[Federal Register Volume 76, Number 232 (Friday, December 2, 2011)]
[Notices]
[Pages 75593-75597]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2011-30989]
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SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION
[Release No. 34-65836; File No. SR-NASDAQ-2011-153]
Self-Regulatory Organizations; The NASDAQ Stock Market, LLC;
Notice of Filing and Immediate Effectiveness of Proposed Rule Change To
Establish Fees for a Direct Market Data Product, NASDAQ Options Trade
Outline (``NOTO'')
November 28, 2011.
Pursuant to Section 19(b)(1) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
(``Exchange Act'') \1\ and Rule 19b-4 thereunder,\2\ notice is hereby
given that, on November 16, 2011, The NASDAQ Stock Market LLC
(``NASDAQ'' or ``Exchange'') filed with the Securities and Exchange
Commission (the ``Commission'') the proposed rule change as described
in Items I, II, and III below, which Items have been prepared by the
Exchange. The Commission is publishing this notice to solicit comments
on the proposed rule change from interested persons.
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\1\ 15 U.S.C. 78s(b)(1).
\2\ 17 CFR 240.19b-4.
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I. Self-Regulatory Organization's Statement of the Terms of Substance
of the Proposed Rule Change
The Exchange proposes to amend NASDAQ Rule 7054, Charges for
Membership, Services, and Equipment, by establishing fees for a direct
data product known as the NASDAQ Options Trade Outline (``NOTO'')
market data product. The proposed fees will become effective on
December 1, 2011.
The text of the proposed rule change is available on the Exchange's
Web site at http://www.nasdaq.cchwallstreet.com, at the principal
office of the Exchange, and at the Commission's Public Reference Room.
II. Self-Regulatory Organization's Statement of the Purpose of, and
Statutory Basis for, the Proposed Rule Change
In its filing with the Commission, the Exchange included statements
concerning the purpose of and basis for the proposed rule change and
discussed any comments it received on the proposed rule change. The
text of these statements may be examined at the places specified in
Item IV below. The Exchange has prepared summaries, set forth in
sections A, B, and C below, of the most significant aspects of such
statements.
A. Self-Regulatory Organization's Statement of the Purpose of, and
Statutory Basis for, the Proposed Rule Change
1. Purpose
The purpose of the proposed rule change is to establish fees for
the NOTO market data product.\3\ NOTO is a market data product offered
by the Exchange that is designed to provide proprietary electronic
trade data to subscribers. NOTO is available as either an ``End-of-
Day'' data product or an ``Intra-Day'' data product, as described more
fully below. NOTO is available to any person who wishes to subscribe to
it, regardless of whether or not they are a member of the Exchange. The
fees for both the End of Day product and the Intra-Day product are
uniform for all subscribers. NOTO is available only for internal use
and distribution by subscribers.
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\3\ See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 65587 (October 18,
2011), 76 FR 65765 (October 24, 2011) (SR-Nasdaq-2011-144).
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Data Included in NOTO
NOTO provides information about the activity of a particular option
series
[[Page 75594]]
during a particular trading session. NOTO subscribers will receive the
following data:
Aggregate number of buy and sell transactions in the
affected series;
Aggregate volume traded electronically on the Exchange in
the affected series;
Aggregate number of trades effected on the Exchange to
open a position; \4\
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\4\ NOTO will provide subscribers with the aggregate number of
``opening purchase transactions'' in the affected series. An opening
purchase transaction is an Exchange options transaction in which the
purchaser's intention is to create or increase a long position in
the series of options involved in such transaction. NOTO will also
provide subscribers with the aggregate number of ``opening writing
transactions.'' An opening writing transaction is an Exchange
options transaction in which the seller's (writer's) intention is to
create or increase a short position in the series of options
involved in such transaction.
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Aggregate number of trades effected on the Exchange to
close a position; \5\
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\5\ NOTO will provide subscribers with the aggregate number of
``closing purchase transactions'' in the affected series. A closing
purchase transaction is an Exchange options transaction in which the
purchaser's intention is to reduce or eliminate a short position in
the series of options involved in such transaction. NOTO will also
provide subscribers with the aggregate number of ``closing sale
transactions.'' A closing sale transaction is an Exchange options
transaction an Exchange options transaction [sic] in which the
seller's intention is to reduce or eliminate a long position in the
series of options involved in such transaction.
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Origin of the orders involved in trades on the Exchange in
the affected series during a particular trading session, specifically
aggregated in the following categories of participants: customers,
broker-dealers, and market makers.
End of Day Product
The End-of-Day product includes the aggregate data described above
representing the entire trading session. It is calculated during an
overnight process after each trading session and is available to
subscribers for download the following morning at approximately 7 a.m.,
ET.
The monthly subscriber fee for the End of Day product subscribers
is $500.00.
Intra-Day Product
The Intra-Day product includes periodic, cumulative data for a
particular trading session. The Intra-Day product is produced and
updated every ten minutes during the trading day. Data is captured in
``snapshots'' taken every 10 minutes throughout the trading day and is
available to subscribers within 5 minutes of the conclusion of each 10
minute period. For example, subscribers to the Intra-Day product will
receive the first calculation of intra-day data by 9:44 a.m. ET, which
represents data captured from 9:30 a.m. to 9:39 a.m. Subscribers will
receive the next update at 9:54 a.m., representing the data previously
provided together with data captured from 9:40 a.m. through 9:49 a.m.,
and so forth. Each update will represent the aggregate data captured
from the current ``snapshot'' and all previous ``snapshots.'' The
monthly subscriber fee for the Intra-Day product is $750.00.
NOTO provides subscribers data that should enhance their ability to
analyze option trade and volume data, and to create and test trading
models and analytical strategies. The Exchange believes that NOTO is a
valuable tool that subscribers can use to gain comprehensive insight
into the trading activity in a particular option series.
2. Statutory Basis
NASDAQ believes that the proposed rule change is consistent with
the provisions of Section 6 of the Act,\6\ in general, and with Section
6(b)(4) of the Act,\7\ in particular, in that it provides an equitable
allocation of reasonable fees among users and recipients of NASDAQ
data. In adopting Regulation NMS, the Commission granted self-
regulatory organizations and broker-dealers increased authority and
flexibility to offer new and unique market data to the public. It was
believed that this authority would expand the amount of data available
to consumers, and also spur innovation and competition for the
provision of market data.
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\6\ 15 U.S.C. 78f.
\7\ 15 U.S.C. 78f(b)(4).
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The Commission concluded that Regulation NMS--by deregulating the
market in proprietary data--would itself further the Act's goals of
facilitating efficiency and competition:
``[E]fficiency is promoted when broker-dealers who do not need
the data beyond the prices, sizes, market center identifications of
the NBBO and consolidated last sale information are not required to
receive (and pay for) such data. The Commission also believes that
efficiency is promoted when broker-dealers may choose to receive
(and pay for) additional market data based on their own internal
analysis of the need for such data.'' \8\
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\8\ See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 51808 (June 9,
2005), 70 FR 37496 (June 29, 2005).
By removing unnecessary regulatory restrictions on the ability of
exchanges to sell their own data, Regulation NMS advanced the goals of
the Act and the principles reflected in its legislative history. If the
free market should determine whether proprietary data is sold to
broker-dealers at all, it follows that the price at which such data is
sold should be set by the market as well. NASDAQ believes that NOTO is
precisely the sort of market data product that the Commission
envisioned when it adopted Regulation NMS.
The Court in NetCoalition, while upholding the Commission's
conclusion that competitive forces may be relied upon to establish the
fairness of prices, nevertheless concluded that the record in that case
did not adequately support the Commission's conclusions as to the
competitive nature of the market for NYSEArca's data product at issue
in that case. As explained below in NASDAQ's Statement on Burden on
Competition, however, NASDAQ believes that there is substantial
evidence of competition in the marketplace for data that was not in the
record in the NetCoalition case, and that the Commission is entitled to
rely upon such evidence in concluding that the fees established in this
filing are the product of competition, and therefore in accordance with
the relevant statutory standards.\9\
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\9\ It should also be noted that Section 916 of Dodd- Frank Wall
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 (``Dodd-Frank
Act'') has amended paragraph (A) of Section 19(b)(3) of the Act, 15
U.S.C. 78s(b)(3) to make it clear that all exchange fees, including
fees for market data, may be filed by exchanges on an immediately
effective basis. Although this change in the law does not alter the
Commission's authority to evaluate and ultimately disapprove
exchange rules if it concludes that they are not consistent with the
Act, it unambiguously reflects a conclusion that market data fee
changes do not require prior Commission review before taking effect,
and that a formal proceeding with regard to a particular fee change
is required only if the Commission determines that it is necessary
or appropriate to suspend the fee and institute such a proceeding.
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On July 21, 2010, President Barak [sic] Obama signed into law H.R.
4173, the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of
2010 (``Dodd-Frank Act''), which amended Section 19 of the Act. Among
other things, Section 916 of the Dodd-Frank Act amended paragraph (A)
of Section 19(b)(3) of the Act by inserting the phrase ``on any person,
whether or not the person is a member of the self-regulatory
organization'' after ``due, fee or other charge imposed by the self-
regulatory organization.'' As a result, all SRO rule proposals
establishing or changing dues, fees, or other charges are immediately
effective upon filing regardless of whether such dues, fees, or other
charges are imposed on members of the SRO, non-members, or both.
Section 916 further amended paragraph (C) of Section 19(b)(3) of the
Exchange Act to read, in pertinent part, ``At any time within the 60-
day period beginning on the date of filing of such a proposed rule
change in accordance with the provisions of paragraph (1) [of Section
[[Page 75595]]
19(b)], the Commission summarily may temporarily suspend the change in
the rules of the self-regulatory organization made thereby, if it
appears to the Commission that such action is necessary or appropriate
in the public interest, for the protection of investors, or otherwise
in furtherance of the purposes of this title. If the Commission takes
such action, the Commission shall institute proceedings under paragraph
(2)(B) [of Section 19(b)] to determine whether the proposed rule should
be approved or disapproved.''
NASDAQ believes that these amendments to Section 19 of the Act
reflect Congress's intent to allow the Commission to rely upon the
forces of competition to ensure that fees for market data are
reasonable and equitably allocated. Although Section 19(b) had formerly
authorized immediate effectiveness for a ``due, fee or other charge
imposed by the self-regulatory organization,'' the Commission adopted a
policy and subsequently a rule stipulating that fees for data and other
products available to persons that are not members of the self-
regulatory organization must be approved by the Commission after first
being published for comment. At the time, the Commission supported the
adoption of the policy and the rule by pointing out that unlike
members, whose representation in self-regulatory organization
governance was mandated by the Act, non-members should be given the
opportunity to comment on fees before being required to pay them, and
that the Commission should specifically approve all such fees.
NASDAQ believes that the amendment to Section 19 reflects
Congress's conclusion that the evolution of self-regulatory
organization governance and competitive market structure have rendered
the Commission's prior policy on non-member fees obsolete.
Specifically, many exchanges have evolved from member-owned not-
for-profit corporations into for-profit investor-owned corporations (or
subsidiaries of investor owned corporations). Accordingly, exchanges no
longer have narrow incentives to manage their affairs for the exclusive
benefit of their members, but rather have incentives to maximize the
appeal of their products to all customers, whether members or
nonmembers, so as to broaden distribution and grow revenues. Moreover,
we believe that the change also reflects an endorsement of the
Commission's determinations that reliance on competitive markets is an
appropriate means to ensure equitable and reasonable prices. Simply
put, the change reflects a presumption that all fee changes should be
permitted to take effect immediately, since the level of all fees are
constrained by competitive forces.
The recent decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit in NetCoaliton [sic] v. SEC, No. 09-1042
(DC Cir. 2010), although reviewing a Commission decision made prior to
the effective date of the Dodd-Frank Act, upheld the Commission's
reliance upon competitive markets to set reasonable and equitably
allocated fees for market data. ``In fact, the legislative history
indicates that the Congress intended that the market system `evolve
through the interplay of competitive forces as unnecessary regulatory
restrictions are removed' and that the SEC wield its regulatory power
`in those situations where competition may not be sufficient,' such as
in the creation of a `consolidated transactional reporting system.' ''
\10\
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\10\ NetCoaltion [sic], at 15 (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 94-229, at
92 (1975), as reprinted in 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. 321, 323).
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The court's conclusions about Congressional intent are therefore
reinforced by the Dodd-Frank Act amendments, which create a presumption
that exchange fees, including market data fees, may take effect
immediately, without prior Commission approval, and that the Commission
should take action to suspend a fee change and institute a proceeding
to determine whether the fee change should be approved or disapproved
only where the Commission has concerns that the change may not be
consistent with the Act.
B. Self-Regulatory Organization's Statement on Burden on Competition
NASDAQ does not believe that the proposed rule change will result
in any burden on competition that is not necessary or appropriate in
furtherance of the purposes of the Act, as amended. Notwithstanding its
determination that the Commission may rely upon competition to
establish fair and equitably allocated fees for market data, the
NetCoaltion [sic] court found that the Commission had not, in that
case, compiled a record that adequately supported its conclusion that
the market for the data at issue in the case was competitive.
For the reasons discussed above, NASDAQ believes that the Dodd-
Frank Act amendments to Section 19 materially alter the scope of the
Commission's review of future market data filings, by creating a
presumption that all fees may take effect immediately, without prior
analysis by the Commission of the competitive environment.
Even in the absence of this important statutory change, however,
NASDAQ believes that a record may readily be established to demonstrate
the competitive nature of the market in question.
There is intense competition between trading platforms that provide
transaction execution and routing services and proprietary data
products. Transaction execution and proprietary data products are
complementary in that market data is both an input and a by-product of
the execution service. In fact, market data and trade execution are a
paradigmatic example of joint products with joint costs. The decision
whether and on which platform to post an order will depend on the
attributes of the platform where the order can be posted, including the
execution fees, data quality and price and distribution of its data
products. Without the prospect of a taking order recognizing and
reacting to a posted order on a particular platform, the posting of the
order would accomplish little.
Without trade executions, exchange data products cannot exist. Data
products are valuable to many end users only insofar as they provide
information that end users expect will assist them or their customers
in making trading decisions.
The costs of producing market data include not only the costs of
the data distribution infrastructure, but also the costs of designing,
maintaining, and operating the exchange's transaction execution
platform and the cost of regulating the exchange to ensure its fair
operation and maintain investor confidence. The total return that a
trading platform earns reflects the revenues it receives from both
products and the joint costs it incurs. Moreover, an exchange's
customers view the costs of transaction executions and of data as a
unified cost of doing business with the exchange. A broker-dealer will
direct orders to a particular exchange only if the expected revenues
from executing trades on the exchange exceed net transaction execution
costs and the cost of data that the broker-dealer chooses to buy to
support its trading decisions (or those of its customers). The choice
of data products is, in turn, a product of the value of the products in
making profitable trading decisions. If the cost of the product exceeds
its expected value, the broker-dealer will choose not to buy it.
Moreover, as a broker-dealer chooses to direct fewer orders to a
[[Page 75596]]
particular exchange, the value of the product to that broker-dealer
decreases, for two reasons. First, the product will contain less
information, because executions of the broker-dealer's orders will not
be reflected in it. Second, and perhaps more important, the product
will be less valuable to that broker-dealer because it does not provide
information about the venue to which it is directing its orders. Data
from the competing venue to which the broker-dealer is directing orders
will become correspondingly more valuable.
Thus, a super-competitive increase in the fees charged for either
transactions or data has the potential to impair revenues from both
products. ``No one disputes that competition for order flow is
`fierce'.'' \11\ However, the existence of fierce competition for order
flow implies a high degree of price sensitivity on the part of broker-
dealers with order flow, since they may readily reduce costs by
directing orders toward the lowest-cost trading venues. A broker-dealer
that shifted its order flow from one platform to another in response to
order execution price differentials would both reduce the value of that
platform's market data and reduce its own need to consume data from the
disfavored platform. Similarly, if a platform increases its market data
fees, the change will affect the overall cost of doing business with
the platform, and affected broker-dealers will assess whether they can
lower their trading costs by directing orders elsewhere and thereby
lessening the need for the more expensive data.
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\11\ NetCoalition at 24.
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Analyzing the cost of market data distribution in isolation from
the cost of all of the inputs supporting the creation of market data
will inevitably underestimate the cost of the data. Thus, because it is
impossible to create data without a fast, technologically robust, and
well-regulated execution system, system costs and regulatory costs
affect the price of market data. It would be equally misleading,
however, to attribute all of the exchange's costs to the market data
portion of an exchange's joint product. Rather, all of the exchange's
costs are incurred for the unified purposes of attracting order flow,
executing and/or routing orders, and generating and selling data about
market activity. The total return that an exchange earns reflects the
revenues it receives from the joint products and the total costs of the
joint products.
Competition among trading platforms can be expected to constrain
the aggregate return each platform earns from the sale of its joint
products, but different platforms may choose from a range of possible,
and equally reasonable, pricing strategies as the means of recovering
total costs. For example, some platforms may choose to pay rebates to
attract orders, charge relatively low prices for market information (or
provide information free of charge) and charge relatively high prices
for accessing posted liquidity. Other platforms may choose a strategy
of paying lower rebates (or no rebates) to attract orders, setting
relatively high prices for market information, and setting relatively
low prices for accessing posted liquidity. In this environment, there
is no economic basis for regulating maximum prices for one of the joint
products in an industry in which suppliers face competitive constraints
with regard to the joint offering. This would be akin to strictly
regulating the price that an automobile manufacturer can charge for car
sound systems despite the existence of a highly competitive market for
cars and the availability of aftermarket alternatives to the
manufacturer-supplied system.
The market for market data products is competitive and inherently
contestable because there is fierce competition for the inputs
necessary to the creation of proprietary data and strict pricing
discipline for the proprietary products themselves. Numerous exchanges
compete with each other for listings, trades, and market data itself,
providing virtually limitless opportunities for entrepreneurs who wish
to produce and distribute their own market data. This proprietary data
is produced by each individual exchange, as well as other entities, in
a vigorously competitive market. Broker-dealers currently have numerous
alternative venues for their order flow, including ten self-regulatory
organization (``SRO'') markets, as well as internalizing broker-dealers
(``BDs'') and various forms of alternative trading systems (``ATSs''),
including dark pools and electronic communication networks (``ECNs'').
Each SRO market competes to produce transaction reports via trade
executions, and two FINRA regulated Trade Reporting Facilities
(``TRFs'') compete to attract internalized transaction reports.
Competitive markets for order flow, executions, and transaction reports
provide pricing discipline for the inputs of proprietary data products.
For example, the Exchange notes that at least two other U.S. options
exchanges offer a market data product that is substantially similar to
NOTO, which NASDAQ must consider in its pricing discipline in order to
compete for listings, trades, and the market data itself.\12\
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\12\ The International Securities Exchange, Inc. (``ISE'') Open/
Close Trade Profile and the ISE Open/Close Trade Profile Intra-Day
contain substantially similar data to that included in NOTO End of
Day and NOTO Intra-Day. See Securities Exchange Act Release No.
56254 (August 15, 2007), 72 FR 47104 (August 22, 2007) (SR-ISE-2007-
70). The Chicago Board Options Exchange, Inc. (``CBOE'') also offers
similar market data. See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 55062
(January 8, 2007), 72 FR 2048 (January 17, 2007) (SR-CBOE-2006-88)
(order granting approval to proposed rule change to codify a fee
schedule for the sale of open and close volume data on CBOE listed
options by Market Data Express, LLC).
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The large number of SROs, TRFs, BDs, and ATSs that currently
produce proprietary data or are currently capable of producing it
provides further pricing discipline for proprietary data products. Each
SRO, TRF, ATS, and BD is currently permitted to produce proprietary
data products, and many currently do or have announced plans to do so,
including, NASDAQ, PHLX, NYSE, NYSE Amex, NYSEArca, and BATS.
Any ATS or BD can combine with any other ATS, BD, or multiple ATSs
or BDs to produce joint proprietary data products. Additionally, order
routers and market data vendors can facilitate single or multiple
broker-dealers' production of proprietary data products. The potential
sources of proprietary products are virtually limitless.
The fact that proprietary data from ATSs, BDs, and vendors can by-
pass SROs is significant in two respects. First, non-SROs can compete
directly with SROs for the production and sale of proprietary data
products, as BATS and Arca did before registering as exchanges by
publishing proprietary book data on the Internet. Second, because a
single order or transaction report can appear in an SRO proprietary
product, a non-SRO proprietary product, or both, the data available in
proprietary products is exponentially greater than the actual number of
orders and transaction reports that exist in the marketplace.
Market data vendors provide another form of price discipline for
proprietary data products because they control the primary means of
access to end users. Vendors impose price restraints based upon their
business models. For example, vendors such as Bloomberg and Reuters
that assess a surcharge on data they sell may refuse to offer
proprietary products that end users will not purchase in sufficient
numbers. Internet portals, such as Yahoo, impose a discipline by
providing only data that will enable them to attract ``eyeballs'' that
contribute to their advertising revenue. Retail broker-dealers, such as
[[Page 75597]]
Schwab and Fidelity, offer their customers proprietary data only if it
promotes trading and generates sufficient commission revenue. Although
the business models may differ, these vendors' pricing discipline is
the same: they can simply refuse to purchase any proprietary data
product that fails to provide sufficient value. NASDAQ and other
producers of proprietary data products must understand and respond to
these varying business models and pricing disciplines in order to
market proprietary data products successfully.
In addition to the competition and price discipline described
above, the market for proprietary data products is also highly
contestable because market entry is rapid, inexpensive, and profitable.
The history of electronic trading is replete with examples of entrants
that swiftly grew into some of the largest electronic trading platforms
and proprietary data producers: Archipelago, Bloomberg Tradebook,
Island, RediBook, Attain, TracECN, BATS Trading and Direct Edge. A
proliferation of dark pools and other ATSs operate profitably with
fragmentary shares of consolidated market volume.
Regulation NMS, by deregulating the market for proprietary data,
has increased the contestability of that market. While broker-dealers
have previously published their proprietary data individually,
Regulation NMS encourages market data vendors and broker-dealers to
produce proprietary products cooperatively in a manner never before
possible. Multiple market data vendors already have the capability to
aggregate data and disseminate it on a profitable scale, including
Bloomberg, and Thomson-Reuters.
The court in NetCoalition concluded that the Commission had failed
to demonstrate that the market for market data was competitive based on
the reasoning of the Commission's NetCoalition order because, in the
court's view, the Commission had not adequately demonstrated that the
depth-of-book data at issue in the case is used to attract order flow.
NASDAQ believes, however, that evidence not before the court clearly
demonstrates that availability of depth data attracts order flow.
Competition among platforms has driven NASDAQ continually to
improve its platform data offerings and to cater to customers' data
needs.
For the foregoing reasons, NASDAQ does not believe that the
proposed rule change will result in any burden on competition that is
not necessary or appropriate in furtherance of the purpose of the Act.
C. Self-Regulatory Organization's Statement on Comments on the Proposed
Rule Change Received From Members, Participants, or Others
No written comments were either solicited or received.
III. Date of Effectiveness of the Proposed Rule Change and Timing for
Commission Action
The foregoing rule change has become effective pursuant to Section
19(b)(3)(A)(ii) of the Act.\13\ At any time within 60 days of the
filing of the proposed rule change, the Commission summarily may
temporarily suspend such rule change if it appears to the Commission
that such action is necessary or appropriate in the public interest,
for the protection of investors, or otherwise in furtherance of the
purposes of the Act.
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\13\ 15 U.S.C. 78s(b)(3)(A)(ii).
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IV. Solicitation of Comments
Interested persons are invited to submit written data, views, and
arguments concerning the foregoing, including whether the proposed rule
change is consistent with the Exchange Act. Comments may be submitted
by any of the following methods:
Electronic Comments
Use the Commission's Internet comment form (http://www.sec.gov/rules/sro.shtml); or
Send an email to [email protected]. Please include
File Number SR-NASDAQ-2011-153 on the subject line.
Paper Comments
Send paper comments in triplicate to Elizabeth M. Murphy,
Secretary, Securities and Exchange Commission, 100 F Street NE.,
Washington, DC 20549-1090.
All submissions should refer to File Number SR-NASDAQ-2011-153. This
file number should be included on the subject line if email is used. To
help the Commission process and review your comments more efficiently,
please use only one method. The Commission will post all comments on
the Commission's Internet Web site (http://www.sec.gov/rules/sro.shtml). Copies of the submission, all subsequent amendments, all
written statements with respect to the proposed rule change that are
filed with the Commission, and all written communications relating to
the proposed rule change between the Commission and any person, other
than those that may be withheld from the public in accordance with the
provisions of 5 U.S.C. 552, will be available for Web site viewing and
printing in the Commission's Public Reference Room, 100 F Street NE.,
Washington, DC 20549, on official business days between the hours of 10
a.m. and 3 p.m. Copies of the filing also will be available for
inspection and copying at the principal office of the Exchange. All
comments received will be posted without change; the Commission does
not edit personal identifying information from submissions. You should
submit only information that you wish to make available publicly. All
submissions should refer to File Number SR-NASDAQ-2011-153 and should
be submitted on or before December 23, 2011.
For the Commission, by the Division of Trading and Markets,
pursuant to delegated authority.\14\
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\14\ 17 CFR 200.30-3(a)(12).
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Kevin M. O'Neill,
Deputy Secretary.
[FR Doc. 2011-30989 Filed 12-1-11; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 8011-01-P