National Mall: Steps Identified by Stakeholders Facilitate Design
and Approval of Security Enhancements (14-JUN-05, GAO-05-518).
The National Mall in Washington, D.C., encompasses some of our
country's most treasured icons and serves as a public gathering
place for millions of visitors each year. The National Air and
Space Museum, for example, was the most visited museum worldwide
in 2003, hosting 9.4 million visitors. Federal agencies with
facilities on the National Mall have begun implementing physical
security enhancements to protect their facilities and the
visiting public. This report responds to Congressional interest
in the efforts and expenditures pertaining to these security
enhancements and discusses (1) the physical security enhancements
that have been implemented on the National Mall since September
11, 2001, the additional enhancements planned, and the costs of
these enhancements; (2) the considerations given to incorporating
access and aesthetics into the design and approval of these
security enhancements, and how issues of access and aesthetics
are perceived by visitors in relation to these enhancements; and
(3) examples of how federal agencies are using key practices to
implement the enhancements, and any challenges the agencies are
experiencing in using these key practices. In commenting on a
draft of this report, the Smithsonian Institution, Department of
the Interior, Department of Agriculture, and National Gallery of
Art provided clarifying and technical comments, which were
incorporated into this report where appropriate.
-------------------------Indexing Terms-------------------------
REPORTNUM: GAO-05-518
ACCNO: A26498
TITLE: National Mall: Steps Identified by Stakeholders
Facilitate Design and Approval of Security Enhancements
DATE: 06/14/2005
SUBJECT: Facility security
Federal facilities
Federal property
Federal property management
Historic preservation
Museums
National parks
Perimeter security
Physical security
Recreation areas
Strategic planning
National Mall (DC)
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GAO-05-518
* Report to the Chairman, Committee on Government Reform, House of
Representatives
* June 2005
* NATIONAL MALL
* Steps Identified by Stakeholders Facilitate Design and Approval
of Security Enhancements
* Contents
* Results in Brief
* Background
* Federal Agencies Have Obligated about $132 Million for Physical
Security Enhancements on the National Mall since September 11,
and Additional Measures Are Planned
* National Park Service and U.S. Park Police
* Smithsonian Institution
* National Gallery of Art
* Department of Agriculture
* U.S. Botanic Garden
* Security Enhancements Have Incorporated Considerations of Public
Access and Aesthetics and Have Been Generally Accepted by
Visitors
* Access and Aesthetics Are Critical to the Design and
Approval of Physical Security Enhancements on the National
Mall
* Multiple Organizations Work with National Mall Agencies to
Design and Review Security Enhancements
* National Mall Agencies and Review Organizations Identified
Challenges in Designing and Approving Security Enhancements
* National Mall Agencies and Review Organizations Identified
Steps That Can Make the Review Process More Efficient
* Effects of Enhancements on Access and Appearance Are
Generally Acceptable to Visitors
* Federal Agencies Report Using Most Key Practices, but Balancing
Mission Priorities with the Need for Physical Security
Enhancements Poses Common Challenge
* Agencies Report Using Most Key Practices to Implement
Physical Security Enhancements
* Allocating Resources Using Risk Management
* Leveraging Security Technology
* Information-Sharing and Coordination
* Performance Measurement and Testing
* Strategic Human Capital Management
* Aligning Assets to Mission
* Balancing Mission Priorities with the Need for Physical
Security Enhancements Poses Common Challenge
* Concluding Observations
* Agency Comments
* Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
* Results of National Mall Visitor Survey
* GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments
* GAO Contacts
* Staff Acknowledgments
* Bibliography
* Advisory Council on Historic Preservation
* Department of the Interior
* National Capital Planning Commission
* National Coalition to Save Our Mall
United States Government Accountability Office
Report to the Chairman, Committee on Government Reform, House of
Representatives
June 2005
NATIONAL MALL
Steps Identified by Stakeholders Facilitate Design and Approval of Security
Enhancements
a
GAO-05-518
NATIONAL MALL
Steps Identified by Stakeholders Facilitate Design and Approval of
Security Enhancements
What GAO Found
Since September 11, 2001, federal agencies on the National Mall have
obligated about $132 million for physical security enhancements, with the
National Park Service and the Smithsonian accounting for about 75 percent
of the total obligations. Security enhancements include additional
security personnel, facility upgrades, and equipment and technology.
Planned enhancements include the installation of permanent security
barriers to protect against vehicle bombs.
Public access and aesthetic considerations are integral to the design and
approval of security enhancements on the National Mall. Federal agencies
must coordinate with reviewing organizations, such as the National Capital
Planning Commission, and consider aesthetics, historic preservation, urban
design, urban planning, and environmental effects when implementing
security enhancements. Although federal agencies reported that the review
process can be time-consuming, review organizations noted that early and
frequent consultation with them helps to ensure a smoother, more
efficient, and expeditious review process. GAO's survey of about 300
visitors to the National Mall, and reports from federal agencies, indicate
that visitors value access to and the appearance of the National Mall and
generally find the current level of security enhancements acceptable.
GAO's survey results also suggest that visitors regard access and
aesthetics as important priorities when adding security enhancements to
the National Mall.
Federal agencies on the National Mall reported using five of the six key
practices identified by GAO-allocating resources using risk management,
leveraging technology, information-sharing and coordination, performance
management and testing, and strategic management of human capital-in
implementing physical security enhancements. However, none of the federal
agencies on the National Mall reported using the key practice of aligning
assets to mission in implementing security measures because they believe
they do not have excess or underutilized facilities or consider the
practice applicable to property under their jurisdiction. Agencies
identified balancing ongoing mission priorities with the need for security
as a common challenge in using key practices to implement physical
security enhancements.
Current and Proposed Security Enhancements at the National Museum of
Natural History
Source: National Capital Planning Commission. Current security measures at
the National Museum of Natural History (left). Planned perimeter security
improvements as depicted in the artistic rendering (right).
United States Government Accountability Office
Contents
Letter 1
Results in Brief 3 Background 5 Federal Agencies Have Obligated about $132
Million for Physical
Security Enhancements on the National Mall since September 11,
and Additional Measures Are Planned 11 Security Enhancements Have
Incorporated Considerations of Public
Access and Aesthetics and Have Been Generally Accepted by
Visitors 22 Federal Agencies Report Using Most Key Practices, but
Balancing
Mission Priorities with the Need for Physical Security
Enhancements Poses Common Challenge 36 Concluding Observations 45 Agency
Comments 45
Appendixes
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology 47
Appendix II: Results of National Mall Visitor Survey 52
Appendix III: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments 56
GAO Contacts 56
Staff Acknowledgments 56
57
Bibliography
Advisory Council on Historic Preservation 57 Department of the Interior 57
National Capital Planning Commission 57 National Coalition to Save Our
Mall 58
Table 1: Total Obligations for Physical Security Enhancements on
Tables
the National Mall, Fiscal Years 2002 through 2004
Figure 1: The National Mall in Washington, D.C. 6
Figures
Figure 2: Key Practices in Facility Protection 11 Figure 3: Phased
Implementation of USDA Physical Security Enhancements 21 Figure 4:
Incorporation of Physical Security Enhancements in the National Museum of
the American Indian 24
Page i GAO-05-518 National Mall Security
Contents
Figure 5: Modifications to Physical Security Enhancements of the
Washington Monument 26
Figure 6: Current and Proposed Security Enhancements at the
National Museum of Natural History 34
Figure 7: Visitor Survey Results on Access to and Appearance of
the National Mall 35
Abbreviations
ACHP Advisory Council on Historic Preservation
CFA U.S. Commission of Fine Arts
DHS Department of Homeland Security
EOC Emergency Operations Center
FEMA Federal Emergency Management Agency
FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation
HVAC heating, ventilating, and air-conditioning
NCPC National Capital Planning Commission
NEPA National Environmental Policy Act
NHPA National Historic Preservation Act
NM&I National Monuments and Icons Assessment Methodology
SHPO State Historic Preservation Officer
USBG U.S. Botanic Garden
USDA U.S. Department of Agriculture
This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright
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separately.
A
United States Government Accountability Office Washington, D.C. 20548
June 14, 2005
The Honorable Tom Davis Chairman, Committee on Government Reform House of
Representatives
Dear Mr. Chairman:
Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, increased attention has
been given to protecting our nation's key assets, whose destruction could
result not only in the loss of life, but in the loss of irreplaceable
items from American history and of structures that have come to symbolize
America worldwide. The National Mall in Washington, D.C., encompasses some
of our country's most treasured icons and serves as a public gathering
place for millions of visitors each year. The National Air and Space
Museum, for example, was the world's most frequently visited museum in
2003, with 9.4 million visitors. As such, federal agencies and entities1
with facilities on the National Mall2-the National Park Service,
Smithsonian Institution, National Gallery of Art, Department of
Agriculture, and U.S. Botanic Garden-have implemented and are continuing
to implement physical security enhancements to protect their facilities,
employees, and the visiting public. To assist in financing the anticipated
costs of designing and implementing new security enhancements, Congress
provided supplemental appropriations to most of these federal agencies in
fiscal year 2002.3 In addition, the agencies have funded security
enhancements from their annual appropriations acts.
1For the purposes of this report, we are using the term "agency" to refer
to all five federal entities noted.
2For the purposes of this report, the National Mall has been designated as
the area extending from the foot of the U.S. Capitol grounds west to the
Washington Monument, proceeding west to the Lincoln Memorial, and
continuing southeast to the Jefferson Memorial. It also includes the area
between Constitution and Independence Avenues between 1st and 14th
Streets.
3P.L. 107-117, 115 Stat. 2230 (2002).
We have issued several reports on the physical security of federal
facilities. For example, in November 2004, we identified a set of key
practices that can provide a framework for guiding federal agencies'
facility protection efforts.4 To assist the Committee in its oversight
role, this report discusses
(1)
the physical security enhancements that have been implemented on
the National Mall since September 11, the additional enhancements
planned, and the costs of these enhancements; (2) the
considerations given to incorporating access and aesthetics in
designing and approving physical security enhancements on the
National Mall, and how issues of access and aesthetics are
perceived by visitors in relation to these enhancements; and
(3)
examples of how federal agencies are using key practices to
implement physical security enhancements on the National Mall, and
any challenges the agencies are experiencing in using these key
practices.
To accomplish all of these objectives, we reviewed historical plans for
the design, expansion, and maintenance of the National Mall;
appropriations acts and accompanying legislative material; statutory and
regulatory provisions related to security enhancements of the National
Mall grounds; and federal agency proposals for implementing physical
security enhancements on the National Mall. We also received information
about obligations and costs associated with physical security enhancements
on the National Mall since the terrorist attacks of September 11. We
interviewed officials of the National Park Service, U.S. Park Police,
Smithsonian Institution, National Gallery of Art, Department of
Agriculture, U.S. Botanic Garden, U.S. Capitol Police, National Capital
Planning Commission, U.S. Commission of Fine Arts, Advisory Council for
Historic Preservation, District of Columbia's Historic Preservation
Office, Department of Homeland Security, and National Coalition to Save
Our Mall. Furthermore, we surveyed about 300 visitors to the National Mall
on 5 days in October and November 2004 to obtain reactions about security
enhancements. We performed our work from August 2004 through May 2005 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. (See
app. I for a more detailed discussion of the report's scope and
methodology; also see app. II for the results of our National Mall Visitor
Survey.)
4GAO, Homeland Security: Further Actions Needed to Coordinate Federal
Agencies' Facility Protection Efforts and Promote Key Practices, GAO-05-49
(Washington, D.C.: Nov. 30, 2004).
Page 2 GAO-05-518 National Mall Security
Results in Brief
Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, federal agencies on the
National Mall have obligated about $132 million for physical security
enhancements, with two agencies accounting for about three-quarters of the
obligations incurred. Specifically, the National Park Service accounted
for about $57 million, or 43 percent of the total obligations, and the
Smithsonian Institution accounted for an additional 32 percent of the
total obligations. Security enhancements implemented by these federal
agencies include additional security personnel, facility upgrades, and
equipment and technology. Additional security enhancements planned by
these federal agencies include the installation of permanent perimeter
security barriers to protect against vehicle bombs and of technological
upgrades to improve surveillance and monitor access into facilities.
However, the implementation of physical security enhancements on the
National Mall is shaped, in part, by the availability of funds and the
costs of enhancements. Federal agencies typically adjust their security
plans on the basis of available funding.
Public access and aesthetic considerations are integral to the design and
approval of security enhancements on the National Mall. Federal agencies
are required to coordinate with review organizations, such as the National
Capital Planning Commission, and consider aesthetics, historic
preservation, urban design, urban planning, and environmental impacts when
implementing physical security enhancements. Although federal agencies
told us the review process can be time-consuming, review organizations
noted that early and frequent consultation with review organizations helps
to ensure a smoother, more efficient, and expeditious review process.
These officials also noted that informal consultations should occur during
the project's preliminary design phase and continue throughout the design
of the security project. For example, the Smithsonian Institution
consulted with all of the review organizations before developing a concept
design for its perimeter security projects and, as a result, received
favorable reviews from all stakeholders on its preliminary design.
Finally, our survey results and reports from federal agencies indicate
that visitors value access to and the appearance of the National Mall, and
that they generally find the current level of security enhancements
acceptable. Our survey results further suggest that visitors regard access
and aesthetics as important priorities when adding security enhancements
to the National Mall.
In past work, we identified six key practices that have emerged from the
increased attention to facilities protection that, collectively, could
provide a framework for guiding federal agencies' ongoing facility
protection efforts. These key practices are allocating resources using
risk management, leveraging security technology, information-sharing and
coordination, performance management and testing, strategic management of
human capital, and aligning assets to mission. Federal agencies on the
National Mall reported using five of these six key practices in
implementing physical security enhancements. For example, agencies told us
they use risk assessments to efficiently allocate resources to mitigate
areas of greatest risk first. In addition, agencies reported integrating
new technologies to extend the capabilities of security staff and to
improve their facilities' overall operating efficiencies. Agencies also
reported sharing information through periodic meetings, including
performance measures in their strategic plans, and providing new training
programs for security personnel. However, none of the federal agencies on
the National Mall reported using the key practice of aligning assets to
mission, which involves the reduction of underutilized or excess
facilities in order to reduce vulnerabilities, in implementing security
measures on the National Mall. Agencies reported that they do not believe
that they have any excess or underutilized facilities on the National Mall
or elsewhere or do not consider this practice applicable to property under
their jurisdiction. For example, one agency reported that all of its
facilities are needed to execute its mission of increasing and diffusing
knowledge, and that the closure of any of its facilities would therefore
be inconsistent with its mission. Federal agencies identified balancing
ongoing mission priorities with security needs as a common challenge in
using key practices to implement physical security enhancements.
In commenting on a draft of this report, the Smithsonian Institution,
Department of the Interior, Department of Agriculture, and National
Gallery of Art provided clarifying and technical comments, which we
incorporated into this report where appropriate.
Background
The National Mall in Washington, D.C., traces its history in part to plans
developed by Pierre Charles L'Enfant and the U.S. Senate's Park Commission
of the District of Columbia-commonly known as the McMillan Commission. The
L'Enfant Plan of 1791 envisioned the National Mall as a grand avenue
beginning at the U.S. Capitol and extending west to the current site of
the Washington Monument. The McMillan Commission Plan of 1901-1902
extended the National Mall further west and south to the future sites of
the Lincoln and Jefferson Memorials. Multiple geographic definitions of
the National Mall exist. For example, the narrowest definition of the
National Mall encompasses the area between 1st and 14th Streets and
Constitution and Independence Avenues. Broader definitions of the National
Mall extend its boundaries to include the grounds of the Washington
Monument and the grounds of the Lincoln and Jefferson Memorials, while
other definitions also include the U.S. Capitol, the White House, the
Ellipse, and West Potomac Park. For the purposes of our report, we defined
the National Mall as the area extending from the foot of the U.S. Capitol
grounds west to the Washington Monument and proceeding further west and
southeast to include the Lincoln and Jefferson Memorials. It also includes
the area between Constitution and Independence Avenues between 1st and
14th Streets (see fig. 1).5
5We did not include the White House or U.S. Capitol Building because
security enhancements for these buildings fall under the jurisdiction of
the U.S. Secret Service and the U.S. Capitol Police, respectively.
Page 5 GAO-05-518 National Mall Security
Figure 1: The National Mall in Washington, D.C.
Source: Department of the Interior's National Park Service.
The open spaces of the National Mall, along with the Washington Monument,
the Lincoln and Jefferson Memorials, and other memorials,6 are
(1) administered and maintained by the National Capital Parks unit of the
National Park Service (Park Service), which is within the Department of
the Interior (Interior), and (2) patrolled by the U.S. Park Police. In
addition, other federal agencies control and maintain various facilities
located on the National Mall, as described below:
o Smithsonian Institution (Smithsonian): Created as a trust
instrumentality of the United States by an act of Congress in 1846,7 the
Smithsonian is considered the world's largest museum and research complex,
featuring 11 facilities on the National Mall-that is, the
6The Franklin Delano Roosevelt Memorial, Korean War Veterans Memorial,
Vietnam Veterans Memorial, and World War II Memorial are also located on
the National Mall.
7The Smithsonian Institution was created in accordance with the terms of a
bequest made by James Smithson of England to form "an establishment for
the increase and diffusion of knowledge among men." In total, the
Smithsonian consists of 18 museums and galleries, the National Zoological
Park, and 10 science centers.
Page 6 GAO-05-518 National Mall Security
Smithsonian Castle, Arts and Industries Building, Freer Gallery of Art,
Hirshhorn Museum and Sculpture Garden, National Air and Space
Museum, National Museum of African Art, National Museum of
American History, National Museum of the American Indian, National
Museum of Natural History, Arthur M. Sackler Gallery, and S. Dillon
Ripley Center.
o National Gallery of Art (National Gallery): With the gift of Andrew W.
Mellon's collection of paintings and works of sculptures, the National
Gallery was created by a joint resolution of Congress in 1937. Located
at the northeast corner of the National Mall, the National Gallery
today maintains two buildings-the West and East Buildings, opened in
1941 and 1978, respectively-and an outdoor Sculpture Garden, opened to
the public in 1999.
o Department of Agriculture (USDA): The only cabinet-level agency
building located on the National Mall is the USDA's Whitten Building.8
In 1995, this building was named for former U.S. Representative Jamie
L. Whitten.
* U.S. Botanic Garden (USBG): Tracing its origins as far back as
1816, USBG is managed under the direction of the Joint Committee
on the Library, with the Architect of the Capitol responsible for
the garden's operations and maintenance. USBG's Conservatory and
the adjacent outdoor National Garden (currently under
construction) are situated on the southeast corner of the
National Mall. Security for USBG is provided by the U.S. Capitol
Police.
* Along with the federal agencies that manage facilities on the
National Mall, several governmental and other entities have an
oversight, advisory, or advocacy role related to the
construction, renovation, or modification of facilities,
including the implementation of security enhancements, on the
National Mall and throughout Washington, D.C. These entities
include the following:
o National Capital Planning Commission (NCPC): NCPC, which is the
federal government's central planning agency for the National Capital
8The headquarters complex of the Department of Agriculture also includes
the South and Yates Buildings and the Cotton Annex; however, these
buildings are not located directly on the National Mall.
Page 7 GAO-05-518 National Mall Security
Region, provides planning guidance for the development of federal land and
buildings in the city. NCPC and federal agencies must comply with both the
National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) and the National Historic
Preservation Act (NHPA). These laws require that federal agencies consider
the effects of their undertakings on environmental quality and historic
properties, respectively, and allow for public participation and comment.
NCPC's policies and procedures are meant to ensure compliance with these
laws during its review process. NCPC also reviews the design of federal
construction projects, oversees long-range planning for development, and
monitors capital investment by federal agencies.
* Commission of Fine Arts (CFA): CFA provides advice to federal and
* D.C. government agencies on matters of art and architecture that
affect the appearance of the capital city.
o D.C. State Historic Preservation Officer (SHPO) and Advisory Council
on Historic Preservation (ACHP): Federal agencies that undertake the
construction or renovation of properties in Washington, D.C., are
required by law to assess whether there may be effects to designated
historic properties, engage in consultation with the SHPO9 on effects
to historic properties, and provide ACHP with an opportunity to
comment. ACHP promotes the preservation, enhancement, and productive
use of the nation's historic resources and reviews federal programs
and policies to promote effectiveness, coordination, and consistency
with national preservation policies.
o National Coalition to Save Our Mall: Founded in 2000, the coalition is
made up of professional and civic organizations and concerned artists,
historians, and citizens to provide a national constituency dedicated
to the protection and preservation of the National Mall in Washington,
D.C. The coalition's mission is to "defend our national gathering
place and symbol of Constitutional principles against threats posed by
recent and ongoing proposals-for new memorials, security barriers,
service buildings and roads-that would encroach on the Mall's
historical and cultural integrity, its open spaces and sweeping
vistas, and its significance in American public life."
9The State Historic Preservation Officer is appointed by the Mayor of
Washington, D.C.
The physical security of federal facilities, including those on the
National Mall, has been a more urgent governmentwide concern since the
1995 bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City,
Oklahoma. The vulnerability of our nation's infrastructure was further
highlighted after the terrorist attacks of September 11. Since the
September 11 attacks, actions have been taken to better protect our
critical infrastructure and key assets from future attacks of terrorism.
In 2002, the Administration's Office of Homeland Security issued The
National Strategy for Homeland Security, which recognized the potential
for attacks on national monuments and icons and identified Interior as the
lead federal agency with jurisdiction over these key assets.10 The
Administration outlined actions that Interior should take to protect
national icons and monuments in The National Strategy for the Physical
Protection of Critical Infrastructures and Key Assets in 2003.11
Furthermore, the Administration issued Homeland Security Presidential
Directive 7 in December 2003, establishing a national policy for federal
agencies to identify and prioritize U.S. critical infrastructure and key
resources and to protect them from terrorist attacks.12
10Office of Homeland Security, The National Strategy for Homeland
Security, July 2002.
11Office of Homeland Security, The National Strategy for the Physical
Protection of Critical Infrastructures and Key Assets, February 2003. The
National Strategy directs Interior to take the lead on the following
initiatives to protect national icons and monuments: define critical
criteria for national monuments, icons, and symbols; conduct threat and
vulnerability assessments; retain a quality security force; conduct
security-focused public outreach and awareness programs; collaborate with
state and local governments and private foundations to ensure the
protection of symbols and icons outside the federal domain; evaluate
innovative technologies; and make provisions for extra security during
high-profile events.
12Homeland Security Presidential Directive Number 7, Critical
Infrastructure Identification, Prioritization, and Protection, December
17, 2003.
In response to the effects of what were viewed as makeshift security
measures that affected the historic design and streetscape of Washington,
D.C., NCPC's Interagency Task Force issued a report in October 2001-
Designing for Security in the Nation's Capital-identifying design
strategies to improve mobility and aesthetic conditions throughout
Washington, D.C.13 The following year, NCPC released a design framework
and implementation strategy for Washington's "monumental core" and
downtown area, National Capital Urban Design and Security Plan, which
provided a summary of building perimeter security considerations;
streetscape design concepts that incorporate security components; and an
implementation strategy for the design, construction, funding,
maintenance, and operations of security installations in Washington,
D.C.14 (See the bibliography for additional reports related to this
topic.)
Likewise, improving the physical security of federal facilities has been
the subject of several GAO reports, including our November 2004 report.15
In that report, we assessed the actions of the federal government's
Interagency Security Committee in coordinating federal facility protection
efforts and delineated a set of six key practices emerging from the
collective practices of federal agencies to provide a framework for
guiding agencies' facility protection efforts (see fig. 2). As previously
mentioned, these key practices are allocating resources using risk
management, leveraging technology, information-sharing and coordination,
performance measurement and testing, aligning assets to mission, and
strategic management of human capital.
13NCPC, Designing for Security in the Nation's Capital, October 2001. The
Interagency Task Force included representatives from the Departments of
the Interior, State, the Treasury, Defense, and Justice; the General
Services Administration, Central Intelligence Agency, Federal Bureau of
Investigation, U.S. Secret Service, National Park Service, Federal Highway
Administration, Architect of the Capitol, and U.S. Capitol Police; the
House Committee on Government Reform and Senate Committee on Governmental
Affairs; various D.C. government agencies; and other interested parties.
14NCPC, National Capital Urban Design and Security Plan, October 2002.
15GAO-05-49 .
Figure 2: Key Practices in Facility Protection
Federal Agencies Have Obligated about $132 Million for Physical Security
Enhancements on the National Mall since September 11, and Additional Measures
Are Planned
Source: GAO.
Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, about $132 million has been
obligated for physical security enhancements by federal agencies for
facilities on the National Mall. Overall, the Park Service and the
Smithsonian have incurred higher levels of obligations for physical
security enhancements than other agencies because they manage most of the
facilities on the National Mall (see table 1). Federal agencies obligated
funds for physical security enhancements from funds made available through
annual and supplemental appropriations.
Table 1: Total Obligations for Physical Security Enhancements on the
National Mall, Fiscal Years 2002 through 2004
Dollars in millions
Fiscal year Park Service Smithsonian National Gallery USDA USBG
2002 $19.0 $17.1a $1.4 $8.5 $0
2003 14.4 17.3 2.1 9.5 0.6
2004 24.0 7.2 3.7 7.1 0
Total $57.4b $41.6c $7.2d $25.1e $0.6f
Sources: Department of the Interior's National Park Service, Smithsonian
Institution, National Gallery of Art, Department of Agriculture, and U.S.
Botanic Garden.
aObligation includes $2.25 million for temporary security barriers.
bPark Service obligations include $24.5 million for Park Police security
personnel, including some overtime, and equipment.
cSecurity personnel costs are included in the obligation totals for each
fiscal year.
dObligations for security personnel are not included because no additional
security personnel were hired after September 11.
eSome obligations made for the entire headquarters complex of USDA are
included.
fObligations at USBG have been made by the U.S. Capitol Police since 2003.
The U.S. Capitol Police did not incur any obligations for physical
security enhancements at USBG in fiscal year 2004. No obligations were
incurred in fiscal year 2002.
The implementation of physical security enhancements on the National Mall
is shaped, in part, by the availability of funds and the costs of
enhancements. Federal agencies often adjust their security plans on the
basis of available funding. The remaining text in this section describes
the physical security enhancements for which these agencies told us they
have obligated funds, as well as some of the costs associated with
implementing these enhancements. Additional planned physical security
enhancements for each of the agencies are also discussed.
National Park Service and The Park Service and the Park Police told us
they obligated over $57
million for physical security enhancements, including security personnel,
U.S. Park Police
on the National Mall during fiscal years 2002 through 2004, primarily at
the Washington Monument and the Lincoln and Jefferson Memorials.16 For
each of these monuments and memorials, the Park Service incurred such
16The Park Service has not obligated funds at any of its other memorials
on the National Mall, such as the World War II Memorial, for vehicle
barrier systems. Funds have been obligated for closed-circuit television
systems at various locations on the National Mall.
Page 12 GAO-05-518 National Mall Security
obligations to conduct site surveys; develop security proposals; comply
with environmental, historical, and design guidelines; hire construction
managers; and replace temporary security measures with permanent security
enhancements. Perimeter security construction was under way at both the
Washington Monument and the Lincoln Memorial during our review, while
designs for perimeter security at the Jefferson Memorial have not been
finalized. The following text provides some examples of perimeter security
enhancements implemented and planned at each of these national icons.
o The Washington Monument: After September 11, the Park Service installed
closed-circuit television cameras, in addition to temporary security
measures, such as a ring of jersey barriers and a visitor screening
facility at the Washington Monument. During our review, the Monument was
closed to the public because of construction to replace these temporary
security features with permanent security enhancements. The Monument
reopened in April 2005, and the grounds are expected to reopen in early
summer. The grounds will be regraded, and 30-inch retaining walls, serving
as both vehicle barriers and visitor seating, will surround the Monument.
In addition, pedestrian pathways, upgraded lighting, and seating benches
are expected to be installed on the Monument grounds. The total cost of
constructing these permanent physical security enhancements is estimated
at $12.2 million. The Park Service also told us it is considering the
installation of a remote visitor screening facility; however,
implementation of this security enhancement had not been approved or
scheduled.17
17The Park Service initially had plans for an underground visitor
screening facility.
Smithsonian Institution
In fiscal years 2002 through 2004, the Smithsonian obligated approximately
$42 million for numerous physical security enhancements, such as
additional security personnel, periodic risk assessments, perimeter
vehicle barriers, blast mitigation film, closed-circuit television
cameras, emergency voice systems, and electronic screening of the public
and mail at its National Mall facilities. Some of these security
enhancements were already completed at the time of our review. In other
cases, enhancements already existed in a facility or are planned to be
implemented during future renovations. Smithsonian officials noted that
they have established priorities for the implementation of physical
security enhancements, identifying as their top priorities the
installation of perimeter security barriers and of blast protection film
on their facilities' windows. The Smithsonian plans to obligate an
additional $72 million to implement these and other security enhancements
between fiscal years 2006 through 2012.19
o Perimeter vehicle barriers: Permanent barriers around the exterior of
each of the Smithsonian's National Mall facilities will replace
existing temporary barriers to provide protection from vehicle bombs.
According to the Smithsonian, this security measure, which is to be
implemented in three phases, is one of its highest priorities. The
first phase, the construction of a perimeter barrier around the
National Air and Space Museum, has already begun and is expected to be
completed in February 2006.20 The second phase, the construction of
perimeter barriers around the Smithsonian's National Museum of
American History and National Museum of Natural History is expected to
begin in July 2006 and to be completed in June 2008. The final phase,
addressing perimeter security for the remaining Smithsonian facilities
on the National Mall, will be implemented between April 2008 and April
2010. Smithsonian officials told us that $11 million was obligated for
this project in fiscal years 2002 and 2003, and that an additional
$24.7 million is planned for obligation through fiscal year 2008.
o Blast-resistant window system enhancement: For this enhancement, which
is designed to prevent or reduce the number of deaths or injuries from
flying glass, the Smithsonian obligated a total of $1.8 million in
19The Smithsonian's planned obligations do not include security personnel.
20Due to delays in obtaining the required stone, this project has been
delayed from its original completion date of October 2005.
Page 16 GAO-05-518 National Mall Security
fiscal years 2003 and 2004 and plans to obligate an additional $44.9
million through fiscal year 2012 to implement this measure.
o Perimeter closed-circuit television cameras: Providing surveillance of
the grounds adjacent to the Smithsonian's National Mall facilities to
detect suspicious activities, this enhancement has been implemented by
the Smithsonian at 3 of its facilities on the National Mall,21
resulting in obligations totaling $660,000 in fiscal year 2002. The
Smithsonian canceled the implementation of this security enhancement
at some of its other National Mall facilities but plans to implement
the measure during future security upgrades or capital renovation
projects.
o Emergency voice systems: This enhancement, intended to enable
emergency response staff to broadcast disaster- or emergency-related
information to affected Smithsonian staff and visitors, was in place
at three museums on the National Mall prior to September 11. To
implement this enhancement at the remainder of its facilities, the
Smithsonian obligated $2.9 million in fiscal year 2002.
o Electronic screening of the public and mail: According to the
Smithsonian, this enhancement is designed to prevent a terrorist from
carrying an explosive device or firearm into a Smithsonian facility,
or to mitigate the effects of such a weapon's use. The enhancement
also is designed to detect explosives or biological agents delivered
through the mail system. Although lack of space for screening
equipment will limit the use of this security enhancement at its
National Mall facilities, the Smithsonian does plan to implement this
measure at some of its facilities. However, in some cases, renovations
are required to install an adequate number of screening stations. The
Smithsonian has deferred renovations to fully implement this measure
until it can address higher priority security enhancements. In the
meantime, several facilities have received full magnetometer screening
and bag searches to limit the potential for explosive devices or
firearms to enter a Smithsonian facility. The Smithsonian obligated
$2.2 million in fiscal year 2002 for this enhancement.
21The Smithsonian installed closed-circuit television cameras at the
National Museum of American History, National Museum of Natural History,
and National Air and Space Museum.
Page 17 GAO-05-518 National Mall Security
Besides funding the enhancements previously identified, the Smithsonian
obligated about $20 million for additional security personnel and $1
million for risk assessments for its facilities during fiscal years 2002
through 2004. Furthermore, the Smithsonian has requested $700,000 for
electronic access control measures and $2 million to deter, detect, or
prevent the introduction of chemical, biological, or radiological agents
into air intakes at its National Mall facilities.
National Gallery of Art Officials from the National Gallery told us it has
obligated over $7 million to implement physical security enhancements at
its East and West Buildings and Sculpture Garden since September 11. Funds
have been obligated at both the East and West Buildings and for equipment
and technology, such as magnetometers, X-ray machines, closed-circuit
television cameras, and body armor. In addition, the National Gallery
installed streetscape and landscape barriers, such as trees and boulders,
along the exterior of the East Building; constructed a security guardhouse
and modified the service entrance at the West Building; and deployed
temporary barricades to be used during heightened security alerts.
Finally, the National Gallery has obligated funds for an Integrated
Security Management System, the review of its disaster management plan,
and the review of vulnerability assessments for security against explosive
devices. Although implementation of future security enhancements is
subject to available funding, the following text describes some examples
of security enhancements planned by the National Gallery:
o The National Gallery plans to conduct additional studies to evaluate
its camera system and the need for an Emergency Operations Center
(EOC). By determining the number and location of cameras currently in
use throughout the National Gallery, this study will provide the
gallery with the most comprehensive surveillance system possible. The
EOC study will determine the National Gallery's need for an off-site
space to conduct security operations in the event of a large-scale
emergency affecting the National Mall. The estimated cost of the
studies is $350,000.
o The National Gallery plans to upgrade perimeter security through
additional protections against explosions and hazardous agents. These
measures include erecting bollards and retractable steel plates around
the perimeter of the East and West Buildings and Sculpture Garden to
protect against unauthorized vehicles, adding window film to windows
in the entire East Building and part of the West Building, and
installing air intake protection sensors in the West Building to
protect against
Department of Agriculture
biological agents or other materials. The estimated cost of implementing
these enhancements is $1.4 million.
o The National Gallery plans to install additional equipment and
technology, such as improved access controls and biometrics, perimeter
cameras, and screening devices. For example, new employee identification
badges (smart cards) will be authenticated and electronically tracked
through the National Gallery's Integrated Security Management System to
protect against fraud. In addition, the National Gallery intends to
improve security and access controls through the use of biometric systems.
Additional external cameras will improve surveillance of the East and West
Buildings and Sculpture Garden. Finally, X-ray machines and magnetometers
that are already in use at some public entrances will be added at closed
entrances at the West Building to improve visitor access during heightened
security. The estimated cost of implementing these enhancements is
$580,000.
USDA has obligated about $25 million for physical security enhancements
for its facilities on or adjacent to the National Mall since September
11.22 USDA conducted blast assessment studies, hired additional security
personnel, and began installing window protection measures and a public
address system at each of its Washington, D.C., facilities, in addition to
developing a perimeter streetscape security master plan for the
four-building headquarters complex. USDA also obligated funds for a
situation room and a heating, ventilating, and air-conditioning (HVAC) air
intake study at the Whitten Building located on the National Mall.
USDA plans to continue installing blast resistant windows for the South
Building under its overall modernization project and safety drapes in
additional locations in the four-building headquarters complex; it also
plans to undertake major HVAC improvements against bioterrorism. However,
the implementation of these measures is dependent on available funding and
the priority given to these measures by USDA. In some cases, the security
enhancements will be coordinated with major renovations of its facilities.
Beginning in fiscal year 2006, USDA also plans to improve security around
its facilities by implementing perimeter security barriers that it
developed for the Whitten Building and adjacent facilities. USDA
22USDA's Whitten Building is located on the National Mall, whereas the
South and Yates Buildings and the Cotton Annex are located adjacent to the
National Mall.
Page 19 GAO-05-518 National Mall Security
plans to implement this project in four phases based on funding
availability and USDA's assessment of each building's location,
vulnerability, and other factors (see fig. 3). Each phase can be
subdivided and adjusted according to funding availability. The proposed
security elements include a combination of bollards, fences, planters,
tree well enclosures, and retaining and freestanding walls located
primarily at the buildings' roadways, curbs, and driveways. Specifically,
at the Whitten Building facing the National Mall, USDA plans to install a
combination of bollards and planters to create a 50-foot stand-off
distance from the facility. The overall estimated cost of implementing
these perimeter security enhancements is between $13 million and $14
million.
Figure 3: Phased Implementation of USDA Physical Security Enhancements
Temporary Security Planters
Phase 1 Whitten Building: Bollard fence, curbside bollards, and planter
walls
Yates Building: Streetscape bollards, bollard fences, hardened
site wall,
hardened lights, and realigned curb
South Building: Streetscape and bollard fences
Phase 2 Whitten Building: Landscape bollards located behind new evergreen
hedges
South Building: Streetscape and bollard fences
Phase 3 South Building: Streetscape bollards, tree well enclosures,
removable bollards,
and connection of existing retractable bollards
Phase 4 Cotton Annex: Series of bollards, tree panel enclosures, and
hardened fence
Source: GAO analysis of information provided by the Department of
Agriculture and the Department of the Interior's National Park Service.
U.S. Botanic Garden
The U.S. Capitol Police is responsible for security at USBG. The physical
security enhancements implemented at USBG include a visitor screening
facility at the entrance of the Conservatory to detect weapons and
explosives, security cameras, card readers throughout the Conservatory, an
alarm system, and the addition of four security officers when the
Conservatory is open to the public. The U.S. Capitol Police obligated
Page 21 GAO-05-518 National Mall Security
Security Enhancements Have Incorporated Considerations of Public Access and
Aesthetics and Have Been Generally Accepted by Visitors
$600,000 in fiscal year 2003 to implement these enhancements. U.S. Capitol
Police officials told us they do not anticipate a need for additional
funding for security enhancements at USBG.
Public access and aesthetics are vital to the design and approval of
physical security enhancements to sites on the National Mall. Agencies are
required to coordinate with reviewing organizations and consider
aesthetics, historic preservation, urban design, urban planning, and
environmental impacts when implementing physical security enhancements.
Reports from federal agencies, along with responses to our own survey of
National Mall visitors, indicate that visitors have found the current
level of public access and the aesthetics of temporary and permanent
physical security enhancements acceptable. The majority of survey
respondents also indicated that aesthetics and public access should be
given high priorities when adding security enhancements to the National
Mall.
Access and Aesthetics Are Critical to the Design and Approval of Physical
Security Enhancements on the National Mall
Agency officials told us that they consider public access and aesthetics
in developing and designing physical security enhancements for their
facilities on the National Mall. These officials noted that maintaining
the cultural and historic character of their facilities is important, and
that providing visitors with access to their facilities is fundamental to
their educational and commemorative missions. For example, officials of
the Smithsonian and National Gallery stated the importance of ensuring the
public's access to their collections and exhibits when implementing
security enhancements. Park Service officials noted that they want
visitors to be able to access the monuments and memorials as they did
before security enhancements were implemented. Similarly, in terms of
aesthetics, officials of the Smithsonian and National Gallery told us that
in designing smaller security projects, they use exhibit and design
specialists to ensure that the security projects are implemented according
to consistent standards throughout their facilities. For larger security
projects, they also work with security consultants, design specialists,
and architecture and engineering firms to ensure that aesthetics are
incorporated into their security designs. USBG works with the U.S. Capitol
Police to incorporate aesthetics into security enhancements.23 For
example, additional
23The U.S. Capitol Police coordinates with the Architect of the Capitol on
the design and implementation of security enhancements for the Capitol
Complex.
Page 22 GAO-05-518 National Mall Security
surveillance cameras were reinstalled in less visible sites, while
maintaining their overall security function.
In the case of a facility that is under construction, such as the
Smithsonian's National Museum of the American Indian,24 security features
can be integrated directly into the design of the structure without the
need for the subsequent installation of potentially more conspicuous and
obtrusive features (see fig. 4). After September 11, the Smithsonian
altered the landscaping plan for the National Museum of the American
Indian to integrate additional security enhancements into the design of
the facility. Specifically, four substantial "grandfather rocks"25 were
repositioned to locations where they could serve as a vehicle barrier,
while maintaining the cultural and aesthetic significance of these
objects.
24The National Museum of the American Indian was under construction during
our review and opened to the public in September 2004.
25The "grandfather rocks" serve as reminders of the longevity of Native
peoples' relationships to the environment and carry the message and
cultural memory of past generations to future generations.
Page 23 GAO-05-518 National Mall Security
Figure 4: Incorporation of Physical Security Enhancements in the National Museum
of the American Indian
Source: GAO. The National Museum of the American Indian features bollards
that integrate into the design structure (left) and grandfather rocks that
are culturally significant and act as vehicle barriers (right).
In most cases, however, agencies have had to develop and design physical
security enhancements for facilities already in place on the National
Mall. Still, officials of these agencies told us that public access and
aesthetics are critical elements in the design of security enhancements.
For example, officials of the Smithsonian noted that the perimeter vehicle
barriers that will be constructed around each of its museums on the
National Mall have been designed with an eye toward integrating the
architectural design and characteristics of the museums into the barriers.
In addition, they noted that the height of the barriers will be adjusted
in certain locations to achieve a better appearance and scale, improve
pedestrian movement and accessibility, and provide space for visitors to
sit on the barriers themselves. Similarly, the physical security
enhancements to the Washington Monument that were under construction
during our review were designed to ensure consistency in the historical
landscaping of the grounds and in the spaces for visitors' recreation.
Although the Park Service developed alternative design proposals,
including the one depicted in the figure below (right), the selected
design includes a regrading of the Monument grounds and the construction
of retaining walls that are intended to disappear into the landscape (see
fig. 5).
Figure 5: Modifications to Physical Security Enhancements of the Washington
Monument
Multiple Organizations Work with National Mall Agencies to Design and Review
Security Enhancements
Top left: The Park Service put jersey barriers around the Washington
Monument as a temporary perimeter barrier.
Right: The Park Service initially proposed using several hundred bollards
that would have been placed in a circular pattern around the monument as a
perimeter barrier.
Bottom left: The Park Service settled on this final design, incorporating
the regrading of the Washington Monument grounds with providing retaining
walls that follow the outer curvilinear pathway.
Sources: Department of the Interior's National Park Service and National Capital
Planning Commission.
Several organizations work with the agencies that have facilities on the
National Mall to ensure that security enhancements reflect access and
aesthetic concerns. Specifically, the SHPO and ACHP, as well as NCPC and
CFA, coordinate with the agencies that have facilities on the National
Mall. Such coordination is designed to ensure that architecture, urban
design, urban planning, aesthetics, historic preservation, and
environmental impacts are considered when implementing physical security
enhancements.
For example, federal agencies26 must prepare an environmental assessment
to determine the effects of proposed security enhancements on the human
environment as part of the NEPA process.27 In addition, because security
enhancements may affect the historic character of properties on the
National Mall, federal agencies are required to follow the NHPA's Section
106 review process. This process has federal agencies consider the effects
of their actions on historic property and address "adverse effects" that
could diminish the integrity of the property. Federal agencies are
responsible for initiating the review process and for consulting with the
SHPO on measures to deal with any adverse effects. In addition, ACHP is
given a reasonable opportunity to comment as part of the NHPA process.
Federal agencies are also required to solicit public input as part of both
the NEPA and NHPA review processes.
Finally, agencies must submit those designs that fall under the NCPC and
CFA statutory authorities to these review organizations before security
enhancements can be implemented. NCPC officials told us that they examine
security projects comprehensively from a broad design and urban planning
perspective to ensure the project's consistency with the commission's
comprehensive urban design and planning documents, such as the
Comprehensive Plan for the National Capital and the Urban Design and
Security Plan. NCPC must give approval before a security enhancement
project can be implemented. CFA officials told us they focus on visual
appearance and on how security enhancements can be physically integrated
into the urban environment. Although agencies must submit security designs
to CFA, the commission plays an advisory role in reviewing security
projects and cannot enforce agencies to implement its recommendations.
Projects are generally submitted to NCPC and CFA after the completion of
most, if not all, of the NEPA and NHPA processes. These processes must be
completed before NCPC approves the final design.
26For purposes of certain laws, such as NEPA and NHPA, the Smithsonian is
treated as a federal agency.
2742 U.S.C. S: 4332.
Page 27 GAO-05-518 National Mall Security
National Mall Agencies and Review Organizations Identified Challenges in
Designing and Approving Security Enhancements
Although aesthetic and public access considerations are seen as critical
elements in the design and approval of physical security enhancements to
facilities on the National Mall, agency officials also told us that the
process applicable to all construction and renovation projects in
Washington, D.C.-requiring consultation, review, and approval with
multiple review organizations-adds to project costs and can be both
time-consuming and inefficient. Of particular concern, officials of these
agencies noted the seeming overlap in consultations and reviews of
projects required among the review organizations. For example, Park
Service officials told us that in submitting a security proposal, one
review organization might request a particular change to the design, and
another organization might request an entirely different change.
Sometimes, consensus on the design of a security project had been reached
at the staff level within a review organization, but the commissioners
within that organization then had different ideas about the project's
design. For example, designs for security enhancements for the eastern
portion of the Lincoln Memorial have gone before the CFA's commissioners
several times for their review.28 Furthermore, some agency officials noted
that the commissioners from CFA and NCPC might disagree on a particular
security design. According to officials from the Park Service, there is
currently no guidance available to assist agencies in moving forward on
proposals that receive contradictory direction. These officials suggested
that in such cases, commissioners, rather than staff, from both review
organizations should consult with one another to resolve their differences
and provide guidance to the agency on moving forward. While CFA officials
acknowledged that there is no formal process for resolving disagreements
between commissions, they noted several options for reconciling such
differences. For example, in some cases, agencies may be able to circulate
revised drawings to the commissions in between formal meetings, or the
commissions might delegate approval authority to the staff level, pending
modifications. Finally, the public can comment on security proposals
affecting the National Mall. As a result of competing stakeholder
interests, it can take months or even years to go through the review
process.
28According to Park Service officials, they are continuing to work with
both NCPC and CFA to develop a solution for the eastern portion of the
Lincoln Memorial.
Page 28 GAO-05-518 National Mall Security
The perimeter security designs for the Washington Monument illustrate the
effects multiple stakeholders can have on a proposed security project's
design and schedule. Officials from the Park Service told us that a
preliminary design for the Washington Monument was selected in December
2001. The design consisted primarily of landscape barriers that would
provide perimeter security and an underground visitor screening facility.
The Park Service submitted its design to CFA at this time, and, according
to both parties, CFA approved the vehicular barrier portion of the design
with only minor changes.29 In addition, Park Service officials told us
that they submitted the security design to NCPC in January 2002 and
received final approval for the perimeter security portion of the design
in June 2003. Park Service officials noted the approval process for the
Washington Monument design was relatively quick. However, the design for
the underground screening facility did not receive final approval from CFA
and received only preliminary approval from NCPC before the underground
screening facility project was canceled. According to CFA officials, the
screening facility as planned would have drastically changed how visitors
accessed the Monument, and it was not an effective security proposal. CFA
officials told us they proposed a number of alternatives for this portion
of the project, but the Park Service rejected them. According to CFA
officials, they have not recently discussed this project with the Park
Service. Park Service officials told us that the concept for the
underground screening facility was abandoned because of significant
resistance from a number of stakeholders and because Congress never
approved funding for the measure. Park Service officials told us the
temporary screening facility that was in place before the Washington
Monument was under construction will be put back until a permanent
screening facility is designed.
Review organizations also identified challenges in the review process for
implementing security enhancements on the National Mall. Review
organizations said they have concerns about their budgets and staff
resources. Officials from these organizations told us that the number of
security projects submitted for their review has greatly increased since
the September 11 terrorist attacks. However, officials noted that they
have not received additional funding or staff to respond to the increase
in proposals. In addition, officials from CFA and NCPC noted that some
agencies do not always justify the need for a particular security
enhancement or identify
29In a letter dated March 5, 2002, CFA stated "the Commission...have
concluded with their unanimous approval, that Mr. Olin's preliminary
scheme, as presented, is an appropriate design solution to improve the
Monument's physical perimeter security."
Page 29 GAO-05-518 National Mall Security
National Mall Agencies and Review Organizations Identified Steps That Can
Make the Review Process More Efficient
the threat that the agency is trying to protect against. Officials from
CFA noted that this type of information is helpful in developing a design
that meets the needs of both the agency and the review organization.
Furthermore, officials from CFA also noted that when applicants come to
them after a project already has been designed, the applicant is often
reluctant to make any changes or consider alternative approaches because
of the time and money already invested. Finally, both federal agencies and
the review organizations noted that the limited number of security designs
available to secure facilities in an urban environment presents a
challenge in implementing security enhancements. Park Service officials
noted that the technology available for perimeter security consists
primarily of vehicle barrier systems (e.g., bollards, walls, and
strengthened street furniture). However, these officials noted that the
review organizations often do not approve security designs that
exclusively consist of bollards.
Several agency officials, along with the review organizations, stated that
early and frequent consultation helps to ensure a smoother, more efficient
review process. Both the agencies and the review organizations noted that
informal consultations between all parties should continue throughout the
design of the security project. Informal consultations can begin before
"putting pen to paper" and should occur during the project's preliminary
design phase. According to these officials, security proposals, in
particular, benefit from these early consultations because of their
importance and sensitivity. Both the review organizations and the federal
agencies identified the following additional actions that could lead to a
more efficient review process:
o Consult early and frequently with all relevant stakeholders: Consulting
with all of the review organizations that play a role in the design and
approval of security enhancements at the same time not only facilitates a
more efficient review process, but doing so can also improve relations
between agencies and review organizations over time. In addition,
consulting with all stakeholders allows for the expression of everyone's
views and concerns up front. Moreover, consultation with the staff and, in
some cases with the commissioners of the review organizations, allows them
to react informally to a proposed design, thereby giving agencies the
opportunity to incorporate their opinions into the proposal. Officials
from NCPC told us that their commissioners and CFA's commissioners might
disagree on a design proposal because they are providing a first reaction
to a design that was not previously discussed during informal
consultations. In such cases, agencies may have to go back through the
review process to meet everyone's needs, which can take several additional
months or even years, in addition to costing the agency financial and
staff resources. However, officials from the review organizations noted
that disagreements between the two commissions occur infrequently, perhaps
once a year. According to the Park Service, disagreements between the two
commissions seem to occur more often with security projects that include
some of our nation's memorials. For example, Park Service officials noted
that they have received different direction from the two commissions on
the Washington Monument, Lincoln Memorial, and Jefferson Memorial security
projects.
In considering a design for its perimeter security projects, the
Smithsonian consulted with all of the review organizations before
developing a concept design. The parties discussed different design
options, and the Smithsonian was able to incorporate the review
organizations' comments and suggestions into its proposal. According to
CFA, the Smithsonian also selected a designer that considered the needs of
the agency and the balance between security and access and urban design.
Smithsonian officials believe that the success of their efforts hinged on
bringing to the table experts from their offices of Protection Services;
Historic Preservation; and Engineering, Design, and Construction who were
willing to engage in dialogue and answer questions from the review
organizations. As a result, the Smithsonian received favorable reviews of
their preliminary design for security enhancements from all of the
stakeholders. According to Smithsonian officials, the Smithsonian
continues to consult with the SHPO, NCPC, and CFA during the ongoing
development of its final perimeter security designs.
o Be flexible and open to the review process and possible changes:
Officials from some of the agencies and the review organizations discussed
the importance of being open and flexible to alternatives throughout the
design process for security enhancements. In particular, some officials
stressed the importance of taking time to develop a security solution
built on the opinions and consensus of all stakeholders. According to
these officials, this approach will ultimately result in stronger working
relationships and a design solution that takes both security and urban
design issues into consideration.
Officials from CFA told us that the Departments of Energy and Education
developed successful security designs because they consulted early and
were open to considering alternative proposals. For example, according to
CFA, Energy's ideas for security designs at one of its Washington, D.C.,
facilities were not appropriate for an urban environment. However, through
consultations with the review organizations, Energy was able to design a
better security project that will be less costly than the one it
originally designed. Similarly, Education developed a proposal for
renovating its plaza but did not incorporate any security enhancements
into the design. However, because Education consulted with the review
organizations before going too far in the design process, it was able to
incorporate security features into the design. As a result, Education
avoided later costly revisions to the project.
o Consult urban planning documents such as NCPC's submission guidelines
and Urban Design and Security Plan: Agencies submitting project proposals
to NCPC for review and approval are required to follow NCPC's submission
guidelines. The guidelines include NCPC's requirements for various phases
of project proposals as well as NCPC's environmental and historic
preservation procedures. The submission guidelines also outline
suggestions for coordinating stages of the review process. For example,
agencies can initiate the NEPA and NHPA review processes simultaneously
and plan their public participation, analysis, and review so as to meet
the purposes and requirements of both statutes in a timely and efficient
manner. The Security Plan provides a framework for planning, designing,
and implementing security enhancements and focuses exclusively on
incorporating perimeter security measures into existing streetscape or
landscape features. The Security Plan also identifies security design
solutions that are appropriate to the character of areas within the
Monumental Core,30 including the National Mall and the Washington Monument
and Lincoln and Jefferson Memorials.
30The Monumental Core includes the Capitol Grounds, the Mall and Mall
Complex, the Southwest Federal Center, the Federal Triangle, the White
House and President's Park, the Northwest Rectangle, Arlington Cemetery,
the Pentagon, Fort Meyer, and Henderson Hall.
Page 32 GAO-05-518 National Mall Security
Several of the agencies on the National Mall told us they actively
participated in the development of the Security Plan, and they are using
the plan to help them balance perimeter security issues with
considerations of aesthetics and access to the National Mall. For example,
Park Service officials told us they used the plan to develop concept
designs for the Washington Monument as well as the Lincoln and Jefferson
Memorials.31 Similarly, the Smithsonian developed plans to replace planter
pots, industrial-looking vehicle barriers, and other temporary security
measures with custom-designed elements, including benches, light poles,
urns, and bollards, that complement the historic surroundings of the
National Mall (see fig. 6). Smithsonian officials noted that the Security
Plan provides constructive ideas for what NCPC does and does not look for
in designs for security enhancements. As a result, NCPC has praised the
Smithsonian on its efforts to balance necessary security enhancements with
public access and aesthetics.
31According to Park Service officials, following the Security Plan can
sometimes lead to delay in the approval process for security projects.
Park Service officials stated that their submission for a security project
for the Lincoln Memorial, which followed the Security Plan recommendation,
was rejected by NCPC in favor of an alternative plan that was designed by
NCPC staff.
Page 33 GAO-05-518 National Mall Security
Figure 6: Current and Proposed Security Enhancements at the National Museum of
Natural History
Source: National Capital Planning Commission. Current security measures at
the National Museum of Natural History (left). Planned perimeter security
improvements as depicted in the artistic rendering (right).
Furthermore, according to USDA, its proposed security project was designed
to address both minimum USDA perimeter security requirements and the goals
of the NCPC plan. Proposed security enhancements for the Whitten Building
include landscape bollards that sit well within the generous "front lawn"
of the building, and that are designed to respect the significant and
historic open character of the National Mall.
Effects of Enhancements on Access and Appearance Are Generally Acceptable to
Visitors
Visitors value access to and the appearance of the National Mall and
generally find security enhancements acceptable. A number of agencies on
the National Mall told us that they have received very few complaints
about difficulty in accessing sites on the National Mall. Officials from
the Smithsonian further told us that a survey they conducted of visitors
to their museums in fiscal year 2002 suggests that visitors do not
consider the time standing in line to pass security checkpoints at museum
entrances problematic, provided the wait is less than 15 minutes.
Moreover, some agencies we interviewed also reported very few complaints
about the appearance of sites that are being or have been modified to
accommodate physical security enhancements.
Our survey of about 300 visitors to the National Mall found that these
visitors did not view the security enhancements on the National Mall,
which included both temporary and permanent enhancements, as having
unacceptable effects on access or appearance.32 Seventy-eight percent of
respondents indicated that security enhancements had no effect on public
access to sites on the National Mall, or made access easier. In addition,
64 percent of those surveyed said the security enhancements had no effect
or a positive effect on the appearance of the National Mall (see fig. 7).
Figure 7: Visitor Survey Results on Access to and Appearance of the
National Mall
Security enhancements: Effect on access to sites on the National Security
enhancements: Effect on overall appearance of the Mall National Mall
Difficult access
Negative effect
Easy access or no effect Positive or no effect
Source: GAO.
The majority of survey respondents also said the security enhancements
they encountered would have no effect on whether they will return for a
visit. However, results differed between residents of the Washington,
D.C.,
32A total of 308 surveys were conducted on 5 days in late October and
early November 2004 at various locations on the National Mall. Although we
took measures to avoid sample bias, our survey sample is a nonprobability
sample. Results from nonprobability samples cannot be used to make
inferences about a population because in a nonprobability sample, some
elements of the population being studied have no chance or an unknown
chance of being selected as part of the sample.
Page 35 GAO-05-518 National Mall Security
Federal Agencies Report Using Most Key Practices, but Balancing Mission
Priorities with the Need for Physical Security Enhancements Poses Common
Challenge
Agencies Report Using Most Key Practices to Implement Physical Security
Enhancements
metropolitan area and those who reside in other areas. Washington, D.C.,
metropolitan-area residents were almost twice as likely as U.S. residents
from outside the Washington, D.C., metropolitan area to report that
security measures have had a negative effect on access to and appearance
of sites on the National Mall. Furthermore, although visitors reported
that current levels of public access and appearance are satisfactory, the
survey results also suggest that visitors regard access and aesthetics as
important priorities when adding security measures to the National Mall.
The majority of respondents (85 percent) said both access and aesthetics
should be considered a medium to high priority when implementing
additional security enhancements. Overall, these results suggest that in
terms of public access and aesthetics, visitors to the National Mall find
the existing temporary and permanent security enhancements acceptable.
In our November 2004 report,33 we identified six key practices that have
emerged from the increased attention to facilities protection given by
federal agencies in recent years. We noted that, collectively, these key
practices could provide a framework for guiding federal agencies' ongoing
facility protection efforts. These practices are allocating resources
using risk management; leveraging security technology; sharing information
and coordinating protection efforts with other stakeholders; measuring
program performance and testing security initiatives; implementing
33GAO-05-49.
Allocating Resources Using Risk Management
strategic human capital management to ensure that agencies are
well-equipped to recruit and retain high-performing security
professionals; and aligning assets to mission, thereby reducing
vulnerabilities.
Throughout our review, agencies with facilities on the National Mall
reported using all but one of these key practices when implementing
security enhancements. For example, the Smithsonian told us it leverages
technology by using closed-circuit television cameras to extend the
capabilities of its security staff. Closed-circuit television cameras
enable security staff to quickly identify and respond to a security
incident for investigative purposes. In addition, the Smithsonian told us
it conducts periodic risk assessments of all its properties to determine
how to allocate resources to mitigate the greatest risks first. The Park
Service told us that it is including performance measures in its draft
strategic plan, and that it conducts regular security inspections of
national icons. The Park Service also told us that it is providing new
training programs for security personnel, including in-service training
for officers of the Park Police. To attract a more qualified pool of
applicants for security positions, the National Gallery reported
strengthening its recruitment process and reported a new emphasis on
antiterrorism training for its security personnel. The National Gallery
also told us it has implemented, or plans to implement, a number of
advanced security technologies to provide a more comprehensive security
assessment of its facilities. Finally, federal agencies also reported
meeting periodically to discuss upcoming events, intelligence information,
and criminal activities. However, none of the federal agencies reported
using one key practice-aligning assets to mission-to implement physical
security enhancements because they do not believe that they have excess or
underutilized facilities on the National Mall or elsewhere or consider the
practice applicable to properties under their jurisdiction.34
Allocating resources using risk management entails the systematic and
analytical process of considering the likelihood that a threat will
endanger an asset-that is, a structure, individual, or function-and
identifying actions that can reduce the risk and mitigate the
consequences. As part of its Disaster Management Program, the Smithsonian
performs risk assessments of all its properties every 3 to 5 years to
determine the need
34The key practice of aligning assets to mission encourages agencies to
release excess or underutilized property, so that they no longer incur
costs to maintain and secure such property.
Page 37 GAO-05-518 National Mall Security
for security enhancements. Smithsonian officials told us that their last
risk assessment was performed in fiscal year 2002, but another multihazard
risk assessment-addressing both man-made and natural disasters-was
occurring during our review. According to Smithsonian officials, the
current effort will update the last risk assessment and provide a ranked
listing of risks, with proposed mitigation actions and costs, across the
entire portfolio of the Smithsonian's facilities. In accordance with the
intent of this key practice, Smithsonian officials said the updated risk
assessment will allow the institution to use resources more efficiently to
mitigate the greatest risks first.
Park Service officials also told us that risk management is a key practice
used to determine the need for physical security enhancements to their
facilities on the National Mall. They noted that risk assessments were
completed in the late 1990s by three outside entities, and internal
reviews were performed by Park Police and Park Service officials. After
September 11, the Park Service worked with a private security firm to
assess the risk of terrorist attacks at monuments on the National Mall.
This assessment examined potential threats-including the distance from
which explosives could potentially destroy any of the National Mall's
structures-and alternative methods of both prevention and protection.
Additionally, the Park Service identified specific protection criteria and
designated key areas with the highest vulnerability as priorities,
including areas of the National Mall. The Park Service told us it has used
the security firm's report findings to determine where to allocate
appropriated funds and implement security upgrades for high-risk
structures. Park Service officials also told us that they rely on risk
assessments as well as intelligence assessments, reviews of latest terror
trends, visitor needs, and reviews of criminal and service incidents to
allocate resources to respond to identified risks.
Leveraging Security Technology
Since June 2004, Interior has applied its National Monuments and Icons
Assessment Methodology (NM&I Methodology) to assets that fall under the
purview of the Park Service. The NM&I Methodology provides a uniform risk
assessment and ranking methodology and was developed in response to the
Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7's requirement that Interior
formulate a plan for identifying, assessing, prioritizing, and developing
protective programs for critical assets within the national icons and
monuments sector. According to information from Interior, the NM&I
Methodology is specifically designed to quantify risk, identify needed
security enhancements, and measure risk-reduction benefits at icon and
monument assets.35
National Gallery officials told us that it assesses potential risks to the
physical security of its facilities through the use of technical
consultants with specialized experience in security areas, such as blast
analysis. The National Gallery uses the results of such studies to form a
basis for developing specific projects or operational policies to mitigate
the identified risks. For example, National Gallery officials told us that
targeted risk assessments, such as the blast analysis on the exterior wall
of the East Building, identified the need for window security film and
various types of physical barriers.
By efficiently using technology to supplement and reinforce other security
measures, agencies can more effectively apply the appropriate
countermeasures to vulnerabilities identified through the risk management
process. Our previous work reported that prior to a significant investment
in a project, a detailed analysis should be conducted to determine whether
the benefits of a technology outweigh its costs. In addition, we reported
that agencies should decide how a technology will be used and whether to
use a technology at all to address vulnerabilities before implementation.
The implementation costs of technologies in facilities protection can be
high, particularly if infrastructure modifications are necessary.
Therefore, in some cases, a lesser technological solution may be more
effective and less costly than more advanced technologies.
35The NM&I Methodology has two phases, a consequence assessment phase and
a risk assessment phase. During the consequence phase, each asset's iconic
significance is subjectively determined and specific attack scenarios are
used to evaluate security at each asset. The risk assessment phase is used
to determine the effectiveness of existing security systems for preventing
or mitigating the specified attack scenarios.
Page 39 GAO-05-518 National Mall Security
Information-Sharing and Coordination
Several of the agency officials we spoke with identified steps they have
taken to make efficient use of technology to supplement and reinforce
other security enhancements. For example, the Smithsonian uses
closed-circuit television cameras in several of its museums on the
National Mall. These cameras are low-cost security technologies that
extend the capabilities of the Smithsonian's security staff by providing
an immediate assessment of information for investigative purposes. The
Smithsonian also identified the need for electronic screening facilities
at some of its facilities on the National Mall. However, because the
museums would need to undergo costly renovations to make enough space for
the screening equipment, these museums are using magnetometer screening
and bag searches until other, higher priority security enhancements have
been implemented.
The National Gallery has also implemented, and plans to implement, a
number of security technologies at its facilities on the National Mall.
Currently, the National Gallery uses magnetometers, X-ray machines, and
closed-circuit television cameras to improve its perimeter protection. The
National Gallery plans to undertake a risk analysis of its security camera
configuration to determine whether the number of cameras currently in use
provides the most comprehensive surveillance system possible. In addition,
the National Gallery plans to improve its access control through new
employee identification badges that can be rapidly authenticated and
tracked electronically through an Integrated Security Management System.
According to the National Gallery, comprehensively integrating a number of
new technologies provides more complete security for its facilities and
improves its operating efficiencies.
Finally, Park Service officials stated that closed-circuit television
cameras are in extensive use at the national icons on the National Mall
and are a critical component to the security of the area. Park Service
officials also noted that they are constantly reviewing developing
security technologies to determine the most cost-effective methods for
upgrades.
All agencies said they obtain and share information on potential threats
to facilities to better understand risks and more effectively determine
preventive measures. Among the agencies with facilities on the National
Mall, meetings are held quarterly to discuss upcoming events, intelligence
information, and criminal activities. Numerous other forums of
information-sharing and coordination also occur:
o Park Service officials told us that Park Police officers are assigned
to the Federal Bureau of Investigation's (FBI) Joint Task Force and
participate in meetings with the U.S. Attorneys, the D.C. Metropolitan
Police Department, and their own intelligence unit. In addition, we
were told that the Park Service relies on information gathered from
officers and rangers assigned to the National Mall area, who relay
such information to other entities as appropriate; and that
coordination routinely occurs between the Park Police and the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS).
o Smithsonian officials said that they meet with the Park Police twice
per month to discuss security issues, and again monthly to receive
crime and terrorism intelligence from the Park Police, and on a daily
basis to coordinate police activities on the National Mall. In
addition, Smithsonian security officials meet and coordinate with the
FBI and receive daily general information on terrorist and other
disaster-related activity from DHS.
* According to officials of the National Gallery, they attend
meetings and briefings with the FBI, the Mayor's Special Events
Task Group, and the
* U.S. Park Police. Further, National Gallery officials said they
coordinate regularly with these entities, as well as the Federal
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), D.C. Metropolitan Police
Department, DHS, U.S. Attorneys Office, U.S. Secret Service,
Smithsonian, Library of Congress, National Archives, Federal
Trade Commission, Federal Protective Service, and the John F.
Kennedy Center for the Performing Arts.
o USDA officials noted they share information and coordinate with the
Smithsonian, their immediate neighbor on the National Mall. USDA
officials also told us they coordinate with the Federal Protective
Service and the Park Police for general physical security and law
enforcement activities. In addition, USDA officials noted they
coordinate matters pertaining to national security, threats and
emergency response directly with DHS, FEMA, the FBI, and the U.S.
Secret Service, as applicable. Dignitary protection and the security
of high-risk personnel are coordinated with the U.S. Secret Service
and the Department of State. Finally, USDA officials told us they
participate on the Southeast Area Security Chiefs Council and other
forums to exchange and develop information pertaining to security and
law enforcement.
Performance Measurement and Testing
Strategic Human Capital Management
As previously noted, another source of coordination on physical security
enhancements occurred through the NCPC Interagency Security Task Force.
Made up of representatives of 75 stakeholder agencies, the task force's
efforts resulted in two reports that have guided agencies throughout the
city in devising and implementing physical security enhancements. Both the
Smithsonian and USDA's perimeter security projects relied heavily on the
task force's National Capital Urban Design and Security Plan.
This key practice encompasses two components to ensure the effectiveness
of physical security enhancements implemented by agencies: linking
security goals to broader agency mission goals, and inspecting and
assessing physical security enhancements. Park Service officials indicated
that they use both parts of this key practice because they (1) include
performance measures in the U.S. Park Police's draft strategic plan and
(2) conduct regular and frequent inspections of the national icons by the
Park Police and routinely update and discuss security issues with Park
Police officials. Smithsonian officials also told us they use both parts
of this key practice in performing risk assessments of their facilities;
implementing risk assessment recommendations for facility upgrades, adding
staff, adding equipment, and using operational procedures as performance
metrics; and including physical security measures in the Smithsonian's
broader performance measurements. USDA also said it uses both parts of
this key practice by linking security goals to the broader agency goal of
providing a safe and functional workplace to support staff in carrying out
their public service missions and through an established program to
inspect and periodically reassess the physical security stature of all
USDA properties, including the properties near the National Mall, and to
effect corrective actions as appropriate.
Strategic management of human capital involves implementing strategies to
help individuals maximize their full potential, having the capability to
recruit and retain high-performing security and law enforcement
professionals, and ensuring that personnel are well exercised and exhibit
good judgment in following security procedures. We found that most of the
agencies on the National Mall are implementing this key practice primarily
by offering new training programs for security personnel. Specifically,
Park Service officials told us that they have sponsored training for
employees of all affected parks as well as in-service training for
officers of the Park Police. Similarly, the Smithsonian has instituted
training courses on terrorism awareness, emergency procedure, and
shelter-in-place procedures, among others, for its security staff. The
National Gallery has also focused its efforts on training, with particular
emphasis on
Aligning Assets to Mission
antiterrorism training, such as shelter-in-place and evacuation drills. In
addition, to attract a more qualified pool of applicants for security
positions, the National Gallery reported strengthening its recruitment
process. USDA constructed an emergency operations center, which is staffed
24 hours a day, 7 days a week, to monitor and respond to emergencies.
Aligning assets to mission involves the reduction of underutilized or
excess property at federal agencies in order to better reflect agencies'
missions and reduce vulnerabilities by decreasing the number of assets
that need to be protected. Our previous work reported that to the extent
that agencies are expending resources to maintain and protect facilities
that are not needed, funds available to protect critical assets may be
lessened. In addition, we noted that funds no longer spent securing and
maintaining excess property could be put to other uses, such as enhancing
protection at critical assets that are tied to agencies' missions. For
example, we reported in January 2003 that the Department of Defense
estimates it is spending $3 billion to $4 billion each year maintaining
facilities that are not needed. In another example, costs associated with
excess Energy facilities, primarily for security and maintenance, were
estimated by Energy's Office of the Inspector General in April 2002 to
exceed $70 million annually.36 One building that illustrates this problem
is the former Chicago main post office. In October 2003, we testified that
this building, a massive 2.5 million square foot structure located near
the Sears Tower, is vacant and costing USPS $2 million annually in holding
costs.37 It is likely that agencies that continue to hold excess or
underutilized property are also incurring significant holdings costs for
services, including security and maintenance. Finally, we recently
recommended that the Chair of the Interagency Security Committee consider
our work as a starting point for establishing a framework of key practices
that could guide agencies' efforts in the facility protection area.38
None of the federal agencies reported using this key practice to implement
physical security enhancements on the National Mall because they do not
36Department of Energy, Office of the Inspector General, Disposition of
the Department's Excess Facilities, DOE/IG-0550 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 3,
2002).
37GAO, Federal Real Property: Actions Needed to Address Long-standing and
Complex Problems, GAO-04-119T (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 1, 2003).
38GAO-05-49 .
Page 43 GAO-05-518 National Mall Security
Balancing Mission Priorities with the Need for Physical Security
Enhancements Poses Common Challenge
believe that they have excess or underutilized facilities or consider this
practice applicable to property under their jurisdiction. For example,
Smithsonian officials told us that they do not have any excess property on
the National Mall or elsewhere. Officials stated that all of the
Smithsonian's facilities, including its gardens, are needed for research,
education, and exhibition purposes to execute its mission of increasing
and diffusing knowledge. The Smithsonian believes that any closures of its
facilities would therefore be inconsistent with its mission. Similarly,
according to the Park Service, land reserved or dedicated for national
park purposes, including land under its jurisdiction, by law is not
considered excess or underutilized property.39
Although we found that agencies on the National Mall are using most of the
key practices we identified for the protection of facilities, officials
from most of these agencies identified a common challenge in using these
practices and, in fact, in implementing all types of physical security
enhancements. That common challenge is balancing their ongoing mission
priorities with the emergent need to implement physical security
enhancements. Some officials described the challenge as inadequate funding
for security enhancements, or as competition for limited resources between
any new requirements for security enhancements and more traditional
functions and operations. Officials described the challenge as a more
subtle need to ensure that physical security enhancements are not
inconsistent with the agencies' mission. For example, one official told us
that planning for security enhancements necessitates the involvement of
key facilities personnel to ensure that part of the agency's
mission-public access-is maintained. Another official we spoke with noted
that careful planning and coordination for implementing physical security
enhancements is essential to avoid compromising both programs and public
access. Similarly, some officials suggested that the multiple levels of
consultation and review required for projects that involve construction or
renovation on federal property could be an obstacle to the use of key
practices. Finally, officials from one agency noted that a lack of
reliable, quantitative risk assessment data and little consistency in
interpreting
39The general practice of disposing of "excess or underutilized property"
does not apply to Park Service property that is reserved or dedicated for
national park purposes because the Federal Property and Administrative
Services Act of 1949, as amended, specifically excludes this. 40 U.S.C. S:
102(9)(A)(ii).
Page 44 GAO-05-518 National Mall Security
Concluding Observations
information and intelligence obtained from various sources create a
challenge in using key practices to implement security measures.
The security of our nation's critical infrastructure remains a heightened
concern in the aftermath of the September 11 terrorist attacks. On the
National Mall, federal agencies are in the early stages of designing and
implementing permanent perimeter security barriers to protect their
facilities and the visiting public. In doing so, agencies have coordinated
with a number of review organizations that consider the impact of proposed
security designs on the urban environment and the symbolic nature of the
National Mall, its icons, and its museums. Multiple stakeholder viewpoints
on the design of security enhancements present a challenge for an
efficient review process. In some cases, agencies involved stakeholders
after investing time and resources in a particular security design. As a
result, these agencies sometimes had to go through multiple iterations of
the review process, which can strain the already limited financial and
staff resources of all stakeholders.
As agencies continue developing security proposals for their facilities on
the National Mall, several steps, such as early and frequent consultation
with all stakeholders, can result in a more efficient review process.
Specifically, consultation in the preliminary design phase allows for the
consideration of multiple viewpoints and alternative design solutions,
thereby mitigating the potential for later costly and time-consuming
revisions. Such early consultation could also expedite the implementation
of security enhancements to protect facilities and visitors on the
National Mall.
Key practices, such as allocating resources using risk management,
coordinating protection efforts with other stakeholders, and aligning
assets to mission, have clear implications for the facility protection
area. As we have recently recommended, it is important that agencies give
attention to these practices and consider them collectively as a framework
for guiding their ongoing efforts in implementing security measures on the
National Mall and in their overall facility protection areas.
We provided draft copies of this report to the Smithsonian, Interior,
USDA,
Agency Comments
and National Gallery for their review and comment. USDA officials
generally agreed with the report's findings and concluding observations
Page 45 GAO-05-518 National Mall Security
and provided clarifying comments. Officials from the other agencies also
provided clarifying and technical comments, which we incorporated into
this report where appropriate.
As agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce the contents of
this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days from
the report date. At that time, we will send copies of this report to other
interested congressional committees; the Secretaries of Agriculture, the
Interior, and Smithsonian; and the Director of the National Gallery. We
will also make copies available to others upon request. In addition, the
report will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at h
ttp://www.gao.gov.
If you have any questions regarding this report, please contact me on
(202) 512-2834 or at g [email protected] or Susan Fleming, Assistant
Director, on (202) 512-4431 or at f [email protected].
Sincerely yours,
Mark L. Goldstein Director, Physical Infrastructure Issues Appendix I
Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to assess (1) physical security enhancements that have
been implemented on the National Mall since September 11, 2001, the
additional enhancements planned, and the costs of these enhancements;
(2) the considerations given to incorporating access and aesthetics in
designing and approving physical security enhancements on the National
Mall, and how issues of access and aesthetics are perceived by visitors in
relation to these enhancements; and (3) examples of how federal agencies
are using key practices to implement physical security enhancements on the
National Mall, and any challenges the agencies are experiencing in using
these key practices.
For all of these objectives, we researched historical plans for the
design, expansion, and maintenance of the National Mall; appropriations
acts and accompanying legislative material; statutory and regulatory
provisions related to security enhancements of the National Mall grounds;
and proposals for implementing physical security enhancements on the
National Mall. We also interviewed officials of the National Park Service
(Park Service), U.S. Park Police, Smithsonian Institution (Smithsonian),
National Gallery of Art (National Gallery), Department of Agriculture
(USDA), U.S. Botanic Garden (USBG), U.S. Capitol Police, National Capital
Planning Commission, U.S. Commission of Fine Arts, Advisory Council for
Historic Preservation, District of Columbia's Historic Preservation
Office, Department of Homeland Security, and National Coalition to Save
Our Mall.
While multiple geographic definitions of the National Mall exist, we
defined the area of the National Mall, for purposes of our report, as
extending from the foot of the U.S. Capitol grounds west to the Washington
Monument and proceeding farther west and southeast to include the Lincoln
and Jefferson Memorials. It also includes the area between Constitution
and Independence Avenues between 1st and 14th Streets. We did not include
the White House or the U.S. Capitol Building because security enhancements
for these buildings fall under the jurisdiction of the U.S. Secret Service
and the U.S. Capitol Police, respectively.
In addition, for our first objective, we reviewed federal appropriations
law and accompanying legislative materials, budget reports, and federal
agencies' and entities' budget submissions related to physical security
enhancements on the National Mall; we also received information about
obligations and costs associated with physical security enhancements on
the National Mall since the terrorist attacks of September 11. Agencies on
the National Mall provided us with obligation data only for their
facilities located on the National Mall, where possible. In some cases,
obligations
Appendix I Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
incurred for facilities on the National Mall could not be separated from
obligations incurred for an agency's facilities located adjacent to the
National Mall. To assess the reliability of the obligation and cost data
received by these agencies, we developed a template for agencies on the
National Mall to obtain consistency in the data provided by each of the
agencies; interviewed knowledgeable agency officials to clarify any
questions; provided the agencies with a spreadsheet we developed that
organized obligations for security enhancements by fiscal year to make
sure that we accurately used the data provided and asked agencies to
identify the source of the obligations incurred; and further clarified any
discrepancies in these data. From this assessment, we determined that
these data are sufficiently reliable for purposes of this report.
For our second objective, we also reviewed the law, planning and review
criteria, reports, and documentation related to specific proposals for
physical security enhancements on the National Mall. In addition, we
conducted a 3-minute intercept survey of visitors to the National Mall to
determine (1) the extent to which visitors to the National Mall feel that
security measures on the National Mall affect access to sites on the
National Mall and the appearance of the National Mall; (2) the extent to
which visitors to the National Mall feel that additional security measures
are needed; (3) the priority that National Mall visitors would assign
access to the National Mall and the appearance of the National Mall, in
the event that additional security measures are added; and (4) whether
security measures affect the likelihood that National Mall visitors will
return.
To develop the questions for the 3-minute survey, we identified the key
information necessary to gain a general understanding of (1) how visitors
to the National Mall assess the effects of security measures on access to
and the appearance of the National Mall and (2) the priority that visitors
assign to the National Mall's accessibility and appearance. After
initially developing, reviewing, and modifying the survey questions, we
conducted a total of nine pretests-four cognitive pretests with GAO
employees who were not associated with this review and five with visitors
to the National Mall.
We provided GAO employee pretest participants (internal participants) with
an overview of the engagement and the intercept survey methodology to be
utilized. Subsequently, we showed internal participants the map of the
National Mall and then asked them to respond to the survey questions. Upon
completion of the survey, we asked for specific comments on each question
and encouraged participants to share their thoughts and ideas
Appendix I Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
regarding the structure of the survey and the extent to which the
questions seemed clear and easy to answer.
The five external pretests were conducted by GAO team members on the
National Mall, near the Smithsonian Metro Station. Following the intercept
survey protocol, our interviewers approached respondents asking if they
would like to answer a short survey on physical security measures on the
National Mall area. Five out of 15 potential respondents approached
participated in the survey. Nonrespondents consisted of those unwilling to
participate, those who had not yet seen anything on the National Mall
because they had just arrived, and those unable to speak the English
language. Respondents were first shown the map of the National Mall and
then were asked to respond to the survey questions. Interviewers noted
questions, comments, and any lack of clarity to the questions on the part
of external pretest respondents. The final changes to the survey were made
on the basis of the combined observations from the pretests with GAO
employees and pretests with visitors to the National Mall.
The population for the survey was National Mall visitors. We chose survey
sites to cover the geographic range of the National Mall and conducted
interviews between 1:30 p.m. and 4:00 p.m. on Monday, October 18; Monday,
October 25; Tuesday, October 26; Friday, November 5; and Sunday, November
7, 2004. We chose to interview National Mall visitors during these hours
for two reasons: (1) to make it more likely that visitors stopped for the
survey had been on the National Mall long enough to visit one or more
sites on the National Mall and (2) to reduce the chances of surveying
government employees on the National Mall during their lunch break.
We identified 300 as the target size for our sample, on the basis of
balancing the advantages and costs associated with a larger sample size,
considering that a sample of this size allows for some analysis of
subgroups but is small enough to limit survey costs. We stratified the
sample by choosing survey sites to cover the geographic range of the
National Mall. To avoid any bias by gender, ethnicity, or other individual
differences, we systematically approached the fifth person who passed by a
particular landmark (e.g., a park bench, tree, or light pole); first, from
the time interviewing commenced and, thereafter, immediately following the
completion of an interview.
In counting potential respondents, we excluded several types of
individuals as out of scope. Specifically, we excluded persons who did not
speak English, who appeared to be younger than 18 years old, who were
Appendix I Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
exercising on the National Mall, who were talking on a cell phone, who
were leading a group of people on the National Mall, or who had just
arrived on the National Mall and had not yet visited any sites. Of 667
National Mall visitors approached and asked to complete the survey, 537
were found to be in scope. Of these 537 visitors, 229 declined to complete
the survey, yielding a 57 percent response rate.
Although we took measures to avoid sample bias, our survey sample is a
nonprobability sample. Results from nonprobability samples cannot be used
to make inferences about a population because in a nonprobability sample,
some elements of the population being studied have no chance or an unknown
chance of being selected as part of the sample.
GAO employees conducted the interviews. A GAO employee showed respondents
a map of the National Mall, asked the survey questions, and marked
responses on the survey. The survey first asked respondents to specify
which sites and what types of security measures they had seen in their
visit to the National Mall. To help with site identification, the map that
the respondents received clearly labeled the museums and monuments. The
survey then posed a series of questions about the effects of the security
measures on access to National Mall sites and the appearance of the
National Mall, the extent to which additional security is needed on the
National Mall, and the priority respondents would assign to the
accessibility and appearance of National Mall sites, in the event that
further security measures are added. The survey concluded by asking
whether the security measures affect respondents' likelihood of returning
to visit the National Mall.
For our third objective, we also reviewed and analyzed GAO and other
governmental reports on the protection of federal facilities and homeland
security. We also developed a structured interview guide with questions
about the key practices for implementing security enhancements and sent
the guide to the Smithsonian, Park Service, USDA, and National Gallery. We
then incorporated their responses into the report without independent
verification.
We conducted our review from August 2004 through May 2005 in accordance
with generally accepted government auditing standards. Federal agency
officials provided much of the data and other information used in this
report. Overall, we found no discrepancies with these data and, therefore,
determined that the data were sufficiently reliable for the purpose of
this report. We requested official comments on this report from
Appendix I Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
the Smithsonian, the Department of the Interior, USDA, and the National
Gallery.
Appendix II
Results of National Mall Visitor Survey
Appendix II Results of National Mall Visitor Survey
2. I'm going to read through a list of security measures that you may or
may not have encountered or seen today or recently. For each measure,
please answer yes or no, as to whether or not you encountered these
measures.
Yes No Don't Remember
69% 31% 1%
A) Fences that limited access (212) (94) (2)
69% 29% 2%
B) Concrete barriers (213) (89) (6)
84% 16% <1%
C) Security personnel (259) (48) (1)
61% 39% 1%
D) Metal detectors (189) (117) (2)
11% 89% <1%
E) Guard dogs (34) (273) (1)
F) Bag search 59% 41% 0%
(183) (125) (0)
2a. Did you see any other types of security
measures, anything that's not on our list? 8% 92% 0%
Other (SPECIFY) (26) (282) (0)
Would that be very difficult or somewhat difficult?
Very difficult 6% (18)
Somewhat
Difficult 16% (46)
Appendix II Results of National Mall Visitor Survey
rity measures are added to the National Mall, what
priority - low
medium or high - would you give the following: Low Medium High
A) Overall public access to the National
16% (47) 27% (82) 58% (175)
Mall
B) Overall appearance of the National Mall 15% (45) 31% (93) 54% (162)
7. Do you currently live in the Washington metropolitan area, another
state, or another country?
^.
Washington D.C. area 21% (65)
^.
Another state, please list: 72% (221)
^.
Another country, please list: 7% (22)
Appendix II Results of National Mall Visitor Survey
8. Would you say that the security measures you encountered today make it less
likely that you will return for a visit, more likely that you will return for a
visit, or do they
have no effect at all?
^.Less likely to return for a visit 5% (15)
^. More likely to return for a visit 12% (38)
^. No effect at all 83% (255)
END: Thank you so much for participating.
Interview Date: 10/18/2004 23% (70)
10/25/2004 20% (61)
10/26/2004 17% (53)
11/5/2004 14% (42)
11/7/2004 27% (82)
Survey Location: Museum of Natural History /Museum of American
History 14% (44)
Lincoln/Vietnam Memorials 23% (70)
Air and Space /American Indian Museums 23% (72)
WWII Memorial 23% (72)
Art West/Art East 11% (33)
Jefferson Memorial 6% (17)
Note: Percentage represents the portion of 308 possible responses.
Percentages may not total 100 because each percentage is rounded to the
nearest whole number. The number of respondents for each question is in
parentheses. The number for each question may not total to 308, based on
respondents who did not answer, or were not asked, a given question.
Questions 3 and 4 were only asked of respondents who encountered security
measures.
Appendix III
GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments
Mark L. Goldstein, (202) 512-2834
GAO Contacts
Susan A. Fleming, (202) 512-4431
In addition to those named above, Dennis J. Amari, Virginia Chanley,
Staff
Sandra J. DePaulis, Robert V. Dolson, Colin Fallon, Denise M. Fantone, H.
Brandon Haller, Anne Izod, Jason Kelly, Nancy J. Lueke, David Sausville,
and Susan Michal-Smith made key contributions to this report.
Bibliography
Advisory Council on Historic Preservation. Protecting Historic Properties:
Advisory Council on
A Citizen's Guide to Section 106 Review. Washington, D.C.: 2002.
Department of the Interior
Department of the Interior, Office of the Inspector General. Homeland
Security: Protection of Critical Infrastructure Systems - Assessment 2:
Critical Infrastructure Systems (2002-I-0053). Washington, D.C.: September
2002.
Department of the Interior, Office of the Inspector General. Homeland
Security: Protection of Critical Infrastructure Facilities and National
Icons-Assessment 1: Supplemental Funding - Plans and Progress
(2002-I-0039). Washington, D.C.: June 2002.
Department of the Interior, Office of the Inspector General. Progress
Report: Secretary's Directives for Implementing Law Enforcement Reform in
Department of the Interior (2003-I-0062). Washington, D.C.: August 28,
2003.
Department of the Interior, Office of the Inspector General. Review of
National Icon Park Security (2003-I-0063). Washington, D.C.: August 2003.
National Capital Planning Commission
National Capital Planning Commission. Comprehensive Plan for the National
Capital: Federal Elements. Washington, D.C.: August 2004.
Interagency Task Force of the National Capital Planning Commission.
Designing for Security in the Nation's Capital. Washington, D.C.: October
2001.
National Capital Planning Commission. National Capital Urban Design and
Security Plan. Washington, D.C.: July 2002.
National Capital Planning Commission. Memorials and Museums Master Plan.
Washington, D.C.: September 2001.
Bibliography
National Coalition to Save Our Mall. First Annual State of the Mall
Report:
National Coalition to
The Current Condition of the National Mall. Rockville, MD: October 2002.
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