BOARD OF CONTRACT APPEALS U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE WASHINGTON, DC 20401 In the Matter of ) ) the Appeal of ) ) NEWS PRINTING COMPANY, INC. ) Docket No. GPOBCA 13-94 Program 1216-S ) Print Orders 80003, 80004, ) 80005, and 80006 ) For the Appellant: News Printing Company, Inc., Claysburg, Pennsylvania, by Frederic G. Antoun, Jr., Attorney at Law, Chambersburg, Pennsylvania. For the Respondent: Roy E. Potter, Esq., Assistant General Counsel, U.S. Government Printing Office. Before BERGER, Ad Hoc Chairman. DECISION AND ORDER News Printing Company, Inc. (Appellant), P.O. Box 373, Claysburg, Pennsylvania 16625, timely appealed the March 11, 1994, final decision of Contracting Officer James T. Reingruber of the U.S. Government Printing Office (Respondent or GPO), denying the Appellant's request to be compensated in the amount of $12,863.23 for expenses incurred in redrilling holes, at the Respondent's direction, in copies of the Index of Specifications and Standards (DODISS) and Associated Publications which it produced pursuant to Print Orders 80003, 80004, 80005, and 8006, Program 1216-S, Purchase Order B6196. For the reasons which follow, the Contracting Officer's decision is REVERSED and the appeal is GRANTED. I. BACKGROUND 1. On or about May 12, 1993, the Appellant was awarded a requirements contract for Program 1216-S. The contract, for the period of June 1, 1993 through May 31, 1994, provided in the "Ordering" clause of the General Terms and Conditions section that the items to be furnished under the contract would be ordered through the issuance of print orders and that all print orders issued thereunder were "subject to the terms and conditions of this contract." The clause also provided that "[t] his contract shall control in the event of conflict with any print order." Rule 4 File, Tab B.1 In the "Drilling" provision of the Specifications section, the contract stated the following: "Drill 3-3/8" diameter holes centered on the 11" side, 4-1/4" center to center." 2. On they issued June 22, 1993, Print Orders 80000, 80001, and 80002 were issued to the Appellant. On August 18, 1993, Print Orders 80003, 80004, 80005, and 80006 were issued. Unlike the print orders issued in June, which set forth a 4-1/4" center to center drilling requirement, the latter four print orders specified a 4-1/2" center to center distance. This was later determined to be the result of an error in typing. Rule 4 File, Tab P; Report of Prehearing Conference. 3. The Appellant produced the publications in accordance with the print orders. The requiring agency (the Navy) considered the publications produced under Print Orders 80003, 80004, 80005, and 80006 to be unusable because the holes were drilled 4-1/2" center to center instead of 4-1/4" center to center. Rule 4 File, Tab J. The Respondent subsequently directed the Appellant to pick up the publications, correct the problem by drilling holes 4-1/4" center to center as required by the contract specifications, and to redeliver the corrected publications. Rule 4 File, Tab K. 4. The Appellant followed the Respondent's instructions, but advised the Respondent that because it had adhered to the requirements of the print orders it did not consider itself to be at fault and that it would be making a claim "for compensation for the additional freight and labor involved in this additional work." Rule 4 File, Tab L. Thereafter, the Appellant requested additional compensation in the amount of $12,648.37, Rule 4 File, Tab M, later revised to $12,863.23. Rule 4 File, Tab O. The Contracting Officer denied the request on the basis that the contract and its specifications were controlling over the print orders and that the discrepancy between the contract and the print orders was "so blatant that it should have prompted an immediate query to the [Respondent] for clarification." Rule 4 File, Tab P. This appeal followed. II. DISCUSSION This appeal involves the very straightforward issue of what should happen when a print order issued by the Respondent to a contractor under one of the Respondent's requirements contracts is inconsistent with the specification provisions of that contract. The Respondent asserts that when, as here, there is a patent ambiguity between the two, the contractor has a duty to seek clarification from the Respondent and, if it fails to do so, must bear the consequences if it resolves the ambiguity incorrectly. Respondent's Brief.2 The Appellant asserts that there was no patent ambiguity because, under its interpretation of the contract as well as its experience with the Respondent, it could not ignore, and had no reason to question, the print orders as issued. Appellant's Brief. In this regard, the Appellant argues the following: (1) since no work under the contract may be initiated without a print order and since the contract, in the "Assignment of Jackets, Purchase and Print Orders" provision of the General Terms and Conditions section, provides that the print order "will indicate the quantity to be produced and any other information pertinent to the particular order," it "should be able to . . . rely" on the print order for "specific guidance and information as to how to produce a particular order under the contract"; (2) the language in the "ordering" clause that states the contract shall control over a print order applies with respect to contract terms and conditions but not to contract specifications; and (3) in prior dealings with the Respondent the Appellant was told "to follow the print order." The Appellant concludes that under the circumstances it was justified in viewing the four print orders as written change orders to the contract. Complaint; Appellant's Reply Brief. GPO relies on print orders to obtain printing and binding services from contractors who have been awarded term contracts. Printing Procurement Regulation, GPO Pub. 305.3 (Rev. 10-90) (hereafter PPR), Chap. XII, Sec.1, ¶ 5; GPO Form 2511, "Print Order", PPR, Chap. XVI. The term contracts contain specifications which set forth mandatory requirements applicable to the printed products to be furnished. GPO's regulations provide that the print orders, for ordering "[i]tems to be furnished under this contract," Rule 4 File, Tab B, are to "include" information concerning ink color, number of pages for cover and text, kind of paper, number and size of foldins, method of binding, trim size,3 total copies, and quantity breakdown for various delivery destinations, PPR Chap. XII, Sec. 1, ¶ 5.a.(1); the print order form also contains a section for hole drilling requirements. In some instances the contract and print orders will overlap, with both specifying particular requirements. (In this case, for example, both documents specify the trim size and the ink color as well as the hole drilling requirements.) In other cases, the contract specifications will refer the contractor to the print order or impose a requirement that can be "waived" by the print order. See RD Printing Assocs., Inc., GPOBCA 02-92 (December 16, 1992), slip op. at 3, 1992 WL 516088 ("Margins will be as indicated on the print order . . . . Blank apron of 8-1/2 x 11" required on bind side of all foldouts unless waived in the print order."). Either way, it is the original contract document and the print order that together constitute the enforceable contract between GPO and the contractor. See Reprographex, Inc., GPOBCA 14-86 (July 7, 1987), slip op., 1987 WL 228971; PPR, Chap. I, Sec. 1, ¶ 2 (definition of "contract"). In this case it is undisputed that Print Orders 80003, 80004, 80005, and 80006 contain a hole drilling requirement that is different from the hole drilling requirement in the original contract specifications. It is also undisputed that the Appellant was aware of this difference prior to entering into performance in response to those print orders. Complaint; Report of Prehearing Conference. Where specifications or other contract terms are inconsistent on their face, a patent ambiguity arises. Newsom v. United States, 676 F.2d 647 (Ct. Cl. 1982) (. . . a patent ambiguity existed. Two parts of the contract said very different things."); Assurance Co., ASBCA 25254, 83-2 BCA ¶ 16,908; MPE Business Forms, Inc., GPOBCA 10-95 (August 16, 1996), slip op. at 44, 1996 WL 812877. The existence of this patent ambiguity creates a duty to on the part of the contractor to seek clarification. Dalton v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 98 F.3d 1298 (Fed. Cir. 1996); S.O.G. of Ark. v. United States, 546 F.2d 367 (Ct. Cl. 1976); Renfrow v. United States, 38 Fed. Cl. 435 (1997); Fry Comms., Inc./InfoConversion Joint Venture v. United States, 22 Cl. Ct. 497 (1991); MPE Business Forms, Inc., supra. While in the typical case this duty will arise in the preaward environment as a result of ambiguity in the solicitation, see, e.g., Grumman Data Sys. Corp. v. Dalton, 88 F.3d 990 (Fed. Cir. 1996), the underlying rationale for the patent ambiguity rule-avoiding later disputes and expensive litigation by clarifying ambiguous language before the parties are locked in, S.O.G. of Ark. v. United States, supra; Int'l Transducer Corp. v. United States, 30 Fed. Cl. 522 (1994)-is equally applicable when the issuance of orders under term/requirements contracts first gives rise to the ambiguity. See Goal Chemical Sealants Corp., GSBCA 8626 (unpub.), 1988 WL 71816 (the agency erroneously issued a delivery order that was inconsistent with the contract specifications, the contractor followed the delivery order, the agency rejected the delivered supplies and ultimately defaulted the contractor, and the default was upheld because the contractor did not meet its duty to inquire in the face of the patent ambiguity) and C-Mor Co., ASBCA 30479, 87-2 BCA ¶ 19,682 (delivery order specifications were different from the contract specifications, the contractor followed the contract specifications, the agency rejected the delivery and terminated for default, and the default was upheld because upon receipt of the delivery order the contractor "should have . . . resolved the matter with [the] Army."). In other words, where a term contractor is aware of an ambiguity between its basic contract and a print order issued under that contract, the same duty to inquire is present because it is only through such inquiry, a "device of preventive hygiene," S.O.G. of Ark. v. United States, supra, that disputes such as this one can be avoided. If the contractor fails in its duty to inquire, it bears the risk of misinterpreting the Government's actual requirements. MWK Int'l, Ltd. v. United States, 2 Cl. Ct. 206 (1983). The Appellant asserts that it had no duty to inquire because it was aware of no patent ambiguity. It bases this assertion on its position that under the circumstances it was entitled to view the print orders as written change orders. If these print orders did constitute change orders, of course, the Appellant would be correct as there would have been no ambiguity at all concerning the hole punching requirement-the contract would have been modified to require 4-1/2" center to center drilling. The "Changes" clause, incorporated in the contract by reference, allows the Contracting Officer to make unilateral changes, within the general scope of the contract, to drawings, designs, and specifications. GPO Contract Terms, Solicitation Provisions, Supplemental Specificatioons, and Contract Clauses, GPO Pub. 310.2, effective December 1, 1987 (Rev. 9-88), Contract Clauses, ¶ 4. As the Board has previously pointed out, while a formal change order issued pursuant to the "Changes" clause need not be on the specific form (Form 913) identified for that purpose in GPO's regulations, see PPR, Chap. XII, Sec. 2, ¶ 2.b., it must: (a) be directed to the contractor by the person with contracting authority; (b) be in writing; (c) be within the general scope of the contract and concern the specifications or other matters encompassed by the clause; (d) provide for an equitable adjustment in case costs are increased by the change; and (e) inform the contractor that it must submit any equitable adjustment proposal within 30 days from receipt of the order. GraphicData, Inc., GPOBCA 35-94 (June 14, 1996), slip op. at 99-102, 1996 WL 837426. The print orders clearly do not provide for an equitable adjustment or inform the contractor of any adjustment submittal requirement. More importantly, the record does not establish that the print orders were signed by a contracting officer. (The Respondent's regulations make it absolutely clear that formal change orders may be issued only by the Contracting Officer. See PPR, Chap.XII, Sec. 2 [change orders "require the signature of the contracting officer only." PPR, Chap. XII, Sec. 2, ¶ 1.c.(2)]). Two contracting officers are identified in this record: Annamarie T. Mierson, who awarded the original contract to the Appellant, Rule 4 File, Tabs F and G, and James T. Reingruber, who issued the Contracting Officer's final decision in this matter, Rule 4 File, Tab P, and who described himself as having been the Contracting Officer on Program 1216-S. Reingruber Declaration. The print orders were not signed by either of these individuals-they were signed by Joan Ridgway. While Ms. Ridgway is not further identified in the record, the Respondent's regulations make clear that the signature on print orders normally will not be that of the contracting officer, but of an individual from the requiring agency authorized to sign print orders. PPR, Chap. XII, Sec. 1., ¶ 5.a.(1)(vii). Accordingly, on this record the Board cannot consider the print orders to be formal change orders. Compare GraphicData, Inc., supra, where the Board found all the necessary elements of a formal change order to be present. The Board does find, however, that the issuance of the print orders constituted a constructive change. "A constructive change occurs when the contract work is actually changed but the procedures of the 'Changes' clause have not been followed." John Cibinic, Jr. and Ralph C. Nash, Jr., Administration of Government Contracts 429 (Third ed. 1995) (hereafter Cibinic & Nash, Administration). Since the Government may be bound only by the actions of its officers acting within the scope of their authority, Federal Crop Ins. Corp. v. Merrill, 332 U.S. 380 (1947); Wilber Nat'l Bank v. United States, 294, U.S. 120 (1935), the act or acts asserted to be a constructive change to a contract must be those of someone with authority to make a change to the contract. That someone, of course, is the contracting officer. Thus, for a constructive change to be recognized, the basis for it must be some action by either the contracting officer or someone authorized to act on his/her behalf, DOT Sys., Inc., DOTCAB 1208, 82-2 BCA ¶ 15,817; Inez Kaiser & Assocs., Inc., ASBCA 22212, 88-2 BCA ¶ 20,732, or a ratification by the contracting officer or other authorized official of some other official's unauthorized act. Reliable Disposal Co., Inc., ASBCA 40100, 91-2 BCA ¶ 23,895. As discussed, the print orders were not issued by the Contracting Officer, and there is no suggestion in the record of a ratification. Accordingly, the issuance of the print orders can be a constructive change only if they were issued by someone who had express or implied authority to change the contract. According to the Respondent's regulations, print orders, when received from customer agencies, are reviewed by a GPO "printing specialist and/or the procurement assistant (program operator) to determine that the work is within the scope of the contract and that the print order is properly filled out . . . ." PPR, Chap. XII, Sec.1, ¶ 5.a.(1). When it is determined that those requirements, including one for an authorized signature (with authorization for the signature "on file" with the Respondent's Central and Regional Offices), id., have been met, "the order may be placed." PPR, Chap. XII, Sec. 1, ¶ 5.a.(2). It is clear from other references in the regulation that the order is to be placed by the program operator. Thus, under the Respondent's regulatory scheme for print order processing for the type of contract involved here, the print orders will be signed by someone from the customer agency and, after review, placed with the contractor by a GPO program operator. A program operator is defined as "a printing specialist or procurement assistant assigned responsibility for processing and administering orders under a term contract." PPR, Chap. 1, Sec. 2. While "processing and administering orders" by itself falls far short of an express grant of authority to make changes to the contract, the role and function of the program operator in GPO's contractual scheme, along with GPO's regulations concerning print orders, are sufficient, in the Board's view, to establish implied authority in the program operator to make changes to the contract. Despite the language in the "Changes" clause empowering only the contracting officer to issue change orders, Government employees other than the contracting officer, such as the contracting officer's technical representatives, inspectors, and project managers, have been held to have implied authority to act for the contracting officer and bind the Government to constructive changes. See Cibinic & Nash, Administration at 44-47, 441-2. The authority generally has been implied when "considered to be an integral part of the duties assigned" to the employee. Cibinic & Nash, Administration at 45, citing H. Landau & Co v. United States, 886 F.2d 322 (Fed. Cir. 1989), and DOT Sys. Inc., supra. For example, one of the predecessor panels to this Board4 held that certain employees of the requisitioning agency who acted as inspectors for GPO had implied authority to act for the contracting officer on technical matters and that their instructions to the contractor resulted in a constructive change. Pikes Peak Lithographing Co., GPOCAB 77-7 (October 6, 1978), slip op. On the other hand, this Board held that a GPO press sheet inspector had no implied authority "with respect to acceptance of the paper." Graphic Litho, GPOBCA 21-84 (February 4, 1985) slip op. at 20-21, 1985 WL 154850. In so holding, the Board relied on "a careful reading of the contract" to conclude that the inspector's job was simply to make a visual inspection which fell considerably short of what the Respondent was entitled to do to determine compliance with the specifications prior to acceptance. Id. at 20. Thus, what is ultimately dispositive here is whether the authority to bind the Government is an integral part of the duties assigned to the program operator. The term contract awarded here tells the contractor that it is to do no work except that called for by print orders issued "by the Government" for "[i]tems to be furnished under this contract." That is, the contract, the document signed by the contracting officer, establishes the print orders as the contractual documents to which the contractor is to look for its specific production and delivery requirements. In other words, it is the print orders that give rise to specific contractual performance obligations and therefore, as recognized in the PPR definition of "contract," are themselves, in that sense, contracts. Under the PPR the GPO program operator is charged with administering and processing print orders, including, for this contract, placing them with the contractor. Thus, it is clear that once a GPO term contract (other than a "direct-deal" contract, which is discussed below) has been awarded, the contracting officer's authority to order specific tasks of the contractor and to bind the Government to pay for that effort has been delegated to the program operator and it is from that official that the contractor receives its binding orders to perform. Since the print orders are the mechanism through which the Respondent deals with the contractor when imposing specific production obligations on the contractor and it is through the program operator that the print orders are issued,5 the program operator necessarily has the implied authority to specify what those obligations will be. See D.W.S., Inc., ASBCA 29743, 93-1 BCA ¶ 25,404. The Respondent, of course, could place express limitations on the program operator's authority, and indeed it has done so. Those limitations, however, which are set forth in the PPR, are themselves limited. First, the program operator is to determine that the print orders are within the scope of the contract, PPR, Chap. XII, Sec. 1, ¶ 5.a.(1), and that the delivery schedule complies with the contract schedule. Id. at ¶ 5.a.(1)(ii). Second, if the order submitted by the customer agency contains an item not included in the contract schedule of prices, the program operator is to obtain a price for the item from the contractor and if that price is determined to be fair and reasonable, the contracting officer is to modify the contract and the program operator is to then place the order. PPR, Chap. XII, Sec.1, ¶ 5.a.(3). Thus, under the PPR the program operator may not issue a print order unless it is within the scope of the contract and consistent with the delivery schedule of the underlying contract, and may not include in the print order an item not priced in the original contract without first obtaining contracting officer approval and contract modification. Nothing in the PPR calls for the program operator to ensure that the print orders, with the exception of the delivery schedule, adhere precisely to the various contract specifications. By singling out only the delivery schedule from the contract specifications as having to be unchanged from the contract and identifying only the inclusion of an unpriced item as requiring contracting officer approval and contract modification, the PPR, under recognized principles of both statutory and contract interpretation, may be reasonably read as impliedly authorizing the program operator to issue print orders that do contain changes to the original contract specifications exclusive of those pertaining to the delivery schedule. See, e.g., Supermex, Inc. v. United States, 35 Fed. Cl. 29 (1996) (interpret so as to give effect to every word and clause and not render any provision meaningless or superfluous); Henry J. Korpi, ASBCA 6948, 61-1 BCA ¶ 3,030 (failure to list an item when specifically referencing other items "would lead reasonably intelligent persons to conclude" that the unlisted item was not meant to be included). The Board notes that the Respondent, when it wants to place express limits on the authority of those issuing print orders, has no difficulty in so doing. Certain term contracts awarded by the Respondent are "direct-deal" contracts, under which print orders are issued to the contractor directly by the customer agency. PPR, Chap. XII, Sec. 1, ¶¶ 1 and 2; see Swanson Printing Co., GPOBCA 27-94 and 27-94A (November 18, 1996), slip op. at 4, n.9. When "direct-deal" contracts are awarded, the Respondent explicitly informs the contractor in the award notification letter that while direct contact with the customer agency is authorized "for transmitting print orders," the "[r] epresentatives of the ordering agency do not have authority to alter or change the specifications, contract terms, or the print orders, once issued." Swanson Printing Co., supra, at 34; see United Computer Supplies, Joint Venture, supra, at 3 and GPO Agency Procedural Handbook, GPO Pub. 305.1, dated March 1987, Sec. IV, ¶ 2 (an agency's direct-deal authority "extends only to the placement of print orders and to the transmission of copy and proofs. . . . All other authority rests with GPO's Contracting Officers.") Thus, the contractor is explicitly placed on notice from the outset that the individual issuing the print orders is without authority to change the specifications and contract terms. In contrast, the award notification in this case advised the contractor that print orders would be transmitted by GPO, that direct contact with the customer agency was not authorized, that representatives of the ordering agency had no authority to change the specifications, and that changes requested by other than GPO "are without authority and shall have no force or effect unless confirmed in writing" by GPO. Rule 4 File, Tab G. There is absolutely nothing in this letter that would alert the contractor to any limitation on the authority of the GPO official who would be issuing print orders. Accordingly, the Board concludes that GPO's program operator had implied authority to change the contract specifications so long as the change did not involve the delivery schedule and was within the scope of the contract. The Board further concludes that the issuance of Print Orders 80003, 80004, 80005, and 80006 with the 4-1/2" center to center distance hole drilling requirement properly could be viewed by the Appellant as a constructive change to the contract since the two elements of a constructive change-a "change" and an "order," see Cibinic & Nash, Administration at 431-are inherent in the print orders.6 That being so, the Appellant did not proceed improperly when it performed in accordance with those print orders. Consequently, the Respondent's direction to the Appellant to retrieve the publications it had furnished under the print orders and to correct them in accordance with the original contract specification was tantamount to another constructive change, see Custom Printing Co., GPOBCA 28-94 (March 12, 1997), slip op. at 67, 1997 WL 742505, entitling the Appellant to an equitable adjustment to compensate it for the extra work it was directed to perform. While the Appellant has requested $12,863.23, broken down by print order and by freight costs and labor, the Appellant has not met its burden to establish its entitlement to that amount as it has furnished no supporting documentation. Thus, the Board is unable to determine the reasonableness of either the total amount claimed or the amounts claimed under each print order. In Custom Printing Co., supra, the Board denied a claim for the costs incurred in performing certain extra work because no evidence was offered to support the claim. However, in another case where the contractor also failed to provide evidentiary support for the amount of its claim, the Board determined an equitable adjustment amount after noting the "undisputed fact" that the Respondent had ordered the contractor to do extra work and that it was "inescapable that the contract changes ordered . . . had some cost impact." Universal Printing Co., GPOBCA 09-90 (June 22, 1994), slip op. at 49, 1994 WL 377586. In that case, both the contractor and the Respondent had staked out positions as to the monetary amount to which the contractor was entitled, and the Board was able to utilize a jury verdict approach to resolve the matter. Here, it is also inescapable that the extra work ordered by the Respondent had a cost impact, but there is no indication in the record that the Respondent has ever determined an amount to which the Appellant would be entitled. The record contains only a statement from the Contracting Officer, which pre-dates his final decision on this matter, that he had not determined the reasonablenesss of the amount claimed. Under the circumstances, the matter is remanded to the Contracting Officer for a determination of a fair and reasonable equitable adjustment amount. III. ORDER The Contracting Officer's final decision is REVERSED, the appeal is SUSTAINED, and the matter is REMANDED to the Contracting Officer. It is so Ordered. February 20, 1998 Ronald Berger Ad Hoc Chairman GPO Board of Contract Appeals _______________ 1 The Contracting Officer's appeal file, assembled pursuant to Rule 4 of the Board's Rules of Practice and Procedure, was delivered to the Board on May 4, 1994. It will be referred to as the Rule 4 File, with an appropriate Tab letter also indicated. The Rule 4 File consists of 16 tabs identified as Tab A through Tab P. 2 The parties agreed that a hearing was not required in this case. Report of Prehearing Conference dated December 23, 1994. The decision is based on the Rule 4 File and the briefs (Appellant's Brief, Respondent's Brief with accompanying declaration from Contracting Officer James T. Reingruber (hereafter Reingruber Declaration), and Appellant's Reply Brief) submitted by the parties. 3 For a discussion of "trim size," see United Computer Supplies, Joint Venture, GPOBCA 26-94 (January 23, 1998), slip op. at 11-14, 1998 WL ______. 4 Prior to the creation of this Board in 1984, ad hoc panels heard and decided disputes between GPO and its contractors. The Board cites the decisions of these ad hoc panels as GPOCAB. See Rose Printing, Inc., GPOBCA 32-95 (December 16, 1996), slip op. at 27, n.28, 1996 WL 812880. 5 While the Respondent's regulations refer to the order being "placed," PPR, Chap. XII, Sec. 1, ¶ 5.a.(2), the "Ordering" clause of the contract states that items shall be ordered "by the issuance of print orders," which is defined in that clause as depositing in the mail or otherwise furnishing to the contractor. See Rule 4 File, Tab B. 6 The Board recognizes that the change made by the print orders was an unusual one. As the Contracting Officer states, "[t]he standard for 3-hole drilling when drilling a 8-1/2 x 11 book or paper is 4-1/4 inches center to center." Reingruber Declaration. While the Appellant asserts that it is not uncommon for GPO to require 4-1/2 inch center to center drilling, the specifications Appellant furnishes in support of its assertion are less than convincing on this point as they do not appear to involve 8-1/2" x 11" products. Nonetheless, the Board does not consider the unusual aspect of the 4-1/2" drilling requirement as imposing some duty of inquiry on the Appellant that had to be satisfied before it could view the print orders as changing the specifications since: (1) the 4-1/2" requirement was set forth in four different print orders; (2) the print orders, unlike the prior print orders issued to the Appellant under this contract, were for the basic Index rather than for a supplement to the Index; (3) 4-1/2" drilling requirements are not unknown to both the Appellant and the Respondent: and (4) the Respondent's position that a 4-1/2" center to center drilling requirement for the paper size specified here is not "standard" and is a "deviation from the widely used standard," Resp. Brief, stops well short of establishing that such a requirement has not been or could not be reasonably imposed.