor security 
requirements rulemaking. In COMSECY-05-0046, dated November 1, 2005 
(accession number ML053050439), the Commission approved the staff's 
approach in incorporating the select provisions of EPAct 2005.

III. Proposed Regulations

    This section describes significant provisions of this rulemaking:
    1. EPAct 2005 weapons requirements. The new Sec. Sec.  73.18 and 
73.19 would contain requirements to implement provisions of section 
161A of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (AEA). Section 653 of 
the EPAct amended the AEA by adding section 161A, ``Use of Firearms by 
Security Personnel.'' Section 161A provides new authority to the 
Commission to enhance security at certain NRC licensee and certificate 
holder facilities by authorizing the security personnel of those 
licensees or certificate holders to transfer, receive, possess, 
transport, import, and use an expanded arsenal of weapons, to include: 
Short-barreled shotguns, short-barreled rifles, and machine guns. In 
addition, section 161A also provides that NRC-designated licensees and 
certificate holders may apply to the NRC for authority to preempt 
local, State, or certain Federal firearms laws (including regulations) 
that prohibits the transfer, receipt, possession, transportation, 
importation, or use of handguns, rifles, shotguns, short-barreled 
shotguns, short-barreled rifles, machine guns, semiautomatic assault 
weapons, ammunition for such guns or weapons, and large capacity 
ammunition feeding devices. Prior to granting either authority, 
however, the Commission must determine that the proposed use of this 
authority is necessary in the discharge of official duties by security 
personnel engaged in protecting: (1) Facilities owned or operated by an 
NRC licensee or certificate holder and designated by the Commission, or 
(2) radioactive material or other property that is owned or possessed 
by an NRC licensee or certificate holder, or that is being transported 
to or from an NRC-regulated facility, if the Commission has determined 
the radioactive material or other property to be of significance to the 
common defense and security or public health and safety. Licensees and 
certificate holders must receive preemption authority before receiving 
NRC approval for enhanced weapons authority. Finally, the NRC may 
consider making preemption authority or enhanced-weapons authority 
available to other types of licensees or certificate holders in future 
rulemakings.
    Under the provisions of section 161A.d, section 161A takes effect 
on the date that implementing guidelines are issued by the Commission 
after being approved by the U.S. Attorney General. Following enactment 
of the EPAct 2005, NRC staff began discussions with staffs from the 
U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) and its subordinate agencies the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the U.S. Bureau of Alcohol, 
Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (ATF) to develop these guidelines. 
Issuance of these guidelines is a prerequisite for the issuance of a 
final rule on Sec. Sec.  73.18 and 73.19, and the conforming changes in 
Sec.  73.2. The proposed language for Sec. Sec.  73.18 and 73.19, and 
the conforming changes in Sec.  73.2, set forth in this proposed rule 
is consistent, to the extent possible, with the discussions between NRC 
and DOJ. However, because NRC and DOJ staffs continue to work to 
resolve the remaining issues, the guidelines have not been finalized as 
of the issuance of this notice. Once the final guidelines are issued, 
the Commission will, if necessary, take the appropriate actions to 
ensure that the language of proposed Sec. Sec.  73.18, 73.19, and 73.2, 
conforms with the guidelines. The Commission is utilizing this parallel 
approach to provide the most expeditious process for promulgating the 
necessary regulations implementing section 161A; thereby enhancing the 
security (i.e., weapons) capabilities of NRC-licensed facilities, while 
being mindful of our obligations to provide stakeholders an opportunity 
to comment on proposed regulations.
    2. Safety/Security interface requirements. These requirements are 
located in proposed Sec.  73.58. The safety/security requirements are 
intended to explicitly require licensee coordination of potential 
adverse interactions between security activities and other plant 
activities that could compromise either plant security or plant safety. 
The proposed requirements would direct licensees to assess and manage 
these interactions so that neither safety nor security is compromised. 
These proposed requirements address, in part, a Petition for Rulemaking 
(PRM 50-80) that requested the establishment of regulations governing 
proposed changes

[[Page 62667]]

to the facilities which could adversely affect the protection against 
radiological sabotage.
    3. EPAct 2005 additional requirements. The EPAct 2005 requirements 
that would be implemented by this proposed rulemaking, in addition to 
the weapons-related additions described previously, consist of new 
requirements to perform force-on-force exercises, and to mitigate 
potential conflicts of interest that could influence the results of 
NRC-conducted force-on-force exercises. These proposed new requirements 
would be included in proposed Sec.  73.55 and appendix C to part 73.
    4. Accelerated notification and revised four-hour reporting 
requirements. This proposed rule contains accelerated security 
notification requirements (i.e., within 15 minutes) in proposed Sec.  
73.71 and appendix G to part 73 for attacks and imminent threats to 
power reactors. The proposed accelerated notification requirements are 
similar to what was provided to the industry in NRC Bulletin 2005-02, 
``Emergency Preparedness and Response Actions for Security-Based 
Events,'' dated July 18, 2005. The proposed rule also contains two new 
four-hour reporting requirements. The proposed rule would direct 
licensees to report to the NRC information pertaining to suspicious 
activities as described in the proposed requirement. The proposed rule 
would also include a new four-hour reporting requirement for tampering 
events that do not meet the current threshold for one-hour reporting.
    5. Mixed-oxide (MOX) fuel requirements. These requirements would be 
incorporated into proposed Sec.  73.55 for licensees who propose to use 
MOX fuel in their reactor(s). These proposed requirements are in lieu 
of unnecessarily rigorous part 73 requirements (e.g., Sec. Sec.  73.45 
and 73.46), which would otherwise apply because of the MOX fuel's low 
plutonium content and the weight and size of the MOX fuel assemblies. 
The proposed MOX fuel security requirements are intended to be 
consistent with the approach implemented at Catawba Nuclear Station 
through the MOX lead test assembly effort.
    6. Cyber-security requirements. This proposed rule would contain 
more detailed programmatic requirements for addressing cyber security 
at power reactors, which build on the requirements imposed by the 
February 2002 order. The proposed cyber-security requirements are 
designed to be consistent with ongoing industry cyber-security efforts.
    7. Mitigating strategies. The proposed rule would require licensees 
to develop specific guidance and strategies to maintain or restore core 
cooling, containment, and spent fuel pool cooling capabilities using 
existing or readily available resources (equipment and personnel) that 
can be effectively implemented under the circumstances associated with 
the loss of large areas of the plant due to explosions or fire. These 
proposed requirements would be incorporated into the proposed appendix 
C to part 73.
    8. Access authorization enhancements. The proposed changes would 
improve the integration of the access authorization requirements, 
fitness-for-duty requirements, and security program requirements. The 
proposed rule would include an increase in the rigor for some elements 
of the access authorization program including requirements for the 
conduct of psychological assessments, requirements for individuals to 
report arrests to the reviewing official, and requirements to clarify 
the responsibility for the acceptance of shared information. The 
proposed rule would also add requirements to allow NRC inspection of 
licensee information sharing records and requirements that subject 
additional individuals, such as those who have electronic access via 
computer systems or those who administer the access authorization 
program, to the access authorization requirements.
    9. Training and qualification enhancements. The proposed rule 
includes modifications to the training and qualification requirements 
that are based on insights from implementation of the security orders, 
review of site security plans, and implementation of the enhanced 
baseline inspection program and force-on-force exercises. These new 
requirements would include additional physical requirements for unarmed 
security personnel to assure that personnel performing these functions 
meet physical requirements commensurate with their duties. Proposed new 
requirements also include a minimum age requirement of 18 years for 
unarmed responders, qualification scores for testing required by the 
training and qualification plan, qualification requirements for 
security trainers, qualification requirements of personnel assessing 
psychological qualifications, armorer certification requirements, and 
program requirements for on-the-job training.
    10. Security Program Implementation insights. The proposed rule 
would impose new enhancements identified from implementation of the 
security orders, review of site security plans, and implementation of 
the enhanced baseline inspection program and force-on-force exercises. 
These new requirements would include changes to specifically require 
that the central alarm station (CAS) and secondary alarm station (SAS) 
have functionally equivalent capabilities such that no single act can 
disable the key functions of both CAS and SAS. The proposed additions 
would also include requirements for new reactor licensees to position 
the SAS within the protected area, add bullet resistance and limit the 
visibility into SAS. Proposed additions also require uninterruptible 
backup power supplies for detection and assessment equipment, ``video-
capture'' capability, and qualification requirements for drill and 
exercise controllers.
    11. Miscellaneous. The proposed rule would eliminate some 
requirements that the staff found to be unnecessary, while still 
providing high assurance that activities involving special nuclear 
material are not inimical to the common defense and security and do not 
constitute an unreasonable risk to the public health and safety. One 
such requirement to be eliminated provides for guards to escort 
operators of motor vehicles within the protected area if the operators 
are cleared for unescorted access. The proposed rule would also add new 
requirements, including predefined provisions for the suspension of 
safeguards measures for severe weather conditions that could result in 
life-threatening situations for security personnel (e.g., tornadoes, 
floods, and hurricanes), and reduced overly-prescriptive requirements 
through the inclusion of performance-based language to allow 
flexibility in the methods used to accomplish requirements.

IV. Section-by-Section Analysis

IV.1. New Weapons Requirements

    This proposed rulemaking would implement new weapons requirements 
that stem from the EPAct 2005. This is the only portion of this 
proposed rulemaking that involves facilities other than nuclear power 
reactors. The newly proposed weapons requirements would apply to power 
reactors and facilities authorized to possess a formula quantity or 
greater of strategic special nuclear material whose security plans are 
governed by Sec. Sec.  73.20, 73.45, and 73.46. The new requirements 
would be in three different sections and would include the utilization 
of an NRC Form:
     Revised proposed Sec.  73.2, ``Definitions''.

[[Page 62668]]

     Proposed Sec.  73.18, ``Firearms background checks for 
armed security personnel''.
     Proposed Sec.  73.19, ``Authorization for use of enhanced 
weapons''.
     Proposed NRC Form 754, ``Armed Security Personnel 
Background Check''.
    Under proposed Sec.  73.18, after the NRC approves the licensee's 
or certificate holder's application, all security personnel must have a 
satisfactorily completed firearms background check to have access to 
covered weapons. Licensees and certificate holders would be required 
under proposed Sec.  73.19 to notify the NRC that they have 
satisfactorily completed a sufficient number of firearms background 
checks to staff their security organization. The firearms background 
checks required by proposed Sec.  73.18 would be intended to verify 
that armed security personnel are not prohibited from receiving, 
possessing, transporting, or using firearms under Federal or State law. 
A firearms background check would consist of two parts, a check of an 
individual's fingerprints against the FBI's fingerprint system and a 
check of the individual's identity against the FBI's National Instant 
Criminal Background Check System (NICS). The NRC would propose a new 
NRC Form 754 for licensee or certificate holder security personnel to 
submit the necessary information to the NRC for forwarding to the FBI 
to perform the NICS portion of the firearms background check. The 
requirement to satisfactorily complete a firearms background check 
would apply to security personnel either directly employed by the 
licensee or certificate holder or employed by a security contractor to 
the licensee or certificate holder and whose official duties require 
access to covered weapons (i.e., armed security personnel) [see also 
new definitions for covered weapons, enhanced weapons, and standard 
weapons in Sec.  73.2]. Additionally, the requirement for licensees or 
certificate holders to ensure that their security personnel have 
satisfactorily completed a firearms background check would apply to 
licensees and certificate holders who have applied for and received NRC 
approval of preemption authority or enhanced-weapons authority. In 
order to simplify the rule language, Sec.  73.18 would only refer to 
applications for preemption authority because preemption authority 
would always be a necessary prerequisite for the receipt of enhanced 
weapons authority.
    The NRC would propose that a licensee or certificate holder may 
begin firearms background checks on armed security personnel after the 
licensee or certificate holder has applied to the NRC for the 
preemption authority section 161A of the AEA. Because the NRC has not 
previously had the authority to require its licensees or certificate 
holders to complete firearms background checks on security personnel, 
in most instances these requirements would be new to licensees and 
uncertainties exist over the amount of time to complete these checks. 
Thus delays in completing the checks (e.g., the time necessary to 
resolve any errors of fact in the FBI's NICS databases) could reduce 
the number of available security officers and create fatigue or minimum 
staffing level issues. Therefore, the NRC envisions working with 
licensees and certificate holders on a case-by-case basis to establish 
the date for NRC approval of an application for preemption authority; 
and thereby ensure that the licensee's or certificate holder's security 
organizations can continue to adequately protect the facility when the 
approval is issued.
    The Commission has not yet determined whether licensees and 
certificate holders may apply for preemption authority alone or 
combined preemption and enhanced-weapons authority prior to issuance of 
a final rule. In anticipation that the Commission does permit 
applications for section 161A authority prior to promulgation of a 
final rule, the proposed rule would include language to support a 
transition to these regulations from requirements imposed by Commission 
orders granting section 161A authority. The proposed rule would not, 
however, require a licensee or certificate holder to repeat a firearms 
background check for security personnel who previously satisfactorily 
completed a firearms background check that was required under 
Commission order. Consequently, this approach would provide both the 
Commission and industry with the maximum flexibility to expeditiously 
implement the security enhancements authorized by section 161A. The 
exception to this requirement would be for security personnel who have 
had a break in employment with the licensee or certificate holder or 
their security contractor, or who have transferred from another 
licensee or certificate holder (who previously completed a firearms 
background check on them). In either case these security personnel 
would be treated as new security personnel and they would be subject to 
a new firearms background check.
    The proposed rule would also provide direction on how security 
personnel who have received an adverse firearms background check (i.e., 
a ``denied'' or ``delayed'' NICS response) may: (1) Obtain further 
information from the FBI on the reason for the adverse response, (2) 
appeal a ``denied'' response, or (3) provide additional information to 
resolve a ``delayed'' response. Security personnel would be required to 
apply directly to the FBI for these actions (i.e., the licensee or 
certificate holder may not appeal to the FBI on behalf of the security 
personnel). Only after such personnel have successfully appealed their 
``denied'' response, and have subsequently received a ``proceed'' NICS 
response, would they be permitted access to covered weapons.
    Security personnel who receive a ``denied'' NICS response are 
presumed by ATF to be prohibited from possessing or receiving a firearm 
under federal law (see 18 U.S.C. 922) and may not have access to 
covered weapons unless they have successfully appealed the ``denied'' 
NICS response and received a ``proceed'' NICS response. Because of the 
structure of section 161A, the proposed rule would not require 
licensees or certificate holders to remove personnel with a ``denied'' 
response until after the NRC has approved the licensee's or certificate 
holder's application for preemption authority (i.e., licensee's and 
certificate holders would not be subject to the requirements of Sec.  
73.18 until after the NRC's approval of their application for 
preemption authority is issued). However, the NRC's expectation is that 
current licensees or certificate holders who receive a ``denied'' 
response for current security personnel would remove those personnel 
from any security duties requiring possession of firearms to comport 
with applicable Federal law and ATF regulations.
    The NRC would propose to charge the same fee for fingerprints 
submitted for a firearms background check as is currently imposed for 
fingerprints submitted for other NRC-required criminal history checks 
including fingerprints (i.e., an NRC administrative fee plus the FBI's 
processing fee). In addition, the NRC would charge an administrative 
fee for processing the NICS check information; however, no FBI fee 
would be charged for the NICS check.
    The proposed Sec.  73.19 would only apply to power reactor 
licensees and Category I special nuclear material licensees; therefore, 
only these two classes of licensees would be subject to the firearms 
background check provisions of Sec.  73.18. The NRC may, however, 
consider making stand-alone preemption authority or combined enhanced-
weapons authority and preemption authority available to other

[[Page 62669]]

types of licensees or certificate holders in future rulemakings.
    In Sec.  73.19, the NRC would propose requirements for a licensee 
or certificate holder to apply for stand-alone preemption authority or 
to apply for combined enhanced-weapons authority and preemption 
authority. Licensees and certificate holders who apply for enhanced-
weapons authority, must also apply for and receive NRC approval of 
preemption authority as a necessary prerequisite to receiving enhanced-
weapons authority. The NRC would propose limiting either authority to 
power reactor licensees and Category I SSNM licensees at this time. The 
NRC may consider applying this authority to other types of licensees, 
certificate holders, radioactive material, or other property (as 
authorized under section 161A) in future rulemakings. Obtaining 
enhanced-weapons authority from the NRC would be a necessary 
prerequisite for a licensee or certificate holder to apply under ATF's 
regulations for a Federal firearms license for these weapons. The NRC 
would propose that licensees and certificate holders who want to apply 
for enhanced-weapons authority must provide the NRC, for prior review 
and approval, a new or revised security plan, training and 
qualification plan, and safeguards contingency plan to reflect the use 
of these specific new weapons the licensee or certificate holder 
intends to employ and to provide a safety assessment of the onsite and 
offsite impact of these specific enhanced weapons.
    The proposed rule would also provide direction on acceptable 
training standards for training and qualification on enhanced weapons. 
The NRC would require licensees and certificate holders to complete 
training and qualification of security personnel on any enhanced 
weapons, before these personnel employ those weapons to protect the 
facility. The NRC would also require Commission licensees and 
certificate holders to notify the NRC of any adverse ATF findings 
associated with ATF's inspections, audits, or reviews of their Federal 
firearms license (FFL) (i.e., an FFL held by an NRC licensee or 
certificate holder).
    Finally, the NRC would propose to treat enhanced weapons the same 
as existing weapons for the purpose of ``use'' of these weapons; and 
therefore Sec.  73.19 would cross reference to existing regulation in 
Sec. Sec.  73.55 and 73.46 on the use of weapons by reactor licensees 
and by Category I SSNM licensees ( i.e., the NRC is not proposing 
separate requirements on enhanced weapons versus standard weapons; 
rather, requirements on the use of any weaponry possessed by the 
licensee or certificate holder should be appropriate for the facility).
    To implement the new weapons provisions, three new terms would be 
added to Sec.  73.2: covered weapon, enhanced weapon, and standard 
weapon.
    The proposed new weapons requirements and supporting discussion for 
the proposed language are set forth in more detail (including the 
proposed new definitions) in Table 1.

IV.2. Section 73.55, ``Requirements for Physical Protection of Licensed 
Activities in Nuclear Power Reactors Against Radiological Sabotage''

    Proposed Sec.  73.55 contains security program requirements for 
power reactor licensees. The security program requirements in Sec.  
73.55 would apply to all nuclear power plant licensees that hold a 10 
CFR part 50 license and to applicants who are applying for either a 
part 50 license or a part 52 combined license. Paragraph (a) of Sec.  
73.55 would identify the licensees and applicants for which the 
requirements apply, and the need for submitting to NRC (for review and 
approval) a ``Physical Security Plan,'' a ``Training and Qualification 
Plan,'' and a ``Safeguards Contingency Plan.'' Paragraph (b) of Sec.  
73.55 would set forth the performance objectives that govern power 
reactor security programs. The remaining paragraphs of Sec.  73.55 
would implement the detailed requirements for each of the security 
plans, as well as for the various features of physical security.
    This section would be extensively revised in an effort to make 
generically applicable security requirements imposed by Commission 
orders issued after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, based 
upon experience and insights gained by the Commission during 
implementation, fulfill certain provisions of the EPAct of 2005, and 
add several new requirements that resulted from evaluation insights 
from implementation of the security orders, review of site security 
plans, and implementation of the enhanced baseline inspection program 
and force-on-force exercises. The proposed regulations would require an 
integrated security plan that begins at the owner controlled area 
boundary and would implement defense-in-depth concepts and protective 
strategies based on protecting target sets from the various attributes 
of the design basis threat. Notable additions to the proposed Sec.  
73.55 are summarized below.
Cyber Security Requirements
    The current security regulations do not contain requirements 
related to cyber security. Subsequent to the events of September 11, 
2001, the NRC issued orders to require power reactor licensees to 
implement measures to enhance cyber security. These security measures 
required an assessment of cyber systems and the implementation of 
corrective measures sufficient to provide protection against the cyber 
threats at the time the orders were issued.
    The proposed requirements maintain the intent of the security 
orders by establishing the requirement for a cyber security program to 
protect any system that, if compromised, can adversely impact safety, 
security, or emergency preparedness.
Requirements for CAS and SAS To Have Functionally Equivalent 
Capabilities Such That No Single Act Can Disable the Function of CAS 
and SAS
    Current regulatory requirements ensure that both CAS and SAS have 
equivalent alarm annunciation and communication capabilities, but do 
not explicitly require equivalent assessment, monitoring, observation, 
and surveillance capabilities. Further, the current requirement of 
Sec.  73.55(e)(1) states ``All alarms required pursuant to this part 
must annunciate in a continuously manned central alarm station located 
within the protected area and in at least one other continuously manned 
station not necessarily onsite, so that a single act cannot remove the 
capability of calling for assistance or otherwise responding to an 
alarm.'' The Commission orders added enhanced detection and assessment 
capabilities, but did not require equivalent capabilities for both CAS 
and SAS. The security plans approved by the Commission on October 29, 
2004, varied, due to the performance-based nature of the requirements, 
with respect to how the individual licensees implemented these 
requirements, but all sites were required to provide a CAS and SAS with 
functionally equivalent capabilities to support the implementation of 
the site protective strategy.
    The proposed rule would extend the requirement for no single act to 
remove capabilities to the key functions of the alarm stations and 
would require licensees to implement protective measures such that a 
single act would not disable the intrusion detection, assessment, and 
communications capabilities of both the CAS and SAS. This proposed 
requirement would ensure continuity of response

[[Page 62670]]

operations during a security event by ensuring that the detection, 
assessment, and communications functions required to effectively 
implement the licensee's protective strategy are maintained despite the 
loss of one or the other alarm station. For the purposes of assessing 
the regulatory burden of this proposed rule, the NRC assumed that all 
licensees would require assessments and approximately one third of the 
licensees would choose to implement hardware modifications.
    The NRC has concluded that protecting the alarm stations such that 
a single act does not disable the key functions would provide an 
enhanced level of assurance that a licensee can maintain detection, 
assessment and communications capabilities required to protect the 
facility against the design basis threat of radiological sabotage. For 
new reactor licensees, licensed after the publication of this rule, the 
Commission would require CAS and SAS to be designed, constructed, and 
equipped with equivalent standards.
Uninterruptible Power for Intrusion Detection and Assessment Systems
    Current regulatory requirements require back-up power for alarm 
annunciation and non-portable communication equipment, but do not 
require this back-up power to be uninterruptible. Although not 
specifically required, many licensees have installed uninterruptible 
power to their security systems for added reliability of these 
electronic systems. However, the Commission had not required 
uninterruptible power for assessment systems. For the purposes of 
assessing the regulatory burden of this proposed rule, the NRC assumed 
that only a small number of licensees would require hardware 
modifications to meet this proposed requirement.
    Through implementation of the Commission-approved security plans, 
baseline inspections, and force-on-force testing, the NRC has concluded 
that uninterruptible back-up power would provide an enhanced level of 
assurance that a licensee can maintain detection, assessment and 
communication capabilities required to protect the facility against the 
design basis threat of radiological sabotage. This new requirement 
would reduce the risk of losing detection, assessment, and 
communication capabilities during a loss of the normal power supply.
``Video-Capture'' Capability
    Current regulatory requirements address the use of closed circuit 
television systems, but do not explicitly require them. Although not 
specifically required, all licensees have adopted the use of video 
surveillance in their site security plans. Many of the licensees have 
adopted advanced video surveillance technology to provide real-time and 
play-back/recorded video images to assist security personnel in 
determining the cause of an alarm annunciation. For the purposes of 
assessing the regulatory burden of this proposed rule, the NRC assumed 
that a small percentage of licensees would require hardware 
modifications to comply with this proposed requirement for advanced 
video surveillance technology.
    Through implementation of the Commission-approved security plans, 
baseline inspections, and force-on-force testing, the NRC has concluded 
that advanced video technology would provide an enhanced level of 
assurance that a licensee can assess the cause of an alarm annunciation 
and initiate a timely response capable of defending the facility 
against the threat up to and including the design basis threat of 
radiological sabotage. Therefore the proposed rule would require 
advanced video surveillance technology.
    Implementation of Sec.  73.55 is linked principally to the 
application of appendix B to part 73, ``General criteria for security 
personnel,'' and appendix C to part 73, ``Licensee safeguards 
contingency plans,'' both of which would be revised in this proposed 
rulemaking. Proposed changes to these appendices are discussed in 
Sections IV.6 and IV.7 of this document.
    Table 2 sets forth the proposed Sec.  73.55 language as compared to 
the current language, and provides the supporting discussion for the 
proposed language including new definitions for security officer and 
target set that would be added to Sec.  73.2. Because Sec.  73.55 would 
be restructured extensively, Table 9 (See Section VIII) provides a 
cross reference to locate individual requirements of the current 
regulation within the proposed regulation.
    The Commission is interested in obtaining specific stakeholder 
input on the impacts and burdens for certain areas of proposed changes 
to Sec.  73.55. Due to the accelerated rulemaking schedule, the NRC 
staff's assessments of impacts to individual licensees as a result of 
the proposed new requirements have not been informed by stakeholder 
insights on potential implementation issues. Consequently, the 
Commission recognizes that its views on the feasability, costs, and 
time necessary to fully implement certain portions of this proposed 
rule (e.g., alarm station, supporting systems, video systems, and cyber 
security issues) by selected licensees may not be fully informed. 
Accordingly, the Commission is requesting persons commenting on this 
proposed rule to address the following questions:
    1. What insights and estimates can stakeholders provide on the 
feasability, costs, and time necessary to implement the proposed rule's 
changes to existing alarm stations, supporting systems, video systems, 
and cyber security?
    2. Are there any actions that should be considered, such as 
authorizing alternative measures, exemptions, extended implementation 
schedules, etc., that would allow the NRC to mitigate any unnecessary 
regulatory burden created by these requirements?

IV.3. Section 73.56, ``Personnel Access Authorization Requirements for 
Nuclear Power Plants''

    This section would continue to apply to all current part 50 
licensees and to all applicants who are applying for a new reactor 
license under parts 50 or 52, but would be extensively revised. 
Proposed Sec.  73.56 would retain the requirement for a licensee to 
determine that an individual is trustworthy and reliable before 
permitting the individual to have unescorted access to nuclear power 
plant protected areas and vital areas. The majority of the revisions in 
proposed Sec.  73.56 reflect several fundamental changes to the NRC's 
approach to access authorization requirements since the terrorist 
attacks of September 11, 2001, and the NRC's concern with the threat of 
an active or passive insider who may collude with adversaries to commit 
radiological sabotage. These changes would include: (1) An increase in 
the rigor of some elements of the access authorization program to 
provide increased assurance that individuals who have unescorted access 
authorization are trustworthy and reliable; (2) an elimination of 
temporary unescorted access provisions [prior to the completion of the 
full background check]; (3) an elimination of the provisions that 
permit relaxation of the program when a reactor is in cold shutdown; 
and (4) the addition of a new category of individuals who would be 
subject to Sec.  73.56.
    Proposed Sec.  73.56(b)(ii) would require licensees' access 
authorization programs to cover individuals whose job duties and 
responsibilities permit them to access or use digital computer systems 
that may affect licensees' operational safety and security systems, and 
emergency response capabilities. Historically digital computer systems 
have played a limited role in the operation of nuclear power plants. 
However, the role of computer systems

[[Page 62671]]

at nuclear power plants is increasing, as licensees take advantage of 
computer technology to maximize plant productivity. In general, 
licensees currently exclude from their access authorization programs, 
individuals who may electronically access equipment in the protected 
areas of nuclear power plants to perform their job functions, if their 
duties and responsibilities do not require physical unescorted access 
to the equipment located within protected or vital areas. However, 
because these individuals manage and maintain the networks that connect 
to equipment located within protected or vital areas and are 
responsible for permitting authorized and/or trusted personnel to gain 
electronic access to equipment and systems, they are often granted 
greater electronic privileges than the trusted and authorized 
personnel. With advancements in electronic technology and 
telecommunications, differences in the potential adverse impacts of a 
saboteur's actions through physical access and electronic access are 
lessening. Thus, the proposed rule would require those individuals who 
have authority to electronically access equipment that, if compromised, 
can adversely impact operational safety, security or emergency 
preparedness of the nuclear power plants, to be determined to be 
trustworthy and reliable.
    The proposed revisions to Sec.  73.56 would also address changes in 
the nuclear industry's structure and business practices since this rule 
was originally promulgated. At the time the current Sec.  73.56 was 
developed, personnel transfers between licensees (i.e., leaving the 
employment of one licensee to work for another licensee) with 
interruptions in unescorted access authorization were less common. Most 
licensees operated plants at a single site and maintained an access 
authorization program that applied only to that site. When an 
individual left employment at one site and began working for another 
licensee, the individual was subject to a different access 
authorization program that often had different requirements. Because 
some licensees were reluctant to share information about previous 
employees with the new employer, licensees often did not have access to 
the information the previous licensee had gathered about the individual 
and so were required to gather the necessary information again. The 
additional effort to collect information that another licensee held 
created a burden on both licensees and applicants for unescorted access 
authorization. But, because few individuals transferred, the burden was 
not excessive.
    However, since 1991, the industry has undergone significant 
consolidation and developed new business practices to use its workforce 
more efficiently. Industry efforts to better use staffing resources 
have resulted in the development of a transient workforce that travels 
from site to site as needed, such as roving outage crews. Although the 
industry has always relied on contractors and vendors (C/V) for special 
expertise and staff for outages, the number of transient personnel who 
work solely in the nuclear industry has increased and the length of 
time they are on site has decreased. Because the current regulations 
were written on the basis that the majority of nuclear personnel would 
remain at one site for years, and that licensees would maintain 
independent, site-specific access authorization programs and share 
limited information, the current regulations do not adequately address 
the transfer of personnel between sites.
    In light of the NRC's increased concern with an insider threat 
since September 11, 2001, the increasingly mobile nuclear industry 
workforce has heightened the need for information sharing among 
licensee access authorization programs, including C/V authorization 
programs upon which licensees rely, to ensure that licensees have 
information that is as complete as possible about an individual when 
making an unescorted access authorization decision. To address this 
need, the access authorization orders issued by the NRC to nuclear 
power plant licensees on January 7, 2003, mandated increased sharing of 
information. In addition, proposed Sec.  73.56 would require licensees 
and C/V to collect and share greater amounts of information than under 
the current rule, subject to the protections of individuals' privacy 
that would be specified in proposed Sec.  73.56(m) [Protection of 
information]. As a result, individuals who are subject to this section 
would establish a detailed ``track record'' within the industry that 
would potentially cover their activities over long periods of time and 
would follow them if they change jobs and move to a new position that 
requires them to be granted unescorted access authorization by another 
licensee. The proposed requirement acknowledges the industry initiative 
to develop and utilize a database to ensure accurate information 
sharing between sites. This increased information sharing is necessary 
to provide high assurance that individuals who are granted and maintain 
unescorted access authorization are trustworthy and reliable when 
individuals move between access authorization programs. In addition, 
the increased information sharing would reduce regulatory burden on 
licensees when processing individuals who have had only short breaks 
between periods of unescorted access authorization.
    Another change in the NRC's proposed approach to access 
authorization requirements is the result of a series of public meetings 
that were held with stakeholders during 2001-2004 to discuss potential 
revisions to 10 CFR part, 26, ``Fitness-for-Duty Programs.'' Part 26 
establishes additional steps that the licensees who are subject to 
Sec.  73.56 must take as part of the process of determining whether to 
grant unescorted access authorization to an individual or permit an 
individual to maintain unescorted access authorization. These 
additional requirements focus on aspects of an individual's behavior, 
character, and reputation related to substance abuse. They require the 
licensee and other entities who are subject to part 26 to conduct drug 
and alcohol testing of individuals and an inquiry into the individual's 
past behavior with respect to illegal drug use or consumption of 
alcohol to excess, as part of determining whether the individual may be 
granted unescorted access authorization. However, historically there 
have been some inconsistencies and redundancies between the Sec.  73.56 
access authorization requirements and the related requirements in part 
26. These inconsistencies have led to implementation questions from 
licensees, as well as inconsistencies in how licensees have implemented 
the requirements. The redundancies have, in other cases, imposed an 
unnecessary regulatory burden on licensees.
    During public meetings held to discuss potential changes to part 
26, the stakeholders pointed out ambiguities in the terms used in both 
part 26 and Sec.  73.56, apparent inconsistencies and redundancies in 
the related requirements, and reported many experiences in which the 
ambiguities and lack of specificity and clarity in current Sec.  73.56 
had resulted in unintended consequences. Although these meetings did 
not focus on Sec.  73.56, many of the stakeholders' comments directly 
resulted in some of the proposed changes to Sec.  73.56. (Summaries of 
these meetings, and any comments provided through the Web site, are 
available at http://ruleforum.llnl.gov/cgi-bin/rulemake?source=Part26_
risk&st=risk.) In response to stakeholder requests, the

[[Page 62672]]

NRC has proposed language changes to improve the clarity and 
specificity of the requirements in proposed Sec.  73.56 and 
substantially reorganized the section to present the requirements 
generally in the order in which they would apply to licensees' access 
authorization processes. The proposed changes are expected to result in 
more uniform implementation of the requirements, and, consequently, 
greater consistency in achieving the goals of Sec.  73.56. Table 3 sets 
forth the proposed Sec.  73.56 language as compared to the current 
language, and discusses the proposed language.
    The Commission is interested in obtaining specific stakeholder 
input on the following two issues:
    1. The Commission requests public comment specific to the 
appropriateness of the framework for the Insider Mitigation Program as 
specified by the proposed 10 CFR 73.55(b)(7)(i) and 73.55(b)(7)(ii). 
The proposed rule specifies that the Insider Mitigation Program include 
elements of the access authorization program, fitness-for-duty program, 
behavioral observation program, and various physical security measures 
for the purpose of providing assurance that insider activities would be 
detected before adverse affects could be realized.
    2. The Commission requests public comment on the feasibility of 
adding a requirement to the proposed rule to require a modified 
escorted visitor access provision which would allow site visits by 
members of the public to limited areas of the facility for the purpose 
of enhancing public education and awareness through informational 
briefings and tours at the facility.

IV.4. Section 73.58 ``Safety/Security Interface Requirements for 
Nuclear Power Reactors''

    The NRC is proposing to add a new requirement to part 73 addressing 
the safety/security interface for nuclear power reactor licensees. The 
need for the proposed new requirement is based upon the NRC's 
experience in reviewing licensees' implementation of a significant 
number of new security requirements since the terrorist attacks of 
September 11, 2001. Licensees have always been required to ensure that 
any changes to safety functions, systems, programs, and activities do 
not have unintended consequences on other facility safety functions, 
systems, programs, and activities. Likewise, licensees have been 
required to ensure that any changes to security functions, systems, 
programs, and activities do not have unintended consequences on other 
facility security functions, systems, programs, and activities. 
However, the Commission has concluded that the pace, number, and 
complexity of these security changes warrant the establishment of a 
more formal program to ensure licensees properly assess the safety/
security interface in implementing these changes.
    On April 28, 2003, the Union of Concerned Scientists and the San 
Luis Obispo Mothers for Peace submitted a petition for rulemaking (PRM-
50-80) requesting that, in part, the NRC's regulations establishing 
conditions of licenses and requirements for evaluating proposed 
changes, tests, and experiments for nuclear power plants be amended to 
require licensee evaluation of whether the proposed changes, tests, and 
experiments cause protection against radiological sabotage to be 
decreased and, if so, that the changes, tests, and experiments only be 
conducted with prior NRC approval. In SECY-05-0048, dated March 28, 
2005, the NRC staff recommended that the Commission approve rulemaking 
for the requested action, but did not necessarily endorse the specific 
amendments suggested by the petition. In SECY-05-0048, dated June 28, 
2005, the Commission directed the staff to develop the technical basis 
for such a rule and to incorporate its provisions within the ongoing 
power reactor security requirements rulemaking. This proposed rule 
addresses, in part, the petitioner's request by incorporating proposed 
Sec.  73.58 within this rulemaking.
    The Commission has determined that the proposed safety/security 
interface rule requirements are necessary because the current 
regulations do not specifically require evaluation of the effects of 
plant changes on security or the effects of security changes on plant 
safety. Further, current regulations do not require communication about 
the implementation and timing of changes, which would promote awareness 
of the effects of changing facility conditions and result in 
appropriate assessment and response.
    The NRC is aware of a number of occurrences of adverse safety/
security interactions at nuclear power plants over the years to justify 
consideration of a new rule. Examples of adverse interactions include: 
(1) Inadvertent security barrier breaches while performing maintenance 
activities (e.g., cutting of pipes that provided uncontrolled access to 
vital areas, removing ventilation fans or other equipment from vital 
area boundary walls without taking compensatory measures to prevent 
uncontrolled access into vital areas); (2) Blockage of bullet resisting 
enclosure's (or other defensive firing position's) fields of fire; (3) 
Erection of scaffolding and other equipment without due consideration 
of its impact on the site's applicable physical protection strategy; 
and (4) Staging of temporary equipment within security isolation zones.
    Security could also adversely affect operations because of 
inadequate staffing of security force personnel on backshifts, 
weekends, and holidays, to support operations during emergencies (e.g., 
opening and securing vital area access doors to allow operations 
personnel timely access to safety-related equipment). Also, security 
structures, such as vehicle barriers, delay barriers, rerouted 
isolation zones, or defensive shields could adversely affect plant 
equipment such as valve pits, fire stations, other prepositioned 
emergency equipment, blowout panels, or otherwise interfere with 
operators responding to plant events.
    The NRC considered many factors in developing this proposed new 
requirement. One of the factors considered is that existing change 
processes are focused on specific areas of plant activities, and that 
implementation of these processes is generally well understood by 
licensees. An example is found in Sec.  50.54(p), which provides that a 
reactor licensee may make changes to its safeguards contingency plans 
without Commission approval provided that the changes do not decrease 
the safeguards effectiveness of the plan. Similarly, Sec.  50.65(a)(4) 
provides that a reactor licensee shall assess and manage the increase 
in risk that may result from proposed maintenance activities. However, 
neither Sec. Sec.  50.54(p) (security) nor 50.65(a)(4) (safety) require 
that an assessment for potential adverse impacts on safety/security 
interface be made before the proposed changes are implemented. The 
proposed Sec.  73.58 would address this gap by requiring that, before 
implementing allowed changes, licensees must assess the changes with 
respect to the safety/security interface and, if potential adverse 
interactions are identified, take appropriate compensatory and/or 
mitigative action before making the changes.
    The proposed rule reflects a performance-based approach and 
language which is sufficiently broad that, in addition to operating 
power reactors, it could be applied to other classes of licensees in 
separate rulemaking(s), if conditions warrant. In addition to the 
requirements in proposed Sec.  73.58, a new definition for

[[Page 62673]]

safety/security interface would be added to Sec.  73.2.
    Table 4 sets forth the proposed Sec.  73.58 language and provides 
the supporting discussion for the proposed language, including a new 
definition for safety/security interface that would be added to Sec.  
73.2.

IV.5. Section 73.71 ``Reporting of Safeguards Events''

    The events of September 11, 2001, emphasized the need for the 
capability to respond to coordinated attacks that could pose an 
imminent threat to national infrastructure such as nuclear power 
reactor sites. Prompt licensee notification to the NRC of a security 
event involving an actual or imminent threat would initiate the NRC's 
alerting mechanism for other nuclear facilities in recognition that an 
attack or threat against a single facility may be the prelude to 
attacks or threats against multiple facilities. In either case, timely 
communication of this event to the NRC, and the NRC's communication of 
the threat or attack to other licensees could reduce the adversaries' 
ability to engage in coordinated attacks and would strengthen the 
licensees' response posture. NRC would also initiate notifications to 
the Homeland Security/Federal response networks for an ``Incident of 
National Significance,'' as defined by the National Response Plan 
(NRP).
    Currently, Sec.  73.71(b)(1) requires power reactor licensees to 
notify the NRC within one hour of discovery, as described in Paragraph 
I of appendix G to 10 CFR part 73, ``Reportable safeguards events.'' In 
addition, Sec.  50.72 establishes reporting requirements for events 
requiring an emergency declaration in accordance with a licensee's 
emergency plan. Licensee notification under Sec.  50.72(a)(3) is 
required only after the threat is assessed, an ``Emergency Class'' is 
declared, and initial notification of appropriate State and local 
agencies are completed first (i.e., not upon discovery). The current 
timing of requirements of this notification would not allow the NRC to 
warn other licensees of a potential threat to their facilities in a 
prompt manner to allow other licensees to change their security posture 
in advance of a threat or potential attack. The Commission has 
previously advised licensees of the need to expedite their initial 
notification to the NRC. The proposed accelerated notification 
requirements are similar to those provided to licensees in NRC Bulletin 
2005-02, ``Emergency Preparedness and Response Actions for Security-
Based Events,'' dated July 18, 2005.
    The proposed amendments to Sec.  73.71 would add a new expedited 
notification requirement for licensees subject to the provisions of 
Sec.  73.55 to notify the NRC Operations Center as soon as possible 
after the discovery of an imminent or actual threat against the 
facility as described in appendix G to part 73, but not later than 15 
minutes after discovery. The proposed amendments to Sec.  73.71 and 
appendix G to part 73 would also add two additional four-hour 
notification requirements for suspicious events and tampering events 
not otherwise covered under appendix G to part 73. The proposed Sec.  
73.71 would retain the requirement for the licensee to maintain a 
continuous communications channel for one-hour notifications upon 
request of the NRC. The proposed rule would not require a continuous 
communications channel for four-hour notifications, because of the 
lesser degree of urgency of these events. For 15-minute notifications, 
the NRC may request the licensee establish a continuous communications 
channel after the licensee has made any emergency notifications to 
State officials or local law enforcement and if the licensee has taken 
action to stabilize the plant following any transient [associated with 
the 15-minute notification]. In NRC Bulletin 2005-02, ``Emergency 
Preparedness and Response Actions for Security-Based Events,'' dated 
July 18, 2005, the NRC had indicated a continuous communications 
channel was not necessary for the new 15-minute notifications. However, 
in developing this proposed rule the Commission has evaluated the need 
to promptly obtain information of an unfolding event versus imposing an 
unreasonable burden on licensees in the midst of a rapidly unfolding 
event and possible plant transient. The Commission considers that the 
proposed regulation would provide a reasonable balance between these 
two objectives. Table 5 sets forth the proposed amendments to Sec.  
73.71 language as compared to the current language, and provides the 
supporting discussion for the proposed language. Table 8 sets forth the 
proposed amendments to the appendix G to part 73 language as compared 
to the current language, and provides the supporting discussion for the 
proposed language.
    The Commission is interested in obtaining specific stakeholder 
input on the proposed changes to Sec.  73.71 and appendix G to part 73 
. Accordingly, the Commission is requesting persons commenting on this 
proposed rule to address the following question:
    1. For the types of events covered by the proposed four-hour 
notification requirements in Sec.  73.71 and appendix G to part 73, 
should the notification time interval of all or some of these 
notifications be different (e.g., a 1-hour, 2-hour, 8-hour, 24-hour 
notification)? If so, what notification time interval is appropriate? 
``Notification time interval'' is meant to be the time from when a 
licensee recognizes that an event has occurred or is occurring to the 
time that the licensee reports the event to the NRC.

IV.6. Appendix B to Part 73, ``General Criteria for Security 
Personnel''

    Appendix B to part 73 provides requirements for the training and 
qualification of security personnel to ensure that security personnel 
can execute their duties. Following the events of September 11, 2001, 
the Commission determined that tactical proficiency and physical 
fitness requirements governing licensees' armed security force 
personnel needed to be enhanced. The proposed amendments to appendix B 
to part 73 make generically applicable security requirements imposed by 
Commission orders issued after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 
2001, based upon experience and insights gained by the Commission 
during implementation and add several new requirements that resulted 
from evaluation insights from force-on-force exercises.
    Notable additions to the proposed appendix B to part 73 
requirements are summarized as follows:
Additional Physical Requirements and Minimum Age Requirements for 
Unarmed Members of the Security Organization
    Unarmed security personnel perform duties similar to armed security 
personnel, such as detection, assessment, vehicle and personnel escort, 
and vital area controls. The current requirements for unarmed members 
of the security organization state, in part, that these individuals 
shall have no physical weaknesses or abnormalities that would affect 
their performance of assigned duties. However, the current rule does 
not require unarmed personnel to pass a physical examination to verify 
that they meet standards for vision, hearing, or some portions of 
psychological qualifications. The proposed rule would include a 
requirement to assure that unarmed security personnel are physically 
capable of performing their assigned duties.
    Additionally, the current rule specifies a minimum age of 21 years 
old

[[Page 62674]]

for armed security personnel, but does not specify a minimum age 
requirement for unarmed security personnel. The proposed rule would 
require that unarmed members attain the age of 18 prior to assignment 
to establish a minimum age requirement for unarmed members of the 
security organization at a power reactor facility.
    These proposed additional requirements would assure that personnel 
performing security functions, whether armed or unarmed, meet 
appropriate age, vision, hearing and psychological requirements 
commensurate with their assigned security duties.
Qualification Scores for Program Elements Required by the Training and 
Qualification Plan
    The current rule includes daylight qualification scores of 70 
percent for handguns, 80 percent for semiautomatic rifles, 50 percent 
for shotguns and a requirement for night fire familiarization with 
assigned weapons. The April 29, 2003, Training Order imposed new 
requirements for the firearms training and qualification programs at 
power reactor licensees. The Training Order retained the current 
daylight qualification scores of 70 percent for handguns, 80 percent 
for semiautomatic rifles and superceded the daylight qualification 
score of 50 percent for the shotgun. The order did not specify a 
qualification score for the daylight course of fire for the shotgun, 
only an acceptable level of proficiency. The order superceded the 
current rule for night fire familiarization and added courses of fire 
for night fire and tactical training with assigned weapons.
    The proposed rule would retain the qualification scores of the 
existing regulations and add specific qualification scores for the 
daylight course of fire for the shotgun and/or enhanced weapons, the 
night fire qualification for shotguns, handguns, semiautomatic rifles 
and/or enhanced weapons and the tactical course of fire for all 
assigned weapons to remain consistent with the qualification scoring 
methodology contained in the current rule. The scoring methodology for 
the current rule and the proposed rule is consistent with the scoring 
methodology used for firearms programs at the local, State and Federal 
levels and is consistent with approved courses of fire from the law 
enforcement community and recognized national entities.
    The proposed rule would also include a requirement for a 
qualification score of 80 percent for the annual written exam. The 
current rule does not provide a requirement for an annual written exam 
score. Likewise, the April 29, 2003, Training Order that required 
licensees to develop and implement an annual written exam also did not 
specify a qualification score. The Commission has determined that a 
score of 80 percent demonstrates a minimum level of understanding and 
familiarity of the material necessary to adequately perform security-
related tasks. The 80-percent score would be consistent with minimum 
scores commonly utilized throughout the nuclear industry.
Qualification Requirements for Security Trainers, Personnel Assessing 
Psychological Qualifications and Armorer Certifications
    The current rule and the security orders do not specifically 
address the qualification or certification of instructors, or other 
personnel that have assigned duties and responsibilities for 
implementation of training and qualification programs of power reactor 
licensees.
    The proposed rule includes specific references to personnel that 
have assigned duties and responsibilities for implementation of 
training and qualification programs to ensure these persons are 
qualified and/or certified to make determinations of security personnel 
suitability, working condition of security equipment, and overall 
determinations that security personnel are trained and qualified to 
execute their assigned duties.
On-the-Job Training
    The current rule states in part that each individual who requires 
training to perform assigned security duties shall, prior to 
assignment, be trained to perform these tasks and duties. Each 
individual shall demonstrate the required knowledge, skill and ability 
in accordance with specific standards of each task.
    The proposed rule would specify the new requirement that the 
licensee include on-the-job training as part of the training and 
qualification program prior to assigning an individual to an 
unsupervised security position. This requirement is in addition to 
formal and informal classroom training. The on-the-job training program 
would provide the licensee the ability to assess an individual's 
knowledge, skill and ability to effectively carry-out assigned duties, 
in a supervised manner, within the actual work environment, before 
assignment, to an unsupervised position.
    The proposed revision to appendix B of part 73 required special 
treatment in this rulemaking to preserve, with a minimum of conforming 
changes, the current requirements for licensees and applicants to whom 
this proposed rule would not apply. Accordingly, Section I through V of 
appendix B to part 73 would remain unchanged, and the proposed new 
language for power reactors would be added as Section VI.
    Table 6 sets forth the proposed amendments to appendix B to part 73 
and provides the supporting discussion for the proposed language. 
Because this section would be extensively restructured, Table 10 (See 
Section VIII) provides a cross-reference to locate individual 
requirements of the current regulation within the proposed regulation.

IV.7. Appendix C to Part 73, ``Licensee Safeguards Contingency Plans''

    Appendix C to part 73 provides requirements that govern the 
development of safeguards contingency plans. Following the terrorist 
attacks of September 11, 2001, the NRC conducted a thorough review of 
security to continue to ensure that nuclear power plants had effective 
security measures in place given the changing threat environment. The 
proposed appendix C would increase the information required in the 
safeguards contingency plans for responses to threats, up to and 
including, design basis threats, as described in Sec.  73.1. Notable 
additions to the proposed appendix C to part 73 requirements are 
summarized below:
Mitigating Strategies
    Current regulations do not include requirements to develop 
mitigating strategies for events beyond the scope of the design basis 
threat. The orders issued after September 11, 2001, included a 
requirement to preplan strategies for coping with such events. The 
proposed appendix C to part 73 would contain this element of the orders 
to require that licensees preplan strategies to respond to and mitigate 
the consequences of potential events, including those that may result 
in the loss of large areas of the plant due to explosions or fire.
Qualification Requirements for Drill and Exercise Controllers
    The current rule and the security orders do not specifically 
address the qualification of personnel that are assigned duties and 
responsibilities for implementation of training and qualification 
drills and exercises at power reactor licensees.
    The proposed rule includes specific references to personnel who 
function as drill and exercise controllers to ensure these persons are 
trained and qualified to execute their assigned duties. Drills

[[Page 62675]]

and exercises are key elements to assuring the preparedness of the 
licensee security force and must be conducted in a manner that 
demonstrates the licensee's ability to execute the protective strategy 
as described in the site security plans. Additionally, drills and 
exercises must be performed properly to assure they do not negatively 
impact personnel or plant safety.
    The proposed revision to appendix C of part 73 required special 
treatment in this rulemaking to preserve, with a minimum of conforming 
changes, the current requirements for licensees and applicants to whom 
this proposed rule would not apply. Accordingly, appendix C to part 73 
would be divided into two sections, with Section I maintaining all 
current requirements, and Section II containing all proposed 
requirements related to nuclear power reactors.
    Table 7 sets forth the proposed amendments to appendix C to part 73 
and provides the supporting discussion for the proposed language. 
Because this section would be extensively restructured, Table 11 (See 
Section VIII) is a cross-reference showing where individual 
requirements of the current regulation would be in the proposed 
regulation.

IV.8. Appendix G to Part 73, ``Reportable Safeguards Events''

    Proposed appendix G to part 73 provides requirements regarding the 
reporting of safeguards events. Proposed appendix G would contain 
changes to support the revised and accelerated reporting requirements 
which would be incorporated into this rulemaking. Proposed appendix G 
to part 73 would also contain revised four-hour reporting requirements 
that would require licensees to report to the NRC information of 
suspicious surveillance activities, attempts at access, or other 
similar information as addressed in Appendix G, section III (a)(1) and 
(2). Following September 11, 2001, the NRC issued guidance requesting 
that licensees report suspicious activities near their facilities to 
allow assessment by the NRC and other appropriate agencies. The 
proposed new reporting requirement would clarify this expectation to 
assure consistent reporting of this important information. 
Additionally, the proposed rule would contain an additional four-hour 
reporting requirement for tampering events that do not meet the 
threshold for reporting under the current one-hour requirements. The 
proposed reporting requirements for tampering events would allow NRC 
assessment of these events. Table 8 sets forth the proposed amendments 
to appendix G to part 73 and provides the supporting discussion for the 
proposed language.
    The Commission is interested in obtaining specific stakeholder 
input on the following issue:
    1. The Commission requests public comment on the need to establish 
an additional requirement for licensees to establish and maintain 
predetermined communication protocols, such as passwords, with the 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission in order to verify the authenticity of 
communications during a security event, to include requirements for 
uniform protocols to verify the authenticity of reports required under 
this proposed rule.

IV.9. Conforming and Corrective Changes

    The following conforming changes would also be made: Sec. Sec.  
50.34 and 50.54 (references to the correct paragraphs of revised 
appendix C of part 73), Sec.  50.72 (changes to Sec.  73.71 reports), 
Sec. Sec.  72.212 and 73.70 (references to the correct paragraphs due 
to renumbering of Sec.  73.55), and Sec.  73.8 (adding Sec.  73.18, 
Sec.  73.19, and revised to reflect new NRC form 754 to reflect 
recordkeeping or reporting burden). A corrective change would also be 
made to Sec.  73.8 to reflect an existing recordkeeping or reporting 
burden for NRC Form 366 under Sec.  73.71. However, no changes would be 
made to Sec.  73.81(b) (due to the new Sec. Sec.  73.18, 73.19, and 
73.58), because willful violations of Sec. Sec.  73.18, 73.19, and 
73.58 may be subject to criminal penalties.

 Table 1.--Proposed Part 73.18 and 73.19 and Conforming Changes to Part
                                  73.2
      [Firearms background checks for armed security personnel and
    authorization for preemption of firearms laws and use of enhanced
                                weapons]
------------------------------------------------------------------------
           Proposed language                      Considerations
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Sec.   73.18 Firearms background checks  This new section would
 for armed security personnel.            implement the firearms
(a) Purpose. This section sets forth      background check requirements
 the requirements for completion of       of new section 161A of the
 firearms background checks on armed      Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as
 security personnel at selected NRC-      amended. Section 161A was
 regulated facilities. Firearms           added by section 653 of the
 background checks are intended to        Energy Policy Act of 2005.
 verify that security personnel whose    The proposed rule language in
 duties require access to covered         Sec.  Sec.   73.18 and 73.19,
 weapons are not prohibited from          and conforming changes to Sec.
 receiving, possessing, transporting,       73.2 would be consistent
 importing, or using such weapons under   with the guidelines required
 applicable Federal or State law.         by section 161A.d to implement
 Licensees and certificate holders        the provisions of section
 listed under paragraph (c) of this       161A. Section 161A.d requires
 section who have applied for             the Commission to issue
 preemption authority under Sec.          guidelines, with the approval
 73.19 (i.e., Sec.   73.19 authority),    of the Attorney General, for
 or who have been granted preemption      section 161A to take effect.
 authority by Commission order, are       In parallel and separate from
 subject to the requirements of this      this rulemaking effort,
 section.                                 guidelines are being developed
                                          by staffs from the NRC and the
                                          Department of Justice (DOJ),
                                          [including staffs from the FBI
                                          and ATF].
                                         During development of these
                                          guidelines, the DOJ indicated
                                          that the firearms background
                                          check provisions of section
                                          161A only take effect if a
                                          triggering event occurs. A
                                          triggering event would occur
                                          when a licensee or certificate
                                          holder applies to the NRC to
                                          use the stand-alone preemption
                                          authority or the combined
                                          enhanced-weapons and
                                          preemption authority of
                                          section 161A. Therefore, armed
                                          security personnel of both
                                          current and future licensees
                                          and certificate holders would
                                          not be subject to the firearms
                                          background check provisions of
                                          the proposed Sec.   73.18,
                                          unless their employing
                                          licensee or certificate holder
                                          applies for and receives Sec.
                                           73.19 authority from the NRC.

[[Page 62676]]

 
Sec.   73.18(b) General Requirements.    Paragraph (b)(1) would require
 (1) Licensees and certificate holders    current and future licensees
 listed in paragraph (c) of this          and certificate holders who
 section who have received NRC approval   have received NRC approval of
 of their application for preemption      their application for
 authority shall ensure that a firearms   preemption authority to ensure
 background check has been                that all security personnel
 satisfactorily completed for all         whose official duties require
 security personnel requiring access to   access to covered weapons
 covered weapons as part of their         satisfactorily complete a
 official security duties prior to        firearms background check. The
 granting access to any covered weapons   firearms background check must
 to those personnel. Security personnel   be satisfactorily completed to
 who have satisfactorily completed a      permit access to covered
 firearms background check, but who       weapons. The Commission
 have had a break in employment with      intends for duties ``requiring
 the licensee, certificate holder, or     access to a covered weapon''
 their security contractor of greater     to include such duties as:
 than one (1) week subsequent to their    Security operations
 most recent firearms background check,   activities; training and
 or who have transferred from a           qualification activities; and
 different licensee or certificate        weapons' maintenance,
 holder (even though the other licensee   handling, accountability,
 or certificate holder satisfactorily     transport, and use activities.
 completed a firearms background check    [See also new definitions for
 on such individuals), are not excepted   covered weapons, enhanced
 from the requirements of this section.   weapons, and standard weapons
                                          in Sec.   73.2 at the end of
                                          Table 1]. A new firearms
                                          background check would be
                                          required for security
                                          personnel who have a break in
                                          employment or who have
                                          transferred from another
                                          licensee or certificate holder
                                          irrespective of whether the
                                          individual previously
                                          satisfactorily completed a
                                          firearms background check
                                          (i.e., such individuals would
                                          be treated as new security
                                          personnel and subject to a new
                                          firearms background check).
Sec.   73.18(b)(2) Security personnel    The NRC staff recognizes that
 who have satisfactorily completed a      the Commission has not yet
 firearms background check pursuant to    made a final decision on
 Commission orders are not subject to a   whether licensees and
 further firearms background check        certificate holders may apply
 under this section, unless these         for preemption authority alone
 personnel have a break in service or     or combined preemption and
 transfer as set forth in paragraph       enhanced-weapons authority
 (b)(1) of this section.                  prior to issuance of a final
                                          rule; however, the proposed
                                          rule would include language to
                                          support a transfer from any
                                          orders associated with such
                                          applications for section 161A
                                          authority to regulations and
                                          thereby provide both the
                                          Commission and industry with
                                          the maximum flexibility to
                                          expeditiously implement the
                                          security enhancements of
                                          section 161A.
                                         Paragraph (b)(2) would exempt
                                          previously checked personnel
                                          from a recheck, except in the
                                          case of a break in service or
                                          transfer [as in paragraph
                                          (b)(1)].
Sec.   73.18(b)(3) A change in the       Paragraph (b)(3) would indicate
 licensee, certificate holder, or         that changes in the security
 ownership of a facility, radioactive     contractor or ownership of the
 material, or other property designated   licensee or certificate holder
 under Sec.   73.19, or a change in the   are not triggering events that
 security contractor that provides        require a new firearms
 security personnel responsible for       background check.
 protecting such facilities,             Paragraph (b)(4) would indicate
 radioactive material, or other           that Licensee and certificate
 property, shall not constitute `a        holders may begin submitting
 break in service' or `transfer,' as      their security personnel for
 those terms are used in paragraph        firearms background checks
 (b)(2) of this section.                  after the licensee or
(4) Licensees and certificate holders     certificate holder has applied
 listed in paragraph (c) of this          to the NRC for preemption
 section may begin the application        authority alone or combined
 process for firearms background checks   preemption and enhanced
 under this section for security          weapons authority (i.e., Sec.
 personnel whose duties require access     73.19 authority).
 to covered weapons immediately on       Paragraph (b)(5) would indicate
 application to the NRC for preemption    that firearms background
 authority.                               checks are in addition to
(5) Firearms background checks do not     access authorization or
 replace any other background checks or   security clearance checks that
 criminal history checks required for     security personnel currently
 the licensee's or certificate holder's   undergo under other NRC
 security personnel under this chapter.   regulations (e.g., Sec.  Sec.
                                           11.15, 25.17 or 73.57). The
                                          NRC expects licensees and
                                          certificate holders who become
                                          aware of any new potentially
                                          derogatory information on
                                          current security personnel
                                          (through the completion of a
                                          firearms background check), to
                                          evaluate any such information
                                          for applicability as required
                                          by the licensee's or
                                          certificate holder's access
                                          authorization or security
                                          clearance programs.
Sec.   73.18(c) Applicability. This      Paragraph (c) would define the
 section applies to licensees or          applicability of Sec.   73.18
 certificate holders who have applied     to licensees or certificate
 for or received NRC approval of their    holders who have applied for
 application for Sec.   73.19 authority   or received Commission
 or were issued Commission orders         approval of stand-alone
 requiring firearms background checks.    preemption authority or
                                          combined enhanced-weapons and
                                          preemption authority [see
                                          considerations below for Sec.
                                           73.19(c) on the applicability
                                          of licensee and certificate
                                          holder under this proposed
                                          rule].
                                         Note: portions of this section
                                          would apply to licensee or
                                          certificate holder who has
                                          applied for, but not yet
                                          received preemption authority
                                          (e.g., requirements for
                                          submission of fingerprints) or
                                          those portions that would only
                                          apply to licensees or
                                          certificate holders who have
                                          received NRC approval of their
                                          application (e.g.,
                                          requirements for removal of
                                          security personnel who have
                                          not yet satisfactorily
                                          completed a firearms
                                          background check). This
                                          section would also apply to
                                          power reactor and Category I
                                          SSNM licensees or certificate
                                          holders issued Commission
                                          orders requiring completion of
                                          firearms background checks
                                          [see consideration for
                                          paragraph (b)(2) above].
Sec.   73.18(d) Firearms background      Paragraph (d) would identify
 check requirements. A firearms           the two components of a
 background check for security            firearms background check that
 personnel must include--                 are required by section 161A
(1) A check of the individual's           (i.e., a fingerprint check and
 fingerprints against the Federal         a NICS check).
 Bureau of Investigation's (FBI's)       The NICS was established
 fingerprint system; and                  pursuant to section 103.(b) of
(2) A check of the individual's           the Brady Handgun Violence
 identifying information against the      Prevention Act (Pub. L. 103-
 FBI's National Instant Criminal          159) and is maintained by the
 Background Check System (NICS).          FBI.

[[Page 62677]]

 
Sec.   73.18(e) Firearms background      Paragraph (e) would indicate
 check submittals.                        the process for submitting to
(1) Licensees and certificate holders     the NRC the two components of
 shall submit to the NRC, in accordance   the firearms background check.
 with Sec.   73.4, for all security       Accomplishment of the NICS
 personnel requiring a firearms           check would be based upon
 background check under this section--    information submitted by the
(i) A set of fingerprints, in             licensee or certificate holder
 accordance with paragraph (n) of this    to the NRC under new NRC Form
 section, and                             754 (see Section VIII of this
(ii) A completed NRC Form 754.            notice for further information
                                          on this NRC Form).
Sec.   73.18(e)(2) Licensees and         Paragraph (e)(2) would
 certificate holders shall retain a       establish the records
 copy of all NRC Forms 754 submitted to   retention requirements for
 the NRC for a period of one (1) year     submitted NRC Forms 754.
 subsequent to the termination of an
 individual's access to covered weapons
 or to the denial of an individual's
 access to covered weapons.
Sec.   73.18(f) NICS portion of a        Paragraph (f) would indicate
 firearms background check. The NRC       that the NRC is forwarding the
 will forward the information contained   information from submitted NRC
 in the submitted NRC Forms 754 to the    Forms 754 to the FBI for
 FBI for evaluation against the NICS.     evaluation against the NICS.
 Upon completion of the NICS check, the   The FBI will return one of the
 FBI will inform the NRC of the results   three results from the NICS
 with one of three responses under 28     check (per the FBI's
 CFR part 25; ``proceed,'' ``denied,''    regulations) and a NICS
 or ``delayed,'' and the associated       transaction number. The NRC
 NICS transaction number. The NRC will    will forward this returned
 forward these results and the            information to the submitting
 associated NICS transaction number to    licensee or certificate holder
 the submitting licensee or certificate   for forwarding to the
 holder. The licensee or certificate      individual security officer.
 holder shall provide these results to    The NICS transaction number is
 the individual who completed the NRC     necessary for any future
 Form 754.                                communications with the FBI on
                                          the NICS check (e.g., an
                                          individual's appeal of a
                                          ``denied'' NICS response).
Sec.   73.18(g) Satisfactory and         Paragraph (g) would set forth
 adverse firearms background checks.      the criteria for a
(1) A satisfactorily completed firearms   satisfactory firearms
 background check means a ``proceed''     background check based upon
 response for the individual from the     the specific NICS response.
 NICS.                                    The fingerprint checks
(2) An adversely completed firearms       mandated by section 161A
 background check means a ``denied'' or   support the accomplishment of
 ``delayed'' response from the NICS.      the NICS check and resolution
                                          of any adverse NICS records;
                                          therefore, the NRC would not
                                          specify a [satisfactory or
                                          adverse] completion criteria
                                          for the fingerprint portion of
                                          the firearms background check.
Sec.   73.18(h) Removal from access to   Paragraph (h) would require the
 covered weapons. Licensees or            licensee or certificate holder
 certificate holders who have received    to remove personnel who are
 NRC approval of their application for    prohibited from possessing or
 Sec.   73.19 authority shall ensure      receiving firearms from duties
 security personnel are removed from      requiring access to covered
 duties requiring access to covered       weapons. Disqualifying status
 weapons upon the licensee's or           or occurrences are found under
 certificate holder's knowledge of any    the United States Code, Title
 disqualifying status or the occurrence   18, Section 922 and ATF's
 of any disqualifying events under 18     implementing regulations (see
 U.S.C. 922(g) or (n), and the ATF's      27 CFR 478.32 and 478.11). See
 implementing regulations in 27 CFR       also considerations for Sec.
 part 478.                                73.18(b)(5).
Sec.   73.18(i) [Reserved].............  Paragraph (i) would not be used
                                          to avoid confusion with the
                                          use of sub-sub paragraph (i).
Sec.   73.18(j) Security personnel       Paragraph (j) would require
 responsibilities. Security personnel     security personnel who become
 assigned duties requiring access to      prohibited from possessing or
 covered weapons shall promptly [within   receiving firearms due to a
 three (3) working days] notify their     disqualifying status or
 employing licensee's or certificate      occurrence of a disqualifying
 holder's security management (whether    event to notify their licensee
 directly employed by the licensee or     or certificate holder within
 certificate holder or employed by a      three (3) days of this fact.
 security contractor to the licensee or  This paragraph would work in
 certificate holder) of the existence     conjunction with the
 of any disqualifying status or upon      requirements of paragraphs
 the occurrence of any disqualifying      (k), (m), and (n) and would
 events listed under 18 U.S.C. 922(g)     require security personnel to
 or (n), and the ATF's implementing       self report the occurrence of
 regulations in 27 CFR part 478 that      any disqualifying status or
 would prohibit them from possessing or   events.
 receiving a covered weapon.
Sec.   73.18(k) Awareness of             Paragraph (k) would require
 disqualifying events. Licensees and      licensees and certificate
 certificate holders who have received    holders to train security
 NRC approval of Sec.   73.19 authority   personnel on disqualifying
 shall include within their NRC-          status or events to facilitate
 approved security training and           self reporting of such status
 qualification plans instruction on--     or events by security
(1) Disqualifying status or events        personnel under paragraph (j).
 specified in 18 U.S.C. 922(g) and (n),   And to train security
 and ATF's implementing regulations in    personnel on their ongoing
 27 CFR part 478 (including any           responsibility to report
 applicable definitions) identifying      disqualifying status or events
 categories of persons who are            to their licensee or
 prohibited from possessing or            certificate holder.
 receiving any covered weapons; and
(2) The continuing responsibility of
 security personnel assigned duties
 requiring access to covered weapons to
 promptly notify their employing
 licensee or certificate holder of the
 occurrence of any disqualifying
 events.
Sec.   73.18(l) [Reserved].............  Paragraph (l) would not be used
                                          to avoid confusion with the
                                          use of sub-paragraph (1) [see
                                          also paragraph (i) above].

[[Page 62678]]

 
Sec.   73.18(m) Notification of          Paragraph (m) would require
 removal. Within 72 hours after taking    licensees or certificate
 action to remove security personnel      holders to report instances
 from duties requiring access to          where security personnel (with
 covered weapons, because of the          current access to weapons) are
 existence of any disqualifying status    removed from armed duties
 or the occurrence of any disqualifying   because of the occurrence of
 event--other than due to the prompt      any disqualifying status or
 notification by the security officer     event. The timeliness of this
 under paragraph (j) of this section--    notification would be based
 licensees and certificate holders who    upon the need for appropriate
 have received NRC approval of Sec.       NRC followup of a potential
 73.19 authority shall notify the NRC     criminal violation, rather
 Operations Center of such removal        than the followup necessary
 actions, in accordance with appendix A   for an ongoing security event
 of this part.                            (i.e., the individual no
                                          longer has access to covered
                                          weapons). Appendix A provides
                                          contact information for the
                                          NRC Operations Center.
Sec.   73.18(n) Reporting violations of  Paragraph (n) would indicate
 law. The NRC will promptly report        that if the NRC becomes aware
 suspected violations of Federal law to   of suspected violations of
 the appropriate Federal agency or        criminal law (e.g., a
 suspected violations of State law to     prohibited person actually
 the appropriate State agency.            possessing weapons as a
                                          security officer) it is
                                          obligated to report suspected
                                          violations of Federal or State
                                          law to the appropriate
                                          government agency or agencies.
Sec.   73.18(o) Procedures for           Paragraph (o) would prescribe
 processing of fingerprint checks. (1)    the location, method, and
 Licensees and certificate holders who    requirements for submission of
 have applied for Sec.   73.19            fingerprints to the NRC as
 authority, using an appropriate method   part of a firearms background
 listed in Sec.   73.4, shall submit to   check.
 the NRC's Division of Facilities and    The proposed language would be
 Security one (1) completed, legible      essentially identical to that
 standard fingerprint card (Form FD-      contained to the current
 258, ORIMDNRCOOOZ) or, where             fingerprint submission
 practicable, other fingerprint record    requirements under the current
 for each individual requiring a          access authorization
 firearms background check, to the        regulations in Sec.
 NRC's Director, Division of Facilities   73.57(d).
 and Security, Mail Stop T6-E46, ATTN:
 Criminal History Check. Copies of this
 form may be obtained by writing the
 Office of Information Services, U.S.
 Nuclear Regulatory Commission,
 Washington, DC 20555-0001, by calling
 (301) 415-5877, or by e-mail to
 FORMS@nrc.gov. Guidance on what
 alternative formats, including
 electronic submissions, may be
 practicable are referenced in Sec.
 73.4.
Sec.   73.18(o)(2) Licensees and         See considerations for Sec.
 certificate holders shall indicate on    73.18(o). This provision will
 the fingerprint card or other            permit proper internal routing
 fingerprint record that the purpose      of fingerprints within the
 for this fingerprint check is the        FBI's Criminal Justice
 accomplishment of a firearms             Information Services Division
 background check.                        to support the NICS checks.
Sec.   73.18(o)(3) Licensees and         See considerations for Sec.
 certificate holders shall establish      73.18(o).
 procedures to ensure that the quality
 of the fingerprints taken results in
 minimizing the rejection rate of
 fingerprint cards or records due to
 illegible or incomplete information.
Sec.   73.18(o)(4) The Commission will   See considerations for Sec.
 review fingerprints for firearms         73.18(o).
 background checks for completeness.
 Any Form FD-258 or other fingerprint
 record containing omissions or evident
 errors will be returned to the
 licensee or certificate holder for
 corrections. The fee for processing
 fingerprint checks includes one (1)
 free re-submission if the initial
 submission is returned by the FBI
 because the fingerprint impressions
 cannot be classified. The one (1) free
 re-submission must have the FBI
 Transaction Control Number reflected
 on the re-submission. If additional
 submissions are necessary, they will
 be treated as an initial submittal and
 require a second payment of the
 processing fee. The payment of a new
 processing fee entitles the submitter
 to an additional free re-submittal, if
 necessary. Previously rejected
 submissions may not be included with
 the third submission because the
 submittal will be rejected
 automatically. Licensees and
 certificate holders may wish to
 consider using different methods for
 recording fingerprints for
 resubmissions, if difficulty occurs
 with obtaining a legible set of
 impressions.
Sec.   73.18(o)(5)(i) Fees for the       See considerations for Sec.
 processing of fingerprint checks are     73.18(o).
 due upon application. Licensees and
 certificate holders shall submit
 payment with the application for the
 processing of fingerprints, and
 payment must be made by corporate
 check, certified check, cashier's
 check, money order, or electronic
 payment, made payable to ``U.S. NRC.''
 a Combined payment for multiple
 applications is acceptable.
(ii) The application fee is the sum of
 the user fee charged by the FBI for
 each fingerprint card or other
 fingerprint record submitted by the
 NRC on behalf of a licensee or
 certificate holder, and an
 administrative processing fee assessed
 by the NRC. The NRC processing fee
 covers administrative costs associated
 with NRC handling of licensee and
 certificate holder fingerprint
 submissions. The Commission publishes
 the amount of the fingerprint check
 application fee on the NRC's public
 Web site.b The Commission will
 directly notify licensees and
 certificate holders who are subject to
 this regulation of any fee changes.
 

[[Page 62679]]

 
Footnotes:
a For guidance on making electronic
 payments, contact the NRC's Security
 Branch, Division of Facilities and
 Security, Office of Administration at
 (301) 415-7404.
b For information on the current fee
 amount, refer to the Electronic
 Submittals page at http://www.nrc.gov/
site-help/eie.html and select the link
 for the Criminal History Program.
Sec.   73.18(o)(6) The Commission will   See considerations for Sec.
 forward to the submitting licensee or    73.18(o).
 certificate holder all data received
 from the FBI as a result of the
 licensee's or certificate holder's
 application(s) for fingerprint
 background checks, including the FBI's
 fingerprint record.
Sec.   73.18(p) Appeals and correction   Paragraph (p)(1) would indicate
 of erroneous system information.         that individuals who have
(1) Individuals who require a firearms    received a ``denied'' response
 background check under this section      or a ``delayed'' response may
 and who receive a ``denied'' NICS        not be assigned duties
 response or a ``delayed'' NICS           requiring access to covered
 response may not be assigned duties      weapons during their appeal of
 requiring access to covered weapons      the denial or resolution of
 during the pendency of an appeal of      the delay.
 the results of the check or during the  Paragraph (p)(2) would indicate
 pendency of providing and evaluating     that the licensee or
 any necessary additional information     certificate holder will
 to the FBI to resolve the ``delayed''    provide information on the
 response, respectively.                  FBI's appeals process to the
(2) Licensees and certificate holders     denied individual. The NRC and
 shall provide information on the FBI's   FBI are considering creating a
 procedures for appealing a ``denied''    brochure describing the
 response to the denied individual or     appeals process or resolution
 on providing additional information to   process that would be similar
 the FBI to resolve a ``delayed''         to the FBI's current brochure
 response.                                [describing the NICS appeals
(3) An individual who receives a          process] provided by federal
 ``denied'' or ``delayed'' NICS           firearms licensees to
 response to a firearms background        individuals receiving a
 check under this section may request     ``denied'' NICS response (see
 the reason for the response from the     example at the FBI's NICS
 FBI. The licensee or certificate         information website at http://
 holder shall provide to the individual   www.fbi.gov/hq/cjisd/nics/
 who has received the ``denied'' or       index.htm).
 ``delayed'' response the unique NICS    Paragraph (p)(3) would indicate
 transaction number associated with the   that the individual who
 specific firearms background check.      receives a ``denied'' or
(4) These requests for the reason for a   ``delayed'' response must
 ``denied'' or ``delayed'' NICS           personally make any requests
 response must be made in writing, and    to the FBI on the reason for
 must include the NICS transaction        the NICS response; and the
 number. The request must be sent to      licensee or certificate holder
 the Federal Bureau of Investigation;     may not make such requests
 NICS Section; Appeals Service Team,      upon the individual's behalf.
 Module A-1; PO Box 4278; Clarksburg,    Paragraph (p)(4) would provide
 WV 26302-9922. The FBI will provide      the FBI's address for
 the individual with the reasons for      correspondence. Additionally,
 the ``denied'' response or ``delayed''   in response to the
 response. The FBI will also indicate     individual's request the FBI
 whether additional information or        would provide the person the
 documents are required to support an     reason for the denial or the
 appeal or resolution, for example,       delay to facilitate any
 where there is a claim that the record   appeals or to facilitate
 in question does not pertain to the      providing supplemental
 individual who was denied.               information to resolve a
                                          ``delayed'' response.
Sec.   73.18(p)(5) If the individual     Paragraph (p)(5) would set a
 wishes to challenge the accuracy of      time limit for filing an
 the record upon which the ``denied''     initial appeal of a ``denied''
 or ``delayed'' response is based, or     response or to request
 if the individual wishes to assert       resolution of a ``delayed''
 that his or her rights to possess or     response to encourage timely
 receive a firearm have been restored     resolution of such cases and
 by lawful process, he or she may make    facilitate FBI disposition of
 application first to the FBI. The        interim records. The
 individual shall file an appeal of a     individual filing the appeal
 ``denied'' response or file a request    would be required to set forth
 to resolve a ``delayed'' response        the basis for the appeal and
 within 45 calender days of the date      provide information supporting
 the NRC forwards the results of the      their claim. Copies of records
 firearms background check to the         would be required to be true
 licensee or certificate holder. The      copies (i.e., certified by a
 appeal or request must include           court or other government
 appropriate documentation or record(s)   entity). Because some
 establishing the legal and/or factual    supplemental information may
 basis for the challenge. Any record or   take longer than 45 days to
 document of a court or other             obtain, individuals filling an
 government entity or official            appeal or requesting
 furnished in support of an appeal must   resolution should not delay
 be certified by the court or other       their filing in order to
 government entity or official as a       gather all necessary
 true copy. The individual may            information, but would
 supplement their initial appeal or       indicate that additional
 request--subsequent to the 45 day        supporting information will be
 filing deadline--with additional         forthcoming.
 information as it becomes available,    Paragraph (p)(6) would indicate
 for example, where obtaining a true      that if an individual cannot
 copy of a court transcript may take      resolve a record with the FBI,
 longer than 45 days. The individual      the individual may apply to
 should note in their appeal or request   the originating agency to
 any information or records that are      correct the record and notify
 being obtained, but are not yet          the FBI of those results.
 available.                              The originating agency may
(6) If the individual is notified that    respond to the individual's
 the FBI is unable to resolve the         application by addressing the
 appeal, the individual may then apply    individual's specific reasons
 for correction of the record directly    for the challenge, and by
 to the agency from which the             indicating whether additional
 information forming the basis of the     information or documents are
 denial was originated. If the            required. If the record is
 individual is notified by the            corrected as a result of the
 originating agency, that additional      appeal to the originating
 information or documents are required    agency, the individual may so
 the individual may provide them to the   notify the FBI, which would,
 originating agency. If the record is     in turn, verify the record
 corrected as a result of the appeal to   correction with the
 the originating agency, the individual   originating agency (assuming
 may so notify the FBI and submit         the originating agency has not
 written proof of the correction.         already notified the FBI of
                                          the correction) and take all
                                          necessary steps to correct the
                                          record in the NICS system.

[[Page 62680]]

 
Sec.   73.18(p)(7) An individual who     Paragraph (p)(7) would indicate
 has satisfactorily appealed a            that an individual who has
 ``denied'' response or resolved a        successfully resolved a
 ``delayed'' response may provide         ``denied'' or ``delayed''
 written consent to the FBI to maintain   response may consent to the
 information about himself or herself     FBI maintaining information
 in a Voluntary Appeal File (VAF) to be   about himself or herself in
 established by the FBI and checked by    the FBI's VAF (i.e., the basis
 the NICS for the purpose of preventing   for the successful
 the erroneous denial or extended delay   resolution). The FBI will
 by the NICS of any future NICS checks.   issue such individuals a VAF
(8) Individuals appealing a ``denied''    number that can be entered on
 response or resolving a ``delayed''      an NRC Form 754 or ATF Form
 response are responsible for providing   4417 to prevent repetition of
 the FBI any additional information the   excessive delays in completing
 FBI requires to resolve the              any future NICS checks (both
 ``delayed'' response.                    for checks as security
                                          personnel and for checks of
                                          individuals engaging in a
                                          firearms transaction as a
                                          private person).
                                         A VAF file would be used only
                                          by the NICS for this purpose.
                                          The FBI would remove all
                                          information in the VAF
                                          pertaining to an individual
                                          upon receipt of a written
                                          request by that individual.
                                          However, the FBI may retain
                                          such information contained in
                                          the VAF as long as needed to
                                          pursue cases of identified
                                          misuse of the system. If the
                                          FBI finds a disqualifying
                                          record on the individual after
                                          his or her entry into the VAF,
                                          the FBI may remove the
                                          individual's information from
                                          the file. Paragraph (p)(8)
                                          would indicate that the
                                          responsibility for providing
                                          any necessary additional
                                          information to the FBI to
                                          appeal the ``denied'' response
                                          or resolve the ``delayed''
                                          rests with the individual, not
                                          with the FBI.
Sec.   73.19 Authorization for           This new section would
 preemption of firearms laws and use of   implement the provisions of
 enhanced weapons.                        new section 161A of the AEA
(a) Purpose. This section sets forth      with respect to preemption
 the requirements for licensees and       authority alone or combined
 certificate holders to obtain NRC        enhanced-weapons authority and
 approval to use the expanded             preemption authority. This
 authorities provided under section       section would permit, but not
 161A of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954,   require, selected classes of
 as amended (AEA), in protecting NRC-     licensees and certificate
 designated facilities, radioactive       holders to apply to the NRC
 material, or other property. These       for these authorities.
 authorities include ``preemption        Paragraph (a) would provide the
 authority'' and ``enhanced-weapons       overall purpose and indicate
 authority.''                             that this section applies to
                                          defending NRC-designated
                                          facilities, radioactive
                                          material, or other property.
Sec.   73.19(b) General Requirements.    Paragraph (b) would contain
 Licensees and certificate holders        general requirements and
 listed in paragraph (c) of this          overview of the advantages of
 section may apply to the NRC, in         these two authorities. The
 accordance with the provisions of this   ability of licensees and
 section, to receive stand-alone          certificate holders to apply
 preemption authority or combined         to the NRC for stand-alone
 enhanced weapons authority and           preemption authority or
 preemption authority.                    combined enhanced-weapons
(1) Preemption authority, as provided     authority and preemption
 in section 161A of the AEA, means the    authority would be limited to
 authority of the Commission to permit    the classes of licensees set
 licensees or certificate holders, or     forth in paragraph (c) of this
 the designated security personnel of     section.
 the licensee or certificate holder, to  Licensees and certificate
 transfer, receive, possess, transport,   holders may apply for
 import, or use one (1) or more           preemption authority alone.
 category of standard and enhanced        However, licensees and
 weapons, as defined in Sec.   73.2,      certificate holders who apply
 notwithstanding any local, State, or     for enhanced-weapons authority
 certain Federal firearms laws            would also be required to
 (including regulations).                 apply for preemption
(2) Enhanced weapons authority, as        authority, because of
 provided in section 161A of the AEA,     restrictions on the possession
 means the authority of the Commission    of enhanced weapons require
 to permit licensees or certificate       the preemption of certain
 holders, or the designated security      regulations. The NRC would
 personnel of the licensee or             create this separate, but
 certificate holder, to transfer,         parallel, structure to provide
 receive, possess, transport, import,     licensees with flexibility in
 and use one (1) or more category of      choosing security capabilities
 enhanced weapons, as defined in Sec.     versus security costs.
 73.2, notwithstanding any local,        Paragraphs (b)(1) and (b)(2)
 State, or certain Federal firearms       provide definitions of these
 laws (including regulations).            two authorities.
Sec.   73.19(b)(3) Prior to receiving    Paragraph (b)(3) would indicate
 NRC approval of enhanced-weapons         that to receive enhanced-
 authority, the licensee or certificate   weapons authority, a licensee
 holder must have applied for and         or certificate holder must
 received NRC approval for preemption     also have received preemption
 authority, in accordance with this       authority.
 section or under Commission orders.     Paragraph (b)(4) would describe
(4) Prior to granting either authority    the criteria of section 161A
 the NRC must determine that the          the Commission must determine
 proposed use of this authority is        are present for a licensee or
 necessary in the discharge of official   certificate holder to apply to
 duties by security personnel engaged     the NRC for stand-alone
 in protecting--.                         preemption authority or
(i) Facilities owned or operated by a     combined enhanced-weapons
 licensee or certificate holder and       authority and preemption
 designated by the Commission under       authority for other types of
 paragraph (c) of this section, or.       facilities, radioactive
(ii) Radioactive material or other        material, or other property.
 property that is owned or possessed by
 a licensee or certificate holder, or
 that is being transported to or from
 an NRC-regulated facility. Before
 granting such approval, the Commission
 must determined that the radioactive
 material or other property is of
 significance to the common defense and
 security or public health and safety
 and has designated such radioactive
 material or other property under
 paragraph (c) of this section.

[[Page 62681]]

 
Sec.   73.19(c) Applicability. (1) The   Paragraph (c)(1) would limit
 following classes of licensees or        the types of licensees who
 certificate holders may apply for        could apply for stand-alone
 stand-alone preemption authority--       preemption authority alone to
(i) Power reactor facilities; and         two classes of NRC-regulated
(ii) Facilities authorized to possess a   facilities--power reactor
 formula quantity or greater of           facilities and fuel cycle
 strategic special nuclear material       facilities authorized to
 with security plans subject to Sec.      possess Category I quantities
 Sec.   73.20, 73.45, and 73.46.          of SSNM. Such SSNM fuel cycle
(2) The following classes of licensees    facilities would include:
 or certificate holders may apply for     production facilities, spent
 combined enhanced-weapons authority      fuel reprocessing facilities,
 and preemption authority--               fuel fabrication facilities,
(i) Power reactor facilities; and         and uranium enrichment
(ii) Facilities authorized to possess a   facilities. However, they
 formula quantity or greater of           would not include hot cell
 strategic special nuclear material       facilities, independent spent
 with security plans subject to Sec.      fuel storage installations,
 Sec.   73.20, 73.45, and 73.46.          monitored retrievable storage
                                          installations, geologic
                                          repository operations areas,
                                          non-power reactors, byproduct
                                          material facilities, and the
                                          transportation of spent fuel,
                                          high level waste, and special
                                          nuclear material.
                                         Paragraph (c)(2) would also
                                          limit the types of licensees
                                          who could apply for combined
                                          enhanced-weapons authority and
                                          preemption authority to these
                                          same two classes of licensed
                                          facilities.
                                         The Commission is proposing
                                          under this rulemaking to limit
                                          the range of facilities,
                                          radioactive material, or other
                                          property [for which these
                                          authorities are appropriate]
                                          to power reactor facilities
                                          and fuel cycle facilities
                                          authorized to possess Category
                                          I quantities of strategic
                                          special nuclear material. The
                                          Commission would take this
                                          approach to be consistent with
                                          the scope of this rulemaking.
                                          The Commission may consider
                                          other types of facilities,
                                          radioactive material, or other
                                          property as appropriate for
                                          these authorities in future
                                          rulemakings. Additionally, the
                                          Commission would use the
                                          parallel structure in
                                          paragraph (c) to facilitate
                                          future rulemakings.
                                          Specifically, the Commission
                                          recognizes that enhanced-
                                          weapons authority may not be
                                          appropriate for all present
                                          and future classes of
                                          licensees with armed security
                                          programs; whereas the
                                          applicability of preemption
                                          authority to all present and
                                          future classes of licensees
                                          with armed security programs
                                          may be much broader.
Sec.   73.19(c)(3) With respect to the   Paragraph (b)(3) would indicate
 possession and use of firearms by all    that the provisions of this
 other NRC licensees or certificate       section do not supersede
 holders, the Commission's requirements   existing Commission
 in effect before [effective date of      regulations or orders for non-
 final rule] remain applicable, except    power reactor and non-Category
 to the extent those requirements are     I SSNM licensees, unless
 modified by Commission order or          specifically indicated.
 regulations applicable to such
 licensees and certificate holders.
Sec.   73.19(d) Authorization for stand- Paragraph (d)(1) would describe
 alone preemption of firearms laws. (1)   the process for a licensee or
 Licensees and certificate holders        certificate holder to apply
 listed in paragraph (c) of this          for preemption authority. This
 section may apply to the NRC for the     would be a voluntary action.
 preemption authority described in        Based upon the Commission's
 paragraph (b)(1) of this section.        conclusion that the classes of
 Licensees and certificate holders        facilities listed under
 seeking such authority shall submit an   paragraph (c) are appropriate
 application to the NRC in writing, in    for the use of such preemption
 accordance with Sec.   73.4, and         authority, no additional
 indicate that the licensee or            documentation or supporting
 certificate holder is requesting         information would be required
 preemption authority under section       by a licensee or certificate
 161A of the AEA.                         holder to apply for preemption
(2) Licensees and certificate holders     authority other than the
 who have applied for preemption          licensee or certificate holder
 authority under this section may begin   is included within the list of
 firearms background checks under Sec.    licenses and certificate
  73.18 for their armed security          holders in paragraph (c).
 personnel.                              Paragraph (d)(2) would permit
(3) Licensees and certificate holders     licensees and certificate
 who have applied for preemption          holders who have applied for
 authority under this section and who     preemption authority to begin
 have satisfactorily completed firearms   submitting their security
 background checks for a sufficient       personnel for firearms
 number of security personnel (to         background checks under Sec.
 implement their security plan while      73.18.
 meeting security personnel fatigue      Paragraph (c)(3) would require
 requirements of this chapter or          licensees and certificate
 Commission order) shall notify the       holders who applied for
 NRC, in accordance with Sec.   73.4,     preemption authority to
 of their readiness to receive NRC        subsequently notify the NRC of
 approval of preemption authority and     their readiness to fully
 implement all the provisions of Sec.     implement Sec.   73.18 without
 73.18.                                   adverse impact on the security
                                          organization (i.e., the
                                          provisions in Sec.   73.18
                                          requiring removal from armed
                                          duties of personnel with a
                                          ``denied'' or ``delayed''
                                          response would not adversely
                                          affect the licensee's or
                                          certificate holder's security
                                          organization).
Sec.   73.19(d)(4) Based upon the        Paragraph (d)(4) would indicate
 licensee's or certificate holder's       that the NRC will rely upon
 readiness notification and any           the licensee's or certificate
 discussions with the licensee or         holder's determination that
 certificate holder, the NRC will         sufficient numbers of its
 document in writing to the licensee or   security personnel have
 certificate holder that the Commission   satisfactorily passed the
 has approved or disapproved the          firearms background check to
 licensee's or certificate holder's       fully implement the provisions
 application for preemption authority.    of Sec.   73.18. The NRC would
                                          document in writing its
                                          approval or disapproval of the
                                          licensee's or certificate
                                          holder's application for
                                          preemption authority. The NRC
                                          may also rely upon discussions
                                          with the licensee or
                                          certificate holder to reach a
                                          conclusion.

[[Page 62682]]

 
Sec.   73.19(e) Authorization for use    Paragraph (e)(1) would describe
 of enhanced weapons. (1) Licensees and   the process for a licensee or
 certificate holders listed in            certificate holder to apply
 paragraph (c)(2) of this section may     for combined enhanced-weapons
 apply to the NRC for enhanced-weapons    authority and preemption
 authority described in paragraph         authority. A licensee or
 (a)(2) of this section. Licensees and    certificate holder would be
 certificate holders applying for         permitted to apply for
 enhanced-weapons authority shall have    preemption authority in
 also applied for preemption authority.   conjunction with an
 Licensees and certificate holders may    application for enhanced-
 make these applications concurrently.    weapons authority, or the
(2) Licensees and certificate holders     licensee or certificate holder
 seeking enhanced-weapons authority       may apply for preemption
 shall submit an application to the       authority first. Only the
 NRC, in accordance with Sec.   73.4,     classes of licensees and
 indicating that the licensee or          certificate holders listed
 certificate holder is requesting         under paragraph (c)(2) would
 enhanced-weapons authority under         be permitted to apply for
 section 161A of the AEA. Licensees and   combined enhanced-weapons
 certificate holders shall also include   authority and preemption
 with their application--.                authority.
(i) The additional information required  Paragraph (e)(2) would require
 by paragraph (f) of this section;.       a licensee or certificate
(ii) The date they applied to the NRC     holder to include specific
 for preemption authority (if not         information with their
 concurrent with the application for      application as set forth in
 enhanced weapons authority); and.        Sec.   73.19(f). The licensee
(iii) If applicable, the date when the    or certificate holder would
 licensee or certificate holder           also be required to include
 received NRC approval of their           information on the date they
 application for preemption authority     applied for, and/or received
 under this section or via Commission     NRC approval of their
 order..                                  application for preemption
                                          authority under Sec.   73.19,
                                          or under Commission order
                                          prior to the effective date of
                                          a final rule.
Sec.   73.19(e)(3) The NRC will          Paragraph (e)(3) would indicate
 document in writing to the licensee or   that the NRC would document in
 certificate holder that the Commission   writing the approval or
 has approved or disapproved the          disapproval of an application
 licensee's or certificate holder's       for combined enhanced-weapons
 application for enhanced-weapons         authority and preemption
 authority. The NRC must approve, or      authority. The NRC's approval
 have previously approved, a licensee's   would also indicate the total
 or certificate holder's application      numbers, types, and calibers
 for preemption authority under           of enhanced weapons that are
 paragraph (d) of this section, or via    approved for a specific
 Commission order, to approve the         licensee or certificate
 application for enhanced weapons         holder.
 authority.
Sec.   73.19(e)(4) Licensees and         Paragraph (e)(4) would indicate
 certificate holders who have applied     that after the licensee or
 to the NRC for and received enhanced-    certificate holder has
 weapons authority shall then apply to    received NRC approval of its
 the U.S. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco,     application to use enhanced
 Firearms, and Explosives (ATF) for a     weapons, it must then apply to
 federal firearms license (FFL) and       ATF to obtain a FFL and also
 also register under the National         register under the NFA to
 Firearms Act (NFA) in accordance with    obtain these weapons. Because
 ATF regulations under 27 CFR parts 478   ATF has indicated it would
 and 479 to obtain the enhanced           rely upon the NRC's technical
 weapons. Licensees and certificate       evaluation [on whether the
 holders shall include a copy of the      specific weapons listed in the
 NRC's written approval with their NFA    NRC's approval are appropriate
 registration application.                for the licensee or
                                          certificate holder] in
                                          processing the licensee's or
                                          certificate holder's NFA
                                          registration application,
                                          licensees and certificate
                                          holders would include a copy
                                          of the NRC's approval with
                                          their NFA registration
                                          application.
                                         This paragraph would require
                                          licensees to obtain a FFL in
                                          addition to registering under
                                          the NFA. Based upon
                                          conversations with ATF, the
                                          NRC understands that while
                                          ATF's regulations do not
                                          mandate that persons who
                                          obtain NFA weapons also have
                                          an FFL, NRC licensees and
                                          certificate holders desiring
                                          to obtain enhanced weapons
                                          would benefit from status an
                                          ATF FFL. Advantages would
                                          include reduced time to
                                          process requests to transfer
                                          NFA weapons to or from the
                                          licensee or certificate holder
                                          (e.g., initial receipt,
                                          repair, or disposition),
                                          simplification of the ATF's
                                          review of an NFA registration
                                          application, and elimination
                                          of transfer taxes for NFA-
                                          weapons transactions. The NRC
                                          also understands that status
                                          as an FFL would create
                                          obligations for such
                                          licensee's and certificate
                                          holders. Obligations would
                                          include payment of an annual
                                          special occupational tax,
                                          additional recordkeeping
                                          requirements, and a
                                          requirement to permit ATF
                                          inspectors access to the
                                          licensee's or certificate
                                          holder's facilities possessing
                                          enhanced weapons to inspect
                                          ATF-licensed weapons and
                                          corresponding records.
Sec.   73.19(f) Application for          Paragraph (f)(1) would describe
 enhanced-weapons authority additional    the additional information a
 information. (1) Licensees and           licensee or certificate holder
 certificate holders applying to the      would be required to submit
 Commission for enhanced-weapons          along with their application
 authority under paragraph (e) of this    for preemption and enhanced-
 section shall also submit to the NRC     weapons authority. This
 for prior review and written approval    information would be submitted
 new, or revised, physical security       to the NRC for prior review
 plans, security personnel training and   and approval and would
 qualification plans, safeguards          describe and address the
 contingency plans, and safety            specific weapons to be
 assessments incorporating the use of     employed. In addition to
 the specific enhanced weapons the        addressing the enhanced
 licensee or certificate holder intends   weapons in the security,
 to use. These plans and assessments      training and qualification,
 must be specific to the facility,        and safeguards contingency
 radioactive material, or other           plans, a licensee or
 property being protected.                certificate holder would also
                                          provide a safety assessment on
                                          the use of the specific
                                          enhanced weapons to be
                                          employed. Licensees and
                                          certificate holders who apply
                                          for authority alone under
                                          paragraph (d) would not be
                                          subject to the requirements of
                                          paragraph (f).

[[Page 62683]]

 
Sec.   73.19(f)(2) In addition to other  Paragraph (e)(2) would describe
 requirements set forth in this part,     specific information the
 these plans and assessments must--       license or certificate holder
(i) For the physical security plan,       would include in the plans and
 identify the specific types or models,   assessments accompanying the
 calibers, and numbers of enhanced        application for enhanced-
 weapons to be used;                      weapons authority. The
(ii) For the training and qualification   paragraph would also describe
 plan, address the training and           the scope of the safety
 qualification requirements to use        assessments and would require
 these specific enhanced weapons; and     evaluation of both onsite and
(iii) For the safeguards contingency      offsite impacts from the use
 plan, address how these enhanced and     of the specific enhanced
 any standard weapons will be employed    weapons to be employed. The
 by the licensee's or certificate         safety assessment would be
 holder's security personnel in meeting   required to only address the
 the NRC-required protective strategy,    enhanced weapons the license
 including tactical approaches and        or certificate holder intends
 maneuvers.                               to employ.
Sec.   73.19(f)(2)(iv) For the safety    See considerations for Sec.
 assessment--                             73.19(f)(2).
(A) Assess any potential safety impact
 on the facility, radioactive material,
 or other property from the use of
 these enhanced weapons;
(B) Assess any potential safety impact
 on public or private facilities,
 public or private property, or on
 members of the public in areas outside
 of the site boundary from the use of
 these enhanced weapons; and
(C) Assess any potential safety impact
 on public or private facilities,
 public or private property, or on
 members of the public from the use of
 these enhanced weapons at training
 facilities intended for proficiency
 demonstration and qualification
 purposes.
Sec.   73.19(f)(3) The licensee's or     Paragraph (f)(3) would specify
 certificate holder's training and        acceptable standards for the
 qualification plan on possessing,        licensee or certificate holder
 storing, maintaining, qualifying on,     to use in creating a training
 and using enhanced weapons must          and qualification plan for
 include information from applicable      enhanced weapons. This
 firearms standards developed by          paragraph would not create any
 nationally-recognized firearms           new requirements for training
 organizations or standard setting        standards for standard
 bodies or standards developed by         weapons.
 Federal agencies, such as: the U.S.     Paragraph (f)(4) would require
 Department of Homeland Security's        the submission of revised
 Federal Law Enforcement Training         plans for prior NRC review and
 Center, the U.S. Department of           approval, irrespective of
 Energy's National Training Center, and   whether the licensee or
 the U.S. Department of Defense.          certificate holder concludes
(4) Licensees or certificate holders      that the use of these enhanced
 shall submit any new or revised plans    weapons would not cause ``a
 and assessments for prior NRC review     decrease in security
 and written approval notwithstanding     effectiveness'' under the
 the provisions of Sec.  Sec.             applicable NRC regulation.
 50.54(p), 70.32(e), and 76.60 of this
 chapter which otherwise permit a
 license or certificate holder to make
 changes to such plans ``that would not
 decrease their effectiveness'' without
 prior NRC review.
Sec.   73.19(g) Completion of training   Paragraph (g) would require
 and qualification prior to use of        licensees and certificate
 enhanced weapons.                        holders to ensure security
Licensees and certificate holders who     personnel are trained and
 have applied for and received enhanced-  qualified on the use and
 weapons authority under paragraph (e)    employment of enhanced weapons
 of this section shall ensure security    before the licensee or
 personnel complete required firearms     certificate holder deploys
 training and qualification in            these enhanced weapons to
 accordance with the licensee's or        defend the facility,
 certificate holder's NRC-approved        radioactive material, or other
 training and qualification plan. Such    property.
 training must be completed prior to     Documentation of completion of
 security personnel's use of enhanced     this training would be
 weapons to protect NRC-designated        consistent with the licensee's
 facilities, radioactive material, or     or certificate holder's
 other property and must be documented    approved training and
 in accordance with the requirements of   qualification plan.
 the licensee's or certificate holder's
 training and qualification plan.
Sec.   73.19(h) Use of enhanced          Paragraph (h) would indicate
 weapons. Requirements regarding the      that Sec.   73.19 does not
 use of enhanced weapons by security      supercede requirements on the
 personnel in the performance of their    use of weapons under the power
 official duties are contained in Sec.    reactor and Category I fuel
 Sec.   73.46 and 73.55 and in            cycle facility security
 appendices B and C of this part, as      regulations found in Part 73.
 applicable.
Sec.   73.19(i) [Reserved].............  Paragraph (i) would not be used
                                          to avoid confusion with the
                                          use of sub-sub paragraph (i).
Sec.   73.19(j) Notification of adverse  Paragraph (j) would require NRC
 ATF findings or notices. NRC licensees   licensees or certificate
 and certificate holders with an ATF      holders to notify NRC, should
 federal firearms license (FFL) and/or    the licensee or certificate
 enhanced weapons shall notify the NRC,   holder receive any adverse
 in accordance with Sec.   73.4, of       findings based upon an ATF
 instances involving any adverse ATF      inspection, audit, or review
 findings or ATF notices related to       of the enhanced weapons
 their FFL or such weapons.               possessed by the licensee or
                                          certificate holder under an
                                          ATF FFL. This would allow the
                                          NRC to appropriately respond
                                          to any public or media
                                          inquiries associated with such
                                          findings in a timely manner.
Sec.   73.2 Definitions................  Three new definitions would be
                                          added to this section as
                                          conforming changes supporting
                                          the new Sec.  Sec.   73.18 and
                                          73.19 that would include:
                                          covered weapon, enhanced
                                          weapon, and standard weapon.
                                          The NRC would use these three
                                          terms to envelope the weapons,
                                          ammunition, and devices listed
                                          under section 161A of the AEA.

[[Page 62684]]

 
                                         Other new definitions that
                                          would be added as conforming
                                          changes to this section in
                                          support of other regulations
                                          (e.g., safety/security
                                          interface and target set) are
                                          discussed in other tables in
                                          this proposed rule.
Covered weapon means any handgun,        A definition for covered weapon
 rifle, shotgun, short-barreled           would be used as an overall
 shotgun, short-barreled rifle, semi-     term to encompass the firearms
 automatic assault weapon, machinegun,    (weapons), ammunition, and
 ammunition for any such gun or weapon,   devices listed in section
 or large capacity ammunition feeding     161A. The meanings of the
 device as specified under section 161A   specific terms for the
 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as     firearms, ammunition, or
 amended. As used here, the terms         devices encompassed within
 ``handgun, rifle, shotgun, short-        this definition would have the
 barreled shotgun, short-barreled         same meaning for those terms
 rifle, semi-automatic assault weapon,    as is those found under Title
 machinegun, ammunition, or large         18 of the United States Code,
 capacity ammunition feeding device''     Section 921(a) [18 U.S.C.
 have the same meaning as set forth for   921(a)].
 those terms under 18 U.S.C. 921(a).
 Covered weapons include both enhanced
 weapons and standard weapons. However,
 enhanced weapons do not include
 standard weapons.
Enhanced weapon means any short-         Definitions for enhanced weapon
 barreled shotgun, short-barreled         and standard weapon would be
 rifle, or machinegun. Enhanced weapons   added to support the differing
 do not include destructive devices,      scope of these new sections.
 including explosives or weapons          The relationship between
 greater than 50 caliber (i.e., weapons   covered weapon, enhanced
 with a bore greater than 1.27 cm [0.5    weapon, and standard weapon
 in] diameter).                           would be explained.
Standard weapon means any handgun,       Also, the definition for
 rifle, shotgun, semi-automatic assault   enhanced weapons would not
 weapon, or a large capacity ammunition   include destructive devices as
 feeding device.                          defined under ATF's
                                          regulations, since the NRC's
                                          authority under section 161A
                                          of the AEA does not permit
                                          licensees or certificate
                                          holders to possess destructive
                                          devices.
------------------------------------------------------------------------


                     Table 2.--Part 73 Section 73.55
 [Requirements for physical protection of licensed activities in nuclear
              power reactors against radiological sabotage]
------------------------------------------------------------------------
      Current language          Proposed language      Considerations
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Requirements for physical     Requirements for      This title would be
 protection of licensed        physical protection   retained.
 activities in nuclear power   of licensed
 reactors against              activities in
 radiological sabotage.        nuclear power
                               reactors against
                               radiological
                               sabotage.
                              (a) Introduction....  This header would be
                                                     added for
                                                     formatting
                                                     purposes.
Sec.   73.55 By December 2,   (a)(1) By [date--180  This requirement
 1986, each licensee, as       days--after the       would be added to
 appropriate, shall submit     effective date of     discuss the types
 proposed amendments to its    the final rule        of Commission
 security plan which define    published in the      licensees to whom
 how the amended               Federal Register],    the proposed
 requirements of Paragraphs    each nuclear power    requirements of
 (a), (d)(7), (d)(9), and      reactor licensee,     this section would
 (e)(1) will be met.           licensed under 10     apply and the
                               CFR part 50, shall    schedule for
                               incorporate the       submitting the
                               revised               amended security
                               requirements of       plans. The
                               this section          Commission intends
                               through amendments    to delete the
                               to its Commission-    current language,
                               approved Physical     because it applies
                               Security Plan,        only to a past rule
                               Training and          change that is
                               Qualification Plan,   completed. The
                               and Safeguards        proposed
                               Contingency Plan,     requirements of
                               referred to           this section would
                               collectively as       be applicable to
                               ``approved security   decommissioned/ing
                               plans,'' and shall    reactors unless
                               submit the amended    otherwise exempted.
                               security plans to
                               the Commission for
                               review and approval.
Sec.   73.55 Each submittal   (a)(2) The amended    This requirement
 must include a proposed       security plans must   would be added to
 implementation schedule for   be submitted as       provide a reference
 Commission approval.          specified in Sec.     to the current Sec.
                               50.4 of this            50.4(b)(4) which
                               chapter and must      describes
                               describe how the      procedural details
                               revised               relative to the
                               requirements of       proposed security
                               this section will     plan submission
                               be implemented by     requirement.
                               the licensee, to
                               include a proposed
                               implementation
                               schedule.
Sec.   73.55 The amended      (a)(3) The licensee   This requirement
 safeguards requirements of    shall implement the   would be added to
 these paragraphs must be      existing approved     clarify that the
 implemented by the licensee   security plans and    licensee must
 within 180 days after         associated            continue to
 Commission approval of the    Commission orders     implement the
 proposed security plan in     until Commission      current Commission-
 accordance with the           approval of the       approved security
 approved schedule.            amended security      plans until the
                               plans, unless         Commission approves
                               otherwise             the amended plans.
                               authorized by the     The phrase ``unless
                               Commission.           otherwise
                                                     authorized by the
                                                     Commission'' would
                                                     provide flexibility
                                                     to account for
                                                     unanticipated
                                                     situations that may
                                                     affect the
                                                     licensee's ability
                                                     to comply with this
                                                     proposed
                                                     requirement.

[[Page 62685]]

 
Sec.   73.55(b)(1)(i) The     (a)(4) The licensee   This requirement
 licensee is responsible to    is responsible for    would retain the
 the Commission for            maintaining the       current requirement
 maintaining safeguards in     onsite physical       that the licensee
 accordance with Commission    protection program    is responsible for
 regulations and the           in accordance with    meeting Commission
 licensee's security plan.     Commission            regulations and the
                               regulations and       approved security
                               related Commission-   plans. The phrase
                               directed orders       ``through the
                               through the           implementation of
                               implementation of     the approved
                               the approved          security plans and
                               security plans and    site implementing
                               site implementing     procedures'' would
                               procedures.           be added to
                                                     describe the
                                                     relationship
                                                     between Commission
                                                     regulations, the
                                                     approved security
                                                     plans, and
                                                     implementing
                                                     procedures. The
                                                     word ``safeguards''
                                                     would be replaced
                                                     with the phrase
                                                     ``physical
                                                     protection
                                                     program'' to more
                                                     accurately focus
                                                     this requirement to
                                                     the security
                                                     program rather than
                                                     the broad
                                                     ``safeguards''
                                                     which includes
                                                     safety.
                                                    The Commission views
                                                     the approved
                                                     security plans as
                                                     the mechanism
                                                     through which the
                                                     licensee meets
                                                     Commission
                                                     requirements
                                                     through
                                                     implementation,
                                                     therefore, the
                                                     licensee is
                                                     responsible to the
                                                     Commission for this
                                                     performance.
                              (a)(5) Applicants     This requirement
                               for an operating      would be added to
                               license under the     describe the
                               provisions of part    proposed
                               50 of this chapter,   requirements for
                               or holders of a       applicants and to
                               combined license      specify that these
                               under the             proposed
                               provisions of part    requirements must
                               52 of this chapter,   be met before an
                               shall satisfy the     applicant's receipt
                               requirements of       of special nuclear
                               this section before   material in the
                               the receipt of        form of fuel
                               special nuclear       assemblies.
                               material in the
                               form of fuel
                               assemblies.
                              (a)(6) For licenses   This requirement
                               issued after          would be added to
                               [effective date of    describe the
                               this rule],           Commission
                               licensees shall       expectations for
                               design, construct,    new reactors. Based
                               and equip the         on changes to the
                               central alarm         threat environment
                               station and           the Commission has
                               secondary alarm       determined that the
                               station to            functions required
                               equivalent            to be performed by
                               standards.            the central alarm
                                                     station are a
                                                     critical element of
                                                     the licensee
                                                     capability to
                                                     satisfy the
                                                     performance
                                                     objective and
                                                     requirements of the
                                                     proposed paragraph
                                                     (b) of this
                                                     section.
                                                    Therefore, to ensure
                                                     that these critical
                                                     capabilities are
                                                     maintained, the
                                                     Commission has
                                                     determined that
                                                     this proposed
                                                     requirement would
                                                     be a prudent and
                                                     necessary measure
                                                     to ensure the
                                                     licensee's ability
                                                     to summon
                                                     assistance or
                                                     otherwise respond
                                                     to an alarm as is
                                                     currently required
                                                     by Sec.
                                                     73.55(e)(1) and
                                                     therefore satisfy
                                                     the performance
                                                     objective and
                                                     requirements of the
                                                     proposed paragraph
                                                     (b) of this
                                                     section.
                              (a)(6)(i) Licensees   This requirement
                               shall apply the       would be added for
                               requirements for      consistency with
                               the central alarm     and clarification
                               station listed in     of the proposed
                               paragraphs            requirement of
                               (e)(6)(v),            paragraph (a)(6) of
                               (e)(7)(iii), and      this section. The
                               (i)(8)(ii) of this    Commission has
                               section to the        determined that
                               secondary alarm       these construction
                               station as well as    standards that were
                               the central alarm     previously applied
                               station.              to only the central
                                                     alarm station
                                                     should also be
                                                     built into the
                                                     secondary alarm
                                                     station for new
                                                     reactor licensees.
                              (a)(6)(ii) Licensees  This requirement
                               shall comply with     would be added for
                               the requirements of   consistency with
                               paragraph (i)(4) of   and clarification
                               this section such     of the proposed
                               that both alarm       requirement of
                               stations are          paragraph (i)(4) of
                               provided with         this section and to
                               equivalent            clarify that for
                               capabilities for      new reactors, both
                               detection,            the central and
                               assessment,           secondary alarm
                               monitoring,           stations must be
                               observation,          provided
                               surveillance, and     ``equivalent
                               communications.       capabilities'' and
                                                     not simply
                                                     equivalent
                                                     ``functional''
                                                     capabilities as is
                                                     stated in the
                                                     proposed paragraph
                                                     (i)(4) of this
                                                     section. The
                                                     Commission has
                                                     determined that
                                                     these capabilities
                                                     must be equivalent
                                                     for new reactors to
                                                     ensure that the
                                                     secondary alarm
                                                     station is
                                                     redundant to the
                                                     central alarm
                                                     station.

[[Page 62686]]

 
Sec.   73.55(a) General       (b) General           This header would be
 performance objective and     performance           retained. The
 requirements.                 objective and         proposed
                               requirements.         requirements of
                                                     this section are
                                                     intended to
                                                     represent the
                                                     general outline for
                                                     a physical
                                                     protection program
                                                     that would provide
                                                     an acceptable level
                                                     of protection if
                                                     effectively
                                                     implemented. The
                                                     proposed actions,
                                                     standards,
                                                     criteria, and
                                                     requirements of
                                                     this section are
                                                     intended to be
                                                     bounded by the
                                                     description of the
                                                     design basis threat
                                                     identified by the
                                                     Commission in Sec.
                                                      73.1.
Sec.   73.55(a) The licensee  (b)(1) The licensee   This requirement
 shall establish and           shall establish and   would retain the
 maintain an onsite physical   maintain a physical   current performance
 protection system and         protection program,   objective of Sec.
 security organization which   to include a          73.55(a) with two
 will have as its objective    security              minor changes.
 to provide high assurance     organization which    First, the phrase
 that activities involving     will have as its      ``an onsite
 special nuclear material      objective to          physical protection
 are not inimical to the       provide high          system'' would be
 common defense and security   assurance that        replaced with the
 and do not constitute an      activities            phrase ``a physical
 unreasonable risk to the      involving special     protection
 public health and safety.     nuclear material      program'' to more
                               are not inimical to   clearly state the
                               the common defense    Commission's view
                               and security and do   that the physical
                               not constitute an     protection system
                               unreasonable risk     elements described
                               to the public         in this proposed
                               health and safety.    rule combine to
                                                     make the licensee
                                                     physical protection
                                                     program. Second,
                                                     the word ``and''
                                                     would be replaced
                                                     with the phrase
                                                     ``to include a'' to
                                                     clarify the
                                                     Commission's view
                                                     that the security
                                                     organization is not
                                                     considered to be
                                                     independent of the
                                                     licensee physical
                                                     protection program
                                                     but rather, is a
                                                     component of that
                                                     program.
Sec.   73.55(a) The physical  (b)(2) The physical   This requirement
 protection system shall be    protection program    would contain a
 designed to protect against   must be designed to   substantial
 the design basis threat of    detect, assess,       revision to provide
 radiological sabotage as      intercept,            a more detailed and
 stated in Sec.   73.1(a).     challenge, delay,     performance based
Sec.   73.55(h)(4)(iii)(A)     and neutralize        requirement for the
 Requiring responding guards   threats up to and     design of the
 or other armed response       including the         licensee physical
 personnel to interpose        design basis threat   protection program.
 themselves * * *..            of radiological       Most significantly,
                               sabotage as stated    the word
                               in Sec.   73.1(a),    ``interpose'' would
                               at all times.         be replaced with
                                                     the words ``detect,
                                                     assess, intercept,
                                                     challenge, delay,
                                                     and neutralize''.
                                                     The current
                                                     requirement of Sec.
 
                                                     73.55(h)(4)(iii)(A)
                                                     requires the
                                                     licensee to
                                                     ``interpose'' for
                                                     the purpose of
                                                     preventing
                                                     radiological
                                                     sabotage, however,
                                                     the definition of
                                                     ``radiological
                                                     sabotage'' stated
                                                     in Sec.   73.2 does
                                                     not contain a
                                                     performance based
                                                     element by which
                                                     the Commission can
                                                     measure this
                                                     capability and
                                                     therefore, this
                                                     proposed
                                                     requirement would
                                                     provide the six
                                                     performance based
                                                     elements or
                                                     capabilities
                                                     ``detect, assess,
                                                     intercept,
                                                     challenge, delay,
                                                     and neutralize.''
                                                     The first element,
                                                     ``detect'', would
                                                     be provided through
                                                     the use of
                                                     detection
                                                     equipment, patrols,
                                                     access controls,
                                                     and other program
                                                     elements required
                                                     by this proposed
                                                     rule and would
                                                     provide
                                                     notification to the
                                                     licensee that a
                                                     potential threat is
                                                     present and where
                                                     the threat is
                                                     located.

[[Page 62687]]

 
                                                    The second element,
                                                     ``assess'', would
                                                     provide a mechanism
                                                     through which the
                                                     licensee would
                                                     identify the nature
                                                     of the threat
                                                     detected. This
                                                     would be
                                                     accomplished
                                                     through the use of
                                                     video equipment,
                                                     patrols, and other
                                                     program elements
                                                     that would be
                                                     required by this
                                                     proposed rule and
                                                     would provide the
                                                     licensee with
                                                     information about
                                                     the threat upon
                                                     which the licensee
                                                     would determine how
                                                     to respond. The
                                                     third, fourth, and
                                                     fifth elements
                                                     would comprise the
                                                     component actions
                                                     of response and
                                                     would be provided
                                                     by personnel
                                                     trained and
                                                     equipped in
                                                     accordance with a
                                                     response strategy.
                                                     The third element
                                                     ``intercept'' would
                                                     be the act of
                                                     placing a person at
                                                     an intersecting
                                                     defensive position
                                                     directly in the
                                                     path of advancement
                                                     taken by the
                                                     threat, and between
                                                     the threat and the
                                                     protected target or
                                                     target set element.
                                                     The fourth element
                                                     ``challenge'' would
                                                     be to verbally or
                                                     physically confront
                                                     the threat to
                                                     impede, halt, or
                                                     otherwise interact
                                                     with the threat
                                                     with the intent of
                                                     preventing further
                                                     advancement of the
                                                     threat towards the
                                                     protected target or
                                                     target set element.
                                                    The fifth element
                                                     ``delay'' would be
                                                     to take necessary
                                                     actions to counter
                                                     any attempt by the
                                                     threat to advance
                                                     towards the
                                                     protected target or
                                                     target set element.
                                                     The sixth element
                                                     ``neutralize''
                                                     would be to place
                                                     the threat in a
                                                     condition from
                                                     which the threat no
                                                     longer has the
                                                     potential to, or
                                                     capability of,
                                                     doing harm to the
                                                     protected item. The
                                                     Commission does not
                                                     intend to suggest
                                                     that the action,
                                                     ``neutralize'',
                                                     would require the
                                                     application of
                                                     ``deadly force'' in
                                                     all instances. The
                                                     phrase ``threat of
                                                     radiological
                                                     sabotage'' would be
                                                     replaced with the
                                                     phrase ``threats up
                                                     to and including
                                                     the design basis
                                                     threat of
                                                     radiological
                                                     sabotage'' to
                                                     clarify the
                                                     Commission's view
                                                     that the licensee
                                                     must provide
                                                     protection against
                                                     any element of the
                                                     design basis
                                                     threat, to include
                                                     those that do not
                                                     rise to the full
                                                     capability of the
                                                     design basis
                                                     threat.

[[Page 62688]]

 
Sec.   73.55(a) To achieve    (b)(3) The licensee   This requirement
 this general performance      physical protection   would retain and
 objective, the onsite         program must be       revise two current
 physical protection system    designed and          requirements to
 and security organization     implemented to        provide a
 must include, but not         satisfy the           performance based
 necessarily be limited to,    requirements of       requirement for the
 the capabilities to meet      this section and      design of the
 the specific requirements     ensure that no        physical protection
 contained in paragraphs (b)   single act, as        program. The first
 through (h) of this section.  bounded by the        significant
Sec.   73.55(e)(1) * * * so    design basis          revision would
 that a single act cannot      threat, can disable   expand the current
 remove the capability of      the personnel,        requirement for
 calling for assistance or     equipment, or         alarm stations to
 otherwise responding to an    systems necessary     be protected
 alarm..                       to prevent            against a single
                               significant core      act, and would
                               damage and spent      require that the
                               fuel sabotage.        licensee physical
                                                     protection program
                                                     be designed to
                                                     ensure that a
                                                     single act can not
                                                     disable the
                                                     personnel,
                                                     equipment, or
                                                     systems necessary
                                                     to prevent
                                                     significant core
                                                     damage and spent
                                                     fuel sabotage which
                                                     would result in the
                                                     loss of the
                                                     capability to
                                                     prevent
                                                     radiological
                                                     sabotage. The
                                                     Commission's view
                                                     is that because of
                                                     changes to the
                                                     threat environment,
                                                     it is necessary to
                                                     emphasize the
                                                     ``remove the
                                                     capability''
                                                     requirement of the
                                                     current Sec.
                                                     73.55(e)(1) such
                                                     that the single act
                                                     protection
                                                     requirement would
                                                     apply to personnel,
                                                     equipment, and
                                                     systems required to
                                                     perform specific
                                                     functions that if
                                                     disabled would
                                                     remove the licensee
                                                     capability to
                                                     prevent
                                                     radiological
                                                     sabotage. The
                                                     second significant
                                                     revision would
                                                     provide a
                                                     measurable and
                                                     performance based
                                                     requirement against
                                                     which the
                                                     Commission would
                                                     measure the
                                                     effectiveness of
                                                     the licensee's
                                                     physical protection
                                                     program to prevent
                                                     radiological
                                                     sabotage.
                                                    The Commission's
                                                     view is that the
                                                     goal of the
                                                     licensee's physical
                                                     protection program
                                                     must include an
                                                     acceptable safety
                                                     margin to assure
                                                     that the
                                                     performance
                                                     objective of public
                                                     health and safety
                                                     is met. This safety
                                                     margin would be
                                                     established by
                                                     designing and
                                                     implementing a
                                                     physical protection
                                                     program that
                                                     protects against
                                                     radiological
                                                     sabotage by
                                                     preventing
                                                     significant core
                                                     damage and spent
                                                     fuel sabotage which
                                                     describes the
                                                     undesirable
                                                     consequences that
                                                     could result from
                                                     the destruction of
                                                     a target set or all
                                                     elements of a
                                                     target set and
                                                     would be a
                                                     precursor to
                                                     radiological
                                                     sabotage. The
                                                     Commission's view
                                                     is that significant
                                                     damage to the core
                                                     or sabotage to
                                                     spent fuel would
                                                     result in a
                                                     condition in which
                                                     the performance
                                                     objective of ``High
                                                     Assurance'' could
                                                     no longer be
                                                     provided and
                                                     therefore,
                                                     prevention of
                                                     significant core
                                                     damage and spent
                                                     fuel sabotage are a
                                                     measurable
                                                     performance
                                                     criteria against
                                                     which the
                                                     Commission would
                                                     evaluate the
                                                     effectiveness of
                                                     the licensee
                                                     physical protection
                                                     program.

[[Page 62689]]

 
                                                    The phrase ``as
                                                     bounded by the
                                                     design basis
                                                     threat'' would be
                                                     used to clarify the
                                                     Commission's view
                                                     that the licensee
                                                     must ensure that
                                                     the physical
                                                     protection program
                                                     is designed to
                                                     protect against the
                                                     design basis threat
                                                     and all other
                                                     threats that do not
                                                     rise to the level
                                                     of the design basis
                                                     threat. The phrase
                                                     ``the capabilities
                                                     to meet the
                                                     specific
                                                     requirements
                                                     contained in
                                                     paragraphs (b)
                                                     through (h) of this
                                                     section'' would be
                                                     replaced by the
                                                     phase ``implemented
                                                     to satisfy the
                                                     requirements of
                                                     this section'' to
                                                     account for the
                                                     reformatting of
                                                     this proposed rule
                                                     and to describe the
                                                     Commission view
                                                     that the licensee
                                                     is responsible to
                                                     implement
                                                     Commission
                                                     requirements
                                                     through the
                                                     approved security
                                                     plans and
                                                     procedures.
                              (b)(4) The physical   This requirement
                               protection program    would be added to
                               must include          apply defense-in-
                               diverse and           depth concepts as
                               redundant             part of the
                               equipment, systems,   physical protection
                               technology,           program to ensure
                               programs,             the capability to
                               supporting            meet the
                               processes, and        performance
                               implementing          objective of the
                               procedures.           proposed paragraph
                                                     (b)(1) of this
                                                     section is
                                                     maintained in the
                                                     changing threat
                                                     environment. The
                                                     terms ``diverse and
                                                     redundant'' are
                                                     intended to
                                                     describe defense-in-
                                                     depth in a
                                                     performance based
                                                     manner and would be
                                                     a critical element
                                                     for meeting the
                                                     proposed
                                                     requirement for
                                                     protection against
                                                     a single act
                                                     described in the
                                                     proposed paragraph
                                                     (b)(3) of this
                                                     section.
Sec.   73.55(b)(4)(i) Upon    (b)(5) Upon the       This requirement
 the request of an             request of an         would retain the
 authorized representative     authorized            current requirement
 of the Commission, the        representative of     for demonstration
 licensee shall demonstrate    the Commission, the   and would contain
 the ability of the physical   licensee shall        minor revisions to
 security personnel to carry   demonstrate the       apply this
 out their assigned duties     ability to meet       requirement to the
 and responsibilities.         Commission            licensee's ability
                               requirements          to implement the
                               through the           physical protection
                               implementation of     program and not be
                               the physical          limited to only the
                               protection program,   ability of security
                               including the         personnel to carry
                               ability of armed      out their duties.
                               and unarmed           This proposed
                               personnel to          requirement would
                               perform assigned      clarify the
                               duties and            Commission's view
                               responsibilities      that the licensee
                               required by the       must also
                               approved security     demonstrate the
                               plans and licensee    effectiveness of
                               procedures.           plans, procedures,
                                                     and equipment to
                                                     accomplish their
                                                     intended function
                                                     within the physical
                                                     protection program.
                              (b)(6) The licensee   This requirement
                               shall establish and   would be added to
                               maintain a written    specify that this
                               performance           performance
                               evaluation program    evaluation program
                               in accordance with    would be the
                               appendix B and        mechanism by which
                               appendix C to this    the licensee would
                               part, to              demonstrate the
                               demonstrate and       capabilities
                               assess the            described by the
                               effectiveness of      performance based
                               armed responders      requirements of the
                               and armed security    proposed paragraphs
                               officers to perform   (b)(2) through (4)
                               their assigned        of this section.
                               duties and            The phrase ``target
                               responsibilities to   sets'' would be
                               protect target sets   used consistent
                               described in          with the proposed
                               paragraph (f) of      (b)(3) of this
                               this section and      section to describe
                               appendix C to this    the combination of
                               part, through         equipment and
                               implementation of     operator actions
                               the licensee          which, if all are
                               protective strategy.  prevented from
                                                     performing their
                                                     intended safety
                                                     function or
                                                     prevented from
                                                     being accomplished,
                                                     would likely result
                                                     in significant core
                                                     damage (e.g., non-
                                                     incipient, non-
                                                     localized fuel
                                                     melting, and/or
                                                     core disruption)
                                                     barring
                                                     extraordinary
                                                     action by plant
                                                     operators.
                                                    A target set with
                                                     respect to spent
                                                     fuel sabotage is
                                                     draining the spent
                                                     fuel pool leaving
                                                     the spent fuel
                                                     uncovered for a
                                                     period of time,
                                                     allowing spent fuel
                                                     heat up and the
                                                     associated
                                                     potential for
                                                     release of fission
                                                     products.

[[Page 62690]]

 
Sec.   73.55(d)(7) The        (b)(7) The licensee   This requirement
 licensee shall:               shall establish,      would be retained
(i) Establish an access        maintain, and         and revised to
 authorization system * * *.   follow an access      require the
                               authorization         licensee to provide
                               program in            an Access
                               accordance with       Authorization
                               Sec.   73.56.         Program.
                              (b)(7)(i) In          This proposed
                               addition to the       requirement would
                               access                be added to
                               authorization         establish the
                               program required      insider mitigation
                               above, and the        program (IMP). The
                               fitness-for-duty      licensee's IMP
                               program required in   should integrate
                               part 26 of this       specific elements
                               chapter, each         of the licensee AA
                               licensee shall        and FFD programs to
                               develop, implement,   focus those
                               and maintain an       elements on
                               insider mitigation    identifying
                               program.              potential insider
                                                     threats and denying
                                                     the opportunity for
                                                     an insider to gain
                                                     or retain access at
                                                     an NRC licensed
                                                     facility.
                              (b)(7)(ii) The        This proposed
                               insider mitigation    requirement would
                               program must be       be added to provide
                               designed to oversee   a performance based
                               and monitor the       requirement for the
                               initial and           design and content
                               continuing            of the IMP. The
                               trustworthiness and   Commission has
                               reliability of        concluded that, by
                               individuals granted   itself, the initial
                               or retaining          determination of
                               unescorted access     trustworthiness and
                               authorization to a    reliability is not
                               protected or vital    adequate to
                               area and implement    minimize the
                               defense-in-depth      potential
                               methodologies to      opportunity for an
                               minimize the          insider to gain or
                               potential for an      retain access, and
                               insider to            that only through
                               adversely affect,     continual re-
                               either directly or    evaluation of the
                               indirectly, the       information
                               licensee capability   obtained through
                               to prevent            these processes can
                               significant core      the licensee
                               damage or spent       provide the level
                               fuel sabotage.        of assurance
                                                     necessary. The
                                                     Commission has also
                                                     determined that
                                                     defense-in-depth
                                                     would be provided
                                                     through the
                                                     integration of
                                                     physical protection
                                                     measures with
                                                     access
                                                     authorization and
                                                     fitness-for-duty
                                                     program elements,
                                                     to ensure the
                                                     licensee capability
                                                     to identify and
                                                     mitigate the
                                                     potential
                                                     activities of an
                                                     insider, such as,
                                                     but not limited to,
                                                     tampering. The
                                                     Commission does not
                                                     intend that a
                                                     licensee would
                                                     limit the IMP to
                                                     any one or more
                                                     elements, but
                                                     rather that the
                                                     licensee would
                                                     identify and add
                                                     additional elements
                                                     as necessary to
                                                     ensure the site's
                                                     IMP satisfies the
                                                     performance
                                                     requirements
                                                     specified by the
                                                     Commission.
                                                    The Commission has
                                                     determined that no
                                                     one element of the
                                                     physical protection
                                                     program, access
                                                     authorization
                                                     program, or fitness-
                                                     for-duty program
                                                     would, by itself,
                                                     provide the level
                                                     of protection
                                                     against the insider
                                                     necessary to meet
                                                     the performance
                                                     objective of the
                                                     proposed paragraph
                                                     (b) and therefore,
                                                     the effective
                                                     integration of
                                                     these three
                                                     programs is a
                                                     necessary
                                                     requirement to
                                                     achieve defense-in-
                                                     depth against the
                                                     potential insider.
                              (b)(8) The licensee   This requirement
                               shall ensure that     would be added to
                               its corrective        provide a
                               action program        performance based
                               assures that          requirement to
                               failures,             ensure that the
                               malfunctions,         licensee implements
                               deficiencies,         and completes the
                               deviations,           required corrective
                               defective equipment   actions in a timely
                               and nonconformances   manner and that
                               in security program   actions would be
                               components,           taken to correct
                               functions, or         the cause of the
                               personnel are         problem to ensure
                               promptly identified   that the problem
                               and corrected.        would not be
                               Measures shall        repeated.
                               ensure that the
                               cause of any of
                               these conditions is
                               determined and that
                               corrective action
                               is taken to
                               preclude repetition.
                              (c) Security plans..  This header would be
                                                     added for
                                                     formatting
                                                     purposes.
                              (c)(1) Licensee       This requirement
                               security plans.       would be added to
                               Licensee security     describe the
                               plans must            purpose of the
                               implement             licensee Physical
                               Commission            Security Plan,
                               requirements and      Training and
                               must describe:        Qualification Plan,
                                                     and Safeguards
                                                     Contingency Plan in
                                                     a performance based
                                                     requirement and to
                                                     introduce the
                                                     general types of
                                                     information to be
                                                     discussed.

[[Page 62691]]

 
                              (c)(1)(i) How the     This requirement
                               physical protection   would be added to
                               program will          describe the
                               prevent significant   performance based
                               core damage and       requirement to be
                               spent fuel sabotage   met by the physical
                               through the           protection program
                               establishment and     and the basic
                               maintenance of a      elements of the
                               security              system that must be
                               organization, the     described in the
                               use of security       security plans.
                               equipment and
                               technology, the
                               training and
                               qualification of
                               security personnel,
                               and the
                               implementation of
                               predetermined
                               response plans and
                               strategies; and
                              (c)(1)(ii) Site-      This requirement
                               specific conditions   would be added to
                               that affect           reflect the
                               implementation of     Commission's view
                               Commission            that licensees must
                               requirements.         focus attention on
                                                     site-specific
                                                     conditions in the
                                                     development and
                                                     implementation of
                                                     site plans,
                                                     procedures,
                                                     processes, response
                                                     strategies, and
                                                     ultimately, the
                                                     licensee capability
                                                     to achieve the
                                                     performance
                                                     objective of the
                                                     proposed paragraph
                                                     (b)(1) of this
                                                     section.
                              (c)(2) Protection of  This requirement
                               security plans. The   would be added to
                               licensee shall        emphasize the
                               protect the           requirements for
                               approved security     the protection of
                               plans and other       safeguards
                               related safeguards    information in
                               information against   accordance with the
                               unauthorized          requirements of
                               disclosure in         Sec.   73.21.
                               accordance with the
                               requirements of
                               Sec.   73.21.
                              (c)(3) Physical       This header would be
                               security plan.        added for
                                                     formatting
                                                     purposes.
                              (c)(3)(i) The         This requirement
                               licensee shall        would be added to
                               establish,            specify the
                               maintain, and         requirement for a
                               implement a           physical security
                               Commission-approved   plan.
                               physical security
                               plan that describes
                               how the performance
                               objective and
                               requirements set
                               forth in this
                               section will be
                               implemented.
                              (c)(3)(ii) The        This requirement
                               physical security     would be added to
                               plan must describe    describe the
                               the facility          general content of
                               location and          the physical
                               layout, the           security plan and
                               security              specify the general
                               organization and      types of
                               structure, duties     information to be
                               and                   addressed. Because
                               responsibilities of   the specifics of
                               personnel, defense-   defense-in-depth
                               in-depth              required by the
                               implementation that   proposed Sec.
                               describes             73.55(b)(4) would
                               components,           vary from site-to-
                               equipment and         site, the terms
                               technology used.      ``components,''
                                                     ``equipment'' and
                                                     ``technology''
                                                     would be used to
                                                     provide
                                                     flexibility.
                              (c)(4) Training and   This header would be
                               qualification plan.   added for
                                                     formatting
                                                     purposes.
Sec.   73.55(b)(4)(ii) Each   (c)(4)(i) The         This requirement
 licensee shall establish,     licensee shall        would retain and
 maintain, and follow an NRC-  establish,            separate two
 approved training and         maintain, and         current
 qualifications plan * * *.    follow a Commission-  requirements of
                               approved training     Sec.
                               and qualification     73.55(b)(4)(ii).
                               plan that describes   This proposed
                               how the criteria      requirement would
                               set forth in          require the
                               appendix B            licensee to provide
                               ``General Criteria    a training and
                               for Security          qualification plan.
                               Personnel,'' to
                               this part will be
                               implemented.
Sec.   73.55(b)(4)(ii) * * *  (c)(4)(ii) The        This requirement
 outlining the processes by    training and          would retain the
 which guards, watchmen,       qualification plan    requirement for the
 armed response persons, and   must describe the     licensee to outline
 other members of the          process by which      the processes in
 security organization will    armed and unarmed     this plan with
 be selected, trained,         security personnel,   minor revisions.
 equipped, tested, and         watchpersons, and     The phrase
 qualified to ensure that      other members of      ``guards, watchmen,
 these individuals meet the    the security          armed response
 requirements of this          organization will     persons'' would be
 paragraph.                    be selected,          replaced by the
                               trained, equipped,    phrase ``armed and
                               tested, qualified,    unarmed security
                               and re-qualified to   personnel,
                               ensure that these     watchpersons'' to
                               individuals possess   generically
                               and maintain the      identify all
                               knowledge, skills,    members of the
                               and abilities         security
                               required to carry     organization. The
                               out their assigned    Commission does not
                               duties and            intend that
                               responsibilities      administrative
                               effectively.          staff be included
                                                     except as these
                                                     personnel would be
                                                     used to perform
                                                     duties required to
                                                     detect, assess,
                                                     intercept,
                                                     challenge, delay,
                                                     and neutralize a
                                                     threat, to include
                                                     compensatory
                                                     measures used to
                                                     maintain these
                                                     capabilities in the
                                                     event of a failed
                                                     component.

[[Page 62692]]

 
                                                    The phrase ``meet
                                                     the requirements of
                                                     this paragraph''
                                                     would be replaced
                                                     by the phrase
                                                     ``possess the
                                                     knowledge, skills,
                                                     and abilities
                                                     required to
                                                     effectively carry
                                                     out their assigned
                                                     duties and
                                                     responsibilities''
                                                     to clarify that the
                                                     focus of this
                                                     proposed
                                                     requirement would
                                                     be to ensure these
                                                     individuals possess
                                                     these capabilities.
                              (c)(5) Safeguards     This header would be
                               contingency plan.     added for
                                                     formatting
                                                     purposes.
Sec.   73.55(h)(1)            (c)(5)(i) The         This requirement
 Safeguards contingency        licensee shall        would retain the
 plans must be in accordance   establish,            current requirement
 with the criteria in          maintain, and         of Sec.
 appendix C to this part,      implement a           73.55(h)(1) to
 ``Licensee Safeguards         Commission-approved   provide a
 Contingency Plans''.          safeguards            safeguards
                               contingency plan      contingency plan
                               that describes how    with minor
                               the criteria set      revisions. Most
                               forth in section II   significantly, the
                               of appendix C,        reference to
                               ``Licensee            appendix C to part
                               Safeguards            73 would be revised
                               Contingency           to reflect the
                               Plans,'' to this      reformatting of the
                               part will be          proposed appendix C
                               implemented.          to part 73 which
                                                     would have a
                                                     section II that
                                                     applies only to
                                                     power reactors.
                              (c)(5)(ii) The        This requirement
                               safeguards            would be added to
                               contingency plan      generally describe
                               must describe         the content of the
                               predetermined         Safeguards
                               actions, plans, and   Contingency Plan.
                               strategies designed
                               to intercept,
                               challenge, delay,
                               and neutralize
                               threats up to and
                               including the
                               design basis threat
                               of radiological
                               sabotage.
                              (c)(6) Implementing   This header would be
                               procedures.           added for
                                                     formatting
                                                     purposes.
Sec.   73.55(b)(3)(i)         (c)(6)(i) The         This requirement
 Written security procedures   licensee shall        would retain the
 that document the structure   establish,            requirement for
 of the security               maintain, and         written security
 organization and detail the   implement written     procedures with
 duties of guards, watchmen,   procedures that       minor revisions.
 and other individuals         document the          The phrase ``and
 responsible for security.     structure of the      implement
                               security              Commission
                               organization,         requirements
                               detail the specific   through the
                               duties and            approved security
                               responsibilities of   plans'' would be
                               each position, and    added to clarify
                               implement             the requirement
                               Commission            that the licensee
                               requirements          implements
                               through the           Commission
                               approved security     requirements
                               plans.                through procedures
                                                     as well as the
                                                     approved security
                                                     plans.
                              (c)(6)(ii)            This requirement
                               Implementing          would be added to
                               procedures need not   address the current
                               be submitted to the   and proposed
                               Commission for        procedural details
                               prior approval, but   for implementing
                               are subject to        procedures.
                               inspection by the
                               Commission.
                              (c)(6)(iii)           This requirement
                               Implementing          would be added to
                               procedures must       describe the
                               detail the specific   content of
                               actions to be taken   implementing
                               and decisions to be   procedures to
                               made by each          clarify the current
                               position of the       requirement
                               security              ``detail the duties
                               organization to       of guards,
                               implement the         watchmen, and other
                               approved security     individuals
                               plans.                responsible for
                                                     security.''
Sec.   73.55(b)(3) The        (c)(6)(iv) The        This requirement
 licensee shall have a         licensee shall:       would be retained
 management system to                                and would separate
 provide for * * *.                                  the two current
                                                     requirements of
                                                     Sec.   73.55(b)(3)
                                                     with minor
                                                     revisions. The
                                                     phrase ``management
                                                     system'' would be
                                                     replaced with the
                                                     word ``process.''
                                                     The current
                                                     requirement to have
                                                     a management system
                                                     would be addressed
                                                     in the proposed
                                                     Sec.   73.55(d)(2).
Sec.   73.55(b)(3) * * * the  (c)(6)(iv)(A)         This requirement
 development, revision,        Develop, maintain,    would retain the
 implementation, and           enforce, review,      requirement to
 enforcement of security       and revise security   develop, revise,
 procedures.                   implementing          implement, and
                               procedures.           enforce security
                                                     procedures. The
                                                     words ``maintenance
                                                     and review'' would
                                                     be added to clarify
                                                     these tasks as
                                                     necessary
                                                     functions. The word
                                                     ``implementation''
                                                     would be deleted
                                                     because
                                                     implementation is
                                                     addressed in the
                                                     proposed paragraphs
                                                     (c)(6)(i) through
                                                     (iii) of this
                                                     section.
Sec.   73.55(b)(3)(ii)        (c)(6)(iv)(B)         This requirement
 Provision for written         Provide a process     would retain the
 approval of these             for the written       current requirement
 procedures and any            approval of           for written
 revisions to the procedures   implementing          approval with minor
 by the individual with        procedures and        revisions.
 overall responsibility for    revisions by the
 the security functions.       individual with
                               overall
                               responsibility for
                               the security
                               functions.

[[Page 62693]]

 
                              (c)(6)(iv)(C) Ensure  This requirement
                               that changes made     would be added to
                               to implementing       ensure that the
                               procedures do not     licensee process
                               decrease the          for making changes
                               effectiveness of      to implementing
                               any procedure to      procedures includes
                               implement and         a process to ensure
                               satisfy Commission    that changes do not
                               requirements.         result in a
                                                     reduction of
                                                     effectiveness or
                                                     result in a
                                                     conflict with other
                                                     site procedures.
                              (c)(7) Plan           This requirement
                               revisions. The        would be added to
                               licensee shall        outline the three
                               revise approved       methodologies for
                               security plans as     making changes to
                               necessary to ensure   the Commission-
                               the effective         approved security
                               implementation of     plans and clarify
                               Commission            that the licensee
                               regulations and the   would make
                               licensee's            necessary plan
                               protective            changes to account
                               strategy.             for changes to site
                               Commission approval   specific conditions
                               of revisions made     and lessons learned
                               pursuant to this      from implementing
                               paragraph is not      the approved
                               required, provided    security plans.
                               that revisions meet
                               the requirements of
                               Sec.   50.54(p) of
                               this chapter.
                               Changes that are
                               beyond the scope
                               allowed per Sec.
                               50.54(p) of this
                               chapter shall be
                               submitted as
                               required by Sec.
                               Sec.   50.90 of
                               this chapter or
                               Sec.   73.5.
Sec.   73.55(b) Physical      (d) Security          This header would be
 Security Organization.        organization.         retained with a
                                                     minor revision.
Sec.   73.55(b)(1) The        (d)(1) The licensee   This requirement
 licensee shall establish a    shall establish and   would retain the
 security organization,        maintain a security   current requirement
 including guards, to          organization          for a security
 protect his facility          designed, staffed,    organization to
 against radiological          trained, and          protect against
 sabotage.                     equipped to provide   radiological
                               early detection,      sabotage. This
                               assessment, and       proposed
                               response to           requirement would
                               unauthorized          be revised to
                               activities within     describe a more
                               any area of the       performance based
                               facility.             requirement
                                                     consistent with the
                                                     proposed paragraphs
                                                     (b)(2) through (4)
                                                     of this section.
                                                    The phrase
                                                     ``including guards,
                                                     to protect his
                                                     facility against
                                                     radiological
                                                     sabotage'' would be
                                                     replaced with the
                                                     phrase ``designed,
                                                     staffed, trained,
                                                     and equipped to
                                                     provide early
                                                     detection,
                                                     assessment, and
                                                     response to
                                                     unauthorized
                                                     activities'' to
                                                     describe those
                                                     elements of the
                                                     security
                                                     organization needed
                                                     to provide the
                                                     capabilities
                                                     described in the
                                                     proposed paragraph
                                                     (b). The phrase
                                                     ``within any area
                                                     of the facility''
                                                     would be added to
                                                     clarify the
                                                     Commission's
                                                     expectation that
                                                     the licensee must
                                                     implement measures
                                                     consistent with
                                                     site security
                                                     assessments and the
                                                     licensee response
                                                     strategy, to
                                                     facilitate the
                                                     identification of a
                                                     threat before an
                                                     attempt to
                                                     penetrate the
                                                     protected area
                                                     would be made.
Sec.   73.55(b)(3) The        (d)(2) The security   This requirement
 system shall include:         organization must     would be retained
                               include:              with minor
                                                     revisions. The word
                                                     ``system'' would be
                                                     replaced by the
                                                     phrase ``security
                                                     organization.''
                                                     Although, the
                                                     security ``system''
                                                     would include the
                                                     security
                                                     organization, this
                                                     proposed
                                                     requirement focuses
                                                     only on the
                                                     security
                                                     organization.
Sec.   73.55(b)(3) The        (d)(2)(i) A           This requirement
 licensee shall have a         management system     would retain the
 management system * * *.      that provides         requirement for a
                               oversight of the      management system
                               onsite physical       with minor
                               protection program.   revisions. Most
                                                     significantly this
                                                     proposed
                                                     requirement would
                                                     not limit the
                                                     licensee management
                                                     system to only
                                                     provide for the
                                                     development,
                                                     revision,
                                                     implementation, and
                                                     enforcement of
                                                     security procedures
                                                     which are addressed
                                                     in the proposed
                                                     paragraph
                                                     (c)(6)(iv) of this
                                                     section. The
                                                     Commission
                                                     expectation would
                                                     be that the
                                                     licensee management
                                                     system oversees all
                                                     aspects of the
                                                     onsite physical
                                                     protection program
                                                     to ensure the
                                                     effective
                                                     implementation of
                                                     Commission
                                                     requirements
                                                     through the
                                                     approved security
                                                     plans and
                                                     implementing
                                                     procedures.

[[Page 62694]]

 
Sec.   73.55(b)(2) At least   (d)(2)(ii) At least   This requirement
 one full time member of the   one member, onsite    would be retained
 security organization who     and available at      with minor
 has the authority to direct   all times, who has    revisions. The
 the physical protection       the authority to      phrase ``who is
 activities of the security    direct the            assigned no other
 organization shall be         activities of the     duties which would
 onsite at all times.          security              interfere with''
                               organization and      would be added to
                               who is assigned no    ensure that the
                               other duties that     designated
                               would interfere       individual would
                               with this             not be assigned any
                               individual's          duties that would
                               ability to perform    prevent or
                               these duties in       interfere with the
                               accordance with the   ability to direct
                               approved security     these activities
                               plans and licensee    when needed.
                               protective strategy.
Sec.   73.55(b)(4)(i) The     (d)(3) The licensee   This requirement
 licensee may not permit an    may not permit any    would be retained
 individual to act as a        individual to act     with minor
 guard, watchman, armed        as a member of the    revisions.
 response person, or other     security
 member of the security        organization unless
 organization unless the       the individual has
 individual has been           been trained,
 trained, equipped, and        equipped, and
 qualified to perform each     qualified to
 assigned security job duty    perform assigned
 in accordance with appendix   duties and
 B, ``General Criteria for     responsibilities in
 Security Personnel,'' to      accordance with the
 this part.                    requirements of
                               appendix B to part
                               73 and the
                               Commission-approved
                               training and
                               qualification plan.
                              (d)(4) The licensee   This requirement
                               may not assign an     would be added to
                               individual to any     clarify the
                               position involving    prerequisite
                               detection,            qualifications for
                               assessment, or        assignment to any
                               response to           position involving
                               unauthorized          a function upon
                               activities unless     which detection,
                               that individual has   assessment, or
                               satisfied the         response
                               requirements of       capabilities
                               Sec.   73.56.         depend.
Sec.   73.55(b)(1) If a       (d)(5) If a           This requirement
 contract guard force is       contracted security   would be retained
 utilized for site security,   force is used to      with minor
 the licensee's written        implement the         revision. The
 agreement with the            onsite physical       phrase ``utilized
 contractor that must be       protection program,   for site security''
 retained by the licensee as   the licensee's        would be replaced
 a record for the duration     written agreement     with the phrase
 of the contract will          with the contractor   ``used to implement
 clearly show that:            must be retained by   the onsite physical
                               the licensee as a     protection
                               record for the        program'' to focus
                               duration of the       on the
                               contract and must     implementation of
                               clearly state the     the onsite physical
                               following             protection program.
                               conditions:
Sec.   73.55(b)(1)(i) The     (d)(5)(i) The         This requirement
 licensee is responsible to    licensee is           would be retained
 the Commission for            responsible for       with minor
 maintaining safeguards in     maintaining the       revisions. Most
 accordance with Commission    onsite physical       significantly, the
 regulations and the           protection program    word ``safeguards''
 licensee's security plan.     in accordance with    would be replaced
                               Commission orders,    with the phrase''
                               Commission            onsite physical
                               regulations, and      protection
                               the approved          program'' to more
                               security plans.       accurately describe
                                                     the focus of this
                                                     requirement.
Sec.   73.55(b)(1)(ii) The    (d)(5)(ii) The        This requirement
 NRC may inspect, copy, and    Commission may        would be retained
 take away copies of all       inspect, copy,        with minor
 reports and documents         retain, and remove    revisions.
 required to be kept by        all reports and
 Commission regulations,       documents required
 orders, or applicable         to be kept by
 license conditions whether    Commission
 the reports and documents     regulations,
 are kept by the licensee or   orders, or
 the contractor.               applicable license
                               conditions whether
                               the reports and
                               documents are kept
                               by the licensee or
                               the contractor.
                              (d)(5)(iii) An        This requirement
                               individual may not    would be added for
                               be assigned to any    consistency with
                               position involving    the proposed
                               detection,            requirements of the
                               assessment, or        proposed paragraph
                               response to           (d)(4) of this
                               unauthorized          section. This
                               activities unless     proposed
                               that individual has   requirement would
                               satisfied the         be stipulated in a
                               requirements of       contract because it
                               Sec.   73.56.         relates to a
                                                     function of the
                                                     contract.
Sec.   73.55(b)(1)(iv) The    (d)(5)(iv) An         This requirement
 contractor will not assign    individual may not    would retain and
 any personnel to the site     be assigned duties    combine two current
 who have not first been       and                   requirements of
 made aware of these           responsibilities      Sec.
 responsibilities.             required to           73.55(b)(1)(iv) and
Sec.   73.55(b)(4)(i) The      implement the         Sec.
 licensee may not permit an    approved security     73.55(b)(4)(i) with
 individual to act as a        plans or licensee     minor revisions
 guard, watchman, armed        protective strategy   necessary for
 response person, or other     unless that           consistency with
 member of the security        individual has been   the proposed rule.
 organization unless the       properly trained,
 individual has been           equipped, and
 trained, equipped, and        qualified to
 qualified to perform each     perform their
 assigned security job duty    assigned duties and
 in accordance with appendix   responsibilities in
 B * * *..                     accordance with
                               appendix B to part
                               73 and the
                               Commission-approved
                               training and
                               qualification plan.
Sec.   73.55(b)(1)(iii) The   (d)(5)(v) Upon the    This requirement
 requirement in paragraph      request of an         would be retained
 (b)(4) of this section that   authorized            to describe the
 the licensee demonstrate      representative of     current requirement
 the ability of physical       the Commission, the   for demonstration
 security personnel to         contractor security   by contract
 perform their assigned        employees shall       security personnel.
 duties and responsibilities   demonstrate the       The language of
 includes demonstration of     ability to perform    this current
 the ability of the            their assigned        requirement would
 contractor's physical         duties and            be deleted and
 security personnel to         responsibilities      replaced by the
 perform their assigned        effectively.          proposed language
 duties and responsibilities                         of the proposed
 in carrying out the                                 Sec.   73.55(b)(5).
 provisions of the Security
 Plan and these regulations,
 and * * *.

[[Page 62695]]

 
                              (d)(5)(vi) Any        This requirement
                               license for           would be added to
                               possession and        implement
                               ownership of          applicable portions
                               enhanced weapons      of the EPAct 2005,
                               will reside with      and to require any
                               the licensee.         security force
                                                     contract to include
                                                     a statement that
                                                     would ensure that
                                                     all licenses
                                                     relative to
                                                     firearms and
                                                     enhanced weapons
                                                     reside with the
                                                     licensee, not the
                                                     contractor.
Sec.   73.55(c) Physical      (e) Physical          This requirement
 barriers.                     barriers. Based       would be added to
                               upon the licensee's   provide a
                               protective            performance based
                               strategy, analyses,   requirement for
                               and site conditions   determining the use
                               that affect the use   and placement of
                               and placement of      physical barriers
                               physical barriers,    required for
                               the licensee shall    protection of
                               install and           personnel,
                               maintain physical     equipment, and
                               barriers that are     systems, the
                               designed and          failure of which
                               constructed as        could directly or
                               necessary to deter,   indirectly endanger
                               delay, and prevent    public health and
                               the introduction of   safety.
                               unauthorized
                               personnel,
                               vehicles, or
                               materials into
                               areas for which
                               access must be
                               controlled or
                               restricted.
                                                    The phrase ``Based
                                                     upon the licensee
                                                     protective
                                                     strategy, analyses,
                                                     and site specific
                                                     conditions'', would
                                                     be used to ensure
                                                     that licensees
                                                     consider protective
                                                     strategy
                                                     requirements and
                                                     needs, as well as
                                                     any analyses
                                                     conducted by the
                                                     licensee or
                                                     required by the
                                                     Commission to
                                                     determine the
                                                     effects the design
                                                     basis threat could
                                                     have on personnel,
                                                     equipment, and
                                                     systems, and any
                                                     site specific
                                                     condition that
                                                     could have an
                                                     impact on the
                                                     capability to
                                                     prevent significant
                                                     core damage and
                                                     spent fuel
                                                     sabotage. The
                                                     Commission
                                                     considers these
                                                     factors to be
                                                     necessary
                                                     considerations when
                                                     determining the
                                                     appropriate use and
                                                     placement of
                                                     barriers in any
                                                     area.
                              (e)(1) The licensee   This requirement
                               shall describe in     would be added to
                               the approved          provide a mechanism
                               security plans, the   by which the
                               design,               licensee would
                               construction, and     confirm information
                               function of           regarding the use,
                               physical barriers     placement, and
                               and barrier systems   construction of
                               used and shall        barriers to include
                               ensure that each      the intended
                               barrier and barrier   function of
                               system is designed    specific barriers
                               and constructed to    as they relate to
                               satisfy the stated    satisfying the
                               function of the       proposed
                               barrier and barrier   requirements of
                               system.               this section.
Sec.   73.55(c)(9)(iii)       (e)(2) The licensee   This requirement
 Protect as Safeguards         shall retain in       would retain and
 Information, information      accordance with       combine the current
 required by the Commission    Sec.   73.70, all     requirements of
 pursuant to Sec.              analyses,             Sec.
 73.55(c)(8) and (9).          comparisons, and      73.55(c)(9)(iii)
Sec.   73.55(c)(9)(iv)         descriptions of the   and (9)(iv) with
 Retain, in accordance with    physical barriers     minor revisions.
 Sec.   73.70, all             and barrier systems
 comparisons and analyses      used to satisfy the
 prepared pursuant to Sec.     requirements of
 73.55(c)(7) and (8)..         this section, and
                               shall protect these
                               records as
                               safeguards
                               information in
                               accordance with the
                               requirements of
                               Sec.   73.21.
                              (e)(3) Physical       This header would be
                               barriers must:        added for
                                                     formatting
                                                     purposes.
                              (e)(3)(i) Clearly     This requirement
                               delineate the         would be added to
                               boundaries of the     provide a
                               area(s) for which     performance based
                               the physical          requirement for the
                               barrier provides      use of barriers.
                               protection or a
                               function, such as
                               protected and vital
                               area boundaries and
                               stand-off distance.
Sec.   73.55(c)(8) Each       (e)(3)(ii) Be         This requirement
 licensee shall compare the    designed and          would be added to
 vehicle control measures      constructed to        apply the current
 established in accordance     protect against the   requirement of Sec.
 with Sec.   73.55(c)(7) to    design basis threat     73.55(c)(8) to
 the Commission's design       commensurate to the   compare vehicle
 goals (i.e., to protect       required function     control measures
 equipment, systems,           of each barrier and   against Commission
 devices, or material, the     in support of the     design goals, to
 failure of which could        licensee protective   all barriers, such
 directly or indirectly        strategy.             as but not limited
 endanger public health and                          to, channeling
 safety by exposure to                               barriers, delay
 radiation) and criteria for                         barriers, and
 protection against a land                           bullet resisting
 vehicle bomb.                                       enclosures, and not
                                                     limit this
                                                     comparison to only
                                                     vehicle barriers.
                                                     The Commission's
                                                     view is that the
                                                     physical
                                                     construction,
                                                     materials, and
                                                     design of any
                                                     barrier must be
                                                     sufficient to
                                                     perform the
                                                     intended function
                                                     and therefore, the
                                                     licensee must meet
                                                     these standards.

[[Page 62696]]

 
                              (e)(3)(iii) Provide   This requirement
                               visual deterrence,    would be added to
                               delay, and support    provide a
                               access control        performance based
                               measures.             requirement for
                                                     physical barriers.
                                                     Because of changes
                                                     to the threat
                                                     environment the
                                                     Commission believes
                                                     emphasis on the use
                                                     of physical
                                                     barriers would be
                                                     appropriate.
                              (e)(3)(iv) Support    This requirement
                               effective             would be added to
                               implementation of     provide a
                               the licensee's        performance based
                               protective strategy.  requirement for
                                                     physical barriers.
                                                     Because of changes
                                                     to the threat
                                                     environment the use
                                                     of physical
                                                     barriers within the
                                                     licensee protective
                                                     strategy would be
                                                     considered
                                                     essential.
                              (e)(4) Owner          This requirement
                               controlled area.      would be added to
                               The licensee shall    provide a
                               establish and         performance based
                               maintain physical     requirement to
                               barriers in the       provide enhanced
                               owner controlled      protection outside
                               area to deter,        the protected area
                               delay, or prevent     relative to
                               unauthorized          detecting and
                               access, facilitate    delaying a threat
                               the early detection   before reaching any
                               of unauthorized       area from which the
                               activities, and       threat could
                               control approach      disable the
                               routes to the         personnel,
                               facility.             equipment, or
                                                     systems required to
                                                     meet the
                                                     performance
                                                     objective and
                                                     requirements
                                                     described in the
                                                     proposed paragraph
                                                     (b) of this
                                                     section.
                              (e)(5) Isolation      This header would be
                               zone.                 added for
                                                     formatting
                                                     purposes.
Sec.   73.55(c)(3) Isolation  (e)(5)(i) An          This requirement
 zones shall be maintained     isolation zone must   would retain the
 in outdoor areas adjacent     be maintained in      current requirement
 to the physical barrier at    outdoor areas         for an isolation
 the perimeter of the          adjacent to the       zone.
 protected area * * *.         protected area
                               perimeter barrier.
                               The isolation zone
                               shall be:
Sec.   73.55(c)(3) Isolation  (e)(5)(i)(A)          This requirement
 zones * * * and shall be of   Designed and of       would retain and
 sufficient size to permit     sufficient size to    revise the current
 observation of the            permit unobstructed   requirement for
 activities of people on       observation and       isolation zone
 either side of that barrier   assessment of         design to provide
 in the event of its           activities on         observation. Most
 penetration.                  either side of the    significantly, the
                               protected area        words ``designed''
                               barrier.              and
                                                     ``unobstructed''
                                                     would be added to
                                                     provide a more
                                                     performance based
                                                     requirement. The
                                                     phrase ``of
                                                     people'' would be
                                                     deleted to focus
                                                     the proposed
                                                     requirement on
                                                     ``activities''.
Sec.   73.55(c)(4) Detection  (e)(5)(i)(B)          This requirement
 of penetration or attempted   Equipped with         would be retained
 penetration of the            intrusion detection   and revised to
 protected area or the         equipment capable     require intrusion
 isolation zone adjacent to    of detecting both     detection equipment
 the protected area barrier    attempted and         within an isolation
 shall assure that adequate    actual penetration    zone and provide a
 response by the security      of the protected      performance based
 organization can be           area perimeter        requirement for
 initiated.                    barrier and           that equipment. The
                               assessment            phrase ``shall
                               equipment capable     assure that
                               of facilitating       adequate response
                               timely evaluation     by the security
                               of the detected       organization can be
                               unauthorized          initiated'' would
                               activities before     be moved from this
                               completed             proposed
                               penetration of the    requirement to the
                               protected area        proposed Sec.
                               perimeter barrier.    73.55(i)(9)(v).
                              (e)(5)(ii)            This requirement
                               Assessment            would be added to
                               equipment in the      provide a
                               isolation zone must   performance based
                               provide real-time     requirement for
                               and play-back/        assessment
                               recorded video        equipment utilized
                               images in a manner    for the isolation
                               that allows timely    zone. The
                               evaluation of the     Commission has
                               detected              determined that
                               unauthorized          based on changes to
                               activities before     threat environment
                               and after each        the use of
                               alarm annunciation.   technology that
                                                     allows for the
                                                     assessment of
                                                     activities before
                                                     and after an alarm
                                                     annunciation is
                                                     necessary to
                                                     facilitate a
                                                     determination of
                                                     the level of
                                                     response needed to
                                                     satisfy the
                                                     performance
                                                     objective and
                                                     requirements of the
                                                     proposed paragraph
                                                     (b) of this
                                                     section. The
                                                     Commission believes
                                                     the application of
                                                     this commonly used
                                                     technology would be
                                                     an appropriate use
                                                     of technological
                                                     advancements that
                                                     would effectively
                                                     enhance licensee
                                                     capabilities to
                                                     achieve the
                                                     performance
                                                     objective and
                                                     requirements of the
                                                     proposed paragraph
                                                     (b) of this
                                                     section.

[[Page 62697]]

 
Sec.   73.55(c)(3) If         (e)(5)(iii) Parking   This requirement
 parking facilities are        facilities, storage   would be retained
 provided for employees or     areas, or other       and revised to
 visitors, they shall be       obstructions that     provide a
 located outside the           could provide         performance based
 isolation zone and exterior   concealment or        requirement for the
 to the protected area         otherwise interfere   areas outside the
 barrier.                      with the licensee's   isolation zone.
                               capability to meet    Most significantly,
                               the requirements of   the phrase
                               paragraphs            ``storage areas, or
                               (e)(5)(i)(A) and      other obstructions
                               (B) of this           which could provide
                               section, must be      concealment or
                               located outside of    otherwise
                               the isolation zone.   interfere'' would
                                                     be added to ensure
                                                     that areas inside,
                                                     outside, and
                                                     adjacent to the
                                                     protected area
                                                     barrier would be
                                                     maintained clear of
                                                     obstructions to
                                                     ensure observation
                                                     and assessment
                                                     capabilities.
                              (e)(6) Protected      This header would be
                               area.                 added for
                                                     formatting
                                                     purposes.
                              (e)(6)(i) The         This requirement
                               protected area        would be added to
                               perimeter must be     provide a
                               protected by          performance based
                               physical barriers     requirement for
                               designed and          physical barriers
                               constructed to meet   and penetrations
                               Commission            though the
                               requirements and      protected area
                               all penetrations      barrier to be
                               through this          secured to prevent
                               barrier must be       and detect
                               secured in a manner   attempted or actual
                               that prevents or      exploitation of the
                               delays, and detects   penetration. The
                               the exploitation of   Commission's view
                               any penetration.      is that
                                                     penetrations must
                                                     be secured equal to
                                                     the strength of the
                                                     barrier of which it
                                                     is a part and that
                                                     attempts to exploit
                                                     a penetration must
                                                     be detected and
                                                     response initiated.
Sec.   73.55(c)(2) The        (e)(6)(ii) The        This requirement
 physical barriers at the      protected area        would be retained
 perimeter of the protected    perimeter physical    with minor
 area shall be separated       barriers must be      revision. The
 from any other barrier        separated from any    phrase ``unless
 designated as a physical      other barrier         otherwise
 barrier for a vital area      designated as a       identified in the
 within the protected area.    vital area physical   approved physical
                               barrier, unless       security plan''
                               otherwise             would be added to
                               identified in the     provide flexibility
                               approved physical     for an alternate
                               security plan.        methodology to be
                                                     described in the
                                                     Commission-approved
                                                     security plans.
Sec.   73.55(e)(3) All        (e)(6)(iii) All       This requirement
 emergency exits in each       emergency exits in    would retain and
 protected area and each       the protected area    separate the two
 vital area shall be alarmed.  must be secured by    current
                               locking devices       requirements with
                               that allow exit       minor revision. The
                               only and alarmed.     phrase ``secured by
                                                     locking devices
                                                     which allow exit
                                                     only'' would be
                                                     added to provide a
                                                     performance based
                                                     requirement
                                                     relative to the
                                                     function of locking
                                                     devices with
                                                     emergency exit
                                                     design to prevent
                                                     entry. Vital areas
                                                     would be addressed
                                                     in the proposed
                                                     Sec.
                                                     73.55(e)(8)(vii).
                              (e)(6)(iv) Where      This requirement
                               building walls,       would be added to
                               roofs, or             provide a
                               penetrations          performance based
                               comprise a portion    requirement for
                               of the protected      instances where
                               area perimeter        this site condition
                               barrier, an           would exist.
                               isolation zone is
                               not necessary,
                               provided that the
                               detection,
                               assessment,
                               observation,
                               monitoring, and
                               surveillance
                               requirements of
                               this section are
                               met, appropriately
                               designed and
                               constructed
                               barriers are
                               installed, and the
                               area is described
                               in the approved
                               security plans.
Sec.   73.55(c)(6) The        (e)(6)(v) The         This requirement
 walls, doors, ceiling,        reactor control       would retain the
 floor, and any windows in     room, the central     locations
 the walls and in the doors    alarm station, and    identified in the
 of the reactor control room   the location within   current Sec.
 shall be bullet-resisting.    which the last        73.55(c)(6),
Sec.   73.55(d)(1) The         access control        (d)(1), and (e)(1).
 individual responsible for    function for access   Specific reference
 the last access control       to the protected      to walls, doors,
 function (controlling         area is performed,    ceiling, floor, and
 admission to the protected    must be bullet-       any windows in the
 area) must be isolated        resisting.            walls, doors,
 within a bullet-resisting                           ceiling, and floor
 structure as described in                           would be deleted to
 Paragraph (c)(6) of this                            clarify that all
 section to assure his or                            construction
 her ability to respond or                           features would be
 summon assistance.                                  required to meet
Sec.   73.55(e)(1) The                               the bullet
 onsite central alarm                                resisting
 station must be considered                          requirement, and
 a vital area and its walls,                         therefore remove
 doors, ceiling, floor, and                          the potential for
 any windows in the walls                            confusion where a
 and in the doors must be                            structural feature
 bullet-resisting..                                  such as sky-lights
                                                     would not be
                                                     listed. The
                                                     Commission does not
                                                     intend to suggest
                                                     that penetrations,
                                                     such as heating/
                                                     cooling ducts be
                                                     made bullet-
                                                     resistant, but
                                                     rather that the
                                                     licensee implement
                                                     appropriate
                                                     measures to prevent
                                                     the exploitation of
                                                     such features in a
                                                     manner consistent
                                                     with the intent of
                                                     the bullet-
                                                     resisting
                                                     requirement to
                                                     ensure the required
                                                     functions performed
                                                     in these locations
                                                     are protected and
                                                     maintained.

[[Page 62698]]

 
                              (e)(6)(vi) All        This requirement
                               exterior areas        would be added to
                               within the            provide a
                               protected area must   performance based
                               be periodically       requirement for
                               checked to detect     monitoring exterior
                               and deter             areas of the
                               unauthorized          protected area to
                               activities,           facilitate
                               personnel,            achievement of the
                               vehicles, and         requirements
                               materials.            described by the
                                                     proposed paragraph
                                                     (b).
                              (e)(7) Vital areas..  This header would be
                                                     added for
                                                     formatting
                                                     purposes.
Sec.   73.55(c)(1) The        (e)(7)(i) Vital       This requirement
 licensee shall locate vital   equipment must be     would be retained
 equipment only within a       located only within   with minor
 vital area, which in turn,    vital areas, which    revision. The
 shall be located within a     in turn must be       phrase ``of
 protected area such that      located within        sufficient strength
 access to vital equipment     protected areas so    to meet the
 requires passage through at   that access to        performance
 least two physical barriers   vital equipment       requirements of
 of sufficient strength to     requires passage      paragraph (a) of
 meet the performance          through at least      this section''
 requirements of paragraph     two physical          would be replaced
 (a) of this section.          barriers designed     with the phrase
                               and constructed to    ``designed and
                               perform the           constructed to
                               required function,    perform the
                               except as otherwise   required function''
                               approved by the       for consistency
                               Commission in         with the proposed
                               accordance with       requirements for
                               paragraph (f)(2) of   physical barriers
                               this section.         discussed
                                                     throughout this
                                                     proposed Sec.
                                                     73.55(e). The
                                                     phrase ``except as
                                                     otherwise approved
                                                     by the Commission
                                                     in accordance with
                                                     paragraph (f)(2) of
                                                     this section''
                                                     would be added to
                                                     account for the
                                                     condition addressed
                                                     by paragraph
                                                     (f)(2).
Sec.   73.55(c)(1) More than  (e)(7)(ii) More than  This requirement
 one vital area may be         one vital area may    would be retained.
 located within a single       be located within a
 protected area.               single protected
                               area.
Sec.   73.55(e)(1) The        (e)(7)(iii) The       This requirement
 onsite central alarm          reactor control       would retain and
 station must be considered    room, the spent       combine two current
 a vital area and * * *.       fuel pool,            requirements from
Sec.   73.55(e)(1) Onsite      secondary power       10 CFR 73.55(e)(1),
 secondary power supply        supply systems for    for protecting
 systems for alarm             intrusion detection   these areas
 annunciator equipment and     and assessment        equivalent to a
 non-portable communications   equipment, non-       vital area. The
 equipment as required in      portable              Commission added
 paragraph (f) of this         communications        the ``spent fuel
 section must be located       equipment, and the    pool'' to emphasize
 within vital areas..          central alarm         the Commission view
                               station, must be      that because of
                               provided protection   changes to the
                               equivalent to vital   threat environment
                               equipment located     the spent fuel pool
                               within a vital area.  must also be
                                                     provided this
                                                     protection. The
                                                     phrase ``alarm
                                                     annunciator'' would
                                                     be replaced with
                                                     ``intrusion
                                                     detection and
                                                     assessment'' to
                                                     clarify the
                                                     application of this
                                                     proposed
                                                     requirement to
                                                     intrusion detection
                                                     sensors and video
                                                     assessment
                                                     equipment as well
                                                     as the alarm
                                                     annunciation
                                                     equipment.
                              (e)(7)(iv) Vital      This requirement
                               equipment that is     would be added to
                               undergoing            provide a
                               maintenance or is     performance based
                               out of service, or    requirement
                               any other change to   consistent with the
                               site conditions       proposed Sec.
                               that could            73.58 Safety/
                               adversely affect      Security Program.
                               plant safety or
                               security, must be
                               identified in
                               accordance with
                               Sec.   73.58, and
                               adjustments must be
                               made to the site
                               protective
                               strategy, site
                               procedures, and
                               approved security
                               plans, as necessary.
Sec.   73.55(e)(3) All        (e)(7)(v) The         This requirement
 emergency exits in each       licensee shall        would retain and
 protected area and each       protect all vital     combine two current
 vital area shall be alarmed.  areas, vital area     requirements 10 CFR
Sec.   73.55(d)(7)(D) Lock     access portals, and   73.55(e)(3) and
 and protect by an activated   vital area            (d)(7)(D) with
 intrusion alarm system all    emergency exits       minor revision for
 unoccupied vital areas..      with intrusion        formatting
                               detection equipment   purposes. The
                               and locking           phrase ``Emergency
                               devices. Emergency    exit locking
                               exit locking          devices shall be
                               devices shall be      designed to permit
                               designed to permit    exit only'' would
                               exit only.            be added to provide
                                                     a performance based
                                                     requirement to
                                                     describe the
                                                     function to be
                                                     provided by
                                                     emergency exit
                                                     locking devices.
Sec.   73.55(d)(7)(D) Lock    (e)(7)(vi)            This requirement
 and protect by an activated   Unoccupied vital      would retain the
 intrusion alarm system all    areas must be         current requirement
 unoccupied vital areas.       locked.               to lock unoccupied
                                                     vital areas with
                                                     minor revision for
                                                     formatting
                                                     purposes. The
                                                     current requirement
                                                     to alarm all vital
                                                     areas would be
                                                     moved to the
                                                     proposed paragraph
                                                     (e)(7)(v) of this
                                                     section.
                              (e)(8) Vehicle        This header would be
                               barrier system. The   added for
                               licensee must:        formatting
                                                     purposes.

[[Page 62699]]

 
Sec.   73.55(c)(7) Vehicle    (e)(8)(i) Prevent     This requirement
 control measures, including   unauthorized          would be retained
 vehicle barrier systems,      vehicle access or     and revised to
 must be established to        proximity to any      provide a
 protect against use of a      area from which any   requirement for
 land vehicle, as specified    vehicle, its          protection against
 by the Commission, as a       personnel, or its     any vehicle within
 means of transportation to    contents could        the context of the
 gain unauthorized proximity   disable the           design basis threat
 to vital areas.               personnel,            described in Sec.
                               equipment, or         73.1. Because of
                               systems necessary     changes to the
                               to meet the           threat environment,
                               performance           the meaning of the
                               objective and         word ``proximity''
                               requirements          remains the same
                               described in          but is applied to
                               paragraph (b) of      include all
                               this section.         locations from
                                                     which the design
                                                     basis threat could
                                                     disable the
                                                     personnel,
                                                     equipment, or
                                                     systems required to
                                                     prevent
                                                     radiological
                                                     sabotage.
                              (e)(8)(ii) Limit and  This requirement
                               control all vehicle   would be added to
                               approach routes.      provide a
                                                     requirement for
                                                     limiting and
                                                     controlling vehicle
                                                     access routes to
                                                     the site for the
                                                     purpose of
                                                     protecting the
                                                     facility against
                                                     vehicle bomb
                                                     attacks and the use
                                                     of vehicles as a
                                                     means of
                                                     transporting
                                                     personnel and
                                                     materials that
                                                     would be considered
                                                     a threat. Because
                                                     of changes to the
                                                     threat environment
                                                     the Commission has
                                                     determined that
                                                     control of all
                                                     vehicle approach
                                                     routes is a
                                                     critical element of
                                                     the onsite physical
                                                     protection program.
                              (e)(8)(iii) Design    This requirement
                               and install a         would be added to
                               vehicle barrier       require the
                               system, to include    licensee to
                               passive and active    determine the
                               barriers, at a        potential effects a
                               stand-off distance    vehicle bomb could
                               adequate to protect   have on the
                               personnel,            facility and to
                               equipment, and        establish a barrier
                               systems against the   system at a stand-
                               design basis threat.  off distance
                                                     sufficient to
                                                     protect personnel,
                                                     equipment and
                                                     systems. Because of
                                                     changes to the
                                                     threat environment,
                                                     the Commission
                                                     views stand-off
                                                     distances to be a
                                                     critical element of
                                                     the onsite physical
                                                     protection program
                                                     and which require
                                                     continuing analysis
                                                     and evaluation to
                                                     maintain
                                                     effectiveness.
                              (e)(8)(iv) Deter,     This requirement
                               detect, delay, or     would be added to
                               prevent vehicle use   ensure the licensee
                               as a means of         maintains the
                               transporting          capability to
                               unauthorized          deter, detect,
                               personnel or          delay, or prevent
                               materials to gain     unauthorized access
                               unauthorized access   beyond a vehicle
                               beyond a vehicle      barrier system.
                               barrier system,       Because of changes
                               gain proximity to a   to the threat
                               protected area or     environment, the
                               vital area, or        Commission views
                               otherwise penetrate   the vehicle threat
                               the protected area    to be a critical
                               perimeter.            element of the
                                                     onsite physical
                                                     protection program
                                                     that requires
                                                     continual analysis
                                                     and evaluation to
                                                     maintain
                                                     effectiveness. This
                                                     proposed
                                                     requirement would
                                                     include vehicles
                                                     that do not reach
                                                     the full capability
                                                     of the design basis
                                                     threat.
                              (e)(8)(v)             This requirement
                               Periodically check    would be added
                               the operation of      consistent with the
                               active vehicle        current requirement
                               barriers and          of Sec.
                               provide a secondary   73.55(g)(1) and
                               power source or a     would apply to the
                               means of mechanical   operation of active
                               or manual             vehicle barriers
                               operation, in the     within time lines
                               event of a power      required to prevent
                               failure to ensure     unauthorized
                               that the active       vehicle access,
                               barrier can be        despite the loss of
                               placed in the         the primary power
                               denial position       source. The term
                               within the time       ``periodically''
                               line required to      would be intended
                               prevent               to allow the
                               unauthorized          licensees to
                               vehicle access        establish checks at
                               beyond the required   a frequency
                               standoff distance.    necessary to ensure
                                                     active barriers
                                                     remain effective
                                                     for both denial and
                                                     non-denial
                                                     operation.
                              (e)(8)(vi) Provide    This requirement
                               surveillance and      would be added to
                               observation of        provide a
                               vehicle barriers      requirement for the
                               and barrier systems   licensee to monitor
                               to detect             the integrity of
                               unauthorized          barriers to verify
                               activities and to     availability when
                               ensure the            needed and to
                               integrity of each     prevent or detect
                               vehicle barrier and   tampering. Because
                               barrier system.       of changes to the
                                                     threat environment,
                                                     the Commission
                                                     views the vehicle
                                                     bomb consideration
                                                     to be a critical
                                                     element of the
                                                     onsite physical
                                                     protection program
                                                     which requires
                                                     continuing analysis
                                                     and evaluation to
                                                     maintain
                                                     effectiveness.

[[Page 62700]]

 
                              (e)(9) Waterways....  This header would be
                                                     added for
                                                     formatting
                                                     purposes.
                              (e)(9)(i) The         This requirement
                               licensee shall        would be added to
                               control waterway      provide a
                               approach routes or    requirement for
                               proximity to any      controlling
                               area from which a     waterway approach
                               waterborne vehicle,   routes consistent
                               its personnel, or     with the
                               its contents could    requirement of the
                               disable the           proposed paragraph
                               personnel,            (e)(9)(ii) of this
                               equipment, or         section. Because of
                               systems necessary     changes to the
                               to meet the           threat environment,
                               performance           the Commission
                               objective and         views waterway
                               requirements          approach routes and
                               described in          control measures to
                               paragraph (b) of      be a critical
                               this section.         element of the
                                                     onsite physical
                                                     protection program
                                                     and one that
                                                     requires continual
                                                     analysis and
                                                     evaluation to
                                                     maintain
                                                     effectiveness.
                              (e)(9)(ii) The        This requirement
                               licensee shall        would be added to
                               delineate areas       provide a
                               from which a          requirement for
                               waterborne vehicle    notifying
                               must be restricted    unauthorized
                               and install           individuals that
                               waterborne vehicle    access is not
                               control measures,     permitted, and the
                               where applicable.     installation of
                                                     barriers where
                                                     appropriate.
                              (e)(9)(iii) The       This requirement
                               licensee shall        would be added to
                               monitor waterway      provide a
                               approaches and        requirement for
                               adjacent areas to     monitoring waterway
                               ensure early          approaches
                               detection,            consistent with
                               assessment, and       other monitoring
                               response to           and surveillance
                               unauthorized          requirements of
                               activity or           this proposed
                               proximity, and to     section.
                               ensure the
                               integrity of
                               installed
                               waterborne vehicle
                               control measures.
                              (e)(9)(iv) Where      This requirement
                               necessary to meet     would be added to
                               the requirements of   provide a
                               this section,         requirement to
                               licensees shall       coordinate where
                               coordinate with       necessary with
                               local, State, and     other agencies
                               Federal agencies      having
                               having jurisdiction   jurisdictional
                               over waterway         authority over
                               approaches.           waterways to ensure
                                                     that the proposed
                                                     requirements of
                                                     this section would
                                                     be met.
                              (e)(10) Unattended    This requirement
                               openings in any       would be added to
                               barrier established   provide a
                               to meet the           requirement for all
                               requirements of       openings in any
                               this section that     OCA, PA, or VA
                               are 620 cm\2\ (96.1   barrier to ensure
                               in\2\) or greater     that the intended
                               in total area and     function of the
                               have a smallest       barrier is met. The
                               dimension of 15 cm    phrase ``consistent
                               (5.9 in) or           with the intended
                               greater, must be      function of each
                               secured and           barrier'' would
                               monitored at a        describe the
                               frequency that        criteria for making
                               would prevent         a determination to
                               exploitation of the   secure or monitor
                               opening consistent    openings of this
                               with the intended     size where the
                               function of each      intended function
                               barrier.              of the barrier
                                                     would be
                                                     compromised if the
                                                     opening is not
                                                     secured or
                                                     monitored. The size
                                                     of the opening
                                                     described is a
                                                     commonly accepted
                                                     standard throughout
                                                     the security
                                                     profession for
                                                     application to any
                                                     security program
                                                     and one that
                                                     represents an
                                                     opening large
                                                     enough for a person
                                                     to exploit.
                                                    Therefore, the
                                                     Commission has
                                                     determined that
                                                     openings meeting
                                                     the stated criteria
                                                     require measures to
                                                     prevent
                                                     exploitation.
                              (f) Target sets.....  This header would be
                                                     added for
                                                     formatting
                                                     purposes.
                              (f)(1) The licensee   This requirement
                               shall document in     would be added to
                               site procedures the   provide a
                               process used to       performance based
                               develop and           requirement for the
                               identify target       licensee to
                               sets, to include      document how each
                               analyses and          target set was
                               methodologies used    developed to
                               to determine and      facilitate review
                               group the target      of the licensee
                               set equipment or      methodology by the
                               elements.             Commission. The
                                                     Commission has
                                                     determined that
                                                     because of changes
                                                     to the threat
                                                     environment the
                                                     identification and
                                                     protection of all
                                                     target sets would
                                                     be a critical
                                                     component for the
                                                     development and
                                                     implementation of
                                                     the licensee
                                                     protective strategy
                                                     and the capability
                                                     of the licensee to
                                                     prevent significant
                                                     core damage and
                                                     spent fuel
                                                     sabotage,
                                                     therefore,
                                                     providing
                                                     protection against
                                                     radiological
                                                     sabotage and
                                                     satisfying the
                                                     performance
                                                     objective and
                                                     requirements stated
                                                     in the proposed
                                                     paragraph (b) of
                                                     this section.

[[Page 62701]]

 
                              (f)(2) The licensee   This requirement
                               shall consider the    would be added to
                               effects that cyber    ensure cyber
                               attacks may have      attacks associated
                               upon individual       with advancements
                               equipment or          in the area of
                               elements of each      automated computer
                               target set or         technology are
                               grouping.             considered and the
                                                     affects that such
                                                     attacks may have on
                                                     the integrity of
                                                     individual target
                                                     set equipment and
                                                     elements is
                                                     accounted for in
                                                     the licensee
                                                     protective
                                                     strategy.
                              (f)(3) Target set     This requirement
                               equipment or          would be added to
                               elements that are     provide a
                               not contained         performance based
                               within a protected    requirement to
                               or vital area must    identify and
                               be explicitly         account for this
                               identified in the     condition in the
                               approved security     approved security
                               plans and             plans, if it exists
                               protective measures   at a site.
                               for such equipment
                               or elements must be
                               addressed by the
                               licensee's
                               protective strategy
                               in accordance with
                               appendix C to this
                               part.
                              (f)(4) The licensee   This requirement
                               shall implement a     would be added to
                               program for the       require the
                               oversight of plant    licensee to
                               equipment and         establish and
                               systems documented    implement a program
                               as part of the        that focuses on
                               licensee protective   ensuring that
                               strategy to ensure    certain plant
                               that changes to the   equipment and
                               configuration of      systems are
                               the identified        periodically
                               equipment and         checked to ensure
                               systems do not        that unauthorized
                               compromise the        configuration
                               licensee's            changes or
                               capability to         tampering would be
                               prevent significant   identified and an
                               core damage and       appropriate
                               spent fuel sabotage.  response initiated.
                                                     Based on changes to
                                                     the threat
                                                     environment, the
                                                     Commission has
                                                     determined this
                                                     would be an
                                                     appropriate
                                                     enhancement to the
                                                     licensee onsite
                                                     physical protection
                                                     program.
                              (g) Access control..  This header would be
                                                     added for
                                                     formatting
                                                     purposes.
                              (g)(1) The licensee   This header would be
                               shall:                added for
                                                     formatting
                                                     purposes.
Sec.   73.55(d)(1) The        (g)(1)(i) Control     This requirement
 licensee shall control all    all points of         would be retained
 points of personnel and       personnel, vehicle,   and revised with
 vehicle access into a         and material access   minor revisions.
 protected area.               into any area, or     Most significantly,
                               beyond any physical   the phrase ``a
                               barrier or barrier    protected area''
                               system, established   would be replaced
                               to meet the           by the phrase ``any
                               requirements of       area, or beyond any
                               this section.         physical barrier or
                                                     barrier system,
                                                     established to meet
                                                     the requirements of
                                                     this section'' to
                                                     clarify that the
                                                     focus of this
                                                     proposed
                                                     requirement would
                                                     not be limited to
                                                     only protected area
                                                     access but would
                                                     apply to any area
                                                     for which access
                                                     must be controlled
                                                     to meet
                                                     complimentary
                                                     requirements
                                                     addressed in this
                                                     proposed rule. In
                                                     addition, the word
                                                     ``material'' would
                                                     be added to
                                                     emphasize that the
                                                     control of material
                                                     into these areas
                                                     would also be a
                                                     critical element of
                                                     the onsite physical
                                                     protection program
                                                     to facilitate
                                                     achievement of the
                                                     performance
                                                     objective of the
                                                     proposed paragraph
                                                     (b) of this
                                                     section.
Sec.   73.55(d)(7)(i)(B)      (g)(1)(ii) Control    This requirement
 Positively control, in        all points of         would be retained
 accordance with the access    personnel and         with minor
 list established pursuant     vehicle access into   revisions.
 to paragraph (d)(7)(i) of     vital areas in
 this section, all points of   accordance with
 personnel and vehicle         access
 access to vital areas.        authorization lists.
Sec.   73.55(d)(7)(i) * * *   (g)(1)(iii) During    This requirement
 limit unescorted access to    non-emergency         would be retained
 vital areas during            conditions, limit     and revised with
 nonemergency conditions to    unescorted access     minor revisions.
 individuals who require       to the protected      Most significantly,
 access in order to perform    area and vital        the phrase
 their duties. To achieve      areas to only those   ``protected area''
 this, the licensee shall:     individuals who       would be added to
                               require unescorted    emphasize that the
                               access to perform     same ``assigned
                               assigned duties and   duties and
                               responsibilities.     responsibilities''
                                                     criteria apply to
                                                     both vital and
                                                     protected areas.

[[Page 62702]]

 
                              (g)(1)(iv) Monitor    This requirement
                               and ensure the        would be added to
                               integrity of access   provide a
                               control systems.      requirement for
                                                     ensuring the
                                                     integrity of the
                                                     access control
                                                     system and prevent
                                                     its unauthorized
                                                     bypass. Based on
                                                     changes to the
                                                     threat environment,
                                                     the Commission has
                                                     determined that
                                                     emphasis would be
                                                     necessary to ensure
                                                     that the integrity
                                                     of the access
                                                     control system is
                                                     maintained through
                                                     oversight and that
                                                     attempts to
                                                     circumvent or
                                                     bypass the
                                                     established process
                                                     will be detected
                                                     and access denied.
                              (g)(1)(v) Provide     This requirement
                               supervision and       would be added to
                               control over the      provide a
                               badging process to    requirement for
                               prevent               ensuring the
                               unauthorized bypass   integrity of the
                               of access control     access control
                               equipment located     process. Based on
                               at or outside of      changes to the
                               the protected area.   threat environment,
                                                     the Commission has
                                                     determined that
                                                     specific emphasis
                                                     on access control
                                                     equipment outside
                                                     the protected area
                                                     would be necessary
                                                     to ensure that the
                                                     integrity of the
                                                     access control
                                                     system is
                                                     maintained for
                                                     those process
                                                     elements that are
                                                     not contained
                                                     within the
                                                     protected area.
Sec.   73.55(d)(1) The        (g)(1)(vi) Isolate    This requirement
 individual responsible for    the individual        would be retained
 the last access control       responsible for the   and revised with
 function (controlling         last access control   minor revisions.
 admission to the protected    function              Most significantly,
 area) must be isolated        (controlling          the phrase ``as
 within a bullet-resisting     admission to the      described in
 structure as described in     protected area)       paragraph (c)(6) of
 paragraph (c)(6) of this      within a bullet-      this section''
 section to assure his or      resisting structure   would be deleted
 her ability to respond or     to assure the         because the
 to summon assistance.         ability to respond    specific criteria
                               or to summon          for bullet-
                               assistance in         resisting would no
                               response to           longer be addressed
                               unauthorized          in the referenced
                               activities.           paragraph. Specific
                                                     criteria would be
                                                     addressed in
                                                     standards published
                                                     by the Underwriters
                                                     Laboratory (UL).
                              (g)(1)(vii) In        This requirement
                               response to           would be added to
                               specific threat and   require two
                               security              specific actions to
                               information,          be taken by the
                               implement a two-      licensee where
                               person (line-of-      credible threat
                               sight) rule for all   information is
                               personnel in vital    provided. This
                               areas so that no      proposed
                               one individual is     requirement would
                               permitted             first require that
                               unescorted access     the two-person rule
                               to vital areas.       be implemented, and
                               Under these           second, that
                               conditions the        measures be
                               licensee shall        implemented to
                               implement measures    verify that the two-
                               to verify that the    person rule is met
                               two person rule has   when access to a
                               been met when a       vital area is
                               vital area is         gained. This
                               accessed.             proposed
                                                     requirement would
                                                     include those areas
                                                     identified in the
                                                     proposed (e)(8)(iv)
                                                     of this section to
                                                     be protected as
                                                     vital areas. Based
                                                     on changes to the
                                                     threat environment,
                                                     the Commission has
                                                     determined that the
                                                     proposed
                                                     requirement is
                                                     necessary to
                                                     facilitate licensee
                                                     achievement of the
                                                     performance
                                                     objective of the
                                                     proposed paragraph
                                                     (b) of this
                                                     section.
                              (g)(2) In accordance  This requirement
                               with the approved     would be added to
                               security plans and    specify the basic
                               before granting       functions that must
                               unescorted access     be satisfied to
                               through an access     meet the current
                               control point, the    and proposed
                               licensee shall:       requirements for
                                                     controlling access
                                                     into any area for
                                                     which access
                                                     controls are
                                                     implemented.
Sec.   73.55(d)(1)            (g)(2)(i) Confirm     This requirement
 Identification * * * of all   the identity of       would retain the
 individuals unless            individuals.          current requirement
 otherwise provided herein                           with minor
 must be made and * * *.                             revisions for
                                                     formatting
                                                     purposes.
Sec.   73.55(d)(1) * * *      (g)(2)(ii) Verify     This requirement
 authorization must be         the authorization     would retain the
 checked at these points.      for access of         current requirement
                               individuals,          with minor
                               vehicles, and         revisions for
                               materials.            formatting
                                                     purposes.
Sec.   73.55(d)(1) * * *      (g)(2)(iii) Search    This requirement
 search of all individuals     individuals,          would retain the
 unless otherwise provided     vehicles, packages,   current requirement
 herein must be made and * *   deliveries, and       with minor
 *.                            materials in          revisions for
                               accordance with       formatting
                               paragraph (h) of      purposes.
                               this section.

[[Page 62703]]

 
                              (g)(2)(iv) Confirm,   This requirement
                               in accordance with    would be added to
                               industry shared       describe an
                               lists and             acceptable
                               databases, that       information sharing
                               individuals have      mechanism used by
                               not been denied       licensees to share
                               access to another     information about
                               licensed facility.    visitors and
                                                     employees who have
                                                     requested either
                                                     escorted or
                                                     unescorted access
                                                     to at least one
                                                     site. Based on
                                                     changes to the
                                                     threat environment,
                                                     the Commission has
                                                     determined that
                                                     this proposed
                                                     requirement would
                                                     be a prudent
                                                     enhancement to the
                                                     licensee
                                                     capabilities.
                              (g)(3) Access         This header would be
                               control points must   added for
                               be:                   formatting
                                                     purposes.
                              (g)(3)(i) Equipped    This requirement
                               with locking          would be added to
                               devices, intrusion    describe the types
                               detection             of equipment
                               equipment, and        determined to be
                               monitoring,           acceptable to
                               observation, and      satisfy the desired
                               surveillance          level of
                               equipment, as         performance
                               appropriate.          intended by the
                                                     proposed
                                                     requirements of
                                                     this section. The
                                                     phrase ``as
                                                     appropriate'' would
                                                     be used to provide
                                                     the flexibility
                                                     needed to provide
                                                     only that equipment
                                                     that is required to
                                                     accomplish the
                                                     desired function of
                                                     the specific access
                                                     control point.
Sec.   73.55(d)(1) The        (g)(3)(ii) Located    This requirement
 licensee shall control all    outside or            would be added to
 points of personnel and       concurrent with,      clarify the
 vehicle access into a         the physical          location of access
 protected area.               barrier system        control points to
                               through which it      ensure personnel
                               controls access.      and vehicles do not
                                                     gain access beyond
                                                     a barrier (i.e.,
                                                     stand-off distance)
                                                     before being
                                                     searched.
                              (g)(4) Emergency      This header would be
                               conditions.           added for
                                                     formatting
                                                     purposes.
Sec.   73.55(d)(7)(ii)        (g)(4)(i) The         This requirement
 Design the access             licensee shall        would be retained
 authorization system to       design the access     with minor
 accommodate the potential     control system to     revision. Most
 need for rapid ingress or     accommodate the       significantly, the
 egress of individuals         potential need for    phrase ``access
 during emergency conditions   rapid ingress or      authorization
 or situations that could      egress of             system'' would be
 lead to emergency             authorized            replaced with the
 conditions. To help assure    individuals during    phrase ``access
 this, the licensee shall:     emergency             control system'' to
                               conditions or         clarify that the
                               situations that       focus of this
                               could lead to         proposed
                               emergency             requirement is on
                               conditions.           controlling access
                                                     during emergency
                                                     conditions. The
                                                     need for rapid
                                                     ingress and egress
                                                     is a physical
                                                     action and would
                                                     more appropriately
                                                     be addressed
                                                     through access
                                                     controls.
                                                    Also, the phrase
                                                     ``authorized
                                                     individuals'' would
                                                     be added to
                                                     indicate that
                                                     access
                                                     authorization
                                                     requirements are
                                                     satisfied by the
                                                     individual in
                                                     advance of the need
                                                     for access. In
                                                     addition, the
                                                     phrase ``To help
                                                     assure this, the
                                                     licensee shall:''
                                                     would be deleted
                                                     because it would no
                                                     longer be needed.
Sec.   73.55(d)(7)(ii)(A)     (g)(4)(ii) Under      This requirement
 Ensure prompt access to       emergency             would be retained
 vital equipment.              conditions, the       and revised to add
                               licensee shall        a performance based
                               implement             requirement that
                               procedures to         the licensee
                               ensure that:          develop and
                              (g)(4)(ii)(A)          maintain a process
                               Authorized            by which prompt
                               emergency personnel   access to vital
                               are provided prompt   equipment is
                               access to affected    assured while at
                               areas and             the same time
                               equipment..           ensuring the
                              (g)(4)(ii)(B)          detection of
                               Attempted or actual   unauthorized entry,
                               unauthorized entry    and that this
                               to vital equipment    process would be
                               is detected..         implemented in a
                              (g)(4)(ii)(C) The      manner that is
                               capability to         consistent with the
                               prevent significant   proposed
                               core damage and       requirements of
                               spent fuel sabotage   this section and
                               is maintained..       ensures the
                                                     licensee capability
                                                     to satisfy the
                                                     performance
                                                     objective of the
                                                     proposed paragraph
                                                     (b) of this
                                                     section.

[[Page 62704]]

 
                              (g)(4)(iii) The       This requirement
                               licensee shall        would be added to
                               ensure that           provide a
                               restrictions for      performance based
                               site access and       requirement for
                               egress during         coordination of
                               emergency             security access
                               conditions are        controls during
                               coordinated with      emergencies with
                               responses by          the access needs of
                               offsite emergency     emergency response
                               support agencies      personnel. This
                               identified in the     proposed
                               site emergency        requirement is
                               plans.                intended to provide
                                                     the necessary level
                                                     of flexibility to
                                                     the licensee to
                                                     ensure access by
                                                     appropriate
                                                     personnel while
                                                     maintaining the
                                                     necessary security
                                                     posture for
                                                     controlling access
                                                     to areas where
                                                     dangerous
                                                     conditions exist,
                                                     such as violent
                                                     conflict involving
                                                     weapons.
                              (g)(5) Vehicles.....  This header would be
                                                     added for
                                                     formatting
                                                     purposes.
Sec.   73.55(d)(4) The        (g)(5)(i) The         This requirement
 licensee shall exercise       licensee shall        would be retained
 positive control over all     exercise control      and revised to
 such designated vehicles to   over all vehicles     apply to all
 assure that they are used     while inside the      vehicles and not be
 only by authorized persons    protected area and    limited to only
 and for authorized purposes.  vital areas to        designated
                               ensure they are       vehicles. Most
                               used only by          significantly, the
                               authorized persons    phrase ``all such
                               and for authorized    designated
                               purposes.             vehicles'' would be
                                                     deleted to remove
                                                     this limitation and
                                                     clarify that the
                                                     proposed
                                                     requirement applies
                                                     to any vehicle
                                                     granted access. The
                                                     word ``positive''
                                                     would be deleted to
                                                     remove
                                                     uncertainties
                                                     regarding the
                                                     meaning of this
                                                     word.
Sec.   73.55(d)(4) All        (g)(5)(ii) Vehicles   This requirement
 vehicles, except designated   inside the            would be retained
 licensee vehicles,            protected area or     and would contain a
 requiring entry into the      vital areas must be   significant
 protected area shall be       operated by an        revision to relieve
 escorted by a member of the   individual            the licensee from
 security organization while   authorized            the current
 within the protected area,    unescorted access     requirement to
 and * * *.                    to the area, or       escort a vehicle
                               must be escorted by   operated by an
                               an individual         individual who
                               trained, qualified,   otherwise has
                               and equipped to       unescorted access
                               perform vehicle       and relief from the
                               escort duties,        requirement that a
                               while inside the      member of the
                               area.                 security
                                                     organization must
                                                     escort vehicles.
                                                     The phrase
                                                     ``escorted by a
                                                     member of the
                                                     security
                                                     organization''
                                                     would be replaced
                                                     with the phrase
                                                     ``operated by an
                                                     individual
                                                     authorized
                                                     unescorted access
                                                     to the area, or
                                                     must be escorted
                                                     while inside the
                                                     area'' to allow
                                                     personnel
                                                     authorized
                                                     unescorted access,
                                                     to operate the
                                                     vehicle without
                                                     escort and to allow
                                                     a vehicle to be
                                                     escorted by an
                                                     individual other
                                                     than a member of
                                                     the security
                                                     organization if the
                                                     operator is not
                                                     authorized
                                                     unescorted access.
                                                     Training and
                                                     qualification
                                                     requirements for
                                                     escorts would be
                                                     addressed in the
                                                     proposed Sec.
                                                     73.55(g)(7) and
                                                     (g)(8).
Sec.   73.55(d)(4)            (g)(5)(iii) Vehicles  This requirement
 Designated licensee           inside the            would be retained
 vehicles shall be limited     protected area must   and revised. Most
 in their use to onsite        be limited to plant   significantly, the
 plant functions and shall     functions or          phrase ``Designated
 remain in the protected       emergencies, and      licensee'' would be
 area except for               must be disabled      deleted to broaden
 operational, maintenance,     when not in use.      the scope of this
 repair security and                                 proposed
 emergency purposes.                                 requirement to all
                                                     vehicles. Also, the
                                                     phrase ``shall
                                                     remain in the
                                                     protected area
                                                     except for
                                                     operational,
                                                     maintenance, repair
                                                     security and
                                                     emergency
                                                     purposes'' would be
                                                     deleted because it
                                                     would no longer be
                                                     needed. The word
                                                     ``disabled'' would
                                                     be added to specify
                                                     that when not in
                                                     use all vehicles
                                                     must be rendered
                                                     non-operational
                                                     such that the
                                                     vehicle would not
                                                     be in a ready-to-
                                                     use configuration.
                              (g)(5)(iv) Vehicles   This requirement
                               transporting          would be added to
                               hazardous materials   ensure the control
                               inside the            of hazardous
                               protected area must   material
                               be escorted by an     deliveries. The
                               armed member of the   Commission has
                               security              determined that the
                               organization.         level of control
                                                     described by this
                                                     proposed
                                                     requirement is
                                                     prudent and
                                                     necessary to
                                                     satisfy the
                                                     performance
                                                     objective of the
                                                     proposed paragraph
                                                     (b) of this
                                                     section.
                              (g)(6) Access         This header would be
                               control devices.      added for
                                                     formatting
                                                     purposes.

[[Page 62705]]

 
Sec.   73.55(d)(5) A          (g)(6)(i)             This requirement
 numbered picture badge        Identification        would be retained
 identification system shall   badges. The           and revised with
 be used for all individuals   licensee shall        minor revisions.
 who are authorized access     implement a           Most significantly,
 to protected areas without    numbered photo        the phrase ``and
 escort.                       identification        vital areas'' is
                               badge/key-card        added to provide
                               system for all        necessary focus
                               individuals           that badges apply
                               authorized            to both the
                               unescorted access     protected area and
                               to the protected      vital areas. Access
                               area and vital        to the protected
                               areas.                area does not
                                                     include access to a
                                                     vital area except
                                                     as required to
                                                     perform duties.
Sec.   73.55(d)(5)(ii)        (g)(6)(i)(A)          This requirement
 Badges may be removed from    Identification        would be retained
 the protected area when       badges may be         and revised with
 measures are in place to      removed from the      minor revisions.
 confirm the true identity     protected area only   Most significantly,
 and authorization for         when measures are     the phrase ``upon
 access of the badge holder    in place to confirm   entry to the
 upon entry to the protected   the true identity     protected area''
 area.                         and authorization     would be replaced
                               for unescorted        with the phrase
                               access of the badge   ``before allowing
                               holder before         unescorted access
                               allowing unescorted   to the protected
                               access to the         area'' to clarify
                               protected area.       that the
                                                     performance to be
                                                     achieved would be
                                                     to confirm and
                                                     verify access
                                                     authorization
                                                     before granting
                                                     access to any
                                                     individual.
Sec.   73.55(d)(5)(ii)        (g)(6)(i)(B) Except   This requirement
 Badges shall be displayed     where operational     would retain the
 by all individuals while      safety concerns       current requirement
 inside the protected area.    require otherwise,    to display badges
                               identification        at all times and
                               badges must be        would be revised to
                               clearly displayed     address the
                               by all individuals    exception to this
                               while inside the      proposed
                               protected area and    requirement. The
                               vital areas.          phrase ``Except
                                                     where operational
                                                     safety concerns
                                                     require
                                                     otherwise,'' would
                                                     be added to account
                                                     for considerations
                                                     such as
                                                     radiological
                                                     control
                                                     requirements or
                                                     foreign material
                                                     exclusion
                                                     requirements, that
                                                     may preclude this
                                                     requirement. In
                                                     addition, the word
                                                     ``clearly'' would
                                                     be added to
                                                     describe the
                                                     expected
                                                     performance that
                                                     badges would be
                                                     visible to provide
                                                     an indication of
                                                     authorization to be
                                                     in the area.
                              (g)(6)(i)(C) The      This requirement
                               licensee shall        would be added to
                               maintain a record,    account for
                               to include the name   technological
                               and areas to which    advancements
                               unescorted access     commonly associated
                               is granted, of all    with electronically
                               individuals to whom   based badging
                               photo                 systems used by
                               identification        licensees. The
                               badge/key-cards       Commission has
                               have been issued.     determined that
                                                     this proposed
                                                     requirement is
                                                     prudent and
                                                     necessary because
                                                     such a record would
                                                     be automatically
                                                     made as a standard
                                                     function and intent
                                                     of this type of
                                                     system. In
                                                     addition, badging
                                                     systems commonly
                                                     used by licensees
                                                     include the ability
                                                     to program remote
                                                     card-readers which
                                                     are designed to
                                                     grant or deny
                                                     access to specific
                                                     areas based upon
                                                     the information
                                                     electronically
                                                     associated with
                                                     specific badges/key-
                                                     cards. This
                                                     proposed
                                                     requirement would
                                                     not specify the
                                                     media in which this
                                                     record must be
                                                     maintained to allow
                                                     for electronic
                                                     storage.
Sec.   73.55(d)(8) All keys,  (g)(6)(ii) Keys,      This requirement
 locks, combinations, and      locks,                would be retained
 related access control        combinations, and     and revised with
 devices used to control       passwords. All        minor revisions.
 access to protected areas     keys, locks,          Most significantly,
 and vital areas must be       combinations,         the word
 controlled to reduce the      passwords, and        ``passwords'' would
 probability of compromise.    related access        be added to account
                               control devices       for technological
                               used to control       advancements
                               access to protected   associated with the
                               areas, vital areas,   use of computers.
                               security systems,     The phrase
                               and safeguards        ``security systems,
                               information must be   and safeguards
                               controlled and        information'' would
                               accounted for to      be added to
                               reduce the            emphasize the need
                               probability of        to control access
                               compromise. The       to these items. The
                               licensee shall:       phrase ``and
                                                     accounted for''
                                                     would be added to
                                                     confirm possession
                                                     by the individual
                                                     to whom the access
                                                     control device has
                                                     been issued.

[[Page 62706]]

 
Sec.   73.55(d)(8) The        (g)(6)(ii)(A) Issue   This requirement
 licensee shall issue keys,    access control        would be retained
 locks, combinations, and      devices only to       and revised with
 other access control          individuals who       minor revisions.
 devices to protected areas    require unescorted    Most significantly,
 and vital areas only to       access to perform     the phrase
 persons granted unescorted    official duties and   ``protected areas
 facility access.              responsibilities.     and vital areas''
                                                     would be replaced
                                                     with the phrase
                                                     ``to perform
                                                     official duties and
                                                     responsibilities''
                                                     to account for
                                                     access control
                                                     devices to items or
                                                     systems that may be
                                                     located outside of
                                                     protected and vital
                                                     areas, such as to
                                                     computer systems
                                                     and safeguards
                                                     information storage
                                                     cabinets. The
                                                     phrase ``keys,
                                                     locks,
                                                     combinations, and
                                                     other access
                                                     control devices''
                                                     would be replaced
                                                     by the phrase
                                                     ``access control
                                                     devices'' to
                                                     generically
                                                     describe these
                                                     items and account
                                                     for other
                                                     technological
                                                     advancements that
                                                     may occur in the
                                                     future.
                              (g)(6)(ii)(B)         This requirement
                               Maintain a record,    would be added to
                               to include name and   facilitate
                               affiliation, of all   achievement of the
                               individuals to whom   current requirement
                               access control        to control access
                               devices have been     control devices to
                               issued, and           reduce the
                               implement a process   probability of
                               to account for        compromise. The use
                               access control        of key control logs
                               devices at least      and annual
                               annually.             inventories is a
                                                     commonly used
                                                     mechanism for any
                                                     security system and
                                                     therefore, the
                                                     Commission has
                                                     determined that
                                                     this proposed
                                                     requirement is a
                                                     prudent and
                                                     necessary
                                                     enhancement to
                                                     facilitate the
                                                     licensee's
                                                     capability to
                                                     achieve the
                                                     performance
                                                     objective of the
                                                     proposed paragraph
                                                     (b) of this
                                                     section.
Sec.   73.55(d)(8) Whenever   (g)(6)(ii)(C)         This requirement
 there is evidence or          Implement             would be retained
 suspicion that any key,       compensatory          and revised to
 lock, combination, or         measures upon         provide a
 related access control        discovery or          performance based
 device may have been          suspicion that any    requirement for
 compromised, it must be       access control        compensatory
 changed or rotated.           device may have       measures taken in
                               been compromised.     response to
                               Compensatory          compromise. Most
                               measures must         significantly, the
                               remain in effect      phrase ``it must be
                               until the             changed or
                               compromise is         rotated'' would be
                               corrected.            captured in the
                                                     proposed Sec.
                                                     73.55(g)(6)(ii) (D)
                                                     and (E). The phrase
                                                     ``Compensatory
                                                     Measures must
                                                     remain in effect
                                                     until the
                                                     compromise is
                                                     corrected'' would
                                                     be added to provide
                                                     focus specific to
                                                     when compensatory
                                                     measures would no
                                                     longer apply.
Sec.   73.55(d)(8) Whenever   (g)(6)(ii)(D)         This requirement
 there is evidence or          Retrieve, change,     would be retained
 suspicion that any key,       rotate, deactivate,   and revised with
 lock, combination, or         or otherwise          minor revisions.
 related access control        disable access        Most significantly,
 devices may have been         control devices       the words
 compromised, it must be       that have been, or    ``retrieve'',
 changed or rotated.           may have been         ``deactivate'', and
                               compromised.          ``disable'' would
                                                     be added to ensure
                                                     focus is provided
                                                     on these actions
                                                     relative to
                                                     ensuring control of
                                                     access control
                                                     devices and to
                                                     account for
                                                     electronic devices.
Sec.   73.55(d)(7)(C)         (g)(6)(ii)(E)         This requirement
 Revoke, in the case of an     Retrieve, change,     would retain and
 individual's involuntary      rotate, deactivate,   combine two current
 termination for cause, the    or otherwise          requirements to
 individual's unescorted       disable all access    specify the actions
 facility access and           control devices       required to control
 retrieve his or her           issued to             access control
 identification badge and      individuals who no    devices issued to
 other entry devices, as       longer require        personnel who no
 applicable, prior to or       unescorted access     longer possess a
 simultaneously with           to the areas for      need for access.
 notifying this individual     which the devices     The Commission has
 of his or her termination.    were designed.        determined that the
Sec.   73.55(d)(8) Whenever                          cause for
 an individual's unescorted                          revocation of
 access is revoked due to                            unescorted access
 his or her lack of                                  authorization does
 trustworthiness,                                    not effect the
 reliability, or inadequate                          actions needed to
 work performance, keys,                             reduce the
 locks, combinations, and                            probability of
 related access control                              compromise.
 devices to which that                               Therefore, the same
 person had access must be                           actions are
 changed or rotated.                                 necessary whether
                                                     access is revoked
                                                     under favorable or
                                                     unfavorable
                                                     conditions.
                                                     Whenever an
                                                     individual no
                                                     longer requires
                                                     access to an area
                                                     the access control
                                                     devices issued to
                                                     that individual
                                                     would be retrieved,
                                                     changed, rotated,
                                                     deactivated, or
                                                     otherwise disabled
                                                     to provide high
                                                     assurance that the
                                                     individual would
                                                     not continue to
                                                     have access to the
                                                     item or location.
                              (g)(7) Visitors.....  This header would be
                                                     added for
                                                     formatting
                                                     purposes.

[[Page 62707]]

 
Sec.   73.55(d)(6)            (g)(7)(i) The         This requirement
 Individuals not authorized    licensee may permit   would retain the
 by the licensee to enter      escorted access to    current requirement
 protected areas without       the protected area    to provide escorted
 escort shall be escorted by   to individuals who    access with minor
 a watchman or other           do not have           revisions. This
 individual designated by      unescorted access     proposed
 the licensee while in a       authorization in      requirement would
 protected area and shall be   accordance with the   address visitor
 badged to indicate that an    requirements of       access and would
 escort is required.           Sec.   73.56 and      specify that anyone
                               part 26 of this       who has not
                               chapter. The          satisfied the
                               licensee shall:       requirements of
                                                     Sec.   73.56 and
                                                     part 26 of this
                                                     chapter would be
                                                     considered to be a
                                                     visitor. The
                                                     current requirement
                                                     for escorts would
                                                     be addressed in
                                                     proposed Sec.
                                                     73.55(g)(8).
                              (g)(7)(i)(A)          This requirement
                               Implement             would be added to
                               procedures for        require
                               processing,           implementing
                               escorting, and        procedures that
                               controlling           describe how
                               visitors.             visitors would be
                                                     processed,
                                                     escorted, and
                                                     controlled.
                              (g)(7)(i)(B) Confirm  This requirement
                               the identity of       would be added to
                               each visitor          require the
                               through physical      verification of the
                               presentation of a     true identity of
                               recognized            non-employee
                               identification card   individuals through
                               issued by a local,    the presentation of
                               State, or Federal     photographic
                               Government agency     government issued
                               that includes a       identification
                               photo or contains     (i.e., driver's
                               physical              license) which
                               characteristics of    provides physical
                               the individual        characteristics
                               requesting escorted   that can be
                               access.               compared to the
                                                     holder. The word
                                                     ``recognized''
                                                     would be used to
                                                     provide flexibility
                                                     for other types of
                                                     identification that
                                                     may be issued by
                                                     local, State or
                                                     Federal
                                                     Governments.
Sec.   73.55(d)(6) In         (g)(7)(i)(C)          This requirement
 addition, the licensee        Maintain a visitor    would be retained
 shall require that each       control register in   with minor
 individual register his or    which all visitors    revision.
 her name, date, time,         shall register
 purpose of visit,             their name, date,
 employment affiliation,       time, purpose of
 citizenship, and name of      visit, employment
 the individual to be          affiliation,
 visited.                      citizenship, and
                               name of the
                               individual to be
                               visited before
                               being escorted into
                               any protected or
                               vital area.
Sec.   73.55(d)(6)            (g)(7)(i)(D) Issue a  This requirement
 Individuals not authorized    visitor badge to      would be retained
 by the licensee to enter      all visitors that     with minor revision
 protected areas without       clearly indicates     for formatting
 escort shall * * * be         that an escort is     purposes. Most
 badged to indicate that an    required.             significantly, the
 escort is required.                                 word ``clearly''
                                                     would be added to
                                                     focus on display of
                                                     the badge in a
                                                     manner that easily
                                                     identifies the
                                                     individual as
                                                     requiring an
                                                     escort.
Sec.   73.55(d)(6)            (g)(7)(i)(E) Escort   This requirement
 Individuals not authorized    all visitors, at      would retain the
 by the licensee to enter      all times, while      requirement for
 protected areas without       inside the            escort with minor
 escort shall be escorted by   protected area and    revision for
 a watchman or other           vital areas.          formatting
 individual designated by                            purposes. Most
 the licensee while in a                             significantly, the
 protected area and * * *.                           requirement for who
                                                     performs these
                                                     escort duties is
                                                     moved to the
                                                     proposed paragraph
                                                     (g)(8) of this
                                                     section.
Sec.   73.55(d)(5)(i) An      (g)(7)(ii)            This requirement
 individual not employed by    Individuals not       would be retained
 the licensee but who          employed by the       with minor
 requires frequent and         licensee but who      revisions. Most
 extended access to            require frequent      significantly, the
 protected and vital areas     and extended          phrase ``shall
 may be authorized access to   unescorted access     satisfy the access
 such areas without escort     to the protected      authorization
 provided that he receives a   area and vital        requirements of
 picture badge upon entrance   areas shall satisfy   Sec.   73.56 and
 into the protected area       the access            part 26 of this
 which must be returned upon   authorization         chapter'' would be
 exit from the protected       requirements of       added to clarify
 area and which indicates:     Sec.   73.56 and      the requirement
                               part 26 of this       that these
                               chapter and shall     individual's
                               be issued a non-      satisfy the same
                               employee photo        background check
                               identification        requirements and
                               badge that is         Behavior
                               easily                Observation Program
                               distinguished from    participation that
                               other                 would be applied to
                               identification        any other licensee
                               badges before being   employee for
                               allowed unescorted    unescorted access
                               access to the         authorization. In
                               protected area. Non-  addition, the
                               employee photo        phrase ``which must
                               identification        be returned upon
                               badges must           exit from the
                               indicate:             protected area''
                                                     would be deleted
                                                     because removal of
                                                     badges from the
                                                     protected area
                                                     would be addressed
                                                     in the proposed
                                                     paragraph
                                                     (g)(6)(i)(A).
Sec.   73.55(d)(5)(i)(A) Non- (g)(7)(ii)(A) Non-    This requirement
 employee, no escort           employee, no escort   would be retained
 required;                     required.             with minor revision
                                                     for formatting
                                                     purposes.
Sec.   73.55(d)(5)(i)(B)      (g)(7)(ii)(B) Areas   This requirement
 Areas to which access is      to which access is    would be retained
 authorized; and               authorized.           with minor revision
                                                     for formatting
                                                     purposes.
Sec.   73.55(d)(5)(i)(c) The  (g)(7)(ii)(C) The     This requirement
 period for which access has   period for which      would be retained
 been authorized.              access is             with minor revision
                               authorized.           for formatting
                                                     purposes.
                              (g)(7)(ii)(D) The     This requirement
                               individual's          would be added to
                               employer.             facilitate
                                                     identification of
                                                     this type of non-
                                                     employee and the
                                                     type of activities
                                                     this individual
                                                     should be
                                                     performing.

[[Page 62708]]

 
                              (g)(7)(ii)(E) A       This requirement
                               means to determine    would be added for
                               the individual's      emergency planning
                               emergency plan        purposes.
                               assembly area.
                              (g)(8) Escorts. The   This requirement
                               licensee shall        would be added to
                               ensure that all       provided
                               escorts are trained   performance based
                               in accordance with    requirements for
                               appendix B to this    satisfying the
                               part, the approved    escort requirements
                               training and          of this proposed
                               qualification plan,   rule and would
                               and licensee          provide regulatory
                               policies and          stability through
                               procedures.           the consistent
                                                     application of
                                                     visitor controls at
                                                     all sites. Based on
                                                     changes to the
                                                     threat environment,
                                                     the Commission has
                                                     determined that
                                                     emphasis on the
                                                     identification and
                                                     control of visitors
                                                     is a prudent and
                                                     necessary
                                                     enhancement to
                                                     facilitate licensee
                                                     achievement of the
                                                     performance basis
                                                     of the proposed
                                                     paragraph (b)(1) of
                                                     this section.
                              (g)(8)(i) Escorts     This requirement
                               shall be authorized   would be added to
                               unescorted access     establish a basic
                               to all areas in       qualification
                               which they will       criteria for
                               perform escort        individuals
                               duties.               performing escort
                                                     duties. Individuals
                                                     not authorized
                                                     unescorted access
                                                     to an area must be
                                                     escorted and
                                                     therefore, would
                                                     not be qualified to
                                                     perform escort
                                                     duties in that
                                                     area.
                              (g)(8)(ii)            This requirement
                               Individuals           would be added to
                               assigned to escort    establish a basic
                               visitors shall be     qualification
                               provided a means of   criteria for
                               timely                individuals
                               communication with    performing escort
                               both alarm stations   duties. The phrase
                               in a manner that      ``timely
                               ensures the ability   communication''
                               to summon             would mean the
                               assistance when       ability to call for
                               needed.               assistance before
                                                     that ability can be
                                                     taken away.
                              (g)(8)(iii)           This requirement
                               Individuals           would be added to
                               assigned to vehicle   establish a basic
                               escort duties shall   qualification
                               be provided a means   criteria for
                               of continuous         individuals
                               communication with    performing escort
                               both alarm stations   duties. The word
                               to ensure the         ``continuous
                               ability to summon     communication''
                               assistance when       would mean
                               needed.               possession of a
                                                     direct line of
                                                     communication for
                                                     immediate
                                                     notification, such
                                                     as a radio.
                              (g)(8)(iv) Escorts    This requirement
                               shall be              would be added to
                               knowledgeable of      establish a basic
                               those activities      qualification
                               that are authorized   criteria for
                               to be performed       individuals
                               within the areas      performing escort
                               for which they are    duties. The primary
                               assigned to perform   responsibility of
                               escort duties and     an escort would be
                               must also be          the identification
                               knowledgeable of      and reporting of
                               those activities      unauthorized
                               that are authorized   activities,
                               to be performed by    therefore, to
                               any individual for    perform escort
                               which the escort is   duties the
                               assigned              individual must
                               responsibility.       possess this
                                                     knowledge in order
                                                     to be an effective
                                                     escort and
                                                     recognize an event
                                                     involving an
                                                     unauthorized
                                                     activity.
                              (g)(8)(v) Visitor to  This requirement
                               escort ratios shall   would be added to
                               be limited to 10 to   establish a basic
                               1 in the protected    restriction to
                               area and 5 to 1 in    ensure that
                               vital areas,          individuals
                               provided that the     performing escort
                               necessary             duties are able to
                               observation and       maintain control
                               control               over the personnel
                               requirements of       being escorted. The
                               this section can be   phrase ``provided
                               maintained by the     that the necessary
                               assigned escort       observation and
                               over all visitor      control
                               activities.           requirements of
                                                     this section can be
                                                     maintained'' would
                                                     provide flexibility
                                                     for the licensee to
                                                     reduce the
                                                     specified ratios to
                                                     facilitate
                                                     achievement of the
                                                     performance
                                                     objective of the
                                                     proposed paragraph
                                                     (b).
                              (h) Search programs.  This header would be
                                                     added for
                                                     formatting
                                                     purposes.
Sec.   73.55(d)(2) At the     (h)(1) At each        This requirement
 point of personnel and        designated access     would be retained
 vehicle access into a         control point into    with minor
 protected area, all hand-     the owner             revisions. Most
 carried packages shall be     controlled area and   significantly, the
 searched for devices such     protected area, the   phrase ``for
 as firearms, explosives,      licensee shall        devices such as
 and incendiary devices, or    search individuals,   firearms,
 other items which could be    vehicles, packages,   explosives, and
 used for radiological         deliveries, and       incendiary devices,
 sabotage.                     materials in          or other items
                               accordance with the   which could be used
                               requirements of       for radiological
                               this section and      sabotage'' would be
                               the approved          replaced with the
                               security plans,       phrase ``in
                               before granting       accordance with the
                               access.               requirements of
                                                     this section and
                                                     the approved
                                                     security plans'' to
                                                     provide language
                                                     that would make
                                                     this proposed
                                                     requirement
                                                     generically
                                                     applicable to all
                                                     searches.

[[Page 62709]]

 
Sec.   73.55(d)(2) At the     (h)(1)(i) The         This requirement
 point of personnel and        objective of the      would be retained
 vehicle access into a         search program must   and revised to
 protected area, all hand-     be to deter,          focus this proposed
 carried packages shall be     detect, and prevent   requirement on the
 searched for devices such     the introduction of   objective of the
 as firearms, explosives,      unauthorized          search program for
 and incendiary devices, or    firearms,             all areas and not
 other items which could be    explosives,           limit the search
 used for radiological         incendiary devices,   function to only
 sabotage.                     or other              protected and vital
                               unauthorized          areas. The
                               materials and         Commission has
                               devices into          determined that
                               designated areas in   because of changes
                               which the             to the threat
                               unauthorized items    environment, the
                               could be used to      focus of protective
                               disable personnel,    measures must be to
                               equipment, and        protect any area
                               systems necessary     from which the
                               to meet the           licensee capability
                               performance           to meet the
                               objective and         performance
                               requirements of       objective and
                               paragraph (b) of      requirements of the
                               this section.         proposed paragraph
                                                     (b) of this section
                                                     could be disabled
                                                     or destroyed.
Sec.   73.55(d)(1) The        (h)(1)(ii) The        This requirement
 search function for           search requirements   would be retained
 detection of firearms,        for unauthorized      with minor
 explosives, and incendiary    firearms,             revisions. The
 devices must be               explosives,           phrase ``or other
 accomplished through the      incendiary devices,   unauthorized
 use of both firearms and      or other              materials and
 explosive detection           unauthorized          devices'' would be
 equipment capable of          materials and         added to account
 detecting those devices.      devices must be       for future
                               accomplished          technological
                               through the use of    advancements. The
                               equipment capable     phrase ``and
                               of detecting these    through visual and
                               unauthorized items    hands-on physical
                               and through visual    searches'' would be
                               and hands-on          added to ensure
                               physical searches,    these aspects of
                               as needed to ensure   the search process
                               all items are         are considered and
                               identified before     applied when
                               granting access.      needed.
                              (h)(1)(iii) Only      This requirement
                               trained and           would be added for
                               qualified members     consistency with
                               of the security       the current Sec.
                               organization, and     73.55(b)(4)(i), and
                               other trained and     clarification for
                               qualified personnel   ``observation'' of
                               designated by the     search activities
                               licensee, shall       by personnel. The
                               perform search        phrase ``other
                               activities or be      trained and
                               assigned duties and   qualified personnel
                               responsibilities      designated by the
                               required to satisfy   licensee'' would be
                               observation           used to account for
                               requirements for      non-security
                               the search            personnel who would
                               activities.           be assigned search
                                                     duties relative to
                                                     supply or warehouse
                                                     functions or other
                                                     types of bulk
                                                     shipments.
                              (h)(2) The licensee   This requirement
                               shall establish and   would be added for
                               implement written     consistency with
                               search procedures     the current Sec.
                               for all access        73.55(b)(3)(i).
                               control points
                               before granting
                               access to any
                               individual,
                               vehicle, package,
                               delivery, or
                               material.
                              (h)(2)(i) Search      This requirement
                               procedures must       would be added for
                               ensure that items     consistency with
                               possessed by an       the current Sec.
                               individual, or        73.55(d)(1)
                               contained within a    relative to the use
                               vehicle or package,   of search equipment
                               must be clearly       and to specify a
                               identified as not     requirement for the
                               being a prohibited    licensee to
                               item before           identify items that
                               granting access       may be obscured
                               beyond the access     from observation by
                               control point for     equipment such as X-
                               which the search is   ray equipment. This
                               conducted.            requirement would
                                                     ensure that human
                                                     interaction with
                                                     search equipment is
                                                     effective and that
                                                     assigned personnel
                                                     are aware of all
                                                     items observed or
                                                     are not identified
                                                     by search
                                                     equipment.
                              (h)(2)(ii) The        This requirement
                               licensee shall        would be added for
                               visually and          consistency with
                               physically hand       the current Sec.
                               search all            73.55(d)(1),
                               individuals,          relative to the
                               vehicles, and         purpose of the
                               packages containing   search function to
                               items that cannot     identify items that
                               be or are not         may be obscured
                               clearly identified    from observation by
                               by search equipment.  equipment such as X-
                                                     ray equipment. This
                                                     proposed
                                                     requirement intends
                                                     to ensure that the
                                                     licensee take
                                                     appropriate actions
                                                     to ensure all items
                                                     granted access to
                                                     the PA would be
                                                     identified before
                                                     granting access.
Sec.   73.55(d)(1) Whenever   (h)(3) Whenever       This requirement
 firearms or explosives        search equipment is   would be retained
 detection equipment at a      out of service or     with minor
 portal is out of service or   is not operating      revisions. The
 not operating                 satisfactorily,       phrase ``firearms
 satisfactorily, the           trained and           or explosives
 licensee shall conduct a      qualified members     detection equipment
 physical pat-down search of   of the security       at a portal'' would
 all persons who would         organization shall    be replaced with
 otherwise have been subject   conduct a hands-on    the phrase ``search
 to equipment searches.        physical search of    equipment `` to
                               all individuals,      generically
                               vehicles, packages,   describe this
                               deliveries, and       equipment. The
                               materials that        phrase ``a physical
                               would otherwise       pat-down search''
                               have been subject     would be replaced
                               to equipment          with the phrase ``a
                               searches.             hands-on physical
                                                     search'' to update
                                                     the language
                                                     commonly used to
                                                     describe this
                                                     activity.

[[Page 62710]]

 
Sec.   73.55(d)(1) When the   (h)(4) When an        This requirement
 licensee has cause to         attempt to            would be retained
 suspect that an individual    introduce             with minor
 is attempting to introduce    unauthorized items    revisions to
 firearms, explosives, or      has occurred or is    provide additional
 incendiary devices into       suspected, the        performance based
 protected areas, the          licensee shall        requirements
 licensee shall conduct a      implement actions     relative to
 physical pat-down search of   to ensure that the    achieving the
 that individual.              suspect               desired results.
                               individuals,
                               vehicles, packages,
                               deliveries, and
                               materials are
                               denied access and
                               shall perform a
                               visual and hands-on
                               physical search to
                               determine the
                               absence or
                               existence of a
                               threat.
                              (h)(5) Vehicle        This requirement
                               search procedures     would be added to
                               must be performed     provide a
                               by at least two (2)   performance based
                               properly trained      requirement for
                               and equipped          performing vehicle
                               security personnel,   searches. This
                               at least one of       proposed
                               whom is positioned    requirement would
                               to observe the        ensure that
                               search process and    unauthorized
                               provide a timely      activities would be
                               response to           identified and a
                               unauthorized          timely response
                               activities if         would be initiated
                               necessary.            at a vehicle search
                                                     area, to include an
                                                     armed response.
                                                     Based on changes to
                                                     the threat
                                                     environment, the
                                                     Commission has
                                                     determined that
                                                     this requirement
                                                     would facilitate
                                                     achievement of the
                                                     performance
                                                     objective and
                                                     requirements of the
                                                     proposed paragraph
                                                     (b) of this
                                                     section.
Sec.   73.55(d)(4) Vehicle    (h)(6) Vehicle areas  This requirement
 areas to be searched shall    to be searched must   would be retained
 include the cab, engine       include, but are      with minor
 compartment, undercarriage,   not limited to, the   revisions.
 and cargo area.               cab, engine
                               compartment,
                               undercarriage, and
                               cargo area.
                              (h)(7) Vehicle        This requirement
                               search checkpoints    would be added to
                               must be equipped      provide additional
                               with video            performance based
                               surveillance          requirements
                               equipment that must   relative to
                               be monitored by an    achieving the
                               individual capable    desired results for
                               of initiating and     vehicle searches at
                               directing a timely    any location
                               response to           designated for the
                               unauthorized          performance of
                               activity.             vehicle searches.
                                                     To satisfy this
                                                     proposed
                                                     requirement, the
                                                     individual assigned
                                                     to monitor search
                                                     activities need not
                                                     be located in the
                                                     CAS or SAS, but
                                                     rather may be
                                                     located in any
                                                     position from which
                                                     the monitoring and
                                                     notification
                                                     requirements of
                                                     this section could
                                                     be assured.
Sec.   73.55(d)(1) * * *      (h)(8) Exceptions to  This requirement
 except bona fide Federal,     the search            would retain,
 State, and local law          requirements of       combine, and revise
 enforcement personnel on      this section must     two current
 official duty to these        be submitted to the   requirements Sec.
 equipment searches upon       Commission for        73.55(d)(1) and (4)
 entry into a protected area.  prior review and      to generically
Sec.   73.55(d)(4) * * *       approval and must     account for those
 except under emergency        be identified in      instances where
 conditions, shall be          the approved          search requirements
 searched for items which      security plans.       would not be met
 could be used for sabotage                          before granting
 purposes prior to entry                             access beyond a
 into the protected area.                            physical barrier.
                                                     This proposed
                                                     requirement would
                                                     require that the
                                                     licensee specify in
                                                     the approved plans
                                                     the specific
                                                     circumstances under
                                                     which search
                                                     requirements would
                                                     not be satisfied.
Sec.   73.55(d)(3) * * *      (h)(8)(i) Vehicles    This requirement
 except those Commission       and items that may    would be retained
 approved delivery and         be excepted from      and revised. Most
 inspection activities         the search            significantly, this
 specifically designated by    requirements of       requirement would
 the licensee to be carried    this section must     be revised to
 out within vital or           be escorted by an     ensure that
 protected areas for reasons   armed individual      vehicles and items
 of safety, security or        who is trained and    excepted from
 operational necessity.        equipped to observe   search requirements
                               offloading and        before entry into
                               perform search        the protected area
                               activities at the     are escorted by an
                               final destination     armed individual
                               within the            and searched when
                               protected area.       offloaded to
                                                     provide assurance
                                                     that unauthorized
                                                     personnel and items
                                                     would be detected
                                                     and reported.
Sec.   73.55(d)(4) * * * to   (h)(8)(ii) To the     This requirement
 the extent practicable,       extent practicable,   would be retained
 shall be off loaded in the    items excepted from   with minor
 protected area at a           search must be off    revision.
 specific designated           loaded only at
 materials receiving area      specified receiving
 that is not adjacent to a     areas that are not
 vital area.                   adjacent to a vital
                               area.
                              (h)(8)(iii) The       This requirement
                               excepted items must   would be added to
                               be searched at the    provide a
                               receiving area and    performance based
                               opened at the final   requirement that
                               destination by an     would ensure that
                               individual familiar   the proposed
                               with the items.       requirement for
                                                     search is met at
                                                     the receiving area.
                              Sec.   73.55(i)       This header would be
                               Detection and         added for
                               assessment systems..  formatting
                                                     purposes.

[[Page 62711]]

 
                              (i)(1) The licensee   This requirement
                               shall establish and   would be added for
                               maintain an           consistency with
                               intrusion detection   the current
                               and assessment        requirement of 10
                               system that must      CFR 73.55(e)(1) and
                               provide, at all       the proposed Sec.
                               times, the            73.55(b)(2) through
                               capability for        (4). The phrase
                               early detection and   ``intrusion
                               assessment of         detection and
                               unauthorized          assessment system''
                               persons and           would be intended
                               activities.           to describe all
                                                     components (i.e.,
                                                     personnel,
                                                     procedures, and
                                                     equipment)
                                                     designated by the
                                                     licensee as
                                                     performing a
                                                     function(s)
                                                     required to detect
                                                     or assess
                                                     unauthorized
                                                     activities in any
                                                     area to which
                                                     access must be
                                                     controlled to meet
                                                     Commission
                                                     requirements. The
                                                     term ``system''
                                                     refers to how these
                                                     components interact
                                                     to satisfy
                                                     Commission
                                                     requirements. This
                                                     proposed
                                                     requirement does
                                                     not mandate
                                                     specific intrusion
                                                     detection equipment
                                                     for any specific
                                                     area, but rather
                                                     requires that the
                                                     system provide
                                                     detection and
                                                     assessment
                                                     capabilities that
                                                     meet Commission
                                                     requirements. The
                                                     phrase ``at all
                                                     times'' is used to
                                                     describe the
                                                     Commission's view
                                                     that the licensee
                                                     must have in place
                                                     and operational a
                                                     mechanism by which
                                                     all threats will be
                                                     detected and an
                                                     appropriate
                                                     response initiated,
                                                     at any time.
                                                    The Commission does
                                                     not mean to suggest
                                                     that a failure of
                                                     any component of a
                                                     system would
                                                     constitute an
                                                     automatic non-
                                                     compliance with
                                                     this proposed
                                                     requirement
                                                     provided the
                                                     failure is
                                                     identified and
                                                     compensatory
                                                     measures are
                                                     implemented within
                                                     a time frame
                                                     consistent with the
                                                     time lines
                                                     necessary to
                                                     prevent
                                                     exploitation of the
                                                     failure, beginning
                                                     at the time of the
                                                     failure.
Sec.   73.55(e)(1) All        (i)(2) Intrusion      This requirement
 alarms required pursuant to   detection equipment   would be retained
 this part must annunciate     must annunciate,      with three
 in a continuously manned      and video             significant
 central alarm station         assessment            revisions. The most
 located within the            equipment images      significant
 protected area and in at      shall display,        revision would be
 least one other               concurrently in at    the deletion of the
 continuously manned station   least two             current language
 not necessarily onsite, so    continuously          that describes
 that a single act cannot      staffed onsite        where the secondary
 remove the capability of      alarm stations, at    alarm station may
 calling for assistance or     least one of which    be located. Because
 otherwise responding to an    must be protected     of changes to the
 alarm.                        in accordance with    threat environment
                               the requirements of   the Commission has
                               paragraphs            determined that to
                               (e)(6)(v),            ensure the
                               (e)(7)(iii), and      functions required
                               (i)(8)(ii) of this    to be performed by
                               section.              the central alarm
                                                     are maintained,
                                                     both alarm stations
                                                     must be located
                                                     onsite. As all
                                                     current licensees
                                                     have their
                                                     secondary alarm
                                                     station onsite, the
                                                     Commission has
                                                     determined that
                                                     deletion of the
                                                     ``not necessarily
                                                     onsite'' provision,
                                                     would have no
                                                     impact.
                                                    The second
                                                     significant
                                                     revision is the
                                                     addition of the
                                                     word
                                                     ``concurrently'' to
                                                     provide a
                                                     performance based
                                                     requirement that
                                                     focuses on the need
                                                     to ensure that both
                                                     alarm station
                                                     operators are
                                                     notified of a
                                                     potential threat,
                                                     are capable of
                                                     making a timely and
                                                     independent
                                                     assessment, and
                                                     have equal
                                                     capabilities to
                                                     ensure that a
                                                     timely response is
                                                     made. This proposed
                                                     requirement would
                                                     be necessary for
                                                     consistency with
                                                     the current
                                                     requirement to
                                                     protect against a
                                                     single act. The
                                                     third significant
                                                     revision would be
                                                     the addition of the
                                                     phrase ``and video
                                                     assessment
                                                     equipment images
                                                     shall display'' to
                                                     add a performance
                                                     based requirement
                                                     that focuses on the
                                                     relationship
                                                     between detection
                                                     and assessment.

[[Page 62712]]

 
                              (i)(3) The            This requirement
                               licensee's            would be added to
                               intrusion detection   provide performance
                               system must be        based requirements
                               designed to ensure    consistent with the
                               that both alarm       current Sec.
                               station operators:    73.55(e)(1), and
                              (i)(3)(i) Are          the proposed
                               concurrently          requirements of
                               notified of the       this proposed
                               alarm annunciation.   section. The
                              (i)(3)(ii) Are         proposed
                               capable of making a   requirement for
                               timely assessment     dual knowledge and
                               of the cause of       dual capability
                               each alarm            within both alarm
                               annunciation.         stations provides a
                              (i)(3)(iii) Possess    defense-in-depth
                               the capability to     component
                               initiate a timely     consistent with the
                               response in           proposed
                               accordance with the   requirement for
                               approved security     protection against
                               plans, licensee       a single act.
                               protective
                               strategy, and
                               implementing
                               procedures.
                                                    Based on changes to
                                                     the threat
                                                     environment the
                                                     Commission has
                                                     determined this
                                                     proposed
                                                     requirement is a
                                                     prudent
                                                     clarification of
                                                     current
                                                     requirements
                                                     necessary to
                                                     facilitate the
                                                     licensee capability
                                                     to achieve the
                                                     performance
                                                     objective of the
                                                     proposed paragraph
                                                     (b)(1) of this
                                                     section.
                              (i)(4) Both alarm     This requirement
                               stations must be      would be added for
                               equipped with         consistency with
                               equivalent            the current Sec.
                               capabilities for      73.55(e)(1) and the
                               detection and         proposed
                               communication, and    requirements for
                               must be equipped      defense-in-depth
                               with functionally     and protection
                               equivalent            against a single
                               assessment,           act. The word
                               monitoring,           ``equivalent''
                               observation, and      would require the
                               surveillance          licensee to provide
                               capabilities to       both alarm stations
                               support the           with detection and
                               effective             communication
                               implementation of     equipment that
                               the approved          ensures each alarm
                               security plans and    station operator is
                               the licensee          knowledgeable of an
                               protective strategy   alarm annunciation
                               in the event that     at each alarm point
                               either alarm          and zone, and can
                               station is disabled.  communicate the
                                                     initiation of an
                                                     appropriate
                                                     response to include
                                                     the disposition of
                                                     each alarm. The
                                                     phrase
                                                     ``functionally
                                                     equivalent'' would
                                                     require that both
                                                     alarm stations be
                                                     equally equipped to
                                                     perform those
                                                     assessment,
                                                     surveillance,
                                                     observation, and
                                                     monitoring
                                                     functions needed to
                                                     support the
                                                     effective
                                                     implementation of
                                                     the licensee
                                                     protective
                                                     strategy.
                                                    This proposed
                                                     requirement would
                                                     clarify the
                                                     Commission
                                                     expectation that
                                                     those video
                                                     technologies and
                                                     capabilities used
                                                     to support the
                                                     effective
                                                     implementation of
                                                     the approved
                                                     security plans and
                                                     the licensee
                                                     protective strategy
                                                     are equally
                                                     available for use
                                                     by both alarm
                                                     station operators
                                                     to ensure that the
                                                     functions of
                                                     detection,
                                                     assessment, and
                                                     communications can
                                                     be effectively
                                                     maintained and
                                                     utilized in the
                                                     event that one or
                                                     the other alarm
                                                     station is
                                                     disabled. Based on
                                                     changes to the
                                                     threat environment
                                                     the Commission has
                                                     determined that
                                                     this proposed
                                                     requirement is a
                                                     prudent and
                                                     necessary
                                                     clarification of
                                                     current
                                                     requirements and
                                                     Commission Orders
                                                     necessary to ensure
                                                     the performance
                                                     objective and
                                                     requirements of the
                                                     proposed paragraph
                                                     (b) of this section
                                                     are met.
Sec.   73.55(e)(1) * * * so   (i)(4)(i) The         This requirement
 that a single act cannot      licensee shall        would be retained
 remove the capability of      ensure that a         and revised to
 calling for assistance or     single act cannot     provide additional
 otherwise responding to an    remove the            clarification
 alarm.                        capability of both    regarding the
                               alarm stations to     critical functions
                               detect and assess     determined
                               unauthorized          essential and which
                               activities, respond   must be maintained
                               to an alarm, summon   to carry out an
                               offsite assistance,   effective response
                               implement the         to threats
                               protective            consistent with the
                               strategy, provide     proposed
                               command and           performance
                               control, or           objective and
                               otherwise prevent     requirements of
                               significant core      paragraph (b) of
                               damage and spent      this section.
                               fuel sabotage.

[[Page 62713]]

 
Sec.   73.55(e)(1) Onsite     (i)(4)(ii) The alarm  This requirement
 secondary power supply        station functions     would retain the
 systems for alarm             in paragraph (i)(4)   current requirement
 annunciator equipment * * *.  of this section       for secondary power
                               must remain           with two
                               operable from an      significant
                               uninterruptible       revisions. First,
                               backup power supply   the phrase
                               in the event of the   ``annunciator
                               loss of normal        equipment'' would
                               power.                be replaced with
                                                     the phrase ``alarm
                                                     station functions''
                                                     to ensure that the
                                                     equipment required
                                                     by each alarm
                                                     station to fulfill
                                                     its assigned
                                                     functions, are
                                                     available and
                                                     operational without
                                                     interruption due to
                                                     a loss of normal
                                                     power. Second, the
                                                     word
                                                     ``uninterruptible''
                                                     would be added to
                                                     clarify the
                                                     Commission's view
                                                     that the operation
                                                     of detection and
                                                     assessment
                                                     equipment must be
                                                     maintained without
                                                     interruption, in
                                                     the event of a loss
                                                     of normal power.
                                                     Backup power supply
                                                     for non-portable
                                                     communication
                                                     equipment is
                                                     addressed in the
                                                     proposed paragraph
                                                     (j)(5) of this
                                                     section. Based on
                                                     changes to the
                                                     threat environment,
                                                     the Commission has
                                                     determined that
                                                     this proposed
                                                     requirement is
                                                     prudent and
                                                     necessary to
                                                     facilitate
                                                     achievement of the
                                                     performance
                                                     objective and
                                                     requirements of the
                                                     proposed paragraph
                                                     (b) of this
                                                     section.
                              (i)(5) Detection.     This requirement
                               Detection             would be added for
                               capabilities must     consistency with
                               be provided by        the current Sec.
                               security              73.55(c)(4) and to
                               organization          provide a
                               personnel and         performance based
                               intrusion detection   requirement for
                               equipment, and        detection equipment
                               shall be defined in   to be capable of
                               implementing          operating under
                               procedures.           known/normal site
                               Intrusion detection   conditions such as
                               equipment must be     heat, wind,
                               capable of            humidity, fog,
                               operating as          cold, snowfall,
                               intended under the    etc. Equipment
                               conditions            failure and
                               encountered at the    abnormal or severe
                               facility.             weather cannot
                                                     always be predicted
                                                     but compensatory
                                                     measures would be
                                                     required in
                                                     accordance with the
                                                     proposed
                                                     requirements of
                                                     this section to
                                                     ensure compliance.
                              (i)(6) Assessment.    This requirement
                               Assessment            would be added for
                               capabilities must     consistency with
                               be provided by        the current Sec.
                               security              73.55(c)(4) and to
                               organization          provide a
                               personnel and video   performance based
                               assessment            requirement for
                               equipment, and        assessment
                               shall be described    equipment to be
                               in implementing       capable of
                               procedures. Video     operating under
                               assessment            known/normal site
                               equipment must be     conditions such as
                               capable of            heat, wind,
                               operating as          humidity, fog,
                               intended under the    cold, snowfall,
                               conditions            etc. Equipment
                               encountered at the    failure and
                               facility and must     abnormal or severe
                               provide video         weather cannot
                               images from which     always be predicted
                               accurate and timely   but compensatory
                               assessments can be    measures would be
                               made in response to   required in
                               an alarm              accordance with the
                               annunciation or       proposed
                               other notification    requirements of
                               of unauthorized       this section to
                               activity.             ensure compliance.
                              (i)(7) The licensee   This requirement
                               intrusion detection   would be added for
                               and assessment        formatting
                               system must:          purposes.
                              (i)(7)(i) Ensure      This requirement
                               that the duties and   would be added to
                               responsibilities      provide a
                               assigned to           performance based
                               personnel, the use    requirement
                               of equipment, and     relative to the
                               the implementation    design of the
                               of procedures         licensee detection
                               provides the          and assessment
                               detection and         system and to
                               assessment            clarify that this
                               capabilities          system would
                               necessary to meet     include all three
                               the requirements of   components.
                               paragraph (b) of
                               this section.
Sec.   73.55(e)(2) The        (i)(7)(ii) Ensure     This requirement
 annunciation of an alarm at   that annunciation     would be retained
 the alarm stations shall      of an alarm           with minor
 indicate the type of alarm    indicates the type    revision. The
 (e.g., intrusion alarms,      and location of the   phrase ``at the
 emergency exit alarm, etc.)   alarm.                alarm stations''
 and location.                                       and the listed
                                                     examples would be
                                                     deleted because
                                                     they would no
                                                     longer be needed.
Sec.   73.55(e)(2) All alarm  (i)(7)(iii) Ensure    This requirement
 devices including             that alarm devices,   would be retained
 transmission lines to         to include            with minor revision
 annunciators shall be         transmission lines    for formatting
 tamper indicating and self-   to annunciators,      purposes.
 checking.                     are tamper
                               indicating and self-
                               checking.

[[Page 62714]]

 
                              (i)(7)(iv) Provide    This requirement
                               visual and audible    would be added for
                               alarm annunciation    consistency with
                               and concurrent        the proposed
                               video assessment      requirement for
                               capability to both    equivalent
                               alarm stations in a   capabilities in
                               manner that ensures   both alarm
                               timely recognition,   stations. The
                               acknowledgment and    phrase ``visual and
                               response by each      audible'' would
                               alarm station         provide redundancy
                               operator in           to ensure that each
                               accordance with       alarm would be
                               written response      recognized and
                               procedures.           acknowledged when
                                                     received.
Sec.   73.55(e)(2) * * *      (i)(7)(v) Provide an  This requirement
 e.g., an automatic            automatic             would be retained
 indication is provided when   indication when the   with minor revision
 failure of the alarm system   alarm system or a     for formatting
 or a component occurs, or     component of the      purposes.
 when the system is on         alarm system fails,
 standby power.                or when the system
                               is operating on the
                               backup power supply.
Sec.   73.70(f) A record at   (i)(7)(vi) Maintain   This requirement
 each onsite alarm             a record of all       would be added for
 annunciation location of      alarm                 consistency with
 each alarm, false alarm,      annunciations, the    Sec.   73.70(f).
 alarm check, and tamper       cause of each         The Commission
 indication that identifies    alarm, and the        expects that this
 the type of alarm,            disposition of each   record would be a
 location, circuit, date,      alarm.                commonly maintained
 and time. In addition,                              record in
 details of response by                              electronic form
 facility guards and                                 which is generated
 watchmen to each alarm,                             as an automatic
 intrusion, or other                                 function of the
 incident shall be recorded.                         intrusion detection
                                                     system.
                              (i)(8) Alarm          This header would be
                               stations.             added for
                                                     formatting
                                                     purposes.
Sec.   73.55(e)(1) All        (i)(8)(i) Both alarm  This requirement
 alarms required pursuant to   stations must be      would retain the
 this part must annunciate     continuously          current requirement
 in a continuously manned      staffed by at least   Sec.   73.55(e)(1)
 central alarm station         one trained and       for continuously
 located within the            qualified member of   staffed alarm
 protected area and in at      the security          stations and would
 least one other               organization.         be revised to
 continuously manned station                         describe the
 * * *.                                              necessary
                                                     qualifications that
                                                     would be required
                                                     of the assigned
                                                     individuals.
Sec.   73.55(e)(1) The        (i)(8)(ii) The        This requirement
 onsite central alarm          interior of the       would be retained
 station must be located       central alarm         with minor
 within a building in such a   station must not be   revision. Most
 manner that the interior of   visible from the      significantly, the
 the central alarm station     perimeter of the      phrase ``located
 is not visible from the       protected area.       within a building''
 perimeter of the protected                          would be deleted
 area.                                               because it would be
                                                     considered
                                                     unnecessary.
Sec.   73.55(e)(1) This       (i)(8)(iii) The       This requirement
 station must not contain      licensee may not      would be retained
 any operational activities    permit any            with minor
 that would interfere with     activities to be      revisions to
 the execution of the alarm    performed within      provide a
 response function.            either alarm          performance based
                               station that would    requirement
                               interfere with an     regarding the
                               alarm station         primary duties
                               operator's ability    required to satisfy
                               to effectively        the current
                               execute assigned      requirement
                               detection,            ``execution of the
                               assessment,           alarm response
                               surveillance, and     function.''
                               communication
                               duties and
                               responsibilities.
                              (i)(8)(iv) The        This requirement
                               licensee shall        would be added for
                               assess and respond    consistency with
                               to all alarms and     current
                               other indications     requirements. The
                               of unauthorized       specific
                               activities in         requirements of the
                               accordance with the   current Sec.
                               approved security     73.55(h)(4) are
                               plans and             retained in detail
                               implementing          in the proposed
                               procedures.           appendix C to part
                                                     73.
                              (i)(8)(v) The         This requirement
                               licensee              would be added for
                               implementing          consistency with
                               procedures must       related
                               ensure that both      requirements of
                               alarm station         this proposed
                               operators are         section and to
                               knowledgeable of      ensure that the
                               all alarm             licensee provides a
                               annunciations,        process by which
                               assessments, and      both alarm station
                               final disposition     operators are
                               of all alarms, to     concurrently made
                               include but not       aware of each alarm
                               limited to a          and are
                               prohibition from      knowledgeable of
                               changing the status   how each alarm is
                               of a detection        resolved and that
                               point or              no one alarm
                               deactivating a        station operator
                               locking or access     can manipulate
                               control device at a   alarm station
                               protected or vital    equipment,
                               area portal,          communications, or
                               without the           procedures without
                               knowledge and         the knowledge and
                               concurrence of the    concurrence of the
                               other alarm station   other.
                               operator.
                              (i)(9) Surveillance,  This header would be
                               observation, and      added for
                               monitoring.           formatting
                                                     purposes.
                              (i)(9)(i) The onsite  This requirement
                               physical protection   would be added to
                               program must          provide a
                               include the           performance based
                               capability for        requirement for
                               surveillance,         ensuring
                               observation, and      surveillance,
                               monitoring in a       observation, and
                               manner that           monitoring
                               provides early        capabilities in any
                               detection and         area for which
                               assessment of         these measures are
                               unauthorized          necessary to meet
                               activities.           the requirements of
                                                     this proposed
                                                     section.

[[Page 62715]]

 
                              (i)(9)(ii) The        This requirement
                               licensee shall        would be added to
                               provide continual     provide a
                               surveillance,         performance based
                               observation, and      requirement for
                               monitoring of all     ensuring
                               areas identified in   surveillance,
                               the approved          observation, and
                               security plans as     monitoring
                               requiring             capabilities in any
                               surveillance,         area for which
                               observation, and      these measures are
                               monitoring to         necessary to meet
                               ensure early          the requirements of
                               detection of          this proposed
                               unauthorized          section. The word
                               activities and to     ``continual'' would
                               ensure the            mean regularly
                               integrity of          recurring actions
                               physical barriers     such that
                               or other components   designated areas
                               of the onsite         would be checked at
                               physical protection   intervals
                               program.              sufficient to
                                                     ensure the
                                                     detection of
                                                     unauthorized
                                                     activities.
                              (i)(9)(ii)(A)         This requirement
                               Continual             would be added to
                               surveillance,         provide necessary
                               observation, and      qualifying
                               monitoring            requirements for
                               responsibilities      performance of
                               must be performed     observation and
                               by security           monitoring
                               personnel during      activities. The
                               routine patrols or    word ``continual''
                               by other trained      would mean the same
                               and equipped          as used in the
                               personnel             proposed paragraph
                               designated as a       (i)(9)(ii) of this
                               component of the      section.
                               protective strategy.
                              (i)(9)(ii)(B)         This requirement
                               Surveillance,         would be added to
                               observation, and      provide a
                               monitoring            performance based
                               requirements may be   requirement for
                               accomplished by       ensuring that
                               direct observation    surveillance,
                               or video technology.  observation, and
                                                     monitoring
                                                     capabilities that
                                                     may be met through
                                                     the use of video
                                                     technology or
                                                     direct human
                                                     observation.
                              (i)(9)(iii) The       This requirement
                               licensee shall        would be added to
                               provide random        focus a performance
                               patrols of all        based requirement
                               accessible areas      on the protection
                               containing target     of target set
                               set equipment.        equipment. Target
                                                     set equipment would
                                                     be addressed in
                                                     detail in the
                                                     proposed paragraph
                                                     (f) of this
                                                     section. The term
                                                     ``random'' provides
                                                     flexibility to the
                                                     licensee and
                                                     requires patrols at
                                                     unpredictable times
                                                     within
                                                     predetermined
                                                     intervals to deter
                                                     exploitation of
                                                     periods between
                                                     patrols. The phrase
                                                     ``accessible
                                                     areas'' would
                                                     exclude areas such
                                                     as locked high
                                                     radiation areas or
                                                     other such areas
                                                     containing a
                                                     significant safety
                                                     concern that would
                                                     preclude the
                                                     conduct of the
                                                     patrol function.
                              (i)(9)(iii)(A) Armed  This requirement
                               security patrols      would be added to
                               shall periodically    focus on the items
                               check designated      that, because of
                               areas and shall       changes to the
                               inspect vital area    threat environment,
                               entrances, portals,   the Commission has
                               and external          determined would
                               barriers.             require focus by
                                                     armed security
                                                     patrols. The term
                                                     ``periodically''
                                                     provides
                                                     flexibility to the
                                                     licensee. The
                                                     phrase ``designated
                                                     areas'' means any
                                                     area identified by
                                                     the licensee as
                                                     requiring an action
                                                     to meet the
                                                     proposed
                                                     requirements of
                                                     this section.
                              (i)(9)(iii)(B)        This requirement
                               Physical barriers     would be added for
                               must be inspected     consistency with
                               at random intervals   the current
                               to identify           requirement Sec.
                               tampering and         73.55(g)(1) and to
                               degradation.          focus on verifying
                                                     the integrity of
                                                     physical barriers
                                                     to ensure that the
                                                     barrier would
                                                     perform as
                                                     expected. The word
                                                     ``random'' would
                                                     mean that the
                                                     required inspection
                                                     would be performed
                                                     at unpredictable
                                                     times to deter
                                                     exploitation of
                                                     periods between
                                                     inspections.
Sec.   73.55(b)(4)(i) The     (i)(9)(iii)(C)        This requirement
 licensee may not permit an    Security personnel    would be added for
 individual to act as a        shall be trained to   consistency with
 guard, watchman, armed        recognize             the current
 response person, or other     indications of        requirement Sec.
 member of the security        tampering as          73.55(b)(4)(i) to
 organization unless the       necessary to          provide necessary
 individual has been           perform assigned      focus on the threat
 trained, equipped, and        duties and            of tampering and
 qualified to perform each     responsibilities as   the need to ensure
 assigned security job duty.   they relate to        that personnel are
                               safety and security   trained to
                               systems and           recognize it.
                               equipment.
                              (i)(9)(iv)            This requirement
                               Unattended openings   would be added to
                               that are not          provide a
                               monitored by          performance based
                               intrusion detection   requirement to
                               equipment must be     ensure that
                               observed by           unattended openings
                               security personnel    that cross a
                               at a frequency that   security boundary
                               would prevent         established to meet
                               exploitation of       the proposed
                               that opening.         requirements of
                                                     this section would
                                                     not be exploited by
                                                     the design basis
                                                     threat of
                                                     radiological
                                                     sabotage to include
                                                     the use of tools to
                                                     enlarge the
                                                     opening.

[[Page 62716]]

 
Sec.   73.55(h)(4) Upon       (i)(9)(v) Upon        This requirement
 detection of abnormal         detection of          would be retained
 presence or activity of       unauthorized          with minor revision
 persons or vehicles * * *,    activities,           to provide
 the licensee security         tampering, or other   flexibility for the
 organization shall * * *.     threats, the          licensee to
                               licensee shall        determine if all or
                               initiate actions      only part of the
                               consistent with the   protective strategy
                               approved security     capabilities would
                               plans, the licensee   be needed for a
                               protective            specific event. The
                               strategy, and         phrase ``abnormal
                               implementing          presence or
                               procedures.           activity of persons
                                                     or vehicles'' would
                                                     be replaced with
                                                     the phrase
                                                     ``unauthorized
                                                     activities,
                                                     tampering, or other
                                                     threats'' to
                                                     clarify the types
                                                     of activities that
                                                     would be expected
                                                     to warrant a
                                                     response by the
                                                     licensee.
                              (i)(10) Video         This header would be
                               technology.           added for
                                                     formatting
                                                     purposes.
                              (i)(10)(i) The        This requirement
                               licensee shall        would be added for
                               maintain in           consistency with
                               operable condition    the current
                               all video             requirement Sec.
                               technology used to    73.55(g)(1) and
                               satisfy the           would provide a
                               monitoring,           performance based
                               observation,          requirement for
                               surveillance, and     ensuring video
                               assessment            technology is
                               requirements of       operating and
                               this section.         available when
                                                     needed.
                              (i)(10)(ii) Video     This header would be
                               technology must be:   added for
                                                     formatting
                                                     purposes.
                              (i)(10)(ii)(A)        This requirement
                               Displayed             would be added for
                               concurrently at       consistency with
                               both alarm stations.  the other proposed
                                                     requirements for
                                                     dual alarm stations
                                                     and would focus on
                                                     the need for video
                                                     technology to be
                                                     provided to both
                                                     alarm stations at
                                                     the same time to
                                                     ensure that an
                                                     assessment would be
                                                     made and a timely
                                                     response would be
                                                     initiated.
                              (i)(10)(ii)(B)        This requirement
                               Designed to provide   would be added for
                               concurrent            consistency with
                               observation,          the other proposed
                               monitoring, and       requirements for
                               surveillance of       dual alarm stations
                               designated areas      and would focus on
                               from which an alarm   the need for the
                               annunciation or a     same capabilities
                               notification of       to be provided to
                               unauthorized          both to ensure
                               activity is           observation,
                               received.             monitoring, and
                                                     surveillance
                                                     requirements are
                                                     met.
                              (i)(10)(ii)(C)        This requirement
                               Capable of            would be added to
                               providing a timely    provide a
                               visual display from   performance based
                               which positive        requirement for
                               recognition and       video technology
                               assessment of the     which focuses on
                               detected activity     the need for clear
                               can be made and a     visual images from
                               timely response       which accurate and
                               initiated.            timely assessment
                                                     can be made in
                                                     response to alarm
                                                     annunciations.
Sec.   73.55(h)(6) To         (i)(10)(ii)(D) Used   This requirement
 facilitate initial response   to supplement and     would retain the
 to detection of penetration   limit the exposure    current requirement
 * * * preferably by means     of security           to use video
 of closed circuit             personnel to          technology to limit
 television or by other        possible attack.      the exposure of
 suitable means which limit                          security personnel
 exposure of responding                              while performing
 personnel to possible                               security duties
 attack.                                             with minor revision
                                                     to add patrols.
                              (i)(10)(iii) The      This requirement
                               licensee shall        would be added to
                               implement controls    provide a
                               for personnel         performance based
                               assigned to monitor   requirement
                               video technology to   relative to
                               ensure that           controlling
                               assigned personnel    personnel fatigue
                               maintain the level    related to extended
                               of alertness          periods of
                               required to           monitoring video
                               effectively perform   technology. The
                               the assigned duties   Commission has
                               and                   determined that
                               responsibilities.     each individual's
                                                     alertness is
                                                     critical to the
                                                     effective use of
                                                     video technology
                                                     and the licensee
                                                     capability to
                                                     achieve the
                                                     performance
                                                     objective of this
                                                     proposed section.
                                                     Therefore, licensee
                                                     work hour controls
                                                     should ensure that
                                                     assigned personnel
                                                     are relieved of
                                                     these duties and
                                                     assigned other
                                                     duties at intervals
                                                     sufficient to
                                                     ensure the
                                                     individual's
                                                     ability to
                                                     effectively carry
                                                     out assigned duties
                                                     and
                                                     responsibilities.
                              (i)(11) Illumination  This header would be
                                                     added for
                                                     formatting
                                                     purposes.

[[Page 62717]]

 
Sec.   73.55(c)(5) Isolation  (i)(11)(i) The        This requirement
 zones and all exterior        licensee shall        would be retained
 areas within the protected    ensure that all       and revised. Most
 area shall be provided with   areas of the          significantly, this
 illumination sufficient for   facility, to          proposed
 the monitoring and            include appropriate   requirement would
 observation requirements of   portions of the       expand a
 paragraphs (c)(3), (c)(4),    owner controlled      performance based
 and (h)(4) of this section,   area, are provided    lighting
 but * * *.                    with illumination     requirement to all
                               necessary to          areas designated by
                               satisfy the           the licensee as
                               requirements of       having a need for
                               this section.         detection,
                                                     assessment,
                                                     surveillance,
                                                     observation, and
                                                     monitoring
                                                     capabilities in
                                                     support of the
                                                     protective strategy
                                                     and not limit it to
                                                     only the isolation
                                                     zone and all
                                                     exterior areas
                                                     within the
                                                     protected area.
                                                     This requirement
                                                     would not require
                                                     deterministic
                                                     illumination levels
                                                     but rather would
                                                     require that
                                                     illumination levels
                                                     be sufficient to
                                                     provide the
                                                     detection,
                                                     assessment,
                                                     surveillance,
                                                     observation, and
                                                     monitoring
                                                     capabilities
                                                     described by the
                                                     licensee in the
                                                     approved security
                                                     plans. This
                                                     description would
                                                     be required to
                                                     consider the
                                                     requirements of the
                                                     proposed
                                                     (i)(11)(ii) and
                                                     (iii).
Sec.   73.55(c)(5) Isolation  (i)(11)(ii) The       This requirement
 zones and all exterior        licensee shall        would be retained
 areas within the protected    provide a minimum     and revised to
 area shall be provided with   illumination level    provide a
 illumination * * * not less   of 0.2 footcandle     performance based
 than 0.2 footcandle           measured              requirement for
 measured horizontally at      horizontally at       illumination. Most
 ground level.                 ground level, in      significantly, this
                               the isolation zones   proposed
                               and all exterior      requirement would
                               areas within the      maintain the
                               protected area, or    current 0.2
                               may augment the       footcandle lighting
                               facility              requirement but
                               illumination          would also provide
                               system, to include    flexibility to a
                               patrols,              licensee to provide
                               responders, and       less than the 0.2
                               video technology      footcandle where
                               with low-light        low-light
                               technology capable    technology would be
                               of meeting the        used to maintain
                               detection,            the capability to
                               assessment,           meet the
                               surveillance,         performance level
                               observation,          for detection,
                               monitoring, and       assessment,
                               response              surveillance,
                               requirements of       observation,
                               this section.         monitoring, and
                                                     response. The word
                                                     ``or'' would be
                                                     used specifically
                                                     to mean that the
                                                     licensee need
                                                     satisfy only one of
                                                     the two options
                                                     such that the 0.2
                                                     footcandle
                                                     requirement must be
                                                     met in the
                                                     isolation zone and
                                                     all exterior areas
                                                     within the
                                                     protected area
                                                     unless low-light
                                                     technology is used.
                                                     However, the word
                                                     ``augment'' would
                                                     be used to
                                                     represent the
                                                     Commission's view
                                                     that sole use of
                                                     low-light
                                                     technology is not
                                                     authorized as this
                                                     approach would be
                                                     contrary to defense-
                                                     in-depth and could
                                                     be susceptible to
                                                     single failure
                                                     where a counter
                                                     technology is
                                                     developed or used.
                              (i)(11)(iii) The      This requirement
                               licensee shall        would be added to
                               describe in the       clarify the need
                               approved security     for lighting to be
                               plans how the         described in the
                               lighting              approved security
                               requirements of       plans and how the
                               this section are      lighting ``system''
                               met and, if used,     would be used to
                               the type(s) and       achieve the
                               application of low-   performance
                               light technology      objective.
                               used.
Sec.   73.55(f)               (j) Communication     This header would be
 Communication requirements.   requirements.         retained. The
                                                     current
                                                     requirements under
                                                     this header are
                                                     retained and
                                                     reformatted to
                                                     individually
                                                     address each
                                                     current
                                                     requirement.
                                                     Significant
                                                     revisions would be
                                                     specifically
                                                     identified as each
                                                     current requirement
                                                     is addressed.
Sec.   73.55(f)(1) Each       (j)(1) The licensee   This requirement
 guard, watchman or armed      shall establish and   would be retained
 response individual on duty   maintain,             with minor
 shall be capable of           continuous            revision. Most
 maintaining continuous        communication         significantly, the
 communication with an         capability with       specific language
 individual in each            onsite and offsite    of the current
 continuously manned alarm     resources to ensure   requirement would
 station required by           effective command     be revised to a
 paragraph (e)(1) of this      and control during    more performance
 section * * *.                both normal and       based requirement.
                               emergency             The word
                               situations.           ``continuous''
                                                     would be used to
                                                     mean that a
                                                     communication
                                                     method would be
                                                     available and
                                                     operating any time
                                                     it would be needed
                                                     to communicate
                                                     information.

[[Page 62718]]

 
Sec.   73.55(f)(1) * * * who  (j)(2) Individuals    This requirement
 shall be capable of calling   assigned to each      would be retained
 for assistance from other     alarm station shall   with minor
 guards, watchmen, and armed   be capable of         revision. Most
 response personnel and from   calling for           significantly, in
 local law enforcement         assistance in         order to provide
 authorities.                  accordance with the   flexibility and to
                               approved security     capture the
                               plans, licensee       proposed
                               integrated response   requirements of
                               plan, and licensee    appendix C to part
                               procedures.           73 for an
                                                     Integrated Response
                                                     Plan, this proposed
                                                     requirement
                                                     replaces the
                                                     specific list of
                                                     support entities to
                                                     be called with a
                                                     performance based
                                                     requirement to
                                                     follow
                                                     predetermined
                                                     actions.
Sec.   73.55(f)(1) Each       (j)(3) Each on-duty   This requirement
 guard, watchman or armed      security officer,     would be retained
 response individual on duty   watchperson,          with minor
 shall be capable of           vehicle escort, and   revisions. Most
 maintaining continuous        armed response        significantly, this
 communication with an         force member shall    proposed
 individual in each            be capable of         requirement would
 continuously manned alarm     maintaining           update the titles
 station required by           continuous            used to identify
 paragraph (e)(1) of this      communication with    the listed
 section * * *.                an individual in      positions and would
                               each alarm station.   add ``vehicle
                                                     escorts'' for
                                                     consistency with
                                                     the proposed
                                                     paragraph (g)(8) of
                                                     this section.
Sec.   73.55(f)(3) To         (j)(4) The following  This requirement
 provide the capability of     continuous            would be retained
 continuous communication *    communication         with minor revision
 * * and shall terminate in    capabilities must     for formatting
 each continuously manned      terminate in both     purposes.
 alarm station required by     alarm stations
 paragraph (e)(1) of this      required by this
 section.                      section:
Sec.   73.55(f)(2) The alarm  (j)(4)(i)             This requirement
 stations required by          Conventional          would be retained
 paragraph (e)(1) of this      telephone service.    with minor
 section shall have                                  revision. Most
 conventional telephone                              significantly, the
 service for communication                           phrase ``with the
 with the law enforcement                            law enforcement
 authorities as described in                         authorities as
 paragraph (f)(1) of this                            described in
 section.                                            paragraph (f)(1) of
                                                     this section''
                                                     would be deleted
                                                     because site plans
                                                     and procedures
                                                     would contain
                                                     protocols for
                                                     contacting support
                                                     personnel and
                                                     agencies.
Sec.   73.55(f)(3) To         (j)(4)(ii) Radio or   This requirement
 provide the capability of     microwave             would be retained
 continuous communication,     transmitted two-way   with minor
 radio or microwave            voice                 revision. Most
 transmitted two-way voice     communication,        significantly, the
 communication, either         either directly or    phrase ``shall be
 directly or through an        through an            established, in
 intermediary, shall be        intermediary.         addition to
 established, in addition to                         conventional
 conventional telephone                              telephone service,
 service, between local law                          between local law
 enforcement authorities and                         enforcement
 the facility and * * *.                             authorities and the
                                                     facility and''
                                                     would be deleted
                                                     because site plans
                                                     and procedures
                                                     would contain
                                                     protocols for
                                                     contacting support
                                                     personnel and
                                                     agencies.
                              (j)(4)(iii) A system  This requirement
                               for communication     would be added for
                               with all control      consistency with
                               rooms, on-duty        the proposed
                               operations            requirements of
                               personnel, escorts,   this section and to
                               local, State, and     provide a
                               Federal law           performance based
                               enforcement           requirement for
                               agencies, and all     communications
                               other personnel       consistent with the
                               necessary to          proposed Integrated
                               coordinate both       Response Plan
                               onsite and offsite    addressed in the
                               responses.            proposed appendix C
                                                     to part 73.
Sec.   73.55(f)(4) Non-       (j)(5) Non-portable   This requirement
 portable communications       communications        would be retained
 equipment controlled by the   equipment must        with minor
 licensee and required by      remain operable       revision. Most
 this section shall remain     from independent      significantly, the
 operable from independent     power sources in      phrase ``controlled
 power sources in the event    the event of the      by the licensee and
 of the loss of normal power.  loss of normal        required by this
                               power.                section'' would be
                                                     deleted because
                                                     there would be no
                                                     requirement for non-
                                                     portable
                                                     communications
                                                     equipment that is
                                                     not under licensee
                                                     control or not
                                                     required by this
                                                     section.
                              (j)(6) The licensee   This requirement
                               shall identify site   would be added to
                               areas where           ensure the
                               communication could   capability to
                               be interrupted or     communicate during
                               cannot be             both normal and
                               maintained and        emergency
                               shall establish       conditions, and to
                               alternative           focus attention on
                               communication         the requirement
                               measures for these    that the licensee
                               areas in              must identify site
                               implementing          areas in which
                               procedures.           communications
                                                     could be lost and
                                                     account for those
                                                     areas in their
                                                     procedures.
73.55(h) Response             (k) Response          This header would be
 requirement.                  requirements.         retained.
                              (k)(1) Personnel and  This header would be
                               equipment.            added for
                                                     formatting
                                                     purposes.

[[Page 62719]]

 
                              (k)(1)(i) The         This requirement
                               licensee shall        would be added to
                               establish and         provide a
                               maintain, at all      performance based
                               times, the minimum    requirement for
                               number of properly    determining the
                               trained and           minimum number of
                               equipped personnel    armed responders
                               required to           needed to protect
                               intercept,            the facility
                               challenge, delay,     against the full
                               and neutralize        capability of the
                               threats up to and     design basis
                               including the         threat. The phrase
                               design basis threat   ``to intercept,
                               of radiological       challenge, delay,
                               sabotage as defined   and neutralize
                               in Sec.   73.1, to    threats up to and
                               prevent significant   including the
                               core damage and       design basis threat
                               spent fuel sabotage.  of radiological
                                                     sabotage as defined
                                                     in Sec.   73.1, to
                                                     prevent significant
                                                     core damage and
                                                     spent fuel
                                                     sabotage'' would be
                                                     used for
                                                     consistency with
                                                     the proposed
                                                     paragraphs (b)(2)
                                                     through (4) of this
                                                     section.
                              (k)(1)(ii) The        This requirement
                               licensee shall        would be added to
                               provide and           provide a
                               maintain firearms,    performance based
                               ammunition, and       requirement to
                               equipment capable     ensure that the
                               of performing         licensee provides
                               functions             weapons that are
                               commensurate to the   capable of
                               needs of each armed   performing the
                               member of the         functions required
                               security              for each armed
                               organization to       individual to
                               carry out their       fulfill their
                               assigned duties and   assigned duties per
                               responsibilities in   the licensee
                               accordance with the   protective
                               approved security     strategy. For
                               plans, the licensee   example, if an
                               protective            individual is
                               strategy,             assigned to a
                               implementing          position for which
                               procedures, and the   the protective
                               site specific         strategy requires
                               conditions under      weapons use at 200
                               which the firearms,   meters, then the
                               ammunition, and       assigned weapon
                               equipment will be     must be capable of
                               used.                 that performance as
                                                     well as the
                                                     individual.
                              (k)(1)(iii) The       This requirement
                               licensee shall        would be added to
                               describe in the       ensure that the
                               approved security     licensee provides,
                               plans, all firearms   in the approved
                               and equipment to be   security plans, a
                               possessed by and      description of the
                               readily available     weapons to be used
                               to, armed personnel   and those equipment
                               to implement the      designated as
                               protective strategy   readily available.
                               and carry out all
                               assigned duties and
                               responsibilities.
                               This description
                               must include the
                               general
                               distribution and
                               assignment of
                               firearms,
                               ammunition, body
                               armor, and other
                               equipment used.
                              (k)(1)(iv) The        This requirement
                               licensee shall        would be added to
                               ensure that all       provide a
                               firearms,             performance based
                               ammunition, and       requirement to
                               equipment required    ensure the
                               by the protective     availability and
                               strategy are in       operability of
                               sufficient supply,    equipment needed to
                               are in working        accomplish response
                               condition, and are    goals and
                               readily available     objectives during
                               for use in            postulated events.
                               accordance with the   The term ``readily
                               licensee protective   available'' would
                               strategy and          mean that required
                               predetermined time    firearms and
                               lines.                equipment are
                                                     either in the
                                                     individuals
                                                     possession or at
                                                     pre-staged
                                                     locations such that
                                                     required response
                                                     time lines are met.
                              (k)(1)(v) The         This requirement
                               licensee shall        would be added to
                               ensure that all       provide a
                               armed members of      performance based
                               the security          requirement to
                               organization are      ensure that all
                               trained in the        armed personnel
                               proper use and        meet standard
                               maintenance of        training program
                               assigned weapons      requirements and
                               and equipment in      specific training
                               accordance with       requirements
                               appendix B to part    applicable to the
                               73.                   specific weapons
                                                     they are assigned,
                                                     to include the
                                                     maintenance
                                                     required for each
                                                     to ensure
                                                     operability. The
                                                     ability for armed
                                                     personnel to
                                                     trouble-shoot a
                                                     problem, such as a
                                                     jammed round during
                                                     an actual event,
                                                     would be considered
                                                     a critical function
                                                     necessary to
                                                     achieve the
                                                     performance
                                                     objective.

[[Page 62720]]

 
Sec.   73.55(h)(5) The        (k)(2) The licensee   This requirement
 licensee shall instruct       shall instruct each   would be retained
 every guard and all armed     armed response        with some revision.
 response personnel to         person to prevent     The term ``guard''
 prevent or impede attempted   or impede attempted   was removed as the
 acts of theft or              acts of theft or      term is no longer
 radiological sabotage by      radiological          used. The phrase
 using force sufficient to     sabotage by using     ``or any other
 counter the force directed    force sufficient to   circumstances as
 at him including the use of   counter the force     authorized by
 deadly force when the guard   directed at that      applicable state
 or other armed response       person including      law'' would be
 person has a reasonable       the use of deadly     added to clarify
 belief it is necessary in     force when the        that applicable
 self-defense or in the        armed response        state law specifies
 defense of others.            person has a          the conditions
                               reasonable belief     under which deadly
                               that the use of       force may be
                               deadly force is       applied. It is
                               necessary in self-    important to note
                               defense or in the     that the use of
                               defense of others,    deadly force should
                               or any other          be a last resort
                               circumstances as      when all other
                               authorized by         lesser measures to
                               applicable state      neutralize the
                               law.                  threat have failed.
                                                     The conditions
                                                     under which deadly
                                                     force would be
                                                     authorized are
                                                     governed by state
                                                     laws and nothing in
                                                     this proposed rule
                                                     should be
                                                     interpreted to mean
                                                     or require anything
                                                     that would
                                                     contradict such
                                                     state law. The term
                                                     ``it'' is replaced
                                                     with the phrase
                                                     ``deadly force'' to
                                                     more clearly
                                                     describe the
                                                     action.
                              (k)(3) The licensee   This requirement
                               shall provide an      would be added to
                               armed response team   provide a
                               consisting of both    performance based
                               armed responders      requirement that
                               and armed security    would retain the
                               officers to carry     current requirement
                               out response          for armed
                               duties, within        responders and add
                               predetermined time    a category of armed
                               lines.                security officer to
                                                     clarify the
                                                     division of types
                                                     of armed response
                                                     personnel and their
                                                     roles.
                              (k)(3)(i) Armed       This header would be
                               responders.           added for
                                                     formatting
                                                     purposes.
Sec.   73.55(h)(3) The total  (k)(3)(i)(A) The      This requirement
 number of guards, and         licensee shall        would be retained
 armed, trained personnel      determine the         and revised to
 immediately available at      minimum number of     remove the specific
 the facility to fulfill       armed responders      minimum numbers of
 these response requirements   necessary to          10, but no less
 shall nominally be ten        protect against the   than 5, to provide
 (10), unless specifically     design basis threat   a performance based
 required otherwise on a       described in Sec.     requirement that
 case by case basis by the     73.1(a), subject to   meets the proposed
 Commission; however, this     Commission            requirement of
 number may not be reduced     approval, and shall   paragraph (k)(1)(i)
 to less than five (5)         document this         of this section.
 guards.                       number in the         This proposed
                               approved security     requirement would
                               plans.                ensure that the
                                                     licensee would
                                                     provide the
                                                     requisite number of
                                                     armed responders
                                                     needed to carry-out
                                                     the protective
                                                     strategy, the
                                                     effectiveness of
                                                     which would be
                                                     evaluated through
                                                     annual exercises
                                                     and triennial
                                                     exercises observed
                                                     by the Commission.
Sec.   73.55(h)(3) The total  (k)(3)(i)(B) Armed    This requirement
 number of guards, and         responders shall be   would be retained
 armed, trained personnel      available at all      and revised. Most
 immediately available at      times inside the      significantly, this
 the facility to fulfill       protected area and    proposed
 these response requirements   may not be assigned   requirement would
 * * *.                        any other duties or   specify the
                               responsibilities      conditions that
                               that could            must be met to
                               interfere with        satisfy the meaning
                               assigned response     of the word
                               duties.               ``available'' as
                                                     used.
                              (k)(3)(ii) Armed      This header would be
                               security officers.    added for
                                                     formatting
                                                     purposes.
                              (k)(3)(ii)(A) Armed   This requirement
                               security officers     would be added to
                               designated to         provide a
                               strengthen response   performance based
                               capabilities shall    requirement for the
                               be onsite and         licensee to
                               available at all      identify a new
                               times to carry out    category of armed
                               assigned response     personnel to be
                               duties.               used to supplement
                                                     and support the
                                                     armed responders
                                                     identified in the
                                                     proposed paragraph
                                                     (k)(3)(ii)(A) of
                                                     this section.
Sec.   73.55(h)(3) The total  (k)(3)(ii)(B) The     This requirement
 number of guards, and         minimum number of     would be added to
 armed, trained personnel      armed security        require licensees
 immediately available at      officers must be      to document the
 the facility to fulfill       documented in the     number of armed
 these response requirements   approved security     security officers
 shall nominally be * * *.     plans.                to be used.
                              (k)(3)((iii) The      This requirement
                               licensee shall        would be added for
                               ensure that           consistency with
                               training and          the current
                               qualification         requirement Sec.
                               requirements          73.55(b)(4)(ii) for
                               accurately reflect    an approved T&Q
                               the duties and        plan and the
                               responsibilities to   current requirement
                               be performed.         for licensees to
                                                     document how these
                                                     personnel are to be
                                                     trained and
                                                     qualified.

[[Page 62721]]

 
                              (k)(3)(iv) The        This requirement
                               licensee shall        would be added for
                               ensure that all       consistency with
                               firearms,             the current Sec.
                               ammunition, and       73.55(g)(1) to
                               equipment needed      ensure that all
                               for completing the    firearms and
                               actions described     equipment required
                               in the approved       by each member of
                               security plans and    the armed response
                               licensee protective   team would be
                               strategy are          operable and in the
                               readily available     possession of or
                               and in working        available at pre-
                               condition.            staged locations,
                                                     to ensure that each
                                                     individual is able
                                                     to meet the time
                                                     lines specified by
                                                     the protective
                                                     strategy. This
                                                     includes those
                                                     equipment
                                                     designated as
                                                     readily available.
                              (k)(4) The licensee   This requirement
                               shall describe in     would be added to
                               the approved          provide regulatory
                               security plans,       consistency for the
                               procedures for        period of time a
                               responding to an      licensee may not
                               unplanned incident    meet the minimum
                               that reduces the      numbers stated in
                               number of available   the approved plans
                               armed response team   because of illness
                               members below the     or injury to an
                               minimum number        assigned individual
                               documented by the     or individuals
                               licensee in the       while on-duty.
                               approved security
                               plans.
                              (k)(5) Protective     This requirement
                               Strategy. Licensees   would be added to
                               shall develop,        provide a
                               maintain, and         performance based
                               implement a written   requirement for the
                               protective strategy   development of a
                               in accordance with    protective strategy
                               the requirements of   that specifies how
                               this section and      the licensee will
                               appendix C to this    utilize onsite and
                               part.                 offsite, the
                                                     resources to ensure
                                                     the performance
                                                     objective of how
                                                     the proposed
                                                     paragraph (b) of
                                                     this section is
                                                     met.
                              (k)(6) The licensee   This proposed
                               shall ensure that     requirement would
                               all personnel         be added to ensure
                               authorized            that both security
                               unescorted access     and non-security
                               to the protected      organization
                               area are trained      personnel are
                               and understand        trained to
                               their roles and       recognize and
                               responsibilities      respond to hostage
                               during security       and duress
                               incidents, to         situations. This
                               include hostage and   proposed training
                               duress situations.    would also include
                                                     the specific
                                                     actions to be
                                                     performed during
                                                     these postulated
                                                     security events.
Sec.   73.55(h)(4) Upon       (k)(7) Upon receipt   This requirement
 detection of abnormal         of an alarm or        would be retained
 presence or activity of       other indication of   and revised for
 persons or vehicles within    threat, the           consistency with
 an isolation zone, a          licensee shall:       the proposed
 protected area, material                            requirements of
 access area, or a vital                             this section.
 area; or upon evidence or                           Reference to the
 indication of intrusion                             specific site areas
 into a protected area, a                            would be deleted
 material access area, or a                          because the
 vital area, the licensee                            performance based
 security organization                               requirements of
 shall:                                              this proposed
                                                     section would be
                                                     applicable to all
                                                     facility areas, and
                                                     therefore such
                                                     reference would not
                                                     be needed.
Sec.   73.55(h)(4)(i)         (k)(7)(i) Determine   This requirement
 Determine whether or not a    the existence of a    would be retained
 threat exists,                threat in             with minor
                               accordance with       revision.
                               assessment
                               procedures.
Sec.   73.55(h)(4)(ii)        (k)(7)(ii) Identify   This requirement
 Assess the extent of the      the level of threat   would be retained
 threat, if any,               present through the   with minor
                               use of assessment     revision.
                               methodologies and
                               procedures.
Sec.   73.55(h)(4)(iii)(A)    (k)(7)(iii)           This requirement
 Requiring responding guards   Determine the         would be retained
 or other armed response       response necessary    with revision for
 personnel to interpose        to intercept,         consistency with
 themselves * * *.             challenge, delay,     the proposed
                               and neutralize the    paragraph (b) of
                               threat in             this section.
                               accordance with the
                               requirements of
                               appendix C to part
                               73, the Commission-
                               approved safeguards
                               contingency plan,
                               and the licensee
                               response strategy.
Sec.   73.55(h)(4)(iii)(B)    (k)(7)(iv) Notify     This requirement
 Informing local law           offsite support       would be retained
 enforcement agencies of the   agencies such as      with revision for
 threat and requesting         local law             consistency with
 assistance.                   enforcement, in       the Integrated
                               accordance with       Response Plan.
                               site procedures.
Sec.   73.55(h)(2) The        (k)(8) Law            This requirement
 licensee shall establish      enforcement           would be retained
 and document liaison with     liaison. The          with minor
 local law enforcement         licensee shall        revision. Most
 authorities.                  document and          significantly, this
                               maintain current      proposed
                               agreements with       requirement
                               local, state, and     addresses the need
                               Federal law           to identify the
                               enforcement           resources and
                               agencies, to          response times to
                               include estimated     be expected in
                               response times and    order to facilitate
                               capabilities.         planning
                                                     development.

[[Page 62722]]

 
                              (l) Facilities using  This paragraph would
                               mixed-oxide (MOX)     be added to provide
                               fuel assemblies. In   general provisions
                               addition to the       for the onsite
                               requirements          physical protection
                               described in this     of unirradiated
                               section for           mixed oxide (MOX)
                               protection against    fuel assemblies in
                               radiological          recognition of the
                               sabotage, operating   fact that some
                               commercial nuclear    nuclear power
                               power reactors        reactor facilities
                               licensed under 10     currently have
                               CFR parts 50 or 52    chosen or may
                               and using special     choose to possess
                               nuclear material in   and utilize this
                               the form of MOX       type of special
                               fuel assemblies       nuclear material at
                               shall protect         their sites.
                               unirradiated MOX      Because weapons
                               fuel assemblies       grade plutonium is
                               against theft or      utilized in the
                               diversion.            fabrication of MOX
                                                     fuel assemblies,
                                                     the Commission has
                                                     determined that a
                                                     threat of theft
                                                     applies and that it
                                                     is prudent and
                                                     necessary to apply
                                                     certain security
                                                     measures for MOX
                                                     fuel that are in
                                                     addition to those
                                                     that are currently
                                                     required at other
                                                     nuclear power
                                                     reactor facilities.
                                                     Therefore, the
                                                     requirements
                                                     proposed in this
                                                     paragraph are
                                                     provided to ensure
                                                     that these
                                                     additional
                                                     requirements are
                                                     identified and met
                                                     by those licensees
                                                     who have chosen or
                                                     may choose to
                                                     utilize MOX fuel.
                              (l)(1) Licensees      This requirement
                               shall protect the     would be added to
                               unirradiated MOX      identify
                               fuel assemblies       applicability of
                               against theft or      this paragraph.
                               diversion in
                               accordance with the
                               requirements of
                               this section and
                               the approved
                               security plans.
                              (l)(2) Commercial     This requirement
                               nuclear power         would be added
                               reactors using MOX    because the
                               fuel assemblies are   Commission has
                               exempt from the       determined that due
                               requirements of       to the low
                               Sec.  Sec.   73.20,   plutonium
                               73.45, and 73.46      concentration,
                               for the onsite        composition of the
                               physical protection   MOX fuel, and
                               of unirradiated MOX   configuration (size
                               fuel assemblies.      and weight) of the
                                                     assemblies, the
                                                     physical security
                                                     protection measures
                                                     identified in the
                                                     listed regulations
                                                     are superceded by
                                                     those requirements
                                                     addressed in this
                                                     proposed section
                                                     for unirradiated
                                                     MOX fuel assemblies
                                                     at nuclear power
                                                     reactor facilities.
                              (l)(3)                This header would be
                               Administrative        added for
                               controls.             formatting
                                                     purposes.
                              (l)(3)(i) The         This requirement
                               licensee shall        would be added to
                               describe in the       ensure that the
                               approved security     licensee describes
                               plans, the            the onsite physical
                               operational and       protection measures
                               administrative        in the approved
                               controls to be        security plans.
                               implemented for the
                               receipt,
                               inspection,
                               movement, storage,
                               and protection of
                               unirradiated MOX
                               fuel assemblies.
                              (l)(3)(ii) The        This requirement
                               licensee shall        would be added to
                               implement the use     provide assurance
                               of tamper-            that the
                               indicating devices    unirradiated fuel
                               for unirradiated      assemblies were not
                               MOX fuel assembly     accessed during
                               transport and shall   transport.
                               verify their use
                               and integrity
                               before receipt.
                              (l)(3)(iii) Upon      This requirement
                               delivery of           would be added for
                               unirradiated MOX      formatting
                               fuel assemblies,      purposes.
                               the licensee shall:
                              (l)(3)(iii)(A)        This requirement
                               Inspect               would be added to
                               unirradiated MOX      ensure that
                               fuel assemblies for   unirradiated MOX
                               damage.               fuel assemblies are
                                                     in an acceptable
                                                     condition before
                                                     use or storage.
                              (l)(3)(iii)(B)        This requirement
                               Search unirradiated   would be added to
                               MOX fuel assemblies   ensure that no
                               for unauthorized      unauthorized
                               materials.            materials were
                                                     introduced within
                                                     the unirradiated
                                                     MOX fuel assembly
                                                     during transport.
                              (l)(3)(iv) The        This requirement
                               licensee may          would be added to
                               conduct the           provide a
                               required inspection   performance based
                               and search            requirement that
                               functions             provides
                               simultaneously.       flexibility for
                                                     accomplishment of
                                                     the proposed
                                                     requirements.
                              (l)(3)(v) The         This requirement
                               licensee shall        would be added for
                               ensure the proper     formatting
                               placement and         purposes.
                               control of
                               unirradiated MOX
                               fuel assemblies as
                               follows:

[[Page 62723]]

 
                              (l)(3)(v)(A) At       This requirement
                               least one armed       would be added to
                               security officer,     provide deterrence
                               in addition to the    and immediate armed
                               armed response team   response to
                               required by           attempts of theft
                               paragraphs (h)(4)     or tampering. This
                               and (h)(5) of         proposed armed
                               appendix C to part    responder's duty
                               73, shall be          would be solely to
                               present during the    observe and protect
                               receipt and           the unirradiated
                               inspection of         MOX fuel assemblies
                               unirradiated MOX      upon receipt and
                               fuel assemblies.      before storage.
                              (l)(3)(v)(B) The      This requirement
                               licensee shall        would be added to
                               store unirradiated    reduce the risk of
                               MOX fuel assemblies   theft by providing
                               only within a spent   three delay
                               fuel pool, located    barriers before
                               within a vital        gaining
                               area, so that         unauthorized access
                               access to the         to the MOX fuel
                               unirradiated MOX      assembles while in
                               fuel assemblies       storage.
                               requires passage
                               through at least
                               three physical
                               barriers.
                              (l)(3)(vi) The        This requirement
                               licensee shall        would be added to
                               implement a           ensure that a
                               material control      material control
                               and accountability    and accountability
                               program for the       program would be
                               unirradiated MOX      established and
                               fuel assemblies       implemented and
                               that includes a       would focus on
                               predetermined and     recordkeeping which
                               documented storage    describes the
                               location for each     inventory and
                               unirradiated MOX      location of the
                               fuel assembly.        SSNM within the
                                                     assemblies.
                              (l)(3)(vii) Records   This requirement
                               that identify the     would be added to
                               storage locations     ensure restricted
                               of unirradiated MOX   access to records
                               fuel assemblies are   which describe or
                               considered            identify the
                               safeguards            location of
                               information and       unirradiated MOX
                               must be protected     fuel assemblies
                               and stored in         within the spent
                               accordance with       fuel pool.
                               Sec.   73.21.
                              (l)(4) Physical       This header would be
                               controls.             added for
                                                     formatting
                                                     purposes.
                              (l)(4)(i) The         This requirement
                               licensee shall lock   would be added to
                               or disable all        provide a
                               equipment and power   performance based
                               supplies to           requirement for
                               equipment required    administrative
                               for the movement      controls over
                               and handling of       equipment and power
                               unirradiated MOX      supplies to
                               fuel assemblies.      equipment required
                                                     to physically move
                                                     the unirradiated
                                                     MOX fuel assemblies
                                                     to ensure that at
                                                     least two security
                                                     measures must be
                                                     disabled before
                                                     this equipment
                                                     could be used.
                              (l)(4)(ii) The        This requirement
                               licensee shall        would be added to
                               implement a two-      provide an
                               person line-of-       administrative
                               sight rule whenever   control to reduce
                               control systems or    the risk of the
                               equipment required    insider threat and
                               for the movement or   theft.
                               handling of
                               unirradiated MOX
                               fuel assemblies
                               must be accessed.
                              (l)(4)(iii) The       This requirement
                               licensee shall        would be added to
                               conduct random        provide
                               patrols of areas      surveillance
                               containing            activities for the
                               unirradiated MOX      detection of
                               fuel assemblies to    unauthorized
                               ensure the            activities that
                               integrity of          would pose a threat
                               barriers and locks,   to MOX fuel
                               deter unauthorized    assemblies in
                               activities, and to    addition to any
                               identify              similar
                               indications of        requirements of
                               tampering.            this proposed
                                                     section.
                              (l)(4)(iv) Locks,     This requirement
                               keys, and any other   would be added to
                               access control        ensure that the
                               device used to        security
                               secure equipment      organization would
                               and power sources     be responsible for
                               required for the      the administrative
                               movement of           controls over
                               unirradiated MOX      access control
                               fuel assemblies or    devices.
                               openings to areas
                               containing
                               unirradiated MOX
                               fuel assemblies
                               must be controlled
                               by the security
                               organization.
                              (l)(4)(v) Removal of  This requirement
                               locks used to         would be added to
                               secure equipment      ensure that both
                               and power sources     the licensee
                               required for the      security and
                               movement of           operations
                               unirradiated MOX      management level
                               fuel assemblies or    personnel would be
                               openings to areas     responsible for the
                               containing            removal of locks
                               unirradiated MOX      securing MOX fuel
                               fuel assemblies       assemblies.
                               must require
                               approval by both
                               the on-duty
                               security shift
                               supervisor and the
                               operations shift
                               manager.
                              (l)(4)(v)(A) At       This requirement
                               least one armed       would be added to
                               security officer      ensure that
                               shall be present to   immediate armed
                               observe activities    response capability
                               involving the         is provided before
                               movement of           accessing equipment
                               unirradiated MOX      used to move
                               fuel assemblies       unirradiated MOX
                               before the removal    fuel assemblies.
                               of the locks and
                               providing power to
                               equipment required
                               for the movement or
                               handling of
                               unirradiated MOX
                               fuel assemblies.

[[Page 62724]]

 
                              (l)(4)(v)(B) At       This requirement
                               least one armed       would be added to
                               security officer      ensure that
                               shall be present at   immediate armed
                               all times until       response capability
                               power is removed      is provided during
                               from equipment and    any activity
                               locks are secured.    involving the use
                                                     of equipment used
                                                     to move
                                                     unirradiated MOX
                                                     fuel assemblies.
                              (l)(4)(v)(C)          This requirement
                               Security officers     would be added to
                               shall be trained      ensure that
                               and knowledgeable     assigned security
                               of authorized and     officers possess
                               unauthorized          the capability to
                               activities            immediately
                               involving             recognize, report,
                               unirradiated MOX      and respond to
                               fuel assemblies.      unauthorized
                                                     activities
                                                     involving
                                                     unirradiated MOX
                                                     fuel assemblies.
                              (l)(5) At least one   This requirement
                               armed security        would be added to
                               officer shall be      ensure physical
                               present and shall     protection of
                               maintain constant     unirradiated MOX
                               surveillance of       fuel assemblies
                               unirradiated MOX      when not located
                               fuel assemblies       within an area that
                               when the assemblies   meets the three
                               are not located in    barrier requirement
                               the spent fuel pool   of this proposed
                               or reactor.           rule.
                              (l)(6) The licensee   This requirement
                               shall maintain at     would be added for
                               all times the         consistency with
                               capability to         the proposed
                               detect, assess,       paragraph (b) of
                               intercept,            this section.
                               challenge, delay,
                               and neutralize
                               threats to
                               unirradiated MOX
                               fuel assemblies in
                               accordance with the
                               requirements of
                               this section.
                              (m) Digital computer  This header would be
                               and communication     added for
                               networks.             formatting
                                                     purposes.
                              (m)(1) The licensee   This requirement
                               shall implement a     would be to ensure
                               cyber-security        that nuclear power
                               program that          plants are
                               provides high         protected from
                               assurance that        cyber attacks via
                               computer systems,     minimizing the
                               which if              potential attack
                               compromised would     pathway and the
                               likely adversely      consequences
                               impact safety,        arising from a
                               security, and         successful cyber
                               emergency             attack.
                               preparedness, are
                               protected from
                               cyber attacks.
                              (m)(1)(i) The         This requirement
                               licensee shall        would be added to
                               describe the cyber-   ensure licensees
                               security program      have a
                               requirements in the   comprehensive
                               approved security     security plan by
                               plans.                integrating cyber-
                                                     security into the
                                                     overall onsite
                                                     physical protection
                                                     program. As
                                                     licensees take
                                                     advantage of
                                                     computer technology
                                                     to maximize plant
                                                     productivity, the
                                                     role of computer
                                                     systems at nuclear
                                                     power plants is
                                                     increasing.
                                                     Therefore, the
                                                     Commission has
                                                     determined that
                                                     incorporation of a
                                                     cyber-security
                                                     program into the
                                                     Commission-approved
                                                     security plans
                                                     would be a prudent
                                                     and necessary
                                                     security
                                                     enhancement.
                              (m)(1)(ii) The        This requirement
                               licensee shall        would be added to
                               incorporate the       ensure that the
                               cyber-security        computer systems
                               program into the      used in onsite
                               onsite physical       physical protection
                               protection program.   systems are
                                                     protected from
                                                     cyber attacks. With
                                                     advancements in
                                                     computer
                                                     technology, many
                                                     systems in nuclear
                                                     power plants rely
                                                     on computers to
                                                     perform their
                                                     functions,
                                                     including some
                                                     security functions.
                                                     Therefore, the
                                                     Commission has
                                                     determined that the
                                                     integration of
                                                     security measures
                                                     covering these
                                                     systems would be a
                                                     prudent and
                                                     necessary action.
                              (m)(1)(iii) The       This requirement
                               cyber-security        would be added to
                               program must be       ensure licensees
                               designed to detect    actively and
                               and prevent cyber     proactively secure
                               attacks on            their plants from
                               protected computer    cyber attacks. The
                               systems.              Commission has
                                                     determined that
                                                     because specific
                                                     cyber threats and
                                                     the people who seek
                                                     unauthorized access
                                                     to, or use of
                                                     computers are
                                                     constantly
                                                     changing, protected
                                                     computer systems
                                                     must be protected
                                                     against these
                                                     attacks and
                                                     mitigation measures
                                                     implemented.
                              (m)(2) Cyber-         This requirement
                               security              would be added to
                               assessment. The       require licensees
                               licensee shall        to systematically
                               implement a cyber-    determine the
                               security assessment   status of their
                               program to            plant's cyber risks
                               systematically        and identify
                               assess and manage     vulnerabilities
                               cyber risks.          that need to be
                                                     mitigated to reduce
                                                     risks to acceptable
                                                     levels.
                              (m)(3) Policies,      This header would be
                               requirements, and     added for
                               procedures.           formatting
                                                     purposes.

[[Page 62725]]

 
                              (m)(3)(i) The         This requirement
                               licensee shall        would be added to
                               apply cyber-          create a computer
                               security              security program
                               requirements and      that establishes
                               policies that         specific goals and
                               identify management   assigns
                               expectations and      responsibilities to
                               requirements for      employees to meet
                               the protection of     those goals.
                               computer systems.
                              (m)(3)(ii) The        This requirement
                               licensee shall        would be added to
                               develop and           ensure the licensee
                               maintain              develops,
                               implementing          implements, and
                               procedures to         enforces, detailed
                               ensure cyber-         guidance documents
                               security              that licensee
                               requirements and      employees would be
                               policies are          required to follow
                               implemented           to meet the stated
                               effectively.          security goals.
                              (m)(4) Incident       This header would be
                               response and          added for
                               recovery.             formatting
                                                     purposes.
                              (m)(4)(i) The         This requirement
                               licensee shall        would be added to
                               implement a cyber-    ensure that each
                               security incident     licensee would be
                               response and          prepared to respond
                               recovery plan to      to computer
                               minimize the          security incidents
                               adverse impact of a   in a manner that
                               cyber-security        ensures that plants
                               incident on safety,   are safe and
                               security, or          secure. A computer
                               emergency             security incident
                               preparedness          could result from a
                               systems.              computer virus,
                                                     other malicious
                                                     code, or a system
                                                     intruder, either an
                                                     insider or as a
                                                     result of an
                                                     external attack and
                                                     could adversely
                                                     impact the
                                                     licensee's ability
                                                     to effectively
                                                     maintain safety,
                                                     security, or
                                                     emergency
                                                     preparedness.
                                                     Without an incident
                                                     response and
                                                     recovery plan,
                                                     licensees would
                                                     respond to a
                                                     computer security
                                                     incident in an ad
                                                     hoc manner. However
                                                     with an incident
                                                     response and
                                                     recovery plan,
                                                     licensees would
                                                     respond to an
                                                     incident in a quick
                                                     and organized
                                                     manner. This would
                                                     minimize the
                                                     adverse impact
                                                     caused by a
                                                     computer security
                                                     incident.
                              (m)(4)(ii) The cyber- This requirement
                               security incident     would be added to
                               response and          ensure licensees
                               recovery plan must    have a
                               be described in the   comprehensive
                               integrated response   incident response
                               plan required by      plan by integrating
                               appendix C to this    cyber-security into
                               part.                 the overall
                                                     security of their
                                                     plants. As
                                                     licensees take
                                                     advantage of
                                                     computer technology
                                                     to maximize plant
                                                     productivity, the
                                                     role of computer
                                                     systems at nuclear
                                                     power plants is
                                                     increasing as well
                                                     as the possibility
                                                     for adverse impact
                                                     from a computer
                                                     mishap. Therefore,
                                                     the Commission has
                                                     determined that it
                                                     would be a prudent
                                                     and necessary
                                                     action for
                                                     licensees to
                                                     develop and
                                                     implement a
                                                     comprehensive
                                                     response plan that
                                                     includes a cyber
                                                     incident response
                                                     and recovery plan.
                              (m)(4)(iii) The       This requirement
                               cyber-security        would be added to
                               incident response     ensure that
                               and recovery plan     licensees acquire
                               must ensure the       the capability to
                               capability to         respond to cyber
                               respond to cyber-     incidents in a
                               security incidents,   manner that
                               minimize loss and     contains and
                               destruction,          repairs damage from
                               mitigate and          incidents, and
                               correct the           prevents future
                               weaknesses that       damage. An incident
                               were exploited, and   handling capability
                               restore systems and/  provides a way for
                               or equipment          plant personnel to
                               affected by a cyber-  report incidents
                               security incident.    and the appropriate
                                                     response and
                                                     assistance to be
                                                     provided to aid in
                                                     recovery.
                              (m)(5) Protective     This requirement
                               strategies. The       would be added to
                               licensee shall        incorporate the
                               implement defense-    approach of delay,
                               in-depth protective   detect, and
                               strategies to         respond. The use of
                               protect computer      multiple and
                               systems from cyber    diverse layers of
                               attacks, detecting,   defense would delay
                               isolating, and        the threat from
                               neutralizing          reaching those
                               unauthorized          systems that, if
                               activities in a       compromised, can
                               timely manner.        adversely impact
                                                     safety, security,
                                                     or emergency
                                                     preparedness of the
                                                     nuclear power
                                                     plants. This delay
                                                     in attack would
                                                     allow more time to
                                                     detect the attack
                                                     and would allow
                                                     time to respond.

[[Page 62726]]

 
                              (m)(6) Configuration  This requirement
                               and control           would be added to
                               management program.   implement
                               The licensee shall    configuration
                               implement a           management to
                               configuration and     ensure that the
                               control management    system in operation
                               program, to include   is the correct
                               cyber risk            version
                               analysis, to ensure   (configuration) of
                               that modifications    the system and that
                               to computer system    any changes to be
                               designs, access       made are reviewed
                               control measures,     for security
                               configuration,        implications.
                               operational           Configuration
                               integrity, and        management can be
                               management process    used to help ensure
                               do not adversely      that changes take
                               impact facility       place in an
                               safety, security,     identifiable and
                               and emergency         controlled
                               preparedness          environment and
                               systems before        that they do not
                               implementation of     unintentionally
                               those modifications.  harm any of the
                                                     system's
                                                     properties,
                                                     including its
                                                     security.
                              (m)(7) Cyber-         This header would be
                               security awareness    added for
                               and training..        formatting
                                                     purposes.
                              (m)(7)(i) The         This requirement
                               licensee shall        would be added to
                               implement a cyber-    ensure licensees
                               security awareness    implement cyber-
                               and training          security awareness
                               program.              and training
                                                     programs to ensure
                                                     that appropriate
                                                     personnel are aware
                                                     of cyber-security
                                                     requirements and
                                                     have the cyber-
                                                     security skills and
                                                     competencies
                                                     necessary to secure
                                                     affected plant
                                                     systems and
                                                     equipment.
                              (m)(7)(ii) The cyber- This requirement
                               security awareness    would be added to
                               and training          implement a cyber-
                               program must ensure   security awareness
                               that appropriate      and training
                               plant personnel,      program to:
                               including            1. Improve employee
                               contractors, are      awareness of the
                               aware of cyber-       need to protect
                               security              computer systems;
                               requirements and     2. Develop employee
                               that they receive     skills and
                               the training          knowledge so
                               required to           computer users can
                               effectively perform   perform their jobs
                               their assigned        more securely; and
                               duties and           3. Build in-depth
                               responsibilities.     knowledge, as
                                                     needed, to design,
                                                     implement, or
                                                     operate security
                                                     programs for
                                                     organizations and
                                                     systems.
                              (n) Security program  This header would be
                               reviews and audits.   added for
                                                     formatting
                                                     purposes.
Sec.   73.55(g)(4)(i)(A) At   (n)(1) The licensee   This requirement
 intervals not to exceed 12    shall review the      would be retained
 months or * * *.              onsite physical       with minor revision
                               protection program    for formatting
                               at intervals not to   purposes.
                               exceed 12 months,
                               or
Sec.   73.55(g)(4)(i)(B) As   (n)(1)(i) As          This requirement
 necessary, based on an        necessary based       would be retained
 assessment by the licensee    upon assessments or   with minor
 against performance           other performance     revision.
 indicators * * *.             indicators.
Sec.   73.55(g)(4)(i)(B) * *  (n)(1)(ii) Within 12  This requirement
 * as soon as reasonably       months after a        would be retained
 practicable after a change    change occurs in      and revised. Most
 occurs in personnel,          personnel,            significantly, the
 procedures, equipment, or     procedures,           phrase ``as soon as
 facilities that potentially   equipment, or         reasonably
 could adversely affect        facilities that       practicable'' would
 security but no longer than   potentially could     be deleted and the
 12 months after the change.   adversely affect      current requirement
                               security.             ``12 months'' would
                                                     be moved to the
                                                     beginning of the
                                                     sentence to
                                                     eliminate potential
                                                     for
                                                     misunderstanding
                                                     and improve
                                                     consistency.
Sec.   73.55(g)(4)(i)(B) In   (n)(2) As a minimum,  This requirement
 any case, each element of     each element of the   would be retained
 the security program must     onsite physical       with minor
 be reviewed at least every    protection program    revision.
 24 months.                    must be reviewed at
                               least every twenty-
                               four (24) months.
Sec.   73.55(g)(4)(i) The     (n)(2)(i) The onsite  This requirement
 licensee shall review         physical protection   would be retained
 implementation of the         program review must   and revised to
 security program by           be documented and     combine two current
 individuals who have no       performed by          requirements. Most
 direct responsibility for     individuals           significantly, the
 the security program          independent of        word ``documented''
 either:                       those personnel       would be added for
Sec.   73.55(g)(4)(ii) The     responsible for       consistency with
 results and recommendations   program management    the current Sec.
 of the security program       and any individual    73.55(g)(4)(ii).
 review * * * must be          who has direct        The phrase
 documented * * *.             responsibility for    ``security
                               implementing the      program'' would be
                               onsite physical       replaced with the
                               protection program.   phrase ``program''
                                                     for consistency
                                                     with use of the
                                                     phrase ``onsite
                                                     physical protection
                                                     program''.
Sec.   73.55(g)(4)(ii) The    (n)(2)(ii) Onsite     This requirement
 security program review       physical protection   would be retained
 must include an audit of      program reviews and   and revised to
 security procedures and       audits must           provide additional
 practices, an evaluation of   include, but not be   examples. Most
 the effectiveness of the      limited to, an        significantly, the
 physical protection system,   evaluation of the     phrase ``but not be
 an audit of the physical      effectiveness of      limited to'' would
 protection system testing     the approved          be added to clarify
 and maintenance program,      security plans,       that the proposed
 and an audit of commitments   implementing          examples are not
 established for response by   procedures,           all inclusive.
 local law enforcement         response
 authorities.                  commitments by
                               local, State, and
                               Federal law
                               enforcement
                               authorities, cyber-
                               security programs,
                               safety/security
                               interface, and the
                               testing,
                               maintenance, and
                               calibration program.

[[Page 62727]]

 
Sec.   73.55(d)(7)(ii)(B)     (n)(3) The licensee   This requirement
 Periodically review           shall periodically    would be retained
 physical security plans and   review the approved   with minor
 contingency plans and         security plans, the   revision. The
 procedures to evaluate        integrated response   phrase ``Integrated
 their potential impact on     plan, the licensee    Response Plan''
 plant and personnel safety.   protective            would be added to
                               strategy, and         emphasize the
                               licensee              importance of this
                               implementing          proposed plan and
                               procedures to         to emphasize its
                               evaluate their        relationship to
                               effectiveness and     other site plans.
                               potential impact on   The term
                               plant and personnel   ``implementing''
                               safety.               procedures would be
                                                     added for
                                                     consistency with
                                                     this proposed
                                                     section.
                              (n)(4) The licensee   This requirement
                               shall periodically    would be added to
                               evaluate the cyber-   account for the use
                               security program      of computers and
                               for effectiveness     the need to ensure
                               and shall update      that required
                               the cyber-security    protective measures
                               program as needed     are being met and
                               to ensure             to evaluate the
                               protection against    effects that
                               changes to internal   changes or other
                               and external          technological
                               threats.              advancements would
                                                     have on systems
                                                     used at nuclear
                                                     power plants.
                              (n)(5) The licensee   This requirement
                               shall conduct         would be added to
                               quarterly drills      provide a
                               and annual force-on-  performance based
                               force exercises in    requirement for the
                               accordance with       conduct of force-on-
                               appendix C to part    force drills and
                               73 and the licensee   exercises.
                               performance
                               evaluation program.
Sec.   73.55(g)(4)(ii) The    (n)(6) The results    This requirement
 results and recommendations   and recommendations   would be retained
 of the security program       of the onsite         with minor
 review, management's          physical protection   revision. The
 findings on whether the       program reviews and   phrase ``security
 security program is           audits,               program review''
 currently effective, and      management's          would be replaced
 any actions taken as a        findings regarding    with the phrase''
 result of recommendations     program               onsite physical
 from prior program reviews    effectiveness, and    protection program
 must be documented in a       any actions taken     reviews and
 report to the licensee's      as a result of        audits'' for
 plant manager and to          recommendations       consistency with
 corporate management at       from prior program    the format of the
 least one level higher than   reviews, must be      proposed rule. The
 that having responsibility    documented in a       phrase ``on whether
 for the day-to-day plant      report to the         the security
 operation.                    licensee's plant      program is
                               manager and to        currently
                               corporate             effective'' would
                               management at least   be replaced with
                               one level higher      the phrase
                               than that having      ``regarding program
                               responsibility for    effectiveness'' for
                               day-to-day plant      plain language
                               operation.            purposes.
                              (n)(7) Findings from  This requirement
                               onsite physical       would be added to
                               protection program    ensure that
                               reviews, audits,      security
                               and assessments       deficiencies and
                               must be entered       findings would be
                               into the site         tracked through the
                               corrective action     site corrective
                               program and           action program
                               protected as          until corrected,
                               safeguards            and information
                               information, if       regarding specific
                               applicable.           findings would be
                                                     protected in
                                                     accordance with the
                                                     sensitivity and
                                                     potential for
                                                     exploitation of the
                                                     information.
                              (n)(8) The licensee   This requirement
                               shall make changes    would be added to
                               to the approved       provide a
                               security plans and    performance based
                               implementing          requirement for the
                               procedures as a       revision of
                               result of findings    approved security
                               from security         plans where plan
                               program reviews,      changes are
                               audits, and           necessary to
                               assessments, where    account for
                               necessary to ensure   implementation
                               the effective         problems, changes
                               implementation of     to site conditions,
                               Commission            or other problems
                               regulations and the   that adversely
                               licensee protective   affect the licensee
                               strategy.             capability to
                                                     effectively
                                                     implement
                                                     Commission
                                                     requirements.
                              (n)(9) Unless         This requirement
                               otherwise specified   would be added to
                               by the Commission,    provide necessary
                               onsite physical       flexibility to
                               protection program    allow licensees to
                               reviews, audits,      conduct audits/
                               and assessments may   reviews within a
                               be conducted up to    specified time
                               thirty days prior     period without
                               to, but no later      changing future
                               than thirty days      scheduled audit/
                               after the scheduled   review dates. This
                               date without          requirement
                               adverse impact upon   provides regulatory
                               the next scheduled    stability and
                               annual audit date.    flexibility to
                                                     account for
                                                     unforseen
                                                     circumstances that
                                                     may interfere with
                                                     regularly scheduled
                                                     dates, such as
                                                     forced outages.
Sec.   73.55(g) Testing and   (o) Maintenance,      This header would be
 maintenance.                  testing, and          retained and
                               calibration.          revised to include
                                                     ``calibration'' of
                                                     equipment to ensure
                                                     the accuracy of
                                                     readings provided
                                                     from such
                                                     equipment.
                              (o)(1) The licensee   This header would be
                               shall:                added for
                                                     formatting
                                                     purposes.
                              (o)(1)(i) Implement   This requirement
                               a maintenance,        would be added to
                               testing and           comprehensively
                               calibration program   address all
                               to ensure that        security equipment
                               security systems      in consistent
                               and equipment are     terms. This
                               tested for            proposed
                               operability and       requirement would
                               performance at        clarify the current
                               predetermined         requirement for
                               intervals, are        ensuring that
                               maintained in         security equipment
                               operable condition,   operates and
                               and are capable of    performs as stated
                               performing their      in the approved
                               intended function     security plans.
                               when needed.

[[Page 62728]]

 
                              (o)(1)(ii) Describe   This requirement
                               the maintenance,      would be added to
                               testing and           address the
                               calibration program   maintenance,
                               in the approved       testing and
                               physical security     calibration of
                               plan. Implementing    security equipment
                               procedures must       in non-specific
                               specify operational   terms and describe
                               and technical         the types of
                               details required to   documentation and
                               perform               level of detail
                               maintenance,          needed.
                               testing, and
                               calibration
                               activities to
                               include, but not
                               limited to, purpose
                               of activity,
                               actions to be
                               taken, acceptance
                               criteria, the
                               intervals or
                               frequency at which
                               the activity will
                               be performed, and
                               compensatory
                               actions required.
                              (o)(1)(iii) Document  This requirement
                               problems, failures,   would be added for
                               deficiencies, and     consistency with
                               other findings, to    the proposed
                               include the cause     requirement for
                               of each, and enter    addressing findings
                               each into the site    from security
                               corrective action     program reviews and
                               program. The          audits and how
                               licensee shall        specific
                               protect this          information
                               information as        concerning security
                               safeguards            deficiencies and
                               information, if       findings must be
                               applicable.           protected so that
                                                     noted deficiencies
                                                     could not be
                                                     exploited.
Sec.   73.55(g)(1) The        (o)(1)(iv) Implement  This requirement
 licensee shall develop and    compensatory          would be retained
 employ compensatory           measures in a         with minor
 measures including            timely manner to      revision.
 equipment, additional         ensure that the
 security personnel and        effectiveness of
 specific procedures to        the onsite physical
 assure that the               protection program
 effectiveness of the          is not reduced by
 security system is not        failure or degraded
 reduced by failure or other   operation of
 contingencies affecting the   security-related
 operation of the security     components or
 related equipment or          equipment.
 structures.
Sec.   73.55(g)(2) Each       (o)(2) Each           This requirement
 intrusion alarm shall be      intrusion alarm       would be retained
 tested for performance at     must be tested for    and revised to
 the beginning and end of      operability at the    correct the use of
 any period that it is used    beginning and end     the phrase ``tested
 for security. If the period   of any period that    for performance'',
 of continuous use is longer   it is used for        as stated in the
 than seven days, the          security, or if the   current Sec.
 intrusion alarm shall also    period of             73.55(g)(2). The
 be tested at least once       continuous use        testing performed
 every seven (7) days.         exceeds seven (7)     at the beginning
                               days, the intrusion   and end of any
                               alarm must be         period is intended
                               tested at least       to be a ``go, no-
                               once every seven      go'' test or
                               (7) days.             operational test
                                                     that is used to
                                                     simply indicate
                                                     that the equipment
                                                     functions in
                                                     response to
                                                     predetermined
                                                     stimuli. A
                                                     performance test is
                                                     a more elaborate
                                                     test that would
                                                     test a system
                                                     through the entire
                                                     range of its
                                                     intended function
                                                     or stimuli.
Sec.   73.55(g)(2) Each       (o)(3) Intrusion      This requirement
 intrusion alarm shall be      detection and         would be retained
 tested for performance at     access control        and revised to
 the beginning and end of      equipment must be     correct the
 any period that it is used    performance tested    periodicity of
 for security.                 in accordance with    performance testing
                               the approved          stated in the
                               security plans.       current Sec.
                                                     73.55(g)(2) and to
                                                     add ``access
                                                     control equipment''
                                                     due to the
                                                     widespread use of
                                                     access control
                                                     technologies and to
                                                     focus on the need
                                                     to ensure that this
                                                     equipment is
                                                     functioning as
                                                     intended in
                                                     response to the
                                                     predetermined
                                                     stimuli (e.g.,
                                                     biometrics). The
                                                     phrase ``each
                                                     intrusion alarm''
                                                     would be replaced
                                                     with the phrase
                                                     ``Intrusion
                                                     detection and
                                                     access control
                                                     equipment'' to more
                                                     accurately describe
                                                     the equipment to be
                                                     performance tested.
Sec.   73.55(g)(3)            (o)(4) Equipment      This proposed
 Communications equipment      required for          requirement would
 required for communications   communications        be retained and
 onsite shall be tested for    onsite must be        revised to correct
 performance not less          tested for            the use of the
 frequently than once at the   operability not       phrase ``tested for
 beginning of each security    less frequently       performance'', as
 personnel work shift.         than once at the      stated in the
                               beginning of each     current Sec.
                               security personnel    73.55(g)(3). The
                               work shift.           testing performed
                                                     at the beginning
                                                     and end of any
                                                     period is intended
                                                     to be a ``go, no-
                                                     go'' test or
                                                     operational test
                                                     that is used to
                                                     simply indicate
                                                     that the equipment
                                                     functions in
                                                     response to
                                                     predetermined
                                                     stimuli.

[[Page 62729]]

 
Sec.   73.55(g)(3)            (o)(5) Communication  This requirement
 Communications equipment      systems between the   would be retained
 required for communications   alarm stations and    and revised to
 offsite shall be tested for   each control room,    include both
 performance not less than     and between the       ``onsite'' and
 once a day.                   alarm stations and    offsite
                               offsite support       communication
                               agencies, to          equipment
                               include back-up       associated with
                               communication         integrated response
                               equipment, must be    and to correct the
                               tested for            use of the term
                               operability at        ``performance
                               least once each day.  test,'' as stated
                                                     in the current Sec.
                                                       73.55(g)(3). The
                                                     testing performed
                                                     at least once each
                                                     day is intended to
                                                     be a ``go, no-go''
                                                     test or operational
                                                     test that is used
                                                     to simply indicate
                                                     that the equipment
                                                     functions.
                              (o)(6) Search         This requirement
                               equipment must be     would be added to
                               tested for            ensure that search
                               operability at        equipment is tested
                               least once each day   for operability and
                               and tested for        performance at
                               performance at        intervals that
                               least once during     provide assurance
                               each seven (7) day    that unauthorized
                               period and before     items would be
                               being placed back     detected as
                               in service after      required. This
                               each repair or        proposed
                               inoperative state.    requirement is
                                                     added to address
                                                     the widespread use
                                                     of search equipment
                                                     technologies, such
                                                     as explosives and
                                                     metal detectors,
                                                     and x-ray equipment
                                                     and to provide a
                                                     performance based
                                                     requirement that
                                                     focuses on the
                                                     importance for
                                                     accurate
                                                     performance of this
                                                     equipment.
Sec.   73.55(g)(1) All        (o)(7) All intrusion  This requirement
 alarms, communication         detection             would be retained
 equipment, physical           equipment,            with minor
 barriers, and other           communication         revision. Most
 security related devices or   equipment, physical   significantly, back-
 equipment shall be            barriers, and other   up power supplies
 maintained in operable        security-related      are added to ensure
 condition.                    devices or            this critical
                               equipment, to         element is
                               include back-up       maintained in
                               power supplies must   operable condition.
                               be maintained in
                               operable condition.
                              (o)(8) A program for  This requirement
                               testing or            would be added to
                               verifying the         account for those
                               operability of        circumstances when
                               devices or            a licensee cannot
                               equipment located     satisfy testing
                               in hazardous areas    requirements due to
                               must be specified     safety hazards or
                               in the approved       radiation
                               security plans and    restrictions. Vital
                               must define           component area
                               alternate measures    portals located
                               to be taken to        within facility
                               ensure the timely     radiological
                               completion of         controlled areas
                               testing or            that are
                               maintenance when      inaccessible due to
                               the hazardous         safety hazards or
                               condition or          established
                               radiation             radiation
                               restrictions are no   restrictions may be
                               longer applicable.    excluded from the
                                                     testing
                                                     requirements of
                                                     this section.
                              (p) Compensatory      This header would be
                               measures.             added for
                                                     formatting
                                                     purposes.
Sec.   73.55(g)(1) The        (p)(1) The licensee   This requirement
 licensee shall develop and    shall identify        would be retained
 employ compensatory           measures and          with minor
 measures * * *.               criteria needed to    revision. The word
                               compensate for the    ``compensate'' is
                               loss or reduced       used to provide a
                               performance of        performance based
                               personnel,            requirement that
                               equipment, systems,   requires the
                               and components,       identified
                               that are required     compensatory
                               to meet the           measure to be
                               requirements of       ``developed and
                               this section.         employed''.
Sec.   73.55(g)(1) The        (p)(2) Compensatory   This requirement
 licensee shall develop and    measures must be      would be retained
 employ compensatory           designed and          and revised to
 measures including            implemented to        focus on the
 equipment, additional         provide a level of    Commission's view
 security personnel and        protection that is    that compensatory
 specific procedures to        equivalent to the     measures must
 assure that the               protection that was   provide a level of
 effectiveness of the          provided by the       protection that
 security system is not        degraded or           satisfies the
 reduced by failure or other   inoperable            Commission
 contingencies affecting the   personnel,            requirement which
 operation of the security     equipment, system,    was otherwise
 related equipment or          or components.        satisfied through
 structures.                                         use or
                                                     implementation of
                                                     the failed
                                                     component of the
                                                     onsite physical
                                                     protection program.
                              (p)(3) Compensatory   This requirement
                               measures must be      would be added to
                               implemented within    provide a
                               specific time lines   performance based
                               necessary to meet     requirement for
                               the requirements      timely
                               stated in paragraph   implementation of
                               (b) of this section   compensatory
                               and described in      measures. The
                               the approved          phrase ``within
                               security plans.       specific time lines
                                                     necessary to meet
                                                     the requirements
                                                     stated in paragraph
                                                     (b)'' would provide
                                                     qualifying details
                                                     against which
                                                     specific time lines
                                                     would be developed.
                              (q) Suspension of     This header would be
                               safeguards measures.  added for
                                                     formatting
                                                     purposes.
                              (q)(1) The licensee   This requirement
                               may suspend           would be added for
                               implementation of     formatting
                               affected              purposes. The
                               requirements of       phrase
                               this section under    ``implementation of
                               the following         affected
                               conditions:           requirements''
                                                     would be used to
                                                     ensure the licensee
                                                     only suspends those
                                                     measures that
                                                     cannot be met as a
                                                     direct result of
                                                     the condition.

[[Page 62730]]

 
Sec.   73.55(a) In            (q)(1)(i) In          This requirement
 accordance with Sec.  Sec.    accordance with       would be retained
  50.54(x) and 50.54(y) of     Sec.  Sec.            with minor
 this chapter, the licensee    50.54(x) and          revision.
 may suspend any safeguards    50.54(y) of this
 measures pursuant to Sec.     chapter, the
 73.55 in an emergency when    licensee may
 this action is immediately    suspend any
 needed to protect the         safeguards measures
 public health and safety      pursuant to this
 and no action consistent      section in an
 with license conditions and   emergency when this
 technical specification       action is
 that can provide adequate     immediately needed
 or equivalent protection is   to protect the
 immediately apparent.         public health and
                               safety and no
                               action consistent
                               with license
                               conditions and
                               technical
                               specifications that
                               can provide
                               adequate or
                               equivalent
                               protection is
                               immediately
                               apparent.
Sec.   73.55(a) This          This suspension of    This requirement
 suspension must be approved   safeguards measures   would be retained
 as a minimum by a licensed    must be approved as   with minor revision
 senior operator prior to      a minimum by a        to report this
 taking the action.            licensed senior       information to the
                               operator prior to     control room. This
                               taking this action.   proposed
                                                     requirement is
                                                     intended to ensure
                                                     that at least one
                                                     onsite, licensee
                                                     management level
                                                     person who is
                                                     knowledgeable and
                                                     aware of reactor
                                                     operations and
                                                     reactor status at
                                                     the time, is the
                                                     individual who
                                                     would approve the
                                                     suspension and has
                                                     the knowledge to
                                                     determine and the
                                                     authority to direct
                                                     appropriate
                                                     compensatory
                                                     measures to
                                                     include, but not
                                                     limited to,
                                                     modifications to
                                                     the licensee
                                                     protective strategy
                                                     during the
                                                     suspension period.
                              (q)(1)(ii) During     This requirement
                               severe weather when   would be added to
                               the suspension is     provide a
                               immediately needed    performance based
                               to protect            requirement that
                               personnel whose       accounts for the
                               assigned duties and   suspension of
                               responsibilities in   safeguards measures
                               meeting the           during severe
                               requirements of       weather conditions
                               this section would    that could result
                               otherwise             in life threatening
                               constitute a life     situations such as
                               threatening           tornadoes, floods,
                               situation and no      hurricanes, etc.,
                               action consistent     for those
                               with the              individuals
                               requirements of       assigned to carry
                               this section that     out certain duties
                               can provide           and
                               equivalent            responsibilities
                               protection is         required by
                               immediately           Commission
                               apparent.             regulations, and
                                                     the approved
                                                     security plans and
                                                     procedures.
                              Suspension of         This requirement
                               safeguards due to     would be added to
                               severe weather must   provide a
                               be initiated by the   requirement for who
                               security supervisor   is authorized to
                               and approved by a     approve suspensions
                               licensed senior       under severe
                               operator prior to     weather conditions.
                               taking this action.
                              (q)(2) Suspended      This requirement
                               security measures     would be added to
                               must be               provide a
                               reimplemented as      performance based
                               soon as conditions    requirement for
                               permit.               reimplementing
                                                     suspended security
                                                     measures.
Sec.   73.55(a) The           (q)(3) The            This requirement
 suspension of safeguards      suspension of         would be retained
 measures must be reported     safeguards measures   with minor revision
 in accordance with the        must be reported      for documenting
 provisions of Sec.   73.71.   and documented in     suspended security
                               accordance with the   measures.
                               provisions of Sec.
                                73.71.
Sec.   73.55(a) Reports made  (q)(4) Reports made   This requirement
 under Section Sec.   50.72    under Sec.   50.72    would be retained.
 need not be duplicated        of this chapter
 under Sec.   73.71.           need not be
                               duplicated under
                               Sec.   73.71.
                              (r) Records.........  This header would be
                                                     added for
                                                     formatting
                                                     purposes.
Sec.   73.55(b)(1)(ii) The    (r)(1) The            This requirement
 NRC may inspect, copy, and    Commission may        would be retained
 take away copies of all       inspect, copy,        with minor
 reports and documents         retain, and remove    revision. The
 required to be kept by        copies of all         phrase ``reports
 Commission regulations,       records required to   and documents''
 orders, or applicable         be kept by            would be replaced
 license conditions whether    Commission            with the word
 the reports and documents     regulations,          ``records'' to
 are kept by the licensee or   orders, or license    account for all
 the contractor.               conditions whether    information
                               the records are       collection
                               kept by the           requirements
                               licensee or a         regardless of
                               contractor.           media, to include
                                                     electronic record
                                                     keeping systems.
Sec.   73.55(g)(4) These      (r)(2) The licensee   This requirement
 reports must be maintained    shall maintain all    would be retained
 in an auditable form,         records required to   and revised to
 available for inspection,     be kept by            consolidate
 for a period of 3 years.      Commission            multiple current
                               regulations,          records retention
                               orders, or license    requirements rather
                               conditions, as a      than state the same
                               record until the      requirement
                               Commission            multiple times for
                               terminates the        each record
                               license for which     throughout this
                               the records were      rule. The phrase
                               developed and shall   ``unless otherwise
                               maintain superceded   specified by the
                               portions of these     Commission'' would
                               records for at        be used to address
                               least three (3)       any conflict that
                               years after the       may arise between
                               record is             other records
                               superseded, unless    retention
                               otherwise specified   requirements such
                               by the Commission.    that the more
                                                     restrictive
                                                     requirement would
                                                     take precedence.

[[Page 62731]]

 
                              (s) Safety/security   This requirement
                               interface. In         would be added to
                               accordance with the   provide specific
                               requirements of       reference to the
                               Sec.   73.58, the     proposed Sec.
                               licensee shall        73.58 for Safety
                               develop and           and Security
                               implement a process   Interface
                               to inform and         requirements.
                               coordinate safety
                               and security
                               activities to
                               ensure that these
                               activities do not
                               adversely affect
                               the capabilities of
                               the security
                               organization to
                               satisfy the
                               requirements of
                               this section, or
                               overall plant
                               safety.
                              (t) Alternative       This header would be
                               measures.             added for
                                                     formatting
                                                     purposes.
Sec.   73.55(a) The           (t)(1) The            This requirement
 Commission may authorize an   Commission may        would be retained
 applicant or licensee to      authorize an          and revised to
 provide measures for          applicant or          provide a
 protection against            licensee to provide   performance based
 radiological sabotage other   a measure for         requirement for
 than those required by this   protection against    alternative
 section if the applicant or   radiological          measures that focus
 licensee demonstrates that    sabotage other than   attention on the
 the measures have the same    one required by       Commission's view
 high assurance objective as   this section if the   that an alternative
 specified in this paragraph   applicant or          measure is an
 and that the overall level    licensee              unanalyzed
 of system performance         demonstrates that:    substitute for a
 provides protection against  (i) The measure        specific Commission
 radiological sabotage         meets the same        requirement of this
 equivalent to that which      performance           proposed section
 would be provided by          objective and         and therefore, must
 Paragraphs (b) through (h)    requirements as       be individually and
 of this section and meets     specified in          knowingly reviewed
 the general performance       paragraph (b) of      and approved by the
 requirements of this          this section, and.    Commission before
 section.                     (ii) The proposed      implementation to
                               alternative measure   ensure consistency
                               provides protection   with these proposed
                               against               Commission
                               radiological          regulations. The
                               sabotage or theft     Commission has
                               of unirradiated MOX   determined that the
                               fuel assemblies,      requirements
                               equivalent to that    described in this
                               which would be        proposed section
                               provided by the       have been carefully
                               specific              analyzed by the
                               requirement for       Commission and
                               which it would        therefore, an
                               substitute.           alternative measure
                                                     to a proposed
                                                     requirement of this
                                                     section must also
                                                     be carefully
                                                     analyzed through
                                                     the process
                                                     addressed in 10 CFR
                                                     50.90 before
                                                     implementation.
                                                     Specifically, the
                                                     language used by
                                                     this proposed
                                                     requirement
                                                     addresses
                                                     alternative
                                                     measures
                                                     ``individually''
                                                     rather than
                                                     collectively to
                                                     clarify that each
                                                     proposed
                                                     alternative measure
                                                     is unique by itself
                                                     and must be
                                                     analyzed as such.
                                                     In addition, the
                                                     phrase ``have the
                                                     same high assurance
                                                     objective'' is
                                                     replaced with the
                                                     phrase ``meets the
                                                     same performance
                                                     objective and
                                                     requirements as
                                                     specified in
                                                     paragraph (b) of
                                                     this section''.
                                                    The proposed
                                                     paragraph (b) of
                                                     this section
                                                     retains the same
                                                     ``high assurance
                                                     objective''
                                                     referred to by the
                                                     current requirement
                                                     and incorporates by
                                                     reference the
                                                     performance based
                                                     requirements of
                                                     this proposed
                                                     section that
                                                     facilitate licensee
                                                     achievement of the
                                                     intended high
                                                     assurance
                                                     objective.
Sec.   73.55(c)(9)(i) For     (t)(2) The licensee   This requirement
 licensees who choose to       shall submit each     would be retained
 propose alternative           proposed              and revised to
 measures as provided for in   alternative measure   expand the
 10 CFR 73.55(c)(8), the       to the Commission     application of the
 proposal must be submitted    for review and        current provision
 in accordance with 10 CFR     approval in           for alternative
 50.90 and include the         accordance with       measures to all
 analysis and justification    Sec.  Sec.   50.4     proposed
 for the proposed              and 50.90 of this     requirements of
 alternatives.                 chapter before        this section and
                               implementation.       would provide the
                                                     process by which
                                                     alternative
                                                     measures would be
                                                     submitted for
                                                     Commission review
                                                     and approval.
Sec.   73.55(c)(8)(ii)        (t)(3) The licensee   This requirement
 Propose alternative           shall submit a        would be retained
 measures, in addition to      technical basis for   and revised to
 the measures established in   each proposed         expand the
 accordance with 10 CFR        alternative           application of the
 73.55(c)(7), describe the     measure, to include   current provision
 level of protection that      any analysis or       for alternative
 these measures would          assessment            measures to all
 provide against a land        conducted in          proposed
 vehicle bomb, and compare     support of a          requirements of
 the costs of the              determination that    this section and to
 alternative measures with     the proposed          provide a
 the costs of measures         alternative measure   description of the
 necessary to fully meet the   provides a level of   detailed
 design goals and criteria.    protection that is    information needed
                               at least equal to     to support the
                               that which would      technical basis for
                               otherwise be          a request for
                               provided by the       Commission approval
                               specific              of an alternative
                               requirement of this   measure.
                               section.

[[Page 62732]]

 
Sec.   73.55(c)(8)(ii) The    (t)(4) Alternative    This requirement
 Commission will approve the   vehicle barrier       would be retained
 proposed alternative          systems. In the       with minor
 measures if they provide      case of alternative   revision. The
 substantial protection        vehicle barrier       phrase ``The
 against a land vehicle        systems required by   Commission will
 bomb, and it is determined    Sec.   73.55(e)(8),   approve the
 by an analysis, using the     the licensee shall    proposed
 essential elements of 10      demonstrate that:     alternative
 CFR 50.109, that the costs   (i) The alternative    measures'' would be
 of fully meeting the design   measure provides      deleted because
 goals and criteria are not    substantial           approval would be
 justified by the added        protection against    based on NRC
 protection that would be      a vehicle bomb, and.  review. The
 provided.                    (ii) Based on          proposed language
                               comparison of the     clearly stipulates
                               costs of the          that alternative
                               alternative           measures will be
                               measures to the       reviewed by the
                               costs of meeting      staff and approval
                               the Commission's      would be contingent
                               requirements using    upon the
                               the essential         justification
                               elements of 10 CFR    provided by the
                               50.109, the costs     licensee to include
                               of fully meeting      an analysis that
                               the Commission's      examines the costs
                               requirements are      and benefits of the
                               not justified by      alternative measure
                               the protection that   consistent with 10
                               would be provided.    CFR 50.109.
                              Sec.   73.55          This requirement
                               Definitions.          would be added to
                                                     clarify the use of
                                                     the listed terms
                                                     used in this
                                                     proposed rule.
                              Security Officer      This definition
                               means a uniformed     would be added to
                               individual, either    clarify what is
                               armed with a          meant by the term
                               covered weapon or     ``Security
                               unarmed, whose        Officer'' as used
                               primary duty is the   in this document.
                               protection of a
                               facility, of
                               radioactive
                               material, or of
                               other property
                               against theft or
                               diversion or
                               against
                               radiological
                               sabotage.
                              Target Set means the  This definition
                               combination of        would be added to
                               equipment or          clarify what is
                               operator actions      meant by the term
                               which, if all are     ``Target Set'' as
                               prevented from        used in this
                               performing their      document.
                               intended safety
                               function or
                               prevented from
                               being accomplished,
                               would likely result
                               in significant core
                               damage (e.g., non-
                               incipient, non-
                               localized fuel
                               melting, and/or
                               core disruption)
                               barring
                               extraordinary
                               action by plant
                               operators. A target
                               set with respect to
                               spent fuel sabotage
                               is draining the
                               spent fuel pool
                               leaving the spent
                               fuel uncovered for
                               a period of time,
                               allowing spent fuel
                               heat-up and the
                               associated
                               potential for
                               release of fission
                               products.
------------------------------------------------------------------------


                Table 3.--Proposed Part 73 Section 73.56
 [Personnel access authorization requirements for nuclear power plants]
------------------------------------------------------------------------
      Current language          Proposed language      Considerations
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Sec.   73.56(a) General.....  (a) Introduction....  This header would be
                                                     added for
                                                     formatting
                                                     purposes. This
                                                     proposed Sec.
                                                     73.56(a) would
                                                     amend and
                                                     reorganize current
                                                     Sec.   73.56(a)
                                                     [General]. The
                                                     current Sec.
                                                     73.56(a) required
                                                     licensees to
                                                     develop and
                                                     implement access
                                                     authorization (AA)
                                                     programs. The
                                                     proposed Sec.
                                                     73.56(a) would
                                                     update these
                                                     requirements. The
                                                     title of this
                                                     paragraph would be
                                                     revised to more
                                                     accurately capture
                                                     the topics
                                                     addressed in the
                                                     proposed Sec.
                                                     73.56(a), which
                                                     would include a
                                                     description of the
                                                     NRC-regulated
                                                     entities who would
                                                     be subject to the
                                                     section and the
                                                     methods by which
                                                     the NRC intends
                                                     that licensees
                                                     would implement the
                                                     amended AA
                                                     programs. These
                                                     proposed changes to
                                                     the language and
                                                     organization of
                                                     current Sec.
                                                     73.56(a) would be
                                                     made to enhance the
                                                     clarity of the
                                                     requirements in
                                                     this section, for
                                                     the reasons
                                                     discussed in
                                                     Section IV.

[[Page 62733]]

 
Sec.   73.56(a) General. (1)  (a)(1) By [date--180  This requirement
 Each licensee who is          days--after the       would be added to
 authorized on April 25,       effective date of     discuss the types
 1991, to operate a nuclear    the final rule        of Commission
 power reactor pursuant to     published in the      licensees to whom
 Sec.  Sec.   50.21(b) or      Federal Register],    the proposed
 50.22 of this chapter shall   each nuclear power    requirements of
 comply with the               reactor licensee,     this section would
 requirements of this          licensed under 10     apply and the
 section. By April 27, 1992,   CFR part 50, shall    schedule for
 the required access           incorporate the       submitting the
 authorization program must    revised               amended access
 be incorporated into the      requirements of       authorization
 site Physical Security Plan   this section          program. The
 as provided for by 10 CFR     through amendments    Commission intends
 50.54(p)(2) and               to its Commission-    to delete the
 implemented. By April 27,     approved access       current language,
 1992, each licensee shall     authorization         because it applies
 certify to the NRC that it    program and shall     only to a past rule
 has implemented an access     submit the amended    change that is
 authorization program that    program to the        completed. The
 meets the requirements of     Commission for        proposed
 this part.                    review and approval.  requirements of
                                                     this section would
                                                     be applicable to
                                                     decommissioned/ing
                                                     reactors unless
                                                     otherwise approved
                                                     by the Commission.
                                                     This proposed
                                                     requirement would
                                                     add a requirement
                                                     for Commission
                                                     review and approval
                                                     of the amended
                                                     access
                                                     authorization
                                                     program to ensure
                                                     that access
                                                     authorization
                                                     programs meet the
                                                     objective of
                                                     providing high
                                                     assurance that
                                                     individuals who are
                                                     subject to the
                                                     requirements of
                                                     this section are
                                                     trustworthy and
                                                     reliable, and do
                                                     not constitute an
                                                     unreasonable risk
                                                     to public health
                                                     and safety or the
                                                     common defense and
                                                     security, including
                                                     the potential to
                                                     commit radiological
                                                     sabotage.
                              (a)(2) The amended    This requirement
                               program must be       would be added to
                               submitted as          provide a reference
                               specified in Sec.     to the current Sec.
                               50.4 and must           50.4(b)(4) which
                               describe how the      describes
                               revised               procedural details
                               requirements of       relative to the
                               this section will     proposed security
                               be implemented by     plan submission
                               the licensee, to      requirement.
                               include a proposed
                               implementation
                               schedule.
                              (a)(3) The licensee   This requirement
                               shall implement the   would be added to
                               existing approved     clarify that the
                               access                licensee must
                               authorization         continue to
                               program and           implement the
                               associated            current Commission-
                               Commission orders     approved security
                               until Commission      plans until the
                               approval of the       Commission approves
                               amended program,      the amended plans.
                               unless otherwise      The phrase ``unless
                               authorized by the     otherwise
                               Commission.           authorized by the
                                                     Commission'' would
                                                     provide flexibility
                                                     to account for
                                                     unanticipated
                                                     situations that may
                                                     affect the
                                                     licensee's ability
                                                     to comply with this
                                                     proposed
                                                     requirement.
                              (a)(4) The licensee   This requirement
                               is responsible to     would be added to
                               the Commission for    clarify that the
                               maintaining the       licensee is
                               authorization         responsible for
                               program in            meeting Commission
                               accordance with       regulations and the
                               Commission            approved security
                               regulations and       plans. The phrase
                               related Commission-   ``through the
                               directed orders       implementation of
                               through the           the approved
                               implementation of     program and site
                               the approved          implementing
                               program and site      procedures'' would
                               implementing          be added to
                               procedures.           describe the
                                                     relationship
                                                     between Commission
                                                     regulations, the
                                                     approved
                                                     authorization
                                                     program, and
                                                     implementing
                                                     procedures. The
                                                     Commission views
                                                     the approved
                                                     security plans as
                                                     the mechanism
                                                     through which the
                                                     licensee implements
                                                     Commission
                                                     requirements.

[[Page 62734]]

 
Sec.   73.56(a)(2) Each       (a)(5) Applicants     This requirement
 applicant for a license to    for an operating      would be added to
 operate a nuclear power       license under the     describe the
 reactor pursuant to Sec.      provisions of part    proposed
 Sec.   50.21(b) or 50.22 of   50 of this chapter,   requirements for
 this chapter, whose           or holders of a       applicants and to
 application was submitted     combined license      specify that the
 prior to April 25, 1991,      under the             proposed
 shall either by April 27,     provisions of part    requirements of
 1992, or the date of          52 of this chapter,   this section must
 receipt of the operating      shall satisfy the     be met upon receipt
 license, whichever is         requirements of       of an operating
 later, incorporate the        this section upon     license or upon
 required access               receipt of an         notice of the
 authorization program into    operating license     Commission's
 the site Physical Security    or upon notice of     finding under Sec.
 Plan and implement it.        the Commission's       52.103(g) of this
Sec.   73.56(a)(3) Each        finding under Sec.    chapter. This
 applicant for a license to     52.103(g) of this    proposed
 operate a nuclear power       chapter.              requirement would
 reactor pursuant to Sec.                            retain the meaning
 Sec.   50.21(b) or 50.22 of                         of the current Sec.
 this chapter and each                                 73.56(a)(3),
 applicant for a combined                            which requires
 construction permit and                             applicants for a
 operating license pursuant                          license to operate
 to part 52 of this chapter,                         a nuclear power
 whose application is                                plant to
 submitted after April 25,                           incorporate an
 1991, shall include the                             access
 required access                                     authorization
 authorization program as                            program in their
 part of its Physical                                Physical Security
 Security Plan. The                                  Plan and implement
 applicant, upon receipt of                          the approved access
 an operating license or                             authorization
 upon receipt of operating                           program when
 authorization, shall                                approval to begin
 implement the required                              operating is
 access authorization                                received. This
 program as part of its site                         proposed
 Physical Security Plan..                            requirement would
                                                     also add a
                                                     requirement for
                                                     Commission review
                                                     and approval of an
                                                     applicant's
                                                     Physical Security
                                                     Plan incorporating
                                                     the requirements of
                                                     this proposed
                                                     section for the
                                                     reasons discussed
                                                     with respect to
                                                     proposed Sec.
                                                     73.56(a)(1). The
                                                     Commission intends
                                                     to delete the
                                                     current Sec.
                                                     73.56(a)(2) because
                                                     there are no
                                                     remaining
                                                     applicants for an
                                                     operating license
                                                     under Sec.  Sec.
                                                     50.21(b) or 50.22
                                                     of this chapter who
                                                     have not
                                                     implemented an AA
                                                     program under the
                                                     current
                                                     requirements.
                                                     Therefore, the
                                                     current paragraph
                                                     is no longer
                                                     necessary.
                                                    The proposed
                                                     paragraph would
                                                     retain the current
                                                     requirement for
                                                     licensees and
                                                     applicants to
                                                     implement access
                                                     authorization
                                                     programs upon
                                                     receipt of an
                                                     operating license
                                                     or operating
                                                     authorization,
                                                     respectively, and
                                                     add a requirement
                                                     for these entities
                                                     to maintain their
                                                     access
                                                     authorization
                                                     programs. The
                                                     requirement to
                                                     maintain AA
                                                     programs would be
                                                     added to convey
                                                     more accurately
                                                     that Sec.   73.56
                                                     includes
                                                     requirements for
                                                     maintaining AA
                                                     programs, in
                                                     addition to
                                                     requirements for
                                                     implementing them.
Sec.   73.56(a)(4) The        (a)(6) Contractors    Proposed Sec.
 licensee may accept part of   and vendors (C/Vs)    73.56(a)(6) would
 an access authorization       who implement         amend current Sec.
 program used by its           authorization          73.56(a)(4), which
 contractors, vendors, or      programs or program   permits licensees
 other affected                elements shall        to accept a C/V
 organizations and             develop, implement,   authorization
 substitute, supplement, or    and maintain          program to meet the
 duplicate any portion of      authorization         standards of this
 the program as necessary to   programs or program   section. The
 meet the requirements of      elements that meet    proposed paragraph
 this section. In any case,    the requirements of   would retain the
 the licensee is responsible   this section, to      current permission
 for granting, denying, or     the extent that the   for licensees to
 revoking unescorted access    licensees and         accept C/V
 authorization to any          applicants            authorization
 contractor, vendor, or        specified in          programs, in full
 other affected organization   paragraphs (a)(1)     or in part, but
 employee.                     and (a)(5) of this    would also add C/Vs
                               section rely upon     to the list of
                               those C/V             entities who are
                               authorization         subject to proposed
                               programs or program   Sec.   73.56 in
                               elements to meet      order to convey
                               the requirements of   more clearly that C/
                               this section. In      Vs may be directly
                               any case, only a      subject to NRC
                               licensee or           inspection and
                               applicant shall       enforcement actions
                               grant or permit an    than the current
                               individual to         rule language
                               maintain unescorted   implies.
                               access to nuclear
                               power plant
                               protected and vital
                               areas.

[[Page 62735]]

 
                                                    This change is
                                                     necessary to
                                                     clarify the
                                                     applicability of
                                                     the rule's
                                                     requirements to a C/
                                                     V's authorization
                                                     program because
                                                     several
                                                     requirements in the
                                                     current section
                                                     could be
                                                     interpreted as
                                                     implying that a C/V
                                                     is accountable to
                                                     the licensee but
                                                     not to the NRC,
                                                     should significant
                                                     weaknesses be
                                                     identified in the C/
                                                     V's authorization
                                                     program upon which
                                                     one or more
                                                     licensees rely.
                                                     However, this
                                                     interpretation
                                                     would be incorrect.
                                                     Therefore, proposed
                                                     Sec.   73.56(a)(6)
                                                     would include C/V
                                                     authorization
                                                     programs and
                                                     program elements
                                                     upon which
                                                     licensees and
                                                     applicants rely
                                                     within the scope of
                                                     this section to
                                                     convey more
                                                     accurately that
                                                     these C/Vs are
                                                     directly
                                                     accountable to the
                                                     NRC for meeting the
                                                     applicable
                                                     requirements of
                                                     Sec.   73.56. This
                                                     clarification is
                                                     also necessary to
                                                     maintain the
                                                     internal
                                                     consistency of the
                                                     proposed rule
                                                     because some
                                                     provisions of the
                                                     proposed section
                                                     apply only to C/Vs,
                                                     including, but not
                                                     limited to, the
                                                     second sentence of
                                                     proposed Sec.
                                                     73.56(n)(7). The
                                                     proposed paragraph
                                                     would also retain
                                                     the intent of the
                                                     current requirement
                                                     that only licensees
                                                     and applicants have
                                                     the authority to
                                                     grant or permit an
                                                     individual to
                                                     maintain unescorted
                                                     access to nuclear
                                                     power plant
                                                     protected and vital
                                                     areas.
                                                    The phrases,
                                                     ``program
                                                     elements'' and ``to
                                                     the extent that * *
                                                     *,'' would replace
                                                     the second sentence
                                                     of current Sec.
                                                     73.56(a)(4), which
                                                     permits licensees
                                                     to accept part of
                                                     an authorization
                                                     program used by its
                                                     contractors,
                                                     vendors, or other
                                                     affected
                                                     organizations and
                                                     substitute,
                                                     supplement, or
                                                     duplicate any
                                                     portion of the
                                                     program as
                                                     necessary to meet
                                                     the requirements of
                                                     this section. The
                                                     proposed change
                                                     would retain the
                                                     meaning of the
                                                     current provision,
                                                     but would clarify
                                                     the intent of the
                                                     provision in
                                                     response to
                                                     implementation
                                                     questions from
                                                     licensees. The
                                                     phrase, ``program
                                                     elements,'' would
                                                     replace ``part of
                                                     an access
                                                     authorization
                                                     program,'' to more
                                                     clearly convey that
                                                     the parts of an
                                                     authorization
                                                     program to which
                                                     this provision
                                                     refers are the
                                                     program elements
                                                     that are required
                                                     under current and
                                                     proposed Sec.
                                                     73.56, including a
                                                     background
                                                     investigation;
                                                     psychological
                                                     assessment;
                                                     behavioral
                                                     observation; a
                                                     review procedure
                                                     for adverse
                                                     determinations
                                                     regarding an
                                                     individual's
                                                     trustworthiness and
                                                     reliability;
                                                     audits; the
                                                     protection of
                                                     information; and
                                                     retaining and
                                                     sharing records.

[[Page 62736]]

 
                                                    The phrase, ``to the
                                                     extent that the
                                                     licensees and
                                                     applicants rely
                                                     upon C/V
                                                     authorization
                                                     programs or program
                                                     elements,'' would
                                                     be used in proposed
                                                     Sec.   73.56(a)(6)
                                                     to clarify that C/
                                                     Vs need only meet
                                                     the requirements of
                                                     this section for
                                                     those authorization
                                                     program elements
                                                     upon which
                                                     licensees and
                                                     applicants who are
                                                     subject to this
                                                     section rely. This
                                                     change would be
                                                     made to address two
                                                     issues. First, ``to
                                                     the extent that''
                                                     would be used to
                                                     indicate that C/Vs
                                                     need not implement
                                                     every element of an
                                                     AA program in order
                                                     for licensees to
                                                     rely on the program
                                                     elements that a C/V
                                                     does implement in
                                                     accordance with the
                                                     requirements of
                                                     this section. For
                                                     example, if a C/V
                                                     conducts background
                                                     investigations upon
                                                     which licensees
                                                     rely in making
                                                     unescorted access
                                                     authorization
                                                     determinations, the
                                                     background
                                                     investigations must
                                                     meet the
                                                     requirements of
                                                     current Sec.
                                                     73.56(b)(2)(i) [or
                                                     proposed Sec.
                                                     73.56(d)]. However,
                                                     the C/V need not
                                                     also perform
                                                     psychological
                                                     assessments or any
                                                     other services for
                                                     licensees in order
                                                     for licensees to
                                                     rely on the
                                                     background
                                                     investigations that
                                                     the C/V performs.
                                                     Second, the phrase,
                                                     ``to the extent
                                                     that,'' would also
                                                     indicate that any
                                                     elements of an
                                                     authorization
                                                     program that a C/V
                                                     implements that are
                                                     not relied upon by
                                                     licensees need not
                                                     meet the
                                                     requirements of
                                                     this section.
                                                    For example, if the
                                                     same C/V in the
                                                     previous example
                                                     also offers
                                                     psychological
                                                     assessment
                                                     services, in
                                                     addition to
                                                     conducting
                                                     background
                                                     investigations for
                                                     licensees, but no
                                                     licensees or
                                                     applicants who are
                                                     subject to this
                                                     section rely on
                                                     those psychological
                                                     assessment services
                                                     to make unescorted
                                                     access
                                                     authorization
                                                     decisions, then the
                                                     C/V need not meet
                                                     the requirements of
                                                     current Sec.
                                                     73.56(b)(2)(ii) [or
                                                     proposed Sec.
                                                     73.56(e)] for
                                                     conducting those
                                                     psychological
                                                     assessments. These
                                                     proposed changes to
                                                     the terms used in
                                                     current Sec.
                                                     73.56(a)(4) would
                                                     be made for
                                                     increased clarity
                                                     in the language of
                                                     the rule.
                              (b) Individuals who   A new Sec.
                               are subject to an     73.56(b)
                               authorization         [Individuals who
                               program.              are subject to an
                              (b)(1) The following   AA program] would
                               individuals shall     specify the
                               be subject to an      individuals who
                               authorization         must be subject to
                               program:.             an AA program,
                                                     based on their job
                                                     duties and
                                                     responsibilities.
                                                     Current Sec.
                                                     73.56 requires only
                                                     that individuals
                                                     who have unescorted
                                                     access to protected
                                                     and vital areas
                                                     shall be subject to
                                                     an AA program. The
                                                     proposed rule would
                                                     add several
                                                     categories of
                                                     individuals who
                                                     would be subject to
                                                     the proposed AA
                                                     program, for the
                                                     reasons discussed
                                                     with respect to
                                                     each paragraph that
                                                     addresses the
                                                     additional
                                                     categories of
                                                     individuals who
                                                     would be covered.
                                                    Proposed Sec.
                                                     73.56(b) would be
                                                     added for clarity
                                                     in the organization
                                                     of the proposed
                                                     section by grouping
                                                     together in one
                                                     list the
                                                     individuals who
                                                     would be subject to
                                                     the proposed
                                                     regulations.

[[Page 62737]]

 
Sec.   73.56(b) General       (b)(1)(i) Any         Proposed Sec.
 performance objective and     individual to whom    73.56(b)(1)(i)
 requirements. (1) The         a licensee or         would retain the
 licensee shall establish      applicant grants      current requirement
 and maintain an access        unescorted access     that any individual
 authorization program         to nuclear power      who has unescorted
 granting individuals          plant protected and   access to nuclear
 unescorted access to          vital areas.          power plant
 protected and vital areas *                         protected and vital
 * *.                                                areas shall be
                                                     subject to an AA
                                                     program that meets
                                                     the requirements of
                                                     this section. The
                                                     current requirement
                                                     is embedded in the
                                                     first sentence of
                                                     current Sec.
                                                     73.56(b) [General
                                                     performance
                                                     objective and
                                                     requirements]. The
                                                     proposed paragraph
                                                     would list this
                                                     category of
                                                     individuals
                                                     separately for
                                                     organizational
                                                     clarity in the
                                                     rule.
                              (b)(1)(ii) Any        A new Sec.
                               individual whose      73.56(b)(1)(ii)
                               assigned duties and   would require that
                               responsibilities      individuals who are
                               permit the            assigned duties and
                               individual to take    responsibilities
                               actions by            that permit them to
                               electronic means,     take actions by
                               either onsite or      electronic means
                               remotely, that        that could
                               could adversely       adversely impact a
                               impact a licensee's   licensee's or
                               or applicant's        applicant's
                               operational safety,   operational safety,
                               security, or          security, or
                               emergency response    emergency response
                               capabilities; and     capabilities would
                                                     be subject to an AA
                                                     program.
                                                    The proposed
                                                     provision would be
                                                     consistent with the
                                                     intent of current
                                                     Sec.   73.56, which
                                                     is to ensure that
                                                     anyone who has
                                                     unescorted access
                                                     to equipment that
                                                     is important to the
                                                     operational safety
                                                     and security of
                                                     plant operations
                                                     must be trustworthy
                                                     and reliable. As
                                                     discussed in
                                                     Section IV.3,
                                                     because of the
                                                     increased use of
                                                     digital systems and
                                                     advanced
                                                     communications
                                                     technologies in
                                                     nuclear power
                                                     plants, the current
                                                     regulations, which
                                                     focus on
                                                     individuals who
                                                     have physical
                                                     access to equipment
                                                     within protected
                                                     and vital areas, do
                                                     not provide
                                                     adequate assurance
                                                     of the
                                                     trustworthiness and
                                                     reliability of
                                                     persons whose job
                                                     duties and
                                                     responsibilities
                                                     permit them to take
                                                     actions through
                                                     electronic means
                                                     that can affect
                                                     operational safety,
                                                     security, and
                                                     emergency response
                                                     capabilities, but
                                                     who, because of
                                                     advances in
                                                     electronic
                                                     communications, may
                                                     not require
                                                     physical access to
                                                     protected and vital
                                                     areas. For example,
                                                     some licensees have
                                                     installed systems
                                                     that permit
                                                     engineers or
                                                     information
                                                     technology
                                                     technicians to take
                                                     actions from remote
                                                     locations that may
                                                     affect the
                                                     operability of
                                                     safety-related
                                                     components, or
                                                     affect the
                                                     functionality of
                                                     operating systems.
                                                    Because the
                                                     potential impact of
                                                     actions taken
                                                     through electronic
                                                     means may be as
                                                     serious as actions
                                                     taken by an
                                                     individual who is
                                                     physically present
                                                     within a protected
                                                     or vital area, the
                                                     NRC has determined
                                                     that subjecting
                                                     this additional
                                                     category of
                                                     individuals to the
                                                     AA program is
                                                     necessary.

[[Page 62738]]

 
                              (b)(1)(iii) Any       Proposed Sec.
                               individual who has    73.56(b)(1)(iii)
                               responsibilities      would require that
                               for implementing a    certain individuals
                               licensee's or         who are members of
                               applicant's           the licensee's or
                               protective            applicant's
                               strategy,             security
                               including, but not    organization shall
                               limited to, armed     be subject to an AA
                               security force        program, based on
                               officers, alarm       their
                               station operators,    responsibilities
                               and tactical          for implementing a
                               response team         licensee's
                               leaders; and          protective
                                                     strategy. Current
                                                     Sec.   73.55
                                                     requires that any
                                                     armed members of
                                                     the security
                                                     organization must
                                                     be subject to an AA
                                                     program, but the
                                                     proposed rule would
                                                     also list them here
                                                     for clarity and
                                                     completeness in the
                                                     requirements of
                                                     this section. The
                                                     proposed paragraph
                                                     would also include
                                                     any individual who
                                                     has
                                                     responsibilities
                                                     for implementing
                                                     the licensee's
                                                     protective
                                                     strategy, which may
                                                     include individuals
                                                     who are not armed.
                                                     In practice, the
                                                     NRC is not aware of
                                                     any licensees,
                                                     applicants, or C/Vs
                                                     who do not subject
                                                     this broader
                                                     category of
                                                     individuals to an
                                                     AA program.
                                                    However, the
                                                     proposed rule would
                                                     specify that these
                                                     individuals shall
                                                     be subject to an AA
                                                     program because of
                                                     their critical
                                                     responsibilities
                                                     with respect to
                                                     plant security and,
                                                     therefore, the need
                                                     for high assurance
                                                     that they are
                                                     trustworthy and
                                                     reliable.
                              (b)(1)(iv) The        Proposed Sec.
                               licensee's,           73.56(b)(1)(iv)
                               applicant's, or C/    would introduce a
                               V's reviewing         new term,
                               official.             ``reviewing
                                                     official,'' to Sec.
                                                       73.56 to refer to
                                                     an individual who
                                                     is designated by a
                                                     licensee,
                                                     applicant, or C/V
                                                     to be responsible
                                                     for reviewing and
                                                     evaluating
                                                     information about
                                                     persons who are
                                                     applying for
                                                     unescorted access
                                                     authorization and
                                                     determining whether
                                                     to grant, deny,
                                                     maintain, or
                                                     unfavorably
                                                     terminate
                                                     unescorted access
                                                     authorization. The
                                                     proposed paragraph
                                                     would require
                                                     reviewing officials
                                                     to be subject to
                                                     the AA program
                                                     because of the key
                                                     role these
                                                     individuals play in
                                                     providing high
                                                     assurance that
                                                     persons who are
                                                     granted unescorted
                                                     access to protected
                                                     areas and
                                                     electronic access
                                                     to operational
                                                     safety, security,
                                                     or emergency
                                                     response systems
                                                     within protected or
                                                     vital areas are
                                                     trustworthy and
                                                     reliable.
                                                    In addition,
                                                     reviewing
                                                     officials' actions
                                                     affect the
                                                     confidence that the
                                                     public, management,
                                                     the NRC, and
                                                     individuals who are
                                                     subject to the AA
                                                     program have in the
                                                     integrity of the
                                                     program and the
                                                     accuracy and
                                                     reliability of the
                                                     authorization
                                                     decisions that are
                                                     made under the
                                                     program. Therefore,
                                                     the NRC believes
                                                     that reviewing
                                                     officials must meet
                                                     the highest
                                                     standards for
                                                     trustworthiness and
                                                     reliability,
                                                     including the
                                                     requirements of an
                                                     AA program.

[[Page 62739]]

 
                              (b)(2) At the         Proposed Sec.
                               licensee's,           73.56(b)(2) would
                               applicant's, or C/    recognize the long-
                               V's discretion,       standing industry
                               other individuals     practice, which has
                               who are designated    been endorsed by
                               in access             the NRC, of
                               authorization         subjecting
                               program procedures    additional
                               may be subject to     individuals to
                               an authorization      authorization
                               program that meets    requirements during
                               the requirements of   periods when those
                               this section.         individuals do not
                                                     require and have
                                                     not been granted
                                                     unescorted access
                                                     to protected or
                                                     vital areas. For
                                                     example, some C/Vs,
                                                     whose personnel may
                                                     be called upon by a
                                                     licensee to work at
                                                     a licensee's site
                                                     under contract,
                                                     implement full
                                                     authorization
                                                     programs to cover
                                                     those personnel.
                                                     Similarly, some
                                                     licensees require
                                                     employees who are
                                                     normally stationed
                                                     at their corporate
                                                     headquarters to be
                                                     subject to an
                                                     authorization
                                                     program, for such
                                                     access, is referred
                                                     to as having
                                                     ``unescorted
                                                     access'' (UA).
                                                    The proposed
                                                     paragraph would be
                                                     added to give
                                                     licensees,
                                                     applicants, and C/
                                                     Vs who implement
                                                     authorization
                                                     programs that meet
                                                     the requirements of
                                                     this part the
                                                     authority to do so
                                                     under the proposed
                                                     rule.
Sec.   73.56(b) General       (c) General           Proposed Sec.
 performance objective and     performance           73.56(c) would
 requirements. (1) The         objective. Access     retain the meaning
 licensee shall establish      authorization         of the current
 and maintain an access        programs must         program performance
 authorization program         provide high          objective, which is
 granting individuals          assurance that the    embedded in current
 unescorted access to          individuals who are   Sec.   73.56(b),
 protected and vital areas     specified in          but would separate
 with the objective of         paragraph (b)(1) of   it from the
 providing high assurance      this section, and,    requirement in the
 that individuals granted      if applicable,        current paragraph
 unescorted access are         (b)(2) of this        for licensees to
 trustworthy and reliable,     section are           establish and
 and do not constitute an      trustworthy and       maintain an AA
 unreasonable risk to the      reliable, such that   program. The
 health and safety of the      they do not           requirement to
 public including a            constitute an         establish and
 potential to commit           unreasonable risk     maintain AA
 radiological sabotage.        to public health      programs would be
                               and safety or the     moved to proposed
                               common defense and    Sec.   73.56(a),
                               security, including   where it would be
                               the potential to      imposed on each
                               commit radiological   entity who would be
                               sabotage.             subject to the
                                                     section, for
                                                     organizational
                                                     clarity. The
                                                     performance
                                                     objective would be
                                                     revised to add
                                                     cross-references to
                                                     the categories of
                                                     individuals who
                                                     must be subject to
                                                     an authorization
                                                     program, as
                                                     specified in
                                                     proposed Sec.
                                                     73.56(b), because
                                                     the proposed rule
                                                     would require that
                                                     certain
                                                     individuals, in
                                                     addition to those
                                                     who have unescorted
                                                     physical access to
                                                     protected and vital
                                                     areas of a nuclear
                                                     power plant, would
                                                     be subject to the
                                                     AA program, as
                                                     discussed with
                                                     respect to Sec.
                                                     73.56(b).
                                                    In addition, the
                                                     phrase, ``common
                                                     defense and
                                                     security,'' would
                                                     be added to the
                                                     proposed paragraph
                                                     to convey the
                                                     purpose of
                                                     authorization
                                                     programs more
                                                     specifically, which
                                                     would include
                                                     protection of the
                                                     public from the
                                                     potential insider
                                                     activities defined
                                                     in current Sec.
                                                     73.1(a)(1)(B) and
                                                     (a)(2)(B).

[[Page 62740]]

 
Sec.   73.56(2) Except as     (d) Background        Proposed Sec.
 provided for in paragraphs    investigation. In     73.56(d) would
 (c) and (d) of this           order to grant        amend current Sec.
 section, the unescorted       unescorted access      73.56(b)(2)(i),
 access authorization          authorization to an   which requires
 program must include the      individual, the       authorization
 following: (i) A background   licensees,            programs to include
 investigation designed to     applicants and C/Vs   a background
 identify past actions which   specified in          investigation and
 are indicative of an          paragraph (a) of      describes the
 individual's future           this section shall    aspects of an
 reliability within a          ensure that the       individual's
 protected or vital area of    individual has been   background to be
 a nuclear power reactor. As   subject to a          investigated.
 a minimum, the background     background            Proposed Sec.
 investigation must verify     investigation. The    73.56(d) would
 an individual's * * *.        background            retain the
                               investigation must    requirements of the
                               include, but is not   current paragraph,
                               limited to, the       but increase the
                               following elements:   level of detail
                                                     with which they are
                                                     specified in
                                                     response to
                                                     implementation
                                                     questions from
                                                     licensees and in
                                                     order to increase
                                                     consistency among
                                                     authorization
                                                     programs, as
                                                     discussed in
                                                     Section IV.3.
                                                     Because the
                                                     requirements in the
                                                     proposed rule would
                                                     be more detailed,
                                                     the current
                                                     paragraph would be
                                                     restructured and
                                                     subdivided to
                                                     present
                                                     requirements for
                                                     each element of the
                                                     background
                                                     investigation in a
                                                     separate paragraph.
                                                     This change would
                                                     be made for
                                                     increased clarity
                                                     in the organization
                                                     of the rule. The
                                                     cross-references to
                                                     paragraphs (c) and
                                                     (d) in the current
                                                     provision would be
                                                     deleted because
                                                     they would no
                                                     longer apply in the
                                                     reorganized
                                                     section.
                                                    The proposed
                                                     provision would use
                                                     the phrase,
                                                     ``ensure that the
                                                     individual has been
                                                     subject to a
                                                     background
                                                     investigation,''
                                                     because completion
                                                     of every element of
                                                     a background
                                                     investigation may
                                                     not be required
                                                     each time an
                                                     individual applies
                                                     for UAA. As
                                                     discussed with
                                                     respect to proposed
                                                     Sec.   73.46(h)(1)
                                                     and (h)(2), the
                                                     proposed rule would
                                                     permit licensees,
                                                     applicants, and C/
                                                     Vs, in order to
                                                     meet the
                                                     requirements of
                                                     this section, to
                                                     accept and rely on
                                                     certain background
                                                     investigation
                                                     elements,
                                                     psychological
                                                     assessments, and
                                                     behavioral
                                                     observation
                                                     training conducted
                                                     by other licensees,
                                                     applicants, and C/
                                                     Vs who are subject
                                                     this section. This
                                                     permission would
                                                     reduce unnecessary
                                                     regulatory burden
                                                     by eliminating
                                                     redundancies in
                                                     authorization
                                                     program elements
                                                     that cover the same
                                                     subject matter and
                                                     periods of time.
                                                     However, as
                                                     discussed with
                                                     respect to proposed
                                                     paragraphs (h) and
                                                     (i)(1) of this
                                                     section, the
                                                     proposed rule would
                                                     establish time
                                                     limits on the
                                                     permission to
                                                     accept and rely on
                                                     authorization
                                                     program elements to
                                                     which the
                                                     individual was
                                                     previously subject,
                                                     based upon how far
                                                     in the past the
                                                     background
                                                     investigation
                                                     element,
                                                     psychological
                                                     assessment, and
                                                     behavioral
                                                     observation
                                                     training was
                                                     conducted.
                                                    These time limits
                                                     are discussed in
                                                     more detail with
                                                     respect to the
                                                     specific provisions
                                                     in the proposed
                                                     rule that address
                                                     them.

[[Page 62741]]

 
                              (d)(1) Informed       Proposed Sec.
                               consent. The          73.56(d)(1) would
                               licensees,            require the
                               applicants, and C/    entities who are
                               Vs specified in       subject to this
                               paragraph (a) of      section to obtain
                               this section may      written consent
                               not initiate any      from any individual
                               element of a          who is applying for
                               background            UAA before the
                               investigation         licensee,
                               without the           applicant, or C/V
                               knowledge and         initiates any
                               written consent of    element of the
                               the subject           background
                               individual.           investigation that
                               Licensees,            is required in this
                               applicants, and C/    section. The
                               Vs shall inform the   practice of
                               individual of his     obtaining the
                               or her right to       individual's
                               review information    written consent for
                               collected to assure   the background
                               its accuracy and      investigation has
                               provide the           been endorsed by
                               individual with an    the NRC and
                               opportunity to        incorporated into
                               correct any           licensees' Physical
                               inaccurate or         Security Plans
                               incomplete            since Sec.   73.56
                               information that is   was first
                               developed by          promulgated. It is
                               licensees,            necessary to
                               applicants, and C/    protect the privacy
                               Vs about the          rights of
                               individual.           individuals who are
                                                     applying for UAA.
                                                     The proposed
                                                     paragraph would
                                                     also require
                                                     licensees,
                                                     applicants, and C/
                                                     Vs to inform the
                                                     individual of his
                                                     or her right to
                                                     review information
                                                     that is developed
                                                     by the licensee,
                                                     applicant, or C/V
                                                     to verify its
                                                     accuracy, and have
                                                     the opportunity to
                                                     correct any
                                                     misinformation.
                                                    Proposed Sec.
                                                     73.56(o)(6) would
                                                     further require the
                                                     licensee,
                                                     applicant, or C/V
                                                     to ensure that any
                                                     necessary
                                                     corrections are
                                                     made to information
                                                     about the
                                                     individual that has
                                                     been recorded in
                                                     the information-
                                                     sharing mechanism
                                                     that would be
                                                     required under
                                                     proposed Sec.
                                                     73.56(o)(6), as
                                                     discussed with
                                                     respect to that
                                                     paragraph. These
                                                     are also industry
                                                     practices that have
                                                     been endorsed by
                                                     the NRC and
                                                     incorporated into
                                                     licensees' Physical
                                                     Security Plans.
                                                     Permitting the
                                                     individual to
                                                     review and have the
                                                     opportunity to
                                                     correct personal
                                                     information that is
                                                     collected about him
                                                     or her is necessary
                                                     to maintain
                                                     individuals'
                                                     confidence in the
                                                     fairness of
                                                     authorization
                                                     programs by
                                                     protecting
                                                     individuals from
                                                     possible adverse
                                                     employment actions
                                                     that may result
                                                     from an inability
                                                     to gain unescorted
                                                     access to protected
                                                     areas, based upon
                                                     incorrect
                                                     information.
                                                     Requiring the
                                                     entities who are
                                                     subject to this
                                                     section to correct
                                                     information
                                                     contained in the
                                                     information-sharing
                                                     mechanism, as would
                                                     be required under
                                                     proposed Sec.
                                                     73.56(o)(6), is
                                                     necessary to
                                                     maintain the
                                                     integrity of the
                                                     personal
                                                     information shared
                                                     among the entities
                                                     who would be
                                                     subject to the
                                                     proposed section,
                                                     and the
                                                     effectiveness of AA
                                                     programs.

[[Page 62742]]

 
                              (d)(1)(i) The         Proposed Sec.
                               subject individual    73.56(d)(1)(i)
                               may withdraw his or   would specify that
                               her consent at any    an individual who
                               time. The licensee,   has given his or
                               applicant or C/V to   her written consent
                               whom the individual   for a background
                               has applied for       investigation under
                               unescorted access     proposed Sec.
                               authorization shall   73.56(d)(1) may
                               inform the            withdraw that
                               individual that--     consent at any
                              (A) Withdrawal of      time. However,
                               his or her consent    because a
                               will withdraw the     background
                               individual's          investigation is
                               current application   one of the
                               for access            requirements for
                               authorization under   granting UAA, and
                               the licensee's,       because the
                               applicant's or C/     background
                               V's authorization     investigation
                               program; and.         cannot be completed
                              (B) Other licensees,   without the subject
                               applicants and C/Vs   individual's
                               will have access to   consent, proposed
                               information           Sec.
                               documenting the       73.56(d)(1)(i)(A)
                               withdrawal through    would specify that
                               the information-      the licensee,
                               sharing mechanism     applicant, or C/V
                               required under        to whom the
                               paragraph (o)(6) of   individual has
                               this section..        applied for UAA
                                                     must inform the
                                                     individual who has
                                                     withdrawn consent
                                                     that withdrawal of
                                                     consent will
                                                     terminate the
                                                     individual's
                                                     current application
                                                     for UAA. In
                                                     addition, the
                                                     licensee,
                                                     applicant, or C/V
                                                     would be required
                                                     by proposed Sec.
                                                     73.56(d)(1)(i)(B)
                                                     to notify the
                                                     individual that
                                                     other licensees,
                                                     applicants, and C/
                                                     Vs will have access
                                                     to information
                                                     documenting the
                                                     withdrawal through
                                                     the information-
                                                     sharing mechanism
                                                     required under
                                                     proposed Sec.
                                                     73.56(o)(6). That
                                                     proposed paragraph
                                                     would require that
                                                     information
                                                     specified in the
                                                     licensee's or
                                                     applicant's
                                                     Physical Security
                                                     Plan about
                                                     individuals who
                                                     have applied for
                                                     UAA, must be
                                                     recorded and
                                                     retained in a
                                                     database that is
                                                     administered as an
                                                     information-sharing
                                                     mechanism by
                                                     licensees and
                                                     applicants subject
                                                     to Sec.   73.56.
                              (d)(1)(ii) If an      Proposed Sec.
                               individual            73.56(d)(1)(ii)
                               withdraws his or      would establish
                               her consent, the      several
                               licensees,            requirements
                               applicants and C/Vs   related to a
                               specified in          withdrawal of
                               paragraph (a) of      consent by an
                               this section may      individual who has
                               not initiate any      applied for UAA.
                               elements of the       The proposed
                               background            paragraph would
                               investigation that    require the
                               were not in           entities who are
                               progress at the       subject to this
                               time the individual   section to document
                               withdrew his or her   the individual's
                               consent, but shall    withdrawal of
                               complete any          consent, and
                               background            complete and
                               investigation         document any
                               elements that are     elements of the
                               in progress at the    background
                               time consent is       investigation that
                               withdrawn. In the     had been initiated
                               information-sharing   before the time at
                               mechanism required    which an individual
                               under paragraph       withdraws his or
                               (o)(6) of this        her consent, and
                               section, the          would prohibit the
                               licensee,             initiation of any
                               applicant, or C/V     element that was
                               shall record the      not in progress.
                               individual's          For example, if a
                               application for       licensee had
                               unescorted access     submitted a request
                               authorization; his    to a credit history
                               or her withdrawal     reporting agency
                               of consent for the    before an
                               background            individual withdrew
                               investigation; the    his or her consent,
                               reason given by the   the proposed
                               individual for the    paragraph would
                               withdrawal, if any;   require the
                               and any pertinent     licensee to
                               information           document the credit
                               collected from the    history information
                               background            that is obtained
                               investigation         about the
                               elements that were    individual, even if
                               completed.            the licensee
                                                     receives the credit
                                                     history report
                                                     after the date on
                                                     which the
                                                     individual withdrew
                                                     his or her consent.
                                                     However, if the
                                                     licensee had not
                                                     yet requested
                                                     information about
                                                     the individual's
                                                     military service
                                                     history at the time
                                                     the individual
                                                     withdraws consent,
                                                     the proposed
                                                     provision would
                                                     prohibit the
                                                     licensee from
                                                     initiating a
                                                     request for
                                                     military service
                                                     history
                                                     information. There
                                                     are many reasons
                                                     that an individual
                                                     may withdraw his or
                                                     her consent for the
                                                     background
                                                     investigation.

[[Page 62743]]

 
                                                    In most instances,
                                                     the reason that an
                                                     individual
                                                     withdraws his or
                                                     her consent is
                                                     legitimate, such as
                                                     a change in the
                                                     individual's work
                                                     assignment.
                                                     However, in some
                                                     instances, the NRC
                                                     is aware that
                                                     individuals have
                                                     withdrawn consent
                                                     for the background
                                                     investigation in
                                                     order to attempt to
                                                     prevent the
                                                     discovery of
                                                     adverse information
                                                     or the sharing of
                                                     adverse information
                                                     already discovered
                                                     about the
                                                     individual by the
                                                     licensee with other
                                                     licensees. If the
                                                     licensee were to
                                                     stop all
                                                     information
                                                     gathering at the
                                                     time at which the
                                                     individual withdrew
                                                     his or her consent,
                                                     the likelihood that
                                                     the adverse
                                                     information would
                                                     be discovered would
                                                     be reduced. As a
                                                     result, the
                                                     individual could be
                                                     afforded an
                                                     opportunity to
                                                     create a risk to
                                                     public health and
                                                     safety and the
                                                     common defense and
                                                     security by having
                                                     physical access to
                                                     a protected or
                                                     vital area, and
                                                     most importantly,
                                                     be in a position to
                                                     observe the
                                                     licensee's security
                                                     posture by
                                                     obtaining access to
                                                     a licensee facility
                                                     under escort,
                                                     because a rigorous
                                                     background
                                                     investigation is
                                                     not required for
                                                     individuals who
                                                     ``visit'' a nuclear
                                                     power plant under
                                                     escort.
                                                    Similarly, if
                                                     information that
                                                     had been requested
                                                     by the licensee,
                                                     such as a criminal
                                                     history report
                                                     under proposed Sec.
                                                       73.57
                                                     [Requirements for
                                                     criminal history
                                                     checks of
                                                     individuals granted
                                                     unescorted access
                                                     to a nuclear power
                                                     facility or access
                                                     to safeguards
                                                     information by
                                                     power reactor
                                                     licensees] of this
                                                     chapter or the
                                                     credit history
                                                     report under
                                                     proposed Sec.
                                                     73.56(d)(5), was
                                                     received by the
                                                     licensee after the
                                                     time the individual
                                                     withdrew consent
                                                     and contained
                                                     adverse
                                                     information, but
                                                     that adverse
                                                     information was not
                                                     documented in the
                                                     information-sharing
                                                     mechanism required
                                                     under proposed
                                                     paragraph (o)(6) of
                                                     this section, the
                                                     individual also
                                                     could be
                                                     inappropriately
                                                     permitted to visit
                                                     under escort the
                                                     same or another
                                                     site because the
                                                     adverse information
                                                     would not be
                                                     available for
                                                     review. Therefore,
                                                     the proposed
                                                     provisions would be
                                                     necessary to
                                                     maintain the
                                                     effectiveness of AA
                                                     programs in
                                                     protecting public
                                                     health and safety
                                                     and the common
                                                     defense and
                                                     security by
                                                     ensuring that all
                                                     available
                                                     information about
                                                     individuals who
                                                     have applied for
                                                     UAA is documented
                                                     and shared, while
                                                     also protecting the
                                                     privacy rights of
                                                     individuals by
                                                     initiating no
                                                     further elements of
                                                     the background
                                                     investigation when
                                                     an individual
                                                     withdraws his or
                                                     her consent.
                                                    The proposed
                                                     paragraph would
                                                     also require
                                                     licensees,
                                                     applicants, and C/
                                                     Vs to create a
                                                     record, accessible
                                                     to other licensees,
                                                     applicants, and C/
                                                     Vs, of the fact
                                                     that an individual
                                                     withdrew his or her
                                                     consent to the
                                                     background
                                                     investigation and
                                                     the reason for the
                                                     withdrawal. This
                                                     record would need
                                                     to be created in
                                                     the information-
                                                     sharing mechanism
                                                     required by
                                                     proposed Sec.
                                                     73.56(o)(6), in
                                                     order for
                                                     licensees,
                                                     applicants, and C/
                                                     Vs to carry out the
                                                     notice requirement
                                                     in proposed Sec.
                                                     73.56(d)(1)(i)(B).

[[Page 62744]]

 
Sec.   73.56(4) Failure by    (d)(1)(iii) The
 an individual to report any   licensees,
 previous suspension,          applicants, and C/
 revocation, or denial of      Vs specified in
 unescorted access to          paragraph (a) of
 nuclear power reactors is     this section shall
 considered sufficient cause   inform, in writing,
 for denial of unescorted      any individual who
 access authorization.         is applying for
                               unescorted access
                               authorization that
                               the following
                               actions related to
                               providing and
                               sharing the
                               personal
                               information under
                               this section are
                               sufficient cause
                               for denial or
                               unfavorable
                               termination of
                               unescorted access
                               authorization:
                              (A) Refusal to
                               provide written
                               consent for the
                               background
                               investigation;.
                              (B) Refusal to
                               provide or the
                               falsification of
                               any personal
                               history information
                               required under this
                               section, including
                               the failure to
                               report any previous
                               denial or
                               unfavorable
                               termination of
                               unescorted access
                               authorization;
                               Proposed Sec.
                               73.56(d)(1)(iii)
                               would replace
                               current Sec.
                               73.56(b)(4). The
                               proposed paragraph
                               would retain the
                               intent of the
                               current provision
                               in proposed Sec.
                               73.56(d)(4), but
                               would add other
                               actions related to
                               providing and
                               sharing personal
                               information that
                               would be sufficient
                               cause for a
                               reviewing official
                               to deny or
                               unfavorably
                               terminate an
                               individual's UAA.
                               Proposed paragraph
                               (d)(1)(iii)(B) of
                               this section would
                               add falsification
                               of any personal
                               history information
                               as a sufficient
                               reason to deny or
                               unfavorably
                               terminate UAA in
                               order to deter
                               falsification
                               attempts..
                              (C) Refusal to        Proposed paragraph
                               provide written       (d)(1)(iii)(D) of
                               consent for the       this section would
                               sharing of personal   add failure to
                               information with      comply with the
                               other licensees,      arrest-reporting
                               applicants, or C/Vs   requirements of
                               required under        proposed paragraph
                               paragraph (d)(4)(v)   (g) of this section
                               of this section;      as a sufficient
                               and                   reason to deny or
                              (D) Failure to         unfavorably
                               report any arrests    terminate UAA in
                               or formal actions     order to deter
                               specified in          individuals from
                               paragraph (g) of      delaying or failing
                               this section..        to report such
                                                     incidents. The
                                                     additional actions
                                                     that would be
                                                     sufficient cause
                                                     for denial or
                                                     unfavorable
                                                     termination would
                                                     include: refusing
                                                     to provide written
                                                     consent for the
                                                     background
                                                     investigation that
                                                     would be required
                                                     under proposed
                                                     paragraph
                                                     (d)(1)(iii)(A) of
                                                     this section;
                                                     refusing to provide
                                                     personal history
                                                     information
                                                     required under
                                                     paragraph (d)(2) of
                                                     this section, in
                                                     proposed
                                                     (d)(1)(iii)(B); and
                                                     refusing to provide
                                                     written consent for
                                                     the individual's
                                                     personal
                                                     information to be
                                                     shared among the
                                                     entities who would
                                                     be subject to this
                                                     section that would
                                                     be required under
                                                     paragraph (d)(4)(v)
                                                     of this section, in
                                                     proposed paragraph
                                                     (d)(1)(iii)(C).

[[Page 62745]]

 
                                                    The proposed rule
                                                     would specify these
                                                     requirements for
                                                     the disclosure and
                                                     sharing of personal
                                                     information because
                                                     implementation of
                                                     the AA programs
                                                     required under this
                                                     section requires
                                                     individuals to
                                                     disclose and permit
                                                     the sharing of such
                                                     personal
                                                     information,
                                                     subject to the
                                                     protections of such
                                                     information that
                                                     would be provided
                                                     in proposed Sec.
                                                     73.56(m). The
                                                     proposed paragraph
                                                     would also require
                                                     the entities who
                                                     are subject to this
                                                     section to inform
                                                     individuals of the
                                                     potential
                                                     consequences of
                                                     these actions so
                                                     that individuals
                                                     understand the
                                                     requirements to
                                                     which they are
                                                     subject and,
                                                     therefore, would be
                                                     more likely to
                                                     comply with them.
                                                     The proposed
                                                     paragraph would
                                                     delete the terms,
                                                     ``suspension'' and
                                                     ``revocation,'' and
                                                     replace them with
                                                     the term,
                                                     ``unfavorable
                                                     termination.''
                                                     Historically, there
                                                     have been some
                                                     inconsistencies
                                                     between Sec.
                                                     73.56 access
                                                     authorization
                                                     requirements and
                                                     related
                                                     requirements in 10
                                                     CFR part 26 that
                                                     have led to
                                                     implementation
                                                     questions from
                                                     licensees, as well
                                                     as inconsistencies
                                                     in how the
                                                     licensees have
                                                     implemented the
                                                     requirements.
                                                    During the public
                                                     meetings discussed
                                                     in Section IV.3,
                                                     the stakeholders
                                                     provided examples
                                                     of ambiguities in
                                                     the terms used in
                                                     Sec.   73.56 and
                                                     how these
                                                     ambiguities and
                                                     lack of clarity in
                                                     Sec.   73.56 had
                                                     resulted in
                                                     unintended
                                                     consequences.
                                                     Therefore, to
                                                     address stakeholder
                                                     requests for
                                                     clarity and
                                                     consistently
                                                     describe the
                                                     actions of denying
                                                     UAA to an
                                                     individual and
                                                     terminating an
                                                     individual's UAA
                                                     for cause in
                                                     proposed Sec.
                                                     73.56, only the
                                                     terms, ``deny or
                                                     denial'' and
                                                     ``unfavorably
                                                     terminate or
                                                     unfavorable
                                                     termination,''
                                                     would be used in
                                                     the proposed
                                                     paragraph and
                                                     throughout the
                                                     proposed section.
                              (d)(2) Personal       Proposed Sec.
                               history disclosure.   73.56(d)(2) would
                              (i) Any individual     require an
                               who is applying for   individual who is
                               unescorted access     applying for UAA to
                               authorization shall   provide the
                               disclose the          personal
                               personal history      information that is
                               information that is   required under the
                               required by the       licensee's,
                               licensee's,           applicant's, or C/
                               applicant's, or C/    V's authorization
                               V's authorization     program, and any
                               program and any       information that
                               information that      may be necessary
                               may be necessary      for the reviewing
                               for the reviewing     official to
                               official to make a    evaluate the
                               determination of      individual's
                               the individual's      trustworthiness and
                               trustworthiness and   reliability. The
                               reliability..         proposed provision
                                                     would be added to
                                                     impose a
                                                     requirement on
                                                     individuals to
                                                     divulge personal
                                                     information in
                                                     order to be granted
                                                     UAA, in response to
                                                     stakeholder
                                                     requests at the
                                                     public meetings
                                                     discussed in
                                                     Section IV.3.

[[Page 62746]]

 
                                                    The proposed
                                                     paragraph would not
                                                     specify the nature
                                                     of the information
                                                     that individuals
                                                     may be required to
                                                     disclose because
                                                     the information may
                                                     vary widely,
                                                     depending upon a
                                                     number of factors,
                                                     including, but not
                                                     limited to, whether
                                                     or not the
                                                     individual has
                                                     previously held
                                                     UAA; the length of
                                                     time that has
                                                     elapsed since his
                                                     or her last period
                                                     of UAA was
                                                     terminated; the job
                                                     duties and
                                                     responsibilities
                                                     that the individual
                                                     would perform for
                                                     which UAA is
                                                     required; and
                                                     whether any adverse
                                                     information about
                                                     the individual is
                                                     disclosed or
                                                     discovered as a
                                                     result of the
                                                     background
                                                     investigation,
                                                     psychological
                                                     assessment, or the
                                                     suitable inquiry
                                                     and drug and
                                                     alcohol testing
                                                     required under part
                                                     26 of this chapter.
                                                     Although the amount
                                                     and nature of
                                                     information to be
                                                     disclosed would
                                                     vary depending on
                                                     the factors
                                                     described,
                                                     individuals
                                                     applying for UAA
                                                     would be required
                                                     to disclose some
                                                     personal history
                                                     information each
                                                     time he or she
                                                     applies for UAA, as
                                                     discussed with
                                                     respect to proposed
                                                     Sec.   73.56(h)
                                                     [Granting
                                                     unescorted access
                                                     authorization].
                              (d)(2)(ii)            Proposed Sec.
                               Licensees,            73.56(d)(2)(ii)
                               applicants, and C/    would prohibit a
                               Vs may not require    licensee,
                               an individual to      applicant, or C/V
                               disclose an           from requiring an
                               administrative        individual to
                               withdrawal of         report an
                               unescorted access     administrative
                               authorization under   withdrawal of UAA
                               the requirements of   that may be
                               paragraphs (g),       required under
                               (h)(7), or            proposed Sec.
                               (i)(1)(v) of this     73.56(g), (h)(7),
                               section, if the       or (i)(1)(v),
                               individual's          except if the
                               unescorted access     information
                               authorization was     developed or
                               not subsequently      discovered about
                               denied or             the individual
                               terminated            during the period
                               unfavorably by a      of the
                               licensee,             administrative
                               applicant, or C/V.    withdrawal resulted
                                                     in a denial or
                                                     unfavorable
                                                     termination of the
                                                     individual's UAA.
                                                     The proposed
                                                     paragraph would
                                                     ensure that a
                                                     temporary
                                                     administrative
                                                     withdrawal of an
                                                     individual's UAA,
                                                     caused by an
                                                     administrative
                                                     delay in completing
                                                     an evaluation of
                                                     any formal legal
                                                     action, or any
                                                     portion of a
                                                     background
                                                     investigation, re-
                                                     investigation, or
                                                     psychological
                                                     assessment or re-
                                                     assessment that is
                                                     not under the
                                                     individual's
                                                     control, would not
                                                     be treated as an
                                                     unfavorable
                                                     termination, except
                                                     if the reviewing
                                                     official determines
                                                     that the delayed
                                                     information
                                                     requires denial or
                                                     unfavorable
                                                     termination of the
                                                     individual's UAA.
                                                     This proposed
                                                     provision would be
                                                     necessary to
                                                     maintain the
                                                     public's and
                                                     individuals'
                                                     confidence in the
                                                     fairness of AA
                                                     programs by
                                                     protecting
                                                     individuals from
                                                     possible adverse
                                                     employment actions
                                                     that may be based
                                                     upon administrative
                                                     delays for which
                                                     they are not
                                                     responsible.

[[Page 62747]]

 
Sec.   73.56(b)(2)(i) * * *   (d)(3) Verification   Proposed Sec.
 true identity, and develop    of true identity.     73.56(d)(3) would
 information concerning an     Licensees,            expand on the
 individual's employment       applicants, and C/    portion of current
 history, education history,   Vs shall verify the   Sec.
 credit history, criminal      true identity of an   73.56(b)(2)(i) that
 history, military service,    individual who is     requires licensees
 and verify an individual's    applying for          to verify an
 character and reputation.     unescorted access     individual's true
                               authorization in      identity. The
                               order to ensure       proposed paragraph
                               that the applicant    would require the
                               is the person that    entities who are
                               he or she has         subject to this
                               claimed to be. At a   section, at a
                               minimum, licensees,   minimum, to
                               applicants, and C/    validate the social
                               Vs shall validate     security number, or
                               the social security   in the case of
                               number that the       foreign nationals,
                               individual has        the alien
                               provided, and, in     registration
                               the case of foreign   number, that the
                               nationals, the        individual has
                               alien registration    provided to the
                               number that the       licensee, applicant
                               individual            or C/V. The term,
                               provides. In          ``validation,''
                               addition,             would be used in
                               licensees,            the proposed
                               applicants, and C/    paragraph to
                               Vs shall also         indicate that
                               determine whether     licensees,
                               the results of the    applicants and C/Vs
                               fingerprinting        would be required
                               required under Sec.   to take steps to
                                 73.21 confirm the   access information
                               individual's          in addition to that
                               claimed identity,     provided by the
                               if such results are   individual from
                               available.            other reliable
                                                     sources to ensure
                                                     that the personal
                                                     identifying
                                                     information the
                                                     individual has
                                                     provided to the
                                                     licensee is
                                                     authentic. This
                                                     validation could be
                                                     achieved through a
                                                     variety of means,
                                                     including, but not
                                                     limited to,
                                                     accessing
                                                     information from
                                                     databases that are
                                                     maintained by the
                                                     Federal Government,
                                                     or evaluating an
                                                     accumulation of
                                                     information, such
                                                     as comparing the
                                                     social security
                                                     number the
                                                     individual provided
                                                     to the social
                                                     security number(s)
                                                     included in a
                                                     credit history
                                                     report and
                                                     information
                                                     obtained from other
                                                     sources.
                                                    The proposed
                                                     paragraph would
                                                     also require using
                                                     the information
                                                     obtained from
                                                     fingerprinting
                                                     individuals, as
                                                     required under
                                                     proposed Sec.
                                                     73.21, to confirm
                                                     an individual's
                                                     identity, if that
                                                     information is
                                                     available. The
                                                     proposed
                                                     requirement
                                                     clarifies the NRC's
                                                     intent with respect
                                                     to this portion of
                                                     the background
                                                     investigation.
Sec.   73.56(b)(2)(i) * * *   (d)(4) Employment     Proposed Sec.
 and develop information       history evaluation.   73.56(d)(4) would
 concerning an individual's    Licensees,            amend the portion
 employment history * * *.     applicants, and C/    of current Sec.
                               Vs shall ensure       73.56(b)(2)(i) that
                               that an employment    requires licensees
                               history evaluation    to develop
                               has been completed,   information
                               by questioning the    concerning an
                               individual's          individual's
                               present and former    employment history,
                               employers, and by     education history,
                               determining the       and military
                               activities of         service. This
                               individuals while     paragraph would be
                               unemployed.           added in response
                                                     to many
                                                     implementation
                                                     questions about
                                                     these requirements
                                                     from licensees.
                                                     Because the
                                                     proposed paragraph
                                                     would add several
                                                     clarifications of
                                                     the current
                                                     requirements, it
                                                     would be subdivided
                                                     to present each
                                                     requirement
                                                     separately for
                                                     organizational
                                                     clarity in the
                                                     rule. Considered
                                                     together, the
                                                     requirements of
                                                     proposed Sec.
                                                     73.56(d)(4) would
                                                     clarify the NRC's
                                                     intent that periods
                                                     of unemployment,
                                                     education, and
                                                     military service
                                                     must be evaluated
                                                     only if the
                                                     individual claims
                                                     them instead of
                                                     typical civilian
                                                     employment.

[[Page 62748]]

 
                                                    Proposed Sec.
                                                     73.56(d)(4) would
                                                     require licensees,
                                                     applicants, and C/
                                                     Vs to demonstrate a
                                                     best effort to
                                                     complete the
                                                     employment history
                                                     evaluation. The
                                                     term, ``best
                                                     effort,'' would be
                                                     added to clarify
                                                     the requirements
                                                     and increase
                                                     consistency between
                                                     Sec.   73.56 and
                                                     related
                                                     requirements in 10
                                                     CFR 26.27(a). The
                                                     best effort
                                                     criterion
                                                     recognizes
                                                     licensees',
                                                     applicants', and C/
                                                     Vs' status as
                                                     commercial entities
                                                     with no legal
                                                     authority to
                                                     require the release
                                                     of the information
                                                     from other private
                                                     employers and
                                                     educational
                                                     institutions.
                                                     Because of privacy
                                                     and potential
                                                     litigation
                                                     concerns, some
                                                     private employers
                                                     and educational
                                                     institutions may be
                                                     unable or unwilling
                                                     to release
                                                     qualitative
                                                     information about a
                                                     former employee or
                                                     student. Therefore,
                                                     the best effort
                                                     criterion would
                                                     first require
                                                     licensees,
                                                     applicants, and C/
                                                     Vs to seek
                                                     employment
                                                     information from
                                                     the primary source
                                                     (e.g. a company,
                                                     private employer,
                                                     or educational
                                                     institution that
                                                     the applicant has
                                                     listed on his or
                                                     her employment
                                                     history), but
                                                     recognizes that it
                                                     may not be
                                                     forthcoming. In
                                                     this case a
                                                     licensee,
                                                     applicant, or C/V
                                                     would be required
                                                     to seek information
                                                     from an alternate,
                                                     secondary source
                                                     when the
                                                     information from
                                                     the primary source
                                                     is unavailable.
                                                    The proposed
                                                     provision would use
                                                     the phrase,
                                                     ``ensure that the
                                                     employment history
                                                     evaluation has been
                                                     completed,''
                                                     because a licensee,
                                                     applicant, or C/V
                                                     may not be required
                                                     to conduct an
                                                     employment history
                                                     evaluation for
                                                     every individual
                                                     who applies for
                                                     UAA. As discussed
                                                     with respect to
                                                     proposed Sec.
                                                     73.56(h)(3) and
                                                     (h)(4), the
                                                     proposed rule would
                                                     permit licensees,
                                                     applicants, and C/
                                                     Vs to accept and
                                                     rely on elements of
                                                     the background
                                                     investigations,
                                                     psychological
                                                     assessments, and
                                                     behavioral
                                                     observation
                                                     training conducted
                                                     by other entities
                                                     who are subject to
                                                     this section to
                                                     meet the
                                                     requirements of
                                                     this section.
                                                     Therefore, the need
                                                     for and extent of
                                                     the employment
                                                     history evaluation
                                                     would vary,
                                                     depending upon how
                                                     much recent
                                                     information was
                                                     available to the
                                                     licensee,
                                                     applicant, or C/V
                                                     from any previous
                                                     periods during
                                                     which the
                                                     individual may have
                                                     held UAA. In the
                                                     case of individuals
                                                     whose UAA has been
                                                     interrupted for 30
                                                     or fewer days,
                                                     proposed Sec.
                                                     73.56(h) would not
                                                     require an
                                                     employment history
                                                     evaluation for the
                                                     reasons discussed
                                                     with respect to
                                                     that paragraph.

[[Page 62749]]

 
                                                    However, proposed
                                                     Sec.   73.56(h)
                                                     would establish
                                                     time limits on the
                                                     permission to
                                                     accept and rely on
                                                     AA program elements
                                                     to which the
                                                     individual was
                                                     previously subject,
                                                     based upon how far
                                                     in the past the
                                                     background
                                                     investigation,
                                                     psychological
                                                     assessment, and
                                                     behavioral
                                                     observation
                                                     training elements
                                                     were completed.
                                                     These time limits
                                                     are discussed in
                                                     more detail with
                                                     respect to the
                                                     specific provisions
                                                     in the proposed
                                                     rule that address
                                                     them. The proposed
                                                     provision would
                                                     also require
                                                     licensees,
                                                     applicants, and C/
                                                     Vs to determine the
                                                     activities of
                                                     individuals during
                                                     periods in which
                                                     the individual was
                                                     unemployed. The
                                                     proposed rule would
                                                     add this
                                                     requirement to make
                                                     certain that,
                                                     during the periods
                                                     that individuals
                                                     claim to have been
                                                     unemployed, (1)
                                                     they were not
                                                     engaged in
                                                     activities that may
                                                     reflect adversely
                                                     on their
                                                     trustworthiness and
                                                     reliability, such
                                                     as confinement for
                                                     periods of
                                                     incarceration or in-
                                                     patient drug or
                                                     alcohol treatment,
                                                     or (2) they
                                                     intentionally
                                                     failed to disclose
                                                     periods of
                                                     employment that
                                                     were ended
                                                     unfavorably.
                              (d)(4)(i) For the     A new Sec.
                               claimed employment    73.56(d)(4)(i)
                               period, the           would specify the
                               employment history    purpose of the
                               evaluation must       employment history
                               ascertain the         evaluation, which
                               reason for            would be to
                               termination,          ascertain
                               eligibility for       information about
                               rehire, and other     the individual's
                               information that      trustworthiness and
                               could reflect on      reliability, and
                               the individual's      the types of
                               trustworthiness and   information that
                               reliability.          the licensee,
                                                     applicant, or C/V
                                                     would seek from
                                                     employers regarding
                                                     an individual who
                                                     is applying for
                                                     UAA. The proposed
                                                     paragraph would
                                                     require the
                                                     entities who are
                                                     subject to this
                                                     section to
                                                     ascertain,
                                                     consistent with the
                                                     ``best effort''
                                                     criterion
                                                     established in
                                                     proposed Sec.
                                                     73.56(d)(4), the
                                                     reason that the
                                                     individual's
                                                     employment was
                                                     terminated, his or
                                                     her eligibility for
                                                     rehire, and other
                                                     information that
                                                     could reflect on
                                                     the individual's
                                                     trustworthiness and
                                                     reliability. The
                                                     term,
                                                     ``ascertain,''
                                                     would be used in
                                                     the proposed
                                                     paragraph because
                                                     it is consistent
                                                     with the
                                                     terminology used by
                                                     the industry to
                                                     refer to the
                                                     actions taken with
                                                     respect to
                                                     conducting the
                                                     employment history
                                                     evaluation and
                                                     would, therefore,
                                                     improve the clarity
                                                     of this requirement
                                                     for those who must
                                                     implement it.
                                                    In addition, there
                                                     may be instances in
                                                     which it is
                                                     unnecessary for a
                                                     licensee,
                                                     applicant, or C/V
                                                     to conduct the
                                                     employment history
                                                     evaluation, as
                                                     discussed with
                                                     respect to proposed
                                                     Sec.   73.56(d)(4),
                                                     because proposed
                                                     Sec.   73.56(h)(2)
                                                     would permit the
                                                     entities who
                                                     implement
                                                     authorization
                                                     programs to rely on
                                                     employment history
                                                     evaluations
                                                     conducted by other
                                                     entities who are
                                                     subject to this
                                                     section. In such
                                                     cases, the
                                                     licensee's,
                                                     applicant's, or C/
                                                     V's reviewing
                                                     official would not
                                                     review information
                                                     that was developed
                                                     under his or her AA
                                                     program, but would
                                                     ascertain the
                                                     subject
                                                     individual's
                                                     employment history
                                                     by reviewing
                                                     information that
                                                     had been collected
                                                     by others. The
                                                     proposed
                                                     requirement would
                                                     be added in
                                                     response to
                                                     implementation
                                                     questions that have
                                                     arisen about the
                                                     employment history
                                                     check that is
                                                     required in current
                                                     Sec.
                                                     73.56(b)(2)(i).

[[Page 62750]]

 
Sec.   73.56(b)(2)(i) * * *   (d)(4)(ii) If the     Proposed Sec.
 the background                claimed employment    73.56(d)(4)(ii)
 investigation must * * *      was military          would amend the
 develop information           service, the          portion of current
 concerning an individual's    licensee,             Sec.   73.56(2)(i)
 * * * military service * *    applicant, or C/V     that requires
 *.                            who is conducting     licensees to
                               the employment        develop information
                               history evaluation    about an
                               shall request a       individual's
                               characterization of   military service.
                               service, reason for   The proposed
                               separation, and any   paragraph would
                               disciplinary          clarify the NRC's
                               actions that could    intent that
                               affect a              verification and
                               trustworthiness and   characterization of
                               reliability           the individual's
                               determination.        military service
                                                     would be required
                                                     only if the
                                                     individual claims
                                                     military service as
                                                     employment within
                                                     the periods during
                                                     which the
                                                     individual would be
                                                     required to
                                                     disclose his or her
                                                     employment history,
                                                     as specified in
                                                     proposed Sec.
                                                     73.56(h) [Granting
                                                     unescorted access
                                                     authorization].
                                                     This clarification
                                                     would respond to
                                                     implementation
                                                     questions from
                                                     licensees and
                                                     stakeholder
                                                     requests at the
                                                     public meetings
                                                     discussed in
                                                     Section IV.3.
Sec.   73.56(b)(2)(i) * * *   (d)(4)(iii) Periods   Proposed Sec.
 and develop information       of self-employment    73.56(d)(4)(iii)
 concerning an individual's    or unemployment may   would be added at
 * * * education history, *    be verified by any    the request of
 * *.                          reasonable method.    stakeholders at the
                               If education is       public meetings
                               claimed in lieu of    discussed in
                               employment, the       Section IV.3 to
                               licensee,             clarify the NRC's
                               applicant, or C/V     intent with respect
                               shall request         to periods of self-
                               information that      employment,
                               could reflect on      unemployment, or
                               the individual's      education, if the
                               trustworthiness and   individual claims
                               reliability and, at   such activities
                               a minimum, verify     within the periods
                               that the individual   during which the
                               was actively          individual would be
                               participating in      required to
                               the educational       disclose his or her
                               process during the    employment history,
                               claimed period.       as specified in
                                                     proposed Sec.
                                                     73.56(h).
                                                    The proposed
                                                     paragraph would
                                                     permit licensees,
                                                     applicants, and C/
                                                     Vs to use any
                                                     reasonable means,
                                                     consistent with the
                                                     ``best effort''
                                                     criterion discussed
                                                     with respect to
                                                     proposed Sec.
                                                     73.56(d)(4), to
                                                     verify the
                                                     individual's
                                                     activities during
                                                     claimed periods of
                                                     self-employment and
                                                     unemployment.
                                                     Reasonable means to
                                                     verify the
                                                     individual's
                                                     activities may
                                                     include, but would
                                                     not be limited to,
                                                     a review of
                                                     business or tax
                                                     records documenting
                                                     the individual's
                                                     self-employment,
                                                     copies of
                                                     unemployment
                                                     compensation
                                                     checks, or
                                                     interviews with
                                                     business associates
                                                     or acquaintances.
                                                     To verify education
                                                     in lieu of
                                                     employment, the
                                                     proposed paragraph
                                                     would require the
                                                     entities who are
                                                     subject to this
                                                     section to request
                                                     information from
                                                     the claimed
                                                     educational
                                                     institution that
                                                     could reflect on
                                                     the individual's
                                                     trustworthiness and
                                                     reliability.
                                                     However, for
                                                     reasons that are
                                                     similar to those
                                                     discussed with
                                                     respect to proposed
                                                     Sec.   73.56(d)(4),
                                                     the NRC recognizes
                                                     that it may be
                                                     difficult to obtain
                                                     information from an
                                                     educational
                                                     institution about
                                                     the individual's
                                                     behavior while a
                                                     student. Therefore,
                                                     the proposed
                                                     paragraph would
                                                     permit licensees,
                                                     applicants, and C/
                                                     Vs to verify, at a
                                                     minimum, that the
                                                     applicant was
                                                     attending and
                                                     actively
                                                     participating in
                                                     school during the
                                                     claimed period(s).

[[Page 62751]]

 
                              (d)(4)(iv) If a       Proposed Sec.
                               company, previous     73.56(d)(4)(iv)
                               employer, or          would further
                               educational           clarify the NRC's
                               institution to whom   intent with respect
                               the licensee,         to the actions that
                               applicant, or C/V     licensees,
                               has directed a        applicants, and C/
                               request for           Vs would take to
                               information refuses   meet the best
                               to provide            effort criterion in
                               information or        proposed Sec.
                               indicates an          73.56(d)(4), in
                               inability or          response to many
                               unwillingness to      implementation
                               provide information   questions received
                               within 3 business     from licensees. The
                               days of the           proposed paragraph
                               request, the          would address
                               licensee,             circumstances in
                               applicant, or C/V     which a primary
                               shall document this   source of
                               refusal, inability,   information refuses
                               or unwillingness in   to provide
                               the licensee's,       employment
                               applicant's, or C/    information or
                               V's record of the     indicates an
                               investigation, and    inability or
                               obtain a              unwillingness to
                               confirmation of       provide it within 3
                               employment or         days of the
                               educational           request. Licensees
                               enrollment and        and other entities
                               attendance from at    would be required
                               least one alternate   to document that
                               source, with          the request for
                               questions answered    information was
                               to the best of the    directed to the
                               alternate source's    primary source and
                               ability. This         the nature of the
                               alternate source      response (i.e., a
                               may not have been     refusal, inability,
                               previously used by    or unwillingness).
                               the licensee,         If a licensee,
                               applicant, or C/V     applicant, or C/V
                               to obtain             encounters such
                               information about     circumstances, the
                               the individual's      proposed paragraph
                               character and         would require the
                               reputation. If the    licensee,
                               licensee,             applicant, permit,
                               applicant, or C/V     or C/V to seek
                               uses an alternate     employment history
                               source because        information from an
                               employment            alternate source,
                               information is not    to the extent of
                               forthcoming within    the alternate
                               3 business days of    source's ability to
                               the request, the      provide the
                               licensee,             information. An
                               applicant, or C/V     alternate source
                               need not delay        may include, but
                               granting unescorted   would not be
                               access                limited to, a co-
                               authorization to      worker or
                               wait for any          supervisor at the
                               employer response,    same company who
                               but shall evaluate    had personal
                               and document the      knowledge of the
                               response if it is     applicant, if such
                               received.             an individual could
                                                     be located.
                                                    However, the
                                                     proposed rule would
                                                     prohibit the
                                                     licensee,
                                                     applicant, or C/V
                                                     from using the
                                                     alternate source of
                                                     employment
                                                     information to meet
                                                     the requirements in
                                                     proposed Sec.
                                                     73.56(d)(6) for a
                                                     character
                                                     reference, in order
                                                     to ensure that the
                                                     scope of the
                                                     background
                                                     investigation is
                                                     sufficiently broad
                                                     to provide high
                                                     assurance that
                                                     individuals who are
                                                     granted UAA are
                                                     trustworthy and
                                                     reliable. The
                                                     proposed paragraph
                                                     would permit
                                                     licensees and other
                                                     entities to grant
                                                     UAA, if warranted,
                                                     when a response has
                                                     been obtained from
                                                     an alternate
                                                     source, without
                                                     waiting more than 3
                                                     days after the
                                                     request for
                                                     information was
                                                     directed to a
                                                     primary source. The
                                                     3-day period would
                                                     be established
                                                     because industry
                                                     and NRC experience
                                                     in implementing
                                                     current Sec.
                                                     73.56 has shown
                                                     that if an employer
                                                     or educational
                                                     institution intends
                                                     to respond to the
                                                     request for
                                                     information, the
                                                     response will be
                                                     forthcoming within
                                                     this period.
                                                     Therefore, there is
                                                     no added benefit to
                                                     public health and
                                                     safety or the
                                                     common defense and
                                                     security in
                                                     requiring
                                                     licensees,
                                                     applicants, or C/Vs
                                                     to wait longer than
                                                     3 days before
                                                     implementing the
                                                     alternative methods
                                                     of meeting the
                                                     employment history
                                                     evaluation
                                                     requirements that
                                                     would be permitted
                                                     in the proposed
                                                     paragraph.

[[Page 62752]]

 
                                                    However, should the
                                                     licensee,
                                                     applicant, or C/V
                                                     receive an employer
                                                     response to the
                                                     request for
                                                     information after
                                                     the 3-day period,
                                                     the proposed
                                                     paragraph would
                                                     require that the
                                                     implications of the
                                                     information must be
                                                     evaluated with
                                                     respect to the
                                                     individual's
                                                     trustworthiness and
                                                     reliability and the
                                                     information
                                                     documented, so that
                                                     it is available to
                                                     other licensees,
                                                     applicants, and C/
                                                     Vs. These changes
                                                     would be made to
                                                     reduce unnecessary
                                                     regulatory burden
                                                     while maintaining
                                                     high assurance that
                                                     individuals who are
                                                     subject to an AA
                                                     program are
                                                     trustworthy and
                                                     reliable.
                              (d)(4)(v) When any    Proposed Sec.
                               licensee,             73.56(d)(v) would
                               applicant, or C/V     require licensees,
                               specified in          applicants, and C/
                               paragraph (a) of      Vs who are subject
                               this section is       to this section to
                               legitimately          share employment
                               seeking the           history information
                               information           that they have
                               required for an       collected, if
                               unescorted access     contacted by
                               authorization         another licensee,
                               decision under this   applicant, or C/V
                               section and has       who has a release
                               obtained a signed     signed by the
                               release from the      individual who is
                               subject individual    applying for UAA
                               authorizing the       that would permit
                               disclosure of such    the sharing of that
                               information, a        information. This
                               licensee,             proposed provision
                               applicant, or C/V     would amend the
                               who is subject to     requirement to
                               this section shall    release employment
                               disclose whether      history information
                               the subject           in current Sec.
                               individual's          73.56(f)(2) and
                               unescorted access     would be consistent
                               authorization was     with related
                               denied or             requirements in 10
                               terminated            CFR part 26. The
                               unfavorably. The      proposed provision
                               licensee,             would also clarify
                               applicant, or C/V     that the
                               who receives the      information must
                               request for           also be released to
                               information shall     C/Vs who have
                               make available the    authorization to
                               information upon      programs when the C/
                               which the denial or   V has obtained the
                               unfavorable           required signed
                               termination of        release from the
                               unescorted access     applicant. This
                               authorization was     proposed
                               based.                clarification is
                                                     necessary because
                                                     some licensees have
                                                     misinterpreted
                                                     current Sec.
                                                     73.56(f)(2) as
                                                     prohibiting the
                                                     release of
                                                     employment history
                                                     information to C/Vs
                                                     who administer
                                                     authorization
                                                     programs under this
                                                     section. These
                                                     requirements are
                                                     necessary to ensure
                                                     that adequate
                                                     information to
                                                     serve as a basis
                                                     for UAA decisions
                                                     can be obtained by
                                                     a licensee,
                                                     applicant, or C/V.
                              (d)(4)(vi) In         Proposed Sec.
                               conducting an         73.56(d)(4)(vi)
                               employment history    would permit
                               evaluation, the       licensees,
                               licensee,             applicants, and C/
                               applicant, or C/V     Vs to use
                               may obtain            electronic means of
                               information and       obtaining the
                               documents by          employment history
                               electronic means,     information to
                               including, but not    increase the
                               limited to,           efficiency with
                               telephone,            which licensees,
                               facsimile, or         applicants, and C/V
                               email. The            could obtain the
                               licensee,             employment history
                               applicant, or C/V     information. The
                               shall make a record   proposed paragraph
                               of the contents of    would be added in
                               the telephone call    response to
                               and shall retain      stakeholder
                               that record, and      requests at the
                               any documents or      public meetings
                               files obtained        discussed in
                               electronically, in    Section IV.3, and
                               accordance with       would be consistent
                               paragraph (o) of      with related
                               this section.         requirements in 10
                                                     CFR part 26. The
                                                     proposed paragraph
                                                     would also add a
                                                     cross-reference to
                                                     the applicable
                                                     records retention
                                                     requirement in
                                                     proposed Sec.
                                                     73.56(o) [Records]
                                                     to ensure that
                                                     licensees,
                                                     applicants, and C/
                                                     Vs are aware of the
                                                     applicability of
                                                     these requirements
                                                     to the employment
                                                     history information
                                                     obtained
                                                     electronically.

[[Page 62753]]

 
Sec.   73.56(b)(2)(i) * * *   (d)(5) Credit         Proposed Sec.
 and develop information       history evaluation.   73.56(d)(5) would
 concerning an individual's    The licensees,        retain the
 * * * credit history, * * *.  applicants, and C/    requirement for a
                               Vs specified in       credit history
                               paragraph (a) of      evaluation that is
                               this section shall    embedded in current
                               ensure that the       Sec.
                               full credit history   73.56(b)(2)(i) and
                               of any individual     provide more
                               who is applying for   detailed
                               unescorted access     requirements, in
                               authorization has     response to
                               been evaluated. A     stakeholder
                               full credit history   requests at the
                               evaluation must       public meetings
                               include, but would    discussed in
                               not be limited to,    Section IV.3. The
                               an inquiry to         proposed paragraph
                               detect potential      would require the
                               fraud or misuse of    credit history
                               social security       evaluation to
                               numbers or other      include an inquiry
                               financial             to detect any past
                               identifiers, and a    instances of fraud
                               review and            or misuse of social
                               evaluation of all     security numbers or
                               of the information    other financial
                               that is provided by   identifiers. This
                               a national credit-    requirement would
                               reporting agency      be added because
                               about the             most credit-
                               individual's credit   reporting agencies
                               history.              require a specific
                                                     request for this
                                                     information before
                                                     they report it, and
                                                     the NRC has
                                                     determined that
                                                     instances of fraud
                                                     or misuse of
                                                     financial
                                                     identifiers, such
                                                     as social security
                                                     numbers or the
                                                     names that an
                                                     individual has
                                                     used, may provide
                                                     important
                                                     information about
                                                     an individual's
                                                     trustworthiness and
                                                     reliability. The
                                                     proposed paragraph
                                                     would also require
                                                     the entities who
                                                     are subject to this
                                                     section to review
                                                     all of the
                                                     information that is
                                                     provided by the
                                                     national credit-
                                                     reporting agency,
                                                     as part of the
                                                     background
                                                     investigation
                                                     process.
                                                    The proposed
                                                     paragraph would use
                                                     the term, ``full''
                                                     to convey that
                                                     there is no time
                                                     limit on the number
                                                     of years of credit
                                                     history information
                                                     that the reviewing
                                                     official would
                                                     consider or other
                                                     limitations on
                                                     using information
                                                     contained in the
                                                     credit history
                                                     report to assist in
                                                     determining the
                                                     individual's
                                                     trustworthiness and
                                                     reliability. In the
                                                     past, licensees' AA
                                                     program procedures
                                                     limited the number
                                                     of years of the
                                                     individual's credit
                                                     history that
                                                     reviewing officials
                                                     were required to
                                                     consider in
                                                     determining an
                                                     individual's
                                                     trustworthiness and
                                                     reliability. As a
                                                     result, some
                                                     reviewing officials
                                                     may not have
                                                     considered credit
                                                     history information
                                                     for several years,
                                                     even if the
                                                     reporting agency
                                                     provided it. As a
                                                     result, individuals
                                                     who were subject to
                                                     different
                                                     authorization
                                                     programs were
                                                     evaluated
                                                     inconsistently.
                                                     Furthermore, credit
                                                     history reporting
                                                     agencies also
                                                     provide employment
                                                     data that can be
                                                     compared to the
                                                     information
                                                     disclosed by the
                                                     applicant for UAA
                                                     to validate the
                                                     individual's
                                                     disclosure.
                                                     However, some AA
                                                     program procedures
                                                     did not require the
                                                     reviewing official
                                                     to make this
                                                     comparison.
                                                    Therefore, the
                                                     proposed paragraph
                                                     would require the
                                                     reviewing official
                                                     to consider the
                                                     ``full'' credit
                                                     history report, in
                                                     order to strengthen
                                                     the effectiveness
                                                     of the credit
                                                     history evaluation
                                                     element of AA
                                                     programs and
                                                     increase the
                                                     consistency with
                                                     which licensees,
                                                     applicants, and C/
                                                     Vs would conduct
                                                     the credit history
                                                     evaluation.

[[Page 62754]]

 
Sec.   73.56(b)(2)(i) * * *   (d)(6) Character and  Proposed Sec.
 and develop information       reputation. The       73.56(d)(6) would
 concerning an individual's    licensees,            expand on the
 * * * character and           applicants, and C/    requirement in
 reputation.                   Vs specified in       current Sec.
                               paragraph (a) of      73.56(b)(2)(i) for
                               this section shall    licensees to verify
                               ascertain the         an individual's
                               character and         character and
                               reputation of an      reputation. The
                               individual who has    proposed provision
                               applied for           would require the
                               unescorted access     entities who
                               authorization by      implement AA
                               conducting            programs to develop
                               reference checks.     information about
                               Reference checks      an individual's
                               may not be            trustworthiness and
                               conducted with any    reliability by
                               person who is known   contacting and
                               to be a close         interviewing
                               member of the         associates of the
                               individual's          individual who
                               family, including     would have
                               but not limited to,   knowledge of his or
                               the individual's      her character and
                               spouse, parents,      reputation, but who
                               siblings, or          would not be a
                               children, or any      member of the
                               individual who        individual's
                               resides in the        immediate family or
                               individual's          reside in his or
                               permanent             her household.
                               household. The        Family and
                               reference checks      household members
                               must focus on the     would be excluded
                               individual's          because these
                               reputation for        individuals are
                               trustworthiness and   typically reluctant
                               reliability.          to reveal any
                                                     adverse
                                                     information, if it
                                                     exists. The term,
                                                     ``ascertain,''
                                                     would replace
                                                     ``verify,'' in the
                                                     proposed paragraph
                                                     because it is
                                                     consistent with the
                                                     terminology used by
                                                     the industry to
                                                     refer to the
                                                     actions taken with
                                                     respect to
                                                     determining an
                                                     individual's
                                                     character and
                                                     reputation and
                                                     would, therefore,
                                                     improve the clarity
                                                     of this requirement
                                                     for those who must
                                                     implement it.
                                                    In addition, there
                                                     would be instances
                                                     in which it is
                                                     unnecessary for a
                                                     licensee,
                                                     applicant, or C/V
                                                     to conduct the
                                                     character and
                                                     reputation
                                                     evaluation because
                                                     proposed Sec.
                                                     73.56(h)(4) would
                                                     permit the entities
                                                     who implement AA
                                                     programs to rely on
                                                     the background
                                                     investigations
                                                     conducted by other
                                                     entities who are
                                                     subject to this
                                                     section. In such
                                                     cases, the
                                                     licensee's,
                                                     applicant's, or C/
                                                     V's reviewing
                                                     official would not
                                                     review information
                                                     that was collected
                                                     under his or her AA
                                                     program, but would
                                                     ascertain the
                                                     subject
                                                     individual's
                                                     character and
                                                     reputation by
                                                     reviewing
                                                     information that
                                                     had been collected
                                                     by others. The last
                                                     sentence of the
                                                     proposed paragraph
                                                     would clarify that
                                                     the scope of the
                                                     reference checks
                                                     would be limited to
                                                     developing
                                                     information that
                                                     would be useful to
                                                     the reviewing
                                                     official in
                                                     determining the
                                                     individual's
                                                     trustworthiness and
                                                     reliability for the
                                                     UAA decision. This
                                                     requirement would
                                                     be added in
                                                     response to
                                                     stakeholder
                                                     requests at the
                                                     public meetings
                                                     discussed in
                                                     Section IV.3 for
                                                     increased clarity
                                                     and specificity in
                                                     the regulation's
                                                     requirements.

[[Page 62755]]

 
Sec.   73.56(b)(2)(i) * * *   (d)(7) Criminal       Proposed Sec.
 and develop information       history review. The   73.56(d)(7) would
 concerning an individual's    licensee's,           amend the
 * * * criminal history * *    applicant's, or C/    requirement in
 *.                            V's reviewing         current Sec.
                               official shall        73.56(b)(2)(i) for
                               evaluate the entire   licensees to
                               criminal history      develop information
                               record of an          about an
                               individual who is     individual's
                               applying for          criminal history.
                               unescorted access     The proposed
                               authorization to      provision would
                               assist in             eliminate the
                               determining whether   current requirement
                               the individual has    to develop criminal
                               a record of           history information
                               criminal activity     because proposed
                               that may adversely    Sec.   73.57
                               impact his or her     [Requirements for
                               trustworthiness and   criminal history
                               reliability. The      checks of
                               criminal history      individuals granted
                               record must be        unescorted access
                               obtained in           to a nuclear power
                               accordance with the   facility or access
                               requirements of       to Safeguards
                               Sec.   73.57.         Information by
                                                     power reactor
                                                     licensees] would
                                                     establish the
                                                     methods by which
                                                     criminal history
                                                     information about
                                                     individuals who are
                                                     applying for UAA
                                                     would be obtained
                                                     and it is
                                                     unnecessary to
                                                     repeat those
                                                     requirements in
                                                     this section. The
                                                     proposed paragraph
                                                     would require the
                                                     reviewing official
                                                     to review the
                                                     individual's entire
                                                     criminal history
                                                     record. This
                                                     requirement would
                                                     be necessary
                                                     because, in the
                                                     past, some
                                                     licensees limited
                                                     the criminal
                                                     history review to
                                                     the individual's
                                                     history over the
                                                     past 5 or fewer
                                                     years, but did not
                                                     consider criminal
                                                     history information
                                                     from earlier years,
                                                     even if the
                                                     reporting agency
                                                     provided it.
                                                     However, the NRC
                                                     has determined that
                                                     a review of all of
                                                     the criminal
                                                     history information
                                                     that is provided in
                                                     a criminal history
                                                     record provides
                                                     higher assurance
                                                     that any instances
                                                     or patterns of
                                                     lawlessness are
                                                     considered when
                                                     determining whether
                                                     an individual is
                                                     trustworthy and
                                                     reliable.
                                                    Therefore, the
                                                     proposed rule would
                                                     incorporate this
                                                     requirement in
                                                     order to strengthen
                                                     the effectiveness
                                                     of AA programs.
Sec.   73.56(d) Requirements  Deleted.............  Current Sec.
 during cold shutdown. (1)                           73.56(d)
 The licensee may grant                              [Requirements
 unescorted access during                            during cold
 cold shutdown to an                                 shutdown] would be
 individual who does not                             eliminated from the
 possess an access                                   proposed rule.
 authorization granted in                            Because of an
 accordance with paragraph                           increased concern
 (b) of this section                                 with a potential
 provided the licensee                               insider threat, as
 develops and incorporates                           discussed in
 into its Physical Security                          Section IV.3, the
 Plan measures to be taken                           NRC has determined
 to ensure that the                                  that the relaxation
 functional capability of                            of UAA requirements
 equipment in areas for                              permitted in the
 which the access                                    current provision
 authorization requirement                           does not meet the
 has been relaxed has not                            Commission's
 been impaired by relaxation                         objective of
 of that requirement. (2)                            providing high
 Prior to incorporating such                         assurance that
 measures into its Physical                          individuals who
 Security Plan the licensee                          have unescorted
 shall submit those plan                             access to protected
 changes to the NRC for                              areas in nuclear
 review and approval                                 power plants are
 pursuant to Sec.   50.90.                           trustworthy and
 (3) Any provisions in                               reliable.
 licensees' security plans                           Therefore, the
 that allow for relaxation                           current permission
 of access authorization                             to grant unescorted
 requirements during cold                            access to an
 shutdown are superseded by                          individual without
 this rule. Provisions in                            meeting all of the
 licensees' Physical                                 requirements of
 Security Plans on April 25,                         proposed Sec.
 1991 that provide for                               73.56 would be
 devitalization (that is, a                          eliminated from the
 change from vital to                                proposed rule.
 protected area status)                              Licensees and
 during cold shutdown are                            applicants would
 not affected.                                       continue to be
                                                     permitted to seek
                                                     an exemption from
                                                     the requirements of
                                                     proposed Sec.
                                                     73.56 under current
                                                     Sec.   73.5
                                                     [Specific
                                                     exemptions].

[[Page 62756]]

 
Sec.   73.56(b)(2)(ii) A      (e) Psychological     Proposed Sec.
 psychological assessment      assessment. In        73.56(e) would
 designed to evaluate the      order to assist in    amend current Sec.
 possible impact of any        determining an         73.56(b)(2)(ii),
 noted psychological           individual's          which requires AA
 characteristics which may     trustworthiness and   programs to include
 have a bearing on             reliability, the      a psychological
 trustworthiness and           licensees,            assessment, by
 reliability.                  applicants, and C/    adding several
                               Vs specified in       requirements to the
                               paragraph (a) of      current rule.
                               this section shall    Because the
                               ensure that a         requirements in the
                               psychological         proposed rule would
                               assessment has been   be more detailed,
                               completed of the      the current
                               individual who is     paragraph would be
                               applying for          restructured and
                               unescorted access     subdivided to
                               authorization. The    present the new
                               psychological         requirements in
                               assessment must be    separate
                               designed to           paragraphs. This
                               evaluate the          change would be
                               possible adverse      made for increased
                               impact of any noted   clarity in the
                               psychological         organization of the
                               characteristics on    rule. The proposed
                               the individual's      paragraph would
                               trustworthiness and   retain the current
                               reliability.          requirement for the
                                                     psychological
                                                     assessment to be
                                                     designed to
                                                     evaluate the
                                                     implications of the
                                                     individual's
                                                     psychological
                                                     characteristics on
                                                     his or her
                                                     trustworthiness and
                                                     reliability in a
                                                     separate sentence
                                                     for clarity. For
                                                     the same reason,
                                                     ``adverse'' would
                                                     be added to more
                                                     clearly describe
                                                     the intended
                                                     purpose of the
                                                     psychological
                                                     assessment. The
                                                     proposed provision
                                                     would retain the
                                                     intent of the
                                                     current requirement
                                                     for AA programs to
                                                     include a
                                                     psychological
                                                     assessment, but
                                                     would use the
                                                     phrase, ``has been
                                                     completed,''
                                                     because licensees,
                                                     applicants, and C/
                                                     Vs may not be
                                                     required to
                                                     complete the
                                                     psychological
                                                     assessment each
                                                     time that an
                                                     individual applies
                                                     for UAA.
                                                    As discussed with
                                                     respect to proposed
                                                     Sec.   73.56(h)(1),
                                                     AA programs would
                                                     be permitted to
                                                     rely on
                                                     psychological
                                                     assessments that
                                                     were completed by
                                                     other AA programs.
                                                     Individuals who
                                                     have been subject
                                                     to a psychological
                                                     assessment, which
                                                     was conducted in
                                                     accordance with
                                                     requirements of
                                                     this proposed
                                                     section and
                                                     resulted in the
                                                     granting of UAA,
                                                     within the time
                                                     period specified in
                                                     the licensee's or
                                                     applicant's
                                                     Physical Security
                                                     Plan [as discussed
                                                     with respect to
                                                     proposed Sec.
                                                     73.56(i)(1)(v)],
                                                     would not be
                                                     required to be
                                                     assessed again in
                                                     order to be granted
                                                     UAA.
                              (e)(1) A licensed     Proposed Sec.
                               clinical              73.56(e)(1) would
                               psychologist or       establish minimum
                               psychiatrist shall    requirements for
                               conduct the           the credentials of
                               psychological         individuals who
                               assessment.           perform the
                                                     psychological
                                                     assessments that
                                                     are required under
                                                     current Sec.
                                                     73.56(b)(2)(ii),
                                                     which are not
                                                     addressed in the
                                                     current rule. The
                                                     proposed provision
                                                     would require a
                                                     licensed clinical
                                                     psychologist or
                                                     psychiatrist to
                                                     conduct the
                                                     psychological
                                                     assessment, because
                                                     the extensive
                                                     education,
                                                     training, and
                                                     supervised clinical
                                                     experience that
                                                     these professionals
                                                     must possess in
                                                     order to be
                                                     licensed under
                                                     State laws would
                                                     provide high
                                                     assurance that they
                                                     are qualified to
                                                     conduct the
                                                     psychological
                                                     assessments that
                                                     are required under
                                                     the rule.
                                                    The proposed rule
                                                     would impose this
                                                     new requirement
                                                     because of the key
                                                     role that the
                                                     psychological
                                                     assessment element
                                                     of AA programs
                                                     plays in assuring
                                                     the public health
                                                     and safety and
                                                     common defense and
                                                     security when
                                                     determining whether
                                                     an individual is
                                                     trustworthy and
                                                     reliable.
                                                     Therefore, the
                                                     proposed provision
                                                     would be added to
                                                     strengthen the
                                                     effectiveness of AA
                                                     programs.

[[Page 62757]]

 
                              (e)(2) The            A new Sec.
                               psychological         73.56(e)(2) would
                               assessment must be    require
                               conducted in          psychological
                               accordance with the   assessments to be
                               applicable ethical    conducted in
                               principles for        accordance with
                               conducting such       ethical principles
                               assessments           for conducting such
                               established by the    assessments that
                               American              are established by
                               Psychological         the American
                               Association or        Psychological
                               American              Association or the
                               Psychiatric           American
                               Association.          Psychiatric
                                                     Association, as
                                                     applicable. In
                                                     order to meet State
                                                     licensure
                                                     requirements,
                                                     clinical
                                                     psychologists and
                                                     psychiatrists are
                                                     required to
                                                     practice in
                                                     accordance with the
                                                     applicable
                                                     professional
                                                     standards. However,
                                                     the proposed rule
                                                     would add a
                                                     reference to these
                                                     professional
                                                     standards to
                                                     emphasize the
                                                     importance that the
                                                     NRC places on the
                                                     proper conduct of
                                                     psychological
                                                     assessments, in
                                                     order to ensure the
                                                     rights of
                                                     individuals,
                                                     consistent
                                                     treatment, and the
                                                     effectiveness of
                                                     the psychological
                                                     assessment
                                                     component of AA
                                                     programs.
                              (e)(3) At a minimum,  Proposed Sec.
                               the psychological     73.56(e)(3) would
                               assessment must       establish new
                               include the           requirements for
                               administration and    the psychological
                               interpretation of a   testing that
                               standardized,         licensees,
                               objective,            applicants, and C/
                               professionally        Vs would conduct as
                               accepted              part of the
                               psychological test    psychological
                               that provides         assessment. The
                               information to        proposed paragraph
                               identify              would require the
                               indications of        administration and
                               disturbances in       interpretation of
                               personality or        an objective
                               psychopathology       psychological test
                               that may have         that provides
                               implications for an   information to aid
                               individual's          in identifying
                               trustworthiness and   personality
                               reliability.          disturbances and
                               Predetermined         psychopathology.
                               thresholds must be    The proposed rule
                               applied in            would specify
                               interpreting the      psychological tests
                               results of the        that are designed
                               psychological test,   to identify
                               to determine          indications of
                               whether an            personality
                               individual shall be   disturbances and
                               interviewed by a      psychopathology
                               psychiatrist or       because some of
                               licensed clinical     these conditions
                               psychologist under    may reflect
                               paragraph (e)(4)(i)   adversely on an
                               of this section.      individual's
                                                     trustworthiness and
                                                     reliability. The
                                                     proposed rule would
                                                     not prohibit the
                                                     use of other types
                                                     of psychological
                                                     tests, such as
                                                     personality
                                                     inventories and
                                                     tests of abilities,
                                                     in the
                                                     psychological
                                                     assessment process,
                                                     but would establish
                                                     the minimum
                                                     requirement for a
                                                     test that
                                                     identifies
                                                     indications of
                                                     personality
                                                     disturbances and
                                                     psychopathology
                                                     because the
                                                     identification of
                                                     these conditions is
                                                     most relevant to
                                                     the purpose of the
                                                     psychological
                                                     assessment element
                                                     of AA programs. The
                                                     proposed provision
                                                     would also require
                                                     the use of
                                                     standardized,
                                                     objective
                                                     psychological tests
                                                     to reduce potential
                                                     variability in the
                                                     testing that is
                                                     conducted under
                                                     this section.

[[Page 62758]]

 
                                                    Decreasing potential
                                                     variability in
                                                     testing is
                                                     important to
                                                     provide greater
                                                     assurance than in
                                                     the past that
                                                     individuals who are
                                                     applying for or
                                                     maintaining UAA are
                                                     treated
                                                     consistently under
                                                     the proposed rule.
                                                     The proposed rule
                                                     would not prohibit
                                                     the use of other
                                                     types of
                                                     psychological
                                                     tests, such as
                                                     projective tests,
                                                     in the
                                                     psychological
                                                     assessment process,
                                                     but would establish
                                                     the minimum
                                                     requirement for a
                                                     standardized,
                                                     objective test to
                                                     facilitate the
                                                     psychological re-
                                                     assessments that
                                                     would be required
                                                     under proposed Sec.
                                                       73.56(i)(1)(v).
                                                     Comparing scores on
                                                     a standardized,
                                                     objective test to
                                                     identify
                                                     indications of any
                                                     adverse changes in
                                                     the individual's
                                                     psychological
                                                     status is
                                                     simplified when the
                                                     testing that is
                                                     performed for a re-
                                                     assessment is
                                                     similar to or the
                                                     same as previous
                                                     testing that was
                                                     conducted under
                                                     this section,
                                                     particularly when
                                                     the clinician who
                                                     conducts the re-
                                                     assessment did not
                                                     conduct the
                                                     previous testing.
                                                     The proposed
                                                     paragraph would
                                                     also require
                                                     licensees,
                                                     applicants, and C/
                                                     Vs to establish
                                                     thresholds in
                                                     interpreting the
                                                     results of the
                                                     psychological test,
                                                     to aid in
                                                     determining whether
                                                     an individual would
                                                     be required to be
                                                     interviewed by a
                                                     psychiatrist or
                                                     licensed clinical
                                                     psychologist under
                                                     proposed paragraph
                                                     (e)(4)(ii) of this
                                                     section.
                                                    The NRC is aware of
                                                     substantial
                                                     variability in the
                                                     thresholds used by
                                                     authorization
                                                     programs in the
                                                     past to determine
                                                     whether an
                                                     individual's test
                                                     results provided
                                                     indications of
                                                     personality
                                                     disturbances or
                                                     psychopathology.
                                                     Different clinical
                                                     psychologists
                                                     providing services
                                                     to the same or
                                                     different AA
                                                     programs would vary
                                                     in the thresholds
                                                     they applied in
                                                     determining whether
                                                     an individual's
                                                     test results
                                                     indicated the need
                                                     for further
                                                     evaluation in a
                                                     clinical interview.
                                                     As a consequence,
                                                     whether or not
                                                     individuals who had
                                                     the same patterns
                                                     of scores on the
                                                     psychological test
                                                     would be subject to
                                                     a clinical
                                                     interview would
                                                     vary both within
                                                     and between AA
                                                     programs. The
                                                     proposed rule would
                                                     add a requirement
                                                     for predetermined
                                                     thresholds to
                                                     reduce this
                                                     variability in
                                                     order to protect
                                                     the rights of
                                                     individuals who are
                                                     subject to AA
                                                     programs to fair
                                                     and consistent
                                                     treatment.

[[Page 62759]]

 
                              (e)(4) The            A new Sec.
                               psychological         73.56(e)(4) would
                               assessment must       establish
                               include a clinical    requirements for
                               interview--           the conditions
                              (i) If an              under which the
                               individual's scores   psychological
                               on the                assessment must
                               psychological test    include a clinical
                               in paragraph (e)(3)   interview. Proposed
                               of this section       Sec.
                               identify              73.56(e)(4)(i)
                               indications of        would require a
                               disturbances in       clinical interview
                               personality or        if an individual's
                               psychopathology       scores on the
                               that may have         psychological test
                               implications for an   identified
                               individual's          indications of
                               trustworthiness and   disturbances in
                               reliability; or.      personality or
                              (ii) If the            psychopathology
                               licensee's or         that would
                               applicant's           necessitate further
                               Physical Security     assessment. The
                               Plan requires a       clinical interview
                               clinical interview    would be performed
                               based on job          by a licensed
                               assignments..         clinical
                                                     psychologist or
                                                     psychiatrist,
                                                     consistent with the
                                                     ethical principles
                                                     for conducting
                                                     psychological
                                                     assessments that
                                                     are established by
                                                     the American
                                                     Psychological
                                                     Association or the
                                                     American
                                                     Psychiatric
                                                     Association. The
                                                     purposes of the
                                                     clinical interview
                                                     would include, but
                                                     would not be
                                                     limited to,
                                                     validating the test
                                                     results and
                                                     assessing their
                                                     implications for
                                                     the individual's
                                                     trustworthiness and
                                                     reliability.
                                                     Proposed Sec.
                                                     73.56(e)(4)(ii)
                                                     would also require
                                                     a clinical
                                                     interview for some
                                                     individuals who
                                                     would be identified
                                                     in the licensee's
                                                     or applicant's
                                                     Physical Security
                                                     Plan. In general,
                                                     the individuals who
                                                     would always
                                                     receive a clinical
                                                     interview before
                                                     being granted UAA
                                                     would be those who
                                                     perform critical
                                                     operational and
                                                     security-related
                                                     functions at the
                                                     licensee's site.
                                                    The proposed
                                                     requirements are
                                                     necessary to ensure
                                                     that any noted
                                                     psychological
                                                     characteristics of
                                                     individuals who are
                                                     applying for or
                                                     maintaining UAA do
                                                     not adversely
                                                     affect their
                                                     trustworthiness and
                                                     reliability.
                              (e)(5) If, in the     A new Sec.
                               course of             73.56(e)(5) would
                               conducting the        require the
                               psychological         psychologist or
                               assessment, the       psychiatrist who
                               licensed clinical     conducts the
                               psychologist or       psychological
                               psychiatrist          assessment to
                               identifies            report to the
                               indications of, or    reviewing official
                               information related   any information
                               to, a medical         obtained through
                               condition that        conducting the
                               could adversely       assessment that
                               impact the            indicates the
                               individual's          individual may have
                               fitness for duty or   a medical condition
                               trustworthiness and   that could
                               reliability, the      adversely affect
                               psychologist or       his or her fitness
                               psychiatrist shall    for duty or
                               inform the            trustworthiness and
                               reviewing official,   reliability. For
                               who shall ensure      example, some
                               that an appropriate   psychological tests
                               evaluation of the     identify
                               possible medical      indications of a
                               condition is          substance abuse
                               conducted under the   problem. Or, an
                               requirements of       individual may
                               part 26 of this       disclose during the
                               chapter.              clinical interview
                                                     that he or she is
                                                     taking prescription
                                                     medications that
                                                     could cause
                                                     impairment. In
                                                     these instances,
                                                     the proposed rule
                                                     would require the
                                                     reviewing official
                                                     to ensure that the
                                                     potential impact of
                                                     any possible
                                                     medical condition
                                                     on the individual's
                                                     fitness for duty or
                                                     trustworthiness and
                                                     reliability is
                                                     evaluated. The
                                                     term,
                                                     ``appropriate,''
                                                     would be used with
                                                     respect to the
                                                     medical evaluation
                                                     to recognize that
                                                     healthcare
                                                     professionals vary
                                                     in their
                                                     qualifications.

[[Page 62760]]

 
                                                    For example, a
                                                     psychiatrist who
                                                     conducts the
                                                     assessment would be
                                                     qualified to assess
                                                     the potential
                                                     impacts on an
                                                     individual's
                                                     fitness for duty of
                                                     any psychoactive
                                                     medications the
                                                     individual may be
                                                     taking, whereas a
                                                     substance abuse
                                                     professional, nurse
                                                     practitioner, or
                                                     other licensed
                                                     physician may not.
                                                     The NRC is aware of
                                                     instances in which
                                                     indications of a
                                                     substance problem
                                                     or other medical
                                                     condition that
                                                     could adversely
                                                     affect an
                                                     individual's
                                                     fitness for duty or
                                                     trustworthiness and
                                                     reliability were
                                                     identified during
                                                     the psychological
                                                     assessment, but
                                                     were not
                                                     communicated to
                                                     fitness-for-duty
                                                     program personnel
                                                     and, therefore,
                                                     were not evaluated
                                                     as part of the
                                                     access
                                                     authorization
                                                     decision. The
                                                     proposed paragraph
                                                     would be added to
                                                     ensure that
                                                     information about
                                                     potential medical
                                                     conditions is
                                                     communicated and
                                                     evaluated. This
                                                     provision would be
                                                     added to strengthen
                                                     the effectiveness
                                                     of the access
                                                     authorization
                                                     process.
Sec.   73.56(b)(2)(iii)       (f) Behavioral        Proposed Sec.
 Behavioral observation,       observation. Access   73.56(f)
 conducted by supervisors      authorization         [Behavioral
 and management personnel,     programs must         observation] would
 designed to detect            include a             replace current
 individual behavioral         behavioral            Sec.
 changes which, if left        observation element   73.56(b)(2)(iii),
 unattended, could lead to     that is designed to   which requires
 acts detrimental to the       detect behaviors or   licensees' AA
 public health and safety.     activities that may   programs to include
                               constitute an         a behavioral
                               unreasonable risk     observation
                               to the health and     element, to be
                               safety of the         conducted by
                               public and common     supervisors and
                               defense and           management
                               security, including   personnel, and
                               a potential threat    designed to detect
                               to commit             individual
                               radiological          behavioral changes
                               sabotage.             which, if left
                                                     unattended, could
                                                     lead to acts
                                                     detrimental to the
                                                     public health and
                                                     safety. The
                                                     proposed paragraph
                                                     would amend the
                                                     requirements of the
                                                     current paragraph
                                                     and add others.
                                                     Proposed Sec.
                                                     73.56(f) would
                                                     amend the objective
                                                     of the behavioral
                                                     observation element
                                                     of AA programs in
                                                     the current
                                                     provision. The
                                                     proposed paragraph
                                                     would eliminate the
                                                     current reference
                                                     to behavior changes
                                                     which, if left
                                                     unattended, could
                                                     lead to detrimental
                                                     acts. Although
                                                     detecting and
                                                     evaluating behavior
                                                     changes in order to
                                                     determine whether
                                                     they may lead to
                                                     acts detrimental to
                                                     the public health
                                                     and safety is
                                                     important, the
                                                     behavioral
                                                     observation element
                                                     of fitness-for-duty
                                                     programs that is
                                                     required under 10
                                                     CFR 26.22(a)(4)
                                                     also addresses this
                                                     objective.
                                                     Therefore, the
                                                     proposed paragraph
                                                     would be revised,
                                                     in part, to
                                                     eliminate this
                                                     redundancy.

[[Page 62761]]

 
                                                    In addition, the
                                                     current provision's
                                                     requirement for
                                                     behavioral
                                                     observation to
                                                     focus only on
                                                     detecting behavior
                                                     changes is too
                                                     narrow. The NRC
                                                     intends that
                                                     behavioral
                                                     observation must
                                                     also be conducted
                                                     in order to
                                                     increase the
                                                     likelihood that
                                                     potentially adverse
                                                     behavior patterns
                                                     and actions will be
                                                     detected and
                                                     evaluated before
                                                     there is an
                                                     opportunity for
                                                     such behavior
                                                     patterns or acts to
                                                     result in
                                                     detrimental
                                                     consequences. For
                                                     example, experience
                                                     in other industries
                                                     has shown that an
                                                     individual's
                                                     unusual interest in
                                                     an organization's
                                                     security activities
                                                     and operations that
                                                     are outside the
                                                     scope of the
                                                     individual's normal
                                                     work assignments
                                                     may be an
                                                     indication that the
                                                     individual is
                                                     gathering
                                                     intelligence for
                                                     adversarial
                                                     purposes. If the
                                                     behavioral
                                                     observation element
                                                     of AA programs
                                                     focuses only on
                                                     behavior changes,
                                                     and an individual
                                                     has demonstrated a
                                                     pattern of
                                                     ``unusual
                                                     interest'' since
                                                     starting work for
                                                     the licensee, other
                                                     persons who are
                                                     aware of the
                                                     individual's
                                                     behavior pattern
                                                     may not consider
                                                     the behavior to be
                                                     a potential concern
                                                     and, therefore, may
                                                     not raise the
                                                     concern. As a
                                                     result, an
                                                     opportunity to
                                                     detect and evaluate
                                                     this behavior
                                                     pattern would be
                                                     lost.
                                                    Therefore, in order
                                                     to increase the
                                                     effectiveness of
                                                     the behavioral
                                                     observation element
                                                     of AA programs and
                                                     more clearly convey
                                                     the NRC's intent,
                                                     the proposed
                                                     paragraph would be
                                                     revised to clarify
                                                     that the objective
                                                     of behavioral
                                                     observation is to
                                                     detect behavior or
                                                     activities that
                                                     have the potential
                                                     to constitute an
                                                     unreasonable risk
                                                     to the health and
                                                     safety of the
                                                     public and common
                                                     defense and
                                                     security, including
                                                     a potential threat
                                                     to commit
                                                     radiological
                                                     sabotage. The
                                                     portion of current
                                                     Sec.
                                                     73.56(b)(2)(iii)
                                                     that addresses who
                                                     must conduct
                                                     behavioral
                                                     observation (i.e.,
                                                     supervisors and
                                                     management
                                                     personnel) would be
                                                     moved to a separate
                                                     paragraph for
                                                     increased
                                                     organizational
                                                     clarity in this
                                                     section, and would
                                                     be amended for the
                                                     reasons discussed
                                                     with respect to
                                                     proposed Sec.
                                                     73.56(f)(2).
                              (f)(1) The            Proposed Sec.
                               licensees,            73.56(f)(1) would
                               applicants, and C/    clarify the intent
                               Vs specified in       of the current
                               paragraph (a) of      requirement by
                               this section shall    specifying the
                               ensure that the       individuals who
                               individuals           must be subject to
                               specified in          behavioral
                               paragraph (b)(1) of   observation. The
                               this section and,     proposed paragraph
                               if applicable,        would be added to
                               (b)(2) of this        address stakeholder
                               section are subject   requests at the
                               to behavioral         public meetings
                               observation.          discussed in
                                                     Section IV.3, for
                                                     increased
                                                     specificity in the
                                                     language of the
                                                     rule.

[[Page 62762]]

 
                              (f)(2) The            The proposed
                               individuals           paragraph would
                               specified in          amend the portion
                               paragraph (b)(1)      of current Sec.
                               and, if applicable,   73.56(b)(2)(iii)
                               (b)(2) of this        that requires only
                               section shall         supervisors and
                               observe the           management
                               behavior of other     personnel to
                               individuals. The      conduct behavioral
                               licensees,            observation by
                               applicants, and C/    requiring all
                               Vs specified in       individuals who are
                               paragraph (a) of      subject to an
                               this section shall    authorization
                               ensure that           program to conduct
                               individuals who are   behavioral
                               subject to this       observation.
                               section also          Increasing the
                               successfully          number of
                               complete behavioral   individuals who
                               observation           conduct behavioral
                               training.             observation would
                                                     enhance the
                                                     effectiveness of AA
                                                     programs by
                                                     increasing the
                                                     likelihood of
                                                     detecting behavior
                                                     or activities that
                                                     may be adverse to
                                                     the safe operation
                                                     and security of the
                                                     facility and may,
                                                     therefore,
                                                     constitute an
                                                     unreasonable risk
                                                     to the health and
                                                     safety and common
                                                     defense and
                                                     security. This
                                                     change is necessary
                                                     to address the
                                                     NRC's increased
                                                     concern with a
                                                     potential insider
                                                     threat discussed in
                                                     Section IV.3.
                                                     Proposed Sec.
                                                     73.56(f)(2) also
                                                     would require
                                                     licensees,
                                                     applicants, and C/
                                                     Vs to ensure that
                                                     individuals who are
                                                     subject to an
                                                     authorization
                                                     program
                                                     successfully
                                                     complete behavioral
                                                     observation
                                                     training. The means
                                                     by which licensees,
                                                     applicants, and C/
                                                     Vs would
                                                     demonstrate that an
                                                     individual has
                                                     successfully
                                                     completed the
                                                     training would be
                                                     through the
                                                     administration of
                                                     the comprehensive
                                                     examination
                                                     discussed with
                                                     respect to proposed
                                                     Sec.
                                                     73.56(f)(2)(iii).
                                                    Because all
                                                     individuals who are
                                                     subject to the AA
                                                     program would be
                                                     required to conduct
                                                     behavioral
                                                     observation,
                                                     training is
                                                     necessary to ensure
                                                     that individuals
                                                     have the knowledge,
                                                     skills, and
                                                     abilities necessary
                                                     to do so.
                              (f)(2)(i) Behavioral  Proposed Sec.
                               observation           73.56(f)(2)(i)
                               training must be      would require all
                               completed before      personnel who are
                               the licensee,         subject to this
                               applicant, or C/V     section to complete
                               grants an initial     behavioral
                               unescorted access     observation
                               authorization, as     training before the
                               defined in            licensee,
                               paragraph (h)(5) of   applicant, or C/V
                               this section, and     grants initial
                               must be current       unescorted access
                               before the            authorization to
                               licensee,             the individual, as
                               applicant, or C/V     defined in proposed
                               grants an             paragraph (h)(5)
                               unescorted access     [Initial unescorted
                               authorization         access
                               update, as defined    authorization]. The
                               in paragraph (h)(6)   proposed rule would
                               of this section, or   also require that
                               an unescorted         an individual's
                               access                training must be
                               authorization         current before the
                               reinstatement, as     licensee,
                               defined in            applicant, or C/V
                               paragraph (h)(7) of   grants an
                               this section;         unescorted access
                                                     authorization
                                                     update or
                                                     reinstatement to
                                                     the individual, as
                                                     defined in proposed
                                                     paragraphs (h)(6)
                                                     [Updated unescorted
                                                     access
                                                     authorization] and
                                                     (h)(7)
                                                     [Reinstatement of
                                                     unescorted access
                                                     authorization
                                                     reinstatement] of
                                                     this section,
                                                     respectively.
                                                     Annual refresher
                                                     training, which
                                                     would be the means
                                                     by which licensees,
                                                     applicants, and C/
                                                     Vs would meet the
                                                     requirement for
                                                     training to be
                                                     ``current,'' would
                                                     be addressed in
                                                     proposed Sec.
                                                     73.56(f)(2)(ii).
                                                    The proposed
                                                     requirement to
                                                     complete behavioral
                                                     observation
                                                     training before
                                                     initial unescorted
                                                     access
                                                     authorization is
                                                     granted is
                                                     necessary to ensure
                                                     that individuals
                                                     have the knowledge,
                                                     skills, and
                                                     abilities required
                                                     to meet their
                                                     responsibilities
                                                     for conducting
                                                     behavioral
                                                     observation under
                                                     proposed paragraph
                                                     (f)(2)(i). The
                                                     basis for requiring
                                                     refresher training
                                                     is discussed with
                                                     respect to proposed
                                                     paragraph
                                                     (f)(2)(ii) of this
                                                     section.

[[Page 62763]]

 
                              (f)(2)(ii)            Proposed Sec.
                               Individuals shall     73.45(f)(2)(ii)
                               complete refresher    would require
                               training on a         annual refresher
                               nominal 12-month      training in
                               frequency, or more    behavioral
                               frequently where      observation, at a
                               the need is           minimum, with more
                               indicated.            frequent refresher
                               Individuals may       training when the
                               take and pass a       need is indicated.
                               comprehensive         The proposed
                               examination that      paragraph would
                               meets the             require annual or
                               requirements of       more frequent
                               paragraph             refresher training
                               (f)(2)(iii) of this   in order to ensure
                               section in lieu of    that individuals
                               completing annual     retain the
                               refresher training;   knowledge, skills,
                                                     and abilities
                                                     gained through
                                                     initial training.
                                                     Refresher training
                                                     may also be
                                                     necessary if an
                                                     individual
                                                     demonstrates a
                                                     failure to
                                                     implement
                                                     behavioral
                                                     observation
                                                     requirements in
                                                     accordance with AA
                                                     program procedures
                                                     or new information
                                                     is added to the
                                                     behavioral
                                                     observation
                                                     training
                                                     curriculum.
                                                    The proposed
                                                     paragraph would
                                                     also permit
                                                     individuals who
                                                     pass a
                                                     comprehensive
                                                     ``challenge''
                                                     examination that
                                                     demonstrates their
                                                     continued
                                                     understanding of
                                                     behavioral
                                                     observation to be
                                                     excused from the
                                                     refresher training
                                                     that would
                                                     otherwise be
                                                     required under the
                                                     proposed paragraph.
                                                     The proposed rule
                                                     would require that
                                                     the ``challenge''
                                                     examination must
                                                     meet the
                                                     examination
                                                     requirements
                                                     specified in
                                                     proposed paragraph
                                                     (f)(2)(iii) of this
                                                     section and
                                                     individuals who did
                                                     not pass would
                                                     undergo remedial
                                                     training.
                                                     Permitting
                                                     individuals to pass
                                                     a comprehensive
                                                     ``challenge''
                                                     examination rather
                                                     than take refresher
                                                     training each year
                                                     would ensure that
                                                     they are retaining
                                                     their knowledge,
                                                     skills, and
                                                     abilities while
                                                     reducing some costs
                                                     associated with
                                                     meeting the annual
                                                     refresher training
                                                     requirement.
                              (f)(2)(iii)           Proposed Sec.
                               Individuals shall     73.56(f)(2)(iii)
                               demonstrate the       would require
                               successful            individuals to
                               completion of         demonstrate that
                               behavioral            they have
                               observation           successfully
                               training by passing   completed
                               a comprehensive       behavioral
                               examination that      observation
                               addresses the         training by passing
                               knowledge and         a comprehensive
                               abilities necessary   examination. The
                               to detect behavior    proposed provision
                               or activities that    would require
                               have the potential    remedial training
                               to constitute an      and re-testing for
                               unreasonable risk     individuals who
                               to the health and     fail to achieve a
                               safety of the         passing score on
                               public and common     the examination.
                               defense and           These proposed
                               security, including   requirements would
                               a potential threat    be modeled on other
                               to commit             required training
                               radiological          programs that have
                               sabotage. Remedial    been successful in
                               training and re-      ensuring that
                               testing are           examinations are
                               required for          valid and
                               individuals who       individuals have
                               fail to               achieved an
                               satisfactorily        adequate
                               complete the          understanding of
                               examination.          the subject matter.
                              (f)(2)(iv) Initial    Proposed Sec.
                               and refresher         73.56(f)(2)(iv)
                               training may be       would permit the
                               delivered using a     use of various
                               variety of media      media for
                               (including, but not   administering
                               limited to,           training in order
                               classroom lectures,   to achieve the
                               required reading,     efficiencies
                               video, or computer-   associated with
                               based training        computer-based
                               systems). The         training, for
                               licensee,             example, and other
                               applicant, or C/V     new training
                               shall monitor the     delivery
                               completion of         technologies that
                               training.             may become
                                                     available.
                                                     Permitting the use
                                                     of various media to
                                                     administer the
                                                     training would
                                                     improve the
                                                     efficiency of AA
                                                     programs and reduce
                                                     regulatory burden,
                                                     by providing
                                                     flexibility in the
                                                     methods that
                                                     licensees and other
                                                     entities may use to
                                                     administer the
                                                     required training.
                                                     The proposed
                                                     paragraph would
                                                     also require the
                                                     completion of
                                                     training to be
                                                     monitored by the
                                                     licensee,
                                                     applicant, or C/V.

[[Page 62764]]

 
                                                    This requirement is
                                                     necessary to ensure
                                                     that individuals
                                                     who are subject to
                                                     an authorization
                                                     program actively
                                                     participate in and
                                                     receive the
                                                     required training.
                                                     The NRC is aware
                                                     that some
                                                     individuals have
                                                     engaged in
                                                     successful
                                                     litigation against
                                                     licensees on the
                                                     basis that they
                                                     were not aware of
                                                     the requirements to
                                                     which they were
                                                     subject, in part,
                                                     because of
                                                     deficiencies in
                                                     licensee processes
                                                     for ensuring that
                                                     individuals are
                                                     trained. Therefore,
                                                     the proposed rule
                                                     would add this
                                                     requirement to
                                                     improve the
                                                     effectiveness of
                                                     the training
                                                     element of AA
                                                     programs.
                              (f)(3) Individuals    Proposed Sec.
                               who are subject to    73.56(f)(3) would
                               an authorization      require individuals
                               program under this    to report any
                               section shall         concerns arising
                               report to the         from behavioral
                               reviewing official    observation to the
                               any concerns          licensee's,
                               arising from          applicant's, or C/
                               behavioral            V's reviewing
                               observation,          official. This
                               including, but not    specificity is
                               limited to,           necessary because
                               concerns related to   the NRC is aware of
                               any questionable      past instances in
                               behavior patterns     which individuals
                               or activities of      reported concerns
                               others.               to supervisors or
                                                     other licensee
                                                     personnel who did
                                                     not then inform the
                                                     reviewing official
                                                     of the concern. As
                                                     a result, the
                                                     concern was not
                                                     addressed and any
                                                     implications of the
                                                     concern for the
                                                     individual's
                                                     trustworthiness and
                                                     reliability were
                                                     not evaluated.
                                                    Therefore, the
                                                     proposed rule would
                                                     require individuals
                                                     to report directly
                                                     to the reviewing
                                                     official, to ensure
                                                     that the reviewing
                                                     official is made
                                                     aware of the
                                                     concern, has the
                                                     opportunity to
                                                     evaluate it, and
                                                     determine whether
                                                     to grant, maintain,
                                                     administratively
                                                     withdraw, deny, or
                                                     terminate UAA. The
                                                     proposed provision
                                                     would be added to
                                                     clarify and
                                                     strengthen the
                                                     behavioral
                                                     observation element
                                                     of AA programs by
                                                     increasing the
                                                     likelihood that
                                                     questionable
                                                     behaviors or
                                                     activities are
                                                     appropriately
                                                     addressed by the
                                                     licensees and other
                                                     entities who are
                                                     subject to the
                                                     rule.
                              (g) Arrest            A new Sec.
                               reporting. Any        73.56(g) would
                               individual who has    establish
                               applied for or is     requirements
                               maintaining           related to the
                               unescorted access     arrest, indictment,
                               authorization under   filing of charges,
                               this section shall    or conviction of
                               promptly report to    any individual who
                               the reviewing         is applying for or
                               official any formal   maintaining UAA
                               action(s) taken by    under this section.
                               a law enforcement     The proposed
                               authority or court    paragraph would
                               of law to which the   require individuals
                               individual has been   to promptly report
                               subject, including    to the reviewing
                               an arrest, an         official any such
                               indictment, the       formal action(s) to
                               filing of charges,    ensure that the
                               or a conviction. On   reviewing official
                               the day that the      has an opportunity
                               report is received,   to evaluate the
                               the reviewing         implications of the
                               official shall        formal action(s)
                               evaluate the          with respect to the
                               circumstances         individual's
                               related to the        trustworthiness and
                               formal action(s)      reliability.
                               and determine
                               whether to grant,
                               maintain,
                               administratively
                               withdraw, deny, or
                               unfavorably
                               terminate the
                               individual's
                               unescorted access
                               authorization.

[[Page 62765]]

 
                                                    The proposed rule
                                                     includes other
                                                     provisions that
                                                     would also ensure
                                                     that the reviewing
                                                     official is aware
                                                     of and evaluates
                                                     the implications of
                                                     any formal
                                                     action(s) to which
                                                     an individual may
                                                     be subject,
                                                     including the
                                                     requirement for a
                                                     criminal history
                                                     review under
                                                     proposed Sec.
                                                     73.56(d)(7) and
                                                     regular updates to
                                                     the criminal
                                                     history review
                                                     under proposed Sec.
                                                       73.56(i)(1)(v).
                                                     However, these
                                                     proposed provisions
                                                     would not provide
                                                     for prompt
                                                     evaluation of any
                                                     formal action(s)
                                                     that arise in the
                                                     intervening time
                                                     period since a
                                                     criminal history
                                                     review was last
                                                     conducted.
                                                     Therefore, this
                                                     requirement would
                                                     be added to ensure
                                                     that the reviewing
                                                     official is made
                                                     aware of formal
                                                     actions at the time
                                                     that they occur,
                                                     has the opportunity
                                                     to evaluate the
                                                     implications of
                                                     these formal
                                                     actions with
                                                     respect to the
                                                     individual's
                                                     trustworthiness and
                                                     reliability, and,
                                                     if necessary, take
                                                     timely action to
                                                     deny or unfavorably
                                                     terminate the
                                                     individual's UAA,
                                                     if the reviewing
                                                     official determines
                                                     that the formal
                                                     actions cast doubt
                                                     on the individual's
                                                     trustworthiness and
                                                     reliability. The
                                                     proposed rule would
                                                     also specifically
                                                     require the formal
                                                     action(s) to be
                                                     reported to the
                                                     licensee's,
                                                     applicant's, or C/
                                                     V's reviewing
                                                     official.
                                                    This specificity is
                                                     necessary because
                                                     the NRC is aware of
                                                     past instances in
                                                     which individuals
                                                     reported formal
                                                     actions to
                                                     supervisors who did
                                                     not then inform the
                                                     reviewing official.
                                                     As a result, some
                                                     individuals were
                                                     granted or
                                                     maintained UAA
                                                     without the high
                                                     assurance that they
                                                     are trustworthy and
                                                     reliable that AA
                                                     programs must
                                                     provide, as
                                                     discussed with
                                                     respect to proposed
                                                     Sec.   73.56(c)
                                                     [General
                                                     performance
                                                     objective].
                                                     Therefore, a
                                                     specific
                                                     requirement for
                                                     individuals to
                                                     report directly to
                                                     the reviewing
                                                     official is
                                                     necessary to ensure
                                                     that the reviewing
                                                     official is aware
                                                     of the actions, has
                                                     the opportunity to
                                                     evaluate the
                                                     circumstances
                                                     surrounding the
                                                     actions, and
                                                     determine whether
                                                     to grant, maintain,
                                                     administratively
                                                     withdraw, deny, or
                                                     terminate UAA. The
                                                     proposed paragraph
                                                     would not establish
                                                     a specific time
                                                     limit within which
                                                     an individual would
                                                     be required to
                                                     report a formal
                                                     action because the
                                                     time frames within
                                                     which different
                                                     formal actions
                                                     occur may vary
                                                     widely, depending
                                                     on the nature of
                                                     the formal action
                                                     and characteristics
                                                     of the locality in
                                                     which the formal
                                                     action is taken.
                                                     However, nothing in
                                                     the proposed
                                                     provision would
                                                     prohibit licensees,
                                                     applicants, and C/
                                                     Vs from
                                                     establishing, in
                                                     program procedures,
                                                     reporting time
                                                     limits that are
                                                     appropriate for
                                                     their local
                                                     circumstances.

[[Page 62766]]

 
                                                    The proposed rule
                                                     would use the term,
                                                     ``promptly,'' to
                                                     clarify the NRC's
                                                     intent that
                                                     individuals are
                                                     responsible for
                                                     reporting any
                                                     formal action(s) of
                                                     the type specified
                                                     in the proposed
                                                     paragraph without
                                                     delay. The proposed
                                                     paragraph would
                                                     also require the
                                                     reviewing official
                                                     to evaluate the
                                                     circumstances
                                                     related to the
                                                     formal action and
                                                     decide whether to
                                                     grant, maintain,
                                                     administratively
                                                     withdraw, deny, or
                                                     unfavorably
                                                     terminate the
                                                     individual's UAA on
                                                     the day that he or
                                                     she receives the
                                                     report of an
                                                     arrest, indictment,
                                                     the filing of
                                                     charges, or
                                                     conviction. The
                                                     proposed
                                                     requirement is
                                                     necessary because
                                                     the NRC is aware of
                                                     past instances in
                                                     which reviewing
                                                     officials have been
                                                     informed of a
                                                     formal action, but
                                                     have not acted
                                                     promptly to
                                                     evaluate the
                                                     information and
                                                     determine its
                                                     implications with
                                                     respect to the
                                                     individual's
                                                     trustworthiness and
                                                     reliability. As a
                                                     result, some
                                                     individuals were
                                                     granted or
                                                     maintained UAA
                                                     without the high
                                                     assurance that they
                                                     are trustworthy and
                                                     reliable that AA
                                                     programs must
                                                     provide, as
                                                     discussed with
                                                     respect to proposed
                                                     Sec.   73.56(c)
                                                     [General
                                                     performance
                                                     objective].
                                                    The proposed
                                                     paragraph would
                                                     provide for the
                                                     administrative
                                                     withdrawal of UAA
                                                     without a positive
                                                     determination that
                                                     the individual is
                                                     trustworthy and
                                                     reliable (which
                                                     would permit the
                                                     granting or
                                                     maintaining of UAA)
                                                     or a negative
                                                     determination of
                                                     the individual's
                                                     trustworthiness and
                                                     reliability (which
                                                     would require the
                                                     denial or
                                                     unfavorable
                                                     termination of
                                                     UAA), because the
                                                     reviewing official
                                                     may not have
                                                     sufficient
                                                     information on the
                                                     day that the report
                                                     is received to make
                                                     the determination.
                                                     However, if, based
                                                     on the information
                                                     available to the
                                                     reviewing official,
                                                     he or she is unable
                                                     to make either a
                                                     positive or
                                                     negative
                                                     determination, the
                                                     proposed rule would
                                                     require the
                                                     administrative
                                                     withdrawal of UAA
                                                     until such a
                                                     determination can
                                                     be made. The
                                                     administrative
                                                     withdrawal of the
                                                     individual's UAA
                                                     would be necessary
                                                     to protect public
                                                     health and safety
                                                     and the common
                                                     defense and
                                                     security when the
                                                     trustworthiness and
                                                     reliability of an
                                                     individual cannot
                                                     be positively
                                                     determined.
Sec.   73.56(c) Existing,     (c)(1) Deleted......  The proposed rule
 reinstated, transferred,                            would eliminate
 and temporary access                                current Sec.
 authorization. (1)                                  73.56(c)(1), which
 Individuals who have had an                         permitted
 uninterrupted unescorted                            individuals who had
 access authorization for at                         an uninterrupted
 least 180 days on April 25,                         unescorted access
 1991 need not be further                            authorization for
 evaluated. Such individuals                         at least 180 days
 shall be subject to the                             on April 25, 1991,
 behavioral observation                              to retain
 requirements of this                                unescorted access
 section.                                            authorization and
                                                     required them to be
                                                     subject to
                                                     behavioral
                                                     observation. The
                                                     current paragraph
                                                     would be eliminated
                                                     because these
                                                     requirements no
                                                     longer apply.

[[Page 62767]]

 
Sec.   73.56(c) Existing,     (h) Granting          Proposed Sec.
 reinstated, transferred,      unescorted access     73.56(h) would
 and temporary access          authorization. The    replace and amend
 authorization.                licensees,            current Sec.
                               applicants, and C/    73.56(c), which
                               Vs specified in       permits AA programs
                               paragraph (a) of      to specify
                               this section shall    conditions for
                               implement the         reinstating an
                               requirements of       interrupted UAA,
                               this paragraph for    for transferring
                               granting initial      UAA from another
                               unescorted access     licensee, and for
                               authorization,        permitting
                               updated unescorted    temporary UAA. As
                               access                discussed in
                               authorization, and    Section IV.3, the
                               reinstatement of      requirements in
                               unescorted access     proposed Sec.
                               authorization.        73.56 are based
                                                     upon several
                                                     fundamental changes
                                                     to the NRC's
                                                     approach to access
                                                     authorization since
                                                     the terrorist
                                                     attacks of
                                                     September 11, 2001,
                                                     and an increased
                                                     concern for an
                                                     active or passive
                                                     insider who may
                                                     collude with
                                                     adversaries to
                                                     commit radiological
                                                     sabotage.
                                                    The primary concern,
                                                     which many of the
                                                     amendments to Sec.
                                                      73.56 are designed
                                                     to address, is the
                                                     necessity of
                                                     increasing the
                                                     rigor of the access
                                                     authorization
                                                     process to provide
                                                     high assurance that
                                                     any individual who
                                                     is granted and
                                                     maintains UAA is
                                                     trustworthy and
                                                     reliable. Proposed
                                                     Sec.   73.56(h)
                                                     would identify
                                                     three categories of
                                                     proposed
                                                     requirements for
                                                     granting UAA: (1)
                                                     Initial unescorted
                                                     access
                                                     authorization, (2)
                                                     updated unescorted
                                                     access
                                                     authorization, and
                                                     (3) reinstatement
                                                     of unescorted
                                                     access
                                                     authorization. The
                                                     proposed
                                                     categories, which
                                                     are based upon
                                                     whether an
                                                     individual who has
                                                     applied for UAA has
                                                     previously held UAA
                                                     under Sec.   73.56
                                                     and the length of
                                                     time that has
                                                     elapsed since the
                                                     individual's last
                                                     period of UAA
                                                     ended, would be
                                                     defined in proposed
                                                     Sec.   73.56(h)(5)
                                                     [Initial unescorted
                                                     access
                                                     authorization],
                                                     proposed Sec.
                                                     73.56(h)(6)
                                                     [Updated unescorted
                                                     access
                                                     authorization], and
                                                     proposed Sec.
                                                     73.56(h)(7)
                                                     [Reinstatement of
                                                     unescorted access
                                                     authorization].
                                                    Proposed Sec.
                                                     73.56(h) would
                                                     direct licensees,
                                                     applicants, and C/
                                                     Vs to use the
                                                     criteria for
                                                     granting UAA that
                                                     are found in
                                                     proposed Sec.
                                                     73.56(h)(5),
                                                     (h)(6), and (h)(7),
                                                     depending on which
                                                     of the proposed
                                                     paragraphs would
                                                     apply to the
                                                     individual seeking
                                                     UAA. Current Sec.
                                                     73.56 permits
                                                     authorization
                                                     programs to specify
                                                     conditions for
                                                     reinstating an
                                                     interrupted UAA or
                                                     transferring UAA
                                                     from another
                                                     licensee, but it
                                                     does not use the
                                                     concepts of
                                                     ``initial
                                                     unescorted access
                                                     authorization,''
                                                     ``updated
                                                     unescorted access
                                                     authorization,'' or
                                                     ``reinstatement of
                                                     unescorted access
                                                     authorization.''
                                                     These concepts
                                                     would be used in
                                                     proposed Sec.
                                                     73.56 to focus the
                                                     requirements for
                                                     UAA more precisely
                                                     on whether the
                                                     individual has
                                                     established a
                                                     ``track record'' in
                                                     the industry, and
                                                     to specify the
                                                     amount of original
                                                     information-
                                                     gathering that
                                                     licensees,
                                                     applicants, and C/
                                                     Vs would be
                                                     required to
                                                     perform, based on
                                                     whether previous AA
                                                     programs have
                                                     collected
                                                     information about
                                                     the individual.

[[Page 62768]]

 
                                                    For individuals who
                                                     have established a
                                                     favorable track
                                                     record in the
                                                     industry, the steps
                                                     that licensees,
                                                     applicants, and C/
                                                     Vs would complete
                                                     in order to grant
                                                     UAA to an
                                                     individual would
                                                     also depend upon
                                                     the length of time
                                                     that has elapsed
                                                     since the
                                                     individual's last
                                                     period of UAA was
                                                     terminated and the
                                                     amount of
                                                     supervision to
                                                     which the
                                                     individual was
                                                     subject during the
                                                     interruption. (the
                                                     term,
                                                     ``interruption,''
                                                     refers to the
                                                     interval of time
                                                     between periods
                                                     during which an
                                                     individual
                                                     maintains UAA under
                                                     Sec.   73.56 and
                                                     will be discussed
                                                     in reference to
                                                     Sec.   73.56
                                                     (h)(4)). In
                                                     general, the more
                                                     time that has
                                                     elapsed since an
                                                     individual's last
                                                     period of UAA
                                                     ended, the more
                                                     steps that the
                                                     proposed rule would
                                                     require licensees,
                                                     applicants, and C/
                                                     Vs to complete
                                                     before granting UAA
                                                     to the individual.
                                                     However, if the
                                                     individual was
                                                     s