[Federal Register Volume 81, Number 65 (Tuesday, April 5, 2016)]
[Notices]
[Pages 19588-19594]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2016-07738]
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DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
Surplus Plutonium Disposition
AGENCY: National Nuclear Security Administration, U.S. Department of
Energy.
ACTION: Record of Decision.
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SUMMARY: On May 8, 2015, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
issued a Federal Register notice (80 FR 26559) announcing the
availability of the Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security
Administration's (DOE/NNSA's) Final Surplus Plutonium Disposition
Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement (Final SPD Supplemental
EIS) (DOE/EIS-0283-S2, April 2015). Among the proposed actions
considered in the Final SPD Supplemental EIS, DOE/NNSA analyzed the
potential environmental impacts of alternatives for the disposition of
13.1 metric tons (MT) (14.4 tons) of surplus plutonium for which a
disposition path is not assigned, including 7.1 MT (7.8 tons) of
surplus pit plutonium and 6 MT (6.6 tons) of surplus non-pit plutonium.
At the time the Final SPD Supplemental EIS was issued, DOE/NNSA did not
have a Preferred Alternative for any of the proposed actions considered
in the Final SPD Supplemental EIS. Subsequently, on December 24, 2015,
DOE/NNSA issued a Federal Register notice (80 FR 80348) identifying the
Preferred Alternative for disposition of the 6 MT of surplus non-pit
plutonium analyzed in the Final SPD Supplemental EIS. In its Federal
Register notice, DOE/NNSA announced that its Preferred Alternative is
to prepare 6 MT of surplus non-pit plutonium for disposal at the Waste
Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) near Carlsbad, New Mexico, a geologic
repository for disposal of transuranic (TRU) waste generated by atomic
energy defense activities.
DOE/NNSA is announcing a decision to implement its Preferred
Alternative for the disposition of 6 MT of surplus non-pit plutonium,
as described in DOE/NNSA's Preferred Alternative for Certain Quantities
of Plutonium Evaluated in the Final Surplus Plutonium Disposition
Supplemental EIS. Shipments of this surplus non-pit plutonium to WIPP,
after it is operational,\1\ will be placed in the queue of waste to be
shipped to WIPP. This plutonium will be prepared and packaged to meet
the WIPP waste acceptance criteria for contact-handled TRU waste and
other applicable regulatory requirements.
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\1\ DOE suspended disposal activities at WIPP in February 2014
following a salt truck fire and unrelated radiological event
underground. Waste emplacement operations at WIPP are expected to
commence in late 2016.
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The scope of DOE/NNSA's current decision pertains only to the 6 MT
of surplus non-pit plutonium that is a subset of the 13.1 MT of surplus
plutonium considered in the Final SPD Supplemental EIS. DOE/NNSA does
not have a preferred alternative and is not making any decisions, at
the present time, for other alternatives considered in the Final SPD
Supplemental EIS. These other alternatives include alternatives for the
disposition of 7.1 MT of surplus pit plutonium for which a disposition
path is not assigned and various options for providing the capability
to disassemble surplus pits and convert the plutonium from pits into a
form suitable for disposition.
Additionally, DOE/NNSA reaffirms its commitment to the Agreement
Between the Government of the United States of America and the
Government of the Russian Federation Concerning the Management and
Disposition of Plutonium Designated as No Longer Needed for Defense
Purposes (Plutonium Management and Disposition Agreement or PMDA),
which calls for the United States and the Russian Federation to each
dispose of at least 34 MT (37.5 tons) of weapon-grade plutonium
withdrawn from nuclear weapon programs. DOE/NNSA's previous decisions
related to surplus plutonium disposition, including copies of the
applicable Federal Register notices, may be found in Appendix A of the
Final SPD Supplemental EIS.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For further information on the surplus
plutonium disposition program, please contact Ms. Sachiko W. McAlhany,
National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) Document Manager, U.S.
Department of Energy at [email protected].
For information on DOE's NEPA process, please contact Ms. Carol M.
Borgstrom, Director, Office of NEPA Policy and Compliance, U.S.
Department of Energy, 1000 Independence Avenue SW., Washington, DC
20585-0103; Telephone: (202) 586-4600, or leave a message at (800) 472-
2756.
This Record of Decision, the Final SPD Supplemental EIS, and
related NEPA documents are available at http://nnsa.energy.gov/nepa/spdsupplementaleis and http://energy.gov/nepa/nepa-documents.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Background
DOE/NNSA's purpose and need for action remains as stated in the
1999 SPD EIS (DOE/EIS-0283, November 1999) to reduce the threat of
nuclear weapons proliferation worldwide by conducting disposition of
surplus plutonium in the United States in an environmentally safe and
timely manner, ensuring that it can never again be readily used in
nuclear weapons.
Based on a series of NEPA reviews beginning with the SPD EIS and
described in Appendix A, Section A.1, of the Final SPD Supplemental
EIS, DOE/NNSA has determined disposition paths for most of the current
U.S. inventory of surplus, weapons-usable plutonium; however, 13.1 MT
of surplus weapons-usable plutonium (7.1 MT of pit plutonium and 6 MT
of non-pit plutonium) did not have an assigned disposition path. DOE/
NNSA prepared the SPD Supplemental EIS to evaluate alternatives for
disposition of this 13.1 MT of surplus plutonium.
[[Page 19589]]
Alternatives Considered
In the Final SPD Supplemental EIS, DOE/NNSA analyzed the potential
environmental impacts for the No Action Alternative and four action
alternatives for disposition of 13.1 MT of surplus plutonium that do
not have a disposition path assigned, of which the 6 MT of non-pit
plutonium is a subset. These four alternatives are: (1) Immobilization
at SRS (Immobilization to Defense Waste Processing Facility [DWPF]
Alternative); (2) fabrication into mixed oxide (MOX) fuel at SRS with
subsequent irradiation in one or more domestic commercial nuclear power
reactors (MOX Fuel Alternative); (3) vitrification with high-level
radioactive waste (HLW) at SRS (H-Canyon/HB-Line and DWPF Alternative);
and, (4) potential disposal as contact-handled transuranic (CH-TRU)
waste at WIPP (WIPP Disposal Alternative). These alternatives are
composed of a combination of pit disassembly and conversion options and
plutonium disposition options. The plutonium disposition options that
are applicable to the 6 MT of surplus non-pit plutonium are described
in Section S.9.2 of the Final SPD Supplemental EIS (DOE/EIS-0283-S2,
April 2015). For the Final SPD Supplemental EIS, the scope of analysis
for the WIPP Disposal Alternative was increased, in response to public
comment, to include the full 13.1 MT of surplus plutonium for which a
disposition path is not assigned. In the Draft SPD Supplemental EIS,
the scope of analysis for the WIPP Disposal Alternative was limited to
6 MT of surplus non-pit plutonium (described in Section S.8.2.4 of DOE/
EIS-0283-S2, July 2012). The disposition decision announced today
addresses 6 MT of surplus, weapons-usable, non-pit plutonium, not the
entire 13.1 MT of surplus plutonium analyzed in the Final SPD
Supplemental EIS.
Within each action alternative, DOE/NNSA evaluated options to
disassemble nuclear weapons pits and convert the plutonium metal to an
oxide form for disposition. DOE/NNSA has not identified a Preferred
Alternative for the disposition of the remaining 7.1 MT of surplus
plutonium (surplus pit plutonium) for which a disposition path has not
been assigned, or for any option(s) for providing the capability to
disassemble surplus pits and convert the plutonium from pits to a form
suitable for disposition. Once DOE/NNSA identifies a Preferred
Alternative for the remaining 7.1 MT of surplus pit plutonium and/or
the disassembly and conversion options, DOE/NNSA will announce its
preference in a Federal Register notice and publish a Record of
Decision no sooner than 30 days after its announcement of a Preferred
Alternative.
Preferred Alternative
As announced on December 24, 2015, in a Federal Register notice (80
FR 80348), DOE/NNSA's Preferred Alternative with regard to the 6 MT of
surplus non-pit plutonium is to prepare this plutonium for disposal at
WIPP near Carlsbad, New Mexico, a geologic repository for disposal of
TRU waste generated by atomic energy defense activities. This would
allow DOE/NNSA to continue progress on the disposition of surplus
weapons-usable plutonium in furtherance of the policies of the United
States to ensure that surplus plutonium is never again readily used in
a nuclear weapon, and to remove surplus plutonium from the Savannah
River Site (SRS) in the State of South Carolina. Surplus non-pit
plutonium would be prepared and packaged at SRS using H-Canyon/HB-Line
and/or K-Area facilities to meet the WIPP waste acceptance criteria and
all other applicable regulatory requirements. Shipments of this surplus
plutonium to WIPP, after it is operational, will be placed in the queue
of waste to be shipped to WIPP.
Environmentally Preferable Alternative
After considering the potential impacts on each resource area, DOE/
NNSA identified the No Action Alternative as the environmentally
preferable alternative in the near-term, for the 6 MT of surplus non-
pit plutonium evaluated in the Final SPD Supplemental EIS and that is
the subject of this Record of Decision. Under the No Action
Alternative, the 6 MT of surplus non-pit plutonium would be stored at
the K-Area Complex at SRS, consistent with the 2002 Amended Record of
Decision: Surplus Plutonium Disposition Program (67 FR 19432); the
Supplement Analysis, Storage of Surplus Plutonium Materials at the
Savannah River Site (DOE/EIS-0229-SA-4) and an amended Record of
Decision issued in 2007 (72 FR 51807). No new facilities would be
constructed and no processing for disposal or off-site transportation
of this material would take place with the exception of a small amount
of plutonium required for the material surveillance program.
Surveillance activities would be performed on the plutonium and
plutonium packages, including destructive and non-destructive
examinations, to ensure safe storage (DOE/EA-1538, Revised Finding of
No Significant Impact for Safeguards and Security Upgrades for Storage
of Materials at the Savannah River Site dated December 2005, and
Interim Action Determinations approved in December 2008, September
2009, and March 2011). Although the No Action Alternative is the
environmentally preferable alternative, this alternative would not
result in the disposition of the 6 MT of surplus non-pit plutonium.
Potential Environmental Impacts of Preferred Alternative
For each alternative, the SPD Supplemental EIS analyzed the
potential impacts on air quality, human health, socioeconomics, waste
management, transportation, environmental justice, land resources,
geology and soils, water resources, noise, ecological resources,
cultural resources, and infrastructure. DOE/NNSA also evaluated the
potential impacts of the irreversible and irretrievable commitment of
resources, the short-term uses of the environment, and the maintenance
and enhancement of long-term productivity. These analyses and results
for the entire 13.1 MT of surplus plutonium are described in the
Summary and Chapter 4 of the Final SPD Supplemental EIS. Table S-3 of
the Final SPD Supplemental EIS Summary provides a summary of potential
environmental impacts associated with each alternative as well as a
means for comparing the potential impacts among alternatives.
In the Draft SPD Supplemental EIS, the scope of analysis for the
WIPP Disposal Alternative was limited to 6 MT of surplus non-pit
plutonium (described in Section S.8.2.4 of DOE/EIS-0283-S2, July 2012).
The analyses and results for the disposition of 6 MT can be found in
the Summary, Chapter 4, and Appendix G ``Impacts of Plutonium
Disposition Options'' of the Draft SPD Supplemental EIS.
In identifying its Preferred Alternative for disposition of 6 MT of
surplus non-pit plutonium and making the decision announced in this
Record of Decision, DOE/NNSA considered the potential environmental
impacts that would result from operations conducted at SRS to prepare
and package this quantity (6 MT) of material for disposition at WIPP,
those related to transporting the material from SRS to WIPP, and
disposal at WIPP. Implementing the WIPP Disposal Alternative relies on
existing facilities, structures and pads at SRS to prepare the surplus
non-pit plutonium for disposal. This would reduce the potential for
additional land disturbance, and reduce the need for additional
deactivation and decommissioning in the future. Some
[[Page 19590]]
staging of packages at E-Area at SRS prior to shipping may be required.
This would result in negligible incremental impacts on both workers and
the public. The pace of environmental restoration activities at SRS, as
well as the requirements for environmental monitoring and protection at
SRS and WIPP, would generally remain unchanged from current levels.
The potential impacts from transporting surplus plutonium to WIPP
are also addressed in the Final SPD Supplemental EIS. The Final SPD
Supplemental EIS indicated that under all alternatives (including the
WIPP Disposal Alternative) no latent cancer fatalities are expected in
the general public along the transportation routes and in the
transportation crews due to incident-free transport of radioactive
wastes and materials from SRS. The potential environmental impacts of
TRU waste disposal at WIPP are evaluated in the Waste Isolation Pilot
Plant Disposal Phase Final Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement
(WIPP SEIS-II) (DOE/EIS-0026-S-2, September 1997) and subsequent
Supplement Analyses from 2005 (DOE/EIS-0026-SA-05) and 2009 (DOE/EIS-
0026-SA-07) and are briefly described in Appendix A, Section A.2, of
the Final SPD Supplemental EIS.
Public Involvement
Since the announcement of the first notice of intent to prepare the
SPD Supplemental EIS in 2007 (72 FR 14543), DOE/NNSA has provided three
scoping periods during which DOE/NNSA held public scoping meetings and
actively solicited scoping comments from Federal agencies, state and
local governmental entities, American Indian tribal governments, and
members of the public. The public scoping periods extended from March
28, 2007 through May 29, 2007; July 19, 2010 through September 17,
2010; and January 12, 2012 through March 12, 2012. Meetings were held
in Aiken, Columbia, and North Augusta, South Carolina; Tanner, Alabama;
Chattanooga, Tennessee; and Carlsbad, Santa Fe, Espanola, and Pojoaque,
New Mexico.
On July 27, 2012, EPA and DOE/NNSA published notices in the Federal
Register announcing the availability of the Draft SPD Supplemental EIS
(77 FR 44234 and 77 FR 44222, respectively). A 60-day comment period
was provided from July 27 to September 25, 2012. In response to public
requests, DOE/NNSA extended the public comment period by 15 days
through October 10, 2012. During the public comment period, DOE/NNSA
held seven public hearings to provide interested members of the public
with opportunities to learn more about the content of the Draft SPD
Supplemental EIS, to hear DOE/NNSA representatives present the results
of the Draft SPD Supplemental EIS analyses, to ask questions; and to
provide oral and/or written comments. The hearings were held in Los
Alamos, Santa Fe, Carlsbad, and Espanola, New Mexico; North Augusta,
South Carolina; Chattanooga, Tennessee; and Tanner, Alabama.
DOE/NNSA received 432 comment documents containing approximately
1,050 comments during the comment period for the Draft SPD Supplemental
EIS. DOE/NNSA responded to these comments in the Comment Response
Document, Volume 3, of the Final SPD Supplemental EIS.
Comments on the Final SPD Supplemental EIS and Preferred Alternative
DOE/NNSA distributed the Final SPD Supplemental EIS to
Congressional members and committees; State and local governments;
other Federal agencies, culturally affiliated American Indian tribal
governments, non-governmental organizations, and other stakeholders
including members of the public who requested the document. Also, the
Final SPD Supplemental EIS was made available via the Internet.
On December 24, 2015, DOE/NNSA announced its Preferred Alternative
in the Preferred Alternative for Certain Quantities of Plutonium
Evaluated in the Final Surplus Plutonium Disposition Supplemental
Environmental Impact Statement (80 FR 80348) with regard to the 6 MT of
non-pit plutonium. DOE/NNSA considered all comments received on the
Final SPD Supplemental EIS and the Preferred Alternative and concluded
that those comments do not identify a need for further NEPA analysis.
The Appendix to this Record of Decision summarizes DOE/NNSA's
consideration of these comments.
Decision
DOE/NNSA has decided to implement its Preferred Alternative as
described in DOE/NNSA's Preferred Alternative for Certain Quantities of
Plutonium Evaluated in the Final Surplus Plutonium Disposition
Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement (80 FR 80348) with regard
to the disposition of 6 MT of surplus, weapons-usable, non-pit
plutonium; DOE/NNSA's Preferred Alternative is to prepare that
plutonium for disposal at WIPP near Carlsbad, New Mexico, a geologic
repository for disposal of TRU waste generated by atomic energy defense
activities. All practicable means to avoid or minimize environmental
harm for the decision identified have been adopted.
Under this alternative, the non-pit plutonium will be prepared for
disposal in facilities at HB-Line or K-Area at SRS for disposal at
WIPP. The non-pit plutonium containers will be opened in an existing
glovebox or newly- constructed glovebox capability in HB-Line or K-
Area. Plutonium metal will be converted to oxide. Plutonium oxide will
be repackaged into suitable containers, mixed/blended with inert
material and loaded into pipe overpack containers (POCs) or criticality
control overpacks (CCOs). (DOE/NNSA plans to move toward the use of the
CCO containers in lieu of the POC to maximize the amount of plutonium
that can be packaged in each container, thereby reducing the number of
shipments and volume emplaced at WIPP.) The inert material will be
added to inhibit plutonium recovery. Loaded POCs or CCOs will be
characterized for WIPP disposal in E-Area at SRS including non-
destructive assay, digital radiography, and headspace gas sampling.
Waste packages containing surplus plutonium that have been successfully
characterized and meet the WIPP waste acceptance criteria will be
placed in the queue of waste to be shipped to WIPP after WIPP is
operational. The packages will be shipped to WIPP in TRUPACT-II or
HalfPACT shipping containers
Unirradiated Fast Flux Test Facility (FFTF) reactor fuel is
included in this 6 MT of non-pit plutonium. If the FFTF fuel cannot be
disposed of by direct disposal at WIPP, it will be disassembled at SRS
and packaged for disposal at WIPP. H-Canyon at SRS will be used to
disassemble the fuel bundles, remove the pellets from the fuel pins,
and package the pellets into suitable containers. HB-Line or K-Area
will be used to prepare and mix/blend the fuel pellet material with
inert material, then package it for shipment to WIPP.
Disposition decisions announced in this Record of Decision address
only the 6 MT of surplus non-pit plutonium. DOE/NNSA has no Preferred
Alternative at this time for the disposition of the remaining 7.1 MT of
surplus plutonium from pits for which a disposition pathway has not
been assigned, or for the capability to disassemble surplus pits and
convert the plutonium from pits to a form suitable for disposition.
Once a Preferred Alternative is identified, DOE/NNSA will announce its
preference in a Federal Register notice and publish a Record of
Decision no sooner than 30 days after its announcement of a Preferred
Alternative.
[[Page 19591]]
Basis for Decision
In making its decision, DOE/NNSA considered potential environmental
impacts of construction and operations, current and future mission
needs, technical and security considerations, availability of
resources, and public comments on the Draft and Final SPD Supplemental
EIS, and the notice of Preferred Alternative. Implementing the WIPP
Disposal Alternative for disposition of 6 MT of surplus non-pit
plutonium allows DOE/NNSA to take advantage of existing facilities,
infrastructure and expertise at SRS and WIPP. The decision builds on
the existing capabilities, infrastructure, and skilled workforce
trained in safe operation of nuclear facilities. Environmental impacts
and costs (DOE (U.S. Department of Energy) Report of the Plutonium
Disposition Working Group: Analysis of Surplus Weapon[hyphen]Grade
Plutonium Disposition Options, Washington, DC, April 2014) would be
less than some of the other alternatives that would require the
construction of new facilities. In addition, DOE/NNSA will make use of
existing facilities, resulting in efficient use of the facilities.
Blending for disposal at WIPP is a proven process that is ongoing at
SRS for disposition of plutonium material from the DOE-STD-3013
surveillance process and other non-pit plutonium. In addition, disposal
of this surplus non-pit plutonium will avoid long-term impacts, risks,
and costs associated with storage.
DOE/NNSA also considered acceptability of the surplus non-pit
plutonium at WIPP and WIPP's performance in making this decision. DOE
has previously disposed of similar surplus plutonium at WIPP from SRS,
the Rocky Flats Environmental Technology Site, and the Hanford Site
(the Rocky Flats and Hanford materials were packaged and shipped
directly from those sites). As was the case for previous SRS activities
requiring the processing of surplus plutonium for disposal at WIPP, the
surplus plutonium identified in this decision will be packaged to meet
the WIPP waste acceptance criteria and all applicable regulatory
requirements. Compliance with the WIPP waste acceptance criteria is one
factor that will help ensure that any TRU waste emplaced in WIPP will
not exceed the 40 CFR part 191 performance standards and will meet
other applicable requirements. Additionally, the WIPP TRU waste
inventory--which includes radionuclide activity--is revised annually
and reviewed by DOE for compliance. DOE's currently projected WIPP TRU
waste inventory with the addition of the 6 MT of surplus non-pit
plutonium suggests that WIPP would continue to comply with 40 CFR 191.
These projections from the TRU Waste Inventory and other information
are submitted every five years to the EPA, as part of the Compliance
Recertification Application, under 40 CFR part 194, Criteria for the
Certification and Re-Certification of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant's
Compliance with the 40 CFR part 191 Disposal Regulations. Following
issuance of this ROD, the 6 MT of surplus non-pit plutonium will be
reflected in the TRU Waste Inventory and inform the next compliance re-
certification application to be submitted to EPA in 2019.
Implementing the Preferred Alternative will allow the DOE/NNSA to
continue its progress on the disposition of surplus weapon-usable
plutonium in furtherance of the policies of the United States to ensure
that surplus plutonium is never again readily used in a nuclear weapon,
and to remove surplus plutonium from the State of South Carolina.
Mitigation Measures
SRS facility operations would result in airborne emissions of
various pollutants, including radionuclides, and organic and inorganic
constituents. These emissions would continue to be controlled using
Best Available Control Technology to ensure that emissions are
compliant with applicable standards. Impacts would be controlled by use
of glovebox confinement, packaging as applicable, building confinement
and air filtration systems to remove radioactive particulates before
discharging process exhaust air to the atmosphere, and internal
scrubbers to reduce chemical gas concentrations. Occupational safety
risks to workers would be limited by adherence to Federal and state
laws; Occupational Safety and Health Administration regulations; DOE/
NNSA requirements including regulations and orders; and plans and
procedures for performing work. DOE/NNSA facility operations adhere to
programs to ensure the reduction of human health and safety impacts.
Workers are protected from specific hazards by use of engineering and
administrative controls, use of personal protective equipment, and
monitoring and training. The Radiological Protection Program limits
impacts by ensuring that radiological exposures and doses to all
personnel are maintained As Low As Reasonably Achievable (ALARA) and by
providing job specific instructions to the facility workers regarding
the use of personal protective equipment. The Emergency Preparedness
Program mitigates potential accident consequences by ensuring that
appropriate organizations are available to respond to emergency
situations and take appropriate actions to recover from accident
events, while reducing the spread of contamination and protecting
facility personnel and the public.
Issued at Washington, DC on March 29, 2016.
Frank G. Klotz,
Administrator, National Nuclear Security Administration.
Appendix: Public Comments Received on the Final SPD Supplemental EIS
and the Preferred Alternative for Certain Quantities of Plutonium
Evaluated in the Final Surplus Plutonium Disposition Supplemental
Environmental Impact Statement
DOE/NNSA received eight letters and emails regarding the Final
Surplus Plutonium Disposition Supplemental Environmental Impact
Statement (Final SPD Supplemental EIS) (DOE/EIS-0283-S2, April 2015)
(80 FR 26559) and Preferred Alternative for Certain Quantities of
Plutonium Evaluated in the Final Surplus Plutonium Disposition
Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement (80 FR 80348). DOE/NNSA
considered all comments contained in the letters and emails. Some of
the comments included issues already raised during the comment
period for the Draft Surplus Plutonium Disposition Supplemental
Environmental Impact Statement. All prior comments submitted on the
Draft SPD Supplemental EIS and DOE/NNSA responses to those comments
have been published in the Final SPD Supplemental EIS, Volume 3,
Comment Response Document, and are not being revisited.
In announcing its Preferred Alternative for the disposition of 6
MT of surplus non-pit plutonium, DOE/NNSA stated that it had no
Preferred Alternative for other potential actions considered in the
Final SPD Supplemental EIS. Specifically, DOE/NNSA stated that it
had no Preferred Alternative for the disposition of the remaining
7.1 MT of surplus plutonium from pits and that it did not have a
Preferred Alternative among the pathways analyzed for providing the
capability to disassemble surplus pits and convert the plutonium
from pits to a form suitable for disposition. Further, some of the
comments were beyond the scope of the Final SPD Supplemental EIS.
DOE/NNSA did not address such comments.
DOE/NNSA received comments on the Final SPD Supplemental EIS and
the notice of Preferred Alternative from The Governing Body of the
City of Carlsbad, New Mexico; Shelly Wilson, Permitting and Federal
Facilities Liaison of the South Carolina Department of Health and
Environmental Control; Rick McLeod, Executive Director of the
Savannah River Site Community Reuse
[[Page 19592]]
Organization; Tom Clements of Savannah River Site Watch; Edwin Lyman
and Frank von Hippel of the Union of Concerned Scientists; Andrew
Kadak; Michael High; and Don Hancock of Southwest Research and
Information Center. The topics below summarize the concerns
expressed within those comments and provides DOE/NNSA's responses.
Topic A--National Environmental Policy Act Compliance:
Commentors were concerned that analyses of the potential
environmental impacts of processing, packaging, and disposal of
surplus non-pit plutonium, which could include some quantity of
``gap'' plutonium retrieved from foreign countries, had not been
performed as required by the National Environmental Policy Act
(NEPA) and new or supplemental EISs should be prepared. A commentor
also stated that in March 2015, President Obama authorized DOE to
pursue a defense high level radioactive waste (HLW) repository;
therefore, it is a reasonable alternative for defense surplus
plutonium that must be considered, but is not included in the
Storage and Disposition PEIS, nor the Draft or Final SPD
Supplemental EIS.
Discussion: DOE believes sufficient information exists,
including NEPA documentation, to support a Record of Decision for
the disposition of 6 MT of surplus non-pit plutonium for which a
disposition path was not assigned. DOE has completed appropriate
tiered NEPA analyses related to the Surplus Plutonium Disposition
program including the Storage and Disposition of Weapons-Usable
Fissile Materials Final Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement
(Storage and Disposition PEIS) (DOE/EIS-0229) in 1996, Surplus
Plutonium Disposition Environmental Impact Statement (SPD EIS) (DOE-
EIS-0283) in 1999, and Surplus Plutonium Disposition Supplemental
Environmental Impact Statement (SPD Supplemental EIS) (DOE/EIS-0283-
S2) in 2015.
DOE/NNSA's need to store and disposition surplus plutonium, in
accordance with U.S. nonproliferation and export control policies in
a safe, reliable, cost effective and timely manner, has not changed
since the Storage and Disposition PEIS was prepared in 1996. DOE/
NNSA did, however, become aware of new circumstances and information
relevant to the 1999 SPD EIS that did warrant re-examination of some
of the analyses provided in that NEPA document.
Consequently, the SPD Supplemental EIS was prepared in
accordance with applicable Council on Environmental Quality and DOE
NEPA regulations to examine the potential environmental impacts of
reasonable alternatives for the disposition of 13.1 MT of surplus
plutonium for which a disposition path was not assigned, including 6
MT of surplus non-pit plutonium. The SPD Supplemental EIS also
analyzed options to provide the appropriate capability to
disassemble surplus pits and convert surplus plutonium to a form
suitable for disposition. In preparing the Final SPD Supplemental
EIS, DOE/NNSA considered the analyses in the related NEPA documents
identified above. The Final SPD Supplemental EIS addresses all of
the relevant issues and analysis related to the proposed action and
updates the analyses where necessary.
Appropriate NEPA analyses exist for processing 6 MT of surplus
non-pit plutonium at SRS and transportation and disposal of the
resulting CH-TRU waste at WIPP, near Carlsbad, New Mexico, a
geologic repository for disposal of TRU waste generated by atomic
energy defense activities. Chapter 4 and Appendix G of the SPD
Supplemental EIS, describe the potential environmental impacts of
plutonium disposition options, including preparing surplus non-pit
plutonium at facilities at SRS for disposal at WIPP. Appendix E of
the SPD Supplemental EIS, describes the potential environmental
impacts of transportation of surplus plutonium for disposal at WIPP.
Section 4.5.3.6.3, of the Final SPD Supplemental EIS describes the
capacity and ability of WIPP to accept 13.1 MT of surplus plutonium
as analyzed under the WIPP Disposal Alternative in the Final SPD
Supplemental EIS. The potential environmental impacts of TRU waste
disposal at WIPP are evaluated in the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant
Disposal Phase Final Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement
(WIPP SEIS-II) (DOE/EIS-0026-S2, September 1997) and subsequent
Supplement Analyses from 2005 (DOE/EIS-0026-SA-05) and 2009 (DOE/
EIS-0026-SA-07). Also, see Topic B--WIPP Capacity, and Topic C--WIPP
Acceptance, for further discussion of these topics.
Certain plutonium recovered from foreign sources may have
originated from atomic energy defense activities. Up to 0.9 MT of
such plutonium may be included in the 6 MT of surplus non-pit
plutonium discussed in Chapter 1, Section 1.5.2 of the Final SPD
Supplemental EIS in the event that the plutonium from foreign
sources is received at SRS. Thus, the potential environmental
impacts from the processing and disposition of surplus plutonium
recovered from foreign countries, also referred to as ``gap material
plutonium'', through NNSA's Global Threat Reduction Initiative are
evaluated in the SPD Supplemental EIS. NEPA analysis for the
transportation, receipt, and processing of gap material plutonium in
preparation for disposition is provided in DOE/NNSA's Environmental
Assessment for the U.S. Receipt and Storage of Gap Material
Plutonium (DOE/EA-1771) May 2010 \2\ and DOE/NNSA's Environmental
Assessment for Gap Material Plutonium--Transport, Receipt, and
Processing (Gap Material Plutonium EA) (DOE/EA-2024), December 2015.
DOE determined that the potential environmental impacts of
implementing the proposed action are not significant, and in May
2010 and December 2015, issued Findings of No Significant Impact.
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\2\ While this EA is for Official Use Only, the Finding of No
Significant Impact can be viewed on the DOE NEPA Web site (http://energy.gov/nepa/downloads/ea-1771-finding-no-significant-impact).
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In President Obama's March 24, 2015, ``Presidential Memorandum--
Disposal of Defense High-Level Radioactive Waste in a Separate
Repository'' to the Secretary of Energy, President Obama found, in
accordance with Section 8 of the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982,
that ``the development of a repository for the disposal of high-
level radioactive waste resulting from atomic energy defense
activities only is required.'' DOE is now authorized to move forward
with planning for a separate repository for HLW resulting from
atomic energy defense activities. At present, no site has been
identified or proposed and no funds have been appropriated for
designing, constructing and operating such a repository.
Topic B--The Blending Process and Implementing the Preferred
Alternative at SRS: Commentors expressed concern that many hurdles
would remain affecting DOE/NNSA's ability to carry out this decision
once the ROD is issued. Commentors also expressed the view that no
additional surplus plutonium should be received at SRS until surplus
plutonium currently in storage at SRS is removed from the State of
South Carolina. Commentors requested information about facilities
and infrastructure for blending and packaging the 6 MT of surplus
non-pit plutonium at SRS, a description of the processes to be used
in blending and packaging and the schedule for processing and
shipping to WIPP.
Discussion: As described in this Record of Decision, DOE/NNSA
has decided to prepare 6 MT of surplus non-pit plutonium for
disposal at WIPP. This would allow the DOE/NNSA to continue progress
on the disposition of surplus weapon-usable plutonium in furtherance
of the policies of the United States to ensure that surplus
plutonium is never again readily used in a nuclear weapon, and to
remove surplus plutonium from the State of South Carolina.
This Record of Decision summarizes how DOE/NNSA intends to
prepare the 6 MT of surplus non-pit plutonium for disposition at
WIPP. For additional information, Chapter 2, Section 2.2.4, and
Appendix B, Section B.1.3, of the Final SPD Supplemental EIS
describe how plutonium would be blended with inert materials and
packaged at SRS. Blending these types of materials for disposal at
WIPP is a proven process that is ongoing at SRS for disposition of
plutonium material from the DOE-STD-3013 surveillance process and
other non-pit plutonium. Implementing the WIPP Disposal Alternative
for this surplus non-pit plutonium relies on existing SRS facilities
(with additional glovebox capability in an existing facility),
structures, and pads to prepare the material for disposal. Surplus
non-pit plutonium would be prepared and packaged at SRS using H-
Canyon/HB-line and/or K-Area Complex facilities and would be
temporarily stored in E-Area at SRS until shipped to WIPP. DOE/
NNSA's assumptions associated with the schedule for equipping and
operating facilities at SRS are described in Table B-2 in the Final
SPD Supplemental EIS.
This Record of Decision identifies DOE/NNSA's intent to place
the 6 MT of non-pit plutonium in POCs or CCOs for disposition
following its conversion to plutonium oxide and blending with inert
materials. (DOE/NNSA plans to move toward the use of the CCO
containers in lieu of the POC to maximize the amount of plutonium
that can be packaged in each container, thereby reducing the number
of shipments and
[[Page 19593]]
volume emplaced at WIPP.) For additional information, see Chapter 2,
Section 2.2.4, and Appendix B, Section B.3, of the SPD Supplemental
EIS which describe the POC and CCO containers that would be used for
disposal of surplus plutonium at WIPP.
The details of the inert materials with which plutonium would be
blended and applicable safeguards for the plutonium are classified
or official use only. The termination of safeguards process is part
of DOE/NNSA's Material Control and Accountability Program and is
outside the scope of the Final SPD Supplemental EIS and this Record
of Decision.
A schedule for shipment of the 6 MT of plutonium to WIPP has not
been established (limited waste emplacement operations at WIPP are
expected to commence in late 2016). Shipments of this surplus non-
pit plutonium to WIPP, after it is operational, will placed in the
queue of waste to be shipped to WIPP.
Topic C--WIPP Capacity: Commentors were concerned that the WIPP
unsubscribed capacity had been incorrectly calculated and that the
available volume is less than the volume described in the SPD
Supplemental EIS; thus, the disposition of 6 MT of surplus non-pit
plutonium could not be accomplished within the unsubscribed capacity
of WIPP.
Discussion: The WIPP Land Withdrawal Act establishes a total
WIPP capacity for TRU waste disposal of 175,600 cubic meters (6.2
million cubic feet). Chapter 4, Section 4.5.3.6.3, of the Final SPD
Supplemental EIS describes the capacity and ability of WIPP to
accept 13.1 MT of surplus plutonium as analyzed under the WIPP
Disposal Alternative. This analysis considered past and projected
disposal amounts at WIPP of TRU waste from across the DOE complex
and as a result of these considerations, an unsubscribed disposal
capacity of 24,700 cubic meters (872,000 cubic feet) of CH-TRU waste
was assumed for purposes of analysis in the Final SPD Supplemental
EIS.
The estimate of unsubscribed disposal capacity in the Final SPD
Supplemental EIS was made using DOE's Annual Transuranic Waste
Inventory Report for 2012. The TRU waste volumes reported in the
Annual Transuranic Waste Inventory Reports are based on final
(containerized) TRU waste forms. Projections from the Annual
Transuranic Waste Inventory Reports for 2014 and 2015, suggests that
although TRU waste disposal projections vary somewhat from year to
year, the information in these documents would not change the
conclusions reached in the Final SPD Supplemental EIS.
All of the TRU waste projected from the activities addressed in
the Final SPD Supplemental EIS is expected to be CH-TRU waste. As
indicated in Chapter 4, Section 4.5.3.6.3 of the Draft SPD
Supplemental EIS, disposal of 6 MT of surplus non-pit plutonium at
is estimated to result in 15,000 to 17,000 cubic meters of CH-TRU
waste, using pipe overpack containers (POCs) for packaging the 6 MT
of surplus non-pit plutonium. These estimated volumes can be
substantially reduced if criticality control overpacks (CCOs) are
used for packaging the surplus plutonium for WIPP disposal rather
than the assumed POCs and the unirradiated Fast Flux Test Facility
(FFTF) fuel is disposed of by direct disposal at WIPP. (If the FFTF
fuel cannot be disposed of by direct disposal at WIPP, it will be
disassembled at SRS and packaged for disposal at WIPP.)
The WIPP underground is composed of disposal rooms or ``panels''
mined from the salt beds. Disposal panels at WIPP can be enlarged
and/or additional panels can be created to accommodate the 175,600
cubic meters (6.2 million cubic feet) of TRU waste allowed under the
WIPP Land Withdrawal Act. Future waste disposal at WIPP could
involve new disposal panels that could be larger (with more capacity
per panel) or more numerous than the 10 panels that were included in
the nominal conceptual design of the WIPP underground that one of
the commentors references.
Topic D--WIPP Acceptance: Commentors requested information on
the process and procedures for acceptance of drums containing
surplus plutonium at WIPP. In addition, commentors were concerned
that disposal of 6 MT of surplus non-pit plutonium at WIPP exceeds
previously evaluated amounts of plutonium increasing criticality
risk, and that it exceeds plutonium amounts included in previous
Compliance Certification Applications to the U. S. Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA).
Discussion: The process and procedures for acceptance of surplus
plutonium blended with inert materials are the same as the process
and procedures for acceptance of any CH-TRU waste at WIPP as
described in Transuranic Waste Acceptance Criteria for the Waste
Isolation Pilot Plant (DOE/WIPP-02-3122). As required by DOE Order
420.1, Facility Safety, criticality was considered in the Waste
Isolation Pilot Plant Documented Safety Analysis (DOE/WIPP 07-3372,
November 2013) and determined to be an ``incredible event'' at WIPP.
DOE has previously disposed of similar surplus plutonium at WIPP
from SRS, the Rocky Flats Environmental Technology Site, and the
Hanford Site; the Rocky Flats and Hanford materials were packaged
and shipped directly from those sites (Los Alamos National
Laboratory Carlsbad Operations Performance Assessment Inventory
Report 2012, INV-PA-12, Revision 0). As was the case for previous
SRS activities requiring the processing of surplus plutonium for
disposal at WIPP, the surplus plutonium identified in this decision
will be packaged to meet the WIPP waste acceptance criteria and all
applicable regulatory requirements.
As described above, there are statutory limits on the total
volume of TRU waste that may be disposed of at WIPP. There are also
statutory limits on the total curies of remote-handled TRU waste,
but there are no statutory limits on the total curies of CH-TRU
waste, such as the 6 MT of surplus non-pit plutonium. The
regulations at 40 CFR part 191, subparts B and C, Environmental
Standards for Disposal and Environmental Standards for Ground-Water
Protection, applicable to WIPP, provide release limits to the
accessible environment and the regulations in Subpart B require
reasonable expectation that the individual protection (dose)
standard will be met for 10,000 years after disposal, based on a
performance assessment and other applicable information, which takes
into account the potential release of radionuclides to the
accessible environment from the TRU Waste Inventory emplaced and
projected to be emplaced in WIPP. The TRU waste inventory--which
includes radionuclide activity--is revised annually and reviewed by
DOE for compliance. DOE's projections of its TRU waste inventory
with the addition of the 6 MT of surplus non-pit plutonium suggest
that WIPP would continue to comply with applicable 40 CFR part 191
requirements. These projections from the TRU Waste Inventory Report
and other information are submitted every five years to EPA, as part
of the Compliance Recertification Application, under 40 CFR part
194, Criteria for the Certification and Re-Certification of the
Waste Isolation Pilot Plant's Compliance with the 40 CFR part 191
Disposal Regulations. Following issuance of this Record of Decision,
the 6 MT of surplus non-pit plutonium will be reflected in the TRU
Waste Inventory Report and inform the next re-certification
application to be submitted to EPA in 2019.
The WIPP waste acceptance criteria help ensure, with an
appropriate margin, that any TRU waste emplaced in WIPP will not
exceed the 40 CFR part 191 performance standards and will meet other
applicable requirements. The 6 MT of surplus non-pit plutonium will
be packaged to meet the WIPP waste acceptance criteria, thereby
providing further assurance that the additional inventory will not
challenge the 40 CFR part 191 repository performance standards.
During the disposal phase of WIPP repository operations,
criticality is controlled by the packaging requirements imposed by
the waste acceptance criteria. As required by DOE Order 420.1,
Facility Safety, criticality was considered in the Waste Isolation
Pilot Plant Documented Safety Analysis (DOE/WIPP 07-3372) and
determined to be an ``incredible event'' at WIPP. Furthermore, in
2000, Sandia National Laboratories was commissioned to conduct a
conservative analysis of the possibility of a criticality event over
the required 10,000-year performance period for WIPP. In
Consideration of Nuclear Criticality When Disposing of Transuranic
Waste at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (SAN 099-2898), Sandia
National Laboratories concluded that criticality is not a credible
event. The analysis evaluated conditions within the WIPP repository
itself including the possibility of a criticality event in adjacent
geologic media into which fissile material could be assumed to
migrate.
Topic E--Consideration of the February 2014 Incidents and
Restart of Operations at WIPP: Commentors were concerned that the
WIPP operational history and the February 2014 incidents were not
considered in developing the Final SPD Supplemental EIS and this
Record of Decision.
Discussion: The ``Foreword'' of the Final SPD Supplemental EIS
includes information on the February 2014 incidents at WIPP. DOE has
considered WIPP''s performance in
[[Page 19594]]
making this decision to send 6 MT of surplus plutonium to WIPP for
disposal. A schedule for shipment of the 6 MT of surplus non-pit
plutonium to WIPP has not been established. Shipments of this
surplus non-pit plutonium to WIPP, after it is operational, will be
placed in the queue of waste to be shipped to WIPP. DOE anticipates
resuming limited waste disposal operations at WIPP in 2016 when it
is safe to do so. Significant improvements are being implemented to
enhance the safety environment at WIPP including enhancements to
fire suppression and unground ventilation and improvements in
underground stability. DOE provides regular updates and detailed
information on the status of recovery activities at WIPP on the WIPP
Web site (http://www.wipp.energy.gov/wipprecovery/recovery.html).
These safety changes and improvements are being implemented
regardless of the decision to dispose of 6 MT of surplus plutonium
at WIPP.
Topic F--Cost: Commentors were concerned about the cost of the
surplus plutonium disposition alternatives and that adequate funding
be provided such that DOE can move forward with disposition of the 6
MT of surplus non-pit plutonium at WIPP.
Discussion: As described in this Record of Decision, DOE/NNSA
has decided to prepare 6 MT of surplus non-pit plutonium for
disposal at WIPP. This would allow the DOE/NNSA to continue progress
on the disposition of surplus weapon-usable plutonium in furtherance
of the policies of the United States to ensure that surplus
plutonium is never again readily used in a nuclear weapon, and to
remove surplus plutonium from the State of South Carolina.
Scheduling and implementation of surplus plutonium disposition
activities are subject to the availability of funds as appropriated
by Congress.
With respect to cost considerations, implementing the WIPP
Disposal Alternative for the disposition of 6 MT of surplus non-pit
plutonium would rely on existing facilities (with additional
glovebox capability in an existing facility), structures, and pads,
and when compared to the other alternatives evaluated in the SPD
Supplemental EIS, would reduce the potential need for constructing
and equipping additional facilities, and consequently reduce the
need for future facility deactivation and decommissioning at SRS.
Blending with inert materials for disposal at WIPP is a proven
process that is ongoing at SRS for disposition of plutonium material
from the DOE-STD-3013 surveillance process and other non-pit
plutonium.
[FR Doc. 2016-07738 Filed 4-4-16; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6450-01-P