

National Islamic Front government by maintaining the current unilateral sanctions regime and by increasing efforts for multilateral sanctions;

(G) to provide the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) and its National Democratic Alliance (NDA) allies with political and material support;

(H) to take the lead to strengthen the Intergovernmental Authority for Development's (IGAD) peace process; and

(I) not later than 3 months after the adoption of this resolution, to report to the Congress about the administration's efforts or plans to end slavery in Sudan;

(5) calls on the United Nations Security Council—

(A) to impose an arms embargo on the Government of Sudan;

(B) to condemn the enslavement of innocent civilians and take appropriate measures against the perpetrators of this crime;

(C) to swiftly implement reforms within the Operation Lifeline Sudan to enhance independence from the National Islamic Front regime;

(D) to implement United Nations Security Council Resolution 1070 relating to an air embargo;

(E) to make a determination that the National Islamic Front's war policy in southern Sudan and the Nuba Mountains constitutes genocide or ethnic cleansing; and

(F) to protect innocent civilians from aerial bombardment by the National Islamic Front's air force;

(6) urges the Inter-Governmental Authority for Development (IGAD) partners under the leadership of President Daniel Arap Moi to call on the Government of Sudan to immediately stop the indiscriminate bombings in southern Sudan;

(7) strongly condemns any government that financially supports the Government of Sudan;

(8) calls on the President to transmit to the Congress not later than 90 days after the date of the adoption of this concurrent resolution, and not later than every 90 days thereafter, a report regarding flight suspensions for humanitarian purposes concerning Operation Lifeline Sudan; and

(9) urges the President to increase by 100 percent the allocation of funds that are made available through the Sudanese Transition Assistance for Rehabilitation Program (commonly referred to as the "STAR Program") for the promotion of the rule of law to advance democracy, civil administration and judiciary, and the enhancement of infrastructure, in the areas in Sudan that are controlled by the opposition to the National Islamic Front government.

The SPEAKER pro tempore, Mr. SHIMKUS, recognized Mr. ROYCE and Mr. PAYNE, each for 20 minutes.

After debate,

The question being put, viva voce,

Will the House suspend the rules and agree to said concurrent resolution, as amended?

The SPEAKER pro tempore, Mr. SHIMKUS, announced that two-thirds of the Members present had voted in the affirmative.

Mr. ROYCE demanded that the vote be taken by the yeas and nays, which demand was supported by one-fifth of the Members present, so the yeas and nays were ordered.

The SPEAKER pro tempore, Mr. SHIMKUS, pursuant to clause 5, rule I, announced that further proceedings on the motion were postponed.

#### ¶64.11 MESSAGES FROM THE PRESIDENT

Sundry messages in writing from the President of the United States were communicated to the House by Mr. Sherman Williams, one of his secretaries.

#### ¶64.12 SECURITY ASSISTANCE MODIFICATIONS

Mr. GILMAN moved to suspend the rules and pass the bill (H.R. 973) to modify authorities with respect to the provision of security assistance under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 and the Arms Control Act, and for other purposes; as amended.

The SPEAKER pro tempore, Mr. SHIMKUS, recognized Mr. GILMAN and Mr. GEJDENSON, each for 20 minutes.

After debate,

The question being put, viva voce,

Will the House suspend the rules and pass said bill, as amended?

The SPEAKER pro tempore, Mr. SHIMKUS, announced that two-thirds of the Members present had voted in the affirmative.

So, two-thirds of the Members present having voted in favor thereof, the rules were suspended and said bill, as amended, was passed.

A motion to reconsider the vote whereby the rules were suspended and said bill, as amended, was passed was, by unanimous consent, laid on the table.

Ordered, That the Clerk request the concurrence of the Senate in said bill.

#### ¶64.13 MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT—COMMODITY CREDIT CORPORATION

The SPEAKER pro tempore, Mr. SHIMKUS, laid before the House a message from the President, which was read as follows:

*To the Congress of the United States:*

In accordance with the provisions of section 13, Public Law 806, 80th Congress (15 U.S.C. 714k), I transmit herewith the report of the Commodity Credit Corporation for the fiscal year ending September 30, 1997.

WILLIAM J. CLINTON.

THE WHITE HOUSE, June 15, 1999.

By unanimous consent, the message, together with the accompanying papers, was referred to the Committee on Agriculture.

#### ¶64.14 MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT—EXCHANGE STABILIZATION FUND WITH RESPECT TO BRAZIL

The SPEAKER pro tempore, Mr. SHIMKUS, laid before the House a message from the President, which was read as follows:

*To the Congress of the United States:*

On November 9, 1998, I approved the use of the Exchange Stabilization Fund (ESF) to provide up to \$5 billion for the U.S. part of a multilateral guarantee of a credit facility for up to \$13.28 billion from the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) to the Banco Central do Brasil (Banco Central). Eighteen other central banks and monetary authorities are guaranteeing portions of the

BIS credit facility. In addition, through the Bank of Japan, the Government of Japan is providing a swap facility of up to \$1.25 billion to Brazil under terms consistent with the terms of the BIS credit facility. Pursuant to the requirements of 31 U.S.C. 5302(b), I am hereby notifying the Congress that I have determined that unique or emergency circumstances require the ESF financing to be available for more than 6 months.

The BIS credit facility is part of a multilateral effort to support an International Monetary Fund (IMF) standby arrangement with Brazil that itself totals approximately \$18.1 billion, which is designed to help restore financial market confidence in Brazil and its currency, and to reestablish conditions for long-term sustainable growth. The IMF is providing this package through normal credit tranches and the Supplemental Reserve Facility (SRF), which provides short-term financing at significantly higher interest rates than those for credit tranche financing. Also, the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank are providing up to \$9 billion in support of the international financial package for Brazil.

Since December 1998, international assistance from the IMF, the BIS credit facility, and the Bank of Japan's swap facility has provided key support for Brazil's efforts to reform its economy and resolve its financial crisis. From the IMF arrangement, Brazil has purchased approximately \$4.6 billion in December 1998 and approximately \$4.9 billion in April 1999. On December 18, 1998, the Banco Central made a first drawing of \$4.15 billion from the BIS credit facility and also drew \$390 million from the Bank of Japan's swap facility. The Banco Central made a second drawing of \$4.5 billion from the BIS credit facility and \$423.5 million from the Bank of Japan's swap facility on April 9, 1999. The ESF's "guarantee" share of each of these BIS credit facility drawings is approximately 38 percent.

Each drawing from the BIS credit facility or the Bank of Japan's swap facility matures in 6 months, with an option for additional 6-month renewals. The Banco Central must therefore repay its first drawing from the BIS and Bank of Japan facilities by June 18, 1999, unless the parties agree to a rollover. The Banco Central has informed the BIS and the Bank of Japan that it plans to request, in early June, a rollover of 70 percent of the first drawing from each facility, and will repay 30 percent of the first drawing from each facility.

The BIS's agreement with the Banco Central contains conditions that minimize risks to the ESF. For example, the participating central banks or the BIS may accelerate repayment if the Banco Central has failed to meet any condition of the agreement or Brazil has failed to meet any material obligation to the IMF. The Banco Central must repay the BIS no slower than, and