[Federal Register Volume 79, Number 69 (Thursday, April 10, 2014)]
[Notices]
[Pages 19942-19947]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2014-07993]
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SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION
[Release No. 34-71874; File No. SR-NASDAQ-2014-029]
Self-Regulatory Organizations; The NASDAQ Stock Market LLC;
Notice of Filing and Immediate Effectiveness of Proposed Rule Change
Relating to Managed Data Solution for Non-Display Usage
April 4, 2014.
Pursuant to Section 19(b)(1) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
(``Act''),\1\ and Rule 19b-4 thereunder,\2\ notice is hereby given that
on March 21, 2014, The NASDAQ Stock Market LLC (``NASDAQ'' or
``Exchange'') filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission
(``SEC'' or ``Commission'') the proposed rule change to modify rules of
the NASDAQ Options Market, LLC (``NOM'') as described in Items I, II,
and III, below, which Items have been prepared by NASDAQ. The
Commission is publishing this notice to solicit comments on the
proposed rule change from interested persons.
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\1\ 15 U.S.C. 78s(b)(1).
\2\ 17 CFR 240.19b-4.
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I. Self-Regulatory Organization's Statement of the Terms of Substance
of the Proposed Rule Change
NASDAQ proposes to add new Section 11 (Managed Data Solutions) to
the NOM rule book to establish
[[Page 19943]]
Managed Data Solution fees for Non-Display Usage.
While the changes proposed herein are effective upon filing, the
Exchange has designated that the amendments be operative on April 1,
2014.
The text of the proposed rule change is available on the Exchange's
Web site at http://www.nasdaq.cchwallstreet.com, at the principal
office of the Exchange, and at the Commission's Public Reference Room.
II. Self-Regulatory Organization's Statement of the Purpose of, and
Statutory Basis for, the Proposed Rule Change
In its filing with the Commission, the Exchange included statements
concerning the purpose of and basis for the proposed rule change. The
text of these statements may be examined at the places specified in
Item IV below. The Exchange has prepared summaries, set forth in
sections A, B, and C below, of the most significant aspects of such
statements.
A. Self-Regulatory Organization's Statement of the Purpose of, and
Statutory Basis for, the Proposed Rule Change
1. Purpose
The purpose of the proposed rule change is to modify Chapter XV
(Options Pricing) by adding proposed new Section 11 in the NOM rule
book to establish Managed Data Solution fees. The Exchange is proposing
to create a new data distribution model (a Managed Data Solution for
Non-Display Usage) to further the distribution of Best of NASDAQ
Options and Itch to Trade Options (``BONO and ITTO''), (together ``NOM
data'').
The proposed Managed Data Solution for Non-Display Usage is similar
to data distribution models currently in use and aligns the Exchange
with other markets.\3\
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\3\ See Securities Exchange Act Release Nos. 70748 (October 23,
2013), 78 FR 64569 (October 29, 2013) (SR-Phlx-2013-105) (notice of
filing and immediate effectiveness of proposed rule change to
establish non-display Managed Data Solution for Phlx); 70269 (August
27, 2013), 78 FR 54336 (September 3, 2013) (SR-NASDAQ-2013-106)
(notice of filing and immediate effectiveness of proposed rule
change to establish non-display Managed Data Solution for NASDAQ);
and 69182 (March 19, 2013), 78 FR 18378 (March 26, 2013) (SR-Phlx-
2013-28) (notice of filing and immediate effectiveness of proposed
rule change to establish non-display Managed Data Solution for Phlx
equities market PSX). See also Securities Exchange Act Release No.
69041 (March 5, 2013), 78 FR 15791 (March 12, 2013) (SR-BX-2013-018)
(notice of filing and immediate effectiveness of proposed rule
change to establish Managed Data Solution for BX).
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The Managed Data Solution proposal offers a delivery method to
firms seeking simplified market data administration. The Managed Data
Solution for Non-Display Usage may be offered by Distributors \4\
externally distributing data to clients and/or client organizations
that are using the NOM data internally for Non-Display Usage. This new
pricing and administrative option is in response to industry demand, as
well as due to changes in the technology used to distribute market
data. As such, rather than substantive changes the proposal reflects
current data distribution practices in the industry. Distributors
offering Managed Data Solutions for Non-Display Usage continue to be
fee liable for the applicable distributor, annual administrative and
other applicable fees for the receipt and distribution of NOM data.
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\4\ ``Distributor'' shall mean the same as in NOM Chapter XV,
Section 4(b). Proposed Chapter XV, Section 11(b).
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This Managed Data Solution for Non-Display Usage is a delivery
option that will assess a new, innovative fee schedule to Distributors
of NOM data that provide data feed solutions such as an Application
Programming Interface (API) or similar automated delivery solutions to
Recipients for Non-Display Usage with only limited entitlement controls
(e.g., usernames and/or passwords) (``Managed Data Recipients'').
However, the Distributor must first agree to reformat, redisplay and/or
alter the NOM data prior to retransmission, but not to affect the
integrity of the NOM data and not to render it inaccurate, unfair,
uninformative, fictitious, misleading, or discriminatory. A Managed
Data Solution for Non-Display Usage is any retransmission data product
containing NOM data offered by a Distributor where the Distributor
manages and monitors, but does not control, the information and the
Recipient of a Managed Data Solution may use the information for
internal Non-Display purposes only and may not distribute the
information outside of their organization. However, the Distributor
does maintain contracts with the Managed Data Recipients and is liable
for any unauthorized use by the Managed Data Recipients under a Managed
Data Solution.
Currently, the Exchange does not distinguish between Managed Data
Solution Recipients and a recipient of an uncontrolled data product.
Some Distributors believe that the Managed Data Solution for Non-
Display Usage is a viable alternative to an uncontrolled data product.
Some Distributors have even delayed deploying new NOM data offerings,
pending the initiation of Managed Data Solutions for Non-Display Usage.
Thus, offering a Managed Data Solution fee schedule would not only
result in the Exchange offering lower fees for existing Managed Data
Recipients utilizing a Managed Data Solution, but will allow new
Distributors to deliver Managed Data Solutions to new clients, thereby
increasing transparency of the market.
The Exchange proposes to establish a monthly Managed Data Solution
Administration fee and a monthly Subscriber \5\ fee for Distributors
and Subscribers that adopt the Managed Data Solution for Non-Display
Usage.\6\ The proposed fees for Managed Data Solutions products for
Non-Display Usage--ITTO would be $500/mo per Distributor and $125/mo
per Subscriber; and for Non-Display Usage--BONO would be $500/mo per
Distributor and $125/mo per Subscriber.\7\ The Exchange proposes to
establish a Managed Data Solution for Non-Display Usage only, as is
done on other markets. The Exchange believes that the proposal is in
line with current market practice.\8\
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\5\ ``Subscriber'' shall mean a device or computer terminal or
an automated service which is entitled to receive Information.
Proposed Chapter XV Section 11(c).
\6\ Without a Managed Data Solution as proposed herein, the
current fee for internal distribution that is not a Managed Data
Solution but rather an uncontrolled NOM data product with a
distributor fee of $1,500 per month would apply (along with a $5 or
$10 professional subscriber fee). Per the proposal for the Managed
Data Solution, on the other hand, the Managed Data Recipient fee for
Non-Display internal use of NOM Orders managed data would be $125
per Subscriber for each of ITTO and BONO, thereby providing a
reduced cost option where the data is for Non-Display internal use
only.
\7\ The proposed monthly fee would be in addition to the monthly
Market Data Distributor fee of $2,000 (for external usage) currently
set forth in the Options Schedule in NOM Chapter XV for recipients
of BONO and ITTO options data feeds.
\8\ The Exchange believes that most firms, as an example,
currently use BONO and ITTO options data feeds in non-display
format.
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2. Statutory Basis
The Exchange believes that the proposed rule change is consistent
with the provisions of Section 6 of the Act,\9\ in general, and with
Section 6(b)(4) of the Act,\10\ in particular, in that it provides an
equitable allocation of reasonable fees among Subscribers and
Recipients of NOM data. In adopting Regulation NMS, the Commission
granted self-regulatory organizations (``SROs'') and broker-dealers
(``BDs'') increased authority and flexibility to offer new and unique
market data to the
[[Page 19944]]
public. It was believed that this authority would expand the amount of
data available to consumers, and also spur innovation and competition
for the provision of market data.
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\9\ 15 U.S.C. 78f.
\10\ 15 U.S.C. 78f(b)(4).
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The Commission concluded that Regulation NMS--by lessening the
regulation of the market in proprietary data--would itself further the
Act's goals of facilitating efficiency and competition:
[E]fficiency is promoted when broker-dealers who do not need the
data beyond the prices, sizes, market center identifications of the
NBBO and consolidated last sale information are not required to
receive (and pay for) such data. The Commission also believes that
efficiency is promoted when broker-dealers may choose to receive
(and pay for) additional market data based on their own internal
analysis of the need for such data.\11\
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\11\ Securities Exchange Act Release No. 51808 (June 9, 2005),
70 FR 37496 (June 29, 2005).
By removing ``unnecessary regulatory restrictions'' on the ability of
exchanges to sell their own data, Regulation NMS advanced the goals of
the Act and the principles reflected in its legislative history. If the
free market should determine whether proprietary data is sold to BDs at
all, it follows that the price at which such data is sold should be set
by the market as well.
The decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia Circuit in NetCoaliton v. SEC, 615 F.3d 525 (D.C. Cir.
2010) (``NetCoalition I''), upheld the Commission's reliance upon
competitive markets to set reasonable and equitably allocated fees for
market data. ``In fact, the legislative history indicates that the
Congress intended that the market system `evolve through the interplay
of competitive forces as unnecessary regulatory restrictions are
removed' and that the SEC wield its regulatory power `in those
situations where competition may not be sufficient,' such as in the
creation of a `consolidated transactional reporting system.'
NetCoaltion I, at 535 (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 94-229, at 92 (1975), as
reprinted in 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. 321, 323). The court agreed with the
Commission's conclusion that ``Congress intended that `competitive
forces should dictate the services and practices that constitute the
U.S. national market system for trading equity securities.' '' \12\
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\12\ NetCoalition I, at 535.
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The court in NetCoalition I, while upholding the Commission's
conclusion that competitive forces may be relied upon to establish the
fairness of prices, nevertheless concluded that the record in that case
did not adequately support the Commission's conclusions as to the
competitive nature of the market for NYSE Arca's data product at issue
in that case. As explained below in the Exchange's Statement on Burden
on Competition, however, the Exchange believes that there is
substantial evidence of competition in the marketplace for data that
was not in the record in the NetCoalition I case, and that the
Commission is entitled to rely upon such evidence in concluding that
the fees established in this filing are the product of competition, and
therefore in accordance with the relevant statutory standards.\13\
Moreover, the Exchange further notes that the product at issue in this
filing--NOM Managed Data Solutions for Non-Display Usage fees--is quite
different from the NYSE Arca depth-of-book data product at issue in
NetCoalition I. Accordingly, any findings of the court with respect to
that product may not be relevant to the product at issue in this
filing.
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\13\ It should also be noted that Section 916 of the Dodd-Frank
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 (``Dodd-Frank
Act'') has amended paragraph (A) of Section 19(b)(3) of the Act, 15
U.S.C. 78s(b)(3), to make it clear that all exchange fees, including
fees for market data, may be filed by exchanges on an immediately
effective basis.
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B. Self-Regulatory Organization's Statement on Burden on Competition
The Exchange does not believe that the proposed rule change will
result in any burden on competition that is not necessary or
appropriate in furtherance of the purposes of the Act, as amended. The
Exchange's ability to price its Managed Data Solution products for Non-
Display Usage is constrained by (1) competition between exchanges and
other trading platforms that compete with each other in a variety of
dimensions; (2) the existence of inexpensive real-time consolidated
data and market-specific data and free delayed consolidated data; and
(3) the inherent contestability of the market for this data.
The market for proprietary data products is currently competitive
and inherently contestable because there is fierce competition for the
inputs necessary to the creation of proprietary data and strict pricing
discipline for the proprietary products themselves. Numerous exchanges
compete with each other for listings, trades, and market data itself,
providing virtually limitless opportunities for entrepreneurs who wish
to produce and distribute their own market data. This proprietary data
is produced by each individual exchange, as well as other entities, in
a vigorously competitive market.
Transaction execution and proprietary data products are
complementary in that market data is both an input and a byproduct of
the execution service. In fact, market data and trade execution are a
paradigmatic example of joint products with joint costs. The decision
whether and on which platform to post an order will depend on the
attributes of the platform where the order can be posted, including the
execution fees, data quality and price and distribution of its data
products. Without trade executions, exchange data products cannot
exist. Moreover, data products are valuable to many end users only
insofar as they provide information that end users expect will assist
them or their customers in making trading decisions.
The costs of producing market data include not only the costs of
the data distribution infrastructure, but also the costs of designing,
maintaining, and operating the exchange's transaction execution
platform and the cost of regulating the exchange to ensure its fair
operation and maintain investor confidence. The total return that a
trading platform earns reflects the revenues it receives from both
products and the joint costs it incurs. Moreover, the operation of the
exchange is characterized by high fixed costs and low marginal costs.
This cost structure is common in content and content distribution
industries such as software, where developing new software typically
requires a large initial investment (and continuing large investments
to upgrade the software), but once the software is developed, the
incremental cost of providing that software to an additional user is
typically small, or even zero (e.g., if the software can be downloaded
over the Internet after being purchased).\14\ In the Exchange's case,
it is costly to build and maintain a trading platform, but the
incremental cost of trading each additional share on an existing
platform, or distributing an additional instance of data, is very low.
Market information and executions are each produced jointly (in the
sense that the activities of trading and placing orders are the source
of the information that is distributed) and are each subject to
significant scale economies. In such cases, marginal cost pricing is
not feasible because if all sales were priced at the margin, the
Exchange would be
[[Page 19945]]
unable to defray its platform costs of providing the joint products.
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\14\ See William J. Baumol and Daniel G. Swanson, ``The New
Economy and Ubiquitous Competitive Price Discrimination: Identifying
Defensible Criteria of Market Power,'' Antitrust Law Journal, Vol.
70, No. 3 (2003).
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An exchange's BD customers view the costs of transaction executions
and of data as a unified cost of doing business with the exchange. A BD
will direct orders to a particular exchange only if the expected
revenues from executing trades on the exchange exceed net transaction
execution costs and the cost of data that the BD chooses to buy to
support its trading decisions (or those of its customers). The choice
of data products is, in turn, a product of the value of the products in
making profitable trading decisions. If the cost of the product exceeds
its expected value, the BD will choose not to buy it. Moreover, as a BD
chooses to direct fewer orders to a particular exchange, the value of
the product to that BD decreases, for two reasons. First, the product
will contain less information, because executions of the BD's trading
activity will not be reflected in it. Second, and perhaps more
important, the product will be less valuable to that BD because it does
not provide information about the venue to which it is directing its
orders. Data from the competing venue to which the BD is directing
orders will become correspondingly more valuable.
Similarly, in the case of products such as this that are
distributed through market data vendors, the vendors provide price
discipline for proprietary data products because they control the
primary means of access to end users. Vendors impose price restraints
based upon their business models. For example, vendors such as
Bloomberg and Reuters that assess a surcharge on data they sell may
refuse to offer proprietary products that end users will not purchase
in sufficient numbers. Internet portals, such as Google, impose a
discipline by providing only data that will enable them to attract
``eyeballs'' that contribute to their advertising revenue. Retail BDs,
such as Schwab and Fidelity, offer their customers proprietary data
only if it promotes trading and generates sufficient commission
revenue. Although the business models may differ, these vendors'
pricing discipline is the same: They can simply refuse to purchase any
proprietary data product that fails to provide sufficient value. The
Exchange and other producers of proprietary data products must
understand and respond to these varying business models and pricing
disciplines in order to market proprietary data products successfully.
Moreover, the Exchange believes that products such as this can enhance
order flow to the Exchange, thereby encouraging wider participation in
the market by investors with access to the Internet or television.
Conversely, the value of such products to distributors and investors
decreases if order flow falls, because the products contain less
content.
Analyzing the cost of market data distribution in isolation from
the cost of all of the inputs supporting the creation of market data
will inevitably underestimate the cost of the data. Thus, because it is
impossible to create data without a fast, technologically robust, and
well-regulated execution system, system costs and regulatory costs
affect the price of market data. It would be equally misleading,
however, to attribute all of the exchange's costs to the market data
portion of an exchange's joint product. Rather, all of the exchange's
costs are incurred for the unified purposes of attracting order flow,
executing and/or routing orders, and generating and selling data about
market activity. The total return that an exchange earns reflects the
revenues it receives from the joint products and the total costs of the
joint products.
Competition among trading platforms can be expected to constrain
the aggregate return each platform earns from the sale of its joint
products, but different platforms may choose from a range of possible,
and equally reasonable, pricing strategies as the means of recovering
total costs. For example, some platform may choose to pay rebates to
attract orders, charge relatively low prices for market information (or
provide information free of charge) and charge relatively high prices
for accessing posted liquidity. Other platforms may choose a strategy
of paying lower liquidity rebates to attract orders, setting relatively
low prices for accessing posted liquidity and setting relatively high
prices for market information. Still others may provide most data free
of charge and rely exclusively on transaction fees to recover their
costs. Finally, some platforms may incentivize use by providing
opportunities for equity ownership, which may allow them to charge
lower direct fees for executions and data.
In this environment, there is no economic basis for regulating
maximum prices for one of the joint products in an industry in which
suppliers face competitive constraints with regard to the joint
offering. Such regulation is unnecessary because an ``excessive'' price
for one of the joint products will ultimately have to be reflected in
lower prices for other products sold by the firm, or otherwise the firm
will experience a loss in the volume of its sales that will be adverse
to its overall profitability. In other words, an increase in the price
of data will ultimately have to be accompanied by a decrease in the
cost of executions, or the volume of both data and executions will
fall.
The level of competition and contestability in the market is
evident in the numerous alternative venues that compete for order flow,
including thirteen SRO markets, as well as internalizing BDs and
various forms of alternative trading systems (``ATSs''), including dark
pools and electronic communication networks (``ECNs''). Each SRO market
competes to produce transaction reports via trade executions, and two
FINRA-regulated Trade Reporting Facilities (``TRFs'') compete to
attract internalized transaction reports. It is common for BDs to
further and exploit this competition by sending their order flow and
transaction reports to multiple markets, rather than providing them all
to a single market. Competitive markets for order flow, executions, and
transaction reports provide pricing discipline for the inputs of
proprietary data products.
The large number of SROs, TRFs, BDs, and ATSs that currently
produce proprietary data or are currently capable of producing it
provides further pricing discipline for proprietary data products. Each
SRO, TRF, ATS, and BD is currently permitted to produce proprietary
data products, and many currently do or have announced plans to do so,
including NASDAQ Stock Market LLC, New York Stock Exchange, The NYSE
MKT LLC, NYSE Arca, Inc., BATS Exchange, Inc., and Direct Edge.
Any ATS or BD can combine with any other ATS, BD, or multiple ATSs
or BDs to produce joint proprietary data products. Additionally, order
routers and market data vendors can facilitate single or multiple BD
production of proprietary data products. The potential sources of
proprietary products are virtually limitless.
Market data vendors provide another form of price discipline for
proprietary data products because they control the primary means of
access to end Subscribers. Vendors impose price restraints based upon
their business models. For example, vendors such as Bloomberg and
Thomson Reuters that assess a surcharge on data they sell may refuse to
offer proprietary products that end Subscribers will not purchase in
sufficient numbers. Internet portals, such as Google, impose a
discipline by providing only data that will enable them to attract
``eyeballs'' that contribute to their advertising revenue. Retail
broker-dealers, such as Schwab and Fidelity, offer their customers
proprietary data only if it promotes
[[Page 19946]]
trading and generates sufficient commission revenue. Although the
business models may differ, these vendors' pricing discipline is the
same: They can simply refuse to purchase any proprietary data product
that fails to provide sufficient value. The Exchange and other
producers of proprietary data products must understand and respond to
these varying business models and pricing disciplines in order to
market proprietary data products successfully.
In addition to the competition and price discipline described
above, the market for proprietary data products is also highly
contestable because market entry is rapid, inexpensive, and profitable.
The history of electronic trading is replete with examples of entrants
that swiftly grew into some of the largest electronic trading platforms
and proprietary data producers: Archipelago, Bloomberg Tradebook,
Island, RediBook, Attain, TracECN, BATS Trading and Direct Edge. A
proliferation of dark pools and other ATSs operate profitably with
fragmentary shares of consolidated market volume.
Regulation NMS, by deregulating the market for proprietary data,
has increased the contestability of that market. While BDs have
previously published their proprietary data individually, Regulation
NMS encourages market data vendors and BDs to produce proprietary
products cooperatively in a manner never before possible. Multiple
market data vendors already have the capability to aggregate data and
disseminate it on a profitable scale, including Bloomberg, and Thomson
Reuters.
Competition among platforms has driven the Exchange continually to
improve its platform data offerings and to cater to customers' data
needs. For example, the Exchange has developed and maintained multiple
delivery mechanisms (e.g., IP, multi-cast) that enable customers to
receive data in the form and manner they prefer and at the lowest cost
to them. The Exchange has created products like Depth Data and Top of
Market Data, because offering data in multiple formatting allows the
Exchange to better fit customer needs. The Exchange offers data via
multiple extranet providers, thereby helping to reduce network and
total cost for its data products. The Exchange has developed an online
administrative system to provide customers transparency into their data
feed requests and streamline data usage reporting.
Despite these enhancements and a dramatic increase in message
traffic, the Exchange's fees for market data have remained flat. In
fact, as a percent of total Subscriber costs, Exchange data fees have
fallen relative to other data usage costs--including bandwidth,
programming, and infrastructure--that have risen. The same holds true
for execution services; despite numerous enhancements to the Exchange's
trading platform, absolute and relative trading costs have declined.
Platform competition has intensified as new entrants have emerged,
constraining prices for both executions and for data.
The vigor of competition for proprietary information is significant
and the Exchange believes that this proposal itself clearly evidences
such competition. The Exchange is offering a new pricing model in order
to keep pace with changes in the industry and evolving customer needs.
It is entirely optional and is geared towards attracting new customers,
as well as retaining existing customers.
The Exchange has witnessed competitors creating new products and
innovative pricing in this space over the course of the past year. The
Exchange continues to see firms challenge its pricing on the basis of
the Exchange's explicit fees being higher than the zero-priced fees
from other competitors such as BATS. In all cases, firms make decisions
on how much and what types of data to consume on the basis of the total
cost of interacting with the Exchange or other exchanges. Of course,
the explicit data fees are but one factor in a total platform analysis.
Some competitors have lower transactions fees and higher data fees, and
others are vice versa. The market for this proprietary information is
highly competitive and continually evolves as products develop and
change.
C. Self-Regulatory Organization's Statement on Comments on the Proposed
Rule Change Received From Members, Participants, or Others
No written comments were either solicited or received.
III. Date of Effectiveness of the Proposed Rule Change and Timing for
Commission Action
The foregoing rule change has become effective pursuant to Section
19(b)(3)(A)(ii) of the Act.\15\ At any time within 60 days of the
filing of the proposed rule change, the Commission summarily may
temporarily suspend such rule change if it appears to the Commission
that such action is necessary or appropriate in the public interest,
for the protection of investors, or otherwise in furtherance of the
purposes of the Act. If the Commission takes such action, the
Commission shall institute proceedings to determine whether the
proposed rule should be approved or disapproved.
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\15\ 15 U.S.C. 78s(b)(3)(A)(ii).
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IV. Solicitation of Comments
Interested persons are invited to submit written data, views, and
arguments concerning the foregoing, including whether the proposed rule
change is consistent with the Act. Comments may be submitted by any of
the following methods:
Electronic Comments
Use the Commission's Internet comment form (http://www.sec.gov/rules/sro.shtml); or
Send an email to [email protected]. Please include
File Number SR-NASDAQ-2014-029 on the subject line.
Paper Comments
Send paper comments in triplicate to Secretary, Securities
and Exchange Commission, 100 F Street NE., Washington, DC 20549-1090.
All submissions should refer to File Number SR-NASDAQ-2014-029. This
file number should be included on the subject line if email is used. To
help the Commission process and review your comments more efficiently,
please use only one method. The Commission will post all comments on
the Commission's Internet Web site (http://www.sec.gov/rules/sro.shtml). Copies of the submission, all subsequent amendments, all
written statements with respect to the proposed rule change that are
filed with the Commission, and all written communications relating to
the proposed rule change between the Commission and any person, other
than those that may be withheld from the public in accordance with the
provisions of 5 U.S.C. 552, will be available for Web site viewing and
printing in the Commission's Public Reference Room, 100 F Street NE.,
Washington, DC 20549, on official business days between the hours of
10:00 a.m. and 3:00 p.m. Copies of the filing also will be available
for inspection and copying at the principal office of the Exchange. All
comments received will be posted without change; the Commission does
not edit personal identifying information from submissions. You should
submit only information that you wish to make available publicly.
All submissions should refer to File Number SR-NASDAQ-2014-029 and
should be submitted on or before May 1, 2014.
[[Page 19947]]
For the Commission, by the Division of Trading and Markets,
pursuant to delegated authority.\16\
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\16\ 17 CFR 200.30-3(a)(12).
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Kevin M. O'Neill,
Deputy Secretary.
[FR Doc. 2014-07993 Filed 4-9-14; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 8011-01-P