Homeland Security: Federal Efforts Are Helping to Alleviate Some 
Challenges Encountered by State and Local Information Fusion	 
Centers (30-OCT-07, GAO-08-35). 				 
                                                                 
In general, a fusion center is a collaborative effort to detect, 
prevent, investigate, and respond to criminal and terrorist	 
activity. Recognizing that fusion centers are a mechanism for	 
information sharing, the federal government--including the	 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the Department of Justice 
(DOJ), and the Program Manager for the Information Sharing	 
Environment (PM-ISE), which has primary responsibility for	 
governmentwide information sharing and is located in the Office  
of the Director of National Intelligence--is taking steps to	 
partner with fusion centers. In response to Congressional	 
request, GAO examined (1) the status and characteristics of	 
fusion centers and (2) to what extent federal efforts help	 
alleviate challenges the centers identified. GAO reviewed	 
center-related documents and conducted interviews with officials 
from DHS, DOJ, and the PM-ISE, and conducted semistructured	 
interviews with 58 state and local fusion centers. The results	 
are not generalizable to the universe of fusion centers. Data are
not available on the total number of local fusion centers.	 
-------------------------Indexing Terms------------------------- 
REPORTNUM:   GAO-08-35						        
    ACCNO:   A77768						        
  TITLE:     Homeland Security: Federal Efforts Are Helping to	      
Alleviate Some Challenges Encountered by State and Local	 
Information Fusion Centers					 
     DATE:   10/30/2007 
  SUBJECT:   Counterterrorism					 
	     Federal/state relations				 
	     Government information dissemination		 
	     Homeland security					 
	     Information centers				 
	     Information management				 
	     Interagency relations				 
	     Law enforcement					 
	     Law enforcement information systems		 
	     Program evaluation 				 
	     State programs					 
	     State-administered programs			 
	     State/local relations				 
	     Terrorism						 
	     Information sharing				 
	     Program goals or objectives			 
	     Fusion Center Guidelines				 

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GAO-08-35

   

     * [1]Results in Brief
     * [2]Background

          * [3]DHS's Role in Fusion Centers
          * [4]FBI's Role in Fusion Centers
          * [5]Role of the Program Manager of the Information Sharing Envir
          * [6]DHS's and DOJ's Networks and Systems for Sharing Information

     * [7]State and Local Fusion Centers Vary in Their Stages of Devel

          * [8]Fusion Centers Have Been Established in Most States
          * [9]Operational Fusion Centers and Their Characteristics
          * [10]Fusion Centers in the Planning and Early Stages of Developme

     * [11]Federal Agencies' Efforts to Support Fusion Centers Help to

          * [12]DHS, FBI, and the PM-ISE Have Some Actions Under Way to Addr
          * [13]DHS and FBI Provide Clearances to Fusion Center Officials an
          * [14]Fusion Center Officials We Contacted Cited Challenges with P

               * [15]Obtaining and Retaining Qualified Personnel Was Reported
                 as
               * [16]DHS and FBI Have Deployed Personnel to Fusion Centers
               * [17]Fusion Center Officials Cited Challenges with the
                 Federal Gr
               * [18]DHS Has Provided Grant Funding for Fusion-Related
                 Activities

          * [19]DHS and DOJ Have Provided Guidance, Technical Assistance, an

     * [20]Conclusions
     * [21]Recommendation
     * [22]Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
     * [23]Alabama
     * [24]Alaska
     * [25]Arizona
     * [26]Arkansas
     * [27]California

          * [28]State Terrorism Threat Assessment Center
          * [29]Los Angeles Joint Regional Intelligence Center
          * [30]Sacramento Regional Terrorism Threat Assessment Center

     * [31]Colorado
     * [32]Connecticut
     * [33]Delaware
     * [34]District of Columbia
     * [35]Florida
     * [36]Georgia
     * [37]Hawaii
     * [38]Idaho
     * [39]Illinois

          * [40]Statewide Terrorism and Intelligence Center
          * [41]Chicago Crime Prevention and Information Center

     * [42]Indiana
     * [43]Iowa
     * [44]Kansas
     * [45]Kentucky
     * [46]Louisiana
     * [47]Maine
     * [48]Maryland
     * [49]Massachusetts
     * [50]Michigan

          * [51]Michigan Intelligence and Operations Center
          * [52]Detroit and Southeastern Michigan Regional Fusion Center

     * [53]Minnesota
     * [54]Mississippi
     * [55]Missouri
     * [56]Montana
     * [57]Nebraska
     * [58]Nevada
     * [59]New Hampshire
     * [60]New Jersey
     * [61]New Mexico
     * [62]New York

          * [63]New York State Intelligence Center
          * [64]NYPD Intelligence Division
          * [65]Rockland County Intelligence Center

     * [66]North Carolina
     * [67]North Dakota
     * [68]Ohio
     * [69]Oklahoma
     * [70]Oregon
     * [71]Pennsylvania
     * [72]Rhode Island
     * [73]South Carolina
     * [74]South Dakota
     * [75]Tennessee
     * [76]Texas

          * [77]Texas Fusion Center
          * [78]North Central Texas Fusion Center

     * [79]Utah
     * [80]Vermont
     * [81]Virginia
     * [82]Washington
     * [83]West Virginia
     * [84]Wisconsin

          * [85]Wisconsin Statewide Intelligence Center
          * [86]Southeastern Wisconsin Terrorism Alert Center

     * [87]Wyoming
     * [88]GAO Contact
     * [89]Acknowledgments
     * [90]GAO's Mission
     * [91]Obtaining Copies of GAO Reports and Testimony

          * [92]Order by Mail or Phone

     * [93]To Report Fraud, Waste, and Abuse in Federal Programs
     * [94]Congressional Relations
     * [95]Public Affairs

Report to Congressional Committees

United States Government Accountability Office

GAO

October 2007

HOMELAND SECURITY

Federal Efforts Are Helping to Alleviate Some Challenges Encountered by
State and Local Information Fusion Centers

GAO-08-35

Contents

Letter 1

Results in Brief 5
Background 9
State and Local Fusion Centers Vary in Their Stages of Development and
Characteristics 14
Federal Agencies' Efforts to Support Fusion Centers Help to Address Some
Reported Challenges and Provide Further Assistance 23
Conclusions 40
Recommendations 40
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 41
Appendix I Objectives, Scope, and Methodology 44
Appendix II Operational Fusion Centers 47
Appendix III Fusion Centers in the Planning and Early Stages of
Development 51
Appendix IV Summary of State and Local Fusion Centers GAO Contacted 53
Appendix V GAO Contacts and Acknowledgments 109

Tables

Table 1: Networks and Systems to Which State and Local Fusion Centers May
Have Access 13
Table 2: DHS Grant Funds Allocated for Fusion-Related Activities, Fiscal
Year 2004 through 2006 35
Table 3: Examples of Technical Assistance Services Provided Jointly by DHS
and DOJ for the Fusion Process 38
Table 4: Selected Characteristics of Operational Fusion Centers We
Contacted, as of September 2007 47
Table 5: Selected Characteristics of Fusion Centers in the Planning and
Early Stages of Development We Contacted, as of September 2007 51

Figures

Figure 1: Reported Stage of Development for Fusion Centers We Contacted,
as of September 2007 16
Figure 2: Number of Fusion Centers Opened, by Year, Since September 2001
18

Abbreviations

ACS: Automated Case Support: 
AcTIC: Arizona Counter Terrorism Information Center: 
AMBER: America's Missing: Broadcast Emergency Response: 
ATF: Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms: 
BJA: Bureau of Justice Assistance: 
CBP: U.S. Customs and Border Protection: 
CFC: Commonwealth Fusion Center: 
CIAC: Colorado Information Analysis Center: 
CPIC: Chicago Crime Prevention and Information Center: 
CRS: Congressional Research Service: 
CTC: Counterterrorism Center: 
CTIC: Connecticut Intelligence Center: 
DEA: Drug Enforcement Administration: 
DHS: Department of Homeland Security: 
DIAC: Delaware Information Analysis Center: 
DOJ: Department of Justice: 
EPICEl: Paso Intelligence Center: 
FAMS: Federal Air Marshal Service: 
FBI: Federal Bureau of Investigation: 
FBINET: Federal Bureau of Investigation Network: 
FDLE: Florida Department of Law Enforcement: 
FEMA: Federal Emergency Management Agency: 
FIG: Field Intelligence Group Fin: 
CEN: Financial Crimes Enforcement Network: 
FPS: Federal Protective Service: 
GISAC: Georgia Information Sharing and Analysis Center: 
HIDTA: High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area: 
HSDN: Homeland Security Data Network: 
HSGP: Homeland Security Grant Program: 
HSIN: Homeland Security Information Network: 
I&A: Office of Intelligence and Analysis: 
ICE: Immigration and Customs Enforcement: 
ICEFISHX: Intelligence Communications Enterprise for Information 
Sharing and Exchange: 
IDW: Investigative Data Warehouse: 
IIFC: Indiana Intelligence Fusion Center: 
INTERPOL: International Criminal Police Organization: 
ISAAC: Information Sharing and Analysis Center: 
ISE: Information Sharing Environment: 
ITACG: Interagency Threat Assessment Coordination Group: 
JRIC: Joint Regional Intelligence Center: 
JTTF: Joint Terrorism Task Force: 
KIFC: Kentucky Intelligence Fusion Center: 
KSTIC: Kansas Threat Integration Center: 
LAPD: Los Angeles Police Department: 
La-SAFE: Louisiana State Analysis and Fusion Exchange: 
LEO: Law Enforcement Online: 
LETPP: Law Enforcement Terrorism Prevention Program: 
MATIC: Montana All-Threat Intelligence Center: 
MCAC: Maryland Coordination and Analysis Center: 
MIOC: Michigan Intelligence and Operations Center: 
MN-JAC: Minnesota Joint Analysis Center: 
MSAIC: Mississippi Analysis & Information Center: 
MWFC: Metropolitan Washington Fusion Center: 
NCIC: National Criminal Information Center: 
NPD: National Preparedness Directorate: 
NDIC: National Drug Intelligence Center: 
NFCCG: National Fusion Center Coordination Group: 
NLETS: International Justice and Public Safety Information Sharing 
Network: 
NMASIC: New Mexico All Source Intelligence Center: 
NTFC: North Central Texas Fusion Center: 
NYPD: New York Police Department: 
NYSIC: New York State Intelligence Center: 
PaCIC: Pennsylvania Criminal Intelligence Center: 
PM-ISE: Program Manager for the ISE: 
RISS: Regional Information Sharing System: 
RISS ATIX: Regional Information Sharing System Automated Trusted 
Information Exchange: 
RISSNET: Regional Information Sharing System: 
Secure Intranet: 
ROIC: Regional Operations Intelligence Center: 
RTTAC: Regional Terrorism Threat Analysis Center: 
SAIC: Strategic Analysis and Information Center: 
SBI: State Bureau of Investigation: 
SCIEX: South Carolina Information Exchange: 
SCIF: Sensitive Compartmented Information Facility: 
SCION: Sensitive Compartmental Information Operational Network: 
SEVIS: Student and Exchange Visitor Information System: 
SHSP: State Homeland Security Program: 
SIPRNet: Secret Internet Protocol Router Network: 
STAC: Southeastern Wisconsin Terrorism Alert Center: 
STIC: Statewide Terrorism and Intelligence Center: 
STTAC: State Terrorism Threat Assessment Center: 
TEW: Terrorism Early Warning: 
TITAN: Terrorism Intelligence and Threat Assessment Network: 
TLO: Terrorism Liaison Officer: 
TRIC: Tennessee Regional Information Center: 
TSA: Transportation Security Administration: 
TS/SCI: Top Secret/Sensitive Compartmented Information: 
UASI: Urban Areas Security Initiative: 
WAJAC: Washington Joint Analytical Center: 
WSIC: Wisconsin Statewide Intelligence Center: 

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United States Government Accountability Office
Washington, DC 20548

October 30, 2007

Congressional Requesters

A breakdown in information sharing was a major factor contributing to the
failure to prevent the attacks of September 11, 2001, according to the
National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (the 9/11
Commission). Since then, most states and some local governments have,
largely on their own initiative, established fusion centers to address
gaps in homeland security, terrorism, and law enforcement information
sharing by the federal government and to provide a conduit of this
information within the state. Indeed, developing a fusion center was a
high priority of state homeland security directors, according to a 2006
National Governors Association survey. Although fusion centers vary
because they were primarily established to meet state and local needs, a
fusion center is generally "a collaborative effort of two or more agencies
that provide resources, expertise, and information to the center with the
goal of maximizing their ability to detect, prevent, investigate, and
respond to criminal and terrorist activity."1 Fusion centers may include a
range of federal, state, and local entities and collect and analyze
information related to homeland security, terrorism, and law enforcement.

With information-sharing weaknesses recognized as a major contributing
factor to the nation's lack of preparedness for the 9/11 attacks, a number
of information-sharing initiatives were mandated by the Homeland Security
Act of 2002 and the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of
2004 (Intelligence Reform Act). The Homeland Security Act, for example,
requires that the President prescribe and implement procedures under which
federal agencies can share relevant and appropriate homeland security
information with other federal agencies and with appropriate state and
local personnel, such as law enforcement agencies and first responders.2
The President assigned most responsibilities for executing this
requirement to the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security in
July 2003. The Intelligence Reform Act, as amended in August 2007 by the
Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 (9/11
Commission Act), mandates a more extensive information-sharing regime that
requires the President to take action to facilitate the sharing of
terrorism and homeland security information by establishing an Information
Sharing Environment (ISE) that is to combine policies, procedures, and
technologies that link people, systems, and information among all
appropriate federal, state, local, and tribal entities and the private
sector.3 This act also requires, among other things, that the President
appoint a program manager to oversee development and implementation of the
ISE, which the President did in April 2005.

1See Global Justice Information Sharing Initiative, Fusion Center
Guidelines, Developing and Sharing Information and Intelligence in a New
Era, Guidelines for Establishing and Operating Fusion Centers at the
Local, State, and Federal Levels--Law Enforcement Intelligence, Public
Safety, and the Private Sector (August 2006).

2See Pub. L. No. 107-296, S 892, 116 Stat. 2135, 2253-55 (2002).

Recognizing that state and local fusion centers represent a critical
source of local information about potential threats and a mechanism for
providing terrorism-related information and intelligence from federal
sources, the Program Manager for the ISE (PM-ISE),4 the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS), and the Department of Justice (DOJ) are taking
steps to partner with and leverage fusion centers as part of the overall
information sharing environment. The PM-ISE issued an implementation plan
in November 2006 that incorporated presidentially approved recommendations
for federal, state, local, and private sector information sharing and
largely relied on efforts under way by DHS and DOJ with respect to fusion
centers. Recognizing that the collaboration between fusion centers and
with the federal government marks a tremendous increase in the nation's
overall analytic capacity that can be used to combat terrorism, the plan
envisions that the federal government will work to leverage and promote
fusion center initiatives to facilitate effective nationwide
terrorism-related information sharing, with fusion centers becoming the
focal point of this sharing. Under the plan, DHS and DOJ are to work with
states to designate a primary fusion center to serve as the statewide or
regional hub to interface with the federal government and through which to
coordinate the gathering, processing, analyzing, and disseminating of
terrorism-related information. DHS and DOJ are to assume the
responsibility for technical assistance and training to support the
establishment and operation of the fusion centers. Finally, according to
PM-ISE officials, the plan envisions that in order to receive grant
funding, each designated fusion center must develop a coordinated approach
with any other fusion centers in the state and will eventually achieve a
baseline level of capability and ensure compliance with all applicable
privacy laws and standards. Both DHS and DOJ have established program
offices to oversee their relationships with fusion centers.

3See Pub. L. No. 108-458, S 1016, 118 Stat. 3638, 3664-70 (2004), amended
by  Pub. L. No. 110-53, S 504, 121 Stat. 266, 313-17 (2007).

4On June 2, 2005, the President issued a memorandum placing the PM-ISE and
its staff within the Office of the Director of National Intelligence.

In addition, the 9/11 Commission Act contains several provisions related
to fusion centers.5 For example, the act requires the Secretary of DHS, in
consultation with the Attorney General, the PM-ISE, and others to
establish a state, local, and regional fusion center initiative within DHS
to establish partnerships with state, local, and regional fusion centers
that will, among other things, provide operational and intelligence advice
and assistance, as well as management assistance, and facilitate close
communication and coordination between fusion centers and DHS. In
addition, the initiative is to provide training to fusion centers and
encourage the centers to participate in terrorism-threat-related exercises
conducted by DHS.

In response to your request to describe state and local fusion centers and
federal efforts underway to support them, this report answers the
following two questions:

           o What are the stages of development and characteristics of state
           and local fusion centers?

           o To what extent do efforts under way by the PM-ISE, DHS, and DOJ
           help to address some of the challenges identified by fusion
           centers?

To answer these questions, we reviewed relevant directives, plans, and
documents and interviewed officials--including many of those from the
PM-ISE, DHS, and DOJ--who are involved with those entities' efforts to
support fusion centers. In addition, we spoke with officials from 11
organizations conducting research on state and local information sharing,
including officials at the Congressional Research Service (CRS) who
released a report in July 2007 on fusion centers.6 We also conducted
semistructured telephone interviews with the director (or his or her
designee) of every state fusion center, the District of Columbia fusion
center, and eight local fusion centers to obtain information about the
centers' characteristics, challenges encountered, and support received
from DHS and DOJ.7 Our selection criteria for the local fusion centers
included their relationships with the state fusion center, stage of
development, and geographic diversity. Where a fusion center was in the
planning stages, we spoke with officials involved in the planning and
establishment of the center, such as directors of homeland security
offices. From February through May 2007, we spoke with officials from all
50 states, the District of Columbia, and 8 local jurisdictions. While we
did contact officials in all state fusion centers, we did not contact
officials in all local fusion centers; therefore our results are not
generalizable to the universe of fusion centers. Data were not available
to determine the total number of local fusion centers.

5See Pub. L. No. 110-53, S 511, 121 Stat. at 317-24 (adding section 210A
to subtitle A, title II of the Homeland Security Act, Pub. L. No. 107-296,
116 Stat. 2135).

6See Congressional Research Service, Fusion Centers: Issues and Options
for Congress, RL34070 (Washington, D.C.: July 6, 2007).

To describe the challenges fusion centers encountered in establishing and
operating, we asked officials during our semistructured telephone
interviews whether they encountered challenges in 10 different categories
and, if so, the extent to which the category was a challenge both at
establishment and, for operational centers, in day-to-day operations.
These categories included federal partnerships, personnel, guidance,
training, funding, access to information, and security clearances. Fusion
center officials provided open-ended, descriptive responses of challenges
faced by their centers. On the basis of a content analysis of fusion
center officials' responses, we identified, categorized, and counted
similar challenges. Fusion center officials may not have indicated that
they encountered all the challenges discussed in the report. In addition,
individual fusion center officials may have identified multiple challenges
in a given category, for example funding.

We also obtained and summarized descriptive information from the fusion
centers including structure, organization, personnel, and information
technology systems used. Finally, to obtain detailed information about
centers' operations and challenges encountered, we conducted site visits
to fusion centers in Atlanta, Georgia; Phoenix, Arizona; Richmond,
Virginia; Baltimore, Maryland; West Trenton, New Jersey; and New York, New
York. Our selection criteria for these centers included their stage of
development, extent of federal partnerships, and geographic
representation. Appendix I provides further details on our objectives,
scope, and methodology. We performed our work from August 2006 through
September 2007 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing
standards.

7For purposes of this report, we use "local fusion center" to refer to
centers established by major urban areas, counties, cities, and intrastate
regions.

Results in Brief

Established by state and local governments generally to improve
information sharing and to prevent terrorism or other threats, fusion
centers across the country are in varying stages of development--from
operational to early in the planning stages. Officials in 43 of the 58
fusion centers we contacted described their centers as operational as of
September 2007.8 Thirty-four of the operational centers are relatively
new, having been opened since January 2004, while 9 centers opened within
the couple of years after the attacks of September 11. The majority had
missions and scopes of operations that included more than just
counterterrorism-related activities, such as collecting, analyzing, and
disseminating criminal as well as terrorism-related information. Adopting
a broader focus helped provide information about all threats and, in the
opinion of some fusion center officials, increased the center's
sustainability, for instance, by including additional stakeholders. Law
enforcement entities, such as state police or state bureaus of
investigation, are the lead or managing agencies in the majority of the
operational centers we contacted. However, the centers varied in their
staff sizes and partnerships with other agencies. At least 34 of the 43
operational fusion centers we contacted had federal personnel assigned to
them. For example, officials in 17 of the operational centers we contacted
reported that they had DHS intelligence officers, and officials in about
three quarters of the operational centers told us that they had FBI
special agents or intelligence analysts assigned to their centers. Many
fusion centers reported having access to DHS's and DOJ's unclassified
networks or systems, such as 40 with access to the Homeland Security
Information Network (HSIN) and 39 with access to Law Enforcement Online
(LEO).9 In addition, 16 of the 43 centers said they had or were in the
process of obtaining access to DHS's classified network, and 23 reported
they had or were in the process of obtaining access to the FBI's
classified systems. Products disseminated and services provided also vary.
For instance, some centers provide investigative support for law
enforcement officers.

8We contacted all 50 states, the District of Columbia, and 8 local areas;
however, one state did not plan a fusion center. For that reason, we have
responses from 58 fusion centers--43 operational and 15 in the planning or
early stages of development.

9HSIN serves as DHS's primary nationwide information-sharing tool for
communicating sensitive but unclassified homeland security information.
LEO serves as a real-time on-line controlled-access communications and
information-sharing data repository for sensitive but unclassified
information about, among other things, antiterrorism, intelligence, law
enforcement, and criminal justice.

DHS and DOJ, recognizing the importance of fusion centers in information
sharing, have efforts under way that begin to address challenges fusion
center officials identified in establishing and operating their centers,
such as accessing information, obtaining security clearances, obtaining
and retaining personnel, obtaining funding, and finding sufficient
guidance and training.

           o As we have highlighted, DHS and DOJ have provided many fusion
           centers access to their information systems, but fusion center
           officials cited challenges accessing and managing multiple
           information systems. For example, officials at 31 of the 58
           centers we contacted reported challenges obtaining access to
           federal information systems or networks. DHS and the FBI have
           taken some steps to address this challenge, such as assisting with
           needed system security requirements that are a prerequisite to
           obtaining access. Officials at 30 of the fusion centers also found
           the multiple systems or heavy volume of often redundant
           information a challenge to manage. Officials from the PM-ISE's
           office said they are collaborating with agencies, including DHS
           and DOJ, on an effort to review existing federal information
           systems and users' needs to determine opportunities to streamline
           system access. However, it is too early to tell whether these
           efforts will address the challenges reported by fusion centers.

           o Both DHS and the FBI have provided security clearances for state
           and local personnel and have set goals to reduce the length of
           time it takes to obtain a clearance. DHS and the FBI have also
           provided centers with information about the security clearance
           process and time frames in an effort to clarify the time needed to
           process requests. However, obtaining and using security clearances
           represented a challenge for 44 of the 58 fusion centers we
           contacted. For instance, officials at 32 of the centers cited
           difficulties with the length of time it takes to receive a
           security clearance from DHS or the FBI. Further, while law and
           executive order provide that a security clearance granted by one
           federal agency should generally be accepted by other agencies, 10
           officials in 19 of the centers encountered difficulties with
           federal agencies, particularly DHS and the FBI, accepting each
           others' clearances. DHS and DOJ officials said that they were not
           aware of fusion centers encountering recent challenges with
           reciprocity of security clearances. However, they said that there
           were complications in the clearance process, for example, multiple
           federal agencies carry out their own processes without central
           coordination.

           o Officials in 43 of the 58 fusion centers we contacted reported
           facing challenges related to obtaining personnel, and officials in
           54 fusion centers reported challenges with obtaining and
           maintaining funding when establishing and operating their centers,
           challenges which some of these officials also said affected their
           centers' sustainability. For example, officials in 37 centers said
           they encountered challenges with federal, state, and local
           agencies not being able to detail personnel to their fusion
           center, particularly in the face of resource constraints. Fusion
           centers rely on such details as a means of staffing the centers
           and enhancing information sharing with other state and local
           agencies. To support fusion centers, as of September 2007, DHS had
           assigned intelligence officers to 17 of the operational fusion
           centers we contacted, and the FBI had assigned personnel to about
           three quarters of the fusion centers we contacted. In terms of
           funding, officials in 35 of the 58 centers encountered challenges
           with the complexity of the federal grant process or uncertain or
           declining federal funding, and officials from 28 of the 58 centers
           reported having difficulty obtaining state or local funding. They
           said that these issues created confusion for their centers over
           the steps needed to secure federal funds, made it difficult to
           plan for the future, and created concerns about the fusion
           centers' abilities to sustain their capabilities for the
           long-term. Additionally, fusion center officials identified
           challenges with restrictions on the use of federal grant funds,
           and DHS has made several changes to help address these challenges
           by taking steps to ease the grant process and by adjusting some of
           the restrictions on the timing and use of grant funds. While these
           funds are helpful, fusion center officials were concerned about
           the extent of federal support they could expect over the long
           term. The federal government, through the ISE, has stated that it
           expects to rely on a nationwide network of fusion centers as the
           cornerstone of information sharing with state and local
           governments, but ISE plans or guidance to date do not articulate
           the long-term role the federal government expects to play in
           sustaining these centers, especially in relation to the role of
           their state or local jurisdictions. It is critical for center
           management to know whether to expect continued federal
           resources--such as grant funds, facility support, personnel, and
           information systems--over the long term. While the federal
           government generally cannot commit future resources, articulating
           the extent to which it plans to help support these centers in the
           long term is important for fusion center management in its
           planning efforts and for sustaining the network.

           o DHS, DOJ, and the PM-ISE have taken steps to develop guidance
           and provide technical assistance to fusion centers to address
           their challenges in the areas of guidance and training. For
           instance, in August 2006, DHS and DOJ issued jointly developed
           Fusion Center Guidelines that outline 18 recommended elements for
           establishing and operating fusion centers--for example, ensuring
           appropriate security measures are in place for facility, data, and
           personnel. Officials in 48 of the 58 fusion centers we contacted
           said that they found the Guidelines generally good or useful,
           although officials at 19 fusion centers said they lacked guidance
           on specific policies and procedures on information sharing or
           lacked national standards and guidelines on training or
           qualifications for analysts. Furthermore, officials at 31 of the
           fusion centers we contacted said they had challenges training
           their personnel, and officials at 11 centers expressed a need for
           the federal government to establish standards for training fusion
           center analysts to help ensure that analysts have similar skills.
           DHS and DOJ have initiated a technical assistance service program
           for fusion centers and, along with the PM-ISE, sponsored regional
           and national conferences and are developing a baseline
           capabilities document to provide more specific guidelines for
           fusion centers. However, as of September 2007, the baseline
           capabilities document was still in draft form and had not been
           issued.

10National Security Directive 63, issued by President Bush in 1991,
provides that investigations satisfying the scope and standards specified
in the directive are transferable between agencies and shall be deemed to
meet the investigative standards for access to collateral Top Secret and
Sensitive Compartmented Information. Executive Order 12968, issued by
President Clinton in 1995, provides that background investigation
determinations of access to classified information are to be mutually and
reciprocally accepted by all agencies. Additionally, section 3001 of the
Intelligence Reform Act, enacted in December 2004, requires that all
security clearance background investigations and determinations completed
by an authorized agency be accepted by all agencies.

To help address concerns about sustaining centers, we are recommending
that the federal government determine and articulate its long-term fusion
center role and whether it expects to provide resources to centers to help
ensure their sustainability as part of the nationwide network of fusion
centers.

We requested comments on a draft of this report from the Secretary of the
Department of Homeland Security, the Acting Attorney General, and the
Program Manager for the Information Sharing Environment or their
designees. In commenting on drafts of the report, DHS and the PM-ISE
agreed with our recommendation, and DOJ had no comments on the draft.
Further, DHS commented that it, along with its federal partners, is
reviewing strategies to sustain fusion centers as part of the work plan of
the National Fusion Center Coordination Group. This group plans to present
these strategies to the federal departments before the end of the year.

Background

DHS's Role in Fusion Centers

As part of its mission and in accordance with the Homeland Security Act,
DHS has responsibility for coordinating efforts to share homeland security
information across all levels of government, including federal, state,
local, and tribal governments and the private sector. Specifically with
respect to fusion centers, DHS envisions creating partnerships with state
and local centers to improve information flow between DHS and the centers
and to improve their effectiveness as a whole. As such, the Office of
Intelligence and Analysis (I&A) was designated in June 2006 by the
Secretary as the executive agent to manage a program to accomplish DHS's
state and local fusion center mission. The Assistant Secretary for
Intelligence and Analysis approved the establishment of the State and
Local Program Office (SLPO) under the direction of a Principle Deputy
Assistant Secretary to implement this mission. Specifically, the office is
responsible for deploying DHS personnel with operational and intelligence
skills to state and local fusion centers to facilitate coordination and
the flow of information between DHS and the center, provide expertise in
intelligence analysis and reporting, coordinate with local DHS and FBI
components, and provide DHS with local situational awareness and access to
fusion center information. As part of this effort, DHS is conducting needs
assessments at fusion centers to review their status and determine what
resources, such as personnel, system access, and security, are needed. As
of September 2007, DHS had conducted 25 fusion center needs assessments.
The SLPO also coordinates the granting of DHS security clearances for
personnel located in fusion centers and the deployment of DHS classified
and unclassified systems for use in the fusion center.

The Homeland Security Grant Program (HSGP) awards funds to states,
territories, and urban areas to enhance their ability to prepare for,
prevent, and respond to terrorist attacks and other major disasters. HSGP
consists of five separate programs, three of which can be used by states
and local jurisdictions, at their discretion, for fusion center-related
funding. The State Homeland Security Program (SHSP) supports the
implementation of the State Homeland Security Strategies to address the
identified planning, equipment, training, and exercise needs for
preventing acts of terrorism. The Law Enforcement Terrorism Prevention
Program (LETPP) provides resources to law enforcement and public safety
communities to support critical terrorism prevention activities. Each
state receives a minimum allocation under SHSP and LETPP and additional
funds are allocated based on the analyses of risk and anticipated
effectiveness. The Urban Areas Security Initiative (UASI) program
addresses the unique planning, equipment, training, and exercise needs of
high-threat, high-density urban areas and assists them in building an
enhanced and sustainable capacity to prevent, protect against, respond to,
and recover from acts of terrorism. UASI funds are allocated on the basis
of risk and anticipated effectiveness to about 45 candidate areas. The
fiscal year 2007 HSGP grant guidance specified the establishment and
enhancement of state and local fusion centers as a prevention priority,
making them a priority for LETPP. DHS's Federal Emergency Management
Agency National Preparedness Directorate (FEMA/NPD) manages the grant
process and allocates these funds to state and local entities.11

FBI's Role in Fusion Centers

The FBI serves as the primary investigative unit of DOJ, and its mission
includes investigating serious federal crimes, protecting the nation from
terrorist and foreign intelligence threats, and assisting federal, state,
and municipal law enforcement agencies. Following the attacks on September
11, 2001, the FBI shifted its primary mission to focus on
counterterrorism; that is, detecting and preventing future attacks. The
FBI primarily conducts its counterterrorism investigations through its
Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTF), which are multi-agency task forces
that generally contain state and local officials. As of September 2007,
there were JTTFs in 101 locations, including one in each of the FBI's 56
field offices. Since 2003, each of the 56 field offices has also
established a Field Intelligence Group (FIG) to serve as the centralized
intelligence component responsible for the management, execution, and
coordination of intelligence functions.

11Effective April 2007, the functions performed by the former DHS Office
of Grants and Training were transferred to FEMA as part of a realignment
of major national preparedness functions required by the Post-Katrina
Emergency Management Reform Act of 2006. See Pub. L. No. 109-295, SS 611,
614, 120 Stat. 1355, 1395-1411.

Recognizing that fusion centers are becoming focal points for the sharing
of homeland security, terrorism, and law enforcement information among
federal, state, and local governments, the FBI has directed that its field
offices, through their FIGs, become involved in the fusion centers in
order to enhance the FBI's ability to accomplish its mission and "stay
ahead of the threat." In June 2006, the FBI's National Security Branch
directed each field office to assess its own information sharing
environment and, when appropriate, detail a FIG special agent and
intelligence analyst to the leading fusion center within its territory.
The FBI's Directorate of Intelligence established an Interagency
Integration Unit in January 2007 to provide headquarters oversight of FBI
field offices' relationships with fusion centers. While the FBI's role in
and support of individual fusion centers varies depending on the
interaction between the particular center and the FBI field office, FBI
efforts to support centers include assigning FBI special agents and
intelligence analysts to fusion centers, providing office space or rent
for fusion center facilities, providing security clearances, conducting
security certification of facilities, and providing direct or facilitated
access to the FBI. FBI personnel assigned to fusion centers are to provide
an effective two-way flow of information between the fusion center and the
FBI; participate as an investigative or analytical partner uncovering,
understanding, reporting, and responding to threats; and ensure the timely
flow of information between the fusion center and the local JTTF and FIG.

Role of the Program Manager of the Information Sharing Environment in Fusion
Centers

Established under the Intelligence Reform Act, the PM-ISE is charged with
developing and overseeing implementation of the ISE, which consists of the
policies, processes, and technologies that enable the sharing of terrorism
information among local, state, tribal, federal, and private sector
entities as well as foreign partners, and, as such, released an ISE
Implementation Plan in November 2006. Recognizing that the collaboration
between fusion centers and with the federal government marks a tremendous
increase in the nation's overall analytic capacity that can be used to
combat terrorism, the plan--integrating presidentially approved
recommendations for federal, state, local, and private sector
terrorism-related information sharing--calls for the federal government to
promote the establishment of a nationwide integrated network of state and
local fusion centers to facilitate effective terrorism information
sharing. The plan outlines several actions on the part of the federal
government, largely through DHS and DOJ, to support fusion centers,
including providing technical assistance and training to support the
establishment and operation of centers.

In addition, the PM-ISE has established a National Fusion Center
Coordination Group (NFCCG), led by DHS and DOJ, to identify federal
resources to support the development of a national, integrated network of
fusion centers. The NFCCG is to ensure that designated fusion centers
achieve a baseline level of capability and comply with all applicable
federal laws and policies regarding the protection of information and
privacy and other legal rights of individuals. The NFCCG also is to ensure
coordination between federal entities interacting with these fusion
centers and has been tasked to develop recommendations regarding funding
options relating to their establishment. However, to date, the efforts of
the NFCCG have not included delineating whether such assistance is for the
short-term establishment or long-term sustainability of fusion centers. In
addition, the PM-ISE, in consultation with the Information Sharing
Council--the forum for top information sharing officials from departments
and agencies with activities that may include terrorism-related
information--has also established a Senior-Level Interagency Advisory
Group that oversees the NFCCG as part of its overall responsibility to
monitor and ensure the implementation of the ISE.

DHS's and DOJ's Networks and Systems for Sharing Information That Fusion Centers
May Access

We reported in April 2007 that DHS and DOJ have 17 major networks and 4
system applications that they use to support their homeland security
missions, including sharing information with state and local entities such
as fusion centers.12 In addition, state and local governments have similar
information technology initiatives to carry out their homeland security
missions. Table 1 provides information on the primary networks and systems
used by fusion centers.

12GAO, Information Technology: Numerous Federal Networks Used to Support
Homeland Security Need to Be Better Coordinated with Key State and Local
Information-Sharing Initiatives, [96]GAO-07-455 (Washington, D.C.: Apr.
16, 2007).

Table 1: Networks and Systems to Which State and Local Fusion Centers May
Have Access

Table 1: Networks and Systems to Which State and Local Fusion Centers 
May Have Access: 

System or network: Homeland Security Information Network (HSIN); 
Owner: DHS; 
Sensitivity level: Sensitive but unclassified; 
Brief summary of selected functions: 
* Serves as DHS's primary nationwide information- sharing tool for 
transporting sensitive but unclassified information; 
* Composed of over 35 communities of interest such as emergency 
management, law enforcement, counterterrorism, individual states, and 
private sector communities. Each community of interest has Web pages 
that are tailored for the community and contain general and community- 
specific news articles, links, and contact information; 
Types of information shared: 
* DHS' primary system for sharing terrorism and related information; 
* Supplies suspicious incident and pre-incident information, 24x7 
situational awareness, and analyses of terrorist threats, tactics, and 
weapons. 

System or network: Federal Protective Service (FPS) Secure Portal 
System; 
Owner: DHS; 
Sensitivity level: Sensitive but unclassified; 
Brief summary of selected functions: 
* Supports secure communications and collaboration across the law 
enforcement community; 
Types of information shared: 
* Manages information to help ensure the safety and security of federal 
buildings, protection officers, and visitors. 

System or network: Homeland Secure Data Network (HSDN); 
Owner: DHS; 
Sensitivity level: Secret; 
Brief summary of selected functions: 
* Secret-level classified communications network system with which 
government agencies are able to share information and collaborate in 
order to detect, deter, and mitigate threats to the homeland at the 
Secret level; 
* Provides state and local governments with their own area to post and 
manage collateral-level information for access by their federal law 
enforcement and intelligence community partners; 
Types of information shared: 
* Transmits homeland security data in support of activities including 
intelligence, investigations, and inspections that are classified at 
the Secret level. 

System or network: Federal Bureau of Investigation Network (FBINET); 
Owner: FBI; 
Sensitivity level: Secret; 
Brief summary of selected functions: 
* Serves as a global area network used for communicating Secret 
information; 
* Operated, maintained, and access controlled by the FBI; 
Types of information shared: 
* Communicates Secret information, including investigative case files 
and intelligence pertaining to national security. 

System or network: Law Enforcement Online (LEO); 
Owner: DOJ; 
Sensitivity level: Sensitive but unclassified; 
Brief summary of selected functions: 
* Serves as a real-time on-line controlled-access communications and 
information-sharing data repository; 
* Supports an Internet-accessible focal point for electronic sensitive 
but unclassified communication and information sharing with federal, 
state, local, and tribal law enforcement agencies; 
Types of information shared: 
* Contains information about, among other things, antiterrorism, 
intelligence, law enforcement, and criminal justice. 

System or network: Regional Information Sharing Systems (RISS) Secure 
Intranet (RISSNET); 
Owner: State and local officials of the RISS program[A] with funding 
through a DOJ grant; 
Sensitivity level: Sensitive but unclassified; 
Brief summary of selected functions: 
* Serves as a secure network for law enforcement agencies throughout 
the United States and other countries; 
* Offers services such as secure e- mail, document libraries, 
intelligence databases, bulletin boards, a chat tool, and Web pages 
that contain general and community-specific news articles, links, and 
contact information; 
Types of information shared: 
* Provides a secure criminal intelligence network for communications 
and information sharing by local, state, tribal, and federal law 
enforcement agencies; 
* Beyond its collaboration tools, also provides users with access to 
other law enforcement resources such as analytical criminal data-
visualization tools and criminal intelligence databases. 

System or network: Regional Information Sharing Systems Automated 
Trusted Information Exchange (RISS ATIX); 
Owner: State and local officials of the RISS program with funding 
through a DOJ grant; 
Sensitivity level: Sensitive but unclassified; 
Brief summary of selected functions: 
* Offers services similar to RISSNET to agencies beyond the law 
enforcement community, including executives and officials from 
governmental and nongovernmental agencies and organizations that have 
public safety responsibilities; 
* Partitioned into 39 communities of interest such as critical 
infrastructure, emergency management, public health, and government 
officials. Services offered through its Web pages are tailored for each 
community of interest and contain community-specific news articles, 
links, and contact information; 
Types of information shared: 
* Users can post timely threat information, documents, images, and 
information related to terrorism and homeland security, as well as 
receive DHS information, advisories, and warnings. 

Source: [97]GAO-07-455 and GAO analysis of DHS and DOJ information.

[a]Operated and managed by state and local officials, RISS was established
in 1974 as a nationwide initiative to share criminal intelligence among
stakeholders in law enforcement, first responders, and the private sector
and to coordinate efforts against crime that operate across jurisdictional
lines. The program consists of six regional information analysis centers
that offer services to RISS members in their regions, including
information sharing and research, analytical products, case investigation
support, funding, equipment loans, and training.

State and Local Fusion Centers Vary in Their Stages of Development and
Characteristics

Established by state and local governments to improve information sharing
among federal, state, and local entities and to prevent terrorism or other
threats, fusion centers across the country vary in their stages of
development--from operational to early in the planning stages. Those
centers that are operational vary in many of their characteristics, but
generally have missions that are broader than counterterrorism, have
multiple agencies represented--including federal partners--in their
centers, and have access to a number of networks and systems that provide
homeland security and law enforcement-related information.

Fusion Centers Have Been Established in Most States

Since September 2001, almost all states and several local governments have
established or are in the process of establishing a fusion center.
Officials in 43 of the 58 fusion centers we contacted described their
centers as operational as of September 2007. Specifically, officials in 35
states, the District of Columbia, and 7 local jurisdictions we contacted
described their fusion center as operational, officials in 14 states and 1
local jurisdiction considered their centers to be in the planning or early
stages of development, and 1 state did not have or plan to have a fusion
center, as shown in figure 1. In 6 states we contacted, there was more
than one fusion center established.

Figure 1: Reported Stage of Development for Fusion Centers We Contacted,
as of September 2007

Officials cited a variety of reasons why their state or local jurisdiction
established a fusion center. To improve information sharing--related to
homeland security, terrorism, and law enforcement--among federal, state,
and local entities and to prevent terrorism or threats after the attacks
of September 11 were the most frequently cited reasons. For example,
officials in one state said that their state was "mentioned 59 times in
the 9/11 Commission Report, the majority of which were not complimentary,"
and as a result established a 24-hour-per-day and 7-day-per-week
intelligence and information analysis center to serve as the central hub
to facilitate the collection, analysis, and dissemination of crime and
terrorism-related information. Several officials cited the need to enhance
information sharing within their own jurisdictions across disciplines and
levels of government as the reason why their jurisdiction established a
center. While most officials from fusion centers that were in the planning
or early stages of development stated that they were establishing a fusion
center in general to enhance information sharing or protect against future
threats, officials in a few centers also noted that their jurisdictions
were discussing or establishing fusion centers because of available DHS
grant funding or their perception that DHS was requiring states to
establish a center. Appendixes II and III provide basic information about
operational fusion centers and fusion centers in the planning and early
stages of development, respectively. Appendix IV provides a state-by-state
summary of state and local areas' efforts to establish and operate fusion
centers.

Operational Fusion Centers and Their Characteristics

Officials in operational fusion centers provided varying explanations for
their centers' stage of development. Officials in 16 of the 43 operational
fusion centers said that their fusion centers were at an "intermediate"
stage of development, that is, the centers had limited operations and
functionality. For instance, several of these officials said that while
they had many operational components (such as policies and procedures,
analytical personnel, or technical access to systems and networks) in
place, at least one of these components was still in the process of being
developed or finalized. For example, officials in one fusion center said
that its analysts have completed training and are producing products, but
the center is still in the final stages of reconstructing its facility and
establishing access to systems and networks. Officials in 21of the 43
operational fusion centers considered their fusion centers to be
"developed," that is, fully operational and fully functional. For example,
an official in one center said that the fusion center has analysts from
DHS, FBI, and state and local entities; operates at the Top Secret level;
and has a Sensitive Compartmented Information Facility (SCIF).13
Additionally, several officials also stated that even though their centers
were developed, the centers would continue to expand and evolve. Officials
in the remaining six fusion centers considered their centers to have more
than limited operations and functionality but not yet be fully
operational. For example, one official said that the center would like to
develop its strategic component, for example related to risk assessments.
Another official stated that his center would like to expand its
operations but does not have enough personnel.

13A SCIF is a facility providing formal access controls and is used to
hold information concerning or derived from intelligence sources, methods,
or analytical processes. A SCIF is different from a secure room, which is
a room or office that is secured to control the flow of personnel into the
area that is not built to the same structural specifications as a SCIF.

Thirty-four of the operational centers are relatively new, having been
opened since January 2004, while 9 centers opened in the couple of years
after September 11, as shown in figure 2.

Figure 2: Number of Fusion Centers Opened, by Year, Since September 2001

Consistent with the purpose of a fusion center, as defined by the Fusion
Center Guidelines, officials in 41 of the 43 operational centers we
contacted said that their centers' scopes of operations were broader than
solely focusing on counterterrorism. For example, officials in 22 of the
43 operational centers described their centers' scopes of operations as
all crimes or all crimes and counterterrorism, and officials in 19
operational centers said that their scopes of operations included all
hazards. There were subtle distinctions in officials' descriptions of an
all-crimes scope; however, they generally either said that their center
focused on all "serious" crimes, such as violent crimes or felonies, or
specified that the center focused on those crimes that may be linked to
terrorist activity. Officials who described their centers as including an
all-hazards focus provided different explanations of this scope, including
colocation with the state's emergency operations center or partnerships
with emergency management organizations or first responders. One official
referred to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita as reasons why the center had an
all-hazards scope of operation.

Officials provided two primary explanations for why their fusion centers
have adopted a broader focus than counterterrorism. The first explanation
was because of the nexus, or link, of many crimes to terrorist-related
activity. For example, officials at one fusion center said that they have
an all-crimes focus because terrorism can be funded through a number of
criminal acts, such as drugs, while another said that collecting
information on all crimes often leads to terrorist or threat information
because typically if there is terrorist-related activity there are other
crimes involved as well. The second reason why officials said that their
fusion centers had a broader focus than counterterrorism was in order to
include additional stakeholders or to provide a sustainable service. For
example, one official said that because the state is rural with only two
metropolitan areas and many small communities, the center needed to have a
broader focus than terrorism to obtain participation from local law
enforcement. Officials in another center said that their center opened in
the months after September 2001, so it focused on homeland security and
terrorism, but since then has evolved to include an all-hazards focus as
it has established partnerships with agencies outside of law enforcement.
An official in another center said that while counterterrorism is the
primary mission of the center, in the past year the center has included an
all-crimes element since on average the center only receives three
terrorism-related tips a day, and as a result, it is difficult to convince
agencies to detail a staff person to the center for this mission alone.

The majority of the operational fusion centers we contacted were primarily
led by law enforcement entities, such as state police or state bureaus of
investigation. Some of these centers were established as partnerships
between state or local law enforcement entities and the FBI, and others
were established as partnerships with the state homeland security offices.
While all of the operational fusion centers we contacted had more than one
agency represented in the centers, the staff size and agencies represented
varied. For example, three centers we contacted had fewer than five people
on their staff representing fewer than five agencies. Whereas, 2 of the
centers we contacted had over 80 people staffed to the center,
representing about 20 agencies. In its fusion center report, CRS
determined that the average number of full-time staff at about 27
persons.14 In addition to law enforcement agencies, such as state police
or highway patrol, county sheriffs, and city police departments, 29 of the
43 operational centers we contacted had personnel assigned to their
centers from the state's National Guard,15 and some centers' also included
emergency management, fire, corrections, or transportation partners.

At least 34 of the 43 operational fusion centers we contacted had federal
personnel assigned to their centers. Officials in about three quarters of
the centers we contacted reported that the FBI has assigned personnel,
including intelligence analysts and special agents, to their centers. Most
had one or two full-time intelligence analysts or special agents at their
center. Additionally, 12 of the 43 operational centers we contacted were
colocated in an FBI field office or with an FBI task force, such as a JTTF
or a FIG, allowing the center's personnel access to FBI systems and
networks. Also, officials in 17 of the 43 operational centers reported
that DHS's Office of Intelligence and Analysis had assigned intelligence
officers to their centers. These officers are assigned to fusion centers
on a full-time basis and are responsible for, among other things,
facilitating the flow of information between the center and DHS, providing
expertise in intelligence analysis and reporting, and providing DHS with
local situational information and access. Finally, officials in 19 of the
43 operational centers reported that they had other DHS and DOJ components
represented in their centers including personnel from U.S. Customs and
Border Protection; U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE); United
States Secret Service; United States Coast Guard; Transportation Security
Administration; United States Attorneys Office; Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco
and Firearms; Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA); or the United States
Marshals Service.

As we have previously highlighted, operational fusion centers we contacted
reported having access to a variety of networks and systems for collecting
homeland security, terrorism-related, and law enforcement information. For
example, as of September 2007, 40 and 39 of the 43 operational fusion
centers we contacted told us they had access to DHS's and FBI's
unclassified networks, such as HSIN and LEO, respectively. Further, about
half of the operational centers also said that they had access to one of
the RISS networks. In addition, 16 of the 43 operational centers we
contacted reported that they had access or had plans to obtain access to
HSDN, and 23 indicated that they had access or were in the process of
obtaining access to FBINet or FBI's other classified networks. Further, 3
centers also reported having access to FBI's Top Secret network.16
Additionally, several operational fusion centers reported having access to
other classified and unclassified federal systems and networks providing
defense, financial, drug, and immigration-related information, including
the Department of Defense's Secret Internet Protocol Router Network
(SIPRNet),17 Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN),18 El Paso
Intelligence Center (EPIC),19 and the Student and Exchange Visitor
Information System (SEVIS).20

14CRS, RL34070, July 2007.

15Overseen by the National Guard Bureau, a joint bureau of the departments
of the Army and Air Force, the National Guard has a dual federal and state
mission. When National Guard units are not under federal control, the
governor can activate National Guard personnel to "state active duty" in
response to a natural or man-made disaster or for homeland defense
missions.

Thus far, products disseminated and services provided also vary. Fusion
centers reported issuing a variety of products, such as daily and weekly
bulletins on general criminal or intelligence information and intelligence
assessments that, in general, provide in-depth reporting on an emerging
threat, group, or crime. For example, one center's weekly bulletin
contained sections on domestic and international terrorism, cold case
investigations, missing persons, officer safety, and items of interest to
law enforcement.

16This network, the Sensitive Compartmental Information Operational
Network, is used to transport top secret counterterrorism data, including
intelligence and warning information.

17SIPRNet is the Department of Defense's largest interoperable command and
control data network.

18FinCEN is operated by the U.S. Department of the Treasury and
concentrates on suspicious financial activities and currency transaction
amounts over $10,000; the program covers both domestic and international
financial activity.

19EPIC concentrates on drug movements and immigration violations and
provides access to a wide range of intelligence including information from
DEA and ICE.

20SEVIS, operated by ICE, includes information to track and monitor
schools and programs, students, exchange visitors and their dependents
throughout the duration of approved participation within the U.S.
education system.

Some centers provide investigative support for law enforcement officers.
For example, one fusion center reported that it provided response within
20 minutes to requests for information from law enforcement officers who
were conducting traffic stops or responding to major crime scenes.
Further, several of the centers in our review were organized into two
sections--an operational section that manages and processes the
information flowing into the center and an analytical section responsible
for analyzing the information and disseminating products.

Fusion Centers in the Planning and Early Stages of Development and Their
Characteristics

Officials in 7 states and one local jurisdiction said that their fusion
centers were in the early stages of development and officials in 7 states
said that they were in the planning stage. For example, one official said
that the center is developing memorandums of understanding for agency
representation at and support of the center, working to get the center's
secure space certified, and placing equipment and furniture. Officials
from another state said that they had appointed an officer-in-charge and
are in the process of acquiring additional staff members but had not
acquired access to federal networks and systems. Officials in 6 of the 15
centers said that their centers had already opened or were expected to
open by the end of 2007.

Efforts to establish a fusion center are being led by homeland security
offices, law enforcement entities, and in some states, by a partnership of
two or more state agencies. As with operational centers, these centers
planned to include all crimes and all hazards scopes of operations. While
most of these centers were being newly established, a few were in the
process of transitioning from existing law enforcement intelligence units
or criminal intelligence centers. For example, an official in one center
said the fusion center is in the planning stages and is transitioning from
an intelligence center, which was established prior to the 2002 Winter
Olympics. One state, Wyoming, was planning to partner with an adjacent
state instead of building a physical fusion center.

Federal Agencies' Efforts to Support Fusion Centers Help to Address Some
Reported Challenges and Provide Further Assistance

In light of the importance of fusion centers in facilitating information
sharing among levels of government, DHS and DOJ have several efforts under
way that begin to address challenges that fusion center officials
identified in establishing and operating their centers.21 DHS and DOJ have
made efforts to provide fusion centers access to federal information
systems, but some fusion center officials cited challenges accessing
relevant, actionable information and managing multiple information
systems. As a result, these center officials said that their ability to
receive and share information with those who need it may be limited.
Additionally, both DHS and the FBI have provided clearances to state and
local officials, but some fusion center officials told us they had
encountered challenges obtaining and using security clearances, which
interfered with their ability to obtain classified information. Further,
notwithstanding DHS and FBI efforts to deploy personnel to fusion centers
and DHS's grant funding to support their establishment and enhancement,
fusion center officials noted challenges obtaining personnel and ensuring
sufficient funding to sustain the centers. Finally, DHS and DOJ have taken
steps to develop guidance and provide technical assistance and training,
but fusion center officials cited the need for clearer and more specific
guidance in a variety of areas to help address operational challenges.

DHS, FBI, and the PM-ISE Have Some Actions Under Way to Address Challenges Some
Fusion Center Officials Cited with Accessing and Managing Multiple Information
Systems

As described earlier, DHS and FBI have provided access to their primary
unclassified systems (HSIN and LEO) to many of the 43 operational fusion
centers we contacted. Further, DHS and DOJ have outlined plans to provide
access to their primary classified networks, HSDN and FBINET, to state and
local fusion centers that have federal personnel at the center. However,
officials in 31 of the 58 fusion centers we contacted told us that they
had difficulty obtaining access to federal information networks or
systems. For example, officials in some centers cited challenges with DHS
and FBI not providing fusion center personnel with direct access to their
classified systems. In these centers, fusion center personnel must rely on
federal personnel who are assigned to the center or other state personnel
assigned to FBI task forces to access these systems, obtain the relevant
information and share it with them. Further, officials in 12 of 58 fusion
centers reported challenges meeting system security requirements or
establishing technical capabilities necessary to access information
systems. For example, officials cited challenges with the cost and
logistics of setting up a secure room or installing the requisite hardware
to access the information systems.

21We present information about challenges encountered by 58 fusion
centers--those in all stages of development--as they were establishing and
operating their centers. Fusion centers may have encountered more than one
challenge related to a particular area, for example, related to guidance
and training.

DHS and FBI have taken steps to address these logistical challenges to
providing access to classified systems. For example, as part of its needs
assessment process, DHS reviews the fusion centers' security status and
assesses its adequacy in light of DHS's intention to assign personnel and
information systems in the center. The FBI has provided fusion centers
access to classified systems through JTTF members and has colocated with
some fusion centers in FBI space. Finally, several FBI field offices have
coordinated with fusion centers to rent or build and certify facilities or
secure rooms for those centers located outside of FBI-controlled space.
For example according to FBI field offices, it is paying estimated costs
of about $40,000 and $50,000 respectively to provide secure facilities in
two fusion centers.

While officials in many fusion centers cited challenges obtaining access
to systems, primarily classified systems, officials in 30 of the 58 fusion
centers we contacted told us that the high volume of information or the
existence of multiple systems with often redundant information was
challenging to manage. More specifically, officials in 18 fusion centers
said that they had difficulty with what they perceived to be the high
volume of information their center receives, variously describing the flow
of information as "overwhelming," "information overload," and "excessive."
For example, officials said that center personnel must sort through the
large amount of information, much of which is not relevant to the center,
to find information that is useful or important to them. Additionally,
officials in 18 fusion centers found the lack of integration among these
multiple, competing, or duplicative information systems challenging, or
said that they wanted a single mechanism or system through which to
receive or send information. Finally, officials in 11 centers said that
the redundancy of information from these multiple sources posed a
challenge. For instance, an official said that the center receives volumes
of information that contain redundancies from DHS and the FBI. CRS also
reported that one of the most consistent and constant issues raised by
fusion center officials relates to the plethora of competing federal
information-sharing systems, including, but not limited to, DHS and DOJ
systems such as HSIN, HSDN, LEO, and RISS.22

22CRS, RL34070, July 2007.

DHS/DOJ's current joint guidance on operating fusion centers--the Fusion
Center Guidelines--does not delineate the primary systems to which fusion
centers should have access or provide guidance to centers about how to
manage multiple systems with potentially redundant information. For
example, the guidance recommends that fusion centers obtain access to a
variety of databases and systems and provides a list of 17 available
system and network resources that provide homeland security,
terrorism-related, or law enforcement information, including the LEO,
RISS, and HSIN, but do not identify which of the 17 available systems are
critical to sharing information with federal counterparts. In addition, we
have previously reported on the redundancies and lack of coordination
among DHS's HSIN and other systems. For example, we found in April 2007
that in developing HSIN, DHS did not work with the two key state and local
initiatives comprising major portions of the RISS program, thereby putting
itself at risk that HSIN duplicated state and local capabilities.23 In
that report, we recommended that DHS identify existing and planned
information-sharing initiatives and assess whether there are opportunities
for DHS to avoid duplication of effort. In response, DHS initiated efforts
to accomplish this goal--such as creating a bridge between the RISS and
HSIN systems to allow reports to flow back and forth between these two
systems--though it is currently too early to determine the effect of these
efforts.

The PM-ISE also reported that in consultation with the Information Sharing
Council, it has been coordinating the efforts of a working group intended
to address the issue of duplicative or redundant information systems that
handle sensitive but unclassified information. 24 Officials from the
PM-ISE stated that this group has completed a review of the most commonly
used systems, such as LEO, RISS, and HSIN. According to the officials, the
review included an examination of the services provided by the systems and
the needs of the systems' users to identify any potential areas to
streamline system access. The review is in accordance with recommendations
that fusion centers made during the National Fusion Center Conference in
March 2007.25 Specifically, fusion centers recommended the federal
government explore using a single sign-on or search capability, which
would facilitate accessing multiple systems. Further, in our interviews,
officials in 23 of the 58 fusion centers said that DHS and DOJ, to
facilitate the implementation of a national network of fusion centers,
should streamline existing systems or develop a unified platform or
mechanism for information sharing with fusion centers. In addition, PM-ISE
officials said that they, along with DHS and DOJ and other federal
agencies, were taking steps to improve the quality and flow of information
through the development of an Interagency Threat Assessment Coordination
Group (ITACG). As part of the National Counterterrorism Center,26 this
group will provide advice, counsel, and subject-matter expertise to the
intelligence community regarding the types of terrorism-related
information needed by state, local, and tribal governments and how these
entities use that terrorism-related information to fulfill their
counterterrorism responsibilities. In doing so, ITACG will enable the
timely production by the National Counterterrorism Center of clear,
relevant, and federally coordinated terrorism-related information products
intended for dissemination to state, local, and tribal officials. As of
September 2007, ITACG has achieved an initial operational capability,
according to PM-ISE officials. Additionally, the 9/11 Commission Act,
enacted in August 2007, made the ITACG a statutorily mandated body.27

23 [98]GAO-07-455 .

24The Information Sharing Council was established pursuant to section 1016
of the Intelligence Reform Act to advise the President and the PM-ISE on
developing policies, procedures, guidelines, roles, and standards
necessary to establish, implement, and maintain the ISE, as well as to
ensure coordination among federal departments and agencies participating
in the ISE.

25During the conference, fusion center officials attended regionally based
workshops, during which they made recommendations to the federal
government on a variety of information sharing issues.

26The National Counterterrorism Center is a partnership of intelligence
agencies that analyze and disseminate national intelligence data, among
other things.

27See Pub. L. No. 110-53, S 521, 121 Stat. at 328-32 (adding section 210D
to subtitle A, title II of the Homeland Security Act, Pub. L. No. 107-296,
116 Stat. 2135).

DHS and FBI Provide Clearances to Fusion Center Officials and Have Set
Timeliness Goals for Doing So, but Officials Cited Some Challenges Obtaining and
Using Clearances

Both DHS and the FBI have provided clearances for numerous state and local
personnel and have set goals to shorten the length of time it takes to
obtain a security clearance. DHS and the FBI provide clearances at the
Secret level for state and local officials with a need-to-know national
security information classified at the Confidential or Secret level, and
the FBI, when necessary, also provides clearances at the Top Secret level
to state and local officials with a need-to-know national security
information classified at this level and who need unescorted access in FBI
facilities.28 For instance, to date DHS reported that it had provided
security clearances, typically granted at the Secret level, for 1,291
state and local personnel--not necessarily personnel in fusion centers.29
The FBI, in fiscal year 2007, reported that as of April it had provided
520 security clearances, typically granted at the Top Secret level, to
state and local fusion center personnel.30 Further, CRS reported that on
average, as of July 2007, each fusion center appeared to have 14 staff
with Secret clearances and 6 staff with Top Secret clearances.31 However,
officials in 21 of the 58 fusion centers we contacted reported
difficulties obtaining the clearances necessary to access different levels
of classified materials.

DHS and FBI also have provided centers with information for state and
local personnel about the security clearance process, stating that
processing time for individual security clearances can vary depending on
complexity. For example, DHS set a goal of 90 days to complete a Secret
clearance, and FBI set a goal of 45 to 60 days to complete a Secret
clearance and 6 to 9 months to complete a Top Secret clearance.32 Yet,
officials in 32 of the 58 fusion centers at the time we contacted them
reported difficulties with the length of time it takes to receive a
security clearance from DHS or the FBI. For example, in one center that
receives security clearances from both DHS and the FBI, officials said
that it was taking 6 to 9 months for a Secret clearance and 1 year to 1
1/2 years for a Top Secret clearance. While some fusion center officials
acknowledged that the process (and the associated length of time) was
necessary--to perform the requisite background checks to ensure that
clearances are only given to individuals who meet the requirements--others
said it was detrimental to the fusion center because newly hired or newly
promoted analysts were unable to work without the clearances to perform
their duties. To address timeliness concerns, the FBI has taken steps to
reduce the turnaround time for clearances. According to the FBI, Top
Secret security clearances granted by the FBI to state and local personnel
in March 2007 took an average of 63 days to complete, down from an average
of 116 days in fiscal year 2006. The FBI is also implementing both
short-term solutions--including prioritization of background
investigations for state, local, and tribal officials and the electronic
submission of fingerprints--and long-term solutions, such as training
fusion center security officers to conduct preliminary background checks,
according to a May 2007 FBI Interagency Integration Unit review of
security clearances. Indeed, officials at one fusion center told us that
when the center was opening in 2003, it took approximately 2 years to
obtain a clearance, but in January 2007, it took only 3 months to obtain a
security clearance for new personnel.

28To obtain security clearances from DHS and the FBI, applicants must,
among other things, undergo a mandatory background investigation, the
scope of which varies with the level of clearance being sought, and be
determined eligible for the clearance.

29These are all clearance requests coming from the state Homeland Security
Advisor.

30Additionally, according to the FBI, there are 110 security clearances in
a pending status which means that the personnel have been processed by the
FBI for security clearances and are in varying stages of the clearance
process but have not yet reached final adjudication. The estimated cost to
the FBI associated with obtaining a Top Secret clearance for state and
local fusion center personnel is about $7,200 per person.

31CRS, RL34070, July 2007.

While law and executive order provide that a security clearance granted by
one federal agency should generally be accepted by other agencies,
officials in 19 fusion centers we contacted said they faced challenges
with federal agencies, particularly DHS and the FBI, accepting each
others' clearances. This reported lack of reciprocity could hinder the
centers' ability to access facilities, computer systems, and information
from multiple agencies. For example, an official at one fusion center who
holds an FBI security clearance said he was unable to access other federal
agencies' facilities. An official at another fusion center said that DHS
did not accept clearances that had been issued by the FBI to fusion center
personnel and therefore would not provide access to information technology
or intelligence.

32In April 2004, we reported on the timeliness of the FBI clearance
process and found that about 92 percent of the applications the FBI
received for Top Secret security clearances since September 11, 2001, were
processed within the FBI's stated time frame goals. In contrast, the
majority of Secret applications (about 74 percent) were not processed
within the FBI's time frame goals. However, during the last half of 2003,
the FBI nearly doubled its success rate for completing Secret security
clearance applications within its time frame goals. See GAO, Security
Clearances: FBI Has Enhanced Its Process for State and Local Law
Enforcement Officials, [99]GAO-04-596 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 30, 2004).
Amendments to the Homeland Security Act provide that the DHS
Undersecretary for Intelligence and Analysis shall ensure that each
official or intelligence analyst assigned to a fusion center under S 210A
of the Act has the appropriate security clearance to contribute
effectively to the mission of the fusion center and may request that
security clearance processing be expedited for each such officer or
intelligence analyst (and may use available funds for such purpose). See
Pub. L. No. 110-53 S 511, 121 Stat. at 320.

DHS and DOJ officials said that they were not aware of fusion centers
encountering recent challenges with reciprocity of security clearances,
but they said that there were complications in the clearance process. For
example, a DHS official said that multiple federal agencies carry out
their own clearance processes and grant clearances without central
coordination.33 For example, both DHS and the FBI could each be conducting
a separate security clearance investigation and determining eligibility
for access to classified information on the same individual. An FBI
official also explained that some agencies and some parts of the
Department of Defense do require a polygraph examination to obtain a
clearance and some do not, so reciprocity among those agencies with
different standards may be an issue. Indeed, the DHS official acknowledged
that, overall, federal agencies do not have a consolidated system for
granting and handling security clearances and said that currently there
are not sufficient federal efforts to develop such a system.

33Several federal agencies conduct background investigations necessary to
grant clearances for individuals with a need to know classified
information. For example, the Office of Personnel Management (OPM)
conducts the clearance process for most federal agencies, while the FBI
conducts its own security clearance process.

Fusion Center Officials We Contacted Cited Challenges with Personnel and
Funding; DHS and FBI Are Helping to Address These Issues to Some Extent but Have
Not Defined Plans for Long-Term Support

Officials in 43 of the 58 fusion centers we contacted reported facing
several challenges related to obtaining personnel, and officials in 54 of
the centers reported encountering funding challenges when establishing and
operating their centers, challenges which some of these officials also
indicated affected their centers' sustainability. Although many of these
reported challenges were attributed to difficulties at the state and local
level, DHS and FBI have efforts under way to help support fusion centers
by providing some personnel and grant funding.

  Obtaining and Retaining Qualified Personnel Was Reported as a Challenge for
  Many Centers

Officials in 37 of the 58 centers we contacted said they had difficulty
with state, local, and federal agencies assigning personnel to the
center--one means of staffing the centers--primarily as a result of
resource constraints. Most (27 of the 37) of these officials identified
challenges with state and local agencies rather than with federal agencies
contributing personnel. For instance, an official at one fusion center
said that, because of limited resources in state and local agencies, it is
challenging to convince these agencies to contribute personnel to the
center because they view doing so as a loss of resources. In addition,
officials in 8 of the 58 centers we contacted said that they had
difficulty with state and local agencies contributing personnel to their
centers specifically because the state and local agencies had to continue
to fund the salaries of personnel assigned to the fusion centers from
their own budgets. Similarly, CRS reported that there are many cases in
which local law enforcement agencies appear unconvinced of the value of
fusion centers--and by their cost/benefit analysis, it does not benefit
their agencies to detail personnel to the center.34 In terms of federal
personnel, officials in 11 of the 58 fusion centers said that they
encountered challenges with federal agencies not contributing personnel to
their centers.

In addition, officials in 20 of the 58 fusion centers we contacted said
that they faced challenges finding, attracting, and retaining qualified
personnel. Specifically, officials from 12 of these centers said that they
had difficulty finding qualified personnel. For instance, an official from
one fusion center said that finding personnel with the expertise to
understand the concept behind the development of the center and to use the
tools to build the center was challenging, while an official at another
fusion center acknowledged that there was a very limited number of
qualified candidates in the state from which to hire personnel.
Additionally, officials in eight centers reported that retention was a
challenge because of competition with other entities, particularly
higher-paying federal agencies and private sector companies. In some
cases, such as for those analysts hired by the FBI, the official said that
the federal salaries are almost twice what the center could afford to pay.
An official at another fusion center expressed concern that, if fusion
centers do not find a way to offer state and local analysts a career path
comparable to that offered by the federal agencies, fusion centers will
see a plateau in the quality of available analysts.

34CRS, RL34070, July 2007.

  DHS and FBI Have Deployed Personnel to Fusion Centers

To support fusion centers and facilitate information sharing, DHS and FBI
have each assigned federal personnel to centers. As of September 2007, DHS
had deployed intelligence officers to 17 of the 43 operational fusion
centers we contacted, and was in the process of staffing 6 additional
centers we contacted. The FBI had assigned personnel to about three
quarters of the operational fusion centers we contacted. Additionally, DHS
was in the process of staffing 2 local fusion centers we did not contact,
and the FBI had assigned personnel to 7 local fusion centers that were not
included in our review.

In terms of the future, DHS plans to place intelligence officers in as
many as 35 fusion centers by the end of fiscal year 2008. DHS has not
determined to what extent it will provide additional staff to centers
after the first round of assessments and placements are completed. For its
part, FBI officials noted in January 2007 that the FBI process and
criteria for staffing personnel to fusion centers remains ongoing. Because
of the variety of fusion centers, the FBI--through its field office
leaders--conducts its staffing efforts on a case-by-base basis using
criteria such as whether the fusion center has a facility, connectivity to
state and local systems, and personnel from multiple agencies.

  Fusion Center Officials Cited Challenges with the Federal Grant Process,
  Obtaining Sustainable Funding, and Federal Grant Restrictions

Officials in 35 of the 58 centers we contacted cited a variety of
challenges with the federal grant process, including its complexity, and
challenges related to uncertain federal funding or declining federal
funding, challenges that led to overall concerns about the sustainability
of the centers. For example, officials in 16 of the 58 fusion centers we
contacted said that they faced challenges with the federal grant process,
including unclear and changing grant guidance and a lack of understanding
of how federal funding decisions are made. One official said that the
fusion center did not perceive a link between the work performed at the
center and the level of federal funding received, and hence, he did not
understand how DHS made its funding decisions for fusion centers. The
official added that it is important for local units of government to
better understand these issues to help them understand the need to provide
funding for fusion centers. Further, officials in 22 of the fusion centers
said that they encountered challenges related to the sustainability of
federal funding, such as the potential for, or actual, declining federal
funding, which created concerns for the officials about their centers'
ability to sustain capability for the long term. Officials at another
fusion center said that they are concerned that they will establish a
fusion center with DHS funding only to have the funding end in the future
and the center close because the region is unable to support it. When
asked about key factors for sustaining their centers, officials in 41 of
the 58 fusion centers indicated funding, and several specified a
sustainable source or mechanism for that funding.

Officials in 40 of the 58 fusion centers we contacted identified
challenges with finding adequate funding for specific components of their
centers' operations--in particular personnel, training, and
facilities--and officials in 24 of those 40 centers related these
challenges to restrictions and requirements of federal grant funding.
Specifically, officials in 21 fusion centers we contacted said that
obtaining adequate funding for personnel was difficult, and officials in
17 fusion centers found federal time limits on the use of DHS grant funds
for personnel35 challenging--challenges that they said could affect the
sustainability of their centers. For example, one official at another
fusion center said that the 2-year time limit on the use of DHS grant
funds for personnel makes retaining the personnel challenging because
state and local agencies may lack the resources to continue funding the
positions, which could hinder the fusion center's ability to continue to
operate. Officials in eight of the fusion centers expressed concerns about
maintaining their personnel levels, particularly if federal funding
declines. For instance, one fusion center official said that a state
police official did not want to fund analysts with federal grant funds
because of a concern that, if the federal grant funds end, the center will
lose qualified personnel who will take away their knowledge base.
Furthermore, officials in 17 of the 58 fusion centers we contacted found
complying with the DHS grant requirement for training newly hired analysts
(that they attend training within 6 months or have previous analytical
experience) or the funding costs associated with training challenging.36
For example, one fusion center official said that the center found
limitations on the particular training the grant funds can be used for to
be challenging.37 In addition, officials in 14 of the centers said that
they had difficulty funding training costs, such as when using the funds
for training conflicted with buying equipment or other tangible goods.
Finally, officials in 14 fusion centers said that funding their facilities
poses a challenge, particularly because of DHS restrictions on the use of
grant funds for construction and renovation.38 For example, officials in
eight fusion centers said that the DHS grant restrictions on construction
and renovation have made it challenging to meet security requirements for
their facilities, build a secure room, or build or renovate their
facilities.

35According to the fiscal year 2007 DHS HSGP Guidance, UASI and LETPP
funds could be used to hire new staff or contractor positions to serve as
intelligence analysts to enable information and intelligence sharing
capabilities. Costs associated with hiring new intelligence analysts are
allowable only for 2 years, after which states and urban areas may be
responsible for supporting the costs to sustain those intelligence
analysts.

Officials in 17 of the 58 fusion centers we contacted said that
competition for funding with state and local entities was challenging,
particularly as a result of the pass-through requirement associated with
DHS grant funding in which the state must make no less than 80 percent of
the total grant available to local units of government.39 For example, one
fusion center official said that it is very difficult for state-run fusion
centers to cover costs such as hiring analysts and completing renovations
to their physical space out of the 20 percent of the DHS grant funds they
are eligible to receive after the state complies with the pass-through
requirement. Other officials noted that, even after the state has complied
with the pass-through requirement, fusion centers must still compete with
other state and local entities for the remaining DHS funding. For
instance, one fusion center official said that the state emergency
management agency wants to dedicate DHS funds to priorities other than the
fusion center, such as the purchase of new fire-fighting equipment. CRS
also reported that the 80 percent funding requirement was cited
continually by fusion center officials as a major hurdle in channeling
homeland security funds toward statewide fusion center efforts.40

36The grant guidance says that in order to be hired as an intelligence
analyst personnel must either (1) successfully complete training to ensure
baseline proficiency in intelligence analysis and production within 6
months of being hired or (2) have previously served as an intelligence
analyst for a minimum of 2 years either in a federal intelligence agency,
the military, or state or local law enforcement intelligence unit.

37According to the fiscal year 2007 DHS HSGP Guidance, DHS HSGP funds may
be used to develop a state homeland security training program, including
training provided by DHS's FEMA/NPD, as well as training not it does not
provide, such as state or federal sponsored courses coordinated and
approved by the State Administering Agency or their designated training
point of contact that fall within DHS's mission to prepare state and local
personnel to prevent, protect against, respond to, and recover from acts
of terrorism or catastrophic events.

38According to the fiscal year 2007 DHS HSGP Guidance, use of HSGP funds
for construction and renovation is generally prohibited. However, project
construction and renovation not exceeding $1 million is allowable, as
deemed necessary by a DHS Assistant Secretary, under the SHSP, UASI, and
LETPP programs. These program funds may be used for construction and
renovation projects only when those projects specifically address enhanced
security at critical infrastructure facilities. Construction or renovation
to guard facilities, and any other construction or renovation efforts that
change or expand the footprint of a facility or structure, including
security enhancements to improve perimeter security, are considered to
constitute construction or renovation, and must follow an approval process
and be approved by DHS prior to the use of any funds for construction or
renovation.

Officials in 28 of the 58 fusion centers we contacted told us that they
also had difficulty obtaining state or local funding for a variety of
other reasons, including state or local budgetary constraints; challenges
with convincing state officials, for example, in disciplines other than
law enforcement, to provide funding to support the fusion center; and
managing state and local officials who thought the federal government
should be responsible for funding fusion centers. Further, 5 of these
fusion center officials expressed concerns about their centers' long-term
sustainability without state or local funding. For example, one official
said that federal funding for the center will eventually end and the state
will need to provide funding to support the fusion center, but the state
currently has no plan for providing that support. However, an official at
another fusion center expressed concern that federal funding could cause
states to lose autonomy over their centers, and the centers would become
federal fusion centers located in a state rather than the state fusion
centers originally envisioned.

  DHS Has Provided Grant Funding for Fusion-Related Activities and Made Some
  Changes to Grants for Fusion Centers

DHS homeland security grant programs, such as SHSP, LETPP, and UASI, have
provided funding to state and local entities for data collection,
analysis, fusion, and information-sharing projects, and DHS has adjusted
the programs for fusion centers. Table 2 shows that from fiscal years 2004
through 2006, DHS allocated almost $131 million to states and local areas
from these programs for what DHS defined as fusion-related activities.41

39According to the fiscal year 2007 DHS HSGP Guidance, this pass-through
requirement applies to funding received through the SHSP, the UASI, and
LETPP.

40CRS, RL34070, July 2007.

Table 2: DHS Grant Funds Allocated for Fusion-Related Activities, Fiscal
Year 2004 through 2006

Fiscal year: 2004; 
Funding allocated: $ 29,974,650. 

Fiscal year: 2005; 
Funding allocated: 57,456,112. 

Fiscal year: 2006; 
Funding allocated: 43,103,624. 

Fiscal year: Total; 
Funding allocated: $130,534,386. 

Source: DHS.

Further, according to DHS, 49 states and 37 local jurisdictions submitted
grant investment justifications in fiscal year 2007 in support of
information-sharing and dissemination efforts, with requests for funding
totaling nearly $180 million, though exact funding amounts had not been
determined as of August 2007. Exact funding amounts for fusion centers
will be determined on the basis of the prioritization and allocation of
funds by states. For fiscal year 2007, DHS included language in its grant
guidelines emphasizing fusion center activities and explicitly made
establishing and enhancing fusion centers a priority for the Law
Enforcement Terrorism Prevention Program.42 However, these grant programs
are not specifically targeted at or limited to fusion centers. As a
result, funding provided to states may not necessarily reach a particular
fusion center because, as a DHS official noted, states are free to
reprioritize their use of grant funds after submitting their grant
justifications to DHS and receiving allocated funds. Thus, fusion centers
cannot be certain that they will receive funds to sustain fusion center
activities from year to year or over the long term.

41Project types identified by DHS as "fusion center funded activities"
included: establishment/enhancement of a terrorism intelligence/early
warning system, center, or task force; establishment/enhancement of a
public-private emergency preparedness program; development/enhancement of
homeland security/emergency management organization and structure;
enhancement of capability to support international border and waterway
security; enhancement of capabilities to respond to chemical, biological,
radiological, nuclear, and explosive events; establishment/enhancement of
regional response teams; assessment of the vulnerability of and/or
harden/protect critical infrastructure and key assets; Transit Security
Grant Programs for bus, ferry, and rail; and enhancement of citizen
awareness of emergency preparedness, prevention, and response measures.

42Fiscal year 2007 HSGP funding also focuses on establishing a baseline
level of capability in all state and urban area fusion centers and
establishes some requirements for fusion centers receiving DHS funds to
achieve that goal. DHS requires that fusion centers already possess or
prioritize their efforts and expenditures to a variety of baseline
capabilities in areas such as management and governance, collection,
analysis, and dissemination.

Over time, DHS has also made several changes to help address challenges
identified by fusion centers by focusing homeland security grants on
fusion-related activities, by taking steps to ease the grant process, and
by adjusting some of the restrictions on the timing and use of grant
funds. For example, DHS expanded grant funding in fiscal year 2006 in the
area of allowable costs for information sharing and collaborative efforts.
Funds could be used by states to develop and enhance their fusion centers,
particularly by hiring contract or government employees as intelligence
analysts; purchasing information technology hardware, software and
communications equipment; hiring consultants to make recommendations on
fusion center development; or by leasing office space for use by a fusion
center. In addition, DHS continued to make Homeland Security Grant Program
adjustments in fiscal year 2007 based on outreach to grant program
stakeholders. For example, DHS gave potential applicants more time to
complete the grant application process and the period for performance
under HSGP grants increased from 2 years to 3 years.

DHS and DOJ Have Provided Guidance, Technical Assistance, and Training to Fusion
Centers

DHS and DOJ have collaborated to provide guidance and technical assistance
to fusion centers and, along with the PM-ISE, have sponsored regional and
national conferences, in part to determine the needs of fusion centers.
For example, DHS and DOJ jointly issued their most recent Fusion Center
Guidelines in August 2006 that outline 18 recommended elements for
establishing and operating fusion centers.43 The Guidelines were intended
as a way to ensure state and local fusion centers could be established and
operated consistently and were developed to help fusion center
administrators create policies, manage resources, and evaluate fusion
center services. Officials in 48 of the 58 fusion centers told us that the
Guidelines were generally good and useful. However, officials in 20 of the
58 fusion centers we contacted found the available federal guidance
lacking in specificity, conflicting, confusing, or difficult to implement
in their individual centers. For example, some of these officials said
that the Guidelines were broad and did not provide guidance on specific
issues relevant to operating a fusion center, such as how to connect the
multiple information-sharing systems or set up their physical space. In
addition, officials in 19 of the 58 fusion centers we contacted said that
they lacked guidance on specific information-sharing policies and
procedures, such as sharing or handling sensitive or classified
information or privacy and civil liberties issues. For example, officials
in some fusion centers we contacted said that they lacked guidance on
sharing and handling classified information, and officials in five fusion
centers said the lack of guidance on privacy and civil liberties issues is
a concern when sharing or storing information. To illustrate, officials at
one fusion center said that the absence of an encompassing guideline to
use as a standard makes it difficult to manage information sharing across
levels of government and among states because of the variations in state
and federal privacy laws and regulations. For instance, federal regulation
provides that certain information on individuals may not be retained for
longer than 5 years, whereas the center's state requirement provides that
information may not be retained for longer than 1 year.44

43The Fusion Center Guidelines, developed as a collaborative effort
between DOJ's Global Justice Information Sharing Initiative (Global) and
DHS's Homeland Security Advisory Council (HSAC), were first issued in 2005
to help resolve interoperability and communication issues with centers at
the state, regional, and federal levels and to provide guidance in
relation to the collection, analysis, and dissemination of
terrorism-related intelligence. In 2006, the Guidelines were expanded to
integrate public safety and private sector entities. Both Global and the
HSAC include state, local, tribal, and private sector officials that
provide advice and counsel to the Attorney General and the Secretary of
Homeland Security. HSAC also includes members of academia and Global also
includes federal and international representatives.

FEMA/NPD, DOJ's Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA),45 and the FBI have
partnered to provide a program of technical assistance services for fusion
centers to facilitate information sharing.46 As shown in table 3, many of
the technical services provided under this program provide an overview or
general information, and the technical assistance efforts focus on giving
the state or local area the basic tools they need to successfully
establish and operate a fusion center, such as helping to create a
governance board, assisting with the development of a fusion process of
implementation plan, and providing the basics of fusion center operations.
As of September 2007, there have been 35 service deliveries to 19 fusion
centers, according to FEMA/NPD and BJA officials.

44Fusion centers may be required to manage information in accordance with
28 C.F.R. part 23, which contains implementing standards for operating
federally funded multijurisdictional intelligence systems operating under
Title I of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Street Act of 1968, as
amended. Under this regulation, all multi-jurisdictional law enforcement
information management systems funded in part by federal grants must
follow guidelines for the collection, storage, and purging of information.
Furthermore, information stored in such systems must be "reviewed and
validated for continuing compliance with system submission criteria before
the expiration of its retention period, which in no event shall be longer
than five (5) years." Receipt and dissemination of such information is
based on a "need to know" and "right to know," which under the regulation
are standards to be defined by the organizational unit operating the
particular system.

45BJA is a DOJ component responsible for supporting local, state, and
tribal efforts to achieve safer communities. In fulfilling its mission,
BJA provides grants for programs and for training and technical assistance
to combat violent and drug-related crime and help improve the criminal
justice system.

Table 3: Examples of Technical Assistance Services Provided Jointly by DHS
and DOJ for the Fusion Process

Services provided: Fusion process orientation; 
Description: Provides an overview of the fusion process and facilitates 
the development of a strategic fusion center process/center development 
plan. 

Services provided: Fusion center governance structure and authority; 
Description: Assists in the development of a comprehensive governance 
structure to include legal foundation and steering/subcommittee 
structure. 

Services provided: Fusion center concept of operations development; 
Description: Organizes the development of the core document used to 
synchronize current operations and plan future operations. 

Services provided: Fusion center privacy policy development; 
Description: Assists with the development of a privacy policy to ensure 
that constitutional rights, civil liberties, and civil rights are 
protected while allowing the fusion center to achieve its mission 
objectives. 

Services provided: Fusion center administration and management; 
Description: Supports the design of a strategic framework to structure 
the management of personnel and organize assets provided by 
participating entities. 

Services provided: State and local antiterrorism training; 
Description: Provides specialized awareness orientation regarding 
terrorism interdiction, investigation, and prevention for law 
enforcement executives, command personnel, intelligence officers, 
investigators, analytical personnel, training directors, and 
prosecutors. 

Services provided: Criminal intelligence for the chief executive; 
Description: Provides an overview regarding the importance of and 
responsibilities associated with developing intelligence capabilities 
within law enforcement agencies. 

Source: BJA.

DHS and DOJ have numerous efforts to provide training to fusion centers.
Also, DHS offers over 90 courses from 45 training partners and is working
to increase the availability of training under Homeland Security Grant
Program funding. According to FEMA/NPD officials, DHS recently approved
for funding three courses, two of which involve analyst training. DHS and
BJA provide a number of training services under their joint technical
assistance program, and the FBI provides ongoing training for fusion
centers through its field offices. However, officials in 21 of the 58
fusion centers we contacted said that the availability of adequate
training for mission-related issues, such as training on intelligence
analysis was a challenge. Further, officials in 11 fusion centers we
contacted, most of whom were in fusion centers that had been in operation
for more than 2 years, said that they lacked national standards or
guidelines for analyst training or qualifications. For example, one fusion
center official said that no one federal agency has taken responsibility
for determining a single, standardized training agenda--including content
and length of time--for both new and experienced analysts. Officials in
another fusion center said that the center had difficulty creating a
training program for its analysts because of the lack of a coordinated,
trusted set of training guidelines. Two other officials said that they
would like to see a federal baseline for appropriate and necessary
training for analysts with a certification attached to its completion or a
standardized course of analyst training to ensure that analysts are
trained in the same way nationwide. They said that this would help fusion
center analysts better communicate and be more likely to share information
with analysts in other centers.

46DHS's FEMA/NPD and BJA coordinated with I&A, the Office of the Director
of National Intelligence, FBI, and the state and local community,
including Global, in this effort and provide these technical assistance
services to fusion centers at no cost. In addition, the technical
assistance program provides online resources, such as the National
Criminal Intelligence Resource Center, which contains a resource
information databank used to share policies, techniques, and lessons
learned, and the Fusion Process Technical Assistance Program Resource
Center, which contains existing fusion center templates, manuals, policy
documents, memoranda of understanding, and concept of operations
documents.

DHS and FBI officials noted some challenges with designating a single
training curriculum for fusion center analysts because agencies and
training groups differ on what should constitute the minimum baseline. To
remedy this, the NFCCG has developed and documented minimum baseline
capabilities for state and major urban area fusion centers, and as of
September 2007 was in the process of evaluating the current level of
capability of designated state and major urban area fusion centers. The
minimum baseline capabilities require fusion centers to develop a training
plan to ensure their personnel are knowledgeable of fusion center
operations, policies, and procedures, including training on the
intelligence and fusion processes, analytic processes and writing skills,
security policy and protocols, and the fusion center mission and goals.
However, it is too soon to determine the extent to which the baseline
document sets out minimum training standards for fusion center analysts
that would address the challenges fusion centers reported to us.

Conclusions

Although state and local governments created fusion centers to fill their
information needs, the centers have attracted the attention of the federal
government as it works to improve information sharing with state, local,
and tribal entities in accordance with the Homeland Security and
Intelligence Reform Acts, as amended. Indeed, recognizing that the
collaboration between fusion centers and the federal government marks a
tremendous increase in the nation's overall analytic capacity that can be
used to combat terrorism, the PM-ISE's implementation plan envisions that
the federal government will work to promote fusion center initiatives to
facilitate information sharing and designates fusion centers as the focus
of sharing with state, local, and tribal governments. Given the federal
interest in fusion centers and the fusion centers' interest in supporting
such a national network, it is important that the federal government
continue to provide fusion centers with added value as an incentive to
facilitate such a network. To date, DHS's and DOJ's efforts to assist
fusion centers, such as providing access to information systems, security
clearances, personnel, funding, and guidance have begun to address a
number of the challenges fusion center directors identified to us.
However, it is also important for fusion center management to understand
the federal government's longer-term role with respect to these centers.
Many fusion center officials were uncertain about the level of future
resources and the sustainability of federal support. Although the federal
government cannot make promises regarding future resources, decisions
could be made and articulated to fusion centers regarding whether the
federal government views its role with respect to providing
resources--such as grant funding, facilities, personnel, and
information-sharing systems--to fusion centers as short term for start-up
resources or longer term for operational needs. The National Fusion Center
Coordination Group (NFCCG) is already tasked with identifying grant
funding, technical assistance, and training to support fusion centers.
However, to date, the efforts of the NFCCG have not included delineating
whether such assistance is for the short-term establishment or for the
long-term sustainability of fusion centers. The NFCCG, through the PM-ISE
and the Information Sharing Council, would be in the best position to
articulate whether fusion centers can expect to continue to receive this
support over the longer term.

Recommendation

To improve efforts to create a national network of fusion centers, we
recommend that the NFCCG, through the Information Sharing Council and the
PM-ISE, determine and articulate the federal government's role in, and
whether it expects to provide resources to, fusion centers over the
long-term to help ensure their sustainability. Particular emphasis should
be placed on how best to sustain those fusion center functions that
support a national information sharing capability as critical nodes of the
ISE.

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation

We requested comments on a draft of this report from the Secretary of
Homeland Security, the Acting Attorney General, and the Program Manager
for the Information Sharing Environment or their designees. In commenting
on drafts of the report, DHS and the PM-ISE concurred with our
recommendation that the federal government should determine its long-term
fusion center role and whether it expects to provide resources to centers
to help ensure their sustainability. DOJ had no comments on the draft.
Further, DHS commented that it, along with its federal partners, is
reviewing strategies to sustain fusion centers as part of the work plan of
the National Fusion Center Coordination Group. This group plans on
presenting these strategies to the federal departments before the end of
the year.

As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly release the contents of
this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days from
the report date. We will then send copies of this report to the Secretary
of the Department of Homeland Security, the Acting Attorney General, the
Program Manager for the Information Sharing Environment, selected
congressional committees, and other interested parties. In addition, this
report will be available at no charge on GAO's Web site at
[100]http://www.gao.gov .

If you or your staff have any questions concerning this report, please
contact me at (202) 512-8777 or [101]larencee@gao.gov . Contact
information for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs
may be found on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made major
contributions to this report are listed in appendix V.

Eileen R. Larence
Director, Homeland Security and Justice Issues

List of Requesters

The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable Peter T. King: 
Ranking Member: 
Committee on Homeland Security: 
House of Representatives: 

The Honorable Jane Harman: 
Chair: 
The Honorable David G. Reichert: 
Ranking Member: 
Subcommittee on Intelligence, Information Sharing and Terrorism Risk 
Assessment: 
Committee on Homeland Security: 
House of Representatives: 

The Honorable Joseph I. Lieberman: 
Chairman: 
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs: 
United States Senate: 

The Honorable Mark Pryor: 
Chairman: 
Subcommittee on State, Local and Private Sector Preparedness and 
Integration: 
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs: 
United States Senate: 

The Honorable Daniel K. Akaka: 
Chairman: 
Subcommittee on Oversight of Government Management, the Federal 
Workforce and the District of Columbia: 
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs: 
United States Senate: 

The Honorable Tom Davis: 
Ranking Member: 
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform: 
House of Representatives: 

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

The objectives of our review were to (1) describe the stages of
development and characteristics of state and local fusion centers and (2)
identify to what extent efforts under way by the Program Manager for the
Information Sharing Environment (PM-ISE), Department of Homeland Security
(DHS), and Department of Justice (DOJ) help to address some of the
challenges identified by fusion centers.

To describe the stages of development and characteristics of state and
local fusion centers, we conducted semistructured telephone interviews
with the director (or his or her designee) of every state fusion center,
the District of Columbia fusion center, and eight local fusion centers. We
defined "local fusion center" to include centers established by major
urban areas, counties, cities, and intrastate regions. Our selection
criteria for local fusion centers included their relationships with the
state fusion center, stage of development, and geographic diversity.
Fusion center officials we spoke with included state and local police
officials, agents in state bureaus of investigation, state homeland
security directors, and directors in state public safety departments.
Where a fusion center was in the planning stages, we spoke with officials
involved in planning and establishing the center, such as directors of
state homeland security offices. We asked fusion center officials about
the status and characteristics of the fusion centers, including their
stages of development, reasons for establishing, scopes of operations, and
the types of funding the centers received. We relied on the centers' own
definitions of themselves as fusion centers and did not evaluate their
status, characteristics, or operations. From February through May, we
spoke with officials from all 50 states, the District of Columbia, and 8
local jurisdictions. While we did contact officials in all state fusion
centers, we did not contact officials in all local fusion centers;
therefore our results are not generalizable to the universe of fusion
centers. Data were not available to determine the total number of local
fusion centers.

We also obtained and summarized descriptive information from the fusion
centers including structure, organization, personnel, and information
technology systems used. We provided the summaries to the fusion centers
for a review of accuracy. However, we did not independently verify all of
the information provided to us. We also interviewed officials from 11
agencies conducting research on state and local information sharing,
including RAND, the Police Executive Research Forum, the International
Association of Chiefs of Police, and the Congressional Research Service
(CRS), which released a report in July 2007 on fusion centers.1 Finally,
to obtain detailed information about centers' operations, we conducted
site visits to fusion centers in Atlanta, Georgia; Phoenix, Arizona;
Richmond, Virginia; Baltimore, Maryland; West Trenton, New Jersey; and New
York, New York. Our selection criteria for these centers included their
stages of development, extent of federal partnerships, and geographic
representation.

To identify to what extent efforts under way by the PM-ISE, DHS, and DOJ
help to address some of the challenges identified by fusion centers, we
analyzed fusion center responses to our semistructured telephone
interviews, reviewed applicable documents, and interviewed officials at
the PM-ISE, DHS, and DOJ, as well as several organizations conducting
research about fusion centers. Specifically, to describe the challenges
fusion centers encountered in establishing themselves and operating, we
asked officials during our semistructured telephone interviews whether
they had encountered challenges in 10 different categories and, if so, the
extent to which the category was a challenge both at establishment and,
for operational centers, in day-to-day operations. These categories
included federal partnerships, personnel, guidance, training, funding,
access to information, and security clearances. Fusion center officials
provided open-ended, descriptive responses of challenges faced by their
centers. On the basis of a content analysis of fusion center officials'
responses, we identified, categorized, and counted similar challenges.
Fusion center officials may not have indicated that they encountered all
the challenges discussed in the report. In addition, individual fusion
center officials may have identified multiple challenges in a given
category, for example funding. We also reviewed CRS's July 2007 report to
obtain information on fusion center challenges.

In addition, to determine to what extent efforts under way by the PM-ISE,
DHS, and DOJ help to address some of the challenges identified by fusion
centers, we reviewed applicable federal laws, executive orders,
directives, briefings, testimonies, plans, reports, and documents to
identify efforts of the PM-ISE, DHS, and DOJ to address challenges
identified by fusion centers. We interviewed officials at the PM-ISE's
office, DHS's Office of Intelligence and Analysis, the Federal Emergency
Management Agency National Preparedness Directorate,2 the Federal Bureau
of Investigation (FBI), and DOJ's Bureau of Justice Assistance and
discussed efforts under way to address challenges identified by fusion
centers. We also asked fusion center officials in our semistructured
telephone interviews to describe the support they had received and were
interested in receiving from DHS and the FBI.

1See CRS, Fusion Centers: Issues and Options for Congress, RL34070
(Washington, D.C.: July 6, 2007).

We performed our work from August 2006 through September 2007 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.

2Effective April 2007, the functions performed by the former DHS Office of
Grants and Training were transferred to FEMA as part of a realignment of
major national preparedness functions required by the Post-Katrina
Emergency Management Reform Act of 2006.

Appendix II: Operational Fusion Centers

Table 4 presents information about operational fusion centers as reported
to us by fusion center officials during semistructured interviews, as of
September 2007. During these interviews, we asked officials to
characterize their fusion centers as being in one of the following stages:
planning, early development, intermediate (limited operations and
functionality), or developed (fully operational and fully functional).

Table 4: Selected Characteristics of Operational Fusion Centers We
Contacted, as of September 2007

State: Arizona; 
Name of fusion center: Arizona Counter Terrorism Information Center 
(AcTIC); 
Stage of development: Intermediate; 
Lead agency: Arizona Department of Public Safety and the FBI; 
Scope of operations: All crimes; 
Start date: October 2004. 

State: California; 
Name of fusion center: State Terrorism Threat Assessment Center 
(STTAC); 
Stage of development: Developed; 
Lead agency: Partnership of the California Governor's Office of 
Homeland Security, California Department of Justice, and the California 
Highway Patrol; 
Scope of operations: All crimes and counterterrorism; 
Start date: December 2005. 

State: California; 
Name of fusion center: Los Angeles, Joint Regional Intelligence Center 
(JRIC); 
Stage of development: Intermediate; 
Lead agency: Joint effort of the Los Angeles Police Department, the Los 
Angeles County Sheriff's Department, and the FBI; 
Scope of operations: All crimes and counterterrorism; 
Start date: July 2006. 

State: California; 
Name of fusion center: Sacramento, Regional Terrorism Threat Assessment 
Center (RTTAC); 
Stage of development: Developed; 
Lead agency: Sacramento County Sheriff's Department; 
Scope of operations: All crimes and counterterrorism; 
Start date: November 2004. 

State: Colorado; 
Name of fusion center: Colorado Information Analysis Center (CIAC); 
Stage of development: Developed; 
Lead agency: Colorado State Patrol; 
Scope of operations: All crimes and all hazards; 
Start date: October 2004. 

State: Connecticut; 
Name of fusion center: Connecticut Intelligence Center (CTIC); 
Stage of development: Intermediate; 
Lead agency: Connecticut State Police and the FBI; 
Scope of operations: All crimes; 
Start date: April 2005. 

State: Delaware; 
Name of fusion center: Delaware Information Analysis Center (DIAC); 
Stage of development: Intermediate; 
Lead agency: Delaware State Police; 
Scope of operations: All crimes and all hazards; 
Start date: December 2005. 

State: Florida; 
Name of fusion center: Florida Fusion Center; 
Stage of development: Developed; 
Lead agency: Florida Department of Law Enforcement; 
Scope of operations: All crimes and all hazards; 
Start date: January 2007. 

State: Georgia; 
Name of fusion center: Georgia Information Sharing and Analysis Center 
(GISAC); 
Stage of development: Between intermediate and developed; 
Lead agency: Component of the Georgia Office of Homeland Security; 
Scope of operations: All hazards and counterterrorism; 
Start date: October 2001. 

State: Illinois; 
Name of fusion center: Chicago Crime Prevention and Information Center 
(CPIC); 
Stage of development: Developed; 
Lead agency: Chicago Police Department; 
Scope of operations: All crimes and counterterrorism; 
Start date: April 2007. 

State: Illinois; 
Name of fusion center: Statewide Terrorism and Intelligence Center 
(STIC); 
Stage of development: Developed; 
Lead agency: Illinois State Police; 
Scope of operations: All crimes; 
Start date: May 2003. 

State: Indiana; 
Name of fusion center: Indiana Intelligence Fusion Center (IIFC); 
Stage of development: Developed; 
Lead agency: Indiana Department of Homeland Security; 
Scope of operations: All crimes; 
Start date: December 2006. 

State: Iowa; 
Name of fusion center: Iowa Intelligence Fusion Center; 
Stage of development: Between intermediate and developed; 
Lead agency: Iowa Department of Public Safety; 
Scope of operations: All crimes; 
Start date: December 2004. 

State: Kansas; 
Name of fusion center: Kansas Threat Integration Center (KSTIC); 
Stage of development: Between intermediate and developed; 
Lead agency: Joint operation of the Kansas Bureau of Investigation, 
Kansas National Guard, and the Kansas Highway Patrol; 
Scope of operations: Counterterrorism; 
Start date: June 2004. 

State: Kentucky; 
Name of fusion center: Kentucky Intelligence Fusion Center (KIFC); 
Stage of development: Developed; 
Lead agency: Kentucky Office of Homeland Security; 
Scope of operations: All crimes; 
Start date: December 2005. 

State: Louisiana; 
Name of fusion center: Louisiana State Analysis and Fusion Exchange (La-
SAFE); 
Stage of development: Intermediate; 
Lead agency: Louisiana State Police; 
Scope of operations: All crimes and all hazards; 
Start date: October 2004. 

State: Maryland; 
Name of fusion center: Maryland Coordination and Analysis Center 
(MCAC); 
Stage of development: Developed; 
Lead agency: Overseen by the Anti-Terrorism Advisory Council Executive 
Committee; 
Scope of operations: All crimes and counterterrorism; 
Start date: November 2003. 

State: Massachusetts; 
Name of fusion center: Commonwealth Fusion Center (CFC); 
Stage of development: Intermediate; 
Lead agency: Massachusetts State Police; 
Scope of operations: All crimes and counterterrorism; 
Start date: October 2004. 

State: Michigan; 
Name of fusion center: Michigan Intelligence and Operations Center 
(MIOC); 
Stage of development: Intermediate; 
Lead agency: Michigan State Police; 
Scope of operations: All crimes; 
Start date: December 2006. 

State: Minnesota; 
Name of fusion center: Minnesota Joint Analysis Center (MN-JAC); 
Stage of development: Intermediate; 
Lead agency: Partnership of FBI, Department of Public Safety, and local 
police departments; 
Scope of operations: All crimes and all hazards; 
Start date: May 2005. 

State: Missouri; 
Name of fusion center: Missouri Information Analysis Center; 
Stage of development: Between intermediate and developed; 
Lead agency: Missouri State Highway Patrol; 
Scope of operations: All crimes and all hazards; 
Start date: December 2005. 

State: Montana; 
Name of fusion center: Montana All-Threat Intelligence Center (MATIC); 
Stage of development: Developed; 
Lead agency: Administered by the Montana Department of Justice Division 
of Criminal Investigation; 
Scope of operations: All crimes; 
Start date: Spring of 2003. 

State: New Jersey; 
Name of fusion center: Regional Operations Intelligence Center (ROIC); 
Stage of development: Developed; 
Lead agency: New Jersey State Police; 
Scope of operations: All crimes and all hazards; 
Start date: January 2005. 

State: New Mexico; 
Intermediate; 
New Mexico Department of Homeland Security and Emergency Management; 
All crimes, all hazards, and counterterrorism; 
September 2007; 
New Mexico All Source Intelligence Center (NMASIC). 

State: New York; 
Name of fusion center: New York Police Department (NYPD) Intelligence 
Division; 
Stage of development: Developed; 
Lead agency: NYPD; 
Scope of operations: All crimes and counterterrorism; 
Start date: March 2002. 

State: New York; 
Name of fusion center: Rockland County Intelligence Center; 
Stage of development: Developed; 
Lead agency: Rockland County law enforcement; 
Scope of operations: All crimes; 
Start date: 1995, however focus shifted after 9/11. 

State: New York; 
Name of fusion center: New York State Intelligence Center (NYSIC); 
Stage of development: Developed; 
Lead agency: New York State Police; 
Scope of operations: All crimes; 
Start date: August 2003. 

State: North Carolina; 
Name of fusion center: North Carolina Information Sharing and Analysis 
Center (ISAAC); 
Stage of development: Developed; 
Lead agency: North Carolina State Bureau of Investigation; 
Scope of operations: Homeland security, gangs, drugs; 
Start date: May 2006. 

State: North Dakota; 
Name of fusion center: North Dakota Fusion Center; 
Stage of development: Intermediate; 
Lead agency: Joint effort of the North Dakota Bureau of Criminal 
Investigation, North Dakota Highway Patrol, North Dakota Division of 
Homeland Security, and North Dakota National Guard; 
Scope of operations: All crimes, all hazards, and counterterrorism; 
Start date: September 2003. 

State: Ohio; 
Name of fusion center: Strategic Analysis and Information Center 
(SAIC); 
Stage of development: Developed; 
Lead agency: Ohio Division of Homeland Security; 
Scope of operations: All crimes and counterterrorism; 
Start date: January 2005. 

State: Oregon; 
Developed; 
Oregon Department of Justice; 
All crimes (all threats); 
June 2007; 
Terrorism Intelligence and Threat Assessment Network (TITAN) Fusion 
Center. 

State: Rhode Island; 
Name of fusion center: Rhode Island Fusion Center; 
Stage of development: Intermediate; 
Lead agency: Rhode Island State Police; 
Scope of operations: Counterterrorism; 
Start date: March 2006. 

State: South Carolina; 
Name of fusion center: South Carolina Information Exchange (SCIEx); 
Stage of development: Developed; 
Lead agency: South Carolina Law Enforcement Division; 
Scope of operations: All crimes and all hazards; 
Start date: March 2005. 

State: South Dakota; 
Name of fusion center: South Dakota Fusion Center; 
Stage of development: Intermediate; 
Lead agency: South Dakota Office of Homeland Security and the South 
Dakota Highway Patrol; 
Scope of operations: All crimes and all hazards; 
Start date: June 2006. 

State: Tennessee; 
Between intermediate and developed; 
Tennessee Bureau of Investigation and Tennessee Department of 
Safety/Office of Homeland Security; 
All crimes; 
May 2007; 
Tennessee Regional Information Center (TRIC). 

State: Texas; 
Name of fusion center: North Central Texas Fusion Center (NTFC); 
Stage of development: Between intermediate and developed; 
Lead agency: Collin County Department of Homeland Security; 
Scope of operations: All crimes and all hazards; 
Start date: February 2006. 

State: Texas; 
Name of fusion center: Texas Fusion Center; 
Stage of development: Intermediate; 
Lead agency: Criminal Law Enforcement Division and the Governor's 
Office of Homeland Security in the Texas Department of Public Safety; 
Scope of operations: All crimes and all hazards; 
Start date: July 2005. 

State: Vermont; 
Name of fusion center: Vermont Fusion Center; 
Stage of development: Developed; 
Lead agency: Vermont State Police; 
Scope of operations: All crimes; 
Start date: August 2005. 

State: Virginia; 
Name of fusion center: Virginia Fusion Center; 
Stage of development: Developed; 
Lead agency: Virginia State Police and Virginia Department of Emergency 
Management; 
Scope of operations: All hazards and counterterrorism; 
Start date: February 2005. 

State: Washington; 
Name of fusion center: Washington Joint Analytical Center (WAJAC); 
Stage of development: Intermediate; 
Lead agency: Joint effort between the Washington State Patrol and the 
FBI; 
Scope of operations: All crimes, all hazards, and counterterrorism; 
Start date: 2003. 

State: Washington, D.C; 
Name of fusion center: Metropolitan Washington Fusion Center (MWFC); 
Stage of development: Intermediate; 
Lead agency: Washington, D.C., Metropolitan Police Department; 
Scope of operations: All crimes and all hazards; 
Start date: Spring of 2006. 

State: Wisconsin; 
Name of fusion center: Southeastern Wisconsin Terrorism Alert Center 
(STAC); 
Stage of development: Intermediate; 
Lead agency: Milwaukee Police Department; 
Scope of operations: All crimes, all hazards, and counterterrorism; 
Start date: October 2006. 

State: Wisconsin; 
Name of fusion center: Wisconsin Statewide Intelligence Center (WSIC); 
Stage of development: Developed; 
Lead agency: Wisconsin Department of Justice, Division of Criminal 
Investigation; 
Scope of operations: All crimes, all hazards, all events; 
Start date: March 2006. 

Source: Fusion center officials.

Appendix III: Fusion Centers in the Planning and Early Stages of
Development

Table 5 presents information about fusion centers in the planning and
early stages of development, as reported to us by fusion center officials
during semistructured interviews as of September 2007. During these
interviews, we asked officials to characterize their fusion centers as
being in one of the following stages: planning, early development,
intermediate (limited operations and functionality), or developed (fully
operational and fully functional).

Table 5: Selected Characteristics of Fusion Centers in the Planning and
Early Stages of Development We Contacted, as of September 2007

State: Alabama; 
Name of fusion center: Alabama Information Fusion Center; 
Stage of development: Planning stage; 
Lead agency: Alabama Department of Homeland Security; 
Scope of operations: All crimes; 
Planned opening: The officials said that the center is expected to open 
in the fall of 2007. 

State: Alaska; 
Name of fusion center: Alaska Fusion Center; 
Stage of development: Planning stage; 
Lead agency: Alaska Department of Public Safety and Alaska Division of 
Homeland Security and Emergency Management; 
Scope of operations: All crimes, all hazards, all source; 
Planned opening: The officials did not provide a specific date. 

State: Arkansas; 
Name of fusion center: Arkansas Fusion Center; 
Stage of development: Early stage of development; 
Lead agency: Arkansas State Police; 
Scope of operations: All crimes (all threats); 
Planned opening: The officials said that the center may be able to 
begin limited operations by the winter of 2007. 

State: Hawaii; 
Name of fusion center: Hawaii Fusion Center; 
Stage of development: Planning stage; 
Lead agency: To be determined; 
Scope of operations: All hazards; 
Planned opening: The officials did not provide a specific date. 

State: Maine; 
Name of fusion center: Maine Intelligence and Analysis Center; 
Stage of development: Early stage of development; 
Lead agency: Maine Emergency Management Agency and the Maine State 
Police; 
Scope of operations: Counterterrorism; 
Planned opening: The officials said that the center opened in December 
2006. 

State: Michigan; 
Name of fusion center: Detroit and Southeastern Michigan Regional 
Fusion Center; 
Stage of development: Early stage of development; 
Lead agency: City of Detroit Homeland Security and Emergency 
Management; 
Scope of operations: All crimes, all hazards, and counterterrorism; 
Planned opening: The officials said that the center will be fully 
operational in January 2008. 

State: Mississippi; 
Name of fusion center: Mississippi Analysis & Information Center; 
Stage of development: Early stage of development; 
Lead agency: Mississippi Office of Homeland Security and Mississippi 
Department of Public Safety; 
Scope of operations: All crimes, all hazards, and all threats; 
Planned opening: The official said that the fusion center is expected 
to open at the end of September 2007. 

State: Nebraska; 
Name of fusion center: Nebraska Fusion Center; 
Stage of development: Planning stage; 
Lead agency: Nebraska State Patrol; 
Scope of operations: All crimes and all hazards, including terrorism; 
Planned opening: The officials said that the fusion center is expected 
to open in the fall of 2007. 

State: Nevada; 
Name of fusion center: Nevada Analytical and Information Center; 
Stage of development: Planning stage; 
Lead agency: Nevada Department of Public Safety; 
Scope of operations: All crimes (all threats); 
Planned opening: The official did not provide a specific date. 

State: New Hampshire; 
Name of fusion center: New Hampshire Fusion Center; 
Stage of development: Early stage of development; 
Lead agency: New Hampshire Department of Safety Division of State 
Police; 
Scope of operations: All crimes and all hazards; 
Planned opening: The official said the fusion center is planning to 
open in 2008. 

State: Oklahoma; 
Name of fusion center: Oklahoma Information Fusion Center; 
Stage of development: Early stage of development; 
Lead agency: Oklahoma State Bureau of Investigation; 
Scope of operations: All crimes and all hazards; 
Planned opening: The official said the fusion center is expected to 
open in early 2008. 

State: Pennsylvania; 
Name of fusion center: Pennsylvania Criminal Intelligence Center; 
Stage of development: Early stage of development; 
Lead agency: Pennsylvania State Police; 
Scope of operations: All crimes; 
Planned opening: The official said the center opened in July 2003. 
However, the official said he considers the center in the early stage 
of development as a fusion center but developed as a criminal 
intelligence center. 

State: Utah; 
Name of fusion center: Utah Fusion Center; 
Stage of development: Planning stage; 
Lead agency: Utah Department of Public Safety; 
Scope of operations: All crimes and all hazards; 
Planned opening: The official did not provide a specific date. 

State: West Virginia; 
Name of fusion center: West Virginia Fusion Center; 
Stage of development: Planning stage; 
Lead agency: Department of Military Affairs and Public Safety, Division 
of Homeland Security; 
Scope of operations: All crimes, all hazards, and counterterrorism; 
Planned opening: The official did not provide a specific date. 

State: Wyoming; 
Name of fusion center: [Empty]; 
Stage of development: Partnership is between planning and early stage 
of development; 
Lead agency: Wyoming Office of Homeland Security; 
Scope of operations: Counterterrorism; 
Planned opening: The officials said that Wyoming is planning to partner 
with Colorado. 

Source: Fusion center officials.

Appendix IV: Summary of State and Local Fusion Centers GAO Contacted

Following is a summary of the status and selected characteristics of the
state and local fusion centers we contacted between February and May
2007.1 The summaries are primarily based on documents provided to us by
fusion centers and interviews we conducted with fusion center officials.2
Specifically, we obtained and summarized documentation about the centers
that covered a variety of topics including mission; lead agency; staffing;
federal, state, and local entities represented; and types of services
performed and products disseminated. During semistructured interviews with
officials, we asked about the stage of development of the fusion center,
reasons for establishing the center, and the scope of operations (e.g.,
counterterrorism). In some instances we augmented the information provided
to us by fusion center officials with publicly available information about
the fusion center or information provided to us by the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS) or the FBI. We sent the summaries to the fusion
centers for a review of accuracy as of September 2007. However, we did not
independently verify all of the information provided to us.

Alabama

The Alabama Department of Homeland Security is in the final planning stage
of establishing the Alabama Information Fusion Center. The center intends
to use information not normally considered crime-related to prevent
terrorist activity, but it will also adopt an all-crimes scope of
operations. The fusion center has appointed an officer in charge and is in
the process of acquiring additional staff members. However, the center is
not yet fully operational. The executive order that will establish the
office has been submitted to the Governor for approval, and it is expected
that the fusion center will open for business in the fall of 2007.

Alaska

The Alaska Fusion Center is in the advanced planning stage with the major
concentration being on defining the missions, developing the governance,
and outlining potential products and services. The fusion center will be a
combined effort of the Alaska Department of Public Safety and the Alaska
Division of Homeland Security and Emergency Management. While they do not
have a physical fusion center, planning officials have partnerships
established with the FBI, other federal and state law enforcement, the
U.S. Attorney's Office, the U.S. Coast Guard, the military, and the
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). Through these partnerships,
the member agencies already share information and coordinate activities.
The officials said that they are considering the advantages of a joint,
permanently staffed facility. If feasible and advantageous, they will plan
to build or move into an available facility in the future.

1We relied on the centers' own definitions of themselves as fusion centers
and did not evaluate their status, characteristics, or operations.

2For purposes of this report, "fusion center officials" includes the
directors, commanders, or special agents in charge of the centers (or
their designees). In states where a fusion center is not operational, we
spoke with officials who were responsible for the planning or
establishment of the fusion center.

The Alaska Fusion Center will have an all-crimes, all-hazards, and
all-source scope of operations. As a result of Public Safety and Homeland
Security and Emergency Management involvement in developing the fusion
center, the center will have both law enforcement and emergency management
components. All-source includes law enforcement as well as economic
information and infrastructure issues. The center will have three focus
areas: day-to-day compilation, distillation, and distribution of
information products; analyses and assessments of patterns and trends in
the risks, threats, and hazards facing Alaska; and serving as an
operational planning group serving all agencies when a threat emerges or a
disaster occurs. The center has access to DHS's Homeland Security
Information Network (HSIN), Department of Justice's Law Enforcement Online
(LEO), and the Department of Defense's Secret Internet Protocol Router
Network (SIPRNet).

Arizona

The Arizona Counter Terrorism Information Center (AcTIC) opened in October
2004 as a cross-jurisdictional partnership among local, state, and federal
law enforcement; first responders; and emergency management. Mandated by
the Governor's Arizona Homeland Security plan, AcTIC's mission is to
protect the citizens and critical infrastructures of Arizona by enhancing
intelligence and domestic preparedness operations for all local, state,
and federal law enforcement agencies. Mission execution will be guided by
the understanding that the key to effectiveness is the development of
information among participants to the fullest extent permitted by law or
agency policy. AcTIC has an all-crimes focus and both an analytical and
investigative scope of operations.

AcTIC is run jointly by the FBI and the Arizona Department of Public
Safety. There are 24 state, local, and federal agencies represented in the
center. Among them are the Arizona Department of Public Safety; Arizona
Department of Homeland Security; Arizona National Guard; Arizona Motor
Vehicle Department; Arizona Department of Liquor License & Control; a
number of county and city fire and law enforcement departments; the Rocky
Mountain Information Network; the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms
(ATF); U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE); the Department of
State; DHS's Office of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A); and the FBI. AcTIC
is colocated in the same building with the FBI's Joint Terrorism Task
Force (JTTF) and Field Intelligence Group (FIG). These FBI groups are
located in a separate suite and operate at the Top Secret/Sensitive
Compartmented Information (TS/SCI) level. In addition, AcTIC has
collaborated with Arizona State University-West Campus to create an
internship program. Overall, there are about 240 personnel in AcTIC,
including investigators, analysts, and support personnel. Most AcTIC
personnel receive Secret clearances from the FBI. AcTIC is overseen by a
Management Board that consists of the leader of every agency represented
in the center and a governor-appointed Oversight Committee that provides
guidance to the center.

Within AcTIC, there is a Watch Center that is the central location for all
information coming into the AcTIC. In addition, the facility houses the
Terrorism Liaison Officer (TLO) squad, the HAZMAT/Weapons of Mass
Destruction unit, a computer forensics laboratory, the Criminal
Investigations Research Unit, Geographical Information Systems, and the
Violent Criminal Apprehension Program.

AcTIC concentrates on an all-crimes focus for gathering information, which
is collected from a variety of Web sites; federal, state, and local
databases and networks; the media; and unclassified intelligence
bulletins. DHS and DOJ information systems or networks accessible to the
center include LEO Special Interest Groups, HSIN-Intel, HSIN-Intel
Arizona, and HSDN. AcTIC has direct connectivity to FBI classified systems
and networks. However, those AcTIC personnel with Top Secret clearances
must enter the JTTF suite and access an FBI system. AcTIC has access to,
among others, Regional Information Sharing System (RISS) Automated Trusted
Information Exchange (ATIX), SIPRNet, the National Criminal Information
Center (NCIC), International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL),
Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN), and El Paso Intelligence
Center (EPIC). In total AcTIC has over 100 law enforcement and public
source databases available to it. AcTIC produces biweekly intelligence
briefings, advisories, citizens' bulletins, information collection
requirement bulletins, information bulletins, intelligence bulletins, and
threat assessments. These products are primarily created for law
enforcement entities and specific community partners, but some are for the
public (e.g., advisories and citizens' bulletins). The products are
typically disseminated via e-mail, Web site postings to LEO or HSIN, or
faxes on occasion.

Arkansas

The Arkansas State Police is in the early stage of development of the
Arkansas Fusion Center. The focus of the Arkansas Fusion Center will
initially be all crimes and all threats, although the intent is to
incorporate an all-hazards element in the future. Currently, the center
has commitments from the following federal, state, and local agencies to
assign between 12 to 13 full-time personnel to the center: FBI, Arkansas
Highway Police, Arkansas Crime Information Center, Arkansas National
Guard, Arkansas Department of Corrections, Arkansas Department of Health,
Arkansas State Police, Arkansas Game and Fish Commission, the Arkansas
Association of Chiefs of Police, and the Arkansas Sheriff's Association.
The officials said that they expect to receive funding in the fall of
2007, and that the center may be able to begin limited operations by the
winter of 2007.

California

In addition to the State Terrorism Threat Assessment Center (STTAC),
California has established four regional fusion centers known as Regional
Terrorism Threat Analysis Centers (RTTACs) that are located in San Diego,
San Francisco, Los Angeles, and Sacramento and correspond to the FBI's
four field office regions. The mission of the RTTACs is to collect, fuse,
and analyze information related to terrorism from local law enforcement,
fire departments, and public health and private sector entities. Each
RTTAC is uniquely organized, but each is closely linked with local
sheriffs. We contacted the STTAC, the Los Angeles RTTAC, known as the
Joint Regional Intelligence Center (JRIC), and the Sacramento RTTAC.

State Terrorism Threat Assessment Center

Former Governor Gray Davis and Attorney General Bill Lockyer created the
California Anti-Terrorism Information Center on September 25, 2001, and in
December 2005 the center was transformed into the State Terrorism Threat
Assessment Center. STTAC is a joint partnership of the Governor's Office
of Homeland Security, California Department of Justice, and the California
Highway Patrol. The mission of STTAC is to serve as a joint operation
among the parties with the function of receiving, analyzing, and
maintaining relevant intelligence information obtained from various
federal, state, local, and tribal sources, and disseminating
counterterrorism intelligence information in appropriate formats to
individuals and entities in California for the purpose of protecting
California's citizens, property, and infrastructure from terrorist acts.
STTAC's core mission is serving as California's central all-crimes and
counterterrorism criminal intelligence center. STTAC is also to perform
warning functions with the California State Warning Center in the Office
of Emergency Services.

STTAC operates in close cooperation with the Office of Homeland Security,
California Highway Patrol, Office of Emergency Services, the four RTTACs,
and federal agencies including DHS and FBI. STTAC's authorized staff level
is 44, and the staff is composed primarily of California Department of
Justice and Office of Homeland Security analysts and investigators. There
are also representatives from the California Highway Patrol and the state
National Guard. STTAC does not have DHS or FBI staff assigned directly to
it. However, DHS has provided one senior intelligence officer who resides
at the Sacramento RTTAC and supports STTAC and another officer who resides
at the Los Angeles JRIC. The FBI provides support to STTAC upon request
and has assigned personnel to all of the California RTTACs. An Executive
Management Board consisting of leaders from the partner agencies provides
strategic oversight of STTAC.

DHS and DOJ information systems or networks accessible to the fusion
center include HSIN (e.g., the Law Enforcement, Counterterrorism, and
Intel portals), LEO, the Federal Protective Service (FPS) portal, and the
Foreign Terrorist Tracking Task Force portal,3 as well as several
California law enforcement and justice information and intelligence
systems and commercially available databases.

STTAC provides intelligence support to all state agencies and disseminates
situational awareness products. For instance, it supports regional
intelligence analysis and criminal investigations by supplying the RTTACs
analytical support, field investigations, and intelligence assessments and
reports, among other things. STTAC produces a variety of intelligence
products including, but not limited to, the following: advisories that
provide a brief description of a local tactical issue, suspect, event, or
situation that may be of immediate concern to law enforcement or key
policy makers; intelligence bulletins that provide a strategic in-depth
review of a particular terrorist group, event, or public safety issue
affecting the state; alerts that are issued when there is a specific,
validated, and verified threat; special reports that provide extensive
overviews of a particular group or issue and contain background
information, methods and geographical areas of operation, violence
potential, conclusions, and recommendations for interdicting the activity;
and threat assessments.

3A Web portal is generally a site that offers several resources or
services, such as search engines, news articles, forums, or other tools.
HSIN contains a series of Web-based portals that are organized in various
community groups, for example, law enforcement, emergency management, or
users from a specific state.

Los Angeles Joint Regional Intelligence Center

The Los Angeles Joint Regional Intelligence Center (JRIC) opened in July
2006. However, according to Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department and
FBI officials, the three founding agencies of JRIC--the Los Angeles
Sheriff's Department, FBI Los Angeles, and the Los Angeles Police
Department (LAPD)--came together and realized that the region needed a
center to address counterterrorism and critical infrastructure protection
missions after the events of 9/11. The County Sheriff, the Chief of LAPD,
and the Assistant Director in Charge of the FBI Los Angeles Field Office
jointly decided to develop the center to cover the seven counties in the
Los Angeles/southern California area. JRIC brought together the FBI's FIG,
LAPD's Major Crimes Division, and the Sheriff Department's Terrorism Early
Warning (TEW) group.4

JRIC has an all-crimes and counterterrorism scope of operations.
Specifically, JRIC collects information using an all-crimes approach,
converts the information into operational and strategic intelligence, and
disseminates the intelligence to prevent terrorist attacks and combat
crime in the Central District of California. Its mission is intelligence
intake, fusion, and analysis, with an emphasis on terrorist threat
intelligence; providing timely, regionally focused, and actionable
information to consumers and producing assessments; and identifying
trends, patterns and terrorist tactics, techniques and procedures; and
sponsoring training opportunities.

In addition to JRIC's founding agencies, cooperating agencies in JRIC
include DHS I&A, the U.S. Attorney's Office, Governor's Office of Homeland
Security, and California Department of Justice. DHS I&A has assigned an
intelligence officer to JRIC, and the center includes about 30 full-time
personnel representing 14 agencies. JRIC personnel receive Secret or Top
Secret clearances from the FBI. TLOs connect law enforcement and public
safety partners in the seven-county region to JRIC by collecting,
assessing, and passing on information, intelligence, tips, and leads to
the center and then distributing advisories, bulletins, assessments, and
requests for information to their home agencies.

4TEWs are multilateral, multidisciplinary groups designed to provide local
responders information on current threats and offer decision-making
information to community leaders.

JRIC collects information from national reporting; leads and tips from the
FBI, LAPD, the Sheriff's Department and the TLOs; and from private sector
outreach. DHS and DOJ information systems or networks accessible to JRIC
include LEO; every HSIN portal (e.g., Intelligence, Law Enforcement,
Emergency Management); the classified Homeland Security Data Network
(HSDN); and all of the system and databases available in the FBI's
FBINet/Trilogy system. The center also has access to the FBI's Top Secret
network, the Sensitive Compartmental Information Operational Network
(SCION) through a facility located on the same floor as JRIC.5 JRIC
disseminates information to, among others, JTTFs, California Office of
Homeland Security, DHS and LEO portals, law enforcement and public safety
partners, affected municipality and critical infrastructure owners, and
the originator of the information (in the form of feedback). JRIC also
produces daily and weekly reports.

Sacramento Regional Terrorism Threat Assessment Center

The Sacramento RTTAC was established primarily to bring analysts from
different state, local, and federal agencies together to work on
terrorism-related issues. The center has been located in its current
building, which has a Sensitive Compartmented Information Facility (SCIF),
and operating at its current level of functionality, at the TS/SCI level,
since November 2006. Prior to that, the center operated at a Law
Enforcement Sensitive level for about 2 years in a different facility.
RTTAC has an all-crimes and counterterrorism scope of operations and
handles all of the critical asset management and threat assessment
capabilities in its area of responsibility.

Participating agencies include the National Guard, FBI, U.S. Attorney's
Office, ICE, and representatives from fire, law enforcement, and public
health disciplines. DHS I&A has assigned an intelligence officer, and the
FBI has assigned two analysts and one intelligence research specialist,
and recently added a JTTF threat squad to the RTTAC team to vet tips and
leads. In addition, there are other state and local analysts in the
center. The FBI also provides RTTAC personnel with TS/SCI security
clearances. DHS and DOJ information systems or networks accessible to the
fusion center include LEO, HSIN, HSIN-Counterterrorism portal, HSDN, as
well as FBI systems, such as the Automated Case Support (ACS) system and
SCION. The RTTAC also has access to SIPRNet, among other federal and state
systems and networks.

5SCION is used to transport Top Secret counterterrorism data, including
intelligence and warning information.

Colorado

The Colorado Information Analysis Center (CIAC) became operational in
October 2004 under the direction of the Colorado Bureau of Investigation.
The Colorado State Patrol took over operation and management of CIAC in
March 2005, and it moved into its new facility in April 2005. CIAC was
originally opened to support and respond to credible threats during the
elections in 2004, but has since evolved to have an all-crimes and
all-hazards scope of operation. Its mission is to provide an integrated,
multidiscipline information-sharing network to collect, analyze, and
disseminate information to stakeholders in a timely manner in order to
protect the citizens and critical infrastructure of Colorado. CIAC has no
investigative power but does have the ability to collect, analyze, and vet
information for authenticity. When additional investigation is necessary,
CIAC sends information to the DHS, the FBI's FIG, and to local law
enforcement.

CIAC is staffed full-time by the Colorado State Patrol, the National
Guard, the Department of Revenue, and the FBI. There are part-time
participants in CIAC from the Colorado Departments of Agriculture, Public
Health, Corrections, Education, and the Colorado Springs Police
Department, as well as from the U.S. Marshals Service. The University of
Denver also provides interns to CIAC. DHS I&A has conducted a needs
assessment of CIAC. However, at the time of our review, it had not placed
an intelligence analyst in the center. CIAC has access to a regional DHS
protective security advisor.6

DHS and DOJ information systems or networks accessible to CIAC include
HSIN, LEO, and the FPS portal. In addition, the center has access to,
among others, Rocky Mountain Information Network, U.S. Northern Command,
and SIPRNET, which is accessed through the FBI. CIAC produces several
types of bulletins and summaries, including For Official Use Only and Law
Enforcement Sensitive versions of a monthly summary of reported incidents,
daily reports, officer safety bulletins, and early warning and special
reports. These products are e-mailed to a number of recipients, including
members of the critical infrastructure sectors. Products are also
distributed directly to law enforcement officers via in-car mobile data
computers. The monthly summaries are produced with the FBI FIG and also
cover incidents in Wyoming, and some of the special reports are produced
jointly with the FBI and the U.S. Northern Command.

6DHS protective security advisors have experience related to vulnerability
reduction and physical security and many have law enforcement or military
backgrounds. The advisors have responsibility for assisting in identifying
high-priority facilities, providing the local community with information
on threats and best practices, and coordinating training and facility
visits.

Connecticut

The Connecticut Intelligence Center (CTIC) opened in April 2005 as the
centralized point of information sharing for the state. CTIC is a
multi-agency operation representing various jurisdictions that serves to
collect, analyze, and disseminate criminal and terrorism-related
intelligence to all law enforcement agencies in the state. CTIC has an
all-crimes scope of operations and endeavors to identify emerging threats
or crime trends.

Colocated with an FBI field office and jointly led by the FBI and the
Connecticut State Police, CTIC's 12-member staff includes representatives
from the FBI, the U.S. Coast Guard, the state department of corrections,
State Police, and local law enforcement agencies. DHS I&A placed an
intelligence officer in the center in September 2007. FBI personnel serve
in both supervisory and analytical roles in CTIC. For example, CTIC
Operations Supervisor is also the FBI FIG supervisor. Day-to-day
operations are managed by an FBI Supervisory Special Agent and supported
by two Intelligence Coordinators, one from the state police and one from
the FBI. The FBI also provides Top Secret clearances to CTIC personnel.

The state is divided into five regions, each of which is represented in
CTIC by a Regional Intelligence Liaison Officers. The officers are
appointed by the corresponding Connecticut Police Chiefs Association and
represent local law enforcement agencies in the center. The officers
maintain full-time positions at CTIC and serve a recommended minimum of 2
years after obtaining a Top Secret clearance. CTIC offers a stipend for
each municipality that places an officer in the center. The officers serve
as the communication link between CTIC and a network of Intelligence
Liaison Officers who are specially trained officers who represent local
departments within each region. The Intelligence Liaison Officers are
responsible for providing information to CTIC and for providing statewide
and jurisdictional-specific information from CTIC to their respective
agencies. CTIC has an Advisory Board that meets quarterly and defines
strategy and policy for the center. CTIC also has partnerships with the
private sector through Connecticut Infragard.7

CTIC takes an all-crimes approach to information collection and has access
to a number of state and federal systems and networks. DHS and DOJ
information systems or networks accessible to CTIC include HSIN, LEO, and
ACS, Guardian, and Investigative Data Warehouse (IDW) through the FBI. In
addition, CTIC has access to the New England State Police Information
Network, which is part of RISSNet, and SIPRNet. CTIC produces a variety of
intelligence products, including weekly bulletins on criminal activities;
weekly intelligence bulletins; intelligence assessments, which provide
in-depth reporting on an emerging threat, group, or crime; and
intelligence information reports. Their primary customers are the law
enforcement officers, emergency managers, and the private sector in the
state and Northeast region.

Delaware

After the September 11, 2001, attacks, Delaware officials identified a
need to establish a conduit for information flow, both to and from the
federal government and local entities and in and out of Delaware. Led by
the Delaware State Police, the Delaware Information Analysis Center (DIAC)
was subsequently opened in December 2005. DIAC, through a
multijurisdictional and multidiscipline effort, is committed to providing
a coordinated, professional, and all-hazards approach in preventing,
disrupting, and defeating criminal and terrorist activity while
safeguarding individuals' constitutional guarantees. Specifically, using
an all-crimes and all-hazards approach, DIAC will collect, analyze, and
disseminate criminal intelligence; conduct crime analysis; provide officer
and public safety alerts to all disciplines; and disseminate critical
infrastructure information to those persons in law enforcement,
government, and the private sector who have both a right and need to know,
with the objective of protecting the citizens, infrastructure, and key
assets of the state.

7InfraGard is an information-sharing and analysis effort between, at a
minimum, the FBI and the private sector that serves the interests and
combines the knowledge base of a wide range of members. It is an
association of businesses, academic institutions, state and local law
enforcement agencies, and other participants dedicated to sharing
information and intelligence to prevent hostile acts on the nation and its
interests. InfraGard chapters are geographically linked with FBI field
office territories, and each chapter has an FBI special agent coordinator
assigned to it who works closely with program managers in FBI
headquarters.

Partners from other state agencies include Public Health, Department of
Technology and Information, Department of Corrections, Transportation,
Division of Revenue, and Natural Resources, as well as the Delaware
Volunteer Firemen's Association and all other law enforcement entities in
the state, including local and federal agencies. At the time of our
review, DIAC staff included six full-time analysts and two Delaware
National Guard analysts, as well as three personnel assigned to critical
infrastructure protection. DIAC also has two Delaware State Police
commissioned officers assigned in administrative roles. Two of the six
state police analysts have Top Secret clearances that were granted by the
FBI. At the time of our review, there were no DHS or FBI personnel
represented in DIAC.

Analysts produce a variety of products, including a weekly intelligence
report for law enforcement and a weekly infrastructure bulletin for
private sector partners as well as situational reports and homeland
security and situational alerts. Tactical alerts and reports on
multijurisdictional criminal activity are supplied to Delaware law
enforcement agencies in many forms such as officer safety warnings,
warnings and indicators of terrorist events, site-specific critical
infrastructure and asset alerts, and informational bulletins and
assessments. DHS and DOJ information systems or networks accessible to the
fusion center include HSIN, LEO, and FPS portal. In addition, DIAC has
access to information from High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area (HIDTA)
and the Information Sharing and Analysis Centers, which are private sector
critical infrastructure protection sharing centers. Both information and
intelligence are collected from and disseminated to other state fusion
centers, DHS, the FBI, the U.S. Coast Guard, local law enforcement, the
private sector, the Delaware National Guard, Dover Air Force Base, other
state agencies, and the Information Sharing and Analysis Centers.

District of Columbia

After a planning stage that began in 2005, the Metropolitan Washington
Fusion Center (MWFC) opened in the spring of 2006 to provide local
governments and agencies with an approach and capability for networked
information sharing. Led by the Metropolitan Police Department, MWFC has
multiple agencies and disciplines represented and serves the National
Capital Region.

MWFC has a 24/7 command center that provides a constant flow of
information and looks at that information for patterns of activity
alongside the crime analysis unit. MWFC is an all-crimes center, but also
has an all-hazards function as it follows the National Infrastructure
Protection Plan, in particular focusing on the large number of national
monuments located within the Washington metropolitan area. The all-hazards
function is supported by partnerships with the Department of Health, which
helps with responding to health issues such as pandemics and natural
disasters, and the Washington, D.C., National Guard, which helps with the
analysis of patterns and response to events. It is also coordinated with
the MWFC's Emergency Management Agency functions. An official said that
MWFC did not want to focus only on crime because important threat
information and information that leads analysts to detect suspicious
patterns occurs in many other areas as well. In addition, it was also
important to MWFC to adopt the dual all-crimes, all-hazards focus because
the fusion center wanted to give a number of partner agencies "a seat at
the table" to increase support of the center. An official also noted that
the MWFC has created a Fusion Center Regional Programmatic Workgroup to
develop a regional strategy, product development, and charter, and to form
a solid, cohesive, common operating picture for the region.

The FBI and DHS I&A have assigned personnel to MWFC. At the time of our
review, the fusion center was located in secure space provided by the FBI.
However, according to the official, the center is planning to move into
D.C. government space within 30 months. DHS and DOJ information systems or
networks accessible to the fusion center include LEO and FBINet. The
center will be a RISS node through the Middle Atlantic-Great Lakes
Organized Crime Law Enforcement Network and is in the review process with
DHS to receive HSDN.

Florida

The Florida Fusion Center is a component of the Florida Department of Law
Enforcement's (FDLE) Office of Statewide Intelligence. According to FDLE
officials, the Office of Statewide Intelligence was created in 1996 with
the primary mission "to provide FDLE leadership with sufficient
information so that they (sic) may make informed decisions on the
deployment of resources." The office is responsible for the coordination
of FDLE's intelligence efforts and analysis and dissemination of
intelligence and crime data information. The office has always had an
all-crimes approach that was reflective of FDLE's investigative strategy
and focus areas. This approach was enhanced with the addition of a
domestic security mission after 9/11. Under the coordination of FDLE,
seven regional domestic security task forces were created, along with an
analytical unit within the Office of Statewide Intelligence to enhance
domestic security and counterterrorism investigative efforts. Each task
force is cochaired by an FDLE Special Agent in Charge and a sheriff from
the region. The task forces include multidisciplinary partners from
education, fire rescue, health, communications, law enforcement, and
emergency management. These disciplines are also reflected in the
composition of the fusion center.

The Florida Fusion Center was established in January 2007 with a mission
to protect the citizens, visitors, resources, and critical infrastructure
of Florida by enhancing information sharing, intelligence capabilities,
and preparedness operations for all local, state, and federal agencies in
accordance with Florida's Domestic Security Strategy. The fusion center
will serve as the state node and will provide connectivity and
intelligence sharing amongst Florida's regional fusion centers. The center
consists of approximately 45 FDLE members, federal agencies, state
multidisciplinary partners, and includes outreach to private sector
entities. FDLE members who are part of the fusion center have assignments
to various squads within the Office of Statewide Intelligence, to include
counterterrorism intelligence, financial crime analysis, critical
infrastructure, and a 24/7 situational awareness unit, the Florida
investigative support squad. FFC also has full-time analysts from DHS I&A
and the FBI working at the center, as well as representation from the U.S.
Attorney's Office. The center will add a full-time analyst from the
Florida National Guard in October 2007.

State agencies and departments that have committed to participate as
members of the Fusion Center Executive Policy Board and have designated an
intelligence liaison officer or analyst to the fusion center include:
Agriculture; Business and Professional Regulation; Corrections; Education;
Emergency Management; Environmental Protection; Fish and Wildlife
Conservation Commission; Financial Services; Health; Highway Safety; FDLE;
Transportation; and the National Guard.

DHS and DOJ systems and networks the center has access to include LEO,
HSIN, HSIN-Intel, HSIN-Florida, and HSDN.

Georgia

The Georgia Information Sharing and Analysis Center (GISAC) was
established in October 2001 and falls under the responsibility and
management of the Georgia Office of Homeland Security. The initial focus
of GISAC was to address terrorism and the information gap among federal,
state, and local law enforcement in providing homeland security
intelligence. Its mission is to serve as the focal point for collection,
analysis, and dissemination of information on threats or attacks of a
terrorist nature within and against the State of Georgia, its citizens, or
infrastructure.

GISAC is one of the three components of the Georgia Office of Homeland
Security and is divided into four sections--law enforcement, criminal
intelligence, fire services/hazmat, and emergency management. GISAC has a
staff of 27, the majority of whom are personnel from the Georgia Bureau of
Investigation. Other state agencies with assigned personnel at the center
include the Georgia Emergency Management Agency, Georgia State Patrol,
Georgia Department of Corrections, and Georgia National Guard. The Georgia
Sheriffs' Association, Georgia Fire Chiefs Association, and Georgia
Association of Chiefs of Police have each assigned one person to the
center. DHS I&A has assigned two staff to GISAC; one Southeast region
representative and one intelligence officer. There are no FBI personnel
assigned directly to GISAC. However, there are two GISAC personnel
assigned to the JTTF, and all analysts have access to the FBI FIG, whereby
they have access to FBI systems. GISAC is also located in the same
building as the FBI field office with its JTTF and FIG.

GISAC produces a variety of products, including an open source report
weekly, which is posted on the Office of Homeland Security-Georgia
Emergency Management Agency Web site and distributed electronically; a
monthly intelligence report that is For Official Use Only and distributed
electronically; alerts and notices, which are produced on an as-needed
basis; a monthly outbreak and surveillance report from the Georgia
Department of Health; and an Georgia Bureau of Investigation-produced
joint GISAC/FBI multipage monthly bulletin that contains GISAC statistics
combined with FBI information. DHS and DOJ systems and networks to which
GISAC has access include HSIN, HSDN, and LEO. In addition, GISAC analysts
are able to access FBI systems, such as E-Guardian, IDW, and ACS.

Hawaii

According to a State of Hawaii Department of Defense official, for the
past 2 years officials from civil defense and state law enforcement have
discussed the possibility of establishing a fusion center in Hawaii.
Specifically, they have discussed establishing an intelligence unit under
state and local law enforcement control to complement the FBI's JTTF in
Honolulu. A state fusion center would provide intelligence and analysis to
all disciplines, especially law enforcement. Planning officials are not
seeking a center that is only focused on the prevention and disruption of
terrorism, but one that would complement other departments, agencies, and
task forces within the context of all hazards. The official noted that the
establishment of a fusion center in Hawaii depends on the adequacy and
allocation of Homeland Security grant funds in fiscal years 2007 and 2008.
According to the official, Hawaii's fiscal year 2007 allocation will not
support the current investment strategy for a fusion center. The official
said that they will have to wait until fiscal year 2008 or find an
alternative funding strategy.

Idaho

Idaho does not have and is not planning to establish a physical fusion
center. However, according to the directors of the Bureau of Homeland
Security and Idaho State Police, the state has a "virtual fusion process."
The fusion process grew out of monthly information-sharing meetings prior
to September 11 that were held by the Idaho Bureau of Hazardous Materials
with other federal, state, and local officials in Idaho. In October 2001,
the U.S. Attorney's Office for the District of Idaho offered to serve as
the cornerstone of an information-sharing effort. A member of the U.S.
Attorney's Office, who is also a member of the Anti-Terrorism Advisory
Council,8 provides the overarching structure for the fusion process by
facilitating connections between federal sources of intelligence in Idaho
and state and local law enforcement. This individual holds meetings
several times a year, provides information and analyses to consumers by
way of the Internet and coordinates with the two JTTFs in the area.
Participants in the fusion process also use HSIN.

The officials articulated several reasons why they are not planning to
establish a fusion center, including the state's commitment to support the
efforts of the U.S. Attorney's Office to conduct threat analyses and share
information, political concerns about the role of the government in
information sharing, local agencies' lack of interest in participating in
a fusion center because they perceive the centers to be
intelligence-gathering entities, and local communities do not want law
enforcement to be involved in gathering intelligence, the state's low risk
for international terrorism, and difficulties staffing a center because
state and local agencies would not have the capacity to provide personnel
to work in a fusion center.

Illinois

There are two fusion centers in Illinois, the Statewide Terrorism and
Intelligence Center (STIC) and the Chicago Crime Prevention and
Information Center (CPIC).

8The Anti-Terrorism Advisory Council in the U.S. Attorney's Office for the
District of Idaho was created after September 11 and is composed of
representatives from federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies.
The Idaho ATAC coordinates antiterrorism initiatives, initiates training
programs, and facilitates information sharing.

Statewide Terrorism and Intelligence Center

Led by the Illinois State Police, the Statewide Terrorism and Intelligence
Center (STIC) was established in May 2003 with the mission to provide
timely, effective, and actionable intelligence information to local,
state, and federal law enforcement and private sector partners in order to
enhance public safety, facilitate communication between agencies, and
provide support in the fight against terrorism and criminal activity. STIC
is an all-crimes fusion center that is colocated with the Illinois
Emergency Management Agency, with which it works closely during disasters.
When STIC was established, it absorbed the state police intelligence unit,
which focused on general crimes (e.g., violent crimes, narcotics, sex
offenders), because, in part, the planners wanted to combine all of the
silos of information needed to prevent criminal and terrorist activity.

STIC is organized into two sections: a terrorism section, which staffs the
24/7 watch, and the field support section, which has a criminal
intelligence unit with specialists working on drugs, violent crimes, motor
vehicle theft, and sex offenses. The Illinois State Police and the
Illinois National Guard provide nearly all of the personnel, including 7
sworn officers, 18 terrorism research specialists, 4 narcotics analysts, 3
other crime/violent crime analysts, 1 senior terrorism lead analyst, 1
firearms analyst, 2 motor vehicle theft analysts, 6 Internet crime
analysts, 1 America's Missing: Broadcast Emergency Response (AMBER) Alert
analyst, and 2 office assistants. The FBI has assigned two analysts to
work terrorism-related cases, the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA)
has assigned one analyst to work narcotics cases, and DHS I&A has assigned
one analyst to work on homeland security issues. The Illinois Terrorism
Task Force, which is composed of representatives from state and local
agencies involved in emergency planning in the event of a critical
incident, provides support to the Illinois State Police and approves the
funding for STIC.

STIC also has partnerships with the private sector. For example, the
Illinois Association of Chiefs of Police and its Public-Private Liaison
Committee, along with STIC, initiated the Infrastructure Security
Awareness program in September 2004. The program was designed to share
critical and sensitive non-law-enforcement information in a timely manner
with corporate security executives as well as provide a forum for
information exchange among private security professionals. This program
enables STIC to provide threat information to major corporations and to
receive reports of suspicious activity. STIC provides information to
private security partners by using HSIN, which allows for the exchange of
data, text messages, meeting dates, and the building of specialized tools
to meet various applications through a secure Internet connection.

STIC's terrorism research specialists collect, analyze, and disseminate
terrorism-related intelligence data; complete in-depth threat assessments;
and identify predictive, incident-based indicators of potential terrorist
activities within the state. The specialists have access to various state
and federal law enforcement intelligence databases, public records
databases, and financial databases. DHS and DOJ information systems or
networks accessible to STIC include HSIN, JRIES, LEO, RISSNET, R-DEX, and
the FPS portal as well as FinCEN and HIDTA. The officials said that they
will have access to FBI and DHS classified systems when their SCIF, for
which the FBI is funding the construction, is completed.

STIC provides a variety of services to support officers in the field,
including a 20-minute workup on requests from officers conducting traffic
stops and responding to major crime scenes, lead management and
development, on-scene analytical services, and statewide deconfliction to
all law enforcement agencies by using the HIDTA nationwide network. STIC
recently adopted the Internet Crimes Analysis Unit, which takes calls from
the public regarding fraud, sexual predators, terrorism, and other issues
and also administers the AMBER Alert program.

Chicago Crime Prevention and Information Center

The Chicago Crime Prevention and Information Center (CPIC), led by the
Chicago Police Department, opened in April 2007 with the mission "to
enhance partnerships which foster a connection between every facet of the
law enforcement community. CPIC will afford the men and women, who are
dedicated to protecting the public and addressing violence, with all
available intelligence resources, and communications capabilities." CPIC's
goal is to be the clearinghouse of information that is fused and delivered
to stakeholders. CPIC has an all-crimes and counterterrorism focus. The
Chicago Police Department is involved in the fusion process as it relates
to violent crime, and the department has an in-house counterterrorism
section.

In addition to Chicago Police Department officers, the FBI has assigned
three analysts to the CPIC. The center also has personnel from ICE, ATF,
HIDTA (5 days a week), Chicago's Metrarail, the Cook County Sheriff's
Department, the Illinois State Police, and 35 suburban police departments.
CPIC is in the process of establishing a transportation "desk" staffed
with Transportation Security Administration (TSA), Amtrak, Federal Air
Marshal Service (FAMS), and local agency personnel. DHS I&A has conducted
a needs assessment. However, at the time of our review, it had not placed
an intelligence analyst in the center.

CPIC is tactically oriented and designed to provide direct, near-real-time
support to law enforcement personnel on the street. It provides, among
other things, real-time violent crime detection monitoring and response,
continual assessment of available resources for the purpose of possible
redeployment of manpower, instantaneous major incident notification,
analysis and identification of retaliatory violence and automated
construction of enforcement missions to thwart retaliatory violence, crime
pattern identification, and immediate access to in-depth background data
on persons of investigative interest. DHS and DOJ systems and networks
accessible to CPIC include HSIN, HSDN, FPS Portal, LEO, FBI's ACS and IDW,
as well as NCIC, FinCEN, RISSNET, RISS ATIX, INTERPOL, International
Justice and Public Safety Information Sharing Network (NLETS), EPIC,
National Drug Intelligence Center (NDIC), Treasury Enforcement
Communications System, and numerous other state and local systems and data
sources. CPIC also recently added a satellite tracking system that traces
stolen bank funds and the offender.

CPIC focuses on producing products to assist police officers on the
street. A primary product is the District Intelligence Bulletin System,
which is a Web-based application that uses multiple data sources to
provide officers with a law enforcement road map. It provides officers
with calls for service, wanted persons, most recent shootings/homicides,
and additional intelligence in a succinct format. All of this information
is automatically updated on a continuous basis throughout the day and is
accessible by deployed patrol officers. It allows an officer to review
information by district and deployment area. CPIC also publishes a daily
intelligence briefing, which is designed to give officers a more detailed
overview of potential threats based on international, national, and local
events, and a weekly version for the private sector.

Indiana

The Indiana Intelligence Fusion Center (IIFC), which opened in December
2006, was established with the mission to collect, evaluate, analyze, and
disseminate information and intelligence data regarding criminal and
terrorist activity in the State of Indiana while following Fair
Information Practices to ensure the rights and privacy of citizens. In
addition to collecting information on all crimes, IIFC will specifically
collect information as it relates to terrorism and its impact on Indiana.
IIFC has an all-crimes approach, acting as an intelligence group for the
state. However, there is a terrorism nexus to the fusion center's work.

IIFC is operated by the Indiana Department of Homeland Security and has
been staffed as a task force entity with federal and state partners.
Indiana state agency, department, and association partners in IIFC are:
Homeland Security, National Guard, State Excise Police, Natural Resources,
Association of Chiefs of Police, Gaming Commission Division of Gaming
Agents, Indiana State Police, Corrections, Sheriff's Association, Marion
County Sheriff's Department, and the Indiana Campus Law Enforcement
Association. Federal partners in IIFC include the FBI, and the U.S.
Attorneys for the Northern and Southern Districts of Indiana. The FBI has
assigned two FIG analysts to IIFC. DHS I&A has conducted a needs
assessment of IIFC. However, at the time of our review, it had not yet
placed an intelligence analyst in the center. A 12-member executive
committee oversees IIFC's activities.

The center is a 24/7 intelligence operations center that works in
conjunction with statewide law enforcement liaisons, providing for
intelligence-led policing throughout the state. IIFC operates a 1-800 tip
line and an IIFC e-mail box and produces a bulletin three times a week.
DHS and DOJ systems and networks that IIFC has access to include
HSIN-Intel, HSDN, RISS, FPS portal, LEO, as well as SIPRNet, RISS, NCIC,
and EPIC. The FBI has built a Top Secret secure room within IIFC, and also
provided access to the ACS and Guardian systems in the secure space.

Iowa

The Iowa Intelligence Fusion Center was established in December 2004 with
the mission to enable the State of Iowa to proactively direct core
resources with its partners to avert or meet current, emerging, and future
public safety and homeland security threats. Following the attacks of
September 11, Iowa established a Homeland Security Advisory Council to
enhance the state's capability to implement the Iowa Homeland Security
Initiative. In the spring of 2002, the council's Information and
Intelligence Sharing Task force was formed to make recommendations for
sharing intelligence and information, and among other things, it
recommended the establishment of a fusion center.

Built on the backbone of the Iowa Law Enforcement Intelligence Network,
the Intelligence Fusion System consists of the fusion center, six regional
fusion offices, and a number of partner agencies and organizations. The
fusion center is led by the Iowa Department of Public Safety and serves as
a centralized information collection, analysis, and dissemination point.
It is staffed with 18 full-time analysts (16 of whom are state funded), 11
investigator/collectors, and 5 support staff. Nearly all are Iowa
Department of Public Safety personnel. However, there is an Iowa National
Guard analyst assigned to the center, and the Midwest HIDTA provides
funding for one intelligence analyst in the center. Although no federal
agencies have assigned personnel to the fusion center yet, the center
conducts regular meetings with the FBI's FIG and JTTF, the U.S. Attorney's
Office, and the DHS Protective Security Advisor. The fusion center has
placed one Department of Public Safety agent full-time at the JTTF and
conducts regular and as-needed coordination and information-sharing
meetings with the state Homeland Security Advisor, the Iowa Homeland
Security and Emergency Management Division, the Iowa Department of
Agriculture and Land Stewardship, and the Iowa Department of Public
Health, among others. The six regional fusion offices are strategically
located across the state. A fusion center agent is assigned to each
regional office and is partnered with two to four local officials at each
site. Fusion system personnel also regularly participate in meetings of
the local InfraGard chapter. In addition, the Department of Public Safety
is part of the Safeguard Iowa Partnership, which is a voluntary coalition
of business and government leaders who combine their efforts to prevent,
protect from, respond to, and recover from catastrophic events. The
Safeguard Iowa Partnership was formally launched in January 2007.

DHS and DOJ information systems or networks accessible to the fusion
center include LEO and HSIN (law enforcement and counterterrorism
portals), as well as RISSNET. HSIN-Secret has been deployed to the State
Emergency Operations Center, but DHS has not deployed the system to the
fusion center. Fusion center personnel who are JTTF members are granted
Top Secret clearances and can access FBI systems at the JTTF office.

Kansas

The Adjutant General of Kansas, Kansas Bureau of Investigation, and Kansas
Highway Patrol formed the Kansas Threat Integration Center (KSTIC) in June
2004 with the mission to assist Kansas law enforcement and other related
agencies in their mission to protect the citizens and critical
infrastructures within Kansas through enhanced gathering, analysis, and
dissemination of criminal and terrorist intelligence information. KSTIC
focuses on the development, gathering, analyzing, and dissemination of
criminal and terrorist threat information in order to protect citizens,
property, and infrastructure in Kansas. Additionally, KSTIC works to
increase threat awareness among law enforcement, other governmental
agencies, and private infrastructure providers in the state. KSTIC's scope
of operations is primarily focused on terrorist/extremist activities with
a secondary all-crimes scope of operations that comes into play when
criminal acts serve as a prelude to terrorist or extremist activities. It
is not an all-hazards facility, but KSTIC is colocated with the Kansas
Division of Emergency Management and therefore has access to its
resources.

KSTIC is a joint operation of the Kansas Bureau of Investigation, National
Guard, and Highway Patrol. An Executive Board, consisting of one member
from each agency, provides oversight and the KBI representative is
responsible for the day-to-day operations of KSTIC. There are three
full-time staff--a Kansas Bureau of Investigation senior special agent, an
investigator from the Highway Patrol, and a National Guard
Captain--however, KSTIC can use Kansas Bureau of Investigation analysts
for assistance as needed. Personnel hold TS/SCI clearances. KSTIC is in
the process of hiring two to four analysts depending on funding
availability. While KSTIC has no federal partners, it interfaces with
state FBI JTTFs on a regular basis and is discussing the possibility of
colocating with the JTTF.

KSTIC accesses sensitive but unclassified bulletins and reports and open
source information to report on terrorist/extremist threats to Kansas in
particular and the Midwest in general. Additionally, KSTIC receives tip
and other information directly from citizens and state law enforcement.
KSTIC uses access to classified systems to identify and monitor potential
threats to Kansas. DHS and DOJ information systems or networks accessible
to KSTIC include HSIN, HSIN-Secret, LEO, FPS portal, as well as SIPRNet
and FinCEN. KSTIC personnel also have full access to the FBI's various
databases (i.e., Guardian and IDW) at an FBI field office or JTTF
location. Through the National Guard, the KSTIC is planning to construct a
SCIF, which when completed will provide space for approximately 15
personnel as well as secure connectivity to a variety of Top Secret and
other systems.

KSTIC produces intelligence/information bulletins for state and regional
law enforcement. All information disseminated is sensitive but
unclassified, with the exception of the periodic open source bulletins
published for dissemination to a public/infrastructure distribution list.
Bulletins are posted on several secure sites, such as LEO and FPS Web
sites, as well as distributed via statewide teletype and e-mail. The
distribution list includes state, local, and federal agencies in Kansas as
well as other agencies around the country.

Kentucky

The Kentucky Intelligence Fusion Center (KIFC) opened in December 2005 as
an all-crimes fusion center. The fusion center focuses on all crimes,
rather than those with a nexus to terrorism, primarily to obtain buy-in
from local agencies. KIFC was established with support from the Kentucky
Office of Homeland Security; the Kentucky State Police, which transferred
its intelligence center to KIFC; and the Kentucky Transportation Cabinet,
which provides KIFC its facility. Other agencies in the fusion center
include ATF, the Kentucky Department of Corrections, Kentucky Department
of Military Affairs, Kentucky Vehicle Enforcement, and the Lexington Metro
Police. The FBI has assigned one full-time FIG analyst to the center. KIFC
does not have any DHS personnel assigned to the center.

The fusion center provides all-crimes and terrorism intelligence
analytical services; supports the JTTF with counterterrorism
investigators; assists all federal, state, and local law enforcement with
requests for information on suspects; assists law enforcement in the
location of subjects, suspect vehicle registration, and suspect driver's
license photo and data; provides link analysis charts such as association
links, communication links, and event flow; serves as the conduit for law
enforcement's request for information from other state fusion centers;
provides access to HSIN-KY, the state Web site for law enforcement
information sharing; and serves as a repository for the state's identified
critical infrastructures. Some KIFC components are operational 24/7, such
as the law enforcement communication and the transportation component.

KIFC receives statewide all-crimes tips through a toll-free hotline and
through Web site submission and has law enforcement radio and data
communications capability through Kentucky State Police Communications,
which is located in the fusion center. DHS and DOJ information systems or
networks accessible to the fusion center include HSIN and LEO, as well as
RISS/Regional Organized Crime Information Center. The official said that
KIFC does not have the capacity to receive classified information because
the facility has no secure room or SCIF.

Louisiana

Established in October 2004, the Louisiana State Analysis & Fusion
Exchange (La-SAFE), which is led by the Louisiana State Police, evolved
from existing state police analytical units. The state police
Investigative Support Section has been in place since the late 1960s and
early 1970s, with an intelligence collection and analysis unit that was
developed primarily to handle organized crime. As the investigative and
intelligence needs of the police shifted over time, so too did the mission
of the intelligence component, expanding from organized crime to gangs,
drug trafficking, and, post-September 11, homeland security. The police
intelligence unit was engaged in all-crimes collection of intelligence to
support all criminal investigations. La-SAFE has adopted an
all-crimes/all-hazards scope of operations.

The mission of La-SAFE is to (1) promote a collaborative environment for
governmental and corporate partners to work together in providing timely
information for use in providing public safety and promoting national
security against terrorist and other criminal threats; (2) actively work
to collect and analyze information from various sources to provide those
responsible for protecting state resources with information that is
pertinent in decision-making processes, allows for the maximizing of
resources, and improves the ability to efficiently protect the citizens of
Louisiana in matters of infrastructure protection and against organized
criminal activity; and (3) evaluate all information provided and ensure
that the information La-SAFE retains and utilizes is directly related to
legitimate law enforcement purposes and has been legally obtained. La-SAFE
will not interfere with the exercise of constitutionally guaranteed rights
and privileges of individuals.

La-SAFE is staffed by 3 commissioned personnel and 20 analysts with
experience in case support, information production, and information
sharing in the areas of organized crime and terrorism. Louisiana State
Police, the Louisiana Governor's Office of Homeland Security and Emergency
Preparedness, Louisiana National Guard, East Baton Rouge Parish Sheriff's
Office, DHS I&A, and FBI have assigned full-time analysts to La-SAFE. The
center recently established a relationship with the U.S. Coast Guard.

La-SAFE produces a variety of information and intelligence products,
including general information bulletins (e.g., notices on general crimes
or intelligence); daily incident briefs (i.e., daily reports of incidents
reported to the center from a variety of sources); a weekly homeland
defense bulletin covering homeland security issues around the world; and a
summary of monthly regional crime information called the Intelligator.

DHS and DOJ systems and networks accessible to La-SAFE include HSIN, LEO,
and the U.S. Coast Guard's Homeport. Louisiana has a state HSIN portal,
HSIN-LA, that provides a secure capability to share information and
collaborate with public and private sector partners. It allows users to
report suspicious activities to the fusion center for review and action.
There are currently over 800 participants representing law enforcement,
first responders, and critical infrastructure with access to HSIN-LA.
Information currently being shared within HSIN-LA includes safety
bulletins, intelligence reports, training opportunities,
information-sharing meetings, and requests for information.

Maine

The Maine Intelligence and Analysis Center is a collaborative effort
between the Maine State Police and the Maine Emergency Management Agency
to share resources, expertise, and information to maximize homeland
security efforts and to detect and assist in the deterrence of terrorist
activity. Maine has had a traditional state police criminal intelligence
unit for 30 years, but the state's background in counterintelligence was
limited to traditional criminal enterprises. The Governor decided after
September 11 that the state needed a counterintelligence unit that was
homeland-security driven to deliver information to the Governor. The
center was formally established by an executive order that was effective
December 2006. The Maine Intelligence and Analysis Center is in the early
stages of development and at the time of our review was not yet fully
functional. For example, the center has physical space and personnel, has
developed standard operating procedures, and is in the process of
conducting outreach with state and local entities.

The center's mission is to support the Maine State Police and the Maine
Emergency Management Agency in their respective roles of public safety
protector and homeland security incident manager for the citizens of the
State of Maine. The center is to be a clearinghouse of and central
repository for intelligence and information related to Maine's homeland
security and any terrorist-related activity that may threaten the lives
and safety of the citizens of the United States and the State of Maine.
Its scope of operations is counterterrorism. However, the center plans to
expand its focus in the future to include an all-crimes approach.

The Maine Intelligence and Analysis Center has one intelligence analyst
and one homeland security specialist, along with a backbone of four
analysts from the Maine State Patrol Criminal Intelligence Unit. An
official indicated that the center will absorb the Criminal Intelligence
Unit in the near future forming a single unit. While there are no federal
personnel assigned to the center, it has partnered with FBI's JTTF, the
U.S. Attorney's Office Anti-Terror Section, U.S. Customs and Border
Protection (CBP), TSA, U.S. Coast Guard, ICE, Maine National Guard, other
state and local law enforcement agencies with intelligence sections, and
the Maine Anti-Terror Intelligence Network, which is organized by the U.S.
Attorney's Office to facilitate interaction between partner agencies'
analysts. The center is overseen by an Advisory Board consisting of three
members who meet at least twice annually.

The center conducts research and analysis to provide actionable
intelligence for field units and policy makers, and provides quick (i.e.,
within 15 minutes) response to queries from the field to allow officers to
take action within constitutionally reasonable time frames. DHS and DOJ
information systems or networks accessible to the fusion center include
LEO and HSIN, as well as RISS ATIX, RISS, FinCEN, INTERPOL, EPIC, and
NLETS. The center also has access to a variety of state and commercial
information systems and databases. Products include notices, bulletins,
briefing information, reports, and assessments that cover day-to-day
events, warnings, and officer safety issues. First responders, law
enforcement, emergency managers, civilians, and the private sector (e.g.,
utilities, chemicals, food supply, and technology) are among the center's
customers.

Maryland

The Maryland Coordination and Analysis Center (MCAC) is operated by the
Anti-Terrorism Advisory Council Executive Committee and is governed by a
charter that was developed with input from the FBI and approved by the
Executive Committee. MCAC began operations in November 2003 in response to
the events of September 11 and the need for ways for the FBI and local
agencies to disseminate terrorist-related information. MCAC has an
all-crimes and counterterrorism scope of operations and consists of
representatives of 24 agencies who staff the center, including the FBI,
DHS, U.S. Army, U.S. Coast Guard, and Maryland state and local
organizations. DHS I&A has assigned one analyst, and the FBI has seven
analysts, one special agent, and one supervisory special agent assigned to
MCAC.

MCAC, which operates 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, is organized into two
sections, the Watch Section and the Strategic Analysis Section. The Watch
Section provides support to federal, state, and local agencies by
receiving and processing information, monitoring intelligence resources,
coordinating with Maryland law enforcement, and disseminating intelligence
information. The Watch Section primarily consists of representatives from
Maryland police and sheriffs, along with representation from the U.S. Army
and the Maryland National Guard. As information enters MCAC, it is passed
through the Watch Section, which either passes that information on to
federal or state entities or the Strategic Analysis Section or enters it
into federal and state databases, such as the FBI's Guardian. The
Strategic Analysis Section receives, processes, analyzes, and disseminates
information. MCAC has 12 analysts, and the section is staffed by
representatives from various organizations, including the Maryland State
Police, FBI, U.S. Coast Guard, and the Maryland National Guard.

Information enters MCAC through a variety of ways, including tips from the
general public or law enforcement, as well as from the National Guard or
emergency response personnel. Information is received via a tip line or
e-mail. DHS and DOJ systems and networks accessible to MCAC include HSIN,
HSDN, LEO, FBINet, SCION, as well as RISS/Middle Atlantic-Great Lakes
Organized Crime Law Enforcement Network, SIPRNET, NCIC, INTERPOL, EPIC,
and NLETS, among others. MCAC provides a daily report to every police
chief in the state as well as other state fusion centers and any other
organization that is on its distribution list. Entities such as the
Maryland JTTF, Terrorism Screening Center, and National Counterterrorism
Center receive information from MCAC. Terrorism-related law enforcement
information is also shared and entered into the FBI's Guardian database.
Products include a daily watch report, which is a brief summary of tips
and requests for information received by the Watch Section over the
previous 24-hour period, and intelligence bulletins, which are
intelligence/law enforcement-related information disseminated to law
enforcement and homeland security personnel by fax, teletype, or e-mail,
and may also be posted to LEO or RISS. Other products include threat
assessments, covering, for example, threats to military-recruiting
stations, propane cylinders, agroterrorism, or gang activity.

Massachusetts

The Commonwealth Fusion Center (CFC) was established in October 2004 on
the foundations of the State Homeland Security Strategy and an executive
order designating it the state's principal center for information
collection and dissemination. Its mission is to collect and analyze
information from all available sources to produce and disseminate
actionable intelligence to stakeholders for strategic and tactical
decision making in order to identify, disrupt, or deter domestic and
international terrorism as well as criminal activity. CFC takes an
all-threats, all-crimes approach and has both criminal and
counterterrorism analytical support roles. The center focuses on precursor
crimes--such as organized crimes, which can be indicators of terrorism.
CFC also supports the state's Emergency Management Agency, which is
responsible for handling all hazards.

CFC works with various federal and state and agencies including FBI, ICE,
U.S. Coast Guard, HIDTA, Secret Service, TSA, ATF, the United States
Marshals Service, U.S. Attorney's Office, the Massachusetts Emergency
Management Agency, Massachusetts Department of Fire Services, Department
of Public Health, Department of Corrections, and the National Guard. There
are 15 analysts assigned to CFC, the majority of who are Massachusetts
State Police employees. However, officials said that four of these
analysts are assigned to other duties, such as the Crime Reporting Unit or
security officer, or are otherwise engaged. The Department of Corrections
and the Army National Guard have also each assigned an analyst to CFC. All
analysts and most sworn members of CFC have Secret clearances, and a few
sworn members have Top Secret clearances. The FBI has assigned both an
intelligence analyst and special agent to CFC. DHS has assigned an
intelligence officer to the center.

CFC also possesses an investigative component through the Massachusetts
State Police Criminal Intelligence Section that provides 5 state troopers
and the Massachusetts JTTF, which has 11 state troopers in Boston and
Springfield, for a total of 16 investigators assigned to CFC. CFC also has
a railroad representative and is involved in public/private outreach
through Project Sentinel, which is a program targeting businesses likely
to identify precursor terrorist activity. CFC also has personnel assigned
to the Boston Regional Intelligence Center, which is the regional
intelligence center for the Boston/Cambridge Urban Areas Security
Initiative (UASI) region and is led by the Boston Police Department.

CFC analysts produce information and intelligence briefings and
assessments and provide support to the statewide assessment of critical
infrastructure. Past products include an overview of gang activity in the
state, an assessment on prison radicalization in the state, a report on
trafficking and possible links to terrorism, a report on the stock market
and possible indicators of terrorism, and an overview of white supremacist
activity in the state. CFC also uses Geographic Information Systems to
develop products and provide data to law enforcement and critical
infrastructure stakeholders. DHS and DOJ unclassified systems and networks
accessible to CFC include HSIN and LEO, and CFC also has access to FBI and
DHS classified systems on site. Briefings and assessments are posted on
CFC secure Web site, HSIN-MA, which also provides a document library and
information-sharing capability to Massachusetts' law enforcement, public
safety, and critical infrastructure sectors. CFC has developed e-mail
lists and extensive contact lists for state, local, and federal law
enforcement partners, military stakeholders, fire services,
transportation, and other critical infrastructure sectors.

Michigan

There are two fusion centers in Michigan, the statewide Michigan
Intelligence and Operations Center (MIOC) and the Detroit and Southeastern
Michigan Regional (Detroit UASI) Fusion Center.

Michigan Intelligence and Operations Center

Led by the Michigan State Police, MIOC opened in December 2006 and went to
a 24/7 operation in January 2007. The center was built on the preexisting
foundation of the Michigan State Police Intelligence and Operations
sections. MIOC's mission is to collect, evaluate, collate, and analyze
criminal justice-related information and intelligence and, as appropriate,
disseminate this information and intelligence to the proper public safety
agencies so that any threat of terrorism will be successfully identified
and addressed. Additionally, MIOC will provide criminal justice
information to appropriate law enforcement agencies to aid in the
successful prosecution of individuals involved in criminal behavior. MIOC
has an all-crimes, all-threats scope of operations with a focus on the
prevention of terrorism.

MIOC is divided into two components: (1) the operational, 24/7 portion
where all tips, requests for information, and initial information flow
into MIOC, and (2) the intelligence portion, where information is
processed, analyzed, disseminated, and reviewed. MIOC's 45-person staff
includes operational, intelligence, and administrative personnel, most of
whom are Michigan State Police personnel. There are 26 intelligence
personnel (detectives and analysts) and 13 operational personnel (officers
and dispatchers). Included in the intelligence personnel are five analysts
assigned by the National Guard, one responsible for narcotics and four
responsible for HSIN-Intel and critical infrastructure protection at a
statewide level. The state Department of Corrections has assigned a person
2 days per week, and the Michigan State University Police Department has
assigned a full-time inspector.

The FBI has assigned one analyst and one special agent to MIOC. Three
Michigan State Police detectives are also assigned to the JTTF. DHS I&A
has conducted a needs assessment of MIOC and posted the position for an
analyst. However, at the time of our review an analyst an analyst had not
yet been assigned to the center. Additionally, MIOC is expecting the
assignment of a U.S. Coast Guard intelligence lieutenant and a DEA
analyst. MIOC has established an internship program with the Michigan
State University Criminal Justice Program. MIOC's 14-member advisory
board, which includes representatives from state and federal entities,
civil rights groups, the Detroit UASI Fusion Center, and state law
enforcement associations, provides advice and counsel to MIOC.

MIOC collects and disseminates information regarding criminal
investigations of all natures and serves as a direct case support for
various investigations. Its personnel are divided into the four priority
areas of international terrorism, domestic terrorism, organized crime, and
smuggling. DHS and DOJ information systems or networks accessible to MIOC
include HSIN, LEO, and HSDN, as well as RISS/MAGLOCLEN. MIOC is planning
to have access to SIPRNET, ACS, and Guardian, for members of those
agencies residing at MIOC. MIOC disseminates information via briefings and
bulletins (weekly and special) to law enforcement, responds to requests
for information, prepares intelligence analysis reports, provides case
support, operates a Tip Line, provides support services (such as K-9,
underwater recovery, hazmat, forensic artists, and emergency support
team), and posts its products on sites such as LEO, HSIN-Law Enforcement,
and MAGLOCLEN. Non-law-enforcement homeland security and critical
infrastructure protection partners receive information through postings on
HSIN-Michigan.

Detroit and Southeastern Michigan Regional Fusion Center

The Detroit and Southeastern Michigan Regional (Detroit UASI) Fusion
Center is in the early stages of development. Led by the Detroit Homeland
Security and Emergency Management, there are seven regional partners in
the urban area that are planning the center, including Wayne County, the
City of Detroit, and five other surrounding counties. The vision for the
fusion center is to identify, monitor, and provide analysis on all
terrorism, all crimes, and all hazards in the Southeast Michigan Region in
support of law enforcement, public safety, and the private sector's
prevention, preparedness, and response activities. The center will focus
on prevention and protection by serving as a conduit to local police
officers and emergency managers in the field and will follow up on tips,
conduct a watch function, and provide "foresight on emerging situations."

The fusion center is in the first phase of planning, which is expected to
culminate in the center being fully operational in January 2008. At the
time of our review, planning officials were in the process of establishing
partnerships, selecting and training analysts, and planning to move into
the center's new facility, which will be colocated with the Michigan
HIDTA. Federal partners identified include ICE, CBP, TSA, Secret Service,
U.S. Coast Guard, FBI, Federal Bureau of Prisons, U.S. Attorney's Office,
and HIDTA. The center did not have access to DHS and DOJ systems, but
would obtain access to FBI systems once it was colocated with the HIDTA.
Additionally, the fusion center plans to work with MIOC to leverage
technology purchases and utilize similar policies and standard operating
procedures.

Minnesota

The Minnesota Joint Analysis Center (MN-JAC) opened in May 2005 as a
partnership of the Department of Public Safety, the FBI, and several local
police departments. Its mission is the collection, management, and
distribution of strategic and tactical information and the development and
implementation of useful and meaningful information products and training,
focusing on all crimes and all hazards within and affecting Minnesota.
MN-JAC has an all-crimes and all-hazards scope of operations. However, the
center is not a law enforcement or investigative agency because of
restrictions imposed by state law.9 As the center works to determine its
position relative to the existing laws, it serves primarily to coordinate
among FBI and DHS and state and local agencies. One of the ways MN-JAC
accomplishes its information-sharing function is through the development
and maintenance of its information-sharing Web portal, the Intelligence
Communications Enterprise for Information Sharing and Exchange
(ICEFISHX).10

MN-JAC has 10 employees, 2 of whom are provided by the state, and the
remainder from local law enforcement agencies and the National Guard.
MN-JAC does not have an FBI analyst staffed to its center. However, MN-JAC
and the FBI's field office are colocated in the same building, and MN-JAC
personnel have access to the FBI's systems and networks. DHS I&A has
conducted a needs assessment of MN-JAC. However, at the time of our
review, it had not yet placed an intelligence analyst in the center.

DHS and DOJ systems and networks accessible to MN-JAC include HSIN,
HSIN-Law Enforcement, FPS portal, LEO, ACS, the FBI Intelligence
Information Reports Dissemination System,11 as well as SIPRNet. The center
also has access to HSIN-Secret. However, the system is accessible only at
the state's Emergency Operations Center. MN-JAC produces two weekly
briefs, one for all subscribers that covers critical infrastructure and
one for law enforcement agencies that is law enforcement sensitive, as
well as situation analyses of incidents and threats and special threat
assessments.

9In Minnesota, all government data collected, created, received,
maintained, or disseminated by a government entity shall be public unless
classified by statute or temporary classification pursuant to state or
federal law.

10ICEFISHX is a partnership among Minnesota, North Dakota, and South
Dakota law enforcement agencies. It is an internet-based
intelligence-sharing initiative and alert network designed to collect and
disseminate information relating to terrorist operations and other
criminal activities to law enforcement, government agencies, and the
private sector within the tristate area. ICEFISHX collects suspicious
activities reports. There are close to 1,700 subscribers from law
enforcement and non-law enforcement organizations on ICEFISHX. Private
sector security officers are also subscribers to the network. There is
also a Resource Library on the Web site, with documents posted for
subscriber use. The FBI supports ICEFISHX.

11The FBI Intelligence Information Reports Dissemination System is a
Web-based software application that allows access to the FBI's intranet to
create and disseminate standardized intelligence information reports.

Mississippi

The Mississippi Office of Homeland Security and Mississippi Department of
Public Safety are in the early stages of developing a state fusion center.
The Mississippi Analysis & Information Center (MSAIC) is expected to open
its door at the end of September 2007 and become operational at that time.
Currently, planning officials are developing memorandums of understanding
for agency representation at and support of the center, certifying the
center's secure space, and placing equipment and furniture.

The fusion center will have a broad scope of operations--focusing on all
crimes, all hazards, and all threats--in order to support the needs of the
state and to help with the sustainability of the center. For instance, the
official said that with an all-crimes scope of operations, the fusion
center could give something back to local law enforcement entities, many
of which have limited resources and access to information. In terms of all
hazards, the fusion center is to support the state strategy to aid in
prevention and deterrence and will be colocated with the state emergency
management agency.

Missouri

The Missouri Information Analysis Center was established in December 2005
with the mission to provide a public safety partnership, consisting of
local, state, and federal agencies, as well as the public sector and
private entities, that will collect, evaluate, analyze, and disseminate
information and intelligence to the agencies tasked with homeland security
responsibilities in a timely, effective, and secure manner. The main goal
of the center is to serve as the fastest means for sharing information
during hazards, along with the ability to acquire and disseminate
information throughout the state. The center was initially established
with analysts who were transferred from the Missouri Highway Patrol
Criminal Intelligence and Analysis Unit. The center, which is led by the
Missouri Highway Patrol, has an all-crimes and all-hazards focus, which
was established in part as a result of the center's partnerships. The
center is a member of the RISS project and is partners with the Missouri
Department of Public Safety, the Missouri Emergency Management
Administration, and the Missouri National Guard, the latter two with which
it is colocated.

In addition to its director, the Missouri Information Analysis Center has
21 other personnel, including an assistant director and an intelligence
network manager, 8 full-time criminal intelligence analysts, and 10
part-time intelligence intake analysts. The Missouri Gaming Commission has
also dedicated a full-time intelligence analyst to the center.
Investigators are assigned to cases out of the Highway Patrol's Division
of Drug and Crime Control as needed. The center also provides local law
enforcement the opportunity to assign analysts and officers to it for
internships. The center works closely with the JTTFs and FIGs in the state
and, according to officials, is close to completing its secure room for
two FBI special agents currently working in the center. The center also
works with the Business Executives for National Security, which has
representation from the majority of the private corporations within the
state as well as individuals interested in assisting homeland security,
and has a 13-member oversight board that is composed of state, local, and
federal representatives.

The Missouri Information Analysis Center collects and disseminates
information involving all crimes, all threats, and all hazards. The
information can be tips, leads, law enforcement reports, and open source
reports as well as information provided from the federal level. DHS and
DOJ information systems or networks accessible to the fusion center
include HSIN, HSIN-Secret, JRIES, RISSNet, RDEx, and LEO, as well as the
Midwest HIDTA Safety Net. Analysts conduct numerous services, including,
but not limited to, responding to intelligence and criminal activity
inquiries from local, state, and federal law enforcement agencies and
prosecuting attorneys; performing various analyses to evaluate patterns of
criminal activity; compiling and disseminating intelligence booklets
containing data on subjects in question for criminal activity to case
investigation officers and prosecutors; developing reports, threat
assessments, bulletins, summaries, and other publications on relevant
criminal activity trends; serving as liaison for the statewide
intelligence database; providing strategic analytical services,
development, and training at the state level to support the Midwest HIDTA;
maintaining close liaison with the Midwest HIDTA; and developing various
standardized statistical reports involving criminal and terrorist threat
assessments.

Montana

The Montana All-Threat Intelligence Center (MATIC) developed from the
intelligence unit of the Montana Department of Justice, Division of
Criminal Investigation. After the attacks of September 11, the unit
relocated to a Department of Military Affairs facility and colocated with
the JTTF. The unit opened its fusion center incarnation, MATIC, in the
spring of 2003 with the mission to collect, store, analyze, and
disseminate information on crimes, both real and suspected, to the law
enforcement community and government officials concerning dangerous drugs,
fraud, organized crime, terrorism and other criminal activity for the
purposes of decision making, public safety, and proactive law enforcement.
The center has an all-crimes scope of operations.

MATIC, administered by the Division of Criminal Investigation, is a joint
venture of the division and the Department of Corrections, Department of
Military Affairs, and the Rocky Mountain Information Network. There are
eight full-time employees, five of whom are Division of Criminal
Investigation employees. The Department of Corrections, Department of
Military Affairs, and the Rocky Mountain Information Network each provide
one full-time employee. The FBI has assigned one analyst to MATIC, and all
MATIC analysts are also considered assigned to the JTTF.

DHS and DOJ systems and networks accessible to MATIC analysts include
HSIN, LEO, NCIC, and FBI classified systems located in the JTTF, as well
as the RISS/Rocky Mountain Information Network, FinCEN, and INTERPOL.
MATIC analysts provide case support to all Montana law enforcement and
assist investigators in identifying evidence, suspects, and trends in
their investigation. Each analyst assigned to MATIC has one or more
portfolios for which he or she is responsible; the portfolios include
drugs, outlaw motorcycle gangs, corrections, general crime, left wing,
right wing, northern border, critical infrastructure, and international
terrorism. Analysts review new organizations active within the state,
ongoing or potential criminal activity, trends or activity around the
country that could affect Montana, and trends or activity in Montana that
could affect other parts of the United States or Canada. MATIC produces a
daily brief for Montana that covers three topic areas--international
terrorism/border issues, domestic terrorism, and general crime--and is
disseminated on RISS and on the MATIC Web portal. MATIC also responds to
specific requests for information, manages the critical infrastructure
program, conducts training sessions for law enforcement, and maintains a
Web portal to assist in the secure sharing of information among law
enforcement. About 180 local, state, tribal, and federal agencies access
MATIC information on its Web portal.

Nebraska

The Nebraska State Patrol is in the planning stage of establishing the
Nebraska Fusion Center. The Nebraska State Patrol is setting up the
command structure for the center, has reorganized and placed staff into
positions, and, according to an official, is awaiting DHS funding to hire
a consultant to help develop a blueprint for the center. The official also
noted that funding will allow purchase of software necessary to fuse their
intelligence databases together. The center's timeline has the center
scheduled to open in the fall of 2007. The fusion center is to be
all-crimes, all-hazards, including terrorism. Nebraska State Patrol
officials said that the center will collect as much intelligence
information as it can, whether related to crime, drugs, threats,
terrorism, or other hazards, and then combine it and share it with the
necessary agencies. The fusion center will be the lead
intelligence-sharing component in the state and provide a seamless flow of
information to assess potential risks to the state.

The fusion center is planning to initially invite FBI, DEA, and ICE at the
federal level; the Nebraska Emergency Management Agency, Department of
Health and Human Services, and Department of Roads at the state level; and
the Omaha Police Department, the TEW in the Omaha area, and the Lincoln
Police Department at the local level. The center also plans to partner
with key elements of the private sector since the center plans to develop
infrastructure protection plans. The officials expect that many
information systems will be in place, including LEO and RISS/Mid-States
Organized Crime Information Center, and the center is planning to
disseminate an intelligence update either daily or weekly.

Nevada

The Nevada Department of Public Safety is in the planning stages of
establishing the Nevada Analytical and Information Center. The center is
planning to have an all-crimes and all-threats focus, which would include
major crimes (such as burglary rings, fraud, rape, or homicides) and
terrorism. The state fusion center will look at crimes at the state level
and will share information with federal and local law enforcement agencies
to identify crime trends and patterns. The center will also have an
all-hazards mission and plans to include fire departments and public
health entities as stakeholders.

The center will be responsible for 15 of the 17 counties in the state,
excluding Clark and Washoe Counties, which will be covered by separate
centers operated by the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department and the
Washoe County Sheriff's Office.

New Hampshire

The New Hampshire Department of Safety Division of State Police is in the
early stages of establishing the New Hampshire Fusion Center. They are in
the process of developing the fusion center as a separate entity from
several existing intelligence units within the state. For example, after
the events of September 11 the State Police created a terrorism
intelligence unit, in addition to a criminal intelligence unit that
focuses on narcotics and organized crime. The fusion center is planning to
open in 2008.

The New Hampshire Fusion Center will focus on all crimes and all hazards.
The state chose to adopt an all-crimes focus both because terrorism is
funded by and associated with many other crimes (such as drug trafficking,
credit card fraud, and identity theft). The New Hampshire State Police
intelligence unit has a full-time member assigned to it and coordinates
with the FBI JTTF. Also, the State Police sustain interoperability with
the FBI because four of its members have FBI clearances. The fusion center
will be housed within the New Hampshire Department of Safety, which
includes the State Police, the Division of Motor Vehicles, and the Bureau
of Emergency Communication (911), and the Office of Homeland Security and
Emergency Management. The fusion center has access to LEO and RISS
systems.

New Jersey

The Regional Operations Intelligence Center (ROIC) was established in
January 2005 and moved into its current facility in October 2006. ROIC is
a 24-hour a day all-crimes, all-hazards, all-threats, all-the-time watch
command and analysis center. The New Jersey State Police is the executive
agency of ROIC and administers the general personnel, policy, and
management functions. The center's mission is to collect, analyze, and
disseminate intelligence to participating law enforcement entities;
evaluate intelligence for reliability and validity; provide intelligence
support to tactical and strategic planning; evaluate intelligence in the
Statewide Intelligence Management System; and disseminate
terrorism-related activity and information to the FBI, among others. ROIC
is also the home of the State Emergency Operations Center, the State
Office of Emergency Management, and the State Police Emergency Management
Section Offices.

ROIC has personnel assigned (including 13 analysts) from the FBI, DHS,
ATF, ICE, FAMS, and the U.S. Coast Guard, in addition to personnel from
the State Police, New Jersey Office of Homeland Security and Preparedness,
and the Department of Transportation. ROIC is seeking representation from
the departments of Corrections, Parole, Health and Senior Services;
Environmental Protection; and Military and Veteran Affairs. ROIC is
overseen by a Governance Committee, chaired by the director of ROIC, that
consists of representatives from state and federal entities and law
enforcement associations who meet quarterly to discuss ROIC policies and
other related matters. ROIC is seeking to develop additional relationships
with private sector organizations--such as the American Society of
Industrial Security, the Princeton Area Security Group, the Bankers and
Brokers Group, and the All Hazards Consortium--to further the mission of
the intelligence analysis element of ROIC.

ROIC consists of three components: (1) an analysis component, responsible
for collecting, analyzing, and disseminating intelligence information
entered into the Statewide Intelligence Management System by local,
county, state, and federal law enforcement; (2) the operations component,
which will control the actions of State Police operational and support
personnel and serve as a liaison to federal agencies, other state
entities, and county or municipal agencies on operational matters; and (3)
a call center component, which will provide the center with situational
awareness intelligence about emergency situations.

DHS and DOJ systems and networks to which ROIC has access include LEO,
HSIN, HSIN-Secret, and ACS, as well as SIPRNet. ROIC is scheduled to have
HSDN installed in late September 2007. ROIC disseminates officer safety
information, bulletins, and any other information deemed to be of value to
the law enforcement or homeland security community. The State Police
provide operational support to the law enforcement community on canine
support for bomb and drug detection, bomb technicians, medevac helicopter
support, and marine services.

New Mexico

The New Mexico All Source Intelligence Center (NMASIC) will serve as New
Mexico's primary intelligence collection, analysis, and dissemination
point for all homeland security intelligence matters, which will include
intelligence support for counterterrorism operations, intelligence support
for counter-human smuggling operations, critical infrastructure threat
assessments, intelligence training, and terrorism and counterterrorism
awareness training. According to officials in the New Mexico Governor's
Office of Homeland Security and Emergency Management, NMASIC was
established to provide the Governor and State Homeland Security Advisor
with the capability to receive information and intelligence from a number
of sources and fuse that information and intelligence together to create a
common intelligence and threat picture, upon which they, and other senior
officials, can make long-term policy decisions. NMASIC was also
established to provide tactical intelligence support to local, tribal, and
state agencies in New Mexico.

NMASIC will accomplish this mission by developing and sustaining five key
projects and programs: a statewide integrated intelligence program, a
statewide information sharing environment, intelligence product
development and production management, collection requirements and
collection management, and a state law enforcement operational component.

NMASIC's analytical functions will include a collection management
analyst, an international terrorism/Islamic extremist analyst, a
single-issue extremist analyst, a militia/white supremacists analyst, a
border security analyst, and a critical infrastructure analyst. Once fully
staffed, NMASIC will provide tactical and strategic intelligence support
to agencies in New Mexico. Participating agencies and disciplines include
the Governor's Office of Homeland Security, Department of Public
Safety/New Mexico State Police, local law enforcement, local fire
departments, local emergency management, Pueblo Public Safety
Organizations, FPS, TSA, DHS I&A, Department of Energy, Department of
State, the FBI, HIDTA, the U.S. Attorney's Office, and the U.S. Bureau of
Reclamation.

New York

In addition to the state fusion center--the New York State Intelligence
Center (NYSIC)--there are other local area centers in New York, including
those operated by the New York City Police Department Intelligence
Division and Rockland County.

New York State Intelligence Center

The New York State Intelligence Center (NYSIC) was established in August
2003 as a multijurisdictional intelligence and investigative center
composed of representatives from state, federal, and local law
enforcement, criminal justice, and intelligence agencies. Its mission is
to advance the effectiveness and efficiency of New York State law
enforcement operations and services by acting as a centralized and
comprehensive criminal intelligence resource. NYSIC, which is led by the
New York State Police, operates 24 hours a day, 7 days a week. NYSIC
combines the duties of an intelligence center and fusion center to enhance
collaboration among New York state law enforcement agencies and law
enforcement agencies nationwide. Using an all-crimes approach, the NYSIC
collects, analyzes, evaluates, and disseminates information and
intelligence to identify emerging patterns and trends, investigate current
criminal activities, and prevent future criminal acts.

NYSIC opened the Counterterrorism Center (CTC) in May 2004, and this
component is responsible for intelligence and information sharing in all
areas outside New York City. The mission of NYSIC-CTC is to provide law
enforcement agencies throughout New York state with timely and useful
intelligence to assist in the prevention, detection, and deterrence of
terrorism. NYSIC-CTC provides a centralized contact point for the
reporting of suspicious activity from both civilians and law enforcement.
NYSIC-CTC vets information and directs it to the appropriate federal,
state, or local law enforcement agency for investigation.

NYSIC has 18 agencies represented in the facility, with over 80 people in
the center. Federal entities with personnel in NYSIC include the FBI
(three intelligence analysts and one special agent); DEA (one intelligence
analyst); the U.S Attorney's Office (one part-time intelligence research
specialist); DHS I &A (one senior intelligence analyst); ICE (one senior
special agent); CBP (one special agent expected); and the Social Security
Administration (one special agent). The New York State Police provides the
majority of NYSIC's personnel, with 44 investigators and 20 analysts
assigned. In addition, the New York State Department of Motor Vehicles,
Division of Parole, Department of Correctional Services, Department of
Insurance, Office of Homeland Security, and National Guard have provided
personnel and services to NYSIC. Among the local entities providing
personnel, liaison, and services to NYSIC are the New York City Police
Department, New York City Metropolitan Transit Authority Police
Department, Rensselaer County Sheriff's Office, and the Town of Colonie
Police Department. The Executive Committee on Counter Terrorism,
consisting of state police executives, the Director of the State Office of
Homeland Security, commissioners of various state agencies,
representatives from police chiefs and sheriffs, and the Office of the
Governor, serves as an Advisory Board to NYSIC.

NYSIC collects information including tips from law enforcement, the
private sectors, and the public via crime and terrorism tip hotlines.
NYSIC also receives reports from federal, state, local, and tribal law
enforcement entities. Federal information includes threat assessments, CBP
reporting, and DHS daily reporting. DHS and DOJ information systems or
networks accessible to the fusion center include HSIN (Unclassified and
Secret), HSDN, FPS portal, LEO, as well as FinCEN and Treasury Enforcement
Communications System. Some NYSIC personnel--CTC personnel with Top Secret
clearances--have full access to FBI systems (e.g., ACS, IDW, and
Guardian). Reporting from state, local, and tribal agencies includes
investigative and intelligence submissions, suspicious incidents, public
safety and public health information, and infrastructure information.
NYSIC also collects information from open sources. The types of services
performed and products disseminated include counterterrorism and criminal
intelligence analysis and reporting, situational awareness reporting,
situation reports on emerging incidents, investigative support, and
outreach and training. NYSIC conducts critical infrastructure and outreach
and awareness in conjunction with New York Office of Homeland Security.

NYPD Intelligence Division

The NYPD Intelligence Division opened its Intelligence Center in March
2002. The center has both an all-crimes and counterterrorism focus, for
example, focusing on traditional crimes (e.g., guns, gangs, and drugs) as
well as having one group of intelligence analysts who analyze information
for ties to terrorism. Analysts look at global trends and patterns for
applicability to New York City. Personnel have access to among others, all
FBI systems, LEO, and HSIN.

Rockland County Intelligence Center

The Rockland County Intelligence Center has been in existence since 1995.
However, according to its director, the center changed focus after
September 2001. The mission of the center is to provide intelligence to
law enforcement agencies based upon the collection, evaluation, and
analysis of information that can identify criminal activity. The center
takes an all-crimes approach and is involved in any crime that occurs
within the county.

The center is composed of sworn officers from Rockland County law
enforcement agencies who are assigned specialized desks, such as street
gangs, burglary/robbery, terrorism, and traditional organized crime. In
addition, the FBI assigned a special agent on a full-time basis to the
center. DHS and DOJ networks and systems to which the center has access
include HSIN and LEO, as well as HIDTA and RISS/Mid-Atlantic Great Lakes
Organized Crime Law Enforcement Network.

North Carolina

The North Carolina Information Sharing and Analysis Center (ISAAC) opened
in May 2006 and is overseen by the North Carolina State Bureau of
Investigation's (SBI) Intelligence and Technical Services Section within
the state Department of Justice. The mission of ISAAC is to serve as the
focal point for the collection, analysis, and dissemination of terrorism
and criminal information relating to threats and attacks within North
Carolina. ISAAC will enhance and facilitate the collection of information
from local, state, and federal resources and analyze that information so
that it will benefit homeland security and criminal interdiction programs
at all levels. Specifically, ISAAC develops and evaluates information
about persons or organizations engaged in criminal activity, including
homeland security, gang activity, and drug activity.

ISAAC partners include the U.S. Attorney's Office, the FBI, SBI, the State
Highway Patrol, National Guard, Association of Chiefs of Police, Sheriff's
Association, Division of Public Health, Department of Agriculture,
Department of Corrections, Alcohol Law Enforcement, Emergency Management,
and the Governor's Crime Commission. Partners take what ISAAC refers to as
"a global approach to a state response." The ISAAC team consists of
investigators and analysts from SBI, the Raleigh Police Department, Wake
County Sheriff's Office, State Highway Patrol, state Alcohol Law
Enforcement, National Guard, U.S. Attorney's Office, and the FBI.
Specifically, the FBI assigned a full-time analyst and a part-time special
agent to ISAAC. ISAAC investigators actively investigate leads and tips
and work jointly with the JTTFs throughout the state. DHS I&A has
conducted a needs assessment of the ISAAC. However, at the time of our
review, it had not yet placed an intelligence officer in the center.

DHS and DOJ information systems or networks accessible to the fusion
center include HSIN, LEO, as well as FinCEN, Regional Organized Crime
Information Center, RISSNET, EPIC, INTERPOL, as well as a variety of state
information. The FBI analyst has access to FBI classified systems, and the
FBI has cleared all sworn and analytical personnel assigned to the fusion
center. ISAAC produces a variety of products, including an open source
report; Suspicious Activity Reports; and a monthly information bulletin
with articles of interest, a special events calendar, tips and leads
summary, and products and services of ISAAC. ISAAC also supports special
events, maintains a tips and leads database, and conducts community
outreach. For instance, ISAAC has developed relationships with several
Muslim organizations.

North Dakota

The North Dakota Fusion Center was established in September 2003 with
support from the North Dakota Division of Homeland Security and the North
Dakota National Guard. In January 2004, the North Dakota Bureau of
Criminal Investigation and the North Dakota Highway Patrol assigned a
special agent and a captain, respectively, to the center. The fusion
center takes an all-crimes and all-hazards approach to terrorism. As such,
it collects and disseminates all-hazard and all-crime information with
possible links to terrorism. The fusion center is staffed with personnel
from the Bureau of Criminal Investigation, North Dakota Division of
Homeland Security, North Dakota National Guard, and North Dakota Highway
Patrol. The fusion center consists of law enforcement, intelligence
analysts (both domestic and international), operations and planning, and
critical infrastructure personnel and is divided into three sections--law
enforcement, operations, and intelligence--that work together. While there
are no FBI personnel assigned to the center, fusion center law enforcement
personnel are JTTF members.

The North Dakota Fusion Center provides training and terrorism
investigative support; conducts critical infrastructure assessments; and
disseminates products including a monthly newsletter to law enforcement
and homeland security stakeholders, and summaries to military
stakeholders. DHS and DOJ information systems or networks accessible to
the fusion center include HSIN, HSIN-Secret, and FBI's ACS, as well as
RISS, RISS ATIX, INTERPOL, FinCEN, and INFRAGARD. The fusion center is
located in a secure National Guard facility.

Ohio

After the September 11 attacks, Ohio established the Ohio Strategic Task
Force, a working group of state cabinet-level positions, to develop a
strategic plan that included the formation of a fusion center. In January
2005, the Ohio Homeland Security Division's Strategic Analysis and
Information Center (SAIC) began initial operations with a base group
composed of state National Guard, State Highway Patrol, Emergency
Management, and Homeland Security personnel. According to an SAIC
official, legislation subsequently widened the foundation and basis for
the center. In December 2005, SAIC moved to its second phase of
development and implemented a work-week-style operation, acquired
personnel, conducted additional training in intelligence analysis, and
bought additional software to handle information acquisition. SAIC's third
phase of development is projected to begin in the fall/winter of 2007 and
will include an evening second shift. SAIC maintains a 10-hour-a-day,
5-day-a-week schedule with 24-hour radio and telephone coverage through
the Highway Patrol. The center serves as a secure one-stop shop that
collects, filters, analyzes, and disseminates terrorism-related
information. SAIC has a counterterrorism and all-crimes scope of
operations.

The center has seven full-time employees with a number of agencies
represented on a part-time rotational basis. State entities represented
include the Department of Agriculture, Attorney General's Office, Bureau
of Criminal Identification and Investigation, Emergency Medical Services,
Environmental Protection Agency, Fire Marshal, Department of Health,
Highway Patrol, Homeland Security, National Guard, Department of Public
Safety, Department of Transportation, the Ohio Association of Chiefs of
Police, and the Fire Chief's Association. There are also a number of city
and county agencies represented on a part-time basis. The FBI has assigned
a full-time analyst and a special agent to the center. DHS has assigned a
full-time intelligence analyst to the center. Other federal partners in
SAIC include ATF, TSA, U.S. Coast Guard, and the U.S. Attorney's Office.

SAIC's Investigation Unit is composed of law enforcement personnel from
multiple agencies and includes commissioned officers from local, state,
and federal agencies as well as intelligence analysts. The unit's primary
mission is the detection of persons engaged in terrorist activities. This
unit receives information from law enforcement agencies, crime reports,
and field interrogation contacts as well as direct reports from both the
public and law enforcement via a telephone tip line and Internet Web
applications. DHS and DOJ systems and networks accessible to SAIC include
HSIN and LEO. SAIC has HSDN installed in its secure room, but the system
is not currently operational pending certification of the secure space.
The FBI's classified systems are accessible by the FBI analyst assigned to
SAIC, and preparations are underway to build a secure room to house
FBINet. The Investigation Unit conducts preliminary investigations of
information and either processes the complaint, lead, or tip internally or
forwards the complaint, lead, or tip to the JTTF or law enforcement agency
with primary jurisdiction.

Oklahoma

The Oklahoma State Bureau of Investigation, in collaboration with other
state and local entities, is in the early stages of developing the
Oklahoma Information Fusion Center.12 Specifically, it has obtained
funding, developed an implementation plan, and identified 10 positions for
which it will be hiring. The official opening of the center is expected in
early 2008.

There were two primary reasons for the establishment of the center. First
was to help in the prevention of future attacks, and second was to serve
as a hub to facilitate information and intelligence sharing with law
enforcement officers in the field. The purpose of the fusion center will
be to screen the information, determine whether it is pertinent to
Oklahoma, and consolidate the information. As such, the proposed mission
statement for the center is to serve as the focal point for the
collection, assessment, analysis, and dissemination of terrorism
intelligence and other criminal activity information relating to Oklahoma.
The scope of operations for the center will be both all-crimes and
all-hazards.

12A Fusion Center Working Group consisting of representatives of the
Oklahoma Office of Homeland Security, State Bureau of Investigation,
Military Department, Department of Public Safety, FBI, Oklahoma City
Police Department, and the Tulsa Police Department is coordinating to
design the Fusion Center.

The Oklahoma State Bureau of Investigation is to act as the host agency
for the fusion center, serving as the focal point for all fusion center
activities, housing the fusion center within its headquarters, and
providing most of the center's analysts and agents. The fusion center will
include nine Oklahoma State Bureau of Investigation analysts. In addition,
the center plans to include analysts from the Oklahoma Office of Homeland
Security, the FBI FIG, and the Oklahoma National Guard. There are also six
Oklahoma State Bureau of Investigation agents who will play a support role
to the center.

The Oklahoma Information Fusion Center will collect information on all
crimes in accordance with 28 CFR, part 23. Fusion center personnel are
expected to perform intelligence analysis on all investigative reports and
informational reports provided to the center. Personnel can provide
investigative support through the use of intelligence products such as
charts, timelines, intelligence summary reports, and many other products.
Center personnel also have direct access to numerous databases that can be
used to support investigative activities as well as intelligence
investigations. DHS and DOJ systems to which the fusion center has access
include LEO, HSIN, as well as RISSNet, FinCEN, and VICAP.

Oregon

Oregon's Terrorism Intelligence and Threat Assessment Network (TITAN)
Fusion Center opened in June 2007. Its primary mission is information
sharing and coordination of terrorism intelligence among Oregon's 220 law
enforcement entities. In addition, the coordination and passing of
terrorism-related information to the FBI is a primary function for the
center. The center will also support an all-crimes approach to identifying
terrorism-related activity, including criminal activities in areas such as
money laundering, counterfeiting and piracy, and human and weapons
smuggling.

The center is administered by the Oregon Department of Justice and has
representatives from the FBI, ATF, Internal Revenue Service, the Oregon
HIDTA program, Oregon State Police, and the Oregon Military Department.
TITAN Fusion Center is located in the same building as an FBI's resident
agency.

The Terrorism Intelligence and Threat Assessment Network is Oregon's
terrorism liaison officer program. This program began in May 2004 and has
since grown to include 53 members who represent 35 agencies. The primary
mission of the program is information sharing between the fusion center
and first responders. The fusion center is the clearinghouse and
information hub within the state. Intelligence is collected, collated,
analyzed, and then disseminated as briefings, intelligence, and officer
safety bulletins and alerts.

Pennsylvania

The Pennsylvania Criminal Intelligence Center (PaCIC) was established in
July of 2003 to serve as the primary conduit through which law enforcement
officers in Pennsylvania can submit information and receive actionable
intelligence for the benefit of their decision makers. PaCIC, which is a
component of the Pennsylvania State Police, is an all-crimes analysis
center. However, the center is planning to diversify and focus on all
hazards in the future. According to its director, PaCIC is a developed
criminal intelligence center. However, in terms of a fusion center, it is
still in the early stages of development.

PaCIC is staffed 24 hours a day, 7 days a week. PaCIC's 32-member staff
includes Pennsylvania State Police intelligence analysts, research
analysts, officers, and an information technology specialist. PaCIC also
contains a watch-center component of enlisted supervisors designed to
maintain situational awareness. A representative of the state Department
of Corrections works in the center on a part-time basis and provides
direct access to corrections intelligence. There are currently no federal
entities represented in PaCIC. However, DHS representation is being
planned with the eventual expansion into an all-crimes and all-hazards
fusion center. FBI security modifications to the center are under way, and
FBI representation is anticipated by November 2007. PaCIC has access to
HSIN and disseminates products including daily reports, strategic
assessments, intelligence alerts, information briefs, and threat
assessments. The center also operates a drug tip line and a terrorism tip
line.

Rhode Island

The Rhode Island Fusion Center was established in March 2006 and is a
component of the Rhode Island State Police. In establishing the center,
the state recognized the importance of the fusion center concept for state
and local information sharing. The fusion center is colocated with an FBI
field office and thus focuses primarily on counterterrorism. However, the
center also serves as a resource for the local police agencies in the
state.

The fusion center has three personnel--one investigator and two analysts.
The FBI is the fusion center's only federal partner, although the director
said that he works with ICE on a regular basis. The fusion center works
closely with the JTTF, to which there are also State Police officers
assigned. DHS and DOJ information systems or networks accessible to the
fusion center include HSIN, LEO, FPS portal, and FBI's ACS system and
Guardian. The FBI also facilitates all of the center's security clearances
and provides the center's facility, which is colocated with the JTTF, free
of charge.

South Carolina

In South Carolina, the Chief of the State Law Enforcement Division is the
state Director of Homeland Security and the state representative to DHS.
In July 2004, the Chief of the Division approved the development of a
fusion center and the South Carolina Information Exchange (SCIEx) was
established in March 2005. SCIEx has an all-crimes scope of operations and
has devoted its resources to combating all nature of criminal activity.
Its mission is to prevent and deter acts of terrorism and criminal
activity, and to promote homeland security and public safety through
intelligence fusion and information sharing with all sectors of South
Carolina society. SCIEx also handles reports of suspicious activity and
includes a component that deals with "situations as they develop,"
including a response to emergent hazards. Further, SCIEx goals focus on
providing real-time response and timely assistance to local law
enforcement agencies, developing actionable intelligence and analysis to
predict and prevent homeland security threats, and using intelligence-led
policing and other products to facilitate the prevention and interdiction
of criminal and terrorist activities.

SCIEx's 14-person staff includes agents and analysts from the State Law
Enforcement Division; the National Guard; Department of Heath and
Environmental Control; Department of Corrections; Department of Probation,
Pardon, and Parole; and the FBI, which assigned one FIG analyst. DHS I&A
has conducted a needs assessment of SCIEx. However, at the time of our
review, it had not yet placed an intelligence analyst in the center. The
center is organized into an 8/5 watch (with a 24/7 on-call duty roster); a
collection, analysis, and production unit; AMBER alert and missing persons
coordinators; and liaisons to JTTF and Project SeaHawk.13

13The Charleston Harbor Operations Center, better known as Project
SeaHawk, was created as a unique benchmark project to enhance the
protection, security, and infrastructure of seaports nationally.
Administered by the U.S. Attorney's Office for the District of South
Carolina, Project SeaHawk is focused on the Port of Charleston, South
Carolina. It has created a unified intelligence operations center that
includes all federal, state, and local agencies having responsibility for
any aspect of port security and protection.

SCIEx analysts collect information from a variety of sources including
federal intelligence and law enforcement agency reports, incident reports,
and other first responder reports and graphics to produce daily bulletins,
targeted advisories, and intelligence assessments. DHS and DOJ information
systems or networks accessible to the fusion center include HSIN/JRIES,
LEO, EPIC, and VICAP, as well as RISSNET, Interpol, and FinCEN.
HSIN-Secret is available to personnel if they travel to the Emergency
Operations Center, which is located in a different facility than SCIEx.
Additionally, the FBI funded the development of a secure room at SCIEx,
and once the room is completed, SCIEx will also gain access to FBI
systems. SCIEx also uses a variety of analytical tools such as Geographic
Information System and crime mapping to enhance its analytic products.

South Dakota

The South Dakota Fusion Center was established in June 2006 with the
mission to protect the citizens by ensuring the resiliency of critical
infrastructure operations throughout South Dakota by enhancing and
coordinating counterterrorism intelligence and other investigative support
efforts among private sector and local, state, tribal, and federal
stakeholders. The principal role of the fusion center is to compile,
analyze, and disseminate criminal and terrorist information and
intelligence and other information to support efforts to anticipate,
identify, prevent, and/or monitor criminal and terrorist activity. The
center has an all-hazards and all-crimes scope of operations and focuses
on all criminal activity, not just those with a nexus to terrorism. The
all-hazards focus comes from the center's coordination with the state
Office of Emergency Management.

The center is staffed by the South Dakota Office of Homeland Security and
the South Dakota Highway Patrol and receives oversight from the State
Homeland Security Senior Advisory Committee. The center has one full-time
staff person and two part-time personnel from the Office of Homeland
Security. There were no federal entities represented in the fusion center.
However, officials said that they coordinate with the local JTTF, the
HIDTA, and other drug and fugitive task forces.

The fusion center gathers information about all-hazard, all-crimes
incidents and disseminates it to first responders, surrounding states, and
the federal government. DHS and DOJ information systems or networks
accessible to the fusion center include HSIN, LEO, as well as
RISS/Mid-States Organized Crime Information Center, ICEFISHX, and Law
Enforcement Intelligence Network, which are operated by fusion centers in
Minnesota and Iowa.

Tennessee

The state center for Tennessee, the Tennessee Regional Information Center
(TRIC), opened in May 2007, with the mission to lead a team effort of
local, state, and federal law enforcement in cooperation with the citizens
of the state of Tennessee for the timely receipt, analysis, and
dissemination of terrorism and criminal activity information relating to
Tennessee. TRIC provides a central location for the collection and
analysis of classified, law enforcement sensitive, and open source
information; provides a continuous flow of information and intelligence to
the law enforcement community; and provides assistance to law enforcement
agencies in criminal investigation matters. TRIC has an all-crimes scope
of operations that includes crimes such as traditional organized crime,
narcotics, gangs, fugitives, missing children, sex offenders, and
Medicaid/Medicare fraud. TRIC also has a terrorism/national security focus
that includes international and domestic terrorism, foreign
counterintelligence, and other national security issues (such as Avian
Flu).

Led by the Tennessee Bureau of Investigation and the Tennessee Department
of Safety/Office of Homeland Security, TRIC's 31-person staff includes
analysts from these two entities, as well as the Department of
Corrections, the National Guard, and the FBI FIG. Other partner agencies
include the Highway Patrol, the Oak Ridge National Laboratory, HIDTA, the
U.S. Attorney's Office, ATF, and the Regional Organized Crime Information
Center, as well as a growing connectivity to the state's local law
enforcement agencies. TRIC provides support to all agencies within the
state, reviews and analyzes data for crime trend patterns and criminal
activity with a potential nexus to terrorism, disseminates information
through regular bulletins and special advisories, develops threat
assessments and executive news briefs, performs requests for information
as needed, and produces suspicious incident report analysis. The public
can provide tips and information to TRIC through its Web site and via a
toll-free telephone number. DHS and DOJ information systems or networks
accessible to TRIC include HSIN and LEO, as well as RISS and the Regional
Organized Crime Information Center. Fusion center operations work in
concert with other ongoing Tennessee Bureau of Investigation programs,
including AMBER Alerts, sex offender registry, and the aviation unit.

Texas

In addition to the statewide Texas Fusion Center, there are regional
fusion centers including the North Central Texas Fusion Center.

Texas Fusion Center

After September 11, Governor Rick Perry created a task force to study
homeland security matters, and the task force identified communication and
coordination as predominant themes. Subsequently, the Texas Legislature
passed a bill that created a communications center to serve as the focal
point for planning, coordinating, and integrating government
communications regarding the state's homeland defense strategy. This
center, then known as the Texas Security Alert and Analysis Center, opened
in July 2003. The center functioned as a call center to allow the public
and law enforcement to report suspicious activities. In July 2005, the
center was expanded and renamed the Texas Fusion Center, which acts as a
tactical intelligence center for law enforcement that is open 24 hours a
day, 7 days a week and helps coordinate multi-agency border control
activities. The fusion center has an all-crimes and all-hazards scope of
operations in order to disrupt organizations that are using criminal
activities to further terrorist activities. The center gathers information
from the public and law enforcement, analyzes it, and provides it to
JTTFs. The fusion center also focuses on border security, narcoterrorism,
and criminal gangs. The all-hazards scope of operations was adopted in the
aftermath of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. The center works in conjunction
with, and is located in, the State Operation Center, in order to create an
all-hazards response capability.

The Texas Fusion Center has dual oversight by the Criminal Law Enforcement
Division and the Governor's Office of Homeland Security at the Texas
Department of Public Safety. It is staffed by Department of Public Safety
officers and analysts. The FBI assigned a part-time analyst to the center.

The Texas Fusion Center is the central facility for collecting, analyzing,
and disseminating intelligence information related to terrorist
activities. The center is designed to handle and respond to telephone
inquiries from law enforcement and the general public, in addition to
having access to several information systems. The Texas Fusion Center
monitors HSIN, LEO, and JRIES and has access to FBI systems, though only
through the part-time analyst assigned to the center. The center also uses
a variety of state systems and databases, including the Texas Data
Exchange, which is a comprehensive information-sharing portal that allows
criminal justice agencies to exchange jail and records management systems
data, and provides system access to a variety of state databases.

North Central Texas Fusion Center

The North Central Texas Fusion Center (NTFC) became operational in
February 2006, after a 2 1/2-year planning process. The planners
recognized the fusion center needed a different mission from those already
being conducted by the North Texas HIDTA and FBI FIG, so NTFC adopted an
all-crimes and all-hazards scope of operations. Specifically, NTFC works
to prevent or minimize the impacts of natural, intentional, and accidental
hazards/disasters through information sharing across jurisdictions and
across disciplines. The center also supports emergency response, field
personnel, and investigations.

Stakeholders include those in homeland security, law enforcement, public
health, fire, emergency management, and state and federal government such
as the Texas Fusion Center, Texas National Guard, and DHS. DHS I&A has
assigned an intelligence analyst to the center.

The center provides intelligence support to regional task forces, State of
Texas initiatives, and local police department homicide and criminal
investigations and also assesses regional threats. Users from 42 regional
jurisdictions and agencies covering five major disciplines, including law
enforcement, health, fire, emergency management, and intelligence, receive
bulletins and alert information. Reports and alerts are also distributed
via e-mail to the stakeholders. Most of the reports are all-hazard and
all-discipline focused and look at trends, observations, and predictive
elements primarily in support of prevention and preparedness. DHS and DOJ
systems and networks accessible to NTFC include HSIN, LEO, and HSDN, in
addition to a variety of other state and open source information
databases.

Utah

The Utah Fusion Center is in the planning stage and is transitioning from
an intelligence center--the Utah Criminal Intelligence Center--which was
established prior to the 2002 Winter Olympics. Led by the Utah Department
of Public Safety, the fusion center is in the process of developing
operations guidelines and memorandums of understanding and consulting with
DHS's Office of Grants and Training. The Utah Fusion Center will adopt an
all-crimes and all-hazards scope of operations to move beyond law
enforcement and broaden the center's focus to include homeland security
and public safety.

The fusion center was established to enhance the ability to share
information across disciplines beyond law enforcement and levels of
government. The fusion center, as was the criminal intelligence center, is
colocated with the local FBI JTTF and will employ criminal researchers and
investigators. The center works closely with the FBI JTTF and the local
DHS representative, partnerships that were developed with the
establishment of the precursor intelligence center in 2002. The FBI
provides Top Secret clearances, and most of the staff members have had Top
Secret security clearances since the 2002 Winter Olympics. DHS and DOJ
information systems or networks accessible to the fusion center include
HSIN, LEO, FBI classified systems, as well as RISS/Rocky Mountain
Information Network.

Vermont

The Vermont Fusion Center, which is managed by the Vermont State Police,
was established in August 2005 in order to further the national homeland
security mission in response to the terrorist attacks on September 11. The
fusion center, which is colocated with ICE's Law Enforcement Support
Center (LESC),14 is a partnership of the Vermont Department of Homeland
Security, Vermont State Police Criminal Intelligence Unit, ICE, Vermont
National Guard Counter Drug Program, and the U.S. Coast Guard. Each entity
provides personnel to the center.

The fusion center serves as Vermont's clearinghouse to analyze and assess
information received from law enforcement and disseminate information from
a single location. The goals of the Vermont Fusion Center include
providing timely, accurate, and actionable information to the state,
national, and international law enforcement communities; identifying
parallel investigations, reducing duplication, and increasing officer
safety (deconfliction); and providing strategic analysis, to include crime
mapping for all types of criminal activity, particularly related to
illegal narcotics, money laundering crimes, identity theft, crimes that
support terrorism, and other major crimes. The center has an all-crimes
scope of operations reflecting the multiple sectors, including public
safety and law enforcement, that have come together to form the fusion
center.

The center provides major criminal case assistance, such as fugitive
tracking, phone searches, liaison with federal and Canadian agencies,
analytical reports, and utilization of federal capabilities such as
cellular telephone triangulation, mail covers, passport information, and
border lookouts. The center also disseminates notifications, alerts,
indicators, and warnings to Vermont law enforcement. DHS and DOJ
information systems or networks accessible to the fusion center include
HSIN, Student and Exchange Visitor Information System, U.S. Visitor and
Immigration Status Indicator Technology System, National Security
Entry-Exit Registration System, FPS portal, U.S. Coast Guard Homeport,
LEO, VICAP, EPIC, NCIC, as well as RISS/New England Police Information
Network, NLETS, INTERPOL, HIDTA, FinCEN, and Treasury Enforcement
Communications System. The center also has access to a number of state and
commercial systems and databases, and to the Canadian Border Information /
Intel Center.

14LESC provides information to local, state, and federal law enforcement
agencies on the immigrant status and identity information on aliens
suspected, arrested, or convicted of criminal activity. LESC is a
24-hour-a-day/ 7-day-a-week/365-days-a-year center operated by ICE.

Virginia

The Virginia Fusion Center was established in February 2005 after being
mandated by legislation15 and moved into a new facility in November 2005.
Operated by the Virginia State Police, in cooperation with the Virginia
Department of Emergency Management, the primary mission of the center is
to fuse together resources from local, state, and federal agencies and
private industries to facilitate information collection, analysis, and
sharing in order to deter and prevent criminal and terrorist attacks. The
secondary mission of the center is, in support of the Virginia Emergency
Operations Center (with which it is colocated), to centralize information
and resources to provide coordinated and effective response in the event
of an attack. The center has an all-hazards and counterterrorism scope of
operations.

The Virginia Fusion Center has partnerships established with state, local,
and federal law enforcement agencies, including ATF and the U.S. Secret
Service; DHS's Homeland Security Operation Center; FBI JTTFs in the state
of Virginia; the private sector; Fire and Emergency Medical Services; the
military, including the Army and the U.S. Coast Guard; the National
Capitol Regional Intelligence Center; other state intelligence centers; as
well as the public. There are over 20 people in the center--17 analysts, 5
special agents, and other management and administrative personnel. The
analysts are primarily from the Virginia State Police and the Department
of Emergency Management. The National Guard has also assigned an analyst.
DHS has detailed one intelligence analyst, and the FBI has assigned one
reports officer to the center. The DHS Protective Security Advisor has a
desk in the center as well. Several center employees are detailed to other
organizations; for example, the Virginia State Police have five agents
assigned to JTTFs in the state.

15According to Virginia State Police officials, prior to the events of
September 11, they had a criminal intelligence center. But, after that,
they realized that the state and local law enforcement officials needed an
avenue to get timely and accurate information from the federal government,
and so the concept of a fusion center was initiated.

DHS and DOJ information systems or networks accessible to the fusion
center include HSIN, HSIN-Intel, HSDN, LEO, and JRIES, as well as the
RISS/Regional Organized Crime Information Center. The FBI reports officer
in the center can access FBI classified systems. The fusion center shares
all-hazards information and intelligence, tactical information, raw
information, and finished intelligence products with a variety of clients.
These products include daily terrorism intelligence briefings that could
be produced at Law Enforcement Sensitive, For Official Use Only, and open
source levels and are e-mailed to all law enforcement and military
contacts and posted to a bulletin; intelligence bulletins that describe
emerging trends or upcoming events; threat assessments for events; and
information reports on pertinent information that has not been fully
analyzed. Virginia Fusion Center analysts also produce special projects or
reports, provide case support, follow up on calls, and respond to requests
for information. The center has established a variety of performance
measures, including quarterly surveys disseminated to its users and
activity reports (e.g., daily, weekly, quarterly, and yearly). All
personnel also have core responsibilities and competencies.

Washington

The Washington Joint Analytical Center (WAJAC) started as a small project
in 2003 to facilitate information sharing within the state and with the
federal government and has gradually evolved. WAJAC, which is a joint
effort between the Washington State Patrol and the FBI, has an all-crimes,
all-hazards, and counterterrorism scope of operations to support the state
and local law enforcement community. This approach allows WAJAC
intelligence analysts and investigators the ability to fully evaluate
information for trends, emerging crime problems, and their possible
connections to terrorism. WAJAC has recently included an all-hazards focus
and has started looking at natural disasters and public health epidemics.

WAJAC personnel include representatives from the Washington State Patrol,
King County Sheriff's Office, Bellevue Police Department, Seattle Police
Department, the Washington Military Department (National Guard), ICE, and
TSA. There are no FBI personnel assigned directly to WAJAC; however, WAJAC
is colocated in an FBI field office and WAJAC analysts work side by side
with the FIG in the field office. DHS I&A has conducted a needs assessment
of WAJAC, and, according to DHS, had assigned an intelligence analyst to
the center.

DHS and DOJ information systems or networks accessible to the fusion
center include HSIN, LEO, ICE and TSA systems; all FBI systems; as well as
access to systems of each partner agency in WAJAC. WAJAC personnel receive
all of their clearances, at the Top Secret level through the FBI. WAJAC
produces a variety of weekly intelligence briefings, bulletins, and
assessments in conjunction with the FIG. These products are e-mailed to
law enforcement agencies, other government agencies, private sector
security officers, and military units.

West Virginia

The Department of Military Affairs and Public Safety's Homeland Security
Division is in the planning stage of establishing the West Virginia Fusion
Center. The planning team for the development of the fusion center
consists of multiple agencies and stakeholders with leadership from the
Homeland Security Advisor. The West Virginia Fusion Center is to operate
under the direct control of the Homeland Security Advisor and the State
Administrative Agency. A governance committee, to be chaired by the State
Administrative Agency with representatives from the Northern and Southern
Anti-Terrorism Advisory Councils, state police, National Guard, health
care, higher education, the private sector, and the interoperability
coordinator will be responsible for providing guidance and policy. At the
time of our review, the West Virginia Fusion Center was beginning its
phased opening and bringing in personnel from the National Guard and the
state police.

The vision for the fusion center is to prevent, deter, and disrupt
terrorism and criminal activity, enabling a safe and secure environment
for the citizens of West Virginia. The fusion center will adopt an
all-crimes, all-hazards, and counterterrorism scope of operations but
plans to tailor each depending on the stakeholders in the center. For
example, the West Virginia Public Broadcasting System will be represented
in the fusion center to help gather and manage information. However, if
there is an evacuation event, it will also disseminate the information
directly to the public as public service announcements through television
and radio stations.

Wisconsin

There are two fusion centers in Wisconsin: the Wisconsin Statewide
Intelligence Center (WSIC) and the Milwaukee-based Southeastern Terrorism
Alert Center (STAC).

Wisconsin Statewide Intelligence Center

Led by the Wisconsin Department of Justice Division of Criminal
Investigation, the Wisconsin Statewide Intelligence Center (WSIC) became
operational in March 2006 as the central information and intelligence-
gathering entity for the state of Wisconsin and acts as the clearinghouse
for information and intelligence coming from local and county agencies.
WSIC's mission includes managing intelligence gathering efforts and
passing information to appropriate agencies and the JTTF; interfacing with
the Emergency Operations Center and Joint Operations Center during
critical incidents or as requested; producing general weekly law
enforcement bulletins and daily intelligence briefings for the Governor,
top law enforcement officials, and partner agency heads, among others;
supporting the Division of Criminal Investigation technology assets in the
field; and providing statewide major case support and analytical services.
Though counterterrorism is the primary concern of WSIC, the center
operates with an all-crimes, all-hazards, all-events approach directed by
the state Homeland Security Council, which wanted the center to be the
intelligence voice for the state and to help the state in a comprehensive
way.

WSIC is staffed by eight full-time personnel, five of whom are Division of
Criminal Investigation personnel. There are also two National Guard
analysts, a special investigator from the Wisconsin Department of Natural
Resources, and one FBI analyst at the center. DHS I&A has conducted a
needs assessment of WSIC. However, at the time of our review it had not
yet placed an intelligence analyst in the center. WSIC also supports the
STAC by providing three Division of Criminal Investigation personnel to
the center. WSIC is overseen by a Governance Board made up of federal,
state, and local representatives.

WSIC analysts provide short- or long-term assistance to agencies by using
analytical tools and systems to clarify and visualize case investigations,
tailoring the analytical support to the requesting agency's needs. WSIC
analysts work in a variety of areas and initiatives, including
counterterrorism and domestic security, gang intelligence, identity theft,
and the Highway Drug Interdiction Program with the Wisconsin State Patrol.
DHS and DOJ networks and systems accessible to WSIC include HSIN, LEO, and
NCIC, as well as RISSNET and a statewide law enforcement network that
enables law enforcement officers to submit intelligence or requests for
assistance to WSIC, and it provides law enforcement with WSIC bulletins
and alerts, staff contact information, officer safety information, and
resource links. WSIC provides a variety of products and services that
include weekly law enforcement bulletins for every agency in the state
containing sections on domestic and international terrorism, cold case
investigations, missing persons, officer safety, and items of interest to
law enforcement. Additionally, WSIC prepares a daily Command Staff
Intelligence Briefing for the Governor, the Attorney General, the Adjutant
General, and top law enforcement officials across the state that is
primarily focused on issues within the previous 24 hours. WSIC also
broadcasts statewide Alert Bulletins when it receives time-sensitive
information, handles major criminal case analytical support, provides
assistance on electronic surveillance, and conducts training events across
the state and region.

Southeastern Wisconsin Terrorism Alert Center

The Southeastern Wisconsin Terrorism Alert Center (STAC) is a
counterterrorism, all-crimes, all-hazards intelligence organization made
up of law enforcement, fire service, homeland security, military, DOJ,
FBI, emergency management, and health department members. STAC officials
said they were exposed to the TEW concept from Los Angeles and saw a need
for establishing a TEW in their urban area in 2005 to improve information
sharing. STAC was built on the TEW foundation as a satellite of WSIC. STAC
began operating when its analysts were hired in October 2006. However, the
officials said that they are still getting the physical location
established and are in the final stages of reconstruction and establishing
the facility.

The mission of STAC is to protect the citizens, critical infrastructure,
and key resources of southeastern Wisconsin by promoting intelligence-led
policing, supporting criminal investigative efforts, and enhancing the
domestic preparedness of first responders, all levels of government, and
its partners in the private sector.

STAC staff will eventually include 10 full- and part-time officers,
detectives, and analysts from the Milwaukee Police Department, Office of
the Sheriff of Milwaukee County, one DCI analyst, and one Milwaukee Fire
Department analyst. The FBI has assigned a full-time intelligence analyst
and a part-time special agent. A governance board provides oversight for
the center. STAC is in the process of developing a TLO program, which is a
network of police, fire department, public health, and private sector
partners that collect and share information related to terrorism threats.
STAC TLO coordinators will be responsible for analyzing available sources
of terrorist threat information and preparing versions for distribution to
the first responder agencies within their regions.

STAC has also conducted some initial critical infrastructure assessments
and published alerts, threat assessments, and intelligence information
bulletins with information for first responders about local threats,
terrorism trends, and counterterrorism training and offers training
information for critical incident preparation. DHS and DOJ systems or
networks accessible to STAC include LEO, HSIN, and RISS. STAC does not
have classified FBI systems in its facility. However, the FBI analyst at
STAC has access to them. The FBI also provides STAC personnel with their
security clearances, most at the Secret level, and one at the Top Secret
level.

Wyoming

Wyoming does not have and is not planning to establish a physical fusion
center. However, the Office of Homeland Security is working with Colorado
officials to develop a plan for Wyoming to become an "adjunct" to CIAC.
The officials stated that Wyoming, which has a population of only around
400,000 people and operates its law enforcement agencies with a total of
only 1,600 officers, does not have the threat or the necessity for a
full-fledged fusion center, much less the funding or personnel to support
such a center. In addition, the Wyoming Office of Homeland Security is
supported by the FBI's JTTF in Wyoming that provides assistance such as
helping with analytical review of information.

Wyoming officials said that they have taken several steps to facilitate
the development of a partnership with Colorado's CIAC, including putting
in place a technical system to augment the communications capability of
Wyoming's law enforcement agencies to transmit intelligence and
information with CIAC. Wyoming officials intend to develop memorandums of
understanding with CIAC to cover a regional area including both Colorado
and Wyoming. In addition, Wyoming will furnish personnel for CIAC. The
officials characterized the development of the partnership as between the
planning and early stages of development and said that Wyoming and CIAC
will have their partnership operational approximately in the fall of 2007.
However, a Wyoming official noted that the state's fiscal year 2007
funding did not designate any funding to continue with the fusion
initiative. The official said that the fusion center initiative is
critical to efforts to thwart terrorism, and the state intends to continue
its partnership with CIAC and attempt to obtain future grant funding.

Appendix V: GAO Contacts and Acknowledgments

GAO Contact

Eileen R. Larence (202) 512-8777 or [102]larencee@gao.gov

Acknowledgments

In addition to the contact named above, Susan H. Quinlan, Assistant
Director; Michael Blinde; Katherine Davis; George Erhart; Jill Evancho;
Mary Catherine Hult; Julian King; Tom Lombardi; and Jay Smale made key
contributions to this report.

(440525)

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Highlights of [110]GAO-08-35 , a report to congressional committees

October 2007

HOMELAND SECURITY

Federal Efforts Are Helping to Alleviate Some Challenges Encountered by
State and Local Information Fusion Centers

In general, a fusion center is a collaborative effort to detect, prevent,
investigate, and respond to criminal and terrorist activity. Recognizing
that fusion centers are a mechanism for information sharing, the federal
government--including the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the
Department of Justice (DOJ), and the Program Manager for the Information
Sharing Environment (PM-ISE), which has primary responsibility for
governmentwide information sharing and is located in the Office of the
Director of National Intelligence--is taking steps to partner with fusion
centers.

In response to your request, GAO examined (1) the status and
characteristics of fusion centers and (2) to what extent federal efforts
help alleviate challenges the centers identified. GAO reviewed
center-related documents and conducted interviews with officials from DHS,
DOJ, and the PM-ISE, and conducted semistructured interviews with 58 state
and local fusion centers. The results are not generalizable to the
universe of fusion centers. Data are not available on the total number of
local fusion centers.

[111]What GAO Recommends

GAO is recommending that the federal government determine and articulate
its long-term fusion center role and whether it expects to provide
resources to help ensure their sustainability. DHS and PM-ISE reviewed a
report draft and agreed with our recommendation.

Most states and many local governments have established fusion centers to
address gaps in information sharing. Fusion centers across the country
vary in their stages of development--from operational to early in the
planning stages. Officials in 43 of the centers GAO contacted described
their centers as operational, and 34 of these centers had opened since
January 2004. Law enforcement entities, such as state police or state
bureaus of investigation, are the lead or managing agencies in the
majority of the operational centers GAO contacted; however, the centers
varied in their staff sizes and partnerships with other agencies. Nearly
all of the operational fusion centers GAO contacted had federal personnel
assigned to them. For example, DHS has assigned personnel to 17, and the
FBI has assigned personnel to about three quarters of the operational
centers GAO contacted.

DHS and DOJ have several efforts under way that begin to address
challenges fusion center officials identified. DHS and DOJ have provided
many fusion centers access to their information systems, but fusion center
officials cited challenges accessing and managing multiple information
systems. Both DHS and the FBI have provided security clearances for state
and local personnel and set timeliness goals. However, officials cited
challenges obtaining and using security clearances. Officials in 43 of the
58 fusion centers contacted reported facing challenges related to
obtaining personnel, and officials in 54 fusion centers reported
challenges with funding, some of which affected these centers'
sustainability. The officials said that these issues made it difficult to
plan for the future and created concerns about the fusion centers' ability
to sustain their capability for the long-term. To support fusion centers,
both DHS and the FBI have assigned personnel to the centers. To help
address funding issues, DHS has made several changes to address
restrictions on the use of federal grants funds. These individual agency
efforts help address some of the challenges with personnel and funding.
However, the federal government has not clearly articulated the long-term
role it expects to play in sustaining fusion centers. It is critical for
center management to know whether to expect continued federal resources,
such as personnel and grant funding, since the federal government, through
the information sharing environment, expects to rely on a nationwide
network of centers to facilitate information sharing with state and local
governments. Finally, DHS, DOJ, and the PM-ISE have taken steps to develop
guidance and provide technical assistance to fusion centers, for instance,
by issuing guidelines for establishing and operating centers. However,
officials at 31 of the 58 centers said they had challenges training their
personnel, and officials at 11 centers expressed a need for the federal
government to establish standards for training fusion center analysts to
help ensure that analysts have similar skills. DHS and DOJ have initiated
a technical assistance program for fusion centers. They have also
developed a set of baseline capabilities, but the document was still in
draft as of September and had not been issued.

References

Visible links
  96. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-455
  97. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-455
  98. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-455
  99. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-596
 100. http://www.gao.gov/
 101. mailto:larencee@gao.gov
 102. mailto:larencee@gao.gov
 103. http://www.gao.gov/
 104. http://www.gao.gov/
 105. http://www.gao.gov/fraudnet/fraudnet.htm
 106. mailto:fraudnet@gao.gov
 107. mailto:JarmonG@gao.gov
 108. mailto:BeckerS@gao.gov
 109. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-08-35
 110. http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-08-35
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