[Federal Register Volume 72, Number 244 (Thursday, December 20, 2007)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Pages 72522-72562]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: E7-24346]
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Part III
Nuclear Regulatory Commission
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10 CFR Parts 60, 63, 73 and 74
Geologic Repository Operations Area Security and Material Control and
Accounting Requirements; Proposed Rule
Federal Register / Vol. 72, No. 244 / Thursday, December 20, 2007 /
Proposed Rules
[[Page 72522]]
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
10 CFR Parts 60, 63, 73, and 74
RIN 3150-AI06
Geologic Repository Operations Area Security and Material Control
and Accounting Requirements
AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
ACTION: Proposed rule.
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SUMMARY: The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is proposing to amend
its regulations to revise the security requirements and material
control and accounting (MC&A) requirements for a geologic repository
operations area (GROA). The goal of this rulemaking is to ensure that
effective security measures are in place for the protection of high-
level radioactive waste (HLW) and other radioactive material at a GROA
given the post-September 11, 2001, threat environment. New requirements
for specific training enhancements, improved access authorization,
enhancements to defensive strategies, and enhanced reporting
requirements would be incorporated. The proposed rule would establish
general performance objectives and corresponding system capabilities
for the GROA MC&A program, with a focus on strengthening, streamlining,
and consolidating all MC&A regulations specific to a GROA. In addition,
the proposed rule would require the emergency plan to address
radiological emergencies.
DATES: The comment period expires March 4, 2008. Comments received
after this date will be considered if it is practical to do so, but the
NRC is able to assure consideration only for comments received on or
before this date.
ADDRESSES: You may submit comments by any one of the following methods.
Please include the number RIN 3150-AI06 in the subject line of your
comments. Comments on rulemakings submitted in writing or in electronic
form will be made available to the public in their entirety on the NRC
rulemaking Web site. Personal information such as name, address,
telephone, e-mail address, etc., will not be removed from your
submission.
Mail comments to: Secretary, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission,
Washington, DC 20555-0001, ATTN: Rulemakings and Adjudications Staff.
E-mail comments to: [email protected]. If you do not receive a reply e-
mail confirming that we have received your comments, contact us
directly at (301) 415-1677.
Comments can also be submitted via the Federal eRulemaking Portal
http://www.regulations.gov.
Hand deliver comments to: 11555 Rockville Pike, Rockville, Maryland
20852, between 7:30 am and 4:15 pm Federal workdays. (Telephone (301)
415-1677).
Fax comments to: Secretary, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission at
(301) 415-1101.
Publicly available documents related to this rulemaking, including
comments, may be viewed electronically on the public computers located
at the NRC's Public Document Room (PDR), O1 F21, One White Flint North,
11555 Rockville Pike, Rockville, Maryland. The PDR reproduction
contractor will copy documents for a fee.
Publicly available documents created or received at the NRC after
November 1, 1999, are available electronically at the NRC's Electronic
Reading Room at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html. From this
site, the public can gain entry into the NRC's Agencywide Document
Access and Management System (ADAMS), which provides text and image
files of NRC's public documents. If you do not have access to ADAMS or
if there are problems in accessing the documents located in ADAMS,
contact the NRC PDR Reference staff at 1-800-397-4209, 301-415-4737, or
by e-mail to [email protected].
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Merri Horn, Office of Federal and
State Materials and Environmental Management Programs, U.S. Nuclear
Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, telephone (301) 415-
8126, e-mail, [email protected].
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
I. Background
II. Discussion
A. What Action Is the NRC Taking?
B. Whom Would This Action Affect?
C. Why Do the Requirements Need to be Revised?
D. When Do the Security and MC&A Plans Need To Be Submitted?
E. What Types of Material Would Be Covered by the New Security
and MC&A Requirements?
F. What Are the Key Aspects of the Proposed MC&A Requirements?
G. What Kinds of Systems Capabilities Would Be Proposed for the
MC&A Program?
H. Would Shipper-Receiver Comparisons With Independent
Measurements Be Required for Receipts?
I. What Measurements Would Be Necessary Under the GROA MC&A
Program?
J. What Would an MC&A Detection and Response Program Involve?
K. What Additional Requirements Would Be Imposed if DOE
Possesses Formula Quantities of Strategic SNM That Is in a Form
Other Than as Irradiated Nuclear Reactor Fuel?
L. What Special MC&A-Related Needs Exist?
M. What Is the Objective of the Proposed Physical Security
Requirements?
N. What Threat Would a GROA Be Required To Defend Against?
O. Why Do the Security Requirements Differ for Various Aspects
of a GROA?
P. Would Access Authorization Requirements Apply to a GROA and
What Would They Cover?
Q. Would Criminal History Checks Apply to a GROA?
R. What Are the Key Aspects of the Security Requirements?
S. What Is a Target Set as it Applies to a GROA?
T. What Weapons Authorization Would Be Necessary for the GROA
Operations?
U. Would DOE Be Required To Conduct Force-on-Force Exercises for
the GROA Facility?
V. How Would the Security Plans Handle Construction at a GROA
After Receipt of HLW Begins?
W. Does This Rulemaking Cover Transportation of High-Level
Radioactive Waste to a GROA?
X. Would the Security and MC&A Plans Cover Postclosure?
Y. What Safeguards Reporting Requirements Would Be Proposed for
a GROA?
Z. Does the NRC Plan To Issue Guidance Documents?
AA. Would the GROA Facilities Be Subject to IAEA Safeguards?
BB. What Changes Would Be Made to the Emergency Plan
Requirements?
CC. What Should I Consider as I Prepare My Comments to NRC?
III. Discussion of Proposed Amendments by Section
IV. Criminal Penalties
V. Agreement State Compatibility
VI. Plain Language
VII. Voluntary Consensus Standards
VIII. Finding of No Significant Environmental Impact
IX. Paperwork Reduction Act Statement
X. Public Protection Notification
XI. Regulatory Analysis
XII. Regulatory Flexibility Certification
XIII. Backfit Analysis
I. Background
On November 2, 2001 (66 FR 55732), the NRC published its final rule
governing disposal of HLW in a potential geologic repository at Yucca
Mountain in Nevada. The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) must comply
with these regulations for NRC to authorize construction and license
operation of a potential repository at Yucca Mountain in Nevada. The
security requirements applicable to a GROA in these regulations were
developed prior to September 11, 2001, under a previous and very
different
[[Page 72523]]
threat environment. Currently, there is no distinction between the
security and MC&A requirements for independent spent fuel storage
installations (ISFSIs) and the requirements for larger, more
complicated geologic repositories for permanent disposal of HLW. At the
time the security provisions were established, the NRC used the same
regulatory approach for protecting a GROA as that for protecting spent
nuclear fuel storage facilities licensed under 10 CFR part 72. GROA
operations, at least those conducted in surface facilities, seemed
vulnerable to the same kinds of potential threats that were
characteristic of the storage of spent nuclear fuel (SNF). The same
level of protection was deemed sufficient to protect against acts that
might be inimical to the common defense and security. The same
reasoning applies to the MC&A requirements.
The NRC's regulatory approach was predicated on maintaining the
physical integrity of the SNF rods. In the event the physical integrity
of the SNF rods could not be maintained, the staff planned to address
the additional security measures that would be necessary by
incorporating conditions into the license.
Potential surface operations at a GROA have become more complex
over the years. For example, the DOE has indicated that it now plans to
include bare SNF handling operations within a spent fuel pool to
transfer SNF from a non-TAD (transfer, aging, disposal) canister to a
TAD canister, which would then be utilized for emplacement and
permanent disposal of the SNF in the Yucca Mountain repository.
Because both the threat environment and the plans for surface
operations at the GROA have changed, the NRC now believes that a
separate regulatory approach for protecting and safeguarding a GROA is
necessary. The DOE has not set forth a final concept of operations for
the GROA. Therefore, it is not clear what types of facilities will be
part of the surface operations or what type of handling of the HLW
within the surface facilities may occur.
The new security and MC&A requirements also should be broad enough
and sufficiently flexible to cover a range of possible types of non-HLW
radioactive materials without the need for additional rulemaking. The
DOE, in its Final Environmental Impact Statement (FEIS) for a geologic
repository at Yucca Mountain, considered the possibility that
radioactive waste types other than SNF and HLW, such as Greater-Than-
Class-C low-level radioactive waste (LLW) and Special-Performance-
Assessment-Required LLW might be disposed of in a geologic repository.
See Final Environmental Impact Statement for a Geologic Repository for
the Disposal of Spent Nuclear Fuel and High-Level Radioactive Waste at
Yucca Mountain, Nye County, Nevada, February 2002, Vol. II, A-1, A-57-
A-64. Disposal of such non-HLW could require new legislation or a
determination by the NRC that these wastes require permanent isolation.
The NRC is not making such a determination in this rulemaking. However,
the security and MC&A requirements being proposed for a GROA take
account of the possibility that the geologic repository might be used
for the disposal of radioactive materials which are not SNF or HLW.
Following the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, the NRC
conducted a thorough review of its security requirements to ensure that
special nuclear material (SNM) at fixed sites and in transit continued
to have effective security measures in place given the changing threat
environment. Through a series of security orders issued to certain NRC
licensees, the Commission specified changes to the Design Basis Threat
(DBT) for power reactor and Category I Strategic SNM licensees, and
implemented enhanced requirements for specific training, access
authorization, defensive strategies, and security. Through generic
communications, the Commission specified expectations about enhanced
notifications to the NRC for certain security events or suspicious
activities. These enhancements resulted in some licensees revising
their physical security plans, security personnel training and
qualification plans, and safeguards contingency plans to defend against
the supplemental DBT requirements. These security orders specifically
required certain licensees to: (1) Increase patrols; (2) augment the
security force capabilities and security posts; (3) add and modify
existing physical security barriers; (4) move vehicle check points to a
greater standoff distance; (5) enhance coordination with local law
enforcement agency (LLEA) and military authorities; (6) augment their
security and emergency response training, equipment, and
communications; and (7) strengthen off-site access controls, including
additional background and screening checks of employees. The enhanced
security measures have yet to be imposed on a GROA. This rulemaking is
the mechanism the NRC is using to impose the new requirements on the
DOE for operations at a GROA.
This rulemaking to upgrade the requirements for physical protection
of HLW and other radioactive materials at a GROA combines lessons
learned, current/best practices, and requirements based on those
contained in security orders issued to NRC licensees that address the
post-September 11, 2001, threat environment. The security orders, as
well as other ongoing security rulemakings, are used as the basis for
upgrading the GROA security requirements. Specifically, the security
requirements for power reactors are being used as the starting point
for the security requirements for this proposed rule. The reactor
requirements are used as the stating point because of the similarity in
material, the material's attractiveness for malevolent use, and the
potential consequences of its malevolent use. The security requirements
should provide protection equivalent to a power reactor. The reactor
requirements have been proposed in a rule entitled ``Power Reactor
Security Requirements'' (71 FR 62664; October 26, 2006).
Section 653 of the Energy Policy Act of 2005 (EPAct), signed into
law on August 8, 2005, allows the NRC to authorize licensees to use, as
part of their protective strategies, an expanded arsenal of weapons,
including machine guns and semi-automatic assault weapons. Section 653
requires that all security personnel with access to any weapons undergo
a background check that includes fingerprinting and a check against the
Federal Bureau of Investigation's (FBI) National Instant Criminal
Background Check System (NICS) database. Under Section 161k. of the
Atomic Energy Act (AEA), as amended, the DOE has authority for
authorization of weapons. The NRC does not plan to use its authority
under Section 653 of the EPAct. The DOE, under its own authority under
Section 161k. of the AEA, may authorize the use of an expanded weapons
arsenal and the use of force in accordance with the requirements of 10
CFR part 1047.
The goal of this rulemaking is to ensure that effective security
measures are in place for the protection of HLW and other radioactive
materials given the post-September 11, 2001, threat environment. New
requirements for specific training enhancements, improved access
authorization, and enhancements to defensive strategies would be
incorporated. The proposed rule would establish general performance
objectives and corresponding system capabilities for the GROA MC&A
program, with a focus on strengthening, streamlining, and consolidating
into 10 CFR Part 74 all MC&A regulations specific to a GROA. In
addition, the proposed rule would
[[Page 72524]]
require the emergency plan to address radiological emergencies.
II. Discussion
A. What Action Is the NRC Taking?
The NRC is proposing to amend its regulations primarily to
establish new physical security and MC&A requirements for HLW and other
radioactive materials at a GROA. The requirements specified in this
rulemaking would establish the objectives and minimum performance
standards that the DOE must meet to protect against each threat (theft
or diversion and radiological sabotage) at a GROA, and the objectives
and minimum capabilities for the MC&A program. The proposed rule is
risk-informed and performance-based.
B. Whom Would This Action Affect?
Only the DOE, as the potential operator of any repository, would be
impacted by this proposed rule. The regulations in 10 CFR Part 63 are
specific for the Yucca Mountain repository.
C. Why Do the Requirements Need To be Revised?
The current regulations for MC&A and security for a GROA were
developed under a different threat environment, and the threat
environment has changed, as have the plans for surface operations at a
GROA. The NRC now believes that a new regulatory approach for
protecting a GROA is necessary. In addition, the DOE has not set forth
a final concept of operations document for the GROA; therefore, the
types and forms of material to be handled and disposed of at a GROA
have not been finalized. The current security and MC&A requirements for
a GROA are not adequate to protect the common defense and security or
the public health and safety. The new security and MC&A requirements
must be broad enough and sufficiently flexible to cover a range of
possible activities without the need for additional rulemaking. This
rulemaking to upgrade the requirements for physical protection of HLW
and other radioactive materials at a GROA capitalizes on the lessons
learned, current/best practices, and security orders issued to NRC
licensees to address the post-September 11, 2001, threat environment.
The security orders, as well as ongoing security rulemakings, have been
used as the basis for upgrading the GROA security requirements. The
proposed rule would also establish general performance objectives and
corresponding system capabilities for the GROA MC&A program, with a
particular focus on strengthening, streamlining, and consolidating into
10 CFR part 74 all MC&A regulations specific to a GROA.
D. When Do the Security and MC&A Plans Need To Be Submitted?
The DOE should include a description of the security and MC&A plans
in its license application when it is submitted. The actual plans would
be submitted no later than 180 days after the Commission grants the
construction authorization for the GROA. A description of the security
and MC&A plans is necessary at the time of the application to
demonstrate that the DOE can adequately address and meet the NRC
requirements for security and MC&A. Additionally, there may be some
aspects that would be better integrated during construction. Submitting
the plans after the Commission grants a construction authorization
allows the DOE to take advantage of any new technology and concepts
that may not be available at the time the construction application is
submitted. The timing still allows some aspects, if appropriate, to be
addressed during construction. The plans would not need to be
implemented until the Commission grants a license to receive and
possess source, special nuclear, or byproduct material at a GROA.
E. What Types of Material Would Be Covered by the New Security and MC&A
Requirements?
This rule would cover the security and MC&A aspects for the
radioactive material at both surface and subsurface areas where waste
handling activities are conducted. This radioactive material can
include HLW in the form of irradiated reactor fuel and reprocessing
wastes. Section 63.102(b)(4) provides that if the DOE proposes to use
the GROA for storage of radioactive waste other than HLW, the storage
of this radioactive waste is subject to the requirements of 10 CFR Part
63. Irradiated reactor fuel contains SNM and fission byproducts.
Depending on the enrichment and quantity, the SNM may be considered
strategic special nuclear material, SNM of moderate strategic
significance, or SNM of low strategic significance. The higher the
enrichment of the SNM, the more attractive the material may be for
malevolent purposes. While it is expected that the primary waste to be
handled at a GROA is irradiated reactor fuel, it is possible that the
DOE may propose the storage of other types of radioactive waste.
Therefore, the Commission has attempted in this proposed rule to
develop security and MC&A requirements that are broad enough to cover
the spectrum of waste materials that could potentially be dispositioned
at a GROA without the need for future rulemaking. The security
requirements that would be established are, in part, based on the
attractiveness of the waste material, shape, size, and the potential
consequences if the waste were used for malevolent purposes. The MC&A
requirements pertain to the SNM content of the waste.
F. What Are the Key Aspects of the Proposed MC&A Requirements?
The proposed rule would establish general performance objectives
and corresponding systems capabilities for the GROA MC&A program, with
a particular focus on strengthening, streamlining, and consolidating in
10 CFR Part 74 all MC&A regulations specific to a GROA. Proposed
objectives for the GROA MC&A program would center on detecting and
responding to a potential loss of SNM, including theft and diversion,
commensurate with the strategic worth of the SNM. The DOE would be
required to submit an MC&A plan describing how those objectives would
be achieved through the implementation of specified system capabilities
commensurate with safeguards risks.
G. What Kinds of Systems Capabilities Would Be Proposed for the MC&A
Program?
The DOE would be required to establish and maintain internal
control, inventory, auditing, and recordkeeping capabilities. Internal
controls would include comprehensive measures for management
structuring, personnel qualification and training, validating receipts
and any shipments, item control, collusion protection, measurements,
and measurement control for resolving anomalies (as needed). This would
include an overall detection and response program and a collusion
program to thwart theft or diversion and would include incorporating
checks and balances that are sufficient to detect falsification of data
and reports that could conceal the theft or diversion of SNM.
Item control of SNM and continuous assurance of its integrity from
receipt to emplacement would be important. If necessary, additional
item control and physical inventory measures may be required for
recovery of waste packages or retrieval of waste packages from
emplacement in Yucca Mountain to an alternate storage or an area for
possible examination or external shipment.
[[Page 72525]]
H. Would Shipper-Receiver Comparisons With Independent Measurements Be
Required for Receipts?
No, the DOE would not be required to conduct independent
measurements on receipts of HLW or SNM at a GROA. The DOE would be
allowed to accept the originator-assigned values. However, the DOE
would be required to routinely assure the validity of each originator's
assigned SNM content values and the integrity of receipts (with
validating physical checking of unique identity, intactness, and
tamper-safing) accepted at a GROA. No routine nondestructive assay
(NDA) measurements of receipts would be required. The DOE would be
required to closely coordinate with originators to adequately
understand the technical basis for assigning SNM content and procedures
to be followed for packaging and assuring item identification and
integrity, (e.g., with reactor fuel burnup calculations, unique serial
numbers, and the tamper-safing of canisters and shipment overpacts).
Tamper-safing refers to the use of devices on containers in a manner
that ensures a clear indication if the device has been removed to allow
opening of the container.
For shipments of commercial SNF to the proposed Yucca Mountain
repository, the DOE is currently expected to be the shipper as the DOE
is expected to take possession of the material at the nuclear reactor.
However, for the purposes of reporting to the Nuclear Material
Management Safeguards System (NMMSS), power reactor utilities would be
expected to complete and file the DOE/NRC Form-741 for transferring the
SNM to the GROA using their respective NRC Reporting Identification
Symbol (RIS). As a result, following the instructions in NUREG/BR-0007
and NMMSS Report D-24, the transfer for MC&A technical purposes would
be made between two NRC RISs--from a power reactor utility RIS to that
assigned to the GROA for receiving and possessing SNM under license.
This is not a new requirement as licensees are currently required to
report transfers of SNM. In their reference to shippers, the MC&A
regulations at Sec. 74.15 are addressing the licensed utilities who
are originating and reporting the transfers with SNM content values
technically assigned by the utility. Any required tamper-safing of
shipments to assure their integrity (e.g., the welding of canisters or
the affixing of tamper-indicating devices on shipping overpacts) would
also be done by such originating shippers from a shipper-receiver
validation/comparison.
I. What Measurements Would Be Necessary Under the GROA MC&A Program?
As warranted, independent confirmatory weight and NDA measurements
of HLW and SNM would be required for off-normal circumstances (e.g., in
resolving certain types of anomalies that may arise and trigger
investigations and special reporting of safeguards events). The state-
of-the-art for NDA and other practical limitations shall be considered
for such nonroutine measurements (e.g., at a wet transfer facility
where bare spent fuel assemblies may be handled). At this point, no
routine onsite measurements are foreseen as necessary to further
validate/accept SNM content values assigned to receipts by the
originators.
J. What Would an MC&A Detection and Response Program Involve?
The focus would be on rapidly detecting and responding to
indications of SNM loss, including possible theft or diversion. This
includes triggering investigations and resolving action on anomalies,
as well as a way to thwart any attempts to covertly steal or divert SNM
by insiders acting individually or in collusion. The design of measures
to counter such a potential internal threat is to include a diversion
path analysis or risk analysis of postulated scenarios considering
conceivable ways and means potential insiders might try to steal or
divert SNM at a GROA.
As background, the general diversion path analysis method that has
been used by the NRC is described in the open literature (R. Hawkins,
S. Baloga, N. Zack, W. Stanbro, and J. Markin, ``Diversion Path
Analysis--A New Approach,'' INMM Proceedings XXI, 763-769, 1992). This
technical paper expanded on diversion path analysis methods originally
developed by the U.S. Bureau of Standards and published by the U.S.
Energy Research and Development Administration (ERDA) (M. Maltese, K.
Goodwin, and J. Scheter, ``Diversion Path Analysis Handbook,'' ERDA,
October 1976). In addition, diversion path analysis methods have been
extensively applied by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
for designing and implementing its safeguards strategy under the Treaty
on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Regarding the generic
safeguarding of geologic repositories, the IAEA has published a
comprehensive, multi-volume document (``Safeguards for the Final
Disposal of Spent Fuel in Geologic Repositories,'' STR-312, IAEA,
Department of Safeguards, September 1998), which identifies and
analyzes, in considerable detail, resulting diversion paths for a
hypothetical facility.
K. What Additional Requirements Would Be Imposed if the DOE Possesses
Formula Quantities of Strategic SNM That Is in a Form Other Than as
Irradiated Nuclear Reactor Fuel?
Additional requirements would be included for specified system
capabilities for strategic SNM. These requirements include additional
measures for item monitoring and more rigorous access control, quality
assurance, and alarm resolution in concert with any enhanced physical
protection to be provided under 10 CFR Part 73.
L. What Special MC&A-Related Needs Exist?
There is a need to consider risk-informed, performance-based
alternatives for resolving anomalies, particularly onsite NDA
measurements by the DOE in cases where item identity and integrity may
have been compromised. Another need is the extent of item control and
physical inventorying that would be necessary for SNM (in HLW and other
radioactive waste) in underground drifts and at aging pads, especially
from a containment, surveillance, and access control perspective, and a
worker perspective that involves reducing radiation exposure to
personnel to as low as is reasonably achievable, as well as other
impact aspects. The MC&A plan also needs to address SNM control and
accounting functional aspects of retrievability and alternate storage
capabilities that are required by Sec. Sec. 60.21(c)(12) and
63.21(c)(7).
M. What Is the Objective of the Proposed Physical Security
Requirements?
The objective of the proposed physical security requirements is to
provide high assurance that activities at a GROA are not inimical to
the common defense and security, and do not constitute an unreasonable
risk to the public health and safety. In order to provide a high
assurance of protection, the NRC's philosophy is to use a defense-in-
depth strategy towards the protection of HLW. Defense-in-depth relies
on a holistic approach towards the protection of these materials and
other radioactive materials, which includes using people, processes,
equipment, and facilities to protect HLW and other radioactive
materials from theft or diversion or radiological sabotage for
malevolent purposes. The GROA physical security requirements would
[[Page 72526]]
be determined using a graded approach related to the projected risk
from radiological sabotage, theft, or diversion of HLW and other
radioactive materials.
N. What Threat Would a GROA Be Required To Defend Against?
The design basis threat defined in Sec. 73.1(a) would apply to a
GROA in the specific circumstances where a radiological sabotage or
theft and diversion event may involve formula quantities of SNM. Under
the proposed rule, the threat to a GROA is largely defined by specific
security scenarios which represent the greatest threats against which
GROA security forces must be able to defend against, with a high
assurance of success. A GROA would have graded security measures based
on the material, waste form, and operations within a particular
facility at a GROA. Therefore, depending on the material content,
quantity, and consequence from a radiological sabotage event, as well
as the theft or diversion of certain material, the security measures
may rely on the design basis threat defined in Sec. 73.1(a) or may
rely on other Commission requirements. The NRC specifically invites
comment on the physical protection protocol for a GROA. We are
interested in information concerning: Do we need a specific physical
protection protocol for a GROA or should we apply the existing DBT and
increased controls as appropriate.
O. Why Do the Security Requirements Differ for Various Aspects of a
GROA?
The consequences of radiological and theft or diversion security
events are highly dependent on the characteristics and packaging of the
HLW and other radioactive materials and their location within a GROA.
The activities and operations at a GROA aid in defining the physical
security requirements and protective strategies that would be
implemented. At this time, the GROA concept of operations has not been
fully defined by the DOE; therefore, the NRC is establishing physical
security requirements that would be dependent upon the consequences of
a potential radiological event and the theft or diversion of certain
material. These physical security requirements would be based on five
proposed protection levels. The highest protection level would be for
waste containing strategic SNM with the protection system designed to
protect the material against the design basis threat for both theft or
diversion and radiological sabotage. The next protection level would be
for radioactive material that could result in a significant
radiological sabotage event releasing radioactive materials in
sufficient quantity such that any individual located at the lesser of
the controlled area boundary or 400 meters from the source could
receive a total effective dose equivalent equal to or greater than 0.25
Sv (25 rem). For these materials, the protection system must be
designed to protect against the design basis threat for radiological
sabotage. The third protection level would be for radioactive material
that could result in a moderate radiological sabotage event releasing
radioactive materials in sufficient quantity such that any individual
located at the lesser of the controlled area boundary or 400 meters
from the source could receive a total effective dose equivalent equal
to or greater than 0.05 Sv (5 rem) but less than 0.25 Sv (25 rem). For
these materials, the protection system must be designed to protect the
material against radiological sabotage. The fourth protection level
would be for all other radioactive material containing SNM. The
physical protection system would be designed to protect the material
against security-related events specified for theft and diversion. The
lowest protection level would be for other solidified radioactive
material and material that would meet the criteria in appendix P to 10
CFR part 110 (Categories 1 and 2 radioactive materials). The protective
strategy for these materials would be equivalent to the increased
controls (i.e., prevent or impede removal, locate and prompt recovery,
and mitigation of any potential consequence).
P. Would Access Authorization Requirements Apply to a GROA and What
Would They Cover?
Yes, access authorization requirements would apply to a GROA. The
facilities that possess large radiation sources, such as irradiated
nuclear reactor fuels (e.g., SNF), are attractive targets for those who
seek to commit radiological malevolent acts. Insiders who have
unescorted access to facilities that possess such radiation sources,
including a GROA, could pose a threat to the public health and safety
or the common defense and security because they may have the ability to
commit radiological malevolent acts. Therefore, imposing access
authorization requirements is a prudent security measure to ensure that
individuals who are granted unescorted access to the protected area of
a GROA: (1) Are trustworthy and reliable; (2) do not impose an
unreasonable risk to the health and safety of the public or the common
defense and security (as a result of increasing the likelihood of an
insider threat); and (3) do not pose a potential threat to commit
radiological malevolent acts or theft or diversion of HLW. Fingerprints
are required of any individual granted unescorted access to the
protected area of a GROA.
Q. Would Criminal History Checks Apply to a GROA?
Section 652 of the EPAct amended Section 149 of the AEA to require
fingerprinting and a Federal Bureau of Investigation identification and
criminal history records check of any person who is permitted
unescorted access to radioactive materials subject to regulation by the
Commission, and which the Commission determines to be of such
significance to the public health and safety or the common defense and
security as to warrant fingerprinting and background checks. The
Commission has determined that the radioactive material at a GROA is of
such significance and is proposing to implement the requirement for
fingerprinting and a FBI identification and criminal history records
check of any person who is permitted unescorted access to radioactive
materials at a GROA. Background investigations, which include criminal
history checks, represent a key element of the access authorization
program ensuring that individuals who have unescorted access to a GROA
are trustworthy and reliable. To accomplish this task, requirements
were developed that focused on accumulating data on an individual's
past that would produce an overall perspective of the individual's
character and allow the licensee to make a determination of
trustworthiness and reliability.
R. What Are the Key Aspects of the Security Requirements?
The key aspects of the security requirements for a GROA are similar
to the security requirements for similar types of NRC-licensed material
and facilities. The proposed regulations would require an integrated
security plan that would implement defense-in-depth concepts and
protective strategies based on protecting target sets from various
threat scenarios. The requirements are performance based and include an
access authorization program and a physical protection system to
detect, delay, and respond to postulated threat scenarios in such a way
that prevents or mitigates undesirable consequences of malevolent
actions. The postulated threat scenarios include the theft or diversion
of SNM and HLW as well as radiological sabotage. The access
authorization program requirements include measures
[[Page 72527]]
necessary to assure that personnel having critical safety or security
functions or having access to certain nuclear materials remain
trustworthy and reliable. The physical protection system requirements
for detection measures include intrusion sensing, alarm communication,
alarm assessment, and entry or access controls. Detection would be
provided through the use of detection equipment, patrols, access
controls, and other program elements required by this proposed rule. It
also would provide notification to the licensee that a potential threat
is present and where the threat is located. Alarm assessment is the
mechanism through which the licensee obtains the information necessary
to identify the nature of the threat detected and to determine how to
respond. There are access control requirements for personnel, vehicles,
and hazardous materials. The requirements for delay measures include
barriers to delay adversarial actions to allow a timely response by
security personnel. The requirements for responding to malevolent
events allow the DOE to develop effective response strategies to
challenge intruders so they cannot accomplish actions that are
necessary to achieving undesirable consequences. In some instances, the
strategy may include neutralizing adversaries to deny access to the
nuclear material. The proposed rule uses a risk-informed approach for
response requirements that permits protective strategies to be tailored
to the type of material being protected, operations that involve
handling this material and the potential consequences of postulated
threat scenarios.
Security personnel who are responsible for the protection of the
radioactive waste would be required to meet minimum requirements and
performance criteria. The DOE would have to meet general criteria
requirements for selection, training, equipping, testing,
qualification, and contingency plans of security forces involved in
GROA operations. These requirements would include hiring personnel who
function as drill and exercise controllers to ensure that security
forces are trained and qualified to execute their assigned duties.
Drills and exercises are key elements to assuring the preparedness of
the security force and must be conducted in a manner that demonstrates
the DOE's ability to execute the protective strategy as described in
the site security plans. As for contingency plans, the information
required in the safeguards contingency plans includes responses to
threats, up to and including design basis threats, as described in
Sec. 73.1(a). The DOE would be required to submit for NRC approval a
plan detailing how the prescribed criteria are going to be met.
S. What Is a Target Set as it Applies to a GROA?
As it applies to a GROA, target set means the combination of
equipment or operator actions which, if all are prevented from
performing their intended safety function or prevented from being
accomplished, would likely result in significant operational disruption
or radiological contamination barring extraordinary action by site
operators. For a GROA, a target set means the quantities and form of
HLW and other radioactive material and the protective and mitigative
measures to protect against potential large scale releases of fission
products from malevolent actions. For example, a target set with
respect to spent fuel sabotage at a GROA could be draining the spent
fuel pool leaving the spent fuel uncovered for a period of time,
allowing spent fuel to heat up, and the associated potential for
release of fission products. Due to the sensitivity of this
information, specific target sets to the GROA will not be available in
a public document.
T. What Weapons Authorization Would Be Necessary for the GROA
Operations?
There are two ways weapons may be authorized for use at a GROA.
First, section 161A of the AEA allows the NRC to authorize licensees to
use, as part of their protective strategies, an expanded arsenal of
weapons, including machine guns. Section 161A was added to the AEA
under the EPAct. Secondly, under section 161k. of the AEA, the DOE has
separate authority for authorization of weapons on any of its sites.
The DOE, under its own authority under section 161k. of the AEA, may
authorize the use of an expanded weapons arsenal, limited arrest
authority, and the use of force in accordance with the DOE's current
regulations under 10 CFR part 1047. The NRC does not plan to use its
authority under Section 161A of the AEA.
U. Would DOE Be Required To Conduct Force-on-Force Exercises for the
GROA Facility?
Yes, some type of force-on-force exercises are necessary to test
the effectiveness of the DOE's protective strategies for the high-
consequence target sets. The requirement for annual force-on-force
exercises only applies to formula quantities of strategic SNM and
significant radiological sabotage consequence target sets.
V. How Would the Security Plans Handle Construction at a GROA After
Receipt of HLW Begins?
A license to receive and possess source, special nuclear, or
byproduct material at a GROA may only be issued by the Commission on a
finding that construction of the GROA has been substantially completed.
Construction may be considered substantially complete if the
construction of surface and interconnecting structures, systems, and
components and any underground storage space required for initial
operation are substantially complete. Some construction activities
could continue once receipt of material begins.
The NRC's security requirements are designed to protect all
material at a GROA. Handling, storage, and emplacement operations for
HLW and other radioactive materials shall be conducted inside a
protected area. The NRC's security requirements are flexible enough to
allow the DOE to establish a protected area that could separate
remaining construction activities from operations involving HLW and
other radioactive material. Any construction activity occurring within
the protected area would be subject to the NRC's security requirements.
Any construction activities outside the protected area, but within the
DOE controlled area, would be subject to some NRC security controls and
DOE security orders. The protected area and security plans would be
expanded to include new facilities or areas before radioactive material
could be received in that new facility or area.
W. Does This Rulemaking Cover Transportation of High-Level Radioactive
Waste to a GROA?
No, the NRC's regulatory authority is limited to the operations at
a GROA. As an independent Federal Agency, the DOE must comply with its
own internal requirements (DOE orders) and Departments of
Transportation and Homeland Security regulations when transporting HLW
and other radioactive materials to a GROA. However, the DOE must use
shipping containers certified by the NRC under the regulations in 10
CFR part 71. Part 71 is not being revised by this proposed rule.
X. Would the Security and MC&A Plans Cover Postclosure?
No, these plans would not cover the postclosure period. Once the
NRC license is terminated, the NRC would no longer have regulatory
authority. However, the DOE plans for continued
[[Page 72528]]
oversight of the Yucca Mountain site after permanent closure.
Y. What Safeguards Reporting Requirements Would Be Proposed for a GROA?
Prompt notification to the NRC of a security event involving an
actual or imminent threat would permit the NRC to contact other Federal
authorities and other licensees, as appropriate. The Commission would
expect the DOE to notify the NRC Operations Center as soon as possible
after they notify local law enforcement agencies, but within 15
minutes. A written 60-day report would also be required for these
notifications. This new reporting requirement would require the DOE to
promptly notify the NRC of any event involving an actual or imminent
threat at the GROA.
Four-hour notification would be proposed for suspicious activities,
attempts at access, etc., that may indicate pre-operational
surveillance, reconnaissance, or intelligence gathering activities
targeted against the GROA. This would assist the intelligence and
homeland security communities in evaluating threats across critical
infrastructure sectors.
The current provision for one-hour notifications for certain
safeguards events (e.g., theft or unlawful diversion of SNM,
significant physical damage to the facility, entry of an unauthorized
person into protected areas) would be retained, with some modifications
to include attempted actions and to broaden the scope of the language
used for specific areas. The provision for events to be recorded in the
safeguards log would also be retained.
Z. Does the NRC Plan To Issue Guidance Documents?
Yes, the NRC intends to issue guidance documents. The NRC intends
to issue a GROA-specific regulatory guidance document. This document
would address adversary characteristics for the design basis threats
and describe details of the GROA security-related threats. Other
guidance documents are under consideration. The publication of the
guidance documents is planned after the publication of the final rule.
Because the guidance documents may contain Safeguards Information and/
or classified information, these documents would only be available to
those with a need-to-know, and who are qualified to have access to
Safeguards Information and/or classified information, as applicable.
However, the NRC has determined that access to these guidance documents
is not necessary for the public or other stakeholders to provide
informed comment on this proposed rule.
AA. Would the GROA Facilities Be Subject to IAEA Safeguards?
The U.S. Government has not yet made a determination as to whether
a GROA can be subject to IAEA safeguards.
BB. What Changes Would Be Made to the Emergency Plan Requirements?
The emergency plan requirements would be changed to reflect the
need to respond to radiological emergencies instead of radiological
accidents. The term radiological emergencies is more inclusive of the
types of situations that the emergency plan may need to address. In
addition, Sec. 63.21(c)(21) requires a description of the plan for
responding to, and recovering from, radiological emergencies; the
proposed change is consistent with this language.
CC. What Should I Consider as I Prepare My Comments to NRC?
Tips for preparing your comments--when submitting your comments,
remember to:
i. Identify the rulemaking (RIN 3150-AI06).
ii. Explain why you agree or disagree; suggest alternatives and
substitute language for your requested changes.
iii. Describe any assumptions and provide any technical information
and/or data that you used.
iv. If you estimate potential costs or burdens, explain how you
arrived at your estimate in sufficient detail to allow for it to be
reproduced.
v. Provide specific examples to illustrate your concerns, and
suggest alternatives.
vi. Explain your views as clearly as possible.
vii. Make sure to submit your comments by the comment period
deadline identified.
viii. See item N of the Discussion portion of this notice for NRC's
specific request for comments on the need for a specific physical
protection protocol for a GROA. See Section VI of the preamble for the
request for comments on the use of plain language and Section XI for
the request for comments on the draft regulatory analysis.
III. Discussion of Proposed Amendments by Section
Section 60.21 Content of Application
Paragraph (b)(3) would be revised to change the reference for the
security requirements from Sec. 73.51 to the new requirements in Sec.
73.53 and to require a description instead of plans. Paragraph (b)(4)
would be revised to change the reference for the MC&A requirements from
Sec. 60.78 to the new requirements in 10 CFR Part 74. The actual plans
would be submitted after the construction authorization was issued. The
security and MC&A plans would not be implemented until SNM is received
at the GROA.
Section 60.24 Updating of Application and Environmental Impact
Statement
Paragraph (d) would be added to require the DOE to submit the
actual security plans and MC&A plan for NRC approval no later than 180
days after the Commission issues the construction authorization. Under
the current regulations, the DOE was not required to submit the actual
MC&A plan for NRC approval. This requirement corrects that oversight.
Section 60.78 Criticality Reporting
This section would be renamed to reflect the criticality reporting
that remains after the MC&A requirements are relocated to 10 CFR part
74. Currently, the criticality reporting requirement is captured by the
reference to Sec. 72.74. The section would be revised to include the
criticality reporting requirement instead of a reference to another
section. The actual requirements would not change.
Section 63.21 Content of Application
Paragraph (b)(3) would be revised to change the reference for the
security requirements from Sec. 73.51 to the new requirements in Sec.
73.53 and would clarify that only a description of the program need be
submitted with the construction application. Paragraph (b)(4) would be
revised to change the reference for the MC&A requirements from Sec.
63.78 to the new requirements in 10 CFR part 74. The actual security
and MC&A plans would be submitted after the construction authorization
was issued. The security and MC&A plans would not be implemented until
SNM is received at the GROA.
Section 63.24 Updating of Application and Environmental Impact
Statement
Paragraph (d) would be added to require the DOE to submit the
actual security plans and MC&A plan for NRC approval no later than 180
days after the Commission issues the construction authorization. Under
the current regulations, the DOE was not required to submit the actual
plans for NRC approval. This requirement corrects that oversight.
Section 63.78 Criticality Reporting
This section would be renamed to reflect the criticality reporting
that remains after the MC&A requirements are relocated to 10 CFR part
74.
[[Page 72529]]
Currently, the criticality reporting requirement is captured by the
reference to Sec. 72.74. The section would be revised to include the
criticality reporting requirement instead of a reference to another
section. The actual requirements would not change.
Section 63.161 Emergency Plan for the Geologic Repository Operations
Area Through Permanent Closure
This section would be revised to refer to radiological emergencies
instead of radiological accidents. The term radiological emergencies is
more inclusive of the types of situations that the emergency plan may
need to address. In addition, Sec. 63.21(c)(21) requires a description
of the plan for responding to, and recovering from, radiological
emergencies; the proposed change is consistent with that language. The
reference to develop and implement a plan to ``cope with radiological
accidents'' is changed to a plan to ``provide reasonable assurance that
adequate protective measures can and would be taken in the event of a
radiological emergency.''
Section 73.2 Definitions
This section would be revised to incorporate the definition for
high-level radioactive waste in 10 CFR part 63 and to add a definition
for target set for application to a GROA.
Section 73.50 Requirements for Physical Protection of Licensed
Activities
This section would be revised to include a reference to Sec. 73.53
to retain the exemption for a GROA from the security requirements
listed in the section. Requirements for a GROA are specified in
proposed Sec. 73.53.
Section 73.51 Requirements for Physical Protection of Stored Spent
Nuclear Fuel and High-Level Radioactive Waste
This section would be revised to remove references to a GROA. The
security requirements for an ISFSI and a monitored retrievable storage
installation would remain unchanged. The requirements for a GROA would
be contained in new section 73.53.
Section 73.53 Requirements for Physical Protection at a Geologic
Repository Operations Area
The proposed rule would create a new section for the GROA physical
protection requirements. The existing requirements for GROA security
are contained in Sec. 73.51(b), (c), and (d). The requirements have
been expanded and strengthened to reflect the post-September 11, 2001,
threat environment and placed in this new section.
Paragraph (a) would establish that the physical protection
requirements in this section apply to The DOE for the operation of a
GROA.
Paragraph (b)(1) would require The DOE to submit a Physical
Security Plan, Training and Qualification Plan, and Safeguards
Contingency Plan that describe how the requirements of the section
would be met. The plans would be submitted no later than 180 days after
the NRC issues a construction authorization for a GROA. Paragraph
(b)(1) would also establish the implementation timeframe. Paragraph
(b)(2) would exempt the DOE from the security requirements after
permanent closure of a GROA. This provision is currently located at
Sec. 73.51(e).
Paragraph (c) would establish the performance objectives. Paragraph
(c)(1) would establish the general performance objective to provide
high assurance that activities involving radioactive waste are not
inimical to the common defense and security and do not constitute an
unreasonable risk to the public health and safety. The current general
objective does not address common defense and security. Paragraphs
(c)(2) and (c)(3) would establish objectives based on the type and form
of material and the consequences of a postulated radiological sabotage
event. The more risk-significant the material, the higher the level of
protection required.
Paragraph (d) would establish general requirements for the physical
security program. The DOE would be required to design and implement a
program to satisfy the performance requirements and to ensure that no
single act can disable the personnel, equipment, or systems necessary
to prevent the theft of strategic SNM and significant radiological
sabotage. The DOE would also be required to establish and maintain a
written performance evaluation program, an access authorization
program, an insider mitigation program, and a corrective action
program.
Paragraph (e) would require the DOE to develop security plans that
describe how the physical protection program would prevent the theft or
diversion and radiological sabotage of SNM and byproduct material and
to protect safeguards information against unauthorized disclosure. The
DOE would be required to establish, implement, and maintain written
procedures and to have a process for the DOE's approval of implementing
procedures. The DOE would be allowed to make changes to the security
plans without NRC approval as long as the changes do not decrease the
plan's effectiveness. The DOE would be required to establish, maintain,
and follow a Commission-approved training and qualification plan and a
safeguards contingency plan and to establish, implement, and maintain a
Commission-approved physical security plan.
Paragraph (f) would require the DOE to establish and maintain a
security organization designed, staffed, trained, and equipped to
provide early detection, assessment, and response to unauthorized
activities within any area of the facility. The Commission expectation
would be that the management system oversee all aspects of the onsite
physical protection program to ensure the effective implementation of
Commission requirements through the approved security plans and
implementing procedures. The DOE would also be required to ensure that
any written agreement with any contractor used to implement the onsite
physical protection program was retained as a record for the duration
of the contract and that the contract clearly state several conditions
related to training, access authorization, and document availability.
Provisions regarding the security organization are currently addressed
at Sec. 73.51(d)(5). The proposed requirements would strengthen and
expand on the current requirements.
Paragraph (g) would provide a performance-based requirement for
determining the use and placement of physical barriers for the
protection of personnel, equipment, and systems, the failure of which
could directly or indirectly endanger public health and safety. The DOE
would be required to establish and maintain physical barriers in the
controlled area, as necessary, to deter, delay, or prevent unauthorized
access; facilitate the early detection of unauthorized activities; and
control approach routes to the facility. Paragraph (g) would establish
requirements related to physical barriers (paragraph (g)(3)), isolation
zones (paragraph (g)(4)), protected areas (paragraph (g)(5)), vital
areas (paragraph (g)(6)), vehicle barrier systems (paragraph (g)(7)),
and unattended openings (paragraph (g)(8)). Current provisions
addressing physical barriers are located at Sec. 73.51(d)(1). The
proposed requirements would strengthen and expand on the current
requirements.
Paragraph (h) would require the DOE to develop and identify target
sets and document the analyses and methodologies used to determine and
group the target set equipment or
[[Page 72530]]
elements. The DOE would also be required to implement a program for the
oversight of certain facility equipment and systems documented as part
of the DOE protective strategy.
Paragraph (i) would require the DOE to establish an access control
program for personnel, vehicles, and material. The paragraph would
establish the features required for the access control program,
including access control points, emergency conditions, vehicles, access
control devices, visitors, and escorts. Current provisions addressing
access control are found at Sec. 73.51(b)(2), 73.51(d)(7), and
73.51(d)(9). The proposed requirements would strengthen and expand on
the current requirements.
Paragraph (j) would establish the requirements for search programs
for individuals, packages, and vehicles. This paragraph would expand
and strengthen the current requirements located in Sec. 73.51(d)(9).
Paragraph (k) would establish the requirements for the detection
and assessment systems. The DOE would be required to establish and
maintain an intrusion detection and assessment system that must provide
the capability for early detection and assessment of unauthorized
persons and activities. This proposed requirement would not mandate
specific intrusion detection equipment for any specific area, but
rather would require that the system provide detection and assessment
capabilities that meet Commission requirements. The current
requirements addressing detection and assessment systems are located at
Sec. 73.51(b)(2), 73.51(d)(2), 73.51(d)(3), 73.51(d)(4), and
73.51(d)(11). The proposed requirements would strengthen and expand on
the current requirements.
Paragraph (l) would require the DOE to establish and maintain
continuous communication capability with onsite and offsite resources
to ensure effective command and control during both normal and
emergency situations. The chosen communication method would be
available and operating any time it would be needed to communicate
information. The proposed requirements would strengthen and expand on
the current requirements located at Sec. 73.51(b)(2), 73.51(d)(6), and
73.51(d)(8).
Paragraph (m) would establish the response requirements for
personnel and equipment and armed responders. The DOE would be required
to establish and maintain the minimum number of properly trained and
equipped personnel required to intercept, challenge, delay and/or
neutralize any security related events.
Paragraph (n) would require the DOE to implement a cyber-security
program that provides high assurance that computer systems, which if
compromised could adversely impact safety, security, and emergency
preparedness, are protected from cyber attacks.
Paragraph (o) would establish the requirements for security program
reviews and audits. The DOE would be required to review the physical
protection program at intervals not to exceed 12 months or as necessary
based upon assessments or other performance indicators with each
element being reviewed at least every 24 months. The DOE would also be
required to conduct quarterly drills and annual exercises in accordance
with Section III of Appendix C of 10 CFR part 73 and the DOE
performance evaluation program. The proposed requirements expand on the
current requirement for a physical protection program review every 24
months that is in Sec. 73.51(d)(12).
Paragraph (p) would require the DOE to implement a maintenance,
testing and calibration program to ensure that security programs and
equipment are tested for operability and performance at predetermined
intervals, are maintained in operable condition, and are capable of
performing their intended function when needed.
Paragraph (q) would require the DOE to identify measures and
criteria needed to compensate for the loss or reduced performance of
personnel, equipment systems, and components that are required to meet
the requirements.
Paragraph (r) would authorize the DOE to suspend implementation of
affected requirements of Sec. 73.53 in an emergency when action is
immediately needed to protect the public health and safety and during
severe weather when the suspension is needed to protect personnel from
a life threatening situation. In both cases, a designated senior site
manager would need to approve the suspension before taking the action.
Paragraph (s) would require the DOE to maintain all records
required to be kept until the Commission terminates the license and to
maintain superseded portions of these records for at least 3 years
after the record is superseded.
Paragraph (t) would require the DOE to develop and implement a
process to inform and coordinate safety and security activities to
ensure that these requirements do not adversely affect the capabilities
of the security organization to satisfy the security requirements or
overall GROA safety.
Paragraph (u) would provide a mechanism for the DOE to receive
approval for use of alternative measures to those required by Sec.
73.53. Current provisions for alternative measures are covered by Sec.
73.51(d).
Paragraph (v) would contain additional performance capabilities
that must be met if the DOE were to possess formula quantities of
strategic SNM, unless otherwise approved by the Commission. These
additional measures include requirements on the security organization;
physical barrier subsystem; access control subsystem and procedures;
search programs; detection, surveillance, and alarm subsystems and
procedures; and response requirements.
Section 73.56a Personnel Access Authorization Requirements for a
Geologic Repository Operations Area
This section would be added to address the requirements for the
personnel access authorization program for a GROA. The current
regulations require the DOE to grant access to the protected area only
to individuals who are authorized to enter the protected area; however,
there are no specific requirements for the access authorization
program. The proposed program addresses the integration of the access
authorization requirements and security program requirements. The
proposed performance objective is to provide high assurance that
individuals granted unescorted access are trustworthy and reliable,
such that they do not constitute an unreasonable risk to public health
and safety or the common defense and security, including the potential
to commit radiological sabotage, theft, or diversion. The proposed rule
would establish requirements for the background investigation
(paragraph (d)), psychological assessments (paragraph (e)), behavioral
observation (paragraph (f)), arrest reporting (paragraph (g)), granting
unescorted access authorization (paragraph (h)), maintaining access
authorization (paragraph (i)), access to vital areas (paragraph (j)),
trustworthiness and reliability of background screeners and
authorization program personnel (paragraph (k)), review procedures
(paragraph (l)), protection of information (paragraph (m)), audits and
corrective action (paragraph (n)), and records (paragraph (o)). The
proposed requirements are nearly identical as those proposed for power
reactors (71 FR 62664; October 26, 2006).
[[Page 72531]]
Section 73.57 Requirements for Criminal History Checks of Individuals
Granted Unescorted Access to a Nuclear Power Facility or the Protected
Area of a Geologic Repository Operations Area, or Access to Safeguards
Information by Power Reactor Licensees
This section would be retitled to include the protected area of a
GROA. New paragraph (a)(4) would be added to require the DOE to comply
with the requirements for criminal history checks contained in this
section upon receipt of Commission authorization to receive and possess
source, special nuclear, or byproduct material at a GROA. Paragraph
(b)(2)(iii) would be added to expand the requirements for criminal
history checks to anyone granted unescorted access to the protected
area of a GROA. Paragraphs (b)(1), (b)(4), (b)(4)(i), (b)(5), (b)(8),
(c)(1), (d)(1), (f)(2), and (f)(5) would be revised to expand the
requirements to individuals granted unescorted access to the protected
area of a GROA.
Section 73.70 Records
The introductory paragraph would be revised to include a reference
to Sec. 73.53. Paragraph (c)(1) would be added to include a reference
to Sec. 73.53(i)(7). A new paragraph (c)(1) is being proposed because
changes to paragraph (c) have been proposed in the power security rule
and it could cause confusion to stakeholders to propose additional
changes to the same section. This section would establish the
requirements for record retention. Record retention requirements are
currently located in Sec. 73.51(c), 73.51(d)(10), and 73.51(d)(13).
The record retention period remains 3 years or termination of the
license, depending on the record type.
Section 73.71a Reporting of Safeguards Events for a GROA
Section 73.71a would be created to contain the safeguards reporting
events that are specific to a GROA. A new section is being proposed
because significant changes to this section have been proposed in the
power reactor security rule and it could cause significant confusion to
stakeholders to propose additional changes to the same section. A new
reporting requirement is proposed that would require the DOE to
promptly notify the NRC of any event involving an actual or imminent
threat. Four-hour notification is being proposed for suspicious events
and tampering events not otherwise covered under Appendix G. The
provision for one-hour notifications for certain safeguards events
(e.g., theft or unlawful diversion of SNM, significant physical damage
to any facility, entry of an unauthorized person into protected areas.)
would be retained, with some modifications to include attempted actions
and to broaden the scope of the language used for specified areas. The
provisions for events to be recorded in the safeguards log would be
retained with minor revisions. Requirements for making the required
telephonic and written notifications are also proposed.
Appendix B to 10 CFR Part 73--General Criteria for Security Personnel
A new Section VII, ``Geologic Repository Operations Area Training
and Qualification Plan,'' would contain the training and qualification
requirements for security personnel. These new requirements would
include additional physical requirements for unarmed security personnel
to assure the personnel performing these functions meet physical
requirements commensurate with their duties. Proposed new requirements
also include a minimum age requirement of 18 years for unarmed
responders, qualification scores for testing required by the training
and qualification plan, qualification requirements for security
trainers, qualification requirements of personnel assessing
psychological qualifications, armorer certification requirements, and
program requirements for on-the-job training.
Appendix C to 10 CFR Part 73--Licensee Safeguards Contingency Plans
A new Section III, ``Geologic repository operations area safeguards
contingency plans,'' would establish the requirements that govern the
development of the safeguards contingency plan for a GROA. Proposed
requirements include specific references to personnel who function as
drill and exercise controllers to ensure these persons are trained and
qualified to execute their assigned duties. Drills and exercises are
key elements to assuring the preparedness of the GROA security force
and must be conducted in a manner that demonstrates the DOE's ability
to execute the protective strategy as described in the site security
plans. Additionally drills and exercises must be performed properly to
assure they do not negatively impact personnel or facility safety.
Appendix G to 10 CFR Part 73--Reportable Safeguards Events
The introductory paragraph would be revised to include a reference
to Sec. Sec. 73.71a and 73.53 to address the reporting provisions that
would apply specifically to a GROA. The reporting requirements would be
revised to support the revised reporting requirements from proposed
Sec. 73.71a. Paragraph V would be added to require prompt reporting
(not later than 15 minutes of discovery) after the discovery of an
imminent or actual threat against the facility. Paragraph VI would
contain the reports to be reported within one (1) hour. Paragraph VII
would contain the events to be reported with four (4) hours. Paragraph
VIII would contain the events to be recorded in the safeguards log.
Section 74.1 Purpose
Paragraph (b) would be revised to include a reference to Sec. Sec.
60.21 and 63.21 to cover submittal of a license application for a GROA.
Section 74.2 Scope
Paragraph (b) would be revised to include a reference to the
proposed Subpart F.
Section 74.4 Definitions
This section would be revised to add definitions for accounting,
custodian, high-level radioactive waste, item control area, item
control program, and material balance area.
Section 74.13 Material Status Reports
Paragraph (a) would be revised to require the submittal of Material
Status Reports within 60 calendar days of the GROA physical inventory.
This requirement was previously covered by Sec. 72.76.
Section 74.17 Special Nuclear Material Physical Inventory Summary
Report
Paragraph (d) would be added to require the DOE to submit Special
Nuclear Material Physical Inventory Summary Reports for the GROA.
Section 74.19 Recordkeeping
Paragraphs (a) and (c) would be revised to exempt a GROA from the
recordkeeping requirements because the recordkeeping requirements for a
GROA would be specified in a new Subpart F.
Subpart F--Geologic Repository Operations Area
This new subpart would contain the MC&A requirements that are
specific for a GROA. The new Subpart would contain requirements that
are both risk informed and performance based.
Section 74.71 Nuclear Material Control and Accounting for a Geologic
Repository Operations Area (GROA)
This new section would contain the MC&A general performance
objectives (paragraph (a)), the systems capabilities
[[Page 72532]]
(paragraph (b)), and the implementation dates (paragraph (c)) for a
GROA. Required systems capabilities and features would be commensurate
with the kind, amount, and specifications of the SNM proposed to be
possessed at a GROA.
Paragraph (a) would require the DOE to establish, implement, and
maintain a Commission-approved MC&A program that meets the following
performance objectives: (1) Maintain accurate, current, and reliable
information on, and confirm the quantities and locations of, SNM; (2)
detect, respond to, and resolve any anomalies indicating a possible
loss of SNM; (3) permit rapid determination of whether an actual loss
of a significant amount of SNM has occurred: (4) generate and provide,
as requested, information to aid in the investigation and recovery of
missing SNM; and (5) control access to MC&A information that might
assist adversaries in possible attempts to carry out a theft or
diversion, or to help target HLW for radiological sabotage.
Paragraph (b) would require the DOE to include the capabilities and
features specified in Section 74.73 in the MC&A program.
Paragraph (c) would require the DOE to submit an MC&A plan that
describes how the performance objectives would be achieved and the
system capabilities would be met. The plan would be submitted no later
than 180 days after the NRC issues a construction authorization for the
GROA. Paragraph (c) would also require the DOE to implement the
Commission-approved MC&A plan upon issuance of a license to receive and
possess source, special nuclear, or byproduct material at the GROA or
by a date specified in a license condition.
Section 74.73 Internal Controls, Inventory, and Records
This new section would establish the internal controls (paragraphs
(b), (c), (d), (e), (f), (g), and (h)), inventory requirements
(paragraph (i)), additional provisions for receipt of strategic SNM
(paragraph (j)), and the recordkeeping requirements (paragraph (k)) for
the MC&A program.
Paragraph (a) would require the DOE to establish and maintain the
internal control, inventory, and recordkeeping capabilities that would
be required by paragraphs (b) through (k).
Paragraph (b) would require the DOE to establish, document, and
maintain a management structure that assures clear overall
responsibility for the MC&A program, would be independent of other
operations, and would provide for separation of key responsibilities.
The DOE would also be required to provide for the adequate review,
approval, and use of written procedures.
Paragraph (c) would require the DOE to assure that personnel that
work in key positions are trained to maintain a high-level of
safeguards awareness and are qualified to perform their duties.
Paragraph (d) would require the DOE to perform and document
independent reviews and assessments of the total MC&A program at
intervals not to exceed 24 months.
Paragraph (e) would require the DOE to establish, document,
implement, and maintain an item control program that: (1) Provides
current knowledge of all HLW items with respect to unique identity,
element and isotope content, and location from receipt to underground
emplacement and possible retrieval and alternate storage; (2) assures
that the integrity of items is maintained such that the unauthorized
removal of SNM would be readily apparent; (3) maintains and follows
procedures for any tamper-safing program that is to be used for
assuring the validity of prior measurements; and (4) stipulates the use
of the 2-person rule for sealing operations, affixing tamper-indicating
devices, handling of bare fuel assemblies, performing physical
inventories, and internal transfers.
Paragraph (f) would require the DOE to establish, implement, and
maintain an anomaly, detection, and response program that incorporates
checks and balances sufficient to thwart attempts to divert SNM and to
detect falsification of data and reports that could conceal the theft
or diversion of SNM. The program would also be required to detect and
respond to a potential loss or misuse of SNM, including the theft or
diversion of SNM by an internal threat using collusion, stealth, and
deceit. The overall design of the detection and response program would
need to include an analysis of conceivable ways and means through which
clandestine attempts of theft, diversion, or other misuse might occur.
Paragraph (g) would require the DOE to establish, document,
implement, and maintain a program to reasonably assure the validity of
assigned SNM quantities, including a measurement system and a
measurement control program that maintains a level of effectiveness
sufficient to satisfy the capabilities required for resolving
anomalies, as needed.
Paragraph (h) would require the DOE to provide information to the
NRC or other agencies deemed necessary for conducting an investigation
of actual (or highly suspected) events pertaining to missing SNM and
information relevant to recovery of the SNM.
Paragraph (i) would require the DOE to perform a facility-wide
physical inventory of all possessed SNM to close material balances at
intervals not to exceed 12 calendar months. The paragraph would further
require the DOE to provide written instructions for conducting the
physical inventories. Within 60 days after the start of the inventory,
the DOE would be required to reconcile and adjust the book record, as
appropriate, to the results of the physical inventory and to
investigate and resolve, or report any unresolved inventory difference
or discrepancy to the NRC.
Paragraph (j) would require the DOE to establish additional
measures, if the DOE were to receive formula quantities of strategic
SNM that are in a form other than irradiated reactor fuel or high-level
radioactive waste. These additional measures include: (1) Item-
monitoring features as specified in Sec. 74.55; (2) alarm resolution
as specified in Sec. 74.57; (3) quality assurance and accounting
capabilities as specified in Sec. 74.59; (4) establishment of
controlled areas for strategic SNM; and (5) semi-annual physical
inventories of all strategic SNM.
Paragraph (k) would require the DOE to establish records that
demonstrate that the requirements have been met, to maintain the
records in duplicate in an auditable form, and to retain the records
until the Commission terminates the GROA license. The paragraph also
requires the DOE to retain procedures until the Commission terminates
the license, with superceded portions of a procedure to be retained for
3 years after the portion is superceded. The DOE would also be required
to maintain adequate safeguards against tampering with and loss of
records. The DOE must also satisfy the requirements of 10 CFR 60.71 or
63.71 for records on the receipt, handling, and disposition of
radioactive waste at a GROA.
IV. Criminal Penalties
For the purpose of Section 223 of the Atomic Energy Act (AEA), as
amended, the Commission is proposing to amend 10 CFR parts 60, 63, 73,
and 74 under one or more of Sections 161b, 161i, or 161o of the AEA.
Criminal penalties, as they apply to regulations in part 73, are
discussed in Sec. 73.81. The new Sec. Sec. 73.53, 73.56a, and 73.71a
are issued under Sections 161b, 161i, or 161o of the AEA, and are not
included in Sec. 73.81(b). Criminal penalties, as they apply to
regulations in part 74, are discussed in Sec. 74.84. The new
Sec. Sec. 74.71 and 74.73 are issued under Sections 161b, 161i, or
[[Page 72533]]
161o of the AEA, and are not included in Sec. 74.84(b). Willful
violations of the rule would be subject to criminal enforcement.
V. Agreement State Compatibility
Under the ``Policy Statement on Adequacy and Compatibility of
Agreement State Programs'' approved by the Commission on June 30, 1997,
and published in the Federal Register on September 3, 1997 (62 FR
46517), this rule is classified as Compatibility Category ``NRC.''
Compatibility is not required for Category ``NRC'' regulations. The NRC
program elements in this category are those that relate directly to
areas of regulation reserved to the NRC by the Atomic Energy Act of
1954, as amended, or the provisions of Title 10 of the Code of Federal
Regulations.
VI. Plain Language
The Presidential Memorandum, ``Plain Language in Government
Writing,'' published June 10, 1998 (63 FR 31883), directed that the
Government's documents be in clear and accessible language. The NRC
requests comments on this proposed rule specifically with respect to
the clarity and effectiveness of the language used. Comments should be
sent to the address listed under the ADDRESSES heading.
VII. Voluntary Consensus Standards
The National Technology Transfer and Advancement Act of 1995 (Pub.
L. 104-113) requires that Federal agencies use technical standards that
are developed or adopted by voluntary consensus standards bodies unless
the use of such a standard is inconsistent with applicable law or
otherwise impractical. In this proposed rule, the NRC would establish
security and MC&A requirements for a GROA. This action does not
constitute the establishment of a standard that establishes generally
applicable requirements.
VIII. Finding of No Significant Environmental Impact
Pursuant to Section 121(c) of the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, this
proposed rule does not require the preparation of an environmental
impact statement under Section 102(2)(c) of the National Environmental
Policy Act of 1969 or any environmental review under subparagraph (E)
or (F) of Section 102(2) of such act.
IX. Paperwork Reduction Act Statement
The information collection requirements contained in this proposed
rule of limited applicability affect one respondent, which is a federal
entity. Therefore, Office of Management and Budget approval is not
required pursuant to the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (44 U.S.C.
3501 et seq.).
X. Public Protection Notification
The NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to
respond to, a request for information or an information collection
requirement unless the requesting document displays a currently valid
OMB control number.
XI. Regulatory Analysis
The Commission has prepared a draft regulatory analysis on this
proposed regulation. The analysis examines the costs and benefits of
the alternatives considered by the Commission.
The Commission requests public comment on the draft regulatory
analysis. Comments on the draft analysis may be submitted to the NRC as
indicated under the ADDRESSES heading. The analysis is available for
inspection in the NRC Public Document Room, 11555 Rockville Pike,
Rockville, MD 20852.
XII. Regulatory Flexibility Certification
In accordance with the Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980 (5 U.S.C.
605(b)), the Commission certifies that this rule would not, if
promulgated, have a significant economic impact on a substantial number
of small entities. This proposed rule affects only the licensing of one
entity, the DOE, which does not fall within the scope of the definition
of ``small entities'' set forth in the Regulatory Flexibility Act or
the size standards established by the NRC (10 CFR 2.810).
XIII. Backfit Analysis
The NRC has determined that the backfit rule (Sec. Sec. 50.109,
70.76, 72.62, or 76.76) does not apply to this proposed rule because
this amendment would not involve any provisions that would impose
backfits as defined in 10 CFR Chapter I. Therefore, a backfit analysis
is not required.
List of Subjects
10 CFR Part 60
Criminal penalties, High-level waste, Nuclear materials, Nuclear
power plants and reactors, Reporting and recordkeeping requirements,
Waste treatment and disposal.
10 CFR Part 63
Criminal penalties, High-level waste, Nuclear power plants and
reactors, Reporting and recordkeeping requirements, Waste treatment and
disposal.
10 CFR Part 73
Criminal penalties, Export, Hazardous materials transportation,
Import, Nuclear materials, Nuclear power plants and reactors, Reporting
and recordkeeping requirements, Security measures.
10 CFR Part 74
Accounting, Criminal penalties, Hazardous materials transportation,
Material control and accounting, Nuclear materials, Packaging and
containers, Radiation protection, Reporting and recordkeeping
requirements, Scientific equipment, Special nuclear material.
For the reasons set out in the preamble and under the authority of
the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended; the Energy Reorganization
Act of 1974, as amended; and 5 U.S.C. 552; the NRC is proposing to
adopt the following amendments to 10 CFR parts 60, 63, 73, and 74:
PART 60--DISPOSAL OF HIGH-LEVEL RADIOACTIVE WASTES IN GEOLOGIC
REPOSITORIES
1. The authority citation for part 60 continues to read as follows:
Authority: Secs. 51, 53, 62, 63, 65, 81, 161, 182, 183, 68 Stat.
929, 930, 932, 933, 935, 948, 953, 954, as amended (42 U.S.C. 2071,
2073, 2092, 2093, 2095, 2111, 2201, 2232, 2233); secs. 202, 206, 88
Stat. 1244, 1246 (42 U.S.C. 5842, 5846); secs. 10 and 14, Pub. L.
95-601, 92 Stat. 2951 (42 U.S.C. 2021a and 5851); sec. 102, Pub. L.
91-190, 83 Stat. 853 (42 U.S.C. 4332); secs. 114, 121, Pub. L. 97-
425, 96 Stat. 2213g, 2228, as amended (42 U.S.C. 10134, 10141), and
Pub. L. 102-486, sec. 2902, 106 Stat. 3123 (42 U.S.C. 5851); sec.
1704, 112 Stat. 2750 (44 U.S.C. 3504 note).
2. In Sec. 60.21, paragraphs (b)(3) and (b)(4) are revised to read
as follows:
Sec. 60.21 Content of application.
* * * * *
(b) * * *
(3) A description of the security measures for physical protection
of high-level radioactive waste and other radioactive material in
accordance with Sec. 73.53 of this chapter. This description must
include a description of the design for physical protection, the
safeguards contingency plan, and security organization personnel
training and qualification plan. The description must list tests,
inspections, audits, and other
[[Page 72534]]
means to be used to demonstrate compliance with such requirements.
(4) A description of the material control and accounting program to
meet the requirements of Sec. Sec. 74.11, 74.13, 74.15, 74.17, 74.71,
and 74.73 of this chapter.
* * * * *
3. In Sec. 60.24, paragraph (d) is added to read as follows:
Sec. 60.24 Updating of application and environmental impact
statement.
* * * * *
(d) DOE shall supplement its application no later than 180 days
after the NRC issues a construction authorization for the GROA with the
submittal of the following plans:
(1) Physical Security Plan;
(2) Training and Qualification Plan;
(3) Safeguards Contingency Plan; and
(4) Material Control and Accounting Plan.
4. Section 60.78 is revised to read as follows:
Sec. 60.78 Criticality reporting.
(a) DOE shall notify the NRC Operations Center \3\ within one hour
of discovery of any case of accidental criticality.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ Commercial telephone number of the NRC Operations Center is
(301) 816-5100.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(b) This notification must be made to the NRC Operations Center via
the Emergency Notification System if DOE is party to that system. If
the Emergency Notification System is inoperative or unavailable, DOE
shall make the required notification via commercial telephonic service
or other dedicated telephonic system or any other method that will
ensure that a report is received by the NRC Operations Center within
one hour.
PART 63--DISPOSAL OF HIGH-LEVEL RADIOACTIVE WASTES IN A GEOLOGIC
REPOSITORY AT YUCCA MOUNTAIN, NEVADA
5. The authority citation for part 63 continues to read as follows:
Authority: Secs. 51, 53, 62, 63, 65, 81, 161, 182, 183, 68 Stat.
929, 930, 932, 933, 935, 948, 953, 954, as amended (42 U.S.C. 2071,
2073, 2092, 2093, 2095, 2111, 2201, 2232, 2233); secs. 202, 206, 88
Stat. 1244, 1246 (42 U.S.C. 5842, 5846); secs. 10 and 14, Pub. L.
95-601, 92 Stat. 2951 (42 U.S.C. 2021a and 5851); sec. 102, Pub. L.
91-190, 83 Stat. 853 (42 U.S.C. 4332); secs. 114, 121, Pub. L. 97-
425, 96 Stat. 2213g, 2238, as amended (42 U.S.C. 10134, 10141), and
Pub. L. 102-486, sec. 2902, 106 Stat. 3123 (42 U.S.C. 5851); sec.
1704, 112 Stat. 2750 (44 U.S.C. 3504 note).
6. In Sec. 63.21, paragraphs (b)(3) and (b)(4) are revised to read
as follows:
Sec. 63.21 Content of application.
* * * * *
(b) * * *
(3) A description of the security measures for physical protection
of high-level radioactive waste and other radioactive material in
accordance with Sec. 73.53 of this chapter. This description must
include the description of the design for physical protection, the
safeguards contingency plan, and security organization personnel
training and qualification plan. The description must list tests,
inspections, audits, and other means to be used to demonstrate
compliance with such requirements.
(4) A description of the material control and accounting program to
meet the requirements of Sec. Sec. 74.11, 74.13, 74.15, 74.17, 74.71,
and 74.73 of this chapter.
* * * * *
7. In Sec. 63.24, paragraph (d) is added to read as follows:
Sec. 63.24 Updating of application and environmental impact
statement.
* * * * *
(d) DOE shall supplement its application no later than 180 days
after the NRC issues a construction authorization for the GROA with the
submittal of the following plans:
(1) Physical Security Plan;
(2) Training and Qualification Plan;
(3) Safeguards Contingency Plan; and
(4) Material Control and Accounting Plan.
8. Section 63.78 is revised to read as follows:
Sec. 63.78 Criticality reporting.
(a) DOE shall notify the NRC Operations Center\3\ within one hour
of discovery of any case of accidental criticality.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ Commercial telephone number of the NRC Operations Center is
(301) 816-5100
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(b) This notification must be made to the NRC Operations Center via
the Emergency Notification System if DOE is party to that system. If
the Emergency Notification System is inoperative or unavailable, DOE
shall make the required notification via commercial telephonic service
or other dedicated telephonic system or any other method that will
ensure that a report is received by the NRC Operations Center within
one hour.
9. Section 63.161 is revised to read as follows:
Sec. 63.161 Emergency plan for the geologic repository operations
area through permanent closure.
DOE shall develop and be prepared to implement a plan to provide
reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be
taken in the event of a radiological emergency at the geologic
repository operations area, at any time before permanent closure and
decontamination or decontamination and dismantlement of surface
facilities. The emergency plan must be based on the criteria of Sec.
72.32(b) of this chapter.
PART 73--PHYSICAL PROTECTION OF PLANTS AND MATERIALS
10. The authority citation for Part 73 continues to read as
follows:
Authority: Secs. 53, 161, 68 Stat. 930, 948, as amended, sec.
147, 94 Stat. 780 (42 U.S.C. 2073, 2167, 2201); sec. 201, as
amended, 204, 88 Stat. 1242, as amended, 1245, sec. 1701, 106 Stat.
2951, 2952, 2953 (42 U.S.C. 5841, 5844, 2297f); sec. 1704, 112 Stat.
2750 (44 U.S.C. 3504 note).
Section 73.1 also issued under secs. 135, 141, Pub. L. 97-425,
96 Stat. 2232, 2241 (42 U.S.C, 10155, 10161). Section 73.37(f) also
issued under sec. 301, Pub. L. 96-295, 94 Stat. 789 (42 U.S.C. 5841
note). Section 73.57 is issued under sec. 606, Pub. L. 99-399, 100
Stat. 876 (42 U.S.C. 2169) and under sec. 652, Pub. L. 109-58, 119
Stat. 810 (42 U.S.C. 2169).
11. In Sec. 73.2, definitions for ``high-level radioactive waste''
and ``target set for a geologic repository operations area'' are added
in alphabetical order to read as follows:
Sec. 73.2 Definitions.
* * * * *
High-level radioactive waste or HLW means:
(1) The highly radioactive material resulting from the reprocessing
of spent nuclear fuel, including liquid waste produced directly in
reprocessing and any solid material derived from such liquid waste that
contains fission products in sufficient concentrations;
(2) Irradiated reactor fuel; and
(3) Other highly radioactive material that the Commission,
consistent with existing law, determines by rule requires permanent
isolation.
* * * * *
Target set for a geologic repository operations area means the
combination of equipment or operator actions which, if all are
prevented from performing their intended safety function or prevented
from being accomplished, would likely result in significant operational
disruption or radiological contamination barring extraordinary action
by site operators. For a geological repository operations area (GROA),
a target set means quantities and form of high-level radioactive waste
and other radioactive material and the protective and mitigative
measures to protect against potential large scale releases of
[[Page 72535]]
fission products from malevolent actions.
* * * * *
12. In Sec. 73.50, the introductory paragraph is revised to read
as follows:
Sec. 73.50 Requirements for physical protection of licensed
activities.
Each licensee who is not subject to Sec. Sec. 73.51 or 73.53, but
who possesses, uses, or stores formula quantities of strategic special
nuclear material that are not readily separable from other radioactive
material and which have total external radiation dose rates in excess
of 100 rems per hour at a distance of 3 feet from any accessible
surfaces without intervening shielding other than at a nuclear reactor
facility licensed pursuant to part 50 of this chapter, shall comply
with the following:
* * * * *
13. In Sec. 73.51, the heading is revised and paragraph (a) is
revised to read as follows:
Sec. 73.51 Requirements for physical protection of stored spent
nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste.
(a) Applicability. Notwithstanding the provisions of Sec. Sec.
73.20, 73.50, or 73.67, the physical protection requirements of this
section apply to each licensee that stores spent nuclear fuel and high-
level radioactive waste pursuant to paragraphs (a)(1) and (2) of this
section. This includes spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive
waste stored under a specific license issued pursuant to part 72 of
this chapter:
(1) At an independent spent fuel storage installation (ISFSI) or
(2) At a monitored retrievable storage (MRS) installation.
* * * * *
14. Section 73.53 is added to read as follows:
Sec. 73.53 Requirements for physical protection of a geologic
repository operations area.
(a) Applicability. Notwithstanding the provisions of Sec. Sec.
73.20, 73.50, or 73.67, the physical protection requirements of this
section apply to DOE for its activities at the geologic repository
operations area (GROA) pursuant to a license issued under Part 60 or 63
of this chapter.
(b) Submittal and implementation dates. (1) DOE shall submit a
Physical Security Plan, Training and Qualification Plan, and Safeguards
Contingency Plan that delineate how the requirements of this section
will be met. The security plans must be submitted no later than 180
days after the NRC issues a construction authorization for the GROA.
The Commission-approved security plans must be implemented upon the
Commission's issuance of a license to receive and possess source,
special nuclear, or byproduct material at the GROA or by the date
specified in a license condition.
(2) DOE is exempt from the requirements of this section after
permanent closure of the GROA.
(c) Performance objectives--(1) General. DOE shall establish,
implement, and maintain an onsite physical protection program and
security organization which will have as its objective to provide high
assurance that activities involving radioactive waste are not inimical
to the common defense and security and do not constitute an
unreasonable risk to the public health and safety.
(2) Radioactive waste containing strategic special nuclear
material. For formula quantities of strategic special nuclear material,
DOE shall establish and maintain, or make arrangements for, a physical
protection system designed to detect, assess, intercept, challenge,
delay, and neutralize security-related events specified for theft or
diversion of strategic special nuclear material and radiological
sabotage as stated in Sec. 73.1(a).
(3) Radioactive waste not containing strategic special nuclear
material. (i) For radioactive material that could result in a
significant radiological sabotage event releasing radioactive materials
in sufficient quantity such that any individual located at the
controlled area boundary, or 400 meters (1300 ft), whichever is less,
could receive a total effective dose equivalent equal to or greater
than 0.25 Sv (25 rem), DOE shall establish and maintain, or make
arrangements for, a physical protection system designed to detect,
assess, intercept, challenge, delay and neutralize security-related
events specified for radiological sabotage as stated in Sec.
73.1(a)(1).
(ii) For radioactive material that could result in a moderate
radiological sabotage event releasing radioactive materials in
sufficient quantity such that any individual located at the controlled
area boundary, or 400 meters (1300 ft), whichever is less, could
receive a total effective dose equivalent equal to or greater than 0.05
Sv (5 rem) but less than 0.25 Sv (25 rem), DOE shall establish and
maintain, or make arrangements for, a physical protection system
designed to detect, assess, intercept, challenge, delay and neutralize,
impede, or mitigate security-related events specified for radiological
sabotage. DOE must protect against an adversary force that is well-
trained (including military training and skills) and contains dedicated
individuals. The adversary force may include assistance from an inside
knowledgeable individual participating in a passive role (e.g., provide
information), an active role (e.g., facilitate entrance and exit,
disable alarms and communications, participate in violent attack), or
both. The adversary force may be armed with suitable weapons, up to and
including hand-held automatic weapons, equipped with silencers and
having effective long range accuracy, and be equipped with hand-carried
equipment, including incapacitating agents and explosives for use as
tools of entry or for otherwise destroying the facility, transporter,
or container integrity or features of the safeguards system. The
adversary force may use a four-wheel drive land vehicle used for
transporting personnel and their hand-carried equipment or land vehicle
bomb to the proximity of vital areas.
(iii) For all other radioactive material containing special nuclear
material, DOE shall establish and maintain, or make arrangements for, a
physical protection system designed to detect, assess, intercept,
challenge, delay, and prevent the removal of special nuclear material
from the protected area for security-related events specified for theft
or diversion. DOE must protect against an adversary force that is well-
trained (including military training and skills) and contains dedicated
individuals. The adversary force may include assistance from an inside
knowledgeable individual participating in a passive role (e.g., provide
information), an active role (e.g., facilitate entrance and exit,
disable alarms and communications, participate in violent attack), or
both. The adversary force may be armed with suitable weapons, up to and
including hand-held automatic weapons, equipped with silencers and
having effective long range accuracy, and be equipped with hand-carried
equipment, including incapacitating agents and explosives for use as
tools of entry or for otherwise destroying the facility, transporter,
or container integrity or features of the safeguards system. The
adversary force may use a four-wheel drive land vehicle used for
transporting personnel and their hand-carried equipment or land vehicle
bomb to the proximity of vital areas.
(iv) For other solidified radioactive material and Appendix P to
part 110--Category 1 and 2 Radioactive Material, DOE shall establish
and maintain or make arrangements for a physical protection system
designed to:
[[Page 72536]]
(A) Minimize the possibilities for unauthorized access to the
radioactive material;
(B) Prevent or impede the removal of the radioactive material from
the controlled area;
(C) Facilitate the location and prompt recovery of lost, stolen, or
missing radioactive material; and
(D) Mitigate potential consequences of such security-related
events.
(d) General requirements. DOE shall:
(1) Design and implement the physical protection program to satisfy
the performance requirements of this section and ensure that no single
act can disable the personnel, equipment, or systems necessary to
prevent the theft of strategic special nuclear material and significant
radiological sabotage. The physical protection program must include
diverse and redundant equipment, systems, technology, programs,
supporting processes, and implementing procedures;
(2) Establish and maintain a written performance evaluation program
in accordance with Appendix B and Appendix C to this part, to
demonstrate and assess the effectiveness of armed responders and armed
security officers to perform their assigned duties and responsibilities
to protect target sets described in paragraph (h) of this section and
Appendix C to this part, through implementation of the DOE protective
strategy. Except, the requirement for annual force-on-force exercises
only applies to formula quantities of strategic special nuclear
material and significant radiological sabotage consequence target sets;
(3) Establish, maintain, and follow an access authorization program
for protected and vital areas that meets the requirements of Sec.
73.56a and Sec. 73.57;
(4) Develop, implement, and maintain an insider mitigation program.
The insider mitigation program must be designed to oversee and monitor
the initial and continuing trustworthiness and reliability of
individuals granted or retaining unescorted access authorization to a
protected or vital area and implement defense-in-depth methodologies to
minimize the potential for an insider to adversely affect, either
directly or indirectly, DOE capability to prevent theft, diversion, and
radiological sabotage of high-level radioactive waste; and
(5) Ensure that its corrective action program assures that
failures, malfunctions, deficiencies, deviations, defective equipment,
and nonconformances in security program components, functions, or
personnel are promptly identified and corrected. Measures shall ensure
that the cause of any of these conditions is determined and that
corrective action is taken to preclude repetition.
(e) Security plans. DOE shall:
(1) Develop security plans that implement Commission requirements
and that identify:
(i) How the physical protection program will prevent the theft or
diversion and radiological sabotage of special nuclear and byproduct
materials through the establishment and maintenance of a security
organization, the use of security equipment and technology, the
training and qualification of security personnel, and the
implementation of predetermined response plans and strategies; and
(ii) Site-specific conditions that affect implementation of
Commission requirements.
(2) Protect the security plans and other related safeguards
information against unauthorized disclosure in accordance with the
requirements of Sec. 73.21 or Executive Order 12958, as appropriate.
(3) Establish, implement, and maintain written procedures that
document the structure of the security organization, detail the
specific duties and responsibilities of each position, and implement
Commission requirements through the approved security plans.
Implementing procedures must detail the specific actions to be taken
and decisions to be made by each position of the security organization
to implement the approved security plans.
(4) Develop, implement, and maintain a process for DOE's written
approval of implementing procedures and revisions to those procedures.
The process shall ensure that implementing procedures and revisions to
the procedures do not decrease the effectiveness of the security plans.
(5) Revise approved security plans as necessary to ensure the
effective implementation of Commission regulations and DOE's protective
strategy. Commission approval of revisions made pursuant to this
paragraph is not required, provided that the revisions make no change
that would decrease the effectiveness of any security plan prepared
pursuant to this section. DOE shall submit a report containing a
description of each change within six months after the change is made.
DOE shall submit any change that decreases the effectiveness of any
security plan for NRC approval pursuant to Sec. Sec. 60.45 or 63.45 of
this chapter.
(6) Establish, implement, and maintain a Commission-approved
physical security plan that identifies how the performance objective
and requirements set forth in this section will be implemented. The
physical security plan must describe the facility location and layout;
the security organization and structure; duties and responsibilities of
personnel; and defense-in-depth implementation that describes
components, equipment, and technology used. The physical security plan
must include an assessment of radiological sabotage security events
against the radiological dose criteria to determine the appropriate
protective strategy for identified target sets described in paragraph
(h) of this section.
(7) Establish, maintain, and follow a Commission-approved training
and qualification plan that identifies how the criteria set forth in
Appendix B, ``General Criteria for Security Personnel,'' Section VII,
to this part will be implemented. The training and qualification plan
must describe the process by which armed and unarmed security
personnel, watch persons, and other members of the security
organization will be selected, trained, equipped, tested, qualified,
and requalified to ensure that these individuals possess and maintain
the knowledge, skills, and abilities required to carry out their
assigned duties and responsibilities effectively.
(8) Establish, implement, and maintain a Commission-approved
safeguards contingency plan that describes how the criteria set forth
in Appendix C, ``Licensee Safeguards Contingency Plans,'' Section III,
to this part will be implemented. The safeguards contingency plan must
describe predetermined actions, plans, and strategies designed to
respond to security related events.
(f) Security organization. DOE:
(1) Shall establish and maintain a security organization designed,
staffed, trained, and equipped to provide early detection, assessment,
and response to unauthorized activities within any area of the
facility. The security organization must include:
(i) A management system that provides oversight of the onsite
physical protection program; and
(ii) At least one member, onsite and available at all times, who
has the authority to direct the activities of the security organization
and who is assigned no other duties that would interfere with this
individual's ability to perform these duties in accordance with the
approved security plans and licensee's protective strategy.
(2) Shall not permit any individual to act as a member of the
security organization unless the individual has been trained, equipped,
and qualified to
[[Page 72537]]
perform assigned duties and responsibilities in accordance with the
requirements of Appendix B, Section VII, to this part and the
Commission-approved training and qualification plan.
(3) Shall not assign an individual to any position involving
detection, assessment, or response to unauthorized activities unless
that individual has satisfied the requirements of Sec. 73.56a.
(4) Shall ensure that any written agreement with any contractor
used to implement the onsite physical protection program must be
retained as a record for the duration of the contract, and the
agreement must clearly state the following conditions:
(i) DOE is responsible to the Commission for maintaining the
physical protection program in accordance with Commission orders,
Commission regulations, and the approved security plans;
(ii) The Commission may inspect, copy, retain, and remove all
reports and documents required to be kept by Commission regulations,
orders, or applicable license conditions whether the reports and
documents are kept by DOE or the contractor;
(iii) An individual may not be assigned to any position involving
detection, assessment, or response to unauthorized activities unless
that individual has satisfied the requirements of Sec. 73.56a;
(iv) An individual may not be assigned duties and responsibilities
required to implement the approved security plans or DOE protective
strategy unless that individual has been properly trained, equipped,
and qualified to perform his or her assigned duties and
responsibilities in accordance with Appendix B, Section VII, to this
part and the Commission-approved training and qualification plan; and
(v) Upon the request of an authorized representative of the
Commission, the contractor security employees shall demonstrate the
ability to perform their assigned duties and responsibilities
effectively.
(g) Physical barriers. DOE shall establish and maintain physical
barriers in the controlled area to deter, delay, or prevent
unauthorized access; facilitate the early detection of unauthorized
activities; and control approach routes to the facility. Based upon
DOE's protective strategy, analyses, and site conditions that affect
the use and placement of physical barriers, DOE shall install and
maintain physical barriers that are designed and constructed as
necessary to deter, delay, and prevent the introduction of unauthorized
personnel, vehicles, or materials into areas for which access must be
controlled or restricted.
(1) DOE shall describe in the approved security plans, the design,
construction, and function of physical barriers and barrier systems
used and shall ensure that each barrier and barrier system is designed
and constructed to satisfy the stated function of the barrier and
barrier system.
(2) DOE shall retain in accordance with Sec. 73.70, all analyses,
comparisons, and descriptions of the physical barriers and barrier
systems used to satisfy the requirements of this section, and shall
protect these records as safeguards information in accordance with the
requirements of Sec. 73.21.
(3) Physical barriers must:
(i) Clearly delineate the boundaries of the area(s) for which the
physical barrier provides protection or a function, such as protected
and vital area boundaries and standoff distance;
(ii) Be designed and constructed to protect against security-
related events as specified by the Commission, commensurate to the
required function of each barrier and in support of the DOE's
protective strategy;
(iii) Provide visual deterrence, delay, and support access control
measures; and
(iv) Support effective implementation of DOE's protective strategy.
(4) Isolation zone. (i) An isolation zone must be maintained in
outdoor areas adjacent to the protected area perimeter barrier. The
isolation zone shall be:
(A) Designed and of sufficient size, typically 6.1 m (20 feet)
wide, to permit unobstructed observation and assessment of activities
on either side of the protected area barrier; and
(B) Equipped with intrusion detection equipment capable of
detecting both attempted and actual penetration of the protected area
perimeter barrier and assessment equipment capable of facilitating
timely evaluation of the detected unauthorized activities before
completed penetration of the protected area perimeter barrier.
(ii) Assessment equipment in the isolation zone must provide real-
time and play-back/recorded video images in a manner that allows timely
evaluation of any detected unauthorized activities before and after
each alarm annunciation.
(iii) Parking facilities, storage areas, or other obstructions that
could provide concealment or otherwise interfere with the DOE's
capability to meet the requirements of paragraphs (g)(5)(i)(A) and
(g)(5)(i)(B) must be located outside of the isolation zone.
(5) Protected area. (i) The protected area perimeter must be
protected by physical barriers designed and constructed to meet
Commission requirements, and all penetrations through this barrier must
be secured in a manner that prevents or delays and detects the
exploitation of any penetration.
(ii) The protected area perimeter physical barriers must be
separated from any other barrier designated as a vital area physical
barrier, unless otherwise identified in the approved physical security
plan.
(iii) All emergency exits in the protected area must be secured by
locking devices that allow exit only and are alarmed.
(iv) The central alarm station and the location, within which the
last access control function for access to the protected area is
performed, must be bullet-resisting.
(v) All exterior areas within the protected area must be
periodically checked to detect and deter unauthorized activities,
personnel, vehicles, and materials.
(6) Vital areas. (i) Vital equipment must be located only within
vital areas, which in turn must be located within protected areas so
that access to vital equipment requires passage through at least two
physical barriers designed and constructed to perform the required
function, except as otherwise approved by the Commission in accordance
with paragraph (h)(3) of this section.
(ii) More than one vital area may be located within a single
protected area.
(iii) Secondary power supply systems for intrusion detection and
assessment equipment, nonportable communications equipment, and the
alarm stations, must be provided protection equivalent to vital
equipment located within a vital area.
(iv) Vital equipment that is undergoing maintenance or is out of
service, or any other change to site conditions that could adversely
affect plant safety or security, must be identified in accordance with
paragraph (t) of this section, and adjustments must be made to the site
protective strategy, site procedures, and approved security plans, as
necessary.
(v) DOE shall protect all vital areas, vital area access portals,
and vital area emergency exits with intrusion detection equipment and
locking devices. Emergency exit locking devices shall be designed to
permit exit only.
(vi) Unoccupied vital areas must be locked.
(7) Vehicle barrier system. DOE must:
(i) Prevent unauthorized vehicle access or proximity to any area
from
[[Page 72538]]
which any vehicle, its personnel, or its contents could disable the
personnel, equipment, or systems necessary to meet the performance
objectives and requirements described in paragraphs (c) and (d) of this
section, as appropriate;
(ii) Limit and control all vehicle approach routes;
(iii) Design and install a vehicle barrier system, to include
passive and active barriers, at a standoff distance adequate to protect
personnel, equipment, and systems against security-related events as
specified by Commission requirements;
(iv) Deter, detect, delay, or prevent vehicle use as a means of
transporting unauthorized personnel or materials to gain unauthorized
access beyond a vehicle barrier system, gain proximity to a protected
area or vital area, or otherwise penetrate the protected area
perimeter;
(v) Periodically check the operation of active vehicle barriers and
provide a secondary power source or a means of mechanical or manual
operation, in the event of a power failure, to ensure that the active
barrier can be placed in the denial position within the time line
required to prevent unauthorized vehicle access beyond the required
standoff distance; and
(vi) Provide surveillance and observation of vehicle barriers and
barrier systems to detect unauthorized activities and to ensure the
integrity of each vehicle barrier and barrier system.
(8) Unattended openings. Unattended openings in any barrier
established to meet the requirements of this section that are 620 cm\2\
(96.1 in\2\) or greater in total area and have a smallest dimension of
15 cm (5.9 in) or greater, must be secured and monitored at a frequency
that would prevent exploitation of the opening consistent with the
intended function of each barrier.
(h) Target sets. DOE shall:
(1) Document in site procedures the process used to develop and
identify target sets, to include analyses and methodologies used to
determine and group the target set equipment or elements.
(2) Consider the effects that cyber attacks may have upon
individual equipment or elements of each target set or grouping.
(3) Explicitly identify in the approved security plans any target
set equipment or elements that are not contained within a protected or
vital area. Protective measures for such equipment or elements must be
addressed by DOE's protective strategy in accordance with Appendix C to
this part.
(4) Implement a program for the oversight of plant equipment and
systems documented as part of DOE's protective strategy to ensure that
changes to the configuration of the identified equipment and systems do
not compromise DOE's capability to prevent or mitigate radiological
sabotage.
(i) Access control. DOE shall establish an access control program
with the features described in paragraphs (i)(1) through (i)(8) of this
section.
(1) General. DOE shall:
(i) Control all points of personnel, vehicle, and material access
into any area, or beyond any physical barrier or barrier system,
established to meet the requirements of this section;
(ii) Control all points of personnel and vehicle access into vital
areas in accordance with access authorization lists;
(iii) During nonemergency conditions, limit unescorted access to
the protected area and vital areas to only those individuals who
require unescorted access to perform assigned duties and
responsibilities;
(iv) Monitor and ensure the integrity of access control systems;
(v) Provide supervision and control over the badging process to
prevent unauthorized bypass of control equipment located at or outside
of the protected area;
(vi) Isolate the individual responsible for the last control
function (controlling admission to the protected area) within a bullet-
resisting structure to assure the ability to respond or to summon
assistance in response to unauthorized activities; and
(vii) In response to a specific threat and security information,
implement a two (2) person (line-of-sight) rule for all personnel in
vital areas so that no one individual is permitted unescorted access to
vital areas. Under these conditions, DOE shall implement measures to
verify that the two-person rule has been met when a vital area is
accessed.
(2) Confirmation, verification, and search. In accordance with the
approved security plans and before granting unescorted access through
an access control point, DOE shall:
(i) Confirm the identity of individuals;
(ii) Verify the authorization for access of individuals, vehicles,
and materials; and
(iii) Search individuals, vehicles, packages, deliveries, and
materials in accordance with paragraph (j) of this section.
(3) Access control points. Access control points must be:
(i) Equipped with locking devices, intrusion detection equipment,
and monitoring, observation, and surveillance equipment, as
appropriate; and
(ii) Located outside or concurrent with, the physical barrier
system through which it controls access.
(4) Emergency conditions. DOE shall:
(i) Design the access control system to accommodate the potential
need for rapid ingress or egress of authorized individuals during
emergency conditions or situations that could lead to emergency
conditions;
(ii) Under emergency conditions, implement procedures to ensure
that:
(A) Authorized emergency personnel are provided prompt access to
affected areas and equipment;
(B) Attempted or actual unauthorized entry to vital equipment is
detected; and
(C) The capability to prevent or mitigate radiological sabotage is
maintained.
(iii) Ensure that restrictions for site access and egress during
emergency conditions are coordinated with responses by emergency
support organizations identified in the emergency plans required by
Sec. 60.21(c)(9) or Sec. 63.161 of this chapter.
(5) Vehicles. (i) DOE shall exercise control over all vehicles
while inside the protected area and vital areas to ensure that they are
used only by authorized persons and for authorized purposes.
(ii) Vehicles inside the protected area or vital areas must be
operated by an individual authorized unescorted access to the area, or
must be escorted by an individual trained, qualified, and equipped to
perform vehicle escort duties, while inside the area.
(iii) Vehicles inside the protected area must be limited to
facility functions or emergencies, and must be disabled when not in
use.
(iv) Vehicles transporting hazardous materials inside the protected
area must be escorted by an armed member of the security organization.
(6) Access control devices--(i) Identification badges. DOE shall
implement a numbered photo identification badge/key-card system for all
individuals authorized unescorted access to the protected area and
vital areas.
(A) Identification badges may be removed from the protected area
only when measures are in place to confirm the true identity and
authorization for unescorted access of the badge holder before allowing
unescorted access to the protected area.
(B) Except where operational safety concerns require otherwise,
[[Page 72539]]
identification badges must be clearly displayed by all individuals
while inside the protected area and vital areas.
(C) DOE shall maintain a record, to include the name and areas to
which unescorted access is granted, of all individuals to whom photo
identification badge/key-cards have been issued.
(ii) Keys, locks, combinations, and passwords. All keys, locks,
combinations, passwords, and related access control devices used to
control access to protected areas, vital areas, security systems, and
safeguards information must be controlled and accounted for to reduce
the probability of compromise. DOE shall:
(A) Issue access control devices only to individuals who require
unescorted access to perform official duties and responsibilities;
(B) Maintain a record, to include name and affiliation, of all
individuals to whom access control devices have been issued, and
implement a process to account for access control devices at least
annually;
(C) Implement compensatory measures upon discovery or suspicion
that any access control device may have been compromised. Compensatory
measures must remain in effect until the compromise is corrected;
(D) Retrieve, change, rotate, deactivate, or otherwise disable
access control devices that have been, or may have been, compromised;
and
(E) Retrieve, change, rotate, deactivate, or otherwise disable all
access control devices issued to individuals who no longer require
unescorted access to the areas for which the devices were designed.
(7) Visitors. (i) DOE may permit escorted access to the protected
area to individuals who do not have unescorted access authorization in
accordance with the requirements of Sec. 73.56a of this part and part
26 of this chapter. DOE shall:
(A) Implement procedures for processing, escorting, and controlling
visitors;
(B) Confirm the identity of each visitor through physical
presentation of a recognized identification card issued by a local,
State, or Federal Government agency that includes a photo or contains
physical characteristics of the individual requesting escorted access;
(C) Maintain a visitor control register in which all visitors shall
register their name, date, time, purpose of visit, employment
affiliation, citizenship, and name of the individual to be visited
before being escorted into any protected or vital area;
(D) Issue a visitor badge to all visitors that clearly indicates
that an escort is required; and
(E) Escort all visitors, at all times, while inside the protected
area and vital areas.
(ii) Individuals not employed by DOE, but who require frequent and
extended unescorted access to the protected area and vital areas, shall
satisfy the access authorization requirements of Sec. 73.56a and part
26 of this chapter and shall be issued a nonemployee photo
identification badge that is easily distinguished from other
identification badges before being allowed unescorted access to the
protected area. Nonemployee photo identification badges must indicate:
(A) Nonemployee, no escort required;
(B) Areas to which access is authorized;
(C) The period for which access is authorized;
(D) The individual's employer; and
(E) A means to determine the individual's emergency plan assembly
area.
(8) Escorts. DOE shall ensure that all escorts are trained in
accordance with Section VII of Appendix B to this part, the approved
training and qualification plan, and DOE policies and procedures.
(i) Escorts shall be authorized unescorted access to all areas in
which they will perform escort duties.
(ii) Individuals assigned to escort visitors shall be provided a
means of timely communication with both alarm stations in a manner that
ensures the ability to summon assistance when needed.
(iii) Individuals assigned to vehicle escort duties shall be
provided a means of continuous communication with both alarm stations
to ensure the ability to summon assistance when needed.
(iv) Escorts shall be knowledgeable of those activities that are
authorized to be performed within the areas for which they are assigned
to perform escort duties and must also be knowledgeable of those
activities that are authorized to be performed by any individual for
which the escort is assigned responsibility.
(v) Visitor-to-escort ratios shall be limited to 10 to 1 in the
protected area and 5 to 1 in vital areas, provided that the necessary
observation and control requirements of this section can be maintained
by the assigned escort over all visitor activities.
(j) Search programs. (1) At each designated access control point
into the DOE-controlled area and protected areas, DOE shall search
individuals, vehicles, packages, deliveries, and materials in
accordance with the requirements of this section and the approved
security plans, before granting access.
(i) The objective of the search program must be to deter, detect,
and prevent the introduction of unauthorized firearms, explosives,
incendiary devices, or other unauthorized materials and devices into
designated areas in which the unauthorized items could be used to
disable personnel, equipment, and systems necessary to meet the
performance objectives and requirements of paragraphs (c) and (d) of
this section, as appropriate.
(ii) The search requirements for unauthorized firearms, explosives,
incendiary devices, or other unauthorized materials and devices must be
accomplished through the use of equipment capable of detecting these
unauthorized items and through visual and hands-on physical searches,
as needed to ensure all items are identified before granting access.
(iii) Only trained and qualified members of the security
organization, and other trained and qualified personnel designated by
DOE, shall perform search activities or be assigned duties and
responsibilities required to satisfy observation requirements for the
search activities.
(2) DOE shall establish and implement written search procedures for
all access control points before granting access to any individual,
vehicle, package, delivery, or material.
(i) Search procedures must ensure that items possessed by an
individual, or contained within a vehicle or package, must be clearly
identified as not being a prohibited item before granting access beyond
the access control point for which the search is conducted.
(ii) DOE shall visually and physically hand search all individuals,
vehicles, and packages containing items that cannot be or are not
clearly identified by search equipment.
(3) Whenever search equipment is out of service or is not operating
satisfactorily, trained and qualified members of the security
organization shall conduct a hands-on physical search of all
individuals, vehicles, packages, deliveries, and materials that would
otherwise have been subject to equipment searches.
(4) When an attempt to introduce unauthorized items has occurred or
is suspected, DOE shall implement actions to ensure that the suspect
individuals, vehicles, packages, deliveries, and materials are denied
access and shall perform a visual and hands-on physical search to
determine the absence or existence of a threat.
[[Page 72540]]
(5) Vehicle search procedures must be performed by at least two (2)
properly trained and equipped security personnel, at least one of whom
is positioned to observe the search process and provide a timely
response to unauthorized activities, if necessary.
(6) Vehicle areas to be searched must include, but are not limited
to, the cab, engine compartment, undercarriage, and cargo area.
(7) Vehicle search checkpoints must be equipped with video
surveillance equipment that must be monitored by an individual capable
of initiating and directing a timely response to unauthorized activity.
(8) Exceptions to the search requirements of this section must be
submitted to the Commission for prior review and approval and must be
identified in the approved security plans.
(i) Vehicles and items that may be excepted from the search
requirements of this section must be escorted by an armed individual
who is trained and equipped to observe offloading and perform search
activities at the final destination within the protected area.
(ii) To the extent practicable, items excepted from search must be
off loaded only at specified receiving areas that are not adjacent to a
vital area.
(iii) The excepted items must be searched at the receiving area and
opened at the final destination by an individual familiar with the
items.
(k) Detection and assessment systems. (1) DOE shall establish and
maintain an intrusion detection and assessment system that must
provide, at all times, the capability for early detection and
assessment of unauthorized persons and activities.
(2) Intrusion detection equipment must annunciate, and video
assessment equipment images shall display, concurrently in at least two
(2) continuously staffed onsite alarm stations, both of which must be
protected in accordance with the requirements of paragraphs (g)(5)(iv),
(g)(6)(iii), and (k)(8)(ii) of this section.
(3) DOE's intrusion detection system must be designed to ensure
that both alarm station operators:
(i) Are concurrently notified of the alarm annunciation;
(ii) Are capable of making a timely assessment of the cause of each
alarm annunciation; and
(iii) Possess the capability to initiate a timely response in
accordance with the approved security plans, licensee protective
strategy, and implementing procedures.
(4) Both alarm stations must be equipped with equivalent
capabilities for detection and communication, and must be equipped with
functionally equivalent assessment, monitoring, observation, and
surveillance capabilities to support the effective implementation of
the approved security plans and DOE protective strategy in the event
that either alarm station is disabled.
(i) DOE shall ensure that a single act cannot remove the capability
of both alarm stations to detect and assess unauthorized activities,
respond to an alarm, summon assistance, implement the protective
strategy, provide command and control, or otherwise prevent
radiological sabotage or mitigate consequences.
(ii) The alarm station functions in paragraph (k)(4) of this
section must remain operable from an uninterruptible backup power
supply in the event of the loss of normal power.
(5) Detection. Detection capabilities must be provided by security
organization personnel and intrusion detection equipment, and shall be
defined in implementing procedures. Intrusion detection equipment must
be capable of operating as intended under the conditions encountered at
the facility.
(6) Assessment. Assessment capabilities must be provided by
security organization personnel and video assessment equipment, and
shall be described in implementing procedures. Video assessment
equipment must be capable of operating as intended under the conditions
encountered at the facility and must provide video images from which
accurate and timely assessments can be made in response to an alarm
annunciation or other notification of unauthorized activity.
(7) Intrusion system capabilities. DOE intrusion detection and
assessment system must:
(i) Ensure that the duties and responsibilities assigned to
personnel, the use of equipment, and the implementation of procedures
provide the detection and assessment capabilities necessary to meet the
requirements of paragraph (d) of this section;
(ii) Ensure that annunciation of an alarm indicates the type and
location of the alarm;
(iii) Ensure that alarm devices, to include transmission lines to
annunciators, are tamper indicating and self-checking;
(iv) Provide visual and audible alarm annunciation and concurrent
video assessment capability to both alarm stations in a manner that
ensures timely recognition, acknowledgment and response by each alarm
station operator in accordance with written response procedures;
(v) Provide an automatic indication when the alarm system or a
component of the alarm system fails, or when the system is operating on
the backup power supply; and
(vi) Maintain a record of all alarm annunciations, the cause of
each alarm, and the disposition of each alarm.
(8) Alarm stations. (i) Both alarm stations must be continuously
staffed by at least one trained and qualified member of the security
organization.
(ii) The interior of the alarm stations must not be visible from
the perimeter of the protected area.
(iii) DOE must not permit any activities to be performed within
either alarm station that would interfere with an alarm station
operator's ability to effectively execute assigned detection,
assessment, surveillance, and communication duties and
responsibilities.
(iv) DOE shall assess and respond to all alarms and other
indications of unauthorized activities in accordance with the approved
security plans and implementing procedures.
(v) DOE's implementing procedures must ensure that both alarm
station operators are knowledgeable of all alarm annunciations,
assessments, and final disposition of all alarms, to include, but not
limited to, a prohibition from changing the status of a detection point
or deactivating a locking or access control device at a protected or
vital area portal, without the knowledge and concurrence of the other
alarm station operator.
(9) Surveillance, observation, and monitoring.
(i) The physical protection program must include the capability for
surveillance, observation, and monitoring in a manner that provides
early detection and assessment of unauthorized activities.
(ii) DOE shall provide continual surveillance, observation, and
monitoring of all areas identified in the approved security plans as
requiring surveillance, observation, and monitoring to ensure early
detection of unauthorized activities and to ensure the integrity of
physical barriers or other components of the physical protection
program.
(A) Continual surveillance, observation, and monitoring
responsibilities must be performed by security personnel during routine
patrols or by other trained and equipped personnel designated as a
component of the protective strategy.
[[Page 72541]]
(B) Surveillance, observation, and monitoring requirements may be
accomplished by direct observation or video technology.
(iii) DOE shall provide random patrols of all accessible areas
containing target set equipment.
(A) Armed security patrols shall periodically check designated
areas and shall inspect vital area entrances, portals, and external
barriers.
(B) Physical barriers must be inspected at random intervals to
identify tampering and degradation.
(C) Security personnel shall be trained to recognize indications of
tampering, as necessary, to perform assigned duties and
responsibilities as they relate to safety and security systems and
equipment.
(iv) Unattended openings that are not monitored by intrusion
detection equipment must be observed by security personnel at a
frequency that would prevent exploitation of that opening.
(v) Upon detection of unauthorized activities, tampering, or other
threats, DOE shall initiate actions consistent with the approved
security plans, DOE protective strategy, and implementing procedures.
(10) Video technology. DOE shall:
(i) Maintain in operable condition all video technology used to
satisfy the monitoring, observation, surveillance, and assessment
requirements of this section. Video technology must be:
(A) Displayed concurrently at both alarm stations;
(B) Designed to provide concurrent observation, monitoring, and
surveillance of designated areas from which an alarm annunciation or a
notification of unauthorized activity is received;
(C) Capable of providing a timely visual display from which
positive recognition and assessment of the detected activity can be
made and a timely response initiated; and
(D) Used to supplement and limit the exposure of security personnel
to possible attack.
(ii) Implement controls for personnel assigned to monitor video
technology to ensure that assigned personnel maintain the level of
alertness required to effectively perform the assigned duties and
responsibilities.
(11) Illumination. DOE shall:
(i) Ensure that all areas of the facility, to include appropriate
portions of the DOE controlled area, are provided with illumination
necessary to satisfy the requirements of this section;
(ii) Provide a minimum illumination level of 2.2 Lux (0.2 foot-
candle) measured horizontally at ground level, in the isolation zones
and all exterior areas within the protected area, or augment the
facility illumination system, to include patrols, responders, and video
technology, with low-light technology capable of meeting the detection,
assessment, surveillance, observation, monitoring, and response
requirements of this section; and
(iii) Describe in the approved security plans how the lighting
requirements of this section are met and, if used, the type(s) and
application of low-light technology used.
(l) Communication requirements. (1) DOE shall establish and
maintain continuous communication capability with onsite and offsite
resources to ensure effective command and control during both normal
and emergency situations.
(2) Individuals assigned to each alarm station shall be capable of
calling for assistance in accordance with the approved security plans,
licensee integrated response plan, and licensee procedures.
(3) Each on-duty security officer, watch-person, vehicle escort,
and armed response force member shall be capable of maintaining
continuous communication with an individual in each alarm station.
(4) The following continuous communication capabilities must
terminate in both alarm stations required by this section:
(i) Conventional telephone service;
(ii) Radio or microwave transmitted two-way voice communication,
either directly or through an intermediary; and
(iii) A system for communication with on-duty operations personnel,
escorts, local, State, and Federal law enforcement agencies, and all
other personnel necessary to coordinate necessary responses.
(5) Nonportable communications equipment must remain operable from
independent power sources in the event of the loss of normal power.
(6) DOE shall identify site areas where communication could be
interrupted or cannot be maintained and shall establish alternative
communication measures for these areas in implementing procedures.
(m) Response requirements. (1) DOE shall:
(i) Establish and maintain, at all times, the minimum number of
properly trained and equipped personnel required to intercept,
challenge, delay, and/or neutralize security-related events as
specified by the Commission for radiological sabotage and theft or
diversion of special nuclear material.
(ii) Provide and maintain firearms, ammunition, and equipment
capable of performing functions commensurate to the needs of each armed
member of the security organization to carry out their assigned duties
and responsibilities in accordance with the approved security plans,
DOE's protective strategy, implementing procedures, and the site-
specific conditions under which the firearms, ammunition, and equipment
will be used.
(iii) Describe, in the approved security plans, all firearms and
equipment to be possessed by, and readily available to, armed personnel
to implement the protective strategy and carry out all assigned duties
and responsibilities. This description must include the general
distribution and assignment of firearms, ammunition, body armor, and
other equipment used.
(iv) Ensure that all firearms, ammunition, and equipment required
by the protective strategy and security plans are in sufficient supply,
are in working condition, and are readily available for use in
accordance with DOE protective strategy and predetermined timelines.
(v) Ensure that all armed members of the security organization are
trained in the proper use and maintenance of assigned weapons and
equipment in accordance with Section VII of Appendix B of this part
(2) DOE shall:
(i) Instruct each armed response person to prevent or impede
attempted acts of theft or radiological sabotage by using force
sufficient to counter the force directed at that person, including the
use of deadly force in accordance with the requirements of Part 1047 of
this title, when the armed response person has a reasonable belief that
the use of such force is necessary in self-defense or in the defense of
others, or any other circumstances as authorized by applicable Federal
law;
(ii) Provide an armed response consisting of a tactical response
team, armed responders, and armed security officers to carry out
response duties, within predetermined timelines;
(iii) Determine, subject to Commission approval, the minimum number
of armed security officers and armed responders necessary to protect
against security events and document the numbers in the approved
security plans;
(iv) Have armed responders available at all times inside the
protected area. The armed responders may not be assigned any other
duties or responsibilities that could interfere with assigned response
duties. Armed security officers designated to strengthen response
capabilities shall be onsite and available at all times to carry out
assigned response duties; and
[[Page 72542]]
(v) Ensure that training and qualification requirements accurately
reflect the duties and responsibilities to be performed.
(3) DOE shall describe, in the approved security plans, procedures
for responding to an unplanned incident that reduces the number of
available armed response team members below the minimum number
documented by DOE in the approved security plans.
(4) DOE shall develop, maintain, and implement a written protective
strategy in accordance with the requirements of this section and
Appendix C to this part.
(5) DOE shall ensure that all personnel authorized unescorted
access to the protected area are trained and understand their roles and
responsibilities during security incidents, to include hostage and
duress situations.
(6) Upon receipt of an alarm or other indication of threat, DOE
shall:
(i) Determine the existence of a threat in accordance with
assessment procedures;
(ii) Identify the level of threat present through the use of
assessment methodologies and procedures;
(iii) Determine the response necessary to intercept, challenge,
delay, and neutralize, impede, or mitigate the threat in accordance
with the requirements of Section III of Appendix C of this part, the
Commission-approved safeguards contingency plan, and the DOE response
strategy; and
(iv) If required, notify offsite support agencies such as local law
enforcement, in accordance with site procedures.
(7) If offsite support is required, DOE shall document and maintain
a pre-arranged plan with local, State, and/or Federal law enforcement
agencies for assistance, in response to an actual theft of radioactive
material.
(n) Digital computer and communication networks--(1) Cyber-security
program. DOE shall implement a cyber-security program that provides
high assurance that computer systems, which if compromised would likely
adversely impact safety, security, and emergency preparedness, are
protected from cyber attacks.
(i) DOE shall describe the cyber-security program requirements in
the approved security plans.
(ii) DOE shall incorporate the cyber-security program into the
physical protection program.
(iii) The cyber-security program must be designed to detect and
prevent cyber attacks on protected computer systems.
(2) Cyber-security assessment. DOE shall implement a cyber security
assessment program to systematically assess and manage cyber risks.
(3) Policies, requirements, and procedures. (i) DOE shall apply
cyber-security requirements and policies that identify management
expectations and requirements for the protection of computer systems.
(ii) DOE shall develop and maintain implementing procedures to
ensure that cyber-security requirements and policies are implemented
effectively.
(4) Incident response and recovery. (i) DOE shall implement a
cyber-security incident response and recovery plan to minimize the
adverse impact of a cyber-security incident on safety, security, or
emergency preparedness systems.
(ii) The cyber-security incident response and recovery plan must be
described in the integrated response plan required by Section III of
Appendix C to this part.
(iii) The cyber-security incident response and recovery plan must
ensure the capability to respond to cyber-security incidents, minimize
loss and destruction, mitigate and correct the weaknesses that were
exploited, and restore systems and/or equipment affected by a cyber-
security incident.
(5) Protective strategies. DOE shall implement defense-in-depth
protective strategies to protect computer systems from cyber attacks,
detecting, isolating, and neutralizing unauthorized activities in a
timely manner.
(6) Configuration and control management program. DOE shall
implement a configuration and control management program, to include
cyber-risk analysis, to ensure that modifications to computer system
designs, access control measures, configuration, operational integrity,
and management process do not adversely impact facility safety,
security, and emergency preparedness systems before implementation of
those modifications.
(7) Cyber-security awareness and training. (i) DOE shall implement
a cyber-security awareness and training program.
(ii) The cyber-security awareness and training program must ensure
that appropriate personnel, including contractors, are aware of cyber-
security requirements and that they receive the training required to
effectively perform their assigned duties and responsibilities.
(o) Security program reviews and audits. (1) DOE shall review the
physical protection program at intervals not to exceed twelve (12)
months, or
(i) As necessary based upon assessments or other performance
indicators; or
(ii) Within twelve (12) months after a change occurs in personnel,
procedures, equipment, or facilities that potentially could adversely
affect security.
(2) As a minimum, each element of the physical protection program
must be reviewed at least every twenty-four (24) months.
(i) The onsite physical protection program review must be
documented and performed by individuals independent of those personnel
responsible for program management and any individual who has direct
responsibility for implementing the onsite physical protection program.
(ii) Physical protection program reviews and audits must include,
but not be limited to, an evaluation of the effectiveness of the
approved security plans, implementing procedures, response commitments
from any response forces by local, State, and Federal law enforcement
authorities, cyber-security programs, safety/security interface, and
the testing, maintenance, and calibration program.
(3) DOE shall periodically review the approved security plans, the
integrated response plan, DOE protective strategy, and licensee
implementing procedures to evaluate their effectiveness and potential
impact on facility and personnel safety.
(4) DOE shall periodically evaluate the cyber-security program for
effectiveness and shall update the cyber-security program as needed to
ensure protection against changes to internal and external threats.
(5) DOE shall conduct quarterly drills and annual exercises in
accordance with Section III of Appendix C to this part and the DOE
performance evaluation program. Except, the requirements for annual
force-on-force exercises only apply to formula quantities of strategic
special nuclear material and significant radiological sabotage
consequence target sets.
(6) The results and recommendations of the physical protection
program reviews and audits, management's findings regarding program
effectiveness, and any actions taken as a result of recommendations
from prior program reviews must be documented in a report for DOE's
management at least one level higher than that having responsibility
for day-to-day facility operation.
(7) Findings from onsite physical protection program reviews,
audits, and assessments must be entered into the site's corrective
action program and protected as safeguards information, if applicable.
(8) DOE shall make changes to the approved security plans and
implementing procedures as a result of findings from security program
reviews,
[[Page 72543]]
audits, and assessments, where necessary, to ensure the effective
implementation of Commission regulations and DOE protective strategy.
(9) Unless otherwise specified by the Commission, physical
protection program reviews, audits, and assessments may be conducted up
to thirty (30) days prior to, but no later than thirty (30) days after
the scheduled date without adverse impact upon the next scheduled
annual audit date.
(p) Maintenance, testing, and calibration.
(1) DOE shall:
(i) Implement a maintenance, testing, and calibration program to
ensure that security systems and equipment are tested for operability
and performance at predetermined intervals, are maintained in operable
condition, and are capable of performing their intended function when
needed;
(ii) Describe the maintenance, testing, and calibration program in
the approved physical security plan. Implementing procedures must
specify operational and technical details required to perform
maintenance, testing, and calibration activities to include, but not be
limited to, purpose of activity, actions to be taken, acceptance
criteria, the intervals or frequency at which the activity will be
performed, and compensatory actions required;
(iii) Document problems, failures, deficiencies, and other
findings, to include the cause of each, and enter each in the site's
corrective action program. DOE shall protect this information as
safeguards information, if applicable; and
(iv) Implement compensatory measures in a timely manner to ensure
that the effectiveness of the onsite physical protection program is not
reduced by failure or degraded operation of security-related components
or equipment.
(2) Each intrusion alarm must be tested for operability at the
beginning and end of any period that it is used for security, or if the
period of continuous use exceeds seven (7) days, the intrusion alarm
must be tested at least once every seven (7) days.
(3) Intrusion detection and access control equipment must be
performance tested in accordance with the approved security plans.
(4) Equipment required for communications onsite must be tested for
operability not less frequently than once at the beginning of each
security personnel work shift.
(5) Communication systems between the alarm stations and each
control room, and between the alarm stations and offsite support
agencies, to include backup communication equipment, must be tested for
operability at least once each day.
(6) Search equipment must be tested for operability at least once
each day and tested for performance at least once during each seven-day
period and before being placed back in service after each repair or
inoperative state.
(7) All intrusion detection equipment, communication equipment,
physical barriers, and other security-related devices or equipment, to
include backup power supplies, must be maintained in operable
condition.
(8) A program for testing or verifying the operability of devices
or equipment located in hazardous areas must be specified in the
approved security plans and must define alternate measures to be taken
to ensure the timely completion of testing or maintenance when the
hazardous condition or radiation restrictions are no longer applicable.
(q) Compensatory measures. DOE shall identify measures and criteria
needed to compensate for the loss or reduced performance of personnel,
equipment, systems, and components that are required to meet the
requirements of this section. Compensatory measures must be designed
and implemented to provide a level of protection that is equivalent to
the protection that was provided by the degraded or inoperable
personnel, equipment, system, or components. Compensatory measures must
be implemented within specific timelines necessary to meet the
requirements stated in paragraph (d) of this section and described in
the approved security plans.
(r) Suspension of safeguards measures. DOE:
(1) May suspend implementation of affected requirements of this
section under the following conditions:
(i) DOE may suspend any safeguards measures, pursuant to this
section, in an emergency, when this action is immediately needed to
protect the public health and safety, and no action consistent with
license conditions and technical specifications that can provide
adequate or equivalent protection is immediately apparent. This
suspension of safeguards measures must be approved at a minimum by a
designated senior site manager prior to taking this action; and
(ii) During severe weather when the suspension is immediately
needed to protect personnel whose assigned duties and responsibilities,
in meeting the requirements of this section, would otherwise constitute
a life threatening situation, and no action consistent with the
requirements of this section that can provide equivalent protection is
immediately apparent. Suspension of safeguards due to severe weather
must be initiated by the security supervisor and approved by a
designated senior site manager prior to taking this action.
(2) Must reimplement suspended security measures as soon as
conditions permit; and
(3) Must report and document the suspension of safeguards measures
in accordance with the provisions of Sec. 73.71 of this part.
(s) Records. DOE shall maintain all records required to be kept by
Commission regulations, orders, or license conditions, as a record
until the Commission terminates the license for which the records were
developed and shall maintain superseded portions of these records for
at least three (3) years after the record is superseded, unless
otherwise specified by the Commission. The Commission may inspect,
copy, retain, and remove copies of all records required to be kept by
Commission regulations, orders, or license conditions whether the
records are kept by DOE or a contractor.
(t) Safety/security interface. DOE shall develop and implement a
process to inform and coordinate safety and security activities to
ensure that these activities do not adversely affect the capabilities
of the security organization to satisfy the requirements of this
section, or overall GROA safety:
(1) DOE shall assess and manage the potential for adverse affects
on safety and security, including the site emergency plan, before
implementing changes to GROA operations, facility conditions, or
security.
(2) The scope of changes to be assessed and managed must include
planned and emergent activities (such as, but not limited to, physical
modifications, procedural changes, changes to operator actions or
security assignments, maintenance activities, system reconfiguration,
access modification or restrictions, and changes to the security plan
and its implementation).
(3) Where potential adverse interactions are identified, DOE shall
communicate them to appropriate licensee personnel and take
compensatory and/or mitigative actions to maintain safety and security
under applicable Commission regulations, requirements, and license
conditions.
(u) Alternative measures. (1) The Commission may authorize DOE to
provide a measure for protection against radiological sabotage or theft
or diversion other than one required by this section if DOE
demonstrates that:
[[Page 72544]]
(i) The measure meets the same performance objectives and
requirements as specified in paragraphs (c) and (d) of this section, as
appropriate; and
(ii) The proposed alternative measure provides protection against
radiological sabotage or theft or diversion equivalent to that which
would be provided by the specific requirement for which it would
substitute.
(2) DOE shall submit each proposed alternative measure to the
Commission for review and approval in accordance with Sec. 60.45 or
Sec. 63.45, of this chapter, before implementation.
(3) DOE shall submit a technical basis for each proposed
alternative measure, to include any analysis or assessment conducted in
support of a determination that the proposed alternative measure
provides a level of protection that is at least equal to that which
would otherwise be provided by the specific requirement of this
section.
(4) In the case of alternative vehicle barrier systems required by
paragraph (g)(7) of this section, DOE shall demonstrate that the
alternative measure provides substantial protection against a vehicle
bomb.
(v) Additional requirements for Strategic Special Nuclear Material.
In addition to any other requirements of this section, for formula
quantities of strategic special nuclear material, DOE shall establish
and maintain, or arrange for physical protection systems, subsystems,
components, and procedures that provide the following additional
performance capabilities for fixed site protection unless otherwise
authorized by the Commission:
(1) Security organization.
(i) DOE's management system shall include written security
procedures which detail the duties of the Tactical Response Team
responsible for responding to security events involving strategic
special nuclear material.
(ii) Tactical Response Team members shall also be trained and
qualified in accordance with Section VII of Appendix B to this part.
Upon the request of an authorized representative of the Commission, DOE
shall demonstrate the ability of the physical security personnel,
whether licensee or contractor employees, to carry out their assigned
duties and responsibilities.
(iii) Within any given period of time, a member of the security
organization may not be assigned to, or have direct operational control
over, more than one of the redundant elements of a physical protection
subsystem if such assignment or control could result in the loss of
effectiveness of the subsystem.
(2) Physical barrier subsystems.
(i) In addition to the requirements in paragraph (g)(6) of this
section, access to vital equipment, related to strategic special
nuclear material, requires passage through at least three physical
barriers.
(ii) Strategic special nuclear material must be stored or handled
only in a material access area located within a protected area so that
access to strategic special nuclear material requires passage through
at least three physical barriers. (NOTE: A waste package or a cask is
considered to be a barrier.)
(iii) The inner barrier of the protected area perimeter must be
positioned and constructed to delay attempts at unauthorized exit from
the protected area.
(iv) The physical barriers at the perimeter of the protected area
shall be separated from any other barrier designated as a physical
barrier for a vital area or material access area within the protected
area.
(3) Access control subsystems and procedures.
(i) In addition to the requirements of paragraph (i) of this
section:
(A) Access to vital equipment, related to strategic special nuclear
material and material access areas, shall include at least two
individuals;
(B) Authorization for such individuals shall be indicated by the
issuance of specially coded numbered badges indicating material access
areas, and controlled access areas to which access is authorized; and
(C) No activities other than those which require access to
strategic special nuclear material or to equipment used in the
processing, use, or storage of strategic special nuclear material, or
necessary maintenance, shall be permitted within a material access
area.
(ii) DOE shall establish and follow written procedures that will
permit access control personnel to identify those vehicles that are
authorized and those materials that are not authorized entry to
material access areas.
(iii) DOE shall control all points of personnel and vehicle access
to material access areas, strategic special nuclear material vital
areas, and strategic special nuclear material controlled access areas.
(A) At least two (2) armed guards, trained in accordance with the
provisions contained in paragraph (d)(3) of this section and Section
VII of Appendix B of this part, shall be posted at each material access
area control point whenever in use.
(B) Identification and authorization of personnel and vehicles must
be verified at the material access area control point.
(C) Prior to entry into a material access area, packages must be
searched for firearms, explosives, and incendiary devices.
(4) Search programs.
(i) All vehicles, materials, and packages, including trash, wastes,
tools, and equipment exiting from a material access area, must be
searched for concealed strategic special nuclear material by a team of
at least two individuals who are not authorized access to that material
access area.
(ii) Each individual exiting a material access area shall undergo
at least two (2) separate searches for concealed strategic special
nuclear material. For individuals exiting an area that contains only
alloyed or encapsulated strategic special nuclear material, the second
search may be conducted in a random manner.
(iii) Before exiting from a material access area, containers of
contaminated wastes must be drum scanned and tamper sealed by at least
two (2) individuals, working and recording their findings as a team,
who do not have access to material processing and storage areas.
(5) Detection, surveillance, and alarm subsystems and procedures.
(i) All emergency exits in each material access and strategic special
nuclear material vital area shall be locked to prevent entry from the
outside and alarmed to provide local visible and audible alarm
annunciation.
(ii) All unoccupied strategic special nuclear material vital areas
and material access areas shall be locked and protected by an intrusion
alarm subsystem which will alarm upon the entry of a person anywhere
into the area, upon exit from the area, and upon movement of an
individual within the area.
(iii) Vaults that contain strategic special nuclear material that
has not been alloyed or encapsulated shall also be under the
surveillance of closed circuit television that is monitored in both
alarm stations. Additionally, means shall be employed which require
that an individual other than an alarm station operator be present at,
or have knowledge of access to, such unoccupied vaults or process
areas.
(iv) Methods to observe individuals within material access areas to
assure that strategic special nuclear material is not moved to
unauthorized locations or in an unauthorized manner shall be provided
and used on a continuing basis.
(v) Alarms occurring within unoccupied vaults and unoccupied
material access areas containing unalloyed or unencapsulated strategic
special nuclear material shall be assessed by at least two (2) security
[[Page 72545]]
personnel using closed circuit television or other remote means.
(vi) Alarms occurring within unoccupied material access areas that
contain only alloyed or encapsulated strategic special nuclear material
shall be assessed by at least two (2) security personnel using closed
circuit television or other remote means, or by at least two (2)
security personnel who shall undergo a search before exiting the
material access area.
(6) Response requirements. In addition to the armed response team,
a Tactical Response Team consisting of a minimum of five (5) members
must be available at the facility to fulfill assessment and response
requirements.
(i) The size and availability of the Tactical Response Force must
be determined on the basis of site-specific considerations that could
affect the ability of the total onsite response force to neutralize
security-related events consistent with DOE's protective strategy.
(ii) Each Tactical Response Team member shall be armed with a 9mm
semiautomatic pistol. All but one member of the Tactical Response Team
shall be additionally armed with a covered weapon as described in
Section VII of Appendix B of this part.
(iii) The rationale for the total number, availability, and arming
of Tactical Response Team personnel must be included in the security
plans submitted to the Commission for approval.
(iv) DOE shall establish, maintain, and follow a Commission-
approved safeguards contingency plan for responding to threats up to
and including the design basis threats described in Sec. 73.1(a), for
theft or diversion and radiological sabotage related to formula
quantities of strategic special nuclear material.
15. Section 73.56a is added to read as follows:
Sec. 73.56a Personnel access authorization requirements for a
geologic repository operations area.
(a) Applicability. (1) DOE, as a licensee under part 60 or part 63
of this chapter, shall satisfy the requirements of this section upon
receipt of Commission authorization to receive and possess source,
special nuclear, or byproduct material at the geologic repository
operations area. DOE shall submit the access authorization program for
review and approval.
(2) DOE is responsible to the Commission for maintaining the
authorization program in accordance with Commission regulations and
related Commission-directed orders through the implementation of the
approved program and site implementing procedures.
(3) Contractors and vendors (C/Vs) who implement authorization
programs or program elements shall develop, implement, and maintain
authorization programs or program elements that meet the requirements
of this section, to the extent that DOE relies upon those C/V
authorization programs or program elements to meet the requirements of
this section. In any case, only DOE shall grant or permit an individual
to maintain unescorted access to the protected and vital areas of a
GROA.
(b) Individuals who are subject to an authorization program.
(1) The following individuals shall be subject to an authorization
program:
(i) Any individual to whom a DOE grants unescorted access to
protected and vital areas of a GROA;
(ii) Any individual whose assigned duties and responsibilities
permit the individual to take actions by electronic means, either
onsite or remotely, that could adversely impact the operational safety,
security, or emergency response capabilities;
(iii) Any individual who has responsibilities for implementing
DOE's protective strategy, including, but not limited to, armed
security force officers, alarm station operators, and tactical response
team leaders; and
(iv) DOE's or the C/V's reviewing official.
(2) At DOE's or the C/V's discretion, other individuals who are
designated in access authorization program procedures may be subject to
an authorization program that meets the requirements of this section.
(c) General performance objective. Access authorization programs
must provide high assurance that the individuals who are specified in
paragraph (b)(1) of this section, and, if applicable, paragraph (b)(2)
of this section are trustworthy and reliable, such that they do not
constitute an unreasonable risk to public health and safety or the
common defense and security, including the potential to commit
radiological sabotage, theft, or diversion.
(d) Background investigation. In order to grant unescorted access
authorization to an individual, DOE and the C/Vs specified in paragraph
(a) of this section shall ensure that the individual has been subject
to a background investigation. The background investigation must
include, but is not limited to, the following elements:
(1) Informed consent. DOE and the C/Vs specified in paragraph (a)
of this section may not initiate any element of a background
investigation without the knowledge and written consent of the subject
individual. DOE and C/Vs shall inform the individual of his or her
right to review information collected to assure its accuracy and
provide the individual with an opportunity to correct any inaccurate or
incomplete information that is developed by DOE and C/Vs about the
individual.
(i) The subject individual may withdraw his or her consent at any
time. DOE or the C/V to whom the individual has applied for unescorted
access authorization shall inform the individual that withdrawal of his
or her consent will withdraw the individual's current application for
access authorization under DOE's or the C/V's authorization program;
and
(ii) If an individual withdraws his or her consent, DOE and the C/
Vs specified in paragraph (a) of this section may not initiate any
elements of the background investigation that were not in progress at
the time the individual withdrew his or her consent, but shall complete
any background investigation elements that are in progress at the time
consent is withdrawn.
(iii) DOE and the C/Vs specified in paragraph (a) of this section
shall inform, in writing, any individual who is applying for unescorted
access authorization that the following actions related to providing
and sharing the personal information under this section are sufficient
cause for denial or unfavorable termination of unescorted access
authorization:
(A) Refusal to provide written consent for the background
investigation;
(B) Refusal to provide or the falsification of any personal history
information required under this section, including the failure to
report any previous denial or unfavorable termination of unescorted
access authorization; and
(C) Failure to report any arrests or formal actions specified in
paragraph (g) of this section.
(2) Personal history disclosure.
(i) Any individual who is applying for unescorted access
authorization shall disclose the personal history information that is
required by DOE's or the C/V's authorization program and any
information that may be necessary for the reviewing official to make a
determination of the individual's trustworthiness and reliability.
(ii) DOE and the C/Vs may not require an individual to disclose an
administrative withdrawal of unescorted access authorization under the
requirements of paragraphs (g), (h)(7), or (i)(1)(v) of this section,
if the individual's unescorted access
[[Page 72546]]
authorization was not subsequently denied or terminated unfavorably by
DOE or a C/V.
(3) Verification of true identity. DOE and C/Vs shall verify the
true identity of an individual who is applying for unescorted access
authorization in order to ensure that the applicant is the person that
he or she has claimed to be. At a minimum, DOE and C/Vs shall validate
the social security number that the individual has provided and, in the
case of foreign nationals, the alien registration number that the
individual provides. In addition, DOE and C/Vs shall also determine
whether the results of the fingerprinting required under Sec. 73.21
confirm the individual's claimed identity, if such results are
available.
(4) Employment history evaluation. DOE and C/Vs shall ensure that
an employment history evaluation has been completed, by questioning the
individual's present and former employers, and by determining the
activities of individuals while unemployed.
(i) For the claimed employment period, the employment history
evaluation must ascertain the reason for termination, eligibility for
rehire, and other information that could reflect on the individual's
trustworthiness and reliability.
(ii) If the claimed employment was military service, DOE or the C/V
who is conducting the employment history evaluation shall request a
characterization of service, reason for separation, and any
disciplinary actions that could affect a trustworthiness and
reliability determination.
(iii) Periods of self-employment or unemployment may be verified by
any reasonable method. If education is claimed in lieu of employment,
DOE or the C/V shall request information that could reflect on the
individual's trustworthiness and reliability and, at a minimum, verify
that the individual was actively participating in the educational
process during the claimed period.
(iv) If a company, previous employer, or educational institution to
whom DOE or the C/V has directed a request for information refuses to
provide information or indicates an inability or unwillingness to
provide information within 3 business days of the request, DOE or the
C/V shall document this refusal, inability, or unwillingness in DOE's,
or the C/V's, record of the investigation, and obtain a confirmation of
employment or educational enrollment and attendance from at least one
alternate source, with questions answered to the best of the alternate
source's ability. This alternate source may not have been previously
used by DOE or the C/V to obtain information about the individual's
character and reputation. If DOE or the C/V uses an alternate source
because employment information is not forthcoming within 3 business
days of the request, DOE or the C/V need not delay granting unescorted
access authorization to wait for any employer response, but shall
evaluate and document the response if it is received.
(v) When DOE, or any C/V specified in paragraph (a) of this
section, is legitimately seeking the information required for an
unescorted access authorization decision under this section and has
obtained a signed release from the subject individual authorizing the
disclosure of such information, DOE or a C/V who is subject to this
section shall disclose whether the subject individual's unescorted
access authorization was denied or terminated unfavorably. DOE or the
C/V who receives the request for information shall make available the
information upon which the denial or unfavorable termination of
unescorted access authorization was based.
(vi) In conducting an employment history evaluation, DOE or the C/V
may obtain information and documents by electronic means, including,
but not limited to, telephone, facsimile, or email. DOE or the C/V
shall make a record of the contents of the telephone call and shall
retain that record, and any documents or files obtained electronically,
in accordance with paragraph (o) of this section.
(5) Credit history evaluation. DOE and the C/Vs specified in
paragraph (a) of this section shall ensure that the full credit history
of any individual who is applying for unescorted access authorization
has been evaluated. A full credit history evaluation must include, but
would not be limited to, an inquiry to detect potential fraud or misuse
of social security numbers or other financial identifiers, and a review
and evaluation of all of the information that is provided by a national
credit-reporting agency about the individual's credit history.
(6) Character and reputation. DOE and the C/Vs specified in
paragraph (a) of this section shall ascertain the character and
reputation of an individual who has applied for unescorted access
authorization by conducting reference checks. Reference checks may not
be conducted with any person who is known to be a close member of the
individual's family, including, but not limited to, the individual's
spouse, parents, siblings, or children, or any individual who resides
in the individual's permanent household. The reference checks must
focus on the individual's reputation for trustworthiness and
reliability.
(7) Criminal history review. DOE's or the C/V's reviewing official
shall evaluate the entire criminal history record of an individual who
is applying for unescorted access authorization to assist in
determining whether the individual has a record of criminal activity
that may adversely impact his or her trustworthiness and reliability.
The criminal history record must be obtained in accordance with the
requirements of Sec. 73.57.
(e) Psychological assessment. In order to assist in determining an
individual's trustworthiness and reliability, DOE and the C/Vs
specified in paragraph (a) of this section shall ensure that a
psychological assessment has been completed of the individual who is
applying for unescorted access authorization. The psychological
assessment must be designed to evaluate the possible adverse impact of
any noted psychological characteristics on the individual's
trustworthiness and reliability.
(1) A licensed clinical psychologist or psychiatrist shall conduct
the psychological assessment.
(2) The psychological assessment must be conducted in accordance
with the applicable ethical principles for conducting such assessments
established by the American Psychological Association or American
Psychiatric Association.
(3) At a minimum, the psychological assessment must include the
administration and interpretation of a standardized, objective,
professionally accepted psychological test that provides information to
identify indications of disturbances in personality or psychopathology
that may have implications for an individual's trustworthiness and
reliability. Predetermined thresholds must be applied in interpreting
the results of the psychological test, to determine whether an
individual shall be interviewed by a psychiatrist or licensed clinical
psychologist under paragraph (e)(4)(i) of this section.
(4) The psychological assessment must include a clinical
interview--
(i) If an individual's scores on the psychological test in
paragraph (e)(3) of this section identify indications of disturbances
in personality or psychopathology that may have implications for an
individual's trustworthiness and reliability; or
(ii) If DOE's Physical Security Plan requires a clinical interview
based on job assignments.
[[Page 72547]]
(5) If, in the course of conducting the psychological assessment,
the licensed clinical psychologist or psychiatrist identifies
indications of, or information related to, a medical condition that
could adversely impact the individual's fitness for duty or
trustworthiness and reliability, the psychologist or psychiatrist shall
inform the reviewing official, who shall ensure that an appropriate
evaluation of the possible medical condition is conducted under the
requirements of part 26 of this chapter.
(f) Behavioral observation. Access authorization programs must
include a behavioral observation element that is designed to detect
behaviors or activities that may constitute an unreasonable risk to the
health and safety of the public and common defense and security,
including a potential threat to commit radiological sabotage, theft, or
diversion.
(1) DOE and the C/Vs specified in paragraph (a) of this section
shall ensure that the individuals specified in paragraph (b)(1) of this
section and, if applicable, paragraph (b)(2) of this section are
subject to behavioral observation.
(2) The individuals specified in paragraph (b)(1) and, if
applicable, paragraph (b)(2) of this section shall observe the behavior
of other individuals. DOE and the C/Vs specified in paragraph (a) of
this section shall ensure that individuals who are subject to this
section also successfully complete behavioral observation training.
(i) Behavioral observation training must be completed before DOE or
the C/V grants an initial unescorted access authorization, as defined
in paragraph (h)(5) of this section, and must be current before DOE or
the C/V grants an unescorted access authorization update, as defined in
paragraph (h)(6) of this section, or an unescorted access authorization
reinstatement, as defined in paragraph (h)(7) of this section;
(ii) Individuals shall complete refresher training on a nominal 12-
month frequency, or more frequently where the need is indicated.
Individuals may take and pass a comprehensive examination that meets
the requirements of paragraph (f)(2)(iii) of this section in lieu of
completing annual refresher training;
(iii) Individuals shall demonstrate the successful completion of
behavioral observation training by passing a comprehensive examination
that addresses the knowledge and abilities necessary to detect behavior
or activities that have the potential to constitute an unreasonable
risk to the health and safety of the public and common defense and
security, including a potential threat to commit radiological sabotage,
theft or diversion. Remedial training and re-testing are required for
individuals who fail to satisfactorily complete the examination.
(iv) Initial and refresher training may be delivered using a
variety of media (including, but not limited to, classroom lectures,
required reading, video, or computer-based training systems). DOE or
the C/V shall monitor the completion of training.
(3) Individuals who are subject to an authorization program under
this section shall report to the reviewing official any concerns
arising from behavioral observation, including, but not limited to,
concerns related to any questionable behavior patterns or activities of
others.
(g) Arrest reporting. Any individual who has applied for or is
maintaining unescorted access authorization under this section shall
promptly report to the reviewing official any formal action(s) taken by
a law enforcement authority or court of law to which the individual has
been subject, including an arrest, an indictment, the filing of
charges, or a conviction. On the day that the report is received, the
reviewing official shall evaluate the circumstances related to the
formal action(s) and determine whether to grant, maintain,
administratively withdraw, deny, or unfavorably terminate the
individual's unescorted access authorization.
(h) Granting unescorted access authorization. DOE and the C/Vs
specified in paragraph (a) of this section shall implement the
requirements of this paragraph for granting initial unescorted access
authorization, updated unescorted access authorization, and
reinstatement of unescorted access authorization.
(1) Accepting unescorted access authorization from other
authorization programs. DOE and the C/Vs who are seeking to grant
unescorted access authorization to an individual who is subject to
another authorization program that complies with this section may rely
on the program elements completed by the transferring authorization
program to satisfy the requirements of this section. An individual may
maintain his or her unescorted access authorization if he or she
continues to be subject to either DOE or the receiving C/V's
authorization program or the transferring licensee's, applicant's, or
C/V's authorization program, or a combination of elements from both
programs that collectively satisfy the requirements of this section.
The receiving authorization program shall ensure that the program
elements maintained by the transferring program remain current.
(2) Information sharing. To meet the requirements of this section,
DOE and C/Vs may rely upon the information that other C/Vs who are
subject to this section have gathered about individuals who have
previously applied for unescorted access authorization and developed
about individuals during periods in which the individuals maintained
unescorted access authorization.
(3) Requirements applicable to all unescorted access authorization
categories. Before granting unescorted access authorization to
individuals in any category, including individuals whose unescorted
access authorization has been interrupted for a period of 30 or fewer
days, DOE or the C/V shall ensure that--
(i) The individual's written consent to conduct a background
investigation, if necessary, has been obtained and the individual's
true identity has been verified, in accordance with paragraphs (d)(2)
and (d)(3) of this section, respectively;
(ii) A credit history evaluation or re-evaluation has been
completed in accordance with the requirements of paragraphs (d)(5) or
(i)(1)(v) of this section, as applicable;
(iii) The individual's character and reputation have been
ascertained, in accordance with paragraph (d)(6) of this section;
(iv) The individual's criminal history record has been obtained and
reviewed or updated, in accordance with paragraphs (d)(7) and (i)(1)(v)
of this section, as applicable;
(v) A psychological assessment or reassessment of the individual
has been completed in accordance with the requirements of paragraphs
(e) or (i)(1)(v) of this section, as applicable;
(vi) The individual has successfully completed the initial or
refresher, as applicable, behavioral observation training that is
required under paragraph (f) of this section; and
(vii) The individual has been informed, in writing, of his or her
arrest-reporting responsibilities under paragraph (g) of this section.
(4) Interruptions in unescorted access authorization. For
individuals who have previously held unescorted access authorization
under this section or Sec. 73.56 but whose unescorted access
authorization has since been terminated under favorable conditions, DOE
or the C/V shall implement the requirements in this paragraph for
initial unescorted access authorization in paragraph (h)(5)
[[Page 72548]]
of this section, updated unescorted access authorization in paragraph
(h)(6) of this section, or reinstatement of unescorted access
authorization in paragraph (h)(7) of this section, based upon the total
number of days that the individual's unescorted access authorization
has been interrupted, to include the day after the individual's last
period of unescorted access authorization was terminated and the
intervening days until the day upon which DOE or the C/V grants
unescorted access authorization to the individual. If potentially
disqualifying information is disclosed or discovered about an
individual, DOE and C/V's shall take additional actions, as specified
in the physical security plan, in order to grant or maintain the
individual's unescorted access authorization.
(5) Initial unescorted access authorization. Before granting
unescorted access authorization to an individual who has never held
unescorted access authorization under this section or whose unescorted
access authorization has been interrupted for a period of 3 years or
more and whose last period of unescorted access authorization was
terminated under favorable conditions, DOE or the C/V shall ensure that
an employment history evaluation has been completed in accordance with
paragraph (d)(4) of this section. The period of the employment history
that the individual shall disclose, and DOE or the C/V shall evaluate,
must be the past 3 years or since the individual's eighteenth birthday,
whichever is shorter. For the 1-year period immediately preceding the
date upon which the individual applies for unescorted access
authorization, DOE or the C/V shall ensure that the employment history
evaluation is conducted with every employer, regardless of the length
of employment. For the remaining 2-year period, DOE or the C/V shall
ensure that the employment history evaluation is conducted with the
employer by whom the individual claims to have been employed the
longest within each calendar month, if the individual claims employment
during the given calendar month.
(6) Updated unescorted access authorization. Before granting
unescorted access authorization to an individual whose unescorted
access authorization has been interrupted for more than 365 days but
fewer than 3 years and whose last period of unescorted access
authorization was terminated under favorable conditions, DOE or the C/V
shall ensure that an employment history evaluation has been completed
in accordance with paragraph (d)(4) of this section. The period of the
employment history that the individual shall disclose, and DOE or the
C/V shall evaluate, must be the period since unescorted access
authorization was last terminated, up to and including the day the
applicant applies for updated unescorted access authorization. For the
1-year period immediately preceding the date upon which the individual
applies for updated unescorted access authorization, DOE or the C/V
shall ensure that the employment history evaluation is conducted with
every employer, regardless of the length of employment. For the
remaining period since unescorted access authorization was last
terminated, DOE or the C/V shall ensure that the employment history
evaluation is conducted with the employer by whom the individual claims
to have been employed the longest within each calendar month, if the
individual claims employment during the given calendar month.
(7) Reinstatement of unescorted access authorization (31 to 365
days). In order to grant authorization to an individual whose
unescorted access authorization has been interrupted for a period of
more than 30 days but no more than 365 days and whose last period of
unescorted access authorization was terminated under favorable
conditions, DOE or the C/V shall ensure that an employment history
evaluation has been completed in accordance with the requirements of
paragraph (d)(4) of this section within 5 business days of reinstating
unescorted access authorization. The period of the employment history
that the individual shall disclose, and DOE or the C/V shall evaluate,
must be the period since the individual's unescorted access
authorization was terminated, up to and including the day the applicant
applies for reinstatement of unescorted access authorization. DOE or
the C/V shall ensure that the employment history evaluation has been
conducted with the employer by whom the individual claims to have been
employed the longest within the calendar month, if the individual
claims employment during a given calendar month. If the employment
history evaluation is not completed within 5 business days due to
circumstances that are outside of DOE's or the C/V's control and DOE or
the C/V is not aware of any potentially disqualifying information
regarding the individual within the past 5 years, DOE or the C/V may
maintain the individual's unescorted access authorization for an
additional 5 business days. If the employment history evaluation is not
completed within 10 business days of reinstating unescorted access
authorization, DOE or the C/V shall administratively withdraw the
individual's unescorted access authorization until the employment
history evaluation is completed.
(8) Determination basis. DOE's or the C/V's reviewing official
shall determine whether to grant, deny, unfavorably terminate, or
maintain or amend an individual's unescorted access authorization
status, based on an evaluation of all pertinent information that has
been gathered about the individual as a result of any application for
unescorted access authorization or developed during or following in any
period during which the individual maintained unescorted access
authorization. DOE's or the C/V's reviewing official may not determine
whether to grant unescorted access authorization to an individual or
maintain an individual's unescorted access authorization until all of
the required information has been provided to the reviewing official
and he or she determines that the accumulated information supports a
positive finding of trustworthiness and reliability.
(9) Unescorted access for NRC-certified personnel. DOE shall grant
unescorted access to all individuals who have been certified by the NRC
as suitable for such access including, but not limited to, contractors
to the NRC and NRC employees.
(i) Maintaining access authorization.
(1) Individuals may maintain unescorted access authorization under
the following conditions:
(i) The individual remains subject to a behavioral observation
program that complies with the requirements of paragraph (f) of this
section;
(ii) The individual successfully completes behavioral observation
refresher training or testing on the nominal 12-month frequency
required in paragraph (f)(2)(ii) of this section;
(iii) The individual complies with DOE's or the C/V's authorization
program policies and procedures to which he or she is subject,
including the arrest-reporting responsibility specified in paragraph
(g) of this section;
(iv) The individual is subject to a supervisory interview at a
nominal 12-month frequency, conducted in accordance with the
requirements of DOE's Physical Security Plan; and
(v) DOE or the C/V determines that the individual continues to be
trustworthy and reliable. This determination must be made as follows:
(A) DOE or the C/V shall complete a criminal history update, credit
history re-evaluation, and psychological re-
[[Page 72549]]
assessment of the individual within 5 years of the date on which these
elements were last completed, or more frequently, based on job
assignment;
(B) The reviewing official shall complete an evaluation of the
information obtained from the criminal history update, credit history
re-evaluation, psychological re-assessment, and the supervisory
interview required under paragraph (i)(1)(iv) of this section within 30
calendar days of initiating any one of these elements;
(C) The results of the criminal history update, credit history re-
evaluation, psychological re-assessment, and the supervisory interview
required under paragraph (i)(1)(iv) of this section must support a
positive determination of the individual's continued trustworthiness
and reliability; and
(D) If the criminal history update, credit history re-evaluation,
psychological re-assessment, and supervisory review have not been
completed and the information evaluated by the reviewing official
within 5 years of the initial completion of these elements or the most
recent update, re-evaluation, and re-assessment under this paragraph,
or within the time period specified in the Physical Security Plans, DOE
or the C/V shall administratively withdraw the individual's unescorted
access authorization until these requirements have been met.
(2) If an individual who has unescorted access authorization is not
subject to an authorization program that meets the requirements of this
part for more than 30 continuous days, then DOE or the C/V shall
terminate the individual's unescorted access authorization and the
individual shall meet the requirements in this section, as applicable,
to regain unescorted access authorization.
(j) Access to vital areas. DOE shall establish, implement, and
maintain a list of individuals who are authorized to have unescorted
access to specific vital areas to assist in limiting access to those
vital areas during non-emergency conditions. The list must include only
those individuals who require access to those specific vital areas in
order to perform their duties and responsibilities. The list must be
approved by a cognizant manager, or supervisor who is responsible for
directing the work activities of the individual who is granted
unescorted access to each vital area, and updated and re-approved no
less frequently than every 31 days.
(k) Trustworthiness and reliability of background screeners and
authorization program personnel. DOE and C/Vs shall ensure that any
individuals who collect, process, or have access to personal
information that is used to make unescorted access authorization
determinations under this section have been determined to be
trustworthy and reliable.
(1) Background screeners. DOE and C/Vs who rely on individuals who
are not directly under their control to collect and process information
that will be used by a reviewing official to make unescorted access
authorization determinations shall ensure that a background check of
such individuals has been completed and determines that such
individuals are trustworthy and reliable. At a minimum, the following
checks are required:
(i) Verification of the individual's identity;
(ii) A local criminal history review and evaluation from the State
of the individual's permanent residence;
(iii) A credit history review and evaluation;
(iv) An employment history review and evaluation for the past 3
years; and
(v) An evaluation of character and reputation.
(2) Authorization program personnel. DOE and C/Vs shall ensure that
any individual who evaluates personal information for the purpose of
processing applications for unescorted access authorization including,
but not limited to a clinical psychologist of psychiatrist who conducts
psychological assessments under paragraph (e) of this section; has
access to the files, records, and personal information associated with
individuals who have applied for unescorted access authorization; or is
responsible for managing any databases that contain such files,
records, and personal information has been determined to be trustworthy
and reliable, as follows:
(i) The individual is subject to an authorization program that
meets requirements of this section; or (ii) DOE or the C/V determines
that the individual is trustworthy and reliable based upon an
evaluation that meets the requirements of paragraphs (d)(1) through
(d)(5) and (e) of this section and a local criminal history review and
evaluation from the State of the individual's permanent residence.
(l) Review procedures. DOE and each C/V who is implementing an
authorization program under this section shall include a procedure for
the review, at the request of the affected individual, of a denial or
unfavorable termination of unescorted access authorization. The
procedure must require that the individual is informed of the grounds
for the denial or unfavorable termination and allow the individual an
opportunity to provide additional relevant information, and provide an
opportunity for an objective review of the information on which the
denial or unfavorable termination of unescorted access authorization
was based. The procedure may be an impartial and independent internal
management review. DOE may not grant or permit the individual to
maintain unescorted access authorization during the review process.
(m) Protection of information. DOE or each C/V who is subject to
this section who collects personal information about an individual for
the purpose of complying with this section, shall establish and
maintain a system of files and procedures to protect the personal
information.
(1) DOE and C/Vs shall obtain a signed consent from the subject
individual that authorizes the disclosure of the personal information
collected and maintained under this section before disclosing the
personal information, except for disclosures to the following
individuals:
(i) The subject individual or his or her representative, when the
individual has designated the representative in writing for specified
unescorted access authorization matters;
(ii) NRC representatives;
(iii) Appropriate law enforcement officials under court order;
(iv) DOE's or the C/V's representatives who have a need to have
access to the information in performing assigned duties, including
determinations of trustworthiness and reliability, and audits of
authorization programs;
(v) The presiding officer in a judicial or administrative
proceeding that is initiated by the subject individual;
(vi) Persons deciding matters under the review procedures in
paragraph (k) of this section; and
(vii) Other persons pursuant to court order.
(2) Personal information that is collected under this section must
be disclosed to DOE and other C/Vs, or their authorized
representatives, who are seeking the information for unescorted access
authorization determinations under this section and who have obtained a
signed release from the subject individual.
(3) Upon receipt of a written request by the subject individual or
his or her designated representative, DOE or the C/V possessing such
records shall promptly provide copies of all records pertaining to a
denial or unfavorable termination of the individual's unescorted access
authorization.
[[Page 72550]]
(4) DOE's or a C/V's contracts with any individual or organization
who collects and maintains personal information that is relevant to an
unescorted access authorization determination must require that such
records be held in confidence, except as provided in paragraphs (m)(1)
through (m)(3) of this section.
(5) DOE and C/Vs who collect and maintain personal information
under this section, and any individual or organization who collects and
maintains personal information on behalf of DOE or a C/V, shall
establish, implement, and maintain a system and procedures for the
secure storage and handling of the personal information collected.
(6) This paragraph does not authorize DOE or the C/V to withhold
evidence of criminal conduct from law enforcement officials.
(n) Audits and corrective action. DOE shall be responsible for the
continuing effectiveness of the authorization program, including
authorization program elements that are provided by C/Vs, and the
authorization programs of any C/Vs that are accepted by DOE. DOE and
each C/V who is subject to this section shall ensure that authorization
programs and program elements are audited to confirm compliance with
the requirements of this section and that comprehensive actions are
taken to correct any non-conformance that is identified.
(1) DOE and each C/V who is subject to this section shall ensure
that their entire authorization program is audited as needed, but no
less frequently than nominally every 24 months. DOE and C/Vs are
responsible for determining the appropriate frequency, scope, and depth
of additional auditing activities within the nominal 24-month period
based on the review of program performance indicators, such as the
frequency, nature, and severity of discovered problems, personnel or
procedural changes, and previous audit findings.
(2) Authorization program services that are provided to DOE by C/V
personnel who are off site or are not under the direct daily
supervision or observation of DOE's personnel must be audited on a
nominal 12-month frequency. In addition, any authorization program
services that are provided to C/Vs by subcontractor personnel who are
off site or are not under the direct daily supervision or observation
of the C/V's personnel must be audited on a nominal 12-month frequency.
(3) DOE's contracts with C/Vs must reserve the right to audit the
C/V and the C/V's subcontractors providing authorization program
services at any time, including at unannounced times, as well as to
review all information and documentation that is reasonably relevant to
the performance of the program.
(4) DOE's contracts with C/Vs, and a C/V's contracts with
subcontractors, must also require that DOE shall be provided with, or
permitted access to, copies of any documents and take away any
documents that may be needed to assure that the C/V and its
subcontractors are performing their functions properly and that staff
and procedures meet applicable requirements.
(5) Audits must focus on the effectiveness of the authorization
program or program element(s), as appropriate. At least one member of
the audit team shall be a person who is knowledgeable of and practiced
with meeting authorization program performance objectives and
requirements. The individuals performing the audit of the authorization
program or program element(s) shall be independent from both the
subject authorization program's management and from personnel who are
directly responsible for implementing the authorization program(s)
being audited.
(6) The result of the audits, along with any recommendations, must
be documented and reported to senior site management. Each audit report
must identify conditions that are adverse to the proper performance of
the authorization program, the cause of the condition(s), and, when
appropriate, recommended corrective actions, and corrective actions
taken. DOE or the C/V shall review the audit findings and take any
additional corrective actions, to include re-auditing of the deficient
areas where indicated, to preclude, within reason, repetition of the
condition. The resolution of the audit findings and corrective actions
must be documented.
(7) DOE may jointly conduct audits, or may accept audits of C/Vs
that were conducted by other licensees and applicants who are subject
to Sec. 73.56, if the audit addresses the services obtained from the
C/V by each of the sharing licensees and applicants. C/Vs may jointly
conduct audits, or may accept audits of its subcontractors that were
conducted by other licensees, applicants, and C/Vs who are subject to
this section or Sec. 73.56, if the audit addresses the services
obtained from the subcontractor by each of the sharing licensees,
applicants, and C/Vs.
(i) DOE and C/Vs shall review audit records and reports to identify
any areas that were not covered by the shared or accepted audit and
ensure that authorization program elements and services upon which DOE
or the C/V relies are audited, if the program elements and services
were not addressed in the shared audit.
(ii) Sharing licensees and applicants need not re-audit the same C/
V for the same period of time. Sharing C/Vs need not re-audit the same
subcontractor for the same period of time.
(iii) DOE and each C/V shall maintain a copy of the shared audit,
including findings, recommendations, and corrective actions.
(o) Records. DOE and each C/V who is subject to this section shall
maintain the records that are required by the regulations in this
section for the period specified by the appropriate regulation. If a
retention period is not otherwise specified, these records must be
retained until the Commission terminates the facility's license or
other regulatory approval.
(1) All records may be stored and archived electronically, provided
that the method used to create the electronic records meets the
following criteria:
(i) Provides an accurate representation of the original records;
(ii) Prevents unauthorized access to the records;
(iii) Prevents the alteration of any archived information and/or
data once it has been committed to storage; and
(iv) Permits easy retrieval and re-creation of the original
records.
(2) DOE and each C/V who is subject to this section shall retain
the following records for at least 5 years after DOE or the C/V
terminates or denies an individual's unescorted access authorization or
until the completion of all related legal proceedings, whichever is
later:
(i) Records of the information that must be collected under
paragraphs (d) and (e) of this section that results in the granting of
unescorted access authorization;
(ii) Records pertaining to denial or unfavorable termination of
unescorted access authorization and related management actions; and
(iii) Documentation of the granting and termination of unescorted
access authorization.
(3) DOE and each C/V who is subject to this section shall retain
the following records for at least 3 years or until the completion of
all related legal proceedings, whichever is later:
(i) Records of behavioral observation training conducted under
paragraph (f)(2) of this section; and
(ii) Records of audits, audit findings, and corrective actions
taken under paragraph (n) of this section.
(4) DOE and C/Vs shall retain written agreements for the provision
of services
[[Page 72551]]
under this section for the life of the agreement or until completion of
all legal proceedings related to a denial or unfavorable termination of
unescorted access authorization that involved those services, whichever
is later.
(5) DOE and C/Vs shall retain records of the background checks, and
psychological assessments of authorization program personnel, conducted
under paragraphs (d) and (e) of this section, for the length of the
individual's employment by or contractual relationship with DOE or the
C/V, or until the completion of any legal proceedings relating to the
actions of such authorization program personnel, whichever is later.
(6) If DOE or a C/V administratively withdraws an individual's
unescorted access authorization under the requirements of this section,
DOE or the C/V may not record the administrative action to withdraw the
individual's unescorted access authorization as an unfavorable
termination and may not disclose it in response to a suitable inquiry
conducted under the provisions of part 26 of this chapter, a background
investigation conducted under the provisions of this section, or any
other inquiry or investigation. Immediately upon favorable completion
of the background investigation element that caused the administrative
withdrawal, DOE or the C/V shall ensure that any matter that could link
the individual to the temporary administrative action is eliminated
from the subject individual's access authorization or personnel record
and other records, except if a review of the information obtained or
developed causes the reviewing official to unfavorably terminate the
individual's unescorted access.
16. In Sec. 73.57, the heading is revised, paragraph (a)(4) is
added; paragraphs (b)(2)(iii) and (b)(2)(iv) are redesignated as
(b)(2)(iv) and (b)(2)(v); a new paragraph (b)(2)(iii) is added; and
paragraphs (b)(1), (b)(4), (b)(4)(i), (b)(5), (b)(8), (c)(1), (d)(1),
(d)(3)(ii), (f)(2), and (f)(5) are revised to read as follows:
Sec. 73.57 Requirements for criminal history checks of individuals
granted unescorted access to a nuclear power facility, the protected
area of a geologic repository operations area, or access to Safeguards
Information by power reactor licensees.
(a) * * *
(4) DOE, as a licensee under part 60 or part 63 of this chapter,
shall comply with the requirements of this section upon receipt of
Commission authorization to receive and possess source, special
nuclear, or byproduct material at the geologic repository operations
area.
(b) * * *
(1) Except those listed in paragraph (b)(2) of this section, each
licensee subject to the provisions of this section shall fingerprint
each individual who is permitted unescorted access to the nuclear power
facility or access to Safeguards Information or unescorted access to
the protected area of a GROA. Individuals who have unescorted access
authorization on April 1, 1987 will retain such access pending licensee
receipt of the results of the criminal history check on the
individual's fingerprints, so long as the cards were submitted by
September 28, 1987. The licensee will then review and use the
information received from the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI),
and based on the provisions contained in this rule, determine either to
continue to grant or to deny further unescorted access to the facility
or Safeguards Information for that individual. Individuals who do not
have unescorted access or access to Safeguards Information after April
1, 1987 shall be fingerprinted by the licensee and the results of the
criminal history records check shall be used prior to making a
determination for granting unescorted access to the nuclear power
facility, the protected area of a GROA, or access to Safeguards
Information.
(2) * * *
(iii) For unescorted access to the protected area of a GROA, NRC
employees and NRC contractors on official agency business; individuals
responding to a site emergency in accordance with the provisions of
Sec. 73.53(s); a representative of the International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA) engaged in activities associated with the U.S./IAEA
Safeguards Agreement at designated facilities who has been certified by
the NRC; law enforcement personnel acting in an official capacity;
State or local government employees who have had equivalent reviews of
FBI criminal history data; and individuals employed at a facility who
possess ``Q'' or ``L'' clearances or possess another active government
granted security clearance, i.e., Top Secret, Secret, or Confidential;
* * * * *
(4) Fingerprinting is not required if the utility is reinstating
the unescorted access to the nuclear power facility, unescorted access
to the protected area of a GROA, or access to Safeguards Information
granted an individual if:
(i) The individual returns to the same nuclear power utility or
GROA that granted access and such access has not been interrupted for a
continuous period of more than 365 days; and
* * * * *
(5) Fingerprints need not be taken, in the discretion of the
licensee, if an individual who is an employee of a licensee,
contractor, manufacturer, or supplier has been granted unescorted
access to a nuclear power facility, unescorted access to the protected
area of a GROA, or to Safeguards Information by another licensee, based
in part on a criminal history records check under this section. The
criminal history check file may be transferred to the gaining licensee
in accordance with the provisions of paragraph (f)(3) of this section.
* * * * *
(8) A licensee shall use the information obtained as part of a
criminal history records check solely for the purpose of determining an
individual's suitability for unescorted access to the nuclear power
facility, unescorted access to the protected area of a GROA, or access
to Safeguards Information.
(c) * * *
(1) A licensee may not base a final determination to deny an
individual unescorted access to the nuclear power facility, unescorted
access to the protected area of a GROA, or access to Safeguards
Information solely on the basis of information received from the FBI
involving:
* * * * *
(d) * * *
(1) For the purpose of complying with this section, licensees
shall, using an appropriate method listed in Sec. 73.4, submit to the
NRC's Division of Facilities and Security, Mail Stop T-6E46, one
completed, legible standard fingerprint card (Form FD-258,
ORIMDNRCOOOZ) or, where practicable, other fingerprint record for each
individual requiring unescorted access to the nuclear power facility,
unescorted access to the protected area of a GROA, or access to
Safeguards Information, to the Director of the NRC's Division of
Facilities and Security, marked for the attention of the Division's
Criminal History Check Section. Copies of these forms may be obtained
by writing the Office of Information Services, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, by calling (301) 415-7232, or by
e-mail to [email protected]. Guidance on what alternative formats might be
practicable is referenced in Sec. 73.4. The licensee shall establish
procedures to ensure that the quality of the fingerprints taken results
in minimizing the rejection rate of fingerprint cards due to illegible
or incomplete cards.
* * * * *
[[Page 72552]]
(3) * * *
(ii) The application fee is the sum of the user fee charged by the
FBI for each fingerprint card or other fingerprint record submitted by
the NRC on behalf of a nuclear plant licensee or GROA licensee, and an
administrative processing fee assessed by the NRC. The NRC processing
fee covers administrative costs associated with NRC handling of
licensee fingerprint submissions. The Commission publishes the amount
of the fingerprint check application fee on the NRC public Web site.
(To Find the current fee amount, go to the Electronic Submittals page
at http://www.nrc.gov/site-help/eie.html and select the link for the
Criminal History Program.) The Commission will directly notify
licensees who are subject to this regulation of any fee changes.
* * * * *
(f) * * *
(2) The licensee may not disclose the record or personal
information collected and maintained to persons other than the subject
individual, his/her representative, or to those who have a need to have
access to the information in performing assigned duties in the process
of granting or denying unescorted access to the nuclear power facility,
unescorted access to the protected area of a GROA, or access to
Safeguards Information. No individual authorized to have access to the
information may re-disseminate the information to any other individual
who does not have a need to know.
* * * * *
(5) The licensee shall retain all fingerprint and criminal history
records received from the FBI, or a copy if the individual's file has
been transferred, on an individual (including data indicating no
record) for 1 year after termination or denial of unescorted access to
the nuclear power facility or unescorted access to the protected area
of a GROA, or access to Safeguards Information.
17. In Sec. 73.70, the introductory paragraph is revised and
paragraph (c)(1) is added to read as follows:
Sec. 73.70 Records.
Each record required by this part must be legible throughout the
retention period specified by each Commission regulation. The record
may be the original or a reproduced copy or a microform provided that
the copy or microform is authenticated by authorized personnel and that
the microform is capable of producing a clear copy throughout the
required retention period. The record may also be stored in electronic
media with the capability for producing legible, accurate, and complete
records during the required retention period. Records, such as letters,
drawings, and specifications, must include all pertinent information
such as stamps, initials, and signatures. The licensee shall maintain
adequate safeguards against tampering with and loss of records. Each
licensee subject to the provisions of Sec. Sec. 73.20, 73.25, 73.26,
73.27, 73.45, 73.46, 73.53, 73.55, or 73.60 shall keep the following
records:
* * * * *
(c) * * *
(1) A register of visitors, vendors, and other individuals not
employed by DOE pursuant to Sec. 73.53(i)(7)(i)(c). DOE shall retain
this register as a record, available for inspection, for three (3)
years after the last entry is made in the register.
* * * * *
18. Section 73.71a is added to read as follows:
Sec. 73.71a Reporting of safeguards events for a GROA.
(a) DOE, as a licensee subject to the provisions of Sec. 73.53,
shall notify the NRC Operations Center as soon as possible but not
later than 15 minutes after discovery of an imminent or actual
safeguards threat against the facility and other safeguards events
described in paragraph V of Appendix G to this part.
(1) When making a report under paragraph (a) of this section, the
licensee shall:
(i) Identify the facility name; and
(ii) Briefly describe the nature of the threat or event, including:
(A) Type of threat or event (e.g., armed assault, vehicle bomb,
credible bomb threat, etc.); and
(B) Threat or event status (i.e., imminent, in progress, or
neutralized).
(2) Notifications must be made according to paragraph (d) of this
section, as applicable.
(b) DOE shall notify the NRC Operations Center within 1 hour of
discovery of the safeguards events described in paragraph VI of
Appendix G to this part. Notifications must be made according to
paragraph (d) of this section, as applicable.
(c) DOE shall notify the NRC Operations Center, as soon as possible
but not later than four (4) hours after discovery of the safeguards
events described in paragraph VII of Appendix G to this part.
Notifications must be made according to paragraph (d) of this section,
as applicable.
(d) DOE shall make the telephonic notifications required by
paragraphs (a), (b), and (c) of this section to the NRC Operations
Center via the Emergency Notification System, or other dedicated
telephonic system that may be designated by the Commission, if the
licensee has access to that system.
(1) If the Emergency Notification System or other designated
telephonic system is inoperative or unavailable, DOE shall make the
required notification via commercial telephonic service or any other
methods that will ensure that a report is received by the NRC
Operations Center within the timeliness requirements of paragraph (a),
(b), and (c) of this section, as applicable.
(2) Telephonic reports required by this section shall be made by
DOE using secure telecommunications equipment approved for the
transmission of safeguards information and classified information.
(3) For events reported under paragraph (a) of this section, the
licensee may be requested by the NRC to maintain an open, continuous
communication channel with the NRC Operations Center, once the licensee
has completed other required notifications under this section, and any
immediate actions to stabilize the facility. When established, the
continuous communications channel shall be staffed by a knowledgeable
individual in the licensee's security or operations organizations
(e.g., a security supervisor, an alarm station operator, operations
personnel, etc.) from a location deemed appropriate by the licensee.
The continuous communications channel may be established via the
Emergency Notification System or dedicated telephonic system that may
be designated by the Commission, if the licensee has access to these
systems, or a commercial telephonic system.
(4) For events reported under paragraph (b) of this section, the
licensee shall maintain an open, continuous communication channel with
the NRC Operations Center upon request from the NRC.
(5) For events reported under paragraph (c) of this section, the
licensee is not required to maintain an open, continuous communication
channel with the NRC Operations Center.
(e) DOE shall maintain a current safeguards event log.
(1) DOE shall record the safeguards events described in paragraph
VI of Appendix G to this part within 24 hours of discovery.
(2) DOE shall retain the log of events recorded under this section
as a record for three (3) years after the last entry is made in each
log or until termination of the license.
[[Page 72553]]
(f) DOE shall make written reports as follows:
(1) DOE shall make an initial telephonic notification under
paragraphs (a) and (b) of this section and shall also submit a written
report to the NRC within a 60-day period by an appropriate method
listed in Sec. 73.4.
(2) DOE is not required to submit a written report following a
telephonic notification made under paragraph (c) of this section.
(3) DOE shall submit to the Commission written reports that are of
a quality that will permit legible reproduction and processing.
(4) DOE shall prepare the written report in letter format.
(5) In addition to the addressees specified in Sec. 73.4, DOE
shall also provide one copy of the written report addressed to the
Director, Office of Nuclear Security and Incident Response.
(6) The report must include sufficient information for NRC analysis
and evaluation.
(7) Significant supplemental information which becomes available
after the initial telephonic notification to the NRC Operations Center
or after the submission of the written report must be telephonically
reported to the NRC Operations Center under paragraph (d) of this
section and also submitted in a revised written report (with the
revisions indicated) as required under paragraph (f)(5) of this
section.
(8) Errors discovered in a written report must be corrected in a
revised report with revisions indicated.
(9) The revised report must replace the previous report; the update
must be complete and not be limited to only supplementary or revised
information.
(10) DOE shall maintain a copy of the written report of an event
submitted under this section as a record for a period of three (3)
years from the date of the report.
19. In Appendix B to Part 73, a new Section VII is added to the
table of contents, the introductory text is revised by adding a new
paragraph between the first and second undesignated paragraphs, and
Section VII is added to read as follows:
Appendix B to Part 73--General Criteria for Security Personnel
Table of Contents
* * * * *
VII. Geologic Repository Operations Area Training and
Qualification Plan
A. General requirements and introduction
B. Employment suitability and qualification
C. Duty training
D. Duty qualification and requalification
E. Weapons training
F. Weapons qualification and requalification program
G. Weapons, personal equipment, and maintenance
H. Records
I. Audits and reviews
J. Definitions
* * * * *
Insofar as DOE is subject to the requirements of Sec. 73.53 of
this part, DOE shall comply only with the requirements in Section
VII of this appendix. All other licensees, applicants, or
certificate holders shall comply only with Sections I through V of
this appendix .
* * * * *
VII. Geologic Repository Operations Area Training and Qualification
Plan
A. General requirements and introduction.
1. DOE shall ensure that all individuals who are assigned duties
and responsibilities required to prevent high-level radioactive
waste theft or diversion and radiological sabotage and who implement
the Commission-approved security plans, DOE response strategy, and
implementing procedures, meet minimum training and qualification
requirements to ensure that each individual possesses the knowledge,
skills, and abilities required to effectively perform the assigned
duties and responsibilities.
2. To ensure that those individuals who are assigned to perform
duties and responsibilities required for the implementation of the
Commission-approved security plans, DOE response strategy, and
implementing procedures are properly suited, trained, equipped, and
qualified to perform their assigned duties and responsibilities, the
Commission has developed minimum training and qualification
requirements that must be implemented through a Commission-approved
training and qualification plan.
3. DOE shall establish, maintain, and follow a Commission-
approved training and qualification plan, describing how the minimum
training and qualification requirements set forth in this appendix
will be met, to include the processes by which all members of the
security organization will be selected, trained, equipped, tested,
and qualified.
4. Each individual assigned to perform security program duties
and responsibilities required to effectively implement the
Commission-approved security plans, DOE protective strategy, and the
DOE implementing procedures shall demonstrate the knowledge, skills,
and abilities required to effectively perform the assigned duties
and responsibilities before the individual is assigned the duty or
responsibility.
5. DOE shall ensure that the training and qualification program
simulates, as closely as practicable, the specific conditions under
which the individual shall be required to perform assigned duties
and responsibilities.
6. DOE may not allow any individual to perform any security
function, assume any security duties or responsibilities, or return
to security duty, until that individual satisfies the training and
qualification requirements of this appendix and the Commission-
approved training and qualification plan, unless specifically
authorized by the Commission.
7. Annual requirements must be scheduled at a nominal twelve-
(12) month periodicity. Annual requirements may be completed up to
three (3) months before or three (3) months after the scheduled
date. However, the next annual training must be scheduled twelve
(12) months from the previously scheduled date rather than the date
the training was actually completed.
B. Employment suitability and qualification.
1. Suitability.
a. Before employment, or assignment to the security
organization, an individual shall:
(1) Possess a high school diploma or pass an equivalent
performance examination designed to measure basic mathematical,
language, and reasoning skills, abilities, and knowledge required to
perform security duties and responsibilities; and
(2) Have attained the age of 21 for an armed capacity or the age
of 18 for an unarmed capacity.
b. An unarmed individual assigned to the security organization
may not have any felony convictions that reflect on the individual's
reliability.
c. The qualification of each individual to perform assigned
duties and responsibilities must be documented by a qualified
training instructor and attested to by a security supervisor.
2. Physical qualifications.
a. General physical qualifications.
(1) Individuals whose duties and responsibilities are directly
associated with the effective implementation of the Commission-
approved security plans, DOE protective strategy, and implementing
procedures, may not have any physical conditions that would
adversely affect their performance.
(2) Armed and unarmed members of the security organization shall
be subject to a physical examination designed to measure the
individual's physical ability to perform assigned duties and
responsibilities as identified in the Commission-approved security
plans, DOE protective strategy, and implementing procedures.
(3) This physical examination must be administered by a licensed
health professional with final determination being made by a
licensed physician to verify the individual's physical capability to
perform assigned duties and responsibilities.
(4) DOE shall ensure that both armed and unarmed members of the
security organization, who are assigned security duties and
responsibilities identified in the Commission-approved security
plans, the DOE protective strategy, and implementing procedures,
meet the following minimum physical requirements, as required to
effectively perform their assigned duties.
b. Vision.
(1) For each individual, distant visual acuity in each eye shall
be correctable to 20/30 (Snellen or equivalent) in the better eye
and 20/40 in the other eye with eyeglasses or contact lenses.
[[Page 72554]]
(2) Near visual acuity, corrected or uncorrected, shall be at
least 20/40 in the better eye.
(3) Field of vision must be at least 70 degrees horizontal
meridian in each eye.
(4) The ability to distinguish red, green, and yellow colors is
required.
(5) Loss of vision in one eye is disqualifying.
(6) Glaucoma is disqualifying, unless controlled by acceptable
medical or surgical means, provided that medications used for
controlling glaucoma do not cause undesirable side effects which
adversely affect the individual's ability to perform assigned
security job duties, and provided the visual acuity and field of
vision requirements are met.
(7) On-the-job evaluation must be used for individuals who
exhibit a mild color vision defect.
(8) If uncorrected distance vision is not at least 20/40 in the
better eye, the individual shall carry an extra pair of corrective
lenses in the event that the primaries are damaged. Corrective
eyeglasses must be of the safety glass type.
(9) The use of corrective eyeglasses or contact lenses may not
interfere with an individual's ability to effectively perform
assigned duties and responsibilities during normal or emergency
conditions.
c. Hearing.
(1) Individuals may not have hearing loss in the better ear
greater than 30 decibels average at 500 Hz, 1,000 Hz, and 2,000 Hz
with no level greater than 40 decibels at any one frequency.
(2) A hearing aid is acceptable provided that suitable testing
procedures demonstrate auditory acuity equivalent to the hearing
requirement.
(3) The use of a hearing aid may not decrease the effective
performance of the individual's assigned security job duties during
normal or emergency operations.
d. Existing medical conditions.
(1) Individuals may not have an established medical history or
medical diagnosis of existing medical conditions which could
interfere with or prevent the individual from effectively performing
assigned duties and responsibilities.
(2) If a medical condition exists, the individual shall provide
medical evidence that the condition can be controlled with medical
treatment in a manner which does not adversely affect the
individual's fitness-for-duty, mental alertness, physical condition,
or capability to otherwise effectively perform assigned duties and
responsibilities.
e. Addiction. Individuals may not have any established medical
history or medical diagnosis of habitual alcoholism or drug
addiction or, where this type of condition has existed, the
individual shall provide certified documentation of having completed
a rehabilitation program which would give a reasonable degree of
confidence that the individual would be capable of effectively
performing assigned duties and responsibilities.
f. Other physical requirements. An individual who has been
incapacitated due to a serious illness, injury, disease, or
operation, which could interfere with the effective performance of
assigned duties and responsibilities shall, before resumption of
assigned duties and responsibilities, provide medical evidence of
recovery and ability to perform these duties and responsibilities.
3. Psychological qualifications.
a. Armed and unarmed members of the security organization shall
demonstrate the ability to apply good judgment, mental alertness,
and the capability to implement instructions and assigned tasks, and
shall possess the acuity of senses and ability of expression
sufficient to permit accurate communication by written, spoken,
audible, visible, or other signals required by assigned duties and
responsibilities.
b. A licensed clinical psychologist, psychiatrist, or physician,
trained in part to identify emotional instability, shall determine
whether armed members of the security organization and alarm station
operators, in addition to meeting the requirement stated in
paragraph a. of this section, have no emotional instability that
would interfere with the effective performance of assigned duties
and responsibilities.
c. A person professionally trained to identify emotional
instability shall determine whether unarmed members of the security
organization, in addition to meeting the requirement stated in
paragraph B.3.a. of this section, have no emotional instability that
would interfere with the effective performance of assigned duties
and responsibilities.
4. Medical examinations and physical fitness qualifications.
a. Armed members of the security organization shall be subject
to a medical examination by a licensed physician to determine the
individual's fitness to participate in physical fitness tests. DOE
shall obtain and retain a written certification from the licensed
physician that no medical conditions were disclosed by the medical
examination that would preclude the individual's ability to
participate in the physical fitness tests or meet the physical
fitness attributes or objectives associated with assigned duties.
b. Before assignment, armed members of the security organization
shall demonstrate physical fitness for assigned duties and
responsibilities by performing a practical physical fitness test.
(1) The physical fitness test must consider physical conditions,
such as strenuous activity, physical exertion, levels of stress, and
exposure to the elements as they pertain to each individual's
assigned security job duties, for both normal and emergency
operations and must simulate site-specific conditions under which
the individual will be required to perform assigned duties and
responsibilities.
(2) DOE shall describe the physical fitness test in the
Commission-approved training and qualification plan.
(3) The physical fitness test must include physical attributes
and performance objectives which demonstrate the strength,
endurance, and agility, consistent with assigned duties in the
Commission-approved security plans, DOE protective strategy, and
implementing procedures during normal and emergency conditions.
(4) The physical fitness qualification of each armed member of
the security organization must be documented by a qualified training
instructor and attested to by a security supervisor.
5. Physical requalification.
a. At least annually, armed and unarmed members of the security
organization shall be required to demonstrate the capability to meet
the physical requirements of this appendix and the training and
qualification plan.
b. The physical requalification of each armed and unarmed member
of the security organization must be documented by a qualified
training instructor and attested to by a security supervisor.
C. Duty training.
1. Duty training and qualification requirements. All personnel,
who are assigned to perform any security-related duty or
responsibility, shall be trained and qualified to perform assigned
duties and responsibilities to ensure that each individual possesses
the minimum knowledge, skills, and abilities required to effectively
carry out those assigned duties and responsibilities.
a. The areas of knowledge, skills, and abilities that are
required to perform assigned duties and responsibilities must be
identified in the Commission-approved training and qualification
plan.
b. Each individual who is assigned duties and responsibilities
identified in the Commission-approved security plans, DOE protective
strategy, and implementing procedures shall, before assignment:
(1) Be trained to perform assigned duties and responsibilities
in accordance with the requirements of this appendix and the
Commission-approved training and qualification plan;
(2) Meet the minimum qualification requirements of this appendix
and the Commission-approved training and qualification plan; and
(3) Be trained and qualified in the use of all equipment or
devices required to effectively perform all assigned duties and
responsibilities.
2. On-the-job training.
a. The DOE training and qualification program must include on-
the-job training performance standards and criteria to ensure that
each individual demonstrates the requisite knowledge, skills, and
abilities needed to effectively carry-out assigned duties and
responsibilities in accordance with the Commission-approved security
plans, DOE protective strategy, and implementing procedures, before
the individual is assigned the duty or responsibility.
b. In addition to meeting the requirement stated in paragraph
C.2.a. of this section, before assignment, individuals assigned
duties and responsibilities to implement the Safeguards Contingency
Plan shall complete a minimum of 40 hours of on-the-job training to
demonstrate their ability to effectively apply the knowledge,
skills, and abilities required to effectively perform assigned
duties and responsibilities in accordance
[[Page 72555]]
with the approved security plans, DOE protective strategy, and
implementing procedures. On-the-job training must be documented by a
qualified training instructor and attested to by a security
supervisor.
c. On-the-job training for contingency activities and drills
must include, but is not limited to, hands-on application of
knowledge, skills, and abilities related to:
(1) Response team duties;
(2) Use of force;
(3) Tactical movement;
(4) Cover and concealment;
(5) Defensive-positions;
(6) Fields-of-fire;
(7) Re-deployment;
(8) Communications (primary and alternate);
(9) Use of assigned equipment;
(10) Target sets;
(11) Table top drills; and
(12) Command and control duties.
3. Tactical response team drills and exercises.
a. DOE shall demonstrate response capabilities through a
performance evaluation program as described in Appendix C to this
part.
b. DOE shall conduct drills and exercises in accordance with
Commission-approved security plans, DOE protective strategy, and
implementing procedures.
(1) Drills and exercises must be designed to challenge
participants in a manner which requires each participant to
demonstrate requisite knowledge, skills, and abilities.
(2) Tabletop exercises may be used to supplement drills and
exercises to accomplish desired training goals and objectives.
D. Duty qualification and requalification.
1. Qualification demonstration.
a. Armed and unarmed members of the security organization shall
demonstrate the required knowledge, skills, and abilities to carry
out assigned duties and responsibilities as stated in the
Commission-approved security plans, DOE protective strategy, and
implementing procedures.
b. This demonstration must include an annual written exam and
hands-on performance demonstration.
(1) Written Exam. The written exams must include those elements
listed in the Commission-approved training and qualification plan
and shall require a minimum score of 80 percent to demonstrate an
acceptable understanding of assigned duties and responsibilities, to
include the recognition of potential tampering involving both safety
and security equipment and systems.
(2) Hands-on Performance Demonstration. Armed and unarmed
members of the security organization shall demonstrate hands-on
performance for assigned duties and responsibilities by performing a
practical hands-on demonstration for required tasks. The hands-on
demonstration must ensure that theory and associated learning
objectives for each required task are considered and each individual
demonstrates the knowledge, skills, and abilities required to
effectively perform the task.
c. Upon request by an authorized representative of the
Commission, any individual assigned to perform any security-related
duty or responsibility shall demonstrate the required knowledge,
skills, and abilities for each assigned duty and responsibility, as
stated in the Commission-approved security plans, DOE protective
strategy, or implementing procedures.
2. Requalification.
a. Armed and unarmed members of the security organization shall
be requalified at least annually in accordance with the requirements
of this appendix and the Commission-approved training and
qualification plan.
b. The results of requalification must be documented by a
qualified training instructor and attested to by a security
supervisor.
E. Weapons training.
1. General firearms training.
a. Armed members of the security organization shall be trained
and qualified in accordance with the requirements of this appendix
and the Commission-approved training and qualification plan.
b. Firearms instructors.
(1) Each armed member of the security organization shall be
trained and qualified by a certified firearms instructor for the use
and maintenance of each assigned weapon to include, but not limited
to, qualification scores, assembly, disassembly, cleaning, storage,
handling, clearing, loading, unloading, and reloading, for each
assigned weapon.
(2) Firearms instructors shall be certified from a national or
State recognized entity.
(3) Certification must specify the weapon or weapon type(s) for
which the instructor is qualified to teach.
(4) Firearms instructors shall be recertified in accordance with
the standards recognized by the certifying national or State entity,
but in no case shall recertification exceed three (3) years.
c. Annual firearms familiarization. DOE shall conduct annual
firearms familiarization training in accordance with the Commission-
approved training and qualification plan.
d. The Commission-approved training and qualification plan shall
include, but is not limited to, the following areas:
(1) Mechanical assembly, disassembly, range penetration
capability of weapon, and bull's-eye firing;
(2) Weapons cleaning and storage;
(3) Combat firing, day and night;
(4) Safe weapons handling;
(5) Clearing, loading, unloading, and reloading;
(6) Drawing and pointing a weapon;
(7) Rapid fire techniques;
(8) Closed-quarter firing;
(9) Stress firing;
(10) Zeroing assigned weapon(s) (sight and sight/scope
adjustments);
(11) Target engagement;
(12) Weapon malfunctions;
(13) Cover and concealment;
(14) Weapon transition between strong (primary) and weak
(support) hands; and
(15) Weapon familiarization.
e. DOE shall ensure that each armed member of the security
organization is instructed on the use of deadly force as authorized
by applicable Federal or State law.
f. Armed members of the security organization shall participate
in weapons range activities on a nominal four (4) month periodicity.
Performance may be conducted up to five (5) weeks before to five (5)
weeks after the scheduled date. The next scheduled date must be four
(4) months from the originally scheduled date.
F. Weapons qualification and requalification program.
1. General weapons qualification requirements.
a. Qualification firing must be accomplished in accordance with
Commission requirements and the Commission-approved training and
qualification plan for assigned weapons.
b. The results of weapons qualification and requalification must
be documented and retained as a record.
c. Each individual shall be requalified at least annually.
2. Alternate weapons qualification. Upon written request by DOE,
the Commission may authorize DOE to provide firearms qualification
programs other than those listed in this appendix if DOE
demonstrates that the alternative firearm qualification program
satisfies Commission requirements. Written requests must provide
information regarding the proposed firearms qualification programs
and describe how the proposed alternative satisfies Commission
requirements.
3. Tactical weapons qualification. The DOE Training and
Qualification Plan must describe the firearms used, the firearms
qualification program, and other tactical training required to
implement the Commission-approved security plans, DOE protective
strategy, and implementing procedures. DOE-developed qualification
and requalification courses for each firearm must describe the
performance criteria needed, including the site-specific conditions
(such as lighting, elevation, fields-of-fire) under which assigned
personnel shall be required to carryout their assigned duties.
4. Firearms qualification courses. DOE shall conduct the
following qualification courses for weapons used.
a. Annual daylight qualification course. Qualifying score must
be an accumulated total of 70 percent with handgun and shotgun, and
80 percent with semiautomatic rifle and/or enhanced weapons, of the
maximum obtainable target score.
b. Annual night fire qualification course. Qualifying score must
be an accumulated total of 70 percent with handgun and shotgun, and
80 percent with semiautomatic rifle and/or enhanced weapons of the
maximum obtainable target score.
c. Annual tactical qualification course. Qualifying score must
be an accumulated total of 80 percent of the maximum obtainable
score.
5. Courses of fire.
a. Handgun.
(1) Armed members of the security organization, assigned duties
and responsibilities involving the use of a revolver or
semiautomatic pistol, shall qualify in accordance with standards and
scores established by a law enforcement course or an equivalent
nationally recognized course.
[[Page 72556]]
(2) Qualifying scores must be an accumulated total of 70 percent
of the maximum obtainable target score.
b. Semiautomatic rifle.
(1) Armed members of the security organization, assigned duties
and responsibilities involving the use of a semiautomatic rifle,
shall qualify in accordance with the standards and scores
established by a law enforcement course or an equivalent nationally
recognized course.
(2) Qualifying scores must be an accumulated total of 80 percent
of the maximum obtainable score.
c. Shotgun.
(1) Armed members of the security organization, assigned duties
and responsibilities involving the use of a shotgun, shall qualify
in accordance with standards and scores established by a law
enforcement course or an equivalent nationally recognized course.
(2) Qualifying scores must be an accumulated total of 70 percent
of the maximum obtainable target score.
d. Enhanced weapons.
(1) Armed members of the security organization, assigned duties
and responsibilities involving the use of any weapon or weapons not
described in paragraph F.5. shall qualify in accordance with
applicable standards and scores established by a law enforcement
course or an equivalent nationally recognized course for these
weapons.
(2) Qualifying scores must be an accumulated total of 80 percent
of the maximum obtainable score.
6. Requalification.
a. Armed members of the security organization shall be
requalified for each assigned weapon at least annually in accordance
with Commission requirements and the Commission-approved training
and qualification plan.
b. Firearms requalification must be conducted using the courses
of fire outlined in paragraph 5 of this section.
G. Weapons, personal equipment, and maintenance.
1. Weapons.
DOE shall provide armed personnel with weapons that are capable
of performing the function stated in the Commission-approved
security plans, DOE protective strategy, and implementing
procedures.
2. Personal equipment.
a. DOE shall ensure that each individual is equipped or has
ready access to all personal equipment or devices required for the
effective implementation of the Commission-approved security plans,
DOE protective strategy, and implementing procedures.
b. DOE shall provide armed security personnel, at a minimum, but
is not limited to, the following:
(1) Gas mask, full face;
(2) Body armor (bullet-resistant vest);
(3) Ammunition/equipment belt;
(4) Duress alarms; and
(5) Two-way portable radios (handi-talkie) 2 channels minimum, 1
operating and 1 emergency.
c. Based upon the DOE protective strategy and the specific
duties and responsibilities assigned to each individual, DOE should
provide, but is not limited to, the following:
(1) Flashlights and batteries;
(2) Baton or other non-lethal weapons;
(3) Handcuffs;
(4) Binoculars;
(5) Night vision aids (e.g., goggles, weapons sights);
(6) Hand-fired illumination flares or equivalent; and
(7) Tear gas or other non-lethal gas.
3. Maintenance.
Firearms maintenance program. DOE shall implement a firearms
maintenance and accountability program in accordance with the
Commission regulations and the Commission-approved training and
qualification plan. The program must include:
(1) Semiannual test firing for accuracy and functionality;
(2) Firearms maintenance procedures that include cleaning
schedules and cleaning requirements;
(3) Program activity documentation;
(4) Control and accountability (weapons and ammunition);
(5) Firearm storage requirements; and
(6) Armorer certification.
H. Records.
1. DOE shall retain all reports, records, or other documentation
required by this appendix in accordance with the requirements of
Sec. 73.53(s).
2. DOE shall retain each individual's initial qualification
record for three (3) years after termination of the individual's
employment and shall retain each requalification record for three
(3) years after it is superseded.
3. DOE shall document data and test results from each
individual's suitability, physical, and psychological qualification
and shall retain this documentation as a record for three years from
the date of obtaining and recording these results.
I. Audits and reviews.
DOE shall review the Commission-approved training and
qualification plan in accordance with the requirements of Sec.
73.55(o).
J. Definitions.
Terms defined in parts 60, 63, and 73 of this chapter have the
same meaning when used in this appendix.
20. In Appendix C to Part 73, a heading for Section I and a new
introductory paragraph are added after the ``Introduction'' section and
before the heading ``Content of the Plan,'' the heading Audit and
Review is revised to read Section II: Audit and Review, and a new
Section III is added at the end of the Appendix to read as follows:
Appendix C to Part 73--Licensee Safeguards Contingency Plans
* * * * *
Section I: Safeguards Contingency Plans
Introduction
Licensee, applicants, and certificate holders, with the
exception of those who are subject to the requirements of Sec.
73.53, shall comply with the requirements of Section I of this
appendix.
* * * * *
Section II: Audit and Review
* * * * *
Section III: Geologic repository operations area safeguards
contingency plans.
(a) Introduction.
The safeguards contingency plan must describe how the criteria
set forth in this appendix will be satisfied through implementation
and must provide specific goals, objectives and general guidance to
personnel to facilitate the initiation and completion of
predetermined and exercised responses to threat scenarios, up to and
including the design basis threat described in Sec. 73.1(a), for
radioactive waste containing strategic special nuclear material.
Contents of the Plan
(b) Each safeguards contingency plan must include the following
twelve (12) categories of information:
(1) Background.
(2) Generic planning base.
(3) DOE planning base.
(4) Responsibility matrix.
(5) Primary security functions.
(6) Response capabilities.
(7) Protective strategy.
(8) Integrated response plan.
(9) Threat warning system.
(10) Performance evaluation program.
(11) Records, audits and reviews.
(12) Implementing procedures.
(c) Background.
(1) Consistent with the design basis threat specified in Sec.
73.1(a), DOE shall identify and describe the perceived dangers,
threats, and incidents against which the safeguards contingency plan
is designed to protect up to and including the design basis threat
as specified in Sec. 73.1(a).
(2) DOE shall describe the general goals and operational
concepts underlying implementation of the approved safeguards
contingency plan to include, but not be limited to, the following:
(i) The types of incidents covered;
(ii) The specific goals and objectives to be accomplished;
(iii) The different elements of the onsite physical protection
program shall provide at all times the capability to detect, assess,
deter, intercept, challenge, delay, and neutralize threats up to and
including the design basis threat relative to the perceived dangers
and incidents described in the Commission-approved safeguards
contingency plan. DOE shall include preplanned strategies for the
GROA of potential events, including those that may result in the
loss of large areas of the facility due to explosions or fire;
(iv) How the onsite response effort is organized and coordinated
to ensure that the capability to prevent high-level radioactive
waste theft and sabotage is maintained throughout each type of
incident covered;
(v) How the onsite response effort is integrated to include
specific procedures, guidance, and strategies to restore the
facility, using existing or readily available resources (equipment
and personnel) that can be effectively implemented under the
circumstances associated with loss of large areas of the facility
due to explosions or fires; and
[[Page 72557]]
(vi) A list of terms and their definitions used in describing
operational and technical aspects of the approved safeguards
contingency plan.
(d) Generic planning base.
(1) DOE shall define the criteria for initiation and termination
of responses to threats to include the specific decisions, actions,
and supporting information needed to respond to each type of
incident covered by the approved safeguards contingency plan.
(2) DOE shall ensure early detection of unauthorized activities
and shall respond to all alarms or other indications of a threat
condition such as tampering, bomb threats, unauthorized barrier
penetration (vehicle or personnel), missing or unaccounted for
nuclear material, escalating civil disturbances, imminent threat
notification, or other threat warnings.
(3) The safeguards contingency plan must:
(i) Identify the types of events that signal the beginning or
initiation of a safeguards contingency event;
(ii) Provide predetermined and structured responses to each type
of postulated event;
(iii) Define specific goals and objectives for response to each
postulated event;
(iv) Identify the predetermined decisions and actions which are
required to satisfy the written goals and objectives for each
postulated event;
(v) Identify the data, criteria, procedures, mechanisms, and
logistical support necessary to implement the predetermined
decisions and actions;
(vi) Identify the individuals, groups, or organizational
entities responsible for each predetermined decision and action;
(vii) Define the command-and-control structure required to
coordinate each individual, group, or organizational entity carrying
out predetermined actions; and
(viii) Describe how effectiveness will be measured and
demonstrated to include the effectiveness of the capability to
detect, assess, intercept, challenge, delay, and neutralize threats
up to and including the design basis threat.
(e) DOE planning base.
DOE shall describe the site-specific factors affecting
contingency planning and shall develop plans for actions to be taken
in response to postulated threats. The following topics must be
addressed:
(1) Organizational structure. The safeguards contingency plan
must describe the organization's chain of command and delegation of
authority during safeguards contingencies to include a description
of how command-and-control functions will be coordinated and
maintained.
(2) Physical layout. The safeguards contingency plan must
include a site description, to include maps and drawings, of the
physical structures and their locations.
(i) Site description. The site description must address the site
location in relation to nearby towns, transportation routes (e.g.,
rail, water, air, roads), pipelines, hazardous material facilities,
onsite independent spent fuel storage installations, and pertinent
environmental features that may have an effect upon coordination of
response operations.
(ii) Approaches. Particular emphasis must be placed on main and
alternate entry routes for law enforcement or other offsite support
agencies and the location of control points for marshaling and
coordinating response activities.
(3) Safeguards systems hardware. The safeguards contingency plan
must contain a description of the physical security and material
accounting system hardware that influence how DOE will respond to an
event.
(4) Law enforcement assistance.
(i) The safeguards contingency plan must contain a listing of
available local, State, and Federal law enforcement agencies and a
general description of response capabilities to include the number
of personnel, types of weapons, and estimated response timelines.
(ii) The safeguards contingency plan must contain a discussion
of working agreements with offsite law enforcement agencies to
include criteria for response, command and control protocols, and
communication procedures.
(5) Policy constraints and assumptions. The safeguards
contingency plan must contain a discussion of Federal laws, State
laws, local ordinances, and policies and practices that govern DOE
response to incidents and must include, but not be limited to, the
following:
(i) Use of deadly force;
(ii) Recall of off-duty employees;
(iii) Site jurisdictional boundaries; and
(iv) Use of enhanced weapons, if applicable.
(6) Administrative and logistical considerations. The safeguards
contingency plan must contain a description of DOE practices which
influence how DOE responds to a threat to include, but not be
limited to, a description of the procedures that will be used for
ensuring that all equipment needed to effect a successful response
will be readily accessible, in good working order, and in sufficient
supply to provide redundancy in case of equipment failure.
(f) Responsibility matrix.
(1) The safeguards contingency plan must describe the
organizational entities that are responsible for each decision and
action associated with responses to threats.
(i) For each identified initiating event, a tabulation must be
made for each response depicting the assignment of responsibilities
for all decisions and actions to be taken.
(ii) The tabulations described in the responsibility matrix must
provide an overall description of response actions and
interrelationships.
(2) DOE shall ensure that duties and responsibilities required
by the approved safeguards contingency plan do not conflict with or
prevent the execution of other site emergency plans.
(3) DOE shall identify and discuss potential areas of conflict
between site plans in the integrated response plan required by
Section III(b)(8) of this appendix.
(4) DOE shall address safety/security interface issues in
accordance with the requirements of Sec. 73.53(t) to ensure that
activities by the security organization, maintenance, operations,
and other onsite entities are coordinated in a manner that precludes
conflict during both normal and emergency conditions.
(g) Primary security functions.
(1) DOE shall establish and maintain, at all times, the
capability to detect, assess, and respond to all threats to the
facility up to and including the design basis threat.
(2) To facilitate initial response to a threat, DOE shall ensure
the capability to observe all areas of the facility in a manner that
ensures early detection of unauthorized activities and limits
exposure of responding personnel to possible attack.
(3) DOE shall generally describe how the primary security
functions are integrated to provide defense in depth and are
maintained despite the loss of any single element of the onsite
physical protection program.
(4) The DOE description must begin with physical protection
measures implemented in the outermost facility perimeter and must
move inward through those measures implemented to protect vital and
target set equipment.
(h) Response capabilities.
(1) DOE shall establish and maintain at all times the capability
to intercept, challenge, delay, and neutralize threats up to and
including the design basis threat.
(2) DOE shall identify the personnel, equipment, and resources
necessary to perform the actions required to prevent sabotage in
response to postulated events.
(3) DOE shall ensure that predetermined actions can be completed
under the postulated conditions.
(4) DOE shall provide at all times an armed response team
comprised of trained and qualified personnel who possess the
knowledge, skills, abilities, and equipment required to implement
the Commission-approved safeguards contingency plan and site
protective strategy. The plan must include a description of the
armed response team including the following:
(i) The authorized minimum number of armed responders, available
at all times inside the protected area.
(ii) The authorized minimum number of armed security officers,
available onsite at all times.
(5) The total number of armed responders and armed security
officers must be documented in the approved security plans and
documented as a component of the protective strategy.
(6) DOE shall ensure that individuals assigned duties and
responsibilities to implement the safeguards contingency plan are
trained and qualified in accordance with appendix B of this part and
the Commission-approved security plans.
(i) Protective strategy.
(1) DOE shall develop, maintain, and implement a written
protective strategy that describes the deployment of the armed
response team relative to the general goals, operational concepts,
performance objectives, and specific actions to be accomplished by
each individual in response to postulated events.
(2) The protective strategy must:
(i) Be designed to prevent high-level radioactive waste theft or
diversion and radiological sabotage through the coordinated
implementation of specific actions and strategies required to
intercept, challenge, delay, and neutralize, impede, or mitigate
security-related threats;
[[Page 72558]]
(ii) Describe and consider site-specific conditions, to include
but not be limited to, facility layout, the location of target set
equipment and elements, target set equipment that is in maintenance
or out of service, and the potential effects that unauthorized
electronic access to safety and security systems may have on the
protective strategy capability to prevent high-level radioactive
waste theft or diversion or sabotage;
(iii) Identify predetermined actions and timelines for the
deployment of armed personnel;
(iv) Provide bullet resisting protected positions with
appropriate fields of fire; and
(v) Limit exposure of security personnel to possible attack.
(3) DOE shall provide a command and control structure, to
include response by offsite law enforcement agencies, which ensures
that decisions and actions are coordinated and communicated in a
timely manner and that facilitates response in accordance with the
integrated response plan.
(j) Integrated Response Plan.
(1) DOE shall document, maintain, and implement an Integrated
Response Plan which must identify, describe, and coordinate actions
to be taken by DOE personnel and offsite agencies during a
contingency event or other emergency situation.
(2) The Integrated Response Plan must:
(i) Be designed to integrate and coordinate all actions to be
taken in response to an emergency event in a manner that will ensure
that each site plan and procedure can be successfully implemented
without conflict from other plans and procedures;
(ii) Include specific procedures, guidance, and strategies to
restore the facility using existing or readily available resources
(equipment and personnel) that can be effectively implemented under
the circumstances associated with loss of large areas of the
facility due to explosions or fires;
(iii) Ensure that onsite staffing levels, facilities, and
equipment required for response to any identified event are readily
available and capable of fulfilling their intended purpose;
(iv) Provide emergency action levels to ensure that threats
result in at least a notification of unusual event, and implement
procedures for the assignment of a predetermined classification to
specific events; and
(v) Include specific procedures, guidance, and strategies
describing cyber incident response and recovery.
(3) DOE shall:
(i) Reconfirm on an annual basis, liaison with local, State, and
Federal law enforcement agencies, established in accordance with
Sec. 73.53(m)(8), to include communication protocols, command and
control structure, marshaling locations, estimated response times,
and anticipated response capabilities and specialized equipment.
(ii) Provide required training personnel in accordance with site
procedures to ensure the operational readiness of personnel
commensurate with assigned duties and responsibilities.
(iii) Periodically train personnel in accordance with site
procedures to respond to a hostage or duress situation.
(iv) Determine the possible effects that nearby hazardous
material facilities may have upon site response plans and modify
response plans, procedures, and equipment as necessary.
(v) Ensure that identified actions are achievable under
postulated conditions.
(k) Threat warning system.
(1) DOE shall implement a ``Threat warning system'' which
identifies specific graduated protective measures and actions to be
taken to increase preparedness against a heightened or imminent
threat of attack.
(2) DOE shall ensure that the specific protective measures and
actions identified for each threat level are consistent with the
Commission-approved safeguards contingency plan, and other site
security, and emergency plans and procedures.
(3) Upon notification by an authorized representative of the
Commission, DOE shall implement the specific protective measures
assigned to the threat level indicated by the Commission
representative.
(l) Performance Evaluation Program.
(1) DOE shall document and maintain a Performance Evaluation
Program that describes how the DOE will demonstrate and assess the
effectiveness of the onsite physical protection program to prevent
significant radiological sabotage events and to include the
capability of armed personnel to carry out their assigned duties and
responsibilities.
(2) The Performance Evaluation Program must include procedures
for the conduct of quarterly drills and annual force-on-force
exercises that are designed to demonstrate the effectiveness of
DOE's capability to detect, assess, intercept, challenge, delay, and
neutralize a simulated threat.
(i) The scope of drills conducted for training purposes must be
determined by DOE as needed, and can be limited to specific portions
of the site protective strategy.
(ii) Drills, exercises, and other training must be conducted
under conditions that simulate as closely as practical the site
specific conditions under which each member will, or may be,
required to perform assigned duties and responsibilities.
(iii) DOE shall document each performance evaluation to include,
but not be limited to, scenarios, participants, and critiques.
(iv) Each drill and exercise must include a documented post-
exercise critique in which participants identify failures,
deficiencies, or other findings in performance, plans, equipment, or
strategies.
(v) DOE shall enter all findings, deficiencies, and failures
identified by each performance evaluation into the corrective action
program to ensure that timely corrections are made to the onsite
physical protection program, and necessary changes are made to the
approved security plans, DOE protective strategy, and implementing
procedures.
(vi) DOE shall protect all findings, deficiencies, and failures
relative to the effectiveness of the onsite physical protection
program in accordance with the requirements of Sec. 73.21.
(3) For the purpose of drills and exercises, DOE shall:
(i) Use no more than the number of armed personnel specified in
the approved security plans to demonstrate effectiveness;
(ii) Minimize the number and effects of artificialities
associated with drills and exercises;
(iii) Implement the use of systems or methodologies that
simulate the realities of armed engagement through visual and
audible means and that reflect the capabilities of armed personnel
to neutralize a target through the use of firearms during drills and
exercises; and
(iv) Ensure that each scenario used is capable of challenging
the ability of armed personnel to perform assigned duties and
implement required elements of the protective strategy.
(4) The Performance Evaluation Program must be designed to
ensure that:
(i) Each member of each shift who is assigned duties and
responsibilities required to implement the approved safeguards
contingency plan and DOE protective strategy participates in at
least one (1) drill on a quarterly basis and one (1) force-on-force
exercise on an annual basis, as appropriate;
(ii) The mock adversary force replicates, as closely as
possible, adversary characteristics and capabilities in the design
basis threat described in Sec. 73.1(a) of this part, and is capable
of exploiting and challenging the DOE protective strategy,
personnel, command and control, and implementing procedures;
(iii) Protective strategies are evaluated and challenged through
tabletop demonstrations;
(iv) Drill and exercise controllers are trained and qualified to
ensure each controller has the requisite knowledge and experience to
control and evaluate exercises; and
(v) Drills and exercises are conducted safely in accordance with
site safety plans.
(5) Members of the mock adversary force used for NRC-observed
exercises shall be independent of both the security program
management and personnel who have direct responsibility for
implementation of the security program, including contractors, to
avoid the possibility for a conflict-of-interest.
(6) Scenarios.
(i) DOE shall develop and document multiple scenarios for use in
conducting quarterly drills and annual force-on-force exercises.
(ii) DOE scenarios must be designed to test and challenge any
component, or combination of components, of the onsite physical
protection program and protective strategy.
(iii) Each scenario must use a unique target set or target sets,
and varying combinations of adversary equipment, strategies, and
tactics, to ensure that the combination of all scenarios challenges
every component of the onsite physical protection program and
protective strategy to include, but not be limited to, equipment,
implementing procedures, and personnel.
(iv) DOE shall ensure that scenarios used for required drills
and exercises are not repeated within any twelve (12) month
[[Page 72559]]
period for drills and three (3) years for exercises.
(m) Records, audits, and reviews.
(1) DOE shall review and audit the Commission-approved
safeguards contingency plan in accordance with the requirements
Sec. 73.53(o).
(2) DOE shall make necessary adjustments to the Commission-
approved safeguards contingency plan to ensure successful
implementation of Commission regulations and the site protective
strategy.
(3) The safeguards contingency plan review must include an audit
of implementing procedures and practices, the site protective
strategy, and response agreements made by local, State, and Federal
law enforcement authorities.
(4) DOE shall retain all reports, records, or other
documentation required by this appendix in accordance with the
requirements of Sec. 73.53(s).
(n) Implementing procedures.
(1) DOE shall establish and maintain written implementing
procedures that provide specific guidance and operating details that
identify the actions to be taken and decisions to be made by each
member of the security organization who is assigned duties and
responsibilities required for the effective implementation of the
Commission-approved security plans and the site protective strategy.
(2) DOE shall ensure that implementing procedures accurately
reflect the information contained in the responsibility matrix
required by this appendix, the Commission-approved security plans,
the Integrated Response Plan, and other site plans.
(3) Implementing procedures need not be submitted to the
Commission for approval but are subject to inspection.
21. In Appendix G to part 73, a paragraph is added after the
introductory paragraph, paragraphs III and IV are reserved, and
paragraphs V, VI, VII and VIII are added to read as follows:
Appendix G to Part 73--Reportable Safeguards Events
* * * * *
Under the provisions of Sec. 73.71a DOE, as a licensee subject
to the provisions of Sec. 73.53, shall report or record, as
appropriate, the following safeguards events under paragraphs V, VI,
VII, and VIII of this appendix. DOE shall make such reports to the
Commission under the provisions of 73.71a.
* * * * *
III [Reserved]
IV [Reserved]
V. Events at a GROA to be reported as soon as possible, but no
later than 15 minutes after discovery, followed by a written report
within sixty (60) days.
(a) The initiation of a security response consistent with DOE's
physical security plan, safeguards contingency plan, or defensive
strategy based on actual or imminent threat.
(b) DOE is not required to report security responses initiated
as a result of information communicated to the licensee by the
Commission, such as the threat warning system addressed in Appendix
C to this part.
VI. Events at a GROA to be reported within one (1) hour of
discovery, followed by a written report within sixty (60) days.
(a) Any event in which there is reason to believe that a person
has committed or caused, or attempted to commit or cause, or has
made a threat to commit or cause:
(1) A theft or unlawful diversion of special nuclear material;
or
(2) Significant physical damage to the GROA facility if it
possesses strategic special nuclear material; or
(3) Interruption of normal operation of the GROA through the
unauthorized use of or tampering with its components, or controls
including the security system.
(b) An actual or attempted entry of an unauthorized person into
any area or transport for which DOE is required by Commission
regulations to control access.
(c) Any failure, degradation, or the discovered vulnerability in
a safeguard system that could allow unauthorized or undetected
access to any area or transport for which DOE is required by
Commission regulations to control access and for which compensatory
measures have not been employed.
(d) The actual or attempted introduction of contraband into any
area or transport for which DOE is required by Commission
regulations to control access.
VII. Events at a GROA to be reported within four (4) hours of
discovery. No written followup report is required.
(a) Any other information received by the licensee of suspicious
surveillance activities or attempts at access, including:
(1) Any security-related incident involving suspicious activity
that may be indicative of potential pre-operational surveillance,
reconnaissance, or intelligence-gathering activities directed
against the facility. Such activity may include, but not be limited
to, attempted surveillance or reconnaissance activity, elicitation
of information from security or other site personnel relating to the
security or safe operation of the facility, or challenges to
security systems (e.g., failure to stop for security checkpoints or
possible tests of security response and security screening
equipment.
(2) Any security-related incident involving suspicious aircraft
overflight activity. Commercial or military aircraft activity
considered routine by DOE is not required to be reported.
(3) Any incident resulting in the notification of local, state
or national law enforcement, or law enforcement response to the site
not included in paragraphs V or VI of this appendix;
(b) The unauthorized use of or tampering with the components or
controls, including the security system.
(c) Follow-up communications regarding events reported under
paragraph VII of this appendix will be completed through the NRC
threat assessment process via the NRC Operations Center.
VIII. Events at a GROA to be recorded within 24 hours of
discovery in the safeguards event log.
(a) Any failure, degradation, or discovered vulnerability in a
safeguards system that could have allowed unauthorized or undetected
access to any area or transport in which the licensee is required by
Commission regulations to control access had compensatory measures
not been established.
(b) Any other threatened, attempted, or committed act not
previously defined in this appendix with the potential for reducing
the effectiveness of the physical protection program below that
described in a licensee physical security or safeguards contingency
plan, or the actual condition of such reduction in effectiveness.
PART 74--MATERIAL CONTROL AND ACCOUNTING OF SPECIAL NUCLEAR
MATERIAL
22. The authority citation for part 74 continues to read as
follows:
Authority: Secs. 53, 57, 161, 182, 183, 68 Stat. 930, 932, 948,
953, 954, as amended, sec. 234, 83 Stat. 444, as amended, sec. 1701,
106 Stat. 2951, 2952, 2953, (42 U.S.C. 2073, 2077, 2201, 2232, 2233,
2282, 2297f); secs. 201, as amended 202, 206, 88 Stat. 1242, as
amended, 1244, 1246 (42 U.S.C. 5841, 5842, 5846); sec. 1704, 112
Stat. 2750 (44 U.S.C. 3504 note).
23. In Sec. 74.1, paragraph (b) is revised to read as follows:
Sec. 74.1 Purpose.
* * * * *
(b) The general conditions and procedures for the submittal of a
license application for the activities covered in this part are
detailed in Sec. Sec. 60.21, 63.21, or 70.22 of this chapter.
24. In Sec. 74.2, paragraph (b) is revised to read as follows:
Sec. 74.2 Scope.
* * * * *
(b) In addition, specific control and accounting requirements are
included in subparts C, D, E, and F of this part for certain licensees
who:
(1) Possess and use formula quantities of strategic special nuclear
material;
(2) Possess and use special nuclear material of moderate strategic
significance;
(3) Possess and use special nuclear material of low strategic
significance;
(4) Possess uranium source material and equipment capable of
producing enriched uranium; or
(5) Possess and use waste containing special nuclear material at a
GROA.
* * * * *
25. In Sec. 74.4, definitions for ``accounting'', ``custodian'',
``high-level radioactive waste'', ``item control area'', ``item control
program'', and ``material balance area'' are added in alphabetical
order to read as follows:
Sec. 74.4 Definitions.
* * * * *
Accounting means the records (e.g., ledgers, journals, source
documents,
[[Page 72560]]
etc.) pertaining to the determination of, and current record
maintenance of, special nuclear material quantities associated with
receipts, shipments, measured discards, transfers into and between
material balance areas and/or item control areas, and total material on
current inventory.
* * * * *
Custodian means a designated individual who is responsible for the
control and movement of all special nuclear material within a specified
control area, and maintaining records relative to all special nuclear
material transferred into or out of the area and that is currently
located within the control area. Control areas are usually designated
as material balance areas or item control areas. From the standpoint of
appropriate safeguards practice, a single individual should not be a
custodian of more than one control area.
* * * * *
High-level radioactive waste or HLW means:
(1) The highly radioactive material resulting from the reprocessing
of spent nuclear fuel, including liquid waste produced directly in
reprocessing and any solid material derived from such liquid waste that
contains fission products in sufficient concentrations;
(2) Irradiated reactor fuel; and
(3) Other highly radioactive material that the Commission,
consistent with existing law, determines by rule requires permanent
isolation.
* * * * *
Item control area (ICA) means an identifiable physical area for the
storage and control of special nuclear material items. Control of items
moving into or out of an ICA is by item identity and assigned special
nuclear material quantity.
Item control program means a system that tracks (i.e., records) the
creation, identity, location, and disposition of all special nuclear
material items of certain predetermined categories. In addition, item
control programs usually provide a periodic verification of item
existence and location for static items.
* * * * *
Material balance area (MBA) means an identifiable physical area for
the physical and administrative control of special nuclear material
such that the quantity of nuclear material being moved into or out of
the MBA is a measurement-based assigned value for element and isotope.
* * * * *
26. In Sec. 74.13, paragraph (a) is revised to read as follows:
Sec. 74.13 Material Status Reports.
(a) Each licensee, including nuclear reactor licensees as defined
in Sec. Sec. 50.21 and 50.22 of this chapter, authorized to possess at
any one time and location special nuclear material in a quantity
totaling more than 350 grams of contained uranium-235, uranium-233, or
plutonium, or any combination thereof, shall complete and submit, in
computer-readable format, Material Balance Reports concerning special
nuclear material that the licensee has received, produced, possessed,
transferred, consumed, disposed of, or lost. This prescribed computer-
readable report replaces the DOE/NRC Form 742 which has been previously
submitted in paper form. The Physical Inventory Listing Report must be
submitted with each Material Balance Report. This prescribed computer-
readable report replaces the DOE/NRC Form 742C which has been
previously submitted in paper form. Each licensee shall prepare and
submit the reports described in this paragraph in accordance with
instructions (NUREG/BR-0007 and NMMSS Report D-24 ``Personal Computer
Data Input for NRC Licensees''). Copies of these instructions may be
obtained from the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Office of Nuclear
Material Safety and Safeguards, Washington, DC 20555-0001. Each
licensee subject to the requirements of Sec. 74.51 shall compile a
report as of March 31 and September 30 of each year and file it within
30 days after the end of the period covered by the report. All other
licensees subject to this requirement shall submit a report within 60
calendar days of the beginning of the physical inventory required by
Sec. Sec. 74.19(c), 74.31(c)(5), 74.33(c)(4), 74.43(c)(6), or
74.73(i)(1). The Commission may permit a licensee to submit the reports
at other times for good cause.
* * * * *
27. In Sec. 74.17, a new paragraph (d) is added to read as
follows:
Sec. 74.17 Special nuclear material physical inventory summary
report.
* * * * *
(d) DOE shall submit a completed Special Nuclear Material Physical
Inventory Summary Report on NRC Form 327 not later than 60 calendar
days from the start of each physical inventory required by Sec.
74.73(i). DOE shall report the physical inventory results by facility
and total facility to the Director, Office of Nuclear Material Safety
and Safeguards, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
28. In Sec. 74.19, paragraphs (a) introductory text and (c) are
revised to read as follows:
Sec. 74.19 Recordkeeping.
(a) Licensees subject to the recordkeeping requirements of
Sec. Sec. 74.31, 74.33, 74.43, 74.59, or 74.73 are exempt from the
requirements of paragraphs (a)(1) through (a)(4) of this section.
Otherwise:
* * * * *
(c) Other than licensees subject to Sec. Sec. 74.31, 74.33, 74.41,
74.51, or 74.71, each licensee who is authorized to possess special
nuclear material, at any one time and site location, in a quantity
greater than 350 grams of contained uranium-235, uranium-233, or
plutonium, or any combination thereof, shall conduct a physical
inventory of all special nuclear material in its possession under
license at intervals not to exceed 12 months. The results of these
physical inventories need not be reported to the Commission, but the
licensee shall retain the records associated with each physical
inventory until the Commission terminates the license that authorized
the possession of special nuclear material.
* * * * *
29. Subpart F is redesignated as Subpart G and a new Subpart F is
added to read as follows:
Subpart F--Geologic Repository Operations Area
Sec. 74.71 Nuclear material control and accounting for a geologic
repository operations area.
(a) General performance objectives. DOE shall establish, implement,
and maintain a Commission-approved material control and accounting
(MC&A) program that will achieve the following performance objectives:
(1) Maintain accurate, current, and reliable information on, and
confirm the quantities and locations of special nuclear material (SNM)
in radioactive waste in DOE's possession at the GROA;
(2) Detect, respond to, and resolve any anomalies indicating a
possible loss of SNM, including potential theft or diversion;
(3) Permit rapid determination of whether an actual loss of a
significant quantity of SNM has occurred;
(4) Generate and provide, as requested, information to aid in the
investigation and recovery of missing SNM in the event of an actual
loss, theft, or other misuse; and
(5) Control access to MC&A information that might assist
adversaries in possible attempts to carry out a theft or diversion, or
to help target
[[Page 72561]]
radioactive waste for radiological sabotage.
(b) System capabilities. To achieve the general performance
objectives in Sec. 74.71(a), the MC&A program must include the
capabilities and features described in Sec. 74.73.
(c) Submittal and implementation dates. DOE shall submit an MC&A
plan describing how the performance objectives of Sec. 74.71(a) will
be achieved, and how the system capabilities required by Sec. 74.71(b)
will be met. The MC&A plan must be submitted no later than 180 days
after the NRC issues a construction authorization for the GROA. The
Commission-approved MC&A plan must be implemented upon the Commission's
issuance of a license to operate the GROA or by the date specified in a
license condition.
Sec. 74.73 Internal controls, inventory, and records.
(a) General. DOE shall establish and maintain the internal control,
inventory, and recordkeeping capabilities required in paragraphs (b)
through (k) of this section.
(b) Management structure. DOE shall:
(1) Establish, document, and maintain a management structure that
assures clear overall responsibility for MC&A functions, independence
of MC&A functions from operations responsibilities, and separation of
key responsibilities; and
(2) Provide for the adequate review, approval, and use of written
procedures that are identified in the approved MC&A plan as being
critical to the effectiveness of the described program.
(c) Personnel qualification and training. DOE shall assure that
personnel, who work in key positions where mistakes could degrade the
effectiveness of the MC&A system, are trained to maintain a high level
of safeguards awareness and are qualified to perform their duties and/
or responsibilities.
(d) Independent assessments. DOE shall perform and document
independent reviews and assessments of the total MC&A program, at
intervals not to exceed 24 months, that assess the performance of the
program, review its effectiveness, and document management's action on
prior assessment recommendations and identified deficiencies.
(e) Item control program. DOE shall establish, document, implement,
and maintain an item control program that:
(1) Provides current knowledge of all SNM items with respect to
unique identity, element and isotope content, and location from receipt
to underground emplacement to retrieval (if necessary);
(2) Assures that the integrity of items is maintained by the
tamper-safing of containers; placement in a controlled access area that
provides protection at least equivalent to tamper-safing; or sealing
such that the unauthorized removal of SNM would be readily apparent.
(3) Maintains and follows procedures for tamper-safing of
containers, which include control of access to and distribution of
unused seals and records showing the date and time of seal application;
(4) Stipulates the use of the 2-person rule for sealing operations,
for affixing tamper-indicating devices, for any handling of bare fuel
assemblies, for taking and/or verifying physical inventories or for
transfers of SNM.
(5) Designates item control areas (ICA) and ICA custodians.
(f) Anomaly, detection, and response program. DOE shall establish,
implement, and maintain a program that:
(1) Detects and responds to anomalies indicating a potential loss
or misuse of SNM, including the possible theft or diversion of SNM by
an internal threat using collusion, stealth, and deceit. The overall
design of the detection and response program must include an analysis
of conceivable ways and means through which clandestine attempts of
theft, diversion, or other misuse might occur; and
(2) Incorporates checks and balances that are sufficient to thwart
an attempt to divert SNM and to detect falsification of data and
reports that could conceal the theft or diversion of SNM by:
(i) A single individual, including an employee in any position; and
(ii) Collusion between individuals, one or more of whom have
authorized access to SNM.
(g) Quality assurance capabilities. DOE shall establish, document,
implement, and maintain a program to reasonably assure the validity of
assigned SNM quantities, including a measurement system and a
measurement control program that:
(1) Maintains a level of effectiveness sufficient to satisfy the
capabilities required for detection, response, and accounting. To
achieve this objective, DOE shall perform engineering analyses and
evaluations of the design, installation, preoperational tests,
calibration, and operation of all measurement systems to be used for
MC&A systems; and
(2) Assures the validity of the assigned SNM content for receipts
on a shipment basis by:
(i) Checking unique identification, integrity and intactness of
shipments;
(ii) Coordinating with originators regarding the technical bases
and assignment of SNM values, the loading of canisters/shipping casks,
and tamper-safing/sealing procedures for shipping SNM to the GROA;
(iii) Investigating and resolving any discrepancies that may arise
from validity checks on receipts or from off-normal circumstances; and
(iv) Using, as needed, weighing and/or nondestructive assay
measurements for verifying SNM content in the resolution of anomalies
or other off-normal circumstances from receipt to emplacement.
(h) Information aid. To meet the general performance objective in
Sec. 74.71(a)(4) DOE shall provide to the NRC and/or other appropriate
government agencies information deemed necessary for conducting an
investigation of actual (or highly suspected) events pertaining to
missing SNM and information relevant to the recovery of missing SNM
from theft, diversion, or other loss.
(i) Inventory. DOE shall:
(1) Except as required by part 75 of this chapter, perform a
facility-wide physical inventory of all possessed SNM to close material
balances on an annual basis;
(2) Provide written instructions for conducting physical
inventories that detail assignments, responsibilities, preparation for
and performance of an inventory, and assure that all items are listed,
and no item is listed more than once;
(3) Designate material balance areas (MBA) and MC&A database
administrators. MBAs shall be designated for taking physical
inventories of specified underground and surface operations; and
(4) Within 60 days after the start of each physical inventory
required by paragraph (i)(1) of this section:
(i) Reconcile and adjust the book record, as appropriate, to the
results of the physical inventory;
(ii) Investigate and resolve, or report, by an appropriate method
listed in Sec. 74.6 to the Director, Office of Nuclear Material Safety
and Safeguards, any unresolved inventory difference or discrepancy.
(j) Measures for formula quantities of strategic SNM. If DOE
receives formula quantities of strategic special nuclear materials at
the GROA that are in a form other than as irradiated reactor fuel or
high-level radioactive waste, such strategic SNM shall be controlled
and accounted for in a manner that meets
[[Page 72562]]
the following additional program measures:
(1) Item monitoring features as specified in Sec. 74.55;
(2) Alarm resolution as specified in Sec. 74.57;
(3) Quality assurance and accounting capabilities, as appropriate,
as specified in Sec. 74.59;
(4) Establishment of controlled areas for strategic special nuclear
material; and
(5) Conduct of a semiannual physical inventory of all strategic
special nuclear material.
(k) Recordkeeping. (1) DOE shall:
(i) Establish records that will demonstrate that the performance
objectives of Sec. 74.71(a) and the system capability and feature
requirements of Sec. 74.73 have been met, and maintain these records
in duplicate in an auditable form, available for inspection, and retain
these records until the Commission terminates the GROA license;
(ii) Retain material control and accounting procedures until the
Commission terminates the GROA license and retain any superseded
portion of the procedure for 3 years after the portion is superseded;
(iii) Maintain adequate safeguards against tampering with and loss
of records;
(iv) Satisfy the requirements of Sec. 60.71 or Sec. 63.71 of this
chapter, for records on the receipt, handling, and disposition of
radioactive waste at the GROA.
(2) Records that must be maintained pursuant to this part may be
the original or a reproduced copy or a microform if the reproduced copy
or microform is duly authenticated by authorized personnel, and the
microform is capable of producing a clear and legible copy after
storage for the period specified by Commission regulations. The record
may also be stored in electronic media with the capability for
producing legible, accurate, and complete records during the required
retention period. Records such as letters, drawings, or specifications
must include all pertinent information such as stamps, initials, and
signatures.
Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 11th day of December 2007.
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Annette Vietti-Cook,
Secretary of the Commission.
[FR Doc. E7-24346 Filed 12-19-07; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590-01-P