[Federal Register Volume 78, Number 236 (Monday, December 9, 2013)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Pages 73756-73768]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2013-29197]
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DEPARTMENT OF LABOR
Occupational Safety and Health Administration
29 CFR Part 1910
[Docket No. OSHA-2013-0020]
RIN 1218-AC82
Process Safety Management and Prevention of Major Chemical
Accidents
AGENCY: Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA),
Department of Labor.
ACTION: Request for information.
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SUMMARY: In response to Executive Order 13650, OSHA requests comment on
potential revisions to its Process Safety Management (PSM) standard and
its Explosives and Blasting Agents standard, potential updates to its
Flammable Liquids standard and Spray Finishing standard, and potential
changes to PSM enforcement policies. In this Request for Information
(RFI), the Agency asks for information and data on specific rulemaking
and policy options, and the workplace hazards they address. OSHA will
use the information received in response to this RFI to determine what
action, if any, it may take.
DATES: Submit comments and additional material on this Request for
Information March 10, 2014. All submissions must bear a postmark or
provide other evidence of the submission date. The following section
describes the available methods for making submissions.
ADDRESSES: Submit comments and additional materials by any of the
following methods:
Electronically: Submit comments and attachments electronically at
http://www.regulations.gov, which is the Federal eRulemaking Portal.
Follow the instructions online for making electronic submissions.
Facsimile: OSHA allows facsimile transmission of comments and
additional material that are 10 pages or fewer in length (including
attachments). Send these documents to the OSHA Docket Office at (202)
693-1648. OSHA does not require hard copies of these documents. Instead
of transmitting facsimile copies of attachments that supplement these
documents (for example, studies, journal articles), commenters must
submit these attachments to the OSHA Docket Office, Technical Data
Center, Room N-2625, OSHA, U.S. Department of Labor, 200 Constitution
Ave. NW., Washington, DC 20210. These attachments must identify clearly
the sender's name, the date, subject, and docket number (OSHA-2013-
0020) so that the Docket Office can attach them to the appropriate
document.
Regular mail, express mail, hand delivery, or messenger (courier)
service: Submit comments and any additional material (for example,
studies, journal articles) to the OSHA Docket Office, Docket No. OSHA-
2013-0020 or RIN 1218-AC82, Technical Data Center, Room N-2625, OSHA,
U.S. Department of Labor, 200 Constitution Ave. NW., Washington, DC
20210; telephone: (202) 693-2350. (OSHA's TTY number is (877) 889-
5627.) Contact the OSHA Docket Office for information about security
procedures concerning delivery of materials by express mail, hand
delivery, and messenger service. The hours of operation for the OSHA
Docket Office are 8:15 a.m. to 4:45 p.m., e.t.
Instructions: All submissions must include the Agency's name and
the docket number for this Request for Information (that is, OSHA-2013-
0020). OSHA will place comments and other material, including any
personal information, in the public docket without revision, and these
materials will be available online at http://www.regulations.gov.
Therefore, OSHA cautions commenters about submitting statements they do
not want made available to the public and submitting comments that
contain personal information (either about themselves or others) such
as Social Security numbers, birth dates, and medical data.
If you submit scientific or technical studies or other results of
scientific research, OSHA requests (but is not requiring) that you also
provide the following information where it is available: (1)
Identification of the funding source(s) and sponsoring organization(s)
of the research; (2) the extent to which the research findings were
reviewed by a potentially affected party prior to publication or
submission to the docket, and identification of any such parties; and
(3) the nature of any financial relationships (e.g., consulting
agreements, expert witness support, or research funding) between
investigators who conducted the research and any organization(s) or
entities having an interest in the rulemaking and policy
[[Page 73757]]
options discussed in this RFI. Disclosure of such information is
intended to promote transparency and scientific integrity of data and
technical information submitted to the record. This request is
consistent with Executive Order 13563, issued on January 18, 2011,
which instructs agencies to ensure the objectivity of any scientific
and technological information used to support their regulatory actions.
OSHA emphasizes that all material submitted to the record will be
considered by the Agency if it engages in rulemaking.
Docket: To read or download submissions or other material in the
docket, go to http://www.regulations.gov or the OSHA Docket Office at
the address above. The http://www.regulations.gov index lists all
documents in the docket. However, some information (e.g., copyrighted
material) is not available publicly to read or download through the Web
site. All submissions, including copyrighted material, are available
for inspection at the OSHA Docket Office. Contact the OSHA Docket
Office for assistance in locating docket submissions.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Press inquiries: Mr. Frank Meilinger, Director, OSHA Office of
Communications, Room N-3647, U.S. Department of Labor, 200 Constitution
Avenue NW., Washington, DC 20210; telephone: (202) 693-1999; email:
[email protected].
General and technical information: Ms. Lisa Long, Director, Office
of Engineering Safety, OSHA Directorate of Standards and Guidance, Room
N-3609, U.S. Department of Labor, 200 Constitution Avenue NW.,
Washington, DC 20210; telephone: (202) 693-2222; email:
[email protected].
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Copies of this Federal Register notice and news releases:
Electronic copies of these documents are available at OSHA's Web page
at http://www.osha.gov. Copies of this Federal Register notice also are
available at http://www.regulations.gov.
I. Background
A. Executive Order 13650
On August 1, 2013, President Obama signed Executive Order 13650,
entitled Improving Chemical Facility Safety and Security. Section
6(e)(ii) of the order requires OSHA to publish, within 90 days, an RFI
designed to identify issues related to modernization of its PSM
standard \1\ and related standards necessary to meet the goal of
preventing major chemical accidents. In response to the Executive
Order, OSHA is publishing this RFI to collect data and information on
its PSM standard and related standards, as well as other regulatory
issues involving hazardous chemicals.
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\1\ https://www.osha.gov/SLTC/processsafetymanagement/.
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B. Process Safety Management of Highly Hazardous Chemicals
OSHA originally promulgated the Sec. 1910.119 Process Safety
Management (PSM) standard in 1992 in response to a number of
catastrophic chemical-release incidents that occurred worldwide. The
incidents spurred broad recognition in the safety community that
accidental releases of highly hazardous chemicals can result in
multiple worker injuries or fatalities. The main objective of the PSM
standard is to prevent or minimize employee exposure to the hazards
associated with uncontrolled releases of highly hazardous chemicals.
The PSM standard is a comprehensive management program for highly
hazardous chemicals that integrates technologies, procedures, and
management practices to help assure safe and healthful workplaces. One
of the key components of the PSM standard is the requirement that
employers perform a process hazard analysis, which is a careful review
of what could go wrong and what safeguards employers must implement to
prevent uncontrolled releases. The PSM standard also mandates written
operating procedures; employee training; prestartup safety reviews;
evaluation of the mechanical integrity of critical equipment; and
written procedures for managing change. In addition, the PSM standard
specifies a permit system for hot work; investigation of incidents
involving releases or near misses of covered chemicals; emergency-
action plans; compliance audits at least every three years; and trade-
secret protection.
While the PSM standard has been effective in improving process
safety in the United States and protecting workers from many of the
hazards associated with uncontrolled releases of highly hazardous
chemicals, major incidents have continued to occur.
(1) On April 23, 2004, an explosion and fire at Formosa Plastics in
Illiopolis, Illinois, killed five workers and severely injured three
others. According to the U.S. Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation
Board's (CSB) report on the incident (CSB Report No, 2004-10-I-IL),
while Formosa failed to properly implement many OSHA-required elements
of its PSM program, modernization of the PSM standard to include
several issues discussed below would likely have prevented or minimized
the consequences of this incident. In 2005, OSHA reached a settlement
agreement with Formosa with 48 citations, 31 of which were PSM
citations, and fines totaling $300,000. The CSB report contains a
detailed analysis of the root causes of this incident.
(2) On March 23, 2005, 15 workers died and more than 170 others
were injured at the BP Refinery in Texas City, Texas. As a result of
the incident, OSHA issued over 300 citations and fined BP over $21
million. Many of the citations were for PSM violations, including
failing to properly implement mechanical integrity, training, and
standard operating procedures. In a 2009 follow-up investigation, OSHA
found numerous deficiencies at the BP Texas City Refinery and issued
270 failure-to-abate notices. In a 2010 settlement agreement with OSHA,
BP agreed to pay a penalty of $50.6 million to resolve the notices.
(3) On April 2, 2010, an explosion and fire at the Tesoro refinery
in Anacortes, Washington, killed seven workers. The incident occurred
when a heat exchanger suddenly ruptured during maintenance, releasing a
highly hazardous chemical that subsequently exploded. The company
operated under the jurisdiction of the Washington State Department of
Labor and Industries Division of Occupational Safety and Health (DOSH),
which adopted OSHA's PSM standard into its state plan regulations at
WAC 296-67. DOSH inspectors found that Tesoro failed to properly
implement its PSM program by inadequately testing its equipment and
continuing to operate failing equipment. As the result of the incident,
DOSH issued 44 citations, 36 of which were PSM citations, to Tesoro,
totaling $2.39 million. The root cause investigation is ongoing,
however, modernization of the PSM standard to include several issues
discussed below would likely have prevented or minimized the
consequences of this incident.
(4) On April 17, 2013, an ammonium nitrate explosion at the West
Fertilizer Company storage and distribution facility in West, Texas,
killed at least 15 people--the majority of whom were firefighters
responding to a fire at the facility--and injured over 160 others. The
West Fertilizer facility is not currently covered by PSM, however it is
a stark example of how potential modernization of the PSM standard may
include such facilities and prevent future catastrophe.
[[Page 73758]]
In 2007, OSHA initiated its Petroleum Refinery PSM National
Emphasis Program (NEP) to reduce or eliminate the workplace hazards
associated with the catastrophic release of highly hazardous chemicals
in petroleum refineries. The program outlined a new approach for
inspecting PSM-covered facilities that allowed for a greater number of
inspections using better allocation of OSHA resources. In 2009, OSHA
built upon that inspection program by implementing a pilot PSM-Covered
Chemical Facilities NEP, which it later expanded into a full NEP. Under
both of the PSM NEPs, OSHA was able to increase the number of PSM-
covered facilities inspected and gained valuable inspection data.
C. Rulemaking and Enforcement Policy Change Options Under Consideration
OSHA has determined that revisions to its PSM standard may be
needed to address issues in coverage. As specified in Executive Order
13650, the Agency is also considering related revisions to its
Explosives and Blasting Agents standard to address potential issues in
coverage; updates to its Flammable Liquids standard and Spray Finishing
standard to better align with current versions of applicable consensus
standards; and changes in its enforcement policies for these standards.
OSHA identified a number of rulemaking and policy options through the
Agency's PSM NEPs, its investigation of major accidents, and its review
of recommendations from the safety community. OSHA identified the
following topics as potential candidates for rulemaking or enforcement
policy changes:
1. Clarifying the PSM exemption for atmospheric storage tanks;
2. Oil- and Gas-Well Drilling and Servicing;
3. Oil- and Gas-Production Facilities;
4. Expanding PSM Coverage and Requirements for Reactivity Hazards;
5. Updating the List of Highly Hazardous Chemicals in Appendix A of
the PSM Standard;
6. Revising the PSM Standard to Require Additional Management-
System Elements;
7. Amending Paragraph (d) of the PSM Standard to Require Evaluation
of Updates to Applicable recognized and generally accepted good
engineering practices (RAGAGEP);
8. Clarifying the PSM Standard by Adding a Definition for RAGAGEP;
9. Expanding the Scope of Paragraph (j) of the PSM Standard to
Cover the Mechanical Integrity of Any Safety-Critical Equipment;
10. Clarifying Paragraph (l) of the PSM Standard with an Explicit
Requirement that Employers Manage Organizational Changes;
11. Revising Paragraph (n) of the PSM Standard to Require
Coordination of Emergency Planning with Local Emergency-Response
Authorities;
12. Revising Paragraph (o) of the PSM Standard to Require Third-
Party Compliance Audits;
13. Expanding the Requirements of Sec. 1910.109 to Cover
Dismantling and Disposal of Explosives, Blasting Agents, and
Pyrotechnics;
14. Updating Sec. Sec. 1910.106 and 1910.107 Based on the Latest
Applicable Consensus Standards;
15. Updating the Regulations Addressing the Storage, Handling, and
Management of Ammonium Nitrate;
16. Changing Enforcement Policy of the PSM Exemption for Retail
Facilities; and
17. Changing Enforcement Policy for Highly Hazardous Chemicals
Listed in Appendix A of the PSM Standard without Specific
Concentrations.
The subsections below discuss each of these potential rulemaking
topics in greater detail.
1. Clarifying the PSM Exemption for Atmospheric Storage Tanks
Pursuant to paragraph (a)(1)(ii) of Sec. 1910.119, the PSM
standard applies to processes involving a flammable liquid or gas on
site in one location in a quantity of 10,000 pounds or more. However,
paragraph (a)(1)(ii)(B) contains an exemption for ``[f]lammable liquids
stored in atmospheric tanks or transferred which are kept below their
normal boiling point without benefit of chilling or refrigeration.''
In Secretary of Labor v. Meer Corporation (1997) (OSHRC Docket No.
95-0341), an administrative law judge ruled that PSM coverage does not
extend to flammables stored in atmospheric tanks, even if the tanks are
connected to a process. As a result, employers can exclude the amount
of flammable liquid contained in an atmospheric storage tank, or in
transfer to or from storage, from the quantity contained in the process
when determining whether a process meets the 10,000-pound threshold
quantity. The Meer decision was contrary to OSHA's earlier
interpretation \2\ of paragraph (a)(1)(ii)(B), which was that the
standard covered all stored flammables when connected to, or in close
proximity to, a process.
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\2\ https://www.osha.gov/pls/oshaweb/owadisp.show_document?p_table=STANDARDS&p_id=9760.
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OSHA believes that revising paragraph (a)(1)(ii)(B) to include
flammable liquids in atmospheric storage tanks within or connected to a
PSM covered processes would improve the safety of workers by remedying
the issue in PSM enforcement that has existed since the Meer decision.
In the questions in this RFI, the Agency requests comment on revising
paragraph (a)(1)(ii)(B) to clarify that the PSM standard covers all
stored flammables when connected to, or in close proximity to, a
process.
2. Oil- and Gas-Well Drilling and Servicing
Paragraph (a)(2)(ii) of Sec. 1910.119 exempts oil- and gas-well
drilling and servicing operations from PSM coverage. The preamble to
the PSM final rule explained that OSHA excluded these operations
because it had begun a separate rulemaking for oil and gas well
drilling and servicing operations (48 FR 57202). However, the Agency
subsequently removed the oil and gas well drilling and servicing
operations rulemaking from its regulatory agenda and never promulgated
a final rule for these operations. In light of this history, OSHA
requests public comment on whether to retain or remove the Sec.
1910.119(a)(2)(ii) exemption.
3. Oil- and Gas-Production Facilities
On March 4, 1998, a catastrophic vessel failure and fire killed
four workers at an oil- and gas-production facility near Pitkin,
Louisiana, owned by Sonat Exploration Company. Sonat was using well
fluid to purge air from a two-mile pipeline that connected a separation
facility to a production well when the separation vessel failed. In its
investigation report on the incident (Report No. 1998-002-I-LA), the
CSB stated that ``[t]wo elements of the PSM standard, process hazard
analyses and written operating procedures, are particularly relevant to
the Sonat incident.'' The CSB further concluded that ``[t]he incident
would likely have been prevented if process safety management
principles or good engineering practice had been followed more
effectively at the facility.''
The exemption in Sec. 1910.119(a)(2)(ii) does not extend to oil-
and gas-well production operations such as the Sonat facility noted in
the previous paragraph. A December 20, 1999, memo from Compliance
Programs director Richard Fairfax to OSHA regional administrators,
entitled PSM Applicability to Oil/Gas Production Facilities, explained
that ``production
[[Page 73759]]
facilities . . . were always intended to be covered under PSM.'' The
memo described covered production operations as follows:
Production, as recognized by the petroleum industry, is a phase
of well operations that deals with bringing well fluids to the
surface, separating them, and then storing, gauging and otherwise
preparing the product for the pipeline. This production phase occurs
after a well has been drilled, completed, and placed into operation,
or after it has been returned to operation following workover or
servicing. A completed well includes a ``Christmas tree'' (control
valves, pressure gauges and choke assemblies to control the flow of
oil and gas) which is attached at the top of the well where pressure
is expected. It is at this point, the top of the well, where the
covered PSM process begins. The distance between separation
equipment and the well is not a factor when determining PSM
applicability for production facilities.
The American Petroleum Institute (API) objected to the December 20,
1999, memo, asserting that PSM coverage of oil- and gas-production
facilities was invalid because OSHA did not conduct an economic
analysis during the original PSM rulemaking proceedings addressing such
coverage. In a March 7, 2000, letter to API, OSHA conceded that the
original economic analysis for the PSM standard did not include oil-
and gas-production operations, and stated further that the Agency would
suspend enforcement of the PSM standard for oil- and gas-production
operations until it performed the analysis. OSHA is considering
completing this analysis so that it can resume enforcement of the PSM
standard for oil- and gas-production facilities.
OSHA believes that implementation of an effective PSM program in
accordance with the requirements in Sec. 1910.119 by oil and gas
production facilities could prevent or mitigate accidents like the
Sonat explosion. In the questions in this RFI, the Agency requests
public comment on completing an economic analysis and possibly resuming
enforcement for PSM-covered oil- and gas-production facilities. OSHA
will review the comments received to determine what action, if any, the
Agency will take.
4. Expanding PSM Coverage and Requirements for Reactivity Hazards
Paragraph (a) of Sec. 1910.119 states that the standard applies to
any ``process which involves a chemical at or above the specified
threshold quantities listed in Appendix A,'' and to any ``process which
involves a Category 1 flammable gas (as defined in 1910.1200(c)) or a
flammable liquid with a flashpoint below 100[emsp14][deg]F (37.8
[deg]C) on site in one location, in a quantity of 10,000 pounds (4535.9
kg),'' unless the process meets one of the exceptions in Sec.
1910.119(a)(1)(ii)(A) and (B). Appendix A of Sec. 1910.119 contains a
list of 137 highly hazardous chemicals that present a potential for a
catastrophic event at or above the listed threshold quantities. A
number of the chemicals listed in Appendix A are highly reactive
chemicals based on a variety of metrics, including consensus standard
sources, but the list does not cover all highly reactive chemicals.
OSHA has long been aware of the need to update the PSM standard to
address hazards associated with reactive chemicals. In response to a
1995 chemical explosion that killed five workers at Napp Technologies,
Inc., in Lodi, New Jersey, OSHA received a petition to revise its PSM
standard to address reactivity hazards. OSHA and the U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) investigated the Napp Technologies accident and
concluded in a jointly issued 1997 report (EPA-550-R-97-002) that the
explosion was most likely triggered by an uncontrolled chemical
reaction of water, sodium hydrosulfite, and aluminum powder. Aluminum
powder and sodium hydrosulfate are relatively stable chemicals, with
instability/reactivity ratings \3\ of one \4\ and two,\5\ respectively.
However, when both of these chemicals are mixed with water the reaction
is extremely hazardous. In 2000, OSHA added an advance notice of
proposed rulemaking (ANPRM) for reactive chemicals (RIN 1218-AB63) to
its regulatory agenda. However, OSHA removed the item from its
regulatory agenda in 2002 and never published the ANPRM. In 2003, the
labor unions re-filed their petition for OSHA to revise its PSM
standard to address reactivity hazards.
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\3\ Instability/reactivity ratings listed are set by the
National Fire Protection Association's Standard System for the
Identification of the Hazards of Materials for Emergency Response
(NFPA 704).
\4\ NFPA 704 instability/reactivity of one: ``normally stable,
but can become unstable at elevated temperatures and pressures.''
\5\ NFPA 704 instability/reactivity of two: ``undergoes violent
chemical change at elevated temperatures and pressures.''
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The CSB has also made a number of recommendations to OSHA on how
the PSM standard could be amended to more comprehensively control
reactive hazards. In a 2002 report, the CSB broadly recommended that
OSHA extend PSM coverage to chemicals based on a class of highly
reactive properties, similar to the way the existing PSM standard
defines a class of flammable liquids or gases. The CSB explained that a
performance-based approach to evaluating reactive hazards would allow
for both a comprehensive analysis and flexibility in implementation,
but it cautioned that a proper hazard analysis of reactive hazards
would require expertise in reactivity hazards.
One approach to regulating reactive hazards is the New Jersey Toxic
Catastrophe Prevention Act (TCPA). Enacted in 1986, the TCPA is a New
Jersey statute that contains many process safety elements similar to
the PSM standard, but the TCPA differs from PSM by explicitly covering
reactive hazards, including reactive mixtures. Unlike the PSM standard,
which contains only one list of covered hazardous chemicals in Appendix
A, the TCPA contains multiple lists. This includes the List of
Individual Reactive Hazardous Substances, as well as a list of Reactive
Hazard Substances Mixture Functional Groups. N.J.A.C. 7:31-6.3(a),
Table I, Part D, Group I, N.J.A.C. 7:31-6.3(a), Table I, Part D, Group
II. These functional groups include certain molecular structures that
have been identified as highly reactive, based on scientific research
and accident history. Under the TCPA, covered facilities must determine
if any of the chemicals they are intentionally mixing include
components on the Functional Group list. If so, then the facility must
determine the heat of the reaction and the corresponding threshold
quantity for TCPA coverage. This approach takes into account not only
certain specific chemicals, but also their overall reactivity in
determining the level of coverage.
In the questions in this RFI, OSHA invites comment on different
regulatory approaches to covering reactive hazards, including the
approach used in the TCPA.
5. Updating the List of Highly Hazardous Chemicals in Appendix A of the
PSM Standard
Appendix A of Sec. 1910.119 contains a list of 137 highly
hazardous chemicals that present a potential for a catastrophic event
at or above the threshold quantity of the standard. OSHA compiled the
Appendix A list of chemicals from multiple sources, including:
New Jersey's Toxic Chemical Prevention Act;
Delaware's Extremely Hazardous Substances Risk Management
Act;
The World Bank's Manual of Industrial Hazard Assessment
Techniques;
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency's List of Extremely
Hazardous Substances;
[[Page 73760]]
U.S. Department of Transportation's Emergency Response
Guidebook;
Council of the European Communities' Council Directive of
June 24, 1982, on the Major Accident Hazards of Certain Industrial
Activities (82/501/EEC);
United Kingdom Health and Safety Executive's A guide to
the Control of Major Accident Hazards Regulations 1999 (as amended);
API's Recommended Practice 750--Management of Process
Hazards;
National Fire Protection Association's (NFPA) NFPA 49--
Hazardous Chemicals Data; and
Organization Resources Counselors, Inc.'s Recommendations
for Process Hazards Management of Substances with Catastrophic
Potential.
Every chemical listed in Appendix A appeared in at least one of
these sources as warranting a high degree of management control due to
its extremely hazardous properties; most of the chemicals appeared in
several of the sources.
Appendix A has remained unchanged since OSHA promulgated the PSM
standard in 1992. In the questions in this RFI, OSHA requests public
comment on which chemicals, if any, the Agency should add to Appendix A
through rulemaking. OSHA further seeks comment on methods for
periodically updating Appendix A to ensure adequate protection of
workers in PSM-covered facilities when new hazards are discovered and
as technology and advancements in chemical science evolve.
6. Revising the PSM Standard To Require Additional Management-System
Elements
Executive Order 13650 requires OSHA to ``identify issues related to
modernizing the PSM standard.'' When OSHA promulgated the PSM standard
in 1992, the standard adopted management-system elements based on best
practices from industry at the time. However, best practices have
continued to evolve since 1992 and additional management-system
elements may now be recognized to be necessary to protect workers. In
this RFI, OSHA seeks public comment on additional management-system
elements that would increase worker protection if required under the
PSM standard.
The Center for Chemical Process Safety (CCPS) is an example of a
safety organization that recommends additional management-system
elements. CCPS specifies in its Risk Based Process Safety (RBPS)
program 20 different management-system elements, a number of which are
not included in the PSM standard. One such RBPS element is
``Measurement and Metrics,'' described by CCPS as a system for
establishing indicators to track the effectiveness of the management
system.\6\ In this element, the employer typically uses metrics to
track leading and lagging safety indicators, and to identify
opportunities for improvement. Another RBPS element is ``Management
Review and Continuous Improvement,'' which CCPS describes as ``the
ongoing `due diligence' review by management that fills the gap between
day-to-day work activities and periodic formal audits.'' \7\ A third
RBPS element is ``Process Safety Competency,'' which CCPS explains
``encompasses three interrelated actions: (1) Continuously improving of
knowledge and competency, (2) ensuring that appropriate information is
available to people who need it, and (3) consistently applying what has
been learned.'' \8\
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\6\ Guidelines for Risk Based Process Safety, CCPS. http://www.aiche.org/ccps.
\7\ Ibid.
\8\ Ibid.
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OSHA also is considering adopting management-system elements from
safety standards that other federal agencies promulgated since 1992.
For example, the Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement's
(BSEE) Revisions to Safety and Environmental Management Systems (SEMS
II) final rule (78 FR 20423; 04/05/2013), which revised a number of
requirements in 30 CFR 250, Subpart S, contains management-system
elements not included in the PSM standard. In its SEMS II Fact Sheet
(April, 2013) \9\, BSEE describes three of the main additional elements
as follows:
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\9\ http://www.bsee.gov/BSEE-Newsroom/BSEE-Fact-Sheet/SEMS-II-Fact-Sheet.aspx.
Developing and implementing a stop work authority that
creates procedures and authorizes any and all offshore industry
personnel who witness an imminent risk or dangerous activity to stop
work.
Developing and implementing an ultimate work authority
that requires offshore industry operators to clearly define who has
the ultimate work authority on a facility for operational safety and
decision-making at any given time.
Requiring an employee participation plan that provides
an environment that promotes participation by offshore industry
employees as well as their management to eliminate or mitigate
safety hazards.
OSHA invites public comment on any additional management-system
elements, or on expanding existing elements, including those elements
discussed in this RFI to improve worker protection in facilities
covered under the PSM standard. The Agency requests that commenters
submit data and information on management-system elements from
consensus standards, safety organizations, federal standards, or other
sources that could increase worker safety if OSHA expanded the PSM
standard to include the elements.
7. Amending Paragraph (d) of the PSM Standard To Require Evaluation of
Updates to Applicable RAGAGEP
Paragraph (d)(3)(ii) of Sec. 1910.119 requires employers to
document that covered equipment complies with RAGAGEP. ``For existing
equipment designed and constructed in accordance with codes, standards,
or practices that are no longer in general use,'' paragraph (d)(3)(iii)
of Sec. 1910.119 further requires employers to ``determine and
document that the equipment is designed, maintained, inspected, tested,
and operating in a safe manner.'' However, the PSM standard does not
require employers to evaluate updates to applicable RAGAGEP or to
examine new RAGAGEP after evaluating and documenting compliance with
either Sec. 1910.119(d)(3)(ii) or (iii).
Through extensive collaboration and evaluation of incidents, many
safety organizations periodically update their standards to improve
work practices and protect workers against newly identified hazards.
Since the practices constituting RAGAGEP under the PSM standard are
constantly changing as a result of this process, evaluating updates to
applicable RAGAGEP ensures that employers base a facility's PSM program
on the most up-to-date and accurate safety information available.
An accident that occurred at a Formosa Plastics facility in Point
Comfort, Texas, on October 6, 2005, illustrates the importance of
evaluating updates to applicable RAGAGEP. A trailer towed by a forklift
became snagged and pulled a small drain valve out of a strainer in a
liquid propylene system at the facility. Escaping propylene rapidly
vaporized, causing a series of explosions and fires that injured 16
workers. According to the CSB's investigation report on the incident
(CSB Report No. 2006-01-I-TX), Formosa and the company that sold the
plant design failed to evaluate updates to applicable RAGAGEP for
fireproofing structural steel that supports critical safety systems.
The CSB concluded in its report that had Formosa fireproofed the steel
according to more recent RAGAGEP, then ``the consequences of this
incident would likely have been less severe.'' OSHA invites public
comment on the best approach to revising paragraph (d) of
[[Page 73761]]
the PSM standard to require employers to evaluate updates to applicable
RAGAGEP could help prevent or mitigate accidents like the October 6,
2005, Formosa explosion, and increase worker protection in PSM-covered
facilities.
8. Clarifying the PSM Standard by Adding a Definition for RAGAGEP
The term ``recognized and generally accepted good engineering
practices'' (RAGAGEP) appears in paragraphs (d)(3)(ii) and (j)(4)(ii)
of Sec. 1910.119, but the PSM standard does not contain a definition
for the term. For guidance purposes, OSHA's Petroleum Refinery NEP
directive (CPL 03-00-010) provides one example of a RAGAGEP definition
from CCPS's Guidelines for Mechanical Integrity Systems:
Recognized And Generally Accepted Good Engineering Practices''
(RAGAGEP)--are the basis for engineering, operation, or maintenance
activities and are themselves based on established codes, standards,
published technical reports or recommended practices (RP) or similar
documents. RAGAGEPs detail generally approved ways to perform
specific engineering, inspection or mechanical integrity activities,
such as fabricating a vessel, inspecting a storage tank, or
servicing a relief valve.
Although the CCPS's definition of RAGAGEP is not an official OSHA
definition, it is consistent with OSHA's intent when it promulgated the
standard. In its PSM proposal, OSHA would have required employers to
follow commonly accepted consensus standards and industry codes. 55 FR
29150, 29155 (July 17, 1990). In promulgating the final rule, OSHA
changed the requirement that employers comply with applicable published
codes to the requirement that they comply with ``recognized and
generally accepted good engineering practices.'' In making this change,
OSHA explained that RAGAGEP would include codes and standards published
by organizations such as NFPA, ASTM, and ANSI, as well as ``appropriate
internal standards.'' 57 FR at 6390-91. OSHA made the change in
response to comments expressing a number of concerns about the proposed
language. These included comments about employers' difficulties in
obtaining relevant codes and standards, potential confusion on which
codes were required by OSHA in a given situation, the possibility that
codes and standards could become outdated, and the inability of
employers to use more stringent internal standards. OSHA believed it
was clear from the context of this change that it intended
``appropriate internal standards'' to be those employers developed when
published codes and standards were unavailable or outdated, or that
were more stringent than published standards. 57 FR at 6390-91.
However, OSHA did not include a definition of RAGAGEP in the standard
itself.
In this RFI, OSHA invites public comment on whether the Agency
should clarify the PSM standard by including an explicit definition of
RAGAGEP in Sec. 1910.119 to assist employers in complying. OSHA
requests that commenters specify if the Agency should adopt the CCPS's
definition of RAGAGEP in Sec. 1910.119, or any other appropriate
definition, and whether inclusion of a definition would increase worker
protection and enhance process safety.
9. Expanding the Scope of Paragraph (j) of the PSM Standard To Cover
the Mechanical Integrity of Any Safety-Critical Equipment
Paragraph (j) of Sec. 1910.119 requires employers to implement an
ongoing mechanical-integrity program with respect to their PSM-covered
processes. For processing, storing, or handling highly hazardous
chemicals, employers must use equipment designed, constructed,
installed, and maintained to minimize the risk of an uncontrolled
release. Elements of an effective mechanical-integrity program include:
Identifying and categorizing equipment and instrumentation; inspecting
and testing their frequency; maintaining procedures; training
maintenance personnel; having criteria for acceptable test results;
documenting test and inspection results; and documenting manufacturer
recommendations for equipment and instrumentation.
Paragraph (j)(1) states that the mechanical-integrity requirements
of the PSM standard apply to: Pressure vessels and storage tanks;
piping systems (including piping components such as valves); relief and
vent systems and devices; emergency shutdown systems; controls
(including monitoring devices and sensors, alarms, and interlocks); and
pumps. In the preamble to the PSM final rule, OSHA explained that ``if
an employer deems additional equipment to be critical to a particular
process, that employer should consider that equipment to be covered by
this paragraph and treat it accordingly'' (57 FR 6389, February 24,
1992). In light of the limited list of covered equipment in paragraph
(j)(1), OSHA addresses hazards associated with other types of safety-
critical equipment through citations for violations of Section 5(a)(1)
of the OSH Act.
Revising paragraph (j) to explicitly apply the mechanical-integrity
requirements of the PSM standard to all equipment the employer
identifies as critical to process safety-critical equipment, in
addition to the equipment currently listed in the standard, would
provide industry with proper notice regarding coverage of such
equipment. OSHA invites comment on whether the addition of this
provision to paragraph (j) will increase worker safety and whether any
further clarifying revisions would be recommended to ease
implementation.
10. Clarifying Paragraph (l) of the PSM Standard With an Explicit
Requirement That Employers Manage Organizational Changes
Paragraph (l) of Sec. 1910.119 requires employers to establish and
implement written procedures to manage change, including all
modifications to equipment, technology, procedures, raw materials, and
processing conditions other than replacements in kind. Temporary
changes are subject to the management-of-change requirements of the
standard. Employers must properly identify and review all PSM-covered
changes before implementation.
The existing standard does not explicitly state that employers must
follow management-of-change procedures for organizational changes,\10\
such as changes in management structure, budget cuts, or personnel
changes; however, as noted in a March 31, 2009, Memorandum for Regional
Administrators from Richard Fairfax,\11\ it is OSHA's position that
paragraph (l) covers organizational changes if the changes have the
potential to affect process safety. Since the original promulgation of
the PSM rule, it has become well established in the safety community
that organizational changes can have a profound impact on worker safety
and, therefore, employers should evaluate organizational change like
any other change. Illustrating the significant hazards that
organizational changes can produce, the CSB identified a lack of
organizational management of change as a significant factor behind the
2005 BP Texas City Refinery accident that killed 15 workers and injured
over 170 others (CSB Report No. 2005-04-I-TX). OSHA invites comments on
whether revising
[[Page 73762]]
paragraph (l) to clarify that the PSM standard's organizational
management-of-change requirements will increase worker safety.
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\10\ CCPS provides the following examples of organizational
changes: ``a reduction in the number of operators on a shift, a
change in the maintenance contractor for the site, changing from 5-
day operation to 7-day operation, or rotation of plant managers.''
Guidelines for the Management of Change for Process Safety, CCPS.
\11\ https://www.osha.gov/pls/oshaweb/owadisp.show_document?p_table=INTERPRETATIONS&p_id=28628.
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11. Revising Paragraph (n) of the PSM Standard To Require Coordination
of Emergency Planning With Local Emergency-Response Authorities
Paragraph (n) of Sec. 1910.119 requires employers to establish and
implement an emergency-action plan in accordance with Sec. 1910.38,
OSHA's Emergency Action Plans (EAP) standard, and to meet applicable
requirements in paragraphs (a), (p), and (q) of Sec. 1910.120, the
Agency's Hazardous Waste Operations and Emergency Response (HAZWOPER)
standard. While some OSHA standards, such as Sec. 1910.146, Permit-
Required Confined Spaces, require employers to coordinate emergency
planning with local emergency-response authorities, the existing PSM
standard does not contain such a requirement. Existing Sec. Sec.
1910.38 and 1910.120 do not require coordination of emergency planning
with outside parties if the employer chooses to evacuate employees from
the danger area when an emergency occurs that does not permit employees
to assist in handling the emergency.
When emergency responders and other workers do not have adequate
information or employer coordination about hazardous chemicals in a
facility, they are at elevated risk of death and serious injury. On
April 17, 2013, an ammonium nitrate explosion at the West Fertilizer
Company storage and distribution facility in West, Texas, killed at
least 15 people--the majority of whom were firefighters responding to a
fire at the facility--and injured over 160 others.\12\ OSHA believes
that revising paragraph (n) of the PSM standard to require facilities
to coordinate emergency planning with local emergency-response
authorities could help prevent or mitigate similar accidents by
allowing first responders to develop the appropriate strategies in
advance of their arrival and seeks comment on the appropriate mechanism
and corresponding language to incorporate such coordination
requirements into paragraph (n).
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\12\ Following the West, Texas facility explosion, OSHA and
partner agencies EPA and ATF issued updated guidance on Ammonium
Nitrate. See, Chemical Advisory: Safe Storage, Handling, and
Management of Ammonium Nitrate, EPA 550-S-13-001, EPA, OSHA, and
ATF, August, 2013.
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12. Revising Paragraph (o) of the PSM Standard To Require Third-Party
Compliance Audits
Paragraph (o)(1) of Sec. 1910.119 requires employers to audit the
PSM program in their facilities for compliance every three years.
Paragraph (o)(2) further requires that the audits ``be conducted by at
least one person knowledgeable in the process.'' However, Sec.
1910.119 does not require employers to use a third party in conducting
the compliance audits. According to CCPS, ``Third party auditors
(typically, consulting companies who can provide experienced auditors)
potentially provide the highest degree of objectivity.'' \13\
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\13\ Guidelines for Risk Based Process Safety, CCPS. http://www.aiche.org/ccps.
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It is notable that BSEE's Safety and Environmental Management
Systems (SEMS) standard, 30 CFR 250, Subpart S, requires audits
conducted by an independent third party, subject to approval by BSEE,
or by designated and qualified personnel if the employer implements
procedures to avoid conflicts of interest. In addition, BSEE's SEMS II
revisions to the standard require that, by June 4, 2015, the team lead
for compliance audits must be independent and represent an accredited
audit service provider. In the preamble to its SEMS II final rule, BSEE
discussed its third-party-auditing requirements as follows:
Consistent audits performed by well trained and experienced
auditors are critical to ensuring that SEMS programs are
successfully implemented and maintained on the OCS. As a result, we
are adopting industry best practices related to SEMS audits and
auditor qualifications. Industry is already voluntarily adopting
these practices in many deepwater operations. We believe that the
application of these requirements to all OCS operations will result
in more robust and consistent SEMS audits. (78 FR 20430; 04/05/
2013.)
In its investigation report on the 2005 BP Texas City Refinery
explosion, the CSB identified a lack of rigorous compliance audits as a
contributing factor behind the accident. As the CSB noted in its
report, the resulting settlement agreement \14\ between OSHA and BP
required BP to retain a third-party compliance auditor with PSM
expertise, subject to approval by OSHA, to assess the company's PSM
program. OSHA is aware that third-party compliance auditors exist and
are already utilized by some of the PSM regulated community. In the
questions in this RFI, OSHA seeks comment on whether revising paragraph
(o) of the PSM standard to require employers to use a qualified third
party for compliance audits would increase worker protection through a
more rigorous and objective PSM auditing process.
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\14\ United States of America Occupational Safety and Health
Administration, BP Products North America Inc. Settlement Agreement,
September 21, 2005.
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OSHA is also seeking comment on increasing the required frequency
of compliance audits. In addition, the Agency is seeking comment on
requiring specific timeframes for responding to deficiencies found in
the compliance audit process.
13. Expanding the Requirements of Sec. 1910.109 To Cover Dismantling
and Disposal of Explosives, Blasting Agents, and Pyrotechnics
Paragraph (k)(1) of Sec. 1910.109 provides that the standard
applies to ``the manufacture, keeping, having, storage, sale,
transportation, and use of explosives, blasting agents, and
pyrotechnics,'' and does not apply to the sale and use of fireworks or
the use of explosives in the form prescribed by the U.S.
Pharmacopeia.15 16 Although dismantling and
disposing of explosives can be just as hazardous as the covered
activities listed in paragraph (k), dismantling and disposal are not
activities that the existing standard covers.
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\15\ The U.S. Pharmacopeial Convention (USP) is a scientific
nonprofit organization that sets standards for the identity,
strength, quality, and purity of medicines, food ingredients, and
dietary supplements manufactured, distributed and consumed
worldwide. http://www.usp.org/about-usp.
\16\ OSHA has no data showing an increase in accidents with this
activity and is not seeking comment on changing this exclusion.
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On April 8, 2011, an accidental explosion in Waikele, Hawaii,
killed five workers who were disposing of fireworks seized by the
Federal Government as contraband. The workers, employed by contractor
Donaldson Enterprises, Inc., were disassembling the firework tubes by
hand and separating black powder and aerial shells into plastic-lined
cardboard boxes, which they then soaked in diesel for burning. The CSB
investigated the explosion and determined (CSB Report No. 2011-06-I-HI)
that gaps in federal regulations--specifically with regard to
dismantling and disposal of explosives--contributed to the accident.
Hawaii administers its own state safety and health program approved
under the OSH Act, and adopted the federal OSHA standards in their
entirety.
OSHA believes that expanding the scope of Sec. 1910.109(k) to
cover dismantling and disposal of explosives, blasting agents, and
pyrotechnics, in the
[[Page 73763]]
workplace in addition to the activities covered under the existing
standard, would prevent tragic accidents similar to the Hawaii
accident. While the U.S. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and
Explosives exercises jurisdiction over many aspects of the explosives
industry through its Commerce in Explosives standard at 27 CFR Part
555, OSHA seeks comment on whether expanding the scope of 29 CFR
1910.109 to address hazards associated with dismantling and disposal of
explosives would lead to increased worker protection and whether ATF's
current regulations would make any revisions to OSHA's regulations
duplicative.
14. Updating Sec. Sec. 1910.106 and 1910.107 Based on the Latest
Applicable Consensus Standards
OSHA is considering updating its Flammable Liquids standard and
Spray Finishing standard. OSHA first published these standards in 1974
and based the requirements on NFPA consensus standards from the 1960s.
The format and requirements of the standards are significantly out of
date, and need updating based on the latest applicable consensus
standards.\17\ OSHA seeks recommendations on updates that should be
considered and comments on how such updates will lead to increased
worker protection.
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\17\ Applicable consensus standards may include, but are not
limited to: NFPA 30, NFPA 30A, NFPA 30B, NFPA 33.
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15. Updating the Regulations Addressing the Storage, Handling, and
Management of Ammonium Nitrate
Industry manufactures millions of tons of ammonium nitrate annually
in the United States. Consumers commonly use high-density ammonium
nitrate in fertilizer and use low-density ammonium nitrate in making
explosives. The NFPA assigns a reactivity rating of 3 (in a range of 0-
4) to ammonium nitrate, which means that it is capable of detonation,
explosive decomposition, or explosive reaction; ignition requires a
strong initiating source or heating the substance under confinement.
Stored ammonium nitrate is generally stable, but explosions of ammonium
nitrate can be severe and have resulted in many injuries and
fatalities. OSHA's requirements for storage of ammonium nitrate are
contained in Sec. 1910.109, and are based on a 1970 NFPA consensus
standard.
As discussed earlier in this RFI, on April 17, 2013, an ammonium
nitrate explosion at the West Fertilizer Company storage and
distribution facility in West, Texas, killed at least 15 people and
injured over 160 others leading OSHA and its partner agencies EPA and
ATF to issue an updated chemical advisory on the safe storage,
handling, and management of ammonium nitrate.\18\ An ammonium nitrate
explosion that occurred in Texas City, Texas, on April 16, 1947, was
the deadliest industrial accident in United States history. In that
case, the initial explosion of a ship carrying ammonium nitrate, and
the subsequent chain reaction of fires and explosions in other ships
and nearby oil-storage facilities, killed at least 581 people and
injured thousands of others.\19\
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\18\ Chemical Advisory: Safe Storage, Handling, and Management
of Ammonium Nitrate, EPA 550-S-13-001, published by EPA, OSHA, and
ATF, August, 2013.
\19\ Texas City, Texas, Disaster, April 16, 17, 1947. Fire
Prevention and Engineering Bureau of Texas, 1947.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In the questions in this RFI, OSHA invites comment on safe work
practices for storing, handling, and managing ammonium nitrate. OSHA
further seeks comment on how to update its regulatory requirements to
improve its approach to preventing the hazards associated with ammonium
nitrate.
16. Changing Enforcement Policy of the PSM Exemption for Retail
Facilities
The PSM standard contains an exemption from coverage for retail
facilities at 29 CFR 1910.119(a)(2)(i). Although the term ``retail
facility'' is not defined, the Preamble to the Final PSM standard noted
that chemicals in retail facilities are generally in small packages,
containers, and allotments, and gives the example of gasoline stations
as a type of facility that would typically qualify for the exemption.
57 FR 6356, 6369 (February 24, 1992).
Other Federal Government agencies have explicit definitions of
retail facilities. In particular, the U.S. Department of Commerce,
which is responsible for the development of the North American Industry
Classification System (NAICS) that organizes businesses into specific
industrial sectors for economic and statistical purposes, characterizes
retail trade as follows:
The Retail Trade sector comprises establishments engaged in
retailing merchandise, generally without transformation, and
rendering services incidental to the sale of merchandise. The
retailing process is the final step in the distribution of
merchandise; retailers are, therefore, organized to sell merchandise
in small quantities to the general public.
North American Industry Classification System Manual (``NAICS
Manual''), Sector 44-45--Retail Trade.
OSHA has stated that this NAICS Manual definition applies in
interpreting the retail exemption. In a November 8, 1995, memo from
Enforcement Programs director Richard Fairfax to Acting Region 10
Administrator Richard S. Terrell, OSHA distinguished retail end users
from wholesale end users:
[T]he ``retail facilities'' exception is intended to apply to an
establishment in the retail trade as delineated in the Standard
Industrial Classification (SIC) Manual. With exceptions, retail
trade establishments sell merchandise to the general public for
personal or household consumption. On the other hand, wholesale
trade establishments may sell similar merchandise for exclusive use
by industry . . . Income derived from selling [merchandise] to
industry may not be counted as ``income obtained from direct sales
to end users'' for the purpose of qualifying for the ``retail
facilities'' exception under paragraph 1910.119(a)(2)(i).
Notwithstanding this general statement, OSHA has also issued
letters saying that a facility that is primarily engaged in selling
anhydrous ammonia product to farmers (a wholesale operation under the
NAICS definition) could qualify for the Sec. 1910.119(a)(2)(i) retail-
facilities exemption. For example, the January 26, 2001 letter from
Richard Fairfax to J.D. Varn III of Varnco, Inc. which states that a
facility selling 75% of its anhydrous ammonia to farmers qualifies for
the retail exemption because the farmers were the ``end users'' of the
product.
Applying the retail-facility exemption in this way is inconsistent
with the normal meaning of ``retail'' and the preamble's explanation of
the purpose of the exemption. As stated in the preamble, OSHA chose to
exclude retail facilities from PSM coverage because the limited
container, package, or allotment sizes of the chemicals typically found
at these facilities do not present the same safety hazards as those
encountered at establishments working with large, bulk quantities of
materials. Facilities selling large or bulk quantities of materials
would typically fall into Sector 42--Wholesale Trade of the NAICS
system, which includes facilities that sell or arrange the purchase or
sale of raw and intermediate materials and supplies used in production.
As a result of increased workplace hazards associated with large, bulk
quantities of highly hazardous chemicals, OSHA believes that only
retail-trade facilities listed in NAICS sectors 44 and 45 that sell
highly hazardous chemicals in small containers, packages, or allotments
to the general public qualify for the retail-facilities exemption in 29
CFR 1910.119(a)(2)(i).
[[Page 73764]]
In light of OSHA's inconsistent statements on the application of
the retail exemption, the Agency is inviting comment on what the
exemption should cover and whether OSHA's current enforcement policy
adequately addresses workplace hazards associated with these
facilities.
17. Changing Enforcement Policy for Highly Hazardous Chemicals Listed
in Appendix A of the PSM Standard Without Specific Concentrations
Appendix A of the PSM standard lists highly hazardous chemicals and
threshold quantities that must be met to establish PSM coverage.
Although Appendix A provides specific concentrations for 11 of its
listed chemicals, the standard is silent on concentrations for the
remaining 126 listed chemicals. For example, Appendix A lists hydrogen
peroxide at concentrations of 52% by weight or greater, but the
appendix does not provide a specific concentration for hydroxylamine.
OSHA has issued interpretation letters taking a variety of positions
regarding coverage of chemicals that have no listed concentration.
Under one such approach, OSHA considers PSM coverage to apply if
threshold quantities of such chemicals are present at commercial grade.
As noted in a 1994 Letter of Interpretation from Compliance Programs
Deputy Direction H. Berrien Zettler to Mr. Luc Hamelin of IVACO, Inc.,
OSHA defined commercial grade to mean ``a typical maximum concentration
of the chemical that is commercially available and shipped.'' The
letter added that, to determine commercial grade concentrations, an
employer may refer to any published catalogue of chemicals for
commercial sales.
In 1999, an explosion at Concept Sciences, Inc. in Allentown,
Pennsylvania, killed five people as the company was attempting to
produce concentrated hydroxylamine. A U.S. District Court dismissed a
subsequent criminal indictment related to this incident based on
inconsistencies in OSHA's statements regarding coverage of
hydroxylamine. The Court pointed out that the PSM standard is ambiguous
with respect to concentrations of Appendix A chemicals. It concluded
that in light of a series of OSHA letters that were themselves
inconsistent, no reasonable person in the defendant's position could
determine how a chemical is covered by the standard. U.S. v. Ward, 21
BNA OSHC 1882, 1884 (2001). In light of this, OSHA believes it is
important to issue a clear and authoritative statement about PSM
coverage of chemicals for which Appendix A does not include a specific
concentration.
With respect to the commercial grade approach, OSHA also realizes
that it is difficult to determine the maximum commercial grade of many
of the highly hazardous chemicals listed in Appendix A. In addition,
the maximum commercial grade of a chemical may change over time due to
technological innovation or changes in industry. Furthermore, even
where the concentration of a PSM-listed highly hazardous chemical falls
below the correctly determined maximum commercial grade, the chemical
may still present a hazard because substances in a mixture retain their
original properties. For example, a solution of any concentration of
hydroxylamine can form pure hydroxylamine crystals, which can rapidly
decompose and cause fires or explosions.
An interpretative approach that is consistent with the regulatory
language and that addresses this concern is the approach currently used
by EPA under the Risk Management Program (RMP). Similar to OSHA's list
of highly hazardous chemicals in Appendix A of the PSM standard, the
EPA RMP provides a list of toxic substances in 40 CFR 68, Appendix A--
Table of Toxic Endpoints. However, in contrast to OSHA's ``commercial
grade'' policy for PSM-listed chemicals, EPA considers a mixture
containing an RMP-listed substance to be covered if the concentration
is greater than one percent and the calculated weight of the substance
in the mixture is greater than the threshold quantity.\20\ With a few
exceptions, this rule does not apply in cases where the operator can
demonstrate that the partial pressure of the substance in the mixture
is less than 10 mmHg.
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\20\ General Guidance On Risk Management Programs For Chemical
Accident Prevention (40 CFR Part 68); EPA 555-B-04-001; U.S. EPA;
March 2009.
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OSHA invites comment on whether it should adopt the EPA's policy
for RMP-listed substances as a simpler and more practical approach to
addressing hazards associated with Appendix A chemicals that do not
have listed concentrations. If OSHA adopts this policy, the Agency
would consider a PSM-listed chemical in a mixture to be covered if the
concentration of the chemical were greater than one percent and the
calculated weight of the chemical in the mixture were greater than the
threshold quantity. OSHA believes this represents a more practical,
consistent, and straightforward approach to coverage of Appendix A
chemicals under the PSM standard.
D. Effects of Possible Regulatory and Policy Changes
As part of this RFI, the Agency is requesting data and information
on the potential economic impacts of each option. OSHA requests that
commenters discuss potential economic impacts, whenever possible, in
terms of quantitative benefits (e.g., reductions in injuries,
fatalities, and property damage), costs (e.g., compliance costs or
decreases in production), and offsets to costs (e.g., less need for
maintenance and repairs) when responding to the questions in this RFI.
OSHA also requests that commenters provide data and information on
economic effects that the options may have on market conditions or
services (e.g., market structure and concentration). In addition, OSHA
invites public comment on unintended consequences and consistencies or
inconsistences with other policies or regulatory programs.
OSHA requests that commenters discuss economic impacts in as
specific terms as possible. For example, if a rulemaking or policy
change would necessitate additional employee training, then helpful
information would include the following: the training courses
necessary; the types of employees who would receive the training; the
length and frequency of the courses; topics covered; any retraining
necessary; and the training costs if conducted by a third-party vendor
or in-house trainer. The Agency invites comment on the time and level
of expertise required to implement potential changes discussed in this
RFI, even if dollar-cost estimates are not available. For discussion of
equipment-related costs, OSHA requests that commenters estimate
relevant factors such as purchase price, cost of installation, cost of
equipment maintenance, cost of training, and expected life of the
equipment.
E. Impacts on Small Entities
The Agency would like to determine whether the options in this RFI
will have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of
small entities. If the options have such impacts, then under the
Regulatory Flexibility Act, 5 U.S.C. Sec. Sec. 601-612, OSHA must, if
it engages in rulemaking, develop a regulatory flexibility analysis and
assemble a Small Business Advocacy Review Panel before publishing a
proposal. Regardless of the economic impacts, OSHA seeks ways of
minimizing burdens on small entities
[[Page 73765]]
consistent with OSHA's statutory and regulatory requirements and
objectives. The Agency requests that, when responding to the questions
in this RFI, commenters discuss any special circumstances related to
small entities, such as potential market-structure disruptions or
uniquely high costs that small entities may bear.
II. Request for Data, Information, and Comments
OSHA is providing the following questions to collect data,
information, and comments on the options discussed in this RFI. The
Agency invites the public to respond to any questions for which they
have specific knowledge, data, or information, regardless of their
involvement in PSM-covered operations.
OSHA would appreciate detailed responses to the following
questions. When responding, please reference the specific question
number to which you are responding.
A. General Information
1. To assist in classifying comments, please provide information on
the workplace (or industry) about which you are commenting, including
the type of facility, NAICS code (if available), number of employees,
types and volumes of chemicals handled, when the facility began
operation, and other relevant information.
2. If you are commenting about a specific workplace or industry,
does the workplace or industry conduct operations covered by the PSM
standard? Please explain.
B. Clarifying the PSM Exemption for Atmospheric Storage Tanks
3. Does your facility have any atmospheric storage tanks that are
exempt from PSM coverage under Sec. 1910.119(a)(1)(ii)(B)? If so, what
facts led you to conclude that the exemption applies, and do you treat
the exempted tanks as if they were PSM-covered for safety or other
reasons? Please explain.
4. Please provide any data or information on workplace accidents,
near misses, or other safety-related incidents related to flammable
liquids stored in atmospheric tanks exempted from PSM coverage under
Sec. 1910.119(a)(1)(ii)(B).
5. Would limiting the Sec. 1910.119(a)(1)(ii)(B) exemption to
apply only to flammable liquids stored in terminals and tank farms
prevent worker injuries and fatalities? What would be the economic
impacts of limiting the exemption in this way (e.g., costs and benefits
of extending PSM coverage to additional types of tanks)? Are there any
special circumstances involving small entities that OSHA should
consider with respect to this option?
6. Should OSHA limit the Sec. 1910.119(a)(1)(ii)(B) exemption to
apply only to specific NAICS codes? If so, which NAICS codes should
OSHA exempt?
7. Should the Sec. 1910.119(a)(1)(ii)(B) exemption apply only to
``storage tanks,'' such that ``process tanks'' are explicitly covered
under PSM? If so, how should OSHA define the terms ``storage tanks''
and ``process tanks''? What would be the economic impacts of limiting
the exemption in this way? Are there any special circumstances
involving small entities that OSHA should consider with respect to this
option?
8. Are there any other options related to the Sec.
1910.119(a)(1)(ii)(B) exemption of flammable liquids stored in
atmospheric tanks that OSHA should consider to prevent worker injuries
and fatalities? If so, what would be the economic impacts of the
option(s), and are there any special circumstances involving small
entities that OSHA should consider with respect to the option(s)?
C. Oil- and Gas-Well Drilling and Servicing
9. Does your facility conduct oil- and gas-well drilling or
servicing operations not covered under Sec. 1910.119? If so, do you
treat these activities as covered by the PSM standard for safety or
other reasons? Are the activities covered under other federal or state
regulations? Please explain.
10. Please provide any data or information on workplace accidents,
near misses, or other safety-related incidents involving oil-and gas-
well drilling or servicing operations.
11. Would removing the Sec. 1910.119(a)(2)(ii) exemption for oil-
and gas-well drilling and servicing operations prevent worker injuries
and fatalities? What would be the economic impact of removing the
exemption? Are there any special circumstances involving small entities
that OSHA should consider with respect to this option?
D. Oil- and Gas-Production Facilities
12. Does your facility conduct oil- and gas-production operations
for which OSHA is not currently enforcing PSM requirements? If so, do
you follow PSM requirements for these operations for safety or other
reasons? Are the activities covered under other federal or state
regulations? Please explain.
13. Please provide any data or information on workplace accidents,
near misses, or other safety-related incidents involving oil- and gas-
production facilities.
14. What would be the economic impact of resuming enforcement of
the PSM standard for oil- and gas-production facilities? Are there any
special circumstances involving small entities that OSHA should
consider with respect to this option?
E. Expanding PSM Coverage and Requirements for Reactivity Hazards
15. What are the best criteria to use in classifying reactive
hazards? What do you consider to be a reactive chemical? What do you
consider to be a reactive mixture?
16. Do you consider some reactive hazards to be outside coverage of
the existing PSM standard? If so, please describe these hazards.
17. Should OSHA add reactive chemicals to the list of PSM-covered
chemicals in Appendix A of Sec. 1910.119? If so, which reactive
chemicals?
18. If your facility is in New Jersey and covered by the New Jersey
TCPA, has the TCPA been effective in protecting New Jersey workers from
reactive hazards? Please describe any economic impacts associated with
TCPA coverage (e.g., costs and benefits, cost savings, shifts in usage
of reactive chemicals, special circumstances involving small entities,
etc.).
19. Should OSHA revise the PSM standard to use chemical functional
groups similar to those in the TCPA \21\ to define hazardous reactive
mixtures? If so, which chemical functional groups should OSHA use?
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\21\ The definition of ``reactive hazard substance (RHS)
mixture'' in the TCPA references a list of chemical functional
groups specified in N.J.A.C. 7:31-6.3(a), Table I, Part D, Group II.
Whether any of the chemical functional groups are present
determines, in part, coverage of an RHS mixture under the TCPA.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
20. Does your facility follow NFPA 400 for reactive hazards? If so,
please describe the economic impacts associated with following NFPA 400
(e.g., cost of additional equipment, cost of additional training,
benefits of quality management, special circumstances involving small
entities, etc.). Is following NFPA 400 an effective way of protecting
workers from reactive hazards? Please explain.
21. Has your facility implemented a reactive-hazards management
program other than a program specified by the TCPA and NFPA 400? If so,
please describe your facility's program, whether it protects worker
more or less than the TCPA and NFPA 400, any
[[Page 73766]]
economic impacts associated with the program, and any special
circumstances involving small entities.
22. What specific regulatory approach, if any, should OSHA use to
comprehensively address reactive hazards, what would be the economic
impacts of this approach, and would there be any special circumstances
involving small entities? Are there specific requirements that OSHA
should add to the PSM standard to ensure that employers adequately
manage reactive hazards?
23. Please provide any data or information on workplace accidents,
near misses, or other safety-related incidents involving reactive
hazards not covered under the existing PSM standard. Would reactive-
hazards management requirements in PSM have prevented the incidents?
F. Updating the List of Highly Hazardous Chemicals in Appendix A of the
PSM Standard
24. What chemicals, if any, should OSHA add to the list of highly
hazardous chemicals in Appendix A of Sec. 1910.119 to prevent worker
injuries and fatalities? Please provide any sources, data, or incident
examples related to the hazards associated with the chemicals. What
would be the economic impacts of adding the chemicals to Appendix A?
Are there any special circumstances involving small entities that OSHA
should consider with respect to adding the chemicals to Appendix A?
25. How often should OSHA update the list of highly hazardous
chemicals in Appendix A of Sec. 1910.119?
26. Is there a method, other than periodically updating the list of
highly hazardous chemicals in Appendix A of Sec. 1910.119 through
rulemaking, that OSHA should use to prevent worker injuries and
fatalities? Please explain.
G. Revising the PSM Standard To Require Additional Management-System
Elements
27. Does your facility follow any management-system elements not
required under Sec. 1910.119 for PSM-covered operations? If so, please
describe the additional management-system elements, the safety
benefits, any economic impacts associated with following the elements,
and any special circumstances involving small entities.
28. Would expanding the scope of the PSM standard to require
additional management-system elements, or expanding the scope of
existing PSM management-system elements, prevent worker injuries and
fatalities? If so, please describe the elements, the safety benefits,
any economic impacts associated with expanding the scope of the PSM
standard in this way, and any special circumstances involving small
entities that OSHA should consider.
29. In systems using management and metrics, how do facilities
develop useful leading indicators? Should the PSM standard require
facilities to share these indicators with employees or OSHA?
30. Would expansion of the PSM standard's employee participation
provision to include requirements such as the SEMS stop-work authority,
or other efforts to involve employees in all management-system
elements, prevent worker injuries and fatalities?
31. Are there any other management-system elements in the existing
PSM standard that OSHA should expand with additional requirements
(e.g., a new requirement that employers perform a root-cause analysis
for incidents under Sec. 1910.119(m))? If so, please describe the
additional requirements, the safety benefits, any economic impacts
associated with expanding the PSM elements in this way, and any special
circumstances involving small entities that OSHA should consider.
32. Please provide any data or information on workplace accidents,
near misses, or other safety-related incidents that the employer could
have prevented by following management-system elements not required
under the existing PSM standard.
H. Amending Paragraph (d) of the PSM Standard To Require Evaluation of
Updates to Applicable RAGAGEP
33. From what sources (e.g., codes, standards, published technical
reports, consensus standards) does your facility select applicable
RAGAGEP for operations covered under the PSM standard?
34. Does your facility evaluate updates to its selected RAGAGEP? If
so, how does your facility monitor any updates, and how often do you
evaluate them?
35. Please provide any data or information on workplace accidents,
near misses, or other safety-related incidents involving failure to
evaluate updates to applicable RAGAGEP for PSM-covered operations.
36. What would be an appropriate time period in which to conduct
this evaluation? Would such a requirement be more appropriate in
another paragraph of the PSM standard? For example, should such a
requirement become part of the Process Hazard Analysis revalidation
requirements at 29 CFR 1910.119(e)(5)?
37. Would requiring employers to evaluate updates to applicable
RAGAGEP prevent worker injuries and fatalities? Is there another
approach that can be used to ensure the incorporation of RAGAGEP into
facility operations that is tangible and documentable? What would be
the economic impacts of this requirement? Are there any special
circumstances involving small entities that OSHA should consider with
respect to this option?
I. Clarifying the PSM Standard by Adding a Definition for RAGAGEP
38. What does your facility use as a definition for RAGAGEP?
39. Would adding a definition for RAGAGEP to the PSM standard
improve understanding of PSM requirements and prevent worker injuries
and fatalities? If so, what specific definition for RAGAGEP should OSHA
add to the PSM standard? What would be the economic impacts of adding
such a definition? Are there any special circumstances involving small
entities that OSHA should consider with respect to this option?
40. What criteria does your facility use to develop appropriate
internal standards? For instance, if there is an applicable consensus
standard, what steps do you take to ensure that your internal standards
are at least as protective as the applicable standard?
J. Expanding the Scope of Paragraph (j) To Cover the Mechanical
Integrity of Any Safety-Critical Equipment
41. Does your facility have any equipment not covered under Sec.
1910.119(j) that is critical to process safety? If so, what type(s) of
equipment? Did you identify the equipment as safety-critical through a
PSM process hazard analysis? How did your facility determine that the
equipment was safety-critical, and does your facility treat the
equipment as if it were PSM covered for safety or other reasons? Please
explain.
42. Please provide any data or information on workplace accidents,
near misses, or other safety-related incidents related to the
mechanical integrity of safety-critical equipment not covered under
Sec. 1910.119(j).
43. Would expanding the scope of Sec. 1910.119(j) to cover the
mechanical integrity of all equipment the employer identifies as
critical to process safety, in addition to the equipment listed in
existing Sec. 1910.119(j), prevent worker injuries and fatalities?
What would be the economic impact of expanding the scope of Sec.
1910.119(j) in this way? Are there any special circumstances involving
small entities that OSHA
[[Page 73767]]
should consider with respect to this option?
K. Clarifying Paragraph (l) of the PSM Standard With an Explicit
Requirement That Employers Manage Organizational Changes
44. What do you consider to be an organizational change within the
context of process safety management practices? For example, would you
consider the following, or similar, changes to be organizational
changes: reducing the number of operators in a shift; changing from 5-
day to 7-day operations; changing from 8-hour to 12-hour operator
shifts; replacing a unit manager; relocating a technical group to a
remote corporate location; or changing a supervisory or compensation
structure?
45. If your facility has established and implemented written
procedures for management of organizational changes, please describe
any economic impacts associated with the procedures.
46. Would clarifying Sec. 1910.119(l) with an explicit requirement
that employers manage organizational changes prevent worker injuries
and fatalities? What would be the economic impact of such a
clarification? Are there any special circumstances involving small
entities that OSHA should consider with respect to this option?
47. Please describe any organizational changes made in your
facility or organization that have had the potential to affect process
operations. Were management-of-change procedures followed before making
the changes?
48. What do you consider to be the best safety practices concerning
management of organizational change?
49. Please provide any data or information on workplace accidents,
near misses, or other safety-related incidents involving the failure to
manage organizational change. Would following management-of-change
procedures under Sec. 1910.119(l) prevent these incidents?
L. Revising Paragraph (n) of the PSM Standard To Require Coordination
of Emergency Planning With Local Emergency-Response Authorities
50. Does your facility provide information to, or coordinate
emergency planning with, local emergency-response authorities? If so,
please explain any special circumstances that necessitated the
information sharing or coordination of emergency planning.
51. If OSHA proposes a regulatory amendment to require
coordination, what types of information should OSHA require PSM-covered
facilities to provide to local emergency-response authorities? For
example, should OSHA require employers to provide safety data sheets
for all on-site chemicals, list the quantities of chemicals, list the
location of chemicals, provide block-flow diagrams, list fire-
mitigation systems present, or report known fire and explosion risks in
the facility? What would be the economic impact of requiring employers
to provide such information? Are there any special circumstances
involving small entities that OSHA should consider with respect to this
option? What would be the cost to emergency-response authorities of
coordinating emergency planning with PSM-covered employers?
52. What, if any, steps should OSHA require PSM-covered facilities
to take in coordinating emergency planning with local emergency-
response authorities? What additional benefits would accrue from
requiring training exercises in addition to information sharing? What
would be the economic impact of such requirements, and would there be
any special circumstances involving small entities or security concerns
that OSHA should consider?
53. Please provide any data or information on workplace accidents,
near misses, or other safety-related incidents related to local
emergency response authorities responding to a PSM-covered facility
without adequate information on the chemicals present.
M. Revising Paragraph (o) of the PSM Standard To Require Third-Party
Compliance Audits
54. Does your facility use a third party for conducting compliance
audits under Sec. 1910.119(o) for safety or other reasons? Please
explain.
55. Please provide any data or information on workplace accidents,
near misses, or other safety-related incidents that could have been
prevented or minimized by more effective compliance audits conducted
for operations covered under Sec. 1910.119(o). Were the ineffective
compliance audits conducted by in-house staff or a third party?
56. Would revising Sec. 1910.119(o) to require employers to use a
third party for compliance audits prevent worker injuries and
fatalities? What would be the economic impacts of revising Sec.
1910.119(o) in this way (e.g., typical consultant fees, additional work
hours required, special circumstances involving small entities, etc.)?
57. Should OSHA revise Sec. 1910.119(o) to require employers to
use compliance auditors (internal or third party) with certain minimum
credentials or certifications? If so, what minimum credentials or
certifications should the Agency require? What burden might this place
on small businesses?
58. Should OSHA revise Sec. 1910.119(o)(1) to require a compliance
audit frequency less than every three years?
59. Would revising Sec. 1910.119(o) to require employers to
respond to deficiencies found in the compliance audit within certain
timeframes prevent worker injuries and fatalities? What would you
consider to be an appropriate timeframe?
N. Expanding the Requirements of Sec. 1910.109 To Cover Dismantling
and Disposal of Explosives, Blasting Agents, and Pyrotechnics
60. Does your facility conduct explosives dismantling or disposal
activities not covered under Sec. 1910.109? If so, do you treat these
activities as covered under Sec. 1910.109 for safety or other reasons?
Please explain.
61. Please provide any data or information on workplace accidents,
near misses, or other safety-related incidents involving dismantling or
disposal of explosives, blasting agents, and pyrotechnics. Would
coverage of these dismantling and disposal activities under Sec.
1910.109 prevent such incidents from occurring?
62. Are your operations currently covered under regulations issued
by ATF? Are there specific areas of workplace safety that are not
covered by ATF that should be considered by OSHA? Is there overlap or
inconsistencies between the Requirements of Sec. 1910.109 and ATF
regulations that would need to be addressed before an expansion would
be recommended?
63. What would be the economic impacts if OSHA expanded the scope
of Sec. 1910.109 to cover the dismantling and disposal of explosives,
blasting agents, and pyrotechnics? Are there any special circumstances
involving small entities that OSHA should consider with respect to this
option?
O. Updating Sec. Sec. 1910.106 and 1910.107 Based on the Latest
Applicable Consensus Standards
64. Is your facility covered by Sec. Sec. 1910.106 or 1910.107? If
so, what are the operations covered by the standard(s)?
65. Are there other federal, state, or local requirements that
cover flammable liquids or spray finishing operations in your facility?
If so, do the requirements protect workers more or less than Sec. Sec.
1910.106 and 1910.107? Please explain.
66. Does your facility follow NFPA 30, 30A, or 30B for flammable
liquids,
[[Page 73768]]
or NFPA 33 for spray-finishing operations? If so, which edition(s)? Are
there any other consensus standards applicable to flammable liquids or
spray-finishing operations that your facility follows?
67. On which standards (e.g., consensus, federal, state, local)
were the design and operation of your facility primarily based?
68. Should OSHA replace Sec. Sec. 1910.106 and 1910.107 with the
latest editions of NFPA 30, 30A, 30B, and 33? If so, should OSHA
replace Sec. Sec. 1910.106 and 1910.107 entirely or only in part? What
would be the economic impacts of these options (e.g., cost of
additional equipment, cost of additional training, benefits of quality
management, special circumstances involving small entities, etc.)?
69. Are there gaps in safety coverage in Sec. Sec. 1910.106 or
1910.107? If so, what are the gaps, would NFPA 30, 30A, 30B, and 33
address the gaps, and what would be the economic impacts of addressing
the gaps through rulemaking? Are there any special circumstances
involving small entities that OSHA should consider with respect to
addressing the gaps through rulemaking?
70. Are there any requirements in Sec. Sec. 1910.106 and 1910.107
that prevent worker injuries and fatalities better than the safety
practices in the latest editions of NFPA 30, 30A, 30B, and 33? If so,
which requirements?
71. Please provide any data or information on workplace accidents,
near misses, or other safety-related incidents involving gaps in safety
coverage in Sec. Sec. 1910.106 or 1910.107.
72. Are the Sec. 1910.106 provisions related to facility types
(e.g., bulk plant, chemical plant, distillery) a useful classification
system? If not, what type of a classification system should the
standard use instead? Please explain.
73. If OSHA updates Sec. 1910.106 and 1910.107 through rulemaking,
what revisions to the scope and application of the standards would
provide the best protection to workers?
P. Updating the Regulations Addressing the Storage, Handling, and
Management of Ammonium Nitrate
74. Does your facility store, handle, or manage ammonium nitrate?
If so, in what form (e.g., solid, liquid) and in what grade (e.g., high
density, low density) is the ammonium nitrate? Please explain.
75. Does your facility comply with Sec. 1910.109(i) for the
storage of ammonium nitrate? Are there any other standards, including
consensus standards, applicable to ammonium nitrate storage, handling,
and management that your facility follows? If so, which ones?
76. Please provide any data or information on workplace accidents,
near misses, or other safety-related incidents involving the storage,
handling, and management of ammonium nitrate.
77. How can OSHA update its standards and improve its enforcement
policy relating to the storage, handling, and management of ammonium
nitrate to prevent worker injuries and fatalities? Please discuss the
economic impacts associated with such improvement, including any
special circumstances involving small entities that OSHA should
consider.
Q. Changing Enforcement Policy for the PSM Exemption for Retail
Facilities
78. Does your facility qualify for the PSM exemption for ``retail
facilities'' under OSHA's current enforcement policy? If so, would
changing OSHA's enforcement policy to only exempt facilities in NAICS
sectors 44 and 45 that sell highly hazardous chemicals in small
containers, packages, or allotments to the general public result in PSM
coverage for your facility?
79. Please provide any data or information on workplace accidents,
near misses, or other safety-related incidents involving highly
hazardous chemicals at ``retail facilities'' exempt from PSM coverage
under Sec. 1910.119(a)(2)(i).
80. Please discuss any economic impacts that would result from
changing OSHA's retail-facilities policy to only exempt facilities in
NAICS sectors 44 and 45 that sell highly hazardous chemicals in small
containers, packages, or allotments to the general public. Are there
any special circumstances involving small entities that OSHA should
consider with respect to this option?
81. Is there a definition of ``retail facilities'' that OSHA should
use to protect workers under the PSM standard? Please discuss any
economic impacts associated with your suggested definition. Are there
any special circumstances involving small entities that OSHA should
consider with respect to your or other definitions?
R. Changing Enforcement Policy for Highly Hazardous Chemicals Listed in
Appendix A of the PSM Standard Without Specific Concentrations
82. Does your facility handle any chemicals excluded from PSM
coverage on the basis that the concentration is below the ``maximum
commercial grade''? If so, what are these chemicals and concentrations,
and would OSHA adopting EPA's policy for RMP-listed chemicals in
mixtures as OSHA's enforcement policy for PSM-listed chemicals without
specific concentrations result in PSM coverage of the chemicals in your
facility?
83. Please provide any data or information on workplace accidents,
near misses, or other safety-related incidents involving highly
hazardous chemicals excluded from PSM coverage on the basis that that
the concentration was below the ``maximum commercial grade.''
84. Please discuss any economic impacts that would result from OSHA
adopting EPA's policy for RMP-listed chemicals in mixtures as OSHA's
enforcement policy for PSM-listed chemicals without specific
concentrations. Are there any special circumstances involving small
entities that OSHA should consider with respect to this option?
85. Is there a different enforcement policy that OSHA should use to
protect workers from the hazards associated with the chemicals listed
in Appendix A of the PSM standard without specific concentrations?
Please discuss any economic impacts associated with your suggested
enforcement policy. Are there any special circumstances involving small
entities that OSHA should consider with respect to your suggested
enforcement policy?
Authority and Signature
David Michaels, Ph.D., MPH, Assistant Secretary of Labor for
Occupational Safety and Health, authorized the preparation of this
notice pursuant to 29 U.S.C. 653, 655, and 657, Secretary's Order 1-
2012 (77 FR 3912; Jan. 25, 2012), and 29 CFR part 1911.
David Michaels,
Assistant Secretary of Labor for Occupational Safety and Health.
[FR Doc. 2013-29197 Filed 12-6-13; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4510-26-P