[Federal Register Volume 79, Number 214 (Wednesday, November 5, 2014)]
[Notices]
[Pages 65715-65727]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2014-26292]
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
[Docket No. 50-305; NRC-2014-0219]
Dominion Energy Kewaunee, Inc.; Kewaunee Power Station
AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
ACTION: Exemption; issuance.
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SUMMARY: Kewaunee Power Station (KPS) is a decommissioning nuclear
power reactor that permanently shut down on May 7, 2013, and
permanently defueled on May 14, 2013. In response to a request from
Dominion Energy Kewaunee, Inc. (DEK or the licensee), the U.S. Nuclear
Regulatory Commission (NRC) is granting exemptions from certain
emergency planning (EP) requirements. The exemptions will eliminate the
requirements to maintain offsite radiological emergency plans and
reduce the scope of the onsite emergency planning activities at the
Kewaunee Power Station (KPS) based on the reduced risks of accidents
that could result in an offsite radiological
[[Page 65716]]
release when compared to operating power reactors. The exemptions will
continue to maintain requirements for onsite radiological emergency
planning and include provisions for capabilities to communicate and
coordinate with offsite response authorities. The NRC staff has
concluded that the exemptions being granted by this action will
maintain an acceptable level of emergency preparedness at KPS given its
permanently shutdown and defueled status, and that there is reasonable
assurance that adequate offsite protective measures can and will be
taken by State and local government agencies, if needed, in the event
of a radiological emergency at the KPS facility.
ADDRESSES: Please refer to Docket ID NRC-2014-0219 when contacting the
NRC about the availability of information regarding this document. You
may obtain publicly-available information related to this document
using any of the following methods:
Federal Rulemaking Web site: Go to http://www.regulations.gov and search for Docket ID NRC-2014-0219. Address
questions about NRC dockets to Carol Gallagher; telephone: 301-287-
3422; email: [email protected]. For technical questions, contact
the individual listed in the FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT section of
this document.
NRC's Agencywide Documents Access and Management System
(ADAMS): You may access publicly available documents online in the NRC
Library at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html. To begin the
search, select ``ADAMS Public Documents'' and then select ``Begin Web-
based ADAMS Search.'' For problems with ADAMS, please contact the NRC's
Public Document Room (PDR) reference staff at 1-800-397-4209, 301-415-
4737, or by email to [email protected]. The ADAMS Accession number
for each document referenced in this document (if that document is
available in ADAMS) is provided the first time that a document is
referenced.
NRC's PDR: You may examine and purchase copies of public
documents at the NRC's PDR, Room O1-F21, One White Flint North, 11555
Rockville Pike, Rockville, Maryland 20852.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: William Huffman, Office of Nuclear
Reactor Regulation, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC
20555-0001; telephone: 301-415-2046; email: [email protected].
I. Background
The KPS facility is a decommissioning power reactor located on
approximately 900 acres in Carlton (Kewaunee County), Wisconsin, 27
miles southeast of Green Bay, Wisconsin. The licensee, DEK, is the
holder of KPS Renewed Facility Operating License No. DPR-43. The
license provides, among other things, that the facility is subject to
all rules, regulations, and orders of the NRC now or hereafter in
effect.
By letter dated February 25, 2013 (ADAMS Accession No.
ML13058A065), DEK submitted a certification to the NRC indicating it
would permanently cease power operations at KPS on May 7, 2013. On May
7, 2013, DEK permanently shut down the KPS reactor. On May 14, 2013,
DEK certified that it had permanently defueled the KPS reactor vessel
(ADAMS Accession No. ML13135A209). As a permanently shutdown and
defueled facility, and in accordance with Sec. 50.82(a)(2) of Title 10
of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR), KPS is no longer
authorized to operate the reactor or emplace nuclear fuel into the
reactor vessel. Kewaunee Power Station is still authorized to possess
and store irradiated nuclear fuel. Irradiated fuel is currently being
stored onsite in a spent fuel pool (SFP) and in Independent Spent Fuel
Storage Installation (ISFSI) dry casks.
During normal power reactor operations, the forced flow of water
through the reactor coolant system (RCS) removes heat generated by the
reactor. The RCS, operating at high temperatures and pressures,
transfers this heat through the steam generator tubes converting non-
radioactive feedwater to steam, which then flows to the main turbine
generator to produce electricity. Many of the accident scenarios
postulated in the updated safety analysis reports (USARs) for operating
power reactors involve failures or malfunctions of systems which could
affect the fuel in the reactor core, which in the most severe
postulated accidents, would involve the release of large quantities of
fission products. With the permanent cessation of reactor operations at
KPS and the permanent removal of the fuel from the reactor core, such
accidents are no longer possible. The reactor, RCS, and supporting
systems are no longer in operation and have no function related to the
storage of the irradiated fuel. Therefore, postulated accidents
involving failure or malfunction of the reactor, RCS, or supporting
systems are no longer applicable.
Since KPS is permanently shutdown and defueled, the only design
basis accident that could potentially result in an offsite radiological
release at KPS is the fuel handling accident. Analysis performed by DEK
showed that 90 days after KPS permanently shutdown, the radiological
consequence of the fuel handling accident would not exceed the limits
established by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA's)
Protective Action Guidelines (PAGs) at the exclusion area boundary.
Based on the time that KPS has been permanently shutdown (approximately
17 months), there is no longer any possibility of an offsite
radiological release from a design basis-accident that could exceed the
EPA PAGs.
The EP requirements of 10 CFR 50.47, ``Emergency plans,'' and
Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50, ``Emergency Planning and Preparedness for
Production and Utilization Facilities,'' continue to apply to nuclear
power reactors that have permanently ceased operation and have removed
all fuel from the reactor vessel. There are no explicit regulatory
provisions distinguishing EP requirements for a power reactor that is
permanently shutdown and defueled from a reactor that is authorized to
operate. In order for DEK to modify the KPS emergency plan to reflect
the reduced risk associated with the permanently shutdown and defueled
condition of KPS, certain exemptions from the EP regulations must be
obtained before the KPS emergency plan can be amended.
II. Request/Action
By letter dated July 31, 2013, ``Request for Exemptions from
Portions of 10 CFR 50.47 and 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E'' (ADAMS
Accession No. ML13221A182), DEK requested exemptions from certain EP
requirements of 10 CFR Part 50 for KPS. More specifically, DEK
requested exemptions from certain planning standards in 10 CFR 50.47(b)
regarding onsite and offsite radiological emergency plans for nuclear
power reactors; from certain requirements in 10 CFR 50.47(c)(2) that
require establishment of plume exposure and ingestion pathway emergency
planning zones for nuclear power reactors; and from certain
requirements in 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV, which
establishes the elements that make up the content of emergency plans.
In a letter dated December 11, 2013 (ADAMS Accession No. ML13351A040),
DEK provided responses to the NRC staff's request for additional
information (RAI) concerning the proposed exemptions. In a letter dated
January 10, 2014, DEK
[[Page 65717]]
provided a supplemental response to the RAI (ADAMS Accession No.
ML14016A078), which contained information applicable to the SFP
inventory makeup strategies for mitigating the potential loss of water
inventory due to a beyond design-basis accident. The information
provided by DEK included justifications for each exemption requested.
The exemptions requested by DEK will eliminate the requirements to
maintain offsite radiological emergency plans, reviewed by the Federal
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) under the requirements of 44 CFR
Part 350, and reduce the scope of onsite emergency planning activities.
DEK stated that application of all of the standards and requirements in
10 CFR 50.47(b), 10 CFR 50.47(c) and 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E is not
needed for adequate emergency response capability based on the reduced
risks at the permanently shutdown and defueled facility. If offsite
protective actions where needed for a very unlikely accident that could
challenge the safe storage of spent fuel at KPS, provisions exist for
offsite agencies to take protective actions using a comprehensive
emergency management plan (CEMP) under the National Preparedness System
to protect the health and safety of the public. A CEMP in this context,
also referred to as an emergency operations plan (EOP), is addressed in
FEMA Comprehensive Preparedness Guide 101, ``Developing and Maintaining
Emergency Operations Plans.'' Comprehensive Preparedness Guide 101 is
the foundation for State, territorial, Tribal, and local emergency
planning in the United States. It promotes a common understanding of
the fundamentals of risk-informed planning and decision making and
helps planners at all levels of government in their efforts to develop
and maintain viable, all-hazards, all-threats emergency plans. An EOP
is flexible enough for use in all emergencies. It describes how people
and property will be protected; details who is responsible for carrying
out specific actions; identifies the personnel, equipment, facilities,
supplies and other resources available; and outlines how all actions
will be coordinated. A comprehensive emergency management plan is often
referred to as a synonym for ``all hazards planning.''
III. Discussion
In accordance with 10 CFR 50.12, ``Specific exemptions,'' the
Commission may, upon application by any interested person or upon its
own initiative, grant exemptions from the requirements of 10 CFR Part
50 when: (1) The exemptions are authorized by law, will not present an
undue risk to public health or safety, and are consistent with the
common defense and security; and (2) any of the special circumstances
listed in 10 CFR 50.12(a)(2) are present. These special circumstances
include, among other things, that the application of the regulation in
the particular circumstances would not serve the underlying purpose of
the rule or is not necessary to achieve the underlying purpose of the
rule.
As noted previously, the current EP regulations contained in 10 CFR
50.47(b) and Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50 apply to both operating and
shutdown power reactors. The NRC has consistently acknowledged that the
risk of an offsite radiological release at a power reactor that has
permanently ceased operations and removed fuel from the reactor vessel
is significantly lower, and the types of possible accidents are
significantly fewer, than at an operating power reactor. However, EP
regulations are silent with regard to the fact that once a power
reactor permanently ceases operation, the consequences of credible
emergency accident scenarios are reduced. The reduced risks generally
relate to a decrease in the potential for any significant offsite
radiological release based on the preclusion of accidents applicable to
an operating power reactor and on the reduced decay heat, and the decay
of short-lived radionuclides as spent fuel ages. NUREG-1738,
``Technical Study of Spent Fuel Pool Accident Risk at Decommissioning
Nuclear Power Plants,'' dated February 2001 (ADAMS Accession No.
ML010430066), confirmed that for permanently shutdown and defueled
power reactors bounded by the assumptions and conditions in the report,
the risk of offsite radiological release is significantly less than for
an operating power reactor.
Similar to the EP exemptions requested by DEK, prior EP exemptions
granted to permanently shutdown and defueled power reactors did not
relieve the licensees of all EP requirements. Rather, the exemptions
allowed the licensees to modify their emergency plans commensurate with
the credible site-specific risks that were consistent with a
permanently shutdown and defueled status. Specifically, precedent for
the approval of the exemptions from certain EP requirements for
previous permanently shutdown and defueled power reactors were based on
demonstrating that: (1) The radiological consequences of design-basis
accidents would not exceed the limits of the EPA PAGs at the exclusion
area boundary, and; (2) in the unlikely event of a beyond design-basis
accident resulting in a loss of all modes of heat transfer from the
fuel stored in the SFP, there is sufficient time to initiate
appropriate mitigating actions, and if needed, for offsite authorities
to implement offsite protective actions using a CEMP approach to
protect the health and safety of the public.
With respect to design-basis accidents at KPS, the licensee
provided analysis demonstrating that 90 days after KPS was permanently
shutdown, the radiological consequences of the only remaining design-
basis accident with potential for offsite radiological release (the
fuel handling accident) will not exceed the limits of the EPA PAGs at
the exclusion area boundary. Therefore, because KPS has been
permanently shutdown for approximately 17 months, there is no longer
any design-basis accident that would warrant an offsite radiological
emergency plan meeting the requirements of 10 CFR Part 50.
With respect to beyond design-basis accidents at KPS, the licensee
analyzed the two bounding beyond design-basis accidents that have a
potential for a significant offsite release. One of these beyond
design-basis accidents involves a complete loss of SFP water inventory,
where cooling of the spent fuel would be primarily accomplished by
natural circulation of air through the uncovered spent fuel assemblies.
The licensee's analysis of this accident shows that by October 30,
2014, air cooling of the spent fuel assemblies will be sufficient to
keep the fuel within a safe temperature range indefinitely without fuel
damage or offsite radiological release. The other beyond design-basis
accident analysis performed by the licensee could not completely rule
out the possibility of a radiological release from a SFP. This more
limiting analysis assumes an incomplete drain down of the SFP water, or
some other catastrophic event (such as a complete drainage of the SFP
with rearrangement of spent fuel rack geometry and/or the addition of
rubble to the SFP), that would effectively impede any decay heat
removal through all possible modes of cooling. The licensee's analysis
demonstrates that as of October 21, 2014, there would be at least 10
hours after the loss of all cooling means considered in the analysis
for the described beyond design-basis accident, before the spent fuel
cladding would reach a temperature where the potential for a
significant offsite radiological release could occur. This analysis
conservatively does not consider the period of time from the initiating
event
[[Page 65718]]
causing a loss of SFP water inventory until all cooling means are lost.
The NRC staff has verified DEK's analyses and its calculations. The
analyses provide reasonable assurance that in granting the requested
exemption to DEK, there is no design-basis accident that will result in
an offsite radiological release exceeding the EPA PAGs at the site
boundary. In the unlikely event of a beyond design-basis accident
affecting the SFP that results in a complete loss of heat removal via
all modes of heat transfer, there will be at least 10 hours available
before an offsite release might occur and, therefore, at least 10 hours
to initiate appropriate mitigating actions to restore a means of heat
removal to the spent fuel. If a radiological release were projected to
occur under this unlikely scenario, a minimum of 10 hours is considered
sufficient time for offsite authorities to implement protective actions
using a CEMP approach to protect the health and safety of the public.
The NRC staff reviewed the licensee's justification for the
requested exemptions against the criteria in 10 CFR 50.12(a), in
addition to considering the basis for prior EP exemption requests as
discussed above, to determine whether the exemptions should be granted.
After evaluating the exemption requests, the staff determined, as
described below, that the criteria in 10 CFR50.12(a) are met, and that
the exemptions should be granted. Assessment of the DEK EP exemptions
is described in SECY-14-0066, ``Request by Dominion Energy Kewaunee,
Inc. for Exemptions from Certain Emergency Planning Requirements,''
dated June 27, 2014 (ADAMS Accession No. ML14072A257). The Commission
approved the NRC staff's intention to grant the exemptions in the staff
requirements memorandum (SRM) to SECY-14-0066, dated August 7, 2014
(ADAMS Accession No. ML14219A366). Descriptions of the specific
exemptions being granted to DEK, with the NRC staff's basis for
granting each exemption, are provided in SECY-14-0066 and summarized in
a table at the end of this document. The staff's detailed review and
technical basis for the approval of the specific EP exemptions being
granted to DEK are provided in the NRC staff's safety evaluation
enclosed in NRC letter dated October 27, 2014 (ADAMS Accession No.
ML14261A223).
A. Authorized by Law
The licensee has proposed exemptions from certain EP requirements
in 10 CFR 50.47(b), 10 CFR 50.47(c)(2), and 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E,
Section IV, that would allow DEK to revise the KPS Emergency Plan to
reflect the permanently shutdown and defueled condition of the station.
As stated above, in accordance with 10 CFR 50.12, the Commission may,
upon application by any interested person or upon its own initiative,
grant exemptions from the requirements of 10 CFR Part 50. The NRC staff
has determined that granting of the licensee's proposed exemptions will
not result in a violation of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended,
or the Commission's regulations. Therefore, the exemptions are
authorized by law.
B. No Undue Risk to Public Health and Safety
As stated previously, DEK provided analyses that show the
radiological consequences of design-basis accidents will not exceed the
limits of the EPA PAGs at the exclusion area boundary. Therefore,
offsite radiological emergency plans required under 10 CFR Part 50 are
no longer needed for protection of the public beyond the exclusion area
boundary based on the radiological consequences of design-basis
accidents still possible at KPS.
Although very unlikely, there are postulated beyond design-basis
accidents that might result in significant offsite radiological
releases. However, NUREG-1738 confirms that the risk of beyond design-
basis accidents is greatly reduced at permanently shutdown and defueled
reactors. The staff's analyses in NUREG-1738 concludes that the event
sequences important to risk at permanently shutdown and defueled power
reactors are limited to large earthquakes and cask drop events. For EP
assessments, this is an important difference relative to operating
power reactors where typically a large number of different sequences
make significant contributions to risk. Per NUREG-1738, relaxation of
offsite EP requirements under 10 CFR Part 50 a few months after
shutdown resulted in only a small change in risk. The report further
concludes that the change in risk due to relaxation of offsite EP
requirements is small because the overall risk is low, and because even
under current EP requirements for operating power reactors, EP was
judged to have marginal impact on evacuation effectiveness in the
severe earthquakes that dominate SFP risk. All other sequences
including cask drops (for which offsite radiological emergency plans
are expected to be more effective) are too low in likelihood to have a
significant impact on risk.
Therefore, granting exemptions eliminating the requirements of 10
CFR 50 to maintain offsite radiological emergency plans and reducing
the scope of onsite emergency planning activities will not present an
undue risk to the public health and safety.
C. Consistent With the Common Defense and Security
The requested exemptions by DEK only involve EP requirements under
10 CFR Part 50 and will allow DEK to revise the KPS Emergency Plan to
reflect the permanently shutdown and defueled condition of the
facility. Physical security measures at KPS are not affected by the
requested EP exemptions. The discontinuation of offsite radiological
emergency plans and the reduction in scope of the onsite emergency
planning activities at KPS will not adversely affect DEK's ability to
physically secure the site or protect special nuclear material.
Therefore, the proposed exemptions are consistent with the common
defense and security.
D. Special Circumstances
Special circumstances, in accordance with 10 CFR 50.12(a)(2)(ii),
are present whenever application of the regulation in the particular
circumstances is not necessary to achieve the underlying purpose of the
rule. The underlying purpose of 10 CFR 50.47(b), 10 CFR 50.47(c)(2),
and 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV, is to provide reasonable
assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in
the event of a radiological emergency, to establish plume exposure and
ingestion pathway emergency planning zones for nuclear power plants,
and to ensure that licensees maintain effective offsite and onsite
radiological emergency plans. The standards and requirements in these
regulations were developed by considering the risks associated with
operation of a power reactor at its licensed full-power level. These
risks include the potential for a reactor accident with offsite
radiological dose consequences.
As discussed previously, because KPS is permanently shutdown and
defueled, there is no longer a risk of offsite radiological release
from a design-basis accident and the risk of a significant offsite
radiological release from a beyond design-basis accident is greatly
reduced when compared to an operating power reactor. The NRC staff has
confirmed the reduced risks at KPS by comparing the generic risk
assumptions in the analyses in NUREG-1738 to site specific conditions
at KPS and determined that the risk values in NUREG-1738 bound the
risks presented by KPS. Furthermore, the staff has
[[Page 65719]]
recently concluded in NUREG-2161, ``Consequence Study of a Beyond-
Design-Basis Earthquake Affecting the Spent Fuel Pool for a U.S. Mark I
Boiling Water Reactor,'' dated September 2014 (ADAMS Accession No.
ML14255A365), that, consistent with earlier research studies, SFPs are
robust structures that are likely to withstand severe earthquakes
without leaking cooling water and potentially uncovering the spent
fuel. The NUREG-2161 study shows the likelihood of a radiological
release from the spent fuel after the analyzed severe earthquake at the
reference plant to be about one time in 10 million years or lower.
The licensee has analyzed site-specific beyond design-basis
accidents to determine the risk of a significant offsite radiological
release. In one such analysis, DEK determined that if all the normal
cooling systems used to cool the SFP were lost and not restored for the
duration of the postulated accident, then as of September 20, 2014, the
SFP at the KPS would take 120 hours before it would begin to boil and,
due to the loss of SFP water level from the resulting boil off, it
would take 26 days for the water inventory to lower to a level of three
feet from the top of the fuel. Additionally, DEK analysis shows that as
of October 30, 2014, in the event of a complete SFP drain down due to a
loss of water inventory, assuming natural circulation of air through
the spent fuel racks was available, then the peak fuel clad temperature
would remain below 1049 [deg]F (565 [deg]C), the temperature at which
incipient cladding failure may occur. Therefore, in this postulated
accident, fuel cladding remains intact and an offsite radiological
release would not take place.
The only beyond design-basis accident analysis that reached a
condition where a significant offsite release might occur involved a
scenario where the SFP drained in such a way that all modes of cooling
or heat transfer are assumed to be unavailable. This results in an
adiabatic heat-up of the spent fuel. DEK analysis of this beyond
design-basis accident shows that as of October 21, 2014, a minimum of
10 hours would be available between the time the fuel is uncovered (at
which time adiabatic heat-up begins), until the fuel cladding reaches a
temperature of 1652 [deg]F (900 [deg]C), the temperature associated
with rapid cladding oxidation and the potential for a significant
radiological release.
Exemptions from the offsite EP requirements in 10 CFR 50 have
previously been approved by the NRC when the site-specific analyses
show that at least 10 hours is available following a loss of SFP
coolant inventory accident with no air cooling (or other methods of
removing decay heat) until cladding of the hottest fuel assembly
reaches the zirconium rapid oxidation temperature. The staff concluded
in its previously granted exemptions, as it does with the DEK requested
EP exemptions, that if a minimum of 10 hours is available to initiate
mitigative actions consistent with plant conditions, or if needed, for
offsite authorities to implement protective actions using a CEMP
approach, then offsite radiological emergency plans, required under 10
CFR Part 50, are not necessary at permanently shutdown and defueled
power reactor licensees.
Additionally, DEK committed to enhanced SFP makeup strategies in
its letter to the NRC dated August 23, 2014 (ADAMS Accession No.
ML13242A019). The multiple strategies for providing makeup to the SFP
include: Using existing plant systems for inventory makeup; supplying
water through hoses to a spool piece connection to the existing SFP
piping; or using a diesel-driven portable pump to take suction from
Lake Michigan and provide makeup or spray to the SFP. These strategies
will continue to be required as a license condition. DEK further
provides that the equipment needed to perform these actions will
continue to be located onsite, and that the external makeup strategy
(using a diesel driven portable pump) is capable of being deployed
within 2 hours. Considering the very low probability of beyond design-
basis accidents affecting the SFP, these diverse strategies provide
defense-in-depth and time to provide makeup or spray to the SFP before
the onset of any postulated offsite radiological release.
For all the reasons stated above, the staff finds that the
licensee's requested exemptions to meet the underlying purpose of all
of the standards in 10 CFR 50.47(b), and requirements in 10 CFR
50.47(c)(2) and Appendix E, acceptably satisfy the special
circumstances in 10 CFR 50.12(a)(2)(ii) in view of the greatly reduced
risk of offsite radiological consequences associated with the
permanently shutdown and defueled state of the KPS facility.
The NRC staff has concluded that the exemptions being granted by
this action will maintain an acceptable level of emergency preparedness
at KPS and, if needed, that there is reasonable assurance that adequate
offsite protective measures can and will be taken by State and local
government agencies using a CEMP approach in the event of a
radiological emergency at the KPS facility. Since the underlying
purposes of the rules, as exempted, would continue to be achieved, even
with the elimination of the requirements under 10 CFR Part 50 to
maintain offsite radiological emergency plans and reduction in the
scope of the onsite emergency planning activities at KPS, the special
circumstances required by 10 CFR 50.12(a)(2)(ii) exist.
E. Environmental Considerations
In accordance with 10 CFR 51.31(a), the Commission has determined
that the granting of this exemption will not have a significant effect
on the quality of the human environment as discussed in the NRC staff's
Finding of No Significant Impact and associated Environmental
Assessment published October 7, 2014 (79 FR 60513).
V. Conclusions
Accordingly, the Commission has determined, pursuant to 10 CFR
50.12(a), that DEK's request for exemptions from certain EP
requirements in 10 CFR 50.47(b), 10 CFR 50.47(c)(2), and 10 CFR Part
50, Appendix E, Section IV, and as summarized in the table at the end
of this document, are authorized by law, will not present an undue risk
to the public health and safety, and are consistent with the common
defense and security. Also, special circumstances are present.
Therefore, the Commission hereby grants DEK exemptions from certain EP
requirements of 10 CFR 50.47(b), 10 CFR 50.47(c)(2), and 10 CFR Part
50, Appendix E, Section IV, as discussed and evaluated in detail in the
staff's safety evaluation dated October 27, 2014. The exemptions are
effective as of October 30, 2014.
Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 27th day of October, 2014.
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Michele G. Evans,
Director, Division of Operating Reactor Licensing, Office of Nuclear
Reactor Regulation.
[[Page 65720]]
IV--Table of Exemptions Granted to DEK
------------------------------------------------------------------------
10 CFR 50.47 NRC staff basis for exemption
------------------------------------------------------------------------
10 CFR 50.47(b)........................ In the Statement of
The NRC is granting exemption from Considerations (SOC) for the
portions of the rule language that final rule for emergency
would otherwise require offsite planning (EP) requirements for
emergency response plans. independent spent fuel storage
installations (ISFSIs) and for
monitor retrievable storage
installations (MRS) (60
Federal Register (FR) 32430;
June 22, 1995), the Commission
responded to comments
concerning offsite EP for
ISFSIs or an MRS and concluded
that, ``the offsite
consequences of potential
accidents at an ISFSI or a MRS
would not warrant establishing
Emergency Planning Zones
[EPZ].''
In a nuclear power reactor's
permanently defueled state,
the accident risks are more
similar to an ISFSI or MRS
than an operating nuclear
power plant. The EP program
would be similar to that
required for an ISFSI under
Section 72.32(a) of Title 10
of the Code of Federal
Regulations (10 CFR) when fuel
stored in the spent fuel pool
(SFP) has more than 5 years of
decay time and would not
change substantially when all
the fuel is transferred from
the SFP to an onsite ISFSI.
Exemptions from offsite EP
requirements have previously
been approved when the site-
specific analyses show that at
least 10 hours is available
from a partial drain-down
event where cooling of the
spent fuel is not effective
until the hottest fuel
assembly reaches 900 [deg]C.
The technical basis that
underlied the approval of the
exemption request is based
partly on the analysis of a
time period that spent fuel
stored in the SFP is unlikely
to reach the zirconium
ignition temperature in less
than 10 hours. This time
period is based on a heat-up
calculation which uses several
simplifying assumptions. Some
of these assumptions are
conservative (adiabatic
conditions), while others are
non-conservative (no oxidation
below 900 [deg]C). Weighing
the conservatisms and non-
conservatisms, the NRC staff
judges that this calculation
reasonably represents
conditions which may occur in
the event of an SFP accident.
The staff concluded that if 10
hours were available to
initiate mitigative actions,
or if needed, offsite
protective actions using a
comprehensive emergency
management plan (CEMP), formal
offsite radiological emergency
plans are not necessary for
these permanently defueled
nuclear power reactor
licensees.
As supported by the licensee's
SFP analysis, the NRC staff
believes an exemption to the
requirements for formal
offsite radiological emergency
plans is justified for a
zirconium fire scenario
considering the low likelihood
of this event together with
time available to take
mitigative or protective
actions between the initiating
event and before the onset of
a postulated fire.
The Dominion Energy Kewaunee,
Inc. (DEK) analysis has
demonstrated that 90 days
after shutdown, the
radiological consequences of
design-basis accidents will
not exceed the limits of the
U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency's (EPA) Protective
Action Guidelines (PAGs) at
the exclusion area boundary.
These analyses also show that
after the spent fuel has
decayed for 17 months, for
beyond-design-basis events
where the SFP is drained, air
cooling will prevent the fuel
from reaching the lowest
temperature where incipient
cladding failure may occur
(565 [deg]C). In the event
that air cooling is not
possible, 10 hours is
available to take mitigative
or, if needed, offsite
protective actions using a
CEMP from the time the fuel is
uncovered until it reaches the
auto-ignition temperature of
900 [deg]C.
DEK has also furnished
information on its SFP
inventory makeup strategies
for mitigating the loss of
water inventory. The multiple
strategies for providing
makeup to the SPF include:
using existing plant systems
for inventory makeup;
supplying water via hoses to a
spool piece connection to the
existing SFP piping; or using
a diesel-driven portable pump
to take suction from Lake
Michigan and provide makeup or
spray to the SFP. DEK also
stated that the tools and
equipment needed to perform
these actions are located on
site and that the external
makeup strategy (using a
diesel driven portable pump)
was able to be deployed within
2 hours. DEK believes these
diverse strategies provide
defense-in-depth and ample
time to provide makeup or
spray to the SFP prior to the
onset of zirconium cladding
ignition when considering very
low probability of beyond
design-basis events affecting
the SFP.
10 CFR 50.47(b)(1)..................... Refer to basis for 10 CFR
50.47(b).
The NRC is granting exemption from
portions of the rule language that
would otherwise require the need for
Emergency Planning Zones (EPZs).
[[Page 65721]]
10 CFR 50.47(b)(3)..................... Decommissioning power reactors
The NRC is granting exemption from present a low likelihood of
portions of the rule language that any credible accident
would otherwise require the need for resulting in a radiological
an Emergency Operations Facility. release together with the time
available to take mitigative
or, if needed, offsite
protective actions using a
CEMP between the initiating
event and before the onset of
a postulated fire. As such, an
emergency operations facility
would not be required. The
``nuclear island,'' control
room, or other onsite location
can provide for the
communication and coordination
with offsite organizations for
the level of support required.
Also refer to basis for 10 CFR
50.47(b).
10 CFR 50.47(b)(4)..................... Decommissioning power reactors
The NRC is granting exemption from present a low likelihood of
portions of the rule language that any credible accident
would otherwise require reference to resulting in a radiological
formal offsite radiological emergency release together with the time
response plans. available to take mitigative
or if needed, offsite
protective actions using a
CEMP between the initiating
event and before the onset of
a postulated fire. As such,
formal offsite radiological
emergency response plans are
not required.
The Nuclear Energy Institute
(NEI) document NEI 99-01,
``Development of Emergency
Action Levels for Non-Passive
Reactors'' (Revision 6), was
found to be an acceptable
method for development of
emergency action levels (EALs)
and was endorsed by the U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission
(NRC) in a letter dated March
28, 2013 (ADAMS Accession No.
ML12346A463). NEI 99-01
provides EALs for non-passive
operating nuclear power
reactors, permanently defueled
reactors, and ISFSIs.
Also refer to basis for 10 CFR
50.47(b).
10 CFR 50.47(b)(5)..................... Refer to basis for 10 CFR
50.47(b).
The NRC is granting exemption from
portions of the rule language that
would otherwise require early
notification of the public and a means
to provide instructions to the public
within the plume exposure pathway
Emergency Planning Zone.
10 CFR 50.47(b)(6)..................... Refer to basis for 10 CFR
50.47(b).
The NRC is granting exemption from
portions of the rule language that
would otherwise require prompt
communications with the public.
10 CFR 50.47(b)(7)..................... Refer to basis for 10 CFR
50.47(b).
The NRC is granting exemption from
portions of the rule language that
would otherwise require information to
be made available to the public on a
periodic basis about how they will be
notified and what their initial
protective actions should be.
10 CFR 50.47(b)(9)..................... Refer to basis for 10 CFR
50.47(b).
The NRC is granting exemption from
portions of the rule language that
would otherwise require the capability
for monitoring offsite consequences.
10 CFR 50.47(b)(10).................... In the unlikely event of an SFP
The NRC is granting exemption from accident, the iodine isotopes,
portions of the rule language that which contribute to an off-
would reduce the range of protective site dose from an operating
actions developed for emergency reactor accident, are not
workers and the public. Consideration present, so potassium iodide
of evacuation, sheltering, or the use distribution would no longer
of potassium iodide will no longer be serve as an effective or
necessary. Evacuation times will no necessary supplemental
longer need to developed or updated. protective action.
Protective actions for the ingestion The Commission responded to
exposure pathway EPZ will not need to comments in its SOC for the
be developed. final rule for emergency
planning requirements for
ISFSIs and MRS facilities (60
FR 32435), and concluded that,
``the offsite consequences of
potential accidents at an
ISFSI or an MRS would not
warrant establishing Emergency
Planning Zones.''
Additionally, in the SOC for
the final rule for EP
requirements for ISFSIs and
for MRS facilities (60 FR
32430), the Commission
responded to comments
concerning site-specific EP
that includes evacuation of
surrounding population for an
ISFSI not at a reactor site,
and concluded that, ``The
Commission does not agree that
as a general matter emergency
plans for an ISFSI must
include evacuation planning.''
Also refer to basis for 10 CFR
50.47(b).
10 CFR 50.47(c)(2)..................... Refer to basis for 10 CFR
50.47(b)(10).
The NRC is granting exemption from
portions of the rule language that
would otherwise require the
establishment of a 10 mile radius
plume exposure pathway EPZ and a 50
mile radius ingestion pathway EPZ.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
[[Page 65722]]
10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV NRC staff basis for exemption
------------------------------------------------------------------------
10 CFR Part 50, App. E, Section IV 1... The EP Rule published in the
The NRC is granting exemption from Federal Register (76 FR 72560;
portions of the rule language that November 23, 2011) amended
would otherwise require onsite certain requirements in 10 CFR
protective actions during hostile Part 50. Among the changes,
action. the definition of ``hostile
action'' was added as an act
directed toward a nuclear
power plant or its personnel.
This definition is based on
the definition of ``hostile
action'' provided in NRC
Bulletin 2005-02, ``Emergency
Preparedness and Response
Actions for Security-Based
Events.'' NRC Bulletin 2005-02
was not applicable to nuclear
power reactors that have
permanently ceased operations
and have certified that fuel
has been removed from the
reactor vessel.
The NRC excluded non-power
reactors from the scope of
``hostile action'' at the time
of the rulemaking because, as
defined in 10 CFR 50.2, a non-
power reactor is not
considered a nuclear power
reactor and a regulatory basis
had not been developed to
support the inclusion of non-
power reactors within the
scope of ``hostile action.''
Similarly, a decommissioning
power reactor or an ISFSI is
not a ``nuclear reactor'' as
defined in 10 CFR Part 50. A
decommissioning power reactor
also has a low likelihood of a
credible accident resulting in
radiological releases
requiring offsite protective
measures. For all of these
reasons, the staff concludes
that a decommissioning power
reactor is not a facility that
falls within the scope of
``hostile action.''
Similarly, for security, risk
insights can be used to
determine which targets are
important to protect against
sabotage. A level of security
commensurate with the
consequences of a sabotage
event is required and is
evaluated on a site-specific
basis. The severity of the
consequences declines as fuel
ages and, thereby, removes
over time the underlying
concern that a sabotage attack
could cause offsite
radiological consequences.
Although, this analysis
provides a justification for
exempting KPS from ``hostile
action'' related requirements,
some EP requirements for
security-based events are
maintained. The classification
of security-based events,
notification of offsite
authorities and coordination
with offsite agencies under a
CEMP concept are still
required.
10 CFR Part 50, App. E, Section IV 2... Refer to basis for 10 CFR
50.47(b)(10).
The NRC is granting exemption from
portions of the rule language
concerning the evacuation time
analyses within the plume exposure
pathway EPZ for the licensee's initial
application
10 CFR Part 50, App. E, Section IV 3... Refer to basis for 10 CFR Part
The NRC is granting exemption from 50, Appendix E, Section IV.2.
portions of the rule language that
would otherwise require use of NRC-
approved evacuation time estimates
(ETEs) and updates to State and local
governments when developing protective
action strategies.
10 CFR Part 50, App. E, Section IV 4... Refer to basis for 10 CFR Part
The NRC is granting exemption from 50, Appendix E, Section IV.2.
portions of the rule language that
would otherwise require licensees to
develop evacuation time estimates
based on the most recent census data
and submit the ETE analysis to the NRC
prior to providing it to State and
local government for developing
protective action strategies.
10 CFR Part 50, App. E, Section IV 5... Refer to basis for 10 CFR Part
The NRC is granting exemption from 50, Appendix E, Section IV.2.
portions of the rule language that
would otherwise require licensees to
estimate the EPZ permanent resident
population changes once a year between
decennial censuses.
10 CFR Part 50, App. E, Section IV 6... Refer to basis for 10 CFR Part
The NRC is granting exemption from 50, Appendix E, Section IV.2.
portions of the rule language that
would otherwise require the licensee
to submit an updated ETE analysis to
the NRC based on changes in the
resident population that result in
exceeding specific evacuation time
increase criteria.
10 CFR Part 50, App. E, Section IV A.1. Based on the permanently
The NRC is granting exemption from the shutdown and defueled status
word ``operating'' in the requirement of the reactor, a
to describe the normal plant decommissioning reactor is not
organization. authorized to operate under 10
CFR 50.82(a). Because the
licensee cannot operate the
reactors, the licensee does
not have a ``plant operating
organization.''
10 CFR Part 50, App. E, Section IV A.3. The number of staff at
The NRC is granting exemption to the decommissioning sites is
requirement to describe the licensee's generally small but is
headquarters personnel sent to the commensurate with the need to
site to augment the onsite emergency safely store spent fuel at the
response organization. facility in a manner that is
protective of public health
and safety. Decommissioning
sites typically have a level
of emergency response that
does not require response by
the licensee's headquarters
personnel.
[[Page 65723]]
10 CFR Part 50, App. E, Section IV A. 4 Although, the likelihood of
The NRC is granting exemption from events that would result in
portions of the rule language that doses in excess of the EPA
would otherwise require the licensee PAGs to the public beyond the
to identify a position and function owner controlled area boundary
within its organization which will based on the permanently
carry the responsibility for making shutdown and defueled status
offsite dose projections. of the reactor is extremely
low, the licensee still must
be able to determine if a
radiological release is
occurring. If a release is
occurring, then the licensee
staff should promptly
communicate that information
to offsite authorities for
their consideration. The
offsite organizations are
responsible for deciding what,
if any, protective actions
should be taken based on
comprehensive emergency
planning.
10 CFR Part 50, App. E, Section IV A. 5 The number of staff at
The NRC is granting exemption from the decommissioning sites is
requirement for the licensee to generally small but should be
identify individuals with special commensurate with the need to
qualifications for coping with operate the facility in a
emergencies. manner that is protective of
public health and safety.
10 CFR Part 50, App. E, Section IV A.7. Refer to basis for 10 CFR Part
The NRC is granting exemption from 50, Appendix E, Section IV.1.
portions of the rule language that
would otherwise require a description
of the assistance expected from State,
local, and Federal agencies for coping
with a hostile action.
10 CFR Part 50, App. E, Section IV A.8. Offsite emergency measures are
The NRC is granting exemption from the limited to support provided by
requirement to identify the State and local police, fire
local officials for ordering departments, and ambulance and
protective actions and evacuations. hospital services, as
appropriate. Due to the low
probability of design basis
accidents or other credible
events to exceed the EPA PAGs,
protective actions such as
evacuation should not be
required, but could be
implemented at the discretion
of offsite authorities using a
CEMP.
Also refer to basis for 10 CFR
50.47(b)(10).
10 CFR Part 50, App. E, Section IV A.9. Responsibilities should be well
The NRC is granting exemption from the defined in the emergency plan
requirement for the licensee to and procedures, regularly
provide an analysis demonstrating that tested through drills and
on-shift personnel are not assigned exercises audited and
responsibilities that would prevent inspected by the licensee and
them from performing their assigned the NRC. The duties of the
emergency plan functions. onshift personnel at a
decommissioning reactor
facility are not as
complicated and diverse as
those for an operating power
reactor.
The NRC staff considered the
similarity between the
staffing levels at a
permanently shutdown and
defueled reactor and staffing
levels at an operating power
reactor site. The minimal
systems and equipment needed
to maintain the spent nuclear
fuel in the SFP or in a dry
cask storage system in a safe
condition requires minimal
personnel and is governed by
Technical Specifications. In
the EP final rule published in
the Federal Register (76 FR
72560; November 23, 2011), the
NRC concluded that the
staffing analysis requirement
was not necessary for non-
power reactor licensees due to
the small staffing levels
required to operate the
facility.
The NRC staff also examined the
actions required to mitigate
the very low probability
beyond design-basis events for
the SFP. Additionally, DEK
also furnished information on
its SFP inventory makeup
strategies for mitigating the
loss of water inventory. The
multiple strategies for
providing makeup to the SFP
include: using existing plant
systems for inventory makeup;
supplying water via hoses to a
spool piece connection to the
existing SFP piping; or using
a diesel-driven portable pump
to take suction from Lake
Michigan and provide makeup or
spray to the SFP. DEK further
provided that the tools and
equipment needed to perform
these actions are located on
site and the external makeup
strategy (using a diesel
driven portable pump) was
demonstrated to be capable of
being deployed within 2 hours,
significantly less time than
the 10 hours that would be
available for ad hoc response.
DEK believes, and the NRC
staff agrees, that these
diverse strategies provide
defense-in-depth and ample
time to provide makeup or
spray to the SFP prior to the
onset of zirconium cladding
ignition when considering very
low probability beyond design-
basis events affecting the
SFP.
10 CFR Part 50, App. E, Section IV B.1. NEI 99-01, ``Development of
The NRC is granting exemption from Emergency Action levels for
portions of the rule language that Non-Passive Reactors''
would otherwise require offsite (Revision 6), was found to be
emergency actions levels and offsite an acceptable method for
protective measures and associate development of EALs and was
offsite monitoring for the emergency endorsed by the NRC in a
conditions. letter dated March 28, 2013
In addition, the NRC is granting (ADAMS Accession No.
exemption from portions of the rule ML12346A463). No offsite
language that would otherwise require protective actions are
emergency action levels based on anticipated to be necessary,
hostile action. so classification above the
alert level is no longer
required, which is consistent
with ISFSI facilities.
Also refer to basis for 10 CFR
Part 50, Appendix E, Section
IV.1.
[[Page 65724]]
10 CFR Part 50, App. E, Section IV C.1. Containment parameters do not
The NRC is granting exemption from provide an indication of the
portions of the rule language that conditions at a defueled
would otherwise require emergency facility and emergency core
actions levels based on operating cooling systems are no longer
reactor concerns, such as offsite required. Other indications,
radiation monitoring, pressure in such as SFP level or
containment, and the response of the temperature, can be used at
emergency core cooling system. In sites where there is spent
addition, the NRC is striking language fuel in the SFPs.
that would otherwise require offsite In the SOC for the final rule
emergency action levels of a site area for EP requirements for ISFSIs
emergency and a general emergency. and MRS) facilities (60 FR
32430), the Commission
responded to comments
concerning a general emergency
at an ISFSI and an MRS, and
concluded that, ``. . . an
essential element of a General
Emergency is that a release
can be reasonably expected to
exceed EPA Protective Action
Guidelines exposure levels off
site for more than the
immediate site area.''
The probability of a condition
reaching the level above an
emergency classification of
alert is very low. In the
event of an accident at a
defueled facility that meets
the conditions for relaxation
of EP requirements, there will
be available time for event
mitigation and, if necessary,
implementation of offsite
protective actions using a
CEMP.
NEI 99-01, ``Development of
Emergency Action levels for
Non-Passive Reactors,''
(Revision 6) was found to be
an acceptable method for
development of EALs and was
endorsed by the NRC in a
letter dated March 28, 2013
(ADAMS Accession No.
ML12346A463). No offsite
protective actions are
anticipated to be necessary,
so classification above the
alert level is no longer
required.
10 CFR Part 50, App. E, Section IV C.2. In the EP rule published in the
The NRC is granting exemption from Federal Register (76 FR
portions of the rule language that 72560), non-power reactor
would otherwise require the licensee licensees were not required to
to assess, classify, and declare an assess, classify and declare
emergency condition within 15 minutes. an emergency condition within
15 minutes. An SFP and an
ISFSI are also not nuclear
power reactors as defined in
the NRC's regulations. A
decommissioning power reactor
has a low likelihood of a
credible accident resulting in
radiological releases
requiring offsite protective
measures. For these reasons,
the NRC staff concludes that a
decommissioning power reactor
should not be required to
assess, classify and declare
an emergency condition within
15 minutes.
10 CFR Part 50, App. E, Section IV D.1. Refer to basis for 10 CFR
The NRC is granting exemption from 50.47(b) and 10 CFR
portions of the rule language that 50.47(b)(10).
would otherwise require the licensee
to reach agreement with local, State,
and Federal officials and agencies for
prompt notification of protective
measures or evacuations and the
associated titles of officials to be
notified for each agency within the
EPZs.
10 CFR Part 50, App. E, Section IV D.2. Refer to basis for 10 CFR Part
The NRC is granting exemption from the 50, Appendix E, Section
requirement for the licensee to IV.D.1.
annually disseminate general
information on emergency planning and
evacuations within the plume exposure
pathway EPZ. The need for signage or
other measure to address transient
populations is also being struck.
10 CFR Part 50, App. E, Section IV D.3. While the capability needs to
The NRC is granting exemption from exist for the notification of
portions of the rule language that offsite government agencies
would otherwise require the licensee within a specified time
to have the capability to make period, previous exemptions
notifications to State and local have allowed for extending the
government agencies within 15 minutes State and local government
of declaring an emergency. agencies' notification time up
to 60 minutes based on the
site-specific justification
provided.
DEK's exemption request
provides that the KPS will
make notifications to the
State of Wisconsin, to the
local county (Kewaunee) and
the NRC within 60 minutes of
declaration of an event. In
the permanently defueled
condition of the reactor, the
rapidly developing scenarios
associated with events
initiated during reactor power
operation are no longer
credible.
Also refer to basis for 10 CFR
50.47(b) and 10 CFR
50.47(b)(10).
10 CFR Part 50, App. E, Section IV D.4. Refer to basis for 10 CFR Part
The NRC is granting exemption from the 50, Appendix E, Section IV.D.3
requirement for the licensee to obtain regarding the alert and
FEMA approval of its backup alert and notification system
notification capability. requirements.
10 CFR Part 50, App. E, Section IV Due to the low probability of
E.8.a.(i). design-basis accidents or
The NRC is granting exemption from other credible events to
portions of the rule language that exceed the EPA PAGs at the
would otherwise require the licensee site boundary, the available
to have an onsite technical support time for event mitigation at a
center and emergency operations decommissioning reactor and,
facility.. if needed, to implement
offsite protective actions
using a CEMP, an emergency
operations facility (EOF)
would not be required to
support offsite agency
response. Onsite actions may
be directed from the control
room or other location,
without the requirements
imposed on a technical support
center (TSC).
[[Page 65725]]
10 CFR Part 50, App. E, Section IV NUREG-0696, ``Functional
E.8.a.(ii). Criteria for Emergency
The NRC is granting exemption from Response Facilities,''
portions of the rule language that provides that the operational
would otherwise require the licensee support center (OSC) is an
to have an onsite operational support onsite area separate from the
center. control room and the TSC where
licensee operations support
personnel will assemble in an
emergency. For a
decommissioning power reactor,
an OSC is no longer required
to meet its original purpose
of an assembly area for plant
logistical support during an
emergency. The OSC function
can be incorporated into
another facility.
10 CFR Part 50, App. E, Section IV Refer to basis for 10 CFR
E.8.b. and subpart Sections IV 50.47(b)(3).
E.8.b.(1)-E.8.b.(5).
The NRC is granting exemption from the
requirements related to an offsite
emergency operations facility
location, space and size,
communications capability, access to
plant data and radiological
information, and access to coping and
office supplies.
10 CFR Part 50, App. E, Section IV Refer to basis for 10 CFR
E.8.c. and Sections IV E.8.c.(1)- 50.47(b)(3).
E.8.c.(3).
The NRC is granting exemption from the
requirements to have an emergency
operations facility with the
capabilities to obtain and display
plant data and radiological
information; the capability to analyze
technical information and provide
briefings; and the capability to
support events occurring at more than
one site (if the emergency operations
center supports more than one site).
10 CFR Part 50, App. E, Section IV Refer to basis for 10 CFR Part
E.8.d. 50, Appendix E, Section IV.1
The NRC is granting exemption from the regarding hostile action.
requirements to have an alternate
facility that would be accessible even
if the site is under threat of or
experiencing hostile action, to
function as a staging area for
augmentation of emergency response
staff.
10 CFR Part 50, App. E, Section IV Refer to basis for 10 CFR
E.8.e. 50.47(b)(3).
The NRC is granting exemption from the
requirement regarding the need for the
licensee to comply with paragraph 8.b
of this section
10 CFR Part 50, App. E, Section IV Refer to basis for 10 CFR
E.9.a. 50.47(b) and 10 CFR
The NRC is granting exemption from 50.47(b)(10).
portions of the rule language that Communications with State and
would otherwise require the licensee local governments that are not
to have communications with State and contiguous with or bordering
local governments that are within the the site boundary will no
plume exposure pathway EPZ (which is longer be required. However,
no longer required by the exemption the contiguous State and the
granted to 10 CFR 50.47(b)(10)) but local governments in which the
are not contiguous with or bordering nuclear facility is located
on the licensee site boundary. will still need to be informed
of events and emergencies, so
lines of communication must be
maintained.
10 CFR Part 50, App. E, Section IV Because of the low probability
E.9.c. of design-basis accidents or
The NRC is granting exemption from the other credible events that
requirements for communication and would be expected to exceed
testing provisions between the control the EPA PAGs and the available
room, the onsite technical support time for event mitigation and,
center, State/local emergency if needed, implementation of
operations facilities, and field offsite protective actions
assessment teams. using a CEMP, there is no need
for the TSC, EOF, or offsite
field assessment teams.
Also refer to justification for
10 CFR 50.47(b)(3).
Communication with State and
local emergency operation
centers is maintained to
coordinate assistance on site
if required.
10 CFR Part 50, App. E, Section IV The functions of the control
E.9.d. room, EOF, TSC, and OSC may be
The NRC is granting exemption from combined into one or more
portions of the rule language that locations due to the smaller
would otherwise require provisions for facility staff and the greatly
communications from the control room, reduced required interaction
onsite technical support center, and with State and local emergency
emergency operations facility with NRC response facilities.
Headquarters and appropriate Regional Also refer to basis for 10 CFR
Operations Center. 50.47(b).
10 CFR Part 50, App. E, Section IV F.1 Decommissioning power reactor
and Section IV F.1. v.iii. sites typically have a level
The NRC is granting exemption from of emergency response that
portions of the rule language that does not require additional
would otherwise require the licensee response by the licensee's
to provide training and drills for the headquarters personnel, Civil
licensee's headquarters personnel, Defense personnel, or local
Civil Defense personnel, or local news news media. Therefore, the NRC
media. staff considers it reasonable
to exempt the licensee from
training and drill
requirements for these
personnel.
10 CFR Part 50, App. E, Section IV F.2. Because of the low probability
The NRC is granting exemption from of design basis accidents or
portions of the rule language that other credible events that
would otherwise require testing of a would be expected to exceed
public alert and notification system. the limits of EPA PAGs and the
available time for event
mitigation and offsite
protective actions from a
CEMP, the public alert and
notification system will not
be used and, therefore,
requires no testing.
Also refer to basis for 10 CFR
50.47(b).
[[Page 65726]]
10 CFR Part 50, App. E, Section IV Due to the low probability of
F.2.a. and Section IV F.2.a.(i) design basis accidents or
through IV F.2.a.(iii). other credible events that
The NRC is granting exemption from the would be expected to exceed
requirements for full participation the limits of EPA PAGs, the
exercises and the submittal of the available time for event
associated exercise scenarios to the mitigation and, if necessary,
NRC. implementation of offsite
protective actions using a
CEMP, no formal offsite
radiological emergency plans
are required.
The intent of submitting
exercise scenarios at an
operating power reactor site
is to ensure that licensees
utilize different scenarios in
order to prevent the
preconditioning of responders
at power reactors. For
decommissioning power reactor
sites, there are limited
events that could occur, and
as such, the previously
routine progression to general
emergency in an operating
power reactor site scenario is
not applicable.
The licensee would be exempt
from 10 CFR.
Part 50, Appendix E, Section
IV.F.2.a.(i)-(iii) because the
licensee would be exempt from
the umbrella provision of 10
CFR Part 50, Appendix E,
Section IV.F.2.a.
10 CFR Part 50, App. E, Section IV Refer to basis for 10 CFR Part
F.2.b. 50, Appendix E, Section
The NRC is granting exemption from IV.F.2.a.
portions of the rule language that The low probability of design
would otherwise require the licensee basis accidents or other
to submit scenarios for its biennial credible events that would
exercises of its onsite emergency exceed the EPA PAGs, the
plan. In addition, the NRC is granting available time for event
exemption from portions of the rule mitigation and, if necessary,
language that requires assessment of implementation of offsite
offsite releases, protective action protective actions using a
decision making, and reference to the CEMP, render a TSC, OSC and
Technical Support Center, Operations EOF unnecessary. The principal
Support Center, and the Emergency functions required by
Operations Facility. regulation can be performed at
an onsite location that does
not meet the requirements of
the TSC, OSC or EOF.
10 CFR Part 50, App. E, Section IV Refer to basis for 10 CFR Part
F.2.c. and Sections IV F.2.c.(1) 50, Appendix E, Section
through F.2.c.(5). IV.F.2.a.
The NRC is granting exemption from the
requirements regarding the need for
the licensee to exercise offsite plans
biennially with full participation by
each offsite authority having a role
under the radiological response plan.
The NRC is also granting exemptions
from the conditions for conducting
these exercises (including hostile
action exercises) if two different
licensees have facilities on the same
site or on adjacent, contiguous sites,
or share most of the elements defining
co-located licensees.
10 CFR Part 50, App. E, Section IV Refer to basis for 10 CFR Part
F.2.d. 50, Appendix E, Section IV.2.
The NRC is granting exemption from the
requirements to obtain State
participation in an ingestion pathway
exercise and a hostile action
exercise, with each State that has
responsibilities, at least once per
exercise cycle.
10 CFR Part 50, App. E, Section IV Refer to basis for 10 CFR Part
F.2.e. 50, Appendix E, Section IV.2.
The NRC is granting exemption from
portions of the rule language that
would otherwise require the licensee
to allow participation exercise in
licensee drills by any State and local
Government in the plume exposure
pathway EPZ when requested.
10 CFR Part 50, App. E, Section IV The U.S. Federal Emergency
F.2.f. Management Agency is
The NRC is granting exemption from responsible for evaluating the
portions of the rule language that adequacy of offsite response
would otherwise require FEMA to during an exercise. No action
consult with the NRC on remedial is expected from State or
exercises. The NRC is granting local government organizations
exemption from portions of the rule in response to an event at a
language that discuss the extent of decommissioning power reactor
State and local participation in site other than onsite
remedial exercises. firefighting, law enforcement
and ambulance/medical services
support. A memorandum of
understanding should be in
place for those services.
Offsite response organizations
will continue to take actions
on a comprehensive emergency
planning basis to protect the
health and safety of the
public as they would at any
other industrial site.
10 CFR Part 50, App. E, Section IV Due to the low probability of
F.2.i. design basis accidents or
The NRC is granting exemption from other credible events to
portions of the rule language that exceed the EPA PAGs, the
would otherwise require the licensee available time for event
to drill and exercise scenarios that mitigation and, if needed,
include a wide spectrum of implementation of offsite
radiological release events and protective actions using a
hostile action. CEMP, the previously routine
progression to general
emergency in power reactor
site scenarios is not
applicable to a
decommissioning site.
Therefore, the licensee is not
expected to demonstrate
response to a wide spectrum of
events.
Also refer to basis for 10 CFR
Part 50, Appendix E, Section
IV.1 regarding hostile action.
10 CFR Part 50, App. E, Section IV Refer to basis for 10 CFR Part
F.2.j. 50, Appendix E, Section
The NRC is granting exemption from the IV.F.2.
requirements regarding the need for
the licensee's emergency response
organization to demonstrate
proficiency in key skills in the
principal functional areas of
emergency response. Additionally, the
NRC is granting exemption during an
eight calendar year exercise cycle,
from demonstrating proficiency in the
key skills necessary to respond to
such scenarios as hostile actions,
unplanned minimal radiological
release, Sec. 50.54(hh)(2)
implementation strategies, and
scenarios involving rapid escalation
to a Site Area Emergency or General
Emergency.
[[Page 65727]]
10 CFR Part 50, App. E, Section IV I... Refer to basis for 10 CFR Part
The NRC is granting exemption from the 50, Appendix E, Section
requirements regarding the need for IV.E.8.d.
the licensee to develop a range of
protective action for onsite personnel
during hostile actions.
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[FR Doc. 2014-26292 Filed 11-4-14; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590-01-P