[Impeachment of President William Jefferson Clinton - The Evidentiary Record Pursuant to S. Res. 16 - Index to Senate Document 106-3, Vols. I-XXIV]
[Volume XV - Committee Report to Accompany H. Res.611, Impeaching the President of the United States, H. Rept. 105-830 (Star Print) ]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office, www.gpo.gov]



_______________________________________________________________________

105th Congress                                                   Report
2d Session              HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES                105-830
_______________________________________________________________________




 
               IMPEACHMENT OF WILLIAM JEFFERSON CLINTON,


                    PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES

                               ----------                              

                                 REPORT

                                 of the

                       COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY
                        HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                             together with

               ADDITIONAL, MINORITY, AND DISSENTING VIEWS

                              to accompany

                              H. RES. 611




December 16, 1998 (pursuant to clause 2(l)(5) of rule XI).--Referred to 
              the House Calendar and ordered to be printed

                               --------

                    U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE                    
*52-880                     WASHINGTON : 1998





                       COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY

                   HENRY J. HYDE, Illinois, Chairman

F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, Jr.,         JOHN CONYERS, Jr., Michigan
    Wisconsin                        BARNEY FRANK, Massachusetts
BILL McCOLLUM, Florida               CHARLES E. SCHUMER, New York
GEORGE W. GEKAS, Pennsylvania        HOWARD L. BERMAN, California
HOWARD COBLE, North Carolina         RICK BOUCHER, Virginia
LAMAR S. SMITH, Texas                JERROLD NADLER, New York
ELTON GALLEGLY, California           ROBERT C. SCOTT, Virginia
CHARLES T. CANADY, Florida           MELVIN L. WATT, North Carolina
BOB INGLIS, South Carolina           ZOE LOFGREN, California
BOB GOODLATTE, Virginia              SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas
STEPHEN E. BUYER, Indiana            MAXINE WATERS, California
ED BRYANT, Tennessee                 MARTIN T. MEEHAN, Massachusetts
STEVE CHABOT, Ohio                   WILLIAM D. DELAHUNT, Massachusetts
BOB BARR, Georgia                    ROBERT WEXLER, Florida
WILLIAM L. JENKINS, Tennessee        STEVEN R. ROTHMAN, New Jersey
ASA HUTCHINSON, Arkansas             THOMAS M. BARRETT, Wisconsin
EDWARD A. PEASE, Indiana
CHRISTOPHER B. CANNON, Utah
JAMES E. ROGAN, California
LINDSEY O. GRAHAM, South Carolina
MARY BONO, California

                             Majority Staff

         Thomas E. Mooney, Sr., General Counsel-Chief of Staff
          Jon W. Dudas, Deputy General Counsel-Staff Director
         Diana L. Schacht, Deputy Staff Director-Chief Counsel
               Daniel M. Freeman, Parliamentarian-Counsel
       Paul J. McNulty, Director of Communications-Chief Counsel
                    Joseph H. Gibson, Chief Counsel
                         Rick Filkins, Counsel
                       Sharee M. Freeman, Counsel
                       Peter J. Levinson, Counsel
                       John F. Mautz, IV, Counsel
                     William E. Moschella, Counsel
                        Stephen Pinkos, Counsel

George M. Fishman, Chief Counsel     David P. Schippers, Chief 
Mitch Glazier, Chief Counsel             Investigative Counsel
John H. Ladd, Chief Counsel            
Raymond V. Smietanka, Chief Counsel  Susan Bogart, Investigative 
Laura Ann Baxter, Counsel                Counsel
Daniel J. Bryant, Counsel            Robert S. Hoover, Counsel
Cathleen A. Cleaver, Counsel         John C. Kocoras, Counsel
Vince Garlock, Counsel               Berle S. Littmann, Investigator
James W. Harper, Counsel             Stephen P. Lynch, Professional 
Susan Jensen-Conklin, Counsel            Staff Member
Debra K. Laman, Counsel              Charles F. Marino, Counsel
Blaine S. Merritt, Counsel           Jeffrey J. Pavletic, Investigative 
Nicole R. Nason, Counsel                 Counsel
Glenn R. Schmitt, Counsel            Thomas M. Schippers, Investigative 
Jim Y. Wilon, Counsel                    Counsel
                                     Albert F. Tracy, Investigator
                                     Peter J. Wacks, Investigator
                                     Diana L. Woznicki, Investigator

                             Minority Staff

         Julian Epstein, Minority Chief Counsel-Staff Director
Perry H. Apelbaum, Minority General  Abbe D. Lowell, Minority Chief 
    Counsel                              Investigative Counsel
David G. Lachmann, Counsel           Sampak P. Garg, Investigative 
Cynthia A. R. Martin, Counsel            Counsel
Henry Moniz, Counsel                 Steven F. Reich, Investigative 
Stephanie J. Peters, Counsel             Counsel
Samara T. Ryder, Counsel             Deborah L. Rhode, Investigative 
Brian P. Woolfolk, Counsel               Counsel
                                     Kevin M. Simpson, Investigative 
                                         Counsel
                                     Lis W. Wiehl, Investigative 
                                         Counsel


                            C O N T E N T S

                              ----------                              
                                                                   Page
Articles of Impeachment..........................................     2
  I. Introduction.....................................................5
 II. Narrative........................................................7
      A. The Paula Jones Litigation..............................     7
      B. The Relationship Between President Clinton and Monica 
        Lewinsky.................................................     7
      C. GThe Events of December 5-6, 1997--President Clinton 
        Learns Ms. Lewinsky is on the Witness List...............     8
      D. The Search for a Job for Ms. Lewinsky...................    10
      E. GThe Events of December 17, 1997--President Clinton 
        Informs Ms. Lewinsky that She is on the Witness List.....    11
      F. GThe Events of December 19, 1997--Ms. Lewinsky Receives 
        a Subpoena...............................................    14
      G. The Events of December 28, 1997--Ms. Currie Retrieves 
        the Gifts................................................    15
      H. GThe Events of January 5-9, 1997--Ms. Lewinsky Signs the 
        False Affidavit and Gets the Job.........................    17
      I. The Filing of the False Affidavit.......................    19
      J. GThe Events of January 17, 1998--President Clinton and 
        Mr. Bennett at the Deposition............................    20
      K. The Events of Late January, 1998--The Deposition 
        Aftermath................................................    21
      L. The Events of August 17, 1998--The Grand Jury Testimony.    28
      M. Answers to the Committee's Requests for Admission.......    32
III. Explanation of Articles of Impeachment..........................32
      A. Article I--Perjury in the Grand Jury....................    32
          1. The Committee concluded that, on August 17, 1998, 
            the President provided perjurious, false, and 
            misleading testimony to a Federal grand jury 
            concerning the nature and details of his relationship 
            with a subordinate government employee...............    33
          2. The Committee concluded that the President provided 
            perjurious, false, and misleading testimony to a 
            Federal grand jury concerning prior perjurious, 
            false, and misleading testimony he gave in a federal 
            civil rights action brought against him..............    38
          3. The Committee concluded that the President provided 
            perjurious, false, and misleading testimony to a 
            Federal grand jury concerning prior perjurious, 
            false, and misleading statements he allowed his 
            attorney to make to a Federal judge in that civil 
            rights action........................................    40
          4. The Committee concluded that the President provided 
            perjurious, false, and misleading testimony to a 
            Federal grand jury concerning his corrupt efforts to 
            influence the testimony of witnesses and to impede 
            the discovery of evidence in that civil rights 
            action...............................................    42
              a. The President gave perjurious, false, and 
                misleading testimony before the grand jury when 
                he denied engaging in a plan to hide evidence 
                that had been subpoenaed in the federal civil 
                rights action against him........................    42
              b. The President made perjurious, false, and 
                misleading statements before the grand jury 
                regarding his knowledge that the contents of an 
                affidavit executed by a subordinate federal 
                employee who was a witness in the federal civil 
                rights action brought against him were untrue....    46
              c. The President made perjurious, false, and 
                misleading statements before the grand jury when 
                he recited a false account of the facts regarding 
                his interactions with Monica Lewinsky to Betty 
                Currie, a potential witness in the federal civil 
                rights action brought against him................    48
              d. The President made perjurious, false, and 
                misleading statements before the grand jury 
                concerning statements he made to aides regarding 
                his relationship with Monica Lewinsky............    49
          5. Explanation of the Rogan Amendment to Article I.....    52
      B. Article II--Perjury in the Civil Case...................    53
          1. The Committee concluded that the President provided 
            perjurious, false, and misleading testimony in a 
            Federal civil rights action in response to written 
            questions............................................    53
          2. The Committee concluded that the President provided 
            perjurious, false, and misleading testimony in a 
            Federal civil rights action in his deposition........    54
              a. The President lied in his deposition about the 
                nature of his conduct with a subordinate federal 
                employee who was a witness in the federal civil 
                rights action brought against him................    54
              b. The President lied in his deposition after being 
                asked if anyone had reported to him within the 
                past two weeks that they had had a conversation 
                with a subordinate federal employee concerning 
                the Jones v. Clinton lawsuit.....................    56
              c. The President lied in his deposition about his 
                being alone or in certain locations with a 
                subordinate federal employee who was a witness in 
                the action brought against him...................    57
              d. The President lied in his deposition about his 
                knowledge of gifts exchanged between himself and 
                a subordinate federal employee who was a witness 
                in the action brought against him................    59
              e. The President lied in his deposition about his 
                knowledge about whether he had ever spoken to a 
                subordinate federal employee about the 
                possibility that such subordinate employee might 
                be called as a witness to testify in the federal 
                civil rights action brought against him..........    61
              f. The President lied in his deposition about his 
                knowledge of the service of a subpoena to a 
                subordinate federal employee to testify as a 
                witness in the federal civil rights action 
                brought against him..............................    62
              g. The President lied in his deposition about his 
                knowledge of the final conversation he had with a 
                subordinate employee who was a witness in the 
                federal civil rights action brought against him..    62
              h. The President lied in his deposition about his 
                knowledge that the contents of an affidavit 
                executed by a subordinate federal employee who 
                was a witness in the federal civil rights action 
                brought against him..............................    63
      C. Article III--Obstruction of Justice.....................    63
          1. The Committee concluded that on or about December 
            17, 1997, William Jefferson Clinton corruptly 
            encouraged a witness in a Federal civil rights action 
            brought against him to execute a sworn affidavit in 
            that proceeding that he knew to be perjurious, false, 
            and misleading.......................................    64
          2. The Committee concluded that on or about December 
            17, 1997, William Jefferson Clinton corruptly 
            encouraged a witness in a Federal civil rights action 
            brought against him to give perjurious, false, and 
            misleading testimony if and when called to testify 
            personally in that proceeding........................    65
          3. The Committee concluded that on or about December 
            28, 1997, William Jefferson Clinton corruptly engaged 
            in, encouraged, or supported a scheme to conceal 
            evidence that had been subpoenaed in a Federal civil 
            rights action brought against him....................    66
          4. The Committee concluded that beginning on or about 
            December 7, 1997, and continuing through and 
            including January 14, 1998, William Jefferson Clinton 
            intensified and succeeded in an effort to secure job 
            assistance for a witness in a Federal civil rights 
            action brought against him in order to corruptly 
            prevent the truthful testimony of that witness in 
            that proceeding at a time when the truthful testimony 
            of that witness would have been harmful to him.......    69
          5. The Committee concluded that on January 17, 1998, at 
            his deposition in a Federal civil rights action 
            brought against him, William Jefferson Clinton 
            corruptly allowed his attorney to make false and 
            misleading statements to a Federal judge 
            characterizing an affidavit, in order to prevent 
            questioning deemed relevant by the judge. Such false 
            and misleading statements were subsequently 
            acknowledged by his attorney in a communication to 
            that judge...........................................    72
          6. The Committee concluded that on or about January 18 
            and January 20-21, 1998, William Jefferson Clinton 
            related a false and misleading account of events 
            relevant to a Federal civil rights action brought 
            against him to a potential witness in that 
            proceeding, in order to corruptly influence the 
            testimony of that witness............................    73
          7. The Committee concluded that on or about January 21, 
            23, and 26, 1998, William Jefferson Clinton made 
            false and misleading statements to potential 
            witnesses in a Federal grand jury proceeding in order 
            to corruptly influence the testimony of those 
            witnesses. The false and misleading statements made 
            by William Jefferson Clinton were repeated by the 
            witnesses to the grand jury, causing the grand jury 
            to receive false and misleading information..........    75
      D. Article IV--Abuse of Power..............................    76
          1. The President abused his power by refusing and 
            failing to respond to certain written requests for 
            admission and willfully made perjurious, false, and 
            misleading sworn statements in response to certain 
            written requests for admission propounded to him by 
            the Committee........................................    76
              a. Request for Admission Number 19.................    77
              b. Request for Admission Number 20.................    78
              c. Request for Admission Number 24.................    79
              d. Request for Admission Number 26.................    79
              e. Request for Admission Number 27.................    80
              f. Request for Admission Number 34.................    80
              g. Request for Admission Number 42.................    81
              h. Request for Admission Number 43.................    82
              i. Request for Admission Number 52.................    82
              j. Request for Admission Number 53.................    83
          2. Explanation of the Gekas Amendment to Article IV....    84
     IV. The Constitutional Process of Impeachment..................106
      A. General Arguments About Impeachment.....................   106
          1. Constitutional Provisions...........................   106
          2. Impeachment is Not Removal from Office..............   106
          3. Impeachment Does Not Overturn an Election...........   107
          4. A Senate Trial of an Impeachment is a Constitutional 
            Process..............................................   107
      B. Articles of Impeachment Against President Clinton.......   108
          1. Article I--Grand Jury Perjury.......................   108
              a. Facts...........................................   108
              b. Lessons from the Judicial Impeachments of the 
                1980s............................................   110
                i. Federal Judges v. Presidents..................   110
                ii. Perjurious, False, and Misleading Statements 
                  Made Under Oath or Subject to Penalty for 
                  Perjury........................................   113
                  a. Judge Harry E. Claiborne....................   113
                  b. Judge Walter Nixon..........................   114
                  c. Judge Alcee Hastings........................   115
                  d. Conclusion..................................   115
                iii. Conduct Not Related to Official Duties......   115
          2. Article II--Perjury in the Civil Case...............   118
          3. Article III--Obstruction of Justice.................   119
              a. Lessons from the Impeachment of President Nixon.   119
              b. Federal Obstruction of Justice Statutes.........   120
          4. Article IV--Abuse of Power..........................   121
  V. Committee Consideration of Impeachment Proceedings.............123
      A. Votes of the Committee..................................   128
          1. Rollcall No. 1--Amendment to Article I Offered by 
            Rep. Rogan...........................................   128
          2. Rollcall No. 2--Article I...........................   129
          3. Rollcall No. 3--Article II..........................   130
          4. Rollcall No. 4--Article III.........................   131
          5. Rollcall No. 5--Amendment to Article IV Offered by 
            Rep. Gekas...........................................   132
          6. Rollcall No. 6--Article IV..........................   134
          7. Rollcall No. 7--Censure Resolution..................   135
      B. Committee Oversight Findings............................   136
      C. Committee on Government Reform and Oversight Findings...   136
      D. New Budget Authority and Tax Expenditures...............   136
      E. Committee Cost Estimate.................................   136
      F. Constitutional Authority................................   137
 VI. Arguments About Censure........................................137
      A. Prohibited Bill of Attainder............................   137
      B. Censure of President Andrew Jackson.....................   139
VII. Additional Views...............................................143
VIII.Minority Views.................................................200

 IX. Dissenting Views...............................................279
  X. Appendices.....................................................307
      Appendix A. House Resolution 525...........................   307
      Appendix B. House Resolution 581...........................   308
      Appendix C. Correspondence.................................   309
      Appendix D. The Committee's 81 Requests to the President 
        for Admission, the President's Responses, and Citations 
        to Relevant Parts of the Record Provided by the 
        Committee's Majority Staff...............................   400
                                                                       



105th Congress                                                   Report
  2d Session              HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES              105-830

=======================================================================


   IMPEACHMENT OF WILLIAM JEFFERSON CLINTON, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED 
                                 STATES

                                _______


 December 16, 1998.--Referred to the House Calendar and ordered to be 
                                printed

                                _______
                                

 Mr. Hyde, from the Committee on the Judiciary, submitted the following

                              R E P O R T

                             together with

               ADDITIONAL, MINORITY, AND DISSENTING VIEWS

    The Committee on the Judiciary, to whom was referred the 
consideration of recommendations concerning the exercise of the 
constitutional power to impeach William Jefferson Clinton, 
President of the United States, having considered the same, 
reports thereon pursuant to H. Res. 581 as follows and 
recommends that the House exercise its constitutional power to 
impeach William Jefferson Clinton, President of the United 
States, and that articles of impeachment be exhibited to the 
Senate as follows:

                               RESOLUTION

    Impeaching William Jefferson Clinton, President of the 
United States, for high crimes and misdemeanors.
    Resolved, That William Jefferson Clinton, President of the 
United States, is impeached for high crimes and misdemeanors, 
and that the following articles of impeachment be exhibited to 
the United States Senate:
    Articles of impeachment exhibited by the House of 
Representatives of the United States of America in the name of 
itself and of the people of the United States of America, 
against William Jefferson Clinton, President of the United 
States of America, in maintenance and support of its 
impeachment against him for high crimes and misdemeanors.

                               Article I

    In his conduct while President of the United States, 
William Jefferson Clinton, in violation of his constitutional 
oath faithfully to execute the office of President of the 
United States and, to the best of his ability, preserve, 
protect, and defend the Constitution of the United States, and 
in violation of his constitutional duty to take care that the 
laws be faithfully executed, has willfully corrupted and 
manipulated the judicial process of the United States for his 
personal gain and exoneration, impeding the administration of 
justice, in that:
    On August 17, 1998, William Jefferson Clinton swore to tell 
the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth before a 
Federal grand jury of the United States. Contrary to that oath, 
William Jefferson Clinton willfully provided perjurious, false 
and misleading testimony to the grand jury concerning one or 
more of the following: (1) the nature and details of his 
relationship with a subordinate Government employee; (2) prior 
perjurious, false and misleading testimony he gave in a Federal 
civil rights action brought against him; (3) prior false and 
misleading statements he allowed his attorney to make to a 
Federal judge in that civil rights action; and (4) his corrupt 
efforts to influence the testimony of witnesses and to impede 
the discovery of evidence in that civil rights action.
    In doing this, William Jefferson Clinton has undermined the 
integrity of his office, has brought disrepute on the 
Presidency, has betrayed his trust as President, and has acted 
in a manner subversive of the rule of law and justice, to the 
manifest injury of the people of the United States.
    Wherefore, William Jefferson Clinton, by such conduct, 
warrants impeachment and trial, and removal from office and 
disqualification to hold and enjoy any office of honor, trust, 
or profit under the United States.

                               Article II

    In his conduct while President of the United States, 
William Jefferson Clinton, in violation of his constitutional 
oath faithfully to execute the office of President of the 
United States and, to the best of his ability, preserve, 
protect, and defend the Constitution of the United States, and 
in violation of his constitutional duty to take care that the 
laws be faithfully executed, has willfully corrupted and 
manipulated the judicial process of the United States for his 
personal gain and exoneration, impeding the administration of 
justice, in that:
          (1) On December 23, 1997, William Jefferson Clinton, 
        in sworn answers to written questions asked as part of 
        a Federal civil rights action brought against him, 
        willfully provided perjurious, false and misleading 
        testimony in response to questions deemed relevant by a 
        Federal judge concerning conduct and proposed conduct 
        with subordinate employees.
          (2) On January 17, 1998, William Jefferson Clinton 
        swore under oath to tell the truth, the whole truth, 
        and nothing but the truth in a deposition given as part 
        of a Federal civil rights action brought against him. 
        Contrary to that oath, William Jefferson Clinton 
        willfully provided perjurious, false and misleading 
        testimony in response to questions deemed relevant by a 
        Federal judge concerning the nature and details of his 
        relationship with a subordinate Government employee, 
        his knowledge of that employee's involvement and 
        participation in the civil rights action brought 
        against him, and his corrupt efforts to influence the 
        testimony of that employee.
    In all of this, William Jefferson Clinton has undermined 
the integrity of his office, has brought disrepute on the 
Presidency, has betrayed his trust as President, and has acted 
in a manner subversive of the rule of law and justice, to the 
manifest injury of the people of the United States.
    Wherefore, William Jefferson Clinton, by such conduct, 
warrants impeachment and trial, and removal from office and 
disqualification to hold and enjoy any office of honor, trust, 
or profit under the United States.

                              Article III

    In his conduct while President of the United States, 
William Jefferson Clinton, in violation of his constitutional 
oath faithfully to execute the office of President of the 
United States and, to the best of his ability, preserve, 
protect, and defend the Constitution of the United States, and 
in violation of his constitutional duty to take care that the 
laws be faithfully executed, has prevented, obstructed, and 
impeded the administration of justice, and has to that end 
engaged personally, and through his subordinates and agents, in 
a course of conduct or scheme designed to delay, impede, cover 
up, and conceal the existence of evidence and testimony related 
to a Federal civil rights action brought against him in a duly 
instituted judicial proceeding.
    The means used to implement this course of conduct or 
scheme included one or more of the following acts:
          (1) On or about December 17, 1997, William Jefferson 
        Clinton corruptly encouraged a witness in a Federal 
        civil rights action brought against him to execute a 
        sworn affidavit in that proceeding that he knew to be 
        perjurious, false and misleading.
          (2) On or about December 17, 1997, William Jefferson 
        Clinton corruptly encouraged a witness in a Federal 
        civil rights action brought against him to give 
        perjurious, false and misleading testimony if and when 
        called to testify personally in that proceeding.
          (3) On or about December 28, 1997, William Jefferson 
        Clinton corruptly engaged in, encouraged, or supported 
        a scheme to conceal evidence that had been subpoenaed 
        in a Federal civil rights action brought against him.
          (4) Beginning on or about December 7, 1997, and 
        continuing through and including January 14, 1998, 
        William Jefferson Clinton intensified and succeeded in 
        an effort to secure job assistance to a witness in a 
        Federal civil rights action brought against him in 
        order to corruptly prevent the truthful testimony of 
        that witness in that proceeding at a time when the 
        truthful testimony of that witness would have been 
        harmful to him.
          (5) On January 17, 1998, at his deposition in a 
        Federal civil rights action brought against him, 
        William Jefferson Clinton corruptly allowed his 
        attorney to make false and misleading statements to a 
        Federal judge characterizing an affidavit, in order to 
        prevent questioning deemed relevant by the judge. Such 
        false and misleading statements were subsequently 
        acknowledged by his attorney in a communication to that 
        judge.
          (6) On or about January 18 and January 20-21, 1998, 
        William Jefferson Clinton related a false and 
        misleading account of events relevant to a Federal 
        civil rights action brought against him to a potential 
        witness in that proceeding, in order to corruptly 
        influence the testimony of that witness.
          (7) On or about January 21, 23 and 26, 1998, William 
        Jefferson Clinton made false and misleading statements 
        to potential witnesses in a Federal grand jury 
        proceeding in order to corruptly influence the 
        testimony of those witnesses. The false and misleading 
        statements made by William Jefferson Clinton were 
        repeated by the witnesses to the grand jury, causing 
        the grand jury to receive false and misleading 
        information.
    In all of this, William Jefferson Clinton has undermined 
the integrity of his office, has brought disrepute on the 
Presidency, has betrayed his trust as President, and has acted 
in a manner subversive of the rule of law and justice, to the 
manifest injury of the people of the United States.
    Wherefore, William Jefferson Clinton, by such conduct, 
warrants impeachment and trial, and removal from office and 
disqualification to hold and enjoy any office of honor, trust, 
or profit under the United States.

                               Article IV

    Using the powers and influence of the office of President 
of the United States, William Jefferson Clinton, in violation 
of his constitutional oath faithfully to execute the office of 
President of the United States and, to the best of his ability, 
preserve, protect, and defend the Constitution of the United 
States, and in disregard of his constitutional duty to take 
care that the laws be faithfully executed, has engaged in 
conduct that resulted in misuse and abuse of his high office, 
impaired the due and proper administration of justice and the 
conduct of lawful inquiries, and contravened the authority of 
the legislative branch and the truth seeking purpose of a 
coordinate investigative proceeding, in that, as President, 
William Jefferson Clinton refused and failed to respond to 
certain written requests for admission and willfully made 
perjurious, false and misleading sworn statements in response 
to certain written requests for admission propounded to him as 
part of the impeachment inquiry authorized by the House of 
Representatives of the Congress of the United States. William 
Jefferson Clinton, in refusing and failing to respond and in 
making perjurious, false and misleading statements, assumed to 
himself functions and judgments necessary to the exercise of 
the sole power of impeachment vested by the Constitution in the 
House of Representatives and exhibited contempt for the 
inquiry.
    In doing this, William Jefferson Clinton has undermined the 
integrity of his office, has brought disrepute on the 
Presidency, has betrayed his trust as President, and has acted 
in a manner subversive of the rule of law and justice, to the 
manifest injury of the people of the United States.
    Wherefore, William Jefferson Clinton, by such conduct, 
warrants impeachment and trial, and removal from office and 
disqualification to hold and enjoy any office of honor, trust, 
or profit under the United States.

                            I. INTRODUCTION

    ``Equal Justice Under Law''--That principle so embodies the 
American constitutional order that we have carved it in stone 
on the front of our Supreme Court. The carving shines like a 
beacon from the highest sanctum of the Judicial Branch across 
to the Capitol, the home of the Legislative Branch, and down 
Pennsylvania Avenue to the White House, the home of the 
Executive Branch. It illuminates our national life and reminds 
those other branches that despite the tumbling tides of 
politics, ours is a government of laws and not of men. It was 
the inspired vision of our founders and framers that the 
Judicial, Legislative, and Executive branches would work 
together to preserve the rule of law.
    But ``Equal Justice Under Law'' amounts to much more than a 
stone carving. Although we cannot see or hear it, this living, 
breathing force has real consequences in the lives of average 
citizens every day. Ultimately, it protects us from the knock 
on the door in the middle of the night. More commonly, it 
allows us to claim the assistance of the government when 
someone has wronged us--even if that person is stronger or 
wealthier or more popular than we are. In America, unlike other 
countries, when the average citizen sues the Chief Executive of 
our nation, they stand equal before the bar of justice. The 
Constitution requires the judicial branch of our government to 
apply the law equally to both. That is the living consequence 
of ``Equal Justice Under Law.''
    The President of the United States must work with the 
Judicial and Legislative branches to sustain that force. The 
temporary trustee of that office, William Jefferson Clinton, 
worked to defeat it. When he stood before the bar of justice, 
he acted without authority to award himself the special 
privileges of lying and obstructing to gain an advantage in a 
federal civil rights action in the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Arkansas, in a federal grand jury 
investigation in the United States District Court for the 
District of Columbia, and in an impeachment inquiry in the 
United States House of Representatives. His resistance brings 
us to this most unfortunate juncture.
    So ``Equal Justice Under Law'' lies at the heart of this 
matter. It rests on three essential pillars: an impartial 
judiciary, an ethical bar, and a sacred oath. If litigants 
profane the sanctity of the oath, ``Equal Justice Under Law'' 
loses its protective force. Against that backdrop, consider the 
actions of President Clinton.
    On May 27, 1997, the nine justices of the Supreme Court of 
the United States unanimously ruled that Paula Corbin Jones 
could pursue her federal civil rights action against William 
Jefferson Clinton. Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681 (1997). On 
December 11, 1997, United States District Judge Susan Webber 
Wright ordered President Clinton to provide Ms. Jones with 
answers to certain routine questions relevant to the lawsuit. 
Acting under the authority of these court orders, Ms. Jones 
exercised her rights--rights that every litigant has under our 
system of justice. She sought answers from President Clinton to 
help her prove her case against him--just as President Clinton 
sought and received answers from her. President Clinton used 
numerous means to prevent her from getting truthful answers.
    On December 17, 1997, he encouraged a witness, whose 
truthful testimony would have helped Ms. Jones, to file a false 
affidavit in the case and to testify falsely if she were called 
to testify in the case. On December 23, 1997, he provided, 
under oath, false written answers to Ms. Jones's questions. On 
December 28, 1997, he began an effort to get the witness to 
conceal evidence that would have helped Ms. Jones. Throughout 
this period, he intensified efforts to provide the witness with 
help in getting a job to ensure that she carried out his 
designs.
    On January 17, 1998, President Clinton provided, under 
oath, numerous false answers to Ms. Jones's questions during 
his deposition. In the days immediately following the 
deposition, he provided a false and misleading account to 
another witness, Betty Currie, in hopes that she would 
substantiate the false testimony he gave in the deposition. 
These actions denied Ms. Jones her rights as a litigant, 
subverted the fundamental truth seeking function of the United 
States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas, and 
violated President Clinton's constitutional oath to ``preserve, 
protect and defend the Constitution of the United States'' and 
his constitutional duty to ``take care that the laws be 
faithfully executed.''
    Beginning shortly after his deposition, President Clinton 
became aware that a federal grand jury empaneled by the United 
States District Court for the District of Columbia was 
investigating his actions before and during his civil 
deposition. President Clinton made numerous false statements to 
potential grand jury witnesses in hopes that they would repeat 
these statements to the grand jury. On August 17, 1998, 
President Clinton appeared before the grand jury by video and, 
under oath, provided numerous false answers to the questions 
asked. These actions impeded the grand jury's investigation, 
subverted the fundamental truth seeking function of the United 
States District Court for the District of Columbia, and 
violated President Clinton's constitutional oath to ``preserve, 
protect and defend the Constitution of the United States'' and 
his constitutional duty to ``take care that the laws be 
faithfully executed.''
    President Clinton's actions then led to this inquiry. On 
October 8, 1998, the United States House of Representatives 
passed House Resolution 581 directing the Committee on the 
Judiciary to begin an inquiry to determine whether President 
Clinton should be impeached. As part of that inquiry, the 
Committee sent written requests for admission to him. On 
November 27, 1998, President Clinton provided, under oath, 
numerous false statements to this Committee in response to the 
requests for admission. These actions impeded the committee's 
inquiry, subverted the fundamental truth seeking function of 
the United States House of Representatives in exercising the 
sole power of impeachment, and violated President Clinton's 
constitutional oath to ``preserve, protect and defend the 
Constitution of the United States'' and his constitutional duty 
to ``take care that the laws be faithfully executed.''
    By these actions, President Clinton violated the sanctity 
of the oath without which ``Equal Justice Under Law'' cannot 
survive. Rather than work with the Judicial and Legislative 
branches to uphold the rule of law, he directly attacked their 
fundamental truth seeking function. He has disgraced himself 
and the high office he holds. His high crimes and misdemeanors 
undermine our Constitution. They warrant his impeachment, his 
removal from office, and his disqualification from holding 
further office.

                             II. NARRATIVE

                     A. The Paula Jones Litigation

    On May 6, 1994, Paula Corbin Jones filed a federal civil 
rights lawsuit against President Clinton in the United States 
District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas. This 
lawsuit arose out of an incident that Ms. Jones alleged 
occurred in 1991 while she was an Arkansas state employee and 
President Clinton was Governor of Arkansas. Ms. Jones alleged 
that then Governor Clinton had an Arkansas state trooper invite 
Ms. Jones to his hotel room where he made a crude sexual 
advance toward her and she rejected it.
    After Ms. Jones brought the lawsuit, President Clinton 
claimed that the Constitution requires that any such lawsuit be 
deferred until his term ended. The parties litigated this 
question, and ultimately the Supreme Court of the United States 
decided unanimously that Ms. Jones could proceed with her 
lawsuit without waiting for President Clinton's term to end. 
Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681 (1997).
    The discovery phase of the lawsuit began shortly 
thereafter. During the discovery phase, Judge Susan Webber 
Wright of the United States District Court for the Eastern 
District of Arkansas ordered President Clinton to answer 
certain questions about any history he had of involvement in 
sexual relationships with state or federal employees. Such 
questions are standard in sexual harassment lawsuits, and they 
help to establish whether the defendant has engaged in a 
pattern and practice of harassing conduct. President Clinton's 
efforts to resist giving truthful answers to these questions 
gave rise to this matter.

   B. The Relationship Between President Clinton and Monica Lewinsky

    Monica Lewinsky, a 21-year-old intern, was working at the 
White House during the government shutdown in November, 1995. 
Before their first intimate encounter, she had never even 
spoken with the President. Sometime on November 15, 1995, Ms. 
Lewinsky made an improper gesture to the President. Rather than 
rebuff the gesture, President Clinton invited this unknown 
young intern into a private area off the Oval Office, where he 
kissed her. He then invited her back to the same area later 
that day. When she returned, the two engaged in the first of 
many acts of inappropriate sexual contact.
    Thereafter, the two continued their secret liaisons, and 
they concocted a cover story to use if they were discovered. If 
Ms. Lewinsky was seen, she was to say she was bringing papers 
to the President. That story was false. The only papers she 
brought were personal messages having nothing to do with her 
duties or the President's. After Ms. Lewinsky moved from the 
White House to the Pentagon, she and President Clinton 
disguised her frequent visits to the White House as visits to 
Betty Currie. Those cover stories play a vital role in the 
later perjuries and obstruction of justice.
    Over the term of their relationship the following 
significant matters occurred:
          1. Monica Lewinsky and President Clinton were alone 
        on at least 21 occasions;
          2. They had at least eleven personal sexual 
        encounters, other than phone sex: 3 in 1995, 5 in 1996, 
        and 3 in 1997;
          3. They had at least 55 telephone conversations, at 
        least 17 of which involved phone sex;
          4. President Clinton gave Ms. Lewinsky 24 presents; 
        and,
          5. Ms. Lewinsky gave President Clinton 40 presents.
See generally Appendices at 116-26.
    These essential facts form the backdrop for all of the 
subsequent events. During the fall of 1997, the relationship 
was largely dormant. Ms. Lewinsky was working at the Pentagon 
and looking for a high paying job in New York. Discovery in the 
Paula Jones case was proceeding slowly, and no one seemed to 
care about the outcome. Then, in the first week of December 
1997, things began to unravel.
    The sexual details of the President's encounters with Ms. 
Lewinsky need not be described in detail. However, those 
encounters are highly relevant because the President repeatedly 
lied about that sexual relationship in the civil case, before 
the grand jury, and in his responses to this Committee's 
questions. In an effort to support the original lies he told in 
the civil case, he has consistently maintained that Ms. 
Lewinsky performed sexual acts on him, while he never touched 
her in a sexual manner. President Clinton's characterization of 
the relationship directly contradicts Ms. Lewinsky's testimony, 
the sworn grand jury testimony of three of her friends, and the 
statements by two professional counselors with whom Ms. 
Lewinsky contemporaneously shared the details of her 
relationship.

   C. The Events of December 5-6, 1997--President Clinton Learns Ms. 
                    Lewinsky is on the Witness List

    On Friday, December 5, 1997, Ms. Lewinsky asked Betty 
Currie, President Clinton's personal secretary, if President 
Clinton could see her the next day, Saturday. Ms. Currie said 
that he was scheduled to meet with his lawyers all day. 
Lewinsky 8/6/98 GJT at 107-08. Later that Friday, Ms. Lewinsky 
spoke briefly to President Clinton at a Christmas party. 
Lewinsky 7/31/98 302 at 1; Lewinsky 8/6/98 GJT at 108.
    That evening, Paula Jones's attorneys faxed a list of 
potential witnesses to President Clinton's attorneys. The list 
included the name of Ms. Lewinsky. However, Ms. Lewinsky did 
not find out that her name was on the list until President 
Clinton told her ten days later on December 17. Lewinsky 8/6/98 
GJT at 121-23. That delay is significant.
    After her conversation with Ms. Currie and her conversation 
with President Clinton at the Christmas party, Ms. Lewinsky 
drafted a letter to President Clinton terminating their 
relationship. Lewinsky 7/31/98 302 at 2. The next morning, 
Saturday, December 6, Ms. Lewinsky went to the White House to 
deliver the letter and some gifts for President Clinton to Ms. 
Currie. Lewinsky 8/6/98 GJT at 108-09. When she arrived at the 
White House, Ms. Lewinsky spoke to several Secret Service 
officers, and one of them told her that President Clinton was 
not with his lawyers, as she had been told, but rather, he was 
meeting with another woman. Lewinsky 8/6/98 GJT at 111; Mondale 
7/16/98 302 at 1. Ms. Lewinsky called Ms. Currie from a pay 
phone, angrily exchanged words with her, and went home. 
Lewinsky 8/6/98 GJT at 112-13; Currie 1/27/98 GJT at 37. After 
that phone call, Ms. Currie told the Secret Service watch 
commander that President Clinton was so upset about the 
disclosure of his meeting with the woman that he wanted to fire 
someone. Purdie 7/23/98 GJT at 13, 18-19.
    At 12:05 p.m. on December 6th, records demonstrate that Ms. 
Currie paged Bruce Lindsey with the message: ``Call Betty 
ASAP.'' Around that same time, according to Ms. Lewinsky, while 
she was back at her apartment, Ms. Lewinsky and President 
Clinton spoke on the telephone. President Clinton was very 
angry; he told Ms. Lewinsky that no one had ever treated him as 
poorly as she had. Lewinsky 8/6/98 GJT at 113-14. President 
Clinton acknowledged to the grand jury that he was upset about 
Ms. Lewinsky's behavior and considered it inappropriate. 
Clinton 8/17/98 GJT at 85. Nevertheless, in a sudden change of 
mood, he invited her to visit him at the White House that 
afternoon. Lewinsky 8/6/98 GJT at 114.
    Ms. Lewinsky arrived at the White House for the second time 
that day, and she was cleared to enter at 12:52 p.m. Although, 
in Ms. Lewinsky's words, the President was ``very angry'' with 
her during their recent telephone conversation, he was 
``sweet'' and ``very affectionate'' during this visit. Lewinsky 
8/6/98 GJT at 113-15. He also told her that he would talk to 
Vernon Jordan, a Washington lawyer and close personal friend of 
President Clinton's, about her job situation. Lewinsky 8/6/98 
GJT at 115-16.
    President Clinton also suddenly changed his attitude toward 
the Secret Service. Ms. Currie informed some officers that if 
they kept quiet about the Lewinsky incident, they would not be 
disciplined. Currie 7/22/98 GJT at 91-92; Williams 7/23/98 GJT 
at 25, 27-28; Chinery 7/23/98 GJT at 22-23. According to the 
Secret Service watch commander, Captain Jeffrey Purdie, the 
President personally told him, ``I hope you use your 
discretion'' or ``I hope I can count on your discretion.'' 
Purdie 7/17/98 GJT at 3, 7/23/98 GJT at 32. Deputy Chief 
Charles O'Malley, Captain Purdie's supervisor, testified that 
he knew of no other incident in his fourteen years of service 
at the White House in which a President raised a performance 
issue with a member of the Secret Service Uniformed Division. 
O'Malley 9/8/98 Dep. at 40-41. After his conversation with 
President Clinton, Captain Purdie told a number of officers 
that they should not discuss the Lewinsky incident. Porter 8/
13/98 GJT at 12; Niedzwiecki 7/30/98 GJT at 30-31.
    When President Clinton was questioned before the grand jury 
about his statements to the Secret Service, he testified ``I 
don't remember what I said and I don't remember to whom I said 
it.'' Clinton 8/17/98 GJT at 86. When confronted with Captain 
Purdie's testimony, the President testified, ``I don't remember 
anything I said to him in that regard. I have no recollection 
of that whatever.'' Clinton 8/17/98 GJT at 91.
    President Clinton testified before the grand jury that he 
learned that Ms. Lewinsky was on the Jones witness list that 
evening, Saturday, December 6, during a meeting with his 
lawyers. Clinton 8/17/98 GJT at 83-84. He stood by this answer 
in response to Request Number 16 submitted by this Committee. 
The meeting occurred around 5 p.m., after Ms. Lewinsky had left 
the White House. Lindsey 3/12/98 GJT at 64-66. According to 
Bruce Lindsey, at the meeting, Robert Bennett, the President's 
attorney, had a copy of the Jones witness list which had been 
faxed to Bennett the previous night. Lindsey 3/12/98 GJT at 65-
67.
    However, during his deposition, President Clinton testified 
that he had heard about the witness list before he saw it. 
Clinton 1/17/98 Dep. at 70. In other words, if President 
Clinton testified truthfully in his deposition, then he knew 
about the witness list before the 5 p.m. meeting. It is 
reasonable to infer that hearing Ms. Lewinsky's name on a 
witness list prompted President Clinton's sudden and otherwise 
unexplained change from ``very angry'' to ``very affectionate'' 
that Saturday afternoon. It is also reasonable to infer that it 
prompted him to give the unique instruction to a Secret Service 
watch commander to use ``discretion'' regarding Ms. Lewinsky's 
visit to the White House, which the watch commander interpreted 
as an instruction to remain silent about the incident. Purdie 
7/17/98 GJT at 20-21.

                D. The Search for a Job for Ms. Lewinsky

    Ms. Lewinsky had been searching for a highly paid job in 
New York since the previous July. She had not had much success 
despite President Clinton's promise to help. In early November, 
Ms. Currie arranged a meeting with Mr. Jordan who was supposed 
to help.
    On November 5, Ms. Lewinsky met for 20 minutes with Mr. 
Jordan. Lewinsky 8/6/98 GJT at 104. No action followed, no job 
interviews were arranged, and Ms. Lewinsky had no further 
contacts with Mr. Jordan at that time. Mr. Jordan made no 
effort to find a job for Ms. Lewinsky. Indeed, it was so 
unimportant to him that he testified that he ``had no 
recollection of an early November meeting'' and that finding a 
job for Ms. Lewinsky was not a priority. Jordan 3/3/98 GJT at 
50, 5/5/98 GJT at 76. Nothing happened during the month of 
November because Mr. Jordan was either gone or would not return 
Ms. Lewinsky's calls. Lewinsky 8/6/98 GJT at 105-06.
    During the December 6 meeting with President Clinton, Ms. 
Lewinsky mentioned that she had not been able to reach Mr. 
Jordan and that it did not seem he had done anything to help 
her. Clinton 8/17/98 GJT at 84. President Clinton responded by 
stating, ``Oh, I'll talk to him. I'll get on it,'' or something 
to that effect. Lewinsky 8/6/98 GJT at 116. There was still no 
urgency to help Ms. Lewinsky. Mr. Jordan met President Clinton 
the next day, December 7, but the meeting had nothing to do 
with Ms. Lewinsky. Jordan 5/5/98 GJT at 83, 116.
    The first activity calculated to help Ms. Lewinsky actually 
get a job took place on December 11. Mr. Jordan met with Ms. 
Lewinsky and gave her a list of contact names. The two also 
discussed President Clinton. Lewinsky 8/6/98 GJT at 119-20. Mr. 
Jordan remembered that meeting. Jordan 3/5/98 GJT at 41. Mr. 
Jordan immediately placed calls to two prospective employers. 
Jordan 3/3/98 GJT at 54, 62-63. Later in the afternoon, he even 
called President Clinton to report on his job search efforts. 
Jordan 3/3/98 GJT at 64-66. Suddenly, Mr. Jordan and President 
Clinton were now very interested in helping Ms. Lewinsky find a 
good job in New York. Jordan 5/5/98 GJT at 95.
    Something happened that changed the priority assigned to 
the job search. On the morning of December 11, 1997, Judge 
Susan Webber Wright ordered President Clinton to provide 
information regarding any state or federal employee with whom 
he had, proposed, or sought sexual relations. To keep Ms. 
Lewinsky satisfied was now of critical importance.

   E. The Events of December 17, 1997--President Clinton Informs Ms. 
                Lewinsky that She is on the Witness List

    On December 17, 1997, between 2:00 and 2:30 in the morning, 
Monica Lewinsky's phone rang unexpectedly. It was President 
Clinton. He said that he wanted to tell Ms. Lewinsky two 
things. One was that Ms. Currie's brother had been killed in a 
car accident. Second, he said that he ``had some more bad 
news''--that he had seen the witness list for the Jones case 
and Ms. Lewinsky's name was on it. Lewinsky 8/6/98 GJT at 123. 
He told Ms. Lewinsky that seeing her name on the list ``broke 
his heart.'' He then told her that ``if [she] were to be 
subpoenaed, [she] should contact Betty and let Betty know that 
[she] had received the subpoena.'' Lewinsky 8/6/98 GJT at 123. 
Ms. Lewinsky asked what she should do if subpoenaed. President 
Clinton responded: ``Well, maybe you can sign an affidavit.'' 
Lewinsky 8/6/98 GJT at 123. Both knew that the affidavit would 
have to be false and misleading to avoid Ms. Lewinsky's having 
to testify.
    Then, the President made a pointed suggestion to Monica 
Lewinsky, a suggestion that left little room for compromise. He 
did not say specifically ``go in and lie.'' What he did say is 
``you know, you can always say you were coming to see Betty or 
that you were bringing me letters.''
    To understand the significance of this statement, one must 
recall the cover stories that President Clinton and Ms. 
Lewinsky had previously agreed on to deceive those who 
protected and worked with the President.
    Ms. Lewinsky was to say that she was simply delivering 
papers when she visited President Clinton. When she saw him, 
she would say: ``Oh, gee, here are your letters,'' and he would 
answer, ``okay that's good.'' After Ms. Lewinsky left 
employment at the White House, she was to return to the Oval 
Office under the guise of visiting Betty Currie, not President 
Clinton. Moreover, Ms. Lewinsky promised him that she would 
always deny the sexual relationship and always protect him. The 
President would respond ``that's good'' or similar language of 
encouragement.
    When President Clinton called Ms. Lewinsky to tell her she 
was on the witness list, he made sure to remind her of those 
prior cover stories. Ms. Lewinsky testified that when he 
brought up the misleading story, she understood that the two 
would continue their pre-existing pattern of deception. 
President Clinton had no intention of making his sexual 
relationship with Ms. Lewinsky a public affair. He would use 
lies, deceit, and deception to ensure that the truth would not 
be known.
    When the President was asked by the grand jury whether he 
remembered calling Monica Lewinsky at 2:00 a.m., he responded: 
``No sir, I don't. But it would--it is quite possible that that 
happened . . .'' Clinton 8/17/98 GJT at 116. When he was asked 
whether he encouraged Ms. Lewinsky to continue the cover 
stories of ``coming to see Betty'' or ``bringing the letters,'' 
he answered: ``I don't remember exactly what I told her that 
night.'' Clinton 8/17/98 GJT at 117.
    Six days earlier, he had become aware that Ms. Jones's 
lawyers were now able to inquire about other women. Ms. 
Lewinsky could file a false affidavit, but it might not work. 
It was absolutely essential that both parties tell the same 
story. He knew that he would lie if asked about Ms. Lewinsky; 
and he wanted to make certain that she would lie also.
    But President Clinton had an additional problem. It was not 
enough that he and Ms. Lewinsky simply deny the relationship. 
The evidence was accumulating. And the evidence was driving the 
President to reevaluate his defense. By this time, the evidence 
was establishing, through records and eyewitness accounts, that 
President Clinton and Ms. Lewinsky were spending a significant 
amount of time together in the Oval Office complex. The 
unassailable facts were forcing President Clinton to 
acknowledge the relationship. But at this point, he still had 
the opportunity to establish an explanation for their meetings 
that did not reveal the sexual relationship. He still had this 
opportunity because his DNA had not yet been identified on Ms. 
Lewinsky's blue dress. For that reason, President Clinton 
needed Ms. Lewinsky to go along with the cover story to provide 
an innocent explanation for their frequent meetings. And that 
innocent explanation came in the form of ``document 
deliveries'' and ``friendly chats with Betty Currie.''
    When the President was deposed on January 17, 1998, he used 
the exact same cover stories that Ms. Lewinsky had used. In 
doing so, he maintained consistency with any future Lewinsky 
testimony while also maintaining his defense in the Jones 
lawsuit. In his deposition, he was asked whether he was ever 
alone with Ms. Lewinsky. He responded: ``I don't recall . . . 
She--it seems to me she brought things to me once or twice on 
the weekends. In that case, whatever time she would be in 
there, drop it off, exchange a few words and go, she was 
there.'' Clinton 1/17/98 Dep. at 52-53 (emphasis added).
    Additionally, whenever questions were posed regarding Ms. 
Lewinsky's frequent visits to the Oval Office, President 
Clinton never hesitated to bring Betty Currie's name into his 
answers:
          A. And my recollection is that on a couple of 
        occasions after [the pizza party meeting], she was 
        there [in the Oval Office] but my secretary, Betty 
        Currie, was there with her.

Clinton 1/17/98 Dep. at 58.

          Q. When was the last time you spoke with Monica 
        Lewinsky?
          A. I'm trying to remember. Probably sometime before 
        Christmas. She came by to see Betty sometime before 
        Christmas. And she was there talking to her, and I 
        stuck my head out, said hello to her.

Clinton 1/17/98 Dep. at 68. Or in another example:

          Q. Mr. President, before the break, we were talking 
        about Monica Lewinsky. At any time were you and Monica 
        Lewinsky together alone in the Oval Office?
          A. I don't recall, but as I said, when she worked at 
        the legislative affairs office, they always had 
        somebody there on the weekends. I typically worked some 
        on the weekends. Sometimes they'd bring me things on 
        the weekends. She--it seems to me she brought things to 
        me once or twice on the weekends. In that case, 
        whatever time she would be in there, drop it off, 
        exchange a few words and go, she was there. I don't 
        have any specific recollections of what the issues 
        were, what was going on, but when the Congress is 
        there, we're working all the time, and typically I 
        would do some work on one of the days of the weekends 
        in the afternoon.
          Q. So I understand, your testimony is that it was 
        possible, then, that you were alone with her, but you 
        have no specific recollection of that ever happening?
          A. Yes, that's correct. It's possible that she, in, 
        while she was working there, brought something to me 
        and that at the time she brought it to me, she was the 
        only person there. That's possible.
          Q. At any time were you and Monica Lewinsky alone in 
        the hallway between the Oval Office and this kitchen 
        area?
          A. I don't believe so, unless we were walking back to 
        the back dining room with the pizza. I just, I don't 
        remember. I don't believe we were alone in the hallway, 
        no.
          Q. At any time have you and Monica Lewinsky ever been 
        alone together in any room in the White House?
          A. I think I testified to that earlier. I think that 
        there is a, it is--I have no specific recollection, but 
        it seems to me that she was on duty on a couple of 
        occasions working for the legislative affairs office 
        and brought me some things to sign, something on the 
        weekend. That's--I have a general memory of that.
          Q. Do you remember anything that was said in any of 
        those meetings?
          A. No. You know, we just have conversation, I don't 
        remember.

Clinton 1/17/98 Dep. at 52-53, 58-59.

  F. The Events of December 19, 1997--Ms. Lewinsky Receives a Subpoena

    President Clinton and Ms. Lewinsky realized their greatest 
fears on December 19, 1997, when Ms. Lewinsky received a 
subpoena to testify in a deposition on January 23, 1998 in the 
Jones case. Lewinsky 8/6/98 GJT at 128. It also called for her 
to produce gifts given to her by President Clinton, including a 
hat pin. Extremely distraught, she immediately called Mr. 
Jordan. Ms. Lewinsky testified that President Clinton 
previously told her to call Ms. Currie if she were subpoenaed. 
She called Mr. Jordan instead because Ms. Currie's brother 
recently died, and Ms. Lewinsky did not want to bother her. 
Lewinsky 8/6/98 GJT at 128-29.
    Mr. Jordan invited Ms. Lewinsky to his office and she 
arrived shortly before 5 p.m. She was still extremely 
distraught. Sometime around this time, Mr. Jordan called 
President Clinton and told him Ms. Lewinsky had been 
subpoenaed. Jordan 5/5/98 GJT at 145. During the meeting with 
Ms. Lewinsky, which Mr. Jordan characterized as ``disturbing,'' 
she talked about her infatuation with President Clinton. Jordan 
3/3/98 GJT at 100, 150. Mr. Jordan also decided that he would 
call a lawyer for her. Jordan 3/3/98 GJT at 161. That evening, 
Mr. Jordan met with President Clinton and relayed his 
conversation with Ms. Lewinsky. The details are important 
because President Clinton, in his deposition, testified that he 
did not recall that meeting.
    Mr. Jordan told President Clinton again that Ms. Lewinsky 
had been subpoenaed, that he was concerned about her 
fascination with President Clinton, and that Ms. Lewinsky had 
asked Mr. Jordan if he thought President Clinton would leave 
the First Lady. He also asked President Clinton if he had 
sexual relations with Ms. Lewinsky. Jordan 3/3/98 GJT at 169. 
President Clinton was asked:

          Q. Did anyone other than your attorneys ever tell you 
        that Monica Lewinsky had been served with a subpoena in 
        this case?
          A. I don't think so.
          Q. Did you ever talk with Monica Lewinsky about the 
        possibility that she might be asked to testify in this 
        case?
          A. Bruce Lindsey, I think Bruce Lindsey told me that 
        she was, I think maybe that's the first person told me 
        she was. I want to be as accurate as I can.

Clinton 1/17/98 Dep. at 68-69.
    In the grand jury, President Clinton first repeated his 
denial that Mr. Jordan told him Ms. Lewinsky had been 
subpoenaed. Clinton 8/17/98 GJT at 39. Then, when given more 
specific facts, he admitted that he ``knows now'' that he spoke 
with Mr. Jordan about the subpoena on the night of December 19, 
but his ``memory is not clear.'' Clinton 8/17/98 GJT at 41-42. 
In an attempt to explain away his false deposition testimony, 
the President testified in the grand jury that he was trying to 
remember who told him first. Clinton 8/17/98 GJT at 41. But 
that was not the question. So his answer was again false and 
misleading. When one considers the nature of the conversation 
between President Clinton and Mr. Jordan, the suggestion that 
President Clinton forgot it defies common sense.

   G. The Events of December 28, 1997--Ms. Currie Retrieves the Gifts

    December 28, 1997 is a crucial date because the evidence 
shows that President Clinton made false and misleading 
statements to the federal court, the federal grand jury and the 
Congress of the United States about the events on that date. He 
also continued his course of obstructing justice.
    President Clinton testified that it was ``possible'' that 
he invited Ms. Lewinsky to the White House for a visit on this 
date. Clinton 8/17/98 GJT at 34. He admitted that he 
``probably'' gave Ms. Lewinsky the most gifts he had ever given 
her on that date and that he had given her gifts on other 
occasions. Clinton 8/17/98 GJT at 35. Among the many gifts the 
President gave Ms. Lewinsky on December 28 was a bear that he 
said was a symbol of strength. Clinton 8/17/98 GJT at 176. Yet 
on January 17, just three weeks later, the President forgot 
that he had given any gifts to Monica:

          Q. Well, have you ever given any gifts to Monica 
        Lewinsky?
          A. I don't recall. Do you know what they were?
          Q. A hat pin?
          A. I don't, I don't remember. But I certainly could 
        have.

Clinton 1/17/98 Dep. at 75.
    As an attorney, he knew that the law will not tolerate 
someone who says ``I don't recall'' when that answer is 
unreasonable under the circumstances. He also knew that, under 
those circumstances, his answer in the deposition could not be 
believed. When asked in the grand jury why he was unable to 
remember, though he had given Ms. Lewinsky so many gifts only 
three weeks before the deposition, the President gave a 
contrived explanation:

          A. I think what I meant there was I don't recall what 
        they were, not that I don't recall whether I had given 
        them.

Clinton 8/17/98 GJT at 51.
    President Clinton adopted that same answer in Response No. 
42 to the Committee's Requests for Admissions. He was not asked 
in the deposition to identify the gifts. He was simply asked, 
``Have you ever'' given gifts to Ms. Lewinsky. The law does not 
allow a witness to insert ``unstated premises'' or mental 
reservations into the question to make his answer technically 
true, if factually false. The essence of lying is in deception, 
not in words.
    His false testimony with respect to gifts also extends to 
whether Ms. Lewinsky gave him gifts. President Clinton was 
asked in the deposition if Ms. Lewinsky ever gave him gifts.

          Q. Has Monica Lewinsky ever given you any gifts?
          A. Once or twice. I think she's given me a book or 
        two.

Clinton 1/17/98 Dep. at 76-77.
    This is also false testimony. He answered this question in 
his Response Number 43 to the Committee by saying that he 
receives numerous gifts, and he did not focus on the precise 
number. The law again does not support the President's 
position. An answer that ``baldly understates a numerical 
fact'' in ``response to a specific quantitative inquiry'' can 
be deemed ``technically true'' but actually false. For example, 
a witness is testifying falsely if he says he went to the store 
five times when in fact he had gone fifty, even though 
technically he had gone five times also. So too, when the 
President answered once or twice in the face of evidence that 
Ms. Lewinsky brought him 40 gifts, he was lying.
    On December 28, one of the most blatant efforts to obstruct 
justice and conceal evidence occurred. Ms. Lewinsky testified 
that she discussed with President Clinton her having been 
subpoenaed and the subpoena's calling for her to produce gifts. 
She recalled telling him that the subpoena requested a hat pin 
and that that caused her concern. Lewinsky 8/6/98 GJT at 151-
52. He told her that it ``bothered'' him, too. Lewinsky 8/20/98 
GJT at 66. Ms. Lewinsky then suggested that she take the gifts 
somewhere, or give them to someone, possibly Ms. Currie. The 
President answered: ``I don't know'' or ``Let me think about 
that.'' Lewinsky 8/6/98 GJT at 152- 53. Later that day, Ms. 
Lewinsky got a call from Ms. Currie, who said: ``I understand 
you have something to give me'' or ``the President said you 
have something to give me.'' Lewinsky 8/6/98 GJT at 154-55. Ms. 
Currie has an unclear memory about this incident, but says that 
``the best she can remember,'' Ms. Lewinsky called her. Currie 
5/6/98 GJT at 105. Key evidence shows that Ms. Currie's unclear 
recollection is wrong. Ms. Lewinsky said that she thought Ms. 
Currie called from her cell phone. Lewinsky 8/6/98 GJT at 154-
55. Ms. Currie's cell phone record corroborates Ms. Lewinsky 
and proves conclusively that Ms. Currie called Ms. Lewinsky 
from her cell phone several hours after she had left the White 
House. The evidence strongly suggests that President Clinton 
directed her to do so.
    Ms. Currie's actions buttress that conclusion. There is no 
evidence that she asked why Ms. Lewinsky would have called her 
for this strange task. Rather, she simply took the gifts and 
placed them under her bed without asking a single question. 
Currie 1/27/98 GJT at 57-58, 5/6/98 GJT at 105-08, 114.
    President Clinton stated in his Response to Requests for 
Admissions No. 24 and 25 from this Committee that he was not 
concerned about the gifts. In fact, he said that he recalled 
telling Ms. Lewinsky that if the Jones lawyers request gifts, 
she should turn them over. He testified that he is ``not sure'' 
if he knew the subpoena asked for gifts. Clinton 8/17/98 GJT at 
42-43. There would be no reason for Ms. Lewinsky and President 
Clinton to discuss turning over gifts to the Jones lawyers if 
Ms. Lewinsky had not told him that the subpoena asked for 
gifts.
    On the other hand, knowing the subpoena requested gifts, 
his giving Ms. Lewinsky more gifts on December 28 seems odd. 
But Ms. Lewinsky's testimony reveals why he did so. She said 
that she never questioned ``that we were ever going to do 
anything but keep this private'' and that meant to take 
``whatever appropriate steps needed to be taken'' to keep it 
quiet. Lewinsky 8/6/98 GJT at 166. The only logical inference 
is that the gifts--including the bear symbolizing strength--
were a tacit reminder to Ms. Lewinsky that they would deny the 
relationship--even in the face of a federal subpoena.
    Furthermore, President Clinton, at various times in his 
deposition, seriously misrepresented the nature of his meeting 
with Ms. Lewinsky on December 28. First, he was asked: ``Did 
she tell you she had been served with a subpoena in this 
case?'' He answered flatly: ``No. I don't know she had been.'' 
Clinton 1/17/98 Dep. at 68.
    He was also asked if he ``ever talked to Monica Lewinsky 
about the possibility of her testifying.'' ``I'm not sure . . 
.,'' he said. He then added that he may have joked to her that 
the Jones lawyers might subpoena every woman he had ever spoken 
to, and that ``I don't think we ever had more of a conversation 
than that about it. . . .'' Clinton 1/17/98 Dep. at 70. Not 
only does Ms. Lewinsky directly contradict this testimony, but 
President Clinton also directly contradicted himself before the 
grand jury. Speaking of his December 28, 1997 meeting, he said 
that he ``knew by then, of course, that she had gotten a 
subpoena'' and that they had a ``conversation about the 
possibility of her testifying.'' Clinton 8/17/98 GJT at 35-36. 
He had this conversation about her testimony only three weeks 
before his deposition. Again, his version is not reasonable.

   H. The Events of January 5-9, 1997--Ms. Lewinsky Signs the False 
                       Affidavit and Gets the Job

    President Clinton knew that Monica Lewinsky was going to 
sign a false affidavit. He was so certain of the content that 
when she asked if he wanted to see it, he told her no, that he 
had seen fifteen of them. Lewinsky 8/2/98 302 at 3. He got his 
information in part from his attorneys and in part from 
discussions with Ms. Lewinsky and Mr. Jordan about the content 
of the affidavit. Besides, he had suggested the affidavit 
himself and he trusted Mr. Jordan to be certain the mission was 
accomplished.
    In the afternoon of January 5, 1998, Ms. Lewinsky met with 
her lawyer, Mr. Frank Carter, to discuss the affidavit. 
Lewinsky 8/6/98 GJT at 192. Mr. Carter asked her some hard 
questions about how she got her job. Lewinsky 8/6/98 GJT at 
195. After the meeting, she called Ms. Currie, and said that 
she wanted to speak to President Clinton before she signed 
anything. Lewinsky 8/6/98 GJT at 195. Ms. Lewinsky and 
President Clinton discussed the issue of how she would answer 
under oath if asked about how she got her job at the Pentagon. 
Lewinsky 8/6/98 GJT at 197. He told her: ``Well, you could 
always say that the people in Legislative Affairs got it for 
you or helped you get it.'' Lewinsky 8/6/98 GJT at 197. That 
was another lie.
    Mr. Jordan also kept President Clinton advised as to the 
contents of the affidavit. Jordan 5/5/98 GJT at 224. On January 
6, 1998, Ms. Lewinsky picked up a draft of the affidavit from 
Mr. Carter's office. Lewinsky 8/6/98 GJT at 199. She delivered 
a copy to Mr. Jordan's office because she wanted Mr. Jordan to 
look at the affidavit in the belief that if he approved, 
President Clinton would also. Lewinsky 8/6/98 GJT at 194-95. 
Ms. Lewinsky and Mr. Jordan conferred about the contents and 
agreed to delete a paragraph Mr. Carter inserted which might 
open a line of questions concerning whether she had been alone 
with President Clinton. Lewinsky 8/6/98 GJT at 200. By 
contrast, Mr. Jordan said he had nothing to do with the details 
of the affidavit. Jordan 3/5/98 GJT at 12. He admits, though, 
that he spoke with President Clinton after conferring with Ms. 
Lewinsky about the changes made to her affidavit. Jordan 5/5/98 
GJT at 218.
    The next day, January 7, Monica Lewinsky signed the false 
affidavit. Lewinsky 8/6/98 GJT at 204-05. She showed the 
executed copy to Mr. Jordan that same day. Jordan 5/5/98 GJT at 
222. She did this so that Mr. Jordan could report to President 
Clinton that it had been signed and another mission had been 
accomplished. Jordan 3/5/98 GJT at 26.
    On January 8, 1998, Ms. Lewinsky had an interview arranged 
by Mr. Jordan with MacAndrews and Forbes in New York. Lewinsky 
8/6/98 GJT at 206. The interview went poorly. Afterwards, Ms. 
Lewinsky called Mr. Jordan and informed him. Lewinsky 8/6/98 
GJT at 206. Mr. Jordan, who had done nothing from early 
November to mid December, then called the chief executive 
officer of MacAndrews and Forbes, Ron Perelman, to ``make 
things happen, if they could happen.'' Jordan 5/5/98 GJT at 
231. Mr. Jordan called Ms. Lewinsky back and told her not to 
worry. Lewinsky 8/6/98 GJT at 208-09. That evening, MacAndrews 
and Forbes called Ms. Lewinsky and told that she would be given 
more interviews the next morning. Lewinsky 8/6/98 GJT at 209.
    The next morning, Ms. Lewinsky received her reward for 
signing the false affidavit. After a series of interviews with 
MacAndrews and Forbes personnel, she was informally offered a 
job. Lewinsky 8/6/98 GJT at 210. When Ms. Lewinsky called Mr. 
Jordan to tell him, he passed the good news on to Ms. Currie--
Tell the President, ``Mission Accomplished.'' Jordan 5/28/98 
GJT at 39. Later, Mr. Jordan called President Clinton and told 
him personally. Jordan 5/28/98 GJT at 41.
    After months of looking for a job--since July according to 
the President's lawyers--Mr. Jordan makes the call to a CEO the 
day after the false affidavit is signed. Mr. Perelman testified 
that Mr. Jordan had never called him before about a job 
recommendation. Perelman 4/23/98 Dep. at 11. Mr. Jordan on the 
other hand, said that he called Mr. Perelman to recommend for 
hiring: (1) former Mayor Dinkins of New York; (2) a very 
talented attorney from his law firm, Akin, Gump; (3) a Harvard 
business school graduate; and (4) Ms. Lewinsky. Jordan 3/5/98 
GJT at 58-59. Even if Mr. Perelman's testimony is mistaken, Ms. 
Lewinsky does not have qualifications that would merit Mr. 
Jordan's direct recommendation to a CEO of a Fortune 500 
company.
    Mr. Jordan knew that the people with whom Ms. Lewinsky 
worked at the White House did not like her and that she did not 
like her Pentagon job. Jordan 3/3/98 GJT at 43-44, 59. Mr. 
Jordan was asked if at ``any point during this process you 
wondered about her qualifications for employment?'' He 
answered: ``No, because that was not my judgment to make.'' 
Jordan 3/3/98 GJT at 44. Yet when he called Mr. Perelman the 
day after she signed the affidavit, he referred to Monica as a 
bright young girl who is ``terrific.'' Perelman 4/23/98 Dep. at 
10. Mr. Jordan said that she had been hounding him for a job 
and voicing unrealistic expectations concerning positions and 
salary. Jordan 3/5/98 GJT at 37-38. Moreover, she narrated a 
disturbing story about President Clinton leaving the First Lady 
and how the President was not spending enough time with her. 
Yet, none of that gave Mr. Jordan pause in making the 
recommendation. Jordan 3/3/98 GJT at 156-57. People like Mr. 
Jordan do not call CEOs for marginal employees unless there is 
a compelling reason. The compelling reason was that President 
Clinton told him this was a top priority, especially after Ms. 
Lewinsky received a subpoena.

                  I. The Filing of the False Affidavit

    Ms. Lewinsky's false affidavit was important to President 
Clinton's deposition. It enabled him, through his attorneys, to 
assert at his January 17, 1998 deposition that `` . . . there 
is absolutely no sex of any kind in any manner, shape or form 
with President Clinton. . . .'' Clinton 1/17/98 Dep. at 54. 
When his own attorney questioned him in the deposition, the 
President stated specifically that the now famous paragraph 8 
of Ms. Lewinsky's affidavit was ``absolutely true.'' Clinton 1/
17/98 Dep. at 204. President Clinton later affirmed the truth 
of that statement when testifying before the grand jury. 
Clinton 8/17/98 GJT at 20-21. Paragraph 8 of Ms. Lewinsky's 
affidavit states:

          I have never had a sexual relationship with the 
        President, he did not propose that we have a sexual 
        relationship, he did not offer me employment or other 
        benefits in exchange for a sexual relationship, he did 
        not deny me employment or other benefits for rejecting 
        a sexual relationship.

Appendices at 1235-36.
    Ms. Lewinsky reviewed the draft affidavit on January 6, and 
signed it on January 7 after deleting a reference to being 
alone with President Clinton. She showed a copy of the signed 
affidavit to Mr. Jordan who called President Clinton and told 
him that she signed it. Jordan 3/5/98 GJT at 24-26, 5/5/98 GJT 
at 222.
    Getting the affidavit signed was only half the battle. To 
have its full effect, it had to be filed with the Court and 
provided to President Clinton's attorneys in time for his 
deposition on January 17. On January 14, the President's 
lawyers called Mr. Carter and left a message, presumably to 
find out if he had filed the affidavit with the Court. Carter 
6/18/98 GJT at 123. On January 15, President Clinton's 
attorneys called Mr. Carter twice. When they finally reached 
him, they requested a copy of the affidavit, and asked him, 
``Are we still on time?'' Carter 6/18/98 GJT at 123. Mr. Carter 
faxed a copy on January 15. Carter 6/18/98 GJT at 123. 
President Clinton's counsel knew of its contents and used it 
powerfully in the deposition.
    Mr. Carter called the Court in Arkansas twice on January 15 
to ensure that the affidavit could be filed on Saturday, 
January 17. Carter 6/18/98 GJT at 124-25. He finished the 
Motion to Quash Ms. Lewinsky's deposition in the early morning 
hours of January 16, and mailed it to the Court with the false 
affidavit attached for Saturday delivery. Carter 6/18/98 GJT at 
134. President Clinton's lawyers called him again on January 16 
telling him, ``You'll know what it's about.'' Carter 6/18/98 
GJT at 135. President Clinton needed that affidavit to be filed 
with the Court to support his plans to mislead Ms. Jones's 
attorneys in the deposition.
    On January 15, Michael Isikoff, a Newsweek reporter, called 
Ms. Currie and asked her whether Ms. Lewinsky had been sending 
gifts to her by courier. Currie 5/6/98 GJT at 123; Lewinsky 8/
6/98 GJT at 228. Ms. Currie then called Ms. Lewinsky and told 
her about it. Lewinsky 8/6/98 GJT at 228-29. President Clinton 
was out of town. Later, Ms. Currie called Ms. Lewinsky back and 
asked for a ride to Mr. Jordan's office. Lewinsky 8/6/98 GJT at 
229; Currie 5/6/98 GJT at 130-31. Mr. Jordan advised her to 
speak with White House Deputy Counsel Bruce Lindsey and White 
House Press Secretary Mike McCurry. Jordan 3/5/98 GJT at 71. 
Ms. Currie testified that she spoke immediately to Mr. Lindsey 
about Mr. Isikoff's call. Currie 5/6/98 GJT at 127.

J. The Events of January 17, 1998--President Clinton and Mr. Bennett at 
                             the Deposition

    President Clinton also provided false and misleading 
testimony in the grand jury when he was asked about his 
attorney, Robert Bennett's representation to Judge Wright, the 
judge in the Jones case, that President Clinton is ``fully 
aware'' that Ms. Lewinsky filed an affidavit saying that 
``there is absolutely no sex of any kind in any manner, shape 
or form, with President Clinton. . . .'' Clinton 1/17/98 Dep. 
at 54. In the grand jury, President Clinton was asked about his 
lawyer's representation in his presence and whether he felt 
obligated to inform Judge Wright of the true state of affairs. 
President Clinton answered that he was ``not even sure I paid 
much attention to what [Mr. Bennett] was saying.'' Clinton 8/
17/98 GJT at 24. When pressed further, he said that he did not 
believe he ``even focused on what Mr. Bennett said in the exact 
words he did until I started reading this transcript carefully 
for this hearing. That moment, the whole argument just passed 
me by.'' Clinton 8/17/98 GJT at 29.
    This last statement by President Clinton is critical. 
First, he had planned his answer to the grand jurors. He spent 
literally days with his attorney going over that deposition in 
detail and crafting answers in his mind that would not be 
obviously false. Second, he knew that he could only avoid an 
admission that he allowed a false affidavit to be filed by 
convincing the grand jury that he had not been paying 
attention. The videotape of the deposition shows clearly that 
President Clinton was paying close attention and that he 
followed his lawyer's argument.
    President Clinton had every reason to pay attention. Mr. 
Bennett was talking about Ms. Lewinsky, at the time the most 
dangerous person in his life. If the false affidavit worked and 
Ms. Jones's lawyers could not question him about her, the 
Lewinsky problem was solved. President Clinton was vitally 
interested in what Mr. Bennett was saying. Nonetheless, when he 
was asked in the grand jury whether Mr. Bennett's statement was 
false, he still was unable to tell the truth--even before a 
federal grand jury. He answered with the now famous sentence, 
``It depends on what the meaning of the word ``is'' is.'' 
Clinton 8/17/98 GJT at 58.
    But President Clinton reinforced Ms. Lewinsky's lie. Mr. 
Bennett read to him the paragraph in Ms. Lewinsky's affidavit 
in which she denied a sexual relationship with President 
Clinton:
          Q. In paragraph eight of her affidavit, she says 
        this, ``I have never had a sexual relationship with the 
        President, he did not propose that we have a sexual 
        relationship, he did not offer me employment or other 
        benefits in exchange for a sexual relationship, he did 
        not deny me employment or other benefits for rejecting 
        a sexual relationship.'' Is that a true and accurate 
        statement as far as you know it?
          A. That is absolutely true.

Clinton 1/17/98 Dep. at 204. When asked about this in the grand 
jury and when questioned about it by this Committee, the 
President said that if Ms. Lewinsky believed it to be true, 
then it was a true statement. Clinton 8/17/98 GJT at 21.
    First, Ms. Lewinsky admitted to the grand jury that the 
paragraph was false. Lewinsky 8/6/98 GJT at 204. Second, 
President Clinton was not asked about Ms. Lewinsky's belief. 
Rather, he was asked quite clearly and directly by his own 
lawyer whether the statement was true. His answer was 
unequivocally, yes. That statement is false.
    Lastly, President Clinton asserts that according to his 
reading of the definition of ``sexual relations'' given to him 
at the deposition, he did not have sexual relations with Ms. 
Lewinsky. His reading of the definition was an afterthought 
conceived while preparing for his grand jury testimony. His 
explanation to the grand jury, then, was also false and 
misleading.
    Apart from that defined term, President Clinton does not 
explain his denial of an affair or a sexual affair--he cannot. 
Neither can he avoid his unequivocal denial of sexual relations 
in the answers to interrogatories in the Jones case--answered 
before the definition of sexual relations used in the 
deposition had been developed.

          Q. Did you have an extramarital sexual affair with 
        Monica Lewinsky?
          A. No.
          Q. If she told someone that she had a sexual affair 
        with you beginning in November of 1995, would that be a 
        lie?
          A. It's certainly not the truth. It would not be the 
        truth.
          Q. I think I used the term ``sexual affair.'' And so 
        the record is completely clear, have you ever had 
        sexual relations with Monica Lewinsky, as that term is 
        defined in Deposition Exhibit 1, as modified by the 
        Court?
          Mr. Bennett. I object because I don't know that he 
        can remember----
          Judge Wright. Well, it's real short. He can--I will 
        permit the question and you may show the witness 
        definition number one.
          A. I have never had sexual relations with Monica 
        Lewinsky. I've never had an affair with her.

Clinton 1/17/98 Dep. at 78.

       K. The Events of Late January, 1998--Deposition Aftermath

    By the time President Clinton concluded his deposition, he 
knew that someone was talking about his relationship with Ms. 
Lewinsky. He also knew that the only person who could be 
talking was Ms. Lewinsky herself. The cover story that he and 
Ms. Lewinsky created and that he used during the deposition was 
now in jeopardy. He needed not only to contact Ms. Lewinsky, 
but also to obtain corroboration from his trusted secretary, 
Ms. Currie. At around 7 p.m. on the night of the deposition, 
the President called Ms. Currie and asked that she come in the 
following day, a Sunday. Currie 7/22/98 GJT at 154-55. Ms. 
Currie could not recall the President ever before calling her 
that late at home on a Saturday night. Currie 1/27/98 GJT at 
69.
    In the early morning hours of January 18, 1998--i.e. the 
night of the deposition, President Clinton learned about the 
Drudge Report mentioning Ms. Lewinsky released earlier that 
day. Clinton 8/17/98 GJT at 142-43. Between 11:49 a.m. and 2:55 
p.m., Mr. Jordan and President Clinton had three phone calls. 
At about 5 p.m., Ms. Currie met with President Clinton. Currie 
1/27/98 GJT at 67. He told her that he had just been deposed 
and that the attorneys asked several questions about Ms. 
Lewinsky. Currie 1/27/98 GJT at 69-70. This, incidentally, 
violated Judge Wright's gag order prohibiting any discussions 
about the deposition testimony. He then made a series of 
statements to Ms. Currie:

          (1) I was never really alone with Monica, right?
          (2) You were always there when Monica was there, 
        right?
          (3) Monica came on to me, and I never touched her, 
        right?
          (4) You could see and hear everything, right?
          (5) She wanted to have sex with me, and I cannot do 
        that.

Currie 1/27/98 GJT at 70-75, 7/22/98 GJT at 6-7.
    During Betty Currie's grand jury testimony, she was asked 
whether she believed that the President wished her to agree 
with the statement:

          Q. Would it be fair to say, then--based on the way he 
        stated [these five points] and the demeanor that he was 
        using at the time that he stated it to you--that he 
        wished you to agree with that statement?
          A. I can't speak for him, but----
          Q. How did you take it? Because you told us at these 
        [previous] meetings in the last several days that that 
        is how you took it.
          A. (Nodding)
          Q. And you're nodding your head, ``yes'', is that 
        correct?
          A. That's correct.
          Q. Okay, with regard to the statement that the 
        President made to you, ``You remember I was never 
        really alone with Monica, right, was that also a 
        statement that, as far as you took, that he wished you 
        to agree with that?
          A. Correct.

Currie 1/27/98 GJT at 74.
    In the grand jury, President Clinton was questioned about 
his intentions when he made those five statements to Ms. Currie 
in his office on that Sunday afternoon. He stated:

    And what I wanted to establish was that Betty was there at 
all other times in the complex, and I wanted to know what 
Betty's memory was about what she heard, what she could hear. 
And what I did not know was--I did not know that. And I was 
trying to figure out in a hurry because I knew something was 
up.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

    So, I was not trying to get Betty Currie to say something 
that was untruthful. I was trying to get as much information as 
quickly as I could.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

    . . . I thought we were going to be deluged by the press 
comments. And I was trying to refresh my memory about what the 
facts were.

Clinton 8/17/98 GJT at 54, 56, 131. Though Ms. Currie would 
later intimate that she did not necessarily feel pressured by 
President Clinton, she did state that she felt he was seeking 
her agreement (or disagreement) with those statements. Currie 
7/22/98 GJT at 27.
    Logic tells us that his plea that he was just trying to 
refresh his memory is contrived and false. First, consider his 
options after he left his deposition:
          (1) He could abide by Judge Wright's order to remain 
        silent and not divulge any details of his deposition;
          (2) He could defy Judge Wright's order, and call Ms. 
        Currie on the phone and ask her open ended questions 
        (i.e., ``What do you remember about . . .?''); or
          (3) He could call Ms. Currie and arrange a Sunday 
        afternoon meeting--a time when the fewest distractions 
        exist and the presence of White House staff is minimal. 
        He chose the third option.
    He made sure that this was a face-to-face meeting--not a 
telephone call. He made sure that no one else was present when 
he spoke to her. He made sure that he had the meeting in his 
office, an area where he was comfortable and could utilize its 
power and prestige to influence her potential testimony.
    When Ms. Currie testified before the grand jury, she could 
not recall whether she had another one-on-one discussion with 
President Clinton on Tuesday, January 20 or Wednesday, January 
21. But she did state that on one of those days, he summoned 
her back to his office. At that time, he recapped their Sunday 
afternoon discussion in the Oval Office. When he spoke to her 
in this second meeting, he spoke in the same tone and demeanor 
that he used in his January 18 Sunday session. Currie 1/27/98 
GJT at 70-75, 7/22/98 GJT at 6-7. Ms. Currie stated that the 
President may have mentioned that she might be asked about 
Monica Lewinsky. Currie 1/24/98 302 at 8.
    During these meetings, President Clinton made short, clear, 
understandable, declarative statements telling Ms. Currie what 
his testimony was. He was not interested in what she knew. 
Rather, he did not want his personal secretary to contradict 
him. The only way to ensure that was by telling her what to 
say, not asking her what she remembered. One does not refresh 
someone else's memory by telling that person what he or she 
remembers. One certainly does not make declarative statements 
to someone regarding factual scenarios of which the listener 
was unaware.
    Ms. Currie could not possibly have any personal knowledge 
of the facts that the President was asking. Ms. Currie could 
not know if they were ever alone. If they were, Ms. Currie was 
not there. She could not know that the President never touched 
Monica. President Clinton was not trying to refresh his 
recollection--instead, it was witness tampering pure and 
simple.
    President Clinton essentially admitted to making these 
statements when he knew they were not true. Consequently, he 
painted himself into a legal corner. Understanding the 
seriousness of the President ``coaching'' Ms. Currie, his 
attorneys have argued that those statements to her could not 
constitute obstruction because she had not been subpoenaed, and 
the President did not know that she was a potential witness at 
the time. This argument is refuted by both the law and the 
facts.
    The Eighth Circuit rejected this argument stating:

          [A] person may be convicted of obstructing justice if 
        he urges or persuades a prospective witness to give 
        false testimony. Neither must the target be scheduled 
        to testify at the time of the offense, nor must he or 
        she actually give testimony at a later time.

United States v. Shannon, 836 F.2d 1125, 1128 (8th Cir.), cert. 
denied, 486 U.S. 1058 (1988), citing, e.g., United States v. 
Friedland, 660 F.2d 919, 931 (3d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 
U.S. 989 (1982). Indeed, under the witness tampering statute, 
there need not even be a proceeding pending, 18 U.S.C. 
Sec. 1512(e)(1). As discussed, President Clinton and Ms. 
Lewinsky concocted a cover story that brought Ms. Currie into 
the fray as a corroborating witness. True to this scheme, 
President Clinton invoked Ms. Currie's name frequently as a 
witness who could corroborate his false and misleading 
testimony about the Lewinsky affair. For example, during his 
deposition, when asked whether he was alone with Ms. Lewinsky, 
he said that he was not alone with her or that Ms. Currie was 
there with Ms. Lewinsky. Clinton 8/17/98 GJT at 58. When asked 
about the last time he saw Ms. Lewinsky, which was December 28, 
1997, he falsely testified that he only recalled that she was 
there to see Ms. Currie. Clinton 1/17/98 Dep. at 70. He also 
told the Jones lawyers to ``ask Betty'' whether Ms. Lewinsky 
was alone with him or with Ms. Currie in the White House 
between the hours of midnight and 6 a.m. Clinton 1/17/98 Dep. 
at 64-66. Asked whether Ms. Lewinsky sent packages to him, he 
stated that Ms. Currie handled packages for him. Clinton 1/17/
98 Dep. at 64. Asked whether he may have assisted in any way 
with Ms. Lewinsky's job search, he stated that he thought Ms. 
Currie suggested Mr. Jordan talk to Ms. Lewinsky, and that Ms. 
Lewinsky asked Ms. Currie to ask someone to talk to Ambassador 
Richardson about a job at the United Nations. Clinton 1/17/98 
Dep. at 72-74.
    Ms. Currie was a prospective witness, and President Clinton 
clearly wanted her to be deposed, as his ``ask Betty'' 
testimony demonstrates. He claims that he called Ms. Currie 
into work on a Sunday night only to find out what she knew. But 
he knew the truth about his relationship with Ms. Lewinsky, and 
if he had told the truth during his deposition the day before, 
then he would have no reason to worry about what Ms. Currie 
knew. More importantly, the President's demeanor, Ms. Currie's 
reaction to his demeanor, and the suggested lies clearly prove 
that the President was not merely interviewing Ms. Currie. 
Rather, he was looking for corroboration for his false cover-
up, and that is why he coached her.
    Soon after his Sunday meeting with Ms. Currie, at 5:12 
p.m., the flurry of telephone calls began looking for Ms. 
Lewinsky. Between 5:12 p.m. and 8:28 p.m., Ms. Currie paged Ms. 
Lewinsky four times. At 11:02 p.m., President Clinton called 
Ms. Currie at home to ask if she has reached Ms. Lewinsky. 
Currie 7/22/98 GJT at 160.
    The following morning, January 19, Ms. Currie continued to 
work diligently for President Clinton. Between 7:02 a.m. and 
8:41 a.m., she paged Ms. Lewinsky another five times. After the 
8:41 a.m. page, Ms. Currie called President Clinton at 8:43 
a.m. and said that she was unable to reach Ms. Lewinsky. Currie 
8/22/98 GJT at 161-62. One minute later, at 8:44 a.m., she 
again paged Ms. Lewinsky. This time, Ms. Currie's page stated: 
``Family Emergency,'' apparently in an attempt to alarm Ms. 
Lewinsky into calling back. That may have been President 
Clinton's idea because Ms. Currie had just spoken with him. He 
was quite concerned because he called Ms. Currie only six 
minutes later, at 8:50 a.m. Immediately thereafter, at 8:51 
a.m., Ms. Currie tries a different tactic sending the message: 
``Good news.'' Ms. Currie said that she was trying to encourage 
Ms. Lewinsky to call, but there was no sense of ``urgency.'' 
Currie 7/22/98 GJT at 165. Ms. Currie's recollection of why she 
was calling was again unclear. She said at one point that she 
believes President Clinton asked her to call Ms. Lewinsky, and 
she thought she was calling just to tell her that her name came 
up in the deposition. Currie 7/22/98 GJT at 162. Ms. Lewinsky 
had been subpoenaed. It was no surprise that her name came up 
in the deposition. There was another and more important reason 
the President needed to get in touch with her.
    At 8:56 a.m., President Clinton telephoned Mr. Jordan who 
then joined in the activity. Over a course of twenty-four 
minutes, from 10:29 to 10:53 a.m., Mr. Jordan called the White 
House three times, paged Ms. Lewinsky, and called Ms. 
Lewinsky's attorney, Frank Carter. Between 10:53 a.m. and 4:54 
p.m., there are continued calls between Mr. Jordan, Ms. 
Lewinsky's attorney, and individuals at the White House.
    Later that afternoon, matters deteriorated for President 
Clinton. At 4:54 p.m., Mr. Jordan called Mr. Carter. Mr. Carter 
informed Mr. Jordan that he had been told he no longer 
represented Ms. Lewinsky. Jordan 3/5/98 GJT at 141. Mr. Jordan 
then made feverish attempts to reach President Clinton or 
someone at the White House to tell them the bad news, as 
represented by the six calls between 4:58 p.m. and 5:22 p.m. 
Mr. Jordan said that he tried to relay this information to the 
White House because ``[t]he President asked me to get Monica 
Lewinsky a job,'' and he thought it was ``information that they 
ought to have.'' Jordan 6/9/98 GJT at 45-46. Mr. Jordan then 
called Mr. Carter back at 5:14 p.m. to ``go over'' what they 
had already talked about. Jordan 3/5/98 GJT at 146. Mr. Jordan 
finally reached the President at 5:56 p.m., and tells him that 
Mr. Carter had been fired. Jordan 6/9/98 GJT at 54.
    This activity occurred because it was important for the 
President of the United States to find Monica Lewinsky to learn 
to whom she was talking. Ms. Currie was in charge of contacting 
Ms. Lewinsky. President Clinton had just completed a deposition 
in which he provided false and misleading testimony about his 
relationship with Ms. Lewinsky. She was a co-conspirator in 
hiding this relationship from the Jones attorneys, and he was 
losing control over her. He never got complete control over her 
again.
    But President Clinton's efforts to obtain false 
corroboration did not end there. On Wednesday, January 21, 
1998, the Washington Post published a story entitled ``Clinton 
Accused of Urging Aide to Lie; Starr Probes Whether President 
Told Woman to Deny Alleged Affair to Jones' Lawyers.'' The 
White House learned the substance of the Post story on the 
evening of January 20, 1998.
    After President Clinton learned of that story, he made a 
series of telephone calls. At 12:08 a.m. he called his 
attorney, Mr. Bennett, and they had a conversation. The next 
morning, Mr. Bennett was quoted in the Post stating: ``The 
President adamantly denies he ever had a relationship with Ms. 
Lewinsky and she has confirmed the truth of that.'' He added, 
``This story seems ridiculous and I frankly smell a rat.''
    After that conversation, President Clinton had a half hour 
conversation with White House Deputy Counsel Bruce Lindsey. At 
1:16 a.m., he called Ms. Currie and spoke to her for 20 
minutes. He then called Mr. Lindsey again. At 6:30 a.m. the 
President called Mr. Jordan. After that, he again conversed 
with Bruce Lindsey.
    This flurry of activity was a prelude to the stories which 
President Clinton would soon inflict on top White House aides 
and advisors. On the morning of January 21, 1998, he met with 
White House Chief of Staff, Erskine Bowles and his two 
deputies, John Podesta and Sylvia Matthews. Mr. Bowles recalled 
entering the President's office at 9:00 a.m. that morning. He 
then recounts President Clinton's immediate words as he and two 
others entered the Oval Office:

          And he looked up at us and he said the same thing he 
        said to the American people. He said, ``I want you to 
        know I did not have sexual relationships with this 
        woman, Monica Lewinsky. I did not ask anybody to lie. 
        And when the facts came out, you'll understand.''

Bowles 4/2/98 GJT at 84. After he made that blanket denial, Mr. 
Bowles responded:

          I said, ``Mr. President, I don't know what the facts 
        are. I don't know if they're good, bad, or indifferent. 
        But whatever they are, you ought to get them out. And 
        you ought to get them out right now.''

Bowles 4/2/98 GJT at 84. When counsel asked whether President 
Clinton responded to Bowles's suggestion that he tell the 
truth, Mr. Bowles responded: ``I don't think he made any 
response, but he didn't disagree with me.'' Bowles 4/2/98 GJT 
at 84.
    Deputy Chief of Staff John Podesta also recalled a meeting 
with President Clinton on the morning of January 21, 1998. He 
testified before the grand jury as to what occurred in the Oval 
Office that morning:

          A. And we started off meeting--we didn't--I don't 
        think we said anything. And I think the President 
        directed this specifically to Mr. Bowles. He said, 
        ``Erskine, I want you to know that this story is not 
        true.''
          Q. What else did he say?
          A. He said that--that he had not had a sexual 
        relationship with her, and that he never asked anybody 
        to lie.

Podesta 6/16/98 GJT at 85.
    Two days later on January 23, 1998, Mr. Podesta had another 
discussion with the President:

          I asked him how he was doing, and he said he was 
        working on this draft and he said to me that he never 
        had sex with her, and that--and that he never asked--
        you know, he repeated the denial, but he was extremely 
        explicit in saying he never had sex with her.

Podesta 6/16/98 GJT at 92. Then Mr. Podesta testified as 
follows:

          Q. Okay. Not explicit, in the sense that he got more 
        specific than sex, than the word ``sex.''
          A. Yes, he was more specific than that.
          Q. Okay, share that with us.
          A. Well, I think he said--he said that--there was 
        some spate. Of, you know, what sex acts were counted, 
        and he said that he had never had sex with her in any 
        way whatsoever----
          Q. Okay.
          A. That they had not had oral sex.

Podesta 6/16/98 GJT at 92.
    Later in the day on January 21, 1998, President Clinton 
called Sidney Blumenthal to his office. His lies became more 
elaborate and pronounced when he had time to concoct his newest 
line of defense. When the President spoke to Mr. Bowles and Mr. 
Podesta, he simply denied the story. By the time he spoke to 
Mr. Blumenthal, he had added three new angles to his defense 
strategy: (1) he now portrays Ms. Lewinsky as the aggressor; 
(2) he launches an attack on her reputation by portraying her 
as a ``stalker''; and (3) he presents himself as the innocent 
victim being attacked by the forces of evil.
    Mr. Blumenthal recalled in his June 4, 1998 testimony:

          And it was at this point that he gave his account of 
        what had happened to me and he said that Monica--and it 
        came very fast. He said, ``Monica Lewinsky came at me 
        and made a sexual demand on me.'' He rebuffed her. He 
        said, ``I've gone down that road before, I've caused 
        pain for a lot of people and I'm not going to do that 
        again.'' She threatened him. She said that she would 
        tell people they'd had an affair, that she was known as 
        the stalker among her peers, and that she hated it and 
        if she had an affair or said she had an affair then she 
        wouldn't be the stalker anymore.

Blumenthal 6/4/98 GJT at 49. Mr. Blumenthal said President 
Clinton told him moments later:

          And he said, ``I feel like a character in a novel. I 
        feel like somebody who is surrounded by an oppressive 
        force that is creating a lie about me and I can't get 
        the truth out. I feel like the character in the novel 
        Darkness at Noon.''
          And I said to him, ``When this happened with Monica 
        Lewinsky, were you alone?'' He said, ``Well, I was 
        within eyesight or earshot of someone.''

Blumenthal 6/4/98 GJT at 50. At one point, Mr. Blumenthal is 
asked by the grand jury to describe the President's manner and 
demeanor during the exchange.

          Q. In response to my question how you responded to 
        the President's story about a threat or discussion 
        about a threat from Ms. Lewinsky, you mentioned you 
        didn't recall specifically. Do you recall generally the 
        nature of your response to the President?
          A. It was generally sympathetic to the President. And 
        I certainly believed his story. It was a very heartfelt 
        story, he was pouring out his heart, and I believed 
        him.

Blumenthal 6/25/98 GJT at 16-17.
    President Clinton also implemented a win-at-all-costs 
strategy. Former presidential advisor Dick Morris testified 
that on January 21, 1998, he spoke to President Clinton and 
they discussed the turbulent events of the day. President 
Clinton again denied the accusations against him. After further 
discussions, they decided to have an overnight poll taken to 
determine if the American people would forgive the President 
for adultery, perjury, and obstruction of justice. When Mr. 
Morris received the results, he called the President:

          And I said, ``They're just too shocked by this. It's 
        just too new, it's too raw.'' And I said, ``And the 
        problem is they're willing to forgive you for adultery, 
        but not for perjury or obstruction of justice or the 
        various other things.''

Morris 8/18/98 GJT at 28. Mr. Morris then recalls the following 
exchange:

          Morris: And I said, ``They're just not ready for 
        it.'' meaning the voters. President Clinton: Well, we 
        just have to win, then.

Morris 8/18/98 GJT at 30. President Clinton cannot recall this 
statement.

       L. The Events of August 17, 1998--The Grand Jury Testimony

    On August 17, the last act of the tragedy took place. After 
six invitations, President Clinton appeared before a grand jury 
of his fellow citizens and took an oath to tell the truth. He 
equivocated and engaged in legalistic fencing, but he also 
lied. Actually, the entire testimony was calculated to mislead 
and deceive the grand jury and eventually the American people.
    On August 16, 1998, President Clinton's personal attorney, 
David Kendall provided the following statement regarding his 
testimony:

          There is apparently an enormous amount of groundless 
        speculation about the President's testimony tomorrow. 
        The truth is the truth. Period. And that's how the 
        President will testify.

Kendall 8/16/98 Statement.
    The untruthful tone, however, was set at the very 
beginning. Judge Starr testified that in a grand jury a witness 
can tell the truth, lie, or assert a legal privilege. President 
Clinton was given a fourth choice. The President was permitted 
to read a statement:

          When I was alone with Ms. Lewinsky on certain 
        occasions in early 1996 and once in early 1997, I 
        engaged in conduct that was wrong. These encounters did 
        not consist of sexual intercourse. They did not 
        constitute sexual relations as I understood that term 
        to be defined at my January 17th deposition. But they 
        did involve inappropriate intimate contact.
          These inappropriate encounters ended, at my 
        insistence, in early 1997. I also had occasional 
        telephone conversations with Ms. Lewinsky that included 
        inappropriate sexual banter.
          I regret that what began as a friendship came to 
        include this conduct, and I will take full 
        responsibility for my actions.
          While I will provide the grand jury whatever other 
        information I can, because of privacy considerations 
        affecting my family, myself, and others, and in an 
        effort to preserve the dignity of the office I hold, 
        this is all I will say about the specifics of these 
        particular matters.
          I will try to answer, to the best of my ability, 
        other questions including questions about my 
        relationship with Ms. Lewinsky; questions about my 
        understanding of the term ``sexual relations,'' as I 
        understood it to be defined at my January 17th, 1998 
        deposition; and questions concerning alleged 
        subornation of perjury, obstruction of justice, and 
        intimidation of witnesses. That, Mr. Bittman, is my 
        statement.

Clinton 8/17/98 GJT at 8-10.
    That statement itself is false in many particulars. 
President Clinton claims that he engaged in wrongful conduct 
with Ms. Lewinsky ``on certain occasions in early 1996 and once 
in 1997.'' He does not mention 1995. There was a reason. On the 
three ``occasions'' in 1995, Ms. Lewinsky was a twenty-one year 
old intern. As for being alone on ``certain occasions,'' he was 
alone with Ms. Lewinsky more than twenty times at least. The 
President also told the jurors that he ``also had occasional 
telephone conversations with Ms. Lewinsky that included sexual 
banter.'' Actually, the two had at least fifty-five phone 
conversations, many in the middle of the night and in seventeen 
of these calls, Ms. Lewinsky and President Clinton engaged in 
phone sex.
    Again, President Clinton carefully crafted his statements 
to give the appearance of being candid, when actually he 
intended the opposite. In addition, throughout the testimony 
whenever he was asked a specific question that could not be 
answered directly without either admitting the truth or giving 
an easily provable false answer, he said, ``I rely on my 
statement.'' Nineteen times he relied on this false and 
misleading statement; nineteen times, then, he repeated those 
lies. For example:

          Q. Getting back to the conversation you had with Mrs. 
        Currie on January 18th, you told her--if she testified 
        that you told her, Monica came on to me and I never 
        touched her, you did, in fact, of course, touch Ms. 
        Lewinsky, isn't that right, in a physically intimate 
        way?
          A. Now, I've testified about that. And that's one of 
        those questions that I believe is answered by the 
        statement that I made.

Clinton 8/17/98 GJT at 138.
    He also admitted to the grand jury that, after the 
allegations were publicly reported, that he made ``misleading'' 
statements to particular aides whom he knew would likely be 
called to testify before the Grand Jury:

          Q. Do you recall denying any sexual relationship with 
        Monica Lewinsky to the following people: Harry 
        Thomasson, Erskine Bowles, Harold Ickes, Mr. Podesta, 
        Mr. Blumenthal, Mr. Jordan, Ms. Betty Currie? Do you 
        recall denying any sexual relationship with Monica 
        Lewinsky to those individuals?
          A. I recall telling a number of those people that I 
        didn't have, either I didn't have an affair with Monica 
        Lewinsky or didn't have sex with her. And I believe, 
        sir, that--you'll have to ask them what they thought. 
        But I was using those terms in the normal way people 
        use them. You'll have to ask them what they thought I 
        was saying.
          Q. If they testified that you denied sexual relations 
        or relationship with Monica Lewinsky, or if they told 
        us that you denied that, do you have any reason to 
        doubt them, in the days after the story broke; do you 
        have any reason to doubt them?
          A. No.

Clinton 8/17/98 GJT at 104-05. President Clinton then was 
specifically asked whether he knew that his aides were likely 
to be called before the grand jury:

          Q. It may have been misleading, sir, and you knew 
        though, after January 21st when the Post article broke 
        and said that Judge Starr was looking into this, you 
        knew that they might be witnesses. You knew that they 
        might be called into a grand jury, didn't you?
          A. That's right. I think I was quite careful what I 
        said after that. I may have said something to all these 
        people to that effect, but I'll also--whenever anybody 
        asked me any details, I said, look, I don't want you to 
        be a witness or I turn you into a witness or give you 
        information that would get you in trouble. I just 
        wouldn't talk. I, by and large, didn't talk to people 
        about it.
          Q. If all of these people--let's leave Mrs. Currie 
        for a minute. Vernon Jordan, Sid Blumenthal, John 
        Podesta, Harold Ickes, Erskine Bowles, Harry Thomasson, 
        after the story broke, after Judge Starr's involvement 
        was known on January 21st, have said that you denied a 
        sexual relationship with them. Are you denying that?
          A. No.
          Q. And you've told us that you----
          A. I'm just telling you what I meant by it. I told 
        you what I meant by it when they started this 
        deposition.
          Q. You've told us now that you were being careful, 
        but that it might have been misleading. Is that 
        correct?
          A. It might have been . . . . So, what I was trying 
        to do was to give them something they could--that would 
        be true, even if misleading in the context of this 
        deposition, and keep them out of trouble, and let's 
        deal--and deal with what I thought was the almost 
        ludicrous suggestion that I had urged someone to lie or 
        tried to suborn perjury, in other words.

Clinton 8/17/98 GJT at 106-08.
    As the President testified before the grand jury, he 
maintained that he was being truthful with his aides:

          Q. You don't remember denying any kind of sex in any 
        way, shape or form, and including oral sex, correct?
          A. I remember that I issued a number of denials to 
        people that I thought needed to hear them, but I tried 
        to be careful and to be accurate, and I do not remember 
        what I said to John Podesta.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

          Q. Did you deny it to them or not, Mr. President?
          A. Let me finish. So, what--I did not want to mislead 
        my friends, but I wanted to find language where I could 
        say that. I also, frankly, did not want to turn any of 
        them into witnesses, because I--and, sure enough, they 
        all became witnesses.
          Q. Well, you knew they might be----
          A. And so----
          Q. Witnesses, didn't you?
          A. And so I said to them things that were true about 
        this relationship. That I used--in the language I used, 
        I said, there's nothing going on between us. That was 
        true. I said, I have not had sex with her as I defined 
        it. That was true. And did I hope that I would never 
        have to be here on this day giving this testimony? Of 
        course.
          But I also didn't want to do anything to complicate 
        this matter further. So, I said things that were true. 
        They may have been misleading, and if they were I have 
        to take responsibility for it, and I'm sorry.

Clinton 8/17/98 GJT at 100, 105-06. He stated that when he 
spoke to his aides, he was careful with his wording. He stated 
that he wanted his statement regarding ``sexual relations'' to 
be literally true because he was only referring to intercourse.
    However, John Podesta said that President Clinton denied 
sex ``in any way whatsoever'' ``including oral sex.'' He told 
Mr. Podesta, Mr. Bowles, Ms. Williams, and Harold Ickes that he 
did not have a ``sexual relationship'' with that woman. Seven 
days after the President's grand jury appearance, the White 
House issued a document entitled, ``Talking Points January 24, 
1998.'' This ``Talking Points'' document outlines proposed 
questions that the President may be asked. It also outlines 
suggested answers to those questions. The ``Talking Points'' 
purport to state the President's view of sexual relations and 
his view of the relationship with Monica Lewinsky.
    The ``Talking Points'' state in relevant part as follows:

          Q. What acts does the President believe constitute a 
        sexual relationship?
          A. I can't believe we're on national television 
        discussing this. I am not about to engage in an ``act-
        by-act'' discussion of what constitutes a sexual 
        relationship.
          Q. Well, for example, Ms. Lewinsky is on tape 
        indicating that the President does not believe oral sex 
        is adultery. Would oral sex, to the President, 
        constitute a sexual relationship?
          A. Of course it would.

    Based upon the foregoing, the President's own talking 
points refute the President's ``literal truth'' argument.

          M. Answers to the Committee's Requests for Admission

    In an effort to avoid unnecessary work and to bring this 
inquiry to an expeditious end, this Committee submitted to the 
President eighty-one requests to admit or deny specific facts 
relevant to this investigation. Although, for the most part, 
the questions could have been answered with a simple ``admit'' 
or ``deny'', President Clinton chose to follow the pattern of 
selective memory, reference to other testimony, blatant 
untruths, artful distortions, outright lies and half truths he 
had already used. When he did answer, he engaged in legalistic 
hairsplitting in an attempt to skirt the truth and to deceive 
this Committee.
    Thus, on at least twenty-three questions, President Clinton 
professed a lack of memory despite the testimony of several 
witnesses that he has a remarkable memory. In at least fifteen 
answers, he merely referred to ``White House Records.'' He also 
referred to his own prior testimony and that of others. He 
answered several of the requests by merely restating the same 
deceptive answers that he gave to the grand jury.
    These half-truths, legalistic parsings, and evasive and 
misleading answers were calculated to obstruct the efforts of 
this Committee. They have had the effect of seriously hampering 
this Committee's ability to ascertain the truth. President 
Clinton has, therefore, added obstruction of an inquiry by the 
Legislative Branch to his obstructions of justice before the 
Judicial Branch.

                      III. EXPLANATION OF ARTICLES

                A. Article I--Perjury in the Grand Jury

    On August 17, 1998, William Jefferson Clinton swore to tell 
the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth before a 
federal grand jury of the United States. Contrary to that oath, 
William Jefferson Clinton willfully provided perjurious, false 
and misleading testimony to the grand jury concerning one or 
more of the following: (1) the nature and details of his 
relationship with a subordinate government employee; (2) prior 
perjurious, false and misleading testimony he gave in a federal 
civil rights action brought against him; (3) prior false and 
misleading statements he allowed his attorney to make to a 
Federal judge in that civil rights action; and (4) his corrupt 
efforts to influence the testimony of witnesses and to impede 
the discovery of evidence in that civil rights action.

1. The Committee concluded that, on August 17, 1998, the President 
        provided perjurious, false, and misleading testimony to a 
        Federal grand jury concerning the nature and details of his 
        relationship with a subordinate government employee

    On August 17, 1998, the President gave perjurious, false, 
and misleading testimony regarding his relationship with Monica 
Lewinsky before a Federal grand jury. Such testimony includes 
the following:

    Q. Mr. President, were you physically intimate with Monica 
Lewinsky?
    A. Mr. Bittman, I think maybe I can save the--you and the 
grand jurors a lot of time if I read a statement, which, which 
I think will make it clear what the nature of my relationship 
with Ms. Lewinsky was and how it related to the testimony I 
gave, what I was trying to do in that testimony. And I think it 
will perhaps make it possible for you to ask even more relevant 
questions from your point of view. And, with your permission, 
I'd like to read that statement.
    Q. Absolutely. Please, Mr. President.
    A. When I was alone with Ms. Lewinsky on certain occasions 
in early 1996 and once in early 1997, I engaged in conduct that 
was wrong. These encounters did not consist of sexual 
intercourse. They did not constitute sexual relations as I 
understood that term to be defined at my January 17th, 1998 
deposition. But they did involve inappropriate intimate 
contact.
    These inappropriate encounters ended, at my insistence, in 
early 1997. I also had occasional telephone conversations with 
Ms. Lewinsky that included inappropriate sexual banter.

Grand Jury Testimony of President Clinton, 8/17/98, pp. 8-9, H. 
Doc. 105-311, pp. 460-61.
    The President referred or reverted to this perjurious, 
false, and misleading statement many times throughout his grand 
jury testimony. For examples, see p. 37, lines 23-25, p. 38, 
lines 1-6; p. 101, lines 11-21; p. 109, lines 6-25, p. 110, 
lines 7-13; p. 138, lines 16-23; p. 166, lines 23-25, p. 167, 
lines 1-12.
    This statement is misleading. The fact that it was prepared 
beforehand reveals an intent to mislead. The purpose of the 
statement was to avoid answering specific questions related to 
the President's conduct with Ms. Lewinsky. This is evident from 
the fact that the President reverted to his statement 19 times 
in lieu of answering direct questions required by a grand jury 
witness. He used a prepared statement in order to justify the 
perjurious answers he gave at his deposition, which were 
intended to affect the outcome of the Jones case. See Article 
II analysis. The above quoted testimony reveals some direct 
lies. For example, the sexual contact between the President and 
Ms. Lewinsky was not limited to 1996 and 1997. It began in 
1995, when Monica Lewinsky was a 21 year old intern. The 
President and Ms. Lewinsky were not alone only on ``certain 
occasions.'' They were alone at least 20 times, and had 11 
sexual encounters. The ``occasional'' telephone conversations 
that included ``sexual banter'' actually included 55 phone 
conversations, during 17 of which they engaged in phone sex.
    These direct lies, however, taken alone, do not constitute 
the heart of the perjury committed by the President. Rather, 
the fact that he provided to the grand jury a half-true, 
incomplete and misleading statement as a true and complete 
characterization of his conduct (as required by the oath), and 
used that statement as a response to direct questions going to 
the heart of the investigation into whether he committed 
perjury and obstructed justice related to his deposition, 
constitutes a premeditated effort to thwart the investigation 
and to justify prior criminal wrongdoing.
    The President also provided the following perjurious, 
false, and misleading testimony regarding the nature and 
details of his relationship with a subordinate employee:

    Q. Did you understand the words in the first portion of the 
exhibit, Mr. President, that is, ``For the purposes of this 
deposition, a person engages in `sexual relations' when the 
person knowingly engages in or causes''?
    Did you understand, do you understand the words there in 
that phrase?
    A. Yes. My--I can tell you what my understanding of the 
definition is, if you want me to----
    Q. Sure.
    A  [continuing]. Do it. My understanding of this definition 
is it covers contact by the person being deposed with the 
enumerated areas, if the contact is done with an intent to 
arouse or gratify. That's my understanding of the definition.
    Q. What did you believe the definition to include and 
exclude? What kinds of activities?
    A. I thought the definition included any activity by the 
person being deposed, where the person was the actor and came 
into contact with those parts of the bodies with the purpose or 
intent or gratification, and excluded any other activity.

Grand Jury Testimony of President Clinton, 8/17/98, pp. 14-15, 
H. Doc. 105-311, pp. 466-67.
    This statement is perjurious. At the deposition of the 
President, his attorney Mr. Bennett, in characterizing the 
affidavit of Monica Lewinsky in which she stated that she did 
not have ``sexual relations'' with the President, stated that 
``sexual relations'' in that affidavit meant ``there is no sex 
of any kind in any manner, shape or form.'' The President would 
have the grand jury, and now the House of Representatives 
believe that the purposely broad definition of sexual 
relations, meant to address the affidavit filed, and chosen by 
the court in the Jones case, meant something different than the 
same words in Ms. Lewinsky's affidavit and that it took into 
account contorted and strained interpretations of words and 
meanings. It is unrealistic to contemplate that the President, 
at his deposition, honestly and without a desire to mislead, 
gave the meaning to the definition of ``sexual relations'' that 
he testified to before the grand jury.
    During his deposition in the Jones case, President Clinton, 
having knowledge of the false affidavit executed by Ms. 
Lewinsky denying any relationship, asserted the same falsehood 
contained in that affidavit which he encouraged her to file. He 
denied having a ``sexual affair, a sexual relationship or 
sexual relations'' with Monica Lewinsky. Deposition Testimony 
of President in the Jones case, 1/17/98, pp. 78, 204. Thus, the 
question of whether there was a sexual relationship between the 
President and this subordinate employee became part of the OIC 
investigation into whether the chief law enforcement officer of 
the country committed perjury and obstructed justice, 
undermining the rule of law in a civil rights sexual harassment 
case.
    The OIC proceeded to gather a substantial body of evidence 
proving that the President did indeed subvert the judicial 
system by lying under oath in his deposition and obstructing 
justice. This evidence includes Ms. Lewinsky's consistent and 
detailed testimony given under oath regarding 11 specific 
sexual encounters with the President, confirmation of the 
President's semen stain on Monica Lewinsky's dress, and the 
testimony of Monica Lewinsky's friends, family members and 
counselors to whom she made near contemporaneous statements 
about the relationship. Ms. Lewinsky's memory and accounts were 
further corroborated by her recollection of times and phone 
calls which were shown to be correct with entrance logs and 
phone records. (For a summary of testimony and citations to the 
record, see the OIC Referral, pp. 134-40).
    As indicated, contrary to this compelling corroborated 
evidence, President Clinton testified before the grand jury 
that he did not have ``sexual relations'' with Ms. Lewinsky. 
The Committee has concluded that the President lied under oath 
in making this statement. The obligation to tell the truth, the 
whole truth, and nothing but the truth requires a complete 
answer and does not allow a deponent to hide behind twisted 
interpretations that a reasonable person would not draw. Such 
``technical accuracy,'' as defined by the President, may pose 
an even greater affront to the basic concepts of judicial 
proceedings because it makes it impossible to achieve the 
truth-seeking purpose of such a proceeding. Legal hairsplitting 
used to bypass the requirement of telling the complete truth 
directly challenges the deterrence factor of the nation's 
perjury laws, denying a citizen her right to a constitutional 
orderly disposition of her claims in a court of law.
    While the President attempted to justify his perjurious 
deposition testimony regarding his relationship with Ms. 
Lewinsky by continuing to supply misleading answers concerning 
the definition of ``sexual relations'' used in the deposition, 
he lied before the grand jury about his contact with her even 
under his misleading interpretation of that definition:

    Q. If the person being deposed kissed the breast of another 
person, would that be in the definition of sexual relations as 
you understood it in the Jones case.
    A. Yes, that would constitute contact . . .
    Q. So, touching, in your view then and now--the person 
being deposed touching or kissing the breast of another person 
would fall within the definition?
    A. That's correct sir.
    Q. And you testified that you didn't have sexual relations 
with Monica Lewinsky in the Jones deposition, under that 
definition, correct?
    A. That's correct, sir.
    Q. If the person being deposed touched the genitalia of 
another person, would that be'' and with the intent to arouse 
the sexual desire, arouse or gratify, as defined in definition 
(1), would that be, under your understanding then and now----
    A. Yes, sir.
    Q  [continuing]. Sexual relations?
    A. Yes, sir.
    Q. Yes it would?
    A. Yes, it would. If you had direct contact with any of 
these places in the body, if you had direct contact with intent 
to arouse or gratify, that would fall within the definition.
    Q. So, you didn't do any of those three things----
    A. You----
    Q  [continuing]. With Monica Lewinsky?
    A. You are free to infer that my testimony is that I did 
not have sexual relations, as I understood this term to be 
defined.
    Q. Including touching her breast, kissing her breast, or 
touching her genitalia?
    A. That's correct.

Grand Jury Testimony of President Clinton 8/17/98 p. 94-95, H. 
Doc. 105-311 p. 546-47.
    Another example of such perjurious, false, and misleading 
grand jury testimony regarding the nature of this relationship 
can be found on p. 92, lines 13-17. The President thus 
testified that even under his strained and unrealistic 
interpretation of the definition of ``sexual relationship'', 
intended to cover that term as used in Ms. Lewinsky's false 
affidavit, the touching of her breasts and genitalia would fall 
under that definition and thus would constitute sexual 
relations. While it is curious that the President would assert 
that oral sex would not constitute sexual relations, but the 
touching of breasts would constitute such relations, even under 
his tortured reconstruction of the definition, the President 
committed perjury. He denied before the grand jury that he 
engaged in ``sexual relations as I understood that term to be 
defined at my January 17th, 1998 deposition.'' As mentioned 
above, he invoked this statement 19 times. Ms. Lewinsky 
testified under oath on several occasions that the President 
and she did engage in conduct that involved the touching of 
breasts and genitalia and therefore did constitute sexual 
relations even under the President's admitted interpretation of 
the definition.
    Ms. Lewinsky had every reason to tell the truth to the 
grand jury. She was under a threat of prosecution for perjury 
not only regarding her statements made on these occasions, but 
on the statements made in her admittedly false affidavit if she 
did not tell the truth, since truthful testimony was a 
condition of the immunity agreement she made. As indicated, her 
testimony is also corroborated.
    The vague and evasive responses given by the President were 
made in violation of the oath he took to tell ``the truth, the 
whole truth and nothing but the truth.'' He asserted in his 
grand jury testimony that because of his interpretation behind 
the motives for the lawsuit being brought, he was entitled in 
his deposition to answer in a manner that was less than 
completely truthful. This argument has no basis in law and is 
detrimental to the purpose of the oath. The technical and hair-
splitting legal arguments advanced by the President that he did 
not have an obligation to tell the complete truth unless a 
question was posed in a way that he had no choice but to give 
the complete truth, or that he did not ``technically'' perjure 
himself in his deposition, defy the common sense and human 
experience which must be applied by any prospective fact- 
finder in this case.
    The President did not have to answer untruthfully in the 
grand jury. The Constitution provided him with the opportunity 
to assert his Fifth Amendment right to refuse to respond based 
on his opinion that a completely truthful answer would tend to 
incriminate him for prior acts of perjury and obstruction of 
justice. He was apprised of this right in the grand jury 
proceeding:

          Q. You have a privilege against self-incrimination. 
        If a truthful answer to any question would tend to 
        incriminate you, you can invoke the privilege and that 
        invocation will not be used against you. Do you 
        understand that?
          A. I do.
          Q. And if you don't invoke it, however, any answer 
        that you give can and will be used against you. Do you 
        understand that, sir?
          A. I do.

Grand Jury Testimony of President Clinton, 8/17/98, pp. 4-5, H. 
Doc. 105-311, pp. 456-57.
    Instead of invoking his right, the President chose to place 
his own personal and political interests ahead of the interests 
of justice and the nation and continued to assert that he did 
not have sexual relations with Ms. Lewinsky. He also, as 
indicated infra, lied about the truthfulness of his prior 
testimony and his efforts to influence others related to the 
Jones action.
    The Committee has concluded that the President's statements 
to the grand jury denying that he had sexual relations with Ms. 
Lewinsky were calculated to avoid difficult questions regarding 
his conduct and to project the appearance that he was being 
forthright with the grand jury and the American people. In 
fact, his premeditated and carefully prepared statements were 
perjurious, false and misleading in light of corroborated 
evidence to the contrary.

2. The Committee concluded that the President provided perjurious, 
        false, and misleading testimony to a Federal grand jury 
        concerning prior perjurious, false and misleading testimony he 
        gave in a federal civil rights action brought against him.

    On August 17, 1998, the President gave perjurious, false, 
and misleading testimony regarding prior statements of the same 
nature he made in his deposition. Such testimony includes the 
following:

          Q. Now, you took the same oath to tell the truth, the 
        whole truth, and nothing but the truth on January 17th, 
        1998 in a deposition in the Paula Jones litigation; is 
        that correct, sir?
          A. I did take an oath then.
          Q. Did the oath you took on that occasion mean the 
        same to you then as it does today?
          A. I believed then that I had to answer the questions 
        truthfully, that is correct.

Grand Jury Testimony of President Clinton, 8/17/98, pp. 6-7, H. 
Doc. 105-311, pp. 457-58.

          Q. You're not going back on your earlier statement 
        that you understand you were sworn to tell the truth, 
        the whole truth and nothing but the truth to the folks 
        at that deposition, are you, Mr. President?
          A. No, sir, but I think we might as well put this out 
        on the table. You tried to get me to give a broader 
        interpretation to my oath than just my obligation to 
        tell the truth. In other words, you tried to say, even 
        though these people are treating you in an illegal 
        manner in illegally leaking these depositions, you 
        should be a good lawyer for them. And if they don't 
        have enough sense to write--to ask a question, and even 
        if Mr. Bennett invited them to ask follow-up questions, 
        if they didn't do it, you should have done all their 
        work for them.
          Now, so I will admit this, sir. My goal in this 
        deposition was to be truthful, but not particularly 
        helpful. I did not wish to do the work of the Jones 
        lawyers. I deplored what they were doing. I deplored 
        the innocent people they were tormenting and 
        traumatizing. I deplored their illegal leaking. I 
        deplored the fact that they knew, once they knew our 
        evidence, that this was a bogus lawsuit, and that 
        because of the funding they had from my political 
        enemies, they were putting ahead. I deplored it.
          But I was determined to work through the minefield of 
        this deposition without violating the law, and I 
        believe I did.

Grand Jury Testimony of President Clinton, 8/17/98, pp. 79-80, 
H. Doc. 105-311, pp. 531-32.
    The President did not believe that he had given truthful 
answers in his deposition testimony. If he had, he would not 
have related a false account of events to Betty Currie, his 
secretary, who he knew, according to his own statements in the 
deposition, might be called as a witness in the Jones case. He 
would not have told false accounts to his aides who, he 
admitted, he knew would be called to testify before the grand 
jury. The President understood from previous conversations with 
Monica Lewinsky that her affidavit, stating that they did not 
have ``sexual relations'', was false. He knew that the 
definition in the Jones case was meant to cover the same 
activity as that mentioned in the affidavit. In fact, the 
affidavit was directly mentioned in the President's deposition. 
Rather than tell the complete truth, the President lied about 
his relationship, the cover stories, the affidavit, the 
subpoena and the search for a job for Ms. Lewinsky at his 
deposition. He then denied committing perjury at his deposition 
before the grand jury. The President thus engaged in a series 
of lies and obstruction, each one calculated to cover the one 
preceding it.
    Throughout his grand jury testimony, the President 
acknowledged that he was bound to tell the truth during the 
January 17,1998, deposition in the Paula Jones case, as well as 
before the grand jury on August 17, 1998:

          Q. Mr. President, you understand that your testimony 
        here today is under oath?
          A. I do.
          Q. And do you understand that because you have sworn 
        to tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the 
        truth, that if you were to lie or intentionally mislead 
        the grand jury, you could be prosecuted for perjury 
        and/or obstruction of justice?
          A. I believe that's correct. . . .
          Q. You understand that it requires you to give the 
        whole truth, that is, a complete answer to each 
        question, sir?
          A. I will answer each question as accurately and 
        fully as I can.

Grand Jury Testimony of President Clinton, 8/17/98, pp. 457, H. 
Doc. 105-311.
    The President did not answer each question as accurately 
and fully as he could have. In contrast to his assertions that 
he testified truthfully when deposed on January 17, 1998, the 
record reflects that the President did not ``work through the 
minefield of [his deposition in the case of Jones v. Clinton] 
without violating the law.'' In fact, the Committee has 
concluded that President Clinton made multiple perjurious, 
false and misleading statements during his deposition in the 
case of Jones v. Clinton. Thus, his assertion before the grand 
jury that he did not violate the law in the deposition is 
itself a perjurious, false, and misleading statement and 
evidence of his continuing efforts to deny and cover-up his 
criminal wrongdoing. The details of the President's perjurious, 
false, and misleading statements made during his deposition in 
the case of Jones v. Clinton are set forth in Article II, 
Paragraph 2.

3. The Committee concluded that the President provided perjurious, 
        false, and misleading testimony to a Federal grand jury 
        concerning prior false and misleading statements he allowed his 
        attorney to make to a Federal judge in that civil rights action

    The President made perjurious, false and misleading 
statements before the grand jury when he testified he did not 
allow his attorney to refer to an affidavit before the judge in 
the Jones case that he knew to be false:

    Q. Mr. President, I want to before I go into a new subject 
area, briefly go over something you were talking about with Mr. 
Bittman.
    The statement of your attorney, Mr. Bennett, at the Paul 
Jones deposition, ``counsel is fully aware''--it's page 54 line 
5--``counsel is fully aware that Ms. Lewinsky has filed, has an 
affidavit which they are in possession of saying that there is 
no sex of any kind in any manner, shape or form, with President 
Clinton?
    That statement is made by your attorney in front of Judge 
Susan Webber Wright, correct?
    A. That's correct.
    Q. That statement is a completely false statement. Whether 
or not Mr. Bennett knew of your relationship with Ms. Lewinsky, 
the statement that there was ``no sex of any kind in any 
manner, shape or form, with President Clinton,'' was an utterly 
false statement. Is that correct?
    A. It depends on what the meaning of the word ``is'' is. If 
the--if he--if ``is'' means is and never has been, that is 
not--that is one thing. If it means there is none, that was a 
completely true statement.
    But, as I have testified, and I'd like to testify again, 
this is--it is somewhat unusual for a client to be asked about 
his lawyer's statements, instead of the other way around. I was 
not paying a great deal of attention to this exchange. I was 
focusing on my own testimony.

Grand Jury Testimony of President Clinton, 8/17/98, pp. 57-58, 
H. Doc. 105-311, pp. 509-510.
    Further perjurious, false and misleading statements from 
the President's grand jury testimony regarding this issue can 
be found on p. 24, lines 6-20; p. 25, lines 1-6; p. 59, lines 
16-23; p. 60, lines 4-15, and p. 61, lines 4-15.
    On January 15, 1998, Robert Bennett, attorney for President 
Clinton in the case of Jones v. Clinton, obtained a copy of the 
affidavit Monica Lewinsky filed in an attempt to avoid having 
to testify in the case of Jones v. Clinton. Grand Jury 
Testimony of Frank Carter, 6/18/98, pp. 1, 12-13, H. Doc. 105-
316, pp. 420-21. In this affidavit, Monica Lewinsky asserted 
that she had never had a sexual relationship with President 
Clinton. At the President's deposition on January 17, 1988, an 
attorney for Paula Jones began to ask the President questions 
about his relationship with Ms. Lewinsky. Mr. Bennett objected 
to the ``innuendo'' of the questions and he pointed out that 
Ms. Lewinsky had signed an affidavit denying a ``sexual 
relationship'' with the President. Mr. Bennett asserted that 
this indicated ``there is no sex of any kind in any manner, 
shape or form,'' between the President and Ms. Lewinsky, and 
after a warning from Judge Wright he stated that, ``I am not 
coaching the witness. In preparation of the witness for this 
deposition, the witness is fully aware of Ms. Jane Doe 6's 
affidavit, so I have not told him a single thing he doesn't 
know.'' Mr. Bennett clearly used the affidavit in an attempt to 
stop the questioning of the President about Ms. Lewinsky. The 
President did not say anything to correct Mr. Bennett even 
though he knew the affidavit was false. Judge Wright overruled 
Mr. Bennett's objection and allowed the questioning to proceed. 
Deposition of President Clinton in the Jones case, 1/17/98, p. 
54.
    Later in the deposition, Mr. Bennett read the President the 
portion of Ms. Lewinsky's affidavit in which she denied having 
a ``sexual relationship'' with the President and asked the 
President if Ms. Lewinsky's statement was true and accurate. 
The President responded: ``That is absolutely true.'' 
Deposition of President Clinton in the case of Jones v. 
Clinton, 1/17/98, p. 204. The grand jury testimony of Monica 
Lewinsky, given under oath and following a grant of 
transnational immunity, confirmed that the contents of her 
affidavit were not true:

          Q. Paragraph 8 . . . [of the affidavit] says, ``I 
        have never had a sexual relationship with the 
        President.'' Is that true?
          A. No.

Grand Jury Testimony of Monica Lewinsky, 8/6/98, H. Doc. 105-
311, p. 924.
    When President Clinton was asked during his grand jury 
testimony how he could have lawfully sat silent at his 
deposition while his attorney made a false statement (``there 
is no sex of any kind, in any manner shape or form'') to a 
United States District Court Judge, the President first said 
that he was not paying ``a great deal of attention'' to Mr. 
Bennett when he said this. The President's videotaped 
deposition, however, shows the President paying close attention 
and squarely looking in Mr. Bennett's direction while Mr. 
Bennett was making the statement about ``no sex of any kind.'' 
The President then argued that when Mr. Bennett made the 
assertion that there ``is no sex of any kind. . . . ,'' Mr. 
Bennett was speaking only in the present tense, as if he 
understood that to be the case at the time the remark was made, 
and when he was allegedly not paying attention to the remark. 
The President stated, ``It depends on what the meaning of the 
word ``is'' is, and that ``[i]f it means there is none, that 
was a completely true statement.'' Grand Jury Testimony of 
President Clinton, 8/17/98, pp. 57-61, H. Doc. 105-311, pp. 
509-513; see also id., pp. 24-25, H. Doc. 105-311, pp. 476-77.
    It is clear to the Committee that the President perjured 
himself when he said that Mr. Bennett's statement that there 
was ``no sex of any kind'' was ``completely true'' depending on 
what the word ``is'' is. The President did not want to admit 
that Mr. Bennett's statement was false, because to do so would 
have been to admit that the term ``sexual relations'' as used 
in the Lewinsky affidavit meant ``no sex of any kind.'' 
Admitting that would be to admit that he perjured himself 
previously in his grand jury testimony and in his prior 
deposition. Thus, the President engaged in an evolving series 
of lies in sworn testimony in order to cover previous lies he 
told in sworn testimony and previous obstructive conduct. In 
all of this, it was the intention of the President to thwart 
the ability of Paula Jones to bring a case against him and to 
sidetrack the OIC investigation into his misconduct.

4. The Committee concluded that the President provided perjurious, 
        false, and misleading testimony to a Federal grand jury 
        concerning his corrupt efforts to influence the testimony of 
        witnesses and to impede the discovery of evidence in that civil 
        rights action

            a. The President gave perjurious, false and misleading 
                    testimony before the grand jury when he denied 
                    engaging in a plan to hide evidence that had been 
                    subpoenaed in the federal civil rights action 
                    against him
    The President made the following perjurious, false, and 
misleading statements before the grand jury regarding efforts 
to hide evidence that had been subpoenaed in the case of Jones 
v. Clinton.

          Q. Getting back to your meeting with Ms. Lewinsky on 
        December 28, you are aware that she's been subpoenaed. 
        You are aware, are you not, Mr. President, that the 
        subpoena called for the production of, among other 
        things, all the gifts that you had given Ms. Lewinsky? 
        You were aware of that on December 28, weren't you?
          A. I'm not sure. And I understand this is an 
        important question. I did have a conversation with Ms. 
        Lewinsky at some time about gifts, the gifts I had 
        given her. I do not know whether it occurred on the 
        28th, or whether it occurred earlier. I do not know 
        whether it occurred in person or whether it occurred on 
        the telephone. I have searched my memory for this, 
        because I know it's an important issue.
          Perhaps if you--I can tell you what I remember about 
        the conversation and you can see why I'm having trouble 
        placing the date.
          Q. Please.
          A. The reason I'm not sure it happened on the 28th is 
        that my recollection is that Ms. Lewinsky said 
        something to me like, what if they ask me about the 
        gifts you've given me. That's the memory I have. That's 
        why I question whether it happened on the 28th, because 
        she had a subpoena with her, request for production.
          And I told her if they asked for gifts, she'd have to 
        give them whatever she had, that that's what the law 
        was.

Grand Jury Testimony of President Clinton, 8/17/98, p. 42-43, 
H. Doc. 105-311, p. 494-495.
    Essentially the same perjurious, false, and misleading 
testimony is repeated by the President later in his grand jury 
testimony, p. 45, lines 11-23.
    The following testimony was also given:

          Q. After you gave her the gifts on December 28th, did 
        you speak with your secretary, Ms. Currie, and ask her 
        to pick up a box of gifts that were some compilation of 
        gifts that Ms. Lewinsky would have----
          A. No, sir, I didn't do that.
          Q  [continuing]. To give to Ms. Currie?
          A. I did not do that.

Grand Jury Testimony of President Clinton, 8/17/98, p. 50, H. 
Doc. 105-311, p. 502.
    Similar perjurious, false, and misleading grand jury 
testimony of President Clinton can be found on p. 113, lines 
16-25, p. 114, lines 1-25 of the transcript from that grand 
jury testimony of 8/17/98.
    On December 19, 1997, Monica Lewinsky was served with a 
subpoena in connection with the case of Jones v. Clinton. The 
subpoena required her to testify at a deposition on January 23, 
1998. The subpoena also required her to produce each and every 
gift given to her by President Clinton. On the morning of 
December 28, 1998, Ms. Lewinsky met with the President for 
about 45 minutes in the Oval Office. By this time, President 
Clinton knew Ms. Lewinsky had been subpoenaed. At this meeting 
they discussed the fact that the gifts had been subpoenaed, 
including a hat pin, the first gift Clinton had given Lewinsky. 
Monica Lewinsky testified that at some point in this meeting 
she said to the President, `` `Well, you know, I--maybe I 
should put the gifts away outside my house somewhere or give 
them to someone, maybe Betty'. And he sort of said--I think he 
responded, `I don't know' or `Let me think about that.' And 
left that topic.'' Grand Jury Testimony of Monica Lewinsky, 8/
6/98, p. 152, H. Doc. 105-311, p. 872; See also 7/27/98 OIC 
Interview of Monica Lewinsky, p. 7, H. Doc. 105-311, p. 1395.
    President Clinton provided the following explanation to the 
grand jury and this Committee regarding this conversation: 
``Ms. Lewinsky said something to me like, what if they ask me 
about the gifts you've given me,'' but I do not know whether 
that conversation occurred on December 28, 1997, or earlier. 
Whenever this conversation occurred, I testified, I told her 
``that if they asked her for gifts, she'd have to give them 
whatever she had. . . .'' I simply was not concerned about the 
fact that I had given her gifts. Indeed, I gave her additional 
gifts on December 28, 1997. Request for Admission number 24; 
see also Grand Jury Testimony of President Clinton, 8/17/98, p. 
43, H. Doc. 105-311, p. 495. The President's statement that he 
told Ms. Lewinsky that if the attorneys for Paula Jones asked 
for the gifts, she had to provide them is perjurious, false and 
misleading. It simply strains logic to believe the President 
would encourage Monica Lewinsky to turn over the gifts. To do 
so would have raised questions about their relationship and 
would have been contrary to all of their other efforts to 
conceal the relationship, including the filing of an affidavit 
denying a sexual relationship. The fact that the President gave 
Ms. Lewinsky additional gifts on December 28, 1998, provides 
further evidence that the President did not believe Ms. 
Lewinsky would provide gifts that had been subpoenaed. As Ms. 
Lewinsky testified, she never questioned, ``that we were ever 
going to do anything but keep this quiet.'' This meant that 
they had to take ``whatever steps needed to be taken'' to keep 
it quiet. By giving more gifts to Monica Lewinsky after she 
received a subpoena to appear for a deposition in the case of 
Jones v. Clinton, the President was making another gesture of 
affection towards Ms. Lewinsky to help ensure that she would 
not testify truthfully regarding their relationship.
    Ms. Lewinsky testified that she was never under the 
impression from anything the President said that she should 
turn over to Ms. Jones's attorneys all the gifts that he had 
given her. Deposition of Monica Lewinsky, 8/26/98, p. 58, H. 
Doc. 105-311, p. 1337. Additionally, she said she can't answer 
why the President would give her more gifts on the 28th when he 
knew she was under an obligation to produce gifts in response 
to a subpoena. She did testify, however, that, ``to me it was 
never a question in my mind and I--from everything he said to 
me, I never questioned him, that we were never going to do 
anything but keep this private, so that meant deny it and that 
meant do--take whatever appropriate steps needed to be taken, 
you know, for that to happen . . .. So by turning over these 
gifts, it would at least prompt [the Jones attorneys] to 
question me about what kind of friendship I had with the 
President. . . .'' Grand Jury Testimony of Monica Lewinsky, 8/
6/98, pp. 166-67, H. Doc. 105-311, pp. 886-87.
    After this meeting on the morning of December 28th, Ms. 
Currie called Monica Lewinsky and made arrangements to pick up 
gifts the President had given to Ms. Lewinsky. Monica Lewinsky 
testified under oath before the grand jury that a few hours 
after meeting with the President on December 28, 1997, a 
meeting in which Ms. Lewinsky and President Clinton discussed 
the fact that gifts given to her by Mr. Clinton had been 
subpoenaed in the case of Jones v. Clinton, Betty Currie called 
her. The record indicates the following discussion occurred:

        4  Q. What did [Betty Currie] say?
          A. She said, ``I understand you have something to 
        give me.'' Or, ``The President said you have something 
        to give me.'' Along those lines. . . .
          Q. When she said something along the lines of ``I 
        understand you have something to give me,'' or ``The 
        President says you have something for me,'' what did 
        you understand her to mean?
          A. The gifts.

Grand Jury Testimony of Monica Lewinsky, 8/6/98, pp. 154-55, H. 
Doc. 105-311, pp. 874.
    Later in the day on December 28th, Ms. Currie drove to Ms. 
Lewinsky's home and Ms. Lewinsky gave her a sealed box that 
contained several gifts Ms. Lewinsky had received from the 
President, including the hat pin. Grand Jury Testimony of 
Monica Lewinsky, 8/6/98, pp. 156-58, H. Doc. 105-311, pp. 875-
78. Ms. Currie testified that she understood the box contained 
gifts from the President. She took the box home and put it 
under her bed. Grand Jury Testimony of Betty Currie, 5/6/98, 
pp. 107-8, H. Doc. 105-316, p. 581. In Monica Lewinsky's 
February 1, 1998 handwritten statement to the OIC, which Ms. 
Lewinsky has testified is truthful, she stated, ``Ms. Currie 
called Ms. L later that afternoon and said that the Pres. had 
told her Ms. L wanted her to hold onto something for her. Ms. L 
boxed up most of the gifts she had received and gave them to 
Ms. Currie.'' 2/1/98 Handwritten Proffer of Monica Lewinsky, p. 
7, H. Doc. 105-311, p. 715.
    Betty Currie testified that she did not recall the 
President telling her that Ms. Lewinsky wanted her to retrieve 
and hold some items; that Ms. Lewinsky called her and asked her 
to come get the gifts. Grand Jury Testimony of Betty Currie, 5/
6/98, pp. 105-6, H. Doc. 105-316, p. 581. When asked if a 
contrary statement by Ms. Lewinsky--indicating that Ms. Currie 
had in fact spoken to the President about the gift transfer--
would be false, Ms. Currie replied: ``She may remember better 
than I. I don't remember.'' Grand Jury Testimony of Betty 
Currie, 5/6/98, p. 126, H. Doc. 105-316, p. 584.
    Further evidence before the Committee reveals that Betty 
Currie telephoned Monica Lewinsky regarding the gifts, and not 
the other way around:

          Mr. Schippers: When Ms. Currie, when they wanted to 
        get rid of the gifts, Ms. Currie went and picked them 
        up, put them under her bed to keep them from anybody 
        else. Another mission accomplished?
          Mr. Starr: That's right.
          Mr. Schippers: By the way, there has been some talk 
        here that Monica said that she recalled that Betty 
        Currie called her and said, either the President wants 
        me to pick something up, or I understand you have 
        something for me to pick up. Later, Ms. Currie backed 
        off that and said, well, I am not sure, maybe Monica 
        called me. In the material that you made available, you 
        and your staff made available to us, there were 302s in 
        which Monica said, I think when Betty called me, she 
        was using her cell phone. Do you recall that, Judge 
        Starr?
          Mr. Starr: I do.
          Mr. Schippers: And in that same material that is in 
        your office that both parties were able to review and 
        that we did, in fact, review, there are phone records 
        of Ms. Currie; are there not?
          Mr. Starr: There are.
          Mr. Schippers: And there is a telephone call on her 
        cell phone to Monica Lewinsky's home on the afternoon 
        of December 28, 1997; isn't there?
          Mr. Starr: That is correct.
          Mr. Schippers: Once again, Monica is right and she 
        has been corroborated, right?
          Mr. Starr: That certainly tends to corroborate Ms. 
        Lewinsky's recollection.

Impeachment Hearing on Inquiry Pursuant to H. Res. 581, 
Thursday, November 19, 1998, Transcript pp. 407-409.
    President Clinton testified before the grand jury, and 
reiterated to this Committee (Request for Admission number 26) 
that he did not recall any conversation with Ms. Currie on or 
about December 28, 1997, about gifts previously given to Ms. 
Lewinsky and that he never told Ms. Currie to take possession 
of gifts he had given Ms. Lewinsky. Grand Jury Testimony of 
President Clinton, 8/17/98, p. 50, H. Doc. 105-311, p. 502; see 
also Grand Jury Testimony of President Clinton, 8/17/98, pp. 
113-114, H. Doc. 105-311, pp. 565-66. This answer is false and 
misleading because the evidence reveals that Betty Currie did 
call Monica Lewinsky about the gifts and there is no reason for 
her to do so unless instructed by the President. Because she 
did not personally know of the gift issue, there is no other 
way Ms. Currie could have known to call Ms. Lewinsky about the 
gifts unless the President told her to do so. The President had 
a motive to conceal the gifts because both he and Ms. Lewinsky 
were concerned that the gifts might raise questions about their 
relationship. By confirming that the gifts would not be 
produced, the President ensured that these questions would not 
arise. The concealment and non-production of the gifts to the 
attorneys for Paula Jones allowed the President to provide 
false and misleading statements about the gifts at his 
deposition in the Jones case. Additionally, Ms. Lewinsky's 
testimony on this subject has been consistent and unequivocal; 
she provided the same facts in February, July and August. Betty 
Currie's cell phone records show that she placed a one minute 
call to Monica Lewinsky on the afternoon of December 28th.
            b. The President made perjurious, false, and misleading 
                    statements before the grand jury regarding his 
                    knowledge that the contents of an affidavit 
                    executed by a subordinate federal employee who was 
                    a witness in the federal civil rights action 
                    brought against him were untrue
    The President provided the following perjurious, false and 
misleading testimony to the grand jury:

          Q. Did you tell her to tell the truth?
          A. Well, I think the implication was she would tell 
        the truth. I've already told you that I felt strongly 
        she could execute an affidavit that would be factually 
        truthful, that might get her out of having to testify. 
        Now, it obviously wouldn't if the Jones people knew 
        this, because they knew if they could get this and leak 
        it, it would serve their larger purposes, even if the 
        judge ruled that she couldn't be a witness in that 
        case. The judge later ruled she wouldn't be a witness 
        in that case. The judge later ruled the case had no 
        merit.
          So, I knew that. And did I hope she'd be able to get 
        out of testifying on an affidavit? Absolutely. Did I 
        want her to execute a false affidavit? No, I did not.
          Q. If Monica has stated that her affidavit that she 
        didn't have a sexual relationship with you is, in fact, 
        a lie, I take it you disagree with that.
          A. No. I told you before what I thought the issue was 
        there. I think the issue is how do you define sexual 
        relationship. And there is no definition imposed on her 
        at the time she executed the affidavit. Therefore, she 
        was free to give it any reasonable meaning.

Grand Jury Testimony of President Clinton, 8/17/98, p. 119-120, 
H. Doc. 105-311, p. 571-572.
    A similar perjurious, false, and misleading statement can 
be found at p. 20, lines 20-25, p. 21, lines 1-16 of the 
President's grand jury testimony
    The President also provided the following perjurious, 
false, and misleading testimony regarding his knowledge that 
the contents of the affidavit were untrue:

          Q. And do you remember that Ms. Lewinsky's affidavit 
        said that she had had no sexual relationship with you. 
        Do you remember that?
          A. I do.
          Q. And do you remember in the deposition that Mr. 
        Bennett asked you about that. This is at the end of 
        the--towards the end of the deposition. And you 
        indicated, he asked you whether the statement that Ms. 
        Lewinsky made in her affidavit was----
          A. Truthful.
          Q.--True. And you indicated that it was absolutely 
        correct.
          A. I did. And at the time she made the statement, and 
        indeed to the present day because, as far as I know, 
        she was never deposed since the Judge ruled she would 
        not be permitted to testify in a case the Judge ruled 
        had no merit; that is, this case we're talking about.
          I believe at the time she filled out this affidavit, 
        if she believed that the definition of sexual 
        relationship was two people having intercourse, then 
        this is accurate. And I believe that is the definition 
        that most ordinary Americans would give it.

Grand Jury Testimony of President Clinton, 8/17/98, pp. 20-21, 
H. Doc. 105-311, pp.472-73.
    Monica Lewinsky filed an affidavit in the Jones case, in 
which she denied ever having a sexual relationship with the 
President. During his deposition in that case, the President 
affirmed that the statement of Monica Lewinsky in her affidavit 
denying a sexual relationship was ``absolutely true.'' 
Deposition of President Clinton in the case of Jones v. 
Clinton, 1/17/98, p. 204. Monica Lewinsky has stated that she 
is ``100 percent sure'' that the President suggested she might 
want to sign an affidavit to avoid testifying in the case of 
Jones v. Clinton. 8/19/98 OIC interview of Monica Lewinsky, pp. 
4-5, H. Doc. 105-311, pp. 1558-9, see also Grand Jury Testimony 
of Monica Lewinsky, 8/6/98, pp. 123-24, H. Doc. 105-311, pp. 
834-44. President Clinton told this Committee he believed he 
told Ms. Lewinsky ``other witnesses had executed affidavits, 
and there was a chance they would not have to testify.'' 
Request for Admission number 18. The President gave the 
following testimony before the grand jury ``And did I hope 
she'd be able to get out of testifying on an affidavit? 
Absolutely. Did I want her to execute a false affidavit? No I 
did not.'' Grand Jury Testimony of President Clinton, 8/17/98, 
p. 119, H. Doc. 105-311, p. 571.
    This testimony is false and misleading because it is not 
possible that Monica Lewinsky could have filed a full and 
truthful affidavit, i.e. an affidavit acknowledging a sexual 
relationship with the President, that would have helped her to 
avoid a deposition in the Jones case. The attorneys for Paula 
Jones were seeking evidence of sexual relationships the 
President may have had with other state or federal employees. 
Such information is often deemed relevant in sexual harassment 
lawsuits to help prove the underlying claim of the Plaintiff 
and Judge Susan Weber Wright ruled that Paula Jones was 
entitled to this information for purposes of discovery. 
Consequently, if Monica Lewinsky acknowledged a sexual 
relationship with the President in her affidavit, then she 
certainly could not have avoided a deposition. The President 
had to be aware of this and this renders his grand jury 
testimony on this subject false and misleading.
            c. The President made perjurious, false, and misleading 
                    statements before the grand jury when he recited a 
                    false account of the facts regarding his 
                    interactions with Monica Lewinsky to Betty Currie, 
                    a potential witness in the federal civil rights 
                    action brought against him
    The President provided the following perjurious, false and 
misleading testimony concerning the false account he provided 
to Betty Currie regarding his relationship with Ms. Lewinsky:

          Q. What was your purpose in making these statements 
        to Miss Currie, if they weren't for the purpose to try 
        to suggest to her if ever asked?
          A. Now, Mr. Bittman, I told you, the only thing I 
        remember is when all the stuff blew up, I was trying to 
        figure out what the facts were. I was trying to 
        remember.

Grand Jury Testimony of President Clinton, 8/17/98, p. 138-39, 
H. Doc. 105-311, pp. 590-91.
    For very similar perjurious, false and misleading grand 
jury testimony of President Clinton, see p. 54, lines 19-25, p. 
55, lines 1-25 and p. 56, lines 1-16; p. 130, lines 18-25, p. 
131, lines 1-14; p. 141, lines 7-12 and 23-25, p. 142, lines 1-
3.
    The record reflects that President Clinton attempted to 
influence the testimony of Betty Currie, his personal 
secretary, by coaching her to recite inaccurate answers to 
possible questions that might be asked of her if called to 
testify in the Paula Jones case. The President did this shortly 
after he had been deposed in the case.
    In his grand jury testimony and responses to the 
Committee's Requests for Admission, the President was 
occasionally evasive and vague on this point. He stated that on 
January 18, 1998, he met with Ms. Currie and ``. . . asked her 
certain questions, in an effort to get as much information as 
quickly as I could and made certain statements, although I do 
not remember exactly what I said.'' Grand Jury Testimony of 
President Clinton, 8/17/98, H. Doc. 105-311, p. 508; Response 
of President Clinton to Question No. 52 of the Committee's 
Requests for Admission. The President added that he urged Ms. 
Currie to ``tell the truth'' after learning that the Office of 
Independent Counsel (OIC) might subpoena her to testify. (Id at 
p. 591.)
    The President also stated that he could not recall how many 
times he had talked to Ms. Currie or when, in response to OIC 
questioning on the subject of a similar meeting that took place 
on or about January 20 or 21, 1998. He claimed that by asking 
questions of Ms. Currie he was only attempting to ``. . . 
ascertain what the facts were, trying to ascertain what Betty's 
perception was.'' Grand Jury Testimony of President Clinton, 8/
17/98, H. Doc. 105-311, pp. 592-93; Response of President 
Clinton to Question No. 53 of the Committee's Requests for 
Admission.
    While testifying before the grand jury, Ms. Currie was more 
precise in her recollection of the two meetings. An OIC 
attorney asked her if the President had made a series of 
leading statements or questions that were similar to the 
following:

          You were always there when she [Monica Lewinsky] was 
        there, right? We were never really alone.''
          You could see hear and hear everything.
          Monica came on to me, and I never touched her, right?
          She wanted to have sex with me and I couldn't do 
        that.

    In her testimony Ms. Currie indicated that the President's 
remarks were ``more like statements than questions.'' Based on 
his demeanor and the manner in which he asked the questions, 
she concluded that the President wanted her to agree with him. 
Ms. Currie thought that the President was attempting to gauge 
her reaction, and appeared concerned. OIC Referral, H. Doc. 
105-3 10, pp. 191-92; Grand Jury Testimony of Betty Currie, 1/
27/98, pp. 71-76, H. Doc. 105-316, pp. 559-60.
    Ms. Currie also acknowledged that while she indicated to 
the President that she agreed with him, in fact she knew that, 
at times, he was alone with Ms. Lewinsky and that she could not 
or did not hear or see the two of them while they were alone.
    As to their subsequent meeting on January 20 or 21, 1998, 
Ms. Currie stated that ``. . . it was sort of a recapitulation 
of what we had talked about on Sunday [January 18, 19981. . . 
.'' Grand Jury Testimony of Betty Currie, 1/27/98, p. 81, H. 
Doc. 105-316, p. 561.
            d. The President made perjurious, false and misleading 
                    statements before the grand jury concerning 
                    statements he made to aides regarding his 
                    relationship with Monica Lewinsky
    The President gave the following perjurious testimony under 
oath before the grand jury:

          Q. Did you deny to them or not, Mr. President?
          A. Let me finish. So, what--I did not want to mislead 
        my friends but I want to define language where I can 
        say that. I also, frankly, do not want to turn any of 
        them into witnesses, because I--and, sure enough, they 
        all became witnesses.
          Q. Well you knew they might be----
          A. And so----
          Q. Witnesses, didn't you?
          A. And so I said to them things that were true about 
        this relationship. That I used--in the language I used, 
        I said, there is nothing go on between us. That was 
        true. I said, I have not had sex with her as I defined 
        it. That was true. And did I hope that I would never 
        have to be here on this day giving this testimony? Of 
        course. But I also didn't want to do anything to 
        complicate this matter further. So, I said things that 
        were true. They may have been misleading, and if they 
        were, I have to take responsibility for it, and I'm 
        sorry.

Grand Jury Testimony of President Clinton 8/17/98, p. 105-106, 
H. Doc. 105-311 p. 557-558.
    Another perjurious, false and misleading statement by the 
President regarding conversations with his aides is recorded on 
p. 100, lines 20-25 of the grand jury transcript.
    The following grand jury testimony of several Presidential 
aides demonstrates that the President's testimony that he 
``said things that were true'' to his aides is clearly 
perjurious, false and misleading.
    The record reflects that President Clinton met with a total 
of five aides who would later be called to testify before the 
grand jury shortly after the President's deposition in the 
Paula Jones case and following a Washington Post story, 
published on January 21, 1998, which detailed the relationship 
between the President and Monica Lewinsky. During the meetings 
the President made untrue statements to his aides:
            Sidney Blumenthal
    Testifying before the grand jury on June 4, 1998, Sidney 
Blumenthal, an Assistant to the President, related the 
following discussion he had with the President on January 21, 
1998:

          He said Dick Morris had called him that day and he 
        said Dick had told him that Nixon--he had read the 
        newspaper and he said ``You know, Nixon could have 
        survived if he had gone on television and given an 
        address and said everything he had done wrong and got 
        it all out in the beginning.''
          And I said to the President, ``What have you done 
        wrong?'' And he said, ``Nothing, I haven't done 
        anything wrong.'' I said, ``Well then, that's one of 
        the stupidest things I've ever heard. Why would you do 
        that if you've done nothing wrong?'
          And it was at that point that he gave his account of 
        what had happened to me and he said that Monica--and it 
        came very fast. He said, ``Monica Lewinsky came at me 
        and made a sexual demand on me.'' He rebuffed her. He 
        said, I've gone down that road before, I've caused pain 
        for a lot of people and I'm not going to do that 
        again.''

Grand Jury Testimony of Sidney Blumenthal, 6-4-98, p. 49, H. 
Doc. 105-316, p. 185.
            John Podesta
    In his grand jury testimony on June 16, 1998, then White 
House Deputy Chief of Staff John Podesta (now Chief Of Staff) 
testified to the following regarding a January 21, 1998 meeting 
with President Clinton:

          A. And we went in to see the President.
          Q. Who's we?
          A. Mr. Bowles, myself and Ms. Matthews.
          Q. Okay. Tell us about that.
          A. And we started off the meeting--we didn't--I don't 
        think we said anything, and I think the President 
        directed this specifically to Mr. Bowles. He said, 
        ``Erskine, I want you to know that this story is not 
        true.
          Q. What else did he say?
          A. He said that--that he had not had a sexual 
        relationship with her, and that he never asked anybody 
        to lie.

Grand Jury Testimony of John Podesta, 6/16/98, p. 85, H. Doc. 
105-316, p. 3310.
    Erskine Bowles had the following recollection of the same 
meeting:

          A. And this was the day this huge story breaks. And 
        the three of us walk in together--Sylvia Matthews, John 
        Podesta and me--into the oval office, and the President 
        was standing behind his desk.
          Q. About what time of day is this?
          A. This is approximately 9:00 in the morning or 
        something--you know, in that area. And he looked up at 
        us and he said the same thing he said to the American 
        people. He said, I want you to know I did not have 
        sexual relationships with this woman Monica Lewinsky. I 
        did not ask anybody to lie. And when the facts come 
        out, you'll understand.

Grand Jury Testimony of Erskine Bowles, 4/2/98, pp. 83-84, H. 
Doc. 105-316, p. 239.
    The record indicates the President also had a January 23, 
1998, conversation with John Podesta, in which you stated that 
you had never had an affair with Monica Lewinsky?

          A. See, we were getting ready to do the State of the 
        Union prep and he was working on the state of the union 
        draft back in his study. I went back there to just to 
        kind of get him going--this is the first thing in the 
        morning--you know, we sort of get engaged. I asked him 
        how he was doing, and he said he was working on this 
        draft, and he said to me that he had never had sex with 
        her, and that--he never asked--you know, he repeated 
        the denial, but he was extremely explicit in saying he 
        never had sex with her.
          Q. How do you mean?
          A. Just what I said.
          Q. Okay. Not explicit, in the sense that he got more 
        specific than sex, than the word ``sex.''
          A. Yes, he was more specific than that.
          Q. Okay. Share that with us.
          A. Well, I think he said--he said that--there was 
        some spate of, you know, what sex acts were counted, 
        and he said that he had never had sex with her in any 
        way whatsoever----
          Q. Okay.
          A. That they had not had oral sex.
          Q. No question in you mind he's denying any sex in 
        any way, shape or form, correct?
          A. That's correct.

Grand Jury Testimony of John Podesta, 6/16/98, pp. 91-3, H. 
Doc. 105-316, p. 3311.
    In that same January 23rd conversation with John Podesta, 
the President stated he was not alone with Monica Lewinsky in 
the Oval Office, and that Betty Currie was either in his 
presence or outside his office with the door open while he was 
visiting with Monica Lewinsky:

          Q. Did the President ever speak to that issue with 
        you, the issue of if he didn't have an improper 
        relationship with Ms. Lewinsky, what was she doing 
        there so often? Did he ever speak to that?
          A. He said to me--I don't think it was in this 
        conversation, I think it was a couple weeks later. He 
        said to me that after she left, that when she had come 
        by, she came to see Betty, and that he--when she was 
        there, either Betty was with them--either that she was 
        with Betty when he saw her or that he saw her in the 
        Oval Office with the door open and Betty was around--
        and Betty was out at her desk.

Grand Jury Testimony of John Podesta, 6/16/98, p. 88, H. Doc. 
105-316, p. 3310.
            Harold Ickes
    On or about January 26, 1998, The President had a 
conversation with Harold Ickes, in which he made statements to 
the effect that he did not have an affair with Monica Lewinsky:

          Q. What did the President say about Monica Lewinsky?
          A. The only discussion I recall having with him, he 
        denied that he had had sexual relations with Ms. 
        Lewinsky and denied that he had--I don't know how to 
        capsulize it--obstructed justice, let's use that 
        phrase.

Grand Jury Testimony of Harold Ickes, 6/10/98, p. 21, H. Doc. 
105-316, p. 1487; See also Grand Jury Testimony of Harold Ickes 
from 8/5/98, p. 88, H. Doc. 105-316, p. 1610 (``He denied to me 
that he had had a sexual relationship. I don't know the exact 
phrase, but the word `sexual' was there. And he denied any 
obstruction of justice'')).

5. Explanation of the Rogan Amendment to Article I

    The Committee adopted an amendment to Article I of the 
Resolution offered by Representative Rogan of California. 
Article I addresses certain statements which the President made 
during his grand jury testimony on August 17, 1997. More 
explicitly, the Article charges the President with providing 
perjurious, false, and misleading testimony governing the 
following topics:
        The nature and details of his relationship with a 
        subordinated Government employee;
          Prior testimony in a deposition he gave in a Federal 
        civil rights action against brought against him in the 
        case of Jones v. Clinton;
          Prior false and misleading statements he allowed his 
        attorney to make to a Federal judge in that civil 
        rights action; and
          His corrupt efforts to influence the testimony of 
        witnesses and to impede the discovery of evidence in 
        that civil rights action.
    The Rogan amendment supplements the language of Article I 
by specifying that the President willfully provided perjurious, 
false, and misleading testimony to the grand jury concerning 
any one or more of the four topics enumerated. In other words, 
contrary to his grand jury oath, the President provided 
perjurious, false, and misleading testimony about ``one or 
more'' of the four topics.
    The Rogan language simply tracks identical language invoked 
in the 1974 Articles of Impeachment against President Nixon. 
Like the evidence in the Nixon precedent, the evidence in the 
instant case is sufficient to sustain President Clinton's 
culpability under Article I for his testimony concerning all 
four topics collectively, or each topic individually.

                B. Article II--Perjury in the Civil Case

1. The Committee concluded that the President provided perjurious, 
        false, and misleading testimony in a Federal civil rights 
        action in response to written questions

    On December 23, 1997, William Jefferson Clinton, in sworn 
answers to written questions asked as part of a Federal civil 
rights action brought against him, willfully provided 
perjurious, false and misleading testimony in response to 
questions deemed relevant by a Federal judge concerning conduct 
and proposed conduct with subordinate employees.
    The evidence reveals that the President Clinton made 
perjurious, false, and misleading statements in response to 
written interrogatories in the civil rights case of Jones v. 
Clinton. The perjurious, false, and misleading statements are 
set forth below:

1. Interrogatory Number 10: Please state the name, address, and 
        telephone number of each and every individual (other than 
        Hillary Rodham Clinton) with whom you had sexual relations when 
        you held any of the following positions:

          a. Attorney General of the State of Arkansas;
          b. Governor of the State of Arkansas;
          c. President of the United States.
    On December 11, 1997, the Court issued an order modifying 
the scope of the interrogatories to incidents from May 8, 1986 
to the present involving state or federal employees and 
compelling the President to answer the interrogatories.
    The President's December 23, 1997, supplemental response to 
Interrogatory Number 10 (as modified by direction of the 
Court): None

2. Interrogatory Number 11: Please state the name, address, and 
        telephone number of each and every individual (other than 
        Hillary Rodham Clinton) with whom you sought to have sexual 
        relations when you held any of the following positions:

          a. Attorney General of the State of Arkansas;
          b. Governor of the State of Arkansas;
          c. President of the United States.
    The same court order modifying the scope of the 
interrogatories to incidents from May 8, 1986 to the present 
involving state or federal employees and compelling the 
President to answer the interrogatories was applicable to this 
question.
    The President's December 23, 1997, supplemental response to 
Interrogatory Number 10 (as modified by direction of the 
Court): None
    It is clear from the evidence before the Committee that the 
President did have sexual relations with Monica Lewinsky, a 
young, subordinate federal employee in the Oval Office complex 
of the White House while he was President of the United States. 
It is also evident that he sought to have sexual relations with 
her. This evidence includes, as cited previously, the sworn 
testimony of Monica Lewinsky, corroborated by the testimony of 
others and by phone and entrance records. In addition, DNA 
evidence before the Committee reveals that the President's 
semen was found on Ms. Lewinsky's dress.

2. The Committee concluded that the President provided perjurious, 
        false, and misleading testimony in a Federal civil rights 
        action in his deposition

    On January 17, 1998, William Jefferson Clinton swore under 
oath to tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the 
truth in a deposition given as part of a Federal civil rights 
action brought against him. Contrary to that oath, William 
Jefferson Clinton willfully provided perjurious, false and 
misleading testimony in response to questions deemed relevant 
by a Federal judge concerning the nature and details of his 
relationship with a subordinate government employee, his 
knowledge of that employee's involvement and participation in 
the civil rights action brought against him, and his corrupt 
efforts to influence the testimony of that employee.
    The record indicates that on January 17, 1998, before 
beginning to respond to questions during a deposition in a 
civil rights lawsuit in which he was a named defendant, the 
President answered in the affirmative to the question, ``Do you 
swear and affirm that your testimony will be the truth, the 
whole truth and nothing but the truth, so help you God.'' In 
the President's Response for Admissions Number 5, the President 
admits that he took an oath to tell the truth before his 
deposition in the Jones v. Clinton case.
            a. The President lied in his deposition about the nature of 
                    his conduct with a subordinate federal employee who 
                    was a witness in the federal civil rights action 
                    brought against him
    In the President's Deposition he admits that Monica 
Lewinsky is a federal employee:

          Q. Now, do you know a woman named Monica Lewinsky?
          A. I do.
          Q. How do you know her?
          A. She worked in the White House for a while, first 
        as an intern, and then in, as the, in the legislative 
        affairs office.

Deposition of President Clinton, 1/17/97, p. 1.

    The President was asked about his conduct with Monica 
Lewinsky and in his deposition he denied having sexual 
relations with Monica Lewinsky. The definition of sexual 
relations was: ``For purposes of this deposition, a person 
engages in `sexual relations' when the person knowingly engages 
in or causes--(1) contact with the genitalia, anus, groin, 
breast, inner thigh, or buttocks of any person with an intent 
to arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person; (2) 
contact between any part of the person's body or an object and 
the genitals or anus of another person; or (3) contact between 
the genitals or anus of the person and any part of another 
person's body. `Contact' means intentional touching, either 
directly or through clothing.''

          Q. Did you have an extramarital sexual affair with 
        Monica Lewinsky?
          A. No.
          Q. If she told someone that she had a sexual affair 
        with you beginning in November of 1995, would that be a 
        lie?
          A. It's certainly not the truth. It would not be the 
        truth.
          Q. I think I used the term ``sexual affair.'' And so 
        the record is completely clear, have you ever had 
        sexual relations with Monica Lewinsky, as that term is 
        defined in Deposition Exhibit 1, as modified by the 
        Court.
          A. I have never had sexual relations with Monica 
        Lewinsky. I've never had an affair with her.

Deposition of President Clinton, 1/17/98, p. 78.
    According to the sworn testimony of Monica Lewinsky, she 
and the President had 11 sexual encounters, 8 while she worked 
at the White House and 2 thereafter. The sexual encounters 
generally occurred in or near the oval office private study. 
The evidence indicates that the conduct the President had with 
Ms. Lewinsky met the definition and that he lied about their 
conduct. According to Ms. Lewinsky, she performed oral sex on 
the President; he never performed oral sex on her. OIC 
Referral, H. Doc. 105-310, p. 17.
    The record indicates an agreement to deny the conduct and 
that a relationship existed between the President and Monica 
Lewinsky:

          Q. Had you talked with [the President] earlier [than 
        December 17] about . . . false explanations about what 
        you were doing visiting him on several occasions?
          A. Several occasions throughout the entire 
        relationship. . . . It was the pattern of the 
        relationship to sort of conceal it.

Grand Jury Testimony of Monica Lewinsky, 8/6/98, p. 124, H. 
Doc. 105-311, p. 844.
    The Committee has concluded that the President lied under 
oath about his relationship with Monica Lewinsky in his 
deposition in accord with an agreement to lie developed 
earlier.
            b. The President lied in his deposition after being asked 
                    if anyone had reported to him within the past two 
                    weeks that they had had a conversation with a 
                    subordinate federal employee concerning the Jones 
                    v. Clinton lawsuit
          Q. . . . within the past two weeks has anyone 
        reported to you that they had had a conversation with 
        Monica Lewinsky concerning this lawsuit?
          A. I don't believe so. I'm sorry, I just don't 
        believe so.

Deposition of President Clinton, 1/17/98, pp. 12-13 of public 
copy.
    The record indicates that a telephone conversation took 
place on January 6, 1998, with Vernon Jordan and President 
Clinton during which President Clinton discussed Monica 
Lewinsky's affidavit, yet to be filed, in the case of Jones v. 
Clinton. See Telephone Calls, Table 35, included in Appendix G 
as referenced in note 928, H. Doc. 105-310, p. 108 (Vernon 
Jordan telephones the President less than 30 minutes after 
speaking with Monica Lewinsky over the telephone about her 
draft affidavit).
    The record indicates that the President had knowledge of 
the fact that Monica Lewinsky executed for filing an affidavit 
in the case of Jones v. Clinton on January 7, 1998.

          Q. . . . [Y]ou conveyed . . . both to Betty Currie 
        and to the President--namely, that you knew Ms. 
        Lewinsky had signed the affidavit [on January 7, 1998]?
          A. ``Right.''
Grand Jury Testimony of Vernon Jordan, 5/5/98, p. 223, H. Doc. 
105-316, p. 1828.
    The record indicates that on or about January 7, 1998, the 
President had a discussion with Vernon Jordan in which Mr. 
Jordan mentioned that Monica Lewinsky executed for filing an 
affidavit in the case of Jones v. Clinton.

          Q. Okay, do you believe that it would have been 
        during one of these calls [phone conversations between 
        the President and Vernon Jordan on January 7, 1998] 
        that you would have indicated to the President that Ms. 
        Lewinsky had, in fact, signed the affidavit?
          A. That, too, is a reasonable assumption.

Grand Jury Testimony of Vernon Jordan, 5/5/98, p. 224, H. Doc. 
105-316, p. 1828.
    Furthermore, the President acknowledged before the grand 
jury and to this Committee, that Vernon Jordan discussed Monica 
Lewinsky's affidavit with him and within two weeks of his 
deposition. ``As I testified before the grand jury, `I believe 
that [Mr. Jordan] did notify us' when she signed the affidavit. 
While I do not remember the timing, as I told the grand jury, I 
have no reason to doubt Mr. Jordan's statement that he notified 
me about the affidavit around January 7, 1998.'' See Request 
for Admission number 29 and Grand Jury testimony of President 
Clinton, 8/17/98, H. Doc. 105-311, p. 525.
            c. The President lied in his deposition about his being 
                    alone or in certain locations with a subordinate 
                    federal employee who was a witness in the action 
                    brought against him
    President Clinton gave the following testimony under oath 
in his deposition in the case of Jones v. Clinton regarding the 
subject:

          Q. Is it true that when she worked at the White House 
        she met with you several times?
          A. I don't know about several times. There was a 
        period when the Republican Congress shut the government 
        down that the whole White House was being run by 
        interns, and she was assigned to work back in the chief 
        of staffs office, and we were all working there, and so 
        I saw her on two or three occasions then, and then when 
        she worked at the White House, I think there was one or 
        two other times when she brought some documents to me.

Deposition of President Clinton, 1/17/98, pp. 50-51.

          Q. At any time were you and Monica Lewinsky alone in 
        the hallway between the Oval Office and this kitchen 
        area?
          A. I don't believe so, unless we were walking back to 
        the back dining room with the pizzas. I just, I don't 
        remember. I don't believe we were alone in the hallway, 
        no.
          Q. Are there doors at both ends of the hallway?
          A. They are, and they're always open.
          Q. At any time have you and Monica Lewinsky ever been 
        alone together in any room in the White House?
          A. I think I testified to that earlier. I think that 
        there is a, it is--I have no specific recollection, but 
        it seems to me that she was on duty on a couple of 
        occasions working for the legislative affairs office 
        and brought me some things to sign, something on the 
        weekend. That's--I have a general memory of that.
          Q. Do you remember anything that was said in any of 
        those meetings.
          A. No. You know, we just have conversation. I don't 
        remember.

Deposition of President Clinton, 1/17/98, p. 58.
    The record indicates that a plan existed to cover the fact 
that they were alone and were having a sexual relationship. 
Monica Lewinsky provided the following testimony under oath 
regarding this subject:

          Q. I would like to ask you some questions about any 
        steps you took to keep your relationship with the 
        President secret.
          A. A lot.
          Q. All right. Well, why don't we just ask the 
        question open-endedly and we'll follow up.
          A. Okay. I'm sure, as everyone can imagine, that this 
        is a kind of relationship that you keep quiet, and we 
        both wanted to be careful being in the White House. 
        Whenever I would visit him during--when--during my 
        tenure at the White House, we always--unless it was 
        sort of a chance meeting on the weekend and then we 
        ended up back in the office, we would usually plan that 
        I would either bring papers, or one time we had 
        accidentally bumped into each other in the hall and 
        went from that way, so then we planned to do that again 
        because that seemed to work well. But we always--there 
        was always some sort of a cover.
          Q. When you say you planned to bring papers, did you 
        ever discuss with the President the fact that you would 
        try to use that as a cover?
          A. Yes.
          Q. Okay. What did the two of you say in those 
        conversations?
          A. I don't remember exactly. I mean, in general, it 
        might have been something like me saying, well, maybe 
        once I got there kind of saying, ``Oh, gee here are 
        your letters,'' wink, wink, wink, and him saying: 
        ``Okay that's good,'' or--
          Q. And as part of this concealment, if you will, did 
        you carry around papers when you went to visit the 
        President while you worked at Legislative Affairs?
          A. Yes, I did.
          Q. Did you ever actually bring him papers to sign as 
        part of business?
          A. No.
          Q. Did you actually bring him papers at all?
          A. Yes.
          Q. All right. And tell us a little about that.
          A. It varied. Sometimes it was just actual copies of 
        letters. One time I wrote a really stupid poem. 
        Sometimes I put gifts in the folder which I brought.
          Q. And even on those occasions, was there a 
        legitimate business purpose to that?
          A. No.

Grand Jury Testimony of Monica Lewinsky, 8/6/98, pp. 53-55, H. 
Doc. 105-311, p. 977.
    President Clinton was also asked during his deposition on 
January 17, 1998:

          Q. Has it ever happened that a White House record was 
        created that reflected that Betty Currie was meeting 
        with Monica Lewinsky when in fact you were meeting with 
        Monica Lewinsky?
          A. Not to my knowledge.

Deposition Testimony of President Clinton in the case of Jones 
v. Clinton, 1/17/98.
    The record indicates the President had such discussions 
with Monica Lewinsky prior to December 17, 1997 that Betty 
Currie should be the one to clear Ms. Lewinsky in to see him so 
that Ms. Lewinsky could say that she was visiting with Ms. 
Currie instead of with him. Monica Lewinsky provided the 
following testimony under oath regarding this subject:

          Q. Did you ever [prior to your conversation with the 
        President on December 17] have discussions with the 
        President about what you would say about your frequent 
        visits with him after you had left legislative affairs?
          A. Yes.
          Q. Yes. What was that about?
          A. I think we--we discussed that--you know, the 
        backwards route of it was that Betty always needed to 
        be the one to clear me in so that, you know, I could 
        always say I was coming to see Betty.

Grand Jury Testimony of Monica Lewinsky, 8/6/98, p. 55, H. Doc. 
105-311, p. 977.

          Q. Did you come to have a telephone conversation with 
        the President on December 17?
          A. Yes . . .
          Q. Tell us how the conversation went from there . . .
          A. . . . At some point in the conversation, and I 
        don't know if it was before or after the subject of the 
        affidavit came up, he sort of said, ``You know, you can 
        always say you were coming to see Betty or that you 
        were bringing me letters.'' Which I understood was 
        really a reminder of things that we had discussed 
        before.

Grand Jury Testimony of Monica Lewinsky, 8/6/98, p. 123, H. 
Doc. 105-311, p. 843.
    In his grand jury testimony, the President himself admits 
that he was alone with Ms. Lewinsky: ``When I was alone with 
Ms. Lewinsky on certain occasions in early 1996 and once in 
early 1997, I engaged in conduct that was wrong.'' Grand Jury 
Testimony of President Clinton, 8/17/98, pp. 8-9, H. Doc. 105-
311, pp. 460-61.
            d. The President lied in his deposition about his knowledge 
                    of gifts exchanged between himself and a 
                    subordinate federal employee who was a witness in 
                    the action brought against him
    The record indicates that the President did present each of 
these items as gifts to Monica Lewinsky:
          1. A lithograph
          2. A hatpin
          3. A large ``Black Dog'' canvas bag
          4. A large ``Rockettes'' blanket
          5. A pin of the New York skyline
          6. A box of ``cherry chocolates''
          7. A pair of novelty sunglasses
          8. A stuffed animal from the ``Black Dog''
          9. A marble bear's head
          10. A London pin
          11. A shamrock pin
          12. An Annie Lennox compact disc
          13. Davidoff cigars

    A chart prepared as part of her testimony before the Grand 
Jury details Monica Lewinsky's visits to the President and the 
exchange of gifts during those visits is contained in H. Doc. 
105-311, pp. 1251-61.
    The record indicates that the President gave false and 
misleading testimony in his deposition when he responded ``once 
or twice'' to the question ``has Monica Lewinsky ever given you 
any gifts?''

    Q. Has Monica Lewinsky ever given you any gifts?
    A. Once or twice. I think she's given me a book or two.

Deposition of President Clinton in the case of Jones v. 
Clinton, 1/17/98, p. 76.
    The evidence shows that Ms. Lewinsky gave the President 
approximately a total of 38 gifts presented on numerous 
occasions. (See chart in House Document 105-311, pp. 1251-61.)
    The record indicates that the President had a discussion 
with Monica Lewinsky regarding the gifts he had given to Ms. 
Lewinsky that were subpoenaed in the case of Jones v. Clinton.

    A. We--we really spent maybe about five--no more than ten 
minutes talking about the Paula Jones case on [December 28] . . 
. I brought up the subject of the case because I was concerned 
about how I had been brought into the case and been put on the 
witness list . . . And then at some point I said to him, 
``Well, you know, I--maybe I should put the gifts away outside 
my house somewhere or give them to someone, maybe Betty.'' And 
he sort of said--I think he responded, ``I don't know'' or 
``Let me think about that.'' And left that topic.

Grand Jury Testimony of Monica Lewinsky, 8/6/98, p. 152, H. 
Doc. 105-311, p. 872; See also 7/27/98 OIC Interview of Monica 
Lewinsky, p. 7, H. Doc. 105-311, p. 1395.
    Furthermore, the evidence shows that President Clinton and 
Monica Lewinsky discussed the hat pin gift on December 28, 
1997, after Ms. Lewinsky received a subpoena calling for her to 
produce all gifts she received from Mr. Clinton, including any 
hat pins. Ms. Lewinsky stated under oath before the grand jury 
that ``I mentioned that I had been concerned about the hat pin 
being on the subpoena and he said that that had sort of 
concerned him also and asked me if I had told anyone that he 
had given me the hat pin and I said no.'' Grand Jury Testimony 
of Monica Lewinsky, 8/6/98, p. 152, H. Doc. 105-311, p. 1000.
    The record indicates that the President stated that he did 
not recall giving gifts to Ms. Lewinsky even though he had 
knowledge:

    Q. Well, have you ever given any gifts to Monica Lewinsky?
    A. I don't recall. Do you know what they were?
    Q. A hat pin?
    A. I don't, I don't remember. But I certainly, I could 
have.

Deposition of President Clinton in the case of Jones v. 
Clinton, 1/17/98, p. 75. See also request for admission number 
41 for evidence of numerous gifts Mr. Clinton gave to Ms. 
Lewinsky.
            e. The President lied in his deposition about his knowledge 
                    about whether he had ever spoken to a subordinate 
                    federal employee about the possibility that such 
                    subordinate employee might be called as a witness 
                    to testify in the federal civil rights action 
                    brought against him.
    President Clinton was asked about this subject during his 
deposition on January 17, 1998:

    Q. Did you ever talk with Monica Lewinsky about the 
possibility that she might be asked to testify on this case?
    A. Bruce Lindsey, I think Bruce Lindsey told me that she 
was, I think maybe that's the first person [who] told me she 
was. I want to be as accurate as I can. . . .
    Q. I believe I was starting to ask you a question a moment 
ago and we got sidetracked. Have you ever talked to Monica 
Lewinsky about the possibility that she might be asked to 
testify in this lawsuit?
    A. I'm not sure, and let me tell you why I'm not sure. It 
seems to me the, the, the--I want to be as accurate as I can 
here. Seems to me the last time she was there to see Betty 
before Christmas we were joking about how you--all, with the 
help of the Rutherford Institute, were going to call every 
woman I'd ever talked to and ask them that, and so I said you 
would qualify, or something like that. I don't think we ever 
had more of a conversation than that about it . . .''

Deposition Testimony of President Clinton in the case of Jones 
v. Clinton, 1/17/98 pp. 70-71.
    The record indicates that the President did indeed tell 
Monica Lewinsky about the appearance of her name on December 
17, 1998:

    Q. . . . Did you come to have a telephone conversation with 
the President on December 17?
    A. Yes . . . he told me he had some more bad news, that he 
had seen the witness list for the Paula Jones case and my name 
was on it . . . He told me that it didn't necessarily mean that 
I would be subpoenaed, but that that was a possibility, and if 
I were subpoenaed, that I should contact Betty and let Betty 
know that I had received the subpoena.

Grand Jury Testimony of Monica Lewinsky, 8/6/98, p. 123, H. 
Doc. 105-311, p. 843.
    The record indicates that the President on or about 
December 17, 1997, made the suggestion to Monica Lewinsky that 
the submission of an affidavit in the case of Jones v. Clinton 
might prevent her from having to testify:

    A. I believe I probably asked him, you know, what should I 
do in the course of that and he suggested, he said, ``Well, 
maybe you can sign an affidavit.'' . . .
    Q. When he said that you might sign an affidavit, what did 
you understand it to mean at that time?
    A. I thought that signing an affidavit could range from 
anywhere--the point of it would be to deter or to prevent me 
from being deposed and so that that could range from anywhere 
between maybe just somehow mentioning, you know, innocuous 
things or going as far as maybe having to deny any kind of 
relationship.''

Grand Jury Testimony of Monica Lewinsky, 8/6/98, pp. 123-24, H. 
Doc. 105-311, pp. 843-44.
    Furthermore, Monica Lewinsky has stated that she is ``100% 
sure that the President suggested that she might want to sign 
an affidavit to avoid testifying.'' 8/19/98 OIC interview of 
Monica Lewinsky, pp. 4-5, H. Doc. 105-311, pp. 1558-9.
            f. The President lied in his deposition about his knowledge 
                    of the service of a subpoena to a subordinate 
                    federal employee to testify as a witness in the 
                    federal civil rights action brought against him.
    The record indicates that despite evidence revealing the 
contrary, President Clinton swore in his deposition that Mr. 
Jordan did not know if Monica Lewinsky had been subpoenaed to 
testify in that case:

    Q. Did she tell you she had been served with a subpoena in 
this case?
    A. No. I don't know if she had been.
    Q. Did anyone other than your attorneys ever tell you that 
Monica Lewinsky had been served with a subpoena in this case?
    A. I don't think so.

Deposition Testimony of President Clinton in the case of Jones 
v. Clinton, 1/18/98, p. 68.
    ``I said to the President, `Monica Lewinsky called me . . . 
She is coming to see me about this subpoena.' '' Grand Jury 
Testimony of Vernon Jordan, 5/5/98, p. 145 (referencing a 
December 19, 1997, telephone conversation with the President), 
H. Doc. 105-316, p. 1815.
    The record indicates that the President knew, before his 
deposition, that Monica Lewinsky had been subpoenaed in the 
case of Jones v. Clinton. Monica Lewinsky was served with a 
subpoena on December 19, 1997, a subpoena that commanded her to 
appear for a deposition on January 23, 1998 and to produce 
certain documents and gifts. Monica Lewinsky talked to Vernon 
Jordan about it that day and Mr. Jordan spoke to the President 
shortly thereafter. The President and Ms. Lewinsky met on 
December 28th and discussed the subpoena.
            g. The President lied in his deposition about his knowledge 
                    of the final conversation he had with a subordinate 
                    employee who was a witness in the federal civil 
                    rights action brought against him.
    When asked in the Jones Deposition about his last meeting 
with Ms. Lewinsky, the President remembered only that she 
stopped by ``probably sometime before Christmas'' and he 
``stuck his head out [of the office], said hello to her.'' 
Deposition of President Clinton in the case of Jones v. 
Clinton, 1/17/98, p. 68.
    The President's answer was perjurious, false and 
misleading. The evidence reveals that the President and Ms. 
Lewinsky met for over 45 minutes on December 28, 1997. During 
this meeting, they exchanged gifts and discussed the subpoena 
that Ms. Lewinsky had received in the Jones case. In the 
answers to the requests for admission, the President admitted 
that he met with Ms. Lewinsky on December 28, 1997: ``When I 
met with Ms. Lewinsky on December 28, 1997, I knew she was 
planning to move to New York, and we discussed her move.'' 
Response to Request for Admission No. 22. He further 
contradicts his deposition testimony and admits that he gave 
her gifts on that crucial day. See Response to Request for 
Admission No. 24.
            h. The President lied in his deposition about his knowledge 
                    that the contents of an affidavit executed by a 
                    subordinate federal employee who was a witness in 
                    the federal civil rights action brought against him 
                    were false.
    The record indicates that the President, under oath, 
affirmed that the assertions made in Monica Lewinsky's 
affidavit were true, even though he knew they were false. 
During the January 17, 1998 deposition of President Clinton in 
the case of Jones v. Clinton, Robert Bennett, the President's 
attorney, read parts of the affidavit Monica Lewinsky had 
executed in the case of Jones v. Clinton. At one point Mr. 
Bennett read part of paragraph eight of Monica Lewinsky's 
affidavit, in which Monica Lewinsky asserts, ``I have never had 
a sexual relationship with the President, he did not propose 
that we have a sexual relationship, he did not offer me 
employment or other benefits in exchange for a sexual 
relationship, he did not deny me employment or other benefits 
for reflecting a sexual relationship.''
    After reading from the affidavit out loud, Mr. Bennett 
asked the President: ``Is that a true and accurate statement as 
far as you know it?'' The President answered, ``That is 
absolutely true.'' Deposition of President Clinton in the case 
of Jones v. Clinton, 1/17/98, p. 204.
    During the January 17, 1998 deposition of President Clinton 
in the case of Jones v. Clinton, Robert Bennett, President 
Clinton's attorney, stated ``Counsel is fully aware that Ms. 
Jane Doe #6 has filed, has an affidavit which they are in 
possession of saying that there is absolutely no sex of any 
kind in any manner, shape or form, with President Clinton . . 
.'' Deposition of President Clinton in the case of Jones v. 
Clinton, 1/17/98, p. 54.
    The Grand Jury Testimony of Monica Lewinsky, given under 
oath and following a grant of transnational immunity, confirmed 
that the contents of her affidavit were not true:

    Q. Paragraph 8 . . . [of the affidavit] says, I have never 
had a sexual relationship with the President. Is that true?
          A. No.

Grand Jury Testimony of Monica Lewinsky, 8/6/98, p. 204, H. 
Doc. 105-3 11, p. 924.

                 C. Article III--Obstruction of Justice

    The following explanations for the individual paragraphs of 
Article III clearly justify the conclusion that President 
Clinton, using the powers of his high office, engaged 
personally and through his subordinates and agents, in a course 
of conduct or plan designed to delay, impede, cover up, and 
conceal the existence of evidence and testimony related to the 
duly instituted federal civil rights lawsuit of Jones v. 
Clinton and the duly instituted investigation of Independent 
Counsel Kenneth Starr.
    Although, the actions of President Clinton do not have to 
rise to the level of violating the federal statute regarding 
obstruction of justice in order to justify impeachment, some if 
not all of his actions clearly do. The general obstruction of 
justice statute is 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1503. It provides in relevant 
part: ``whoever . . . corruptly or by threats or force, or by 
any threatening letter or communication, influences, obstructs, 
or impedes, or endeavors to influence, obstruct, or impede, the 
due administration of justice, shall be punished . . . '' In 
short, Sec. 1503 applies to activities which obstruct, or are 
intended to obstruct, the due administration of justice in both 
civil and criminal proceedings.
    To prove in a court of law that obstruction of justice had 
occurred, three things have to be proved beyond a reasonable 
doubt:
        First, that there was a pending federal judicial 
        proceeding;
        Second, that the defendant knew of the proceeding; and
        Third, that the defendant acted corruptly with the 
        intent to obstruct or interfere with the proceeding or 
        due administration of justice.

1. The Committee concluded that on or about December 17, 1997, William 
        Jefferson Clinton corruptly encouraged a witness in a Federal 
        civil rights action brought against him to execute a sworn 
        affidavit in that proceeding that he knew to be perjurious, 
        false, and misleading.

    On or about December 17, 1997, William Jefferson Clinton 
corruptly encouraged a witness in a Federal civil rights action 
brought against him to execute a sworn affidavit in that 
proceeding that he knew to be perjurious, false, and 
misleading. 
    President Clinton admitted that he spoke to Ms. Lewinsky 
``before Christmas'' and that, while he was not ``sure'' if she 
would be called to testify in the Paula Jones civil suit, she 
might ``qualify, or something like that.'' Deposition Testimony 
of President Clinton in the case of Jones v. Clinton, 1/17/98, 
pp. 70-71. While the President has denied asking or encouraging 
Ms. Lewinsky to lie by filing a false affidavit denying their 
relationship, he concedes in his response to Question 18 of the 
Committee's Requests for Admission that he told her that ``. . 
. other witnesses had executed affidavits, and there was a 
chance they would not have to testify.''
    Monica Lewinsky was more emphatic on the subject in her 
grand jury testimony. When she asked the President what she 
should do if called to testify, he said, `` `Well, maybe you 
can sign an affidavit.'' . . . [T]he point of it would be to 
deter or to prevent me from being deposed and so that could 
range anywhere between . . . just somehow mentioning . . . 
innocuous things or going as far as maybe having to deny any 
kind of relationship.'' Grand Jury Testimony of Monica 
Lewinsky, 8/6/98, pp. 123-24, H. Doc. 105-311, pp. 843-44. She 
further stated that she was ``100% sure that the President 
suggested that she might want to sign an affidavit to avoid 
testifying.'' 8/19/98 Office of Independent Counsel (OIC) 
interview of Monica Lewinsky, pp. 4 H. Doc. 105-311, pp. 1558-
9.
    Ms. Lewinsky also notes that the President never explicitly 
instructed her to lie about the matter; rather, since the 
President never told her to file an affidavit detailing the 
true nature of their sexual relationship--which would only 
invite humiliation and prove damaging to the President in the 
Paula Jones case--she contextually understood that the 
President wanted her to lie. See the OIC Referral, H. Doc. 105-
310, p. 174.
    Furthermore, the attorneys for Paula Jones were seeking 
evidence of sexual relationships the President may have had 
with other state or federal employees. Such information is 
often deemed relevant in sexual harassment lawsuits to help 
prove the underlying claim of the Plaintiff and Judge Susan 
Weber Wright ruled that Paula Jones was entitled to this 
information for purposes of discovery. Consequently, when the 
President encouraged Monica Lewinsky to file an affidavit, he 
knew that it would have to be false for Ms. Lewinsky to avoid 
testifying. If she filed a truthful affidavit, one 
acknowledging a sexual relationship with the president, she 
certainly would have been called as a deposition witness and 
her subsequent truthful testimony would have been damaging to 
the President both politically and legally.

2. The Committee concluded that on or about December 17, 1997, William 
        Jefferson Clinton corruptly encouraged a witness in a Federal 
        civil rights action brought against him to give perjurious, 
        false, and misleading testimony if and when called to testify 
        personally in that proceeding.

    On or about December 17, 1997, William Jefferson Clinton 
corruptly encouraged a witness in a Federal civil rights action 
brought against him to give perjurious, false, and misleading 
testimony if and when called to testify personally in that 
proceeding.
    Prior to December 17, 1997, the record demonstrates that 
the President and Monica Lewinsky had discussed the use of 
fabricated stories to conceal their relationship. The record 
also reveals that the President revisited this same topic in a 
telephone conversation with Monica Lewinsky on December 17, 
1997; in fact, she was encouraged to repeat these fabrications 
if called to testify in the Paula Jones case.
    In his grand jury testimony as well as his response to the 
Committee's Requests for Admission, the President claimed that 
he had ``no specific memory'' of a conversation prior to 
December 17, 1997, in which he suggested that Ms. Lewinsky 
invoke cover stories to explain why she was alone with the 
President. He conceded, however, that he ``. . . may have 
talked about what to do in a non-legal context at some point in 
the past, . . .[but that] . . . any such conversation was not 
in connection with her status as a witness in the Jones v. 
Clinton case.'' Grand Jury Testimony of President Clinton, 8/
17/98, H. Doc. 105-311, p. 569; Responses of President Clinton 
to Question Nos. 13-15 in the Committee's Requests for 
Admissions. President Clinton's testimony here is clearly 
designed to be convenient; he has ``no specific memory'' of a 
conversation with Ms. Lewinsky regarding cover stories, but if 
the conversation did occur, he is certain it was in a ``non-
legal context.''
    Ms. Lewinsky's testimony conflicts with that of the 
President. In her grand jury testimony, she states that. . . 
this is a kind of relationship that you keep quiet, and we both 
wanted to be careful being in the White House. Whenever I would 
visit him . . . unless it was some sort of chance meeting on 
the weekend and then we ended up back in the office, we would 
usually plan that I would either bring papers, or one time we 
accidentally bumped into each other in the hall and went from 
that way, so then we planned to do that again because that 
seemed to work well. But . . . there was always some sort of a 
cover. Grand Jury Testimony of Monica Lewinsky, 8/6/98, H. Doc. 
105-311, p. 977.
    Ms. Lewinsky admits further that delivering documents to 
the President was a ruse that had no legitimate business 
purpose. Id.
    In addition, the President and Ms. Lewinsky developed a 
second cover story by using Betty Currie as a source of 
clearance to the White House for Ms. Lewinsky; in other words, 
Ms. Lewinsky could claim she was visiting Ms. Currie, and not 
the President. Id. The President has stated that he had ``no 
knowledge'' of any ``White House record'' constructed for this 
purpose. Deposition of President Clinton, 1/17/98, p. 54.
    Consistent with these events, during a telephone 
conversation with Monica Lewinsky on December 17, 1997, a 
conversation in which the President informed Monica Lewinsky 
that she was on the witness list in the case of Jones v. 
Clinton, the President encouraged Ms. Lewinsky to invoke either 
of these cover stories if called to testify in the Paula Jones 
case. Ms. Lewinsky stated in her grand jury testimony that: 
``[a]t some point in the conversation, and I don't know if it 
was before or after the subject of the affidavit came up, he 
sort of said, ``You know, you can always say you were coming to 
see Betty or that you were bringing me letters.'' Which I 
understood was really a reminder of things we had discussed 
before.'' Grand Jury Testimony of Monica Lewinsky, 8/6/98, p. 
123, H. Doc. 105-311, p. 843.

3. The Committee concluded that on or about December 28, 1997, William 
        Jefferson Clinton corruptly engaged in, encouraged, or 
        supported a scheme to conceal evidence that had been subpoenaed 
        in a Federal civil rights action brought against him.

    On or about December 28, 1997, William Jefferson Clinton 
corruptly engaged in, encouraged, or supported a scheme to 
conceal evidence that had been subpoenaed in a Federal civil 
rights action brought against him.
    On December 19, 1997, Monica Lewinsky was served with a 
subpoena in connection with the case of Jones v. Clinton. The 
subpoena required her to testify at a deposition on January 23, 
1998. The subpoena also required her to produce each and every 
gift given to her by President Clinton. On the morning of 
December 28, Ms. Lewinsky met with the President for about 45 
minutes in the Oval Office. By this time, President Clinton 
knew Ms. Lewinsky had been subpoenaed. At this meeting they 
discussed the fact that the gifts had been subpoenaed, 
including a hat pin, the first gift Clinton had given Lewinsky. 
Monica Lewinsky testified that at some point in this meeting 
she said to the President, ``Well, you know, I--maybe I should 
put the gifts away outside my house somewhere or give them to 
someone, maybe Betty. And he sort of said--I think he 
responded, `I don't know' or `Let me think about that.' And 
left that topic.'' Grand Jury Testimony of Monica Lewinsky, 8/
6/98, p. 152, H. Doc. 105-311, p. 872; See also 7/27/98 OIC 
Interview of Monica Lewinsky, p. 7, H. Doc. 105-311, p. 1395. 
Ms. Lewinsky also testified that both she and the President had 
a specific concern about the hat pin being on the list; ``I 
mentioned that I had been concerned about the hat pin being on 
the subpoena and he said that had sort of concerned him also.'' 
Grand Jury Testimony of Monica Lewinsky, 8/6/98, p. 152, H. 
Doc. 105-311, p. 872; see also 7/27/98 OIC Interview of Monica 
Lewinsky, p. 7, H. Doc. 105-311, p. 1395.
    President Clinton provided the following explanation to the 
grand jury and this Committee regarding this conversation: 
``Ms. Lewinsky said something to me like, ``what if they ask me 
about the gifts you've given me,'' but I do not know whether 
that conversation occurred on December 28, 1997, or earlier. 
Whenever this conversation occurred, I testified, I told her 
`that if they asked her for gifts, she'd have to give them 
whatever she had. . . . ' I simply was not concerned about the 
fact that I had given her gifts. Indeed, I gave her additional 
gifts on December 28, 1997. I also told the grand jury that I 
do not recall Ms. Lewinsky telling me that the subpoena 
specifically called for a hat pin that I had given her.'' 
Request for Admission number 24; see also Grand Jury Testimony 
of President Clinton, 8/17/98, H. Doc. 105-311, p. 495-98.
    Ms. Lewinsky testified that she was never under the 
impression from anything the President said that she should 
turn over to Ms. Jones's attorneys all the gifts that he had 
given her. Deposition of Monica Lewinsky, 8/26/98, p. 58, H. 
Doc. 105-311, p. 1337.
    Additionally, she said she can't answer why the President 
would give her more gifts on the 28th when he knew she was 
under an obligation to produce gifts in response to a subpoena. 
She did testify, however, that, ``to me it was never a question 
in my mind and I--from everything he said to me, I never 
questioned him, that we were never going to do anything but 
keep this private, so that meant deny it and that meant do--
take whatever appropriate steps needed to be taken, you know, 
for that to happen. . . . So by turning over these gifts, it 
would at least prompt [the Jones attorneys] to question me 
about what kind of friendship I had with the President. . . .'' 
Grand Jury Testimony of Monica Lewinsky, 8/6/98, pp.166-67, H. 
Doc. 105-311, pp. 886-87.
    After this meeting on the morning of December 28th, Ms. 
Currie called Monica Lewinsky and made arrangements to pick up 
gifts the President had given to Ms. Lewinsky. Monica Lewinsky 
testified under oath before the grand jury that a few hours 
after meeting with the President on December 28, 1997, a 
meeting in which Ms. Lewinsky and President Clinton discussed 
the fact that gifts given to her by Mr. Clinton had been 
subpoenaed in the case of Jones v. Clinton, Betty Currie called 
her. The record indicates the following discussion occurred:

          Q. What did [Betty Currie] say?
          A. She said, ``I understand you have something to 
        give me.'' Or, ``The President said you have something 
        to give me.'' Along those lines. . . .
          Q. When she said something along the lines of ``I 
        understand you have something to give me,'' or ``The 
        President says you have something for me,'' what did 
        you understand her to mean?
          A. The gifts.

Grand Jury Testimony of Monica Lewinsky, 8/6/98, pp. 154-55, H. 
Doc. 105-311, pp. 874.
    Later in the day on December 28, Ms. Currie drove to Ms. 
Lewinsky's home and Ms. Lewinsky gave her a sealed box that 
contained several gifts Ms. Lewinsky had received from the 
President, including the hat pin. Grand Jury Testimony of 
Monica Lewinsky, 8/6/98, pp. 156-58, H. Doc. 105-311, pp. 875-
78. Ms. Currie testified that she understood the box contained 
gifts from the President. She took the box home and put it 
under her bed. Grand Jury Testimony of Betty Currie, 5/6/98, 
pp. 107-8, H. Doc. 105-316, p. 581. In Monica Lewinsky's 
February 1, 1998 handwritten statement to the OIC, which Ms. 
Lewinsky has testified is truthful, she stated, ``Ms. Currie 
called Ms. L later that afternoon and said that the Pres. had 
told her Ms. L wanted her to hold onto something for her. Ms. L 
boxed up most of the gifts she had received and gave them to 
Ms. Currie.'' 2/1/98 Handwritten Proffer of Monica Lewinsky, p. 
7, H. Doc. 105-311, p. 715.
    Betty Currie testified that she did not recall the 
President telling her that Ms. Lewinsky wanted her to retrieve 
and hold some items; that Ms. Lewinsky called her and asked her 
to come get the gifts. Grand Jury Testimony of Betty Currie, 5/
6/98, pp. 105-6, H. Doc. 105-316, p. 581. When asked if a 
contrary statement by Ms. Lewinsky--indicating that Ms. Currie 
had in fact spoken to the President about the gift transfer--
would be false, Ms. Currie replied: ``She may remember better 
than I. I don't remember.'' Grand Jury Testimony of Betty 
Currie, 5/6/98, p. 126, H. Doc. 105-316, p. 584.
    Further evidence before the Committee reveals that Betty 
Currie telephoned Monica Lewinsky regarding the gifts, and not 
the other way around:

          Mr. Schippers: When Ms. Currie, when they wanted to 
        get rid of the gifts, Ms. Currie went and picked them 
        up, put them under her bed to keep them from anybody 
        else. Another mission accomplished?
          Mr. Starr: That's right.
          Mr. Schippers: By the way, there has been some talk 
        here that Monica said that she recalled that Betty 
        Currie called her and said, either the President wants 
        me to pick something up, or I understand you have 
        something for me to pick up. Later, Ms. Currie backed 
        off that and said, well, I am not sure, maybe Monica 
        called me. In the material that you made available, you 
        and your staff made available to us, there were 302s in 
        which Monica said, I think when Betty called me, she 
        was using her cell phone. Do you recall that, Judge 
        Starr?
          Mr. Starr: I do.
          Mr. Schippers: And in that same material that is in 
        your office that both parties were able to review and 
        that we did, in fact, review, there are phone records 
        of Ms. Currie; are there not?
          Mr. Starr: There are.
          Mr. Schippers: And there is a telephone call on her 
        cell phone to Monica Lewinsky's home on the afternoon 
        of December 28, 1997; isn't there?
          Mr. Starr: That is correct.
          Mr. Schippers: Once again, Monica is right and she 
        has been corroborated, right?
          Mr. Starr: That certainly tends to corroborate Ms. 
        Lewinsky's recollection.

Impeachment Hearing on Inquiry Pursuant to H. Res. 581, 
Thursday, November 19, 1998, Transcript pp. 407-409.
    President Clinton testified before the grand jury, and 
reiterated to this Committee (Request for Admission Number 26) 
that he did not recall any conversation with Ms. Currie on or 
about December 28, 1997, about gifts previously given to Ms. 
Lewinsky and that he never told Ms. Currie to take possession 
of gifts he had given Ms. Lewinsky. Grand Jury Testimony of 
President Clinton, 8/17/98, p. 50, H. Doc. 105-311, p. 502; see 
also Id. at 113-114, H. Doc. 105-311 at 565-66. The Committee 
believes this answer is false because the evidence reveals that 
Betty Currie did call Monica Lewinsky about the gifts and there 
is no reason for her to do so unless instructed by the 
President. Because she did not personally know of the gift 
issue, there is no other way Ms. Currie could have known to 
call Ms. Lewinsky about the gifts unless the President told her 
to do so. The President had a motive to conceal the gifts 
because both he and Ms. Lewinsky were concerned that the gifts 
might raise questions about their relationship. By confirming 
that the gifts would not be produced, the President ensured 
that these questions would not arise. The concealment and non-
production of the gifts to the attorneys for Paula Jones, 
allowed the President to provide false and misleading 
statements about the gifts at his deposition in the case of 
Jones v. Clinton. Additionally, Ms. Lewinsky's testimony on 
this subject has been consistent and unequivocal; she recited 
the same facts in February, July and August.

4. The Committee concluded that beginning on or about December 7, 1997, 
        and continuing through and including January 14, 1998, William 
        Jefferson Clinton intensified and succeeded in an effort to 
        secure job assistance for a witness in a Federal civil rights 
        action brought against him in order to corruptly prevent the 
        truthful testimony of that witness in that proceeding at a time 
        when the truthful testimony of that witness would have been 
        harmful to him

    Beginning on or about December 7, 1997, and continuing 
through and including January 14, 1998, William Jefferson 
Clinton intensified and succeeded in an effort to secure job 
assistance for a witness in a Federal civil rights action 
brought against him in order to corruptly prevent the truthful 
testimony of that witness in that proceeding at a time when the 
truthful testimony of that witness would have been harmful to 
him.
    Although Monica Lewinsky discussed jobs in New York with 
the President in October, interviewed with Bill Richardson in 
October and met with Vernon Jordan regarding her move to New 
York on November 5, 1997, the effort to obtain a job for Monica 
Lewinsky in New York intensified after the President learned, 
on December 6, 1997, that Monica Lewinsky was listed on the 
witness list for the case of Jones v. Clinton.
    On December 7, 1997, President Clinton met with Vernon 
Jordan at the White House. Ms. Lewinsky met with Mr. Jordan on 
December 11 to discuss specific job contacts in New York. 
Jordan then made calls to certain New York companies on Ms. 
Lewinsky's behalf. Jordan telephoned President Clinton to keep 
him informed of the efforts to get Ms. Lewinsky a job. Grand 
Jury Testimony of Vernon Jordan, 3/3/98, pp. 64-66, H. Doc. 
105-316, pp. 1710-11.
      On December 11, Judge Wright ordered President Clinton to 
answer interrogatories, including whether he has engaged in 
sexual relations with any government employees. On December 16, 
the President's attorneys received a request for production of 
documents that mentioned Monica Lewinsky by name. On December 
18 and 23, Monica Lewinsky interviewed with New York based 
companies that had been contacted by Vernon Jordan. On December 
19, Monica Lewinsky was served with a deposition subpoena in 
the case of Jones v. Clinton. On December 22, Vernon Jordan 
took Monica Lewinsky to see her new attorney, Frank Carter, who 
had been recommended by Vernon Jordan. During the car ride to 
Mr. Carter's office, Monica Lewinsky and Vernon Jordan 
discussed the subpoena, the case of Jones v. Clinton, and her 
job search. Grand Jury Testimony of Monica Lewinsky, 8/6/98, p. 
138-42, H. Doc. 105-311, pp. 997-98; see also Grand Jury 
Testimony of Vernon Jordan, 3/3/98, p.183-85, H. Doc. 105-316, 
p. 1730.
    On December 28, 1997, the President had a discussion with 
Monica Lewinsky at the White House in which they discussed 
Monica Lewinsky's involvement in the case of Jones v. Clinton 
and her plan to move to New York. Ms. Lewinsky recalled that 
President Clinton suggested to her that she move to New York 
soon because by moving to New York, the lawyers representing 
Paula Jones in the case of Jones v. Clinton may not contact 
her. The following statement was recorded by an OIC 
investigator after interviewing Monica Lewinsky:
    ``On December 28, 1997, Lewinsky visited the President at 
the White House . . . the President said that if Lewinsky was 
in New York the Jones lawyers might not call; that the sooner 
Lewinsky moved the better; and that maybe the lawyers would 
ignore her.'' 7/27/98 OIC Interview of Monica Lewinsky, p. 7, 
H. Doc. 105-311, p. 1395.
    The President stated to the Committee he did not suggest 
that Monica Lewinsky could avoid testifying in the Jones v. 
Clinton case by moving to New York. See Request for Admission 
number 23.
    On January 5, Monica Lewinsky had a telephone conversation 
with the President in which they discussed the signing of an 
affidavit in the case of Jones v. Clinton. Grand Jury Testimony 
of Monica Lewinsky, 8/6/98, pp. 191-98, H. Doc 105-311, pp. 
1010-12. On January 7, 1998, Monica Lewinsky signed an 
affidavit to be filed in the case of Jones v. Clinton in which 
she denied having a sexual relationship with President Clinton. 
On or about January 7, 1998, the President had a discussion 
with Vernon Jordan in which Mr. Jordan mentioned that he was 
assisting Monica Lewinsky in finding a job in New York. Mr. 
Jordan made the following statement before the grand jury: 
``I'm sure I said, `I'm still working on her job [in New 
York]'.'' To which Jordan quotes the President as responding, 
``Good.'' Grand Jury Testimony of Vernon Jordan, 5/5/98, p. 
225-26, H. Doc. 105-316, p. 1828-29. President Clinton 
acknowledges that he was aware that Mr. Jordan was assisting 
Ms. Lewinsky in her job search in connection with her move to 
New York. See Request for Admission number 31.
    On January 8, 1998, Monica Lewinsky interviewed in New York 
with MacAndrews and Forbes, a company recommended by Vernon 
Jordan. Ms . Lewinsky informed Mr. Jordan that the interview 
did not go well, so he called the Chairman of the Board and 
Chief Executive Officer at MacAndrews and Forbes. Ms. Lewinsky 
was given a second interview with MacAndrews and Forbes on the 
morning of January 9, 1998, and she was given an informal job 
offer that she informally accepted on the afternoon of January 
9th. Ms. Lewinsky conveyed the news of the job offer to Vernon 
Jordan. Grand Jury Testimony of Monica Lewinsky, 8/6/98, pp. 
206-210, H. Doc. 105-311, pp. 1014-15; Grand Jury Testimony of 
Vernon Jordan, 5/5/98, p. 229-31, H. Doc. 105-316, p. 1829. On 
or about January 9, 1998, the President received a message from 
Vernon Jordan indicating that Monica Lewinsky had received a 
job offer in New York. Sometime shortly thereafter, Vernon 
Jordan had a conversation with the President, during which 
Vernon Jordan testified that he told the President, ``Monica 
Lewinsky's going to work for Revlon and his response was thank 
you very much.'' Grand Jury Testimony of Vernon Jordan, 5/28/
98, p. 59, H. Doc. 105-316, p. 1903. The President acknowledges 
that he was informed that Monica Lewinsky had received a job 
offer in New York, but cannot recall who told him or when he 
first learned of the job offer. See Request for Admission 
number 37.
    On January 13, 1998, Monica Lewinsky received a formalized 
job offer from Revlon (a MacAndrews and Forbes company) and was 
asked to provide references. The evidence shows that President 
Clinton, after learning of Monica Lewinsky's New York job 
offer, asked Erskine Bowles if he would ask John Hilley to give 
Ms. Lewinsky a job recommendation. Mr. Bowles testified that 
the President told him that ``[Monica Lewinsky] had found a job 
in the private sector, and that she had listed John Hilley as a 
reference, and could we see if he could recommend her, if 
asked.'' Grand Jury Testimony of Erskine Bowles, 4/2/98, p. 78, 
H. Doc. 105-316, p. 238.
    It is logical to infer from this chain of events that the 
efforts of the President and others at the President's 
direction to obtain a job in New York for Monica Lewinsky were 
motivated to influence the testimony of a potential witness in 
the case of Jones v. Clinton, if not to prevent her testimony 
outright. The job search for Monica Lewinsky was intensified in 
late 1997, when it became likely that Monica Lewinsky would be 
asked to provide testimony in the case of Jones v. Clinton and 
her truthful testimony would be harmful to the President.

5. The Committee concluded that on January 17, 1998, at his deposition 
        in a Federal civil rights action brought against him, William 
        Jefferson Clinton corruptly allowed his attorney to make false 
        and misleading statements to a Federal judge characterizing an 
        affidavit, in order to prevent questioning deemed relevant by 
        the judge. Such false and misleading statements were 
        subsequently acknowledged by his attorney in a communication to 
        that judge

    On January 17, 1998, at his deposition in a Federal civil 
rights action brought against him, William Jefferson Clinton 
corruptly allowed his attorney to make false and misleading 
statements to a Federal judge characterizing an affidavit, in 
order to prevent questioning deemed relevant by the judge. Such 
false and misleading statements were subsequently acknowledged 
by his attorney in a communication to that judge.
    On January 15, 1998, Robert Bennett, attorney for President 
Clinton in the case of Jones v. Clinton, obtained a copy of the 
affidavit Monica Lewinsky filed in an attempt to avoid having 
to testify in the case of Jones v. Clinton. Grand Jury 
Testimony of Frank Carter, 6/18/98, pp.112-13, H. Doc. 105-316, 
pp. 420-21. In this affidavit, Monica Lewinsky asserted that 
she had never had a sexual relationship with President Clinton. 
At the President's deposition on January 17, 1998, an attorney 
for Paula Jones began to ask the President questions about his 
relationship with Ms. Lewinsky. Mr. Bennett objected to the 
``innuendo'' of the questions and he pointed out that she had 
signed an affidavit denying a sexual relationship with the 
President. Mr. Bennett asserted that this indicated ``there is 
no sex of any kind in any manner, shape or form,'' and after a 
warning from Judge Wright he stated that, ``I am not coaching 
the witness. In preparation of the witness for this deposition, 
the witness is fully aware of Ms. Jane Doe 6's affidavit, so I 
have not told him a single thing he doesn't know.'' Mr. Bennett 
clearly used the affidavit in an attempt to stop the 
questioning of the President about Ms. Lewinsky. The President 
did not say anything to correct Mr. Bennett even though he knew 
the affidavit was false. Judge Wright overruled Mr. Bennett's 
objection and allowed the questioning to proceed. Deposition of 
President Clinton in the case of Jones v. Clinton, 1/17/98, p. 
54. Later in the deposition, Mr. Bennett read the President the 
portion of Ms. Lewinsky's affidavit in which she denied having 
a ``sexual relationship'' with the President and asked the 
President if Ms. Lewinsky's statement was true and accurate. 
The President responded: ``That is absolutely true.'' 
Deposition of President Clinton in the case of Jones v. 
Clinton, 1/17/98, p. 204. The Grand Jury Testimony of Monica 
Lewinsky, given under oath and following a grant of 
transnational immunity, confirmed that the contents of her 
affidavit were not true:

          Q. Paragraph 8 . . . [of the affidavit] says, ``I 
        have never had a sexual relationship with the 
        President.'' Is that true?
          A. No.

Grand Jury Testimony of Monica Lewinsky, 8/6/98, H. Doc. 105-
311, p. 924.
    When President Clinton was asked during his grand jury 
testimony how he could have lawfully sat silent at his 
deposition while his attorney made a false statement (``there 
is no sex of any kind, in any manner shape or form'') to a 
United States District Court Judge, the President first said 
that he was not paying ``a great deal of attention'' to Mr. 
Bennett when he said this. The President also stated that ``I 
didn't pay any attention to this colloquy that went on.'' The 
videotaped deposition shows the President looking in Mr. 
Bennett's direction while Mr. Bennett was making the statement 
about no sex of any kind. The President then argued that when 
Mr. Bennett made the assertion that there ``is no sex of any 
kind . . .,'' Mr. Bennett was speaking only in the present 
tense. The President stated, ``It depends on what the meaning 
of the word `is' is,'' and that ``if it means there is none, 
that was a completely true statement.'' Grand Jury Testimony of 
President Clinton, 8/17/98, pp. 57-61, H. Doc. 105-311, pp. 
509-513; see also id., pp. 24-25, H. Doc. 105-311, pp. 476-77. 
President Clinton's suggestion that he might have engaged in 
such a parsing of the words at his deposition is at odds with 
his assertion that the whole argument just passed him by.

6. The Committee concluded that on or about January 18 and January 20-
        21, 1998, William Jefferson Clinton related a false and 
        misleading account of events relevant to a Federal civil rights 
        action brought against him to a potential witness in that 
        proceeding, in order to corruptly influence the testimony of 
        that witness

    On or about January 18 and January 20-21, 1998, William 
Jefferson Clinton related a false and misleading account of 
events relevant to a Federal civil rights action brought 
against him to a potential witness in that proceeding, in order 
to corruptly influence the testimony of that witness.
    The record reflects that President Clinton attempted to 
influence the testimony of Betty Currie, his personal 
secretary, by coaching her to recite inaccurate answers to 
possible questions that might be asked of her if called to 
testify in the case of Jones v. Clinton. The President did this 
shortly after he had been deposed in the case. In his 
deposition, when asked about whether it would be extraordinary 
for Betty Currie to be in the White House between midnight and 
six a.m., the President answered in part, ``those are questions 
you'd have to ask her.'' Deposition of President Clinton in the 
case of Jones v. Clinton, page 21 of the publicly released 
document. Furthermore, he invokes Betty Currie's name numerous 
times throughout the deposition, oftentimes asserting that 
Monica was around to see Betty and that Betty talked about 
Vernon Jordan helping Ms. Lewinsky and Betty talked with Ms. 
Lewinsky about her move to New York. After mentioning Betty 
Currie so often in answers to questions during his deposition, 
it was very logical for the President to assume that the Jones 
Lawyers may call her as a witness. That is why the President 
called her about two hours after the completion of his 
deposition and asked her to come in to the office the next day, 
which was a Sunday. See Request for Admission number 47.
    In his grand jury testimony and responses to the 
Committee's Requests for Admission, the President was 
occasionally evasive and vague on this point. He stated that on 
January 18, 1998, he met with Ms. Currie and ``. . . asked her 
certain questions, in an effort to get as much information as 
quickly as I could and made certain statements, although I do 
not remember exactly what I said.'' Grand Jury Testimony of 
President Clinton, 8/17/98, H. Doc. 105-311, p. 508; Response 
of President Clinton to Question No. 52 of the Committee's 
Requests for Admission. The President added that he urged Ms. 
Currie to ``tell the truth'' after learning that the Office of 
Independent Counsel (OIC) might subpoena her to testify. Id. at 
p. 591.
    The President also stated that he could not recall how many 
times he had talked to Ms. Currie or when, in response to OIC 
questioning on the subject of a similar meeting that took place 
on or about January 20 or 21, 1998. He claimed that by asking 
questions of Ms. Currie he was only attempting to ``. . . 
ascertain what the facts were, trying to ascertain what Betty's 
perception was.'' Grand Jury Testimony of President Clinton, 8/
17/98, H. Doc. 105-311, pp. 592-93; Response of President 
Clinton to Question No. 53 of the Committee's Requests for 
Admission.
    While testifying before the grand jury, Ms. Currie was more 
precise in her recollection of the two meetings. An OIC 
attorney asked her if the President had made a series of 
leading statements or questions that were similar to the 
following:
          1. You were always there when she [Monica Lewinsky] 
        was there, right? We were never really alone.
          2. You could see and hear everything.
          3. Monica came on to me, and I never touched her, 
        right?
          4. She wanted to have sex with me and I couldn't do 
        that.
Question No. 53, Committee's Requests for Admission; OIC 
Referral, H. Doc. 105-310, p. 191.
    In her testimony Ms. Currie indicated that the President's 
remarks were ``more like statements than questions.'' Based on 
his demeanor and the manner in which he asked the questions, 
she concluded that the President wanted her to agree with him. 
Ms. Currie thought that the President was attempting to gauge 
her reaction, and appeared concerned. OIC Referral, H. Doc. 
105-310, pp. 191-92; Grand Jury Testimony of Betty Currie, 1/
27/98, pp. 71-76, H. Doc. 105-316, pp. 559-60.
    Ms. Currie also acknowledged that while she indicated to 
the President that she agreed with him, in fact she knew that, 
at times, he was alone with Ms. Lewinsky and that she could not 
or did not hear or see the two of them while they were alone. 
Id.
    As to their subsequent meeting on January 20 or 21, 1998, 
Ms. Currie stated that ``. . . it was sort of a recapitulation 
of what we had talked about on Sunday [January 18, 1998] . . 
.'' Grand Jury Testimony of Betty Currie, 1/27/98, p. 81, H. 
Doc. 105-316, p. 561.
    The President's response that he was trying to ascertain 
what the facts were or trying to ascertain what Betty's 
perception was is simply not credible in light of the fact that 
3 of the 4 statements he made to Ms. Currie were clearly false. 
This is further evidence that he was trying to influence the 
testimony of a potential witness. Why would the President be 
trying to get information from her about false statements or 
refresh his recollection concerning falsehoods?

7. The Committee concluded that on or about January 21, 23, and 26, 
        1998, William Jefferson Clinton made false and misleading 
        statements to potential witnesses in a Federal grand jury 
        proceeding in order to corruptly influence the testimony of 
        those witnesses. The false and misleading statements made by 
        William Jefferson Clinton were repeated by the witnesses to the 
        grand jury, causing the grand jury to receive false and 
        misleading information

    On or about January 21, 23, and 26, 1998, William Jefferson 
Clinton made false and misleading statements to potential 
witnesses in a Federal grand jury proceeding in order to 
corruptly influence the testimony of those witnesses. The false 
and misleading statements made by William Jefferson Clinton 
were repeated by the witnesses to the grand jury, causing the 
grand jury to receive false and misleading information.
    The record reflects that on the dates in question President 
Clinton met with a total of five aides who would later be 
called to testify before the grand jury. The meetings took 
place shortly after the President's deposition in the Paula 
Jones case and following a Washington Post story, published on 
January 21, 1998, which detailed the relationship between the 
President and Monica Lewinsky. During the meetings the 
President made false and misleading statements to his aides 
which he knew would be repeated once they were called to 
testify.
    The President submitted the same response to each of seven 
questions (Nos. 62-68) relating to this topic as set forth in 
the Committee's Requests for Admission. The President answered 
by stating that ``. . . I did not want my family friends, or 
colleagues to know the full nature of my relationship with Ms. 
Lewinsky. In the days following the January 21, 1998, 
Washington Post article, I misled people about this 
relationship. I have repeatedly apologized for doing so.'' 
Response of President Clinton to Question Nos. 62-68 of the 
Committee's Requests for Admission.
    The President's public ``apology'' occurred on August 17, 
1998, during a nationally-televised broadcast in which he 
confessed having made ``misleading'' statements about the 
nature of his relationship with Monica Lewinsky. It should be 
noted, however, that the ``apology'' was delivered after August 
3, 1998, the date on which a White House physician drew a blood 
sample from the President for DNA testing by the Federal Bureau 
of Investigation (FBI). The President therefore knew that, 
potentially, the sample might be matched with semen that may 
have been preserved on an article of clothing or some other 
item belonging to Ms. Lewinsky. This, in fact, occurred on 
August 17, 1998, when the FBI released its DNA report that 
linked the President (based on his blood sample) to a semen 
stain on one of Ms. Lewinsky's dresses. OIC Referral, H. Doc. 
105-310, p. 136, n. 42 and p. 138, pp. 51 and 52.
    According to the aides who met with the President on the 
days in question, he insisted unequivocally that he had not 
indulged in a sexual relationship with Ms. Lewinsky or 
otherwise done anything inappropriate. On January 21, 1998, in 
a conversation with Sydney Blumenthal, one of his Assistants, 
the President said that he rebuffed Monica Lewinsky after she 
`` `. . . came at me and made a sexual demand on me.' '' The 
President also told Mr. Blumenthal, `` `I haven't done anything 
wrong.' '' Grand Jury Testimony of Sydney Blumenthal, 6/4/98, 
p. 49, H. Doc. 105-316, p. 185.
    Also on January 21, 1998, the President met with Erskine 
Bowles, his Chief of Staff, and two of Mr. Bowles' Deputies, 
Sylvia Matthews and John Podesta. The President began the 
meeting by telling Mr. Bowles that the Washington Post story 
was not true. (Grand Jury Testimony of John Podesta, 6/16/98, 
p. 85, H. Doc. 105-316, p. 3310). He said that he had not had a 
sexual relationship with her, and had not asked anyone to lie. 
Id.; Grand Jury Testimony of Erskine Bowles, 4/2/98, pp. 83-4, 
H. Doc. 105-316, p. 239.
    Two days later (January 23, 1998), as he was preparing for 
his State of the Union address, the President engaged Mr. 
Podesta in another conversation in which he ``. . . was 
extremely explicit in saying he never had sex with her.'' When 
the OIC attorney asked for greater specificity, Mr. Podesta 
stated that the President said he had not had oral sex with Ms. 
Lewinsky, and in fact was ``. . . denying any sex in any way, 
shape or form . . ..'' Grand Jury Testimony of John Podesta, 6/
16/98, pp. 91-3, H. Doc. 105-316, p. 3311. The President also 
explained that Ms. Lewinsky's frequent visits to the White 
House were nothing more than efforts to visit Betty Currie. Ms. 
Currie was either with the President and Ms. Lewinsky during 
these ``visits,'' or she was seated at her desk outside the 
Oval Office with the door open. Id., p. 3310.
    Finally, on January 26, 1998, the President met with Harold 
Ickes, another Deputy Chief of Staff to Mr. Bowles. At the 
time, the President said that he had not had a sexual 
relationship with Ms. Lewinsky, had not obstructed justice in 
the matter, and had not instructed anyone to lie or obstruct 
justice. Grand Jury Testimony of Harold Ickes, 6/10/98, pp. 21, 
73, H. Doc. 105-316, pp. 1487, 1539.
    By his own admission more than seven months later, the 
President said that he had told a number of his aides that he 
did not ``. . . have an affair with [Ms. Lewinsky] or . . . 
have sex with her.'' He also admitted that he knew that these 
aides might be called before the grand jury as witnesses. Grand 
Jury Testimony of President Clinton, 8/17/98, pp. 105-07, H. 
Doc. 105-311, p. 647.

                     D. Article IV--Abuse of Power

1. The President abused his power by refusing and failing to respond to 
        certain written requests for admission and willfully made 
        perjurious, false, and misleading sworn statements in response 
        to certain written requests for admission propounded to him by 
        the Committee

    Using the powers and influence of the office of President 
of the United States, William Jefferson Clinton, in violation 
of his constitutional oath faithfully to execute the office of 
President of the United States and, to the best of his ability, 
preserve, protect, and defend the Constitution of the United 
States, and in disregard of his constitutional duty to take 
care that the laws be faithfully executed, has engaged in 
conduct that resulted in misuse and abuse of his high office, 
impaired the due and proper administration of justice and the 
conduct of lawful inquiries, and contravened the authority of 
the legislative branch and the truth seeking purpose of a 
coordinate investigative proceeding, in that, as President, 
William Jefferson Clinton refused and failed to respond to 
certain written requests for admission and willfully made 
perjurious, false and misleading sworn statements in response 
to certain written requests for admissions propounded to him as 
part of the impeachment inquiry authorized by the House of 
Representatives of the Congress of the United States. William 
Jefferson Clinton, in refusing and failing to respond and in 
making perjurious, false and misleading statements, assumed to 
himself functions and judgments necessary to the exercise of 
the sole power of impeachment vested by the Constitution in the 
House of Representatives and exhibited contempt for the 
inquiry.

    On November 5, 1998, the Committee presented President 
Clinton with 81 requests for admission. The requests were made 
in order to allow the President to candidly dispute or affirm 
key sworn evidence before the Committee by admitting or denying 
certain facts. The President responded to the requests on 
November 27, 1998. After a thorough review of the President's 
answers, the Committee concluded that several of the 
President's answers to the 81 questions asked of him by the 
Committee are clearly perjurious, false, and misleading. In 
responding in such a manner, the President exhibited contempt 
for the constitutional prerogative of Congress to conduct an 
impeachment inquiry. The impeachment duty is a solemn one 
vested exclusively in the House of Representatives as a check 
and balance on the President and the Judiciary. The Committee 
reached the unfortunate conclusion that the President, by 
giving perjurious, false, and misleading answers under oath to 
the Committee's requests for admission, chose to take steps to 
thwart this serious constitutional process.
    A further intention of the Committee in propounding these 
questions to the President was to expedite the impeachment 
inquiry and offer the President an opportunity to provide 
exculpatory evidence to the Committee. Unfortunately, the 
President chose to perpetuate the lying he began at his 
deposition last January and the lying and legal hairsplitting 
he engaged in during his grand jury testimony in August. His 
answers are a continuation of a pattern of deceit and 
obstruction of duly authorized investigations.
    Article IV states the matter quite succinctly, ``William 
Jefferson Clinton, in refusing and failing to respond and in 
making perjurious, false and misleading statements, assumed to 
himself functions and judgments necessary to the exercise of 
the sole power of impeachment vested by the Constitution in the 
House of Representatives and exhibited contempt for the 
inquiry.''
    Several instances of perjurious, false, and misleading 
statements that President Clinton provided in his answers to 
the 81 requests for admission propounded by this Committee are 
set forth below:
            a. Request for Admission, Number 19
          Q. Do you admit or deny that on or about December 17, 
        1997, you suggested to Monica Lewinsky that she could 
        say to anyone inquiring about her relationship with you 
        that her visits to the Oval Office were for the purpose 
        of visiting with Betty Currie or to deliver papers to 
        you?
          A. I was asked essentially these same questions by 
        OIC lawyers. I testified that Ms. Lewinsky and I ``may 
        have talked about what to do in a non-legal context at 
        some point in the past, but I have no specific memory 
        of that conversation.'' App. At 569. That continues to 
        be my recollection today--that is, any such 
        conversation was not in connection with her status as a 
        witness in the Jones v. Clinton case.

    By December 17, 1997, the President knew Ms. Lewinsky was 
on the witness list in the case of Jones v. Clinton. The 
President reiterated to this Committee his grand jury testimony 
that he ``may have talked about what to do in a non-legal 
context at some point in the past, but I have no specific 
memory of that conversation.'' Grand Jury Testimony of 
President Clinton, 8/17/98, H. Doc. 105-311, p. 569. The 
President goes on to tell the Committee that ``that continues 
to be my recollection today--that is, any such conversation was 
not in connection with her status as a witness . . .''
    Monica Lewinsky testified before the grand jury that the 
President did suggest, during a phone conversation resulting 
from a call from the President in the middle of the night on 
December 17, using these cover stories if she was called as a 
witness. Grand Jury testimony of Monica Lewinsky, 8/6/98, p. 
123, H. Doc. 105-311, p. 843. This was a reiteration of stories 
they had concocted and ruses they had implemented long before 
December 17, 1997, as part of their plan to try to keep their 
relationship secret. Ms. Lewinsky's recollection has been clear 
and consistent regarding this phone conversation, as it has 
been on many other subjects. Furthermore, it is odd that the 
President has ``no specific memory'' of a conversation with Ms. 
Lewinsky regarding cover stories, but if the conversation did 
occur, he is certain it was in a ``non-legal context.''
            b. Request for Admission, Number 20
          Q. Do you admit or deny that you gave false and 
        misleading testimony under oath when you stated during 
        your deposition in the case of Jones v. Clinton on 
        January 17, 1998, that you did not know if Monica 
        Lewinsky had been subpoenaed to testify in that case?
          A. It's evident from my testimony on pages 69 to 70 
        of the deposition that I did know on January 17, 1998, 
        that Ms. Lewinsky had been subpoenaed in the Jones v. 
        Clinton case. Ms. Jones' lawyer's question, ``did you 
        talk to Mr. Lindsey about what action, if any, should 
        be taken as a result of her being served with a 
        subpoena?'', and my response, ``No,'' id. at 70, 
        reflected my understanding that Ms. Lewinsky had been 
        subpoenaed. That testimony was not false and 
        misleading.

    The President argued that it is evident from his testimony 
in that deposition that he did know that Ms. Lewinsky had been 
subpoenaed and his answers exhibit this knowledge. He makes 
this assertion despite the fact that during his deposition in 
the case of Jones v. Clinton, he responded ``No. I don't know 
if she had been.'' when asked the question, ``Did she tell you 
she had been served with a subpoena in this case?'' Deposition 
Testimony of President Clinton, 1/17/98 in the case of Jones v. 
Clinton. His subsequent attempts to deny this denial are 
unreasonable and are still inconsistent with the fact that he 
actually had discussed the subpoena with Monica Lewinsky on 
December 28, 1997.
            c. Request for Admission, Number 24
          Q. Do you admit or deny that on or about December 28, 
        1997, you had a discussion with Monica Lewinsky at the 
        White House regarding gifts you had given to Ms. 
        Lewinsky that were subpoenaed in the case of Jones v. 
        Clinton?
          A. As I told the grand jury, ``Ms. Lewinsky said 
        something to me like, what if they ask me about the 
        gifts you've given me,'' App. At 495, but I do not know 
        whether that conversation occurred on December 28, 
        1997, or earlier. Ibid. Whenever this conversation 
        occurred, I testified, I told her ``that if they asked 
        her for gifts, she'd have to give them whatever she 
        had. . . . '' App. At 495. I simply was not concerned 
        about the fact that I had given her gifts. See App. At 
        495-98. Indeed, I gave her additional gifts on December 
        28, 1997. I also told the grand jury that I do not 
        recall Ms. Lewinsky telling me that the subpoena 
        specifically called for a hat pin that I had given her. 
        App. At 496.

    In his response to Request for Admission number 24, the 
President reiterated his grand jury testimony that when he 
talked to Ms. Lewinsky about subpoenaed gifts he told her 
``that if they asked her for gifts, she'd have to give them 
whatever she had.'' The President's statement that he told Ms. 
Lewinsky that if the attorneys for Paula Jones asked for the 
gifts she had to provide them is false and misleading. It 
simply strains logic to believe the President would encourage 
Monica Lewinsky to turn over the gifts. To do so would have 
raised questions about their relationship and would have been 
contrary to all of their other efforts to conceal the 
relationship, including a discussion about filing an affidavit 
denying a sexual relationship.
            d. Request for Admission, Number 26
          Q. Do you admit or deny that on or about December 28, 
        1997, you discussed with Betty Currie gifts previously 
        given by you to Monica Lewinsky?
          A. I do not recall any conversation with Ms. Currie 
        on or about December 28, 1997, about gifts I had 
        previously given to Ms. Lewinsky. I never told Ms. 
        Currie to take possession of gifts I had given Ms. 
        Lewinsky; I understand Ms. Currie has stated that Ms. 
        Lewinsky called Ms. Currie to ask her to hold a box. 
        See Supp. At 531.

    In his response to Request for Admission number 26, the 
President denies any conversation with Betty Currie regarding 
gifts. President Clinton testified before the grand jury, and 
reiterates to this Committee that he did not recall any 
conversation with Ms. Currie on or about December 28, 1997, 
about gifts previously given to Ms. Lewinsky and that he never 
told Ms. Currie to take possession of gifts he had given Ms. 
Lewinsky. Grand Jury Testimony of President Clinton, 8/17/98, 
p. 50, H. Doc. 105-311, pp. 565-66. This answer is false and 
misleading because the evidence reveals that Betty Currie did 
call Monica Lewinsky about the gifts and there was no reason 
for her to do so unless she was told to do so by the President. 
Because she did not personally know of the gifts, there is no 
other way Ms. Currie could have known to call Ms. Lewinsky 
about the gifts unless the President told her to do so. The 
President had a motive to conceal the gifts because both he and 
Ms. Lewinsky were concerned that the gifts might raise 
questions about their relationship. By confirming that the 
gifts would not be produced, the President ensured that these 
questions would not arise. The concealment and non-production 
of the gifts to the attorneys for Paula Jones allowed the 
President to provide false and misleading statements about the 
gifts at his deposition in the case of Jones v. Clinton. Ms. 
Lewinsky's testimony on this subject has been consistent and 
unequivocal, she provided the same facts in February, July and 
August, 1998. Additionally, the cellular phone records of Betty 
Currie indicate that Betty Currie called Monica Lewinsky on the 
afternoon of December 28, 1997.
            e. Request for Admission, Number 27
          Q. Do you admit or deny that on or about December 28, 
        1998 [sic], you requested, instructed, suggested to or 
        otherwise discussed with Betty Currie that she take 
        possession of gifts previously given to Monica Lewinsky 
        by you?
          A. I do not recall any conversation with Ms. Currie 
        on or about December 28, 1997, about gifts I had 
        previously given to Ms. Lewinsky. I never told Ms. 
        Currie to take possession of gifts I had given Ms. 
        Lewinsky; I understand Ms. Currie has stated that Ms. 
        Lewinsky called Ms. Currie to ask her to hold a box. 
        See Supp. At 531.

    Based on the facts set forth in the Committee's explanation 
of Request for Admission number 26, the President's response to 
Request for Admission number 27 is also perjurious, false and 
misleading.
            f. Request for Admission, Number 34
          Q. Do you admit or deny that you had knowledge that 
        any facts or assertions contained in the affidavit 
        executed by Monica Lewinsky on January 7, 1998, in the 
        case of Jones v. Clinton were not true?
          A. I was asked at my deposition in January about two 
        paragraphs of Ms. Lewinsky's affidavit. With respect to 
        Paragraph 6, I explained the extent to which I was able 
        to attest to its accuracy. Dep. at 202-03.
          With respect to Paragraph 8, I stated in my 
        deposition that it was true. Dep. at 204. In my August 
        17th grand jury testimony, I sought to explain the 
        basis for that deposition answer: ``I believe at the 
        time that she filled out this affidavit, if she 
        believed that the definition of sexual relationship was 
        two people having intercourse, then this is accurate.'' 
        App. At 473.

    In the affidavit in question, Monica Lewinsky asserted that 
she had never had a sexual relationship with President Clinton. 
The President quotes from his grand jury testimony, ``I believe 
at the time she filled out this affidavit, if she believed that 
the definition of sexual relationship was two people having 
intercourse, then it is accurate.'' Grand Jury Testimony of 
President Clinton, 8/17/98, H. Doc. 105-311, p. 473. He made 
this statement despite the fact that at the President's 
deposition on January 17, 1988, his attorney asserted that the 
affidavit indicated ``there is no sex of any kind in any 
manner, shape or form.'' Later in the deposition, Mr. Bennett 
read the President the portion of Ms. Lewinsky affidavit in 
which she denied having a ``sexual relationship'' with the 
President and asked the President if Ms. Lewinsky's statement 
was true and accurate. The President responded: ``This is 
absolutely true.'' Deposition of President Clinton in the case 
of Jones v. Clinton, 1/17/98, p. 204. The President could not 
reasonably have believed this affidavit was true in light of 
the fact that he had engaged in an extensive sexual 
relationship with Monica Lewinsky. His subsequent explanation 
defining the term ``sexual relationship'' as having to include 
sexual intercourse is contrived and it is not credible that 
that is what he believed at the time of his deposition. Monica 
Lewinsky testified before the grand jury under oath and 
following a grant of transactional immunity that the contents 
of her affidavit were not true:

          Q. Paragraph 8 . . . [of the affidavit] says, ``I 
        have never had a sexual relationship with the 
        President.'' Is that true?
          A. No.

Grand Jury Testimony of Monica Lewinsky, 8/6/98, H. Doc. 105-
311, p. 924.
            g. Request for Admission, Number 42
          Q. Do you admit or deny that when asked on January 
        17, 1998, in your deposition in the case of Jones v. 
        Clinton if you had ever given gifts to Monica Lewinsky, 
        you stated that you did not recall, even though you 
        actually had knowledge of giving her gifts in addition 
        to gifts from the ``Black Dog?''
          A. In my grand jury testimony, I was asked about this 
        same statement. I explained that my full response was, 
        ``I don't recall. Do you know what they were?'' By that 
        answer, I did not mean to suggest that I did not recall 
        giving gifts; rather, I meant that I did not recall 
        what the gifts were, and I asked for reminders. See 
        App. At 502-03.

    The President's response to Request for Admission number 42 
is false and misleading because in his answer, the president 
tries to explain away his deposition answer in a manner that is 
simply not believable. The President responded ``I don't 
recall. Do you know what they were?'' to the question ``Well 
have you ever given any gifts to Monica Lewinsky?'' He tells 
the Committee this was not false or misleading because he did 
not mean to suggest that he did not recall giving her gifts, 
rather, he meant that he did not recall what the gifts were and 
was asking for reminders. The President had a conversation on 
December 28, 1997, three weeks before his deposition, in which 
he discussed subpoenaed gifts with her, including a specific 
gift, a hat pin. His response of ``I don't recall'' was 
perjurious, false, and misleading, as was his explanation to 
this Committee. Deposition of President Clinton in the case of 
Jones v. Clinton, 1/17/98, p. 75.
            h. Request for Admission, Number 43
          Q. Do you admit or deny that you gave false and 
        misleading testimony under oath in your deposition in 
        the case of Jones v. Clinton when you responded ``once 
        or twice'' to the question ``has Monica Lewinsky ever 
        given you any gifts?''
          A. My testimony was not false and misleading. As I 
        have testified previously, I give and receive numerous 
        gifts. Before my January 17, 1998, deposition, I had 
        not focused on the precise number of gifts Ms. Lewinsky 
        had given me. App. At 495-98. My deposition testimony 
        made clear that Ms. Lewinsky had given me gifts; at the 
        deposition, I recalled ``a book or two'' and a tie. 
        Dep. At 77. At the time, those were the gifts I 
        recalled. In response to OIC inquiries, after I had had 
        a chance to search my memory and refresh my 
        recollection, I was able to be more responsive. 
        However, as my counsel have informed the OIC, in light 
        of the very large number of gifts I receive, there 
        might still be gifts from Ms. Lewinsky that I have not 
        identified.

    The President's Request for Admission number 43 is also 
false and misleading because in it he continues to insist that 
he was being truthful when he responded ``once or twice'' at 
the deposition when he was asked if Monica Lewinsky had ever 
given him any gifts. In fact, the evidence shows that Ms. 
Lewinsky gave the President approximately 38 gifts presented on 
numerous occasions. See chart H. Doc. 105-311, pp. 1251-61; 
Deposition of President Clinton in the case of Jones v. 
Clinton, 1/17/98, p. 76.
            i. Request for Admission, Number 52
          Q. Do you admit or deny that on January 18, 1998, at 
        or about 5:00 P.M., you had a meeting with Betty Currie 
        at which you made statements similar to any of the 
        following regarding your relationship with Monica 
        Lewinsky?
          You were always there when she was there, right? We 
        were never really alone.
          You could see and hear everything.
          Monica came on to me, and I never touched her right?
          She wanted to have sex with me and I couldn't do 
        that.
          A. When I met with Ms. Currie, I believe that I asked 
        her certain questions, in an effort to get as much 
        information as quickly as I could and made certain 
        statements, although I do not remember exactly what I 
        said. See App. At 508.
          Some time later, I learned that the Office of 
        Independent Counsel was involved and that Ms. Currie 
        was going to have to testify before the grand jury. 
        After learning this, I stated in my grand jury 
        testimony, I told Ms. Currie, ``Just relax, go in there 
        and tell the truth.'' App. At 591.
            j. Request for Admission, Number 53
          Q. Do you admit or deny that you had a conversation 
        with Betty Currie within several days of January 18, 
        1998, in which you made statements similar to any of 
        the following regarding your relationship with Monica 
        Lewinsky?
          You were always there when she was there, right? We 
        were never really alone.
          You could see and hear everything.
          Monica came on to me, and I never touched her right?
          She wanted to have sex with me and I couldn't do 
        that.
          A. I previously told the grand jury that, ``I don't 
        know that I'' had another conversation with Ms. Currie 
        within several days of January 18, 1998, in which I 
        made statements similar to those quoted above. ``I 
        remember having this [conversation] one time.'' App. At 
        592. I further explained. ``I do not remember how many 
        times I talked to Betty Currie or when. I don't. I 
        can't possibly remember that. I do remember, when I 
        first heard about this story breaking, trying to 
        ascertain what the facts were, trying to ascertain what 
        Betty's perception was. I remember that I was highly 
        agitated, understandably, I think.'' App at 593.
          I understand that Ms. Currie has said a second 
        conversation occurred the next day that I was in the 
        White House (when she was), Supp. At 535-36, which 
        would have been Tuesday, January 20, before I knew 
        about the grand jury investigation.

    The President provided this committee with false and 
misleading answers to Request for Admissions number 52 and 53. 
He denies ``coaching'' Betty Currie after his deposition in the 
case of Jones v. Clinton; instead, he responded ``I believe I 
asked her certain questions, in an effort to get as much 
information as quickly as I could.'' In number 53, the 
President quoted his grand jury testimony, ``I do not remember 
how many times I talked to Betty Currie or when. I don't, I 
can't possibly remember that. I do remember, when I first heard 
about this story breaking, trying to ascertain what the facts 
were, trying to ascertain what Betty's perception was.'' Grand 
Jury testimony of President Clinton, 8/17/98, H. Doc. 105-311, 
p. 593.
    These answers are not credible because the statements he 
made to Ms. Currie were clearly false. Why would he be trying 
to get information from her about false statements or refresh 
his recollection concerning falsehoods? When President Clinton 
was asked in his deposition whether it would be extraordinary 
for Betty Currie to be in the White House between midnight and 
six a.m., the President answered in part, ``those are questions 
you'd have to ask her.'' Furthermore, he invoked Betty Currie's 
name numerous times throughout the deposition, oftentimes 
asserting that Ms. Lewinsky was around the oval office to see 
Ms. Currie and that Ms. Currie talked about Vernon Jordan 
helping Ms. Lewinsky and Betty talked with Ms. Lewinsky about 
her move to New York. After mentioning Betty Currie so often 
during his deposition, it was very logical for the President to 
assume that the lawyers for Paula Jones may call her as a 
witness. That explains why the President called her about two 
hours after the completion of his deposition and asked her to 
come into the office the next day, which was a Sunday. In her 
testimony, Ms. Currie indicated that the President's remarks 
were ``more like statements than questions.'' Based on his 
demeanor and the manner in which he asked the questions, she 
concluded that the President wanted her to agree with him. Ms. 
Currie thought that the President was attempting to gauge her 
reaction, and appeared concerned. Grand Jury Testimony of Betty 
Currie, 1/17/98, pp. 71-76, H. Doc. 105-316, pp. 559-60.
    The evidence clearly reveals the President was not trying 
to refresh his recollection during a conversation with Betty 
Currie on January 18, 1998, rather it reveals that President 
Clinton was attempting to influence the testimony of Betty 
Currie, by coaching her to recite inaccurate answers to 
possible questions that might be asked of her if called to 
testify in the case of Jones v. Clinton.

2. Explanation of the Gekas Amendment to Article IV

    Representative Gekas of Pennsylvania offered an amendment 
to strike paragraphs one, two, and three of Article IV. The 
amendment was adopted by a vote of 29-5, with three Members 
voting present. The stricken paragraphs asserted that President 
Clinton abused the office of the President by lying to the 
American people, aides and cabinet officials and by frivolously 
asserting executive privilege in order to impede a federal 
investigation. The remaining paragraph of Article IV charges 
that the President abused the office of the President by making 
perjurious, false and misleading statements in his response to 
written requests for admission submitted to him by this 
Committee as part of its impeachment inquiry. The Committee's 
general conclusion regarding Mr. Gekas's amendment was summed 
up by Mr. Goodlatte:

          I think that no one should take from the decision to 
        delete these three sections of the article that we 
        don't severely abhor the actions of the President in 
        regard to these three sections. I believe that the 
        allegations contained in them are all true. I believe 
        the President of the United States did lie to the 
        American people. I do believe the President lied to his 
        cabinet and others, and I think that he hoped that in 
        so doing that they would carry forth his lies and I 
        think that is wrong as well. And I do believe that the 
        President has improperly exercised executive privilege. 
        But, I also don't believe that any of these three items 
        are impeachable offenses. And as a result, I'll support 
        this amendment.

    Article IV originally read as follows:

          Using the powers and influence of the office of 
        President of the United States, William Jefferson 
        Clinton, in violation of his constitutional oath 
        faithfully to execute the office of President of the 
        United States and, to the best of his ability, 
        preserve, protect, and defend the Constitution of the 
        United States, and in disregard of his constitutional 
        duty to take care that the laws be faithfully executed, 
        has repeatedly engaged in conduct that resulted in 
        misuse and abuse of his high office, impaired the due 
        and proper administration of justice and the conduct of 
        lawful inquiries, and contravened the laws governing 
        the integrity of the judicial and legislative branches 
        and the truth- seeking purpose of coordinate 
        investigative proceedings.
          This misuse and abuse of office has included one or 
        more of the following:
          (1) As President, using the attributes of office, 
        William Jefferson Clinton willfully made false and 
        misleading public statements for the purpose of 
        deceiving the people of the United States in order to 
        continue concealing his misconduct and to escape 
        accountability for such misconduct.
          (2) As President, using the attributes of office, 
        William Jefferson Clinton willfully made false and 
        misleading public statements to members of his cabinet, 
        and White House aides, so that these Federal employees 
        would repeat such false and misleading statements 
        publicly, thereby utilizing public resources for the 
        purpose of deceiving the people of the United States, 
        in order to continue concealing his misconduct and to 
        escape accountability for such misconduct. The false 
        and misleading statements made by William Jefferson 
        Clinton to members of his cabinet and White House aides 
        were repeated by those members and aides, causing the 
        people of the United States to receive false and 
        misleading information from high government officials.
          (3) As President, using the Office of the White House 
        Counsel, William Jefferson Clinton frivolously and 
        corruptly asserted executive privilege, which is 
        intended to protect from disclosure communications 
        regarding the constitutional functions of the 
        Executive, and which may be exercised only by the 
        President, with respect to communications other than 
        those regarding the constitutional functions of the 
        Executive, for the purpose of delaying and obstructing 
        a Federal criminal investigation and the proceedings of 
        a Federal grand jury.
          (4) As President William Jefferson Clinton refused 
        and failed to respond to certain written requests for 
        admission and willfully made perjurious, false and 
        misleading sworn statements in response to certain 
        written requests for admissions propounded to him as 
        part of the impeachment inquiry authorized by the House 
        of Representatives of the Congress of the United 
        States. William Jefferson Clinton, in refusing and 
        failing to respond and in making perjurious, false and 
        misleading statements, assumed to himself functions and 
        judgments necessary to the exercise of the sole power 
        of impeachment vested by the Constitution in the House 
        of Representatives and exhibited contempt for the 
        inquiry.
          In all of this, William Jefferson Clinton has 
        undermined the integrity of his office, has brought 
        disrepute on the Presidency, has betrayed his trust as 
        President, and has acted in a manner subversive of the 
        rule of law, to the manifest injury of the people of 
        the United States.
          Wherefore, William Jefferson Clinton, by such 
        conduct, warrants impeachment and trial, and removal 
        from office and disqualification to hold and enjoy any 
        office of honor, trust, or profit under the United 
        States.
            Paragraph (1)
    In consideration of the drafting of Article IV, several 
members had expressed grave concern regarding the President's 
lies to the American people with respect to the Paula Jones 
lawsuit, Monica Lewinsky and his potential criminal 
culpability. President Clinton made six public statements 
denying allegations that he had an improper sexual relationship 
with Monica Lewinsky or obstructed justice in the federal civil 
rights case of Jones v. Clinton. The Committee concluded that 
the public trust, which is held by the President of the United 
States, was deliberately abused by President Clinton when he 
made these false statements. The intent of President Clinton 
making false statements to the American public was to utilize 
the power of the office of the President and convince the 
public that these allegations were false. The political powers 
that accompany the office of the President do not include 
misleading the American public in an attempt to avoid or thwart 
federal investigation.
    President Clinton addressed the nation on August 17, 1998 
and continued to mislead the American public. Although 
President Clinton took this opportunity to disclose his 
inappropriate sexual relationship, he stated that he had 
testified truthfully before the grand jury and maintained that 
his statements in his civil deposition were still ``legally 
accurate.'' This statement was made from the map room of the 
White House and aired across the country on almost every radio 
or television station. The statement was not related to any 
official business of the White House, it was made in the wake 
of a federal investigation, and it was designed to mislead. 
This statement was unlike any other statement President Clinton 
has ever made and only analogous to a handful of other 
Presidential statements throughout our history. However, the 
Committee believes this statement was designed to mislead the 
American public.
    President Clinton has publicly apologized to the American 
public for his inappropriate relationship but he has 
continually denied any criminal allegations. The President 
holds the highest office in the country and the trust of the 
people. The Committee believes his failure to address these 
criminal allegations while he has apologized for his personal 
acts is a deliberate attempt by President Clinton to cloud the 
issues before the American public. In 1974, the current 
distinguished Ranking Member, Representative John Conyers, 
noted that the American public cannot judge a chief executive 
if he does not or will not speak to the American people 
truthfully.
    The chronology of the President's lies to the American 
public began almost immediately after the Washington Post 
published an article regarding the Lewinsky-Clinton affair on 
Wednesday, January 21, 1998. The White House learned about the 
story on the night of January 20th. The President spoke with 
Bob Bennett between 12:08 a.m. and 12:39 a.m. on the 21st. Mr. 
Bennett was quoted in the Washington Post article of the 21st 
as saying, ``The President adamantly denies he ever had a 
relationship with Ms. Lewinsky and she has confirmed the truth 
of that.'' The White House issued a statement later that same 
the day in response to the Washington Post story. The 
statement, personally approved by the President, announced that 
the President was ``outraged by these allegations'' and 
proclaimed that he ``has never had an improper relationship 
with this woman.''
    President Clinton then began to personally and repeatedly 
deny his relationship with Ms. Lewinsky to the American people:
    1. January 21, 1998, Interview with Mara Liasson, Robert 
Siegel and Linda Wertheimer, NPR: All Things Considered.

          Siegel. Mr. President, welcome to the program. Many 
        Americans woke up to the news today that the Whitewater 
        independent counsel is investigating an allegation that 
        you, or you and Vernon Jordan, encouraged a young woman 
        to lie to lawyers in the Paula Jones civil suit. Is 
        there any truth to that allegation?
          The President. No, sir. There's not. It's just not 
        true.
          Siegel. Is there any truth to the allegation of an 
        affair between you and the young woman?
          The President. No. That's not true either, and I have 
        told that--people that I would cooperate in the 
        investigation and I expect to cooperate with it. I 
        don't know any more about it really than you do, but I 
        will cooperate. The charges are not true. And I haven't 
        asked anybody to lie.
          Liasson. Mr. President, where do you think this comes 
        from? Did you have any kind of relationship with her 
        that could have been misconstrued?
          The President. Mara, I'm going to do my best to 
        cooperate with the investigation. I want to know what 
        they want to know from me. I think it's more important 
        for me to tell the American people that there wasn't 
        improper relations, I didn't ask anybody to lie, and I 
        intend to cooperate. And I think that's all I should 
        say right now, so I can get back to the work of the 
        country.

    2. January 21, 1998, Interview with Jim Lehrer of the PBS 
News Hour.

          Mr. Lehrer. ``No improper relationship''--define what 
        you mean by that.
          The President. Well, I think you know what it means. 
        It means that there is not a sexual relationship, an 
        improper sexual relationship, or any other kind of 
        improper relationship.

    3. January 21, 1998, Telephone Interview with Morton 
Kondracke and Ed Henry of Roll Call.

          Mr. Kondracke. Okay. Let me just ask you one more 
        question about this. You said in a statement today that 
        you had no improper relationship with this intern. What 
        exactly was the nature of your relationship with her?
          The President. Well, let me say, the relationship's 
        not improper, and I think that's important enough to 
        say. But because the investigation is going on and 
        because I don't know what is out--what's going to be 
        asked of me, I think I need to cooperate, answer the 
        questions, but I think it's important for me to make it 
        clear what is not. And then, at the appropriate time, 
        I'll try to answer what is. But let me answer, it is 
        not an improper relationship, and I know what the word 
        means. So let's just----
          Mr. Kondracke. Was it in any way sexual?
          The President. The relationship was not sexual. And I 
        know what you mean, and the answer is no.

    4. January 22, 1998, Remarks Prior to Discussions with 
Chairman Yasser Arafat of the Palestinian Authority and an 
Exchange With Reporters:

          Q. Forgive us for raising this while you're dealing 
        with important issues in the Middle East, but could you 
        clarify for us, sir, exactly what your relationship was 
        with Ms. Lewinsky, and whether the two of you talked by 
        phone, including any messages you may have left?
          The President. Let me say, first of all, I want to 
        reiterate what I said yesterday. The allegations are 
        false, and I would never ask anybody to do anything 
        other than tell the truth. Let's get to the big issues 
        there, about the nature of the relationship and whether 
        I suggested anybody not tell the truth. That is false. 
        Now, there are a lot of other questions that are, I 
        think, very legitimate. You have a right to ask them; 
        you and the American people have a right to get 
        answers. We are working very hard to comply and get all 
        the requests for information up here, and we will give 
        you as many answers as we can, as soon as we can, at 
        the appropriate time, consistent with our obligation to 
        also cooperate with the investigations. And that's not 
        a dodge, that's really why I've--I've talked with our 
        people. I want to do that. I'd like for you to have 
        more rather than less, sooner rather than later. So 
        we'll work through it as quickly as we can and get all 
        those questions out there to you.

      5. January 26, 1998, Remarks on the After-School Child 
Care Initiative, Public Papers of the President, President 
Clinton discussed the allegations surrounding his relationship 
with Miss Lewinsky, in the conclusion of his statement on the 
After-School Child Care Initiative:

          Now, I have to go back to work on my State of the 
        Union speech. And I worked on it until pretty late last 
        night. But I want to say one thing to the American 
        people. I want you to listen to me. I'm going to say 
        this again. I did not have sexual relations with that 
        woman, Miss Lewinsky. I never told anybody to lie, not 
        a single time--never. These allegations are false. And 
        I need to go back to work for the American people.

    6. February 5, 1998, Remarks Prior to Discussions with 
Prime Minister Blair and an Exchange with Reporters, Public 
Papers of the Presidents.

          Q Mr. President, would you like to use this occasion 
        to tell the American people what kind of relationship, 
        if any, you had with Monica Lewinsky?
          The President. Well, I've already said that the 
        charges are false. But there is an ongoing 
        investigation, and I think it's important that I go 
        back and do the work for the American people that I was 
        hired to do. I think that's what I have to do now.
    President Clinton misled the American public when he 
addressed the nation on August 17, 1998:

          This afternoon in this room from this chair, I 
        testified before the Office of Independent Counsel and 
        the grand jury. . . . I answered their questions 
        truthfully, including questions about my private life, 
        questions no American citizen would ever want to 
        answer.

    President Clinton falsely reassured the American people 
that ``. . . I must take complete responsibility for all my 
actions, both public and private. And that is why I am speaking 
to you tonight.''
    President Clinton misled the American public about his 
civil deposition: ``As you know, in a deposition in January, I 
was asked questions about my relationship with Monica Lewinsky. 
While my answers were legally accurate, I did not volunteer 
information.'' President Clinton admitted he misled people:
    ``I know my public comments and my silence about this 
matter gave a false impression. I misled people, including even 
my wife. I deeply regret that.''
    After perjuring himself before the grand jury, President 
Clinton told the American people there was no public 
responsibility:

         Now, this matter is between me, the two people I love 
        most--my wife and our daughter--and our God. I must put 
        it right, and I am prepared to do whatever it takes to 
        do so. . . . Nothing is more important to me 
        personally. But it is private, and I intend to reclaim 
        my family life for my family. It's nobody's business 
        but ours.

    Committee members found these blatant attempts by the 
President to deceive the American people to be particularly 
offensive and violative of the public trust. However, it was 
the measured judgment of most Committee members that these 
statements did not rise to the level of an impeachable offense, 
although the Committee does believe that Presidential lies to 
the American public could constitute an impeachable offense in 
other circumstances.
    During debate on the Gekas amendment, Mr. McCollum noted 
that paragraph one was about ``. . . lying to the public. Now, 
I don't think we should go forward and impeach the President 
for his speech before the American public telling us lies. But 
I want you to know that in the Watergate hearings the 
conclusion was just to do exactly that.''
    The Committee decided not to follow the Watergate precedent 
regarding lying to the American public in an attempt to cover-
up presidential criminal wrongdoing. Rather, the Committee 
passed three articles against President Clinton charging him 
with making similar lies under oath in a deposition, before a 
grand jury and in answers to requests for admission propounded 
to him by this Committee.
    Mr. Hutchinson aptly summed up the views of many Committee 
members regarding the deletion of paragraph 1 of Article IV:

          I would have had trouble supporting Article IV 
        without this amendment that would delete paragraphs 
        one, two, and three. But I say that not to diminish the 
        significance or the substantially of the evidence in 
        regard to these three areas. One of them is the 
        President lied to the American public. I think that is 
        extraordinarily serious any time that happened. 
        Obviously there's no question that it did happen. It is 
        wrong. But I do not believe that should be included in 
        this article of impeachment on abuse of office.
            Paragraph (2)
    Article II, which passed the Committee by a vote of 21-16, 
includes paragraph seven which asserts that the President tried 
to obstruct justice and conceal evidence in an ongoing federal 
grand jury investigation by making false and misleading 
statements to his aides which the President knew may be 
repeated if and when the aides testified before the grand jury. 
Several Members believed the President also abused the power of 
the office of the Presidency by lying to aides and cabinet 
members whom he knew would repeat the lies in public 
statements. The lies to aides that, in the view of the 
Committee, constituted an attempt to prevent, impede or 
obstruct the administration of justice are detailed in the 
explanation section for Article III. Some of the lies that were 
perpetuated by press aides and cabinet officials are detailed 
below.
    On January 23, 1998, after a meeting with his Cabinet, some 
Cabinet members answered questions to the press about the 
allegations.
    Secretary of State Madeline Albright: ``The president 
started out by saying that we--the allegations are untrue, that 
we should stay focused on our jobs, and that he will be fine. . 
. . I believe the allegations are completely untrue.''
    Commerce Secretary William Daley: ``I'll second that. 
Definitely.''
    Health and Human Services Secretary Donna Shalala: ``Third 
it.''
    Michael McCurry, White House Spokesperson, on January 27, 
1998, during a news briefing the Associated Press reported that 
Mr. McCurry said: ``I think every American that heard him knows 
exactly what he meant.''
    Anne Lewis, White House Communications Director, on January 
26, 1998, interview with Nightline: ``I can say with absolute 
assurance the President of the United States did not have a 
sexual relationship because I have heard the President of the 
United States say so.''
    On January 27, 1998, the Associated Press quoted Ms. Lewis: 
``Sex is sex, even in Washington. I've been assured.''
    President Clinton made a deliberate decision to fight 
criminal allegations surrounding his relationship with Monica 
Lewinsky. Grand Jury testimony reveals that President Clinton 
told Richard Morris that he would have to win rather than admit 
to committing perjury or obstruction of justice. The Committee 
concluded that President Clinton consciously misled several 
aides and cabinet members knowing that they would repeat his 
false statements to the American public. These officials are 
all federally paid civil servants who have used their positions 
in the White House as a pulpit to repeat President Clinton's 
false statements to the American public. The Committee believe 
that use of these advisors in an attempt to mislead the 
American public and beat his criminal allegations was an abuse 
of the office of the President and his position as head of the 
executive branch of government.
    The President's continued deceptions caused millions of tax 
dollars to be spent by not only the Office of Independent 
Counsel in its duly authorized investigation, but also by White 
House lawyers, communications employees and other government 
employees who were utilized to help perpetuate the President's 
lies and defend him from his criminal conduct.
    After the grand jury began investigating the allegation of 
perjury and obstruction of justice, President Clinton had the 
chance to set the record straight before the grand jury itself, 
but he declined six invitations in January, February and March 
of 1998 from the OIC to appear before the grand jury and give 
his testimony. Although he had no obligation to appear 
voluntarily before the grand jury, he still continued to 
perpetuate his lies and abuse the public trust as well as 
utilizing the power of his office to attack the allegations of 
criminal conduct. When Mr. Clinton finally testified before the 
grand jury, he lied several times and then went on national 
television after his testimony and lied to the American people 
again.
    Many Committee members were also appalled by the 
President's efforts to spread his lies publicly through his 
aides and cabinet members. These individuals work for and 
represent the taxpayers and should not be made unwitting 
participants in a Presidential cover-up. The majority Committee 
members believed this was an abuse of the office of the 
President and the resources that are available to its occupant. 
Furthermore, Mr. Hutchinson pointed out that lying to aides is 
``extraordinarily relevant and significant in terms of proving 
intent and a pattern of conduct on behalf of the President 
supporting obstruction of justice and other false statements 
that are recited in other articles.'' However, the Committee 
concluded that lies to the aides standing alone did not 
constitute an impeachable offense in this case.
            Paragraph (3)
    The aspect of executive privilege that was at issue in 
paragraph three of Article IV dealt with the presidential 
communications privilege. This privilege derives from the 
separation of powers principle embodied in the Constitution. It 
protects the confidentiality of communications between a 
President and his senior advisers about official government 
matters. It also protects conversations between one or more 
senior advisers when the President is not present, if the 
conversation is about advice to be given to the President on 
official government matters. The privilege belongs to the 
President alone and the President must personally direct that 
it be asserted.
    Such conversations are presumptively privileged. However, 
the privilege can be overcome if a prosecutor conducting a 
criminal investigation can demonstrate with specificity why it 
is likely that the presumptively privileged materials contain 
important evidence and why this evidence is not practically 
available from other sources.
    Several members of the Committee asserted that President 
Clinton's Assertions of Privilege were an abuse of power 
because even under the broadest interpretation of the 
presidential communications privilege, it is intended only to 
protect communications about official government matters. 
Moreover, it is a privilege for the use of the President alone. 
It is not intended to allow the President to cover up 
embarrassing personal matters. The Members charged that is 
exactly what President Clinton used it for here--indeed, the 
President repeatedly argued that he should not be impeached 
precisely because these matters are purely private in nature.
    In addition, they argued that President tried to extend the 
privilege far beyond any previously known boundaries by 
claiming it for conversations that White House aides had with 
grand jury witnesses and their attorneys, the President's 
private attorneys, Vernon Jordan, and low-level White House 
employees who do not advise the President. The Members 
supporting impeachment for abuse of power relating to executive 
privilege argued that there is no legal basis for including any 
of these conversations within the privilege. According to this 
view, if these boundaries of the privilege were accepted, the 
President could easily cover up almost any wrongdoing. 
Furthermore, these frivolous assertions of privilege also cost 
huge amounts of the OIC's time and resources to litigate, many 
of which the President ultimately abandoned.
    Most members of the majority associated themselves with the 
comments of Mr. McCollum that:

          With regard to executive privilege, I don't think 
        there's any question the President has abused executive 
        privilege here because it can only be used to protect 
        official functions. And in case after case, from Bruce 
        Lindsey all the way through the witnesses who were 
        called before the grand jury who were White House aides 
        were not asserting executive privilege to protect the 
        government official business they were asserting it in 
        order to protect and keep private matters that concern 
        the personal conduct of the President in the matters 
        we've been discussing here.

    However, the prevailing conclusion of the Committee was 
summed up by Mr. Gekas:

          I don't believe that the evidence that has been 
        presented to us nor the contents of the referral give 
        us the ability to second guess the rationale behind the 
        President or what was in his mind in asserting that 
        executive privilege. We may have a good idea. And those 
        of us who have become suspicious about some of the 
        actions of the President would have a right to enhance 
        those suspicions. Nevertheless, we ought to give, in my 
        judgment and in the judgment of many, the benefit of 
        the doubt in the assertion of executive privilege.

    Although most Members were not prepared to include abuse of 
executive privilege in an impeachment article against President 
Clinton, many Members also agreed with Representative 
Goodlatte's statement that ``this Committee should be outspoken 
in it's condemnation of the misuse of executive privilege 
because in some instances that executive privilege power has 
been exercised wrongly with the Congress in other regards. And 
it is important that we do not allow a continued abuse of the 
executive privilege power.''
    The following is a list of assertions of Executive 
Privilege by President Clinton that many Members of the 
Committee found to be frivolous.
    In the course of the Lewinsky investigation, President 
Clinton abused his power through repeated frivolous assertions 
of executive privilege by at least five of his aides.
            1. Bruce Lindsey
    Mr. Lindsey is Assistant to the President and Deputy 
Counsel and one of President Clinton's closest confidantes. 
None of the conversations for which Mr. Lindsey claimed 
executive privilege involved official governmental matters and 
the privilege was overcome by the need for the information in 
the criminal investigation.
    In addition, Mr. Lindsey claimed executive privilege for a 
typed statement about privilege that he brought in and read to 
the grand jury even after he had read it. He claimed executive 
privilege for his conversations with the President's private 
lawyers and Vernon Jordan. He claimed executive privilege for 
conversations he had with attorneys for witnesses who appeared 
in the grand jury. He claimed executive privilege for a 
conversation with Stephen Goodin, who is the President's 
personal aide and who has no responsibility for advising the 
President.
    It should be noted that at some points before the grand 
jury, Mr. Lindsey took the position that he was not actually 
asserting the privilege, but that he was merely noting that the 
answer might be privileged. He further asserted that he would 
have to get instructions from the President as to whether to 
assert the privilege. Whatever the technicalities, he refused 
to answer the questions. See, e.g., Lindsey 2/18/98 GJT at 77-
79: Supplemental Materials (H. Doc. 105-316) at 2360.
    The President contested the OIC's motion to compel the 
testimony of Mr. Lindsey. After losing in the District Court, 
the President abandoned the claim of executive privilege. In Re 
Grand Jury Proceedings, 5 F.Supp. 2d 21 (D.D.C. 1998). However, 
he continued to pursue a claim of governmental attorney-client 
privilege with Mr. Lindsey. In addition, despite the earlier 
abandonment of the claim, Mr. Lindsey again asserted privilege 
when he appeared in the grand jury on August 28.
    See the list, infra, for exact questions to which Mr. 
Lindsey asserted executive privilege.
            2. Lanny Breuer
    Mr. Breuer is a special counsel to the President working in 
the White House Counsel's Office. None of the conversations for 
which Mr. Breuer claimed executive privilege involved official 
governmental matters and the privilege was overcome by the need 
for the information in the criminal investigation.
    In addition, Mr. Breuer asserted executive privilege for 
his conversations with the President's private lawyers and his 
conversations with a low level White House employee about his 
efforts to get her an attorney. Neither the private lawyers nor 
the low level employee fell within the privilege.
    Interestingly, the President did not claim executive 
privilege for Mr. Blumenthal's conversations with the 
President's private lawyers. Blumenthal 2/26/98 GJT at 27-34; 
Supplemental Materials (H. Doc. 105-316) at 164-65. In 
addition, Mr. Breuer asserted executive privilege for 
conversations with Mr. Blumenthal when Mr. Blumenthal had 
already testified to the substance of those conversations. 
Compare Breuer 8/4/98 GJT at 19, 22-23, 28; Supplemental 
Materials (H. Doc. 105-316) at 269-71 with Blumenthal 6/25/98 
GJT at 30-31, 50; Supplemental Materials (H. Doc. 105-316) at 
196, 201.
    According to the referral from the Office of the 
Independent Counsel, on August 11, 1998, the District Court 
denied Mr. Breuer's claim of executive privilege. On August 21, 
1998, the White House appealed to the D.C. Circuit. The White 
House ultimately abandoned its appeal of this case. It is 
unknown whether Mr. Breuer has returned to the grand jury. See 
Referral (H. Doc. 105-310) at 208.
    See the list, infra, for exact questions to which Mr. 
Breuer asserted executive privilege.
            3. Cheryl Mills
    Ms. Mills is Deputy Assistant to the President and Deputy 
Counsel. None of the conversations for which Ms. Mills claimed 
executive privilege involved official governmental matters and 
the privilege was overcome by the need for the information in 
the criminal investigation.
    In addition, Ms. Mills claimed executive privilege for her 
conversations with the President's private lawyers. She claimed 
executive privilege for conversations she had with witnesses 
who appeared in the grand jury and their attorneys. She claimed 
executive privilege for a conversation with Betty Currie, who 
is the President's personal secretary and who has no 
responsibility for advising the President.
    As far as is publicly known, the OIC never sought to 
litigate Ms. Mills's claims of executive privilege.
    See the list, infra, for exact questions to which Ms. Mills 
asserted executive privilege.
            4. Sidney Blumenthal
    Mr. Blumenthal is an Assistant to the President who works 
on a variety of matters. None of the conversations for which 
Mr. Blumenthal claimed executive privilege involved official 
governmental matters and the privilege was overcome by the need 
for the information in the criminal investigation.
    The President contested the OIC's motion to compel the 
testimony of Mr. Blumenthal. After losing in the District 
Court, the President abandoned the claim, and Mr. Blumenthal 
answered the questions in the grand jury. In Re Grand Jury 
Proceedings, 5 F.Supp.2d 21 (D.D.C. 1998).
    See the list, infra, for exact questions to which Mr. 
Blumenthal asserted executive privilege.
            5. Nancy Hernreich
    Ms. Hernreich is Deputy Assistant to the President and 
Director of Oval Office Operations. Ms. Hernreich described her 
job as executing the President's daily schedule and managing 
his immediate secretarial staff. Hernreich 2/25/98 GJT at 4-7; 
Supplemental Materials (H. Doc. 105-316) at 1318-19. None of 
the conversations for which Ms. Hernreich claimed executive 
privilege involved official governmental matters and the 
privilege was overcome by the need for the information in the 
criminal investigation.
    In addition, Ms. Hernreich is a clerical and administrative 
employee. She does not fall within the category of advisers 
covered by the privilege--those ``who have broad and 
significant responsibility for investigating and formulating 
the advice to be given the President on a particular matter.'' 
In Re Sealed Case, 121 F.3d 729, 752 (D.C. Cir. 1997). In this 
connection, the President did not assert executive privilege 
with respect to Betty Currie, who holds a similar job. The 
President contested the OIC's motion to compel Ms. Hernreich's 
testimony, but without explanation abandoned the claim 
immediately before the hearing. See Referral (H. Doc. 105-310) 
at 207.
    See the list, infra, for exact questions to which Ms. 
Hernreich asserted executive privilege.
            Lying about Assertions of Executive Privilege
    Several members of the Committee concluded that the 
President has lied at least twice about his claims of executive 
privilege. On March 24, while traveling in Africa, the 
President publicly stated that he did not know about the 
assertions of executive privilege and said that the press 
should ask someone who knows. A week earlier in a sealed 
filing, White House Counsel Chuck Ruff had filed a declaration 
in which he told the Court that he had discussed the matter 
with the President and that the President had directed him to 
assert the privilege. See Referral (H. Doc. 105-310) at 207-08.
    After Judge Johnson ruled against the President on May 27 
on executive privilege with respect to Ms. Hernreich, Mr. 
Blumenthal, and Mr. Lindsey, he abandoned those claims of 
executive privilege. The OIC thought that the President would 
no longer claim the privilege in the grand jury. However, Mr. 
Breuer appeared in the grand jury on August 4 and again made 
broad claims of executive privilege. On August 11, Judge 
Johnson again ruled against the President. The same day, Ms. 
Mills appeared in the grand jury and made broad claims of 
executive privilege. On August 17, the President told the grand 
jury that he strongly felt that the original executive 
privilege decision should not be appealed. On August 21, he 
filed an appeal in the Breuer case. On August 28, Mr. Lindsey 
appeared before the grand jury and again asserted executive 
privilege even though the President had previously abandoned 
the claim. See Referral (H. Doc. 105-310) at 208-09. The White 
House later withdrew its appeal of the Breuer executive 
privilege case.
            Questions on which Bruce Lindsey asserted executive 
                    privilege
    1. Q. Have you received information from him [i.e. Ms. 
Currie's attorney], sir?
    A. No, sir. Not directly.
    Q. Directly or indirectly?
    A. I don't believe that I can respond to that one. I think 
that would cover areas that are potentially privileged. Lindsey 
2/18/98 GJT at 45; Supplemental Materials (H. Doc. 105-316) at 
2355.
    2. Mr. Lindsey claimed executive privilege for a typed 
statement about privileges that he brought in and read to the 
grand jury. Lindsey 2/18/98 GJT at 57-58; Supplemental 
Materials (H. Doc. 105-316) at 2357.
    3. ``Tell the grand jury about all conversations you had 
about Monica Lewinsky at any time, including, say, since the 
first of 1998.'' Lindsey 2/18/98 GJT at 73-74; Supplemental 
Materials (H. Doc. 105-316) at 2359-60.
    4. ``As counsel for the presidency or the President, are 
you aware of any statements to you where the President has 
indicated that he wanted to limit disclosure of information in 
this matter, that being the Monica Lewinsky matter?'' Lindsey 
2/18/98 GJT at 76; Supplemental Materials (H. Doc. 105- 316) at 
2360.
    5. ``Knowing that we may ask you those question, did you go 
to the President and ask the President whether or not he would 
waive attorney-client privilege or waive executive privilege?'' 
Lindsey 2/18/98 GJT at 78; Supplemental Materials (H. Doc. 105-
316) at 2360.
    6. ``Well, can we assume that if you had had that 
conversation and he [i.e. the President] had directed you to 
answer the questions and to waive the privilege, you'd be doing 
so today?'' Lindsey 2/18/98 GJT at 84; Supplemental Materials 
(H. Doc. 105-316) at 2361.
    7. ``Can you tell us about those [i.e. conversations with 
the President about the Jones case]?'' Lindsey 2/18/98 GJT at 
84-85; Supplemental Materials (H. Doc. 105-316) at 2361.
    8. ``Will you tell the grand jurors what those facts [i.e. 
facts learned from the President about the Paula Jones matter] 
were?'' Lindsey 2/18/98 GJT at 89-90; Supplemental Materials 
(H. Doc. 105- 316) at 2362.
    9. ``Tell us what you discussed [with the President about 
Monica Lewinsky and the Paula Jones matter].'' Lindsey 2/18/98 
GJT at 90; Supplemental Materials (H. Doc. 105-316) at 2362.
    10. ``Did you tell the President that Monica Lewinsky was 
identified as a witness in the Paula Jones case?'' Lindsey 2/
18/98 GJT at 91; Supplemental Materials (H. Doc. 105-316) at 
2362.
    11. ``Q. When did you first know that Monica Lewinsky was a 
witness in the Paula Jones case?
    A. Can I ask my lawyer whether I can respond to that 
question?
    Q. Yes. Well, why don't you write that down? Why don't you 
write that down with your questions? From whom did you learn 
that Monica Lewinsky was identified as a witness? Actually--
well--
    A. Let me answer it. Without--well, I don't want to waive 
any privileges here. I certainly don't want to walk down that 
road. Monica Lewinsky's name appeared on a witness list 
provided by the plaintiffs.
    Q. From whom did you receive the witness list?
    A. Again, you know, I--I'm--we're walking down that road. 
You know, I don't know if I can respond to that.
    Q. When did you receive the witness list?
    A. I think I can--well, let me see if I can answer when--
Lindsey 2/18/98 GJT at 96-97; Supplemental Materials (H. Doc. 
105-316) at 2363.
    12. ``Has there been a concerted effort known to you, 
either conducted out of your office or in some other office in 
the White House, that is designed to criticize the Independent 
Counsel investigation and this grand jury's work?'' Lindsey 2/
18/98 GJT at 103; Supplemental Materials at (H. Doc. 105- 316) 
2364.
    13. ``What was discussed [between Mr. Lindsey and Vernon 
Jordan about the Paula Jones case on January 18]?'' Lindsey 2/
18/98 GJT at 108, 112; Supplemental Materials (H. Doc. 105-316) 
at 2365, 2366.
    14. ``What did you discuss [between Mr. Lindsey, Ms. Mills, 
and Vernon Jordan about the Paula Jones case on January 19]?'' 
Lindsey 2/18/98 GJT at 113; Supplemental Materials (H. Doc. 
105- 316) at 2366.
    15. After this exchange, Mr. Lindsey was asked a number of 
questions about when he would assert executive privilege that 
repeated the questions set out above and his assertions of the 
privilege. Lindsey 2/18/98 GJT at 115-22; Supplemental 
Materials (H. Doc. 105-316) at 2366-68.
    16. ``What was discussed at the meeting--the subject--I 
mean, the substance of the meeting [among Mr. Lindsey, Ms. 
Mills, Mr. Ruff, the President, and the First Lady on February 
17]. I am now asking you.'' Lindsey 2/19/98 GJT at 7; 
Supplemental Materials (H. Doc. 105-316) at 2389.
    17. ``What was the substance of what occurred at the 
meeting [among Mr. Lindsey, Ms. Mills, Mr. Ruff, Mr. Breuer, 
Mr. Eggleston, and the President on February 18]?'' Lindsey 2/
19/98 GJT at 8; Supplemental Materials (H. Doc. 105-316) at 
2389.
    18. ``What did you talk about at this meeting [among Mr. 
Lindsey, the President's private lawyers, and the President] on 
the [January] 17th--before the [President's] deposition?'' 
Lindsey 2/19/98 GJT at 11; Supplemental Materials (H. Doc. 105-
316) at 2389.
    19. ``What was discussed with regard to Monica Lewinsky 
[among Mr. Lindsey, the President's private lawyers, and the 
President during the breaks in the President's deposition]?'' 
Lindsey 2/19/98 GJT at 13; Supplemental Materials (H. Doc. 105-
316) at 2390.
    20. ``Again what was discussed at that meeting [among Mr. 
Lindsey, Mr. Bowles, and the President shortly after the 
President's deposition]?'' Lindsey 2/19/98 GJT at 14; 
Supplemental Materials (H. Doc. 105-316) at 2390.
    21. ``At any of these meetings that occurred that day--that 
is, the day of the [January] 17th--did Betty Currie's name come 
up?'' Lindsey 2/19/98 GJT at 14; Supplemental Materials (H. 
Doc. 105- 316) at 2390.
    22. ``What was said during that conversation [i.e. Mr. 
Lindsey's phone conversation with the President in the early 
morning hours of January 21, the day the Lewinsky story was 
first published in the Washington Post]?'' Lindsey 2/19/98 GJT 
at 42; Supplemental Materials (H. Doc. 105-316) at 2394.
    23. ``What did he [Mr. McCurry] say occurred [in a meeting 
among White House staff in the morning of January 21, the day 
the Lewinsky story was first published in the Washington 
Post]?'' Lindsey 2/19/98 GJT at 44; Supplemental Materials (H. 
Doc. 105-316) at 2395.
    24. ``And you will not tell us about the substance of what 
occurred with your conversation with Mr. McCurry [about a 
meeting among White House staff in the morning of January 21, 
the day the Lewinsky story was first published in the 
Washington Post]?'' Lindsey 2/19/98 GJT at 45; Supplemental 
Materials (H. Doc. 105-316) at 2395.
    25. ``Tell us everything that occurred in the 10 minutes 
that you talked about the Monica Lewinsky matter [in a meeting 
among White House Counsel's Office staff, White House press 
staff, and the President on January 21, the day the Lewinsky 
story was first published in the Washington Post]?'' Lindsey 2/
19/98 GJT at 48; Supplemental Materials (H. Doc. 105-316) at 
2395.
    26. ``What did you talk to him [the President's personal 
aide, Stephen Goodin] about [shortly after the Lewinsky story 
broke]?'' Lindsey 2/19/98 GJT at 49; Supplemental Materials (H. 
Doc. 105-316) at 2396.
    27. ``What did you [Mr. Lindsey] say, and what did he [Mr. 
McGrath, an attorney for a witness] say [in a telephone 
conversation that occurred in early February]?'' Lindsey 2/19/
98 GJT at 51; Supplemental Materials (H. Doc. 105-316) at 2396.
    28. ``What did you [Mr. Lindsey and Mr. Podesta's lawyer] 
talk about [in a conversation that occurred in early 
February]?'' Lindsey 2/19/98 GJT at 53; Supplemental Materials 
(H. Doc. 105-316) at 2396.
    29. ``You know they [i.e. other attorneys in the White 
House Counsel's Office] have [spoken to Betty Currie's 
attorney]? How do you know that?'' Lindsey 2/19/98 GJT at 54; 
Supplemental Materials (H. Doc. 105-316) at 2396.
    30. ``Q. Are you prepared to answer any questions about 
conversations you are aware of about Monica Lewinsky that 
occurred among White House staff?
    A. I believe the answer is that I'm not because of the 
reasons I stated: the presidential communication, the 
deliberative process, and/or the attorney-client privilege.'' 
Lindsey 2/19/98 GJT at 59; Supplemental Materials (H. Doc. 105-
316) at 2397.
    31. ``Are you prepared to tell us about your discussion 
with Lanny Breuer about that [i.e. Mr. Breuer's conversation 
with the attorney for witness, Michael McGrath]?'' Lindsey 2/
19/98 GJT at 60; Supplemental Materials (H. Doc. 105-316) at 
2397.
    32. Towards the end of Mr. Lindsey's appearance before the 
grand jury on February 19, he gave a lengthy explanation of his 
view of the various privileges that he claimed. Lindsey 2/19/98 
GJT at 64-79; Supplemental Materials (H. Doc. 105-316) at 2399-
401.
    33. ``And you decline to answer either one--the substance 
of either one [of Mr. Lindsey's meetings with Mickey Kantor, 
one of the President's private attorneys, after January 
20th]?'' Lindsey 2/19/98 GJT at 81; Supplemental Materials (H. 
Doc. 105-316) at 2401.
    34. ``Are you prepared to discuss the substance of what you 
heard [from other members of the White House Counsel's Office 
about the testimony of White House steward Bayani Nelvis]?'' 
Lindsey 2/19/98 GJT at 82; Supplemental Materials (H. Doc. 105-
316) at 2401.
    35. ``Q. Mr. Lindsey, my understanding from discussions 
with your attorney is, at least as of now, you are going to 
claim all the privileges you've mentioned with respect to which 
individuals [i.e. grand jury witnesses], if any, you received 
information [i.e. how they testified] about; is that correct?
    A. That is correct, yes, sir.'' Lindsey 2/19/98 GJT at 83-
84; Supplemental Materials (H. Doc. 105- 316) at 2401.
    36. ``Okay. Who was that [who asked him why Mr. Lindsey why 
he did not return Linda Tripp's page in the summer of 1997 
regarding Kathleen Willey]?'' Lindsey 3/12/98 GJT at 16-17; 
Supplemental Materials (H. Doc. 105-316) at 2406-07.
    37. ``Did the President seem concerned about the number of 
deposition questions he was asked pertaining to Monica Lewinsky 
when you spoke to him after the deposition?'' Lindsey 3/12/98 
GJT at 18; Supplemental Materials (H. Doc. 105-316) at 2407.
    38. ``Was the President concerned about the number of 
deposition questions asked about Monica Lewinsky?'' Lindsey 3/
12/98 GJT at 20; Supplemental Materials (H. Doc. 105-316) at 
2407.
    39. ``My question would be after that weekend [i.e. the 
weekend immediately after the Lewinsky story broke], aside from 
anything that might have been reported in the press, did you 
hear directly or indirectly that she [i.e. Betty Currie] might 
have been talking to representatives from our office?'' Lindsey 
3/12/98 GJT at 27-28; Supplemental Materials (H. Doc. 105-316) 
at 2409.
    40. ``Did Vernon Jordan ever tell you that President 
Clinton should settle the Paula Jones matter?'' Lindsey 3/12/98 
GJT at 31-32; Supplemental Materials (H. Doc. 105-316) at 2410.
    41. ``I had asked you how much of your discussion with 
Vernon Jordan was related to settlement and you are invoking 
the privilege on that?'' Lindsey 3/12/98 GJT at 36; 
Supplemental Materials (H. Doc. 105-316) at 2411.
    42. ``Did you discuss with him [Vernon Jordan] or did he 
discuss with you how much money would be needed to settle the 
case and who would raise it?'' Lindsey 3/12/98 GJT at 37; 
Supplemental Materials (H. Doc. 105-316) at 2412.
    43. ``Can you tell us what that conversation [among Mr. 
Lindsey, Ms. Mills, and Mr. Jordan on January 19] was about?'' 
Lindsey 3/12/98 GJT at 39; Supplemental Materials (H. Doc. 105-
316) at 2412.
    44. ``Okay. And what was the reason that he [Mr. Jordan] 
was there [at the January 19 meeting among Mr. Lindsey, Ms. 
Mills, and Mr. Jordan]?'' Lindsey 3/12/98 GJT at 40; 
Supplemental Materials (H. Doc. 105-316) at 2412.
    45. ``Q. Are your claiming a privilege as to any Monica 
Lewinsky/Paula Jones discussions you may have had with the 
First Lady?
    A. I consider at a minimum the First Lady to be an advisor 
to the President, yes.'' Lindsey 3/12/98 GJT at 47; 
Supplemental Materials (H. Doc. 105-316) at 2414.
    46. ``Did the President know whether Betty Currie had 
called Vernon Jordan in order to help Monica Lewinsky get a job 
in New York?'' Lindsey 3/12/98 GJT at 53; Supplemental 
Materials (H. Doc. 105-316) at 2416.
    47. ``When, if ever, did you know it [i.e. that Ms. 
Lewinsky had been in the White House on December 6th], if you 
know it?'' Lindsey 3/12/98 GJT at 64; Supplemental Materials 
(H. Doc. 105- 316) at 2418.
    48. ``What did he [i.e. the President] say [about his 
relationship with Ms. Lewinsky at a meeting among Mr. Lindsey, 
Ms. Mills, and the President shortly after the Lewinsky story 
broke]?'' Lindsey 8/28/98 GJT at 22; Supplemental Materials (H. 
Doc. 105-316) at 2428.
    49. ``Okay. The Grand Jury also asked the question: In your 
discussions with the President about the relationship that he 
had with Ms. Lewinsky, did you ever explicitly ask him, you 
know, ``What exactly did you do with her?'' Not, ``What didn't 
you do?''--``What did you do?''' Lindsey 8/28/98 GJT at 84-87; 
Supplemental Materials (H. Doc. 105-316) at 2444.
    50. ``And this is a telephone log from the White House log 
indicating the President spoke to you--called you the morning 
of January 21, 1998, and spoke to you from the hours of 12:41 
to 1:10 a.m. What did you talk about?'' Lindsey 8/28/98 GJT at 
88; Supplemental Materials (H. Doc. 105-316) at 2445.
    51. ``This Grand Jury exhibit, BRL-1, also indicates that 
you called the President back after your conversation with him 
[Mr. Podesta]--twice. At 1:36 a.m., you talked to him for two 
minutes; then you called him back again at 1:39 a.m. and talked 
to him for no more than two minutes. What did you talk about 
with the President then?'' Lindsey 8/28/98 GJT at 90; 
Supplemental Materials (H. Doc. 105-316) at 2445.
    52. ``And then, the President called you at 7:14 a.m. that 
Wednesday, January 21, and you talked from 7:14 a.m. to 7:22 
a.m. What did you talk about then?'' Lindsey 8/28/98 GJT at 90; 
Supplemental Materials (H. Doc. 105-316) at 2445.
                                ------                                

            Questions on which Lanny Breuer asserted executive 
                    privilege
    1. ``All right. Do you recall `` and again, I'll go back to 
the time period we identified when the Washington Post article 
appeared, January 1, 1998, do you recall Mr. Blumenthal on or 
about that date revealing to you a conversation he had had with 
the President regarding Monica Lewinsky?'' Breuer 8/4/98 GJT at 
19; Supplemental Materials (H. Doc. 105-316) at 269.
    Although Mr. Breuer refused to answer this question, Mr. 
Blumenthal had already testified to the substance of the 
conversation. Blumenthal 6/25/98 GJT at 30-31, 50; Supplemental 
Materials (H. Doc. 105-316) at 196, 201.
    2. ``Do you recall what that [i.e. what else was discussed 
with Mr. Blumenthal during this conversation] was?'' Breuer 8/
4/98 GJT at 22-23; Supplemental Materials (H. Doc. 105-316) at 
270.
    Although Mr. Breuer refused to answer this question, Mr. 
Blumenthal had already testified to the substance of the 
conversation. Blumenthal 6/25/98 GJT at 30-31, 50; Supplemental 
Materials (H. Doc. 105-316) at 196, 201.
    3. ``Mr. Breuer, let me pick back up on our discussion of 
the conversation that you had with Mr. Blumenthal. Did he tell 
you when he had had the conversation with the President that he 
related to you?'' Breuer 8/4/98 GJT at 28; Supplemental 
Materials (H. Doc. 105-316) at 271. (Although Mr. Breuer 
refused to answer this question, Mr. Blumenthal had already 
testified to the substance of the conversation. Blumenthal 6/
25/98 GJT at 30-31, 50; Supplemental Materials (H. Doc. 105-
316) at 196, 201.)
    4. ``Q. The President's private lawyers, where do they fit 
in?''
    A. I will not--conversations that I had with the 
President's personal lawyers, I will claim privilege over.
    Q. Both privileges [i.e. executive privilege and attorney-
client privilege]?
    A. Both privileges. Breuer 8/4/98 GJT at 45; Supplemental 
Materials (H. Doc. 105-316) at 276.
    5. ``Q. Okay. Do you know how Ms. White [an attorney] came 
to represent Ms. Raines [a White House employee]?
    A. I do know the answer to that.
    Q. Can you tell us how that came about?
    A. Well, I don't believe I can because I think to do that 
would force me to reveal a conversation that I've had with Ms. 
Raines. Since Ms. Raines is a White House employee and I would 
have had a conversation with her in my capacity as special 
counsel, I think my discussion with Ms. Raines would be 
protected, given that she was seeking advice, it would be 
protected by both the attorney- client privilege and executive 
privilege. Breuer 8/4/98 GJT at 59; Supplemental Materials (H. 
Doc. 105-316) at 279.
    6. ``Q. Okay. I guess I'm asking you if you gave Ms. Raines 
Wendy White's [name]''
    A. Right. And I guess I can't answer that, given that I'm 
trying to preserve the substance of the conversation, so I 
think you might make a natural conclusion of that, but I 
really, truly believe that I'm going to try as best I can to 
preserve the communications I have with White House employees 
and over the substance of them assert attorney-client privilege 
and executive privilege. I don't think I can answer that 
specific question. Breuer 8/4/98 GJT at 65; Supplemental 
Materials (H. Doc. 105- 316) at 281.
    7. Mr. Breuer asserted executive privilege with respect to 
five meetings he had with the President relating to the 
Lewinsky matter. Breuer 8/4/98 GJT at 70-78; Supplemental 
Materials (H. Doc. 105- 316) at 282-84.
    8. Mr. Breuer asserted executive privilege with respect to 
the White House Counsel's Office's preparations for impeachment 
proceedings. Breuer 8/4/98 GJT at 78; Supplemental Materials 
(H. Doc. 105-316) at 284.
    9. ``Have you ever discussed with Mr. Kendall the 
relationship between the President and Monica Lewinsky?'' 
Breuer 8/4/98 GJT at 79; Supplemental Materials (H. Doc. 105-
316) at 284.
    10. ``Have you ever discussed with Ms. Seligman, who is 
another of the President's private lawyers, the relationship 
between the President and Monica Lewinsky?'' Breuer 8/4/98 GJT 
at 80; Supplemental Materials (H. Doc. 105-316) at 284.
    11. ``Have you ever discussed, again, with Mr. Kantor the 
relationship between the resident and Monica Lewinsky?'' Breuer 
8/4/98 GJT at 84; Supplemental Materials (H. Doc. 105-316) at 
285.
    12. ``Have you ever discussed with Mr. Ruff the nature of 
the relationship between the President and Monica Lewinsky?'' 
Breuer 8/4/98 GJT at 84; Supplemental Materials (H. Doc. 105-
316) at 285.
    13. ``Have you ever discussed with Cheryl Mills the nature 
of the relationship between the President and Monica 
Lewinsky?'' Breuer 8/4/98 GJT at 84; Supplemental Materials (H. 
Doc. 105-316) at 285.
    14. ``Have you had such discussions with Bruce Lindsey?'' 
Breuer 8/4/98 GJT at 85; Supplemental Materials (H. Doc. 105-
316) at 286.
    15. ``And has he [i.e. Bob Bennett] described to you the 
nature of the relationship between the President and Monica 
Lewinsky?'' Breuer 8/4/98 GJT at 95; Supplemental Materials (H. 
Doc. 105- 316) at 288.
    16. Mr. Breuer also asserted executive privilege with 
respect to whether he had discussed gifts, the President's 
conversation with Ms. Currie, Ms. Lewinsky's affidavit, and the 
President's knowledge of Ms. Lewinsky's job search with the 
persons mentioned in 9-15, above. Breuer 8/4/98 GJT at 95- 103; 
Supplemental Materials (H. Doc. 105-316) at 288-90.
            Questions on which Cheryl Mills asserted executive 
                    privilege
    1. ``Okay. And with respect to the conversation [between 
Ms. Mills and Mr. Lindsey on the day of the President's 
deposition] that you don't want to reveal the substance of the 
conversation, what privileges are you asserting with respect to 
that?'' Mills 8/11/98 GJT at 53; Supplemental Materials (H. 
Doc. 105-316) at 2890.
    2. ``Okay. Tell me about that [i.e. the President's 
direction to Ms. Mills to assert executive privilege] with 
respect to the privileges being asserted in this matter.'' 
Mills 8/11/98 GJT at 53; Supplemental Materials (H. Doc. 105-
316) at 2890.
    3. ``Okay. And how do you know that [i.e. that the 
President directed Ms. Mills to assert executive privilege]?'' 
Mills 8/11/98 GJT at 54; Supplemental Materials (H. Doc. 105-
316) at 2890.
    4. ``All right. With respect to this conversation [with Mr. 
Lindsey on the day of the President's deposition] about which 
you've asserted the privilege, what caused--you don't recall 
who called whom that day, but what caused the contact between 
either of you with respect to this conversation?'' Mills 8/11/
98 GJT at 54; Supplemental Materials (H. Doc. 105-316) at 2890.
    5. ``Okay. Are you aware of whether or not something 
happened on Mr. Lindsey's end to cause the conversation to take 
place? Without respect to what that was.'' Mills 8/11/98 GJT at 
55; Supplemental Materials (H. Doc. 105-316) at 2890.
    6. ``All right. And what was discussed at that meeting 
[among the President and various White House attorneys and 
staff on January 31 or February 1] with respect to the 
President's relationship with Monica Lewinsky?'' Mills 8/11/98 
GJT at 66; Supplemental Materials (H. Doc. 105-316) at 2893.
    7. After asserting privilege on the previous question, Ms. 
Mills made a general claim of executive privilege with respect 
to her conversations with the President about Monica Lewinsky. 
Mills 8/11/98 GJT at 66-68; Supplemental Materials (H. Doc. 
105-316) at 2893.
    8. ``I think I asked you about the contacts you had with 
the President's outside lawyers with respect to the Paula Jones 
litigation.'' Mills 8/11/98 GJT at 71; Supplemental Materials 
(H. Doc. 105-316) at 2894.
    9. ``Okay. And with respect to the questions we would ask 
you as to your conversations with such persons [i.e. grand jury 
witnesses], would you assert a privilege and decline to provide 
the information of those conversations?'' Mills 8/11/98 GJT at 
72-73; Supplemental Materials (H. Doc. 105-316) at 2894-95.
    10. ``All right. With respect to counsel for such [grand 
jury] witnesses, are you asserting privilege with respect to 
that or not?'' Mills 8/11/98 GJT at 73; Supplemental Materials 
(H. Doc. 105-316) at 2895.
    11. ``Okay. And I want to ask you about your discussion 
with her concerning her [i.e. Betty Currie's] need for a 
lawyer. Is that a matter over which you are asserting 
privilege?'' Mills 8/11/98 GJT at 77; Supplemental Materials 
(H. Doc. 105-316) at 2896
            Questions on which Sidney Blumenthal asserted executive 
                    privilege
    1. ``What occurs at these 8:30 and 6:45 p.m., these daily 
meetings [relating to the Lewinsky matter]?'' Blumenthal 2/26/
98 GJT at 12-13; Supplemental Materials (H. Doc. 105-316) at 
161-62.
    After abandoning this claim, Mr. Blumenthal testified that 
in these meetings senior White House advisers discussed the 
policy, political, legal, and media impact of various scandals 
on the Administration and gave various examples of the kinds of 
matters discussed. Blumenthal 6/4/98 GJT at 25-40; Supplemental 
Materials (H. Doc. 105-316) at 179-82.
    2. ``What information have you received from the President 
[about Monica Lewinsky]?'' Blumenthal 2/26/98 GJT at 15; 
Supplemental Materials (H. Doc. 105-316) at 162.
    After abandoning this claim, Mr. Blumenthal testified that 
the President told him that Ms. Lewinsky had made a sexual 
advance on him and that he had rebuffed it. The President 
further told him that Ms. Lewinsky had threatened to tell other 
people that they had had an affair if he did not have sex with 
her. The President also told him that he was never alone with 
Ms. Lewinsky. Blumenthal 6/4/98 GJT at 49-50; Supplemental 
Materials (H. Doc. 105-316) at 185.
    3. ``Okay. Can you tell us what information you received 
from Mrs. Clinton [about Monica Lewinsky]?'' Blumenthal 2/26/98 
GJT at 15; Supplemental Materials (H. Doc. 105-316) at 162.
    After abandoning this claim, Mr. Blumenthal testified that 
the First Lady told him that the Lewinsky matter was a 
political attack and that the President had simply been 
ministering to a troubled young person. Blumenthal 6/4/98 GJT 
at 46-53; Supplemental Materials (H. Doc. 105-316) at 184-86.
    4. ``Okay. Did your attorneys, that is either the White 
House or your private attorneys, indicate to you which 
privilege--well, let me ask you the question first. What was 
discussed? What was the substance of what was discussed 
[between Mr. Blumenthal and the President about Monica 
Lewinsky]?'' Blumenthal 2/26/98 GJT at 19; Supplemental 
Materials (H. Doc. 105-316) at 163.
    After abandoning this claim, Mr. Blumenthal testified that 
the President told him that Ms. Lewinsky had made a sexual 
advance on him and that he had rebuffed it. The President 
further told him that Ms. Lewinsky had threatened to tell other 
people that they had had an affair if he did not have sex with 
her. The President also told him that he was never alone with 
Ms. Lewinsky. Blumenthal 6/4/98 GJT at 49-50; Supplemental 
Materials (H. Doc. 105-316) at 185. Blumenthal 6/25/98 GJT at 
4-37; Supplemental Materials (H. Doc. 105-316) at 189-98.
    5. ``What was the substance of the meeting with the First 
Lady [about Monica Lewinsky]?'' Blumenthal 2/26/98 GJT at 25; 
Supplemental Materials (H. Doc. 105-316) at 164.
    After abandoning this claim, Mr. Blumenthal testified that 
the First Lady told him that the Lewinsky matter was a 
political attack and that the President had simply been 
ministering to a troubled young person. Blumenthal 6/4/98 GJT 
at 46-53; Supplemental Materials (H. Doc. 105-316) at 184-86.
    6. ``Tell us about the ones [i.e. telephone conversations 
with the First Lady about Monica Lewinsky] that you do 
specifically recall?'' Blumenthal 2/26/98 GJT at 26; 
Supplemental Materials (H. Doc. 105-316) at 164.
    After abandoning this claim, Mr. Blumenthal testified that 
he and the First Lady talked about matters in the media about 
the investigation and not any material facts about Ms. 
Lewinsky. Blumenthal 6/25/98 GJT at 58-59; Supplemental 
Materials (H. Doc. 105-316) at 203. He later said they involved 
leaks, tactics, and congressional reactions. Blumenthal 6/25/98 
GJT at 62; Supplemental Materials (H. Doc. 105-316) at 204.
            Questions on which Nancy Hernreich asserted executive 
                    privilege
    1. ``Okay. As best you recollect, could you tell us what 
the conversation was about. Who said what?'' Hernreich 2/25/98 
GJT at 37; Supplemental Materials (H. Doc. 105-316) at 1324. 
(The question refers to Ms. Hernreich's conversation with the 
President about Ms. Lewinsky.)
    After abandoning the claim of privilege, Ms. Hernreich 
testified that the President told her that he did not do 
``this'' (i.e. have a relationship with Ms. Lewinsky) and that 
the President had at some point mentioned that Ms. Lewinsky was 
a friend of Walter Kaye. Hernreich 3/26/98 GJT at 12-13; 
Supplemental Materials (H. Doc. 105-316) at 1341-42. Hernreich 
6/16/98 GJT at 90-91; Supplemental Materials (H. Doc. 105-316) 
at 1406-07.
    2. Ms. Hernreich testified that she had been instructed by 
White House attorneys to invoke executive privilege with 
respect to any questions about conversations she may have had 
with senior White House staff about Ms. Lewinsky. Hernreich 2/
25/98 GJT at 44-45; Supplemental Materials (H. Doc. 105-316) at 
1325.
    After abandoning this claim, Ms. Hernreich testified that 
she may have had discussions with White House attorneys Cheryl 
Mills or Lanny Breuer about Ms. Lewinsky, but she did not 
recall the details. Hernreich 6/16/98 GJT at 53-54; 
Supplemental Materials (H. Doc. 105-316) at 1400. Ms. Hernreich 
also testified that she did not have any conversations with 
senior staff about Ms. Lewinsky's efforts to return to a White 
House job. Hernreich 6/16/98 GJT at 63-64; Supplemental 
Materials (H. Doc. 105-316) at 1402.
    3. Ms. Hernreich testified that she had been instructed by 
White House attorneys to invoke executive privilege with 
respect to any questions about conversations she may have had 
with the President about Kathleen Willey. Hernreich 2/25/98 GJT 
at 45-46; Supplemental Materials (H. Doc. 105-316) at 1325.
    After abandoning this claim, Ms. Hernreich testified that 
she had conversations with the President about the suicide of 
Ms. Willey's husband and efforts to get Ms. Willey a job in the 
White House. Hernreich 3/31/98 GJT at 104-08; Supplemental 
Materials (H. Doc. 105-316) at 1384-85. She further testified 
that later she had a conversation with the President in which 
she informed him of a call from Ms. Willey in which Ms. Willey 
informed Ms. Hernreich that a reporter was asking questions 
about the Willey incident. Ms. Hernreich thought that the 
President might have told her to relay this information to Mr. 
Lindsey. Hernreich 6/16/98 GJT at 59-60; Supplemental Materials 
(H. Doc. 105-316) at 1401.
    4. ``Then my question to you is now: Tell the grand jurors 
the content of those conversations, as you remember them. And 
do you want to tell us that, or do you invoke privilege?'' 
Hernreich 2/25/98 GJT at 54; Supplemental Materials (H. Doc. 
105-316) at 1326. (The question refers to Ms. Hernreich's 
conversation with Bruce Lindsey about Ms. Lewinsky.)
    After abandoning this claim, Ms. Hernreich testified that 
she did not recall any discussions she had with Mr. Lindsey 
about Ms. Lewinsky and Ms. Tripp. Hernreich 6/16/98 GJT at 51; 
Supplemental Materials (H. Doc. 105-316) at 1400. She later 
testified that she might have had ten to twenty conversations 
with Mr. Lindsey about Ms. Lewinsky, but that only one or two 
of them would have involved more than general mention of the 
story in the press. Hernreich 6/16/98 GJT at 99-102; 
Supplemental Materials (H. Doc. 105-316) at 1408.
    5. Q. Okay. I'm not going to go to the content, but let me 
explain the reason I'm asking it, because I thought as we 
understood it, that the demarcation for Monica Lewinsky was 
after the story broke--which would have been on or about 
January 21st or 23rd, somewhere in that area.
    So given that as what you've previously indicated as sort 
of your framework for invoking executive privilege, the 
conversations with Bruce Lindsey--I'm not going to ask you the 
content, but did the conversation with Bruce Lindsey concern 
Monica Lewinsky?
    A. I would like to claim executive privilege on my 
conversations with Bruce Lindsey.
    Q. Even to as to identify the nature of the topic?
    A. Yes. Hernreich 2/25/98 GJT at 61; Supplemental Materials 
(H. Doc. 105-316) at 1328.
    After abandoning this claim, Ms. Hernreich testified that 
she did not recall any discussions she had with Mr. Lindsey 
about Ms. Lewinsky. Hernreich 6/16/98 GJT at 51; Supplemental 
Materials (H. Doc. 105-316) at 1400. She later testified that 
she might have had ten to twenty conversations with Mr. Lindsey 
about Ms. Lewinsky, but that only one or two of them would have 
involved more than general mention of the story in the press. 
Hernreich 6/16/98 GJT at 99-102; Supplemental Materials (H. 
Doc. 105-316) at 1408.
    6. Ms. Hernreich testified that these conversations did not 
involve any national security, state secret, or official 
governmental matters. Hernreich 2/25/98 GJT at 65-66; 
Supplemental Materials (H. Doc. 105-316) at 1328.

             IV. THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROCESS OF IMPEACHMENT

                 A. General Arguments About Impeachment

1. Constitutional provisions

    The following provisions in the Constitution relate to 
impeachment:
    ``The House of Representatives shall choose their Speaker 
and other Officers; and shall have the sole Power of 
Impeachment.'' U.S. Const. art. I, sec. 2.
    ``The Senate shall have the sole power to try all 
Impeachments.'' U.S. Const. art. I, sec. 3, cl. 6.
    ``Judgment in Cases of Impeachment shall not extend further 
than to removal from Office, and disqualification to hold and 
enjoy any Office of honor, Trust or Profit under the United 
States: but the party convicted shall nevertheless be liable 
and subject to Indictment, Trial, Judgement and Punishment, 
according to Law.'' U.S. Const. art. I, sec. 3, cl. 7.
    ``The President, Vice President and all civil Officers of 
the United States, shall be removed from Office on Impeachment 
for, and Conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes 
and Misdemeanors.'' U.S. Const. art. II, sec. 4.

2. Impeachment is not removal from office

    Some have suggested that impeachment is equivalent to 
removal from office. This suggestion is patently false. Article 
II of the Constitution specifies that the President ``shall be 
removed from Office on Impeachment for, and Conviction of'' 
certain offenses. U.S. Const. art. II, sec. 4 (emphasis added). 
The language is clear on its face.
    Elsewhere the Constitution sets forth the procedure that is 
to be used to address the derelictions of the President, and 
that procedure demonstrates that impeachment is the charging 
phase, and trial by the Senate is the conviction and removal 
phase. Article I gives the House of Representatives ``the sole 
Power of Impeachment,'' U.S. Const. art. I, sec. 2, and gives 
the Senate ``the sole Power to try all Impeachments. When 
sitting for that Purpose, they shall be on Oath or 
Affirmation.'' U.S. Const. art. I, sec. 3. The Constitution 
gives each House of Congress a specific duty: the House serves 
as accuser, the Senate as judge.
    Representative Barbara Jordan, a Democrat from Texas who 
served on the Judiciary Committee during the impeachment 
inquiry of President Richard Nixon, described this delegation 
of duties as follows:

          It is wrong, I suggest, it is a misreading of the 
        Constitution for any member here to assert that for a 
        member to vote for an article of impeachment means that 
        that member must be convinced that the president should 
        be removed from office. The Constitution doesn't say 
        that. The powers relating to impeachment are an 
        essential check in the hands of this body, the 
        legislature, against and upon the encroachment of the 
        executive. In establishing the division between the two 
        branches of the legislature, the House and the Senate, 
        assigning to the one the right to accuse and to the 
        other the right to judge, the framers of the 
        Constitution were very astute. They did not make the 
        accusers and the judges the same person.

Debate on Articles of Impeachment, p. 111 (1974).
    At the Markup of the Articles of Impeachment, Chairman Hyde 
echoed these thoughts:

          The framers' decision to confine legislative 
        sanctioning of executive officials to removal upon 
        impeachment was carefully considered. By forcing the 
        House and Senate to act as a tribunal and a trial jury 
        rather than merely as a legislative body, they infused 
        the process with notions of due process. The 
        requirement of removal upon conviction accentuates the 
        magnitude of the procedure, encouraging serious 
        deliberation among Members of Congress.

Markup Session, Articles of Impeachment of William Jefferson 
Clinton, Statement of Chairman Henry J. Hyde, December 12, 
1998, at 172. It is abundantly clear that removal cannot occur 
until the Senate's trial has concluded in conviction.

3. Impeachment Does Not Overturn an Election

    One rhetorical device that has recently been employed by 
some who oppose the impeachment of President Clinton is that 
impeachment of the President will ``overturn the election.'' 
The suggestion is that the congressional majority is using 
impeachment for political reasons--to undo a presidential 
election in which their party did not succeed.
    The success of this rhetorical strategy rests wholly on the 
expectation that those to be persuaded by it will not read the 
Constitution. The Twenty-Fifth Amendment to the Constitution, 
which was ratified on February 10, 1967, states: ``In case of 
the removal of the President from office or of his death or 
resignation, the Vice President shall become President.'' Since 
the vice presidential and presidential candidates run for 
office on the same ticket, impeachment of the President could 
not possibly result in a change of political party control in 
the Executive. Any assertion to the contrary is patently false.

4. A Senate Trial of an Impeachment is a Constitutional Process

    Another debating tactic recently employed by those who 
oppose impeachment is to portray the trial in the Senate as an 
unbearable exercise for the country. This tactic is undoubtedly 
designed to alarm the public, and to aggravate the discomfort 
already inherent in the notion of impeaching a president. 
Representative Charles T. Canady addressed this argument on 
December 12, 1998 during the debate on the motion to adopt a 
joint resolution of censure:

          Now, we have a responsibility to follow the 
        Constitution. Now, we have heard many suggestions about 
        what will happen if this President is impeached. We 
        have heard horror story after horror story. But do we 
        have such fear of following the path marked out for us 
        by the Constitution that we would take it upon 
        ourselves to go down a different path, a path of our 
        own choosing? Will we let our faith in the constitution 
        be put aside and overwhelmed by the fears that have 
        been feverishly propagated by the President's 
        defenders?
          Now, there is no question that this is a momentous 
        issue. There is no question that impeaching a President 
        of the United States is a momentous act. But this is 
        not a legislative coup d'etat. This is a constitutional 
        process. . . . There is a great deal of evidence before 
        us, but in its essentials, this is a rather simple 
        case. It can be resolved by the Senate expeditiously. 
        We should reject the scare tactics, we should reject 
        the effort to have us turn away from our constitutional 
        duty, we should vote down this motion and move forward 
        with doing our duty in the House of Representatives.

Markup Session, Articles of Impeachment of William Jefferson 
Clinton, Statement of Representative Charles T. Canady, 
December 12, 1998, at 210-11.
    It is clear that a Senate trial following impeachment would 
not be an extraordinary event, but it would be a methodical 
procedure of regular constitutional order. Those finding fault 
with the idea of a trial are really faulting the Constitution, 
and not those who believe President Clinton has committed 
offenses deserving impeachment and removal.

          b. articles of impeachment against president clinton

1. Article I--Grand Jury Perjury

a. Facts

    Article I charges President Clinton with ``willfully 
provid[ing] perjurious, false and misleading testimony'' to a 
federal grand jury on August 17, 1998. A review of the judicial 
impeachments of the 1980s makes it clear that when a president 
knowingly makes false statements under oath, especially when 
the statements meet the standards of perjury, he has committed 
impeachable offenses. This is true whether or not the 
statements are in regard to matters related to his official 
duties.
    The first article of impeachment against President Clinton, 
in charging that he made perjurious, false and misleading 
statements to a federal grand jury, can be challenged on two 
other bases. The first, that the President's statements were 
literally true, has already been dismissed. The second is that 
the statements were not material to the matters being 
considered by the grand jury convened by the Office of 
Independent Counsel. As one of the matters the grand jury was 
considering was the OIC's investigation of ``whether Monica 
Lewinsky or others had violated federal law in connection with 
the Jones v. Clinton case'', materiality would be determined by 
whether the President's affair with Ms. Lewinsky was material 
to that case. Referral from Independent Counsel Kenneth W. 
Starr in Conformity with the Requirements of Title 28, United 
States Code, Section 595(c), H.R. Doc. 105-310, 105th Cong., 2d 
Sess. at 8 (1998).
    Unfortunately for the President's argument, on May 26, the 
United States Court of Appeals for District of Columbia Circuit 
ruled that President Clinton's affair with Monica Lewinsky was 
material to the Jones v. Clinton lawsuit. The court stated 
that:

          [Monica] Lewinsky tells us . . . the government could 
        not establish perjury because her denial of having had 
        a ``sexual relationship'' with President Clinton was 
        not ``material'' to the Arkansas proceeding [the Jones 
        case] within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1623(a); and 
        her affidavit containing this denial could not have 
        constituted a ``corrupt[] . . . endeavor[] to 
        influence'' the Arkansas district court. . . .
          A statement is ``material'' if it ``has a natural 
        tendency to influence, or was capable of influencing, 
        the decision of the tribunal in making a [particular] 
        determination. . . . The ``central object'' of any 
        materiality inquiry is ``whether the misrepresentation 
        or concealment was predictably capable of affecting, 
        i.e., had a natural tendency to affect, the official 
        decision.'' . . . Lewinsky used the statement in her 
        affidavit . . . to support her motion to quash the 
        subpoena issued in the discovery phase of the [Jones] 
        litigation. District courts faced with such motions 
        must decide whether the testimony or material sought is 
        reasonably calculated to lead to admissible evidence 
        and, if so, whether the need for the testimony, its 
        probative value, the nature and importance of the 
        litigation, and similar factors outweigh any burden 
        enforcement of the subpoena might impose. . . . There 
        can be little doubt that Lewinsky's statements in her 
        affidavit were . . . ``predictably capable of 
        affecting'' the decision. She executed and filed her 
        affidavit for this very purpose.

In re Sealed Case, No. 98-3052, slip op. at 4-6 (D.C. Cir. May 
26, 1998)(citations omitted).
    It is true that the above opinion was in regard to whether 
Ms. Lewinsky could quash a subpoena to produce items and 
testify in the case of Jones v. Clinton regarding her alleged 
affair with President Clinton. However, the reasons for which 
the court upheld the subpoena as material to the Jones case are 
directly applicable to whether Ms. Lewinsky's affidavit was 
material to the Jones case. In both cases, the essential 
question was whether Lewinsky's alleged affair with President 
Clinton was material to the Jones case.
    Why would Ms. Lewinsky's affair with President Clinton be 
material to the Jones case? Because in ``he-said, she-said'' 
sexual harassment cases such as Paula Jones's, patterns of 
conduct are important evidence in establishing that harassment 
has in fact occurred. President Clinton's conduct in relation 
to other subordinate employees--such as Ms. Lewinsky--could 
help establish the veracity of Ms. Jones's claims.

b. Lessons from the Judicial Impeachments of the 1980s

    The impeachments of three sitting federal judges in the 
1980s provide compelling reasons to believe that President 
Clinton committed impeachable offenses when he made perjurious, 
false and misleading statements to the grand jury.
            i. Federal Judges vs. Presidents
    The argument is frequently made that offenses leading to 
impeachment when committed by federal judges do not necessarily 
rise to this level when committed by a president--the 
argument's basis is said to be that the Constitution provides 
that Article III judges ``shall hold their Offices during good 
Behavior,'' U.S. Const. art. III, Sec. 1, and thus that judges 
are impeachable for ``misbehavior'' while other federal 
officials are only impeachable for treason, bribery, and other 
high crimes and misdemeanors.
    The staff of the House Judiciary Committee in the 1970s and 
the National Commission on Judicial Discipline and Removal in 
the 1990s have both rejected this argument. In 1974, the staff 
of the Judiciary Committee's Impeachment Inquiry issued a 
report which asked whether the good behavior clause ``limit[s] 
the relevance of the . . . impeachments of judges with respect 
to presidential impeachment standards as has been argued by 
some[.]'' Staff of House Comm. on the Judiciary, 93rd Cong., 2d 
Sess., Constitutional Grounds for Presidential Impeachment 
(Comm. Print 1974) at 17. The staff concluded that: ``It does 
not. . . . [T]he only impeachment provision . . . included in 
the Constitution . . . applies to all civil officers, including 
judges, and defines impeachment offenses as `Treason, Bribery, 
and other high Crimes and Misdemeanors.' '' Id.
    The conclusion of the staff report is bolstered by the 
findings of the National Commission on Judicial Discipline and 
Removal, chaired by Robert Kastenmeier, former Chairman of the 
Committee's Subcommittee on Courts, Civil Liberties and the 
Administration of Justice and one of the House managers during 
the Senate trial of U.S. District Court Judge Harry Claiborne. 
The Commission concluded that ``the most plausible reading of 
the phrase `during good Behavior' is that it means tenure for 
life, subject to the impeachment power. . . . The ratification 
debates about the federal judiciary seem to have proceeded on 
the assumption that good-behavior tenure meant removal only 
through impeachment and conviction.'' National Commission on 
Judicial Discipline and Removal, Report of the National 
Commission on Judicial Discipline and Removal 17-18 
(1993)(footnote omitted).
    The record of the 1986 impeachment of Judge Claiborne also 
argues against different standards for impeachable offenses 
when committed by federal judges as when committed by 
presidents. Judge Claiborne filed a motion asking the Senate to 
dismiss the articles of impeachment against him for failure to 
state impeachable offenses. One of the motion's arguments was 
that ``[t]he standard for impeachment of a judge is different 
than that for other officers'' and that the Constitution 
limited ``removal of the judiciary to acts involving misconduct 
related to discharge of office.'' Memorandum in Support of 
Motion to Dismiss the Articles of Impeachment on the Grounds 
They Do Not State Impeachable Offenses 4 (hereinafter cited as 
``Claiborne Motion''), reprinted in Hearings Before the Senate 
Impeachment Trial Committee, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 245 
(1986)(hereinafter cited as ``Senate Claiborne Hearings'').
    Judge Claiborne's attorney stated to the Senate trial 
committee that:

          [B]ecause of the separation of powers contemplated by 
        the framers . . . the standard for impeachment of a 
        Federal judge is distinct from the standard of 
        impeachment for the President, Vice President, or other 
        civil officers of the United States because as we know, 
        under article II, section 4, the President, Vice 
        President, and civil officers may be removed on 
        impeachment for [and] conviction of treason, bribery, 
        or other high crimes and misdemeanors.
          It is our contention that the Federal judiciary, in 
        order to remain an independent branch, has a different 
        standard, a separate and distinct standard, as far as 
        the ability or the disability to be impeached, and that 
        is that the impeachment process would take place if in 
        fact the judge, who is the sole . . . lifetime 
        appointment of all the officers which are referred to 
        in the Constitution, is not on good behavior, a 
        separate and distinct standard than that which is 
        applicable to the elected officials and the officials 
        who are appointed for a specific term.

Senate Claiborne Hearings at 76-77 (statement of Oscar 
Goodman).
    Judge Claiborne's attorney was arguing that federal judges 
are not ``civil officers'' and thus that the impeachment 
standard in article II, section 4, does not apply; instead, 
``misbehavior'' would be the grounds for impeaching a federal 
judge. Id. at 78-79. See also Claiborne Motion at 3-4. He 
admitted his theory would fall if the Senate concluded that a 
federal judge was a civil officer. Senate Claiborne Hearings at 
79.
    Representative Kastenmeier responded that ``reliance on the 
term `good behavior' as stating a sanction for judges is 
totally misplaced and virtually all commentators agree that 
that is directed to affirming the life tenure of judges during 
good behavior. It is not to set them down, differently, as 
judicial officers from civil officers.'' Id. at 81-82. He 
further stated that ``[n]or . . . is there any support for the 
notion that . . . Federal judges are not civil officers of the 
United States, subject to the impeachment clause of article II 
of the Constitution.'' Id. at 81.
    Kastenmeier's argument was repeated by the House of 
Representatives. U.S. House of Representatives, Opposition to 
Motion to Dismiss Articles of Impeachment for Failure to State 
Impeachable Offenses (hereinafter cited as ``Opposition to 
Claiborne Motion''), reprinted in Senate Claiborne Hearings at 
441. The House stated that:

          If lack of good behavior were the sole standard for 
        impeaching federal judges, then a different standard 
        would apply to civil officers other than judges. 
        Nowhere in the proceedings of the Constitutional 
        Convention was such a distinction made. On the 
        contrary, the proceedings of the Convention show an 
        intention to limit the grounds of impeachment for all 
        civil officers, including federal judges, to those 
        contained in Article II.
          On August 20, 1787, a committee was directed to 
        report on ``a mode of trying the supreme Judges in 
        cases of impeachment.'' The committee reported back on 
        August 22 that ``the Judges should be triable by the 
        Senate.'' . . . Several days later, a judicial removal 
        provision was added to the impeachment clause. On 
        September 8, 1787, the judicial removal clause was 
        deleted and the impeachment clause was expanded to 
        include the Vice President and all civil officers. . . 
        . In so doing, the Constitutional Convention rejected a 
        dual test of ``misbehavior'' for judges and ``high 
        crimes and misdemeanors'' for all other federal 
        officials.

    In Federalist No. 79, Alexander Hamilton confirmed this 
reading of the Convention's actions with respect to the 
impeachment standard:

          The precautions for [judges'] responsibility, are 
        comprised in the article respecting impeachments. . . . 
        This is the only provision on the point, which is 
        consistent with the necessary independence of the 
        judicial character, and is the only one which we find 
        in our Constitution with respect to our own judges.

Opposition to Claiborne Motion at 6-7 (citations omitted).
    The Senate never voted on Claiborne's motion. However, the 
Senate was clearly not swayed by the arguments contained 
therein because the body later voted to convict Judge 
Claiborne. 132 Con. Rec. S15,760-62 (daily ed. Oct. 9, 1986). 
The Senate thus rejected the claim that the standard of 
impeachable offenses was different for judges than for 
presidents. It can thus be reliably stated that both federal 
judges and U.S. presidents are impeachable for the same 
misdeeds: ``Treason, Bribery, and other high Crimes and 
Misdemeanors''.
    One additional argument can be made in an effort to 
differentiate the standards of impeachment for judges and 
presidents. While both judges and presidents are impeachable 
for committing ``Treason, Bribery, and other high Crimes and 
Misdemeanors'', it might be argued that certain high crimes 
such as perjury are more detrimental when committed by judges 
and therefore only impeachable when committed by judges. Thus, 
one article of impeachment against Judge Claiborne charged that 
he was ``required to discharge and perform all the duties 
incumbent on him and to uphold and obey the Constitution and 
laws of the United States'' and was ``required to uphold the 
integrity of the judiciary and to perform the duties of his 
office impartially'' and that by willfully and knowingly 
falsifying his income on his tax returns, he had ``betrayed the 
trust of the people of the United States and reduced confidence 
in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary, thereby 
bringing disrepute on the Federal courts and the administration 
of justice by the courts.'' Id. Judges must lead by example in 
convincing witnesses before their courts to testify truthfully, 
and they must be viewed as impartial when deciding issues in 
cases--thus it is devastating when they are viewed as being 
less than truthful.
    This argument fails because it is just as devastating to 
our system of government when presidents commit perjury. As the 
Judiciary Committee stated in justifying an article of 
impeachment against President Nixon, the President not only has 
``the obligation that every citizen has to live under the 
law[,]'' but in addition has the duty ``not merely to live by 
the law but to see that law faithfully applied[.]'' Impeachment 
of Richard M. Nixon, President of the United States, H.R. Rep. 
No. 93-1305, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. at 180 (1974) (hereinafter 
cited as ``Impeachment of Richard M. Nixon''). The Constitution 
provides that he ``shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully 
executed.'' U.S. Const. art. II, Sec. 3. As Justice Felix 
Frankfurter has stated, this is ``the embracing function of the 
President.'' Id. at 180, quoting Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co. 
v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 610 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., 
concurring). When a president, as chief law enforcement officer 
of the United States, commits perjury, he violates this 
constitutional oath unique to his office and casts doubt on the 
notion that we are a nation ruled by laws and not men.
            ii. Perjurious, False and Misleading Statements Made Under 
                    Oath or Subject to Penalty for Perjury
            a. Judge Harry Claiborne
    When Judge Harry Claiborne was impeached, he was serving a 
sentence in federal prison for filing false federal income tax 
returns for 1979 and 1980. Judge Claiborne had signed written 
declarations that the returns were made under penalty of 
perjury. A jury had found beyond a reasonable doubt that Judge 
Claiborne had failed to report substantial income in violation 
of federal law.
    The Senate convicted Judge Claiborne of three articles of 
impeachment. 132 Cong. Rec. S15,760-62 (daily ed. Oct. 9, 
1986). The first article had charged that, while serving as a 
federal judge, Judge Claiborne willfully and knowingly filed 
under penalty of perjury an income tax return for 1979, which 
he did not believe to be true and correct as to every material 
matter in that it substantially understated his income. Id. The 
second article had charged that he had done the same with his 
income tax return for 1980. Id. The third article was mentioned 
in the previous section.
    The first two articles of impeachment charged Judge 
Claiborne not only with making false statements, but with 
making perjurious statements. This can be inferred from the 
fact that the first two articles stated two crucial 
requirements of perjury, that a falsehood be made knowingly, 
and that it be ``material.'' A person is guilty of perjury if 
in a proceeding before or ancillary to any court or grand jury 
of the United States, he knowingly makes any false material 
declaration under oath. 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1623(a)(1994 & Supp. 
1996). A general perjury provision is found at 18 U.S.C. 
Sec. 1621. Section 1621 requires that the defendant 
``willfully'' make a false statement. Under this section, the 
prosecution must present at least two independent witnesses or 
one witness with corroborating evidence. See Hammer v. United 
States, 271 U.S. 620, 626 (1926). The prosecution does not have 
to meet this ``two witness rule'' under Sec. 1623.
    To be material, a statement must have ``a natural tendency 
to influence, or [be] capable of influencing, the decision of 
the decisionmaking body to which it was addressed.'' Kungys v. 
United States, 485 U.S. 759, 770 (1988)(quotation marks 
omitted)(While Kungys dealt with materiality under the 
Immigration and Nationality Act, the Court stated that ``[t]he 
federal courts have long displayed a quite uniform 
understanding of the `materiality' concept as embodied in such 
statutes.'' Id. See United States v. Dickerson, 114 F.3d 464, 
466 (4th Cir. 1997), for a section 1623 case involving 
testimony before a grand jury with a similar definition of 
materiality.). Of course, the statement must influence the body 
on the subject before it. See United States v. Cosby, 601 F.2d 
754, 756 n.2 (5th Cir. 1979). Materiality is determined at the 
time of the testimony, and ``subsequent events do not eliminate 
that materiality.'' See United States v. Manfredonia, 414 F.2d 
760, 765 (2d Cir. 1969) (footnote omitted).
            b. Judge Walter Nixon
    U.S. District Court Judge Walter L. Nixon, Jr., was 
impeached in 1989. At the time of his impeachment, he was 
serving a sentence in federal prison for committing perjury 
before a federal grand jury. A federal jury had convicted Judge 
Nixon of two counts of perjury while acquitting him of the 
underlying illegal gratuity count. He committed the perjury in 
an attempt to conceal his involvement with an aborted state 
prosecution for drug smuggling against the son of a man who had 
benefitted Judge Nixon financially with a ``sweetheart'' oil 
and gas investment. The Senate convicted Judge Nixon of two 
articles of impeachment, which were both based on Nixon's 
perjurious testimony. Proceedings of the United States Senate 
in the Impeachment Trial of Walter L. Nixon, Jr., a Judge of 
the United States District Court for the Southern District of 
Mississippi, S. Doc. No. 101-22, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 432-35 
(1989). The first article upon which he was convicted found 
that in testimony before the federal grand jury investigating 
Judge Nixon's business relationship with an individual and a 
state prosecutor's handling of a drug smuggling prosecution of 
that individual's son, Judge Nixon knowingly made a material 
false or misleading statement in violation of his oath to tell 
the truth to the effect that he never discussed the prosecution 
with the state prosecutor. Id. at 432-35. The second article 
upon which he was convicted found that in testimony before the 
same grand jury, Judge Nixon knowingly made a material false or 
misleading statement in violation of his oath to tell the truth 
to the effect that he never talked to anyone that in any way 
influenced anyone with respect to the drug smuggling case. Id.
    As in the case of Judge Claiborne, the articles of 
impeachment against Judge Nixon charged him not only with 
making false statements, but with making perjurious statements. 
This can be inferred from the fact that the two articles stated 
two crucial requirements of perjury, that a falsehood be made 
knowingly, and that it be ``material.'' Of course, the federal 
jury had found that he had met these two requirements by 
convicting him of perjury.
            c. Judge Alcee Hastings
    U.S. District Court Judge Alcee L. Hastings was impeached 
in 1989. In 1983, a federal jury acquitted Judge Hastings of 
charges that he and a friend had conspired to solicit a 
$150,000 bribe from defendants in a racketeering and 
embezzlement case heard by Judge Hastings in exchange for 
lenient sentencing. However, in a separate trial, a jury had 
convicted his alleged co-conspirator on these charges and it 
was alleged that Judge Hastings won acquittal by lying on the 
witness stand.
    Judge Hastings was found guilty by the Senate on seven of 
twelve articles of impeachment involving false testimony and on 
an article stating that he was a participant in the bribery 
conspiracy. 135 Cong. Rec. 25,330-35 (1989). The seven ``false 
testimony'' articles alleged that Judge Hastings knowingly made 
false statements under oath intending to mislead the trier of 
fact regarding whether he had (1) entered into an agreement to 
seek the $150,000 bribe from the defendants, (2) agreed to 
modify the sentences of the defendants in return for the bribe, 
(3) agreed in connection with the bribe to return property to 
the defendants that he had previously ordered forfeited, (4) 
appeared at a hotel to demonstrate his participation in the 
bribery scheme, (5) instructed his law clerk to prepare an 
order returning property to the defendants in the racketeering 
and embezzlement case in furtherance of the bribery scheme, (6) 
conducted a telephone conversation with his co-conspirator in 
furtherance of the bribery scheme, and (7) fabricated certain 
letters in an effort to hide the bribery scheme. 134 Cong. Rec. 
20,206-07 (1988).
    Since the articles of impeachment did not charge that Judge 
Hastings's false statements met a materiality standard, it can 
be inferred that Congress did not endeavor to impeach him for 
perjury, but only for making false statements. However, it 
seems obvious that the false statements made by Judge Hastings 
would have been found by a court to be material.
            d. Conclusion
    The recent judicial impeachments make clear that perjury is 
an impeachable offense. This is not surprising given that 
courts have long emphasized the destructiveness of perjury to 
the judicial system. The Supreme Court has stated that 
``[p]erjured testimony is an obvious and flagrant affront to 
the basic concepts of judicial proceedings[,]'' United States 
v. Mandujano, 425 U.S. 564, 576 (1976), that ``[f]alse 
testimony in a formal proceeding is intolerable,'' and that 
``[p]erjury should be severely sanctioned in appropriate 
cases.'' ABF Freight System v. NLRB, 510 U.S. 317, 323 (1994).
            iii. Conduct not Related to Official Duties
    The record of Judge Claiborne's impeachment proceedings 
make it clear that an individual can be impeached for conduct 
not related to his or her official duties. Hamilton Fish, 
ranking member of the Judiciary Committee and one of the House 
managers in the Senate trial, stated that ``[i]mpeachable 
conduct does not have to occur in the course of the performance 
of an officer's official duties. Evidence of misconduct, 
misbehavior, high crimes, and misdemeanors can be justified 
upon one's private dealings as well as one's exercise of public 
office. That, of course, is the situation in this case.'' 132 
Cong. Rec. H4713 (daily ed. July 22, 1986).
    Representative Fish's views were reinforced by now chairman 
of the Judiciary Committee and then House manager Henry Hyde, 
who stated that ``the decision to impeach and convict . . . 
stands as an admonition to others in public life. It is an 
opportunity for Congress to restate and reemphasize the 
standards of both personal and professional conduct expected of 
those holding high Federal office.'' 132 Cong. Rec. H4716 
(daily ed. July 22, 1986). House manager Romano Mazzoli stated 
that impeachment reached ``corruption, maladministration, gross 
neglect of duties and other public and private improprieties 
committed by judges and high Government officials which 
rendered them unfit to continue in office.'' 132 Cong. Rec. 
H4717 (daily ed. July 22, 1986).
    Additional evidence that personal misconduct can lead to 
impeachment is provided by the fact that Judge Claiborne's 
motion that the Senate dismiss the articles of impeachment for 
failure to state impeachable offenses was unsuccessful. One of 
the arguments his attorney made for the motion was that ``there 
is no allegation . . . that the behavior of Judge Claiborne in 
any way was related to misbehavior in his official function as 
a judge; it was private misbehavior.'' Senate Claiborne 
Hearings at 77 (statement of Judge Claiborne's counsel, Oscar 
Goodman). See also Claiborne Motion at 3.
    Representative Kastenmeier responded by stating that ``it 
would be absurd to conclude that a judge who had committed 
murder, mayhem, rape, or perhaps espionage in his private life, 
could not be removed from office by the U.S. Senate.'' Senate 
Claiborne Hearings at 81. Kastenmeier's response was repeated 
by the House of Representatives in its pleading opposing 
Claiborne's motion to dismiss. Opposition to Claiborne Motion 
at 2.
    The House went on to state that:

    [Claiborne's] narrow view of impeachable offenses expressly 
was offered and rejected by the Framers of the Constitution.
    . . . As originally drafted, the impeachment clause 
provided that the President should be ``removable on 
impeachment and conviction of malpractice or neglect of duty.''
    . . . The provision was subsequently revised to make the 
President impeachable for ``treason, bribery or corruption.''
    . . . Colonel Mason moved to add the phrase ``or 
maladministration'' after ``bribery.'' . . . In response, James 
Madison objected that ``maladministration'' was too narrow a 
standard. Mason soon withdrew his amendment and substituted the 
phrase ``or other high crimes and misdemeanors.'' This 
formulation was accepted, along with an amendment to extend the 
impeachment sanction to the Vice President and all other civil 
officers. . . . The Framers thus rejected . . . the concepts of 
professional ``malpractice'' or ``maladministration'' as the 
sole basis for the impeachment of federal officials.
    The contrary position urged by Judge Claiborne is 
incompatible with common sense and the orderly conduct of 
government. Little can be added to the succinct argument of 
Representative Clayton in 1913 on this identical point, during 
the impeachment proceedings involving Judge Charles Swayne:
          . . . [The contention is that] however serious the 
        crime, the misdemeanor, or misbehavior of the judge may 
        be, if it can be said to be extrajudicial, he cannot be 
        impeached. To illustrate this contention, the judge may 
        have committed murder or burglary and be confined under 
        a sentence in a penitentiary for any period of time, 
        however long, but because he has not committed the 
        murder or burglary in his capacity as judge he cannot 
        be impeached. That contention, carried out logically, 
        might lead to the very defeat of the performance of the 
        function confided to the judicial branch of the 
        government.
     . . . As also noted in one commentary:
          An act or a course of misbehavior which renders 
        scandalous the personal life of a public officer, 
        shakes the confidence of the people in his 
        administration of the public affairs, and thus impairs 
        his official usefulness, although it may not directly 
        affect his official integrity or otherwise incapacitate 
        him properly to perform his ascribed functions.
    Thus, Judge Claiborne's argument is both inaccurate and 
illogical in its extraordinary premise that a federal judge may 
intentionally commit a felonious act outside his judicial 
functions and automatically find protection from the 
impeachment sanction.

    Id. at 3-5 (citations omitted) (emphasis in original).
    Senator Charles Mathias, Jr., chairman of the impeachment 
trial committee, referred Judge Claiborne's motion to the full 
Senate, it having jurisdiction over the articles of 
impeachment. Senate Claiborne Hearings at 113. He did state, 
however, that:

          [I]t is my opinion . . . that the impeachment power 
        is not as narrow as Judge Claiborne suggests. There is 
        neither historical nor logical reason to believe that 
        the Framers of the Constitution sought to prohibit the 
        House from impeaching . . . an officer of the United 
        States who had committed treason or bribery or any 
        other high crime or misdemeanor which is a serious 
        offense against the government of the United States and 
        which indicates that the official is unfit to exercise 
        public responsibilities, but which is an offense which 
        is technically unrelated to the officer's particular 
        job responsibilities.

Id. at 113-14.
    The Senate never voted on Judge Claiborne's motion. 
However, the Senate was clearly not swayed by the arguments 
contained therein because the body later voted to convict Judge 
Claiborne. 132 Con. Rec. S15,760-62 (daily ed. Oct. 9, 1986). 
The Senate thus agreed with the House that private 
improprieties could be, and were in this instance, impeachable 
offenses.
    The Claiborne case makes clear that perjury, even if it 
relates to a matter wholly separated from a federal officer's 
official duties--as to a judge's tax returns--is an impeachable 
offense. Judge Nixon's false statements were also in regards to 
a matter distinct from his official duties. Of course, the 
false statements made by Judge Hastings were intimately related 
to his official duties, as they were in regard to one of his 
cases.

2. Article II--Perjury in the Civil Case

    Article II charges President Clinton with willfully 
providing perjurious, false and misleading testimony in sworn 
answers to written questions asked as part of a federal civil 
rights action brought against him by Paula Jones, and in a 
deposition given as part of that action. These actions are 
impeachable offenses no less than is President Clinton's 
perjurious, false and misleading testimony to a federal grand 
jury.
    First, as previously stated, a person is guilty of perjury 
if in a proceeding before or ancillary to any court or grand 
jury of the United States, he knowingly makes any false 
material declaration under oath. A federal civil deposition is 
such an ancillary proceeding. See, e.g., United States v. 
Wilkinson, 137 F.3d 214, 225 (4th Cir. 1998), cert. denied 119 
S.Ct. 172 (1998); United States v. McAfee, 8 F.3d 1010, 1014 
(5th Cir. 1993). Thus, the actions of President Clinton alleged 
in this article can constitute perjury under federal law.
    Second, perjury in civil proceedings is just as pernicious 
as perjury in criminal proceedings. The Eleventh Circuit has 
stated that ``[w]e categorically reject any suggestion, 
implicit or otherwise, that perjury is somehow less serious 
when made in a civil proceeding. Perjury, regardless of the 
setting, is a serious offense that results in incalculable harm 
to the functioning and integrity of the legal system as well as 
to private individuals.'' United States v. Holland, 22 F.3d 
1040, 1047 (11th Cir. 1994), cert. denied 513 U.S. 1109 (1995).
    Third, certain federal circuits apply a loose definition of 
materiality to statements made in civil depositions because 
they are investigatory in nature. For instance, the Second 
Circuit in stated that ``we see no persuasive reason not to 
apply the broad standard for materiality of whether a truthful 
answer might reasonably be calculated to lead to the discovery 
of evidence admissible at the trial of the underlying suit.'' 
United States v. Kross, 14 F.3d 751, 754 (2d Cir. 1994) (a 
section 1623 case). See contra United States v. Adams, 870 F.2d 
1140, 1147 (6th Cir. 1989) (a section 1623 case) (The test is 
``whether a truthful statement might have assisted or 
influenced the tribunal in its inquiry.''). The Fifth Circuit 
stated that ``[o]rdinarily, there would appear to be no 
sufficient reason why a deponent should not be held to his oath 
with respect to matters properly the subject of and material to 
the deposition, even if the information elicited might 
ultimately turn out not to be admissible at the subsequent 
trial. United States v. Holley, 942 F.2d 916, 924 (5th Cir. 
1991), aff'd after retrial, 986 F.2d 100 (1993) (a section 1623 
case). In assessing the materiality of statements made in a 
discovery deposition, some account must be taken of the more 
liberal rules of discovery.

3. Article III--Obstruction of Justice

    Article III charges that President Clinton has ``prevented, 
obstructed, and impeded the administration of justice, and has 
to that end engaged personally, and through his subordinates 
and agents, in a course of conduct or scheme designed to delay, 
impede, cover up, and conceal the existence of evidence and 
testimony related to a Federal civil rights action brought 
against him . . . .''

a. Lessons from the Impeachment of President Nixon

    This article finds clear precedent in the first article of 
impeachment the Judiciary Committee approved against President 
Richard Nixon. That article charged President Nixon with 
interfering with the investigation of events relating to the 
June 17, 1972, unlawful entry at the Washington, D.C. 
headquarters of the Democratic National Committee for the 
purpose of securing political intelligence.
    Using the powers of his office, the president ``engaged 
personally and through his subordinates and agents, in a course 
of conduct or plan designed to delay, impede, and obstruct the 
investigation of such unlawful entry; to cover up, conceal and 
protect those responsible; and to conceal the existence and 
scope of other unlawful covert activities.'' The article 
charged that implementation of the course of conduct included 
(1) making or causing to be made false or misleading statements 
to investigative officers and employees of the United States, 
(2) withholding relevant and material evidence or information 
from such persons, (3) approving, condoning, acquiescing in, 
and counseling witnesses with respect to the giving of false or 
misleading statements to such persons as well as in judicial 
and congressional proceedings, (4) interfering or endeavoring 
to interfere with the conduct of investigations by the 
Department of Justice, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the 
Office of Watergate Special Prosecution Force and congressional 
committees, (5) approving, condoning, and acquiescing in 
surreptitious payments for the purpose of obtaining the silence 
of or influencing the testimony of witnesses, potential 
witnesses or participants in the unlawful entry or other 
illegal activities, (6) endeavoring to misuse the Central 
Intelligence Agency, (7) disseminating information received 
from the Department of Justice to subjects of investigations, 
(8) making false or misleading public statements for the 
purpose of deceiving the people of the United States into 
believing that a thorough investigation of ``Watergate'' had 
taken place, and (9) endeavoring to cause prospective 
defendants and persons convicted to expect favored treatment or 
rewards in return for silence or false testimony. Impeachment 
of Richard M. Nixon at 2-3.
    Article III against President Clinton states that ``[t]he 
means used to implement this course of conduct or scheme 
included one or more of '' seven acts. The first alleged act by 
President Clinton, ``corruptly encourag[ing] a witness in a 
Federal civil rights action brought against him to execute a 
sworn affidavit in that proceeding that he knew to be 
perjurious, false and misleading'', and the second alleged act, 
``corruptly encourag[ing] a witness in a Federal civil rights 
action brought against him to give perjurious, false and 
misleading testimony[,]'' are clearly analogous to the third 
alleged act of President Nixon. The fourth alleged act by 
President Clinton was his that he ``intensified and succeeded 
in an effort to secure job assistance to a witness in a Federal 
civil rights action brought against him in order to corruptly 
prevent the truthful testimony of that witness . . . .'' This 
is clearly analogous to the fifth alleged act of President 
Nixon.

b. Federal Obstruction of Justice Statutes

    There are two federal obstruction of justice statutes. The 
first, section 1503 of title 18 of the United States Code, 
states, in relevant part, that ``[w]hoever . . . corruptly, or 
by threats or force . . . influences, obstructs, or impedes, or 
endeavors to influence, obstruct, or impede, the due 
administration of justice, shall be punished . . . .'' 18 
U.S.C. Sec. 1503(a)(1994 & Supp. 1997). The proscribed actions 
must relate to a pending judicial process. See, e.g., United 
States v. Walasek, 527 F.2d 676, 678 (3rd Cir. 1975). The 
pending judicial process can be a civil action. See, e.g., Falk 
v. United States, 370 F.2d 472, 476 (9th Cir. 1967), cert. 
denied 387 U.S. 926 (1967).
    The Fifth Circuit has stated that:

          Whatever can be accomplished through intimidating or 
        influencing a witness, juror, or court official is 
        labeled by section 1503 as an obstruction of justice, 
        for the reason that each of these actors has certain 
        duties imposed by law, and the interference with his 
        performance of these duties necessarily disrupts the 
        processes of the criminal justice system.

United States v. Howard, 569 F.2d 1331, 1333-34 (5th Cir. 
1978)(footnote omitted), cert. denied 439 U.S. 834 (1978). Even 
soliciting a merely prospective witness may provide the basis 
for a conviction. See United States v. Friedland, 660 F.2d 919, 
931 (3rd Cir. 1981), cert. denied 456 U.S. 989 (1982); Falk v. 
United States, 370 F.2d at 476.
    The second statute, section 1512 of title 18 of the United 
States Code, states, in relevant part, that:

          Whoever . . . corruptly persuades another person, or 
        attempts to do so, or engages in misleading conduct 
        toward another person, with intent to . . . influence, 
        delay, or prevent the testimony of any person in an 
        official proceeding . . . [or] cause or induce any 
        person to . . . withhold testimony, or withhold a 
        record, document, or other object from an official 
        proceeding . . . shall be [punished].

18 U.S.C. Sec. Sec. 1512(b)(1)-(2)(1994 & Supp. 1996). Either 
of the two statutes can be used in the case of witness 
tampering. See, e.g., United States v. Maloney, 71 F.3d 645, 
659 (7th Cir. 1995), cert. denied 117 S.Ct. 295 (1996); United 
States v. Tackett, 113 F.3d 603, 611 (6th Cir. 1997), cert. 
denied 118 S.Ct. 879 (1998).
    The first alleged act by President Clinton, ``corruptly 
encourag[ing] a witness in a Federal civil rights action 
brought against him to execute a sworn affidavit in that 
proceeding that he knew to be perjurious, false and 
misleading'', and the second alleged act, ``corruptly 
encourag[ing] a witness in a Federal civil rights action 
brought against him to give perjurious, false and misleading 
testimony[,]'' clearly violate both statutes. The third alleged 
act, ``corruptly engag[ing] in, encourag[ing] or [supporting] a 
scheme to conceal evidence that had been subpoenaed in a 
Federal civil rights action brought against him[,]'' clearly 
violates the second statute. The fourth alleged act, that 
President Clinton ``intensified and succeeded in an effort to 
secure job assistance to a witness in a Federal civil rights 
action brought against him in order to corruptly prevent the 
truthful testimony of that witness[,]'' clearly violates both 
statutes. The sixth alleged act, ``relat[ing] a false and 
misleading account of events relevant to a Federal civil rights 
action brought against him to a potential witness in that 
proceeding, in order to corruptly influence the testimony of 
that witness[,]'' and the seventh alleged act, ``ma[king] false 
and misleading statements to potential witnesses in a Federal 
grand jury proceeding in order to corruptly influence the 
testimony of those witnesses[,]'' clearly violate both 
statutes. ``The most obvious example of a Sec. 1512 violation 
may be the situation where a defendant tells a potential 
witness a false story as if the story were true, intending that 
the witness believe the story and testify to it before the 
grand jury.'' United States v. Rodolitz, 786 F.2d 77, 82 (2d 
Cir. 1986), cert. denied 479 U.S. 826 (1986).

4. Article IV--Abuse of Power

    Article IV charges President Clinton with ``refus[ing] and 
fail[ing] to respond to certain written requests for admission 
and willfully ma[king] perjurious, false and misleading sworn 
statements in response to certain written requests for 
admission . . . .'' In doing such, the President ``assumed to 
himself functions and judgments necessary to the exercise of 
the sole power of impeachment invested by the Constitution in 
the House of Representatives''--the Constitution provides that 
``the House of Representatives . . . shall have the sole Power 
of Impeachment'' U.S. Const. art. I, Sec. 2, cl. 5--and thus 
warrants impeachment. Chairman Hyde made the written request 
for 81 admissions by letter dated November 5, 1998. The gravity 
of the request was made clear by the facts that the answers 
were to be under oath, Letter from Henry J. Hyde to U.S. 
President William J. Clinton (Nov. 5, 1998), and that if a 
response was not provided by President Clinton, the Judiciary 
Committee would have subpoenaed it. Chairman Hyde sent a letter 
to the President stating that ``[i]f the Committee is not 
provided complete and specific answers to [the 81 questions] by 
Monday, November 30, I have no course but to urge the full 
Committee to subpoena those answers.'' Letter from Henry J. 
Hyde to U.S. President William J. Clinton 2 (Nov. 25, 1998).
    Far from representing novel grounds for impeachment, 
Article IV finds clear precedent in the third article of 
impeachment that the Judiciary Committee approved in the case 
of President Richard Nixon. That article found that President 
Nixon had committed impeachable offenses by failing to 
``produce papers and things as directed by duly authorized 
subpoenas issued by the Committee on the Judiciary'' and 
``willfully disobey[ing] such subpoenas.'' The items subpoenaed 
were needed to ``resolve . . . fundamental, factual questions 
relating to Presidential direction, knowledge or approval of 
actions demonstrated by other evidence to be substantial 
grounds for impeachment of the President.'' The Article found 
that the President:

          In refusing to produce these papers and things . . . 
        substitut[ed] his judgment as to what materials were 
        necessary for the inquiry, interposed the powers of the 
        presidency against the lawful subpoenas of the House of 
        Representatives, thereby assuming to himself functions 
        and judgments necessary to the exercise of the sole 
        power of impeachment vested by the Constitution in the 
        House of Representatives[, and thus warrants 
        impeachment].

Impeachment of Richard M. Nixon at 188.
    The Committee found that by not providing the subpoenaed 
information, President Nixon ``interfer[ed] with the discharge 
of the Committee's responsibility to investigate fully and 
completely whether sufficient grounds exist[ed] to impeach 
him.'' Id. at 189. In addition, his ``defiance of the Committee 
forced it to deliberate and make judgments on a record that . . 
. was `incomplete'.'' Id. at 190. The President ``is obligated 
to supply . . . relevant evidence necessary for Congress to 
exercise its constitutional responsibility in an impeachment 
proceeding.'' Id. at 213. Finally, as Chairman Rodino stated in 
a letter to President Nixon:

          Under the Constitution it is not within the power of 
        the President to conduct an inquiry into his own 
        impeachment, to determine which evidence, and what 
        version or portion of that evidence, is relevant and 
        necessary to such an inquiry. These are matters which, 
        under the Constitution, the House has the sole power to 
        determine.

Id. at 194, quoting letter from Chairman Rodino to President 
Richard M. Nixon (May 30, 1974).
    By refusing and failing to respond to some of the Judiciary 
Committee's requests for admissions, and by answering others in 
a perjurious, false and misleading fashion, President Clinton 
committed acts and omissions of the same nature as those 
committed by President Nixon. The 81 requests for admissions 
went to facts at the heart of the conduct which form the basis 
of the Committee's impeachment investigation. That full and 
truthful responses were crucial to the investigation was made 
clear by the fact that responses were made under oath and, had 
they not been forthcoming, would have been compelled by 
subpoena. The information requested was clearly as important to 
the Committee's investigation in 1998 as were the items sought 
to be subpoenaed by the Committee in 1974.
    Where President Clinton failed to respond, he, just as 
President Nixon, took it upon himself, as Chairman Rodino had 
stated, to ``determine which evidence, and what version or 
portion of that evidence, is relevant and necessary to such an 
inquiry.'' President Clinton assumed to himself functions and 
judgments necessary to the exercise of the sole power of 
impeachment vested by the Constitution in the House of 
Representatives and thereby committed impeachable offenses.
    President Clinton did no less when he provided the 
Committee with perjurious, false and misleading responses to 
other requests for admissions. It is ludicrous to suppose that 
it is impeachable to fail to provide certain requested 
information, yet at the same time not impeachable to provide 
false information. For it is probable that President Clinton 
caused more harm to the Committee's investigation by providing 
false responses than he would have by providing no responses at 
all. Just as with President Nixon, he showed contempt for the 
legislative branch and impeded Congress's exercise of its 
Constitutional responsibility, thus justifying impeachment.

         V. COMMITTEE CONSIDERATION OF IMPEACHMENT PROCEEDINGS

    On January 16, 1998, in response to Attorney General Janet 
Reno's request, the Special Division of the United States Court 
of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, expanded the 
jurisdiction of Independent Counsel Kenneth W. Starr. The 
Special Division's order provides in pertinent part:

          The Independent Counsel shall have jurisdiction and 
        authority to investigate to the maximum extent 
        authorized by the Independent Counsel Reauthorization 
        Act of 1994 whether Monica Lewinsky or others suborned 
        perjury, obstructed justice, intimidated witnesses, or 
        otherwise violated federal law other than a Class B or 
        C misdemeanor or infraction in dealing with witnesses, 
        potential witnesses, attorneys, or others concerning 
        the civil case Jones v. Clinton.

In re: Madison Guaranty Savings and Loan Association, Order of 
the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia 
Circuit, Division for the Purpose of Appointing Independent 
Counsels, January 16, 1998 (reprinted in H.R. Doc. 105-311, 
Part I, at 6-7).
    On September 9, 1998, Independent Counsel Starr notified 
Speaker Gingrich and Minority Leader Gephardt that his office 
``delivered to the Sergeant at Arms, the Honorable Wilson 
Livingood, 36 sealed boxes containing two complete copies of a 
Referral to the House of Representatives.'' Letter from 
Independent Counsel Kenneth W. Starr to The Honorable Newt 
Gingrich and the Honorable Richard A. Gephardt, September 9, 
1998. The Referral included a narrative, appendices, and 
supporting documents and evidence (including grand jury 
transcripts) which supported the Office of Independent 
Counsel's findings regarding the Lewinsky matter.
    Independent Counsel Starr forwarded this information 
pursuant to the Independent Counsel Reauthorization Act, 28 
U.S.C. Sec. 591 et. seq., which provides:

          Information relating to impeachment.--An independent 
        counsel shall advise the House of Representatives of 
        any substantial and credible information which such 
        independent counsel receives, in carrying out the 
        independent counsel's responsibilities under this 
        chapter, that may constitute grounds for an 
        impeachment. Nothing in this chapter or section 49 of 
        this title [concerning the assignment of judges to the 
        Special Division that appoints an independent counsel] 
        shall prevent the Congress or either House thereof from 
        obtaining information in the course of an impeachment 
        proceeding.

28 U.S.C. Sec. 595(c) (1994). After the Sergeant at Arms 
received the materials, they were stored in a secure facility 
in the Ford Building. The room, which is equipped with security 
technology, is guarded by the U.S. Capitol police around the 
clock.
    Soon after the delivery of the materials from Independent 
Counsel Starr, a bipartisan meeting of the House leadership was 
held in the Speaker's office to decide the manner in which the 
material would be handled. The meeting included Speaker 
Gingrich, Majority Leader Armey, Minority Leader Gephardt, 
Rules Committee Chairman Solomon, Rules Committee Democratic 
Member Frost, Judiciary Committee Chairman Hyde, and Judiciary 
Committee Ranking Minority Member Conyers. The meeting took 
place at 5:00 p.m. in room H-230 in the Capitol. The main issue 
resolved at that meeting was the manner in which the material 
would be released to the public.
    Chairman Hyde's original proposal did not include a 
provision for the immediate release of documents to the public. 
Instead, his plan included referring the communication from 
Independent Counsel Starr to the Judiciary Committee so that 
the Committee could review the material to determine whether 
sufficient grounds existed to recommend to the House that an 
impeachment inquiry be commenced. The material would have been 
deemed received in executive session and access to the material 
would have been restricted to the Members of the Committee on 
the Judiciary. Chairman Hyde's draft resolution also contained 
investigative authorities, such as staff deposition authority, 
which would have enabled the Committee begin conducting an 
investigation. Chairman Hyde's proposal, particularly the 
provisions regarding the secrecy of the material and the 
investigative authorities, were rejected.
    Although many Democrats and pundits have criticized the 
House of Representatives and the Committee for releasing the 
pertinent parts of Independent Counsel's Starr's referral, few 
know that a chief proponent of immediately releasing the 
information was Minority Leader Gephardt. Rep. Gephardt favored 
release because of his concern about leaks coming from the 
Committee. He argued that it would be futile to hold material 
back as there would be selective leaking, which would prejudice 
the President's case. Therefore, he stated that there was a 
general need to release all the material in the referral--
including the appendices and supporting evidence--to the public 
as soon as possible. In fact, he insisted that all of the 
information be made public. He expressed his sense that many 
Members of Congress, who did not serve on the Committee, would 
demand access to the supporting appendices, and it would be 
unwise for the Committee to restrict the access to those 
materials to Judiciary Committee Members only. Minority Leader 
Gephardt also requested that the President be allowed to obtain 
a copy of the narrative 24 hours before its public release, but 
did not insist on his request which he abandoned quickly.
    Rep. Conyers argued against the release of the materials as 
did his chief investigative counsel. They were concerned about 
the sensitivity of the material, particularly grand jury 
material, and requested that the Committee be given an 
opportunity to thoroughly review the material. In fact, Rep. 
Conyers' position regarding public access to the material was 
similar to Chairman Hyde's original position. At one point 
during the meeting, Rep. Conyers and Minority Leader Gephardt 
argued about the advisability of releasing the material to the 
public for several minutes. Minority Leader Gephardt's position 
eventually prevailed with one modification. Instead of 
releasing all of the material immediately, the House authorized 
the release of the narrative and then gave the Committee about 
two and a half weeks to review and release the remaining 
material by September 28, 1998. Speaker Gingrich, Minority 
Leader Gephardt, and Rules Committee Chairman Solomon made it 
clear toward the end of the meeting that the presumption was 
that the Committee would release all of the relevant material 
and should only redact personal, degrading, irrelevant, or 
other sensitive information.
    On September 10, 1998, the Committee on Rules received 
testimony regarding the handling of the Referral. Hearing 
before the Committee on Rules on H. Res. 525, 105th Cong., 2nd 
Sess. (September 10, 1998). After the hearing, the Committee 
considered H. Res. 525, which provided for a deliberative 
review by the Committee on the Judiciary of a communication 
from an independent counsel, and for the release thereof. Id. 
The full House of Representatives approved H. Res. 525 on 
September 11, 1998, by a vote of 363-63. 144 Cong. Rec. H7587-
H7608 (daily ed. September 11, 1998). As a result of the 
passage of H. Res. 525, the narrative was ordered printed as a 
House document. Referral from Independent Counsel Kenneth W. 
Starr in Conformity with the Requirements of Title 28, United 
States Code, Section 595(c), H.R. Doc. 105-310, 105th Cong., 
2nd Sess, 129-130 (1998).
    In addition to ordering the public release of the 
narrative, section two of H. Res. 525 directed that the 
``balance of [the] material . . . shall be released from 
[executive session status] on September 28, 1998, except as 
otherwise determined by the committee. Material so released 
shall immediately be submitted for printing as a document of 
the House.'' Pursuant to this directive, the Committee staff 
reviewed over 60,000 documents in less than three weeks. The 
task was daunting and required a great deal of staff resources 
to complete the job within the allotted time frame. After the 
staff and Members reviewed the material, the Committee met in 
executive session on September 17, 18, and 25 to consider the 
staff's recommendations regarding the release of materials and 
proposed redactions to those materials which were made to 
protect privacy, remove vulgarities, and protect sensitive law 
enforcement information, such as the names of FBI agents. See 
Votes of the Committee in Executive Session Pursuant to H. Res. 
525, Committee on the Judiciary, House of Representatives, 
Committee Print, Ser. No. 7, 105th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1998). On 
September 18 and pursuant to H. Res. 525, redacted appendices 
to the Referral were ordered printed as a House document, 
(Appendices to the Referral to the United States House of 
Representatives Pursuant to Title 28, United States Code, 
Section 595(c) Submitted by the Office of the Independent 
Counsel, September 9, 1998, H.R. Doc. 105-311, 105th Cong., 2nd 
Sess. (September 18, 1998)), and redacted supplemental 
materials to the referral were released on September 28. 
Supplemental Materials to the Referral to the United States 
House of Representatives Pursuant to Title 28, United States 
Code, Section 595(c) Submitted by the Office of the Independent 
Counsel, September 9, 1998, H.R. Doc. 105-316, 105th Cong., 2nd 
Sess. (September 28, 1998). Also, on September 28, the 
President's responses to the Referral, which were received by 
the Committee in executive session, were ordered printed as a 
House document. Preliminary Memorandum of the President of the 
United States Concerning Referral of the Office of the 
Independent Counsel and Initial Response of the President of 
the United States to Referral of the Office of the Independent 
Counsel, H.R. Doc. 105-317, 105th Cong., 2nd Sess. (September 
28, 1998).
    Pursuant to H. Res. 525, the Committee was also obligated 
to ``determine whether sufficient grounds exist to recommend to 
the House that an impeachment inquiry be commenced.'' In order 
to fulfill that important obligation, the Chairman and Ranking 
Minority Member directed the majority and minority chief 
investigative counsels to advise the Committee regarding the 
information referred by the Independent Counsel. The Committee 
received their orally delivered reports on October 5, 1998. The 
Committee's Chief Investigative Counsel advised that there was 
enough information to warrant a full inquiry, while the 
minority's chief investigative counsel advised against 
conducting a full inquiry. Following those presentations, the 
Committee approved a resolution, H. Res. 581, which recommended 
that the full House of Representatives authorize the Committee 
to conduct an impeachment inquiry. Also, on that day the 
Committee considered and approved by voice vote impeachment 
inquiry procedures which were modeled after the procedures used 
in 1974. Authorization of an Inquiry Into Whether Grounds Exist 
for the Impeachment of William Jefferson Clinton, President of 
the United States; Meeting of the House Comm. on the Judiciary 
Held October 5, 1998; Presentation by Inquiry Staff 
Consideration of Inquiry Resolution Adoption of Inquiry 
Procedures, Committee Print, Ser. No. 8, 105th Cong., 2nd Sess. 
(December 1998). On October 7, the Committee filed its report 
on H. Res. 581 in the House. Investigatory Powers of the 
Committee on the Judiciary with Respect to its Impeachment 
Inquiry, H.R. Rept. 105-795, 105th Cong., 2nd Sess. (October 7, 
1998). On October 8, by a vote of 258 to 176, the House passed 
H. Res. 581, which ``authorized and directed [the Committee on 
the Judiciary] to investigate fully and completely whether 
sufficient grounds exist for the House of Representatives to 
exercise its constitutional power to impeach William Jefferson 
Clinton, President of the United States of America.'' 144 Cong. 
Rec. H10119 (daily ed. October 8, 1998).
    After the passage of H. Res. 581, Committee staff were 
directed to investigate fully the allegations and evidence 
relating to the Referral. Furthermore, the staff met with 
representatives of the White House to discuss ways in which the 
inquiry could proceed expeditiously. At an October 21, 1998 
meeting, Charles F.C. Ruff, counsel to the President, and his 
colleagues, were asked to provide exculpatory information to 
the Committee. They did not supply any information. Also, the 
White House was provided copies of the Committee's procedures 
which, inter alia, allowed the President's counsel to call 
witnesses. They did not exercise this right until the Committee 
was preparing to vote on articles of impeachment.
    In order to move the process forward, the Committee sent 
the President 81 requests for admission which were to be 
answered in writing under oath. Letter from The Honorable Henry 
J. Hyde to The Honorable William Jefferson Clinton, November 5, 
1998. Notwithstanding repeated requests, the White House did 
not submit its answers until after three weeks passed. Letter 
from Mr. David Kendall, Esq. to The Honorable Henry J. Hyde, 
November 27, 1998. Many on the Committee felt that the 
President's answers were evasive, misleading, and perjurious. 
His answers became the basis for the fourth article of 
impeachment.
    On October 9, 1998, the Subcommittee on the Constitution 
held a hearing in which 19 legal and constitutional experts 
testified on the background and history of impeachment. The 
Background and History of Impeachment: Hearing before the 
Subcomm. On the Constitution, Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th 
Cong., 2nd Sess. (November 9, 1998). The purpose of the hearing 
was to hear from a diverse group of scholars regarding the 
constitutional standard of impeachment--``high crimes and 
misdemeanors.'' The Committee also published two lengthy 
documents to assist Members with their research into 
impeachment. See Constitutional Grounds for Presidential 
Impeachment: Modern Precedents, House Comm. on the Judiciary, 
Comm. Print, Ser. No. 9, 105th Cong., 2nd Sess. (November 
1998); Impeachment: Selected Materials, House Comm. on the 
Judiciary, Comm. Print, Ser. No. 10, 105th Cong., 2nd Sess. 
(November 1998).
    On October 19, 1998, the Committee heard testimony from 
Independent Counsel Starr. Hearings on Impeachment Inquiry 
Pursuant to H. Res. 581: Hearing before the Comm. On the 
Judiciary, 105th Cong., 2nd Sess. (November 1, 1998). Judge 
Starr was invited after many Democrats requested that he be 
called before the Committee. David Kendall, the President's 
private attorney, questioned Judge Starr for an hour. In all of 
his questioning, Mr. Kendall never once asked any questions 
relating to the evidence collected during the grand jury's 
investigation. On December 1, the Committee adduced testimony 
from various witnesses regarding the law of perjury. The 
Consequences of Perjury and Related Crimes: Hearing before the 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong., 2nd Sess. (December 1, 
1998). Two of the witnesses were women who were prosecuted for 
perjury arising out of civil cases which had many similarities 
to the Jones v. Clinton case. After several months of 
requesting the White House to submit witnesses, the White House 
notified the Committee on Friday, December 4, that they wished 
to call witnesses. This was after the Chairman had already 
announced that the Committee would consider articles of 
impeachment the following week. The Committee accommodated the 
White House's request, and held two days of hearings, including 
receiving testimony from White House Counsel Charles F.C. Ruff. 
Hearings on Impeachment Inquiry Pursuant to H. Res. 581: 
Hearing before the Comm. On the Judiciary, 105th Cong., 2nd 
Sess. (December 9, 1998). The Committee ordered printed Mr. 
Ruff's submission to the Committee. Submission by Counsel for 
President Clinton to the Committee on the Judiciary of the 
United States House of Representatives, House Comm. on the 
Judiciary, Comm. Print, Ser. No. 16, 105th Cong., 2nd Sess. 
(December 1998).
    Finally, on December 10, 11, and 12, 1998, the Committee 
considered and passed four articles of impeachment. The 
procedure used to consider the articles of impeachment were 
similar to and predicated upon the procedures used in 1974. 
Prior to the consideration of the articles, Rep. Sensenbrenner 
moved the resolution's favorable recommendation to the House. 
After the clerk of the Committee reported the resolution, the 
Committee approved Chairman Hyde's unanimous consent request 
that provided in pertinent part that ``. . . the proposed 
articles shall be considered as read and open for amendment. 
Each proposed article and any additional article, if any, shall 
be separately voted upon, as amended, for the recommendation to 
the House, if any article has been agreed to, the original 
motion shall be considered as adopted and the Chairman shall 
report to the House said resolution of impeachment, together 
with such articles as have been agreed to.'' See House 
Committee on the Judiciary Business Meeting, at 3-6, December 
10, 1998 (unofficial transcript). Four articles of impeachment 
were eventually adopted and ordered reported to the House.

                       A. VOTES OF THE COMMITTEE

    Pursuant to clause 2(l)(2)(B) of House rule XI, the results 
of each rollcall vote on an amendment or motion to report, 
together with the names of those voting for and against, are 
printed herein. The following roll call votes occurred during 
Committee deliberations on a resolution exhibiting articles of 
impeachment. Also included is a rollcall vote on a joint 
resolution sponsored by Rep. Boucher censuring President 
Clinton. Chairman Hyde allowed a vote on this joint resolution 
even though it was not germane to the articles of impeachment.

1. Rollcall No. 1--Amendment to Article I Offered by Rep. Rogan

    An amendment was offered by Mr. Rogan to Article I of the 
Hyde resolution which inserted the words, ``one or more of the 
following''. This language was inserted so that the statements 
that comprise the perjurious, false and misleading statements 
in the August 17, 1998 grand jury testimony of President 
William Jefferson Clinton did not have to include all the 
circumstances itemized in the paragraphs of Article I, but 
could relate to one or more of the following circumstances: 
statements related to the nature and details of his 
relationship with a subordinate government employee; prior 
perjurious, false and misleading testimony given in a federal 
civil rights action brought against him; prior false and 
misleading statements he allowed his attorney to make to a 
federal judge in that civil rights action; and his corrupt 
efforts to influence the testimony of witnesses and to impede 
the discovery of evidence. The amendment was adopted by a vote 
of 21 ayes to 16 nays.

                             ROLLCALL NO. 1

    Subject: Amendment of Mr. Rogan to the Resolution 
Impeaching William Jefferson Clinton, President of the United 
States, for high crimes and misdemeanors. Article I, page 2, 
line 17, insert after ``concerning'' the following: ``one or 
more of the following''. Passed by a vote of 21 ayes to 16 
noes.

------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                Ayes     Nays    Present
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Mr. Sensenbrenner...........................        X  .......  ........
Mr. McCollum................................        X  .......  ........
Mr. Gekas...................................        X  .......  ........
Mr. Coble...................................        X  .......  ........
Mr. Smith...................................        X  .......  ........
Mr. Gallegly................................        X  .......  ........
Mr. Canady..................................        X  .......  ........
Mr. Inglis..................................        X  .......  ........
Mr. Goodlatte...............................        X  .......  ........
Mr. Buyer...................................        X  .......  ........
Mr. Bryant..................................        X  .......  ........
Mr. Chabot..................................        X  .......  ........
Mr. Barr....................................        X  .......  ........
Mr. Jenkins.................................        X  .......  ........
Mr. Hutchinson..............................        X  .......  ........
Mr. Pease...................................        X  .......  ........
Mr. Cannon..................................        X  .......  ........
Mr. Rogan...................................        X  .......  ........
Mr. Graham..................................        X  .......  ........
Ms. Bono....................................        X  .......  ........
Mr. Conyers.................................  .......        X  ........
Mr. Frank...................................  .......        X  ........
Mr. Schumer.................................  .......        X  ........
Mr. Berman..................................  .......        X  ........
Mr. Boucher.................................  .......        X  ........
Mr. Nadler..................................  .......        X  ........
Mr. Scott...................................  .......        X  ........
Mr. Watt....................................  .......        X  ........
Mr. Lofgren.................................  .......        X  ........
Ms. Jackson-Lee.............................  .......        X  ........
Ms. Waters..................................  .......        X  ........
Mr. Meehan..................................  .......        X  ........
Mr. Delahunt................................  .......        X  ........
Mr. Wexler..................................  .......        X  ........
Mr. Rothman.................................  .......        X  ........
Mr. Barrett (WI)............................  .......        X  ........
Mr. Hyde, Chairman..........................        X  .......  ........
                                             ---------------------------
      Total.................................       21       16  ........
------------------------------------------------------------------------

2. Rollcall No. 2--Article I

    Article I states that President William Jefferson Clinton 
provided perjurious, false and misleading testimony to the 
federal grand jury regarding one or more of the following: (1) 
the nature of his relationship with Monica Lewinsky; (2) prior 
perjurious, false, and misleading testimony he gave in the 
Paula Jones civil rights case; (3) prior false and misleading 
statements he allowed his attorney, Bob Bennett, to make in the 
Paula Jones case; and (4) his efforts to influence the 
testimony of witnesses and to impede the discovery of evidence 
in the Paula Jones case. Article I was agreed to, as amended, 
by a vote of 21 ayes to 16 noes.

                             ROLLCALL NO. 2

    Subject: Article I of the Resolution Impeaching William 
Jefferson Clinton, President of the United States, for high 
crimes and misdemeanors. Article I passed, as amended, by a 
vote of 21 ayes to 16 noes.

------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                             Ayes      Nays     Present
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Mr. Sensenbrenner........................        X   ........  .........
Mr. McCollum.............................        X   ........  .........
Mr. Gekas................................        X   ........  .........
Mr. Coble................................        X   ........  .........
Mr. Smith................................        X   ........  .........
Mr. Gallegly.............................        X   ........  .........
Mr. Canady...............................        X   ........  .........
Mr. Inglis...............................        X   ........  .........
Mr. Goodlatte............................        X   ........  .........
Mr. Buyer................................        X   ........  .........
Mr. Bryant...............................        X   ........  .........
Mr. Chabot...............................        X   ........  .........
Mr. Barr.................................        X   ........  .........
Mr. Jenkins..............................        X   ........  .........
Mr. Hutchinson...........................        X   ........  .........
Mr. Pease................................        X   ........  .........
Mr. Cannon...............................        X   ........  .........
Mr. Rogan................................        X   ........  .........
Mr. Graham...............................        X   ........  .........
Ms. Bono.................................        X   ........  .........
Mr. Conyers..............................  ........        X   .........
Mr. Frank................................  ........        X   .........
Mr. Schumer..............................  ........        X   .........
Mr. Berman...............................  ........        X   .........
Mr. Boucher..............................  ........        X   .........
Mr. Nadler...............................  ........        X   .........
Mr. Scott................................  ........        X   .........
Mr. Watt.................................  ........        X   .........
Mr. Lofgren..............................  ........        X   .........
Ms. Jackson-Lee..........................  ........        X   .........
Ms. Waters...............................  ........        X   .........
Mr. Meehan...............................  ........        X   .........
Mr. Delahunt.............................  ........        X   .........
Mr. Wexler...............................  ........        X   .........
Mr. Rothman..............................  ........        X   .........
Mr. Barrett (WI).........................  ........        X   .........
Mr. Hyde, Chairman.......................        X   ........  .........
                                          ------------------------------
      Total..............................       21        16   .........
------------------------------------------------------------------------

3. Rollcall No. 3--Article II

    Article II states that President William Jefferson Clinton 
provided perjurious, false and misleading testimony as part of 
the Paula Jones civil rights action brought against him: (1) in 
his sworn answers to written questions; and (2) in his January 
17, 1998 deposition. Article II was agreed to by a vote of 20 
ayes to 17 noes.

                             ROLLCALL NO. 3

    Subject: Article II of the Resolution Impeaching William 
Jefferson Clinton, President of the United States, for high 
crimes and misdemeanors. Article II passed by a vote of 20 ayes 
to 17 noes.

------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                             Ayes      Nays     Present
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Mr. Sensenbrenner........................        X   ........  .........
Mr. McCollum.............................        X   ........  .........
Mr. Gekas................................        X   ........  .........
Mr. Coble................................        X   ........  .........
Mr. Smith................................        X   ........  .........
Mr. Gallegly.............................        X   ........  .........
Mr. Canady...............................        X   ........  .........
Mr. Inglis...............................        X   ........  .........
Mr. Goodlatte............................        X   ........  .........
Mr. Buyer................................        X   ........  .........
Mr. Bryant...............................        X   ........  .........
Mr. Chabot...............................        X   ........  .........
Mr. Barr.................................        X   ........  .........
Mr. Jenkins..............................        X   ........  .........
Mr. Hutchinson...........................        X   ........  .........
Mr. Pease................................        X   ........  .........
Mr. Cannon...............................        X   ........  .........
Mr. Rogan................................        X   ........  .........
Mr. Graham...............................  ........        X   .........
Ms. Bono.................................        X   ........  .........
Mr. Conyers..............................  ........        X   .........
Mr. Frank................................  ........        X   .........
Mr. Schumer..............................  ........        X   .........
Mr. Berman...............................  ........        X   .........
Mr. Boucher..............................  ........        X   .........
Mr. Nadler...............................  ........        X   .........
Mr. Scott................................  ........        X   .........
Mr. Watt.................................  ........        X   .........
Mr. Lofgren..............................  ........        X   .........
Ms. Jackson-Lee..........................  ........        X   .........
Ms. Waters...............................  ........        X   .........
Mr. Meehan...............................  ........        X   .........
Mr. Delahunt.............................  ........        X   .........
Mr. Wexler...............................  ........        X   .........
Mr. Rothman..............................  ........        X   .........
Mr. Barrett (WI).........................  ........        X   .........
Mr. Hyde, Chairman.......................        X   ........  .........
                                          ------------------------------
      Total..............................       20   ........        17
------------------------------------------------------------------------

4. Rollcall No. 4--Article III

    Article III provides that President William Jefferson 
Clinton obstructed justice in an effort to delay, impede, cover 
up, and conceal the existence of evidence related to the Paula 
Jones civil rights case in the following instances: (1) On or 
about December 17, 1998, President Clinton encouraged Monica 
Lewinsky to submit a false written statement (affidavit) to the 
court; (2) On or about December 17, 1998, President Clinton 
encouraged Monica Lewinsky to give false testimony to the 
court; (3) On or about December 28, 1998, President Clinton 
helped in a plan to hide the gifts Monica Lewinsky gave him; 
(4) Beginning on or about December 7, 1998, and continuing 
through and including January 14, 1998, President Clinton 
intensified efforts and succeeded in getting Monica Lewinsky a 
job to prevent her truthful testimony; (5) On or about January 
17, 1998, in his deposition in the Paula Jones civil rights 
case, President Clinton allowed his attorney, Bob Bennett, to 
make false and misleading statements about Monica Lewinsky's 
affidavit; (6) On or about January 18, and January 20-21, 1998, 
President Clinton made false and misleading statements to Betty 
Currie, a potential witness, to influence her testimony in the 
Paula Jones civil case; (7) On or about January 21, 23, and 26, 
1998, President Clinton made false and misleading statements to 
Erskine Bowles, Bruce Lindsey and Sidney Blumenthal, potential 
witnesses in the criminal case, to influence their testimony. 
Article III was agreed to by a vote of 21 ayes to 16 noes.

                             ROLLCALL NO. 4

    Subject: Article III of the Resolution Impeaching William 
Jefferson Clinton, President of the United States, for high 
crimes and misdemeanors. Article III passed by a vote of 21 
ayes to 16 noes.

------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                             Ayes      Nays     Present
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Mr. Sensenbrenner........................        X   ........  .........
Mr. McCollum.............................        X   ........  .........
Mr. Gekas................................        X   ........  .........
Mr. Coble................................        X   ........  .........
Mr. Smith................................        X   ........  .........
Mr. Gallegly.............................        X   ........  .........
Mr. Canady...............................        X   ........  .........
Mr. Inglis...............................        X   ........  .........
Mr. Goodlatte............................        X   ........  .........
Mr. Buyer................................        X   ........  .........
Mr. Bryant...............................        X   ........  .........
Mr. Chabot...............................        X   ........  .........
Mr. Barr.................................        X   ........  .........
Mr. Jenkins..............................        X   ........  .........
Mr. Hutchinson...........................        X   ........  .........
Mr. Pease................................        X   ........  .........
Mr. Cannon...............................        X   ........  .........
Mr. Rogan................................        X   ........  .........
Mr. Graham...............................        X   ........  .........
Ms. Bono.................................        X   ........  .........
Mr. Conyers..............................  ........        X   .........
Mr. Frank................................  ........        X   .........
Mr. Schumer..............................  ........        X   .........
Mr. Berman...............................  ........        X   .........
Mr. Boucher..............................  ........        X   .........
Mr. Nadler...............................  ........        X   .........
Mr. Scott................................  ........        X   .........
Mr. Watt.................................  ........        X   .........
Mr. Lofgren..............................  ........        X   .........
Ms. Jackson-Lee..........................  ........        X   .........
Ms. Waters...............................  ........        X   .........
Mr. Meehan...............................  ........        X   .........
Mr. Delahunt.............................  ........        X   .........
Mr. Wexler...............................  ........        X   .........
Mr. Rothman..............................  ........        X   .........
Mr. Barrett (WI).........................  ........        X   .........
Mr. Hyde, Chairman.......................        X   ........  .........
                                          ------------------------------
    Total................................       21        16
------------------------------------------------------------------------

5. Rollcall No. 5--Amendment to Article IV Offered by Rep. Gekas

    An amendment was offered by Mr. Gekas to Article IV of the 
Hyde resolution which struck the word ``repeatedly'' as a 
description of conduct that resulted in the misuse and abuse of 
the President's office to correspond with the deletion of 
Paragraphs 1, 2, and 3. Article IV had set forth several 
grounds to impeach President William Jefferson Clinton for 
misuse and abuse of the office of the President. Paragraph 1 of 
Article IV, which was deleted by the amendment, stated that 
President William Jefferson Clinton willfully made false and 
misleading public statements for the purpose of deceiving the 
people of the United States. Paragraph 2 of Article IV, which 
was deleted by the amendment, stated that President William 
Jefferson Clinton willfully made false and misleading 
statements to members of his cabinet and White House aides, so 
that these statements would be repeated publicly using public 
resources for the purpose of deceiving the people of the United 
States. Paragraph 3 of Article IV, which was deleted by the 
amendment, stated that as President, using the Office of the 
White House counsel, William Jefferson Clinton did frivolously 
and corruptly assert executive privilege for the purpose of 
delaying and obstructing a federal criminal investigation and 
the proceeding of the grand jury. The remaining Paragraph 4 of 
Article IV was rewritten by the amendment and provides that 
President William Jefferson Clinton made false and misleading 
sworn statements, refused and failed to respond to certain 
written requests for admissions asked of him by the House of 
Representatives of the Congress of the United States (answers 
to the 81 questions), showing contempt for the impeachment 
inquiry process. The amendment was adopted by a vote of 29 
ayes, 5 noes and 3 present.

                             ROLLCALL NO. 5

    Subject: Amendment by Mr. Gekas to the Resolution 
Impeaching William Jefferson Clinton, President of the United 
States, for high crimes and misdemeanors. Article IV. Strikes 
paragraphs regarding ``misuse and abuse of power'' with respect 
to false and misleading sworn statements for the purpose of 
deceiving the people of the United States, members of his 
cabinet, and in asserting the executive privilege and inserts a 
section regarding ``perjurious, false and misleading sworn 
statements'' made to the Congress. Passed by a vote of 29 ayes 
to 5 noes and 3 present.

------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                             Ayes      Nays     Present
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Mr. Sensenbrenner........................        X   ........  .........
Mr. McCollum.............................        X   ........  .........
Mr. Gekas................................        X   ........  .........
Mr. Coble................................        X   ........  .........
Mr. Smith................................        X   ........  .........
Mr. Gallegly.............................        X   ........  .........
Mr. Canady...............................        X   ........  .........
Mr. Inglis...............................        X   ........  .........
Mr. Goodlatte............................        X   ........  .........
Mr. Buyer................................        X   ........  .........
Mr. Bryant...............................        X   ........  .........
Mr. Chabot...............................        X   ........  .........
Mr. Barr.................................        X   ........  .........
Mr. Jenkins..............................        X   ........  .........
Mr. Hutchinson...........................        X   ........  .........
Mr. Pease................................        X   ........  .........
Mr. Cannon...............................  ........        X   .........
Mr. Rogan................................        X   ........  .........
Mr. Graham...............................        X   ........  .........
Ms Bono..................................        X   ........  .........
Ms. Conyers..............................        X   ........  .........
Mr. Frank................................  ........  ........         X
Mr. Schumer..............................        X   ........  .........
Mr. Berman...............................        X   ........  .........
Mr. Boucher..............................        X   ........  .........
Mr. Nadler...............................        X   ........  .........
Mr. Scott................................        X   ........  .........
Mr. Watt.................................        X   ........  .........
Ms. Lofgren..............................  ........  ........         X
Ms. Jackson-Lee..........................  ........        X   .........
Ms. Waters...............................  ........        X   .........
Mr. Meehan...............................  ........  ........         X
Mr. Delahunt.............................        X   ........  .........
Mr. Wexler...............................  ........        X   .........
Mr. Rothman..............................        X   ........  .........
Mr. Barrett (WI).........................  ........        X   .........
Mr. Hyde, Chairman.......................        X   ........  .........
                                          ------------------------------
      Total..............................       29         5          3
------------------------------------------------------------------------

6. Rollcall No. 6--Article IV

    Article IV provides that President William Jefferson 
Clinton willfully made perjurious, false and misleading sworn 
statements in response to certain written requests for 
admissions asked of him by the House of Representatives of the 
Congress of the United States, (answers to the 81 questions) 
showing contempt for the impeachment inquiry process. Article 
IV was adopted by a vote of 21 ayes to 16 noes.

                             ROLLCALL NO. 6

    Subject: Article IV of the Resolution Impeaching William 
Jefferson Clinton, President of the United States, for high 
crimes and misdemeanors. Article IV passed, as amended, by a 
vote 21 ayes to 16 noes.

------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                             Ayes      Nays     Present
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Mr. Ssnsenbrenner........................        X   ........  .........
Mr. McCollum.............................        X   ........  .........
Mr. Gekas................................        X   ........  .........
Mr. Coble................................        X   ........  .........
Mr. Smith................................        X   ........  .........
Mr. Gallegly.............................        X   ........  .........
Mr. Canady...............................        X   ........  .........
Mr. Inglis...............................        X   ........  .........
Mr. Goodlatte............................        X   ........  .........
Mr. Buyer................................        X   ........  .........
Mr. Bryant...............................        X   ........  .........
Mr. Chabot...............................        X   ........  .........
Mr. Barr.................................        X   ........  .........
Mr. Jenkins..............................        X   ........  .........
Mr. Hutchinson...........................        X   ........  .........
Mr. Pease................................        X   ........  .........
Mr. Cannon...............................        X   ........  .........
Mr. Rogan................................        X   ........  .........
Mr. Graham...............................        X   ........  .........
Mrs. Bono................................        X   ........  .........
Mr. Conyers..............................  ........        X   .........
Mr. Frank................................  ........        X   .........
Mr. Schumer..............................  ........        X   .........
Mr. Berman...............................  ........        X   .........
Mr. Boucher..............................  ........        X   .........
Mr. Nadler...............................  ........        X   .........
Mr. Scott................................  ........        X   .........
Mr. Watt.................................  ........        X   .........
Ms. Lofgren..............................  ........        X   .........
Ms. Jackson-Lee..........................  ........        X   .........
Ms. Waters...............................  ........        X   .........
Mr. Meehan...............................  ........        X   .........
Mr. Delahunt.............................  ........        X   .........
Mr. Wexler...............................  ........        X   .........
Mr. Rothman..............................  ........        X   .........
Mr. Barrett (WI).........................  ........        X   .........
Mr. Hyde, Chairman.......................        X   ........  .........
                                          ------------------------------
      Total..............................       21        16   .........
------------------------------------------------------------------------

7. Rollcall No. 7--Censure Resolution

    Although not germane to the consideration of a privileged 
impeachment resolution, Chairman Hyde and the Committee agreed 
to consider a joint resolution sponsored by Mr. Boucher that 
would express the sense of Congress with respect to the censure 
of President William Jefferson Clinton. The joint resolution of 
censure offered by Mr. Boucher was defeated by a vote 14 ayes, 
22 nays and 1 present. The text of the joint resolution 
follows:

                            Joint Resolution

    Expressing the sense of Congress with respect to the 
censure of William Jefferson Clinton. Resolved by the Senate 
and House of Representatives of the United States of America in 
Congress assembled, That it is the sense of Congress that--
    (1) on January 20, 1993, William Jefferson Clinton took the 
oath prescribed by the Constitution of the United States 
faithfully to execute the office of President; implicit in that 
oath is the obligation that the President set an example of 
high moral standards and conduct himself in a manner that 
fosters respect for the truth; and William Jefferson Clinton, 
has egregiously failed in this obligation, and through his 
actions violated the trust of the American people, lessened 
their esteem for the office of President, and dishonored the 
office which they have entrusted to him;
    (2)(A) William Jefferson Clinton made false statements 
concerning his reprehensible conduct with a subordinate;
    (B) William Jefferson Clinton wrongly took steps to delay 
discovery of the truth; and
    (C) in as much as no person is above the law, William 
Jefferson Clinton remains subject to criminal and civil 
penalties; and
    (3) William Jefferson Clinton, President of the United 
States, by his conduct has brought upon himself, and fully 
deserves, the censure and condemnation of the American people 
and the Congress; and by his signature on this Joint 
Resolution, acknowledges this censure and condemnation.

                             ROLLCALL NO. 7

    Subject: Joint Resolution Expressing the sense of Congress 
with respect to the censure of William Jefferson Clinton. 
Defeated by a vote of 14 ayes to 22 noes and 1 present.

------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                             Ayes      Nays     Present
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Mr. Sensenbrenner........................  ........        X   .........
Mr. McCollum.............................  ........        X   .........
Mr. Gekas................................  ........        X   .........
Mr. Coble................................  ........        X   .........
Mr. Smith................................  ........        X   .........
Mr. Gallegly.............................  ........        X   .........
Mr. Canady...............................  ........        X   .........
Mr. Inglis...............................  ........        X   .........
Mr. Goodlatte............................  ........        X   .........
Mr. Buyer................................  ........        X   .........
Mr. Bryant...............................  ........        X   .........
Mr. Chabot...............................  ........        X   .........
Mr. Barr.................................  ........        X   .........
Mr. Jenkins..............................  ........        X   .........
Mr. Hutchinson...........................  ........        X   .........
Mr. Pease................................  ........        X   .........
Mr. Cannon...............................  ........        X   .........
Mr. Rogan................................  ........        X   .........
Mr. Graham...............................  ........        X   .........
Mrs. Bono................................  ........        X   .........
Mr. Conyers..............................        X   ........  .........
Mr. Frank................................        X   ........  .........
Mr. Schumer..............................        X   ........  .........
Mr. Berman...............................        X   ........  .........
Mr. Boucher..............................        X   ........  .........
Mr. Nadler...............................        X   ........  .........
Mr. Scott................................  ........        X   .........
Mr. Watt.................................        X   ........  .........
Ms. Lofgren..............................        X   ........  .........
Ms. Jackson-Lee..........................        X   ........  .........
Ms. Waters...............................  ........  ........         X
Mr. Meehan...............................        X   ........  .........
Mr. Delahunt.............................        X   ........  .........
Mr. Wexler...............................        X   ........  .........
Mr. Rothman..............................        X   ........  .........
Mr. Barrett (WI).........................        X   ........  .........
Mr. Hyde, Chairman.......................  ........        X   .........
                                          ------------------------------
      Total..............................       14        22          1
------------------------------------------------------------------------

                    B. COMMITTEE OVERSIGHT FINDINGS

    In compliance with clause 2(l)(3)(A) of rule XI of the 
Rules of the House of Representatives, the Committee reports 
that the findings and recommendations of the Committee, based 
on oversight activities under clause 2(b)(l) of rule X of the 
Rules of the House of Representatives, are incorporated in the 
descriptive portions of this report.

        C. COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM AND OVERSIGHT FINDINGS

    Clause 2(l)(3)(D) of rule XI requires each Committee report 
to contain a summary of the oversight findings and 
recommendations made by the Government Reform and Oversight 
Committee pursuant to clause 4(c)(2) of rule X, whenever such 
findings have been timely submitted. The Committee on the 
Judiciary has received no such findings or recommendations from 
the Committee on Government Reform and Oversight.

              D. NEW BUDGET AUTHORITY AND TAX EXPENDITURES

    Clause 2(l)(3)(B) of House rule XI is inapplicable because 
this resolution does not provide new budgetary authority or 
increased tax expenditures.

                       E. COMMITTEE COST ESTIMATE

    In compliance with clause 7(a) of rule XIII of the Rules of 
the House of Representatives, the Committee believes that the 
resolution will have no budget effect.

                      F. CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY

    Pursuant to clause 2(l)(4) of the Rules of the House of 
Representatives, the Committee finds the authority for this 
resolution in Article I, section 2, clause 5 of the 
Constitution.

                      VI. ARGUMENTS ABOUT CENSURE

    The Constitution contains a single procedure for Congress 
to address the fitness for office of the President of the 
United States--impeachment by the House, and subsequent trial 
by the Senate. Article II, section 4 of the Constitution also 
specifies the necessary consequence of conviction in an 
impeachment case: ``The President, the Vice-President and all 
civil officers shall be removed from Office on Impeachment for, 
and Conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and 
Misdemeanors.''
    Article I, section 3 states that ``Judgment in Cases of 
Impeachment will not extend further than removal from Office, 
and disqualification to hold and enjoy any Office of honor, 
Trust or Profit under the United States.'' This provision, 
however, does not authorize Congress to impose legislative 
punishments short of removal. Read together, the impeachment 
clauses require removal upon conviction, but allow the Senate 
at its discretion to impose a single additional penalty--
disqualification from future office.
    The Framers' decision to confine legislative sanctioning of 
executive officials to removal upon impeachment was carefully 
considered. By forcing the House and Senate to act as a 
tribunal and trial jury, rather than merely as a legislative 
body, they infused the process with notions of due process. 
Under the Constitution, the House impeaches by a majority vote. 
However, the requirement of removal upon conviction after a 
two-thirds vote in the Senate accentuates the magnitude of the 
procedure, encouraging serious deliberation among members of 
Congress. Most importantly, by refusing to include any 
consequences less serious than removal as outcomes of the 
impeachment process, the Framers made impeachment into such an 
awesome power that Congress could not use it to harass 
executive officials or otherwise interfere with operations of 
coordinate branches.
    But for the President or any other civil officer, censure 
as a shaming punishment by the legislature is precluded by the 
Constitution, since the impeachment provisions permit Congress 
only to remove an officer of another branch of government and 
disqualify him from office. Not only would such a punishment 
undermine the separation of powers by punishing the President 
or other civil officers of the government in a manner other 
than expressly provided for in the Constitution, but it would 
violate the Constitution's prohibition on Bills of Attainder. 
U.S. Const. art. I, sec. 9, cl. 3. (``No Bill of Attainder or 
ex post facto Law shall be passed'').

                    A. Prohibited Bill of Attainder

    A Bill of Attainder was originally a mechanism by which the 
British Parliament could punish specific individuals for 
activities against the interests of the Crown. Artway v. 
Attorney General of New Jersey, 876 F. Supp. 666, 683 (1995), 
aff'd in part, vacated in part, 81 F.3d 1235 (3rd Cir. 1996). 
It was a feature of the British Common law abominable to the 
Framers of our Constitution. Id. A Bill of Attainder is a law 
that is intended to punish a specific individual (or 
identifiable group of individuals) rather than a regulatory or 
prophylactic law intended to protect the public. United States 
v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437 (1965). The Bill of Attainder Clause was 
intended, as the Supreme Court declared in Brown, id. at 442, 
to serve as ``a general safeguard against legislative exercise 
of the judicial function, or more simply trial by 
legislature.'' In 1977, the Supreme Court described a Bill of 
Attainder as ``a law that legislatively determines guilt and 
inflicts punishment upon an identified individual without the 
provisions of the protections of a judicial trial.'' Nixon v. 
Administrator of General Services, 433 U.S. 425, 468 (1977). 
The Court also said that ``a major concern that prompted the 
bill of attainder prohibition [was] the fear that the 
legislature, in seeking to pander to the inflamed popular 
constituency, will find it expedient openly to assume the 
mantle of judge.'' Id. at 480 (emphasis added); cf. E.E.O.C. v. 
Sears, Roebuck and Company, 504 F. Supp. 241 (1980)(finding no 
bill of attainder violation because ``there has been no 
determination of . . . guilt'' nor imposition of punitive 
measures).
    Importantly, the proposed censure resolution is a joint 
resolution, requiring passage by both houses and signature by 
the President. While a simple or concurrent resolution is more 
like a ``collective shout'' from the House or Senate Floor than 
a bill, a joint resolution is very clearly a ``bill,'' since it 
is a measure requiring the signature of the President. A joint 
resolution of censure--a law formally and publicly expressing 
condemnation by the legislature directed at a specific 
individual--confronts squarely the prohibition on Bills of 
Attainder.
    Defenders of presidential ``censure'' argue that it does 
not really punish and therefore cannot be a Bill of Attainder. 
In determining whether a law is punitive within the context of 
the prohibition of Bills of Attainder, courts look to what are 
understood as the motivational, functional, and historical 
tests: (1) whether the legislature intended the law to be 
punitive; (2) whether the law reasonably can be said to further 
non-punitive legislative purposes; and (3) whether the 
punishment was traditionally judged to be prohibited by the 
Bill of Attainder clause. See In re McMullen, 989 F.2d 603, 607 
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 301 (1993).
    The motivational test is clearly implicated here. As the 
Congressional Research Service has noted, any argument that 
censure provisions were not intended to be punitive would 
``face the task of overcoming express statements by individual 
Members concerning the appropriate `punishment' in this 
particular case.'' Censure of the President by Congress, Jack 
Maskell, Legislative Attorney, American Law Division, CRS 
Report for Congress, September 29, 1998, at 9. Indeed, the 
record is replete with such references. As Representative Pease 
stated during consideration of the joint resolution of censure:

          It seems to me, after all this discussion of what 
        exactly is a resolution of censure regarding the 
        President, there is still no agreement. It is either an 
        action to punish the President or it is an action that 
        doesn't punish the President. If it is an action to 
        punish the President, it is a bill of attainder and 
        unconstitutional. If it is a resolution that does not 
        punish the President, it is meaningless. For that 
        reason, though I have the greatest respect for those 
        who have offered it, I cannot support the resolution.

Markup Session, Articles of Impeachment of William Jefferson 
Clinton, Statement of Representative Edward A. Pease, December 
12, 1998, at 286 (Statement of Rep. Pease).
    In Nixon v. Administrator of General Services, the Supreme 
Court examined claims by President Richard Nixon that the 
Presidential Recordings and Materials Preservation Act 
constituted an unconstitutional Bill of Attainder. Nixon v. 
Administrator of General Services, 433 U.S. at 468. 
Importantly, the Court upheld the District Court's finding that 
there was ``no evidence presented . . . [or] to be found in the 
legislative record, to indicate that Congress' design was to 
impose a penalty upon Mr. Nixon . . . as punishment for alleged 
past wrongdoings.'' Id. at 478. The Court noted that ``the 
objectives of preserving the availability of judicial 
evidence'' was properly within Congress' legislative 
competence, and agreed with the District Court's conclusion 
that ``the Act before us is regulatory and not punitive in 
character.'' Id.
    In a concurring opinion in Nixon, Justice Stevens was 
concerned that ``[t]he statute implicitly condemns him as an 
unreliable custodian of his papers'' and declared that 
``[l]egislation which subjects a named individual to this 
humiliating treatment must raise serious questions under the 
Bill of Attainder Clause.'' Id. at 484 (J. Stevens, concurring 
opinion)(emphasis added). A resolution explicitly condemning a 
person and subjecting him to humiliating treatment confronts 
directly the Article I prohibition on Bills of Attainder. 
Moreover, Professor John C. Harrison of the University of 
Virginia Law School, who testified at the Committee hearing on 
``The Background and History of Impeachment,'' has written 
that:

          A resolution of censure, even if purely expressive, 
        still would have a punitive purpose. Expressed moral 
        condemnation is a form of retribution, and acceptance 
        of it is a form of contrition just as acceptance of 
        more concrete punishment is a form of contrition. That 
        punitive purpose would bring a censure resolution 
        within the ban on bills of attainder if one were to 
        conclude that the injury inflicted on the President, 
        although purely expressive, were punishment within the 
        meaning of the Bill of Attainder Clause.

Letter of John C. Harrison, Professor of Law, University of 
Virginia Law School, to Representative William Delahunt 
(December 3, 1998).

                 B. Censure of President Andrew Jackson

    The House of Representatives has never before censured a 
President. Moreover, no President has ever willingly accepted a 
censure of the Executive by the Legislative Branch. In 1834, 
the Senate voted to censure President Andrew Jackson on the 
ground that, in withdrawing federal funds from the Bank of the 
United States, he had ``assumed upon himself authority and 
power not conferred by the Constitution and laws, but in 
derogation of both.'' Telling are the words of protest from 
President Jackson, which the Senate refused to enter on its 
Journal:

          By an expression of the constitution, before the 
        President of the United States can enter on the 
        execution of his office, he is required to take an oath 
        or affirmation in the following words: ``I do solemnly 
        swear (or affirm) that I will faithfully execute the 
        office of President of the United States, and will, to 
        the best of my ability, preserve, protect, and defend 
        the constitution of the United States.''
          The duty of defending, so far as in him lies, the 
        integrity of the constitution, would indeed have 
        resulted from the very nature of his office; but by 
        thus expressing it in the official oath or affirmation, 
        which, in this respect, differs from that of every 
        other functionary, the founders of our republic have 
        attested their sense of its importance, and have given 
        to it a peculiar solemnity and force. Bound to the 
        performance of this duty by the oath I have taken, by 
        the strongest obligations of gratitude to the American 
        people, and by the ties which unite my every earthly 
        interest with the welfare and glory of my country, and 
        perfectly convinced that the discussion and passage of 
        the above-mentioned resolution were not only 
        unauthorized by the Constitution, but in many respects 
        repugnant to its provisions and subversive of the 
        rights secured by it to other co-ordinate departments, 
        I deem it an imperative duty to maintain the supremacy 
        of that sacred instrument, and the immunities of the 
        department intrusted to my care, by all means 
        consistent with my own lawful powers, with the rights 
        of others, and with the genius of our civil 
        institutions. To this end, I have caused this, my 
        solemn protest against the aforesaid proceedings, to be 
        placed on the files of the Executive department, and be 
        transmitted to the Senate.

Gales & Seaton's Register, President's Protest, April 17, 1834, 
Protest of President Andrew Jackson.
    President Jackson wrote that the very idea of a censure is 
a ``subversion of that distribution of powers of government 
which [the Constitution] has ordained and established [and] 
destructive of the checks and safeguards by which those powers 
were intended on the one hand to be controlled and the other to 
be protected.'' Id. It was for this reason that President 
Jackson argued that censure was ``wholly unauthorized by the 
Constitution and in derogation of its entire spirit.'' Id.  One 
of the constitutional scholars appearing before the Committee 
during the course of its impeachment hearings, Gary McDowell, 
stated this point eloquently:

          Impeachment is the only power granted by the 
        Constitution to the Congress to deal with errant 
        executives. It is the only means whereby the 
        necessarily high walls of separation between the two 
        branches may be legitimately scaled. Had the Founders 
        intended some other means of punishment to be available 
        to your branch they would have said so, as Chief 
        Justice John Marshall once said, ``in plain and 
        intelligible language.'' That they did not do so should 
        be your only guide in this grave and sensitive matter.
          The temptation to do anything possible to avoid 
        exercising the awful constitutional power of 
        impeachment is obviously and understandably great. But 
        such a temptation to take the easy way out by assuming 
        a power not granted should be shunned. And should 
        President Clinton, as a result of bad advice or 
        political pressure, agree to such an unconstitutional 
        punishment as a censure, that would be a breach of his 
        constitutional obligations as great as anything else of 
        which he has been accused. The great office he is 
        privileged to hold deserves his protection against any 
        ill-considered censorious assault from Congress.

Letter of Gary McDowell, Director of the Institute for U.S. 
Studies, University of London, to Representative William 
Delahunt (December 3, 1998).
    It is important to note that the Senate expunged the 
censure of President Andrew Jackson only three years later. 
Register of Debates, 24th Congress, 2d Sess. 379-418, 427-506 
(1837), see discussion in Fisher, Constitutional Conflicts 
Between Congress and the President, 54-55 (4th ed. 1997).

          This is significant because the word expungement, the 
        phrase `expungement from the record', has legal as well 
        as historical significance. It doesn't mean we just 
        turn our back on it. It means it never happened. If 
        somebody is convicted of a crime and they later go back 
        to court after their conviction is over and they've 
        served their time, if they petition the court to 
        expunge the record, it means they lawfully can answer 
        under oath that they have never been convicted of a 
        crime because it never happened. And on any given date, 
        any future Congress could by a simple majority vote 
        take this piece of paper and erase it from the history 
        books of America, erase its significance, erase its 
        longevity and erase its effect. I don't see that as a 
        significant rebuke at all.

Markup Session, Articles of Impeachment of William Jefferson 
Clinton, Statement of Representative James E. Rogan, December 
12, 1998, at 310.
    Constitutional scholar John O. McGinnis testified before 
the Committee that:

          The current interest in creating new forms of 
        sanctions for the President reflects a cavalier 
        attitude toward constitutional governance, and indeed 
        illustrates the kind of lasting damage that the country 
        risks from presidential misconduct. If a President 
        cannot legitimately deny that he has breached the 
        public trust there will be a widespread feeling that he 
        must be punished. He or his supporters then may be 
        willing to trade the prerogatives of his office for 
        their personal or political benefit. Thus one way a 
        President who has committed serious misconduct poses a 
        threat to the Republic, is the increased likelihood 
        that he will agree to disastrous constitutional 
        precedents to protect his own tenure.

Hearing on ``The Background and History of Impeachment,'' 
before the Subcommittee on the Constitution of the House 
Committee on the Judiciary, 105th Cong., 2d Sess., (Nov. 9, 
1998) (written statement of Professor John O. McGinnis, 
Professor of Law, Yeshiva University Cardozo School of Law) at 
19.
    Representative Canady underscored this point during the 
markup of Articles of Impeachment:

          Now, we have heard many suggestions about what will 
        happen if this President is impeached. We have heard 
        horror story after horror story. But do we have such 
        fear of following the path marked out for us by the 
        Constitution that we would take it upon ourselves to go 
        down a different path, a path of our own choosing? Will 
        we let our faith in the Constitution be put aside and 
        overwhelmed by the fears that have been feverishly 
        propagated by the President's defenders? Now, there is 
        no question that this is a momentous issue. There is no 
        question that impeaching a President of the United 
        States is a momentous act. But this is not a 
        legislative coup d'etat. This is a constitutional 
        process. . . . We have made statements, and I have made 
        statements about the President's conduct, which I have 
        concluded more in sorrow than in anger. But the facts 
        point to the conclusion that the President has been 
        more concerned with maintaining his personal power than 
        with maintaining the dignity and the integrity of the 
        high office entrusted to him under our Constitution.

Markup Session, Articles of Impeachment of William Jefferson 
Clinton, Statement of Representative Charles T. Canady, 
December 12, 1998, at 208-12.

                         VII. ADDITIONAL VIEWS

                              ----------                              


                 ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF HON. BILL McCOLLUM

      Chairman, Subcommittee on Crime, Committee on the Judiciary

                              introduction

    I have carefully reviewed the entire record regarding the 
allegations of criminal wrongdoing by President Clinton. And it 
is with a heavy heart that I have concluded that the evidence 
establishes clearly and convincingly that President Clinton is 
an oath breaker and a law breaker and should be impeached.
    On January 20, 1993, William Jefferson Clinton raised his 
right hand, placed his left hand on the Bible, and solemnly 
swore an oath before Congress, the American people, a watching 
world, and Almighty God to ``faithfully execute the Office of 
President of the United States, and . . . to the best of [his] 
ability, preserve, protect and defend the Constitution of the 
United States.'' That oath obligated the President to 
faithfully discharge his duties as the chief law enforcement 
officer of the land and commander-in-chief of the armed forces. 
Again, on January 17, 1998, before a United States District 
Court judge in a federal civil rights suit, and on August 17, 
1998, before a federal grand jury, President Clinton took an 
oath to ``tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the 
truth, so help me God.'' Far from keeping his solemn oaths, 
President Clinton actively sought to thwart the due 
administration of justice by repeatedly committing the felony 
crimes of perjury, witness tampering, and obstruction of 
justice. He has also repeatedly lied to the American people and 
to the United States Congress. President William Jefferson 
Clinton should be impeached.

                                analysis

    There are three principal considerations in determining 
whether President Clinton should be impeached: Did he commit 
any of the crimes for which he stands accused? If so, are such 
crimes impeachable offenses under the U.S. Constitution? And if 
they are impeachable, is there any reason why the U.S. House of 
Representatives, in its discretion, should not impeach him, and 
what might be the consequences of such inaction?
    When considered objectively apart from the hype, the 
evidence examined by the House Judiciary Committee 
overwhelmingly establishes that President Clinton committed not 
one, but numerous serious felony crimes. There is little doubt 
that a prosecutor could bring the case to trial, and a strong 
likelihood that the jury would convict President Clinton for 
several, if not all, the charged crimes.
Encouraging Ms. Lewinsky's false affidavit and relying on it
    Long before Ms. Lewinsky was subpoenaed in the Jones v. 
Clinton case, President Clinton and Ms. Lewinsky reached an 
understanding that they would deny any relationship between 
them. Ms. Lewinsky learned from the President that her name was 
on the Jones v. Clinton witness list. She asked him what to do 
if she was subpoenaed, and the President suggested she could 
submit an affidavit that might keep her from having to testify. 
Ms. Lewinsky testified that she understood President Clinton's 
suggestion to mean she might be able to execute an affidavit 
that would avoid her having to disclose the true nature of 
their relationship. While saying the President never told her 
to lie in the affidavit, Ms. Lewinsky took his suggestion to 
file an affidavit, in conjunction with their previous agreement 
to deny the relationship, and the absence of any suggestion 
from him that she tell the truth in the affidavit, to mean that 
he expected her to deny the relationship in the affidavit. 
Indeed, in the very same conversation in which President 
Clinton suggested she file an affidavit if subpoenaed, he 
reminded her of the cover stories they had previously 
fabricated and encouraged her to continue using them.
    Ms. Lewinsky carried out the plan and filed a false 
affidavit, in which she denied the relationship with President 
Clinton, in the Jones v. Clinton case. During the President's 
civil deposition President Clinton's attorney, Robert Bennett, 
stated that the President was fully aware of the contents of 
Ms. Lewinsky's affidavit. Whether or not the President 
explicitly asked her to file the false affidavit, he clearly 
encouraged her to, planning to rely on it in his civil 
deposition, and then doing so. As such, President Clinton 
committed the crime of obstructing justice.
Concealing evidence
    When Ms. Lewinsky was served with a subpoena to testify in 
the Jones v. Clinton case, she was also served with a subpoena 
to produce every gift given to her by President Clinton. Nine 
days later (on December 28, 1997) she met with the President 
and expressed concern about the gifts being subpoenaed and 
particularly about the hat pin named in the subpoena--the first 
gift he had ever given her. The President asked her if she had 
told anyone about the hat pin and she said no. Ms. Lewinsky 
testified that she asked President Clinton if she should put 
the gifts away outside her house or possibly give them to 
somebody like Betty Currie. She testified that his response was 
noncommittal.
    In his testimony before the federal grand jury the 
President said that he told Ms. Lewinsky that if the lawyers 
for Ms. Jones asked for gifts she would have to give them what 
she had. She testified that President Clinton never said 
anything to give her that impression. On the contrary, she was 
left with the opposite impression: that she was supposed to 
deny their existence and do whatever was necessary to conceal 
them. Ms. Lewinsky testified that later that same day Mrs. 
Currie called her on a cell phone about picking up 
``something'' from her and then came by Ms. Lewinsky's place, 
saying that the President told her (Mrs. Currie) that Ms. 
Lewinsky wanted her (Mrs. Currie) to keep to some things for 
her (Ms. Lewinsky). Ms. Lewinsky boxed up most of the gifts and 
gave them to Mrs. Currie, who took them home and stored them 
beneath her bed.
    Mrs. Currie testified that Ms. Lewinsky, not Mrs. Currie, 
placed the call and raised the subject of the gifts, but when 
confronted with the contrary statement of Ms. Lewinsky, Mrs. 
Currie changed her testimony and said she didn't remember who 
made the call but that Ms. Lewinsky's memory may be better than 
her own. Telephone records show Mrs. Currie made a cell phone 
call to Ms. Lewinsky on the afternoon in question. Furthermore, 
it would have been completely out of character for Mrs. Currie 
to have taken the action without the President's direction or 
approval inasmuch as she always checked with him before she did 
anything involving Ms. Lewinsky. And finally, if the President 
had truly suggested to Ms. Lewinsky that she produce the gifts 
to Ms. Jones' attorneys she would not have turned right around 
and called Mrs. Currie to give the gifts to her. The evidence 
clearly and convincingly leads to the conclusion that Ms. 
Lewinsky told the truth about the gifts and that the President 
orchestrated their concealment, or, at a minimum, participated 
in a scheme to conceal them. As such, President Clinton 
committed the crime of obstruction of justice.

Perjury in a civil case before the federal judge

    On January 17, 1998, President Clinton gave sworn testimony 
by deposition before Judge Wright in the Jones v. Clinton case. 
When he did so he committed perjury repeatedly by testifying 
that: he had not had sexual relations, a sexual affair, or a 
sexual relationship with Ms. Lewinsky; he could not recall 
being alone with her, when he had been alone with her on 
numerous occasions when they had engaged in sexual activities; 
and he could not recall giving her any gifts, when he had given 
her numerous gifts and they were the subject of great concern 
during several conversations with her in the month preceding 
his deposition. A fair and objective review of the evidence 
necessarily leads to the conclusion that the President 
knowingly and willfully lied about material matters numerous 
times under oath in the deposition. It requires creative and 
tortured technical arguments about the definition of perjury--
arguments without legal merit--to come to any conclusion other 
than that President Clinton repeatedly committed the crime of 
perjury in his deposition in the Jones v. Clinton case.

Witness tampering

    During President Clinton's deposition in the Jones v. 
Clinton case, the President used the cover stories involving 
Betty Currie that he and Ms. Lewinsky had fabricated. Within 
hours of the deposition, he called Mrs. Currie and asked her to 
come to the White House on the following day, a Sunday (January 
18, 1998). He told her of the deposition and then made a series 
of statements regarding his relationship with Ms. Lewinsky. He 
stated, in succession: ``You were always there when she was 
there, right? We were never really alone'; ``you could see and 
hear everything'; ``Monica came on to me, and I never touched 
her, right?'' and ``she wanted to have sex with me, and I can't 
do that.'' Mrs. Currie said she felt that President Clinton 
wanted her to agree with his statements and made these remarks 
to see her reaction. She testified that she indicated to the 
President her agreement, although she knew the President and 
Lewinsky had been alone. A couple of days later the President 
again met with her and, according to Mrs. Currie, went over 
precisely the same points. All of these statements volunteered 
by the President to Mrs. Currie were consistent with the 
testimony given in his deposition, but were false. And the 
President knew they were false.
    President Clinton claims that he was just trying to refresh 
his memory when he made these statements to Mrs. Currie. His 
assertion is highly implausible. For example, how could Mrs. 
Currie know whether the President and Ms. Lewinsky were ever 
alone, or whether she (Mrs Currie) ``could see and hear 
everything,'' or whether Ms. Lewinsky ``came on to [the 
President],'' or that he ``never touched her'' or that ``she 
wanted to have sex with [the President], and [he] can't do 
that.'' The only reasonable conclusion is that President 
Clinton was attempting to enlist her as a witness to back up 
his false testimony. In doing so President Clinton committed 
the crime of obstruction of justice and the crime of witness 
tampering. The fact that Mrs. Currie was not on the witness 
list in the Jones v. Clinton case is irrelevant. Under the law, 
all that is required is that the President had reason to 
believe that Mrs. Currie might be called to testify.

Grand jury perjury

    And finally, President Clinton clearly committed perjury in 
his testimony before the federal grand jury. Ms. Lewinsky 
testified before the grand jury that the President engaged in 
sexual acts that were spelled out in the court's definition in 
the Jones v. Clinton case. In his grand jury testimony the 
President specifically denied these activities. Lewinsky's 
testimony is credible and the President's is not. Numerous 
friends, family members and even medical professionals visited 
by Ms. Lewinsky testified and corroborated Ms. Lewinsky's 
testimony in great detail. Ms. Lewinsky discussed these matters 
with these witnesses contemporaneously to the time when she 
engaged in the acts with the President. The evidence 
overwhelmingly establishes that President Clinton committed the 
crime of perjury while testifying before the grand jury.

Impeachable Offenses

    Perjury, obstruction of justice, witness tampering and 
bribery of a witness are all equally grave crimes that 
undermine the integrity of the judicial system. When people lie 
under oath in testifying in a civil case or encourage others to 
do so or conceal evidence or get others to conceal evidence, 
they prevent at least one of the parties to the suit from 
receiving a just and fair decision by the court. It is worth 
noting that the crime of perjury is punished more severely in 
the federal courts than the crime of bribery. To suggest that 
perjury and obstruction of justice do not rise to the level of 
``treason, bribery and other high crimes and misdemeanors'' as 
contemplated for impeachment by the founding fathers defies 
both common sense and the state of common law in England at the 
time the U.S. Constitution was written.
    Having concluded that the President committed the 
impeachable offenses of perjury and obstruction of justice, the 
question must be asked, what would be the consequences of 
failing to impeach the President? Such inaction in a notorious 
case of criminal wrongdoing would send a terrible message to 
those who testify in civil cases and before grand juries in the 
future.
    Studies show that perjury is occurring more frequently in 
our courts. Contrary to what some have asserted there are 
numerous recent examples of federal prosecution of perjury in 
civil cases. Indeed, there are currently 115 people in federal 
prison today for perjury in civil cases. If the President is 
not impeached for these crimes a clear and harmful message will 
be sent across the country: That there is a double standard, 
with the President of the United States being exempted from the 
force of law in these matters, and that these crimes aren't as 
serious as was once assumed. It is also probable that the 
failure to impeach in such a notorious case involving so many 
perjurious statements would lead to more instances of perjury. 
Furthermore, failure to impeach would make it more difficult 
for future Congresses to impeach federal judges for perjury and 
like crimes. As such, failure to impeach would fundamentally 
undermine the integrity of our court system.
    At the same time, there would be serious repercussions in 
the U.S. Armed Forces if the Commander-in-Chief were to be held 
to a dramatically lower standard than that applied to officers 
and enlisted personnel. The men and women in the military would 
routinely be removed from duty and discharged from service if 
they engaged in the non-criminal activities that the President 
engaged in with Ms. Lewinsky, and would face certain court 
martial if they committed like criminal conduct.

                               Conclusion

    The Committee on the Judiciary has carefully examined 
voluminous evidence, including thousands of pages of sworn 
testimony, regarding the alleged criminal wrongdoing of 
President Clinton. The evidence clearly and convincingly 
establishes that the President, with premeditation, engaged in 
a pattern of illegal conduct over an extended period of time, 
so as to prevent a federal court and a federal grand jury from 
uncovering the truth about his relationship with Ms. Lewinsky. 
His repeated crimes include perjury, witness tampering and 
obstruction of justice. These felony crimes are impeachable 
offenses within the meaning of the U.S. Constitution. President 
Clinton should be impeached by the House of Representatives.

                                                     Bill McCollum.

       ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF MR. COBLE, MR. GALLEGLY, AND MRS. BONO

     the role of the committee on the judiciary in a presidential 
                          impeachment inquiry

    While there have been several impeachment inquiries 
conducted concerning the conduct of members of the judicial 
branch, the William Jefferson Clinton impeachment inquiry was 
only the second this century, and the third in our nation's 
history, to investigate the President of the United States. A 
significant question from the outset was, how were we to 
proceed?
    The distinguished Chairman of our Committee, the Honorable 
Henry J. Hyde, is not only an astute legislator and lawyer, he 
is also a student of history. Recognizing that the impeachment 
of President Andrew Johnson was riddled with problems--it 
involved high political tensions brought about by the ending of 
the Civil War; it played out over eighteen months; the 
originating committee was supplanted by a politically stacked 
committee in a new Congress; etc.--Mr. Hyde thus spent a 
significant amount of his time studying the impeachment inquiry 
of President Richard M. Nixon. That inquiry took place in 1973 
and 1974 in the Committee on the Judiciary under the 
chairmanship of Representative Peter W. Rodino, Jr. of New 
Jersey--a Democrat. So impressed was Chairman Hyde with the 
perceived fairness and due process of the Nixon inquiry, he 
made a historically momentous decision to, as closely as 
possible, adhere to the precedents of that proceeding. Thus, 
our committee set out to follow the path of ``the Rodino 
model.''
    On September 9, 1998 the office of the Independent Counsel, 
Mr. Kenneth W. Starr, delivered to the House of Representatives 
a report that contained what the Counsel portrayed as 
``substantial and credible information that President William 
Jefferson Clinton committed acts that may constitute grounds 
for an impeachment.'' This report was delivered pursuant to 
Section 595(c) Title 28 of the United States Code, which is 
part of the Ethics in Government Act. On September 18, 1998, 
the House passed a Resolution which directed the Independent 
Counsel report be referred to our Committee with instructions 
that it be reviewed and released to the public by September 28, 
1998. After that on October 8, 1998 by a vote of 258-176 the 
House approved a resolution directing our Committee to conduct 
an impeachment inquiry.
    At the outset of the work on the Starr referral, Chairman 
Hyde attempted to guide our Committee on a set of fixed 
principles which included:
    ``--that no person is above the law, not even the 
President;
    --that we must submit ourselves to the letter and spirit of 
the Constitution;
    --that we must constantly strive to be fair, thorough, and 
expeditious in all that we do;
    --that we must be tireless in gathering and reviewing all 
of the relevant facts;
    --and that we must keep the American people well informed, 
in part by giving them as much information as possible.''
    In addition, he also adhered to his earlier decision to 
follow the Rodino model. Two key documents from 1974 were 
updated and reprinted as committee documents. One--
``Impeachment--Selected Materials'' was a recitation of past 
impeachment precedents, and the other ``Constitutional Grounds 
for Presidential Impeachment: Modern Precedents'', was an 
updated staff report based directly on the same type of report 
done by the Rodino staff in 1974.
    Although the staff study on the question of an impeachment 
standard was done early in the Nixon inquiry, the Rodino 
Committee never actually met and discussed the issue. Mr. 
Rodino recognized then, as did Chairman Hyde some twenty-four 
years later, that there is no one standard for what constitutes 
impeachable conduct. The Framers never intended such a 
standard. As Representative Lawrence J. Hogan said in the 
closing debate in 1974 about this question. ``. . . Now the 
first responsibility facing members of this committee was to 
try to and define what an impeachable offense is. The 
Constitution does not define it. The precedents which are 
sparse do not give us any real guidance as to what constitutes 
an impeachable offense. So each of us in our own conscience, in 
our own mind, in our own heart, after much study, had to decide 
for ourselves what constitutes an impeachable offense . . .'' 
Despite this Chairman Hyde once again went the extra step and 
actually had Representative Charles T. Canady, Chairman of the 
Subcommittee on the Constitution, convene a special one day 
hearing on November 9, 1998 concerning the background and 
history of impeachment, at which a lengthy list of scholars 
appeared. Following this, our Committee upon Chairman Hyde's 
recommendation also:
    --approved a set of inquiry procedures which were taken 
almost verbatim from the Rodino committee procedures;
    --throughout the hearings utilized the five minute rule and 
generously allotted additional time to Members when needed, and 
also allowed Members a ten minute opening statement prior to 
the final debate on the articles of impeachment; and
    --allowed the President of the United States the 
opportunity to have his counsel represent him at committee 
deliberations, and to question any witnesses summoned by the 
committee, and to call witnesses to testify on behalf of the 
President, and to make an oral and written presentation on the 
evidence before the committee.
    For the historical record, a major difference between the 
Hyde and Rodino inquiries was openness. With the exception of a 
couple of occasions when the Hyde Committee went into executive 
session to discuss appropriately sensitive matters, our 
impeachment inquiry of the President was held in public before 
the American people. At every opportunity, material was made 
public, even though the subject matter at times was extremely 
reprehensible and disgusting. Nevertheless, Chairman Hyde felt 
honor bound to operate in open, so that all of our citizens 
could have faith in the Committee's findings no matter where 
they led us.
    History is forever. It covers the pages of the annals of 
our time for one and all to see, especially our generations to 
come. The impeachment inquiry conducted under the leadership of 
Chairman Henry J. Hyde was public, fair, and just. Mr. Hyde 
often likes to remind us of the oath every Member of Congress 
is administered upon their swearing in: ``I do solemnly swear 
that I will support and defend the Constitution of the United 
States against all enemies, foreign and domestic; that I will 
bear true faith and allegiance to the same; that I take this 
obligation freely, without any mental reservation or purpose of 
evasion; and that I will well and faithfully discharge the 
duties of the office on which I am about to enter. So help me 
God.''
    Our Chairman often quotes ``A Man for all Seasons.'' In it 
at one point Sir Thomas More tells his daughter, ``When you 
take an oath, you hold your soul in your hands, and if you 
break that oath, you open up your fingers and your soul runs 
through them and it is lost.'' At certain times in history, 
various individuals are placed in a position not of their own 
choosing. They must step into the arena and with no control of 
the events or forces to come, they must stand and defend their 
soul and the principles that form the very foundation of that 
soul. Our nation was blessed that at this time in our history, 
such a man walked amongst us, and in the great American 
tradition, persevered and did that which was both right and 
just. It was an honor to serve with Henry J. Hyde, and thus 
will history so record.

                                   Howard Coble.
                                   Elton Gallegly.
                                   Mary Bono.

               ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF HON. CHARLES T. CANADY

    ``Facts are stubborn things; and whatever may be our 
wishes, our inclinations, or the dictates of our passions, they 
cannot alter the state of facts and evidence.''--John Adams.
    In the case before the Committee, the facts show a 
sustained pattern of lying under oath and multiple acts of 
obstruction of justice by the President of the United States. 
First, the President through obstruction of justice and false 
statements under oath sought to conceal the truth in a sexual 
harassment case in order to defeat the rights of the plaintiff 
in that case. Then, the President engaged in a nearly year-long 
cover-up of those earlier offenses--a cover-up that included 
lying under oath before a federal grand jury and in statements 
submitted to the Judiciary Committee.
    All the attacks on the investigation conducted by the 
Independent Counsel and on the proceedings of the Judiciary 
Committee do nothing to alter the facts of the case against 
William Jefferson Clinton. All the attempts to palliate cannot 
alter the stubborn facts of the case against the President. The 
facts cannot be wished away, they cannot be ignored, they 
cannot be treated as trivial. The facts make a compelling case 
for impeachment.
    The President has engaged in a course of conduct which 
evidences a calculated contempt for the rule of law. He has 
directly and repeatedly violated his oath of office to 
``faithfully execute the office'' of President, and breached 
his duty to ``take care that the laws be faithfully executed.'' 
He has repeatedly put his selfish personal interests ahead of 
the dignity and integrity of the high office entrusted to him 
by the people.
    Soon after the adoption of the Constitution, Alexander 
Hamilton wrote that ``an inviolable respect for the 
Constitution and Laws'' is the ``most sacred duty and the 
greatest source of security in a Republic.'' Hamilton 
understood that respect for the Constitution itself grows out 
of a general respect for the law. And he understood the 
essential connection between respect for law and the 
maintenance of liberty in a Republic. Without respect for the 
law, the Constitution is without an adequate foundation. 
Without respect for the law, our freedom is at risk. Thus, 
according to Hamilton, those who ``set examples which undermine 
or subvert the authority of the laws lead us from freedom to 
slavery . . .''
    President Clinton by his persistent and calculated 
misconduct has set a pernicious example of lawlessness--an 
example which by its very nature subverts respect for the law. 
His perjury and obstruction of justice have become a byword. 
The perverse example he has set the inevitable effect of 
undermining the integrity of the judicial process.
    Contrary to the claims of his defenders, the offenses of 
which the President is guilty are not mere private offenses. 
Although his crimes were occasioned by his personal misconduct, 
when the President attempted to obstruct justice and willfully 
gave false testimony under oath he committed public wrongs. 
Perjury and obstruction of justice are not private matters; 
they are crimes against the system of justice.
    Since the early days of our Republic, perjury has been 
considered a grave offense against justice. John Jay, the first 
Chief Justice of the United States, said that ``there is no 
crime more extensively pernicious to society'' than perjury. 
According to Jay, perjury ``discolors and poisons the streams 
of justice, and by substituting falsehood for truth, saps the 
foundations of personal and public rights.''
    The maintenance in office of a persistent perjurer is 
inconsistent with maintenance of the rule of law. The 
impeachment process is intended to preserve the rule of law 
against the corrupt conduct of the Chief Executive and other 
high officials. The corrupt conduct of President Clinton is 
exactly the sort of conduct that the impeachment power was 
designed to address. The impeachment power must be used to call 
him to account for his crimes.

                 nixon tax fraud article of impeachment

    In their submission to the Committee, Counsel for the 
President argue that the failure in 1974 of the Committee to 
adopt an article of impeachment against President Nixon for tax 
fraud supports the claim that current charges against President 
Clinton do not rise to the level of impeachable offenses. The 
President's lawyers contend that the tax fraud article against 
President Nixon ``was not approved because the otherwise 
conflicting views of the Committee majority and minority were 
in concord: submission of a false tax return was not so related 
to exercise of the President Office as to trigger 
impeachment.''
    Wayne Owens and Robert F. Drinan, who were members of the 
Committee in 1974, have recently testified to the Committee in 
support of this argument. In a recent opinion piece they assert 
that in 1974 the Committee decided by a vote of 26 to 12 that 
President Nixon ``should not be impeached for tax fraud because 
it did not involve official conduct or abuse of presidential 
powers.''
    It is, of course, undisputed that the Judiciary Committee 
rejected the proposed tax fraud article against President 
Nixon. It is also undisputed that certain Committee members 
stated the view that tax fraud would not be an impeachable 
offense. That view is illustrated by the comments of Rep. 
Waldie that in the tax fraud article thee was ``not an abuse of 
power sufficient to warrant impeachment . . .'' Similar views 
were expressed by Rep. Hogan and Rep. Mayne. Rep. Railsback 
took the position that there was ``a serious question'' whether 
misconduct of the President in connection with his taxes would 
be impeachable.
    Other members who opposed the tax fraud article based their 
opposition on somewhat different grounds. Rep. Thornton based 
his opposition to the tax fraud article on the ``view that 
these charges may be reached in due course in the regular 
process of law.'' Rep. Butler stated his view that the tax 
fraud article should be rejected on prudential grounds: ``Sound 
judgment would indicate that we not add this article to the 
trial burden we already have.''
    The record is clear, however, that the overwhelming 
majority of those who expressed a view in the debate in 
opposition to the tax fraud article based their opposition on 
the insufficiency of the evidence, and not on the view that tax 
fraud, if proven, would not be an impeachable offense.
    The comments of Wayne Owens in the debate in 1974 are quite 
instructive. Those comments directly contradict the view that 
Mr. Owens has expressed in recent days. Although Mr. Owens in 
1974 expressed his ``belief'' that President Nixon was guilty 
of misconduct in connection with his taxes, he clearly stated 
his conclusion that ``on the evidence available'' Mr. Nixon's 
offenses were not impeachable. Mr. Owens spoke of the need for 
``hard evidence'' and discussed his unavailing efforts to 
obtain additional evidence that would tie ``the President to 
the fraudulent deed'' or that would otherwise ``close the 
inferential gap that has to be closed in order to charge the 
President.'' He concluded his comments in the 1974 debate by 
urging the members of the Committee ``to reject this article'' 
``based on that lack of evidence.''
    In addition to Mr. Owens, eleven members of the Committee 
stated the view that there was not sufficient evidence of tax 
fraud to support the article against President Nixon. (Wiggins: 
``fraud . . . is wholly unsupported in the evidence.'' McClory: 
``no substantial evidence of any tax fraud.'' Sandman: ``There 
was absolutely no intent to defraud here.'' Lott: ``mere 
mistakes or negligence by the President in filing his tax 
returns should clearly not be grounds for impeachment.'' 
Maraziti: discusing absence of evidence of fraud. Dennis: ``no 
fraud has been found.'' Cohen: questioning whether ``in fact 
there was criminal fraud involved.'' Hungate: ``I think there 
is a case here but in my judgment I am having trouble deciding 
if it has as yet been made.'' Latta: only ``bad judgment and 
gross negligence.'' Fish: ``There is not to be found before us 
evidence that the President acted willfully to evade his 
taxes.'' Moorhead: ``there is no showing that President Nixon 
in anyway engaged in any fraud.'')
    The group of those who found the evidence insufficient 
included moderate Democrats like Rep. Hungate and Rep. Owens, 
as well as Republicans like Rep. Fish, Rep. Cohen, and Rep. 
McClory, who all supported the impeachment of President Nixon.
    In light of all these facts, it is not credible to assert 
that the Committee in 1974 determined that tax fraud by the 
President would not be an impeachable offense. The failure of 
the Committee to adopt the tax fraud article against President 
Nixon simply does not support the claim of President Clinton's 
lawyers that the offenses charged against him do not rise to 
the level of impeachable offenses.
    In the Committee debate in 1974 a compelling case was made 
that tax fraud by a President--if proven by sufficient 
evidence--would be an impeachable offense. Rep. Brooks, who 
later served as chairman of the Committee, said:

        No man in America can be above the law. It is our duty 
        to establish now that evidence of specific statutory 
        crimes and constitutional violations by the President 
        of the United States will subject all Presidents now 
        and in the future to impeachment . . .
        No President is exempt under our U.S. Constitution and 
        the laws of the United States from accountability for 
        personal misdeeds any more than he is for official 
        misdeeds. And I think that we on this Committee in our 
        effort to fairly evaluate the President's activities 
        must show the American people that all men are treated 
        equally under the law.

    Prof. Charles Black stated it succinctly: ``A large-scale 
tax cheat is not a viable chief magistrate.'' What is true of 
tax fraud is also true of a persistent pattern of perjury by 
the President. An incorrigible perjurer is not a viable chief 
magistrate.

                                                 Charles T. Canady.

                  ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF HON. STEVE BUYER

    The Judiciary Committee of the U.S. House of 
Representatives of the 105th Congress recently completed an 
impeachment inquiry of President William Jefferson Clinton. The 
purpose of the inquiry was to defend the Constitution, search 
for the truth, and follow the rule of law.
    The wisdom of the Founding Fathers is truly amazing. They 
understood that the nature of the human heart struggles between 
good and evil. So, the Founders created a system for 
accountability, comprised of checks and balances. If corruption 
invaded the political system, the Constitution provides a means 
to address it. The Founders felt impeachment was so important, 
language regarding impeachment appears in six different places 
in the Constitution.1 The power to impeach rests in 
the House of Representatives, while the power to remove the 
President resides in the Senate.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ The clauses discussing congressional power are: ``The House of 
Representatives . . . shall have the sole power of Impeachment.'' U.S. 
Const. art. I, Sec. 2; ``The Senate shall have the sole Power to try 
all Impeachments. When sitting for that Purpose, they shall be on Oath 
or Affirmation. When the President of the United States is tried, the 
Chief Justice shall preside: And No Person shall be convicted without 
the Concurrence of two thirds of the Members present.'' U.S. Const. 
art. I, Sec. 3. ``The President, Vice President and all civil Officers, 
of the United States, shall be removed from Office on Impeachment for, 
and Conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or other High Crimes and 
Misdemeanors.'' U.S. Const. art. II. Sec. 4.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In 1974, the House engaged in a similar impeachment 
investigation of President Richard M. Nixon. At that time, the 
House investigated the facts as reported by the Judiciary 
Committee in order to determine whether the allegations 
presented reached the level of impeachable offenses. In the 
present case, the purpose of the inquiry by the Judiciary 
Committee and the House of Representatives was to determine 
whether the evidence contained in the Referral by the Office of 
the Independent Counsel (``OIC'') gives rise to impeachment.
    In order to place the allegations against President Clinton 
in the proper context, I will first briefly examine the 
historical underpinnings of the impeachment clause in terms of 
our national heritage.2 I will then discuss the 
nature of the Paula Corbin Jones sexual harassment lawsuit, 
which gave rise to the investigation of the President. Further, 
I will review the evidence and allegations presented to the 
Judiciary Committee by the OIC, as well as the President's 
defense as advanced by scholars, historians and legal 
practitioners. I conclude by explaining why I believe the 
evidence presented suggests that the President committed 
impeachable offenses. Finally, I will address censure and why I 
believe it is extra-constitutional.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \2\ On November 9, 1998, the Constitution Subcommittee of the House 
Judiciary Committee conducted hearings on the background and history of 
impeachment wherein we were benefitted by the testimony of numerous 
scholars and historians. I will refer to the testimony of such 
individuals. As numerous scholars advised, the Framers of the 
Constitution purposely used the phrase ``Treason, Bribery and other 
high Crimes and Misdemeanors,'' as it is rooted in approximately 400 
years of English common law.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

i. historical analysis of ``treason, bribery and other high crimes and 
                             misdemeanors''

    At the Constitutional Convention of 1787 the Framers 
arranged three branches of government with an elaborate system 
of checks and balances. An integral part of the power over the 
executive branch is found in Congress' impeachment 
powers.3 As stated in a report prepared by the House 
Judiciary Committee staff in 1974 regarding impeachment, the 
evidence from the Constitutional Convention ``shows that the 
framers intended impeachment to be a constitutional safeguard 
of the public trust, the powers of government conferred upon 
the President and other civil officers, and the division of 
powers among the legislative, judicial and executive 
departments.'' 4 Congress itself has the power of 
impeachment, a process of presenting and prosecuting charges 
against the President, Vice President and other civil officers. 
Under the Constitution, the House does not have the power to 
punish. In trying cases of impeachment, it is the Senate that 
acts as the high court. In 1868, the Senate ceased in order to 
call itself ``a high court of impeachment.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \3\ See supra note 1.
    \4\ Staff of the House Judiciary Committee, 93rd Cong., Report by 
the Staff of the Impeachment Inquiry on the Constitutional Grounds for 
Presidential Impeachment 709 (Comm. Print 1974) [hereinafter staff 
report]
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In practice, whenever the House of Representatives decides 
to bring the President of the United States before the bar of 
the Senate, it adopts, by resolution, Articles of Impeachment 
approved by the House Judiciary Committee, charging the 
President with certain high crimes and misdemeanors and 
enumerating in sufficient detail as to place him on notice of 
his particular offenses. If the resolution passes the House by 
simple majority vote, thereupon it chooses leaders to direct 
the prosecution before the Senate. The case is then conducted 
in the form of a trial, under the Senate's own rules of due 
process, with the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court presiding. 
The prosecution states its case; witnesses for and against the 
accused can be heard; and attorneys on both sides make their 
arguments. When the case is fully presented the Senators vote, 
and if two-thirds of the members present concur in holding the 
accused guilty, he stands convicted and removed from office; 
however, if there is a vote of less than two-thirds of the 
Members present, he is acquitted.
    The penalty which the Senate can impose upon any person 
convicted in a case of impeachment is strictly limited to 
removal of the offender from office and the imposition of a 
disqualification to hold and enjoy any future office of honor, 
trust, or profit under the United States. Any person convicted, 
however, is still liable, after his removal from office, to 
indictment, trial, judgment, and punishment for his offenses 
according to law.
    The jurisdiction of the Senate as a court of impeachment 
extends only over the President, Vice President, and the civil 
officers of the United States for the offenses of treason, 
bribery, or other high crimes and misdemeanors. What conduct 
constitutes an impeachable offense is determined by the House. 
At the Constitutional Convention, originally George Mason 
favored including the word ``maladministration'' but he deemed 
the phrase too ambiguous, and capable of bestowing excessive 
power in the Senate.5 As a result, the phrase was 
replaced with ``High crimes and misdemeanors'' in order to 
better define the standard.6
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \5\ The Background and History of Impeachment: Hearings Before the 
Subcommittee on the Constitution of the House Judiciary Committee, 
105th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1998) (statement of Hon. Griffin E. Bell).
    \6\ Id. It is important to note that the phrase is not intended to 
include only criminal offenses, rather it stems from the word 
``maladministration'' proposed by George Mason. See Staff Report 12.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Scholars and legal historians differ on exactly what the 
standard is intended to include. The Committee heard testimony 
from several scholars who contend that the phrase is narrow and 
intended to cover conduct relating to abuse of official power 
or public acts affecting the state,7 but others 
argued that the phrase is applicable to objective misconduct 
relating to fitness in office.8 One of the witnesses 
before the Subcommittee on the Constitution stated:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \7\ See The Background and History of Impeachment: Hearings Before 
the Subcommittee on the Constitution of the House Judiciary Committee, 
105th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1998) (statements of Susan Low Bloch, Professor 
of Law, Georgetown University, and Cass R. Sunstein, Professor of Law, 
University of Chicago Law School). Many also contend that ``private'' 
actions of the President do not give rise to impeachable behavior. See 
e.g., The Background and History of Impeachment: Hearings Before the 
Subcommittee on the Constitution of the House Judiciary Committee, 
105th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1998) (statement of Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., 
Professor of History, City University of New York).
    \8\ The Background and History of Impeachment: Hearings Before the 
Subcommittee on the Constitution of the House Judiciary Committee, 
105th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1998) (statement of John O. McGinnis, Professor 
of Law, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, Yeshiva University).

          To be sure, serious crimes committed in the actual 
        performance of official government functions are likely 
        to constitute impeachable offenses in all cases. But 
        the scope of the House's impeachment authority is not 
        confined to such crimes, or even to crimes at all. . . 
        . [T]he crimes of perjury and obstruction of justice, 
        like treason and bribery, are quintessentially offenses 
        against our system of government, visit injury 
        immediately on society itself, whether or not committed 
        in connection with the exercise of official government 
        powers. Indeed, in a society governed by the rule of 
        law, perjury and obstruction of justice cannot be 
        tolerated precisely because these crimes subvert the 
        very judicial processes on which the rule of law so 
        vitally depends.9
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \9\ The Background and History of Impeachment: Hearings Before the 
Subcommittee on the Constitution of the House Judiciary Committee, 
105th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1998) (statement of Charles J. Cooper, Esq.).

    As noted in the Staff Report of 1974, ``impeachment is a 
constitutional remedy addressed to serious offenses against the 
system of government . . . they are constitutional wrongs that 
subvert the structure of government, or undermine the integrity 
of office and even the Constitution itself, and thus are 
``high'' offenses . . ..'' 10 The Report also stated 
that in impeachment proceedings in English practice and in this 
country, ``[T]he emphasis has been on the significant effects 
of the conduct-undermining the integrity of office, disregard 
of constitutional duties and oath of office, arrogation of 
power, abuse of the governmental process, [and] adverse impact 
on the system of government.'' 11
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \10\ Staff Report 26.
    \11\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    I concur with the premise that while the crimes alleged 
against the President may not directly involve the exercise of 
executive powers, excepting the issue of possible misuse of 
executive privileges, the alleged crimes, plainly, do involve 
the violation of the president's executive duties.12
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \12\ The Judiciary Committee voted to amend Article IV and deleted 
the abuse of power language regarding misuses of the executive 
privilege.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Relying on the testimony and advice of the legal scholars, 
historians and judges that appeared before the Subcommittee on 
the Constitution, I will not attempt to define the impeachment 
standard. It is best stated by Justice Joseph Story in 
``Commentaries on the Constitution'' (1833), the impeachment 
power applies to ``political offenses, growing out of personal 
misconduct or gross neglect, or usurpation, or habitual 
disregard of the public interests, in the discharge of the 
duties of political office. These are so various in their 
character, and so indefinable in their actual involutions, that 
it is almost impossible to provide systematically for them by 
positive law.'' 13
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \13\ See Staff Report 16-17.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    We received testimony regarding impeachment in both English 
and American history. It is understood that personal 
misconduct, violations of trust, and other charges of a more 
private nature can be impeachable offenses.14 
Perjury and obstruction of justice drive a stake in the rule of 
law. Now the question is whether perjury to conceal private 
conduct and other actions to thwart and impede justice in a 
civil rights case in federal court, as well as perjury before a 
federal grand jury, rise to the level of impeachable offenses.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \14\ In 1986 the House of Representatives voted to impeach the 
Honorable Harry E. Claiborne. On August 10, 1984, while serving as a 
judge of the United States District Court for the District of Nevada, 
Judge Claiborne was found guilty by a jury of making a false and 
fraudulent income tax return for the calendar years of 1979 and 1980 in 
violation of 26 U.S.C. Sec. 7206(1). The House of Representatives 
adopted four articles of impeachment charging Judge Claiborne with 
willfully and knowingly filing false income tax returns, under penalty 
of perjury, for the years 1979 and 1980. One of the articles of 
impeachment charged that Judge Claiborne, by willfully and knowingly 
filing false income tax returns while serving as a Federal Judge, with 
betraying the trust of the people of the United States and reducing 
confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the Federal judiciary. 
Representative Hamilton Fish, ranking member of the Judiciary Committee 
and one of the House managers in the Senate trial stated, ``Judge 
Claiborne's actions raise fundamental questions about public confidence 
in, and the public's perception of, the Federal court system. They 
serve to undermine the confidence of the American people in our 
judicial system.'' 132 Cong. Rec. H4713 (daily ed. July 22, 1986).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

                 ii. the jones v. clinton civil lawsuit

    In May 1994, Paula Corbin Jones filed a sexual harassment 
lawsuit 15 against William Jefferson Clinton in the 
United States District Court for the Eastern District of 
Arkansas.16 Ms. Jones alleged that the sexual 
harassment incident took place in a hotel room 17 in 
Little Rock, Arkansas, while Mr. Clinton was the Governor of 
Arkansas.18 The President denied the allegations and 
argued that Ms. Jones did not have the right to proceed against 
him because he is a sitting President.19 The Supreme 
Court unanimously rejected such an argument stating: ``Like 
every other citizen who properly invokes [the] jurisdiction [of 
the District Court], [Ms. Jones] has a right to an orderly 
disposition of her claims.'' 20 Thus, the Supreme 
Court determined that Ms. Jones was entitled to proceed with 
her claim as an ordinary litigant, entitled to discovery from 
the defendant, President Clinton. The Supreme Court therefore 
reaffirmed the proposition that no person is above the law.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \15\ Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 does not explicitly 
refer to ``sexual harassment'' but makes it unlawful for an employer 
with fifteen or more employees to discriminate against applicants for 
employment or employees ``because . . . of sex.'' 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e-
2(a)(1). Sexual harassment laws have largely developed through judicial 
opinions, as well as opinions from the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission interpreting Title VII's sex discrimination prohibition. See 
42 U.S.C. 2000e et. seq. See also Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore 
Services, Inc., 118 S.Ct. 998 (1998)(holding that same sex harassment 
is actionable under Title VII); Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 118 
S.Ct. 2275 (1998)(holding employer vicariously liable for harassment by 
supervisor); Burlington Industries v. Ellerth, 118 S.Ct. 2257 
(1998)(same). The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
also involves the freedom to be free from gender discrimination unless 
it is substantially related to an important government objective. See 
Beardsley v. Webb, 30 F.3d 524, 529 (4th Cir. 1994). Intentional sexual 
harassment against employers acting under the color of state law is 
actionable under the Fourteenth Amendment and Sec. 1983. Id.
    \16\ Referral from Independent Counsel Kenneth W. Starr, 105th 
Cong., 2d Sess., H.R. Doc. No. 105-310, at 1 (1998) (hereinafter ``OIC 
Referral'').
    \17\ The allegations in the Jones v. Clinton case are reminiscent 
of the facts in the Lewinsky matter. In Jones, the plaintiff alleged 
that ``as she left the room . . . the Governor ``detained'' her 
momentarily, ``looked sternly'' at her, and said, ``You are smart. 
Let's keep this between ourselves.' '' Jones v. Clinton, 990 F. Supp. 
657, 664 (1998).
    \18\ OIC Referral at 2. Specifically, Ms. Jones alleged that on the 
night in question in 1991, Governor Clinton exposed his genitals and 
asked her to perform oral sex on him. Id. at 1 n.3. Ms. Jones was an 
employee of the Arkansas Industrial Development Corporation at the time 
of the alleged incident. Id.
    \19\ Id. at 2.
    \20\ Jones v. Clinton, 117 S.Ct. 1636, 1652 (1997) (holding, inter 
alia, that the Constitution does not afford a sitting president 
temporary immunity in ``all but the most exceptional circumstances,'' 
and that the doctrine of separation of powers does not require the 
court to stay civil proceedings against the President).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    As is common in sexual harassment litigation, a defendant's 
past behavior can be relevant and material evidence to 
establish a pattern of misconduct to support the present 
allegations and the defendant's propensities. In late 1997, the 
parties disputed whether the President would be required to 
disclose information about past sexual relationships 
21 with other women,22 United States 
District Judge Susan Webber Wright ruled that ``the plaintiff 
[was] entitled to information regarding any individuals with 
whom the President had sexual relations . . . and who were . . 
. state or federal employees.'' 23 In late December 
the President responded to written discovery 
requests.24 When asked under oath to identify women 
with whom he had sexual relations who were state or federal 
employees during a specified limited time frame, the President 
responded ``none.'' 25 On January 17, 1998, the 
President was questioned under oath at a deposition regarding 
sexual relationships with women in the workplace.26 
During the deposition, the President denied that he had engaged 
in a ``sexual affair, a ``sexual relationship,'' or ``sexual 
relations'' with Ms. Lewinsky, while also stating that he ``had 
no specific memory of being alone with Ms. Lewinsky, that he 
remembered few details of any gifts they might have exchanged, 
and indicated that no one except his attorneys had kept him 
informed of Ms. Lewinsky's status as a potential witness in the 
[Jones v. Clinton] case.'' 27 The evidence shows 
that the President's testimony during that deposition was 
perjurious, false, and misleading with the motive to hide the 
relationship for the purpose to defeat the Jones v. Clinton 
suit and deny Ms. Jones her right to a fair trial as an alleged 
victim of sexual harassment.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \21\ The list of ``Jane Does'' in the Jones v. Clinton case and the 
evidence on each of them was held by the Judiciary Committee in 
Executive Session and redacted from public dissemination.
    \22\ OIC Referral at 2.
    \23\ 921-DC-00000461 (Dec. 11, 1997 Order at 3).
    \24\ OIC Referral at 2.
    \25\ V002-DC-00000053 (President Clinton's Supplemental Responses 
to Plaintiff's Second Set of Interrogatories at 2).
    \26\ OIC Referral at 3.
    \27\ Id. at 3.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    III. The Investigation By the Office of the Independent Counsel

    On January 12, 1998, the OIC received information that Ms. 
Lewinsky was attempting to influence the testimony of a witness 
by the name of Linda Tripp 28 in the Jones v. 
Clinton case, and that Ms. Lewinsky intended to provide false 
testimony in the case.29 The information was 
transmitted to Attorney General Janet Reno, who determined that 
an independent counsel should examine the matter for criminal 
wrongdoing.30 Pursuant to the Independent Counsel 
statute, the Attorney General applied, and received, the 
authorization for the jurisdiction of the OIC. Discovery in the 
Jones v. Clinton case involving Ms. Lewinsky was then stayed at 
the request of the OIC,31 which means that Ms. Jones 
was prevented from establishing facts that may have been 
otherwise obtainable through Ms. Lewinsky. The criminal 
investigation commenced,32 and the results of that 
investigation were reported to Congress as required by 28 
U.S.C. 595(c).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \28\ Linda Tripp was also a witness in the OIC open investigation 
regarding the White House travel office firings and the FBI files.
    \29\ OIC Referral at 3.
    \30\ Id. The Attorney General also received information regarding 
Ms. Lewinsky's job search and the possible involvement of Vernon 
Jordan. Id. These allegations were similar to allegations in the 
ongoing Whitewater investigation regarding possible ``hush money'' paid 
to former Deputy Attorney General Webster Hubbel in which Vernon Jordan 
was involved. Id.
    \31\ Id. at 4; see also Jones v. Clinton, 993 F. Supp. 1217 (1998). 
The court which granted the Independent Counsel's motion for limited 
intervention and stay of discovery based its decision on three grounds. 
Jones v. Clinton, 993 F. Supp. at 1219-1220. Specifically, the court 
determined that allowing the evidence of the Lewinsky investigation to 
be used in the Jones case might be unduly prejudicial to the President; 
see Fed. R. Evid. 403; and might be excluded by the trial judge based 
on Ms. Jones' burden in proving her sexual harassment claim. Jones, 993 
F. Supp. at 1219. Further, the court determined that the trial must be 
conducted as expeditiously as possible. Id. Lastly, the court noted 
that the integrity of the independent criminal investigation warranted 
excluding evidence concerning Ms. Lewinsky. Id. The court determined 
that the risk of exposing information obtained in the pending criminal 
investigation outweighed the plaintiff's right to include such 
information. Id. at 1220.
    \32\ The Independent Counsel was granted jurisdiction to 
investigate whether Monica Lewinsky or others suborned perjury, 
obstructed justice, intimidated witnesses, or otherwise violated 
federal law. OIC Referral, Appendices, Part I, H. Doc. 105-311, at 6-7 
(1998) [hereinafter H. Doc. 105-311]. Additionally, it had the 
authority to investigate federal crimes, obstruction of justice, and 
any material false testimony in violation of criminal law. Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

              IV. The Findings of the Independent Counsel

    In his testimony before the House Judiciary Committee, the 
Independent Counsel explained how the relationship between the 
President and Ms. Lewinsky became a matter of public 
concern.33 First, the President was a defendant in a 
sexual harassment case which the Supreme Court ordered to 
proceed even though the defendant is a sitting 
President.34 Second, ``the law of sexual harassment 
and the law of evidence allow the plaintiff to inquire into the 
defendant's relationships with other women in the workplace, 
which in this case included President Clinton's relationship 
with Ms. Lewinsky.'' 35 Third, Judge Wright rejected 
the President's objections to such questions.36 
Fourth, perjury and obstruction of justice are federal crimes 
in civil cases, including sexual harassment cases.37 
Fifth, ``the evidence suggests that the President and Ms. 
Lewinsky made false statements under oath and obstructed the 
judicial process in the Jones v. Clinton case by preventing the 
court from obtaining the truth about their relationship.'' 
38
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \33\ See Statement of Independent Counsel Kenneth W. Starr Before 
the House Judiciary Committee, 105th Cong., 2nd Sess. 9-10 (1998).
    \34\ Id. at 9. See also Jones v. Clinton, 117 S.Ct. 1636 (1997).
    \35\ Statement of Independent Counsel Kenneth W. Starr Before the 
House Judiciary Committee, 105th Cong., 2nd Sess. 9 (1998).
    \36\ Id.
    \37\ Id. at 10; see also United States v. Holland, 22 F.3d 1040, 
1047-48 (11th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1109 (1995) (rejecting 
that perjury is less serious when made in a civil proceeding); United 
States v. McAfee, 8 F.3d 1010, 1013-14 (5th Cir. 1993) (rejecting the 
argument that the perjury statute does not apply to civil depositions).
    \38\ Statement of Independent Counsel Kenneth W. Starr Before the 
House Judiciary Committee, 105th Cong. 2nd Sess. 10 (1998).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

A. Pattern of deception

    The OIC reported to the Committee that between December 5, 
1997, and January 17, 1998, the President engaged in a pattern 
of deceptive behavior.39 According to the Referral 
provided by the OIC, on December 5, 1997, Ms. Jones' attorneys 
identified Ms. Lewinsky as a potential witness in the sexual 
harassment lawsuit, and the President learned this fact within 
a day.40 It is alleged that the President called Ms. 
Lewinsky at 2:00 a.m. on the morning of December 17, 1997, and 
informed her that she was a potential witness.41 
According to Ms. Lewinsky, the President suggested that she 
execute an affidavit to deny a sexual relationship and use 
``cover stories'' or lies to explain why she visited the Oval 
Office on so many occasions.42
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \39\ Id. at 11.
    \40\ Id.
    \41\ Id. at 12.
    \42\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    It is important to note that an affidavit is a legal 
document executed under oath. Yet, the President was suggesting 
that she include falsehoods in the affidavit. The Referral 
states that on that date the President and Ms. Lewinsky thus 
had an agreement to lie in their sworn affidavits.43
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \43\ Id. at 13.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    A defendant in pending litigation suggesting that a 
potential witness in the lawsuit lie in an affidavit to avoid 
being deposed by the plaintiff is a criminal act that flies in 
the face of judicial integrity. Every American has the duty 
when under oath to tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing 
but the truth in civil and criminal investigations.
    Later, on December 23, 1997, the President answered 
interrogatories in the Jones v. Clinton case under 
oath.44 Once again, the President, under oath, 
stated that he had not had sexual relations with any federal 
employees during a particular time frame.45 As we 
now know, in fact the President did have sexual relations with 
a federal employee during the stated time frame. The effect of 
such lies was borne by Ms. Jones, who suffered the injustice of 
not having her day in court; she was precluded from presenting 
all potentially relevant and material evidence to the court.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \44\ Id.
    \45\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    On Sunday, December 28, 1997, the President met with Ms. 
Lewinsky at the White House and discussed the gifts the two had 
exchanged during their relationship.46 ``Ms. 
Lewinsky asked the President `how he thought [she] got put on 
the witness list.' He speculated that Linda Tripp or one of the 
uniformed Secret Service officers had told the Jones' attorneys 
about her. When Ms. Lewinsky mentioned her anxiety about the 
subpoena's reference to a hat pin, he said `that sort of 
bothered [him], too.' He asked whether she had told anyone 
about the hat pin, and she assured him that she had not. At 
some point in the conversation, Ms. Lewinsky told the 
President, `[M]aybe I should put the gifts away outside my 
house somewhere or give them to someone, maybe Betty.' Ms. 
Lewinsky recalled that the President responded either `I don't 
know' or `Let me think about that.' '' 47 According 
to Ms. Lewinsky, later that day the President's secretary, 
Betty Currie, drove to Ms. Lewinsky's home, picked up the 
gifts, and took them to her home where she stored them under 
her bed.48
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \46\ Id. at 14.
    \47\ OIC Referral at 101.
    \48\ Statement of Independent Counsel Kenneth W. Starr Before the 
House Judiciary Committee, 105th Cong. 2nd Sess. 14 (1998).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    It is important to note that these items were under court 
subpoena. They were potential items of evidence in a pending 
case. Once again, the facts here demonstrate intent to 
circumvent the laws. The President testified to the criminal 
grand jury in August that he had no particular concern about 
the gifts, yet the circumstantial evidence and the phone 
records suggest that Ms. Currie was directed to retrieve the 
gifts. Moreover, when asked about the gifts in the deposition 
in January 1998 he stated that he did not recall whether he 
gave Ms. Lewinsky gifts.49
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \49\ Id. at 15.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

B. Ms. Lewinsky's job search when she was a potential witness

    After the Supreme Court held that Ms. Jones was entitled to 
pursue her case against the President, the facts show that the 
President, with the help of his close friend and confidant 
Vernon Jordan, was instrumental in finding Ms. Lewinsky 
employment.50 The evidence presented suggests that 
Vernon Jordan's assistance to Ms. Lewinsky in finding a job was 
intended to placate Ms. Lewinsky or ensure that she would not 
become a witness against the President.51 The 
President wanted to keep Ms. Lewinsky on his side of the sexual 
harassment suit. If Ms. Lewinsky abandoned their ``cover 
stories,'' the lies they used to keep the affair a secret, the 
President would have been vulnerable in legal and political 
respects, as will be discussed below.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \50\ Id. at 16.
    \51\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

C. Fraud upon the court

    The evidence shows that in mid-January Ms. Lewinsky 
submitted a false affidavit in the Jones v. Clinton case in 
accordance with the ``cover stories'' she and the President 
discussed.52 The President requested to see the 
affidavit before appearing for his deposition on January 17 and 
even stated during the deposition that he was ``fully 
familiar'' with the contents of Ms. Lewinsky's 
affidavit.53 The evidence presented shows that the 
President allowed his attorney to attest to the truthfulness of 
Ms. Lewinsky's affidavit, and thus inform the court that 
``there [was] absolutely no sex of any kind in any manner, 
shape, or form'' between the President and Ms. Lewinsky when he 
knew such information to be false. Such silence is a fraud upon 
the court. Further, the President was untruthful in the 
deposition when he testified that Ms. Lewinsky's affidavit was 
``absolutely true.'' 54 Thus, the evidence shows 
that the President engaged in a pattern of behavior designed to 
deceive the court in the Jones v. Clinton case through his own 
deception and that of Ms. Lewinsky.55
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \52\ Id. at 17.
    \53\ Id.
    \54\ OIC referral at 15. ``The President made false statements not 
only about his intimate relationship with Ms. Lewinsky, but about a 
whole host of matters. The President testified that he did not know 
that Vernon Jordan had met with Ms. Lewinsky and talked about the Jones 
v. Clinton case. That was untrue. He testified that he could not recall 
being alone with Ms. Lewinsky. That was untrue. He testified that he 
could not recall ever being in the Oval Office hallway with Ms. 
Lewinsky except perhaps when she was delivering pizza. That was untrue. 
He testified that he could not recall gifts exchanged between Ms. 
Lewinsky and him. That was untrue. He testified--after a 14 second 
pause--that he was ``not sure'' whether he had ever talked to Ms. 
Lewinsky about the possibility that she might be asked to testify in 
the lawsuit. That was untrue. The President testified that he did not 
know whether Ms. Lewinsky had been served a subpoena at the time he 
last saw her in December 1997. That was untrue. When his attorney read 
Ms. Lewinsky's affidavit denying a sexual relationship, the President 
stated that the affidavit was ``absolutely true.'' That was untrue.'' 
Id. at 18-19.
    \55\ Id. at 19.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The facts also show that the President attempted to coach 
Ms. Currie after his deposition.56 In regard to his 
relationship with Ms. Lewinsky the President stated to Ms. 
Currie: ``you were always there when she was there, right? ``We 
were never really alone,'' ``you could see and hear 
everything,'' and ``She wanted to have sex with me and I 
couldn't do that.'' 57 Ms. Currie testified that he 
reiterated these instructions again on either January 20 or 
21.58
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \56\ Id. at 20.
    \57\ Id.
    \58\ Id. at 21.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

D. Damage control

    After the relationship involving Ms. Lewinsky became public 
on January 21, 1998, the President's former media consultant, 
Dick Morris, called the President to show his 
empathy.59 Mr. Morris suggested the President 
confess.60 ``The President replied, `But what about 
the legal thing? You know the legal thing? You know, Starr and 
perjury and all' . . . Mr. Morris [suggested he conduct a poll 
and he] called [the President] with the results [of the poll]. 
He stated that the American people were willing to forgive 
adultery but not perjury or obstruction of justice. The 
President replied, `Well, we just have to win, then.' '' 
61
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \59\ Id. at 22. Mr. Morris then conducted a poll to gauge public 
opinion. Questions in the poll included the following: ``13. If 
President Clinton did lie and encouraged Monica to lie, do you think he 
should be removed from office? [the numbers ``48-41'' were written 
below the question] 14. If President Clinton lied, he committed the 
crime of perjury. If he encouraged Monica to lie, he committed the 
crime of obstruction of justice. In view of these facts, do you think 
President Clinton should be removed from office? [the numbers ``60-30'' 
were written below the question]'' OIC Referral, part 2, H. Doc. 106-
316, at 2956 (1998)[hereinafter H. Doc. 106-316].
    \60\ Statement of Independent Counsel Kenneth W. Starr Before the 
House Judiciary Committee, 105th Cong., 2nd Sess. 21 (1998).
    \61\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The President then engaged in a full scale attack on truth 
and honesty. On January 26, 1998, the President wagged his 
finger at the American people and denied a sexual relationship 
with ``that woman, Ms. Lewinsky.'' He promised to cooperate 
with the investigation, yet he refused six requests to testify 
before the grand jury over a period of six months. He lied to 
his aides about the nature of his relationship with Ms. 
Lewinsky. Some of these aides then testified before the grand 
jury and unwittingly perpetuated these falsehoods. They also 
repeated the falsehoods in the public, the press and to some 
Members of Congress, who in turn began to characterize her as 
``a stalker,'' a ``poor child . . . with serious emotional 
problems,'' and ``she's fantasizing. And I haven't heard she 
played with a full deck in other experiences,'' and other 
similar comments.62 Chief Investigative Counsel 
David Schippers accused the White House of employing ``the full 
power and credibility of the White House and the press corps to 
destroy'' Ms. Lewinsky. This tactic was also used to attack the 
credibility of Paula Jones, the plaintiff in Jones v. Clinton. 
These actions by the President demonstrate a clear intent to 
mislead and impede the pursuit of the truth.63 It is 
worth noting that sources within the White House stopped these 
vicious rumors when there rumors that Ms. Lewinsky saved her 
blue dress stained with semen.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \62\ Rep. Charles Rangel, Democrat of New York.
    \63\ Id. at 23.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

E. Grand jury testimony on August 17, 1998 64
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \64\ It is important to note that the Independent Counsel received 
permission from the United States Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia Circuit to disclose grand jury materials in accordance with 
its duty to report to Congress under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 595(c). OIC 
Referral 5 n.18. Generally, disclosure of grand jury testimony is 
prohibited under Rule 6(e) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. 
See Fed. R. Crim. P. 6 (e).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Finally, when the President appeared before the federal 
criminal grand jury on August 17, 1998,65 he 
testified that he did not lie in his civil 
deposition.66 He also ``denied any conduct that 
would establish that he had lied under oath at his civil 
deposition. The President thus denied certain conduct with Ms. 
Lewinsky and devised a variety of tortured and false 
definitions.'' 67
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \65\ The President was admonished by members of the Senate as to 
the absolute requirement that the President answer the questions put to 
him truthfully. Senator Hatch stated: ``So help me, if he lies before 
the grand jury, that will be grounds for impeachment.'' Id. at 28. 
Similarly, Senator Moynihan stated that perjury before a grand jury is 
an impeachable offense. Id.
    \66\ Id.
    \67\ Id. Members on the Judiciary Committee have stated that the 
President was dishonest before the Grand Jury. Id. Senator-elect 
Schumer stated, ``it is clear that the President lied when he testified 
before the grand jury.'' Id. Congressman Meehan stated that the 
President ``engaged in a dangerous game of verbal Twister.'' Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Thus, over the eight-month period at issue, evidence has 
been presented that the President: made false statements under 
oath in a civil deposition, made false statements before a 
criminal grand jury, made false statements to his Cabinet and 
other professional staff, tampered with witnesses, obstructed 
justice by tampering with items under subpoena, and attempted 
to hide under a veil of Presidential authority to conceal the 
relationship and protect himself from 
investigation.68
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \68\ Id. at 29.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

F. The allegations are supported by evidence

    Physical evidence establishes the relationship between the 
President and Ms. Lewinsky. DNA tests conducted on semen stains 
from Ms. Lewinsky's clothing indicate that the President was 
the source of the semen.69 The tests demonstrated 
that the ``genetic markers on the semen, which match the 
President's DNA, are characteristic of one out of 7.87 trillion 
Caucasians.70
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \69\ OIC Referral at 11.
    \70\ Id. at 12.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The allegations are also supported by extensive de-briefing 
of Ms. Lewinsky.71 An initial interview was 
conducted with Ms. Lewinsky on July 27, 1998, to evaluate her 
credibility.72 She was further interviewed over 
fifteen days, and provided testimony under oath on three 
occasions.73 The OIC Referral states that: ``[i]n 
the evaluation of experienced prosecutors and investigators, 
Ms. Lewinsky has provided truthful information. She has not 
falsely inculpated the President. Harming him, she has 
testified, is ``the last thing in the world I want to do.' '' 
74
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \71\ Id.
    \72\ Id.
    \73\ Id.
    \74\ Id. It is important to note that Ms. Lewinsky engaged in a 
cooperation agreement that includes safeguards to ensure that she tells 
the truth. Id. Under the cooperation agreement her immunity could be 
removed altogether by a federal district judge if it is found by a 
preponderance of the evidence that she lied. The ``preponderance'' 
standard, in basic terms, is comparable to a ``more likely than not'' 
standard and is not as difficult to prove as the ``beyond a reasonable 
doubt'' standard. Thus, if a federal judge finds that she lied, she 
could be punished to the fullest extent of the law.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Testimony and information from numerous confidants of Ms. 
Lewinsky also provided information to the Independent 
Counsel.75 Approximately eleven individuals received 
contemporaneous information from Ms. Lewinsky about her 
involvement with the President.76 These individuals 
were questioned. Many of them provided testimony under oath 
before a federal grand jury.77 Documents also lend 
support to Ms. Lewinsky's account.78
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \75\ Id. at 13.
    \76\ Id.
    \77\ Id.
    \78\ Id. at 14.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

                          V. Violations of Law

    This constitutional inquiry is not about sex or private 
conduct. This inquiry is about enforcing the law and 
demonstrating that: multiple obstructions of justice, multiple 
instances of perjury, the practice of engaging in false and 
misleading statements to the court, and witness tampering are 
attacks on the integrity of our system of justice.
    As stated by Mr. Schippers, Chief Investigative Counsel, 
before the Judiciary Committee on December 10, 1998, ``the real 
issues are whether the President of the United States testified 
falsely under oath; whether he engaged in a continuing plot to 
obstruct justice, to hide evidence, to tamper with witnesses 
and to abuse the power of his office in furtherance of that 
plot. The ultimate issue is whether the President's course of 
conduct is such as to affect adversely the Office of the 
Presidency by bringing scandal and disrespect upon it and also 
upon the administration of justice, and whether he has acted in 
a manner contrary to his trust as President and subversive to 
the Rule of Law and Constitutional government.''

                               A. Perjury

1. Grand Jury Perjury--18 U.S.C. Sec. 1623

    The grand jury process is an integral part of our criminal 
justice system. The Fifth Amendment assures that grand jury 
proceedings are a prerequisite to federal criminal charges and 
prosecution; ``no person shall be held to answer for a capital, 
or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or 
indictment of a grand jury.'' The grand jury engages in a truth 
finding mission.
    Grand juries have the power to direct an investigation, and 
therefore counteract ``suspicions of corruption and 
partisanship in criminal law enforcement.'' 79 The 
importance of the grand jury function is underscored by the 
fact that perjury in grand jury and court proceedings is 
discussed separately than perjury in general.80 The 
Supreme Court has noted the gravity of perjury:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \79\ Wayne R. LaFave & Jerold H. Israel, Criminal Procedure 
Sec. 8.6 (2d. ed. 1992).
    \80\ See 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1623; cf 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1621.

          In this constitutional process of securing a witness' 
        testimony, perjury simply has no place whatever. 
        Perjured testimony is an obvious and flagrant affront 
        to the basic concepts of judicial proceedings. 
        Effective restraints against the type of egregious 
        offense are therefore imperative. The power of 
        subpoena, broad as it is, and the power of contempt for 
        refusing to answer, drastic as that is--and the 
        solemnity of the oath--cannot insure truthful answers. 
        Hence Congress has made the giving of false answers a 
        criminal act punishable by severe penalties; in no 
        other way can criminal conduct be flushed into the open 
        where the law can deal with it.
          Similarly, our cases have consistently--indeed 
        without exception--allowed sanction for false statement 
        or perjury; they have done so even in instances where 
        the perjurer complained that the Government exceeded 
        its constitutional powers in making the 
        inquiry.81
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \81\ United States v. Mandujano, 425 U.S. 564, 576-
77(1976)(plurality opinion)(footnote and citations omitted).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

2. Perjury In General--18 U.S.C. Sec. 1621

    Perjury consists of providing false testimony as to 
material facts while under oath: ``The essential elements of 
the crime of perjury as defined in 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1621 . . . 
are (1) an oath authorized by a law of the United States, (2) 
taken before a competent tribunal, officer, or person, and (3) 
a false statement willfully made as to facts material to the 
hearing.'' 82 Materiality is based on the 
circumstances and context in which the statement was 
made.83 There are no exceptions to perjury for 
sexual matters.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \82\ United States v. Hvass, 355 U.S. 570, 574 (1958)(internal 
quotation marks omitted); see also 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1621. Section 1621 
carries a penalty of fines or imprisonment for up to five years.
    \83\ See, e.g., United States v. Holley, 942 F.2d 916, 923 (5th 
Cir. 1991)(``the government must prove that Holley's statements were, 
at the time made, material to the proceeding in which his deposition 
was taken.'' (emphasis added.)); United States v. Martinez, 855 F.2d 
621, 624 (9th Cir. 1988)(``The proper test is to judge materiality in 
terms of its potential for obstructing justice at the time the 
statement is made . . ..'' (emphasis added)); United States v. Percell, 
526 F.2d 189, 190 (9th Cir. 1975).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Some have argued that perjury is less important in civil 
cases and is rarely prosecuted. Such assertions are 
misguided.84 As stated by the United States Court of 
Appeals for the 11th Circuit, ``we categorically reject any 
suggestion, implicit or otherwise, that perjury is somehow less 
serious when made in a civil proceeding. Perjury, regardless of 
the setting, is a serious offense that results in incalculable 
harm to the functioning and integrity of the legal system as 
well as to private individuals.'' 85 In fact, this 
year the Justice Department prosecuted a woman for perjury 
pertaining to a sexual relationship.86 The woman, 
Ms. Battalino, testified before the Judiciary Committee. She 
was sentenced to one year home detention and fined $3500 in 
court costs.87
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \84\ See, e.g., United States v. Wilkinson, 137 F.3d 214 (4th Cir. 
1998)(perjury in civil deposition); United States v. Kersey, 130 F.3d 
1463 (11th Cir. 1997)(perjury in civil deposition and affidavit); 
United States v. Sassanelli, 118 F.3d 495 (6th Cir. 1997)(perjury in 
civil affidavit); Virgin Islands v. Davis, 43 F.3d 41 (3rd Cir. 1994), 
cert. denied, 515 U.S. 1123 (1995)(perjury in civil case); United 
States v. Thompson, 29 F.3d 62 (2d Cir. 1994)(perjury in bankruptcy 
proceeding); United States v. Chaplin, 25 F.3d 1373 (7th Cir. 
1994)(perjury in bankruptcy deposition); United States v. Nebel, 16 
F.3d 1222, 1994 WL 12647 (6th Cir. 1994)(unpublished)(perjury in civil 
deposition); United States v. Kross, 14 F.3d 751 (2d Cir.), cert. 
denied, 513 U.S. 828 (1994)(perjury in civil deposition); United States 
v. Markiewicz, 978 F.2d 786 (2d cir. 1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1086 
(1993)(perjury in civil deposition); United States v. Clark, 918 F.2d 
843 (9th Cir. 1990)(perjury in civil deposition); United States v. Cox, 
859 F.2d 151 (4th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1044 
(1989)(unpublished)(perjury in civil trial); United States v. Holley, 
942 F.2d 916 (5th Cir. 1991)(perjury in civil deposition).
    \85\ United States v. Holland, 22 F.3d 1040, 1047-48 (11th Cir. 
1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1109 (1995)(emphasis added); see also 
United States v. McAfee, 8 F.3d 1010, 1013-14 (5th Cir. 1993)(rejecting 
the argument that the perjury statute does not apply to civil 
depositions ``[t]here is no real substantive difference between federal 
civil and federal criminal proceedings [in regard to perjury].'').
    \86\ United States v. Battalino, Case No. CR-98-038-S-EJL (D. 
Idaho); see also David Tell, Bill Clinton: This Precedent's For You, 
The Weekly Standard, June 22, 1998, at 9.
    \87\ David Tell, Contagious Corruption, The Weekly Standard, August 
3, 1998, at 9.
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                     B. THE ARTICLES OF IMPEACHMENT

(1) Article I--Grand Jury Perjury
    In his conduct while President of the United States, 
William Jefferson Clinton, in violation of his constitutional 
oath faithfully to execute the office of President of the 
United States and, to the best of his ability, preserve, 
protect, and defend the Constitution of the United States, and 
in violation of his constitutional duty to take care that the 
laws be faithfully executed, has willfully corrupted and 
manipulated the judicial process of the United States for his 
personal gain and exoneration, impeding the administration of 
justice, in that:
    On August 17, 1998, William Jefferson Clinton swore to tell 
the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth before a 
Federal grand jury of the United States. Contrary to that oath, 
William Jefferson Clinton willfully provided perjurious, false 
and misleading testimony to the grand jury concerning one or 
more of the following: (1) the nature and details of his 
relationship with a subordinate Government employee; (2) prior 
perjurious, false and misleading testimony he gave in a Federal 
civil rights action brought against him; (3) prior false and 
misleading statements he allowed his attorney to make to a 
Federal judge in that civil rights action; and (4) his corrupt 
efforts to influence the testimony of witnesses and to impede 
the discovery of evidence in that civil rights action.
    In doing this, William Jefferson Clinton has undermined the 
integrity of his office, has brought disrepute on the 
Presidency, has betrayed his trust as President, and has acted 
in a manner subversive of the rule of law and justice, to the 
manifest injury of the people of the United States.
    Wherefore, William Jefferson Clinton, by such conduct, 
warrants impeachment and trial, and removal from office and 
disqualification to hold and enjoy any office of honor, trust, 
or profit under the United States.

    Article I passed the Judiciary Committee by a vote of 21 to 
16 on December 11, 1998. I voted in support of its passage.
    In the drafting of the Articles of Impeachment, I 
successfully convinced my colleagues to separate the perjurious 
conduct of the President into two separate articles, making 
Article I pertain to grand jury perjury, while making all other 
perjurious statements into a separate article, Article II. The 
grand jury system, which common law refers to as the 
``peoples'' panel'' to serve as the community's watchdog, has 
screening and investigative functions to develop evidence in 
search of the sometimes painful truth with unbridled candor. 
Throughout legal history, defense lawyers have been critics, 
often attacking the prosecutor and the process, wherein a grand 
jury's broad investigative power and independence are linked 
with criminal procedure, by calling it an ``inquisitorial 
element.''
    ``The Supreme Court has described the grand jury's 
authority to compel testimony as `[a]mong the necessary and 
most important of the powers . . . [that] assure the effective 
functioning of government in an ordered society.' '' 
88 For this reason, it is proper that the first 
Article of Impeachment cite grand jury perjury.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \88\ Wayne R. LaFave & Jerold H. Israel, criminal procedure 
Sec. 8.6 (2d. ed. 1992)(citation omitted).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The specific allegations contained in the first article are 
that the President provided perjurious, false and misleading 
testimony to the grand jury on August 17, 1998, regarding: the 
nature and details of his relationship with Ms. Lewinsky; prior 
perjurious, false and misleading testimony he gave in a Federal 
civil rights action brought against him; prior false and 
misleading statements he allowed his attorney to make to a 
Federal judge in that civil rights action; and his corrupt 
efforts to influence the testimony of witnesses and to impede 
the discovery of evidence in that civil rights 
action.89
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \89\ H. Res. ------, 105th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1998).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
            a. The President Willfully Provided Perjurious, False and 
                    Misleading Testimony To The Grand Jury Concerning 
                    the Nature and Details of The Relationship With A 
                    Subordinate Government Employee.
    The evidence presented demonstrates that President Clinton 
committed perjury before the grand jury on August 17, 1998. The 
President gave false and misleading testimony before the grand 
jury regarding his conduct with a subordinate federal employee 
who was a witness in the federal civil rights action brought 
against him. A key inquiry, which could demonstrate perjury in 
the civil deposition and in responses to interrogatories from 
the OIC, was whether the President had a sexual relationship 
with Ms. Lewinsky as defined in Jones v. Clinton.
    The President lied before the grand jury three times. 
First, the President stated that oral sex was not included in 
the definition of sexual relations employed in the Jones v. 
Clinton deposition.90 It is an incredible torture of 
words for the President to assert that oral sex would not fall 
under ``sexual relationship,'' ``sexual relations,'' or a 
``sexual affair.'' The President interpreted the definition of 
sexual relations to mean that one who is receiving a sexual 
favor, or engaged in activity short of sexual intercourse, is 
not involved in sexual relations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \90\ Oic Referral at 148.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Second, even if the definition of sexual relations as it 
was understood by the President is employed, the President 
engaged in sexual relations with Ms. Lewinsky. The thrust of 
the President's understanding of the definition of the sex is 
that if the witness was the person who was touched, rather than 
provided the touching, then the conduct does not fall under the 
definition of sexual relations. Substantial and credible 
evidence shows that on numerous occasions the President did in 
fact touch Ms. Lewinsky as defined by the court in Jones v. 
Clinton. In fact, Ms. Lewinsky testified under oath that she 
had ten sexual encounters with the President, while several of 
Ms. Lewinsky's friends, family members and counselors testified 
that she had informed them of a sexual relationship during the 
pertinent time period. Another item of evidence includes the 
DNA test. Yet, before the grand jury, the President lied by 
stating he did not engage in sexual relations with Ms. 
Lewinsky.
    Third, the President made a false statement as to when his 
relationship with Ms. Lewinsky began.91 Before the 
grand jury the President testified that the relationship did 
not begin until 1996, when Ms. Lewinsky was a White House 
employee.92 However, corroborated evidence shows 
that the affair began during the government shut-down of 
November, 1995, when she was only a 22 year old 
intern.93 According to Ms. Lewinsky's testimony, 
after first sexual encounter the President tugged on her intern 
badge and stated that her status as an intern could be a 
problem.94
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \91\ Id. at 149.
    \92\ Id.
    \93\ Id.
    \94\ Id. at 150.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Facing such dire circumstances, the President decided to 
evade the truth before the grand jury. He admitted to an 
``inappropriate intimate relationship'' with Lewinsky but 
denied that he lied in the Jones v. Clinton deposition when he 
said he did not have sexual relations with Ms. 
Lewinsky.95 The President did not want to admit that 
he had oral sex with a 22 year-old White House intern.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \95\ OIC Referral at 146-50.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The extensive details of the sexual contacts between the 
President and Ms. Lewinsky was important to this investigation, 
because it is only through an examination of precisely what sex 
acts occurred that one can determine whether the President 
lied. Based on the detailed information provided by Ms. 
Lewinsky, as well as physical evidence such as DNA evidence, it 
is clear the President and Ms. Lewinsky engaged in sexual 
relations under the definition used in the Jones v. Clinton 
case.
    During the grand jury inquiry, ``the President was asked 
whether Ms. Lewinsky performed oral sex on him, and if so, 
whether he committed perjury by denying a sexual relationship, 
sexual affair, or sexual relations with her. The President 
refused to say whether he had oral sex. Instead, the President 
said (i) that the undefined terms ``sexual affair,'' ``sexual 
relationship,'' and ``sexual relations'' necessarily require 
sexual intercourse, (ii) that he had not engaged in intercourse 
with Ms. Lewinsky, and (iii) that he therefore had not 
committed perjury in denying a sexual relationship, sexual 
affair, or sexual relations.'' 96
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \96\ Id. at 146.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The President's defense relies on a twisted, and hair-
splitting interpretation of sexual relations. Such a contrived 
interpretation of the statute flies in the face of testimony 
which provides ``the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but 
the truth.''
    If the President admitted a sexual relationship with Ms. 
Lewinsky before the grand jury, he would have revealed that he 
lied in the prior proceeding and in his responses to 
interrogatories. Such concessions would have made him 
vulnerable as a defendant in the civil rights lawsuit filed by 
Paula Jones, whose appeal was pending, and would have 
jeopardized his family structure, and would have caused 
enormous embarrassment to his family and personal integrity. 
Thus, in context, the President had motive to lie. In fact, 
before the Judiciary Committee the White House counsel Mr. 
Craig stated: ``the President's testimony was evasive, 
incomplete, misleading, and even maddening.'' Those facts in 
evidence, coupled with the President's demeanor and motive to 
lie, comprise compelling evidence as to his state of mind that 
he willfully gave false testimony to the grand jury.
            b. The President Willfully Provided Perjurious, False and 
                    Misleading Testimony to the Grand Jury Regarding 
                    Prior Perjurious, False and Misleading Testimony 
                    Provided in A Federal Civil Rights Action Brought 
                    Against Him
    The President made a false and misleading statement before 
the grand jury when he asserted that the testimony he gave in 
his deposition taken as a part of the civil rights action 
brought against him in Jones v. Clinton was truthful.
    Throughout his grand jury testimony, the President 
acknowledged his oath and recognized that he was bound to tell 
the truth during the January 17, 1998, deposition in the Jones 
v. Clinton case, as well as his testimony before the grand jury 
on August 17, 1998. The record reflects that he lied.
    In contrast to his assertions to testify truthfully when 
deposed on January 17, 1998, and before the grand jury on 
August 17, 1998, the record reflects that the President lied, 
thereby committing grand jury perjury.
            c. The President Willfully Provided Perjurious, False and 
                    Misleading Testimony to the Grand Jury Regarding 
                    Prior False And Misleading Statements He Allowed 
                    His Attorney To Make To A Federal Judge In That 
                    Civil Rights Action Brought Against Him
    Ms. Lewinsky's affidavit stated that she and the President 
had no sexual relations at any time. The evidence shows that 
the President was aware of Ms. Lewinsky's affidavit. Ms. 
Lewinsky's attorney, Mr. Frank Carter, worked closely with the 
President's attorney, Mr. Bennett, to ensure the affidavit was 
filed with the court prior to the civil 
deposition.97 The President allowed his attorney to 
represent to a federal judge that Ms. Lewinsky's affidavit was 
true and accurate. Thus, the President sat back and allowed his 
attorney to report facts to the court which he knew to be 
false.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \97\ OIC Referral at 174.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The President argues that he was unaware of what his 
attorney was doing at the time and therefore did not allow his 
attorney to represent false information to the court. Yet, Mr. 
Schippers presentation of the videotape of the deposition shows 
that the President was closely following the actions and 
arguments of his attorney. Furthermore it is incredulous to 
assert that at the time the court was arguing whether to open 
``Pandora's Box'' the President was unaware of his attorney's 
actions. As stated, truthful information about his relationship 
with Ms. Lewinsky was potentially disastrous to the President: 
it would demonstrate he lied in interrogatories answered in 
December; it would have made him vulnerable as a defendant in a 
civil rights sexual harassment lawsuit; it would have greatly 
embarrassed his family; and, it tarnish his political standing.
    During the grand jury testimony the President was asked 
about the deposition. The President argued that when his 
attorney, Mr. Bennett, informed the court that there ``is no 
sex of any kind . . . '' Mr. Bennett was speaking only in the 
present tense. The President stated, ``It depends upon what the 
meaning of ``is'' is, and that ``if it means there is none, 
that was a completely true statement.'' \98\ President Clinton 
is guilty of what C.S. Lewis called ``verbicide,'' murder of 
the plain spoken word. His attempt to invoke the literal truth 
defense fails under the reasonableness test.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \98\ OIC Referral, Part I at 476-77.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    As stated in the OIC Referral regarding sworn testimony in 
the affidavit and its use:

        Monica Lewinsky testified that President Clinton called 
        her around 2:00 to 2:30 a.m. on December 17, 1997, and 
        told her that her name was on the Jones case witness 
        list. As noted in her February 1 handwritten statement: 
        `When asked what to do if she was subpoenaed, the Pres. 
        [sic] suggested she could sign an affidavit . . . ' Ms. 
        Lewinsky said she is `100% sure' that the President 
        suggested that she might want to sign an affidavit.
        Ms. Lewinsky understood the President's advice to mean 
        that she might be able to execute an affidavit that 
        would not disclose the true nature of their 
        relationship. In order `to prevent me from being 
        deposed,' she said she would need an affidavit that 
        `could range from anywhere between maybe just somehow 
        mentioning, you know, innocuous things or going as far 
        as maybe having to deny any kind of relationship.'
        Ms. Lewinsky stated that the President never explicitly 
        told her to lie. Instead, as she explained, they both 
        understood from their conversations that they would 
        continue their pattern of covering up and lying about 
        the relationship. In that regard, the President never 
        said they must now tell the truth under oath; to the 
        contrary, as Ms. Lewinsky stated: `[I]t wasn't as if 
        the President called me and said, `You know, Monica, 
        you're on the witness list, this is going to be really 
        hard for us, we're going to have to tell the truth and 
        be humiliated in front of the entire world about what 
        we've done,' which I would have fought him on probably. 
        That was different. And by him not calling me and 
        saying that, you know, I knew what that meant.'
        Ms. Jones's lawyers served Ms. Lewinsky with a subpoena 
        on December 19, 1997. Ms. Lewinsky contacted Vernon 
        Jordan, who in turn put her in contact with attorney 
        Frank Carter. Based on the information that Ms. 
        Lewinsky provided, Mr. Carter prepared an affidavit 
        which stated: `I have never had a sexual relationship 
        with the President.'
        After Mr. Carter drafted the affidavit, Ms. Lewinsky 
        spoke to the President by phone on January 5th. She 
        asked the President if he wanted to see the draft 
        affidavit. According to Ms. Lewinsky, the President 
        replied that he did not need to see it because he had 
        already `seen 15 others.'
        Mr. Jordan confirmed that President Clinton knew that 
        Ms. Lewinsky planned to execute an affidavit denying a 
        sexual relationship. Mr. Jordan further testified that 
        he informed President Clinton when Ms. Lewinsky signed 
        the affidavit. Ms. Lewinsky's affidavit was sent to the 
        federal court in Arkansas on January 16, 1998--the day 
        before the President's deposition--as part of her 
        motion to quash the deposition subpoena.
        Two days before the President's deposition, his lawyer, 
        Robert Bennett, obtained a copy of Ms. Lewinsky's 
        affidavit from Mr. Carter. At the President's 
        deposition, Ms. Jones's counsel asked questions about 
        the President's relationship with Ms. Lewinsky. Mr. 
        Bennett objected to the `innuendo' of the questions, 
        noting that Ms. Lewinsky had signed an affidavit 
        denying a sexual relationship, which according to Mr. 
        Bennett, indicated that `there is absolutely no sex of 
        any kind in any manner, shape or form.' Mr. Bennett 
        said that the President was `fully aware of Ms. 
        Lewinsky's affidavit.' Mr. Bennett affirmatively used 
        the affidavit in an effort to cut off questioning. The 
        President said nothing--even though, as he knew, the 
        affidavit was false. Judge Wright overruled the 
        objection and allowed the questioning to continue.
        Later, Mr. Bennett read Ms. Lewinsky's affidavit 
        denying a `sexual relationship' to the President and 
        asked him: `Is that a true and accurate statement as 
        far as you know it?' The President answered, `That is 
        absolutely true.'\99\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \99\ OIC Referral at 173-75.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
            d. The President Willfully Provided Perjurious, False and 
                    Misleading Testimony to the Grand Jury Regarding 
                    His Corrupt Efforts To Influence The Testimony Of 
                    Witnesses And To Impede The Discovery Of Evidence 
                    In That Civil Rights Action
            1. The President Gave False and Misleading Testimony Before 
                    the Grand Jury When He Denied Engaging in a Plan to 
                    Hide Evidence that had been Subpoenaed in the 
                    Federal Civil Rights Action Against Him
    Starting in November 1995, the President engaged in sexual 
relations with Ms. Lewinsky. In order to keep the relationship 
a secret, they devised ``cover stories.'' As discussed, on 
December 5, 1997, Ms. Jones' attorneys identified Ms. Lewinsky 
as a potential witness in the case, and the President learned 
this fact within a day.\100\ The President then called Ms. 
Lewinsky at 2:00 a.m. on the morning of December 17, 1997, and 
informed her that she was a potential witness.\101\ According 
to Ms. Lewinsky, the President suggested that she execute an 
affidavit to avoid a deposition, and that they continue with 
the usual ``cover stories'' to explain why she visited the oval 
office on so many occasions.\102\ The ``cover stories'' were 
lies. The President suggested to a potential witness in a 
federal civil rights case to lie.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \100\Id.
    \101\ Id. at 12.
    \102\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    As to the discovery of evidence in the Jones v. Clinton 
case, according to the evidence presented by the OIC, Ms. 
Lewinsky gave the President approximately 38 gifts. On December 
28, 1997, the President and Ms. Lewinsky had a conversation 
about the gifts they exchanged, Ms. Lewinsky said: `` `I 
mentioned that I had been concerned about the hat pin being on 
the subpoena and [the President] said that that had sort of 
concerned him also and asked me if I had told anyone that he 
had given me this hat pin and I said no.'' \103\ Ms. Currie 
also testified to having had conversations with the President 
about certain gifts.\104\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \103\ Id. at 156.
    \104\ Id. 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    That day, the Sunday after Christmas, Ms. Currie went over 
to Ms. Lewinsky's home and retrieved a box of gifts from her. 
She took the gifts home and hid them under her bed.
    It is unreasonable to believe that a young former White 
House intern would have the clout to summon the secretary to 
the President of the United States to her house on the Sunday 
after Christmas in order to pick up personal gifts so that she 
could hide them under her bed. Reasonable people do not 
subscribe to the absurd. These gifts were all under subpoena in 
the Jones v. Clinton case. The facts surrounding the retrieval 
of the gifts lead a reasonable person to the conclusion that 
Ms. Currie was instructed to do so by the President.
    President Clinton testified before the grand jury, and 
reiterated to the Judiciary Committee in Request for Admission 
No. 26, that he did not recall any conversation with Ms. Currie 
on or about December 28 1997, about gifts previously given to 
Ms. Lewinsky and that he never told Ms. Currie to take 
possession of the gifts he had given to Ms. Lewinsky.\105\ This 
answer is false and misleading because the evidence reveals 
that Betty Currie did place a call to Monica Lewinsky about the 
gifts and there is no reason for her to do so unless instructed 
by the President. Because she did not personally know of the 
gift issue, there is no other way Ms. Currie could have known 
to call Ms. Lewinsky about the gifts unless the President told 
her to do so. The President had a motive to conceal the gifts 
because both he and Ms. Lewinsky were concerned that the gifts 
might raise questions about their relationship. By confirming 
that the gifts would not be produced, the President ensured 
that these questions would not arise. The concealment and non-
production of the gifts to the attorneys' for Paula Jones 
allowed the President to provide false and misleading 
statements about the gifts at his deposition in the case of 
Jones v. Clinton. Additionally, Ms. Lewinsky's testimony on 
this subject has been consistent and unequivocal; she provided 
the same facts in February, July and August. Betty Currie's 
cell phone records show that she placed a one minute call to 
Monica Lewinsky on the afternoon of December 28th.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \105\ H. Doc. 105-311, at 502.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
            2. The President Made False and Misleading Statements 
                    Before The Grand Jury Regarding His Knowledge That 
                    The Contents of an Affidavit Executed by a 
                    Subordinate Federal Employee Who was a Witness in 
                    The Federal Civil Rights Action Brought Against Him 
                    Were Untrue
    Ms. Lewinsky filed an affidavit in the Jones v. Clinton 
case, in which she denied ever having a sexual relationship 
with the President. During his deposition in the case, the 
President affirmed that the statement of Ms. Lewinsky in her 
affidavit was ``absolutely true.'' Ms. Lewinsky testified that 
she is ``100 percent sure'' that the President suggested that 
she might want to sign an affidavit to avoid testifying in the 
Jones v. Clinton case.
    The President told the Judiciary Committee that he believed 
he told Ms. Lewinsky ``other witnesses had executed affidavits, 
and there was a chance they would not have to testify.'' \106\ 
Before the criminal grand jury in August, the President 
testified that he hoped that Ms. Lewinsky could avoid being 
deposed by filing an affidavit, but that he did not want her to 
submit a false affidavit.\107\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \106\ Request for Admission No. 18.
    \107\ H. Doc. 105-311, at 571.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Such testimony is false and misleading because it would 
have been impossible for Ms. Lewinsky to file a truthful 
affidavit without jeopardizing the President by being deposed. 
Ms. Jones' attorneys were seeking information about other state 
or federal employees with whom the President had sexual 
relationships. Judge Susan Weber Wright ruled that Ms. Jones 
was entitled to such discovery information. The President must 
have been cognizant of such facts which renders his grand jury 
testimony on these facts false and misleading. In his efforts 
to be evasive, the President favored a feigned memory after 
citing Betty Currie as a source for the answer, thus setting up 
Ms. Currie as a potential witness.
    While testifying before the grand jury, Ms. Currie was more 
precise in her recollection of the two meetings. An OIC 
attorney asked her if the President had made a series of 
leading statements or questions that were similar to the 
following:
    1. ``You were always there when she [Monica Lewinsky] was 
there, right? We were never really alone.''
    2. ``You could see and hear everything.''
    3. ``Monica came on to me, and I never touched her, right?'
    4. ``She wanted to have sex with me and I couldn't do 
that.'' 108
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \108\ OIC Referral at 191-192.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Based on his demeanor and the manner in which he asked the 
questions, she concluded that the President wanted her to agree 
with him. Ms. Currie thought that the President was attempting 
to gauge her reaction, and appeared concerned.109 
Ms. Currie also acknowledged that while she indicated to the 
President that she agreed with him, in fact she knew that, at 
times, he was alone with Ms. Lewinsky and that she could not or 
did not hear or see the two of them while they were alone.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \109\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
            3. The President Made False and Misleading Statements 
                    Before the Grand Jury When He Recited a False 
                    Account of the Facts Regarding His Interactions 
                    with Monica Lewinsky to Betty Currie, a Potential 
                    Witness in the Federal Civil Rights Action Brought 
                    Against Him
    The evidence shows that immediately after the President was 
deposed in the Jones v. Clinton case he attempted to influence 
the testimony of Ms. Betty Currie. Ms. Currie testified that 
the President discussed Ms. Lewinsky with her, and that his 
questions were actually statements with which he wanted her to 
agree.110
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \110\ H. Doc. 105-310, at 191-92.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Before the grand jury the President was vague and evasive 
on these points. He stated that he talked to Ms. Currie right 
after his deposition, but that he talked to her in an effort to 
learn as much about the matter as he could.111 He 
further stated that he instructed Ms. Currie to ``tell the 
truth'' after learning she could have been called to 
testify.112 The President also testified that he 
could not remember how many times he talked to Ms. Currie, 
however Ms. Currie testified to two such discussions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \111\ See Request for Admission No. 52.
    \112\ H. Doc. 105-311, at 591.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

(2) Article II--Other Perjurious Testimony

    In his conduct while President of the United States, 
William Jefferson Clinton, in violation of his constitutional 
oath faithfully to execute the office of President of the 
United States and, to the best of his ability, preserve, 
protect, and defend the Constitution of the United States, and 
in violation of his constitutional duty to take care that the 
laws be faithfully executed, has willfully corrupted and 
manipulated the judicial process of the United States for his 
personal gain and exoneration, impeding the administration of 
justice, in that:

          (1) On December 23, 1997, William Jefferson Clinton, 
        in sworn answers to written questions asked as part of 
        a Federal civil rights action brought against him, 
        willfully provided perjurious, false and misleading 
        testimony in response to questions deemed relevant by a 
        Federal judge concerning conduct and proposed conduct 
        with subordinate employees.
          (2) On January 17, 1998, William Jefferson Clinton 
        swore under oath to tell the truth, the whole truth, 
        and nothing but the truth in a deposition given as part 
        of a Federal civil right action brought against him. 
        Contrary to that oath, William Jefferson Clinton 
        willfully provided perjurious, false and misleading 
        testimony in response to questions deemed relevant by a 
        Federal judge concerning the nature and details of his 
        relationship with a subordinate Government employee, 
        his knowledge of that employee's involvement and 
        participation in the civil rights action brought 
        against him, and his corrupt efforts to influence the 
        testimony of that employee.
          In all of this, William Jefferson Clinton has 
        undermined the integrity of his office, has brought 
        disrepute on the Presidency, has betrayed his trust as 
        President, and has acted in a manner subversive to the 
        rule of law and justice, to the manifest injury of the 
        people of the United States.
          Wherefore, William Jefferson Clinton, by such 
        conduct, warrants impeachment and trial, and removal 
        from office and disqualification to hold and enjoy any 
        office of honor, trust, or profit under the United 
        States.

    Article II passed the Judiciary Committee by a vote of 20 
to 17 on December 11, 1998. I voted in support of its passage.
    The specific allegations contained in Article II are that 
the President willfully provided perjurious, false and 
misleading testimony in answers to written questions posed by 
the plaintiff in Jones v. Clinton on December 23, 1997, and 
that the President willfully provided perjurious, false and 
misleading testimony in answers to questions proposed by the 
plaintiff's attorney in a deposition on January 17, 1998.
            a. On December 23, 1997, the President, in Sworn Answers to 
                    Written Questions Asked As Part of A Federal Civil 
                    Rights Action Brought Against Him, Willfully 
                    Provided Perjurious, False and Misleading Testimony 
                    In Response To Questions Deemed Relevant By A 
                    Federal Judge Concerning Conduct And Proposed 
                    Conduct With Subordinate Employees.
    As stated previously, on December 23, 1997, the President 
answered interrogatories in the Jones case under 
oath.113 When asked under oath to identify women 
with whom he had sexual relations who were state or federal 
employees during a specified limited time frame, the President 
responded ``none.'' 114 The President lied.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \113\ OIC Referral. at 13.
    \114\ V002-DC-00000053 (President Clinton's Supplemental Responses 
to Plaintiff's Second Set of Interrogatories at 2).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
            b. On January 17, 1998, the President Swore Under Oath To 
                    Tell The Truth, The Whole Truth, And Nothing But 
                    The Truth In a Deposition Given As Part of A 
                    Federal Civil Rights Action Brought Against Him. 
                    Contrary To That Oath, the President Willfully 
                    Provided Perjurious, False and Misleading Testimony 
                    In Response To Questions Deemed Relevant By a 
                    Federal Judge Concerning The Nature and Details Of 
                    His Relationship With A Subordinate Government 
                    Employee And His Corrupt Efforts To Influence The 
                    Testimony Of That Employee.
    On January 17, 1998, the President was questioned under 
oath at a deposition regarding sexual relationships with women 
in the workplace.115 During the deposition, the 
President denied that he had engaged in a ``sexual affair,'' a 
``sexual relationship,'' or ``sexual relations'' with Ms. 
Lewinsky, while also stating that he ``had no specific memory 
of being alone with Ms. Lewinsky, that he remembered few 
details of any gifts they might have exchanged, and indicated 
that no one except his attorneys had kept him informed of Ms. 
Lewinsky's status as a potential witness in the [Jones v. 
Clinton] case.'' 116 Under oath the President stated 
that he had not had sexual relations with any federal employees 
during a particular time frame.117 As we now know, 
in fact the President did have sexual relations with a federal 
employee during the stated time frame. The President lied.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \115\ OIC Referral at 3.
    \116\ Id. at 3.
    \117\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    According to Ms. Lewinsky, she and the President had ten 
sexual encounters, eight while she was a White House intern or 
employee, and two thereafter. The sexual encounters generally 
occurred in or near the Oval Office private study. The evidence 
indicates that the conduct the President had with Ms. Lewinsky 
met the definition of sex, and that he lied about their 
conduct. Ms. Lewinsky testified that her physical relationship 
with the President included oral sex but not sexual 
intercourse.
            c. The President Lied in His Deposition About Being Alone 
                    in Certain Locations of the White House with A 
                    Subordinate Federal Employee Who Was a Witness In 
                    The Action Brought Against Him
    The evidence is clear that Ms. Lewinsky and the President 
did have sexual relations when they were ``alone.'' There is no 
evidence that anyone saw them, or that they were caught in a 
sex act, which would lead reasonable minds to believe that 
their relationship was always covert. They were in fact alone. 
The President's attempt to defend himself on this charge is a 
tortured definition of the word ``alone,'' wherein it refers to 
an entire geographical area, rather than the immediate 
surroundings. When the President said he was never alone with 
Ms. Lewinsky, he meant he was never alone in the White House 
oval office complex. In fact, the President and Ms. Lewinsky 
were alone on at least 21 occasions. Naturally, in the literal 
sense, one is never alone in the cosmos. Reasonable people do 
not believe the absurd. Reasonable people would believe that 
the President's testimony was perjurious.
    The President relies on the literal truth defense. He 
asserts that he is never really alone in the White House. There 
must be a objective reasonable basis for a subjective belief to 
have merit. The President's subjective belief is neither 
reasonable nor sufficient to shield him from perjury charges. 
There was no reasonable basis. The evidence supports that the 
President lied.
            d. The President Lied In His Deposition About His Knowledge 
                    of Gifts Exchanged Between Himself and a 
                    Subordinate Federal Employee Who Was A Witness in 
                    the Action Brought Against Him
    The evidence shows that the President presented Ms. 
Lewinsky with a number of gifts, including, a lithograph, a hat 
pin, a large ``Black Dog'' canvas bag, a large ``Rockettes'' 
blanket, a pin of the New York City skyline, a box of 
chocolates, a pair of sunglasses, a stuffed animal from the 
``Black Dog,'' a marble bear's head, a London pin., a shamrock 
pin, an Annie Lennox compact disc, and Davidoff cigars.\118\ In 
the deposition of the President he provided false answers when 
he testified that Ms. Lewinsky has given him ``a book or two.'' 
The evidence also shows that Ms. Lewinsky gave the President 
approximately 38 gifts.\119\ The President gave Ms. Lewinsky 
approximately 24 gifts. The evidence supports that the 
President lied.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \118\ OIC Referral at 101.
    \119\ Id. at 157.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
            e. The President Lied In His Deposition About His Knowledge 
                    Regarding Whether He Had Ever Spoken To A 
                    Subordinate Federal Employee About The Possibility 
                    That Such Subordinate Employee Might Be Called As A 
                    Witness To Testify In The Federal Civil Rights 
                    Action Brought Against Him
    When asked in the deposition about whether he talked to Ms. 
Lewinsky about her being called as a witness the President 
testified that he could not recall. However, the evidence shows 
that on December 17, 1997, the President called Ms. Lewinsky 
and informed her that he had seen the witness list and that her 
name was on it.\120\ Moreover, he told her that if she was 
called as a witness she was to notify Ms. Currie.\121\ The 
evidence supports that the President lied.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \120\ Id. at 843.
    \121\ Id..
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
            f. The President lied in his deposition about his knowledge 
                    of the service of a subpoena to a subordinate 
                    federal employee to testify as a witness in the 
                    federal civil rights action brought against him
    In the civil deposition, the President was asked the 
question:

          Q. Did she tell you she had been served with a 
        subpoena in this case?
          A. No. I don't know if she had been.
          Q. Did anyone other than your attorneys tell you that 
        Monica Lewinsky had been served with a subpoena in this 
        case?
          A. I don't think so.'' \122\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \122\ Deposition of President Clinton in the case of Jones v. 
Clinton, January 18, 1998, p. 068.

    The evidence shows that the President discussed with Vernon 
Jordan the fact that Ms. Lewinsky was served with a subpoena. 
The testimony of the President and Vernon Jordan is in direct 
conflict on this fact.\123\ The record indicates that the 
President knew, before his deposition, that Ms. Lewinsky had 
been subpoenaed in the case of Jones v. Clinton.\124\ Ms. 
Lewinsky was served with a subpoena on December 19, 1997, a 
subpoena that commanded her to appear for a deposition on 
January 23, 1998, and to produce certain documents and 
gifts.\125\ Monica Lewinsky talked to Vernon Jordan about the 
subpoena on December 19, 1997, and Mr. Jordan spoke to the 
President that afternoon and again that evening.\126\ He told 
the President that he had met with Ms. Lewinsky, she had been 
subpoenaed, and that he planned on obtaining an attorney for 
her.\127\ On Sunday, December 28, 1997, the President met with 
Ms. Lewinsky who expressed concerns about the subpoena's demand 
for gifts he had given her.\128\ The evidence supports that the 
President lied.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \123\ OIC Referral at 96.
    \124\ Id. at 97.
    \125\ Id. at 96.
    \126\ Id. at 96-97.
    \127\ Id. at 97.
    \128\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
            g. The President Lied In His Deposition About His Knowledge 
                    Of The Final Conversation He Had With A Subordinate 
                    Employee Who Was A Witness In The Federal Civil 
                    Rights Action Brought Against Him
    The testimony of the President and Ms. Lewinsky regarding 
their last meeting are in direct conflict. The President 
testified that he stuck his head out of his office and said 
hello to Ms. Lewinsky at the time of their last meeting. Ms. 
Lewinsky testified that the President gave her Christmas gifts, 
and they talked about the Jones v. Clinton case.\129\ 
Specifically, she wanted to know how she got put on the witness 
list and they discussed the subpoena and its direct reference 
to a hat pin which was the first gift he had ever given 
her.\130\ The evidence supports that the President lied.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \129\ Id. at 101.
    \130\ Id. Corroborating evidence shows that Ms. Currie called Ms. 
Lewinsky and asked her to come to the White House at 8:30 a.m. on the 
morning of December 28, the day of their last meeting. WAVES records 
indicate that the meeting was requested by Ms. Currie and that Ms. 
Lewinsky entered the White House at 8:16 a.m., December 28, 1997. After 
she arrived at the Oval Office, she, the President and Ms. Currie 
played with Buddy, the President's dog, and chatted. Then the President 
took Ms. Lewinsky into the study and gave her several Christmas 
presents: a marble bear's head, a Rockettes blanket, a Black Dog 
stuffed animal, a small box of chocolate, a pair of joke sunglasses, 
and a pin with the New York skyline on it. Ms. Lewinsky testified that 
on this occasion she and the President had a ``passionate and 
physically intimate kiss.'' Id. 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
            h. The President Lied In His Deposition About His Knowledge 
                    That The Contents Of An Affidavit Executed By A 
                    Subordinate Federal Employee Who Was A Witness In 
                    The Federal Civil Rights Action Brought Against Him
    As discussed elsewhere, the President affirmed to the court 
in his civil deposition the truth of the statements contained 
in Ms. Lewinsky's affidavit regarding sexual relations. The 
President and Ms. Lewinsky concocted a cover story with the 
willful intent to deceive the court. As the evidence shows, the 
President did in fact have sexual relations with Ms. Lewinsky. 
The evidence supports that the President lied.

(3) Article III--Obstruction of Justice

    In his conduct while President of the United States, 
William Jefferson Clinton, in violation of his constitutional 
oath faithfully to execute the office of President of the 
United States and, to the best of his ability, preserve, 
protect, and defend the Constitution of the United States, and 
in violation of his constitutional duty to take care that the 
laws be faithfully executed, has prevented, obstructed, and 
impeded the administration of justice, and has to that end 
engaged personally, and through his subordinates and agents, in 
a course of conduct or scheme designed to delay, impede, cover 
up, and conceal the existence of evidence and testimony related 
to a Federal civil rights action brought against him in a duly 
instituted judicial proceeding.
    The means used to implement this course of conduct or 
scheme included one or more of the following acts:
    (1) On or about December 17, 1997, William Jefferson 
Clinton corruptly encouraged a witness in a Federal civil 
rights action brought against him to execute a sworn affidavit 
in that proceeding that he knew to be perjurious, false and 
misleading.
    (2) On or about December 17, 1997, William Jefferson 
Clinton corruptly encouraged a witness in a Federal civil 
rights action brought against him to give perjurious, false and 
misleading testimony if and when called to testify personally 
in that proceeding.
    (3) On or about December 28, 1997, William Jefferson 
Clinton corruptly engaged in, encouraged, or supported a scheme 
to conceal evidence that had been subpoenaed in a Federal civil 
rights action brought against him.
    (4) Beginning on or about December 7, 1997, and continuing 
through and including January 14, 1998, William Jefferson 
Clinton intensified and succeeded in an effort to secure job 
assistance to a witness in a Federal civil rights action 
brought against him in order to corruptly prevent the truthful 
testimony of that witness in that proceeding at a time when the 
truthful testimony of that witness could have been harmed.
    (5) On January 17, 1998, at his deposition in a Federal 
civil rights action brought against him, William Jefferson 
Clinton corruptly allowed his attorney to make false and 
misleading statements to a Federal Judge characterizing an 
affidavit, in order to prevent questioning deemed relevant by 
the Judge. Such false and misleading statements were 
subsequently acknowledged by his attorney in a communication to 
that judge.
    (6) On or about January 18 and January 20-21, 1998, William 
Jefferson Clinton related a false and misleading account of 
events relevant to a Federal civil rights action brought 
against him to a potential witness in that proceeding, in order 
to corruptly influence the testimony of that witness.
    (7) On or about January 21, 23 and 26, 1998, William 
Jefferson Clinton made false and misleading statements to 
potential witnesses in a Federal grand jury proceeding in order 
to corruptly influence the testimony of those witnesses. The 
false and misleading statements made by William Jefferson 
Clinton were repeated by the witnesses to the grand jury, 
causing the grand jury to receive false and misleading 
information.
    In all of this, William Jefferson Clinton has undermined 
the integrity of his office, has brought disrepute on the 
Presidency, has betrayed his trust as President, and has acted 
in a manner subversive of the rule of law and justice, to the 
manifest injury of the people of the United States. Wherefore, 
William Jefferson Clinton, by such conduct, warrants 
impeachment and trial, and removal from office and 
disqualification to hold and enjoy any office of honor, trust, 
or profit under the United States.
    Article III passed the Judiciary Committee by a vote of 21 
to 16 on December 11, 1998. I voted in support of its passage.
    Article II, Section 1, clause 8 of the U.S. Constitution 
states that before a President begins his term, he shall take 
an oath. William Jefferson Clinton took the following oath: ``I 
do solemnly swear that I will faithfully execute the Office of 
President of the United States, and will to the best of my 
ability, preserve, protect and defend the Constitution of the 
United States.'' Furthermore, Article II, Section 3 of the 
United States Constitution states in part that the President 
shall ``take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.'' 
President Clinton abrogated these duties by engaging in a 
course of conduct that obstructed and impeded the 
administration of justice. In so doing, he exhibited a complete 
disregard and lack of respect for the solemnity of the judicial 
process and the rule of law.
    The following explanations for the individual paragraphs of 
Article III clearly justify the conclusion that President 
Clinton, using the powers of his high office, engaged 
personally and through his subordinates and agents, in a course 
of conduct or plan designed to delay, impede, cover up, and 
conceal the existence of evidence and testimony related to the 
duly instituted federal civil rights lawsuit of Jones v. 
Clinton and the duly instituted investigation of Independent 
Counsel Kenneth Starr.
    Although the actions of the President do not have to rise 
to the level of violating the federal statute regarding 
obstruction of justice in order to justify impeachment, some if 
not all of his actions clearly do. The general obstruction of 
justice statute is 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1503. It provides in 
pertinent part: ``whoever . . . corruptly or by threats or 
force, or by any threatening letter or communication, 
influences, obstructs, or impedes, or endeavors to influence, 
obstruct, or impede, the due administration of justice, shall 
be punished. . . '' \131\ In short, Sec. 1503 applies to 
activities which obstruct, or are intended to obstruct, the due 
administration of justice in both civil and criminal 
proceedings. This section has been interpreted to apply only to 
pending judicial proceedings.\132\ The Jones v. Clinton civil 
rights lawsuit was pending at the time of all alleged 
wrongdoing under this Article.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \131\ 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1503.
    \132\ See, e.g., United States v. Neal, 951 F.2d 630, 632 (5th Cir. 
1992).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
            a. On Or About December 17, 1997, The President Encouraged 
                    A Witness In A Federal Civil Rights Action Brought 
                    Against Him To Execute A Sworn Affidavit In That 
                    Proceeding That He Knew To Be Perjurious, False And 
                    Misleading
    While the President has denied asking or encouraging Ms. 
Lewinsky to lie by filing a false affidavit denying their 
relationship, he concedes in his response to Question 18 of the 
Committee's Requests for Admission that he told her that ``. . 
. other witnesses had executed affidavits, and there was a 
chance they would not have to testify.''
    Ms. Lewinsky was more emphatic on the subject in her grand 
jury testimony. When she asked the President what she should do 
if called to testify, he said, ``Well, maybe you can sign an 
affidavit.  . . . The point of it would be to deter or to 
prevent me from being deposed and so that could range anywhere 
between . . . just somehow mentioning . . . innocuous things or 
going as far as maybe having to deny any kind of 
relationship.''\133\ She further stated that she was ``100% 
sure that the President suggested that she might want to sign 
an affidavit to avoid testifying.''\134\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \133\ H.Doc. 105-311, at 843-44.
    \134\ Id. at 1558-59.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Ms. Lewinsky claims that the President never explicitly 
told her to lie. The President and Ms. Lewinsky did have a 
scheme to mislead and deceive court through the use of cover 
stories and the proffer of a false affidavit.\135\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \135\ OIC Referral at 174.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Moreover, the attorneys for Paula Jones were seeking 
evidence of sexual relationships the President may have had 
with other state or federal employees. Such information is 
often deemed relevant in sexual harassment lawsuits to help 
prove the underlying claim of the plaintiff, and Judge Susan 
Weber Wright ruled that Paula Jones was entitled to this 
information for the purposes of discovery. Consequently, when 
the President encouraged Monica Lewinsky to file an affidavit, 
he knew that it would have to be false for Ms. Lewinsky to 
avoid testifying. If she filed a truthful affidavit, one 
acknowledging a sexual relationship with the President, she 
would have been called as a deposition witness and her 
subsequent truthful testimony would have been damaging to the 
President both politically and legally.
            b. On Or About December 17, 1997, The President Corruptly 
                    Encouraged A Witness In A Federal Civil Rights 
                    Action Brought Against Him to Give Perjurious, 
                    False and Misleading Testimony If And When Called 
                    To Testify Personally in That Proceeding.
    Ms. Lewinsky's statements that no one told her to lie are 
not dispositive as to whether the President is guilty of 
obstruction of justice. One need not directly command another 
to lie in order to be guilty of obstruction: ``One who proposes 
to another that the other lie in a judicial proceeding is 
guilty of obstructing justice. The statute prohibits elliptical 
suggestions as much as it does direct commands.'' \136\ Indeed, 
the facts cannot be taken in a vacuum, they must be examined in 
their proper context. While Ms. Lewinsky and the President both 
have testified ``I never asked her to lie'' and ``he never 
asked me to lie,'' the circumstantial evidence is overwhelming. 
The statement was not necessary because they concocted the 
cover story and both understood the willful intent to conceal 
the relationship in order to impede justice in Jones v. 
Clinton.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \136\ United States v. Tranakos, 911 F.2d 1422, 1432 (10th Cir. 
1990) (citations omitted).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
            c. On Or About December 28, 1997, The President Corruptly 
                    Engaged In, Encouraged, Or Supported A Scheme To 
                    Conceal Evidence That Had Been Subpoenaed In A 
                    Federal Civil Rights Action Brought Against Him
    See the discussion regarding the evidence and findings 
under B(1)(d), supra.
            d. Beginning On Or About December 7, 1997, And Continuing 
                    Through And Including January 14, 1998, the 
                    President Intensified And Succeeded In An Effort To 
                    Secure Job Assistance To A Witness In A Federal 
                    Civil Rights Action Brought Against Him In Order To 
                    Corruptly Prevent The Truthful Testimony Of That 
                    Witness In That Proceeding At A Time When The 
                    Truthful Testimony Of That Witness Would Have Been 
                    Harmful To Him
    On December 5, 1997, Paula Jones' attorneys notified the 
President's attorneys of their witness list.\137\ The President 
testified that he was notified the following day.\138\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \137\ OIC Referral at 88.
    \138\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    After having been transferred from the White House to the 
Pentagon Ms. Lewinsky made repeated demands of the President 
for a job that would return her to the White House. She sent a 
letter to the President on July 3, 1997, which ``obliquely 
threatened to disclose their relationship. If she was not going 
to return to work at the White House, she wrote, then she would 
`need to explain to my parents exactly why that wasn't 
happening.' '' \139\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \139\ Id. at 66.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    After being rebuffed by the President on December 5, 1997, 
Ms. Lewinsky drafted a letter to the President expressing her 
remorse over what appeared to be the end of their affair.\140\ 
The following day she went to the White House to deliver the 
letter to the President, however she was told she would have to 
wait approximately forty minutes because the President had a 
visitor, who she learned was Eleanor Mondale.\141\ Upon hearing 
such news Ms. Lewinsky was ``livid.'' \142\ When the President 
learned that she was aware who he was meeting with, the 
President became irate and indicated that someone's job was in 
jeopardy.\143\ Such facts are important given that the 
President knew that Ms. Lewinsky was on the witness list for a 
case in which he was the defendant; he knew that she could be a 
potential bombshell to his defense strategy in Jones v. 
Clinton.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \140\ Id. at 89.
    \141\ Id.
    \142\ Id. at 90.
    \143\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The President then invited her over to the White House that 
afternoon in order to rectify the situation.\144\ During the 
meeting Ms. Lewinsky informed the President that Vernon Jordan 
had ``done nothing to help her find a job.'' \145\ In response 
the President, now well motivated to ensure that Ms. Lewinsky 
would not become a hostile witness to the defense in Jones v. 
Clinton, said he would ``talk to him. I'll get on it.'' \146\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \144\ Id.
    \145\ Id.
    \146\ Id. at 91.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    On December 11, 1997, Judge Susan Weber Wright ordered that 
Paula Jones was entitled to information about any state or 
federal employee with whom he had sexual relations, or proposed 
or sought to have sexual relations. Keeping Ms. Lewinsky on the 
team was now of critical importance.
    On that same day, December 11, 1997, Vernon Jordan met with 
Ms. Lewinsky and provided her with the names of three 
individuals she was to contact for a job.\147\ Later that day 
Vernon Jordan personally called three executives in order to 
find her a job.\148\ Approximately one week later Ms. Lewinsky 
had two job interviews in New York City.\149\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \147\ Id. at 93.
    \148\Id.
    \149\ Id. at 95.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The evidence shows that on January 7, 1998, Ms. Lewinsky 
signed the false affidavit. She showed the affidavit on that 
day to Vernon Jordan, who in turn reported to the President 
that it had been signed. The following day Vernon Jordan called 
MacAndrews and Forbes' CEO, Ron Perelman, to ``make things 
happen, if they could happen,'' because Ms. Lewinsky's 
interview went poorly. Mr. Jordan called Ms. Lewinsky and told 
her not to worry. That evening Ms. Lewinsky was called by 
MacAndrews and Forbes and told that she would be given a second 
interview the next morning. The next morning, Ms. Lewinsky 
received her reward for signing the false affidavit. After a 
series of interviews with MacAndrews and Forbes personnel, she 
was informally offered a job. When Ms. Lewinsky called Mr. 
Jordan to tell him, he passed the good news along to Betty 
Currie. Tell the President, ``mission accomplished.'' Later, 
Mr. Jordan called the President personally and told him the 
news.
    Mr. Perelman testified that Mr. Jordan had never called him 
before about a job recommendation. Jordan, on the other hand, 
said that he called Mr. Perelman for hiring: the former mayor 
of New York City; a very talented attorney from the law firm 
Akin Gump; a Harvard Business School graduate; and Monica 
Lewinsky. How does Ms. Lewinsky fit into the caliber of persons 
who would merit Mr. Jordan's full attention and direct 
recommendation to a CEO of a Fortune 500 company?
    The President and Ms. Lewinsky both testified that she was 
not promised a job in exchange for her silence. However, upon 
examining the compelling evidence in context, reasonable people 
would conclude that the President provided such assistance to 
Ms. Lewinsky because she was a witness in the civil suit in 
which he was the defendant and her truthful testimony would be 
harmful to the President. The quid pro quo of this arrangement 
was the false affidavit in exchange for Ms. Lewinsky's job in 
New York.
            e. On January 17, 1998, At This Deposition In a Federal 
                    Civil Rights Action Brought Against Him, the 
                    President Corruptly Allowed His Attorney To Make 
                    False And Misleading Statements To A Federal Judge 
                    Characterizing An Affidavit, In Order To Present 
                    Questioning Deemed Relevant By the Judge. Such 
                    False And Misleading Statements Were Subsequently 
                    Acknowledged By His Attorney In A Communication To 
                    That Judge
    On January 15, 1998, Robert Bennett, attorney for President 
Clinton in the case of Jones v. Clinton, obtained a copy of the 
affidavit Monica Lewinsky filed in an attempt to avoid having 
to testify in the case of Jones v. Clinton.150 In 
her affidavit, Ms. Lewinsky asserted that she had never had a 
sexual relationship with President Clinton. At the President's 
deposition on January 17, 1998, an attorney for Paula Jones 
began to ask the President questions about his relationship 
with Ms. Lewinsky. Mr. Bennett objected to the ``innuendo'' of 
the question and he pointed out that she had signed an 
affidavit denying a sexual relationship with the President. Mr. 
Bennett asserted that this indicated ``there is not sex of any 
kind in any manner, shape or form,'' and after a warning from 
Judge Wright he stated that, ``I am not coaching the witness. 
In preparation of the witness for this deposition the witness 
is fully aware of Ms. Jane Doe 6's affidavit, so I have not 
told him a single thing he doesn't know.'' Mr. Bennett clearly 
used the affidavit in an attempt to stop the questioning of the 
President about Ms. Lewinsky. The President did not say 
anything to correct Mr. Bennett, even though he knew the 
affidavit was false. Judge Wright overruled Mr. Bennett's 
objection and allowed the questioning to proceed. Later in the 
deposition, Mr. Bennett read the President the portion of Ms. 
Lewinsky's affidavit in which she denied having a ``sexual 
relationship'' with the President and asked the President if 
Ms. Lewinsky's statement was true and accurate. The President 
responded: ``That is absolutely true.'' 151 The 
grand jury testimony of Ms. Lewinsky, given under oath and 
following a grant of transactional immunity, confirmed that the 
contents of her affidavit were not true:

    \150\ H. Doc. 105-316, at 420-21.
    \151\ Deposition of President Clinton in the case of Jones v. 
Clinton, January 17, 1998, p. 204.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
          Q: ``Paragraph 8 . . . [of the affidavit] says, ``I 
        have never had a sexual relationship with the 
        President.'' Is that true?
          A: No.'' 152

    \152\ H. Doc. 105-311, at 924.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    When President Clinton was asked during his grand jury 
testimony how he could have lawfully sat silent at his 
deposition while his attorney made a false statement to a 
United States District Court Judge, the President first said 
that he was not paying ``a great deal of attention'' to Mr. 
Bennett when he said this. The President also stated that ``I 
didn't pay any attention to this colloquy that went on.'' The 
videotaped deposition shows the President looking in Mr. 
Bennett's direction while Mr. Bennett was making the statement 
about no sex of any kind. The President then argued that when 
Mr. Bennett made the assertion that there ``is no sex of any 
kind . . .,'' Mr. Bennett was speaking only in the present 
tense. The President stated, `` It depends on what the meaning 
of the word ``is'' is.'' and that ``if it means there is none, 
that was a completely true statement.'' 153 
President Clinton's suggestion that he might have engaged in 
such a parsing of the words at his deposition is at odds with 
his assertion that the whole argument just passed him by.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \153\ Id. at 476-77.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
            f. On Or About January 18 and January 20-21, 1998, The 
                    President Related A False And Misleading Account Of 
                    Events Relevant To A Federal Civil Rights Action 
                    Brought Against Him To A Potential Witness In That 
                    Proceeding, In Order To Corruptly Influence The 
                    testimony Of That Witness
    The record reflects that President Clinton attempted to 
influence the testimony of Betty Currie, his personal secretary 
by coaching her to recite inaccurate answers to possible 
questions that might be asked of her if called to testify in 
the Jones v. Clinton. The President did this shortly after he 
was deposed in the case. In his deposition, he invokes Betty 
Currie's name numerous times. Even though Betty Currie's name 
was not on the witness list, it is very logical for the 
President to assume that the plaintiff's lawyers in the Jones 
v. Clinton would call her as a witness. That is why the 
President called her about two hours after the completion of 
his deposition and asked her to come into the office the next 
day, which was a Sunday.154 Why would the President 
be trying to get information from Ms. Currie about false 
statements or refresh his recollection concerning falsehoods. 
The evidence supports the conclusion that the President was 
trying to influence the testimony of a potential witness so 
that she would repeat his rendition of the facts which were 
meant to deceive the court.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \154\ Request for Admission No. 47.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
            g. On Or About January 21, 23, And 26, 1998, The President 
                    Made False And Misleading Statements To Potential 
                    Witnesses In A Federal Grand Jury Proceeding In 
                    Order To Corruptly Influence The Testimony Of Those 
                    Witnesses. The False and Misleading Statement Made 
                    By The President Were Repeated By The Witnesses To 
                    the Grand Jury, Causing The Grand Jury To Receive 
                    False And Misleading Information.
    The record reflects that on the dates in question President 
Clinton met with a total of five aides who would later be 
called to testify before the grand jury. The meeting took place 
shortly after the President's deposition in the Jones v. 
Clinton case and following a Washington Post story, published 
on January 21, 1998, which detailed the relationship between 
the President and Ms. Lewinsky. During the meetings the 
President made false and misleading statements to his aides 
which he knew would be repeated once they were called to 
testify.
    The President submitted the same response to each of seven 
questions (Nos. 62-68) relating to this topic as set forth in 
the Committee's Requests for Admission. The President answered 
by stating that ``I did not want my family, friends, or 
colleagues to know the full nature of my relationship with Ms. 
Lewinsky. In the days following the January 21, 1998, 
Washington Post article, I misled people about this 
relationship. . . .'' 155
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \155\ Request for Admissions Nos. 62-68.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    According to aides who met with the President on the days 
in question, he insisted unequivocally that he had not indulged 
in a sexual relationship with Ms. Lewinsky or otherwise done 
anything inappropriate. On January 21, 1998, in a conversation 
with Sydney Blumenthal, Assistant to the President, the 
President said that he rebuffed Ms. Lewinsky after she `` `came 
at me and made a sexual demand on me.' '' The President also 
told Mr. Blumenthal, `` `I haven't done anything wrong.' '' 
156 Also on January 21, 1998, the President met with 
Erskine Bowles, his Chief of Staff, and two of Mr. Bowles' 
Deputies, Sylvia Matthews and John Podesta. The President began 
the meeting by telling Mr. Bowles that the Washington Post 
story was not true.157 Further, the President stated 
that he had not had a sexual relationship with her, and had not 
asked anyone to lie.158
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \156\ Grand Jury Testimony of Deposition of Sydney Blumenthal, June 
4, 1998, p.49.
    \157\ Grand Jury Testimony of John Podesta, June 16, 1998, p. 85.
    \158\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Two days later, on January 23, 1998, as he was preparing 
for his State of the Union address, the President engaged Mr. 
Podesta in another conversation in which he ``was extremely 
explicit in saying he never had sex with her.'' When the OIC 
attorney asked for greater specificity, Mr. Podesta stated that 
the President said he had not had oral sex with Ms. Lewinsky, 
and in fact was ``denying any sex in any way, shape or form . . 
. .'' 159 The President also explained that Ms. 
Lewinsky's frequent visits to the White House were nothing more 
than efforts to visit Betty Currie. Ms. Currie was either with 
the President and Ms. Lewinsky during these ``visits,'' or she 
was seated at her desk outside the Oval Office with the door 
open.160
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \159\ Id.at 91-3.
    \160\ H. Doc. 105-316, at 3310.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Finally, on January 26, 1998, the President met with Harold 
Ickes, another Deputy Chief of Staff to Mr. Bowles. At the 
time, the President said that he had not had a sexual 
relationship with Ms. Lewinsky, had not obstructed justice in 
the matter, and had not instructed anyone to lie or obstruct 
justice.161
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \161\ Id. at 1487, 1539
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    By his own admission more than seven months later, the 
President said that he had told a number of his aides that he 
did not ``have an affair with [Ms. Lewinsky ] or . . . have sex 
with her.'' He also admitted that he knew that these aides 
might be called before the grand jury as 
witnesses.162
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \162\ H. Doc. 105-311, at 647.
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(4) Article IV--Perjury Before the House

    Using the powers and influence of the office of President 
of the United States, William Jefferson Clinton, in violation 
of his constitutional oath faithfully to execute the office of 
President of the United States and, to the best of his ability, 
preserve, protect, and defend the Constitution of the United 
States, and in disregard of his constitutional duty to take 
care that the laws be faithfully executed, has engaged in 
conduct that resulted in misuse and abuse of his high office, 
impaired the due and proper administration of justice and the 
conduct of lawful inquiries and contravened the authority of 
the legislative branch and the truth-seeking purpose of a 
coordinate investigative proceeding, in that, as President, 
William Jefferson Clinton refused and failed to respond to 
certain written requests for admission and willfully made 
perjurious, false and misleading sworn statements in response 
to certain written requests for admission propounded to him as 
part of the impeachment inquiry authorized by the House of 
Representatives of the Congress of the United States. William 
Jefferson Clinton, in refusing and failing to respond and in 
making perjurious, false and misleading statements, assumed to 
himself functions and judgments necessary to the exercise of 
the sole power of impeachment vested by the Constitution in the 
House of Representatives and exhibited contempt for the 
inquiry.
    In doing this, William Jefferson Clinton has undermined the 
integrity of his office, has brought disrepute on the 
Presidency, has betrayed his trust as President, and has acted 
in a manner subversive of the rule of law and justice, to the 
manifest injury of the people of the United States.
    Wherefore, William Jefferson Clinton, by such conduct, 
warrants impeachment and trial, and removal from office and 
disqualification to hold and enjoy any office of honor, trust, 
or profit under the United States.

    The House Judiciary Committee voted in favor of reporting 
Article IV to the House of Representatives by a vote of 21 to 
16 on December 12, 1998. I voted in favor of its passage.

          He who permits himself to tell a lie once, finds it 
        much easier to do it a second and third time, till at 
        length it becomes habitual; he tells lies without 
        attending to it, and truths without the world's 
        believing him. This falsehood of the tongue leads to 
        that of the heart, and in time depraves all its good 
        dispositions.163
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    \163\ Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Peter Carr (August 19, 1785).

    Pursuant to House Resolution 581, on November 5, 1998, the 
Judiciary Committee sent a letter to the President seeking his 
cooperation in the impeachment investigation. The letter asked 
the President to answer 81 questions, under oath, utilizing an 
enclosed affidavit.
    The President provided false and misleading statements 
under oath in response to the written requests for admissions. 
Specifically, the President did not answer completely and 
honestly request for admissions numbers: 19, 20, 24, 26, 27, 
34, 42, 43, 52, and 53. Failure to answer the questions 
completely and honestly represents a violation of his duty to 
cooperate with the congressional committee exercising the 
impeachment power.
    I will briefly discuss the pertinent requests for 
admissions one at a time.
    Question 19. Do you admit or deny that on or about December 
17, 1997, you suggested to Monica Lewinsky that she could say 
to anyone inquiring about her relationship with you that her 
visits to the Oval Office were for the purpose of visiting with 
Betty Currie or to deliver papers to you?
    Answer Provided. The President responded that such cover 
stories were only in a non-legal context: [I] ``may have talked 
about what to do in a non-legal context at some point in the 
past, but I have no specific memory of that conversation.'' The 
President maintained that any such conversation was not in the 
context of the Jones v. Clinton case.
    Facts as Provided in Referral: Under oath Ms. Lewinsky 
testified that she had a conversation with the President about 
her affidavit, and that at some point the President suggested 
the cover story: ``[Y]ou can always say you were coming to see 
Betty or that you were bringing me letters.''
    Question 20. Do you admit or deny that you gave false and 
misleading testimony under oath when you stated during your 
deposition in the case of Jones v. Clinton on January 17, 1998, 
that you did not know if Monica Lewinsky had been subpoenaed to 
testify in that case?
    Answer Provided. The President contradicted his deposition 
testimony. In the answer to request No. 20 the President stated 
that he did know that Ms. Lewinsky had been subpoenaed.
    Facts As Provided In Referral: In the deposition he stated 
that he did not know about the subpoena, and did not speak with 
anyone besides his attorneys regarding the subpoena. This 
question and answer demonstrates a direct contradiction. Thus, 
it demonstrates an intent to mislead either at the time of the 
deposition, or in answering the requests for admissions.
    Question 24. Do you admit or deny that on or about December 
28, 1997, you had a discussion with Monica Lewinsky at the 
White House regarding gifts you had given to Ms. Lewinsky that 
were subpoenaed in the case of Jones v. Clinton?
    Answer Provided. The President stated that when Ms. 
Lewinsky inquired about the subpoena covering the gifts, he 
told her if subpoenaed she would have to turn over the gifts.
    Facts As Provided In Referral: Ms. Lewinsky testified that 
she expressed her concern about the Jones case, and suggested 
that the gifts be put away. According to Ms. Lewinsky, the 
President responded that he would think about it or consider 
it. Thus, in the requests for admission the President states 
that he told her she would have to follow the law. The 
testimony of Ms. Lewinsky contradicts such assertions.
    Question 26. Do you admit or deny that on or about December 
28, 1997, you discussed with Betty Currie gifts previously 
given by you to Monica Lewinsky?
    Answer. The President responded that he did not recall any 
conversation with Ms. Currie regarding the gifts. Further, he 
answered that he did not instruct Ms. Currie to retrieve the 
gifts.
    Facts As Provided In Referral: According to Ms. Lewinsky's 
testimony, Betty Currie called her on the telephone and stated 
that she understood Ms. Lewinsky had something to give her. 
Phone record indicate that Ms. Currie initiated the phone call. 
Thus, the evidence shows that the President was attempting to 
avert the whole truth and nothing but the truth as to this 
question.
    Question 27. Do you admit or deny that on or about December 
28, 1998, you requested, instructed, suggested to or otherwise 
discussed with Betty Currie that she take possession of gifts 
previously given to Monica Lewinsky by you?
    Answer. The President responded that he could not recall 
any such conversation. He further stated that he did not 
instruct Ms. Currie to take possession of the gifts. The 
evidence as to these matters is discussed in regard to Question 
26, supra.
    Question 34. Do you admit or deny that you had knowledge 
that any facts or assertions contained in the affidavit 
executed by Monica Lewinsky on January 7, 1998, in the case 
Jones v. Clinton were not true?
    Answer. As to paragraph 8 pertaining to sexual relations, 
the President maintained that his deposition answer attesting 
to Ms. Lewinsky's affidavit was true. In paragraph 8 of Ms. 
Lewinsky's affidavit she stated that she had not engaged in 
sexual relations. In the deposition the President affirmed the 
truthfulness of Ms. Lewinsky's affidavit. In the request for 
admission answer the President persists in stating that he was 
truthful because he understood her interpretation of sexual 
relations to only include sexual intercourse. Such a response 
is yet another attempt to evade the truth and mislead the 
Committee.
    Question 42. Do you admit or deny that when asked on 
January 17, 1998, in your deposition in the case of Jones v. 
Clinton if you had ever given gifts to Monica Lewinsky, you 
stated that you did not recall, even though you actually had 
knowledge of giving her gifts in addition to gifts from the 
``Black Dog?''
    Answer. The President stated that his response at the 
deposition was ``I don't recall. Do you know what they were?'' 
The President maintains that by responding in such a manner he 
did not mean that he could not remember giving her gifts, only 
that he could not remember what they were.
    Facts As Provided In Referral: The evidence shows that only 
three weeks earlier the President and Ms. Lewinsky had a 
discussion about the hat pin which was under subpoena. The 
evidence further shows that both parties expressed concern 
about that particular gift under subpoena. The President's 
lawyer, Mr. Ruff, vouched that the President has an impeccable 
memory. Given that the discussion of gifts was only three weeks 
earlier, it is highly unlikely that the President could not 
remember the hat pin in particular. The President's answers 
were therefore evasive and less than truthful.
    Question 43. Do you admit or deny that you gave false and 
misleading testimony under oath in your deposition in the case 
of Jones v. Clinton when you responded ``once or twice'' to the 
question ``has Monica Lewinsky ever given you any gifts?''
    Answer. The President responded in his deposition by 
stating that he gives and receives numerous gifts, and that he 
thought she had given him one or two. In fact, Ms. Lewinsky 
gave the President approximately 38 gifts. In the request for 
admissions the President stated that his deposition response 
was not false and misleading because given the large number of 
gifts he receives he could not recall a precise amount.
    Facts As Provided In Referral: In fact, the President was 
not even close to the number of gifts she gave him. Once again, 
taken within the context of the overwhelming evidence, this is 
another example of the President's feigned memory problems 
which represents an intent to mislead the Committee and 
withhold the truth.
    Question 52. Do you admit or deny that on January 18, 1998, 
at or about 5:00 p.m. you had a meeting with Betty Currie at 
which you made statements similar to any of the following 
regarding your relationship with Monica Lewinsky?
    a. ``You were always there when she was there, right? We 
were never really alone.''
    b. ``You could see and hear everything.''
    c. ``Monica came on to me, and I never touched her right?''
    d. ``She wanted to have sex with me and I couldn't do 
that.''
    Answer. In response to the requests for admissions, the 
President stated that he asked Ms. Currie certain questions, 
but could not remember exactly what was said.
    Facts As Provided In Referral: In fact, Ms. Currie 
testified that she understood his comments to be statements 
rather than questions. Further, the record indicates that the 
President made similar statements at a meeting held around 5 
p.m. that day.
    Question 53. Do you admit or deny that you had a 
conversation with Betty Currie within several days of January 
18, 1998, in which you made statements similar to any of the 
following regarding your relationship with Monica Lewinsky?
    a. ``You were always there when she was there, right?'' 
``We were never really alone.''
    b. ``You could see and hear everything.''
    c. ``Monica came on to me, and I never touched her right?'
    d. ``She wanted to have sex with me and I couldn't do 
that.''
    Answer. In the answer to the requests for admissions the 
President stated that in his grand jury testimony he stated 
that he did not know that he had another conversation with Ms. 
Currie in which he made statements similar to those quoted.
    Facts As Provided In Referral: The record indicates that 
the President made similar statements to Ms. Currie on another 
occasion close in time to January 18, 1998.

                            VI. CONCLUSIONS

    Those in defense of the President argue that even if all 
the evidence is true, the activities do not amount to 
impeachable offenses. They insist that the President's actions 
involved private conduct, and the impeachment remedy for 
corruption does not apply to private conduct. Such an argument 
is both convenient and misguided. In the last twenty years 
Congress has indeed impeached individuals for private conduct.
    There have been three impeachments involving judges since 
the impeachment of President Nixon. Judge Harry Claiborne was 
impeached for making a false and fraudulent income tax return. 
Judge Walter Nixon was impeached for making false and 
misleading statements before a federal grand jury. Judge Alcee 
Hastings was impeached for perjury in a criminal trial. The 
alleged perjury committed by Judge Hastings was to conceal his 
involvement in a bribery conspiracy. Thus, perjury has played a 
central role in each of the three judicial impeachments.
    During Judge Claiborne's impeachment proceedings, 
Representative Hamilton Fish stated that: ``[i]mpeachable 
conduct does not have to occur in the course of the performance 
of an officer's official duties. Evidence of misconduct, 
misbehavior, high crimes, and misdemeanors can be justified 
upon one's private dealings as well as one's exercise of public 
office. That, of course, is the situation in this case.'' 
164
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    \164\ Cong. Rec. H4713 (daily ed. July 22, 1986).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In the present case, even if the President's actions were 
``private,'' the evidence leads a reasonable person to the 
conclusion that the President lied under oath, obstructed 
justice and tampered with witnesses.
    The President argues that he did not commit perjury because 
the answers he provided under oath were literally correct. Such 
a defense relies on a misguided parsing and hair-splitting of 
words. The law is clear. Perjury charges can be imposed upon a 
witness who feigns forgetfulness.165 When a witness 
feigns forgetfulness, the prosecutor need only prove that the 
witness had information or knowledge about the events in 
question.166 Such circumstances require an 
examination of all the evidence in the case, or the 
circumstantial evidence which tends to show that the witness in 
fact had information about the events in 
question.167 If the circumstantial evidence shows 
beyond a reasonable doubt that the witness had information, a 
conviction may lie.168
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \165\ See United States v. Dean, 55 F.3d 640 (D.C. Cir. 1995), 
cert. denied, 516 U.S. 184 (1996); see also United States v. Dunnigan, 
507 U.S. 87 (1993).
    \166\ See United States v. Dean, 55 F.3d 640 (D.C. Cir. 1995), 
cert. denied, 516 U.S. 184 (1996).
    \167\ Id.
    \168\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Before the grand jury, and throughout this investigation, 
the President has repeatedly said, ``I don't remember,'' and 
``I don't recall.'' When Mr. Ruff, the Chief White House 
Counsel, testified before the Judiciary Committee in the 
President's defense he stated that the President has an 
excellent memory. Interestingly, the President had a motive to 
lie from the moment Judge Wright ordered that an inquiry into 
other federal and state employees with whom the President had 
sexual relations was permissible and relevant to the Jones v. 
Clinton case. The overwhelming circumstantial evidence in this 
case demonstrates that the President feigned forgetfulness on a 
consistent basis.
    For example, the evidence shows that the President met with 
Ms. Lewinsky on December 28, 1997, and had a discussion about 
certain gifts the two had exchanged, specifically, the hat pin 
which was listed in Ms. Lewinsky's subpoena. The evidence also 
shows that the President's secretary went to retrieve numerous 
gifts from Ms. Lewinsky that day, the Sunday after Christmas 
weekend. In fact, the President was concerned that a reporter 
questioned Ms. Lewinsky about a hat pin that was a gift from 
the President. Yet, three weeks later in the Jones v. Clinton 
deposition the President could not recall specific gifts, and 
later testified that he was not concerned about them on that 
day. Again, examining the cumulative evidence in this case, it 
is very clear the President had knowledge about this matter, 
but feigned forgetfulness to the court.
    On at least 23 questions the President professed a lack of 
memory. This from a man who is renowned for his remarkable 
memory and ability to recall details, as testified to by White 
House Counsel, Mr. Ruff, before the Judiciary Committee.
    In a letter to House leaders, numerous legal scholars 
stated, ``[i]t goes without saying that lying under oath is a 
very serious offense.'' 169 They also recognize that 
perjury is an attack on our system of laws, ``[p]erjury and 
obstructing justice can without doubt be impeachable offenses . 
. .  Moreover, covering up a crime furthers or aids the 
underlying crime.'' 170
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \169\ Letter from professors of law to Speaker Gingrich and House 
leaders 3 (Nov. 6, 1998) (on file with Congressman Buyer).
    \170\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Another fact which tends to show that perjury is indeed a 
high crime worthy of impeachment is the fact that perjury and 
bribery are accorded the same penalty under the Federal 
Sentencing Guidelines. The Guidelines are a product of the 
Federal Sentencing Commission which determines the penalty for 
criminal offenses by examining the predicate offense, or the 
crime for which the person was charged, and then lists 
mitigating and aggravating factors in order to reach a 
recommended sentence for courts to consider when imposing a 
punishment on a convicted criminal. According to the 
Commission, bribery and perjury warrant the same penalty. It 
follows that the two crimes are comparable in gravity according 
to the Commission.

                              VII. Censure

          Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives 
        of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 
        That it is the sense of Congress that--
          (1) on January 20, 1993, William Jefferson Clinton 
        took the oath prescribed by the Constitution of the 
        United States faithfully to execute the office of 
        President; implicit in that oath is the obligation that 
        the President set an example of high moral standards 
        and conduct himself in a manner that fosters respect 
        for the truth; and William Jefferson Clinton, has 
        egregiously failed in his obligation, and through his 
        actions violated the trust of the American people, 
        lessened their esteem for the office of President, and 
        dishonored the office which they have entrusted to him;
          (2)(A) William Jefferson Clinton made false 
        statements concerning his reprehensible conduct with a 
        subordinate;
          (B) William Jefferson Clinton wrongly took steps to 
        delay discovery of the truth; and
          (C) inasmuch as no person is above the law, William 
        Jefferson Clinton remains subject to criminal and civil 
        penalties; and
          (3) William Jefferson Clinton, President of the 
        United States, by his conduct has brought upon himself, 
        and fully deserves, the censure and condemnation of the 
        American people and the Congress; and by his signature 
        on this Joint Resolution, acknowledges this censure and 
        condemnation.

    On December 12, 1998, the Judiciary Committee considered a 
censure resolution. After lengthy debate, the Committee 
declined to submit such a resolution by a vote of 14 in favor 
to 22 in opposition. I opposed the censure resolution.
    Congress lacks the power to punish the President aside from 
formal impeachment procedures. The impeachment clauses of the 
Constitution specifically provide that the Chief Executive is 
subject to impeachment by the House and trial by the 
Senate.171
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    \171\ ``The House of Representatives . . . shall have the sole 
Power of Impeachment.'' U.S. Const. art. I, Sec. 2. ``The Senate shall 
have the sole Power to try all Impeachments.'' U.S. Const. art. I, 
Sec. 3. ``The President, Vice President and all civil Officers of the 
United States, shall be removed from Office on Impeachment for, and 
Conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and 
Misdemeanors.'' U.S. Const. Art II, Sec. 4.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The Framers' decision to confine legislative sanctioning of 
the executive officials to removal upon impeachment was 
carefully considered. By forcing the House and Senate to act as 
a tribunal and trial jury, rather than merely as a legislative 
body, they infused the process with notions of due process to 
prevent impeachment from becoming a common tool of party 
politics. The requirement of removal upon conviction 
accentuates the magnitude of the procedure, encouraging serious 
deliberation among members of Congress. Most importantly, by 
refusing to include any consequences less serious than removal 
as outcomes of the impeachment process, the Framers made 
impeachment into such an awesome weapon that Congress could not 
use it to harass executive officials or otherwise interfere 
with operations of coordinate branches.
    The Framers of the Constitution purposely avoided granting 
the legislature the power to impose nonjudicial punishment, as 
``such bills are condemned in the Constitution because they 
represent legislative encroachment on the powers of the 
judiciary.'' 172 A bill of attainder ``assumes . . . 
judicial magistracy; it pronounces upon the guilt of the party, 
without any of the forms or safeguards of trial.'' 
173 The impeachment procedures explicitly provided 
by the Constitution provide such fairness. Censure is an 
inappropriate method to bypass the impeachment procedures 
prescribed in the Constitution.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \172\ Linnas v. INS, 790 F.2d 1024, 1028, cert. denied, 107 S.Ct. 
600, 479 U.S. 995 (1986).
    \173\ Id. at 1028, quoting Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 
271, 323, 18 L.Ed. 356 (1866).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Some members have proposed censure as a sanction from 
analogy to the legislative procedures by which members of each 
House censure its own members. The analogy fails because the 
Constitution expressly provides plenary authority to each House 
of Congress to fashion penalties for member of the legislative 
branch short of expulsion, but provides no such authority to 
discipline officers of other branches in the same manner. It is 
pursuant to this explicit authority that each House can require 
one of its members to go to the well of the House and receive 
the judgment of their peers.
    For the President or any other civil officer, this kind of 
shaming punishment by the legislature is precluded, since the 
impeachment provisions permit Congress only to remove an 
officer of another branch and disqualify him from office. Not 
only would such a punishment undermine the separation of 
powers, but it would violate the Constitution's prohibition on 
bills of attainder.
    The law is clear on legislative punishments without the 
benefit of a trial. Such punishments violate Article I, section 
9 of the Constitution which prohibits bills of attainder. A 
bill of attainder is defined as a legislative act which 
inflicts punishment without a judicial trial.174, 
175 In basic terms, that means that other than through 
impeachment procedures, Congress may not punish the President 
for past acts. These constitutional prohibitions on bills of 
attainder prohibit state legislatures, as well as the federal 
legislature from imposing an expedited or summary punishment 
for past conduct.176
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \174\ Historically, the bill of attainder was used to punish a 
certain person or a group by death, prison, banishment, punitive 
confiscation of property, or by barring participation in specific 
employment or vocation. Artway v. Attorney General of the State of New 
Jersey, 81 F.3d 1235 (3rd Cir. 1996).
    \175\ Nixon v. Administrator of General Services, 433 U.S. 425, 468 
(1977); Linnas v. INS, 790 F.2d 1024, cert. denied, 107 S.Ct. 600, 479 
U.S. 995 (1986); WMX Tech., Inc. v. Gasconade County, Mo., 105 F.3d 
1195, 1201 (8th Cir. 1997); Charles v. Rice, 28 F.3d 1312, 1318 (1st 
Cir. 1994); Antonio v. Wards Cove Packing Co., Inc., 10 F.3d 1485, 
cert. denied, 115 S.Ct. 57, 513 U.S. 809 (9th Cir. 1993); U.S. v. 
Patzer, 15 F.3d 934 (10th Cir. 1993).
    \176\ Landraf v. USI Film Products, 114 S.Ct. 1483, 1497, 511 U.S. 
244 (1994); Fraternal Order of Police Hobart Lodge No. 121 v. City of 
Hobart, 864 F.2d 5451 (7th Cir. 1988); Artway v. Attorney General of 
the State of New Jersey, 81 F.3d 1235, reh'g denied, 83 F.3d 594 (3rd 
Cir. 1996).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Even a statement of reproval intended to punish the 
President by discussing his behavior could potentially violate 
the rule against bills of attainder.177 Censure 
measures which include language of proposed articles of 
impeachment could therefore implicate the bills of attainder 
prohibition.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \177\ WMX Tech., Inc. v. Gasconade County, Mo., 105 F.3d 1195, 1201 
(8th Cir. 1997); Selective Service System v. Minnesota Public Interest 
Research Group, 104 S.Ct. 3348, 3352, 468 U.S. 841 (1984).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In order for a legislative measure to survive the bill of 
attainder prohibition, it must pass a three prong test. The 
test requires that the actual purpose, objective purpose, and 
effect are non- punitive.178 Courts are directed to 
examine the legislative intent of the measure to see if the 
intent was to punish.179 If the objective purpose 
was solely remedial, the measure may not qualify as 
punitive.180 Similarly, if the intent of the measure 
is to deter future acts of the same nature, it is likely not 
punitive.181 Stated simply, a bill of attainder 
prohibited by the Constitution contains three components: 
specification of affected persons, some form of punishment, and 
lack of a judicial trial.182
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \178\ Artway v. Attorney General of the State of New Jersey, 81 
F.3d 1235, 1263 (3rd Cir. 1996).
    \179\ Id. at 1263.
    \180\ Id.
    \181\ Id.
    \182\ Dehainaut v. Pena, 32 F.3d 1066 (7th Cir. 1994); Zilich v. 
Longo, 34 F.3d 359 (6th Cir. 1994).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    An integral part of the censure debate was whether the 
purpose of censure is to punish the President. Would censure 
serve a valid legislative purpose? What is the intent behind a 
censure resolution? Is censure merely impeachment under another 
name? Or is it a novel form of a plea bargain wherein a 
``deal'' is made to mitigate the punishment? In answers to my 
questions regarding the intent of the authors, Representative 
Boucher of Virginia stated: ``It is not our purpose to have 
findings of guilt. It is not our intent to punish the 
President.'' However, a close examination of the wording in the 
censure resolution appears that the implicit purpose would be 
to shame the President, to voice disdain for his actions which 
undermine the integrity of the office of the president, to 
reprove his dubious if not criminal acts, i.e., to punish.
    The censure resolution uses such words and phrases as, 
``egregiously failed;'' ``violated the trust of the American 
people;'' ``lessened their esteem;'' ``dishonored the office;'' 
``made false statements;'' ``reprehensible conduct;'' ``wrongly 
took steps to delay discovery of the truth;'' and ``fully 
deserves, the censure and condemnation.'' The use of these 
words and phrases is not remedial, on the contrary, it is to 
shame and condemn the President's misconduct.
    Paragraph (2)(A) of the censure resolution states: 
``William Jefferson Clinton made false statements concerning 
his reprehensible conduct with a subordinate.'' This is in 
reference to the President's sexual misconduct. It is an 
expression of moral condemnation as a form of national 
retribution. Therefore, in my opinion, it is a legislative 
punishment neither contemplated by the express provisions nor 
the design of the Constitution regarding separation of powers.
    Some members of Congress argue that censuring the President 
is a better idea than impeachment because that is ``what the 
American people want.'' The American people want their elected 
officials to act under and in accordance with the laws of this 
nation. Further, the American people want their elected 
representatives to take a stand on matters of national 
importance, such as the integrity of our justice system, and 
for Members of Congress and the Senate to exercise judgment in 
matters of statecraft based on their intellect, not the 
emotions of the moment, and for the President to do his duty to 
faithfully execute and uphold the laws of this nation.
    The facts and evidence in this case are overwhelming; the 
allegations are grave.183 The Judiciary Committee, 
endowed with the responsibility to investigate this evidence, 
determined the allegations against the President do rise to the 
level of impeachable offenses. A minority of Members disagreed 
and offered a censure resolution as an alternative to 
impeachment.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \183\ As discussed, the allegations substantiated by evidence 
include: perjury while a defendant in a civil rights case, perjury as a 
witness before a federal grand jury, subornation of perjury, witness 
tampering, obstruction of justice, and misleading Congress in refusing 
to answer the requests for admissions completely and truthfully.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

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    On December 12, 1998, I delivered the final closing 
argument for the majority on the Judiciary Committee on the 
Articles of Impeachment:

                  Statement of Congressman Steve Buyer

                                                 December 12, 1998.
    I thank the gentlewoman, Ms. Bono of California, for 
yielding. I am going to support the Gekas amendment. I will 
vote for Impeachment Article IV. The President's responses to 
the 81 requests for admissions from the Judiciary Committee 
were a continuation of a pattern of perjury and obstruction of 
justice.
    When we bring up the issues regarding the impeachment of 
former Federal judges Mr. Claiborne and Mr. Nixon, what was 
interesting, at the time we had a Democrat Majority on the 
Judiciary Committee, and they brought forward Articles of 
Impeachments. They passed the House. We had managers who 
prosecuted them in trial before the Senate. What I find most 
interesting is that these judges were prosecuted, and one 
standard was used: high crimes and misdemeanors. They said one 
standard that applies to the President and Vice President will 
also apply to these Federal judges and other civil officers. 
Yet now, the President's defenders are arguing Judge 
Claiborne's position that his private misconduct does not rise 
to the level of an impeachable offense.
    You see, in the defense of the Judges Claiborne and Nixon, 
the defense lawyers in the trial in the Senate argued that the 
Federal judges should be treated differently, that they could 
not be impeached for private misbehavior, because it is 
extrajudicial. The Democrat Majority at the time rejected that 
proposition as incompatible with common sense and the orderly 
conduct of government. Federal judges and the President should 
be treated by the same standard: impeachment for high crimes 
and misdemeanors. Well, I agree. I think the Republicans and 
Democrats at the time in the 1980's on both of those cases 
agreed and had it right. I think the Judiciary Committee needs 
to follow the precedent and be consistent, and that is what we 
are trying to do here.
    I also want to express my appreciation to Mr. Coble of 
North Carolina. Mr. Coble expressed some honesty about his own 
personal conscience, about his gut and how it was being turned 
over. And I don't believe anyone should make a mockery about 
someone describing how they personally feel going through this 
process, because it is not easy. So I am going to speak about 
my conscience.
    You see, I didn't sleep very well last night. So what I did 
about 2 a.m. this morning is I went out and took a jog. Now 
some may say that may not be a smart thing to do in Washington 
at 2 a.m., but I took a jog down the Mall. I first went through 
the area of the Korean Memorial. I did that because of my 
father, and then I thought of Mr. Conyers, and I thought of 
others; I then went over to the Vietnam Memorial, and I walked 
slowly. I thought of my days back as a cadet at The Citadel.
    There was this officer who was a Vietnam veteran, walked up 
to the blackboard, and his name today is Colonel Trez. He was a 
young major at the time, carrying the fresh memories of battle. 
He walked over and he wrote this statement on the blackboard 
and demanded that his young Citadel cadets memorize this 
statement. It read, ``Those who serve their country on a 
distant battlefield see life in a dimension that the protected 
may never know.''
    You see, I worked hard to understand what it meant. I 
thought I did, but it wasn't until years later that I 
understood the real meaning from my military service in the 
Gulf War. I had a very dear friend die. I understand the 
painful tears, and I understand the horrors of war.
    As I jogged back, I stopped at the Washington Monument. The 
Mall is beautiful at night. And then I thought about the World 
War II veterans, Mr. Hyde and others, a unique generation. They 
were truly crusaders. They fought for no bounty of their own. 
They left freedom in their footsteps. And then I thought about 
something I had read in military history. After D-Day they were 
policing up the battlefield and lying upon the battlefield was 
an American soldier who was dead. No one was around to hear his 
last words, so he wrote them on a pad. Can you imagine the 
frustration, knowing you are about to die and there is no one 
around to say your last words to? I don't know what you would 
write, but this soldier wrote, ``Tell them when you go home, I 
gave this day for their tomorrow.'' Of my fallen comrades, if I 
permit the eyes of my mind to focus, I can see them. And, if I 
permit the ears of my heart to listen, I can hear them. The 
echoes of ``do not let my sacrifice be in vain. I fell with the 
guidon in my hand. Pick it up and stake it in the high 
ground.''
    You see, part of my conscience is driven by my military 
service. I am an individual that not only is principled, but 
also steeped in virtues, and I use them to guide me through the 
chaos. Throughout this case, I think about people all across 
America, about America's values and the American character, and 
I want to put it in plain-spoken words.
    I believe we are to defend the Constitution, America's 
heritage, and define our Nation's character. So when I think 
about America's character and commonsense virtues, I think 
about honesty. What is it? Tell the truth; be sincere; don't 
deceive, mislead or be devious or use trickery; don't betray a 
trust. Don't withhold information in relationships of trust. 
Don't cheat or lie to the detriment of others, nor tolerate 
such practice. On issues of integrity, exhibit the best in 
yourself. Choose the harder right over the easier wrong. Walk 
your talk. Show courage, commitment, and self-discipline.
    On issues of promise-keeping, honor your oath and keep your 
word.
    On issues of loyalty, stand by, support and protect your 
family, your friends, your community, and your country. Don't 
spread rumors, lies, or distortions to harm others. You don't 
violate the law and ethical principles to win personal gain, 
and you don't ask a friend to do something wrong.
    On issues of respect, you be courteous and polite. You 
judge all people on their merits. You be tolerant and 
appreciative and accepting of individual differences. You don't 
abuse, demean, or mistrust anyone. You don't use, manipulate, 
exploit, or take advantage of others. You respect the right of 
individuals.
    On the issues of acting responsibly and being accountable, 
think before you act; meaning, consider the possible 
consequences on all people from your actions. You pursue 
excellence, you be reliable, be accountable, exercise self 
control. You don't blame others for your mistakes. You set a 
good example for those who look up to you.
    On the issue of fairness, treat all people fairly. Don't 
take unfair advantage of others, don't take more than your fair 
share. Don't be selfish, mean, cruel or insensitive to others. 
Live by the Golden Rule.
    You see, citizens all across America play by the rules, 
obey the laws, pull their own weight; many do their fair share; 
and they do so while respecting authority.
    I have been disheartened by the facts in this case. It is 
sad to have the occupant of the White House, an office that I 
respect so much, riddled with these allegations, and now I have 
findings of criminal misconduct and unethical behavior. We 
cannot expect to restore the confidence in government by 
leaving a perjurious President in office.
    I yield back my time.

                                                       Steve Buyer.

                          VIII. MINORITY VIEWS

    For only the second time in the history of our Nation, the 
House is poised to impeach a sitting President. The Judiciary 
Committee Democrats uniformly and resoundingly dissent.
    We believe that the President's conduct was wrongful in 
attempting to conceal an extramarital relationship. But we do 
not believe that the allegations that the President violated 
criminal laws in attempting to conceal that relationship--even 
if proven true--amount to the abuse of official power which is 
an historically rooted prerequisite for impeaching a President. 
Nor do we believe that the Majority has come anywhere close to 
establishing the impeachable misconduct alleged by the required 
clear and convincing evidence.
    Historian Arthur Schlesinger, appearing before the 
Committee on November 9, 1998, explained the grave dangers of 
``dumbing-down'' the impeachment process for largely private 
misconduct:

          Lowering the bar to impeachment creates a novel, 
        indeed revolutionary theory of impeachment, a theory 
        that would send us on an adventure with ominous 
        implications for the separation of owers that the 
        Constitution established as the basis of our political 
        order. 1
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ The Background and History of Impeachment: Hearings on H. Res. 
581 Before the Subcomm. On the Constitution, 105th Cong., 2d Sess. 
(1998) (Nov. 9, 1998) (``Subcommittee Hearing''), at 96-7.

    Impeachment is like a wall around the fort of the 
separation of powers fundamental to our constitution; the crack 
we put in the wall today becomes the fissure tomorrow, which 
ultimately destroys the wall entirely. This process is that 
serious. It is so serious the wall was not even approached when 
President Lincoln suspended the writ of habeas corpus, nor when 
President Roosevelt misled the public in the lend-lease 
program, nor when there was evidence that Presidents Reagan and 
Bush gave misleading evidence in the Iran-contra affair.
    We also note at the outset our profound disagreement with 
the process that the Judiciary Committee undertook to report 
this resolution. Without any independent examination of fact 
witnesses, this Committee essentially rubber-stamped a 
September 9th Referral from the Office of Independent Counsel 
(OIC). That Referral contained largely unproven allegations 
based on grand jury testimony--often inadmissable hearsay 
evidence--which was never subject to cross examination. Indeed 
the Committee's investigation of this material amounted to 
nothing more than simply releasing to the public the Referral 
and tens of thousands of accompanying pages of confidential 
grand jury material. In this regard, we decry the partisanship 
that accompanied this sad three month process at nearly every 
turn, and point out its unfortunate departure from the 
experience of Watergate in 1974.
    There is no question that the President's actions were 
wrong, and that he has suffered profound and untold humiliation 
and pain for his actions. But it is also undeniable that, when 
asked squarely about his relationship with Ms. Lewinsky before 
the grand jury, the President directly admitted to the improper 
physical relationship. The core of the charges against the 
President, thus, is that he did not adequately describe the 
intimate details of the relationship, and that his attempts to 
conceal his relationship amounted to a criminal conspiracy. Our 
review of the evidence, however, convinces us of one central 
fact--there is no persuasive support for the suggestion that 
the President perjured himself in his civil deposition or 
before the grand jury in any manner nearing an impeachable 
offense, obstructed justice, or abused the powers of his 
office. A few examples will make the point.
    The President's statements under oath in the dismissed 
Jones case were in all likelihood immaterial to that case and 
would never have formed the legal basis for any investigation. 
The alleged perjury before the grand jury also involves petty 
factual disputes which have no standing as impeachment counts. 
The Majority further alleges that the President attempted to 
find Ms. Lewinsky a job in order to buy her silence. But the 
evidence makes clear that efforts to help Ms. Lewinsky find a 
job began in April 1996, long before she ever was identified as 
a witness in the Jones case. Ms. Lewinsky herself testified 
that ``no one ever asked me to lie and I was never promised a 
job for my silence.'' \2\ Likewise, while the Majority contends 
that the President tried to hide gifts he had given Ms. 
Lewinsky, the evidence makes clear that Ms. Lewinsky--and not 
the President--initiated the transfer of those items to the 
President's secretary, Ms. Currie. Finally, while the Committee 
wisely rejected the abuse of power allegations brought by the 
OIC, it then improvidently substituted a spurious new charge of 
abuse largely because they did not like the President's tone in 
responding to the 81 questions posed by Chairman Hyde.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \2\ H.R. Doc. No. 311, infra, at 1393 (reprinting Lewinsky 7/27/98 
OIC 302 at 5).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In this context, we also point out, that since the election 
of President Clinton in 1992, Congressional Republicans and the 
OIC have spent tens of millions of dollars of taxpayers' monies 
on investigations of the President--investigations which have 
been discredited in the eyes of the public. In the process, 
Congressional Republicans have perverted the powers of 
Congressional investigation into a political weapon, setting a 
dangerous precedent for future generations.
    Finally, we note that there is virtual unanimity among 
Democrats and Republicans that the Senate will not convict 
President Clinton, and, thus, that the House is merely using 
the extraordinary powers of impeachment to express its 
displeasure for presidential actions. We regard this use of the 
impeachment sword as a perversion of our Constitutional form of 
government and as a dangerous arrogation of power by the 
Majority.
    The following sets forth an outline of our dissenting 
views:
                                                                   Page
  I. The Constitutional Standard for Impeachment has not been satisf203
      A. A President May Only Be Impeached for ``Treason, Bribery 
        or Other High Crimes and Misdemeanors''..................   205
      B. The Appropriate Role of The House In The Impeachment 
        Process..................................................   210
 II. The misconduct alleged in the articles would never be charged as a 
     criminal violation.............................................211
      A. The Alleged Perjurious Statements Were Immaterial.......   211
      B. The Alleged Perjurious Statements Would Never Merit 
        Prosecution..............................................   215
III. The articles of impeachment fail to establish impeachable offen218
      A. Article I Alleging Perjury Before the Grand Jury Fails 
        To Establish Impeachable Offenses........................   218
          1. The President Did Not Commit Impeachable Offenses 
            When Testifying About ``the nature and details of his 
            relationship with a subordinate Government 
            employee''...........................................   219
              a. The President did not commit an impeachable 
                offense when testifying about his understanding 
                of the definition of ``sexual relations'' 
                presented to him during his civil deposition in 
                the Jones case...................................   219
              b. The President did not commit an impeachable 
                offense when testifying about the nature of his 
                intimate contacts with Ms. Lewinsky..............   222
              c. The President did not commit an impeachable 
                offense when testifying about the date on which 
                his inappropriate contacts with Ms. Lewinsky 
                began............................................   226
              d. The President did not commit an impeachable 
                offense when testifying about the number of 
                occasions on which he was alone with Ms. Lewinsky 
                and the number of occasions on which they were 
                having phone sex.................................   227
          2. The President Did Not Commit an Impeachable Offense 
            Testifying About His Prior Testimony In The Jones 
            Civil Deposition.....................................   228
          3. The President Did Not Commit an Impeachable Offense 
            When His Attorney Characterized the Contents of Ms. 
            Lewinsky's Affidavit to the Presiding Judge in the 
            Jones Case...........................................   228
          4. The President Did Not Commit An Impeachable Offense 
            When He Testified About Allegations That He Had 
            Obstructed Justice...................................   229
      B. Article II's Allegations of Perjury In The Jones Civil 
        Deposition Fail To Establish An Impeachable Offense......   230
          1. The President Did Not Commit An Impeachable Offense 
            When He Testified about Meeting Alone with Ms. 
            Lewinsky.............................................   230
          2. The President Did Not Commit An Impeachable Offense 
            When He Testified about Meeting Alone with Ms. 
            Lewinsky.............................................   232
          3. The President Did Not Commit An Impeachable Offense 
            When He Testified about Gifts He exchanged with Ms. 
            Lewinsky.............................................   233
          4. The President Did Not Commit An Impeachable Offense 
            When He Testified about Whether He Had Talked with 
            Ms. Lewinsky about the Possibility She Would Be Asked 
            to Testify in the Jones Case.........................   238
          5. The President Did Not Commit An Impeachable Offense 
            When He Testified about Whether Ms. Lewinsky Had Told 
            Him She Had Been Subpoenaed..........................   239
          6. The President Did Not Commit An Impeachable Offense 
            When He Testified about Who Had Informed Him That Ms. 
            Lewinsky Had Received a Subpoena in the Jones Case...   240
          7. The President Did Not Commit An Impeachable Offense 
            When He Testified about Whether Anyone Had Reported 
            to Him about a Conversation with Ms. Lewinsky 
            Concerning the Jones Case in the Two Weeks Prior to 
            the Deposition.......................................   241
          8. The President Did Not Commit An Impeachable Offense 
            When He Testified about Whether He Had Heard That Mr. 
            Jordan and Ms. Lewinsky had Met to Discuss the Jones 
            Case.................................................   242
      C. Article III's allegations of obstruction of justice fail 
        to establish and impeachable offense.....................   243
          1. The President did not encourage Ms. Lewinsky to file 
            a false affidavit in the Jones case or testify 
            falsely if deposed in that matter....................   244
          2. The President did not obstruct justice by concealing 
            gifts that he gave to Ms. Lewinsky...................   246
          3. The President did not assist Ms. Lewinsky in 
            obtaining a job in New York in order to influence her 
            testimony in the Jones case..........................   249
          4. The President did not commit an impeachable offense 
            when his counsel characterized Ms. Lewinsky's 
            affidavit to the presiding judge during the Jones 
            deposition...........................................   252
          5. The President did not relate to Ms. Currie a false 
            and misleading account of events relevant to the 
            Jones suit with an intent to influence her testimony 
            in any legal proceeding..............................   252
          6. The President did not obstruct justice or abuse his 
            power by denying to his staff his inappropriate 
            contacts with Ms. Lewinsky...........................   256
      D. Article IV Alleging Abuse of Power Fails to Establish An 
        Impeachable Offenses.....................................   257
 IV. The credibility of the impeachment inquiry has been compromised259
      A. Bias in OIC Investigation...............................   259
      B. Unfairness in Committee Investigation...................   264
          1. Unfairness in Conducting Committee Inquiry..........   264
          2. Unfairness in the Drafting of the Articles of 
            Impeachment..........................................   267
  V.  Censure is an Appropriate and Constitutional Alternative to 
     Impeachment....................................................270
      A. Censure Resolution Is Constitutional....................   273
      B. Censure of the President Is Appropriate.................   275
 VI. Conclusion.....................................................277

 I. The Constitutional Standard for Impeachment Has Not Been Satisfied

    Impeachment is only warranted for conduct that constitutes 
``Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors'' as 
set forth in Article II, Section 4 of the Constitution. As 
virtually all constitutional scholars have noted, there is an 
important distinction between criminal and impeachable 
offenses--impeachment serves to protect the nation, not to 
punish the wrongdoer. A review of the language of the 
Constitution, the history and drafting of the impeachment 
clause, and subsequent review of its usage all serve to confirm 
that in all but the most extreme instances, the remedy of 
impeachment should be reserved for egregious abuses of 
presidential authority, rather than misconduct unrelated to 
public office. It is also clear that the President is subject 
to civil and criminal punishment independently of the 
impeachment process. The constitutional process of impeachment 
should not, therefore, be used for punitive purposes.
    Members of the Majority have gone to great lengths to 
misconstrue the power of impeachment as one that is 
appropriately exercised against a chief executive based on any 
potentially criminal conduct. This interpretation is flatly 
inconsistent with the intentions of the Framers and the prior 
presidential impeachments in this country. It also is contrary 
to the central conclusions of the Staff Report produced by the 
Watergate impeachment inquiry staff in 1974.3
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \3\ Staff of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 2d Sess 
(Comm. Print 1974), Constitutional Grounds for Presidential 
Impeachment) (hereinafter, ``Watergate Staff Report''). At the November 
9, 1998, Constitution Subcommittee Hearing on the Background and 
History of Impeachment, Mr. Scott asked the panel whether they agreed 
that every felony falls within the definition of ``Treason, Bribery or 
other high Crimes and Misdemeanors.'' The record shows that not one of 
the 10 panelists agreed that every felony is an impeachable offense.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Although many have inaptly compared the present proceedings 
to the genuine constitutional crisis brought about by President 
Richard Nixon, there are far more dissimilarities than 
parallels. In using the powers granted by the Independent 
Counsel Act 4 for the first time to justify the 
submission of a report to Congress outlining possible 
impeachable offenses, the OIC departed from the traditional 
deference shown by past presidential prosecutors. As these 
other prosecutors have recognized, it is Congress 
constitutional responsibility to determine whether alleged 
misconduct by a chief executive constitutes grounds for 
impeachment. Watergate independent prosecutor Leon Jaworski 
submitted grand jury materials to Congress that consisted only 
of grand jury transcripts and a ``road map'' through the 
allegations being investigated by the grand jury. His report 
``provided no analysis and drew no conclusions.'' 5 
To this day, that document remains sealed.6 
Congress, in short, recognized that only it had the right and 
the responsibility to level public charges of impeachable 
offenses against the President.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \4\ Ethics in Government Act, 28 U.S.C. Sec. Sec. 591-99.
    \5\ Linda Greenhouse, Testing of a President, New York Times, Sept. 
12, 1998, at 1A.
    \6\ Kevin Johnson and Judy Keen, The Case Against the President, 
USA Today, Sept. 14, 1998, at 1E.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The Committee's constitutional responsibility is quite 
distinct from cataloging laws that may have been violated. The 
determination of whether to impeach a President is vastly 
different than the determination of whether there is evidence 
of a legal offense. The Majority, by invoking the language of 
criminal statutes to describe the President's alleged 
misconduct, directly contradicts one of the main conclusions of 
the Watergate Staff Report, which it purports to endorse:

          The impeachment of a President must occur only for 
        reasons at least as pressing as those needs of 
        government which give rise to the creation of criminal 
        offenses. But this does not mean that the various 
        elements of proof, defenses, and other substantive 
        concepts surrounding an indictable offense control the 
        impeachment process. Nor does it mean that state or 
        federal criminal codes are necessarily the place to 
        turn to provide a standard under the United States 
        Constitution. Impeachment is a constitutional remedy. 
        The Framers intended that the impeachment language they 
        employed should reflect the grave misconduct that so 
        injures or abuses our constitutional institutions and 
        form of government as to justify 
        impeachment.7
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \7\ Watergate Staff Report at 22.

    The assumption that a president's violation of any of a 
number of laws may trigger the impeachment provisions of 
Article II, Section 4 of the Constitution is fundamentally 
misguided. In fact, as virtually all constitutional experts 
recognize, not all impeachable offenses are crimes and not all 
crimes are impeachable offenses. Again, the 1974 Watergate 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Staff Report is instructive on this issue:

          Impeachment and the criminal law serve fundamentally 
        different purposes. Impeachment is the first step in a 
        remedial process--removal from office and possible 
        disqualification from holding future office. The 
        purpose of impeachment is not personal punishment; its 
        function is primarily to maintain constitutional 
        government . . . The general applicability of the 
        criminal law also makes it inappropriate as the 
        standard for a process applicable to a highly specific 
        situation such as removal of a President. . . . In an 
        impeachment proceeding a President is called to account 
        for abusing powers that only a President 
        possesses.8
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \8\ Watergate Staff Report at 24.

 A. A President May Only Be Impeached for ``Treason, Bribery or Other 
                     High Crimes and Misdemeanors''

    With regard to the actual text of the Constitution, the 
juxtaposition of such serious offenses of Treason and Bribery 
with the phrase ``other high Crimes and Misdemeanors'' serves 
as an important indicator of how the latter term should be 
defined. In other words, such ``other high Crimes and 
Misdemeanors'' must constitute abuses of public office--similar 
to treason and bribery--to become impeachable 
conduct.9
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \9\ This reading is an example of the standard rule of construction 
known in Latin as ``ejusdem generis,'' or ``of the same kind,'' 
providing that when a general word occurs after a number of specific 
words, the meaning of the general word is limited to the kind or class 
of things in which the specific words fall.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    It also bears emphasis that the word ``high'' modifies both 
``Crimes'' and ``Misdemeanors.'' As the history of the latter 
term makes clear, the Framers did not entrust Congress with the 
power to impeach a popularly elected President simply upon a 
showing that the executive committed a ``misdemeanor'' crime as 
we now understand the term--a minor offense usually punishable 
by a fine or brief period of incarceration. Instead, an 
examination of the relevant historical precedents indicates 
that a president may only be impeached for conduct that 
constitutes an egregious abuse or subversion of the powers of 
the executive office.10
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \10\ The 1974 Watergate Staff Report at 12 wrote, ``Blackstone's 
Commentaries on the Laws of England--a work cited by delegates in other 
portions of the Convention's deliberations and which Madison later 
described (in the Virginia ratifying convention) as `a book which is in 
every man's hand'--included `high misdemeanors' as one term for 
positive offenses `against the king and government.' . . . `High Crimes 
and Misdemeanors' has traditionally been considered a `term of art,' 
like such other constitutional phrases as `levying war' and `due 
process.' ''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    It is evident from the legislative history surrounding the 
constitutional convention that the Framers intended impeachment 
to be a very limited constitutional remedy. At the outset, 
delegates such as Governor Morris and James Madison objected to 
the use of broad impeachment language. Morris argued that 
``corruption & some few other offences to be such as ought to 
be impeachable; but thought the cases ought to be enumerated & 
defined,'' 11 and Madison noted that impeachment was 
only necessary to be used to ``defend[] the Community against 
the incapacity, negligence or perfidy of the chief 
Magistrate.'' 12
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \11\ Raoul Berger, Impeachment: The Constitutional Problems, 65 
(1973).
    \12\ Id. (emphasis added).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The critical drafting occurred on September 8, 1787. George 
Mason objected to the fact that the draft was too limited 
because it applied only to ``treason or bribery'' and sought to 
add the term ``maladministration.'' When Madison objected that 
``so vague a term will be equivalent to a tenure during 
pleasure of the Senate,'' Mason withdrew ``maladministration'' 
and substituted ``high crimes and misdemeanors agst. the 
State,'' which was accepted by the delegates.13 The 
narrowness of the phrase ``other high Crimes and Misdemeanors'' 
was confirmed by the addition of the language ``against the 
State,'' reflecting the Convention's view that only offenses 
against the political order should provide a basis for 
impeachment. Although the phrase ``against the United States'' 
was eventually deleted by the Committee of Style that produced 
the final Constitution,14 the Committee of Style was 
directed not to change the meaning of any 
provision.15 It is therefore clear that the phrase 
was dropped as a redundancy and its deletion was not intended 
to have any substantive impact.16
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \13\ Watergate Staff Report at 11-12.
    \14\ 2 Max Farrand, The Records of the Federal Convention of 1781, 
551 (Rev. Ed. 1967).
    \15\ Id. at 553.
    \16\ See Fenton, The Scope of the Impeachment Power, 65 N. W. L. 
Rev. 719, 740 (1970).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The construction that ``other high Crimes and 
Misdemeanors'' should be limited to serious abuses of official 
power is further confirmed by the commentary of prominent 
Framers and early constitutional commentators. Alexander 
Hamilton wrote in Federalist No. 65 that impeachable offenses 
``proceed from the misconduct of public men, or in other words 
from the abuse or violation of some public trust.'' He stressed 
that those offenses ``may with peculiar propriety be 
denominated POLITICAL, as they relate chiefly to injuries done 
immediately to the society itself.'' 17 Hamilton's 
view was endorsed a generation later by Justice Joseph Story in 
his Commentaries on the Constitution when he wrote, 
``[impeachable offenses] are committed by public men in 
violation of their public trust and duties. . .. Strictly 
speaking, then, the impeachment power partakes of a political 
character, as it respects injuries to the society in its 
political character.'' 18 Justice Story added that 
impeachable offenses ``peculiarly injure the commonwealth by 
the abuse of high offices of trust.'' 19
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \17\ Alexander Hamilton, The Federalist Papers, 65 (C. Rossiter, 
ed., 1991).
    \18\ 2 Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Constitution Sec. 744 (1st 
ed. 1833) .
    \19\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Prior impeachment precedents also demonstrate that, for 
offenses to be impeachable, they must arise out of a 
president's public, not private, conduct. In 1868, Andrew 
Johnson was impeached by the House Republicans because he had 
removed the Secretary of War, Edwin M. Stanton, who had 
disagreed with his post-Civil War reconstruction 
policies.20 Although the impeachment of President 
Andrew Johnson failed in the Senate, it bears note that all of 
the impeachment articles related to alleged public 
misconduct.21
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \20\ Stanton's removal was said to be inconsistent with the Tenure 
in Office Act, requiring Senate approval for removal of certain 
officers.
    \21\ The eleven articles of impeachment related to Johnson's 
removal of Stanton, the impact of that removal on congressional 
prerogatives and its impact on post-civil war reconstruction. See Cong. 
Globe Supp., 40th Cong. 2d Sess. V. II, at 139-40 (April 23, 1868) and 
286-89 (April 29, 1868). See also Cong. Globe Supp., 40th Cong. 2d. 
Sess., at 286-310 (1868).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The circumstances surrounding the proposed impeachment of 
President Nixon also support the view that impeachment should 
be limited to threats that undermine the Constitution, not 
ordinary criminal misbehavior unrelated to a president's 
official duties. All three of the articles of impeachment 
approved by the House Judiciary Committee involved misuse of 
the President's official duties.22 Even more telling 
are the circumstances by which the Committee rejected articles 
of impeachment relating to allegations of income tax evasion. 
When the Judiciary Committee debated a proposed article of 
impeachment alleging that President Nixon had committed tax 
fraud when filing his federal income tax returns for the years 
1969 through 1972 filed under penalty of perjury 23 
it was defeated by a vote of 26-12. Although some Members 
believed this count was not supported by the evidence, the 
primary ground for rejection was that the Article related to 
the President's private conduct, not to an abuse of his 
authority as President.24
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \22\ The First Article--alleging that President Nixon coordinated a 
cover-up of the Watergate break-in by interfering with numerous 
government investigations, using the CIA to aid the cover-up, approving 
the payment of money and offering clemency to obtain false testimony--
qualified as a high Crime and Misdemeanor, because ``[the President 
used] the powers of his high office [to] engage . . . in a course of 
conduct or plan designed to delay, impede, and obstruct [the Watergate 
investigation].'' The Second Article--alleging that the President used 
the IRS as a means of political intimidation and directed illegal 
wiretapping and other secret surveillance for political purposes--
described ``a repeated and continuing abuse of the powers of the 
Presidency in disregard of the fundamental principle of the rule of law 
in our system of government.'' The Third Article `` alleging that 
President Nixon refused to comply with subpoenas issued by the 
Judiciary Committee in its impeachment inquiry--was considered 
impeachable because such subpoena power was essential to ``Congress' 
[ability] to act as the ultimate safeguard against improper 
presidential conduct.''
    \23\ The crux of the impeachment article related to allegations 
that the President understated his income and overstated his deductions 
for the years 1969 through 1972.
    \24\ Republican congressmen explicitly emphasized that personal 
misconduct could not give rise to an impeachable offense. Congressman 
Tom Railsback (R-IL) noted that there was ``a serious question as to 
whether something involving [the President's] personal tax liability 
has anything to do with his conduct of the office of the President.'' 
Congressman Lawrence J. Hogan (R-MD), quoted from the impeachment 
inquiry staff report:
    As a technical term, high crime signified a crime against the 
system of government, not merely a serious crime. This element of 
injury to the commonwealth, that is, to the state itself and to the 
Constitution, was historically the criteria for distinguishing a high 
crime or misdemeanor from an ordinary one.
    Similarly, Democratic Congressman Jerome Waldie (D-CA) echoed the 
Republican distinction between public and private conduct, and opposed 
the proposed article because ``the impeachment process is a process 
designed to redefine Presidential powers in cases where there has been 
enormous abuse of those powers and then to limit the powers as a 
concluding result of the impeachment process.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    A review of the writings by prominent scholars concerning 
the issue of impeachment further confirms the general principal 
that for presidential wrongdoing to rise to the level of an 
impeachable offense it must relate to grievous abuse of office. 
The question of whether private presidential misconduct could 
be impeachable was posed twenty-five years ago by Professor 
Charles Black, in his seminal work, Impeachment: A Handbook, 
when he posited the following hypothetical:

          Suppose a President transported a woman across a 
        state line or even (as the Mann Act reads) from one 
        point to another within the District of Columbia, for 
        what is quaintly called an ``immoral purpose.'' . . . 
        Or suppose the president actively assisted a young 
        White House intern in concealing the latter's 
        possession of three ounces of marijuana--thus himself 
        becoming guilty of ``obstruction of justice.'' Would it 
        not be preposterous to think that any of this is what 
        the Framers meant when they referred to ``Treason, 
        Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors,'' or 
        that any sensible constitutional plan would make a 
        president removable on such grounds?25
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \25\ Charles L. Black, Impeachment: A Handbook 35-36 (1974).

    More recently, a large group of legal scholars and 
academics have offered their views regarding the impeachability 
of the misconduct alleged by the Majority. On November 6, 1998, 
430 Constitutional law professors wrote: ``Did President 
Clinton commit `high Crimes and Misdemeanors' warranting 
impeachment under the Constitution? We . . . believe that the 
misconduct alleged in the report of the Independent Counsel . . 
. does not cross that threshold . . . [I]t is clear that 
Members of Congress would violate their constitutional 
responsibilities if they sought to impeach and remove the 
President for misconduct, even criminal misconduct, that fell 
short of the high constitutional standard required for 
impeachment.'' 26
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \26\ Letter from more than 400 Constitutional law professors (Nov. 
6, 1998) (submitted as part of the Constitution Subcommittee Hearing 
Record).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    One week earlier, more than four hundred historians issued 
a joint statement warning that because impeachment has 
traditionally been reserved for high crimes and misdemeanors in 
the exercise of executive power, impeachment of President 
Clinton based on the facts alleged in the OIC Referral would 
set a dangerous precedent. ``If carried forward, they will 
leave the Presidency permanently disfigured and diminished, at 
the mercy as never before of caprices of any Congress. The 
Presidency, historically the center of leadership during our 
great national ordeals, will be crippled in meeting the 
inevitable challenges of the future.'' 27
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \27\ Statement Against the Impeachment Inquiry, submitted to the 
Committee by more than 400 historians (Oct. 28, 1998)(submitted as part 
of the Constitution Subcommittee Hearing Record).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The weight of evidence offered at Committee hearings also 
supports the view that in all but the most extreme instances, 
impeachment should be limited to abuse of public office, not 
private misconduct. This point was made by several of the 
witnesses at the Constitution Subcommittee Hearing on the 
Background and History of Impeachment. Chicago Law Professor 
Cass Sunstein, summarized the standard as follows: ``[w]ith 
respect to the President, the principal goal of the impeachment 
clause is to allow impeachment for a narrow category of large-
scale abuses of authority that come from the exercise of 
distinctly presidential powers. Outside of that category of 
cases, impeachment is generally foreign to our traditions and 
prohibited by the Constitution.'' 28 Professor 
Sunstein went on to review English Parliamentary precedent, the 
intent of the Framers and subsequent impeachment practice as 
all supporting this bedrock principle. In his view, the only 
exception where purely private conduct would be implicated was 
in the case of a heinous crime, such as murder or rape:

    \28\ Subcommittee Hearing, (Written Testimony of Cass Professor 
Sunstein at 2) (emphasis in original).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
          [B]oth the original understanding and historical 
        practice converge on a simple principle. The basic 
        point of the impeachment provision is to allow the 
        House of Representatives to impeach the President of 
        the United States for egregious misconduct that amounts 
        to the abusive misuse of the authority of his office. 
        This principle does not exclude the possibility that a 
        president would be impeachable for an extremely heinous 
        ``private'' crime, such as murder or rape. But it 
        suggests that outside such extraordinary (and 
        unprecedented and most unlikely) cases, impeachment is 
        unacceptable.29
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \29\ Id. at 5, 7, 8, 11, 12 (emphasis in original).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Father Drinan, a former House Judiciary Committee Member 
who participated in the Watergate impeachment process, and now 
a Professor of Law at Georgetown University, reached the same 
conclusion, testifying that, ``the impeachment of a President 
must relate to some reprehensible exercise of official 
authority. If a President commits treason he has abused his 
executive powers. Likewise a President who accepts bribes has 
abused his official powers. The same misuse of official powers 
must be present in any consideration of a President's engaging 
in `other high crimes and misdemeanors.' 30 Eminent 
historian Arthur Schlesinger similarly distinguished between 
private and public misconduct:

    \30\ Id. (Written Testimony of Robert F. Drinan, S.J. at 3-7).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
          The question we confront . . . is whether it is a 
        good idea to lower the bar to impeachment. The charges 
        levied against the President by the Independent Counsel 
        plainly do not rise to the level of treason and 
        bribery. They do not apply to acts committed by a 
        President in his role of public official. They arise 
        from instances of private misbehavior. All the 
        Independent Counsel's charges . . . derive entirely 
        from a President's lies about his own sex life. His 
        attempts to hide personal misbehavior are certainly 
        disgraceful; but if they are to be deemed impeachable, 
        then we reject the standards laid down by the Framers 
        in the Constitution and trivialize the process of 
        impeachment.31

    \31\ Id. (Written Statement of Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. at 2).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Prominent witnesses called by the White House concurred in 
these assessments. Former Attorney General Nicholas Katzenbach 
testified that impeachment must involve ``some conduct--some 
acts--which are so serious as to bring into question the 
capacity of the person involved to carry out his role with the 
confidence of the public'' and noted that it was clear that 
``despite the strongly held views of some, the public does not 
put perjury about sexual relations in the category of `high 
crimes or misdemeanors.' '' 32 Princeton History 
Professor Sean Wilentz warned the Committee about the dangers 
of a largely partisan impeachment, and warned that ``these 
proceedings are on the brink of becoming irretrievably 
politicized, more so even than the notorious drive to remove 
Andrew Johnson from office one hundred and thirty years ago.'' 
33
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \32\ Hearing before the House Comm. on the Judiciary, Dec. 8, 1998 
(Statement of Nicholas Katzenbach at 3-4).
    \33\ Id. (Written Testimony of Professor Sean Wilentz, at 5).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The one witness jointly selected by the Majority and the 
Minority--William & Mary Law Professor Michael Gearhardt--also 
testified that impeachment should principally be limited to 
abuse of public office:

          [There is a] widespread recognition that there is a 
        paradigmatic case for impeachment consisting of the 
        abuse of power. In the paradigmatic case, there must be 
        a nexus between the misconduct of an impeachable 
        official and the latter's official duties. It is this 
        paradigm that Hamilton captured so dramatically in his 
        suggestion that impeachable offenses derive from ``the 
        abuse or violation of some public trust'' and are ``of 
        a nature which may be peculiar propriety be denominated 
        POLITICAL, as they relate chiefly to injuries done 
        immediately to the society itself. This paradigm is 
        also implicit in the founders' many references to 
        abuses or power as constituting political crimes or 
        impeachable offenses.34
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \34\ Id. (Written Testimony of Professor Michael Gearhardt at 13-
14) (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added).

    Even some witnesses called by the Majority cautioned that 
discretion should be applied before applying the impeachment 
power in all situations. For example, Duke Law Professor 
William Van Alstyne stated that the allegations by Mr. Starr 
constituted ``low crimes and misdemeanors'' and that ``[t]he 
further impeachment pursuit of Mr. Clinton may well not now be 
particularly worthwhile.'' 35 Charles E. Wiggins, a 
senior judge on the Ninth Circuit, and a former Republican 
Member of the Judiciary Committee who participated in the 
Watergate inquiry stated, ``I am presently of the opinion that 
the misconduct admittedly occurring by the President is not of 
the gravity to remove him from office.'' 36
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \35\ Id. (Written Testimony of Professor William Van Alstyne at 6).
    \36\ Hearings before the House Comm. on the Judiciary, ``The 
Consequences of Perjury and Related Crimes,'' Dec. 1, 1998 (Written 
Testimony of Hon. Charles E. Wiggins).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    B. The Appropriate Role of The House In The Impeachment Process

    It has been repeatedly argued that the House is like a 
grand jury that simply votes out an article of impeachment 
based on ``probable cause'' to believe that impeachable offense 
have occurred and lets the Senate weigh the actual evidence. 
This view of the House's role has been offered in support of 
the proposition that the House does not have to hear evidence 
or make decisions about who is telling the truth because that 
is the Senate's job. This cramped view of the appropriate role 
of the House finds no support in the Constitution and is 
completely contrary to the great weight of historical 
precedent. As former Watergate Era Attorney General Elliot 
Richardson warned:

          A vote to impeach is a vote to remove. If members . . 
        . believe that should be the outcome, they should vote 
        to impeach. If they think that is an excessive 
        sentence, they should not vote to impeach, because if 
        they do . . . the matter is out of your hands . . . 
        37
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \37\ Id. (Written Testimony of Elliott Richardson).

    During the debate over the articles of impeachment, Rep. 
Frank reminded the Members that they should not take the 
House's independent role to remove the President from office 
lightly: ``I have to say that I think it is a grave error 
constitutionally to denigrate what we are doing. Yes, it is 
true that, as a consequence of this, the President will not be 
instantly thrown out of office. It is also true that the only 
justification and basis for this proceeding and the only basis 
on which Members can honestly vote for these articles is the 
conviction that the President ought to be thrown out of 
office.'' 38
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \38\ Markup Tr. 12/11/98, at 464.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The argument that the House is merely the body that accuses 
and the Senate is the body that tries, undermines the dual 
protection against misuse of the impeachment power that the 
founders intended. The Constitution requires more than that the 
House be a mere rubber stamp for sending allegations of 
wrongdoing to the Senate; rather Article II intends that the 
House as well as the Senate look to the same evidence with the 
same standards. As constitutional expert Professor John H. 
Labovitz concluded with respect to Watergate, in terms that 
seem as if they were written for today;

          . . . there were undesirable consequences if the 
        House voted impeachment on the basis of one-sided or 
        incomplete information or insufficiently persuasive 
        evidence. Subjecting the Senate, the President, and the 
        nation to the uncertainty and potential divisiveness of 
        a presidential impeachment trial is not a step to be 
        lightly undertaken. While the formal consequences of an 
        ill-advised impeachment would merely be acquittal after 
        trial, the political ramifications could be much more 
        severe. Accordingly, the house . . . should not vote 
        impeachments that are unlikely to succeed in the senate 
        . . . the standard of proof applied in the House should 
        reflect the standards of proof in the Senate . . . 
        39
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \39\ Labovitz, Presidential Impeachments, at 192-3.

    Professor Labovitz has meticulously documented how, in the 
Nixon inquiry, everyone agreed--the Majority, the Minority, and 
the President's counsel--that the standard of proof for the 
Committee and the House was ``clear and convincing evidence.'' 
When the articles of impeachment are weighed against this 
standard, it is clear that the constitutional standard has not 
been satisfied.

II. The Misconduct Alleged in the Articles Would Never Be Charged As A 
                           Criminal Violation

    As discussed above, violations of criminal law are not 
sufficient to establish an impeachable offense. Much of the 
misconduct alleged in the articles of impeachment could not be 
the subject of a successful perjury prosecution and experienced 
prosecutors have persuasively testified that the misconduct 
alleged in the articles would never be the subject of a 
criminal prosecution.

          A. The Alleged Perjurious Statements Were Immaterial

    Both the Majority's allegation that the President committed 
perjury during his grand jury testimony (Article I) and during 
his testimony in the Jones case (Article II), are predicated on 
the President's efforts to conceal the nature and extent of his 
relationship with Ms. Lewinsky. Since so much time of the 
Committee was taken up with an examination of whether the 
President's conduct violated criminal law (rather than on 
whether that conduct amounted to impeachable offenses), some of 
the relevant issues of law have to be defined. In considering 
whether such conduct constituted a violation of law, the 
Committee should have focused on the effect, if any, that this 
testimony had on the course of that litigation.40 
Accordingly, since the first two Articles are largely based on 
the presumed seriousness of the President's failure to admit 
the full extent of his inappropriate relationship during his 
testimony, the relevance of the testimony must be considered.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \40\ A lie under oath becomes a criminal offense only when it is 
``material'' to the proceeding in which it is given. Courts have held a 
statement to be material if it ``has a natural tendency to influence, 
or was capable of influencing, the decision of the tribunal in making a 
[particular] determination. Proof of actual reliance on the statement 
is not required; the Government need only make a reasonable showing of 
its potential effects.'' United States v. Barrett, 111 F.3d 947, 953 
(D.C. Cir. 1997) (internal quotation omitted) (brackets in original); 
see also United States v. Moore, 613 F.2d 1029, 1037-38 (D.C. Cir. 
1979) (same); United States v. Icardi, 140 F. Supp. 383, 388 (D.D.C. 
1956) (same).
    Significantly, the Supreme Court's recent decision in United States 
v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506 (1995) strongly suggests the correctness of 
this standard. There, the Supreme Court considered the question 
whether, under the federal false statements statute, 18 U.S.C. 
Sec. 1001, issues of materiality should be decided by the judge or the 
jury. In his opinion holding that the issue is for the jury, Justice 
Scalia endorsed the view that a statement is material only if it has a 
``'natural tendency to influence, or [be] capable of influencing, the 
decision of the decisionmaking body to which it was addressed.'' 
Gaudin, 515 U.S. at 509 (quoting Kungys v. United States, 485 U.S. 759, 
770 (1988)) (brackets in original). The Court's interpretation of 
Sec. 1001 as embodying a ``capable of influencing'' definition of 
materiality should be applied to the perjury statutes, which are very 
similar in scope and purpose.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Paula Jones was seeking to prove unwelcome and unsolicited 
conduct by the President. Whatever else it was, the President's 
relationship with Ms. Lewinsky was neither unwanted nor 
harassing.41 If the President's testimony under oath 
is what supports the allegation of abuse of constitutional 
magnitude, then the immateriality of that testimony makes clear 
the insufficiency of the Articles recommending impeachment on 
that basis.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \41\ See Equal Employment Opportunity Statement: Executive Office 
of the President; 29 CFR Sec. 1604.11a.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Paula Jones, a former Arkansas state employee, filed a 
civil lawsuit against the President in 1994 alleging that he 
had sexually harassed her during an encounter in a hotel room 
during a government conference. After protracted discovery, the 
President's motion for summary judgment was granted on the 
basis that, even if one assumed the truth of every allegation 
made by Jones concerning the President's behavior, Jones failed 
to prove that she was entitled to any relief as a matter of 
law. In light of this fundamental weakness in Jones' case, it 
is exceedingly difficult to establish that the allegedly 
misleading statements made by the President during his 
testimony were legally ``material'' or ``capable of 
influencing'' a court.42 Simply put, Mrs. Jones 
would have lost her lawsuit regardless of the President's 
deposition testimony.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \42\ United States v. Barrett, 111 F.3d 947, 953 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In evaluating the Majority's charge, the rulings made by 
Judge Wright in the Jones case must be considered. These are 
directly relevant to the question whether the President's 
allegedly false statements could possibly be characterized as 
violations of the federal law cited by the Referral and relied 
upon by the Majority. Judge Wright's order excluding evidence 
concerning Ms. Lewinsky, and her order granting the President's 
summary judgment motion, clearly establish that any alleged 
misleading statements by the President concerning his 
indisputably consensual and non-harassing relationship with Ms. 
Lewinsky were simply not material matters.
    On January 29, 1998, the Independent Counsel intervened in 
the Jones case and moved to exclude from that proceeding any 
evidence regarding Monica Lewinsky.43 In her order 
granting that motion, Judge Wright concluded that evidence 
relating to Monica Lewinsky was not ``essential to the core 
issues in this case.'' 44 Since Paula Jones' lawyers 
would have been precluded from introducing any evidence 
relating to Lewinsky to attack the President's credibility, the 
President's testimony was not material to the Jones case.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \43\ The President's actions in supposedly denying a civil litigant 
access to evidence has been frequently cited as one reason that the 
President's alleged perjury may constitute an impeachable offense. It 
is ironic, therefore, that it was the Independent Counsel's insistence 
that the allegations relating to Ms. Lewinsky merited criminal 
investigation which actually deprived Mrs. Jones of the ability to 
present evidence concerning Monica Lewinsky to the court.
    \44\ Judge Wright's order further held that ``some of this evidence 
might even be inadmissible as extrinsic evidence under Rule 608(b) of 
the Federal Rules of Evidence.'' Jones v. Clinton, No. LR-C-94-290, 
Order dated Jan. 29, 1998, at 2. Federal Rule of Evidence 608(b) 
governs a party's ability to introduce specific instances of a witness' 
prior conduct in order to impeach the witness' credibility. The rule 
provides, as a general matter, that a witness' prior conduct may not be 
proved by extrinsic evidence. Judge Wright clearly thought it possible 
that proof of the President's alleged relationship with Monica Lewinsky 
would be inadmissible because, at best, it was relevant only to the 
President's credibility. See also Jones v. Clinton, No. LR-C-94-290, 
Order dated Mar. 9, 1998, at 2 (denying motion to reconsider order 
excluding Lewinsky evidence because ``any evidence concerning Ms. 
Lewinsky would be excluded from the trial of this matter'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    On April 1, 1998, Judge Wright granted the President's 
motion for summary judgment in the Jones case.45 As 
required by federal law, in reviewing the President's summary 
judgment motion, Judge Wright assessed the evidence in the case 
in the light most favorable to Ms. Jones.46 
Nevertheless, Judge Wright concluded that no ``rational trier 
of fact [could] find for [Ms. Jones],'' and therefore that 
there were ``no genuine issues for trial[.]'' 47 The 
court's decision undermines the OIC's assumption that the 
President's testimony regarding Monica Lewinsky could ever be 
material to the resolution of the specific claims that Ms. 
Jones made:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \45\ Jones v. Clinton, No. LR-C-94-290, Memorandum Opinion and 
Order at 10-11 (E.D. Ark. Apr. 1, 1998).
    \46\ Id. at 3 n.3.
    \47\ Id. at 39.

          One final matter concerns the alleged suppression of 
        pattern and practice evidence. Whatever relevance such 
        evidence may have to prove other elements of the 
        plaintiff's case, it does not have anything to do with 
        the issues presented by the President's . . . motion[] 
        for summary judgment . . . Whether other women may have 
        been subjected to workplace harassment, and whether 
        such evidence has allegedly been suppressed, does not 
        change the fact that plaintiff has failed to 
        demonstrate that she has a case worthy of submitting to 
        a jury.48
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \48\ Id. at 38-39 (emphasis in original).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    If Jones' claims failed for lack of proof, nothing the 
President said about Ms. Lewinsky could possibly have affected 
the outcome of the case.
    The presence of Judge Wright during the deposition and her 
decision to allow certain questions to be posed does not 
suggest, as some have argued, that the President's responses to 
those questions were inevitably material to the Jones case. 
During a discovery deposition, only questions that are wholly 
irrelevant to the underlying action will be disallowed. 
Relevance in the discovery stage of civil litigation is an 
exceedingly broad standard which is not co-extensive with the 
concept of materiality. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
provide that discovery may be had on any subject relevant to a 
pending case, and that the ``information sought need not be 
admissible at the trial if the information sought appears 
reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible 
evidence.'' Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1).49 Courts have 
held, however, that the mere fact that testimony was deemed 
permissible is not sufficient to establish materiality.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \49\ The drafters of the rule further explained that testimony is 
proper at a deposition so long as it is part of ``a broad search for 
facts, . . . or any other matter which may aid a party in the 
preparation or presentation of his case.'' Fed. R. Civ. P. 26, 1946 
Advisory Committee Note.

          [T]he credibility of a witness is always at issue, 
        but not every word of a witness' testimony is 
        invariably material. The materiality of a particular 
        snippet of testimony is not automatically established 
        by the simple expedient of proving that the testimony 
        was given.50
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \50\ United States v. Adams, 870 F.2d 1140, 1147-48 (6th Cir. 
1989).

In sum, not all testimony that a judge permits to be elicited 
during a pretrial discovery proceeding can satisfy the 
materiality requirement that the information be likely to 
influence the outcome of the case.
    Some Members of the Majority and the OIC in press releases 
that it issued during the course of the Committee's hearings 
\51\ have alleged that the materiality of the President's 
alleged false statements in Jones v. Clinton has already been 
dispositively resolved by the United States Court of Appeals 
for the District of Columbia Circuit. \52\ This assertion is 
misleading and untrue. The litigation referred to by the OIC 
involved a legal challenge by Ms. Lewinsky's lawyer, Frank 
Carter, to a subpoena issued by the OIC for testimony and 
materials protected by the attorney-client privilege. In 
seeking to compel testimony that would ordinarily be protected 
by the attorney-client privilege, the OIC argued that it had 
reason to believe that the attorney-client relationship had 
been exploited to facilitate the filing of a false affidavit, 
which would permit ordinarily privileged material to be 
disclosed pursuant to the ``crime-fraud'' exception. In 
opposing this subpoena to her former attorney, Ms. Lewinsky 
argued that her affidavit related to matters later excluded 
from the Jones case and, therefore, was not ``material'' to 
that proceeding, thereby rendering the truth or falsity of her 
affidavit legally irrelevant. The D.C. Circuit, in rejecting 
this argument, did not hold that Ms. Lewinsky's affidavit was 
relevant to the underlying Jones litigation. Instead, the Court 
arrived at the much narrower ruling that Ms. Lewinsky's 
affidavit was relevant to her motion to quash her own subpoena.

    \51\ The practice of the OIC to continue to speak publicly and to 
issue press releases after it made its' 595(c) Referral to Congress 
bears note. This report points out the bias, impartiality, and 
``attitude'' with which the Referral was written. The fact that the OIC 
continued to feel the need to defend itself against all possible 
criticisms--large and small--demonstrates that it was indeed too vested 
and partial in this entire event.
    \52\ Appendices to the Referral (Part 1) H. Doc. 103-311 at 294.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
          Lewinsky used the statement in her affidavit . . . to 
        support her motion to quash the subpoena issued in the 
        discovery phase of the Arkansas litigation. . . . There 
        can be no doubt that Lewinsky's statements in her 
        affidavit were . . . predictably capable of affecting 
        this decision. She executed and filed her affidavit for 
        this very purpose. \53\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \53\ In re Sealed Case, slip op. at 4-6 (D.C. Cir., Nos. 98-3052, 
98-3053, 98-3059, May 26, 1998).

    That Ms. Lewinsky's affidavit was material to her own 
motion to quash is not surprising, but that holding does not 
compel the conclusion that the President's testimony concerning 
Ms. Lewinsky was material to the Jones case. It is a disservice 
to the state of the record to suggest that the important 
threshold question of materiality has been conclusively 
resolved by the D.C. Circuit. Most importantly, as the Majority 
has argued time and time again, these are not legal 
proceedings. Although scholars differ about the materiality 
issue, it cannot be denied that the President's allegedly false 
statements played no actual role in depriving Ms. Jones of any 
relief she was seeking as a civil litigant. To the contrary, 
the negative publicity created by both her case and the OIC's 
involvement in her civil discovery processes may well led the 
President to offer her a generous settlement despite the 
decision dismissing her claims. These are legitimate, common-
sense considerations which should have weighed more heavily in 
this Committee's deliberations about the gravity of the 
offenses alleged. When Judge Webber Wright ruled on April 1 
that no matter what the President did with Ms. Lewinsky, Paula 
Jones herself had not proven that she had been harmed, the 
court's opinion confirmed that the President's statements, 
whether truthful or not, were not of the grave constitutional 
significance necessary to support impeachment.

   B. The Alleged Perjurious Statements Would Never Merit Prosecution

    On December 9, 1998, a panel of five highly regarded former 
Democratic and Republican federal prosecutors appeared before 
the Committee and testified that the OIC's case against the 
President would not have been pursued by a responsible federal 
prosecutor. It stood to reason, therefore, that if lawyers 
could agree that the President's conduct would not even merit a 
criminal prosecution under ordinary circumstances, how could 
lawmakers in Congress conclude that it amounted to a ``high 
crime?'' The bi-partisan panel consisted of:
          Richard J. Davis, former task force leader for the 
        Watergate Special Prosecution Force, and former 
        Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for Enforcement and 
        Operations;
          Edward S.G. Dennis, Jr., former Acting Deputy 
        Attorney General of the United States, former Assistant 
        Attorney General for the Criminal Division of the 
        Department of Justice, and former United States 
        Attorney for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania;
          Ronald K. Noble, former Under Secretary for 
        Enforcement of the Department of the Treasury, former 
        Deputy Assistant Attorney General of the United States, 
        and former Assistant United States Attorney for the 
        Eastern District of Pennsylvania;
          Thomas P. Sullivan, former United States Attorney for 
        the Northern District of Illinois; and
          William F. Weld, former Governor of Massachusetts, 
        former Assistant Attorney General in charge of the 
        Criminal Division of the Department of Justice, former 
        United States Attorney for the District of 
        Massachusetts, and House Judiciary Committee Counsel 
        during Watergate.
    In his testimony, Mr. Sullivan told the Committee that 
federal prosecutions for perjury and obstruction of justice are 
relatively rare, in part, because they are extremely difficult 
to prove. \54\ He explained that the law of perjury ``can be 
particularly arcane, including the requirements that the 
government prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant 
knew his testimony to be false at the time he or she testified, 
that the alleged false testimony was material, and that any 
ambiguity or uncertainty about what the question or answer 
meant must be construed in favor of the defendant.'' \55\ He 
further stated that, as a general matter, ``[f]ederal 
prosecutors do not use the criminal process in connection with 
civil litigation involving private parties.'' \56\ That is 
because ``there are well established remedies available to 
civil litigants who believe perjury or obstruction has 
occurred.'' \57\ Mr. Sullivan testified that ``the evidence set 
out in the Starr report would not be prosecuted as a criminal 
case by a responsible federal prosecutor.'' \58\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \54\ 12/9/98 Tr. at 14-15.
    \55\ 12/9/98 Tr. at 15.
    \56\ 12/9/98 Tr. at 15.
    \57\ 12/9/98 Tr. at 16.
    \58\ 12/9/98 Tr. at 17.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Mr. Davis testified that in ``making a prosecution decision 
as recognized by Justice Department policy, the initial 
question for any prosecutor is, can the case be won at trial? 
Simply stated, no prosecutor should bring a case if he or she 
does not believe that based upon the facts and the law, it is 
more likely than not that they will prevail at trial.'' \59\ 
Mr. Davis added that ``[c]ases that are likely to be lost 
cannot be brought simply to make a point, to express a sense of 
moral outrage, however justified such a sense of outrage might 
be.'' \60\ Like Mr. Sullivan, Mr. Davis noted that perjury 
cases are difficult to prosecute because ``questions and 
answers are often imprecise.'' \61\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \59\ 12/9/98 Tr. at 24.
    \60\ 12/9/98 Tr. at 24.
    \61\ 12/9/98 Tr. at 24.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Significantly, Mr. Davis noted that in civil lawsuits, 
``lawyers routinely counsel their clients to answer only the 
question asked, not to volunteer and not to help out an 
inarticulate questioner.'' \62\ Based on his review of the 
OIC's evidence, Mr. Davis concluded that there does not exist a 
prosecutable case of perjury against the President arising out 
of his grand jury testimony. That is because the President 
``acknowledged to the grand jury the existence of an improper 
relationship with Monica Lewinsky, but argued with prosecutors 
questioning him that his acknowledged conduct was not a sexual 
relationship as he understood the definition of that term being 
used in the Jones deposition.'' \63\ Put another way, Mr. Davis 
testified that it would not be possible to prove that the 
President perjured himself about his subjective understanding 
of the definition of ``sexual relations'' drafted by the Jones 
attorneys.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \62\ 12/9/98 Tr. at 24.
    \63\ 12/9/98 Tr. at 26.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Mr. Dennis testified that a criminal conviction of the 
President ``would be extremely difficult to obtain in a court 
of law'' because there ``is very weak proof of the criminal 
intent of the President.'' \64\ In addition, Mr. Dennis told 
the Committee that the ``Lewinsky affair is of questionable 
materiality to the proceedings in which it was raised.'' \65\ 
According to Mr. Dennis, perjury and obstruction of justice 
cases arising out of civil litigation involving private parties 
are ``rare,'' and ``rarer still are criminal investigations in 
the course of civil litigation in anticipation of incipient 
perjury or obstruction of justice.'' \66\ That is because in 
the latter circumstances, ``prosecutors are justifiably 
concerned about the appearance that government is taking the 
side of one private party against another.'' \67\ Under the 
facts of the Jones case, Mr. Dennis testified that a criminal 
prosecution was not warranted and ``most likely would fail.'' 
\68\ He concluded that ``[c]ertainly the exercise of sound 
prosecutorial discretion would not dictate prosecuting such a 
case.'' \69\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \64\ 12/9/98 Tr. at 32.
    \65\ 12/9/98 Tr. at 32.
    \66\ 12/9/98 Tr. at 33.
    \67\ 12/9/98 Tr. at 33.
    \68\ 12/9/98 Tr. at 34.
    \69\ 12/9/98 Tr. at 34.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Mr. Noble testified that ``a Federal prosecutor ordinarily 
would not prosecute a case against a private citizen based on 
the facts set forth in the Starr referral.''\70\ He explained 
that ``Federal prosecutors and Federal agents, as a rule, ought 
to stay out of the private sexual lives of consenting adults.'' 
\71\ Like his colleagues, Mr. Noble agreed that as a general 
matter ``Federal prosecutors are not asked to bring Federal 
criminal charges against individuals who have allegedly 
perjured themselves in connection with civil lawsuits.'' \72\ 
That is because ``[b]y their nature, lawsuits have remedies 
built into the system. Lying litigants can be exposed to such 
and lose their lawsuits. The judge overseeing the lawsuit is in 
the best position to receive evidence about false statements, 
deceitful conduct and even perjured testimony.'' \73\ Mr. Noble 
also testified that ``[n]o prosecutor would be permitted to 
bring a prosecution where she believed that there was no chance 
that an unbiased jury would convict[,]'' and for that reason 
urged the Committee to ``consider the impact that a long and no 
doubt sensationalized trial will have on the country, 
especially a trial that will not result in a conviction.'' \74\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \70\ 12/9/98 Tr. at 35.
    \71\ 12/9/98 Tr. at 39.
    \72\ 12/9/98 Tr. at 41.
    \73\ 12/9/98 Tr. at 41.
    \74\ 12/9/98 Tr. at 45.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Finally, Governor Weld testified that in the Reagan 
Administration, it was not the policy of the Department of 
Justice ``to seek an indictment based solely on evidence that a 
prospective defendant had falsely denied committing unlawful 
adultery or fornication.'' 75 He also testified that 
under settled principles of federal prosecution, ``the 
prosecutor has to believe that there is sufficient evidence, 
admissible evidence, to obtain from a reasonable and unbiased 
jury a conviction and to sustain it on appeal'' before a 
decision is made to bring a charge against a potential 
defendant.76
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \75\ 12/9/98 Tr. at 48.
    \76\ 12/9/98 Tr. at 81.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Thus, the former federal prosecutors agreed on a number of 
points. First, they agreed that the criminal law generally is 
not used to sanction misbehavior that occurs during civil 
litigation. As Mr. Sullivan explained, ``the thrust of what I 
am saying is that the Federal criminal process simply is not 
used to determine truth or falsity in statements in civil 
litigation, and it is particularly true--I mean, that's true, 
and it is also even more true when you take a situation, as you 
have here, that the testimony is even peripheral to the civil 
case involved.'' 77 Second, they concurred that 
testimony concerning the President's relationship with Ms. 
Lewinsky was not material to the Jones lawsuit. Mr. Dennis 
testified that the ``Lewinsky affair is of questionable 
materiality to the proceedings in which it was raised.'' 
78 Third, the panelists agreed that the OIC's case 
against the President likely could not be sustained in court. 
As Mr. Noble put it, ``I think that it is fairly clear, and 
that if a poll were taken of former U.S. attorneys from any 
administration, you would probably find the overwhelming number 
of them would agree with the assessment that this case is a 
loser and just would not be sustained in court.'' 79
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \77\ 12/9/98 Tr. at 58.
    \78\ 12/9/98 Tr. at 32.
    \79\ 12/9/98 Tr. at 59.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Fourth, the former prosecutors agreed that the charge of 
obstruction of justice against the President arising out of his 
conversations with Betty Currie was weak. In the words of 
Governor Weld, ``I think it [the case for obstruction] is a 
little thin.'' 80 And finally, they agreed that a 
charge should not be brought against a defendant unless it can 
be sustained at trial. As Mr. Sullivan remarked, ``I have had 
situations where my . . . [law enforcement] agents have said to 
me after discussion about the evidence--and we concluded that 
we cannot get a conviction or it is likely that we will lose--
let's indict him anyway to show him. My response to that is, 
get out of my office and never come back.'' 81
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \80\ 12/9/98 Tr. at 75.
    \81\ 12/9/98 Tr. at 81.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

III. The Articles of Impeachment Fail to Establish Impeachable Offenses

A. Article I Alleging Perjury Before the Grand Jury Fails To Establish 
                          Impeachable Offenses

    The Committee has approved an article of impeachment 
concerning the President's grand jury testimony which alleges 
perjurious testimony with respect to the following subject 
matters: ``(1) the nature and details of his relationship with 
a subordinate Government employee; (2) prior perjurious, false 
and misleading testimony he gave in a Federal civil rights 
actions brought against him; (3) prior false and misleading 
statements he allowed his attorney to make to a federal judge 
in that civil rights action; and (4) his corrupt efforts to 
influence the testimony of witnesses and to impede the 
discovery of evidence in that civil actions.''

1. The President Did Not Commit Impeachable Offenses When Testifying 
        About ``the nature and details of his relationship with a 
        subordinate Government employee''

    Specific details of the allegedly perjurious statements 
described by this subparagraph were not included in the 
articles. In the absence of such specifics, the Minority has no 
choice but to presume that the Committee intends to parrot the 
allegations of grand jury perjury contained in the OIC's 
Referral. The Referral alleged that the President perjured 
himself in his grand jury testimony by responding to questions 
concerning the physical nature of his relationship with Ms. 
Lewinsky in the following ways:
          The President testified that he understood the 
        definition of ``sexual relations'' given to him in the 
        Jones deposition not to include oral sex performed on 
        him.
          The President asserted that his admittedly intimate 
        contacts with Ms. Lewinsky did not constitute ``sexual 
        relations'' as the President testified he understood 
        that term to be defined in the Jones deposition.
          The President testified that his physical 
        relationship with Ms. Lewinsky did not begin until 
        early 1996, rather than late 1995, as recalled by Ms. 
        Lewinsky.
    The Majority Counsel, in his presentation, additionally 
alleged that the President testified falsely to the grand jury 
concerning the following issues:
          The exact number of the President's meetings with Ms. 
        Lewinsky.
          The exact number of his telephone conversations with 
        Ms. Lewinksy that included sexual banter.
    This Committee has not been presented with clear and 
convincing evidence that the President's testimony on any of 
subjects was intentionally false. More importantly, there is no 
real prospect that a Senate trial would ever find sufficient 
evidence to convict the President of impeachable offenses based 
on these allegations.
            (a) The President did not commit an impeachable offense 
                    when testifying about his understanding of the 
                    definition of ``sexual relations'' presented to him 
                    during his civil deposition in the Jones case
    It is alleged that the President falsely testified before 
the grand jury that he genuinely believed that the definition 
of ``sexual relations'' presented to him in the Jones case did 
not include oral sex. This charge turns, of course, on the 
nearly impossible task of demonstrating that the President's 
was not testifying truthfully about his subjective 
understanding of a complicated and abstract legal definition of 
``sexual relations'' presented to him for the first time on the 
day of the Jones deposition and modified by the presiding judge 
in response to the President's objections.
    At the beginning of the Jones deposition, the President was 
presented with the following definition of sexual relations:

          For the purposes of this deposition, a person engages 
        in ``sexual relations'' when the person knowingly 
        engages in or causes--
          (1) contact with the genitalia, anus, groin, breast, 
        inner thigh, or buttocks of any person with an intent 
        to arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person[.]
          (2) contact between any part of the person's body or 
        an object and the genitals or anus of another person; 
        or (3) contact between the genitals or anus of the 
        person and any part of another person's body.
          ``Contact'' means intentional touching, either 
        directly or through clothing.

    The proposed use of this definition by the Jones attorney 
drew heated and protracted objections based on its ambiguous 
wording and the potential for confusion. The President's 
lawyer, Robert Bennett, argued: ``I think this could really 
lead to confusion, and I think it's important that the record 
be clear . . . I do not want my client answering questions not 
understanding exactly what these folks are talking about.'' 
82 Counsel for the President's co-defendant, former 
Arkansas trooper Danny Ferguson, also objected. ``Frankly, I 
think it's a political trick [the definition], and I've told 
you [Judge Wright] before how I feel about the political 
character of this lawsuit.'' 83 The President's 
counsel invited the Jones attorneys to questions the President 
directly about his conduct regardless of the embarrassing 
nature of the questions. ``Why don't they ask him about what 
happened or what didn't happen?'' In retrospect, these 
objections were especially well-taken since we now know that 
Jones's attorneys had been extensively debriefed the previous 
evening by Ms. Lewinsky's confidante, Linda Tripp. Judge 
Wright, in response to these objections, amended the definition 
by striking subparts (2) and (3), allowing only subpart (1) to 
stand. When the plaintiff's attorneys sought to introduce 
another convoluted definition, Judge Wright, apparently 
regretting her previous ruling permitting the earlier use of 
such definitions during questioning, rejected the plaintiff's 
additional proposed definition due to its confusing nature, and 
concluded: ``I'm not sure Mr. Clinton knows all these 
definitions, anyway.'' 84 When the President was 
later asked by the Jones attorneys whether his contacts with 
Ms. Lewinsky fit within their tortured definition of sexual 
relations, he understandably denied that this was 
so.85
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \82\ Clinton 1/17/98 Depo at 20.
    \83\ Clinton 1/17/98 Depo at 20.
    \84\ Clinton 1/17/98 Depo at 25.
    \85\ Clinton 1/17/98 Depo at 78.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    During the President's August 17, 1998 grand jury 
testimony, the OIC prosecutor returned to this topic and asked 
whether the President regarded oral sex as falling within the 
definition provided to him in the Jones deposition.

          Q: [I]s oral sex performed on you within the 
        definition as you understood it, the definition in the 
        Jones . . .
          As I understood it, it was not; no.86
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \86\ Clinton 8/17/98 GJ at 93.

The President was consistent in his interpretation that sexual 
relations are distinct from oral sex, and, thus, that his 
physical relations with Ms. Lewinsky did not meet the 
definition provided in the Jones case. For example, he 
testified that when he was presented with the definition in the 
Jones case he was very uncomfortable because he had to 
acknowledge that, in one instance, he had engaged in conduct 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
that met the definition of ``sexual relations'':

    All I can tell you is, whatever I thought was covered, and 
I thought about this carefully. And let me just point out, this 
was uncomfortable for me. I had to acknowledge, because of this 
definition, that under this definition I had actually had 
sexual relations with Gennifer Flowers, a person who had spread 
all kinds of ridiculous, dishonest, exaggerated stories about 
me for money. And I knew when I did that, it would be leaked. 
It was. And I was embarrassed. But I did it.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

    Let me remind you, sir, I read this carefully. And I 
thought about it. I thought about what ``contact'' meant. I 
thought about what ``intent to arouse or gratify'' meant. And I 
had to admit under this definition that I'd actually had sexual 
relations with Gennifer Flowers. Now, I would rather have taken 
a whipping than done that, after all the trouble I'd been 
through with Gennifer Flowers 87
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \87\ Clinton 8/17/98 GJ at 150.

    The lawyers in the Jones deposition simply did not ask the 
question most relevant to uncovering the nature of the physical 
contact between the President and Ms. Lewinsky. The world now 
knows why these attorneys asked the questions couched in the 
definitions they invented. They were, in fact, trying to create 
the very chaos and confusion that has occurred. They were not 
seeking information; they already had it from Linda Tripp. What 
they were seeking was to set the President up. If they had 
asked real questions, seeking real information, and had raised 
specific conduct, we might have avoided this charge in the 
Referral entirely. The President testified that he had no 
intention of avoiding a question regarding oral sex; he just 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
wasn't asked about it:

          Q. Would you have been prepared, if asked by the 
        Jones lawyers, would you have been prepared to answer a 
        question directly about oral sex performed on you by 
        Monica Lewinsky?
          A. If the Judge had required me to answer it, of 
        course, I would have answered it. And I would have 
        answered truthfully. . . . 88
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \88\ Clinton 8/17/98 GJ at 151.

    There is no evidence of intent on the President's part to 
commit perjury in his grand jury appearance--the President 
simply explained and re-explained his interpretation of the 
definition of sexual relations provided to him by the lawyers 
in the Jones case.
    When a question is ``fundamentally ambiguous,'' the answers 
to the questions posed are insufficient as a matter of law to 
support a perjury conviction. 89 Simply put, when 
there is more than one way of understanding the meaning of a 
question, and the witness has answered truthfully as to his 
understanding, he cannot commit perjury.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \89\ See, e.g., United States v. Finucan, 708 F.2d 838, 848 (1st 
Cir. 1983); United States v. Lighte, 782 F.2d 367, 375 (2d Cir. 1986); 
United States v. Tonelli, 577 F.2d 194, 199 (3d Cir. 1978); United 
States v. Bell, 623 F.2d 1132, 1337 (5th Cir. 1980); United States v. 
Wall, 371 F.2d 398, 400 (6th Cir. 1967); United States v. Williams, 552 
F.2d 226, 229 (8th Cir. 1977).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Even assuming, for the sake of argument, that the 
President's definition of sexual relations is too narrow, even 
in the context of the Jones deposition, the record shows at 
most that the President may have been mistaken in construing 
the definition too narrowly, not that he intended to lie. It is 
well established that inaccurate or false testimony which is 
provided as a result of confusion or mistake cannot form the 
basis for a perjury charge.90
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \90\ See United States v. Dunnigan, 507 U.S. 87, 94 (1993): 
Department of Justice Manual, at 9-69.214 (Supp. 1997).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
            (b) The President did not commit an impeachable offense 
                    when testifying about the nature of his intimate 
                    contacts with Ms. Lewinsky
    Article I also appears to encompass the allegation that the 
President testified falsely when he denied during his grand 
jury testimony that his intimate physical contact with Ms. 
Lewinsky fell within the definition presented to him in the 
Jones deposition. We do not believe that the constitutional 
responsibilities of this Committee compel a detailed 
regurgitation of the salacious details concerning the alleged 
physical contact between the President and Ms. Lewinsky. 
Considerations of personal privacy and institutional dignity 
must hold some sway in this process, especially where this 
factual question, even if dispositively resolved against the 
President, cannot merit his impeachment.
    In a prolonged Senate trial, additional evidence could 
conceivably be amassed concerning the intimate details of the 
physical relationship between the President and Ms. Lewinsky, 
but that is not necessary. The President's alleged 
misstatements about this matter would not warrant the inquiry 
suggested by the Majority. These were statements made in a 
civil case that was based on allegations of sexual harassment, 
not consensual sexual relationships; these were statements made 
under a very narrow and confusing definition of ``sexual 
relations;'' and these were statements not material to the 
decision in the case. In the end, these statements denying an 
improper relationship were made with the primary purpose of 
attempting to conceal what the President himself has 
acknowledged was a serious lapse of judgment concerning a 
private matter, rather than a corrupt attempt to impede the 
administration of justice.
    It is equally important to note that the evidence does not 
provide clear and convincing proof that the President has 
testified in an intentionally false manner concerning the 
nature of his intimate contacts with Ms. Lewinsky. Article I 
rests on the OIC's untenable assumption that there is no 
possibility that Ms. Lewinsky's memory is inaccurate or that 
she was, to some extent, untruthful. As the Referral states: 
``There can be no contention that one of them has a lack of 
memory or is mistaken.'' 91 Independent Counsel 
Starr at his November 19, 1998 appearance before the Committee 
all but stated that Ms. Lewinsky was not to be believed on a 
variety of issues (e.g., whether she was denied a chance to 
call her attorney when she was first confronted, whether she 
was asked to wear a wire to tape record Vernon Jordan and the 
President, and whether she really believed that ``no one asked 
her to lie, and no one promised her a job for her silence''). 
The OIC then reiterated the same lack of confidence in Ms. 
Lewinsky in its December 11, 1998 written responses to the 
Committee's questions following his November 19 appearance, 
repeatedly asserted that Ms. Lewinsky's grand jury testimony 
concerning the conduct of OIC prosecutors was false. For 
example, the OIC denied the truthfulness of Ms. Lewinsky's 
sworn testimony that she had been threatened with a jail 
sentence of 27 years, that her mother had been threatened with 
prosecution, and that she had been asked to secretly tape 
record conversations with Betty Currie, Vernon Jordan and 
possibly the President. As Rep. Watt asked during his 
questioning of the Independent Counsel, ``how are you picking 
and choosing what you believe from Ms. Lewinsky?'' 
92
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \91\ Referral at 148.
    \92\ 11/19/98 Hearing Tr. at 236.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    More specifically, the record is replete with evidence that 
Ms. Lewinsky's memory, standing alone, does not constitute 
clear and convincing evidence on the disputed issues of fact 
concerning her intimate contacts with the President. If the 
House is going to discharge its constitutional responsibilities 
to send charges to the Senate only upon ``clear and 
convincing'' evidence, it must review the contradictions in the 
record with respect to Ms. Lewinsky. This is especially true 
with respect to times that Ms. Lewinsky was contemporaneously 
describing ``the nature and details'' of her relationship with 
the President to her friends and acquaintances--the very issue 
about which a trial in the Senate would have to occur. However, 
the Minority has been seeking, and continues to seek to avoid 
entirely, any further inquiry into these matters and thereby 
spare Ms. Lewinsky further personal embarrassment. That is why 
it has pointed out that the immateriality of these allegedly 
false statements concerning these matters is dispositive of the 
issue.
    As a general matter, the Independent Counsel's Referral 
acknowledges (albeit in a footnote) that Ms. Lewinsky has 
certain credibility problems due to ``her perjurious Jones 
affidavit, her efforts to persuade Linda Tripp to commit 
perjury, her assertion in a recorded conversation that she had 
been brought up to regard lying as necessary, and her forgery 
of a letter while in college. 93 As a result, the 
Independent Counsel placed great weight on statements made by 
Ms. Lewinsky to her confidantes concerning the nature and 
character of her physical contacts with the President. 
94 Indeed, on the narrow factual question in dispute 
concerning the exact nature of their physical contacts, Ms. 
Lewinsky's contemporaneous statements to her associates are the 
only corroborating evidence offered for Ms. Lewinsky's account. 
A more detailed examination of the record reveals, however, 
that the mere fact that, on more than one occasion, Ms. 
Lewinsky volunteered information to friends about the details 
of her relationship with the President is not a reliable 
indicator of the truthfulness of that information.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \93\ Referral at 12, n. 8.
    \94\ Referral at 13.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    For example, Ms. Lewinsky confided to her friend, Kathleen 
Estep, on one occasion, that the President was brought to her 
apartment at 2:00 a.m. by the Secret Service. 95 Not 
only did Ms. Estep conclude that Ms. Lewinsky was lying to her 
about this incident, but the OIC found no evidence that such a 
visit had occurred. 96 Similarly, Ms. Lewinsky told 
her friend, Dale Young, that she had recorded some of the 
President's late night telephone calls to her. 97 No 
such recordings were ever recovered and Ms. Lewinsky never told 
the OIC about such recordings during her extensive debriefings 
with them. When interviewing for a job in New York, Ms. 
Lewinsky told one of her interviewers that she had lunch with 
Hillary Clinton the previous week and that the First Lady had 
offered to help Ms. Lewinsky find an apartment in New York. 
98 It was the impression of the interviewer that 
``Lewinsky's comments strained credulity.'' 99
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \95\ Estep 8/23/98 302 at 3.
    \96\ Estep 8/23/98 302 at 3.
    \97\ Young 6/23/98 GJ at 48.
    \98\ Nancy Ridson 1/26/98 302.
    \99\ Nancy Ridson 3/27/98 302.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Ms. Lewinsky also offered untruthful details to her friends 
about the nature of her intimate contacts with the President. 
For example, Ms. Lewinsky told a friend about a sexual 
encounter with the President where she was fully unclothed 
100, but told the grand jury that neither she nor 
the President ever fully disrobed. 101 Ms. Lewinsky 
told both Ashley Raines and Linda Tripp that her sexual 
relations with the President included, on occasion ``reciprocal 
oral sex.'' 102 Ms. Lewinsky told the grand jury, 
however, that she never received oral sex from the President. 
103
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \100\ Erbland 2/12/98 GJ at 26 (``She told me that she had given 
him [oral sex] and she had had all of her clothes off, . . ''),
    \101\ ``[N]either of us ever really took--completely took off any 
piece of our clothing, I think specifically because of the possibility 
of encounters . . .'' Lewinsky 8/26/98 GJ at 43-44.
    \102\ Raines 1/25/98 302 at 1; Tripp 7/2/98 GJ at 101.
    \103\ Lewinsky 8/6/98 GJ at 19.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    These conflicting accounts are all the evidence available 
to the Committee on this narrow issue. It is not necessary to 
conclude, however, that either Ms. Lewinsky or the President is 
intentionally falsifying their respective accounts of their 
intimate contacts. The record before us suggests that 
recollections can vary according to the witness' perspective. 
For example, Ms. Lewinsky testified before the grand jury that 
she ``does not have a memory'' of how she ``made it clear that 
she intended to deny'' the sexual relationship with the 
President (as she said in her proffer), but insists she was 
telling the truth at the time she wrote that.104 In 
a remarkable exchange, the OIC prosecutors suggested that one 
reason for her inability to remember may be her guilt over 
getting Jordan in trouble:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \104\ Lewinsky 8/6/98 GJ at 178-79.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
          Q. But--and I think you also said you feel some--I 
        don't know if this is the reason you don't remember it, 
        but--you have expressed to us that you feel some guilt 
        about Vernon Jordan. Is that correct?
          A. Yes.
          Q. Okay. Can you tell us why that is?
          A. He was the only person who did what he said he was 
        going to do for me and--in getting me the job. And when 
        I met with Linda on the 13th, when she was wearing a 
        wire, and even in subsequent or previous conversations 
        and subsequent conversations, I attributed things to 
        Mr. Jordan that weren't true because I knew that it had 
        leverage with Linda and that a lot of those things that 
        I said got him into a lot of trouble and I just--he's a 
        good person.105
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \105\ Lewinsky 8/6/98 GJ at 179-180.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    This is not the only failure of Ms. Lewinsky's recollection 
concerning Mr. Jordan. For example, Ms. Lewinsky told the OIC 
in an interview that she never explained to Jordan what phone 
sex was, but testified in her grand jury appearance that she 
did.106 The OIC's indulgence of the memory lapses of 
its star witness on a key point in her proffer does not strike 
the Minority as wholly unreasonable. Instead, the Independent 
Counsel gave Ms. Lewinsky the benefit of the doubt based on the 
apparent assumption that recollections can honestly fail 
concerning subjects that cause the witness emotional 
pain.107 On the basis of the record before us, 
particularly in light of the gravity of this impeachment 
proceeding, every consideration should also be given to the 
possibility that the differing recollections of the President 
and Ms. Lewinsky may be colored by their differing emotional 
perspectives concerning the intimate events at issue. As Ms. 
Lewinsky testified before the grand jury, the President's 
description of the limited nature of their physical contacts 
was interpreted by her as a repudiation of the emotional 
component of their relationship that reduced it to a mere 
``service contract.'' 108 It is incumbent on us to 
consider the possibility that her emotional perspective could 
lead a mistaken but good-faith recollection about the nature of 
their contacts.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \106\ See Lewinsky 8/6/98 GJ at 143; cf. Lewinsky 8/1/98 OIC 302 at 
8; Lewinsky 7/27/98 OIC 302 at 9.
    \107\ In his testimony before the Committee, Independent Counsel 
Starr reiterated that people can have different perceptions about these 
kinds of events without one being called a liar.
    \108\ Lewinsky 8/20/98 GJ at 54.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Likewise, the President's recollection of the limited 
nature of their sexual contacts was not a subject of emotional 
indifference to him. Ms. Lewinsky testified to the grand jury 
that the President's refusal to engage in specific sexual acts 
was his way of rationalizing his behavior.109 Ms. 
Lewinsky herself described the depth of the President's 
emotional reaction when he rebuffed her sexual overture to him 
in August of 1997, several months after the President had ended 
their relationship. According to Ms. Lewinsky, she was 
``shocked'' about the extent to which the President became 
``visibly upset'' and ``emotionally upset'' about her 
overture.110 The President's public expressions of 
guilt and remorse over his inappropriate conduct underscore 
this same point.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \109\ Lewinsky 8/20/98 GJ at 24.
    \110\ Lewinsky 8/26/98 GJ at 51-52; see also Lewinsky 8/20/98 GJ at 
70.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In light of the contradictory state of the evidence, the 
uncertain probative worth of Ms. Lewinsky's contemporaneous 
statements to friends and the other failures of recollection 
documented in the record, it seems highly unlikely that a 
Senate trial will ever be able to adduce clear and convincing 
evidence that the President intentionally lied to the grand 
jury about the exact nature of his intimate contacts with Ms. 
Lewinsky.
            (c) The President did not commit an impeachable offense 
                    when testifying about the date on which his 
                    inappropriate contacts with Ms. Lewinsky began
    Article I also alleges that the President made a false 
statement to the grand jury regarding the timing of the 
beginning of his relationship with Ms. Lewinsky. The Referral 
charges the President with making a false statement because he 
testified to the grand jury that his inappropriate relationship 
with Ms. Lewinsky began in early 1996, whereas Ms. Lewinsky 
testified that their relationship began in November 1995. In 
the Majority Staff's initial presentation to the Committee on 
October 5, when it was debating whether to recommend the 
initiation of a formal impeachment inquiry, this particular 
allegation of false testimony to the grand jury was not even 
mentioned. During a hearing the Committee conducted on December 
1, 1998, the Chairman even stated that this charge was a 
``particularly weak'' one. Now, based on the exact same 
evidentiary record, the charge has been resurrected. Even 
assuming Ms. Lewinsky is correct in her recollection, the 
statement by the President regarding the timing of the 
relationship is completely immaterial to the grand jury's 
investigation.
    A statement must be material to be perjurious. Certainly 
the President's testimony concerning the date that his intimate 
contacts with Ms. Lewinsky began could not have made any 
difference to the grand jury's inquiry into whether the 
President lied during the Jones deposition about having sexual 
relations with Ms. Lewinsky. The President has admitted that he 
had an inappropriate relationship with Ms. Lewinsky. The 
differing, yet immaterial, recollections of Ms. Lewinsky and 
the President as to the commencement of the consensual 
relationship--a quibble over whether the relationship began in 
November 1995 or February 1996--could not possibly support a 
charge of criminal perjury, much less an article of 
impeachment.
    Moreover, the evidence in support of the proposition that 
the President testified falsely on this point is exceedingly 
slight. The Independent Counsel's Referral supports this charge 
by arguing that the President was motivated to lie about the 
date on which his physical relationship with Ms. Lewinsky 
started because the President did not want to admit having an 
inappropriate relationship with an intern.111 As 
support for this assertion, the Referral cites a comment from 
the President to Ms. Lewinsky where, according to Ms. Lewinsky, 
the President said that her ``pink intern pass'' was ``going to 
be a problem.'' 112 The Referral suggests that the 
President intentionally misled the grand jury concerning the 
beginning of his relationship to avoid having to acknowledge 
inappropriate physical contact with Ms. Lewinsky while she was 
an intern.113 This is an extremely unconvincing 
argument.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \111\ Referral at 149.
    \112\ Lewinsky 7/30/98 302 at 6.
    \113\ Referral at 149.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    First, the President's admission in his grand jury 
testimony of his inappropriate physical contacts with Ms. 
Lewinsky sparked an entirely foreseeable firestorm of intense 
public criticism of the President's conduct. The suggestion 
that the President intentionally sought to mislead the grand 
jury based on the hope that such public criticism could be 
muted by obscuring Ms. Lewinsky's employment status at the time 
the relationship began seems strained, to say the least. 
Second, the evidence in the record strongly suggests a much 
more plausible alternative explanation for the President's 
comment to Ms. Lewinsky about her intern pass: namely, that he 
was concerned that this pass did not allow her access to the 
West Wing without an escort. Ms. Lewinsky confirmed that to be 
the President's concern when he made the statement to 
her.114 The attempt to characterize the President's 
mere confusion over dates as an intentionally perjurious 
statement finds no persuasive support in the record.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \114\ Lewinsky 8/24/98 FBI 302 form at 5.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
            (d) The President did not commit an impeachable offense 
                    when testifying about the number of occasions on 
                    which he was alone with Ms. Lewinsky and the number 
                    of occasions on which they were having phone sex
    The Majority Counsel's presentation, alleged not only the 
false statements to the grand jury outlined above, but also 
that the President intentionally perjured himself when he 
admitted to the grand jury that he had been alone with Ms. 
Lewinsky on ``certain occasions'' and that he ``also had 
occasional telephone conversations with Lewinsky that included 
sexual banter.'' Incredibly, the Majority Counsel charges that 
these candid admissions were, in fact, intentionally false 
because the record suggests that the President was alone with 
Ms. Lewinsky on twenty occasions and that the President had 
seventeen phone conversations with Ms. Lewinsky that included 
sexual banter. The Majority Counsel offered no support for his 
contention that the President's description was intentionally 
false except to offer his opinion that ``[o]ccasional sounds 
like once every four months or so doesn't it.'' In fact, the 
dictionary defines ``occasional'' as an event ``occurring at 
irregular or infrequent intervals.'' 115 The 
meetings between Ms. Lewinsky and the President were, in fact, 
``irregular and infrequent.'' 116 The Majority 
Counsel also refused to offer any reason why he or the grand 
jury would be legitimately interested in the exact number of 
telephone calls between the President and Ms. Lewinsky that 
included sexual banter. The President was never asked about 
such phone calls during the Jones deposition (because phone sex 
was plainly not within the definition in that case) and this 
issue was, therefore, wholly irrelevant to the questions that 
the grand jury was examining concerning the truth of the 
President's statements during that deposition. The mere fact 
that the President chose not to include as many salacious 
details in his statement to the grand jury as the Independent 
Counsel included in his Referral hardly constitutes an 
intentional falsehood, much less an impeachable offense. To 
even refer to such trivial matters amply demonstrates the 
underlying partisanship of these proceedings and undermines the 
Majority's claim that this inquiry is not about sex.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \115\ Webster's Collegiate Dictionary (10th ed. 1997).
    \116\ Referral at 156 n.160; GJ Exhibit ML-7 (chart prepared by OIC 
based on Lewinsky's testimony listing, inter alia, all visits with the 
President).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

2. The President Did Not Commit An Impeachable Offense When Testifying 
        About His Prior Testimony In The Jones Civil Deposition

    This subsection of Article I represents a dramatic 
departure from the approach utilized by the Independent 
Counsel's Referral by alleging that the President's 
descriptions and justifications for his allegedly perjurious 
statements in the Jones civil deposition were themselves 
perjurious. The Majority has offered no formal specifications 
of which statements fall into this category. Instead, in 
response to objections stated during public debate about the 
Article's lack of specificity, the Members indicated an 
intention to refer the full House and the Senate to the 
presentation by the Majority Counsel and the record of the 
debates within the Committee. With these stated intentions as 
the only available guidance concerning the particulars of this 
subsection, our review suggests that the following statements 
are at issue:
          The President's explanation of his response to 
        questions during the Jones deposition concerning who 
        had told him that Ms. Lewinsky had been subpoenaed.
          The President's explanation of his response to 
        questions during the Jones deposition concerning 
        whether he had exchanged gifts with Ms. Lewinsky.
          The President's explanation of why he characterized 
        Ms. Lewinsky's affidavit as ``true'' during the Jones 
        deposition.
    Each of these alleged false statements are analyzed in 
detail in the following section in connection with Article II, 
which explains why the President's testimony during Jones 
deposition, as well as his explanation of that testimony during 
his grand jury appearance, was not intentionally false and did 
not constitute an impeachable offense. See Section III.B, 
infra.

3. The President Did Not Commit An Impeachable Offense When His 
        Attorney Characterized the Contents of Ms. Lewinsky's Affidavit 
        to the Presiding Judge in the Jones case

    In another departure from the approach taken by the 
Independent Counsel's Referral, the Majority, without the 
benefit of any additional evidence, has recycled an allegation 
that Mr. Starr used solely in support of his claim that the 
President committed perjury during his civil deposition. This 
approach bootstraps the same facts into a new and separate 
allegation of grand jury perjury.
    The basis for the allegation in this subsection is the 
President's failure to volunteer information during the Jones 
deposition when Mr. Bennett, while discussing the appropriate 
scope of questioning by plaintiff's attorneys, characterized 
Ms. Lewinsky's affidavit as saying that ``there is no 
absolutely no sex of any kind in any manner, shape or form, 
with President Clinton. . . .'' 117 As a threshold 
matter, no charge of perjury can exist without some perjurious 
statement by the defendant. Here, of course, the Majority 
appears to advance a new theory of criminal liability: the 
imputed perjurious statement. Notwithstanding the legal 
irrelevance Mr. Bennett's statement, the President explained in 
his grand jury testimony that he was not paying close attention 
to his lawyer's comments.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \117\ Clinton 1/17/98 Depo at 54.

          I don't believe I ever even focused on what Mr. 
        Bennett said in the exact words he did until I started 
        reading this transcript carefully for this hearing. 
        That moment, that whole argument just passed me by. I 
        was a witness. I was trying to focus on what I said and 
        how I said it.118
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \118\ Clinton 1/17/98 Depo at 29.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
          I was not paying a great deal of attention to this 
        exchange. I was focusing on my testimony. . . . I'm 
        quite sure that I didn't follow all the interchanges 
        between the lawyers all that carefully. And I don't 
        really believe therefore, that I can say Mr. Bennett's 
        testimony or statement is testimony or is imputable to 
        me. I didn't--I don't know that I was even paying that 
        much attention to it.119
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \119\ Clinton 1/17/98 Depo at 58-59.

The Majority Counsel argues that this was a perjurious 
statement because the videotape of the deposition supposedly 
shows that the President was paying attention. The evaluation 
of the demeanor of a witness is traditionally reserved to the 
ultimate fact-finder, but a review of the tape does not reveal 
any outward sign that the President is in fact following or 
agreeing with Mr. Bennett's colloquy with the judge. The 
President appears to be looking in Mr. Bennett's direction, but 
he neither nods his head nor makes any other facial expression 
from which his awareness of the import of Mr. Bennett's remarks 
may be inferred. On many other occasions during the videotaped 
deposition, the viewer can see the President nodding or making 
some other gesture of acknowledgment which is not the case in 
this exchange. In addition, the article fails to state that the 
President obviously was thinking as fast as he could as he just 
realized that someone was setting him up with respect to the 
relationship with Ms. Lewinsky. He was, no doubt, taking every 
break from questions and answers he could to try to figure out 
how much the Jones attorneys knew and where the questions were 
heading. It is completely logical to think that he was not 
paying attention under all of these circumstances.
    Finally, it is important to note that, as with all of the 
other alleged perjurious statements, Judge Wright retained the 
inherent authority to impose sanctions, including criminal 
contempt, on the President for his alleged conduct during the 
deposition. Indeed, Judge Wright was invited to do just that by 
the Jones attorneys, but has, to date, declined to take any 
such action. We believe that the district judge's forbearance 
in this matter is a legitimate factor that weighs against the 
supposed gravity of the allegations leveled against the 
President.

4. The President Did Not Commit An Impeachable Offense When He 
        Testified About Allegations That He Had Obstructed Justice

    In another apparent attempt to bolster the article charging 
grand jury perjury, the Majority has included new allegations 
of perjury in the grand jury not detailed in the Independent 
Counsel's Referral concerning the President's responses to 
questions about the actions that are alleged to constitute 
obstruction of justice. It is significant that the Independent 
Counsel, with all his prosecutorial zeal, declined to ``double 
charge'' the President with both obstruction of justice and 
separate charges of perjury based solely on his denials that he 
committed obstruction of justice. The Majority, however, has 
shown no similar reluctance to pile on duplicative charges. 
Once again, without a formal statement of the alleged false 
statements, the Minority is left to guess from the Majority 
Counsel's presentation, and other exchanges during Committee 
debates, that this subpart of the article refers to the 
following statements:
         The President's testimony that he could not recall, 
        but did not dispute, making a 2:00 a.m. telephone call 
        to Ms. Lewinsky on December 17.
         The President's testimony concerning his discussion 
        with Ms. Lewinsky on December 28, during which meeting 
        it is alleged that Ms. Lewinsky asked about what to do 
        in response to any request from the Jones lawyers for 
        gifts he had given her.
         The President's testimony concerning his purpose in 
        speaking with his secretary, Betty Currie, following 
        the Jones deposition.
As noted above, these allegations essentially restate charges 
that are contained in Article III, which alleges obstruction of 
justice. In order to avoid unnecessary duplication (a goal not 
shared by these needlessly repetitive articles of impeachment), 
the Minority's views on the substance of these allegations are 
discussed below in the section addressing Article III. See 
Section III.C, infra.

 B. Article II's Allegations of Perjury In The Jones Civil Deposition 
                Fail To Establish An Impeachable Offense

    The second article of impeachment charges the President 
with unspecified instances of perjurious testimony concerning 
three broad subject-matter areas: (i) the ``nature and details 
of his relationship with a subordinate Government employee''; 
(ii) his ``knowledge of that employee's involvement and 
participation in the civil rights action brought against him'; 
and (iii) his ``corrupt efforts to influence the testimony of 
that employee.'' Although the alleged perjurious statements 
contemplated by this article are not identified, the Minority 
believes that the article contemplates at least the following 
allegations.

1. The President Did Not Commit An Impeachable Offense When He 
        Testified about the Nature of His Relationship with Ms. 
        Lewinsky

    During his deposition in the Jones case, the President 
testified that his intimate contact with Ms. Lewinsky could not 
be accurately characterized as a ``sexual relationship,'' a 
``sexual affair,'' or even ``sexual relations'' as that term 
was used by Ms. Lewinsky in her affidavit, which was presented 
to the President during his deposition. It is now a matter of 
record that the President and Ms. Lewinsky enjoyed intimate 
contact, but never had sexual intercourse. The question whether 
the President's responses can be labeled as perjurious turns, 
therefore, on whether the President testified in an 
intentionally false manner when he denied various questions 
inquiring into whether he had ``sex'' with Ms. Lewinsky. There 
is substantial evidence in this record that the President's 
responses, although evasive and misleading, did reflect a 
genuinely-held and not unreasonable belief that the limited 
nature of his intimate contacts with Ms. Lewinsky did not 
require him to respond affirmatively to the questions put to 
him on this subject.
    The President testified during his grand jury appearance 
that he understood questions concerning sexual relations to be 
inquiring into whether he had had intercourse with Ms. 
Lewinsky:

         If you said Jane and Harry have a sexual relationship, 
        and you're not talking about people being drawn into a 
        lawsuit and being given definitions, and then a great 
        effort to trick them in some way, but you are just 
        talking about people in ordinary conversations, I'll 
        bet the grand jurors, if they were talking about two 
        people they know, and said they have a sexual 
        relationship, they meant they were sleeping together; 
        they meant they were having intercourse 
        together.120
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \120\  Clinton 8/17/98 GJ at 21.

    Ms. Lewinsky was similarly convinced that her contacts with 
the President did not constitute ``sex.'' In an illegally 
recorded telephone conversation with Ms. Tripp, Ms. Lewinsky 
confided that she did not believe that her contacts with the 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
President amounted to sex:

         Tripp: Well, I guess you can count [the President] in 
        a half-assed sort of way.
         Lewinsky: Not at all. I never even came close to 
        sleeping with him.
         Tripp: Why, because you were standing up.
         Lewinsky: We didn't have sex, Linda. Not--we didn't 
        have sex.
         Tripp: Well, what do you call it?
         Lewinsky: We fooled around.
         Tripp: Oh.
         Lewinsky: Not sex.
         Tripp: Oh, I don't know. I think if you go to--if you 
        get to orgasm, that's having sex.
         Lewinsky: No, it's not. It's----
         Tripp: Its not having----
         Lewinsky: Having sex is having 
        intercourse.121
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \121\ Lewinsky/Tripp 10/3/97 Tr.0018 at 49.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Another friend of Ms. Lewinsky's, Dale Young, testified 
before the grand jury that Ms. Lewinsky had told her that ``she 
didn't have sex with the President,'' and that when Ms. 
Lewinsky referred to sex she meant ``intercourse.'' 
122 The genuineness of President Clinton's beliefs 
on this subject is even supported by the OIC's account of Ms. 
Lewinsky's testimony during an interview with the FBI:

    \122\ Young 6/23/98 GJ at 91.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
         [A]fter having a relationship with him, Lewinsky 
        deduced that the President, in his mind, apparently 
        does not consider oral sex to be sex. Sex to him must 
        mean intercourse.123
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \123\ App. at 1558 (8/19/98 FBI 302 Form Interview of Ms. 
Lewinsky).

    The record is convincing that these beliefs were not only 
genuinely held, but objectively reasonable. Numerous dictionary 
definitions support both the President's and Ms. Lewinsky's 
interpretation of sexual relations as necessarily including 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
intercourse.

         Webster's Third New International Dictionary (1st ed. 
        1981) at 2082, defines ``sexual relations'' as 
        ``coitus;''
         Random House Webster's College Dictionary (1st ed. 
        1996) at 1229, defines ``sexual relations'' as ``sexual 
        intercourse; coitus;''
         Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary (10th ed. 
        1997) at 1074, defines ``sexual relations'' as 
        ``coitus;'
         Black's Law Dictionary (Abridged 6th ed. 1991) at 560, 
        defines ``intercourse'' as ``sexual relations;'' and
         Webster's Tenth Edition defines ``sexual relations'' 
        as ``coitus'' which is defined as ``intercourse.''

In short, the evidence supports only the conclusion that the 
President's responses with respect to these undefined terms 
were truthful and good faith responses to indisputably 
ambiguous questions. There is no evidence to the contrary.

2. The President Did Not Commit An Impeachable Offense When He 
        Testified about Meeting Alone with Lewinsky

    Some Minority Members of the Committee have expressed 
discomfort with the President's responses during the Jones 
deposition to questions about whether he was ever alone with 
Ms. Lewinsky, some even concluded that they believed his 
testimony may have been false. The President's counsel, 
however, has strongly argued that the President's responses on 
this point cannot be characterized as perjurious.

         President Clinton's deposition testimony regarding 
        whether he was alone with Ms. Lewinsky at various times 
        and places does not constitute perjury. The fundamental 
        flaw in the charge is that it is based on a 
        mischaracterization of the President's testimony--the 
        President did not testify that he was never alone with 
        Ms. Lewinsky.
         Both the Starr Referral and Mr. Schipper's 
        presentation to the Committee start from the incorrect 
        premise that the President testified that he was never 
        alone with Ms. Lewinsky. In fact, the President did not 
        deny that he had been alone with Ms. Lewinsky. For 
        example, the President answered ``yes'' to the question 
        ``your testimony is that it was possible, then, that 
        you were alone with her . . .?'' 124
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \124\ Clinton 1/17/98 Depo at 53. In his grand jury testimony the 
President stated that he had been alone with Ms. Lewinsky. See, e.g., 
App. at 481. The term ``alone'' is vague unless a particular geographic 
space is identified. For example, Ms. Currie testified that ``she 
considers the term alone to mean that no one else was in the entire 
Oval Office area.'' Supp. at 534-35 (1/24/98 FBI Form 302 Interview of 
Ms. Currie; see also Supp. at 665 (7/22/98 grand jury testimony of Ms. 
Currie) (``I interpret being `alone' as alone . . . [W]e were around, 
so they were never alone.''). Ms. Currie also acknowledged that the 
President and Ms. Lewinsky were ``alone'' on certain occasions if alone 
meant that no one else was in the same room. Supp. at 552-53 (1/27/98 
grand jury testimony of Ms. Currie).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
         Whatever confusion or incompleteness there may have 
        been in the President's testimony about when and where 
        he was alone with Ms. Lewinsky cannot be charged 
        against the President. The Jones lawyers failed to 
        follow up on incomplete or unresponsive answers. They 
        were free to ask specific follow-up questions about the 
        frequency or locale of any physical contact, but they 
        did not do so. This failure cannot be used to support a 
        charge of perjury.125
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \125\ Submission by Counsel for President Clinton to the Committee 
on the Judiciary of the United States House of Representatives, pp. 77-
78 (Dec. 8, 1998).

    In addition to the evidentiary questions raised by the 
President's counsel, the lack of materiality of any of the 
President's responses concerning Ms. Lewinsky in the Jones 
litigation undercuts arguments that false statements in this 
civil deposition could support the criminal charge of perjury, 
much less constitute an impeachable offense.

3. The President Did Not Commit An Impeachable Offense When He 
        Testified about Gifts He Exchanged with Lewinsky

    The President's civil deposition testimony has been 
seriously mischaracterized by suggestions that the President 
falsely stated that ``he could not recall whether he had given 
any gifts to Ms. Lewinsky.'' 126 In fact, the 
President's response, fairly read, clearly concedes that he had 
given Ms. Lewinsky gifts, but that he could not specifically 
recall what they were.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \126\ Referral at 158.

         Q. Well, have you given any gifts to Monica Lewinsky?
         A. I don't recall. Do you know what they were? 
        127
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \127\ Clinton 1/17/98 Depo. at 75 (emphasis added).

President Clinton confirmed to the grand jury that this was the 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
proper interpretation of his response.

         I think what I meant there was I don't recall what 
        they were, not that I don't recall whether I had given 
        them.128
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \128\ Clinton 8/17/98 GJ at 52:7-8.

    The Majority Counsel, in his December 10 presentation to 
the Committee, claimed that this response was perjurious on the 
theory that an answer that ``baldly understates a numerical 
fact'' in ``response to a specific quantitative inquiry'' may 
be technically true but is actually false.129 
Majority Counsel's belabored construction of the applicable 
legal principles totally ignores the fact that no 
``quantitative inquiry'' was put to the President on this 
topic. The President was not asked how many gifts he had given 
to Ms. Lewinsky, but simply whether he had given her any gifts. 
In response to such an inquiry, it is astounding that the 
Majority Counsel continues to insist that the President's 
immediate acknowledgment that he had given Ms. Lewinsky gifts 
amounts to a perjurious statement.130 The entire 
theory of alleged perjury by the President concerning gifts 
rests, therefore, not on the President's denials that gifts had 
been exchanged, but simply on his failure to recall the gifts 
with specificity.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \129\ Majority Counsel's Presentation (Dec. 10, 1998).
    \130\ Indeed, the President readily acknowledged having given Ms. 
Lewinsky certain gifts after they were specifically identified. See 
Clinton 1/17/98 Depo at 75 (``Q. Do you remember giving her an item 
that had been purchased from The Black Dog store at Martha's Vineyard? 
A. I do remember that . . ..'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Before discussing each specific question concerning gifts, 
it is important to note that the President testified during his 
grand jury testimony that he was not especially concerned about 
the Jones attorneys discovering that he had exchanged gifts 
with Monica Lewinsky:

    I formed an opinion really early in 1996, once I got into 
this unfortunate and wrong conduct, that when I stopped it, 
which I knew I'd have to do and which I should have done a long 
time before I did, that she would talk about it. Not because 
Monica Lewinsky is a bad person. She's basically a good girl. 
She's a good young woman with a good heart and a good mind. I 
think she is burdened by some unfortunate conditions of her 
upbringing. But she's basically a good person. But I knew that 
the minute there was no longer any contact, she would talk 
about this. She would have to. She couldn't help it. It was, it 
was a part of her psyche.131
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \131\  Clinton 8/17/98 GJ at 575-76.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The President also testified that he did not view an admission 
about gifts as necessarily indicating a romantic relationship 
between himself and Monica Lewinsky:

    And let me also tell you, Mr. Bittman, if you go back and 
look at my testimony here, I actually asked the Jones lawyers 
for help on one occasion, when they were asking me what gifts I 
had given her, so they could--I was never hung up on this gift 
issue. Maybe its because I have a different experience. But, 
you know, the President gets hundreds of gifts a year, maybe 
more. I have always given a lot of gifts to people, especially 
if they give me gifts. And this was no big deal to me. I mean, 
it's nice. I enjoy it. I gave dozens of personal gifts to 
people last Christmas. I give gifts to people all the time. 
Friends of mine give me gifts all the time, give me ties, give 
me books, give me other things. So, it was just not a big deal.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

    And when I was asked about this in my deposition, even 
though I was not trying to be helpful particularly to these 
people that I though were not well-motivated, or being honest 
or even lawful in their conduct vis-a-vis me, that is, the 
Jones legal team, I did ask them specifically to enumerate the 
gifts. I asked them to help me because I couldn't remember the 
specifics. So, all I'm saying is, it didn't--I wasn't troubled 
by this gift issue.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

I have always given a lot of people gifts. I have always been 
given gifts. I do not think there is anything improper about a 
man giving a woman a gift, or a woman giving a man a gift, that 
necessarily connotes an improper relationship. So, it didn't 
bother me.132
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \132\ Clinton 8/17/98 GJ at 43, 45 & 46.

    Even Linda Tripp's grand jury testimony confirmed that the 
President expressed no great alarm to Ms. Lewinsky about the 
prospect that his gifts to her might be surrendered to the 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Jones attorneys.

        But the interesting thing was his take on that, and so 
        then Monica's take on that, was no big deal. No one 
        seems to--he said it's still just a fishing net and 
        they're just--you know, maybe he bought 25 hat pins and 
        its known that he bought 25 hat pins . . 
        .133
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \133\ Tripp 7/29/98 GJ at 105.

The President also pointed out in his own defense that the 
specificity of the questions put to him by the Jones attorneys 
made it clear to him that they had specific information 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
concerning his receipt of the gifts:

        It was obvious to me by this point in the deposition, 
        in this deposition, that they had, these people had 
        access to a lot of information from somewhere, and I 
        presume it came from Linda Tripp. And I had no interest 
        in not answering their questions about these gifts. I 
        do not believe that gifts are incriminating, nor do I 
        think they are wrong. I think it was a good thing to 
        do. I'm not, I'm still not sorry I gave Monica Lewinsky 
        gifts.134
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \134\ Clinton 8/17/98 GJ at 51-52.

In order to credit the assertion that the President's failures 
of memory regarding specific gifts were intentionally false 
statements rather than genuine memory lapses, one has to accept 
the notion that the President intentionally misled the Jones 
attorneys about gifts that he did not believe would indicate an 
improper relationship and about which the Jones attorneys 
clearly had specific information. These premises are inherently 
implausible. The actual facts concerning the specific gifts 
about which the President was asked quickly reveals the 
insubstantiality of these allegations.
    The hat pin. In response to specific follow-up questions on 
this topic, the President conceded that he may have given Ms. 
Lewinsky a hat pin, but that he had no specific recollection of 
doing so. There is no persuasive evidence that the President 
falsely denied that he could not recall whether he gave Ms. 
Lewinsky a hat pin. The President gave Ms. Lewinsky that gift 
on February 28, 1997, almost eleven months prior to his 
deposition in the Jones case. 135 Under these 
circumstances, the President's inability to recall whether he 
had given this specific item to Ms. Lewinsky is hardly so 
remarkable as to justify the inference that the President's 
failure of recollection was an intentionally perjurious 
statement. 136
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \135\ Referral at 156.
    \136\ The Referral also misleadingly suggests that the President 
also spoke with Currie about the hat pin around the same time that Ms. 
Lewinsky claims to have discussed with the President the request for it 
by the Jones lawyers. Ms. Currie testified that she did not know when 
she discussed the hat pin with the President, and her description of 
their conversation strongly supports the conclusion that it occurred 
shortly after the President presented Ms. Lewinsky with the hat pin on 
February 28, 1997. Currie 5/6/98 GJ at 142:9-10 (``I think he may have 
said something `Did Monica show you the hat pin I gave her . . . ' '').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    It has been argued that the President must have had a 
specific recollection of the hat pin by citing to Ms. 
Lewinsky's testimony that she specifically discussed the hat 
pin with the President on December 28, 1997, after she received 
a subpoena from the Jones lawyers.137 According to 
Ms. Lewinsky, she met with the President on December 28, 1997, 
and brought up the fact that she had received a subpoena from 
the Jones lawyers asking her to produce, among other things, 
any hat pin given to her by the President.138 
According to Ms. Lewinsky, the President ``said that that had 
sort of concerned him also and asked me if I had told anyone 
that he had given me this hat pin and I said no.'' 
139 The entire discussion concerning the Jones case, 
according to Ms. Lewinsky, took ``maybe about five--no more 
than ten minutes.'' 140 The President testified to 
the grand jury that he would not dispute Ms. Lewinsky's 
recollection, but reiterated that he had no recollection of any 
reference to the hat pin during that conversation:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \137\ Referral at 156.
    \138\ Lewinsky 8/6/98 GJ at 152.
    \139\ Lewinsky 8/6/98 GJ at 152.
    \140\ Lewinsky 8/6/98 GJ at 151:18-19.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
          Q. Well, didn't she tell you, Mr. President, that the 
        subpoena specifically called for a hat pin that you had 
        . . . given her?
          A. I don't remember that. I remember--sir, I've told 
        you what I remember. That doesn't mean my memory is 
        accurate. A lot of things have happened in the last 
        several months, and a lot of things were happening 
        then. But my memory is she asked me a general question 
        about gifts.141
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \141\ Clinton 8/17/98 GJ at 45:9-16.

The record is simply inconclusive as to whether the President's 
failure to recall giving a hat pin to Ms. Lewinsky was 
intentionally false.
    In addition, this factual point was not material to the 
Jones lawsuit. The gift of a hat pin would not have signified 
an inappropriate relationship between the President and Ms. 
Lewinsky. Indeed, the President readily conceded that he may 
have given Ms. Lewinsky a hat pin and, notwithstanding his 
inability to summon a specific recollection of that gift, the 
Jones attorneys were free to pose appropriate follow-up 
questions, which they declined to do.
    Book ``about'' Walt Whitman. When asked if he had ever 
given Ms. Lewinsky a book ``about'' Walt Whitman, the President 
responded by saying that ``I give people a lot of gifts, and 
when people are around I give a lot of things I have at the 
White House away, so I could have given her a gift, but I don't 
remember a specific gift.'' 142 The President had 
given Ms. Lewinsky a volume of poetry by Walt Whitman called 
``Leaves of Grass.'' 143 Jones' lawyer, however, 
inartfully asked the President whether he ever gave Ms. 
Lewinsky a book ``about'' Walt Whitman.144 The 
allegation that the President responded falsely to this 
question appears to be premised on the assumption that the 
President was obligated to guess about what the Jones lawyers 
intended to ask and respond accordingly. Our perjury statutes 
impose no such obligation. Simply put, the President's 
testimony on this point was not perjurious.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \142\ Clinton 1/17/98 Depo. at 75.
    \143\ Referral at 156.
    \144\ Clinton 1/17/98 Depo. at 75.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The gold broach. The President also testified that he did 
not remember giving Ms. Lewinsky a gold broach.145 
Both the Majority Counsel and the Independent Counsel allege 
that the President knowingly lied in denying any specific 
recollection of giving the broach to Ms. Lewinsky, but neither 
has acknowledged that Ms. Lewinsky herself suffered lapses of 
memory concerning her receipt of that item. For example, in 
support of its allegation that the President gave Ms. Lewinsky 
the broach, the Referral directs the reader to the ``Chart of 
Contacts and Gifts'' prepared by the OIC from all of the 
evidence it has received.146 This chart is described 
by Ms. Lewinsky during one of her grand jury appearances as a 
document she prepared in consultation with the Independent 
Counsel, and that ``definitely includes the visits I had with 
him, as well as most of the gifts we exchanged.'' 
147 Ms. Lewinsky also agreed that the chart was ``a 
pretty accurate rendition or description of [Lewinsky's] memory 
of all the events.'' 148 This chart, although 
reviewed by Ms. Lewinsky on several occasions 149 
and cited by the Referral in support of the assertion that the 
President had given Ms. Lewinsky a gold broach 150, 
does not list the gold broach.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \145\ Clinton 1/17/98 Depo. at 75.
    \146\ Referral at 156 n.160; GJ Exhibit ML-7.
    \147\ Lewinsky 8/6/98 GJ at 27-28.
    \148\ Lewinsky 8/6/98 GJ at 28:18-19.
    \149\ Lewinsky 8/7/98 302 at 1.
    \150\ Referral at 156 n.160 (``Ms. Lewinsky testified that the 
President had given her a gold broach, . . .'')
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    A review of all the statements and testimony given by Ms. 
Lewinsky reveals that a ``broach'' is only mentioned once in 
passing as an item included in the box of items given to Currie 
on December 28, 1997.151 The broach is not 
mentioned, however, in other interviews with Ms. Lewinsky 
concerning gifts.152 Ms. Lewinsky's repeated failure 
to recall the broach she received from the President during 
multiple interviews with the Independent Counsel is certainly 
relevant to any assessment of the truthfulness of the 
President's testimony that he did not recall giving that item 
to her. The Majority, however, makes no attempt to place these 
facts in their proper context.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \151\ Lewinsky 7/27/98 302 at 8.
    \152\ Lewinsky 7/27/98 302 at 14-15 (Lewinsky lists all gifts 
received from President, but broach is not itemized); see also Lewinsky 
7/30/98 302 at 19-21 (similar list does not mention a gold broach).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Moreover, one of Ms. Lewinsky's confidante's, Neysa 
Erbland, testified that she had heard about Ms. Lewinsky's 
receipt of the broach from the President around Christmas of 
1996.153 The more than one-year gap between the time 
that the President gave the broach to Ms. Lewinsky and the time 
that he was asked about it during the Jones deposition 
reinforces the reasonableness of his inability to recall that 
specific gift.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \153\ Erbland 2/12/98 GJ at 41. The Referral misleadingly asserts 
that Lewinsky made ``near-contemporaneous'' comments about the receipt 
of the broach to four of her confidantes. Referral at 156 n.160. With 
the exception of Neysa Erbland, however, three of these witnesses had 
no knowledge as to when Lewinsky received the broach from the President 
and each had heard about or seen the gift at different times of the 
year. Raines 1/29/98 GJ at 53:13-18 (cannot recall whether Lewinsky 
received broach before or after leaving White House); Ungvari 3/19/98 
GJ at 44 (saw either the pin or the broach, but cannot recall which 
one, at Lewinsky's father's house ``this past Thanksgiving''); Tripp 7/
29/98 GJ at 105 (recounting discussion about broach after Lewinsky 
received subpoena in December 1997).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

4. The President Did Not Commit An Impeachable Offense When He 
        Testified about Whether He Had Talked with Lewinsky about the 
        Possibility She Would Be Asked to Testify in the Jones Case

    During the Jones deposition, when questioned as to whether 
he ``ever talked to Monica Lewinsky about the possibility that 
she might be asked to testify?'' the President began an answer 
with ``I'm not sure,'' but then suggested that if he had, it 
was as part of a conversation in which he joked that every 
woman he had ever talked to was going to be called as a witness 
in the Paula Jones case. 154 This was a truthful 
response. 155 The President did not deny that he had 
had other conversations with Ms. Lewinsky about the Jones case. 
The President expressed uncertainty about whether there were 
other occasions. The President testified that ``I don't think 
we ever had more of a conversation than that about it.'' when 
describing the earlier exchange with Ms. Lewinsky over whether 
she might appear on the witness list. 156 As in so 
many other instances, the Jones attorneys failed to ask 
appropriate follow-up questions such as ``were there any other 
conversations concerning the possibility that Ms. Lewinsky 
would testify in the Jones case?''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \154\ Clinton 1/17/98 Depo at 69.
    \155\ Ms. Lewinsky confirmed the accuracy of the President's 
recollection of this conversation in her testimony. See Lewinsky 8/24/
98 FBI 302 form (``LEWINSKY advised CLINTON may have said during this 
conversation that every woman he had ever spoken to was going to be on 
the witness list.'').
    \156\ Clinton 1/17/98 Depo at 70-71.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Perjury, of course, requires proof that a defendant 
knowingly made a false statement as to material facts. 
157 As we have already discussed, testimony 
regarding Ms. Lewinsky was not central to the Jones case. 
Moreover, the following types of answers cannot be 
characterized as perjurious: literally truthful answers that 
imply facts that are not true, see, e.g., United States v. 
Bronston, 409 U.S. 352, 358 (1973), truthful answers to 
questions that are not asked, see, e.g., United States v. Corr, 
543 F.2d 1042, 1049 (2d Cir. 1976), and failures to correct 
misleading impressions. See, e.g., United States v. Earp, 812 
F.2d 917, 919 (4th Cir. 1987). The Supreme Court has made 
abundantly clear that it is not relevant for perjury purposes 
whether the witness intends his answer to mislead, or indeed 
intends a ``pattern'' of answers to mislead, if the answers are 
truthful or literally truthful.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \157\ United States v. Dunnigan, 507 U.S. 87, 94 (1993).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Ms. Lewinsky has only testified about one other discussion 
with the President about the possibility that she ``might'' be 
asked to testify. Ms. Lewinsky claims that the President told 
her during a December 17 phone call that she had appeared on 
the Jones witness list. Subsequent conversations between the 
President and Ms. Lewinsky about the receipt of her subpoena 
two days later would not have been responsive to the question 
posed by the Jones attorneys because the ``possibility that she 
might be asked to testify'' had become a reality by that point. 
Even if Ms. Lewinsky's testimony is fully credited, the 
President's failure to recall that they discussed the 
possibility that she would be asked to testify in the Jones 
case during their December 17 conversation was an 
understandable memory lapse. That call was made at 2:00 a.m. 
and the main purpose of the call was to inform Ms. Lewinsky 
about the death of Betty Currie's brother.

5. The President Did Not Commit an Impeachable Offense When He 
        Testified About Whether Lewinsky Had Told Him She Had Been 
        Subpoenaed

    It is alleged that the President committed perjury in his 
deposition when he failed to acknowledge that he knew that Ms. 
Lewinsky had been subpoenaed at the time he had last seen and 
spoken to her. The President acknowledged, however, that he 
knew that Ms. Lewinsky had been subpoenaed, but that he was not 
sure when was the last time he had seen and spoken with her 
(but that it was sometime around Christmas), and that he had 
discussed with her the possibility that she would have to 
testify.
    The allegation that the President denied knowing that Ms. 
Lewinsky had been subpoenaed the last time he spoke to her 
illustrates the problem of taking selected pieces of testimony 
out of context.
          Q. Did she tell you she had been served with a 
        subpoena in this case?
          A. No. I don't know if she had been. 158
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \158\ Clinton 1/17/98 Depo at 68.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    This testimony does not support the charge that the 
President perjured himself by denying that he knew that Ms. 
Lewinsky had been subpoenaed the last time he had spoken with 
her. First, the testimony immediately following this exchange 
demonstrates both that the President was not hiding that he 
knew Ms. Lewinsky had been subpoenaed by the time of the 
deposition and that the Jones lawyers were well aware that this 
was the President's position:

          Q. Did anyone other than your attorneys ever tell you 
        that Monica Lewinsky had been served with a subpoena in 
        this case?
          A. I don't think so.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

          A. Bruce Lindsey, I think Bruce Lindsey told me that 
        she was, I think maybe that's the first person [who] 
        told me she was. I want to be as accurate as I can.
          Q. Did you talk to Mr. Lindsey about what action, if 
        any, should be taken as a result of her being served 
        with a subpoena?
          A. No.159
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \159\ Clinton 1/17/98 Depo at 68-70.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    It is evident from the complete exchange on this subject 
that the President was not generally denying that he knew that 
Ms. Lewinsky had been subpoenaed in the Jones case. The 
questions that the Jones lawyers were asking the President also 
make clear that this is what they understood the President's 
testimony to be.
    Second, the President's testimony cannot fairly be read as 
an express denial of knowledge that Ms. Lewinsky had been 
subpoenaed the last time he had spoken to her before the 
deposition. Most importantly, the President was not asked 
whether he knew that Ms. Lewinsky had been subpoenaed on 
December 28th, which was the last time he had seen her. When 
the President answered the question, ``Did she tell you she had 
been served with a subpoena in this case?'', he plainly was not 
thinking about December 28th. To the contrary, the President's 
testimony indicates that he was thoroughly confused about the 
dates of his last meetings with Ms. Lewinsky, and he made that 
abundantly clear to the Jones lawyers:
          Q. When was the last time you spoke with Monica 
        Lewinsky?
          A. I'm trying to remember. Probably sometime before 
        Christmas. She came by to see Betty sometime before 
        Christmas. And she was there talking to her, and I 
        stuck my head out, said hello to her.
          Q. Stuck your head out of the Oval Office?
          A. Uh-huh, Betty said she was coming by and talked to 
        her, and I said hello to her.
          Q. Was that shortly before Christmas or----
          A. I'm sorry, I don't remember. Been sometime in 
        December, I think, and I believe--that may not be the 
        last time. I think she came to one of the, one of the 
        Christmas parties. 160
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \160\ Clinton 1/17/98 Depo at 68 (emphasis added).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    His statement that he did not know whether she had been 
subpoenaed directly followed this confused exchange and was not 
tied to any particular meeting with her. By that time it is 
totally unclear what date the answer is addressing. Given his 
confusion, which the Jones lawyers made no attempt to resolve, 
it is difficult to know what was being said, much less to label 
it false and perjurious.

6. The President Did Not Commit An Impeachable Offense When He 
        Testified about Who Had Informed Him That Lewinsky Had Received 
        a Subpoena in the Jones Case

    Article II also appears to encompass the claim that the 
President perjured himself by failing to identify Vernon Jordan 
as one of the individuals who told him that Ms. Lewinsky had 
been served with a subpoena. In fact, when asked who had 
informed him that Ms. Lewinsky had been subpoenaed, the 
President began to identify the individuals who had conveyed 
that information to him, but the Jones attorneys did not 
consider the matter sufficiently important to elicit all of the 
responsive information. To support his perjury claim, the 
Majority Counsel unfairly rips a single sentence of the Jones 
deposition out of context without ever acknowledging that the 
President, in response to very next question, began to amend 
and expand on his answer to the question at issue. The exact 
sequence is as follows:

          Q. Did anyone other than your attorneys ever tell you 
        that Monica Lewinsky had been served with a subpoena in 
        this case?
          G. I don't think so.
          Q. Did you ever talk with Monica Lewinsky about the 
        possibility that she might be asked to testify in this 
        case?
          Q. Bruce Lindsey. I think Bruce Lindsey told me that 
        she was, I think maybe that's the first person who told 
        me she was.161
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \161\  Clinton 1/17/98 Depo. at 68-69 (emphasis added).

The Jones attorneys then proceeded to question the President 
about the specifics of his conversation with Lindsey concerning 
this subject. After the President had responded fully to these 
questions, the Jones attorneys failed to ask the obvious 
follow-up question that had been invited by the President's use 
of the qualifier ``first'': who else besides your lawyers told 
you that Ms. Lewinsky had been served with a subpoena? Criminal 
sanctions cannot attach to a deposition answer that is 
incomplete on its face if the lawyer posing the questions is 
not even interested enough to pursue obvious follow-up 
questions. Our system of justice does not impose criminal 
sanctions ``simply because a wily witness succeeds in derailing 
the questioner--so long as the witness speaks the literal 
truth.'' 162
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \162\ United States v. Bronston, 409 U.S. 352, 360 (1973).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The Independent Counsel's Referral also freely speculated 
that the President's incomplete answer was motivated by his 
reluctance to mention Jordan, who continues to be investigated 
by the Independent Counsel for alleged obstruction of justice 
relating to Webster Hubbell.163 The Independent 
Counsel's insinuations in this regard, however, studiously 
ignores the fact that the President truthfully identified Bruce 
Lindsey as one of the individuals who told him that Lewsinky 
had been subpoenaed.164 Lindsey, like Jordan, has 
long been under an unfair cloud of suspicion resulting from the 
Independent Counsel's investigation into supposedly 
``obstructionist'' activities. If the President, as the 
Independent Counsel claims, omitted mentioning Jordan out of 
concern about ``admitting any possible link'' between Ms. 
Lewinsky and a person who was already under investigation for 
``obstructing justice,'' then this same logic would have 
militated against mentioning Lindsey. The Independent Counsel's 
logically inconsistent speculation only serves to highlight the 
persistent factual weaknesses in the allegations of criminal 
wrongdoing that have been uncritically adopted by the Majority.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \163\ Referral at 189.
    \164\ Clinton 1/17/98 Depo at 68-69.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

7. The President Did Not Commit An Impeachable Offense When He 
        Testified about Whether Anyone Had Reported to Him about a 
        Conversation with Ms. Lewinsky Concerning the Jones Case in the 
        Two Weeks Prior to the Deposition

    During the Jones deposition, the President was asked 
whether, in the ``past two weeks'' (before January 17) anyone 
had reported to him that they had had a conversation with Ms. 
Lewinsky about the Jones lawsuit. The President replied he 
``did not believe so.'' 165 This allegedly 
constituted a false statement because Jordan informed the 
President during a phone call on January 7 that the Lewinsky 
affidavit had been signed.166
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \165\ Clinton 1/17/98 Depo at 68-69.
    \166\ Referral at 187.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The record does not, however, demonstrate that Mr. Jordan 
told the President about a conversation with Ms. Lewinsky. 
Jordan made a phone call to the President on January 7 
informing him that the Lewinsky affidavit had been signed, but 
Jordan did not speak with the President about his discussion 
with Lewinsky on that day.167 Instead, as Jordan 
testified before the grand jury, he simply conveyed to the 
President that the affidavit had been signed (he refers to the 
conversation with the President as ``a simple information 
flow'').168
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \167\ Referral at 187.
    \168\  Referral at 187-88.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Simply put, the information conveyed by Mr. Jordan to the 
President on December 7 did not imply that he had talked to Ms. 
Lewinsky that day. For all the President knew, Jordan learned 
about the signing of the affidavit from the lawyer that Jordan 
had put Ms. Lewinsky in touch with, Frank Carter. Indeed, Mr. 
Jordan had previously transmitted information he learned from 
Mr. Carter directly to the President.169
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \169\  See Jordan 5/5/98 GJ at 224-26 (Jordan sometimes relayed 
information to President concerning Lewinsky that he learned from 
Carter).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

8. The President Did Not Commit An Impeachable Offense When He 
        Testified about whether he had heard that Mr. Jordan and Ms. 
        Lewinsky had met to discuss the Jones case

    When asked during the Jones deposition whether the 
President had heard that Jordan and Ms. Lewinsky had met to 
discuss the Jones case; the President recounted his belief that 
the two had met to discuss the job search--about which the 
President readily acknowledged an awareness. It is alleged that 
this was a false statement because the President had talked to 
Jordan about Ms. Lewinsky's involvement in the Jones 
case.170
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \170\ Referral, at 186.

          Q. Has it ever been reported to you that [Vernon 
        Jordan] met with Monica Lewinsky and talked about this 
        case?
          A: I knew that he met with her. I think Betty 
        suggested that he meet with her. Anyway, he met with 
        her. I, I thought that he talked to her about something 
        else. I didn't know that--I thought he had given her 
        some advice about her move to New York.171
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \171\ Clinton 1/17/98 Depo at 72 (emphasis added).

    The President, however, was asked only about his knowledge 
of meetings between Jordan and Ms. Lewinsky concerning the 
Jones case. The assertion that the President ``did not recall 
whether Mr. Jordan had talked to Ms. Lewinsky about her 
involvement in the Jones case,'' is misleading.172 
The President was never simply asked whether he was aware that 
Jordan had ever talked with Ms. Lewinsky about her involvement 
in the Jones case. Instead, the President recounted his belief 
that the two had met to discuss the job search--about which the 
President readily acknowledged an awareness.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \172\ Referral at 186.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The President's failure to recall that Jordan told him of 
meeting with Ms. Lewinsky concerning the Jones case, rather 
than job search, was not intentionally false. Rather, there is 
substantial evidence to suggest that the President's belief 
that the meetings between Jordan and Ms. Lewinsky only involved 
her job search was reasonable because the job search was a 
major part of the contacts between Ms. Lewinsky and Mr. Jordan. 
For example, up until December 19, Mr. Jordan's only 
conversations with Ms. Lewinsky concerned her search for a job 
in New York.173 Furthermore, Ms. Lewinsky's job 
search was one of the topics discussed by Mr. Jordan with the 
President during their December 19 meeting during which Mr. 
Jordan told the President that Ms. Lewinsky had been 
subpoenaed.174 Mrs. Currie asked Mr. Jordan to help 
Ms. Lewinsky find a job in New York and testified that it is 
not possible that the President told her to talk to Mr. Jordan 
on this topic.175 Moreover, as Mr. Jordan testified, 
``Lewinsky was never the main topic of any conversation with 
the President.'' 176 The President's further 
response--that he believed Mr. Jordan met with Ms. Lewinsky to 
give her advice about her move to New York--was fully accurate.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \173\ Jordan 3/3/98 GJ at 92.
    \174\ Jordan 3/3/98 GJ at President. 171 (``I said ``You know. I'm 
trying to help her get a job and I'm going to continue to do that.' '')
    \175\ Currie 5/6/98 GJ at 169-83.
    \176\ Jordan 3/5/98 GJ at 28 (emphasis added).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    C. Article III's Allegations of Obstruction of Justice Fail to 
                    Establish an Impeachable Offense

    The Committee has approved an article of impeachment 
alleging that the President obstructed justice. The article 
contends that the ``means used to implement this course of 
conduct or scheme included one or more of the following acts: 
(1) on or about December 17, 1997, William Jefferson Clinton 
corruptly encouraged a witness in a Federal civil rights action 
brought against him to execute a sworn affidavit in that 
proceeding that he knew to be perjurious, false and misleading; 
(2) on or about December 17, 1997, William Jefferson Clinton 
corruptly encouraged a witness in a Federal civil rights action 
brought against him to give perjurious, false and misleading 
testimony if and when called to testify personally in that 
proceeding; (3) on or about December 28, 1997, William 
Jefferson Clinton corruptly engaged in, encouraged, or 
supported a scheme to conceal evidence that had been subpoenaed 
in a Federal civil rights action brought against him; (4) 
[b]eginning on or about December 7, 1997, and continuing 
through and including January 14, 1998, William Jefferson 
Clinton intensified and succeeded in an effort to secure job 
assistance to a witness in a Federal civil rights action 
brought against him in order to corruptly prevent the truthful 
testimony of that witness in that proceeding at a time when the 
truthful testimony of that witness would have been harmful to 
him; (5) on January 17, 1998, at his deposition in a Federal 
civil rights action brought against him, William Jefferson 
Clinton corruptly allowed his attorney to make false and 
misleading statements to a Federal judge characterizing an 
affidavit, in order to prevent questioning deemed relevant by 
the judge. Such false and misleading statements were 
subsequently acknowledged by his attorney in a communication to 
that judge.; (6) [o]n or about January 18 and January 20-21, 
1998, William Jefferson Clinton related a false and misleading 
account of events relevant to a Federal civil rights action 
brought against him to a potential witness in that proceeding, 
in order to corruptly influence the testimony of that witness; 
(7) on or about January 21, 23 and 26, 1998, William Jefferson 
Clinton made false and misleading statements to potential 
witnesses in a Federal grand jury proceeding in order to 
corruptly influence the testimony of those witnesses. The false 
and misleading statements made by William Jefferson Clinton 
were repeated by the witnesses to the grand jury, causing the 
grand jury to receive false and misleading information.''

1. The President did not encourage Ms. Lewinsky to file a false 
        affidavit in the Jones case or testify falsely if deposed in 
        that matter.

    There is no doubt that Ms. Lewinsky and the President 
discussed the desirability of having her submit an affidavit in 
lieu of testifying, but there is no evidence that the President 
encouraged her to file a false affidavit, or encouraged her to 
lie if she were ultimately required to provide a deposition in 
the Jones case. The President testified during his grand jury 
appearance that ``I believed then, I believe now, that Monica 
Lewinsky could have sworn out an honest affidavit, that under 
reasonable circumstances, and without the benefit of what Linda 
Tripp did to her, would have given her a chance not to be a 
witness in this case.'' 177 The distinction between 
the submission of a truthful and a false affidavit is crucial 
to the Minority's firm conviction that there is no basis for 
impeachment. The Majority chooses to simply ignore the fact 
that the Jones case involved a claim of unwelcome, harassing 
conduct while the President's relationship with Ms. Lewinsky 
was purely consensual. Ms. Lewinsky was prepared to state 
truthfully that she was not the subject of harassment or any 
unwelcome advances, and the filing of an affidavit with that 
statement might have avoided the need for Ms. Lewinsky to 
reveal her relationship with the President.178
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \177\ Clinton 8/17/98 GJ at 69. See also id. at 77 (``I believed 
then, I believe today, that she could execute an affidavit which, under 
reasonable circumstances with fair-minded, non-politically oriented 
people, would result in her being relieved of the burden to be put 
through the kind of testimony that, thanks to Linda Tripp's work with 
you and with the Jones lawyers, she would have been put through''); 116 
(``I also will tell you that I felt quite comfortable that she could 
have executed a truthful affidavit, which would not have disclosed the 
embarrassing details of the relationship that we had had'').
    \178\ The Minority specifically notes, in that regard, that 
obstruction of justice requires proof of a specific intent to obstruct 
a judicial proceeding. United States v. Bashaw, 982 F.2d 168, 170 (6th 
Cir. 1992); United States v. Moon, 718 F.2d 1219, 1236 (2d Cir. 1983); 
United States v. Rasheed, 663 F.2d 843, 847 (9th Cir. 1981). There 
simply is no such proof in this case.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Evidence transmitted to Congress by the Independent 
Counsel, but ignored by the Majority, is equally critical in 
assessing the Majority's allegations of obstruction of justice. 
For example, the President testified that he never asked Ms. 
Lewinsky to lie, and Ms. Lewinsky similarly testified that the 
President never told her to submit a false affidavit or to lie 
in any way.179 Ms. Lewinsky's words on the subject 
are instructive. During her final appearance before the grand 
jury, Ms. Lewinsky testified in response to a grand juror's 
question that:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \179\ Clinton 8/17/98 GJ at 4, 7; Lewinsky 7/27/98 302 at 12.

          I think because of the public nature of how this 
        investigation has been and what the charges aired, that 
        I would just like to say that no one ever asked me to 
        lie and I was never promised a job for my 
        silence.180
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \180\ Lewinsky 8/20/98 GJ at 105.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Ms. Lewinsky made the same point in her earlier proffer to the 
OIC. She wrote that ``[n]either the Pres. nor Mr. Jordan (or 
anyone on their behalf) asked or encouraged Ms. L to lie.'' 
181 She also stated that she had asked the President 
if he wanted to see her affidavit before it was filed, and he 
said he did not.182 Ms. Lewinsky believed her denial 
of a sexual relationship with the President to be true because 
they had never had sexual intercourse.183 Nor did 
Ms. Lewinsky contrive that definition for purposes of 
litigation. Rather, she made the point to Ms. Tripp in a 
surreptitiously recorded conversation in which Ms. Lewinsky 
said that ``[h]aving sex is having intercourse.'' 
184 Moreover, she deemed the matter to be a personal 
one, and none of Paula Jones' business.185
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \181\ Lewinsky 2/1/98 Proffer at 10.
    \182\ Lewinsky 8/2/98 302 at 3.
    \183\ Lewinsky 2/1/98 Proffer at 10; Lewinsky 7/27/98 OIC 302 at 
12.
    \184\ Tripp Tape 18 at 50.
    \185\ Lewinsky 8/1/98 FBI 302 form at 10.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The Majority also fails to mention Ms. Lewinsky's crucial 
testimony that her affidavit was in no way contingent on her 
receiving assistance with her search for employment. Ms. 
Lewinsky told the OIC's investigators that:

          [t]here was no agreement with the President, JORDAN, 
        or anyone else that LEWINSKY had to sign the Jones 
        affidavit before getting a job in New York. LEWINSKY 
        never demanded a job from JORDAN in return for a 
        favorable affidavit. Neither the President nor JORDAN 
        ever told LEWINSKY she had to lie.186
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \186\ Lewinsky 7/27/98 FBI 302 form at 10.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Indeed, the evidence makes clear that Ms. Tripp was the 
only person to suggest a jobs-for-affidavit trade. Ms. Lewinsky 
repeatedly made that point in her interviews with the OIC's 
staff, and in her grand jury appearances.187
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \187\ Lewinsky 8/2/98 OIC 302 at 7 (``TRIPP told LEWINSKY not to 
sign the affidavit until LEWINSKY had a job''); Lewinsky 8/6/98 GJ at 
182 (reporting that Tripp said, ``Monica, promise me you won't sign the 
affidavit until you get the job. Tell Vernon you won't sign the 
affidavit until you get the job because if you sign the affidavit 
before you get the job, they're never going to give you the job'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In a further effort to support claims of obstruction of 
justice, the Majority apparently adopts the OIC's argument that 
the President and Ms. Lewinsky improperly agreed to use ``cover 
stories'' to hide their relationship, and that Ms. Lewinsky 
could use those cover stories if she were unable to avoid a 
deposition appearance. While the Majority does not specifically 
articulate the grounds for its charge, the OIC's Referral 
acknowledges that these cover stories were created long before 
Ms. Lewinsky was subpoenaed in the Jones case. The OIC 
nevertheless asserts that the stories were unlawfully continued 
after the subpoena was served, and that the President failed to 
advise Ms. Lewinsky to abandon them when she prepared her 
affidavit.188
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \188\ Referral at 180.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The Minority believes it constitutionally insignificant 
that two people in an inappropriate workplace relationship 
would attempt to conceal their relationship. And, far from 
inculpating the President, the Minority believes that the long-
standing cover stories employed by the President and Ms. 
Lewinsky actually exculpate him. It is obvious that these cover 
stories were not designed to obstruct justice, but simply to 
prevent family members, friends, staff, and the public from 
learning of the President's concededly inappropriate 
relationship. Indeed, Ms. Lewinsky testified that she and the 
President did not discuss denying their relationship after Ms. 
Lewinsky learned she was a witness in the Jones 
case.189 During one of Ms. Lewinsky's grand jury 
appearances, the following exchange occurred:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \189\ Lewinsky 8/20/98 GJ at 63-64.

          Q. Is it possible that you had these discussions 
        [about denying the relationship] after you learned that 
        you were a witness in the Paula Jones case?
          A. I don't believe so. No.
          Q. Can you exclude that possibility?
          A. I pretty much can . . . . 190
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \190\ Lewinsky 8/20/98 GJ at 63.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Thus, the record actually undermines the Majority's contention 
that the President intended to obstruct justice.
    The bottom line is this: the secrecy surrounding an 
extramarital relationship, standing alone, is far too weak a 
foundation on which to construct a criminal case, let alone an 
impeachment of the President. There simply is no evidence that 
the President sought to have Ms. Lewinsky file a false 
affidavit or give false testimony in the Jones case.

2. The President did not Obstruct Justice by Concealing Gifts that he 
        Gave to Ms. Lewinsky

    There is no dispute that the President and Lewinsky 
exchanged gifts. Nor is it disputed that some of those gifts 
were transferred by Lewinsky to the President's secretary, 
Betty Currie, on December 28, 1997, the same day that the 
President and Lewinsky had a brief meeting at the White House. 
The article's allegation of obstruction is based on its 
contention that this transfer of gifts was initiated by the 
President with the intent to make them unavailable for 
production in response to a document subpoena served on 
Lewinsky by lawyers for Paula Jones.\191\ Referral at 169-71. A 
full and fair review of all the relevant testimony strongly 
suggests that Lewinsky initiated the transfer to Currie without 
any intervention by the President, and that the President was 
unconcerned about the possibility that gifts might be produced 
to the Jones lawyers. In fact, the President testified that he 
told Ms. Lewinsky that she would have to turn over to the Jones 
lawyers whatever gifts she had.\192\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \191\ Referral at 166.
    \192\ Clinton 8/17/98 GJ at 43. ``And I told [Ms. Lewinsky] that if 
they asked her for gifts, she'd have to give them whatever she had, and 
that that's what the law was.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    To reach the conclusions contained in this article, the 
Majority has overlooked key evidence. For example, the 
Independent Counsel alleges that Lewinsky and the President 
``discussed the possibility of moving some of the gifts out of 
her possession.'' A review of the actual testimony, however, 
reveals that the Independent Counsel's assertion lacks a basis 
in the evidence he sent. Ms. Lewinsky testified that when she 
told the President on December 28, 1997, ``maybe I should put 
the gifts outside my house somewhere or give them to someone, 
maybe Betty[,]'' the President did not respond in the 
affirmative, but said ``I don't know'' or ``[l]et me think 
about that.'' \193\ This is hardly the stuff of obstruction.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \193\ Lewinsky 8/6/98 GJ at 152.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The Independent Counsel chose to state the President's 
response, without bothering to mention the other nine times 
they asked Ms. Lewinsky the question.\194\ Moreover, Ms. Currie 
stated repeatedly that Ms. Lewinsky called her and raised the 
issue of picking up the gifts and that the President never 
asked her to call Ms. Lewinsky for the gifts:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \194\ Ms. Lewinsky made at least ten distinct statements on this 
subject during the course of her original proffer, interviews, grand 
jury testimony and deposition. Although the OIC claims that there was a 
discussion between Ms. Lewinsky and the President on this subject, the 
actual testimony does not support the OIC's contention. Lewinsky 2/1/98 
proffer at 7; Lewinsky 7/27/98 interview statement at 7; Lewinsky 8/1/
98 interview statement at 11; Lewinsky 8/6/98 GJ at 152; Lewinsky 8/13/
97 interview statement at 7; Lewinsky 8/20/98 GJ at 65-66 and 70; 
Lewinsky 8/24 interview statement at 4; Lewinsky 9/3/98 interview 
statement at 2.

          A. My recollection--the best I remember is Monica 
        calling me and asking me if I'd hold some gifts for 
        her. I said I would.
          Q. And did the President know you were holding these 
        things?
          A. I don't know.
          Q. Didn't he say to you that Monica had something for 
        you to hold?
          A. I don't remember that. I don't.\195\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \195\ Currie 5/6/98 GJ at 105-6.

And:
          Q. Exactly how [did] that box of gifts come into your 
        possession?
          A. I do not recall the President asking me to call 
        about a box of gifts.\196\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \196\ Currie 7/22/98 GJ at 175-6.

    The OIC's argument that the President was concerned about 
the gifts is inconsistent with evidence that, during the 
meeting on December 28, he gave Lewinsky additional presents 
for Christmas.\197\ It strains believability to suggest that 
the President was concerned enough about the gifts to cause 
Lewinsky to surrender possession of them, yet at the same time 
was foolish enough to give her more gifts that would have to be 
produced on the very same day. The President's testimony is 
clear that he told Lewinsky she would have to produce any gifts 
that remained in her possession, and that Lewinsky--and not 
he--was worried about having to produce them.\198\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \197\ Referral at 168.
    \198\ Clinton 8/17/98 GJ at 44-47.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The Referral's conclusion is also unsupported by Currie's 
testimony that Lewinsky, and not Currie, initiated the 
telephone call that resulted in Currie retrieving the gifts 
from Lewinsky's Watergate apartment. According to Currie, 
Lewinsky called her and expressed concern that people--whom 
Currie understood to mean Newsweek magazine reporter Michael 
Isikoff--were asking questions about the gifts.\199\ The 
Independent Counsel acknowledges that ``Currie testified that 
Ms. Lewinsky, not Ms. Currie, placed the call and raised the 
subject of transferring the gifts[,]'' but thereafter discounts 
Currie's testimony by arguing that she ultimately said that 
Lewinsky might have a better recollection of these events.\200\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \199\ Currie 1/27/98 GJ at 57; Currie 5/6/98 GJ at 124.
    \200\ Referral at 167.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The Majority claims to have proved that Ms. Currie called 
Ms. Lewinsky about picking up the gifts, rather than the other 
way around as Ms. Currie testified, by pointing to a cell phone 
record (billed at one minute) which reflects a phone call from 
Ms. Currie to Ms. Lewinsky's number at 3:32 p.m. on December 
28th. Aside from the fact that this cell phone record (of a 
``rounded-up'' one-minute phone call) proves absolutely nothing 
about the content of that conversation (or even whether a 
conversation actually occurred), the Majority fails to note 
that, according to Ms. Lewinsky's testimony, Ms. Currie came 
and picked up the gifts at 2:00 p.m. on that day. It seems 
obvious that a call at 3:32 p.m. was not the call to arrange a 
pick-up that occurred an hour-and-a-half earlier. The Majority, 
however, refuses to acknowledge any contradictions between Ms. 
Lewinsky's account and other evidence.\201\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \201\ Lewinsky 7/27/98 302 at 8.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Ms. Lewinsky, of course, recalled that Ms. Currie initiated 
the conversation that resulted in the transfer of the 
gifts.\202\ In effect, this article of impeachment is based on 
an answer to an ambiguous leading question to a witness who 
acknowledges, as any truthful witness might, the possibility 
that she ``might be wrong.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \202\ Lewinsky 8/6/98 GJ at 154.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Given the weight that the Independent Counsel attaches to 
Ms. Currie's supposed concession, it is surprising to find that 
the transcript of Ms. Currie's testimony does not support his 
characterization of what was said. The transcript reveals that 
when Currie spoke the words on which the OIC relies so heavily, 
she was not talking about who initiated the call to transfer 
the gifts, but apparently whether, after she picked the gifts 
up, she informed the President of that fact. The actual 
transcript reads as follows:

          Q. What about the President's knowledge about Monica 
        turning over to you the gifts he had given her?
          A. I don't know.
          Q. Did you talk to him about it?
          A. I don't remember talking to him about that, the 
        gifts.
          Q. If Monica said you did, would that not be true?
          A. If Monica said I talked to the President about it?
          Q. Right.
          A. Then she may remember better than I. I don't 
        remember.\203\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \203\ Currie 5/6/98 GJ at 125-26.

    Read in its full context, in the entire transcript, this 
highly ambiguous line of questioning is best understood to be 
inquiring about the President's knowledge after the fact that 
the gifts had actually been transferred. Had the prosecutor 
been able to support his point directly, he would have relied 
on the answer to a question like: ``Did the President know, in 
advance, that Monica intended to turn the gifts over to you?'' 
Or, more appropriately, the answer to a question like ``Did the 
President tell you to retrieve the gifts from Monica?'' could 
have been cited in the Referral. The problem is that when those 
questions were asked, Ms. Currie made quite clear that Ms. 
Lewinsky initiated the transfer.\204\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \204\ Currie 1/27/98 GJ at 57-58; Currie 5/6/98 GJ at 105-06. The 
President similarly denied asking Currie to retrieve any gifts. Clinton 
8/17/98 GJ at 114-15.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In an attempt to bridge the gap between the answers it 
wanted and the ones Ms. Currie gave, the Referral makes a 
further unsupported suggestion: because Ms. Currie went to Ms. 
Lewinsky's apartment to pick up the gifts, she must have 
initiated the contact because ``the person making the extra 
effort . . . is ordinarily the person requesting the favor.'' 
\205\ Beyond its facial implausibility, the argument fails for 
a simple reason: there was no ``extra effort'' made; Ms. 
Lewinsky's apartment was directly along a convenient route that 
Ms. Currie could take to get home from work. Ms. Currie 
testified that she stopped at Ms. Lewinsky's apartment on her 
way home.\206\ Ms. Currie lives in Arlington, Virginia, and 
anyone familiar with the metropolitan Washington, D.C. area 
knows that the entrances to both Highways 66 and 50, which 
provide ready access to Ms. Currie's residence in Arlington, 
are both within blocks of Ms. Lewinsky's Watergate 
apartment.\207\ This absence of ``extra effort'' demonstrates a 
repeated problem with the Referral--when it confronts large 
gaps in the evidence, it fills the void with illogical and 
unsupported leaps. Such unsubstantiated assumptions should be 
no basis for an article of impeachment.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \205\ Referral at 170.
    \206\ Currie 5/6/98 GJ at 108, 113.
    \207\ Id. at 116.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

3. The President did not Assist Ms. Lewinsky in Obtaining a Job in New 
        York in Order to Influence her Testimony in the Jones Case

    The Committee has approved an article of impeachment 
concerning the President's alleged attempts to find Ms. 
Lewinsky a job in New York at a time when she may have been a 
witness against him in the Jones case.\208\ The evidence, 
however, shows that the President's attempt to help Ms. 
Lewinsky find a job in New York had nothing to do with buying 
her silence or obstructing a legal proceeding.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \208\ Referral at 181.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The article alleges that ``the President assisted Ms. 
Lewinsky in her job search motivated at least in part by his 
desire to keep her ``on the team'' in the Jones litigation.'' 
\209\ This conclusion does not flow from the abundant evidence, 
which makes clear that Ms. Lewinsky's job search began long 
before she was identified as a witness in the Jones case. On 
April 5, 1996, Ms. Lewinsky's supervisor at the White House 
told her that she would need to leave her position in the 
Legislative Affairs office, and that a job at the Pentagon was 
available for her.\210\ Distraught, she met with the President 
two days later, and he allegedly promised that he would bring 
her back to the White House after the November elections.\211\ 
It was common knowledge at the White House that Ms. Lewinsky 
was transferred because she was deemed to spend too much time 
in the West Wing.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \209\ Id. at 185.
    \210\ Lewinsky 8/6/98 GJ at 61.
    \211\ Id. at 63.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Ms. Currie, who had befriended Ms. Lewinsky, believed that 
Ms. Lewinsky had been ``wronged'' by her transfer.\212\ As a 
result, Ms. Currie took it upon herself to try to find Ms. 
Lewinsky another job at the White House. Ms. Currie contacted 
White House Deputy Director of Personnel Marsha Scott and asked 
Ms. Scott to meet with Ms. Lewinsky, but nothing came of the 
meeting.\213\ When November passed and no White House job 
materialized, she began to complain to Ms. Currie and ask why 
the President didn't just order that she be returned.\214\ When 
it became clear that she would never receive another White 
House job, Ms. Lewinsky decided to move to New York City, where 
her mother had recently taken up residence. Ms. Lewinsky told 
the President on July 3, 1997, of her decision.\215\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \212\ Currie 5/6/98 GJ at 45.
    \213\ Id. at 38.
    \214\ Id. at 160.
    \215\ Lewinsky 8/6/98 GJ at 67-69.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In October 1997, Ms. Currie contacted White House Deputy 
Chief of Staff John Podesta, with whom she had a longstanding 
friendship, to see whether he could assist Ms. Lewinsky in 
finding a job in New York.\216\ She did so after the President 
requested only that she do what she could to help Ms. 
Lewinsky.\217\ Some months earlier, in the summer or fall of 
1997, White House Chief of Staff Erskine Bowles, in response to 
a similar request from the President, also mentioned Ms. 
Lewinsky's name to Mr. Podesta and asked whether any jobs might 
be available for her at the White House.\218\ While efforts to 
find a White House job failed, Mr. Podesta succeeded in 
arranging an interview for Ms. Lewinsky with United Nations 
Ambassador Bill Richardson. Ultimately, Mr. Richardson offered 
her a position that she declined.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \216\ Currie 1/24/98 OIC 302 at 4.
    \217\ Currie 5/6/98 GJ at 170.
    \218\ Bowles 4/2/98 GJ at 70.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    These efforts to find Ms. Lewinsky a job started far too 
early to have anything to do with the Jones case. Moreover, the 
Majority repeatedly fails to acknowledge an innocent and highly 
plausible explanation for the President's actions: he wished to 
help the woman he was involved with, cared for, and felt guilty 
about hurting. Instead, the Majority relies on a concocted 
theory of obstruction without the facts to support it.
    The OIC--and presumably the Majority--makes much of the 
assistance provided to Ms. Lewinsky by White House personnel. 
But Mr. Podesta made clear in his testimony before the grand 
jury that there was nothing unusual about these efforts.\219\ 
The Majority also relies heavily on the job-search assistance 
provided by Vernon Jordan. However, Ms. Lewinsky made clear in 
her testimony that she--and not the President--first suggested 
enlisting Mr. Jordan's help.\220\ And, as it turns out, the 
idea for obtaining Mr. Jordan's assistance first arose in a 
conversation between Ms. Lewinsky and her former friend, Linda 
Tripp, when one of them--most likely Mrs. Tripp--suggested that 
Mr. Jordan might be able to help Lewinsky.\221\ In response to 
Ms. Lewinsky's request, the President suggested that she give 
him a list of New York jobs in which she might be 
interested.\222\ On her own, Ms. Currie also asked Mr. Jordan 
to assist Ms. Lewinsky.\223\ She and Mr. Jordan were old 
friends, and she was concerned because Ms. Lewinsky was 
``frantic'' to find a job.\224\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \219\ Podesta 2/5/98 GJ at 27-29, 39, 41-42; Podesta 6/16/98 GJ at 
22.
    \220\ Lewinsky 8/6/98 GJ at 103-04.
    \221\ Id.; Lewinsky 8/20/98 GJ at 23; Lewinsky 7/27/98 OIC 302 at 
5.
    \222\ Lewinsky 8/6/98 GJ at 104.
    \223\ Currie 5/6/98 GJ at 176.
    \224\ Id. at 172.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The President never asked Ms. Currie to seek Mr. Jordan's 
assistance and, although Ms. Currie kept the President advised 
of her efforts, she--and not the President--was the one 
actively trying to assist Ms. Lewinsky.\225\ Mr Jordan confirms 
that Ms. Lewinsky was referred to him by Ms. Currie, although 
he acknowledges that he, too, kept the President updated on his 
efforts.\226\ Mr. Jordan routinely tried to assist young people 
with their careers.\227\ Indeed, Mr. Jordan recalled another 
occasion on which he telephoned Ron Perelman, Chairman of the 
Board of McAndrews & Forbes Holding Incorporated (the parent 
company of Revlon, which eventually offered Lewinsky an entry-
level position), on behalf of a young lawyer who worked at Mr. 
Jordan's law firm.\228\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \225\ Id. at 176, 179.
    \226\ Jordan 3/3/98 GJ at 65.
    \227\ Id. at 76.
    \228\ Jordan 3/5/98 GJ at 55.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Mr. Jordan also testified, and both Ms. Lewinsky and the 
President confirmed, that neither told him of their 
relationship.\229\ After her initial meeting with Mr. Jordan in 
early November 1997, Ms. Lewinsky complained that he was not 
doing anything to help her find work.\230\ Indeed, Ms. Lewinsky 
contacted Ms. Currie and asked her to speak with Mr. Jordan 
about why there had been no movement on the job front.\231\ Mr. 
Jordan's conduct is wholly inconsistent with the allegation 
that he was trying to silence a potentially damaging witness. 
Mr. Jordan did not exert any pressure on his private sector 
contacts regarding a job for Ms. Lewinsky.\232\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \229\ Id. at 79.
    \230\ Lewinsky 8/6/98 GJ at 105.
    \231\ Id.
    \232\ Fairbarn 1/29/98 FBI 302 form at 1; Halperin 3/27/98 FBI 302 
form at 2.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The Referral unfairly minimizes the job-search efforts of 
White House personnel that preceded Ms. Lewinsky's December 5 
appearance on the witness list in the Jones case, and unfairly 
emphasizes the efforts following that date. A review of the 
entire record sent to Congress makes clear that efforts to help 
Ms. Lewinsky began as soon as she was transferred to the 
Pentagon. In context, the evidence demonstrates that the 
President himself did little to assist Ms. Lewinsky, and that 
the efforts he undertook were motivated by a desire to help a 
person with whom he had been intimate. Indeed, as the President 
testified, if he had really felt obligated to get her a job, he 
certainly could have accomplished it.\233\ The President also 
testified that he knew that sooner or later his inappropriate 
contacts with Ms. Lewinsky would become public knowledge.\234\ 
And still he did not get her a job at the White House. 
Moreover, the President has connections in New York that he 
never used to get Ms. Lewinsky a job there.\235\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \233\ The President said that he did not order Ms. Lewinsky to be 
hired at the White House. ``I could have done so. I wouldn't do it. She 
tried for months to get in. She was angry.'' Clinton 8/17/98 GJ at 123.
    \234\ Clinton 8/17/98 GJ at 135.
    \235\ Currie 5/6/98 GJ at 182; Currie 5/14/98 GJ at 57.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    With respect to Ms. Currie, who took a more active role in 
assisting Ms. Lewinsky, the evidence indicates that she was 
motivated by a belief that Ms. Lewinsky had been unfairly 
transferred from her White House position. Finally, the record 
makes abundantly clear that Mr. Jordan became involved after 
Ms. Tripp suggested and Ms. Lewinsky concluded that Ms. 
Lewinsky should ask for Mr. Jordan's assistance.
    For her part, Ms. Lewinsky told the grand jury and the 
Independent Counsel's investigators that ``[n]o one ever asked 
me to lie and I was never promised a job for my silence.'' 
\236\ It also bears emphasis that Ms. Lewinsky's grand jury 
testimony on this key point was elicited not by one of the 
Independent Counsel's prosecutors, but by a grand juror who 
asked, ``Monica, is there anything that you would like to add 
to your prior testimony[?]' \237\ The OIC's failure to elicit 
that crucial piece of exculpatory testimony is important for 
Committee members to consider in determining the overall 
credibility of the investigation and the scope of their own 
review.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \236\ Lewinsky 8/20/98 GJ at 105; Lewinsky 7/27/98 OIC 302 at 10.
    \237\ Lewinsky 8/20/98 GJ at 105.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

4. The President Did Not Commit an Impeachable Offense When His Counsel 
        Characterized Ms. Lewinsky's Affidavit to the Presiding Judge 
        During the Jones Deposition

    This subparagraph is indistinguishable from the allegation 
contained in subparagraph 3 of Article I. The Minority views on 
why these allegations do not establish an impeachable offense 
are fully set forth, supra.

5. The President Did Not Relate to Ms. Currie A False And Misleading 
        Account of Events Relevant to the Jones Suit With an Intent to 
        Influence Her Testimony In Any Legal Proceeding

    It is undisputed that the President met with Ms. Currie at 
the White House the day after his deposition in the Jones case. 
Ms. Currie testified that she and the President also spoke a 
few days after the deposition--but before the fact of the OIC's 
grand jury investigation was revealed--about the President's 
contacts with Ms. Lewinsky.238 Majority counsel has 
argued to the Committee that ``Ms. Currie was a prospective 
witness'' in the Jones case at the time the President spoke to 
her, and that by referring to Ms. Currie during his deposition, 
the President indicated that he ``clearly wanted her to be 
deposed as a witness'' in the case.239 The 
Majority's allegations find no basis in the record, and are a 
transparent effort to cast perfectly understandable and lawful 
conduct in the most sinister light possible.240
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \238\ Currie 1/27/98 GJ at 80-82.
    \239\ Statement of Majority Counsel at 17.
    \240\ It is worth noting that at least one court has concluded that 
an obstruction of justice charge cannot be predicated on conduct 
arising in the context of a civil lawsuit. Richmark Corp. v. Timber 
Falling Consultants, 730 F.Supp. 1525 (D. Or. 1990).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The simple truth is that the President's actions did not 
obstruct justice because Ms. Currie was not a witness in any 
proceeding when they spoke, and the President had no 
expectation that she would be.241 Even Mr. Starr 
acknowledged during his appearance before the Committee that 
``[t]he evidence is not that she was on a witness list, and we 
have never said that she was.'' 242 Nor is it 
persuasive for the Majority to argue that the President's 
deposition references to Ms. Currie made it inevitable that her 
deposition would be taken. The undeniable fact is that 
following the President's deposition, the Jones lawyers never 
sought to take Ms. Currie's testimony. Indeed, discovery in the 
Jones case was set to close just days after the President's 
deposition was taken, and it is unlikely that her deposition 
could have been taken in the few days remaining.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \241\ Under federal law, an obstruction of justice charge does not 
lie unless the defendant knew the witness in question to be involved in 
a legal proceeding. 2 Leonard B. Sand, John S. Siffert, Walter P. 
Loughlin, and Steven A. Reiss, Modern Federal Jury Instructions para. 
46.01 at 46-14 (1997).
    \242\ 11/19/98 Tr. at 192.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Nor did the President have any way of knowing that the OIC 
was conducting a grand jury investigation of his relationship 
with Ms. Lewinsky when he spoke to Ms. Currie. That fact that a 
grand jury investigation had been commenced was not revealed 
until the Washington Post ran a front-page story on Wednesday, 
January 21, 1998, entitled ``Clinton Accused of Urging Aide to 
Lie; Starr Probes Whether President Told Woman to Deny Alleged 
Affair to Jones's Lawyers.'' 243 Thus, not even the 
Majority can claim that the President endeavored to obstruct 
Mr. Starr's criminal probe of his consensual sexual 
relationship with Ms. Lewinsky.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \243\ Referral at 122.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Put in proper context, the facts reveal that the 
President's statements to Ms. Currie were not motivated by a 
desire to influence her testimony, but by the President's 
knowledge that his deposition testimony would be leaked to the 
media, 244 and that statements regarding Ms. 
Lewinsky would be contradicted by aggressive press coverage of 
the story. The President testified in the grand jury that he 
never expected the OIC to be involved in the Jones suit, and 
that his concern was that the story about Ms. Lewinsky ``would 
break in the press.'' 245 Questions during the 
course of the deposition led the President to believe that 
``obviously someone had given [Jones' lawyers] a lot of 
information, some of which struck me as accurate, some of which 
struck me as dead wrong.'' 246 Following his 
testimony, the President was worried that he had been asked 
such detailed questions about what, to that point, he viewed as 
a secret relationship with Ms. Lewinsky. The President's 
concerns were borne out when, shortly after the deposition, 
Internet gossip columnist Matt Drudge reported the President's 
involvement with Ms. Lewinsky. Drudge's story received wide 
exposure the next morning, January 18, when it surfaced on 
ABC's This Week program.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \244\ Clinton 8/17/98 GJ at 99. The President explained his state 
of mind when he appeared at his deposition as follows: [m]y goal in 
this deposition was to be truthful, but not particularly helpful. I did 
not wish to do the work of the Jones lawyers. I deplored what they were 
doing. I deplored the innocent people they were tormenting and 
traumatizing. I deplored their illegal leaking. I deplored the fact 
that they knew, once they knew our evidence, that this was a bogus 
lawsuit, and that because of the funding they had from my political 
enemies, they were putting ahead. I deplored it. Clinton 8/17/98 GJ at 
81. See also id. at 79 (``I wanted to be legal without being 
particularly helpful'').
    \245\ Clinton 8/17/98 GJ at 55. See also id. at 131 (``I thought we 
were going to be deluged by press comments'').
    \246\ Clinton 8/17/98 GJ at 132.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The President told the grand jury about his reasons for 
talking to Ms. Currie: ``what I was trying to determine was 
whether my recollection was right and that she was always in 
the office complex when Monica was there . . . I was trying to 
get the facts down. I was trying to understand what the facts 
were . . . I was trying to get information in a hurry. I was 
downloading what I remembered.'' 247 The President 
plainly was hopeful that Ms. Currie was unaware of his 
relationship with Ms. Lewinsky, and was testing to see how much 
she knew. The state of her knowledge was important not because 
he expected her to give testimony in a judicial proceeding, but 
because it would help dictate the media strategy he adopted 
following a leak of his testimony about Ms. 
Lewinsky.248 To that end, the President testified 
that he ``was not trying to get Betty Currie to say something 
that was untruthful. I was trying to get as much information as 
quickly as I could.'' 249
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \247\ Clinton 8/17/98 GJ at 55-56.
    \248\ While the President's efforts to tailor his media strategy in 
that manner may not be admirable, it certainly is not impeachable, as 
the Majority plainly conceded when it dropped similar allegations from 
its article of impeachment charging that the President misused his 
office.
    \249\ Clinton 8/17/98 GJ at 56.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    With some variations in wording, Ms. Currie testified that 
the President made the following statements to her on January 
18 regarding Ms. Lewinsky: (1) ``[y]ou were always there when 
she was there, right? We were never alone;'' (2) ``[y]ou could 
see and hear everything;'
    (3) Monica came on to me, and I never touched her, right?'; 
and (4) [s]he wanted to have sex with me, and I can't do 
that.'' 250 Ms. Currie also testified that a few 
days later (but before the fact of the OIC's investigation 
became public), she again talked to the President, and that 
``it was sort of a recapitulation of what we had talked about 
Sunday.'' 251 While the Majority asserts that these 
questions were an effort by the President to obtain Ms. 
Currie's acquiescence to those propositions, the totality of 
her grand jury testimony makes clear that she did not feel 
pressured by her conversations with the President to change her 
recollection of events; that she did not believe the President 
wanted her to say ``right'' in response to his statements; and 
that she agreed that the President and Lewinsky generally were 
not alone because she was near the Oval Office on most 
occasions when they met.252
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \250\ Currie 1/27/98 GJ at 71-74.
    \251\ Currie 1/27/98 GJ at 80-82.
    \252\ Currie 7/22/98 GJ at 11, 22-23.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Ms. Currie testified as follows in the grand jury:

         Q. You testified with respect to the statements as the 
        President made them, and, in particular, the four 
        statements that we've already discussed. You felt at 
        the time that they were technically accurate? Is that a 
        fair assessment of your testimony?
         A. That's a fair assessment.253
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \253\ Currie 7/22/98 GJ at 18.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The following exchanges also occurred:

         Q. Now, back again to the four statements that you 
        testified the President made to you that were presented 
        as statements, did you feel pressured when he told you 
        those statements?
         A. None whatsoever.
          Q. What did you think, or what was going through your 
        mind about what he was doing?
          A. At that time I felt that he was--I want to use the 
        word shocked or surprised that this was an issue, and 
        he was just talking.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

          Q. That was your impression that he wanted you to 
        say--because he would end each of the statements with 
        ``Right?'' with a question.
          A. I do not remember that he wanted me to say 
        ``Right.'' He would say ``Right'' and I could have 
        said, ``Wrong.''
          Q. But he would end each of those questions with a 
        ``Right?'' and you could either say whether it was true 
        or not true?
          A. Correct.
          Q. Did you feel any pressure to agree with your boss?
          A. None.254
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \254\ Currie 7/22/98 GJ at 23.

    Significantly, the President testified that when he learned 
that Ms. Currie had been called to testify before the grand 
jury, he said, ``Betty, just don't worry about me. Just relax, 
go in there, and tell the truth.'' 255 The President 
also testified that ``I didn't want her to, to be untruthful to 
the grand jury. And if her memory was different than mine, it 
was fine, just go in there and tell them what she thought. So, 
that's all I remember.'' 256
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \255\ Clinton 8/17/98 GJ at 139.
    \256\ Clinton 8/17/98 GJ at 141.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Although the Independent Counsel interviewed the Paula 
Jones attorneys, they studiously avoided asking them about 
their intentions with respect to calling Betty Currie as a 
witness. Moreover, the fact that she was never contacted, never 
deposed, and never added to the witness list in any way, even 
after the President's deposition, destroys this obstruction 
charge.
    In sum, the President had no reason to believe that Ms. 
Currie would be a witness in any proceeding at the time he 
spoke to her. In contrast, the President knew that once his 
deposition testimony leaked, the White House would be 
``deluged'' by the media.257 It is far more likely 
that, when the President spoke to Ms. Currie, his goal was to 
keep the media and the public from finding out about his 
relationship with Ms. Lewinsky. Both the President and Betty 
Currie, the only people involved in this event, both agree that 
the conversation on January 18 was not about testimony, was not 
intended to pressure her, and was caused by the inquiries from 
the press, not for any litigation. The President's desire to 
keep that relationship secret was obvious and understandable, 
but not illegal, and certainly not grounds to justify 
impeachment. The Majority's evidence falls far short of 
establishing the existence of an obstruction of justice or 
other impeachable offense.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \257\ Clinton 8/17/98 GJ at 132.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

6. The President Did Not Obstruct Justice or Abuse his Power by Denying 
        to his Staff his Inappropriate Contacts with Ms. Lewinsky

    The Majority alleges that the President obstructed justice 
by lying to his staff or to the people around him about his 
inappropriate contacts with Ms. Lewinsky, knowing that they 
might repeat those statements in a grand jury. But the 
President's statements to his staff on January 21, 23, and 26, 
were made to protect his family from discovering his 
relationship with Ms. Lewinsky. He could not have known then 
that his staff would be called before the OIC's grand jury. The 
President did not want to admit he had an inappropriate 
relationship. This understandable desire falls far short of 
establishing an impeachable offense.
    The Referral lists the statements that the President 
allegedly made to various aides, and then how the aides 
testified to what the President said in their grand jury 
appearances.258 When asked leading questions in the 
grand jury, the President acknowledged that he assumed that 
various staff members might be called to the grand 
jury.259 Based only on that acknowledgment, the 
Majority alleges a ground for impeachment.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \258\ Referral at 123-25, 198-203.
    \259\ Clinton 8/17/98 GJ at 107.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    However, in its fervor to construct an impeachable offense, 
the Majority omits important details. First, what the President 
was denying to his aides was the fact of his private, sexual 
relationship. This was not comparable to enlisting aides in 
misrepresenting the progress and success of our troops during 
the Vietnam War, or misrepresenting the United States' efforts 
to divert financial assistance from Iran to help the Contras in 
Nicaragua, or misrepresenting involvement in the Watergate 
burglaries. This was a man denying to those with whom he worked 
that he was having an extra-marital relationship with a young 
woman. The fact that the man was President, and the co-workers 
were White House employees, should not elevate this everyday 
occurrence into a constitutional crisis.
    Second, the article does not allege, because there are no 
facts from which to do so, that the President denied that he 
had an inappropriate relationship with Ms. Lewinsky for the 
corrupt purpose of influencing their grand jury testimony. But 
the President's admission after the fact that some people he 
talked with might be called to testify in the grand jury is not 
the same as an admission that he intended those people to lie. 
Indeed, the case cited by the Independent Counsel proves that 
very point.260 Criminal convictions require that the 
actor intend that a person lie. Not one of the individuals 
identified in the Referral states that the President discussed, 
or even suggested, that they should testify in any particular 
way. The point of the President's conversation with the staff 
had nothing whatsoever to do with the grand jury. It had to do 
with denying an intimate relationship for the more obvious 
reasons that these kinds of relationships are always denied. To 
put the point most simply: does anyone really think the 
President would have admitted to this relationship even if no 
grand jury had been sitting?
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \260\ See United States v. Bordallo, 857 F.2d 519 (9th Cir. 1988).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    It is important to note that the President's statements to 
staff were all made at a time when the media began its 
firestorm coverage of the OIC's expansion of its jurisdiction. 
Having announced to the entire country that he was not having a 
relationship with Lewinsky, it is hardly remarkable that he did 
the same with his staff. The President was not singling out his 
staff--he denied the affair to everyone--so he was not 
motivated by a desire to influence their grand jury testimony. 
This denial comes nowhere close to meeting the threshold for an 
impeachable offense.

D. Article IV Alleging Abuse of Power Fails To Establish An Impeachable 
                                Offense

    On November 5, 1998, the Majority sent the President a list 
of 81 questions that it deemed relevant to its impeachment 
inquiry. The President responded to those questions on November 
27, 1998. The Majority has identified the President's responses 
to ten of those questions 261 as being ``perjurious, 
false and misleading,'' and constituting grounds for 
impeachment.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \261\ The ten responses that form the basis for Article IV are 
Numbers 19, 20, 24, 26, 27, 34, 42, 43, 52, 53.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The manner in which the Majority drafted Article IV causes 
the Minority considerable concern. Originally, the Majority 
publicly released a version of the article that contained four 
clauses.262 Relying on allegations first propounded 
by the Independent Counsel, the first clause alleged that the 
President made misleading statements to the public concerning 
his relationship with Ms. Lewinsky. Clause two asserted that 
the President made false statements to aides concerning the 
relationship knowing that the aides would repeat the statements 
during appearances before the grand jury. Clause three 
contended that the President improperly asserted executive 
privilege to obstruct the OIC's investigation of him, while 
clause four relied on the President's allegedly perjurious 
responses to the 81 questions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \262\ Indicative of the highly partisan nature of the process is 
the fact that the Majority released its proposed articles of 
impeachment to the public even as Counsel to the President, Charles 
F.C. Ruff, was testifying before the Committee.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    During the Committee's debate on Article IV, Rep. Gekas, a 
member of the Majority, moved to amend the language of that 
provision by removing the first three clauses and making 
conforming changes to the preamble. The Gekas Amendment was 
approved by a vote of 29 ``aye,'' 5 ``no,'' and 3 ``present.'' 
The Minority was hard-pressed to understand the reasons for the 
Majority's sweeping changes to the article that it had proposed 
just days earlier, and Rep. Schumer requested that the Chairman 
explain the process by which the article was 
drafted.263 The Chairman declined to do 
so.264 In an interview with the Washington Post, 
however, Rep. Hutchinson, a member of the Majority, 
``emphasized that [the Article] had been written by staff 
attorneys and that ``[i]t had never been debated [by the 
Majority Members]. The [Majority] [M]embers never voted on 
Article IV.'' 265 Thus, the Majority offered Article 
IV even though no Member of the Majority actually voted for it.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \263\ 12/12/98 Tr. at 15.
    \264\ 12/12/98 Tr. at 15.
    \265\ Peter Baker and Juliet Eilperin, GOP Blocks Democrats' Bid to 
Debate Censure in House, Wash. Post, Dec. 13, 1998, at A1.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The allegation that the President's responses to some of 
the 81 questions constitute a ``misuse and abuse'' of his 
office is curious. In its other articles of impeachment, the 
Majority elected to charge perjury in the grand jury and 
perjury during the Jones deposition without tying those 
allegations to any supposed abuse of the Office of the 
President. Even if one were to assume, for the sake of 
argument, that the President's responses to some of the 81 
questions were false, the Minority fails to understand how 
those responses could constitute an abuse of power. The text of 
the revised article reveals a desperate, and ultimately 
unsuccessful, effort by the Majority to link the President's 
responses to an official governmental function. The article 
provides that the President's responses ``assumed to himself 
functions and judgments necessary to the exercise of the sole 
power of impeachment vested by the Constitution in the House of 
Representatives and exhibited contempt for the inquiry.''
    The Minority notes that the Majority's language in Article 
IV is not accidental. During Watergate, Article III of the 
articles of impeachment charged that President Nixon abused the 
power of his office by failing to comply with subpoenas for 
documents and things served on him by the Committee. The Nixon 
article alleged that the President's failure to respond to the 
subpoenas interposed the powers of the Presidency against 
lawful subpoenas of the House of Representatives and, as the 
Majority has alleged here, that the President ``thereby 
assuming to himself functions and judgments necessary to the 
exercise of the sole power of impeachment vested by the 
Constitution in the House of Representatives.'' 266 
Thus, the present-day Majority has attempted to conjure the 
ghost of Watergate by couching what are, at best, additional 
allegations of perjury in terms that are reminiscent of the 
true abuses of power that occurred during Watergate.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \266\ Report of the Committee on the Judiciary, Impeachment of 
Richard M. Nixon, President of the United States, House Rep. No. 93-
1305, 92nd Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1974).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The Minority also takes strong exception to the Majority's 
efforts to set a ``perjury trap'' for the President. ``A 
perjury trap is created when the government calls a witness . . 
. [to testify] for the primary purpose of obtaining testimony 
from him in order to prosecute him later for perjury.'' 
267 Here, the responses on which the Majority relies 
to support Article IV all involve subjects on which the 
President testified either in his Jones deposition, or the 
grand jury, or both.268 Over and over since his 
testimony on those occasions, the President has acknowledged 
that he misled the country, largely to spare himself and his 
family the embarrassment of revealing his relationship with Ms. 
Lewinsky.269 When the Majority propounded its 81 
questions to the President, it knew that he would not change 
his testimony simply to satisfy its demands. In essence, then, 
the Majority has manufactured a count of impeachment against 
the President simply by requiring him to respond, in writing, 
to its demands for additional information.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \267\ United States v. Chen, 933 F.2d 793, 796 (9th Cir. 1991).
    \268\ Response No. 19 (cover stories); 20 (knowledge of subpoena 
served on Ms. Lewinsky); 24, 26, 27, 42, 43 (gifts exchanged with Ms. 
Lewinsky); 34 (Ms. Lewinsky's affidavit) and 52, 53 (statements to Ms. 
Currie).
    \269\ See, e.g., 8/17/98 Tr. of Address to the Nation at 1.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The President's responses to the 81 questions make clear 
that the Majority has not identified any new conduct of the 
President that warrants impeachment. Every one of the ten 
responses on which the Majority relies either quotes directly 
from, or cites to, earlier testimony that the President gave on 
the referenced subjects. Presumably, the Majority believes that 
it would be free to manufacture additional articles of 
impeachment simply by asking the President over and over again 
about topics on which he is certain not to change his answers, 
and then accusing the President of lying each time it did not 
like his responses. In contrast to Watergate, where the 
Committee premised its abuse of power allegations on President 
Nixon's affirmative refusal to comply with Committee subpoenas, 
the Majority here has simply bootstrapped what it believes to 
be earlier instances of presidential perjury into a new abuse 
of power article. The Minority completely rejects the 
Majority's transparent effort to draw a parallel to the events 
of 1974.

  IV. The Credibility of the Impeachment Inquiry Has Been Compromised

    Aside from the substantive problems we have with both the 
lax standard of impeachment that has been applied by the 
Majority, and the many errors in the culpability of conduct 
identified, by the OIC, we are also concerned about the process 
which has brought the House to this point. Our concerns derive 
from both perceived unfairness and bias in the OIC 
investigation as well as the Committee's inquiry.

                      A. Bias in OIC Investigation

    The OIC's conduct has raised a great many doubts regarding 
the fairness of an investigation which has brought this body to 
the brink of an impeachment vote. Collectively, these actions 
raise the question whether the OIC was motivated by an effort 
to conduct an impartial investigation or by prosecutorial zeal 
to damage a President. Our concerns arise from a number of 
reasons.
    First, many of our problems arise from the Independent 
Counsel law, and its interaction with impeachment proceedings 
in particular. The law gives little guidance or specification 
regarding the manner in which impeachment referrals are to 
occur. As already noted, in this case, the OIC chose to ignore 
the Watergate precedent of special prosecutor Jaworski who saw 
fit to provide only unedited grand jury transcripts to the 
Committee. Instead, Mr. Starr developed his own impeachment 
standards, and then went out of his way to argue the case for 
impeachment to the Congress. It was just such authority that 
allowed the Referral to be characterized as a ``referral with 
an attitude.'' 270 Similarly, it was Mr. Starr's 
unbending advocacy which caused his ethics adviser Samuel Dash 
to resign the day after his congressional 
testimony.271
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \270\ Linda Greenhouse, Testing of a President, N.Y. Times, Sept. 
12, 1998, at A1.
    \271\ In his resignation letter, Professor Dash wrote:

      I resign for a fundamental reason. Against my strong 
      advice, you decided to depart from your usual professional 
      decision-making by accepting the invitation of the House 
      Judiciary Committee to appear before the committee and 
      serve as an aggressive advocate for the proposition that 
      the evidence in your referral demonstrates that the 
      President committed impeachable offenses. In doing this you 
      have violated your obligations under the Independent 
      Counsel statute and have unlawfully intruded on the power 
      of impeachment which the Constitution gives solely to the 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
      House.

    Letter from Samuel Dash, Professor, Georgetown University Law 
Center, to Kenneth W. Starr, Independent Counsel (Nov. 20, 1998).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Second, doubts have been raised regarding the 
appropriateness of the initial selection of Mr. Starr by the 
three-judge panel. Questions have been raised regarding the 
propriety of a luncheon meeting between Judge Sentelle, a 
member of the three-judge panel, and Senator Faircloth, one of 
President Clinton's severest political critics, shortly before 
Mr. Starr's appointment as Independent Counsel. Issues have 
also arisen regarding the appropriateness of Mr. Starr's 
continued representation of business interests, such as the 
tobacco industry, who were involved in litigation directly 
adverse to positions taken by the President. These concerns 
were compounded when Mr. Starr tentatively accepted a lucrative 
academic position at Pepperdine University which was largely 
funded by Richard Mellon Scaife, another harsh critic of the 
President.
    Third, questions have been raised regarding the 
appropriateness of Mr. Starr's advocacy in support of Paula 
Jones with respect to constitutional issues arising in her 
civil lawsuit against President Clinton. Prior to being named 
Independent Counsel, a lawyer for Paula Jones approached Mr. 
Starr about drafting an amicus brief arguing against the 
President's claim of immunity in the Jones case,272 
and Mr. Starr ultimately agreed to represent pro bono a 
conservative women's group, the Independent Women's Forum, in 
their filing of a legal brief opposing the President on this 
matter.273 The representation of the Independent 
Women's Forum did not end until August 8, 1994, four days after 
Mr. Starr became Independent Counsel.274 Mr. Starr 
also appeared on the MacNeil/Lehrer Newshour to argue against 
the President's immunity claim.275
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \272\ Impeachment Hearing on Inquiry Pursuant to H. Res. 581, 105th 
Cong., 2d Sess. 119 (1998).
    \273\ Id. at 123; Declaration of Daniel F. Attridge para. 13, Jones 
v. Clinton (D.D.C.) (No. 98-042).
    \274\ Decl. of Daniel F. Attridge para. 13, Jones v. Clinton 
(D.D.C.) (No. 98-042).
    \275\ MacNeil/Lehrer NewsHour: Presidential Immunity (PBS 
television broadcast, May 24, 1994) (transcript available on Lexis). 
Also raising concern is the fact that Mr. Starr, as a partner at 
Kirkland & Ellis, was consulted by, and gave legal advice to, lawyers 
for Paula Jones on approximately half-a-dozen occasions. Morning 
Edition: Questions on Starr-Jones Connection (NPR radio broadcast, Oct. 
15, 1998) (transcript available on Lexis). Richard Porter, another 
Kirkland & Ellis lawyer and former aide to Vice President Dan Quayle, 
was asked in May 1994, while the Independent Counsel was a partner 
there, to serve as counsel to Ms. Jones; Mr. Porter declined the 
representation but faxed the declaration of a Jones witness to the 
Chicago Tribune. Second Decl. of Daniel F. Attridge para. 2, Jones v. 
Clinton (D.D.C.) (No. 98-042). In addition, Mr. Porter suggested that 
Nelson Lund, formerly a counsel to President Bush, represent Ms. Jones 
in her lawsuit, but Mr. Lund declined the representation and instead 
recommended Gilbert Davis and Joseph Cammarata. Robert Novak, Ex-Bush 
Aides Helped Jones Find Lawyers, Chicago Sun-Times, May 15, 1994, at 
41. Ms. Jones ultimately hired both Mr. Davis and Mr. Cammarata. Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    A fourth concern arises from the fact that the OIC appears 
to have been made aware of allegations of possible wrongdoing 
at least one week before he sought to expand his investigation 
into this area. Based on newspaper accounts and Mr. Starr's own 
testimony, the following time line can be constructed.
          --In mid-October of 1997, around the time when Linda 
        Tripp began illegally taping her telephone 
        conversations with Monica Lewinsky, someone placed an 
        anonymous phone call to the Rutherford Institute, the 
        conservative organization funding Ms. Jones's lawsuit, 
        saying that the President was having an 
        affair.276
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \276\ Rene Sanchez & David Segal, Mysterious Efforts Permeate 
Lewinsky, Jones Allegations, Wash. Post, Jan. 31, 1998, at A13.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
          --On November 21, 1997, David Pyke, one of Ms. 
        Jones's lawyers, called Ms. Tripp to say that Lucianne 
        Goldberg had contacted him about a woman having an 
        affair with the President.277 Ms. Tripp 
        confirmed for Mr. Pyke that she knew a woman who was 
        having a two-year affair with the President that 
        started when she was a White House 
        intern.278 When discussing her becoming 
        involved with the Jones lawsuit, Ms. Tripp told Mr. 
        Pyke that she should appear to be a hostile 
        witness.279
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \277\ Supplemental Materials to the Referral to the U.S. House of 
Representatives Pursuant to Title 28, U.S. Code, Section 595(c) 
Submitted by the Office of Indep. Counsel, Sept. 9, 1998, H.R. Doc. No. 
316, 105th Cong., 2d Sess. 2531-32 (reprinting Lewinsky/Tripp Phone Tr. 
005 at 91-102).
    \278\ Id.
    \279\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
          --On November 24, 1997, the Jones lawyers subpoenaed 
        Ms. Tripp.280 Ms. Goldberg, in January of 
        1998, began to explore how Ms. Tripp could contact the 
        OIC about the Lewinsky affair.281 Ms. 
        Goldberg contacted Mr. Porter, the Kirkland & Ellis 
        lawyer who had the opportunity to represent Paula 
        Jones, who, in turn, contacted Jerome Marcus, a 
        Philadelphia attorney.282
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \280\ Alan C. Miller & Judy Pasternak, Starr's Office Let Tripp 
Give Details to Jones' Lawyers, L.A. Times, Oct. 11, 1998.
    \281\ Id.
    \282\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
          --On January 8, 1998, Mr. Marcus called Paul 
        Rosenzweig, one of the OIC attorneys to convey Ms. 
        Tripp's information.283
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \283\ Id.; The Independent Counsel testified before the Judiciary 
Committee that ``[o]n January 8, an attorney in our office was informed 
that a witness, who was Linda Tripp, who had been a witness in prior 
investigations in our office, had information that she wanted to 
provide. A message was conveyed back that she should provide her 
information directly.'' Impeachment Hearing on Inquiry Pursuant to H. 
Res. 581, 105th Cong., 2d Sess. 66 (1998).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
          --On January 9, 1998, Mr. Rosenzweig informed Deputy 
        Independent Counsel Jackie M. Bennett, Jr., what he had 
        heard about a White House intern and the 
        President.284 Also on that day, Ms. Goldberg 
        spoke to Mr. Conway to get Ms. Tripp a new, more 
        conservative lawyer; Ms. Tripp hired Mr. Conway's 
        recommendation, James Moody.285
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \284\ Miller & Pasternak, supra.
    \285\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
          --On January 12, Ms. Tripp finally called the OIC, 
        herself, and spoke to Mr. Bennett.286 That 
        night, the OIC promised to seek immunity for Ms. Tripp 
        from federal prosecution for the illegal taping; the 
        OIC also promised to help Ms. Tripp if state 
        authorities began to investigate the 
        taping.287
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \286\ Id.
    \287\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
          --On January 16, the Special Division gave permission 
        for the OIC to expand its jurisdiction into the 
        Lewinsky allegations.288 That day, the OIC 
        gave Ms. Tripp an immunity agreement to protect her 
        from federal prosecution for the taping.289 
        Knowing that Ms. Tripp had connections to the Jones 
        case, the OIC failed to include in her agreement a 
        clause that prevented Ms. Tripp from speaking to anyone 
        about the OIC's investigation.290 Ms. Tripp 
        spoke to the Jones's lawyers that night, after speaking 
        to the OIC and after leading the OIC to Ms. Lewinsky at 
        the Ritz-Carlton Hotel, thereby setting up the 
        President for his deposition in the Jones 
        case.291
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \288\ Appendices to the Referral to the U.S. House of 
Representatives Pursuant to Title 28, U.S. Code, Section 595(c) 
Submitted by the Office of the Indep. Counsel, Sept. 9, 1998, H.R. Doc. 
No. 311, 105th Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1998) (reprinting January 16, 1998 
Order of the Special Division).
    \289\ Miller & Pasternak, supra.
    \290\ Impeachment Hearing on Inquiry Pursuant to H. Res. 581, 105th 
Cong., 2d Sess. 126 (1998).
    \291\ Miller & Pasternak, supra.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In particular, we are concerned that rather than 
immediately reporting any of these facts to the Department of 
Justice, Mr. Starr's office sought to create their own exigency 
which left the Attorney General with little choice but to 
approve his requested extension in jurisdiction. These concerns 
are exacerbated by the fact that Mr. Starr failed to disclose 
any previous contacts between himself and his firm and the 
Jones legal team to the Department of Justice.292
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \292\ When members of the OIC went to meet with the Deputy Attorney 
General to seek permission to expand their jurisdiction to investigate 
these issues notes were taken by participants at the meeting that were 
released for the first time by the Committee on December 10, 1998. 
Reference to those notes indicate that at no time did anyone from the 
OIC even mention to the Justice Department that Mr. Starr or his firm 
(1) had been contacted to be Ms. Jones's attorney, (2) had given legal 
advice to Ms. Jones's attorneys, (3) had considered filing a brief on 
Ms. Jones's behalf, or (4) had helped Ms. Tripp contact the OIC with 
her illegally obtained tapes.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Fifth, an ongoing investigation into illegal grand jury 
leaks by the OIC does not give us much further comfort. On June 
19, Chief U.S. District Judge Norma Holloway Johnson issued an 
order holding that ``serious and repetitive'' leaks to the news 
media about the OIC's investigation of the Lewinsky allegations 
justified an inquiry into whether the OIC broke the rule 
barring dissemination of grand jury material.293 
Subsequently, in a September 25, 1998 ruling, Judge Johnson 
appointed a special master to conduct an independent 
investigation of the alleged OIC leaks of grand jury material, 
``[d]ue to serious and repetitive prima facie violations of 
Rule 6(e).294 To date the court has identified 24 
separate instances of possibly illegal grand jury leaks. 
Whether or not one agrees with the OIC view that it is not 
illegal to leak information which is merely likely to be 
submitted to the grand jury, or the D.C. Circuit view that such 
leaks are illegal,295 it is not difficult to see 
that the better course of discretion in a politically charged 
investigation such as this would have been to avoid leaking any 
information.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \293\ Order to Show Cause, Misc. No. 98-55, slip. op. at 4 (D.D.C. 
June 19, 1998).
    \294\ In re Grand Jury Proceedings, Misc. No. 98-228, 1998 U.S. 
Dist LEXIS 17290, at *32-*38.
    \295\ It has long been the rule in the D.C. Circuit that the law 
against disclosing ``matters occurring before the grand jury'' 
prohibits disclosing ``not only what has occurred and what is 
occurring, but also what is likely to occur.'' In re Motions of Dow 
Jones & Company, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 8676 (D.C. Cir. May 5, 1998) 
(emphasis added) (quoting, SEC v. Dresser Indus., 628 F.2d 1368, 1382 
(D.C. Cir. 1980).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Sixth, we are concerned that the OIC may have violated 
Department of Justice guidelines in gathering its evidence. The 
Department of Justice rules provide that an attorney for the 
government should not communicate with a targeted person who 
government knows is represented by an attorney.296 
At the time the Independent Counsel confronted Ms. Lewinsky at 
the Ritz Carlton, she plainly was a target of the newly-
expanded investigation. Yet at that initial confrontation with 
Ms. Lewinsky, the Independent Counsel tried to negotiate an 
immunity deal with her without her lawyer, Frank Carter, being 
present.297
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \296\ DOJ Manual Sec. 9-13.240 (``an attorney for the government 
should not overtly communicate, or cause another to communicate 
overtly, with a represented person who the attorney for the government 
knows is a target of a federal criminal or civil enforcement 
investigation and who the attorney for the government knows is 
represented by an attorney concerning the subject matter of the 
representation without the consent of the lawyer representing such a 
person.'').
    \297\ These tactics also may violate Department of Justice policy 
which prohibits federal prosecutors from contacting a represented 
person to discuss an immunity deal without the consent of the attorney 
representing that person. 28 CFR 77.8. This regulation is intended to 
ensure that a person's right to counsel is respected. Under this 
policy, the Independent Counsel never should have contacted Ms. 
Lewinsky on January 16th and attempted to negotiate an immunity deal 
with her, without the prior consent of her attorney Frank Carter. In 
addition, the Independent Counsel may have violated Department of 
Justice policy by forcing Ms. Lewinsky's mother, Marcia Lewis, to 
appear twice before the grand jury. It is against Department of Justice 
policy to subpoena close family member of targets before the grand 
jury. U.S. Attorney's Manual Sec. 9-23.211.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Finally, and perhaps most seriously, we are deeply 
concerned that the OIC intentionally omitted or downplayed 
exculpatory evidence concerning President Clinton in its 
referral. For example, even though Ms. Lewinsky appeared twice 
before the grand jury, for a total of nine hours (plus a two 
hour deposition after the President's grand jury testimony and 
several more hours of OIC interviews), OIC prosecutors never 
asked her to state for the record whether she was encouraged to 
lie when she submitted her affidavit in the Jones case. It was 
only when a grand juror happened to ask Ms. Lewinsky if she 
would like to add anything to her testimony, that she stated, 
``I would just like to say that no one ever asked me to lie and 
I was never promised a job for my silence.'' 298
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \298\ H.R. Doc. No. 311 at 1161 (reprinting Lewinsky 8/20/98 GJ at 
105) (emphasis added).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Similarly, the Referral charges the President with 
intentionally lying about having sexual relations with Ms. 
Lewinsky. Yet, OIC prosecutors did not see fit to include in 
the Referral the statement by Ms. Lewinsky that she does not 
believe that she had sexual relations with the 
President.299 In addition, the Referral charges the 
President with asking Vernon Jordan to secure a job for Ms. 
Lewinsky in order to keep her from revealing their relationship 
when she testified in the Jones case. The Referral neglects to 
mention Ms. Lewinsky's statement to the OIC's investigators 
that ``LINDA TRIPP suggested to LEWINSKY that the President 
should be asked to ask VERNON JORDAN for assistance.'' 
300 The Referral also fails to mention that Ms. 
Lewinsky testified that Ms. Tripp told her, ``Monica, promise 
me you won't sign the affidavit until you get a job. . . . Tell 
Vernon you won't sign the affidavit until you get the job. . . 
.'' 301 These same types of concerns animate the 
problems we have with the OIC's failure to provide prompt 
notice to the public of its determination to exonerate 
President Clinton with regard to the Whitewater, Travel Office, 
and White House file investigations. It became clear at our 
hearings that the OIC had made this determination before the 
November elections, yet failed to notify Congress or the public 
of its findings.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \299\ Supplemental Materials to the Referral to the U.S. House of 
Representatives Pursuant to Title 28, U.S. Code, Section 595(c) 
Submitted by the Office of Indep. Counsel, Sept. 9, 1998, H.R. Doc. No. 
316, 105th Cong., 2d Sess. 2664 (reprinting Lewinsky/Tripp Phone Tr. 
0018 at 49).
    \300\ H.R. Doc. No. 311, supra, at 1393 (reprinting Lewinsky 7/27/
98 OIC 302 at 5).
    \301\ Id. at 902 (reprinting Lewinsky 8/6/98 GJ, at 182).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

                B. Unfairness in Committee Investigation

1. Unfairness in Conducting Committee Inquiry

    From the outset, Democrats have insisted that the process 
for conducting the impeachment inquiry be fair and balanced. We 
would be remiss if we did not acknowledge that in a few 
respects we have been able to reach bipartisan accord on 
procedural matters. For example, when the Majority chose to 
announce oversight hearings on the History and Background of 
Impeachment,302 and the Consequences of Perjury and 
Related Crimes, we were granted a reasonable opportunity to 
call our own witnesses. Also, we were able to reach accord 
concerning permitting Committee staff to review certain 
materials not initially provided to the Committee from the OIC, 
and requiring the OIC to respond to additional questions posed 
by the Members in writing. Chairman Hyde also granted Mr. 
Conyers' request that the Committee consider a censure 
alternative to impeachment.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \302\ Although this hearing should have been called far earlier in 
the process.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Regrettably, these occasional displays of bipartisanship 
were overshadowed by numerous other actions undertaken by the 
Committee which were unfair to the Minority members of the 
Committee, to the President, and, most importantly, to the 
American people. All too frequently, partisanship, unilateral 
decision-making, and fishing expeditions were the hallmarks of 
this inquiry and damaged its credibility even before it 
started.
    As a threshold matter, we were unable to achieve bipartisan 
consensus for the manner in which the inquiry was to be 
conducted. When H. Res. 581, authorizing the Committee inquiry 
was debated on the floor and at the Committee, Democrats 
offered an alternative resolution which would have allowed for 
an impeachment inquiry limited to the matters set forth in the 
OIC Referral, provided for a full debate on the standards of 
impeachment and a debate on whether the facts alleged rose to 
that standard, and provided for an orderly process to hear 
factual deadlines along with a tentative year-end deadline. 
Unfortunately, the Minority proposal was spurned on each 
occasion, the Majority sought no compromise, and the resulting 
inquiry was unfocused and standardless.
    We were also distressed by the Committee's complete failure 
to consider the direct testimony of any factual witness. The 
Committee gathered none of its own evidence and took testimony 
from none of its own witnesses. This was compounded by the oft-
repeated statement that it is up to the Minority and the 
President to call witnesses to establish his own innocence. As 
a factual matter, this is incorrect--in contravention of the 
Watergate precedent laid down by Chairman Rodino, the Majority 
repeatedly rebuffed our efforts to obtain additional 
evidentiary information.303 In any event, the 
Majority position represents a breathtaking denial of the 
President's right to the presumption of innocence and his right 
to confront any witnesses making accusations against him. 
Although the Committee is not bound as a matter of House Rules 
to provide these protections, we believe it is incumbent upon 
the Committee to provide these basic protections. As Rep. 
Barbara Jordan (D-TX) observed during the Watergate inquiry, 
impeachment not only mandates due process, but of ``due process 
quadrupled.'' 304
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \303\ For example, on November 9, Chairman Hyde rejected Mr. 
Conyers request to issue subpoenas to obtain a variety of evidentiary 
and witness material. On December 11, the Majority rejected Mr. Scott's 
motion that the Committee establish a scope of inquiry and hear from 
witnesses with direct knowledge of the allegations before considering 
articles of impeachment.
    \304\ Watergate Impeachment Inquiry, Book I, 349 (April 25, 1974), 
cited in John R. Labovitz, Presidential Impeachment (1978) at 189.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Instead of calling witnesses in order to independently 
assess their credibility, the Committee chose to rely in total 
on the OIC Referral and accompanying grand jury transcripts 
involving testimony solicited by the OIC attorneys. As we 
describe in more detail above, a principal problem in relying 
on the OIC Referral is that the case it makes out is largely 
circumstantial, with many of the critical alleged criminal 
elements provided by inference and surmise, rather than fact. 
In addition, numerous aspects of the witness testimony are not 
only confusing, but contradictory.
    Conducting a presidential impeachment inquiry in the 
absence of factual witnesses totally contravenes the 
Committee's Watergate precedent. During the Watergate inquiry, 
the Committee heard direct testimony from nine factual 
witnesses. The Members were also confronted with massive 
factual detail compiled by the staff, in the form of 650 
``statements of information'' and more than 7,200 pages of 
supporting evidentiary material, furnished to each Member of 
the Committee in 36 notebooks. Committee Members heard 
recordings from nineteen presidential conversations and 
dictabelt recollections. Eventually, the Committee became privy 
to a tape recording of President Nixon ordering the cover-up 
the Watergate break in shortly after it occurred.305 
None of these independent factual determinations have been 
conducted in the present inquiry.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \305\ Impeachment of Richard M. Nixon, President of the United 
States, H.R. Rep. No. 93-1305, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess., at 9, 166.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The fact that the Committee has received voluminous 
materials from the OIC does not relieve us of our obligation to 
conduct our own independent review of the facts. The 
Constitution is clear in specifying that the ``House of 
Representatives . . . shall have the sole Power of 
Impeachment.'' 306 The Framers crafted this 
requirement with good reason--impeachment as a political 
process is intended to be subject to political accountability. 
By contrast, the OIC is subject to no such constraints and no 
such accountability.307
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \306\ U.S. Const. Art. II, Sec. 2 (emphasis supplied).
    \307\ See e.g., Julie R. O'Sullivan, The Interaction between 
Impeachment and the Independent Counsel Statute, 86 Geo. L. J. 2193 
(1998); Ken Gormley, Impeachment and the Independent Counsel: A 
Dysfunctional Union, __ Stan. L. Rev. __ (1998).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Although the impeachment of a federal judge does not 
provide the same weighty considerations as the impeachment of a 
president, it is instructive to note that in such contexts the 
Committee has chosen to call its own witnesses in order to 
develop an independent case against the judge charged with 
misconduct. For example, when Judge Nixon was impeached in 
1989, even though he had already been convicted in a jury trial 
with the full panoply of due process rights, the Committee 
conducted seven full days of hearings during which nine 
witnesses testified. An even more telling precedent concerns 
the 1988 impeachment of Judge Hastings. His impeachment was 
considered pursuant to a referral by the Judicial Conference 
under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 372(c)(7)(B). Very much like the OIC 
Referral, the Judicial Conference included a comprehensive 
report of 841 pages, detailing a variety of potentially 
impeachable conduct, and including a review of numerous 
district court records, FBI files, Justice Department 
investigatory files, grand jury materials, bank, financial and 
other records, and the locating and interviewing of numerous 
witnesses. Notwithstanding the magnitude and comprehensiveness 
of the Judicial Conference Referral, during Judge Hastings' 
impeachment the Committee opted to hold seven days of hearings 
during which 12 witnesses testified. An additional 60 witnesses 
were separately interviewed or deposed.
    In failing to call any witnesses who could make out a case 
against President Clinton and subjecting such witnesses to 
cross examination, the Majority did not merely deny the 
President of some trivial rules of procedure. Rather, the 
Committee has undercut the very cornerstone of our nation's 
sense of fairness and due process. Summarizing this long and 
distinguished heritage, the Supreme Court wrote in 1895 that 
the presumption of innocence ``is to be found in every code of 
law which has reason, and religion, and humanity, for a 
foundation. It is a maxim which ought to be inscribed in the 
heart of every judge and juryman.'' 308 The 
presumption of innocence has been traced to Deuteronomy, and 
was embodied in the laws of ancient Rome, Sparta and 
Athens.309
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \308\ Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432, 456 (1895).
    \309\ Id. at 454.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The right to confront and cross-examine one's accusers is 
specifically referenced in the Sixth Amendment to the Bill of 
Rights.310 Justice Frankfurter has eloquently 
written that ``[n]o better instrument has been devised for 
arriving at truth than to give a person in jeopardy of serious 
loss notice of the case against him and opportunity to meet 
it.'' 311 The leading treatise on evidence, written 
by Professor Wigmore, declares that ``[t]he belief that no 
safeguard for testing the value of human statements is 
comparable to that furnished by cross-examination, and the 
conviction that no statement . . . should be used as testimony 
until it has been probed and sublimated by that test, has found 
increasing strength in lengthening experience.312 
Significantly, these critical protections are not limited to 
criminal trials, they have been afforded to parties in numerous 
other legal contexts.313
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \310\ In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the 
right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him.'' U.S. 
Const. Amend. VI.
    \311\ Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 
123, 170 (1951).
    \312\ 5 Wigmore on Evidence (3d ed. 1940) Sec. 1367.
    \313\ See e.g., In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967) (due process 
protections held to apply in non-criminal juvenile proceedings); 
Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262-63 (1970) (due process 
requirements applicable in context of termination of welfare benefits).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    When the allegations that the President undertook efforts 
to obstruct Kathleen Willey's testimony led nowhere, the 
Majority expanded the impeachment inquiry to include 
allegations that the President violated federal campaign 
finance laws.314 The Majority took this course 
despite the fact that both the Senate Governmental Affairs 
Committee and the House Government Reform and Oversight 
Committee had investigated the same allegations to no avail. 
The Republicans on the Judiciary Committee succeeded in their 
motion to subpoena and depose FBI Director Louis Freeh and 
Justice Department Campaign Finance Task Force Chief Charles 
LaBella.315 The Republicans ultimately canceled all 
campaign finance-related fishing expeditions.316
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \314\ Juliet Eilperin & Ruth Marcus, Both Sides Harden Impeachment 
Views: Widening of Probe Irks Democrats, Washington. Post, Dec. 2, 
1998, at A1; Alison Mitchell, Panel Seeks Fund-Raising Memos, Stirring 
Democrats, New York Times, Dec. 2, 1998, at A20.
    \315\ Eilperin & Marcus, supra; Mitchell, supra.
    \316\ Guy Gugliotta & Juliet Eilperin, Panel Gives Up Campaign 
Probe, Washington Post, Dec. 4, 1998, at A1; Alison Mitchell, 
Republicans Drop Bid to Investigate Clinton Campaign, New York Times, 
Dec. 4, 1998, at A1.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The rationale for canceling the depositions would be 
unclear except for the fact that, contemporaneous to scheduling 
depositions, the Majority was making efforts to view memoranda 
prepared by Director Freeh and Mr. LaBella for a Justice 
Department investigation of the alleged campaign finance 
violations. The U.S. District Court for the District of 
Columbia, which controlled access to the memoranda pursuant to 
a grand jury investigation of the alleged violations, issued a 
ruling that allowed one staff member from the Majority side of 
the Committee and one staff member from the Minority side of 
the Committee to review the memoranda.317 It was 
after the Majority reviewed the memoranda that the depositions 
of Director Freeh and Mr. LaBella were canceled finally. The 
decision to cancel the depositions in light of whatever 
information was gleaned from the memoranda reveals that the 
claims about campaign finance violations had no foundation--a 
conclusion already reached by Attorney General Janet Reno in 
her decision not to appoint independent counsels to investigate 
either the President or Vice President Al Gore.318
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \317\ Peter Baker & Juliet Eilperin, ``Vigorous Defense'' of 
Clinton is Pledged, Washington Post, Dec. 3, 1998, at A1.
    \318\ In addition, the following instances of procedural unfairness 
occurred in connection with our inquiry:
    (1) On September 11, 1998, the resolution relating to the release 
of the OIC materials, H. Res. 525, was introduced in the absence of 
bipartisan agreement. In particular, the Majority failed to offer the 
President an opportunity to review and respond to the Referral before 
it was released, and reneged on their promise that the initial review 
of the materials would be limited to the Chairman and Ranking Member in 
order to minimize the risk of damaging leaks.
    (2) On September 15, 1998, the Majority unilaterally sought to 
obtain access to a videotaped copy of the President's January 17 
deposition in the Paula Jones case.
    (3) On November 5, 1998, Chairman Hyde unilaterally issued a set of 
81 questions to President Clinton for his response. The questions were 
not approved by any other Member of the Committee, and no advance copy 
was provided to the Minority.
    (4) On November 17, 1998, the Majority rejected a request to grant 
the President's lawyers two hours to question OIC Starr during his 
testimony. No time limitation on questioning by President Nixon's 
lawyers was over imposed during the Watergate Inquiry.
    (5) On November 24, 1998, Chairman Hyde unilaterally sought to 
requested that the Secret Service provide information regarding 
discussions between President Clinton and his High School classmate 
Dolly Kyle Browing at their 1994 high school reunion. Again, this 
request was not approved by any other member of the Committee, and no 
advance copy was provided to the Minority. Ultimately, out of 53 
procedural and executive session votes taken by the committee 31 were 
on straight or near party line votes.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

2. Unfairness in the Drafting of the Articles of Impeachment

    The Majority also failed to inform the Minority, the 
President, or the public in any timely manner what the charges 
against the President would be. The Referral, itself, listed 
eleven acts that could constitute grounds for impeachment of 
the President.319 At his presentation before the 
Committee on October 5, 1998, Majority counsel, David 
Schippers, listed fifteen acts that could constitute grounds 
for impeachment.320 First, we heard there were 
eleven charges, then fifteen, then eleven again, and then 
three.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \319\ Referral from Independent Counsel Kenneth W. Starr, H.R. Doc. 
310, 105th Cong., 2d Sess. 129-210 (1998).
    \320\ Investigatory Powers of the Committee on the Judiciary with 
Respect to its Impeachment Inquiry, H.R. Rep. No. 795, 105th Cong., 2d 
Sess. 11-24 (1998).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    This is in stark contrast with the Watergate inquiry, which 
not only achieved significant bipartisan agreement on the final 
articles of impeachment, but achieved even broader consensus on 
the procedural fairness afforded President Nixon. This was 
illustrated by the fact that immediately before the Committee 
voted out impeachment articles, a bipartisan group of Members 
appeared together on television and stated that the inquiry had 
been conducted fairly and was nonpartisan.321 During 
the Watergate inquiry, the chief Majority and Minority Counsels 
(John Doar and Albert Jenner, Jr.) coordinated all 
investigative work on a bipartisan basis, and both ultimately 
recommended the course of impeachment to the Committee.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \321\ On July 21, 1998 Rep. Charles Wiggins (R-CA), Don Edwards (D-
CA), Walter Flowers (D-CA), and Robert McClory (R-IL) appeared on the 
ABC television program ``Issues and Answers'' and stated that the 
impeachment inquiry had been conducted fairly. For example, Rep. 
Wiggins stated ``by and large it has been fair . . . I have no great 
quarrel [with the investigation].'' 3 Facts on File Watergate and the 
White House 210 (1974).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    On December 9, 1998, the Majority introduced a tentative 
draft of four articles of impeachment without having had one, 
single day of hearings on the evidence. The Minority members 
received this draft only one day before members were to comment 
on them in open session and near the end of the day that 
counsel to the President, Charles F.C. Ruff, made his 
presentation to the Committee. The Majority often complained 
that the President was ignoring official, Committee procedures 
and attempting to delay the proceedings, 322 but the 
Majority itself, failed to identify the charges until the last 
minute.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \322\ Letter from Thomas E. Mooney, Sr., Chief of Staff, House 
Comm. on the Judiciary, to Charles F.C. Ruff, Counsel to the President 
(Dec. 6, 1998); Letter from Thomas E. Mooney, Sr., Chief of Staff, 
House Comm. on the Judiciary, to Charles F.C. Ruff, Counsel to the 
President (Dec. 3, 1998).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Throughout the impeachment process, the Majority has 
resisted requests to narrow, define or state with precision the 
allegations of misconduct leveled at the President. While the 
Independent Counsel's Referral specified eleven possible 
grounds for impeachment, the Majority Counsel, in his initial 
presentation to the Committee, declined without explanation to 
even present some of these grounds to the Committee (e.g., 
Independent Counsel's Grounds 10 and 11 alleging Abuse of 
Power) . Instead, they rewrote, redefined, or restated the 
eleven grounds described by the OIC into fifteen somewhat 
similar, somewhat different allegations of criminal wrongdoing. 
As an example, the Independent Counsel alleged that the 
President obstructed justice by encouraging Lewinsky to file a 
false affidavit in the Jones case.323 In his 
presentation to the Committee on October 5, however, the 
Majority Counsel transformed this straightforward allegation 
into the central underlying factual element of no fewer than 
five charges of criminal wrongdoing.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \323\ Referral at 173-80 (Ground VI).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    This tactic, along with the Majority's subsequent abortive 
forays into allegations relating to Kathleen Willey, Webster 
Hubbell and campaign finance, engendered considerable confusion 
about whether the grounds outlined in the Referral would, in 
fact, continue to be the basis of any proposed articles of 
impeachment. The articles of impeachment, when finally drafted, 
returned to the original allegations and appear to confine 
themselves to the charges relating to the President's 
relationship with Ms. Lewinsky. Yet, although the OIC's 
Referral listed specific allegations, even including the actual 
statements the prosecutors alleged to be false when they were 
making false statement charged, and although the Majority 
Staff's original presentation also included specific charges, 
the actual Articles of Impeachment abandoned such specificity. 
Rather the Articles make vague charges, such as accusing the 
President of making false statement about the ``nature and 
details'' of his relationship with Ms. Lewinsky.
    This lack of specificity reflects poorly on the 
impartiality of the process and is totally inconsistent with 
historical precedent. In the last presidential impeachment 
proceeding, as pointed out by Rep. Alcee Hastings in his 
December 9, 1998 letter to Chairman Hyde and Ranking Minority 
Member Conyers, the Judiciary Committee took pains to ensure 
that each article of impeachment was accompanied by detailed 
statements of fact:

          Both of you will recall that the Chair and the 
        Ranking Minority member (with the concurrence of the 
        Committee) directed John Doar, Special Counsel for the 
        Majority, and Albert Jenner, Special Counsel for the 
        Minority, to produce a comprehensive Statement of 
        Information in the inquiry into the conduct of 
        President Nixon. The Statement of Information that the 
        staff produced for that inquiry consisted of numbered 
        paragraphs, each of which was followed by photocopies 
        of the particular portions of the evidence that the 
        staff concluded supported the assertions made in that 
        paragraph. President Nixon was invited to and did 
        submit a further Statement of Information in the same 
        format. As a result, an organized, balanced, and 
        neutral statement of the facts and presentation of the 
        supporting evidence was a part of the Committee record 
        that was available for any Member to 
        review.324

    \324\ Letter from Rep. Hastings to Hon. Henry Hyde, Chairman, 
Committee on the Judiciary, and Hon. John Conyers, Jr., Ranking 
Minority Member, Committee on the Judiciary, at 1 (Dec. 9, 1998).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
A similar format was used to support the articles of 
impeachment voted out against Judge Hastings.325 No 
such effort has been made in this case to supply a detailed 
road map of the supporting evidence for the articles of 
impeachment.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \325\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    To illustrate, in Article I, the charge is misleading 
testimony concerning ``the nature and details of his 
relationship,'' but the Article declines to identify which 
statements are at issue. This lack of specificity would be a 
grave constitutional defect in any indictment delivered by a 
grand jury against any criminal defendant. This basic measure 
of due process, however, has been denied to the President. It 
is fair to presume that the Majority's unwillingness to 
specifically identify the charges at issue are rooted in a 
reluctance to make plain the essential triviality of the 
allegations of personal misconduct at issue and the salacious 
nature of the issues that the Senate would be condemned to 
explore at trial. To have to state that the removal of the 
President is based on his misstating when his relationship with 
Ms. Lewinsky started, or how many times he had intimate 
telephone conversations with her, or where he touched her would 
demonstrate the frivolity of these charges for something as 
grave as impeachment.
    The Articles also display another unfairness; to the extent 
that the Articles are occasionally specific, they are 
unnecessarily duplicative. For example, Majority Counsel has 
adopted the OIC's allegation that the President tried to 
influence Ms. Lewinsky to file a false affidavit and lists it 
in subparagraph 1 of Article III as an obstruction of justice; 
yet, this same event is included again, renamed as perjury in 
subparagraph 4 of Article I, as a matter about which the 
President testified falsely during his grand jury appearance.

    V. Censure is an Appropriate and Constitutional Alternative to 
                              Impeachment

    Throughout the proceedings, but especially during the 
debate on the actual Articles of Impeachment, the Majority 
attempted to blunt the impact of its decision. The Chairman 
emphasized that ``impeachment is not the same as removal.'' 
Rep. McCollum even went so far, before he corrected himself, to 
reassure the public by stating that a conviction of the 
President in the Senate would not have to lead to his removal 
from office. Both he and other Republicans called the House 
vote on impeachment ``the ultimate censure.''
    The Majority Member's statements underscore their 
discomfort with what they were doing--they too realized that 
President Clinton should not be removed from office for what, 
in effect, were his misstatements about a private, extra-
marital relationship. Yet, the Majority has put the country on 
a collision course with the constitution by insisting that 
impeachment of the President is the only means to address 
misconduct that is serious but falls below the standard for 
removal.
    There are, unfortunately, partisan reasons behind the 
Majority's insistence that the House be given an impeachment or 
nothing option. The Republican leadership understands that 
there are many Members of both parties who believe that an 
alternative to impeachment is appropriate. If such an 
alternative were presented, Republicans would have another 
means to express themselves on the issue of the President's 
conduct. This, in turn, would siphon votes away from 
impeachment--the resolution the leadership desires. Keeping its 
Members in partisan line, however, should not be the motivation 
behind a decision that prevents Members of the House to voting 
their conscience. A censure resolution would provide lawmakers 
on both sides of the aisle a constitutional and appropriate 
alternative.
    At the December 12, l998 Hearings, the Representatives 
Boucher, Delahunt, Barrett, and Jackson Lee introduced a 
resolution of censure addressing the President's conduct. 
Almost all of the Democrats on the Committee voted for the 
resolution and all expressed a desire that their House 
colleagues have the chance to vote their consciences on this 
issue. The resolution read:

          Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives 
        of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 
        That it is the sense of Congress that
          (1) on January 20, 1993, William Jefferson Clinton 
        took the oath prescribed by the Constitution of the 
        United States faithfully to execute the office of 
        President; implicit in that oath is the obligation that 
        the President set an example of high moral standards 
        and conduct himself in a manner that fosters respect 
        for the truth; and William Jefferson Clinton has 
        egregiously failed in this obligation, and through his 
        actions violated the trust of the American people, 
        lessened their esteem for the office of President, and 
        dishonored the office which they entrusted to him;
          (2)(A) William Jefferson Clinton made false 
        statements concerning his reprehensible conduct with a 
        subordinate;
          (B) William Jefferson Clinton wrongly took steps to 
        delay discovery of the truth; and
          (C) inasmuch as no person is above the law, William 
        Jefferson Clinton remains subject to criminal and civil 
        penalties; and
          (3) William Jefferson Clinton, President of the 
        United States, by his conduct has brought upon himself, 
        and fully deserves, the censure and condemnation of the 
        American people and the Congress; and by his signature 
        on this Joint Resolution, acknowledges this censure and 
        condemnation.

    Supporters of that resolution maintained that it would be 
an appropriate way of bringing closure to events that have too 
long diverted public and governmental attention from more 
pressing issues. A vote of censure would condemn actions that 
most members of Congress and the general public find 
reprehensive but not impeachable. Such a formal censure could 
then spare the country the wrenching disruption and policy 
paralysis that would accompany a full trial in the Senate.
    Opponents of censure raised both constitutional and policy 
objections. The constitutional claim was that censure was not 
mentioned in the Constitution as an alternative to impeachment. 
In point of fact, numerous actions by Congress are not 
explicitly mentioned in the Constitution and yet are 
indisputably permissible under Congress's general authority. 
Moreover, Congress expresses its sense on a wide range of 
issues and the President's conduct would be no different. 
Indeed, just this most recent Congress, the House expressed its 
disapproval of President Clinton for: purportedly using White 
House Counsel office resources for personal legal 
matters;326 certifying Mexico under the Foreign 
Assistance Act;327 and invoking certain evidentiary 
privileges.328
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \326\ H. Res. 397.
    \327\ H. Res. 58.
    \328\ H. Res. 432.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    As to the two principal policy objections that Majority 
members raised, they are inherently inconsistent. Some claimed 
that a congressional reprimand would be weak and ineffectual. 
Yet, others claimed that such an action would be capacitating 
because it would deter the President from making policy 
decisions that a congressional majority opposed. The first 
argument is that a censure without penalties would constitute a 
``toothless resolution,'' a ``copout.'' 329 The 
converse argument is that a censure creates a dangerous 
precedent that would threaten the independence of executive and 
judicial officials and upset the separation of powers. Frequent 
actions of condemnation by Congress could divert attention from 
important legislative initiatives and open the way for 
retaliation based on politically unpopular decisions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \329\ Remarks of Representative Bill McCollum, 12/12/98 Tr. at 188; 
remarks of Representative Elton Galleghy, 12/12/98 Tr. at 260.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The Minority pointed out how Republicans were arguing both 
sides of the argument for their own political purposes. In 
addition, Democratic Members noted that only one President has 
ever been officially censured. This form of condemnation 
scarcely has been the means to abuse the separation of powers. 
The unique aspects of the current impeachment inquiry also 
insure that this is not a step that Congress would take 
lightly. This is obviously not a case in which Congress simply 
disagrees with Presidential policy, as was true in some of this 
nation's earlier censure controversies. At issue here is 
misconduct that the President himself has acknowledged and that 
a wide margin of the American public and its democratic leaders 
find offensive. If it takes this type of conduct, followed by 
this degree of consensus among Congress and the public, there 
would be little to fear that this device would be abused in the 
future.
    The Majority's claim that censure would constitute a 
meaningless wrist slap is equally unpersuasive. Representative 
Barney Frank, speaking from his own painful experience, noted 
in Committee hearings:

          I am struck by those who have argued that censure is 
        somehow an irrelevancy, a triviality, something of no 
        weight. History doesn't say that. There are two members 
        of this House right now who continue to play a role who 
        were reprimanded for lying, myself and outgoing Speaker 
        Gingrich. We both were found to have lied, not under 
        oath, but in official proceedings and were reprimanded. 
        I will tell you that having been reprimanded by this 
        House of Representatives, where I'm so proud to serve, 
        was no triviality, it is something that when people 
        write about me, they still write about . . . for all of 
        us who are in this business of dealing with public 
        opinion, and courting it, and trying to shape it, and 
        trying to make it into an instrument of the 
        implementation of our values, to be dismissive of the 
        fact that the United States House of Representatives or 
        Senate might vote a condemnation as if that doesn't 
        mean anything? Members know better. I cannot think of 
        another context in which members would have argued that 
        a censure, a solemn vote of condemnation, would not 
        have meant very much. Certainly former Senators Thomas 
        Dodd and Joseph McCarthy would not have believed that 
        for a minute.

    So too, as Minority members emphasized, a resolution of 
censure against the President will be ``talked about for 
generations and will live in history.'' 330
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \330\ Remarks of Representative Boucher, 12/12/98 Tr. at 308.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

               A. A Censure Resolution Is Constitutional

    The authority of Congress to pass resolutions expressing 
condemnation is well established. Article I, Section 5, (d)(2) 
of the Constitution authorizes both the House and the Senate 
the power to punish Members for disorderly behavior. Although 
the constitutional text provides no similar explicit authority 
for condemnation of behavior by other individuals, Congress has 
long assumed that it has such authority. The House and Senate 
have considered at least a dozen resolutions condemning conduct 
by executive or judicial officials.331 Some of the 
resolutions use the term ``censure,'' while others use language 
such as ``reproof'' or ``condemn.'' 332
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \331\ Richard S. Beth, Congressional Research Service, Censure of 
Executive and Judicial Branch Officials, Legislation Proceedings, 6 
(Oct. 2, 1998) (hereinafter Beth); Jack H. Maskell, Congressional 
Research Service, Censure of the President by Congress, September 29, 
1998, 2-4 (hereinafter, Maskell). It is important to note that the 
Majority repeatedly asked the Committee to turn to proceedings 
involving federal judges to find precedents for impeachment. Yet, the 
same Majority apparently now wants the Committee to ignore the fact 
that Congress has used its censure power to condemn the actions of 
these same judges when impeachment was too severe.
    \332\ Censure is commonly defined as a legislative, administration 
or other body reprimanding a person, normally one of the other members. 
(Black's Law Dictionary 224 (6th Ed. 1990)).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The power to express such disapproval is rooted in 
traditional legislative authority to register the sense of the 
House, the sense of the Senate or the sense of 
Congress.333 Congressional procedural rules have 
long authorized the use of single or concurrent resolutions to 
express legislative opinions on a wide range of 
matters.334 All the members of this Committee have 
voted for such resolutions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \333\ Beth at 6, Maskell at 2-4.
    \334\ William Holmes Brown, 134 House Practice; 4 Guide to the 
Rules, Precedents & Procedures of the House (1996).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The vast majority of scholars, including over two-thirds of 
the Majority and Minority witnesses who testified at the 
Judiciary Committee's hearings, believe that a resolution 
condemning the President, such as the one proposed during the 
proceedings, would be constitutional.335 For 
example, Harvard Law Professor Laurence Tribe has indicated, 
that a straight censure resolution would be constitutional 
``[b]ecause such resolutions entail no exercise of lawmaking 
authority over the other branches of national government, no 
exertion of legislative power over the state or local 
governments, and no assertion of lawmaking authority with 
respect to the lives, liberties, or property of individuals or 
groups, they do not bring into play any of the Constitution's 
substantive or structural limitations on the unauthorized 
assertion of power by the national legislature.'' 
336 Similarly, the witness called by the Majority 
and Minority, William and Mary Professor Michael Geahardt 
concluded that ``every conceivable source of constitutional 
authority--text, structure, and history--supports the 
legitimacy of the House's passage of a resolution expressing 
its disapproval of the President's conduct.'' 337
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \335\ Letter of William D. Delahunt to Henry Hyde, Chairman, 
Committee on the Judiciary, Dec. 4, 1998.
    \336\ Letter from Laurence H. Tribe to William D. Delahunt, Dec. 1, 
1998.
    \337\ Letter from Michael J. Gearhardt to William D. Delahunt, Dec. 
3, 1998.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Other experts in legislative affairs including the 
committee on Federal Legislation of the Association of the Bar 
of the City of New York, have similarly concluded that Congress 
has authority to express its condemnation of presidential 
conduct through means other than impeachment.338 The 
Congressional Research Service has also stated that censure 
would be constitutional: ``In the case of . . . federal 
officials [such as the president] censure would be an exercise 
of the implicit power of a deliberative body to express its 
views, just as Congress may also express judgments of other 
persons or events.'' 339
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \338\ Association of the Bar of New York, Alternatives to 
Impeachment: What Congress Can Do. Tribe Panel. See also authorities 
cited in Maskell, supra; and David E. Rovella, Hyde Delay, Wrong on 
Law, National Law Journal, October 5, 1998 at A6 (noting that surveyed 
constitutional law experts generally agreed that censure was possible).
    \339\ Beth supra. See also Maskell, supra (``It has, however, 
become accepted congressional practice to employ a simple resolution of 
one House of Congress, or a concurrent resolution by both Houses, for 
certain nonlegislative matters, such as to express the opinion or the 
sense of the Congress or of one House of Congress on a public matter, 
and a resolution of censure as a concurrent or simple resolution would 
appear to be in the nature of such a ``sense of Congress'' or sense of 
the House or Senate resolution.'')
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Another argument by some of the Majority was that a censure 
resolution constituted an impermissible ``bill of attainder.'' 
There is no foundation for such a claim in the text, history, 
and structure of the Constitution. Article I, Section 9, cl. 2 
of the United States Constitution provides that ``no Bills of 
Attainder or ex post facto law shall be passed.'' This 
provision refers to acts by the British Parliament that 
punished executive officials with death or forfeiture of 
property. The American prohibition against non-judicial 
punishment is designed to protect the life, liberty, and 
property of citizens and the independence of executive and 
judicial officials. As the Supreme Court has interpreted this 
prohibition, a bill of attainder involves punishment inflicted 
by legislative enactment against individuals or readily 
identifiable groups without judicial trial.340 
Censure resolutions passed by one House have not been viewed as 
bills of attainder because they do not impose a penalty on the 
life or property of the person being censured.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \340\ U.S. v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437 (1965); U.S. v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 
303 (1946); Nixon Administration v. Administration of General Services, 
433 U.S. 425, 468 (1977).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The course proposed by the Minority has ample precedent. 
Resolutions of censure were proposed against Presidents John 
Adams, John Tyler, James Polk, Abraham Lincoln, and former 
President James Buchanan, and one was voted against President 
Andrew Jackson.341 The censure of Andrew Jackson 
occurred in 1834 over his earlier veto of the bill to renew the 
Charter of the Second Bank of America and his dismissal of 
Secretary of the Treasury William J. Duane, who had refused to 
order the removal of federal deposits from the Bank. 
Interestingly, the censure of President Jackson, which the 
Majority condemns because it was later reversed, occurred on a 
strictly partisan vote. It has been considered in history a 
political event not reflecting on real or deserved rebuke for 
Presidential misconduct. The Majority's willingness to impeach 
President Clinton on strictly partisan votes in the Committee 
more resembles the censure of President Jackson than does the 
Democratic attempt in 1998 to forge a bi-partisan resolution of 
this crisis.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \341\ The House of Representatives considered three resolutions 
condemning John Adams for actions beyond his authority and for 
interference with the judiciary. All three resolutions were proposed 
from the floor and none were successful. The presidential conduct at 
issue arose out of a dispute over extradition. In 1842, the House of 
Representatives adopted a motion to agree to a select committee report 
that condemned President Tyler for ``gross abuse of constitutional 
power'' for vetoing appropriations bills passed by Congress. Congress 
twice considered resolutions condemning James Buchanan for conduct 
allowing political considerations and alleged campaign contribution 
``kickbacks'' to influence government contracts and for his alleged 
failures to prevent secessions from the Union of several southern 
states. The proposed censure against President Lincoln responded to his 
agreement to allow Francis P. Blair, Jr. to hold commissions in the 
Army while also serving as an elected member of the House of 
Representatives. There were also censure alternatives proposed 
concerning President Nixon's conduct with respect to the Watergate 
break-in and cover-up. Once clear and convincing evidence surfaced from 
the tape-recorded conversations of the President's involvement with 
abuse of government agencies, this resolution gave way to impeachment.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

              B. A Censure Of The President Is Appropriate

    There is wide consensus among Americans that the 
President's conduct should not go without some form of rebuke. 
There is also wide agreement that impeachment is too severe a 
penalty. Rather than ignoring the will of the people, Congress 
should find a way to embody their sentiment. Early on in the 
process, Representative Graham said: ``Without public outrage, 
impeachment is a very difficult thing, and I think it is an 
essential component of impeachment. I think that is something 
that the founding fathers probably envisioned.'' 342 
Mr. Graham was correct when he made that statement and the goal 
of the Committee should have been to find an alternative that 
reflected the public will. The view that censure is the 
appropriate remedy is shared by Republicans as well as 
Democrats. For example former President Gerald Ford, former 
Republican Presidential candidate Robert Dole, and former 
Massachusetts Governor William Weld, all support some form of 
censure or rebuke as the appropriate action by the 
House.343
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \342\ 11/19/98 Tr. At 325.
    \343\ President Gerald R. Ford, The Path Back to Dignity, New York 
Times, Oct. 4, 1998, at D15; Robert Dole, A Tough but Responsible 
Solution, New York Times, Dec. 15, 1998, at A31.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The consensus of concern about the President's conduct is 
reflected in the resolution proposed by the Minority. It points 
out the role of a President to set ``an example of high moral 
standards and conduct himself in a manner that fosters respect 
for the truth.'' It also underscores how President Clinton 
``failed in this obligation, and through his actions violated 
the trust of the American people, lessened their esteem for the 
office of President, and dishonored the office which they 
entrusted to him.'' Far from being a ``slap on the wrist'' or 
mild rebuke, as some Majority Members have stated, this 
resolution would stain President Clinton's place in history as 
painfully as any Congressional action, short of removal from 
office, could possibly do.
    Members of the Committee also agreed that censure was the 
proper response to the President's misconduct. Rep. Boucher, a 
sponsor of the censure alternative, argued to the Committee 
that the ``Framers of the Constitution intended that the 
impeachment power be used only when the Nation is seriously 
threatened[,]'' i.e., ``it is only to be used for the removal 
from office of a Chief Executive whose conduct is seriously 
incompatible with either the constitutional form and principles 
of our government or the proper performance of the 
constitutional duties of the Presidential office.'' 
344 As Rep. Boucher noted, the ``facts that are now 
before this committee which arise from a personal relationship 
and the effort to conceal it simply do not rise to that high 
constitutional standard.'' 345
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \344\ 12/12/98 Tr. at 169.
    \345\ 12/12/98 Tr. at 169.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Rep. Boucher also argued that censure is ``preferable to 
impeachment for yet another reason. ``. . . The President and 
Congress will be diverted from the Nation's urgent national 
agenda while a prolonged trial takes place in the Senate. The 
Supreme Court will be immobilized all during that time as the 
Chief Justice presides during the Senate trial.'' 
346 Rep. Boucher concluded that those ``harms are 
not necessary'' because ``the Senate will not convict.'' 
347 He urged the Members to ``reach this sensible 
conclusion, which more than any other approach will 
simultaneously acknowledge our long constitutional history and 
place this Nation, the Congress and the Presidency on a path 
toward the restoration of dignity.'' 348
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \346\ 12/12/98 Tr. at 171.
    \347\ 12/12/98 Tr. at 171.
    \348\ 12/12/98 Tr. at 171.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Similarly, Rep. Delahunt, another sponsor of the 
resolution, argued that impeachment ``is not a punishment to be 
imposed on Presidents who fall short of our expectations. It is 
a last resort, an ultimate sanction to be used only when a 
President's actions pose a threat to the Republic so great as 
to compel his removal before his term has ended, not as a form 
of censure.'' 349 Rep. Delahunt noted that the 
Democratic resolution ``does not mince words. It denounces the 
President's behavior sternly and unambiguously in plain, simple 
English[,] [and] i[t] acknowledges that the President is not 
above the law.'' 350
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \349\ 12/12/98 Tr. at 180.
    \350\ 12/12/98 Tr. at 181. Even Mr. Smith, a Member of the 
Majority, acknowledged that the Democratic alternative was a ``serious 
and strong resolution.'' 12/12/98 Tr. at 203.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In making a request that the Majority permit a vote on 
censure on the House floor, Mr. Barrett observed that ``this 
country will not accept a sanction that is not a bipartisan 
sanction, it will continue to divide this country. And I say to 
the proponents of Impeachment, if you want the Impeachment to 
be accepted, there has to be a showing of good faith, a showing 
that every single Member of this Congress was given the 
opportunity to vote his or her conscience.'' 351
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \351\ 12/12/98, Tr. at 318.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Finally, Rep. Jackson Lee, another sponsor of the censure 
resolution, noted that the American people have ``now 
challenged us to break this impasse. They have now risen to the 
point of saying: Censure this President, rebuke him for his 
wrong and horrible and intimidating conduct. He has hurt his 
wife, his daughter, his family of Americans. Listen to us. Let 
us be heard.352 Rep. Jackson Lee argued that 
``[c]ensure is right for this Nation. It causes us to rise 
above the political divide, and it is not unconstitutional. 
Th[ere] is no prohibition in the Constitution, and it is right 
for us to send this motion to the floor of the House.'' 
353 Rep. Jackson Lee urged that a vote for censure 
is a ``[v]ote to heal this Nation[.]'' 354
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \352\ 12/12/98 Tr. at 198.
    \353\ 12/12/98 Tr. at 199.
    \354\ 12/12/98 Tr. at 199.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    A pillar of the American justice system is that the 
punishment must fit the offense. The constitutional scholars 
from whom the Committee heard all agreed that impeachment 
should serve to protect the nation, not punish the offender. 
For Congress to alter that process and impose the ultimate 
political sanction of removal from office is without historic 
precedent. If the Majority is to be taken at its word that it 
wants to demonstrate that the President is not above the law, 
then a censure resolution, which would serve as punishment, is 
the proper means.

                             VI. Conclusion

    After considering thousands of pages of constitutional 
history, evidentiary findings, and testimony of witnesses, this 
Committee should now be in a position to recognize not only 
what impeachment is, but also what it is not. Impeachment is 
not a means to express punitive judgements; it is not a vehicle 
for policing civil litigation or grand jury proceedings; and it 
is not a means for censuring immoral conduct. Other criminal 
and judicial sanctions are available for that purpose. 
Impeachment serves to protect the nation, not punish offenders. 
As the preceding dissenting views makes clear, removing the 
President on the basis of the record before us ill serves that 
national interest.
    Both Majority and Minority Members agree that removal from 
office is appropriate only for conduct that falls within the 
Constitutional standards of ``Treason, Bribery, or Other High 
Crimes and Misdemeanors.'' By that standard, the evidence 
before the Committee falls far short. Some four hundred of the 
nation's leading historians, and a like number of 
constitutional law scholars took the trouble to write to the 
Committee expressing their view that the President's 
misconduct, even if proven, would not satisfy constitutional 
requirements for removal from office. As Harvard Law Professor 
Lawrence Tribe's statement at the November 9 hearings made 
clear, ``weakening the presidency through watering down the 
basic meaning of ``high Crimes and Misdemeanors seems a 
singularly ill conceived . . . way of backing into a new--and 
for us untested--form of government.'' 355
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \355\ Subcommittee Hearing, supra (written testimony of Laurence 
Tribe).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Majority members of the Committee repeatedly insisted that 
their role in impeachment proceedings was to protect ``the Rule 
of Law.'' If so, the appropriate means would be adherence to 
constitutional standards and basic requirements of procedural 
fairness and due process. The Committee's own inquiry, and the 
Independent Counsel's Referral, all far short of those 
requirements.
    As Minority Members of the Committee recognized, the 
President is not above the law. But neither is he beneath its 
protections. He is entitled to fair notice of the charges and 
an unbiased investigation as to their support. The Independent 
Counsel's Referral and the resulting Articles of Impeachment 
provide neither. The ethical violations by OIC prosecutors and 
their failure to provide the Committee with exculpatory 
materials calls into question the quality and credibility of 
the information they provided. Since the Committee itself 
called no fact witnesses and conducted no independent 
investigation, its record fails to supply the clear and 
convincing evidence necessary to support impeachment.
    In the long run, history will judge not only the conduct of 
the President but the conduct of this Committee. Because its 
proceedings fail to conform to fundamental constitutional 
standards, Minority Members respectfully dissent.

                                   John Conyers, Jr.
                                   Barney Frank.
                                   Charles E. Schumer.
                                   Rick Boucher.
                                   Jerrold Nadler.
                                   Robert C. Scott.
                                   Melvin L. Watt.
                                   Sheila Jackson Lee.
                                   Maxine Waters.
                                   Martin T. Meehan.
                                   William D. Delahunt.
                                   Robert Wexler.
                                   Steven R. Rothman.
                                   Thomas M. Barrett.

                          IX. DISSENTING VIEWS

                              ----------                              


                DISSENTING VIEWS OF HON. JERROLD NADLER

    While I am in substantial agreement with, and have signed, 
the Minority Dissenting Views, I wish to clarify my thoughts on 
the question of congressional censure of the President.
    There is no question, as the Minority Views clearly 
elucidate, that there is ample authority and precedent for the 
Congress to censure a President, or to express its views, 
favorable or unfavorable, on any topic.
    Moreover, in this case, where a majority of the members of 
the House of Representatives believes that the President's 
conduct requires some action by the Congress short of 
impeachment, it is unconscionable for the Majority to abuse its 
control of this institution by preventing a vote on censure. 
Plainly, this matter involves important questions of fact, law 
and conscience. It is simply wrong to prevent members from 
being able to vote according to the dictates of their best 
judgement, conscience, and the concerns of the people who 
elected them in what can only be interpreted as a cynical 
attempt to coerce them into voting for impeachment by leaving 
them no other option. They have a right to a choice between the 
extreme and unjustified action of impeachment, and a less 
radical expression of the Congress' and the nation's 
disapproval as embodied in the motion of censure proposed by 
Representatives Boucher, Jackson-Lee, Delahunt and Barrett. The 
impeachment of a President was reserved by the Framers of the 
Constitution for only the most severe threats against the 
nation and our system of government. It exists as a remedy to 
prevent the President from becoming a tyrant. It should not be 
used for mere partisan purposes to overturn the will of the 
people as expressed in two national elections. By providing no 
alternative to impeachment, even an alternative which a 
majority of the House, and of the American people deem more 
appropriate, is little more than moral blackmail and unworthy 
of this House.
    When it was considered in the Judiciary Committee, I 
supported censure, despite my reservations about the precedent 
it would set, because of my strong conviction that members 
should be afforded the opportunity to consider that option in 
the full House.
    Notwithstanding my view that censure is within the power of 
the Congress, and that members should have the opportunity to 
vote on the question, I nonetheless have strong reservations 
about its use by Congress.
    First, I oppose censuring the President for any alleged 
deeds which have been neither admitted nor proven. The authors 
of the censure resolution offered in the Judiciary Committee 
took great care to avoid this error. It is disturbing that the 
authors of the Articles of Impeachment failed to exercise the 
same judicious care when they included vague charges based on 
conjecture and testimony which has not been subject to cross-
examination.
    Second, I believe that censure sets a worrisome precedent 
to the extent that it would tend to undermine the comity and 
relations between coequal branches of government. It would be a 
regrettable legacy of this matter if Congress gets into the 
business of issuing sweeping statements on the conduct of 
future Presidents. In this case, a majority of the American 
people and the members of this House believe that the 
President's actions were wrong and deserving of condemnations. 
The President has acknowledged his actions to his family, 
before a grand jury, and to the nation. He has sought 
forgiveness and national reconciliation. But, presidents often 
do things that anger or offend Members of Congress or the 
public. Presidents are answerable to the American people for 
that conduct and, should their actions violate the law, they 
are answerable in the courts. But to single out this president 
for deception about a personal indiscretion disturbs me.
    We did not censure George Bush when he lied to the nation 
about being ``out of the loop'' in the Iran-Contra scandal or 
when he said, ``Read my lips. No new taxes.'' President Reagan 
was not censured for using members of his White House staff and 
Cabinet to conceal the illegal acts in the Iran-Contra coverup, 
nor was President Bush censured for issuing pardons to keep 
those involved in that illegal conspiracy above the law.
    With those reservations on the matter of censure, I join my 
colleagues in the minority in dissenting. Impeachment, 
especially impeachment forced on an unwilling nation by 
partisan strong-arm tactics, will divide this nation for years 
to come and undermine our democratic system of government.

                                                    Jerrold Nadler.

               DISSENTING VIEWS OF HON. HOWARD L. BERMAN

    The minority dissenting views make several important points 
about the constitutional standard for impeachment and the 
appropriate role of the House of Representatives in the 
impeachment process. I strongly agree with the conclusion that 
the President's conduct is not impeachable. Nevertheless, I 
have elected not to sign the minority views because I believe 
they place too much emphasis on attempting to prove that the 
President did not lie under oath and possibly coach a potential 
witness. In addition, while I am troubled by the conduct of the 
Independent Counsel, I don't believe it should play a central 
role in the impeachment debate. Rather, that conduct should be 
investigated in the context of reauthorizing the Independent 
Counsel statute in the 106th Congress. I have therefore decided 
to submit my own dissenting views, which consists of my 
December 10, 1998 opening statement made prior to the mark up 
of the articles of impeachment:

 Statement of Representative Howard L. Berman Before the Committee on 
                    the Judiciary December 10, 1998

    Thank you Mr. Chairman.
    The often repeated mantra that everybody lies, certainly 
everybody lies about sex, all Presidents lie, and many 
Presidents have affairs must be addressed from this side of the 
aisle.
    It's certainly true that people sometimes lie, and that 
people often lie about sex. It is also true that Presidents 
have been known to lie and that some Presidents have had 
affairs.
    But that mantra has nothing to do with the issues before 
us.
    That mantra does not address the allegations of lying under 
oath or coaching potential witnesses in legal proceedings in 
order to evade responsibility for personal wrongdoing.
    Our proceedings are too momentous to be bogged down by this 
political spin.
    What is an impeachable offense? A precise definition is 
difficult to glean from the Framers of the Constitution, 
American history or scholarship.
    I find the best answer, albeit on a different subject, 
contained in the concurring opinion of Supreme Court Justice 
Potter Stewart from which I quote:

          ``. . . the court . . . was faced with the task of 
        trying to define what may be indefinable . . . I shall 
        not today attempt further to define the kinds of 
        material I understand to be embraced . . . and perhaps 
        I could never succeed in intelligibly doing so. . . But 
        I know it when I see it.''

    Justice Stewart was ruling on the definition of obscenity--
not impeachment--and given his subject matter, some may think 
this analogy too apt.
    But, as regards the basic concept of what constitutes an 
impeachable offense, for me, the logic applies: I know it when 
I see it.
    And on balance, given the totality of the wrongdoing, and 
the totality of the context, this isn't it.
    In fact, though reasonable people may disagree, I don't 
think it's a close call.
    The President's behavior that reflects so badly on the 
Presidency and the country, the President's disregard for his 
obligations as a law-abiding American, the President's refusal 
to respect a common sense interpretation of the English 
language . . . this conduct does not rise to the level that 
justifies thwarting the public's mandate as expressed in the 
1996 election.
    My vote to oppose impeachment turns on three factors:
    The first factor is though this is not just about sex, it 
is colored by sex.
    Second, and more importantly, impeachment must not be 
pursued if the center of gravity of the body politic opposes 
impeachment.
    We are privileged to live in a unique and wonderful system. 
Every four years, we come together to elect a President. This 
is the defining moment in American political life and is 
portentous in its implications.
    Each American takes responsibility, and as a whole, all 
America takes collective responsibility for the decision to 
invest awesome power in this one person.
    There must have been a reason why the Framers vested this 
power of impeachment in a political body, the people's house--
the House of Representatives.
    If they had wanted impeachment to be a non-political 
decision, totally divorced from public opinion, they would have 
vested the impeachment powers in the judicial branch.
    The impeachment process must, at a minimum, pay some 
deference to the totality of the people's views. Unlike every 
other vote we cast where conscience may play a determinative 
role regardless of public opinion, a vote for impeachment 
cannot be blind to the views of those who vested power in the 
President.
    It would be very, very wrong to expunge the results of an 
election for President of the United States without the 
overwhelming consent of the governed.
    It should not be contemplated--unless the wrongdoing is so 
egregious as to threaten our form of government.
    The third factor in my decision is the belief that the 
corrosive effects on American society and America's legal 
system of allowing the President to serve out his term have 
been overstated.
    It is true the President's defense is very troubling. His 
grand jury testimony, his public statements following the grand 
jury testimony, his agents' public statements, and his answers 
to the questions submitted by the Committee are more serious 
than any wrongdoing that caused this process to begin.
    There is something Alice in Wonderland-like in watching 
someone so smart and so skilled, so admired by the American 
people for his intellect and his talents, digging himself 
deeper and deeper and deeper into a rabbit hole, and us along 
with him--and allowing him to escape accountability.
    This troubles me greatly and I know motivates many of the 
calls for impeachment.
    People do have a right to ask, what will America's children 
believe about lying, about reverence for the law, about lying 
under oath? Will more Americans think it is ok to lie under 
oath if the subject matter is sex, or if the subject matter is 
embarrassing, or to evade civil liability in a sexual 
harassment suit, or to evade criminal liability?
    Many thoughtful Americans wonder whether the deconstruction 
of our language--the hair-splitting--will damage the culture 
even beyond the legal system. What will happen if words no 
longer have common sense meaning--if everything is equally 
true... or not true, because, after all, it depends on what 
your definition of ``is'' is?
    Of course there has been and will be harm to our culture 
and the legal system.
    But let's keep it in perspective. This is not a court of 
law. We are not empowered to decide whether or not the 
President should be indicted or convicted of a criminal 
offense.
    While not above the law, the President--the most powerful 
man on the planet, the man who has control over our nuclear 
weapons arsenal, the man whom we vest with the authority to 
protect and defend the interests of the people of the United 
States, indeed, protect all of civilization--is a special case!
    Everybody is equal under the law. But we make special 
provisions for one person while he's serving as President.
    Few would dispute the fact that the President is immune 
from criminal prosecution during his term of office. Many would 
argue that a wise Congress should pass legislation to immunize 
the President from civil litigation during his term of office.
    We invest the Secret Service with the responsibility of 
taking the bullet so our Commander in Chief will serve out his 
term.
    Most Americans can be criminally prosecuted at any time. 
Most Americans can be civilly sued at any time. Most Americans 
do not have a cadre of heroes providing personal protection for 
them and their loved ones.
    That the President's conduct is not impeachable does not 
mean that society condones his conduct. In fact, it does not 
mean that the President is not subject to criminal prosecution 
after he leaves office.
    It just means that the popular vote of the people should 
not be abrogated for this conduct--when the people clearly do 
not wish for his conduct to cause the abrogation.
    The point is, most Americans know--and will instruct their 
children to know--that conduct that may not be impeachable for 
the president of the United States is not necessarily conduct 
that is acceptable in the larger society.
    Those who argue that the institutions of government, or the 
fabric of our society will be irreparably harmed by a failure 
to impeach the President, seriously underestimate the American 
people.
    America is too strong a society, American parents are too 
wise, the American sense of right and wrong too embedded--to be 
confused.
    We all know that the word ``is'' has a common sense 
meaning; We all know that lying under oath will get us in a lot 
of trouble.
    I have anguished over the question, were the facts the same 
for a Republican President in a Democratically controlled 
Congress, would I vote to oppose impeachment?
    I pray that my decision would be the same, regardless of 
party, regardless of political position.
    I hope I've considered only what meets the Constitutional 
standard and what is best for America.
    I find the answer unambiguous. Impeachment must be 
defeated.

                                                  Howard L. Berman.

           DISSENTING VIEWS OF HON. ROBERT C. ``BOBBY'' SCOTT

    I respectfully dissent from the section of the Minority's 
views relating to the issue of censure. Although censure would 
be Constitutionally permissible, I can not support censure 
because of a number of policy problems I believe would be 
created by adopting this censure resolution now.
    I have complained from the beginning about the rank 
unfairness of these proceedings. As a result of this unfair 
process, we have an insufficient factual basis to support 
impeachment and for the same reason, we have not established a 
sufficient factual basis to support the conclusions drawn by 
the proposed censure resolution. I opposed the structure of 
this inquiry and supported instead the fair, focused and 
expeditious process proposed by the Minority. That plan would 
have specifically stated the allegations. We would then have 
been afforded an opportunity to focus on those allegations, if 
any, we believed to be constitutional. This stage would have 
then been followed by a fact finding process and a logical 
conclusion.
    Instead of that fair process, we jumped from the 
allegations to the conclusion that the President should be 
impeached, skipping the focus and fact finding portions of the 
rational inquiry. The so-called evidence for impeachment is 
flimsy, because it is based on contradictory hearsay and 
dubious inferences. This so-called evidence cited by the 
Majority might have been proven true, but unfortunately we have 
not adhered to basic principles of justice and tested that 
evidence by the traditional ways we test the reliability of 
evidence: through cross-examination and the opportunity for the 
accused to rebut this evidence. The evidence before us has been 
selected by Mr. Starr and consists mainly of answers to 
questions posed by the prosecutors. It contains no additional 
answers to questions posed by the President's lawyers nor any 
rebuttal evidence. And, therefore, it is wrong to draw factual 
conclusions from the uncross-examined hearsay and inferences 
drawn by Mr. Starr without the opportunity for the accused to 
provide any rebuttal. Thus, this process, which fails to 
establish a factual basis for impeachment, also fails to 
establish any appropriate factual basis for censure.
    There are also serious policy implications when one co-
equal branch of government seeks to unilaterally punish another 
branch, and this problem becomes even worse when there becomes 
an expectation or responsibility to censure every time one 
branch is outraged by the conduct of another branch. In 
addition, while Articles of Impeachment are pending, it is 
inappropriate to consider a censure resolution, because it 
diverts attention from the reality that we are on the verge of 
impeaching the President of the United States for charges that 
are not supported by the evidence and wouldn't even be 
impeachable offences, if they were true. Furthermore, it may 
lower the bar for future impeachments even lower than the 
standard we have today which a Majority witness at our 
Impeachment hearing called ``low crimes and misdemeanors''. 
That is because allegations which are clearly not impeachable, 
but censurable, such as those before us now, would be deemed to 
warrant a full fledged impeachment inquiry in the future.
    Impeachment Inquiries are serious. In our partisan zeal, we 
have diverted attention from other important issues, such as 
religious freedom, juvenile justice, and immigration matters, 
which could not be considered because we were focused on the 
impeachment inquiry. This impeachment inquiry has unnecessarily 
trampled on the rights of innocent citizens by releasing 
embarrassing information, by issuing subpoenas for confidential 
information, and by voting against a motion to appropriately 
honor the attorney client privileges of witnesses called to 
testify before the Committee. Impeachment inquiries should, 
therefore, only be launched if there are credible allegations 
of serious, impeachable offenses, not the lesser category of 
offenses currently before the Committee.
    In summary, because we have not had any rational fact 
finding to prove any of the allegations before the Committee, 
because co-equal branches of government should refrain from 
censuring one another, and because censure might provoke future 
impeachment inquiries with flimsy allegations such as those 
before us, I cannot support censure in the impeachment context.

                                                       Bobby Scott.

                  DISSENTING VIEWS OF HON. ZOE LOFGREN

    When I worked on the impeachment proceedings against 
President Richard M. Nixon as a staffer, I was in awe of the 
proceedings, of the responsibility, of the effort, of the 
decorum of the members of Congress engaged in that solemn 
undertaking.
    I observed men and women struggle to overcome party 
differences and loyalties in order to do what was fair and 
right, in the interest of the nation, in honor of its history, 
and as guardians of its future. I believe that's why the 
country respected the actions taken by the 1974 Congress. An 
inferior performance could have destroyed our system of 
government. Instead, public men and women rose up to become 
statesmen and stateswomen in a difficult hour.
    Since before the referral of the Independent Counsel, I 
have encouraged my colleagues to read the 1974 Judiciary 
Committee staff report, which sets forth the Constitutional 
grounds for impeachment adopted by the House in 1974. It is 
against this constitutional standard that I have measured the 
conduct of this President. The 1974 Report instructed us that:

          ``Not all presidential misconduct is sufficient to 
        constitute grounds for impeachment. There is a further 
        requirement--substantiality. . . . Because impeachment 
        of a President is a grave step for the nation, it is to 
        be predicated only upon conduct seriously incompatible 
        with either the constitutional form and principles of 
        our government or the proper performance of 
        constitutional duties of the Presidential office.''

    When our Founding Fathers drafted the provisions in our 
Constitution regarding impeachment and wrote the phrase, 
``treason, bribery, or other high crimes and misdemeanors,'' 
they were concerned with wrongdoing directed against the state. 
Treason is a crime against the state. Bribery is a crime 
against the state--an attempt to corrupt the administration of 
the state. During the Constitutional convention, in addition to 
treason and bribery, George Mason and James Madison added the 
phrase ``high crimes and misdemeanors,'' to the grounds for 
impeachment. Their purpose was to allow impeachment to save our 
democracy from other ``great and dangerous offenses,'' which a 
Chief Executive might commit to subvert our constitutional form 
of government.
    The Founders were well aware of the tyranny of the Crown, 
so they established the process of impeachment as a legislative 
safety valve against a tyrannical executive. The Founders 
designed this safety valve for abuses so grave that, in 
Franklin's words, they suggested assassination as a remedy. 
Impeachment was the Founders' civilized substitute. Under our 
Constitution, since impeachment is a remedy for Presidential 
tyranny, only acts of tyranny can justify impeachment. That may 
explain why, after more than two centuries' experience in our 
democracy, not a single President has been removed and only one 
has been impeached.
    It is clear that the Founders did not want the President to 
serve at the pleasure of the Congress. That is why they 
rejected a proposal that the President be impeached for 
``maladministration'' because that would be equivalent, 
according to Madison, ``to a tenure during the pleasure of the 
Senate.'' That lesser standard would have unbalanced our 
constitutional system of checks and balances, and created an 
unstable parliamentary system rather than the stable system we 
presently enjoy. Unlike so many other countries with 
parliamentary systems, we don't suffer from a rapid succession 
of governments, one after another, as votes of no confidence 
drive out prime ministers who hardly have time to govern before 
they are removed by votes of no confidence.
    Alexander Hamilton reaffirmed the jurisdictional scope of 
impeachment in Federalist No. 65 when he wrote that ``the 
subjects of [the Senate's impeachment] jurisdiction are those 
offenses which proceed from the misconduct of public men, or in 
other words from the abuse of the violation of some public 
trust. They are of a nature which may with peculiar propriety 
be denominated POLITICAL, as they relate chiefly to injuries 
done to the society itself.''
    In 1974, Yale Law Professor Charles Black wrote a primer on 
impeachment. Pointing out that plainly, not all regular crimes 
were impeachable, Professor Black wrote:

          ``Suppose a president transported a woman across a 
        state line or even (so the Mann Act reads) from one 
        point to another within the District of Columbia, for 
        what is quaintly called an ``immoral purpose. . . . Or 
        suppose the president actively assisted a young White 
        House intern in concealing the latter's possession of 
        three ounces of marijuana--thus himself becoming guilty 
        of `obstruction of justice.' . . . Would it not be 
        preposterous to think that any of this is what the 
        Framers meant when they referred to `Treason, Bribery, 
        and other High Crimes and Misdemeanors,' or that any 
        sensible constitutional plan would make a president 
        removable on such grounds?''

Thus, Congress had established a standard to apply when faced 
with the grave responsibility of considering impeachment of the 
President. However, in 1998 we got off on the wrong foot and, 
though some of us tried to correct course, we never got it 
right.
    It is unfortunate that Independent Counsel Kenneth Starr 
did not proceed as cautiously as did Watergate Special 
Prosecutor Leon Jaworski. When Jaworski forwarded grand jury 
material to the Congress relating to President Nixon, he didn't 
stage a press event. In fact, in 1974 no material forwarded to 
the Judiciary Committee was made public until the committee and 
the President had a chance to review it. Former Watergate 
prosecutor Richard Ben-Veniste advised some Members of the 
Committee in September that the only thing Jaworski sent with 
the grand jury material was an index; and that index and most 
of the grand jury material referenced in that index have 
remained secret to this day.
    When we got Starr's Referral, I believed that, at a 
minimum, we should have read what it said, and discussed it, 
before we released it to the nation. Instead, we released the 
Referral and this was followed in fast succession by thousands 
of pages of additional material that the nation need not have 
seen. We justified this wholesale release by insisting that the 
people had a right to know, presumably so they could be 
persuaded by the facts and constitutional standard as to what 
was the right course to follow.
    From the outset, I subscribed to what several of the 
members called, ``a yardstick of fairness,'' by which we would 
measure the conduct of the Committee. Our best yardstick of 
fairness was our historical experience. We had to compare the 
procedures we used today with what Congress did a generation 
ago, when a Republican President was investigated by a 
Democratic House. Because of the thorough, deliberative 
procedures used during the Watergate proceedings the ultimate 
result was not only fair but was perceived to be fair. If we 
failed to follow this example, I was concerned that we would 
abdicate the solemn duty that the Constitution had entrusted to 
us and to us alone. If we fell short of that yardstick of 
fairness, the American people would correctly see the cause as 
partisan. I said in the beginning that the damage would be to 
our country and to our system of government.
    While our system of government is based on openness, we 
repeatedly hid behind closed doors to conduct our business. The 
House Judiciary Committee met to decide what salacious material 
to make public but for the most part instead engaged in 
spirited debate about the Constitution, fairness, our country, 
and our future. All motions made to open the meeting or to 
release the transcripts of executive sessions were voted down 
by the Republican majority.
    How ironic that the public was barred from knowing what 
Committee members said about the Constitution and due process 
while we deluged that same public with lurid materials in the 
name of openness and informing the public's discretion.
    We should have spent more time reading what George Mason 
and James Madison said to each other than what Ms. Lewinsky and 
Ms. Tripp said to each other.
    The Minority members co-sponsored a proposal that would 
have been fair, limited in scope and time, and logical, 
starting with a consideration of the impeachment standard and 
whether any of the allegations forwarded by the Independent 
Counsel met that standard. If we needed more time, for any 
reason, the Committee could ask for more time. If the 
Independent Counsel sent another Referral, the Committee could 
consider it consistent with the statute. I am proud to have 
played a key role in the development of the ``fairness 
alternative.''
    The Majority, however, preferred instead an open-ended 
investigation without any deadline at all. The Democratic 
Minority preferred a prompt and fair inquiry. The Committee and 
the House were to split on party lines.
    On October 8, 1998, I rose on the floor of the House in 
opposition to any unfair impeachment inquiry, and said,

          ``I fear what Alexander Hamilton warned against in 
        [the] Federalist . . . [that] there will always be the 
        greatest danger that the decision [to impeach] will be 
        regulated more by the comparative strength of parties 
        than by the real demonstrations of innocence or guilt.' 
        ''

I said, ``the question is not whether the President's 
misconduct was bad. We all know that the President's misconduct 
was bad. The question is, are we going to punish America 
instead of him for misconduct? Are we going to trash our 
Constitution because of his misconduct?''
    Since that day we have not heard a single fact witness in 
Committee, either in public or executive session, although 
there is no question there are many conflicts in the hearsay 
documentation provided us by the Independent Counsel. One 
example of the many conflicts in the evidence is who, if 
anyone, told whom to get what gifts for what reason. The 
President has a quite credible explanation that he would not be 
telling someone to conceal the gifts he gave her--even as he 
was giving her more gifts. There is only one way to resolve 
such conflicts, if indeed the facts are material to our 
inquiry, and that is to question the witnesses. However, we 
questioned no one with direct knowledge of any of the facts.
    Under the circumstances, I have had to compare the evidence 
that can be gleaned of the President's tawdry affair and cover-
up with the Majority's recommended resolution, that we remove 
him from Office. My conclusion, in reliance on constitutional 
standards, is that we have clearly lost all sense of 
proportion. These Articles of Impeachment do not comport with 
the standard set by our Founding Fathers. They did not mean for 
us to remove a president for lying about private sexual 
misconduct, especially when we can prosecute him--if he has 
committed a crime--when he leaves office.
    We do not condone the President's behavior--but impeachment 
is not the remedy for bad behavior. For that we have courts. If 
those who seek to hound the President from office believe they 
have a criminal case against him, then let him pay the penalty 
of a conviction after he leaves office, if they can get a jury 
to agree. That is our system of dealing with all but ``high 
crimes and misdemeanors''.
    Our task has not been made any easier by the way the 
Majority wrote these Articles. The Committee majority refused 
to state the specific perjurious statements by which they would 
have us judge the President. This solemn occasion demands 
perfect clarity and at least the same due process which would 
be granted to any person accused of a crime. But the Congress, 
and the President, are left to guess about the exact nature of 
what he is supposed to have done wrong.
    My friends, neighbors, and even complete strangers approach 
me in my District to tell me what they think is going on. They 
call this a coup d'etat. They say that a runaway majority of 
the House of Representatives seems bent on overturning the 
result of a democratic election, because they don't like the 
result.
    It is significant that the people we represent were not 
persuaded that the Majority was doing the right thing. I 
believe in the American people, and their views on this have 
been remarkably steady. The opinion of the people may not be 
determinative of the issue, but it is certainly relevant when 
we propose to overturn the last two national elections.
    When I questioned the fairness of the proceedings in 
September, the Chairman commended an article by Professors 
Edwin Firmage and R. Collin Mangrum from the 1974 Duke Law 
Journal, starting at page 1023, and titled, ``Removal of the 
President.'' At pages 1044 and 1045, the Professors explained 
that the public's opinion matters so that Congress' action may 
be legitimate and perceived as legitimate:

          ``The legitimacy of a democratic government must be 
        established in the minds of the people; thus, if a 
        transfer of presidential power is to be accomplished by 
        . . . removal . . . in the face of impeachment, the 
        legitimacy of the new administration can only be 
        assured by public recognition that the previous mandate 
        has clearly expired.''

    This same article, at page 1029, states that the 
impeachment process, while ``fundamentally political,'' was 
``designed to protect the foundation of the state itself--not 
to create a sanction for misjudgment or to settle disputes over 
policy, both appropriately dealt with through the electoral 
process.''
    I am troubled that we have endangered the legitimacy by 
which we govern this nation. We lost our way in the Committee. 
I hope we may find it when we reach the floor of the House. I 
hope and trust that the views of the people will inform the 
judgment of my colleagues before they vote this week. The 
people say what they think and they vote accordingly. I hope my 
colleagues may be free to do the same.
    In this regard, I sincerely believe we should be permitted 
to consider censure. There is no constitutional prohibition 
against it. It has been used to some historical effect to 
rebuke other Presidents, particularly President Andrew Jackson. 
The Majority has supported such resolutions on a variety of 
other issues. Thus, we must ask ourselves why they have 
ruthlessly prevented a floor vote on the alternative of censure 
as the appropriate sanction. In doing so, the Majority has 
effectively disenfranchised those members of both parties, like 
myself, who feel that rebuke and condemnation is appropriate 
but impeachment is not.
    Taking another backward glance, I have to say that, unlike 
my experience as a staffer during the 1974 impeachment 
proceedings, I can't say that the men and women I've observed 
in these proceedings have overcome party differences and 
loyalties in order to do what was fair and right in the 
interest of the nation. If courage is a rare flower this wintry 
season, as some suggest, this Congress shall likely become a 
humiliating object lesson for unborn historians to describe how 
this legislative assembly, riven by partisan differences, 
compromised rather than preserved the Republic.
    The Constitution provides impeachment to protect America 
from subversion of the Constitution. How ironic that, in this 
instance, it is Congress' political misuse of impeachment that 
threatens our Constitution, rather than the tawdry misconduct 
of the Chief Executive.
    If the House votes to impeach, and unless voters engage in 
massive punishment of the Republican perpetrators, it is 
inevitable that impeachment will become the routine tool of the 
losing party. They will seek to win in the House what they 
cannot gain in the polling booth. Our country will lose much 
that has made it strong in that process. I am deeply troubled 
and saddened that the Republican party would inflict such 
injury to our country to achieve this short term political 
goal.

                                                       Zoe Lofgren.

              DISSENTING VIEWS OF HON. SHEILA JACKSON-LEE

                      A. Standard for Impeachment

    George Mason, a Framer of the Constitution, stated that 
``high crimes and misdemeanors'' refers to Presidential actions 
that are ``great and dangerous offenses'' or attempts to 
subvert the Constitution.'' This is the proper standard for 
impeachment. James Hamilton, a former Assistant Chief Counsel 
for the Senate Watergate Committee, defined impeachment as ``a 
crime against the state.'' An impeachable offense must relate 
chiefly to official injuries done to society. Another one of 
our Founding Fathers Alexander Hamilton wrote in the Federalist 
Papers No. 65 that,

          Those [impeachable] offenses which proceed from the 
        misconduct of public men, or, on other words, from the 
        abuse or violation of some public trust. They are of a 
        nature which may with peculiar propriety be dominated 
        POLITICAL, as they relate chiefly to injuries done 
        immediately to society itself.

As Hamilton makes clear, criminal conduct alone was and is not 
enough. The conduct also should involve public office. That 
should be the standard here as we proceed.

                    B. Article I--Perjury Grand Jury

    This Article of Impeachment focuses on the testimony that 
the President gave to Independent counsel's grand jury on 
August 17, 1998. First, it is necessary to discuss what is 
necessary to garner a perjury conviction in federal courts. 
First, you must prove that a false statement was made with 
specific intent. That means that the prosecutor must prove that 
the declarant had a subjective awareness that his statements 
were lies. That means, no matter how false a statement is, if 
the person saying it believes he is telling the truth, then he 
cannot be found guilty of perjury. Because we have seen no 
conclusive evidence that the President believes he was, indeed, 
lying--this charge is simply unwarranted. Second, the false 
testimony must be about material facts.
    I would also like to point out another principle of 
American law that is pertinent to this perjury allegation. The 
principle is that the unresponsiveness, the evasiveness, of a 
witness is not per se perjurious.\1\ The burden is on the 
interrogator to elicit the clear statements that will be used 
as the basis of their case. And although every defendant is 
required to be truthful on the stand, there is no requirement 
that they be helpful to the prosecutor. Courts have 
continuously rejected perjury charges where there is more than 
one way of understanding the meaning of a question.\2\ When 
asked if he engaged in ``sexual relations'' with Monica 
Lewinsky, it is clear that the President was answering within 
the confines of the narrow definition that was given to him. I 
think we should all be concerned whether this is enough to 
support a perjury conviction, and then rises to an impeachable 
offense.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ U.S. v. Bronston, 409 U.S. 352 (1973).
    \2\ U.S. v. Finucan, 708 F.2d 838, 848 (1st Cir. 1983); United 
States v. Lighte, 782 F.2d 367, 375 (2d Cir. 1986).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    C. Article II--Alleged False Statements Under Oath in the Jones 
                               Deposition

    One of the primary allegations of perjury arising from 
President Clinton's deposition testimony of January 17, 1998, 
appears to be that he lied under oath about the nature of his 
relationship with Ms. Lewinsky when he denied in that civil 
case that he had a ``sexual affair,'' a ``sexual 
relationship,'' or ``sexual relations'' with Monica Lewinsky. 
Webster's Dictionary, Random House, and Black's Law dictionary 
all define sexual relations as intercourse. But even if you do 
not believe that sexual relations does not specifically mean 
intercourse, there is strong evidence that this is what 
President Clinton believed. This Article should have been 
summarily dismissed and voted down because there are just too 
many holes and not enough clear and convincing evidence that 
the President committed perjury during the Jones deposition.

                 D. Article III--Obstruction of Justice

    Monicia Lewinsky's Grand Jury testimony clearly refutes 
allegations that President Clinton encouraged her to give 
perjurious, false and misleading testimony, ``Neither the 
President nor Mr. Jordan asked or encouraged me to lie.'' This 
statement by Ms. Lewinsky was made in her February 1, 1998, 
proffer to the Office of Independent counsel. President 
Clinton's relationship with Lewinsky was consensual but morally 
wrong. On the other hand, Ms. Jones was alleging sexual 
harassment. Lewinsky's relationship with President Clinton was 
a tangential collateral issue that was not relevant. Therefore, 
the probability of its admittance at trial was unlikely because 
it would not have ``any tendency to make the existence of any 
fact that is of consequence to determination of the Jones 
action more probable.'' There is no concrete evidence to 
substantiate the allegation that President Clinton encouraged a 
witness to execute a false affidavit.
    Article III further alleges that on or about January 18 and 
January 20-21, 1998, President Clinton related a false and 
misleading account of events relevant to a federal civil rights 
action brought against him to a potential witness in that 
proceeding.

                     E. Article IV--Abuse of Power

    In 1974, the Judiciary Committee drafted three Articles of 
Impeachment against President Nixon. Article II charged Richard 
Nixon with ``using the powers of the office of the President of 
the United States, in violation of his constitutional duty. . . 
abuse of power. He has repeatedly engaged in conduct impairing 
the due and proper administration of justice and the conduct of 
lawful inquiries, or contravening the laws governing agencies 
of the executive branch and the purposes of these agencies. 
Here, there was use of official power and therefore abuse of 
power.
    Article IV purports to enumerate ``conduct that resulted in 
misuse and abuse of his high office'' and credible information 
that President Clinton's actions since January 17, 1998, 
regarding his relationship with Monica Lewinsky have been 
inconsistent with President's constitutional duty to faithfully 
execute the Laws.'' It is implausible that one of the counts of 
Article IV is that ``The President misled the American people 
and the Congress in his public statement on August 17, 1998, 
when he stated that his answers at his civil deposition in 
January had been ``legally accurate.'' ABUSE OF POWER REQUIRES 
USE OF POWER! When the President misled the American public on 
August 17, it was not illegal nor impeachable. There is no 
evidence that the President's cabinet members were required or 
instructed to relate information about non-official business to 
the news media. Further, if we follow this argument to its 
logical conclusion an individual would be required to maintain 
``ownership of the original conversation.'' There was no use of 
power by the President, therefore there was no abuse of power.

                F. The Need For a Resolution of Censure

    President Clinton's conduct, although wrong, should Not be 
regarded as an impeachable offense because it was not the 
product of an illegal use of power or a breach of the public 
trust as suggested by the Framers of the Constitution. In 1691, 
Solicitor General Somers told the British Parliament that ``the 
power of impeachment ought to be, like Goliath's sword, kept in 
the temple, and not used but on great occasions.
    Censure is neither a substitute for a federal pardon nor is 
it a cover-up. Therefore, the President is still subject to 
civil and criminal punishment for any alleged crimes he may 
have committed by the court system after he leaves office. The 
United States Constitution does not prohibit censure. However, 
several critics continue to suggest that censure is 
unconstitutional because there is no constitutional provision 
that expressly authorizes censure. Censure is a sensible 
historically proven solution for addressing the President's 
disturbing behavior. It is time for America to move forward; it 
is time to put this unsettling controversy and divisiveness 
aside; it is time for the business of the American people to 
take first priority.

                             G. Conclusion

    President Clinton's behavior was reprehensible and lacking 
poor judgment, but it must meet the high constitutional test of 
a high crime or misdemeanor. . . for it does not, then congress 
bears the burden of giving the President, or the accused ``an 
honorable acquittal.'' It must be non-partisan and rational 
because we are all duly sworn to uphold the Constitution which 
was written to ``form a more perfect union.''

                                                Sheila Jackson-Lee.

                 DISSENTING VIEWS OF HON. MAXINE WATERS

    On Friday and Saturday, December 11 and 12, 1998, the House 
Judiciary Committee embarked on the extraordinary procedure of 
voting to report from this Committee four articles of 
impeachment against President William Jefferson Clinton.
    Let history record, I, Maxine Waters, member of Congress 
representing the 35th Congressional District of the United 
States of America, is of sound mind, excellent health and a 
clear conscience. Let history further record that I direct my 
remarks to my children Ed and Karen to my grandchildren Mikael 
(20 years of age) and Cameron (10 years of age), to my mother 
Velma Lee Moore, my 12 brothers and sisters (living and dead), 
my husband, Ambassador Sidney Williams, my dear friends and 
supporters, my constituents and the American people:
    I did not violate the Constitution of the United States. I 
voted no on each and every vague and general article of 
impeachment presented by this committee. Let history record 
that I fought against the impeachment of the President of the 
United States in every way that I know how, that my Democratic 
colleagues have shown in every possible way that President 
Clinton did not commit perjury, obstruct justice or commit any 
actions or crimes that rise to the constitutional level of 
impeachment.
    Let history treat me kindly as our children and children's 
children analyze what we did here in this Committee. Let the 
historians speak favorably of me because I carefully, 
honorably, and responsibly exercised my duty to uphold the 
Constitution of the United States. So help me God!

                                                     Maxine Waters.

               DISSENTING VIEWS OF HON. MARTIN T. MEEHAN

    I write separately to state clearly my own views on the 
Majority's attempt to impeach President Clinton, though I do 
agree with most of the conclusions contained in the Minority's 
dissenting views.
    President Clinton had an adulterous relationship with 
Monica Lewinsky, which for understandable reasons, he strove to 
conceal. His attempts at concealing that relationship long pre-
dated Ms. Lewinsky's involvement in the Paula Jones civil case 
but ultimately came to include answering questions posed to him 
under oath in a deceptive manner. Contrary to the sweeping 
conclusions of the Majority, that deception occurred largely 
within the boundaries of the law. Yet I do suspect that the 
president's statements crossed the line on a few occasions, 
most prominently regarding precisely where he touched Ms. 
Lewinsky.
    Thus, the president engaged in shameful conduct, breaking 
faith not only with his family but also with the American 
people. He did not, however, commit ``Treason, Bribery, or 
other high Crimes and Misdemeanors.'' As such, I consider the 
Majority's approval of articles of impeachment to be a lawless 
overreach, setting a terrible precedent for the fate of future 
presidents and bound for the condemnation of history.
    The historical precedents and the writings of our Founding 
Fathers indicate that the impeachment of a president is 
justified only by presidential conduct which clearly, 
concretely, and convincingly demonstrates that that president 
lacks the capacity to govern. In other words, impeachment is a 
means of saving our nation from a president who is unable or 
unwilling to fulfill his or her core responsibilities or 
respect the boundaries of his or her power.
    President Clinton's conduct, though shameful, does not 
speak clearly, concretely, and convincingly to his capacity to 
govern.  t does tell us that he is reckless in his private life 
and willing to deceive those who inquire about his 
recklessness. Yet it just as clearly tells us that this man is 
far from unmindful of or uncaring about his obligation to act 
lawfully. Indeed, in reviewing the president's acts of 
governance, I see no failure to execute our laws properly and 
no lack of respect for the boundaries of the presidential 
power.
    Making sweeping conclusions about a president's capacity to 
govern based on his or her private misdeeds sets a terrible 
precedent. It is telling that the one presidential impeachment 
which enjoys history's stamp of approval focused on allegations 
involving the abuse of presidential power, including using the 
CIA to impede an FBI investigation of a politically motivated 
break-in and carrying out a regime of political repression from 
the White House. In fact, the Watergate-era House Judiciary 
Committee appears to have recognized the danger of speculating 
wildly about a president's capacity to govern on the basis of 
his or her private misdeeds, when it expressly rejected an 
article of impeachment alleging that former President Richard 
Nixon committed tax fraud.
    We have heard much about the rule of law during the 
impeachment process. Our Chairman at one point implied that our 
society will gravitate towards the horrors of Auschwitz should 
we fail to impeach this president for allegedly lying under 
oath. Even less excessive formulations of this argument lack 
merit. The American people are smart enough to know the 
difference between right and wrong or legal and illegal, and to 
recognize that presidents who engage in wrongful or illegal 
conduct are not worthy of emulation in certain respects. 
Moreover, no amount of dramatic rhetoric should distract anyone 
from the fact that this president remains subject to indictment 
and prosecution for any illegality he might have committed--
whether we impeach or not.
    The vote by the Majority to impeach President Clinton was 
the culmination of a process which, I believe, was a credit to 
neither the Constitution nor the House Judiciary Committee. The 
Majority voted to impeach this president for allegedly 
obstructing justice, even though it failed to call material 
witnesses to resolve key conflicts in testimony that go to the 
very heart of the obstruction of justice case it seeks to make. 
In terms of calling witnesses, the Majority instead summoned 
before the committee two individuals who had been convicted of 
perjury in a court of law, as if that were sufficient to 
establish that the president committed ``high Crimes and 
Misdemeanors.'' The House dumped the independent counsel's 
gratuitously salacious Referral onto the Internet without 
having read it first. In short, the Majority acted as little 
more than a ready conduit for scandal between the Office of the 
Independent Counsel and the Senate.
    And at the end of the process, during the committee's 
debate on articles of impeachment, members of the Majority 
suggested that its approval of articles of impeachment had 
little to do with the president's prospects for remaining in 
office. Rather, impeachment was merely the ``ultimate 
censure,'' or a ``scarlet letter.'' Their objective in making 
this argument is clear. That objective is to impeach the 
president without alerting the American people to the fact that 
impeachment is the House's sole contribution to a process by 
which a president stands to be removed from office.  With 
public opinion arrayed strongly against the removal of this 
president from office, avoiding the ``r word'' (``removal'') 
might make for smart political spin. But it is just as clearly 
a stunning abdication of responsibility and accountability for 
the clear import of the Majority's actions. If one supports the 
removal of this president, let him or her simply say so, rather 
than absurdly pretending that impeachment has nothing to do 
with removal.
    It is for these reasons that I fear not only how history 
will treat what has been done in the name of the House 
Judiciary Committee but also how those actions will shape 
history. Shall the vote and debate over whether or not to 
impeach the President of the United States exhibit the same 
degree of partisan division and rancor as the votes we cast on 
such issues as school vouchers and committee ratios? If so, 
perhaps impeachment will be viewed by generations-to-come to be 
of no greater gravity than those lesser issues. Shall an 
independent counsel's fact-finding be the sole factual record 
upon which the House Judiciary Committee votes to impeach a 
president? If so, I would suggest we have much to fear. Indeed, 
both parties have at different times recognized that 
independent counsels are hardly infallible in terms of their 
methods, motives, and conclusions.
    Accordingly, I strongly dissent from the decision to 
impeach President Clinton. We should instead enact a resolution 
strongly disapproving of the president's conduct. Enactment of 
a censure resolution would fulfill the House's dual 
responsibility to express outrage over the president's conduct 
and to confine impeachment to cases truly involving ``Treason, 
Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors.'' It would 
punish the president by inflicting a lasting wound to his 
historical legacy. Just as importantly, it would avoid 
punishing this country with an unjustified impeachment and a 
contentious Senate trial.

                                                      Marty Meehan.

              DISSENTING VIEWS OF HON. WILLIAM D. DELAHUNT

    I oppose the articles of impeachment as reported by the 
Judiciary Committee. I agree with much of the reasoning 
included in the Minority's Dissenting Views. However, I write 
separately to clarify my own perspective on a number of 
matters, including the reliability of the allegations upon 
which the case for impeachment is based.
    I neither condone nor excuse the President's admitted 
misdeeds. However, I agree with my Minority colleagues that the 
allegations, even if true, do not form a constitutionally 
sufficient basis for impeachment. Whatever the Founders meant 
by ``high Crimes and Misdemeanors,'' it is well-established 
that impeachment should be reserved for situations in which the 
incumbent poses so grave a danger to the Republic that he must 
be replaced before finishing his term of office. The Majority 
has utterly failed to establish that such is the case here.
    As for the allegations themselves, however, I do not 
believe the Minority is in any better position to assess their 
accuracy then the Majority. The committee took no direct 
testimony in this matter. We called not a single witness who 
could testify to the facts. Instead, we relied solely on the 
assertions contained in the referral of the Independent 
Counsel. Those assertions are based on grand jury testimony and 
other information--much of it ambiguous and contradictory--
whose credibility has never been tested through cross-
examination.
    Even absent such evidentiary problems, Article II of the 
Constitution imposes upon the committee a solemn obligation--
which it may not delegate to the Independent Counsel or any 
other individual--to conduct a thorough and independent 
examination of the allegations and make its own findings of 
fact.
    By failing to do this--by merely rubber-stamping the 
conclusions of the Independent Counsel--we have not only failed 
to establish a factual basis for the charges set forth in the 
articles of impeachment, but have abdicated our constitutional 
role to an unelected prosecutor and recklessly lowered the bar 
for future impeachments. In so doing, we have sanctioned an 
encroachment upon the Executive Branch that could upset the 
delicate equilibrium among the three branches of government 
that is our chief protection against tyranny.
    A related casualty of our cavalier approach to this 
investigation has been the due process to which even our 
Presidents are entitled. We released the referral--including 
thousands of pages of secret grand jury testimony--within hours 
of its receipt, before either the Judiciary Committee or the 
President's counsel had any opportunity to examine it. We voted 
to initiate a formal inquiry against the President without even 
a cursory review of the allegations. We required the 
President's counsel to prepare his defense without knowing what 
charges would be brought. And we released articles of 
impeachment--drafted in secrecy by the Majority alone--before 
the President's counsel had even finished his presentation to 
the committee.
    Having put before the public a one-sided case for the 
prosecution, some members of the Majority actually suggested 
that the President had the burden of proving his innocence. 
When he attempted to do so, those same members accused him of 
``splitting hairs.''
    This was perhaps the most disturbing aspect of our 
proceedings. We live in a nation of laws, in which every 
person--whether pauper or President--is entitled to due 
process. This has nothing to do with ``legal hairsplitting.'' 
It has everything to do with requiring those who wield the 
awesome power of the State to meet their burden of proof. That 
is what distinguishes this country from a totalitarian one. 
That is the genius of a Constitution crafted by men who knew 
and understood the nature of tyranny. As one former United 
States Attorney testified during our hearings, those who 
complain most loudly about such ``technicalities'' are the 
first to resort to them when it is they who stand accused.
    Public confidence in the rule of law is ultimately more 
important than the fate of one particular President. And the 
official lawlessness that has characterized this investigation 
has done far more to shake that confidence than anything of 
which the President stands accused.
    These proceedings stand in stark contrast to those of the 
Watergate committee--which the Majority had self-consciously 
adopted as its model. During the Watergate crisis, the Rodino 
committee managed to transcend partisanship at a critical 
moment in our national life, and set a standard of fairness 
that earned it the lasting respect of the American people. As 
the Judiciary Committee voted to launch this inquiry, I 
expressed the hope that our proceedings would be equally fair, 
thorough and bipartisan, and that--whatever our verdict might 
be--our efforts would be found as worthy of praise.
    In at least one important respect, the committee did merit 
such praise. Chairman Hyde permitted us to offer a censure 
resolution despite the extraordinary pressures that were 
brought to bear for him not to do so. In my view, the 
resolution which I sponsored, together with Mr. Boucher, Mr. 
Barrett and Ms. Jackson Lee, was--and remains--the most 
appropriate means of condemning the President's misconduct 
while sparing the nation the further turmoil and uncertainty of 
a lengthy Senate trial.
    Contrary to the continuing claims of some that censure 
would be unconstitutional, a score of constitutional experts 
called as witnesses by both Republicans and Democrats on the 
Committee agreed in writing--by a margin of almost 4 to 1--that 
the Constitution does not prohibit censure. And it would be a 
breathtaking departure from the democratic principles which are 
the soul of the Constitution to deny the full House an 
opportunity to vote on an alternative to impeachment.
    As we stand on the brink of an impeachment vote for only 
the second time in our history, we can only hope that the 
democracy that has survived so many storms will weather this 
crisis as well, and that the irresponsible actions of this 
Committee will not do lasting damage to the country that we all 
so dearly love.

                                                  William Delahunt.

               DISSENTING VIEWS OF HON. STEVEN R. ROTHMAN

    During the course of the Judiciary Committee's work 
concerning the eleven charges brought against President Clinton 
by Independent Counsel Ken Starr, I have sought to do my duty 
as a member of the House Judiciary Committee: to keep an open 
mind, study the historical origins of our Constitution's 
impeachment standard and subsequent legal precedent, listen 
carefully and conduct myself in a manner that my constituents, 
history and my children will respect.
    I have worked hard to be attentive to all arguments and 
points of view on these subjects, no matter from which 
political party, if any, the author of those views emanated. 
Now, I have, after all these months of hard work and 
deliberation, been called upon to vote on Articles of 
Impeachment.
    With regards to the charges of perjury, abuse of power and 
obstruction of justice brought by Judge Starr against the 
President emanating from the Paula Jones civil deposition and 
the later Grand Jury testimony regarding that deposition, none 
of us on the House Judiciary Committee were fact witnesses to 
any of the alleged acts. Even Judge Starr has repeatedly 
admitted that he was not a fact witness to any impeachable 
offense allegedly committed by the President.
    In the present case, however, Judge Starr has chosen only 
to make opening statements, both written and oral. He has 
presented no fact witnesses. Instead, he has relied on 
transcribed portions of statements from people whose civil 
deposition was taken or who were questioned by his staff before 
a grand jury. But none of these witnesses was ever cross-
examined by the President's counsel or anyone else, even though 
there was a great deal of conflicting and ambiguous testimony 
given by each of these witnesses. In addition, the President's 
counsels, David Kendall and Charles Ruff, and the House 
Judiciary Committee's minority counsel Abbe Lowell, in their 
written and oral responses, have rebutted and refuted each and 
every one of the charges raised by Judge Starr.
    Here, when basic facts are in doubt, I firmly believe that 
it was incumbent upon those advancing the impeachment of a 
sitting U.S. President, to bring forth the fact witnesses so 
that we on the House Judiciary Committee could hear them, see 
them and cross-examine them.
    Cross-examination of the people whose words one wants to 
use to prove something in a judicial proceeding is an old and 
longstanding requirement of our American system of justice. 
Being a nation founded by rebels loathe to take the word of 
government officials only, our Founders gave all accused the 
right to confront witnesses against them, to put the burden of 
proving guilt on the accuser and did not require the accused to 
prove his or her innocence. To put the burden of proof on the 
accused, in this case President Clinton, subverts not only the 
Congress's impeachment power, but two hundred years of American 
justice.
    Some argue that because it is the Senate that conducts the 
impeachment trial of the President, the House Judiciary 
Committee should not require certainty of the truthfulness of 
the impeachment charges. However, when the subject is the 
impeachment of the President of the United States, it is my 
opinion that a clear and convincing standard of proof must be 
met before the House Judiciary Committee and the House of 
Representatives send this matter to the Senate.
    Our Founders created a democracy in which the President was 
to be the only person in America elected by all the people. The 
President was to be in office for only four-year terms and 
would not be guaranteed any tenure longer than four years at a 
time. Only in extraordinary circumstances would the Congress be 
able to remove a sitting President.
    As you may know, the Federalist Papers #65 speaks of a real 
fear that a House of Representatives dominated by one political 
party would impeach a President of the opposite party without 
sufficient cause or proof--causing a terrible shock and 
disruption to our political system.
    That is why the Framers of the Constitution set the bar for 
Presidential impeachment so high. They specifically rejected 
such standards as ``maladministration'' and failure to 
demonstrate ``good behavior''. Instead, they chose ``treason, 
bribery, or other high crimes and misdemeanors.'' According to 
most scholars, that phrase clearly meant offenses as serious a 
threat to the republic as ``treason'' or ``bribery.''
    The various experts and scholars who made presentations to 
the Judiciary Committee reminded us that President Clinton can 
be sued civilly and criminally for any conduct at issue. He is 
not above the rule of law. Therefore, no matter what decision 
this Congress makes about impeaching President Clinton, the 
world knows, and our children know, that the rule of law in 
America applies to all of us `` even the President.
    But this impeachment vote is not about enforcing the civil 
or criminal law, that is the role of the civil and criminal 
courts. Our responsibility is to determine if Judge Starr has 
sufficiently proven any facts upon which our Constitution would 
permit Congress to remove our duly elected President from 
office.
    In my opinion, Judge Starr's burden of proving his case of 
perjury, obstruction of justice and abuse of power--by clear 
and convincing evidence--has not been met.
    In particular, given the conflicting interpretations given 
to the deposition and grand jury witnesses' transcripts relied 
upon by Judge Starr, it was incumbent upon those seeking 
President Clinton's impeachment to present us with the facts 
witnesses who would support the charges. We needed to hear 
them, see them and cross-examine them in order to have 
determined the truthfulness of Judge Starr's conclusions of 
fact and law. None were brought before us. The prosecution's 
burden was not met. Therefore, I will vote against issuing 
Articles of Impeachment against President Clinton based on 
Judge Starr's charges.
    However, that is not the end of this matter. As a nation, 
we must address what we all were witness to in January 1998 
when President Clinton volunteered to us on television that he 
never had sexual relations with Monica Lewinsky. The President 
was adamant and demanded that we believe him. At that time, he 
had no reason to rely on the narrow definition of ``sexual 
relations'' he believed he was held to in the Paula Jones civil 
deposition. He was not telling us the truth. He lied to us.
    I agree with the overwhelming majority of Republican and 
Democratic constitutional scholars that the President's 
televised lie and his relationship with Ms. Lewinsky do not 
rise to the level of ``treason, bribery or other high crimes 
and misdemeanors.'' However, I believe that the President's lie 
to the American people, as well as his admitted adulterous 
behavior with Ms. Lewinsky in the White House, demands 
punishment. Only by taking action against that conduct will we 
be able to look our children in the eyes and tell them that 
even presidents who lie and conduct themselves with such 
dishonor will be punished. That is why I will be voting to 
censure President Clinton on those grounds.

                                                 Steven R. Rothman.

                  DISSENTING VIEWS OF HON. TOM BARRETT

    Representative Barrett signs on to sections 1, 3(C), 3(D), 
4, and 5, but not sections 2, 3(A), and 3(B), of the Minority 
dissenting views. In so doing, Representative Barrett notes 
that Articles of Impeachment I, II, and IV are based upon false 
and perjurious statements allegedly made by President Clinton 
(1) before a federal grand jury, (2) in the Jones deposition, 
and (3) in response to questions propounded by the Chairman of 
this Committee. The Majority party fails to state with 
particularity the words that constitute the allegedly false and 
perjurious statements, denying the President notice and 
opportunity to be heard consistent with traditional notions of 
fairness and due process. The Majority has, moreover, failed to 
establish the factual basis for these artic