[Federal Register Volume 79, Number 159 (Monday, August 18, 2014)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Pages 48709-48716]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2014-19421]
=======================================================================
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION
17 CFR Part 275
[Release No. IA-3893; File No. S7-23-07]
RIN 3235-AL56
Temporary Rule Regarding Principal Trades With Certain Advisory
Clients
AGENCY: Securities and Exchange Commission.
ACTION: Proposed rule.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
SUMMARY: The Securities and Exchange Commission is proposing to amend
rule 206(3)-3T under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, a temporary
rule that establishes an alternative means for investment advisers that
are registered with the Commission as broker-dealers to meet the
requirements of section 206(3) of the Investment Advisers Act when they
act in a principal capacity in transactions with certain of their
advisory clients. The amendment would extend the date on which rule
206(3)-3T will sunset from December 31, 2014 to December 31, 2016.
DATES: Comments must be received on or before September 17, 2014.
ADDRESSES: Comments may be submitted by any of the following methods:
Electronic Comments
Use the Commission's Internet comment form (http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed.shtml); or
Send an email to [email protected]. Please include
File Number S7-23-07 on the subject line; or
Use the Federal eRulemaking Portal (http://www.regulations.gov). Follow the instructions for submitting comments.
Paper Comments
Send paper comments to Secretary, Securities and Exchange
Commission, 100 F Street NE., Washington, DC 20549-1090.
All submissions should refer to File Number S7-23-07. This file number
should be included on the subject line if email is used. To help us
process and review your comments more efficiently, please use only one
method. The Commission will post all comments on the Commission's
Internet Web site (http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed.shtml). Comments
are also available for Web site viewing and printing in the
Commission's Public Reference Room, 100 F Street NE., Washington, DC
20549, on official business days between the hours of 10:00 a.m. and
3:00 p.m. All comments received will be posted without change; we do
not edit personal identifying information from submissions. You should
submit only information that you wish to make available publicly.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Melissa S. Gainor, Senior Counsel,
Sarah A. Buescher, Branch Chief, or Daniel S. Kahl, Assistant Director,
at (202) 551-6787 or [email protected], Investment Adviser Regulation
Office, Division of Investment Management, U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission, 100 F Street NE., Washington, DC 20549-8549.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The Securities and Exchange Commission is
proposing an amendment to temporary rule 206(3)-3T [17 CFR 275.206(3)-
3T] under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 [15 U.S.C. 80b] that
would extend the date on which the rule will sunset from December 31,
2014 to December 31, 2016.
I. Background
On September 24, 2007, we adopted, on an interim final basis, rule
206(3)-3T, a temporary rule under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940
(the ``Advisers Act'') that provides an alternative means for
investment advisers that are registered with us as broker-dealers to
meet the requirements of section 206(3) of the Advisers Act when they
act in a principal capacity in transactions with certain of their
advisory clients.\1\ The purpose of the rule was to permit broker-
dealers to sell to their advisory clients, in the wake of Financial
Planning Association v. SEC (the ``FPA Decision''),\2\ certain
securities held in the proprietary accounts of their firms that might
not be available on an agency basis--or might be available on an agency
basis only on less attractive terms \3\--while protecting clients from
conflicts of interest as a result of such transactions.\4\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Rule 206(3)-3T [17 CFR 275.206(3)-3T]. All references to
rule 206(3)-3T and the various sections thereof in this release are
to 17 CFR 275.206(3)-3T and its corresponding sections. See also
Temporary Rule Regarding Principal Trades with Certain Advisory
Clients, Investment Advisers Act Release No. 2653 (Sep. 24, 2007)
[72 FR 55022 (Sep. 28, 2007)] (``2007 Principal Trade Rule
Release'').
\2\ 482 F.3d 481 (D.C. Cir. 2007). In the FPA Decision, handed
down on March 30, 2007, the Court of Appeals for the DC Circuit
vacated (subject to a subsequent stay until October 1, 2007) rule
202(a)(11)-1 under the Advisers Act. Rule 202(a)(11)-1 provided,
among other things, that fee-based brokerage accounts were not
advisory accounts and were thus not subject to the Advisers Act. For
further discussion of fee-based brokerage accounts, see 2007
Principal Trade Rule Release, Section I.
\3\ See 2007 Principal Trade Rule Release at nn.19-20 and
Section VI.C.
\4\ As a consequence of the FPA Decision, broker-dealers
offering fee-based brokerage accounts with an advisory component
became subject to the Advisers Act with respect to those accounts,
and the client relationship became fully subject to the Advisers
Act. These broker-dealers--to the extent they wanted to continue to
offer fee-based accounts and met the requirements for registration--
had to: Register as investment advisers, if they had not done so
already; act as fiduciaries with respect to those clients; disclose
all material conflicts of interest; and otherwise fully comply with
the Advisers Act, including the restrictions on principal trading
contained in section 206(3) of the Act. See 2007 Principal Trade
Rule Release, Section I.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As initially adopted on an interim final basis, rule 206(3)-3T was
set to sunset on December 31, 2009. In December 2009, however, we
adopted rule 206(3)-3T as a final rule in the same form in which it was
adopted on an interim final basis in 2007, except that we extended the
rule's sunset date by one year to December 31, 2010.\5\ We
[[Page 48710]]
deferred final action on rule 206(3)-3T in December 2009 because we
needed additional time to understand how, and in what situations, the
rule was being used.\6\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ See Temporary Rule Regarding Principal Trades with Certain
Advisory Clients, Investment Advisers Act Release No. 2965 (Dec. 23,
2009) [74 FR 69009 (Dec. 30, 2009)] (``2009 Extension Release'');
Temporary Rule Regarding Principal Trades with Certain Advisory
Clients, Investment Advisers Act Release No. 2965A (Dec. 31, 2009)
[75 FR 742 (Jan. 6, 2010)] (making a technical correction to the
2009 Extension Release).
\6\ See 2009 Extension Release, Section II.c.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In both December 2010 and December 2012, we further extended the
rule's sunset date, in each case for an additional two-year period.\7\
We deferred final action on rule 206(3)-3T in 2010 in order to complete
a study required by section 913 of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform
and Consumer Protection Act (the ``Dodd-Frank Act'').\8\ In 2012, we
deferred final action on rule 206(3)-3T to further consider the
findings, conclusions, and recommendations of the 913 Study and the
comments we had received from interested parties.\9\ In connection with
each extension, we noted that our consideration of the regulatory
requirements applicable to broker-dealers and investment advisers was
ongoing and that an extension would allow the Commission to consider
more broadly the regulatory requirements applicable to broker-dealers
and investment advisers, including whether rule 206(3)-3T should be
substantively modified, supplanted, or permitted to sunset.\10\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\ See Temporary Rule Regarding Principal Trades with Certain
Advisory Clients, Investment Advisers Act Release No. 3118 (Dec. 1,
2010) [75 FR 75650 (Dec. 6, 2010)] (proposing a two-year extension
of rule 206(3)-3T's sunset provision) (``2010 Extension Proposing
Release''); Temporary Rule Regarding Principal Trades with Certain
Advisory Clients, Investment Advisers Act Release No. 3128 (Dec. 28,
2010) [75 FR 82236 (Dec. 30, 2010)] (extending rule 206(3)-3T's
sunset provision from December 31, 2010 to December 31, 2012)
(``2010 Extension Release''); Temporary Rule Regarding Principal
Trades with Certain Advisory Clients, Investment Advisers Act
Release No. 3483 (Oct. 9, 2012) [77 FR 62185 (Oct. 12, 2012)]
(proposing a two-year extension of rule 206(3)-3T's sunset
provision); Temporary Rule Regarding Principal Trades with Certain
Advisory Clients, Investment Advisers Act Release No. 3522 (Dec. 20,
2012) [77 FR 76854 (Dec. 31, 2012)] (extending rule 206(3)-3T's
sunset provision from December 31, 2012 to December 31, 2014)
(``2012 Extension Release'').
\8\ Public Law 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010). Under section 913
of the Dodd-Frank Act, we were required to conduct a study and
provide a report to Congress concerning the obligations of broker-
dealers and investment advisers, including standards of care
applicable to those intermediaries and their associated persons.
Section 913 also authorizes us to promulgate rules concerning the
legal or regulatory standards of care for broker-dealers, investment
advisers, and persons associated with these intermediaries for
providing personalized investment advice about securities to retail
customers, taking into account the findings, conclusions, and
recommendations of the study.
The study mandated by section 913 of the Dodd-Frank Act was
prepared by the staff and delivered to Congress on January 21, 2011.
See Study on Investment Advisers and Broker-Dealers (``913 Study'')
(Jan. 21, 2011), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/2011/913studyfinal.pdf. For a discussion regarding principal trading, see
section IV.C.1.(b) of the 913 Study. See also Commissioners Kathleen
L. Casey and Troy A. Paredes, Statement by SEC Commissioners:
Statement Regarding Study on Investment Advisers and Broker-Dealers
(Jan. 21, 2011), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2011/spch012211klctap.htm (opposing the release of the 913 Study to
Congress and stating that more rigorous analysis is required before
the Commission engages in any follow-on rulemaking).
\9\ See 2012 Extension Release, Section II.
\10\ See id.; 2010 Extension Release, Section II.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
We have continued to consider the regulatory requirements
applicable to broker-dealers and investment advisers. In 2013, we
issued a request for data and other information, including quantitative
data and economic analysis, relating to the benefits and costs that
could result from alternative approaches regarding the standards of
conduct and other obligations of broker-dealers and investment
advisers.\11\ The staff has received over 200 comment letters in
response to the Request, several of which discussed rule 206(3)-3T, and
Commissioners and the staff have held numerous meetings with interested
parties.\12\ None of the comment letters provided quantitative or
qualitative information regarding the effects of the temporary rule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\11\ Duties of Brokers, Dealers, and Investment Advisers,
Investment Advisers Act Release No. 3558 (Mar. 1, 2013) [78 FR 14848
(Mar. 7, 2013)] (the ``Request'').
\12\ See Comments on Study Regarding Obligations of Brokers,
Dealers, and Investment Advisers, File No. 4-606, available at
http://sec.gov/comments/4-606/4-606.shtml. See e.g., Comment Letter
of Consumer Federation of America (Jul. 5, 2013) (``[B]y considering
revisions to the principal trading rules as part of the fiduciary
rulemaking, the Commission could arrive at a workable approach that
is consistent for brokers and investment advisers and provides
improved protections for investors.''); Comment Letter of North
American Securities Administrators Association, Inc. (Jul. 5, 2013)
(``[T]he Commission should consider SEC Rule 206(3)-3T as part of
future fiduciary standard rulemaking.''); Comment Letter of
Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association (``SIFMA'')
(Jul. 5, 2013) (``SIFMA 2013 Letter'') (including survey results
regarding the dollar amount of principal transactions engaged in
with retail clients during 2012).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
II. Discussion
We are proposing to amend rule 206(3)-3T to extend the rule's
sunset date by two additional years.\13\ Absent further action by the
Commission, the rule will sunset on December 31, 2014. We are proposing
this extension because we continue to believe that the issues raised by
principal trading, including the restrictions in section 206(3) of the
Advisers Act and our experiences with, and observations regarding, the
operation of rule 206(3)-3T, should be considered as part of our
broader consideration of the regulatory requirements applicable to
broker-dealers and investment advisers in connection with the Dodd-
Frank Act.\14\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\13\ The rule includes a reference to an ``investment grade debt
security,'' which is defined as ``a non-convertible debt security
that, at the time of sale, is rated in one of the four highest
rating categories of at least two nationally recognized statistical
rating organizations (as defined in section 3(a)(62) of the Exchange
Act).'' Rule 206(3)-3T(a)(2) and (c). Section 939A of the Dodd-Frank
Act requires that we ``review any regulation issued by [us] that
requires the use of an assessment of the credit-worthiness of a
security or money market instrument; and any references to or
requirements in such regulations regarding credit ratings.'' Once we
have completed that review, the statute provides that we modify any
regulations identified in our review to ``remove any reference to or
requirement of reliance on credit ratings and to substitute in such
regulations such standard of credit-worthiness'' as we determine to
be appropriate. We believe that the credit rating requirement in the
temporary rule would be better addressed after the Commission
completes its review of the regulatory standards of conduct that
apply to broker-dealers and investment advisers. Therefore, we are
not proposing any substantive amendments to the rule at this time.
See generally Report on Review of Reliance on Credit Ratings (July
21, 2011), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/2011/939astudy.pdf (staff study reviewing the use of credit ratings in
Commission regulations).
\14\ The 913 Study is one of several studies relevant to the
regulation of broker-dealers and investment advisers mandated by the
Dodd-Frank Act. See, e.g., Study on Enhancing Investment Adviser
Examinations (Jan. 19, 2011), available at http://sec.gov/news/studies/2011/914studyfinal.pdf (staff study required by section 914
of the Dodd-Frank Act, which directed the Commission to review and
analyze the need for enhanced examination and enforcement resources
for investment advisers); Commissioner Elisse B. Walter, Statement
on Study Enhancing Investment Adviser Examinations (Required by
Section 914 of Title IV of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act) (Jan. 19, 2011), available at http://sec.gov/news/speech/2011/spch011911ebw.pdf. See also Study and
Recommendations on Improved Investor Access to Registration
Information About Investment Advisers and Broker-Dealers (Jan. 26,
2011), available at http://sec.gov/news/studies/2011/919bstudy.pdf
(staff study required by section 919B of the Dodd-Frank Act, that
directed the Commission to complete a study, including
recommendations (some of which have been implemented) of ways to
improve investor access to registration information about investment
advisers and broker dealers, and their associated persons); United
States Government Accountability Office Report to Congressional
Committees on Private Fund Advisers (July 11, 2011), available at
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d11623.pdf (study required by section
416 of the Dodd-Frank Act, which directed the Comptroller General of
the United States to study the feasibility of forming an self-
regulatory organization to oversee private funds).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As noted above, section 913 of the Dodd-Frank Act authorizes us to
promulgate rules concerning, among other things, the legal or
regulatory standards of conduct for broker-dealers, investment
advisers, and persons associated with these intermediaries when
providing personalized investment advice about securities to
[[Page 48711]]
retail customers. Since the completion of the 913 Study in 2011, we
have been considering the findings, conclusions, and recommendations of
the study and the comments we have received from interested
parties.\15\ The Commission and its staff have continued to focus on
evaluating options regarding regulatory requirements applicable to
broker-dealers and investment advisers, taking into account the 913
Study's recommendations, the views of investors and other interested
market participants, potential economic and market impacts, and the
information we received in response to the Request in 2013. Staff has
also been engaged in examinations of dual registrants and is assessing
the impact to investors of the different supervisory structures and
legal standards of conduct that govern the provision of brokerage and
investment advisory services, which may help inform our
considerations.\16\ At this time, our consideration of the regulatory
requirements applicable to broker-dealers and investment advisers is
ongoing. We do not expect to complete our consideration of these issues
before December 31, 2014, the current sunset date for rule 206(3)-3T.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\15\ Section 913(f) of the Dodd-Frank Act requires us to
consider the 913 Study in any rulemaking authorized by that section
of the Dodd-Frank Act.
\16\ See National Exam Program, Office of Compliance Inspections
and Examinations, Examination Priorities for 2014 (Jan. 9, 2014),
available at http://www.sec.gov/about/offices/ocie/national-examination-program-priorities-2014.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
If we permit rule 206(3)-3T to sunset on December 31, 2014, after
that date investment advisers registered with us as broker-dealers that
currently rely on rule 206(3)-3T would be required to comply with
section 206(3)'s transaction-by-transaction written disclosure and
consent requirements without the benefit of the alternative means of
complying with these requirements currently provided by rule 206(3)-3T.
This could limit the access of non-discretionary advisory clients of
advisory firms that are registered with us as broker-dealers to certain
securities.\17\ In addition, firms may be required to make substantial
changes to their disclosure documents, client agreements, procedures,
and systems.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\17\ For a discussion of the costs and benefits underlying rule
206(3)-3T, see 2007 Principal Trade Rule Release, Section VI.C.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
We believe that the requirements of rule 206(3)-3T, coupled with
regulatory oversight, will adequately protect advisory clients for an
additional limited period of time while we consider more broadly the
regulatory requirements applicable to broker-dealers and investment
advisers.\18\ Since its adoption and throughout the period of the
proposed extension, the staff has examined and would continue to
examine firms that engage in principal transactions and will take
appropriate action to help ensure that firms are complying with section
206(3) or rule 206(3)-3T (as applicable), including possible
enforcement action.\19\ Since the last extension, examination staff
also requested and received materials from a sample of dual registrants
in 2014 to observe the use of the rule by these firms.\20\ This
examination showed that a number of the firms that were contacted by
staff relied on the rule and that those firms had adopted written
policies and procedures under rule 206(4)-7 that are designed to comply
with the requirements of the temporary rule.\21\ Based on the review,
it appeared to the staff that the firms relying on the rule had
processes in place for the purpose of effecting principal transactions
in compliance with the requirements of the temporary rule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\18\ In addition, rule 206(3)-3T(b) provides that the rule does
not relieve an investment adviser from acting in the best interests
of its clients, or from any obligation that may be imposed by
sections 206(1) or (2) of the Advisers Act or any other applicable
provisions of the federal securities laws.
\19\ In the 2010 Extension Proposing Release, we discussed
certain compliance issues identified by the Office of Compliance,
Inspections and Examinations. See 2010 Extension Proposing Release,
Section II. One matter identified in the staff's review resulted in
a settlement of an enforcement proceeding and other matters continue
to be reviewed by the staff. See In the Matter of Feltl & Company,
Inc., Investment Advisers Act Release No. 3325 (Nov. 28, 2011)
(settled order finding, among other things, violations of section
206(3) of the Advisers Act for certain principal transactions and
section 206(4) of the Advisers Act and rule 206(4)-7 thereunder for
failure to adopt written policies and procedures reasonably designed
to prevent violations of the Advisers Act and its rules).
\20\ Staff identified a representative sample set of dual
registrants based on Form ADV data, including firm disclosures on
Form ADV Part 2A, and requested materials from the firms that
included compliance policies and procedures, sample disclosures, and
data regarding the firm's principal transactions with advisory
accounts. See also infra note 27.
\21\ 17 CFR 275.206(4)-7. See also 2007 Principal Trade Rule
Release (noting that an adviser relying on rule 206(3)-3T as an
alternative means of complying with section 206(3) must have adopted
and implemented written policies and procedures reasonably designed
to comply with the requirements of the rule).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In light of these considerations, we believe that it is not
appropriate to require firms currently relying on the rule to
restructure their operations and client relationships before we
complete our consideration of the standards of conduct and regulatory
requirements applicable to broker-dealers and investment advisers. To
the extent our consideration of these issues leads to new rules
concerning principal trading, these firms would be required to
restructure their operations and client relationships, potentially at
substantial expense.
As part of our broader consideration of the regulatory requirements
applicable to broker-dealers and investment advisers, we intend to
carefully consider principal trading by advisers, including whether
rule 206(3)-3T should be substantively modified, supplanted, or
permitted to sunset. In making these determinations, we will consider,
among other things: The 913 Study; relevant comments and information
received in connection with the 913 Study, the Request, and any
rulemaking that may follow; the results of our staff's evaluation of
the operation of rule 206(3)-3T; the information received in connection
with the review of dual registrants; and comments we receive on rule
206(3)-3T in connection with this proposed extension.
III. Request for Comment
We request comment on our proposal to extend rule 206(3)-3T's
sunset date for two additional years.
Should we allow the rule to sunset?
If so, what costs would advisers that currently rely on
the rule incur? What would be the impact on their clients?
If we allow the rule to sunset, should we consider
exemptive requests from investment advisers that are registered with us
as broker-dealers for exemptive orders providing an alternative means
of compliance with section 206(3)?
Are there any developments since the last extension that
would make an extension not appropriate?
If we extend the rule's sunset date, is two years an
appropriate period of time to extend the sunset date? Or should we
extend the rule's sunset date for a different period of time? If so,
for how long?
Is it appropriate to extend rule 206(3)-3T's sunset date
for a limited period of time in its current form while we complete our
broader consideration of the regulatory requirements applicable to
broker-dealers and investment advisers?
IV. Paperwork Reduction Act
Rule 206(3)-3T contains ``collection of information'' requirements
within the meaning of the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995.\22\ The
Office of Management and Budget (``OMB'') last approved the collection
of information with an expiration date of July 31, 2017. An agency may
not conduct or sponsor,
[[Page 48712]]
and a person is not required to respond to, a collection of information
unless it displays a currently valid OMB control number. The title for
the collection of information is: ``Temporary rule for principal trades
with certain advisory clients, rule 206(3)-3T'' and the OMB control
number for the collection of information is 3235-0630.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\22\ 44 U.S.C. 3501 et seq.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The amendment to the rule we are proposing today--to extend rule
206(3)-3T's sunset date for two years--does not affect the current
annual aggregate estimated hour burden of 139,358 hours.\23\ Therefore,
we are not revising the Paperwork Reduction Act burden and cost
estimates submitted to OMB as a result of this proposed amendment.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\23\ See Proposed Collection; Comment Request, 78 FR 72932 (Dec.
4, 2013); Submission for OMB Review; Comment Request, 79 FR 7481
(Feb. 7, 2014).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
We request comment on whether the estimates continue to be
reasonable. Have circumstances changed such that these estimates (or
the underlying assumptions embedded in these estimates) should be
modified or revised? Persons submitting comments should direct the
comments to the Office of Management and Budget, Attention: Desk
Officer for the Securities and Exchange Commission, Office of
Information and Regulatory Affairs, Washington, DC 20503, and should
send a copy to Secretary, Securities and Exchange Commission, 100 F
Street NE., Washington, DC 20549-1090, with reference to File No. S7-
23-07.
V. Economic Analysis
A. Introduction
The Commission is sensitive to the economic effects, including the
benefits and costs and the effects on efficiency, competition, and
capital formation, that would result from extending rule 206(3)-3T's
sunset date for two years.\24\ The economic effects considered in
proposing this extension are discussed below.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\24\ 15 U.S.C. 80b-2(c). Section 202(c) of the Advisers Act
mandates that the Commission, when engaging in rulemaking that
requires it to consider or determine whether an action is necessary
or appropriate in the public interest, consider, in addition to the
protection of investors, whether the action will promote efficiency,
competition, and capital formation.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Rule 206(3)-3T provides an alternative means for investment
advisers that are registered with the Commission as broker-dealers to
meet the requirements of section 206(3) of the Advisers Act when they
act in a principal capacity in transactions with their non-
discretionary advisory clients. Other than proposing to extend rule
206(3)-3T's sunset date for two years, we are not otherwise proposing
to modify the rule from its current form. We are proposing to extend
rule 206(3)-3T in its current form to avoid disruption to firms and
clients that rely on the rule while the Commission continues its
ongoing consideration of the regulatory requirements applicable to
broker-dealers and investment advisers and the recommendations from the
913 Study. In particular, an extension of the current rule would permit
firms to continue to offer, and clients to have access to, certain
securities on a principal basis without being required to restructure
their operations and client relationships, adjust to a new set of
rules, or abandon the operational systems established to comply with
the current rule--potentially only to have to do so again when the rule
expires or is modified, and once more if the Commission adopts a new
approach to principal trading in connection with the broader
consideration of the regulatory requirements applicable to broker-
dealers and investment advisers. We previously considered and discussed
the economic effects of rule 206(3)-3T in its current form in the 2007
Principal Trade Rule Release, the 2009 Extension Release, the 2010
Extension Release, and the 2012 Extension Release.\25\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\25\ See 2007 Principal Trade Rule Release, Sections VI-VII;
2009 Extension Release, Sections V-VI; 2010 Extension Release,
Sections V-VI; 2012 Extension Release, Sections V-VI.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
At the outset, the Commission notes that, where possible, it has
sought to quantify the costs, benefits, and effects on efficiency,
competition, and capital formation expected to result from extending
rule 206(3)-3T and its reasonable alternatives. In many cases, however,
the Commission is unable to quantify the economic effects because it
lacks the information necessary to provide a reasonable estimate.\26\
The staff has also not found other information, including through
examinations and comment letters, which impacts the discussion of
economic effects in previous releases. We will continue to assess the
rule's operation and impacts along with intervening developments during
the period of the proposed extension.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\26\ In previous releases, the Commission has requested comment
on the economic effects of rule 206(3)-3T, the economic effects of
extending the rule, and the economic effects of alternatives. The
Commission has not received comments providing quantitative data
regarding the economic effects of extensions of rule 206(3)-3T, or
to alternatives of the rule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The temporary rule currently in effect serves as the economic
baseline against which the costs and benefits, as well as the impact on
efficiency, competition, and capital formation, of the amendment are
discussed. The proposed amendment, which will extend rule 206(3)-3T's
sunset date by an additional two years, will affect investment advisers
that are registered with the Commission as broker-dealers and engage
in, or may consider engaging in, principal transactions with non-
discretionary advisory clients, as well as the non-discretionary
advisory clients of these firms that engage in, or may consider
engaging in, principal transactions.
Although the extent to which firms currently rely on the rule is
unknown, based on IARD data as of June 1, 2014, there are 97 dual
registrants that may rely on the rule.\27\ Past comment letters also
have indicated that since its implementation in 2007, both large and
small advisers have relied upon the rule.\28\ Additionally, one comment
letter to the Request in 2013 provided survey results regarding the
dollar amount of principal transactions that a small number of firms
engaged in with retail clients in 2012.\29\ Because the economic
effects of extending the rule and its reasonable alternatives will
depend on the extent to which eligible firms rely on the rule to engage
in principal transactions with non-discretionary
[[Page 48713]]
advisory clients, the economic effects could vary significantly among
firms and their clients.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\27\ Based on IARD data as of June 2, 2014, there are 290 SEC-
registered advisers that are also registered as broker-dealers that
have non-discretionary accounts who could potentially rely on the
rule; however, only 97 of these dual registrants indicate they
currently engage in principal transactions on Form ADV. The actual
number of advisers that engage in principal transactions in reliance
on the temporary rule is likely smaller. The staff's recent outreach
to observe the use of the rule by firms found that some of the dual
registrants in the sample, which was derived based on Form ADV data,
did not rely on the rule.
\28\ For example, SIFMA's 2012 comment letter included survey
results from seven dual-registrant firms that, in the aggregate,
manage over $325 billion of assets in over 1.1 million non-
discretionary advisory accounts. The firms indicated that 459,507
non-discretionary advisory accounts (with aggregate assets of over
$125 billion) were eligible to engage in principal trading in
reliance on the rule. These firms also indicated that, during 2010-
2012, the firms engaged in principal trades in reliance on Rule
206(3)-3T with respect to 106,682 accounts and executed an average
of 12,009 principal trades per month in reliance on the rule.
Comment letter of SIFMA (Nov. 13, 2012). See also Comment Letter of
Wells Fargo Advisors (Nov. 13, 2012) (noting that the firm managed
232,437 non-discretionary advisory accounts in which hundreds of
principal trades are made on a monthly basis for the benefit of
investors).
\29\ See SIFMA 2013 Letter, supra note 12. Ten firms responded
to SIFMA's survey and reported that they relied on the temporary
rule for $8 billion in principal transactions across 163,000 retail
non-discretionary advisory accounts. In comparison, the ten firms
engaged in $36 billion in principal transaction with 498,000 retail
advisory accounts under section 206(3) of the Advisers Act and $809
billion in principal transactions with 2,480,000 retail brokerage
accounts.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
B. Analysis of the Proposed Extension and Alternatives
As noted above, the temporary rule currently in effect serves as
the economic baseline against which the costs and benefits, as well as
the impact on efficiency, competition, and capital formation, of the
amendment are discussed. Because the extension of the sunset date in
the temporary rule maintains the status quo, we do not expect
additional costs or benefits to result from the extension. For the same
reason, we also do not expect the extension to have additional effects
on efficiency, competition or capital formation. Extending the current
rule would provide the Commission with additional time to consider
principal trading as part of the broader consideration of the
regulatory requirements applicable to broker-dealers and investment
advisers.
Two reasonable alternatives to extending the current rule include
allowing the rule to expire and adopting the rule on a permanent basis.
If the rule is allowed to expire, then an adviser that is registered as
a broker-dealer would no longer have a lower cost and more efficient
alternative to the requirements under section 206(3) of the Advisers
Act like that provided by the temporary rule,\30\ and consequently non-
discretionary advisory account clients could lose access to the
principal accounts of firms that rely on the rule. As noted in the 2012
Extension Release, greater access to a wider range of securities may
allow non-discretionary advisory clients to more efficiently allocate
capital and, in the long term, the more efficient allocation of capital
may lead to an increase in capital formation.\31\ If the rule expires,
the loss of access by non-discretionary advisory clients to a wider
range of securities would reduce the ability of these investors to
efficiently allocate capital and therefore could reduce any resulting
long-term gains to capital formation. Allowing the rule to expire also
would reduce the ability of investors to choose between brokerage
accounts and advisory accounts if the investor wishes to maintain
access to securities held in firm principal accounts, and may force
non-discretionary advisory account clients to bear the costs associated
with transferring accounts (or lose access to a firm's principal
accounts). Firms may also bear the potentially substantial costs
associated with restructuring their operations and client
relationships. On the other hand, if the rule is allowed to expire, and
firms engage in principal transactions with advisory account clients
pursuant to the requirements of section 206(3) of the Act, investors
will be able to more fully evaluate the conflicts of the principal
transactions prior to the trades.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\30\ Section 206(3) of the Advisers Act requires an investment
adviser to provide written conflict-of-interest disclosure
describing its role as principal when transacting securities from
its own account and obtain client consent prior to transaction
completion. Rule 206(3)-3T provides a dual registrant firm the
option of providing transaction-by-transaction disclosures verbally
instead of in writing when engaging in principal transactions with
non-discretionary advisory clients as long as the firm satisfies
additional requirements before and after the transactions.
Additional requirements of the temporary rule include the provision
of a written prospective disclosure to clients describing the
conflicts arising from principal transactions, acquisition of
written revocable client consent prospectively authorizing such
transactions, the provision of transaction-by-transaction
confirmations, and the provision of annual reports itemizing the
clients' principal transactions thereafter.
\31\ 2012 Extension Release, Section V.B.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
We continue to believe that non-discretionary advisory client
access to a wider range of securities is beneficial.\32\ Many clients
wish to access securities held in firm inventory of a diversified
broker-dealer, and clients may wish to access these securities through
their non-discretionary advisory accounts.\33\ We believe that it is
appropriate to preserve investors' access to the securities available
through principal transactions made in reliance on rule 206(3)-3T while
consideration of the regulatory requirements applicable to broker-
dealers and investment advisers is ongoing.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\32\ But see Comment Letter of fi360, Inc. (Nov. 13, 2012)
(``fi360 Letter'') (questioning the importance of investor choice as
the principal benefit of Rule 206(3)-3T); Comment Letter of National
Association of Personal Financial Advisors (Dec. 20, 2010) (``NAPFA
Letter'') (questioning the benefits of the rule in: (1) Providing
protections of the sales practice rules of the Exchange Act and the
relevant self-regulatory organizations; (2) allowing non-
discretionary advisory clients of advisory firms that are also
registered as broker-dealers to have easier access to a wider range
of securities which, in turn, should continue to lead to increased
liquidity in the markets for these securities; (3) maintaining
investor choice; and (4) promoting capital formation).
\33\ See 2007 Principal Trade Rule Release, Section I.B.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In connection with the 2010 extension of the rule, a commenter
argued that rule 206(3)-3T would impede, rather than promote, capital
formation because it would lead to ``more numerous and more severe
violations . . . of the trust placed by individual investors in their
trusted investment adviser'', but did not provide any specific data,
analysis, or other information in support of its comment.\34\ While we
understand the view that numerous and severe violations of trust could
impede capital formation, we have not seen any evidence that rule
206(3)-3T has caused this result. The staff has not identified
instances where an adviser has used the temporary rule to ``dump''
unmarketable securities or securities that the adviser believes may
decline in value into an advisory account, a harm that section 206(3)
and the conditions and limitations of rule 206(3)-3T are designed to
redress.\35\ In addition, non-discretionary advisory account clients
benefit from the protections of sales practice rules under the Exchange
Act and of relevant self-regulatory organizations, and the fiduciary
duty and other obligations imposed by the Advisers Act.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\34\ See NAPFA Letter.
\35\ See 2010 Extension Proposing Release, Section II (noting
that the staff did not identify instances of ``dumping'' in
connection with OCIE's examinations regarding compliance with the
temporary rule).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
We also received comments on the 2007 Principal Trade Rule Release
from commenters who opposed the limitation of the temporary rule to
investment advisers that are registered with us as broker-dealers, as
well as to accounts that are subject to both the Advisers Act and
Exchange Act as providing a competitive advantage to investment
advisers that are registered with us as broker-dealers.\36\ Based on
our experience with the rule to date, and as we noted in previous
releases, we have no reason to believe that broker-dealers (or
affiliated but separate investment advisers and broker-dealers) are put
at a competitive disadvantage to advisers that are themselves also
registered as broker-dealers.\37\ We intend to continue to evaluate the
effects of the rule on efficiency, competition, and capital formation
in connection with our broader consideration of the regulatory
requirements applicable to broker-dealers and investment advisers.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\36\ See Comment Letter of the Financial Planning Association
(Nov. 30, 2007); Comment Letter of the American Bar Association,
section of Business Law's Committee on Federal Regulation of
Securities (Apr. 18, 2008). See also 2009 Extension Release, Section
VI.
\37\ See 2009 Extension Release, Section VI; 2010 Extension
Release, Section VI; 2012 Extension Release, Section V.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
If the Commission allowed the rule to expire, firms would no longer
incur the costs associated with rule 206(3)-3T, including the
operational costs associated with complying with the rule.\38\ In the
2007 Principal Trade Rule Release, we presented estimates of the costs
of each of the rule's disclosure
[[Page 48714]]
elements, including: Prospective disclosure and consent; transaction-
by-transaction disclosure and consent; transaction-by-transaction
confirmations; and the annual report of principal transactions. We also
provided estimates for the following related costs of compliance with
rule 206(3)-3T: (i) The initial distribution of prospective disclosure
and collection of consents; (ii) systems programming costs to ensure
that trade confirmations contain all of the information required by the
rule; and (iii) systems programming costs to aggregate already-
collected information to generate compliant principal transactions
reports. Although one commenter on the 2012 extension noted that the
Commission's cost analysis had remained unchanged since 2007, the
commenter did not provide any supporting information discrediting the
cost analysis we presented in the 2007 Principal Trade Rule
Release.\39\ We do not believe the extension we are proposing today
would affect the cost estimates associated with the rule.\40\
Furthermore, we believe that an eligible adviser that begins to rely on
Rule 206(3)-T today would bear the same upfront and ongoing cost
estimates set forth in the 2007 Principal Trade Rule Release.\41\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\38\ See supra n. 25.
\39\ See fi360 Letter. See also 2012 Extension Release, Section
V.B.
\40\ In the 2007 Principal Trade Rule Release, we estimated the
total overall costs, including estimated costs for all eligible
advisers and eligible accounts, relating to compliance with rule
206(3)-3T to be $37,205,569. See 2007 Principal Trade Rule Release,
Section VI.D.
\41\ See id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
If the rule is adopted on a permanent basis, then there may be
additional economic effects. We recognize that a temporary rule, by
nature, creates uncertainty, which in turn, may result in a reduced
ability of firms to coordinate and plan future business activities. The
uncertainty with respect to rule 206(3)-3T would be reduced if either
the rule was allowed to expire or the rule was adopted on a permanent
basis.\42\ Nonetheless, we believe that it would not be appropriate to
adopt the rule on a permanent basis (with any necessary substantive
amendments) while consideration of the regulatory requirements
applicable to broker-dealers and investment advisers is ongoing.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\42\ We received several comments in connection with prior
extensions of the rule urging us to make the rule permanent to avoid
such uncertainty. See e.g., Comment Letter of Winslow, Evans &
Crocker (Dec. 8, 2009); Comment of Bank of America Corporation (Dec.
20, 2010).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Another reasonable alternative would be to extend the rule for a
period other than two years. For example, extending the rule for
greater than two years would provide the Commission with additional
time to evaluate the impact of any potential rulemaking or other
process that may emerge from the broader consideration of fiduciary
obligations and other regulatory requirements applicable to broker-
dealers and investment advisers. Should our consideration of the
fiduciary obligations and other regulatory requirements applicable to
broker-dealers and investment advisers extend beyond the proposed
sunset date of the temporary rule, such a longer period may be
appropriate for the Commission to consider. On balance, however, we
believe that the proposed two-year extension of rule 206(3)-3T
appropriately addresses the concerns of firms and clients relying on
the rule while the Commission continues its ongoing consideration of
the standards applicable to investment advisers and broker-dealers.
C. Request for Comment
We request comment on all aspects of the economic analysis,
including the accuracy of the potential costs and benefits identified
and assessed in this release and the prior releases and information on
any other costs or benefits that may result from the proposal and from
alternatives to the proposal, and whether the proposal, if adopted,
would promote efficiency, competition, and capital formation.
Commenters are requested to provide quantitative and qualitative data
and other information and economic analysis about the costs or benefits
to support their views.
VI. Initial Regulatory Flexibility Act Analysis
The Commission has prepared the following Initial Regulatory
Flexibility Analysis (``IRFA'') regarding the proposed amendment to
rule 206(3)-3T in accordance with section 3(a) of the Regulatory
Flexibility Act.\43\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\43\ 5 U.S.C. 603(a).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
A. Reasons for Proposed Action
We are proposing to extend rule 206(3)-3T's sunset date for two
years because we believe that it would not be appropriate to require
firms relying on the rule to restructure their operations and client
relationships before we complete our broader consideration of the
regulatory requirements applicable to broker-dealers and investment
advisers.
B. Objectives and Legal Basis
The objective of the proposed amendment to rule 206(3)-3T, as
discussed above, is to permit firms currently relying on rule 206(3)-3T
to limit the need to modify their operations and relationships on
multiple occasions, both before and potentially after we complete any
regulatory actions regarding the standards of conduct and other
obligations applicable to broker-dealers and investment advisers.
We are proposing to amend rule 206(3)-3T pursuant to sections 206A
and 211(a) of the Advisers Act [15 U.S.C. 80b-6a and 15 U.S.C. 80b-
11(a)].
C. Small Entities Subject to the Rule
Rule 206(3)-3T is an alternative method of complying with Advisers
Act section 206(3) and is available to all investment advisers that:
(i) Are registered as broker-dealers under the Exchange Act; and (ii)
effect trades with clients directly or indirectly through a broker-
dealer controlling, controlled by or under common control with the
investment adviser, including small entities. Under Advisers Act rule
0-7, for purposes of the Regulatory Flexibility Act an investment
adviser generally is a small entity if it: (i) Has assets under
management of less than $25 million; (ii) did not have total assets of
$5 million or more on the last day of its most recent fiscal year; and
(iii) does not control, is not controlled by, and is not under common
control with another investment adviser that has assets under
management of $25 million or more, or any person (other than a natural
person) that had total assets of $5 million or more on the last day of
its most recent fiscal year.\44\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\44\ See 17 CFR 275.0-7.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
We estimate that as of June 1, 2014, 464 SEC-registered investment
advisers were small entities.\45\ As discussed in the 2007 Principal
Trade Rule Release, we opted not to make the relief provided by rule
206(3)-3T available to all investment advisers, and instead have
restricted it to investment advisers that are registered as broker-
dealers under the Exchange Act.\46\ We therefore estimate for purposes
of this IRFA that 12 of these small entities (those that are both
investment advisers and registered broker-dealers) could rely on rule
206(3)-3T.\47\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\45\ IARD data as of June 1, 2014.
\46\ See 2007 Principal Trade Rule Release, Section VIII.B.
\47\ IARD data as of June 1, 2014.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
[[Page 48715]]
D. Reporting, Recordkeeping, and Other Compliance Requirements
The provisions of rule 206(3)-3T impose certain reporting or
recordkeeping requirements, and our proposal, if adopted, would extend
the imposition of these requirements for an additional two years. We do
not, however, expect that the proposed two-year extension of the rule's
sunset date would alter these requirements.
Rule 206(3)-3T is designed to provide an alternative means of
compliance with the requirements of section 206(3) of the Advisers Act.
Investment advisers taking advantage of the rule with respect to non-
discretionary advisory accounts would be required to make certain
disclosures to clients on a prospective, transaction-by-transaction and
annual basis.
Specifically, rule 206(3)-3T permits an adviser, with respect to a
non-discretionary advisory account, to comply with section 206(3) of
the Advisers Act by, among other things: (i) Making certain written
disclosures; (ii) obtaining written, revocable consent from the client
prospectively authorizing the adviser to enter into principal trades;
(iii) making oral or written disclosure and obtaining the client's
consent orally or in writing prior to the execution of each principal
transaction; (iv) sending to the client a confirmation statement for
each principal trade that discloses the capacity in which the adviser
has acted and indicating that the client consented to the transaction;
and (v) delivering to the client an annual report itemizing the
principal transactions. Advisers are already required to communicate
the content of many of the disclosures pursuant to their fiduciary
obligations to clients. Other disclosures are already required by rules
applicable to broker-dealers.
Our proposed amendment, if adopted, only would extend the rule's
sunset date for two years. Advisers currently relying on the rule
already should be making the disclosures described above.
E. Duplicative, Overlapping, or Conflicting Federal Rules
We believe that there are no rules that duplicate or conflict with
rule 206(3)-3T, which presents an alternative means of compliance with
the procedural requirements of section 206(3) of the Advisers Act that
relate to principal transactions.
We note, however, that rule 10b-10 under the Exchange Act is a
separate confirmation rule that requires broker-dealers to provide
certain information to their customers regarding the transactions they
effect, including whether the broker or dealer is acting as an agent or
as a principal for its own account in a given transaction. Furthermore,
FINRA rule 2232 requires broker-dealers that are members of FINRA to
deliver a written notification in conformity with rule 10b-10 under the
Exchange Act containing certain information. Rule G-15 of the Municipal
Securities Rulemaking Board also contains a separate confirmation rule
that governs transactions in municipal securities, and requires
brokers, dealers and municipal securities dealers to disclose, among
other things, the capacity in which the firm effected a transaction
(i.e., as an agent or principal). In addition, investment advisers that
are qualified custodians for purposes of rule 206(4)-2 under the
Advisers Act and that maintain custody of their advisory clients'
assets must send quarterly account statements to their clients pursuant
to rule 206(4)-2(a)(3) under the Advisers Act.
These rules overlap with certain elements of rule 206(3)-3T, but we
designed the temporary rule to work efficiently together with existing
rules by permitting firms to incorporate the required disclosure into
one confirmation statement.
F. Significant Alternatives
The Regulatory Flexibility Act directs us to consider significant
alternatives that would accomplish our stated objective, while
minimizing any significant adverse impact on small entities.\48\
Alternatives in this category would include: (i) Establishing different
compliance or reporting standards or timetables that take into account
the resources available to small entities; (ii) clarifying,
consolidating, or simplifying compliance requirements under the rule
for small entities; (iii) using performance rather than design
standards; and (iv) exempting small entities from coverage of the rule,
or any part of the rule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\48\ See 5 U.S.C. 603(c).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
We believe that special compliance or reporting requirements or
timetables for small entities, or an exemption from coverage for small
entities, may create the risk that the investors who are advised by and
effect securities transactions through such small entities would not
receive adequate disclosure. Moreover, different disclosure
requirements could create investor confusion if it creates the
impression that small investment advisers have different conflicts of
interest with their advisory clients in connection with principal
trading than larger investment advisers. We believe, therefore, that it
is important for the disclosure protections required by the rule to be
provided to advisory clients by all advisers, not just those that are
not considered small entities. Further consolidation or simplification
of the proposals for investment advisers that are small entities would
be inconsistent with the Commission's goals of fostering investor
protection.
We have endeavored through rule 206(3)-3T to minimize the
regulatory burden on all investment advisers eligible to rely on the
rule, including small entities, while meeting our regulatory
objectives. It was our goal to ensure that eligible small entities may
benefit from the Commission's approach to the rule to the same degree
as other eligible advisers. The condition that advisers seeking to rely
on the rule must also be registered with us as broker-dealers and that
each account with respect to which an adviser seeks to rely on the rule
must be a brokerage account subject to the Exchange Act, and the rules
thereunder, and the rules of the self-regulatory organization(s) of
which the broker-dealer is a member, reflect what we believe is an
important element of our balancing between easing regulatory burdens
(by affording advisers an alternative means of compliance with section
206(3) of the Act) and meeting our investor protection objectives.\49\
Finally, we do not consider using performance rather than design
standards to be consistent with our statutory mandate of investor
protection in the present context.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\49\ See 2007 Principal Trade Rule Release, Section II.B.7
(noting commenters that objected to this condition as disadvantaging
small broker-dealers (or affiliated but separate investment advisers
and broker-dealers)).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
G. Solicitation of Comments
We solicit written comments regarding our analysis. We request
comment on whether the rule will have any effects that we have not
discussed. We request that commenters describe the nature of any impact
on small entities and provide empirical data to support the extent of
the impact.
Do small investment advisers believe an alternative means of
compliance with section 206(3) should be available to them?
VII. Consideration of Impact on the Economy
For purposes of the Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness
Act of
[[Page 48716]]
1996, or ``SBREFA,'' \50\ we must advise OMB whether a proposed
regulation constitutes a ``major'' rule. Under SBREFA, a rule is
considered ``major'' where, if adopted, it results in or is likely to
result in: (1) An annual effect on the economy of $100 million or more;
(2) a major increase in costs or prices for consumers or individual
industries; or (3) significant adverse effects on competition,
investment or innovation.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\50\ Public Law 104-121, Title II, 110 Stat. 857 (1996)
(codified in various sections of 5 U.S.C., 15 U.S.C. and as a note
to 5 U.S.C. 601).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
We request comment on the potential impact of the proposed
amendment on the economy on an annual basis. Commenters are requested
to provide empirical data and other factual support for their views to
the extent possible.
VIII. Statutory Authority
The Commission is proposing to amend rule 206(3)-3T pursuant to
sections 206A and 211(a) of the Advisers Act [15 U.S.C. 80b-6a and 80b-
11(a)].
List of Subjects in 17 CFR Part 275
Investment advisers, Reporting and recordkeeping requirements.
Text of Proposed Rule Amendment
For the reasons set out in the preamble, Title 17, Chapter II of
the Code of Federal Regulations is proposed to be amended as follows.
PART 275--RULES AND REGULATIONS, INVESTMENT ADVISERS ACT OF 1940
0
1. The authority citation for part 275 continues to read in part as
follows:
Authority: 15 U.S.C. 80b-2(a)(11)(G), 80b-2(a)(11)(H), 80b-
2(a)(17), 80b-3, 80b-4, 80b-4a, 80b-6(4), 80b-6a, and 80b-11, unless
otherwise noted.
* * * * *
Sec. 275.206(3)-3T [Amended]
0
2. In Sec. 275.206(3)-3T, amend paragraph (d) by removing the words
``December 31, 2014'' and adding in their place ``December 31, 2016''.
By the Commission.
Dated: August 12, 2014.
Kevin M. O'Neill,
Deputy Secretary.
[FR Doc. 2014-19421 Filed 8-15-14; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 8011-01-P