[Federal Register Volume 81, Number 43 (Friday, March 4, 2016)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 11438-11445]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2016-04746]
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ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY
40 CFR Part 52
[EPA-R04-OAR-2010-0816; FRL-9943-35-Region 4]
Air Plan Disapproval; Georgia: Disapproval of Automatic
Rescission Clause
AGENCY: Environmental Protection Agency.
ACTION: Final rule.
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SUMMARY: The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) is taking final
action to disapprove a portion of a revision to the Georgia State
Implementation Plan (SIP), submitted through the Georgia Department of
Natural Resources Environmental Protection Division (Georgia EPD), on
January 13, 2011, that would allow for the automatic rescission of
federal permitting-related requirements in certain circumstances. EPA
is disapproving Georgia's automatic rescission clause because the
Agency has determined that this provision is not consistent with the
Clean Air Act (CAA or Act) or federal regulations related to SIPs.
DATES: This rule will be effective April 4, 2016.
ADDRESSES: EPA has established a docket for this action under Docket
Identification No. EPA-R04-OAR-2010-0816. All documents in the docket
are listed on the www.regulations.gov Web site. Although listed in the
index, some information is not publicly available, i.e., Confidential
Business Information or other information whose disclosure is
restricted by statute. Certain other material, such as copyrighted
material, is not placed on the Internet and will be publicly available
only in hard copy form. Publicly available docket materials are
available either electronically through www.regulations.gov or in hard
copy at the Air Regulatory Management Section, Air Planning and
Implementation Branch, Air, Pesticides and Toxics Management Division,
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Region 4, 61 Forsyth Street SW.,
Atlanta, Georgia 30303-8960. EPA requests that if at all possible, you
contact the person listed in the FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT
section to schedule your inspection. The Regional Office's official
hours of business are Monday through Friday 8:30 a.m. to 4:30 p.m.,
excluding Federal holidays.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Sean Lakeman, Air Regulatory
Management Section, Air Planning and Implementation Branch, Air,
Pesticides and Toxics Management Division, U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency, Region 4, 61 Forsyth Street SW., Atlanta, Georgia
30303-8960. Mr. Lakeman can be reached by telephone at (404) 562-9043
or via electronic mail at [email protected].
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
I. Background
On September 8, 2011, EPA took final action to approve portions of
a requested revision to the Georgia SIP, submitted by Georgia EPD on
January 13, 2011. See 76 FR 55572. Specifically, the portions of
Georgia's January 13, 2011, SIP submittal that EPA approved
incorporated two updates to the State's air quality regulations under
Georgia's New Source Review (NSR) Prevention of Significant
Deterioration (PSD) program. First, the SIP revision established
emission thresholds for determining which new stationary sources and
modification projects become subject to Georgia's PSD permitting
requirements for their greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. Second, the SIP
revision incorporated provisions for implementing the PSD program for
the fine particulate matter (PM2.5) national ambient air
quality standards (NAAQS). EPA noted in its September 8, 2011 final
rule approving portions of Georgia's January 13, 2011, SIP submittal
that the Agency was still evaluating the portion of the SIP submittal
related to a provision (at 391-3-1-.02(7)(a)(2)(iv)) that would
automatically rescind portions of Georgia's SIP in the wake of certain
court decisions or other triggering events (the automatic rescission
clause), and consequently was not taking action on that provision in
that final action. See 76 FR at 55573.
Specifically, at 391-3-1-.02(7)(a)(2)(iv), Georgia's rules read as
follows: ``The definition and use of the term `subject to regulation'
in 40 CFR,
[[Page 11439]]
part 52.21, as amended June 3, 2010, is hereby incorporated by
reference; provided, however, that in the event all or any portion of
40 CFR 52.21 containing that term is: (i) Declared or adjudged to be
invalid or unconstitutional or stayed by the United States Court of
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit or for the District of Columbia
Circuit; or (ii) withdrawn, repealed, revoked or otherwise rendered of
no force and effect by the United States Environmental Protection
Agency, Congress, or Presidential Executive Order. [sic] Such action
shall render the regulation as incorporated herein, or that portion
thereof that may be affected by such action, as invalid, void, stayed,
or otherwise without force and effect for purposes of this rule upon
the date such action becomes final and effective; provided, further,
that such declaration, adjudication, stay, or other action described
herein shall not affect the remaining portions, if any, of the
regulation as incorporated herein, which shall remain of full force and
effect as if such portion so declared or adjudged invalid or
unconstitutional or stayed or otherwise invalidated or effected were
not originally a part of this rule. The Board declares that it would
[not] have incorporated the remaining parts of the federal regulation
if it had known that such portion thereof would be declared or adjudged
invalid or unconstitutional or stayed or otherwise rendered of no force
and effect.''
In a notice of proposed rulemaking (NPR) published on July 31,
2015, EPA proposed to disapprove the portion of Georgia's January 13,
2011, submittal that would add the automatic rescission clause at
Georgia Rule 391-3-1-.02(7)(a)(2)(iv) to the SIP. See 80 FR 45635. EPA
is now taking final action to disapprove this portion of Georgia's
submittal.
In assessing the approvability of Georgia's proposed automatic
rescission clause, EPA considered two key factors: (1) Whether the
public will be given reasonable notice of any change to the SIP that
occurs as a result of the automatic rescission clause; and (2) whether
any future change to the SIP that occurs as a result of the automatic
rescission clause would be consistent with EPA's interpretation of the
effect of the triggering action (e.g., the extent of an administrative
or judicial stay) on federal permitting requirements at 40 CFR 52.21.
These criteria are derived from the SIP revision procedures set forth
in the CAA and federal regulations.
Regarding public notice, CAA section 110(l) provides that any
revision to a SIP submitted by a State to EPA for approval ``shall be
adopted by such State after reasonable notice and public hearing.'' See
42 U.S.C. 7410(l). Under Georgia's automatic rescission clause, the SIP
would automatically be revised as a result of a triggering action
without public notice. To the extent that there is any ambiguity
regarding how a court order or other triggering action impacts the
federal permitting requirements at 40 CFR 52.21, that ambiguity will
lead to ambiguity regarding the extent to which the triggering action
results in a SIP revision (and indeed, whether a particular court
ruling or other action in fact triggers an automatic SIP revision under
Georgia's automatic rescission clause). EPA concludes that Georgia's
automatic rescission clause would not provide reasonable public notice
of a SIP revision as required by CAA 110(l), 42 U.S.C. 7410(l).
EPA's consideration of whether any SIP change resulting from the
automatic rescission clause would be consistent with EPA's
interpretation of the effect of the triggering action on federal
permitting requirements at 40 CFR 52.21 is based on 40 CFR 51.105.
Under 40 CFR 51.105, ``[r]evisions of a plan, or any portion thereof,
will not be considered part of an applicable plan until such revisions
have been approved by the Administrator in accordance with this part.''
However, the Georgia automatic rescission clause takes effect
immediately upon certain triggering actions without any EPA
intervention. The effect of this is that EPA is not given the
opportunity to determine the effect and extent of the triggering court
order or federal law change on the federal permitting requirements at
40 CFR 52.21; instead, the SIP is modified without EPA's approval.
Comments on the NPR were due on or before August 31, 2015. EPA
received adverse comments on our proposed action, specifically on our
proposed disapproval of the automatic rescission clause, from Georgia
EPD. EPA also received comments from Georgia Industry Environmental
Coalition, Inc. (GIEC). After considering the comments, EPA has decided
to finalize our action as proposed. A summary of the comments and EPA's
responses follow.
II. Response to Comments
Comment 1: Georgia EPD contends that the public notice, the comment
period, and the public hearing held for the rule change that adopted
the automatic rescission clause at Georgia Rule 391-3-
1-.02(7)(a)(2)(iv) satisfies CAA section 110(l) requirements.
Specifically, Georgia EPD notes that it published public notices in
several newspapers announcing an opportunity to comment on the proposed
automatic rescission clause, held a public hearing, and addressed all
comments received during the public comment period. According to
Georgia EPD, Georgia's rescission clause already went through public
notice and comment, and there is no reason to require another round of
public notice and comment simply because the automatic rescission
clause is triggered.
GIEC likewise argues that Georgia EPD followed notice-and-comment
procedures prior to the adoption of the automatic rescission clause
that satisfy the requirements of CAA section 110(l). GIEC adds that the
notice-and-comment procedures the Georgia EPD performed are
indistinguishable from notice-and-comment procedures taken by the
Tennessee Department of Environment and Conservation (TDEC) and the
Louisville Metro Air Pollution Control District (LMAPCD) prior to
enacting EPA-approved ``automatic rescission'' SIP provisions. GIEC
contends that in approving the TDEC and LMAPCD provisions, EPA
concluded that these agencies' respective prior notice-and-comment
procedures satisfied CAA section 110(l) because they placed the public
on notice that the respective SIPs would update automatically to
reflect rescission-triggering actions. According to GIEC, because EPA
concluded that TDEC and LMAPCD notice-and-comment procedures occurring
prior to promulgation of their respective automatic rescission
provisions satisfied CAA section 110(l), EPA cannot now conclude that
the Georgia provision would not provide reasonable public notice under
CAA section 110(l) when Georgia followed indistinguishable notice-and-
comment procedures prior to promulgating that provision. GIEC contends
that if EPA were to finally conclude in this rulemaking that the
provision does not satisfy CAA section 110(l), such a conclusion would
be arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, beyond the Agency's
statutory and Constitutional limits, and otherwise contrary to law in
light of the Agency's final determinations concerning the TDEC and
LMAPCD SIPs.
Response 1: EPA disagrees with the Commenters' contention that the
public notice and comment procedures associated with Georgia's adoption
of the automatic rescission clause are sufficient to fulfill notice-
and-comment requirements with respect to any future SIP revision
resulting from the rescission clause's operation. While EPA does not
dispute that Georgia EPD provided for public comment and a hearing when
promulgating the
[[Page 11440]]
automatic rescission clause at Georgia Rule 391-3-1-.02(7)(a)(2)(iv),
that public comment opportunity did not--and could not--satisfy CAA
section 110(l)'s public-notice-and-comment requirement with respect to
future SIP revisions that would occur in the wake of a triggering
action if EPA were to approve the automatic rescission clause into
Georgia's SIP.
Contrary to the GIEC's suggestion, EPA's approval of the automatic
rescission clauses adopted by TDEC and LMAPCD does not render EPA's
disapproval of Georgia's automatic rescission clause unlawful or
arbitrary and capricious. This is because Georgia's automatic
rescission clause differs substantially from the automatic rescission
clauses adopted by TDEC and LMAPCD. First, under the automatic
rescission clauses adopted by TDEC and LMAPCD, no change to the SIP
will occur until EPA publishes a Federal Register notice announcing
that a portion of 40 CFR 52.21 has been stayed, vacated, or withdrawn.
See 77 FR 12484 (March 1, 2012); 77 FR 62150 (October 12, 2012). As EPA
explained in the final actions approving these clauses, because no
change to the SIP will occur until EPA has published a Federal Register
notice announcing the change in federal regulations, ``the timing and
extent of any future SIP change resulting from the automatic rescission
clause will be clear to both the regulated community and the general
public.'' Id. Second, unlike Georgia's proposed rescission clause, the
automatic rescission clauses adopted by TDEC and LMAPCD make it clear
to the public in advance that any SIP change resulting from operation
of the automatic rescission clause will be consistent with EPA's
interpretation of how the triggering action impacted federal
regulations.
In sharp contrast, the SIP changes resulting from operation of
Georgia's proposed automatic rescission clause would happen
automatically upon a triggering event without any public notice or EPA
involvement. To the extent that there is any ambiguity regarding how a
court order or other triggering action impacts the federal permitting
requirements at 40 CFR 52.21, that ambiguity would lead to ambiguity
regarding the specific revision to Georgia's SIP resulting from the
triggering action. Not only does the public have no assurance that
changes resulting from operation of the rescission clause would be
consistent with EPA's interpretation of the applicable federal
regulations, but after a change occurs, the exact change may not be
clear to the public.\1\ Furthermore, because ambiguity may exist
regarding whether a particular court ruling or other action in fact
triggers an automatic SIP revision under Georgia's automatic rescission
clause, it may not be clear to the public whether the SIP has changed
at all. Due to this ambiguity with respect to how the SIP might be
revised under Georgia's proposed automatic rescission clause in the
wake of a triggering action, EPA concludes that approval of the
automatic rescission clause into Georgia's SIP would authorize future
SIP revisions without reasonable public notice in violation of CAA
section 110(l).
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\1\ Georgia's proposed automatic rescission clause would
invalidate affected regulatory text, but would not actually remove
the text from the regulation. Thus, if EPA were to approve Georgia's
automatic rescission clause, it would be left up to the public, the
regulated community, and ultimately, the courts, to determine
whether and how a potential triggering action changed SIP
requirements.
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Comment 2: Georgia EPD states that after the D.C. Circuit issued
its Amended Judgment in Coalition for Responsible Regulation v. EPA,
606 Fed. Appx. 6; 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 11132 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (issued
in response to the Supreme Court's decision in Utility Air Regulatory
Group v. EPA, 134 S. Ct. 2427 (2014)), EPA removed the affected
portions of the federal PSD regulations without providing an
opportunity for public comment because EPA deemed the action to be
ministerial. See 80 FR 50199 (August 19, 2015). According to Georgia
EPD, its rescission clause is no different than the process utilized by
EPA in this rule to remove vacated permitting requirements from federal
regulations following the Supreme Court's decision.
Likewise, GIEC states that EPA's removal of 40 CFR 52.21(b)(49)(v)
as a ministerial act performed without notice-and-comment establishes
that Georgia's proposed automatic rescission clause, to the extent that
it operates to invalidate Georgia's incorporation of 40 CFR
52.21(b)(49)(v), would not contravene the public notice requirements of
CAA section 110(l). Quoting from EPA's Federal Register notice, GIEC
points out that EPA characterized its removal of 40 CFR 52.21(b)(49)(v)
from the CFR as a ``necessary ministerial act'' for which the Agency
determined ``it was not necessary to provide a public hearing or an
opportunity for public comment.'' GIEC further notes that EPA stated
that ``notice-and-comment would be contrary to the public interest
because it would unnecessarily delay the removal from the CFR of the
Tailoring Rule Step 2 PSD permitting provisions that the Supreme Court
held were invalid.''
Response 2: EPA disagrees with these comments. The April 2015 EPA
rule referenced by the Commenter did not revise a SIP submitted by a
state for EPA approval. Thus, EPA's rule was not subject to the
procedures applicable to the revisions of SIPs. EPA's rule revised
section 40 CFR 51.166, which governs the content of state SIP
submissions. But the EPA rule did not revise any SIP submitted by a
state.
CAA section 110(l) requires without exception that ``[e]ach
revision'' to a SIP submitted to EPA for approval be adopted by the
state ``after reasonable notice and public hearing.'' See 42 U.S.C.
7410(l). Thus, there are no circumstances under which a state can
revise its SIP without providing for public notice and comment on the
revision.
EPA's April 2015 action was not governed by section 110(l) of the
CAA. That rule was promulgated under the Administrative Procedures Act
(APA). Section 307(d) of the CAA says that the rulemaking procedures in
that section ``shall not apply in the case of any rule or circumstance
referred to in subparagraphs (A) and (B) of subsection 553(b) of Title
5.'' Subparagraph (B) of this section in the APA provides that an
agency need not provide notice of proposed rulemaking or opportunity
for public comment when the agency for good cause finds that it is
impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary to the public interest. See 5
U.S.C. 553(b). The APA does not address procedures for state actions to
revise a SIP. Such actions are addressed in section 110(l) of the CAA.
In addition, although EPA's rule was not subject to public comment
under an exception in the APA, EPA's action provided notice to the
public of the change in the law. Georgia's rescission clause provides
no mechanism for informing the public of a change in state law.
Moreover, EPA did not deem all of the regulatory revisions needed
to implement the D.C. Circuit's April 10, 2015, Amended Judgment in
Coalition for Responsible Regulation v. EPA to be ministerial. To the
contrary, EPA explained in the final rule removing certain vacated
elements from the federal PSD and title V regulations that the action
did not fully address all of the revisions needed to implement the
Amended Judgment because ``[t]hose additional revisions to the PSD and
title V regulations, although necessary to implement the Coalition
Amended Judgment, are not purely ministerial in nature and will be
addressed in [a] separate notice-and-comment
[[Page 11441]]
rulemaking, which will give the public an opportunity to comment on how
the EPA proposed to address those portions of the Coalition Amended
Judgment.'' See 80 FR 50199, 50200 (August 19, 2015) (emphasis added).
It is unclear how these more complex regulatory changes would be
handled under Georgia's proposed automatic rescission clause. In any
event, even if Georgia had the authority to revise its SIP without
providing for public notice and comment--which it does not--EPA's
decision to provide public notice but no opportunity for public comment
on certain regulatory changes that it considered to be ministerial in
no way supports Georgia EPD's claim that it would be appropriate to
deem all of the SIP revisions needed to remove vacated GHG permitting
elements to be ministerial and to make such changes to Georgia's SIP
without any public notice or opportunity for public comment.
Finally, Georgia's proposed automatic rescission clause is not
limited to GHG permitting requirements. Rather, the clause applies
broadly to actions that affect ``all or any portion of 40 CFR 52.21''
that contain the term ``subject to regulation.'' See Georgia Rule 391-
3-1-.02(7)(a)(2)(iv). Thus, arguments regarding the alleged lack of
ambiguity with respect to changes needed to address a triggering action
pertaining to GHG permitting in particular are insufficient to support
EPA's approval of Georgia's automatic rescission clause. Even if a
ministerial change generally (or the particular change addressed in
EPA's action) could be exempt from the requirements of 110(l), because
of the broad reach of Georgia's rescission clause, it is impossible to
conclude in advance that every automatic SIP change resulting from a
triggering action would be ministerial.
Comment 3: Georgia EPD states that the occurrence of a triggering
action and the resulting rescission would not be a change to the SIP
because the triggering action and rescission clause were already
included in Georgia Rule 391-3-1-.02(7)(a)(2)(iv). Thus, according to
Georgia EPD, the SIP is not being revised and therefore does not
require approval from the Administrator.
Response 3: EPA disagrees with this comment. Georgia's proposed
automatic rescission clause would automatically invalidate SIP language
in response to a triggering action. Such a change would constitute a
SIP revision.
Comment 4: GIEC states that ``EPA's preliminary conclusion that the
[automatic rescission clause] is inconsistent with 40 CFR 51.105 is
incorrect because EPA has been and will be afforded adequate
opportunity under the CAA and through other proceedings to ensure that
any SIP change resulting from the automatic operation of the
[rescission clause] is consistent with EPA's interpretation of the
effect of the triggering action on the permitting requirements at 40
CFR 52.21.'' GIEC states that although the rescission clause is self-
executing, ``Georgia EPD would implement the effect of the provision's
operation through permitting decisions that, under the Georgia SIP, are
expressly subject to EPA notice, comment, and objection procedures.''
Specifically, GIEC contends that the ``permit notice, comment, and
objection procedures running to EPA's benefit provide EPA with ample
opportunity to convey its interpretation of (and ultimately object to)
the effect of any [rescission clause] triggering action on the
permitting requirements at 40 CFR 52.21 if EPA's interpretation of such
an action conflicted with that of the Georgia EPD.''
Response 4: EPA disagrees with this comment. The CAA's SIP revision
procedures are distinct from the permit notice, comment, and EPA
objection procedures. Indeed, section 110(i) of the Act specifically
prohibits States and EPA, except in certain limited circumstances not
applicable here, from taking any action to modify any requirement of a
SIP with respect to any stationary source, except in compliance with
the CAA's requirements for promulgation or revision of a state plan.
See 42 U.S.C. 7410(i). Thus, contrary to the Commenter's contention,
EPA's opportunity to object to a state permit cannot substitute for the
state's compliance with the CAA's SIP revision requirements. Because
Georgia's rescission clause would automatically revise the SIP in the
wake of a triggering action, by the time EPA has the opportunity to
review the permit for a particular source, it will be too late for EPA
to ``object'' to a prior SIP revision brought about by a triggering
action under Georgia's automatic rescission clause. Georgia cannot
substitute permit review procedures for the procedural requirements
governing SIP revisions at CAA section 110(l) and 40 CFR 51.105.
Comment 5: GIEC states that it is ``highly unlikely'' that any
action triggering the rescission clause's operation would be subject to
interpretation because the provision is triggered by clear and
unambiguous occurrences--the withdrawal, repeal, or revocation of all
or part of the term ``subject to regulation'' in 40 CFR 52.21 by
executive or congressional action or its invalidation or stay by the
Eleventh Circuit or D.C. Circuit Courts of Appeal. GIEC further states
that the triggering actions do not become operative until any such
action is ``final and effective.'' GIEC comments that specifically with
respect to GHG permitting requirements at 40 CFR 52.21(b)(49)(v), there
was no ambiguity regarding the impact of the D.C. Circuit's Amended
Judgment in Coalition for Responsible Regulation, which GIEC states
would have been the ``triggering action'' if Georgia's automatic
rescission clause had been approved by EPA.
According to GIEC, EPA had (and took) several opportunities to
interpret the effect of the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Utility
Air Regulatory Group v. EPA, 134 S. Ct. 2427 (2014), on the permitting
requirements at 40 CFR 52.21. GIEC points to various memoranda issued
by EPA after the Supreme Court's decision. GIEC also notes that as
early as July 2014, EPA was on notice that the Georgia EPD construed
Utility Air Regulatory Group v. EPA to invalidate 40 CFR
52.21(b)(49)(v) and, accordingly, the SIP provision adopting that
regulation was ``no longer valid.'' GIEC states that to its knowledge,
EPA did not object to the Georgia EPD's construction of Utility Air
Regulatory Group v. EPA or the Division's conclusions regarding the
validity of 40 CFR 52.21(b)(49)(v) and the Georgia SIP provision
incorporating it. GIEC concludes that in light of the straightforward
and unambiguous manner in which Georgia's rescission clause
automatically operated as a result of the issuance of the D.C.
Circuit's Amended Judgment in Coalition for Responsible Regulation and
the opportunities EPA had and took to determine the effect of Utility
Air Regulatory Group v. EPA on the permitting requirements at 40 CFR
52.21, it is incorrect and appears somewhat disingenuous for EPA to
preliminarily conclude that the rescission clause is inconsistent with
40 CFR 51.105.
Response 5: EPA disagrees with this comment. Contrary to GIEC's
contention, it is not ``highly unlikely'' that any action triggering
operation of Georgia's automatic rescission clause would be subject to
interpretation. Among other actions, the automatic rescission clause
would be triggered by a decision by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit or the District of Columbia Circuit that declares a
portion of 40 CFR 52.21 to be ``invalid.'' It is sometimes the case
that the precise regulatory changes needed to address a court decision
involve more than simply removing the provision at issue. Under such
circumstances, the exact changes to SIP requirements brought about by a
triggering action under Georgia's
[[Page 11442]]
automatic rescission clause would be unclear.
Rather than support GIEC's argument, the D.C. Circuit's Amended
Judgment in Coalition for Responsible Regulation v. EPA, 606 Fed. Appx.
6; 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 11132 (D.C. Cir. 2015) provides a useful
example of a triggering action that involves some degree of ambiguity
with respect to how it impacts regulatory requirements. The D.C.
Circuit ordered, among other things, that ``the regulations under
review . . . be vacated to the extent they require a stationary source
to obtain a PSD permit if greenhouse gases are the only pollutant (i)
that the source emissions or has the potential to emit above the
applicable major source thresholds, or (ii) for which there is a
significant emissions increase from a modification.'' 2015 U.S. App.
LEXIS 11132, at 130-131. The Court further ordered ``that EPA take
steps to rescind and/or revise the applicable provisions of the Code of
Federal Regulations as expeditiously as practicable to reflect the
relief granted,'' and ``that EPA consider whether any further revisions
to its regulations are appropriate'' in light of the Supreme Court's
decision in Utility Air Regulatory Group v. EPA. Id. at 131. As
explained above, EPA subsequently published a final action removing
some, but not all, of the regulatory provisions impacted by the D.C.
Circuit's Amended Judgment. See 80 FR at 50199. EPA explained in that
notice that some of the regulatory changes needed to address the
Amended Judgment are not purely ministerial. Id. at 50200. Because
those regulatory changes involve the exercise of EPA's discretion to
some extent, EPA intends to publish a separate Federal Register notice
proposing those changes and soliciting public comment. Id.
Thus, contrary to GIEC's argument, it cannot be assumed that
Georgia's automatic rescission clause would be triggered only by
``clear and unambiguous occurrences.'' Rather, as illustrated by EPA's
efforts to respond to the D.C. Circuit's Amended Judgment in Coalition
for Responsible Regulation v. EPA, there may be ambiguity with respect
to the precise change to the permitting requirements in Georgia's SIP
that would result from a triggering action under the automatic
rescission clause. Because Georgia's automatic rescission clause would
automatically change Georgia's SIP without public notice or EPA
approval, any ambiguity regarding the regulatory impact of the
triggering action would lead to ambiguity for regulated entities and
the general public regarding the applicable SIP permitting
requirements. This is especially true because while the automatic
rescission clause would render the affected SIP provisions ``invalid,''
the invalid text would not be removed or otherwise identified. Thus, it
would not necessarily be clear to the public and regulated entities
which SIP requirements remain in effect and which have been rendered
invalid. Significantly, Georgia EPD (and Georgia courts) may disagree
with EPA regarding the regulatory changes brought about by a triggering
action under Georgia's automatic rescission clause. Thus, in the wake
of a triggering action, Georgia's SIP may not be consistent with
federal regulations. Given the uncertainty regarding what SIP revisions
may result from the future operation of Georgia's automatic rescission
clause, EPA cannot at this time ``approve'' such future SIP revisions
in accordance with 40 CFR 51.105.
Comment 6: Georgia EPD comments that the Supreme Court issued its
decision in Utility Air Regulatory Group v. EPA on June 23, 2014.
Georgia EPD then states: ``Ten months later, EPA still had not made any
revisions to the federal PSD or Title V permitting requirements. As a
result, on April 10, 2015, the D.C. Circuit Court issued an amended
judgment in Coalition for Responsible Regulation, Inc. v. Environmental
Protection Agency, 606 Fed. Appx. 6; 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 11132, which
vacated the Tailoring Rule to the extent that it requires sources to
obtain PSD or Title V permits solely due to a potential to emit GHGs.
This prompted EPA to remove portions of those regulations from the
Federal Register that were initially promulgated in 2010.'' According
to Georgia EPD: ``Because EPA did not publish the Final Rule in the
Federal Register until August 2015, without an immediate rescission
clause, facilities would have been required to continue to follow the
provisions in the Tailoring Rule for an additional 14 months after the
Court vacated the rule. The [Georgia] EPD automatic rescission clause
immediately did what it took EPA fourteen (14) months to do.''
Response 6: EPA disagrees with this comment. First, Georgia EPD's
comment reflects some misconceptions regarding the aftermath of the
Supreme Court's decision in Utility Air Regulatory Group v. EPA.
Contrary to Georgia EPD's suggestion, it was not EPA's delay in
revising the federal permitting regulations that resulted in the D.C.
Circuit issuing its Amended Judgment. Rather, the D.C. Circuit was
acting in response to the Supreme Court's remand of the case back to
the D.C. Circuit for issuance of an amended judgment and mandate
consistent with the Supreme Court's opinion. Consistent with standard
judicial practice, following the Supreme Court's remand of the case to
the D.C. Circuit, EPA briefed the D.C. Circuit on what the agency
considered to be the appropriate relief and waited for the D.C. Circuit
to issue its Amended Judgment and mandate before taking action to
remove provisions from the federal PSD and title V regulations.
Notably, the parties to the litigation had differing views as to how
the Supreme Court's decision should impact the federal regulations. The
D.C. Circuit issued its Amended Judgment on April 10, 2015, and EPA
published a final rule in the Federal Register on August 19, 2015,
removing those portions of the federal permitting regulations that the
D.C. Circuit specifically identified as vacated. See 80 FR at 50199.
However, as discussed above, EPA concluded that some of the regulatory
changes needed to address the D.C. Circuit's Amended Judgment are not
purely ministerial and therefore, EPA will address these changes in a
separate notice-and-comment rulemaking. Id. at 50200.
Georgia EPD's comment also reflects some confusion regarding how
Georgia's automatic rescission clause operates. Specifically, Georgia
EPD apparently believes that the Supreme Court's decision, itself, was
the triggering action under the automatic rescission clause. See
Georgia EPD Comments at 2-3. Industry commenters, on the other hand,
take the position that it was the D.C. Circuit's Amended Judgment that
served as the triggering action. See GIEC Comments at 5. This
disagreement between Georgia EPD and industry commenters underscores
EPA's statement in the NPR that in addition to ambiguity regarding how
the SIP might be revised in the future by operation of the automatic
rescission clause, there may also be confusion regarding ``whether a
court ruling or other action in fact triggers an automatic SIP revision
under Georgia's automatic rescission clause.'' See 80 FR at 45637. In
contrast, when a SIP revision is made in accordance with statutory and
regulatory requirements, there is no ambiguity regarding how and when
the SIP is changed.
Regarding Georgia EPD's comment that without the automatic
rescission clause, ``facilities would have been required to continue to
follow the provisions in the Tailoring Rule for an additional 14 months
after the [Supreme] Court vacated the rule,'' EPA notes that shortly
after the Supreme Court issued its decision, EPA announced that it
would no longer
[[Page 11443]]
apply or enforce federal regulatory provisions or the EPA-approved PSD
SIP provisions that require a stationary source to obtain a PSD permit
if greenhouse gases are the only pollutant: (i) That the source emits
or has the potential to emit above the major source thresholds, or (ii)
for which there is a significant emissions increase and a significant
net emissions increase from a modification (e.g., 40 CFR
52.21(b)(49)(v)). Memorandum from Janet G. McCabe, Acting Asst. Adm'r,
Office of Air & Radiation, to Regional Administrators, Regions 1-10,
Next Steps and Preliminary Views on the Application of Clean Air Act
Permitting Programs to Greenhouse Gases Following the Supreme Court's
Decision in Utility Air Regulatory Group v. EPA (July 24, 2014), at 2
(available at http://www3.epa.gov/nsr/documents/20140724memo.pdf). EPA
further announced that it did not intend to continue applying
regulations that would require that states include in their SIP a
requirement that such sources obtain PSD permits.'' Id. Georgia can
exercise this same discretion with respect to enforcement of state GHG
permitting requirements affected by the Supreme Court's decision that
the State has not yet had the opportunity to revise.
EPA appreciates Georgia's desire to enable its SIP to automatically
update to reflect actions that invalidate federal regulatory
requirements. As Georgia EPD noted in its comments, there are some
types of automatic updating provisions that EPA has found to be
approvable. Specifically, EPA concluded that the automatic rescission
clauses adopted by TDEC and LMAPCD were approvable because under those
provisions, no change to the SIP will occur until EPA publishes a
Federal Register document announcing that a portion of 40 CFR 52.21 has
been stayed, vacated, or withdrawn. See 77 FR at 12485 (TDEC
provision); 77 FR at 62153 (LMAPCD provision). Another acceptable
approach would be to enable the SIP to automatically update to reflect
revisions to 40 CFR 52.21.
Comment 7: Georgia EPD states that EPA has itself adopted a similar
automatic rescission clause in a note to paragraph (b)(2)(iii)(a) of 40
CFR 52.21, which states: ``By court order on December 24, 2003, the
second sentence of this paragraph (b)(2)(iii)(a) is stayed
indefinitely. The stayed provisions will become effective immediately
if the court terminates the stay.''
Response 7: EPA disagrees with this comment. The language in 40 CFR
52.21 cited by Georgia EPD has no substantive effect on the regulations
and therefore is not an automatic rescission clause. It was added by
EPA to clarify for the public that paragraph (b)(2)(iii)(a) was stayed
indefinitely by the D.C. Circuit in State of New York v. EPA, No. 03-
1380 and consolidated cases. As EPA explained in the Federal Register
notice promulgating this language, ``this rule is merely a housekeeping
measure that reflects the court order. The action does not have any
substantive effect.'' 69 FR 40274, 40275. In any event, as discussed
above, EPA's procedural obligations derive from the APA, not the CAA.
While the APA provides some exceptions from public notice requirements,
CAA section 110(l) does not.
Comment 8: GIEC states that EPA's August 19, 2015 promulgation of
the Final Rule entitled ``Prevention of Significant Deterioration and
Title V Permitting for Greenhouse Gases: Removal of Certain Vacated
Elements,'' 80 FR 501999, compels the Agency to take final action to
approve Georgia's rescission clause to the extent that it operates to
invalidate Georgia's incorporation of 40 CFR 52.21(b)(49)(v) and to
effectively remove the paragraph from the Georgia SIP. According to
GIEC, the automatic operation of the rescission clause to invalidate
Georgia's incorporation of 40 CFR 52.21(b)(49)(v) is functionally
identical to, and cannot be distinguished from, the ministerial action
EPA performed in its August 19, 2015 Final Rule. Accordingly, GIEC
contends that EPA's August 19, 2015 Final Rule rendered moot any
grounds on which EPA could rely to disapprove Georgia's automatic
rescission clause to the extent it operates to invalidate Georgia's
incorporation of now-vacated and removed 40 CFR 52.21(b)(49)(v). GIEC
further claims that EPA's final rule removing 40 CFR 52.21(b)(49)(v)
establishes that the rescission clause's invalidation of Georgia's
incorporation of 40 CFR 52.21(b)(49)(v) would not contravene 40 CFR
51.105 because such invalidation is consistent with EPA's
interpretation of the triggering action on federal permitting
requirements at 40 CFR 52.21.
Response 8: EPA disagrees with this comment. It is not possible for
EPA to approve Georgia's automatic rescission clause only for the
limited purpose of enabling the automatic rescission of Georgia's
incorporation by reference of 40 CFR 52.21(b)(49)(v). The plain
language of the rescission clause extends well beyond the GHG
permitting requirements to encompass ``all of any portion of 40 CFR
52.21'' that contains the term ``subject to regulation'' that is
impacted by a triggering action. See Georgia Rule 391-3-
1-.02(7)(a)(2)(iv). As explained above, EPA concludes that it cannot
approve this language into Georgia's SIP because it would allow for
future automatic SIP revisions without reasonable public notice as
required by CAA 110(l) and without EPA approval as required by 40 CFR
51.105.
Comment 9: GIEC states that EPA's approval of the rescission clause
to the extent that it operates to invalidate 40 CFR 52.21(b)(49)(v)
would avoid unnecessary delay in removal of this provision from the
Georgia SIP, and that such delay could likely result in confusion on
the part of the regulated industry about how the D.C. Circuit's Amended
Judgment affects the PSD and Title V regulations and PSD permitting
requirements administered by the Georgia EPD.
Response 9: With respect to GIEC's concern that any delay in
removing Georgia's incorporation of 40 CFR 52.21(b)(49)(v) into its SIP
could likely result in confusion on the part of the regulated industry
regarding applicable PSD permitting requirements, as acknowledged by
the commenter, EPA has issued several memoranda explaining how EPA
interprets the effect of the U.S. Supreme Court's decision on PSD
permitting requirements, and these memoranda are available on EPA's Web
site. Further information regarding EPA's interpretation of the impact
of the Court's decision appears in the August 19, 2015, Federal
Register notice removing certain vacated provisions from the CFR. See
80 FR at 50199. Finally, as discussed above, EPA has announced that it
will no longer apply or enforce federal regulatory provisions or the
EPA-approved PSD SIP provisions that require a stationary source to
obtain a PSD permit if greenhouse gases are the only pollutant (i) that
the source emits or has the potential to emit above the major source
thresholds, or (ii) for which there is a significant emissions increase
and a significant net emissions increase from a modification (e.g., 40
CFR 52.21(b)(49)(v)). Georgia can exercise this same discretion with
respect to enforcement of state GHG permitting requirements affected by
the Supreme Court's decision (and the D.C. Circuit's subsequent Amended
Judgment) that the State has not yet had the opportunity to revise.
Regarding GIEC's concerns with respect to the Title V operating permit
regulations, EPA notes that today's final action does not impact
Georgia's approved Title V program because a state's title V
regulations are not incorporated into the SIP and are not subject to
SIP revision procedures.
[[Page 11444]]
Comment 10: Georgia EPD states that ``if the federal GHG rule (or
part of the federal rule) is vacated and considered invalid or stayed
by the Courts, it should be immediately removed from the Georgia SIP.
The state rulemaking process can be time consuming and may not be
capable of responding to judicial, executive (including EPA), or
congressional action in time to allow the permitting process to remain
consistent with federal requirements. Therefore, Georgia EPD created
the rescission clause to ensure that Georgia's PSD rule will be
consistent with federal requirements at all times.''
Response 10: EPA appreciates Georgia's desire to ensure that the
permitting requirements in its SIP remain consistent with federal
requirements. However, Georgia's proposed automatic rescission clause
would create the possibility that Georgia's SIP would be inconsistent
with federal requirements in the wake of a triggering action.
Specifically, Georgia's proposed rescission clause would revise
Georgia's SIP automatically following a triggering action, without
waiting for EPA's public notice explaining how exactly the triggering
action impacts federal requirements. Georgia EPD (and Georgia courts)
may disagree with EPA regarding the regulatory changes brought about by
a triggering action under Georgia's automatic rescission clause,
resulting in confusion for regulated entities and the general public.
This possibility of inconsistency between the Georgia SIP and federal
regulatory requirements, and the lack of public notice regarding such
inconsistency, makes Georgia's proposed automatic SIP revision
different from other automatic updating mechanisms that EPA has found
to be approvable. For example, as Georgia EPD noted in its comments,
EPA concluded that the automatic rescission clauses adopted by TDEC and
LMAPCD were approvable because under those provisions, no change to the
SIP will occur until EPA publishes a Federal Register notice announcing
that a portion of 40 CFR 52.21 has been stayed, vacated, or withdrawn.
See 77 FR at 12485; 77 FR at 62153. Another acceptable approach would
be to enable the SIP to automatically update to reflect to the most
recent version of 40 CFR 52.21, which is the approach that EPA takes
with respect to Federal Implementation Plans (FIPs) that apply 40 CFR
52.21 in states that have not adopted PSD permitting requirements into
their SIP. Under these alternative approaches, regulated entities and
the public can be certain that any changes to the SIP resulting from
automatic updating will simply reflect express changes to the federal
requirements in 40 CFR 52.21, and that there will be no inconsistency
between the SIP and federal permitting regulations.
Comment 11: Georgia EPD notes that EPA stated in its proposed
action that disapproval of Georgia's proposed automatic rescission
clause ``does not impose additional requirements beyond those imposed
by state law'' and ``is certified as not having a significant economic
impact on a substantial number of small entities under the Regulatory
Flexibility Act (5 U.S.C. 601 et seq.).'' However, Georgia EPD believes
that requiring PSD permitting requirements for facilities that a court
has vacated and considered invalid or stayed does impose additional
requirements beyond those imposed by state law and does have a
significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities.
Response 11: EPA disagrees with this comment. EPA's disapproval of
Georgia's automatic rescission clause does not itself impose any
additional requirement on any regulated entity beyond those
requirements imposed by state law. In particular, the rescission clause
is merely a procedural mechanism by which requirements that EPA
previously approved into Georgia's SIP at Georgia's request would be
automatically invalidated in the wake of a triggering action. As
discussed above, EPA has determined that it cannot approve this
procedural mechanism because it contravenes CAA and regulatory
requirements governing SIP revisions. This action does not impair
Georgia's existing ability to request a SIP revision in accordance with
the procedures set forth in the CAA and federal regulations. Because
EPA's disapproval of Georgia's automatic rescission clause does not
impose any additional requirement on any regulated entity, this final
action will not have a significant economic impact on a substantial
number of small entities. Accordingly, EPA concludes pursuant to
section 605 of the Regulatory Flexibility Act, 5 U.S.C. 605, that a
regulatory flexibility analysis is unnecessary.
III. Final Action
EPA is taking final action to disapprove the provision in Georgia's
January 13, 2011, SIP submittal (at Georgia Rule 391-3-
1-.02(7)(a)(2)(iv)) that would automatically rescind permitting-related
federal requirements in certain circumstances. Previously, EPA approved
the remainder of Georgia's January 13, 2011, SIP revision, which
related to PSD requirements for GHG-emitting sources and for the
PM2.5 NAAQS. See 76 FR 55572 (September, 8, 2011). This
action does not change what EPA previously approved. EPA notes that
this disapproval action does not obligate Georgia in any way to make a
new SIP submittal and does not create any potential for sanctions
because this provision is not a required element of the SIP.
IV. Statutory and Executive Order Reviews
Under the CAA, the Administrator is required to approve a SIP
submission that complies with the provisions of the Act and applicable
federal regulations. See 42 U.S.C. 7410(k); 40 CFR 52.02(a). Thus, in
reviewing SIP submissions, EPA's role is to approve state choices,
provided that they meet the criteria of the CAA. This action
disapproves a state law as not meeting Federal requirements and does
not impose additional requirements beyond those imposed by state law.
For that reason, this action:
Is not a ``significant regulatory action'' subject to
review by the Office of Management and Budget under Executive Orders
12866 (58 FR 51735, October 4, 1993) and 13563 (76 FR 3821, January 21,
2011);
Does not impose an information collection burden under the
provisions of the Paperwork Reduction Act (44 U.S.C. 3501 et seq.);
Is certified as not having a significant economic impact
on a substantial number of small entities under the Regulatory
Flexibility Act (5 U.S.C. 601 et seq.);
Does not contain any unfunded mandate or significantly or
uniquely affect small governments, as described in the Unfunded
Mandates Reform Act of 1995 (Pub. L. 104-4);
Does not have Federalism implications as specified in
Executive Order 13132 (64 FR 43255, August 10, 1999);
Is not an economically significant regulatory action based
on health or safety risks subject to Executive Order 13045 (62 FR
19885, April 23, 1997);
Is not a significant regulatory action subject to
Executive Order 13211 (66 FR 28355, May 22, 2001);
Is not subject to requirements of Section 12(d) of the
National Technology Transfer and Advancement Act of 1995 (15 U.S.C. 272
note) because application of those requirements would be inconsistent
with the CAA; and
Does not provide EPA with the discretionary authority to
address, as appropriate, disproportionate human health or environmental
effects, using
[[Page 11445]]
practicable and legally permissible methods, under Executive Order
12898 (59 FR 7629, February 16, 1994).
The SIP is not approved to apply on any Indian reservation land or
in any other area where EPA or an Indian tribe has demonstrated that a
tribe has jurisdiction. In those areas of Indian country, the rule does
not have tribal implications as specified by Executive Order 13175 (65
FR 67249, November 9, 2000), nor will it impose substantial direct
costs on tribal governments or preempt tribal law.
The Congressional Review Act, 5 U.S.C. 801 et seq., as added by the
Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996, generally
provides that before a rule may take effect, the agency promulgating
the rule must submit a rule report, which includes a copy of the rule,
to each House of the Congress and to the Comptroller General of the
United States. EPA will submit a report containing this action and
other required information to the U.S. Senate, the U.S. House of
Representatives, and the Comptroller General of the United States prior
to publication of the rule in the Federal Register. A major rule cannot
take effect until 60 days after it is published in the Federal
Register. This action is not a ``major rule'' as defined by 5 U.S.C.
804(2).
Under section 307(b)(1) of the CAA, petitions for judicial review
of this action must be filed in the United States Court of Appeals for
the appropriate circuit by May 3, 2016. Filing a petition for
reconsideration by the Administrator of this final rule does not affect
the finality of this action for the purposes of judicial review nor
does it extend the time within which a petition for judicial review may
be filed, and shall not postpone the effectiveness of such rule or
action. This action may not be challenged later in proceedings to
enforce its requirements. See section 307(b)(2).
List of Subjects in 40 CFR Part 52
Environmental protection, Air pollution control, Greenhouse gases,
Incorporation by reference, Intergovernmental relations, Particulate
matter, Reporting and recordkeeping requirements.
Dated: February 23, 2016.
Heather McTeer Toney,
Regional Administrator, Region 4.
40 CFR part 52 is amended as follows:
PART 52--APPROVAL AND PROMULGATION OF IMPLEMENTATION PLANS
0
1. The authority citation for part 52 continues to read as follows:
Authority: 42.U.S.C. 7401 et seq.
Subpart L--Georgia
0
2. Amend Sec. 52.572 by designating the existing undesignated
paragraph as paragraph (a) and adding paragraph (b) to read as follows:
Sec. 52.572 Approval status.
* * * * *
(b) Disapproval. Submittal from the State of Georgia, through the
Georgia's Department of Natural Resources Environmental Protection
Division (EPD) on January 13, 2011, that would allow for the automatic
rescission of federal permitting-related requirements in certain
circumstances. EPA is disapproving a portion of the SIP submittal
related to a provision (at 391-3-1-.02(7)(a)(2)(iv)) that would
automatically rescind portions of Georgia's State Implementation Plan
in the wake of certain court decisions or other triggering events (the
automatic rescission clause).
[FR Doc. 2016-04746 Filed 3-3-16; 8:45 am]
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