[Federal Register Volume 80, Number 211 (Monday, November 2, 2015)]
[Notices]
[Pages 67423-67427]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2015-27820]
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DEPARTMENT OF LABOR
Mine Safety and Health Administration
Petitions for Modification of Application of Existing Mandatory
Safety Standards
AGENCY: Mine Safety and Health Administration, Labor.
ACTION: Notice.
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SUMMARY: Section 101(c) of the Federal Mine Safety and Health Act of
1977 and Title 30 of the Code of Federal Regulations Part 44 govern the
application, processing, and disposition of petitions for modification.
This notice is a summary of petitions for modification submitted to the
Mine Safety and Health Administration (MSHA) by the parties listed
below.
DATES: All comments on the petitions must be received by the MSHA's
Office of Standards, Regulations, and Variances on or before December
2, 2015.
ADDRESSES: You may submit your comments, identified by ``docket
number'' on the subject line, by any of the following methods:
1. Electronic Mail: [email protected]. Include the docket
number of the petition in the subject line of the message.
2. Facsimile: 202-693-9441.
3. Regular Mail or Hand Delivery: MSHA, Office of Standards,
Regulations, and Variances, 201 12th Street South, Suite 4E401,
Arlington, Virginia 22202-5452, Attention: Sheila McConnell, Acting
Director, Office of Standards, Regulations, and Variances. Persons
delivering documents are required to check in at the receptionist's
desk in Suite 4E401. Individuals may inspect copies of the petitions
and comments during normal business hours at the address listed above.
MSHA will consider only comments postmarked by the U.S. Postal
Service or proof of delivery from another delivery service such as UPS
or Federal Express on or before the deadline for comments.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Barbara Barron, Office of Standards,
[[Page 67424]]
Regulations, and Variances at 202-693-9447 (Voice),
[email protected] (Email), or 202-693-9441 (Facsimile). [These are
not toll-free numbers.]
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
I. Background
Section 101(c) of the Federal Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977
(Mine Act) allows the mine operator or representative of miners to file
a petition to modify the application of any mandatory safety standard
to a coal or other mine if the Secretary of Labor determines that:
1. An alternative method of achieving the result of such standard
exists which will at all times guarantee no less than the same measure
of protection afforded the miners of such mine by such standard; or
2. That the application of such standard to such mine will result
in a diminution of safety to the miners in such mine.
In addition, the regulations at 30 CFR 44.10 and 44.11 establish
the requirements and procedures for filing petitions for modification.
II. Petitions for Modification
Docket Number: M-2015-004-M.
Petitioner: Cementation USA, Inc., 10151 Centennial Parkway, Suite
110, Sandy, Utah 84070.
Mine: Eagle Mine, MSHA I.D. No. 20-03454, located in Marquette
County, Michigan.
Regulation Affected: 30 CFR 57.15031 (Location of self-rescue
devices).
Modification Request: The petitioner requests a modification of the
existing standard to permit the miners at the Eagle Mine to wear 10-
minute Ocenco Self-Contained Self-Rescue (SCSR) Devices on their mine
belts in tandem with 1-hour SCSRs located on their vehicles, or
equipment being operated within 500 feet or five minutes walking
distance from any miner, whichever is less. The petitioner states that:
(1) The Eagle Mine is a trackless mining environment that utilizes
rubber-tired, diesel- powered equipment.
(2) The majority of the work performed in this environment keeps
the miners on or near mobile equipment.
(3) Mine Emergency Planning requires miners report to refuge
chambers during emergencies.
(4) There are two 4-person and three 12-person MineARC refuge
chambers strategically located underground.
(5) Only 48 persons are allowed underground at any given time,
based on occupancy ratings of refuge chambers.
(6) Refuge chambers are strategically located and able to be
reached within 10-minutes from the working locations.
(7) Secondary escape ways are located on each level are able to be
reached within 10 minutes from anywhere on the working level.
(8) Miners currently carry Drager Oxy 6000 on their mine belt. The
Drager Oxy 6000 is an MSHA approved SCSR that weighs 3.5 kg/7.7lbs.
(9) The Ocenco M-20 SCSR is an MSHA approved SCSR that weights 3.2
lbs.
(10) Miners will frequently catch the release latches of the Oxy
6000 SCSR on equipment handles, requiring replacement of the units.
The petitioner proposes to:
(1) Require all Cementation miners to wear Ocenco M-20 unit Self-
Contained Self-Rescue Devices on their mine belts.
(2) Require all Cementation miners to inspect their issued Ocenco
M-20 unit on a daily basis
(3) Have one Drager Oxy 6000 SCSR per occupant seat located on each
piece of Cementation underground equipment or vehicle.
(4) Have the equipment operators inspect the Drager Oxy 6000 SCSR
stored on Cementation equipment as part of the pre-op inspection.
(5) Provide cached six Drager Oxy 6000 SCSRs in each refuge
chamber. The SCSRs will be inspected on a weekly basis as part of the
weekly refuge chamber inspection.
(6) Provide cached five Drager Oxy 6000 SCSRs at the secondary
escape way on each working level of the mine. These SCSRs will be
inspected on a weekly basis.
(7) Store the MSHA Rated SCSRs in a sealed box that is clearly
marked with highly visible reflective signage indicated on all escape
and evacuation maps posted in the mine. These SCSRs will be inspected
on a weekly basis.
(8) Provide training for all underground miners quarterly in the
use, limitations, care, and inspection of the 10-minue and the 1-hour
SCSR devices. This training will include:
(a) Hands-on training for all types of self-rescue devices used at
the mine, which include:
(i) Instruction and demonstration in the use, care, and maintenance
of self-rescue devices; and
(ii) The complete donning of the SCSR by assuming a donning
position, opening the device, activating the device, inserting the
mouthpiece, and putting on the nose clip.
(b) Hands on training in transferring from a 10-minute SCSR to a 1-
hour SCSR.
(9) Provide instructor certified training annually for each
Cementation miner that will include donning SCSRs in smoke, simulated
smoke, or an equivalent environment, and breathing through a realistic
SCSR training unit that provides the sensation of SCSR airflow
resistance and heat.
(10) Have the operator certify by signature and date that the
training was conducted according to the conditions in this petition, at
the completion of training. This certification will include the names
of the miners who participated in the training.
(11) The certifications will be made available to the Cementation
miner's representative or an authorized Representative of the Secretary
on request. This certificate will be kept at the mine for three years.
(12) Inspect all stored 1-hour SCSRs in the mine for defects in
accordance with the manufacturer's instructions on a weekly basis and
record the results for each device. Records of these inspections will
be made available to the miner's representative and an Authorized
Representative of the Secretary on request. Records of these
inspections will be maintained for three years.
(13) Maintain all SCSRs in good condition. SCSRs that do not
function properly will be removed from service and replaced with
properly functioning SCSRs.
The petitioner asserts that the combination of self-contained self-
rescue devices will at all times guarantee no less than the same
measure of protection for miners as afforded by the standard.
Docket Number: M-2015-005-M.
Petitioner: Tronox Alkali Corp., 950 17th Street, Suite 2600,
Denver, Colorado 80202.
Mine: Tronox Alkali @Westvaco, MSHA I.D. No. 48-00152, located in
Sweetwater County, Wyoming.
Regulation Affected: 30 CFR 57.4760(a) (Shaft mines).
Modification Request: The petitioner requests a modification of the
existing standard that recognizes that Tronox Alkali Corp., can utilize
a mechanical ventilation reversal process for compliance that at all
times, provides the same or a greater degree of protection to persons
underground as would be afforded by other methods of compliance (e.g.
control doors), and avoids reducing safety by the use of other methods.
The petitioner states that:
(a) Westvaco is governed in part by 30 CFR 57.22214, which
prohibits compliance with 30 CFR 57.4760(a), if controls doors are
used.
As a Class III underground mine, ``changes in ventilation which
affect the
[[Page 67425]]
main air current or any split thereof, and which adversely affect the
safety of persons in the mine will be made only when the mine is
idle,'' 30 CFR 57.22214(a) (emphasis added). The only persons permitted
in the mine during these ventilation changes are the persons making
such changes, 30 CFR 57.22214(b). The use of control doors potentially
violates the provision and diminishes safety.
The actuation of control doors near intake shafts changes the
ventilation of the main air current, could occur while the mine is not
idle, and may adversely affect safety, even if only performed when
fire, smoke, or toxic gases are detected. In contrast, controlled air
reversal would only be instituted by management to improve safety by
moving combustion gases out of the mine and away from miners.
Accordingly, changes in a mine's ventilation via control doors has the
potential to conflict with 30 CFR 57.22214. On the other hand,
mechanical ventilation reversal of the airflow would not conflict,
thereby providing further reasons for the approval of this petition.
b. Empirical testing of the underground airflow confirms that
Tronox can accomplish ventilation reversal pursuant to 30 CFR
57.4760(a)(2).
Tronox and its predecessor have operated Westvaco since before the
Mine Act was enacted. Throughout that time, Westvaco worked with
knowledge that, if necessary, a reversal of airflow was always
available to control the spread of fire, smoke, and toxic gases.
During an April 8, 2015, MSHA spot inspections, the Secretary's
authorized representative issued the Citations to Tronox for alleged
violation of the standard. In response to the Citations, Tronox
upgraded its ventilation system. Westvaco has three intake shafts (Nos.
8, 5, and 7), each equipped with identical 1500 hp Jeffry 8HU Vane
Axial ventilation fans, located on the surface. These fans provide the
motive air forced into the mine to maintain a positive pressure,
forcing air out of the mine through Shaft Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, and 9.
Tronox engineering upgrades allow the mine's hoistman to turn off the
ventilation fans, individually or in combination, from their
workstation. The hoistman's station is manned during every shift at
Westvaco.
After the upgrades were complete, Tronox performed engineering
tests and analyses to confirm that the on-duty hoistman could
mechanically reverse the ventilation airflow in the mine by turning off
the main fans in various permutations. Specifically, by turning off one
of the three main fans that force air into the mine, Tronox is able to
maintain positive pressure while simultaneously directing the flow of
air toward a different exhaust shaft.
Tronox tested the fans' effect on underground airflow with
anemometers, smoke tubes, pressure transducers, and synchronized
watches. During the test, Tronox turned off each ventilation fan and
measured the airflow direction, velocity, and pressure fluctuations at
the bottom of the shaft, before and after each fan was de-energized.
The airflow direction was cross-checked at the top of the shaft to
validate the findings underground. The pressure transducers at the top
and bottom of the intake shaft were set to log pressure readings every
five seconds. The testing showed a quantifiable change in the direction
of the underground airflow near each of the shaft stations, which would
control the spread of smoke and toxic gases underground in the event of
a fire.
1. When the 8 Shaft fan is operating the airflow in the vicinity
traveled away from the 8 Shaft, through the east and southern
passageways, towards the longwall. The anemometer and smoke tube
recorded the velocity of the airflow in the area.
When the 8 Shaft fan is turned off, the direction of the airflow
reversed in less than two minutes, and the 8 Shaft transitioned from an
intake shaft to an exhaust shaft. The velocity of the airflow, now
traveling towards the 8 Shaft, was measured between 35 and 125 feet per
minute.
Most important when the 8 Shaft fan was running the airflow in the
three passageways--east, south, and southwest--emanating from the 8
Shaft had been towards the 5 Shaft and 7 Shaft. With the 8 Shaft turn
off, the airflow in these three passages reversed, traveling towards
the 8 Shaft and away from the 5 Shaft and 7 Shaft. In the event
Westvaco experiences a fire in the southern section of the mine, by
turning off the 8 Shaft fan, the change in air pressure would force the
smoke and toxic gases to travel towards and exit the mine through the 8
Shaft. At the same time, fresh air from the 5 Shaft and 7 Shaft main
fans would fill the passageways used by the miners to reach the two
designated escape routes at the 5 Shaft and 7 Shaft, and would enhance
the safety of the evacuation in a means comparable to, or exceeding the
safety provided by the control doors.
2. When the 5 Shaft is operating, the airflow in the vicinity
traveled away from the 5 Shaft through the north, west, and southern
passageways. The anemometers recorded the velocity of the airflow in
this area.
When the 5 Shaft was turned off, once again the direction of the
airflow reversed in less than two minutes, and the 5 Shaft transitioned
from an intake shaft to an exhaust shaft. The velocity of the airflow,
now traveling towards the 5 Shaft, was measured between 140 and 195
feet per minute.
Similar to the 8 Shaft, when the 5 Shaft fan was running, the
airflow in the three adjacent passageways--east, south, and southwest--
emanating from the 5 Shaft had been towards the 8 Shaft and the 7
Shaft. With the 5 Shaft fan turned off, the airflow in these three
passages reversed, traveling towards the 5 Shaft and away from the 8
Shaft and the 7 Shaft. In the event Westvaco experienced a fire in the
central section of the mine, by turning off the 5 Shaft fan, the change
in air pressure would force the smoke and toxic gases to travel towards
and exit the mine through the 5 Shaft. At the same time, fresh air from
the 8 Shaft and the 7 Shaft main fans would fill the northern and
southern passageways, would provide the miners with good air as they
progressed to the 8 Shaft primary hoist or the 7 Shaft northern escape
route, and would enhance the safety of the evacuation in a means
comparable to or exceeding the safety provided by control doors.
3. When the 7 Shaft fan is operating the airflow in the vicinity
traveled away from the 7 Shaft, through west passageway. The anemometer
recorded the velocity of the airflow in the area.
When the 7 Shaft fan was turned off, the direction of the airflow
reversed in less than two minutes, and the 7 Shaft transitioned from an
intake shaft to an exhaust shaft. The velocity of the airflow, now
traveling towards the 7 Shaft, was measured at 195 feet per minute.
The 7 Shaft is on the northern side of the mine, and the intake air
travels from the 7 Shaft down a westward passageway before joining the
airstream supplied by the 5 Shaft in the center of the mine. With the 7
Shaft fan turned off, the airflow in the northern section of the mine
is reversed, and the air supplied by the 5 Shaft flows into the
northern section and exhausts through the 7 Shaft. In the event
Westvaco experienced a fire in the norther section of the mine, by
turning off the 7 Shaft fan, the change in air pressure would force the
smoke and toxic gases to travel towards and exit the mine through the 7
Shaft. At the same time, fresh air from the 5 Shaft main fan would fill
the northern section passageways, would provide the miners with good
air as they progressed to the 8 Shaft primary hoist or the 5 Shaft
escape route, and would enhance the safety of the evacuation in
[[Page 67426]]
a means comparable to, or exceeding the safety provided by control
doors.
4. Overall results of engineering upgrades and Westvaco conditions.
Based on the empirical data gathered from Tronox' testing, the upgrades
permit the reversal of the direction of the airflow underground in all
sections of the mine within two minutes. This performance
demonstration, when used in accordance with the Westvaco Emergency
Control Plan, readily complies with subsection (a)(2) of the standard,
and provides equivalent or improved protection as compared to
subsection (a)(1) of the standard, while preventing a potential
diminution of safety from other compliance methods.
Control doors in an underground mine are intended to constrain or
restrict airflow and ventilation in an attempt to isolate fire, smoke,
and toxic gases. By isolating these hazards, control doors (in theory)
prevent airflow migrating from the hazardous area to sections of the
mine that can expel any hazardous gases or smoke. By isolating various
sections of a mine and restricting the ventilation, control doors
potentially trap smoke and toxic gases in areas miners may need to
travel in order to reach operational hoists and escapeways. However,
the ability to mechanically reverse the ventilation airflow in
designated sections of the mine, not only draws smoke and toxic gases
away from egress points, it provide a source of fresh air into the
areas where miners are located.
c. The installation of control doors at Westvaco could result in a
diminution of safety by reducing or eliminating ventilation during an
evacuation. The purpose of the standard is to ``control the spread of
fire, smoke and toxic gases.'' The first alternative to comply with the
Standard envisions the installation of control doors. The second
alternative envisions mechanical ventilation reversal, 30 CFR
57.4760(a). The alternatives are mutually exclusive. If Tronox is
forced to implement the first alternative, and the installed control
doors were actuated in response to an emergency, Westvaco's main fans
at the affected intake shafts would be isolated and rendered
ineffective. The fans, if left running would be forcing air into closed
shafts, and the motors would be forced out of their operating ranges
and likely stalled, resulting in a loss of ventilation in passageways
adjoining the closed control doors.
Conversely, Tronox' procedures were tested and proven to reverse
the airflow in the mine with the shutdown of a main fan. Requiring
Tronox to install control doors would restrict this airflow reversal,
and would likely increase the accumulation of smoke and toxic gases in
areas confined between any control doors that closed in an emergency. A
better solution to protect the health and safety of the evacuating
miners would affirm that an airflow reversal will draw smoke and toxic
gases out of the shaft, rather than accumulating underground where
miners are still evacuating.
Moreover, compliance with 30 CFR 57.4760(a)(2), which specifically
authorizes airflow reversal, provides a greater or equal level to
safety than the use of control doors. By continuing to operate fans at
the unaffected intake shafts, Westvaco is maintaining positive
pressure, impeding the geological formation from degassing, and
reducing the amount of methane in the mine. The airflow reversal
provides a superior measure of protection than the alternatives, which
would not impede degassing of subsurface methane into the workplace.
1. The alternate solution contemplated by 30 CFR 57.4760(a)(1),
control doors, will result in a diminution of safety to miners at
Westvaco, as compared to Tronox' installed engineering upgrades that
produce air reversal capability for use in a manner consistent with its
escape and evacuation plan. If the control doors for all three shafts
were actuated in response to an emergency, all three ventilation fans
would have to be turned off. Turning off all three fans and having the
control doors closed would put Westvaco in a more hazardous situation
than utilizing intentional reverse airflow ventilation because: (a)
Contaminated air near the fire may not be forced up the designated
exhaust shaft needed to provide safety for the miners; and (b) there
may be no ventilation source for the miners along the escape routes or
in the shafts.
In addition, the standard requires that control doors be
constructed so that they can be opened from either side by one person,
or be provided with a personnel door that can be opened from either
side, 30 CFR 57.4760(a)(1)(vi). Although this requirement for control
doors to have a method that allows miners to pass through them to reach
the intake shaft makes sense from an entrapment standpoint, the fact
that the doors may be opened during an emergency creates the potential
for toxic gases to migrate from one side of the door to the other. In
addition, opening and closing control doors or personnel doors during
an emergency creates the potential for the door to be accidentally
opened or left open.
2. Tronox' implementation of mechanical ventilation reversal meets
the criteria required by 30 CFR 44.4(a). As demonstrated by Tronox'
testing, analysis, and Westvaco's layout, Tronox' ability to remotely
reverse fan ventilation enables Tronox to direct, as opposed to simply
restrict, the flow of air underground during a fire. Airflow reversal
would be used only in emergencies, with the approval of the mine
Manager/Disaster Director or his/her designee. In the event of an
emergency, the Disaster Director will continually assess the location
of the miners and the location of the fire and/or smoke source, and the
8, 5, and 7 Shafts will be maintained as air intake shafts to provide
fresh air underground. In the event that the Disaster Director
determines that air reversal via the shutdown of airflow from one of
these intake shafts is necessary to control the spread of fire, smoke,
or toxic gases, and will not adversely affect the evacuation, the
Disaster Director will coordinate with the Ventilation Coordinator the
shutdown of a main fan to reverse the airflow in the desired area. The
Safety Coordinator, pursuant to Westvaco' Emergency Control Plan, will
inform MSHA of the airflow reversal.
For example, the Disaster Director would order the fan at the 8
Shaft to be turned off in the event there is a fire or smoke in the
southern section of the mine, and miners are to the north of the fire
or smoke source. If the Disaster Director determines that the drop in
air pressure would force smoke and toxic gases to travel toward Shaft
No. 8, and allow fresh air to flow from the 7 Shaft and 5 Shaft, the
Disaster Director would direct the Ventilation Coordinator to shut down
the 8 Shaft's main fan. During this reversal of airflow, the air in the
east, and south passageways emanating from the 8 Shaft would now
exhaust through the 8 Shaft as the miners underground continued to
execute their trained response--to evacuate in fresh air by a secondary
escape route.
In contrast to control doors, which merely segregate the intake
shafts and mine passageways into isolated or unventilated zones and can
be accidently closed or left open. Tronox' use of mechanical
ventilation reversal can provide beneficial affects to the entire mine.
The ventilation reversal can draw air, smoke, and toxic gases near the
fire away from the remainder of the mine on a continual basis as the
miners egress.
Ventilation reversal allows miners to arrive at each shaft station
without having to stop to open a control/personnel door and then close
it behind them. Moreover, the positive effects of the ventilation
reversal are preserved as the miners reach the shaft stations. In
[[Page 67427]]
contrast, a control door's integrity and the isolation at each door's
location are breached every time an egressing miner opens the control
door.
Notwithstanding the fact that Tronox' use of mechanical ventilation
reversal is entirely consistent with 30 CFR 57.4760(a), Tronox
recognizes that the benefits of this engineering solution will be
maximized with additional training for its miners. If this petition is
approved, Tronox proposes to provide additional training, beyond its
current Part 48 training, that will instruct miners and supervisors on
the ventilation reversal capability upgrades and the condition and
procedures for their use during emergencies.
Tronox continues to maintain that its engineering upgrades at
Westvaco, along with its evacuation and escape plans, comply with the
standard, 30 CFR 57.4760(a)(2), and the citations should be terminated.
Nevertheless, in the alternative to the extent MSHA contends that
control doors or other abatement means are required, Tronox
respectfully requests MSHA grant this petition for modification of the
standard. For the reasons discussed above, permitting Tronox to
mechanically reverse the ventilation, in conjunction with the proposed
additional training measures, provides equal or greater protection to
the miners than installing control doors that will constrict airflow
underground. In addition, the imposition of 30 CFR 57.4760(a)(1) at
Westvaco, as applied by MSHA, as opposed to the application of 30 CFR
57.4760(a)(2) as described herein, will result in a diminution of
safety to the miners at Westvaco.
The petitioner asserts that application of the existing standard
will result in a diminution of safety to the miners and that the
proposed alternative method will at all times guarantee no less than
the same measure of protection afforded by the existing standard.
Sheila McConnell,
Acting Director, Office of Standards, Regulations, and Variances.
[FR Doc. 2015-27820 Filed 10-30-15; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4520-43-P