[Federal Register Volume 79, Number 46 (Monday, March 10, 2014)]
[Notices]
[Pages 13375-13377]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2014-05136]
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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Federal Aviation Administration
Waiver of Autonomous Reentry Restriction for a Reentry Vehicle
AGENCY: Office of Commercial Space Transportation; Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA), DOT.
ACTION: Notice of waiver.
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SUMMARY: This notice concerns three petitions for waiver related to the
launch and reentry of an Orion Multi-Purpose Crew Vehicle. In the first
of these petitions, United Launch Alliance (ULA) requested a waiver of
the FAA's requirement that the expected number of casualties for a
launch not exceed 0.00003 casualties (Ec <= 30 x
10-\6\) from debris. For the second and third petitions,
Lockheed Martin (Lockheed) requested waivers of the FAA's regulatory
requirements that (1) the expected number of casualties for the entire
mission, including launch and reentry, not exceed 30 x
10-\6\ casualties from debris; and (2) an operator only
initiate reentry of a reentry vehicle by command. The FAA elects to
consider all three petitions together because all three involve the
same essential facts and risk analyses. The FAA grants all three
petitions.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For technical questions concerning
this waiver, contact Charles P. Brinkman, Aerospace Engineer, AST-200,
Office of Commercial Space Transportation (AST), Federal Aviation
Administration, 800 Independence Avenue SW., Washington, DC 20591;
telephone (202) 267-7715; email: [email protected]. For legal
questions concerning this waiver, contact Laura Montgomery, Manager,
Space Law Branch (AGC-250), Regulations Division, Office of the Chief
Counsel, Federal Aviation Administration, 800 Independence Avenue SW.,
Washington, DC 20591; telephone (202) 267-3150; email:
[email protected].
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Background
Lockheed and ULA are private commercial space flight companies.
Lockheed entered into a contract with the National Aeronautics and
Space Administration (NASA) to provide the first orbital flight test
for NASA's Orion Multi-Purpose Crew Vehicle Program. Lockheed has
contracted with ULA to provide launch services for the mission.
The FAA is responsible for licensing, in relevant part, the launch
of a launch vehicle and the reentry of a reentry vehicle, under
authority granted to the Secretary of Transportation by 51 USC Subtitle
V, chapter 509 (Chapter 509), and delegated to the FAA's Administrator
and Associate Administrator for Commercial Space Transportation.
The mission at issue in this notice is Orion Exploration Flight
Test 1, launching from Cape Canaveral Air Force Station in Florida. The
mission tests the Orion Multi-Purpose Crew Vehicle in an un-crewed,
limited-capability configuration, and serves as a stepping stone
towards a crew-capable vehicle that would enable human exploration
missions beyond Earth orbit. The mission is comprised of a launch,
which is conducted by ULA, and a reentry, which is conducted by
Lockheed. The launch vehicle is ULA's Delta IV Heavy launch vehicle,
which consists of a Common Booster Core (CBC) as the first stage with
two additional strap-on CBCs and a Delta IV Cryogenic Second Stage
(DCSS). The first burn of the DCSS places the Orion and the DCSS in
orbit, and a second DCSS burn places the Orion into a highly
elliptical, negative-perigee trajectory, to simulate the thermal
conditions and high reentry speeds the module would experience
returning from missions beyond Earth orbit. After separating from the
DCSS, the Orion module reenters over the eastern Pacific Ocean,
splashing down 231 nautical miles west of Baja California, Mexico.
Section 417.107(b)(1) of Title 14 of the Code of Federal
Regulations (14 CFR) prohibits the launch of a launch vehicle if the
expected casualty (Ec) for the flight exceeds 30 x
10-\6\ for, in relevant part, impacting inert and explosive
debris (debris). On February 27, 2014, ULA petitioned for a waiver
because the launch has a debris risk of 163 x 10-\6\.
Section 435.35 establishes acceptable risk for reentry vehicles,
and requires operators to comply with Sec. Sec. 431.35(a) and
431.35(b)(1)(i),\1\ which in turn prohibit an Ec for debris
in excess of 30 x 10-\6\, for both launch and reentry
combined. On February 27, 2014, Lockheed also petitioned for a waiver
because the mission has a combined risk of 164 x 10-\6\.
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\1\ Although the module is a reentry vehicle and not a reusable
launch vehicle, 14 CFR 435.33 incorporates and applies Sec. 431.43
to all reentry vehicles.
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Section 431.43(e) requires any reusable launch vehicle (RLV) that
enters Earth orbit to be operated such that the vehicle operator can
monitor and verify the status of safety critical systems before
enabling reentry. This section also prohibits operators from designing
a system to reenter autonomously. On February 27, 2014, Lockheed
requested a waiver from this prohibition.
Waiver Criteria
Chapter 509 allows the FAA to waive a license requirement if the
waiver (1) will not jeopardize public health and safety, and safety of
property; (2) is in the public interest; and (3) will not jeopardize
national security and foreign policy interests of the United States. 51
U.S.C. 50905(b)(3); 14 CFR 404.5(b).
A. Sixty Day Requirement
Section 404.3(b)(5) requires that a petition for waiver be
submitted at least
[[Page 13376]]
sixty days before the proposed effective date of the waiver, which in
this case would be March 8, 2014, the date by which the FAA must make
its licensing determination. This section also provides that a petition
may be submitted late for good cause.
Here, ULA and Lockheed submitted their waiver petitions on February
27, 2014, less than sixty days before the statutory deadline for the
FAA's license determination. However, both launch operators have shared
drafts of their petitions with the FAA, thus providing the FAA with
sufficiently early access to the information to review the information
in a timely fashion. Accordingly, the FAA is able to find good cause.
B. Public Health and Safety, and Safety of Property
For the purposes of clarity, the FAA's analysis of public health
and safety, and the safety of property, is broken down into subsections
reflecting the various issues raised by the risk waivers and autonomous
reentry waivers, respectively.
1. Launch and Mission Risk
Although the FAA's regulations prohibit debris risk in excess of 30
x 10-\6\, a waiver is warranted in this case because the
United States Government's experience conducting other space missions
with risk in excess of 100 x 10-\6\ demonstrates that the
risks of this mission are consistent with the public health and safety,
and the safety of property. ULA and Lockheed provided risk analyses for
both launch and reentry, respectively, but it was the FAA who
calculated the total mission risk for debris as 165 x
10-\6\. That number may be broken down as follows:
--20 x 10-\6\ from launch, with approximately 10 x
10-\6\ attributable to local area risk and approximately 10
x 10-\6\ attributable to overflight (downrange) risk;
--143 x 10-\6\ from random and off-target reentry of the
DCSS during the second DCSS burn;
--<1 x 10-\6\ for reentry of the Orion module
The United States Government has repeatedly accepted risk for
government launches in excess of the FAA's 30 x 10-\6\ and
in excess of 100 x 10-\6\, without negative consequences for
safety. For example, the current Ec requirement for
government launches from U.S. National Test Ranges is 1 x
10-\4\ (equal to 100 x 10-\6\), encompassing all
risk from debris, toxics, and overpressure. See Air Force Instruction
91-217, Space Safety and Mishap Prevention Program (2010). Moreover,
the Space Shuttle used a debris risk criterion of 200 x
10-\6\ for launch risk to the public. See NASA's
Implementation Plan for Space Shuttle Return to Flight and Beyond, Vol.
1 Final Edition, at 2-39 (May 15, 2007). And, in 2005, the U.S. Air
Force approved a government launch of a Titan where the risk ranged
from 145 to 317 x 10-\6\. Dept. of the Air Force Memorandum,
Overflight Risk Exceedance Waiver for Titan IV B-30 Mission (Apr. 4,
2005).
Additionally, in 2012, the FAA granted a waiver to SpaceX under
similar circumstances. Waiver of Acceptable Risk Restriction for Launch
and Reentry, Notice of Waiver, 77 FR 24556 (Apr. 24, 2012). SpaceX's
2012 mission was also NASA-sponsored; involved a test of the company's
reentry vehicle, the Dragon module; and posed an estimated total
mission risk from debris of between 98 and 121 x 10-\6\. Id.
ULA's launch risk of 163 x 10-\6\ is less than the risk
approved for these government systems. Accordingly, granting a waiver
of Sec. Sec. 417.107(b)(1) and 431.35(b)(1)(i) in this case does not
jeopardize the public health and safety, or the safety of property.
2. Safety of Autonomous Reentry Waiver
Because Orion's reentry system allows Lockheed to identify
anomalies or other non-compliant conditions, a waiver allowing
autonomous reentry in this instance would not jeopardize the public
health and safety, or the safety of property. In 1999, in the preamble
to the reentry-rule NPRM, the FAA expressed concern that autonomous
reentry was not adequately safe. Commercial Space Transportation
Reusable Launch Vehicle and Reentry Licensing Regulations, Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking, 64 FR 19626, 19645 (Apr. 21, 1999). The FAA was
specifically concerned about the possibility that anomalies or other
non-compliant conditions occurring in then-existing technology would
not be identified prior to an autonomous reentry initiation. Id. By
requiring the capability for human intervention, however, the FAA did
not intend to permanently foreclose the use of autonomous systems or
autonomous decision-making. In fact, the agency expressly acknowledged
that safer autonomous systems were feasible, and that greater levels of
confidence in a particular system could cause the agency to change its
position. Commercial Space Transportation Reusable Launch Vehicle and
Reentry Licensing Regulations, Final Rule, 65 FR 56618, 56641 (Sept.
19, 2000). Despite its concerns, the FAA retained the authority to
waive the autonomous reentry restriction. Id. Lockheed's proposed
approach to reentry addresses the concerns underlying the FAA's
regulatory requirements. Under Lockheed's proposed plan, Lockheed would
use two means of detecting anomalies and non-compliant conditions.
Lockheed's Flight Control Team can monitor and control the module, and
the Orion module monitors itself real-time.
ULA's proven DCSS system propels the module to a targeted reentry
location over 200 miles into the Pacific Ocean. In a nominal reentry,
the Orion module waits for the DCSS to signal that the module is at its
pre-determined time for separation, the DCSS thrusters are inhibited,
and the vehicle is operating within pre-determined state vector rate
requirements. The Orion then autonomously commands its separation from
the DCSS and activates the module's propulsion system. Each string of
Orion thrusters is capable of providing closed-loop attitude control in
the pitch, yaw, and roll axes, as well as translational delta-velocity.
Given the trajectory and landing location chosen for the mission,
however, combined with the limited thrust performance capability of the
module's individual thrusters and limited total onboard propellant, the
module does not have the propulsive capability to move its impact point
over land following DCSS separation.
While the module is in flight, Lockheed's Flight Control Team is
capable of receiving and monitoring real-time vehicle telemetry
transmissions. By doing so, the team will be able to detect anomalies
and non-compliant conditions. In the event the Flight Control Team
detects an off-nominal condition, the team can send several pre-
approved contingency commands to the module to mitigate loss of vehicle
and protect public safety. In the event a communications failure causes
the Flight Control Team to lose direct insight into the raw health-and-
status telemetry data, the module has the ability to autonomously guide
itself to its pre-determined landing site. This autonomous capability
allows the module to safely reenter, descend, land, and safe itself
post-splashdown--even after a communications failure with the ground.
In addition to the systems already described, the Orion module
itself has the ability to identify anomalies or other non-compliant
conditions. Orion has the ability to monitor its safety-critical
systems in real-time. It has a space-grade vehicle management computer
[[Page 13377]]
with redundant flight control modules. It has the ability to check the
validity of its data by reviewing--using built-in channel selection
criteria--data received from redundant sensors. The redundant sensors
include redundant GPS receiver antennas and redundant, space-grade
inertial measurement units.
Also playing an instrumental role in the FAA's ability to grant a
waiver is the fact that Orion is equipped with a number of mitigating
features. First, Orion has a ``cold-restart'' capability and self-
checking pair processors to maintain proper vehicle commanding after
any unexpected power cycle, radiation upset, or other off-nominal event
that would require an automatic restart of the module's computing
system. Also, Orion's computing system has fail-silent functionality to
prevent off-nominal corrupted or inadvertent vehicle commanding.
Finally, Orion has two independent and redundant propulsion strings,
which ensure that even if one fails the propulsion system will still
perform the planned reentry.
C. Public Interest
The FAA looks to its enabling statute to determine how Congress has
defined the public interest. The FAA, through AST, implements the
agency's statutory mandate to encourage the development of commercial
space capabilities and the continuous improvement of the safety of
launch vehicles designed to carry passengers. 51 U.S.C. 50901(b).
ULA and Lockheed's petitions to waive the FAA's risk and reentry
restrictions are consistent with the public interest because the test
flight is necessary to the development of NASA's human-missions
capability beyond Earth orbit.
D. National Security and Foreign Policy Interests
The FAA has not identified any national security or foreign policy
implications associated with granting this waiver.
Summary and Conclusion
The FAA determines that the waivers associated with this mission
will not jeopardize public health and safety or safety of property. In
addition, the waivers are in the public interest because they
accomplish the goals of Chapter 509 and do not unduly increase risk to
the public. Finally, they will not jeopardize national security and
foreign policy interests of the United States. The FAA therefore waives
the requirements of 14 CFR 417.107(b)(1) and 431.35(b)(1)(i) for launch
and mission risk, respectively, and of 14 CFR 431.43(e) for a commanded
reentry.
Issued in Washington, DC, on February 28, 2014.
Kenneth Wong,
Licensing and Evaluation Division Manager.
[FR Doc. 2014-05136 Filed 3-7-14; 8:45 am]
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