Federal Register, Volume 80 Issue 152 (Friday, August 7, 2015)

[Federal Register Volume 80, Number 152 (Friday, August 7, 2015)]
[Notices]
[Pages 47541-47546]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2015-19382]

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SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION

[Release No. 34-75589; File No. SR-CFE-2015-005]

Self-Regulatory Organizations; CBOE Futures Exchange, LLC; Notice
of Proposed Rule Change Regarding Disruptive Trading Practices

August 3, 2015.
Pursuant to Section 19(b)(7) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
(``Act''),\1\ notice is hereby given that on July 16, 2015 CBOE Futures
Exchange, LLC (``CFE'' or ``Exchange'') filed with the Securities and
Exchange Commission (``SEC'' or ``Commission'') the proposed rule
change described in Items I, II, and III below, which Items have been
prepared by CFE. The Commission is publishing this notice to solicit
comments on the proposed rule change from interested persons. CFE also
has filed this proposed rule change with the Commodity Futures Trading
Commission (``CFTC''). CFE filed a written certification with the CFTC
under Section 5c(c) of the Commodity Exchange Act (``CEA'') \2\ on July
16, 2015.
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\1\ 15 U.S.C. 78s(b)(7).
\2\ 7 U.S.C. 7a-2(c).
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I. Self-Regulatory Organization's Description of the Proposed Rule
Change

The Exchange proposes to amend its rules related to disruptive
trading practices. The scope of this filing is limited solely to the
application of the rule amendments to security futures that are
permitted for trading on CFE. The only security futures that previously
traded on CFE were traded under Chapter 16 of CFE's Rulebook, which is
applicable to Individual Stock Based and Exchange-Traded Fund Based
Volatility Index security futures. No security futures are currently
listed for trading on CFE. The text of the proposed rule change is
attached as Exhibit 4 to the filing but is not attached to the
publication of this notice.

II. Self-Regulatory Organization's Statement of the Purpose of, and
Statutory Basis for, the Proposed Rule Change

In its filing with the Commission, CFE included statements
concerning the

[[Page 47542]]

purpose of and basis for the proposed rule change and discussed any
comments it received on the proposed rule change. The text of these
statements may be examined at the places specified in Item IV below.
CFE has prepared summaries, set forth in Sections A, B, and C below, of
the most significant aspects of such statements.

A. Self-Regulatory Organization's Statement of the Purpose of, and
Statutory Basis for, the Proposed Rule Change

1. Purpose
The purpose of the proposed CFE rule amendments included as part of
this rule change is to amend CFE Rule 620 (Disruptive Practices) and
add CFE Policy and Procedure XVIII (Disruptive Trading Practices (Rule
620)) to provide further guidance on prohibited disruptive trading
practices. The rule amendments included as part of this rule change are
to apply to all products traded on CFE. As previously noted, no
security futures are currently listed for trading on the Exchange.
CFE Rule 620 currently prohibits the disruptive practices
enumerated in Section 4c(a)(5) of the CEA,\3\ which were added to the
CEA by Section 747 of the Dodd-Frank Act.\4\ Specifically, Section
4c(a)(5) and Rule 620 prohibit any trading, practice, or conduct that
``(A) violates bids or offers; (B) demonstrates intentional or reckless
disregard for the orderly execution of transactions during the closing
period; or (C) is, is of the character of, or is commonly known to the
trade as, `spoofing' (bidding or offering with the intent to cancel the
bid or offer before execution).'' Additionally, on May 28, 2013, the
CFTC made effective an interpretive guidance and policy statement
regarding the scope and application of these prohibitions.\5\ The
amendments amend CFE Rule 620 and add CFE Policy and Procedure XVIII to
the Policies and Procedures section of the CFE Rulebook to provide
greater detail regarding the type of activity that is prohibited under
Rule 620.
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\3\ 7 U.S.C. 6c(a)(5).
\4\ Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act,
Public Law 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376, 1739, Sec. 747 (2010).
\5\ Antidisruptive Practices Authority, 78 FR 31890 (May 28,
2013), available at http://www.cftc.gov/ucm/groups/public/@lrfederalregister/documents/file/2013-12365a.pdf.
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Amendments to CFE Rule 620
The amendments add new paragraph (b) to Rule 620, which sets forth
particular types of disruptive order entry and trading practices that
CFE considers to be abusive to the orderly conduct of trading or the
fair execution of transactions. Specifically, the amendments add the
following language as new subsection (b) to Rule 620:
(b) All Orders must be entered for the purpose of executing bona
fide transactions. Additionally, all non-actionable messages must be
entered in good faith for legitimate purposes.
(i) No Person shall enter or cause to be entered an Order or quote
with the intent, at the time of entry, to cancel the Order or quote
before execution or to modify the Order or quote to avoid execution;
(ii) No Person shall enter or cause to be entered an actionable or
non-actionable message or messages with intent to mislead other market
participants;
(iii) No Person shall enter or cause to be entered an actionable or
non-actionable message or messages with intent to overload, delay, or
disrupt the systems of the Exchange or other market participants; and
(iv) No Person shall enter or cause to be entered an actionable or
non-actionable message with intent to disrupt, or with reckless
disregard for the adverse impact on, the orderly conduct of trading or
the fair execution of transactions.
The provisions of this Rule apply to all market states, including
the pre-opening period, the closing period, and all trading sessions.
These amendments are consistent with similar rules and guidance
established and provided by other designated contract markets
(``DCMs'') regarding disruptive practices.\6\
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\6\ These DCMs are the Chicago Mercantile Exchange, Inc. and its
affiliated DCMs (``CME''), ICE Futures U.S., Inc. (``ICE'') and
NASDAQ Futures, Inc. (``NFX''), which each submitted self-
certification rule filings to the CFTC pursuant to CFTC Regulation
Sec. 40.6(a) to effectuate their respective changes. Copies of
these filings (CME Submission No. 14-367 (August 28, 2014); ICE
Submission No. 14-144 (December 29, 2014); and NFX Submission No.
15-16 (April 6, 2015)) may be accessed at the CFTC's Web site. CME
amended its filing and submitted CME Submission No. 14-367R on
September 12, 2014. That filing may be accessed at the CME's Web
site.
The Exchange understands that there is a desire by many market
participants for uniformity and consistency among DCMs to have
similar rules and interpretations regarding disruptive trading
practices. CFE states that this current filing closely tracks the
provisions adopted by CME, ICE and NFX and deviates as needed when
issues or topics addressed by the other DCMs do not apply to CFE,
e.g., CFE does not have all of the same order types as some of the
other DCMs.
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New CFE Policy and Procedure XVIII
The amendments add new CFE Policy and Procedure XVIII, which lists
various factors that the Exchange may consider in assessing whether
conduct violates CFE Rule 620 and provides a non-exhaustive list of
examples of activity considered by CFE to be in violation of Rule 620.
Specifically, the amendments provide the following as new Policy and
Procedure XVIII:
Rule 620 prohibits disruptive trading practices as described by the
Rule. The following are a non-exclusive list of factors that the
Exchange may consider in assessing whether conduct violates Rule 620.
A. Factors the Exchange May Consider in Assessing Whether Conduct
Violates Rule 620
The Exchange may consider a variety of factors in assessing whether
conduct violates Rule 620, including, but not limited to:
Whether the market participant's intent was to induce
others to trade when they otherwise would not;
whether the market participant's intent was to affect a
price rather than to change the market participant's position;
whether the market participant's intent was to create
misleading market conditions;
market conditions in the impacted market(s) and related
markets;
the effect on other market participants;
the market participant's historical pattern of activity;
the market participant's Order \7\ entry and cancellation
activity;
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\7\ For purposes of this Policy and Procedure, all references to
Orders include Orders and quotes.
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the size of the Order(s) relative to market conditions at
the time the Order(s) was placed;
the size of the Order(s) relative to the market
participant's position and/or capitalization;
the number of Orders;
the ability of the market participant to manage the risk
associated with the Order(s) if fully executed;
the duration for which the Order(s) is exposed to the
market;
the duration between, and frequency of, non-actionable
messages;
the queue position or priority of the Order in the order
book;
the prices of preceding and succeeding bids, offers, and
trades;
the change in the best offer price, best bid price, last
sale price, or other price (such as the Expected Opening Price
(``EOP'')) that results from the entry of the Order; and
the market participant's activity in related markets.

[[Page 47543]]

B. Meaning of the Term ``Misleading'' in the Context of Rule 620(b)(ii)
The language is intended to be a more specific statement of the
general requirement that market participants are not permitted to act
in violation of just and equitable principles of trade. This section of
the Rule prohibits a market participant from entering Orders or
messages with the intent of creating the false impression of market
depth or market interest. The Exchange generally will find the
requisite intent where the purpose of the participant's conduct was,
for example, to induce another market participant to engage in market
activity.
C. Specific Amount of Time an Order Should Be Exposed to the Market
Although the amount of time an Order is exposed to the market may
be a factor that is considered when determining whether the Order
constituted a disruptive trading practice, there is no prescribed safe
harbor. The Exchange will consider a variety of factors, including
exposure time, to determine whether an Order or Orders constitute a
disruptive practice.
D. Modification or Cancellation of an Order Once it has Been Entered
An Order, entered with the intent to execute a bona fide
transaction, that is subsequently modified or cancelled due to a
perceived change in circumstances does not constitute a violation of
Rule 620.
E. Orders Entered by Mistake
An unintentional, accidental, or ``fat-finger'' Order will not
constitute a violation of Rule 620, but such activity may be a
violation of other Exchange rules, including, but not limited to, Rule
608 (Acts Detrimental to the Exchange; Acts Inconsistent with Just and
Equitable Principles of Trade; Abusive Practices). Market participants
are expected to take steps to mitigate the occurrence of errors, and
their impact on the market. This is particularly true for entities that
run algorithmic trading applications, or otherwise submit large numbers
of automated Orders to the market.
F. Partial Fill of an Order
While execution of an Order, in part or in full, may be one
indication that an Order was entered in good faith, an execution does
not automatically cause the Order to be considered compliant with Rule
620. Orders must be entered in an attempt to consummate a trade. A
variety of factors may lead to a violative Order ultimately achieving
an execution. The Exchange will consider a multitude of factors in
assessing whether Rule 620 has been violated.
G. Making a Two-Sided Market With Unequal Quantities (e.g., 100 Bid at
10 Offered)
Market participants are not precluded from making unequal markets
as long as the Orders are entered for the purpose of executing bona
fide transactions. If either (or both) Order(s) are entered with
prohibited intent, including recklessness, such activity will
constitute a violation of Rule 620.
H. Stop Limit Orders Entered for Purposes of Protecting a Position
Market participants may enter Stop Limit Orders as a means of
minimizing potential losses with the hope that the Order will not be
triggered. However, it must be the intent of the market participant
that the Order will be executed if the specified condition is met. Such
an order entry is not prohibited by this Rule.
I. Entering Order(s) at Various Price Levels Throughout the Order Book
in Order to Gain Queue Position and Subsequently Canceling Those Orders
as the Market Changes
It is understood that market participants may want to achieve queue
position at certain price levels, and given changing market conditions
may wish to modify or cancel those Orders. In the absence of other
indicia that the Orders were entered for disruptive purposes, they
would not constitute a violation of Rule 620.
J. ``Actionable'' and ``non-actionable messages in relation to rule
620(b)(ii), (iii), and (iv)
Actionable messages are messages that can be accepted by another
party or otherwise lead to the execution of a trade. An example of an
actionable message is an Order message. Non-actionable messages are
those messages submitted to the Exchange that relate to a non-
actionable event. An example of a non-actionable message is a Request
for Quote.
K. The Exchange's Definition of ``orderly conduct of trading or the
fair execution of transactions''
Whether a market participant intends to disrupt the orderly conduct
of trading or the fair execution of transactions or demonstrates a
reckless disregard for the orderly conduct of trading or the fair
execution of transactions may be evaluated only in the context of the
specific instrument, market conditions, and other circumstances present
at the time in question. Some of the factors that may be considered in
determining whether there was orderly conduct or the fair execution of
transactions were described by the Commission as follows: ``[A]n
orderly market may be characterized by, among other things, parameters
such as a rational relationship between consecutive prices, a strong
correlation between price changes and the volume of trades, levels of
volatility that do not dramatically reduce liquidity, accurate
relationships between the price of a derivative and the underlying such
as a physical commodity or financial instrument, and reasonable spreads
between contracts for near months and for remote months.''
Antidisruptive Practices Authority, 78 FR at 31,895-96. Volatility
alone, however, will not be presumptively interpreted as disorderly or
disruptive as market volatility can be consistent with markets
performing their price discovery function.
L. Entering Orders That May Be Considered Large for a Particular
Market, and Thus May Have a Potential Impact on the Market
The size of an Order or cumulative Orders may be deemed to violate
Rule 620 if the entry results in disorderliness in the markets,
including, but not limited to, price or volume aberrations. Market
participants should further be aware that the size of an Order may be
deemed to violate Rule 620 if that Order distorts the integrity of the
settlement prices. Accordingly, market participants should be cognizant
of the market characteristics of the products they trade and ensure
that their Order entry activity does not result in market disruptions.
Exigent circumstances may be considered in determining whether a
violation of Rule 620 has occurred and, if so, what the appropriate
sanction should be for such violation.
M. Meaning of the ``closing period'' in Rule 620
``Closing period'' typically refers to the period during which
transactions, bids, and offers are reviewed for purposes of informing
settlement price determinations.
N. Factors the Exchange Will Consider in Determining if an Act Was Done
With the Prohibited Intent or Reckless Disregard of the Consequences
Proof of intent is not limited to instances in which a market
participant admits the market participant's state of mind. Where the
conduct was such that it more likely than not was intended to produce a
prohibited disruptive consequence, intent may be found. Claims of
ignorance, or lack of

[[Page 47544]]

knowledge, are not acceptable defenses to intentional or reckless
conduct. Recklessness has been commonly defined as conduct that
``departs so far from the standards of ordinary care that it is very
difficult to believe the actor was not aware of what he or she was
doing.'' See Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc. v. CFTC, 850 F.2d 742, 748
(D.C. Cir. 1988).
O. Orders Entered for the Purpose of Igniting Momentum in the Market
A ``momentum ignition'' strategy occurs when a market participant
initiates a series of Orders or trades in an attempt to ignite a price
movement in that market or a related market.
This conduct may be deemed to violate Rule 620 if it is determined
the intent was to disrupt the orderly conduct of trading or the fair
execution of transactions, if the conduct was reckless, or if the
conduct distorted the integrity of the determination of settlement
prices. Further, this activity may violate Rule 620(b)(i) if the
momentum igniting Orders were intended to be canceled before execution,
or if the Orders were intended to mislead others. If the conduct was
intended to create artificially high or low prices, this may also
constitute a violation of Rule 603 (Market Manipulation).
P. ``Flipping'' Orders
Flipping is defined as the entry of Orders or trades for the
purpose of causing turns of the market and the creation of volatility
and/or instability.
A ``flip'' Order typically has two main characteristics. First, it
is an aggressor Order (i.e., an Order that takes liquidity). Second,
shortly before the entry of the Order, the market participant cancels
an Order(s) on the opposite side of the market, typically at the same
price as the aggressor Order. The market participant, for example, has
flipped from offering to bidding at the same price. The Exchange
recognizes there are many variables that can cause a market participant
to change that market participant's perspective of the market. This
Rule, therefore, does not prohibit a market participant from changing
that market participant's bias from short (long) to long (short).
Flipping activity may, however, be disruptive to the marketplace.
For example, repeated instances of a market participant entering
flipping Orders that are each large enough to turn the market (i.e.,
being of a sufficient quantity to sweep the entire quantity on the book
at the particular price level and create a new best bid or best offer
price with any remaining quantity from the aggressor flipping Order)
can be disruptive to the orderly conduct of trading or the fair
execution of transactions. In considering whether this conduct violates
Rule 620, the Exchange would consider, among other factors:
The impact on other market participants;
price fluctuations;
market conditions in the impacted market(s) and related
markets;
the participant's activity in related markets;
whether the flip involved the cancellation of a large
sized Order(s) relative to the existing bid or offer depth; and
whether repeated flipping turns the market back and forth
(e.g., the first flip turns the market in favor of the offer (bid) and
the second flip turns the market in favor of the bid (offer)).
Q. Cancelling an Order Via the Exchange's Self-Trade Prevention
Functionality or Other Self-Match Prevention Technology
The means by which an Order is cancelled, in and of itself, is not
an indicator of whether an Order violates Rule 620. The use of self-
trade prevention functionality in a manner that causes a disruption to
the market may constitute a violation of Rule 620. Further, if the
resting Order that was cancelled was non-bona fide ab initio, it would
be considered to have been entered in violation of Rule 620.
R. Type of Pre-Open Activity Prohibited by Rule 620
Orders entered during the pre-opening period and opening rotation
period must be entered for the purpose of executing bona fide
transactions upon the opening of the market.
The entry and cancellation of Orders during the pre-opening period
and opening rotation period for the purpose of either manipulating the
EOP or attempting to identify the depth of the order book at different
price levels is prohibited and may be deemed a violation of Rule 620 or
other rules.
Other activity related to the pre-opening period may also be
considered disruptive, including but not limited to the entry of orders
prior to the commencement of the pre-opening period in an attempt to
``time'' the price-time priority queue for Trade at Settlement
(``TAS'') transactions, or other similar purposes.
S. Orders Entered Into the CBOE System for the Purpose of Testing, Such
as To Verify a Connection to the CBOE System or a Data Feed From the
CBOE System
The entering of an Order(s) without the intent to execute a bona
fide transaction, including for the purpose of verifying connectivity
or checking a data feed, is not permissible. CFE provides a testing
environment and test symbols in CBOE Command for TPHs to use for the
purpose of testing.
T. Creation or Execution of User-Defined Spreads for the Purposes of
Deceiving or Disadvantaging Other Market Participants
Trading Privilege Holders are not permitted to attempt to create
any user-defined spreads (i.e., spreads created by Trading Privilege
Holders on their own) in the CBOE System. If a Trading Privilege Holder
would like a type of CFE spread to be created that is not already
available in the CBOE System, the Trading Privilege Holder should
contact the Help Desk to request creation of the spread.
Market participants are reminded that knowingly creating and/or
trading spreads in a manner intended to deceive or unfairly
disadvantage other market participants is considered a violation of
Rule 620.
U. Examples of Prohibited Activity
The following is a non-exhaustive list of various examples of
conduct that may be found to violate Rule 620.
A market participant enters one or more Orders to generate
selling or buying interest in a specific contract. By entering the
Orders, often in substantial size relative to the contract's overall
pending order volume, the market participant creates a misleading and
artificial appearance of buy- or sell-side pressure. The market
participant places these large Orders at or near the best bid and offer
prevailing in the market at the time. The market participant benefits
from the market's reaction by either receiving an execution on an
already resting Order on the opposite side of the book from the larger
Order(s) or by obtaining an execution by entering an opposing side
Order subsequent to the market's reaction. Once the smaller Orders are
filled, the market participant cancels the large Orders that had been
designed to create the false appearance of market activity. Placing a
bona fide Order on one side of the market while entering Order(s) on
the other side of the market without intention to trade those Orders
violates Rule 620.
A market participant places buy (or sell) Orders that the
market participant

[[Page 47545]]

intends to have executed, and then immediately enters numerous sell (or
buy) Orders for the purpose of attracting interest to the resting
Orders. The market participant placed these subsequent Orders to induce
or trick other market participants to execute against the initial
Order. Immediately after the execution against the resting Order, the
market participant cancels the open Orders.
A market participant enters one or more Orders in a
particular market (Market A) to identify algorithmic activity in a
related market (Market B). Knowing how the algorithm will react to
order activity in Market A, the participant first enters an Order or
Orders in Market B that the market participant anticipates would be
filled opposite the algorithm when ignited. The participant then enters
an Order or Orders in Market A for the purpose of igniting the
algorithm and creating momentum in Market B. This results in the market
participant's Order(s) in Market B being filled opposite the algorithm.
This conduct violates Rule 620(b)(i), as the Orders in Market A were
not intended to be executed, and Rule 620(b)(ii), as the Orders in
Market A were intended to mislead participants in related markets. If
the conduct resulted in a disruption to the orderly execution of
transactions, it may also violate Rule 620(b)(iv).
A market participant enters a large aggressor buy (sell)
Order at the best offer (bid) price, trading opposite the resting sell
(buy) Orders in the book, which results in the remainder of the
original aggressor Order resting first in the queue at the new best bid
(offer). As the market participant anticipated and intended, other
participants join the market participant's best bid (offer) behind the
market participant in the queue. The market participant then enters a
large aggressor sell (buy) Order into the market participant's now
resting buy (sell) Order at the top of the book. The market
participant's use of CFE's Self-Trade Prevention functionality or other
wash blocking functionality cancels the market participant's resting
buy (sell) Order, such that market participant's aggressor sell (buy)
Order then trades opposite the Orders that joined and were behind the
market participant's best bid (offer) in the book.
A market participant places large quantity Orders during
the pre-opening period in an effort to artificially increase or
decrease the EOP with the intent to attract other market participants.
Once others join the market participant's bid or offer, the market
participant cancels the market participant's Orders shortly before the
opening.
During the pre-opening period, a market participant enters
a large Order priced at a bid higher than the existing best bid or at
an offer lower than the existing best offer, and continues to
systematically enter successive Orders priced further through the book
until it causes a movement in the best bid or best offer. These Orders
are subsequently cancelled. The market participant continues to employ
this strategy on both sides of the market for the purpose of
determining the depth of support at a specific price level for the
product before the market opens.
A market participant enters a large number of messages for
the purpose of overloading the quotation systems of other market
participants with excessive market data messages to create
``information arbitrage.''
A market participant enters messages for the purpose of
creating latencies in the market or in information dissemination by the
Exchange for the purpose of disrupting the orderly functioning of the
market.
As with the amendments to CFE Rule 620, these amendments are
consistent with similar rules and guidance established and provided by
other DCMs regarding disruptive practices.\8\
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\8\ See supra note 6.
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2. Statutory Basis
The Exchange believes that the proposed rule change is consistent
with Section 6(b) of the Act,\9\ in general, and furthers the
objectives of Sections 6(b)(5) \10\ and 6(b)(7) \11\ in particular in
that it is designed:
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\9\ 15 U.S.C. 78f(b).
\10\ 15 U.S.C. 78f(b)(5).
\11\ 15 U.S.C. 78f(b)(7).
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To prevent fraudulent and manipulative acts and practices,
to promote just and equitable principles of trade,
to foster cooperation and coordination with persons
engaged in facilitating transactions in securities, and
to remove impediments to and perfect the mechanism of a
free and open market and a national market system, and in general, to
protect investors and the public interest.
The Exchange believes that the proposed rule change would
strengthen its ability to carry out its responsibilities as a self-
regulatory organization by providing further guidance regarding the
type of activity that is prohibited under CFE Rule 620. CFE Rule 620
currently prohibits the disruptive trading practices that were added to
the CEA by the Dodd-Frank Act and are codified under Section 4c(a)(5)
of the CEA. The proposed rule change sets forth particular types of
disruptive order entry and trading practices that are prohibited under
Rule 620, lists various factors that the Exchange may consider in
assessing whether conduct violates Rule 620, and provides a non-
exhaustive list of examples of activity considered by CFE to be in
violation of Rule 620. By providing this further guidance, the proposed
rule change not only will provide greater clarity to market
participants regarding prohibited disruptive trading practices but also
will strengthen the Exchange's disciplinary program for these types of
violative behavior. As a result, the Exchange believes that the
proposed rule change is equitable and not unfairly discriminatory
because the amendments regarding disruptive trading practices will
apply equally to all market participants. In addition, the proposed
rule change will promote consistency in guidance for market
participants regarding disruptive trading practices by paralleling
similar guidance provided by other DCMs.

B. Self-Regulatory Organization's Statement on Burden on Competition

CFE does not believe that the proposed rule change will impose any
burden on competition not necessary or appropriate in furtherance of
the purposes of the Act, in that the rule change will enhance CFE's
ability to carry out its responsibilities as a self-regulatory
organization. The proposed rule change is not designed to address any
aspect of competition, whether between the Exchange and its
competitors, or among market participants. Instead, the proposed rule
change is designed to make CFE's disruptive trading practice rules
consistent with the existing rules and guidance published by other
DCMs.

C. Self-Regulatory Organization's Statement on Comments on the Proposed
Rule Change Received From Members, Participants, or Others

No written comments were solicited or received with respect to the
proposed rule change.

III. Date of Effectiveness of the Proposed Rule Change and Timing for
Commission Action

The proposed rule change will become effective on July 30, 2015. At
any time within 60 days of the date of effectiveness of the proposed
rule change, the Commission, after consultation with the CFTC, may
summarily abrogate the proposed rule

[[Page 47546]]

change and require that the proposed rule change be refiled in
accordance with the provisions of Section 19(b)(1) of the Act.\12\
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\12\ 15 U.S.C. 78s(b)(1).
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IV. Solicitation of Comments

Interested persons are invited to submit written data, views, and
arguments concerning the foregoing, including whether the proposed rule
change is consistent with the Act. Comments may be submitted by any of
the following methods:

Electronic Comments

Use the Commission's Internet comment form (http://www.sec.gov/rules/sro.shtml); or
Send an email to [email protected]. Please include
File Number SR-CFE-2015-005 on the subject line.

Paper Comments

Send paper comments in triplicate to Secretary, Securities
and Exchange Commission, 100 F Street NE., Washington, DC 20549-1090.

All submissions should refer to File Number SR-CFE-2015-005. This file
number should be included on the subject line if email is used. To help
the Commission process and review your comments more efficiently,
please use only one method. The Commission will post all comments on
the Commission's Internet Web site (http://www.sec.gov/rules/sro.shtml). Copies of the submission, all subsequent amendments, all
written statements with respect to the proposed rule change that are
filed with the Commission, and all written communications relating to
the proposed rule change between the Commission and any person, other
than those that may be withheld from the public in accordance with the
provisions of 5 U.S.C. 552, will be available for Web site viewing and
printing in the Commission's Public Reference Room, 100 F Street NE.,
Washington, DC 20549, on official business days between the hours of
10:00 a.m. and 3:00 p.m. Copies of such filing also will be available
for inspection and copying at the principal office of the Exchange. All
comments received will be posted without change; the Commission does
not edit personal identifying information from submissions. You should
submit only information that you wish to make available publicly. All
submissions should refer to File Number SR-CFE-2015-005, and should be
submitted on or before August 28, 2015.

For the Commission, by the Division of Trading and Markets,
pursuant to delegated authority.\13\
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\13\ 17 CFR 200.30-3(a)(73).
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Robert W. Errett,
Deputy Secretary.
[FR Doc. 2015-19382 Filed 8-6-15; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 8011-01-P