[Federal Register Volume 80, Number 186 (Friday, September 25, 2015)]
[Notices]
[Pages 57835-57837]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2015-24337]
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DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Coast Guard
[Docket No. USCG-2014-0935]
Letter of Recommendation for Washington State Ferries Liquefied
Natural Gas Conversion; Seattle, WA
AGENCY: Coast Guard, DHS.
ACTION: Notice and response to comments
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SUMMARY: On June 27, 2014, Coast Guard Sector Puget Sound received a
Letter of Intent (LOI) and Waterway Suitability Assessment (WSA) from
Washington State Ferries (WSF) for a proposal to modify existing
Washington State Ferry marine terminal operations to include the
handling of Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG). The LNG would be transferred
to and used as a marine fuel by six Issaquah Class Ferries converted to
use LNG propulsion systems. In accordance with regulation and policy
guidance, the Captain of the Port (COTP), Coast Guard Sector Puget
Sound, in cooperation with key port stakeholders, will review and
validate the information in the WSA. The COTP will then issue a Letter
of Recommendation (LOR) to the State of Washington Department of
Transportation that conveys the Coast Guard's recommendation on the
suitability of the following waterways for LNG marine traffic as it
relates to safety and security: Guemes Channel, Rosario Strait,
Thatcher Pass, Harney Channel, Upright Channel, Wasp Channel, San Juan
Channel, Spieden Channel, Haro Strait, Sidney Channel, Possession
Sound, Admiralty Inlet, Puget Sound, Sinclair Inlet, Rich Passage,
Elliot Bay, Admiralty Passage, North East Passage, and Colvos Passage.
As part of this validation process, the Coast Guard, on November
12, 2014, published a ``Notice and Request for Comments'' in the
Federal Register which solicited public comments to inform the COTP's
recommendation. A number of comments were received, including two
outside the comment period. This document summarizes those comments,
explains whether or not they are appropriate for consideration under
regulation, and provides additional information to help inform the
public about the various issues raised in them.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For further information about this
document call or email LT Sarah Rodi[ntilde]o, Coast Guard Sector Puget
Sound; telephone 206-217-6623, email [email protected].
Background
In accordance with 33 CFR 127.007, the COTP, Coast Guard Sector
Puget Sound, received an LOI and WSA from WSF on June 27, 2014
regarding WSF's proposal to modify existing Washington State Ferry
marine terminal operations and add the handling of LNG. The LNG would
be transferred to and used as a marine fuel by six Issaquah Class
Ferries converted to use LNG propulsion systems. The LOI notes that if
the conversion is completed, each vessel would require fueling by truck
once every 7 to 10 days.
Pursuant to 33 CFR 127.009, and using the guidance set forth in
reference to the Coast Guard's Navigation and Vessel Inspection
Circular (NVIC) 01-2011, ``Guidance Related to Waterfront Liquefied
Natural Gas (LNG) Facilities,'' the COTP is reviewing and validating
WSF's WSA in cooperation with key port stakeholders. To assist the
COTP, the Coast Guard on November 12, 2014 published a ``Notice and
Request for Comments'' in the Federal Register (79 FR 67179) seeking
public comments on WSF's proposal. Once the COTP finishes the review
and validation of WSF's WSA, he will develop the LOR with accompanying
analysis and provide it to the State of Washington Department of
Transportation as the agency with jurisdiction over WSF's proposed
activity.
Thirteen comments were received, including two outside the comment
period. This document summarizes those comments, explains whether or
not they are appropriate for consideration under 33 CFR 127.009, and
provides additional information to help inform the public about the
various issues raised in them. Comments that fell outside the scope of
the WSA but are relevant to the vessel design modifications will be
forwarded on to the Coast Guard Marine Safety Center (MSC) to be
considered during the design review and approval process in accordance
with 46 CFR 71.65-10.
WSF's LOI, WSA, and other supporting documentation can be viewed
at: http://www.wsdot.wa.gov/Ferries/Environment/LNG.htm. The public
comments received by the Coast Guard can be viewed at: http://www.regulations.gov/#!docketBrowser;rpp=100;so=DESC;sb=docId;po=0;dct=PS;D=USCG-2014-0935.
A copy of NVIC 01-2011 is available for viewing on the Coast Guard's
Web site at http://www.uscg.mil/hq/cg5/nvic/2010s.asp.
The Coast Guard sincerely appreciates the comments received.
Summary and Discussion of Comments Received
Cost and Funding of Conversion
Multiple comments expressed concern that the proposed conversion is
too expensive and that the funding that would pay for the conversion
should be spent in a different manner. The COTP's role with regard to
WSF's proposal is limited to issuing an LOR to the Washington State
Department of Transportation regarding the suitability of the waterway
for LNG marine traffic based on the criteria listed in 33 CFR 127.009.
Cost of vessel conversion issues fall outside the scope of the LOR. As
such, these comments will not be considered by the COTP in issuing the
LOR.
Pollution
Two comments expressed concern that LNG poses a pollution threat to
the environment. As an issue relevant under 33 CFR 127.009, the COTP
will consider those comments in issuing the LOR. For the public's
awareness, the Coast Guard will examine WSF's Emergency and Operations
Manuals as required by 33 CFR 127.019 covering the transfer system and
transfer procedures. These manuals include but are not limited to LNG
release response procedures, local response organizations contact
[[Page 57836]]
procedures, and emergency shutdown procedures.
Security
Several comments expressed concern that exposed LNG tanks on the
proposed converted ferries pose a security risk. As an issue relevant
under 33 CFR 127.009, the COTP will consider those comments in issuing
the LOR. For the public's awareness on this topic, the Coast Guard
oversees a multilayered security framework under 33 CFR parts 101-105
to enhance maritime security throughout the Puget Sound region. If the
WSF proposal is approved by the Washington State Department of
Transportation, the marine terminal would be required to submit a
facility security plan in accordance with 33 CFR part 105. Washington
State Ferries is currently required to comply with 33 CFR part 104
which requires in-depth security assessments and Coast Guard-approved
vessel security plans. WSF currently has Coast Guard-approved vessel
security plans covering each of its vessels. These security plans would
be reviewed and amended as necessary to reflect the conversion to LNG
fuel.
Design of Converted Ferries
Multiple comments expressed concern about the design of the
proposed converted ferries and that the use of LNG poses an unnecessary
risk to passengers. The COTP's role with regards to the subject
proposal is limited to issuing an LOR to the Washington State
Department of Transportation regarding the suitability of the waterway
for LNG marine traffic based on the items listed in 33 CFR 127.009.
This comment fell outside the scope of the Waterways Suitability
Assessment but is relevant to the vessel design modification and will
be forwarded on to the Coast Guard MSC to be considered during the
design approval process in accordance with 46 CFR 71.65-10. At this
time, final plans have not been submitted by WSF to MSC.
One comment stated that WSF should be required to update its
Emergency Manual and include it as part of the docket. This comment
fell outside the scope of the WSA but for the public's awareness,
Operations and Emergency Manuals are required under 33 CFR 127.019. As
such, the Coast Guard will examine Emergency and Operation Manuals for
compliance with 33 CFR 127.305 and 33 CFR 127.307. WSF will be required
to submit copies of these manuals to the COTP 30 days prior to
transferring LNG. The COTP may also require WSF to update other
required safety plans as necessary.
Two comments expressed concern that a seaplane or other aircraft
could collide with an LNG tank onboard a converted ferry. As an issue
relevant under 33 CFR 127.009, the COTP will consider those comments in
issuing the LOR. For the public's awareness on this topic, historical
data shows that instances of unintentional aircraft collisions with
ferries are extremely low. Malicious or intentional collisions will be
considered in the security threat mitigation strategies explained
previously.
Two comments expressed concern that a large commercial vessel could
collide with a converted ferry carrying LNG causing a tank rupture and
explosion. As an issue relevant under 33 CFR 127.009, the COTP will
consider those comments in issuing the LOR. For the public's awareness
on this topic, the risk of collision between large commercial vessels
is mitigated significantly through a number of systems, processes, and
requirements already in place today including the Coast Guard's Vessel
Traffic Service (VTS), Automated Identification System (AIS), and
Automatic Radar Plotting Aids (ARPA) as well as established traffic
separation schemes and the International Regulations for Preventing
Collisions at Sea (COLREGS) Navigation Rules governing vessel
navigation. In addition, Federal and state laws require large vessels
transiting within Puget Sound, including WSF ferries, to be under the
direction and control of a federally licensed pilot. A federally
licensed pilot is an experienced navigator with expertise specific to
Puget Sound who provides significant risk mitigation in regards to
collisions. Of note, VTS Puget Sound closely monitors and, as
necessary, directs all large commercial vessel traffic throughout the
Puget Sound including the routes transited by the Issaquah class
ferries. The Issaquah class ferry routes have remained unchanged for at
least 55 years and there are no proposed changes to the routes.
One comment expressed the opinion that the Coast Guard should
define strict criteria for conducting risk analysis and research. The
Coast Guard in our role as stewards of safety and security in the
maritime arena regularly integrate risk management into every aspect of
our maritime governance and operations. 33 CFR part 127 and NVIC 01-
2011 contain tailored requirements and guidance based on risk. In
addition, the Coast Guard has commissioned studies from Sandia National
Laboratories to examine the risks associated with potential LNG spills.
These reports are titled ``Guidance on Risk Analysis and Safety
Implication of a Large Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) Over Water'' (2004)
and ``Breach and Safety Analysis of Spills over Water from Large
Liquefied Natural Gas Carriers'' (2008). These studies are available
online at: http://www.energy.ca.gov/lng/documents/2004-12_SANDIA-DOE_RISK_ANALYSIS.PDF and http://www.lngfacts.org/resources/SANDIA_2008_Report_-_Large_LNG_Vessel_Sa.pdf.
Further, NVIC 01-11 was written based on Risk Based Decision
Making, COMDTINST M16010.3, which can be found at: http://www.uscg.mil/hq/cg5/cg5211/risk.asp.
One comment expressed concern about WSF's plan to fuel the
converted ferries by parking a tank truck on the terminal transfer
span, placing the vehicle on an inclined plane. As an issue relevant
under 33 CFR 127.009, the COTP will consider this comment in issuing
the LOR. For the public's awareness, the Coast Guard will examine WSF's
Operations Manual as required by 33 CFR 127.019 covering the transfer
system and transfer procedures.
Regulatory Guidance
One comment expressed concern that currently there are no Federal
regulations regarding LNG fueled passenger vessels. The commenter is
correct that there are currently no Federal regulations in place that
specifically govern the installation and use of LNG as a marine fuel.
This concept is new in the United States, although it is more commonly
used internationally. The Coast Guard has issued vessel design and LNG
bunkering policy documents that provide guidelines for facility and
vessel owner operators to use in consideration of facility operations
and vessel design. Those documents can be found at: http://www.uscg.mil/hq/cg5/lgcncoe/docs/Bunking%20Policy%20LTR.pdf and http://www.uscg.mil/hq/cg5/lgcncoe/docs/LNGF%20Policy%20LTR.pdf.
One comment expressed concern that there is not explicit guidance
regarding the criteria for developing or evaluating a WSA. The
requirements and guidance are located in 33 CFR 127.007 and NVIC 01-11.
Problems With the WSA
One comment expressed concern that the WSA referenced unverified
probability calculations for tank collisions from SOLAS Chapter II-1.
As an issue relevant under 33 CFR 127.009, the COTP will consider those
comments in issuing the LOR. For the public's awareness on this topic,
there is a lack
[[Page 57837]]
of historical information regarding tank collision probabilities, due
to a lack of previous occurrences. However, it should be noted that the
current resources available for mitigating vessel collisions
(previously described above) considerably reduce the probability of
vessel collisions.
One comment stated that the SOLAS model used for collision damage
in the WSA is meant to be used on vessels designed for an ocean route
and the WSF ferries were constructed for lakes, bays and sounds route.
As an issue relevant under 33 CFR 127.009, the COTP will consider those
comments in issuing the LOR. For the public's awareness on this topic,
DNV-GL determined that the use of this model was the best approach
available because a probability model does not exist for a vessel of
similar structure as the WSF ferries.
One commenter stated that DNV did not utilize the correct tank
volume of fuel in the risk assessment models. The correct tank volume
was incorporated in Revision 03 of the WSA.
One comment stated that DNV-GL used inappropriate ignition
probability models when utilizing the International Association of Oil
and Gas Producers (OGP) Scenario 24 Floating Production, Storage, and
Offloading (FPSO) Vessels Gas model. As an issue relevant under 33 CFR
127.009, the COTP will consider those comments in issuing the LOR. For
the public's awareness on this topic, no statistically significant data
exists for ignition probability models for LNG as fuel onboard
passenger ferries. The model used by DNV-GL is meant to model ignition
probability onboard larger scale offshore vessels and was chosen
because it represents a more conservative and representative model for
application to the WSF vessel design.
One comment expressed concern that the societal risks identified in
the WSA required that risks falling in the range between ``broadly
acceptable'' and ``maximum tolerable'' be mitigated so that they are As
Low As Reasonably Possible (ALARP) and that the WSA did not address
mitigating factors to reach the ALARP mitigation. As an issue relevant
under 33 CFR 127.009, the COTP will consider those comments in issuing
the LOR. During the validation process, the COTP will determine if
appropriate risk management strategies have been identified.
One comment expressed concern that the WSA was not completed
objectively and appears to be incomplete. As an issue relevant under 33
CFR 127.009, the COTP will consider those comments in issuing the LOR.
As part of the LOR process and in accordance with NVIC 01-2011, the
COTP has been and will continue to review and validate the WSA in
cooperation with key port stakeholders. This validation will determine
if the WSA presents a realistic and credible analysis of the public
safety and security implications of introducing LNG marine traffic into
the port and waterway.
This response to comments is issued under authority of 33 CFR
127.009.
Dated: August 20, 2015.
M. W. Raymond,
Captain, U.S. Coast Guard, Captain of the Port, Sector Puget Sound.
[FR Doc. 2015-24337 Filed 9-24-15; 8:45 am]
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