[Federal Register Volume 77, Number 249 (Friday, December 28, 2012)]
[Notices]
[Pages 76574-76578]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2012-31152]


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SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION

[Release No. 34-68493; File No. SR-NASDAQ-2012-133]


Self-Regulatory Organizations; The NASDAQ Stock Market LLC; 
Notice of Filing and Immediate Effectiveness of Proposed Rule Change to 
Modify a Level 2 Subscriber Fee and Related Rule Clarifications

December 20, 2012.
    Pursuant to Section 19(b)(1) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 
(``Act''),\1\ and Rule 19b-4 thereunder,\2\ notice is hereby given that 
on December 18, 2012, The NASDAQ Stock Market LLC (``NASDAQ'') filed 
with the Securities and Exchange Commission (``Commission'') the 
proposed rule change as described in Items I, II, and III below, which 
Items have been prepared by NASDAQ. The Commission is publishing this 
notice to solicit comments on the proposed rule change from interested 
persons.
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    \1\ 15 U.S.C. 78s(b)(1).
    \2\ 17 CFR 240.19b-4.
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I. Self-Regulatory Organization's Statement of the Terms of the 
Substance of the Proposed Rule Change

    NASDAQ proposes to modify the NASDAQ Level 2 Professional 
Subscriber fee, as well as to make certain clarifications to NASDAQ 
Rule 7023(b)(1). NASDAQ will implement the proposed revised fee on 
January 1, 2013.

* * * * *

7023. NASDAQ Depth-of-Book Data

    (a) No change.
    (b) Subscriber Fees.
    (1) NASDAQ Level 2
    (A) Non-Professional Subscribers pay a monthly fee of $9 each;
    (B) Professional Subscribers pay a monthly fee of $ [3]40 each 
for [any] Display Usage based upon Direct or Indirect Access, or for 
Non-Display Usage based upon Indirect Access only;
    (C) Professional Subscribers pay a monthly fee as set forth in 
subsection (4) below for Non-Display Usage based upon Direct Access; 
[and]
    (D) The [monthly Subscriber] fees for NASDAQ Level 2 are 
separate from the fees for NASDAQ Level 1 as set forth in the NASDAQ 
UTP Plan[.] ; and
    (E) Direct Access has the same meaning as set forth in NASDAQ 
Rule 7019(d).
    (b)(2)--(4) No change.
    (c)--(e) No change.
* * * * *

II. Self-Regulatory Organization's Statement of the Purpose of, and 
Statutory Basis for, the Proposed Rule Change

    In its filing with the Commission, NASDAQ included statements 
concerning the purpose of and basis for the proposed rule change and 
discussed any comments it received on the proposed rule change. The 
text of these statements may be examined at the places specified in 
Item IV below. NASDAQ has prepared summaries, set forth in Sections A, 
B, and C below, of the most significant aspects of such statements.

A. Self-Regulatory Organization's Statement of the Purpose of, and 
Statutory Basis for, the Proposed Rule Change

1. Purpose
    NASDAQ is proposing a change to modify the NASDAQ Level 2 
Professional Subscriber fee (``Level 2 fee''), as well as to make 
certain modifications for clarity to NASDAQ Rule 7023(b)(1). NASDAQ 
Rule 7023(b)(1) currently provides for a monthly fee of $30 for 
Professional Subscribers each for any Display Usage or for Non-Display 
Usage based upon Indirect Access. Specifically, NASDAQ proposes to 
increase the display fee from $30 per month to $40 per month for 
Professional Subscribers each for Direct or Indirect Access, or for 
Non-Display usage based upon Indirect Access. NASDAQ Level 2 Non-

[[Page 76575]]

Professional Subscriber fees will remain unchanged.
    The NASDAQ Level 2 product is completely optional. NASDAQ has 
enhanced this product through capacity upgrades and regulatory data 
sets over the last approximately 30 years, but has not increased the 
associated Professional Subscriber fee. During this year time period, 
the network capacity for NASDAQ Level 2 has increased from a 56 Kb feed 
in 1983 to the current 30 Mb feed. Additionally, since NASDAQ Level 2 
is also used for market making functions, NASDAQ has invested over the 
years to add regulatory data sets, such as Market Maker Mode and 
Trading Action status. Such investments will continue in 2013 by the 
addition of limit up--limit down and IPO data elements to the feed. The 
only usage fee change NASDAQ has made in the last approximately 30 
years was to add a Non-Professional fee option for NASDAQ Level 2, 
which is widely used by online brokerage firms today. This increase 
represents the first Professional Subscriber price change for display 
usage of NASDAQ Level 2 user fees since its introduction in 1983.
    NASDAQ is also making certain clarifications to NASDAQ Rule 
7023(b)(1). By specifically including the access methods for display 
data into NASDAQ Rule 7023(b)(1)(B), it should serve to assist firms in 
understanding the fees based upon access. This conforms to how other 
Subscriber fees are described within the NASDAQ rules. Additionally, 
the words ``monthly Subscriber'' are being deleted from NASDAQ Rule 
7023(b)(1)(D) to clarify that not only Subscriber fees are separate 
from the fees for NASDAQ Level 1 as set forth in the NASDAQ UTP Plan, 
but distributor fees, access fees or any fees set forth in the NASDAQ 
UTP Plan. Finally, NASDAQ Rule 7023(b)(1)(E) is a definitional 
reference for the term ``Direct Access'' that is being added to improve 
the clarity of the section.
2. Statutory Basis
    NASDAQ believes that the proposed rule change is consistent with 
the provisions of Section 6 of the Act,\3\ in general, and with Section 
6(b)(4) and 6(b)(5) of the Act,\4\ in particular, in that it provides 
an equitable allocation of reasonable fees among Subscribers and 
recipients of NASDAQ data and is not designed to permit unfair 
discrimination between them. In adopting Regulation NMS, the Commission 
granted self-regulatory organizations and broker-dealers increased 
authority and flexibility to offer new and unique market data to the 
public. It was believed that this authority would expand the amount of 
data available to consumers, and also spur innovation and competition 
for the provision of market data.
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    \3\ 15 U.S.C. 78f.
    \4\ 15 U.S.C. 78f(b)(4) and (5).
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    The Commission concluded that Regulation NMS--by deregulating the 
market in proprietary data--would itself further the Act's goals of 
facilitating efficiency and competition:

    [E]fficiency is promoted when broker-dealers who do not need the 
data beyond the prices, sizes, market center identifications of the 
NBBO and consolidated last sale information are not required to 
receive (and pay for) such data. The Commission also believes that 
efficiency is promoted when broker-dealers may choose to receive 
(and pay for) additional market data based on their own internal 
analysis of the need for such data.\5\

    \5\ Securities Exchange Act Release No. 51808 (June 9, 2005), 70 
FR 37496 (June 29, 2005).
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    By removing ``unnecessary regulatory restrictions'' on the ability 
of exchanges to sell their own data, Regulation NMS advanced the goals 
of the Act and the principles reflected in its legislative history. If 
the free market should determine whether proprietary data is sold to 
broker-dealers at all, it follows that the price at which such data is 
sold should be set by the market as well. Level 2, TotalView and 
OpenView are precisely the sort of market data products that the 
Commission envisioned when it adopted Regulation NMS.
    On July 21, 2010, President Barack Obama signed into law H.R. 4173, 
the Dodd- Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 
(``Dodd-Frank Act''), which amended Section 19 of the Act. Among other 
things, Section 916 of the Dodd-Frank Act amended paragraph (A) of 
Section 19(b)(3) of the Act by inserting the phrase ``on any person, 
whether or not the person is a member of the self-regulatory 
organization'' after ``due, fee or other charge imposed by the self-
regulatory organization.'' As a result, all self-regulatory 
organization (``SRO'') rule proposals establishing or changing dues, 
fees, or other charges are immediately effective upon filing regardless 
of whether such dues, fees, or other charges are imposed on members of 
the SRO, non-members, or both. Section 916 further amended paragraph 
(C) of Section 19(b)(3) of the Act to read, in pertinent part, ``At any 
time within the 60-day period beginning on the date of filing of such a 
proposed rule change in accordance with the provisions of paragraph (1) 
[of Section 19(b)], the Commission summarily may temporarily suspend 
the change in the rules of the self-regulatory organization made 
thereby, if it appears to the Commission that such action is necessary 
or appropriate in the public interest, for the protection of investors, 
or otherwise in furtherance of the purposes of this title. If the 
Commission takes such action, the Commission shall institute 
proceedings under paragraph (2)(B) [of Section 19(b)] to determine 
whether the proposed rule should be approved or disapproved.''
    The decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the District 
of Columbia Circuit in NetCoalition v. SEC, No. 09-1042 (D.C. Cir. 
2010), although reviewing a Commission decision made prior to the 
effective date of the Dodd-Frank Act, upheld the Commission's reliance 
upon competitive markets to set reasonable and equitably allocated fees 
for market data. ``In fact, the legislative history indicates that the 
Congress intended that the market system `evolve through the interplay 
of competitive forces as unnecessary regulatory restrictions are 
removed' and that the SEC wield its regulatory power `in those 
situations where competition may not be sufficient,' such as in the 
creation of a `consolidated transactional reporting system.' '' 
NetCoalition, at 15 (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 94-229, at 92 (1975), as 
reprinted in 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. 321, 323).
    For the reasons stated above, NASDAQ believes that the proposed fee 
is fair and equitable in accordance with Section 6(b)(4) of the Act, 
and not unreasonably discriminatory in accordance with Section 6(b)(5) 
of the Act. As described above, the proposed fee is based on pricing 
conventions and distinctions that exist in NASDAQ's current fee 
schedule, and the fee schedules of other exchanges. These distinctions 
(top-of-book versus Depth-of-Book, Professional versus non-Professional 
Subscribers, Direct versus Indirect Access, Internal versus External 
Distribution) are each based on principles of fairness and equity that 
have helped for many years to maintain fair, equitable, and not 
unreasonably discriminatory fees, and that apply with equal or greater 
force to the current proposal.
    As described in greater detail below, if NASDAQ has calculated 
improperly and the market deems the proposed fees to be unfair, 
inequitable, or unreasonably discriminatory, firms can diminish or 
discontinue the use of their data because the proposed product is 
entirely optional to all parties. Firms are not required to purchase 
Depth-of-Book

[[Page 76576]]

data or to utilize any specific pricing alternative if they do choose 
to purchase Depth-of-Book data. NASDAQ is not required to make Depth-
of-Book data available or to offer specific pricing alternatives for 
potential purchases. NASDAQ can discontinue offering a pricing 
alternative (as it has in the past) and firms can discontinue their use 
at any time and for any reason (as they often do), including due to 
their assessment of the reasonableness of fees charged. NASDAQ 
continues to establish and revise pricing policies aimed at increasing 
fairness and equitable allocation of fees among Subscribers.
    NASDAQ believes that periodically it must adjust the Depth-of-Book 
Enterprise Data Subscriber fees to reflect market forces. Given that 
this fee change represents the first Professional Subscriber price 
change for display usage of NASDAQ Level 2 user fees since its 
introduction in 1983, NASDAQ believes it is an appropriate time to 
adjust this fee to more accurately reflect the investments made to 
enhance this product through capacity upgrades and regulatory data sets 
added. Given that this fee could have been justifiably increased at any 
point over the course of the past 29 years, NASDAQ believes that such 
an increase is now long overdue. This also reflects that the market for 
this Depth-of-Book information is highly competitive and continually 
evolves as products develop and change.

B. Self-Regulatory Organization's Statement on Burden on Competition

    NASDAQ does not believe that the proposed rule change will result 
in any burden on competition that is not necessary or appropriate in 
furtherance of the purposes of the Act, as amended. Notwithstanding its 
determination that the Commission may rely upon competition to 
establish fair and equitably allocated fees for market data, the 
NetCoalition court found that the Commission had not, in that case, 
compiled a record that adequately supported its conclusion that the 
market for the data at issue in the case was competitive. NASDAQ 
believes that a record may readily be established to demonstrate the 
competitive nature of the market in question.
    There is intense competition between trading platforms that provide 
transaction execution and routing services and proprietary data 
products. Transaction execution and proprietary data products are 
complementary in that market data is both an input and a byproduct of 
the execution service. In fact, market data and trade execution are a 
paradigmatic example of joint products with joint costs. The decision 
whether and on which platform to post an order will depend on the 
attributes of the platform where the order can be posted, including the 
execution fees, data quality and price and distribution of its data 
products. Without the prospect of a taking order seeing and reacting to 
a posted order on a particular platform, the posting of the order would 
accomplish little. Without trade executions, exchange data products 
cannot exist. Data products are valuable to many end Subscribers only 
insofar as they provide information that end Subscribers expect will 
assist them or their customers in making trading decisions.
    The costs of producing market data include not only the costs of 
the data distribution infrastructure, but also the costs of designing, 
maintaining, and operating the exchange's transaction execution 
platform and the cost of regulating the exchange to ensure its fair 
operation and maintain investor confidence. The total return that a 
trading platform earns reflects the revenues it receives from both 
products and the joint costs it incurs. Moreover, an exchange's 
customers view the costs of transaction executions and of data as a 
unified cost of doing business with the exchange. A broker-dealer will 
direct orders to a particular exchange only if the expected revenues 
from executing trades on the exchange exceed net transaction execution 
costs and the cost of data that the broker-dealer chooses to buy to 
support its trading decisions (or those of its customers). The choice 
of data products is, in turn, a product of the value of the products in 
making profitable trading decisions. If the cost of the product exceeds 
its expected value, the broker-dealer will choose not to buy it. 
Moreover, as a broker-dealer chooses to direct fewer orders to a 
particular exchange, the value of the product to that broker-dealer 
decreases, for two reasons. First, the product will contain less 
information, because executions of the broker-dealer's orders will not 
be reflected in it. Second, and perhaps more important, the product 
will be less valuable to that broker-dealer because it does not provide 
information about the venue to which it is directing its orders. Data 
from the competing venue to which the broker-dealer is directing orders 
will become correspondingly more valuable.
    Thus, an increase in the fees charged for either transactions or 
data has the potential to impair revenues from both products. ``No one 
disputes that competition for order flow is `fierce'.'' NetCoalition at 
24. However, the existence of fierce competition for order flow implies 
a high degree of price sensitivity on the part of broker-dealers with 
order flow, since they may readily reduce costs by directing orders 
toward the lowest-cost trading venues. A broker-dealer that shifted its 
order flow from one platform to another in response to order execution 
price differentials would both reduce the value of that platform's 
market data and reduce its own need to consume data from the disfavored 
platform. Similarly, if a platform increases its market data fees, the 
change will affect the overall cost of doing business with the 
platform, and affected broker-dealers will assess whether they can 
lower their trading costs by directing orders elsewhere and thereby 
lessening the need for the more expensive data.
    Analyzing the cost of market data distribution in isolation from 
the cost of all of the inputs supporting the creation of market data 
will inevitably underestimate the cost of the data. Thus, because it is 
impossible to create data without a fast, technologically robust, and 
well-regulated execution system, system costs and regulatory costs 
affect the price of market data. It would be equally misleading, 
however, to attribute all of the exchange's costs to the market data 
portion of an exchange's joint product. Rather, all of the exchange's 
costs are incurred for the unified purposes of attracting order flow, 
executing and/or routing orders, and generating and selling data about 
market activity. The total return that an exchange earns reflects the 
revenues it receives from the joint products and the total costs of the 
joint products.
    Competition among trading platforms can be expected to constrain 
the aggregate return each platform earns from the sale of its joint 
products, but different platforms may choose from a range of possible, 
and equally reasonable, pricing strategies as the means of recovering 
total costs. For example, some platforms may choose to pay rebates to 
attract orders, charge relatively low prices for market information (or 
provide information free of charge) and charge relatively high prices 
for accessing posted liquidity. Other platforms may choose a strategy 
of paying lower rebates (or no rebates) to attract orders, setting 
relatively high prices for market information, and setting relatively 
low prices for accessing posted liquidity. In this environment, there 
is no economic basis for regulating maximum prices for one of the joint 
products in an industry in which suppliers face competitive constraints 
with regard to the joint offering. This would be akin to strictly

[[Page 76577]]

regulating the price that an automobile manufacturer can charge for car 
sound systems despite the existence of a highly competitive market for 
cars and the availability of after-market alternatives to the 
manufacturer-supplied system.
    The market for market data products is competitive and inherently 
contestable because there is fierce competition for the inputs 
necessary to the creation of proprietary data and strict pricing 
discipline for the proprietary products themselves. Numerous exchanges 
compete with each other for listings, trades, and market data itself, 
providing virtually limitless opportunities for entrepreneurs who wish 
to produce and distribute their own market data. This proprietary data 
is produced by each individual exchange, as well as other entities, in 
a vigorously competitive market.
    Broker-dealers currently have numerous alternative venues for their 
order flow, including thirteen SRO markets, as well as internalizing 
broker-dealers (``BDs'') and various forms of alternative trading 
systems (``ATSs''), including dark pools and electronic communication 
networks (``ECNs''). Each SRO market competes to produce transaction 
reports via trade executions, and two FINRA-regulated Trade Reporting 
Facilities (``TRFs'') compete to attract internalized transaction 
reports. Competitive markets for order flow, executions, and 
transaction reports provide pricing discipline for the inputs of 
proprietary data products.
    The large number of SROs, TRFs, BDs, and ATSs that currently 
produce proprietary data or are currently capable of producing it 
provides further pricing discipline for proprietary data products. Each 
SRO, TRF, ATS, and BD is currently permitted to produce proprietary 
data products, and many currently do or have announced plans to do so, 
including NASDAQ, New York Stock Exchange LLC (``NYSE''), NYSE MKT LLC, 
NYSE Arca LLC, and BATS Exchange, Inc. (``BATS'').
    Any ATS or BD can combine with any other ATS, BD, or multiple ATSs 
or BDs to produce joint proprietary data products. Additionally, order 
routers and market data vendors can facilitate single or multiple 
broker-dealers' production of proprietary data products. The potential 
sources of proprietary products are virtually limitless.
    The fact that proprietary data from ATSs, BDs, and vendors can by-
pass SROs is significant in two respects. First, non-SROs can compete 
directly with SROs for the production and sale of proprietary data 
products, as BATS and Arca did before registering as exchanges by 
publishing Depth-of-Book data on the Internet. Second, because a single 
order or transaction report can appear in an SRO proprietary product, a 
non-SRO proprietary product, or both, the data available in proprietary 
products is exponentially greater than the actual number of orders and 
transaction reports that exist in the marketplace.
    Market data vendors provide another form of price discipline for 
proprietary data products because they control the primary means of 
access to end Subscribers. Vendors impose price restraints based upon 
their business models. For example, vendors such as Bloomberg and 
Thomson Reuters that assess a surcharge on data they sell may refuse to 
offer proprietary products that end Subscribers will not purchase in 
sufficient numbers. Internet portals, such as Google, impose a 
discipline by providing only data that will enable them to attract 
``eyeballs'' that contribute to their advertising revenue. Retail 
broker-dealers, such as Schwab and Fidelity, offer their customers 
proprietary data only if it promotes trading and generates sufficient 
commission revenue. Although the business models may differ, these 
vendors' pricing discipline is the same: they can simply refuse to 
purchase any proprietary data product that fails to provide sufficient 
value. NASDAQ and other producers of proprietary data products must 
understand and respond to these varying business models and pricing 
disciplines in order to market proprietary data products successfully.
    In addition to the competition and price discipline described 
above, the market for proprietary data products is also highly 
contestable because market entry is rapid, inexpensive, and profitable. 
The history of electronic trading is replete with examples of entrants 
that swiftly grew into some of the largest electronic trading platforms 
and proprietary data producers: Archipelago, Bloomberg Tradebook, 
Island, RediBook, Attain, TracECN, BATS Trading and Direct Edge. A 
proliferation of dark pools and other ATSs operate profitably with 
fragmentary shares of consolidated market volume.
    Regulation NMS, by deregulating the market for proprietary data, 
has increased the contestability of that market. While broker-dealers 
have previously published their proprietary data individually, 
Regulation NMS encourages market data vendors and broker-dealers to 
produce proprietary products cooperatively in a manner never before 
possible. Multiple market data vendors already have the capability to 
aggregate data and disseminate it on a profitable scale, including 
Bloomberg, and Thomson Reuters.
    The court in NetCoalition concluded that the Commission had failed 
to demonstrate that the market for market data was competitive based on 
the reasoning of the Commission's NetCoalition order because, in the 
court's view, the Commission had not adequately demonstrated that the 
Depth-of-Book data at issue in the case is used to attract order flow. 
NASDAQ believes, however, that evidence not before the court clearly 
demonstrates that availability of data attracts order flow. For 
example, as of July 2010, 92 of the top 100 broker-dealers by shares 
executed on NASDAQ consumed Level 2 and 80 of the top 100 broker-
dealers consumed TotalView. During that month, the Level 2-Subscribers 
were responsible for 94.44% of the orders entered into NASDAQ and 
TotalView Subscribers were responsible for 92.98%.
    Competition among platforms has driven NASDAQ continually to 
improve its platform data offerings and to cater to customers' data 
needs. For example, NASDAQ has developed and maintained multiple 
delivery mechanisms (IP, multi-cast, and compression) that enable 
customers to receive data in the form and manner they prefer and at the 
lowest cost to them. NASDAQ offers front end applications such as its 
``Bookviewer'' to help customers utilize data. NASDAQ has created new 
products like TotalView Aggregate to complement TotalView ITCH and/
Level 2, because offering data in multiple formatting allows NASDAQ to 
better fit customer needs. NASDAQ offers data via multiple extranet 
providers, thereby helping to reduce network and total cost for its 
data products. NASDAQ has developed an online administrative system to 
provide customers transparency into their data feed requests and 
streamline data usage reporting. NASDAQ has also expanded its 
Enterprise License options that reduce the administrative burden and 
costs to firms that purchase market data.
    Despite these enhancements and a dramatic increase in message 
traffic, NASDAQ's fees for market data have remained flat. In fact, as 
a percent of total Subscriber costs, NASDAQ data fees have fallen 
relative to other data usage costs--including bandwidth, programming, 
and infrastructure--that have risen. The same holds true for execution 
services; despite numerous enhancements to NASDAQ's trading platform, 
absolute and relative trading costs have declined. Platform competition 
has intensified as new

[[Page 76578]]

entrants have emerged, constraining prices for both executions and for 
data.
    The vigor of competition for Depth-of-Book information is 
significant and the Exchange believes that this proposal itself clearly 
evidences such competition. NASDAQ is increasing the fee in order to 
keep pace with changes in the industry and evolving customer needs. 
This product is entirely optional and is geared towards attracting new 
customers, as well as retaining existing customers.
    The Exchange has witnessed competitors creating new products and 
innovative pricing in this space over the course of the past year. 
NASDAQ continues to see firms challenge its pricing on the basis of the 
Exchange's explicit fees being higher than the zero-priced fees from 
other competitors such as BATS. In all cases, firms make decisions on 
how much and what types of data to consume on the basis of the total 
cost of interacting with NASDAQ or other exchanges. Of course, the 
explicit data fees are but one factor in a total platform analysis. 
Some competitors have lower transactions fees and higher data fees, and 
others are vice versa. The market for this Depth-of-Book information is 
highly competitive and continually evolves as products develop and 
change.

C. Self-Regulatory Organization's Statement on Comments on the Proposed 
Rule Change Received from Members, Participants, or Others

    Written comments were neither solicited nor received.

III. Date of Effectiveness of the Proposed Rule Change and Timing for 
Commission Action

    The foregoing rule change has become effective pursuant to Section 
19(b)(3)(A)(ii) of the Act.\6\ At any time within 60 days of the filing 
of the proposed rule change, the Commission summarily may temporarily 
suspend such rule change if it appears to the Commission that such 
action is necessary or appropriate in the public interest, for the 
protection of investors, or otherwise in furtherance of the purposes of 
the Act. If the Commission takes such action, the Commission shall 
institute proceedings to determine whether the proposed rule should be 
approved or disapproved.
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    \6\ 15 U.S.C. 78s(b)(3)(a)(ii).
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IV. Solicitation of Comments

    Interested persons are invited to submit written data, views and 
arguments concerning the foregoing, including whether the proposed rule 
change is consistent with the Act. Comments may be submitted by any of 
the following methods:

Electronic Comments

     Use the Commission's Internet comment form (http://www.sec.gov/rules/sro.shtml); or
     Send an email to rule-comments@sec.gov. Please include 
File Number SR-NASDAQ-2012-133 on the subject line.

Paper Comments

     Send paper comments in triplicate to Elizabeth M. Murphy, 
Secretary, Securities and Exchange Commission, 100 F Street, NE., 
Washington, DC 20549.

All submissions should refer to File Number SR-NASDAQ-2012-133. This 
file number should be included on the subject line if email is used. To 
help the Commission process and review your comments more efficiently, 
please use only one method. The Commission will post all comments on 
the Commission's Internet Web site (http://www.sec.gov/rules/sro.shtml). Copies of the submission, all subsequent amendments, all 
written statements with respect to the proposed rule change that are 
filed with the Commission, and all written communications relating to 
the proposed rule change between the Commission and any person, other 
than those that may be withheld from the public in accordance with the 
provisions of 5 U.S.C. 552, will be available for Web site viewing and 
printing in the Commission's Public Reference Room, 100 F Street NE., 
Washington, DC 20549, on official business days between the hours of 
10:00 a.m. and 3:00 p.m. Copies of such filing also will be available 
for inspection and copying at the principal office of NASDAQ. All 
comments received will be posted without change; the Commission does 
not edit personal identifying information from submissions. You should 
submit only information that you wish to make available publicly. All 
submissions should refer to File Number SR-NASDAQ-2012-133 and should 
be submitted on or before January 18, 2013.

    For the Commission, by the Division of Trading and Markets, 
pursuant to delegated authority.\7\
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    \7\ 17 CFR 200.30-3(a)(12).
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Kevin M. O'Neill,
Deputy Secretary.
[FR Doc. 2012-31152 Filed 12-27-12; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 8011-01-P