[Federal Register Volume 79, Number 194 (Tuesday, October 7, 2014)]
[Notices]
[Pages 60556-60560]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2014-23836]
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SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION
[Release No. 34-73277; File No. SR-FINRA-2014-028]
Self-Regulatory Organizations; Financial Industry Regulatory
Authority, Inc.; Order Instituting Proceedings To Determine Whether To
Approve or Disapprove Proposed Rule Change Relating to Revisions to the
Definitions of Non-Public Arbitrator and Public Arbitrator
October 1, 2014.
I. Introduction
On June 17, 2014, the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority, Inc.
(``FINRA'') filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (``SEC''
or ``Commission''), pursuant to Section 19(b)(1) of the Securities
Exchange Act
[[Page 60557]]
of 1934 (``Act'') \1\ and Rule 19b-4 thereunder,\2\ a proposed rule
change to amend provisions in the FINRA rulebook to ``refine and
reorganize the definitions of `non-public arbitrator' and `public
arbitrator.' '' \3\ The proposed rule change was published for comment
in the Federal Register on July 3, 2014.\4\ On August 4, 2014, FINRA
extended the time period in which the Commission must approve the
proposed rule change, disapprove the proposed rule change, or institute
proceedings to determine whether to approve or disapprove the proposed
rule change to October 1, 2014. The Commission received three hundred
sixteen (316) comment letters in response to the proposed rule
change.\5\ On September 30, 2014, the Commission received a letter from
FINRA responding to the comment letters.\6\ The Commission is
publishing this order to institute proceedings pursuant to Section
19(b)(2)(B) of the Act \7\ to determine whether to approve or
disapprove the proposed rule change.
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\1\ 15 U.S.C. 78s(b)(1).
\2\ 17 CFR 240.19b-4.
\3\ See Release No. 34-72491 (Jun. 27, 2014), 79 FR 38080 (Jul.
3, 2014) (Notice of Filing of Proposed Rule Change Relating to
Revisions to the Definitions of Non-Public Arbitrator and Public
Arbitrator) (``Notice of Filing'').
\4\ Id. The comment period closed on July 24, 2014.
\5\ Of the 316 letters, 21 were unique letters, and 295 of the
letters followed a form designated as the ``Type A'' letter,
submitted by self-identified independent financial advisors
(``independent financial advisors'') (``Type A Letter''). The unique
letters were submitted by: Philip M. Aidikoff, Aidikoff, Uhl &
Bakhtiari, dated July 1, 2014 (``Aidikoff Letter''); Steven B.
Caruso, Esq., Maddox Hargett & Caruso, P.C., dated July 1, 2014
(``Caruso Letter''); Ryan K. Bakhtiari, Aidikoff, Uhl and Bakhtiari,
dated July 2, 2014 (``Bakhtiari Letter''); Richard A. Stephens,
Attorney at Law, dated July 6, 2014 (``Stephens Letter''); Daniel E.
Bacine, Barrack, Rodos & Bacine, dated July 18, 2014 (``Bacine
Letter''); Blossom Nicinski, dated July 20, 2014 (``Nicinski
Letter''); Christopher L. Mass, dated July 21, 2014 (``Mass
Letter''); Glenn S. Gitomer, McCausland Keen & Buckman, dated July
23, 2014 (``Gitomer Letter''); Kevin M. Carroll, Managing Director
and Associate General Counsel, Securities Industry and Financial
Markets Association, dated July 24, 2014 (``SIFMA Letter''); J.
Burton LeBlanc, President, American Association for Justice, dated
July 24, 2014 (``AAJ Letter''); George H. Friedman, Esquire, George
H. Friedman Consulting, LLC, dated July 24, 2014 (``Friedman
Letter''); Andrea Seidt, President, North American Securities
Administrators Association, and Ohio Securities Commissioner, dated
July 24, 2014 (``NASAA Letter''); CJ Croll, Student Intern, Elissa
Germaine, Supervising Attorney, and Jill I. Gross, Director,
Investor Rights Clinic at Pace Law School, dated July 24, 2014
(``PIRC Letter''); Jason Doss, President, Public Investors
Arbitration Bar Association, dated July 24, 2014 (``PIABA Letter'');
David T. Bellaire, Esq., Executive Vice President & General Counsel,
Financial Services Institute, dated July 24, 2014 (``FSI Letter'');
Richard P. Ryder, Esq., President, Securities Arbitration
Commentator, Inc., dated July 24, 2014 (``SAC Letter''); Gary N.
Hardiman, dated July 24, 2014 (``Hardiman Letter''); Thomas J.
Berthel, CEO, Berthel Fisher & Company, dated July 24, 2014
(``Berthel Letter''); Robert Getman, dated July 28, 2014 (``Getman
Letter''); Barry D. Estell, Attorney at Law (retired), dated August
13, 2014 (``Estell Letter''); and Walter N. Vernon III, Esq., dated
August 21, 2014 (``Vernon Letter'').
\6\ Letter from Margo A. Hassan, Assistant Chief Counsel, FINRA
Dispute Resolution, to Brent J. Fields, Secretary, SEC, dated
September 30, 2014 (``FINRA Letter'').
\7\ 15 U.S.C. 78s(b)(2)(B).
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Institution of proceedings does not indicate that the Commission
has reached any conclusions with respect to the proposed rule change,
nor does it mean that the Commission will ultimately disapprove the
proposed rule change. Rather, as discussed below, the Commission seeks
additional input from interested parties on the issues presented by the
proposal.
II. Description of the Proposed Rule Change
Currently, FINRA Rule 12100(p) of the Code of Arbitration Procedure
for Customer Disputes (``Customer Code'') and FINRA Rule 13100(p) of
the Code of Arbitration Procedure for Industry Disputes (``Industry
Code'') (collectively, ``Codes'') define the term ``non-public
arbitrator;'' and FINRA Rule 12100(u) of the Customer Code and Rule
13100(u) of the Industry Code'' define the term ``public arbitrator.''
\8\ In general, the Codes classify arbitrators as ``non-public'' or
``public'' based on their professional and personal affiliations.
Individuals affiliated with the financial industry are typically
considered ``non-public arbitrators.'' Individuals unaffiliated with
the financial industry are typically considered ``public arbitrators.''
\9\
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\8\ Where this order refers only to rules in the Customer Code,
please note that the changes and discussion would also apply to the
same rules of the Industry Code.
\9\ Notice of Filing.
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FINRA is now proposing to amend the Codes to revise and reorganize
the definitions of ``non-public arbitrator'' and ``public arbitrator.''
The amendments would, among other matters, provide that persons who
worked in the financial industry for any duration during their careers
would always be classified as non-public arbitrators. The amendments
would also provide that persons who represent investors or the
financial industry as a significant part of their business would also
be classified as non-public arbitrators, but could become public
arbitrators after a cooling-off period. The amendments would also
reorganize the definitions to make it easier for arbitrator applicants
and parties, among others, to determine the correct arbitrator
classification.\10\
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\10\ Id.
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The text of the proposed rule change is available, at the principal
office of FINRA, on FINRA's Web site at http://www.finra.org, and at
the Commission's Public Reference Room. In addition, you may also find
a more detailed description of the proposed rule changes in the Notice
of Filing.\11\
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\11\ See supra note 3.
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III. Summary of Comments
Five of the commenters expressed support for the proposed rule
change in its entirety.\12\ Two commenters opposed the proposed rule
change in its entirety.\13\ The other commenters (including the
independent financial advisors) generally supported the proposed rule
change in part, but raised concerns about various aspects of the
proposal (discussed below).
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\12\ See Aidikoff Letter, Bakhtiari Letter, Caruso Letter,
Gitomer Letter, and SIFMA Letter.
\13\ See SAC Letter and Friedman Letter. The SAC Letter
indicates that the proposed rule should be disapproved until a cost-
benefit analysis is provided. The Friedman Letter indicates that
FINRA should ``go back to the drawing board.''
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A. Permanent Classification of Industry Employees as Non-Public
Arbitrators
In general, the proposal would result in the permanent
classification (or reclassification of current public arbitrators) of
individuals who worked in the financial industry (a) in any capacity,
(b) at any point, and (c) for any duration, (``Industry Affiliates'')
as non-public arbitrators. Many commenters opposed the permanent
classification of Industry Affiliates as non-public arbitrators for
varying reasons.\14\
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\14\ See e.g., Type A Letter, FSI Letter, Getman Letter, and
Vernon Letter.
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1. Elimination of the Cooling-Off Period
Six commenters supported this provision as providing a workable
``bright-line'' test that would address criticism regarding bias
(perceived or actual) in favor of industry.\15\
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\15\ See Aidikoff Letter; see also Bakhtiari Letter, SIFMA
Letter, NASAA Letter, PIABA Letter, and AAJ Letter.
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Many commenters opposed the elimination of the five-year cooling-
off period for Industry Affiliates.\16\ For instance, some commenters
expressed concern that eliminating the cooling-off period could exclude
arbitrators with industry experience who could be useful on a panel to,
among other things, educate the other panelists on industry
practice.\17\ Two other commenters who opposed the proposed elimination
of the cooling-off period suggested that FINRA should adopt a
proportional cooling-off period for industry employees that would be
[[Page 60558]]
proportional to the number of years they were Industry Affiliates.\18\
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\16\ See e.g., Type A Letter, FSI Letter, Getman Letter, Berthel
Letter and Vernon Letter.
\17\ See Type A Letter and Berthel Letter; see also FSI Letter.
\18\ See PIRC Letter and FSI Letter.
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In its response, FINRA stated that investor advocates have a stated
preference for using expert witnesses and making their own arguments
rather than relying on members of the arbitration panel that have
industry experience to explain and influence matters. It also indicated
that its constituents agreed that a cooling off period for financial
industry employees would ``always leave a perception of unfairness for
some advocates.'' \19\ In addition, FINRA stated that it is more
workable and preferable to use a bright-line test than a pro rata
cooling-off period for industry employees. For these reasons, FINRA
declined to amend the proposal as suggested.\20\
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\19\ See FINRA Letter.
\20\ See FINRA Letter.
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2. All Employees, Regardless of Capacity, To Be Categorized as Non-
Public Arbitrators
Four commenters stated that, as proposed, the rule would improperly
characterize certain individuals without true financial industry
experience as non-public arbitrators.\21\ One of these commenters
expressed concern that individuals performing solely clerical or
ministerial functions for a financial industry firm would be classified
as non-public arbitrators because they would be considered ``associated
persons'' as defined by Rule 12100(p).\22\ Accordingly, this commenter
suggested FINRA amend the definition of the term ``associated person''
in the proposal to track the language of the definition of the term
``associated person'' in Section 3(a)(18) of the Act, which excludes
individuals performing solely clerical or ministerial functions.
Another commenter suggested that the proposal should only classify
individuals who ``worked for [a financial industry firm] in a capacity
for which testing and registration is required'' as non-public
arbitrators to address this concern.\23\
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\21\ See Stephens Letter, FSI Letter, Getman Letter, and Vernon
Letter.
\22\ See Stephens Letter.
\23\ See Vernon Letter (expressing concern that under the
proposal he could be characterized as a non-public arbitrator based
solely on his capacity as a ``trainee'' for Merrill Lynch in 1983).
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In its response letter, FINRA stated that its staff believes that
``investor concerns about the neutrality of the public roster apply to
all industry employees, including those who serve in clerical or
ministerial positions.'' Accordingly, FINRA declined to amend the
proposed rule change.\24\
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\24\ See FINRA Letter.
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B. Classification of Professionals
1. Classifying Investor Advocates as Non-Public Arbitrators
In general, the proposed rule change would classify attorneys,
accountants, expert witnesses, or other professionals who (a) devote 20
percent or more of their professional time (b) in any single calendar
year within the past five calendar years (c) to representing or
providing services to parties in disputes concerning investment
accounts or transactions, or employment relationships within the
industry (``Investor Advocates'') as non-public arbitrators. Currently,
individuals meeting this description are classified as public
arbitrators.
Three commenters supported this provision.\25\
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\25\ See SIFMA Letter (stating that the proposal ``strike[s] an
appropriate balance in the interests of fairness, perceptions of
fairness, and arbitrator neutrality for all parties''), FSI Letter,
and Bethel Letter. In addition to these three letters, the
commenters who used the Type A Letter also supported this provision.
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Eight commenters opposed this provision.\26\ In general, they
stated that the distinction between the public and non-public
arbitrators has always been based on whether the arbitrators had
industry experience and argued for keeping this distinction.\27\
Similarly, some of these commenters noted that the proposal would
create confusion since that U.S. courts, the American Arbitration
Association, and the general public generally view professionals who
represent investors to be ``public arbitrators.'' \28\ One commenter
noted that past NASD response letters, as well as the FINRA Web site,
also make this distinction.\29\
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\26\ See NASAA Letter, PIABA Letter, Stephens Letter, PIRC
Letter, Bacine Letter, Mass Letter, Hardiman Letter, and Friedman
Letter.
\27\ See PIRC Letter, Bacine Letter, and Friedman Letter. See
also NASAA Letter (arguing that FINRA should classify as non-public
arbitrators only persons ``representing or providing services to
non-retail parties in disputes concerning investment accounts or
transactions, or employment relationships within the financial
industry''); PIABA Letter (arguing that there is no need or basis
for classifying Investor Advocates as non-public arbitrators because
FINRA has no evidence to support the conclusion that they are biased
for or against the securities industry); Stephens Letter (arguing
that FINRA should only classify as non-public arbitrators only
persons ``. . . representing or providing services to parties in
disputes [other than customers] concerning investment accounts . .
.''); Mass Letter (asserting that lawyers who represent investors or
claimants are public arbitrators because they work on behalf of the
public at large against industry); and Hardiman Letter (stating that
classifying Investor Advocates as non-public arbitrators would be
``burying professionals who represent the investing public in the
industry non-public side'').
\28\ See e.g., Stephens Letter, NASAA Letter, PIABA Letter, PIRC
Letter, and Bacine Letter.
\29\ See PIRC Letter.
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In its response letter, FINRA noted that industry constituents have
expressed concern about the neutrality of the public arbitrator roster
because of the presence on the roster of Investor Advocates.
Specifically, FINRA stated that these industry constituents believe
that Investor Advocates should not serve as public arbitrators. FINRA
further stated that it designed the proposal to address this concern by
classifying these individuals as non-public arbitrators thereby
excluding them from the public arbitrator roster. Accordingly, FINRA
declined to amend the proposed rule change.\30\
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\30\ See FINRA Letter.
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2. Five-Year Cooling-Off Period for Professionals Representing Industry
In general, the proposed rule change would extend the cooling-off
period from two years to five years for attorneys, accountants, expert
witnesses, or other professionals who (a) devote 20 percent or more of
their professional time (b) in any single calendar year within the past
five calendar years (c) to representing or providing services to
financial industry firms (``Industry Advocates'').
Four commenters generally supported this provision as fair and
acknowledged the consistency of approach towards professionals
representing investors and those representing industry.\31\ One
commenter opposed this provision of the proposal.\32\ In particular,
this commenter stated that Industry Advocates should be permanently
classified as non-public arbitrators like financial industry employees
(i.e., the commenter suggested that FINRA eliminate the cooling-off
period rather than lengthening it).\33\
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\31\ See SIFMA Letter, NASAA Letter, PIABA Letter, and Berthel
Letter.
\32\ See NASAA Letter.
\33\ Id.; but see SIFMA Letter, NASAA Letter, PIABA Letter, and
Berthel Letter (each letter generally supporting this provision of
the proposal as fair and acknowledging the consistent approach
towards Investor Advocates and Industry Advocates).
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In its response letter, FINRA stated that it has drawn a
distinction between individuals who work in the financial industry and
individuals who provide services to the financial industry. It also
believes that it needed to take a consistent approach to cooling-off
periods for service providers to both investors and the financial
industry. Accordingly, FINRA declined to amend the proposed rule
change.\34\
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\34\ See FINRA Letter.
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[[Page 60559]]
3. Using Professional Time To Quantify Professional Work
As stated above, the proposal would classify attorneys,
accountants, expert witnesses, or other professionals as either public
arbitrators or non-public arbitrators depending on, among other things,
the amount of time those individuals devoted to representing either the
financial industry or investors. One commenter opposed this provision
of the proposal.\35\ Specifically, this commenter questioned the
appropriateness of classifying individuals as public or non-public
arbitrators based on the ``amount of time'' an individual devotes to a
client. Alternatively, this commenter suggested FINRA base this
determination on the amount of revenue generated by the professional
relationship. The commenter believes that revenue is a better
measurement since not all professionals track their work in terms of
time, but all professionals would have a record of revenue.\36\
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\35\ See PIRC Letter.
\36\ Id.
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In its response letter, FINRA stated that it discussed this matter
with its National Arbitration and Mediation Committee (``NAMC''). FINRA
stated that based on these discussions, FINRA believes that using the
term ``professional time'' ``added clarity to the rule text, was
simpler to apply, and would result in more accurate calculations by
arbitrator applicants and arbitrators reviewing their business mix.''
\37\ Accordingly, FINRA declined to amend the proposed rule change.\38\
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\37\ FINRA Letter.
\38\ Id.
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C. Impact to the Number of Available Public Arbitrators
Four commenters expressed concerns that the proposed rule change
would reduce the number of public arbitrators to an amount that would
be insufficient to meet future needs.\39\ One of these commenters
stated that permanently classifying certain individuals as non-public
arbitrators would negatively impact the effective administration of the
FINRA arbitration forum.\40\ Two of these commenters expressed concern
that the proposal would reduce the supply of available public
arbitrators at a time when more claimants are selecting all-public
panels.\41\ Another one of these commenters suggested that the
potential shortages of public arbitrators may be more concentrated in
some locations more than others.\42\ Two of these commenters also
suggested that FINRA would need to devote resources to recruit
additional public arbitrators.\43\
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\39\ See Friedman Letter, SAC Letter, NASAA Letter, and FSI
Letter.
\40\ See FSI Letter; see also Bacine Letter (expressing concern
that classifying professionals who provide services to customers as
non-public arbitrators would negatively impact the quality of
chairman-eligible arbitrators).
\41\ See FSI Letter and Friedman Letter; see also Release No.
34-63799 (Jan. 31, 2011); 76 FR 6500 (Feb. 4, 2011) (order approving
a proposed rule change to provide customers with the option to
choose an all-public arbitration panel in all cases); Release No.
34-70442 (Sept. 18, 2013); 78 FR 58580 (Sept. 24, 2013) (order
approving a proposed rule change to, among other things, permit all
parties to select an all-public panel).
\42\ See SAC Letter.
\43\ See SAC Letter and NASAA Letter.
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In its response letter, FINRA stated that, based on a preliminary
analysis of its data, including a review of the public arbitrator
roster, it estimated that approximately 474 arbitrators (out of 3,567)
might be reclassified from public arbitrators to non-public arbitrators
under the proposed rule change. FINRA also stated, however, that if the
proposal was approved, it would conduct a more detailed analysis to
determine whether additional arbitrator recruitment efforts were
necessary in any particular geographic area and would deploy the
necessary resources to avoid any undue delay in the arbitration
process.\44\
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\44\ See FINRA Letter.
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D. Cost-Benefit/More Data Intensive Analysis
Three commenters stated that the proposed rule change should not be
approved until FINRA obtained additional data and published a detailed
cost-benefit analysis justifying the proposal.\45\ More specifically,
two of these commenters expressed concern that the proposal would
result in a reduction in the pool of public arbitrators and chair-
eligible arbitrators and suggested that FINRA seek additional data to
analyze the likelihood of this outcome.\46\ Another one of these
commenters suggested FINRA make information about each arbitrator
publicly available, particularly to academic researchers.\47\ This
commenter stated that this data could provide FINRA with statistical
proof of bias or lack of bias upon which to base its proposal instead
of relying on perceptions of bias.\48\
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\45\ See SAC Letter, Friedman Letter, and Estell Letter.
\46\ See SAC Letter (expressing concern that a decrease in the
number of public arbitrators could result in greater delays in
arbitrating claims, particularly (1) during declines in the
financial markets (when the number of arbitration claims filed
increases) or (2) in certain hearing locations with smaller rosters
of arbitrators) and Friedman Letter.
\47\ See Estell Letter.
\48\ Id.
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In its response letter, FINRA stated that a cost-benefit analysis
would be helpful, but would require a survey of every public arbitrator
on its roster and that such a review would be time-intensive. As an
interim step, FINRA performed a preliminary analysis of databases
currently available to it. FINRA also stated that if the proposal was
approved, it would conduct a more robust cost-benefit analysis.\49\
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\49\ See FINRA Letter.
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E. General Comments
Two commenters suggested alternatives to characterizing arbitrators
as either public or non-public.\50\ Two other commenters objected to
broker-dealers' used of pre-dispute mandatory arbitration
agreements.\51\ Other commenters suggested ways to improve the quality
of arbitration panels.\52\ Another commenter suggested that FINRA's
Arbitration Task Force \53\ should review the proposal.\54\
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\50\ See Friedman Letter (suggesting the following categories:
(1) Affiliated with the financial industry, (2) not affiliated with
the financial industry, and (3) a ``no-man's land,'' which would
preclude an individual from acting as an arbitrator); and Nicinski
Letter (suggesting the discontinuance of all categories of
arbitrators).
\51\ See AAJ Letter and Estell Letter.
\52\ See e.g., Nicinski Letter (recommending that arbitrators be
required to display some knowledge of the investment products likely
to be discussed during an arbitration); and Berthel Letter
(recommending (1) that every panel include arbitrators with a strong
background in securities laws and (2) that the Chair be a judge or
hold a law degree).
\53\ See FINRA News Release, FINRA Announces Arbitration Task
Force (Jul. 17, 2014), available at http://www.finra.org/Newsroom/NewsReleases/2014/P554192 (announcing the formation of an
Arbitration Task Force to consider possible enhancements to improve
transparency, impartiality and efficiency of FINRA's securities
arbitration forum for all participants).
\54\ See Friedman Letter.
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In its response letter, FINRA stated that each of these suggestions
was either outside the scope of, or would cause undue delay to, the
proposed rule change. Accordingly, FINRA declined to amend the proposed
rule change.\55\
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\55\ See FINRA Letter.
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IV. Proceedings To Determine Whether To Approve or Disapprove SR-FINRA-
2014-028 and Grounds for Disapproval Under Consideration
The Commission is instituting proceedings pursuant to Section
19(b)(2)(B) of the Act to determine whether the proposed rule change
should be approved or disapproved.\56\
[[Page 60560]]
Institution of such proceedings appears appropriate at this time in
view of the legal and policy issues raised by the proposal. As noted
above, institution of proceedings does not indicate that the Commission
has reached any conclusions with respect to any of the issues involved.
Rather, the Commission seeks and encourages interested persons to
comment on the issues presented by the proposed rule change and provide
the Commission with arguments to support the Commission's analysis as
to whether to approve or disapprove the proposal.
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\56\ 15 U.S.C. 78s(b)(2). Section 19(b)(2)(B) of the Act
provides that proceedings to determine whether to disapprove a
proposed rule change must be concluded within 180 days of the date
of publication of notice of the filing of the proposed rule change.
The time for conclusion of the proceedings may be extended for up to
an additional 60 days if the Commission finds good cause for such
extension and publishes its reasons for so finding or if the self-
regulatory organization consents to the extension.
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Pursuant to Section 19(b)(2)(B) of the Act,\57\ the Commission is
providing notice of the grounds for disapproval under consideration. In
particular, Section 15A(b)(6) of the Act \58\ requires, among other
things, that FINRA rules must be designed to prevent fraudulent and
manipulative acts and practices, to promote just and equitable
principles of trade, and, in general, to protect investors and the
public interest. In addition, Section 15A(b)(9) of the Act \59\
requires that FINRA rules not impose any unnecessary or inappropriate
burden on competition.
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\57\ 15 U.S.C. 78s(b)(2)(B).
\58\ 15 U.S.C. 78o-3(b)(6).
\59\ 15 U.S.C. 78o-3(b)(9).
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The Commission believes FINRA's proposed rule change raises
questions as to whether it is consistent with the requirements of
Sections 15A(b)(6) and 15A(b)(9) of the Act.
V. Request for Written Comments
The Commission requests that interested persons provide written
submissions of their views, data, and arguments with respect to the
issues raised by the proposed rule change. In particular, the
Commission invites the written views of interested persons on whether
the proposed rule change is inconsistent with Sections 15A(b)(6) and
15A(b)(9), or any other provision, of the Act, or the rules and
regulations thereunder.
Although there do not appear to be any issues relevant to approval
or disapproval that would be facilitated by an oral presentation of
views, data, and arguments, the Commission will consider, pursuant to
Rule 19b-4, any request for an opportunity to make an oral
presentation.\60\
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\60\ Section 19(b)(2) of the Act, as amended by the Securities
Acts Amendments of 1975, Pub. L. 94-29, 89 Stat. 97 (1975), grants
the Commission flexibility to determine what type of proceeding--
either oral or notice and opportunity for written comments--is
appropriate for consideration of a particular proposal by a self-
regulatory organization. See Securities Acts Amendments of 1975,
Report of the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs
to Accompany S. 249, S. Rep. No. 75, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 30
(1975).
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Interested persons are invited to submit written data, views, and
arguments by November 6, 2014 concerning whether the proposed rule
change should be approved or disapproved. Any person who wishes to file
a rebuttal to any other person's submission must file that rebuttal by
November 21, 2014. Comments may be submitted by any of the following
methods:
Electronic Comments
Use the Commission's Internet comment form (http://www.sec.gov/rules/sro.shtml); or
Send an email to [email protected]. Please include
File Number SR-FINRA-2014-028 on the subject line.
Paper Comments
Send paper comments in triplicate to Secretary, Securities
and Exchange Commission, 100 F Street NE., Washington, DC 20549-1090.
All submissions should refer to File Number SR-FINRA-2014-028. This
file number should be included on the subject line if email is used. To
help the Commission process and review your comments more efficiently,
please use only one method. The Commission will post all comments on
the Commission's Internet Web site (http://www.sec.gov/rules/sro.shtml). Copies of the submission, all subsequent amendments, all
written statements with respect to the proposed rule change that are
filed with the Commission, and all written communications relating to
the proposed rule change between the Commission and any person, other
than those that may be withheld from the public in accordance with the
provisions of 5 U.S.C. 552, will be available for Web site viewing and
printing in the Commission's Public Reference Room, 100 F Street NE.,
Washington, DC 20549, on official business days between the hours of
10:00 a.m. and 3:00 p.m. Copies of such filing also will be available
for inspection and copying at the principle office of FINRA. All
comments received will be posted without change. The Commission does
not edit personal identifying information from submissions. You should
submit only information that you wish to make publicly available. All
submissions should refer to File Number SR-FINRA-2014-028 and should be
submitted on or before November 6, 2014. If comments are received, any
rebuttal comments should be submitted by November 21, 2014.
For the Commission, by the Division of Trading and Markets,
pursuant to delegated authority.\61\
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\61\ 17 CFR 200.30-3(a)(12); 17 CFR 200.30-3(a)(57).
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Kevin M. O'Neill,
Deputy Secretary.
[FR Doc. 2014-23836 Filed 10-6-14; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 8011-01-P