[Federal Register Volume 77, Number 237 (Monday, December 10, 2012)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 73282-73286]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2012-29469]
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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Federal Aviation Administration
14 CFR Part 39
[Docket No. FAA-2012-0186; Directorate Identifier 2011-NM-268-AD;
Amendment 39-17278; AD 2012-24-08]
RIN 2120-AA64
Airworthiness Directives; The Boeing Company Airplanes
AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT.
ACTION: Final rule.
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SUMMARY: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain
The Boeing Company Model 737-600, -700, -700C, -800, -900, and -900ER
series airplanes. This AD was prompted by reports of flight crew
failure to activate air data probe heat. This AD requires modifying the
anti-icing system for the angle of attack sensor, the total air
temperature, and the pitot probes. We are issuing this AD to prevent
ice from forming on air data system sensors and consequent loss of or
misleading airspeed indication on all airspeed indicating systems,
which could lead to loss of control of the airplane.
DATES: This AD is effective January 14, 2013.
The Director of the Federal Register approved the incorporation by
reference of a certain publication listed in the AD as of January 14,
2013.
ADDRESSES: For service information identified in this AD, contact
Boeing Commercial Airplanes, Attention: Data & Services Management,
P.O. Box 3707, MC 2H-65, Seattle, WA 98124-2207; telephone 206-544-
5000, extension 1; fax 206-766-5680; Internet https://www.myboeingfleet.com. You may review copies of the referenced service
information at the FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind
Avenue SW., Renton, WA. For information on the availability of this
material at the FAA, call 425-227-1221.
Examining the AD Docket
You may examine the AD docket on the Internet at http://www.regulations.gov; or in person at the Docket Management Facility
between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal
holidays. The AD docket contains this AD, the regulatory evaluation,
any comments received, and other information. The address for the
Docket Office (phone: 800-647-5527) is Document Management Facility,
U.S. Department of Transportation, Docket Operations, M-30, West
Building Ground Floor, Room W12-140, 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE.,
Washington, DC 20590.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Frank Carreras, Aerospace Engineer,
Systems and Equipment Branch, ANM-130S, FAA, Seattle Aircraft
Certification Office (ACO), 1601 Lind Avenue SW., Renton, WA 98057-
3356; phone: 425-917-6442; fax: 425-917-6590; email:
[email protected].
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Discussion
We issued a notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) to amend 14 CFR
part 39 to include an AD that would apply to the specified products.
That NPRM published in the Federal Register on February 28, 2012 (77 FR
11789). That NPRM proposed to require modifying the anti-icing system
for the angle of attack sensor, the total air temperature, and the
pitot probes.
Actions Since Issuance of NPRM (77 FR 11789, February 28, 2012)
Since we issued the NPRM (77 FR 11789, February 28, 2012), we
reviewed Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 737-30A1063, Revision 1, dated
July 10, 2012. (The NPRM referred to Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 737-
30A1063, dated November 16, 2011.) Among other things, Boeing Alert
Service Bulletin 737-30A1063, Revision 1, dated July 10, 2012, updates
certain information, including part numbers, various accomplishment
steps, certain modules, maintenance manuals, and kit information.
Comments
We gave the public the opportunity to participate in developing
this AD. The following presents the comments received on the proposal
(77 FR 11789, February 28, 2012) and the FAA's response to each
comment. Aviation Partners Boeing stated that installation of winglets
per STC ST00830SE does not affect the NPRM and stated it would provide
supporting data to the FAA upon request.
Request To Revise Compliance Time
Seven commenters requested that we revise the 24-month compliance
time, as proposed in the NPRM (77 FR 11789, February 28, 2012).
Korean Air Lines (KAL), Air Pacific Limited (APC), Delta Air Lines,
Inc. (DAL), American Airlines (AAL), United Airlines (UAL), and
Southwest Airlines (SWA) requested we extend the compliance time. UAL
and AAL requested we take into account the time needed to obtain
modification kits and
[[Page 73283]]
to modify the panels. SWA and AAL stated that the compliance time will
result in unscheduled maintenance outside of a heavy maintenance cycle.
SWA stated unscheduled maintenance visits could last up to four days
outside of a heavy maintenance cycle. APC noted it would not be able to
accomplish the actions during this year's C-checks, which are at 2-year
intervals.
Turkish Airlines (THY) stated that the proposed 24-month compliance
time may not be enough for fleet-wide retrofit since the P5-9 panel
modification restricts the rate of aircraft modification. KAL requested
that the compliance time be extend to 30 or more months. DAL requested
that the compliance time be extended to 36 months due to several
factors. DAL cited the rate at which operators can complete the
modification, expected late kit release based on revisions in service
information linked to the service bulletin validation process, and
``flawed'' service information. DAL also compared the modification
specified in this NPRM (77 FR 11789, February 28, 2012) with a similar
modification that installs warning lights to the P1-3 and P3-1 panels,
and stated that this similar modification has a 36-month compliance
time.
We disagree with these requests to extend the compliance time. In
developing an appropriate compliance time for these actions, we
considered the urgency associated with the subject unsafe condition,
the practical aspect of accomplishing the required modification and the
normal scheduled maintenance times for most affected operators. In
consideration of these items, as well as parts availability, we have
determined that the 24-month compliance time for the modification is
the longest duration allowable that will ensure an acceptable level of
safety. According to the provisions of paragraph (i) of this AD,
however, we may approve requests to adjust the compliance time if the
requests include data substantiating that the new compliance time would
provide an acceptable level of safety. We have not changed the final
rule regarding this issue.
Request To Include an Alerting System
Air Line Pilots Association International (ALPA) requested that we
revise the NPRM (77 FR 11789, February 28, 2012) by including an
alerting system as part of the proposed requirements. ALPA stated that
any automatic system design must include a crew alerting system to
provide the flight crew with an aural and visual indication if the
heating system does not automatically activate or is not functioning
properly. ALPA further states that human factors principles should be
integrated into a warning system design to ensure that factors such as
pilot field of view and nuisance warnings due to normal ground
operations (e.g., single engine taxi) are fully evaluated. ALPA stated
that Boeing Model 747-400 airplanes have an automatic system and this
system provides crews with an engine indicating and crew alerting
system (EICAS) message if any item in the air data probe suite is not
being heated, either due to heating element failure or if the system
fails to activate upon engine start. ALPA reasoned that a similar
alerting system should be included in the proposed system for Model 737
airplanes.
We agree that if the heating system does not automatically activate
or is not functioning properly, the flight crew should receive an
alert. We also agree that human factors principles should be considered
in an alert system design. These principles are consistent with FAA
regulations, policy, and guidance.
However, we disagree with revising this AD to include changes to
the flight crew alerting for pitot heat malfunctions on Model 737
airplanes because that model incorporates ``CAPT PITOT'' and ``F/O
PITOT'' caution lights on the P5-9 overhead panel for the captain's and
first officer's probe heat. Both caution lights are tied to a Master
Caution light in each pilot's primary field of view and an ``Anti-ice''
caution light that alerts the pilots to check the overhead panel for
the specific condition causing the Master Caution and ``Anti-ice''
lights to illuminate. The captain's and/or first officer's PITOT light
will illuminate whenever a loss of electrical current flow is sensed
through the respective pitot probe heater. The practical effect of the
change to automatic probe heat activation is that when the probe heat
switch is in AUTO, the respective PITOT light should be out when either
engine is running. Therefore, if the switch is in AUTO and the
corresponding PITOT light remains on with either engine running, a
malfunction of the automatic activation system is indicated.
Flight crew procedures for both normal and non-normal operation of
the pitot heat system are unaffected by this change. We have determined
that the existing flight crew alerting for pitot heat malfunctions
provides adequate flight crew alerting for pitot heat malfunctions on
Model 737 airplanes, whether the system is manually or automatically
activated. Furthermore, since probe heat is activated with the probe
heat switch in AUTO when either engine is running, single engine taxi
should not generate nuisance warnings; a PITOT light during single
engine taxi would indicate a malfunction of the automatic activation
system. No change to the final rule is necessary in this regard.
Request To Revise Precipitating Event Language
Boeing requested we revise the sentence in the Summary section of
the NPRM (77 FR 11789, February 28, 2012) that describes the
precipitating event, i.e., ``reports of flight crew failure to activate
air data probe heat.'' Boeing suggested that the phrase ``as required
by the FAA approved operating procedures'' be added to the end of the
sentence in question. Boeing reasoned that the suggested text would
make it clear that existing Boeing Model 737NG operating procedures are
FAA-approved and that the flight crew failed to perform a required
action.
We disagree with the commenter's request to revise the language
that describes the precipitating event. Regardless of whether the
flight crew adhered to prescribed operating procedures, we consider
that failure to activate the air data probe heat on the part of the
flight crew represents an unacceptable risk to the affected airplanes,
as evidenced by the current lack of an automatic probe heat activation
system in combination with the demonstrated accident and incident
history on the type associated with failure to activate probe heat. In
addition, the purpose of this AD is to identify and correct an unsafe
condition in the type design of the affected airplanes. We find that
the precipitating event statement is accurate as originally worded in
the NPRM (77 FR 11789, February 28, 2012). We have not made any change
to the final rule in this regard.
Request To Revise Unsafe Condition Statement
Boeing requested we revise the unsafe condition statement in the
Summary section, Discussion section, and paragraph (e) of the NPRM (77
FR 11789, February 28, 2012). Boeing stated that the text ``* * * which
could lead to loss of control of the airplane'' should read, ``* * *
which would not provide the necessary air data instrumentation to
safely fly the airplane.'' Boeing stated that loss of, or erroneous,
airspeed indications do not necessarily lead to loss of control because
other indications can be used to safely fly the airplane. Boeing noted
that multiple in-service
[[Page 73284]]
events have occurred without loss of control when the flight crew
followed the procedures that mitigate loss of air data.
We disagree with the commenter's request to revise the unsafe
condition statement. Although some in-service events might have
occurred without loss of control, loss of, or misleading airspeed
indication on all airspeed indicating systems can, in fact, lead to an
unsafe condition of loss of airplane control. FAA Advisory Circular
(AC) 25-11A, ``Electronic Flight Deck Displays,'' dated June 21, 2007
(http://rgl.faa.gov/Regulatory--and--Guidance--Library/
rgAdvisoryCircular.nsf/0/7d6139991c94e7d9862573080063f84d/$FILE/
AC%2025-11A.pdf), typically classifies loss of all airspeed displays
(including the standby display) as a ``catastrophic'' failure
condition. ``Catastrophic'' is defined in FAA AC 25.1309-1A, ``System
Design and Analysis,'' dated June 21, 1988 (http://rgl.faa.gov/
Regulatory--and--Guidance--Library/rgAdvisoryCircular.nsf/0/
50bfe03b65af9ea3862569d100733174/$FILE/AC25.1309-1A.pdf) as a failure
condition which would prevent continued safe flight and landing. FAA AC
25-11A also classifies display of misleading airspeed information on
one primary display combined with a standby failure (i.e., loss of
airspeed or incorrect airspeed) as a ``catastrophic'' failure
condition. As specified in National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB)
Safety Recommendation A-07-56, dated September 13, 2007 (http://www.ntsb.gov/doclib/recletters/2007/a07_55_56.pdf), in at least one
in-service event on a Boeing Model 737 airplane, it was determined that
this condition ultimately resulted in a loss of airplane control with
fatal injuries.
In addition, we agree with Boeing's identification of the effects
of unreliable air data, as given in the Background section of Boeing
Alert Service Bulletin 737-30A1063, dated November 16, 2011; and
Revision 1, dated July 10, 2012. For these reasons, we find that the
unsafe condition statement is accurate as originally worded in the NPRM
(77 FR 11789, February 28, 2012). We have not made any change to the
final rule in this regard.
Request To Revise Discussion Section of the NPRM (77 FR 11789, February
28, 2012)
Boeing requested we revise certain text in the Discussion section
of the NPRM (77 FR 11789, February 28, 2012):
To indicate existing compliance of pitot heat alerting
with section 25.1326 of the Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR
25.1326);
To indicate failure of the flight crew to respond properly
to the amber caution-level indication of a lack of probe heat; and
To state that the indication is in clear view of a flight
crew member. Boeing stated the changes are needed for the following
reasons:
To correctly state that the system provides indication of
a lack of probe heat activation, as required by section 25.1326 of the
Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR 25.1326), rather than a positive
indication of heat activation, as stated by the FAA (and which would
not be compliant);
To make it clear that the existing indication is
compliant;
To correct the ``blameless'' tone of the passive voice
used in the first sentence of the Discussion section by making it clear
that it is only the flight crew that can fail to activate the probe
heat, which is one of the advantages of a manual system; and
To make it explicit that the unsafe condition is not only
a result of flight crew failure to activate the probe heat, but also a
result of the flight crew ignoring the caution-level indication that is
in plain view.
Since the Discussion section of the NPRM (77 FR 11789, February 28,
2012) is not restated in the final rule, we cannot change that section.
However, we find that clarification is necessary.
According to section 39.5 of the Federal Aviation Regulations (14
CFR 39.5), we issue ADs when we find that an unsafe condition exists in
the product, and that the unsafe condition is likely to exist or
develop in other products of the same type design. We made such a
finding with respect to the pitot heat system of the affected airplanes
in this AD action. Therefore, it is our responsibility to correct the
unsafe condition independent of whether the design was considered
compliant to applicable airworthiness standards; an AD is the
appropriate vehicle for doing so.
Additionally, we do not make findings for the incidents identified
in safety recommendations issued by the National Transportation Safety
Board (NTSB). We do not have any information that supports the argument
that the flight crews involved in the incidents identified in the NTSB
safety recommendation deliberately disregarded a properly functioning
pitot heat alert that they had observed. Many possible scenarios
associated with pitot heat alerting could contribute to the failure of
the flight crew to activate the probe heat; including a malfunction of
probe heat alerting resulting in failure to provide an indication of
lack of activation, the flight crew not observing or properly
identifying the alert due to various factors (even though certain
elements of the alerting system are within the pilots' primary field of
view), or the flight crew not understanding the meaning of the alert or
the proper procedures for responding to it.
We have not made any changes to the final rule in this regard.
Request To Revise Cost Estimate
AAL, DAL, and SWA requested that we revise the cost estimate of the
NPRM (77 FR 11789, February 28, 2012). AAL stated the NPRM and service
information underestimate the labor cost by greater than 50 percent.
AAL stated that additional out-of-service days and lost opportunity
cost should be included in the Cost of Compliance section of the NPRM.
DAL stated there is a significant investment in excess of $250,000 in
``seed'' modules that are necessary to minimize the risk of not
accomplishing the proposed changes. DAL concluded that this cost is not
represented in the Costs of Compliance of the NPRM. SWA stated the
expected labor cost is underestimated by 32 work-hours due to removal
and reinstallation of lavatory A and galley 1.
We partially agree with the commenters' request to revise the cost
estimate. We do not agree to change the AD to accommodate the
investment in ``seed'' modules, since this appears to be an operator-
specific cost associated with individual maintenance scheduling. Also,
we disagree that the cost estimate is underestimated by greater than 50
percent. However, we revised the Costs of Compliance section of this AD
as follows. We revised the parts cost to match the information
presented in Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 737-30A1063, Revision 1,
dated July 10, 2012. In addition, we included 30 additional work-hours
for removing and reinstalling lavatory and galley monuments that might
be necessary to do the modification. This information was coordinated
with Boeing.
Request To Reference Revised Service Information
Several commenters noted that Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 737-
30A1063, dated November 16, 2011, is inadequate. That service
information is cited in the NPRM (77 FR 11789, February 28, 2012) as
the appropriate source of service information for accomplishing the
required actions. The commenters requested that the service information
[[Page 73285]]
be revised to incorporate certain clarifications. One airline, DAL,
specifically requested that the final rule not be released until the
service information has been validated.
We agree. As explained previously, Boeing Alert Service Bulletin
737-30A1063, Revision 1, dated July 10, 2012, has been issued. This
service information has been validated by means of use of an aircraft
in maintenance, and is referenced in this final rule as the appropriate
source of service information. In addition, we added a new paragraph
(h) to this AD (and re-designated subsequent paragraphs) to provide
credit for certain actions performed before the effective date of this
AD using Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 737-30A1063, dated November 16,
2011.
DAL also requested we specify ``revisions to BAE Systems Service
Bulletin 233A3201-30-02'' as approved service information, and provide
contact information for BAE. (The commenter did not specify a revision
level or date for the BAE service information.) DAL stated that its
review of the BAE Systems service information (which provides
instructions on how to modify the P5-9 window/pitot heat module to the
required ON and AUTO pitot heat switch configuration) identified
discrepancies in the Accomplishment Instructions.
DAL provided examples of the identified discrepancies, including
connector identifications and the number of printed wire assemblies on
the P5-9 modules. DAL stated it has contacted Boeing and BAE Systems to
seek resolution of these discrepancies.
DAL added that BAE concurred that its service information will
require revision. DAL indicated that additional revision of the Boeing
service information might be required in light of any BAE Systems
service information revision. DAL noted that the service information,
as currently published, would necessitate that operators request
approval of alternative methods of compliance (AMOC) for resolutions to
the identified discrepancies in order to comply with the final rule.
We find that clarification is necessary. The intent of this AD is
to require installation of a P5-9 module with AUTO and ON pitot heat
switch functionality that supports automatic pitot heat activation. As
discussed previously, we reviewed Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 737-
30A1063, dated November 16, 2011; and Boeing Alert Service Bulletin
737-30A1063, Revision 1, dated July 10, 2012; and determined that this
service information provides sufficient instructions to adequately
correct the unsafe condition. Operators may use either the original
issue or Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 737-30A1063, Revision 1, dated
July 10, 2012, to comply with the AD requirements. However, this AD
does not require accomplishment of the BAE service information. No
change to the final rule is necessary in this regard.
Conclusion
We reviewed the relevant data, considered the comments received,
and determined that air safety and the public interest require adopting
the AD with the changes described previously. We have determined that
these minor changes:
[Agr]re consistent with the intent that was proposed in
the NPRM (77 FR 11789, February 28, 2012) for correcting the unsafe
condition; and
Do not add any additional burden upon the public than was
already proposed in the NPRM (77 FR 11789, February 28, 2012).
We also determined that these changes will not increase the
economic burden on any operator or increase the scope of the AD.
Costs of Compliance
We estimate that this AD affects 1,025 airplanes of U.S. registry.
We estimate the following costs to comply with this AD:
Estimated Costs
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Cost per
Action Labor cost Parts cost product Cost on U.S. operators
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Modification, including 90 to 109 work-hours $6,674 to Up to $17,316.. Up to $17,748,900.
removing and reinstalling x $85 per hour = $8,051.
galleys and lavatories. $7,650 to $9,265.
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Authority for This Rulemaking
Title 49 of the United States Code specifies the FAA's authority to
issue rules on aviation safety. Subtitle I, section 106, describes the
authority of the FAA Administrator. Subtitle VII: Aviation Programs,
describes in more detail the scope of the Agency's authority.
We are issuing this rulemaking under the authority described in
Subtitle VII, Part A, Subpart III, Section 44701: ``General
requirements.'' Under that section, Congress charges the FAA with
promoting safe flight of civil aircraft in air commerce by prescribing
regulations for practices, methods, and procedures the Administrator
finds necessary for safety in air commerce. This regulation is within
the scope of that authority because it addresses an unsafe condition
that is likely to exist or develop on products identified in this
rulemaking action.
Regulatory Findings
This AD will not have federalism implications under Executive Order
13132. This AD will not have a substantial direct effect on the States,
on the relationship between the national government and the States, or
on the distribution of power and responsibilities among the various
levels of government.
For the reasons discussed above, I certify that this AD:
(1) Is not a ``significant regulatory action'' under Executive
Order 12866,
(2) Is not a ``significant rule'' under DOT Regulatory Policies and
Procedures (44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979),
(3) Will not affect intrastate aviation in Alaska, and
(4) Will not have a significant economic impact, positive or
negative, on a substantial number of small entities under the criteria
of the Regulatory Flexibility Act.
List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39
Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation safety, Incorporation by
reference, Safety.
Adoption of the Amendment
Accordingly, under the authority delegated to me by the
Administrator, the FAA amends 14 CFR part 39 as follows:
PART 39--AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES
0
1. The authority citation for part 39 continues to read as follows:
Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701.
[[Page 73286]]
Sec. 39.13 [Amended]
0
2. The FAA amends Sec. 39.13 by adding the following new airworthiness
directive (AD):
2012-24-08 The Boeing Company: Amendment 39-17278; Docket No. FAA-
2012-0186; Directorate Identifier 2011-NM-268-AD.
(a) Effective Date
This AD is effective January 14, 2013.
(b) Affected ADs
None.
(c) Applicability
This AD applies to The Boeing Company Model 737-600, -700, -
700C, -800, -900, and -900ER series airplanes; certificated in any
category; as identified in Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 737-
30A1063, Revision 1, dated July 10, 2012.
(d) Subject
Joint Aircraft System Component (JASC)/Air Transport Association
(ATA) of America Code 3030, Pitot/Static Anti-Ice System.
(e) Unsafe Condition
This AD was prompted by reports of flight crew failure to
activate air data probe heat. We are issuing this AD to prevent ice
from forming on air data system sensors and consequent loss of or
misleading airspeed indication on all airspeed indicating systems,
which could lead to loss of control of the airplane.
(f) Compliance
Comply with this AD within the compliance times specified,
unless already done.
(g) Modification
Within 24 months after the effective date of this AD: Modify the
anti-icing system for the angle of attack sensor, the total air
temperature, and the pitot probes, in accordance with the
Accomplishment Instructions of Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 737-
30A1063, Revision 1, dated July 10, 2012.
(h) Credit for Previous Actions
This paragraph provides credit for actions required by paragraph
(g) of this AD, if those actions were performed before the effective
date of this AD using Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 737-30A1063,
dated November 16, 2011, which is not incorporated by reference in
this AD.
(i) Alternative Methods of Compliance (AMOCs)
(1) The Manager, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office (ACO),
FAA, has the authority to approve AMOCs for this AD, if requested
using the procedures found in 14 CFR 39.19. In accordance with 14
CFR 39.19, send your request to your principal inspector or local
Flight Standards District Office, as appropriate. If sending
information directly to the manager of the ACO, send it to the
attention of the person identified in the Related Information
section of this AD. Information may be emailed to: [email protected].
(2) Before using any approved AMOC, notify your appropriate
principal inspector, or lacking a principal inspector, the manager
of the local flight standards district office/certificate holding
district office.
(j) Related Information
For more information about this AD, contact Frank Carreras,
Aerospace Engineer, Systems and Equipment Branch, ANM-130S, FAA,
Seattle Aircraft Certification Office (ACO), 1601 Lind Avenue SW.,
Renton, WA 98057-3356; phone: 425-917-6442; fax: 425-917-6590;
email: [email protected].
(k) Material Incorporated by Reference
(1) The Director of the Federal Register approved the
incorporation by reference (IBR) of the service information listed
in this paragraph under 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR part 51.
(2) You must use this service information as applicable to do
the actions required by this AD, unless the AD specifies otherwise.
(i) Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 737-30A1063, Revision 1, dated
July 10, 2012.
(ii) Reserved.
(3) For service information identified in this AD, contact
Boeing Commercial Airplanes, Attention: Data & Services Management,
P.O. Box 3707, MC 2H-65, Seattle, WA 98124-2207; telephone 206-544-
5000, extension 1; fax 206-766-5680; Internet https://www.myboeingfleet.com.
(4) You may view this service information at FAA, Transport
Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue SW., Renton, WA. For
information on the availability of this material at the FAA, call
425-227-1221.
(5) You may view this service information that is incorporated
by reference at the National Archives and Records Administration
(NARA). For information on the availability of this material at
NARA, call 202-741-6030, or go to: http://www.archives.gov/federal-register/cfr/ibr-locations.html.
Issued in Renton, Washington, on November 23, 2012.
Ali Bahrami,
Manager, Transport Airplane Directorate, Aircraft Certification
Service.
[FR Doc. 2012-29469 Filed 12-7-12; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-13-P