BOARD OF CONTRACT APPEALS
   U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
   WASHINGTON, DC  20401

In the Matter of              )
                              )
the Appeal of                 )
                              )
K.C. PRINTING COMPANY         )   Docket No. GPO BCA 02-91
Jacket Nos. 278-448, 278-449  )
   and 278-450                )
Purchase Order 54958          )

   DECISION AND ORDER

   This appeal, timely filed by K.C. Printing Company (Appellant
   or Contractor), 968 Atlantic Avenue, Brooklyn, New York 11238,
   is from the final decision of Contracting Officer James L.
   Leonard, of the U.S. Government Printing Office's (Respondent
   or GPO or Government) Printing Procurement Department,
   Washington, DC 20401, dated January 9, 1991, assessing excess
   reprocurement costs following a default of its contract for
   failure to meet the delivery schedule (R4 File, Tab E).1  For
   the reasons which follow, the Contracting Officer's decision
   is AFFIRMED, and the appeal is DENIED.2

   I. BACKGROUND

   The facts in this appeal are essentially undisputed and are
   briefly set out here only to the extent necessary for the
   purposes of this decision.

      1.   On November 2, 1990, the Respondent issued Purchase
      Order 54958 to the Appellant awarding it a contract to
      produce three sets of pamphlets for the U.S. Army Corps of
      Engineers (COE) (R4 File, Tab A).3  The estimated cost of
      the contract was $5,124.00, based on the Contractor's bid
      (R4 File, Tab A).

      2.   Under terms of the contract, the Appellant was to
      complete delivery of the pamphlets to the COE by November
      30, 1990 (R4 File, Tab A).  However, on December 13, 1990,
      the COE notified GPO that the pamphlets had not been
      received as of that date (R4 File, Tab B).

      3.   On December 18, 1990, after obtaining the concurrence
      of GPO's Contract Review Board, the Contracting Officer
      terminated the Appellant's contract for default because of
      the Contractor's failure to meet the delivery schedule (R4
      File, Tabs C and D).  The termination notice also advised
      the Appellant that it would be liable for any excess
      reprocurement costs (R4 File, Tab D).  It is undisputed
      that the contract was defaulted without affording the
      Appellant an opportunity to "cure" the delinquent delivery.

      4.   Almost immediately the Contracting Officer solicited
      new bids for the work (R4 File, Tab D-1).  Although the
      Contracting Officer contacted six potential contractors, he
      received only two bids-one from West Shore Printing for
      $19,255.00 and the other from Hiller Industries for
      $18,764.00 (R4 File, Tab D-1).  On January 8, 1991, the
      Contracting Officer awarded the repurchase contract to
      Hiller at its bid price (R4 File, Tabs D-1 and K).4  Hiller
      completed the work and was paid by Government check on
      February 27, 1991 (Check No. 30537679) (R4 File, Tab M).5
      Meanwhile, on January 9, 1991, the Contract Officer
      notified GPO's Financial Management Service (FMS) of the
      reprocurement and asked it to recover the additional costs
      incurred by the Government ($13,640.00) from the Appellant
      (R4 File, Tab E).

      5.   When the Appellant was informed of the repurchase
      action, its response was to write a letter to the Board,
      dated January 28, 1991, challenging the Contracting
      Officer's reprocurement award to Hiller on the ground that
      the contract price of $18,764.00 was "excessively high",
      and asking the Board to make "an inquiry into the procedure
      of the new award" (R4 File, Tab E-1).  The Contractor
      argued that since the second lowest bid on the original
      contract was $6,800.00 (submitted by American Litho), while
      the third lowest was for $8,760.00 (submitted by West Shore
      Printing), there was no justification for awarding the
      repurchase contract to Hiller at a price of $18,760.00 (R4
      File, Tab E-1).

      6.   On being informed that the Appellant had filed an
      appeal with the Board,6 the Contracting Officer reviewed
      his repurchase decision.  Thereafter, by letter dated
      February 27, 1991, the Contracting Officer informed the
      Contractor that upon re-examination of the contract file,
      he was reducing the excess reprocurement cost liability
      from $13,640.00 to $4,201.00,7 based on the price quotation
      of K.S. Press, the fourth lowest bidder on the original
      contract, but the next lowest responsible offeror, who had
      bid $9,325.00 for the job (R4 File, Tab G).  As explained
      by the Contracting Officer:

            This determination was made to mitigate the
            contractor's costs.  On the original solicitation,
            award [could not have been] made to American Litho.
            American Litho had a compliance and quality problem.
            The next contractor was Westshore [sic] Printing who
            wanted to revise his price by a considerable
            increase.  This was reflected in the new
            solicitation.

See, R4 File, Tab H.

      7. On March 1, 1991, the Contracting Officer told FMS to
      recover the lower amount (R4 File, Tab I).  Thereafter, on
      March 4, 1991, the Contracting Officer issued GPO Contract
      Modification No. 1 reflecting the change and sent it to the
      Appellant (R4 File, Tab J).8
   II. QUESTIONS PRESENTED

      1.   Was the default action defective because the
      Contracting Officer failed to provide the Appellant with an
      opportunity to "cure" the delinquency before terminating
      the contract?

      2.   Is the Appellant's reason for not meeting the delivery
      schedule, namely that it lacked the funds to buy supplies
      until its bank completed a merger with another financial
      institution, such an excuse as would forgive its failure to
      perform?

      3.   Has the Government proved its entitlement to recover
      excess reprocurement costs in the amount of $4,201.00?

   III. POSITIONS OF THE PARTIES

   The Appellant does not dispute that it failed to deliver the
   pamphlets to the COE by the contract "due date."  Instead, the
   Contractor maintains that the default termination was
   procedurally defective because it was entitled to a "Cure
   Notice" to correct the delivery problem, and the Contracting
   Officer neglected to provide one.  See, RPTC, pp. 5-6.
   Furthermore, the Appellant believes that the delivery delay
   was excused by the fact that during the time set for
   performance its bank was the subject of a takeover by another
   financial institution,9 and it had no access to the money in
   its account because the account was frozen.10  RPTC, p. 6.
   Consequently, until the bank reorganization was completed, the
   Appellant was without the wherewithal to order supplies.  See,
   Appellant's Brief on Order Requiring Dismissal of Motion to
   Dismiss, dated October 12, 1992, p. 2.  The Contractor asserts
   that if the shipping date had been extended 10 days by the
   issuance of a proper "Cure Notice", it could have produced and
   delivered the pamphlets because the funding problem would have
   been resolved.  RPTC, p. 6.  Finally, at the presubmission
   conference on January 26, 1993, the Appellant stated that it
   would accept the Contracting Officer's lower figure regarding
   its excess reprocurement cost liability, as reflected in
   Contract Modification No. 1, if the Board determined that the
   contract was properly terminated.  Id.

   The Respondent, on the other hand, contends that a "Cure
   Notice" was not required prior to the termination of the
   contract for default in this case, because the Appellant had
   failed to deliver the pamphlets within the time specified in
   the contract.  See, Res. Brf., pp. 5-6; RPTC, p. 6.  As for
   the issue of excess reprocurement costs, GPO submits that the
   Contracting Officer repurchased the defaulted pamphlets in
   accordance with accepted legal precepts so that the Appellant
   is liable for the Government's extra costs in the amount of
   $4,201.00.11  Res. Brf., p. 7.  First, the Respondent notes
   that Hiller's reprocurement contract was for the identical
   supplies, and contained the same terms and conditions as the
   Appellant's original contract.  Res. Brf., pp. 8-10 (citing, B
   & M Construction, Inc., AGBCA No. 90-165-1, 93-1 BCA  25,431;
   Old Dominion Security, Inc., GSBCA No. 9126, 90-2 BCA 
   22,745; Luis Martinez, AGBCA Nos. 86-1-148-1, 86-270-1, 87-3
   BCA  20,219; Marmac Industries, Inc., ASBCA No. 12158, 72-1
   BCA  9,249).  Second, GPO argues that the Contracting Officer
   reprocured the terminated items within a reasonable time
   following the default.  Res. Brf., pp. 10-11 (citing, John L.
   Hartsoe, AGBCA No. 88-116-1, 93-2 BCA  25,614; Birken
   Manufacturing Company, ASBCA No. 32590, 90-2 BCA  22,845;
   Sequal, Inc., ASBCA No. 30838, 88-1 BCA  20,382; Disan
   Corporation, ASBCA Nos. 21297, 22221, 79-1 BCA  16,677).
   Third, the Respondent claims that it used the most efficient
   method of reprocurement under the circumstances and acted
   reasonably to minimize the excess costs.  Res. Brf.,  pp.
   11-13 (citing, Ketchikan Pulp Company v. United States, 20
   Cl.Ct. 164 (1990); Puroflow Corporation, ASBCA No. 36058, 93-3
   BCA  26,191; Barrett Refining Corporation, ASBCA Nos. 36590,
   37093, 91-1 BCA  23,566; Mid-America Painters, Inc., ENG BCA
   No. 5703, 91-1 BCA  23.367; American Photographic Industries,
   Inc., ASBCA Nos. 29272, 29832, 90-1 BCA  22,491).  Finally,
   the Government states that it has presented evidence of
   Hiller's final payment so that the Appellant's excess
   reprocurement cost liability is based upon a sum certain.
   Res. Brf., pp. 13-14 (citing, Sterling Printing, Inc., GPO BCA
   20-89 (March 28, 1994); Patty Armfield, AGBCA Nos. 91-185-1,
   92-141-1, 92-143-1, 93-1 BCA  25,235; Pyramid Packing, Inc.,
   AGBCA No. 86-128-1, 92-2 BCA  24,831).  Accordingly, the
   Respondent urges the Board to uphold the default termination,
   and allow the excess reprocurement cost assessment against the
   Contractor.12  Res. Brf., p. 14.

   IV. CONCLUSIONS13

   Fundamentally, this appeal asks the Board to decide whether or
   not the Appellant's contract was erroneously defaulted, and if
   the termination was proper, is the Contractor nonetheless
   excused from liability for excess reprocurement costs?
   Therefore, it is worthwhile to repeat the applicable  legal
   principles at the outset.

   First, GPO's "Default" clause provides that a contracting
   officer may, upon written notice of default to the contractor,
   terminate a contract, in whole or in part, if the contractor
   fails to: (1) deliver the supplies or perform the required
   services within the time specified or any extension which may
   have been granted; (2) make progress on the work, so as to
   endanger performance of the contract; or (3) perform any of
   the other provisions of the contract.  See, GPO Contract
   Terms, Solicitation Provisions, Supplemental Specifications,
   and Contract Clauses, GPO Publication 310.2, Effective
   December 1, 1987 (Rev. 9-88), Contract Clauses,  20(a)(1)(i),
   (ii),(iii) (Default) (hereinafter GPO Contract Terms).
   Further, where a contract is terminated for default and the
   work must be reprocured, the contractor will be held
   responsible for excess procurement costs and possible
   liquidated damages.  GPO Contract Terms, Contract Clauses, 
   20(b), 22(d).  However, the contractor is excused from paying
   such reprocurement costs or damages if the failure to perform
   or to deliver on time results from causes beyond the control
   and without the fault or negligence of the contractor.14  GPO
   Contract Terms, Contract Clauses,  20(c), 22(e), 23.  Such
   causes include, but are not limited to, acts of God or of the
   public enemy, acts of the Government in either its sovereign
   or contractual capacity, fires, floods, epidemics, quarantine
   restrictions, strikes, freight embargoes, and unusually severe
   weather-but in each case, the failure to perform must be
   beyond the control and without the fault or negligence of the
   contractor.  GPO Contract Terms, Contract Clauses,  20(c).
   See, Printing Unlimited, GPO BCA No. 21-90 (November 30,
   1993), Sl. op. at 16; Shepard Printing, GPO BCA 23-92 (April
   23, 1993) Sl. op. at 11; Chavis and Chavis Printing, GPO BCA
   20-90 (February 6, 1991), Sl. op. at 11.  Where the failure to
   perform is caused by the default of a supplier or
   subcontractor, the cause of the default must be beyond the
   control of both the contractor and subcontractor, and without
   the fault or negligence of either, in order for the contractor
   not to be liable for any excess costs for failure to perform,
   unless the subcontracted supplies or services could have been
   secured from other sources in sufficient time to meet the
   required delivery schedule.  GPO Contract Terms, Contract
   Clauses,  20.(d).  See, Chavis and Chavis Printing, supra,
   Sl. op. at 11.

   Second, because a default termination is a drastic action
   which may only be taken for good cause and on the basis of
   solid evidence,15 see, Shepard Printing, supra, Sl. op. at
   10-11; R.C. Swanson Printing and Typesetting Company, GPO BCA
   31-90 (February 6, 1992), Sl. op. at 25, aff'd, Richard C.
   Swanson, T/A R.C. Swanson Printing and Typesetting Company,
   No. 92-128C (U.S. Claims Court, October 2, 1992);16
   Stephenson, Inc., GPO BCA 02-88 (December 20, 1991), Sl. op.
   at 20 (citing, Mary Rogers Manley d/b/a Mary Rogers Real
   Estate, HUDBCA No. 76-27, 78-2 BCA  13,519; Decatur Realty
   Sales, HUDBCA No. 75-26, 77-2 BCA  12,567), the Government
   has the burden of proving the basis for the default, while the
   contractor has the burden of showing that its failure to
   perform was excusable, see, Shepard Printing, supra, Sl. op.
   at 11; R.C. Swanson Printing and Typesetting Company, supra,
   Sl. op. at 28; Chavis and Chavis Printing, supra, Sl. op. at
   11.  Accord, Lisbon Contractors v. United States, 828 F.2d 759
   (Fed. Cir. 1987)); Switlik Parachute Company v. United States,
   216 Ct.Cl. 362 (1978); J.F. Whalen and Company, AGBCA Nos.
   83-160-1, 83-281-1, 88-3 BCA  21,066; B. M. Harrison
   Electrosonics, Inc., ASBCA No. 7684, 1963 BCA  3,736.  If the
   Government fails to meet its burden of proof, then the
   termination is converted into one of convenience and the
   contractor is allowed to recover for the work performed.  See,
   GPO Contract Terms, Contract Clauses,  20(g).  Cf.,
   Stephenson, Inc., supra, Sl. op. at 17-18; Chavis and Chavis
   Printing, supra, Sl. op. at 9.

   Third, where, as here, the default termination is based on
   untimely performance, the contractor's burden of proof is
   four-fold: (1) to prove affirmatively that the delay was
   caused by or arose out of a situation which was beyond the
   contractor's control and it was not at fault or negligent; (2)
   to show that performance would have been timely but for the
   occurrence of the event which is claimed to excuse the delay;
   (3) to show that it took every reasonable precaution to avoid
   foreseeable causes for delay and to minimize their effect; and
   (4) to establish a precise period of time that performance was
   delayed by the causes alleged.  See, Chavis and Chavis
   Printing, supra, Sl. op. at 12 (and cases cited therein).
   This burden must be carried by substantial evidence-
   unsupported reasons by way of explanation are not enough-and
   the contractor must also show that the delay in contract
   performance was due to unforeseeable causes beyond its control
   and without any contributory negligence on its part.  See,
   Chavis and Chavis Printing, supra, Sl. op. at 12-13 (and cases
   cited therein).

   Finally, a default termination is a discretionary act which
   can be challenged on an abuse of discretion standard.  See,
   Graphics Image, Inc., GPO BCA 13-92 (August 31, 1992), Sl. op.
   at 24-28; Shepard Printing, supra, Sl. op. at 12.  Accord,
   Darwin Construction Company, Inc. v. United States, 811 F.2d
   593 (Fed. Cir. 1987); Quality Environment Systems v. United
   States, 7 Cl.Ct. 428 (1985); Schlesinger v. United States, 390
   F.2d 702 (Ct. Cl. 1968); Executive Elevator Service, Inc.,
   VABCA No. 2152, 87-2 BCA  19,849, mot. for reconsider.
   denied, 87-3 BCA  20,083.  The burden is on the contractor to
   prove abuse of discretion.  See, Shepard Printing, supra, Sl.
   op. at 12.  Accord, Kit Pack Company, Inc., ASBCA No. 33135,
   89-3 BCA  22,151; Lafayette Coal Company, ASBCA No. 32174,
   89-3 BCA  21,963; Quality Environment Systems, Inc., ASBCA
   No. 22178, 87-3 BCA  20,060.

   Applying these principles to the facts in the record, the
   Board reaches the following conclusions:

               A. The Contracting Officer was not required to
               issue a "Cure Notice" before terminating the
               Appellant's contract for default.

      1.   It could not be clearer that the Appellant's contract
      was defaulted by the Contracting Officer for a failure to
      "[d]eliver the supplies or to perform the services within
      the time specified or any extension, thereof;. . .".  GPO
      Contract Terms, Contract Clauses,  20(a)(1)(i).17  Indeed,
      the Contracting Officer's termination letter said as much
      (R4 File, Tab D ("You are notified that your contract . . .
      is hereby terminated for default because of your failure to
      meet our specification (schedule).")  The Appellant does
      not dispute the Contracting Officer's finding in that
      regard.  Rather, the Contractor contends that the
      Contracting Officer's termination action was procedurally
      defective because he failed to issue a "Cure Notice"
      affording it an opportunity to correct the delivery problem
      before the contract was defaulted.  See, RPTC, pp. 5-6.

      2.   The Appellant is mistaken.  As a general rule, no
      "cure notice" is required where a contract is to be
      terminated because of the contractor's failure to timely
      deliver or perform.  See, B. P. Printing and Office
      Supplies, GPO BCA 22-91 (February 5, 1993), Sl. op. at 12;
      Shepard Printing, supra, Sl. op. at 13; Stephenson, Inc.,
      supra, Sl. op. at 19-20.  Accord, Chambers-Thompson Moving
      and Storage, Inc., ASBCA No. 43260, 93-3 BCA  26,033, at
      129,408;  Sonico, Inc., ASBCA Nos. 31110, 34269, 89-2 BCA 
      21,611.  The law does provide a limited exception to this
      principle when a contractor has timely shipped
      nonconforming goods which deviate from the specifications
      in only minor respects, see, Radiation Technology, Inc. v.
      United States, 177 Ct.Cl. 227, 366 F.2d 1003 (1966), but
      such is not this case.18  In light of the Appellant's
      admission that it did not meet the contract delivery date
      in this case, the Board concludes that the Contracting
      Officer did not commit procedural error by failing to issue
      a "Cure Notice" to the Appellant before terminating the
      contract for default, and therefore, the Appellant's
      contentions to the contrary are without merit.19  See, B.
      P. Printing and Office Supplies, supra, Sl. op. at 15;
      Chavis and Chavis Printing, supra, Sl. op. at 13.

               B. The Appellant's reason for not meeting the
               delivery schedule, namely that it lacked the funds
               to buy supplies until its bank completed a merger
               with another financial institution, is not such an
               excuse as would forgive its failure to perform.




      1.   As indicated above, under the "Disputes" clauses a
      defaulting contractor is excused from the consequences of
      its failure to perform or make timely deliveries in
      accordance with the contract terms, if it can demonstrate
      that its delinquency results from causes beyond its control
      and without its fault or negligence.  GPO Contract Terms,
      Contract Clauses,  20(c), 22(e), 23.  In this case, the
      Appellant offers as an excuse for its failure to deliver
      the pamphlets, the fact that it was without the funds to
      order supplies during the time set for performance because
      its bank was merging with another financial institution and
      its account was frozen.  RPTC, p. 6.  This excuse is
      without legal merit.

      2.   It is "black letter" law that a contractor is
      responsible for having the labor, plant, equipment,
      material and finances adequate for contract performance
      prior to making a contract commitment with the Government.
      See, Chavis and Chavis Printing, supra, Sl. op. at 14-15.
      The reason for this rule is simple-implicit in a
      contractor's promise to perform is its assurance that it
      has the ability to perform.  Id., Sl. op. at 14.

      3.   The basic rule with regard to contractor finances was
      stated in a recent decision by the Armed Services Board of
      Contract Appeals (ASBCA).  In Dependable Metal Products,
      Inc., ASBCA Nos. 41446, 41449, 94-3 BCA  26,963, the
      contractor's failure to provide evidence from its bank that
      the bank's negative financing decision was based on
      Government action or inaction, as contended by the
      contractor, resulted in the ASBCA's rejection of the
      contractor's attempt to excuse its default based on its
      financial problems.  As the ASBCA observed:

            While we hear appellant argue that repudiation was
            compelled, in part, by a decision of a lender not to
            provide additional financing, the general rule is
            that a contractor assumes the risk of assuring
            adequate financing to perform the work.  Southeastern
            Airways Corporation v. United States [29 CCF 
            82,261], 673 F.2d 368 (Ct.Cl. 1982); International
            Equipment Services, Inc., ASBCA Nos. 21104, 23170,
            83-2 BCA  16,675.  There is an exception where the
            contractor can show that financing was denied because
            of Government wrongdoing.  TGC Contracting
            Corporation v. United States [32 CCF  73,655], 736
            F.2d 1512 (Fed. Cir. 1984).

Dependable Metal Products, Inc., supra, 94-3 BCA  26,963, at
134,264.  Compare, Litchfield Manufacturing Corporation v. United
States, 338 F.2d 94 (Ct.Cl. 1964) (bank vice president testified
that bank declined financing because of the Government's failure
to timely deliver necessary tooling).  Similarly, as another
contract appeals board noted:

            It is fundamental that the contractor assumes the
            risk of providing funds to perform the contract.
            Consequently, neither undercapitalization nor
            insolvency (actual or impending) will excuse a
            failure to perform.  Consolidated Airborne Systems,
            Inc. v. United States [10 CCF  73,125], 172 Ct.Cl.
            588, 597, 348 F.2d 941, 946 (1965); Willems
            Industries, Inc. v. United States [8 CCF  71,693],
            155 Ct.Cl. 360, 295 F.2d 822 (1961); International
            Equipment Services, Inc., ASBCA Nos. 21104, 23170.
            83-2 BCA  16,675; Medical Fabrics Company, ASBCA No.
            1148, 66-2 BCA  5,887.



See, El Greco Painting Company, ENG BCA No. 5693, 92-1 BCA 
24,522, at 122,379.  See also, Sierra Tahoe Manufacturing, Inc.,
GSBCA No. 12679, 94-2 BCA  26,771; Centennial Leasing, GSBCA No.
12037, 94-1 BCA  26,398; Swiss Products, Inc., ASBCA No. 40031,
93-3 BCA  26,163; Local Contractors, Inc., ASBCA No. 37108, 92-1
BCA  24,491; Ralcon, Inc., ASBCA Nos. 38059, 38191, 40398,
41376, 92-2 BCA  24,971.

      4.   In the Board's view, the general rule is dispositive
      of this case.  It was the Appellant's obligation to have
      proper and adequate financial resources to perform the
      contract.  See, Ralcon, Inc., supra, 92-2 BCA  24,971, at
      124,435.  The Contractor's inability to acquire sufficient
      funds for performance is not such an excuse "beyond its
      control and without its fault or negligence" within the
      meaning of the "Disputes" clause, unless it could show that
      its financial incapacity was Government caused.  See, Local
      Contractors, Inc., supra, 92-1 BCA  24,491, at 122,235-36
      (and cases cited therein).  Financial problems not caused
      by wrongful Government action do not form the basis to
      excuse a failure to deliver.  Midwest Satellite Equipment,
      Inc., ASBCA No. 40713, 91-2 BCA  23,907, at 119,759;
      Unimach Manufacturing, ASBCA No. 39883, 90-3 BCA  22,968,
      at 115,348.  The Appellant has not shown any improper
      conduct on the part of the Government affecting its ability
      to acquire sufficient funds.  While it is unfortunate that
      the Appellant was denied access to its bank account at the
      time it was expected to produce and deliver the pamphlets,
      there is not a scintilla of proof that the Government was
      responsible for freezing the account, nor has the
      Contractor even suggested such a thing.  Furthermore,
      despite the Board's direction to the Appellant at the
      presubmission telephone conference that it obtain a letter
      from its bank corroborating the fact that it had no access
      to its bank account during the contract performance period,
      see, RPTC, pp. 7-8, the Contractor has failed to provide
      any evidence from its bank whatsoever to support its
      contention that its account was frozen.  See, Dependable
      Metal Products, Inc., supra, 94-3 BCA  26,963, at 134,264.
      Accordingly, the Appellant has not met its burden of proof
      with respect to excusing its failure to make a timely
      shipment of the pamphlets under Purchase Order 54958, and
      the Contracting Officer was justified in terminating the
      contract for default.  See, Chavis and Chavis Printing,
      supra, Sl. op. at 15.  Accord, Midwest Satellite Equipment
      , Inc., supra, 91-2 BCA  23,907, at 119,759.

               C. The Respondent has sustained is burden of proof
               with regard to the Appellant's liability for
               excess reprocurement costs.

      1.   The assessment of excess reprocurement costs is
      considered a Government claim.  See, Sterling Printing,
      Inc., supra, Sl. op. at 50-51 (and cases cited therein).
      Consequently, the Government has the burden of
      demonstrating the propriety of the repurchase and proving
      its entitlement to the amount of excess costs it claims.
      Id., Sl. op. at 51 (and cases cited therein).  In doing so,
      the Government must satisfy five criteria to establish an
      entitlement to recovery against a defaulting contractor,
      namely, it must show that: (a) the reprocurement contract
      was performed under substantially the same terms and
      conditions as the original contract; (b) it acted within a
      reasonable time following default to repurchase the
      supplies; (c) it employed a reprocurement method which
      would maximize competition under the circumstances; (d) it
      obtained the lowest reasonable price; and (e) the work has
      been completed and final payment made so that the excess
      costs assessment is based upon liability for a sum
      certain.20  Id., Sl. op. at 52-53 (and cases cited
      therein).  Furthermore, the Government claim must be
      supported by evidence in the record as to each element of
      the claim.  Id., Sl. op. at 53 (and cases cited therein).
      Failure to satisfy even one criterion may result in a
      reduction of the excess costs claimed.  Id., Sl. op. at
      53-54 (and cases cited therein).  Measuring the repurchase
      action in this case against the above standards, the Board
      concludes that the Respondent has satisfied all of the
      elements necessary to sustain an entitlement to excess
      reprocurement costs.
      2.   First, the Board's own comparison of the original and
      reprocurement contracts leaves no question but that the
      reprocurement contractor, Hiller, was asked to produce and
      deliver the identical pamphlets, under essentially the same
      terms and conditions, as those in the Appellant's original
      contract.  Compare, R4 File, Tabs A and L.  The Appellant
      does not allege otherwise.  Both contracts procure
      pamphlets with the same functional purpose and use, and
      there is no significant difference between their terms and
      conditions.  Indeed, the only observable difference between
      the two contracts was the assignment of three new Jacket
      numbers to the repurchase contract.  Accordingly, the Board
      concludes that the Respondent has met the first condition
      for excess reprocurement costs, namely, that the
      reprocurement contract purchased the same or similar items,
      and was performed under substantially the same terms and
      conditions as the original contract.  See, Sterling
      Printing, Inc., supra, Sl. op. at 62-63.  Accord, B & M
      Construction, Inc., supra, 93-1 BCA  25,431; Zan Machine
      Company, ASBCA No. 39462, 91-3 BCA  24,085; Boston
      Pneumatics, Inc., ASBCA Nos. 26188, 26190, 26825, 26984,
      27605, 27606, 87-1 BCA  19,395.

      3.   Second, the Board has no trouble in concluding that
      the reprocurement was accomplished in a timely fashion.
      See, Sterling Printing, Inc., supra, Sl. op. at 63.  The
      record in this case shows that the Appellant's contract was
      terminated for default on December 18, 1990 (R4 File, Tab
      D).  The reprocurement contract was awarded to Hiller 21
      days later, on January 8, 1991 (R4 File, Tabs D-1 and K).
      Accordingly, considering that this time frame included both
      the Christmas and New Year's holidays, on this record the
      Board finds that the Respondent acted with reasonable
      dispatch and without undue delay to reprocure the three
      defaulted pamphlets, and thus it has satisfied its
      evidentiary burden.  See, Sterling Printing, Inc., supra,
      Sl. op. at 64-65.  Accord, Astro-Space Laboratories, Inc.
      v. United States, 200 Ct.Cl. 282, 470 F.2d 1003 (1972);
      Puroflow Corporation, supra, 93-3 BCA  26,191; John L.
      Hartsoe, supra, 93-2 BCA  25,614; Sequal, Inc., supra,
      88-1 BCA  20,382; Disan Corporation, supra, 79-1 BCA 
      16,677.

      4.   Third, it also seems clear that in reprocuring the
      defaulted contract, the Respondent chose a method which was
      designed to maximized competition and obtain the best or
      lowest reasonable price for the Government under the
      circumstances.  See, e.g., Scalf Engineering  Co. and Pike
      County Construction Co., A Joint Venture, IBCA No. 2328,
      89-3 BCA  21,950, at 110,425 (citing, Techcraft Systems,
      VABCA Nos. 1894, 2027, 86-3 BCA  19,320); Sequal, Inc.,
      supra, 88-1 BCA  20,382, at 103,067.  The test used in
      determining the adequacy of a repurchase solicitation is
      one of reasonableness, and "the principal criterion is that
      a sufficient number of potential contractors are contacted
      in the reprocurement solicitation to assure competitive
      prices in order to discharge the Government's obligation to
      mitigate the excess costs of the defaulted contractor."
      See, Century Tool Company, GSBCA No. 4007, 78-1 BCA 
      13,050, at 63,735, mot. for reconsid. denied, 78-2 BCA 
      13,345.  The burden is on the Government to prove that the
      reprocurement method it selected was conducive to obtaining
      full and open competition, and that it acted reasonably to
      mitigate or minimize excess costs.21  Cf., Sam's Electric
      Company, GSBCA Nos. 9359, 10044, 90-3 BCA  12,128; Fancy
      Industries, Inc., ASBCA No. 26578, 83-2 BCA  16,659.  In
      most cases, the Government satisfies this burden by showing
      that it used sealed bid advertising to repurchase defaulted
      supplies and services.22  See, e.g., H & H Manufacturing
      Company v. United States, 168 Ct.Cl. 873 (1964); Lester
      Brothers, Inc. v. United States, 151 Ct.Cl. 536 (1960);
      Star Food Processing, Inc., ASBCA Nos. 34161, 34163, 34164,
      34165, 35544, 35545, 35546, 35547, 90-1 BCA  22,390; Fancy
      Industries, Inc., supra, 83-2 BCA  16,659, at 82,842;
      Erickson Enterprises, AGBCA 77-168, 79-1 BCA  13,628.
      Furthermore, it is not uncommon for the Government to
      solicit those firms which bid on the original
      procurement.23  See, e.g., American Marine Upholstery
      Company v. United States, 170 Ct.Cl. 564, 345 F,2d 577
      (1965); Mid-America Painters, Inc., supra, 91-1 BCA 
      23,367.  Indeed, such a mitigation step is considered
      presumptively reasonable, even if the reprocurement price
      itself seems unreasonable.  See, e.g., Mid-America
      Painters, Inc., supra, 91-1 BCA  23,367 (the Government
      acted reasonably in taking the second low bid in the
      original solicitation despite the fact that the
      reprocurement price was 174 percent above the original
      contract).  The record with respect to the mechanics of the
      reprocurement in this case contains the following: (a) a
      copy of the Government's post-default estimates, dated
      January 7, 1991, for printing the three pamphlets (R4 File,
      Tab L); (b) a copy of the abstract of bids for the
      reprocured work showing that the Respondent solicited six
      potential contractors, including West Shore Printing, the
      third lowest bidder on the original contract, and received
      two bids, of which Hiller's was the lowest (R4 File, Tab
      D-1); (c) a copy of the reprocurement purchase order (R4
      File, Tabs D-1 and K); and (d) a computer printout showing
      that the Government paid Hiller for completing the job (R4
      File, Tab M).  On the evidence before it, the Board is
      satisfied that the reprocurement method chosen by the
      Respondent was reasonable in that a sufficient number of
      potential contractors were contacted to assure competitive
      prices, see, Century Tool Company, supra, 78-1 BCA 
      13,050, at 63,735, and that further solicitation of other
      firms would not have resulted in lower prices and therefore
      would have been unnecessary, cf., Sterling Printing, Inc.,
      supra, Sl. op. at 73.  Accordingly, the Board believes that
      the Respondent has met its burden with respect to the third
      criterion necessary to establish an entitlement to recovery
      of excess reprocurement costs against a defaulting
      contractor.  Cf., Sterling Printing, Inc., supra, Sl. op.
      at 73.

      5.   Fourth, mitigation of damages also requires the
      Government to show that it obtained the lowest reasonable
      reprocurement price.24  See, e.g., Sequal, Inc., supra,
      88-1 BCA  20,382; Fancy Industries, Inc., supra, 83-2 BCA
       16,659.  However, the mere fact that there is a
      significant price increase in the reprocurement does not
      render it unreasonable in the face of Government due care
      and diligence.25  See, Foster Refrigerator Corporation,
      ASBCA No. 34021, 89-2 BCA  21,591; Boston Pneumatics,
      Inc., supra, 87-1 BCA  19,395; Fancy Industries, Inc.,
      supra, 83-2 BCA  16,659.  Thus, while it is true in this
      case that Hiller's successful reprocurement bid
      ($18,764.00) was more than three times the Appellant's
      original offer ($5,124.00), it was still lower than West
      Shore Printing's bid of $19,255.00 (R4 File, Tabs A and
      D-1).  Besides, the Contracting Officer's obligation was to
      obtain the best or lowest reasonable price for the
      Government under circumstances, see, e.g., Scalf
      Engineering  Co. and Pike County Construction Co., A Joint
      Venture, supra, IBCA No. 2328, 89-3 BCA  21,950, at
      110,425; Sequal, Inc., supra, 88-1 BCA  20,382, at
      103,067, not the defaulted Contractor.26  See, Barrett
      Refining Corporation, supra, 91-1 BCA  23,566, at 118,145.
      On the other hand, basing the Appellant's excess cost
      liability solely on Hiller's reprocurement offer would have
      created a problem for the Board in this appeal because the
      law is also clear that the mere selection of the low bid,
      either on a reprocurement or the original contract, in and
      of itself, does not establish a reasonable price for the
      purposes of the mitigation rule.  See, Marine Engine
      Specialties Corporation, ASBCA No. 20521, 76-1 BCA 
      11,891.  That is, a contracting officer cannot "blindly
      accept" a reprocurement contractor's price and be said to
      have acted in a reasonable and prudent manner; some inquiry
      by the contracting officer is required.  See, Sterling
      Printing, Inc., supra, Sl. op. at 76-77.  Accord, B & M
      Construction, Inc., supra, 93-1 BCA  25,431, at 126,669
      (citing, Wise Instrumentation and Control, Inc., NASA BCA
      Nos. 1072-12, 673-7, 75-2 BCA  11,478, mot. for reconsid.
      denied, 76-1 BCA  11,641); Marine Engine Specialties
      Corporation, supra, 76-1 BCA  11,891.  In this case, such
      an inquiry was made by the Contracting Officer following
      the Contractor's appeal to the Board.  As a result of his
      review of the reprocurement file, the Contracting Officer
      reduced the Appellant's excess reprocurement cost liability
      from $13,640.00 to $4,201.00, based on the $9,325.00 bid of
      K.S. Press, the fourth lowest bidder on the original
      contract, but next lowest responsible offeror, and issued a
      Contract Modification to that effect (R4 File, Tabs G and
      J).  Furthermore, the Contracting Officer promptly notified
      FMS that his earlier request to recover additional costs of
      $13,640.00 from the Appellant was rescinded, and the lower
      amount should be recovered instead (R4 File, Tabs E and I).
      The Board is fully satisfied that the Contracting Officer,
      by conducting a post-appeal examination of the contract
      file and deciding to lower the Appellant's obligation for
      excess costs based on K.S. Press's bid on the original
      contract, was acting in a reasonable and prudent manner and
      fully met his responsibility "on behalf of the original
      contractor . . . [to] not unnecessarily do or not do things
      which result in an increased cost to the defaulted
      contractor."  See, William A. Hulett, supra, 93-1 BCA 
      25,389, at 126,459.  Moreover, the Board believes that the
      revised excess reprocurement cost figure represents the
      lowest reasonable reprocurement price, and warrants the
      conclusion that the Government has met its responsibility
      to mitigate its damages.  See, Sterling Printing, Inc.,
      supra, Sl. op. at 84-85 (". . . the most common method used
      for recalculating excess costs is simply to take the
      difference between the original contract price and the
      second low bid on the original contract.").  Accord, Mid-
      America Painters, Inc., supra, 91-1 BCA  23,367; Birken
      Manufacturing Company, supra, 90-2 BCA  22,845; Sequal,
      Inc., supra, 88-1 BCA  20,382; Fancy Industries, Inc.,
      supra, 83-2 BCA  16,659; Zero-Temp, Inc., ASBCA No. 215,
      78-1 BCA  13,212.  Accordingly, the Board finds that the
      Respondent has carried its burden of proof of showing that
      the excess reprocurement costs assessed reasonably
      minimized the liability of the Appellant.  Cf., Sterling
      Printing, Inc., supra, Sl. op. at 77.

      6.   Finally, in order to establish a right to excess
      reprocurement costs, the Government must demonstrate that
      the repurchased work has been completed, and final payment
      made to the reprocurement contractor so that the excess
      costs assessment is based upon liability for a sum certain.
      Whitlock Corporation v. United States, 141 Ct.Cl. 758, 159
      F.Supp. 602 (1958), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 815 (1958).  See
      also, e.g., John L. Hartsoe, supra, 93-2 BCA  25,614;
      Lafayette Coal Company, ASBCA Nos. 32174, 33311, 87-3 BCA 
      20,116.  Where the Government fails to offer evidence that
      a reprocurement contract was awarded, performed, or paid
      for, the assessment of excess costs against a defaulted
      contractor will be denied.  See, Sterling Printing, Inc.,
      supra, Sl. op. at 85.  Accord, Patty Armfield, supra, 93-1
      BCA  25,235; Pyramid Packing, Inc., supra, 92-2 BCA 
      24,831; Scalf Engineering Co. and Pike County Construction
      Co., A Joint Venture, supra, 89-3 BCA  21,950.  Here, the
      relevant documentation presented by the Respondent consists
      of the reprocurement contract and a computer printout of
      the payment history for the three Jacket numbers concerned
      (R4 File, Tabs D-1, K and M).  In the Board's view, this
      evidence is sufficient to prove that Hiller was awarded the
      contract, produced and delivered the pamphlets, and
      received final payment for the work.  Accordingly, the
      Board finds that the Respondent has carried its burden of
      proof with respect to the last element necessary to
      establish its entitlement to excess reprocurement costs.
      Cf., Sterling Printing, Inc., supra, Sl. op. at 83.  Also
      cf., Patty Armfield, supra, 93-1 BCA  25,235; Pyramid
      Packing, Inc., supra, 92-2 BCA  24,831; Scalf Engineering
      Co. and Pike County Construction Co., A Joint Venture,
      supra, 89-3 BCA  21,950.

      ORDER

   Considering the record as a whole, the Board finds and
   concludes that: (1) no "Cure Notice" was required before the
   Appellant's contract could be terminated for default; (2) the
   Appellant's lack of funds because of the merger of its bank
   with another financial institution is not such a reason as
   would excuse its failure to deliver the pamphlets by the
   contract due date; and (3) the Respondent has sustained is
   burden of proof with regard to the Appellant's liability for
   excess reprocurement costs.  THEREFORE, the Contracting
   Officer's decisions terminating the Appellant's contract for
   default and assessing excess reprocurement costs, as set forth
   in Contract Modification No. 1, are hereby AFFIRMED, and the
   appeal is DENIED.

It is so Ordered.

February 22, 1995                  STUART M. FOSS
                           Administrative Judge
_______________

     1 The Contracting Officer's appeal file, assembled pursuant
     to Rule 4 of the Board's Rules of Practice and Procedure,
     was delivered to the Board on March 19, 1991.  GPO
     Instruction 110.12, Subject: Board of Contract Appeals Rules
     of Practice and Procedure, dated September 17, 1984 (Board
     Rules), Rule 4(a).  It will be referred to hereafter as the
     R4 File, with an appropriate Tab letter also indicated.  As
     originally submitted, the R4 File consisted of thirteen (13)
     documents identified as Tabs A through J, and Tabs D-1, E-1
     and E-2.  However, before the record was settled Counsel for
     GPO sought leave to add three (3) additional documents to
     the R4 File on the issue of excess reprocurement costs
     namely: (1) the reprocurement contract; (2) the Government's
     estimates for printing and binding; and (3) a Declaration
     from Robert D. Colvin, with a computer printout showing
     payment to the reprocurement contractor.  See, Respondent's
     Second Motion for Enlargement of Time to File Additional
     Documentation Relating to the Issue of Excess Reprocurement,
     dated September 23, 1994; Notice of Filing, dated October
     13, 1994.  The Respondent's request was granted by the
     Board.  See, K.C. Printing Company, GPO BCA 02-91, Order
     Granting Respondent's Second Motion for Enlargement of Time
     to File Additional Documentation and Establishing a Revised
     Briefing Schedule, dated November 25, 1994 (Order Granting
     Respondent's Second Motion).  The three (3) added documents
     appear in the R4 File, as Tabs K, L and M, respectively.
     2 As indicated in the Board's Order of November 25, 1994,
     the Board was tempted to exercise its authority under Rule
     31, sua sponte, to dismiss the appeal for failure to
     prosecute because its efforts to contact the Appellant by
     mail and telephone since April 13, 1993, have been
     unsuccessful, nor has the Contractor communicated with the
     Board in that time, and thus it seems clear that the appeal
     has been abandoned.  Board Rules, Rule 31.  See, Order
     Granting Respondent's Second Motion, at 4, fn. 3.  In the
     past, the Board, on its own initiative, has exercised its
     discretion to dismiss appeals for want of prosecution.  See,
     e.g, Rosemark, GPO BCA 30-90 (April 22, 1994); Bedrock
     Printing Company, GPO BCA 05-91 (April 10, 1992).  Accord,
     The Work Force Reforestration, Inc., AGBCA No. 88-215-1,
     89-1 BCA  21,373.  However, the Board also noted that since
     the crucial issue in this case involves a Government claim,
     which is still outstanding, namely one for the recovery of
     excess reprocurement costs against the Appellant, and in its
     opinion the Respondent was entitled to a ruling on the
     merits of its claim.  Hence, the Board did not exercise its
     Rule 31 authority in this case.  See, Order Granting
     Respondent's Second Motion, at 4, fn. 3.
     3 Each pamphlet was covered by a separate GPO Jacket number,
     namely, 278-448, 278-449 and 278-450, respectively (R4 File,
     Tab A).
     4 The work was reprocured under three new Jacket numbers,
     namely, 286-863, 286-864 and 286-865 (R4 File, Tabs D-1 and
     L).  It should be noted that the Government's total estimate
     for all three jobs was $21,424.00 (the estimates for Jacket
     Nos. 286-863, 286-864 and 286-865 were $10,778.00,
     $5,823.00, and $5,823.00, respectively) (R4 File, Tab L).
     5 In that regard, the actual costs of Jacket Nos. 286-863,
     286-864 and 286-865 turned out to be $4,073.60, $9,393.60,
     and $4,358.60, respectively (R4 File, Tab M).
     6 The appeal was docketed by the Board on February 15, 1991.
     Board Rules, Rule 3.
     7 At the presubmission telephone conference conducted by the
     Board on January 26, 1993, Counsel for GPO stated that the
     reduced excess reprocurement cost amount was $4,111.00.
     See, Report of Presubmission Telephone Conference, dated
     April 30, 1993, p. 4 (hereinafter RPTC).  In her brief to
     the Board on November 18, 1994, Counsel for GPO used both
     $4,201.00 and $4,111.00 as excess reprocurement cost
     figures.  See, Respondent's Brief, November 18, 1994, pp. 7,
     14 (hereinafter Res. Brf.).  The Board's own calculations
     confirm that $4,201.00 is the correct amount of excess
     reprocurement costs in this case.  In any event, the
     difference between the two figures-$90.00-is de minimis.
     8 Although the Contract Modification stated that it would
     become effective when signed by both parties, the R4 File
     file copy only bears the Contracting Officer's signature.
     Moreover, during the preliminary stages of this appeal, the
     Appellant  expressly denied that the Contracting Officer had
     furnished it with a copy of the Contract Modification.  See,
     Order Requiring Dismissal of Default, dated July 30, 1991,
     p. 2.  Accordingly, during the presubmission telephone
     conference on January 26, 1993, the Board directed the
     Respondent to furnish a copy of the Contract Modification
     signed by both parties.  See, Report of Presubmission
     Telephone Conference, dated April 30, 1993, p. 7 (RPTC).
     The Respondent was unable to locate such a copy in its
     files.  Consequently, from an evidentiary standpoint, the
     Board is essentially dealing with a unilateral modification.
     9 The Board takes judicial notice of the fact that the banks
     in question, the Banco de Ponce and the Banco Popular, were
     located in Puerto Rico.
     10 At the presubmission telephone conference held on January
     26, 1993, the Appellant was asked to furnish the Board with
     a letter from its bank corroborating that the Contractor had
     no access to its bank account during the contract
     performance period.  RPTC, pp. 7-8.  However, the Appellant
     never complied with the Board's request.
     11 See, note 7 supra.
     12  Both at the presubmission conference and in her brief,
     Counsel for GPO maintained that the Contracting Officer's
     decision to reduce the amount of excess reprocurement costs
     after the appeal was filed, mooted the issues raised in the
     appeal.  See, RPTC, pp. 5, 7; Res. Brf., p. 6.  In light of
     its decision in this case, the Board finds it unnecessary to
     address the Government's "mootness" argument.
     13 The record on which the Board's decision is based
     consists of: (a) the Appellant's letter, dated January 28,
     1991, noting an appeal from the Contracting Officer's
     decision; (b) the document submitted by the Contractor,
     dated July 30, 1991, entitled "Order Requiring Dismissal of
     Default", dated July 30, 1991, which the Board deemed to
     meet the requirements of a Complaint, see, Order Requiring
     Respondent to File [an] Answer, dated November 4, 1991; (c)
     the R4 File, Tabs A-M; (d) the Respondent's Answer, dated
     November 14, 1991; (d) the document submitted by the
     Appellant, dated October 12, 1992, entitled "Appellant's
     Brief on Order Requiring Dismissal of Motion to Dismiss";
     (e) the Report of Presubmission Telephone Conference, dated
     April 30, 1993; and (f) the Respondent's Brief, dated
     November 18, 1994.
     14 While the excusable events listed in the "Default"
     clause, all of which must be beyond the control and without
     the fault or negligence of the contractor, are set forth in
     the context of relieving the contractor from responsibility
     for excess reprocurement costs, it is well-settled that the
     same occurrences extend the time available for performance
     and make termination prior to that time improper.  See,
     e.g., FKC Engineering Company, ASBCA No. 14856, 70-1 BCA 
     8,312.
     15 Default terminations-as a species of forfeiture-are
     strictly construed.  See, D. Joseph DeVito v. United States,
     188 Ct.Cl. 979, 413 F.2d 1147, 1153 (1969).  See also,
     Murphy, et al. v. United States, 164 Ct.Cl. 332 (1964); J.
     D. Hedin Construction Co. v. United States, 187 Ct.Cl. 45,
     408 F.2d 424 (1969).
     16 On October 29, 1992, certain provisions of the Federal
     Courts Administration Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-572, 106
     Stat. 4506 (1992), became effective.  Pursuant to Title IX,
     the United States Claims Court was renamed the United States
     Court of Federal Claims.
     17 Such clauses have uniformly been held to apply not only
     to late deliveries of the contracted goods, Stephenson,
     Inc., supra, Sl. op. at 19 (citing, Chavis and Chavis
     Printing, supra, Sl. op. at 12-15; Jomar Enterprises, Inc.,
     GPO BCA 13-86 (May 25, 1989), Sl. op. at 3-5), but also to
     the timely delivery of nonconforming supplies.  Id. (citing,
KOPA Kopier Produckte, ASBCA No. 29,471, 85-3 BCA  18,367; Meyer
Labs, Inc., ASBCA No. 18,347, 77-1 BCA  12,539).  See also,
Delta Industries, Inc., DOT BCA No. 2601, 94-1 BCA  26, 318;
Industrial Data Link Corporation, ASBCA No. 315, 91-1 BCA 
23,382; Air, Inc., GSBCA No. 8847, 91-1 BCA  23,352.  The
rationale for this dual application of the default clause is
simple.  As explained in a leading text on the subject of public
contracts: "While these clauses explicitly make untimely
performance the basis for the default action, it is important to
recognize that nearly every Government contract spells out the
contractor's required performance in terms of the nature of the
product or service which is to be delivered or performed as well
as the time by which these performance efforts are to be
completed.  Thus, in order for the contractor to render `timely
performance,' two basic requirements must be satisfied.  The
product, service or construction work must conform to the
required design/performance characteristics, and the product must
be delivered or the work completed by the specified due date."
[Emphasis added.]  John Cibinic, Jr. & Ralph C. Nash, Jr.,
Administration of Government Contracts 2d ed., (The George
Washington University, 1986), p. 677.
     18 Under this so-called "substantial compliance" rule, a
     defaulting contractor is afforded an opportunity to correct
     minor defects in shipments to the Government.  Cf., B. P.
     Printing and Office Supplies, supra, Sl. op. at 12;
     Stephenson, Inc., supra, Sl. op. at 24, 48-54.  Also cf.,
     Air, Inc., supra, 91-1 BCA  23,352, at 117,112.
     19 It should be noted that GPO's printing procurement
     regulation, like the procurement rules of other Federal
     agencies, recommends the issuance of a show cause letter,
     "where practicable," prior to the default termination of a
     contract for failure to make timely deliveries or perform
     services within the time required by the contract.  GPO
     Printing Procurement Regulation, GPO Publication 305.3 (Rev.
     10-90), Ch. XIV, Sec. 1,  3(c)(1) (PPR).  Accord, Lewis B.
     Udis v. United States, 7 Cl. Ct. 379, 385-86 (1985).  The
     Contracting Officer did not issue a show cause letter prior
     to terminating the contract in this case.  It seems to the
     Board that he simply made the determination that it was
     impracticable to issue such a show cause letter under the
     circumstances herein.  That decision was within his
     discretion.  Since the Appellant has not objected to absence
     of a show cause letter in this case, the Board will not
     disturb the Contracting Officer's judgment.  Cf., Stabbe
     Senter Press, GPO BCA 13-85 and 19-85 (May 12, 1989), Sl.
     op. at 53.  In any event, the omission of a "show cause
     notice" by the Government is not generally a procedural
     defect to a termination based on the contractor's failure to
     make timely deliveries or perform timely services.
     Stephenson, Inc., supra, Sl. op. at 20, fn. 22.  See also,
     Kit Pack Company, Inc., supra, 89-3 BCA  22,151, at
     111,486-87 (citing, H. N. Bailey & Associates, ASBCA No.
     21,300, 77-2 BCA  12,681, at 61,553).
     20 Whether the Government's repurchase was improper, and if
     so, what is the amount of reasonable excess costs under the
     circumstances, are questions of fact.  See, Sterling
     Printing, Inc., supra, Sl. op. at 50 (citing, Cable Systems
     and Assembly Company, ASBCA No. 17844, 73-2 BCA  10,172, at
     47,892).
     21 However, it should be noted that despite the general
     rule, the law allows a contracting officer to limit
     competition for the repurchase if the situation demands it-
     e.g., the Government's need to assure a quick award to a
     firm which could begin work almost immediately-since a
     reprocurement is technically a purchase for the defaulted
     contractor's account. See, e.g., William A. Hulett, AGBCA
     Nos. 91-230-3, 92-133-3, 92-196-3, 93-1 BCA  25,389, at
     126,459; Old Dominion Security, Inc., supra, 90-2 BCA 
     22,745, at 114,165 (citing, Camrex Reliance Paint Company,
     GSBCA No. 6870, 85-3 BCA  18,376; Century Tool Company,
     GSBCA No. 3999, 76-1 BCA  11,850); Sequal, Inc., supra,
     88-1 BCA  20,382, at 103,067.  Thus, appeals boards usually
     apply a "reasonable person" standard when confronted with a
     challenge to a contracting officer's reprocurement of a
     defaulted contract.  In other words, "[t]he duty the
     Government owes the defaulted contractor in reprocuring for
     its account is not one of perfection, but one of
     reasonableness and prudence under the circumstances."  See,
     Barrett Refining Corporation, supra, 91-1 BCA  23,566, at
     118,145.  See also, Mid-America Painters, Inc., supra, 91-1
     BCA  23,367, at 117,232.  This duty is to be carried out
     within the confines of Federal procurement statutes,
     regulations, policies and directives, and in pursuit of the
     Government's own best interests, whether or not that results
     in a lower price for a defaulted contractor.  See, Barrett
     Refining Corporation, supra, 91-1 BCA  23,566, at 118,145.
     22 GPO procedures are consistent with this general practice
     in Government reprocurements.  See, PPR, Chap. XIV, Sec. 1,
      3.f.(2).  However, the printing procurement regulation
     also provides that if the Contracting Officer is
     repurchasing a quantity of items not in excess of the
     undelivered quantity terminated for default, he does not
     have to advertise; i.e., the reprocurement can be
     accomplished through negotiation.  Id.  That may have been
     the case here.
     23 In fact, if the Government fails to make a reasonable
     effort at contacting the original bidders, the result may
     result in a denial or reduction of the excess cost
     assessment.  See, e.g., Associated Cleaning, Inc., supra,
     91-1 BCA  23,360; Old Dominion Security, Inc., supra, 90-2
     BCA  22,745; Barrett Chemical Company, Inc., supra, 77-2
     BCA  12,625.
     24 In fulfilling the obligation to secure the best price for
     the Government, a contracting officer must follow the same
     standard of reasonableness and prudence under the
     circumstances which he/she exercised in the timing and
     selecting of the method of reprocurement.  See, William A.
     Hulett, supra, 93-1 BCA  25,389; Barrett Refining
     Corporation, supra, 91-1 BCA  23,566; Mid-America Painters,
     Inc., supra, 91-1 BCA  23,367.
     25 On the other hand, in the absence of negotiations or some
     other explanation for the increase in the price of
     repurchased supplies, most appeals boards will reduce the
     amount of recoverable excess costs.  See, e.g., Puroflow
     Corporation, supra, 93-3 BCA  26,191; Sequal, Inc., supra,
     88-1 BCA  20,382; Solar Laboratories, Inc., ASBCA No.
     19957, 76-2 BCA  12,115, at 58,195.
     26 See, note 21 supra.