[Federal Register Volume 74, Number 221 (Wednesday, November 18, 2009)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Pages 59874-59890]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: E9-27624]



[[Page 59873]]

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Part V





Department of Homeland Security





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Transportation Security Administration



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49 CFR Parts 1520 and 1554



Aircraft Repair Station Security; Proposed Rule

Federal Register / Vol. 74 , No. 221 / Wednesday, November 18, 2009 / 
Proposed Rules

[[Page 59874]]


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DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

Transportation Security Administration

49 CFR Parts 1520 and 1554

[Docket No. TSA-2004-17131]
RIN 1652-AA38


Aircraft Repair Station Security

AGENCY: Transportation Security Administration (TSA), DHS.

ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM).

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SUMMARY: TSA is proposing to issue regulations to improve the security 
of domestic and foreign aircraft repair stations as required by the 
Vision 100-Century of Aviation Reauthorization Act. The proposed 
regulations establish requirements for repair stations that are 
certificated by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) under 14 CFR 
part 145 to adopt and implement a standard security program and to 
comply with security directives issued by TSA. This rule proposes to 
codify the scope of TSA's existing inspection program and to require 
regulated parties to allow TSA and Department of Homeland Security 
(DHS) officials to enter, inspect, and test property, facilities, and 
records relevant to repair stations. The proposed regulations also 
provide procedures for TSA to notify repair stations of any 
deficiencies in their security programs, and to determine whether a 
particular repair station presents an immediate risk to security. The 
proposal includes a process whereby a repair station may seek review of 
a determination by TSA that the station has not adequately addressed 
security deficiencies or that the repair station poses an immediate 
risk to security.

DATES: Submit comments by January 19, 2010.

ADDRESSES: You may submit comments, identified by Docket No. TSA-2004-
17131, to the Federal Docket Management System (FDMS), a government-
wide, electronic docket management system, using any one of the 
following methods:
    Electronically: You may submit comments through the Federal 
eRulemaking portal at http://www.regulations.gov. Follow the online 
instructions for submitting comments.
    Mail, Fax, or In Person: Address, hand-deliver, or fax your written 
comments to the Docket Management System, U.S. Department of 
Transportation, 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE., West Building Ground Floor, 
Room W12-140, Washington, DC 20590-0001; Fax: 202-493-2251. The 
Department of Transportation (DOT), which maintains and processes TSA's 
official regulatory dockets, will scan the submission and post it to 
FDMS.
    See SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION for format and other information 
about comment submissions.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Celio Young, Office of Security 
Operations, TSA-29, Transportation Security Administration, 601 South 
12th Street, Arlington, VA 20598-6029; telephone (571) 227-3580; 
facsimile (571) 227-1905; e-mail celio.young@dhs.gov.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Comments Invited

    TSA invites interested persons to participate in this rulemaking by 
submitting written comments, data, or views. We also invite comments 
relating to the economic, environmental, energy, recordkeeping, or 
federalism impacts that might result from adopting the proposals in 
this document. See ADDRESSES above for information on where to submit 
comments.
    With each comment, please identify the docket number at the 
beginning of your comments. TSA encourages commenters to provide their 
names and addresses. The most helpful comments reference a specific 
portion of the rulemaking, explain the reason for any recommended 
change, and include supporting data. You may submit comments and 
material electronically, in person, or by mail as provided under 
ADDRESSES, but please submit your comments and material by only one 
means. If you submit comments by mail or delivery, submit them in two 
copies, in an unbound format, no larger than 8.5 by 11 inches, suitable 
for copying and electronic filing.
    If you want TSA to acknowledge receipt of your comments submitted 
by mail, include with your comments a self-addressed, stamped postcard 
on which the docket number appears. We will stamp the date on the 
postcard and mail it to you.
    TSA will file in the public docket address, as well as items sent 
to the address or email under FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT, in the 
public docket, except for comments containing confidential information 
and sensitive security information (SSI).\1\ Should you wish your 
personally identifiable information redacted prior to filing in the 
docket, please so state. TSA will consider all comments that are in the 
docket on or before the closing date for comments and will consider 
comments filed late to the extent practicable. The docket is available 
for public inspection before and after the closing date.
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    \1\ ``Sensitive Security Information'' or ``SSI'' is information 
obtained or developed in the conduct of security activities, the 
disclosure of which would constitute an unwarranted invasion of 
privacy, reveal trade secrets or privileged or confidential 
information, or be detrimental to the security of transportation. 
The protection of SSI is governed by 49 CFR part 1520.
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Handling of Confidential or Proprietary Information and Sensitive 
Security Information (SSI) Submitted in Public Comments

    Do not submit comments that include trade secrets, confidential 
commercial or financial information, or SSI to the public regulatory 
docket. Please submit such comments separately from other comments on 
the rulemaking. Comments containing this type of information should be 
appropriately marked as containing such information and submitted by 
mail to the address listed in FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT section.
    TSA will not place comments containing SSI in the public docket and 
will handle them in accordance with applicable safeguards and 
restrictions on access. TSA will hold documents containing SSI, 
confidential business information, or trade secrets in a separate file 
to which the public does not have access, and place a note in the 
public docket explaining that commenters have submitted such documents. 
TSA may include a redacted version of the comment in the public docket. 
If an individual requests to examine or copy information that is not in 
the public docket, TSA will treat it as any other request under the 
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) (5 U.S.C. 552) and the Department of 
Homeland Security's (DHS') FOIA regulation found in 6 CFR part 5.

Reviewing Comments in the Docket

    Please be aware that anyone is able to search the electronic form 
of all comments received into any of our dockets by the name of the 
individual submitting the comment (or signing the comments, if 
submitted on behalf of an association, business, labor union, etc.). 
You may review the applicable Privacy Act statement published in the 
Federal Register on April 11, 2000 (65 FR 19477) and modified on 
January 17, 2008 (73 FR 3316).
    You may review TSA's electronic public docket on the Internet at 
http://www.regulations.gov. In addition, DOT's Docket Management 
Facility provides a physical facility, staff, equipment, and

[[Page 59875]]

assistance to the public. To obtain assistance or to review comments in 
TSA's public docket, you may visit this facility between 9 a.m. to 5 
p.m., Monday through Friday, excluding legal holidays, or call (202) 
366-9826. This docket operations facility is located in the West 
Building Ground Floor, Room W12-140 at 1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE., 
Washington, DC 20590.

Availability of Rulemaking Document

    You may obtain an electronic copy using the Internet by
    (1) Searching the Federal Docket Management System (FDMS) Web page 
at http://www.regulations.gov;
    (2) Accessing the Government Printing Office's Web page at http://www.gpoaccess.gov/fr/index.html; or
    (3) Visiting TSA's Security Regulations Web page at http://www.tsa.gov and accessing the link for ``Research Center'' at the top 
of the page.
    In addition, copies of the rulemaking document are available by 
writing or calling the individual in the FOR FURTHER INFORMATION 
CONTACT section. Make sure to identify the docket number of this 
rulemaking.

Outline of the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking

I. Background
    A. Introduction
    B. Statutory Requirements
    C. Summary of Proposed Rule
    D. FAA Safety Regulations
    E. Public Listening Session and Comments
    F. Repair Station Site Visits
II. Summary of the Proposed Rule
    A. Repair Station Standard Security Program
    B. Repair Station Profile
    C. Security Inspections
    D. Immediate Risk to Security
III. Section-by-Section Analysis
IV. Rulemaking Analyses and Notices
    A. Paperwork Reduction Act
    B. International Compatibility
    C. Regulatory Impact Analyses
    1. Regulatory Evaluation Summary
    2. Executive Order 12866 Assessment
    3. Initial Regulatory Flexibility Analysis (IRFA)
    4. International Trade Impact Assessment
    5. Unfunded Mandates Reform Act Assessment
    D. Executive Order 13132, Federalism
    E. Environmental Analysis
    F. Energy Impact Analysis

I. Background

A. Introduction

    Civil aviation remains a target of terrorist activity worldwide. 
Terrorists continue to seek opportunities to destroy public confidence 
in the safety and security of travel, deny the ability of the public to 
move and travel freely, and damage international economic security.
    TSA is proposing to issue regulations to provide for the security 
of maintenance and repair work conducted on aircraft and aircraft 
components at domestic and foreign repair stations, of the aircraft and 
aircraft components located at these repair stations, and of the repair 
station facilities as required by Vision 100--Century of Aviation 
Reauthorization Act, codified at 49 U.S.C. 44924 (Vision 100).
    For purposes of this rulemaking, ``repair stations'' are those 
facilities certificated by the FAA to perform maintenance, repair, 
overhaul, or alterations on U.S. aircraft or aircraft components, 
including engines, hydraulics, avionics, safety equipment, airframes, 
and interiors. According to the FAA, there are 4,227 domestic repair 
stations located in the United States and 694 foreign repair stations 
located outside the United States that have an FAA certificate under 
part 145 of the FAA's rules.\2\
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    \2\ FAA Fact Sheet, ``FAA Oversight of Repair Stations,'' March 
29, 2007. See ``FAA Certificated Repair Stations Directory,'' 
Advisory Circular (AC) 140-7R, for a list of FAA certificated repair 
stations.
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    In addition, for purposes of this rulemaking, the term 
``component'' includes any article, airframe, aircraft engine, 
propeller, appliance, or part that is under repair. The term is used 
broadly to encompass both articles and appliances as defined by the 
FAA.\3\
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    \3\ See 14 CFR 1.1 and 145.3(b).
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    Aircraft repair stations vary widely in size, type of repair work 
performed, number of employees, and proximity to an airport. The FAA 
issues ratings to certificated repair stations for the work that can be 
performed at the repair station.\4\ These include airframe ratings, 
power plant ratings, propeller ratings, radio ratings, instrument 
ratings, and accessory ratings. Within each rating there are different 
classes for particular aircraft and equipment. The FAA also issues 
limited ratings for certificated repair stations that only work on a 
particular type of airframe or equipment or performs only specialized 
maintenance operations.\5\ The FAA certificates repair stations with 
few employees located in industrial parks and in residences that may 
work on small components, such as aircraft radios or seat cushions, as 
well as repair stations with many employees that perform major aircraft 
overhauls located in close proximity to an airport runway.\6\ Because 
repair station characteristics vary widely, TSA believes that existing 
security measures, as well as the corresponding security threat, also 
vary widely.
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    \4\ 14 CFR 145.59.
    \5\ 14 CFR 145.61.
    \6\ Approximately 2,803 domestic repair stations have fifteen or 
fewer employees and 1,407 have five or fewer employees. 
Approximately 3,000 certificated domestic repair stations are not 
located on an airport.
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    Repair stations are closely regulated and monitored by the FAA and 
both the FAA and the air carriers inspect work done at repair stations. 
FAA performance standards for foreign and domestic repair stations are 
the same. While the FAA has implemented extensive safety requirements 
for both foreign and domestic repair stations, supplementing those 
requirements with specific security measures for both foreign and 
domestic repair stations would further reduce the likelihood that 
terrorists would be able to gain access to aircraft under repair at a 
repair station. As terrorist organizations continue to seek new and 
creative means of using aircraft to undermine the security and safety 
of the traveling public, the importance of requiring all aircraft 
repair stations to have measures in place to prevent persons from 
commandeering, tampering, or sabotaging aircraft has increased as well. 
Enhancement of repair station security will mitigate the potential 
threat that an aircraft could be used as a weapon or that an aircraft 
could be destroyed.
    This rulemaking sets forth proposed regulations to require all FAA 
certificated repair stations to adopt and carry out a standard security 
program. The proposed regulations list performance standards for 
security measures that would be included in the standard security 
program. The proposed regulations also would require repair stations to 
carry out Security Directives issued by TSA in the event of a specific 
threat.
    In addition, the proposed regulations codify the scope of TSA's 
authority to conduct inspections of both domestic and foreign repair 
stations. The proposed regulations also provide procedures for TSA to 
notify repair stations of deficiencies in their security program and to 
determine whether a particular repair station represents an immediate 
risk to security. Finally, the proposal contains a process whereby a 
repair station may seek review of a determination by TSA that security 
deficiencies have not been addressed or that the repair station poses 
an immediate risk to security.

B. Statutory Requirements

    Vision 100 requires DHS to promulgate security regulations for 
domestic and foreign aircraft repair

[[Page 59876]]

stations.\7\ The statute includes the following additional requirements 
regarding security audits of foreign repair stations:
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    \7\ This section of Vision 100 is codified at 49 U.S.C. 44924. 
The requirement to promulgate regulations is described in 49 U.S.C. 
44924(f). The statute also requires that the Under Secretary for 
Border and Transportation Security issue the final regulations. The 
Under Secretary delegated authority for issuing such regulations to 
TSA on September 16, 2005. TSA sent a Report to Congress on August 
24, 2004, as required at 49 U.S.C. 44924(g).
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     TSA must complete a security review and audit of foreign 
repair stations certificated by the FAA no later than six months after 
regulations are issued.\8\ When conducting the audit, TSA must give 
priority to those repair stations that pose a significant risk to 
security. If security audits are not completed within six months from 
the date regulations are issued, the FAA is barred from certificating 
any new foreign repair stations until the security audits are completed 
for existing repair stations.
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    \8\ In the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission 
Act of 2007 (Pub. L. 110-53, 121 Stat. 266, Aug. 3, 2007), the 
original 18-month deadline for completing security inspections of 
foreign repair stations was reduced to 6 months.
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     TSA must notify the FAA of any security issues or 
vulnerabilities identified during the audit and require foreign repair 
stations to address any such issues or vulnerabilities within 90 days. 
If, after 90 days, TSA determines that the foreign repair station does 
not maintain and carry out effective security measures, TSA must notify 
the FAA and the FAA must suspend the repair station's certificate until 
such time as TSA determines that the repair station does maintain and 
carry out effective security measures.
     TSA must notify the FAA if TSA determines that a foreign 
repair station poses an immediate risk to security and the FAA must 
revoke the repair station's certificate. TSA must establish an appeal 
procedure to be used when a certificate is revoked.

C. Summary of Proposed Rule

    TSA is proposing regulations to:
     Codify TSA's inspection authority.
     Require foreign and domestic repair stations certificated 
by the FAA under part 145 of the FAA's rules to allow TSA and DHS 
officials to enter, inspect, audit, and test property, facilities, and 
records relevant to repair stations.
     Require foreign and domestic repair stations certificated 
by the FAA to adopt and carry out a standard security program issued by 
TSA to safeguard the security of the repair station, the repair work 
conducted at the repair station, and all aircraft and aircraft 
components at the repair station.
     Require each security program to describe the specific 
measures the repair station has implemented to identify individuals 
authorized access to the repair station, aircraft, and aircraft 
components; control access to the repair station, aircraft, and 
aircraft components; challenge individuals who are not authorized 
access and use escort measures for authorized visitors; provide 
security awareness training to all employees; verify employee 
background information; designate a security coordinator; and establish 
a contingency plan.
     Require each repair station to comply with Security 
Directives issued by TSA.
     Establish a process to notify the FAA to suspend a 
certificate upon written notification by TSA that a repair station has 
not corrected security deficiencies identified during a security audit 
within 90 days and to permit appeal of a certificate suspension.
     Establish a process to notify the FAA to revoke a 
certificate upon written notification by TSA that a repair station is 
an immediate risk to security and to permit appeal of a certificate 
revocation.
    In developing these proposals, TSA has consulted with FAA officials 
responsible for repair station safety matters.

D. FAA Safety Regulations

    The security regulations proposed in this NPRM are designed to 
build upon the extensive certification and safety requirements for 
repair stations instituted by the FAA. The FAA certificates repair 
stations, as well as repairmen who work in repair stations.\9\ The FAA 
requires that in order to receive certification, repair stations must 
establish and maintain a quality control system acceptable to the FAA 
that ensures the airworthiness of the articles on which the repair 
station or any of its contractors performs maintenance, preventive 
maintenance, or alterations.\10\ The quality control system must 
describe the procedures the repair station uses to inspect incoming raw 
materials, perform preliminary inspection of all articles that are 
maintained at the repair station, qualify and monitor noncertificated 
persons who perform maintenance, preventive maintenance, or alterations 
for repair stations, and conduct final inspections of maintained 
articles. In addition, the FAA requires that a certificated repair 
station inspect each article upon which it has performed maintenance, 
preventive maintenance, or alterations before approving that article 
for return to service.\11\ The FAA conducts safety inspections of both 
foreign and domestic repair stations.
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    \9\ See 14 CFR part 145 and 14 CFR part 65. While the FAA only 
certificates certain repair station personnel who work in the United 
States, it does require that those repair station personnel located 
outside the United States have practical experience or training in 
the work being performed. Supervisors in repair stations located 
outside the United States must understand, read, and write English. 
14 CFR 145.153.
    \10\ 14 CFR 145.211.
    \11\ 14 CFR 145.211.
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    While these quality control measures provide a significant layer of 
protection and oversight of the components and aircraft under repair, 
the proposed regulations would supplement those measures by requiring 
that FAA certificated repair stations also adopt and carry out a 
security program that would include procedures to control access to the 
repair station itself, the components and aircraft under repair, and 
the work being performed; verify the identity of repair station 
employees; and establish a security coordinator to serve as the point 
of contact for security-related matters.

E. Public Listening Session and Comments

    On February 27, 2004, TSA held a public listening session to 
receive input from stakeholders and other interested parties on repair 
station security issues. TSA also invited written comments to be 
submitted by March 29, 2004.\12\ TSA requested specific comments on the 
following issues:
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    \12\ 69 FR 8357 (Feb. 24, 2004).
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     Security measures that are currently deployed.
     Existing security vulnerabilities.
     Standards that should be in place to prevent unauthorized 
access, tampering, and any other security breaches.
     Current security system costs.
     Whether security requirements should be tailored to the 
type of authorization the repair station holds, number of employees, 
proximity to an airport, number of repairs completed, or other 
characteristics.
     Whether aircraft operators should play a role in ensuring 
that repair stations maintain a secure workplace.
     Whether any repair station operator has experienced a 
breach in security.
    Twelve parties, representing air carriers, repair station operators 
and employees, manufacturers, and unions, spoke during the public 
meeting.\13\ While several parties questioned the need for security 
regulations, most

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recognized the importance of protecting the security of the aircraft, 
the maintenance work that repair stations perform on aircraft and 
aircraft components, and the facility itself, noting that TSA is 
required by statute to develop such regulations. Most parties also 
agreed that the regulations should be tailored to reflect security 
measures that may already be in place, as well as other factors, such 
as those listed by TSA in its request for comments. Concerns were 
expressed regarding the expedited timing of the regulations and the 
security audits, the potential financial burdens resulting from the 
imposition of new regulations, particularly on small repair stations, 
and the appeal process. Several parties recommended that the 
regulations define what constitutes an ``immediate risk to security,'' 
as well as ``existing repair stations.'' Other parties discussed 
security initiatives that had been employed at their facilities since 
September 11, 2001.
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    \13\ A transcript of the public meeting and copies of all filed 
comments are available in docket number TSA-2004-17131 at http://regulations.gov/search.
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    TSA also received 21 written comments, representing the views of 
repair station operators and employees, unions, air carriers, aircraft 
owners, and manufacturers regarding potential security regulations. The 
majority of those submitting written comments also supported the need 
for security regulations, and agreed that the regulations should be 
tailored to reflect the particular characteristics of a repair station. 
Some commenters suggested that TSA include general security criteria 
for domestic and foreign repair stations and others offered 
recommendations regarding specific provisions that should be included 
in the regulations, such as access controls, personnel identification, 
employee background checks, and security awareness training. The 
comments provide valuable input as to how repair station security 
issues should be addressed and the proposal reflects many of the 
issues, as well as the recommendations, contained in these initial 
comments. TSA looks forward to receiving further comments on the 
proposed regulations.

F. Repair Station Site Visits

    In addition to the information gathered during the public listening 
session and through written comments, TSA visited repair stations to 
conduct research on the physical characteristics of repair stations, 
the type of repair work performed, and the extent of security measures 
that had been implemented. The following site visits were conducted:
     June 2005--1 repair station in Hamburg, Germany, and 1 
repair station in Amsterdam, the Netherlands.
     August 2005--5 repair stations in Singapore.
     November 2006--9 repair stations in the state of Arizona.
     December 2006--3 repair stations in Naples, Italy.
     January 2007--3 repair stations in the state of Georgia.
     May 2007--1 repair station in Singapore and 1 repair 
station in Guangzhou, China.
     July 2007--1 repair station in Teterboro, New Jersey.
     May 2008--3 repair stations in Bogota, Colombia.
    These repair station site visits provided valuable insight into the 
different types of facilities certificated by the FAA, the different 
types of repair work conducted at the facilities, and the different 
types of security measures deployed by the various facilities. All of 
the stations visited had some security measures in place. For example, 
one foreign repair station had over 10,000 employees with many 
buildings and its own airport. This facility had perimeter fencing, 
security guards, and surveillance cameras to control access to the 
facility. Its employees were required to display identification media. 
Another foreign repair station had only seven employees and was located 
at an industrial park. That facility was planning to install 
surveillance cameras to be monitored by a private security company. In 
two countries the government had mandated security requirements for 
certain repair stations.
    In the United States, one domestic repair station facility with 40 
employees relied on personal recognition to identify individuals 
authorized entry into the facility, while another domestic repair 
station with fifteen employees used identification media and 
surveillance cameras. By conducting these site visits, TSA was able to 
study security measures already deployed and develop a proposal that 
reflects repair station diversity.

II. Summary of the Proposed Rule

    TSA proposes to add a new part 1554 to its regulations, entitled 
``Aircraft Repair Station Security.'' The new part would require 
aircraft repair stations that are certificated by the FAA under 14 CFR 
part 145, both domestic and foreign, to adopt and carry out a standard 
security program. The regulations would require repair stations to 
safeguard the security of the aircraft and components located at the 
station, the maintenance and repair work performed there, as well as 
the repair station's facilities as required by 49 U.S.C. 44924. For a 
more detailed discussion of the proposed regulations, see the Section-
by-Section Analysis portion of this preamble.
    TSA is also proposing changes to its regulations regarding the 
protection of sensitive security information (SSI) to specify that a 
repair station security program is categorized as SSI and that the 
repair station operator or owner is subject to the SSI requirements 
described in 49 CFR part 1520.\14\
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    \14\ ``Sensitive Security Information'' or ``SSI'' is 
information obtained or developed in the conduct of security 
activities, the disclosure of which would constitute an unwarranted 
invasion of privacy, reveal trade secrets or privileged or 
confidential information, or be detrimental to the security of 
transportation. The protection of SSI is governed by 49 CFR part 
1520.
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A. Repair Station Standard Security Program

    FAA certificated repair stations, whether located at airports that 
have a TSA security program,\15\ at general aviation airports, or at 
off airport properties, could be a target of terrorist activity and TSA 
is proposing that each FAA certificated repair station implement and 
carry out a standard security program issued by TSA to mitigate that 
risk. If the repair station is already incorporated within an airport's 
security program and uses the airport's access control measures, TSA 
will consider the repair station to be in compliance with the security 
measures proposed in these regulations.
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    \15\ See 49 CFR part 1542 for a description of airport security 
program requirements. Aircraft repair stations located at a 
commercial airport may be included within the airport security 
program.
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    The proposed regulations list the general security requirements 
that each repair station would be required to carry out in the standard 
security program. The standard security program would require each 
repair station to include (1) a description of access controls for the 
facility as well as for the aircraft and/or aircraft components; (2) a 
description of the measures used to identify employees and others who 
are authorized to access aircraft and/or aircraft components; (3) a 
description of the procedures to challenge unauthorized individuals; 
(4) a description of security awareness training for employees; (5) the 
name of the designated security coordinator; (6) a contingency plan; 
and (7) a description of the means used to verify employee background 
information. The complete security program contents are discussed in 
the Section by Section analysis.
    These requirements are consistent with the recommendations included 
in the written comments received by TSA,

[[Page 59878]]

as well as with established security procedures for aircraft operators, 
air carriers, and airports.\16\
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    \16\ See, generally, TSA security regulations at 49 CFR parts 
1540, 1542, 1544, and 1546.
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    Recognizing that a ``one size fits all'' approach would not 
appropriately address the diversity in repair station characteristics, 
TSA believes that repair stations should have some flexibility 
regarding the particular equipment, facilities, and measures that would 
be listed in the standard security program and used to comply with the 
proposed regulations. While TSA would provide a standard security 
program which would contain the majority of security measures that a 
repair station must adopt to comply with the proposed regulations, 
certain measures in the standard security program that the repair 
station must adopt may differ depending upon risk factors considered by 
TSA.
    TSA would not require repair stations that are not located on or 
adjacent to an airport to implement the same physical security measures 
in the standard security program as those repair stations that are 
located on or adjacent to an airport. In adopting this approach, TSA 
considered the security risks of repair station operations to determine 
whether there were any factors that could increase the security risks 
of a repair station. The factors TSA considered were (1) size and type 
of aircraft to which employees had access; (2) the type of repair work 
permitted by the FAA certificate; (3) whether the repair station was 
located on an airport and the type of airport; and (4) the number of 
employees at the repair station.
    Based on the information acquired during the repair stations site 
visits, an examination of FAA safety requirements, and discussions with 
FAA safety inspectors, TSA determined that while all of the 
characteristics examined had some effect on security risks, repair 
stations that are located on or adjacent to an airport could pose a 
higher security risk. TSA found that at airport locations, there was 
greater accessibility to aircraft and proximity to a runway, thereby 
increasing the possibility that an aircraft could be commandeered and 
used as a weapon or sabotaged. At off-airport locations, TSA found that 
repair station employees had little, if any, access to operational 
aircraft or runways. Repair station employees at off airport locations 
typically are not the last individuals with access to aircraft prior to 
the reintroduction of the aircraft into service. TSA believes that it 
would be difficult for an individual to damage an aircraft at a repair 
station location that is only rated to repair aircraft components if 
the individual does not have access to aircraft. FAA safety regulations 
require inspection of the repair work and the component before it is 
installed in an aircraft and before the aircraft is deemed to be 
airworthy. Thus, TSA believes it is less likely that a terrorist would 
attempt to target an aircraft by sabotaging a component at an off 
airport location.
    This assessment of the greater risk posed by repair stations 
located on or adjacent to an airport was also supported by several 
commenters. One commenter noted that repair stations located within an 
airport posed the greatest risk to security because of the larger 
number of entry points in such a location. Another explained that 
repair facilities located off airport generally only work on aircraft 
components and that the multiple layers of testing and oversight 
already conducted by the FAA serves as an important security function 
as well. Another commenter agreed, stating that repair stations that do 
not have access to aircraft do not pose a security risk because the 
airworthiness of the components are tested before they are released 
into service.
    Based on this risk assessment, TSA would specify particular 
security measures in the standard security program that would apply to 
repair stations on or adjacent to an airport, but that would not be 
required for other repair stations. TSA believes that this approach 
would be consistent with its efforts to strengthen security measures at 
the non public areas of the airport.
    In addition, TSA would not require repair stations on or adjacent 
to airports that only serve aircraft with a maximum certificated take-
off weight (MTOW) of 12,500 pounds or less to include the same security 
measures in the standard security program as repair stations located on 
or adjacent to airports that serve larger aircraft. TSA has long 
recognized that aircraft with a MTOW over 12,500 pounds pose a greater 
risk to security because such aircraft are of sufficient size and 
weight to inflict significant damage and loss of lives.\17\ Smaller 
aircraft may be a less attractive target for terrorists. Therefore, the 
security program would not include the same requirements for repair 
stations that are located on or adjacent to an airport that serves 
small aircraft. While the proposed regulations apply to all FAA 
certificated repair stations, TSA requests comment on whether it should 
exempt certain repair stations after it conducts security reviews and 
audits. For instance, TSA may consider whether to exempt repair 
stations that only perform maintenance on aircraft that are 12,500 MTOW 
or less. TSA also requests comments on whether there are other 
considerations that could be used to determine potential exemptions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \17\ See 49 CFR 1544.101(d) and 1550.7.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    TSA is aware that the FAA may certificate repair stations operating 
on a Federal government facility, such as a U.S. military base. TSA 
believes that the security at such a facility would likely meet and 
exceed the security requirements proposed herein. Therefore, TSA would 
not apply its requirements to any FAA certificated repair station at 
which the Federal government has assumed responsibility for security 
measures.
    The issue of requiring drug and alcohol testing of repair station 
employees was raised during the public listening session. TSA is not 
proposing to include drug and alcohol testing as part of its security 
program requirements. TSA notes that the FAA has instituted alcohol and 
drug testing as part of its safety regulations.\18\ TSA believes that 
such testing should remain under the purview of the FAA.
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    \18\ See 14 CFR part 121 at Appendix I and Appendix J. The FAA 
requires part 145 certificate holders and non-certificated repair 
stations that perform safety sensitive functions for air carriers 
and commercial operators under 14 CFR parts 121 and 135 to implement 
an FAA Antidrug Program.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    TSA believes that the standard security program would be useful to 
repair stations that have not developed or implemented a security 
program, particularly small repair stations that may lack the resources 
to create their own security program. Further, the standard security 
program would provide consistency in format and content for the 
thousands of security programs that would be implemented under this 
proposal. TSA anticipates requesting comment from repair stations on 
the standard security program before a final rule is adopted and will 
make a draft of the standard security program available for review and 
comment by the repair stations subject to the regulations either 
electronically, through meetings, or both.\19\
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    \19\ Security programs will be sensitive security information 
and will not be available to the general public. See Section-by-
Section analysis for Sec.  1520.3 in this preamble.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

B. Repair Station Profile

    To assess the security risks of a repair station and to establish 
the priority by which repair stations must be inspected, TSA would 
require each repair station to provide a brief profile, to include 
general information as to location, such as whether the repair station 
is located

[[Page 59879]]

on or adjacent to an airport,\20\ the total number of employees, and 
the number of employees with access to large aircraft. The type of 
information is discussed in the Section by Section analysis. We note 
that while the FAA holds some of this information, it does not have all 
of it. We invite comments on the burdens associated with TSA collecting 
this profile. As explained above, TSA has determined that repair 
stations located on or adjacent to an airport pose a higher security 
risk than those that are not located on or adjacent to an airport. In 
addition, TSA has determined that repair stations on airports that 
perform work on aircraft over 12,500 MTOW pose a higher security risk. 
Identifying these higher risk repair stations will enable TSA to make 
certain that they are given a higher priority when scheduling 
inspections.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \20\ If located on an airport, whether the repair station 
participates in the airport security program will impact the need 
for the repair station to comply with the proposed security 
regulations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Further, the profile will assist TSA in determining which measures 
included in the standard security program must be implemented to 
address the higher risk posture of repair stations that are located on 
or adjacent to an airport.

C. Security Inspections

    The proposed regulations would codify TSA's inspection authority 
and would require repair stations to permit TSA and DHS officials to 
enter, inspect, and test property, facilities, and records relevant to 
repair stations. The purpose of the inspection would be to assess 
threats to aviation security, enforce TSA security regulations, 
directives, and requirements, evaluate all aspects of the repair 
station security program, verify whether the security program is being 
implemented and whether it is effective, as well as to identify and 
correct security deficiencies. Such oversight is also necessary to 
monitor continuing compliance with the security requirements. Since the 
inspection program is critical to the enforcement of the security 
program requirement, TSA's inspection authority would extend to all 
repair stations. TSA would initiate foreign repair station inspections 
by giving priority to those foreign repair stations that pose the 
greatest risk to aviation security as required by Vision 100, and that 
have identified themselves through the profile as being located on or 
adjacent to an airport and as performing repair work on large aircraft.
    Pursuant to the inspection process and consistent with Vision 100, 
TSA is proposing to notify the repair station and the FAA of any 
deficiencies in a security program and to permit the repair station 90 
days to correct such deficiencies. If the deficiencies are not 
corrected within 90 days, TSA would notify the FAA that it must suspend 
the repair station's certificate until such time as TSA determines that 
the deficiencies are resolved. The proposed regulations also contain a 
process whereby a repair station may request further review of TSA's 
determination regarding security deficiencies.

D. Immediate Risk to Security

    The proposed regulation contains a specific process whereby a 
repair station that poses an immediate risk to security is identified 
and the FAA is notified of such a determination. The FAA must revoke 
the certificate of a station that TSA determines poses an immediate 
risk to security. Whether the threat is immediate would be evaluated on 
a case by case basis considering existing and potential circumstances 
as information is received and analyzed. The proposal provides a repair 
station with the opportunity to obtain the releasable materials upon 
which the determination was made and to seek review of such a 
determination.

III. Section-by-Section Analysis

Part 1520--Protection of Sensitive Security Information

Section 1520.5--Sensitive Security Information

    Protection of Sensitive Security Information (SSI), as codified at 
49 CFR part 1520, would apply to each repair station required to adopt 
and carry out a security program. Airport and aircraft operator 
security programs and plans, amendments, security directives and 
information circulars, technical specifications of security screening 
and detection systems and devices, among other types of information, 
all constitute SSI under current Sec.  1520.5 and are prohibited from 
public disclosure. TSA is proposing to amend its part 1520 rules to 
include a repair station security program as SSI. This change would 
prevent the public disclosure of the security measures implemented and 
utilized by a repair station covered under the new rules because such 
disclosure would pose a threat to transportation security. It would 
also ensure that the repair station standard security program is 
protected just as other TSA required security programs are protected.

Section 1520.7--Covered Persons

    TSA proposes to amend Sec.  1520.7 to include repair station 
operators as covered persons subject to its SSI requirements. This 
change would require that repair station operators adhere to the SSI 
rules and protect SSI from public dissemination. Access to SSI is 
strictly limited to those persons with a need to know, as defined in 49 
CFR 1520.11. In general, a person has a need to know specific SSI when 
he or she requires access to the information in order to carry out 
transportation security activities that are government-approved, -
accepted, -funded, -recommended, or -directed, including for purposes 
of training on, and supervision of, such activities or to provide legal 
or technical advice regarding security-related requirements. 
Accordingly, the protection of SSI would apply to each repair station 
standard security program pursuant to part 1554.

Part 1554--Aircraft Repair Station Security (New)

Section 1554.1--Scope and Purpose

    Section 1554.1 of the proposed regulation sets forth the scope and 
purpose of new part 1554. The proposed regulations would apply to all 
repair stations, both domestic and foreign, that are certificated by 
the FAA pursuant to 14 CFR part 145. The purpose of the proposed 
regulations would be to safeguard the security of domestic and foreign 
aircraft repair stations as required by 49 U.S.C. 44924. The 
requirements would not apply to any FAA certificated repair station at 
which the U.S. government has assumed responsibility for security 
measures.

Section 1554.3--Terms Used in This Part

    Section 1554.3 of the proposed rule sets forth the definitions of 
certain terms used in this part. The term ``repair station'' is defined 
as any maintenance facility that is certificated by FAA pursuant to 14 
CFR part 145 to perform maintenance, preventive maintenance, repair, 
overhaul, or alterations of an aircraft, airframe, aircraft engine, 
propeller, appliance, or component part.\21\ Since the proposed 
regulations apply to both foreign and domestic repair stations, the 
section defines ``domestic repair station'' as any FAA-certificated 
repair station located within the fifty States, the District of 
Columbia, or the territories and possessions of the United States. A 
``foreign repair station'' is defined as any FAA-certificated repair 
station located outside of the fifty States, the District of Columbia, 
or the

[[Page 59880]]

territories and possessions of the United States.
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    \21\ The proposed definition is consistent with the description 
of the applicability of the FAA's repair station regulations at 14 
CFR 145.1.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Section 1554.5--TSA Inspection Authority

    Section 1554.5 would codify TSA's authority to inspect repair 
stations and would require repair stations to permit TSA and DHS 
officials to enter, inspect, and test property, facilities, and records 
relevant to repair stations. This section would allow TSA to assess 
threats, enforce regulations, security directives, and requirements, 
inspect all facilities and equipment, test the adequacy of security 
measures, verify the implementation of security measures, review 
security programs and other records, and perform such other duties as 
appropriate. This section also would allow TSA to request evidence of 
compliance, including copies of records in English.
    The proposed regulatory language is consistent with the inspection 
authority currently codified at 49 CFR 1542.5 and 1546.3, which apply 
to certain U.S. airports and foreign air carriers. TSA has established 
protocols and procedures on conducting inspections outside the United 
States through its Foreign Airport and Foreign Air Carrier Assessment 
Programs. These established procedures require advance notice to the 
facility to be inspected and coordination with the U.S. Department of 
State and the appropriate foreign government authorities. TSA 
inspectors are required to have TSA identification media and 
credentials with them when inspecting facilities and must display them 
when requested to do so. TSA will use these established procedures when 
conducting inspections of foreign repair stations.
    TSA is also amenable to working with the U.S. Department of State 
and foreign government authorities to facilitate inspections of U.S. 
repair stations that are certificated by a foreign government 
authority. TSA currently permits such inspections of U.S. airports and 
air carriers by foreign government authorities consistent with ICAO 
Annex 17, Section 2.1.
    TSA has kept ICAO apprised of the rulemaking and will continue its 
efforts to harmonize its regulations with those of other countries 
through its participation in ICAO.

Section 1554.101--Adoption and Implementation

    Section 1554.101 would require each repair station to adopt and 
carry out a security program designed to safeguard aircraft and 
aircraft components located within the repair station, the maintenance 
and repair work performed there, and the facility itself. Repair 
stations would be required to use the TSA standard security program 
unless otherwise authorized by TSA.
    This section would also require a repair station to submit a 
profile. The purpose of the profile would be to provide basic 
information regarding repair station operations to assist TSA in 
determining what measures the repair station must include in its 
security program to meet the security requirements. The profile would 
also assist TSA in prioritizing repair stations for purposes of 
conducting inspections. TSA would make the profile template available 
to all repair stations either through the TSA web site, by mail, or 
both. The profile would request the following types of information:
     Identification of the repair stations, such as FAA 
certificate number, repair station name as it appears on the FAA 
certificate, and repair station address.
     Description of location (on or adjacent to an airport, off 
airport in a business location, off airport private residence).
     Security coordinator who will serve as the TSA point of 
contact.
     If on an airport, the name and three letter designator of 
the airport.
     Total number of employees.
     Number of employees authorized unescorted access to 
aircraft over 12,500 MTOW.
    The name and location of each repair station would assist TSA in 
identifying the repair station and determining its proximity to an 
airport since, as explained above, TSA would consider such repair 
stations to be a higher risk than those that are not located on or 
adjacent to an airport. The profile information would also help TSA to 
prioritize its inspections. Repair stations would also be required to 
update their profile information within 30 calendar days if a change in 
the information submitted occurs. This requirement would enable TSA to 
maintain current information on each regulated repair station and make 
certain that it is appraised of changes that could impact the security 
posture of a repair station. Repair stations would not be required to 
alert TSA to changes in total number of employees or number of 
employees who work on large aircraft to prevent the submission of a new 
profile every time an employee is hired or terminated.

Section 1554.103--Security Program Content, Availability, and Amendment

    Section 1554.103 would describe the general requirements describing 
the measures that each repair station must adopt in the standard 
security program. The standard security program must include:
    (1) A description of the measures used to identify individuals who 
are authorized to enter the repair station to prevent unauthorized 
individuals from entering the repair station;
    (2) a description of the measures used to control access to the 
repair station and to detect and prevent the entry, presence, and 
movement of unauthorized individuals and vehicles into or within the 
repair station;
    (3) a description of the measures used to control access to the 
aircraft and/or aircraft components to allow only authorized 
individuals to have such access;
    (4) a description of the measures used to challenge any individual 
entering the repair station to ascertain the authority of the 
individual to enter or be present in the repair station and measures to 
escort an individual who does not have unescorted authority while 
within the repair station;
    (5) a description of the measures to train all individuals with 
authorized access to aircraft and components on the provisions of this 
part and the security program;
    (6) a description of the measures used to verify employee 
background information through confirmation of prior employment and any 
other means as appropriate to validate employee information;
    (7) the name, 24-hour contact information, duties, and training 
requirements of the designated security coordinator who will serve as 
the primary and immediate contact for security-related activities and 
communications with TSA;
    (8) a contingency plan;
    (9) a diagram with dimensions detailing boundaries and pertinent 
physical features of the repair station;
    (10) a list and description of all entry points; and
    (11) an emergency response contact list.
    The regulations also would require that the security program be in 
writing, and signed by the repair station operator, owner, or other 
authorized person. Each repair station would not have to submit the 
security program to TSA, but would have to make it available to TSA 
upon request or during an inspection.
    The individual standard security program requirements are discussed 
below.
(1) Identification of Authorized Individuals
    The proposed regulations would require the repair station to adopt 
and

[[Page 59881]]

describe measures to identify individuals to prevent unauthorized 
individuals from entering the repair station. The specific requirements 
for a personnel identification media system would be included in the 
standard security program. Personal recognition may be sufficient at 
certain repair station locations. During the inspection process, TSA 
would use the following factors to evaluate whether the personnel 
identification media system must be implemented and what type of 
features the system must use:
     Number of employees and number of shifts.
     Physical size of the repair station.
     Number of visitors.
     Proximity of other businesses or operations.
     Type of work, size of aircraft, and length of runway.
     Number of entry points into the repair station.
     Airport security features.
     Other factors that increase ability of unauthorized 
individuals or vehicles to access the repair station.
    For example, a repair station with 50 employees who work multiple 
shifts at a repair station, located adjacent to an airport with many 
access points, might be required to adopt and carry out the personnel 
identification media system. Such a repair station would be considered 
to be a higher risk because of its proximity to an airport. Further, 
the large number of employees working multiple shifts would make it 
difficult for employees to rely solely on personal recognition as 
workers from different shifts may not be able to recognize each other. 
A repair station located in a residence with a single employee would 
not be required to adopt the personnel identification media system in 
the security program. TSA would not anticipate requiring a repair 
station located at an airport to adopt a personnel identification media 
system if employees were required to obtain and display airport 
identification media.
(2) Repair Station Access Control Measures
    The standard security program would specify the access control 
security requirements for all repair stations. Such requirements would 
include measures to control access to the facility and to the aircraft 
and components within the repair station, to challenge any individuals 
to determine if they are authorized to enter or be present in the 
facility, and to respond if unauthorized individuals or vehicles are 
discovered.
    Acceptable access control measures would be specified in the 
security program. Such measures would cover a broad spectrum, including 
standard locks with key control, card swipe access locks, cipher locks, 
locks with coded keys, biometric access cards, fencing, security 
guards, surveillance cameras, and motion detectors.
    As part of the standard security program, the repair station would 
be required to describe all of the entry points to the facility and the 
specific access control measures used for each. During the inspection 
process, TSA would determine whether the access control measures 
deployed at the entry point are appropriate. A repair station located 
on or adjacent to an airport that performs substantial maintenance on 
large aircraft would be required to have more stringent access 
controls. Such controls could include such measures as card swipe 
access locks, security guards, electronically monitored access or 
motion detectors, fencing or a combination of such controls. A repair 
station located in a private residence or in a small component shop in 
an industrial park would be required to have less sophisticated 
controls, such as standard locks with key control and an inventory 
system to track the number of keys. A repair station would be able to 
select the above or other measures that would provide a appropriate 
level of security.
    Access controls would also be required to restrict unauthorized 
access to components located within the facility, such as locked 
storage containers and inventory control of keys.
(3) Aircraft Access Control Measures
    In addition, the security program would include measures to control 
access to aircraft, such as requiring repair stations located on or 
adjacent to an airport to secure large aircraft by locking or disabling 
the aircraft, keeping the aircraft in a secure hangar during non-
operational hours, fencing, surveillance cameras, lighting, and 
security guards.
(4) Challenge Procedures
    The security program would describe the procedures to be followed 
when challenging individuals who cannot be readily identified. Only 
those individuals who are designated and trained in escort procedures 
would be permitted to escort visitors to the repair station. The 
responsibilities of the escort would be specified in the security 
program. At a small facility with few employees, the ability to observe 
individuals present within the facility may be sufficient to ensure 
that access to repair work and/or components is controlled. At large 
repair station facilities, such as those that use a personnel 
identification media system, employees may have to escort individuals 
as part of their responsibilities.
(5) Security Training Measures
    The security program would include measures to conduct initial and 
recurrent security training programs, such as providing guidance to 
repair station personnel on how to implement and maintain the security 
measures included in the security program. The security program would 
also specify that the training curriculum be updated to reflect current 
security requirements. The repair station would be required to maintain 
records of initial and recurrent security training for each employee. 
The standard security program would include a model curriculum that the 
repair station could modify based on the specific security requirements 
applicable to that repair station.
(6) Employee Background Verification
    The security program would include the measures by which the repair 
station verifies the employment history of its employees and conducts 
background checks, to the extent permitted by the laws of the country 
in which the repair station is located. The employment history, length 
of employment, and measures used to verify the individual's employment 
would be listed in the security program.
(7) Security Coordinator
    Each repair station would be required to designate a security 
coordinator who would serve as the immediate and primary point of 
contact for security-related activities and communications with TSA. 
Each repair station would include the name, responsibilities, and 
contact information of the security coordinator in the security program 
and would also specify the training curriculum required for the 
security coordinator. The security coordinator would not necessarily 
need to be on-site at the repair station, but they must be able to 
coordinate incident management at any time.
(8) Contingency Plan
    The security program would include a contingency plan to include 
the specific measures that would be taken to address security-related 
incidents. The security program would include such items as the names 
of the repair station employees designated to perform specific tasks, 
the name and contact information for any contingency response 
organizations that would assist the repair station, a description of 
the

[[Page 59882]]

DHS threat advisory levels and the additional security measures that 
would be implemented based on the threat level, and set forth the 
responsibilities of all personnel involved. The plan would also provide 
for training and regular practices, if appropriate.
Other Security Program Requirements
    The proposed regulations would also require that each security 
program include a diagram of the repair station detailing the 
boundaries and describing the physical features of the repair station. 
The security program would also include a list and description of all 
entry points into the repair station that would be supplied by the 
repair station operator. These requirements would assist TSA in 
assessing the security vulnerability of the repair station and 
determining whether security measures are appropriate. The security 
program would also include emergency response contact information.
    Section 1554.103(b) would require that the security program be in 
writing, and hand-signed by the repair station operator, owner, or 
other authorized person. The security program would be required to be 
accessible to employees at the repair station facility and be written 
in English and in the official language of the repair station's 
country. The security program could be accessible electronically so 
long as it meets all of the requirements. This section would also 
include a requirement that repair stations must restrict the 
distribution, disclosure, and availability of sensitive security 
information as described in 49 CFR part 1520.
    Section 1554.103(c) would require a repair station to notify TSA of 
any amendment to the standard security program and would require that 
the repair station acknowledge receipt and adopt an emergency amendment 
issued by TSA within the time prescribed in the emergency amendment. If 
the repair station cannot implement the emergency amendment, the repair 
station must immediately notify TSA to obtain approval of alternative 
measures. They may contact their TSA inspector or the TSA Repair 
Stations Office at TSA headquarters.

Section 1554.105--Security Directives

    This section would require a repair station to comply with any 
Security Directive issued by TSA mandating security measures. Security 
Directives may be issued when TSA determines that additional or 
specific security measures are necessary to respond to a threat 
assessment or a specific threat against aviation. Upon receipt of a 
Security Directive, the repair station would be required to comply with 
the measures in the time prescribed or immediately notify TSA if it is 
unable to implement the specified security measures so that the repair 
station can obtain approval of alternative measures. The repair station 
would also be required to restrict the availability of a Security 
Directive to only those individuals with an operational need to know.

Section 1554.201--Notification of Security Deficiencies; Suspension of 
Certificate

    Proposed Sec.  1554.201 implements the requirements of 49 U.S.C. 
44924(c)(1) regarding the suspension of a repair station certificate. 
Vision 100 requires audits to be conducted of foreign repair stations 
within a specified timeframe.\22\ TSA would comply with that 
requirement and intends to perform ongoing audits and inspections of 
all repair stations covered by the proposed regulation in order to 
check for compliance with the final regulations.
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    \22\ In the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission 
Act of 2007 (Pub. L 110-53, 121 Stat. 266, Aug. 3, 2007), the 18-
month deadline for completing security inspections of foreign repair 
stations was reduced to 6 months.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The proposed regulation would provide that TSA would notify the 
repair station and the FAA in writing of any security deficiencies 
identified by TSA during an audit. Repair stations would be required to 
respond within 90 days of receipt of the written notification that the 
deficiency has been corrected and include a written explanation of the 
efforts, methods, and procedures used to correct the deficiency. TSA 
may re-audit the repair station to verify that the deficiencies have 
been corrected. The proposal specifies that TSA would provide written 
notification to the FAA if the repair station failed to respond and/or 
to correct the deficiencies within the 90-day period and that, 
consistent with the statute, FAA would suspend the repair station 
certificate. The suspension would remain in effect until TSA makes a 
determination that the deficiencies had been corrected; TSA would then 
notify the FAA requesting that the suspension be lifted.\23\ This 
section also provides that a repair station may seek review of a TSA 
determination that deficiencies have not been corrected and includes 
the redress procedures.
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    \23\ If the repair station certificate covered more than one 
facility, but not all the facilities were found to have security 
deficiencies, TSA would specify that only the facility that was 
found to be deficient be suspended.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Section 1554.203--Immediate Risk to Security; Revocation of Certificate 
and Review Process

    Proposed Sec.  1554.203 implements 49 U.S.C. 44924(c)(2) and 
requires that if TSA makes an initial determination that a repair 
station poses an immediate risk to security, TSA would notify the 
repair station and the FAA that the station's certificate must be 
revoked. The repair station may seek review of TSA's determination that 
the station poses an immediate risk to security; however, the 
revocation would remain in effect unless and until the review is 
complete and a determination is made that the repair station does not 
pose an immediate risk to security.
    Proposed Sec.  1554.203(b) would allow the repair station to 
request the releasable materials upon which the determination is based. 
Proposed Sec.  1554.203(c) would permit the repair station to request a 
review and to provide a response to TSA. The response may include any 
information that the repair station deems relevant to a final decision. 
TSA would conduct an initial review of the basis for the determination 
and the response and, if the determination is upheld, a final review by 
the TSA Assistant Secretary. TSA would notify the FAA of its final 
determination.

Section 1554.205--Nondisclosure of Certain Information

    This section preserves TSA's authority not to disclose classified 
information or other information protected by law or regulation.

IV. Rulemaking Analyses and Notices

A. Paperwork Reduction Act

    The Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (PRA) (44 U.S.C. 3501 et seq.) 
requires that TSA consider the impact of paperwork and other 
information collection burdens imposed on the public and, under the 
provisions of PRA section 3507(d), obtain approval from the Office of 
Management and Budget (OMB) for each collection of information it 
conducts, sponsors, or requires through regulations. This proposed rule 
contains new information collection activities subject to the PRA. 
Accordingly, TSA has submitted the following information requirements 
to OMB for its review.
    Title: Aircraft Repair Station Security.
    Summary: This proposal would require all aircraft and aircraft 
component repair stations certificated by the FAA under 14 CFR part 145 
to adopt and maintain a security program that meets general security 
requirements as required by 49 U.S.C. 44924(f). The

[[Page 59883]]

proposed regulations also authorize TSA to conduct security audits, 
assessments, and inspections of repair stations. Repair stations will 
be required to implement a TSA standard security program which must 
include the specific security measures used by the repair station to 
comply with the regulation. In addition to the actual security 
measures, the security program must also contain any amendments to the 
security program, a contingency plan, a diagram of the facility with 
dimensions detailing boundaries and physical features, the name and 
contact information for the person responsible for security-related 
activities and communications with TSA, a list and description of all 
entry points and an emergency response contact list. The security 
program may be kept electronically or in hard copy format. It does not 
have to be submitted to TSA, but must be made available for review when 
TSA conducts a security audit or inspection. Other records that must 
also be made available during the audit or inspection would include 
employee training records, employee background information, and any 
security directives issued by TSA.
    Use of: This proposal would support the information needs of TSA in 
order to ensure the security of maintenance and repair work conducted 
on air carrier aircraft and aircraft components at repair stations, as 
well as the security of the aircraft and the facility.
    Respondents (including number of): The likely respondents to this 
proposed information requirement are the owners and/or operators of 
repair stations certificated by the FAA under 14 CFR part 145, which is 
estimated to number approximately 5,460 over the next ten years.
    Frequency: Each of the respondents initially would submit a repair 
station profile and develop and carry out a standard security program 
provided by TSA.
    Annual Burden Estimate: Annualized over the next three years, the 
average yearly burden to create security programs is estimated to be 
12,620 hours for all respondents. Thus, the total annual time burden 
estimate is approximately 13,817 hours. The estimated annual costs 
beyond the time burden is approximately $45,200 for all respondents 
when annualized over the next three years.
    TSA is soliciting comments to--
    (1) Evaluate whether the proposed information requirement is 
necessary for the proper performance of the functions of the agency, 
including whether the information will have practical utility;
    (2) Evaluate the accuracy of the agency's estimate of the burden;
    (3) Enhance the quality, utility, and clarity of the information to 
be collected; and
    (4) Minimize the burden of the collection of information on those 
who are to respond, including using appropriate automated, electronic, 
mechanical, or other technological collection techniques or other forms 
of information technology.
    Individuals and organizations may submit comments on the 
information collection requirements by January 19, 2010. Direct the 
comments to the address listed in the ADDRESSES section of this 
document, and fax a copy of them to the Office of Information and 
Regulatory Affairs, Office of Management and Budget, Attention: DHS-TSA 
Desk Officer, at (202) 395-5806. A comment to OMB is most effective if 
OMB receives it within 30 days of publication. TSA will publish the OMB 
control number for this information collection in the Federal Register 
after OMB approves it.
    As protection provided by the Paperwork Reduction Act, as amended, 
an agency may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to 
respond to, a collection of information unless it displays a currently 
valid OMB control number.

B. International Compatibility

    In keeping with U.S. obligations under the Convention on 
International Civil Aviation, it is TSA policy to comply with ICAO 
Standards and Recommended Practices where possible. TSA has determined 
that these proposed regulations are consistent with ICAO Standards and 
Recommended Practices for security of airports and facilities contained 
in Annex 17 of the Convention, the ICAO Security Manual and the ICAO 
Security Audit Reference Manual.

C. Regulatory Impact Analyses

1. Regulatory Evaluation Summary
    Changes to Federal regulations must undergo several economic 
analyses. First, Executive Order 12866, Regulatory Planning and Review 
(58 FR 51735, October 4, 1993), directs each Federal agency to propose 
or adopt a regulation only upon a reasoned determination that the 
benefits of the intended regulation justify its costs. Second, the 
Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980 (5 U.S.C. 601 et seq., as amended by 
the Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act (SBREFA) of 
1996) requires agencies to analyze the economic impact of regulatory 
changes on small entities. Third, the Trade Agreements Act (19 U.S.C. 
2531-2533) prohibits agencies from setting standards that create 
unnecessary obstacles to the foreign commerce of the United States. In 
developing U.S. standards, the Trade Act requires agencies to consider 
international standards, where appropriate, as the basis of U.S. 
standards. Fourth, the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 (2 U.S.C. 
1531-1538) requires agencies to prepare a written assessment of the 
costs, benefits, and other effects of proposed or final rules that 
include a Federal mandate likely to result in the expenditure by State, 
local, or tribal governments, in the aggregate, or by the private 
sector, of $100 million or more annually (adjusted for inflation).
    TSA has prepared a separate detailed analysis document, which is 
available to the public in the docket.\24\ With respect to these four 
analyses, TSA provides the following conclusions, supported by 
additional summary information.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \24\ See information on viewing the Docket under ``Reviewing 
Comments in the Docket'' above. The Regulatory Evaluation is 
categorized as ``Supporting and Related Materials.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    a. This proposed rule is not an economically ``significant 
regulatory action'' as defined in the Executive Order. However, this 
rulemaking may be considered significant because of Congressional and 
stakeholder interest in security since the events of September 11, 
2001.
    b. The Initial Regulatory Flexibility Analysis (IRFA) shows that 
there may be a significant impact on a substantial number of small 
entities.
    c. This proposed rule imposes no significant barriers to 
international trade.
    d. This proposed rule does not impose an unfunded mandate on State, 
local, or tribal governments, or on the private sector in excess of 
$100 million (adjusted for inflation) in any one year.
2. Executive Order 12866 Assessment
    This summary highlights the costs and benefits of the proposed rule 
to amend the transportation security regulations to further enhance and 
improve the security of repair stations. TSA has determined that this 
is not a major rule within the definition of Executive Order (EO) 
12866, as annual costs to all parties do not pass the $100 million 
threshold in any year. The Initial Regulatory Flexibility Analysis 
(IRFA) shows that there may be a significant impact on a substantial 
number of small entities. There are no significant economic impacts for 
the required analyses of international trade

[[Page 59884]]

or unfunded mandates. Both in this summary and the economic evaluation, 
descriptive language is used to try to relate the consequences of the 
regulation. The tables are numbered as they appear in the economic 
evaluation. Although the regulatory evaluation attempts to mirror the 
terms and wording of the regulation, no attempt is made to precisely 
replicate the regulatory language and readers are cautioned that the 
actual regulatory text, not the text of the evaluation, is binding.
Comparison of Costs and Hypothetical Benefits
    Comparison of the total undiscounted domestic costs of the proposed 
rule with potential benefits from the proposed aircraft repair station 
security program relies on a breakeven comparison based on the extent 
to which the program must reduce the underlying baseline risk of 
specific attack impact scenarios in order for the program benefits to 
be greater than the expected costs. Such a comparison is presented in 
Table 2 following the ``Benefits'' section below. This comparison is 
discussed briefly above and in greater depth in the body of the 
analysis.
Benefits
    A major line of defense against an aviation-related terrorist act 
is the prevention of explosives, weapons, and/or incendiary devices 
from getting on board a plane. To date, efforts have been primarily 
related to inspection of baggage, passengers, and cargo, and security 
measures at airports that serve air carriers. With this rule, attention 
is given to aircraft that are located at repair stations, and to 
aircraft parts that are at repair stations, themselves to reduce the 
likelihood of an attack against aviation and the country. Since repair 
station personnel have direct access to all parts of an aircraft, the 
potential exists for a terrorist to seek to commandeer or compromise an 
aircraft when the aircraft is at one of these facilities. Moreover, as 
TSA tightens security in other areas of aviation, repair stations 
increasingly may become attractive targets for terrorist organizations 
attempting to evade aviation security protections currently in place.
    To better inform the comparison of the costs of the repair station 
security program in the proposed rule with the benefits to homeland 
security it might afford due to reduced risk of successful terror 
attack involving an aircraft, a breakeven analysis was performed. In 
this analysis, the annualized costs of the program, discounted at seven 
percent, are compared to the expected benefits of avoiding or 
preventing three attack scenarios of varying consequence. For each 
scenario, the required extent of annual risk reduction due to the 
proposed program, expressed as the frequency with which attacks must be 
averted, is reported in the final column of the break-even analysis 
(Table 2) below.

                                 Table 2--Frequency of Attacks Averted for Aircraft Repair Station Security Costs to Equal Expected Benefits, by Attack Scenario
                                                                                    [Annualized at 7 percent]
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                          Value of a                 Valuation of               Valuation of
                                                         statistical                   moderate                   serious         Estimated                        Attacks averted by  repair
                Attack scenario                   Lives   life (VSL)    Moderate     injuries  at    Severe     injuries  at      aircraft      Total impact      station security required to
                                                  lost     at $5.8M     injuries    1.55%  of VSL   injuries   18.75%  of VSL   market value     ($ million)               break even
                                                         ($ million)                 ($ million)                ($ million)      ($ million)
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                      A  B = A x 5.8            C    D = C x .0899         E   F = E x 1.0875               G     H = B+D+F+G  = H / $24.5M *
                                                ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1 Minimal......................................       3        $17.4           10             $0.9  ........             $0.0            $9.3           $27.6  one every 1.1 years.
2 Aircraft Target..............................     132        765.6  ...........              0.0  ........              0.0            21.8           787.4  one every 32.1 years.
3 Moderate.....................................     250      1,450.0  ...........              0.0       750            815.6             9.3         2,274.9  one every 92.7 years.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
* The total cost of the rule annualized at 7 percent.

Costs
    As required, alternatives to the primary rule requirements were 
analyzed. Table 31 that follows provides the 10-year cost of the 
preferred alternative and two other alternatives, undiscounted and at 
three and seven percent discount rates.

                           Table 31--Total 10-Year Costs by Scenario and Discount Rate
                                                [2006$ millions]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                     Total by scenario                        Undiscounted       3% Discount       7% Discount
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Primary Scenario..........................................            $344.4            $293.3            $241.0
Security Threat Assessments...............................             347.0             295.7             243.1
Vulnerability Assessments.................................             347.1             295.8             243.3
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Using a seven percent discount rate, TSA estimated the 10-year cost 
impacts for the primary scenario of this proposed rule would total 
$241.0 million. This total is distributed among domestic repair 
stations, which would incur total costs of $118.6 million; foreign 
repair stations, which would incur costs of $68.7 million; and TSA-
projected Federal Government costs, which would be $53.7 million.
3. Initial Regulatory Flexibility Analysis (IRFA)
    The Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980 (RFA) establishes ``as a 
principle of regulatory issuance that agencies shall endeavor, 
consistent with the objective of the rule and of applicable statutes, 
to fit regulatory and informational requirements to the scale of the 
business, organizations, and governmental jurisdictions subject to 
regulation.'' To achieve that principle, the RFA requires agencies to 
solicit and consider flexible regulatory proposals and to explain the 
rationale for their actions. The RFA covers a wide range of small 
entities, including small businesses, not-for-profit organizations, and 
small governmental jurisdictions.
    Agencies must perform a review to determine whether a proposed or 
final rule will have a significant economic

[[Page 59885]]

impact on a substantial number of small entities. If the determination 
is that it will, the agency must prepare a regulatory flexibility 
analysis as described in the RFA. However, if an agency determines that 
a proposed or final rule is not expected to have a significant economic 
impact on a substantial number of small entities, section 605(b) of the 
1980 RFA, as amended, provides that the head of the agency may so 
certify and a regulatory flexibility analysis is not required. The 
certification must include a statement providing the factual basis for 
this determination, and the reasoning should be clear.
    As part of implementing this NPRM, TSA expects security to be 
integrated into actions the same way safety has and to become an 
integral component of doing business rather than adding layers or extra 
program costs. The primary cost to repair stations resulting from this 
NPRM would be additional hours for personnel to perform the duties of 
the repair station security coordinator. For many stations this may 
constitute an insignificant impact, while for others the costs to 
comply with the proposed rule may prove significant. TSA has conducted 
an initial regulatory flexibility analysis and believes the proposed 
requirements may result in a significant economic impact on a 
substantial number of small entities. TSA requests comments, 
particularly those supported by data, on this preliminary conclusion.
Reason for the Proposed Rule
    In 2003, Congress enacted Vision 100--Century of Aviation 
Reauthorization Act (Vision 100), Public Law 108-176, (117 Stat. 2490, 
December 12, 2003). Vision 100, which was signed into law by President 
George W. Bush on December 12, 2003, expands TSA's authority to address 
the security of the civil aviation system by requiring TSA to issue 
final regulations to ensure the security of both domestic and foreign 
aircraft repair stations.
Objectives of the Proposed Rule
    The requirements proposed in this NPRM are designed to increase 
overall civil aviation security by bolstering the level of security at 
domestic and foreign aircraft repair stations.
Descriptions and Estimates of the Number of Small Entities
    Aircraft repair stations are classified by the U.S. Census Bureau 
as falling primarily within the North American Industry Classification 
System (NAICS), code 488190 Other Support Activities for Air 
Transportation. In its account of the industry, the U.S. Census Bureau 
describes firms in this market as ``providing specialized services for 
air transportation (except air traffic control and other airport 
operations).'' \25\ The Small Business Administration defines a small 
business within this NAICS code as one having annual revenues of $7.0 
million or less.\26\ More details about the industry can be obtained by 
reading the ``Discussion of the Industry and Status Quo'' section of 
the Regulatory Evaluation.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \25\ U.S. Census Bureau, ``2002 NAICS Definitions.'' Retrieved 
from http://www.census.gov/epcd/naics02/def/ND488190.HTM#N488190 on 
January 31, 2007.
    \26\ U.S. Small Business Administration, ``Table of Small 
Business Size Standards Matched to North American Industry 
Classification System Codes.'' http://www.sba.gov/idc/groups/public/documents/sba_homepage/serv_sstd_tablepdf.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    To estimate the number of small businesses in the aircraft repair 
station industry affected by this NPRM, TSA accessed information 
maintained by Dun & Bradstreet, a provider of international and U.S. 
business data. The data obtained for this effort did not identify the 
type of maintenance the repair stations are certificated to perform or 
their location. This made it difficult for TSA to determine compliance 
costs for the identified small businesses (this is discussed more 
below).
    Through its research, TSA obtained Dun & Bradstreet revenue and 
employment records for 2,276 domestic aircraft repair stations. Of this 
total, 2,123 reflected small businesses, as defined by SBA, and 153 did 
not. TSA was unable to find data on the remaining domestic repair 
stations. For the purposes of this analysis, and to remain conservative 
in its estimates, TSA assumed that the remaining domestic repair 
stations are also small. TSA thus estimated that 4,115 of 4,268 
domestic aircraft repair stations are small businesses, as defined by 
SBA.
Description and Estimate of Compliance Requirements
    In order to address the need for security measures at aircraft 
repair stations and to fulfill the obligations set forth by Congress, 
TSA is proposing to add a new part 1554 to its regulations, entitled 
``Aircraft Repair Station Security.'' The new part would require all 
aircraft repair stations that are certificated by the FAA under 14 CFR 
part 145, both domestic and foreign, to adopt and carry out a security 
program that includes specific security requirements. The regulations 
would require repair stations to safeguard aircraft and components 
located at the station, the maintenance and repair work conducted 
there, as well as the repair station's facilities, as required by 49 
U.S.C. 44924.
    TSA is also proposing changes to its regulations regarding the 
protection of sensitive security information (SSI) to specify that a 
repair station security program is categorized as SSI and that the 
repair station operator or owner is subject to the SSI requirements.
    The proposed rule would require repair stations to establish 
security programs. TSA would provide a standard security program that 
would include the following: Access controls, a personnel 
identification system, security awareness training, the designation of 
a security coordinator, employee background verification, and a 
contingency plan. While repair stations would have some flexibility 
regarding the particular equipment, facilities, and measures used to 
comply with the general security requirements, their security methods 
would need to address each of these requirements in a manner 
commensurate with the station's security risk. For example, small 
repair stations may meet the requirement for a personal identification 
system through employee recognition and challenge procedures, while TSA 
would require stations located on or adjacent to an airport and having 
50 or more employees to implement a formal badging system.
    The proposed rule would require each repair station to complete and 
return to TSA a brief profile form. The profile would identify 
information, such as whether the repair station is located at an 
airport,\27\ the total number of employees, and the number of employees 
with unescorted access to aircraft with a maximum certificated takeoff 
weight (MTOW) exceeding 12,500 pounds. These indicators would assist 
TSA in conducting a risk-based analysis of the repair station in order 
to determine what measures would be needed to meet the security 
requirements proposed in the regulations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \27\ If located on an airport, whether the repair station 
participates in the airport security program will impact the repair 
station's compliance with the proposed security regulations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The proposed regulations also would establish TSA's authority to 
conduct security audits, assessments, and inspections in order to 
ascertain the adequacy of the measures employed by the repair stations 
to implement and maintain the security requirements. The proposed 
inspections and appeals processes are described in detail in the NPRM.

[[Page 59886]]

    In its effort to fulfill the requirements of the RFA, TSA attempted 
to estimate all costs of complying with the above described 
requirements for each firm for which it had Dun & Bradstreet data and 
to calculate those costs as a percent of the repair station's reported 
revenues. TSA determined that this methodology would best conclude 
whether the proposed rule would represent a considerable economic 
burden to a large number of small businesses. After completing this 
preliminary analysis (described below), TSA has tentatively concluded 
that the proposed rule may impose a significant economic impact on a 
substantial number of small entities. The agency seeks comment on this 
preliminary conclusion.
    Compliance costs for the proposed rule would vary across firms. A 
small business with one employee who only services one component of a 
particular aircraft may incur very low compliance costs. Such a 
business is likely to be operated from a small shop or even a private 
residence. Conversely, a larger repair station that works on more 
complex systems or even entire aircraft may incur higher costs as a 
result of this NPRM. These types of facilities may be located at an 
airport, in an industrial park, or may be part of an aircraft 
manufacturing facility. For example, in the ``Cost of Compliance'' 
section above, TSA estimated repair stations located on or adjacent to 
an airport would require 8 hours on average to complete their security 
programs whereas repair stations located off-airport would require only 
4. Unfortunately, TSA was unable to pair the data from Dun & Bradstreet 
with repair station data provided by the FAA. As a result, TSA could 
not estimate compliance costs particular to repair station 
characteristics such as whether it is located on an airport or performs 
substantial maintenance on commercial aircraft.
    Therefore, in order to characterize compliance costs as a 
percentage of repair station revenues, TSA estimated unit compliance 
costs based on weighted averages so as not to underestimate the costs 
of the rule. As a result, these estimates likely overstate the costs to 
some small businesses while understating them for others. TSA welcomes 
comments that will assist it in more accurately estimating compliance 
costs for small businesses.
    Using the assumptions and methods described above, TSA estimated 
the average compliance costs to be about $3,013 for a business with one 
employee to $4,216 for a business with 45 employees. Of this total, 
$2,733 represents costs for security coordinators, and $253 represents 
costs for development and implementation of security programs. The 
remainder is comprised of employee training costs.
    These totals exclude costs for repair stations located on or 
adjacent to an airport and having 50 or more employees to implement a 
badging system. TSA assumed that firms with 100 or more employees 
likely already have a badging system. Based on the Dun and Bradstreet 
data, TSA estimated the average compliance cost for firms reported as 
having between 50 and 99 employees would be approximately $4,728 before 
adding costs to implement a badging system. These firms employ an 
average of 64 individuals. Using the estimate of $25 per badge cited in 
the Regulatory Evaluation, badges would add an average of nearly $1,600 
to these repair stations' compliance costs, resulting in a total cost 
of $6,328. Firms having between 50 and 99 employees in the Dun and 
Bradstreet sample reported average revenue of nearly $6 million. The 
estimated compliance costs would therefore constitute less than one 
percent of their annual revenues. Since the proposed ID requirement 
would affect a subset of these repair stations--only those which are 
located on or adjacent to an airport--TSA does not believe the proposed 
ID requirement would result in a significant impact on affected repair 
stations.
    Table 32 below shows the distribution of compliance costs, 
excluding ID costs, as a percent of repair station revenues.

             Table 32--Small Repair Station Business Distribution of Compliance Cost-Revenue Ratios
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                      Cumulative percentage of
     Compliance costs as a percentage of revenue       Number of small businesses         small businesses
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
<=1.0...............................................                           692                          32.6
<=2.0...............................................                         1,015                          47.8
<=3.0...............................................                         1,527                          71.9
<=4.0...............................................                         1,712                          80.6
<=5.0...............................................                         1,759                          82.9
<=10.0..............................................                         2,100                          98.9
                                                     -----------------------------------------------------------
    Total...........................................                         2,123                         100.0
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The table uses rounded percentages to show that TSA's initial 
assessment is that the NPRM may have a significant impact on a 
substantial number of small businesses. TSA believes that for 47.8 
percent of the small businesses, the compliance costs will result in an 
economic impact of two percent of annual revenue or less, and for 71.9 
percent of the small businesses, the compliance costs will be less than 
three percent of annual revenue. TSA requests comment on these 
estimates.
Significant Alternatives Considered
    During the course of drafting this NPRM, TSA considered regulatory 
alternatives. These alternatives included requiring security threat 
assessments for certain repair station employees and requiring each 
repair station to complete a vulnerability self-assessment. Both of 
these alternatives would have increased the burden on repair stations 
and thus on small entities. A description of these alternatives and the 
reasons they were not adopted can be found in the section of the 
Regulatory Evaluation titled, ``Alternatives Considered.''
    Additionally, as noted above, TSA requests comment on whether it 
should exempt certain repair stations after it conducts security 
reviews and audits. For instance, TSA may consider whether to exempt 
repair stations that only perform maintenance on small aircraft 
(aircraft having a maximum certificated takeoff weight of 12,500 pounds 
or less). To help the agency evaluate the impact of this alternative, 
TSA requests comments, supported by data, on the number of repair 
stations that work exclusively on such aircraft and their compliance 
costs under the proposed rule.
Identification of Duplication, Overlap and Conflict With Other Federal 
Rules
    TSA has no knowledge of any duplicative, overlapping, or 
conflicting Federal rules.

[[Page 59887]]

Preliminary Conclusion
    Based on this preliminary analysis, TSA believes the proposed 
requirements may result in a significant economic impact on a 
substantial number of small entities. However, TSA holds a final 
assessment in abeyance until such time as information becomes available 
to facilitate the development of a Final Regulatory Flexibility 
Analysis (FRFA). TSA requests comments, particularly those supported by 
data, to inform this process.
4. International Trade Impact Assessment
    The Trade Agreement Act of 1979 prohibits Federal agencies from 
engaging in any standards or related activities that create unnecessary 
obstacles to the foreign commerce of the United States. Legitimate 
domestic objectives, such as security, are not considered unnecessary 
obstacles. The statute also requires consideration of international 
standards and, where appropriate, that they be the basis for U.S. 
standards. In addition, it is the policy of TSA to remove or diminish, 
to the extent feasible, barriers to international trade, including both 
barriers affecting the export of American goods and services to foreign 
countries and barriers affecting the import of foreign goods and 
services into the U.S.
    In keeping with U.S. obligations under the Convention on 
International Civil Aviation, it is TSA's policy to comply with 
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) Standards and 
Recommended Practices where possible. TSA has determined that there are 
no ICAO Standards and Recommended Practices that correspond to the 
regulatory standards established by this notice of proposed rulemaking 
(NPRM). TSA has assessed the potential effect of this NPRM and has 
determined that it is unlikely it would create barriers to 
international trade. The full evaluation provides an analysis of a 
number of issues directly related to international trade that were 
considered with this proposed rule.
5. Unfunded Mandates Reform Act Assessment
    The Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 is intended, among other 
things, to curb the practice of imposing unfunded Federal mandates on 
State, local, and tribal governments. Title II of the Act requires each 
Federal agency to prepare a written statement assessing the effects of 
any Federal mandate in a proposed or final agency rule that may result 
in a $100 million or more expenditure (adjusted annually for inflation) 
in any one year by State, local, and tribal governments, in the 
aggregate, or by the private sector; such a mandate is deemed to be a 
``significant regulatory action.'' This rulemaking does not contain 
such a mandate. The requirements of Title II of the Act, therefore, do 
not apply.

D. Executive Order 13132, Federalism

    TSA has analyzed this proposed rule under the principles and 
criteria of Executive Order 13132, Federalism. We have determined that 
this action will not have a substantial direct effect on the States, on 
the relationship between the National Government and the States, or on 
the distribution of power and responsibilities among the various levels 
of government, and therefore will not have federalism implications.

E. Environmental Analysis

    TSA has reviewed this action under DHS Management Directive 5100.1, 
Environmental Planning Program (effective April 19, 2006) which guides 
TSA compliance with the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 
(NEPA) (42 U.S.C. 4321-4347). TSA has determined that this proposal is 
covered by the following categorical exclusions (CATEX) listed in the 
DHS directive: Number A3(a) (administrative and regulatory activities 
involving the promulgation of rules and the development of policies); 
paragraph A4 (information gathering and data analysis); paragraph A7(d) 
(conducting audits, surveys, and data collection of a minimally 
intrusive nature, to include vulnerability, risk, and structural 
integrity assessments of infrastructures); paragraph B3 (proposed 
activities and operations to be conducted in existing structures that 
are compatible with ongoing functions); paragraph B11 (routine 
monitoring and surveillance activities that support homeland security, 
such as patrols, investigations, and intelligence gathering), and H1 
(approval or disapproval of security plans required under legislative 
mandates where such plans do not have a significant effect on the 
environment). In addition, TSA has determined that this proposal meets 
the three conditions required for a CATEX to apply, as described in 
paragraph 3.2, (Conditions and Extraordinary Circumstances).

F. Energy Impact Analysis

    The energy impact of this NPRM has been assessed in accordance with 
the Energy Policy and Conservation Act (EPCA) Public Law 94-163, as 
amended (42 U.S.C. 6362). TSA has determined that this rulemaking is 
not a major regulatory action under the provisions of the EPCA. TSA has 
also analyzed this proposed rule under E.O. 13211, ``Actions Concerning 
Regulations That Significantly Affect Energy Supply, Distribution, or 
Use,'' 66 FR 28355 (May 18, 2001). TSA has determined that this is not 
a ``significant energy action'' under that order.

List of Subjects

49 CFR Part 1520

    Air carriers, Aircraft, Aircraft repair stations, Airports, 
Maritime carriers, Rail hazardous materials receivers, Rail hazardous 
materials shippers, Rail transit systems, Railroad carriers, Railroad 
safety, Railroads, Reporting and recordkeeping requirements, Security 
measures, Vessels.

49 CFR Part 1554

    Aircraft, Aircraft repair stations, Aviation safety, Reporting and 
recordkeeping requirements, Security measures.

The Proposed Amendment

    In consideration of the foregoing, the Transportation Security 
Administration proposes to amend Chapter XII of Title 49, Code of 
Federal Regulations, to read as follows:

Subchapter B--Security Rules for All Modes of Transportation

PART 1520--PROTECTION OF SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

    1. The authority citation for part 1520 continues to read as 
follows:

    Authority:  46 U.S.C. 70102-70106, 70117; 49 U.S.C. 114, 40113, 
44901-44907, 44913-44914, 44916-44918, 44935-44936, 44942, 46105.

    2. In Sec.  1520.5, revise paragraph (b)(1)(i) to read as follows:


Sec.  1520.5  Sensitive security information.

* * * * *
    (b) * * *;
    (1) * * *;
    (i) Any aircraft operator, airport operator, fixed base operator, 
repair station, or air cargo security program, or security contingency 
plan under this chapter;
* * * * *
    3. In Sec.  1520.7, add paragraph (o) to read as follows:


Sec.  1520.7  Covered persons.

* * * * *
    (o) Each operator or owner of an aircraft repair station required 
to have a security program under part 1554 of this chapter.

[[Page 59888]]

Subchapter C--Civil Aviation Security

PART 1554--AIRCRAFT REPAIR STATION SECURITY

Subpart A--General
Sec.
1554.1 Scope and purpose.
1554.3 Terms used in this part.
1554.5 TSA inspection authority.
Subpart B--Security Program
1554.101 Adoption and implementation.
1554.103 Security Program content, availability, and amendment.
1554.105 Security Directives.
Subpart C--Compliance and Enforcement
1554.201 Notification of security deficiencies; suspension of 
certificate.
1554.203 Immediate risk to security; revocation of certificate and 
review process.
1554.205 Nondisclosure of certain information.

    Authority:  49 U.S.C. 114, 40113, 44903, 44924.

Subpart A--General


Sec.  1554.1  Scope and purpose.

    This part applies to domestic and foreign repair stations that are 
certificated by the Federal Aviation Administration pursuant to 14 CFR 
part 145 except for a repair station certificated by the Federal 
Aviation Administration at which the U.S. Government has assumed 
responsibility for security. The purpose of this part is to provide for 
the security of maintenance and repair work conducted on aircraft and 
aircraft components at domestic and foreign repair stations, of the 
aircraft and aircraft components located at the repair stations, and of 
the repair station facilities, as required in 49 U.S.C. 44924.


Sec.  1554.3  Terms used in this part.

    In addition to the terms in Sec. Sec.  1500.3 and 1540.5 of this 
chapter, the following terms apply in this part:
    Repair station means a domestic or foreign facility certificated by 
the Federal Aviation Administration pursuant to 14 CFR part 145 that is 
authorized to perform maintenance, preventive maintenance, or 
alterations of an aircraft, airframe, aircraft engine, propeller, 
appliance, or component part.
    (1) Domestic repair station means a repair station located within 
the fifty States, the District of Columbia, or the territories and 
possessions of the United States.
    (2) Foreign repair station means a repair station located outside 
the fifty States, the District of Columbia, or the territories and 
possessions of the United States.


Sec.  1554.5  TSA inspection authority.

    (a) General. Each repair station must allow TSA and other 
authorized DHS officials, at any time and in a reasonable manner, 
without advance notice, to enter, conduct any audits, assessments, 
tests, or inspections of any property, facilities, equipment, and 
operations; and to view, inspect, and copy records as necessary to 
carry out TSA's security-related statutory or regulatory authorities, 
including its authority to--
    (1) Assess threats to transportation security;
    (2) Enforce security-related regulations, directives, and 
requirements;
    (3) Inspect, maintain, and test security facilities, equipment, and 
systems;
    (4) Ensure the adequacy of security measures;
    (5) Verify the implementation of security measures;
    (6) Review security programs; and,
    (7) Carry out such other duties, and exercise such other powers, 
relating to transportation security as the Assistant Secretary of 
Homeland Security for the TSA considers appropriate, to the extent 
authorized by law.
    (b) Evidence of compliance. At the request of TSA, each repair 
station operator must provide evidence of compliance with its security 
program and with this part, including copies of records.
    (1) All records required under this part must be available in 
English.
    (2) All responses and submissions provided to TSA or its designee, 
pursuant to this part, must be in English, unless otherwise requested 
by TSA.
    (c) Access to repair station. (1) TSA and DHS officials working 
with TSA may enter, without advance notice, and be present within any 
area without access media or identification media issued or approved by 
the repair station in order to inspect, test, or perform any other such 
duties as TSA may direct.
    (2) Repair stations may request TSA inspectors and DHS officials 
working with TSA to present their credentials for examination, but the 
credentials may not be photocopied or otherwise reproduced.

Subpart B--Security Program


Sec.  1554.101  Adoption and implementation.

    (a) General. Each repair station must adopt and carry out a 
security program to safeguard aircraft and aircraft components located 
within the repair station and its facilities, the repair and 
maintenance work conducted at the repair station, and the repair 
station facility itself.
    (b) Repair station profile. No later than 30 calendar days after 
final rules are published in the Federal Register or no later than 30 
calendar days after FAA certification, each repair station must submit 
a profile in a manner prescribed by TSA. Each repair station must 
report changes in profile information as specified by TSA within 30 
calendar days of the date of the change.
    (c) Repair station security program. Unless otherwise authorized by 
TSA, each repair station must use the TSA standard repair station 
security program.


Sec.  1554.103  Security program content, availability, and amendment.

    (a) Content of security program. Each security program must--
    (1) Include measures to identify all individuals who are authorized 
to enter the repair station to prevent unauthorized individuals from 
entering the repair station.
    (2) Include measures to control access to the repair station. Such 
measures must be designed to prevent, detect and resolve any 
unauthorized entry, presence, and movement of individuals and vehicles 
into or within the repair station.
    (3) Include measures to control access to the aircraft and aircraft 
components to allow only authorized individuals to have access to the 
aircraft and aircraft components within the repair station.
    (4) Include measures to challenge any individual entering the 
repair station or who is present in the repair station to ascertain the 
authority of that individual to enter or be present in the area and 
measures to escort an unauthorized individual while within the repair 
station.
    (5) Include measures to conduct initial and recurrent security 
training of all individuals with authorized access to aircraft and 
components on the provisions of this part and the security program and 
to maintain a record of training completed by each employee.
    (6) Include measures to verify employee background information 
through confirmation of prior employment and any other means as 
appropriate to validate employee information.
    (7) Include the name, means of contact on a 24 hour basis, duties, 
and training requirements of the security coordinator(s) who will serve 
as the primary and immediate contact for security-related activities 
and communications with TSA.
    (8) Include a contingency plan.
    (9) Include a diagram with dimensions detailing boundaries and 
physical features of the repair station.

[[Page 59889]]

    (10) Include a list and description of all repair station entry 
points.
    (11) Include an emergency response contact list.
    (12) Be in writing and signed by the operator, owner, or any person 
delegated authority in this matter.
    (b) Availability. (1) The repair station security program must--
    (i) Be written both in English and in the official language of the 
repair station's country.
    (ii) Be accessible at each facility.
    (2) Each repair station must restrict the distribution, disclosure, 
and availability of sensitive security information (SSI) as defined in 
part 1520 of this chapter to persons with a need to know and refer all 
requests for SSI by other persons to TSA.
    (c) Amendment. (1) A repair station must notify TSA of any 
amendment to the standard security program.
    (2) If TSA finds that there is a situation requiring immediate 
action to respond to a security threat, TSA may issue an emergency 
amendment to the standard security program. TSA will provide an 
explanation of the reason for the amendment. Each repair station must 
acknowledge receipt and adopt the emergency amendment within the time 
prescribed. If a repair station is unable to implement the emergency 
amendment, the repair station immediately must notify TSA to obtain 
approval of alternative measures.


Sec.  1554.105  Security Directives.

    (a) General. When TSA determines that additional security measures 
are necessary to respond to a threat assessment or to a specific threat 
against civil aviation, TSA issues a Security Directive setting forth 
mandatory measures.
    (b) Compliance. Each repair station required to have a security 
program must comply with each Security Directive TSA issues to the 
repair station within the time prescribed. Each repair station that 
receives a Security Directive must--
    (1) Verbally acknowledge receipt of the Security Directive.
    (2) Specify the method by which security measures have been or will 
be implemented to meet the effective date.
    (3) Notify TSA to obtain approval of alternative measures, if the 
repair station is unable to implement the measures in the Security 
Directive.
    (c) Availability. Each repair station that receives a Security 
Directive and each person who receives information from a Security 
Directive must--
    (1) Restrict the availability of the Security Directive and the 
information contained in the document to persons who have an 
operational need to know.
    (2) Refuse to release the Security Directive or the information 
contained in the document to persons other than those who have an 
operational need to know without the prior written consent of TSA.

Subpart C--Compliance and Enforcement


Sec.  1554.201  Notification of security deficiencies; suspension of 
certificate.

    (a) General. Each repair station that does not establish and carry 
out a security program, as specified in this part, may be subject to 
suspension of its FAA certificate, as provided by 49 U.S.C. 
44924(c)(1).
    (b) Notice of security deficiencies. TSA provides written 
notification to a repair station and to the FAA of any security 
deficiency identified by TSA.
    (c) Response. A repair station must provide TSA with a written 
explanation in English of all efforts, methods, and procedures used to 
correct the security deficiencies identified by TSA within 45 days of 
receipt of the written notification described in paragraph (b) of this 
section.
    (d) Suspension of certificate. If the repair station does not 
correct security deficiencies within 90 days of the repair station's 
receipt of the written notice of security deficiencies, or if TSA 
determines that the security deficiencies have not been addressed 
sufficiently to comply with this section, TSA provides written 
notification to the repair station and to the FAA that the station's 
certificate shall be suspended. The notification includes an 
explanation of the basis for the suspension. The suspension remains in 
place until such time as TSA determines that the security deficiencies 
have been corrected.
    (e) Reply. No later than 20 calendar days after the date of receipt 
of the notification of suspension, the repair station may serve upon 
TSA a written request for review of the basis for the determination 
that the security deficiencies have not been addressed sufficiently. 
The request must be in English and may include any information that the 
repair station believes TSA should consider regarding its 
determination. The suspension remains in effect until the review is 
complete.
    (f) TSA Review. Not later than 30 calendar days, or such longer 
period as TSA may determine for good cause, after TSA receives the 
repair station's request for review, TSA reviews its initial 
determination and issue a Final Determination on the repair station and 
the FAA in accordance with this paragraph.
    (1) TSA considers the initial notification, the repair station's 
reply, and any other relevant materials before issuing the Final 
Determination.
    (2) If TSA determines that security deficiencies exist and have not 
been addressed, TSA serves upon the repair station and the FAA a Final 
Determination. The Final Determination shall include a statement that 
TSA has reviewed all of the relevant information available and has 
determined that the repair station is not in compliance with this 
section.
    (3) If TSA determines that security deficiencies do not exist or 
have been corrected in a manner consistent with the requirements of 
this part, TSA notifies the repair station and the FAA that the repair 
station's certification may be reinstated.


Sec.  1554.203  Immediate risk to security; revocation of certificate 
and review process.

    (a) Notice. TSA determines whether any repair station poses an 
immediate risk to security. If such a determination is made, TSA 
provides written notification of its determination to the repair 
station and to the FAA that the certificate must be revoked. The 
notification includes an explanation of the basis for the revocation. 
TSA does not include classified information or other information 
described in paragraph (e) of this section.
    (b) Request for review. Not later than 30 days after receipt of the 
notice, a repair station may file a request for review of the 
determination that the repair station poses an immediate risk to 
security. The revocation remains in effect until the review is 
complete. The request must be made in writing, in English, signed by 
the repair station operator or owner, and include--
    (1) A statement that a review is requested; and
    (2) A response to the determination of immediate risk to security, 
including any information TSA should consider in reviewing the basis 
for the determination.
    (c) TSA Review. Not later than 30 calendar days, or such longer 
period as TSA may determine for good cause, after TSA receives the 
repair station's request for review, TSA examines the basis for the 
determination that the repair station poses an immediate risk to 
security, the repair station's response, and any other relevant 
materials.
    (d) Final determination. If TSA determines that the repair station 
poses an immediate risk to security, the TSA Assistant Secretary or his 
or her

[[Page 59890]]

designee reviews the notification, the materials upon which the 
notification was based, the repair station's response and any other 
available information. If the TSA Assistant Secretary or his or her 
designee determines that the repair station continues to pose an 
immediate risk to security, the TSA Assistant Secretary or his or her 
designee submits to the repair station and to the FAA a Final 
Determination. The Final Determination includes a statement that the 
TSA Assistant Secretary or his or her designee personally has reviewed 
all of the relevant information available and has determined that the 
repair station poses an immediate risk to security. If TSA determines 
that the repair station does not pose an immediate risk to security, 
TSA notifies the repair station and the FAA. A Final Determination 
constitutes a final agency action for purposes of 49 U.S.C. 46111.


Sec.  1554.205  Nondisclosure of certain information.

    In connection with the procedures under this subpart, TSA does not 
disclose classified information, as defined in Executive Order 12968 
section 1.1(d), and TSA reserves the right not to disclose any other 
information or material not warranting disclosure or protected from 
disclosure under law or regulation.

    Issued in Arlington, Virginia, on November 12, 2009.
Gale Rossides,
Acting Administrator.
[FR Doc. E9-27624 Filed 11-17-09; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 9110-05-P