[Federal Register Volume 76, Number 124 (Tuesday, June 28, 2011)]
[Notices]
[Pages 37799-37801]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2011-16141]
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DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
DOE Final Decision in Response to Recommendation 2010-1 of the
Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board, Safety Analysis Requirements
for Defining Adequate Protection for the Public and the Workers
AGENCY: Department of Energy.
ACTION: Notice.
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SUMMARY: On April 27, 2011, The Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board
reaffirmed their Recommendation 2010-1, Safety Analysis Requirements
for Defining Adequate Protection for the Public and the Workers, to the
Department of Energy. In accordance with section 315(b) of the Atomic
Energy Act of 1954, as amended, 42 U.S.C. 2286d(d), the following
represents the Secretary of Energy's final decision on the
recommendation and the reasoning for his decision.
ADDRESSES: Send comments, data, views, or arguments concerning the
Secretary's response to: Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board, 625
Indiana Avenue NW., Suite 700, Washington, DC 20004.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Ms. Amanda Anderson, Nuclear Engineer,
Departmental Representative to the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety
Board, Office of Health, Safety and Security, U.S. Department of
Energy, 1000 Independence Avenue SW., Washington, DC 20585.
Issued in Washington, DC on May 27, 2011.
Mari-Josette Campagnone,
Departmental Representative to the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety
Board, Office of Health, Safety and Security.
Report on the Secretary of Energy's Final Decision and
Supporting Reasoning Regarding Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety
Board (Board) Recommendation 2010-1, Safety Analysis Requirements
for Defining Adequate Protection for the Public and the Workers
SUMMARY: This report, together with its attachments, documents
the Secretary of Energy's final decision and supporting reasoning
regarding Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (DNFSB or Board)
Recommendation 2010-1, Safety Analysis Requirements for Defining
Adequate Protection for the Public and the Workers.
[[Page 37800]]
DISCUSSION: The Board issued Recommendation 2010-1 on October
29, 2010. The Recommendation focused on the Department of Energy
(DOE) requirements for developing and approving Documented Safety
Analyses for nuclear facilities. The Recommendation identified six
specific sub-recommendations.
As explained in detail in the Department's February 28, 2011,
response to the Recommendation (the text of which is included as
Attachment 1 to this report), the Secretary of Energy agreed with
the intent of the Recommendation, but took exception to some of the
included technical details on how best to meet that intent. The
Secretary of Energy's response constituted a partial acceptance of
the Recommendation.
Per 42 United States Code (USC) Section 2286d paragraph (d),
when the Secretary of Energy does not fully accept a Recommendation,
the Board must either reaffirm or revise the recommendation, and the
Secretary of Energy must then:
* * * consider the Board's action and make a final decision on
whether to implement all or part of the Board's recommendations.
Subject to subsection (h), the Secretary shall publish the final
decision and the reasoning for such decision in the Federal Register
and shall transmit to the Committees on Armed Services and on
Appropriations of the Senate and to the Speaker of the House of
Representatives a written report containing that decision and
reasoning.
The Board reaffirmed the Recommendation in a letter to the
Secretary of Energy on April 27, 2011. In the letter, the Board
provided clarifications regarding the purposes for each sub-
recommendation and stated that there was flexibility in the manner
in which the sub-recommendations were intended to be implemented by
the Department. The Secretary of Energy agreed that the
clarifications provided by the Board will allow the Department to
develop an Implementation Plan that satisfies DOE's and the Board's
mutual objectives of ensuring that DOE requirements are clear and
ensure adequate protection of the public, workers, and the
environment. For example, the Board clarified that use of the term
structures, systems, and components (SSCs) controls is inclusive of
administrative controls. Further, the Board clarified that the
recommendation did not require that the Department use quantitative
risk assessment to make determinations of what constitutes adequate
protection for the public.
In a letter dated May 27, 2011, the Secretary of Energy
reaffirmed his February 28, 2011, response as his final decision
(the text of which is included as Attachment 2 to this report). DOE
agrees with the critical importance of the use of the 25 rem
evaluation guideline in determining safety controls that provide
adequate protection of the public. DOE has appropriately applied
this approach in the safety analyses for the overwhelming majority
of its nuclear facilities. For the few existing facilities where
existing safety controls could not mitigate the dose below the 25
rem guideline in some accident scenarios, DOE has implemented
necessary compensatory measures and will continue to strengthen both
those and take any additional measures necessary to provide adequate
public protection. Further, the Secretary of Energy confirmed
continuation of the policy that the 25 rem evaluation guideline will
be met for all new facilities.
DOE believes its existing nuclear safety regulatory framework,
utilizing the DOE Standard 3009, Preparation Guide for U.S.
Department of Energy Nonreactor Nuclear Facility Documented Safety
Analyses, as a safe harbor methodology, can continue to be used to
effectively implement the 10 CFR 830 safety basis requirements. DOE
has committed to and is in the process of revising Standard 3009 and
its associated safety analysis review Standard (DOE Standard 1104,
Review and Approval of Nuclear Facility Safety Basis and Safety
Design Basis Documents) to ensure the Standards clearly describe how
the 25 rem evaluation guideline is to be applied for designating
safety controls and the process that will be followed when mitigated
dose cannot be reduced to less than the 25 rem evaluation guideline.
DOE will strengthen its review criteria and approval process for
situations where the 25 rem evaluation guideline cannot be met for
existing facilities, including designation of appropriate senior
management levels of approval authority when the guideline is
exceeded. DOE anticipates the review criteria to be deterministic
criteria rather than criteria that would required a risk analysis.
Attachment 1
February 28, 2011
The Honorable Peter S. Winokur,
Chairman, Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board,
625 Indiana Avenue, NW Suite 700,
Washington, DC 20004.
Dear Mr. Chairman:
This is in response to your October 29, 2010, letter which
provided Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (DNFSB)
Recommendation 2010-1, Safety Analysis Requirements for Defining
Adequate Protection for the Public and the Workers.
The Department of Energy (DOE) is strongly dedicated to the
safety of the public, our workers, and the environment at all of our
facilities. We share your conviction that a clear set of
requirements and standards is vital for safe operations. In 2008, we
began a comprehensive re-examination of our nuclear safety
requirements to assure they were clear, concise, complete, and
current. In March 2010, we enhanced our Directives Reform effort to
better define and expedite it, and we have made good progress in
revising key nuclear safety Directives and the DOE Nuclear Safety
Policy.
We have not changed our interpretation of requirements for
developing and approving Documented Safety Analyses (DSAs). We have
made significant nuclear safety improvements by upgrading facility
safety bases and designs and by improving our safety standards and
procedures. Much has been learned and will continue to be learned
about improving safety. With your assistance, we have applied the
lessons learned from industry incidents to upgrade our requirements.
Our improving safety record reflects these lessons.
Though DOE has an improving safety record, we always strive to
do better. Complacency will not be tolerated. With this in mind, the
Department has carefully evaluated Recommendation 2010-1 and how we
can use it to improve nuclear safety at the Department. The
Department partially accepts the Board's Recommendation; a detailed
explanation is provided below. We have clarified aspects of sub-
recommendation 1, 2, 3c, 4 and 5e. Several elements of
Recommendation 2010-1 will be addressed in the revision of Standard
3009, Preparation Guide for U.S. Department of Energy Nonreactor
Nuclear Facility Documented Safety Analyses. As we develop the
Implementation Plan for Recommendation 2010-1, we will further
engage the Board.
Sub-recommendation 1--Immediately affirm the requirement that
unmitigated, bounding-type accident scenarios will be used at DOE's
defense nuclear facilities to estimate dose consequences at the site
boundary, and that a sufficient combination of SSCs must be
designated safety class to prevent exposures at the site boundary
from approaching 25 rem TEDE [Total Effective Dose Equivalent].
DOE Standard 3009 details DOE's expectations for accident
analyses to identify hazard controls for most DOE nuclear
facilities. DOE agrees that Standard 3009 specifies that the
consequences of unmitigated accidents should to be compared to the
25 rem TEDE Evaluation Guideline to determine if safety class
controls are warranted. As you know, new facilities follow the 25
rem TEDE limit as a siting criteria according to DOE Standard 1189,
Integration of Safety into the Design Process. For existing
facilities safety class Structures, Systems and Components (SSCs)
are normally utilized to prevent exposures from exceeding 25 rem
TEDE. Standard 3009 also includes provisions for use of other means
and controls to assure safety where off-site exposures are not
reduced to below 25 rem TEDE, or where SSCs are not available. The
revised Standard 3009 will further clarify the use of the Evaluation
Guideline in accident analyses for both new and existing facilities.
Sub-recommendation 2--For those defense nuclear facilities that
have not implemented compensatory measures sufficient to reduce
exposures at the site boundary below 25 rem TEDE, direct the
responsible program secretarial officer to develop a formal plan to
meet this requirement within a reasonable timeframe.
DOE's responsible Program Secretarial Officer has evaluated the
safety measures planned or currently in place to protect the public
at the few remaining defense nuclear facilities that have potential
accident doses above the 25 rem TEDE, and has determined that these
measures provide adequate protection. This conclusion is based on an
evaluation of all protective measures in place at these facilities,
including disciplined formal operations, training, safety management
programs, control of materials, and layers of controls to prevent
accidents and/or mitigate their consequences.
Consistent with DOE's commitment to continuous safety
improvement, we will
[[Page 37801]]
continue to evaluate options for enhancing the safety of these
facilities. In some cases, such as the Plutonium Facility (PF-4) at
Los Alamos National Laboratory, DOE anticipates that several near-
term planned improvements will reduce the bounding mitigated dose to
below 25 rem TEDE. Additionally, we have already made substantial
progress in reducing the projected offsite dose that could result
from specific types of accidents. For many limited life facilities
we will achieve permanent, long-term risk reduction through
deactivation and decommissioning. Once we revise DOE Standard 3009,
DOE will evaluate the documented safety analyses for all facilities
as part of the required periodic update process. The Implementation
Plan will describe the steps that will be taken to evaluate safety
improvement options for those facilities determined to need such
improvements.
Sub-recommendation 3--Revise DOE Standard 3009-94 to identify
clearly and unambiguously the requirements that must be met to
demonstrate that an adequate level of protection for the public and
workers is provided through a DSA. This should be accomplished, at a
minimum, by: (followed by four paragraphs labeled a-d).
DOE is revising DOE Standard 3009 to clearly indicate which of
its provisions are mandatory. DOE will implement the specific steps
identified in paragraphs (a), (b), and (d) of this sub-
recommendation. However, DOE will not commit to implementing
paragraph (c) as written, because doing so would predetermine a
specific outcome to the current revision process without any
technical basis. This would be contrary to DOE's standards
development process. DOE will consider the advice provided in
paragraph (c) (i.e., identification of the criteria that must be met
for safety class Systems, Structures and Components (SSCs)), during
the Standard 3009 revision process.
The Implementation Plan will outline the development process and
how the steps identified in all the paragraphs in this sub-
recommendation will be followed.
Sub-recommendation 4--Amend 10 CFR Part 830 by incorporating the
revised version of DOE Standard 3009-94 into the text as a
requirement, instead of as a safe harbor cited in Table 2.
The purpose of a ``safe-harbor'' is to provide a standard
methodology that, if followed, will provide credible analyses and
adequate safety. Nothing in the concept implies that ``safe-harbor''
methodologies are the only way to meet requirements. Of course,
alternative approaches must be approved by DOE, and the criteria for
accepting these alternatives should be clearly defined.
DOE is planning to review 10 CFR 830 (issued in 2001), which
identifies nuclear safety requirements, but we cannot commit to the
exact language prescribed in the Recommendation-that is placing
Standard 3009 in the body of the rule. As a part of our review, we
will update DOE Standard 3009, clearly identifying those provisions
that are mandatory. When DOE Standard 3009 is not applied,
appropriate means for reviewing and improving alternative
methodologies will be established. This will assure implementation
of DOE Standard 3009, where appropriate, while maintaining the
flexibility to improve the standard, as needed. This approach has
allowed DOE to make several important improvements to DOE Standards
in the past. Details of the revision process will be provided in the
Implementation Plan.
Sub-recommendation 5--Formally establish the minimum criteria
and requirements that govern Federal approval of the DSA, by
revision of DOE Standard 1104-2009, and other appropriate documents.
The criteria and requirements should include: (followed by five
paragraphs labeled a-e).
DOE agrees with the need for clear guidelines and requirements
on the appropriate delegation of nuclear safety authorities and will
revise DOE Standard 1104-2009 and other appropriate DOE documents to
achieve this. DOE will implement the specific steps identified in
paragraphs (a) through (d) of this sub-recommendation. However, DOE
cannot commit to implementing paragraph (e) as written, because it
implies that quantitative risk-based decision making must be
established and used. The Department is exploring how quantitative
methods could be applied to support decision-making on safety issues
at our sites and will keep the Board apprised of developments in
this area. Today, deterministic and qualitative means are used.
The Department agrees that the decision to approve safety bases
must rest on a documented conclusion. The conclusion should indicate
that the safety basis provides a reasonable assurance that the
facility can be operated safely, that the hazards have been
adequately analyzed, and that the engineered and administrative
controls provide adequate protection for the public, workers and the
environment. The Implementation Plan will outline DOE's revision to
standard 3009 and the safety basis development process, will clarity
the safety basis approval process, and identify how the steps in
this sub-recommendation will be addressed.
Sub-recommendation 6--Formally identify the responsible
organization and identify the processes for performing independent
oversight to ensure the responsibilities identified in Item 5 above
are fully implemented.
DOE has already identified the responsible organization for
performing independent oversight for the Secretary: the Office of
Independent Oversight, within the Office of Health, Safety and
Security (HSS). However, HSS Independent Oversight protocols and
delegation processes will be reviewed and modified as necessary to
assure adequate oversight of nuclear safety delegations. The
Implementation Plan will describe the steps DOE will take review and
update the protocols and delegation processes.
We appreciate your advice and will continue working closely with
the Board to improve the Department's Directives in a manner that
meets our shared objectives to the safe, effective, and efficient
execution of our mission. We look forward to working further with
the Board and its staff as we prepare the Implementation Plan.
If you have any further questions please contact Glenn Podonsky,
Chief, Office of Health, Safety and Security, at 202-287-6071.
Sincerely,
Steven Chu.
Attachment 2
May 27, 2011
The Honorable Peter S. Winokur,
Chairman, Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board,
625 Indiana Avenue, NW Suite 700,
Washington, DC 20004.
Dear Mr. Chairman:
Thank you for the clarification provided in the Defense Nuclear
Facilities Safety Board's letter dated April 27, 2011, reaffirming
Recommendation 2010-1, Safety Analysis Requirements for Defining
Adequate Protection for the Public and the Workers. As described in
our initial response, dated, February 28, 2011, we had largely
agreed with the intent of your Recommendation, but had disagreed on
some of its technical details. Your letter addressed those details,
and indicated that you intended for there to be flexibility in
implementing them.
Since last February, our staffs have worked closely to ensure
that we understood the original intent of Recommendation 2010-1, as
well as the underlying safety improvements that were sought. Valuing
the significance of this recommendation, and the importance I place
upon having an effective working relationship with your office, I
have also directed that Deputy Secretary Dan Poneman and Associate
Deputy Secretary Mel Williams maintain an active engagement with the
Board members to facilitate effective communications between our
organizations on all safety matters. The clarifications you provided
in your reaffirmation letter have furthered that dialogue, and will
help guide our work to develop an Implementation Plan that satisfies
our mutual objectives of ensuring that our requirements are clear,
ensure adequate protection of the public, workers and the
environment, and can be implemented as written.
We are well on our way to making some of the improvements that
our staffs have discussed. I deeply appreciate the efforts both the
DNFSB and DOE have made in working together, especially in the past
month. While the analysis and conclusions in my enclosed letter
dated February 28, 2011, still hold and constitute my final
decision, I believe our implementation plan will meet the underlying
safety improvement objectives of your Recommendation. I have
assigned Dr. James B. O'Brien, Acting Director, Office of Nuclear
Safety, within the Office of Health, Safety and Security, to be the
Department's responsible manager for developing the Implementation
Plan. Dr. O'Brien can be reached at (301) 903-3331.
Sincerely,
Steven Chu.
Attachment 2
[FR Doc. 2011-16141 Filed 6-27-11; 8:45 am]
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