IC21: The Intelligence Community in the 21st Century

Staff Study
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence
House of Representatives
One Hundred Fourth Congress

Appendix C. CRS Report: Proposals for Intelligence Reorganization 1949-1996

     (A Report Prepared for the Permanent Select Committee on
            Intelligence, House of Representatives)
                             
                   Richard A. Best, Jr.
                Analyst in National Defense
                            and
                 Herbert Andrew Boerstling
                    Research Assistant
       Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division
                             
                             
                      February 28, 1996



                     TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  1

PART I . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
Intelligence Reform Proposals Made by Commissions 
and Major Legislative Initiatives  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
     The Truman Administration, 1945-1953. . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
     The First Hoover Commission, 1949 . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5
     Intelligence Survey Group (Dulles-Jackson-Correa Report),
          1949 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  7
     Summary of the Truman Administration Intelligence 
          Investigations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9
     The Eisenhower Administration, 1953-1961. . . . . . . . . . .  9
     Second Hoover Commission, 1955. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9
     The Doolittle Report, 1954. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
     Bruce-Lovett Report, 1956 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
     Summary of the Eisenhower Administration Intelligence
          Investigations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
     The Kennedy Administration, 1961-1963 . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
     The Taylor Commission . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
     The Kirkpatrick Report. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
     Summary of the Kennedy Administration Intelligence
          Investigations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
     The Johnson Administration, 1963-1969 . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
     The Nixon Administration, 1969-1974 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
     The Schlesinger Report, 1971. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
     Summary of the Nixon Administration Intelligence
          Investigation  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
     The Era of Public Investigations, 1974-1981 . . . . . . . . . 19
     Murphy Commission, (Commission on the Organization of the
          Government for the Conduct of Foreign Policy), 1975. . . 19
     Rockefeller Commission (Commission on CIA Activities within
          the United States), 1975 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
     Church Committee (Senate Select Committee to Study
          Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence
          Activities), 1976. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
     Pike Committee (House Select Committee on Intelligence),
          1976 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
     Clifford and Cline Proposals, 1976. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
     Proposed Charter Legislation, 1978-1980 . . . . . . . . . . . 28
     The Executive Branch Response, 1976-1981  . . . . . . . . . . 29
     The Turner Proposal, 1985 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
     Iran-Contra Investigation, 1987 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
     Boren-McCurdy, 1992 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
     Commission on the Roles and Capabilities of the U.S.
          Intelligence Community (Aspin Commission), 1995-1996 . . 33

PART II. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
Advantages and Disadvantages of Major Proposals. . . . . . . . . . 35
     Role of the DCI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
     Role of the CIA Operations Directorate. . . . . . . . . . . . 39
     Disclosing the Intelligence Budget. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41

Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43



            PROPOSALS FOR INTELLIGENCE REORGANIZATION, 
                           1949-1996
                             
                            SUMMARY
                              
     Proposals for the reorganization of the United States
Intelligence Community have repeatedly emerged from commissions
and committees created by either the executive or legislative
branches.  The heretofore limited authority of Directors of
Central Intelligence and the great influence of the Departments
of State and Defense have inhibited the emergence of major
reorganization plans from within the Intelligence Community
itself.  The history of efforts--successful and otherwise --to
reorganize the U.S. Intelligence Community can be largely traced
in the proposals of outside commissions set up to investigate
perceived shortcoming in intelligence capabilities.  

     Proposals to reorganize the Intelligence Community date to
the period immediately following passage of the National
Security Act of 1947 (P.L. 80-253) that established the position
of Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) and the Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA).  Recommendations have ranged from
adjustments in the DCI's budgetary responsibilities to the
actual dissolution of the CIA and returning its functions to
other departments.  The goals underlying such proposals have
reflected trends in American foreign policy and the
international environment as well as domestic concerns about
governmental accountability.

     In the face of a hostile Soviet Union, early intelligence
reorganization proposals were more concerned with questions of
efficiency.  In the Cold War context of the 1950s, a number of
recommendations sought aggressively to enhance U.S. covert
action and counterintelligence capabilities.  The chairman of
one committee charged with investigating the nation's
intelligence capabilities, Army General James H. Doolittle,
argued that sacrificing America's sense of "fair play" was
wholly justified in the struggle to prevent Soviet world
domination.

     Following the failed invasion of Cuba at the Bay of Pigs,
the unsuccessful results of intervention in Vietnam, and the
Watergate scandal, investigations by congressional committees
focused on the propriety of a wide range of heretofore accepted
intelligence activities that included assassinations and some
domestic surveillance of U.S. citizens.  Some forcefully
questioned the viability of secret intelligence agencies within
a democratic society.  These investigations resulted in much
closer congressional oversight and a more exacting legal
framework for intelligence activities.  At the same time, the
growth in technical intelligence capabilities led to an
enhanced--but by no means predominant--leadership role for the
DCI in determining community-wide budgets and priorities.

     With the end of the Cold War, emerging security concerns,
including transnational terrorism, narcotics trafficking, and
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, face the United
States.  Most recent proposals for intelligence reorganization
address post-Cold War requirements for covert action, the
structure and size of the CIA, and the extent of the DCI's
authority over all elements of the Intelligence Community. 
These post-Cold War issues can be usefully addressed with an
awareness of arguments pro and con that were raised by earlier
investigators.

                    PROPOSALS FOR INTELLIGENCE
                    REORGANIZATION, 1949-1996

                           INTRODUCTION

     The National Security Act of 1947 (P.L. 80-253) established
the statutory framework for the managerial structure of the
United States Intelligence Community, including the Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the position of Director of
Central Intelligence (DCI).  A fundamental intent of this
legislation was to coordinate, and to a certain extent
centralize, the nascent intelligence efforts of the United
States as an emergent superpower in the face of a hostile Soviet
Union.  In addition, the act provided the CIA with the ability
to assume an operational role by charging it with:  

     Perform[ing] such other functions and duties related
     to intelligence affecting the national security as the
     National Security Council may from time to time direct./1/

     In 1947, the foundation of the present-day Intelligence
Community consisted only of the relatively small intelligence
components in the Armed Services, the Departments of State and
the Treasury, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and
the fledgling CIA.  Since 1947, however, the Intelligence
Community "has greatly expanded in size and acquired a much
broader range of responsibilities in the collection, analysis,
and dissemination of foreign intelligence."/2/

     The U.S. Intelligence Community is defined by the Fiscal
Year 1996 Intelligence Authorization Act (P.L. 104-93).  It
listed the following agencies and organizations that conduct
intelligence and intelligence-related activities:

       Central Intelligence Agency 
       Department of Defense
       Defense   Intelligence Agency 
       National Security Agency 
       National Reconnaissance Office 
       Departments of the Army, Navy, Air Force 
       Department of State
       Department of the Treasury 
       Department of Energy 
       Federal Bureau of Investigation 
       Drug Enforcement Administration 
       Central Imagery Office.

     Beginning in January 1948, numerous independent commissions,
individual experts, and legislative initiatives have examined
the growth and evolving mission of the Intelligence Community. 
Proposals by these groups have sought to address perceived
shortcomings in the Intelligence Community's structure,
management, role, and mission.  These proposals have ranged in
scope from basic organizational restructuring to, more recently,
the dissolution of the CIA.

     In 1948 and 1949, two executive branch commissions examined
the intelligence and operational missions of the CIA, and
identified fundamental administrative and organizational
loopholes in P.L. 80-253.  By the 1950s, however, the physical
growth and evolving mission of the Intelligence Community led
subsequent commissions to broaden the scope of their proposals
to include the enhancement of the DCI's community-wide
authority, and the establishment of executive and legislative
branch intelligence oversight committees.  Unlike the
intelligence investigations of the 1970s and 1980s, these early
studies were primarily concerned with questions of efficiency
and effectiveness rather than with issues of legality and
propriety. 

     Following the Vietnam War and "Watergate," investigatory
bodies became increasingly critical of the national intelligence
effort.  Beginning in the mid-1970s, the impetus shifted to the
legislative branch where investigatory committees led by Senator
Frank Church and Representative Otis G. Pike issued a broad
range of proposals, including the separation of the DCI and CIA
Director positions, dividing the CIA's analytical and
operational responsibilities into two separate agencies, and
the establishment of congressional oversight committees.  In
1976 and 1977, respectively, recommendations by the these
committees led to the establishment of the Senate Select
Committee on Intelligence (SSCI) and the House Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI).  These committees were
heavily involved in the investigations into the Iran-Contra
affair of the mid-1980s.  

     With the end of the Cold War, and in the wake of the Aldrich
Ames espionage case, both the executive and legislative branches
are currently undertaking studies to determine the future roles,
capabilities, management, and structure of the Intelligence
Community.  These studies include such issues as the need to
maintain the CIA as a separate entity, the extent and competence
of U.S. counterintelligence (CI) efforts, and the managerial
structure of intelligence components in the armed services and
the Department of Defense (DOD).  A comprehensive examination
of the DCI's roles, responsibilities, authorities, and status
is also being undertaken.  In an era of budgetary constraints
and shifting policy concerns, these studies are also examining
personnel issues, allocation of resources, duplication of
services, expanded use of open source Intelligence (OSCINT),
and the need for maintaining a covert action (CA) capability.

     In the course of recurring proposals for altering the
organization of the Intelligence Community, the forty-eight year
history of these investigations has witnessed the gradual
transformation of intelligence from a White House asset to one
that is shared between the executive and legislative branches. 
Congress not only has access to intelligence judgments but to
most information that intelligence agencies acquire as well as
the details of intelligence activities.  Congress has accepted
some responsibility as a participant in the planning and conduct
of covert actions.  In significant measure, this process has
been encouraged by these external intelligence investigations. 

     This report provides a chronological overview and
examination of the major executive and legislative branch
intelligence investigations made from January 1949 to date. 
In Part I, all major proposals are listed in chronological order
with a brief discussion of their respective results.  In Part
II, these proposals are grouped together by issues and include
an examination of arguments for and against.  Proposals
specifically relating to congressional oversight of the
Intelligence Community are not included in this report.


                          PART I

Intelligence Reform Proposals Made by Commissions 
             and Major Legislative Initiatives
                              
     
     Alice soon came to the conclusion that it was a very
                  difficult game indeed.
     -Lewis Carroll, Alice's Adventures In Wonderland/3/


The Truman Administration, 1945-1953

     Following the Second World War, the United States emerged
as a global political, military, and economic leader.  In the
face of Soviet aggressiveness, the U.S. sought to enhance its
national defense capabilities to curb the international spread
of communism and to provide security for the nation itself. 

     The National Security Act (P.L. 80-253), signed July 26,
1947, established the statutory framework for the managerial
structure of the United States Intelligence Community, including
the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the position of
Director of Central Intelligence (DCI).  The Act also created
a semi-unified military command structure under a Secretary of
Defense, and a National Security Council (NSC) to advise the
President "with respect to the integration of domestic, foreign,
and military policies relating to the national security."/4/ The
fundamental intent of this legislation was to coordinate U.S.
national defense efforts, including intelligence activities,
in the face of a Soviet Union intent upon expanding and leading
a system of communist states.
  
     In response to the rapid growth and changing role of the
Federal government following the Second World War, several
studies were conducted to examine the structure and efficiency
of the executive branch, including the intelligence agencies./5/
Between 1948 and 1949, two important investigations of the
national intelligence effort were conducted. The first, the Task
Force on National Security Organization of the First Hoover
Commission, was established by a unanimous vote in Congress. 
The second, known as the Dulles-Jackson-Correa Report, was
initiated by the NSC at the request of President Harry S.
Truman.


The First Hoover Commission, 1949

     The Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of
the government was established pursuant to P.L. 80-162 of July
27, 1947./6/  Under the chairmanship of former President Herbert
Hoover, the twelve man bipartisan commission conducted a
comprehensive review of the federal bureaucracy, including the
intelligence agencies.  The commission's Task Force on National
Security Organization was headed by Ferdinand Eberstadt, a
strong advocate of a centralized intelligence capability who
had been instrumental in drafting the National Security Act of
1947./7/

     Hearings conducted by the task force began in June 1948.
On January 13, 1949, the Hoover Commission submitted the task
force's 121 page unclassified report to Congress./8/  Known as
the Eberstadt Report, it found the "National Security
Organization, established by the National Security Act of 1947,
[to be] soundly constructed, but not yet working well."/9/  The
report identified fundamental organizational and qualitative
shortcomings in the national intelligence effort and the newly
created CIA.

     A principal concern of the task force was the adversarial
relationship and lack of coordination between the CIA, the
military, and the State Department.  It suggested that this
resulted in unnecessary duplication and the issuance of
departmental intelligence estimates that "have often been
subjective and biased."/10/  In large measure, the military and
State Department were blamed for their failure to consult and
share pertinent information with the CIA.  The task force
recommended "that positive efforts be made to foster relations
of mutual confidence between the [CIA] and the several
departments and agencies that it serves."/11/  

     In short, the report stressed that the CIA "must be the
central organization of the national intelligence system."/12/ 
To facilitate community coordination in the production of
national estimates, a founding intent of CIA, the task force
recommended the creation within CIA "at the top echelon an
evaluation board or section composed of competent and
experienced personnel who would have no administrative
responsibilities and whose duties would be confined solely to
intelligence evaluation."/13/  To foster professionalism and
continuity of service, the report also favored a civilian DCI
with a long term in office./14/

     In the arena of covert operations and clandestine
intelligence, the Eberstadt Report supported the integration
of all clandestine operations into one office within CIA, under
NSC supervision.  To alleviate concerns expressed by the
military who viewed this proposal as encroaching upon their
prerogatives, the report stated that clandestine operations
should be the responsibility of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS)
in time of war./15/

     In examining the daily workings of the CIA, the task force
found the agency's internal structure and personnel system "not
now properly organized."/16/  This led to recommendations for the
adoption of clearer lines of departmental responsibilities, and
the establishment of proper personnel selection and training
systems./17/  In response to legislative concerns regarding
intelligence budgets, the report supported establishing a legal
framework for budgetary procedures and authorities, and in
maintaining the secrecy of the CIA budget in order to provide
the "administrative flexibility and anonymity that are essential
to satisfactory intelligence."/18/  The report also addressed,
and rejected, the possibility of placing the FBI's
counterintelligence responsibilities in the CIA./19/

     Of particular concern was the level of professionalism in
military intelligence, and the glaring inadequacies of medical
and scientific intelligence, including biological and chemical
warfare, electronics, aerodynamics, guided missiles, atomic
weapons, and nuclear energy./20/  The report declared that the
failure to appraise scientific advances in hostile countries
(i.e., the Soviet Union) might have more immediate and
catastrophic consequences than failure in any other field of
intelligence.  Accordingly, the report stressed that the U.S.
should establish a central authority "to collect, collate, and
evaluate scientific and medical intelligence."/21/


Intelligence Survey Group (Dulles-Jackson-Correa Report), 1949

     On January 8, 1948, the National Security Council
established the Intelligence Survey Group (ISG) to "evaluate
the CIA's effort and its relationship with other agencies."/22/
Commissioned at the request of President Truman, the group was
composed of Allen W. Dulles, who had served in the Office of
Strategic Services (OSS) during the Second World War and would
become DCI in 1953, William Jackson, a future Deputy DCI, and
Matthias Correa, a former assistant to Secretary of Defense
James V. Forrestal when the latter had served as Secretary of
the Navy during the war.  Under the chairmanship of Dulles, the
ISG presented its findings, known as the Dulles-Jackson-Correa
Report, to the National Security Council on January 1, 1949. 

     The 193-page report, partially declassified in 1976,
contained fifty-six recommendations, many highly critical of
the CIA and DCI./23/ In particular, the report revealed problems
in the agency's execution of both its intelligence and
operational missions.  It also criticized the quality of
national intelligence estimates by highlighting the CIA's--and,
by implication, the DCI's--"failure to take charge of the
production of coordinated national estimates."/24/  The report
went on to argue that the CIA's current trend in secret
intelligence activities should be reversed in favor of its
mandated role as coordinator of intelligence./25/

     The Dulles Report was particularly concerned about the
personnel situation at CIA, including internal security, the
high turnover of employees, and the excessive number of military
personnel assigned to the agency./26/  To add "continuity of
service" and the "greatest assurance of independence of action,"
the report argued that the DCI should be a civilian and that
military appointees be required to resign their commissions./27/

     As with the Eberstadt Report, the Dulles Report also
expressed concern about the inadequacies in scientific
intelligence and the professionalism of the service intelligence
organizations, and urged that the CIA provide greater
coordination./28/  This led to a recommendation for increased
coordination between the DCI and the Director of the Federal
Bureau of Investigation (FBI) in the arena of counterespionage. 
In turn, the report recommended that the Director of FBI be
elevated to membership in the Intelligence Advisory Committee
(IAC), whose function was to help the DCI coordinate
intelligence and set intelligence requirements./29/

     The principal thrust of the report was a proposed large-scale
reorganization of the CIA to end overlapping and
duplication of functions.  Similar to the Eberstadt Report, the
Dulles study suggested incorporating covert operations and
clandestine intelligence into one office within CIA.  In
particular, the report recommended that the Office of Special
Operations (OSO), responsible for the clandestine collection
of intelligence, and the Office of Policy Coordination (OPC),
responsible for covert actions, be integrated into a single
division within CIA./30/

     Accordingly, the report recommended replacing existing
offices with four new divisions for coordination, estimates,
research and reports, and operations.  The heads of the new
offices would be included in the immediate staff of the DCI so
that he would have "intimate contact with the day-to-day
operations of his agency and be able to give policy guidance
to them."/31/  These recommendations would become the blueprint
for the future organization and operation of the present-day
CIA. 

Summary of the Truman Administration Intelligence Investigations

     The Task Force on National Security Organization was almost
immediately eclipsed by the Dulles-Jackson-Correa Report, that
found a sympathetic ear in the White House.  On July 7, 1949,
the NSC adopted a modified version of the Dulles Report, and
directed DCI Roscoe H. Hillenkoetter to begin implementing its
recommendations, including the establishment of a single
operations division at CIA.  In 1953, the OSO and OPC were
merged within the CIA to form the  Directorate of Plans (DP). 
(DP was designated the Directorate of Operations (DO) in 1973.) 

     Although the Eberstadt Report was not as widely read among
policymakers as the Dulles study, it did play a principal role
in reorganization efforts initiated by DCI Walter Bedell Smith
in 1950.  The two reports, and the lessons learned from fall
of China to the Communists and the unexpected North Korean
invasion of South Korea in June 1950, prompted Smith to create
an intelligence evaluation board called the Board of National
Estimates (BNE).  Designed to review and produce National
Intelligence Estimates (NIEs), the BNE was assisted by an Office
of National Estimates (ONE) that drew upon the resources of the
entire community./32/


The Eisenhower Administration, 1953-1961

     The Eisenhower Administration witnessed the Soviet Union
solidify its hold over Eastern Europe, crushing the Hungarian
revolution, and the rise of Communist insurgencies in Southeast
Asia and Africa.  This was a period in which extensive covert
psychological, political, and paramilitary operations were
initiated in the context of the threat posed by Soviet-led
Communist expansion.  However, between 1948, when a covert
action program was first authorized through NSC Directive 10/2,
and 1955 there was no formally established procedure for
approval.

     Between 1954 and 1956, this prompted three investigations
into U.S. intelligence activities, including the CIA.  The
first, the Task Force on Intelligence Activities of the Second
Hoover Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of
the Government, was sponsored by Congress.  The second, the
Doolittle Report, was commissioned at the request of President
Dwight D. Eisenhower in response to the Second Hoover
Commission.   The third, the Bruce-Lovett Report was initiated
by the President's Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence
Activities (PBCFIA), and reported to President Eisenhower.


Second Hoover Commission, 1955

     The Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of
the Government, also chaired by former President Hoover, was
created pursuant to P.L. 83-108 of July 10, 1953.  Known as the
Second Hoover Commission, it contained a Task Force on
Intelligence Activities under the chairmanship of General Mark
W. Clark.  In May 1955, the task force submitted both classified
and unclassified reports.  The classified version was sent
directly to President Eisenhower, and has not been declassified
according to available information.  The unclassified version
was sent to Congress.

     The unclassified report's seventy-six pages contained nine
recommendations and briefly described the evolution of the
Intelligence Community and its then-current functioning.  The
report initiated the official use of the term "Intelligence
Community."/33/  Until that time, the U.S. had sought to apply
increasing coordination to departmental intelligence efforts,
without the concept of a "community" of departments and
agencies. 

     The task force began by expressing the need to reform the
CIA's internal organization, including the recommendation that
the DCI concentrate on intelligence issues facing the entire
community by leaving the day-to-day administration of the CIA
to an executive officer or chief of staff./34/  It foresaw the
need for better oversight of intelligence activities and
proposed a small, permanent, bipartisan commission, including
Members of Congress and other "public-spirited citizens," to
provide independent oversight of intelligence activities that
were normally kept secret from other parts of the government./35/
The full commission's report elaborated on this by recommending
the establishment of both a congressional oversight committee
and a presidential advisory panel.    

     The task force also expressed concern about
counterintelligence and recommended systematic rechecking of
all personnel every five years "to make sure that the passage
of time has not altered the trustworthiness of any employee,
and to make certain that none has succumbed to some weakness
of intoxicants or sexual perversion."/36/

     In addition, the task force recommended that the CIA replace
the State Department in the "procurement of foreign publications
and for collection of scientific intelligence."/37/  Finally, there
were a number of "housekeeping" recommendations such as the need
to construct an adequate CIA headquarters, to improve linguistic
training, and to raise the salary of the DCI to $20,000
annually./38/


The Doolittle Report, 1954

     In response to the establishment of the Second Hoover
Commission's Task Force on Intelligence Activities, President
Eisenhower sought and secured an agreement for a separate report
to be presented to him personally on the CIA's Directorate of
Plans, that now had responsibility for both clandestine
intelligence collection and covert operations.  Accordingly,
in July 1954, Eisenhower commissioned Lieutenant General James
Doolittle (USAF) to report on the CIA's covert activities and
to "make any recommendations calculated to improve the conduct
of these operations."/39/

     On September 30, 1954, Doolittle submitted his 69-page
classified report directly to Eisenhower.  Declassified in 1976,
the Doolittle Report contained forty-two recommendations.  The
report began by summarizing contemporary American Cold War
attitudes following the Korean War:

      It is now clear that we are facing an implacable enemy
      whose avowed objective is world domination by whatever
      means and at whatever cost. There are no rules in such
      a game...If the United States is to survive, long-standing
      American concepts of "fair play" must be
      reconsidered. We must develop effective espionage and
      counterespionage services and must learn to subvert,
      sabotage and destroy our enemies by more clever, more
      sophisticated and more effective methods than those used
      against us.  It may become necessary that the American
      people be made acquainted with, understand and support
      this fundamentally repugnant philosophy./40/

      The report went on to recommend that "every possible
scientific and technical approach to the intelligence problem"
be explored since the closed society of the Eastern Bloc made
human espionage "prohibitive" in terms of "dollars and human
lives."/41/

     In examining the CIA, Doolittle found it to be properly
placed in the organization of the government. Furthermore, the
report found the laws relating to the CIA's functions were
sufficient for the agency to meet its operational needs, i.e.
penetration of the Soviet Bloc./42/ The report went on to issue
several recommendations calling for more efficient internal
administration, including recruitment and training procedures,
background checks of personnel, and the need to "correct the
natural tendency to over classify documents originating in the
agency."/43/ It also called for increased cooperation between
the clandestine and analytical sides of the agency, and
recommended that the "Inspector General ... operate on an
Agency-wide basis with authority and responsibility to
investigate and report on all activities of the Agency."/44/
Finally, the report mentioned the need to provide CIA with
accommodations tailored to its specific needs, and to exercise
better control (accountability) of expenditures in covert
projects.

     Shortly after submitting the written report, General
Doolittle voiced his concern to President Eisenhower over the
potential difficulties that could arise from the fact that the
DCI, Allen Dulles, and the Secretary of State, John Foster
Dulles, were brothers and might implement policies without
adequate consultation with other administration officials./45/


Bruce-Lovett Report, 1956

     In 1956, PBCFIA's chairman, James Killian, president of the
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, directed David Bruce,
a widely experienced diplomat, and Robert Lovett, a prominent
attorney, to prepare a report for President Eisenhower on the
CIA's covert action programs as implemented by NSC Directive
10/2.  The report itself has not been located by either the
CIA's Center for the Study of Intelligence or by private
researchers.  Presumably, it remains classified.  However, Peter
Grose, biographer of Allen Dulles, was able to use notes of the
report prepared years earlier by historian Arthur M.
Schlesinger, Jr./46/

     According to Grose's account of the Schlesinger notes,  the
report criticized  the CIA for being too heavily involved in
Third-World intrigues while neglecting the collection of hard
intelligence on the Soviet Union.  Reportedly, Bruce and Lovett
went on to express concern about the lack of coordination and
accountability of the government's psychological and political
warfare program.  Stating that "no charge is made for failure,"
the report claimed that "No one, other than those in CIA
immediately concerned with their day-to-day operation, has any
detailed knowledge of what is going on."/47/  These operations,
asserted Bruce and Lovett, were in the hands of a "horde of CIA
representatives (largely under State or Defense
cover),...bright, highly graded young men who must be doing
something all the time to justify their reason for being."/48/

     As had Doolittle, Bruce and Lovett criticized the close
relationship between Secretary of State John Foster Dulles and
his brother DCI Allen W. Dulles.  Due to the unique position
of each brother, the report apparently expressed concern that
they could unduly influence U.S. foreign policy according to
their own perceptions./49/

     The report concluded by suggesting that the U.S. reassess
its approach to covert action programs, and that a permanent
authoritative position be created to assess the viability and
impact of covert action programs./50/


Summary of the Eisenhower Administration Intelligence Investigations

     As a result of the Second Hoover Commission's Report and
General Doolittle's findings, two new NSC Directives, 5412/1
and 5412/2, were issued pertaining to covert activities in March
and November 1955, respectively. Together, these directives
instituted control procedures for covert action and clandestine
activities.  They remained in effect until 1970, providing basic
policy guidelines for the CIA's covert action operations.

     In 1956, in response to the Clark Task Force, and to preempt
closer congressional scrutiny of intelligence gathering,
President Eisenhower created the President's Board of
Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities (PBCFIA) to
conduct independent evaluations of the U.S. intelligence
program.  PBCFIA became the President's Foreign Intelligence
Advisory Board (PFIAB) in 1961.  Permanent intelligence
oversight committees were not established in Congress until the
mid-1970s.

     When the Bruce-Lovett Report was first issued in the autumn
of 1956, its immediate impact was muted due to the
contemporaneous Suez Canal crisis and the Soviet invasion of
Hungary.  However, it did establish a precedent for future
PBCFIA investigations into intelligence activities.


The Kennedy Administration, 1961-1963

     In the 1950s, the Eisenhower Administration had supported
covert CIA initiatives in Iran (1953) and Guatemala (1954) to
overthrow governments unfriendly to the United States.  These
operations were planned to provide the United States with a
reasonable degree of plausible deniability.  During the last
Eisenhower years, revolution in Cuba resulted in a Communist
government under Fidel Castro.  In the context of the Cold War,
a communist Cuba appeared to justify covert U.S. action to
secure a change in that nation's government.  In April 1961 an
ill-fated U.S. backed invasion of Cuba led to a new chapter in
the history of the Intelligence Community.

     On April 17, 1961, some 1,400 Cuban exiles of the Cuban
Expeditionary Force (CEF), trained and supported by the CIA,
landed at the Bay of Pigs in Cuba with the hope of overthrowing
the communist regime of Fidel Castro.  Known as Operation
Zapata, the invasion was a complete disaster. Over the first
two days, Castro succeeded in defeating the invasion force and
exposing direct U.S. involvement.  

     The fiasco led to two official examinations of U.S.
involvement and conduct in Operation Zapata.  The first, the
Taylor Commission, was initiated by President John F. Kennedy
in an attempt to ascertain the overall cause of the operation's
failure. The second, the Kirkpatrick Report, was an internal
CIA investigation to determine what had been done wrong.


The Taylor Commission

     On April 22, President Kennedy asked General Maxwell Taylor,
former Army Chief of Staff, to chair a high-level body composed
of Attorney General Robert Kennedy, former Chief of Naval
Operations Admiral Arleigh Burke, and DCI Allen Dulles to
ascertain the reasons for the invasion's failure.  Known as the
Taylor Commission, the study group's 53-page classified report
was submitted to President Kennedy on June 13, 1961.

     Declassified in 1977, the report examined the conception,
development, and implementation of Operation Zapata.  The
commission's final report focused on administrative rather than
operational matters, and evenly leveled criticism at the White
House, the CIA, the State Department, and the Joint Chiefs of
Staff./51/

     The report found that the CIA, at White House direction,
had organized and trained Cuban exiles to enter Cuba, foment
anti-Castro sentiment, and ultimately overthrow the Cuban
government.  Originally intended by the Eisenhower
Administration as a guerrilla operation, Zapata was supposed
to operate within the parameters of NSC Directive 5412/2, that
called in part for plausible U.S. deniability.  However, in the
Kennedy Administration, the operation grew in size and scope
to include a full-scale military invasion involving "sheep-dipped"
B-26 bombers, supply ships and landing craft./52/  The
report found that "the magnitude of Zapata could not be prepared
and conducted in such a way that all U.S. support of it and
connection with it could be plausibly disclaimed."/53/

     In large measure, the report blamed the operation's planners
at the CIA's Directorate of Plans for not keeping the President
fully informed as to the exact nature of the operation. 
However, the report also criticized the State Department, JCS,
and the White House for acquiescing in the Zapata Plan, that
"gave the impression to others of approving it" and for
reviewing "successive changes of the plan piecemeal and only
within a limited context, a procedure that was inadequate for
a proper examination of all the military ramifications."/54/

     The Taylor Commission found the operation to be ill-conceived
with little chance for ultimate success.  Once underway,
however, the report cited President Kennedy's decision
to limit overt U.S. air support as a factor in the CEF's
defeat./55/  This decision was apparently reached in order to
protect the covert character of the operation.  The report
criticized this decision by stating that when an operation had
been approved, "restrictions designed to protect its covert
character should have been accepted only if they did not impair
the chance of success."/56/

     The failure in communication, breakdown in coordination,
and lack of overall planning led the Taylor Commission to
conclude that:

     The Executive Branch of government was not
     organizationally prepared to cope with this kind of
     paramilitary operation.  There was no single authority
     short of the President capable of coordinating the
     actions of CIA, State, Defense and USIA [U.S.
     Information Agency].  Top level direction was given
     through ad hoc meetings of senior officials without
     consideration of operational plans in writing and with
     no arrangement for recording conclusions reached./57/

     The lessons of Operation Zapata led the report to recommend
six courses of action in the fields of planning, coordination,
effectiveness, and responsibility in overall Cold War strategy. 
The report recommended the creation of a Strategic Resources
Group (SRG) composed of representatives of under-secretarial
rank from the CIA and the Departments of State and Defense. 
With direct access to the President, the SRG would act as a
mechanism for the planning and coordination of overall Cold War
strategy, including paramilitary operations.  The report
recommended including the opinions of the JCS in the planning
and implementation of such paramilitary operations.  In the
context of the Cold War, the report also recommended a review
of restraints placed upon the United States in order to make
the most effective use of the nation's assets, without concern
for international popularity. The report concluded by
reaffirming America's commitment to forcing Castro from power./58/


The Kirkpatrick Report

     Concurrent with the Taylor Commission, DCI Dulles instructed
the CIA's Inspector General, Lyman B. Kirkpatrick, Jr., to
conduct an internal investigation to determine what the CIA had
done wrong in the Cuban operation. Completed in five months,
the report was viewed by the few within CIA who read it as
professionally shabby./59/ Whereas the Taylor Report had more
of the detached perspective of a management-consultant, the
Kirkpatrick Report was viewed as a personal attack against the
CIA and DCI Dulles.

     The 170-page report remains classified. However, in 1972,
Kirkpatrick published an article in the Naval War College Review
that apparently reflected the findings of his report./60/  In
particular, Kirkpatrick criticized the Zapata planners at the
Directorate of Plans for not having fully consulted the CIA's
Cuban analysts before the invasion.  The article also criticized
the operation's internal security, that Kirkpatrick claimed was
virtually nonexistent.  Calling the operation frenzied,
Kirkpatrick accused the CIA of "playing it by ear" and
misleading the President by failing to inform him that "success
had become dubious."/61/  In Kirkpatrick's view, the CIA bore most
of the blame, and the Kennedy Administration could be forgiven
for having trusted the advice of the operation's planners at
the Agency.



Summary of the Kennedy Administration Intelligence Investigations

     On May 4, 1961, following the Bay of Pigs, President Kennedy
reconstituted the PBCFIA as the President's Foreign Intelligence
Advisory Board (PFIAB).  Although little is known of the
Kirkpatrick Report's impact, the Taylor Report influenced
Kennedy's desire to improve the overall management of the
intelligence process.  In 1962, this prompted the President to
instruct the new DCI, John McCone, to concentrate on his
community-wide coordination role:

     As [DCI], while you will continue to have overall
     responsibility for the Agency, I shall expect you to
     delegate to your principal deputy, as you may deem
     necessary, so much of the detailed operation of the
     Agency as may be required to permit you to carry out
     your primary task as [DCI]./62/


The Johnson Administration, 1963-1969

     No major investigations of the Intelligence Community were
conducted under President Lyndon B. Johnson.  In large measure,
this was due to America's growing preoccupation with the Vietnam
conflict and the strain that this placed on the community's
resources.  The only major investigation during the Johnson
Administration was the Warren Commission on the assassination
of President Kennedy.  Former DCI Allen Dulles served on the
commission.


The Nixon Administration, 1969-1974 

     During the Vietnam War, the Intelligence Community devoted
enormous attention in both manpower and resources towards
achieving U.S. policy objectives in Southeast Asia.  As the U.S.
effort in Vietnam and Laos wound down, and attention turned
towards strategic weapons concerns with the Soviet Union, some
members of the Nixon Administration believed that the community
was performing less than adequately.  In 1970, President Richard
M. Nixon and National Security Advisor Henry A. Kissinger
undertook a review of the Intelligence Community's organization. 


The Schlesinger Report, 1971

     In December 1970, President Nixon commissioned the Office
of Management and Budget (OMB) to examine the Intelligence
Community's organization and recommend improvements, short of
legislation.  In March 1971, the report, "A Review of the
Intelligence Community," was submitted by Deputy OMB Director
James R. Schlesinger, a future DCI.  

     Known as the Schlesinger Report, the study's forty-seven
pages noted the community's "impressive rise in...size and cost"
with the "apparent inability to achieve a commensurate
improvement in the scope and overall quality of intelligence
products."/63/  The report sought to uncover the causes of this
problem and identify areas in which constructive change could
take place. 

     In examining the Intelligence Community, Schlesinger
criticized "unproductively duplicative" collection systems and
the failure in forward planning to coordinate the allocation
of resources./64/  In part, the report cited the failure of
policymakers to specify their product needs to the intelligence
producers./65/  However, the report identified the primary cause
of these problems as the lack of a strong, central Intelligence
Community leadership that could "consider the relationship
between cost and substantive output from a national
perspective."/66/  Schlesinger found that this had engendered a
fragmented, departmental intelligence effort.

     To correct these problems, Schlesinger considered the
creation of a Director of National Intelligence (DNI), enhancing
the DCI's authority, and establishing a Coordinator of National
Intelligence (CNI) who would act as the White House-level
overseer of the Intelligence Community to provide more direct
representation of presidential interest in intelligence issues./67/
In the end, the report recommended "a strong DCI who could bring
intelligence costs under control and intelligence production
to an adequate level of quality and responsiveness."/68/

Summary of the Nixon Administration Intelligence Investigation

     The Schlesinger Report led to a limited reorganization of
the Intelligence Community under a Presidential directive dated
November 5, 1971. In part, the directive called for: 

     An enhanced leadership role for the [DCI] in planning,
     reviewing, and evaluating all intelligence programs and
     activities, and in the production of national intelligence./69/

     Consequently, two boards were established to assist the DCI
in preparing a consolidated intelligence budget and to supervise
community-wide intelligence production. The first, was the ill-fated
Intelligence Resources Advisory Committee (IRAC), that
replaced the National Intelligence Resources Board (NIRB)
established in 1968 under DCI Richard Helms.  The IRAC was
designed to advise the DCI on the preparation of a consolidated
budget for the community's intelligence programs.  However, IRAC
was not afforded the statutory authority necessary to bring the
intelligence budget firmly under DCI control.  The second, and
the only long lasting result of the Nixon directive, was the
establishment of the Intelligence Community Staff (ICS) in 1972. 
Created by DCI Helms, the ICS was meant to assist the DCI in
guiding the community's collection and production of
intelligence. However, the ICS did not provide the DCI with the
statutory basis necessary for an expanded community-wide role./70/
In 1992, DCI Robert Gates replaced the ICS with the Community
Management Staff (CMS).


The Era of Public Investigations, 1974-1981

     In the late 1940s and throughout the 1950s, there had been
widespread public agreement on the need for an effective
national security structure to confront Soviet-led Communist
expansion.  However, by the late 1960s, the war in Vietnam had
begun to erode public consensus and support for U.S. foreign
policy.  The controversy surrounding the Watergate
Investigations after 1972, and subsequent revelations of
questionable CIA activities involving domestic surveillance,
provided a backdrop for increasing scrutiny of government
policies, particularly in such fields as national security and
intelligence. 

     Between 1975 and 1976, this led the Ford Administration and
Congress to conduct three separate investigations that examined
the propriety of intelligence operations, assessed the adequacy
of intelligence organizations and functions, and recommended
corrective measures.  A fourth panel, convened earlier to look
more broadly at foreign policy, also submitted recommendations
for intelligence reform.


Murphy Commission, (Commission on the Organization of the Government
for the Conduct of Foreign Policy), 1975

     The Commission on the Organization of the Government for
the Conduct of Foreign Policy, created pursuant to the Foreign
Relations Authorization Act for FY1973 (P.L. 92-352) of July
13, 1972, was headed by former Deputy Secretary of State Robert
D. Murphy.  It looked at national security formulation and
implementation processes rather than the government as a whole. 
As such, the Murphy Commission was more focused than either of
the two Hoover Commissions and devoted greater attention to
intelligence issues.  Although it made reference to the need
to correct "occasional failures to observe those standards of
conduct that should distinguish the behavior of agencies of the
U.S. Government,"/71/ the commission's approach was marked by an
emphasis of the value of intelligence to national security
policymaking and was, on the whole, supportive of the
Intelligence Community.

     Many of the Murphy Commission's recommendations addressed
problems that have continued to concern successive intelligence
managers.  The commission noted the fundamental difficulty that
DCIs have line authority over the CIA but "only limited
influence" over other intelligence agencies./72/  Unlike other
observers, the Murphy Commission did not believe that this
situation should be changed fundamentally: "[It] is neither
possible nor desirable to give the DCI line authority over that
very large fraction of the intelligence community that lies
outside the CIA."  At the same time, it recommended that the
DCI have an office in close proximity to the White House and
be accorded regular and direct contact with the President.  The
commission envisioned a DCI delegating considerable authority
for managing the CIA to a deputy while he devoted more time to
community-wide responsibilities.  The commission also
recommended that the DCI's title be changed to Director of
Foreign Intelligence./73/

     The commission provided for other oversight mechanisms,
viz., a strengthened PFIAB and more extensive review (prior to
their initiation and on a continuing basis thereafter) of covert
actions by a high-level interagency committee.  It argued that
although Congress should be notified of covert actions, the
President should not sign such notifications since it is harmful
to associate "the head of State so formally with such
activities."/74/  It was further recommended that intelligence
requirements and capabilities be established at the NSC-level
to remedy a situation in which "the work of the intelligence
community becomes largely responsive to its own perceptions of
what is important, and irrelevant information is collected,
sometimes drowning out the important."/75/  It also recommended
that this process be formalized in an officially approved five-year
plan.  A consolidated foreign intelligence budget should
also be prepared, approved by an inter-agency committee and OMB
and submitted to Congress.

     Although the importance of economic intelligence was
recognized, the commission did not see a need for intelligence
agencies to seek to expand in this area; rather, it suggested
that the analytical capabilities of the Departments of State,
Treasury, Commerce, Agriculture, and the Council of Economic
Advisers should be significantly strengthened.

     The commission noted the replacement of the Board of
National Estimates by some eleven National Intelligence Officers
(NIOs) who were to draw upon analysts in various agencies to
draft National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs).  This practice
was criticized because it laid excessive burdens on chosen
analysts and because NIEs had in recent years been largely
ignored by senior officials (presumably Secretary of State
Kissinger) who made their own assessments of future developments
based on competing sources of information and analysis.  Thus,
the commission recommended a small staff of analysts from
various agencies assigned to work with NIOs in drafting NIEs
and ensure that differences of view were clearly presented for
the policymakers. 


Rockefeller Commission (Commission on CIA Activities within the
United States), 1975

     Prior to the mid-1960s, the organization and activities of
the Intelligence Community were primarily the concern of
specialists in national security and governmental organization. 
The Murphy Commission, although working during a subsequent and
more politically turbulent period, had approached intelligence
reorganization from this perspective as well.  The political
terrain had, however, been shifting dramatically and the
Intelligence Community would not escape searching criticism. 
During the era of the Vietnam War and Watergate, disputes over
national security policy focused attention on intelligence
activities.  In 1975, media accounts of alleged intelligence
abuses, some stretching back over decades led to a series of
highly publicized congressional hearings.  

     Revelations of assassination plots and other alleged abuses
spurred three separate investigations and sets of
recommendations.  The first was undertaken within the Executive
Branch and was headed by Vice President Nelson A. Rockefeller. 
Other investigations were conducted by select committees in both
houses of Congress.  The Senate effort was led by Senator Frank
Church and the House committee was chaired by Representative
Otis Pike.  These investigations led to the creation of the two
permanent intelligence committees and much closer oversight by
the Congress.  In addition, they also produced a number of
recommendations for reorganization and realignment within the
Intelligence Community.

     Established by Executive Order 11828 on January 4, 1975,
the Commission on CIA Activities within the United States was
chaired by Vice President Rockefeller and included seven others
appointed by President Ford (including then-former Governor
Ronald Reagan).  The commission's mandate was to investigate
whether the CIA had violated provisions of the National Security
Act of 1947, precluding the CIA from exercising internal
security functions.

     The Rockefeller Commission's 30 recommendations/76/ included
a number of proposals designed to delimit CIA's authority to
collect foreign intelligence within the United States (from
"willing sources") and proscribe collection of information about
the domestic activities of U.S. citizens, to strengthen PFIAB,
to establish a congressional joint intelligence committee, and
to establish guidelines for cooperation with the Justice
Department regarding the prosecution of criminal violations by
CIA employees.  There was another recommendation to consider
the question of whether the CIA budget should be made public,
if not in full at least in part.

     The commission recommended that consideration should be
given to appointing DCIs from outside the career service of the
CIA and that no DCI serve longer than 10 years.  Two deputies
should be appointed; one to serve as an administrative officer
to free the DCI from day-to-day management duties; the other
a military officer to foster relations with the military and
provide technical expertise on military intelligence
requirements.

     The CIA position of Inspector General should be upgraded
and his responsibilities expanded along with those of the
General Counsel.  Guidelines should be developed to advise
agency personnel as to what activities are permitted and what
are forbidden by law and executive orders.  

     The President should instruct the DCI that domestic mail
openings should not be undertaken except in time of war and that
mail cover operations (examining and copying of envelopes only)
are to be undertaken only on a limited basis "clearly involving
matters of national security."  

     The commission was specifically concerned with CIA
infiltration of domestic organizations and submitted a number
of recommendations in this area.  Presidents should refrain from
directing the CIA to perform what are essentially internal
security tasks and the CIA should resist any effort to involve
itself in improper activities.  The CIA "should guard against
allowing any component ...  to become so self-contained and
isolated from top leadership that regular supervision and review
are lost."  Files of previous improper investigations should
be destroyed.  The agency should not infiltrate American
organizations without a written determination by the DCI that
there is a threat to agency operations, facilities, or personnel
that cannot be met by law enforcement agencies.  Other
recommendations were directed at CIA investigations of its
personnel or former personnel, including provisions relating
to physical surveillance, wire or oral communications, and
access to income tax information.

     As a result of efforts by some White House staff during the
Nixon Administration to use CIA resources improperly, a number
of recommendations dealt with the need to establish appropriate
channels between the agency and the Executive Office of the
President.  

     Reacting to evidence that drugs had been tested on
unsuspecting persons, the commission recommended that the
practice should not be renewed.  Also, equipment for monitoring
communications should not be tested on unsuspecting persons
within the United States.  An independent agency should be
established to oversee civilian uses of aerial photography to
avoid any concerns over the improper domestic use of a CIA-developed
system. 

     Concerned with distinguishing the separate responsibilities
of the CIA and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the
commission urged that the DCI and the Director of the FBI
prepare and submit to the National Security Council a detailed
agreement setting forth the jurisdictions of each agency and
providing for effective liaison between them.

     The commission also recommended that all intelligence
agencies review their holdings of classified information and
declassify as much as possible.


Church Committee (Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental
Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities), 1976

     Established in the wake of sensational revelations about
assassination plots organized by the CIA, the Church Committee
had a much wider mandate than the Rockefeller Commission,
extending beyond the CIA to all intelligence agencies./77/  It
too, however, concentrated on illegalities and improprieties
rather than organizational or managerial questions per se. 
After extensive and highly publicized hearings, the committee
made some 183 recommendations in its final report, issued April
26, 1976./78/

     The principal recommendation was that omnibus legislation
be enacted to set forth the basic purposes of national
intelligence activities and defining the relationship between
intelligence activities and the Congress.  Criticizing vagueness
in the National Security Act of 1947, the committee urged
charters for the several intelligence agencies to set forth
general organizational structures and procedures, and delineate
roles and responsibilities.  There should also be specific and
clearly defined prohibitions or limitations on intelligence
activities.  The effort to pass such legislation would consume
considerable attention over a number of years, following the
completion of the work of the Church Committee.

     A number of recommendations reflected the committee's views
on the appropriate role of the National Security Council in
directing and monitoring the work of the intelligence agencies. 
The apparent goal was to encourage a more formal process, with
accountability assigned to cabinet-level officials.  The
committee concluded that covert actions should be conducted only
upon presidential authorization with notification to appropriate
congressional committees.

     Attention was given to the role of the DCI within the entire
Intelligence Community.  The committee recommended that the DCI
be recognized by statute as the President's principal foreign
intelligence advisor and that he should be responsible for
establishing national intelligence requirements, preparing the
national intelligence budget, and for providing guidance for
intelligence operations.

     The DCI should have specific responsibility for choosing
among the programs of the different collection and production
agencies and departments and to insure against waste and
unnecessary duplication. The DCI should also have responsibility
for issuing fiscal guidance for the allocation of all national
intelligence resources.  The authority of the DCI to reprogram
funds within the intelligence budget should be defined by
statute./79/

     Monies for the national intelligence budget would be
appropriated to the DCI rather than to the directors of the
various agencies.  The committee also recommended that the DCI
be authorized to establish an intelligence community staff to
assist him in carrying out his managerial responsibilities. The
staff should be drawn "from the best available talent within
and outside the intelligence community."/80/  Further, the position
of Deputy DCI for the Intelligence Community should be
established by statute (in addition to the existing DDCI who
would have responsibility primarily for the CIA itself).  It
also urged consideration of separating the DCI from direct
responsibility over the CIA.

     The DCI, it was urged, should serve at the pleasure of the
President, but for no more than ten years. 

     The committee also looked at intelligence analysis.  It
recommended a more flexible and less hierarchical personnel
system with more established analysts being brought in at middle
and upper grades.  Senior positions should be established on
the basis of analytical ability rather than administrative
responsibilities.  Analysts should be encouraged to accept
temporary assignments at other agencies or on the NSC staff to
give them an appreciation for policymakers' use of intelligence
information.  A system should be in place to ensure that
analysts are more promptly informed about U.S. policies and
programs affecting their areas of responsibility.

     In addressing covert actions, the committee recommended
barring political assassinations, efforts to subvert democratic
governments, and support for police and other internal security
forces engaged in systematic violations of human rights.

     The committee addressed the questions of separating CIA's
analysis and production functions from clandestine collection
and covert action functions.  It listed the pros and cons of
this approach, but ultimately recommended only that the
intelligence committees should give it consideration.

     Reflecting concerns about abuses of the rights of U.S.
citizens, the committee made a series of recommendations
regarding CIA involvement with the academic community, members
of religious organizations, journalists, recipients of
government grants, and the covert use of books and publishing
houses.  A particular concern was limiting any influence on
domestic politics of materials published by the CIA overseas. 
Attention was also given to proprietary organizations CIA
creates to conduct operations abroad; the committee believed
them necessary, but advocated stricter regulation and
congressional oversight.

     The committee recommended enhanced positions for CIA's
Inspector General (IG) and General Counsel (GC), urging that
the latter be made a presidential appointee requiring Senate
confirmation.  

     In looking at intelligence agencies other than the CIA, the
committee recommended that the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA)
be made part of the civilian Office of the Secretary of Defense
and that a small J-2 staff provide intelligence support to the
Joint Chiefs of Staff.  It was urged that the directors of both
DIA and the National Security Agency (NSA) should be appointed
by the President and confirmed by the Senate.  The committee
believe that either the director or deputy director of DIA and
of NSA should be civilians.  Turning to the State Department,
the committee urged the Administration to issue instructions
to implement legislation that authorized ambassadors to be
provided information about activities conducted by intelligence
agencies in their assigned countries.  It also stated that State
Department efforts to collect foreign political and economic
information overtly should be improved. 

     Funding for intelligence activities has been included in
Defense Department authorization and appropriations legislation
since the end of World War II.  The Church Commission advocated
making public, at least, total amounts and suggested
consideration be given as to whether more detailed information
should also be released.  The General Accounting Office (GAO)
should be empowered to conduct audits at the request of
congressional oversight committees.

     Tests by intelligence agencies on human subjects of drugs
or devices that could cause physical or mental harm should not
occur except under stringent conditions.

     The committee made a number of recommendations regarding
procedures for granting security clearances and for handling
classified information. It also recommended consideration of
new legislative initiatives to deal with other existing
problems.  Finally, the Committee recommended the creation of
a registry of all classified executive orders, including NSC
directives, with access provided to congressional oversight
committees.


Pike Committee (House Select Committee on Intelligence), 1976

     The House Select Committee on Intelligence, chaired by
Representative Otis G. Pike, also conducted a wide-ranging
survey of intelligence activities. In the conduct of its
hearings, the Pike Committee was far more adversarial to the
intelligence agencies than the Senate Committee.  Publication
of its final report was not authorized by the House, although
a version was published in a New York tabloid.  The Pike
Committee's recommendations, however, were published on February
11, 1976./81/  There were some twenty recommendations, some dealing
with congressional oversight, with one dealing, anomalously,
with the status of the Assistant to the President for National
Security Affairs.

     The Pike Committee recommended that covert actions not
include, except in time of war, any activities involving direct
or indirect attempts to assassinate any individual.  The
prohibition was extended to all paramilitary operations.  A
National Security Council subcommittee would review all
proposals for covert actions and copies of each subcommittee
member's comments would be provided to congressional committees. 
The committee further recommended that congressional oversight
committees be notified of presidential approval of covert
actions within 48 hours.  According to the proposal, all covert
actions would have to be terminated no later than 12 months from
the date of approval or reconsidered.

     The committee recommended that specific legislation be
enacted to establish NSA and define its role in monitoring
communications of Americans and placed under civilian control.

     The Pike Committee further recommended that all
"intelligence related items" be included as intelligence
expenditures in the President's budget and that the total sum
budgeted for intelligence be disclosed.

     The committee recommended that transfers of funds be
prohibited between agencies or departments involved in
intelligence activities.  Reprogramming of funds within agencies
would be dependent upon the specific approval of congressional
oversight and appropriations committees.  The same procedures
would be required for expenditures from reserve or contingency
funds.

     The Pike Committee also looked at the role of the DCI.  Like
many others who have studied the question, it recommended that
the DCI should be separate from managing any agency and should
focus on coordinating and overseeing the entire intelligence
effort with a view towards eliminating duplication of effort
and promoting competition in analysis.  It advocated that he
should be a member of the National Security Council. Under this
proposal the DCI would have a separate staff and would prepare
national intelligence estimates and daily briefings for the
President.  He would receive budget proposals from agencies
involved in intelligence activities.  (The recommendations did
not indicate the extent of his authority to approve or
disapprove these recommendations.)  The DCI would be charged
with coordinating intelligence agencies under his jurisdiction,
eliminating duplication, and evaluating performance and
efficiency.

     The committee recommended that the GAO conduct a full and
complete management and financial audit of all intelligence
agencies and that the CIA internal audit staff be given complete
access to CIA financial records.

     The committee recommended that a permanent foreign
operations subcommittee of the NSC, composed of cabinet-rank
officials, be established.  This subcommittee would have
jurisdiction over all authorized activities of intelligence
agencies (except those solely related to intelligence gathering)
and review all covert actions, clandestine activities, and
hazardous collecting activities.  

     It was recommended that DIA be abolished and its functions
divided between the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the
CIA.  The intelligence components of the military services would
be prohibited from undertaking covert actions within the U.S.
or clandestine activities against U.S. citizens abroad.

     Relations between intelligence and law enforcement
organizations were to be limited.  Intelligence agencies would
be barred from providing funds to religious or educational
institutions or to those media with general circulation in the
United States.  

     The committee recommended that specific legislation be
considered to deal with the classification and regular
declassification of information.

     It was also recommended that an Inspector General for
Intelligence be nominated by the President and confirmed by the
Senate with authority to investigate potential misconduct of
any intelligence agency or personnel.  He would make annual
reports to the Congress.

     The committee also made recommendations regarding the
organization and operations of the FBI and its role in
investigating domestic groups.

     In an additional recommendation, Representative Les Aspin,
a member of the committee, urged that the CIA be divided into
two separate agencies, one for analysis and the other for
clandestine collection and covert operations.  A similar
recommendation was made by Representative Ron Dellums, who also
served on the committee.


Clifford and Cline Proposals, 1976

     In 1976 hearings by the Senate Committee on Government
Operations, Clark Clifford (who had served as President
Johnson's final Secretary of Defense and, in an earlier position
in the Truman Administration, had been involved in legislation
creating the CIA) proposed the creation of a post of Director
General of Intelligence to serve as the President's chief
adviser on intelligence matters and as principal point of
contact with the congressional intelligence committees.  There
would be a separate director of the CIA whose duties would be
restricted to day-to-day operations./82/

     In the same year, Ray Cline, a former Deputy Director of
the CIA, made a number of recommendations./83/  He recommended
that the DCI exert broad supervisory powers over the entire
intelligence community and the CIA be divided into two agencies,
one to undertake analytical work and the other for clandestine
services.  He also proposed that the DCI be given cabinet rank,
a practice that would find support in both the Reagan and
Clinton administrations.


Proposed Charter Legislation, 1978-1980

     Subsequent to the establishment of permanent intelligence
oversight committees in the Senate in 1976 and the House of
Representatives in 1977, attention in Congress shifted to
consideration of charter legislation for intelligence agencies./84/
It was envisioned that the charter legislation would include
many of the recommendations made earlier by the Church and Pike
Committees.  Introduced by Senator Walter Huddleston and
Representative Edward Boland, the draft National Intelligence
Reorganization and Reform Act of 1978 (S.2525/H.R.11245, 95th
Congress) would have provided statutory charters to all
intelligence agencies and created a Director of National
Intelligence (DNI) to serve as head of the entire Intelligence
Community.  Day-to-day leadership of CIA could be delegated to
a deputy at presidential discretion.  The draft legislation
contained numerous reporting requirements (regarding covert
actions in particular) to Congress and an extensive list of
banned or restricted activities.  The draft legislation of more
that 170 pages was strongly criticized from all sides in
hearings; some arguing that it would legitimize covert actions
inconsistent with American ideals and others suggesting that
its complex restrictions would unduly hamper the protection of
vital American interests.  The bills were never reported out
of either intelligence committee, although the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (P.L. 95-511) provided
a statutory base for electronic surveillance within the United
States.

     Charter legislation was also introduced in the 96th
Congress. It contained many of the provisions introduced in the
earlier version, but also loosened freedom of information
regulations for intelligence agencies and the requirements of
the Hughes-Ryan amendments of 1974 requiring that some eight
committees be notified of covert actions.  This legislation
(S.2284, 96th Congress) came under even heavier criticism from
all sides than its predecessor.  It was not reported by the
Senate Intelligence Committee, but other stand-alone legislation
did pass and a shorter bill reducing the number of committees
receiving notification of covert actions--and "significant
anticipated intelligence activities"--was introduced and
eventually became law in October 1980 as part of the FY1981
Intelligence Authorization Act (P.L. 96-450).


The Executive Branch Response, 1976-1981 

     Concurrent with, and subsequent to, these legislative
initiatives, the Executive Branch, in part to head off further
Congressional action, implemented some of the more limited
recommendations contained in their respective proposals. 
Presidents Gerald Ford, Jimmy Carter, and Ronald Reagan each
issued detailed Executive Orders (E.O.) setting guidelines for
the organization and management of the U.S. Intelligence
Community.  

     Issued by President Ford on February 18, 1976, prior to the
release of the Church and Pike Committee findings, Executive
Order 11905 undertook to implement some of the more limited
recommendations of the Rockefeller and Murphy Commissions.  In
particular, E.O. 11905 identified the DCI as the President's
primary intelligence advisor and the principal spokesman for
the Intelligence Community and gave him responsibilities for
developing the National Foreign Intelligence Program (NFIP).
It also delineated responsibilities of each intelligence agency,
provided two NSC-level committees for internal review of
intelligence operations, and established a separate three-member
Intelligence Oversight Board to review the legality and
propriety of intelligence activities.  It placed restrictions
on the physical and electronic surveillance of American citizens
by intelligence agencies./85/

     On January 24, 1978, President Carter issued Executive Order
12036, that superseded E.O. 11905./86/  Carter's Executive Order
sought to define more clearly the DCI's community-wide authority
in areas relating to the "budget, tasking, intelligence review,
coordination and dissemination, and foreign liaison."/87/  In
particular, it formally recognized the establishment of the
National Foreign Intelligence Program budget and the short-lived
National Intelligence Tasking Center (NTIC), that was supposed
to assist the DCI in "translating intelligence requirements and
priorities into collection objectives."/88/  E.O. 11905 also
restricted medical experimentation and prohibited political
assassinations.

     President Reagan continued the trend towards enhancing the
DCI's community-wide budgetary, tasking, and managerial
authority.  On December 4, 1981, he issued Executive Order
12333, detailing the roles, responsibilities, missions, and
activities of the Intelligence Community.  It supplanted the
previous orders issued by Presidents Ford and Carter.  Fifteen
years later, E.O. 12333 remains the governing executive branch
mandate concerning the managerial structure of the Intelligence
Community.

     E.O. 12333 designates the DCI "as the primary intelligence
advisor to the President and NSC on national foreign
intelligence."/89/  In this capacity, the DCI's duties include
the implementation of special activities (covert actions),
liaison to the nation's foreign intelligence and
counterintelligence components, and the overall protection of
the community's sources, methods, and analytical procedures./90/
It grants the DCI "full responsibility for [the] production and
dissemination of national foreign intelligence," including the
authority to task non-CIA intelligence agencies, and the ability
to decide on community tasking conflicts./91/  The order also
sought to grant the DCI more explicit authority over the
development, implementation, and evaluation of NFIP./92/

     To a certain extent, E.O. 12333 represented a relaxation
of the restrictions placed upon the community by Carter. 
Although it maintained the prohibition on assassination, the
focus was on "authorizations" rather than "restrictions." 
"Propriety" was removed as a criterion for approving operations. 
Arguably, the Reagan Administration established a presumption
in favor of government needs over individual rights./93/ However,
in the absence of legislation, the DCI continued to lack
statutory authority over all aspects of the Intelligence
Community, including budgetary issues.



The Turner Proposal, 1985

     In 1985, Admiral Stansfield Turner, DCI in the Carter
Administration, expressed his views on the need for intelligence
reform./94/  In part, Turner recommended reducing the emphasis
on covert action and implementing a charter for the Intelligence
Community.  The most important recommendation involved the
future of the DCI of which Turner maintained:

     The two jobs, head of the CIA and head of the Intelligence
Community, conflict.  One person cannot do justice to both and
fulfill the DCI's responsibilities to the President, the
Congress, and the public as well./95/

     Turner went on to propose the separation of the two jobs
of DCI and head of the CIA with the creation of a Director of
National Intelligence, separate and superior to the CIA.  Turner
also recommended placing less emphasis on the use of covert
action than the Reagan Administration.


Iran-Contra Investigation, 1987

     During highly publicized investigations of the Reagan
Administration's covert support to Iran and the Nicaraguan
Resistance, the role of the Intelligence Community, the CIA,
and DCI Casey were foci of attention.  Much of the involvement
of National Security Council staff was undertaken precisely
because legislation had been enacted severely limiting the role
of intelligence agencies in Central America and because efforts
to free the hostages through cooperation with Iranian officials
had been strongly opposed by CIA officials.  The executive
branch's review, chaired by former Senator John Tower, expressed
concern that precise procedures be established for restricted
consideration of covert actions and that NSC policy officials
had been too closely involved in the preparation of intelligence
estimates./96/  The investigation of the affair by two
congressional select committees resulted in a number of
recommendations for changes in laws and regulations governing
intelligence activities.

     Specifically the majority report of the two congressional
select committees that investigated the affair made a number
of recommendations regarding presidential findings concerning
the need to initiative covert actions.  Findings should be made
prior to the initiation of a covert action, they should be in
writing, and they should be made known to appropriate Members
of Congress in no event later than forty-eight hours after
approval.  Further, the majority of the committees urged that
findings be far more specific than some had been in the Reagan
Administration.  Statutory inspector general and general
counsels, confirmed by the Senate, for the CIA were also
recommended./97/  Minority members of the two committees made
several recommendations regarding congressional oversight,
urging that on extremely sensitive matters that notifications
of covert actions be made to only four Members of Congress
instead of the existing requirement for eight to be notified./98/

     These recommendations were subsequently considered by the
two intelligence committees.  A number of provisions was enacted
dealing with covert action findings in the Intelligence
Authorization Act for FY1991 (P.L. 102-88).


Boren-McCurdy, 1992

     A major legislative initiative, reflecting the changed
situation of the post-Cold War world, began in February 1992,
when Senator David Boren, the Chairman of the Senate Select
Committee on Intelligence, and Representative Dave McCurdy, the
Chairman of the House Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence, announced separate plans for an omnibus
restructuring of the U.S. Intelligence Community, to serve as
an intelligence counterpart to the Goldwater-Nichols Department
of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986.  The two versions of the
initiative (S. 2198 and H.R. 4165, 102nd Congress) differed in
several respects, but the overall thrust of the two bills was
similar.  Both proposals called for:

          Creating a Director of National Intelligence (DNI) with
          authority to program and reprogram intelligence funds
          throughout the Intelligence Community, including the
          Defense Department, and to direct their expenditure;
          and to task intelligence agencies and transfer personnel
          temporarily from one agency to another to support new
          requirements;

          Creating two Deputy Directors of National Intelligence
          (DDNIs); one of whom would be responsible for analysis
          and estimates, the other for Intelligence Community
          affairs; 

          Creating a separate Director of the CIA, subordinate
          to the new DNI, to manage the agency's collection and
          covert action capabilities on a day-to-day basis; 

          Consolidating analytical and estimative efforts of the
          Intelligence Community (including analysts from CIA,
          and some from DIA, the Bureau of Intelligence and
          Research (INR) at the State Department, and other
          agencies) into a separate office under one of the Deputy
          DNIs (this aspect of the proposal would effectively
          separate CIA's analytical elements from its collection
          and covert action offices);

          Creating a National Imagery Agency within the Department
          of Defense (DOD) to collect, exploit, and analyze
          imagery (these tasks had been spread among several
          entities; the House version would divide these efforts
          into two new separate agencies).

          Authorizing the Director of DIA to task defense
          intelligence agencies (DIA, NSA, the new Imagery Agency)
          with collection requirements; and to shift functions,
          funding, and personnel from one DOD intelligence agency
          to another;

     This major restructuring effort would have provided
statutory mandates for agencies where operational authority was
created by executive branch directives.  Both statutes and
executive branch directives provided the DCI authority to task
intelligence agencies outside the CIA and to approve budgets
and reprogramming efforts; in practice, however, this authority
had never been fully exercised.  This legislation would have
provided a statutory basis for the DCI (or DNI) to direct
collection and analytical efforts throughout the Intelligence
Community.

     The Boren-McCurdy legislation was not adopted, although
provisions were added to the FY1994 Intelligence Authorization
Act (P.L. 102-496) that provided basic charters for intelligence
agencies and set forth in law the DCI's coordinative
responsibilities vis--vis intelligence agencies other than the
CIA.  Observers credited strong opposition from the Defense
Department and concerns of the Armed Services Committees with
inhibiting passage of the original legislation.


Commission on the Roles and Capabilities of the U.S.
Intelligence Community (Aspin Commission), 1995-1996

     Established pursuant to the Intelligence Authorization Act
for FY 1995 (P.L. 103-359) of September 27, 1994, the Commission
on the Roles and Capabilities of the U.S. Intelligence Community
was formed to assess the future direction, priorities, and
structure of the Intelligence Community in the post-Cold War
environment.  Originally under the chairmanship of the late Les
Aspin, the commission was subsequently headed by former
Secretary of Defense Harold Brown.  Nine members were appointed
by the president and eight nominated by the congressional
leadership.  A final report was scheduled for March 1996.

     P.L. 103-359 set forth nineteen separate issues for the
commission to address, including a determination of intelligence
needs and priorities in the post-Cold War world, whether or not
existing organizational arrangements provide the most effective
and efficient framework to meet those needs, and what resources
will be necessary to satisfy these requirements.

     Specifically, the commission was asked to examine such
issues as the need to maintain the CIA as a separate entity,
U.S. counterintelligence efforts, and the managerial structure
of intelligence components in the armed services.  In an era
of budgetary constraints and evolving policy concerns, the
commission also was expected to address personnel issues,
allocations of resources, duplication of services, expanded use
of open source intelligence, and the viability of maintaining
a covert action capability.  The future responsibilities and
authorities of the DCI were indicated to be a paramount concern.



                         PART II

     Advantages and Disadvantages of Major Proposals

     Many of the recommendations contained in commission reports
and legislative initiatives have been--at least in part--adopted
either by Executive Order, through other executive branch
initiatives, or in statutory law.  A number of the issues raised
by commissions and with other proposals have been addressed in
the context of annual authorization bills (and occasionally
through appropriations laws).  Many observers believe that this
process has proven effective since issues can be dealt with on
a case-by-case basis as they appear most urgent.  Charter
legislation, on the other hand, inevitably involves broad
questions relating not only to intelligence, but to defense and
foreign policy.  The legislative effort involved in sorting out
the complexities of such concerns and holding together a
coalition for many months is perceived as more difficult than
including less ambitious provisions in annual authorization
bills.  The annual authorization process is not, however,
necessarily smooth; in November 1990, President Bush pocket-vetoed
an intelligence authorization bill and a replacement was
not signed until the following August; the FY1996 Intelligence
Authorization Act was not signed until more than three months
into the new fiscal year.

     Although a consolidated legislative charter has not been
enacted for the Intelligence Community, legislation has
addressed the preponderance of issues that have been raised by
commissions and investigatory committees.  Title VII of the
Intelligence Authorization Act for FY1993 (P.L. 102-496)
included provisions defining the role of the DCI and the
responsibilities of the Secretary of Defense pertaining to
national intelligence activities.  In so doing, it provided a
statutory basis for intelligence agencies beyond that which they
had been granted in previous legislation.  Earlier statutes
relating to some intelligence agencies primarily concerned
buildings and personnel rather than operational missions.  
    A series of laws has also been enacted governing procedures
for implementing covert actions./99/  There has been extended
controversy on the extent of notice that presidents should
provide to Congress concerning such actions; presidents continue
to assert a constitutional right to initiate covert actions
without notifying Congress in extreme circumstances.  Although
many in Congress remain opposed to this assertion, observers
consider that, on the whole, current procedures are adequate,
as long as reasonably good will prevails between the executive
and legislative branches.  

     CIA Inspectors General are now nominated by the President
and confirmed by the Senate; legislation to require presidential
appointment of the CIA General Counsel was rejected in the 103d
Congress./100/  Little, if any, consideration has been given to
limiting the term of the DCI to 10 years, since all recent DCIs
have had much shorter tenures.  There exists considerable
feeling that presidents must have a degree of confidence in
their DCIs that could not exist in a person who does not serve
at the president's pleasure.  

     Another area of concern reflected in many recommendations
is the potential for intelligence agencies to infringe on the
rights of U.S. citizens.  Such concerns fueled the Church and
Pike investigations as well as others.  Congress has addressed
these issues in several pieces of legislation, including the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 and the Classified
Information Procedures Act of 1980 (P.L. 96-456).  Legislation
relating to warrantless wiretaps and physical searches was
enacted as part of the Intelligence Authorization Act for FY1995
(P.L. 103-359).  Questions regarding the proper coordination
of intelligence collection by the CIA and the FBI were, however,
raised anew in the aftermath of the Oklahoma City bombing.

     A Counterintelligence Policy Board was established, and
closer cooperation between the CIA and the FBI on
counterintelligence issues mandated, in Section 811 of the
FY1995 Intelligence Authorization Act (with the FBI granted a
more important role).  The FY1996 Intelligence Authorization
Act (P.L. 104-93) provided the FBI with enhanced authority to
acquire information for counterintelligence purposes.

     Congress and the executive branch have addressed most of
the issues raised by commissions and individual legislators;
the results inevitably have not been universally popular.  Some
continue to seek broader restrictions, if not outright
prohibitions of covert actions.  Drafting regulations and
statutes on classification continues to be contentious.  As is
the case with any group of federal agencies, there is likely
to be a continuing need to adapt the regulations and statutes
dealing with the Intelligence Community to changing conditions
and public opinion.  

     There remain, nonetheless, several areas of continuing
concern that have been addressed by commissions and Members over
the years that some believe have never been adequately resolved
by Congress or the executive branch.  The extent of the DCI's
authority over agencies other than the CIA, the role and control
of covert actions, and the question of making public the total
amount of intelligence spending are of continuing interest. 
These remain controversial among informed observers and all may
be revisited during the 104th Congress (along with the somewhat
more narrow question of requiring confirmation of the CIA's
General Counsel).  The positions of those who support and oppose
various proposals are indicated where possible, but in many
cases the views noted may only reflect those held at one point
in time.


Role of the DCI

     Almost all reform and reorganization proposals through the
years have addressed, directly or indirectly, the role of the
DCI, and his relationship to the CIA and with other intelligence
agencies.  Statutory authorities dating from the National
Security Act of 1947 give the DCI direct operational control
of the CIA.  He has, in addition, acquired by statute and
presidential direction a degree of influence over the budgetary
and operational practices of other intelligence agencies.  Most
DCIs, however, have chosen (or have been directed) to
concentrate their energies on the CIA.  Stansfield Turner, DCI
under President Carter, was perhaps the DCI most inclined to
focus on community-wide concerns.  The current DCI, John M.
Deutch, following his Pentagon experience, is making vigorous
efforts to integrate intelligence activities of different
agencies.  On the other hand, some DCIs, including those who
were most concerned with clandestine operations, such as Allen
Dulles, Richard Helms, William Colby, and William Casey, tended
not to concentrate on community-wide programs.  The personal
inclinations of DCIs and Presidents will, it seems, inevitably
influence the relative emphasis that is given to community-wide
issues.

     As noted above, some commissions and legislators, perceiving
a need for more centralized direction and coordination of the
Intelligence Community, have proposed that the DCI be given more
authority over all intelligence agencies, specifically in terms
of approving budgets, directing collection and analytical tasks,
realigning functions, and transferring personnel among agencies. 
Some have suggested that the senior intelligence official be
given the title of Director of National Intelligence (DNI) with
a separate position created for the head of the CIA who would
have responsibility for the day-to-day management of the agency. 


     Arguments In Favor.  Intelligence activities and spending
are spread over many agencies and offices, some of which
duplicate the work of others; given the end of the Cold War and
tight budgetary constraints throughout the federal government,
one individual is needed to coordinate and rationalize the
nation's intelligence effort, eliminating waste and duplication
of effort.  Heretofore, despite having been given some authority
to review other agency budgets, DCIs have lacked meaningful
authority to change budgets, initiate or eliminate programs,
and move personnel from one agency to another.  The large
intelligence agencies of the Defense Department that account
for the bulk of intelligence spending, in particular, have been
more responsive to the practical needs of senior military
officers and the OSD staff than to the DCI.  Many of DCI
Turner's efforts to merge national and tactical intelligence
activities in the late 1970s were, however, successfully
resisted by DOD.  Despite subsequent efforts to enhance the
authority of the DCI, DOD retains enormous influence over both
national and tactical systems.

     Existing arrangements, according to this view, have resulted
in faulty coordination, waste, duplication of effort, and a
failure to provide the best available intelligence support to
customers.  Agencies, especially the DOD intelligence agencies,
have set their own agendas, procured their own equipment, and
developed their own programs with insufficient attention to
efforts underway elsewhere.  In some cases, expensive
technologies and/or scarce human agents have been directed to
acquire data that could have been obtained from open sources. 
A major problem area has been a failure by the leadership of
the Intelligence Community to prioritize collection requirements
adequately.  Too often collection efforts have been undertaken
more because the technology and administrative infrastructure
existed rather than as a result of significant operational or
policy needs.

     Despite having certain responsibilities for the entire
Intelligence Community, DCIs for the most part have concentrated
on the management of the CIA (and especially the Operations
Directorate).  Efforts to coordinate the activities of all
agencies have been distinctly secondary.  To remedy the problem
indicated, fundamental statutory changes are required.  The DCI
would have to be given "line" authority over all intelligence
organization, or at least the larger ones--NSA, CIA, NRO, and
DIA.  Budget authority would have to be appropriated to him and
he would have to be given authority to move personnel from
agency to agency as needed and to consolidate and direct the
activities of the entire community.  The creation of the
Intelligence Community Staff in 1972 ultimately proved
inadequate as it became immersed in technical budgetary
staffwork and failed to exert significant leadership of the
community.  It was replaced in 1992 by the Community Management
Staff (CMS) with similar functions but working more closely for
the DCI.  There is some question that the CMS can resolve the
perceived difficulties without changes in the DCI's statutory
authorities.

     Adherents of this view usually indicate that the DCI (or
DNI) should not involve himself directly in the day-to-day
management of the CIA, but concentrate on community-wide issues. 
They see him as functioning at the White House level in a manner
similar to the OMB Director.  These arguments have been put
forth, in varying forms, by many observers including
Schlesinger, Clifford, Cline, the Pike Committee, and in the
Boren/McCurdy bills.

     Arguments in Opposition.  Those who have opposed the above
line of argument believe that any separation of the DCI from
the management of the CIA would render him far less influential. 
To a considerable extent, influence in policy derives from
institutional functions and, if the DCI had only a small
personal staff, he would become merely another White House aide. 
Power would gravitate to the person who was actually directing
the extensive daily affairs of the CIA.

     The major DOD intelligence agencies are closely related to
military combat functions and are staffed with active-duty
military personnel.  The needs of military commander differ from
those of policymakers.  Placing them under a civilian official
not in the military chain of command would undercut the vital
principle of unity of command; it could result in the
subordination of the needs of combat forces to civilian concerns
and a genuine decrease in military capabilities.  The approach
might also encourage a tendency within DOD to establish
rudimentary and less capable intelligence entities under the
direct control of military commanders.  Strong opposition to
this approach has been set forth by Secretaries of Defense
(especially by Secretary Richard Cheney in comments on the
Boren-McCurdy proposals).  Admiral Bobby Inman, who had served
as Director of NSA and Deputy DCI, has noted that "I suspect
if you query the former Directors of Central Intelligence, none
will support [separating the leadership of the Community from
management of CIA], because they all remember the support they
got primarily from CIA for carrying out their missions.  And
they worry that without that they would not be effective in this
city. I have even heard the phrase used, that they would be like
the Drug Czar./101/

     Some opponents of increasing the statutory authority of the
DCI do not believe that current procedures for coordinating
intelligence collection and analysis are inappropriate.  In many
cases, they argue, those closest to collection systems have the
best insight into ways to optimize collection.  Moreover,
analysts in various agencies know which problems are of greatest
concern to senior officials.  The creation of a separate DNI
would add another layer of staff not closely connected to
ongoing needs for intelligence support to policymakers and
military commanders.

     Others acknowledge that real problems exist with
coordination and duplication of effort, but believe that current
authorities are adequate.  The problems stem from inattention
by previous DCIs and, perhaps, poor appointments to leadership
positions in the Intelligence Community.  They believe that a
rigorous exploitation of existing authorities and creative use
of the Community Management Staff could allow the DCI to
coordinate intelligence activities far more effectively than
has been done previously.  The earlier efforts by DCI Turner
were in part misconceived and, in any event, affected by Cold
War issues that are no longer relevant.  Now, it is argued, a
new approach can be taken to bring intelligence agencies into
closer alignment.  


Role of the CIA Operations Directorate

     A number of proposals have been made over the years to
separate analytical functions from the covert operations that
in the popular media constitute the main function of
intelligence agencies (although in recent years they absorb only
a small percentage of the intelligence budget).  Clandestine
activities include both human intelligence (HUMINT) collection
as well as covert actions; there is considerable use of the same
personnel for both duties.  

     Arguments in Favor. Covert actions are, to some critics,
antithetical to democratic values and have often undermined
American interests and the country's reputation.  The continued
existence of a sizable CIA Directorate of Operations provides
policymakers with a readily available instrument to pursue
policies that would not stand up to public scrutiny, especially
in the post-Cold War world.  Furthermore, there is in CIA's
Operations Directorate a culture of secrecy and deceit that some
contend has come to permeate the entire agency.  
     If, under exceptional circumstances, the national interest
requires that covert actions be undertaken, a small office
separated from the CIA, perhaps under DOD control, would be more
appropriate.  Separating or abolishing it would improve the
image of the U.S. government throughout the world and would
reflect a renewed American commitment to human rights and
democracy.  Separation would further help ensure that CIA
analysis is not skewed to support or justify the work of the
Operations Directorate.

     Some observers also argue that intelligence analysts should
be in close touch with academic scholars, journalists, and
others with insight into foreign developments.  Especially in
an era of diverse threats and opportunities, the Intelligence
Community must have access to contacts and analytical resources
available in the civilian sector, as it cannot maintain the
depth of expertise on each area of the world that it once
maintained on the Soviet Union, the Warsaw Pact, and China. 
In Third World areas, the best available information may come
from area specialists in universities and from journalists with
long experience in the region.  The role of the CIA in
undertaking covert actions, and the sustained attention these
efforts receive in the media, complicate the CIA's relationships
with academic and other civilian scholars.  The well-known
hostility to the CIA among many scholars usually derives from
opposition to covert actions (and to the policies that
incorporate them) rather than to the agency's analytical
products.  
     Few, other than those who would abolish the CIA, argue
against the need for the centralized gathering and analysis of
information.  Although intelligence professionals tend to
consider the transfer of hostility to covert actions to
encompass all intelligence activities ill-founded and unfair,
it is a fact of life that effects the Intelligence Community's
ability to provide the best available intelligence to
policymakers.  The CIA would be best served if covert actions
could be undertaken by a smaller separate organization, perhaps
one positioned outside the Intelligence Community.  While there
would probably be some duplication of effort between a separate
covert action organization and CIA clandestine collection
efforts, the merits of improving the CIA's analytical reputation
would outweigh any overlap.  Such arguments have been made by
Ray Cline, former Representative Aspin, and, earlier, by
Professor Harry Howe Ransom./102/  They were also reflected in
the Boren-McCurdy proposals.

     Arguments in Opposition.  Those who support the retention
of the Operations Directorate within the current CIA
organization argue that any separate covert action organization
would complicate the nation's intelligence efforts by creating
still another agency with its own institutional interests,
thereby making centralized coordination more difficult.  There
have been instances of covert operatives working at cross
purposes in the field, and inevitable compartmentalization will
complicate efforts of senior policymakers to gain an
understanding of information held in all parts of the U.S.
government about a given foreign situation.  

     These observers further argue that there is no valid need
to protect analysts from the "grimy real world the collectors
deal with."  Intelligence analysts, they argue, are not academic
specialists but government officials responsible for providing
warning of threats to the national security.  They need,
accordingly, the closest contact with those engaged in
intelligence collection and operations.  Such views have been
set forth by former DCI Colby and former senior CIA official
George Carver./103/

     A Third View.  Still other observers have argued that covert
actions have never been specifically authorized by statute and
that the CIA's conduct of them is legally questionable (although
provisions for the reporting of presidential authorizations have
been enacted)./104/  Those holding this view would probably oppose
an agency specifically established to undertake covert actions
and further argue that covert actions are contrary to the
national interest and the U.S. should set an example by
forswearing them.


Disclosing the Intelligence Budget

     Many observers of the Intelligence Community have long
recommended that the overall intelligence budgets be publicly
disclosed./105/  Since the creation of the CIA, intelligence
spending for the larger intelligence agencies has largely been
"hidden" in DOD authorization and appropriations legislation
whose totals also include other classified accounts.  This has
not been the case for the State Department's Bureau of
Intelligence and Research, the CIA Retirement and Disability
Fund, and some other functions.  The actual figures are
available to Members of Congress and to executive branch
officials with a need-to-know, but are not made public.  In
recent years, there has been widespread media discussions of
a given multi-billion dollar figure and the House Appropriations
Committee in 1994 released testimony that described dollar
amounts included in the Administration intelligence spending
request for FY1995./106/  Congress has twice gone on record (in
the FY1992 and FY1993 intelligence authorization acts) urging
that "the aggregate amount requested and authorized for, and
spent on, intelligence and intelligence-related activities
should be disclosed to the public in an appropriate manner." 
In 1993, 1994, and 1995, however, Congress rejected floor
amendments to release intelligence budget totals.

     Arguments in Favor.  The principal argument by those in
favor of making intelligence spending levels public is based
on constitutional provisions requiring regular statements and
accounts of public spending (Article I, Section 9, Clause 7). 
Even if obscuring intelligence spending is considered
technically legal, given the end of the Cold War it is unwise
and unnecessary.  The public has a right to know how taxmonies
are being spent.  The Church and Pike Committees made this
point, as have numerous other observers in more recent years. 

     The secrecy that surrounded the Cold War superpower
competition is no longer needed.  Even if potential enemies
learn how much the United States is spending on intelligence,
the information will not assist them.  There are unlikely to
be any bulges in intelligence spending that would alert them
to new American capabilities, and current surveillance systems
are widely known.  Similarly, it is unlikely that additional
U.S. resources directed at a new target would be of sufficient
size to create a noticeable increase in total intelligence
spending and alert the targeted country.  Public discourse
regarding intelligence priorities will be enhanced and
intelligence activities ultimately improved through the
democratic process.  Some former senior intelligence officials
have come to support public disclosure of total expenditures,
including former DCI Turner and Admiral Inman.  The current DCI,
John Deutch, has stated that disclosing the aggregate total
figure for intelligence spending would cause no harm to national
security.

     Arguments in Opposition.  Intelligence spending has been
kept secret since the early days of the Republic in order to
avoid making potentially hostile foreign powers even generally
aware of American efforts.  Although the international situation
has changed dramatically in recent years, publicity surrounding
intelligence spending inevitably complicates the conduct of the
nation's foreign policy and gives potential adversaries a
propaganda boon as well as official notice of U.S. activities
and capabilities.  Secrecy, they argue, is the prerequisite for
intelligence collection and evaluation and spending levels can
be a prime indicator of U.S. programs.  Such arguments were made
by former DCI James Woolsey for the Clinton Administration and
by Robert Gates when he served as DCI in the Bush Administration
(although at one earlier point he had indicated flexibility on
the issue).  

     There are two arguments often made by those opposed to
making total figures for intelligence spending public; they are
described colloquially as the "slippery slope" and the "rabbit
in the snake."  The former refers to the difficulty of making
public a single figure for intelligence spending without
immediately having to set forth an elaborate explanation of what
is included and what is excluded.  The resulting discussion and
cost breakouts would eventually and inevitably result in
revealing virtually every aspect of intelligence spending and
reveal legitimate areas of secrecy.  The "rabbit in the snake"
argument suggests that large changes in intelligence spending
in a single year would reveal to foreign governments or hostile
groups the introduction of new collection systems and allow them
to take countermeasures.  It is recalled that the advent of
satellite systems had produced just such an increase, and
information concerning the pace and extent of the U.S. effort
would have been highly valuable to Soviet leaders had they had
access to budgetary totals.  

     Some opposed to releasing budgetary data also suggest that
publishing numbers without extensive explanation could easily
mislead the public.  Some tactical intelligence programs, for
instance, could be moved out of the intelligence budget to
justify claims of a major decline in intelligence spending when
in fact there had been no net savings to the taxpayers. 
Maneuvering some tactical programs into non-intelligence
accounts in order to present a lower overall intelligence budget
figure would further, some would argue, undermine the influence
of the DCI (and, potentially, congressional intelligence
oversight committees) and hamper efforts to closely coordinate
expensive national and tactical programs. 

     Conclusion  

     The efforts of commissions and individuals to encourage
restructuring of the U.S. Intelligence Community have led to
numerous changes through internal agency direction, presidential
directives, and new statutes.  The general trend has been
towards more thorough oversight both by the executive branch
and by congressional committees.  The position of the DCI has
been considerably strengthened and DCIs have been given greater
staff and authority to exert influence on all parts of the
Community.  They have not, however, been given "line" authority
over agencies other than the CIA and the influence of the
Defense Department remains pervasive (and, in view of the
Clinton Administration's emphasis on intelligence support to
military operations, may actually increase).  It is
unquestionable that oversight is now more thorough and that some
questionable practices have ended.  Congress and the incumbent
president now share a degree of responsibility for covert
actions. 

     Judgments on the efficacy of legislative and executive
branch responses to recommendations made by commissions and
outside experts lie beyond the scope of this paper.  Some
observers believe that issues raised by the commissions and
individuals noted above have largely been dealt with, for better
or worse.  They suggest that the new issues that have arisen
in the aftermath of the Cold War and as a result of
technological innovations require new and different
organizational responses.  The advent of highly sophisticated
surveillance and communications technologies, the blurring of
distinctions between foreign and domestic challenges represented
by terrorists and narcotics traffickers, the spread of U.S.
security concerns to long-obscure regions of the world should
be competently dealt with and, in any event, are grist for new
commissions and new recommendations.





                    ------------------------------

                               FOOTNOTES

     /1/Section 102(d)(5), National Security Act of 1947, P.L.
80-253; hereafter cited as National Security Act of 1947.

     /2/Congressional Research Service.  Alfred B. Prados,
Intelligence Community Leadership: Development and Debate Since
1947, CRS Report 89-414 F, June 27, 1989, p. 1; hereafter cited
as Prados, 89-414 F.

     /3/Lewis Carroll, Alice's Adventures in Wonderland (New
York: Barnes & Noble Books, 1994), p. 125.

     /4/Section 101(a), National Security Act of 1947. 

     /5/For a comprehensive examination of similar Commissions
see: Ronald C. Moe,  Reorganizing the Executive Branch in the
Twentieth Century: Landmark Commissions, CRS Report 92-293 GOV,
March 19, 1992.

     /6/The report was reprinted as The Hoover Commission Report
on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government
(Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1970).

     /7/For background on Eberstadt, see Jeffrey M. Dorwart,
Eberstadt and Forrestal: A National Security Partnership, 1909-1949
(College Station, TX: Texas A & M University Press, 1991).

     /8/The Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of
the Government, Task Force Report on National Security
Organization, Appendix G, January 1949; hereafter cited as the
Eberstadt Report.

     /9/Eberstadt Report, p. 3.

     /10/Eberstadt Report, p. 76.

     /11/Eberstadt Report, p. 16, paragraph d.

     /12/Arthur B. Darling, The Central Intelligence Agency: An
Instrument of Government to 1950 (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania
State University Press, 1990), p. 293.  This is a reprint of an
official CIA history prepared in the early 1950's.

     /13/Eberstadt Report, p. 16.

     /14/Darling, introduction to Chapter VIII.

     /15/Darling, introduction to chapter VIII.

     /16/Eberstadt Report, p. 76.

     /17/Darling, pp. 295-298.

     /18/Darling, p. 297.

     /19/Darling, p. 289.

     /20/Eberstadt Report, p. 77; Darling, p. 296.

     /21/Eberstadt Report, p, 20. 

     /22/Mark M. Lowenthal, U.S. Intelligence: Evolution and
Anatomy (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1992), p. 20.

     /23/"The Central Intelligence Agency and National
Organization for Intelligence: A Report to the National Security
Council," January 1, 1949.  Hereafter cited as the
Dulles-Jackson-Correa Report; the declassified report remains highly
sanitized.  A version was reprinted in William M. Leary, ed., The
Central Intelligence Agency: History and Documents (University,
AL: University of Alabama Press, 1984).

     /24/Lowenthal, p. 20; Dulles-Jackson-Correa Report, p. 5, 11.

     /25/Dulles-Jackson-Correa Report, p. 39.

     /26/DCI Hillenkoetter disputed these findings by producing
evidence that CIA's employee turnover was no different than in
other government agencies and that only two percent of CIA
personnel were active duty military. Darling, p. 327.

     /27/Dulles-Jackson-Correa Report, p. 138.

     /28/Dulles-Jackson-Correa Report, pp. 3-4, 149.

     /29/Dulles-Jackson-Correa Report, p. 58.  Although the DCI
served as chairman of the IAC, he was not given budgetary or
administrative authority over the other intelligence agencies.

     /30/Dulles-Jackson-Correa Report, pp. 129, 134.

     /31/Dulles-Jackson-Correa Report, p. 11.

     /32/The work of the BNE is described in Donald P. Steury,
ed., Sherman Kent and the Board of National Estimates: Collected
Essays (Washington: Center for the Study of Intelligence, 1994).

     /33/Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of
the Government, A Report to the Congress, Intelligence
Activities, June 1955, p. 13; hereafter cited as Clark Task Force
Report.

     /34/Clark Task Force Report, pp. 70-71.  For a more detailed
account of the evolution of the DCI's roles and responsibilities,
see Herbert Andrew Boerstling, "The Establishment of a Director
of National Intelligence," unpublished Master of Arts Policy
Paper, Boston University, August 1995.

     /35/Clark Task Force Report, p. 71.

     /36/Clark Task Force Report, p. 74.

     /37/Clark Task Force Report, p. 74.

     /38/Clark Task Force Report, pp. 72-76.

     /39/The Report on the Covert Activities of the Central
Intelligence Agency, September 30, 1954, Appendix A, p. 54;
hereafter cited as the Doolittle Report.

     /40/Doolittle Report, pp. 6-7.

     /41/Doolittle Report, pp. 7-8.

     /42/Doolittle Report, p. 10.

     /43/Doolittle Report, p. 14.

     /44/Doolittle Report, p. 17.

     /45/John Ranelagh, The Agency: the Rise and Decline of the
CIA (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1987), p. 278.

     /46/Peter Grose, Gentleman Spy: The Life of Allen Dulles,
(Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1994), pp. 445-448; also the CIA's
Center for the Study of Intelligence Newsletter, Spring 1995,
Issue No. 3, pp. 3-4.  In writing this book, Grose reported using
notes Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. discovered in the Robert Kennedy
Papers before they were deposited at the John F. Kennedy Library;
p. 598, n. 33 and n. 34.  Reportedly, the JFK Presidential
Library has unsuccessfully searched the RFK papers for the
report.

     /47/Grose, p. 446; from excerpts of the Schlesinger notes. 

     /48/Grose, p. 446; this observation is also taken from
excerpts of the Schlesinger notes.

     /49/Grose, p. 447.

     /50/Grose, pp. 447-448; from excerpts of the Schlesinger
notes.

     /51/Grose, p. 532.

     /52/"Sheep-dipped" is a colloquial intelligence term used
for administrative arrangements designed to insure that the
origin of a person or object is non-traceable. 

     /53/The report was published as Operation Zapata: The
"Ultrasensitive" Report and Testimony of the Board of Inquiry on
the Bay of Pigs (Frederick, MD: University publications of
America, Inc., 1981), p. 40; hereafter cited as the Taylor
Report. 

     /54/Taylor Report, p. 43.

     /55/Taylor Report, p. 38.

     /56/Taylor Report, p. 40.

     /57/Taylor Report, p. 39.

     /58/Taylor Report, pp. 44-53.

     /59/Ranelagh, p. 380.

     /60/Lyman B. Kirkpatrick, Jr., "Paramilitary Case Study -
Bay of Pigs," Naval War College Review, (November-December 1972).
By the same author, see The U.S. Intelligence Community: Foreign
Policy and Domestic Activities (New York: Hill and Wang, 1973). 

     /61/Evan Thomas, The Very Best Men, Four Who Dared: The
Early Years of the CIA, (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1995), p.
268.  Thomas was given special permission to review the report
for use in his book even though it remains classified.

     /62/Memorandum for the Director of Central Intelligence,
January 16, 1962; quoted in Prados, 89-414F, p. 45.

     /63/A Review of the Intelligence Community, March 10, 1971,
p. 1; hereafter cited as the Schlesinger Report.

     /64/Schlesinger Report, pp. 8-9.

     /65/Schlesinger Report, p. 9.

     /66/Schlesinger Report, p. 13.

     /67/Schlesinger Report, pp. 25-33.

     /68/U.S. Congress, Senate, 94th Congress, 2nd session,
Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to
Intelligence Activities Intelligence, Final Report, 1976, Book I,
p. 66; hereafter cited as the Church Committee Report. 

     /69/"Reorganization of the U.S. Intelligence Community,"
Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, November 4, 1971,
pp. 1467-1491, 1482.

     /70/Prados, 89-414F, p. 46.

     /71/U.S., Commission on the Organization of the Government
for the Conduct of Foreign Policy, Report, June 1975, p. 92.

     /72/Commission on Organization of the Government, p. 98

     /73/Commission on Organization of the Government, pp. 98-99.

     /74/Commission on Organization of the Government, pp. 100-101.

     /75/Commission on Organization of the Government, p. 101.

     /76/Report to the President by the Commission on CIA
Activities Within the United States, June 1975.

     /77/The definitive account of the Church Committee's work is
Loch K. Johnson, A Season of Inquiry: Congress and Intelligence,
2nd. ed. (Chicago: Dorsey Press, 1988).

     /78/U.S. Congress, Senate, 94th Congress, 2nd session,
Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with respect to
Intelligence Activities, Foreign and Military Intelligence, Final
Report, Book I, S. Rept. 94-755, April 26, 1976; hereafter cited
as the Church Committee Report.   

     /79/Church Committee Report, pp. 434-435.

     /80/Church Committee Report, p. 435.

     /81/U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, 94th Congress,
2nd session, Select Committee on Intelligence, Recommendations of
the Final Report of the House Select Committee on Intelligence,
H. Rept. 94-833, February 11, 1976.

     /82/U.S. Congress, Senate, 94th Congress, 2nd session, Committee
on Government Operations, Oversight of U.S. Government Intelligence\
Functions, Hearings, Jan. 21-Feb. 6, 1976, pp. 203-204.

     /83/In his book Secrets, Spies, and Scholars (Washington:
Acropolis Books, 1976).

     /84/The effort to pass intelligence charter legislation is
described in John M. Oseth, Regulating U.S. Intelligence
Operations: A Study in Definition of the National Interest
(Lexington, KY: University Press of Kentucky, 1985); also, Frank
J. Smist, Jr., Congress Oversees the United States Intelligence
Community, Second Edition, 1947-1994 (Knoxville, TN: University
of Tennessee Press, 1994).

     /85/Executive Order 11905, February 18, 1976, United States
Foreign Intelligence Activities, as summarized in Alfred B.
Prados, Intelligence Reform: Recent History and Proposals, CRS
Report 88-562 F, August 18, 1988, p. 18; hereafter cited as
Prados, 88-562 F.

     /86/Executive Order 12036, January 24, 1978, United States
Intelligence Activities; hereafter cited as Executive Order
12036.

     /87/Lowenthal, p. 107.

     /88/Bruce W. Watson, Susan M. Watson, and Gerald W. Hopple,
United States Intelligence: An Encyclopedia (New York: Garland
Publishing, 1990), p. 231.

     /89/Section 1.5(a), Executive Order 12333, December 4, 1981,
United States Intelligence Activities.

     /90/Executive Order 12333, Section 1.5 (d,e,h).

     /91/Executive Order 12333, Section 1.5(k,h).

     /92/Lowenthal, p. 107.

     /93/See Oseth, Regulating U.S. Intelligence Operations,
especially p. 155.

     /94/In his book Secrecy and Democracy: The CIA in Transition
(Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1985).

     /95/Secrecy and Democracy, p. 273.

     /96/U.S., President's Special Review Board, Report, 1987,
pp. V-5--V-6.

     /97/U.S. Congress, 100th Congress, 1st session, Senate
Select Committee on Secret Military Assistance to Iran and the
Nicaraguan Opposition and U.S. House of Representatives Select
Committee to Investigate Covert Arms Transactions with Iran,
Report of the Congressional Committees Investigating the Iran-Contra
Affair with Supplemental, Minority, and Additional Views,
S.Rept. 100-216/H. Rept. 100-433, November 17, 1987, pp. 423-427;
hereafter cited as the Iran-Contra Report.

     /98/Iran-Contra Report, pp. 583-586.

     /99/Reporting of covert actions was most recently addressed
in Title VI of the Intelligence Authorization Act for FY1991
(P.L. 102-88) which incorporated changes that reflected judgments
of previous weaknesses revealed in the Iran-Contra Affair.  Some
in Congress had intended to include a provision requiring that
Congress be provided prior notice of covert actions (or, in
emergencies, within 48 hours of initiation), but the Bush
Administration expressed strong opposition and asserted a
Constitutional right for the President to undertake covert
actions when necessary.  The Conference Committee that met on the
FY1991 bill noted that neither intelligence committee had ever
accepted that the Constitution allowed the President to exercise
such authority, but added: "The conferees recognize that this is
a question that neither they nor the Congress itself can resolve. 
Congress cannot diminish by statute powers that are granted by
the Constitution.  Nor can either the legislative or executive
branch authoritatively interpret the Constitution, which is the
exclusive province of the judicial branch."  U.S. Congress, House
of Representatives, 103rd Congress, 1st session, Committee of
Conference, Intelligence Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 1991, H.
Rept. 102-166, July 25, 1991, p. 28.

     /100/The original Senate version of the intelligence
authorization act for FY1995 (S. 2082, 103d Congress) contained
provisions requiring Presidential nomination and Senate
confirmation of CIA's general counsel, but support from House
conferees was not forthcoming.  

     /101/Testimony reprinted in U.S. Congress, Senate, 102nd
Congress, 1st session, Select Committee on Intelligence, Review
of Intelligence Organization, Hearing, S. Hrg. 102-91, March 21,
1991, p. 23.

     /102/See Ransom's The Intelligence Establishment (Cambridge,
Mass: Harvard University Press, 1970), pp. 246-247.

     /103/U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, 102d Congress,
2d session, Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, H.R.
4165, National Security Act of 1992, Hearings, Part I, March 4,
and 11, 1992, especially pp. 38-39, 191-192.

     /104/See the comments contained in a February 20, 1992
letter from the American Civil Liberties Union, reprinted in U.S.
Congress, 102d Congress, 2nd session, Select Committee on
Intelligence, U.S. Senate, and Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence, House of Representatives, S. 2198 and S. 421 to
Reorganize the United States Intelligence Community, Joint
Hearing, S. Hrg 102-1052, April 1, 1992, pp. 96-97.

     /105/For additional background, see Richard A. Best, Jr. and
Elizabeth B. Bazan, Intelligence Spending: Should Total Amounts
Be Made Public?, CRS Report 94-261F, March 22, 1994.

     /106/U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, 103rd
Congress, 2nd session, Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee
on the Department of Defense, Department of Defense
Appropriations for 1995, Hearings, Part 3, 1994, pp. 717, 784.