[Federal Register Volume 77, Number 147 (Tuesday, July 31, 2012)]
[Notices]
[Pages 45417-45418]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2012-18571]
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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration
[Docket No. PHMSA-2012-0176]
Pipeline Safety: Inspection and Protection of Pipeline Facilities
After Railway Accidents
AGENCY: Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA);
DOT.
[[Page 45418]]
ACTION: Notice; Issuance of Advisory Bulletin.
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SUMMARY: PHMSA is issuing an advisory bulletin to alert all pipeline
owners and operators of the circumstances of the Cherry Valley,
Illinois derailment and remind them of the importance of assuring that
pipeline facilities have not been damaged either during a railroad
accident or other event occurring in the right-of-way. Further, the
advisory bulletin reminds pipeline owners and operators of the
importance of providing pertinent information to rail operators and
emergency response officials during an incident. This information
should include the presence, depth and location of the pipelines so
that the movement of heavy equipment and debris on the right-of-way
does not damage or rupture the pipeline or otherwise pose a hazard to
people working in, and around, the accident location. The advisory also
encourages pipeline owners and operators to inform rail operators and
emergency response officials of the benefits of using the 811 ``Call
Before You Dig'' program to identify and notify underground utilities
that an incident has occurred in the vicinity of their buried
facilities.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: David Appelbaum by phone at 202-366-
1419 or by email at [email protected]. Information about PHMSA
may be found at http://phmsa.dot.gov.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Background
On Friday, June 19, 2009, at approximately 8:36 p.m., CST, a
Canadian National Railway Company (CN) freight train U7069l-l8,
traveling eastbound at 36 mph, derailed at a highway/rail grade
crossing in Cherry Valley, Illinois. The train consisted of two
locomotives and 114 cars, 19 of which derailed. All of the derailed
cars were tank cars carrying denatured fuel ethanol, a flammable
liquid. Thirteen of the derailed tank cars were breached or lost
product and caught fire. At the time of the derailment, several motor
vehicles were stopped on either side of the grade crossing waiting for
the train to pass. As a result of the fire that erupted after the
derailment, a passenger in one of the stopped cars was fatally injured,
two passengers in the same car received serious injuries, and five
occupants of other cars waiting at the highway-rail crossing were
injured. Two responding firefighters also sustained minor injuries. The
release of ethanol and the resulting fire prompted a mandatory
evacuation of about 600 residences within a \l/2\-mile radius of the
accident site.
The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) determined that the
probable cause of the accident was the washout of the track structure
that was discovered about one hour before the train's arrival, and CN's
failure to notify the train crew of the known washout in time to stop
the train because of the inadequacy of CN's emergency communication
procedures.
At the site of the derailment was a 12-inch diameter underground
natural gas transmission pipeline operated by Nicor Gas. The pipeline
well exceeded Federal standards for protective ground cover. Yet, as
the wreckage was removed from above the pipeline, Nicor's crews
discovered that a railcar wheel and axle assembly had impinged on the
pipeline. Although the pipeline was buried about 11 feet deep and
protected within a 16-inch diameter casing, the rail car wheels
impacted and severely dented the pipeline. The impact caused a severe
flattening of the pipe casing with sharp angular bends at two locations
where it was contacted by the rail car wheel assembly. This degree of
deformation to the 16-inch casing pipe likely caused similar damage to
the 12-inch carrier pipe. The NTSB concluded that had the gas pipeline
been installed at the railroad crossing with the minimum level of
ground cover permitted by the current Federal and industry pipeline
construction standards, it likely would have failed as a result of
being struck by derailed equipment in this accident.
Advisory Bulletin (ADB-2012-08)
To: Owners and Operators of Hazardous Liquid and Gas Pipeline
Systems.
Subject: Inspection and Protection of Pipeline Facilities after
Railway Accidents.
Advisory: To further enhance the Department's safety efforts, PHMSA
is issuing this advisory bulletin as a reminder for pipeline owners and
operators to appropriately inspect and protect pipeline facilities
following railroad accidents that occur in pipeline right-of-ways.
As illustrated in the June 19, 2009, Cherry Valley, Illinois train
derailment, buried pipelines are susceptible to damage even when depth-
of-cover protection exceeds minimum Federal requirements. Pipeline
owners and operators should inspect their facilities following a
railroad accident or other significant event occurring in right-of-ways
to ensure pipeline integrity. Also, during response operations,
pipeline owners and operators need to inform rail operators and
emergency response officials of the presence, depth and location of the
pipelines so that the movement of heavy equipment on the right-of-way
does not damage or rupture the pipeline or otherwise pose a hazard to
people working in, and around, the accident location.
Additionally, PHMSA encourages pipeline owners and operators, as a
part of their public awareness program, to inform rail operators and
emergency response officials of the benefits of using the 811 ``Call
Before You Dig'' program to identify and notify underground utilities
that an incident has occurred in the vicinity of their buried
facilities.
Linda Daugherty,
Deputy Associate Administrator for Policy and Programs.
[FR Doc. 2012-18571 Filed 7-30-12; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-60-P