[Federal Register Volume 79, Number 148 (Friday, August 1, 2014)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Pages 45016-45079]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2014-17764]
[[Page 45015]]
Vol. 79
Friday,
No. 148
August 1, 2014
Part III
Department of Transportation
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Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration
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49 CFR Parts 171, 172, 173, et al.
Hazardous Materials: Proposed Rules
Federal Register / Vol. 79, No. 148 / Friday, August 1, 2014 /
Proposed Rules
[[Page 45016]]
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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration
49 CFR Parts 171, 172, 173, 174, and 179
[Docket No. PHMSA-2012-0082 (HM-251)]
RIN 2137-AE91
Hazardous Materials: Enhanced Tank Car Standards and Operational
Controls for High-Hazard Flammable Trains
AGENCY: Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA),
DOT.
ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM).
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SUMMARY: The Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration
(PHMSA or we), in coordination with the Federal Railroad Administration
(FRA), is proposing: new operational requirements for certain trains
transporting a large volume of Class 3 flammable liquids; improvements
in tank car standards; and revision of the general requirements for
offerors to ensure proper classification and characterization of mined
gases and liquids. These proposed requirements are designed to lessen
the frequency and consequences of train accidents/incidents (train
accidents) involving certain trains transporting a large volume of
flammable liquids. The growing reliance on trains to transport large
volumes of flammable liquids poses a significant risk to life,
property, and the environment. These significant risks have been
highlighted by the recent instances of trains carrying crude oil that
derailed in Casselton, North Dakota; Aliceville, Alabama; and Lac-
M[eacute]gantic, Quebec, Canada. The proposed changes also address
National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) safety recommendations on
the accurate classification and characterization of such commodities,
enhanced tank car construction, and rail routing.
DATES: Comments must be received by September 30, 2014.
ADDRESSES: You may submit comments identified by the docket number
(Docket No. PHMSA-2012-0082 (HM-251)) and any relevant petition number
by any of the following methods:
Federal eRulemaking Portal: http://www.regulations.gov.
Follow the instructions for submitting comments.
Fax: 1-202-493-2251.
Mail: Docket Management System; U.S. Department of
Transportation, West Building, Ground Floor, Room W12-140, Routing
Symbol M-30, 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE., Washington, DC 20590.
Hand Delivery: To the Docket Management System; Room W12-
140 on the ground floor of the West Building, 1200 New Jersey Avenue
SE., Washington, DC 20590, between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through
Friday, except Federal holidays.
Instructions: All submissions must include the agency name and
docket number for this document at the beginning of the comment. To
avoid duplication, please use only one of these four methods. All
comments received will be posted without change to http://www.regulations.gov and will include any personal information you
provide. All comments received will be posted without change to the
Federal Docket Management System (FDMS), including any personal
information.
Docket: For access to the dockets to read background documents or
comments received, go to http://www.regulations.gov or DOT's Docket
Operations Office located at U.S. Department of Transportation, West
Building, Ground Floor, Room W12-140, Routing Symbol M-30, 1200 New
Jersey Avenue SE., Washington, DC 20590.
Privacy Act: Anyone is able to search the electronic form of all
comments received into any of our dockets by the name of the individual
submitting the comments (or signing the comment, if submitted on behalf
of an association, business, labor union, etc.). You may review DOT's
complete Privacy Act Statement at: http://www.dot.gov/privacy.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Ben Supko or Michael Stevens, (202)
366-8553, Standards and Rulemaking Division, Pipeline and Hazardous
Materials Safety Administration or Karl Alexy, (202) 493-6245, Office
of Safety Assurance and Compliance, Federal Railroad Administration,
1200 New Jersey Ave. SE., Washington, DC 20590-0001.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Frequently Used Abbreviations and Shortened Terms
AAR Association of American Railroads
ANPRM Advance notice of proposed rulemaking or PHMSA's ANPRM
published September 6, 2013 in this rulemaking, depending on context
App. Appendix
CFR Code of Federal Regulations
CPC Casualty Prevention Circular
Crude oil Petroleum crude oil
DHS U.S. Department of Homeland Security
DOT U.S. Department of Transportation
DP Distributed power, an alternative brake signal propagation system
ECP brakes Electronically controlled pneumatic brakes, an
alternative brake signal propagation system
EO 28 FRA Emergency Order No. 28 (78 FR 54849; August 7, 2013)
EOT device Two Way End-of-train device
FR Federal Register
FRA Federal Railroad Administration
GRL Gross Rail Load
HHFT High-Hazard Flammable Train
HMT Hazardous Materials Table at 49 CFR 172.101
HMR Hazardous Materials Regulations at 49 CFR Parts 171-180
LPG Liquefied petroleum gas
NAR Non-accident release, the unintentional release of a hazardous
material while in transportation, including loading and unloading
while in railroad possession, that is not caused by a derailment,
collision, or other rail-related accident
NPRM Notice of proposed rulemaking
NTSB National Transportation Safety Board
OTMA One-time movement approval
PG Packing Group (see 49 CFR 171.8)
PIH Poison Inhalation Hazard
RIA Regulatory impact analysis
RSAC Railroad Safety Advisory Committee
RSPA Research and Special Programs Administration, the predecessor
of PHMSA
SERCs State Emergency Response Commissions
T87.6 Task
Force A task force of the AAR Tank Car Committee
TIH Toxic inhalation hazard or Toxic-by-Inhalation
TTC Tank Car Committee
TSA Transportation Security Administration
U.S.C. United States Code
Table of Contents of Supplementary Information
I. Executive Summary
II. Overview of Current Regulations Relevant to This Proposal
A. Classification and Characterization of Mined Liquids and
Gases
B. Packaging
C. Track Integrity and The Safety of Freight Railroad Operations
D. Oil Spill Response Plans
E. Rail Routing
III. Background
A. Regulatory Actions
B. Emergency Orders and Non-Regulatory Actions
C. NTSB Safety Recommendations
IV. Comments on the ANPRM
A. Commenter Key
B. Summary of Comments Relevant to the Proposed Amendments in
This NPRM
C. Summary of Comments on Possible Amendments Not in This NPRM
V. Discussion of Comments and Section-by-Section Review
A. High-Hazard Flammable Train
B. Notification to SERCs of Petroleum Crude Oil Train
Transportation
C. Rail Routing
D. Classification and Characterization of Crude Oil of Mined
Liquids and Gases
[[Page 45017]]
E. Additional Requirements for High-Hazard Flammable Trains
a. Speed Restriction
b. Alternative Brake Signal Propagation Systems
F. New Tank Cars for High-Hazard Flammable Trains
a. DOT Specification 117--Prescribed Car
b. DOT Specification 117--Performance Standard
G. Existing Tank Cars for High-Hazard Flammable Trains
H. Forthcoming FRA NPRM on Securement and Attendance
VI. Regulatory Review and Notices
A. Executive Order 12866, Executive Order 13563, Executive Order
13610, and DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures
B. Unfunded Mandates Reform Act
C. Executive Order 13132
D. Executive Order 13175
E. Regulatory Flexibility Act, Executive Order 13272, and DOT
Policies and Procedures
F. Paperwork Reduction Act
G. Environmental Assessment
H. Privacy Act
I. Executive Order 13609 and International Trade Analysis
J. Statutory/Legal Authority for This Rulemaking
K. Regulation Identifier Number (RIN)
I. Executive Summary
Expansion in United States (U.S.) energy production has led to
significant challenges in the transportation system. Expansion in oil
production has led to increasing volumes of product transported to
refineries. Traditionally, pipelines and oceangoing tankers have
delivered the vast majority of crude oil to U.S. refineries, accounting
for approximately 93 percent of total receipts (in barrels) in 2012.
Although other modes of transportation--rail, barge, and truck--have
accounted for a relatively minor portion of crude oil shipments,
volumes have been rising very rapidly. With a growing domestic supply,
rail transportation, in particular, has emerged as a flexible
alternative to transportation by pipeline or vessel. The volume of
crude oil carried by rail increased 423 percent between 2011 and
2012.1 2 Volumes continued to increase in 2013, as the
number of rail carloads of crude oil surpassed 400,000.\3\ U.S. ethanol
production has also increased considerably during the last 10 years and
has generated similar growth in the transportation of ethanol by
rail.\4\ The increase in shipments of large quantities of flammable
liquids by rail has led to an increase in the number of train
accidents, posing a significant safety and environmental concern.
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\1\ See U.S. Rail Transportation of Crude Oil: Background and
Issues for Congress; http://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R43390.pdf.
\2\ See also ``Refinery receipts of crude oil by rail, truck,
and barge continue to increase'' http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=12131.
\3\ http://www.stb.dot.gov/stb/industry/econ_waybill.html.
\4\ Association of American Railroads. 2013. Railroads and
Ethanol. Available online at https://www.aar.org/keyissues/Documents/Background-Papers/Railroads%20and%20Ethanol.pdf.
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In this NPRM, PHMSA is proposing revisions to the Hazardous
Materials Regulations (HMR; 49 CFR Parts 171-180) that establish
requirements for ``high-hazard flammable train'' (HHFT). This proposed
rule defines a HHFT as a train comprised of 20 or more carloads of a
Class 3 flammable liquid and ensures that the rail requirements are
more closely aligned with the risks posed by the operation of these
trains. As discussed further in this preamble and in our analysis, this
rule primarily impacts unit train shipments of ethanol and crude oil;
because ethanol and crude oil are most frequently transported in high
volume shipments, typically in trains with 20 or more cars of those
commodities. Currently, as shipped, crude oil and ethanol are typically
classified as Class 3 flammable liquids. The primary intent of this
rulemaking is to propose revisions to the HMR that update and clarify
the regulations to prevent and mitigate the consequences of a train
accident involving flammable liquids, should one occur. Table 1
identifies those affected by this NPRM and describes the regulatory
changes.
Table 1--Affected Entities and Requirements
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Proposed requirement Affected entity
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Better classification and characterization Offerors/Shippers of all
of mined gases and liquids. mined gases and liquids.
Written sampling and testing
program for all mined gases and liquids,
such as crude oil, to address:
(1) frequency of sampling and testing;
(2) sampling at various points along
the supply chain;
(3) sampling methods that ensure a
representative sample of the entire
mixture;
(4) testing methods to enable complete
analysis, classification, and
characterization of material;
(5) statistical justification for
sample frequencies; and,
(6) duplicate samples for quality
assurance.
Require offerer to certify that
program is in place, document the
testing and sampling program, and
make program information available to
DOT personnel, upon request.
Rail routing risk assessment.............. Rail Carriers, Emergency
Responders.
Requires carriers to perform
a routing analysis that considers 27
safety and security factors. The
carrier must select a route based on
findings of the route analysis. These
planning requirements are prescribed
in Sec. 172.820 and would be
expanded to apply to HHFTs.
Notification to SERCs.
Require trains containing one
million gallons of Bakken crude oil
to notify State Emergency Response
Commissions (SERCs) or other
appropriate state delegated entity
about the operation of these trains
through their States.
Reduced operating speeds.
Restrict all HHFTs to 50-mph
in all areas.
PHMSA is requesting comment
on three speed restriction options
for HHFTs that contain any tank cars
not meeting the enhanced tank car
standards proposed by this rule:
[[Page 45018]]
(1) a 40-mph maximum speed
restriction in all areas
(2) a 40-mph speed restriction in
high threat urban areas\5\; and,
(3) a 40-mph speed restriction in
areas with a 100K+ population.
PHMSA is also requesting
comment on a 30-mph speed restriction
for HHFTs that do not comply with
enhanced braking requirements.
Enhanced braking.
Require all HHFTs be equipped
with alternative brake signal
propagation systems. Depending on the
outcome of the tank car standard
proposal and implementation timing,
all HHFTs would be operated with
either electronic controlled
pneumatic brakes (ECP), a two-way end
of train device (EOT), or distributed
power (DP).
Enhanced standards for both new and Tank Car Manufacturers, Tank
existing tank cars. Car owners, Shippers and
Rail Carriers.
Require new tank cars
constructed after October 1, 2015
(that are used to transport flammable
liquids as part of a HHFT) to meet
criteria for a selected option,
including specific design
requirements or performance criteria
(e.g., thermal, top fittings, and
bottom outlet protection; tank head
and shell puncture resistance). PHMSA
is requesting comment on the
following three options for the DOT
Specification 117:
1. FRA and PHMSA Designed Car, or
equivalent
2. AAR 2014 Tank Car,\6\ or
equivalent
3. Jacketed CPC-1232,\7\ or
equivalent
Require existing tank cars
that are used to transport flammable
liquids as part of a HHFT, to be
retrofitted to meet the selected
option for performance requirements,
except for top fittings protection.
Those not retrofitted would be
retired, repurposed, or operated
under speed restrictions for up to
five years, based on packing group
assignment of the lading.
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Table 2 further summarizes the three options for the DOT
Specification 117. As noted in Table 1, PHMSA proposes to require one
of these options for new tank cars constructed after October 1, 2015,
if those tank cars are used as part of HHFT. In addition, for all three
Options, PHMSA proposes the following timelines for tank cars used as
part of HHFT: (1) For Packing Group I, DOT Specification 111 tank cars
are not authorized after October 1, 2017; (2) for Packing Group II, DOT
Specification 111 tank cars are not authorized after October 1, 2018;
and (3) for Packing Group III, DOT Specification 111 tank cars are not
authorized after October 1, 2020.
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\5\ As defined in 49 CFR 1580.3--High Threat Urban Area (HTUA)
means an area comprising one or more cities and surrounding areas
including a 10-mile buffer zone, as listed in appendix A to Part
1580 of the 49 CFR.
\6\ On March 9, 2011 AAR submitted petition for rulemaking P-
1577, which was discussed in the ANPRM. In response to the ANPRM, on
November 15, 2013, AAR and ASLRAA submitted as a comment
recommendations for tank car standards that are enhanced beyond the
design in P-1577. For the purposes of this rulemaking this tank car
will be referred to as the ``AAR 2014 tank car.'' See http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=PHMSA-2012-0082-0090.
\7\ In 2011, the AAR issued Casualty Prevention Circular (CPC)
1232, which outlines industry requirements for additional safety
equipment on certain DOT Specification 111 tanks ordered after
October 1, 2011, and intended for use in ethanol and crude oil
service.
Table 2--Safety Features by Tank Car Option
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Thermal
Tank car Bottom outlet GRL Head shield Pressure relief Shell thickness Jacket Tank material * Top fittings protection Braking
handle (lbs) type valve protection ** system
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Option 1: PHMSA and FRA Bottom outlet 286k Full-height, \1/ Reclosing \9/16\ inch Minimum 11- TC-128 Grade B, TIH Top Thermal ECP brakes.
Designed Tank Car. handle removed 2\ inch thick pressure Minimum. gauge jacket normalized fittings protection
or designed to head shield. relief device. constructed steel. protection system in
prevent from A1011 system and accordance
unintended steel or nozzle capable with Sec.
actuation equivalent. of sustaining, 179.18.
during a train The jacket without
accident. must be failure, a
weather-tight. rollover
accident at a
speed of 9 mph.
[[Page 45019]]
Option 2: AAR 2014 Tank Car.. Bottom outlet 286k Full-height, \1/ Reclosing \9/16\ inch Minimum 11- TC-128 Grade B, Equipped per Thermal In trains with
handle removed 2\ inch thick pressure Minimum. gauge jacket normalized AAR protection DP or EOT
or designed to head shield. relief device. constructed steel. Specifications system in devices.
prevent from A1011 Tank Cars, accordance
unintended steel or appendix E with Sec.
actuation equivalent. paragraph 179.18.
during a train The jacket 10.2.1.
accident. must be
weather-tight.
Option 3: Enhanced CPC 1232 Bottom outlet 286k Full Height \1/ Reclosing \7/16\ inch Minimum 11- TC-128 Grade B, Equipped per Thermal In trains with
Tank Car. handle removed 2\ inch thick pressure Minimum. gauge jacket normalized AAR protection DP or EOT
or designed to head shield. relief device. constructed steel. Specifications system in devices.
prevent from A1011 Tank Cars, accordance
unintended steel or appendix E with Sec.
actuation equivalent. paragraph 179.18.
during a train The jacket 10.2.1.
accident. must be
weather-tight.
DOT 111A100W1................ Bottom Outlets 263K Optional; Bare Reclosing \7/16\ inch Jackets are TC-128 Grade B, Not required, Optional....... Not required.
Specification (Currently are Optional. Tanks half pressure Minimum. optional. normalized but when
Authorized). height; Jacket relief valve. steel.* Equipped per
Tanks full AAR
height. Specifications
Tank Cars,
appendix E
paragraph
10.2.1.
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* For the purposes of this figure, TC-128 Grade B normalized steel is used to provide a consistent comparison to the proposed options. Section 179.200-7 provides alternative materials which
are authorized for the DOT Specification 111.
** Please note that the PHMSA does not propose to require additional top fittings protection for retrofits, because the costs are not supported by corresponding benefits. Newly constructed
cars, however, are required to have additional top fittings protection. Except for additional top fittings protection, the requirements for newly constructed tank cars and retrofits are the
same.
The transportation of large volumes of flammable liquids poses a
risk to life, property, and the environment. The volume of flammable
liquids shipped by rail and in HHFTs has been increasing rapidly since
2006, representing a growing risk. Therefore, we are reevaluating the
structure of the HMR as they pertain to rail transportation.
Approximately 68 percent of the flammable liquids transported by rail
are comprised of crude oil or ethanol. The U.S. is now the global
leader in crude oil production growth. According to the rail industry,
in 2009, there were 10,800 carloads of crude oil originations
transported by Class I railroads, and in 2013, there were over 400,000
carloads of crude oil originations by Class I railroads, or 37 times as
many in the U.S. \8\ Crude oil production from the Bakken region of the
Williston Basin is now over one million barrels per day.\9\
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\8\ Association of American Railroads. 2013. Moving Crude by
Rail. December. Available online at: http://dot111.info/wp-content/uploads/2014/01/Crude-oil-by-rail.pdf.
\9\ Information regarding oil and gas production is available at
the following URL: http://www.eia.gov/petroleum/drilling/#tabs-summary-2.
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U.S. ethanol production has increased considerably during the last
10 years and has generated similar growth in the transportation of
ethanol by rail, according to a recent white paper by the Association
of American Railroads (AAR).\10\ In 2008 there were around 292,000 rail
carloads of ethanol. In 2011, that number increased over 40 percent, to
409,000.\11\ Not surprisingly, this growth in rail traffic has been
accompanied by an increase in the number of rail derailments and
accidents involving ethanol.
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\10\ Association of American Railroads. 2013. Railroads and
Ethanol. Available online at https://www.aar.org/keyissues/Documents/Background-Papers/Railroads%20and%20Ethanol.pdf.
\11\ http://www.stb.dot.gov/stb/industry/econ_waybill.html.
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As the number of shipments of crude oil in HHFTs has increased, the
number of mainline train accidents involving crude oil has increased
from zero in 2010 to five in 2013 and thus far five in 2014.\12\ This
increase comes at a time when, across the entire rail network, the
number of train accidents and hazardous materials releases are
decreasing; while total shipment volume has increased, the total number
of train accidents has declined by 43 percent since 2003, and accidents
involving a hazardous materials release has declined by 16 percent
since 2003.\13\ The projected continued growth of domestic crude oil
production, and the growing number of train accidents involving crude
oil, PHMSA concludes that the potential for future severe train
accidents involving crude oil in HHFTs has increased substantially.
Such an increase raises the likelihood of higher-consequence train
accidents.
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\12\ Source: PHMSA Hazmat Inelegance Portal (HIP), February
2014.
\13\ Data from compiled by FRA's Office of Safety Analysis.
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Recent accidents highlight the potentially severe consequences of
accidents involving HHFTs carrying crude oil. On December 30, 2013, a
train transporting grain derailed onto another track into the path of a
train transporting crude oil, which had too little time to stop before
it collided with the grain train, and then itself derailed and
unintentionally released product, which ignited near Casselton, North
[[Page 45020]]
Dakota, prompting authorities to issue a voluntary evacuation of the
city and surrounding area. On November 8, 2013, a train transporting
crude oil to the Gulf Coast from North Dakota derailed in Aliceville,
Alabama, spilling crude oil in nearby wetlands ignited. On July 6,
2013, a catastrophic railroad accident occurred in Lac-M[eacute]gantic,
Quebec, Canada, when an unsecured and unattended freight train
transporting crude oil rolled down a descending grade and subsequently
derailed, resulting in the unintentional release of lading from
multiple tank cars. The subsequent fires and explosions, along with
other effects of the accident, resulted in the deaths of 47
individuals. In addition, the derailment caused extensive damage to the
town center, a release of hazardous materials resulting in a massive
environmental impact that will require substantial clean-up costs, and
the evacuation of approximately 2,000 people from the surrounding area.
Accidents involving HHFTs transporting ethanol can also cause
severe damage. On August 5, 2012, a train derailed 18 of 106 cars, 17
of which were carrying ethanol, near Plevna, MT. Twelve of the 17 cars
released lading and began to burn, causing two grass fires, a highway
near the site to be closed, and over $1 million in damages. On October
7, 2011, a train derailed 26 loaded freight cars (including 10 loaded
with ethanol) approximately one-half mile east of Tiskilwa, IL. The
release of ethanol and resulting fire initiated an evacuation of about
500 residents within a \1/2\-mile radius of the accident scene, and
resulted in damages over $1.8 million. On June 19, 2009, near Rockford,
IL, a train derailed 19 cars, all of which contained ethanol, and 13 of
the derailed cars caught fire. The derailment destroyed a section of
single main track and an entire highway-rail grade crossing. As a
result of the fire that erupted after the derailment, a passenger in
one of the stopped cars was fatally injured, two passengers in the same
car received serious injuries, and five occupants of other cars waiting
at the highway/rail crossing were injured. Two responding firefighters
also sustained minor injuries. The release of ethanol and resulting
fire initiated a mandatory evacuation of about 2,000 residents within a
\1/2\-mile radius of the accident scene and damages of approximately
$1.7 million. The EPA estimated that 60,000 gallons of ethanol spilled
into an unnamed stream, which flowed near the Rock and Kishwaukee
Rivers.
The following table highlights the risk of HHFTs by summarizing the
impacts of selected major train accidents involving trains of Class 3
flammable liquid.
Table 3--Major Crude Oil/Ethanol Train Accidents in the U.S.
[2006-2014]
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Product
Number of Speed at loss
Date (MM/ Number of crude oil/ derailment Material and type (gallons Type of train
Location YY) tank cars ethanol in miles of train of crude Fire accident or cause
derailed cars per hour or of train accident
penetrated (mph) ethanol)
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LaSalle, CO..................... 05/14 5 1 9 Crude Oil.......... 5,000 No............. To Be Determined
(unit)............. (TBD).
Lynchburg, VA................... 04/14 17 2 23 Crude Oil.......... 30,000 Yes............ TBD.
(unit).............
Vandergrift, PA................. 02/14 21 4 31 Crude Oil.......... 10,000 No............. TBD.
New Augusta, MS................. 01/14 26 25 45 Crude Oil.......... 90,000 No............. TBD.
Casselton, ND................... 12/13 20 18 42 Crude Oil.......... 476,436 Yes............ Collision.
(unit).............
Aliceville, AL.................. 11/13 26 25 39 Crude Oil.......... 630,000 Yes............ TBD.
(unit).............
Plevna, MT...................... 08/12 17 12 25 Ethanol............ 245,336 Yes............ TBD.
Columbus, OH.................... 07/12 3 3 23 Ethanol............ 53,347 Yes............ TBD--NTSB
Investigation.
Tiskilwa, IL.................... 10/11 10 10 34 Ethanol............ 143,534 Yes............ TBD--NTSB
Investigation.
Arcadia, OH..................... 02/11 31 31 46 Ethanol............ 834,840 Yes............ Rail Defect.
(unit).............
Rockford/Cherry Valley, IL...... 06/09 19 13 19 Ethanol............ 232,963 Yes............ Washout.
(unit).............
Painesville, OH................. 10/07 7 5 48 Ethanol............ 76,153 Yes............ Rail Defect.
New Brighton, PA................ 10/06 23 20 37 Ethanol............ 485,278 Yes............ Rail Defect.
(unit).............
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Note 1. The term ``unit'' as used in this chart means that the train was made up only of cars carrying that single commodity, as well as any required
non-hazardous buffer cars and the locomotives.
Note 2. All accidents listed in the table involved HHFTs.
Note 3. All crude oil or crude oil/LPG accidents involved a train transporting over 1 million gallons of oil.
While not all accidents involving crude oil and ethanol release as
much product or have as significant consequences as those shown in this
table, these accidents indicate the potential harm from future
releases. Table 4 provides a brief summary of the justifications for
each provision in this NPRM, and how each provision will address the
safety risks described previously.
[[Page 45021]]
Table 4--Rulemaking Provisions and Safety Justifications
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Provision Justification
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Rail Routing......................... PHMSA is proposing routing
requirements to reduce the risk
of a train accident. This
proposal requires railroads to
balance the risk factors to
identify the route that poses
the lower risk. As such, they
may, in certain cases, choose a
route that eliminates exposure
in areas with high population
densities but poses a risk for
more frequent events in areas
with very low densities. In
other cases the risk of
derailment may be so low along a
section of track that, even
though it runs through a densely
populated area, it poses the
lowest total risk when severity
and likelihood are considered.
Classification of Mined Gas and PHMSA is proposing to require a
Liquid. sampling and testing program for
mined gas and liquid, such as
crude oil. PHMSA expects the
proposed requirements would
reduce the expected non-
catastrophic damages and ensure
that materials are properly
classified in accordance with
the HMR.
Notification to SERCs................ PHMSA is proposing to codify the
May 7, 2014, DOT issued an
Emergency Restriction/
Prohibition Order in Docket No.
DOT-OST-2014-0067 (EO or Order).
Recent accidents have
demonstrated the need for action
in the form of additional
communication between railroads
and emergency responders to
ensure that the emergency
responders are aware of train
movements carrying large
quantities of crude oil through
their communities.
Speed Restrictions................... PHMSA is proposing to restrict
the speed of HHFTs. Speed is a
factor that may contribute to
derailments. Speed can influence
the probability of an accident,
as lower speeds may allow for a
brake application to stop the
train before a collision. Speed
also increases the kinetic
energy of a train, resulting in
a greater possibility of the
tank cars being punctured in the
event of a derailment. The
proposed restrictions will
reduce the frequency and
severity of train accidents.
Braking.............................. To reduce the number of cars and
energy associated with train
accidents, PHMSA is proposing to
require alternative brake signal
propagation systems: Distributed
power (DP), or two-way end of
train devices (EOT); for tank
car Option 1, electronic
controlled pneumatic brakes
(ECP)
Tank Car Specifications.............. PHMSA is proposing a new DOT
Specification 117 tank car to
address the risks associated
with the rail transportation of
ethanol and crude oil and the
risks posed by HHFTs. All tank
car Options for the DOT
Specification 117 incorporate
several enhancements to increase
puncture resistance; provide
thermal protection to survive a
100-minute pool fire; and
protect top fitting (new
construction only) and bottom
outlets during a derailment.
Under all Options, the proposed
system of design enhancements
would reduce the consequences of
a derailment of tank cars
carrying crude oil or ethanol.
There would be fewer car
punctures, fewer releases from
the service equipment (top and
bottom fittings), and delayed
release of flammable liquid from
the tank cars through the
pressure relief devices.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
The consequences of train accidents and increase in the rail
transportation of flammable liquids highlight the need to review
existing regulations and industry practices related to such
transportation. PHMSA and FRA are focused on reducing the risks posed
by HHFTs and are taking action to prevent accidents from occurring and
to mitigate the consequences when accidents do occur. PHMSA and FRA's
actions to date demonstrate their focus on reducing risk associated
with the rail transportation of large quantities of flammable liquids.
PHMSA and FRA actions include: (1) Issuing FRA's Emergency Order No. 28
(EO 28) (78 FR 48218) published on August 7, 2013 stressing train
securement; (2) issuing two Joint Safety Advisories published on August
7, 2013 (78 FR 48224) and November 20, 2013 (78 FR 69745) stressing the
importance of security planning and proper characterization and
classification of crude oil; (3) initiating a comprehensive review of
operational factors that impact the transportation of hazardous
materials by rail in a public meeting held on August 27-28, 2013 (78 FR
42998); (4) referring safety issues related to EO 28 and the August 7,
2013 Joint Safety Advisory to FRA's Railroad Safety Advisory Committee
(RSAC); (5) issuing an emergency order on February 25, 2014, which was
revised and amended on March 6, 2014 requiring that all rail shipments
of crude oil that is properly classed as a flammable liquid in Packing
Group (PG) III material be treated as a PG I or II material; \14\ (6)
issuing an emergency order on May 7, 2014, requiring all railroads that
operate trains containing one million gallons of Bakken crude oil to
notify SERCs about the operation of these trains through their States;
\15\ (7) issuing a Safety Advisory on May 7, 2014, urging carriers
transporting Bakken crude oil by rail to select and use tank cars of
the highest integrity to transport the material; \16\ and (8)
publishing the September 6, 2013, advance notice of proposed rulemaking
(ANPRM) responding to eight petitions for rulemaking and four NTSB
Safety Recommendations related to the transportation of hazardous
materials by rail (78 FR 54849).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\14\ See Docket No. DOT-OST-2014-0025. See also http://www.phmsa.dot.gov/staticfiles/PHMSA/DownloadableFiles/Amended_Emergency_Order_030614.pdf.
\15\ http://www.phmsa.dot.gov/pv_obj_cache/pv_obj_id_D9E224C13963CAF0AE4F15A8B3C4465BAEAF0100/filename/Final_EO_on_Transport_of_Bakken_Crude_Oi_05_07_2014.pdf.
\16\ http://www.phmsa.dot.gov/pv_obj_cache/pv_obj_id_9084EF057B3D4E74A2DEB5CC86006951BE1D0200/filename/Final_FRA_PHMSA_Safety_Advisory_tank_cars_May_2014.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In addition to these eight actions, PHMSA issued a Safety Alert on
January 2, 2014, warning of potential crude oil variability and
emphasizing the proper and sufficient testing to ensure accurate
characterization and classification. The Safety Alert expressed PHMSA's
concern that unprocessed crude oil may affect the integrity of
packaging or present additional hazards related to corrosivity, sulfur
content, and dissolved gas content.\17\ To address these risks, this
NPRM is proposing additional requirements for a sampling plan that
would include proper characterization, classification, and selection of
a hazardous material's Packing Group. Further, the NPRM is proposing to
expand the routing requirements under subpart I of part 172 of the HMR
to include HHFTs. Through its speed, tank car, braking, and
notification requirements, this NPRM is intended to take a
comprehensive approach to the risks of HHFTs.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\17\ See http://www.phmsa.dot.gov/pv_obj_cache/pv_obj_id_111F295A99DD05D9B698AE8968F7C1742DC70000/filename/1_2_14%20Rail_Safety_Alert.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
PHMSA has prepared and placed in the docket a Regulatory Impact
Analysis (RIA) addressing the economic impact of this proposed rule.
Table 5 shows the costs and benefits by affected section and rule
provision over a 20 year period, discounted at a 7% rate. Please note
that because there is overlap in the risk reduction achieved between
some of the proposed requirements listed in
[[Page 45022]]
Table 5, the total benefits and costs of the provisions cannot be
accurately calculated by summing the benefits and costs of each
proposed provision. For example, the benefits for tank car Option 1,
the PHMSA and FRA Designed Car, include benefits that are also
presented as part of the benefits for the proposed ``Braking''
requirements at 49 CFR 174.130. Table 6 shows an explanation of the
comprehensive benefits and costs (i.e., the combined effects of
individual provisions), and the estimated benefits, costs, and net
benefits of each proposed scenario.
Please also note that, given the uncertainty associated with the
risks of crude oil and ethanol shipments, Table 5 contains a range of
benefits estimates. The low end of the range of estimated benefits
estimates risk from 2015 to 2034 based on the U.S. safety record for
crude oil and ethanol from 2006 to 2013, adjusting for the projected
increase in shipment volume over the next 20 years. Absent this
proposed rule, we predict about 15 mainline derailments for 2015,
falling to a prediction of about 5 mainline derailments annually by
2034. The high end of the range of estimated benefits includes the same
estimate of 5 to 15 annual mainline derailments predicted, based on the
U.S. safety record, plus an estimate that the U.S. would experience an
additional 10 safety events of higher consequence--nine of which would
have environmental damages and monetized injury and fatality costs
exceeding $1.15 billion per event and one of which would have
environmental damages and monetized injury and fatality costs exceeding
$5.75 billion--over the next 20 years.
Table 5--20 Year Costs and Benefits by Stand-Alone Proposed Regulatory Amendments 2015-2034 \18\
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Costs (7%)
Affected section \19\ Provision Benefits (7%) (millions)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
49 CFR 172.820.............................. Rail Routing+............ Cost effective if routing $4.5
were to reduce risk of
an incident by 0.17%.
49 CFR 173.41............................... Classification of Mined Cost effective if this 16.2
Gas and Liquid. requirement reduces risk
by 0.61%.
49 CFR 174.310.............................. Notification to SERCs.... Qualitative.............. 0
Speed Restriction: Option $199 million-$636 million 2,680
1: 40 mph speed limit
all areas*.
Speed Restriction: Option $33.6 million-$108 240
2: 40 mph 100k people*. million.
Speed Restriction: Option $6.8 million-$21.8 22.9
3: 40 mph in HTUAs*. million.
Braking: Electronic $737 million-$1,759 500
Pneumatic Control with million.
DP or EOT#.
49 CFR Part 179............................. Option 1: PHMSA and FRA $822 million-$3,256 3,030
designed car @. million.
Option 2: AAR 2014 Tank $610 million-$2,426 2,571
Car. million.
Option 3: Jacketed CPC- $393 million-$1,570 2,040
1232 (new const.). million.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Note: ``*'' indicates voluntary compliance regarding crude oil trains in high-threat urban areas (HTUA).
``+'' indicates voluntary actions that will be taken by shippers and railroads.
``#'' indicates that only tank car Option 1, the PHMSA and FRA designed car, has a requirement for ECP
brakes. However, all HHFTs would be required to have DP or two-way EOT, regardless of which tank car Option is
selected at the final rule stage.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\18\ All costs and benefits are in millions over 20 years, and
are discounted to present value using a 7 percent rate.
\19\ All affected sections of the Code of Federal Regulations
(CFR) are in Title 49.
Table 6--20 Year Benefits and Costs of Proposal Combinations of Proposed
Regulatory Amendments 2015-2034 \20\
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Benefit Range Cost
Proposal (millions) (millions)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
PHMSA and FRA Design Standard + 40 $1,436-$4,386...... $5,820
MPH System Wide.
PHMSA and FRA Design Standard + 40 $1,292-$3,836...... 3,380
MPH in 100K.
PHMSA and FRA Design Standard + 40 $1,269-$3,747...... 3,163
MPH in HTUA.
AAR 2014 Standard + 40 MPH System $794-$3,034........ 5,272
Wide.
AAR 2014 Standard + 40 MPH in 100K. $641-$2,449........ 2,831
AAR 2014 Standard + 40 MPH in HTUA. $616-$2,354........ 2,614
CPC 1232 Standard + 40 MPH System $584-$2,232........ 4,741
Wide.
CPC 1232 Standard + 40 MPH in 100K. $426-$1,626........ 2,300
CPC 1232 Standard + 40 MPH in HTUA. $400-$1,527........ 2,083
------------------------------------------------------------------------
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\20\ All costs and benefits are in millions, and are discounted
to present value using a 7 percent rate.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
II. Overview of Current Regulations Relevant to This Proposal
Federal hazardous materials transportation law (Federal hazmat law;
49 U.S.C. 5101-5128) authorizes the Secretary of Transportation
(Secretary) to ``prescribe regulations for the safe transportation,
including security, of hazardous material in intrastate, interstate,
and foreign commerce.'' The Secretary has delegated this authority to
PHMSA. 49 CFR 1.97(b). PHMSA is responsible for overseeing a hazardous
materials safety program that minimizes the risks to life and property
inherent in transportation in commerce. The HMR provide safety and
security requirements for shipments valued at
[[Page 45023]]
more than $1.4 trillion annually.\21\ The HMR are designed to achieve
three goals: (1) To ensure that hazardous materials are packaged and
handled safely and securely during transportation; (2) to provide
effective communication to transportation workers and emergency
responders of the hazards of the materials being transported; and (3)
to minimize the consequences of an incident should one occur. The
hazardous material regulatory system is a risk management system that
is prevention-oriented and focused on identifying a safety or security
hazard, thus reducing the probability and quantity of a hazardous
material release.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\21\ 2007 Commodity Flow Survey, Research and Innovative
Technology Administration, Bureau of Transportation Statistics.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Under the HMR, hazardous materials are categorized by analysis and
experience into hazard classes and packing groups based upon the risks
that they present during transportation. The HMR specify appropriate
packaging and handling requirements for hazardous materials based on
such classification, and require an offeror to communicate the
material's hazards through the use of shipping papers, package marking
and labeling, and vehicle placarding. The HMR also require offerors to
provide emergency response information applicable to the specific
hazard or hazards of the material being transported. Further, the HMR
mandate training for persons who prepare hazardous materials for
shipment or who transport hazardous materials in commerce and require
the development and implementation of plans to address security risks
related to the transportation of certain types and quantities of
hazardous materials in commerce, including additional planning
requirements for transportation by rail (e.g., the routing of the
material).
The HMR also include operational requirements applicable to each
mode of transportation. The Secretary has authority over all areas of
railroad transportation safety (Federal railroad safety laws,
principally 49 U.S.C. chapters 201-213), and delegates this authority
to FRA. 49 CFR 1.89. FRA inspects and audits railroads, tank car
facilities, and offerors for compliance with both FRA and PHMSA
regulations. FRA also has an extensive, well-established research and
development program to enhance all elements of railroad safety
including hazardous materials transportation.
As a result of the shared role in the safe and secure
transportation of hazardous materials by rail, PHMSA and FRA work very
closely when considering regulatory changes. Regarding rail safety and
security, PHMSA and FRA take a system-wide, comprehensive approach
consistent with the risks posed by the bulk transport of hazardous
materials by rail. To address our concerns regarding the risks
associated with mined liquids and gases (like crude oil), and HHFTs, we
are focusing on three areas: (1) Proper classification and
characterization; (2) operational controls to lessen the likelihood and
consequences of accidents; and (3) improvements to tank car integrity.
This approach is designed to minimize the occurrence of train accidents
and mitigate the damage caused should an accident occur.
As described throughout this NPRM, PHMSA and FRA have relied on a
variety of regulatory and non-regulatory methods to address concerns
regarding HHFTs. These efforts have included issuing guidance,
initiating rulemakings, participating in transportation safety
committees, holding public meetings with the regulated community and
other stakeholders, enhancing enforcement efforts, reaching out to the
public, and addressing tank car integrity and freight rail safety in
general. All of these efforts have been consistent with our system
safety approach. We are confident that collectively these actions have
provided and will continue to provide valuable rail safety
enhancements, information and guidance to the regulated community, and
improve overall safety for the public.
This overview section provides a general discussion of the current
regulations that affect the safety of HHFTs. These issues include: (1)
Proper classification and characterization of the hazardous materials
offered for transportation; (2) packagings authorized for the materials
transported in HHFTs; (3) the role of track integrity in preventing
train accidents; (4) oil spill response plans; and (5) routing of
trains based on an assessment of the safety and security risks along
routes.
A. Classification and Characterization of Mined Liquids and Gases
The proper classification and characterization of a hazardous
material is a key requirement under the HMR, as it dictates which other
requirements apply, such as specific operational controls and proper
packaging selection. Classification is simply ensuring the proper
hazard class and packing group (if applicable) are assigned to a
particular material. Characterization is a complete description of the
properties of a material during the transportation cycle.
Characterization includes the identification of the effects a material
has on both the reliability and safety of the packaging that contains
it. Proper classification and characterization is especially important
when dealing with a material such as mined liquids and gases, including
crude oil, as these materials' properties are variable. Crude oil's
properties are not easily understood and the characterization may vary
considerably based on time, location, method of extraction, temperature
at time of extraction or processing, and the type and extent of
processing of the material. In contrast, the classification and
characterization of manufactured products is generally well understood
and consistent.
Under Sec. 173.22 of the HMR, it is the offeror's responsibility
to properly ``class and describe the hazardous material in accordance
with parts 172 and 173 of the HMR.'' When a single material meets more
than one hazard class, it must be classed based on the hazard
precedence table in Sec. 173.2a. Once an offeror determines the hazard
class of a material, the offeror must then select the most appropriate
proper shipping name from the Sec. 172.101 Hazardous Materials Table
(HMT).
In the case of crude oil, relevant properties to properly classify
a flammable liquid include: Flash point, and boiling point (See section
173.120). The HMR does not specifically provide requirements for
characterization tests however; relevant properties that may affect the
characterization of crude oil include corrosivity, vapor pressure,
specific gravity at loading and reference temperatures, and the
presence and concentration of specific compounds such as sulfur.
Characterization of certain properties enables an offeror to select the
most appropriate shipping name, and identify key packaging
considerations. Based on the shipping name the HMT provides the list of
packagings authorized for use by the HMR. As indicated in Sec.
173.24(e), even though certain packagings are authorized, it is the
responsibility of the offeror to ensure that such packagings are
compatible with their lading. Such information and determination of the
authorized packaging also ensure that the appropriate outage is
maintained in accordance with Sec. 173.24(a).
Crude oil transported by rail is often derived from different
sources and is then blended, complicating proper classification and
characterization of the material. PHMSA and FRA audits of crude oil
loading facilities, prior to the issuance of the February 26, 2014
Emergency Restriction/Prohibition
[[Page 45024]]
Order, indicate that the classification of crude oil being transported
by rail was often based solely on a generic Safety Data Sheet (SDS).
The data on these sheets only provide a material classification and a
range of material properties. This SDS information is typically
provided by the consignee (the person to whom the shipment is to be
delivered) to the offeror. In these instances, it is possible no
validation of the crude oil properties took place. Further, FRA's
audits indicate that SDS information is often not gleaned from any
recently conducted analyses or from analyses of the many different
sources (wells) of the crude oil.
Improper classification and characterization can also impact
operational requirements under the HMR. Offerors and carriers must
ensure that outage is considered when loading a tank car. Section
173.24b(a) of the HMR prescribes the minimum tank car outage for
hazardous materials at one percent at a reference temperature that is
based on the existence of tank car insulation. A crude oil offeror must
know the specific gravity of the hazardous material at the reference
temperature as well as the temperature and specific gravity of the
material at that temperature when loaded. This information is then used
to calculate the total quantity that can be safely loaded into the car
to comply with the one percent outage requirement. If the outage is not
properly calculated because the material's specific gravity is unknown
(or is provided as a range), the tank car could be loaded such that if
the temperature increases during transportation, the tank will become
shell-full, increasing the likelihood of a leak from the valve fittings
or manway, and increase risk during a train accident.
Since 2004, approximately 10 percent of the one-time movement
approval (OTMA) requests that FRA has received under the requirements
of 49 CFR 174.50 have been submitted to move overloaded tank cars. Of
these requests, 33 percent were tank cars containing flammable liquids.
FRA notes that tank cars overloaded by weight are typically identified
when the tank cars go over a weigh-in-motion scale at a railroad's
classification yard. As previously indicated, crude oil and ethanol are
typically moved in HHFTs, and the cars in these trains are generally
moved as a single block in a ``through'' priority or ``key train.''
\22\ As a result, the train is not broken up in a classification yard
for individual car routing purposes, and cars do not typically pass
over weigh-in-motion scales in classification yards. Therefore, it is
unlikely that FRA would receive many OTMA requests for overloaded tank
cars containing crude oil, suggesting that there is a potential of
underreporting. Overloads of general service flammable liquid tank cars
should not be confused with any excess capacity issues. We do not have
information that shippers are filling the excess capacity available to
them.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\22\ On August 5, 2013, AAR published Circular No. OT-55-N. This
document supersedes OT-55-M, issued October 1, 2012. The definition
of a ``key train'' was revised to include ``20 car loads or portable
tank loads of any combination of hazardous material.'' Therefore,
the maximum speed of these trains is limited to 50 MPH. The document
is available in the public docket for this proceeding and at the
following URL: http://www.aar.com/CPC-1258%20OT-55-N%208-5-13.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Moreover, crude oil accounted for the most non-accident releases
(NARs) \23\ by commodity in 2012, nearly doubling the next highest
commodity (alcohols not otherwise specified, which accounts for a
comparable annual volume transported by rail). FRA's data indicate that
98 percent of the NARs involved loaded tank cars. Product releases
through the top valves and fittings of tank cars when the hazardous
material expands during transportation. This suggests that loading
facilities may not know the specific gravity of the hazardous materials
loaded into railroad tank cars, resulting in a lack of sufficient
outage.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\23\ According to the AAR, a non-accident release (NAR) is the
unintentional release of a hazardous material while in
transportation, including loading and unloading while in railroad
possession, which is not caused by a derailment, collision, or other
rail-related accident. NARs consist of leaks, splashes, and other
releases from improperly secured or defective valves, fittings, and
tank shells and also include venting of non-atmospheric gases from
safety release devices.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Commenters to the ANPRM noted incidents involving damage to tank
cars in crude oil service in the form of severe corrosion of the
internal surface of the tank, manway covers, and valves and fittings. A
possible cause is contamination of the crude oil by materials used in
the fracturing process that are corrosive to the tank car tank and
service equipment. Therefore, when crude oil is loaded into tank cars,
it is critical that the existence and concentration of specific
elements or compounds be identified, along with the corrosivity of the
materials to the tank cars and service equipment. Proper identification
also enables an offeror, in coordination with the tank car owner, to
determine if there is a need for an interior coating or lining,
alternative materials of construction for valves and fittings, and
performance requirements for fluid sealing elements, such as gaskets
and o-rings. These steps will help ensure the reliability of the tank
car until the next qualification event.
For the reasons outlined above, proper classification and
characterization of hazardous materials is critical to ensuring that
materials are packaged and transported safely. The HMR do not prescribe
a specific test frequency for classification and characterization of
hazardous materials. However, as provided in Sec. 173.22, the
regulations clearly intend for the frequency and type of testing to be
based on an offeror's knowledge of the hazardous material, with
specific consideration given to the volume of hazardous material
shipped, the variety of the sources of the hazardous material, and the
processes used to generate the hazardous material. Once an offeror has
classified and characterized the material; selected the appropriate
packaging; loaded the packaging; and marked, labeled, and placarded in
accordance with the HMR, the offeror must ``certify'' the shipment.
Section 172.204 of the HMR currently requires the offeror of the
hazardous material to ``certify that the material is offered for
transportation in accordance with this subchapter.'' Certification is a
very important step in the transportation process. The certification
indicates the HMR was followed and that all requirements have been met.
The shipper's certification must include either of the following
statements:
This is to certify that the above-named materials are properly
classified, described, packaged, marked and labeled, and are in
proper condition for transportation according to the applicable
regulations of the Department of Transportation.
or--
I hereby declare that the contents of this consignment are fully
and accurately described above by the proper shipping name, and are
classified, packaged, marked and labeled/placarded, and are in all
respects in proper condition for transport according to applicable
international and national governmental regulations.
As such, ultimately, the offeror is responsible for certifying a
correct classification, and while the HMR do not specifically prescribe
a frequency for classification, it requires an offeror to consider each
hazard class in accordance with the defined HMR test protocol. As
previously discussed, improper classification and characterization can
have serious ramifications that could impact transportation safety.
On January 23, 2014, in response to its investigation of the Lac-
M[eacute]gantic accident, the NTSB issued three recommendations to
PHMSA and FRA.
[[Page 45025]]
Safety Recommendation R-14-6 requested that PHMSA require shippers to
sufficiently test and document the physical and chemical
characteristics of hazardous materials to ensure the proper
classification, packaging, and record-keeping of products offered in
transportation. These and other NTSB Safety Recommendation and the
corresponding PHMSA responses are discussed in further detail in
Section C of the background portion of this document.
B. Packaging
For each proper shipping name, bulk packaging requirements are
provided in Column (8C) of the HMT. For most flammable liquids, the
authorized packaging requirements for a PG I material are provided in
Sec. 173.243 and for PGs II and III in Sec. 173.242. The following
table is provided as a general guide for the packaging options for rail
transport provided by the HMR for a flammable and combustible liquids.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\24\ Additional information on tank car specifications is
available at the following URL: http://www.bnsfhazmat.com/refdocs/1326686674.pdf.
Table 7--Tank Car Options \24\
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Flammable liquid,
Flammable liquid, PG I PG II and III Combustible Liquid
------------------------------------------------------------------------
DOT 103......................... DOT 103........... DOT 103.
DOT 104......................... DOT 104........... DOT 104.
DOT 105......................... DOT 105........... DOT 105.
DOT 109......................... DOT 109........... DOT 109.
DOT 111......................... DOT 111........... DOT 111.
DOT 112......................... DOT 112........... DOT 112.
DOT 114......................... DOT 114........... DOT 114.
DOT 115......................... DOT 115........... DOT 115.
DOT 120......................... DOT 120........... DOT 120.
AAR 206W.......... AAR 206W.
.................. AAR 203W.
.................. AAR 211W.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Note 1. Sections 173.241, 173.242, and 173.243 authorize the use of the
above tank cars.
Note 2. DOT 103, 104,105, 109, 112, 114, and 120 tank cars are pressure
tank cars (HMR; Part 179, Subpart C).
Note 3. DOT 111 and 115 tank cars are non-pressure tank cars (HMR; Part
179, Subpart D).
Note 4. AAR 203W, AAR 206W, and AAR 211W tank cars are non-DOT
specification tank cars that meet AAR standards. These tank cars are
authorized under Sec. 173.241 of the HMR (see Special Provision B1,
as applicable).
Note 5. DOT 114 and DOT 120 pressure cars are permitted to have bottom
outlets and, generally, would be compatible with the DOT 111.
The offeror must select a packaging that is suitable for the
properties of the material and based on the packaging authorizations
provided by the HMR. With regard to package selection, the HMR require
in Sec. 173.24(b) that each package used for the transportation of
hazardous materials be ``designed, constructed, maintained, filled, its
contents so limited, and closed, so that under conditions normally
incident to transportation . . . there will be no identifiable (without
the use of instruments) release of hazardous materials to the
environment [and] . . . the effectiveness of the package will not be
substantially reduced.'' Under this requirement, offerors must consider
how the properties of the material (which can vary depending on
temperature and pressure) will affect the packaging.
The DOT Specification 111 tank car is one of several cars
authorized by the HMR for the rail transportation of many hazardous
materials, including ethanol, crude oil and other flammable liquids.
For summary of the design requirements of the DOT Specification 111
tank car see table 2 in the executive summary. Provided in table 8
below, are estimates of the types of tank car tanks and corresponding
services.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\25\ Source: RSI presentation at the NTSB rail safety forum
April 22, 2014, update provided on June 18, 2014.
Table 8--Estimates for Current Fleet of Rail Tank Cars \25\
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Tank car category Population
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total # of Tank Cars............................ 334,869
Total # of DOT 111.............................. 272,119
Total # of DOT 111 in Flammable Liquid Service.. 80,500
Total # of CPC 1232 in Flammable Liquid Service. 17,300
Total # of Tank Cars hauling Crude Oil.......... 42,550
Total # of Tank Cars Hauling Ethanol............ 29,780
CPC 1232 (Jacketed) in Crude Oil Service................ 4,850
CPC 1232 (Jacketed) in Ethanol Service.................. 0
CPC 1232 (Non-Jacketed) in Crude Oil Service............ 9,400
CPC 1232 (Non-Jacketed) in Ethanol Service.............. 480
DOT 111 (Jacketed) in Crude Oil Service................. 5,500
DOT 111 (Jacketed) in Ethanol Service................... 100
DOT 111 (Non-Jacketed) in Crude Oil Service............. 22,800
DOT 111 (Non-Jacketed) in Ethanol Service............... 29,200
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Rising demand for rail carriage of crude oil \26\ and ethanol \27\
increases the risk of train accidents involving those materials. Major
train accidents often result in the release of hazardous materials.
These events pose a significant danger to the public and the
environment. FRA closely monitors train accidents involving hazardous
materials and documents the damage sustained by all cars involved in
the accident.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\26\ In 2013 there were approximately 400,000 originations of
tank car loads of crude oil. In 2012, there were nearly 234,000
originations. In 2011 there were nearly 66,000 originations. In 2008
there were just 9,500 originations. Association of American
Railroads, Moving Crude Petroleum by Rail, http://dot111.info/wp-content/uploads/2014/01/Crude-oil-by-rail.pdf (December 2013).
\27\ In 2011 there were nearly 341,000 originations of tank car
loads of ethanol, up from 325,000 in 2010. In 2000 there were just
40,000 originations. Association of American Railroads, Railroads
and Ethanol, https://www.aar.org/keyissues/Documents/Background-Papers/Railroads%20and%20Ethanol.pdf. (April 2013).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In published findings from the June 19, 2009, incident in Cherry
Valley,
[[Page 45026]]
Illinois, the NTSB indicated that the DOT Specification 111 tank car
can almost always be expected to breach in the event of a train
accident resulting in car-to-car impacts or pileups.\28\ In addition,
PHMSA received numerous petitions encouraging rulemaking and both FRA
and PHMSA received letters from members of Congress in both parties
urging prompt, responsive actions from the Department. The Association
of American Railroads (AAR) created the T87.6 Task Force to consider
several enhancements to the DOT Specification 111 tank car design and
rail carrier operations to enhance rail transportation safety.
Simultaneously, FRA conducted research on long-standing safety concerns
regarding the survivability of the DOT Specification 111 tank cars
designed to current HMR standards and used for the transportation of
ethanol and crude oil, focusing on issues such as puncture resistance
and top fittings protection. The research indicated that special
consideration is necessary for the transportation of ethanol and crude
oil in DOT Specification 111 tank cars, especially in HHFTs.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\28\ National Transportation Safety Board, Railroad Accident
Report--Derailment of CN Freight Train U70691-18 With Subsequent
Hazardous Materials Release and Fire, http://www.ntsb.gov/doclib/reports/2012/RAR1201.pdf (February 2012).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In addition, PHMSA and FRA reviewed the regulatory history
pertaining to flammable liquids transported in tank cars. Prior to
1990, the distinction between authorized packaging, for flammable
liquids in particular, was described in far more detail in Sec.
173.119. Section 173.119 indicated that the packaging requirements for
flammable liquids are based on a combination of flash point, boiling
point, and vapor pressure. The regulations provided a point at which a
flammable liquid had to be transported in a tank car suitable for
compressed gases, commonly referred to as a ``pressure car'' (e.g., DOT
Specifications 105, 112, 114 tank cars).
On December 21, 1990, the Research and Special Programs
Administration (RSPA), PHMSA's predecessor agency, published a final
rule (Docket HM-181; 55 FR 52402), that comprehensively revised the HMR
with regard to hazard communication, classification, and packaging
requirements based on the United Nations (UN) Recommendations on the
Transport of Dangerous Goods (UN Recommendations). Under Docket HM-181,
RSPA aimed to simplify and streamline the HMR by aligning with
international standards and implementing performance-oriented packaging
standards. As previously stated, Sec. 173.119 specified that the
packaging requirements for flammable liquids are based on a combination
of flash point, boiling point, and vapor pressure. Section 173.119(f)
specified that flammable liquids with a vapor pressure more than 27
pounds per square inch absolute (psia) but less than 40 psia at 100
[deg]F (at 40 psia, the material met the definition of a compressed
gas), were only authorized for transportation in certain pressure cars.
The older regulations recognized that flammable liquids exhibiting high
vapor pressures, such as those liquids with dissolved gases, posed
significant risks and required a more robust packaging.
The packaging authorizations are currently indicated in the HMT and
part 173, subpart F. DOT Specification 111 tank cars are authorized for
low, medium and high-hazard liquids and solids (equivalent to Packing
Groups III, II, I, respectively). Packing groups are designed to assign
a degree of danger presented within a particular hazard class. Packing
Group I poses the highest danger (``great danger'') and Packing Group
III the lowest (``minor danger'').\29\ In addition, the general
packaging requirements prescribed in Sec. 173.24 provide additional
consideration for selecting the most appropriate packaging from the
list of authorized packaging identified in column (8) of the HMT.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\29\ Packing groups, in addition in indicating risk of the
material, can trigger levels of varying requirements. For example
packing groups can indicate differing levels of testing requirements
for a non-bulk packaging such or the need for additional operational
requirements such as security planning requirements.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In 2011, the AAR issued Casualty Prevention Circular (CPC) 1232,
which outlines industry requirements for certain DOT Specification 111
tanks ordered after October 1, 2011, intended for use in ethanol and
crude oil service (construction approved by FRA on January 25, 2011--
see the Background below for information regarding a detailed
description of PHMSA and FRA actions to allow construction under CPC-
1232). Key tank car requirements contained in CPC-1232 include the
following:
PG I and II material tank cars to be constructed to AAR
Standard 286; AAR Manual of Standards and Recommended Practices,
Section C, Car Construction Fundamentals and Details, Standard S-286,
Free/Unrestricted Interchange for 286,000 lb. Gross Rail Load (GRL)
Cars (AAR Standard 286);
Head and shell thickness must be \1/2\ inch for TC-128B
non jacketed cars and \7/16\ inch for jacketed cars;
Shells of non-jacketed tank cars constructed of A5l6-70
must be \9/16\ inch thick;
Shells of jacketed tank cars constructed of A5l6-70 must
be \1/2\ inch thick;
New cars must be equipped with at least \1/2\ inch half-
head shields;
Heads and the shells must be constructed of normalized
steel;
Top fittings must be protected by a protective structure
as tall as the tallest fitting; and
A reclosing pressure relief valve must be installed.
The CPC-1232 requirements are intended to improve the
crashworthiness of the tank cars and include a thicker shell, head
protection, top fittings protection, and relief valves with a greater
flow capacity.
C. Track Integrity and the Safety of Freight Railroad Operations
Train accidents are often the culmination of a sequence of events
that are influenced by a variety of factors and conditions. Broken
rails or welds, track geometry, and human factors such as improper use
of switches are leading causes of derailments. For example, one study
found that broken rails or welds resulted in approximately 670
derailments between 2001 and 2010, which far exceed the average of 89
derailments for all other causes.\30\ Rail defects have caused major
accidents involving HHFTs, including accidents New Brighton, PA and
Arcadia, OH.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\30\ See ``Analysis of Causes of Major Train Derailment and
Their Effect on Accident Rates'' http://ict.illinois.edu/railroad/CEE/pdf/Journal%20Papers/2012/Liu%20et%20al%202012.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
PHMSA and FRA have a shared responsibility for regulating the
transportation of hazardous materials by rail and take a system-wide,
comprehensive approach to the risks posed by the bulk transport of
hazardous materials by rail. This approach includes both preventative
and mitigating measures. In this rulemaking PHMSA is proposing
amendments to directly address the safe transportation of HHFTs. The
focus of this NPRM is on mitigating the damages of train accidents, but
the speed restriction, braking system and routing provisions could also
prevent train accidents. This NPRM does not directly address
regulations governing the inspection and maintenance of track. PHMSA
and FRA find that existing regulations and on-going rulemaking
efforts--together with this NPRM's proposals for speed, braking, and
routing--sufficiently address safety issues involving rail defects and
human
[[Page 45027]]
factors. Specifically, the expansion of routing analysis to include
HHFTs would require consideration of the 27 safety and security factors
(See table 10). These factors include track type, class, and
maintenance schedule (which would address rail defects) as well as
training and skill level of crews (which would address human factors).
Pursuant to its statutory authority, FRA promulgates railroad
safety regulations (49 CFR subtitle B, chapter II (parts 200-299)) and
orders, enforces those regulations and orders as well as the HMR and
the Federal railroad safety laws, and conducts a comprehensive railroad
safety program. FRA's regulations promulgated for the safety of
railroad operations involving the movement of freight address: (1)
Railroad track; (2) signal and train control systems; (3) operating
practices; (4) railroad communications; (5) rolling stock; (6) rear-end
marking devices; (7) safety glazing; (8) railroad accident/incident
reporting; (9) locational requirements for the dispatch of U.S. rail
operations; (10) safety integration plans governing railroad
consolidations, mergers, and acquisitions of control; (11) alcohol and
drug testing; (12) locomotive engineer and conductor certification;
(13) workplace safety; (14) highway-rail grade crossing safety; and
other subjects.
The FRA has many initiatives underway to address freight rail
safety. Key regulatory actions are outlined below:
Risk Reduction Program (2130-AC11)-FRA is developing an
NPRM that will consider appropriate contents for Risk Reduction
Programs by Class I freight railroads and how they should be
implemented and reviewed by FRA. A Risk Reduction Program is a
structured program with proactive processes and procedures developed
and implemented by a railroad to identify hazards and to mitigate, if
not eliminate, the risks associated with those hazards on its system. A
Risk Reduction Program encourages a railroad and its employees to work
together to proactively identify hazards and to jointly determine what
action to take to mitigate or eliminate the associated risks. The ANPRM
was published on December 8, 2010, and the comment period ended on
February 7, 2011.
Track Safety Standards: Improving Rail Integrity (2130-
AC28)--FRA published this rule on January 24, 2014 (79 FR 4234). FRA's
final rule prescribes specific requirements for effective rail
inspection frequencies, rail flaw remedial actions, minimum operator
qualifications, and requirements for rail inspection records. The bulk
of this regulation codified the industry's current good practices. In
addition, it removes the regulatory requirements concerning joint bar
fracture reporting. Section 403(c) of the Rail Safety Improvement Act
of 2008 (RSIA) (Pub. L. 110-432, 122 Stat. 4848 (October 16, 2008)) (49
U.S.C. 20142 note)) mandated that FRA review its existing regulations
to determine if regulatory amendments should be developed that would
revise, for example, rail inspection frequencies and methods and rail
defect remedial actions and consider rail inspection processes and
technologies. The final rule became effective on March 25, 2014. PHMSA
and FRA seek public comment on the extent to which additional changes
to track integrity regulations are justified for HHFT routes. When
commenting, please include a specific proposal, explain the reason for
any recommended change, and include the source, methodology, and key
assumptions of any supporting evidence.
Positive Train Control (PTC) (multiple rulemakings)--PTC
is a processor-based/communication-based train control system designed
to prevent train accidents. The RSIA mandates that PTC be implemented
across a significant portion of the Nation's rail system by December
31, 2015. See 49 U.S.C. 20157. PTC may be voluntarily developed and
implemented by a railroad following the requirements of 49 CFR part
236, Subpart H, Standards for Processor-Based Signal and Train Control
Systems; or, may be, as mandated by the RSIA, developed and implemented
by a railroad following the requirements of 49 CFR part 236, Subpart I,
Positive Train Control Systems. With limited exceptions and exclusions,
PTC is required to be installed and implemented on Class I railroad
main lines (i.e., lines with over 5 million gross tons annually) over
which any poisonous- or toxic-by-inhalation (PIH/TIH) hazardous
materials are transported; and, on any railroad's main lines over which
regularly scheduled passenger intercity or commuter operations are
conducted. It is currently estimated this will equate to approximately
70,000 miles of track and will involve approximately 20,000
locomotives. PTC technology is capable of automatically controlling
train speeds and movements should a train operator fail to take
appropriate action for the conditions at hand. For example, PTC can
force a train to a stop before it passes a signal displaying a stop
indication, or before diverging on a switch improperly lined, thereby
averting a potential collision. PTC systems required to comply with the
requirements of Subpart I must reliably and functionally prevent:
Train-to-train collisions;
Overspeed derailments;
Incursion into an established work zone; and
Movement through a main line switch in the improper
position.
D. Oil Spill Response Plans
PHMSA's regulations (49 CFR part 130) prescribe prevention,
containment and response planning requirements of the Department of
Transportation applicable to transportation of oil \31\ by motor
vehicles and rolling stock. The purpose of a response plan is to ensure
that personnel are trained and available and equipment is in place to
respond to an oil spill, and that procedures are established before a
spill occurs, so that required notifications and appropriate response
actions will follow quickly when there is a spill. We believe that
most, if not all, of the rail community transporting oil, including
crude oil transported as a hazardous material, is subject to the basic
response plan requirement of 49 CFR 130.31(a) based on the
understanding that most, if not all, rail tank cars being used to
transport crude oil have a capacity greater than 3,500 gallons.
However, a comprehensive response plan for shipment of oil is only
required when the oil is in a quantity greater than 42,000 gallons per
package. Tank cars of this size are not used to transport oil. As a
result, the railroads do not file a comprehensive oil response plan. A
comparison of a basic and comprehensive plan can be seen below in Table
9. The shaded rows of the table indicate requirements that are not part
of the basic plan but would be included in the comprehensive plan.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\31\ For purposes of 49 CFR part 130, oil means oil of any kind
or in any form, including, but not limited to, petroleum, fuel oil,
sludge, oil refuse, and oil mixed with the wastes other than dredged
spoil. 49 CFR 130.5. This includes non-petroleum oil such as animal
fat, vegetable oil, or other non-petroleum oil.
[[Page 45028]]
Table 9--Comparison of Basic and Comprehensive Spill Plans by Requirement
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Type of plan
Category Requirement ---------------------------------------------------
Basic Comprehensive
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Preparation...................... Sets forth the manner of Yes..................... Yes.
response to a discharge..
Preparation...................... Accounts for the maximum Yes..................... Yes.
potential discharge of
the packaging..
Personnel/Equipment.............. Identifies private Yes..................... Yes.
personnel and equipment
available for response..
Personnel/Coordination........... Identifies appropriate Yes..................... Yes.
persons and agencies
(including telephone
numbers) to be
contacted, including the
NRC.
Documentation.................... Is kept on file at the Yes..................... Yes.
principal place of
business and at the
dispatcher's office.
Coordination..................... Reflects the requirements No...................... Yes.
of the National
Contingency Plan (40 CFR
Part 300) and Area
Contingency Plans.
Personnel/Coordination........... Identified the qualified No...................... Yes.
individual with full
authority to implement
removal actions, and
requires immediate
communications between
the individual and the
appropriate Federal
official and the persons
providing spill response
personnel and equipment.
Personnel/Equipment/Coordination. Identifies and ensures by No...................... Yes.
contract or other means
the availability of
private personnel, and
the equipment necessary
to remove, to the
maximum extent
practicable, a worst-
case discharge
(including that
resulting from fire or
explosion) and to
mitigate or prevent a
substantial threat of
such a discharge.
Training......................... Describes the training, No...................... Yes.
equipment, testing,
periodic unannounced
drills, and response
actions of personnel, to
be carried out under the
plan to ensure safety
and to mitigate or
prevent discharge or the
substantial threat of
such a discharge.
Documentation.................... Is submitted (and No...................... Yes.
resubmitted in the event
of a significant
change), to the
Administrator of FRA.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
E. Rail Routing
For some time, there has been considerable public and Congressional
interest in the safe and secure rail routing of security-sensitive
hazardous materials (such as chlorine and anhydrous ammonia). The
Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007
directed the Secretary, in consultation with the Secretary of Homeland
Security, to publish a rule governing the rail routing of security-
sensitive hazardous materials. On December 21, 2006, PHMSA, in
coordination with FRA and the Transportation Security Administration
(TSA) of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), published an
NPRM under Docket HM-232E (71 FR 76834), which proposed to revise the
current requirements in the HMR applicable to the safe and secure
transportation of hazardous materials by rail. Specifically, we
proposed to require rail carriers to compile annual data on specified
shipments of hazardous materials, use the data to analyze safety and
security risks along rail routes where those materials are transported,
assess alternative routing options, and make routing decisions based on
those assessments.
In that NPRM, we solicited comments on whether the proposed
requirements should also apply to flammable gases, flammable liquids,
or other materials that could be weaponized, as well as hazardous
materials that could cause serious environmental damage if released
into rivers or lakes. Commenters who addressed this issue indicated
that rail shipments of Division 1.1, 1.2, and 1.3 explosives; PIH
materials; and highway-route controlled quantities of radioactive
materials pose significant rail safety and security risks warranting
the enhanced security measures proposed in the NPRM and adopted in a
November 26, 2008 final rule (73 FR 20752). Commenters generally did
not support enhanced security measures for a broader list of materials
than were proposed in the NPRM.
The City of Las Vegas, Nevada, did support expanding the list of
materials for which enhanced security measures are required to include
flammable liquids; flammable gases; certain oxidizers; certain organic
peroxides; and 5,000 pounds or greater of pyrophoric materials. While
DOT and DHS agreed that these materials pose certain safety and
security risks in rail transportation, the risks were not as great as
those posed by the explosive, PIH, and radioactive materials specified
in the NPRM, and PHMSA was not persuaded that they warranted the
additional safety and security measures. PHMSA did note, however, that
DOT, in consultation with DHS, would continue to evaluate the
transportation safety and security risks posed by all types of
hazardous materials and the effectiveness of our regulations in
addressing those risks and would consider revising specific
requirements as necessary.
The 2008 final rule requires rail carriers to select a practicable
route posing the least overall safety and security risk to transport
security-sensitive hazardous materials (73 FR 72182). The final rule
implemented regulations requiring rail carriers to compile annual data
on certain shipments of explosive, toxic by inhalation, and radioactive
materials; use the data to analyze safety and security risks along rail
routes where those materials are transported; assess alternative
routing options; and make routing decisions based on those assessments.
In accordance with Sec. 172.820(e), the carrier must select the route
posing the least overall safety and security risk. The carrier must
retain in writing all route review and selection decision
documentation. Additionally, the rail carrier must identify a point of
contact on routing issues involving the movement of covered materials
and provide the contact information to the following:
1. State and/or regional Fusion Centers that have been established
to coordinate with state, local, and tribal officials on security
issues and which are located within the area encompassed by the rail
carrier's rail system; \32\ and
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\32\ http://www.dhs.gov/fusion-center-locations-and-contact-information.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
2. State, local, and tribal officials in jurisdictions that may be
affected by a
[[Page 45029]]
rail carrier's routing decisions and who have contacted the carrier
regarding routing decisions.
Rail carriers must assess available routes using, at a minimum, the
27 factors listed in Appendix D to Part 172 of the HMR to determine the
safest, most secure routes for security-sensitive hazardous materials.
Table 10--Factors To Be Considered in the Performance of This Safety and
Security Risk Analysis
------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Volume of hazardous material Rail traffic density Trip length for
transported. route.
Presence and characteristics Track type, class, Track grade and
of railroad facilities. and maintenance curvature.
schedule.
Presence or absence of Presence or absence Number and types of
signals and train control of wayside hazard grade crossings.
systems along the route detectors.
(``dark'' versus signaled
territory).
Single versus double track Frequency and Proximity to iconic
territory. location of track targets.
turnouts.
Environmentally sensitive or Population density Venues along the
significant areas. along the route. route (stations,
events, places of
congregation).
Emergency response Areas of high Presence of
capability along the route. consequence along passenger traffic
the route, along route (shared
including high track).
consequence targets.
Speed of train operations... Proximity to en- Known threats,
route storage or including any
repair facilities. threat scenarios
provided by the DHS
or the DOT for
carrier use in the
development of the
route assessment.
Measures in place to address Availability of Past accidents.
apparent safety and practicable
security risks. alternative routes.
Overall times in transit.... Training and skill Impact on rail
level of crews. network traffic and
congestion.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
These factors address safety and security issues, such as the
condition of the track and supporting infrastructure; the presence or
absence of signals; past incidents; population density along the route;
environmentally-sensitive or significant areas; venues along the route
(stations, events, places of congregation); emergency response
capability along the route; measures and countermeasures already in
place to address apparent safety and security risks; and proximity to
iconic targets. The HMR require carriers to make conscientious efforts
to develop logical and defendable systems using these factors.
FRA enforces the routing requirements in the HMR and is authorized,
after consulting with PHMSA, TSA, and the Surface Transportation Board,
to require a railroad to use an alternative route other than the route
selected by the railroad if it is determined that the railroad's route
selection documentation and underlying analysis are deficient and fail
to establish that the route chosen poses the least overall safety and
security risk based on the information available (49 CFR 209.501).
On January 23, 2014, in response to its investigation of the Lac-
M[eacute]gantic accident, the NTSB issued three recommendations to both
PHMSA and FRA. Recommendation R-14-4 requested PHMSA work with FRA to
expand hazardous materials route planning and selection requirements
for railroads to include key trains transporting flammable liquids as
defined by the AAR Circular No. OT-55-N and, where technically
feasible, require rerouting to avoid transportation of such hazardous
materials through populated and other sensitive areas.
III. Recent Actions Addressing HHFT Risk
PHMSA and FRA have used a variety of regulatory and non-regulatory
methods to address the risks of the bulk transport of flammable
liquids, including crude oil and ethanol, by rail in HHFTs. These
efforts include issuing guidance, conducting rulemakings, participating
in rail safety committees, holding public meetings with the regulated
community, enhancing enforcement efforts, and reaching out to the
public. All of these efforts are consistent with our system-wide
approach. We are confident these actions provide valuable information
and guidance to the regulated community and enhance public safety. In
the following, we discuss in detail these efforts and the NTSB
recommendations related to HHFTs.
A. Regulatory Actions
On May 14, 2010, PHMSA published a final rule under Docket HM-233A
(75 FR 27205) that amended the HMR by incorporating provisions
contained in certain widely used or longstanding special permits having
an established safety record. As part of this rulemaking, PHMSA
authorized certain rail tank cars, transporting hazardous materials, to
exceed the gross weight on rail limitation of 263,000 pounds (263,000
lb. GRL) upon approval of FRA.
On January 25, 2011, FRA published a Federal Register notice of
FRA's approval (76 FR 4250) pursuant to PHMSA's May 14, 2010 final
rule. The notice established detailed conditions for the manufacturing
and operation of certain tank cars in hazardous materials service,
including the DOT-111, that weigh between 263,000 and 286,000 pounds.
Taken as a whole, the PHMSA rulemaking and the FRA notice serves as the
mechanism for tank car manufacturers to build a 286,000-pound tank car.
As such, rail car manufacturers currently have the authority to
manufacture the enhanced DOT Specification 111 tank car (e.g., CPC-1232
tank car outlined in ``II. Overview of Current Regulations Relevant to
this Proposal'') under the conditions outlined, in the January 25, 2011
notice.
The notice grants a blanket approval for tank cars to carry up to
286,000 lb. GRL, when carrying non-PIH materials, subject to certain
requirements. FRA divided these additional requirements into the
following three categories:
1. Existing tank cars that were authorized under a PHMSA special
permit for greater than 263,000 lb. GRL, FRA's approval requires the
following:
a. Compliance with various terms of the existing special permits;
b. Tank cars constructed, rebuilt, or modified to meet AAR Standard
S-259 \33\ must be operated only in controlled interchange;
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\33\ Both S-259 and S-286 are mechanical (underframes, trucks,
wheels, axles, brake system, draft system, a car body fatigue)
design requirements for operation of tank cars at a gross rail load
of 286,000 pounds. S-259 preceded S-286.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
c. Tank cars constructed, rebuilt, or modified to meet AAR Standard
S-286 may operate in unrestricted interchange; and
d. Tank car owners must determine which standard applies, ensure
tank
[[Page 45030]]
cars are marked appropriately, and maintain and file associated
records.
2. Tank cars that have been built, rebuilt, or otherwise modified
pursuant to AAR Standards S-259 or S-286 for greater than 263,000
pounds gross weight on rail, but are not authorized under a PHMSA
special permit, FRA's approval requires the following:
a. Tank cars constructed, rebuilt, or modified to meet AAR Standard
S-259 must be operated only in controlled interchange;
b. Tank cars constructed, rebuilt, or modified to meet AAR Standard
S-286 may operate in unrestricted interchange;
c. Tank cars must satisfy design specifications listed in the
notice, including materials of construction, thickness, and jacketing;
and
d. Tank car owners must determine which standard and additional
specification requirements apply, ensure tank cars are marked
appropriately, and maintain and file associated records.
3. New tank cars, manufactured after the notice was published, to
carry more than 263,000 pounds gross weight on rail, FRA's approval
requires the following:
a. Tank cars must be constructed in accordance with AAR Standard S-
286; and
b. Tank cars must satisfy design specifications listed in the
notice, including puncture resistance and service equipment.
Any manufacturer choosing to design a car that does not meet the
conditions of FRA's 2011 approval must request a new approval from FRA
in accordance with Sec. 179.13 of the HMR.
Following the publication of the PHMSA rule and the subsequent FRA
approval notice, PHMSA received a petition for rulemaking (P-1577) from
the AAR on March 9, 2011, requesting changes to PHMSA's specifications
for tank cars (namely the DOT Specification 111 tank car) used to
transport PG I and II materials. DOT recognized the improvements of the
P-1577 tank car relative to the DOT Specification 111 tank car, but
challenged the industry to consider additional improvements in puncture
resistance, thermal protection, top fitting protection, bottom outlet
protection, and braking, as well as railroad operations. As a result,
the AAR Tank Car Committee (TCC) constituted the T87.6 Task Force. The
task force was charged with (1) reevaluating the standards in P-1577
and considering additional design enhancements for tank cars used to
transport crude oil, ethanol and ethanol/gasoline mixtures as well as
(2) considering operating requirements to reduce the risk of train
accidents involving tank cars carrying crude oil classified as PG I and
II, and ethanol.
FRA chaired this task force and expected the activity would lead to
a more comprehensive approach than requested by P-1577. The task force
promised to address the root cause, severity, and consequences of train
accidents, and its recommendations were finalized on March 1, 2012. The
T87.6 Task Force recommended requirements for a pressure relief device
with a start of discharge setting of 75 psig, and a minimum flow
capacity of 27,000 SCFM.
The task force did not address many of the recommendations provided
by FRA, including the following:
Tank car design and use:
Thermal protection to address breaches attributable to
exposure to fire conditions;
Roll-over protection to prevent damage to top and bottom
fittings and limit stresses transferred from the protection device to
the tank shell;
Hinged and bolted manways to address a common cause of
leakage during accidents and Non-Accident Releases (NARs);
Bottom outlet valve elimination; and
Increasing outage from 1 percent to 2 percent to improve
puncture resistance.
Rail Carrier Operations:
Rail integrity (e.g., broken rails or welds, misaligned
track, obstructions, track geometry, etc.) to reduce the number and
severity of train accidents;
Alternative brake signal propagation systems ECP, DP, and
two-way EOT device to reduce the number of cars and energy associated
with train accidents;
Speed restrictions for key trains containing 20 or more
loaded tank cars (on August 5, 2013, AAR issued Circular No. OT-55-N
addressing this issue); and
Emergency response to mitigate the risks faced by response
and salvage personnel, the impact on the environment, and delays to
traffic on the line.
After considering the disparity between the various stakeholders
and the lack of actionable items by the task force, PHMSA and FRA
initiated the development of an ANPRM to consider revisions to the HMR
by improving the crashworthiness of railroad tank cars and improve
operations. The ANPRM would respond to petitions for rulemaking
submitted by industry and safety recommendations issued by the NTSB.
Between April 2012 and October 2012, PHMSA received an additional three
petitions (P-1587, P-1595 and P-1612) and one modification of a
petition (P-1612) on rail safety issues. The additional petitions were
submitted by concerned communities and various industry associations
requesting further modification to the tank car standards.
On September 6, 2013, PHMSA published the ANPRM (78 FR 54849)
seeking public comments on whether issues raised in eight petitions
\34\ and four NTSB Safety Recommendations would enhance safety, revise,
and clarify the HMR with regard to rail transport. Specifically, we
requested comments on important amendments that would do the following:
(1) Enhance the standards for DOT Specification 111 tank cars used to
transport PG I and II flammable liquids; (2) explore the feasibility of
additional operational requirements to enhance the safe transportation
of Packing Group I and II flammable liquids; (3) afford FRA greater
discretion to authorize the movement of non-conforming tank cars; (4)
correct regulations that allow an unsafe condition associated with
pressure relief valves (PRV) on rail cars transporting carbon dioxide,
refrigerated liquid; (5) revise outdated regulations applicable to the
repair and maintenance of DOT Specification 110, DOT Specification 106,
and ICC 27 tank car tanks (ton tanks); and (6) except rupture discs
from removal if the inspection itself would damage, change, or alter
the intended operation of the device.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\34\ In addition to the four tank car related petitions, PHMSA
also received four additional petitions relating to rail operational
requirements which were contained in the September 2013 ANPRM.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
On November 5, 2013, PHMSA published a 30-day extension of the
comment period for the ANPRM (78 FR 66326). We received a request to
extend the comment period to 90 days from the Sierra Club on behalf of
Climate Parents, Columbia Riverkeeper, ForestEthics, Friends of Earth,
Natural Resources Defense Council, Oil Change International, San
Francisco Baykeeper, Spokane Riverkeeper, Washington Environmental
Council, and the Waterkeeper Alliance. The request indicated that the
primary basis for extension was to allow the public a meaningful review
of these proposed changes in rail safety requirements, especially
regarding tank cars transporting crude oil and tar sands, while
highlighting several recent tank car train accidents. The request also
indicated that the government shutdown in October 2013 prevented
communication with DOT staff for review of the technical proposals
during
[[Page 45031]]
the initial 60-day comment period. Although PHMSA normally considers an
initial 60-day comment period sufficient time to review and respond to
rulemaking proposals, due to PHMSA's desire to collect meaningful input
from a number of potentially affected stakeholders, PHMSA extended the
comment period by 30 days.
Comments submitted in response to the ANPRM indicate that public
interest in the issues raised by the ANPRM is significant. PHMSA
received over 100 individual submissions of comments, including the
signatures of over 152,000 stakeholders, expressing views regarding
tank car and operational standards for flammable liquids. The comments
were from local communities, cities, and towns; rail carriers;
offerors; suppliers of equipment; tank car manufacturers; environmental
groups; NTSB; and the U.S. Congress. PHMSA reviewed the public comments
and used the information gathered to aid in the development of this
proposed rule.
B. Emergency Orders and Non-Regulatory Actions
In addition to the rulemaking activity described above, FRA took
action, in the form of an emergency order, following the Lac-
M[eacute]gantic derailment. On August 7, 2013, FRA published EO 28 (78
FR 48218) to address safety issues related to securement of certain
hazardous materials trains; specifically, trains with--
(1) Five or more tank carloads of any one or any combination of
materials poisonous by inhalation as defined in Title 49 CFR 171.8, and
including anhydrous ammonia (UN1005) and ammonia solutions (UN3318); or
(2) 20 rail carloads or intermodal portable tank loads of any one
or any combination of materials listed in (1) above, or, any Division
2.1 flammable gas, Class 3 flammable liquid or combustible liquid,
Class 1.1 or 1.2 explosive,\35\ or hazardous substance listed in 49 CFR
173.31(f)(2).
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\35\ Should have read ``Division'' instead of ``Class.''
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EO 28 prohibits railroads from leaving trains or vehicles
transporting the specified quantities of the specified types of
hazardous materials unattended on mainline track or siding outside of a
yard or terminal unless the railroad adopts and complies with a plan
that provides sufficient justification for leaving them unattended
under specific circumstances and locations. The order also requires
railroads to develop specific processes for securing, communicating,
and documenting the securement of unattended trains and vehicles
subject to the Order, including locking the controlling locomotive cab
door or removing the reverser and setting a sufficient number of hand
brakes before leaving the equipment unattended. In addition, the order
requires railroads to review, verify, and adjust as necessary existing
requirements and instructions related to the number of hand brakes to
be set on unattended trains; conduct train securement job briefings
among crewmembers and employees; and develop procedures to ensure
qualified employees inspect equipment for proper securement after
emergency response actions that involve the equipment.
The quantities of specific hazardous materials addressed in EO 28
were further addressed under the AAR Circular No. OT-55-N, Recommended
Railroad Operating Practices for Transportation of Hazardous Materials,
effective August 5, 2013.\36\ AAR Circular No. OT-55-N supersedes AAR
Circular No. OT-55-M, issued October 1, 2012. In OT-55-N, AAR revised
the definition of ``key train'' in two specific areas.
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\36\ The document is available in the public docket for this
proceeding and at the following URL: http://www.aar.com/CPC-1258%20OT-55-N%208-5-13.pdf.
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(1) The definition of ``key train'' was revised from ``five tank
carloads of Poison or Toxic Inhalation Hazard (PIH or TIH) (Hazard Zone
A, B, C, or D), anhydrous ammonia (UN1005), or ammonia solutions
(UN3318)'' to one tank carload.
(2) The ``key train'' definition was amended by adding ``20
carloads or portable tank loads of any combination of hazardous
material.''
Any train that meets the ``key train'' definition is limited to a
50-mph speed restriction under AAR Circular No. OT-55-N. In addition,
any route defined by a railroad as a key route shall meet certain
standards described in OT-55-N, including the following:
Wayside defective wheel bearing detectors at a maximum of
40 miles apart, or an equivalent level of protection;
Main track on key routes should be inspected by rail
defect detection and track geometry inspection cars or by any
equivalent level of inspection at least twice each year;
Sidings on key routes should be inspected at least once a
year, and main track and sidings should have periodic track inspections
to identify cracks or breaks in joint bars; and
Track used for meeting and passing key trains should be
FRA Class 2 track or higher.
As previously discussed, EO 28 prohibits railroads from leaving
trains or vehicles transporting the specified hazardous materials
unattended on mainline track or siding outside of a yard or terminal
unless the railroad adopts and complies with a plan that provides
sufficient justification for leaving them unattended under specific
circumstances and locations.
EO 28 was supplemented with a PHMSA and FRA joint safety advisory
published the same day (78 FR 48224). The joint safety advisory
addressed causes of the Lac-M[eacute]gantic derailment, provided DOT
safety and security recommendations, and announced PHMSA and FRA
participation in an Emergency RSAC meeting to address rail safety
concerns.
On August 27-28, 2013, PHMSA and FRA held a public meeting to
review the requirements in the HMR applicable to rail operations (78 FR
42998). PHMSA and FRA conducted this meeting as part of a comprehensive
review of operational factors that impact the safety of the
transportation of hazardous materials by rail. This meeting provided
the opportunity for public input on a wide range of rail safety
requirements including operational rail requirements. PHMSA and FRA
reviewed the transcript and public comments, all of which support a
comprehensive review of these requirements. Additional information
gathered from the public meeting, particularly regarding the
modernization of Part 174 of the HMR, will be addressed in a future
rulemaking.
On August 29, 2013, FRA convened an emergency meeting to initiate a
series of RSAC working groups to discuss and work through specific
tasks resulting from the Lac-M[eacute]gantic derailment. RSAC members
discussed the formulation of task statements regarding appropriate
train crew size, hazard classes, and quantities of hazardous materials
that should trigger additional operating procedures, including
attendance and securement requirements. On April 9, 2014 RSAC approved
by a majority vote the Hazardous Materials Working Group's consensus
recommendations.\37\ Table 11 provides the RSAC recommendations.
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\37\ https://rsac.fra.dot.gov/meetings/Railroad%20Safety%20Advisory%20Committee%20Hazardous%20Materials%20Issues%20Recommendation%20VOTE.pdf.
[[Page 45032]]
Table 11--RSAC Consensus Recommendations From the Hazardous Materials
Issues Working Group
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Subject Recommendation
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Definition of residue............. Propose to amend the definition of
Residue as follows:
Residue means the hazardous material
remaining in a packaging, including
a tank car, after its contents have
been unloaded to the maximum extent
practicable and before the
packaging is either refilled or
cleaned of hazardous material and
purged to remove any hazardous
vapors. The extent practicable
means an unloading facility has
unloaded a bulk package using
properly functioning service
equipment and plant process
equipment.
Guidance document language for Proposed wording for a recommended
securement of tank cars on practice document. Securement and
private track. security of loaded hazardous
materials cars on private track:
``It has come to FRA's attention
that cuts of loaded hazardous
materials cars are being stored on
track that is exclusively leased,
and meets the definition of private
track, but that may not be adjacent
to a shipper or consignee facility.
These stored cars are of great
concern to the general public
living in nearby communities. The
cars are being stored in other
locations simply for available
space reasons--there isn't
available storage space closer to a
consignee facility. If the cars are
stored on track that meets the
definition of ``private track''
they are considered to be no longer
in transportation, and the
hazardous materials regulations do
not apply. Nonetheless, FRA
strongly recommends the following
as best practices that may enhance
the safety and security of stored
hazardous materials cars.''
``FRA recommends that companies
(party in control of private track
as defined in Sec. 171.8) review
the private track locations where
cuts of hazardous materials cars
(20 or more cars) are regularly
stored to determine the following:
1. Whether additional attendance,
monitoring, or other security
measures may be appropriate;
2. Whether an adequate and
appropriate number of handbrakes
are set on the cuts of cars that
will ensure that there is no
unintended movement of the cars;
3. Whether all of the hazard
communication information
(placards, emergency response
information) be maintained as they
would if the cars were in
transportation, and that this
information may be available to
emergency responders if
requested.''
PHMSA re-engage their regulatory In 2003, the Research and Special
authority over certain aspects of Programs Administration (RSPA), the
loading, unloading and storage of predecessor agency to PHMSA,
tank cars containing hazardous clarified its regulatory
materials. jurisdiction over the loading,
unloading, and storage of hazardous
materials. 68 Fed. Reg. 61906
(October 30, 2003). The intent was
to clarify where transportation
began and ended, and thus, where
PHMSA jurisdiction began and ended.
In the rail mode, certain aspects
of the storage, loading, and
unloading of hazardous materials to
and from rail tank cars were no
longer regulated, and those
requirements were removed from the
CFR. The thought was that the
loading, unloading, and storage
were more appropriately workplace
issues better addressed by an
agency such as OSHA. PHMSA
continued to regulate certain ``pre-
transportation functions'' that it
believed were clearly tied to
transportation safety, such as the
securement of closures on rail tank
cars after loading but before
offering the package to a carrier.
This proposal is not intended to
change the current regulation of
OSHA over workplace safety issues
related to loading, unloading, and
storage of railroad tank cars.
As certain industries that ship
hazardous materials by rail have
evolved, and as some loading,
unloading, storage, and
transportation practices have
changed, DOT believes it may be
appropriate to re-engage on these
subjects. DOT believes that there
may be aspects of these procedures
that directly affect transportation
safety, and that it would be
appropriate for to regulate them.
Align definition of Appendix A Appendix A to Emergency Order 28
train with ``Key Train'' from OT- Any train transporting:
55-N. 1. One or more tank car loads of
materials poisonous by inhalation
as defined in 49 CFR 171.8, and
including anhydrous ammonia (UN
1005) and ammonia solutions (UN
3318); or
2. 20 or more rail car loads or
intermodal portable tank loads of
any material listed in (1) above,
or bulk car loads Division 2.1
flammable gases, Class 3 flammable
liquids, or hazardous substances
listed in 49 CFR 173.31(f)(2); or
rail car loads of packages of
Division 1.1 or 1.2 explosives.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
PHMSA solicits information and comment on any alternate approaches
that may be contained in or considered as part of any recommendation
from the RSAC to FRA regarding the proposals in this NPRM.
FRA and PHMSA are active participants and observers of the AAR Tank
Car Committee. This committee is comprised of the AAR, railroads, tank
car owners, manufacturers, and shippers, with active participation from
U.S. and Canadian regulators. The AAR Tank Car Committee works together
to develop technical standards for how tank cars, including those used
to transport hazardous materials, are designed and constructed. PHMSA
also participates as a working member in API's Classification and
Loading of Crude Oil Standard Development Working Group.
On November 20, 2013, PHMSA and FRA issued a follow-up Joint Safety
Advisory to reinforce the importance of proper characterization,
classification, and selection of a packing group for Class 3 (flammable
liquid) materials, and the corresponding regulations for safety and
security planning. The Advisory reinforced the Department's position
that we expect rail offerors and rail carriers to revise their safety
and security plans required by the HMR, including the required risk
assessments, to address the safety and security issues identified in
FRA's Emergency Order No. 28 and the August 7, 2013, joint Safety
Advisory (78 FR 69745). The Advisory was supplemented with enhanced
enforcement operations by FRA to ensure compliance with the applicable
requirements.
On January 2, 2014, PHMSA issued a Safety Alert warning of crude
oil variability and emphasized proper and sufficient testing to ensure
accurate characterization and classification of this hazardous
material. Proper characterization and classification of a hazardous
material are integral for the HMR to accomplish its safety purpose.
Characterization and classification ultimately determine the
appropriate and permitted packagings for a given hazardous material.
This alert addressed the initial findings of Operation Classification,
a compliance initiative involving unannounced inspections and testing
of crude oil samples to verify
[[Page 45033]]
that offerors of the materials have properly classified and described
the hazardous materials. The alert expressed PHMSA's concern that
unprocessed crude oil may affect the integrity of the packaging or
present additional hazards, related to corrosivity, sulfur content, and
dissolved gas content. It also noted that preliminary testing, focused
on the classification and packing group assignments that have been
selected and certified by offerors of crude oil and PHMSA, had found it
necessary to expand the scope of their sampling and analyses to measure
other factors that would affect the proper characterization and
classification of the materials.
PHMSA and FRA launched Operation Classification in August 2013 to
verify that crude oil is being properly classified in accordance with
Federal regulations. Activities included unannounced inspections, data
collection and sampling at strategic terminal and loading locations for
crude oil. PHMSA investigators tested samples from various points along
the crude oil transportation chain; from cargo tanks that deliver crude
oil to rail loading facilities, from storage tanks at the facilities,
and from pipelines connecting storage tanks to rail cars that would
move the crude across the country. On February 4, 2014, PHMSA announced
the first results from Operation Classification, which indicated that
some crude oil taken from cargo tanks en route to rail loading
facilities was not properly classified. Based on some of the test
results, 11 of the 18 samples taken from cargo tanks delivering crude
oil to the rail loading facilities were assigned to packing groups that
incorrectly indicated a lower risk than what was actually being
transported. PHMSA issued three Notices of Probable Violations to the
companies involved as a result, proposing civil penalties totaling
$93,000. Operation Classification is part of a larger Department-wide
effort named Operation Safe Delivery. Operation Safe Delivery is an
effort to ensure the safe transportation of crude oil moving by rail
using a comprehensive approach, including prevention, mitigation and
response.
On January 9, 2014, the Secretary issued a ``Call to Action,'' to
actively engage all the stakeholders in the crude oil industry,
including CEOs of member companies of the American Petroleum Institute
and CEOs of the railroads. In a meeting held on January 16, 2014, the
Secretary and the Administrators of PHMSA and FRA requested that
offerors and carriers identify prevention and mitigation strategies
that can be implemented quickly.
Specifically, the Call to Action discussed issues including proper
classification and characterization of hazardous materials, operational
controls and track maintenance that could prevent accidents, and tank
car integrity improvements that could mitigate the effect of accidents
should one occur. The meeting was an open and constructive dialogue on
how, collaboratively, industry and government can make America's
railways safer.
As a result of this meeting, the rail and crude oil industries
agreed to voluntarily consider or implement potential improvements
including speed restrictions in high consequence areas, alternative
routing, the use of distributive power to improve braking, and
improvements in emergency response preparedness and training. On
January 22, 2014 the Secretary sent a letter to the attendees recapping
the meeting and stressing the importance of this issue.\38\
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\38\ See Call to Action Follow-up letter http://www.phmsa.dot.gov/staticfiles/PHMSA/DownloadableFiles/Files/Letter_from_Secretary_Foxx_Follow_up_to_January_16.pdf.
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The rail and crude oil industries committed to consider and address
several issues and, within 30 days, provide details regarding the
specific actions that shippers and carriers will take immediately to
improve safety in the transportation of petroleum crude oil.
Specifically, the AAR agreed to consider, and provide additional
details about, the following:
The use of existing Federal protocols for routing
hazardous materials, such as Toxic-by-Inhalation hazardous materials
(TIH), for petroleum crude oil unit train shipments;
The use of speed restrictions where appropriate on crude
oil unit trains traveling through high consequence areas;
The use of distributed power on unit petroleum crude oil
trains; and
Increasing and improving track, mechanical, and other rail
safety inspections.
The API recommended and agreed to consider the following:
Share expertise and testing information with DOT, notably
PHMSA, regarding the characteristics of petroleum crude oil in the
Bakken region;
Work on identifying best practices to ensure that
appropriate and comprehensive testing and classification of petroleum
crude oil being transported by rail is performed; and
Collaborate with PHMSA on improving its analysis of
petroleum crude oil characteristics.
Both AAR and API agreed to consider the following:
Improve emergency responder capabilities and training to
address petroleum crude oil train accidents; and
Recommission the AAR's Rail Tank Car Standards Committee
to reach consensus on additional changes proposed to the AAR rail tank
car standard CPC 1232s, to be considered by DOT, as appropriate, in the
rulemaking process.
On January 17, 2014, PHMSA launched a Web page entitled Operation
Safe Delivery: Enhancing the Safe Transport of Flammable Liquids.\39\
This site describes the Department's efforts to enhance the safe
transport of flammable liquids by rail and acts as a valuable resource
for shippers and transporters of those materials. The site will be
continuously updated to provide progress reports on industry
commitments as part of the Call to Action and additional Departmental
activities related to the rail safety initiative. The page also
displays PHMSA's rail safety action plan. The site has already received
considerable traffic, and seems to be an educational resource for the
regulated community.
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\39\ http://www.phmsa.dot.gov/hazmat/osd/calltoaction.
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On February 21, 2014, in response to the Secretary's Call to
Action:
API committed to the following:
1. To assemble top experts to develop a comprehensive industry
standard for testing, characterizing, classifying, and loading and
unloading crude oil in rail tank cars. API is moving as quickly as
possible with the goal of publishing this standard in six months. Its
standards process is open, transparent and accredited by the American
National Standards Institute, the same organization that accredits
similar programs at several U.S. national laboratories. All
stakeholders are invited to participate, including PHMSA.
2. Work with PHMSA, the railroad industry, and emergency responders
to enhance emergency response communications and training. API recently
joined Transportation Community Awareness and Emergency Response, known
as TRANSCAER\R\, which is a voluntary national outreach effort that
assists communities in preparing for and responding to incidents.
API continues to work with PHMSA and other representatives from the
Department of Transportation to share information and expertise on
crude oil
[[Page 45034]]
characteristics. They have also offered to help PHMSA review the data
collected through Operation Classification.
3. API continues to work with the railroad industry, railcar
manufacturers, and other stakeholders to address tank car design. Their
industry has been building next generation tank cars since 2011 that
exceed federal standards. These new cars make up nearly 40 percent of
the crude oil tank car fleet and will be 60 percent by the end of 2015.
They are currently engaged in a holistic and data-driven examination to
determine whether additional design changes would measurably improve
safety without inadvertently shifting risk to other areas.
AAR and its member railroads committed to the following:
1. By no later than July 1, 2014, railroads will apply any
protocols developed by the rail industry to comply with the existing
route analysis requirements of 49 CFR 172.820(c)-(f) and (i) to the
movement of trains transporting 20 or more loaded railroad tank cars
containing petroleum crude oil (Key Crude Oil Train).
2. Rail carriers will continue to adhere to a speed restriction of
50 mph for any Key Crude Oil Trains. By no later than July 1, 2014,
railroads will adhere to a speed restriction of 40 mph for any Key
Crude Oil Train with at least one `DOT Specification 111' tank car
loaded with crude oil or one non-DOT specification tank car loaded with
crude oil while that train travels within the limits of any high-threat
urban area as defined by 49 CFR 1580.3. For purposes of AAR's
commitments, `DOT Specification 111' tank cars are those cars that meet
DOT Specification 111 standards but do not meet the requirements of
CPC-1232 or any new standards adopted by DOT after the date of this
letter.
3. By April, 2014, railroads will equip all Key Crude Oil Trains,
operating on main track with either distributed power locomotives or an
operative two-way telemetry end of train device as defined by 49 CFR
232.5.
4. Effective March 25, 2014, railroads will perform at least one
additional internal rail inspection than is required by 49 CFR
213.237(c) each calendar year on main line routes it owns or has been
assigned responsibility for maintaining under 49 CFR 213.5 over which
Key Crude Oil Trains are operated. Railroads will also conduct at least
two track geometry inspections each calendar year on main line routes
it owns or is responsible for maintaining under 49 CFR 213.5 over which
Key Crude Oil Trains are operated.
5. By no later than July 1, 2014, railroads will commence
installation and will complete such installations as soon as
practicable, of wayside defective bearing detectors at least every 40
miles along main line routes it owns or has been assigned
responsibility or maintaining under 49 CFR 213.5 over which Key Crude
Oil Trains are operated, unless track configuration or other safety
considerations dictate otherwise.
6. AAR and the railroads will create an inventory of emergency
response resources along routes over which Key Crude Oil Trains operate
for responding to the release of large amounts of petroleum crude oil
in the event of an incident. This inventory will include locations for
the staging of emergency response equipment and, where appropriate,
contacts for the notification of communities. Upon completion of the
inventory, the railroads will provide DOT with access to information
regarding the inventory and will make relevant information from the
inventory available to appropriate emergency responders upon request.
7. Railroads will commit in the aggregate a total of approximately
$5 million to develop and provide a hazardous material transportation
training curriculum applicable to petroleum crude oil transport for
emergency responders and to fund a portion of the cost of this training
through the end of 2014. One part of the curriculum will be for local
emergency responders in the field; and more comprehensive training will
be conducted at the Transportation Technology Center, Inc., (TTCI)
training facility in Pueblo, Colorado. AAR will work with emergency
responders in developing, by July 1, 2014, the training program that
meets the needs of emergency responders.
8. Railroads will continue to work with communities through which
Key Crude Oil Trains move to address on a location-specific basis
concerns that the communities may raise regarding the transportation of
petroleum crude oil through those communities and take such action as
the railroads deem appropriate.
The American Short Line and Regional Railroad Association (ASLRRA)
offered the following:
1. ASLRRA will recommend to its members that unit trains of crude
oil (20 cars or more) operate at a top speed of no more than 25 mph on
all routes.
2. ASLRRA will work with its member railroads and the Class I
railroads to develop a program of best practices to assure a seamless
system of timely and effective emergency response to crude oil spills
no matter where on the national rail system an incident may occur.
3. ASLRRA will recommend that its member railroads sign master
service agreements with qualified environmental cleanup providers to
ensure prompt and effective remediation in all areas subjected to
unintentional discharge of crude oil. In addition, ASLRRA will work
with the AAR and Class I railroads to eliminate any gaps in
coordination or response systems when both large and small railroads
are involved.
4. ASLRRA will support and encourage the development of new tank
car standards including but not limited to adoption of the \9/16\ inch
tank car wall that will meet the needs of all stakeholders and enhance
the safety of the transportation of crude oil by rail.
5. Contingent upon securing a six to twelve month pilot-project
grant from the FRA, the ASLRRA plans to expedite the most significant
project in its 100 year history to reduce the risks of accidents,
incidents, and regulatory noncompliance in the small railroad industry.
If grant funding is provided, ASLRRA will create the Short Line Safety
Institute which will:
a. Work jointly with the FRA to develop and implement a pilot
safety inspection and evaluation project for short line railroads.
b. Work with the FRA Office of Research and Development Human
Factors Division (1) to create an assessment process to evaluate the
current safety and compliance attainment levels on small railroads, (2)
to contract and train expert qualified inspectors, and (3) to develop
training, assessment and reporting document systems.
c. Work with FRA to create benchmarks and objectives to measure the
progress and effectiveness of the Short Line Safety Institute safety
inspection programs.
d. Begin with a focus on the transportation of crude oil by small
railroads and thereafter expand to the transportation of all
commodities for Class III railroads.
The Railway Supply Institute Committee on Tank Cars (RSICTC),
although not part of the Call to Action plan, committed to the
following:
In response to the Secretary's Call to Action, RSICTC states:
Although RSICTC was not included in the January 16, 2014
meeting, the issue of tank car safety cannot be resolved without
input from the owners and manufacturers of the tank cars. The RSICTC
members and other AAR task force stakeholders have met repeatedly to
review this issue with only
[[Page 45035]]
limited forward progress. As key stakeholders, RSICTC members have
reviewed the follow-up letter, and reached consensus on a set of
guiding principles to respond to your request. On February 5, 2014,
the RSICTC wrote AAR to provide a written copy of these principles
in advance of the first meeting of the reconvened AAR Tank Car
Committee Task Force T87.6 (`T87.6 Task Force').
RSICTC continued:
In order to provide a timely response to your January 22, 2014
follow-up letter, we recommend the reconvened T87.6 Task Force focus
on and adopt the following principles, for ultimate submission to
the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration
(``PHMSA''), which represent the consensus of the tank car
manufacturing and leasing industry:
1. Newly ordered tank cars, ordered after a date certain agreed
upon by PHMSA and the industry, to be used to transport crude oil or
ethanol must have a jacket, full height head shield and thermal
protection.
2. Tank cars built to the CPC-1232 standard (both jacketed and
non-jacketed) will be allowed to remain in unrestricted service for
their full statutory life, with possible modification to those
existing tank cars limited to pressure relief valves and bottom
outlet valve handles, based on future regulatory requirements or
industry standards.
3. Legacy tank cars (non-CPC-1232 compliant) used for Class 3,
PG III materials will be allowed to remain in unrestricted service
for their full statutory life, with possible modification to those
existing tank cars limited to pressure relief valves and bottom
outlet valve handles, based on future regulatory requirements or
industry standards.
4. Until such a time when standards applicable to legacy tank
cars are developed, non-CPC-1232 compliant tank cars may not be
newly assigned into crude oil or ethanol service.
5. Modification requirements for legacy tank cars used for Class
3, PG I and II service (including crude oil and ethanol) need to be
developed based on the nature of the risks associated with various
products.
6. Priority should be placed on modifying legacy tank cars used
for crude oil and ethanol. Timelines for modifying legacy tank cars
used for other Class 3, PG I and II service should be based on a
risk assessment.
7. It is possible that some types of crude oil may require
packaging in a DOT tank car class other than a DOT Specification 111
and RSI wishes to participate in that evaluation process.
The voluntary actions taken by industry as a result of the Call to
Action are necessary steps to improve safety. In this NPRM we are
proposing to adopt and expand on the key voluntary actions taken with
regard to speed restrictions, braking, and routing for HHFTs, in
addition to, classification verification requirements.
On February 25, 2014, DOT issued an Emergency Restriction/
Prohibition Order requiring those who offer crude oil for
transportation by rail to ensure that the product is properly tested
and classified in accordance with Federal safety regulations, which was
superseded by a revised and amended Order on March 6, 2014, clarifying
the requirement.\40\ The March 6th Amended Emergency Restriction/
Prohibition Order requires that all rail shipments of crude oil that is
properly classed as a flammable liquid in Packing Group (PG) III
material be treated as a PG I or II material, until further notice. The
Amended Emergency Order also authorized PG III materials to be
described as PG III for the purposes of hazard communication.
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\40\ See Docket No. DOT-OST-2014-0025. See also http://www.phmsa.dot.gov/staticfiles/PHMSA/DownloadableFiles/Amended_Emergency_Order_030614.pdf.
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On May 7, 2014, DOT published another Emergency Restriction/
Prohibition Order requiring all railroads that operate trains
containing one million gallons of Bakken crude oil to notify SERCs
about the operation of these trains through their States.\41\
Specifically, this notification should identify each county, or a
particular state or commonwealth's equivalent jurisdiction (e.g.,
Louisiana parishes, Alaska boroughs, Virginia independent cities), in
the state through which the trains will operate. On the same day, FRA
and PHMSA issued a safety advisory recommending that offerors and
carriers of Bakken crude oil use tank car designs with the highest
level of integrity available in their fleets.\42\
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\41\ http://www.phmsa.dot.gov/pv_obj_cache/pv_obj_id_D9E224C13963CAF0AE4F15A8B3C4465BAEAF0100/filename/Final_EO_on_Transport_of_Bakken_Crude_Oi_05_07_2014.pdf.
\42\ http://www.phmsa.dot.gov/pv_obj_cache/pv_obj_id_9084EF057B3D4E74A2DEB5CC86006951BE1D0200/filename/Final_FRA_PHMSA_Safety_Advisory_tank_cars_May_2014.pdf.
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C. NTSB Safety Recommendations
As previously discussed, in addition to the efforts of PHMSA and
FRA, the NTSB has taken a very active role in addressing the risks
posed by the transportation of large quantities of flammable liquids by
rail. On January 23, 2014 the NTSB issued to PHMSA Safety
Recommendations R-14-4 through R-14-6. These recommendations are
derived from the NTSB's participation in the Transportation Safety
Board of Canada's (TSB) investigation of the July 6, 2013 Lac-
M[eacute]gantic derailment. In the letter, NTSB urges PHMSA and FRA to
take action to address routing, oil spill response plans, and
identification and classification of flammable liquids by rail. In
these recommendations, the NTSB recognizes that rail shipments of
flammable liquids have sharply increased in recent years as the United
States experiences unprecedented growth in oil production. The letter
is available for review in the public docket for this rulemaking.
As noted below, NTSB has issued recommendation R-14-5, for PHMSA to
revise spill response planning thresholds contained in Title 49 Code of
Federal Regulations Part 130 to require comprehensive response plans to
effectively provide for the carriers' ability to respond to worst-case
discharges resulting from accidents involving unit trains or blocks of
tank cars transporting oil and petroleum products. PHMSA is not
addressing this recommendation through this NPRM. However, we are
concurrently issuing an Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking in PHMSA
Docket Number PHMSA-2014-0105 to gather more information on this topic
from railroads, first responders, state and local jurisdictions, and
all other interested parties.
Previously, on March 2, 2012, the NTSB issued Railroad Accident
Report RAR-12-01, available for review in the public docket for this
rulemaking. In that report, NTSB determined that one of the probable
causes of the June 19, 2009 train accident in Cherry Valley, Illinois,
in which several derailed cars released ethanol and caught fire,
fatally injuring a passenger in a stopped automobile at the grade
crossing where the derailment occurred and seriously injuring two other
passengers in the automobile, was the washout of the track structure at
the grade crossing and failure to notify the train crew of the known
washout. NTSB also determined that inadequate design features of a DOT
Specification 111 rail tank car made it susceptible to damage and
catastrophic loss of hazardous material during the train accident and,
thus, contributed to the severity of the incident. On March 2, 2012,
the NTSB issued Safety Recommendations R-12-5 thru R-12-8, which
recommended that PHMSA take action to enhance newly manufactured and
existing tank cars used for the transportation for ethanol and crude
oil in PG I and II. (Safety Recommendation R-12-8 was closed by the
NTSB on September 20, 2012).\43\ In addition, NTSB reiterated Safety
Recommendation R-07-4 and urged PHMSA to require that railroads
immediately provide to emergency responders accurate, real-time
[[Page 45036]]
information regarding the identity and location of all hazardous
materials on a train.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\43\ See: http://www.phmsa.dot.gov/staticfiles/PHMSA/DownloadableFiles/Files/NTSB%20Files/R-12-8-Acceptable-Response.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
These accidents demonstrate that major loss of life, property
damage, and environmental consequences can occur when large volumes of
crude oil or other flammable liquids are transported in a HHFT involved
in an accident. Table 12 provides a summary of the NTSB Safety
Recommendations and identifies the effect of this action on those
recommendations:
Table 12--Rail-related NTSB Safety Recommendations
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
NTSB recommendation Summary Addressed in this rule?
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
R-07-4.................................. Recommends that PHMSA, with the assistance No.
of FRA, require that railroads
immediately provide to emergency
responders accurate, real-time
information regarding the identity and
location of all hazardous materials on a
train.
R-12-5.................................. Recommends that PHMSA require all newly- Yes.
manufactured and existing general service
tank cars authorized for transportation
of denatured fuel ethanol and crude oil
in PGs I and II have enhanced tank head
and shell puncture resistance systems and
top fittings protection that exceed
existing design requirements for DOT
Specification 111 tank cars.
R-12-6.................................. Recommends that PHMSA require all bottom Yes.
outlet valves used on newly-manufactured
and existing non-pressure tank cars are
designed to remain closed during
accidents in which the valve and
operating handle are subjected to impact
forces.
R-12-7.................................. Recommends that PHMSA require all newly- No.*
manufactured and existing tank cars
authorized for transportation of
hazardous materials have center sill or
draft sill attachment designs that
conform to the revised AAR design
requirements adopted as a result of
Safety Recommendation R-12-9.
R-12-8.................................. Recommends that PHMSA inform pipeline Closed.**
operators about the circumstances of the
accident and advise them of the need to
inspect pipeline facilities after
notification of accidents occurring in
railroad rights-of-way.
R-14-1.................................. Recommends that FRA work with PHMSA to Yes.
expand hazardous materials route planning
and selection requirements for railroads
under the HMR to include key trains
transporting flammable liquids as defined
by the Association of American Railroads
Circular No. OT-55-N and, where
technically feasible, require rerouting
to avoid transportation of such hazardous
materials through populated and other
sensitive areas.
R-14-2.................................. Recommends that FRA develop a program to No.***
audit response plans for rail carriers of
petroleum products to ensure that
adequate provisions are in place to
respond to and remove a worst-case
discharge to the maximum extent
practicable and to mitigate or prevent a
substantial threat of a worst-case
discharge.
R-14-3.................................. Recommends that FRA audit shippers and Yes.
rail carriers of crude oil to ensure they
are using appropriate hazardous materials
shipping classifications, have developed
transportation safety and security plans,
and have made adequate provision for
safety and security.
R-14-4.................................. Recommends that PHMSA work with FRA to Yes.
expand hazardous materials route planning
and selection requirements for railroads
under Title 49 Code of Federal
Regulations 172.820 to include key trains
transporting flammable liquids as defined
by the AAR Circular No. OT-55-N and,
where technically feasible, require
rerouting to avoid transportation of such
hazardous materials through populated and
other sensitive areas.
R-14-5.................................. Recommends that PHMSA revise the spill No.***
response planning thresholds contained in
Title 49 Code of Federal Regulations Part
130 to require comprehensive response
plans to effectively provide for the
carriers' ability to respond to worst-
case discharges resulting from accidents
involving unit trains or blocks of tank
cars transporting oil and petroleum
products.
R-14-6.................................. Recommends that PHMSA require shippers to Yes.
sufficiently test and document the
physical and chemical characteristics of
hazardous materials to ensure the proper
classification, packaging, and record-
keeping of products offered in
transportation.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
* Under R-12-9, NTSB recommends that AAR: Review the design requirements in the AAR Manual of Standards and
Recommended Practices C-III, ``Specifications for Tank Cars for Attaching Center Sills or Draft Sills,'' and
revise those requirements as needed to ensure that appropriate distances between the welds attaching the draft
sill to the reinforcement pads and the welds attaching the reinforcement pads to the tank are maintained in
all directions in accidents, including the longitudinal direction. These design requirements have not yet been
finalized by the AAR.
** On July 31, 2012, PHMSA published in the Federal Register (77 FR 45417) an advisory bulletin to all pipeline
operators alerting them to the circumstances of the Cherry Valley derailment and reminding them of the
importance of assuring that pipeline facilities have not been damaged either during a railroad accident or
other event occurring in the right-of-way. This recommendation was closed by NTSB on September 20, 2012. This
action is accessible at the following URL: http://phmsa.dot.gov/pipeline/regs/ntsb/closed.
*** PHMSA in consultation with FRA is concurrently publishing an ANPRM (Docket Number PHMSA-2014-0105) that will
address these recommendations.
[[Page 45037]]
IV. Comments on the ANPRM
A. Commenter Key. As of June 2014, Table 13 provides a list of
comments posted to the docket.
Table 13--Commenter Key
------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------------------
(017) Allen Maty....................... (018) Emanuel Guerreiro.
(019) Brant Olson...................... (021) Eugene Matzan/Commercial
Wheel System.
(022) City of Loves Park............... (023) Senator Charles Schumer.
(024) Village Board of Iverness, IL.... (025) City of Wood Dale, IL.
(026) Barrington Township, IL.......... (027) Village of Mt. Prospect,
IL.
(028) Carol Stream, IL................. (029) Village of Schiller Park,
IL.
(030) City of Plano, IL................ (031) City of Frankfort, IL.
(032) Village of Hainesville, IL....... (033) City of Crest City
Council, IL.
(034) Village of Vernon Hills,......... (035) Village of Glendale
Heights.
(036) Village of South Barrington, IL.. (037) Volpe National
Transportation Systems Center
(Volpe), Research and
Innovative Technology
Administration, DOT.
(038) Volpe National Transportation (039) Village of Gilberts, IL.
Systems Center (Volpe).
(040) Village of Wadsworth, IL......... (041) City of Braidwood, IL.
(042) Bartlett Fire Protection (043) Rolling Meadows, IL.
District, IL.
(044) Compressed Gas Association (CGA): (045) City of Warrenville, IL.
P-1519.
(046) City of Highland Park, IL........ Village of Oswego, IL.
(048) Anonymous........................ (049) Trudy McDaniel.
(050) Village of Mokena, IL............ (052) Village of North Aurora,
IL.
(053) Metro West Council of Government, (054) Village of Elburn, IL.
Aurora, IL.
(055) Village of Hampshire, IL......... (056) Village of Wayne, IL.
(057) Village of Green Oaks, IL........ (058) Village of Western
Springs, IL.
(059) Village of Hinckley, IL.......... (060) Village of Diamond, IL.
(061) Village of Lake Barrington, IL... (062) Vermont League of Cities
and Towns, Montpelier,
Vermont.
(063) City of Prospect, IL............. (064) Fred Millar.
(065) Megan Joyce...................... (066) Christopher Lish.
(067) Village of Kaneville, IL......... (068) Village of North
Barrington, IL.
(069) Village of Tower Lakes, IL....... (070) Barrington Area Council
of Governments (BACOG),
Barrington, IL.
(072) Rail Users Network (RUN)......... (074) Village of Deer Park, IL.
(075) Robert Hodge..................... (076) Skagit Audubon, Mount
Vernon, WA.
(077) Sheet Metal, Air, Rail, (078) Anonymous.
Transportation Union (SMART).
(079) Growth Energy, Washington, DC.... (080) Village of Burlington,
IL.
(081) City of St. Charles, IL.......... (082) Village of Hoffman
Estates, IL.
(083) Village of Hawthorn Woods, IL.... (084) Village of Hanover Park,
IL.
(085) Village of Maple Park, Kane and (086) City of Carbondale, IL.
Dekalb Counties, IL.
(087) Village of Campton Hills, IL..... (089) CREDO Action (CREDO).
(090) Association of American Railroads (091) James Jackson.
(AAR) and the American Short Line and
Regional Railroad Association (ASLRRA).
(092) Eldon Jacobson................... (093) The Regional Answer to
Canadian National (TRAC).
(094) Eva Lee.......................... (095) Cuba Township, IL.
(096) Village of Chicago Ridge, IL..... (098) Railway Supply Institute
(RSI).
(099) Solvay USA (Solvay).............. (100) U.S. Chemical Safety
Board (USCSB).
(101) Sierra Club: 23,200 commenters... (102) Mary Ruth Holder.
(103) Michael Bailey................... (104) Phyllis Dolph.
(105) Nathan Luke...................... (106) Russell Pesko.
(107) Michael Reich.................... (108) David C. Breidenbach.
(109) The Fertilizer Institute (TFI)... (110) Village of Barrington, IL
and the TRAC Coalition.
(111) David C. Breidenbach............. (112) Montana Department of
Environmental Quality (MTDEQ).
(113) City of Lake Forest, IL.......... (114) Maine Municipal
Association, Augusta, ME
(MMA).
(115) City of Northlake, IL............ (116) Village of Minoa, NY.
(117) City of Coon Rapids, MN.......... (118) Village of Grayslake, IL.
(119) Eastman Chemical Company (ECC)... (120) City of Fort Collins, CO.
(121) CREDO Action (CREDO; replaces (122) Oil Change International
089): 66,064 commenters. (OCI): 8,727 commenters.
(123) The Chlorine Institute (CI)...... (124) Renewable Fuels
Association (RFA).
(125) Village of Berkeley, IL.......... (126) Watco Companies L.L.C.
(Watco).
(127) The National Industrial (128) Institute of Makers of
Transportation League (NITL). Explosives (IME).
(129) Hess Corporation (Hess).......... (130) North American Freight
Car Association (NAFCA).
(131) New Progressive Alliance (NPA)... (132) The Greenbrier Companies,
Inc. (Greenbrier).
(133) The Railway Supply Institute (134) GLNX Corporation (GLNX).
Committee on Tank Cars (RSICTC).
(135.1) Dow Chemical Company (Dow)..... (135.2) Dow Chemical Company
and Union Pacific Railroad
(DCCUPR).
(136) American Chemistry Council (ACC). (137) Dangerous Goods Advisory
Council (DGAC).
(138) Forest Ethics: 1,489 commenters.. (139) American Petroleum
Institute (API).
(140) National Transportation Safety (141) Petroleum Association of
Board (NTSB). Wyoming (PAW).
(142) Anonymous........................ (143) Rein Attemann.
(144) Natural Resources Defense Council (145) Lloyd Burton, PHD.
(NRDC).
[[Page 45038]]
(146) City of Madison, WI.............. (147) City of Northlake, IL.
(148) Shell Chemical LP (Shell)........ (149) The Accurate Tank Advisor
(ATA).
(150) Senator Charles E. Schumer....... (151) Call to Action Meeting
Documentation.
(152) City of Elmhurst, IL............. (153) The Sierra Club: 52,615
commenters.
(154) Leif Jorgensen................... (155) U.S. DOT/PHMSA Meeting
Record.
(156) Railway Supply Institute Comments (157) BNSF Meeting Record.
(158) Department of Law City of Chicago (159) City of Chicago Comments.
(160) Irv Balto Comments............... (161) Irv Balto Comments.
(162) EO 12866 Meeting w/API 05.19.14.. (163) Meeting w/American
Chemistry Council 05.12.14.
(164) Meeting w/Growth Energy and RFA (165) Meeting w/North Dakota
05.12.14. Petroleum Council 05.12.14.
(166) Meeting w/Quantum Energy 05.21.14 (176) Meeting w/Statoil
05.12.14.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
B. Summary of Comments Relevant to the Proposed Amendments in this NPRM
In response to the September 6, 2013 ANPRM, PHMSA received 113
comments representing over 152,000 signatories related to the eight
petitions for rulemaking and four NTSB recommendations referenced in
the ANPRM and applicable to the transportation of hazardous materials
in commerce. PHMSA solicited public comment on whether the potential
amendments would enhance safety and clarify the HMR with regard to rail
transport. Specifically, these potential amendments, if adopted, would
do the following: (1) Relax regulatory requirements to afford FRA
greater discretion to authorize the movement of non-conforming tank
cars; (2) impose additional requirements that would correct an unsafe
condition associated with pressure relief valves (PRV) on rail cars
transporting carbon dioxide, refrigerated liquid; (3) relax regulatory
requirements applicable to the repair and maintenance of DOT
Specification 110, DOT Specification 106, and ICC 27 tank car tanks
(ton tanks); (4) relax regulatory requirement for the removal of
rupture discs for inspection if the removal process would damage,
change, or alter the intended operation of the device; and (5) impose
additional requirements that would enhance the standards for DOT
Specification 111 tank cars used to transport PG I and II hazardous
materials. This NPRM addresses the four petitions for rulemaking that
are related to the DOT Specification 111 tank car (P-1577, P-1587, P-
1595, and P-1612). The NTSB recommendations directly relate to the
enhancement of DOT Specification 111 tank cars.
We received comment submissions from local communities, cities, and
towns; rail carriers; offerors; suppliers of equipment; tank car
manufacturers; environmental groups; NTSB; and members of the U.S.
Congress. The comments provide many potential solutions to the risks
associated with HHFTs. A common theme among the commenters is that they
support changes that will prevent another catastrophic train accident.
Table 14 provides a brief summary based on key concerns of groups of
commenters:
Table 14--General Overview of Comments Received on the HM-251 ANPRM
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Group of commenters Number of comments Comment summary
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Local communities, cities, towns........ 61 municipal and state Provided overwhelming support for:
government entities. Higher integrity tank car
construction standards;
Revised operational procedures;
and
Standards applicable to newly
constructed and existing DOT 111 tank
cars transporting any Packing Group I
and II materials.
Concerned public........................ 223 individual commenters.. Provided overwhelming support for:
Petition P-1587 (Barrington,
IL); and
NTSB Safety Recommendations that
requires higher integrity construction
and operational standards for new and
existing DOT-111 tank cars.
Rail carriers........................... AAR, American Short Line In their comments AAR and ASLRRA proposed
and Regional Railroad additional enhancements to its original
Association, GNLX petition for rulemaking (P-1577) such
Corporation. as:
Mandating the jacketed version
of the specifications discussed in the
petition for flammable liquids;
For flammable liquids, requiring
high-flow capacity pressure relief
devices;
Requiring thermal blankets or
thermal coatings when constructing or
modifying tank cars used to transport
all packing group I and II materials and
flammable liquids in packing group III;
and
The employment of designs that
ensure bottom outlet valves will remain
closed when the operating handles are
subject to impact forces.
Offerors................................ Multiple................... Commenters solicit PHMSA and FRA to:
Address accident root causes and
to keep tank cars on the track;
Conduct suggested initiatives,
including improvements in inspection and
track maintenance protocols;
Utilize available technology to
assist in reducing human error (e.g.,
Positive Train Control); and
Improve communication systems
for rail operations.
[[Page 45039]]
Tank Car manufacturers.................. Watco, Railway Supply The consensus among manufacturers of tank
Institute, SMART, cars is as follows:
Greenbrier Companies, The increase of tank shell
North American Freight Car thickness and application of tank head
Association. protection will substantially improve
the puncture resistance of DOT-111 tank
cars and provide better protection in
the event of a derailment;
Improved puncture resistance
will result in less product release and,
thus, smaller fires in the event of a
train accident;
The P-1577 (Petition) tank car's
enhancements include a pressure relief
device with a higher exit flow and lower
trigger point. This change to the
pressure relief device will improve the
potential for this equipment to operate
as intended in a fire situation; and
Enhancement is consistent with
the T87.6 Task Force's recommendation.
If any fire exposure should occur, the
enhanced pressure relief system will
serve to reduce the probability of a
high-energy release event.
Tank car requirements for new
cars should be more extensive than the
retrofit requirements for existing cars.
Environmental groups.................... Over 152,000 signatories... Support of NTSB Safety Recommendations
by:
Expressing concern over the
responsibility of local governments
having to provide emergency response
units to manage the impact of
derailments in communities across the
country; and
Expressing concern over the
significant costs to society associated
with clean-up and environmental
remediation.
NTSB.................................... ........................... Urges PHMSA to:
Take immediate action to require
a safer package for transporting
flammable hazardous materials by rail;
and
Take regulatory action that
applies to new construction and the
existing tank car fleet
With FRA, take action to address
routing, oil spill response plans, and
identification and classification of
flammable liquids by rail.
Congressional interest.................. 13 U.S. House and Senate Urges PHMSA to:
members. Take immediate action to require
a safer package for transporting
flammable hazardous materials by rail.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
The most frequent comments received in response to the ANPRM
follow. These issues included operational controls that could be
implemented to address rail safety issues and how the existing fleet of
cars would be affected in the event of the adoption of a new tank car
standard (e.g., retrofitting). These specific issues and some of the
comments received are summarized below.
Operational issues--RSICTC commented that, ``[t]he overall safety
of hazardous material transportation by rail cannot be achieved by
placing the sole burden of that goal on the designs of tank cars.
Therefore while the industry supports safety-enhancing improvements to
the designs of tank cars, it also supports operational enhancements
that will address these root causes.'' Similarly, equipment suppliers
encouraged FRA to publish its final rule on rail integrity. Further,
the API states in its comments that, ``broken rails or welds caused
more major derailments than any other factor. According to task force
87.6, broken rails or welds resulted in approximately 670 derailments
between 2001 and 2010.'' Further, it states, ``RSICTC also supports the
work of the task force to examine additional operational enhancements
such as the alternative brake signal propagations systems, speed
restrictions for ``Key Trains''--unit trains containing 20 or more
loaded tank cars of PG I and II hazardous materials, enhanced track
inspection programs and improvements to the emergency response
system.''
Retrofits--While the P-1577 tank car enhancements will
significantly improve safety for newly manufactured tank cars, RSICTC
strongly urges PHMSA to promulgate a separate rulemaking for existing
tank cars that is uniquely tailored to the needs of the existing DOT-
111 tank car fleet. Further, it states, ``Should modifications be made
to the existing jacketed DOT-111s, we again urge PHMSA to allow these
modified cars to remain in active service for the duration of their
regulatory life.'' RSICTC also submits that PHMSA adopt a ten-year
program allowing compliance to be achieved in phases through
modification, re-purposing or retirement of unmodified tank cars in
Class 3, PG I and II flammable liquid service. Tank car modifications
supported by RSICTC include adding head shields, protecting top and
bottom fittings and adding pressure release valves or enhancing
existing pressure release valves. Greenbrier, a tank car manufacturer,
commented that, ``the most vital of these modifications is addition of
a trapezoidal or conforming half-height head shield to prevent
penetration of tank cars by loose rails. Together with the top and
bottom fittings protections and enhanced release valves, the
improvements can significantly limit the likelihood of breaching the
tank car.'' Further, Greenbrier is of the opinion that the ten-year
timeline suggested by RSICTC is excessive and unmodified tank cars
could and should be removed from hazardous materials service much
sooner. API and other commenters state in their comments that they are
strongly opposed to mandating any retrofits beyond the higher-flow
pressure relief device recommended by the T87.6 Task Force for thermal
protection due to the lack of economic and logistical feasibility.
V. Discussion of Comments and Section-by-Section Review
The vast majority of commenters request prompt action by PHMSA to
address the risk associated with HHFTs. PHMSA agrees that in light of
the recent accidents involving HHFTs prompt action must be taken to
address these trains. Therefore, we limit our
[[Page 45040]]
discussion of the comments received in response to the ANPRM to those
issues related to HHFTs. The remaining comments to the ANPRM and our
August 27-28, 2013 public meeting will be addressed in a future
rulemaking. Comments are available in the public docket for this NPRM,
viewable at http://www.regulations.gov or DOT's Docket Operations
Office (see ADDRESSES section above).
A. High-Hazard Flammable Train
In the ANPRM we asked several questions regarding AAR Circular No.
OT-55-N. Specifically, we asked if it adequately addressed the concerns
of the T87.6 Task Force, especially regarding speed restrictions. We
also asked if we should incorporate the ``key train'' requirements
contained in AAR Circular No. OT-55-N into the HMR, or if it should be
expanded to include trains with fewer than 20 cars.
Several commenters indicate that additional operational
requirements should be based upon the definition for a ``key train'' as
provided by AAR Circular No. OT-55-N. In addition, NTSB Recommendation
R-14-4 states,
Work with the Federal Railroad Administration to expand
hazardous materials route planning and selection requirements for
railroads under Title 49 Code of Federal Regulations 172.820 to
include key trains transporting flammable liquids as defined by the
Association of American Railroads Circular No. OT-55-N and, where
technically feasible, require rerouting to avoid transportation of
such hazardous materials through populated and other sensitive
areas.
Based on the Appendix A to Emergency Order No. 28 and the revised
definition of a ``key train'' under AAR Circular No. OT-55-N, PHMSA is
proposing to add a definition of ``high-hazard flammable train'' to
Sec. 171.8. Under the proposed definition, the term would mean a
single train containing 20 or more tank carloads of Class 3 (flammable
liquid) material.
Section 173.120 of the HMR defines a flammable liquid as a liquid
having a flash point of not more than 60 [deg]C (140[emsp14][deg]F), or
any material in a liquid phase with a flash point at or above 37.8
[deg]C (100[emsp14][deg]F) that is intentionally heated and offered for
transportation or transported at or above its flash point in a bulk
packaging, with certain exceptions. For transportation purposes,
examples of commodities that typically meet this definition are
acetone, crude oil, ethanol gasoline, and ethyl methyl ketone. A Class
3 (flammable liquid) material is further assigned to Packing Group I,
II, or III, based on its degree of danger, that is, great, medium, or
minor, respectively.
Because crude oil is a mined liquid, its flash point and initial
boiling point are variable and, as such, can be assigned to Packing
Groups I, II, or III. Because ethanol is not a mined liquid, its
initial boiling point and flash point are known (78 [deg]C and 9 [deg]C
respectively). Thus, ethanol is assigned to Packing Group II. That
said, our analysis finds that only crude oil and ethanol shipments
would be affected by the limitations of this rule as they are the only
known Class 3 (flammable liquid) materials transported in trains
consisting of 20 cars or more.
While both the Appendix A to Emergency Order No. 28 and the revised
definition of a ``key train'' under AAR Circular No. OT-55-N include
Division 2.1 (flammable gas) material and combustible liquids, PHMSA is
not proposing to include them in the definition of ``high-hazard
flammable train'' in this NPRM. By doing so, the existing fleet of DOT
Specification 111 tank cars can be repurposed and continue to be used
for flammable liquids when not being transported in a HHFT and
combustible liquids which pose a lower risk than other flammable
liquids. PHMSA and FRA seek comment on the definition of a ``high-
hazard flammable train'', PHMSA and FRA seek public comment on the
following discussions and questions. When commenting, please reference
the specific portion of the proposal, explain the reason for any
recommended change, and include the source, methodology, and key
assumptions of any supporting evidence.
1. PHMSA expects that the definition of HHFT would change the
operating practices and tank car packaging primarily for trains that
carry crude oil and ethanol. To what extent would definition of HHFT
affect the operating practices and tank car packaging trains carrying
other Class 3 flammable liquids?
2. Within the definition of HHFT, to what extent would adding or
removing hazardous materials or packing groups within a hazardous
material class affect the benefits and costs of this rule? In
particular, what are the benefits and costs of including Division 2.1
(flammable gas) material and combustible liquids within the definition
of HHFT?[bond]
3. To what extent do the covered hazardous materials, including
crude oil and ethanol, have differing risks when they are in HHFTs?
As described in the Overview section of this preamble, above, we
believe that most, if not all, of the rail community transporting oil,
including crude oil transported as a hazardous material, is subject to
the basic response plan requirement of 49 CFR 130.31(a), based on the
understanding that most, if not all, rail tank cars being used to
transport crude oil have a capacity greater than 3,500 gallons.
However, a comprehensive response plan for shipment of oil is only
required when the oil is in a quantity greater than 42,000 gallons per
package. Accordingly, the number of railroads required to have a
comprehensive response plan is much less, or possibly non-existent,
because a very limited number of rail tank cars in use would be able to
transport a volume of 42,000 gallons in a single package.\44\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\44\ The 2014 AAR's Universal Machine Language Equipment
Register (UMLER) numbers showed 5 tank cars listed with a capacity
equal to or greater than 42,000 gallons, and none of these cars were
being used to transport oil or petroleum products.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Based on this difference in plans and the recent occurrence of
high-profile accidents involving crude oil, the NTSB and TSB have
recommended in Safety Recommendation R-14-5 that the Department and
PHMSA reconsider the threshold quantity for requiring the development
of a comprehensive response plan for the shipment of oil.
While PHMSA will not be specifically addressing Oil Spill Response
Plans in this rulemaking, we will be addressing this topic in this
advance notice of proposed rulemaking under docket number PHMSA-2014-
0105 (RIN 2137-AF08). In this ANPRM we will be seeking comment on the
Oil Spill Prevention and Response Plans as they relate to the rail
transport of large quantities of oil. Specifically, we seek comment on
threshold quantity for a comprehensive plan to Sec. 130.31 and other
issues related to the Oil Spill Prevention and Response Plans as they
relate to rail transport.
B. Notification to State Emergency Response Commissions of Petroleum
Crude Oil Train Transportation
As previously discussed, on May 7, 2014, DOT issued an Emergency
Restriction/Prohibition Order in Docket No. DOT-OST-2014-0067
(Order).\45\ That Order required each railroad transporting 1,000,000
gallons or more of Bakken crude oil in a single train in commerce
within the U.S. provide certain information in writing to the SERC for
each state in which it operates such a train. The notifications made
under the Order must include estimated frequencies of affected trains
transporting Bakken crude oil through
[[Page 45041]]
each county in the state, the routes over which it is transported, a
description of the petroleum crude oil and applicable emergency
response information, and contact information for at least one
responsible party at the host railroads. In addition, the Emergency
Order requires that railroads provide copies of notifications made to
each SERC to FRA upon request and, make updated notifications when
Bakken crude oil traffic materially changes within a particular county
or state (a change of 25 percent or greater from the estimate conveyed
to a state in the current notification). DOT issued the Order under the
Secretary's authority to abate imminent hazards at 49 U.S.C. 5121(d).
The Order was issued in response to the crude oil railroad accidents
previously described, and is in effect until DOT rescinds the Order.
This proposal, if adopted in a final rule in this rulemaking
proceeding, would supplant the requirements in the Order.
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\45\ http://www.dot.gov/briefing-room/emergency-order.
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In this NPRM, PHMSA is proposing to codify and clarify the
requirements of the Order in the HMR, and is requesting public comment
on the various facets of this proposal. As previously discussed, the
amount of crude oil shipments via railroad tank car is increasing
rapidly. The transportation of any hazardous materials is inherently
dangerous, and transporting crude oil can be dangerous if the crude oil
is released into the environment because of its flammability. This risk
of ignition is compounded in the context of rail transportation of
crude oil. It is commonly shipped in HHFTs that may consist of over 100
loaded tank cars, and there appear to be uniquely hazardous
characteristics of crude oil, as previously discussed in this preamble.
With the rising demand for rail carriage of crude oil throughout the
U.S., the risk of rail accidents and incidents increases with the
increase in the volume and the length of haul of the crude oil shipped.
Based on a waybill sample, the total distance field was used to
estimate the average length of haul crude oil. PHMSA found that crude
oil travels over 1,000 miles on the rail network. As also previously
discussed, there have been several significant train accidents in the
U.S. and Canada over the last year resulting in deaths, injuries,
property and environmental damage that involved crude oil shipments.
These accidents have demonstrated the need for action in the form of
additional communication between railroads and emergency responders to
ensure that the emergency responders are aware of train movements
carrying large quantities of crude oil through their communities.
For purposes of this NPRM, PHMSA is proposing regulatory text that
would address the same trains as affected by the Emergency Order (i.e.,
trains transporting 1,000,000 gallons or more of Bakken crude oil).
Considering the typical 30,000-gallon capacity railroad tank car used
for the transport of crude oil, a 1,000,000-gallon threshold for a unit
train would require notification to SERC's or other appropriate state
delegated entities for unit trains composed of approximately 35 cars of
crude oil.\46\ For purposes of the Emergency Order, DOT assumed this
was a reasonable threshold when considering that the major incidents
described above all involved trains consisting of more than 70 railroad
tank cars carrying petroleum crude oil, or well above the Order's
threshold of 1,000,000 gallons or more of petroleum crude oil being
transported in a single train. In setting this threshold quantity of
1,000,000 gallons in the Order, DOT also relied on a Federal Water
Pollution Control Act mandate for regulations requiring a comprehensive
spill response plan to be prepared by an owner or operator of an
onshore facility.\47\
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\46\ This approximation assumes that the tank cars would not be
entirely filled to capacity.
\47\ See 40 CFR 112.20. The Federal Water Pollution Control Act,
as amended by the Oil Pollution Act of 1990, directs the President,
at section 311(j)(1)(C) (33 U.S.C. 1321(j)(1)(C)) and section
311(j)(5) (33 U.S.C. 1321(j)(5)), respectively, to issue regulations
``establishing procedures, methods, and equipment and other
requirements for equipment to prevent discharges of oil and
hazardous substances from vessels and from onshore facilities and
offshore facilities, and to contain such discharges.''
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In the Order, DOT determined that SERCs were the most appropriate
point of contact to convey written notifications regarding the
transportation of trains transporting large quantities of Bakken crude
oil. Each state is required to have a SERC under the Emergency Planning
and Community Right-to-Know Act of 1986 (EPCRA). 42 U.S.C. 11001(a).
The EPCRA is intended to help local entities plan for emergencies
involving hazardous substances.\48\ Generally, SERCs are responsible
for supervising and coordinating with the local emergency planning
committees (LEPC) in states, and are best situated to convey
information regarding hazardous materials shipments to LEPCs and state
and local emergency response agencies.
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\48\ http://www2.epa.gov/epcra.
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After issuance of the Order, DOT received questions from railroads
regarding whether Fusion Centers could be utilized to make the
notifications required by the Emergency Order. Railroads share
information with Fusion Centers under existing Sec. 172.820 of the
HMR, PHMSA's regulation governing additional planning requirements for
transportation by rail of certain hazardous materials. DOT also
received inquiries regarding the Order's implications for Tribal
Emergency Response Commissions (TERCs). TERCs have the same
responsibilities as SERCs, with the Chief Executive Office of the Tribe
appointing the TERC.\49\ In response, DOT issued a Frequently Asked
Questions (FAQs) guidance document to address these inquiries.\50\ In
that FAQs document, DOT explained that if a State agrees that it would
be advantageous for the information required by this Emergency Order to
be shared with a Fusion Center or other State agency involved with
emergency response planning and/or preparedness, as opposed to the
SERC, a railroad may share the required information with that agency
instead of the SERC. DOT also explained that railroads were not
required to make notification under the Order to TERCs, but, rather,
that DOT would be reaching out to Tribal leaders to inform them that
TERCs could coordinate with the appropriate SERC in a state for access
to data supplied under the Emergency Order.
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\49\ http://www2.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2013-08/documents/epcra_fact_sheet.pdf.
\50\ http://www.fra.dot.gov/eLib/Details/L05237.
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After issuance of the Order, railroads were concerned that routing
and traffic information required to be provided to SERCs regarding
affected crude oil would be made public under individual states' open
records laws. DOT has since engaged in discussions with railroads and
states to address this concern. As explained in the FAQs document, DOT
prefers that this information be kept confidential, and acknowledged
that railroads may have an appropriate claim that this information
constitutes confidential business information, but that such claims may
differ by state depending on each state's applicable laws. DOT
encouraged the railroads to work with states to find the most
appropriate means for sharing this information (including Fusion
Centers or other mechanisms that may have established confidentiality
protocols). However, the EO and DOT's subsequent guidance did not
require that states sign confidentiality agreements to receive this
information, and DOT did not designate the information as Sensitive
Security Information (SSI) under the procedures governing such at 49
CFR Part 15. PHMSA understands that despite confidentiality concerns,
railroads are complying with the
[[Page 45042]]
requirements of the Order and have provided the required information to
States.
With regard to the identification of Bakken crude oil versus crude
oil extracted from other geographic locations, DOT acknowledges that
the HMR's current shipping paper requirements do not distinguish Bakken
crude oil from crude oil sourced in other locations. This may present
compliance and enforcement difficulties, particularly with regard to
subsequent railroads transporting petroleum crude after interchange(s)
with an originating or subsequent carrier. DOT explained in the FAQs
document that railroads and offerors should work together to develop a
means for identifying Bakken crude oil prior to transport, such as a
Standard Transportation Commodity Code number, that identifies the
crude oil by its geographic source. DOT also stated that for purposes
of compliance with the Emergency Order, crude oil tendered to railroads
for transportation from any facility directly located within the
Williston Basin (North Dakota, South Dakota, and Montana in the United
States, or Saskatchewan or Manitoba in Canada) is Bakken crude oil.
PHMSA notes it may be possible in any final rule action that this
proposed new Sec. 174.310 could be expanded to include threshold
quantities of all petroleum crude oils or all HHFTs (versus only trains
transporting threshold quantities of Bakken crude oil).
PHMSA therefore seeks public comment on the following discussions
and questions. When commenting, please reference the specific portion
of the proposal, explain the reason for any recommended change, and
include the source, methodology, and key assumptions of any supporting
evidence.
1. Whether codifying the requirements of the Order in the HMR is
the best approach for the notification requirements, and whether
particular public safety improvements could be achieved by requiring
the notifications be made by railroads directly to emergency
responders, or to emergency responders as well as SERCs or other
appropriate state delegated entities.
2. Whether the 1,000,000-gallon threshold is appropriate, or
whether another threshold such as the 20-car HHFT threshold utilized in
this NPRM's other proposals is more appropriate. If you believe that a
threshold other than 1,000,000 gallons is appropriate, please provide
any information on benefits or costs of the change, including for small
railroads.
3. Comments regarding parallel notification requirements for any
affected TERCs.
4. Comments regarding the other topics addressed in the FAQ's
document. In particular, PHMSA seeks comments on the confidential
treatment of data contained in the notifications to SERCs, and the
adoption of a means for identifying Bakken crude oil prior to rail
transportation.
5. Whether PHMSA should place restrictions in the HMR on the
disclosure of the notification information provided to SERCs or to
another state or local government entity.
6. Whether such information should be deemed SSI, and the reasons
indicating why such a determination is appropriate, considering safety,
security, and the public's interest in information.
7. What burden reduction would result from not having to
distinguish the source of the crude oil? What increase in burden would
result from the expanded applicability?
C. Rail Routing
We did not solicit comments on routing requirements for HHFTs in
the September 6, 2013 ANPRM. However, many government agencies and
citizens alike expressed concerns regarding the risks posed by such
rail traffic through their communities. Further, the issue was raised
during the RSAC hazardous materials working group meetings and the
Secretary's Call to Action. As a result of those efforts, the industry
has taken steps to extend the routing requirements in Sec. 172.820 of
the HMR to certain HHFTs transporting crude oil. AAR indicates that
railroads will focus on the risks related to population density along
routes by reducing train speed. Based on AAR's response to the Call to
Action, railroads will operate trains at 40 mph by July 1, 2014, for
any HHFT with at least one non-CPC 1232 DOT Specification 111 tank car
loaded with crude oil or one non-DOT specification tank car loaded with
crude oil while that train travels within the limits of any high-threat
urban area as defined by 49 CFR 1580.3.
We note that under AAR Circular No. OT-55-N, any train that meets
the ``key train'' definition is subject to a 50-mph speed restriction.
Further, any route defined by a railroad as a key route shall meet
certain standards described in OT-55-N. Wayside defective wheel bearing
detectors shall be placed at a maximum of 40 miles apart, or an
equivalent level of protection may be installed based on improvements
in technology. Main track on key routes shall be inspected by rail
defect detection and track geometry inspection cars or by any
equivalent level of inspection at least twice each year. Sidings on key
routes shall be inspected at least once a year, and main track and
sidings shall have periodic track inspections to identify cracks or
breaks in joint bars. Further, any track used for meeting and passing
key trains shall be FRA Class 2 track or higher. If a meet or pass must
occur on less than Class 2 track due to an emergency, one of the trains
shall be stopped before the other train passes. PHMSA and FRA request
comments on the requirements of AAR Circular No. OT-55-N specifically
in regard to track inspection. These comments may be considered for
future regulatory action.
This NPRM proposes to modify Sec. 172.820 to apply to any HHFT, as
PHMSA proposes to define this term in Sec. 171.8 (See discussion in
HHFT section.). The routing requirements discussed in this NPRM reflect
the practices recommended by the NTSB in recommendation R-14-4, and are
in widespread use across the rail industry for security-sensitive
hazardous materials (such as chlorine and anhydrous ammonia). As a
result, rail carriers must assess available routes using, at a minimum,
the 27 factors listed in Appendix D to Part 172 of the HMR to determine
the safest, most secure routes for security-sensitive hazardous
materials. See the Section (D) ``Overview of Current Regulations
Relevant to this Proposal'' of this preamble for more information on
routing.
PHMSA seeks public comment on the following discussions and
questions. When commenting, please reference the specific portion of
the proposal, explain the reason for any recommended change, and
include the source, methodology, and key assumptions of any supporting
evidence.
1. To what extent would the routing requirements change the
operational practices for small railroads, which PHMSA expects to have
limited routing options? What are the benefits and costs of applying
these requirements to small railroads?
2. How has the voluntary compliance with the routing requirements
in response to the Call to Action changed the operational practices for
crude oil shipments?
D. Classification and Characterization of Mined Liquids and Gases
As previously discussed, the proper classification and
characterization of a hazardous material is critical under the HMR, as
it dictates which additional requirements apply, such as the proper
[[Page 45043]]
operational controls and proper packaging selection.
Under the HMR, it is critical that the offeror of a material ensure
that a hazardous material has been classified and characterized
correctly. The classification of a hazardous material triggers the
corresponding packaging and hazard communication. Under Sec. 173.22 of
the HMR, it is the offeror's responsibility to properly ``class and
describe the hazardous material in accordance with parts 172 and 173 of
this subchapter.'' When a single material meets more than one hazard
class the shipping name must be selected based on the hazard precedence
table in Sec. 173.2a. Once an offeror has determined the hazard class
of the material, the offeror must select the most appropriate proper
shipping name from the HMT.
In the case of crude oil, relevant properties to properly classify
a flammable liquid include: flash point, and boiling point (See section
173.120). The HMR do not specifically provide requirements for
characterization tests however; relevant properties that may affect the
characterization of crude oil include corrosivity, vapor pressure,
specific gravity at loading and reference temperatures, and the
presence and concentration of specific compounds such as sulfur.
Characterization of certain properties enables an offeror to select the
most appropriate shipping name, and identify key packaging
considerations. Based on the shipping name the HMT provides the list of
packagings authorized for use by the HMR. As indicated in Sec.
173.24(e), even though certain packagings are authorized, it is the
responsibility of the offeror to ensure that such packagings are
compatible with their lading. Such information and determination of the
authorized packaging also ensure that the appropriate outage is
maintained in accordance with Sec. 173.24(a).
In the September 6, 2013 ANPRM, we did not request comments on the
classification of crude oil. Nonetheless, one commenter, David C.
Breidenbach, provided several comments regarding the volatility of
``gassy'' crude oil. Mr. Breidenbach's comments suggested the need to
conduct pre-movement sampling and safety certification, require
pressurized DOT Specification 112 tank cars for certain PG I crude oil,
and ensure that field operators adjust well head separators to remove
gas and develop gas processing infrastructure.
Classification and characterization were raised during an RSAC
hazardous materials working group meeting, in the Secretary's Call to
Action, under Operation Classification, in the agencies' Joint Safety
Advisories, and in the amended and restated March 6, 2014 DOT Emergency
Order. PHMSA's January 2, 2014 Safety Alert warns of crude oil
variability and emphasizes proper and sufficient testing to ensure
accurate characterization and classification. The Safety Alert
expresses PHMSA's concern that unprocessed crude oil may affect the
integrity of packaging or present additional hazards related to
corrosivity, sulfur content, and dissolved gas content. Proper
classification of crude oil has been a major focus of the PHMSA and FRA
initiative referred to as Operation Classification and the Secretary's
Call to Action. Further, the Department's February 25, 2014 Emergency
Order, as revised on March 6, 2014, requires those who offer crude oil
for transportation by rail to ensure that the product is properly
tested and classified in accordance with Federal safety regulations. As
a result of comments, concerns, and government and industry emphasis on
proper classification, in this NPRM, PHMSA proposes changes to the HMR
that clarify and enhance the current classification requirements for
mined gases and liquids.
The HMR require both the proper classification of hazardous
materials and the selection and use of proper packaging. Packaging
groups are designed to assign a degree of danger presented within a
particular hazard class. Packing Group I poses the highest danger
(``great danger'') and Packing Group III the lowest (``minor danger'').
PHMSA is proposing to revise the bulk packaging sections Sec. Sec.
173.241, 173.242, and 173.243 to provide the timeline for continued use
of existing DOT Specification 111 tank cars in HHFT service in
accordance with the following table:
Table 15--Timeline for Continued Use of DOT Specification 111 Tank Cars
in HHFT Service
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Packing group DOT 111 not authorized after
------------------------------------------------------------------------
I...................................... October 1, 2017.
II..................................... October 1, 2018.
III.................................... October 1, 2020.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Based on the RSI's presentation to the NTSB on tank car production
capacity, it is anticipated that 33,800 tank cars could be manufactured
per year. In addition, PHMSA assumes that the current fleet size in
HHFT service is 72,000. PHMSA used this data to provide a phase out
period for DOT Specification 111 tank cars in certain HHFT service that
would ensure that sufficient time was provided to avoid a fleet
shortage in HHFT service. PHMSA requests comments on the proposed
timelines for discontinuing use of DOT Specification 111 tank cars in
HHFT service.
In Recommendation R-14-6 the NTSB recognized the importance of
sufficient testing and documentation of the physical and chemical
characteristics of hazardous materials to ensure the proper
classification, packaging, and record-keeping of products offered in
transportation. We agree with NTSB. Classification decisions are
essential for the selection of proper equipment (tank, service
equipment, interior lining or coating) and the use, maintenance, and
qualification of the equipment when shipping hazardous materials.
Proper classification is also essential for accommodating the risk-
based implementation schedule for increased tank car requirements
described below. The statement on a shipping paper is the offeror's
certification that a hazardous material is properly classified,
described, packaged, marked and labeled, and in proper condition for
transportation according to applicable DOT regulations. Packaging
decisions are based on the information provided by the offeror.
Incorrect classification and characterization of hazardous material may
lead to failures throughout the transportation system.
Examples where improper information from an offeror may result in
unsafe transportation conditions are found throughout the HMR.
Section 180.509(i) requires an owner of the interior
lining or coating of a tank car transporting a material that is
corrosive or reactive to the tank to ensure an inspection adequate to
detect defects or other conditions that could reduce the design level
of reliability and safety of the tank.
Section 180.509(i) also requires the owner of a tank car
used to transport a hazardous material to ensure the lining conforms to
Sec. Sec. 173.24(b)(2) and (b)(3) of the HMR. Further, the owner
``must use its knowledge of the service life of each coating or lining
and commodity combination to establish an appropriate inspection
interval for that coating or lining and commodity combination.''
Under Sec. 180.509(k) an owner of service equipment
``must analyze the service equipment inspection and test results for
any given lading and, based on the analysis, adjust the inspection and
test frequency to ensure that the design level of reliability and
safety of the equipment is met.''
[[Page 45044]]
Appendix D to Part 180 identifies hazardous materials
corrosive to tanks or service equipment, stating ``While every effort
was made to identify materials deemed corrosive to the tank or service
equipment, owners and operators are cautioned that this list may not be
inclusive.'' Tank car owners and operators are reminded of their duty
to ensure that no in-service tank will deteriorate below the specified
minimum thickness requirements in this subchapter. See Sec.
180.509(f)(3).
The properties of mined gases and liquids, including crude oil, are
variable based on time, method, and location of extraction. Whereas
manufactured goods often undergo a strict quality assurance process to
ensure characteristics are within defined parameters, mined gases and
liquids do not. Unlike manufactured goods, organic materials from oil
and gas production represent a unique challenge in regards to
classification. Differences in the chemical makeup of the raw material
can vary over time and geographical location. Typically, organic
materials from oil and gas production at a well head are passed through
a ``separator'' to remove the gas, sediment, and water from the crude.
As such, there are multiple hazardous materials that are commonly
shipped from the well-site including: Crude, natural gas condensate,
and natural gas liquid.
Given this variability, there is a responsibility under Sec.
173.22 of the HMR for an offeror to ensure the proper characterization
and classification of their materials. Proposed Sec. 173.41 would
explicitly require a sampling and testing program for mined gases and
liquids, including crude oil. Under proposed Sec. 173.41(a), this
program must address the following key elements that are designed to
ensure proper classification and characterization of crude oil:
Frequency of sampling and testing to account for
appreciable variability of the material, including the time,
temperature, means of extraction (including any use of a chemical),\51\
and location of extraction;
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\51\ This accounting for the method of extraction would not
require disclosure of confidential information.
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Sampling at various points along the supply chain to
understand the variability of the material during transportation;
Sampling methods that ensure a representative sample of
the entire mixture, as packaged, is collected;
Testing methods to enable complete analysis,
classification, and characterization of the material under the HMR;
Statistical justification for sample frequencies;
Duplicate samples for quality assurance purposes; and
Criteria for modifying the sampling and testing program.
The sampling and testing program should account for appreciable
differences in the material as a result of time, temperature, etc., but
need not measure ordinary and minor differences in materials. If an
offeror assigns all of its materials to the most stringent packing
group classification, this may serve as one possible justification for
a lower frequency of testing. The offeror would still need to justify
less frequent testing of other properties such as corrosivity. Sampling
along the length of the supply chain will be used to understand the
processing and transportation effects but may be less frequent than
final testing prior to rail car loading.
As a result of Secretary Foxx's call to Action, on February 21,
2014 the API agreed to pursue various actions including to work with
PHMSA and other representatives from the Department of Transportation
to share information and expertise on crude oil characteristics. API
created a working group on entitled the ``API Classification & Loading
of Crude Oil Work Group.'' Within this working group were two task
groups: ``Crude Oil Classification Task Group'' and the ``Crude Oil
Quantity & Quality Measurement Task Group.''
A six month schedule was launched in early 2014, with working
groups meeting every two weeks throughout the country. The goal of this
group was to develop a consensus industry standard for crude oil
testing, sampling and unloading. PHMSA personnel have been active
participants in these meetings. In June 2014 the API working group
finalized a draft standard ``Recommend Practices 3000'' (RP 3000). RP
3000 provides industry best practices, including those regarding
testing and sampling methods. The draft standard is currently in the
balloting process with API members and is on a path to finalization and
thus in not considered in the rulemaking. PHMSA is encouraged by the
development of such an industry standard and API's continued work in
the standard and beyond to improve the accuracy of classification of
materials and the overall safety or operational rail requirements. Once
finalized PHMSA may consider adoption of such a standard and in
addition those in the regulated community may petition for the
incorporation of such standard through the processes outlined in
section 106.95 of the HMR.
Proposed Sec. 173.41(b) would link the certification requirements,
as prescribed in Sec. 172.204, to the sampling and testing program.
Specifically, by certifying the shipment in accordance with Sec.
172.204, the offeror of the hazardous material is certifying compliance
with the sampling and testing program for mined gases and liquids
described above. Based on comments to the ANPRM, we considered
regulatory changes related to the vapor pressure of a flammable liquid.
As mentioned in the Background section of this preamble, above, prior
to 1990 the HMR clearly indicated that the packaging requirements for
flammable liquids are based on a combination of flash point, boiling
point, and vapor pressure. The regulations provided a point at which a
flammable liquid had to be transported in a tank car suitable for
compressed gases, commonly referred to as a ``pressure car'' (e.g., DOT
Specifications 105, 112, 114, and 120 tank cars). Specifically, Sec.
173.119(f) indicated that flammable liquids with a vapor pressure that
exceeded 27 psia but less than 40 psia at 100 [deg]F (at 40 psia, the
material met the definition of a compressed gas), were only authorized
for transportation in one of the authorized pressure cars. The older
regulations recognized that those flammable liquids that exhibited high
vapor pressures, such as those liquids with dissolved gases, require
additional care in packaging. We are not currently proposing any
regulatory changes related to vapor pressure of a material. However,
PHMSA seeks comments from the regulated community on the role of vapor
pressure in the classification, characterization, and packaging
selection process for a flammable liquid and whether regulatory changes
to establish vapor pressure thresholds for packaging selection are
necessary.
Proposed Sec. 173.41(c) would require that the sampling and
testing program be documented in writing and retained while it remains
in effect. It should be noted the while the sampling and testing
program is required be documented in writing and retained while it
remains in effect we are not require a specified retention requirement
for the actual testing records. We acknowledge testing results will be
supplemental materials to support the requirements of the sampling and
testing program. The proposed requirement specifies that the sampling
and testing program must be reviewed and revised and/or updated as
necessary to reflect changing circumstances. The most recent version
[[Page 45045]]
of the sampling and testing program, or portions thereof, must be
provided to the employees who are responsible for implementing it. When
the sampling and testing program is updated or revised, all employees
responsible for implementing it must be notified and all copies of the
sampling and testing program must be maintained as of the date of the
most recent revision. If a sampling and testing program is updated,
revised or superseded, documentation of the program that was updated,
revised, or superseded must be retained for 5 additional years.
Proposed Sec. 173.41(d) would mandate that each person required to
develop and implement a sampling and testing program must maintain a
copy of the sampling and testing program documentation (or an
electronic file thereof) that is accessible at, or through, its
principal place of business and must make the documentation available
upon request, at a reasonable time and location, to an authorized
official of DOT.
It should be noted above in early 2014 API created a working group
on entitled the ``API Classification & Loading of Crude Oil Work
Group.'' The goal of this group was to develop a consensus industry
standard (RP 3000) that would address testing and sampling of crude
oil. PHMSA personnel have been active participants in these meetings.
PHMSA is encouraged by the development of such an industry standard and
API's continued work in the standard and beyond to improve the accuracy
of classification of materials and the overall safety or operational
rail requirements. Once finalized PHMSA may consider adoption of such a
standard and in addition those in the regulated community may petition
for the incorporation of the standard through the processes outlined in
section 106.95 of the HMR.
PHMSA seeks public comment on the following discussions and
questions. When commenting, please reference the specific portion of
the proposal, explain the reason for any recommended change, and
include the source, methodology, and key assumptions of any supporting
evidence.
(1.) What are the differences in the process and costs for
classification of mined gases compared to mined liquids such as crude
oil?
(2.) How much variability exists across a region due to location,
time, temperature, or mining methods for gases and liquids?
(3.) Would more or less specificity regarding the components of a
sampling and testing program aid offerers of shipments to be in
compliance with proposed Sec. 173.41?
(4.) Do the guidelines provides sufficient clarity to offerors to
understand whether they are in compliance with these requirements?
(5.) How could PHMSA provide flexibility and relax the sampling and
testing requirements for offerors who voluntarily use the safest
packaging and equipment replacement standards?
E. Additional Requirements for High-Hazard Flammable Trains
In the September 6, 2013 ANPRM we outlined the additional safety
enhancements, which may include both rail car design and rail carrier
operational changes that were considered by the T87.6 Task Force, and
we provided the public an opportunity to comment. Below are the key
considerations of the task force from both a tank car design and
operations standpoint.
Table 16--Key Considerations and Findings of the T87.6 Task Force
------------------------------------------------------------------------
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
Tank car design
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Thermal protection to address breaches attributable to exposure to fire
conditions.
Findings--Modeling of tank cars exposed to pool fire conditions using a
version of AFFTAC current at the time the TF was active, and using pure
ethanol as a surrogate, indicate thermal protection and a jacket was
not necessary for a tank car to survive 100 minutes in a pool fire. A
pressure relieve valve with a flow capacity of 27,000 SCFM with a start
to discharge pressure of 75 psig was needed to ensure the tank car
survived 100 minutes.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Roll-over protection to prevent damage to top and bottom fittings and
limit stresses transferred from the protection device to the tank
shell.
Findings--Research comparing the top fittings protection required for
the CPC-1232 compliance car and the protection required in the HMR for
certain tank cars based on dynamic loads was considered preliminary and
not sufficient to base a recommendation.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Hinged and bolted manways to address a common cause of leakage during
accidents and Non-Accident Releases (NARS);
Findings--Representatives of the shipping community expressed the
following concerns regarding the elimination of hinged and bolted
manways.
The existing infrastructure at the loading and unloading
facilities has been designed make use of the 20'' manway.
Through the manway the facilities recover vapor, inspect
the interior of the cars, obtain samples of heels in the tanks,
insert a stinger used to dissipate energy of a fluid moving at a
high flow rate, gauge the volume in the car during loading, access
the car for periodic and ad hoc cleaning. In some cases all of the
loading/unloading appurtenances have been incorporated onto a
housing that fits over the manway.
If a bolted pressure plate like assembly is required the
loaded volume may be determined using existing technology. The
specific gravity of crude oil varies from 0.6 to 1.0 limiting the
usefulness of a magnetic gauging device.
Alternatives to hinged and bolted securement are currently under
development and testing.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Bottom outlet valve (BOV) elimination;
Findings--The working group concluded elimination of the allowance for
BOVs is not a viable option in the near term. The Task Force then
considered enhanced protection of the bottom outlet valve. Appendix E
of the AAR's Tank Car Specifications provides the standards for bottom
discontinuity protection. In order to move forward with this concept,
the design criteria will need to be developed. Time constraints
prohibit this task force from advancing this concept. Also, inspection
of the 10 cars involved in a recent derailment indicates the bottom
outlet protection functions as designed and no valve were significantly
damaged.
AAR TCC created a docket T10.5 and a task force to evaluate bottom
outlet performance. Task force T87.6 recommends that the TCC add
development of design criteria for enhanced bottom outlet protection to
the T10.5 charge. The following are other ideas being investigated by
T10.5 that are germane to T87.6.
Shipment of the car without the BOV handle attached and
development of a standard/universal handle attachment.
Eliminate use of overly strong handle.
Incorporating operating stops on valve bodies.
[[Page 45046]]
The working group will also engage BOV manufacturers to
determine if valve configurations or design be altered to prevent
damage documented in recent derailments.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Increasing outage from 1 percent to 2 percent to improve puncture
resistance.
Increasing the minimum allowed outage was a difficult option to evaluate
because the commodities are loaded below the reference temperature and
the outage at the loading temperature is well above the regulatory
minimum. It was reported Ethanol was loaded to an outage of
approximately 4%. The American Petroleum Institute (API) surveyed a
number of its members to learn the outage of ethanol as received. The
outages ranged from 2.86% to 6.23%.
To further evaluate the benefit of this option, the AFFTAC subgroup
performed simulations to determine the benefit (to survivability in a
pool fire) offered by increased outage. Based on the results of the
simulation a tank car with 2% outage had an insignificant change in
performance when exposed to a pool fire.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Rail Carrier Operations
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Rail integrity (e.g., broken rails or welds, misaligned track,
obstructions, track geometry, etc.) to reduce the number and severity
of derailments;
Findings--The Task Force urged groups charged with addressing track
integrity issues to aggressively work toward a quick and meaningful
resolution. In addition, the Task Force urged developers and suppliers
of rail flaw detection technology to continue to make the advancement
and production of the technologies a priority.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Alternative brake signal propagation systems ECP, DP, and two-way EOT to
reduce the number of cars and energy associated with derailments;
Findings--Based on the simulation results and analysis of the data it
was concluded the alternatives considered provided marginal benefits.
Moreover the identified obstacles to implementation represent a
considerable time and cost investment and the predicted benefits would
not be realized for months or years in the future. As such, this
working group will not make a recommendation related to alternative
brake signal propagation systems.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Speed restrictions for key trains containing 20 or more loaded tank cars
(on August 5, 2013, AAR issued Circular No. OT-55-N addressing this
issue);
Findings--The working group recommended that OT-55 not be modified due
to the adverse impact on cycle times and the resulting increase in the
number of tank cars which would be required to transport these
commodities in the same time frame. Most of the benefit of the reduced
speed restriction is already in place, since five of the seven Class 1
railroads already handle unit trains of these commodities as key
trains.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Emergency response to mitigate the risks faced by response and salvage
personnel, the impact on the environment, and delays to traffic on the
line.
Findings--The Task Force supports the RFA's proposed recommendation and
in turn, recommends the AAR request updates from the RFA regarding the
availability of mobile stores of AR-AFFF.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
As part of PHMSA and FRA's systematic approach to rail hazardous
materials transportation safety, in this NPRM, in addition to new tank
car design standards, PHMSA is proposing operational requirements for
HHFTs. Some of these operational requirements are consistent with the
T87.6 Task Force and discussed in further detail below.
a. Speed Restriction
Speed is a factor that may contribute to derailments. Speed can
influence the probability of an accident, as it may allow for a brake
application to stop the train before a collision. Speed also increases
the kinetic energy of a train resulting in a greater possibility of the
tank cars being punctured in the event of a derailment.
The laws of physics indicate that if an accident occurred at 40 mph
instead of 50 we should expect a reduction of kinetic energy of 36%.
After consultations with engineers and subject matter experts, we can
assume that this would translate to the severity of an accident being
reduced by 36%. A slower speed may allow a locomotive engineer to
identify a safety problem ahead and stop the train before an accident
occurs, which could lead to accident prevention. PHMSA only quantifies
benefits in this proposed rule from mitigating the severity of
accidents. With respect to prevention, PHMSA notes that reduced speeds
will reduce the risk of accidents on net, though some risks could
increase under limited circumstances.
PHMSA and FRA used a ten mile speed differential in calculating an
effectiveness rate for the 40 mph speed restriction options, which
assumes that at the time of an accident trains would be going 10 mph
slower if the speed restriction were at 40 mph rather than 50 mph.
Braking is often applied before an accident occurs, and the speed
differential at the time of an accident that results from trains
operating at top speeds of 50 mph and 40 mph could be different than 10
mph. Furthermore, in some cases, other restrictions on speed or
congestion could affect speed at the time of the accident. PHMSA lacks
a basis to modify the assumption that speeds would be 10 mph different
at the time of accidents and seeks comment on how we may better
determine how speed restrictions would affect actual speed at the time
of an accident.
A simulation program, Train Energy & Dynamics Simulator (TEDS) was
used to study the dynamics and energy levels of trains under a variety
of operational conditions. Specifically, TEDS was used to determine the
stopping distance and the rate of dissipation of kinetic energy (KE) of
a generic, 100 tank car train on level tangent track equipped with the
candidate brake signal propagation systems. The simulations were used
to determine the relative performance of the different systems. The
model was validated using brake signal propagation data from Wabtec and
data from a BNSF test performed in 2008.
This modeling tool was then used to determine the remaining energy
to be dissipated and the speed at selected locations in the train when
that tank car reached a defined point specified as the Point of
Derailment (POD). By comparing the results for each technology,
assumptions were made for the difference in number of cars reaching the
point of derailment, remaining kinetic energy of all of the cars in the
train at a set time interval, and conditional probability of release
(CPR) of the train. This modeling supported the conclusion that a 10
mph speed reduction would reduce the harm of a derailment by 36%.
[[Page 45047]]
PHMSA anticipates the reductions in the speed of trains that employ
less safe tank cars will prevent fatalities and other injuries, and
limit the amount of property damage done in an accident. PHMSA expects
fewer safety benefits would be realized from a reduction in speed as
the tank car fleet is enhanced as proposed in this NPRM.
As noted above, T87.6 Task Force considered this issue but did not
recommend action, primarily because of the ``adverse impact on cycle
times and the resulting increase in the number of tank cars which would
be required to transport these commodities in the same time frame.''
However, given the increasing risks of HHFTs, in the ANPRM we asked
several questions regarding AAR Circular No. OT-55-N. Specifically, we
asked if the Circular adequately addressed speed restrictions. The
majority of the commenters indicated that the current voluntary 50-mph
speed restriction is acceptable. Further, during the industry Call to
Action, the rail and crude oil industries agreed to consider further
voluntary improvements, including speed restrictions in high
consequence areas, similar to the requirements that are established by
the routing requirements in Part 172, Subpart I of the HMR. As a result
of those efforts, AAR indicates that railroads began operating certain
trains at 40 mph on July 1, 2014. This voluntary restriction applies to
any HHFT with at least one non-CPC 1232 DOT Specification 111 tank car
loaded with crude oil or one non-DOT specification tank car loaded with
crude oil while that train travels within the limits of any high-threat
urban area (HTUA) as defined by 49 CFR 1580.3.
In their comments, AAR and the ASLRRA stated,
Following Lac-M[eacute]gantic, AAR's and ASLRRA's members
reviewed their operating practices with respect to the
transportation of hazardous materials. The decision was made to
expand OT-55, the industry circular on recommended operating
practices, to encompass all hazardous materials, including flammable
liquids. OT-55's operating restrictions now apply to trains
containing one car of a TIH material, spent nuclear fuel, or high-
level radioactive waste or 20 cars of any combination of other
hazardous materials. The 20-car threshold was chosen in recognition
that in the context of Lac-M[eacute]gantic, the concern is over a
pool fire involving multiple cars. In addition, crude oil and
ethanol typically are shipped in unit trains.
Further, AAR and the ASLRRA stated,
OT-55 has existed for two decades and has been adhered to by the
railroad industry. There is no need to incorporate its provisions
into the hazardous materials regulations. With respect to the 50-mph
speed limit, that is the regulatory limit for TIH.\52\ AAR and
ASLRRA are unaware of any analysis justifying a lower speed limit
and is concerned that a lower speed limit will have the
counterproductive effect of causing shippers to divert freight to
other transportation modes.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\52\ 49 CFR 174.86(b).
Proposed Sec. 174.310(a)(4) would establish a 50-mph maximum speed
restriction for HHFTs. It was suggested that there is no need to
incorporate the speed restrictions of OT-55. OT-55 is a recommended
practice and, as such, does not carry the weight of law. A subscribing
railroad can, without concern of a penalty, move these trains at speeds
exceeding the industry standard and as discussed previously, increase
the energy and likelihood of catastrophic damage to tank cars involved
in a train accident. Codifying this voluntary commitment will ensure
that the benefits of these speed restrictions are realized
indefinitely. Without codification of these requirements the speed
restrictions could be subsequently lifted prematurely and increase
risk. Additionally, in the event that a rail carrier cannot comply with
the proposed braking requirements discussed in the Alternative Brake
Propagation Systems section of this NPRM, the rail carrier would not be
permitted to operate HHFTs at speeds exceeding 30-mph.
Finally, we are proposing three Options for a 40-mph speed
restriction for any HHFT unless all tank cars containing flammable
liquids meet or exceed the proposed standards for the DOT Specification
117 tank car. We request comments on which Option would have greatest
net social benefits and whether the 40-mph speed restriction is
necessary. Those 40-mph speed limit options are as follows:
Option 1: 40 mph Speed Limit All Areas
All HHFTs are limited to a maximum speed of 40 mph, unless all
tank cars meet or exceed the proposed performance standards for the
DOT Specification 117 tank car.
Option 2: 40 mph in Areas With More Than 100,000 People
All HHFTs--unless all tank cars containing flammable liquids
meet or exceed the proposed standards for the DOT Specification 117
tank car--are limited to a maximum speed of 40 mph while operating
in an area that has a population of more than 100,000 people, unless
all tank cars meet or exceed the proposed standards for the DOT
Specification 117 tank car. An area that has a population of more
than 100,000 people would be defined using municipal borders, as
determined by census population data. The 40 mph limitation to
maximum speed would apply when any part of a HHFT is operating
within that municipal border. PHMSA estimates that approximately 10%
of the track miles for crude oil and ethanol traffic are traversed
in cites with a population greater than 100,000 people. We seek
comments on this assumption. Therefore, only 10% of the track miles
would be impacted.
Option 3: 40 mph in HTUAs
All HHFTs--unless all tank cars containing flammable liquids
meet or exceed the proposed standards for the DOT Specification 117
tank car--are limited to a maximum speed of 40 mph while the train
travels within the limits of HTUAs, unless all tank cars meet or
exceed the proposed standards for the DOT Specification 117 tank
car. PHMSA estimates that approximately 2% of the track miles for
crude oil and ethanol traffic are traversed in HTUAs. We seek
comments on this assumption. Therefore, only 2% of the track miles
would be affected.
PHMSA has prepared and placed in the docket a RIA addressing the
economic impact of this proposed rule. In the RIA we provide an
analysis of speed restrictions, including the Options for the 40-mph
speed limit. Our analysis has several limitations, which are listed in
the RIA. The analysis extrapolates from the geometric characteristics
of a single 124-mile subdivision, which may not be representative of
crude and ethanol routes. In addition, we do not estimate any effects
from speed reductions on other types of rail traffic throughout the
rail network (e.g., passenger trains, intermodal freight, and general
merchandise).
PHMSA seeks public comment on the following discussions and
questions. When commenting, please reference the specific portion of
the proposal, explain the reason for any recommended change, and
include the source, methodology, and key assumptions of any supporting
evidence.
1. What would the effects be of a 40-mph speed limit for HHFTs on
other traffic on the network, including passenger and intermodal
traffic, under each of the three described Options?
2. PHMSA estimates the value of an hour of train delay to be $500.
What are the costs per hour of delayed HHFT traffic, and what are the
costs of delays for other types of traffic on the network?
3. PHMSA estimates that a 40-mph speed limit, from 50-mph, will
reduce the severity of a HHFT accidents by 36 percent,\53\ due to the
reduction in kinetic energy by 36 percent. What other factors, in
addition to kinetic energy
[[Page 45048]]
changes, would refine the methodology for calculating potential risk
reduction?
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\53\ Kinetic energy varies directly with the square of speed
(velocity).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
4. To what extent would a 40-mph speed limit in select areas cause
rail traffic to be diverted to other lines, and what are the benefits
and costs of this potential diversion?
5. To what extent would a 40-mph speed limit cause rail traffic,
particularly intermodal traffic, to be diverted onto truck or other
modes of transit as a result of rail delays, and what are the benefits
and costs of this potential diversion?
6. How might the extrapolation from the 124-mile subdivision to the
entire rail network produce over- or underestimates of the effects of
speed restrictions for HHFT routes?
7. What other geographic delineations--in addition to HTUAs and
cities with 100,000 people or more--should PHMSA consider as an Option
for a 40-mph speed restriction in the absence of a proposed DOT 117
tank car?
8. How would the safety benefits of the proposed speed limits
change if combined with the proposed braking systems?
9. What would be the benefits and costs of excluding existing
Jacketed CPC-1232 cars from the proposed 40 mph speed restrictions,
under each speed Option, if PHMSA selects a more stringent tank car
specification than the Enhanced Jacketed CPC-1232?
10. What would be the benefits and costs of limiting the proposed
40 mph speed restrictions, under each Option, only to DOT 111 tank cars
carrying a particular hazardous material (e.g., only crude oil)?
b. Alternative Brake Signal Propagation Systems
T87.6 Task Force did not recommend additional braking requirements,
stating that based on the simulation results and analysis of the data
it was concluded the additional alternatives considered provided
marginal benefits. Moreover the identified obstacles to implementation
represent a considerable time and cost investment and the predicted
benefits would not be realized for months or years in the future. The
group did acknowledge that an alternative signal transmission system,
such as an intermediate EOT device, may be a promising option.
However, given the increasing risks of HHFTs, in the September 6,
2013 ANPRM we specifically requested comments pertaining to alternative
brake signal propagation systems to reduce the number of cars and
energy associated with derailments.
ECP (Electronic Controlled Pneumatic brake system) simultaneously
sends a braking command to all cars in the train, reducing the time
before a car's pneumatic brakes are engaged compared to conventional
brakes. The system also permits the train crew to monitor the
effectiveness of the brakes on each individual car in the train and
provides real-time information on the performance of the entire braking
system of the train. ECP brake system technology also reduces the wear
and tear on brake system components and can significantly reduce fuel
consumption. All cars in a train must be equipped with ECP before a
train can operate in ECP brake mode.
DP (Distributed Power) is a system that provides control of a
number of locomotives dispersed throughout a train from a controlling
locomotive located in the lead position. The system provides control of
the rearward locomotives by command signals originating at the lead
locomotive and transmitted to the remote (rearward) locomotives. A
locomotive located \2/3\ of the way through a train consist may be able
to produce braking rates for the train that are close to those produced
by ECP brakes. The braking rates, however, are more effective when
derailments occur at the head of the train rather than closer to the
back of the train. Further, T87.6 Task Force found that, in practice,
rail carriers intentionally introduce a delay in emergency brake
application that negatively affects the overall benefits from enhance
signal transmission.
One commenter, API, indicates that DP serves as a means to increase
the speed of application of the airbrakes as the braking signal would
reach the cars throughout the train more rapidly. Further, API
indicates that some railroads have already begun using DP and it serves
as the fastest way to send braking signals to all of the cars. In
addition, API indicates that accidents resulting from brake failure in
one engine could be averted if another engine supports the air brakes
on the entire train. API encourages PHMSA to evaluate DP and the
development of a mid-train signaling device.
The two-way EOT device includes two pieces of equipment linked by
radio that initiate an emergency brake application command from the
front unit located in the controlling locomotive, which then activates
the emergency air valve at the rear of the train within one second. The
rear unit of the device sends an acknowledgment message to the front
unit immediately upon receipt of an emergency brake application
command. A two way EOT device is more effective than conventional
brakes because the rear cars receive the brake command more quickly.
FRA conducted simulations to better understand the effect on energy
dissipation and stopping distance of different brake signal propagation
systems; conventional brakes, DP configurations, and ECP. The
simulations were performed using the TEDS program, developed by Sharma
& Associates to study the dynamics and energy levels under a variety of
operating conditions. Derailments involving trains equipped with two
way EOT devices were not specifically simulated. In simulated
derailment speeds of 50 and 60 mph, at approximately the 9th car there
is a divergence in the kinetic energy of individual railcars at the
point of derailment between ECP, DP (EOT), and conventional brake
systems. At those speeds, if a derailment occurs at the first car,
changes in the brake signal propagation system will only be realized
after the 10th car. At a derailment speed of 40 mph the divergence
occurs at the 7th car. The following graphs show the reduction in
kinetic energy as a function of train speed and a tank car's position
in a train for each of the brake signal propagation systems described
above.
Figures 1, 2, 3 and 4 below are based on the following assumptions:
Each train includes three locomotives at 415,000 lbs., 100
cars at 263,000 lbs., train length 6,164 ft.
DP has two locomotives at front and one at rear of train.
DP \2/3\ has two locomotives at front of the train, and
one placed two thirds from the front.
Dynamic brakes were assumed to be inactive for the purpose
of the 18 percent effectiveness rate of DP, thus it is a fair statement
to say DP at the end of the train without the benefit of dynamic brakes
is equivalent to EOT. Therefore, for the purposes of our analysis, we
assumed EOT is as effective as DP when it is located at the end of the
train.\54\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\54\ The specifics of this model will be placed in the docket
for this rulemaking upon completion. This assumption would tend to
underestimate the benefits of ECP brakes, because it enhances the
safety level of the estimated baseline.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
[[Page 45049]]
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP01AU14.008
[[Page 45050]]
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP01AU14.009
The following graph provides the results of a comparison of the
simulations of derailments at 40 and 50 mph. The data are the kinetic
energy versus position in a train operating with conventional brakes.
The trend line of the difference in energy per car is shown. The trend
line is relatively flat, but the slope begins to increase slightly
after the 15th car. This demonstrates that the slower the initial train
speed, the greater the effect of braking on the ability of the train to
dissipate energy.
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP01AU14.010
The results of these simulations suggest that alternative brake
signal propagation systems decrease brake signal propagation time
relative to the conventional brake system. Specifically, FRA
simulations estimated that:
Using its methodology to evaluate the probability of tank
car puncture DOT calculated that a derailment involving a train made up
of Option 1 tank cars (equipped with ECP brakes) will result in 36
percent fewer cars puncturing than the same train with conventional
brakes. As such DOT estimates that ECP brakes would reduce the severity
of a HHFT accident by an estimated 36 percent, compared to conventional
brakes.
Figures 1, 2 and 3 show that the ability for trains
operating with two-way EOT device and DP brake systems to dissipate
energy is between the abilities of those operating with ECP and
conventional brake systems. Accordingly, DOT estimates that two-way EOT
or DP would reduce the severity of a HHFT accident by 18 percent (half
of the 36% estimated for ECP brakes), compared to conventional brakes.
[[Page 45051]]
Based on Sharma's modeling, the effectiveness of ECP was determined
to be 36%, and DP was calculated (not simulated) to determine
effectiveness of about 18 percent. However, as both DP and EOT
effectiveness were calculated based on a number of factors and previous
model runs, PHMSA and FRA will place a technical supplement into the
rulemaking docket to provide greater detail on the inputs and
assumptions underlying the model.
In this NPRM we are proposing to require each HHFT to be equipped
with an enhanced brake signal propagation system. We are proposing an
implementation schedule that minimizes the impacts on rail carriers.
Specifically, subject to one exception, we are proposing to require the
following:
HHFTs to be equipped with a two-way EOT device as defined
in 49 CFR 232.5 or a distributed power system as defined in 49 CFR
229.5,, by October 1, 2015.
After October 1, 2015, a tank car manufactured in
accordance with proposed Sec. 179.202 or Sec. 179.202-11 for use in a
HHFT must be equipped with ECP brakes.
After October 1, 2015, HHFTs comprised entirely of tank
cars manufactured in accordance with proposed Sec. 179.202 and Sec.
179.202-11 (for Tank Car Option 1. the PHMSA and FRA Designed Car,
only), except for required buffer cars, must be operated in ECP brake
mode as defined by 49 CFR 232.5.
To reduce the burden on small carriers that may not have the
capital available to install new braking systems, we are proposing an
exception. If a rail carrier does not comply with the proposed braking
requirements above, the carrier may continue to operate HHFTs at speeds
not to exceed 30 mph. We will continue to monitor braking performance
and may consider other regulatory or non-regulatory actions in the
future on restrictions for specific containers or trains.
An ECP brake system permits the train crew to monitor the
effectiveness of the brakes on each individual car in the train and
provides real-time information on the performance of the entire braking
system of the train. ECP brake system technology also reduces the
degradation on brake system components and can significantly reduce
fuel consumption. Due to these added benefits, we believe that adding
ECP brake technology to these captive fleet trains will have greater
net social benefits than requiring only DP or EOT devices.
PHMSA seeks public comment on the following discussions and
questions. When commenting, please reference the specific portion of
the proposal, explain the reason for any recommended change, and
include the source, methodology, and key assumptions of any supporting
evidence.
1. What is the annual capacity of tank car and locomotive
manufacturing and retrofit facilities to install or implement ECP, DP,
and EOT systems on the HHFT fleet? To what extent will implementation
issues arise?
2. PHMSA estimates that ECP brakes cost $3,000 per new tank car,
$5,000 per retrofitted tank car, and $79,000 per locomotive. To what
extent do these estimates reflect the market prices for ECP?
3. PHMSA estimates that ECP brakes would reduce accident severity
by 36 percent compared to conventional brakes with EOT devices and by
18 percent compared to locomotives with DP or another EOT device. To
what extent do other simulation models, besides those used by FRA, or
the results of ECP pilot programs validate these results?
4. PHMSA expects that all railroads already have two-way EOT
devices, have DP, or operate at speeds lower than 30-mph, so PHMSA
estimates no benefits or costs for the 30-mph limit in the absence of
advanced braking systems. Do any railroads that operate at speeds
greater than 30-mph also not have two-way EOT devices or DP?
5. How would the safety benefits of the proposed braking systems
change if combined with the proposed speed limits and tank car
standards?
F. New Tank Cars for High-Hazard Flammable Trains
In the September 6, 2013 ANPRM we requested comments pertaining to
new construction requirements for DOT Specification 111 tank cars used
in flammable liquid service. Though commenters differ on the
applicability of a new construction requirement to all flammable
liquids, all support prompt action to address new construction of tank
cars.
In Recommendation R-12-5, NTSB recommends that we,
Require that all newly-manufactured and existing general service
tank cars authorized for transportation of denatured fuel ethanol
and crude oil in PGs I and II have enhanced tank head and shell
puncture resistance systems and top fittings protection that exceed
existing design requirements for DOT Specification 111 tank cars.
Several commenters requested that PHMSA not adopt standards of
construction for newly constructed tank cars beyond those of the CPC-
1232. Additionally, most commenters, including API, were strongly
against any retrofits of existing tank cars beyond minor modifications.
For example, according to API,
``There are approximately 15,000 cars built to the CPC-1232
standard currently in flammable liquid service. According to RSI,
Approximately 36,000 more cars will be built to the CPC-1232
industry standard for crude oil service by December 2015. The
industry has reached consensus on the P-1577 standard for tank cars
in crude oil and ethanol service, and it is therefore important to
issue regulations on these cars.''
We address retrofits of existing cars in the next section. This
section describes requirements for newly constructed tank cars used in
HHFT.
In this NPRM, we are proposing three Options for newly manufactured
tank cars that will address the risks associated with the rail
transportation of Class 3 flammable liquids in HHFTs. Tank cars built
to the proposed new standard will be designated ``DOT Specification
117.'' In addition, we are proposing a performance standard for the
design and construction of tank cars equivalent to the DOT
Specification 117. A tank car that meets the performance criteria will
be assigned to ``DOT Specification 117P.'' We propose to require new
tank cars constructed after October 1, 2015 that are used to transport
Class 3 flammable liquids in HHFT to meet the specification
requirements for the DOT Specification 117 tank car or the proposed
performance specifications. The proposed performance standard is
intended to encourage innovation in the design of tank car, use of new
materials, and incorporation of new appurtenances.
In addition, tank car manufacturers have the option to build a DOT
Specification 117 tank car, as outlined in the proposed specification
requirements. Both the prescribed specifications and the performance
standard were developed to provide improved crashworthiness relative to
the DOT Specification 111 tank car. In addition to proposing revisions
to Part 179 of the HMR to include the DOT Specification 117 and 117P
requirements, we are also proposing revisions to the bulk packaging
authorizations in Sec. Sec. 173.241, 173.242, and 173.243 to include
the DOT Specification 117 and 117P tank car as an authorized packaging
for those hazardous materials, as those sections are referenced in
column (8C) of the HMT. We note that, as stated in the introductory
text to Sec. Sec. 173.241, 173.242, and 173.243, each person selecting
a
[[Page 45052]]
packaging must consider the requirements of subparts A and B of Part
173 of the HMR and any special provisions indicated in column (7) of
the HMT.
Finally, we are proposing to incorporate by reference, in Sec.
171.7, Appendix E 10.2.1 of the 2010 version of the AAR Manual of
Standards and Recommended Practices, Section C--Part III,
Specifications for Tank Cars, Specification M-1002, (AAR Specifications
for Tank Cars). AAR frequently updates the AAR Specifications for Tank
Cars. Appendix E provides requirements for top fittings for certain
tank car Options provided below.
a. DOT Specification 117--Prescribed Car
PHMSA is proposing several revisions to the HMR that would change
the specification requirements for rail tank cars authorized to
transport crude oil and ethanol. The changes would stipulate a new tank
car performance specification--the DOT Specification 117 tank car--that
would be phased in over time depending on the packing group of the
flammable liquid. Revising or replacing the current standard for the
DOT Specification 111 tank car is not a decision that DOT takes
lightly. We seek to ensure that we select the car that will have the
greatest net social benefits, with benefits primarily generated from
the mitigation of accident severity. We also aware of, and account for,
the large economic effects associated with regulatory changes of this
scale, as tank cars are a long-term investment. For these reasons, we
are proposing three separate DOT Specification 117 Options and
requesting comments. The tank car Options being considered in this NPRM
are as follows:
Option 1: PHMSA and FRA Designed Car
Option 1 incorporates several enhancements designed to increase
puncture resistance; provide thermal protection to survive a 100-minute
pool fire; protect top fitting and bottom outlets during a derailment;
and improve braking performance. Among the proposed tank car designs,
Option 1 would minimize the consequences of a derailment of tank cars
carrying crude oil or ethanol. There would be fewer car punctures,
fewer releases from the service equipment (top and bottom fittings),
and delayed release of flammable liquid from the tank cars through the
pressure relief devices. The proposed enhancements are outlined in
detail below:
Key features of this tank car Option include the following:
286,000 lb. GRL tank car that is designed and constructed
in accordance with AAR Standard 286;
Wall thickness after forming of the tank shell and heads
must be a minimum of 9/16 inch constructed from TC-128 Grade B,
normalized steel;
Thermal protection system in accordance with Sec. 179.18,
including a reclosing pressure relief device;
Minimum 11-gauge jacket constructed from A1011 steel or
equivalent. The jacket must be weather-tight as required in Sec.
179.200-4;
Full-height, 1/2 inch thick head shield meeting the
requirements of Sec. 179.16(c)(1);
Bottom outlet handle removed or designed to prevent
unintended actuation during a train accident; and
ECP brakes.
Under Option 1, the DOT Specification 117 tank car would be
equipped with a top fittings protection system and nozzle capable of
sustaining, without failure, a rollover accident at a speed of 9 mph,
in which the rolling protective housing strikes a stationary surface
assumed to be flat, level, and rigid and the speed is determined as a
linear velocity, measured at the geometric center of the loaded tank
car as a transverse vector.
For Option 1, PHMSA estimates that the roll-over protection and
increased extra \1/8-inch\ of shell thickness would reduce crude oil
and ethanol accident severity by 10 percent relative to a new tank car
that would be constructed in the absence of this rule. Further, PHMSA
estimates that ECP brakes would reduce accident severity by 36 percent
compared to conventional brakes and 18 percent when compared to for EOT
devices or DP. PHMSA estimates that the addition of ECP brakes, roll-
over protection, and increased shell thickness would together add
$5,000 to the cost of a new tank car that would be constructed in the
absence of this rule.
Option 2: AAR 2014 Recommended Car
Option 2 is based on the AAR's recommended new tank car standard,
approximately 5,000 of which have been ordered by BNSF Rail
Corporation. On March 9, 2011 AAR submitted a petition for rulemaking
P-1577, which was discussed in the ANPRM. In response to the ANPRM, on
November 15, 2013, AAR and ASLRAA submitted as a comment \55\ provide
their recommendations for tank car standards that are enhanced beyond
the design in P-1577. Notable upgrades from AAR's initial petition
include increased shell thickness, jackets, thermal protection full-
height head shields instead of half-height head shields for jacketed
cars, top fittings protections, and bottom outlet handles that will not
open in a derailment.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\55\ See http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=PHMSA-
2012-0082-0090.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Option 2 car has most of the same safety features as the Option
1 car, including the same increase in shell thickness, jacket
requirement, thermal protection requirement, and head shield
requirement, but it lacks rollover protection and the ECP brake
equipment. Installation of ECP brake equipment largely makes up the
cost differential between the Option 1 and 2 cars, and the differences
in estimated effectiveness are also largely a result of ECP brakes. In
essence, examining these cars side by side in the following analysis
provides a de facto comparison of the costs and benefits of equipping
high hazard flammable trains with ECP braking.
For Option 2, FRA estimates that the extra \1/8\ inch of shell
thickness would reduce crude oil and ethanol accident severity by 10
percent relative to the new car that would be constructed in the
absence of this rule. PHMSA estimates that the increased thickness
would add $2,000 to the cost of a new tank car that would be
constructed in the absence of this rule.
Option 3: Enhanced Jacketed CPC-1232
Option 3 is an enhanced jacketed CPC-1232 tank car standard. This
Option would modify the CPC-1232 standard by requiring improvements to
the bottom outlet handle and pressure relief valve. It would also
remove options (1) to build a car with weaker steel type but with added
shell thickness or (2) to build a car with a thicker shell but no
jacket. This standard is the car configuration PHMSA believes will be
built for HHFT service in absence of regulation, based on commitments
from one of the largest rail car manufacturers/leasers--Greenbrier,
Inc. and the Railway Supply Institute.\56\ This car is a substantial
safety improvement over the current DOT Specification 111 but does not
achieve the same level of safety as the Option 1 or Option 2 cars. This
tank car has a 7/16 inch shell, which is thinner than Option 1 or
Option 2 tank cars. Similar to the Option 2 car, this car lacks
rollover protection and ECP brake
[[Page 45053]]
equipment. Because PHMSA assumes that Option 3 is the car that would be
built in the absence of this rule, it estimates no costs or benefits
from Option 3 for new cars.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\56\ Greenbrier: http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=PHMSA-2012-0082-0155. RSI: http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=PHMSA-2012-0082-0156.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
All of the Options provided above are designed to address the
survivability of the tank car and would mitigate the damages of rail
accidents better than the current DOT Specification 111. Specifically,
the tank car Options incorporate several enhancements to increase
puncture resistance; provide thermal protection to survive a 100-minute
pool fire; and protect top fitting and bottom outlets during a
derailment. Under all Options, the proposed system of design
enhancements would reduce the consequences of a derailment of tank cars
carrying crude oil or ethanol. There would be fewer car punctures,
fewer releases from the service equipment (top and bottom fittings),
and delayed release of flammable liquid from the tank cars through the
pressure relief devices.
Table 2 summarizes the safety features of the DOT
Specification 117 tank car Options proposed in this rule. Note that the
proposed Options differ on shell thickness, top fittings, and braking.
Table 17 summarizes the effectiveness of the proposed elements of
each option. The effectiveness was calculated using the following
assumptions:
PHMSA examined the 13 accidents provided in Table 3 to
arrive at its effectiveness rates. This subset of 13 accidents used to
calculate effectiveness rates may not be representative of all 40
mainline accidents, from 2006 to present, for trains carrying crude oil
and ethanol. (see Appendix B of the RIA for a complete listing of the
40 mainline train accidents during this timeframe). However, PHMSA uses
this subset because the data has been verified and demonstrative of
HHFT risk.
DOT Specification 111 tank cars composed the vast majority
of the type of tank cars involved in the derailments listed in Table 3.
The type of damages these tank cars experienced were used to design the
tank car options proposed in the NPRM.
The volume of lading lost from each tank car in the
derailments indicated in Table 3 compiled relative to the documented
damage to each tank car that lost lading. These values were used as the
baseline for tank car constructed to the current DOT 111 specification.
Improvement in performance was based on the following
assumptions.
[cir] The ratio of puncture force (DOT111/option) was used as a
multiplier to determine the reduction in lading loss.
[cir] Thermal protection prevented thermal damage that results in
loss of containment.
[cir] Top fittings protection halves the damage to service
equipment.
[cir] BOV modification prevents lading loss through valve.
The reduced volume of lost lading relative to each
enhancement was compared to the baseline to calculate respective
reduction or effectiveness.
PHMSA will place into the docket for this rulemaking a more
detailed technical supplement that describes the baseline accidents,
model inputs, and assumptions that were used to develop the
effectiveness rates for each tank car option). For a detailed
discussion of these safety features, please refer to Section F. New
Tank Cars for High-Hazard Flammable Trains.
Table 17--Effectiveness of Newly Constructed Tank Car Options Relative to the Non-Jacketed DOT111 Specification
Tank Car
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Head Shell Top
Tank car Total (%) puncture puncture Thermal fittings BOV (%)
(%) (%) damage (%) (%)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Option 1.......................... 55 21 17 12 4 <1
Option 2.......................... 51.3 21 17 12 1.3 <1
Option 3.......................... 41.3 19 9 12 1.3 0
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
* The top fitting protection for the DOT117 is based on the load conditions described in 179.102-3. The top
fittings protection for the BNSF and CPC-1232 car meet the load conditions in M-1002 Appendix E, 10.2. The
former is a dynamic load and the latter is a static load. Modeling indicates the stresses imparted in the tank
shell during the dynamic loads is three time those encountered during the static load. Therefore, DOT assumes
the effectiveness of top fittings for the DOT 117 is 3 times that of the BNSF tank car.
PHMSA will place into the docket for this rulemaking a technical
supplement that describes the model inputs and assumptions that were
used to develop the effectiveness rates in table 17.
Puncture Resistance
Shell and head punctures are the failure modes that result in rapid
and often complete loss of tank contents. A HFFT poses a greater
increase risk resulting from puncture due to the volatility of the
lading. Minimizing the number of cars punctured in a derailment is
critical because flammable liquids, if ignited, can quickly affect the
containment of adjacent cars. For example, a derailment in Columbus,
Ohio in July 2012 involved 17 freight cars, three of which were tank
cars containing ethanol. One of the tank cars was punctured, releasing
ethanol, and a fire ensued. Two adjacent tank cars also carrying
ethanol were exposed to the fire for an extended period of time. Both
cars experienced a thermal tear, resulting in a release of product and
a fire ball. In many cases, tank cars of flammable liquid exposed to
pool fire conditions experience significant pressure rise. When the
pressure relief valve actuates to prevent an energetic failure of the
tank car, it discharges flammable liquid, prolonging the fire.
Shell Puncture
PHMSA examined data collected by both PHMSA and FRA for information
on derailments involving crude oil and ethanol. For the purposes of
this analysis PHMSA focused on main line train derailments beginning in
2006 and forward. We focused on this date range due to the apparent
increase in both the frequency and severity of derailments. PHMSA
believes that this recent trend is a result of increased use of HHFTs
to transport flammable material and we believe this trend will
continue. In reviewing the incidents in table 3, shell puncture is the
most common train accident damage that results in loss of lading. A
number of strategies exist to improve puncture resistance of a tank
car, including using higher strength and tougher steel and increasing
the thickness of the shell and head of the tank. Tougher steel absorbs
more energy by deforming. Thickness of the tank shell/head can be
increased and/or a jacket can be added to the design.
DOT is considering both of these strategies. While the shells and
heads of DOT Specification 111 and the CPC-1232 standard can be
constructed of A516-70 steel, all tank car design standard Options in
this proposed rule would require normalized TC-128 steel
[[Page 45054]]
because of its superior strength and toughness. Further, the head and
shells of DOT Specification 111 and the CPC-1232 standards are \7/16\
inch thick (not including the jacket). Options 1 and 2 propose to
require DOT Specification 117 tank car head and shells be a minimum of
\9/16\ inch thick.
Please note that current regulations do not require a jacket. This
rule requires an 11-gauge steel jacket. PHMSA expects all new tank cars
to have jackets in the absence of this rule, so we do not expect any
benefits or costs from this change.
Using the analytical method developed by E.I. DuPont de Nemours and
validated through testing performed at the Transportation Technology
Center in Pueblo, CO, available for review in the public docket for
this rulemaking, FRA calculated the shell puncture resistance of all
three Options compared to the DOT Specification 111 tank car.\57\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\57\ ``Detailed Puncture Analyses Tank Cars: Analysis of
Different Impactor Threats and Impact Conditions'' can be found at:
http://www.fra.dot.gov/eLib/details/L04420.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The proposed materials, minimum thickness of \9/16\ inch, and
jacket provide a 68 percent improvement in the puncture force for
Options 1 and 2 relative to the current specification requirements for
a DOT Specification 111 tank car. This translates to a 17 percent
effectiveness rate. A tank car constructed to the proposed requirements
of Option 3, would have a 35 percent improvement in puncture force
relative to the current DOT Specification 111 tank car.\58\ This
translates into a 9 percent effectiveness rate.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\58\ Modeling and simulation of puncture velocity indicate a
puncture velocity of approximately 7.4 mph for a legacy DOT
Specification 111; 9.6 mph for Option 3; and 12.3 mph for the cars
under Options 1 and 2. Puncture velocity is based on an impact with
a rigid 12'' x 12'' indenter with a weight of 297,000 pounds.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In addition, PHMSA and FRA do not expect the increased thickness,
combined with a full-height head shield and a jacket, in Options 1 and
2 to decrease new tank car capacity. The T87.6 Task Force, in
considering increased thickness and jacket recommendations, stated that
the increased weight per car ``results in a decrease in the capacity of
the tank and a commensurate increase in the number of shipments
required to meet customer demand. Additional shipments would result in
an increase in the number of tank cars derailed.'' However, for the
reasons mentioned in the section ``Effects of Increased Weight'' below,
PHMSA does not expect that these requirements will cause fully loaded
tank cars to exceed 286,000 GRL.
1b. Head Puncture
Puncture resistance of the tank head is another important
consideration. Table 3 above highlights this risk of HHFTs by
summarizing the impacts of major train accidents involving trains of
crude oil and ethanol. Derailment data from table 3 indicates that
approximately 30 percent of ethanol and crude oil tank cars experienced
punctures in their heads. Of the punctured heads, approximately 38
percent occurred in the top half, and 62 percent occurred in the bottom
half of the head.
Tank head puncture resistance has been the subject of a number of
previous rulemakings. On July 23, 1974, DOT's Hazardous Materials
Regulations Board published a final rule HM-109 (39 FR 27572) that
established requirements for head shields in the HMR at Sec. 179.100-
23. The requirements were for half height head shields (on non-jacketed
pressure cars) with specific minimum dimensions, and performance
requirements defined by the AAR impact test. The requirements were
based on three studies that indicate half height head shields were
between 50 percent and 77 percent effective.
On May 26, 1976, DOT's Materials Transportation Bureau published a
final rule under Docket HM-109 (41 FR 21475) that adopted minor
amendments to the head shield requirements.
On September 15, 1977, DOT's Materials Transportation Bureau
published a final rule under Docket HM-144 (42 FR 46306) that
introduced Sec. 179.105-5 Tank Head Puncture requirements, which
included performance standards and test requirements. Coupler restraint
and thermal protection systems were also included. Half height head
shields were not precluded from use as long as they met the
requirements in Sec. 179.100-23.
On September 21, 1995, DOT's RSPA published a final rule under
Dockets HM-201 and HM-175A (60 FR 49048) that introduced the current
Sec. 179.16 and removed Sec. Sec. 179.100-23 and 179.105-5. The new
requirements applied to tank cars transporting all Class 2 materials.
In the preamble of the rule PHMSA stated ``research demonstrates that
puncture resistance is an inter-related function of head thickness,
insulation thickness, and jacket thickness, and the concept of head
protection must include more than just traditional (half-height) head
shields.'' DOT maintains this position and, accordingly, is proposing
all Options for the DOT Specification 117 tank car with a jacket and
\1/2\ inch thick full height head shields.
The combination of the shell thickness and head shield of Options 1
and 2 provide a head puncture resistance velocity of 18.4 mph (21%
effectiveness rate). Because the Option 3 tank car has a \7/16\ inch
shell, as opposed to the \9/16\ inch shell in Options 1 and 2, it has a
head puncture resistance velocity of 17.8 mph.
The results of this modeling are described in Table 18.
Table 18--Shell and Head Puncture Velocities by Tank Car Option
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Shell puncture Head puncture
velocity velocity
Tank car (improvement (improvement
relative to DOT111 relative to DOT111
non-jacketed) non-jacketed)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Option 1........................ 12.3 mph (66%).... 18.4 mph (114%).
Option 2........................ 12.3 mph (66%).... 18.4 mph (114%).
Option 3........................ 9.6 mph (30%)..... 17.8 mph (107).
CPC-1232 unjacketed............. 8.5 mph (15%)..... Top--10.3 (20%).
Bottom--17.6
(105%).
DOT-111 jacketed................ 9.3 mph (26%)..... 11.6 mph (35%).
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Thermal Protection System
In train accidents listed in Table 3 above, approximately 10
percent of tank car breaches were attributed to exposure to fire
conditions. It is worth distinguishing between insulation and thermal
protection. Insulation is intended to keep lading at or near a desired
temperature during
[[Page 45055]]
transportation. Insulation is ineffective at temperatures exceeding 350
[deg]F because it disintegrates into a powder. Thermal protection is
intended to limit the heat flux into the lading when exposed to fire.
Thermal protection will survive for a certain period of time in pool
fire conditions. Thermal protection will prevent rapid temperature
increase of the lading and commensurate increase in vapor pressure in
the tank. This limits the volume of material evacuated through the
pressure relieve valve and dangerous over pressurization of the tank.
All DOT Specification 117 options in this NPRM require a thermal
protection system sufficient to meet the performance standard of Sec.
179.18, and which must include a reclosing pressure release valve.
Section 179.18 requires that a thermal protection system be capable of
preventing the release of any lading within the tank car, except
release through the pressure release device, when subjected to a pool
fire for 100 minutes and a torch fire for 30 minutes. Typically, tank
cars with thermal protection are equipped with a weather-tight 11-gauge
jacket. Intumescent materials, which do not require a jacket, are
infrequently used because of high maintenance costs. The jacket
provides the necessary protection by shielding the radiated heat to the
commodity tank.
Consistent with current minimum industry standards and Federal
regulations for pressure cars for Class 2 materials, the T87.6 Task
Force agreed that a survivability time of 100-minutes in a pool fire
should be used as a benchmark for adequate performance in this proposed
rule. The 100-minute survival time is the existing performance standard
for pressure tank cars equipped with a thermal protection system and
was established to provide emergency responders with adequate time to
assess a derailment, establish perimeters, and evacuate the public as
needed, while also giving time to vent the hazardous material from the
tank and prevent an energetic failure of the tank car.
The Analysis of Fire Effects on Tank Cars (AFFTAC) \59\ was used to
evaluate the relative performance of tank cars equipped with different
thermal protection systems. The analysis simulated tank cars of varied
configurations (jackets and non-jacketed) and positions (rolled over at
different angles) exposed to pool and torch fires meeting the
requirements in the In evaluating the performance of the thermal
protection systems in the simulations, the T87.6 Task Force considered
the amount of material remaining in the tank at the time of breach,
rather than survival time, to be the best metric of the potential for
energetic rupture. The Task Force came to this conclusion because
research shows that there is a direct relationship between this amount
and the energy of the tank failure \60\ and, as with any simulation,
there are uncertainties in the absolute survival time estimates. Under
all simulation conditions and all thermal protection systems, when the
tank failed all of the lading had been vaporized. That indicates that
there would be little energy remaining in the tank to produce an
energetic rupture at the time of breach. Moreover, the thermal
protection prolonged the survivability of the tank by delaying the
moment where pressure in the tank exceeded the start to discharge of
the pressure relief valve, thus delaying the unintended release of
flammable liquid. Because all the thermal protection systems meeting
the Sec. 179.18 performance standard that PHMSA studied performed
equally well in the simulations, and because the simulations indicated
the importance of a pressure relief valve, PHMSA is not requiring a
particular system, but instead is requiring that a thermal protection
system meet the performance standard of Sec. 179.18 and include a
reclosing pressure relief device.
Top Fittings Protection
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\59\ Information regarding AFFTAC can be found at the following
link. http://www.srconsult.com/AFFTACInfo.htm.
\60\ ``Fire Tests of Propane Tanks to Study BLEVEs [Boiling
Liquid Expanding Vapor Explosions] and Other Thermal Ruptures:
Detailed Analysis of Medium Scale Test Results'', Department of
Mechanical Engineering, Queen's University, Kingston, Ontario, Nov.
1997. Online link to study and research: http://me.queensu.ca/People/Birk/Research/ThermalHazards/.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The top fitting protection consists of a structure designed to
prevent damage to the tank car service equipment under specified
loading conditions. For the DOT Specification 117 is based on the load
conditions described in 179.102-3. The top fittings protection for the
BNSF and CPC-1232 car meet the load conditions in M-1002 Appendix E,
10.2. The former is a dynamic load and the latter is a static load.
Damage to top fittings can occur when a tank car rolls-over and the
equipment strikes the ground or another tank car or is stuck by another
car. The specification requirements must consider all of these
potential causes of damage to prevent loss of containment. The volume
of releases from top fittings is a fraction, typically less than 5
percent of the volume of releases from tank shell and head punctures.
Nonetheless, top fittings represent 25 percent of the documented damage
to tank cars in recent train accidents. A unique issue with derailments
of tank car containing flammable liquids is that ignited lading from a
single car can initiate a domino effect of heating an adjacent car(s)
which will expels flammable liquid from the PRV that fuels the existing
fire and effect additional cars. Preventing the release of flammable
liquids in a derailment, regardless of the volume that is lost from a
specific source, reduces risk to public health and the environment.
The T87.6 Task Force considered three options related to top
fittings with the dual purpose of improved crashworthiness and
reduction of NARs: Removal of vacuum relief valves (VRVs), elimination
of hinged and bolted manways, and roll-over protection.
VRVs, if operated properly, are an important feature of the tank
car's service equipment as they provide an additional safeguard against
implosion of tank cars that are filled with elevated temperature
material or are cleaned with steam or hot liquid. Tank cars are offered
with VRVs as standard equipment. They are often misused by personnel at
the loading or unloading facilities and used as venting equipment
during normal operations (tank cars are typically equipped with air
valves that are designed and intended for repeated opening and losing
for loading and unloading operations. The VRV is an emergency device to
function in only particular circumstances. As a result of misuse VRV
are a common source of non-accident releases. The task force evaluated
whether VRVs should be prohibited from application to all DOT
Specification 111 tank cars.
Hinged and bolted manways are a closure on manways of general
purpose tank cars (DOT Specification 111). The hinge and bolted design
permits repeated opening and closing for loading and unloading, and
inspection. Proper securement of hinged and bolted manways is sensitive
to the size and condition of sealing surface, the type of gasket,
condition of bolts and torque procedure. Unless all these factors are
considered when securing a tank car for transportation a release of
lading will occur resulting from the sloshing of the liquid in
transportation. In derailment conditions, if the manway cover is not
damaged by impact, leaks are often encountered in car rolled-over on
their side. Accordingly, the T87.6 Task Force evaluated the elimination
of hinged and bolted manways. For example, five
[[Page 45056]]
hinged and bolted manways were damaged (creating a leak point) in the
Arcadia, OH derailment. The damages included a shattered manway cover
and sheared bolts. In addition, hinged and bolted manways account for
nearly 30 percent of all NARS. Representatives of the shipping
community expressed several concerns regarding the elimination of
hinged and bolted manways, including infrastructure issues. The
infrastructure at many loading facilities is set up with a system that
seats on the manways and include a stinger to deliver the lading as
well as vapor recovery. In addition, the loading facilities often use
the manways as a means to inspect the gage bar to determine the outage,
inspect the condition of the siphon pipe, interior of the tank shell or
an interior coating. Alternatives to hinged and bolted securement are
currently under development and testing. This option is not being
considered for regulatory action at this time because the burden on the
shipping community may be reduced if alternatives are available at the
time of regulation.
As proposed, only the Option 1 tank car must be equipped with
protective structure capable of sustaining, without failure, a rollover
accident at a speed of 9 mph, in which the structure strikes a
stationary surface assumed to be flat, level, and rigid and the speed
is determined as a linear velocity, measured at the geometric center of
the loaded tank car as a transverse vector. Failure is deemed to occur
when the deformed protective housing contacts any of the service
equipment or when the tank retention capability is compromised.
For Options 2 and 3, newly constructed tank cars would require top
fittings consistent with the AAR's specification for Tank Cars, M-1002,
Appendix E, paragraph 10.2. The top fittings protection design
requirements are for static loads. The rollover protection performance
requirement prescribed in the HMR is for a dynamic load. The resultant
stresses in a protective housing and tank from the dynamic load exceed
those from the static loads by a factor of three based on a study by
Sharma & Associates \61\ comparing the performance of the different
systems under both the static requirements of top fittings protection
and dynamic conditions of roll-over protection. The industry was
concerned that a \7/16\ inch thick shell could not withstand the
stresses imparted by a roll-over protection structure. This concern
remains. However, there is general agreement that a tank car
constructed of \9/16\ inch steel is capable of withstanding the
stresses during a roll-over event. As such, a protective structures
meeting the rollover protection performance standard will offer
protection of the top fittings superior to that of a structure meeting
the static load requirements.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\61\ The studies (Phase I and Phase II) can be found on the e-
Library of the FRA Web site at: http://www.fra.dot.gov/eLib/details/L02545.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Bottom Outlet Protection
The bottom outlet protection ensures that the bottom outlet valve
does not open during a train accident. The NTSB recommended that PHMSA
require all bottom outlet valves used on newly-manufactured and
existing non-pressure tank cars are designed to remain closed during
accidents in which the valve and operating handle are subjected to
impact forces. The proposed requirements for all DOT Specification 117
Options in this NPRM require the bottom outlet handle to be removed or
be designed with protection safety system(s) to prevent unintended
actuation during train accident scenarios.
The T87.6 Task Force considered elimination of BOVs.
Representatives of the shipping community expressed the following
concerns regarding this idea:
BOVs are a valued feature of the tank car for the
shipping community. The BOV is used to unload, and in some cases,
load the tank cars.
The BOV is necessary when the car is cleaned to drain
the rinse liquid.
Eliminating the allowance for BOV will require major
alterations of existing infrastructure of loading and unloading
facilities.
Therefore, the AAR TCC created a docket T10.5 and a task force to
evaluate bottom outlet performance. The task force considered the
following ideas:
Shipment of the car without the BOV handle attached and
development of a standard/universal handle attachment.
Eliminating use of an overly strong handle.
Incorporating operating stops on valve bodies.
In addition to the AAR TCC, recommendations, PHMSA also received
NTSB Recommendation R-12-6. This recommendation requests that PHMSA
require all bottom outlet valves used on newly-manufactured and
existing non-pressure tank cars be designed to remain closed during
accidents where the valve and operating handle are subjected to impact
forces.
PHMSA has considered the loading and unloading concerns of offerors
regarding the removal of the bottom outlet valve entirely. Therefore,
PHMSA is not proposing to eliminate the BOV entirely. Instead, PHMSA is
proposing that on cars with bottom outlet valves, the bottom outlet
handle be removed or be designed to prevent unintended actuation during
train accident scenarios. For example, this requirement could be met
simply by removing the handle during transportation or redesigning
bottom outlet configurations (i.e. recessed valving).
Effects of Increased Weight
The additional safety features of the proposed new tank car
standard could increase the weight of an unloaded tank car. For
instance, all proposed Options for the DOT Specification 117 car
include head shields, a jacket, thicker tank shell steel, and other
safety features not required in DOT Specification 111 tank cars.
Additional weight for the tank car could lead to a reduction in lading
capacity per tank car, as rail cars must be under the applicable gross
rail weight (GRL) when fully loaded. However, PHMSA and FRA believe
there will not be less capacity in practice, for the following reasons:
PHMSA is proposing a performance standard and expects that
the regulations will spur innovation in tank car design and
construction. Industry is currently evaluating new, tougher steels as
well as composite materials and crash energy management systems
intended to improve energy absorption with little or no weight penalty.
Innovation will be driven by a desire to decrease the tare weight of
the tank car. Assuming the market will be interested if the new
materials will restore the pre-DOT Specification 117 tare weight and
cost no more than the materials in the DOT Specification 117, the
reduction will be at least 9%. This decrease in the tare weight will
increase the load limit (carrying capacity) of the car by 9% without
increasing material cost.
When considering risk associated with decreased tank car
load limit it is the number of trains and derailment rate that is
relevant. DOT believes the railroads will optimize unit train length
which may result in longer trains. Optimization will be based on a
number of factors including train length, available horse power, grade
along route, required speed, loading rack capacity and loop size.
Because there are so many variables it is difficult to predict the
change in operations resulting from a potential decrease in load limit.
As such, DOT is seeking comment on the issue.
The DOT 117 is authorized to operate at a GRL of 286,000
lbs. The regulations currently authorize the DOT 111 to operate at a
GRL of 263,000 lbs.
[[Page 45057]]
However, DOT 111 tank cars that meet the minimum standards provided in
FRA's Federal Register Notice of January 25, 2011 \62\ are permitted to
operate at a GRL of up to 286,000 lbs. The proposed tank car
specifications meet those minimum requirements and PHMSA and FRA
believe that the additional weight of the safety features will be
accommodated by the increase in allowable GRL and will not decrease the
load limit (or innage) as indicated in the table below. For example, a
jacketed CPC1232 can be loaded to 1% outage and not weigh 286,000
pounds (approximately 281,000 pound) and as such, there is no capacity
gain to be had unless the allowable GRL is increased beyond 286,000.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\62\ This FR Notice required compliance with AAR standard S286.
AAR Standard S-286 applied to four axel freight cars designed and
designated to carry a gross rail load of greater than 268,000 pounds
and up to 286,000 pounds. The standard includes requirements for car
body design loads, fatigue design, brake systems. Bearings, axels,
wheels, draft system, springs, trucks, and stenciling.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Bridge capacity along the routes limits the GRL of a
particular railroad or segment of rail. The primary concern for this
issue is the terminal railroads. DOT believes all of the Class I RRs
are capable of 286,000. The ASLRRA, Web site indicates that nearly half
of its member railroads are capable of moving tank cars with a gross
rail load of 286,000. There is very little specific information
provided and perhaps a RR has a trestle on a line not capable of
handling a 286,000 car that would not necessarily affect the delivery
of crude oil to a customer because the trestle exists beyond the
delivery point. DOT is requesting information from industry that will
provide a better understanding of the capacity of the terminal
railroads.
The capacity of candidate tank cars are as follows:
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Ethanol Crude oil
Gross rail capacity capacity Total weight Total weight
Tank car characteristics load Tare weight (6.58 lbs./ (6.78 lbs./ of tank car of tank car
gallon) gallon) (ethanol) (crude)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
DOT 111 specification non-jacketed...................... 263,000 67,800 29,666 28,790 263,000 263,000
286,000 67,800 29,700 29,700 233,226 269,166
DOT111/CPC1232 non jacketed............................. 263,000 75,200 28,540 27,699 263,000 263,000
286,000 75,200 29,700 29,700 270,626 276,566
DOT111/CPC1232 jacketed................................. 263,000 80,800 27,690 26,873 263,000 263,000
286,000 80,800 29,700 29,700 276,226 282,166
FRA and PHMSA designed car (Option 1)................... 263,000 85,500 26,976 26,180 263,002 263,000
286,000 85,500 29,700 29,572 280,926 286,000
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
* 29,700 gallons is the minimum allowable outage (1%) on a 30,000 gallon capacity car.
Note: For cars operating at a gross rail load of 286,000 pounds there is no loss of capacity.
Note: If limited to 263,000 pound gross rail load, all cars except the legacy DOT Specification 111 will have a lower capacity. The DOT Specification
117 represents a larger decrease in capacity than the DOT Specification 111/CPC-1232 jacketed.
As a result, we do not expect more, or longer, trains being offered
into transportation as a result of any tank car requirement options in
this proposal. We request comments on our rationale and conclusion that
there will be no reduction in tank car capacity.
PHMSA seeks public comment on the following discussions and
questions. When commenting, please reference the specific portion of
the proposal, explain the reason for any recommended change, and
include the source, methodology, and key assumptions of any supporting
evidence.
1. PHMSA expects that all new tank cars put into in crude oil and
ethanol service would, in the absence of this rule, have jacket,
thermal protection, TC-128 Grade B normalized steel, full height head
shield, enhanced top fittings protection, and bottom outlet valve
reconfigurations. Would any new crude oil or ethanol tank cars,
manufactured in 2015 and beyond, not have all of these features? If so,
please provide specific data on missing features and the numbers of
cars in each category.
2. For the reasons listed above, PHMSA estimates no decrease in
tank car capacity from the increased weight of Options 1 and 2.
However, some commenters on the ANPRM suggested otherwise. PHMSA
solicits data and other relevant information in order to be able to
fully evaluate such claims. To the extent that commenters believe tank
car capacity would be adversely affected, PHMSA seeks information on
the benefits and costs of any such effects or of industry responses
(such as developing innovative materials) to respond to capacity
reduction/weight increases.
3. Would the increased size and weight of the tank car Options have
any other effects not discussed in the NPRM or accompanying RIA? To
what extent would they affect braking effectiveness? To what extent
would they affect track safety performance? To what extent would they
affect loading practices?
4. What additional safety features not discussed here, if any,
should PHMSA consider? If so, please provide detailed estimates on the
costs and benefits of individual safety features.
5. Do any of the safety features included in any of the Options
have costs that are likely to exceed benefits? If so, please provide
detailed estimates on the costs and benefits of individual safety
features.
6. As noted above, PHMSA estimates that that the \1/8-inch\
thickness would provide an 9 percent reduction in accident severity and
would cost $2,000. To what extent does the risk reduction align with
the findings of other tank car effectiveness studies? To what extent
does this cost estimate reflect market prices?
7. For Option 1, PHMSA expects the upgrade to roll-over protection
can be made at almost no cost. To what extent does this cost estimate
reflect market prices?
8. What would be the benefits and costs of allowing CPC-1232 cars
ordered before October 1, 2015 to be placed into service for their
useful life? What, if any, additional safety features should be
required for these cars during their useful lives?
b. DOT Specification 117--Performance Standard
In this NPRM, we propose to require a tank car that is constructed
after October 1, 2015 and used to transport ethanol or crude oil or
used in a HHFT, to either meet the proposed DOT Specification 117
design requirements or the performance criteria. Under this proposal, a
car manufactured to the
[[Page 45058]]
performance standard must be approved in accordance with Sec.
179.13(a) and must incorporate several enhancements to increase
puncture resistance; provide thermal protection to survive a 100-minute
pool fire; and protect top fitting and bottom outlets during a train
accident. The proposed performance standard is intended to encourage
innovation in tank car designs, including materials of construction and
tank car protection features, while providing an equivalent level of
safety as the DOT Specification 117. Tank car manufacturers would be
allowed to develop alternative designs provided they comply with the
performance requirements. Under the proposal, such a design, for
example, may incorporate materials of construction that increase
puncture resistance but reduce the tank weight, increasing the amount
of product in a tank and reducing the number of shipments required to
move the same amount of hazardous materials.
A tank car that meets the performance requirements, if adopted,
will be assigned to ``DOT Specification 117P.'' Builders would have to
demonstrate compliance with the performance standards and receive FRA
approval prior to building the cars.
G. Existing Tank Cars for High-Hazard Flammable Trains
As discussed in Section F above, there are three proposed tank car
Options for new cars, each with a prescribed tank car and a performance
standard. PHMSA proposes to also require existing cars to meet the same
DOT Specification 117P performance standard as these new cars, except
for the requirement to include top fittings protections. Existing tank
car tanks may continue to rely on the equipment installed at the time
of manufacture. PHMSA chose not to include top fitting protections as
part of any retrofit requirement as the costliness of such retrofit is
not supported with a corresponding appropriate safety benefit.\63\
Therefore, retrofitted cars will meet the DOT Specification 117P
performance standard and may continue to rely on the equipment
installed at the time of manufacture. The Options for the performance
standard outlined above and in the regulatory text of this NPRM are:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\63\ The cost to retrofitting Top fitting protection (if no top
fitting protection) is estimated to be $24,500, while the comparable
effectiveness rates are low. For effectiveness rates see Table 19.
Option 1: PHMSA and FRA designed car;
Option 2: AAR 2014 Tank Car; and
Option 3: Enhanced Jacketed CPC-1232.
We request comments regarding the impacts associated with each tank
car option as a standard for existing tank cars. Specifically, we would
like to know which portions of the fleet commenters expect would be
retrofitted, repurposed, or retired under each option, and the
anticipated costs and benefits.
In the September 6, 2013 ANPRM we specifically requested comments
pertaining to the various retrofit options discussed in the tank car
petitions. In its comments, NTSB urges PHMSA to take immediate action
to require a safer package for transporting flammable hazardous
materials by rail. In its comments, NTSB restates its concerns that any
regulatory action should apply to new construction and the existing
tank car fleet.
Railway Supply Institute strongly urges PHMSA to adopt a separate
approach for existing tank cars that is uniquely tailored to the needs
of the existing DOT Specification 111 tank car fleet. It adds,
Many builders and offerors have already made a significant
capital investment in ordering and manufacturing new tank cars that
are built to the CPC-1232 standard and thus are also compliant with
the P-1577 standards. A total of 55,546 CPC-1232 compliant tank cars
will be in service by the end of 2015. This level of activity
represents an industry investment in excess of $7.0 billion. In
light of the industry's proactive decision to incorporate these new
safety enhancements by adopting this standard, RSICTC requests that
PHMSA recognize that these cars already contain safety enhancements
and thus exempt them from any additional modifications that may be
required under the future rule. RSICTC urges PHMSA to expeditiously
address this aspect of the rulemaking to remove any uncertainty
which may otherwise impede the enhancement of overall fleet safety
performance.
In their comments Watco and the Railway Supply Institute (RSI)
provided detailed cost information on each of the enhancements
necessary to bring older cars up to the new performance standard. These
include the cost of top fitting protections,\64\ jackets, thermal
protection or replacement of the pressure relief valve, a new bottom
outlet valve handle, full-height head shields, and ECP brake
installation (for Option 1).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\64\ Top Fitting Protections are new construction requirements
only and are not required as part of any retrofits.
Table 19--Retrofit Costs From Public Comments
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Retrofit option Cost
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Bottom outlet valve handle................................... $1,200
Pressure relief valve........................................ 1,500
New truck.................................................... 16,000
Thermal protection........................................... 4,000
Full jacket.................................................. 23,000
Full height head shield...................................... 17,500
Top fitting protection (if no top fitting protection) \68\... 24,500
ECP brakes................................................... 5,000
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Two retrofit options--increased \1/8-inch\ thickness and roll-over
protection--were not included in the public comments providing cost
estimates. We expect that existing tank cars with \7/16-inch\ shell
thickness will meet this any tank car standard with \9/16-inch\ shell
thickness by adding \1/8-inch\ thickness to the retrofitted jacket
(increasing the jacket thickness from its usual 11-gauge thickness),
and assume this thicker jacket costs an additional $2,000 (from the
estimated $23,000 cost for an 11-gauge jacket). In addition, we expect
no costs from any retrofit for roll-over protection relative to the
top-fitting the protection cost estimate provided in public comments.
Many public commenters raised technical issues and potential
implementation problems from an industry-wide retrofit for crude oil
and ethanol cars. For example, the API public comment noted issues with
the extra weight on stub sills and tank car structures, and issues with
head shields and brake wheels/end platforms, and issues with truck
replacement. API also expressed implementation concerns about shop
capacity, the current backlog of car orders, and engineering capacity.
Public commenters stated that PHMSA should set an implementation
timeframe conducive to avoiding service bottlenecks.
While the CPC 1232 tank car enhancements will significantly improve
safety for newly manufactured tank cars, RSICTC strongly urges PHMSA to
promulgate a separate rulemaking for existing tank cars that is
uniquely tailored to the needs of the existing DOT Specification 111
tank car fleet. RSICTC further states, ``[s]hould modifications be made
to the existing jacketed DOT-111s to conform to the CPC-1232 standards,
we again urge PHMSA to allow these modified cars to remain in active
service for the duration of their regulatory life.'' RSICTC also
submits that PHMSA adopt a ten-year program allowing compliance to be
achieved in phases through modification, re-purposing or retirement of
unmodified tank cars in Class 3, PG
[[Page 45059]]
I and II flammable liquid service. Tank car modifications supported by
RSICTC include adding half-height head shields, protecting top and
bottom fittings and adding pressure release valves or enhancing
existing pressure release valves.
Greenbrier, a tank car manufacturer and servicer has stated that
the most vital of these modifications is the addition of a trapezoidal
or conforming half-height head shield to prevent penetration of tank
cars by loose rails. Greenbrier stated that together with the top and
bottom fittings protections and enhanced release valves, these
improvements could significantly limit the likelihood of breaching the
tank car. Further, Greenbrier commented that the ten-year timeline
suggested by RSICTC is excessive and unmodified tank cars could and
should be removed from hazardous materials service much sooner.
API and other commenters stated in their comments that they are
strongly opposed to the mandating of any retrofits beyond the higher-
flow pressure relief device recommended by the T87.6 Task Force for
thermal protection due to the lack of economic and logistical
feasibility. The table 20 presents how we expect the fleet to evolve
going forward if regulations are not adopted.
Table 20--Fleet Projections 2015-2034 Absent New Regulation
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total cars DOT 111 with CPC 1232 with
Year baseline DOT 111 jacket CPC 1232 jacket
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2014............................ 89,422 51,592 5,600 22,380 9,850
2015............................ 109.722 51,592 5,600 22,380 30,150
2016............................ 115,544 51,592 5,600 22,380 35,972
2017............................ 121,366 51,592 5,600 22,380 41,794
2018............................ 127,188 51,592 5,600 22,380 47,616
2019............................ 133,010 51,592 5,600 22,380 53,438
2020............................ 133,010 51,592 5,600 22,380 53,438
2021............................ 133,010 51,592 5,600 22,380 53,438
2022............................ 133,010 51,592 5,600 22,380 53,438
2023............................ 133,010 51,592 5,600 22,380 53,438
2024............................ 133,010 51,592 5,600 22,380 53,438
2025............................ 133,010 51,592 5,600 22,380 53,438
2026............................ 133,010 51,592 5,600 22,380 53,438
2027............................ 133,010 51,592 5,600 22,380 53,438
2028............................ 133,010 51,592 5,600 22,380 53,438
2029............................ 133,010 51,592 5,600 22,380 53,438
2030............................ 133,010 51,592 5,600 22,380 53,438
2031............................ 133,010 51,592 5,600 22,380 53,438
2032............................ 133,010 51,592 5,600 22,380 53,438
2033............................ 133,010 51,592 5,600 22,380 53,438
2034............................ 133,010 51,592 5,600 22,380 53,438
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
PHMSA believes that reliance on HHFTs to transport millions of
gallons of flammable materials is a risk that must be addressed. For
the purposes of crude oil and ethanol that are classed as flammable
liquids, the DOT Specification 111 tank car would no longer be
authorized for use in HHFT. A risk-based timeline for continued use of
the DOT Specification 111 tank car in HHFTs is provided in Sec. Sec.
173.241, 173.242, and 173.243. This approach also provides time for car
owners to update existing fleets while prioritizing risk-reduction from
the highest danger (packing group) flammable liquid material (See table
15).
It has been demonstrated that the DOT Specification 111 tank car
provides insufficient puncture resistance, is vulnerable to fire and
roll-over accidents, and the current bottom outlet valves are easily
severable in HHFT accidents. These risks have been demonstrated by
recent accidents of HHFTs transporting flammable liquids.
PHMSA is proposing to limit continued use of the DOT Specification
111 tank car to non-HHFTs. In addition, PHMSA is proposing to authorize
the continued use of DOT Specification 111 tank car in combustible
liquid service, given the risks associated with crude oil or ethanol,
classified as a flammable liquid, are greater than that of combustible
liquids. This rule does not cover unit trains of materials that are
classed or reclassified as a combustible liquid. Existing HMR
requirements for these materials will not change. Therefore, under
current Sec. 172.102(c)(3) Special provision B1, for materials with a
flash point at or above 38 [deg]C (100[emsp14][deg]F) that are classed
or reclassed as combustible liquids (see Sec. 173.150(f)) or, crude
oil and ethanol that are classed as flammable liquids (all packing
groups) and not transported in HHFTs, an existing DOT Specification 111
tank car will continue to be authorized for use. Thus, except those
tank cars intended for combustible liquid service, any tank car
manufactured after October 1, 2015 that will be used in a HHFT must
meet or exceed the new DOT Specification 117 standard.
Because of the risks involved, PHMSA is applying the same
requirements for new cars as it is for existing cars, with one
exception. PHMSA does not propose to require additional top fittings
protection for retrofits, because the costs exceed the benefits. Newly
constructed cars, however, are required to have additional top fittings
protection. Except for additional top fittings protection, the
requirements for newly constructed tank cars and retrofits are the
same.
If it can be ascertained that an existing tank car can meet the new
performance standards, it would be authorized for use in a HHFT. From a
technical standpoint, PHMSA expects legacy cars will be able to
withstand the additional weight across all of the tank car options,
without truck replacement, because PHMSA believes the vast majority of
cars in crude and ethanol service have been built in the past 15 years.
As a result, cars in this service should have a truck that would
support the extra weight of the retrofits. PHMSA believes all cars
manufactured in this time period were built to a 286,000 lbs. weight
limit standards, and would include a truck that would support the extra
weight of retrofits.
The proposed changes for existing tank cars are based on comments
discussed above, simulations, and
[[Page 45060]]
modeling. Modeling and simulation of puncture speed velocity of DOT
Specification 111 tank cars currently used to transport ethanol or
crude oil indicate that a velocity of approximately 7.4 mph will
puncture the shell of the tanks when struck with a rigid 12
x 12 indenter with a weight of 297,000 pounds. Validation of
this model has been accomplished using the results of puncture tests
performed at the Transportation Technology Center in Pueblo, CO.\65\
Further, based on modeling and simulation, the head of an unjacketed
DOT Specification 111 tank car, when struck with a 12 x
12 indenter weighing 286,000 pounds will puncture at 7.6
mph. Table 21 provides the tank car shell and head puncture velocities
of the DOT Specification 117 tank car Options proposed in this rule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\65\ ``Detailed Puncture Analyses Tank Cars: Analysis of
Different Impactor Threats and Impact Conditions'' can be found at:
http://www.fra.dot.gov/eLib/details/L04420.
Table 21--Effectiveness of Existing Tank Car Options Relative to the Non-Jacketed DOT111 Specification Tank Car
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
BOV (%) chose
Head puncture Shell puncture Thermal damage not to include
Tank car Total (%) (%) (%) (%) Top fittings (%) top fitting
protections
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Option 1.................................... 51 21 17 12 N/A <1
Option 2.................................... 50 21 17 12 N/A <1
Option 3.................................... 40 19 9 12 N/A 0
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Similar to the methodology for estimating the effectiveness of new
cars, PHMSA uses these puncture velocities to arrive at risk reduction
estimates for retrofits. In evaluating train accidents involving HHFTs
listed in Table 3 above, we found that all but one of the derailments
occurred in excess of 20 mph. Only two of the derailments occurred at a
speed of between 20 mph and 30 mph, four occurred between 30 and 40 mph
and six occurred at speeds in excess of 40 mph. The documented
derailment speeds exceed the puncture velocity of both the DOT
Specification 111 tank car and the Options proposed in this rule.
However, during a derailment the speeds of impacts will vary
considerably between cars, and many of those impacts will not result in
a puncture. The portion of those impacts that could result in a
puncture would decline with the higher puncture velocity of the DOT
Specification 117 tank car Options proposed in this NPRM. As a result
of use of the proposed DOT Specification 117 tank cars, we expect the
volume of flammable liquid released into the environment and the
consequences of a train accident to be reduced.
For Option 1, the PHMSA and FRA designed car,
Retrofitting a DOT 111 Unjacketed (not including ECP brake
risk reduction) reduces accident severity by 51 percent.
Retrofitting a DOT 111 Jacketed (not including ECP brake
risk reduction) reduces accident severity by 21 percent.
Retrofitting a CPC 1232 Unjacketed (not including ECP
brake risk reduction) reduces accident severity by 28 percent.
Retrofitting a CPC 1232 Jacketed (not including ECP brake
risk reduction) reduces accident severity by 10 percent.
For Option 2, the AAR 2014 car,
Retrofitting a DOT 111 Unjacketed reduces accident
severity by 50 percent.
Retrofitting a DOT 111 Jacketed reduces accident severity
by 21 percent.
Retrofitting a CPC 1232 Unjacketed reduces accident
severity by 28 percent.
Retrofitting a CPC 1232 Jacketed reduces accident severity
by 10 percent.
For Option 3, the Enhanced CPC 1232 car,
Retrofitting a DOT 111 Unjacketed reduces accident
severity by 40 percent.
Retrofitting a DOT 111 Jacketed reduces accident severity
by 11 percent.
Retrofitting a CPC 1232 Unjacketed reduces accident
severity by 18 percent.
Retrofitting a CPC 1232 Jacketed does not reduce accident
severity.
In Recommendation R-12-5, NTSB recommended that new and existing
tank cars authorized for transportation of ethanol and crude oil in PGs
I and II have enhanced tank head and shell puncture resistance systems
and top fittings protection. PHMSA chose not to include top fitting
protections as part of any retrofit requirement as the costliness of
such retrofit is not supported with a corresponding appropriate safety
benefit.
A requirement to retrofit existing cars would be costly. Total
costs could exceed $30,000 per car. In addition, a retrofit would
result in a decrease in asset utilization (out-of-service time of at
least one month). As such, PHMSA is proposing to allow numerous options
for compliance. Existing DOT Specification 111 tank cars may be
retrofitted to DOT Specification 117, retired, repurposed, or operated
under speed restrictions.
As a result of this rule, PHMSA expects all DOT Specification 111
Jacketed and CPC 1232 Jacketed crude oil and ethanol cars (about 15,000
cars) to be transferred to Alberta, Canada tar sands services. It does,
however, expect the majority of DOT 111 Un-Jacketed and CPC 1232
Unjacketed cars (about 66,000 cars) to be retrofitted; some DOT
Unjacketed and CPC 1232 Unjacketed cars (about 8,000 cars) will be
transferred to Alberta, Canada tar sands services. No existing tank
cars will be forced into early retirement.
Specifically, for Option 1, the PHMSA and FRA designed car,
Retrofitting a DOT 111 Unjacketed would cost $33,400, plus
$1,032 in out-of-service time and $1,019 in additional fuel and
maintenance costs per year.
Retrofitting a CPC 1232 Unjacketed would cost $32,900,
plus $944 in out-of-service time and $641 in additional fuel and
maintenance costs per year.
For Option 2, the AAR 2014 car,
Retrofitting a DOT 111 Unjacketed would cost $28,900, plus
$1,033 in out-of-service time and $1,019 in additional fuel and
maintenance costs per year.
Retrofitting a CPC 1232 Unjacketed would cost $28,400,
plus $944 in out-of-service time and $641 in additional fuel and
maintenance costs per year.
For Option 3, the Enhanced CPC 1232 car,
Retrofitting a DOT 111 Unjacketed would cost $26,730, plus
$1,032 in out-of-service time and $1019 in additional fuel and
maintenance costs per year.
Retrofitting a CPC 1232 Unjacketed would cost $26,230,
plus $944 in out-of-service time and $641 in additional fuel and
maintenance costs per year.
To better focus limited resources on the highest risk materials, we
are proposing to revise each of the bulk packaging sections, Sec. Sec.
173.241, 173.242,
[[Page 45061]]
and 173.243, to a provide a timeline for the phase out of existing cars
that are in HHFTs based on packing group (See table 15).
This risk-based approach provides sufficient time for car owners to
update the existing fleet while prioritizing the highest danger
material. Specifically, based on estimates of the current fleet size
and composition paired with production capacity of tank car
manufacturers expressed by commenters to the ANPRM, we believe that
providing a two year phase in of packing group I will not result in a
shortage of available tank cars for HHFT (See RIA for further detail).
It also provides additional time for cars to meet the DOT Specification
117 performance standard if offerors take steps to reduce the
volatility of the material. Separation of dissolved gases from crude
oil, for example can reduce the boiling point and flammability of the
material, potentially shifting the product to a different Packing
Group. This may be achieved through a number of methods, including
using better separators and aging of crude oil.
As proposed in this NPRM, DOT Specification 111 tank cars may be
retrofitted to DOT Specification 117, retired, repurposed, or operated
under speed restrictions. Further our proposal limits the future use of
DOT Specification 111 tank cars only if used in a HHFT. DOT
Specification 111 tank cars can continue to be used to transport other
commodities, including flammable liquids provided they are not in a
HHFT. These options provide tank car owners and rail carriers with the
opportunity to make operational changes that focus on the greatest
risks and minimize the impact to the greatest extent practicable.
PHMSA seeks public comment on the following discussions and
questions. When commenting, please reference the specific portion of
the proposal, explain the reason for any recommended change, and
include the source, methodology, and key assumptions of any supporting
evidence.
1. PHMSA expects about 23,000 cars will be transferred to Alberta
tar sands service as a result of this rule. PHMSA also expects no cars
will be retired as a result of this rule. How many of the existing DOT
Specification 111 and CPC-1232 tank cars that will be retired? How many
will be repurposed? How many will be retrofitted?
2. What are the benefits and costs of each of those actions
(retiring, re-purposing, and retrofitting)?
3. Does this estimate for tar sand service re-purposing reflect the
demand for these tank cars? Would any tank cars be re-purposed to
transport a different material?
4. Should the CPC-1232 cars be exempted from some or all of the
retrofitting requirements described here? If so, what are the benefits
and costs of those exemptions?
5. Should CPC-1232 cars have a different implementation timeframe
than legacy DOT 111 cars? If so, what are the benefits and costs of a
different implementation timeframe? What would the economic effects be
of retiring, repurposing or retrofitting, within five years, CPC-1232
tank cars used in flammable liquid service? What would the economic
effects be of retiring, repurposing or retrofitting, within ten years,
CPC-1232 tank cars used in flammable liquid service?
6. For Options 1 and 2, how would existing legacy tank cars comply
with the requirement for an additional \1/8-inch\ thickness? Would
these cars be retrofitted to have jackets thicker than 11-gauge? To
what extent would this introduce engineering challenges?
7. PHMSA estimates all existing crude oil and ethanol cars are
capable of handling 286,000 GRL without truck replacement. To what
extent would the additional weight of the retrofit Options require
structural changes to existing tank cars?
8. PHMSA requests any available detailed data set on the safety
features of the existing fleet.
9. Would the increased size and weight of the tank car Options have
any other effects not discussed in the NPRM or accompanying RIA? To
what extent would they affect braking rates? To what extent would they
affect track safety performance? To what extent would they affect
loading practices?
10. What additional safety features not discussed here, if any,
should PHMSA consider? If so, please provide detailed estimates on the
costs and benefits of individual safety features.
11. Do any of the safety features included in any of the Options
have costs that exceed benefits? If so, please provide detailed
estimates on the costs and benefits of individual safety features.
In addition, while DOT's September 6, 2013 ANPRM, NTSB
Recommendation R-12-5, and some commenters and petitions linked
enhanced tank car specifications and retrofitting of existing tanks
cars to only packaging group I and II materials, this NPRM proposes
packaging requirements for all flammable liquids in a HHFT, regardless
of packing group. Table 22 provides PHMSA's rational for including
flammable liquids in packing groups I, II, and III.
DOT created Class 3 packing groups based on differences in
volatility and ignitability [55 FR 16500]. Volatile liquids, having a
lower flash point, have higher vapor phase concentrations and upon
release, may catch fire immediately or from surface evaporation upon
forming pools, generate a flammable cloud which could ignite and burn
(flash fire), or explode in a vapor cloud explosion. It is also
possible there is no ignition source and instead a potentially toxic
and or flammable vapor cloud results. Other factors such as weather
conditions, wind direction, and congestion around the release influence
the potential impact of the incident. In order to perform a consequence
and impact analysis on different types of incidents, PHMSA would model
the release amount and properties and determine the subsequent impact
of the material and/or energy on people, environment, and physical
surroundings. The impact of different types of flammable liquid spills
could be evaluated based on trinitrotoluene (TNT) equivalency approach,
multi-energy methods, the Baker-Strehlow model, or other
methods.66 67 The results of the modeling could include 1
radiant heat from a fire, peak overpressure from an explosion, impulse
duration, and potential blast size to determine the potential damages.
Lower overpressures (less than 10 psig) may result in collapse of
nearby buildings, resulting in the people inside them susceptible to
injury or fatality, while relatively higher overpressures (>15 psig)
are needed to cause a human fatality directly from an
explosion.68 69
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\66\ Sochet I. Blast effects of external explosions Eighth
International Symposium on Hazards, Prevention, and Mitigation of
Industrial Explosions, Yokohama: Japan (2010)--http://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-00629253.
\67\ Center for Chemical Process Safety, Guidelines for Chemical
Process Quantitative Risk Analysis. Wiley (2010).
\68\ Kent, J. Handbook of Industrial Chemistry and
Biotechnology. Springer (2013).
\69\ Nolan, D. Handbook of Fire and Explosion Protection
Engineering Principles: for Oil, Gas, Chemical and Related
Facilities. William Andrew (2014).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
While Packing Group III materials (flash point greater than or
equal to 73[emsp14][deg]F) are less volatile and may pose a lower fire
and explosion risk than materials in Packing Groups I and II, PHMSA
believes the risk of an incident from a HHFT containing Packing Group
III flammable liquids is sufficient to warrant enhanced car standards
and inclusion in the HHFT definition. Further, PHMSA is concerned about
the possibility of spills and fires from HHFT carrying Packing Group
III materials in
[[Page 45062]]
large volumes. Table 22 provides PHMSA's rational for including
flammable liquids in packing groups I, II, and III.
Table 22--Enhanced Car Standards for Flammable Liquids in HHFT
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Issue Explanation
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Volume of Material......................... The large volume of flammable liquid transported in a HHFT poses a
safety and environmental risk regardless of the packing group.
Specifically, this amount of material contained in a tank car
poses a risk of a considerable oil spill (~35,000 gallon per tank
car). Based on the accidents evaluated in the RIA, approximately 5
cars on average release product with an average quantity release
of approximately 84,000 gallons. Such a spill could result in
significant environmental damage regardless of packing group. By
requiring packing group III materials to be contained in a more
robust tank car, the potential environmental damage from an oil
spill is mitigated as the conditional probability of release would
be decreased.
Combustible Liquid Exception............... PHMSA is proposing to retain the exception that permits flammable
liquids with a flash point at or above 38 [deg]C (100 [deg]F) to
be reclassed as combustible liquids, provided that material does
not meet the definition of any other hazard class. Therefore, the
existing DOT Specification 111 tank cars would continue to be
authorized for these materials. This would allow the existing tank
cars to continue to be used for certain low-hazard packing group
III flammable liquids that are reclassified as combustible
liquids. However, except for combustible liquids service, tank
cars manufactured after October 1, 2015, would be required to meet
the requirements for the DOT Specification 117 when used in a
HHFT.
Consistency................................ Providing a single packaging authorization across all three
flammable liquid packaging groups would simplify the requirements
while providing a packaging appropriate to handle all flammable
liquids.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
PHMSA seeks public comment on the following discussions and
questions. When commenting, please reference the specific portion of
the proposal, explain the reason for any recommended change, and
include the source, methodology, and key assumptions of any supporting
evidence. Further, we request comments on the following:
1. Are there any relatively lower hazard, lower risk flammable
liquids that could potentially be exempt from the enhanced car
standards for HHFT?
2. Is the current exception for combustible liquids sufficient
to incentivize producers to reduce the volatility of crude oil for
continued use of existing tank cars?
3. Would an exception for all PG III flammable liquids further
incentivize producers to reduce the volatility of crude oil prior to
transportation?
4. What are the impacts on the costs and safety benefits of
degasifying to these levels?
5. What are the economic impacts of the proposed phase out date
for existing DOT Specification 111 tank cars used to transport PG
III flammable liquids?
6. Fire and explosion risk of Class III Flammable liquids
a. What characteristics of a released flammable liquid
significantly affect the likelihood and consequence of fire or
explosion upon release?
b. What physical or environmental features of a release affect
the likelihood and consequence of fire or explosion upon release?
c. What existing scientific information is available concerning
the explosion hazards of hydrocarbons and other liquids?
d. What types of flammable liquids are most susceptible to a
high-consequence detonation explosion upon release?
e. What data exists on the relationship between liquid
properties and fire and blast zone size?
7. Should shippers be allowed to petition PHMSA for an exemption
from the requirements for HHFT based on the properties of Class III
liquids? What should be considered (e.g. chemical properties,
historical data, scientific information) before issuing an
exemption?
H. Forthcoming FRA NPRM on Securement and Attendance
On July 23, 2013, Transport Canada issued an Emergency Directive
providing safety and security requirements for locomotives in Canada by
focusing on securement, attendance, crew size and security of
locomotives on main track and sidings.\70\ In regard to attendance, the
Emergency Directive requires attendance for any locomotive coupled to
one or more loaded tank cars containing hazardous materials that are on
a main line track.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\70\ The Emergency Directive is available at the following URL:
http://www.tc.gc.ca/eng/mediaroom/backgrounders-safety-locomotives-7292.html.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
On August 7, 2013, FRA published EO 28 to address safety issues
related to attendance and securement of certain hazardous materials
trains. EO 28 prohibits railroads from leaving trains or vehicles
transporting the specified hazardous materials unattended on mainline
track or siding outside of a yard or terminal unless the railroad
adopts and complies with a plan that provides sufficient justification
for leaving them unattended under specific circumstances and locations.
In addition to demonstrating the potential tragic consequences of a
derailment involving rail cars containing hazardous materials, the
incident in Lac M[eacute]gantic, Quebec identified vulnerabilities of
safety and security that could result in future train accidents.
Emergency Order No. 28 was issued to address certain vulnerabilities
specific to the Lac-M[eacute]gantic incident, but others likely exist.
In addition, the agencies' Joint Safety Advisories published on August
7, 2013 and November 20, 2013 stress the importance of security
planning and updating security plans to address changes made to
railroad operations as a result of Emergency Order No. 28.
We did not seek comments on these or other attendance requirements
in the ANPRM. However, as outlined above, RSAC members have submitted a
consensus recommendation to FRA regarding the hazard classes and
threshold quantities of hazardous materials that should trigger
additional operating procedures, including attendance and securement
requirements.\71\ In summary, RSAC recommended that trains with loaded
cars meet new requirements regarding: (1) The duty status and hours of
service for any railroad personnel left to attend or secure a train;
(2) job briefings for train crews that cover the details of individual
responsibilities for the securement of a train; (3) locking
requirements for locomotives and/or train controls; (4) verification of
securement procedures by personnel not members of the train crew, and
reporting verified securement to dispatchers; and (5) procedures for
verifying securement in the event that emergency response personnel
have been on, under, or between equipment that has been previously
secured.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\71\ The recommendation is available at the following URL:
https://rsac.fra.dot.gov/meetings/Railroad%20Safety%20Advisory%20Committee%20Securement%20Recommendation%20VOTE.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Because the RSAC recommendation is robust in its approach to
matters of
[[Page 45063]]
attendance and securement, and because it covers hazmat beyond crude
oil and ethanol, PHMSA believes that FRA is best suited to address the
matter in its forthcoming NPRM based on the RSAC recommendation. PHMSA
seeks information and comment on any alternate approaches that may be
considered along with the RSAC recommendation regarding the attendance
and securement of these types of trains.
VI. Regulatory Review and Notices
A. Executive Order 12866, Executive Order 13563, Executive Order 13610
and DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures
This NPRM is considered a significant regulatory action under
section 3(f) of Executive Order 12866 and was reviewed by the Office of
Management and Budget (OMB). The NPRM is considered a significant
regulatory action under the Regulatory Policies and Procedures order
issued by DOT (44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979). PHMSA has prepared and
placed in the docket a Regulatory Impact Assessment addressing the
economic impact of this proposed rule.
Executive Orders 12866 (``Regulatory Planning and Review'') and
13563 (``Improving Regulation and Regulatory Review'') require agencies
to regulate in the ``most cost-effective manner,'' to make a ``reasoned
determination that the benefits of the intended regulation justify its
costs,'' and to develop regulations that ``impose the least burden on
society.'' Executive Order 13610, issued May 10, 2012, urges agencies
to conduct retrospective analyses of existing rules to examine whether
they remain justified and whether they should be modified or
streamlined in light of changed circumstances, including the rise of
new technologies. The Department of Transportation believes that
streamlined and clear regulations are important to ensure compliance
with important safety regulations. As such the Department has developed
a plan detailing how such reviews are conducted.\72\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\72\ Department of Transportation's plan for retrospective
regulatory reviews is available at the following URL: http://www.dot.gov/regulations/dot-retrospective-reviews-rules.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Additionally, Executive Orders 12866, 13563, and 13610 require
agencies to provide a meaningful opportunity for public participation.
Accordingly, PHMSA invites comments on these considerations, including
any cost or benefit figures or factors, alternative approaches, and
relevant scientific, technical and economic data. These comments will
help PHMSA evaluate whether the proposed requirements are appropriate.
PHMSA also seeks comment on potential data and information gathering
activities that could be useful in designing an evaluation and/or
retrospective review of this rulemaking.
The United States has experienced a dramatic growth in the quantity
of flammable materials being shipped by rail in recent years. According
to the rail industry, in the U.S. in 2009, there were 10,800 carloads
of crude oil shipped by rail. In 2013, there were 400,000 carloads. In
the Bakken region, over one million barrels a day of crude oil was
produced in March 2014,\73\ most of which is transported by rail.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\73\ Information regarding oil and gas production is available
at the following URL: http://www.eia.gov/petroleum/drilling/#tabs-summary-2.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Transporting flammable material carries safety and environmental
risks. The risk of flammability is compounded in the context of rail
transportation because petroleum crude oil and ethanol are commonly
shipped in large unit trains.
In recent years, train accidents involving a flammable material
release and resulting fire with severe consequences have occurred with
increasing frequency (i.e. Arcadia, OH, Plevna, MT, Casselton, ND,
Aliceville, AL, Lac-M[eacute]gantic, Quebec).
PHMSA is proposing this NPRM, in order to increase the safety of
crude and ethanol shipments by rail. We are proposing revisions to the
HMR to establish requirements specific to HHFTs. As described in
greater detail throughout this document, this NPRM is a system-wide,
comprehensive approach consistent with the risks posed by flammable
liquids transported by rail in HHFTs. Specifically, requirements
address:
(1) Rail routing restrictions;
(2) tank car integrity;
(3) speed restrictions;
(4) braking systems;
(5) proper classification and characterization of mined liquid and
gas; and
(6) notification to State Emergency Response Commissions (SERCs).
Table 1 (Restated here) summarizes major provisions of the proposal,
and identifies those affected.
Table 1--Affected Entities and Requirements
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Proposed requirement Affected entity
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Better classification and characterization of mined gases and Offerors/Shippers of all mined gases and
liquids. liquids.
Written sampling and testing program for all mined
gases and liquids, such as crude oil, to address:
(1) frequency of sampling and testing;
(2) sampling at various points along the supply chain;
(3) sampling methods that ensure a representative sample
of the entire mixture;
(4) testing methods to enable complete analysis,
classification, and characterization of material;
(5) statistical justification for sample frequencies; and,
(6) duplicate samples for quality assurance.
Require offerer to certify that program is in place,
document the testing and sampling program, and make results
available to DOT personnel, upon request.
Rail routing risk assessment.................................. Rail Carriers, Emergency Responders.
Requires carriers to perform a routing analysis
that considers 27 safety and security factors. The
carrier must select a route based on findings of the
route analysis. These planning requirements are
prescribed in Sec. 172.820 and would be expanded to
apply to HHFTs.
Notification to SERCs
Require trains containing one million gallons of
Bakken crude oil to notify State Emergency Response
Commissions (SERCs) or other appropriate state delegated
entity about the operation of these trains through their
States.
Reduced operating speeds
[[Page 45064]]
Restrict all HHFTs to 50-mph in all areas;
PHMSA is requesting comment on three speed
restriction options for HHFTs that contain any tank cars
not meeting the enhanced tank car standards proposed by
this rule:
(4) a 40-mph maximum speed restriction in all areas;
(5) a 40-mph speed restriction in high threat urban areas
\74\; and,
(6) a 40-mph speed restriction in areas with a 100K+
population.
PHMSA is also requesting comment on a 30-mph speed
restriction for HHFTs that do not comply with enhanced
braking requirements.
Enhanced braking
Require all HHFTs be equipped with alternative
brake signal propagation systems. Depending on the
outcome of the tank car standard proposal and
implementation timing, all HHFTs would be operated with
either electronic controlled pneumatic brakes (ECP), a
two-way end of train device (EOT), or distributed power
(DP).
Enhanced standards for both new and existing tank cars........ Tank Car Manufacturers,
Tank Car Owners,
Shippers and Rail Carriers.
Require new tank cars constructed after October
1, 2015 (that are used to transport flammable liquids as
part of a HHFT) to meet criteria for a selected option,
including specific design requirements or performance
criteria (e.g., thermal, top fittings, and bottom outlet
protection; tank head and shell puncture resistance) is
selected in the final rule. PHMSA is requesting comment
on the following three options for the DOT Specification
117:
1. FRA and PHMSA Designed Car, or equivalent
2. AAR 2014Tank Car,\75\ or equivalent
3. Jacketed CPC-1232 \76\, or equivalent
Require existing tank cars that are used to
transport flammable liquids as part of a HHFT, to be
retrofitted to meet the selected option for performance
requirements, except for top fittings protection. Those
not retrofitted would be retired, repurposed, or operated
under speed restrictions for up to five years, based on
packing group assignment of the lading.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Table 5 provides the costs and benefits of the individual
provisions of the proposed rule. PHMSA is co-proposing three different
options for tank car standards and three different options for speed
restrictions. Table 6 presents the costs and benefits of the various
combinations of proposed tank car and speed restriction provisions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\74\ As defined in 49 CFR 1580.3--High Threat Urban Area (HTUA)
means an area comprising one or more cities and surrounding areas
including a 10-mile buffer zone, as listed in appendix A to Part
1580 of the 49 CFR.
\75\ On March 9, 2011 AAR submitted petition for rulemaking P-
1577, which was discussed in the ANPRM. In response to the ANPRM, on
November 15, 2013, AAR and ASLRAA submitted as a comment
recommendations for tank car standards that are enhanced beyond the
design in P-1577. For the purposes of this rulemaking this tank car
will be referred to as the ``AAR 2014 tank car.'' See http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=PHMSA-2012-0082-0090.
\76\ In 2011, the AAR issued Casualty Prevention Circular (CPC)
1232, which outlines industry requirements for additional safety
equipment on certain DOT Specification 111 tanks ordered after
October 1, 2011, and intended for use in ethanol and crude oil
service.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Please note that because there is overlap in the risk reduction
achieved between some of the proposed requirements listed in the Table
5 (restated). The total benefits and costs of the provisions cannot be
accurately calculated by summing the benefits and costs of each
proposed provision. Table 6 (restated), on the other hand, presents
total benefits and costs of the combinations of speed restriction and
tank car proposals. Explanation of the comprehensive benefits and costs
of each combination of proposals is included at the end of the RIA.
Please also note that, given the uncertainty associated with the
risks of crude oil and ethanol shipments in the table below (Table 5
restated here) contains a range of benefits estimates. The low end of
the range estimates risk from 2015 to 2034 based on the U.S. safety
record for crude oil and ethanol from 2006 to 2014, adjusting for the
projected increase in crude oil and ethanol shipment volume over the
next 20 years. The high end of the range estimates risk from 2015 to
2034 based on the U.S. safety record for crude oil and ethanol
shipments from 2006 to 2014, adjusting for the projected increase in
crude oil and ethanol shipments volume, plus an estimate that the U.S.
would experience the equivalent of 10 higher consequence safety
events--nine of which would have environmental damages and monetized
injury and fatality costs exceeding $1.15 billion and one of which
would have environmental damages and monetized injury and fatality
costs exceeding $5.75 billion--over the next 20 years. This outcome
could result from a smaller number of more severe events, or more
numerous events that are less severe.
Table 5--20 Year Costs and Benefits by Stand-Alone Proposed Regulatory Amendments 2015-2034 \77\
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Affected section \78\ Provision Benefits (7%) Costs (7%)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
49 CFR 172.820.............. Rail Routing +............ Cost effective if routing $4.5 million.
were to reduce risk of an
incident by 0.17%.
49 CFR 173.41............... Classification of Mined Cost effective if this 16.2 million.
Gas and Liquid. requirement reduces risk
by 0.61%.
49 CFR 174.310.............. Notification to SERCs..... Qualitative............... 0.
[[Page 45065]]
Speed Restriction: Option $199 million-$636 million. 2,680 million.
1: 40 mph speed limit all
areas *.
Speed Restriction: Option $33.6 million-$108 million 240 million.
2: 40 mph 100k people *.
Speed Restriction: Option $6.8 million-$21.8 million 22.9 million.
3: 40 mph in HTUAs *.
Braking: Electronic $737 million-$1,759 500 million.
Pneumatic Control with DP million.
or EOT #.
49 CFR Part 179............. Option 1: PHMSA and FRA $822 million-$3,256 3,030 million.
designed car @. million.
Option 2: AAR 2014 Tank $610 million-$2,426 2,571 million.
Car. million.
Option 3: Jacketed CPC- $393 million-$1,570 2,040 million.
1232 (new const.). million.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Note: ``*'' indicates voluntary compliance regarding crude oil trains in high-threat urban areas (HTUA).
``+'' indicates voluntary actions that will be taken by shippers and railroads.
``#'' indicates that only tank car Option 1, the PHMSA and FRA designed car, has a requirement for ECP
brakes. However, all HHFTs would be required to have DP or two-way EOT, regardless of which tank car Option is
selected at the final rule stage.
Table 6--20 Year Benefits and Costs of Proposal Combinations of Proposed Regulatory Amendments 2015-2034 \79\
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Benefit range
Proposal (millions) Cost (millions)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
PHMSA and FRA Design Standard + 40 MPH System Wide........................ $1,436-$4,386 $5,820
PHMSA and FRA Design Standard + 40 MPH in 100K............................ $1,292-$3,836 3,380
PHMSA and FRA Design Standard + 40 MPH in HTUA............................ $1,269-$3,747 3,163
AAR 2014 Standard + 40 MPH System Wide.................................... $794-$3,034 5,272
AAR 2014 Standard + 40 MPH in 100K........................................ $641-$2,449 2,831
AAR 2014 Standard + 40 MPH in HTUA........................................ $616-$2,354 2,614
CPC 1232 Standard + 40 MPH System Wide.................................... $584-$2,232 4,741
CPC 1232 Standard + 40 MPH in 100K........................................ $426-$1,626 2,300
CPC 1232 Standard + 40 MPH in HTUA........................................ $400-$1,527 2,083
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Crude Oil Transport by Rail
Figure 5 below shows the recent strong growth in crude oil
production in the U.S., as well as growth in the number of rail
carloads shipped. Figure 5 also shows forecasted domestic crude oil
production from the Energy Information Administration (EIA) and PHMSA's
projected strong demand for the rail shipment of crude oil.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\77\ All costs and benefits are in millions over 20 years, and
are discounted to present value using a 7 percent rate.
\78\ All affected sections of the Code of Federal Regulations
(CFR) are in Title 49.
\79\ All costs and benefits are in millions, and are discounted
to present value using a 7 percent rate.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
[[Page 45066]]
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP01AU14.011
A rise in rail accidents involving crude oil has also risen along
with the increase in crude oil production and rail shipments of crude
oil. Figure 6 below shows this rise.
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP01AU14.012
Based on these train accidents, the projected continued growth of
domestic crude oil production, and the growing number of train
accidents involving crude oil, PHMSA concludes that the potential for a
train accident involving crude oil has increased, which has raised the
likelihood of a catastrophic train accident that would cause
substantial damage to life, property, and the environment.
Additional factors give rise to increased risks, and thus the
increased probability of a catastrophic event occurring. First, the
risk of flammability is compounded, because of the practice of shipping
very large quantities of oil in one train, as shown by the increased
use of high-hazard flammable trains. In 2008 there were less than
10,000 rail carloads of crude oil. By 2013 the
[[Page 45067]]
number of rail carloads of increased to over 400,000.\80\ Second,
unlike other Class 3 manufactured goods, organic materials from oil and
gas production represent a unique challenge in regards to
classification. Differences in the chemical makeup of the raw material
can vary across wells and over time. Unprocessed crude oil may present
unique hazards such as corrosivity, sulfur content and resolved gas
content, thereby affecting the integrity of the tank car.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\80\ http://www.stb.dot.gov/stb/industry/econ_waybill.html.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
PHMSA's analysis of this combination of factors suggests an
increase in the risk of rail related accidents and an increase in the
likelihood of a catastrophic event.
Ethanol
U.S. ethanol production has increased considerably during the last
10 years and has generated similar growth in the transportation of
ethanol by rail, according to a recent white paper by the Association
of American Railroads (AAR).\81\ As shown in the Figure 7 EIA projects
strong demand for ethanol in the future.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\81\ Association of American Railroads. 2013. Railroads and
Ethanol. Available online at https://www.aar.org/keyissues/Documents/Background-Papers/Railroads%20and%20Ethanol.pdf.
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP01AU14.013
In 2008 there were around 292,000 rail carloads of ethanol. In
2011, that number increased over 40 percent to 409,000.\82\ Not
surprisingly, this growth in rail traffic has been accompanied by an
increase in the number of rail accidents involving ethanol. Figure 8
below plots the total number of rail accidents involving ethanol during
the last 13 years compared to the total carloads of ethanol. The left
axis shows the total number of rail derailments and the right axis
shows total carloads shipped.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\82\ http://www.stb.dot.gov/stb/industry/econ_waybill.html.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
[[Page 45068]]
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP01AU14.014
Source: STB Waybill Sample and PHMSA Incident Report Database
Summary of Regulatory Changes
As described in greater detail throughout this document, the
proposed rule is a system-wide, comprehensive approach consistent with
the risks posed by high-hazard flammable trains by rail. Requirements
address:
Rail Routing;
Tank Cars;
Braking;
Speed Restrictions;
Classification of Mined Gas and Liquid; and
Notification to SERCs.
This approach is designed to mitigate damages of rail accidents
involving flammable materials, though some provisions could also
prevent accidents.
The RIA discusses, consistent with this NPRM, six requirement
areas. Although we analyze the effects of individual requirements
separately, the preferred alternative proposed in this rulemaking is a
system-wide approach covering all requirement areas consistent with
this NPRM.
The analysis shows that expected damages based on the historical
safety record are expected to exceed $4.5 billion and that damages from
high-consequence events could reach $13.7 billion over a 20-year period
in the absence of the rule.
PHMSA has proposed multiple options for Speed Restrictions and Tank
Car standards. These options are mutually exclusive. PHMSA may select
one of these options for each of Speed Restrictions and Tank Car
standards, potentially including modifications based on public comments
in response to this NPRM and changed circumstances.
PHMSA supports a system-wide approach covering all requirement
areas provided above. Following consideration of public comments, PHMSA
will consider alternatives for one or more of these requirement areas.
B. Unfunded Mandates Reform Act
The Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 (Pub. L. 104-4, 2 U.S.C.
1531) (UMRA) requires each agency to prepare a written statement for
any proposed or final rule that includes a ``Federal mandate that may
result in the expenditure by State, local, and Native American Indian
tribal governments, in the aggregate, or by the private sector, of
$100,000,000 or more (adjusted annually for inflation) in any one
year.'' The value equivalent of $100 million in 1995, adjusted for
inflation to 2012 levels, is $151 million. If adopted, this proposed
rule would not impose enforceable duties on State, local, or Native
American Indian tribal governments. UMRA was designed to ensure that
Congress and Executive Branch agencies consider the impact of
legislation and regulations on States, local governments, and tribal
governments, and the private sector. With respect to States and
localities, UMRA was an important step in recognizing State and local
governments as partners in our intergovernmental system, rather than
mere entities to be regulated or extensions of the Federal government.
As described in greater detail throughout this document, the
proposed rule is a system-wide, comprehensive approach consistent with
the risks posed by high-hazard flammable materials transported by rail.
Specifically, requirements address: (1) Proper classification and
characterization, (2) operational controls to lessen the likelihood and
consequences of train accidents and (3) tank car integrity. The RIA
discusses, consistent with this NPRM, six requirement areas: Rail
Routing, Classification of Mined Gas and Liquid, Notification of SERCs,
Speed Restrictions, Braking, and enhanced Tank Car standards.
If adopted, this proposed rule would impose enforceable duties on
the private sector of an annual average of approximately $250-$600
million over a 20-year period. It might result in costs to the private
sector that exceed $151 million in any one year and those costs and
benefits associated with this rulemaking have been discussed under
paragraph A, Executive Order 12866, Executive Order 13563, Executive
Order 13610 and DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures, of this
section. The RIA is available in the public docket for this rulemaking.
[[Page 45069]]
PHMSA invites comments on these considerations, including any
unfunded mandates related to this rulemaking.
C. Executive Order 13132: Federalism
Executive Order 13132 requires agencies to assure meaningful and
timely input by state and local officials in the development of
regulatory policies that may have ``substantial direct effects on the
states, on the relationship between the national government and the
States, or on the distribution of power and responsibilities among the
various levels of government.''
This NPRM has been analyzed in accordance with the principles and
criteria contained in Executive Orders 13132 (``Federalism''). The
proposals in the NPRM, if adopted, would not have any direct effect on
the states, or their political subdivisions; it would not impose any
compliance costs; and it would not affect the relationships between the
national government and the states, or political subdivisions, or the
distribution of power and responsibilities among the various levels of
government. We invite state and local governments with an interest in
this rulemaking to comment on any effect that proposed requirements
could have on them, if adopted. However, several of the issues
addressed in this NPRM are subject to our preemption authority, i.e.,
classification, packaging, and rail routing. In regard to rail routing,
for example, in a March 25, 2003 final rule (68 FR 14509) we concluded
that the specifics of routing rail shipments of hazardous materials
preempts all states, their political subdivisions, and Indian tribes
from prescribing or restricting routes for rail shipments of hazardous
materials, under Federal hazardous material transportation law (49
U.S.C. 5125) and the Federal Rail Safety Act (49 U.S.C. 20106). We
would expect the same preemptive effect as a result of this rulemaking,
and thus, the consultation and funding requirements of Executive Orders
13132 and 13175 do not apply. Nonetheless, we invite state and local
governments with an interest in this rulemaking to comment on any
effect that proposed requirements could have on them, if adopted.
D. Executive Order 13175: Consultation and Coordination With Indian
Tribal Governments
Executive Order 13175 requires agencies to assure meaningful and
timely input from Indian tribal government representatives in the
development of rules that significantly or uniquely affect Indian
communities by imposing ``substantial direct compliance costs'' or
``substantial direct effects'' on such communities or the relationship
and distribution of power between the Federal Government and Indian
tribes.
We analyzed this NPRM in accordance with the principles and
criteria prescribed in Executive Order 13175 (``Consultation and
Coordination with Indian Tribal Governments''). Because this rulemaking
does not significantly or uniquely affect tribes, and does not impose
substantial and direct compliance costs on Indian tribal governments,
the funding and consultation requirements of Executive Order 13175 do
not apply; thus, a tribal summary impact statement is not required.
However, we are interested in any possible impacts of the notification
requirements on Tribal Emergency Response Commissions (TERCs) or other
tribal institutions. We invite Indian tribal governments to provide
comments on the costs and effects the proposed requirements could have
on them, if adopted, especially any burdens associated with the
proposed notification requirements.
E. Regulatory Flexibility Act, Executive Order 13272, and DOT Policies
and Procedures
Under the Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980 (RFA) (5 U.S.C. 601 et
seq.), PHMSA must consider whether a rulemaking would have a
``significant economic impact on a substantial number of small
entities.'' ``Small entities'' include small businesses, not-for-profit
organizations that are independently owned and operated and are not
dominant in their fields, and governmental jurisdictions with
populations under 50,000.
To ensure potential impacts of rules on small entities are properly
considered, PHMSA developed this NPRM in accordance with Executive
Order 13272 (``Proper Consideration of Small Entities in Agency
Rulemaking'') and DOT's procedures and policies to promote compliance
with the RFA.
The RFA and Executive Order 13272 (67 FR 53461, August 16, 2002)
require agency review of proposed and final rules to assess their
impacts on small entities. An agency must prepare an initial regulatory
flexibility analysis (IRFA) unless it determines and certifies that a
rule, if promulgated, would not have a significant economic impact on a
substantial number of small entities.
PHMSA is publishing this IRFA to aid the public in commenting on
the potential small business impacts of the requirements in this NPRM.
PHMSA invites all interested parties to submit data and information
regarding the potential economic impact on small entities that would
result from the adoption of the proposals in this NPRM. PHMSA will
consider all information and comments received in the public comment
process when making a determination regarding the economic impact on
small entities in the final rule.
Under the RFA at 5 U.S.C 603(b), each initial regulatory
flexibility analysis is required to address the following topics:
(1) The reasons why the agency is considering the action.
(2) The objectives and legal basis for the proposed rule.
(3) The kind and number of small entities to which the proposed
rule will apply.
(4) The projected reporting, recordkeeping and other compliance
requirements of the proposed rule.
(5) All Federal rules that may duplicate, overlap, or conflict
with the proposed rule.\83\
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\83\ See: http://www.fws.gov/policy/library/rgSBAGuide.pdf
(accessed September 28, 2011).
The RFA at 5 U.S.C. 603(c) requires that each initial regulatory
flexibility analysis contains a description of any significant
alternatives to the proposal that accomplish the statutory objectives
and minimize the significant economic impact of the proposal on small
entities. In this instance, none of the alternatives accomplish the
statutory objectives and minimize the significant economic impact of
the proposal on small entities.
(1) Reasons Why the Agency is Considering the Action
PHMSA is promulgating the NPRM in response to recent train
accidents involving the derailment of HHFTs comprised of twenty rail
carloads of a Class 3 flammable liquid. Shipments of large volumes of
flammable liquids pose a significant risk to life, property, and the
environment. For Example on December 30, 2013, a train carrying crude
oil derailed and ignited near Casselton, North Dakota prompting
authorities to issue a voluntary evacuation of the city and surrounding
area. On November 8, 2013, a train carrying crude oil to the Gulf Coast
from North Dakota derailed in Alabama, spilling crude oil in a nearby
wetland and igniting into flames. On July 6, 2013, a catastrophic
railroad accident occurred in Lac-M[eacute]gantic, Quebec, Canada when
an unattended freight train containing hazardous materials rolled down
a descending grade and subsequently derailed. The derailment resulted
in a fire and multiple energetic ruptures of tank cars, which, along
with other effects of the accident, caused the confirmed death of 47
people. In
[[Page 45070]]
addition, this derailment caused extensive damage to the town center,
clean-up costs, and the evacuation of approximately 2,000 people from
the surrounding area. The Lac-M[eacute]gantic incident resulted in very
large economic losses. PHMSA is taking this regulatory action to
prevent accidents on the scale of that in Lac-M[eacute]gantic from
happening in the United States.
(2) The Objectives and Legal Basis for the Proposed Rule
In this NPRM, PHMSA is proposing revisions to the HMR to ensure
that the rail requirements address the risks posed by the
transportation on railroads of HHFTs. This rulemaking addresses risks
in three areas: (1) Proper classification and characterization of the
product being transported, (2) operational controls to decrease the
likelihood and consequences of train accidents, and (3) tank car
integrity to decrease the consequences of train accidents. Promulgating
this rulemaking in these areas is consistent with the goals of the HMR:
(1) To ensure that hazardous materials are packaged and handled safely
and securely during transportation; (2) to provide effective
communication to transportation workers and emergency responders of the
hazardous materials being transferred; and (3) to minimize the
consequences of an incident should one occur.
The Secretary has the authority to prescribe regulations for the
safe transportation, including the security, of hazardous materials in
intrastate, interstate, and foreign commerce (49 U.S.C. 5103(b)) and
has delegated this authority to PHMSA. 49 CFR 1.97(b).
(3) A description of and, Where Feasible, an Estimate of the Number of
Small Entities to Which the Proposed Rule Will Apply
The universe of the entities considered in an IRFA generally
includes only those small entities that can reasonably expect to be
directly regulated by the proposed action. Small railroads and offerors
are the types of small entities potentially affected by this proposed
rule.
A ``small entity'' is defined in 5 U.S.C. 601(3) as having the same
meaning as ``small business concern'' under section 3 of the Small
Business Act. This includes any small business concern that is
independently owned and operated, and is not dominant in its field of
operation. Title 49 U.S.C. 601(4) likewise includes within the
definition of small entities non-profit enterprises that are
independently owned and operated, and are not dominant in their field
of operation.
The U.S. Small Business Administration (SBA) stipulates in its size
standards that the largest a ``for-profit'' railroad business firm may
be, and still be classified as a small entity, is 1,500 employees for
``line haul operating railroads'' and 500 employees for ``switching and
terminal establishments.'' Additionally, 5 U.S.C. 601(5) defines as
small entities governments of cities, counties, towns, townships,
villages, school districts, or special districts with populations less
than 50,000.
Federal agencies may adopt their own size standards for small
entities in consultation with SBA and in conjunction with public
comment. Pursuant to that authority, FRA has published a final
Statement of Agency Policy that formally establishes small entities or
small businesses as being railroads, contractors, and hazardous
materials offerors that meet the revenue requirements of a Class III
railroad as set forth in 49 CFR 1201.1-1, which is $20 million or less
in inflation-adjusted annual revenues,\84\ and commuter railroads or
small governmental jurisdictions that serve populations of 50,000 or
less. See 68 FR 24891 (May 9, 2003) (codified as appendix C to 49 CFR
Part 209). The $20 million limit is based on the Surface Transportation
Board's revenue threshold for a Class III railroad. Railroad revenue is
adjusted for inflation by applying a revenue deflator formula in
accordance with 49 CFR 1201.1-1. This definition is what PHMSA is
proposing to use for the rulemaking.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\84\ For 2012 the Surface Transportation Board (STB) adjusted
this amount to $36.2 million.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Railroads
Not all small railroads would be required to comply with the
provisions of this proposed rule. Most of the approximately 738 small
railroads do not transport hazardous materials. Based on observations
from FRA's regional offices, 64 small railroads could potentially be
affected by this proposed rule because they transport HHFTs. Therefore,
this proposed rule would impact a substantial number of small
railroads.
Offerors
Almost all hazardous materials tank cars, including those cars that
transport crude oil, ethanol, and other flammable liquids, are owned or
leased by offerors. The proposed requirements for a testing and
sampling program will directly affect shippers as they will now be
required to create a document a sampling and testing program for mined
gases and liquids. In addition, some of the other proposals in this
rulemaking may indirectly affect offerors. DOT believes that a
majority, if not all, of these offerors are large entities. DOT used
data from the DOT/PHMSA Hazardous Materials Information System (HMIS)
database to screen for offerors that may be small entities.
From the DOT/PHMSA HMIS database, and industry sources, DOT found
731 small offerors that might be impacted. Based on further information
available on the companies' Web sites, all other offerors appear to be
subsidiaries of large businesses. Out of these 731, however, only 297
own tank cars that would be affected. All the other 434 offerors either
do not own tank cars or have tank cars that would not be affected by
this proposed rule. Thus, DOT believes that there are only 297 offerors
that are small businesses affected by this proposed rule. Additionally,
no small offerors commented on PHMSA's ANPRM for this proceeding. PHMSA
invites commenters to bring forth information that might assist it in
assessing the number of small offerors that may be economically
impacted by the requirement set forth in the proposed rule for
development of the IRFA.
(4) A Description of the Projected Reporting, Recordkeeping and Other
Compliance Requirements of the Proposed Rule
For a thorough presentation of cost estimates, please refer to the
RIA, which has been placed in the docket for this rulemaking.
This rulemaking has proposed requirements in three areas that
address the potential risks: (1) Proper classification and
characterization of the product being transported, (2) operational
controls to decrease the likelihood of accidents, and (3) tank car
integrity. Proposed requirements for braking, speed restrictions, and
tank car production would not impact any small entities. Most small
railroads affected by this proposed rule do not operate at speeds
higher than those proposed for speed restrictions or travel long
distances over which the reduced speed would cause a significant
impact. Any small railroad that operates at speeds 30 mph or less would
also not be impacted by the proposed braking requirement. Additionally,
in a February 12, 2014, letter to the Secretary, ASLRRA announced that
they recommend to their members to voluntarily operate unit trains of
crude oil at a top speed of no more than 25 mph on all routes.
[[Page 45071]]
PHMSA believes that all offerors, both small and large, who would
be required to select a car that complies with new construction
requirements, would not see a significant increase in their lease
rates. Lease rates are not expected to increase due to proposed
improvements in the industry specification for tank car requirements as
rates have already increased in recent years. . Additionally, also in
the February 12th letter to the Secretary, the ASLRRA noted that it
will support and encourage the development of new tank car standards
including but not limited to adoption of a 9/16 inch tank car shell.
Proposed Sec. 174.310(a)(3) would expand hazardous materials route
planning and selection requirements for railroads. This would include
HHFTs transporting flammable materials and, where technically feasible,
require rerouting to avoid transportation of such hazardous materials
through populated and other sensitive areas. Approximately 64 small
railroads carry crude oil and ethanol in trains consists large enough
that they would potentially be affected by this proposal. However, the
majority of small railroads do not carry hazardous materials on a daily
basis; in fact, some small railroads carry hazardous materials fewer
than five times annually.
The affected Class III railroads are already compliant with the
routing requirements established by HM-232E (71 FR 76834). In general,
at the time that rule was promulgated, it was assumed that the small
railroads, due to their limited size, would, on average, have no less
than one and no more than two primary routes to analyze. Thus, the
potential lack of an alternative route to consider would minimize the
impact of this proposed requirement. Because the distance covered by
the small railroads' routes is likely contained within a limited
geographic region, the hours estimated for analyses are fewer than
those estimated for the larger railroads.
Finally, this proposed rule would also require any offeror who
offers a hazardous material for transportation to develop, implement,
and update its sampling and testing programs related to classification
and characterization of the hazardous material if it is a mined gas or
liquid (e.g., crude oil). PHMSA believes that there would be an initial
cost for each offeror of approximately $3,200 for the first year, and
additional costs of $800 annually thereafter. PHMSA believes that this
proposed section would not significantly burden any of these small
entities.
PHMSA estimates the total cost to each small railroad to be $5,400
in the first year and $3,000 for subsequent years. Based on small
railroads' annual operating revenues, these costs are not significant.
Small railroads' annual operating revenues range from $3 million to $20
million. Previously, FRA sampled small railroads and found that revenue
averaged approximately $4.7 million (not discounted) in 2006. One
percent of average annual revenue per small railroad is $47,000. Thus,
the costs associated with this proposed rule amount to significantly
less than one percent of the railroad's annual operating revenue. PHMSA
realizes that some small railroads will have lower annual revenue than
$4.7 million. However, PHMSA is confident that this total cost estimate
to each small railroad provides a good representation of the small
railroads, in general.
In conclusion, PHMSA believes that although some small railroads
would be directly impacted, they would not be impacted significantly as
the impact would amount to significantly less than one percent of a
small railroad's annual operating revenue. Information available
indicates that none of the offerors would be significantly affected by
the burdens of the proposed rule, but seeks information and comments
from the industry that might assist in quantifying the number of small
offerors who may be economically impacted by the requirements set forth
in the proposed rule. Therefore, these requirements will likely not
have a significant economic impact on any small entities' operations.
PHMSA seeks comments on these conclusions.
(5) An Identification, to the Extent Practicable, of All Federal Rules
That May Duplicate, Overlap, or Conflict With the Proposed Rule
PHMSA is not aware of any relevant Federal rules that may
duplicate, overlap, or conflict with the proposed rule. PHMSA will work
with and coordinate with FRA to ensure that we are aligned with EO 28
or other FRA actions to the greatest extent practicable. This proposed
rule would support most other safety regulations for railroad
operations.
This proposed rule will not have a noticeable impact on the
competitive position of the affected small railroads or on the small
entity segment of the railroad industry as a whole. The small entity
segment of the railroad industry faces little in the way of intramodal
competition. Small railroads generally serve as ``feeders'' to the
larger railroads, collecting carloads in smaller numbers and at lower
densities than would be economical for the larger railroads. They
transport those cars over relatively short distances and then turn them
over to the larger systems, which transport them relatively long
distances to their ultimate destination, or for handoff back to a
smaller railroad for final delivery. Although their relative interests
do not always coincide, the relationship between the large and small
entity segments of the railroad industry is more supportive and co-
dependent than competitive.
It is also rare for small railroads to compete with each other. As
mentioned above, small railroads generally serve smaller, lower density
markets and customers. They tend to operate in markets where there is
not enough traffic to attract or sustain rail competition, large or
small. Given the significant capital investment required (to acquire
right-of-way, build track, purchase fleet, etc.), new entry in the
railroad industry is not a common occurrence. Thus, even to the extent
the proposed rule may have an economic impact, it should have no impact
on the intramodal competitive position of small railroads.
Even though PHMSA did not receive any comments on the ANPRM in
opposition to PHMSA's preliminary finding that this rulemaking will not
have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small
entities, PHMSA has not determined that this proposed rule would not
have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small
entities. Therefore, PHMSA is publishing this IRFA to aid the public in
commenting on the potential small business impacts of the proposals in
this NPRM. PHMSA invites all interested parties to submit data and
information regarding the potential economic impact that would result
from adoption of the proposals in this NPRM. PHMSA will consider all
comments received in the public comment process when making a
determination in the final RFA.
F. Paperwork Reduction Act
PHMSA will request a new information collection from the Office of
Management and Budget (OMB) under OMB Control No. 2137-XXXX entitled
``Flammable Hazardous Materials by Rail Transportation.'' This NPRM may
result in an increase in annual burden and costs under OMB Control No.
2137-XXXX due to proposed requirements pertaining to the creation of a
sampling and testing program for mined gas or liquid and rail routing
for HHFTs.
Under the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995, no person is required to
respond to an information collection unless it has been approved by OMB
and displays a valid OMB control number. Section 1320.8(d) of Title 5
of
[[Page 45072]]
the CFR requires that PHMSA provide interested members of the public
and affected agencies an opportunity to comment on information and
recordkeeping requests.
In addition to the requirements proposed in this NPRM, we request
comment on whether PHMSA should require reporting of data on the total
damages that occur as a result of train accidents involving releases of
hazardous material, including damages related to fatalities, injuries,
property damage, environmental damage and clean-up costs, loss of
business and other economic activity, and evacuation-related costs.
Currently, PHMSA only collects some of this information, and data
verification is inconsistent. Further, we request comment on whether
PHMSA should require reporting on every car carrying hazardous material
that derails, whether that car loses product or not. Such reporting
would assist PHMSA in assessing the effectiveness of different kinds of
cars in containing the hazardous materials that they carry. PHMSA seeks
comment on how hazardous incident reporting of rail accidents can be
improved upon, in the context of this rule. How can PHMSA improve the
data quality, utility, and response rates associated with reporting on
the impacts of incidents associated with the transportation of
hazardous materials on HHFTs? Are changes to the incident reporting
forms or the method of collection warranted?
This document identifies a new information collection request that
PHMSA will submit to OMB for approval based on the requirements in this
proposed rule. PHMSA has developed burden estimates to reflect changes
in this proposed rule and specifically requests comments on the
information collection and recordkeeping burdens associated with this
NPRM.
Sampling and Testing Plans
PHMSA estimates that there will be approximately 1,538 respondents,
based on a review of relevant active registrations on the PHMSA Hazmat
Intelligence Portal, each submitting an average of one sampling and
testing plan each year. First year hourly burden is estimated at 40
hours per response, or 61,520 burden hours; hourly burden for each
subsequent year is estimated at 10 hours per response, or 15,380 burden
hours. PHMSA assumes a Chemical Engineer is the labor category most
appropriate to describe sampling methodologies, testing protocols, and
present test results. The mean hourly wage for a Chemical Engineer was
$46.02 in May 2013, according to the Bureau of Labor Statistics. We
inflate this wage by 60 percent to account for fringe benefits and
overhead of $27.61 per hour, for a total weighted hourly wage of
$73.63, or $74.30 per hour after adjusting for growth in median real
wages. At an average hourly cost of $74.30 per hour, first year burden
cost for this proposed requirement is estimated at $4,570,936.00;
burden cost for each subsequent year is estimated at $1,142,734.00.
Routing--Collection by Line Segment
PHMSA estimates that there will be approximately 74 respondents (10
for Class II Railroads; 64 for Class III Railroads) each submitting an
average of one routing collection response each year, and each
subsequent year. Hourly burden is assumed to be 40 hours per response,
or 2,960 burden hours each year. PHMSA used a labor rate that combines
two employee groups listed in the Bureau of Labor Statistics May 2012
Industry-Specific Occupational Employment and Wage Estimates: NAICS
482000-Rail Transportation occupational code 11-0000 ``Management
Occupations'' and occupation code 43-6011 ``Executive Secretaries and
Executive Administrative Assistants.'' A combination of these two
groups will probably be utilized to perform the requirements in this
proposed rule. The average annual wages for these groups are $100,820
and $54,520 respectively. The resulting average hourly wage rate,
including a 60 percent increase to account for overhead and fringe
benefits, is $67.96. At an average hourly cost of $67.96 per hour,
burden cost for the first year and each subsequent year is estimated at
$201,161.60.
Routing Security Analysis
For the first year, PHMSA estimates that there will be
approximately 74 respondents (10 for Class II Railroads; 64 for Class
III Railroads). Class II Railroads are expected to submit 50 routing
security analysis responses per year, based on the number of feasible
alternate routes to consider after future possible network changes,
with each response taking approximately 80 hours each, or 4,000 hours.
At an average hourly cost of $67.96 per hour, first year burden cost
for Class II Railroads is estimated at $271,840.00. Class III Railroads
are expected to submit 128 routing security analysis responses per
year, with each response taking approximately 40 hours, or 5,120 hours.
At an average hourly cost of $67.96 per hour, first year burden cost
for Class III Railroads is estimated at $347,955.20.
PHMSA assumes that new route analyses are necessary each year based
on changes in commodity flow, but that after the first year's route
analyses are completed, analyses performed on the same routes in
subsequent years will take less time. For each subsequent year, PHMSA
estimates that there will be approximately 74 respondents (10 for Class
II Railroads; 64 for Class III Railroads). Class II Railroads are
expected to submit 50 routing security analysis responses per year,
with each response taking approximately 16 hours each, or 800 hours. At
an average hourly cost of $67.96 per hour, first year burden cost for
Class II Railroads is estimated at $54,368.00. Class III Railroads are
expected to submit 128 routing security analysis responses per year,
with each response taking approximately 8 hours, or 1,024 hours. At an
average hourly cost of $67.96 per hour, first year burden cost for
Class III Railroads is estimated at $69,591.04.
Incident Reporting
From 2011-2014, PHMSA identified 32 incidents, for an average of 11
incidents per year, involving the derailment and release of crude oil/
ethanol. Each report would be submitted by a single respondent and
would take approximately 2 additional hours to submit per response,
compared to the current requirements. At an average hourly cost of
$67.96 per hour, burden cost is estimated at $1,495.12. We do not
currently have sufficient data to estimate the number of respondents
and responses that would be required if PHMSA extended incident
reporting requirements to derailments not involving a product release.
Total
We estimate that the total information collection and recordkeeping
burden for the requirements as specified in this proposed rule would be
as follows:
OMB No. 2137-XXXX, ``Flammable Hazardous Materials by Rail
Transportation''
First Year Annual Burden:
Total Annual Number of Respondents: 1,612.
Total Annual Responses: 1,801.
Total Annual Burden Hours: 73,622.
Total Annual Burden Cost: $5,393,387.92.
Subsequent Year Burden:
Total Annual Number of Respondents: 1,612.
Total Annual Responses: 1,801.
Total Annual Burden Hours: 20,186.
Total Annual Burden Cost: $1,469,349.76.
In addition to the Paperwork Reduction Act requirements outlined above,
PHMSA seeks comment on whether any other provisions in this rule will
result in additional information collection
[[Page 45073]]
requirements and/or burdens, including but not limited to: Notification
to state emergency response commissions, and tank car design
requirements.
Please direct your requests for a copy of the information
collection to Steven Andrews or T. Glenn Foster, U.S. Department of
Transportation, Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration
(PHMSA), East Building, Office of Hazardous Materials Standards (PHH-
12), 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE., Washington, DC 20590, Telephone (202)
366-8553.
G. Environmental Assessment
The National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA) (42 U.S.C.
section 4321-4375), requires that Federal agencies analyze proposed
actions to determine whether the action will have a significant impact
on the human environment. The Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ)
regulations require Federal agencies to conduct an environmental review
considering (1) the need for the proposed action, (2) alternatives to
the proposed action, (3) probable environmental impacts of the proposed
action and alternatives, and (4) the agencies and persons consulted
during the consideration process. 40 CFR 1508.9.
1. Need for the Proposal
This NPRM is intended to address serious safety and environmental
concerns revealed by various recent train accidents and incidents
involving HHFTs. This NPRM is proposing requirements designed to lessen
the frequency and consequences of train accidents involving the
unintentional release flammable liquids in HHFTs. The growing reliance
on trains to transport large volumes of flammable liquids, particularly
crude oil and ethanol, poses a significant risk to life, property, and
the environment. These significant risks have been highlighted by the
recent instances of trains carrying crude oil that derailed in
Casselton, North Dakota; Aliceville, Alabama; and Lac-M[eacute]gantic,
Quebec, Canada and recent instances of trains carrying ethanol that
derailed in Arcadia, Ohio and Cherry Valley, Illinois. The proposed
changes also address NTSB recommendations on accurate classification,
enhanced tank cars, rail routing, and oversight.
2. Alternatives to the Proposed Action
In proposing this NPRM, PHMSA is considering the following
alternatives:
1. No Action Alternative--If PHMSA chose this alternative, it would
not proceed with any rulemaking on this subject, and the current
regulatory standards would remain in effect.
2. Preferred Alternative--This alternative is the current proposal
as it appears in this NPRM. The proposed amendments are more fully
addressed in the preamble and regulatory text sections. However, they
generally include:
a. New defined term of ``High-hazard flammable train;''
b. Rail Routing requirements as specified in Part 172, Subpart I of
the HMR;
c. Sampling and testing program to ensure proper classification and
characterization;
d. Notification to SERCs or other appropriate state delegated
entity, of petroleum crude oil train transportation;
e. Phase in requirements for updated braking devices and braking
systems;
f. Speed restrictions for rail cars that do not meet the safer DOT
Specification 117 standard (In this NPRM we proposed three alternatives
for differing levels of speed restrictions for trains that do not meet
the DOT Specification 117); and
g. Phase out DOT 111 cars in HHFTs and require DOT Specification
117 for such train sets (In this NPRM we proposed three alternatives
tank car design of the proposed DOT Specification 117).
3. The Alternative Proposed in the ANPRM--This alternative includes
the following substantive provisions as proposed in the ANPRM:
a. Relax regulatory requirements to afford the FRA greater
discretion to authorize the movement of non-conforming tank cars;
b. Impose additional requirements that would correct an unsafe
condition associated with pressure relief valves (PRV) on rail cars
transporting carbon dioxide, refrigerated liquid;
c. Relax regulatory requirements applicable to the repair and
maintenance of DOT Specification 110, DOT Specification 106, and ICC 27
tank car tanks (ton tanks);
d. Relax regulatory requirement for the removal of rupture discs
for inspection if the removal process would damage, change, or alter
the intended operation of the device; and
e. Impose additional requirements that would enhance the standards
for DOT Specification 111 tank cars used to transport Packing Group
(PG) I and II hazardous materials.
3. Probable Environmental Impacts of the Proposed Action and
Alternatives
1. No-Action Alternative
If PHMSA were to select the no-action alternative, current
regulations would remain in place, and no new provisions would be
added. However, the safety and environmental threats that result from
the increasing use of HHFTs would not be addressed. The existing threat
of derailment and resulting fire, as exhibited in serious accidents
like Lac-M[eacute]gantic, Quebec, which resulted in 47 fatalities, and
Aliceville, Alabama, where we estimate that 630,000 gallons of crude
oil entered navigable waters, destroying a significant area of wetland
and forest, would continue. Clean-up is ongoing for both of these
accidents.
2. Preferred Alternative
If PHMSA selects the provisions as proposed in this NPRM, PHMSA
believes that safety and environmental risks would be reduced and that
protections to human health and environmental resources would be
increased.
The proposed application of the existing rail routing requirements
to HHFTs would require that rail carriers consider safety and security
risk factors such as population density along the route;
environmentally-sensitive or significant areas; venues along the route
(stations, events, places of congregation); emergency response
capability along the route; etc., when analyzing and selecting routes
for those trains. PHMSA believes that the use of routes that are less
sensitive could mitigate the safety and environmental consequences of a
train accident and release, were one to occur. It is possible that this
requirement could cause rail carriers to choose routes that are less
direct based on these concerns, potentially increasing the emission of
greenhouse gases. However, PHMSA believes that the reduction in risk to
sensitive areas outweighs a slight increase in greenhouse gases.
Next, the sampling and testing proposal is intended to ensure that
each material is properly classified to ensure that: (1) The proper
regulatory requirements are applied to each shipment to minimize the
risk of incident, (2) first responders have accurate information in the
event of a train accident, and (3) the characteristics of the material
are known and fully considered so that offerors and carriers are aware
of and can mitigate potential threats to the integrity of rail tank
cars. PHMSA believes that this provision will reduce the risk of
release of these materials.
PHMSA is proposing to require railroads that operate trains
containing one million gallons of Bakken crude oil to notify SERCs or
other appropriate state delegated entity about the operation of these
trains through their
[[Page 45074]]
States. Railroads must identify each county, or a particular state or
commonwealth's equivalent jurisdiction in the state through which the
trains will operate. PHMSA believes that the notification will allow
communities to better prepare and work with the railroads to ensure
that resources are in place to respond to a spill that could affect
water and environmental resources. As a result, responders can better
mitigate a spill that has entered navigable waters by preventing
further spread of the oil. This prevents further damage to drinking
water resources and wildlife habitat.
PHMSA believes that the proposed braking and speed restrictions,
especially for older DOT Specification 111 tank cars, will reduce the
likelihood of train accidents and resulting release of flammable
liquids. PHMSA also believes that the braking requirements could
improve fuel efficiency, thereby reducing greenhouse gas emissions.
Additionally, system wide implementation of ECP brakes, as proposed for
a DOT Specification 117 manufactured under tank car Option 1, would
improve the efficiency of the rail system by permitting trains to run
closer together because of the improved performance of the brake
system.
PHMSA believes that the phasing out of DOT Specification 111 tank
cars in HHFTs would reduce risk of release because of the improved
integrity and safety features of the proposed DOT Specification 117 and
117P. The DOT Specification 117 will provide bottom outlet protection
and a robust top fitting protection structure. To improve integrity and
puncture resistance of the tank, DOT Specification 117 has a full-
height \1/2\ inch minimum thickness head shield, an 11-gauge jacket,
and, based on the Option, either a \7/16\ inch or \9/16\ inch shell and
head thickness in comparison to DOT Specification 111, which has no
head shield, or jacket requirement and is constructed with a \7/16\
inch thick shell.
The proposed DOT Specification 117 tank car must have a thermal
protection system, capable of surviving a 100-minute pool fire after a
train accident. The 100-minute survivability period is intended to
provide emergency responders time to assess an accident, establish
perimeters, and evacuate the public as needed, while permitting
hazardous material to be vented from the tank to prevent a violent
failure of the tank car. This thermal protection is critical in
limiting human health risks to the public and first responders and
limiting environmental damage in the event of a train accident. The
introduction of the new DOT Specification 117 and 117P, along with the
gradual phase out of the DOT Specification 111 used in HHFTs will
result in increased manufacture of new tank cars. While the gradual
nature of the phase out is intended to decrease burden on the rail
industry, increased manufacture could result in greater release of
greenhouse gases and use of resources needed to make the cars, such as
steel. However, PHMSA believes that these possible risks are far
outweighed by the increased safety and integrity of each railcar and
each train and the decreased risk of release of these fossil fuels to
the environment.
3. ANPRM Alternative
If PHMSA were to select the provisions as proposed in the ANPRM,
PHMSA believes that the significant safety risks that have recently
come to light resulting from HHFTs would not be fully addressed. While
the ANPRM proposed safety enhancements to DOT Specification 111 tank
cars, public comments and current events have led PHMSA to believe that
the gradual phase-out of the tank car in HHFT service is a more prudent
alternative to improve safety. The ANPRM also sought comment on certain
speed restrictions and braking equipment, which was helpful to PHMSA in
drafting the current proposal.
The ANPRM also sought comment on various matters that are not
directly related to the increasing threats described in this document
and will be addressed at another time as those provisions do not
address the modified purpose and need of this rulemaking.
Agencies Consulted
PHMSA worked closely with the FRA, EPA, and DHS/TSA in the
development of this proposed rulemaking for technical and policy
guidance. PHMSA also considered the views expressed in comments to the
ANPRM submitted by members of the public, state and local governments,
and industry.
Conclusion
The provisions of this proposed rule build on current regulatory
requirements to enhance the transportation safety and security of
shipments of hazardous materials transported by rail, thereby reducing
the risks of an accidental or intentional release of hazardous
materials and consequent environmental damage. PHMSA believes the net
environmental impact will be positive. PHMSA believes that there are no
significant environmental impacts associated with this proposed rule.
PHMSA welcomes any views, data, or information related to
environmental impacts that may result if the proposed requirements are
adopted, as well as possible alternatives and their environmental
impacts.
H. Privacy Act
Anyone is able to search the electronic form of any written
communications and comments received into any of our dockets by the
name of the individual submitting the document (or signing the
document, if submitted on behalf of an association, business, labor
union, etc.). You may review DOT's complete Privacy Act Statement,
published in the Federal Register on April 11, 2000 (65 FR 19477) or
you may visit http://www.dot.gov/privacy.html.
I. Executive Order 13609 and International Trade Analysis
Under Executive Order 13609, agencies must consider whether the
impacts associated with significant variations between domestic and
international regulatory approaches are unnecessary or may impair the
ability of American businesses to export and compete internationally.
In meeting shared challenges involving health, safety, labor, security,
environmental, and other issues, regulatory approaches developed
through international cooperation can provide equivalent protection to
standards developed independently while also minimizing unnecessary
differences.
Similarly, the Trade Agreements Act of 1979 (Pub. L. 96-39), as
amended by the Uruguay Round Agreements Act (Pub. L. 103-465),
prohibits Federal agencies from establishing any standards or engaging
in related activities that create unnecessary obstacles to the foreign
commerce of the United States. For purposes of these requirements,
Federal agencies may participate in the establishment of international
standards, so long as the standards have a legitimate domestic
objective, such as providing for safety, and do not operate to exclude
imports that meet this objective. The statute also requires
consideration of international standards and, where appropriate, that
they be the basis for U.S. standards.
PHMSA participates in the establishment of international standards
in order to protect the safety of the American public, and we have
assessed the effects of the proposed rule to ensure that it does not
cause unnecessary obstacles to foreign trade. Accordingly, this
rulemaking is consistent with Executive Order 13609
[[Page 45075]]
and PHMSA's obligations under the Trade Agreement Act, as amended.
PHMSA welcomes any data or information related to international
impacts that may result if the petitions and recommendations are
adopted, as well as possible alternatives and their international
impacts. Please describe the impacts and the basis for the comment.
J. Statutory/Legal Authority for This Rulemaking
This NPRM is published under the authority of 49 U.S.C. 5103(b),
which authorizes the Secretary of Transportation to ``prescribe
regulations for the safe transportation, including security, of
hazardous materials in intrastate, interstate, and foreign commerce.''
The proposed changes in this rule address safety and security
vulnerabilities regarding the transportation of hazardous materials in
commerce.
K. Regulation Identifier Number (RIN)
A regulation identifier number (RIN) is assigned to each regulatory
action listed in the Unified Agenda of Federal Regulations. The
Regulatory Information Service Center publishes the Unified Agenda in
April and October of each year. The RIN contained in the heading of
this document can be used to cross-reference this action with the
Unified Agenda.
List of Subjects
49 CFR Part 171
Exports, Hazardous materials transportation, Hazardous waste,
Imports, Reporting and recordkeeping requirements.
49 CFR Part 172
Hazardous materials transportation, Hazardous waste, Labeling,
Packaging and containers, Reporting and recordkeeping requirements,
Security measures.
49 CFR Part 173
Hazardous materials transportation, Packaging and containers,
Radioactive materials, Reporting and recordkeeping requirements,
Uranium.
49 CFR Part 174
Hazardous materials transportation, Rail carriers, Reporting and
recordkeeping requirements, Security measures.
49 CFR Part 179
Hazardous materials transportation, Railroad safety, Reporting and
recordkeeping requirements.
The Proposed Rule
In consideration of the foregoing, we are proposing to amend title
49, chapter I, subchapter C, as follows:
PART 171--GENERAL INFORMATION, REGULATIONS, AND DEFINITIONS
0
1. The authority citation for part 171 continues to read as follows:
Authority: 49 U.S.C. 5101-5128, 44701; Pub. L. 101-410 section
4 (28 U.S.C. 2461 note); Pub. L. 104-121, sections 212-213; Pub. L.
104-134, section 31001; 49 CFR 1.81 and 1.97.
0
2. In Sec. 171.7, revise paragraphs (k)(2) through (4), and add
paragraph (k)(5) to read as follows:
Sec. 171.7 Reference material.
* * * * *
(k) * * *
(1) * * *
(2) AAR Manual of Standards and Recommended Practices, Section C--
III, Specifications for Tank Cars, Specification M-1002 (AAR
Specifications for Tank Cars), Appendix E, April 2010; into Sec. Sec.
179.203-9; 179.203-11(f); 179.204-9; 179.204-11(f).
(3) AAR Manual of Standards and Recommended Practices, Section I,
Specially Equipped Freight Car and Intermodal Equipment, 1988, into
Sec. 174.55; 174.63.
(4) AAR Specifications for Design, Fabrication and Construction of
Freight Cars, Volume 1, 1988, into Sec. 179.16.
(5) AAR Standard 286; AAR Manual of Standards and Recommended
Practices, Section C, Car Construction Fundamentals and Details,
Standard S-286, Free/Unrestricted Interchange for 286,000 lb Gross Rail
Load Cars (Adopted 2002; Revised: 2003, 2005, 2006), into Sec. 179.13.
* * * * *
0
3. In Sec. 171.8 a definition for ``High-hazard flammable train'' is
added in alphabetical order to read as follows:
Sec. 171.8 Definitions.
* * * * *
High-hazard flammable train means a single train carrying 20 or
more carloads of a Class 3 flammable liquid.
* * * * *
PART 172--HAZARDOUS MATERIALS TABLE, SPECIAL PROVISIONS, HAZARDOUS
MATERIALS COMMUNICATIONS, EMERGENCY RESPONSE INFORMATION, TRAINING
REQUIREMENTS, AND SECURITY PLANS
0
4. The authority citation for part 172 continues to read as follows:
Authority: 49 U.S.C. 5101-5128; 44701; 49 CFR 1.81 and 1.97.
0
5. In Sec. 172.820, paragraph (a)(4) is added to read as follows:
Sec. 172.820 Additional planning requirements for transportation by
rail.
(a) * * *
(4) A high-hazard flammable train as defined in Sec. 171.8 of this
subchapter.
* * * * *
PART 173--SHIPPERS--GENERAL REQUIREMENTS FOR SHIPMENTS AND
PACKAGINGS
0
6. The authority citation for part 173 continues to read as follows:
Authority: 49 U.S.C. 5101-5128, 44701; 49 CFR 1.81 and 1.97.
0
7. Add new Sec. 173.41 to subpart B to read as follows:
Sec. 173.41 Sampling and testing program for mined gas and liquid.
(a) General. Mined gases and liquids, such as petroleum crude oil,
extracted from the earth and offered for transportation must be
properly classed and characterized as prescribed in Sec. 173.22, in
accordance with a sampling and testing program which specifies at a
minimum:
(1) A frequency of sampling and testing that accounts for
appreciable variability of the material, including the time,
temperature, method of extraction (including chemical use), and
location of extraction;
(2) Sampling at various points along the supply chain to understand
the variability of the material during transportation;
(3) Sampling methods that ensure a representative sample of the
entire mixture, as packaged, is collected;
(4) Testing methods that enable complete analysis, classification,
and characterization of the material under the HMR.
(5) Statistical justification for sample frequencies;
(6) Duplicate samples for quality assurance purposes; and
(7) Criteria for modifying the sampling and testing program.
(b) Certification. Each person who offers a hazardous material for
transportation shall certify, as prescribed by Sec. 172.204 of this
subchapter, that the material is offered for transportation in
accordance with this subchapter, including the requirements prescribed
by paragraph (a) of this section.
(c) Documentation, retention, review, dissemination of program. The
sampling and testing program must be documented in writing and must be
retained for as long as it remains in effect. The sampling and testing
[[Page 45076]]
program must be reviewed at least annually and revised and/or updated
as necessary to reflect changing circumstances. The most recent version
of the sampling and testing program, or relevant portions thereof, must
be available to the employees who are responsible for implementing it.
When the sampling and testing program is updated or revised, all
employees responsible for implementing it must be notified, and all
copies of the sampling and testing program must be maintained as of the
date of the most recent revision.
(d) Access by DOT to copy of program documentation. Each person
required to develop and implement a sampling and testing program must
maintain a copy of the sampling and testing program documentation (or
an electronic file thereof) that is accessible at, or through, its
principal place of business, and must make the documentation available
upon request at a reasonable time and location to an authorized
official of the Department of Transportation.
0
8. In Sec. 173.241, revise paragraph (a) to read as follows:
Sec. 173.241 Bulk packagings for certain low-hazard liquid and solid
materials.
* * * * *
(a) Rail cars: Class DOT 103, 104, 105, 109, 111, 112, 114, 115,
117, or 120 tank car tanks; Class 106 or 110 multi-unit tank car tanks;
and AAR Class 203W, 206W, and 211W tank car tanks. Additional
operational requirements apply to high-hazard flammable trains (see
Sec. 171.8 of this subchapter) as prescribed in Sec. 174.310 of this
subchapter. Notwithstanding the tank car specifications prescribed in
this section, DOT Specification 111 tank cars are no longer authorized
for Class 3 (flammable liquids) in Packing Group III for use in high-
hazard flammable train service, after October 1, 2020.
* * * * *
0
9. In Sec. 173.242 revise paragraph (a) to read as follows:
Sec. 173.242 Bulk packagings for certain medium hazard liquids and
solids, including solids with dual hazards.
* * * * *
(a) Rail cars: Class DOT 103, 104, 105, 109, 111, 112, 114, 115,
117, or 120 tank car tanks; Class 106 or 110 multi-unit tank car tanks
and AAR Class 206W tank car tanks. Additional operational requirements
apply to high-hazard flammable trains (see Sec. 171.8 of this
subchapter) as prescribed in Sec. 174.310 of this subchapter.
Notwithstanding the tank car specifications prescribed in this section,
DOT Specification 111 tank cars are no longer authorized for use in
high-hazard flammable train service, based on packing group, after the
following dates:
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Packing group DOT 111 not authorized after
------------------------------------------------------------------------
II.................................... October 1, 2018.
III................................... October 1, 2020.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
* * * * *
0
10. In Sec. 173.243 revise paragraph (a) to read as follows:
Sec. 173.243 Bulk packaging for certain high-hazard liquids and dual-
hazard materials that pose a moderate hazard.
* * * * *
(a) Rail cars: Class DOT 103, 104, 105, 109, 111, 112, 114, 115,
117, or 120 fusion-welded tank car tanks; and Class 106 or 110 multi-
unit tank car tanks. Additional operational requirements apply to high-
hazard flammable trains (see Sec. 171.8 of this subchapter) as
prescribed in Sec. 174.310 of this subchapter. Notwithstanding the
tank car specifications prescribed in this section, DOT Specification
111 tank cars are no longer authorized for Class 3 (flammable liquids)
in Packing Group I for use in high-hazard flammable train service,
after October 1, 2017.
* * * * *
PART 174--CARRIAGE BY RAIL
0
11. The authority citation for part 174 continues to read as follows:
Authority: 49 U.S.C. 5101-5128; 49 CFR 1.81 and 1.97.
0
12. Add new Sec. 174.310 to subpart G to read as follows:
Sec. 174.310 Requirements for the operation of high-hazard flammable
trains.
(a) General. Each rail carrier operating a high-hazard flammable
train (as defined in Sec. 171.8 of this subchapter) must comply with
each of the following additional safety requirements with respect to
each high-hazard flammable train that it operates:
(1) Routing. The additional planning requirements for
transportation by rail in accordance with part 172, subpart I of this
subchapter;
(2) Notification to State Emergency Response Commissions of
petroleum crude oil train transportation. (i) Any railroad transporting
in a single train 1,000,000 gallons or more of UN 1267, Petroleum crude
oil, Class 3, as described by Sec. 172.101 of this subchapter and
sourced from the Bakken shale formation in the Williston Basin (North
Dakota, South Dakota, and Montana in the United States, or Saskatchewan
or Manitoba in Canada), must, within 30 days of [EFFECTIVE DATE OF
FINAL RULE], provide notification to the State Emergency Response
Commission (SERC) or other appropriate state delegated entities in
which it operates. Information required to be shared with SERCs or
other appropriate state delegated entity must consist of the following:
(A) A reasonable estimate of the number of affected trains that are
expected to travel, per week, through each county within the State;
(B) The routes over which the affected trains will be transported;
(C) A description of the petroleum crude oil and applicable
emergency response information required by subparts C and G of part 172
of this subchapter; and,
(D) At least one point of contact at the railroad (including name,
title, phone number and address) responsible for serving as the point
of contact for the State Emergency Response Commission and relevant
emergency responders related to the railroad's transportation of
affected trains.
(ii) Railroads shall update notifications made under paragraph (a)
of this section prior to making any material changes in the estimated
volumes or frequencies of trains traveling through a county.
(iii) Copies of railroad notifications to State Emergency Response
Commissions made under paragraph (a) of this section must be made
available to FRA upon request.
(3) Speed restrictions. All trains are limited to a maximum speed
of 50 mph. In addition, the following restrictions apply:
(i) Option 1--The train is further limited to a maximum speed of 40
mph, unless all tank cars containing a flammable liquid meet or exceed
the standard for the DOT Specification 117 tank car provided in part
179, subpart D of this subchapter;
(ii) Option 2--The train is further limited to a maximum speed of
40 mph while operating in an area, determined by census population
data, that has a population of more than 100,000 people, unless all
tank cars containing a flammable liquid meet or exceed the standard for
the DOT Specification 117 tank car provided in part 179, subpart D of
this subchapter; and
(iii) Option 3--The train is further limited to a maximum speed of
40 mph while that train travels within the limits of high-threat urban
areas (HTUAs) as defined in Sec. 1580.3 of this title, unless all tank
cars containing a flammable liquid meet or exceed the standard for the
DOT Specification 117 tank car provided in part 179, subpart D of this
subchapter.
[[Page 45077]]
(iv) The train is further limited to a maximum speed of 30 mph,
unless it conforms with paragraph (a)(4) of this section.
(4) Braking. (i) The train must be equipped and operated with
either a two-way end of train device, as defined in Sec. 232.5 of this
title, or a distributed power (DP) system, as defined in Sec. 229.5 of
this title.
(ii) After October 1, 2015, a train comprised entirely of tank cars
manufactured in accordance with proposed Sec. 179.202 or the
performance specification prescribed in Sec. 179.202-11 (Option 1
only), except for required buffer cars, must be operated in ECP brake
mode as defined by 49 CFR 232.5.
(5) Tank cars manufactured after October 1, 2015. (i) A tank car
manufactured for use in a HHFT after October 1, 2015 must meet DOT
Specification 117, in part 179, subpart D of this subchapter.
(ii) A tank car manufactured for use in a HHFT after October 1,
2015, in accordance with proposed Sec. 179.202 or the performance
specification prescribed in Sec. 179.202-11 (Option 1), must be
equipped with ECP brakes in accordance with subpart G of part 232 of
this title.
(b) [Reserved]
PART 179--SPECIFICATIONS FOR TANK CARS
0
13. The authority citation for part 179 continues to read as follows:
Authority: 49 U.S.C. 5101-5128; 49 CFR 1.81 and 1.97.
Subpart D-Specifications for Non-Pressure Tank Car Tanks (Classes
DOT-111AW, 115AW, and 117AW)
Option 1
0
14. Add Sec. Sec. 179.202 through 179.202-11 to subpart D of part 179,
to read as follows:
Sec. 179.202 Individual specification requirements applicable to DOT-
117 tank car tanks.
Sec. 179.202-1 Applicability.
Each tank built under these specifications must conform to either
the requirements of Sec. Sec. 179.202-1 through 179.202-10, or the
performance standard requirements of Sec. 179.202-11.
Sec. 179.202-3 Type.
(a) General. The tank car must either be designed to the DOT 117
specification in Sec. 179.202 or conform to the performance
specification prescribed in Sec. 179.202-11.
(b) Approval. The tank car design must be approved by the Associate
Administrator for Railroad Safety/Chief Safety Officer, Federal
Railroad Administration, FRA, 1200 New Jersey Ave. SE., Washington, DC
20590, and must be constructed to the conditions of that approval in
accordance with Sec. 179.13.
(c) Design. The design must meet the individual specification
requirements of Sec. 179.202.
Sec. 179.202-4 Thickness of plates.
The wall thickness after forming of the tank shell and heads must
be, at a minimum, 9/16 of an inch AAR TC-128 Grade B, in accordance
with Sec. 179.200-7(b).
Sec. 179.202-5 Tank head puncture resistance system.
The DOT 117 specification tank car must have a tank head puncture
resistance system. The full height head shields must have a minimum
thickness of \1/2\ inch.
Sec. 179.202-6 Thermal protection systems.
The DOT 117 specification tank car must have a thermal protection
system. The thermal protection system must be designed in accordance
with Sec. 179.18 and include a reclosing pressure relief device in
accordance with Sec. 173.31 of this subchapter.
Sec. 179.202-7 Jackets.
The entire thermal protection system must be covered with a metal
jacket of a thickness not less than 11 gauge A1011 steel or equivalent;
and flashed around all openings so as to be weather tight. The exterior
surface of a carbon steel tank and the inside surface of a carbon steel
jacket must be given a protective coating.
Sec. 179.202-8 Bottom outlets.
If the tank car is equipped with a bottom outlet, the handle must
be removed prior to train movement or be designed with protection
safety system(s) to prevent unintended actuation during train accident
scenarios.
Sec. 179.202-9 Top fittings protection.
The DOT 117 tank car must be equipped with a top fittings
protection system and a nozzle capable of sustaining, without failure,
a rollover accident at a speed of 9 miles per hour, in which the
rolling protective housing strikes a stationary surface assumed to be
flat, level, and rigid and the speed is determined as a linear
velocity, measured at the geometric center of the loaded tank car as a
transverse vector. Failure is deemed to occur when the deformed
protective housing contacts any of the service equipment or when the
tank lading retention capability is compromised (e.g., leaking).
Sec. 179.202-10 DOT 117 design.
The following is an overview of design requirements for a DOT
Specification 117 tank car.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Bursting Minimum plate
DOT specification Insulation pressure thickness Test pressure Bottom
(psig) (Inches) (psig) outlet
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
117A100W..................... Optional........ 500 9/16 100 Optional.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Sec. 179.202-11 Performance standard requirements.
(a) Approval. Design, testing, and modeling results must be
reviewed and approved by the Associate Administrator for Railroad
Safety/Chief Safety Officer, Federal Railroad Administration (FRA),
1200 New Jersey Ave. SE., Washington, DC 20590.
(b) Approval to operate at 286,000 gross rail load (GRL). In
addition to the requirements of paragraph (a) of this section, the tank
car design must be approved, and the tank car must be constructed to
the conditions of an approval issued by the Associate Administrator for
Railroad Safety/Chief Safety Officer, FRA, in accordance with Sec.
179.13.
(c) Puncture resistance.
(1) Minimum side impact speed: 12 mph when impacted at the
longitudinal and vertical center of the shell by a rigid 12-inch by 12-
inch indenter with a weight of 286,000 pounds.
(2) Minimum head impact speed: 18 mph when impacted at the center
of the head by a rigid 12-inch by 12-inch indenter with a weight of
286,000 pounds.
(d) Thermal protection systems. The tank car must be equipped with
a thermal protection system. The thermal protection system must be
designed in accordance with Sec. 179.18 and include a
[[Page 45078]]
reclosing pressure relief device in accordance with Sec. 173.31 of
this subchapter.
(e) Bottom outlet. If the tank car is equipped with a bottom
outlet, the handle must be removed prior to train movement or be
designed with protection safety system(s) to prevent unintended
actuation during train accident scenarios.
(f) Top fittings protection--(1) New construction. Tank car tanks
must be equipped with a top fittings protection system and a nozzle
capable of sustaining, without failure, a rollover accident at a speed
of 9 miles per hour, in which the rolling protective housing strikes a
stationary surface assumed to be flat, level, and rigid and the speed
is determined as a linear velocity, measured at the geometric center of
the loaded tank car as a transverse vector. Failure is deemed to occur
when the deformed protective housing contacts any of the service
equipment or when the tank car lading retention capability is
compromised (e.g., leaking).
(2) Existing tank cars. Existing tank car tanks may continue to
rely on the equipment installed at the time of manufacture.
Option 2
0
15. Add Sec. Sec. 179.203 through 179.203-11 to subpart D of part 179,
to read as follows:
Sec. 179.203 Individual specification requirements applicable to DOT-
117 tank car tanks.
Sec. 179.203-1 Applicability.
Each tank built under these specifications must conform to either
the requirements of Sec. Sec. 179.203 through 179.203-10, or the
performance standard requirements of Sec. 179.203-11.
Sec. 179.203-3 Type.
(a) General. The tank car must either be designed to the DOT 117
specification or conform to the performance specification prescribed in
Sec. 179.203.
(b) Approval. The tank car design must be approved by the Associate
Administrator for Railroad Safety/Chief Safety Officer, Federal
Railroad Administration, FRA, 1200 New Jersey Ave. SE., Washington, DC
20590, and must be constructed to the conditions of that approval in
accordance with Sec. 179.13.
(c) Design. The design must meet the individual specification
requirements of Sec. 179.203.
Sec. 179.203-4 Thickness of plates.
The wall thickness after forming of the tank shell and heads must
be, at a minimum, \9/16\ of an inch AAR TC-128 Grade B, in accordance
with Sec. 179.200-7(b).
Sec. 179.203-5 Tank head puncture resistance system.
The DOT 117 specification tank car must have a tank head puncture
resistance system. The full height head shields must have a minimum
thickness of \1/2\ inch.
Sec. 179.203-6 Thermal protection systems.
The DOT 117 specification tank car must have a thermal protection
system. The thermal protection system must be designed in accordance
with Sec. 179.18 and include a reclosing pressure relief device in
accordance with Sec. 173.31 of this subchapter.
Sec. 179.203-7 Jackets.
The entire thermal protection system must be covered with a metal
jacket of a thickness not less than 11 gauge A1011 steel or equivalent;
and flashed around all openings so as to be weather tight. The exterior
surface of a carbon steel tank and the inside surface of a carbon steel
jacket must be given a protective coating.
Sec. 179.203-8 Bottom outlets.
If the tank car is equipped with a bottom outlet, the handle must
be removed prior to train movement or be designed with protection
safety system(s) to prevent unintended actuation during train accident
scenarios.
Sec. 179.203-9 Top fittings protection.
The tank car tank must be equipped per AAR Specifications Tank
Cars, appendix E paragraph 10.2.1 (IBR, see Sec. 171.7 of this
subchapter).
Sec. 179.203-10 DOT 117 design.
The following is an overview of design requirements for a DOT
Specification 117 tank car.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Bursting Minimum plate
DOT specification Insulation pressure thickness Test pressure Bottom
(psig) (inches) (psig) outlet
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
117A100W..................... Optional........ 500 9/16 100 Optional.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Sec. 179.203-11 Performance standard requirements.
(a) Approval. Design, testing, and modeling results must be
reviewed and approved by the Associate Administrator for Railroad
Safety/Chief Safety Officer, Federal Railroad Administration (FRA),
1200 New Jersey Ave. SE., Washington, DC 20590.
(b) Approval to operate at 286,000 gross rail load (GRL). In
addition to the requirements of paragraph (a) of this section, the tank
car design must be approved, and the tank car must be constructed to
the conditions of an approval issued by the Associate Administrator for
Railroad Safety/Chief Safety Officer, FRA, in accordance with Sec.
179.13.
(c) Puncture resistance.
(1) Minimum side impact speed: 12 mph when impacted at the
longitudinal and vertical center of the shell by a rigid 12-inch by 12-
inch indenter with a weight of 286,000 pounds.
(2) Minimum head impact speed: 18 mph when impacted at the center
of the head by a rigid 12-inch by 12-inch indenter with a weight of
286,000 pounds.
(d) Thermal protection systems. The tank car must be equipped with
a thermal protection system. The thermal protection system must be
designed in accordance with Sec. 179.18 and include a reclosing
pressure relief device in accordance with Sec. 173.31 of this
subchapter.
(e) Bottom outlet. If the tank car is equipped with a bottom
outlet, the handle must be removed prior to train movement or be
designed with protection safety system(s) to prevent unintended
actuation during train accident scenarios.
(f) Top fittings protection.
(1) New construction. The tank car tank must be equipped per AAR
Specifications Tank Cars, appendix E paragraph 10.2.1 (IBR, see Sec.
171.7 of this subchapter).
(2) Existing tank cars. Existing tank car tanks may continue to
rely on the equipment installed at the time of manufacture.
Option 3
0
16. Add Sec. Sec. 179.204 through 179.204-11 to subpart D of part 179,
to read as follows:
[[Page 45079]]
Sec. 179.204 Individual specification requirements applicable to DOT-
117 tank car tanks.
Sec. 179.204-1 Applicability.
Each tank built under these specifications must conform to either
the requirements of Sec. Sec. 179. 204-1 through 179.204-10, or the
performance standard requirements of Sec. 179.204-11.
Sec. 179.204-3 Type.
(a) General. The tank car must either be designed to the DOT 117
specification or conform to the performance specification prescribed in
Sec. 179.204-11.
(b) Approval. The tank car design must be approved by the Associate
Administrator for Railroad Safety/Chief Safety Officer, Federal
Railroad Administration, FRA, 1200 New Jersey Ave. SE., Washington, DC
20590, and must be constructed to the conditions of that approval in
accordance with Sec. 179.13.
(c) Design. The design must meet the individual specification
requirements of Sec. 179.204.
Sec. 179.204-4 Thickness of plates.
The wall thickness after forming of the tank shell and heads must
be, at a minimum, \7/16\ of an inch AAR TC-128 Grade B, in accordance
with Sec. 179.200-7(b).
Sec. 179.204-5 Tank head puncture resistance system.
The DOT 117 specification tank car must have a tank head puncture
resistance system. The full height head shields must have a minimum
thickness of \1/2\ inch.
Sec. 179.204-6 Thermal protection systems.
The DOT 117 specification tank car must have a thermal protection
system. The thermal protection system must be designed in accordance
with Sec. 179.18 and include a reclosing pressure relief device in
accordance with Sec. 173.31 of this subchapter.
Sec. 179.204-7 Jackets.
The entire thermal protection system must be covered with a metal
jacket of a thickness not less than 11 gauge A1011 steel or equivalent;
and flashed around all openings so as to be weather tight. The exterior
surface of a carbon steel tank and the inside surface of a carbon steel
jacket must be given a protective coating.
Sec. 179.204-8 Bottom outlets.
If the tank car is equipped with a bottom outlet, the handle must
be removed prior to train movement or be designed with protection
safety system(s) to prevent unintended actuation during train accident
scenarios.
Sec. 179.204-9 Top fittings protection.
The tank car tank must be equipped per AAR Specifications Tank
Cars, appendix E paragraph 10.2.1 (IBR, see Sec. 171.7 of this
subchapter).
Sec. 179.204-10 DOT 117 design.
The following is an overview of design requirements for a DOT
Specification 117 tank car.
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Minimum plate
DOT specification Insulation Bursting thickness Test pressure Bottom outlet
pressure (psig) (inches) (psig)
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117A100W............. Optional............ 500 7/16 100 Optional.
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Sec. 179.204-11 Performance standard requirements.
(a) Approval. Design, testing, and modeling results must be
reviewed and approved by the Associate Administrator for Railroad
Safety/Chief Safety Officer, Federal Railroad Administration (FRA),
1200 New Jersey Ave. SE., Washington, DC 20590.
(b) Approval to operate at 286,000 gross rail load (GRL). In
addition to the requirements of paragraph (a) of this section, the tank
car design must be approved, and the tank car must be constructed to
the conditions of an approval issued by the Associate Administrator for
Railroad Safety/Chief Safety Officer, FRA, in accordance with Sec.
179.13.
(c) Puncture resistance.
(1) Minimum side impact speed: 9 mph when impacted at the
longitudinal and vertical center of the shell by a rigid 12-inch by 12-
inch indenter with a weight of 286,000 pounds.
(2) Minimum head impact speed: 17 mph when impacted at the center
of the head by a rigid 12-inch by 12-inch indenter with a weight of
286,000 pounds.
(d) Thermal protection systems. The tank car must be equipped with
a thermal protection system. The thermal protection system must be
designed in accordance with Sec. 179.18 and include a reclosing
pressure relief device in accordance with Sec. 173.31 of this
subchapter.
(e) Bottom outlet. If the tank car is equipped with a bottom
outlet, the handle must be removed prior to train movement or be
designed with protection safety system(s) to prevent unintended
actuation during train accident scenarios.
(f) Top fittings protection.
(1) New construction. The tank car tank must be equipped per AAR
Specifications Tank Cars, appendix E paragraph 10.2.1 (IBR, see Sec.
171.7 of this subchapter).
(2) Existing tank cars. Existing tank car tanks may continue to
rely on the equipment installed at the time of manufacture.
Issued in Washington, DC, on July 23, 2014, under authority
delegated in 49 CFR 1.97.
Anthony R. Foxx,
Secretary of Transportation.
[FR Doc. 2014-17764 Filed 7-31-14; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-60-P