U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE BOARD OF CONTRACT APPEALS WASHINGTON, D.C. 20401 STUART M. FOSS Administrative Law Judge The Appeal of THE WESSEL COMPANY, INC. Docket No. GPO BCA 8-90 Jacket No. 234-553 Purchase Order 81837 February 28, 1992 DECISION AND ORDER This appeal, timely filed by the Wessel Company, Inc., 1201 Kirk Street, Elk Grove Village, Illinois 60007-9703 (hereinafter Appellant or Wessel), is from the final decision, dated February 1, 1990, of Contracting Officer George W. Watson (Contracting Officer), of the U.S. Government Printing Office, North Capitol and H Streets, NW., Washington, DC 20401 (hereinafter Respondent or GPO), denying the Appellant's claim for additional compensation under the above-captioned contract (Jacket No. 234-553, Purchase Order 81837), in the amount of $255,506 because it had failed to substantiate and provide documentary evidence in support of an entitlement (R4 File, Tab FF). 1/ The gravamen of the Appellant's claim is that the Respondent's 14-workday delay in furnishing corrected proofs amounted to a breach of contract which caused it financial harm. Consequently, the Appellant filed a claim for damages ($255,506) with the Contracting Officer based on 672 hours of idle time for two presses at an hourly rate of $375.00 per press ($252,000), and the carrying cost of stocking paper for those extra days ($3,506.00). 2/ The issue in this proceeding is whether or not the Board has jurisdiction over "pure" breach of contract claims. BACKGROUND The relevant facts are not in dispute and are set forth here only to the extent necessary for the Board's decision concerning its jurisdiction over this appeal. On April 20, 1989, the Respondent issued an Invitation for Bids (IFB) soliciting bids from potential contractors for the production of 71,625,000 total copies of "Stamps By Mail," a product issued by the U.S. Postal Services (hereinafter USPS) (R4 File, Tab A, p. 1). 3/ The following IFB provisions are particularly pertinent to this appeal: GOVERNMENT TO FURNISH: Camera copy with overlays; maximum size 142 x 11" and with tissue overlays showing color treatment. One full color transparency; 8 x 10". Distribution lists containing imprint addresses. Preaddressed Express Mail labels to be used in conjunction with furnished strips of unaddressed gummed 1st Class mailing labels for return of "Production Samples." Two preaddressed, 52 x 3-7/16" pressure sensitive, 1st Class mailing labels. One reproduction proof (image size 7-7/8 x 6-1/8") for shipping container labels. GPO Form 892 proof label (R4 File, Tab A, p. 1). * * * * * * * * * * CONTRACTOR TO FURNISH: All materials and operations, other than those listed under "Government to Furnish," necessary to produce the product(s) in accordance with these specifications (R4 File, Tab A, p. 2). * * * * * * * * * * PROOFS: One set of Cromalin, Transfer Key, Matchprint, or similar proofs (must be one-piece laminated color proofs) of the face of each version (Version 1 must have one imprint in position). These proofs must have illustrations and text matter composited. One set of color key proofs of the back with all elements in proper position. Two sets of composite Dylux or similar proofs of each version indicating all folds, perforations, and dry gum areas. One complete set of galley proofs of all imprint addresses. If any contractor's errors are serious enough in the opinion of the GPO to require revised proofs, the revised proofs are to be provided at no expense to the Government. No extra time can be allowed for this reproofing; such operations must be accomplished within the original production schedule allotted in the specifications (R4 File, Tab A, p. 3). * * * * * * * * * * The contractor must not print prior to receipt of an "OK to print" (R4 File, Tab A, p. 3). [Emphasis added.] * * * * * * * * * * SCHEDULE: Furnished material will be available for pickup. . . [at the Respondent's facility] . . . on May 1, 1989 [May 8, 1989]. Submit proofs as soon as the contractor deems necessary in order to comply with the shipping schedule. Proofs must be submitted as complete sets. Proofs will be withheld 4 workdays from receipt in the GPO until they are made available for pickup by the contractor. The contractor must notify the GPO of the date and time press sheets will be available. In order that proper arrangements can be made notification must be given at least 2 workdays in advance of the time for inspection of the press sheets. . . . Ship 21,625,000 copies . . . on or before May 19, 1989 [June 1, 1989]. Ship complete on or before June 2, 1989 [June 15, 1989] (R4 File, Tab A, p. 7). 4/ [Emphasis added.] Furthermore, the "Stamps By Mail," contract was to be governed by applicable articles of GPO Contract Terms, GPO Publication 310-2, effective December 1, 1987 (Rev. 9-88) (1988 Contract Terms), and GPO's Quality Assurance Through Attributes Program, GPO Publication 310.1, Revised September 1986 (QATAP), which were incorporated by reference therein (R4 File), Tab A, p. 1). 5/ In that regard, one provision in 1988 Contract Terms which is particularly relevant to this appeal is the "Notice of Compliance with Schedules" clause (Clause 12), which states, in part: (c) Extension of schedules. (1) In the event a delay is caused by any action of the Government, including failure to furnish purchase/print order, copy, GBL [Government Bills of Lading] and/or materials as scheduled, the shipping/delivery schedule will be extended automatically by the total number of workdays that work was delayed PLUS 1 workday for each day of delay; such period of grace for any schedule will not exceed 3 workdays. . . . (1988 Contract Terms, Contract Clauses, 12.(c)(1). 6/ [Emphasis added.] The record discloses that the IFB was sent to 16 potential contractors, three of whom returned responsive bids (R4 File, Tabs B and C). One of the responding bidders was the Appellant, who submitted an offer, dated May 2, 1989, to do the work at an estimated cost of $937,910.00 (R4 File, Tab B). As the lowest bidder capable of doing the work, the Appellant was awarded the "Stamps By Mail," contract by the issuance of Purchase Order 81837 on May 4, 1989 (R4 File, Tab D). The record shows that in accordance with the terms of the contract, the Appellant received the Government-furnished material on May 8, 1989 and returned the required proofs four days later, on May 12, 1989 (R4 File, Tab F). Under the "SCHEDULE" clause, GPO had 4 workdays to approve the proofs and return them to the Appellant for final production; i.e., until May 18, 1989 (R4 File, Tab F). The record discloses that on May 16, 1989, and May 17, 1989, respectively, Mark Olsen, the Appellant's Quality Control Manager, made several inquiries of the Respondent concerning the status of the proofs, and was informed that the USPS had not returned them yet (R4 File, Tab G). On May 18, 1989, although the Respondent initially advised the Appellant that the proofs would be returned that day, it subsequently turned out that the USPS was not ready to proceed (R4 File, Tab G). 7/ Around 1:20 p.m. on May 18, 1989, the Respondent discovered, among other things, that: (1) the USPS was making certain changes (author's alterations) to the proofs; (2) the "construction sample" submitted by the Appellant did not meet the specifications; (3) the art work modified by the Appellant was not acceptable; (4) that revised proofs would be required before an "OK to print" could be given; and (5) the date for the return of the proofs was unknown (R4 File, Tab G). The Respondent communicated this information to Olsen at 2:25 p.m. that same day (R4 File, Tab G). The record discloses that on May 24, 1989, the USPS returned the defective "construction sample" to the Respondent with instructions for corrections, and it seems that the returned proof was immediately sent to the Appellant (R4 File, Tab H). The following day, May 25, 1989, Dennis S. Renoll, USPS' Senior Printing Contract Specialist, sent a memorandum to the Respondent (Alice Jennings), which stated in pertinent part: I returned [the "construction sample"] . . . on May 24, 1989. . . . for the purpose of resolving the construction (placement of the dry gum) with the contract. In approximately 1-1/2 weeks I will be forwarding to you the new four color subject for panel 1. Upon my forwarding of the new subject I will also return the authorization to proceed with the job. We will require new proofs due to author's alteration. However, during the time which are awaiting the new subject we request that GPO resolve the construction problem with the contractor to avoid any additional delay upon receipt of the new subject (R4 File, Tab H). 8/ [Emphasis added.] The record shows that on May 26, 1989, the Appellant sent a revised "construction sample" to the Respondent and requested verification that the new proof was correct (R4 File, Tab I). The Contracting Officer received the new sample on May 31, 1989, and immediately forwarded the corrected proof to the USPS for review. (R4 File, Tab I). That same day, the Contracting Officer also received a letter from the Appellant, dated May 30, 1989, and signed by Anthony S. Jacobs, which stated, in pertinent part: I am writing in the hope that something can be done soon to develop and forward the art work for the above jacket. We sent you chromalins for approval by overnite on May 11th. Our expectation for approved return was Thursday, May 18th. While we understand that, according to [the] contract terms, the government has a right to delay as long as it wishes, it is important to note that this is a major contract for our company and that the press time scheduled for it cannot be resold on such short notice. Out here in Illinois we have heard for a long time that ours is the kind and size of business that America wants to nourish. Yet, for all those good intentions, the results of this delay have been almost catastrophic. A significant portion of our work force has been laid off. The family pain caused by this is obvious. And, from a corporate standpoint, our concern has to be about the number of good men and women who will need to find other jobs during this period. Additionally, we have been denied the expected sales revenues that are vital to a company our size. Certainly every business experiences difficulties from time to time, but as this delay stretches on, our burden becomes almost unbearable. We understand that a cover photo needs to be redone for this form. It is hard for us in business to understand why it has taken so long. The government may move to a different drummer, but it is hoped that those responsible for this photo will now both recognize and understand our need for prompt action (R4 File, Tab J). [Emphasis added.] On June 1, 1989, the USPS sent the Respondent the material which Renoll had mentioned in his letter of May 25, 1989, including one set each of Cromalin and Dylux proofs, a color transparency, and galley proofs, and these were placed in the Appellant's hand the same day (R4 File, Tab F). Because the new material contained author's alterations, the Appellant had to provide revised proofs before proceeding with production of the copies of "Stamps by Mail" (R4 File, Tab F). 9/ The record discloses that the Appellant provided the required proofs to the Respondent on June 6, 1989 (R4 File, Tab F). On June 8, 1989, after the proofs had been reviewed and approved by the USPS, the Respondent returned them to the Appellant with an "OK to print" (R4 File, Tab F). Since the USPS had held on to the proofs for more than the "4 workdays" allowed in the "SCHEDULE" clause, the shipping/delivery schedule was automatically extended by the total number of workdays that the work was delayed plus 1 workday for each day of delay; i.e., by operation of the contract the ship/complete date was adjusted to July 11, 1989. 10/ 1988 Contract Terms, Contract Clauses, 12.(c) (1). Shortly after receiving the approval to print, the Appellant, by letter dated June 16, 1989, wrote to the Respondent and requested a contract modification "due to author's alterations by the Government resulting in an OK to print on [June 9, 1989]" with respect to shipping dates for the Imprints and the Generics (the Appellant anticipated completed shipping the Imprints by June 23, 1989, and the Generics by July 17, 1989) (R4 File, Tab K-1). Because it took time for the parties to resolve certain production problems and issues, the record discloses that the Appellant did not complete shipment on the contract until August 2, 1989, and a contract modification (Contract Modification (No. 1) was issued accordingly (R4 File, Tabs Y and AA). 11/ The issue in this case stems from the Appellant's second request for a contract modification. In that regard, on July 21, 1989, the Appellant wrote a letter to the Contracting Officer, which stated in pertinent part: This is in reference to Jacket 234-553 and the financial hardship caused by the [G]overnment by holding proofs longer than the four workdays required by the specifications. Because of this delay, two of our presses were idle for 672 hours (14 workdays) at a cost of $375.00 per hour. We are asking for a contract modification in the amount of $252,000. In the absence of a compensable delays clause, we are entitled to compensation for delays if they are the result of government fault. Government fault will be found if the Government breaches its implied duty not to hinder or interfere with the contractor's performance. The 14-day delay in returning proofs after they were submitted interfered with our production plan. Due to the press time required for this job and the indefinite schedule created by the delay, the Wessel Company could not schedule any work during the delay (R4 File, Tab O). [Emphasis added.] Another written request for this contract modification was made by the Appellant on August 14, 1989, followed by a telephone inquiry on August 22, 1989 (R4 File, Tabs P-1 and R). The record shows that on August 23, 1989, the Contracting Officer sent the Appellant's contract modification request to the Respondent's Office of the Inspector General (OIG) for an audit (R4 File, Tab S). The record also discloses that a week later, on September 1, 1989, the Contracting Officer wrote to the Appellant, confirming a telephone conversation earlier that day, and asked for: (1) all available information/documentation which would support the $252,000 claim; and (2) a certification of the claim by the Contractor, as a prerequisite for an audit by the OIG (R4 File, Tab V). 12/ See, GPO Printing Procurement Regulation, GPO Publication 305.3, effective September 1, 1988, Chap. X, Sec. 1, 3. The Appellant responded to the Contracting Officer's request on September 14, 1989, by sending a properly certifying the claim to the Respondent along with its "press logs" for the dates in question, which showed that the presses were idle for 672 hours (R4 File, Tab W). The Appellant's letter also revised its claim by adding the extra days carrying cost for the paper it had stocked beginning May 19, 1989 -- $3,506 -- thus making the total amount allegedly due and owing $255,506 (R4 File, Tab W). The OIG submitted its audit report on the Appellant's claim to the Contracting Officer on December 13, 1989 (R4 File, Tab BB). In its report, the OIG found support for only a portion of the Appellant's "idle press time" claim, no support whatsoever for the claim related to the carrying costs of paper, and recommended that the claim be settled for "no more than $36,710" (R4 File, Tab BB, pp. 2). On January 30, 1990, nearly six weeks after receiving the OIG audit report, the Contracting Officer wrote to the Appellant and denied the Appellant's second request for a contract modification "because of your failure to furnish substantiated and documented evidence to support an entitlement" (R4 File, Tab EE). 13/ Two days later, on February 1, 1990, the Contracting Officer wrote an identical letter to the Appellant, specifically designated this time as his "final decision," and set forth the Appellant's appeal rights to this Board (R4 File, Tab FF). 14/ The Appellant's response was a letter, dated February 9, 1990, to the Board noting its appeal from the Contracting Officer's final decision. ISSUE PRESENTED At the prehearing conference held on February 7, 1991, the Board observed that the "pure" breach of contract issue raised by the Appellant is a matter of first impression. See, Prehearing Conference Report (PCR), dated March 28, 1991, p. 11. That issue is a strictly a legal question, and it goes to the jurisdiction of the Board over this matter; thus its resolution is absolutely necessary before the case can proceed. Id. Accordingly, pursuant to a decision it made at the prehearing conference, the Board severed the jurisdictional issue from the merits of the case and directed the parties to brief the following question: Does the GPO Board of Contract Appeals have jurisdiction over breach of contract claims? See, Order Setting Briefing Schedule (Briefing Order), dated March 28, 1991, p. 2; PCR, p. 12. 15/ POSITIONS OF THE PARTIES 16/ 1. The Appellant's Position From the outset, the Appellant has stated openly that the disputed claim was ". . . for damages for GPO's failure to return proofs to Wessel in accordance with GPO's contractual obligations." 17/ See, App. C., 4, p. 1. According to the Appellant, GPO's failure to release the proofs until 14 workdays later than the four day contractual withholding period constitutes a breach of contract. Id., 21 (citing, Swinerton & Belvoir, ASBCA No. 24022, 81-1 BCA 12,156; Specialty Assembling & Packing Company v. United States, 355 F.2d 554 (Ct. Cl. 1966). The Appellant believes that the Board clearly has the authority to decide breach of contract matters. App. Brf., p. 1; PCR, p. 8. The Appellant's position is predicated on its reading of the "Disputes" clause applicable to the contract, which provides that "any dispute concerning a question of fact arising under or relating to this contract" shall be decided by the Contracting Officer, whose decision may be appealed to the Board. 1988 Contract Terms, Contract Clauses, 5(a),(b). [Emphasis added.] See also, PCR, p. 9. Furthermore, the Appellant notes that the preface to the Board's Rules of Practice and Procedure provides that "[the Board] shall consider and determine appeals from final decisions of contracting officers relating to contracts . . .". Board Rules, Preface to Rules, Sec. I (Jurisdiction for Considering Appeals), at p. 1. App. Brf., p. 6; PCR, p. 10. The Appellant contends that disputes clauses using such "relating to" language, like the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR), 52.233-1(b), have traditionally encompassed breach of contract claims. App. Brf., p. 2; PCR, pp. 9-10. Moreover, to the Appellant "it is patently clear" that the phrase "relating to" was added to the old standard "Disputes" clause after the enactment of the Contract Disputes Act of 1978 (CDA), Pub. L. 95-563 (November 1, 1978), 92 Stat. 2383, 41 U.S.C. 601 et seq., to reflect the enlarged jurisdiction of agency boards of contract appeals to encompass over breach of contract claims. 18/ App. Brf., p. 2. The Appellant also contends that the legislative history of the "relating to" language in the CDA, 41 U.S.C. 605(a), 606, gives clear evidence that its purpose was to grant authority to contracting officers and agency boards to decide all disputes connected to a contract, including breach of contract claims. App. Brf., p. 2 (citing, S. REP. No. 95-1118, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 5235, 5253). Furthermore, by including claims relating to contracts, the CDA extended the jurisdiction of boards of contract appeals to breach of contract claims which are not redressable under a contract clause. App. Brf., p. 3 (citing, Federal Electric Corporation, ASBCA No. 24004, 82-2 BCA 15,862 at 17,651; Gentex Corporation, ASBCA No. 24040, 79-2 BCA 14,007 at 68,779; Paragon Energy Corporation v. United States, 645 F.2d 966, 975 (Ct. Cl. 1981)). Thus, the Appellant reasons that by revising its "Disputes" clause to conform to the CDA language by including disputes "relating to" the contract, the Respondent has consented to the Board's exercise of jurisdiction over breach of contract claims. App. Brf., p. 3; PCR, pp. 9, 10; App. R. Brf., p. 2. As the Appellant sees the law, in the absence of the CDA the parties themselves may establish the scope of the jurisdiction of the contract appeals boards by the terms of their agreement. App. R. Brf., p. 2 (citing, General Dynamics Corporation v. United States, 558 F.2d 985, 990 (Ct. Cl. 1977); Potomac Company, Inc., ASBCA No. 25371, 81-1 BCA 14,950 (post-CDA case)). Additionally, the Appellant argues that its position is supported by the historical distinction between disputes clauses involving claims "arising under" a contract ("fact- disputes" clauses), where the contract itself contains a remedy-granting provision, and disputes clauses concerning claims "related to" a contract ("all-disputes" provisions), which are much broader in scope. App. Brf., pp. 3-4 (citing, King and Queen Drive-In, ASBCA No. 14764, 72-1 BCA 9467 ("all-disputes" clause); Texida, Inc., ASBCA No. 19854, 75-2 BCA 11,505 ("all-disputes" clause); S & W Tire Services, Inc., GSBCA No. 6376, 82-2 BCA 16,048 ("all- disputes" clause). 19/ The Appellant observes that prior to the enactment of the CDA, the standard disputes provision was a "fact-disputes" clause which limited the jurisdiction of the boards of contract appeals to disputes "concerning questions of fact arising under" the contract. App. Brf., p. 4; PCR, pp. 8-9. In agreement with the Respondent, the Appellant states that the "settled construction" of that clause "excludes breach of contract claims from its coverage" because of the restrictive meaning given to the words "arising under the contract." App. Br., pp. 4-5 (citing, United States v. Utah Construction and Mining Company, 384 U.S. 394, 407, 412 (1966)); PCR, p. 9. However, the Appellant believes that the Respondent is relying on "stale precedent" in denying jurisdiction to the Board in this case. App. Brf., p. 5; PCR, p. 8. In the Appellant's view, the cases cited by the Respondent, infra, including the decisions of the ad hoc panels which considered GPO contract disputes prior to the establishment of the Board, all construed the "fact-disputes" clause used prior to the CDA, and merely confirm that the provision did not encompass breach of contract claims. 20/ App. Brf., pp. 5-6. Finally, the Appellant believes that the Respondent is erroneously relying on the doctrine of "sovereign immunity", infra, as a bar to the Board's jurisdiction in this matter. 21/ App. R. Brf., p. 1. The Appellant states that agencies can and do waive sovereign immunity by contract. App. R. Brf., p. 3 (citing, Color Corner, Ltd., ASBCA No. 26683, 82-2 BCA 15,957 at 79,095 (non-CDA case)). In summary, the Appellant contends that because its contract is governed by an "all-disputes" clause, and its breach of contract claim "relates to" the agreement, the parties have, in effect, consented to the Board's jurisdiction in this matter. App. Brf., p. 6; App. R. Brf., p.3. Indeed, as indicated above, the Appellant believes that the use of the words "relating to contracts" in the Board's own rules, when combined with the language in the "Disputes" clause, provides a sufficient legal basis for the Board to assert jurisdiction over the Appellant's breach of contract claim. Board Rules, Preface to Rules, Sec. I (Jurisdiction), at p. 1. App. Brf., p. 6. Accordingly, for these reasons the Appellant urges the Board to find that it has jurisdiction to consider the merits of this appeal. 2. The Respondent's Position The Respondent, on the other hand, has maintained throughout these proceedings that the Board is without jurisdiction to hear the Appellant's breach of contract claim. Answer, First Defense, p. 1; PCR, p. 7. The essence of the Respondent's argument is its belief that nothing in the statutory or regulatory underpinnings of the Board amounts to a waiver of sovereign immunity. 22/ Res. Brf., p. 2. In that regard, the Respondent notes that prior to 1978, agency boards of contact appeals uniformly held that they had no jurisdiction to entertain breach of contract claims. Res. Brf., p. 3 (citing, Jack Clark, ASBCA No. 3672, 57-2 BCA 1,402; Alco Lumber Company, Inc., ASBCA No. 9641, 1964 BCA 4,349; and E. & E. Pfotzer Engineers, ENGBCA No. 2656, 65-2 BCA 5,144). Furthermore, the United States Supreme Court had declared that "the settled construction" of the disputes clause then used by Government agencies ". . . exclude[d] breach of contract claims from its coverage. . . .". United States v. Utah Construction and Mining Company, supra, 384 U.S. at 394. In 1978 Congress enacted the CDA which, among other things, broadened the jurisdiction of contracting officers and boards of contract appeals by expressly waiving the Government's sovereign immunity with respect to breach of contract claims brought by third parties. S. REP. No. 95-1118, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978), 1, reprinted in 1978 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 5235. Resp. Brf., pp. 3-4. To the Respondent, the legislative history of the CDA makes clear that Congress believed without the law, agency contracting officers lacked the power to settle and pay breach of contract claims and boards of contract appeals lacked the power to decide them. Res. R. Brf., p. 2. The authority of agency boards of contract appeals to consider breach of contract claims is found in 607(d) of the CDA which states, in pertinent part, that " . . . [i]n exercising [its] jurisdiction, the agency board is authorized to grant any relief that would be available to a litigant asserting a contract claim in the United States Claims Court." 41 U.S.C. 607(d). Res. Brf., p. 4 (citing, Carter Funeral Home-Toano, ASBCA No. 24743, 80-2 BCA 14,473; TMW, A Joint Venture, ASBCA No. 24349, 80-1 BCA 14,389). As the Respondent also observes, the CDA's waiver of sovereign immunity is expressly limited to "executive agencies." 41 U.S.C. 601(2). Relying on the legislative history of the CDA, the Respondent states that Congress deliberately excluded judicial and legislative branch agencies from its coverage because "[a]cquisition activity by these agencies is relatively small, and subjecting them to regulations promulgated by the executive branch agencies could raise constitutional questions under the 'separation of powers' doctrine." Res. Brf., p. 4 (citing, S. REP. No. 95-1118, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978), 16, reprinted in 1978 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 5250. Thus, the Respondent argues that since GPO is an office in the legislative branch of the U.S. Government, Res. Brf., pp. 4-5 (citing, United States v. Allison, 91 U.S. 372 (1876); Thompson v. Sawyer, 678 F.2d 257 (D.C. Cir. 1982); McKenzie v. Sawyer, 684 F.2d 62 (D.C. Cir. 1982); Government Printing Office Employees, B-128759, 36 Comp. Gen. 163 (1956); Photo-Data, Inc., B-208272, 83-1 CPD 281; Fry Communications, Inc., B-207605, 83-1 CPD 109), contract disputes between GPO and its contractors are not subject to the CDA. 23/ Res. Brf., p. 5. According to the Respondent, this issue was "definitively settled" in Tatelbaum v. United States, 749 F.2d 729 (Fed. Cir. 1984), where the Court held that decisions of the Board could not be appealed directly to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit because they were not rendered pursuant to the CDA, and GPO, as a legislative branch agency, was not covered by that Act (citing, International Graphics v. United States, 4 Cl.Ct. 186, 197 (1983)). 24/ Res. Brf., p. 5. The Respondent argues that absent the CDA's waiver of sovereign immunity, the Board is in the position of agency boards prior to the passage of that law, and hence is without authority to decide breach of contract claims. Res. Brf., p. 5.; Res. R. Brf., p. 3. Furthermore, the Respondent states that "[t]he GPOBCA, citing, United States v. Utah Construction, has held '[t]o the extent appellant seeks damages for alleged breach of contract by the Government, this Board is without jurisdiction.' (citing, Harbor Printing & Copy Service, Inc., GPOBCA No. 77-5 (1977); Cloverleaf Enterprises, Inc., GPOBCA 79-12 (1980); and Information Systems, Inc., GPOBCA No. 78-11 (1979))." 25/ Res. Brf., pp. 5-6. The Respondent acknowledges that its "Disputes" clause parallels the language in FAR 52.233-1(b), which the Appellant contends traditionally encompasses breach of contract claims; however, it argues that real question in this appeal is not whether the Board can hear such a claim, but rather "whether the GPO is empowered to waive sovereign immunity, in the absence of congressional authorization." Res. R. Brf., p. 1. As indicated previously, the Respondent believes that the legislative history of the CDA shows a clear congressional intent to furnish contracting officers and boards of contract appeals with the power to settle, pay and decide breach of contract claims where such authority had not existed before. Res. R. Brf., p. 2. According to the Respondent, a review of the history of the development of the administrative resolution of breach of contract claims discloses that agencies only enlarged the jurisdiction of their boards after some congressional action. 26/ Res. R. Brf., p. 2 (citing, Bendix Corporation, ACAB Dkt. No. 1050, September 11, 1962 (unliquidated damages for delay in breach of contract actions)). The Respondent contends that, as a consequence, in order to alleviate the full impact of the sovereign immunity doctrine, agencies added contract clauses that provided a contract remedy for breach of contract claims; e.g., the "suspension of work" clause, which was added after the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Rice, 317 U.S. 61 (1942), allows a contract an extension of time for Government delays. 27/ Res. R. Brf., pp. 3-4. Accordingly, for all of these reasons, the Respondent believes that the Board lacks jurisdiction to hear Appellant's breach of contract claim, and submits that the appeal should be dismissed. DECISION 28/ This appeal presents an issue of first impression for the consideration of the Board. No other case previously before the Board has asked it to weigh its jurisdictional mandate against a "pure" breach of contract claim. 29/ Furthermore, it appears that this is the first instance in which the Board has had to interpret the scope of its jurisdiction in light of the 1988 revisions to the "Disputes" clause in GPO Contract Terms. However, for the reasons which follow, the Board believes that notwithstanding those changes, it still lacks the authority to entertain "pure" breach of contract claims where redress is sought in the form of damages. 30/ At the outset, the Board believes that in order to properly understand the issue and decision in this case, it would be worthwhile to explain, as it has done in other cases, the exact nature of its authority. In that regard, the Board's jurisdiction rests on two legs. The first is the Board's "enabling statute" -- GPO Instruction 110.10C -- and the regulation which implements it -- GPO Instruction 110.12. The second leg is the "Disputes" clause itself. GPO Instruction 110.10C, which established the Board, provides, in pertinent part: 3. Statutory Authority. The United States Government Printing Office (hereinafter GPO) is an Office in the legislative branch of the United States Government. United States v. Allison, 91 U.S. 372 (1876); Lewis v. Sawyer, C.A. No. 82-2869, Memorandum at 3 (D.D.C. Dec. 20, 1982); Thompson v. Sawyer, 678 F.2d 257 (D.C. Cir. 1982); McKenzie v. Sawyer, 648 F.2d 257 (D.C. Cir. 1982); Comp. Gen. Op. B-208272 (1983); Comp. Gen. Op. B-152126 (1963); 36 Comp. Gen. 163 (1956); 34 Comp. Gen. 485 (1955). As such, GPO contract disputes are not subject to the procedures prescribed by the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. 551 et seq. (1982), or the Contract Disputes Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-563, 92 Stat. 2383-91 (codified at 41 U.S.C. 601-613 (1982)). The GPO is under the direction and supervision of the Public Printer of the United States, whose statutory and administrative powers include the authority to enter into contracts on behalf of the United States and to make final administrative determinations regarding such contracts. See 44 U.S.C. 301, 309, 501, 502 (1982). * * * * * * * * * * 5. Jurisdiction of the Board. The Board shall consider and determine appeals from final decisions of Contract Officers relating to contracts which contain provisions requiring the determination of appeals by the Public Printer, or his duly authorized representative or board. By agreement, the Board may also consider and determine appeals from decisions of other legislative branch Contracting Officers made pursuant to their contracts. In addition, the Board shall have jurisdiction over such other procurement-related matters as may be assigned to it by the Public Printer. The Board has authority to determine appeals falling within the scope of its jurisdiction as fully and finally as might the Public Printer. * * * * * * * * * * 7. Decisions of the Board a. Appeals shall be heard by a single Administrative Judge who shall decide them in an impartial, fair, and just manner. Decisions shall be supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole. The decision shall be deemed the decision of the Board. b. When an appeal is taken pursuant to a Disputes clause of a contract which limits appeals to disputes concerning questions of fact, the Board may, in its discretion, hear, consider, and decide all questions of law necessary for the complete adjudication of the appeal. In consideration of an appeal, should it appear that a claim is involved which is not cognizable by the Board, the Board may make findings of fact with respect to such claims without expressing an opinion on the question of liability. [Emphasis added.] Similarly, the preface to the Board's Rules of Practice and Procedure, GPO Instruction 110.12, provides, in relevant part: I. Jurisdiction for Considering Appeals. [The Board] . . . shall consider and determine appeals from final decisions of contract officers relating to contracts which contain provisions requiring the determination of appeals by the Public Printer, or his duly authorized representative or board. By agreement, the Board may also consider and determine appeals from decisions of other legislative branch Contracting Officers made pursuant to their contracts. In addition, the Board shall have jurisdiction over other procurement-related matters assigned to it by the Public Printer. The Board has authority to determine appeals falling within the scope of its jurisdiction as fully and finally as might the Public Printer. * * * * * * * * * * * V. Decisions on Questions of Law. When an appeal is taken pursuant to a "Disputes" clause of a contract which limits appeals to disputes concerning questions of fact, the Board may, in its discretion, hear, consider, and decide all questions of law necessary for the complete adjudication of the appeal. In consideration of an appeal, should it appear that a claim is involved which is not cognizable by the Board, the Board may make findings of fact with respect to such claims without expressing an opinion on the question of liability. [Emphasis added.] As indicated above, the second prong of the Board's jurisdiction is found in the "Disputes" clause of GPO Contract Terms, which currently provides: 5. Disputes. (a) Except as otherwise provided, any dispute concerning a question of fact arising under or related to this contract which is not disposed of by agreement shall be decided by the Contracting Officer, who shall make his/her decision in writing and mail or otherwise furnish a copy thereof to the contractor. (b) The decision of the Contracting Officer shall be final and conclusive unless, within 90 days from the date of receipt of such copy, the contractor mails or otherwise furnishes a written notice of appeal to the Government Printing Office Board of Contract Appeals. (c) The decision of the Board shall be final and conclusive unless determined by a court of competent jurisdiction to have been fraudulent, or capricious, or arbitrary, or so grossly erroneous as necessarily to imply bad faith, or not supported by substantial evidence. (d) In connection with any appeal under this article, the contractor shall be afforded an opportunity to be heard and to offer evidence in support of his/her appeal. Pending final decision of a dispute hereunder, the contractor shall proceed diligently with performance and in accordance with the Contracting Officer's decision. (e) This article does not preclude consideration of law questions in connection with decisions provided for in paragraph (d); provided, that nothing shall be construed as making final the decision of any administrative official, representative, or board on a question of law. 31/ [Emphasis added.] On those occasions when it has had to consider its regulatory foundations in deciding appeal, the Board has consistently maintained that its jurisdiction was narrowly defined. Thus, in Peake Printers, Inc., GPO BCA 12-85 (November 12, 1986), the Board denied a contractor's request for a contract modification, stating, among other things: The Board is not a creature of statute; thus, it has no powers which arise under law as do courts. Instead, it derives all its powers by virtue of the so-called disputes clause of the contract itself. That clause, Article 2-3 of GPO Contract Terms No. 1, gives a contractor the contractual right to appeal any dispute with the Contracting Officer which is "related to the contract" to the Public Printer who is in fact the Officer of the United States authorized by statute to contract on behalf of the United States (44 U.S.C. 502). The disputes clause in turn gives the Public Printer the authority to delegate his appeal authority to his designee which he has done by instruction 110.12 dated September 17, 1984, designating this Board has his agent for that purpose. Thus, the Board's authority is purely derivative and contractual. As such, it is constrained by the terms of the contract itself. Since this is the case, the Board cannot enlarge the very agreement between the parties from which it derives its authority merely because it deems such action to be equitable, but will be constrained to deciding disputes within the parameters of the contract itself. [Emphasis added.] Sl. op. at 6. See also, Bay Printing, Inc., GPO BCA 16-85 (January 30, 1987), Sl. op. at 9. 32/ Furthermore, Automated Datatron, Inc., GPO BCA 20-87 (March 31, 1989), the Board pointed out that: The Public Printer has not under the provision of paragraph 5 of GPO Instruction 110.10C delegated authority to this Board to consider legal questions existing outside the contract itself. Sl. op. at 4-5. Since the Board's authority is purely derivative and contractual, and because it must decide contract appeals within the "four corners" of the agreement itself, the historic position in GPO with respect to the resolution of breach of contract claims has been that the rule in Utah Mining is controlling. United States v. Utah Construction and Mining Company, supra, 384 U.S. at 407, 412. As the Respondent correctly notes, the ad hoc panels of CAB, the Board's predecessor, uniformly held that they lacked jurisdiction to award damages for alleged breaches of contract by the Government. Thus, for example, in Microform Data System, Inc., GPOCAB No. 3-79 (February 1, 1980), where the "Disputes" clause gave the Board jurisdiction over ". . . any dispute concerning a question of fact arising under this contract . . .", the panel stated: It is our opinion that what the Court [in Utah Mining] is saying in this case is that unless there is specific language in the contract to convert what would otherwise be a claims [sic] for damages for breach of contract into claims payable under such contract and hence to be regard as "arising under the contract," the [CAB] does not have authority to entertain a breach of contract case. There is no language in this contract that would convert a pure breach of contract claim into one that would bring it under the provisions of the Disputes clause. Therefore, this case comes squarely under the rule set down in [Utah Mining], where at p. 412 it states: Thus the settled construction of [the] disputes clause excluded breach of contract claims from its coverage . . . Microform Data System, Inc., Sl. op. at 10, 11-12. See also, Harbor Printing & Copy Service, Inc., supra, Sl. op. at 1; Information Systems, Inc., supra, Sl. op. at 5-7; Cloverleaf Enterprises, Inc., supra, Sl. op. at 10-11. Accord, Jet Services, Inc., DOT CAB No. 77-14, 78-2 BCA 13,223, at 64,675; Blake Construction Company, Inc., supra, 67-1 BCA 6,311, at 29,197-98. The 1980 revisions to GPO Contract Terms changed the key phrase in the first part of the "Disputes" clause from ". . . any dispute concerning a question of fact arising under this contract . . ." to ". . . any dispute concerning a question of fact related to the contract . . .". It was this latter language which furnished the basis for the Board's jurisdiction when it was established in 1984. See, GPO Instruction 110.10C, 5; GPO Instruction 110.12, Preface, I. Finally, in 1988 the "Disputes" clause was amended again so that the pertinent wording is now ". . . any dispute concerning a question of fact arising under or related to this contract . . .". 33/ Notwithstanding the fact that the "Disputes" clause has contained the phrase "related to" since 1980, which, as the Appellant suggests, traditionally encompasses breach of contract claims, the Board agrees with the Respondent that the real question here is whether GPO's tinkering with the relevant language has resulted in any substantive change in the powers of this Board to decide such cases. In the Board's view, the key "Disputes" clause language which prevents it from taking jurisdiction over "pure" breach cases is not found in the first paragraph of that clause, but rather in the last. Until 1988, paragraph (b) of the "Disputes" clause had provided: This Disputes clause does not preclude consideration of law questions in connection with decisions provided for in paragraph (a) above: Provided, that nothing in the contract shall be construed as making final the decision of any administrative official, representative or board on a question of law. 1980 Contract Terms, 2-3.(b). See, Microform Data System, Inc., supra, Sl. op. at 10. The only changes made in 1988 were cosmetic and minor; i.e., the paragraph was renumbered and the phrase "in the contract" after the word "nothing" was deleted, but the 37 language was not otherwise altered. 1988 Contract Terms, 5.(e). The concept embodied in the "Disputes" clause's last paragraph was incorporated into the Board's "enabling legislation" and carried forward into its rules. That is, the Board is instructed that in dealing with issues of law, it has discretion under the "Disputes" clause to ". . . hear, consider, and decide all questions of law necessary for the complete adjudication of the appeal," and if it appears that jurisdiction is lacking, the Board may nonetheless ". . . make findings of fact with respect to such claims without expressing an opinion on the question of liability." GPO Instruction 110.10C, 7.b.; GPO Instruction 110.12, Preface, V. Whether or not the Respondent has committed a breach of contract is a question of law. Microform Data System, Inc., supra, Sl. op. at 15; Cloverleaf Enterprises, Inc., supra, Sl. op. at 11. Therefore, as the Board understands its mandate, even if it agreed with the Appellant's position with regard to the meaning of the paragraph (a) of the "Disputes" clause -- that the phrase "related to" gave the Board jurisidction over its breach of contract claim -- it would nonetheless have to deal with the dilemma created by paragraph (e) -- that the Board's decision would not be final and binding, but advisory only. Stated otherwise, if these competing paragraphs of the "Disputes" clause were to be harmonized and given a literal reading, the Board would be allowed to make factual determinations regarding the Appellant's breach of contract claim, but it would be prevented from awarding a meaningful remedy. This situation was specifically addressed by the Supreme Court in Utah Mining, where it observed, in pertinent part: The United States, . . . contends that even if it be accepted that the Boards of Contract Appeals are without jurisdiction to grant relief for breach of contract they are nevertheless authorized by the disputes clause to make binding findings of fact respecting all disputes. * * * * * * * * * * [T]he present charter of the ASBCA provides that: "[when] in the consideration of an appeal it appears that a claim is involved which is not cognizable under the terms of the contract, the Board may, insofar as the evidence permits, making findings of fact with respect to such a claim without expressing an opinion on the question of liability." [Citation omitted.] * * * * * * * * * * The practice of the ASBCA has evidenced an even narrower understanding of the charter provision authorizing findings without expression of opinion on liability. . . . [T]he Board has explained that: "[generally,] as a matter of sound policy, the Board's discretionary right to make findings of fact in instances where a claim is not cognizable under the contract is not exercised, simply because the Board has no way to afford the parties the remedy which logically would flow from the facts found. The cases wherein the Board has declined to consider an appeal because it had no method within the confines of the contract terms to afford a remedy have sometimes been described rather inaptly as being beyond our jurisdiction or beyond our authority to consider. Basically, the lack is not of authority to hear but of authority to finally dispose administratively." [Citation omitted.] [Emphasis added.] United States v. Utah Construction and Mining Company, supra, 384 U.S. at 407-11. See also, Blake Construction Company, Inc., supra, 67-1 BCA 6,311, at 29,197-98. This is the exact problem faced by the Board with respect to the Appellant's breach of contract claim. We also believe that "sound policy" justifies our decision not to exercise jurisdiction here because we would be unable to dispose of it with finality. As for the Appellant's contention that the enactment of the CDA, and GPO's subsequent revision of the "Disputes" clause to conform to that law, enlarged the Board's jurisdiction and gave it authority over breach of contract claims by consent of the parties, Board believes that the argument is without substance. The contractor in Microform Data System, Inc., made a similar point when he argued that the CDA effectively overruled the Supreme Court's holding in Utah Mining. Microform Data System, Inc., supra, Sl. op. at 6, 12. However, the CAB panel rejected that contention noting that notwithstanding Congress' conferring breach of contract jurisdiction on agency boards in section 8(d) of the CDA, 41 U.S.C. 607(d), S. REP. No. 95-1118, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 5239, 5259, that legislation also: . . . provided that a contractor could go directly to the Court of Claims in lieu of appealing to the Contract Appeals Board. It retained the [Wunderlich Act] language on questions of law and provided in 41 U.S.C. 609(b): "In the event of an appeal by a contractor or the Government from a decision of any agency board pursuant to section 607 of this title, notwithstanding any contract provision, regulation or rules of law to the contrary, the decision of the agency board on any question of law shall not be final or conclusive, but the decision on any question of fact shall be final and conclusive and shall not be set aside unless the decision is fraudulent, or arbitrary, or capricious or so grossly erroneous as to necessary imply bad faith, or if such decision is not supported by substantial evidence." If [the CDA] was in effect prior to Utah Mining, . . . there may have been a difference in the [sic] some aspects of the decision, but it would not have affected a question similar to the one before this Board. We are not considering a fact question, but one of law, and both the Wunderlich Act and the [CDA] are consistent with regard to decisions by Contract Boards of Appeal on questions of [l]aw and that is they are not final when an Appeals Board decides them. [Emphasis added.] Microform Data System, Inc., supra, Sl. op. at 15. Consequently, in this case, whether the Board assumed jurisdiction over breach of contract claims by law or by consent, it would still be unable to make a final disposition of the matter. Therefore, nothing in the Appellant's contention in this regard defeats the sound policy reasons favoring the Board's refusal to exercise its discretion to make factual findings only on such claims, while remaining silent on the issue of liability, and thus provide the Appellant with only "half a loaf." Furthermore, the Board is not persuaded by the Appellant's argument that the Respondent's reliance on the "sovereign immunity" doctrine is misplaced in this case. The case cited to the Board for the proposition that agencies can and do waive sovereign immunity by contract -- Color Corner, Ltd. -- involved a NAF activity over which the ASBCA has exercised plenary jurisdiction for years under regulations of the Department of Defense. See also, King and Queen Drive-In, supra, 72-1 BCA 9467; Texida, Inc., supra, 75-2 BCA 11,505. Indeed, NAFs were always considered sui generis in the Federal Government's organizational scheme because of their quasi-commercial aspects and their close connection to the welfare funds of the Military Departments; hence, the Board is not persuaded that the GPO's situation it analogous to that of the NAFs. 34/ See, Champaign-Urbana News Agency, Inc. v. J. L. Cummins News Company, Inc., supra, 632 F.2d at 683-87. More importantly, all of the cases cited by the Appellant arose in the executive branch. The Board, in deciding whether to exercise its discretion in this matter and hear the appeal, must be mindful of the fact that GPO is an entity within the legislative branch and that Congress has expressed a certain intent with respect to the processing of contract claims arising in this branch of Government. See, Tatelbaum v. United States, supra, 749 F.2d at 730. Congress expressly excluded judicial and legislative branch agencies from coverage of the CDA because it thought that "[a]cquisition activity by these agencies is relatively small, and subjecting them to regulations promulgated by the executive branch agencies could raise constitutional questions under the 'separation of powers' doctrine." 35/ S. REP. No. 95-1118, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978), 16, reprinted in 1978 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 5250. The CDA is a clear expression of Congress' intent to waive the Government's sovereign immunity with respect to breach of contract claims against covered Federal agencies. Id., at 5239. 41 U.S.C. 607(d). Because Congress did not include GPO within the parameters of the CDA, the Board must conclude that sovereign immunity still applies to breach of contract claims brought against this agency unless some other law governing GPO provides a waiver. As stated before, the Board only has such powers delegated to it by the Public Printer, the Officer of the United States authorized by statute to contract on behalf of the United States. Peake Printers, Inc., supra, Sl. op. at 6; Bay Printing, Inc., supra, Sl. op. at 9. The Public Printer's procurement authority stems from section 502 of title 44 United States Code, which provides: Printing, binding, and blank-book work authorized by law, which the Public Printer is not able or equipped to do at the Government Printing Office, may be produced elsewhere under contracts made by him with the approval of the Joint Committee on Printing. The legislative history of section 502 discloses that it was enacted as a simple amendment to the Legislative Branch Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 1930. Act of February 28, 1929, 45 Stat. 1400, H.R. 17053, 70th Cong., 2d Sess (1929). Nothing in 502 discloses a clear intent by Congress to waive its sovereign immunity. The Congressional Record reveals no lengthy discussion about this amendment in the Senate where it was introduced, 70 Cong. Rec. 3850 (1929), and none at all in the House debates. 70 Cong. Rec. 3329, 3350 ff. (1929). Similarly, the Senate Report has no comments on printing, binding and blank book-work whatsoever. S. REP. No. 1825, 70th Cong., 2d Sess. (1929). Accordingly, there is nothing in the legislative history of section 502 which would reveal the intent of Congress beyond the plain meaning of the words used in the law, i.e., the Public Printer is authorized to contract out printing, binding, and blank-book work which cannot be accomplished in GPO. The Board sees nothing in the abbreviated legislative history of section 502 to indicate that by authorizing the Public Printer to contract out printing, binding, and blank- book work, Congress thereby also intended to waive the Government's sovereign immunity with respect to his settlement of contract claims against the United States. Certainly, there is nothing in section 502, or its legislative history, which would amount to the sort of unequivocal expression of a waiver of sovereign immunity which the law requires before imposing a liability on the public treasury. United States v. Mitchell, supra, 445 U.S. at 538; United States v. Testan, supra, 424 U.S. at 399 (1976); Overall Roofing & Construction, Inc. v. United States, supra, 929 F.2d at 688; Fitzgerald v. U.S. Civil Service Commission, 554 F.2d 1186, 1189, n. 8 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (in an appropriate case, it might be possible to find an express waiver of sovereign immunity in particularly clear legislative history). Suffice it to say, Congress is perfectly capable of regulating GPO's procurement activities by statute if it has a mind to. See, United States v. International Business Machines Corporation, supra, 892 F.2d at 1007-08 (GPO is subject to the "Brooks Act" for the purpose of its ADP procurements). Since it takes specific legislation to waive the Government's sovereign immunity, the burden was on the Appellant in this case to point to a congressional act that gives consent. Malone v. Bowdoin, supra, 369 U.S. 643; Cole v. United States, supra, 657 F.2d at 109; Paradyne Corporation v. United States Department of Justice, supra, 647 F.Supp. 1228. The Appellant has not done so in this case. Moreover, the simple answer to the Appellant's contention that the Board acquired breach of contract jurisdiction by virtue of GPO Instruction 110.10C, GPO Instruction 110.12, and the revised "Disputes" clause, is that sovereign immunity may not be waived by Government officials, United States v. Shaw, supra, 309 U.S. at 500-01; Champaign-Urbana News Agency, Inc. v. J. L. Cummins News Company, Inc., supra, 632 F.2d at 687; Pezzola v. United States, supra, 618 F.Supp. at 548, or by regulation. Heller v. United States, supra, 776 F.2d at 97-98; Millard v. United States, 16 Cl.Ct. at 490. Finally, from a practical standpoint, the Board believes that the Appellant is not prejudiced by the dismissal of its appeal on jurisdictional grounds. First, except for contract disputes processed in accordance with the CDA, the statute of limitations for filing a claim against the United States with the Claims Court is six years after the right of action first accrues. 28 U.S.C. 2401. Under the facts in this case, since the Contracting Officer's final decision was rendered on February 1, 1990, the time allowed the Appellant to file its breach of contract claim in the appropriate judicial forum will not expire for four more years. Second, and perhaps more importantly, it is certain that the Appellant and the Respondent would expend a great deal of time and money presenting the appeal at the administrative level, after which either this Board and/or the courts would ultimately, and possibly after the passage of a substantial period of time, decide that the Board had no jurisdiction, with the result that the parties would have to repeat their efforts before a tribunal of competent jurisdiction. Therefore, it seems that the interests of fairness and economy of litigation are best served by having the forum of doubtful jurisdiction -- the Board -- decline to consider the matter and to leave the parties to the forum whose jurisdiction is certain -- the Claims Court. Accordingly, for these reasons the Board concludes that it lacks jurisdiction to entertain "pure" breach of contract claims, such as this appeal, on the merits. Therefore, this appeal should be and is DISMISSED. It is so Ordered. _______________ 1. The Contracting Officer's appeal file, assembled pursuant to Rule 4 of the Board's Rules of Practice and Procedure, was delivered to the Board on March 22, 1990. It will be referred to hereafter as the R4 File, with an appropriate Tab letter(s) also indicated. GPO Instruction 110.12, Subject: Board of Contract Appeals Rules of Practice and Procedure, dated September 17, 1984 (GPO Instruction 110.12), Rule 4. 2. This breach of contract figure was amended by the Appellant in its formal complaint of May 23, 1990. The amount of damages now sought is $353,817.60 (based on 750.5 idle press hours at a machine rate of $409.95 per hour plus a 15% profit). Appellant's Complaint (hereinafter App. C.), dated May 23, 1990, ¶22, p. 4. 3. According to the contract specifications, "Stamps By Mail" was a folded form which looked like an open side envelope with welded side seams and a gummed flap with an extension flap (R4 File, Tab A, p. 1). The 71,625,000 copies required were divided into two versions. Id. Version 1 comprised 50,200,000 copies of a Generic version (no imprints) and 20,925,000 copies with 256 different imprint addresses with quantities ranging from 100,000 to 1,000,000 copies per imprint. Id. Version 2 consisted of 500,000 additional copies with Special Dallas imprint and printing. Id. 4. The underscored dates are those given in the original IFB which was sent to potential bidders on April 20, 1989. By telegram, dated April 27, 1989, the Respondent informed potential contractors of certain changes in the IFB, including new dates in the "SCHEDULE" clause for the pickup of Government-furnished material, the first shipment of 21,625,000 copies, and the completed shipment (R4 File, Tab A, Cover Sheet). The amended dates are shown in brackets. 5. The record discloses that the QATAP standards under the contract for both Product Quality Levels (Printing Attributes and Finishing Attributes) was Level III (R4 File, Tab A, p. 4). The Inspection Level standard for Non-Destructive tests was General Inspection Level I, while the measurement for Destructive tests was Special Inspection Level S-2 (R4 File, Tab A, p. 4). There were also three specified standards - Type Quality and Uniformity, Solid and Screen Tint Color Match, and Process Color Match - all of which were "O.K. Press Sheets" (R4 File, Tab A, p. 4). 6. The clause also allows the Contracting Officer, on written request of the contractor, to extend the schedule for such time as he/she deems fair and reasonable when there are, in the opinion of the Contracting Officer, an excessive number of author's alterations. 1988 Contract Terms, Contract Clauses, ¶12.(c)(5)(iii). There is another provision which comes into play in cases of lengthy delays with respect to the return of proofs, namely the "Temporary Suspension" clause which appears in the Supplemental Specifications section of 1988 Contract Terms (Specification 21). The "Temporary Suspension" specification provides that if the Government fails to return a set of proofs to the contractor within two months, or other longer holding period stated in the specifications or print order, the contractor may request that the portion of the job for which the proofs have not been returned be declared temporarily suspended. 1988 Contract Terms, Supplemental Specifications, ¶ 21.(a). The clause also establishes procedures to allow the contractor to bill for completed work during the period of suspension. Id., ¶¶21.(b),(c). In this particular case, however, the delay in returning the proofs to the Appellant was less than two months. 7. The record indicates that the Appellant understood the Respondent's first message as an "OK to print" and initiated steps to finalize production. However, in a subsequent conversation that day, the Respondent informed Olsen that no "OK to print" had, in fact, been given, and Olsen agreed that he had misunderstood (R4 File, Tab G). 8. On May 26, 1989, the Contracting Officer was given this memorandum for the purpose of preparing a reply (R4 File, Tab H). 9. The record also indicates that on June 2, 1989, an additional 16 pages of manuscript copy was sent from the USPS through the Respondent to the Appellant (R4 File, Tab F). 10. Tab F of the R4 File is the "Compliance Record" for the "Stamps By Mail" contract. In addition to containing all the relevant dates concerning the exchange of material between the Respondent, the USPS and the Appellant, the first page of the document is annotated with the number "14" and a line joining that number to two circled dates-May 18, 1989 (in the column "Due at Contractor") and June 8, 1989 (in the column "Date Returned" [to Contractor]). Since the "SCHEDULE" clause speaks in terms of the proofs submitted by the contractor being withheld "4 workdays" before their return, it is clear that the number "14" stands for the number of workdays between May 18, 1989 and June 8, 1989. See, R4 File, Tab O. 11. The R4 File contains numerous documents, notes and memoranda related to matters pertaining to the production process after the "OK to print" had been given to the Appellant. See, R4 File, Tab K (print without bar code, placement of cancellation marks, match of the printing to the approved press sheet, receipt of 100 samples sent to the USPS), Tab L (Appellant's request for a contract modification allowing additional charges totaling $10,650.00 for (a) making first proofs with new color separation, (b) changing to Dallas type, (c) changing type for imprint address changes, and (d) restripping cancellation marks and remaking black plates for 38 imprints), Tab M (Appellant told to retain black plates, adding cancellation marks), Tab N (Appellant's reply to the Respondent's request for clarification regarding the additional charges for the 38 imprints mentioned in Tab L), Tab O-1 (Appellant's letter enclosing Job Change Order and attendant costs related to the changes made because of the author's alterations and presented to the Respondent in Tabs L and N), Tab U (Appellant's documentation supporting its request for a contract modification regarding additional plate costs), Tab X (Contracting Officer's response to the Appellant's request for a contract modification due to the author's alterations, allowing certain charges and disallowing others, and offering to pay $5,000.00 in total settlement of the claim), Tab Z (Appellant's reply rejecting the Contracting Officer's $5,000.00 offer, and countering with a proposal to accept $7,599.36 as payment instead, and annotated with a note from the Contracting Officer that $5,919.71 was agreed by the parties as settlement of the claim), and Tab AA (Contract Modification No. 1 increasing the contract price by $5,919.71). These matters are unrelated to the breach of contract issue in this case, and therefore it is not essential to discuss them in detail in this decision. 12. From the evidence in the record, it seems that this letter was sent to the Appellant both by facsimile transmission and certified mail (R4 File, Tab V). 13. In the interim, on December 21, 1989, shortly after the audit report was delivered to the Contracting Officer, the Appellant had made another written inquiry concerning the status of its claim (R4 File, Tab CC). Confirming a prior telephone call, the Appellant sought an expedited resolution of the matter because the claim was already three months old, the auditor's had completed their work, and ". . . it doesn't seem reasonable to keep stringing the whole affair out . . ." (R4 File, Tab CC). The Contracting Officer replied on December 29, 1989, informing the Appellant that he was giving the claim his "undivided attention" (R4 File, Tab DD). 14. There is nothing in the record to indicate that the Contracting Officer accepted the OIG's recommendation to settle the dispute by making an offer to the Appellant prior to issuing his final decision. 15. At the prehearing conference, Counsel for GPO also believed that this appeal raised a second question; i.e., assuming that the Board has breach of contract jurisdiction, does the contract itself provide the exclusive remedy for a claim based on the Government's failure to meet its obligations in a timely fashion? PCR, p. 7. In that regard, the parties disagreed over whether the automatic day-for-day extension provided for in the "Extension of schedules" clause in 1988 Contract Terms, ¶12.(c) (1), was the exclusive remedy for the Government's delay. PCR, pp. 7, 11. However, Counsel for the Appellant took the position that the jurisdiction issue needed to be disposed of first, and that the remedy question could be dealt with at a later stage of the appeal. Id. Since the Board agreed with Counsel for the Appellant, it told the parties that their briefs did not have to address the issue of the appropriate remedy in this case. See, Briefing Order, p. 2, n. 1. 16. Pursuant to the Board's Briefing Order, both parties submitted briefs setting forth their respective positions on the jurisdiction question. The Appellant's Brief Regarding Jurisdiction (App. Brf.), was filed with the Board on April 26, 1991. The Respondent's Brief on Jurisdiction (Res. Brf.), was submitted to the Board on April 29, 1991. Both parties also submitted reply briefs on May 14, 1991 (hereinafter App. R. Brf. and Res. R. Brf., respectively). The Board's understanding of the positions of the parties is based on the Appellant's Complaint, the Respondent's Answer, the formal briefs filed by the parties, and the discussions at the prehearing conference on February 7, 1991. 17. As indicated previously, in its formal complaint, the Appellant amended its claim for damages to take into account its actual fiscal year costs, information not readily available at the time the initial claim was submitted. See, App. C., note 2 supra, ¶ 22, p. 4. As amended, the Appellant now claims an entitlement to damages of $353,817.60 based on 750.5 idle press hours at a machine rate of $409.95 per hour plus 15 percent profit. Id. 18. The Appellant observes that "fact disputes" clauses (limited to claims arising under the contract) in use prior to the passage of the CDA were replaced by new standard "all-disputes" type clauses to implement the provisions of the statute. App. Brf., p. 2, n. 1 (citing, e.g., Defense Acquisition Circular No. 76-24, dated 28 August 1980). At the prehearing conference, however, the Appellant recognized that its Complaint was in error insofar as it relied, in part, on Section 7 of the CDA, 41 U.S.C. § 606, to support the Board's jurisdiction in this case. App. C., ¶ 1, p. 1. Since the CDA does not apply to GPO contracts because it is a legislative branch agency, the Appellant orally amended its Complaint to delete the reference to the statute. See, Tatelbaum v. United States, 749 F.2d 729, 730 (Fed. Cir. 1984). See, PCR, p. 9, n. 4. 19. The Respondent believes that King and Queen Drive-In and Texida, Inc. are inapposite because the breach of contract claims involved nonappropriated fund activities (NAFs). Res. R. Brf., p. 3. Hence, according to the Respondent, these cases are distinguishable because the contracts were not with a "Federal agency" and any recovery would not be from the U.S. Treasury or the appropriations of a Federal agency. Id. As the Board reads those cases, another reason the ASBCA was given plenary authority to decide all types of claims growing out of NAF contracts, including breach of contract claims, was because no court had been given jurisdiction to entertain breach of contract actions involving NAFs. See, e.g., Rainbow Valley Corporation, ASBCA No. 11691, 68-1 BCA ¶ 6,840; Lauris L. Beigh & Raymond H. Peck, ASBCA No. 7711, 63-1 BCA ¶ 3,740. The law has since been amended to allow such claims to be considered by the Claims Court. 28 U.S.C. § 1491. 20. The Board was created by the Public Printer in 1984 to succeed the prior Contract Appeals Board (CAB), in order to provide GPO with permanent, independent organization solely responsible for the resolution of contract disputes. GPO Instruction 110.10C, Subject: Establishment of the Board of Contract Appeals (GPO Instruction 110.10C), dated September 17, 1984. The establishment of the Board involved the transfer of responsibility for the settlement of disputed contracts and claims from the General Counsel (GC) to a newly named, full-time Chairperson/ Administrative Judge (C/AJ), who was placed in charge of the Board. See, GPO Instruction 105.1B, Subject: Organization and Functions of the Government Printing Office, dated March 17, 1978, Chapter 1, ¶¶6.b.(7),(8), p. 1 (the GC "[s] ettles disputed contracts and claims," and "[c]hairs the Contract Appeals Board."); GPO Instruction 110.10C, ¶¶ 6.c.,7. Under the former system, appeals from decisions of GPO Contracting Officers were considered by ad hoc panels composed of various GPO employees specifically appointed by the Public Printer from nominees selected by GPO Department and Service heads to serve on the CAB. GPO Instruction 110.10 , Subject: Board of Contract Appeals Rules of Practice and Procedure, dated June 6, 1979 (GPO Instruction 110.10), ¶ 3.b.; GPO Instruction 110.10A, Subject: Board of Contract Appeals Rules of Practice and Procedure, dated September 17, 1980 (GPO Instruction 110.10A), ¶ 4.b.; GPO Instruction 110.10B, Subject: Board of Contract Appeals Rules of Practice and Procedure, dated June 18, 1981 (GPO Instruction 110.10B), ¶ 4.b. These ad hoc panels consisted of three (3) members who were assigned to hear appeals on a case-by-case basis. GPO Instruction 110.10, ¶ 3.c.; GPO Instruction 110.10A, ¶ 4.c.; GPO Instruction 110.10B, ¶ 4.c. The 1981 directive amended the panel makeup to the extent that at least one member had to be an attorney. Id. It is worth noting, however, that in accordance with GPO policy, the standards for nomination to these panels required managers to name employees who could ". . . satisfy diversified contract appeal requirements while preventing excessive absences from the employee's organization." See, Memorandum from the Public Printer to All Department/Service/Staff Heads, Subject: GPO Instruction 110.10- GPO Board of Contract Appeals, dated June 14, 1979, p. 2; Memorandum from the Public Printer to Distribution, Subject: GPO Instruction 110.10A-GPO Board of Contract Appeals, dated May 20, 1981, p. 2 21. The doctrine of "sovereign immunity" simply means that the Government cannot be sued or held liable without its consent. United States v. Mitchell, 445 U.S. 535 (1980), rehearing den. 446 U.S. 992 (1980), on remand 664 F.2d 265 (Ct. Cl. 1981), cert. granted 457 U.S. 1104 (1982), affirmed, case remanded 103 S.Ct. 2961 (1983); United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 586 (1941); McQueen v. Bullock, 907 F.2d 1544 (5th Cir. 1990), cert. denied 111 S.Ct. 1308 (1991); Valn v. United States, 708 F.2d 116 (3rd Cir. 1983); Garrett v. United States, 640 F.2d 24 (6th Cir. 1981); Vote v. United States, 753 F.Supp. 866 (D.Nev. 1990), affirmed 930 F.2d 31 (9th Cir. 1991). The purpose of the doctrine is to protect the fiscal integrity of the Government. Gnotta v. United States, 415 F.2d 1271, 1277 (8th Cir. 1969); Neely v. Blumenthal, 458 F.Supp. 945, 954 (D.D.C. 1978); Drumright v. Padzieski, 436 F.Supp. 310, 318 (E.D. Mich., S.D. 1977). 22. As the Respondent correctly points out, waivers of sovereign immunity must be unequivocally expressed and may not be implied. United States v. Mitchell, supra, 445 U.S. at 538; United States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 399 (1976); United States v. King, 395 U.S. 1, 4 (1969); Overall Roofing & Construction, Inc. v. United States, 929 F.2d 687, 688 (Fed. Cir. 1991); Ascot Dinner Theatre, Ltd. v. Small Business Administration, 887 F.2d 1024 (10th Cir. 1989); Fidelity Construction Company v. United States, 700 F.2d 1379, 1387 (Fed. Cir. 1983). Furthermore, waivers of sovereign immunity are strictly construed in favor of the sovereign. Library of Congress v. Shaw, 478 U.S. 310, 318 (1986); Ruckelhaus v. Sierra Club, 463 U.S. 680 (1983); Lehman v. Nakshian, 453 U.S. 156 (1981); McMahon v. United States, 342 U.S. 25, 17 (1951); Haase v. Sessions, 893 F.2d 370 (D.C. Cir. 1990); First National Bank in Brookings v. United States, 829 F.2d 697 (8th Cir. 1987); Sutton v. United States, 819 F.2d 1289 (5th Cir. 1987); Wagner Seed Company, Inc. v. Bush, 709 F.Supp. 249 (D.D.C. 1989); United States v. Rose, 549 F.Supp. 830 (S.D.N.Y. 1982); Boehm v. United States, 22 Ct. Cl. 511 (1991). Res. Brf., pp. 2-3. For that reason, it takes an Act of Congress to waive the Government's sovereign immunity. Malone v. Bowdoin, 369 U.S. 643 (1962); Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15 (1953); Cole v. United States, 657 F.2d 107, 109 (7th Cir. 1981), cert. denied 454 U.S. 1083 (1981); Metropolitan Sanitary District of Greater Chicago v. United States Department of Navy, 722 F.Supp. 1565, on reconsideration 737 F.Supp. 51 (N.D.Ill. 1989); Paradyne Corporation v. United States Department of Justice, 647 F.Supp. 1228 (D.D.C. 1986); Van Schaick v. United States, 586 F.Supp. 1023, 1029 (D.S.C. 1983). Sovereign immunity may not be waived by Government officials, United States v. Shaw, 309 U.S. 495, 500-01 (1940); Champaign-Urbana News Agency, Inc. v. J. L. Cummins News Company, Inc., 632 F.2d 680, 687 (7th Cir. 1980); Pezzola v. United States, 618 F.Supp. 544, 548 (D.E.D. N.Y. 1985), or by regulation. Heller v. United States, 776 F.2d 92, 97-98 (3rd Cir. 1985); Millard v. United States, 16 Cl.Ct. 485, 490 (1989). The Back Pay Act, 5 U.S.C. § 5596, the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(a)(2), 1491, and of course the CDA, 41 U.S.C. §§ 601-613, are three examples of laws waiving the sovereign immunity of the Government with respect to third party suits within the scope of their coverage. Res. Brf., p. 3. 23. As the Respondent correctly notes, the Board is not a creature of the CDA, but rather was established pursuant to the authority of the Public Printer. Res. Brf., p. 5 (citing, GPO Instruction 110.10C). See note 20 supra. 24. However, decisions of the Board can still be reviewed by the United States Claims Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1491, under standards set forth in the Wunderlich Act, 41 U.S.C. §§ 321, 322. See, e.g., Fry Communications, Inc./InfoConversion Joint Venture v. United States, 22 Cl.Ct. 497, 501, n. 5, 6 (1991). 25. As indicated in note 20 supra, prior to the Board's creation, appeals from decisions of GPO Contracting Officers were considered by ad hoc panels of the CAB. The Board has consistently taken the position that although it is the successor to the CAB, it is a different entity. Consequently, while it is the Board's policy to follow the holdings of the CAB's ad hoc panels where applicable and appropriate, it does not regard those decisions as legally binding precedent; indeed, the Board differentiates between its decisions and the opinions of the ad hoc panels by citing the latter as GPOCAB. See, e.g., Chavis and Chavis Printing, GPO BCA 20-90 (February 6, 1991), Sl. Op. at 9, n. 9; Stephenson, Inc., GPO BCA 02-88 (December 20, 1991), Sl. op. at 18, n. 20. 26. The Respondent contends that a distinction was made during these early stages between the powers of boards of contract appeals, which held that they were without jurisdiction to grant relief for alleged breaches of contract, and the Adjustment Boards of agencies, which could entertain such claims. Res. R. Brf., pp. 2-3 (citing, Fiske-Carter Construction Company, 3 C.C.F. 415 (WDBCA 1945); Ardmore Construction Company, 3 C.C.F. 468 (WDBCA 1945)). 27. Technically, "suspension of work" clauses apply to construction contracts; the "Extension of schedules" clause in the Appellant's contract, 1988 Contract Terms, Contract Clauses, ¶12.(c)(1), is the equivalent of the "Government delay of work" clause used in supply contracts. See, John Cibinic, Jr. & Ralph C. Nash, Jr., Administration of Government Contracts 2d ed., (The George Washington University, 1986), pp. 948-52 (hereinafter Cibinic and Nash). While it was unnecessary to brief the issue of the appropriate remedy in this case, see note 15 supra, the Respondent has pressed its contention that because the Appellant was granted an automatic extension under the "Extension of schedules" clause, it had received all the relief it was entitled to under the contract. Res. Brf., p. 2, n. 2.; Res. R. Brf., p. 4. See also, PCR, p. 7. 28. The record on which the Board's decision is based consists of: (1) the Pleadings (Appellant's Complaint; Respondent's Answer); (2) the R4 File (Tabs A-FF); (3) the Prehearing Conference Report; and (4) the briefs submitted by the parties pursuant to the Board's Briefing Order (the Appellant's Brief Regarding Jurisdiction, the Respondent's Brief on Jurisdiction, the Appellant's Reply Brief Regarding Jurisdiction, and the Respondent's Reply Brief On Jurisdiction). 29. A "pure" breach of contract claim is a claim not redressable under a specific contract provision. United States v. Utah Construction and Mining Company, supra, 384 U.S. at 404, n. 6; Blake Construction Company, Inc., GSBCA No. 2205, 67-1 BCA ¶ 6,311, at 29,198. It is clear that the Appellant's claim is predicated on a well-settled principle of public contract law which states that in every Government contract there is an implied affirmative obligation on the part of the Government that it will do whatever is necessary to enable the contractor to perform. See, Cibinic and Nash, note 27 supra, at pp. 221-22, 223-25. Under this doctrine, the Government will be held liable for breaching its implied duty to cooperate if it wrongfully fails or refuses to take some action, within its control, which is essential for the contractor to perform. Id., at p. 221. One way the Government can breach its implied duty is by unreasonably delaying giving approvals called for in the contract. See, e.g., Hoel-Steffen Construction Co. v. United States, 231 Ct. Cl. 128, 684 F.2d 843 (1982); The Kehm Corporation v. United States, 93 F.Supp. 620 (Ct.Cl. 1950). In cases involving Government delays the relevant inquiry is whether the delays constitute a breach of contract. United States V. Howard P. Foley Company, Inc., 329 U.S. 64, 65 (1946); The Kehm Corporation v. United States, supra, 93 F.Supp. at 624. Furthermore, as the Court of Claims made clear in The Kehm Corporation, in such circumstances, the fact that the contract includes a provision for extension of time to perform does not exclude the possibility that recovery may also be had in the form of damages for breach of contract. Id., at 624-25. 30. In a recent decision, Stephenson, Inc., note 25 supra, a case stemming from a contracting officer's partial termination of the appellant's contract for default based on the timely delivery of nonconforming books, the Board was asked to consider, among the other defenses offered by the breaching contractor, whether GPO's conduct during the period between receipt of the books and the date of termination amounted to a breach of the Government's implied duty to cooperate with the appellant to complete performance under the contract. Stephenson, Inc., supra, Sl. Op. at 38. The Board found, on the facts, that no breach had occurred in that case and rejected the appellant's defense. Stephenson, Inc., supra, Sl. Op. at 46-47. That decision is clearly distinguishable from this appeal because it was not a "pure" breach claim; rather, the appellant, as the breaching party, was alleging "breaching" conduct on the part of the Government as a defense against the consequences of its own default; i.e., no money damages were being sought by the contractor. Accord, Spectrum Leasing Corporation, GSBCA Nos. 7347, 7379, 7425-27, 90-3 BCA ¶ 22,984; Ballenger Corporation, DOTCAB No. 74-32, 84-1 BCA ¶ 16,973, mod. on other grounds, 84-2 BCA ¶ 17,277. Therefore, the focus of the Board's analysis in this case must necessarily be on whether or not it has the authority to award damages or are its remedial powers limited by the contract itself? 31. 1988 Contract Terms, Contract Clauses, ¶ 5.(e), paraphrases the requirements of the Wunderlich Act, 41 U.S.C. §§321, 322, which provides, in part: "No Government contract shall contain a provision making final on a question of law the decision of any administrative official, representative, or board." 41 U.S.C. § 322. See also, GPO Contract Terms No. 1, GPO Publication 310.2 (Rev. October 1980), ¶ 2-3.(b) (1980 Contract Terms). 32. The Board's opinions in these cases were rendered under the "Disputes" clause in 1980 Contract Terms. 1980 Contract Terms, Contract Clauses, ¶ 2-3. Prior to 1984, that clause provided: "(a) Except as otherwise provided in the contract, any dispute concerning a question of fact related to the contract which is not disposed of by agreement shall be decided by the Contracting Officer, who shall make his/her decision in writing and mail or otherwise furnish a copy thereof to the contractor. The decision of the Contracting Officer shall be final and conclusive unless, within 90 days from the date of receipt of such copy, the contractor mails or otherwise furnishes to the Contracting Officer a written appeal addressed to the Public Printer. The decision of the Public Printer, or a duly authorized representative for the determination of such appeals, shall be final and conclusive unless determined by a court of competent jurisdiction to have been fraudulent, or capricious, or arbitrary, or so grossly erroneous as necessarily to imply bad faith, or not supported by substantial evidence. In connection with any appeal under this article, the contractor shall be afforded an opportunity to be heard and to offer evidence in support of his/her appeal. Pending final decision of a dispute hereunder, the contractor shall proceed diligently with the performance of the contract and in accordance with the Contracting Officer's decision. (b) This "Disputes" article does not preclude consideration of law questions in connection with decisions provided for in the paragraph above: Provided, That nothing in the contract shall be construed as making final the decision of any administrative official, representative, or board on a question of law." However, when the Board was created 1980 Contract Terms, ¶ 2-3 was amended to substitute the Board for the Public Printer as the appellate authority for contract disputes. See, Memorandum from the Acting Public Printer to Assistant Public Printer (Procurement), ATTN: A & R Staff, dated September 10, 1984. The phrase "arising under or" was added to the "Disputes" clause in the 1988 revisions to GPO Contract Terms. 33. On its face, the 1988 revision to the "Disputes" clause harmonizes GPO Contract Terms with FAR § 52.233-1(b). Such a change-namely, reinserting the more restrictive "arising under" language back into the clause-had been suggested by the Office of General Counsel (OGC) in 1984 in conjunction with the transfer of responsibility for the settlement of disputed contracts and claims to the Board. See, Memorandum from Attorney-Advisor to Walter [Walter C. DeVaughn, the first C/AJ], Subject: Disputes Clause, dated August 13, 1984, ¶ 2. However, the proposed revision was not adopted at the time; the only alteration made to the "Disputes" clause was to delete references to the Public Printer and replace them with the Board, where appropriate. Id., ¶ 1. See, note 32 supra, Memorandum from the Acting Public Printer to Assistant Public Printer (Procurement), ATTN: A & R Staff, dated September 10, 1984. The words "arising under" finally reappeared in the clause with the changes made in 1988 when a complete revision of GPO Contract Terms was undertaken by the aforementioned Procurement A & R (Analysis and Review) Staff. The Board assumes that the OGC put its imprimatur on the new language because it would have been a clearing office under the system followed at the time by GPO when agency regulations were being updated and revised. GPO Instruction 001.1, Subject: GPO Directives System, dated June 10, 1987, ¶ 8.b. 34. See note 19 supra. In Champaign-Urbana News Agency, Inc., after reviewing the unique relationship between the NAFs and the Military Departments, the court refused to find a waiver of sovereign immunity by the Government with respect to making the NAFs subject to the anti-trust provisions of the Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 13(a),(c). Champaign-Urbana News Agency, Inc. v. J. L. Cummins News Company, Inc., supra, 632 F.2d at 692. 35. Congress' concern for the "separation of powers" doctrine can be somewhat flexible. See, Wehran Engineering Corporation, GSBCA No. 6055-NAFC, 84-3 BCA ¶ 17,614 (where a legislative branch entity, the National Alcohol Fuels Commission (NAFC), entered into an agreement with the GSBCA to resolve NAFC contract disputes). Indeed, for certain types of procurements-those relating to the purchase, lease and maintenance of Automated Data Processing (ADP) equipment- Congress has included GPO within the definition of "Federal agency" for coverage under the so-called "Brooks Act." Federal Property and Administrative Services Act of 1949, §111(a)(1), 40 U.S.C. § 759(a)(1), as amended by the Act of October 30, 1986, § 101 et seq., 100 Stat. 3341, 334-342 (amending sec. 822). See, United States v. International Business Machines Corporation, 892 F.2d 1006, 1007-08 (Fed. Cir. 1989). Furthermore, GPO was included under the coverage of the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. 95-454 (October 13, 1978), 92 Stat. 1191, and appears, for example, before the Federal Labor Relations Authority for the resolution of its labor-management disputes. 5 U.S.C. §§7103(a)(3). See, Joint Council of Unions, GPO and U.S. Government Printing Office, Case No. 0-NG-397, 10 FLRA 448 (1982).