[Federal Register Volume 79, Number 28 (Tuesday, February 11, 2014)]
[Notices]
[Pages 8217-8221]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2014-02874]
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SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION
[Release No. 34-71483; File No. SR-NYSEArca-2014-12]
Self-Regulatory Organizations; NYSE Arca, Inc.; Notice of Filing
and Immediate Effectiveness of a Proposed Rule Change Amending the Fees
for NYSE ArcaBook
February 5, 2014.
Pursuant to Section 19(b)(1) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
(``Act'') \1\ and Rule 19b-4 thereunder,\2\ notice is hereby given that
on January 27, 2014, NYSE Arca, Inc. (the ``Exchange'' or ``NYSE
Arca'') filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (the
``Commission'') the proposed rule change as described in Items I, II,
and III below, which Items have been prepared by the self-regulatory
organization. The Commission is publishing this notice to solicit
comments on the proposed rule change from interested persons.
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\1\ 15 U.S.C. 78s(b)(1).
\2\ 17 CFR 240.19b-4.
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I. Self-Regulatory Organization's Statement of the Terms of Substance
of the Proposed Rule Change
The Exchange proposes to amend the fees for NYSE ArcaBook. The
Exchange proposes to implement the fee changes effective February 1,
2014. The text of the proposed rule change is available on the
Exchange's Web site at www.nyse.com, at the principal office of the
Exchange, and at the Commission's Public Reference Room.
[[Page 8218]]
II. Self-Regulatory Organization's Statement of the Purpose of, and
Statutory Basis for, the Proposed Rule Change
In its filing with the Commission, the self-regulatory organization
included statements concerning the purpose of, and basis for, the
proposed rule change and discussed any comments it received on the
proposed rule change. The text of these statements may be examined at
the places specified in Item IV below. The Exchange has prepared
summaries, set forth in sections A, B, and C below, of the most
significant aspects of such statements.
A. Self-Regulatory Organization's Statement of the Purpose of, and
Statutory Basis for, the Proposed Rule Change
1. Purpose
The Exchange proposes to amend the fees for NYSE ArcaBook. The
Exchange proposes to implement the fee changes effective February 1,
2014.
NYSE ArcaBook is a real-time market data product that is a
compilation of all limit orders resident in the NYSE Arca limit order
book.\3\ The Exchange charges the following monthly display fees for
NYSE ArcaBook:
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\3\ See SR-NYSEArca-2014-07.
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Access fee............................. $750
Redistribution Fee..................... $1,500
Subscriber Fees........................ Tape A & B Securities
(including ETFs)
Professional: $15
Non-professional: $5.
Tape C Securities (excluding
ETFs)
Professional: $15
Non-professional: $5.
Non-professional Fee Cap:
$20,000.
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The Exchange proposes to increase the monthly access fee from $750
to $2,000 and to offer Tape A and B Securities (including ETFs) and
Tape C Securities (excluding ETFs) for a single monthly fee of $40 for
professional subscribers and $10 for non-professional subscribers for
display use. The Exchange would no longer offer separate pricing for
the Tape C Securities (excluding ETFs) data. The Exchange has
determined not to separately offer the Tape C option in order to have
greater ease of management. The Exchange also notes that it has not
increased NYSE ArcaBook access fees or the subscriber fees for display
use since they were originally proposed in 2006.\4\
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\4\ See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 59039 (Dec. 2,
2008), 73 FR 74770 (Dec. 9, 2008) (SR-NYSEArca-2006-21).
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The Exchange proposes to make a technical change to remove the
operative date for the NYSE ArcaBook redistribution fee, but does not
otherwise propose any changes to the NYSE ArcaBook redistribution fee,
non-professional fee cap, or non-display fees at this time. The
Exchange notes that the access fee applies to all users of NYSE
ArcaBook, regardless of whether they elect display, non-display, and/or
managed non-display use.
The Exchange further believes that the proposed rule change is
consistent with the market-based approach of the Securities and
Exchange Commission (``Commission''). The decision of the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in NetCoalition
v. SEC, 615 F.3d 525 (DC Cir. 2010), upheld reliance by the Commission
upon the existence of competitive market mechanisms to set reasonable
and equitably allocated fees for proprietary market data:
In fact, the legislative history indicates that the Congress
intended that the market system `evolve through the interplay of
competitive forces as unnecessary regulatory restrictions are
removed' and that the SEC wield its regulatory power `in those
situations where competition may not be sufficient,' such as in the
creation of a `consolidated transactional reporting system.'
Id. at 535 (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 94-229 at 92 (1975), as reprinted
in 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. 323). The court agreed with the Commission's
conclusion that ``Congress intended that `competitive forces should
dictate the services and practices that constitute the U.S. national
market system for trading equity securities.' '' \5\
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\5\ NetCoalition, 615 F.3d at 535.
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As explained below in the Exchange's Statement on Burden on
Competition, the Exchange believes that there is substantial evidence
of competition in the marketplace for proprietary market data and that
the Commission can rely upon such evidence in concluding that the fees
proposed in this filing are the product of competition and therefore
satisfy the relevant statutory standards.\6\ In addition, the existence
of alternatives to NYSE ArcaBook, including real-time consolidated
data, free delayed consolidated data, and proprietary data from other
sources, as described below, further ensures that the Exchange cannot
set unreasonable fees, or fees that are unreasonably discriminatory,
when vendors and subscribers can elect such alternatives.
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\6\ Section 916 of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act of 2010 (the ``Dodd-Frank Act'') amended
paragraph (A) of Section 19(b)(3) of the Act, 15 U.S.C. 78s(b)(3),
to make clear that all exchange fees for market data may be filed by
exchanges on an immediately effective basis.
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As the NetCoalition decision noted, the Commission is not required
to undertake a cost-of-service or ratemaking approach.\7\ The Exchange
believes that, even if it were possible as a matter of economic theory,
cost-based pricing for non-core market data would be so complicated
that it could not be done practically.\8\
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\7\ NetCoalition, 615 F.3d at 536.
\8\ The Exchange believes that cost-based pricing would be
impractical because it would create enormous administrative burdens
for all parties, including the Commission, to cost-regulate a large
number of participants and standardize and analyze extraordinary
amounts of information, accounts, and reports. In addition, and as
described below, it is impossible to regulate market data prices in
isolation from prices charged by markets for other services that are
joint products. Cost-based rate regulation would also lead to
litigation and may distort incentives, including those to minimize
costs and to innovate, leading to further waste. Under cost-based
pricing, the Commission would be burdened with determining a fair
rate of return, and the industry could experience frequent rate
increases based on escalating expense levels. Even in industries
historically subject to utility regulation, cost-based ratemaking
has been discredited. As such, the Exchange believes that cost-based
ratemaking would be inappropriate for proprietary market data and
inconsistent with Congress's direction that the Commission use its
authority to foster the development of the national market system,
and that market forces will continue to provide appropriate pricing
discipline. See Appendix C to NYSE's comments to the Commission's
2000 Concept Release on the Regulation of Market Information Fees
and Revenues, which can be found on the Commission's Web site at
http://www.sec.gov/rules/concept/s72899/buck1.htm.
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[[Page 8219]]
2. Statutory Basis
The Exchange believes that the proposed rule change is consistent
with the provisions of Section 6 of the Act,\9\ in general, and
Sections 6(b)(4) and 6(b)(5) of the Act,\10\ in particular, in that it
provides an equitable allocation of reasonable fees among its members,
issuers, and other persons using its facilities and is not designed to
permit unfair discrimination among customers, issuers, brokers, or
dealers. The Exchange also believes that the proposed rule change is
consistent with Section 11(A) of the Act \11\ in that it is consistent
with (i) fair competition among brokers and dealers, among exchange
markets, and between exchange markets and markets other than exchange
markets; and (ii) the availability to brokers, dealers, and investors
of information with respect to quotations for and transactions in
securities. Furthermore, the proposed rule change is consistent with
Rule 603 of Regulation NMS,\12\ which provides that any national
securities exchange that distributes information with respect to
quotations for or transactions in an NMS stock do so on terms that are
not unreasonably discriminatory.
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\9\ 15 U.S.C. 78f(b).
\10\ 15 U.S.C. 78f(b)(4), (5).
\11\ 15 U.S.C. 78k-1.
\12\ See 17 CFR 242.603.
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The Exchange believes that the proposed subscriber fees for display
use of NYSE ArcaBook are reasonable because they are less than
subscriber fees that are currently being charged for a comparable
product by at least one other exchange.\13\ The Exchange believes that
the proposed subscriber fees are equitable and not unfairly
discriminatory because the fee structure of differentiated professional
and non-professional fees has long been used by the Exchange for other
products, by other exchanges for their products, and by the CTA and CQ
Plans in order to make data more broadly available to retail
customers.\14\ The Exchange further believes that continuing to offer
NYSE ArcaBook to non-professional users with the same data available to
professional users results in greater equity among data recipients.
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\13\ The NASDAQ Stock Market LLC (``NASDAQ'') offers NASDAQ
Level 2 with NASDAQ OpenView for a monthly fee of $51 per
professional subscriber for NASDAQ, NYSE, and NYSE MKT issues ($45
for NASDAQ issues plus $6 for NYSE and NYSE MKT issues) and $10 per
non-professional subscriber for NASDAQ, NYSE, and NYSE MKT issues
($9 for NASDAQ issues plus $1 for NYSE and NYSE MKT issues). See
NASDAQ Rule 7023(b).
\14\ See, e.g., Securities Exchange Act Release No. 20002, File
No. S7-433 (July 22, 1983) (establishing non-professional fees for
CTA data); NASDAQ Rules 7023(b), 7047.
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The proposed access fee for NYSE ArcaBook also is reasonable
because it is less than or equal to access fees that are currently
charged by other exchanges for comparable products.\15\ The Exchange
believes that the proposed access fee for NYSE ArcaBook is equitable
and not unfairly discriminatory because it will be charged uniformly to
vendors and subscribers that elect to offer NYSE ArcaBook, whether for
display, non-display, and/or managed non-display use.
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\15\ The Exchange's affiliate, NYSE, charges a monthly access
fee of $5,000 for its NYSE OpenBook product. See Securities Exchange
Act Release No. 69278 (Apr. 2, 2013), 78 FR 20973 (Apr. 8, 2013)
(SR-NYSE-2013-25). In addition, NASDAQ charges a monthly access fee
for NASDAQ Level 2 of $3,000 for NASDAQ, NYSE, and NYSE MKT issues
($2,000 direct access fee for NASDAQ issues plus $1,000 direct
access fee for NYSE and NYSE MKT issues). See NASDAQ Rule 7019(b).
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The Exchange has not raised the subscriber fees for display use of
NYSE ArcaBook or access fees for NYSE ArcaBook since the fees were
originally proposed more than seven years ago, in 2006.\16\ During this
time period, the Exchange has enhanced NYSE ArcaBook through delivery
upgrades, and the bandwidth to support NYSE ArcaBook has increased
fivefold. The Exchange believes that the new fees are fair and
reasonable in light of its ongoing effort to improve the delivery
technology for market data.
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\16\ See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 54597 (Oct. 12,
2006), 71 FR 62029 (Oct. 20, 2006) (SR-NYSEArca-2006-21).
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The Exchange also notes that the use of NYSE ArcaBook is entirely
optional. Firms have a wide variety of alternative market data products
from which to choose.\17\ Moreover, the Exchange is not required to
make these proprietary data products available or to offer any specific
pricing alternatives to any customers. For these reasons, the Exchange
believes that the proposed fees are reasonable, equitable, and not
unfairly discriminatory.
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\17\ See supra notes 13 and15.
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B. Self-Regulatory Organization's Statement on Burden on Competition
In accordance with Section 6(b)(8) of the Act,\18\ the Exchange
does not believe that the proposed rule change will impose any burden
on competition that is not necessary or appropriate in furtherance of
the purposes of the Act. An exchange's ability to price its proprietary
data feed products is constrained by (1) the inherent contestability of
the market for proprietary data and actual competition for the sale of
such data, (2) the joint product nature of exchange platforms, and (3)
the existence of alternatives to proprietary data.
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\18\ 15 U.S.C. 78f(b)(8).
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The Existence of Actual Competition. The market for proprietary
data products is currently competitive and inherently contestable
because there is fierce competition for the inputs necessary to the
creation of proprietary data and strict pricing discipline for the
proprietary products themselves. Numerous exchanges compete with each
other for listings and order flow and sales of market data itself,
providing virtually limitless opportunities for entrepreneurs who wish
to compete in any or all of those areas, including producing and
distributing their own market data. Proprietary data products are
produced and distributed by each individual exchange, as well as other
entities, in a vigorously competitive market.
Competitive markets for listings, order flow, executions, and
transaction reports provide pricing discipline for the inputs of
proprietary data products and therefore constrain markets from
overpricing proprietary market data. The U.S. Department of Justice
also has acknowledged the aggressive competition among exchanges,
including for the sale of proprietary market data itself. In 2011,
Assistant Attorney General Christine Varney stated that exchanges
``compete head to head to offer real-time equity data products. These
data products include the best bid and offer of every exchange and
information on each equity trade, including the last sale.'' \19\
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\19\ Press Release, U.S. Department of Justice, Assistant
Attorney General Christine Varney Holds Conference Call Regarding
NASDAQ OMX Group Inc. and IntercontinentalExchange Inc. Abandoning
Their Bid for NYSE Euronext (May 16, 2011), available at http://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/atr/speeches/2011/at-speech-110516.html.
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It is common for broker-dealers to further exploit this recognized
competitive constraint by sending their order flow and transaction
reports to multiple markets, rather than providing them all to a single
market. As a 2010 Commission Concept Release noted, the ``current
market structure can be described as dispersed and complex'' with
``trading volume . . . dispersed among many highly automated trading
centers that compete for order flow in the same stocks'' and ``trading
centers offer[ing] a wide range of services that are designed to
attract different types of market participants with varying trading
needs.'' \20\
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\20\ Concept Release on Equity Market Structure, Securities
Exchange Act Release No. 61358 (Jan. 14, 2010), 75 FR 3594 (Jan. 21,
2010) (File No. S7-02-10). This Concept Release included data from
the third quarter of 2009 showing that no market center traded more
than 20% of the volume of listed stocks, further evidencing the
dispersal of and competition for trading activity. Id. at 3598.
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[[Page 8220]]
In addition, in the case of products that are distributed through
market data vendors, the market data vendors themselves provide
additional price discipline for proprietary data products because they
control the primary means of access to certain end users. These vendors
impose price discipline based upon their business models. For example,
vendors that assess a surcharge on data they sell are able to refuse to
offer proprietary products that their end users do not or will not
purchase in sufficient numbers. Internet portals, such as Google,
impose price discipline by providing only data that they believe will
enable them to attract ``eyeballs'' that contribute to their
advertising revenue. Similarly, vendors will not elect to make
available NYSE ArcaBook unless their subscribers request it, and
subscribers will not elect to purchase it unless it can be used for
profit-generating purposes. All of these operate as constraints on
pricing proprietary data products.
Joint Product Nature of Exchange Platform. Transaction execution
and proprietary data products are complementary in that market data is
both an input and a byproduct of the execution service. In fact, market
data and trade executions are a paradigmatic example of joint products
with joint costs. The decision whether and on which platform to post an
order will depend on the attributes of the platforms where the order
can be posted, including the execution fees, data quality, and price
and distribution of their data products. The more trade executions a
platform does, the more valuable its market data products become.
The costs of producing market data include not only the costs of
the data distribution infrastructure, but also the costs of designing,
maintaining, and operating the exchange's transaction execution
platform and the cost of regulating the exchange to ensure its fair
operation and maintain investor confidence. The total return that a
trading platform earns reflects the revenues it receives from both
products and the joint costs it incurs. Moreover, an exchange's broker-
dealer customers view the costs of transaction executions and market
data as a unified cost of doing business with the exchange.
Other market participants have noted that the liquidity provided by
the order book, trade execution, core market data, and non-core market
data are joint products of a joint platform and have common costs.\21\
The Exchange also notes that the economics literature confirms that
there is no way to allocate common costs between joint products that
would shed any light on competitive or efficient pricing.\22\
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\21\ See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 62887 (Sept. 10,
2010), 75 FR 57092, 57095 (Sept. 17, 2010) (SR-Phlx-2010-121);
Securities Exchange Act Release No. 62907 (Sept. 14, 2010), 75 FR
57314, 57317 (Sept. 20, 2010) (SR-NASDAQ-2010-110); and Securities
Exchange Act Release No. 62908 (Sept. 14, 2010), 75 FR 57321, 57324
(Sept. 20, 2010) (SR-NASDAQ-2010-111) (``all of the exchange's costs
are incurred for the unified purposes of attracting order flow,
executing and/or routing orders, and generating and selling data
about market activity. The total return that an exchange earns
reflects the revenues it receives from the joint products and the
total costs of the joint products.''); see also Securities Exchange
Act Release Nos. 71217 (Dec. 31, 2013), 79 FR 875, 877 (Jan. 7,
2014) (SR-NASDAQ-2013-162) and 70945 (Nov. 26, 2013), 78 FR 72740,
72741 (Dec. 3, 2013) (SR-NASDAQ-2013-142) (``Transaction execution
and proprietary data products are complementary in that market data
is both an input and a byproduct of the execution service. In fact,
market data and trade execution are a paradigmatic example of joint
products with joint costs.'').
\22\ See generally Mark Hirschey, Fundamentals of Managerial
Economics, at 600 (2009) (``It is important to note, however, that
although it is possible to determine the separate marginal costs of
goods produced in variable proportions, it is impossible to
determine their individual average costs. This is because common
costs are expenses necessary for manufacture of a joint product.
Common costs of production--raw material and equipment costs,
management expenses, and other overhead--cannot be allocated to each
individual by-product on any economically sound basis. . . . Any
allocation of common costs is wrong and arbitrary.''). This is not
new economic theory. See, e.g., F.W. Taussig, ``A Contribution to
the Theory of Railway Rates,'' Quarterly Journal of Economics V(4)
438, 465 (July 1891) (``Yet, surely, the division is purely
arbitrary. These items of cost, in fact, are jointly incurred for
both sorts of traffic; and I cannot share the hope entertained by
the statistician of the Commission, Professor Henry C. Adams, that
we shall ever reach a mode of apportionment that will lead to
trustworthy results.'').
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Analyzing the cost of market data product production and
distribution in isolation from the cost of all of the inputs supporting
the creation of market data and market data products will inevitably
underestimate the cost of the data and data products. Thus, because it
is impossible to obtain the data inputs to create market data products
without a fast, technologically robust, and well-regulated execution
system, system costs and regulatory costs affect the price of both
obtaining the market data itself and creating and distributing market
data products. It would be equally misleading, however, to attribute
all of an exchange's costs to the market data portion of an exchange's
joint products. Rather, all of an exchange's costs are incurred for the
unified purposes of attracting order flow, executing and/or routing
orders, and generating and selling data about market activity. The
total return that an exchange earns reflects the revenues it receives
from the joint products and the total costs of the joint products.
The level of competition and contestability in the market is
evident in the numerous alternative venues that compete for order flow,
including 14 equities self-regulatory organization (``SRO'') markets,
as well as internalizing broker-dealers (``BDs'') and various forms of
alternative trading systems (``ATSs''), including dark pools and
electronic communication networks (``ECNs''). Competition among trading
platforms can be expected to constrain the aggregate return that each
platform earns from the sale of its joint products, but different
platforms may choose from a range of possible, and equally reasonable,
pricing strategies as the means of recovering total costs. For example,
some platforms may choose to pay rebates to attract orders, charge
relatively low prices for market data products (or provide market data
products free of charge), and charge relatively high prices for
accessing posted liquidity. Other platforms may choose a strategy of
paying lower rebates (or no rebates) to attract orders, setting
relatively high prices for market data products, or setting relatively
low prices for accessing posted liquidity. In this environment, there
is no economic basis for regulating maximum prices for one of the joint
products in an industry in which suppliers face competitive constraints
with regard to the joint offering.
Existence of Alternatives. The large number of SROs, BDs, and ATSs
that currently produce proprietary data or are currently capable of
producing it provides further pricing discipline for proprietary data
products. Each SRO, ATS, and BD is currently permitted to produce
proprietary data products, and many currently do or have announced
plans to do so, including but not limited to the Exchange, NYSE, NYSE
MKT, NASDAQ OMX, BATS, and Direct Edge.
The fact that proprietary data from ATSs, BDs, and vendors can
bypass SROs is significant in two respects. First, non-SROs can compete
directly with SROs for the production and sale of proprietary data
products. Second, because a single order or transaction report can
appear in an SRO proprietary product, a non-SRO proprietary product, or
both, the amount of data available via proprietary products is greater
in size than the actual number of orders and transaction reports that
exist in the marketplace. Because market data users can thus find
suitable substitutes for most proprietary market data
[[Page 8221]]
products,\23\ a market that overprices its market data products stands
a high risk that users may substitute another source of market data
information for its own.
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\23\ See supra notes 13-15.
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Those competitive pressures imposed by available alternatives are
evident in the Exchange's proposed pricing. As noted above, the
proposed subscriber and access fees for NYSE ArcaBook are generally
lower than or the same as the subscriber and access fees charged by
other exchanges such as NYSE and NASDAQ for comparable products.\24\
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\24\ Id.
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In addition to the competition and price discipline described
above, the market for proprietary data products is also highly
contestable because market entry is rapid and inexpensive. The history
of electronic trading is replete with examples of entrants that swiftly
grew into some of the largest electronic trading platforms and
proprietary data producers: Archipelago, Bloomberg Tradebook, Island,
RediBook, Attain, TrackECN, BATS, and Direct Edge. Today, BATS and
Direct Edge provide certain market data at no charge on their Web sites
in order to attract more order flow, and use revenue rebates from
resulting additional executions to maintain low execution charges for
their users.\25\
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\25\ This is simply a securities market-specific example of the
well-established principle that in certain circumstances more sales
at lower margins can be more profitable than fewer sales at higher
margins; this example is additional evidence that market data is an
inherent part of a market's joint platform.
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Further, data products are valuable to certain end users only
insofar as they provide information that end users expect will assist
them or their customers. The Exchange believes that only vendors and
subscribers that expect to derive a reasonable benefit from the
ArcaBook will choose to pay the attendant monthly fees.
In establishing the proposed fees, the Exchange considered the
competitiveness of the market for proprietary data and all of the
implications of that competition. The Exchange believes that it has
considered all relevant factors and has not considered irrelevant
factors in order to establish fair, reasonable, and not unreasonably
discriminatory fees and an equitable allocation of fees among all
users. The existence of alternatives to the Exchange's products,
including proprietary data from other sources, ensures that the
Exchange cannot set unreasonable fees, or fees that are unreasonably
discriminatory, when vendors and subscribers can elect these
alternatives or choose not to purchase a specific proprietary data
product if its cost to purchase is not justified by the returns any
particular vendor or subscriber would achieve through the purchase.
C. Self-Regulatory Organization's Statement on Comments on the Proposed
Rule Change Received From Members, Participants, or Others
No written comments were solicited or received with respect to the
proposed rule change.
III. Date of Effectiveness of the Proposed Rule Change and Timing for
Commission Action
The foregoing rule change is effective upon filing pursuant to
Section 19(b)(3)(A) \26\ of the Act and subparagraph (f)(2) of Rule
19b-4 \27\ thereunder, because it establishes a due, fee, or other
charge imposed by the Exchange.
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\26\ 15 U.S.C. 78s(b)(3)(A).
\27\ 17 CFR 240.19b-4(f)(2).
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At any time within 60 days of the filing of the proposed rule
change, the Commission summarily may temporarily suspend such rule
change if it appears to the Commission that such action is necessary or
appropriate in the public interest, for the protection of investors, or
otherwise in furtherance of the purposes of the Act. If the Commission
takes such action, the Commission shall institute proceedings to
determine whether the proposed rule should be approved or disapproved.
IV. Solicitation of Comments
Interested persons are invited to submit written data, views, and
arguments concerning the foregoing, including whether the proposed rule
change is consistent with the Act. Comments may be submitted by any of
the following methods:
Electronic Comments
Use the Commission's Internet comment form (http://www.sec.gov/rules/sro.shtml); or
Send an email to [email protected]. Please include
File Number SR-NYSEArca-2014-12 on the subject line.
Paper Comments
Send paper comments in triplicate to Elizabeth M. Murphy,
Secretary, Securities and Exchange Commission, 100 F Street NE.,
Washington, DC 20549-1090.
All submissions should refer to File Number SR-NYSEArca-2014-12. This
file number should be included on the subject line if email is used. To
help the Commission process and review your comments more efficiently,
please use only one method. The Commission will post all comments on
the Commission's Internet Web site (http://www.sec.gov/rules/sro.shtml). Copies of the submission, all subsequent amendments, all
written statements with respect to the proposed rule change that are
filed with the Commission, and all written communications relating to
the proposed rule change between the Commission and any person, other
than those that may be withheld from the public in accordance with the
provisions of 5 U.S.C. 552, will be available for Web site viewing and
printing in the Commission's Public Reference Room, 100 F Street NE.,
Washington, DC 20549, on official business days between the hours of
10:00 a.m. and 3:00 p.m. Copies of the filing also will be available
for inspection and copying at the principal office of the Exchange. All
comments received will be posted without change; the Commission does
not edit personal identifying information from submissions. You should
submit only information that you wish to make available publicly. All
submissions should refer to File Number SR-NYSEArca-2014-12 and should
be submitted on or before March 4, 2014.
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\28\ 17 CFR 200.30-3(a)(12).
For the Commission, by the Division of Trading and Markets,
pursuant to delegated authority.\28\
Kevin M. O'Neill,
Deputy Secretary.
[FR Doc. 2014-02874 Filed 2-10-14; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 8011-01-P