Executive Summary One of the centerpieces of the Intelligence Community for the 21st Century (IC21) review is a hard look at Intelligence Community (IC) management and the development of a proposed community model that synthesizes the findings and recommendations of the other staff studies. At the beginning of this undertaking, a hypothesis was developed that the IC and its customers would benefit, either through performance enhancement or cost reduction or both, from a more corporate approach to intelligence. This hypothesis was then "tested" in the following specific areas: planning, programming and budgeting; collection management; production management; personnel management; and research and development. The goal was to identify what specifically would improve management of these areas, and whether or not a more corporate approach would be constructive. Then, if a more corporate approach were dictated, to identify what changes in organization, function, and authority would be required to achieve it. Perhaps not surprisingly, we discovered that the Intelligence Community would benefit from a more corporate approach in each of the major areas we addressed. In order to form a flexible "tool kit" of capabilities for the future, the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) and his staff require additional authorities and different management structures to create a unified, effective and efficient community. Services of common concern should be consolidated at the community level. Programming and budgeting and personnel management must be more centrally managed. Collection must be managed coherently across the disciplines, with increasingly difficult resource trades made at the community level in an informed, all-source process. Improved synergy during collection operations, which will become more and more critical to success in the 21st century, requires movement away from the traditional stovepipe approach to collection. Research and Development requires closer coordination with requirements, and a contingency fund for "good ideas" should be established to allow the community to take advantage of technological targets of opportunity. The community needs to become a corporate entity; personnel reform that promotes lateral movement among agencies and a community SES cadre is essential. The primacy of all-source analysis needs to be reinforced, and strong links forged between analysts and policy-makers and analysts and collectors. The community should be, and to an extent already is, moving toward a "virtual analytical environment" that requires a new set of skills and management techniques. Increased centralization of management functions must be balanced by a strengthened and independent evaluative function. Clandestine operations will continue to be both the riskiest and potentially the highest-payoff intelligence operations, becoming increasingly important in the 21st century due to the likely nature of future targets. This aspect of the intelligence community requires a more intensive level of management involvement on the part of the DCI and should be housed in a separate organization, with a direct reporting chain to the DCI. The defense intelligence community also stands to benefit from more coherent and centralized management. A Director of Military Intelligence with enhanced control over defense intelligence programs and operations would serve as both a senior military advisor to the Secretary of Defense for intelligence, and a locus for the close coordination required between the national and tactical intelligence communities and budgets. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY MANAGEMENT I. Approach One of the centerpieces of The Intelligence Community in the 21st Century (IC21) review is a hard look at Intelligence Community (IC) management and the development of a proposed community model that synthesizes the findings and recommendations of the other staff studies. At the beginning of this undertaking, a hypothesis was developed that the IC and its customers would benefit, either through performance enhancement or cost reduction or both, from a more corporate approach to intelligence. This hypothesis was then "tested" in the following specific areas: planning, programming and budgeting; collection management; production management; personnel management; and research and development. The goal was to identify what specifically would improve management of these areas, and whether or not a more corporate approach would be constructive. Then, if a more corporate approach were dictated, to identify what changes in organization, function, and authority would be required to achieve it. Although they are presented first in this document, the role and authorities of the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) were considered last, in the context of the needed changes in the above-mentioned areas. II. Introduction/Assumptions It immediately became clear that it is impossible to measure the effectiveness of something without a standard by which to measure -- an understanding of the purpose and role of intelligence, and its appropriate relationship to policy and national strategy. With very little research it became apparent that there has historically been disagreement on these topics, and that the level of disagreement is greater today, in the post-Cold War period, than it has been for some time. This makes it necessary to examine these issues in at least a cursory way in order to establish some assumptions without which the answers to the questions posed by this study would be meaningless. At the most basic level, there have been, and remain, two diverging views of the appropriate role of intelligence in the United States. One view maintains that intelligence provides impartial and objective information to policy-makers; intelligence is a truth-seeking profession and the policy community is a customer who does not and should not influence the product. The other, and less widely held, view is that intelligence is in fact an instrument of policy and should be used to both shape and further policy goals: the intelligence and policy communities must act as partners. The question of whether intelligence informs policy or serves it is truly a chicken-or-the-egg issue -- we believe it must do both at different times. Tending too far in either of these directions threatens lack of relevance on the one hand, and politicization on the other. The challenge for the IC is to maintain a balance of objectivity and involvement, a goal that can only be met with the cooperation and understanding of the policy community. This study assumes that the basic structure of the United States government, including its policy apparatus, will remain relatively stable at the departmental level, but that the policy community may be influenced positively by recommended changes in its formal relationship to the IC. Another basic question that must be raised is that of the evolving definition of national security. Although there may be a consensus that intelligence exists primarily to identify potential threats to the national security of the United States, the definition of those threats, and perhaps the threats themselves, change over time. We have seen an evolution from nation-based threats and conflicts to trans-national threats and regional and ethnic strife. New areas of intelligence emphasis, such as proliferation and terrorism, clearly represent emergent threats to our national security. Other, less clear-cut areas of endeavor, such as economic and environmental intelligence, remain subjects of debate concerning the closeness of their relationship with national security, how much value intelligence actually adds to these areas, and at what cost to other, higher priorities. Regardless, all of these areas of endeavor represent a new level of complexity for the IC, requiring an "interdisciplinary" approach to intelligence and a different set of skills than that needed in the Cold War world. Each Administration will be faced with defining threats to national security, and the results will vary. In the absence of definitive guidance, the IC will inevitably try to be all things to all people. Therefore, it is a mistake to structure the community to meet currently articulated or even projected future threats except in the most general sense. In looking to the 21st century, it is important to reach a consensus on the core missions and capabilities of the IC, and to add to those missions only on a pay-as-you-go basis. The new approach to mission-based budgeting, which creates four primary mission areas (support to policy makers, support to military operations, support to law enforcement, and counterintelligence), and within those areas identifies core capabilities, sustaining capabilities and supporting capabilities, appears to be a move in the right direction. The community of the future should be based on the capability and flexibility to perform those basic functions -- a "tool kit," if you will, for the challenges of the next millennium. Within the IC, there are a series of checks and balances. Starting at the top, the relationship between the DCI and the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) epitomizes an important tension in the community: support to military operations (SMO) versus support to national-level policy makers. Considering that military operations are an instrument of policy, SMO is in fact another facet of support to the policy-maker, but it is of a different and potentially all-consuming sort. The Department of Defense (DoD) is the largest customer of intelligence information, and that justifies its significant voice in the process; the DCI, however, must be able to protect the equities of the civilian policy-makers and the longer-term interests of the nation (a more detailed discussion of this tension is contained in both the Intelligence Support to Military Operations and the Intelligence Community Surge Capability staff studies). That much of the intelligence community is a shared resource is at times problematic, but is in accord with statutory direction to "eliminate waste and unnecessary duplication within the intelligence community." It makes sense from a resource perspective, as long as appropriate management safeguards exist to ensure that no customer's needs are shortchanged in the process. Another balance issue within the community is the role of the program manager vis-a-vis the issue coordinator. The Needs Process has established an increasing tension between the issue coordinators, who are looking across programs to fund priority activities that contribute to their individual areas of responsibility adequately, and the program managers, who are faced with satisfying the requirements of all of the issue managers and must make internal trades to build a coherent and sustainable program. This would be more of a contest if the issue coordinators had any real leverage over the budget process, but currently they do not. A similar case is the lesser, but still important, tension between functional managers and program managers. Because the program managers build the budget, and the issue coordinators and functional managers can basically only advise and recommend, the balance of power is skewed in favor of the program managers. In any scheme of intelligence community management, there will be competing requirements of this type. The challenge is to create a programming and budgeting process that minimizes destructive competition and can adjudicate competing requirements and priorities in a balanced way. Finally, the Congressional intelligence oversight function, unique to this nation, represents one of the legislative checks on the executive branch that is the hallmark of our system of government. The two intelligence committees, in turn, provide a check on each other in the performance of this function. Although this makes for a complex and sometimes inefficient system, in the long run it protects the interests of the American people. Within the IC as within the government at large, some of these existing balances may need to be recalibrated; overall, however, they serve a useful purpose and should not be lightly set aside. III. Summary of Findings: Perhaps not surprisingly, we discovered that the IC would benefit from a more corporate approach in each of the major areas we addressed. In order to form a flexible "tool kit" of capabilities for the future, the DCI and his staff require additional authorities and different management structures to create a unified, effective and efficient community. Services of common concern should be consolidated at the community level. Programming and budgeting and personnel management must be more centrally managed. Requirements and collection must be managed coherently across the disciplines, with increasingly difficult resource trades made at the community level in an informed, all-source process. Improved synergy during collection operations, which will become more and more critical to success in the 21st century, requires movement away from the traditional stovepipe approach to collection. Research and Development (R&D) needs to be more closely coordinated with requirements and a contingency fund should be established to take advantage of technological targets of opportunity. The community needs to become a corporate entity; personnel reform which promotes lateral movement among agencies and a community SES cadre is essential. The primacy of all-source analysis needs to be reinforced, and strong links forged between analysts and policy-makers and analysts and collectors. The community should be, and to an extent already is, moving toward a "virtual analytical environment" that requires a new set of skills and management techniques. Increased centralization of management functions must be balanced by a strengthened and independent evaluative function. Clandestine operations will continue to be both the riskiest and potentially the highest-payoff intelligence operations, becoming increasingly important in the 21st century due to the likely nature of future targets. This aspect of the IC requires a more intensive level of management involvement on the part of the DCI and should be housed in a separate organization, with a direct reporting chain to the DCI. The defense intelligence community also stands to benefit from more coherent and centralized management. A Director of Military Intelligence (DMI) with enhanced control over defense intelligence programs and operations would serve as both a senior military advisor to the SECDEF for intelligence, and as a locus for the close coordination required between the national and tactical intelligence communities and budgets. IV. Roles, Relationships and Authorities Role of the DCI The role and authorities of the DCI are central to achieving the goal of a more corporate IC. There are two broad areas at issue: (1) the role of the DCI vis-a-vis the President; and (2) the role of the DCI within the IC. Several witnesses, including several past DCIs and Deputy DCIs, noted that the degree to which the DCI visibly commands the respect and confidence of the President is central to the DCI's effectiveness. Realistically, however, there is no way to mandate or to legislate a close working relationship between these two officials. Two suggestions repeatedly surface regarding the status of the DCI. The first is that he be made a cabinet-rank official. The second is that he be given a fixed term of office. The study group does not believe that either of these has sufficient merit or would achieve the goal of a stronger DCI. The third is that he be relieved of his responsibilities for the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and elevated to a position over the entire IC. Cabinet-rank for officials who are not members of the Cabinet (i.e., the heads of departments) is merely an honorific. The United States does not have Cabinet government; being designated a member of the Cabinet does not in any real sense increase one's authority. It certainly will not enhance or improve the DCI's relationship with the President, which can only be based on an existing level of trust and confidence. Indeed, mandating Cabinet-rank for the DCI while doing anything less than creating a true Intelligence Department -- which no one has contemplated -- only calls more attention to the disparity between the DCI's responsibilities and his authority, even with the enhancements being proposed here. The importance of the DCI's personal relationship with the President is also the main argument against a fixed term. Proponents of a fixed term argue that this would have several benefits. Ten years is often suggested, as has been done with the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). First, and perhaps foremost, a fixed term would provide for greater continuity and stability than we now have. Until 1977, it was not customary for the DCI to be replaced with a new administration. That is no longer the case. Moreover, the DCI's position has since been subjected to fairly frequent turn-overs over and above presidential transitions. From 1973-1977 there were five DCIs; from 1991-1996 there have been four DCIs. However, a fixed term could create the situation where a President would inherit a DCI with whom he could not work. Although there would be greater continuity, the DCI's effectiveness would diminish rapidly, a far greater loss. As noted, an analogy is often drawn to the Director of the FBI. The comparison is inapt. The DCI is the chief intelligence officer and deals directly with the President. The Director of the FBI is not the chief law enforcement officer; the Attorney General is and serves at the President's pleasure. In sum, a fixed term would not be an improvement. The National Security Act states that the DCI is the head of the IC and the President's principal intelligence adviser. Neither of these designations for the DCI is the same as meaningful control. If the IC is to achieve a greater degree of coherence and corporate identity, then the role of the DCI has to be changed. The glaring gap between his responsibilities and his authorities has to be closed to the greatest extent possible. The DCI should be viewed as a chief executive officer of the IC, with purview over all of its major functions and a greater degree of control over budgets, resources and major policy issues that are common to all agencies. However, the testimony of former DCIs and other former senior IC officials all concur that the DCI needs an agency "of his own" -- i.e., the CIA -- if he is to have any real power within the IC. The National Security Council The National Security Act also places the DCI under the direction of the National Security Council (NSC). The NSC is composed of four officials: the President, the Vice President, and the Secretaries of State and Defense. The IC is a service organization. It has no meaning without its relationship to policy makers. Thus, the DCI must have regular contact with the NSC members. However, it is not reasonable to expect that they can give the DCI and, through him, the IC, the kind of regular executive guidance that was envisioned by the National Security Act. Indeed, in each successive Administration, there has been some sort of sub-NSC group created to deal with intelligence, reflecting the shortcomings of the NSC itself to carry out this role. Finally, many witnesses at hearings and staff panels and the oversight experience of this Committee indicate that certain intelligence activities -- clandestine operations and covert action -- require special attention. These activities consume an inordinate amount of the DCI's time, in terms of both management and testimony before Congress. In the future, certain types of offensive information warfare (IW) activities conducted in peacetime or outside the context of a military operation may also fall into this category. We do not question the utility of these activities and believe that the United States must have recourse to them. At the same time, executive control can and should be made more direct. It is important for the DCI to maintain close control over these activities. The following recommendations are designed to resolve the issues noted above. Beginning with the issue of executive guidance, of the various sub-NSC bodies created to deal with intelligence, the Committee on Foreign Intelligence (CFI) created by President Ford in 1976 appeared to be among the more successful, in terms of its stated role, its membership and its performance. Interestingly, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence proposed re-establishing this group in legislation in 1992, as has the Aspin-Brown Commission. We believe that the CFI, properly constituted and empowered, can more usefully serve as a body to provide the DCI and the IC with the necessary guidance and policy-maker oversight. This is not meant to supplant the DCI's current direct access to the NSC members; it is meant to give the DCI access on a more regular basis to senior policy-makers who can give direction to the IC and can listen to and relay IC concerns. Two Deputy Directors of Central Intelligence As noted, we do not find major flaws in the broader parameters of the role of the DCI as currently described in legislation in terms of his tenure or his responsibility for the CIA. The DCI should continue to serve at the pleasure of the President and continue to exercise control over the CIA and the Community Management Staff (CMS), and have direct control over the Clandestine Service. The DCI would, thus, continue to have multiple major responsibilities. All DCIs have found this a broad and sometimes difficult mandate. The ability to delegate is important, although it has been done differently by virtually every DCI. The current DCI, for example, relies on two executive directors -- one for the CIA and one for the CMS. Their titles belie their responsibilities. The positions responsible for these two large parts of the DCI's portfolio should be enhanced and their duties better defined. Given the importance of their positions, Senate confirmation also appears necessary. Some permanence in the DCI's supporting structure is needed and can be achieved without losing necessary flexibility. It also allows for greater institutional continuity, clearer definition of responsibilities and improved congressional oversight. In order to minimize superfluous bureaucratic layering, we concluded that the current position of Deputy DCI (DDCI) should specifically be given day-to-day responsibility for the CIA, whose enhanced analytical responsibilities are discussed below. This would reduce layering, would continue to give the DCI direct access to his major bureaucratic and institutional base, and yet would relieve the DCI of many lesser administrative concerns. Paralleling this first DDCI, there should be a second DDCI for Community Management, for much the same reasons, with purview over the collection, acquisition and infrastructure elements of the IC. There are also changes in the DCI's budget and personnel authorities, noted below. As currently allowed by law, either the DCI or one of his DDCIs -- but no more than one -- could be a military officer. The DCI would select which of the DDCIs would act as DCI in his absence. As noted above, the importance of the DCI's relationship with the President is such that few prerequisites for nominees should be imposed. However, to the extent possible, these DDCI positions should be considered as professional as well as political appointments and should go to individuals with extensive national security or intelligence background. This is especially important if a DCI with less such background is chosen. The two DDCIs should be confirmed by the Senate, just as is the current DDCI position. The Central Intelligence Agency The CIA, which would now be directed by the DDCI, was envisioned by President Truman as a coordinator of disparate intelligence being produced by other agencies. The CIA quickly became a producer in its own right because of policy-maker demands, the unwillingness of then-existent agencies to respond, and an aggressive CIA leadership. Although this is different than President Truman's vision, we do not believe that this development should be reversed. Indeed, it would appear more profitable to underscore the CIA's analytical role by confirming it as the premier all-source (i.e., deriving its analysis from all intelligence collection disciplines) analytical agency within the IC. We concur with the observation of former DCI Richard Helms that the President needs his own analytical group and that if we did not have the CIA today we would probably invent it. Underscoring this role means more than words. The CIA should house not only its analysts, but the second- and third-tier exploiters of the various intelligence collection disciplines. By bringing them closer together we can improve the efficiency of the all-source analytical process and achieve a true synergy between collection and analytical production. The Clandestine Service Given the political and administrative problems raised by clandestine operations and covert action, their bureaucratic tie to the DCI must be made more direct. At present as many as two or three officials are between the DCI and the CIA's Directorate of Operations (DO). Moreover, there is no compelling substantive reason for the DO to be part of the same agency as the analytic Directorate of Intelligence (DI). This is largely the product of historical accident and the bureaucratic aggressiveness of DCI Walter Bedell Smith, who expanded CIA activities into both operations and analysis in the early 1950s, when other agencies failed to meet policy-maker needs in these areas. We believe that it would be better for the DO, renamed the Clandestine Service, to be a distinct entity, under the direct control of the DCI. This would rationalize the structure of the CIA as the premier all-source analytical agency. The Clandestine Service and the CIA can continue to be housed in the same building. However, both the Clandestine Service and the CIA could also be managed more effectively if they each had one major task. The separation of the Clandestine Service should also reinforce the fact that clandestine Human Intelligence (HUMINT) serves the entire community and not just the CIA. The Clandestine Service would conduct all clandestine HUMINT operations, even those undertaken by military personnel, who would be integrated into the organization. There should be a Director of the Clandestine Service, reporting directly to the DCI. This individual should be an intelligence professional. After much debate, we recommend that this individual not be subject to confirmation by the Senate. The sensitivity of this position is such that the DCI must be free to choose the man or woman upon whom the utmost reliance can be placed. Senate confirmation raises a number of other political considerations that might best be avoided. This recommendation, coupled with the role of the new DDCI/Community Management, should also allow a closer integration of collection management and operations, and should enhance oversight of clandestine operations. The Director should have a deputy who is a two-star active duty military officer (further details are contained in the Clandestine Service staff study). NFIP Defense Agencies If the IC is going to achieve the goal of "corporateness," and if the DCI is going to function as a true CEO, then he should have a greater say in the selection of his "corporate team" -- the heads of the other major intelligence components. Current law requires that the SECDEF "consult" with the DCI in naming heads for National Foreign Intelligence Program (NFIP) defense agencies. Although it is unlikely that the SECDEF would nominate someone to whom the DCI is strongly opposed, it is possible. Instead, the DCI's advice and concurrence should be sought. In the unlikely event of disagreement, the issue could be referred to the NSC Committee on Foreign Intelligence or, ultimately, to the President. But the importance of a truly corporate team requires a stronger DCI voice in this process. The study group believes, however, that the role of the NFIP defense agencies is so substantially different from that of the other departmental elements of the NFIP that this arrangement is not appropriate for the State, Energy or Justice Departments. The defense agencies are primary collectors and producers of intelligence without whom the DCI could not perform his statutory functions, while the other departmental elements are analytical efforts focused on tailoring intelligence products for their departmental consumers. Therefore, we recommend no change in the selection process for those activities. Director of Military Intelligence The Defense Department -- civilian policy makers and military services at all levels -- is one of the largest components and mostly important customers of the IC. Many of the larger organizational issues noted for the IC at large are also found within the defense-related part of the IC. Enhancing the DCI's authority solves some, but not all, of the problems. It is important that the defense intelligence establishment also have a single, uniformed official who is both responsible for and empowered to address these issues, or to advise the SECDEF about them. We believe that this should be a three-star military officer, carrying the title of Director of Military Intelligence (DMI). The study group also believes that this individual should be dual-hatted as the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), the program manager of the Joint Military Intelligence Program (JMIP), and program coordinator for the Tactical Intelligence and Related Activities (TIARA). Although previous proposals for a DMI have sought a four-star office, the study group believes a four-star officer is neither appropriate nor likely to be approved. For the senior military intelligence officer to be on a par with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) and the Commander in Chief is not appropriate for a supporting function such as intelligence, and could potentially promote an unhealthy rivalry between the DMI and the DCI, particularly if the DCI were to remain as currently constituted, i.e., not of cabinet rank. The DMI would report to the DCI on IC-wide issues and activities. The three-star DMI concept consolidates management of defense intelligence across the NFIP (DIA), JMIP and TIARA and continues to provide intelligence support to both OSD and CJCS, via the J-2, and a unified J-2/DIA staff. The DMI would not control the DoD agencies within the NFIP, but would be responsible, as currently, for all defense analysis, production, and overt HUMINT operations. As program manager for JMIP, the DMI would ensure a coherent program that complemented national and tactical capabilities. As program coordinator for TIARA, he would ensure that the services' intelligence programs were interoperable and consistent with the larger intelligence architecture. The DMI would need a significantly enhanced staff element to handle program and budget activities for the JMIP and TIARA formerly handled by the office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence (ASD(C3I)), and to be responsible for defense intelligence architectures and coordination with the community systems and architectures office. Assistant Secretary of Defense for Intelligence The position of ASD (C3I) is, in the study group's view, an artificial construct. Although C3I for the Warrior and related concepts have been constructive in encouraging the Services and DoD to integrate intelligence and information handling techniques better into Command, Control and Communications (C3) architectures, integration of C3 and Intelligence as staff functions has simply not happened, either in ASD(C3I) or in the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS). One can also make an argument that in the Information Age, intelligence needs to become increasingly linked to operations; C4I for the Warrior may support this operational concept in theory, but is of limited utility for staff planning purposes. To date, most, if not all, Assistant Secretaries for C3I have placed primary emphasis on the "C3" rather than the "I." Similar emphasis must be placed on intelligence if doctrinal concepts such as Dominant Battlefield Awareness are to be realized. One aspect of this increased emphasis is a more corporate approach to intelligence as embodied by a DMI. The other aspect is a stronger policy presence in Defense. Consequently, the study group believes that defense intelligence would be better served by having a separate Assistant Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (ASD(I)), an option that the SECDEF could exercise at any time. Regardless, the role of the ASD(C3I) or ASD(I) should be policy, planning and oversight; the programmatic and budgeting functions that have devolved to ASD(C3I) should be handled by the DMI staff. Infrastructure Management Numerous studies and reviews of the community, including the National Performance Review, have concluded that there are efficiencies and potential cost-savings to be had by consolidating infrastructure and "services of common concern." During the course of this study, it became apparent that it makes sense to combine under centralized management, although not necessarily in one place, such community functions as personnel management, security, certain types of training, communications, and automation./1/ Although many of the personnel performing these functions could remain physically in place as support detachments, the study group believes that an Infrastructure Support Office should be established to manage these areas across the community. The growth of the IC and proliferation of distinct agencies have led to unwarranted duplication in what are, essentially, administrative and logistical functions. This is not only duplicative and costly, but also can harm the ability of the IC to operate as a corporate whole. Finally, these recommendations raise one final question about oversight. There is, currently, a statutory Inspector General (IG) for the CIA and for DoD. In order to ensure that major IC-wide functions are available to necessary scrutiny, the current CIA IG should serve as the IC IG, operating, when necessary, in conjunction with the DoD IG for NFIP Defense agencies. Recommendations: 1) Reestablish the Committee on Foreign Intelligence to provide the DCI with necessary guidance and feedback. The Assistant to the President for National Security should chair the CFI; other members should be the Secretaries of State and Defense, the Chairman of the JCS, and the Attorney General, or their deputies. 2) Create two Deputy Directors of Central Intelligence: a DDCI to manage the CIA, responsible for all IC production and analysis; and a DDCI for Community Management, responsible for requirements, collection and resource management. Both DDCIs should have extensive national security experience; both should be confirmed by the Senate. At no time should more than one of the three (DCI and two DDCIs) be active duty military. The DCI will designate one of the DDCIs to serve as the acting DCI in his absence. 3) Designate the Director of DIA as the Director of Military Intelligence (DMI). The DMI will be the program manager for the JMIP and the program coordinator for TIARA. 4) Increase the DCI's role in the appointment of NFIP agency directors by requiring the Secretary of Defense to obtain his "advice and concurrence" for these appointments. 5) Urge the Secretary of Defense to consider creating an Assistant Secretary of Defense for Intelligence. 6) Create a separate Clandestine Service directly accountable to the DCI. The Director of the Clandestine Service should be selected by the DCI from among intelligence professionals. The Deputy Director should be a two-star military intelligence officer. 7) Create an Infrastructure Support Office (ISO) which consolidates services of common concern across the community, to include at a minimum personnel, security, training, communications and automation. V. Collection and Requirements Management One of the IC's main shortcomings is an inability to manage collection optimally across disciplines or "INTs." This shortcoming is reflected in two areas: in short-term collection management against current intelligence problems, and, more seriously, in longer-term resource reallocation between collection disciplines based on an examination of intelligence needs, the most appropriate mix of collection assets to fulfill those needs, and an evaluation of how well those assets perform against their tasking. Collection requirements and tasking are currently handled by committees that make resource and tasking decisions in a single-source context that does not promote an optimal all-source approach to collection problems. In the global and resource environment envisioned for the future, competition for collection assets, already stiff, will only increase. Trans-national problems such as proliferation require integrated, all-source solutions. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, even as more information becomes available from open sources, the remaining "hard" targets have become tougher to crack, also necessitating a coordinated, multi-INT approach. The tension between military requirements -- now expanded to include humanitarian and peacekeeping missions -- and longer-term national interests will become greater and the mechanism for making decisions such as whether or not to move a satellite from one region to another must become more robust. The IC needs a management staff with the resources and authorities to build and maintain a coordinated collection program, and keep it in balance with the production and infrastructure elements of the community. What community management is currently provided comes from the National Intelligence Collection Board, a companion organization to the National Intelligence Producer's Board. Although this forum is beginning to become more "energized" under its new chief, it is not yet the body to compel the needed integration of the collection process within the community. The fact that the Executive Director (ExDir) for Community Affairs and the Associate Director of Intelligence for Military Affairs are planning the establishment of a Collection Operations Management Group indicates an awareness of this problem. This organization, or something like it, needs to exist at the community level, with representatives from the programs and DoD/JCS, to provide an integrated forum for collection decisions and to mediate conflicts between short-term military and longer-term policy-maker support. This organization could either supersede or be superimposed upon the current entities involved in single-INT tasking: COMIREX, the Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) Committee, the Measures and Signatures Intelligence (MASINT) Committee, and the National HUMINT Requirements and Tasking Center. For short-term collection against current intelligence targets, there are two collection management centers within the Community, one at the CIA and one at DIA. Although these centers can be said to work reasonably well, the coordination mechanism between them is not well-defined. Also, tasking collection or requesting information within the current system is inefficient. At some point in the requirements chain, a customer with a requirement must submit a SIGINT or Imagery Intelligence (IMINT) collection request, rather than a general request for information. It is virtually impossible for a requestor to ascertain whether the information he requires has already been collected and exists in a database somewhere or must result in new collection tasking. The IC needs a system that centrally manages information requests, and a focal point for managing this process across the community. Although some progress has been made towards this goal, it has been done mostly on an "INT by INT" basis rather than as a community-wide, all-source effort. However, the Intelligence Systems Board (ISB) has proposed a Request For Information (RFI) management system that would further this goal. One cannot discuss collection without addressing "stovepipes." To illustrate the long-standing nature of this debate, the following is a quote from Community Management Task Force Report commissioned by then-DCI Robert Gates and conducted by Danny Childs and Rich Haver in 1991: "We have made one key assumption -- that vertical collection management structures are created. We should note, however, that there is a body of opinion that strongly doubts the wisdom of creating such 'stovepipes.' One concern is that powerful checks and balances will be needed to compensate for the possible tendencies of such strong functional managers to operate unilaterally and make decisions with an eye to resource advantage. A second concern is the possibility that community requirements will not be equitably addressed without the aid of a strong independent body as a requirements authority." Although the existence of stovepipes was an assumption for that report, the study group believes that it is no longer wise or even possible to accept stovepipes as a given. There are real benefits to be achieved by creating a more unified management structure for technical collection operations. MASINT, in particular, which many view as the "INT of the future" because of its potential application for some of the more difficult intelligence problems such as proliferation, would benefit from an approach that does not view it as a competitor to SIGINT and IMINT, but rather as a complementary discipline making use of many of the same sources of collection (see the MASINT : Measurement and Signatures Intelligence staff study for more details). As noted above, the key to future success against difficult collection problems with shorter and shorter timelines is to achieve greater synergy between the collection disciplines. Wherever this occurs, the results are greater than the sum of the parts. Instead of designing cumbersome systems "after the fact" to tip off collection assets operating within a completely different conceptual and operational framework, these operations need to be conceptually integrated from the beginning and managed coherently. The target environment itself is beginning to blur the lines between the technical disciplines. The truth is that, to a certain extent, stovepipes are unavoidable; the issues are how far up they extend and whether or not a mechanism exists to ensure interaction between them at the operational level. Although the technical collection disciplines share many elements (as several interviewees told us, "it's all about bandwidth") and will undoubtedly become increasingly similar in the future, there are nevertheless distinct skills and training requirements associated with SIGINT, IMINT and MASINT -- and HUMINT collection is significantly different from all the others. Although the study group believes that all of the technical disciplines would benefit from being managed in a coherent fashion, the different endeavors are not, in the foreseeable future, interchangeable, and it is important to maintain the levels of expertise in each of these areas that have contributed to our success to date. Therefore, if the technical collection disciplines were combined into one agency, as we recommend, there would in all likelihood be "mini-stovepipes" within it. This would not necessarily be a bad thing as long as there was cross-leveling activity both at the operator level and at the top, where it would all "come together" under the control of one individual. Under a consolidated collection concept, technical control of the various collection disciplines would be vested in the director of the collection agency and delegated to designated functional managers for each discipline. The director of the collection agency would thus assume the Director of the National Security Agency 's (NSA's) responsibilities as SIGINT advisor to both the DCI and the SECDEF, and perform similar functions for IMINT and MASINT. Additionally, the best collection operations occur when collectors and analysts work closely together, so it is important to keep the "first-line" analysts or exploiters with the collectors. These analysts provide immediate feedback to the collectors, report on time-perishable information, and act as a "bridge" to the all-source analytical community, with whom they should be electronically linked. Although we acknowledge that the dividing line between first-line exploiters and second- and third-tier analysts is not as clear-cut in the SIGINT arena as it is in the imagery world, we nevertheless believe it is possible to distinguish between these levels of analysis in a systematic way (see the SIGINT: Signals Intelligence staff study for more details). It is equally important to leave first-tier HUMINT exploiters such as reports officers with the HUMINT collectors. Although the technical collection disciplines could reasonably and effectively be combined into one agency, it is the opinion of the study group that HUMINT collection can and should remain apart, with overt HUMINT collection continuing to be conducted by DIA and the State Department, and all clandestine HUMINT collection operations falling under the purview of the Clandestine Service (see the Clandestine Service's staff study for more details on this concept). HUMINT tasking and operations are different enough that there is little to be gained by combining its management with that of the technical collection disciplines, and, as mentioned earlier, its risks are such that it warrants a more intensive level of organizational oversight. There are, however, numerous instances where HUMINT supports technical collection in extremely important ways. To maintain effective cooperation in these areas, an aggressive rotation policy is required to ensure that clandestine operations personnel are employed in the collection areas supported by their efforts, and that technical personnel are employed where they can affect the tasking of HUMINT assets. It is also important to note that clandestine HUMINT collection tasking and requirements, along with all other collection operations, will be managed by the CMS and reviewed by the National Intelligence Evaluations Council (NIEC). (The NIEC is discussed in the Intelligence Requirements Process staff study. The study group also considered whether or not it was advantageous to combine Open Source collection with the technical collection disciplines. Although clearly areas of similarity exist, we determined there was little to be gained from this proposal. Since the primary focus of Open Source collection is the management of huge amounts of information that are readily available rather than the attempt to collect information from denied areas or that the originator does not wish anyone to have, it was decided to place responsibility for Open Source with the analytical agencies, primarily the CIA. Recommendations: 1) Create a community-level requirements and collection management activity within the CMS responsible for directing collection tasking to the appropriate organizations and ensuring a coherent, multi-INT approach to collection problems. 2) Create and centrally administer a community-wide system for RFI management. 3) Create a Technical Collection Agency (TCA) that combines SIGINT, IMINT and MASINT collection, processing and first-tier exploitation and analysis. The TCA should be a Type 3 Combat Support Agency, and its director should be either a senior defense or intelligence civilian or a flag officer. VI. Production Management There are three primary, sanctioned producers of all-source intelligence products in the IC: the CIA, DIA, the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research (the Department of Energy's Intelligence Division is also an all-source producer of tailored products for its departmental consumers). Although the appropriateness of the State Department maintaining its own analytical capability is rarely questioned, many have suggested that the separate DIA and CIA efforts are not necessary. However, in our view, reality dictates that the Defense community must have its own analysis and reporting capability. If we were to do away with DIA, it would be recreated in another form somewhere in DoD. The study group also believes that the DIA/CIA balance is of value to the community: they have largely deconflicted their analysis and production, they have very different customer bases, and there is inherent value to maintaining the ability within the overall community to get a "second opinion." CIA correctly views one of its roles as providing an independent assessment of the efficacy of U.S. military operations. Although DIA has no formally constituted charter to challenge CIA assessments, in those areas that most threaten our national security, maintaining the ability to do competitive analysis is prudent, as long as it is by design and not a result of lack of management. CIA and DIA, largely left to their own devices by the CMS but questioned by Congress repeatedly over a period of years for duplication of analysis and production, have made a great deal of progress in coordinating and deconflicting their analytical efforts and scheduled production. The fact that scheduled production represents a smaller and smaller percentage of total intelligence product in no way minimizes this achievement, but also shows that this process is a moving target. The coordination of finished products also does not address the issue of the community's other analytical products, which are not (theoretically) all-source -- SIGINT and IMINT reports. Elements of the community have been moving independently in a positive direction in the analysis and reporting area -- this is both the good news and the bad news. The good news is that the community is using technology to work towards the types of products that are most useful to the customer: multi-source, multi-media products delivered electronically. The bad news is that this is being done in a largely uncoordinated way, resulting in the births of multiple, pseudo-all-source analysis centers using many of the same sources of data and producing products that look a lot like all-source products. What the community needs is a coordinated approach to distributed and collaborative analysis, similar to the concepts being developed at NSA (the Analyst Driven SIGINT System being developed in conjunction with NIDL/Sarnoff Labs) and DIA (the Joint Intelligence Virtual Architecture, or JIVA). The community needs to create a "virtual analytical environment" that will maximize the efficiency of an increasingly scarce and valuable commodity -- the analyst. Although exploitation and first-level analysis should remain with the individual collection disciplines, many of the analysts currently doing SIGINT- and IMINT-centered analysis should be moved, physically or, preferably, electronically, to an all-source enclave (CIA or DIA) to provide the understanding of the source data and collection process required to produce high-quality all-source analysis and reporting, with appropriate feedback to the collectors/exploiters. By consolidating these efforts, we prevent the unnecessary replication of analytic effort by ensuring that this second- and third-tier analysis feeds directly into an all-source product, rather than resulting in an intermediate product that contains information from other sources but is not actually or officially all-source. This maximizes the productivity of the analysts and provides the customer with a faster and more comprehensive product. The role of the CIA as the premier analysis and production agency should be reinforced. The DDCI who manages the CIA should also have primary responsibility for coordinating the community's analytical efforts, to include determining when and for what competitive analysis is justified. Most of the DCI's centers will remain in the CIA except for those associated almost exclusively with the current DO, which will become part of the Clandestine Service (see the Intelligence Centers staff study for more details). The CIA will also be the home of the National Intelligence Officers (although one or two may reside elsewhere, at DIA or State) and will be responsible for sponsoring the production of National Intelligence Estimates when they are warranted. The other role currently performed by the National Intelligence Council, that of evaluation, should be assumed by a new organization, the NIEC, which is independent of the CIA and is chartered to evaluate both analysis/production and collection against requirements. This evaluation activity needs to be linked directly to both the community requirements management, collection management and the program management activities (see the Intelligence Requirements Process staff study for more details), with the results of the evaluations going directly to the DCI, the DDCI managing the CIA, the DDCI for Community Management and the DMI. Recommendations: 1) Move towards a "virtual analytical environment" within the IC that electronically links collectors, exploiters, analysts, and, where appropriate, customers. 2) Move second- and third- tier exploitation and analysis, either physically or electronically, to the primary all-source analytical agencies, CIA and DIA. 3) Create a National Intelligence Evaluation Council (NIEC) for evaluating IC-wide collection and production, working closely with the Community Management Staff. The Head of the NIEC should be appointed by the DCI and report directly to him. VII. Planning, Programming, and Budgeting The vast majority of the NFIP budget is embedded in the DoD budget. This was done partially for security reasons, in the case of the CIA, but there are practical and historical reasons for this as well. The DoD provides 86 percent of the personnel who conduct intelligence activities, both military and civilian. Of the statutory elements of the NFIP, only six do not belong to DoD: the CMS, the CIA, and the other Departmental elements belonging to the State Department, Justice Department (FBI), Energy Department and Treasury Department. The "fungibility" of defense dollars -- i.e., the fact that every dollar saved in intelligence can be used to fund other defense programs -- prompts concerns about the motivation of DoD (and Congress) to adequately fund intelligence in light of competing defense priorities. This raises the question as to whether it might not be better for intelligence and the nation to separate intelligence funding from defense funding, either completely or partially. Attempting to separate the intelligence budget from the defense budget entirely would be extraordinarily difficult, and, philosophically, it is difficult to argue that intelligence does not belong in the defense account. In the view of the study group, under no circumstances is it practical or advisable to separate the joint and tactical intelligence programs from the rest of the force structure that they support, so, at most, it would be part or all of the NFIP that could be moved. However, we also believe that moving intelligence activities out of DoD would result in increased costs to the community that are now borne as services of common concern by DoD. Although the programs would be immune to the occasional across-the-board unallocated reductions applied to all DoD programs, the costs of not being part of DoD would probably far outweigh any savings in this regard. Another implication of this change would be that the total amount of the intelligence budget would, in all likelihood, have to be declassified. Although sound arguments can be made for declassifying the top line of the budget, and the SECDEF may make the decision to do this, the study group remains of the opinion that this would inevitably lead to the disclosure of more information about the IC than would be prudent. If the goal of separating intelligence funding from the defense budget is to "protect" the NFIP, within the Executive Branch it is already, to all intents and purposes, protected. NFIP dollars, once identified, are effectively fenced. Executive Order 12333 tasks the DCI to: "(n) develop, with the advice of the program managers and departments and agencies concerned, the consolidated National Foreign Intelligence Program budget, and present it to the President and Congress; (o) Review and approve all requests for reprogramming National Foreign Intelligence Program funds, in accordance with guidelines established by the Office of Management and Budget; (p) Monitor National Foreign Intelligence Program implementation, and, as necessary, conduct program and performance audits and evaluations." The National Security Act of 1947, as amended, states that the SECDEF shall: "(2) ensure appropriate implementation of the policies and resource decisions of the Director of Central Intelligence by elements of the Department of Defense within the National Foreign Intelligence Program." DoD internal guidance (Carlucci memorandum of April 17 1981) stated the policy that NFIP "resources are 'fenced' and they are not to be increased, decreased, or transferred at any point in the fiscal cycle unless such action has been officially coordinated with the DCI." This policy is deemed to continue and has never been seriously challenged. Thus, the concept of the NFIP as a fenced program is well-established and accepted in the Executive Branch. The greatest risk to the NFIP comes from the Legislative Branch, which is currently free to "trade" intelligence dollars for defense dollars in the appropriations process. One way to address this problem would be to create a separate line in the President's budget for intelligence. A separate line would lead to either an Intelligence and Defense Appropriations Bill or a completely separate appropriations bill (and appropriations subcommittee) for intelligence. However, separating intelligence from the rest of DoD (and, by inference, the other departments) into a separate appropriations bill, as was done with Military Construction some time ago, could well make the intelligence appropriations bill more vulnerable to political and fiscal winds, without the "cover" of the larger DoD appropriation. In all, the study group believes that it makes the most sense to leave NFIP funding in the various departments' budgets, but recommend a rules change within the House of Representatives that establishes some kind of a firewall between intelligence and defense funding in the appropriations process. Assuming the intelligence budget is to remain in the defense budget, the question of how many mini-intelligence budgets there should be remains. There are currently three: the NFIP, the JMIP, and TIARA. Theoretically, the TIARA programs are service-unique and the JMIP programs support multiple services or the theater/JTF. It is an article of faith in DoD that the military services have the right to an organic intelligence capability as part of their force structure to serve their unique needs. The study group does not dispute this. This capability is logically composed of the programs grouped into the TIARA aggregation. The JMIP was established to provide more centralized control over intelligence capabilities required for joint operations and that serve multiple customers. These programs are at the intersection between national and tactical intelligence and require a more intensive level of management to ensure that the boundaries are "seamless." There are, thus, logical reasons to retain both the JMIP and TIARA budget categories; however, their composition is a different issue. The JMIP and TIARA budgets differ mostly in how they are constructed. Both are aggregates of MFP II programs, but while TIARA is merely the compilation of those intelligence and intelligence-related programs that the Services have elected to fund, the JMIP is constructed as a formal program and the role of the Deputy SECDEF as program executive protects the program from being "raided" by the Services. In practice, both the JMIP and TIARA are a hodgepodge of programs, the result of a series of unrelated and/or compromise decisions rather than a coherent plan. The composition of the NFIP, JMIP and TIARA was one of the nine key issue areas being examined for presentation to the Expanded Defense Resources Board (EDRB) for the fiscal year 1997 budget submission; it is to be hoped that the results of that review will rationalize the division of programs; regardless, the study group believes that further guidance is required for DoD on the appropriate composition of the JMIP and TIARA aggregation (see the Congressional Oversight staff study for jurisdictional implications of these divisions). In addition to the policy and jurisdictional issues concerning the budget, there are serious problems with the mechanical process as well. The Community has long suffered from a vacuum in planning and guidance emanating from the DCI and his community-level staff. Although DCI guidance to the various functional managers is theoretically issued for each budget cycle, it is frequently either not done, not received in time, and/or not specific enough to affect the programming and budgeting of the various programs. In addition, the requirements system for the community, although much improved as a result of the evolution of the Needs Process, has never been successfully linked to the resource allocation process. Some of these issues are being addressed by the DCI and ExDir of the CMS. The NFIP budget has not previously been built in tandem with the DoD process; until fairly recently, there were not even agreed upon budget categories so that expenditures could be tracked across national and tactical programs. Assuming that most of the intelligence budget will remain a part of the defense budget, it is critical to apply similar processes to building the intelligence program and budget. The current ExDir's new programming and budgeting process is a positive step for several reasons. First, it rests the DoD portion of the intelligence budget on a foundation of program merit rather than relying on a good relationship between the DCI and the SECDEF. Second, it forces the IC itself to do a much more rigorous budget review than it has been able or tasked to do in the past, and to integrate its review with the non-NFIP defense intelligence programs, something that has never been done in a systematic way. It also puts the IC on a better footing with the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), which is beginning to play a more active role in vetting IC budget submissions. Although this may or may not continue, it will always be a possibility depending on the inclination of each particular administration. The disadvantage to this new process is perceived to be "greater DoD control" over the IC budget. However, the DCI and his staff control the development and review of issues and the composition of the program that is presented to the Expanded Defense Resources Board. Although all capabilities are included in the EDRB review process, formal budget action for the non-DoD programs is reserved for the DCI and review is done by the IC Executive Committee (EXCOM). Along with the rest of the NFIP, these activities are subject to OMB review. DoD has gained no new powers or authorities through this new process, only more visibility into some intelligence programs. As resources continue to be constrained, having DoD "buy-in" to the intelligence budget is not a bad thing. And, as has always been the case, in the final analysis the DCI has recourse to the President if he views the results of the process as unfair or inadequate. A more subtle, but more important disadvantage to this process is that it is still the "tail trying to wag the dog." Currently, the program managers submit to the CMS a proposed budget based on top-line guidance from the DCI that has been coordinated with the SECDEF. The CMS does a largely surface review of the submissions (often by personnel on temporary rotation from the agencies they are reviewing) and may make some minor changes to accommodate DCI priorities or some of the more vocal issue coordinators. When the budget is finalized, it is sent to Congress as part of the President's Budget. When the Congress authorizes and appropriates the money, it is appropriated directly to the program managers. The CMS has no control over -- indeed, no visibility into -- budget execution. If the DCI is to manage the Community as a corporate entity and ensure that resource trades are made to address priorities, he and his staff need more authority in the intelligence budgeting process. Although IC funding should still be appropriated to the various Departments, the CMS must have formal authority for formulating the NFIP budget, including the ability to monitor execution, withhold funds and reprogram funds within the NFIP. Thus, the elements of the NFIP should provide budget inputs to the CMS, but the CMS should build the budget in the functional categories mentioned above and submit the Congressional Budget Justification Books (CBJBs) to Congress. The authority to reprogram should be limited to not more than five percent of the losing agency's budget over a one-year period, subject to normal OMB review. The ability to withhold funds as a result of execution review should be accomplished by a formal arrangement between the DCI and SECDEF, allowing the CMS to identify to the OSD comptroller funds to be withheld. These recommendations require the CMS to be significantly enlarged, and although rotational personnel should continue to provide manpower and expertise to the staff, it must have a robust cadre of core staff to perform these and other functions recommended in this staff study. The single most important change that needs to be made concerns the organizing principle around which the budget is constructed. Broadly speaking, the budget could be organized around programs, missions, disciplines or functions. Notwithstanding the existing budget structural categories, the current budget is constructed around programs, even though each program varies widely in mission and composition. Almost any other solution would be an improvement; however the study group believes that the most constructive way to build the budget is along functional rather than programmatic or discipline lines, in the broad categories of collection, processing and exploitation, analysis and production, and infrastructure (to include R&D, dissemination, etc). Building the budget this way would force the types of trade-offs between like items that the IC has been largely unable to achieve to date, and would eliminate the current hegemony of the program managers in the budget process. It would also present to Congress a more balanced picture of the budget and the resource trades made to accommodate changing priorities. Building the budget around disciplines hinders the cross-discipline trades that need to occur, and building it around missions is difficult, because so many capabilities serve multiple purposes. While clearly any budget must start with missions and the required capabilities to perform them, the budget would more constructively be built around those capabilities rather than the missions themselves. Complicating the achievement of this goal is the community method of budgeting and accounting itself. Although there are standard budget accounting categories for the community, each program defines these categories somewhat differently and has its own unique budgeting and accounting system and infrastructure. In addition, resource data are retrievable only under the established budget categories, so there is no efficient way to do cross-mission or cross-functional analyses -- for example, to determine how much the community as a whole is spending on computer support. The Committee has several times engaged the CMS in discussions about how to do matrixed cost accounting so that resources could be flexibly associated with more than one category, but designing and implementing a system for the community that would meet those needs while allowing the DoD agencies to maintain necessary compatibility with DoD is not a trivial undertaking. If the CMS is given both the responsibility and the authority for building the NFIP program and conducting execution reviews, as it should be, a new programming, budgeting and cost accounting methodology must accompany these changes, which will standardize programming and budgeting procedures across the IC. Recommendations: 1) Retain but rationalize the NFIP, JMIP, TIARA budgets. Provide guidance to DoD concerning the appropriate composition of JMIP and TIARA. 2) Provide the CMS a program analysis and evaluation (PA&E) and a limited comptroller capability which would allow them to take responsibility for formulating and executing the NFIP budget. 3) Provide the DCI limited authority to reprogram funds within the NFIP, the amount not to exceed five percent of the losing agency's budget for a one-year period (Section 14(d) of the National Security Act). 4) Provide the CMS the ability to withhold funds through an arrangement with the OSD comptroller. 5) Mandate that the budget be built along functional rather than programmatic lines. Mandate and fund a new community programming, budgeting and accounting system that can track resources in multiple categories across the IC. VIII. Personnel Management The IC continues to face a major personnel crisis that it has, thus far, not addressed in a coherent way. The mandated downsizing, conducted as it has been on a voluntary basis, has left holes in the workforce that cannot be filled because there is no head room to hire new people. The demographic profiles of NSA and DIA are a disaster waiting to happen in 5-10 years unless some way is found to maintain a steady infusion of new blood into the community. At the same time that the number of personnel is declining, the cost of the remaining personnel is continually increasing, meaning that there has been little if any real savings associated with this painful process. As mentioned earlier, the focus of our global interest is changing and requires a different skill mix than the preponderance of political and military analysts that were the bread-and-butter of the Cold War. A related issue that cannot be ignored indefinitely is morale. Without the creation of some head room, prospects for promotion are grim. Without a reasonable demographic spread, meaningful career development is virtually impossible. Again, resolving these problems is dependent at least in part upon the ability to reduce the current workforce faster and more selectively than the hitherto voluntary, incentivized approaches. Further eroding morale is the lack of clear standards in some agencies and the perception of unfair advancement of certain segments of the population. A viable performance appraisal system across the community is an important step to improving this situation. Much of the discussion about the problems in the IC, and particularly the CIA, has revolved around the culture of the community and how it needs to change. However, it is difficult to change a culture by simply moving the same people around in an agency. New blood and fresh perspectives are required, and they can be attained in two basic ways: hiring new people, or "borrowing" people from other agencies and sending your people to those agencies so they come back with some new ideas. The IC overall needs to develop a "corporate culture," and it needs to do this primarily through personnel reform that promotes the concept of a community of professionals rather than a loosely connected group of agencies between which personnel movement is very difficult, if not impossible. This was the whole idea behind the personnel provisions of Goldwater-Nichols, which was designed (largely successfully) to break down the walls between the insular service personnel systems and promote a culture of "jointness." There have been numerous studies done on personnel management in the IC. As is pointed out in the report of the most recent Intelligence Community Task Force on Personnel Reform, led by Christopher Jehn, the same recommendations have been made again and again, but never implemented. In the past, the community has been unable to overcome the resistance of agencies or individuals to address personnel policy issues at the community level. However, we understand that the DCI and the Administration are drafting a legislative proposal for inclusion in the fiscal year 1997 authorization bill that incorporates the recommendations of the Jehn report. The study group is prepared to endorse all of these recommendations, particularly the requirement for an effective performance evaluation system and a coherently managed personnel system that would promote rotations and lateral movement within the community. The Jehn report states that in the course of the task force's review of current personnel systems in the IC, "four principal problems emerged: 1) a largely dysfunctional system of performance appraisal and management; 2) a lack of systematic career planning and professional development across the IC; 3) the variety and complexity of the various systems; and 4) inadequate promotion of a sense of community among the agencies, including a lack of tools and incentives for managers to promote diversity and make full use of the intellectual and cultural diversity in the IC's workforce." The task force's recommendations to counteract these problems were: 1) create an effective performance management system, encouraging the adoption of common performance criteria and standards across agencies; 2) employ broadbanding for compensation and position management to give more flexibility to local managers and immediate supervisors; 3) adopt a system of systematic initial appointment and separation management; 4) standardize recruiting practices, much of career training and elements of the performance management system across agencies, to include a career development program that includes joint training, rotational assignments, and dual tracks for substantive experts and managers. It is important to emphasize that a performance management system would not be identical for each agency or skill area. However, community-wide standards for performance appraisals, compatible pay banding systems, centrally-managed personnel security and a career development program are essential elements for reducing duplication and facilitating lateral movement within the community, thus promoting jointness and improving morale. At a minimum, the SES system should be standardized at the community level, and a rotational assignment should be a prerequisite for achieving SES rank except in rare circumstances. Dual tracks should be available for those personnel who do not aspire to high levels of management but would rather remain in specialized areas such as clandestine operations or cryptomathematics. In addition, we believe the DCI should be able to detail personnel within the community as required to meet short-term surge requirements (see Intelligence Community Surge Capability staff study). However, this authority should be limited to no more than 180 days without the concurrence of the parent agency. The issue of how to reduce further the numbers of personnel is a complicated one and no single solution will effect the required change. Many of the recommendations in the Jehn report would, over time, improve the community's ability to identify and terminate poor performers, particularly if the DCI's termination authority were expanded to the entire community. The problem is how to address the critical time period of the next 2-5 years before these recommendations, if implemented, could begin to have an effect. The agencies of the IC already have certain expanded authorities beyond those accorded to other government agencies. They have termination authorities (although only the CIA has a truly unambiguous termination authority), but they have no special RIF authorities or exemptions from the rules governing RIFs of civil service personnel. The termination authorities are not currently used for fear of lawsuits, a not unreasonable fear in the absence of a performance appraisal system that could produce a documentary record and justification for action. Limited legislative authorities, such as the two percent waiver and directed retirements of annuity-eligible personnel, could provide some relief but could be extremely difficult to get through Congress because of jurisdiction, fiscal and legal challenges. These programs need to be approached as pilot projects with the full cooperation of OMB in order to have some chance of being instituted, and even then cannot be guaranteed. However, it is the belief of the study group that the importance of this issue makes these efforts worth making and we recommend legislation for the Fiscal Year 1997 Intelligence Authorization Act establishing pilot programs for the two percent waiver and directed retirement of annuity-eligible personnel. Proposals for one-time dispensations to either reduce personnel or temporarily exceed mandated downsizing goals in order to allow hiring of essential new personnel were rejected because, although they may be effective in the short term, they do not provide the DCI with tools to prevent a recurrence of the current situation and to enable to IC to continually restructure its workforce in response to changing priorities and targets. Recommendations: 1) Implement recommendations of the Intelligence Community Task Force on Personnel Reform. 2) Standardize SES system across the community and make a rotational assignment a prerequisite for SES rank. 3) Authorize pilot programs to further reduce numbers of intelligence personnel, to include the waiver of the two percent retirement penalty and directed retirement of retirement-eligible personnel. 4) Provide the DCI enhanced control over NFIP personnel, to include the ability to detail as required for up to 180 days. IX. Research, Development and Acquisition Numerous interviews, panels and hearings confirmed the need for better management of increasingly scarce R&D dollars. Reports by an independent review panel on NSA's Advanced Research and Development Program, the results of the Exploitation Technology Working Group's review of R&D efforts in the imagery processing and exploitation field, and a wealth of anecdotal information support the contention that advanced R&D efforts are not adequately focused on the highest priority technical problems facing the IC. The individual discipline staff studies identify the critical areas requiring attention. Currently, although there is an individual on the CMS charged with looking at Advanced Technologies, R&D efforts remain fragmented under the control of individual program managers. The community coordinator has no budgetary authority and, thus, a limited effect on the various programs of the community. The various R&D efforts in the community require closer coordination with the requirements management element to ensure that R&D dollars are focused on the problems that are the most critical, not the most topical or the easiest. It is the study group's belief that the community also needs an R&D fund, similar to the Military Exploitation of Reconnaissance and Intelligence Technology (MERIT) program run by the NRO, to fund promising R&D projects. Under this concept, a fund would be established and elements of the IC could submit proposals on an annual basis for low-cost, potentially high pay-off technology demonstrations or experiments. These would be evaluated by a formally constituted review board and the available funds allocated to the projects based on merit. The MERIT program has been an extremely effective, albeit limited, response to the conundrum within DoD that it is harder to get $2 million now for a good idea than to get a $20 million project into the planning cycle for two years down the road. Another issue that must be addressed by the IC is the cumbersome acquisition process and the need to find a way to keep pace with commercial technology developments, particularly in the automation area. Each agency has automation plans and recapitalization plans of varying degrees of effectiveness. The result is that the community has a bewildering mixture of automation support hardware and software, almost none of it compatible and little of it state of the art. An important function of the ISO, mentioned earlier, would be to establish standards and information architectures for the entire community, building on the role played by the Intelligence Systems Board today. The community also needs a centralized fund for the life-cycle replacement and upgrade of community automation equipment,and a contracting vehicle that does not require the full-blown DoD procurement process to be followed. Consistent with the move towards corporateness and consolidation where practical and efficient, the study group believes that many R&D and acquisition activities should be consolidated for greater efficiency and coherence. Portions of the NRO would form the core of a new agency, but its scope would be broadened to include development of all reconnaissance systems, including airborne systems, and the sensor development and acquisition activities currently undertaken by the Directorate of Science and Technology (DS&T) within the CIA. This agency would be called the Technology Development Office (TDO) and would be funded via the NFIP and the JMIP (for programs currently within the Defense Airborne Reconnaissance Office (DARO)). The inclusion of the DARO in this concept would facilitate the development of a truly unified air/space reconnaissance architecture, an elusive goal thus far. The TDO would have Section 8 acquisition authorities for NFIP monies to ensure that the NRO's and CIA's traditional ability to conduct streamlined acquisition is not lost, and would serve as the acquisition executive with milestone approval authority for the DARO programs. As with most of our IC21 proposals, this would not necessarily require the physical relocation of these elements, but would rely upon a unified management approach to the overall reconnaissance architecture and sensor R&D arena. Other areas of R&D, such as those conducted at NSA in the signal processing area and specialized R&D in support of clandestine HUMINT operations, would remain associated with the agencies they specifically support, but come under greater management review in the process of building the budget functionally. The imagery and MASINT processing R&D currently done at the NRO and DS&T would migrate to the TCA. Recommendations: 1) Create a Technology Development Office that combines R&D and procurement functions for reconnaissance and sensor technologies, to include elements of the NRO, DARO, CIA, and NSA. Maintain Section 8 authorities for NFIP funds; serve as acquisition executive for DARO programs. 2) Establish a MERIT-like contingency fund for the IC to exploit technological targets of opportunity. 3) Establish a fund and a funding mechanism for rapid and continuous update of information systems and automation technologies. 4) Empower the Infrastructure Support Office (ISO) to establish standards and develop architectures for the IC. Make the ISO responsible for the life-cycle management of community ADP systems. ------------------------------ FOOTNOTES /1/The INFOSEC function, that is currently a non-NFIP MFP III program, could also be managed by this consolidated activity in better cooperation with communications and ADP; it could remain at physically at NSA or the TCA, as later discussed, to continue to enjoy the synergy between the "makers and the breakers" of codes, but would respond to community direction. Funding could be split between JMIP and TIARA, and management coordinated with the DMI staff and DMI.