[Federal Register Volume 77, Number 75 (Wednesday, April 18, 2012)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Pages 23161-23166]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2012-9336]


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Proposed Rules
                                                Federal Register
________________________________________________________________________

This section of the FEDERAL REGISTER contains notices to the public of 
the proposed issuance of rules and regulations. The purpose of these 
notices is to give interested persons an opportunity to participate in 
the rule making prior to the adoption of the final rules.

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Federal Register / Vol. 77, No. 75 / Wednesday, April 18, 2012 / 
Proposed Rules

[[Page 23161]]



NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

10 CFR Parts 50 and 52

[NRC-2012-0031]
RIN 3150-AJ11


Onsite Emergency Response Capabilities

AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

ACTION: Advance notice of proposed rulemaking.

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SUMMARY: The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC or the Commission) 
is issuing this Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (ANPR) to begin 
the process of potentially amending its regulations to strengthen and 
integrate onsite emergency response capabilities. The NRC seeks public 
comment on specific questions and issues with respect to possible 
revision to the NRC's requirements for onsite emergency response 
capabilities, and development of both new requirements and the 
supporting regulatory basis. This regulatory action is one of the 
actions stemming from the NRC's lessons-learned efforts associated with 
the March 2011 Fukushima Dai-ichi Nuclear Power Plant accident in 
Japan.

DATES: Submit comments by June 18, 2012. Comments received after this 
date will be considered if it is practical to do so, but the NRC is 
only able to ensure consideration of comments received on or before 
this date.

ADDRESSES: You may access information and comment submissions related 
to this document, which the NRC possesses and is publicly available, by 
searching on http://www.regulations.gov under Docket ID NRC-2012-0031. 
You may submit comments by any of the following methods:
     Federal Rulemaking Web Site: Go to http://www.regulations.gov and search for Docket ID NRC-2012-0031. Address 
questions about NRC dockets to Carol Gallagher; telephone: 301-492-
3668; email: Carol.Gallagher@nrc.gov.
     Email comments to: Rulemaking.Comments@nrc.gov. If you do 
not receive an automatic email reply confirming receipt, contact us 
directly at 301-415-1677.
     Fax comments to: Secretary, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission at 301-415-1101.
     Mail comments to: Secretary, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, Attn: Rulemakings and 
Adjudications Staff.
     Hand deliver comments to: 11555 Rockville Pike, Rockville, 
Maryland 20852, between 7:30 a.m. and 4:15 p.m. (Eastern time) Federal 
workdays; telephone: 301-415-1677.
    For additional direction on accessing information and submitting 
comments, see ``Accessing Information and Submitting Comments'' in the 
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION section of this document.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Robert H. Beall, Office of Nuclear 
Reactor Regulation, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 
20555-0001; telephone: 301-415-3874; email: Robert.Beall@nrc.gov.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

I. Accessing Information and Submitting Comments
II. Background: Fukushima Dai-ichi and the NRC Regulatory Response
III. Background: Onsite Emergency Response Capabilities
    A. Emergency Operating Procedures
    B. Severe Accident Management Guidelines
    C. Extensive Damage Mitigation Guidelines
    D. Onsite Emergency Response Capabilities Versus Emergency 
Preparedness
IV. Discussion and Request for Public Comment
    A. ANPR Purpose
    B. Rulemaking Objectives/Success Criteria
    C. Applicability to NRC Licenses and Approvals
    D. Relationship Between Recommendation 8 and Other Near-Term 
Task Force Recommendations
    E. Interim Regulatory Actions
V. Public Meeting
VI. Rulemaking Process and Schedule
VII. Related Petition for Rulemaking Actions
VIII. Available Supporting Documents

I. Accessing Information and Submitting Comments

A. Accessing Information

    Please refer to Docket ID NRC-2012-0031 when contacting the NRC 
about the availability of information for this notice. You may access 
information related to this ANPR, which the NRC possesses and is 
publicly available, by the following methods:
     Federal Rulemaking Web Site: Go to http://www.regulations.gov and search for Docket ID NRC-2012-0031.
     NRC's Agencywide Documents Access and Management System 
(ADAMS): You may access publicly available documents online in the NRC 
Library at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html. To begin the 
search, select ``ADAMS Public Documents'' and then select ``Begin Web-
based ADAMS Search.'' For problems with ADAMS, please contact the NRC's 
Public Document Room (PDR) reference staff at 1-800-397-4209, 301-415-
4737, or by email to PDR.Resource@nrc.gov. The ADAMS accession number 
for each document referenced in this notice (if that document is 
available in ADAMS) is provided the first time that a document is 
referenced. A table listing documents that provide additional 
background and supporting information is in Section VIII of this 
document.
     NRC's PDR: You may examine and purchase copies of public 
documents at the NRC's PDR, Room O1-F21, One White Flint North, 11555 
Rockville Pike, Rockville, Maryland 20852.

B. Submitting Comments

    Please include Docket ID NRC-2012-0031 in the subject line of your 
comment submission, in order to ensure that the NRC is able to make 
your comment submission available to the public in this docket.
    The NRC cautions you not to include identifying or contact 
information in comment submissions that you do not want to be publicly 
disclosed. The NRC posts all comment submissions at http://www.regulations.gov as well as enters the comment submissions into 
ADAMS. The NRC does not edit comment submissions to remove identifying 
or contact information.
    If you are requesting or aggregating comments from other persons 
for submission to the NRC, then you should inform those persons not to 
include identifying or contact information in their comment submissions 
that they do not want to be publicly disclosed. Your request should 
state that the NRC will not edit comment submissions to remove such 
information before making the comment submissions available to the 
public or entering the comment submissions into ADAMS.

[[Page 23162]]

II. Background: Fukushima Dai-ichi and the NRC Regulatory Response

    On March 11, 2011, a magnitude 9.0 earthquake struck off the coast 
of the Japanese island of Honshu. The earthquake precipitated a large 
tsunami that is estimated to have exceeded 14 meters (45 feet) in 
height at the Fukushima Dai-ichi Nuclear Power Plant site (hereinafter 
referred to as the site or the facility). The earthquake and tsunami 
produced widespread devastation across northeastern Japan, resulting in 
approximately 25,000 people dead or missing, displacing tens of 
thousands of people, and significantly impacting the infrastructure and 
industry in the northeastern coastal areas of Japan. At the time of the 
earthquake, Fukushima Dai-ichi Units 1, 2, and 3 were in operation. 
Units 4, 5, and 6 had been shut down for routine refueling and 
maintenance activities, and the Unit 4 reactor fuel had been offloaded 
to the Unit 4 spent fuel pool.
    As a result of the earthquake, the three operating units at the 
site automatically shut down, and offsite power was lost to the entire 
facility. The emergency diesel generators started at all six units, 
providing alternating current (AC) electrical power to critical 
systems; overall, the facility response to the seismic event appears to 
have been normal.
    Approximately 40 minutes after shutdown of the operating units, the 
first large tsunami wave inundated the site, followed by multiple 
additional waves. The tsunami resulted in extensive damage to site 
facilities and a complete loss of AC electrical power at Units 1 
through 5, a condition known as station blackout (SBO). One diesel 
generator remained functional on Unit 6.
    Despite the actions of the operators following the earthquake and 
tsunami, cooling was lost to the fuel in the Unit 1 reactor after 
several hours, in the Unit 2 reactor after about 70 hours, and in the 
Unit 3 reactor after about 36 hours, resulting in damage to the nuclear 
fuel shortly after the loss of cooling.
    In the days following the Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear accident, the 
NRC Chairman directed the NRC staff to establish a senior-level agency 
task force to conduct a methodical and systematic review of the NRC's 
processes and regulations to determine whether, in light of the events 
in Japan, the agency should make additional improvements to its 
regulatory system, and to make recommendations to the Commission for 
its policy direction. This direction was provided in a tasking 
memorandum dated March 23, 2011, from the NRC Chairman to the NRC 
Executive Director for Operations (COMGBJ-11-0002) (ADAMS Accession No. 
ML110950110).
    In SECY-11-0093, ``Near-Term Report and Recommendations for Agency 
Actions Following the Events in Japan'' (ADAMS Accession No. 
ML11186A959), dated July 12, 2011, the Near-Term Task Force (NTTF) 
provided its recommendations to the Commission. The staff requirements 
memorandum (SRM) for SECY-11-0093 (ADAMS Accession No. ML112310021), 
dated August 19, 2011, directed the NRC staff to identify and make 
``recommendations regarding any Task Force recommendations that can, 
and in the staff's judgment, should be implemented, in part or in 
whole, without unnecessary delay.''
    In SECY-11-0124, ``Recommended Actions To Be Taken Without Delay 
from the Near-Term Task Force Report'' (ADAMS Accession No. 
ML11245A127), the NRC staff provided recommendations to the Commission 
on actions that, in the staff's judgment, should be initiated without 
unnecessary delay, and requested that the Commission provide direction 
for moving forward on these recommendation (subsequently referred to as 
``Tier 1'' recommendations). The Commission approved the staff's 
proposed actions in the SRM for SECY-11-0124 (ADAMS Accession No. 
ML112911571), dated October 18, 2011. In SECY-11-0137, ``Prioritization 
of Recommended Actions to Be Taken in Response to Fukushima Lessons 
Learned'' (ADAMS Accession No. ML11269A204), the NRC staff requested 
that the Commission approve the staff's prioritization of the NTTF 
recommendations. In the SRM for SECY-11-0137 (ADAMS Accession No. 
ML113490055), dated December 15, 2011, the Commission approved the 
staff's proposed prioritization of the NTTF recommendations and 
supported action on the Tier 1 recommendations, subject to the 
direction in the SRM.
    With respect to regulatory action regarding onsite emergency 
response capabilities, the Commission directed the NRC staff to 
initiate a rulemaking on NTTF Recommendation 8, in the form of an ANPR. 
This document responds to that Commission direction.
    In November 2011, the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO) 
issued INPO-11-005, ``Special Report on the Nuclear Accident at the 
Fukushima Dai-ichi Nuclear Power Station'' (ADAMS Accession No. 
ML11347A454). In the SRM for SECY-11-0137, the Commission directed NRC 
staff to consider INPO-11-005 in its development of the technical bases 
for any proposed regulatory changes.

III. Background: Onsite Emergency Response Capabilities

A. Emergency Operating Procedures

    Emergency Operating Procedures (EOPs) are required procedures 
designed to mitigate the effects of a design basis accident and place 
the plant in a safe shutdown condition. The EOPs are required by Title 
10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) Part 50, Appendix B, 
Criterion V, ``Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings,'' and are 
included in the administrative control sections of licensee's technical 
specifications. Licensed operators are trained and evaluated in the 
implementation of EOPs through initial license training. The NRC 
evaluates licensed operator candidates' knowledge of EOPs during an 
initial written examination, as required by 10 CFR 55.41 and 55.43, and 
an initial operating test, as required by 10 CFR 55.45. For 
proficiency, licensed operator requalification training programs, 
required by 10 CFR 55.59, routinely train and evaluate licensed 
operators on their knowledge and ability to implement the EOPs.

B. Severe Accident Management Guidelines

    During the 1990s, the nuclear industry developed Severe Accident 
Management Guidelines (SAMGs) as a voluntary industry initiative in 
response to Generic Letter 88-20, Supplement 2, ``Accident Management 
Strategies for Consideration in the Individual Plant Examination 
Process,'' dated April 4, 1990 (ADAMS Accession No. ML031200551). SAMGs 
provide guidance to operators and Technical Support Center (TSC) staff 
in the event of an accident that progresses beyond a plant's design 
basis (and therefore beyond the scope of the EOPs). The nuclear power 
industry owners' groups (i.e., industry organizations with 
representatives from the various nuclear plant owners that provide 
industry oversight for various plant designs) developed generic 
guidelines specific to the individual plant designs. Given the 
voluntary nature of the initiative for SAMGs, their implementation 
throughout the industry has been varied, as noted by NRC inspection 
results for Temporary Instruction 2515/184, ``Availability and 
Readiness Inspection of Severe Accident Management Guidelines (SAMGs)'' 
(ADAMS Accession No. ML11115A053). The guidelines themselves were 
implemented by individual licensees,

[[Page 23163]]

but because the NRC has not developed a regulatory requirement for 
SAMGs, the training, evaluation, and procedure control requirements for 
SAMGs vary from plant to plant.

C. Extensive Damage Mitigation Guidelines

    Following the terrorist events of September 11, 2001, the NRC 
ordered licensees to develop and implement specific guidance and 
strategies to maintain or restore core cooling, containment, and spent 
fuel pool cooling capabilities using existing or readily available 
resources that can be effectively implemented under the circumstances 
associated with loss of large areas of the plant due to explosions or 
fire. These requirements were subsequently imposed as license 
conditions for individual licensees and formalized in the Power Reactor 
Security Requirements final rule (74 FR 13926; March 27, 2009) in 10 
CFR 50.54(hh)(2). As a result, Extensive Damage Mitigation Guidelines 
(EDMGs) were developed in order to provide guidance to operating crews 
and TSC personnel on the implementation of the strategies developed to 
address these large area events. The events at the Fukushima Dai-ichi 
Nuclear Power Station following the March 11, 2011, earthquake and 
tsunami highlighted the continued potential benefits of these 
strategies in mitigating the effects of prolonged SBOs and other events 
that challenge key safety functions. The NRC has not developed a 
specific regulatory requirement for training on EDMGs.

D. Onsite Emergency Response Capabilities Versus Emergency Preparedness

    This ANPR focuses on the effectiveness of accident mitigating 
procedures and the training and exercises associated with these 
procedures. When using the term ``accident mitigating procedures'' in 
this document, the NRC is referring to EOPs, SAMGs, and EDMGs. The 
licensee's emergency preparedness plan and implementing procedures, 
which are required by 10 CFR 50.47 and 50.54(q) and Appendix E to 10 
CFR part 50, are being evaluated through other NTTF recommendations, 
and the associated efforts are referred to in the questions in Section 
IV.D. However, the licensee's emergency preparedness plan and 
implementing procedures are not the subject of this ANPR.

IV. Discussion and Request for Public Comment

A. ANPR Purpose

    In SECY-11-0124, the NRC staff recommended that the agency engage 
stakeholders during rulemaking activities ``so that the regulatory 
action and licensee actions taken effectively resolve the identified 
issues and implementation challenges are identified in advance.'' The 
NRC staff proposed interaction with stakeholders to support development 
of the regulatory basis, a proposed rule, and implementing guidance for 
strengthening and integrating the onsite emergency response 
capabilities. In the SRM for SECY-11-0124, the Commission directed the 
NRC staff to issue an ANPR prior to developing the regulatory basis for 
a proposed rule. Accordingly, the NRC's objective in this ANPR is to 
solicit external stakeholder feedback to inform the NRC staff's efforts 
to evaluate regulatory approaches for strengthening the current onsite 
emergency response capability requirements.
    In the SRM for SECY-11-0124, the Commission also encouraged NRC 
staff to develop recommendations that continue to realize the strengths 
of a performance-based system as a guiding principle. The Commission 
indicated that, to be effective, approaches should be flexible and able 
to accommodate a diverse range of circumstances and conditions. The 
Commission stated that for ``consideration of events beyond the design 
basis, a regulatory approach founded on performance-based requirements 
will foster development of the most effective and efficient, site-
specific mitigation strategies, similar to how the agency approached 
the approval of licensee response strategies for the `loss of large 
area' event'' addressed in 10 CFR 50.54(hh)(2).
    Consistent with the Commission's direction in the SRM for SECY-11-
0124, the NRC is open to flexible, performance-based strategies to 
address onsite emergency response capability requirements. This ANPR is 
structured around questions intended to solicit information that (1) 
supports development of such a framework and (2) supports assembling a 
complete and adequate regulatory basis that enables rulemaking to be 
successful. In this context, commenters should feel free to provide 
feedback on any aspects of onsite emergency response capability that 
would support this ANPR's regulatory objective, whether or not in 
response to a stated ANPR question.

B. Rulemaking Objectives/Success Criteria

    The NRC is considering development of a proposed rule that would 
amend the current onsite emergency response capability requirements. 
Currently, the regulatory and industry approaches to onsite emergency 
response capability are fragmented into the separate strategies that 
were discussed in Section III of this document. By promulgation of an 
onsite emergency response capability rule, the NRC would be able to 
establish regulations that, when implemented by licensees, would 
strengthen and integrate the various onsite emergency response 
strategies. Specifically, the proposed requirements for onsite 
emergency response capability would strive to accomplish the following 
goals:
    1. Ensure that effective transitions are developed between the 
various accident mitigating procedures (EOPs, SAMGs, and EDMGs) so that 
overall strategies are coherent and comprehensive.
    2. Ensure that command and control strategies for large scale 
events are based on the best understanding of severe accident 
progression and effective mitigation strategies, and well defined in 
order to promote effective decision-making at all levels and develop 
organizational flexibility to respond to unforeseen events.
    3. Ensure that the key personnel relied upon to implement these 
procedures and strategies are trained, qualified, and evaluated in 
their accident mitigation roles.
    4. Ensure that accident mitigating procedures, training, and 
exercises are appropriately standardized throughout the industry and 
are adequately documented and maintained.
    The NRC is seeking stakeholders' views on the following specific 
regulatory objectives:
    1. What is the preferred regulatory approach to addressing NTTF 
Recommendation 8?
    For example:
    a. Should the NRC develop a new rule, or could the requirements 
that would provide for a more strengthened and integrated response 
capability be accomplished by a method other than a rulemaking? Provide 
a discussion that supports your position.
    b. If a new rule is developed, what type of supporting document 
would be most effective for providing guidance on the new requirements? 
Provide a discussion that supports your position.
    2. The NTTF recommendation for emergency response procedures 
stressed that the EOP guidelines should be revised to establish 
effective transitions between EOPs, SAMGs, and EDMGs in

[[Page 23164]]

an effort to promote a more integrated approach to onsite emergency 
response. The NRC is interested in stakeholder opinions on the best 
course of action for revising and maintaining these procedures to 
accomplish this objective. For example:
    a. Should the SAMGs be standardized throughout the industry? If so, 
describe how the procedures should be developed, and discuss what level 
of regulatory review would be appropriate. Should there be two sets of 
standard SAMGs, one applicable to pressurized water reactors (PWRs) and 
one applicable to boiling water reactors (BWRs), or should SAMGs be 
developed for the various plant designs in a manner similar to EOPs? 
Provide a discussion that supports your position.
    b. What is the best approach to ensure that procedural guidance for 
beyond design basis events is based on sound science, coherent, and 
integrated? What is the most effective strategy for linking the EOPs 
with the SAMGs and EDMGs? Should the transition from EOPs to SAMGs be 
based on key safety functions, or should the SAMGs be developed in a 
manner that addresses a series of events that are beyond a plant's 
design basis? Provide a discussion that supports your position.
    c. The NTTF Recommendation 8 strongly advised that the plant 
owners' groups should undertake revision of the accident mitigating 
procedures to avoid having each licensee develop its own approach. Is 
this the best course of action? What additional scenarios or accident 
plans should be considered for addition to SAMG technical guidelines as 
a result of the lessons learned in Japan? Provide a discussion that 
supports your position.
    d. In the SRM for SECY-11-0137, the Commission directed the NRC 
staff to consider the November 2011 INPO report, INPO-11-005, in the 
development of the technical bases for Recommendation 8. How should 
this document be used by industry in developing SAMGs and the NRC in 
developing any proposed regulatory changes? Provide a discussion that 
supports your position.
    e. Should there be a requirement for the SAMGs and EDMGs to be 
maintained as controlled procedures in accordance with licensee quality 
assurance programs? Provide a discussion that supports your position.
    f. Should the SAMGs and EDMGs be added to the ``Administrative 
Controls'' section of licensee technical specifications? Provide a 
discussion that supports your position.
    g. In a letter dated October 13, 2011 (ML11284A136), the Advisory 
Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS) recommended that Recommendation 
8 be expanded to include fire response procedures. In their letter, 
ACRS stated that some plant-specific fire response procedures can 
direct operators to perform actions that may be inconsistent with the 
EOPs, and that experience has shown that parallel execution of fire 
response procedures, abnormal operating procedures, and EOPs can be 
difficult and complex. Should efforts to integrate the EOPs, SAMGs, and 
EDMGs include fire response procedures? Are there other procedures that 
should be included in the scope of this work? Provide a discussion that 
supports your position.
    h. What level of effort, in terms of time and financial commitment, 
will be required by the industry to upgrade the accident mitigating 
procedures? If possible, please include estimated milestones and PWR/
BWR cost estimates.
    3. The NTTF established the identification of clear command and 
control strategies as an essential aspect of Recommendation 8. What 
methodology would be best for ensuring that command and control for 
beyond design basis events is well defined? For example:
    a. Should separate procedures be developed that clearly establish 
the command and control structures for large-scale events? Should 
defined roles and responsibilities be included in technical 
specifications along with associated training and qualification 
requirements? Provide a discussion that supports your position.
    b. Should the command and control approach be standardized 
throughout the industry or left for individual licensees to define? 
Provide a discussion that supports your position.
    c. What level of effort, in terms of time and financial commitment, 
will be required by the industry to develop these command and control 
strategies? If possible, please include estimated milestones and PWR/
BWR cost estimates.
    4. As the guidelines for accident mitigating procedures are revised 
and the command and control strategies are developed, personnel who 
will be implementing these procedures must be adequately trained, 
qualified, and evaluated. What would be the best approach for ensuring 
that the personnel relied upon to implement the revised procedures are 
proficient in the use of the procedures, maintain adequate knowledge of 
the systems referenced in these procedures, and can effectively make 
decisions, establish priorities, and direct actions in an emergency 
situation? For example:
    a. Should a systems approach to training be developed to identify 
key tasks that would be performed by the various roles identified in 
the new strategies? Provide a discussion that supports your position.
    b. Should the current emergency drill and exercise requirements be 
revised to ensure that the strategies developed as a result of this 
ANPR will be evaluated in greater depth? Provide a discussion that 
supports your position.
    c. Should the revised accident mitigating procedures, specifically 
SAMGs and EDMGs, be added to the knowledge and abilities catalogs for 
initial reactor operator licenses? Provide a discussion that supports 
your position.
    d. What level of plant expertise should be demonstrated by the 
personnel assigned to key positions outlined by the accident mitigation 
guidelines and command and control strategy? Should these personnel be 
required to be licensed or certified on the plant design? Provide a 
discussion that supports your position.
    e. What training requirements should be developed to ensure 
emergency directors and other key decision-makers have the command and 
control skills needed to effectively implement an accident mitigation 
strategy? Provide a discussion that supports your position.
    f. What should the qualification process entail for key personnel 
identified in the new strategies? How would this qualification process 
ensure proficiency? Provide a discussion that supports your position.
    g. What level of effort, in terms of time and financial commitment, 
will be required by the industry to develop and implement these 
training, qualification, and evaluation requirements? If possible, 
please include estimated milestones and PWR/BWR cost estimates.

C. Applicability to NRC Licenses and Approvals

    The NRC would apply the new onsite emergency response capability 
requirements to power reactors, both currently operating and new 
reactors, and would like stakeholder feedback.
    Accordingly, the NRC envisions that the requirements would apply to 
the following:
     Nuclear power plants currently licensed under 10 CFR part 
50;
     Nuclear power plants currently being constructed under 
construction permits issued under 10 CFR part 50, or whose construction 
permits may be reinstated;

[[Page 23165]]

     Future nuclear power plants whose construction permits and 
operating licenses are issued under 10 CFR part 50; and
     Current and future nuclear power plants licensed under 10 
CFR part 52.

D. Relationship Between Recommendation 8 and Other Near-Term Task Force 
Recommendations

    The NRC notes that there is a close relationship between the onsite 
emergency response capability requirements under consideration in this 
ANPR effort and several other near-term actions stemming from the NTTF 
report (and identified in SECY-11-0124 and SECY-11-0137). Regulatory 
actions taken in response to these other activities might impact 
efforts to amend onsite accident mitigating procedures and training. In 
this regard:
    1. What is the best regulatory structure for integrating the onsite 
emergency response capability requirements with other post-Fukushima 
regulatory actions, such that there is a full, coherent integration of 
the requirements?
    2. Recommendations 4.1 and 4.2 address SBO regulatory actions and 
mitigation strategies for beyond design basis external events, 
respectively. The implementation strategies developed in response to 
Recommendations 4.1 and 4.2 will require corresponding procedures. The 
NRC recognizes the need for coordinating efforts under Recommendations 
4.1, 4.2, and 8. What is the best way to integrate these three 
regulatory efforts to ensure that they account for the others' 
requirements, yet do not unduly overlap or inadvertently introduce 
redundancy, inconsistency, or incoherency?
    3. Recommendation 9.3 addresses staffing during a multiunit event 
with an SBO. Should staffing levels change as a result of a revised 
onsite emergency response capability or should these duties be assigned 
to existing staff?
    4. Recommendation 10.2 addresses command and control structure and 
qualifications for the licensee's decision-makers for beyond design 
basis events. Should this recommendation be addressed concurrently with 
Recommendation 8?

E. Interim Regulatory Actions

    The NRC recognizes that implementation of multiple post-Fukushima 
requirements could be a challenge for licensees and requests feedback 
on how best to implement multiple requirements, specifically onsite 
emergency response capability requirements, without adversely impacting 
licensees' effectiveness and efficiency. It will take several years to 
issue a final rule. Should the NRC use other regulatory vehicles (such 
as commitment letters or confirmatory action letters) to put in place 
interim coping strategies for onsite emergency response capabilities 
while rulemaking proceeds?

V. Public Meeting

    The NRC plans to hold a category 3 public meeting with stakeholders 
during the ANPR public comment period. The public meeting is intended 
as a forum to discuss the ANPR with external stakeholders and provide 
information on the feedback requested in the ANPR to support 
development of onsite emergency response capability requirements.
    The meeting is not intended to solicit comment. Instead, the NRC 
will encourage stakeholders at the meeting to provide feedback in 
written form during the ANPR comment period. To support full 
participation of stakeholders, the NRC staff plans to provide 
teleconferencing and Webinar access for the public meeting. Since the 
intent of the meeting is not to solicit or accept comments, the meeting 
will not be transcribed. The NRC will issue the public meeting notice 
10 calendar days before the public meeting.
    Stakeholders should monitor the NRC's public meeting Web site for 
information about the public meeting: http://www.nrc.gov/public 
involve/public-meetings/index.cfm.

VI. Rulemaking Process and Schedule

    Stakeholders should recognize that the NRC is not obligated to 
provide detailed comment responses to feedback provided in response to 
this ANPR. If the NRC develops a regulatory basis sufficient to support 
a proposed rule, there will be an opportunity for additional public 
comment when the regulatory basis and the proposed rule are published. 
If supporting guidance is developed for the proposed rule, stakeholders 
will have an opportunity to provide feedback on the implementing 
guidance.

VII. Related Petition for Rulemaking Action

    The NTTF report provided a specific proposal for onsite emergency 
actions that was subsequently endorsed by the National Resources 
Defense Council (NRDC) in a petition for rulemaking (PRM), PRM-50-102 
(76 FR 58165; September 20, 2011), as a way to address licensee 
training and exercises. In connection with NTTF Recommendation 8.4, 
``Onsite emergency actions,'' the NRDC requested in its petition that 
the NRC ``institute a rulemaking proceeding applicable to nuclear 
facilities licensed under 10 CFR 50, 52, and other applicable 
regulations to require more realistic, hands-on training and exercises 
on Severe Accident Mitigation [sic] Guidelines (SAMGs) and Extreme 
Damage Mitigation Guidelines (EDMGs) for licensee staff expected to 
implement the strategies and those licensee staff expected to make 
decisions during emergencies, including emergency coordinators and 
emergency directors.'' The Commission has established a process for 
addressing a number of the recommendations in the NTTF Report, and the 
NRC determined that the issues raised in PRM-50-102 are appropriate for 
consideration and will be considered in this Recommendation 8 
rulemaking. Persons interested in the NRC's actions on PRM-50-102 may 
follow the NRC's activities at www.regulations.gov by searching on 
Docket ID NRC-2012-0031.

VIII. Available Supporting Documents

    The following documents provide additional background and 
supporting information regarding this activity and corresponding 
technical basis. The documents can be found in ADAMS. Instructions for 
accessing ADAMS are in the ADDRESSES section of this document.

------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                         ADAMS Accession
                                                         Number/Federal
             Date                      Document             Register
                                                            Citation
------------------------------------------------------------------------
April 4, 1990.................  Generic Letter 88-20,        ML031200551
                                 Supplement 2,
                                 ``Accident Management
                                 Strategies for
                                 Consideration in the
                                 Individual Plant
                                 Examination Process''.
August 28, 2007...............  Appendix A to 10 CFR         72 FR 49505
                                 part 50--General
                                 Design Criteria for
                                 Nuclear Power Plants.
August 28, 2007...............  Final Rule: Licenses,        72 FR 49352
                                 Certifications, and
                                 Approvals for Nuclear
                                 Power Plants.
March 27, 2009................  Final Rule: Power            74 FR 13926
                                 Reactor Security
                                 Requirements.

[[Page 23166]]

 
March 23, 2011................  Memorandum from              ML110950110
                                 Chairman Jaczko on
                                 Tasking Memorandum-
                                 COMGBJ-11-0002--NRC
                                 Actions Following the
                                 Events in Japan.
April 29, 2011................  Temporary Instruction        ML11115A053
                                 2515/184,
                                 Availability and
                                 Readiness Inspection
                                 of Severe Accident
                                 Management Guidelines
                                 (SAMGs).
May 26, 2011..................  Completion of                ML111470264
                                 Temporary Instruction
                                 2515/184,
                                 Availability and
                                 Readiness Inspection
                                 of Severe Accident
                                 Mitigation Guidelines
                                 (SAMGs), at Region IV
                                 Reactor Facilities.
May 27, 2011..................  Region I Completion of       ML111470361
                                 Temporary Instruction
                                 (TI)-184,
                                 Availability and
                                 Readiness Inspection
                                 of Severe Accident
                                 Mitigation Guidelines
                                 (SAMGs).
June 1, 2011..................  Completion of                ML111520396
                                 Temporary Instruction
                                 (TI) 2515/184,
                                 Availability and
                                 Readiness Inspection
                                 of Severe Accident
                                 Management Guidelines
                                 (SAMGs) at Region III
                                 Sites--Revision.
June 2, 2011..................  Completion of                ML111530328
                                 Temporary Instruction
                                 (TI) 184,
                                 Availability and
                                 Readiness Inspection
                                 of Severe Accident
                                 Mitigation Guidelines
                                 (SAMGS) at Region II
                                 Facilities--Revision.
July 12, 2011.................  SECY-11-0093--``The          ML11186A959
                                 Near-Term Task Force        ML111861807
                                 Review of Insights          (Enclosure)
                                 from the Fukushima
                                 Dai-ichi Accident''.
August 19, 2011...............  SRM-SECY-11-0093--Near-      ML112310021
                                 Term Report and
                                 Recommendations for
                                 Agency Actions
                                 Following the Events
                                 in Japan.
September 9, 2011.............  SECY-11-0124,                ML11245A127
                                 ``Recommended Actions       ML11245A144
                                 to be Taken Without         (Enclosure)
                                 Delay from the Near-
                                 Term Task Force
                                 Report.''.
October 3, 2011...............  SECY-11-0137,                ML11269A204
                                 ``Prioritization of         ML11272A203
                                 Recommended Actions         (Enclosure)
                                 to be Taken in
                                 Response to Fukushima
                                 Lessons Learned.''.
October 18, 2011..............  Staff Requirements           ML112911571
                                 Memorandum--SECY-11-0
                                 124--Recommended
                                 Actions to be Taken
                                 Without Delay From
                                 The Near-Term Task
                                 Force Report.
July 26, 2011.................  NRDC's Petition for          ML11216A242
                                 Rulemaking to Require
                                 More Realistic
                                 Training on Severe
                                 Accident Mitigation
                                 Guidelines (PRM 50-
                                 102).
September 14, 2011............  Letter to Geoffrey H.        ML112700269
                                 Fettus, Natural
                                 Resources Defense
                                 Council, Inc. from
                                 Annette Vietti-Cook,
                                 In Regards to the NRC
                                 Will Not Be
                                 Instituting a Public
                                 Comment Period for
                                 PRM-50-97, PRM-50-98,
                                 PRM-50-99, PRM-50-
                                 100, PRM-50-101, and
                                 PRM-50-102.
October 13, 2011..............  Initial ACRS Review          ML11284A136
                                 of: (1) The NRC Near-
                                 Term Task Force
                                 Report on Fukushima
                                 and (2) Staff's
                                 Recommended Actions
                                 to be Taken Without
                                 Delay.
November 30, 2011.............  INPO-11-005, Special         ML11347A454
                                 Report on the Nuclear
                                 Accident at the
                                 Fukushima Dai-ichi
                                 Nuclear Power Station.
December 15, 2011.............  Staff Requirements           ML113490055
                                 Memorandum--SECY-11-0
                                 137--Prioritization
                                 of Recommended
                                 Actions to be Taken
                                 in Response to the
                                 Fukushima Lessons-
                                 Learned.
March 14, 2012................  Summary of the Public        ML12073A283
                                 Meeting to Discuss
                                 Implementation of
                                 Near-Term Task Force
                                 Recommendation 8,
                                 Strengthening and
                                 Integration of Onsite
                                 Emergency Response
                                 Capabilities Such As
                                 EOPS, SAMGS, and
                                 EDMGS, Related to the
                                 Fukushima Dai-ichi
                                 Power Plant Accident.
------------------------------------------------------------------------


    Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 4th day of April 2012.

    For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Michael F. Weber,
Acting Executive Director for Operations.
[FR Doc. 2012-9336 Filed 4-17-12; 8:45 am]
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