[Federal Register Volume 79, Number 190 (Wednesday, October 1, 2014)]
[Notices]
[Pages 59298-59301]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2014-23299]
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DEPARTMENT OF LABOR
Mine Safety and Health Administration
Petitions for Modification of Application of Existing Mandatory
Safety Standards
AGENCY: Mine Safety and Health Administration, Labor.
ACTION: Notice.
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SUMMARY: Section 101(c) of the Federal Mine Safety and Health Act of
1977 and 30 CFR Part 44 govern the application, processing, and
disposition of petitions for modification. This notice is a summary of
petitions for modification submitted to the Mine Safety and Health
Administration (MSHA) by the parties listed below to modify the
application of existing mandatory safety standards codified in Title 30
of the Code of Federal Regulations.
DATES: All comments on the petitions must be received by the Office of
Standards, Regulations and Variances on or before October 31, 2014.
ADDRESSES: You may submit your comments, identified by ``docket
number'' on the subject line, by any of the following methods:
1. Electronic Mail: [email protected]. Include the docket
number of the petition in the subject line of the message.
2. Facsimile: 202-693-9441.
3. Regular Mail or Hand Delivery: MSHA, Office of Standards,
Regulations and Variances, 1100 Wilson Boulevard, Room 2350, Arlington,
Virginia 22209-3939, Attention: Sheila McConnell, Acting Director,
Office of Standards, Regulations and Variances. Persons delivering
documents are required to check in at the receptionist's desk on the
21st floor. Individuals may inspect copies of the petitions and
comments during normal business hours at the address listed above.
MSHA will consider only comments postmarked by the U.S. Postal
Service or proof of delivery from another delivery service such as UPS
or Federal Express on or before the deadline for comments.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Barbara Barron, Office of Standards,
Regulations and Variances at 202-693-9447 (Voice),
[email protected] (Email), or 202-693-9441 (Facsimile). [These are
not toll-free numbers.]
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
I. Background
Section 101(c) of the Federal Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977
(Mine Act) allows the mine operator or representative of miners to file
a petition to modify the application of any
[[Page 59299]]
mandatory safety standard to a coal or other mine if the Secretary of
Labor determines that:
1. An alternative method of achieving the result of such standard
exists which will at all times guarantee no less than the same measure
of protection afforded the miners of such mine by such standard; or
2. That the application of such standard to such mine will result
in a diminution of safety to the miners in such mine.
In addition, the regulations at 30 CFR 44.10 and 44.11 establish
the requirements and procedures for filing petitions for modification.
II. Petitions for Modification
Docket Numbers: M-2014-007-M; M-2014-008-M; M-2014-009-M; M-2014-
010-M; M-2014-011-M; M-2014-012-M; M-2014-013-M; M-2014-014-M; M-2014-
015-M; M-2014-016-M; M-2014-017-M; and M-2014-018-M.
Petitioner: Wilson County Holdings, LLC, 950 17th Street, Suite
2600, Denver, Colorado 80202.
Mine: Fredonia Project, MSHA I.D. No. 14-01756, located in Wilson
County, Kansas.
Regulations Affected: 30 CFR 57.22301(a), 30 CFR 57.22301(b)(2)(i)
and 30 CFR 57.22301(c) (Atmospheric monitoring systems (I-A, II-A, and
V-A mines)); 30 CFR 57.22302 (Approved equipment (I-A and V-A mines));
30 CFR 57.22312 (Distribution boxes (II-A and V-A mines)); 30 CFR 22501
(Personal electric lamps (I-A, I-B, I-C, II-A, II-B, III, IV, V-A, and
V-B mines)); 30 CFR 57.22207 and 30 CFR 22207(b)(1) (Booster fans (I-A,
II-A, III, and V-A mines)); 30 CFR 57.22227(a) and 30 CFR
57.22227(c)(1) (Approved testing devices (I-A, I-B, I-C, II-A, II-B,
III, IV, V-A, and V-B mines)); 30 CFR 57.22234 and 57.22234(b) (Actions
at 1.0 percent methane (I-A, I-B, III, V-A, and V-B mines)).
Modification Request: The petitioner requests a modification of the
existing standards stating that the operator is not required to comply
with the standards at its Fredonia, Kansas Oil Extraction Project (the
Fredonia Project) but instead may substitute equipment classified as
explosion proof by the National Electric Code (NEC). By filing this
petition, the petitioner does not concede that the cited standards
applies or will apply in the future. However, should the standards be
applied, it will result in a diminution of safety to the miners.
The petitioner states that:
(1) The filing of this petition should not be construed in any way,
or in any subsequent forum, as a waiver of Wilson County Holding's
right to contest any citation issued pursuant to the regulation listed
above at any time in the future.
(2) The Fredonia Project is among the latest of a handful of
underground oil recovery projects. In general, conventional oil
recovery only recovers a relatively small percentage of the oil in
place. In addition, modern developments intended to increase that
recovery, such as horizontal and directional drilling, are subject to a
variety of technological limitations which make them unsuitable for
conventional recovery methods in certain circumstances, such as fields
at depths less than 2400 feet. Therefore, the majority of the
recoverable resource in many older, shallower fields is stranded in
place because recovery is either uneconomical or not technically
feasible.
(3) The Fredonia Project addresses the recoverability issue by
sinking a shaft through the oil bearing formation and mining out a room
approximately 10-20 feet below the bottom of the formation. All
underground areas will be completely lined with concrete or shotcrete
and there will be no exposed ground at the time that equipment
installation and operations begin. Special ports are preinstalled in
the wall of the production area through which the wells are to be
drilled. These ports are designed to be integrated into the drilling
process and there will be no additional penetration of the shotcrete
lining.
(4) When the underground area is completed, three drill rigs will
be installed in the round portion of the underground area (the
production room) to drill upward into the formation allowing oil to
drain out naturally. The oil will be collected into pipes and closed
vessels and pumped out to the surface for transport to a refinery.
(5) The drilling process to be used at the Fredonia Project is
quite similar to that used at conventional oil and gas drilling sites.
The bit used is slightly bigger than the drill pipe on which it is
mounted. During drilling, specially formulated ``drilling mud'' is
pumped into the hole at a pressure intended to remove cuttings and to
hold back any surges in formation pressure that may lead to
uncontrolled flow of gases of fluids uphole. The mud is then circulated
back uphole through the annulus around the drill pipe, carrying with it
the cuttings from the drill as well as any water or hydrocarbons that
are released. The entire mixture is collected in a sealed system in
which the mud, cuttings, water, and hydrocarbons are pumped to the
surface where they are separated and treated appropriately. Although a
small amount of the used mud mixture might be exposed to the mine
atmosphere during routing drilling operations, the only circumstances
in which any material amount of the used mud mixture or any of its
components could escape into the mine atmosphere would be either where
a spike in formation pressures overwhelmed the controls in the
collection system, where a leak developed in the system, or in the
event of a component malfunction. As with other conventional drilling
operations, great care is taken during the drilling process to ensure
that no gases or fluids escape back up the drill hole as it is advanced
toward the target. Those precautions become increasingly intensive as
the drill approaches the hydrocarbon bearing formation. In the case of
the Fredonia Project, all systems intended for collection of drilling
fluids are designed to withstand pressures of up to 740 Pounds Per
Square Inch Gauge (psig) even though tests show that formation
pressures are not anticipated to exceed 100 psig.
(6) Because it is vitally important for both the safety of the
miners and the commercial success of the project, quite a bit of care
has been taken in developing a monitoring system intended to detect any
condition that might lead to an escape of hydrocarbons or other toxic
material from the system. In general, the detection and monitoring
systems are digitally based, automated and remotely monitored. A
variety of sensors (e.g., lower explosive limit (LEL), methane, smoke,
system pressures, temperature), digitally measure and transmit the data
measured to different locations. The data can be monitored remotely
from the surface and is made accessible to those authorized to see it.
Each monitoring system is also programmed to either: (1) Alert
personnel and/or (2) automatically trigger corrective action (e.g.,
increase ventilation or open or close valves) and/or (3) shut down
critical operations in the event a pre-set alarm, corrective action, or
shut-down level is exceeded. This is known as a ``fail-to-safe''
system. In other words, critical component failure, or excursion of a
measured value above or below a set point is programmed to
automatically trigger a condition-appropriate response, up to and
including critical system shut down.
(7) In addition to the monitoring and control systems, the
petitioner recognizes the importance of the ventilation system as
integral to its overall safe operation. Ventilation for normal
operations begins at the surface
[[Page 59300]]
near the entrance to the Supply Air Emergency Escape Shaft. There are
2-100 horse power fans whose speed is controlled by variable frequency
drives (VFD's) with a butterfly-type valve shutoff damper at the
downstream exit of each fan duct located just upstream of the plenum.
The fans will operate in a ``Lead-Lag'' configuration where one fan
operates continuously (lead) and is supported by the back-up (lag) in
the event the lead fan is inoperable or is cycled for wear issues. Each
fan has a 56,000 cfm capacity at 1.75 in-wg for fan blade 2-position at
1800 revolutions per minute. The VFD's are part of the fan control
system providing control of flow rates. Air flow progresses as follows:
(a) Air is drawn into the fan inlet then flows through the Supply
Air Shaft into the underground Alcove. From the Alcove a portion of the
supply air is forced through cooling coils and then into the Motor
Control Center (MCC) Room. This air removes heat from the area then
exits via a duct to the main hoist opening in the Drilling Room. The
MCC ductwork (28 inches in diameter) and the discharge duct (54 inches
by 18 inches) to the main shaft is galvanized steel.
(b) The balance of the air remaining in the Alcove then exits via a
flow regulator (roll-up door) where it then ventilates the Pump Room
and Drilling Room areas.
(c) Air is circulated around the Drilling Room by three axial flow
fans located on the Rib or Back to ensure thorough mixing and movement
of air.
(d) All air flows then converge to exit upwards via the Main Shaft
to the surface and atmosphere.
Ventilation flow is to help ensure that workers and staff have
adequate ventilation and that the MCC Room maintains a positive
relative pressure to the Pump and Drilling Rooms, and this air is
exhausted directly to the main shaft.
The supply air fans provide more than 100 percent back up as a
standby, or to provide higher velocity and flow through the mine as
needed. Approximate total air quantity is expected to be 25,000 cfm
allowing for up to 14 people underground, operation of diesel skid
steer loader underground, heat removal from equipment and personnel,
and dilution of potential contaminants including strata gas.
Adjustments will be made to meet requirements for cooling and
contaminant dilution as necessary.
Notwithstanding the fact that the system is deliberately ``over-
designed'' in terms of anticipated pressures and is virtually 100
percent monitored in a fail-to-safe configuration, the petitioner
recognizes that there is a possibility that some componentry or
instrumentation may be exposed to a potentially flammable or explosive
level of hydrocarbon(s). For that reason, all of the components and
systems that are being used in areas that could possibly be hydrocarbon
contaminated have some measure of explosion protection. Because the
facility is regulated by MSHA, a great deal of effort was expended to
secure electrical components that have been certified as
``permissible'' or ``explosion proof'' by MSHA. However, after
extensive effort, with respect to a number of critical components, the
petitioner has been unable to locate any of those critical components
that have been certified as permissible. Where permissible componentry
is unavailable or unsuitable, the design has called for equipment that
is rated for use in either Class I Division 1 or Class I Division 2
pursuant to Article 500.5 of the NEC depending on the potential
exposure of the particular componentry to ignitable or explosive
atmospheres.
The petitioner recognizes that there may be some componentry which
may be suitable for classification for use in Class I Division 1 or
Class I Division 2 locations, but which do not meet the precise
requirements to be certified as permissible and vice versa. However,
the petitioner also recognizes that the ``permissible'' designation
takes into account the dynamic and largely non-engineered environment
encountered in typical mining operations while the NEC Class I Division
1 and 2 designations refer to primarily static, engineered
environments.
Although regulated by MSHA, the underground environment at the
Fredonia Project is more akin to the environments envisioned by the NEC
classification than those envisioned by the MSHA permissibility
certification requirements. If granted, the petition would allow the
petitioner to use permissible equipment, where available, and equipment
classified for use in either NEC Class I Division 1 or 2 environments,
as appropriate.
I. Complying with the permissibility standards would subject miners
to greater hazards than they are subjected to under current Wilson
County conditions. Although the cited standard may not apply in this
instance, but in the event that it did, requiring the petitioner to
comply would subject miners to greater hazards than they would be
subject to using the systems proposed by Wilson County. To the extent
that permissible equipment is available, the electrical equipment
specified by the petitioner for the Project is explosion proof, rated
at either Class I Division 1 or Class I Division 2, as appropriate to
its location. This design provides a greater level of protection from
explosion than would permissible equipment, and also enables a far
safer work environment based on all of the equipment's inherent
advantages over similar equipment that has been certified permissible
by MSHA. The petitioner states that the use of explosion proof, but not
permissible equipment creates a much safer environment all around
through the number of mechanisms.
The primary advantage presented by the equipment sought to be used
is that it will allow for more precise measurement of potentially
hazardous conditions through remote monitoring and greater automation
of the operation. Use of the specified equipment (for which a
permissible equivalent is generally unavailable) will allow remote
operation and monitoring of the operation, along with facilitating the
``fail-to-safe'' design of the operating circuitry. The primary reason
for this is that the transmission components of the monitoring systems
available in Class I Division 1 and Class I Division 2 compliant
versions are not available in a permissible version in some instances.
What this means is that, while the permissible equipment may be able to
provide the necessary data, it cannot necessarily transmit the data
either to a remote (in this case surface) location or locations nor can
it communicate with a programmable logical control system which runs
the ``fail-to-safe'' logic. On the other hand, the equipment currently
specified for use at the Project can do all of that.
This enhanced transmission capability creates two significant
safety advantages for the Project. First, it drastically lowers the
number of miners who are needed underground at any given time. Absent
the ability to transmit the monitored data to a remote location, miners
would need to be physically underground to check readings and make
determinations as to potential problems. With the pumping systems, for
example, this could be as basic as periodically checking sight glasses
to ensure that the pumps are functioning properly. With other systems
it could involve physically reading digital or analog meters to make
similar determinations. Little, if any, of this type of effort is
necessary if the specified explosion proof, but not permissible,
equipment is used.
Lowering the number of miners underground reduces the potential for
exposure to flammable vapors and, in turn, increases safety overall by
[[Page 59301]]
removing the miners from proximity to the potential hazard. In doing
so, the proposed equipment actually increases the number of people able
to monitor data and respond to potential upset conditions. As currently
configured, the system would allow remote monitoring of data not only
at a central location at the surface, but also to other authorized
users. Any alarms or warnings that might be sent by the system are
heard and seen by every person necessary to respond almost regardless
of when it occurs or where they might be. Thus, decisions that might
end up saving lives could be made in essentially real time, rather than
being delayed by having to be relayed by telephone. Second, the ``fail-
to-safe'' system would operate without the need for human intervention
or judgment. When any metric being monitored detected above or below a
pre-set level, the system automatically initiates an orderly shut-down
or power-down of specified equipment or, depending on the condition
detected, a set of actions intended to reduce the hazard. For example,
the permissibility rules dictate that certain changes must be made to
ventilation when methane levels rise to 0.25 percent. Were the
monitoring equipment used in the Project set to 0.10 percent, the
system could automatically trigger an increase in ventilation which
might prevent methane from reaching levels at which the regulations
would require a change, thus reducing the level of potential methane
exposure to a level well below the level which the regulations would
require. The end result is that fewer miners are exposed to potential
hazards. This also allows personnel to focus on other areas of concern
such as evacuation procedures and other areas of importance.
II. The proposed action by the petitioner would provide no lesser
degree of safety than application of the permissibility standards.
Another basis for permitting modification of the cited standard's
application is that the petitioner's proposed alternative equipment
provides at least the same measure of safety contemplated by the
permissibility standards.
The explosion proof but not permissible equipment to be utilized in
the Fredonia Project is much more scalable than their permissible
counterparts. For instance, available permissible LEL monitors are
triggered at 0.25 percent methane, the level at which regulatory action
is required, and are not sensitive to levels below that. The explosion
proof, but not permissible monitors specified for the project, however,
can be set to levels much lower than 0.25 percent methane which will
allow them to automatically trigger corrective measures before methane
reaches a level at which such measures are required.
The petitioner has done extensive research and has taken great
strides in ensuring that miners' safety is at the forefront of all
decisions. For instance, not only does the selected equipment allow for
early detection and warning of potentially hazardous conditions, but in
the event of an emergency, the equipment can be automatically shut down
through the use of remote monitoring. This is not possible with
available MSHA permissible equipment. In fact, use of the explosion
proof equipment would provide even greater protection than that
required by the permissibility standard.
The measures and electrical equipment proposed by the petitioner,
coupled with the ability to work in what is essentially a much safer
environment, alleviates any potential hazards by providing a workplace
with safeguards additional to those required by MSHA while avoiding the
creation of hazards associated with non-explosion proof equipment.
The petitioner asserts that strict application of the existing
standards would result in a diminution of safety to the miners involved
with the Fredonia Project, while use of the proposed equipment would
afford no less protection (in fact, greater protection) from explosion
hazards than would the available permissible equipment.
Dated: September 25, 2014.
Sheila McConnell,
Acting Director, Office of Standards, Regulations and Variances.
[FR Doc. 2014-23299 Filed 9-30-14; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4510-43-P