[Federal Register Volume 80, Number 63 (Thursday, April 2, 2015)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Pages 18036-18070]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2015-07293]
[[Page 18035]]
Vol. 80
Thursday,
No. 63
April 2, 2015
Part VI
Securities and Exchange Commission
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
17 CFR Part 240
Exemption for Certain Exchange Members; Proposed Rule
Federal Register / Vol. 80 , No. 63 / Thursday, April 2, 2015 /
Proposed Rules
[[Page 18036]]
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION
17 CFR Part 240
[Release No. 34-74581; File No. S7-05-15]
RIN 3235-AL65
Exemption for Certain Exchange Members
AGENCY: Securities and Exchange Commission.
ACTION: Proposed rule.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
SUMMARY: The Securities and Exchange Commission (``Commission'') is
proposing to amend Rule 15b9-1 (``Rule'') under the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 (``Act'' or ``Exchange Act''), which exempts certain
brokers or dealers from membership in a registered national securities
association (``Association''). The proposed amendments would replace
the current gross income allowance in the Rule with a narrower
exemption from Association membership for a broker or dealer that
carries no customer accounts and effects transactions on a national
securities exchange. The proposed amendments would create an exemption
for a dealer that effects transactions off the exchange of which it is
a member solely for the purpose of hedging the risks of its floor-based
activity, or a broker or dealer that effects transactions off the
exchange resulting from orders that are routed by a national securities
exchange of which it is a member, to prevent trade-throughs consistent
with the provisions of Rule 611 of Regulation NMS.
DATES: Comments should be received on or before June 1, 2015.
ADDRESSES: Comments may be submitted by any of the following methods:
Electronic Comments
Use the Commission's Internet comment form (http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed.shtml); or
Send an email to [email protected]. Please include
File Number S7-05-15 on the subject line; or
Use the Federal eRulemaking Portal (http://www.regulations.gov). Follow the instructions for submitting comments.
Paper Comments
Send paper comments to Brent J. Fields, Secretary,
Securities and Exchange Commission, 100 F Street NE., Washington, DC
20549-1090.
All submissions should refer to File Number S7-05-15. This file number
should be included on the subject line if email is used. To help us
process and review your comments more efficiently, please use only one
method. The Commission will post all comments on the Commission's
Internet Web site (http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed.shtml). Comments
are also available for Web site viewing and printing in the
Commission's Public Reference Room, 100 F Street NE., Washington, DC
20549 on official business days between the hours of 10:00 a.m. and
3:00 p.m. All comments received will be posted without change; the
Commission does not edit personal identifying information from
submissions. You should submit only information that you wish to make
available publicly.
Studies, memoranda or other substantive items may be added by the
Commission or staff to the comment file during this rulemaking. A
notification of the inclusion in the comment file of any such materials
will be made available on the Commission's Web site. To ensure direct
electronic receipt of such notifications, sign up through the ``Stay
Connected'' option at www.sec.gov to receive notifications by email.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: David Michehl, Special Counsel, at
(202) 551-5627; Nicholas Shwayri, Special Counsel, at (202) 551-5667;
or Charles Sommers, Attorney-Adviser, at (202) 551-5787, Division of
Trading and Markets, Securities and Exchange Commission, 100 F Street
NE., Washington, DC 20549-7010.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Table of Contents
I. Background
A. Regulatory History
B. Regulatory Oversight of Off-Exchange Trading Activity
II. Discussion of Amendments to Rule 15b9-1
A. Prior Comments on Association Membership
B. Overview of Amendments
C. Elimination of the De Minimis Allowance
D. Floor Member Hedging Exemption
E. Regulation NMS Routing Exemption
III. Effective Date and Implementation
IV. General Request for Comments
V. Economic Analysis
A. Baseline
1. Regulatory Structure and Activity Levels of Non-Member Firms
2. Current Market Oversight
B. Broad Economic Considerations, Including Effects on
Efficiency, Competition and Capital Formation
1. Effects on Regulatory Supervision
2. Firm Response and Effect on Market Activity
3. Competition To Provide Liquidity Is Distorted by Regulatory
Costs Borne by Only a Subset of Competitors, Member Firms
4. Competitive Effects on Off-Exchange Market Regulation
C. Consideration of Costs and Benefits
1. Benefits
2. Costs
D. Alternatives
1. Elimination of the Floor Member Hedging Exemption
2. Improve Off-Exchange Supervision Through Action of Other SROs
With or Without CAT
3. Exchange Membership Alternative
4. Retaining the De Minimis Allowance
5. The Commission Assumes Regulatory Oversight Role for Non-
Member Firms
E. Request for Comment on Economic Analysis
VI. Paperwork Reduction Act
A. Summary of Collection of Information
B. Proposed Use of Information
C. Respondents
D. Total Initial and Annual Reporting and Recordkeeping Burdens
E. Collection of Information is Mandatory
F. Confidentiality of Responses to Collection of Information
G. Retention Period for Recordkeeping Requirements
H. Request for Comments
VII. Consideration of Impact on Economy
VIII. Regulatory Flexibility Act Certification
IX. Statutory Authority--Text of the Proposed Amendments
I. Background
Rule 15b9-1generally provides an exemption for certain broker-
dealers from the Exchange Act requirement to become a member of an
Association. However, the equities markets have undergone a substantial
transformation since the Commission previously considered the Rule.
Over time, active, cross-market proprietary trading firms began relying
on the Rule 15b9-1 exemption in ways that were not envisioned when the
Rule was adopted or amended. The Commission is proposing to amend Rule
15b9-1 to better align the scope of its exemption, in light of today's
market activity, with Section 15(b)(8) of the Exchange Act and the
Commission's purposes underlying the adoption of Rule 15b9-1.
When the Exchange Act was adopted in 1934, the exchanges were the
only self-regulatory organizations (``SROs'') \1\ and were charged with
regulating the activities of their broker-dealer members.\2\ Congress
soon recognized, however, that the benefit of exchange regulation could
be undermined by the absence of a complementary regulatory
[[Page 18037]]
framework for the off-exchange market \3\ and, in 1938, Congress
provided for the creation of national securities associations.\4\
Congress later mandated Association membership for all off-exchange
market participants through Section 15(b)(8) of the Exchange Act,\5\
which requires a broker-dealer to become a member of an Association
unless it effects transactions solely on an exchange of which it is a
member. This provision, among others, reflects an overarching principle
in the Exchange Act that the SRO best positioned to conduct regulatory
oversight should assume those responsibilities \6\ and,
correspondingly, that off-exchange trading is primarily the
responsibility of an Association or Associations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ An SRO is defined, in relevant part, as ``any national
securities exchange, registered securities association, or
registered clearing agency. . . .'' 15 U.S.C. 78c(a)(26). See also
infra notes 26-28 and accompanying text.
\2\ See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. 78f(b) (requiring exchanges to be so
organized as to enforce compliance by their members and persons
associated with their members with the provisions of the Exchange
Act).
\3\ ``Off-exchange'' trading as used herein means any securities
transaction in an exchange-listed security that is not effected,
directly or indirectly, on a national securities exchange. See 17
CFR 240.600(b)(45) (defining ``national securities exchange''). Off-
exchange trading includes securities transactions that occur on
alternative trading systems and directly with a broker-dealer,
acting either as agent or principal, and is also referred to as
over-the-counter (``OTC'') trading. The term ``off-exchange'' as
used herein does not refer, as it does in some contexts, to
transactions in securities, either in equities or other instruments,
that are not listed on a national securities exchange.
\4\ See infra notes 31-33 and accompanying text (describing the
early history and background behind the creation of national
securities associations).
\5\ 15 U.S.C. 78o(b)(8). Section 15(b)(8) of the Exchange Act
was adopted in 1964. See infra notes 36-37 and accompanying text.
Notably, however, from 1976-1983, broker-dealers engaged in off-
exchange trading could either join an Association or be subject to
direct regulation by the Commission under the SEC Only (``SECO'')
Program. See infra notes 38-48 and accompanying text.
\6\ As originally adopted in 1934, the regulation of broker-
dealer activities on national securities exchanges was excluded from
the Commission's authority. See Section 15 as adopted in 1934,
Public Law 73-291, 48 Stat. 881, 895-96 (1934), infra note 27.
Rather, regulation of broker-dealer activities on exchanges
continued to be conducted by the exchanges themselves, many of which
existed prior to the enactment of the Exchange Act. Consequently,
this left regulation of the off-exchange market with the Commission,
until passage of the Maloney Act in 1938, providing for the creation
of voluntary, self-regulating Associations with powers to adopt and
enforce rules to regulate the off-exchange market. Public Law 75-
719, 52 Stat. 1070 (1938) (the ``Maloney Act''); see also infra note
23 and accompanying text.
In the Exchange Act Amendments of 1975 (Pub. L. 94-29, 89 Stat.
97 (1975), the ``1975 Amendments''), Congress recognized that, at
the time, the allocation of self-regulatory responsibilities among
SROs resulted in some cases in duplicative regulation of firms that
were members of multiple SROs and varying standards, both in
substance and enforcement, among SROs. S. Doc. No. 93-13 at 164-165
(1973). As a result, Congress adopted Section 17(d) of the Act,
which provides the Commission with the authority to allocate
regulatory responsibilities among SROs with respect to matters as to
which, in the absence of such allocation, such SROs would share
authority. 15 U.S.C. 78q(d). In adopting Section 17(d), a Senate
Report accompanying the 1975 Amendments expressed the view that
``the Commission should play an affirmative role in allocating
inspection and enforcement responsibilities among the self-
regulatory organizations'' and that ``for reporting purposes each
broker-dealer [should] be assigned to a designated principal self-
regulator or government regulator who will be responsible for
determining the broker-dealer's operating and financial status.''
See 1975 Amendments, Report of the Senate Committee on Banking,
Housing, and Urban Affairs to Accompany S. 249, S. Rep. No. 94-75,
94th Cong., 1st Session 33 (1975).
As a general matter, SROs and the Commission have used the
flexibility provided by Section 17(d) of the Act to allocate
regulatory responsibilities in such a manner. 15 U.S.C. 78q(d). See,
e.g., Exchange Act Release No. 63750 (January 21, 2011), 76 FR 4948
(January 27, 2011) (order approving 17d-2 plan to allocate
regulatory responsibility to FINRA relating to surveillance,
investigation, and enforcement of insider trading rules); Exchange
Act Release No. 70052 (July 26, 2013), 78 FR 46665 (August 1, 2013)
(order approving 17d-2 plan to add Topaz Exchange, LLC to existing
plan with all other options exchanges to allocate regulatory
responsibility to FINRA relating to, among other things, opening of
accounts, supervision, suitability, discretionary accounts,
advertising, customer complaints, customer statements, disclosure
documents, and certification of personnel); Exchange Act Release No.
73641 (November 19, 2014), 79 FR 70230 (November 25, 2014) (order
approving 17d-2 plan to allocate regulatory responsibility to FINRA
for the Miami International Securities Exchange, LLC (``MIAX''),
with respect to examination and enforcement responsibility relating
to compliance by common members with the substantially similar rules
of the two SROs and applicable provisions of the federal securities
laws). See also infra notes 62-63 and accompanying text (discussing
the allocation of regulatory responsibilities among SROs).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Section 15(b)(9) of the Exchange Act,\7\ provides the Commission
with authority to exempt any broker-dealer from the requirements of
Section 15(b)(8), if that exemption is consistent with the public
interest and the protection of investors. Pursuant to that authority,
the Commission adopted Rule 15b9-1,\8\ which was last substantively
updated in 1983.\9\ That Rule was intended to address the limited
activities of exchange-based specialists and floor brokers that were
conducted off the exchange of which they were a member and that were
ancillary to their floor-based business.\10\ Specifically, the Rule
exempts a broker-dealer from the requirement to become a member of an
Association if it is a member of a national securities exchange,
carries no customer accounts, and has annual gross income of no more
than $1,000 that is derived from securities transactions effected
otherwise than on a national securities exchange of which it is a
member (the ``de minimis allowance''). Importantly, the Rule permits
income derived from transactions for the dealer's own account with or
through another registered broker-dealer, to not count toward the
$1,000 de minimis allowance (hereinafter, the ``exclusion for
proprietary trading'').\11\ As discussed more fully below, the de
minimis allowance originally was designed to permit broker-dealers
doing business on exchange floors to share in the commissions paid on
occasional off-exchange transactions in customer accounts they
introduced to other broker-dealers, up to a nominal amount.\12\ In
addition, when the exclusion for proprietary trading was adopted in
1976,\13\ the circumstances under which an exchange specialist or floor
broker would trade proprietarily off-exchange remained quite limited,
such as when a regional exchange specialist would hedge risk on the
primary listing market.\14\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\ The Commission by rule or order, as it deems consistent with
the public interest and the protection of investors, may
conditionally or unconditionally exempt from paragraph (8) of this
subsection any broker or dealer or class of brokers or dealers
specified in such rule or order. See 15 U.S.C. 78o(b)(9); Public Law
98-38, 97 Stat. 205 (1983).
\8\ 17 CFR 240.15b9-1. See also infra notes 38-48 and
accompanying text for a discussion on Rule 15b8-1, the predecessor
to Rule 15b9-1.
\9\ See SECO Programs; Direct Regulation of Certain Broker-
Dealers; Elimination, Exchange Act Release No. 20409 (November 22,
1983), 48 FR 53688 (November 29, 1983) (``SECO Programs Release'').
\10\ See infra note 22 and accompanying text (explaining that
the Rule is limited to receipt of a portion of the commissions paid
on occasional over-the-counter transactions and certain other
activities incidental to their activities as specialists).
\11\ The exclusion for proprietary trading (conducted with or
through another registered broker-dealer) was not part of the
original exemption, but was added in 1976. See infra notes 43-44 and
accompanying text.
\12\ See Qualifications and Fees Relating to Brokers or Dealers
Who Are Not Members of National Security [sic] Association, Exchange
Act Release No. 7697 (September 7, 1965), 30 FR 11673, 11675
(September 11, 1965) (``Qualifications and Fees Release'')
(describing specialist or floor broker's proprietary off-exchange
activity as generally limited to occasional commissions on
introduced accounts and other transactions incidental to their
activity as specialists or floor brokers). See also infra note 22.
\13\ In adopting the exclusion for proprietary trading, the
Commission indicated that an exchange floor broker, through another
broker-dealer, could effect transactions for its own account on an
exchange of which it was not a member. The Commission noted that
such transactions ultimately would be effected by a member of that
exchange. See Extension of Temporary Rules 23a-1(T) and 23a-2(T);
Adoption of Amendments to SECO Rules, Securities Exchange Act
Release No. 12160 (March 3, 1976), 41 FR 10599, 10600 (March 12,
1976) (``Adoption of Amendments to SECO Rules''). See also infra
note 44.
\14\ In the Special Study of the Securities Markets in 1963, the
Commission described how regional exchange specialists reduced their
exposure, including by offsetting those positions on other
exchanges. The Commission noted that ``[s]pecialists on the Boston,
Philadelphia-Baltimore-Washington, Pittsburgh, and Montreal stock
exchange are in communication with each other by direct wires
linking their floors and each may trade on the other exchanges at
member rates'' and ``[s]pecialists who are sole members [of an
exchange] also offset [their positions] with over-the-counter houses
dealing in listed securities. Many of the offsetting transactions
are done on the primary market, the NYSE, with the [specialist]
buying or selling on that exchange as his needs dictate.'' Report of
Special Study of Securities Markets of the Securities and Exchange
Commission, H.R. Doc. No. 88-95, at 935 (1963) (``Special Study'').
The Commission believes that the business of regional exchange
specialists was substantially the same when the exclusion for
proprietary trading in Rule 15b9-1 was adopted in 1976.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
[[Page 18038]]
Accordingly, those broker-dealers exempt from Association
membership pursuant to Rule 15b9-1 when it was first adopted were
broker-dealers with a business focused on the floor of an exchange of
which they were a member.\15\ The Commission crafted Rule 15b9-1 to
accommodate limited activities ancillary to that floor-based business,
and thereby left it to the exchange of which the specialist or floor
broker was a member to continue to regulate the entirety of that
broker-dealer's activities. Therefore, the scope of Rule 15b9-1
originally was consistent with the principle underlying Section
15(b)(8) of the Exchange Act, noted above, that the SRO best positioned
to conduct regulatory oversight should assume those responsibilities.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\15\ See infra note 22.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
However, the equities markets have undergone a substantial
transformation since the Commission previously considered Rule 15b9-1,
evolving from markets with both manual and automated features and
trading volumes concentrated on the primary listing exchanges, to a
highly electronic, decentralized market with substantial competition
among a large number and great variety of trading venues.\16\ New types
of proprietary trading firms have emerged, including those that engage
in so-called high-frequency trading strategies. These firms tend to
effect transactions across the full range of exchange and off-exchange
markets, including alternative trading systems (``ATSs'').\17\ They
also tend to use complex electronic trading strategies and
sophisticated technology to generate a large volume of orders and
transactions throughout the national market system.\18\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\16\ See Concept Release Concerning Equity Market Structure,
Exchange Act Release No. 61358 (January 14, 2010), 75 FR 3594, 3594-
3596 (January 21, 2010) (``Concept Release'') (discussing the
evolution from ``a market structure with primarily manual trading to
a market structure with primarily automated trading'').
\17\ ATSs fall within the statutory definition of national
securities exchange, but are exempt from having to register as an
exchange if they comply with Regulation ATS. See Regulation of
Exchanges and Alternative Trading Systems, Exchange Act Release No.
40760 (December 8, 1998), 63 FR 70844, 70856 (December 22, 1998).
Regulation ATS requires ATSs to be registered as broker-dealers with
the Commission, which entails becoming a member of an Association
and complying with the broker-dealer regulatory regime. 17 CFR
242.301(b)(1). Unlike a registered national securities exchange, an
ATS is not required to file proposed rule changes with the
Commission. ATSs include both dark pools and electronic
communications networks (``ECNs''). ECNs provide their best-priced
orders for inclusion in the consolidated quotation data, while dark
pools do not. See Concept Release, supra note 16 at 3599. See also
infra notes 158--161 and accompanying text (describing some of these
firms' activity on exchanges). ATSs did not exist when Rule 15b9-1
was last amended in 1983.
\18\ Many, but not all, such proprietary trading firms are often
characterized by: (1) The use of extraordinarily high-speed and
sophisticated computer programs for generating, routing and
executing orders; (2) the use of co-location services and individual
data feeds offered by exchanges and others to minimize network and
other types of latencies; (3) the use of very short time-frames for
establishing and liquidating positions; (4) the submission of
numerous orders that are cancelled shortly after submission; and (5)
ending the trading day in as close to a flat position as possible
(that is, not carrying significant, unhedged positions over night).
See Concept Release, supra note 16, at 3606. See also Staff of the
Division of Trading and Markets, Commission, ``Equity Market
Structure Literature Review, Part II: High Frequency Trading,'' at
4-5 (March 18, 2014) (available at http://www.sec.gov/marketstructure/research/hft_lit_review_march_2014.pdf).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Over time, active, cross-market proprietary trading firms began
relying on the Rule 15b9-1 exemption in ways that were not envisioned
when the Rule was adopted or amended.\19\ As noted above, the de
minimis allowance of Rule 15b9-1, and the subsequent exclusion of
income derived from proprietary transactions conducted with or through
another registered broker-dealer from such allowance, were designed to
permit exchange-based specialists or floor brokers to conduct limited
activities off-exchange. However, because the Rule does not explicitly
limit this exclusion from the de minimis allowance to dealer activities
ancillary to a floor-based business, a broker-dealer, with or without a
floor presence, may engage in unlimited proprietary trading in the off-
exchange market without becoming a member of an Association.
Consequently, many of the most active, cross-market proprietary trading
firms have been able to rely on the exemption from Association
membership, despite effecting a significant volume of transactions off-
exchange.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\19\ These firms are registered with the Commission as broker-
dealers but have elected to avail themselves of the Rule 15b9-1
exemption from membership in an Association.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As a result, an exemption that was developed to address limited
off-exchange activity by exchange-based specialists or floor brokers is
today being used by many broker-dealers without a floor-based business,
and that conduct a substantial percentage of the volume of off-exchange
trading in the U.S. securities markets. Specifically, during the fourth
quarter of 2014, broker-dealers that are not Association \20\ members
(``Non-Member Firms'') accounted for 45% of orders sent directly to
ATSs, a significant category of off-exchange trading venue.\21\
Preliminarily, the Commission does not believe the public interest
finding that originally supported the adoption and amendments of Rule
15b9-1continues to apply today in this context.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\20\ Financial Industry Regulatory Authority, Inc. (``FINRA'')
is currently the sole Association. See infra note 34. In 1939, the
Commission approved the National Association of Securities Dealers,
Inc. (``NASD'') as the first national securities association. See 4
FR 3564 (August 9, 1939). In 2007, the Commission approved changes
that consolidated the member firm regulatory functions of the NASD,
an Association, and NYSE Regulation, Inc., and changed the name of
the combined entity to FINRA. See Exchange Act Release No. 56145
(July 26, 2007), 72 FR 42169 (August 1, 2007).
\21\ ATSs received approximately 230 billion orders during 2014
that were sent directly to an ATS (i.e., orders received by a
broker-dealer that are then sent to another trading desk of that
broker-dealer (so called ``desk-reports'') are generally excluded
from these order totals). Orders from Non-Member Firms accounted for
49% of orders sent directly to ATSs during the first quarter of
2014, 49% of orders sent directly to ATSs during the second quarter
of 2014, 48% of orders sent directly to ATSs during the third
quarter of 2014, and 45% of orders sent directly to ATSs during the
fourth quarter of 2014. In 2013, ATSs received approximately 163
billion orders that were sent directly to an ATS. Orders from Non-
Member Firms accounted for 34% of orders sent directly to ATSs
during the first quarter of 2013, 38% of orders sent directly to
ATSs during the second quarter of 2013, 42% of orders sent directly
to ATSs during the third quarter of 2013, and 45% of orders sent
directly to ATSs during the fourth quarter of 2013. On a volume-
weighted basis (i.e., accounting for variations in total order
volume sent to ATSs), Non-Member Firms accounted for 48% of orders
sent directly to ATSs in 2014, 40% in 2013, and 32% in 2012. This
information is from data obtained from FINRA's Order Audit Trail
System (``OATS'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Accordingly, the Commission is proposing to amend Rule 15b9-1 to
better align the scope of its exemption, in light of today's market
activity, with Section 15(b)(8) of the Exchange Act and the
Commission's original purpose in adopting Rule 15b9-1, which was to
accommodate broker-dealer activities ancillary to a floor-based
business while preserving the traditional role of the exchange as the
entity best suited to regulate member conduct on the exchange.\22\ A
broker-dealer that
[[Page 18039]]
conducts off-exchange transactions outside the limited scope of Rule
15b9-1, as proposed to be amended, would be required to become a member
of an Association. Consequently, such a broker-dealer would be subject,
with respect to its off-exchange transactions, to the oversight and
rules of an Association, the category of SRO primarily responsible for
regulating trading in the off-exchange market in accordance with
Section 15(b)(8).\23\ Further, as a result of the proposal, a broker-
dealer that does not trade off-exchange but that trades indirectly on
multiple exchanges would be required in accordance with Section
15(b)(8), to become a member of an Association, or alternatively, a
member of each exchange where it effects transactions other than
transactions to hedge the risks of its floor-based activities.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\22\ In adopting Rule 15b8-1, the Commission stated: ``Among the
broker-dealers that are not members of a registered national
securities association are several specialists and other floor
members of national securities exchanges, some of whom introduce
accounts to other members. The over-the-counter business of these
broker-dealers may be limited to receipt of a portion of the
commissions paid on occasional over-the-counter transactions in
these introduced accounts, and to certain other transactions
incidental to their activities as specialists. In most cases, the
income derived from these activities is nominal.'' See
Qualifications and Fees Release, supra note 12, at 11675.
\23\ See Public Law 75-719, 52 Stat. 1070 (1938) (The Maloney
Act, which established the concept of and framework for
Associations, states in its preamble that its purpose was to provide
for the establishment of a mechanism of regulation [Associations]
among over-the-counter brokers and dealers operating in interstate
and foreign commerce or through the mails, to prevent acts and
practices inconsistent with just and equitable principles of trade,
and for other purposes). See also infra notes 26, 28-33 and
accompanying text (describing the early history of the Maloney Act).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
A. Regulatory History
The primary purpose of an SRO is to regulate its members.\24\
Although the Act provides a limited and targeted exception to
Association membership requirements for broker-dealers, its approach to
effecting supervision is relatively uniform: Broker-dealers must be
members of the SROs that regulate the venues upon which they transact.
Section 19(g)(1) of the Act, among other things, requires every SRO to
examine for and enforce compliance by its members and associated
persons with the Act, the rules and regulations thereunder, and the
SRO's own rules, unless the SRO is relieved of this responsibility
pursuant to Section 17(d) or Section 19(g)(2) of the Act.\25\ A primary
purpose of an Association as an SRO, among other things, is to regulate
the off-exchange market.\26\ Under the Exchange Act, as adopted in
1934, the direct regulation of broker-dealer activities on national
securities exchanges was to be conducted by the exchanges themselves.
As there was no SRO for the off-exchange market, regulation of the off-
exchange market was to be the Commission's responsibility.\27\ Congress
recognized that the benefits of exchange regulation could be undermined
in the absence of a complementary regulatory framework for the off-
exchange market \28\ and provided the Commission the authority to adopt
rules and regulations concerning the off-exchange market to achieve
investor protections comparable to those on exchanges.\29\ After
further study,\30\ however, in 1938 Congress imposed a comprehensive
regulatory framework for the off-exchange market through the Maloney
Act.\31\ The Maloney Act added Section 15A to the Act,\32\ providing
for the creation of national securities associations of broker-dealers,
with powers to adopt and enforce rules to regulate the off-exchange
market.\33\ This led to the creation of NASD, the predecessor of FINRA,
and the only Association \34\ registered to date.\35\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\24\ See, e.g., S. Doc. No. 93-13 at 147 (1973) (describing the
structure of the self-regulatory system in which SROs ``are
delegated governmental power in order to enforce, at their own
initiative, compliance by members of the industry with legal and
ethical standards going beyond the basic requirements laid down in
the Act.'').
\25\ 15 U.S.C. 78q(d); 15 U.S.C. 78s(g).
\26\ The Maloney Act authorizes an Association to, among other
things, establish rules designed to prevent fraudulent and
manipulative acts and practices, to promote just and equitable
principles of trade, to foster cooperation and coordination with
persons engaged in regulating, clearing, settling, processing
information with respect to, and facilitating transactions in
securities, to remove impediments to and perfect the mechanism of a
free and open market and a national market system, and, in general,
to protect investors and the public interest. See 15 U.S.C 78o-
3(b)(6). See also First Jersey Sec., Inc. v. Bergen, 605 F.2d 690,
692 (3d Cir. 1979) (``The purpose of [NASD] is to provide self-
regulation of the over-the-counter securities market.''); Special
Study, supra note 14, at 65 (describing the NASD as ``the agency
with primary self-regulatory responsibility for over-the-counter
markets.'').
\27\ As adopted in 1934, Section 15 of the Exchange Act read, in
relevant part: ``It shall be unlawful, in contravention of such
rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary
or appropriate in the public interest and to insure to investors
protection comparable to that provided by and under authority of
this title in the case of national securities exchanges, (1) for any
broker or dealer . . . to make or create, a market, otherwise than
on a national securities exchange, for both the purchase and sale of
any security . . . or (2) for any broker or dealer to use any
facility of any such market. Such rules and regulations may provide
for the regulation of all transactions by brokers and dealers on any
such market, for the registration with the Commission of dealers
and/or brokers making or creating such a market, and for the
registration of the securities for which they make or create a
market and may make special provision with respect to securities or
specified classes thereof listed, or entitled to unlisted trading
privileges, upon any exchange on the date of the enactment of this
title, which securities are not registered under the provisions of
section 12 of this title.'' Public Law 73-291, 48 Stat. 881, 895-96
(1934).
\28\ In considering adopting the Maloney Act, the House noted
that: ``The committee has been convinced that effective regulation
of the exchanges requires as a corollary a measure of control over
the over-the-counter markets. The problem is clearly put in the
recent report of the Twentieth Century Fund on `Stock Market
Control': `The benefits that would accrue as the result of raising
the standards of security exchanges might be nullified if the over-
the-counter markets were left unregulated and uncontrolled. . . . To
leave the over-the-counter markets out of a regulatory system would
be to destroy the effects of regulating the organized exchanges.'''
H.R. Doc No. 1383, 73d Cong. 2d Sess. at 4 (1934) (quoting report on
``Stock Market Control'' by the Twentieth Century Fund).
\29\ Id.
\30\ See Statement of Senator Francis T. Maloney, Hearings
before Committee on Banking and Currency on S. 3255, 75th Cong., 3d
Sess. (1938) (noting that the Maloney Act came after ``a long-time
effort on the part of the Securities and Exchange Commission in
rather close cooperation with members of the investment banking
business and over-the-counter dealers and brokers.'').
\31\ Public Law 75-719, 52 Stat. 1070 (1938).
\32\ 15 U.S.C. 78o-3.
\33\ Id.; see also S. Rep. No. 75-1455, at 3-4 (1938) (``The
committee believes that there are two alternative programs by which
this problem [of regulation of the off-exchange market] could be
met. The first would involve a pronounced expansion of the
organization of the Securities and Exchange Commission; the
multiplication of branch offices; a large increase in the
expenditure of public funds; an increase in the problem of avoiding
the evils of bureaucracy; and a minute, detailed, and rigid
regulation of business conduct by law. . . . The second of these
alternative programs, which the committee believes distinctly
preferable to the first . . . is based upon cooperative regulation,
in which the task will be largely performed by representative
organizations of investment bankers, dealers, and brokers, with the
Government exercising appropriate supervision in the public
interest, and exercising supplementary powers of direct
regulation.''). See also S. Rep. No. 74-1455, at 2-3 (1938) (``It
has been deemed advisable to authorize the Commission to subject
such activities [i.e., trading in the over-the-counter markets] to
regulation similar to that prescribed for transactions on organized
exchanges. This power is vitally necessary to forestall the
widespread evasion of stock-exchange regulation by the withdrawal of
securities from listing on exchanges, and by transferring trading
therein to `over-the-counter' markets where manipulative evils could
continue to flourish, unchecked by any regulatory authority'')
(quoting S. Rep. No. 73-792, at 6 (1934)). See also supra note 26.
\34\ See supra note 20. The National Futures Association
(``NFA''), as specified in Section 15A(k) of the Act, also is
registered as a national securities association, but only for the
limited purpose of regulating the activities of NFA members that are
registered as brokers or dealers in security futures products under
Section 15(b)(11) of the Act.
\35\ The existing self-regulatory structure in which an
Association serves as the regulator of the off-exchange market and
exchanges focus their regulatory supervision on their respective
markets has not been materially altered from a statutory perspective
since its establishment. See Concept Release Concerning Self-
Regulation, Exchange Act Release No. 50700 (November 18, 2004), 69
FR 71256, 71258 (December 8, 2004).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Section 15(b)(8) of the Act, enacted in 1964,\36\ further
strengthened regulatory
[[Page 18040]]
oversight of the off-exchange market by prohibiting a broker-dealer
from effecting any transaction ``otherwise than on a national
securities exchange'' unless the broker-dealer was either a member of
an Association, or met the Commission's standards with respect to
training, experience, and other relevant qualifications.\37\ In 1965,
the Commission adopted Rule 15b8-1 to establish the SECO Program, which
provided for the direct regulation by the Commission of broker-dealers
that effected transactions off-exchange and that chose not to join an
Association.\38\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\36\ Section 15(b)(8) as enacted provided that no broker or
dealer registered under section 15 of this title shall, during any
period when it is not a member of a securities association
registered with the Commission under section 15A of this title,
effect any transaction in, or induce the purchase or sale of, any
security (otherwise than on a national securities exchange) unless
such broker or dealer and all natural persons associated with such
broker or dealer meet such specified and appropriate standards with
respect to training, experience, and such other qualifications as
the Commission finds necessary or desirable. See Public Law 88-467,
78 Stat. 565, 572-73 (1964).
\37\ In the Special Study, the Commission explained that the
controls over entry into the securities business were inadequate,
allowing entry by unqualified persons. Special Study, supra note 14,
at 1, 23 (1963). Congress' amendments in 1964 responded to these
findings.
\38\ Under the SECO Program, every associated person engaged
directly or indirectly in securities activities for or on behalf of
a non-member broker-dealer, and every associated person who
supervised others engaged in any securities activities, was required
to successfully complete either the general securities examination
prescribed by the Commission or an alternative examination deemed
satisfactory by the Commission. See Qualifications and Fees Release,
supra note 12, at 11676 (defining the term ``nonmember broker or
dealer'' as ``any broker or dealer, including a sole proprietor,
registered under section 15 of the Act, who is not a member of a
national securities association registered with the Commission under
section 15A of the Act.''). Any broker-dealer could choose to join
an Association or be regulated by the Commission directly under the
SECO Program.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Rule 15b8-1 provided for an exemption from the SECO Program, and by
extension from Association membership, for those broker-dealers that:
(1) Were members of a national securities exchange; (2) did not carry
customer accounts; and (3) had annual gross income derived from off-
exchange activity that amounted to no greater than $1,000.\39\ This set
the basic framework for the Rule 15b9-1 exemption from Association
membership that exists today. The Commission recognized that, at that
time, exchange-based specialists and other floor brokers, which were
comprehensively regulated by the exchange of which they were a member,
occasionally introduced accounts to other members and shared in the
commission revenues.\40\ Rule 15b8-1 permitted these broker-dealers,
who were not required to register with the Commission as broker-dealers
at the time,\41\ to receive a portion of the commissions paid on
occasional off-exchange transactions on these introduced accounts
without becoming subject to the SECO rules and broker-dealer
registration, so long as the income derived from those activities was
nominal.\42\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\39\ ``Under Rule 15b8-1 (17 CFR 240.15b8-1), any broker-dealer
who is a member of a national securities exchange is exempt from the
rule if he does not carry customers' accounts and if his annual
gross income derived from his over-the-counter business is no more
than $1,000. Should a broker-dealer's over-the-counter income exceed
these limits for an accounting year, such broker-dealer and all
persons associated with him become subject to the requirements of
the rule.'' Id. at 11675.
\40\ See supra note 22.
\41\ Until 1975, broker-dealers who traded exclusively on the
floor of a national securities exchange were exempt from
registration with the Commission. The 1975 Amendments required all
broker-dealers, including exchange specialists and floor brokers, to
register with the Commission, and extended the Commission's SECO
rulemaking authority to any exchange member trading on an exchange
other than an exchange of which it was a member. 1975 Amendments,
supra note 6, at 121. The 1975 Amendments revised Section 15(b) such
that the substance of then existing Section 15(b)(8) was captured in
Sections 15(b)(7) through (9). See id. at 131. One purpose of the
1975 Amendments was to assure that the Commission could regulate and
recoup the costs of regulating transactions of exchange members
conducted on exchanges of which they were not a member. See 1975
Amendments, supra note 6, at 125 (amending Section 15 of the
Exchange Act to provide the Commission with authority to ``prescribe
reasonable fees and charges to defray its costs'' of regulation).
\42\ See Adoption of Amendments to SECO Rules, supra note 13.
See also supra note 22 (noting that the over-the-counter business of
these broker-dealers may be limited and the income derived from
these activities is nominal).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In 1976, the Commission amended Rule 15b8-1 to provide that income
derived from transactions for the dealer's own account effected with or
through another registered broker-dealer would not count towards the
$1,000 de minimis allowance.\43\ In adopting this amendment to Rule
15b8-1, the Commission noted that an exchange-based floor broker could
effect transactions through another broker-dealer for its own account
on an exchange of which it was not a member, and indicated that such
transactions ultimately would be effected by a member of that
exchange.\44\ At the time this provision was adopted, the circumstances
under which an exchange specialist or floor broker would trade
proprietarily off the exchange were quite limited, such as when a
regional exchange specialist would hedge risk on the primary listing
market.\45\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\43\ ``Any nonmember broker or dealer who is a member of a
national securities exchange shall be exempt from this rule if (1)
he carries no accounts of customers, and (2) his annual gross income
derived from purchases and sales of securities otherwise than on a
national securities exchange of which he is a member is an amount no
greater than $1,000. Provided however, [t]hat gross income derived
from transactions otherwise than on such national securities
exchange which are effected for his own account with or through
another registered broker or dealer shall not be subject to such
limitation.'' See Adoption of Amendments to SECO Rules, supra note
13, at 10601. Thus, broker-dealers registering with the Commission
as a result of the 1975 Amendments became subject to the SECO rules
in 1976, but could remain exempt from such rules pursuant to Rule
15b8-1 and its exclusion for proprietary trading.
\44\ The Commission provided the following example to describe
the application of the exclusion for proprietary trading: ``a broker
who is acting as a floor broker on a particular exchange, and who
effects transactions for his own account otherwise than on that
exchange through another broker-dealer who acts as a clearing member
for the floor broker, would be permitted to effect transactions on
exchanges of which neither he nor his clearing broker are members
without becoming subject to the SECO rules.'' Id. In this example,
``[t]he clearing broker would, of course, effect transactions on an
exchange of which he was not a member through a member of that
exchange.'' Id. at 10602, n. 8.
\45\ See supra note 14.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In 1983, Congress amended the Act to eliminate the direct oversight
of broker-dealers by the Commission.\46\ Congress maintained the
exception from membership in an Association in Section 15(b)(8) of the
Act for those broker-dealers that effected transactions in securities
only on an exchange of which they were a member. Congress also left
unchanged the ability of the Commission to expand upon the statutory
exception in Section 15(b)(8) through exemptive authority in Section
15(b)(9) of the Act.\47\ When the SECO rules were abolished in 1983,
the Commission amended and renumbered Rule 15b8-1.\48\ The substance of
newly renumbered Rule 15b9-1 remained largely the same as Rule 15b8-1,
with modifications that primarily accommodated transactions effected
through the new Intermarket Trading System (``ITS'') linkage,\49\ and
eliminated references to, and requirements under, the SECO Program.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\46\ At that time, direct oversight of broker-dealers by the
Commission was conducted through the SECO Program. 15 U.S.C.
78o(b)(8), as amended by Pub. L. 98-38, 97 Stat. 205, 206 (1983).
See also H.R. Rep. No. 98-106, at 597 (1983) (citing a preference
for self-regulation over direct regulation by the Commission. Among
other benefits of self-regulation, the report noted that NASD had
available a broader and more effective range of disciplinary
sanctions to employ against broker-dealers than had the Commission).
Section 15(b)(8) is virtually the same as it was in 1983: ``It
shall be unlawful for any registered broker or dealer to effect any
transaction in, or induce or attempt to induce the purchase or sale
of, any security (other than or commercial paper, bankers'
acceptances, or commercial bills), unless such broker or dealer is a
member of a securities association registered pursuant to section
15A of this title or effects transactions in securities solely on a
national securities exchange of which it is a member.'' 15 U.S.C.
78o(b)(8). In 1986, Congress enacted non-substantive amendments
modifying a few terms in the statute. Public Law 99-571, 100 Stat.
3208, 3218 (1986). 15 U.S.C. 78o(b)(8).
\47\ See supra note 7.
\48\ See supra note 9.
\49\ See infra notes 126-130 and accompanying text.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Under the Rule as amended in 1983, a broker-dealer was not required
to become a member of an Association if:
[[Page 18041]]
(1) It was a member of a national securities exchange, (2) carried no
customer accounts, and (3) had annual gross income no greater than
$1,000 that was derived from securities transactions effected otherwise
than on a national securities exchange of which the broker-dealer was a
member.\50\ As under the SECO rules, income derived from transactions
effected for a broker-dealer's own account with or through another
broker or dealer was not included in the $1,000 de minimis
allowance.\51\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\50\ Any broker or dealer required by Section 15(b)(8) of the
Act to become a member of a registered national securities
association shall be exempt from such requirement if it is a member
of a national securities exchange, carries no customer accounts, and
has annual gross income derived from purchases and sales of
securities otherwise than on a national securities exchange of which
it is a member in an amount no greater than $1,000. See 17 CFR
240.15b9-1(a); see also SECO Programs Release, supra note 9, at
53690.
\51\ The gross income limitation contained in paragraph (a) of
17 CFR 240.15b9-1, shall not apply to income derived from
transactions for the dealer's own account with or through another
registered broker or dealer, or through the Intermarket Trading
System. See 17 CFR 240.15b9-1(b); SECO Programs Release, supra note
9, at 53690.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Since 1983, Rule 15b9-1 has remained unchanged, except for a
technical amendment in 2005 to update cross-references when the
Commission adopted Regulation NMS.\52\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\52\ Regulation NMS, Exchange Act Release No. 51808 (June 9,
2005), 70 FR 37496, 37618 (June 29, 2005).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
B. Regulatory Oversight of Off-Exchange Trading Activity
Section 19(g)(1) of the Act requires every SRO to examine for and
enforce compliance by its members and associated persons with the Act,
the rules and regulations thereunder, and the SRO's own rules, unless
the SRO is relieved of this responsibility pursuant to Section 17(d) or
Section 19(g)(2) of the Act.\53\ Without this relief, the statutory
obligation of each individual SRO would result in duplicative
examinations and oversight of broker-dealers that are members of more
than one SRO (``common members''). Section 17(d)(1) of the Act is
intended, in part, to eliminate overlapping examinations and regulatory
functions.\54\ With respect to a common member, Section 17(d)(1)
authorizes the Commission, by rule or order, to relieve an SRO of the
responsibility to receive regulatory reports, to examine for and
enforce compliance with the applicable statutes, rules, and
regulations, or to perform other specified regulatory functions.\55\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\53\ 15 U.S.C. 78s(g).
\54\ See 1975 Amendments, Report of the Senate Committee on
Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs to Accompany S. 249, S. Rep. No.
94-75, 94th Cong., 1st Session 32 (1975).
\55\ 15 U.S.C. 78q(d)(1).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
To implement Section 17(d)(1), the Commission adopted two rules:
Rule 17d-1 and Rule 17d-2 under the Act.\56\ Rule 17d-1 authorizes the
Commission to name a single SRO as the designated examining authority
(``DEA'') to examine common members for compliance with the financial
responsibility requirements imposed by the Act, or by the Commission or
SRO rules.\57\ To address regulatory duplication in areas other than
financial responsibility, including sales practices and trading
practices, the Commission adopted Rule 17d-2 under the Act.\58\ Rule
17d-2 permits SROs to propose joint plans among two or more SROs for
the allocation of regulatory responsibility with respect to their
common members.\59\ The regulatory responsibility allocated among SROs
only extends to matters for which the SROs would share authority, which
means that only common rules among SROs can be allocated under Rule
17d-2. Under paragraph (c) of Rule 17d-2, the Commission may declare
such a plan effective if, after appropriate notice and opportunity for
comment, it finds that the plan is necessary or appropriate in the
public interest and for the protection of investors, to foster
cooperation and coordination among SROs, or to remove impediments to
and foster the development of a national market system and a national
clearance and settlement system and in conformity with the factors set
forth in Section 17(d) of the Act.\60\ Commission approval of a plan
filed pursuant to Rule 17d-2 relieves an SRO of those regulatory
responsibilities allocated by the plan to another SRO.\61\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\56\ 17 CFR 240.17d-1; 17 CFR 240.17d-2.
\57\ See Exchange Act Release No. 12352 (April 20, 1976), 41 FR
18808 (May 7, 1976).
\58\ See Exchange Act Release No. 12935 (October 28, 1976), 41
FR 49091 (November 8, 1976).
\59\ Any two or more self-regulatory organizations may file with
the Commission a plan . . . for allocating among the self-regulatory
organizations the responsibility to receive regulatory reports from
persons who are members or participants of more than one of such
self-regulatory organizations to examine such persons for
compliance, or to enforce compliance by such persons, with specified
provisions of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, the rules and
regulations thereunder, and the rules of such self-regulatory
organizations, or to carry out other specified regulatory functions
with respect to such persons. See 17 CFR 240.17d-2.
\60\ Id.
\61\ Id. Exchanges also enter into Regulatory Services
Agreements (``RSAs'') whereby one SRO contractually agrees to
perform regulatory services for another. See, e.g., FINRA News
Release, FINRA Signs Regulatory Services Agreement with the Chicago
Board Options Exchange, Incorporated (``CBOE'') and C2 Options
Exchange, Incorporated (``C2'') (December 22, 2014), available at
http://www.finra.org/newsroom/newsreleases/2014/p602174. However,
RSAs do not relieve the contracting SRO from regulatory
responsibility for the performance of any regulatory services
allocated pursuant to the RSA and are not filed with the Commission
for approval.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The principle underlying the self-regulatory structure in the
Exchange Act is the concept that the SRO best positioned to conduct
regulatory oversight should assume responsibility for that
oversight.\62\ As a general matter, the SROs and the Commission have
used the flexibility provided by Section 17 to allocate
responsibilities in such a manner.\63\ Section 15(b)(8) of the Exchange
Act further implements this construct of effective regulatory oversight
by requiring Association membership of a broker-dealer unless it
effects transactions solely on an exchange of which it is a member.
Those exempt from Association membership pursuant to Rule 15b9-1
originally were exchange specialists and other floor members, and the
off-exchange activity permitted under Rule 15b9-1 (including its
predecessor rule) was intended only to accommodate limited activities
ancillary to that floor-based business.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\62\ Section 17(d)(1) of the Act provides that the Commission,
in allocating authority among SROs pursuant to Section 17(d)(1),
shall take into consideration the regulatory capabilities and
procedures of the self-regulatory organizations, availability of
staff, convenience of location, unnecessary regulatory duplication,
and such other factors as the Commission may consider germane to the
protection of investors, cooperation and coordination among self-
regulatory organizations, and the development of a national market
system. See 15 U.S.C. 78q(d)(1).
\63\ See supra note 6; infra note 69.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As the sole currently registered Association, FINRA is the SRO
primarily responsible for regulating trading in the off-exchange
market.\64\ FINRA also conducts the vast majority of broker-dealer
examinations,\65\ mandates broker-dealer disclosures, and writes and
enforces rules governing broker-dealer conduct.\66\ FINRA regulates
trading in non-listed equities, fixed income, and other traded
products, and investigates and brings enforcement actions against
members for violations of its rules, the rules of the Municipal
Securities Rulemaking Board, and the Exchange Act and the rules
thereunder.\67\ As noted above, the regulatory focus of national
securities exchanges, which are also SROs, has been more narrow, with
primary
[[Page 18042]]
responsibility to regulate trading by their members on their respective
exchanges,\68\ enforce conduct rules (if they have not been relieved of
that responsibility by 17d-2 Agreements), and otherwise perform member
regulation for their members that are not also members of FINRA. Most
exchanges have entered into 17d-2 Agreements with FINRA that allocate
regulatory responsibility over common members to FINRA for compliance
with common conduct rules.\69\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\64\ See supra note 31.
\65\ The Commission staff also conducts risk-based examinations
of broker-dealers. However, routine broker-dealer examinations are
conducted by the SROs, and the Commission staff oversees the
examination efforts of the SROs.
\66\ 15 U.S.C. 78o-3.
\67\ Id.
\68\ Congress saw the codification of the regulations requiring
the registration of off-exchange broker-dealers as ``an essential
supplement to regulation of the exchanges.'' H.R. Rep. No. 74-2601,
at 4 (1936). See also supra note 28 and accompanying text.
\69\ See, e.g., Exchange Act Release No. 63430 (December 3,
2010), 75 FR 76758 (December 9, 2010) (order approving Rule 17d-2
plan to allocate regulatory responsibility to FINRA for certain
Regulation NMS rules by 13 exchanges). Generally, FINRA is also the
DEA for financial responsibility rules for exchange members that
also are members of FINRA. See infra note 164 (discussing DEAs).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
FINRA has developed a transparency and regulatory regime for the
off-exchange market. All off-exchange trades are reported to FINRA,\70\
and as a result FINRA has developed a set of trade reporting rules to
support that transparency regime.\71\ FINRA also has developed a
regulatory audit trail, which provides regulatory data on orders,
quotes, routes, cancellations, and executions.\72\ FINRA has developed
rules and guidance tailored to trading activity \73\ and has developed
surveillance technology and specialized regulatory personnel to provide
surveillance, supervision, and enforcement of activity occurring off-
exchange.\74\ Furthermore, FINRA has a detailed set of member conduct
rules that apply to all activities of a firm, whether on- or off-
exchange.\75\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\70\ FINRA operates two Trade Reporting Facilities (``TRFs''),
one jointly with NASDAQ and another with the NYSE. The TRFs are
FINRA facilities for FINRA members to report transactions effected
otherwise than on an exchange. See Exchange Act Release No. 54084
(June 30, 2006), 71 FR 38935 (July 10, 2006) (order approving the
NASDAQ TRF); Exchange Act Release No. 55325 (February 21, 2007), 72
FR 8820 (February 27, 2007) (notice of filing and immediate
effectiveness of a proposed rule change to establish the NYSE TRF).
In addition, FINRA operates the Alternative Display Facility
(``ADF''), which is a FINRA facility for posting quotes and
reporting trades governed by FINRA's trade reporting rules. See
Exchange Act Release No. 46249 (July 24, 2002), 67 FR 49822 (July
31, 2002) (order approving the ADF); see also Exchange Act Release
No. 71467 (February 3, 2014), 79 FR 7485 (February 7, 2014) (order
approving a proposed rule change to update the rules governing the
ADF).
\71\ See FINRA Rule 7000 Series--Clearing, Transactions and
Order Data Requirements, and Facility Charges.
\72\ FINRA operates the OATS system, which is an integrated
audit trail of order, quote, and trade information for all NMS
stocks and OTC equity securities required to be submitted by FINRA
members. See e.g., Exchange Act Release No. 54585 (October 10,
2006), 71 FR 61112 (October 17, 2006) (order approving a proposed
rule change relating to the expansion of OATS reporting requirements
to OTC equity securities). FINRA uses the OATS audit trail system to
recreate events in the life cycle of orders and more completely
monitor the trading practices of FINRA member firms. See FINRA.org,
Order Audit Trail System (OATS), available at http://www.finra.org/industry/oats (last visited March 19, 2015).
\73\ See e.g., FINRA Rules 5240 (Anti-Intimidation/
Coordination), 5250 (Payments for Market-Making), 5210.02
(Publication of Transactions and Quotations--Self-Trades), and 6140
(Other Trading Practices).
\74\ See FINRA.org, FINRA 2013 Year in Review and Annual
Financial Report, available at http://www.finra.org/sites/default/files/Corporate/p534386.pdf (last visited March 19, 2015).
\75\ See Part V.B.4 discussing the competitive effects of off-
exchange market regulation.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As noted, Rule 15b9-1 in its current form allows a broker-dealer to
engage in unlimited proprietary trading in the off-exchange market
without becoming a member of an Association, so long as its proprietary
trading activity is conducted with or through another registered
broker-dealer (i.e., not with a customer). In practice, this allows
many cross-market proprietary trading firms to avoid Association
membership, despite their effecting a significant volume of
transactions in the off-exchange market. Non-Member Firms are not
subject to oversight by an Association and their off-exchange
transactions typically are not overseen by the exchanges of which they
may be members. Exchanges traditionally have not assumed the role of
regulating the totality of the trading of their member-broker-dealers,
and exchanges are currently not well-positioned to assume that role, in
light of the statutory scheme and, among other things, their limited
access to data \76\ and the proper rule set to regulate off-exchange
trading. Exchanges generally do not have a detailed set of member
conduct rules and non-exchange-specific trading rules, thus allowing
such broker-dealers and their personnel to conduct business under a
less specific regulatory regime than FINRA members. In this context and
consistent with the statutory framework that places responsibility for
off-exchange trading with an Association, therefore, the Commission
preliminarily believes that an Association is better suited to regulate
off-exchange trading.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\76\ See Exchange Act Release No. 67457 (July 18, 2012), 77 FR
45722, 45728-30 (August 1, 2012) (discussing the use and limitations
of current SRO audit trails and noting that ``[m]ost SROs maintain
their own specific audit trails applicable to their members'' and
``each SRO only has direct access to its own audit trails . . .'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Commission estimates that, today, there are approximately 125
broker-dealers exempt from Association membership.\77\ This group
includes some of the most active cross-market proprietary trading
firms, which generate a substantial volume of orders and transactions
in the off-exchange market. For example, the Commission estimates that
orders from Non-Member Firms represented a volume-weighted average of
approximately 32% of all orders sent directly to ATSs during 2012.\78\
By 2014, these Non-Member Firms represented a volume-weighted average
of approximately 48% of orders sent directly to ATSs.\79\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\77\ The Commission believes that the majority of these firms
rely on the Rule 15b9-1 exemption rather than the statutory
exception from Association membership under Section 15(b)(8) of the
Act, 15 U.S.C. 78o(b)(8), because the Rule-based exemption is more
permissive than the statute, allowing, for example, unlimited
proprietary trading on an exchange of which a broker-dealer is not a
member. The estimate of 125 firms is based on publicly available
data reviewed by staff during March of 2015. See infra note 148.
\78\ This estimate is based on data from OATS. See supra note
21.
\79\ This information is based on data from OATS. In 2013, these
Non-Member Firms represented a volume-weighted average of
approximately 40% of orders sent directly to ATSs. Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Accordingly, the Commission believes that many of the broker-
dealers today that rely on the Rule 15b9-1 exemption are very different
from those for which the Rule originally was intended--exchange-based
specialists and other floor members that focused their business on a
single exchange of which they were a member. The presumption built into
Section 15(b)(8) and further extended by Rule 15b9-1, namely that the
exchange of which the firm is a member is in the optimal position to
provide self-regulatory oversight, does not appear to hold for those
firms that avail themselves of the exemption but are engaged in a
significant amount of off-exchange trading.\80\ For broker-dealers that
conduct business only on one exchange, the exchange SRO is well-
positioned to oversee the activities of those broker-dealers and write
and enforce rules tailored to their business model and conduct. For a
broker-dealer that trades electronically across a range of exchange and
off-exchange venues, however, the individual exchange or exchanges of
which the broker-dealer may be a member are not able to as effectively
regulate the off-exchange activity of the broker-dealer because such
exchange(s) today has neither the
[[Page 18043]]
resources nor the necessary expertise to oversee such off-exchange
activity.\81\ The Commission is concerned that the reliance on the Rule
15b9-1 exemption by cross-market proprietary trading firms, given that
exchanges focus their regulatory oversight on their respective
exchanges, undermines the effectiveness of the regulatory structure of
the off-exchange market and the equities markets more broadly.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\80\ For example, based on disclosures on Form BD as of March
2015, there were 13 Non-Member Firms that are members of only CBOE,
an options exchange, that do not disclose as part of their business
activities on Form BD being a ``put and call broker or dealer or
option writer.'' Similarly, five Non-Member Firms disclose on Form
BD that they are a ``broker or dealer making inter-dealer markets in
corporate securities over-the-counter'' and are not members of
FINRA.
\81\ The Commission notes that, while today an exchange may not
be able to effectively regulate off-exchange activity, it may be
able to acquire the resources and expertise to do so.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As noted, FINRA currently is the SRO to which off-exchange trades
are reported.\82\ However, because it does not have jurisdiction over
Non-Member Firms, it is unable to enforce compliance with the federal
securities laws and rules, or apply its own rules, to broker-dealers
that conduct a significant amount of off-exchange trading activity,
including those that engage in so-called high-frequency trading
strategies. As a result, FINRA's ability to perform comprehensive
market surveillance, especially for violations of Commission rules, as
well as its ability to understand and reconstruct activity in the off-
exchange market generally, is limited because Non-Member Firms are not
consistently identified in trade reports to the TRFs \83\ or the ADF,
and their order activity is not captured by OATS.\84\ Accordingly,
FINRA is unable to monitor the off-exchange market activity of Non-
Member Firms, and detect potentially manipulative or other illegal
behavior, as efficiently or effectively as it can with FINRA
members.\85\ Obtaining additional data, such as through the
Consolidated Audit Trail (``CAT''),\86\ or the assumption of post-trade
surveillance and investigation by the Non-Member Firm's member
exchange, would neither confer jurisdiction nor provide needed
oversight tools to FINRA over Non-Member Firms that participate in the
off-exchange market. No exchange currently is positioned to regulate
its members' conduct in the off-exchange market, as the exchanges
generally have access only to order and trade data for transactions
effected on their markets.\87\ Moreover, even if exchanges were able to
access the necessary trading data (a possibility that would increase
with the deployment of CAT),\88\ the Commission believes that piecemeal
regulation of the off-exchange market by multiple SROs based on the
membership status of the participants and a web of regulatory
allocations among SROs, through the use of multiple 17d-2 agreements,
is significantly less efficient and frustrates the structure
established by Congress that an Association regulate the off-exchange
market.\89\ In addition, an Association's regulatory responsibility for
the off-exchange market includes an obligation to monitor those markets
for operational and regulatory issues, as well as issues relating to
market disruptions.\90\ The Commission is concerned that the inability
of an Association to reliably identify and enforce regulatory
compliance by cross-market proprietary trading firms that are Non-
Member Firms in the off-exchange market, creates a risk to the fair and
orderly operations of the market.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\82\ See supra note 70.
\83\ Reports to the TRFs can only be made by FINRA members. See
FINRA Rules 7210A(k) and 7210B(i) (defining the term ``Trade
Reporting Participant'' or ``Participant'' as ``any member of FINRA
in good standing that uses the System'').
\84\ When a Non-Member Firm routes an order to a FINRA member
which then routes the order to an exchange or off-exchange for
execution, OATS data would indicate only that the FINRA member
received an order from a Non-Member Firm. The identity of the Non-
Member Firm is often not captured because such Non-Member Firms are
not required to use a unique Market Participant Identifier
(``MPID'') or other identifier when routing orders to a FINRA
member. In some cases, FINRA is able to identify the Non-Member Firm
that participated in a transaction if, for example, it has an MPID
and provides it to the firm to which it routed an order and that
firm reports it to FINRA. FINRA has solicited comment from its
members on a proposed FINRA rule change that would require FINRA
members to identify Non-Member Firms in off-exchange transactions
reported to OATS. See FINRA Regulatory Notice 14-51, Equity Trading
Initiatives: OATS and ATS Reporting Requirements (November 2014),
available at https://www.finra.org/web/groups/industry/@ip/@reg/@notice/documents/notices/p601681.pdf. This proposal has not yet
been filed with the Commission pursuant to Section 19(b)(1) of the
Act. 15 U.S.C. 78s(b)(1).
\85\ Non-Member Firms that engage in off-exchange transactions
are not required to submit audit trail data to FINRA. See FINRA
Rules 6610 and 6622(a)(i). The Commission believes that this lack of
audit trail reporting is problematic because an Association has
statutory responsibility for regulatory oversight of the off-
exchange market. Although the Commission understands some off-
exchange trades between Non-Member Firms are voluntarily reported by
clearing firms, clearing firms are not obligated to report such
transactions. Lack of comprehensive reporting of off-exchange
transactions to FINRA, among other things, undermines FINRA's
ability to effectively surveil the off-exchange market. By
extension, this also undermines the ability of the Commission and
investors to fully benefit from the self-regulatory model envisioned
by Congress in the Exchange Act.
\86\ Rule 613 under the Act requires SROs to jointly submit to
the Commission a national market system plan (``NMS Plan'') to
create, implement, and maintain a consolidated order tracking
system, or consolidated audit trail, with respect to NMS securities,
that would capture customer and order event information for NMS
securities, across all markets, from the time of order inception
through routing, cancellation, modification, or execution. See
Exchange Act Release No. 67457 (July 19, 2012), 77 FR 45721 (August
1, 2012) (``CAT Release''); 17 CFR 242.613.
\87\ While some exchanges have rules requiring the reporting of
certain off-exchange transactions by their members, these rules, as
they currently exist, would not provide the exchanges with the
complete view of the market that the Commission believes is
necessary to effectively regulate the off-exchange market. For
example, NYSE MKT LLC (``NYSE MKT'') Rule 410B--Equities (Reports of
Listed Securities Transactions Effected Off the Exchange) only
requires reporting of off-exchange transactions in securities listed
on NYSE MKT that are not reported to the Consolidated Tape. See
Exchange Act Release No. 58705 (October 1, 2008), 73 FR 58995
(October 8, 2008) (order approving, among other things, NYSE MKT
Rule 410B); see also, e.g., CBOE Rule 6.49 (Transactions Off the
Exchange) (requiring that CBOE members executing transactions in
options listed on the exchange other than on CBOE merely keep a
record of such transaction for a period of one year).
\88\ The Commission notes that the CAT NMS plan would not be
implemented for several years. In accordance with Rule 613, the SROs
would be required to report the required data to the central
repository within one year after effectiveness of the NMS plan;
broker-dealers, other than small broker-dealers, would be required
to report the required data to the central repository within two
years after effectiveness of the NMS plan; and small broker-dealers
would be required to report the required data within three years
after effectiveness of the NMS plan. 17 CFR 242.613.
\89\ See supra notes 28-33 and accompanying text.
\90\ 15 U.S.C. 78o-3.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Further, because FINRA is unable to apply the rules it has
developed for the off-exchange market to Non-Member Firms, its ability
to create a consistent regulatory framework for the off-exchange market
is undermined. FINRA has sought to establish a robust regulatory regime
for broker-dealers, including broker-dealers conducting business in the
off-exchange market, and has developed a detailed set of rules in core
areas such as trading practices,\91\ business conduct,\92\ financial
condition
[[Page 18044]]
and operations,\93\ and supervision.\94\ Because Non-Member Firms are
not subject to these or other FINRA rules, they may be subject to a
less robust regulatory framework than FINRA members that themselves
trade off-exchange. Non-Member Firms also are not subject to the costs
associated with FINRA membership.\95\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\91\ See FINRA Rule 5000 Series--Securities Offerings and
Trading Standards and Practices. For instance, FINRA has rules
prohibiting members from coordinating prices and intimidating other
members. See FINRA Rule 5240(a), providing, among other things, that
``[n]o member or person associated with a member shall: (1)
Coordinate the prices (including quotations), trades or trade
reports of such member with any other member or person associated
with a member, or any other person; (2) direct or request another
member to alter a price (including a quotation); or (3) engage,
directly or indirectly, in any conduct that threatens, harasses,
coerces, intimidates or otherwise attempts improperly to influence
another member, a person associated with a member, or any other
person.'' The Commission notes that CBOE has stated that it views
any collusion, intimidation and harassment by a CBOE member as
``inconsistent with the just and equitable principles of trade.''
See CBOE Regulatory Circular RG97-167 (February 7, 2000) and CBOE
Rule 4.1. See also supra note 73 and accompanying text.
\92\ See FINRA Rule 2000 Series--Duties and Conflicts.
\93\ See FINRA Rule 4000 Series--Financial and Operational
Rules. See e.g., FINRA Rule 4370(a) providing, among other things,
that ``[e]ach member must create and maintain a written business
continuity plan identifying procedures relating to an emergency or
significant business disruption. Such procedures must be reasonably
designed to enable the member to meet its existing obligations to
customers. In addition, such procedures must address the member's
existing relationships with other broker-dealers and counter-
parties.'' Although NYSE MKT LLC Equities Rule 4370 is similar to
FINRA Rule 4370(a), for example, a number of other exchanges do not
have such a rule.
\94\ See FINRA Rule 3000 Series--Supervision and
Responsibilities Relating to Associated Persons. This rule series
generally requires FINRA member firms to, among other things,
establish, maintain, and enforce written procedures to supervise the
types of business in which the firm engages and the activities of
its associated persons that are reasonably designed to achieve
compliance with applicable securities laws and regulations, and with
applicable FINRA rules. See e.g., FINRA Rules 3110 (Supervision),
3120 (Supervisory Control System), and 3170 (Tape Recording of
Registered Persons by Certain Firms). See also FINRA By-Laws Article
III--Qualifications of Members and Associated Persons. Any person
associated with a member firm who is engaged in the securities
business of the firm--including partners, officers, directors,
branch managers, department supervisors, and salespersons--must
register with FINRA. Other SROs do not have similar standards for
associated persons of member broker-dealers.
\95\ The Commission notes that FINRA may need to consider
reassessing the structure of its fees, including its Trading
Activity Fee, in order to assure that it is fairly and equitably
applied to many of the Non-Member Firms that, as a result of the
amendments to Rule 15b9-1, may join FINRA. FINRA uses the TAF to
recover the costs to FINRA of the supervision and regulation of
members, including performing examinations, financial monitoring,
and policy, rulemaking, interpretive, and enforcement activities.
See FINRA Schedule A to the By-Laws of the Corporation, Section
1(a), available at http://finra.complinet.com/en/display/display_main.html?rbid=2403&element_id=4694 (``FINRA Schedule A'').
The TAF is generally assessed on FINRA member firms for all equity
sales transactions that are not performed in a broker-dealer's
capacity as a registered exchange specialist or market maker. See
id. at Section 1(b). As discussed above, many of the broker-dealers
that may be required to join FINRA if the proposed amendments are
adopted effect transactions in large volumes throughout the national
market system, and often in a capacity other than as a registered
market-maker. Accordingly, the Commission notes that FINRA may need
to consider reevaluating the structure of the TAF to assure that it
appropriately takes into account this business model. See also infra
notes 174-175 and accompanying text for further discussion of the
TAF.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As is discussed in more detail in the Economic Analysis, firms that
become FINRA members would become subject to the fees charged by FINRA
to all of its member firms. FINRA charges each member firm certain
regulatory fees designed to recover the costs to FINRA of the
supervision and regulation of members, including performing
examinations, financial monitoring, and policy, rulemaking,
interpretive, and enforcement activities.\96\ FINRA's regulatory fees
include a Trading Activity Fee (``TAF'').\97\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\96\ FINRA Schedule A, supra note 95, at Section 1.
\97\ FINRA assesses each member a TAF on the sale of all covered
securities. For the purposes of determining the TAF, covered
securities include, among other things, all exchange-registered
securities wherever executed and all other equity securities traded
otherwise than on an exchange. FINRA last adjusted the TAF rate for
sales of covered equity securities effective July 2012. FINRA's
regulatory fees also include a Gross Income Assessment (``GIA'') and
a Personnel Assessment.
In addition, Section 3 of Schedule A to the FINRA By-Laws states
that each member will be assessed a regulatory transaction fee that
is determined periodically in accordance with Section 31 of the
Exchange Act. Section 31(c) generally requires each national
securities association to pay the Commission a fee based on the
aggregate dollar amount of sales of certain securities transacted by
or through any member of such association otherwise than on a
national securities exchange. 15 U.S.C. 78ee(c). The Commission
preliminarily believes that FINRA's Section 3 fees will not change
as a result of the proposed amendments to Rule 15b9-1. The fees
collected by FINRA under Section 3 are intended to correspond to its
obligations to the SEC under Section 31(c) of the Act. However, if
the proposal is adopted, as Non-Member Firms become FINRA members,
FINRA could seek to reallocate Section 3 fees among FINRA members.
Nonetheless, because the Commission generally believes that Section
3 fees are passed through by FINRA members to the parties to covered
transactions, we do not expect the burden of Section 3 fees to
materially change.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The number of trades subject to the TAF in the off-exchange
market--and thus the aggregate fees collected by FINRA for that market
segment--would not be expected to materially change if the proposed
amendments are adopted because, in general, the TAF currently is
assessed on the ATSs where Non-Member Firms effect off-exchange
transactions, rather than on the Non-Member Firms. However, it is
likely that certain on-exchange trades by Non-Member Firms that
currently are not covered by the TAF would be captured.\98\ As such,
the Commission preliminarily believes that FINRA may need to consider
reevaluating its fee structure to ensure that it appropriately reflects
the activities of, and regulatory responsibilities towards, these FINRA
members, if the proposal is adopted.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\98\ As is discussed in more detail in the Economic Analysis,
the Commission preliminarily estimates that some firms could be
subject to a TAF of up to $3.2 million based on their current sales
of covered securities. See Section V.C.2.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In addition, under the proposal a broker-dealer that effects
transactions on multiple exchanges, and not on ATSs or elsewhere in the
off-exchange market, would need to become a member of an Association if
it effects transactions indirectly on exchanges of which it is not a
member (i.e., through another broker-dealer that is a member of that
exchange) in accordance with Section 15(b)(8), unless one of the
specified exceptions in the proposed amendment is available.\99\ The
Commission believes that this is consistent with the statutory
framework and would address an activity potentially not subject to
effective regulatory oversight in today's market. Specifically, if such
a broker-dealer were a member of one exchange but conducted a
significant amount of activity indirectly on other exchanges of which
it was not a member, the exchange of which it was a member would not be
well-positioned to regulate the member's activity on those other
exchanges. As with the off-exchange market, individual exchanges today
lack access to data,\100\ the proper rule set and the necessary
expertise to regulate trading on other exchanges. Under these
circumstances--where the broker-dealer would not be conducting ``off-
exchange'' activity but would be effecting transactions on an exchange
of which it is not a member, the Commission believes that an
Association is best-positioned to oversee this activity.\101\ As
discussed elsewhere in this release, FINRA currently
[[Page 18045]]
conducts cross-market surveillance and is provided exchange audit trail
data pursuant to existing RSAs and 17d-2 agreements.\102\ In contrast,
exchanges generally do not conduct cross-market surveillance and most
have allocated this responsibility to FINRA. Accordingly, the
Commission believes that, as a practical matter and consistent with
Section 15(b)(8), FINRA is currently in the best position to regulate
cross-market activity \103\ by broker-dealers that effect transactions
on exchanges other than those of which the broker-dealer is a member,
even if they do not effect transactions in the off-exchange
market.\104\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\99\ The Commission is not currently aware of any broker-dealer
with such a business model.
\100\ See supra note 76.
\101\ The Commission also believes that this would be consistent
with the statutory framework, which subjected broker-dealers that
effect transactions on an exchange of which they are not a member
first to Commission, and then to Association, oversight. In amending
Rule 15b8-1 in 1976 to add the exclusion for proprietary trading,
the Commission also revised the text of Rule 15b8-1 by substituting
the phrase ``otherwise than on a national securities exchange of
which he is a member'' to replace the phrase ``otherwise than on a
national securities exchange.'' See Adoption of Amendments to SECO
Rules, supra note 13, at 10600. The Commission made this revision
``to conform the scope of the SECO rules to the Commission's
authority'' under Section 15(b)(8) and 15(b)(9) (as revised in 1975)
to subject ``broker-dealers who effect transactions on exchanges
other than those of which they are members to the SECO rules.'' Id.
This change reflected the Commission's understanding that broker-
dealers effecting transactions on exchanges of which they were not a
member should be subject to the then-existing regulatory framework
(i.e., either Association membership or direct Commission regulation
under the SECO program) governing off-exchange trading. As noted
above, Congress amended the Act in 1983 ``to eliminate direct
regulation of broker-dealers by the Commission through the SECO
Program and to require any broker-dealer engaged in an over-the-
counter (`OTC') securities business to join a registered securities
association.'' See SECO Programs Release, supra note 9, at 53688.
Consistent with the Commission's rationale in 1976, the Commission
believes that broker-dealers that effect transactions on exchanges
of which they are not a member should be subject to the current
regulatory framework governing off-exchange trading, namely,
membership in an Association.
\102\ See, e.g., News Release, FINRA, BATS Global Markets, FINRA
Enter Regulatory Service Agreement (February, 6, 2014), available at
https://www.finra.org/Newsroom/NewsReleases/2014/P443474. Such
agreements provide detailed data that allow FINRA to comprehensively
identify the market-wide activity of broker-dealers, and to surveil
behavior for violative activity that might otherwise go undetected
if surveillance were only being conducted on an exchange-specific
basis.
\103\ In advance of the 1975 Amendments, Congress contemplated
reforms to the regulatory structure of the securities markets in
which an Association's role would be expanded, while exchanges would
focus their regulatory activities on their respective markets: ``. .
. the time has come to begin planning a framework which will guide
the development of the self-regulatory system in the future. In the
revised system, a single nationwide entity [an Association] would be
responsible for regulation of the retail end of the securities
business, including such matters as financial responsibility and
selling practices, while each exchange would concentrate on
regulating the use of its own trading facilities . . . the
regulatory activities of the NASD (the only organization presently
registered as a national securities association) would encompass
many of the present regulatory activities of the NYSE and other
exchanges over retail activities of their members. This `expanded'
NASD would have direct responsibility, subject to SEC oversight, for
enforcing SEC rules and its own rules . . .'' S. Doc. No. 93-13 at
16, 169 (1973).
\104\ A broker-dealer would not need to become a member of an
Association if it conducts no activity in the off-exchange market
and it becomes a member of each exchange upon which it effects
transactions. Although the Commission is not aware of such broker-
dealer business model existing today, if one were to arise, the
Commission notes that the exchanges upon which such broker-dealer
directly effects transactions could enter into an RSA to ensure
effective cross-market supervision of this activity. The Commission
acknowledges that in the future another SRO could assume these
responsibilities pursuant to 17d-2 Agreements, subject to Commission
approval, and RSAs.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In sum, the Commission is concerned that some of the most active
cross-market proprietary trading firms may not be subject to effective
regulatory oversight by an exchange or Association with respect to the
full range of their market activity. Accordingly, the Commission is
proposing to amend Rule 15b9-1, as described below, to appropriately
tailor the exemption from Association membership for today's markets.
II. Discussion of Amendments to Rule 15b9-1
A. Prior Comments on Association Membership
In 2010, the Commission issued a Concept Release that, among other
things, solicited comment on whether all proprietary trading firms
should be required to register as broker-dealers and become members of
FINRA to help assure that their operations were subject to full
regulatory oversight.\105\ The Commission received six comment letters
that directly addressed the question as it relates to FINRA membership,
including one comment letter from FINRA.\106\ The six comment letters
offered contrasting views. Three commenters expressed their support for
enhanced oversight of proprietary trading firms, including a
requirement to become members of FINRA, generally asserting that
because proprietary trading firms are not all members of FINRA there is
a lack of uniform regulation among registered broker-dealers.\107\
Three commenters expressed opposition to the idea of requiring
proprietary trading firms to become FINRA members, asserting their
belief that such firms are already subject to full regulatory
oversight,\108\ requiring such firms to join FINRA would be costly and
burdensome,\109\ and that, because proprietary trading firms do not
have customers, there would be no benefit to requiring such firms to
become members of FINRA.\110\ The Commission has considered these
comments, and, for the reasons set forth throughout this release, is
proposing to amend Rule 15b9-1 as described herein.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\105\ See Concept Release, supra note 16, at 3612.
\106\ See letters to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Secretary, Commission,
from Kimberly Unger, Executive Director, Security Traders
Association of New York, Inc., dated April 30, 2010 (``STANY
Letter''); from Liam Connell, Chief Executive Officer, Allston
Trading, LLC, and Richard B. Gorelick, Chief Executive Officer, RGM
Advisors, LLC, and Adam Nunes, President, HRT Financial LLC, Hudson
River Trading, LLC, and Cameron Smith, General Counsel, Quantlab
Financial, LLC, dated April 23, 2010 (``Allston Letter''); from
Donald R. Wilson, Jr., DRW Trading Group, dated April 21, 2010
(``DRW Letter''); from Marcia E. Asquith, Senior Vice President and
Corporate Secretary, Financial Industry Regulatory Authority, dated
April 23, 2010 (``FINRA Letter''); letter to the Commission from
Berkowitz, Trager & Trager, LLC, dated April 21, 2010 (``Berkowitz
Letter''); and from Stephen M. Barnes, J.D., Salt Lake City, Utah,
received October 3, 2011 (``Barnes Letter'').
\107\ See FINRA Letter, supra note 106, at 4-5; Barnes Letter,
supra note 106, at 32-33 (suggesting that, to level the regulatory
playing field, high-frequency trading firms should be required to
register as broker-dealers with the Commission and become members of
an SRO such as FINRA or an exchange); and STANY Letter, supra note
106, at 14 (suggesting that the Commission review and consider
registration requirements of market participants that are not
required to be registered with FINRA and noting that enhanced
surveillance and enforcement should improve investor confidence in
the markets). See also letter to the Honorable Mary Schapiro,
Chairman, Commission, from Kimberly Unger, Executive Director,
Security Traders Association of New York, Inc., dated May 10, 2010,
at 14 (urging the Commission to work towards a more harmonized
regulatory structure, which the commenter believes will put FINRA in
a better position to address regulatory gaps through a holistic,
cross-market approach to regulation that can detect problematic
activity across multiple markets and products).
\108\ See Allston Letter, supra note 106, at 14-15 (stating that
it is inaccurate to say that proprietary trading Non-Member Firms
are not subject to full regulatory oversight and noting that such
firms are generally members of several exchanges and are
consequently subject to multiple regulators).
\109\ See Berkowitz Letter, supra note 106, at 1 (stating that
requiring proprietary trading firms to register as broker-dealers
and become members of FINRA would add significant costs and burdens
to those firms).
\110\ See DRW Letter, supra note 106, at 4 (stating that FINRA's
focus is on investor protection and not proprietary trading, and,
therefore, there would be no benefit to requiring proprietary
trading firms that do not undertake a customer business to become
members of FINRA).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
B. Overview of Amendments
As noted above, Section 15(b)(8) \111\ of the Act \112\ generally
prohibits any registered broker or dealer from effecting transactions
in securities unless it (1) is a member of an Association or (2)
effects transactions in securities solely on an exchange of which it is
a member. Section 15(b)(9) \113\ of the Act provides the Commission
authority to exempt any broker or dealer from the requirements of
Section 15(b)(8). The Commission has, by rule, exercised its exemptive
authority. Specifically, Rule 15b9-1 \114\ generally exempts any broker
or dealer from membership in an Association if it: (1) is a member of a
national securities exchange; (2) carries no customer accounts; and (3)
has annual gross income of no more than $1,000 that is derived from
purchases or sales of securities effected otherwise than on an exchange
of which it is a member. However, income derived from transactions for
the dealer's own account with or through another registered broker or
dealer,\115\ or through the ITS, is excluded from such de minimis
allowance.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\111\ See supra note 46.
\112\ 15 U.S.C. 78a et seq.
\113\ See supra note 7.
\114\ See supra notes 50-51.
\115\ See supra note 51.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Commission is proposing to eliminate the existing de minimis
allowance (including the exclusion for proprietary trading) and replace
it with a more targeted exemption from Association membership for a
broker-dealer that conducts business on a
[[Page 18046]]
national securities exchange, to the extent it effects transactions
off-exchange for the dealer's own account with or through another
registered broker-dealer, that are solely for the purpose of hedging
the risks of its floor-based activities, by reducing or otherwise
mitigating the risks thereof. The proposed amendments also include an
exemption for a broker-dealer to the extent it executes orders that are
routed by a national securities exchange of which it is a member, to
prevent trade-throughs on such national securities exchange consistent
with the provisions of Rule 611 of Regulation NMS.
C. Elimination of the De Minimis Allowance
The Commission proposes to eliminate the de minimis allowance in
its entirety. Specifically, the Commission is proposing to delete the
following language from Rule 15b9-1(a): ``and (3) has annual gross
income derived from purchases and sales of securities otherwise on a
national securities exchange of which it is a member in an amount no
greater than $1000.'' The Commission also is proposing to delete
paragraphs (b) and (c) of the Rule, as they set forth two exceptions to
the de minimis allowance.\116\ Paragraph (b) provides that income
derived from (1) transactions for the dealer's own account with or
through another registered broker-dealer, and (2) transactions through
the ITS, do not count toward the $1,000 de minimis allowance, and
paragraph (c) defines the ITS.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\116\ See supra notes 50-51.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As discussed above, the $1,000 de minimis allowance originally was
intended to permit exchange specialists and other floor members to
receive a nominal amount of commissions on occasional off-exchange
transactions for accounts referred to other members, without subjecting
them to SECO rules and broker-dealer registration and, later,
Association membership.\117\ Since the de minimis allowance was first
adopted in 1965, the securities markets have undergone a significant
transformation. At that time, virtually all trading activity was
conducted manually on the floors of national securities exchanges.\118\
Today, however, electronic cross-market order routing and trading
strategies are a significant component of the markets, and exchange
floor-based businesses represent only a small fraction of market
activity. The $1,000 de minimis allowance has never been adjusted, and
the Commission is unaware of any floor members today that refer
accounts to other broker-dealers in exchange for a share of the
broker's commission revenues. Although the Commission is proposing to
eliminate the de minimis allowance, it is soliciting comment on whether
the de minimis allowance might continue to be appropriate in today's
markets. In particular, the Commission seeks responses to the following
questions:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\117\ See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
\118\ See, e.g., Special Study, supra note 14, at 98 (``Trading
by NYSE members on the Exchange but from off the floor accounts for
approximately 5 percent of total Exchange purchases and sales . .
.'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
1. Do exchange floor members currently rely on the $1,000 de
minimis allowance? If so, how? Please describe the number and types of
floor members that rely on the allowance. Please provide the nature and
extent of reliance on the allowance. Also, please provide any available
data on the amount and frequency of commissions or referral fees that
floor members may continue to receive with respect to off-exchange
transactions.
2. If the de minimis allowance is being used by exchange floor
members, is it being relied upon for its original purposes (i.e.,
accommodating occasional commission splitting or referrals by such
members)? If not, for what purposes are floor members today relying on
the de minimis allowance?
3. If exchange floor members currently rely on the de minimis
allowance and the Commission retains that allowance, should the $1,000
limit be changed? Why or why not? What should the limit be?
4. If the de minimis allowance were eliminated, as proposed, would
some exchange floor members be required to become members of an
Association? If so, how many? Please provide the basis of any estimate.
What would be the effect on those firms?
5. Do other broker-dealers that are not floor members rely on the
de minimis allowance? If so, for what activities? Specifically, do
cross-market proprietary trading firms, as discussed above, rely on the
allowance? If so, why? Are there other types of businesses that use the
allowance? If so, please describe them. How and why do they rely on the
allowance?
6. If the de minimis allowance were eliminated, what would be the
effect on these non-floor-based broker-dealer firms? For example, if
the allowance were eliminated, would there be effects on the business
of firms that would be required to register with an Association, and if
so what would they be? Would business incentives change such that firms
might adjust their business model or their trading volume by leaving
the off-exchange market, moving transactions on-exchange, or leaving
the markets altogether? Would the effects be different on broker-
dealers trading equities from those trading options?
D. Floor Member Hedging Exemption
Although the Commission proposes to eliminate the de minimis
allowance in its entirety, it also proposes to replace the allowance
with an exemption from Association membership for exchange member
broker-dealers that operate on the floor of the exchange, to the extent
they effect transactions off-exchange solely for the purpose of hedging
the risks of their floor-based activities. The Commission proposes the
hedging exemption be limited to firms that trade on the floor of a
national securities exchange, as the Commission understands that
currently, broker-dealers that trade exclusively on a single exchange
do so on a physical exchange floor.\119\ Accordingly, the Commission is
proposing to add the following language to Rule 15b9-1: ``and, (c)
Effects transactions solely on a national securities exchange of which
it is a member, except that . . . (1) A dealer that conducts business
on the floor of a national securities exchange may effect transactions,
for the dealer's own account with or through another registered broker
or dealer, that are solely for the purpose of hedging the risks of its
floor-based activities, by reducing or otherwise mitigating the risks
thereof. A dealer seeking to rely on this exception shall establish,
maintain and enforce written policies and procedures reasonably
designed to ensure and demonstrate that such hedging transactions
reduce or otherwise mitigate the risks of the financial exposure the
dealer incurs as a result of its floor-based activity. Such dealer
shall preserve a copy of its policies and procedures in a manner
consistent with 17 CFR 240.17a-4 until three years after the date the
policies and procedures are replaced with updated policies and
procedures.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\119\ Currently, NYSE Arca Options, NYSE Amex Options, NASDAQ
OMX Phlx, CBOE, NYSE, and NYSE MKT have physical exchange floors.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Commission understands that today there are some broker-dealers
that continue to limit their activities to exchange floors,
particularly in the options markets.\120\ As discussed above,
[[Page 18047]]
at the time Rule 15b9-1 was adopted, the circumstances under which an
exchange specialist or floor broker would trade proprietarily off-
exchange were quite limited, such as where a regional exchange
specialist would hedge risk on the primary listing market. The
Commission believes that those broker-dealers that today continue to
limit their trading activities to an exchange floor may seek to hedge
the risks of their floor-based activities on other markets, both on
national securities exchanges and off-exchange.\121\ Therefore, the
Commission proposes to retain a more focused exemption from Association
membership for the type of activity for which the Commission believes
the exclusion for proprietary trading in Rule 15b9-1 was originally
designed.\122\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\120\ Based on disclosures on Form BD, as of February 2015, the
Commission understands that there are approximately 43 Non-Member
Firms that are members of one national securities exchange and that
disclose being engaged in floor activities on Form BD. The business
model of these firms varies widely, and may include market making,
other proprietary trading and agency business.
\121\ For example, a broker-dealer may operate a floor-based
business on one or more options exchanges. As a result of this
activity, the broker-dealer may need to mitigate the risk of its
options positions, resulting from such activity, on other options
markets or in the equities markets. The proposed floor member
hedging exemption would allow the broker-dealer to enter into
transactions on other markets solely for the purpose of hedging this
risk.
\122\ See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The availability of the proposed hedging exemption would be limited
to dealers that conduct business on the floor of a national securities
exchange and are members of that exchange. Section 15(b)(8) requires
Association membership for all registered broker-dealers other than
those that effect transactions solely on an exchange of which they are
a member. Broker-dealers that limit their activities in this manner
generally are specialists or floor brokers based on the floor of an
individual exchange. In exercising its exemptive authority when it
adopted Rule 15b8-1 in 1965, the Commission sought to accommodate off-
exchange activities ancillary to that floor-based business. The
Commission believes that, today, few broker-dealers limit their
activities to a particular exchange. Those broker-dealers that do limit
their business to an exchange floor, however, may continue to seek to
hedge the risk of their floor-based activities by effecting
transactions on another exchange or in the off-exchange market.
The Commission preliminarily believes that a floor-based dealer
seeking to rely on the proposed hedging exemption in Rule 15b9-1 should
be required to establish, maintain and enforce written policies and
procedures reasonably designed to ensure and demonstrate that its off-
exchange transactions are solely for the purpose of hedging the risks
of its floor-based activities, by reducing or otherwise mitigating the
risks thereof. Such hedging should reduce or otherwise mitigate the
risks of the financial exposure the dealer incurs as a result of its
business on the floor of an exchange of which it is a member. Because
such hedging transactions must be solely for the purpose of hedging the
risks of the dealer's floor-based activities, the transactions, of
course, should not be for the purpose of increasing the aggregate risk
of the dealer. The Commission notes that whether a transaction or
transactions entered into to reduce or otherwise mitigate risk results
in a profit or loss is not dispositive of whether or not such a
transaction or transactions meets the terms of the proposed floor
member hedging exemption. A floor-based dealer seeking to rely on the
proposed hedging exemption would be required to preserve a copy of its
policies and procedures in a manner consistent with Rule 17a-4 until
three years after the date the policies and procedures are replaced
with updated policies and procedures.\123\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\123\ 17 CFR 240.17a-4.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Commission preliminarily believes that requiring written
policies and procedures, as described above, would facilitate SRO
supervision of broker-dealers relying on the proposed hedging
exemption, as it would provide an efficient and effective way for
regulators to assess compliance with the proposed exemption. The
determination of whether an off-exchange transaction by a floor-based
dealer reduces or otherwise mitigates the risk of the financial
exposure incurred as a result of the dealer's floor-based business may
vary depending on the nature of the business of the floor-based dealer,
its financial position, and the particular transactions effected.
Consequently, the Commission preliminarily believes that requiring
floor-based dealers to develop written policies and procedures will
provide sufficient flexibility to accommodate the varying business
models of floor-based dealers and appropriate hedging activities.
The Commission notes, however, that such written policies and
procedures must be reasonably designed to ensure and demonstrate that
the floor-based dealer's off-exchange hedging transactions reduce or
otherwise mitigate the risks of the financial exposure it incurs as a
result of its floor-based activity. Accordingly, a dealer seeking to
rely upon the proposed hedging exemption should maintain documentation
that, in the context of an SRO or Commission examination, would enable
it to show how the hedging transactions it effects off the exchange
reduce or otherwise mitigate the risks of its floor-based business.
The Commission notes that the exchange of which the dealer is a
floor member would be responsible for enforcing compliance with the
hedging exemption, including reviewing the adequacy of the dealer's
written policies and procedures and whether the dealer's off-exchange
transactions comply with those written policies and procedures,
including the requirement that the hedging transactions reduce or
otherwise mitigate the risks of financial exposure the dealer incurs as
a result of its floor-based activity and that the policies and
procedures are reasonably designed to so demonstrate.\124\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\124\ See 15 U.S.C. 78f(b)(1) which requires that an exchange is
so organized and has the capacity to be able to carry out the
purposes of the Exchange Act and to comply, and to enforce
compliance by its members and persons associated with its members,
with the provisions of the Exchange Act, the rules and regulations
thereunder, and the rules of the exchange.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Because the proposed hedging exemption is intended to allow a
dealer to reduce or otherwise mitigate risk incurred in connection with
its floor-based activities, it would be limited to transactions for the
dealer's own account. In addition, because the floor-based dealer would
not itself be a member of the national securities exchange on which
transactions may be effected, or an Association, such transactions
would need to be conducted with or through another registered broker-
dealer that is a member of such other national securities exchange or a
member of an Association (or both).
Finally, a dealer seeking to rely on the proposed hedging exemption
would be required to preserve a copy of its policies and procedures in
a manner consistent with Rule 17a-4 under the Exchange Act until three
years after the date the policies and procedures are replaced with
updated policies and procedures. Accordingly, a dealer must keep the
policies and procedures relating to its use of the hedging exemption as
part of its books and records while they are in effect, and for three
years after they are updated.
The Commission requests comment on all aspects of the proposed
hedging exemption in Rule 15b9-1. In particular, the Commission seeks
responses to the following questions:
7. To what extent do exchange floor members that are Non-Member
Firms today effect transactions in the off-exchange market to hedge the
risk of their floor-based activities? What is the nature and extent of
such off-exchange market activities? Do these activities
[[Page 18048]]
tend to focus on particular products? The Commission specifically seeks
data from exchange floor members that demonstrates the extent to which
they trade off the exchange floor and how such off-exchange trading
relates to their floor-based business, including to hedge the risks
thereof, as such data may be particularly helpful in assessing a
potential floor member hedging exemption when the Commission considers
adoption of the proposed amendments.
8. Is the Commission's proposed description of hedging transactions
appropriate? Is it sufficiently defined? If not, how should it be
modified or supplemented? Is the phrase ``solely for the purpose of
hedging the risks of its floor-based activities,'' as used in the
proposed amendments, sufficiently precise that broker-dealers will know
what activities are allowed under the proposed floor member hedging
exemption from Association membership? If not, what should be changed
or what guidance should be provided?
9. Will broker-dealers seeking to rely on the floor member hedging
exemption be able to evaluate whether, and demonstrate that, off-
exchange transactions are ``solely for the purpose of hedging the risks
of floor-based activities''? Please provide specific examples. What
would be the associated costs?
10. Should there be a hedging exemption at all? Why or why not?
11. Should the Commission narrow or broaden the proposed floor
member hedging exemption in any way? If so, how and why?
12. Do exchange floor members that are Non-Member Firms effect
transactions in the off-exchange market, or on exchanges of which they
are not a member, for purposes other than hedging the risk of their
floor-based activities? If so, please describe the nature and extent of
such activities. Should there be an exemption for these activities? Why
or why not?
13. Are there non-floor-based exchange members that today focus
their business activities on a single exchange? If so, what is the
nature of their business activity? Should there be an exemption for
such activities? Why or why not?
14. The proposed floor member hedging exemption is limited to
transactions effected with or through another registered broker-dealer.
Are there circumstances where an exchange floor member that is a Non-
Member Firm, might need to hedge the risk of its floor-based activities
through a transaction with a non-registered broker-dealer counterparty?
If so, please describe the nature and extent of such transactions and
the particular reason(s) that such transactions should be covered.
15. The proposed floor member hedging exemption is limited to
transactions for the dealer's own account. Are there circumstances
where an exchange floor member that is a Non-Member Firm might need to
hedge the risk of customer activity on the exchange, as agent, in the
off-exchange market or on exchanges of which it is not a member? If so,
please describe.
16. Is the proposed policies and procedures requirement appropriate
for the floor member hedging exemption? What would be the costs of
establishing, maintaining and enforcing the policies and procedures,
and the related record-keeping requirements? How are such costs
determined? Please provide evidence of the nature, timing, and extent
of such costs. Would such costs deter dealers from relying on the floor
member hedging exemption? Are there more efficient and effective
alternatives to a policies and procedures approach? If so, what are
they? Have the transactions executed by floor members pursuant to the
current Rule's exclusion for proprietary trading posed issues of
regulatory compliance, market surveillance, or enforcement? If so,
please describe in detail.
17. Will the proposed requirement to establish, maintain, and
enforce written policies and procedures enable floor members to
efficiently hedge their floor-based activities while effectively
ensuring the floor member hedging exemption is used as intended? Is
there another approach that would better achieve these goals?
18. Would the proposed floor member hedging exemption present
compliance risks or otherwise raise concerns regarding the protection
of investors or the maintenance of fair, orderly, and efficient
markets? If so, please describe.
19. Would current exchange surveillance and enforcement mechanisms
be effective to monitor trades that would be executed pursuant to the
proposed floor member hedging exemption? Please explain.
a. If not, should the Commission require additional reporting by
registered broker-dealers acting as agent for dealers relying on the
floor member hedging exemption? For example, should they report to an
exchange or an Association (i) the identity of the floor member
effecting the hedging transaction; and (ii) the fact that the
transaction was a hedging transaction? Is such a requirement necessary
to assure the adequacy of market surveillance and compliance? Or,
alternatively, is the registered broker-dealer acting as agent on
behalf of the dealer subject to sufficient rules and regulations
(including Rule 15c3-5 under the Exchange Act,\125\ known as the
Commission's ``Market Access Rule'')? Please explain.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\125\ 17 CFR 240.15c3-5.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
b. Could a Non-Member Firm execute a hedging transaction directly
with another Non-Member Firm? If so, how would the transaction be
subject to surveillance? How would this activity affect the enforcement
of the exemption? Please explain.
c. Would exchanges otherwise have the ability to assess compliance
of broker-dealers relying on the Rule?
20. Should the proposed floor member hedging exemption be subject
to any quantitative or qualitative limitations, or to special reporting
obligations? Please explain.
21. Should the proposed floor member hedging exemption require the
floor member to retain records demonstrating how each off-exchange
transaction complies with its policies and procedures? Why or why not?
What would be the associated costs, and what is the basis for those
costs? Would the cost associated with recordkeeping on a transaction by
transaction basis be overly burdensome, or unnecessary given the
Commission's proposed policies and procedures requirement?
22. Should the Rule contain an anti-evasion provision to prevent
floor members from attempting to circumvent the limitations in the
floor member hedging exemption? Is there a better method than the
proposed policies and procedures approach to ensure that floor members
do not misuse the proposed floor member hedging exemption? If so, what
is it? Alternatively, are the existing Commission anti-fraud and anti-
manipulation rules sufficient to prevent misuse of the proposed floor
member hedging exemption?
23. Should floor members have to make a certification in connection
with their reliance on the floor member hedging exemption? Why or why
not? If a certification should be required, what would be the key
elements thereof? How frequently should the certification be made? Who
should make it? What qualifications, if any, to such certification
might be appropriate (e.g., reasonable basis to believe, best of my
knowledge)? Should the certification be made in conjunction with an
internal compliance review? If so, what type of internal compliance
review should be conducted?
[[Page 18049]]
24. Are certifications an appropriate way to promote compliance
with the hedging exemption? Do certifications bring more
accountability, or do they create compliance costs and therefore a
barrier to entry?
25. Is data currently available that could be used by regulators to
monitor the use of the proposed floor member hedging exemption? Are
there other approaches that would do more to enhance regulatory
surveillance, protect investors, or ensure fair, orderly, and efficient
markets?
26. Are there other mechanisms the Commission could consider to
monitor compliance with the floor member hedging exemption? If so,
please explain.
E. Regulation NMS Routing Exemption
The Commission proposes to eliminate a portion of subparagraphs
(b)(2) and all of subparagraph (c) from Rule 15b9-1, because both
contain outdated references to the ``Intermarket Trading System.''
\126\ ITS was a national market system plan (``ITS Plan'') operated by
the national securities exchanges and NASD that required each
participant to provide electronic access to its displayed best bid and
offer to other participants and provided an electronic mechanism for
routing orders, called commitments to trade, to access those displayed
prices.\127\ This permitted ITS Plan members at each market to have
limited access to the other markets for the purpose of avoiding trade-
throughs \128\ and locked markets.\129\ However, the ITS Plan was
eliminated in 2007, when it was superseded by Regulation NMS.\130\
Accordingly, the Commission is proposing to eliminate the following
language, which creates an additional exception to the de minimis
allowance, from Rule 15b9-1 (b): ``Or (2) through the Intermarket
Trading System.'' In addition, the Commission is eliminating in its
entirety subparagraph (c) of the Rule, which defines the ITS as
follows: ``(c) For purposes of this section, the term Intermarket
Trading System shall mean the intermarket communications linkage
operated jointly by certain self-regulatory organizations pursuant to a
plan filed with, and approved by, the Commission pursuant to Sec.
242.608 of this chapter.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\126\ The full title of the ITS Plan was ``Plan for the Purpose
of Creating and Operating an Intermarket Communications Linkage
Pursuant to Section 11A(c)(3)(B) of the Exchange Act of 1934.'' The
ITS Plan was initially approved by the Commission in 1978. Exchange
Act Release No. 14661 (April 14, 1978), 43 FR 17419 (April 24,
1978). All national securities exchanges that traded exchange-listed
stocks and the NASD were participants in the ITS Plan.
\127\ Id.
\128\ See 17 CFR 242.600(b)(77) defining a ``trade-through''
under Regulation NMS.
\129\ A ``locked market'' occurs when a trading center displays
an order to buy at a price equal to an order to sell, or an order to
sell at a price equal to an order to buy, displayed on another
trading center.
\130\ Notice of Filing and Immediate Effectiveness of the Twenty
Fourth Amendment to the ITS Plan Relating to the Elimination of the
ITS Plan, Exchange Act Release No. 55397 (March 5, 2007), 72 FR
11066 (March 12, 2007). Today, Regulation NMS contains an updated
trade-through rule, and contemplates the use of private linkages by
trading centers to route orders to avoid trade-throughs. 17 CFR
242.610-611.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Today, Rule 611 of Regulation NMS requires trading centers to
establish, maintain and enforce policies and procedures reasonably
designed to prevent trade-throughs in exchange-listed stocks, subject
to certain exceptions.\131\ In general, Rule 611 protects automated
quotes that are the best bid or offer of a national securities exchange
or Association.\132\ To facilitate compliance with Rule 611 of
Regulation NMS, national securities exchanges have developed the
capability to route orders through broker-dealers (many of which are
affiliated with the exchanges) to other trading centers with protected
quotations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\131\ Exchange Act Rule 611 states, in part, that ``a trading
center shall establish, maintain, and enforce written policies and
procedures that are reasonably designed to prevent trade-throughs on
that trading center of protected quotations in NMS stocks. . . .''
17 CFR 242.611.
\132\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As discussed above, the Commission understands that some broker-
dealers today continue to limit their activities to exchange floors,
and believes that Rule 15b9-1 should continue to accommodate
transactions away from the exchange of which they are a member that are
necessary to comply with regulatory requirements. A floor-based member
may at times seek to effect a transaction on the exchange at a price
that would trade-through a protected quotation on another trading
center. In such a case, the exchange would need to route the member's
order, through a routing broker-dealer, to that other trading center
before it could execute any remainder of the floor-based member's order
on the exchange. Therefore, a broker-dealer may be required, as a
necessary part of its business, to effect transactions otherwise than
on the exchange of which it is a member as a consequence of the
requirements of Rule 611 of Regulation NMS.
The Commission preliminarily believes that transactions effected
solely to comply with Rule 611 regulatory requirements should not
require membership in an Association by a broker-dealer that otherwise
limits its activities to an exchange of which it is a member.
Accordingly, the Commission proposes to add the following language to
create a second exemption from the requirement under proposed Rule
15b9-1(c) that a broker-dealer effect transactions solely on an
exchange of which it is a member: ``(2) a broker or dealer may effect
transactions off the exchange resulting from orders that are routed by
a national securities exchange of which it is a member, to prevent
trade-throughs on that national securities exchange consistent with 17
CFR 242.611.'' The Commission believes that permitting such routing
only by a national securities exchange of which the broker-dealer is a
member will provide the exchange with visibility into the routing of
transactions by its members to other exchanges, and thus maintain the
exchange's ability to effectively oversee the entirety of its member's
activity.
The Commission requests comment on all aspects of the proposed
Regulation NMS routing exemption in Rule 15b9-1. In particular, the
Commission seeks responses to the following questions:
27. Is the proposed routing exemption necessary and appropriate?
Why or why not?
28. Is the scope of the proposed routing exemption sufficient to
provide for all off-exchange transactions that might be effected by
floor members as a necessary consequence of compliance with Rule 611 of
Regulation NMS? If not, how should it be changed?
29. Does the proposed routing exemption allow transactions beyond
those necessary to comply with Rule 611 of Regulation NMS? If so, is
that appropriate and should it be narrowed or broadened?
30. Are there other off-exchange transactions that a floor member
might need to effect in order to comply with regulatory requirements?
If so, please describe those transactions and the relevant regulatory
requirements.
III. Effective Date and Implementation
The Commission recognizes that firms will require time to comply
with Rule 15b9-1 if the amendments are adopted in order to become a
member of an Association, or modify the firm's business practices to
conform to the requirements of the Rule, as amended. As noted
previously, FINRA is currently the only Association. To become a FINRA
member, a broker-dealer must complete FINRA's New Member Application
and participate in a pre-
[[Page 18050]]
membership interview.\133\ The broker-dealer and its associated persons
must comply with FINRA's registration and qualification
requirements.\134\ The amount of time that it takes to become a FINRA
member would depend on a number of factors, including the nature of the
broker-dealer's business, the level of complexity or uniqueness of the
firm's business plan, the number of associated persons the firm
employs, and whether the firm has an affiliate that is already a member
of FINRA.\135\ The Commission understands, based on conversations with
FINRA that, on average, the FINRA membership application process
generally takes approximately four months.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\133\ See How to Become a Member, FINRA, http://www.finra.org/Industry/Compliance/Registration/MemberApplicationProgram/HowtoBecomeaMember/index.htm (last visited on March 9, 2015).
\134\ See NASD Rule 1010--Membership Proceedings, which sets out
the substantive standards and procedural guidelines for the FINRA
membership application and registration process.
\135\ See Section V.C. discussing the costs of joining FINRA.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Alternatively, if the proposed amendments are adopted, a Non-Member
Firm not eligible for, or choosing not to rely on, an exemption may
become a member of additional exchanges upon which it trades or
otherwise modify its business model to conform with the proposed
amendments to the Rule. The Non-Member Firm may also need to modify its
systems or take other steps to achieve compliance.
The Commission preliminarily believes that 360 days after
publication in the Federal Register of any final rules that the
Commission may adopt should provide firms enough time to comply with
the amended Rule. Therefore, the Commission proposes that the
compliance date for the proposed amendments to Rule 15b9-1 would be 360
days after publication of the final rule in the Federal Register. The
Commission solicits comment on the adequacy of this proposed
implementation timeline. In particular, the Commission seeks responses
to the following questions:
31. Does 360 days after publication in the Federal Register provide
firms with sufficient time to comply with the revised Rule? Would firms
be in a position to comply with the revised Rule earlier than 360 days
after publication?
32. How long does the registration process with FINRA, should a
firm decide to register, typically take? Please include the estimated
time to prepare the application as well as the estimated time for FINRA
to process the application.
33. Do commenters believe that a longer or shorter period is
appropriate to determine whether becoming a member of an Association is
preferable to changing a firm's business model to remain within the
exemptions provided by the Rule, as amended (i.e., ceasing all off-
exchange activity and becoming a member of each exchange on which the
firm trades, or limiting the firm's off-exchange activity to comply
with the floor member hedging exemption and/or NMS routing exemption)?
34. How long does it typically take to complete the application
process with a national securities exchange? Please include the
estimated time to prepare the application as well as the estimated time
for an exchange to process it.
35. To the extent a firm intends to rely on one or more of the
proposed exemptions, how long would it take such firm to make the
required systems changes to comply? Are there other steps that would
need to be taken to achieve compliance? If so, what is the estimated
time to accomplish those steps?
IV. General Request for Comments
The Commission seeks comment on all aspects of the proposed
amendments to Rule 15b9-1. Commenters should, when possible, provide
the Commission with data to support their views. Commenters suggesting
alternative approaches should provide comprehensive proposals,
including any conditions or limitations that they believe should apply,
the reasons for their suggested approaches, and their analysis
regarding why their suggested approaches would satisfy the objectives
of the proposed amendments.
36. The Commission requests comment generally on whether narrowing
or broadening the current exemption is appropriate. In particular, the
Commission seeks comment on whether the fact that Non-Member Firms
currently must use an Association member firm to report off-exchange
trades gives an Association sufficient information and jurisdiction to
effectively regulate the off-exchange market. Are there off-exchange
transactions between two Non-Member Firms that occur that are not
reported?
37. The Commission requests comment on whether the current
exemption should be eliminated entirely. What would be the benefits or
drawbacks of doing so?
38. Other than the proposed hedging exemption and Regulation NMS
routing exemption, are there any other exemptions that the Commission
should consider?
39. Have transactions effected pursuant to the current Rule posed
compliance issues in the past? If so, please describe in detail.
40. In addition, the Commission is interested in data indicating
how many entities rely either on Rule 15b9-1 in its current form, or
exclusively on the statutory exception in Section 15(b)(8) of the
Exchange Act. Reliance on Rule 15b9-1 is currently self-effecting
(i.e., does not require the reporting of such reliance to the
Commission or any other regulatory authority). In lieu of the proposed
amendments, should the Commission require broker-dealers relying on
Rule 15b9-1 to report such reliance to the Commission or to the
exchange of which the broker-dealer is a member? If so, what form
should such reporting take and what information should be provided to
the Commission or the exchange of which the broker-dealer is a member?
If not, why not and what alternative means could be used to collect
data about reliance on Rule 15b9-1?
41. If the Commission were instead to eliminate Rule 15b9-1
altogether, how many broker-dealers would: (i) Restrict their business
to only those national securities exchanges of which they are a member;
(ii) become members of other national securities exchanges; and/or
(iii) become members of an Association? Would implementation of the
proposed amendments have an effect on market liquidity? If so, please
estimate that effect. Could broker-dealers that currently rely on the
Rule respond to its elimination in other ways to avoid Association
membership? If so, please explain.
42. Should the Commission allow Non-Member Firms that conduct off-
exchange trading activity to remain exempt from membership in an
Association? If so, why? Would membership by Non-Member Firms in
multiple exchanges prove an efficient and effective substitute for
Association membership? Should the level of off-exchange activity
affect the ability of a firm to be exempt from Association membership?
Why or why not?
43. Should the Commission require the exchanges to engage in joint
plans to ensure that the on-exchange cross-market activity of their
members is effectively regulated? How might this improve the oversight
of on-exchange trading activity? What problems or inefficiencies would
relying on joint plans for the regulation of on-exchange trading
activity by exchanges create?
44. Is Association membership an efficient or effective approach
for the regulation of firms that trade across multiple exchanges but do
not trade off-
[[Page 18051]]
exchange? Are there more effective alternatives?
45. Under the proposed amendments to the Rule, a Non-Member Firm
that conducts no off-exchange trading, but trades on an exchange of
which it is not currently a member, would, in accordance with Section
15(b)(8), have to either join an Association or become a member of each
exchange upon which it trades. Should the proposed amendments be
revised to provide an exemption from Section 15(b)(8) to permit such a
Non-Member Firm, with no off-exchange trading, to remain exempt from
membership in an Association and continue trading on exchanges of which
it is not a member, so long as certain conditions are met, such as the
exchange of which it is a member entering into appropriate contractual
arrangements such that the exchange is in a position to effectively
surveil all of the trading activities of that firm?
46. Should the Commission consider other changes to Rule 15b9-1? If
so, why? What specifically should be changed and how?
V. Economic Analysis
As discussed above, the Commission is proposing to amend Rule 15b9-
1 to better align the scope of its exemption, in light of today's
market activity, with Section 15(b)(8) of the Exchange Act and the
Commission's original purpose in adopting Rule 15b9-1. Currently, a
broker-dealer can engage in unlimited proprietary trading in the off-
exchange market without becoming a member of an Association, so long as
its proprietary trading activity is conducted with or through another
registered broker-dealer. For a broker-dealer that trades
electronically across a range of exchange and off-exchange venues,
however, the individual exchanges of which the broker-dealer may be a
member are not well-positioned to oversee the off-exchange activity of
the broker-dealer, as was previously discussed. The Commission
preliminarily believes that this oversight role can best be fulfilled
by an Association, which is the SRO intended and authorized by Congress
to regulate the trading activity of off-exchange market participants,
monitor their financial and operational condition, and enforce their
compliance with federal securities laws and Association rules.
The Commission is sensitive to the economic effects of its rule,
including the costs and benefits and effects on efficiency,
competition, and capital formation. Section 3(f) of the Exchange Act
requires the Commission, whenever it engages in rulemaking pursuant to
the Exchange Act, and is required to consider or determine whether an
action is necessary or appropriate in the public interest, to consider,
in addition to the protection of investors, whether the action would
promote efficiency, competition, and capital formation.\136\ In
addition, Section 23(a)(2) of the Exchange Act requires the Commission,
when making rules under the Exchange Act, to consider the effect such
rules would have on competition.\137\ Exchange Act Section 23(a)(2)
prohibits the Commission from adopting any rule that would impose a
burden on competition not necessary or appropriate in furtherance of
the purposes of the Exchange Act.\138\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\136\ 15 U.S.C. 78c(f).
\137\ 15 U.S.C. 78w(a)(2).
\138\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Commission discusses below a number of economic effects that
are likely to result from the proposed amendments. As discussed in
detail below, many of the effects are difficult to quantify with any
degree of certainty. Although the Commission is providing estimates of
direct compliance costs where possible, the Commission also anticipates
that broker-dealers affected by the proposed amendments, as well as
competitors of those broker-dealers, may modify their business
practices regarding the provision of liquidity in both off-exchange
markets and on exchanges. Consequently, much of the discussion below is
qualitative in nature, but where possible, the Commission has provided
quantified estimates.\139\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\139\ See Section V.C. for further discussion of the
difficulties in estimating market quality effects likely to result
from the proposed amendments.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
A. Baseline
1. Regulatory Structure and Activity Levels of Non-Member Firms
The Exchange Act governs the way in which the U.S. securities
markets and its broker-dealers operate. Section 3(a)(4)(A) of the Act
generally defines a ``broker'' broadly as ``any person engaged in the
business of effecting transactions in securities for the account of
others.'' \140\ In addition, Section 3(a)(5)(A) of the Act generally
defines a ``dealer'' as: ``any person engaged in the business of buying
and selling securities for . . . such person's own account through a
broker or otherwise.'' \141\ The Commission oversees approximately
4,209 broker-dealers, of which approximately 4,057 are members of
FINRA, currently the only Association.\142\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\140\ 15 U.S.C. 78c(4)(A).
\141\ 15 U.S.C. 78c(5)(A).
\142\ There were approximately 4,209 broker-dealers registered
with the Commission as of March 2015.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Generally, any firm that interacts directly with a securities
exchange must register with the Commission as a broker-dealer to gain
direct access to the exchange. Consequently, there is diversity in the
size and business activities of broker-dealers.\143\ Carrying broker-
dealers hold customer funds and securities; some of these are also
clearing broker-dealers that handle the clearance and settlement
aspects of customer trades, including record-keeping activities and
preparing trade confirmations.\144\ However, during the fourth quarter
of 2014, only 284 of the 4,184 registered broker-dealers were
classified as carrying or clearing broker-dealers. Thus, the majority
of broker-dealers engage in a wide range of other activities, which may
or may not include handling customer accounts. These other activities
include intermediating between customers and carrying/clearing brokers;
dealing in government bonds; private placement of securities; effecting
transactions in mutual funds that involve transferring funds directly
to the issuer; writing options; acting as an exchange floor broker; and
the provision of liquidity to securities markets, which includes, but
is not limited to, the activities of registered market makers.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\143\ A firm that wishes to transact business upon an exchange
without becoming a broker-dealer can do so by engaging a broker-
dealer to provide market access and settlement services. While
effecting transactions in the off-exchange market does not require
registering as a broker-dealer, it does require obtaining the
services of a broker-dealer to handle settlement at a minimum.
\144\ Based on December 2014 FOCUS data.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Broker-dealers are diverse in size as well as scope of activity.
Most broker-dealers are small, with 67% of broker-dealers employing 10
or fewer registered individuals and only 4% of broker-dealers employing
over 151 registered individuals.\145\ Although the majority of broker-
dealers are small, there are a few very large broker-dealers as well.
Further, while there are many registered broker-dealers, a small
minority of broker-dealers controls the majority of broker-dealer
capital and has the ability to affect the allocation of capital to
liquidity provision. As of December 31, 2014, the majority of broker-
dealers each had total capital of less than $500,000, while the ten
largest broker-dealers in terms of capital accounted for more than 53%
of total broker-dealer
[[Page 18052]]
capital, with each disclosing more than $10 billion in total
capital.\146\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\145\ Id.
\146\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As of March 2015, 125 of the approximately 4,209 registered broker-
dealers were not members of FINRA, currently the only Association. The
Commission believes the majority of Non-Member Firms rely on the Rule's
exemption from Association membership.\147\ Because of the exclusion
for proprietary trading, a broker-dealer that does not carry customer
accounts is not required to join an Association, even when that broker-
dealer has substantial off-exchange trading activity.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\147\ See supra note 77. Historically, these floor brokers had
only incidental trading on exchanges of which they were not members,
and limited off-exchange trading activity. The background and
history of Rule 15b9-1 are discussed in Section I.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Non-Member Firms are diverse in their types and activities. Of the
125 Non-Member Firms, 77 disclose engaging in floor activities on a
national securities exchange, as reported on Form BD.\148\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\148\ See Form BD data for Non-Member Firms during March of
2015. Of the 125 Non-Member Firms, 77 Non-Member Firms disclose
engaging in floor activities on a national securities exchange; 76
firms disclose acting as a put and call broker or dealer or option
writer; and 89 firms disclose trading securities for their own
account. Other businesses cited by multiple Non-Member Firms
include: National securities exchange commission business other than
floor activities (6); making inter-dealer markets in corporate
securities off-exchange (5); selling corporate debt securities (2);
dealing in government securities (4); and other business (18).
Currently, a Non-Member Firm that is a member of a single
exchange but is not engaged in floor-broker activity may engage in
trading upon other exchanges using access provided by a broker-
dealer that is an exchange member of the destination exchange. These
single-exchange member Non-Member Firms may also engage in off-
exchange trading with or without the intermediation of a Member
Firm. Under the proposed amendments, both of these activities would
be disallowed except as outlined in the Floor Member Hedging
Exemption (see Section II.D.) and the Regulation NMS Routing
Exemption (see Section II.E.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
There is significant diversity in the business models of Non-Member
Firms. Some Non-Member Firms may limit their trading to a single
exchange, while others trade on multiple venues possibly including off-
exchange venues like ATSs. Some firms are significant contributors to
both off-exchange and exchange volume. Because any off-exchange
activity that involves a FINRA member firm (``Member Firm'') generates
certain audit trail data, FINRA and the Commission are able to quantify
the aggregate off-exchange activity of Non-Member Firms.\149\ During
the fourth quarter of 2014, there were 104.5 billion orders reported in
the off-exchange market. Of these 104.5 billion orders, 36.9 billion
(35.31%) were received from Non-Member Firms.\150\ Non-Member Firms
submitted 44.99% of all orders within ATSs in the fourth quarter of
2014.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\149\ Most off-exchange interactions involve a Member Firm at
some point in the order audit trail for routing, and therefore
produce OATS data, although identification of the firm that submits
the order is not required by OATS. Interactions between Non-Member
Firms without the involvement of a Member Firm are possible and
would not generate audit trail data, but the Commission believes
these interactions are infrequent for two reasons. First, all ATSs
are operated by Member Firms, so all orders submitted to ATSs are
reported to OATS. Second, although two Non-Member Firms could
theoretically interact on a Non-Member Firm operated single dealer
platform, the Commission is unaware of any single dealer platform
that is operated by a Non-Member Firm. Such a platform would be
visible in OATS data as a routing and execution destination if it
were accessed by Member Firms. Although it is possible that a Non-
Member Firm could approach another Non-Member Firm directly to
negotiate a transaction outside of an automated venue, the
Commission believes large Non-Member Firms transact with each other
almost exclusively through ATSs and do not seek each other out as
trading partners. Further information about off-exchange trading
outside of ATSs is provided by Tuttle, Laura, 2014, Over-the-Counter
Trading: Description of Non-ATS OTC Trading in National Market
System Stocks, available at http://www.sec.gov/dera/staff-papers/white-papers/otc-trading-white-paper-03-2014.pdf.
\150\ Data provided by FINRA. This does not include activity
submitted by firms not registered as broker-dealers, including data
on buy-side activity because the data was screened to include only
Non-Member Firms.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Although the Commission can observe the aggregate off-exchange
trading of Non-Member Firms, it is unable to quantify the off-exchange
trading of all Non-Member Firms on an individual basis because Member
Firms currently are not required to report the identifiers of Non-
Member Firms with whom they transact to OATS.\151\ However, some Member
Firms voluntarily report the exchange-issued identifiers of the Non-
Member Firms with which they interact.\152\ Using this data, the
Commission can estimate the ATS activity level of the 14 Non-Member
Firms that connected to ATSs directly without the intermediation of
another broker-dealer during the fourth quarter of 2014.\153\ Based on
this data, at least 19.31% of all ATS orders is attributable to the
Non-Member Firm that was the most active in ATS orders during the
review period.\154\ The least active of the 14 identifiable Non-Member
Firms has almost no order activity. In total, five of the 14 Non-Member
Firms are each responsible for 1% or more of all orders sent directly
to an ATS for the review period.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\151\ See supra note 84.
\152\ Data provided by FINRA. This does not include activity
submitted by firms not registered as broker-dealers, including data
on buy-side activity. In the fourth quarter of 2014, approximately
46.42% of ATS orders from Non-Member Firms included an exchange-
issued identifier that allows identification of the Non-Member Firm
submitting an order. The set of ATS clients that are not FINRA
members also includes substantial buy-side activity, but this
analysis is limited to firms that are also registered broker-
dealers: The 125 Non-Member Firms.
Although the analysis here focuses on ATS activity, Non-Member
Firms interact with Member Firms outside of ATSs as well, primarily
on single-dealer platforms. Across all off-exchange executions, in
the fourth quarter of 2014, 3.26% of share volume (10.56% of dollar
volume) was attributable to the trading of Non-Member Firms.
\153\ Although these 14 Non-Member Firms connect to ATSs
directly without the assistance of another broker-dealer, the ATSs
are operated by Member Firms and these orders are therefore
permitted under the current rule.
The Commission believes that these 14 Non-Member Firms represent
a subset of the largest Non-Member Firms that actively trade across
multiple exchanges and off-exchange and thus may not be
representative of the broader set of 125 Non-Member Firms. As such,
estimates of these 14 firms' ATS activity levels and the regulatory
fees that the activity would generate exceed those expected from
typical Non-Member Firms.
\154\ Non-Member Firms submitted 32.9 billion of the 66.8
billion ATS orders during the fourth quarter of 2014. ATSs reported
Non-Member MPIDs for 15.3 billion of these Non-Member Firm orders.
The Non-Member Firm most frequently identified as the source of ATS
orders submitted 4.9 billion ATS orders (7.30% of all orders and
39.20% of all Non-Member Firm ATS orders for which a Non-Member Firm
MPID is reported). With the assumption that this firm also submitted
39.20% of the Non-Member Firm ATS orders to ATSs that do not report
Non-Member Firm MPIDs, this firm would account for 19.31% of all ATS
orders.
ATSs generally provide the exchange-issued MPIDs of Non-Member
Firms submitting orders either for all orders or for none of the
orders received directly from Non-Member Firms. For purposes of our
analysis, we assume that the proportion of orders submitted by
individual Non-Member Firms to ATSs that report identifiers is equal
to that proportion for ATSs that do not report Non-Member Firm
MPIDs. It is possible that some Non-Member Firms transact only in
ATSs that do not report these identifiers to FINRA; if that is true,
our estimate of the activity level of the 14 identified Non-Member
Firms would be upwardly biased because we would attribute the ATS
volume of the unidentified Non-Member Firms to those that have been
identified. Furthermore, our estimate that 14 Non-Member Firms
connect to ATSs directly would be downward biased. It is also
possible that the proportions of orders attributable to individual
Non-Member Firms are materially different on ATSs that do not report
Non-Member Firm identifiers, although any error introduced by this
would likely not be directional. Additionally, some Non-Member Firms
may submit orders to Member Firms that are then routed to ATSs or
elsewhere off-exchange. Such activity would cause us to
underestimate the activity of these 14 Non-Member Firms within ATSs,
although such activity would still be counted at the aggregate Non-
Member Firm level.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The business of providing liquidity off-exchange is competitive.
Off-exchange equity trading occurs across many trading venues. In May
2012, 44 ATSs actively traded NMS stocks, comprising 12.12% of NMS
share volume.\155\ Furthermore, 255 broker-
[[Page 18053]]
dealers transacted a further 18.75% of NMS share volume off-exchange
without the involvement of an ATS.\156\ Although many market
participants provide liquidity within this market, Non-Member Firms are
particularly active within ATSs, as discussed above. Although Non-
Member Firms may trade in the Non-ATS segment of the off-exchange
market, the Commission preliminarily believes they rarely act as
liquidity suppliers outside of ATSs.\157\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\155\ Tuttle, Laura, October 2013, Alternative Trading Systems:
Description of ATS Trading in National Market System Stocks,
available at http://www.sec.gov/marketstructure/research/alternative-trading-systems-march-2014.pdf (revised March 2014).
\156\ Transaction volume off-exchange outside of ATSs includes
internalization, in which a broker-dealer fills orders from its own
inventory without interacting directly with an exchange. Tuttle,
Laura, March 2014, OTC Trading: Description of Non-ATS OTC Trading
in National Market System Stocks, available at http://www.sec.gov/dera/staff-papers/white-papers/otc-trading-white-paper-03-2014.pdf.
\157\ OATS data suggests that Non-Member Firms do not supply
off-exchange liquidity to Member Firms outside of ATSs and the
Commission believes that Non-Member Firms rarely transact with each
other outside of ATSs. See supra note 149.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
While some Non-Member Firms trade actively off-exchange, some of
these firms also supply and demand liquidity actively on multiple
exchanges.\158\ The Commission is able to identify the activity of 13
of the 14 Non-Member Firms identified as connecting directly with ATSs
on exchanges operated by BATS, NASDAQ-OMX, and NYSE during May of 2014.
The data show that these Non-Member Firms contribute substantially to
exchange volume.\159\ On these exchanges, during May 2014, these 13
large Non-Member Firms that connect directly to ATSs participate in at
least 17.25% of all exchange trading volume. The highest Non-Member
Firm participation rate in the data is on BATS-Y, where 27.31% of trade
volume involves Non-Member Firms that also connect directly to ATSs.
The lowest participation rate is on NYSE, where 5.54% of trading
involves Non-Member Firms that connect directly with ATSs. One of the
Non-Member Firms that connects directly with ATSs cannot be identified
in exchange data.\160\ The 13 Non-Member Firms that are observed
trading on exchanges tend to trade across the majority of exchanges
represented in the exchange data sample.\161\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\158\ See Section V.D.3 for discussion of SRO cross-monitoring
capabilities.
\159\ The estimates include only Non-Member Firms that connect
directly to at least one ATS that reports Non-Member Firm MPIDs in
OATS. Consequently, some Non-Member Firms are not included in these
estimates. Therefore, the estimates underestimate the importance of
Non-Member Firms to exchange-based activity in aggregate.
\160\ Data from off-exchange markets and exchanges is matched on
a firm-name basis in this analysis. It is possible that one firm
that cannot be identified in the exchange data is present under a
name that is not readily linked to the firm name cited in the off-
exchange data.
\161\ Data for Nasdaq-OMX is not broken down by exchange, but is
instead aggregated at the holding company level. Exchange-level data
was provided by BATS and NYSE.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The market for liquidity provision on equity exchanges is also
competitive. For example, Nasdaq-listed equities, for which the
Commission has relevant data,\162\ each had 13 to 80 market makers
registered to provide liquidity on Nasdaq as of December 2014. The
median Nasdaq-listed equity had 36 registered market makers, and 95% of
securities had 20 or more registered market makers. Because Nasdaq is
not the only exchange trading its listed equities, these statistics
underrepresent the number of firms in the market that provide liquidity
in Nasdaq-listed equities. Although the Commission does not have
readily available data to count the number of market makers in equities
listed on other exchanges, the Commission preliminarily believes that
the figures for Nasdaq-listed equities illustrate the magnitude of
market makers in equities more generally. Additionally, the Commission
notes that while the number of market makers represents the number of
firms in the business of providing liquidity, it does not necessarily
indicate whether each market maker is an active competitor. However,
the Commission believes that many market makers actively compete to
provide liquidity. The Commission currently lacks data to quantify the
liquidity provision activity attributable to Non-Member Firms.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\162\ Data from Center in Research in Security Prices (CRSP).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
2. Current Market Oversight
The surveillance and regulation of each broker-dealer is dependent
upon its individual SRO membership status. Each SRO that operates an
exchange has responsibility for overseeing trading that occurs on the
exchange it operates. Because of this, SROs that operate an exchange
possess expertise in supervising members who specialize in trading the
products and order types that may be unique or specialized within the
exchange. This expertise complements the expertise of an Association in
supervising cross-exchange and off-exchange trading activity.\163\
Exchanges generally have not monitored trading that their members
conduct on other venues.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\163\ See Section I.B. discussing the requirement for SROs to
examine for and enforce compliance with the Exchange Act, and the
rules and regulations thereunder.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Approximately 68 Non-Member Firm broker-dealers are members of a
single exchange that supervises their activity overall. Exchanges
regulate trading by broker-dealers on their exchange and generally may
focus examinations on the financial and operational requirements
associated with their membership. These requirements share many
commonalities across SROs, such as net capital requirements and books
and records requirements. Because many broker-dealers are members of
multiple SROs with similar requirements, one SRO is appointed as the
broker-dealer's DEA.\164\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\164\ A DEA is an SRO assigned by the SEC that has certain
specific supervisory responsibility for a broker-dealer. The DEA
usually performs financial and operations examination activities on
behalf of all SROs of which the broker-dealer is a member, although
SROs may also allocate other regulatory responsibilities under Rule
17d-2. See supra note 69. These examinations, however, do not
generally extend to compliance with trading rules imposed by other
SROs; nor do they facilitate surveillance for activity across market
centers. DEAs therefore cannot substitute for the surveillance of
cross-market and off-exchange trading provided by an Association.
See 17 CFR 240.17d-1. FINRA serves as the DEA for the majority of
Member Firms; there are exceptions, mostly involving firms that have
specialized business models that focus on a particular exchange that
is judged to be best situated to supervise the Member Firm's
activity. These firms are, however, subject to the same supervision
of their trading activity as other Member Firms for whom FINRA does
act as DEA. Under the proposed amendments, Non-Member Firms that
join FINRA may or may not be assigned to FINRA for DEA supervision.
A firm with a specialized business model focusing on a single
exchange with floor activity may be able to continue trading off-
exchange under the proposed floor member hedging exemption without
joining FINRA.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
All registered broker-dealers are required to join an Association
unless they comply with Section 15(b)(8) of the Act or Rule 15b9-1. The
vast majority of broker-dealers join an Association and, since there is
currently a single Association, with the exception of Non-Member Firms,
broker-dealers are subject to relatively uniform regulatory
requirements and levels of surveillance and supervision. The
supervision by FINRA, which is currently the only Association, is more
robust than that of individual exchange SROs because its rule set
addresses its need to supervise a market that is fragmented across many
trading venues and more opaque than exchange trading.\165\
Specifically, FINRA's rule set has provisions related to business
conduct, financial condition
[[Page 18054]]
and operation, and supervision that may differ materially from exchange
SRO rule sets.\166\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\165\ Comprehensive reporting requirements for all Member Firms
that trade off-exchange give FINRA information on market activity
levels and market conditions off-exchange. Because most off-exchange
venues do not disseminate information on the liquidity available in
their systems, comprehensive information from all participants is
necessary for FINRA to analyze and surveil the off-exchange market.
See infra note 204 for a discussion of the off-exchange trading
environment; see also Section I.B. for a discussion of the differing
scope of exchange SRO and Association rule sets.
\166\ See supra notes 91-94 and accompanying text.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The existing Association, FINRA, serves crucial functions in the
current regulatory structure.\167\ FINRA has primary responsibility for
overseeing off-exchange trading.\168\ Furthermore, FINRA provides
cross-market trading supervision of broker-dealers that the exchanges
currently are not well-positioned to provide in light of the statutory
framework that places responsibility for off-exchange trading with an
Association. Exchanges generally do not have a detailed set of member
conduct rules and non-exchange-specific trading rules and have limited
access to data,\169\ thus allowing such broker-dealers and their
personnel to conduct business under a less specific regulatory regime
than FINRA members. On the other hand, FINRA has sought to establish a
robust regulatory regime for broker-dealers, including broker-dealers
conducting business in the off-exchange market, and developed
surveillance technology and specialized regulatory personnel to provide
surveillance, supervision, and enforcement of activity occurring off-
exchange. Consequently, the current regulatory structure achieves
cross-market and off-exchange supervision through the surveillance
actions of FINRA and its examination of its members.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\167\ See Section I.A. for further discussion of the role of
Associations in market oversight.
\168\ See Section I.B. for further discussion of the
responsibilities of an Association.
\169\ See supra note 76.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Currently, Non-Member Firms transact heavily in the course of
normal business activities within venues regulated by SROs of which
they are not members. This is very different from when Rule 15b9-1 was
first adopted. The Act provides for regulation of exchange trading by
the exchanges themselves; it further provides for supervision of off-
exchange trading by an Association. Although the Act provides a limited
and targeted exception to Association membership requirements for
broker-dealers, its approach to effecting supervision is relatively
uniform: Broker-dealers must be members of the SROs that regulate the
venues upon which they transact. For each trading venue, whether an
exchange or the off-exchange market as a whole, the responsible SRO (an
exchange SRO or FINRA) is obligated and empowered to fulfill its
regulatory responsibilities through its authority to adopt rules,
surveil the markets, examine its members' activities and bring
enforcement actions when necessary. To the extent that the current
regulatory structure undermines this functional approach, the ability
of SROs to fulfill their responsibilities to protect investors and
promote fair and orderly markets may be compromised.
Comprehensive supervision of cross-market and off-exchange activity
requires data on off-exchange activity, but this data for Non-Member
Firms is often not readily available to regulators.\170\ FINRA's rules
require that nearly all Member Firms report order audit trail data
daily.\171\ This data records the origination, receipt, execution,
routing, modification or cancellation of every order a Member Firm
handles, with limited exceptions for certain activities including
market-making. Additionally, FINRA currently has RSAs with most
exchanges \172\ that provide FINRA with detailed data that often allow
FINRA to comprehensively identify the market-wide activity of broker-
dealers, and to surveil behavior for violative activity that might
otherwise go undetected on an exchange-specific surveillance basis.
However, a significant amount of activity remains missing from FINRA's
existing audit trail data (OATS) because it does not include the orders
that otherwise would be reported by Non-Member Firms if they were
members, and does not identify executions as those of a broker-dealer.
Non-Member Firm activity that involves a Member Firm (such as an ATS
order or an order routed through a Member Firm) does appear in OATS,
although the identity of the Non-Member Firm sending the order is not
required to be reported.\173\ Furthermore, some off-exchange activity
that does not involve a Member Firm (and thus creates no OATS data
record) may be entirely unsurveiled by FINRA and possibly not subject
to rules that were intended to universally govern off-exchange
activity. In particular, an off-exchange trade between two Non-Member
Firms is not subject to FINRA's audit trail and trade reporting rules.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\170\ If the Commission approves the NMS Plan submitted by the
SROs to create, implement, and maintain a CAT, the CAT would be able
to provide the SROs and the Commission with such data on Non-Member
Firms. See Exchange Act Release No. 67457 (July 19, 2012), 77 FR
45721 (August 1, 2012).
\171\ See generally FINRA Rule 7400 Series--Order Audit Trail
System.
\172\ FINRA has RSAs with all exchanges operated by
Intercontinental Exchange, Nasdaq-OMX, and BATS. Together, these
exchanges accounted for 99.6% of exchange-based share volume in Tape
A, B, and C securities during October 2014, based on data available
on the BATS Web site. See http://www.batstrading.com/market_data/market_volume_history/ (last visited March 9, 2015).
\173\ FINRA has proposed amendments to its rules pertaining to
identification of Non-Member Firms in OATS data. See supra note 84.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Because Non-Member Firms are not required to join an Association,
they are not required to pay the costs of Association membership, which
could be significant, especially for Non-Member Firms with substantial
trading activity. FINRA members currently pay a TAF for all equity
sales transactions that are not performed in the firm's capacity as a
registered specialist or market maker upon an exchange. The Commission
estimates that the annual TAF associated with ATS trading for some Non-
Member Firms would be as high as $3.2 million per year.\174\
Additionally, a substantial portion of Non-Member Firms' exchange-based
activity may be subject to TAF as well.\175\ These estimates of TAF
have substantial uncertainty. As discussed previously, the Commission
believes that FINRA may need to consider revising its fee structure to
reflect the business model of these firms and this may significantly
affect their potential FINRA fee burden.\176\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\174\ TAF incurred for off-exchange activity for Non-Member
firms would be unavoidable as the fee is currently structured. FINRA
assesses it directly on FINRA members. TAF is discussed further in
Section V.C.2.b.
\175\ Schedule A of the FINRA By-Laws outlines which
transactions are subject to the TAF. Generally, equity sales both on
and off-exchange are subject to the TAF unless the member is acting
in the capacity of a specialist or market maker on the exchange
where the transaction was effected.
\176\ See supra note 95. Under the current TAF schedule, Member
Firms may realize some cost savings because they would no longer be
assessed TAF when they buy shares from a Non-Member Firm off-
exchange. This is discussed further in Section V.B.3.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Furthermore, FINRA currently cannot assess Non-Member Firms Section
3 fees for off-exchange trading. The Section 3 fee is the second of two
primary FINRA fees (the other being TAF) that are assessed upon each
off-exchange sale by or through a FINRA member. Under Section 31 of the
Act,\177\ SROs must pay transaction fees based on the volume of their
covered sales. These fees are designed to offset the costs of
regulation incurred by the government--including the Commission--for
supervising and regulating the securities markets and securities
professionals. FINRA obtains money to pay its Section 31 fees from its
membership, in accordance with Section 3 of Schedule A to the FINRA By-
Laws. FINRA assesses these Section 3 fees on the sell side of each off-
exchange trade, when possible. When the sell side of an off-exchange
transaction is a Non-Member Firm and the seller engages the services of
a
[[Page 18055]]
clearing broker that is a Member Firm, FINRA can assess the Section 3
fee against the Member Firm clearing broker.\178\ When the seller is a
Non-Member Firm that self-clears, FINRA has no authority to assess the
Section 3 fee against the seller. In such case, FINRA will seek to
assess the fee against the buyer, if the buyer includes a Member Firm
counterparty or a Member Firm acting as clearing broker for a Non-
Member Firm buy side counterparty. Given that any firm that carries
customer accounts is required to be a member of an Association, firms
that represent the trading of the investing public may bear the fees
that would be otherwise assigned to Non-Member Firms trading
proprietarily in the off-exchange market. These costs may be passed on
to the investing public in whole or in part. Regardless of who
ultimately bears the Section 3 fees, these Non-Member Firms may face
lower off-exchange trading costs than Member Firms due to the
allocation of these fees.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\177\ 15 U.S.C. 78ee.
\178\ The seller's clearing broker may pass that fee on to the
Non-Member Firm.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
B. Broad Economic Considerations, Including Effects on Efficiency,
Competition and Capital Formation
As discussed above, the Commission is proposing amendments to Rule
15b9-1 to address the off-exchange trading activity that may not
currently be subject to effective regulatory oversight that has
developed with the advent of cross-market proprietary trading. In
addition to the specific, individual benefits and costs discussed
below, the Commission expects the proposed amendments to have several
broad economic effects, including effects on efficiency, competition,
and capital formation. These effects are described in this section.
1. Effects on Regulatory Supervision
Non-Member Firms are significant contributors to off-exchange order
and trade activity, yet are not under the jurisdiction of an
Association that supervises off-exchange trading activity. The
Commission preliminarily believes the current exemption of Non-Member
Firms from Association membership undermines the effectiveness of
regulatory supervision. For example, reliance by Non-Member Firms on
the Rule 15b9-1 exemption leaves FINRA charged with responsibility for
the off-exchange market without jurisdiction over broker-dealers that
conduct a substantial amount of off-exchange trading activity. It also
undermines the ability of an Association to apply a consistent set of
conduct, supervisory, and other rules to off-exchange market
participants, and to effectively surveil the trading activity of
broker-dealers with a significant presence in the off-exchange
market.\179\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\179\ See supra notes 91-94 and accompanying text.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As discussed further below, the Commission believes the proposed
amendments will have a beneficial effect on the efficiency of
regulation of the equity markets.\180\ In particular, some broker-
dealers are currently overseen by individual exchanges, which are not
well-positioned to oversee the off-exchange and cross-market activity
of the broker-dealer. Under the proposal, these broker-dealers would be
supervised by an Association that has this expertise. This improvement
in regulatory oversight of the off-exchange market should achieve more
uniform and effective regulatory supervision of off-exchange and cross-
exchange trading practices by broker-dealers.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\180\ See Section V.C.1.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Commission is aware that some of the 125 Non-Member Firms trade
primarily on a single exchange in a floor-based capacity. For these
firms, especially those with specialized business models that operate
primarily on one exchange, their current exchange (not an Association)
may be best equipped to provide efficient supervision. The Commission
believes that many of these firms will not need to join an Association
to comply with the proposed amendments.
2. Firm Response and Effect on Market Activity
Although Non-Member Firms could seek to comply with the proposed
amendments in multiple ways, each route could involve changes to firms'
business models. Some Non-Member Firms limit their trading to exchanges
of which they are members, and the Commission believes they do not
trade off-exchange other than to hedge positions gained through floor
broker activity. These firms will remain exempt from the requirement to
become a member of an Association, if they comply with the Rule as
proposed to be amended.\181\ Other firms will no longer be exempt, and
will need to take action to comply with the amended rule. Under the
revised Rule, a Non-Member Firm that trades off-exchange, or upon
exchanges of which it is not a member, can comply in four ways. The
first option would be to join an Association. This option does not
require the Non-Member Firm to restrict its current trading practices
beyond those necessary to comply with the rules of FINRA. The second
option would be to join all exchanges upon which the Non-Member Firm
wishes to trade, and to cease any off-exchange trading, other than off-
exchange trading consistent with the floor-broker hedging exemption.
Third, a Non-Member Firm could comply by trading solely upon those
exchanges of which it is already a member, consistent with the
statutory exception in Section 15(b)(8).\182\ Finally, a Non-Member
Firm could cease trading equity securities.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\181\ Changes to the exclusion for proprietary trading are
discussed in Section II.C. Changes to the proposed floor member
hedging exemption are discussed in Section II.D.
\182\ 15 U.S.C. 78o(b)(8).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The changes Non-Member Firms make to their business model in order
to comply with the amendments may affect competition in the market for
off-exchange liquidity provision. In particular, Non-Member Firms may
be less willing to compete to provide liquidity off-exchange,
decreasing off-exchange liquidity. For example, Non-Member Firms may
choose to cease their off-exchange activity rather than join an
Association--although it seems likely that firms that trade heavily in
the off-exchange market may find it less costly to join an
Association.\183\ In addition, Non-Member Firms that choose to join an
Association may reduce their off-exchange trading because joining an
Association would increase variable costs to trade in the off-exchange
market, as these trades will incur TAF and possibly additional Section
3 fees.\184\ An increase in cost
[[Page 18056]]
would reduce the profitability of off-exchange trading and thus
potentially reduce off-exchange trading.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\183\ Firms that do not connect directly may trade on ATSs
through a Member Firm at much lower activity levels. For firms with
very limited off-exchange activity, ceasing off-exchange activity is
likely to be less costly than joining an Association. The costs of
joining FINRA are discussed in detail in Section V.C.2; for firms
with very limited off-exchange activity, it is unlikely that the
profits generated from this activity would offset FINRA membership
costs. However, for firms that generate profits from off-exchange
activities that exceed FINRA membership costs, it may be less costly
for these firms to join FINRA than to cease their off-exchange
activity. Firms with very low ATS activity are unlikely to directly
connect to an ATS, instead accessing ATSs through a Member Firm.
The Commission is unaware of any Non-Member Firms operating
single dealer platforms upon which such firms could provide
liquidity to orders routed by Member Firms outside of an ATS.
\184\ As previously noted, FINRA may need to consider
reevaluating the structure of the TAF to assure that it
appropriately takes into account the business model of certain Non-
Member Firms that may join FINRA as a result of the proposed
amendments. See supra note 95. The Commission's analysis of TAF is
based on current TAF structure as outlined in the FINRA By-Laws,
Schedule A. TAF and Section 3 fees are discussed further in Section
V.C.2.b. Firms will also face additional fixed costs both to
establish and maintain Association membership; those costs are
discussed in Section V.C.2.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The removal of this liquidity could either improve or degrade
execution quality on ATSs.\185\ To the extent that institutional
investors transacting in ATSs are seeking institutional investor
counterparties that are not proprietary trading firms for their
transactions, the removal of Non-Member Firm liquidity may be seen by
some institutional investors as improving liquidity quality within
ATSs.\186\ It is also possible that reducing the activity of Non-Member
Firms within ATSs may result in more ATS liquidity, if Non-Member Firms
are acting as net takers of liquidity within these systems.\187\
Regardless, liquidity levels in ATSs may change. In addition, these
firms may reduce their off-exchange trading outside of ATSs such as on
single-dealer platforms. It is possible that this will result in a
transfer of volume from off-exchange venues to exchanges, but it is
also possible that overall market trading volume will diminish if
decreased volume from off-exchange trading does not migrate to
exchanges.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\185\ Non-Member Firms are likely to also reduce their off-
exchange trading outside of ATSs, such as on single-dealer
platforms. However, Non-Member Firms can only take (not make)
liquidity on these platforms. It is possible that additional off-
exchange liquidity may be available outside of ATSs as a result of
the proposed amendments to Rule 15b9-1 due to a reduction in Non-
Member Firm trading on single dealer platforms.
\186\ Industry white papers sometimes discuss the concept of
natural counterparties for institutional trades. These papers may
explicitly or implicitly identify proprietary automated trading
firms as sources of information leakage in dark pools. See e.g.,
Mittal, Hitesh, Are You Playing in a Toxic Dark Pool? A Guide to
Preventing Information Leakage, 2008 ITG white paper, available at
http://www.itg.com/news_events/papers/ITGResearch_Toxic_Dark_Pool_070208.pdf, and Dark Pools and Toxicity
Assessment, 2014, EY White Paper, available at http://www.ey.com/
Publication/vwLUAssets/Dark_pools_and_toxicity_assessment/$FILE/
Dark%20pools%20and%20toxicity%20assessment_FINAL_LR.pdf. Other
industry participants describe a more benign role for automated
trading firms as liquidity providers in ATSs. See High-Speed Traders
Go Dark, 2012, Markets Media Commentary, available at http://marketsmedia.com/high-speed-traders-go-dark/.
\187\ There is some evidence that proprietary electronic trading
firms are net takers of liquidity in equity markets, although the
evidence is not conclusive. Using NASDAQ data from 2008-2010,
Carrion estimates that these firms supply liquidity to 41.2% of
trading dollar volume and take liquidity in 42.2% of trading dollar
volume. See Carrion, Al, 2013, ``Very fast money: High-frequency
trading on the NASDAQ,'' Journal of Financial Markets 16, 680-711.
Al Carrion currently serves as an Economic Fellow within the
Division of Economic and Risk Analysis. Another study finds that
electronic trading firms act as net liquidity suppliers during
periods of extreme price movements. See Brogaard, Moyaert, Riordan,
Shkilko and Sokolov, 2015, ``High Frequency Trading and Extreme
Price Movements,'' working paper.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Changes in business models for Non-Member Firms may affect market
quality on exchanges as well. In addition to trading extensively in the
off-exchange market, many Non-Member Firms are among the most active
participants on exchanges. Business model changes by these firms may
lead to less exchange liquidity for several reasons. First, Non-Member
Firms that choose not to join an Association would no longer be able to
rely on the rule and trade indirectly on exchanges of which they are
not members.\188\ Second, Non-Member Firms that do not join an
Association would no longer be able to access off-exchange liquidity to
unwind positions acquired on exchanges, except as outlined in the floor
member hedging exemption. This may reduce their willingness to provide
liquidity upon exchanges.\189\ Third, Non-Member Firms that choose to
join an Association may be subject to additional variable costs
(primarily regulatory fees) on their exchange-based trading as well as
on their off-exchange trading.\190\ These firms may respond by trading
less actively on exchanges. Finally, Non-Member Firms may choose to
cease trading equity securities rather than join an Association or
change their business models. Reduced liquidity upon exchanges can
result in higher spreads and increased volatility. Increased spreads on
exchanges can lead to increased costs for off-exchange investors as
well as investors transacting on exchanges, because most off-exchange
transactions (including many retail executions) are derivatively priced
with reference to prevailing exchange prices.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\188\ Currently, a Non-Member Firm can indirectly access an
exchange of which it is not a member through a firm that is an
exchange member. In light of the proposed elimination of the
exclusion for proprietary trading, this activity would not be
consistent with the proposed amendments, unless the floor member
hedging exemption or Regulation NMS routing exemption applies.
\189\ These firms could unwind positions on other exchanges, but
the cost to do so may be higher than if all liquidity, including
off-exchange liquidity, were available.
\190\ It is possible Non-Member Firms that choose to join an
Association may avoid some additional costs by registering as market
makers on additional venues, mitigating these charges. Furthermore,
they may see a reduction in fees that were formerly paid to their
DEA if FINRA assumes that role.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Commission preliminarily believes that the proposed amendments
are not likely to have an economically meaningful effect on direct
capital formation (the assignment of financial resources to meet the
funding requirements of a profitable capital project, in this case, the
provision of liquidity to financial markets). However, the Commission
believes that the changes in allocation of regulatory fees and more
efficient supervision within the off-exchange market may result in
improved efficiency of capital allocation by the financial industry.
Currently, Non-Member Firms face lower regulatory costs and a lower
degree of regulatory scrutiny of their off-exchange trading activity
than Member Firms. While the Commission believes that this imposes
certain costs on other market intermediaries and the investors they
represent, there is another externality as well: Over-commitment of
liquidity both to exchanges and the off-exchange market.\191\ This
over-commitment is likely to have some positive effects on capital
markets, such as lower quoted spreads on exchanges. In addition to
lowering immediate execution costs on exchanges, lower exchange quoted
spreads are likely to reduce transaction costs off-exchange as well,
because off-exchange trades are typically priced with reference to
quoted exchange prices. Adoption of the proposed amendments may reduce
the capital commitment of Non-Member Firms to equity market liquidity
provision. It is possible that in response current Member Firms may
choose to commit additional capital to liquidity provision when the
trading environment has more uniform regulatory requirements. These
reallocations of capital may improve or degrade levels of liquidity,
spreads and volatility measures on exchanges and within the off-
exchange market.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\191\ There is likely to be a corresponding underinvestment of
capital somewhere else.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The magnitude of these competitive effects is impossible for the
Commission to determine at this time for a number of reasons. First,
these effects involve strategic decisions by Non-Member Firms that the
Commission cannot predict, and a competitive response that the
Commission lacks information to anticipate. Second, even if the
Commission could predict the likely changes in capital commitment by
market participants, the Commission lacks information on how capital
commitment by financial firms maps into market quality measures such as
spreads, levels of liquidity, and execution costs.\192\ Due to the
[[Page 18057]]
complexity of the economic relationship between capital commitment and
market quality measures, and inadequate information on individual
firm's strategies, cost structures and likely competitive responses,
the Commission cannot estimate the likely magnitude of these effects.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\192\ The Commission has considered whether it is possible to
model this response using current data to estimate these effects.
Even if CAT data were available today, the Commission believes it
would not have sufficient information for this estimation because
information on the daily and perhaps intra-day change in committed
capital levels is not available. Although the Commission has
quarterly data on the net capital of broker-dealers, broker-dealers
do not commit all of this capital to liquidity provision in equity
markets. Furthermore, on a daily or more frequent basis, a liquidity
provider may choose to fully or partially withdraw from the market
for any reason.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
3. Competition To Provide Liquidity Is Distorted by Regulatory Costs
Borne by Only a Subset of Competitors, Member Firms
Currently, Member Firms bear a number of costs not borne by Non-
Member Firms including a number of regulatory fees and indirect costs
that are assessed or imposed upon Member Firms. These costs include
direct costs such as trading fees that are either assigned only to
Member Firms, such as TAF, or in the case of Section 3 fees, Member
Firms may be assigned costs that potentially could be assigned to Non-
Member Firms selling securities off-exchange. There are indirect costs
of disparate regulatory regimes as well. For example, Member Firms bear
costs of interacting with regulators to accommodate supervision, and
must comply with the rules of an Association as well as rules adopted
by the Commission. This inequality in regulatory requirements may
distort competitive forces in the market and these potential
distortions may be mitigated by the proposed amendments to Rule 15b9-1,
to the extent that Non-Member Firms join an Association and subject
themselves to comparable fees and regulatory costs imposed on all other
Member Firms.
The existing differential regulatory burden of Member Firms and
Non-Member Firms may have consequences with respect to market quality
both for exchange-based and off-exchange trading. For example, because
Non-Member Firms, ceteris paribus, currently face lower variable costs
of trading compared to Member Firms, Non-Member Firms may be able to
provide liquidity at a lower cost than Member Firms. Because a low-cost
competitor may be able to quote at a price superior to that of his
competitors, investors may incur lower transaction costs than if Non-
Member Firms faced the same costs as Member Firms. It may also reduce
direct execution costs (such as quoted and effective spreads) for both
exchange and off-exchange trades, the latter of which are normally
derivatively priced with reference to prevailing exchange quotes. The
differential regulatory burden, however, may also reduce depth at best
prices because a Member Firm may not be able to trade profitably at a
price established by a Non-Member Firm that faces lower regulatory
costs. Lower liquidity at best exchange prices implies greater price
effect of trades, which may increase trading costs, particularly for
large orders. For example, if the best price on an exchange is
associated with 100 shares of depth, a 200 share order will exhaust
depth at the best price and the second 100 share lot will execute at an
inferior price.\193\ If depth at best price tends to be larger, it is
less likely that an order will exceed the depth available at the best
price. The change in best price associated with an execution that
exhausts the depth available at the best price is the price effect of
the trade upon the exchange. Because the Commission does not have
access to consolidated audit trail data, the Commission lacks data to
quantify the percent of inside depth provided by Non-Member Firms and
the frequency with which only Non-Member Firms are quoting the best
price on an exchange. However, the high participation rate of Non-
Member Firms in exchange trading suggests they provide a significant
fraction of exchange liquidity.\194\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\193\ This assumes no hidden depth at the best price. If non-
displayed depth is present at the best price, the remaining 100
shares will be filled at the best price if at least 100 shares of
hidden depth exists at the best price.
\194\ Participation rates of Non-Member Firms in exchange
trading are discussed more fully in Section V.A.1.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
4. Competitive Effects on Off-Exchange Market Regulation
Currently, FINRA is the only Association. It is possible, however,
for new Associations to enter the regulatory oversight market and
compete with FINRA. The proposed amendments to Rule 15b9-1 may create
incentives for a new Association (or Associations) to form. The large
Non-Member Firms have commonalities in business models, for example,
they typically do not carry customer accounts. They may consider
joining an Association concurrently. Because these firms collectively
conduct a significant portion of off-exchange volume, the creation of
an Association tailored to these firms may be economically viable.
To be registered as an Association, in addition to requirements
that parallel the requirements to be a national securities exchange, an
Association must ``[b]y reason of the number and geographical
distribution of its members and the scope of their transactions'' be
able to carry out the purposes of Section 15A.\195\ Additionally, for
example, the Association must permit any registered broker-dealer that
meets the Association's qualification standards to become a
member,\196\ and it must have rules regarding the form and content of
quotations relating to securities sold otherwise than on a national
securities exchange that are designed to produce fair and informative
quotations, to prevent fictitious or misleading quotations, and to
promote orderly procedures for collecting, distributing and publishing
quotations.\197\ The Association must also be so organized and have the
capacity to enforce compliance by its members and persons associated
with its members with, among other things, its own rules and the
Exchange Act and the rules and regulations thereunder.\198\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\195\ See 15 U.S.C. 78o-3.
\196\ See 15 U.S.C. 78o-3(b)(3). Section 15A of the Exchange Act
specifically states that an Association shall not be registered as a
national securities association unless the Commission determines,
among other things, that ``(3) . . . the rules of the association
provide that any registered broker or dealer may become a member of
such association and any person may become associated with a member
thereof.''
\197\ See 15 U.S.C. 78o-3(b)(11).
\198\ See 15 U.S.C. 78o-3(b)(2).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The ability to form an Association is characterized by barriers to
entry. A new Association would likely incur significant fixed costs to
create the infrastructure needed to perform the surveillance and
oversight requirements imposed on Associations by statute and
regulation. It may also incur substantial costs, including personnel,
training, travel, and other costs to provide for an effective
surveillance and supervision of the off-exchange market. Indeed, as
previously discussed, the only existing Association, FINRA, has
resources and demonstrated expertise that enable it to surveil and
supervise the off-exchange market. Duplication of that infrastructure
could be costly for a new Association.
The proposed amendments may alter barriers to entry and thus affect
the potential for competition among regulators of off-exchange markets.
Currently the primary barrier to entry is the high fixed-cost involved
in forming and operating an Association. If adopted, the amendments
would bring nearly all off-exchange trading under the jurisdiction of
an Association, including the trading of firms that currently are not
members of an Association (Non-Member Firms). If these firms join the
only existing Association, FINRA, an Association newly formed after
this point may have increased difficulty attracting the members needed
to support the high
[[Page 18058]]
fixed-costs associated with forming an Association because every
broker-dealer that participates in the off-exchange market would
already be a FINRA member. This increased difficulty results because
many firms may be reluctant to change Associations, either because of
the costs to change compliance infrastructures or uncertainty in the
regulatory environment of the new Association. Thus, if the proposal
results in more firms becoming members of the existing Association, a
new Association could face increased difficulties attracting members in
the future.
The proposed amendments do, however, temporarily lower the barriers
to entry for a competing Association. If these amendments are adopted,
a number of firms with similar business models and substantial off-
exchange volume could contemplate Association membership concurrently.
This may provide the incentive to create and tailor a new Association
to specific business models of these firms. If a competing Association
limited the scope of its members or operations, it might not have to
duplicate all of the surveillance and supervision functions required to
be provided by an Association that does not have those limits. This may
lower the costs of forming an Association and alter the barriers to
entry.\199\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\199\ Some limitations on Association membership or operations
would require exemptive relief for the Association to register with
the Commission.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The existence of multiple Associations might provide benefits to
the market as a whole. If a new Association could provide high quality
services to members with a lower fee structure, all Associations would
have incentives to reduce fees to attract members. This could result in
cost savings to broker-dealers. Second, a new Association could
innovate to develop different surveillance and supervision methods that
could be more efficient than FINRA's methods.
Competition among Associations could also entail substantial costs.
If a new Association were to form, the necessary regulatory
infrastructure including Information Technology (``IT'') systems and
personnel would need to be duplicated in the new Association. If the
market for Associations is characterized by economies of scale,
aggregate costs for the same level of regulation would be higher in a
market with two Associations than in a market with a single
Association. These additional costs would ultimately be borne by
Associations' broker-dealer members. Second, Associations might compete
on the basis of providing ``light touch'' regulation, in essence
surveiling less and providing less supervision. As a result, the
quality of market supervision might decrease, although the Commission
does itself oversee self-regulatory organizations, such as
Associations, and accordingly, would not permit a ``race to the
bottom.'' \200\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\200\ See Section 19(g) and Section 19(h) of the Exchange Act.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
C. Consideration of Costs and Benefits
This section discusses costs and benefits of the proposed
amendments. While the Commission has attempted, where possible, to
provide estimated quantifiable ranges, both costs and benefits are
difficult to quantify for this proposal for a number of reasons. First,
market participants are heterogeneous in their type, existing exchange
memberships, and activity level in the off-exchange market.
Consequently, compliance costs will vary across firms in a number of
dimensions. Second, estimating costs is complicated by the fact that
Non-Member Firms can comply with the proposal in a number of ways, and
presumably each will choose to seek compliance in the manner that
minimizes the sum of its direct costs (related to joining and
maintaining memberships in additional SROs) and indirect costs (which
include forgone opportunities to trade profitably and costs associated
with revising business strategies). Furthermore, some firms are likely
to remain exempt upon adoption of the proposed amendments, but the
Commission lacks data to identify those firms with certainty.\201\ At
the other end of the spectrum, the minority of Non-Member Firms that
are large and contribute significantly to both exchange and off-
exchange trading are unlikely to remain exempt.\202\ For the 14 large
firms that connect directly to ATSs, the Commission believes that all
will lose their exempt status, but cannot predict how those firms will
seek to comply with the proposed amendments. The Commission is unable
to more precisely quantify the number of Non-Member Firms that will
lose their exemption from Association membership upon adoption of the
proposed amendments because it is unable to estimate the level of off-
exchange trading for the majority of the 125 Non-Member Firms. OATS
reporting rules do not require Member Firms to disclose the identities
of broker-dealers that submit orders to a Member Firm, making it
infeasible to more precisely estimate non-ATS off-exchange trading for
Non-Member Firms.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\201\ Non-Member Firms that provide liquidity on multiple
exchanges and trade heavily off-exchange are unlikely to be small in
terms of net capital, and are not low trading volume firms by
definition. However, as discussed in Section V.A.1, many Non-Member
Firms are small in terms of net capital and may be members of a
single exchange. Such firms are more likely to have a floor-
brokerage business model, or have limited exposure to off-exchange
markets. Such firms would either be exempt from the rule by virtue
of having no off-exchange trading or no trading on exchanges of
which they are not members, or be able to rely on the floor member
hedging exemption to continue their limited off-exchange trading
related to floor brokerage activities.
\202\ The diversity of Non-Member Firms is discussed in Section
V.A.1.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Quantifying costs is further complicated because Non-Member Firms
do not report order audit trail data. It is difficult to measure the
trading of individual firms, although their activity as a group is
observable within audit trail data. Consequently, the Commission can
measure the approximate overall contribution of Non-Member Firms to
off-exchange volume, but cannot fully partition that volume across Non-
Member Firms.
Some firms with substantial off-exchange trading activity may
choose to change their business models rather than join an Association.
If such firms ceased off-exchange activity, they would remain outside
the supervision of an Association, and their decision to change
business models may affect market quality both on and off-exchange. The
Commission does not have ready access to statistics on the liquidity
provision of Non-Member Firms on and off exchanges. As such, the
Commission cannot quantify the potential changes in transaction costs,
even under broad assumptions about how Non-Member Firms will change
their business models. This is discussed further in Section V.B.2.
The overall benefits of the proposed amendments relate to more
comprehensive and uniform surveillance of off-exchange activity by the
regulator best positioned to oversee such activity. The benefits the
Commission anticipates from the amendments are largely qualitative and
by their nature difficult to measure.
1. Benefits
As discussed above,\203\ some of the firms using the existing Rule
15b9-1 exemption are significant participants in overall off-exchange
market volume. Thus, a substantial share of off-exchange volume is
conducted outside of the regulatory jurisdiction of an Association that
has primary responsibility for overseeing off-exchange activity.
[[Page 18059]]
Association membership would supplement the oversight of the exchanges,
which typically do not examine the off-exchange activity of their
members. This would further assist the Commission in obtaining a more
complete picture of the activity that occurs on ATSs and elsewhere in
the off-exchange market by entities that are not currently members of
an Association. Investors and intermediaries benefit when a specialized
expert regulates and oversees the off-exchange market.\204\ Investors
participating in the off-exchange market currently do not fully realize
the benefits of such expertise and regulatory oversight.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\203\ See Section I.
\204\ The off-exchange market is diverse and less transparent
than exchanges. An exchange typically has a single matching engine
for a given security and a limited number of order types that
interact to create transactions while disseminating quote
information publicly. The off-exchange market encompasses over 40
ATS matching engines while more than half of off-exchange volume
occurs outside of ATSs with transactions reported by more than 200
market participants. Only a few of these ATS venues disseminate
quote information. Surveillance and oversight of the off-exchange
market requires proprietary data from thousands of market
participants, and regulatory personnel with knowledge of the
institutional detail of the workings of dozens of trading venues. At
present, only FINRA possesses those resources. Further detail on
off-exchange market trading is provided by Tuttle, Laura, 2014,
Over-the-Counter Trading: Description of Non-ATS OTC Trading in
National Market System Stocks, available at http://www.sec.gov/dera/staff-papers/white-papers/otc-trading-white-paper-03-2014.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As discussed above,\205\ the Commission preliminarily believes the
inclusion of more Non-Member Firms in an Association would improve such
Association's ability to supervise cross-exchange trading activity.
This would enhance regulators' ability and--through the information
FINRA shares with the Commission--the Commission's ability to
effectively oversee regulation of trading on multiple markets and of
financial products.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\205\ See supra Section I.B.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Commission also preliminarily believes that the proposed
amendments to Rule 15b9-1 would improve supervision of Non-Member
Firms. FINRA, currently the only Association, has substantial
experience and expertise from overseeing a large number of broker-
dealers. This makes FINRA's potential regulation of Non-Member Firms
with off-exchange or cross-market trading activity particularly
efficient.
The Commission preliminarily believes that this proposal provides
significant benefits even in the event that the Commission approves the
CAT NMS Plan.\206\ The CAT eventually may address the regulatory audit
trail data deficiencies discussed previously,\207\ but the CAT will not
address FINRA's lack of jurisdiction over Non-Member Firms
participating in the off-exchange markets, which FINRA is charged with
overseeing, and the need for that enhanced oversight.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\206\ See CAT Release, supra note 86.
\207\ See supra note 170.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
While current members of an Association would not be directly
affected by this rule, they would benefit by having a more level
playing field in terms of their regulatory requirements relative to
Non-Member Firms. Currently, competition in liquidity provision in
equity markets is distorted by inequalities in regulatory
requirements.\208\ With more uniform regulatory requirements and
oversight, firms may compete more equitably to supply liquidity both on
exchanges and off-exchange.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\208\ See Section V.B.3.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
2. Costs
The proposed amendments, by narrowing the existing exemption, would
result in broker-dealers that no longer qualify for the exemption
having to comply with Section 15(b)(8) by either limiting their trading
to exchanges of which they are members or joining an Association. Under
the proposed amendments, therefore, Non-Member Firms that choose to
continue any off-exchange activity will be faced with choices that
would involve corresponding costs. For example, Non-Member Firms may
incur costs related to membership in an Association or costs
necessitated by additional exchange memberships. Additionally, some
Non-Member Firms may incur the costs of losing the benefits of trading
in the off-exchange market if they decide not to join an Association.
Most of the costs incurred in joining an Association and
maintaining membership therein are dependent on firm characteristics
and activity level. Furthermore, the Commission believes that some Non-
Member Firms may comply by ceasing their off-exchange trading activity,
avoiding many of these costs but forgoing the opportunity to trade
profitably in some venues. With certain assumptions, the Commission has
attempted to estimate direct compliance costs that a Non-Member Firm is
likely to face to comply with the proposed amendments. The estimate
applies to the 14 Non-Member Firms that connect directly to ATSs;
smaller firms that choose to join an Association should face lower
costs because they have less revenue and trading volume that would be
subject to GIA, TAF and Section 3 fees. The 14 Non-Member Firms that
connect directly to ATSs, assuming that trading volumes and gross
income levels remain unchanged, would face implementation costs of
approximately $3.3 million per firm, with ongoing annual costs ranging
from about $2.3 million to $23 million depending on the firms' off-
exchange trading volume.\209\ Cost estimates (one time and annual) are
broken down in the following tables and are discussed in detail below:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\209\ The largest contributor to the estimate of implementation
and ongoing costs is the cost of OATS reporting. Estimates for OATS
reporting costs are taken from the CAT NMS Plan and relate to
implementing CAT reporting, which is expected to be more complex and
have more stringent requirements related to technology, such as more
stringent clock synchronization, than OATS reporting requires.
Consequently, the Commission believes these likely are overestimates
of actual costs firms will face to implement OATS reporting. See
infra note 221 for further information on CAT NMS Plan cost
estimates. Each of the 14 firms is assumed to have implementation
costs of $3,160,000 to initiate OATS reporting, $82,500 in legal
consulting costs, and an application fee ranging from $7,500 to
$12,500 depending on the number of registered persons. The
Commission derived these estimates from the CAT NMS Plan. See infra
note 221 and accompanying text for qualifiers on these estimates.
Table 1--Median or Average Firm Implementation Costs
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Median or
Cost average \210\
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Application to join FINRA............................... $7,500
Implement OATS reporting................................ 3,160,000
Legal consulting........................................ 82,500
---------------
Total............................................... 3,250,000
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Table 2--Median or Average Firm Ongoing Annual Costs \211\
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Median or
Cost average
------------------------------------------------------------------------
OATS reporting.......................................... $2,280,300
Gross Income Assessment................................. 113,000
Trading Activity Fee.................................... 40,000
Personnel Assessment.................................... 0
Section 3 fee........................................... 212,000
Compliance work......................................... 60,000
---------------
Total............................................... 2,705,300
------------------------------------------------------------------------
If all 14 of those Non-Member Firms that connect directly to ATSs
were to
[[Page 18060]]
join FINRA, the aggregate cost of the proposal for these firms would be
$42.5 million in implementation costs and ongoing aggregate annual
costs of $85.2 million, with the majority of the costs related to
implementing OATS reporting.\212\ While the Commission is unable to
aggregate the costs of the proposal for the remaining 111 firms, the
Commission believes that the aggregate costs for the subset of 14
represent the majority of the aggregate costs, even assuming that all
125 firms will join FINRA.\213\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\210\ Medians are used where possible. For OATS-related costs,
median values are zero, so averages are used. This data is discussed
further in note 219, infra. Cost estimates are reported as ranges
for legal consulting and compliance work; for these estimates, the
midpoint is used.
\211\ TAF is underestimated because it accounts for only ATS
volume. See infra note 231 and accompanying text. This TAF cost also
represents a transfer from current Non-Member Firms to current
Member Firms. The Section 3 fee estimate assumes that the firms
currently pay no Section 3 fees. It is likely that firms that clear
through a Member Firm are currently assessed these fees indirectly.
\212\ See supra note 209 and infra note 221 related to OATS
reporting costs derived from the CAT NMS Plan. The total cost
calculation assumes range midpoint costs for FINRA application,
legal consulting, and compliance work, as well as maximum costs for
implementation of OATS reporting. GIA, TAF, and Section 3 fees are
calculated using firm share and dollar volume activity estimates
from FINRA data discussed further in Section V.A.1.
\213\ The data provided to the Commission by FINRA describes the
aggregate ATS activity level of all 125 Non-Member firms. Further
firm-level data for the 14 firms that directly connect to ATSs can
be inferred using exchange MPIDs that are reported by some ATSs.
Because these 14 direct-connecting firms account for the majority of
Non-Member Firm ATS activity, the Commission believes that the 111
remaining firms have much lower ATS (and presumably other off-
exchange) activity levels. Since transacted volume is the primary
driver of the variation in costs across firms that join FINRA, the
Commission believes that the remaining 111 firms will face far lower
costs if they choose to join FINRA.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
a. Costs of Joining an Association \214\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\214\ The Commission recognizes that Non-Member Firms would
incur compliance costs on an initial and ongoing basis to comply
with the proposed amendments. See Section V.C.2.a. The Commission
does not aggregate these costs across all Non-Member Firms because
the Commission does not have necessary information about the
majority of the Non-Member Firms and expects that costs would vary
widely across firms. Where possible, however, the Commission has
provided estimates based on a subset of large firms on which the
Commission has sufficient information. The Commission expects that
smaller firms likely will face lower costs.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Based on discussions with FINRA, currently the only Association,
and industry participants, the Commission preliminarily believes that
the direct compliance costs on Non-Member Firms of joining FINRA are
composed of the FINRA membership application fees, costs associated
with adapting IT infrastructure for regulatory data reporting
requirements, and any legal or consulting costs necessary for
effectively completing the application to be a member of FINRA (e.g.,
ensuring compliance with FINRA rules including drafting policies and
procedures as may be required).
The fees associated with a FINRA membership application can vary.
As an initial matter, the application fee to join FINRA is tier-based
according to the number of registered persons associated with the
applicant. This one-time application fee ranges from $7,500 to
$55,000.\215\ The initial membership fee for FINRA is $7,500 for firms
with ten or fewer representatives registered with FINRA and $12,500 for
firms with eleven to one hundred representatives registered with
FINRA.\216\ Based on its knowledge of the size and business models of
Non-Member Firms, the Commission preliminarily believes that most Non-
Member Firms would not incur FINRA application fees exceeding
$12,500.\217\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\215\ See FINRA By-Laws, Schedule A, Section 4.
\216\ Id.
\217\ Based on current FOCUS data, the Commission believes no
Non-Member Firm has more than 100 registered representatives.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Because most FINRA members have OATS reporting obligations, Non-
Member Firms that choose to join FINRA will incur costs related to
initiating and maintaining data reporting.\218\ Costs to initiate and
maintain OATS reporting \219\ will vary widely among firms, depending
on many factors including current IT infrastructure, complexity, and
affiliation with a firm that already reports OATS data. While we are
unable to quantify these costs precisely, one point of reference for
the possible costs associated with OATS reporting obligations is the
CAT NMS Plan, that provides estimates of these costs for reporting CAT
data. There are limitations, however, to those estimates in this
context in that CAT is an order audit system that will be significantly
more complex and larger in scope than OATS.\220\ Because the projected
scope of CAT exceeds substantially the scope of OATS reporting, and
implementation of CAT reporting is expected to include technical
requirements such as more stringent clock synchronization requirements
than OATS, the Commission believes these estimates provide (at best) an
upper-bound for OATS reporting costs. Furthermore, Non-Member Firms
that are members of NASDAQ or NYSE are already required to produce OATS
data and report it to FINRA upon request. Consequently, implementation
costs likely overstate the costs these firms would face in initiating
OATS reporting because the Non-Member Firms may have already
established some of the necessary infrastructure. In addition, the
Commission recognizes that the CAT NMS Plan estimates are based on
voluntary survey responses by a small number of broker-dealers.
Finally, the CAT NMS Plan has not yet been published for comment.
Nevertheless, the Commission believes that those estimates give a sense
of the potential magnitude of initiating OATS reporting.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\218\ See FINRA Rule 7400 Series--Order Audit Trail System.
\219\ Pursuant to Rule 613 under the Exchange Act, the SROs have
submitted a plan to eliminate existing rules and systems that will
be rendered duplicative by the CAT. 17 CFR 242.613(a)(1)(ix). To the
extent that OATS is rendered duplicative by CAT, the CAT NMS Plan
proposes its elimination, and the Commission approves the CAT NMS
Plan, the OATS system may eventually be eliminated. If this occurs,
the costs of OATS reporting to Non-Member Firms may cease, but may
be supplanted by other costs related to order and transaction
reporting requirements under the CAT NMS Plan.
\220\ The CAT NMS Plan proposal discusses OATS reporting
requirement. These requirements include having revenue of less than
two million dollars. The Commission believes that large Non-Member
Firms would not qualify for OATS reporting exemptions, were the
Commission to approve the CAT NMS Plan as submitted on February 27,
2015. See CAT NMS Plan, available at http://catnmsplan.com/web/groups/catnms/@catnms/documents/appsupportdocs/p602500.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The CAT NMS Plan details cost estimates for two types of broker-
dealers. The first type already reports OATS data; the second type does
not. The Commission focuses on costs for large firms that do not
currently report OATS data. In these estimates, the average large firm
estimated CAT implementation costs are approximately $3,160,000;
average implementation costs for a small firm are estimated at
approximately $131,200. The average large firm estimated annual CAT
reporting costs are $3,160,000 annually; average small firm reporting
costs are $121,200.\221\ As discussed previously, these are, at best,
upper-bounds on OATS reporting costs because of differences in
complexity and technical requirements for OATS and CAT reporting.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\221\ Costs estimates are the sum of hardware/software costs,
full time employee costs, and third party/outsourcing costs for
firms that do not currently report to OATS. Within these firms,
median implementation and annual ongoing costs were estimated at
zero. The CAT NMS plan discusses interpretation of the zero medians,
saying ``It is the participants' understanding that this is likely
due to current operational practices among broker-dealers that do
not differentiate between technology and headcount costs that
support business functionality and regulatory reporting.''
Consequently, the Commission believes these estimates do not reflect
the opportunity costs associated with assigning employees to
regulatory reporting tasks instead of other tasks they could be
performing. See the amended CAT NMS Plan, available at http://catnmsplan.com/web/groups/catnms/@catnms/documents/appsupportdocs/p602500.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In addition to the application fees and data reporting costs, the
Commission has taken into account the cost of legal and other advising
necessary for effectively completing the application to
[[Page 18061]]
be a member of FINRA. Some firms may choose to perform this legal work
internally while others may use outside counsel for the initial
membership application. In making this choice, Non-Member Firms will
likely take into account factors, such as the size and resources of the
firm, the complexity of the firm's business model, and whether the firm
previously used outside counsel to register with any exchanges. Based
on conversations with industry participants that assist with FINRA
membership, for Non-Member Firms that choose to employ outside counsel
to assist with their FINRA membership application, the cost of such
counseling ranges from approximately $40,000 to $125,000. Factors
affecting the specific costs of a particular firm include the number of
associated persons, the level of complexity or uniqueness of the firm's
business plan, and whether the firm has previously completed exchange
membership applications with similar requirements.
b. Costs of Maintaining an Association Membership
With respect to ongoing costs, the Commission preliminarily
believes that the three components of such costs are any ongoing fees
associated with FINRA membership, costs of legal work relating to FINRA
membership, and costs associated with additional compliance activities.
The ongoing membership related fees associated with FINRA
membership include the annual gross income assessment; the annual
personnel assessment; and the TAF and Section 3 fees, among others. The
more significant fees are discussed below.\222\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\222\ There are additional fees associated with maintaining an
Association membership. There is an annual Personnel Assessment fee
ranging from $130 to $150 per employee that applies to principals or
representatives in the FINRA member's organization. See FINRA By-
Laws, Schedule A, Section 1(e). Based on 2014 FOCUS reports, the
number of registered representatives of Non-Member Firms that
connect directly to ATSs ranges from 0-91, with an average of 18 and
a median of 0. The Commission estimates that the average Non-Member
Firm would incur a Personnel Assessment fee of no more than $2,520,
and the median Non-Member Firm would incur a Personnel Assessment
fee of $0. The Commission further estimates that the maximum
Personnel Assessment fee that one of these Non-Member Firms would
incur would be $11,830. There are also additional continuing
education and testing requirements which will impose costs upon
firms joining an Association. Additionally, there are de minimis
fees (branch registration fee and system processing fee, among
others). See FINRA By-Laws, Schedule A.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The annual Gross Income Assessment generally requires members to
pay a percentage of the Member Firm's total annual revenue based on a
graduated scale.\223\ The magnitude of the annual Gross Income
Assessment is based on the total annual revenue, excluding commodities
income, reported by the Member Firm on its FOCUS Form Part II or
IIA.\224\ Based on FOCUS Form data from Non-Member Firms in 2014, the
Commission has determined that the average annual total revenue of Non-
Member Firms, excluding commodities income, is approximately $93
million, with a median of $86 million.\225\ For the 14 large firms that
connect directly to ATSs, FINRA's graduated Gross Income Assessment
scale results in an average Gross Income Assessment for these Non-
Member Firms of $91,784 and a median Gross Income Assessment of
$113,824.\226\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\223\ Id. For example, FINRA imposes a Gross Income Assessment
as follows: (1) $1,200 on a Member Firm's annual gross revenue up to
$1 million; (2) a charge of 0.1215% on a Member Firm's annual gross
revenue between $1 million and $25 million; (3) a charge of 0.2599%
on a Member Firm's annual gross revenue between $25 million and $50
million; and so on as provided in Schedule A. When a firm's annual
gross revenue exceeds $25 million, the maximum of current year's
revenue and average of the last three years' revenue is used as the
basis for the income assessment. Id.
\224\ See FINRA By-Laws, Schedule A, Section 2. See also FOCUS
Report Form X-17A-5, Part II and IIA.
\225\ Based on 2012-2014 FOCUS data.
\226\ ($1,200 for the first $1 million of revenue) + (0.1215% x
annual revenue greater than $1 million up to $25 million) + (0.2599%
x annual revenue greater than $25 million up to $50 million) +
(0.0518% of annual revenue greater than $50 million up top $100
million) + (0.0365% of annual revenue greater than $100 million to
$5 billion). As discussed previously, Non-Member Firms vary in size.
GIA for large firms used in these calculations (the 14 that connect
directly to ATSs), is anticipated to be far larger than for the 111
remaining Non-Member Firms. See FINRA By-Laws, Schedule A, Section
1(c).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The magnitude of the TAF depends on the transaction volume of a
FINRA member that is covered by TAF as described in the FINRA
Bylaws.\227\ The Commission notes that FINRA may need to consider
reevaluating the structure of the TAF to assure that it appropriately
takes into account the business models of Non-Member Firms that may
join FINRA as a result of the proposed amendments.\228\ Although the
Commission lacks the data to comprehensively estimate TAF that Non-
Member Firms are likely to incur, data on ATS trading during the fourth
quarter of 2014 provided by FINRA allows the Commission to estimate the
fees associated with ATS activity for Non-Member Firms that connect
directly to an ATS.\229\ The Commission has identified 14 Non-Member
Firms that traded on ATSs directly without the intermediation of a
Member Firm during the fourth quarter of 2014.\230\ The Commission
estimates that trading activity fees incurred by these 14 large Non-
Member Firms due to their ATS activity would range from $0 to
approximately $3.2 million annually, with a median incurred TAF of
around $40,000.\231\ The Commission believes that TAF for Non-Member
Firms not among the 14 identified will be far lower because the median
Non-Member Firm has far lower trading volume than the typical firm of
the 14 identified in the data.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\227\ See FINRA By-Laws, Schedule A, Section 1(b).
\228\ See supra notes 95 and 184.
\229\ Some Non-Member Firms may trade on ATSs indirectly using
the services of a Member Firm. The Commission cannot identify the
magnitude of these firms' trading on an individual basis because
Non-Member Firms are not required to be identified in Member Firms'
OATS data. The Commission thus cannot estimate the TAF that these
firms would incur as FINRA members.
\230\ These 14 firms do not represent typical Non-Member Firms:
they represent the largest of the Non-Member Firms in terms of
trading volume. Consequently, the median TAF discussed here far
exceeds what the majority of Non-Member Firms would pay if they were
to join FINRA.
\231\ Estimated TAF does not include any TAF related to firm's
exchange-based trading activity, or off-exchange activity that
occurs outside of an ATS. If a firm's activity on an exchange is
related to normal market making operations, the activity does not
incur TAF. The Commission is unable to estimate the proportion of
these firms' exchange trading that would incur TAF because the
Commission does not have information on what proportion of Non-
Member Firm exchange activity would qualify for exemption from TAF
fees under FINRA By-Laws. Because other elements of the TAF are not
included in this calculation, it underestimates the actual TAF that
firms would incur if they joined FINRA. The magnitude of the
underestimation may be significant, but firms that join FINRA may be
able to reduce their TAF cost by registering as Market Makers upon
additional exchanges. (TAF is not assessed for certain trades
related to registered market-making. See FINRA By Laws, Schedule A,
Section (1)(b)(2)(F).) Estimates of TAF are based on the percentage
of ATS orders received by Member Firms that operate an ATS and
report the exchange-issued MPIDs of Non-Member Firms that place
orders within that system. The calculation assumes that these
proportions are representative of the trading of Non-Member Firms on
all ATSs, and that the orders placed by these firms are equally
likely to be executed within ATSs. It also assumes that half of all
executed volume is sell volume, which incurs a TAF. The estimated
TAF is equal to estimated sell volume x $0.000119. The $0 minimum is
associated with a firm that has almost no ATS volume.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Some off-exchange trading that Non-Member Firms engage in currently
may no longer be profitable when TAF is incurred. Consequently, Non-
Member Firms may reduce their trading both on exchanges and off-
exchange after joining an Association.
In addition to TAF, Non-Member Firms that choose to join FINRA may
incur additional Section 3 fees. Using data on ATS trading during the
fourth quarter of 2014 provided by FINRA, the Commission estimates that
Section 3 fees incurred by the 14 large Non-Member Firms due to their
off-exchange
[[Page 18062]]
trading would range from $0 to approximately $16.9 million dollars
annually, with a median incurred Section 3 fee \232\ of $212,000.\233\
As discussed in Section V.A.2 above, some of these fees may already be
paid by Non-Member Firms that engage the services of a Member Firm
clearing broker. However, FINRA lacks the authority to assess Section 3
fees against Non-Member Firms that self-clear, in which case FINRA may
assess the fee to the Member Firm counterparty to the transaction.
While these fees will represent a cost to Non-Member Firms, the cost
will be largely offset to the industry as a whole by a reduction of
Section 3 fees incurred by Member Firms (or clearing brokers acting on
behalf of a Member Firm) when they buy from a self-clearing, Non-Member
Firm.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\232\ These estimates do not include fees related to off-
exchange trading outside of an ATS; the Commission is unable to
estimate the magnitude of such fees that Non-Member Firms would
incur if they were to continue trading off-exchange upon adoption of
these amendments because in the absence of a consolidated audit
trail, the Commission lacks data on Non-Member Firm off-exchange
activity outside of ATSs.
\233\ Section 3 fees are estimated using Non-Member Firm off-
exchange dollar volume reported by FINRA. Half of volume is assumed
to be sell volume that would be subject to Section 3 fees. Aggregate
estimated sell volume is estimated across firms by assuming that all
non-member orders are equally likely to generate executions. For
example, assume firm ABC submitted 10% of all off-exchange orders
submitted by Non-Member Firms. Section 3 Fee obligation is
calculated as: Non-Member Firm Dollar Volume x \1/2\ x 10% x $18.40/
$1,000,000.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Ongoing compliance costs would depend on the business circumstances
of each firm and the types of issues that could arise. As in the case
of the initial membership, some Non-Member Firms may choose to conduct
ongoing compliance activities other than regulatory data reporting work
(such as core accounting functions, updating policies and procedures,
and updating forms filed with regulators) in-house while others may
seek to outsource this work. The Commission estimates, based on
discussions with industry participants, that the ongoing compliance
cost for firms that outsource this work will range from $24,000 to
$96,000 per year.\234\ In the case of some Non-Member Firms, i.e.,
those that are affiliates of FINRA members, this cost is likely to be
lower as they may be able to leverage compliance work already being
performed.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\234\ For firms that choose to do this work in-house, the
Commission preliminarily believes that the costs of ongoing
compliance may be less than $96,000. This figure assumes Non-Member
Firms may have experience in ongoing compliance work with SROs
through their exchange membership(s) and, therefore, only captures
the incremental cost of compliance with Association rules.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In addition to the cost estimates discussed above, the Commission
recognizes that both Non-Member Firms and SROs will incur other direct
and indirect costs because of the increased regulatory requirements of
the proposed amendments. Specifically, there will be compliance costs
associated with regulation by FINRA.\235\ Generally, the SROs that
supervise Non-Member Firms are unable to provide the level of
supervision of cross-market and off-exchange activity that FINRA
provides to its Member Firms. Consequently, firms that join an
Association will face costs associated with greater regulatory
scrutiny, including the costs of comprehensive examinations of activity
that was previously subject to less regulatory review. To the extent
that this activity is permissible under Association rules, additional
costs will be limited to those activities that are required to
accommodate normal supervision and examination by an Association. To
the extent that their activity does not already do so, firms will face
additional costs related to bringing activity into compliance with
Association rules. For the reasons discussed above, the Commission is
not able to estimate these costs, although the Commission believes they
will vary among Non-Member Firms.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\235\ However, Non-Member Firms that choose to join an
Association may have FINRA assigned as their DEA. Such an assignment
could eliminate separate DEA fees that the Non-Member Firms may pay
to their current DEA.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
c. Costs of Joining Additional Exchanges Under the Rule as Proposed To
Be Amended
Non-Member Firms must be members of all exchanges upon which they
transact business if they decide not to join an Association. With
limited exceptions for some excluded activity previously discussed,
some Non-Member Firms may choose to join additional exchanges to be
excluded from the requirement to become a member of an Association.
Alternatively, these firms may cease trading on exchanges of which they
are not members.
Based on discussions with FINRA and industry participants, the
Commission understands that completing a membership application with an
additional exchange is generally less complicated and time consuming
than completing a membership application with FINRA. Consequently, the
Commission preliminarily believes that the compliance burden on Non-
Member Firms for joining an additional exchange is likely to be
significantly less than that of joining FINRA as those Non-Member Firms
that choose to join an additional exchange are likely able to perform
this work internally, given that they are already members of at least
one exchange, and that such work should take less time than the time
required to complete an application with FINRA.
In addition to the legal burden, Non-Member Firms joining
additional exchanges as a result of the proposed amendments would incur
membership and related fees. To the extent that Non-Member Firms choose
to become members of additional exchanges, the fees associated with
such memberships would vary depending on the type of access sought and
the exchanges of which Non-Member Firms choose to become members.
The Commission also believes that the exchange membership fees that
would apply to Non-Member Firms joining such exchanges would be those
fees that apply to either introducing broker-dealers or proprietary
trading firms. This assumption is consistent with the fact that any
broker-dealers carrying customer accounts could not qualify for the
current exemption of Rule 15b9-1. Thus, any exchange membership fees
that apply to firms that provide clearing services or conduct a public
business would not apply to Non-Member Firms.
Furthermore, because all Non-Member Firms are members of at least
one exchange,\236\ they would have already completed a Form U4, to
register associated persons.\237\ Although FINRA's rules regarding
registration of associated persons tend to be more specific than
exchange SRO rules regarding associated persons, the Commission
believes Non-Member Firms will not need to register additional
associated persons because the exchange SRO rules are already
comprehensive in this regard. The Commission understands that all
exchanges can access the Form U4 filings within the CRD which is
maintained by FINRA.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\236\ For a broker-dealer to possibly be exempt from the
requirement to be an Association member currently or under the
proposed amendments, the broker-dealer must be a member of at least
one exchange.
\237\ Form U4 is the Uniform Application for Securities Industry
Registration or Transfer. Representatives of broker-dealers,
investment advisers, or issuers of securities use Form U4 to become
registered in the appropriate jurisdictions and/or with SROs. The
Commission understands that all SROs currently use Form U4. See,
e.g., BATS Rule 2.5.01(c), ISE Rule 304(b), Phlx Rule 600(b).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In order to obtain estimates of the cost of joining additional
exchanges, the Commission reviewed the membership
[[Page 18063]]
related fee structures of all eighteen national securities exchanges.
In assuming that the potential burden of joining additional exchanges
would likely be less than that of joining FINRA, the Commission assumes
that the costs imposed on Non-Member Firms by the proposed amendments
would be membership fees, not costs relating to trading, such as
trading permit fees and connectivity. The Commission recognizes that
membership in an exchange, alone, may not guarantee the ability to
trade because many exchanges charge fees for trading rights, ports,
various degrees of connectivity, and floor access and equipment, should
those be desired. The Commission believes that the fees associated with
trading on an exchange are not the result of the proposed amendments
because, under the proposed amendments, a Non-Member Firm could
continue to trade through another broker-dealer on an exchange as long
as that Non-Member Firm is a member of every exchange on which it
trades or is a member of FINRA. In other words, the proposed amendments
themselves do not impose the cost of connectivity and related fees, but
only the costs associated with membership on exchanges on which Non-
Member Firms will trade. To the extent, therefore, that Non-Member
Firms continue to trade through other broker-dealers in a manner
consistent with how they currently operate, the proposed amendments
impose only the costs associated with membership.
The Commission also recognizes that connectivity fees to additional
exchanges can range from the very low--approximately $500 a month for a
workstation at NASDAQ--to upwards of $100,000 monthly, depending on
factors such as latency, distance, bandwidth, and co-location, among
others. Again, however, these costs are not a result of the proposed
amendments because the proposed amendments do not impose any
connectivity requirements. They simply impose membership requirements
to facilitate regulatory supervision.
To arrive at preliminary estimates of the cost of joining
additional exchanges, the Commission aggregated any fees associated
with a firm's initial application to an exchange (``initial fee'') and
separately aggregated the fees associated with any monthly or annual
membership costs to obtain a separate annual cost (``annual fee'').
Based on these aggregations, the Commission obtained a preliminary
range for both the initial fee and the annual fee across exchanges. The
initial fee is as low as $0 for some exchanges. Most exchanges have an
initial fee that is greater than $0 and no more than $5,000.\238\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\238\ The BATS Exchanges do not assess any initial fees. See
BATS BYX Exchange Fee Schedule, available at http://www.batstrading.com/support/fee_schedule/byx/ (last visited February
18, 2015) (omitting any mention of an initial membership fee); BATS
BZX Exchange Fee Schedule, available at http://www.batstrading.com/support/fee_schedule/bzx/ (last visited February 18, 2015) (same);
BATS EDGA Exchange Fee Schedule, available at http://www.batstrading.com/support/fee_schedule/edga/ (last visited
February 18, 2015) (same); BATS EDGX Exchange Fee Schedule,
available at http://www.batstrading.com/support/fee_schedule/edgx/
(last visited February 18, 2015) (same).
Other exchanges do have initial application fees. See, e.g.,
ISE Fee Schedule at 19, available at http://www.ise.com/assets/documents/OptionsExchange/legal/fee/ISE_fee_schedule.pdf (last
visited February 18, 2015) (assessing a one-time application fee of
$3,500 for an ``Electronic Access Member''); application for NYSE
and NYSE MKT Equity Membership for Non-FINRA Members at 2, available
at http://usequities.nyx.com/sites/usequities.nyx.com/files/nyse__mkt_equity_membership_application_for_non-finra_members.pdf
(last visited February 18, 2015) (discussing the Non-Public Firm
Application Fee of $2,500); NASDAQ Price List, available at http://www.nasdaqtrader.com/Trader.aspx?id=PriceListTrading2 (last visited
February 18, 2015) (discussing the NASDAQ Application Fee of
$2,000); CBOE Fee Schedule at 10, available at http://www.cboe.com/publish/feeschedule/CBOEFeeSchedule.pdf (last visited February 18,
2015) (typically assessing a trading permit holder organization
application fee on all of its members of $5,000). If a firm is
organized as a sole proprietorship, the application fee for CBOE is
only $3,000. Id. See also CBOE TPH Organization Application Timeline
and Needs List, available at https://www.cboe.org/publish/TPHForms/TPHOrganizationApplicationTimelineandNeeds.pdf (last visited
February 18, 2015).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Regarding monthly or annual membership fees, most exchanges'
ongoing monthly or annual membership fees generally range from $1,500
to $7,200.\239\ Again, these ongoing exchange membership costs are
generally lower than the annual costs estimated for being a member of
FINRA.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\239\ See, e.g., BATS BYX Exchange Fee Schedule, available at
http://www.batstrading.com/support/fee_schedule/byx/ (last visited
February 18, 2015) (noting an annual membership fee of $2,500); BATS
EDGA Exchange Fee Schedule, http://www.batstrading.com/support/fee_schedule/edga/ (last visited February 18, 2015) (same); CHX Fee
Schedule at 3, available at http://www.chx.com/_literature_119763/CHX_Fee_Schedule (last visited February 18, 2015) (assessing an
annual membership fee of $7,200); MIAX Fee Schedule at 9, available
at http://www.miaxoptions.com/sites/default/files/MIAX_Options_Fee_Schedule_02012015.pdf (last visited February 18,
2015) (assessing a monthly trading permit fee for an ``Electronic
Exchange Member'' of $1,500).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
d. Policies and Procedures Related to the Hedging Exemption
Non-Member Firms that choose not to join an Association but wish to
continue to trade off-exchange (or on exchanges of which they are not
members) must do so in a manner that conforms to the hedging exemption.
To do so, the proposal would require Non-Member Firms to establish,
maintain and enforce policies and procedures as discussed above. The
Commission estimates that firms will incur a burden of 16 hours in
initially preparing these policies and procedures.\240\ Furthermore,
the burden of maintaining and enforcing such policies and procedures,
including a review of such policies at least annually, would be
approximately 96 hours.\241\ The Commission estimates an initial
implementation cost of approximately $5,000 and an annual ongoing cost
of approximately $18,000 for Non-Member Firms that wish to utilize the
hedging exemption and perform this work internally; for firms that
outsource this work, costs are likely to be higher.\242\ For firms that
choose to join FINRA, the hedging exemption is not relevant. They will
not incur these costs.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\240\ This figure is based on the following: (Compliance Manager
at 10 hours) + (Compliance Attorney at 5 hours) + (Director of
Compliance at 1 hour) = 16 burden hours per dealer. See infra note
271. As is discussed in more detail in the Paperwork Reduction Act
discussion, the Commission based this estimate on the estimated
burdens imposed by other rules applicable to broker-dealers, such as
Regulation SHO. However, the Commission preliminarily believes that
the policies and procedures under the proposed floor member hedging
exemption will be substantially less burdensome than those required
by the Amendments to Regulation SHO because those policies and
procedures require certain technology and real-time monitoring
components. In contrast, the policies and procedures under the
proposed amendments to Rule 15b9-1 do not involve a real-time
monitoring or technology component. See infra note 273.
\241\ See Section VI.D.
\242\ For firms that perform this work internally, the initial
cost estimate assumes 4 hours of work performed by a Compliance
Manager at an hourly rate of $283 and 12 hours performed by
Compliance Attorneys at an hourly rate of $334. The annual cost
estimate assumes 48 hours of work by Compliance Clerks at an hourly
rate of $64, 32 hours by Compliance Attorneys, and 16 hours by
Compliance Managers. Hourly salary figure is from SIFMA's Management
& Professional Earnings in the Securities Industry 2013, modified by
Commission staff to account for an 1800-hour work-year and
multiplied by 5.35 to account for bonuses, firm size, employee
benefits and overhead.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
e. Indirect Costs
In addition to possibly incurring costs related to joining
exchanges, Non-Member Firms that choose not to join an Association will
lose the benefits of trading in the off-exchange market, unless they
meet the exemption for hedging. As mentioned above, Non-Member Firms
are significant participants in ATS activity. Much of this trading is
attributed to 14 Non-Member Firms, and the activity level across those
firms varies widely. Assuming that order volume is proportional to
trade volume, the
[[Page 18064]]
Commission estimates that the smallest of the 14 firms executed 11
shares on ATSs during the fourth quarter of 2014.\243\ The largest firm
executed 13.3 billion shares. The median firm in the group of 14 large
Non-Member Firms is estimated to have executed 167.6 million shares.
Although these share volumes are large, the Commission does not have
adequate data on these firms to estimate the proportion of their
trading activity and revenues that occurs on exchanges versus off-
exchange. The Commission cannot judge the likelihood of these firms
choosing to cease off-exchange activity rather than joining an
Association.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\243\ The composition of the list of Non-Member Firms that are
identified in ATS trading data changes across time periods. It is
possible that the number of Non-Member Firms trading directly on
ATSs is higher than estimated here. Additional Non-Member Firms may
access ATSs through Member Firms, which would also exclude them from
this analysis.
To address data limitation, the Commission assumes that ATS
orders from each of the 14 Non-Member Firms observable in the data
are equally likely to be executed.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Finally, those firms that choose not to join an Association would
be limited in their ability to route their own transactions in a manner
so as to comply with the requirements of Regulation NMS.\244\ Their
transactions would have to be routed through a broker-dealer of an
exchange of which they are a member, or routed by a broker-dealer only
to those exchanges of which they are members. The routing of orders of
Non-Member Firms that do not join an Association will be determined by
the routing broker-dealer of the exchanges of which they are members.
This loss in choice could lead to higher costs for routing and costs
associated with increased latency because the exchange's routing
broker-dealer may have a telecommunications infrastructure that is
inferior to that of the broker-dealer that previously provided
connectivity to that exchange to the Non-Member Firm.\245\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\244\ The exemption related to routing to comply with Regulation
NMS is discussed in Section II.E.
\245\ Firms in the business of providing connectivity to
exchanges are likely to compete on the basis of their technology.
The Commission assumes that some firms that do not join FINRA will
have some orders (those governed under the Regulation NMS provisions
to prevent trade-throughs) routed using technology inferior to the
technology of their firm of choice.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
D. Alternatives
1. Elimination of the Floor Member Hedging Exemption
Although the proposed amendments would eliminate the exclusion for
proprietary trading activity for broker-dealers wishing to continue
availing themselves of the exemption from Association membership under
Rule 15b9-1, it would maintain a limited exception for hedging of
floor-based activity.\246\ Currently, Non-Member Firms are able to
hedge their floor-based activity through the exclusion for proprietary
trading in Rule 15b9-1. The Commission does not have data to estimate
the number of Non-Member Firms that use the proprietary trading
exemption in this manner, or the dollar-value of trading that they
hedge through the exemption.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\246\ The floor member hedging exemption is discussed more fully
in Section II.D.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
One alternative considered by the Commission was the elimination of
the hedging exemption entirely. Elimination of the floor member hedging
exemption would require any firm that wished to hedge through off-
exchange transactions to join an Association or become a member of each
exchange on which it trades and cease off-exchange trading. This would
improve the Association's ability to monitor cross-market hedging
activity that was conducted off-exchange. The Commission recognizes,
however, that there may be challenges for the Commission, firms, and
exchanges in proving compliance with the exemption. For example, some
broker-dealers may label activity as hedging activity that is not
covered by the exemption. A firm could establish a limited floor-based
business and then inadvertently or deliberately claim the hedging
exemption covers significant trading off-exchange (and trading on
exchange of which the firm is not a member) that did not reduce or
otherwise mitigate the risk of its floor-based activity. Further, firms
that wish to avail themselves of the hedging exemption will incur costs
to establish, maintain and enforce written policies and procedures
related to its use.\247\ Without the hedging exemption, firms would not
incur these costs, but would incur other costs. In particular, without
a hedging exemption, floor brokers on some exchanges might find that
hedging positions obtained through their normal activity limited to the
floor of a single exchange is less cost-effective. For example, a floor
broker on an options exchange is currently exempt from FINRA membership
if he trades off-exchange under the exclusion for proprietary trading.
After entering an options position, the floor broker can enter an
offsetting equity position by trading on an exchange of which he is not
a member (through a member broker-dealer) or in the off-exchange
market. Under the proposed amendments without the hedging exemption,
the floor broker would not be able to make such a hedging transaction
without joining at least one additional SRO (FINRA or another exchange
where he could transact in equities). If participants have less
opportunity to hedge their positions, they may be less willing to
provide liquidity in their capacity as floor brokers. Therefore, the
Commission is proposing a narrow hedging exemption that covers only the
activity it intends to exclude.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\247\ See Section V.C.2.d.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
2. Improve Off-Exchange Supervision Through Action of Other SROs With
or Without CAT
The Commission also considered whether an alternative approach to
achieving the objectives of the proposed amendments would be to address
the limitations in regulatory oversight of off-exchange activity of
Non-Member Firms through exchanges that act as their DEAs or all
exchanges of which they are members. The Commission preliminarily
believes either of these alternatives would frustrate the regulatory
structure established by Congress and would be inefficient. As
discussed in detail above, exchanges traditionally have not assumed the
role of regulating the totality of the trading of their member-broker-
dealers, and exchanges are currently not well-positioned to assume that
role, in light of the statutory framework and, among other things,
their limited access to data and the lack of a proper rule set to
regulate off-exchange trading.\248\ Exchanges generally do not have as
detailed a set of member conduct rules and do not have non-exchange-
specific trading rules, thus allowing such broker-dealers and their
personnel to conduct business under a less specific regulatory regime
than FINRA members.\249\ As discussed above, in this context and
consistent with the statutory framework, the Commission preliminarily
believes that an Association is better suited to regulate off-exchange
trading.\250\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\248\ See supra notes 82-95 and accompanying text.
\249\ See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
\250\ See supra notes 82-95 and accompanying text.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
With respect to having Non-Member Firms' DEAs assume the regulatory
oversight responsibilities, the Commission could require the Non-Member
Firm's DEA to oversee the off-exchange activity of the firm. This
alternative may offer some benefit in terms of providing efficient
supervision. Non-Member Firms' DEAs may have specialized knowledge of
Non-Member Firms' businesses and operations that would facilitate
efficient supervision of
[[Page 18065]]
their off-exchange activity.\251\ Similarly, requiring all SROs to
supervise the off-exchange activity of their members might bring
certain benefits. First, there might be innovation in surveillance
methodology because exchange SROs could need new surveillance systems
and procedures tailored to current market structure and practice.
Second, this could foster competition among SROs to provide regulatory
services, which could lower costs to members.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\251\ See Allston Letter, supra note 106.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
However, with respect to DEAs, the supervision of trading activity
is outside the scope of typical DEA oversight responsibilities \252\
and the Commission believes most exchanges contract with FINRA to
perform these examinations. Consequently, if exchange SROs were
expected to supervise the off-exchange activities of firms assigned to
them for DEA examinations, the exchanges would need to acquire the
resources to provide this supervision.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\252\ See supra note 164.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Requiring all SROs to supervise their members' off-exchange trading
would also entail substantial costs and create inefficiencies. As
discussed previously, exchange SROs have not generally supervised their
members' activity outside of the markets they operate.\253\ As
discussed above, FINRA has invested in the technological
infrastructure, cooperative agreements with other SROs, and specialized
regulatory personnel to provide surveillance and supervision of
activity in off-exchange markets.\254\ If each of the exchanges were
required to supervise the off-exchange activities of some or all of
their members, the exchanges each would need to invest in similar
regulatory infrastructure. This investment would be costly to the
exchanges; presumably these costs would be passed on to exchange
members and ultimately the investing public through higher trading
costs. In addition, assigning regulatory responsibility to an exchange
SRO, which may in turn contract with FINRA to provide those services,
would be costly and inefficient. Further, notwithstanding the potential
benefits to innovation, the duplication in regulatory oversight would
also be duplication in regulatory resources as multiple SROs would
surveil the off-exchange trading of some firms. This approach also
could be inconsistent with the allocation of regulatory
responsibilities contemplated by Section 17(d) of the Exchange
Act.\255\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\253\ See supra note 68-69 and accompanying text.
\254\ Id.
\255\ 15 U.S.C. 78q(d).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Furthermore, FINRA has adopted rules that govern off-exchange
trading, recognizing the complexity and opacity of the off-exchange
marketplace. If exchanges were required to supervise the off-exchange
activity of their members, exchanges would need to adopt rules that
were tailored to the institutional detail of the off-exchange market.
This could result in off-exchange trading rules that varied depending
on the exchange membership status of individual participants, resulting
in inconsistent rules governing the same off-exchange trading activity.
Finally, the Commission has also considered whether the possibility
that the exchanges could obtain additional data through the CAT, or
through a FINRA rule change if implemented,\256\ affects the
Commission's preliminary belief that an Association is better suited to
regulate off-exchange trading. Although there may thereby be additional
data, these changes would not address the underlying statutory scheme
and resource issues that make FINRA well-positioned to regulate off-
exchange trading.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\256\ See supra note 84.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
3. Exchange Membership Alternative
The proposed amendments would, in accordance with Section 15(b)(8),
preclude any firm that is not a member of an Association from trading
on exchanges of which it is not a member.\257\ Further, under the
proposed amendments, if a firm becomes a member of an Association, it
would not have to become a member of each exchange upon which it
trades.\258\ The Commission has also considered requiring broker-
dealers to become a member of every exchange on which they trade and to
become a member of an Association in order to trade off-exchange
(``Exchange Membership Alternative''). In other words, under this
alternative, becoming a member of an Association would not alone allow
firms to trade on exchanges of which they are not members (as would be
permitted under the proposed amendments).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\257\ The proposed amendments provide limited exemptions for
hedging of floor-based activity and order routing to satisfy certain
provisions of Regulation NMS.
\258\ In order to trade on exchanges of which it is not a
member, the firm would have to trade with or through another broker-
dealer that is a member of that exchange.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In considering the Exchange Membership Alternative, the Commission
weighed whether the same issue of off-exchange activity not being
subject to effective regulatory oversight that exists when a Non-Member
Firm trades off-exchange is present when a Member or Non-Member Firm
trades on an exchange of which it is not a member (through a member of
that exchange). The Commission preliminarily believes that the proposed
amendments adequately address the issue of establishing effective
oversight of off-exchange activity and that the more onerous Exchange
Membership Alternative would not provide any additional regulatory
benefit beyond the proposed amendments for several reasons. First,
while exchanges lack the data, surveillance technology and specialized
regulatory personnel to surveil their members' trading off-exchange,
FINRA has these resources to surveil the activity of Member Firms both
on exchanges and off-exchange. Accordingly, requiring Member Firms to
also become members of each exchange on which they effect transactions,
including indirectly, would be unnecessarily duplicative because FINRA
can already surveil the activity of a Member Firm trading on an
exchange of which it is not a member. In addition, while exchanges do
not have a specialized rule set to govern their members' activity in
the off-exchange market, FINRA's rules are consistent with requiring
Member Firms to adhere to the trading rules of exchanges on which they
transact. If a Member Firm were to violate an exchange rule on an
exchange of which it is not a member, FINRA would have the jurisdiction
needed to address the resulting violation. Therefore, requiring that
the Member Firm also become a member of that exchange would not prevent
FINRA from exercising jurisdiction over the matter.
The Commission notes that the Exchange Membership Alternative might
require firms to become members of more SROs than required under the
proposed amendments, which would impose additional costs. In
particular, some Non-Member Firms that would become Member Firms under
the Proposal would also need to become members of additional exchanges
or cease trading on these exchanges. In addition, some current Member
Firms would also need to become members of additional exchanges.
4. Retaining the De Minimis Allowance
The Commission considered retaining the $1,000 de minimis allowance
for trading other than on an exchange of which the Non-Member Firm is a
member. The Commission also considered retaining the $1,000 de minimis
allowance, but removing the exception for proprietary trading conducted
with or through another registered broker-dealer. As discussed
[[Page 18066]]
above,\259\ the Commission believes that the magnitude of the de
minimis allowance is no longer economically meaningful. Furthermore,
the Commission believes that the commission sharing arrangements
discussed previously \260\ are rarely if ever used. However, the
Commission believes that floor members on some exchanges may rely upon
the exception for proprietary trading conducted with or through another
registered broker-dealer to hedge risks associated with floor-based
activities. Consequently, the proposed amendments include a hedging
exemption for floor-based activity but no longer include a de minimis
dollar amount associated with transactions that do not fall under the
limited hedging exemption.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\259\ See Section II.C.
\260\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
5. The Commission Assumes Regulatory Oversight Role for Non-Member
Firms
The Commission considered assuming the role of providing direct
primary regulatory oversight for Non-Member Firms. We do not believe,
however, that this is a reasonably available alternative because of the
judgments reflected in Congress's determinations over time about where
to locate that oversight function and our own understanding of the
entity best suited to that role. As discussed in detail above, the
Exchange Act, as originally adopted in 1934, left regulation of the
off-exchange market to the Commission.\261\ In 1938, Congress provided
for the creation of Associations,\262\ and from 1965 until 1983,
broker-dealers engaged in off-exchange trading could become members of
NASD or opt to be regulated directly by the Commission under the SECO
program.\263\ In 1983, the Commission recommended that Congress
eliminate the SECO program because, among other things, only a limited
number of broker-dealers chose to be regulated under the SECO program
\264\ and maintaining the program disproportionately affected the
Commission's resources. Congress then amended the Act to eliminate the
SECO program,\265\ which had the effect of making the regulation of
off-exchange trading under the Exchange Act the responsibility of an
Association.\266\ Consistent with this, in this rulemaking the
Commission is proposing to modify the Rule 15b9-1 exemption so that,
with limited exceptions, the off-exchange transactions of broker-
dealers will be subject to the oversight and rules of an Association,
the SRO primarily responsible for regulating trading in the off-
exchange market. As discussed throughout, we believe an Association is
best positioned to regulate that trading. Based on the foregoing,
including the Congress's determination to eliminate the SECO
Program,\267\ the Commission does not view assumption of direct
responsibility for off-exchange broker-dealer oversight by the
Commission as a reasonably available alternative.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\261\ See supra note 27 and accompanying text
\262\ See supra notes 31-33 and accompanying text.
\263\ As previously noted, broker-dealers that traded
exclusively on the floor of an exchange were exempt from broker-
dealer registration with the Commission until the 1975 Amendments,
which extended the Commission's SECO rulemaking authority to any
exchange member trading on an exchange other than an exchange of
which it was a member. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
Broker-dealers registering with the Commission as a result of the
1975 Amendments became subject to the SECO rules in 1976, but could
remain exempt from such rules pursuant to Rule 15b8-1. See supra
note 43 and accompanying text.
\264\ Because many broker-dealers chose to become members of
NASD rather than participating in the SECO Program, only 12 percent
of all active Commission-registered broker-dealers effecting
transactions off-exchange were SECO broker-dealers by May 1982.
House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, ``Authorization of
Appropriations for the Securities and Exchange Commission,'' H.R.
Rep. No. 98-106, at 597 (1983).
\265\ Pub. L. 98-38, 97 Stat. 205 (1983).
\266\ See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
\267\ The report accompanying the amendments made to the Act in
1983 cited a preference for self-regulation over direct regulation
by the Commission. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
E. Request for Comment on Economic Analysis
The Commission has identified above economic effects associated
with the proposal and requests comment on all aspects of its
preliminary economic analysis. The Commission encourages commenters to
identify, discuss, analyze, and supply relevant data, information, or
statistics regarding any such economic effects. In particular, the
Commission seeks comment on the following:
47. Do commenters agree with the Commission's analysis of the
potential economic effects of the proposed amendments? Why or why not?
48. Do commenters agree with the Commission's assessment of the
baseline for the economic effects?
49. Is the supervision and surveillance of Non-Member Firms with
substantial cross-market or off-exchange trading sufficient under
current rules? Why or why not?
50. How would further changes to the scope of existing Regulatory
Services Agreements between SROs affect regulators' ability to
effectively surveil cross-market and off-exchange trading?
51. Do commenters believe that there are additional categories of
benefits or costs that could be quantified or otherwise monetized? If
so, please identify these categories and, if possible, provide specific
estimates or data.
52. Are there any additional benefits that may arise from the
proposed amendments? Or are there benefits described above that would
not likely result from the proposed amendments? If so, please explain
these benefits or lack of benefits in detail.
53. Are there any additional costs that may arise from the proposed
amendments? Are there methods by which the Commission could reduce the
costs imposed by the proposed amendments enabling effective regulatory
oversight of Non-Member Firms? Please explain. Are there any other
potential consequences of the proposed amendments? Or are there costs
described above that would not likely result from the proposed
amendments? If so, please explain these costs or lack of costs in
detail.
54. Does the release appropriately describe the potential effects
of the proposed amendments on the promotion of efficiency, competition,
and capital formation? Why or why not? If possible, commenters should
provide analysis and empirical data to support their views on the
competitive or anticompetitive effects, as well as the efficiency and
capital formation effects, of the proposed amendments.
55. Are there alternative mechanisms for achieving the Commission's
goal of improving regulatory oversight while promoting competition and
capital formation?
56. To the extent that there are reasonable alternatives to the
proposed amendments, what are the potential costs and benefits of those
reasonable alternatives relative to the proposed amendments? What are
the potential effects on the promotion of efficiency, competition, and
capital formation of those reasonable alternatives?
57. Would the cost of FINRA or exchange membership cause some Non-
Member Firms to alter their activities in any way? If so, how would
Non-Member Firms alter their business? How would these changes affect
competition and market efficiency? How would these changes affect
market quality?
58. Would the proposed amendments cause Non-Member Firms to exit
the marketplace? If so, how many Non-Member Firms would elect to
restrict their operations rather that become members of FINRA or one or
more exchanges? How would these changes affect competition and market
efficiency? How would these changes
[[Page 18067]]
affect market quality? What would be the effect on liquidity of Non-
Members Firms exiting the marketplace?
59. Are there costs related to FINRA membership for Non-Member
Firms that the Commission has not considered? What are these costs?
Please be specific.
60. For Non-Member Firms, how much will the cost of FINRA
membership vary? Will the cost of FINRA membership cause some firms to
change the scope of their business? If so, in what manner?
61. Do commenters agree with the assumptions underlying the
Commission's estimates of the range for membership costs for exchanges?
62. Do commenters agree with the Commission's preliminarily belief
that the TAF collected by FINRA would not be expected to materially
change if the proposed amendments were adopted? What would the effect
of the proposed amendments be on the TAF assessed to current FINRA
members? What would the effect of the proposed amendments be on the TAF
assessed to Non-Member Firms that choose to become FINRA members?
63. Has the Commission properly accounted for the compliance cost
burden required to achieve the access to exchanges necessary to comply
with the proposed amendments? Would any costs beyond basic membership
be the direct result of the proposed amendments?
64. If Non-Member Firms were to elect to join additional exchanges
rather than becoming members of FINRA, how many exchanges would they
expect to join?
65. Is the Commission correct in assuming that the cost of
membership is the relevant compliance cost burden and that connectivity
or trading related costs are optional for most to all of the exchanges?
Are there any exchanges on which connectivity or trading rights costs
are mandatory even if a broker-dealer trades through another member
broker-dealer that is paying the connectivity or trading rights costs?
66. Are the Commission's assumptions on the manner in which Section
3 fees are allocated in off-exchange transactions with Non-Member Firms
correct? Are there mechanisms in place already that result in these
fees being passed on to Non-Member Firms that transact in ATSs, or
elsewhere in the off-exchange market?
67. Would a Non-Member Firm elect to become a member of one or more
exchanges rather than become a member of FINRA? If so, please discuss
in detail why a Non-Member Firm would make such an election. Which
exchanges, in particular, are Non-Member Firms likely to join, if they
join additional exchanges, as a result of the proposed amendments? How
would these changes affect competition and market efficiency? How would
these changes affect market quality?
68. Has the Commission articulated all reasonable alternatives for
the proposed rule? If not, please provide additional alternatives and
how their costs and benefits would compare to the proposed rule. For
the alternatives described above, has the Commission accurately
described the costs and benefits? If not, please provide more accurate
costs and benefits, including any data or statistics that support those
costs and benefits.
69. One alternative discussed is to effect improved off-exchange
supervision through the action of exchanges. Is this alternative
practical? What resources would exchanges have to acquire to provide
efficient and effective supervision of their members' off-exchange
trading activity?
70. What effects could the proposed amendments have on FINRA's
oversight of the off-exchange market? How could FINRA's revenues and
cost of regulation be affected? What changes should FINRA consider
implementing should the Commission approve the proposed amendments to
Rule 15b9-1? Please be specific.
71. Would the proposed amendments create a barrier to entry for new
prospective Associations? Would there be benefits to competition among
Associations?
VI. Paperwork Reduction Act
Certain provisions of these proposed amendments to Rule 15b9-1
contain ``collection of information requirements'' within the meaning
of the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (``PRA'').\268\ As discussed in
Part II.D, the proposed amendments to Rule 15b9-1 would require dealers
relying on the floor member hedging exemption under Rule 15b9-1 to
establish, maintain, and enforce certain written policies and
procedures. Compliance with these collections of information
requirements would be mandatory for firms relying on the rule. The
Commission is submitting these collections of information to the Office
of Management and Budget (``OMB'') for review in accordance with 44
U.S.C. 3507(d) and 5 CFR 1320.11. The title of new collection of
information is ``Rule 15b9-1 Floor Member Hedging Exemption.'' An
agency may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to
respond to, a collection of information unless the agency displays a
currently valid control number.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\268\ 44 U.S.C. 3501 et seq.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
A. Summary of Collection of Information
The proposed amendments to Rule 15b9-1 would include a collection
of information within the meaning of the PRA for broker-dealers relying
on the floor member hedging exemption under the proposed Rule. The
floor member hedging exemption under the proposed amendments to Rule
15b9-1 would permit a qualifying dealer \269\ that conducts business on
the floor of a national securities exchange to effect transactions for
its own account with or through another registered broker or dealer
that are solely for the purpose of hedging the risks of its floor-based
activities, by reducing or otherwise mitigating the risks thereof.
Broker-dealers relying on the floor member hedging exemption must
establish, maintain, and enforce written policies and procedures
reasonably designed to ensure and demonstrate that such hedging
transactions reduce or otherwise mitigate the risks of the financial
exposure the dealer incurs as a result of its floor-based activity. In
addition, such dealers would be required to preserve a copy of their
policies and procedures in a manner consistent with Rule 17a-4 until
three years after the date the policies and procedures are replaced
with updated policies and procedures.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\269\ A broker-dealer would have to meet the threshold
requirements of proposed Rule 15b9-1. Specifically, such broker-
dealer would have to: (1) Be a member of a national securities
exchange; (2) carry no customer accounts; and (3) effect
transactions in securities solely on a national securities exchange
of which it is a member, except for transactions complying with the
floor member hedging exemption or the Regulation NMS routing
exemption.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
B. Proposed Use of Information
The policies and procedures required under Rule 15b9-1 would be
used by the Commission and SROs to understand how dealers relying on
the floor member hedging exemption evaluate whether their off-exchange
transactions are conducted solely for the purpose of hedging risks
incurred from the dealer's floor-based business and that such dealers
are complying with the requirements of Rule 15b9-1. These policies and
procedures will be used generally by the Commission as part of its
ongoing efforts to monitor and enforce compliance with the federal
securities laws, including Section 15(b)(8) and Rule 15b9-1 thereunder.
In addition, SROs may use the information to monitor and enforce
compliance by
[[Page 18068]]
their members with applicable SRO rules and the federal securities
laws.
C. Respondents
The Commission estimates that up to 100 dealers may rely on the
floor member hedging exemption contained in Rule 15b9-1. The Commission
notes that, based on publicly available information reviewed in the
first quarter of 2015, there are currently 125 broker-dealers
registered with the Commission that are not members of an Association.
Of those 125 broker-dealers, 77 broker-dealers currently disclose being
an exchange member engaged in floor activities on Form BD.\270\ The
Commission believes that while not all of these dealers will choose to
avail themselves of the floor member hedging exemption contained in
Rule 15b9-1 because the exemption restricts off-exchange transactions
solely to those that hedge risks incurred as a result of their floor-
based activity, some firms not included in this number may decide to
avail themselves of the floor member hedging exemption. The Commission
preliminarily believes, however, that more of these firms are likely to
want the ability to engage in off-exchange transactions other than
those that hedge the risk of their floor-based activity, and may,
accordingly, choose to join an Association as a result of the proposed
amendments to Rule 15b9-1.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\270\ Of the approximately 4,209 total registered broker-dealers
as of March 2015, 182 broker-dealers in total disclose being an
exchange member engaged in floor activities on Form BD (note: The
182 broker-dealers includes the 77 broker-dealers engaged in floor
activities that are not members of an Association). The Commission
preliminarily believes that broker-dealers engaged in floor
activities that are currently members of an Association are unlikely
to withdraw from Association membership and begin relying on the
floor member hedging exemption because such broker-dealers have
already elected to join an Association and reliance on the floor
member hedging exemption would limit their permissible off-exchange
activity solely to hedging risks incurred as a result of their
floor-based business.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
D. Total Initial and Annual Reporting and Recordkeeping Burdens
The Commission estimates that the one-time, initial burden for a
dealer to establish written policies and procedures as required under
Rule 15b9-1 would be approximately 16 hours.\271\ This figure is based
on the estimated number of hours to develop a set of written policies
and procedures, including review and approval by appropriate legal
personnel. The Commission notes that the policies and procedures
required by the proposed Rule are limited to hedging transactions that
reduce or otherwise mitigate the risks of the financial exposure the
dealer incurs as a result of its floor-based activity. In addition, the
Commission estimates the annual burden of maintaining and enforcing
such policies and procedures, including a review of such policies at
least annually, would be approximately 96 hours for each dealer.\272\
This figure includes an estimate of hours related to reviewing existing
policies and procedures, making necessary updates, conducting ongoing
training, maintaining relevant systems and internal controls,
performing necessary testing and monitoring of off-exchange hedging
transactions as they relate to the broker-dealer's floor-based
activities and maintaining copies of the policies and procedures for
the period of time required by the proposed rule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\271\ This figure is based on the following: (Compliance Manager
at 10 hours) + (Compliance Attorney at 5 hours) + (Director of
Compliance at 1 hour) = 16 burden hours per dealer.
\272\ This figure is based on the following: (Compliance Manager
at 60 hours) + (Compliance Attorney at 24 hours) + (Director of
Compliance at 12 hours) = 96 burden hours per dealer.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Commission estimates that the initial burden associated with
Rule 15b9-1 would be 112 hours per dealer, which corresponds to an
initial aggregate burden of 11,200 hours.\273\ The Commission estimates
that the ongoing annualized burden associated with Rule 15b9-1 would be
96 hours per dealer, which corresponds to an ongoing annualized
aggregate burden of 9,600 hours.\274\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\273\ This figure is based on the following: ((16 burden hours
per dealer) + (96 burden hours per dealer)) x (100 dealers) = 11,200
burden hours during the first year. In estimating these burden
hours, the Commission examined the estimated burdens imposed by
other rules applicable to broker-dealers. For example, amendments to
Regulation SHO adopted in 2010 required broker-dealers to establish,
maintain, and enforce written policies and procedures relating to
Rule 201(c) and Rule 201(d)(6) to ensure short-sale orders are,
among other things, properly marked, are submitted at the proper
price, or are properly off-set (in the case of Rule 201(d)(6). See
Exchange Act Release No. 61595 (February 26, 2010) 75 FR 11232,
11286 (March 10, 2010) (``Amendments to Regulation SHO''). The
policies and procedures relating to Rule 201(c) and Rule 201(d)(6)
required under the Amendments to Regulation SHO estimated an average
initial one-time burden of 160 burden hours per broker-dealer and
ongoing compliance cost of 60 hours annually to ensure the policies
and procedures are up-to-date and remain in compliance as well as an
additional 336 hours annual to monitor, surveil, and enforce trading
in compliance with Rule 201. Id. The Commission preliminarily
believes that the policies and procedures under the proposed floor
member hedging exemption will be substantially less burdensome than
those required by the Amendments to Regulation SHO because those
policies and procedures require certain technology and real-time
monitoring components. For example, under the Amendments to
Regulation SHO described above, broker-dealers' policies and
procedures must be reasonably designed to enable a broker-dealer to
monitor, on a real-time basis, the national best bid so as to
determine the price at which a broker-dealer may submit a short sale
order to a trading center in compliance with Rule 201(c), and off-
setting transactions under the riskless principal provision under
Rule 201(d)(6) must be allocated to a riskless principal or customer
account within 60 seconds of execution. Id. at 11284. In contrast,
the policies and procedures under the proposed amendments to Rule
15b9-1 do not involve a real-time monitoring or technology
component.
\274\ This figure is based on the following: (96 burden hours
per dealer) x (100 dealers) = 9,600 ongoing, annualized aggregate
burden hours. In estimating these burden hours, the Commission also
examined the estimated initial and ongoing burden hours imposed on
registered security-based swap dealers under Regulation SBSR--
Reporting and Dissemination of Security-Based Swap Information. See
Exchange Act Release No. 74244 (February 11, 2015) 80 FR 14564,
14683 (March 19, 2015) (``Regulation SBSR''). Regulation SBSR
requires registered security-based swap dealers to establish,
maintain, and enforce written policies and procedures that are
reasonably designed to ensure compliance with any security-based
swap transaction reporting obligations. Id. The estimated initial
and ongoing compliance burden on registered security-based swap
dealers under Regulation SBSR were 216 burden hours and 120 burden
hours respectively. Id. The Commission preliminarily believes that
the initial and ongoing burden hours under the proposed floor member
hedging exemption will be substantially less than for registered
security-based swap dealers under Regulation SBSR, because the
policies and procedures under Regulation SBSR require programing
certain systems for transaction reporting and performing testing of
such systems. Id. In contrast, the proposed floor member hedging
exemption would not necessarily require programming or testing of
certain systems and is a much more discrete set of policies and
procedures as compared to the more comprehensive policies and
procedures required by Regulation SBSR, which cover, among other
things, the full scope of reporting security-based swap transactions
by registered security-based swap dealers and others.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
E. Collection of Information Is Mandatory
All of the collection of information discussed above would be
mandatory.
F. Confidentiality of Responses to Collection of Information
To the extent that the Commission receives confidential information
pursuant to the collection of information, such information will be
kept confidential, subject to the provisions of applicable law.\275\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\275\ See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. 552 et seq.; 15 U.S.C. 78x (governing
the public availability of information obtained by the Commission).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
G. Retention Period for Recordkeeping Requirements
Dealers seeking to take advantage of the proposed hedging exemption
would be required to preserve a copy of their policies and procedures
in a manner consistent with Rule 17a-4 \276\ until
[[Page 18069]]
three years after the date the policies and procedures are replaced
with updated policies and procedures.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\276\ 17 CFR 240.17a-4. Registered brokers and dealers are
already subject to existing recordkeeping and retention requirements
under Rule 17a-4. However, proposed Rule 15b9-1 contains a
requirement that a dealer relying on the floor member hedging
exemption preserve a copy of its policies and procedures in a manner
consistent with Rule 17a-4 until three years after the date the
policies and procedures are replaced with updated policies and
procedures. The burdens associated with this recordkeeping
obligation have been accounted for in the burden estimates discussed
above for Rule 15b9-1.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
H. Request for Comments
Pursuant to 44 U.S.C. 3506(c)(2)(B), the Commission solicits
comment to:
72. Evaluate whether the proposed collection of information is
necessary for the proper performance of our functions, including
whether the information shall have practical utility;
73. Evaluate the accuracy of our estimate of the burden of the
proposed collection of information;
74. Determine whether there are ways to enhance the quality,
utility, and clarity of the information to be collected; and
75. Evaluate whether there are ways to minimize the burden of
collection of information on those who are to respond, including
through the use of automated collection techniques or other forms of
information technology.
Persons submitting comments on the collection of information
requirements should direct them to the Office of Management and Budget,
Attention: Desk Officer for the Securities and Exchange Commission,
Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, Washington, DC 20503, and
should also send a copy of their comments to Brent J. Fields,
Secretary, Securities and Exchange Commission, 100 F Street NE.,
Washington, DC 20549-1090, with reference to File Number [ ]. Requests
for materials submitted to OMB by the Commission with regard to this
collection of information should be in writing, with reference to File
Number [ ] and be submitted to the Securities and Exchange Commission,
Office of FOIA/PA Services, 100 F Street NE., Washington, DC 20549-
2736. As OMB is required to make a decision concerning the collections
of information between 30 and 60 days after publication, a comment to
OMB is best assured of having its full effect if OMB receives it within
30 days of publication.
VII. Consideration of Impact on Economy
For purposes of the Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness
Act of 1996,\277\ the Commission requests comment on the potential
effect of the proposed amendments to Rule 15b9-1 on the United States
economy on an annual basis. The Commission also requests comment on any
potential increases in costs or prices for consumers or individual
industries, and any potential effect on competition, investment, or
innovation. Commenters are requested to provide empirical data and
other factual support for their views to the extent possible.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\277\ 5 U.S.C. 603.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
VIII. Regulatory Flexibility Act Certification
Section 3(a) of the Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980 \278\
(``RFA'') requires the Commission to undertake an initial regulatory
flexibility analysis of the impact of the proposed rule amendments on
small entities unless the Commission certifies that the rule, if
adopted, would not have a significant economic impact on a substantial
number of small entities.\279\ For purposes of Commission rulemaking in
connection with the RFA,\280\ a small entity includes a broker or
dealer that: (1) Had total capital (net worth plus subordinated
liabilities) of less than $500,000 on the date in the prior fiscal year
as of which its audited financial statements were prepared pursuant to
Rule 17a-5(d) under the Exchange Act,\281\ or, if not required to file
such statements, a broker-dealer with total capital (net worth plus
subordinated liabilities) of less than $500,000 on the last day of the
preceding fiscal year (or in the time that it has been in business, if
shorter); and is not affiliated with any person (other than a natural
person) that is not a small business or small organization.\282\ With
regard to exchanges, a small entity is an exchange that has been exempt
from the reporting requirements of Rule 601 under Regulation NMS, and
is not affiliated with any person (other than a natural person) that is
not a small business or small organization.\283\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\278\ 5 U.S.C. 603(a).
\279\ 5 U.S.C. 605(b).
\280\ Although Section 601(b) of the RFA defines the term
``small entity,'' the statute permits agencies to formulate their
own definitions. The Commission has adopted definitions for the term
``small entity'' for the purposes of Commission rulemaking in
accordance with the RFA. Those definitions, as relevant to this
proposed rulemaking, are set forth in Rule 0-10 under the Exchange
Act, 17 CFR 240.0-10. See Exchange Act Release No. 18451 (January
28, 1982), 47 FR 5215 (February 4, 1982) (File No. AS-305).
\281\ 17 CFR 240.17a-5(d).
\282\ See 17 CFR 240.0-10(c).
\283\ See 17 CFR 240.0-10(e).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Commission examined recent FOCUS data for the 125 Non-Member
Firms and concluded that at most 11 of the affected entities have net
capital of $500,000 or less, and some of those might not be small
entities because they might be affiliates of larger organizations.
Although the Commission lacks the data to quantify these firms'
off-exchange activity, it does have FOCUS information on the firms'
disclosed activities. Based on this disclosure, the Commission believes
that many of these firms may be able to trade off-exchange under the
proposed floor member hedging exemption for a number of reasons. First,
a number of firms disclose floor-based activity that may allow them to
trade off-exchange under the floor member hedging exemption: five
report writing options and six disclose floor activity.\284\ Second,
one discloses only trading in government debt securities, so is
unlikely to be affected by the proposed amendments. Finally, only two
of the eleven firms disclose proprietary trading activity. These firms
would be affected only by the elimination of the de minimis allowance,
unless the firms can rely on the floor member hedging exemption for
such activity.\285\ Therefore, the Commission certifies that the
proposed amendments to Rule 15b9-1 would not, if adopted, have a
significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\284\ Firms often disclose multiple activities, so the number of
disclosed activities in this discussion exceeds the number of firms.
\285\ Hedging activity is proprietary trading activity.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
76. We encourage written comments regarding this certification. We
solicit comment as to whether the proposed amendments could have
impacts on small entities that have not been considered. We request
that commenters describe the nature of any impacts on small entities
and provide empirical data to support the extent of such effect.
Such comments will be placed in the same public file as comments on
the proposed amendments to Rule 15b9-1. Persons wishing to submit
written comments should refer to the instructions for submitting
comments in the front of this release.
IX. Statutory Authority--Text of the Proposed Amendments
Pursuant to the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. 78a et seq., and
particularly Sections 3, 15(b)(9), 15A, 17, 19, 23, and 36 thereof, the
Commission is proposing amendments to Title 17, Chapter II of the Code
of Federal Regulations as follows.
List of Subjects in 17 CFR Part 240
Brokers, Dealers, Registration, Securities.
[[Page 18070]]
For the reasons set out in the preamble, title 17, chapter II of
the Code of Federal Regulations is proposed to be amended as follows:
PART 240--GENERAL RULES AND REGULATIONS, SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF
1934
0
1. The authority citation for part 240 continues to read in part as
follows:
Authority: 15 U.S.C. 77c, 77d, 77g, 77j, 77s, 77z-2, 77z-3,
77eee, 77ggg, 77nnn, 77sss, 77ttt, 78c, 78c-3, 78c-5, 78d, 78e, 78f,
78g, 78i, 78j, 78j-1, 78k, 78k-1, 78l, 78m, 78n, 78o, 78o-4, 78o-10,
78p, 78q, 78q-1, 78s, 78u-5, 78w, 78x, 78ll, 78mm, 80a-20, 80a-23,
80a-29, 80a-37, 80b-3, 80b-4, 80b-11, 7201, et seq.; and 8302; 7
U.S.C. 2(c)(2)(E); 12 U.S.C. 5221(e)(3); 18 U.S.C. 1350; and Pub. L.
111-203, 939A, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010), unless otherwise noted.
* * * * *
0
2. Section 240.15b9-1 is revised to read as follows:
Sec. 240.15b9-1 Exemption for certain exchange members.
Any broker or dealer required by section 15(b)(8) of the Act (15
U.S.C. 78o(b)(8)) to become a member of a registered national
securities association shall be exempt from such requirement if it:
(a) Is a member of a national securities exchange;
(b) Carries no customer accounts; and
(c) Effects transactions in securities solely on a national
securities exchange of which it is a member, except that with respect
to this paragraph (c):
(1) A dealer that conducts business on the floor of a national
securities exchange may effect transactions off the exchange, for the
dealer's own account with or through another registered broker or
dealer, that are solely for the purpose of hedging the risks of its
floor-based activities, by reducing or otherwise mitigating the risks
thereof. A dealer seeking to rely on this exception shall establish,
maintain and enforce written policies and procedures reasonably
designed to ensure and demonstrate that such hedging transactions
reduce or otherwise mitigate the risks of the financial exposure the
dealer incurs as a result of its floor-based activity. Such dealer
shall preserve a copy of its policies and procedures in a manner
consistent with 17 CFR 240.17a-4 until three years after the date the
policies and procedures are replaced with updated policies and
procedures; and
(2) A broker or dealer may effect transactions off the exchange
resulting from orders that are routed by a national securities exchange
of which it is a member, to prevent trade-throughs on that national
securities exchange consistent with 17 CFR 242.611.
By the Commission.
Dated: March 25, 2015.
Brent J. Fields,
Secretary.
[FR Doc. 2015-07293 Filed 4-1-15; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 8011-01-P