[Federal Register Volume 79, Number 88 (Wednesday, May 7, 2014)]
[Notices]
[Pages 26290-26293]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2014-10389]
[[Page 26290]]
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SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION
[Release No. 34-72075; File No. SR-NYSEMKT-2014-40]
Self-Regulatory Organizations; NYSE MKT LLC; Notice of Filing and
Immediate Effectiveness of Proposed Rule Change Offering ArcaBook for
Amex Options--Complex on a Standalone Basis Without Charge From May 1,
2014 Through October 31, 2014
May 1, 2014.
Pursuant to Section 19(b)(1) \1\ of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 (the ``Act'') \2\ and Rule 19b-4 thereunder,\3\ notice is hereby
given that, on April 23, 2014, NYSE MKT LLC (the ``Exchange'' or ``NYSE
MKT'') filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (the
``Commission'') the proposed rule change as described in Items I, II,
and III below, which Items have been prepared by the self-regulatory
organization. The Commission is publishing this notice to solicit
comments on the proposed rule change from interested persons.
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\1\ 15 U.S.C.78s(b)(1).
\2\ 15 U.S.C. 78a.
\3\ 17 CFR 240.19b-4.
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I. Self-Regulatory Organization's Statement of the Terms of Substance
of the Proposed Rule Change
The Exchange proposes to offer ArcaBook for Amex Options--Complex
on a standalone basis without charge from May 1, 2014 through October
31, 2014. The text of the proposed rule change is available on the
Exchange's Web site at www.nyse.com, at the principal office of the
Exchange, and at the Commission's Public Reference Room.
II. Self-Regulatory Organization's Statement of the Purpose of, and
Statutory Basis for, the Proposed Rule Change
In its filing with the Commission, the self-regulatory organization
included statements concerning the purpose of, and basis for, the
proposed rule change and discussed any comments it received on the
proposed rule change. The text of those statements may be examined at
the places specified in Item IV below. The Exchange has prepared
summaries, set forth in sections A, B, and C below, of the most
significant parts of such statements.
A. Self-Regulatory Organization's Statement of the Purpose of, and the
Statutory Basis for, the Proposed Rule Change
1. Purpose
The Exchange proposes to offer ArcaBook for Amex Options--Complex
on a standalone basis without charge from May 1, 2014 through October
31, 2014.
On October 1, 2012, the Exchange began offering the following real-
time options market data products: ArcaBook for Amex Options--Trades,
ArcaBook for Amex Options--Top of Book, ArcaBook for Amex Options--
Depth of Book, ArcaBook for Amex Options--Complex, ArcaBook for Amex
Options--Series Status, and ArcaBook for Amex Options--Order Imbalance
(collectively, ``Amex Options Products'').\4\ The Exchange subsequently
introduced combined fees for all six of the Amex Options Products,
which are not currently offered or charged separately.\5\
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\4\ See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 67719 (August 23,
2012), 77 FR 52767 (August 30, 2012) (SR-NYSEMKT-2012-40) (Notice of
Filing and Immediate Effectiveness of Proposed Rule Change Proposing
To Offer Certain Proprietary Options Data Products).
\5\ See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 69524 (May 6, 2013),
78 FR 27459 (May 10, 2013) (SR-NYSEMKT-2013-35) (Notice of Filing
and Immediate Effectiveness of Proposed Rule Change Establishing a
Schedule of the NYSE Amex Options Proprietary Market Data Fees). See
also Securities Exchange Act Release No. 68004 (October 9, 2012), 77
FR 62582 (October 15, 2012) (SR-NYSEMKT-2012-49) (Notice of Filing
and Immediate Effectiveness of Proposed Rule Change Establishing
Fees for Certain Proprietary Options Market Data Products). See also
Securities Exchange Act Release No. 69553 (May 10, 2013), 78 FR
28926 (May 16, 2013) (SR-NYSEMKT-2013-40) (Notice of Filing and
Immediate Effectiveness of Proposed Rule Change Establishing Non-
Display Usage Fees and Amending the Professional End-User Fees for
NYSE Amex Options Market Data). See also Securities Exchange Act
Release No. 71934 (April 11, 2014), 79 FR 21818 (April 17, 2014)
(SR-NYSEMKT-2014-30) (Notice of Filing and Immediate Effectiveness
of Proposed Rule Change Amending the Professional User Fees for NYSE
Amex Options Market Data).
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The Exchange now proposes to offer ArcaBook for Amex Options--
Complex on a standalone basis without charge beginning on May 1,
2014.\6\ The Exchange intends to submit a separate proposed rule change
to the Securities and Exchange Commission (``Commission'') prior to
November 1, 2014 that would establish fees for ArcaBook for Amex
Options--Complex effective as of that date.
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\6\ ArcaBook for Amex Options--Complex would remain one of the
six Amex Options Products for which the existing pricing would
continue to apply.
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The Exchange does not propose to make any other changes to the
availability of, or fees for, other Amex Options Products.
The proposed change is not otherwise intended to address any other
issues, and the Exchange is not aware of any problems that vendors or
subscribers would have in complying with the proposed change.
2. Statutory Basis
The Exchange believes that the proposed rule change is consistent
with Section 6(b) of the Act,\7\ in general, and furthers the
objectives of Sections 6(b)(4) and 6(b)(5) of the Act,\8\ in
particular, because it provides for the equitable allocation of
reasonable dues, fees, and other charges among its members, issuers and
other persons using its facilities and does not unfairly discriminate
between customers, issuers, brokers or dealers.
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\7\ 15 U.S.C. 78f(b).
\8\ 15 U.S.C. 78f(b)(4) and (5).
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The Exchange believes that the proposed change is reasonable
because it would allow for standalone access and subscription to
ArcaBook for Amex Options--Complex, rather than requiring access and
subscription to all six Amex Options Products. In this regard, the
Exchange notes that some vendors of and subscribers to the Amex Options
Products currently utilize only ArcaBook for Amex Options--Complex.
This proposed change is also reasonable because it would make ArcaBook
for Amex Options--Complex more widely accessible, thereby incentivizing
greater use of, and interaction with, the Exchange's Complex Order Book
and leading to greater amounts of liquidity on the Complex Order Book,
specifically, and on the Exchange, generally. The proposed change is
also reasonable because at least one other option market currently
makes standalone complex order market data products available and
charges related fees.\9\ However, subscription to all six Amex Options
Products would remain available.
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\9\ See, e.g., the Chicago Board Options Exchange, Inc.
(``CBOE'') ``Complex Order Book Feed'' product and pricing
information, available at https://www.cboe.org/MDX/CSM/OBOOKMain.aspx.
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The Exchange believes that it is equitable and not unfairly
discriminatory to make ArcaBook for Amex Options--Complex available
free of charge until November 1, 2014 because it would provide an
opportunity for vendors and subscribers to determine whether the
standalone market data product, without the other five Amex Options
Products, suits their needs. This would also be similar to the manner
in which CBOE made its ``Complex Order Book Feed'' available to market
participants free of charge for approximately two months before
[[Page 26291]]
subsequently charging related fees.\10\ Other exchanges also provide
certain market data products entirely free of charge or free for at
least a certain period of time.\11\ This would also be equitable and
not unfairly discriminatory because the product would be free during
this time period to any vendor or subscriber. A period during which the
product is available free of charge would also further contribute to
greater use of, and interaction with, the Exchange's Complex Order
Book.
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\10\ See Securities Exchange Act Release Nos. 70118 (August 5,
2013), 78 FR 48757 (August 9, 2013) (SR-CBOE-2013-070) and 70683
(October 15, 2013), 78 FR 62798 (October 22, 2013) (SR-CBOE-2013-
087).
\11\ For example, NASDAQ OMX BX (``BX'') provides a 30-day free
trial related to its options market data. See Chapter XV, Section
4(g) of the BX Rules and Securities Exchange Act Release No. 69821
(June 21, 2013), 78 FR 38757 (June 27, 2013) (SR-BX-2013-040). BX
similarly provided its ``BX TotalView'' data feed for free for its
first year of operation and also recently reduced the ``Extranet
Access Fee'' from $1,000 per recipient per month to free. See
Securities Exchange Act Release Nos. 59615 (March 20, 2009), 74 FR
14604 (March 31, 2009) (SR-BX-2009-005) and 71506 (February 7,
2014), 79 FR 8769 (February 13, 2014) (SR-BX-2014-008). BATS
Exchange, Inc. (``BATS'') also offers several market data feeds, but
only charges for three of them (``PITCH,'' ``TOP'' and ``Last
Sale''). A list of the available BATS market data feeds is available
at http://www.batstrading.com/market_data/products/ and the feeds
for which fees apply are available at http://cdn.batstrading.com/resources/regulation/BATS_US_Market_Data_Price_List.pdf.
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The Exchange also notes that purchasing Amex Options Products is
entirely optional. Firms are not required to purchase them and have a
wide variety of alternative options market data products from which to
choose. Moreover, the Exchange is not required to make these
proprietary data products available or to offer any specific pricing
alternatives to any customers.
The decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia Circuit in NetCoalition v. SEC, 615 F.3d 525 (D.C. Cir.
2010), upheld reliance by the Commission upon the existence of
competitive market mechanisms to set reasonable and equitably allocated
fees for proprietary market data:
In fact, the legislative history indicates that the Congress
intended that the market system `evolve through the interplay of
competitive forces as unnecessary regulatory restrictions are
removed' and that the SEC wield its regulatory power `in those
situations where competition may not be sufficient,' such as in the
creation of a `consolidated transactional reporting system.'
Id. at 535 (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 94-229 at 92 (1975), as reprinted
in 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. 323). The court agreed with the Commission's
conclusion that ``Congress intended that `competitive forces should
dictate the services and practices that constitute the U.S. national
market system for trading equity securities.' '' \12\ The Exchange
believes that this is also true with respect to options markets.
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\12\ NetCoalition, 615 F.3d at 535.
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As explained below in the Exchange's Statement on Burden on
Competition, the Exchange believes that there is substantial evidence
of competition in the marketplace for data and that the Commission can
rely upon such evidence in concluding that the fees proposed in this
filing are the product of competition and therefore satisfy the
relevant statutory standards.\13\ In addition, the existence of
alternatives to these data products, such as options data from other
sources, as described below, further ensures that the Exchange cannot
set unreasonable fees, or fees that are unreasonably discriminatory,
when vendors and subscribers can elect such alternatives.
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\13\ Section 916 of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act of 2010 (the ``Dodd-Frank Act'') amended
paragraph (A) of Section 19(b)(3) of the Act, 15 U.S.C. 78s(b)(3),
to make clear that all exchange fees for market data may be filed by
exchanges on an immediately effective basis.
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As the NetCoalition decision noted, the Commission is not required
to undertake a cost-of-service or ratemaking approach.\14\ The Exchange
believes that, even if it were possible as a matter of economic theory,
cost-based pricing for non-core market data would be so complicated
that it could not be done practically.\15\
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\14\ NetCoalition, 615 F.3d at 536.
\15\ The Exchange believes that cost-based pricing would be
impractical because it would create enormous administrative burdens
for all parties, including the Commission, to cost-regulate a large
number of participants and standardize and analyze extraordinary
amounts of information, accounts, and reports. In addition, and as
described below, it is impossible to regulate market data prices in
isolation from prices charged by markets for other services that are
joint products. Cost-based rate regulation would also lead to
litigation and may distort incentives, including those to minimize
costs and to innovate, leading to further waste. Under cost-based
pricing, the Commission would be burdened with determining a fair
rate of return, and the industry could experience frequent rate
increases based on escalating expense levels. Even in industries
historically subject to utility regulation, cost-based ratemaking
has been discredited. As such, the Exchange believes that cost-based
ratemaking would be inappropriate for proprietary market data and
inconsistent with Congress's direction that the Commission use its
authority to foster the development of the national market system,
and that market forces will continue to provide appropriate pricing
discipline. See Appendix C to NYSE's comments to the Commission's
2000 Concept Release on the Regulation of Market Information Fees
and Revenues, which can be found on the Commission's Web site at
http://www.sec.gov/rules/concept/s72899/buck1.htm.
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For these reasons, the Exchange believes that the proposed fees are
reasonable, equitable, and not unfairly discriminatory.
B. Self-Regulatory Organization's Statement on Burden on Competition
In accordance with Section 6(b)(8) of the Act,\16\ the Exchange
believes that the proposed rule change would not impose any burden on
competition that is not necessary or appropriate in furtherance of the
purposes of the Act. An exchange's ability to price its proprietary
data products is constrained by actual competition for the sale of
proprietary data products, the joint product nature of exchange
platforms, and the existence of alternatives to the Exchange's
proprietary data.
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\16\ 15 U.S.C. 78f(b)(8).
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The Existence of Actual Competition. The market for proprietary
options data products is currently competitive and inherently
contestable because there is fierce competition for the inputs
necessary for the creation of proprietary data and strict pricing
discipline to the proprietary products themselves. Numerous exchanges
compete with each other for options trades and sales of options market
data itself, providing virtually limitless opportunities for
entrepreneurs who wish to compete in any or all of those areas,
including producing and distributing their own options market data.
Proprietary options data products are produced and distributed by each
individual exchange, as well as other entities, in a vigorously
competitive market.
Competitive markets for order flow, executions, and transaction
reports provide pricing discipline for the inputs of proprietary
options data products and therefore constrain markets from overpricing
proprietary market data. The U.S. Department of Justice has
acknowledged the aggressive competition among exchanges, including for
the sale of proprietary market data itself. In 2011, Assistant Attorney
General Christine Varney stated that exchanges ``compete head to head
to offer real-time equity data products. These data products include
the best bid and offer of every exchange and information on each equity
trade, including the last sale.'' \17\ Similarly, the options markets
vigorously compete
[[Page 26292]]
with respect to options data products.\18\ It is common for broker-
dealers to further exploit this recognized competitive constraint by
sending their order flow and transaction reports to multiple markets,
rather than providing them all to a single market.
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\17\ Press Release, U.S. Department of Justice, Assistant
Attorney General Christine Varney Holds Conference Call Regarding
NASDAQ OMX Group Inc. and IntercontinentalExchange Inc. Abandoning
Their Bid for NYSE Euronext (May 16, 2011), available at http://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/atr/speeches/2011/at-speech-110516.html.
\18\ See, e.g., Securities Exchange Act Release No. 67466 (July
19, 2012), 77 FR 43629 (July 25, 2012) (SR-Phlx-2012-93), which
describes a variety of options market data products and their
pricing.
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In addition, in the case of products that are distributed through
market data vendors, the market data vendors themselves provide
additional price discipline for proprietary data products because they
control the primary means of access to certain end users. These vendors
impose price discipline based upon their business models. For example,
vendors that assess a surcharge on data they sell are able to refuse to
offer proprietary products that their end users do not or will not
purchase in sufficient numbers. Vendors will not elect to make
available the Amex Options Products unless their customers request
them, and data recipients with Professional Users will not elect to
purchase them unless they can be used for profit-generating purposes.
All of these operate as constraints on pricing proprietary data
products.
Joint Product Nature of Exchange Platform. Transaction execution
and proprietary data products are complementary in that market data is
both an input and a byproduct of the execution service. In fact, market
data and trade execution are a paradigmatic example of joint products
with joint costs. The decision whether and on which platform to post an
order will depend on the attributes of the platforms where the order
can be posted, including the execution fees, data quality, and price
and distribution of their data products. The more trade executions a
platform does, the more valuable its market data products become.
Further, data products are valuable to many end-users only insofar as
they provide information that end-users expect will assist them in
making trading decisions. In that respect, the Exchange believes that
the Amex Options Products offer options market data information that is
useful for professionals in making trading decisions.
The costs of producing market data include not only the costs of
the data distribution infrastructure, but also the costs of designing,
maintaining, and operating the exchange's transaction execution
platform and the cost of regulating the exchange to ensure its fair
operation and maintain investor confidence. The total return that a
trading platform earns reflects the revenues it receives from both
products and the joint costs it incurs. Moreover, an exchange's broker-
dealer customers view the costs of transaction executions and market
data as a unified cost of doing business with the exchange.
Other market participants have noted that the liquidity provided by
the order book, trade execution, core market data, and non-core market
data are joint products of a joint platform and have common costs.\19\
The Exchange also notes that the economics literature confirms that
there is no way to allocate common costs between joint products that
would shed any light on competitive or efficient pricing.\20\
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\19\ See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 62887 (Sept. 10,
2010), 75 FR 57092, 57095 (Sept. 17, 2010) (SR-Phlx-2010-121);
Securities Exchange Act Release No. 62907 (Sept. 14, 2010), 75 FR
57314, 57317 (Sept. 20, 2010) (SR-NASDAQ-2010-110); and Securities
Exchange Act Release No. 62908 (Sept. 14, 2010), 75 FR 57321, 57324
(Sept. 20, 2010) (SR-NASDAQ-2010-111) (``all of the exchange's costs
are incurred for the unified purposes of attracting order flow,
executing and/or routing orders, and generating and selling data
about market activity. The total return that an exchange earns
reflects the revenues it receives from the joint products and the
total costs of the joint products.''); see also Securities Exchange
Act Release Nos. 71217 (Dec. 31, 2013), 79 FR 875, 877 (Jan. 7,
2014) (SR-NASDAQ-2013-162) and 70945 (Nov. 26, 2013), 78 FR 72740,
72741 (Dec. 3, 2013) (SR-NASDAQ-2013-142) (``Transaction execution
and proprietary data products are complementary in that market data
is both an input and a byproduct of the execution service. In fact,
market data and trade execution are a paradigmatic example of joint
products with joint costs.'').
\20\ See generally Mark Hirschey, Fundamentals of Managerial
Economics, at 600 (2009) (``It is important to note, however, that
although it is possible to determine the separate marginal costs of
goods produced in variable proportions, it is impossible to
determine their individual average costs. This is because common
costs are expenses necessary for manufacture of a joint product.
Common costs of production--raw material and equipment costs,
management expenses, and other overhead--cannot be allocated to each
individual by-product on any economically sound basis. . . . Any
allocation of common costs is wrong and arbitrary.''). This is not
new economic theory. See, e.g., F. W. Taussig, ``A Contribution to
the Theory of Railway Rates,'' Quarterly Journal of Economics V(4)
438, 465 (July 1891) (``Yet, surely, the division is purely
arbitrary. These items of cost, in fact, are jointly incurred for
both sorts of traffic; and I cannot share the hope entertained by
the statistician of the Commission, Professor Henry C. Adams, that
we shall ever reach a mode of apportionment that will lead to
trustworthy results.'').
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Analyzing the cost of market data product production and
distribution in isolation from the cost of all of the inputs supporting
the creation of market data and market data products will inevitably
underestimate the cost of the data and data products. Thus, because it
is impossible to obtain the data inputs to create market data products
without a fast, technologically robust, and well-regulated execution
system, system costs and regulatory costs affect the price of both
obtaining the market data itself and creating and distributing market
data products. It would be equally misleading, however, to attribute
all of an exchange's costs to the market data portion of an exchange's
joint products. Rather, all of an exchange's costs are incurred for the
unified purposes of attracting order flow, executing and/or routing
orders, and generating and selling data about market activity. The
total return that an exchange earns reflects the revenues it receives
from the joint products and the total costs of the joint products.
The level of competition and contestability in the market is
evident in the numerous alternative venues that compete for order flow,
including 12 self-regulatory organization (``SRO'') options markets,
two of which were approved in the last two years.\21\ The Exchange
believes that these new entrants demonstrate that competition is
robust.
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\21\ See Securities Exchange Act Release Nos. 70050 (July 26,
2013), 78 FR 46622 (August 1, 2013) (File No. 10-209) and 68341
(December 3, 2012), 77 FR 73065 (December 7, 2012) (File No. 10-
207).
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Each SRO market competes to produce transaction reports via trade
executions. Competition among trading platforms can be expected to
constrain the aggregate return that each platform earns from the sale
of its joint products, but different platforms may choose from a range
of possible, and equally reasonable, pricing strategies as the means of
recovering total costs. For example, some platforms may choose to pay
rebates to attract orders, charge relatively low prices for market data
products (or provide market data products free of charge), and charge
relatively high prices for accessing posted liquidity. Other platforms
may choose a strategy of paying lower rebates (or no rebates) to
attract orders, setting relatively high prices for market data
products, and setting relatively low prices for accessing posted
liquidity. In this environment, there is no economic basis for
regulating maximum prices for one of the joint products in an industry
in which suppliers face competitive constraints with regard to the
joint offering.
Existence of Alternatives. The large number of SROs that currently
produce proprietary data or are currently capable of producing it
provides further pricing discipline for proprietary data products. Each
SRO is currently permitted to produce proprietary data products, and
many currently do or have announced plans to do so, including but not
limited
[[Page 26293]]
to the Exchange; NYSE Arca, Inc.; CBOE; C2 Options Exchange,
Incorporated; International Securities Exchange, LLC; NASDAQ; Phlx; BX;
BATS Exchange, Inc. (``BATS''); and Miami International Securities
Exchange LLC. Because market data users can thus find suitable
substitutes for most proprietary market data products,\22\ a market
that overprices its market data products stands a high risk that users
may substitute another source of market data information for its own.
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\22\ See supra note 18.
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In addition to the competition and price discipline described
above, the market for proprietary data products is also highly
contestable because market entry is rapid, inexpensive, and profitable.
The history of electronic trading is replete with examples of entrants
that swiftly grew into some of the largest electronic trading platforms
and proprietary data producers: Archipelago, Bloomberg Tradebook,
Island, RediBook, Attain, TrackECN, BATS, and Direct Edge. Two new
options exchanges have been approved by the SEC in the last two years
alone.\23\
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\23\ See supra note 21.
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In establishing the proposed fees, the Exchange considered the
competitiveness of the market for proprietary options data and all of
the implications of that competition. The Exchange believes that it has
considered all relevant factors and has not considered irrelevant
factors in order to establish fair, reasonable, and not unreasonably
discriminatory fees and an equitable allocation of fees among all
users. The existence of numerous alternatives to the Exchange's
products, including proprietary data from other sources, ensures that
the Exchange cannot set unreasonable fees, or fees that are
unreasonably discriminatory, when vendors and subscribers can elect
these alternatives or choose not to purchase a specific proprietary
data product if its cost to purchase is not justified by the returns
any particular vendor or subscriber would achieve through the purchase.
C. Self-Regulatory Organization's Statement on Comments on the Proposed
Rule Change Received From Members, Participants, or Others
No written comments were solicited or received with respect to the
proposed rule change.
III. Date of Effectiveness of the Proposed Rule Change and Timing for
Commission Action
The foregoing rule change is effective upon filing pursuant to
Section 19(b)(3)(A) \24\ of the Act and subparagraph (f)(2) of Rule
19b-4 \25\ thereunder, because it establishes a due, fee, or other
charge imposed by the Exchange.
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\24\ 15 U.S.C. 78s(b)(3)(A).
\25\ 17 CFR 240.19b-4(f)(2).
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At any time within 60 days of the filing of such proposed rule
change, the Commission summarily may temporarily suspend such rule
change if it appears to the Commission that such action is necessary or
appropriate in the public interest, for the protection of investors, or
otherwise in furtherance of the purposes of the Act. If the Commission
takes such action, the Commission shall institute proceedings under
Section 19(b)(2)(B) \26\ of the Act to determine whether the proposed
rule change should be approved or disapproved.
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\26\ 15 U.S.C. 78s(b)(2)(B).
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IV. Solicitation of Comments
Interested persons are invited to submit written data, views, and
arguments concerning the foregoing, including whether the proposed rule
change is consistent with the Act. Comments may be submitted by any of
the following methods:
Electronic Comments
Use the Commission's Internet comment form (http://www.sec.gov/rules/sro.shtml); or
Send an email to [email protected]. Please include
File Number SR-NYSEMKT-2014-40 on the subject line.
Paper Comments
Send paper comments in triplicate to Secretary, Securities
and Exchange Commission, 100 F Street NE., Washington, DC 20549-1090.
All submissions should refer to File Number SR-NYSEMKT-2014-40. This
file number should be included on the subject line if email is used. To
help the Commission process and review your comments more efficiently,
please use only one method. The Commission will post all comments on
the Commission's Internet Web site (http://www.sec.gov/rules/sro.shtml). Copies of the submission, all subsequent amendments, all
written statements with respect to the proposed rule change that are
filed with the Commission, and all written communications relating to
the proposed rule change between the Commission and any person, other
than those that may be withheld from the public in accordance with the
provisions of 5 U.S.C. 552, will be available for Web site viewing and
printing in the Commission's Public Reference Section, 100 F Street
NE., Washington, DC 20549-1090, on official business days between the
hours of 10:00 a.m. and 3:00 p.m. Copies of the filing will also be
available for inspection and copying at the NYSE's principal office and
on its Internet Web site at www.nyse.com. All comments received will be
posted without change; the Commission does not edit personal
identifying information from submissions. You should submit only
information that you wish to make available publicly. All submissions
should refer to File Number SR-NYSEMKT-2014-40 and should be submitted
on or before May 28, 2014.
For the Commission, by the Division of Trading and Markets,
pursuant to delegated authority.\27\
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\27\ 17 CFR 200.30-3(a)(12).
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Kevin M. O'Neill,
Deputy Secretary.
[FR Doc. 2014-10389 Filed 5-6-14; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 8011-01-P