BOARD OF CONTRACT APPEALS
   U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
   WASHINGTON, DC  20401

In the Matter of               )
                               )
the Appeal of                  )
                               )
NEW SOUTH PRESS & ASSOC., INC. )   Docket No. GPO BCA 14-92
Program D278-S                 )
Purchase Order 90483           )
Print Order 40000              )


   DECISION AND ORDER

   I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE

   This appeal, timely filed by New South Press (Appellant or
   Contractor), 3885 North Palafox Street, Pensacola, Florida
   32505, is from the final decision of Contracting Officer
   Richard Weiss, of the U.S. Government Printing Office's
   (Respondent or GPO or Government) Printing Procurement
   Department, Washington, DC 20401, dated January 8, 1992,
   rejecting two settlement claims submitted by the Contractor
   totaling $29,367.49, after the convenience termination of its
   contract identified as Program D278-S, Purchase Order 90483,
   Print Order 40000, and allowing only total charges of
   $2,749.28 (R4 File, Tabs M, N and T).1  An evidentiary hearing
   in the appeal was conducted by the Board on March 1, 1994, at
   which both parties were represented by counsel, who,
   thereafter, filed timely briefs on the issues involved.2
   Board Rules, Rules 17 through 24, 26 and 27.  Based on the
   record in this case, the Contracting Officer's decision
   disposing of the Appellant's termination claims is MODIFIED,
   and the matter is REMANDED to the Contracting Officer for
   further action in accordance with this opinion.

   II. BACKGROUND
   A. The Termination Action
   1.   This dispute arises from a single-award "requirements"
   contract for the production and distribution of the Department
   of Health and Human Services, National Institutes of Health
   (NIH or customer-agency), Telephone and Service Directories
   (hereinafter referred as Directory (singular) or Directories
   (plural)), for a term beginning October 1, 1990 and ending
   September 30, 1991 (R4 File, Tab A, pp. 1, 5).3  As
   structured, the contract was a "direct-deal" arrangement under
   which the NIH would issue the print orders (R4 File, Tab A, p.
   5).  See Printing Procurement Regulation, GPO Publication
   305.3 (Rev. 10-90), Chap. XII, Sec. 1,  2 (hereinafter PPR).
   2.   Among other things, the specifications stated that the
   contract would be governed by the applicable articles of GPO
   Contract Terms, Solicitation Provisions, Supplemental
   Specifications, and Contract Clauses, GPO Publication 310.2,
   Effective December 1, 987 (Rev. 9-88) (hereinafter GPO
   Contract Terms) (R4 File, Tab A, p. 2).  Insofar as is
   relevant to this case, GPO Contract Terms contains a
   "Termination for Convenience" clause which provides, in
   pertinent part:
      (a)   The Government may terminate performance of work in
      whole or in part if the Contracting Officer determines that
      a termination is in the Government's interest.  The
      Contracting Officer shall terminate by delivering to the
      contractor a Notice of Termination specifying the extent of
      termination and the effective date.

   * * * * * * * * * *

      (c)   After termination, the contractor shall submit a
      final termination settlement proposal promptly, but no
      later than 3 months from the effective date of termination,
      unless extended in writing by the Contracting Officer upon
      written request of the contractor within this 3-month
      period. . . .

       (d) Subject to paragraph (c) above, the contractor and the
       Contracting Officer may agree upon the whole or any part
       of the amount to be paid because of the termination.  The
       amount may include a reasonable allowance for profit on
       work done.  However, the agreed amount, whether under this
       paragraph (d) or paragraph (e) below, exclusive of costs
       shown in subparagraph (e)(3) below, may not exceed the
       total contract price as reduced by (1) the amount of
       payments previously made, and (2) the contract price of
       work not terminated.  The contract shall be amended and
       the contractor paid the agreed amount.  Paragraph (e)
       below shall not limit, restrict, or affect the amount that
       may be agreed upon to be paid under this paragraph.

      (e)   If the contractor and the Contracting Officer fail to
      agree on the whole amount to be paid because of the
      termination of work, the Contracting Officer shall pay the
      contractor the amounts determined by the Contracting
      Officer as follows, but without duplication of any amounts
      agreed on under paragraph (d) above:

              (1) The contract price for completed supplies or
              services accepted by the Government . . . not
              previously paid for, adjusted for any savings of
              freight and other charges.

               (2) The total of-

               (i) The costs incurred in the performance of the
               work terminated, including initial costs and
               preparatory expenses allocable thereto, but
               excluding any costs attributable to supplies or
               services paid or to be paid under subparagraph (e)
               (1) above;

             (ii) The cost of settling and paying termination
             settlement proposals under terminated subcontracts
             that are properly chargeable to the terminated
             portion if not included in subdivision (i) above;
             and

           (iii) A sum, as profit on subdivision (i) above,
           determined by the Contracting Officer to be fair and
           reasonable; however, if it appears that the contractor
           would have sustained a loss on the entire work had it
           been completed, the contracting Officer shall allow no
           profit under this subdivision (iii) and shall reduce
           the settlement to reflect the indicated rate of loss.

   * * * * * * * * * *

      (g) The cost principles and procedures of article 45,
      Contract Clauses in effect on the date of this contract,
      shall govern all costs claimed, agreed to, or determined
      under this clause.4

      (h) The contractor shall have the right of appeal, under
      article 5 "Disputes" from any determination made by the
      Contracting Officer under paragraph (c), (e), or (j),
      except that if the contractor failed to submit the
      termination settlement proposal within the time provided in
      paragraph (c) or (j), and failed to request a time
      extension, there is no right of appeal.  If the Contracting
      Officer has made a determination of the amount due under
      paragraph (c), (e), or (j), the Government shall pay the
      contractor (1) the amount determined by the Contracting
      Officer if there is no right of appeal or if no timely
      appeal has been taken, or (2) the amount finally determined
      on an appeal.

   * * * * * * * * * *

      (k)(1) The Government may, under the terms and conditions
      it prescribes, make partial payments and payments against
      costs incurred by the contractor for the terminated
      portion, if the Contracting Officer believes the total of
      these payments will not exceed the amount to which the
      contractor will be entitled.

      (2) If the total payments exceed the amount finally
      determined to be due, the contractor shall repay the excess
      to the Government upon demand, together with interest
      computed at the rate established by the Secretary of the
      Treasury under 50 U.S.C. App. 1215(b)(2). . . .

See GPO Contract Terms, Contract Clauses,  19 (Termination for
the Convenience of the Government).  See also PPR, Chap. XIV,
Sec. 2,  1-3.q(4).  The Board has previously observed that the
above-quoted language is essentially a verbatim adoption of the
"long-form" clause in the Federal Acquisition Regulation
(hereinafter FAR), 41 C.F.R. 1.000 et seq. (1994), relating to
convenience terminations of fixed-price contracts.5  See R.C.
Swanson Printing and Typesetting Co., GPO BCA 15-90, Supplemental
Decision (July 1, 1993), slip op. at 18, 1993 WL 526638 (citing
FAR, 52.249-2) (hereinafter R.C. Swanson).
   3.   Because the "Termination for Convenience" clause
   incorporates by reference the "Contract Cost Principles and
   Procedures" clause of GPO Contract Terms, see GPO Contract
   Terms, Contract Clauses,  19(g), 45, the contract is also
   subject to relevant provisions of the GPO Cost Directive.6  In
   that regard, two such provisions of Section 3 of the GPO Cost
   Directive are particularly pertinent to this dispute-the
   instructions for idle facilities and idle capacity costs (
   25) and the directions relating to termination costs ( 49).
   Insofar as relevant here, the GPO Cost Directive provides:
      25.  Idle facilities and idle capacity costs.

            (a) "Costs of idle facilities or idle capacity," as
            used in this subsection, means costs such as
            maintenance, repair, housing, rent, and other related
            costs; e.g., property taxes, insurance, and
            depreciation.

            "Facilities," as used in this subsection, means plant
            or any portion thereof (including land integral to
            the operation), equipment, individually or
            collectively, or any other tangible capital asset,
            wherever located, and whether owned or leased by the
            contractor.

            "Idle capacity," as used in this subsection, means
            the unused capacity of partially used facilities.  It
            is the difference between that which a facility could
            achieve under 100 percent operating time on a one-
            shift basis, less operating interruptions resulting
            from time lost for repairs, setups, unsatisfactory
            materials, and other normal delays, and the extent to
            which the facility was actually used to meet demands
            during the accounting period.  A multiple-shift basis
            may be used in the calculation instead of a one-shift
            basis if it can be shown that this amount of usage
            could normally be expected for the type of facility
            involved.

            "Idle facilities," as used in this subsection, means
            completely unused facilities that are excess to the
            contractor's current needs.

            (b) The costs of idle facilities are unallowable
            unless the facilities-

                 (1) Are necessary to meet fluctuations in
                 workload; or

                 (2) Were necessary when acquired and are now
                 idle because of changes in requirements,
                 production economies, reorganization,
                 termination, or other causes which could not
                 have been reasonably foreseen.  (Costs of idle
                 facilities are allowable for a reasonable
                 period, ordinarily not to exceed 1 year,
                 depending upon the initiative taken to use,
                 lease, or dispose of the idle facilities (but
                 see 3.49)).


            (c) Costs of idle capacity are costs of doing
            business and are a factor in the normal fluctuations
            of usage or overhead rates from period to period.
            Such costs are allowable provided the capacity is
            necessary or was originally reasonable and is not
            subject to reduction or elimination by subletting,
            renting, or sale, in accordance with sound business,
            economics, or security practices.  Widespread idle
            capacity throughout an entire plant or among a group
            of assets having substantially the same function may
            be idle facilities.

            (d) Any costs to be paid directly by the Government
            for idle facilities or idle capacity reserved for
            defense mobilization production shall be the subject
            of a separate agreement.

   * * * * * * * * * *

      49. Termination costs.

            Contract terminations generally give rise to the
            incurrence of costs or the need for special treatment
            of costs that would not have arisen had the contract
            not been terminated.  The following cost principles
            peculiar to termination situations are to be used in
            conjunction with the other cost principles in this
            section:

            (a) Common items. The costs of items reasonably
            usable on the contractor's other work shall not be
            allowable unless the contractor submits evidence that
            the items could not be retained at cost without
            sustaining a loss.  The contracting officer should
            consider the contractor's plans and orders for
            current and planned production when determining if
            items can reasonably be used on other work of the
            contractor.  Contemporaneous purchases of common
            items by the contractor shall be regarded as evidence
            that such items are reasonably usable on the
            contractor's other work.  Any acceptance of common
            items as allocable to the terminated portion of the
            contract should be limited to the extent that the
            quantities of such items on hand, in transit, and on
            order are in excess of the reasonable quantitative
            requirements of other work.

            (b) Costs continuing after termination. Despite all
            reasonable efforts by the contractor, costs which
            cannot be discontinued immediately after the
            effective date of termination are generally
            allowable.  However, any costs continuing after the
            effective date of the termination due to the
            negligent or willful failure of the contractor to
            discontinue the costs shall be unallowable.


            (c)   Initial costs. Initial costs, including
            starting load and preparatory costs, are allowable as
            follows:


                  (1) Starting load costs not fully absorbed
                  because of termination are nonrecurring labor,
                  material, and related overhead costs incurred
                  in the early part of production and result from
                  factors such as-

                  (i)   Excessive spoilage due to inexperienced
                  labor;

                (ii) Idle time and subnormal production due to
                testing and changing production methods;

                 (iii) Training; and

                 (iv) Lack of familiarity or experience with the
                 product, materials, or manufacturing processes.

               (2) Preparatory costs incurred in preparing to
               perform the terminated contract include such costs
               as those incurred for initial plant rearrangement
               and alterations, management and personnel
               organization, and production planning.  They do
               not include special machinery and equipment and
               starting load costs. . . . .

            (d) Loss of useful value. Loss of useful value of
            special tooling, and special machinery and equipment
            is generally allowable, provided-

               (1) The special tooling, or special machinery and
               equipment is not reasonably capable of use in the
               other work of the contractor;

               (2) The Government's interest is protected by
               transfer of title or by other means deemed
               appropriate by the contracting officer; and

               (3) The loss of useful value for any one
               terminated contract is limited to that portion of
               the acquisition cost which bears the same ratio to
               the total acquisition cost as the terminated
               portion of the contract bears to the entire
               terminated contract and other Government contracts
               for which the special tooling, or special
               machinery and equipment was acquired.

   * * * * * * * * *

            (g) Settlement expenses. (1) Settlement expenses,
            including the following, are generally allowable:

               (i) Accounting, legal, clerical, an similar costs
               reasonably necessary for-
                      (A) The preparation and presentation,
                      including supporting data, of settlement
                      claims to the contracting officer; and

                          (B) The termination and settlement of
                          contracts.

                 (ii) Reasonable costs for the storage,
                 transportation, protection, and disposition of
                 property acquired or produced for the contract.

               (iii)   Indirect costs related to salary and wages
               incurred as settlement expenses in (i) and (ii);
               normally, such indirect costs shall be limited to
               payroll taxes, fringe benefits, occupancy costs,
               and immediate supervision costs.

   * * * * * * * * * *

See GPO Cost Directive, Sec. 3,  25(b),(c), 49.

   4.   The Appellant was awarded the contract on October 5,
   1990, at a price of $156,678.77 ($159,876.30 less a two (2)
   percent discount) (R4 File, Tabs C and D).7  Approximately
   three and one-half months later, on January 23, 1991, the NIH
   issued the first print order under the contract-Print Order
   40000-which the Contractor received the following day (Tr. 10,
   15, 77; R4 File, Tabs E and O).  The Print Order required the
   production of 19,000 copies of the Directory for shipment to
   the customer-agency by February 15, 1991 (Tr. 11; R4 File,
   Tabs E and O).8  The Government furnished material (GFM) to
   produce the books was given to the Contractor at the same time
   as the print order (Tr. 15).
   5.   The Appellant originally figured that Print Order 40000
   was worth $54,792,81, including a profit of $4,981.16 (R4
   File, Tab O, Cost Analysis).9  However, on receiving the print
   order the Contractor noticed that the contract specifications
   which had formed the basis for its bid contained an error
   which would have increased its production costs and the time
   required to perform the work.  See Report of Prehearing
   Telephone Conference, dated March 26, 1993, pp. 2-3
   (hereinafter RPTC-1); Complaint,  9.  Specifically, the
   contract's "Determination of Award" figures for Items III(a),
   (b), and (c) indicate that an estimated 16,188,000 leaves of
   text paper would be needed to complete all work under the
   contract (R4 File, Tab A, p. 10; Appellant's Complaint, dated
   June 17, 1992,  2 (hereinafter Complaint); Respondent's
   Answer, dated July 17, 1992,  2 (hereinafter Answer)).
   Furthermore, the contract provided that three (3) orders a
   year (Winter, Spring and Fall) could be expected, with each
   order consisting of approximately 3,017 copies of an Item 1
   book containing 252 pages, and approximately 16,000 copies of
   an Item 2 book containing 312 pages.  See Complaint,  3;
   Answer,  3.  Comparing the contract's figures for the
   anticipated orders with the "Determination of Award" numbers,
   the Appellant concluded that the latter were "vastly in excess
   of the requirements under the contract, being approximately
   double what the contract actually required."10  See Complaint,
    4.  Consequently, the Contractor estimated that its loss
   from this discrepancy would amount to approximately $20,000.00
   (roughly the difference between its expected price of
   $54,792,81 and the actual price of $33,253.09 for the first
   print order) (R4 File, Tab F, Attachment, Tab O, Cost
   Analysis; Complaint,  14, Exhibit A (Memorandum, dated
   January 25, 1991, from Gerald Goldstein, the Appellant's
   President, to the Contracting Officer)).11
   6.   On January 25, 1991, the Appellant telephoned the
   Respondent to discuss the problem.12  See RPTC-1, p. 3;
   Complaint, Exhibit A.  Later that same day, the Contractor
   sent the Contracting Officer a facsimile message which, inter
   alia, confirmed the understandings reached on the telephone,
   and stated, in pertinent part:
      . . . GPO authorizes New South Press to continue with Print
      Order 4000 [sic] and bill at the current price.  New South
      Press is then to submit a claim for the difference between
      the current amount and what would be a fair price for Print
      Order 4000 [sic].  GPO will send auditors to New South
      Press to determine a fair amount for Print Order 4000 [sic]
      considering our costs and a fair profit margin.

See R4 File, Tab O; Complaint, Exhibit A.13  Based on this
understanding, the Appellant continued the pre-press work on
Print Order 40000, and on January 28, 1991, sent the blueline
proofs to NIH (Tr. 22, 45).14
   7.   Thereafter, on January 28, 1991, the Appellant sent a
   follow up letter to the Respondent (Tr. 46; R4 File, Tab F).
   In its correspondence, the Contractor said, in pertinent part:
      . . . There exists and has been acknowledged in the
      determination of award, calculation of determination of
      award are vastly inflated with regard to the number of
      leaves needed to produce the contract.  The result of this
      over inflated figure and the actual production of what we
      received on [Print Order] 40000 amounts to approximately
      [a] $20,000.00 difference.

      A copy of our cost analysis to actually produce this book
      is being forwarded via fax as well as a copy of line item
      charges.  You can see there is a significant difference
      between these two prices.  In accordance with your
      instructions, this job has been put on hold pending the
      result of this information.

      Program 278-S[,] Print Order 40000 requires 1.4 million
      impressions; these hours cannot be filled with such short
      notice and would adversely affect the financial well being
      of New South Press and compensation must be considered if
      we are not to produce this job.  You are further notified
      that paper amounting to an excess of $18,000.00 would
      require no less than a 25% restocking fee or purchase from
      New South Press plus a reasonable profit. . . .

      The severity of this situation requires immediate attention
      as we expected to go to press no later than January 31.  In
      addition the delivery date must be altered to a negotiated
      delivery date.

See R4 File, Tab F; Complaint, Exhibit B.
   8.   On January 29, 1991, confirming a telephone conversation
   with the Appellant on the previous day, Jack Scott, Assistant
   Superintendent of the Respondent's Term Contracts Division,
   sent a letter by facsimile transmission to the Contractor,
   which stated, in pertinent part:
      In our conversation you informed me that as a result of the
      Determination of Award figures in the contract being wrong,
      that you could not produce the order for your bid prices.
      My response was that I directed you to produce the order at
      your bid prices and then file a claim with the Contracting
      Officer, Mr. Richard Weiss, for any additional monies you
      feel entitled to.  Or, if you refuse to produce this order,
      send it back to me and we would then terminate the
      contract.  After much discussion you stated that you
      intended to produce the order and then file a claim.

      In addition, since the order was on hold from January 24,
      199115 to January  28, 1991, the following new schedule was
      agreed to:

            Submit Dylux proofs by February 4, 1991.
            Proofs will be available for pickup by February 6,
            1991.
            Complete production and delivery by February 25,
            1991.16

See R4 File, Tabs G and O.
   9.   On receiving Scott's letter, the Appellant saw a need to
   clarify the understandings reached on January 28, 1991 (Tr.
   83-84).  Therefore, the Contractor immediately replied:
      . . . [Y]ou have accurately depicted the situation in
      reference to program D278-S, Print Order 40000, except I
      think it is important to state your intent to terminate the
      contract under the default provision if we do not proceed.
      It is because of that provision that New South Press will
      proceed as well as tremendous losses the Government would
      incur through loss of press time, paper and loss of
      profits.  Finally we agreed upon a ship date of February
      25, not a delivery date.17

See R4 File, Tabs H and O); Complaint, Exhibit C.  [Emphasis
added.]
   10.   While the above exchange of correspondence was taking
   place, GPO contacted the NIH about the proposed shipping date
   of February 25, 1991, and was informed by the customer-agency
   that it was unacceptable (R4 File, Tab I, pp. 1, 2).  Instead,
   the NIH demanded delivery of 40 to 50 percent of the
   Directories by February 20, 1991, with the balance by February
   25, 1991, and told the Respondent that if the Appellant could
   not meet that schedule it wanted the contract canceled so that
   the books could be reprocured elsewhere (R4 File, Tab I, pp.
   1, 2).  When advised of the NIH's position, the Contractor
   said that it might be able to meet the customer-agency's date
   if the Government would waive the contract's 50 percent waste
   requirement, since its supplier had not yet delivered the
   white offset paper stock (R4 File, Tab I, p. 1).  However, the
   Contracting Officer refused to waive the waste requirement,
   and asked the Appellant to tell him by February 3, 1991,
   whether or not it could meet the delivery schedule of February
   20, 1991 (R4 File, Tab I, p. 1).
   11.   On January 30, 1991, around 8:00 a.m., the Contracting
   Officer talked to the Contractor again about performing the
   contract (R4 File, Tab I, p. 3).  The Contracting Officer told
   the Appellant that if it could not meet the delivery date of
   February 20, 1991, he would be compelled to terminate the
   contract because the NIH needed the Directories (R4 File, Tab
   I, p. 3).  When the Contracting Officer asked if the
   Contractor could deliver 40 percent of the job by that date,
   the Contractor said that it could not meet that schedule (R4
   File, Tab I, p. 3).
   12.   Accordingly, later that morning, at approximately 9:30
   a.m., the Contracting Officer telephoned the Appellant to say
   that he was going to terminate the contract for the
   convenience of the Government because the delivery date could
   not be met (R4 File, Tab I, p. 4).18  The Contracting Officer
   confirmed his decision by letter dated the same day, which
   also instructed the Appellant to: (a) discontinue all work on
   Print Order No. 40000; and (b) return the GFM to the
   Respondent (R4 File, Tab J).
   13.   Also on January 30, 1991, the Contracting Officer, as
   required by the Respondent's procurement regulation, sought
   the approval of GPO's Contract Review Board (CRB) for the
   proposed convenience termination action (R4 File, Tab K).  See
   PPR, Chap. XIV, Sec. 2,  3.(a)(1).  In his memorandum, after
   reciting the relevant contract history, the Contracting
   Officer told the CRB that he believed it was "in the best
   interest of the Government to terminate [P]rint [O]rder 40000
   and the balance of the contract due to the erroneous
   determination of award regarding the running rate and
   paper[.]" (R4 File, Tab K).  By January 31, 1991, all members
   of the CRB had given their approval to the Contracting Officer
   to terminate the Appellant's contract for the convenience of
   the Government (R4 File, Tab K).
   14.   By letter dated January 31, 1991, expressly entitled
   "Notice of Termination (Termination for Convenience of the
   Government) (hereinafter Notice)," the Respondent officially
   notified the Appellant that Print Order 40000, and the balance
   of its contract, was terminated for the convenience of the
   Government, effective that date (R4 File, Tab L).  See GPO
   Contract Terms, Contract Clauses,  19(a).  Among other
   things, the Notice instructed the  Contractor to submit its
   settlement proposal to the Respondent on GPO Form 911, which
   was enclosed, and "take such other action as may be required
   by the Contracting Officer or under the termination clause
   contained in your contract[.]" (R4 File, Tab L, p. 2,  f).
   See GPO Contract Terms, Contract Clauses,  19(c); PPR, Chap.
   XIV, Sec. 2,  3.c.(viii),(x).

          B. The Termination Claim
   1.   By letter dated January 30, 1991, the Appellant filed a
   partial claim for $4,697.37 for the pre-press work performed
   on Print Order 40000 up to the date of termination (Tr. 16,
   17, 27; R4 File, Tabs M and O; App. Exh. No. 2).  The claim
   was comprised of six (6) line items:
        1.   Film: 344 pages @ $5.10=          $1,754.00
            (as per contract)

      2.   Stripping 84 flats @ $9.50=            798.1219

      3.   Bluelines (2 copies)
            572 pages @ $3.50=             2,002.00

      4.   Federal Express charges for
            receipt of original documents            65.00

      5.   UPS second day shipping of
            bluelines to customer=                       7.00

      6.   Federal Express charges for
            return of originals to GPO
            71.25

See R4 File, Tabs M and O, p. 1; App. Exh. No. 2, p. 1).20  The
Contractor's letter also told the Contracting Officer, in
pertinent part:
      . . . there were charges . . . for the down time and idling
      of our plant.  These charges will be worked up in a
      separate settlement proposal.  Fortunately New South Press
      was able to save the GPO by cancelling [sic] in excess of
      $18,000.00 worth of paper and a minimum of 25% restocking
      fee or a 15% markup on paper.  Unfortunately, we are not
      able to fill the press or bindery time due [to] the short
      notice of your cancellation.

See R4 File, Tabs M and O, pp. 1-2, App. Exh. No. 2, pp. 1-2.21
   2.   Thereafter, by letter dated February 4, 1991, the
   Contractor submitted a claim for an additional $24,670.13, to
   cover its losses resulting from the convenience cancellation
   of the contract (Tr. 26, 57-58; R4 File, Tabs N and O).22  The
   reason for the claim, as explained by the Appellant, was:
      Due to the enormity of this printing project and the
      inability to fill manufacturing time on such short notice,
      we find it necessary to bill the government for the lost
      production time."

See R4 File, Tab N.  The Contractor also noted that it was asking
reimbursement only for its costs, and that no profit was included
in its claim (R4 File, Tab N).
   3.   The February 4, 1991, claim consisted of two (2) parts:
   (a) extra charges for makeready work; and (b) the projected
   costs for producing the Directories, including running time
   for the presses, the folding machines, hand collating, binding
   and trimming (Tr. 26-27; R4 File, Tabs N and O, Attachment).
   In summary, the breakdown of the claim was as follows:
      MAKEREADY: Calculated at 1/2 hour for two unit plate hang,
      register and run to color.  For the two Directories covered
      by the Print Order, the Appellant stated that a total of 72
      makeready's, at 1/2 hour each, or  36 total makeready
      hours, was necessary.  At a budgeted hourly rate (BHR) of
      $90.04, the total makeready cost was $3,241.44.23

      RUNNING: Calculated at an effective running rate of 6,500
      impressions per hour, including loading and unloading
      tasks.  Counting both Directories, the Contractor figured
      that it would have taken 115 hours at the effective running
      rate to print the 747,500 total impressions required by the
      Print Order.  At a BHR of $90.04, the total running cost
      was $10,353.60, which yielded total press costs (makeready
      and running) of $13,596.04.24

      FOLDING: Calculated at a machine rate of 8,500 sheets an
      hour.  The Appellant indicated that it would have taken 88
      hours to fold 747,500 sheets.  At a BHR of $44.25, the
      total folding cost was $3,891.40.

      COLLATING: Calculated at a hand collating rate of two (2)
      books per  minute, or 120 per hour.  To collate 19,000
      books, the Contractor allowed 158 hours at a BHR of $24.13,
      for a total cost of $3,820.58.

      PERFECT BINDING: Calculated at a rate of 250 books per
      hour.  The Appellant claims that it would have taken 76
      hours to bind the 19,000 Directories, at a BHR of $24.13,
      for a total binding cost of $1,833.88.

      TRIMMING: Calculated at a rate of 300 sheets an hour for
      trimming three (3) sides.  The Contractor said that it
      would take 63 hours to trim the 19,000 books, at a BHR of
      $24.13, for a total trimming cost of $1,528.23, yielding
      total binder costs (folding, collating, perfect binding,
      and trimming) of $11,074.09.

See R4 File, Tab N, Attachment.25  Subsequently, by letters dated
March 12, 1991, and March 13,  1991, respectively, the Appellant
transmitted additional supporting information, and certified its
claim (R4 File, Tabs O and P).26
   4.   On February 28, 1991, the Contracting Officer asked GPO's
   Office of the Inspector General (OIG) to evaluate the
   Appellant's claim (Tr. 119, 122, 133; R4 File, Tab Q).  The
   record indicates that, on May 20, 1991, in response to an OIG
   request, the Appellant sent additional supporting information
   to the assigned auditors, including all of its original
   estimates and the cost summaries for its printing operations
   (Tr. 137-38; GPOBCA Exh. No. 1).
   5.   On January 3, 1992, the OIG issued its audit report on
   the Appellant's claim (R4 File, Tab R).  In its analysis of
   the Contractor's first (January 30, 1991) claim, the OIG
   approved all film costs and return costs for the GFM
   ($1,754.00 and $143.00, respectively), but questioned most of
   the stripping claim (only $76.00 of the $798.00 claim was
   allowed), and all of the blueline claim ($2,002.00); i.e.,
   overall 42 percent of the claim ($1,973.00) was allowed and 58
   percent ($2,724.00) was questioned (Tr. 134, 136; R4 File, Tab
   R, Attachment D).27  As for the second (February 4, 1991)
   claim, the OIG questioned the entire $24,670.13 as contrary to
   the cost principles governing GPO contracts, especially the
   provisions relating to the recovery of idle capacity and idle
   facilities (Tr. 129, 133-34; R4 File, Tab R, Attachment E).
   See GPO Cost Directive, Sec. 3,  25(b),(c).  Noting that
   those costs principles state that "[c]osts of idle capacity
   are costs of doing business and are a factor in the normal
   fluctuations of usage or overhead rates from period to
   period[.]," the auditors concluded that the Appellant's lost
   production time claim was not peculiar to the contract, but
   rather those "costs should be included in New South Press'
   overhead from prior years[.]" (R4 File, Tab R, Attachment E,
   fn. 1, citing GPO Cost Directive, Sec. 3,  25(c)).
   6.   Although the Contracting Officer reviewed the audit
   report and relied heavily on it in making his final decision
   on the claim, the record also indicates that he did not
   completely agree with the OIG's findings (Tr. 117-19, 122,
   128, 130; R4 File, Tab S).  Therefore, using the audit
   findings as a base, Weiss made his own calculations which
   allowed an additional recovery of nearly all of the stripping
   charges and some blueline costs (R4 File, Tab S).  Thus, the
   Contracting Officer believed the Appellant was entitled to
   total compensation of $2,749.28 computed as follows: (a)
   $1,754.00 for the film work; (b) $852.28 for the stripping and
   bluelines; and (c) $143.00 for Federal Express charges (Tr.
   117, 124; R4 File, Tab S, p. 2).28  While there was no set
   procedure for pricing the contract in this case, the record
   clearly shows that the guiding principle followed by the
   Contracting Officer was that the Contractor was entitled to be
   paid only for the work actually performed (Tr. 119, 121).29
   7.   The Appellant rejected the Contracting Officer's offer to
   settle the matter for $2,749.28 (R4 File, Tab T, p. 1).
   Therefore, on January 8, 1992, the Contracting Officer issued
   his final decision on the claim, stating in pertinent part:
      . . . [I]t is the decision of the Contracting Officer that
      the charges for the 344 films produced are in accordance
      with the contract schedule of prices and allowable.  The
      stripping and blueline charges totalling $2800.00 are not
      covered in the contract schedule of prices and are not
      allowable.  An average per page cost for bluelines was done
      on 38 contractor [sic] performing on the A814-S Program.
      This cost came to $1.49 per page.  This figure multiplied
      by 572 pages comes to [$]852.28.  The shipping charges
      totaling $143.00 are allowable.

      The total of allowable charges comes to $2749.28.

See R4 File, Tab T, p. 1.30  The final decision letter did not
specifically address the claim for lost production time, but
clearly the Contracting Officer rejected it by implication.
   8.   By letter dated April 6, 1992, the Appellant timely
   appealed the Contracting Officer's decision to the Board.
   Board Rules, Rule 1(a).
   9.   At the hearing on March 1, 1994, the Appellant's
   evidence, almost exclusively, concerned its idle press time
   claim.31  Aside from the documentary evidence already referred
   to in this opinion, the Contractor also introduced: (a) a
   listing of the machine and employee hours lost because of
   downtime on the Miller Press for the month of February 1991,
   along with the supporting shop logs;32 (b) a summary analysis
   of its idle time based on the 112 hours of actual press time
   which could not be filled, and calculated at a utilization
   rate of 80 percent;33 and (c) financial statements for the
   months of January, February, and March 1991 (Tr. 42, 44,
   52-53, 60, 61, 67-68, 70-71, 80; App. Exh. Nos. 5, 6, 7, 8,
   and 9).34  Moreover, during the hearing the Appellant also
   revised and lowered its unabsorbed overhead claim to
   $14,460.04 to account for the actual number of unfilled hours
   of press time-a reduction of nearly 41 percent from its
   original idle time claim ($24,670.13) ((Tr. 60, 74-5; R4 File,
   Tabs N and O; App. Exh. No. 6; App. Brf., p. 1).35  To
   summarize, relying on the documentation it submitted at the
   hearing, as revised by oral testimony,36 the Contractor now
   seeks termination compensation as follows:
      MAKEREADY AND RUNNING: The Appellant originally calculated
      that the job would take 36 hours of makeready and 115 hours
      of running time to print all of the 747,500 sheets required
      for both Directories, or 151 total hours.  However, the
      Contractor has reduced its combined claim for makeready and
      running to a total of 112 hours, figured at a BHR of $56.68
      (70 percent utilization) for a total of $6,348.16.37

      PRESS HELPER: The Appellant omitted the cost of the press
      helper on the Miller Press, who was idled by the
      termination of the contract, from its initial claim.  The
      press helper is compensated at the rate of $9.45 an hour.
      Therefore the cost to the Contractor for the press helper's
      downtime is $1,058.40 (112 hours times $9.45).38

      FOLDING: The Appellant originally estimated that at a
      machine rate of 8,500 sheets, folding would take 88 hours
      to complete.  As revised, the Contractor has reduced its
      claim to 46.88 hours computed at a BHR of $45.72, or a
      total cost of $2,143.35.

      COLLATING: The Appellant initially calculated that
      collating would take 158 hours, accomplished in part by
      hand labor.  The revised claim deletes the hand collating
      charge, and narrows the Contractor's request to
      compensation for the unfilled machine time of the
      Collator.39  In that regard, the Contractor calculated that
      it would take 30.5 hours to collate both Directories, which
      at a BHR of $44.47, yielded a collating cost of $1,356.34.

      PERFECT BINDING: The Appellant still estimates that it
      would have taken 76 hours to bind both Directories.
      However, the Contractor now computes that operation at a
      BHR of $34.20, for a total binding cost of $2,599.20.

      TRIMMING: The Appellant figures that it would have taken 63
      hours to trim both Directories.  However, the Contractor
      now calculates that task at a BHR of $31.09, for a total
      trimming cost of $1,958.67.

See Tr. 60-63, 74-75; App. Exh. No. 6.

   III. ISSUES PRESENTED
      Based on the record as a whole, including the prehearing
      conference discussions, the evidence presented at the
      hearing, and the briefs of the parties, this appeal
      presents three issues for the Board's consideration:

      1. Did the Contracting Officer err by using another GPO
      contract-Program A814-M-to determine that the Appellant's
      stripping and blueline claim was too high, and to develop a
      new per page rate for those costs?

      2. Was the Contracting Officer correct in denying all of
      the Appellant's claim for post-termination downtime costs
      based on the OIG's interpretation of GPO Cost Directive,
      Sec. 3,  25(c) contained in the audit report?  Stated
      otherwise, what is the proper cost basis for considering
      the Appellant's unabsorbed overhead claim in this case?

      3. Is the Appellant entitled to any recovery for post-
      termination costs under the circumstances of this case, and
      if so, how much?

   III. POSITIONS OF THE PARTIES

   A. The Appellant's Argument

   The Appellant presents the Board with two different claims-a
   small claim for the pre-press work which it actually performed
   prior to termination, and a large unabsorbed overhead claim,
   consisting primarily of idle press time costs resulting from
   the termination action itself.  With respect to the pre-press
   claim, the Appellant asserts that its charges were reasonable
   and normal for the work in question, and thus it is entitled
   to full payment for those costs under the express terms of the
   contract (App. Brf., p. 2, citing GPO Contract Terms, Contract
   Clauses,  19(e)(2)(i),(iii)).  The Contractor also contends
   that the Respondent erred in denying the claim on the ground
   that the contract's schedule of bid prices lacked a line item
   for stripping and bluelines.  Id.  Furthermore, the Appellant
   says that the Contracting Officer wrongfully relied on the
   line item structure of another GPO contract-Program A814-M-to
   establish the prices for stripping and bluelines because: (1)
   the low rates in Program A814-M are the result of the
   extremely high volume of work called for under that contract
   and involves multiple orders throughout the year; and (2) line
   item prices usually reflect the contractor's belief that he or
   she will be producing a finished product, not just a portion
   of it (App. Brf., pp. 2-3).  Consequently, to apply Program
   A814-M prices to just the pre-press work on the smaller
   contract in this case is "grossly unfair" (App. Brf., p. 3).
   Finally, the Contractor observes that GPO's interpretation
   could damage many contractors who bid pre-press production
   functions at "no charge," and include those costs elsewhere in
   the job, only to find when the contract is subsequently
   terminated that such work would not be compensated at all-a
   result contrary to the provisions of GPO Contract Terms.  Id.
   Accordingly, the Appellant urges the Board to find that its
   charges for the pre-press work actually performed prior to
   termination were reasonable, and that it is entitled to the
   full amount of its claim ($4,697.37) (App. Brf., pp. 3, 7).
   As for its downtime claim, the Contractor does acknowledge the
   general rule which says that such indirect costs incurred
   after a termination for convenience are not recoverable (App.
   Brf., pp. 3, 5, 7, citing Chamberlain Manufacturing Corp.,
   ASBCA No. 16877, 73-2 BCA  10,139; Sun Electric Corp., ASBCA
   No. 13031, 70-2 BCA  8371).  However, the Appellant also
   points out that in a few cases post-termination idle
   facilities and idle capacity costs have been allowed when
   there is a "particular showing" that the termination was
   simply more than routine (App. Brf., pp. 4-5, citing Raquette
   River Construction, ASBCA No. 26486, 82-1 BCA  15769;
   Southland Manufacturing Corp., ASBCA No. 16830, 75-1 BCA 
   10,994, reconsid. denied, 75-1 BCA  11,272).  See also
   RPTC-1, p. 6.  The Contractor believes that it has made such a
   showing in this case by demonstrating that the contract was
   canceled one day before the job went to press, and at a time
   when a major portion of the work was already in progress (App.
   Brf., p. 5; App. Exh. No. 5).
   On the other hand, the Appellant argues that since the source
   of the general rule is found in decisions of contract appeals
   boards and courts interpreting the FAR, and specific
   convenience termination clauses of other agencies, while these
   decisions are instructive, they are not binding on the Board
   in GPO procurements (App. Brf., pp. 3, 4).  Instead, the
   Contractor believes that the Board must look to the
   "Termination for the Convenience of the Government" clause in
   GPO Contract Terms and the GPO Cost Directive for guidance in
   deciding the issues in this case (App. Brf., pp. 3-4, citing
   GPO Contract Terms, Contract Clauses,  19;  GPO Cost
   Directive, Sec. 3,  25 (Idle facilities and idle capacity
   costs),  49 (Termination costs)).  In that regard, the
   Appellant contends that since nothing in GPO Contract Terms or
   the GPO Cost Directive requires the disallowance of downtime
   costs upon a termination for convenience,40  the solution to
   this controversy primarily lies in the GPO Cost Directive,
   since the termination clause is silent on the matter.  First,
   the Contractor notes that recovery for idle facilities and
   idle capacity costs is expressly covered by GPO Cost
   Directive, Sec. 3,  25, and also points out that
   reimbursement for idle capacity costs in particular, is
   allowed under certain circumstances; i.e., the capacity was
   necessary or originally reasonable to the production of work,
   and are not otherwise subject to a reduction by rent or sale,
   in accordance with sound business practices (App. Brf., p. 4).
   See GPO Cost Directive, Sec. 3,  25(c).  Second, the
   Appellant says that while the provisions of the GPO Cost
   Directive expressly dealing with termination costs do not
   address recovery of unabsorbed overhead one way or the other,
   it does incorporate the idle facilities and idle capacity
   rules by reference (App. Brf., p. 4).  See GPO Cost Directive,
   Sec. 3,  49.  Furthermore, although it does not describe such
   costs with particularity, the termination provisions of the
   GPO Cost Directive state that a contractor can recover costs
   which were incurred after termination that could be
   immediately discontinued through reasonable efforts (App.
   Brf., p. 4).  See GPO Cost Directive, Sec. 3,  49(b).
   Finally, relying on the works of several authors on the
   subject of cost accounting for Government contracts, the
   Appellant contends that the Board should allow the post-
   termination unabsorbed overhead claim because that is the only
   fair and equitable means of compensation for its costs in this
   case (App. Brf., pp. 5-6, citing A. Joseph & N. O'Donnell,
   Termination of Government Contracts, at X-36 to X-41 (Fed.
   Pub. 1987) (hereinafter Joseph & O'Donnell); J. Bedingfield
   and L. Rosen, Government Contract Accounting, at 15-16 to
   15-20 (1st ed. 1984); P. Trueger, Accounting Guide for
   Government Contracts, at 745-760 (8th ed. 1985) (hereinafter
   Trueger)).  The Contractor anchors this argument for
   reimbursement of idle facilities and capacity costs in
   commonplace notions of fairness and justice, and criticizes
   the majority of cases applying the general rule against
   recovery of unabsorbed overhead as mere rigid adherence to
   prior decisions (App. Brf., p. 6).41  Where, as here, an
   actual downtime loss results from a convenience termination,
   says the Appellant, case law which denies recovery of these
   costs is clearly inequitable or unjust.  Thus, the Contractor
   urges the Board to follow the path suggested by these
   enlightened commentators, and allow the reimbursement in the
   interest of providing adequate and fair compensation to the
   contractor (App. Brf., p. 6).  Accordingly, for these reasons,
   the Appellant asks the Board to rule that it is entitled to
   recover post-termination unabsorbed overhead costs in the
   amount of $14,460.04, particularly since it has shown the
   requisite "unusual circumstances" (App. Brf., pp. 6-7).42

   B. The Respondent's Argument
   Contrary to the Appellant, the Respondent believes that the
   Contracting Officer was correct in only partially allowing the
   Contractor's claim for pre-press costs, while denying the
   unabsorbed overhead claim in its entirety.  The Government
   does not dispute that the Appellant was entitled to recover
   certain direct costs incurred in beginning production on the
   first print order as part of the termination settlement (R.
   Brf., p. 7).  Rather, the issue dividing the parties concerns
   whether the stripping and blueline costs submitted by the
   Contractor were reasonable-all other charges were allowed by
   the Government in the amounts claimed (R. Brf., pp. 7-8).  In
   that regard, the Respondent says that when the Contracting
   Officer compared the Appellant's stripping and blueline claim
   with GPO's charges and the prices of other commercial
   printers, he concluded that they were too high (R. Brf., p. 8,
   citing Tr. 126-127).  Consequently, to arrive at a reasonable
   price for stripping and bluelines in the absence of individual
   line items for those costs in the contract (they were included
   in the contract price for films), the Contracting Officer
   referred to a multiple award, general usage GPO contract-
   Program A814-M-and averaged the blueline prices of 38 printing
   contractors in order to estimate a fair and reasonable price
   for the those operations in this case (R. Brf., p. 8, citing
   Tr. 117-18; R4 File, Tab A, p. 11).43  The result was a price
   of $1.49 per page, or $852.28 total, which the Contracting
   Officer allowed against the Appellant's claim of $2,800.12 for
   stripping and bluelines (R. Brf., p. 8).  The Respondent not
   only sees this approach as justified under the circumstances,
   but also contends that the Appellant, who had the burden of
   proof, failed to prove its stripping and blueline costs were
   reasonable (R. Brf., p. 8).  Instead, the Government contends
   that the Appellant's own testimony at the hearing shows that
   its claim was based on its standard retail charges rather than
   its actual costs (R. Brf., p. 8, citing Tr. 24, 89).
   Accordingly, since the Contractor has not met its burden with
   respect to its pre-press claim, the Contracting Officer's
   decision should be allowed to stand (R. Brf., p. 8).
   Unlike the pre-press claim in which the only question is one
   of reasonableness, the unabsorbed overhead claim concerns the
   threshold issue of entitlement.  The Respondent has
   steadfastly maintained that the Appellant is not legally
   entitled to recover unabsorbed overhead costs following a
   termination for convenience (R. Brf., p. 3).  The reason that
   such costs in the form of idle press time are generally not
   allowed, according to the Government, is that they are
   indirect costs representing the cost of doing business (R.
   Brf., pp. 3-4, citing Nolan Brothers, Inc. v. United States,
   194 Ct. Cl. 1 at 34-35, 437 F.2d 1371 (1971); Chamberlain
   Manufacturing Corp., supra; Pioneer Recovery Systems, ASBCA
   No. 24658; 81-1 BCA  15,059; Melvin Rishe, Government
   Contract Costs 23-29 (1983)).
   The Respondent contends that the precedents of courts and
   other contract appeals boards preclude a contractor from
   recovering any costs beyond actual costs incurred, plus a
   reasonable profit on work performed (R. Brf., pp. 4-5, citing
   William Green Construction Co., Inc. et al. v. United States,
   201 Ct. Cl. 616 (1978)).  As explained by GPO, unabsorbed
   overhead costs are not incurred as a result of contract work
   performed, are not directly related to the termination, and
   are not recognized continuing costs of the terminated
   contract, and thus they are unallowable (R. Brf., p. 5, citing
   Hewitt Contracting Co., ENGBCA No. 4596, 83-2 BCA  16,816;
   Technology, Inc., ASBCA No. 14083, 71-2 BCA  8,956; reconsid.
   denied, 72-1 BCA  9281; Fairchild Stratos Inc., ASBCA No.
   9169, 67-1 BCA  6,225; reconsid. denied, 68-1 BCA  7,053;
   Chamberlain Manufacturing Corp., supra; Pioneer Recovery
   Systems, supra).  Furthermore, the Respondent points out that
   other contract appeals boards have considered, and rejected,
   contractor claims that the general rule is unfair or
   inequitable, primarily on the grounds that: (1) overhead
   continues as long as the contractor exists as a ongoing
   organization; (2) the risk of unabsorbed overhead in
   termination cases is essentially no different than cases of a
   contractor's failure to obtain other anticipated business
   during the accounting period; and (3) paying such overhead
   costs without receiving any benefit for doing so would, in
   practical effect, amount to a Government guarantee of a
   contractor's overhead costs, more or less as a penalty for
   exercising its contractual rights (R. Brf., pp. 5-7, quoting
   Chamberlain Manufacturing Corp., supra, 73-2 BCA at 47,678-79;
   Pioneer Recovery Systems, supra, 81-1 BCA at 74,494).
   Finally, the Respondent contends that the Appellant's reliance
   on certain provisions of the GPO Cost Directive is misplaced
   (R. Brf., p. 3; RPTC-1, p. 7).  The Government notes that the
   GPO Cost Directive is simply the agency's FAR Part 31, 48
   C.F.R. 31.000 et seq. (1994), and both regulations establish
   contract cost principles and procedures to be utilized in
   determining what costs are allowable under Federal contracts
   (R. Brf., p. 3).  However, it also believes that the GPO Cost
   Directive is not particularly relevant in the context of this
   appeal, but rather the central focus should be on the factors
   considered by the Contracting Officer in his decision,
   including the OIG's recommendations to disallow the claim for
   unabsorbed overhead costs.  RPTC-2, p. 3; RPTC-1, p. 7.
   Regardless, the Respondent contends that the Appellant
   mistakenly relies on GPO Cost Directive, sec. 3,  25 to
   support its claim for idle facilities and idle capital costs,
   because that provision only applies to Federal cost
   reimbursement contracts (R. Brf., p. 3).  GPO says that the
   Contractor has ignored the appropriate provision of the
   instruction-GPO Cost Directive, sec. 3,  49-which
   specifically defines those costs which are allowable in a
   termination for convenience claim (R. Brf., p. 3).  The
   Respondent believes that the Appellant's exclusive remedy in
   this case is provided by the termination for convenience
   articles of GPO Contract Terms and the GPO Cost Directive (R.
   Brf., pp. 3-4, citing GPO Contract Terms, Contract Clauses, 
   19; GPO Cost Directive, sec. 3,  49). ).  Accordingly, for
   all of these reasons, but especially the weight of case
   authority, GPO submits that the Board should affirm the
   Contracting Officer's denial of the Appellant's entire
   $14,460.20 claim for unabsorbed overhead costs (R. Brf., pp.
   7, 9).

   IV. DECISION44
   The Appellant believes that the main issue in this case, which
   tests the validity of its claim for post-termination
   unabsorbed overhead costs, is a matter of first impression for
   the Board (App. Brf., p. 7).  While perhaps that precise
   question has never been presented before, the Board is
   certainly no stranger to termination for convenience problems.
   However, it is also true that both in this forum, as well as
   in the proceedings of the ad hoc panels which proceeded the
   Board,45 termination for convenience cases are extremely
   rare,46 probably because in most instances the parties are
   able to reach an amicable settlement regarding termination
   cost issues.  See PPR, Chap. XIV, Sec. 2,  3.d(ii),(iii),
   3.j(1).  In that respect, the case history in GPO is no
   different than the experience of other boards established to
   hear contract appeals.  See e.g., Pioneer Recovery Systems,
   supra, 81-1 BCA at 74,494 (". . . convenience terminations are
   relatively rare, . . .").  Regardless, the combined experience
   of this agency's contract appeals forums, plus the precedents
   of the Board's Executive Branch counterparts, provide ample
   guidance by which to examine all of the issues in dispute.
   Furthermore, it is clear to the Board that this appeal offers
   a proper and convenient vehicle to revisit its Supplemental
   Decision in R.C. Swanson, supra, and reiterate, explain and
   clarify the standards which govern convenience termination
   settlements for "requirements" contracts.47
   At the outset, before addressing the specific issues raised by
   the parties, a few words need to be said about the nature,
   purpose, and philosophy behind terminations for convenience,
   so that the Board's approach in this case can be better
   understood.  The principal treatise on Government contracts
   describes the nature of terminations for convenience as
   follows:
      The Termination for Convenience of the Government clause is
      one of the most unique provisions contained in Government
      contracts.  In no other area of contract law has one party
      been given such complete authority to escape from
      contractual obligations.  This clause gives the Government
      the broad right to terminate without cause and limits the
      contractor's recovery to costs incurred, profit on work
      done, and costs of preparing the termination settlement
      proposal.  Recovery of anticipated profit is

      precluded.  Thus, this mandatory provision confers a major
      contract right on the Government with no commensurate
      advantage to the contractor.
See John Cibinic, Jr., & Ralph C. Nash, Jr., Administration of
Government Contracts, 3d Ed., 1995, George Washington University,
National Law Center, Government Contracts Program, p. 1073
(hereinafter Cibinic & Nash).48  See also Tom Shaw, Inc., ENG BCA
Nos. 5540, 5541, 89-3 BCA  21,961 (the Government's right to
terminate a contract for its own convenience without suffering
the usual penalties for breach of contract, is an extraordinary
right with a commensurate responsibility to be entirely fair in
the exercise of the right).  As the Armed Services Board of
Contract Appeals (ASBCA) has observed:
      [A] termination for convenience is a risk by which, by dint
      of the contractual relationship with the sovereign, is
      reasonably foreseeable whenever a contractor signs a
      Government contract.  The contractor's recourse after such
      a termination is spelled out in the termination clause and
      the related regulations.  If a contractor incurs losses
      which do not fall within these parameters, it simply has no
      contractual recourse.

See J.W. Cook & Sons, Inc., ASBCA No. 39691, 92-3 BCA  25,053,
at 124,865.
   Because of the extraordinary powers vested in the Government
   to terminate contracts for its convenience, the courts and
   contract appeals boards have placed some limits on its
   exercise.  In the words of the United States Court of Appeals
   for the Federal Circuit, the Government cannot use its
   convenience termination authority to "dishonor [its]
   contractual obligations."  See Maxima Corp. v. United States,
   847 F.2d 1549, 1553 (Fed. Cir. 1988); Torncello v. United
   States, supra, 681 F.2d at 772.

   The right to terminate a contract under the termination for
   convenience clause is usually triggered by a contracting
   officer's determination that the cancellation is in the
   Government's best interest.49  See GPO Contract Terms,
   Contract Clauses,  19(a); PPR, Chap. XIV, Sec. 2,  2.  See
   also American Drafting and Laminating Co., supra; Cloverleaf
   Enterprises, Inc., supra.  Furthermore, the contracting
   officer's election to terminate is conclusive in the absence
   of bad faith or a clear abuse of discretion.50  See Melvin R.
   Kessler, PSBCA Nos. 2820, 2972, 92-2 BCA  24,857, at 123,996
   (citing John Reiner v. United States, 325 F.2d 438, 442 (Ct.
   Cl. 1963), cert. den. 377 U.S. 931 (1964)), mot. for reconsid.
   denied 92-3 BCA  25,092; Salisbury Industries v. United
   States, 905 F.2d 1518 (Fed. Cir. 1990)), mot. for reconsid.
   denied 92-3 BCA  25,092.  See also, Seaboard Lumber v. United
   States, 19 Cl. Ct. 310 (1989); Robert K. Adams, ASBCA No.
   34519, 92-3 BCA  25,165; Automated Services, Inc., DOTBCA No.
   1753, 87-1 BCA  19,459; ITG Corp., ASBCA No. 27285, 85-1 BCA
    17,935.51  As the Board has said on numerous occasions, an
   allegation of bad faith must be established by "well-nigh
   irrefragable" proof because there is a strong presumption that
   Government officials properly and honestly carry out their
   functions.52  See e.g., Asa L. Shipman's Sons, Ltd., GPO BCA
   06-95 (August 29, 1995), slip op. at 12, fn. 16; Professional
   Printing of Kansas, Inc., GPO BCA 02-93 (May 19, 1995), slip
   op. at 43, fn. 58, 1995 WL 488488; Universal Printing Co.,
   supra, slip op. at 24, fn. 24; Sterling Printing, Inc., GPO
   BCA 20-89 (March 28, 1994), slip op. at 34-35, fn. 46, 1994 WL
   275104; B. P. Printing and Office Supplies, GPO BCA 14-91
   (August 10, 1992), slip op. at 16, 1992 WL 382917; The
   Standard Register Co., supra, slip op. at 12-13.  Accord Brill
   Brothers, Inc., ASBCA No. 42573, 94-1 BCA  26,352; Karpak
   Data and Design, IBCA No. 2944 et al., 93-1 BCA  25,360;
   Local Contractors, Inc., ASBCA No. 37108, 92-1 BCA  24,491.
   However, there are no "bad faith or a clear abuse of
   discretion" issues in this appeal.53     Properly exercised, a
   contracting officer's discretion to act pursuant to the
   "Termination for Convenience" clause is very broad.  See
   Caldwell & Santmyer, Inc., supra, 94-2 BCA at 133,625 (citing
   ARDCO Inc., AGBCA Nos. 94-101-1, 94-102-1, 94-103-1, 1994 WL
   45000 (Feb. 16, 1994); Michael J. Earl, PSBCA No. 3332, 93-3
   BCA  26,234).  Thus, apart from the typical situation
   involving a change in the Government's needs, see e.g., R.C.
   Swanson, supra, Supplemental Decision, slip op. at 5 (contract
   for the production of Department of Justice briefs from
   manuscript copy was terminated for convenience because it
   would not accommodate the customer-agency's additional
   requirement that briefs be produced from electronically
   transmitted data), a termination for convenience is also
   appropriate to preserve the integrity of the procurement
   system where it is determined that the Government's estimates
   have not been realistic, see Special Waste, Inc., ASBCA No.
   36775, 90-2 BCA  22,935, at 115,129-30, to reprocure the
   contract if the contractor will not agree to a change in
   schedule, see Melvin R. Kessler, supra, to relieve a
   contractor of performance where its lack of success does not
   arise from any fault or negligence on its part, see American
   Drafting and Laminating Co., supra, or to end an improvident
   procurement, especially before performance commences, see
   Caldwell & Santmyer, Inc., supra, 94-2 BCA at 133,625 (citing
   KAL M.E.I. Manufacturing and Trade, Ltd., ASBCA No. 40597,
   92-1 BCA  24,411).54
   The Respondent's "Termination for Convenience" clause contains
   the general rule that once a contract is terminated, the
   contractor is entitled to recover its incurred costs plus a
   reasonable profit.  See GPO Contract Terms, Contract Clauses,
    19(d); PPR, Chap. XIV, Sec. 2,  3.n.  See also R.C.
   Swanson, supra, Supplemental Decision, slip. op. at 17-18
   (citing Humphrey Logging Co., AGBCA Nos. 84-359-3, 85-204-3,
   85-3 BCA  18,433); Graphic Litho Co., Inc., supra, slip. op.
   at 10; Bay Ridge Press, supra, slip. at 3.  Accord,
   Youngstrand Surveying, AGBCA No. 90-150-1, 92-2 BCA  25,017,
   at 124,694; Chamberlain Manufacturing Corp., supra, 73-2 BCA
   at 47,678.  Recovery of anticipated profits is not allowed.
   See PPR, Chap. XIV, Sec. 2,  3.n.  See also Bay Ridge Press,
   supra, Supplemental Decision, slip op. at 3.  Accord Plaza 70
   Interiors, Ltd., supra, 95-2 BCA at 137,939 (citing FAR
   49.202,; Steelcare, Inc., GSBCA No. 5491, 81-1 BCA  15,143,
   at 74,901).  See generally Cibinic & Nash, p. 1098 ("Perhaps
   the major impact of the termination for convenience procedure
   is that it relieves the Government from the obligation of
   paying anticipated profits for unperformed work if terminates
   the contractor's performance of the work."  Citing Dairy Sales
   Corp. v. United States, 219 Ct. Cl. 431, 593 F.2d 1002 (1979),
   aff'g Dairy Sales Corp., ASBCA No. 20193, 75-2 BCA  11,613).
   Similarly, where a contractor is in a loss position on the
   terminated contract, it is not entitled to recovery of any
   profit.55  See GPO Contract Terms, Contract Clauses,  19(e)
   (2)(iii); PPR, Chap. XIV, Sec. 2,  3.o.  See also Maitland
   Brothers Co., supra, 93-3 BCA at 129,304; Tom Shaw, Inc., ENG
   BCA Nos. 5540, 5541, 5620-5628, 93-2 BCA  25,742, at 128,082.
   The terminated contractor has the burden of establishing both
   that it actually incurred costs and the amount of its incurred
   costs.  See R.C. Swanson, supra, Supplemental Decision, slip.
   op. at 19 (citing Building Maintenance Specialists, Inc., ENG
   BCA No. 5654, 90-3 BCA  23,032).  Accord Lisbon Contractors,
   Inc. v. United States, 828 F.2d 759, 767 (Fed. Cir. 1987);
   J.W. Cook & Sons, Inc., supra, 92-3 BCA at 124,863 (citing
   Tubergen & Associates, Inc., ASBCA Nos. 34106, 34107, 90-3 BCA
    23,058); Youngstrand Surveying, supra, 92-2 BCA at 124,694
   (citing Roberts International Corp., ASBCA No. 15118, 71-1 BCA
    8869).  Indeed, actual incurrence of costs is a prerequisite
   to recovery under a termination for convenience; i.e., if the
   contractor has incurred no cost, there is no recovery.  See
   R.C. Swanson, supra, Supplemental Decision, slip. op. at 19
   (citing Seiler Instrument and Manufacturing Co., Inc., ASBCA
   No. 44380, 93-1 BCA  25,436).  Accordingly, in these cases
   the contractor's cost, not the value of the performance to the
   Government, is the measure of recovery.  See, e.g., Fil-Coil,
   ASBCA No. 23,137, 79-1 BCA  13,618 (1978), mot. for reconsid.
   denied, 79-1 BCA  13,683 (1979); Scope Electronics, Inc.,
   ASBCA No. 20359, 77-1 BCA  12,404, mot. for reconsid. denied,
   77-2 BCA  12,586 (1977); Arnold H. Leibowitz, GSBCA No.
   CCR-1, 76-2 BCA  11,930 (1976).  In short, the reimbursement
   formula for convenience terminations permits the recovery of
   allowable costs incurred, plus profit, subject to the overall
   limitation of the contract price and the possible application
   of the loss adjustment provisions.  See Cibinic & Nash, p.
   1098.
   The conventional wisdom, often expressed in "boilerplate"
   language in court and board decisions, is that when a fixed-
   price contract is terminated for the convenience of the
   Government, it is converted into a cost reimbursement
   contract, which entitles the contractor to recover the
   allowable costs incurred under the terminated contract, to the
   extent that they are reasonable, allocable and not
   specifically designated as unallowable by regulation.  See
   Richerson Construction, Inc., GSBCA Nos. 11161, 11263(11045)-
   REIN, 11430, 93-1 BCA  25,239, at 125,704; Youngstrand
   Surveying, supra, 92-2 BCA at 124,694; Raquette River
   Construction, supra, 82-1 BCA at 78,051 (citing Paul E.
   McCollum, ASBCA No. 23269, 81-2 BCA  15,311).  See also
   Riverport Industries, Inc., ASBCA No. 30888, 87-2 BCA 
   19,876; Southland Manufacturing Corp., supra; International
   Space Corp., ASBCA No. 13883, 70-2 BCA  8519; Caskel Forge,
   Inc., supra.  See generally Cibinic & Nash, p. 1098.  While
   this principal may be technically correct as a general
   proposition, on closer examination the rule is not entirely
   accurate.56  As the Corps of Engineers Board of Contract
   Appeals (ENGBCA) has observed, in pertinent part:
      . . . [M]any of the BCA cases refer to termination of a
      fixed-price contract as tantamount to converting it to a
      cost reimbursable contract.  This is an oversimplification.
      While the cost principles applicable to cost reimbursable
      contracts do come into play in a termination for
      convenience, the principles that the contract price serves
      as a ceiling on recovery, that a profit allowance is
      partially or totally eliminated on a loss contract, and
      that recovery of actual costs may be reduced by a loss
      factor, also come into play.  These principles are not
      consistent with treating the fixed-price contract as
      actually converted to a cost reimbursable contract.

      Of particular note is the fact that the contract price
      ceiling is not at all related to the use of a Limitation of
      Cost or similar clause in a cost reimbursable contract, . .
      . . [T]he contract price as a ceiling is logically related
      to the fact that payments under a fixed price contract
      would amount to the contract price if the work were
      completed.  There is no automatic justification for paying
      more than the contract price for doing less than fully
      completing the work.  A fixed-price contractor has not, in
      incurring performance costs, relied to its detriment on the
      fact that the Government, after performance has ended, has
      made payments exceeding the contract price.  There is even
      less logic to an argument that making payments that exceed
      the contract price is an act that totally forfeits or
      waives any further ceiling on payments.  Paragraph (j) of
      GP-18 (Termination for the Convenience of the Government
      (Construction) clause even provides for recapture of such
      excess payments.

      On the other hand, a cost reimbursable contractor largely
      controls the rate of expenditures and the total costs of
      its contract as the work proceeds, and is uniquely able to
      warn the Government that actual expenditures are
      approaching any preset funding limit, giving the Government
      the option of continuing to fund additional work or ending
      the contract.  That is the primary purpose of a Limitation
      of Costs clause.  When such a warning has been given,
      whether formally or constructively, the Limitation of Costs
      clause has served its purpose.  If the Government then
      permits the work to continue, the cost reimbursable
      contractor continues to incur costs in reliance that it
      otherwise could have avoided, so the waiver theory has a
      logical application.  The case law on waiver of Limitation
      of Costs and similar clauses deals strictly with cost
      reimbursable contracts that are such from their inception.
      A terminated fixed-price contract is not converted to a
      true cost reimbursable contract, and there is no reasonable
      basis to extend the waiver concept to this case.

See Tom Shaw, Inc., supra, 93-2 BCA  25,742, at 128,073.
[Original emphasis.]

   Another immutable convenience termination rule is that the
   "total contract price" sets the boundaries of the contractor's
   recovery.57  See R.C. Swanson, supra, Supplemental Decision,
   slip. op. at 19 (citing GPO Contract Terms, Contract Clauses,
    19(d); FAR 52.249-2(e)).  Accord Alta Construction Co.,
   PSBCA Nos. 1463, 2820, 94-3 BCA  27,053, at 134,816; Tom
   Shaw, Inc., supra, 93-2 BCA at 128,073.  Apparently, the
   theory is that the contractor should not receive more than the
   contract price for doing less than the full amount of work
   required by the contract.  Id.  The "total contract price"
   concept encompasses three things: (1) it sets the maximum
   amount a contractor may recover under a termination for
   convenience; (2) it is important when considering the recovery
   of costs continuing after termination; and (3) the rules for
   setting the "total contract price" vary depending on the type
   of contract terminated.  See R.C. Swanson, supra, Supplemental
   Decision, slip. op. at 19-20 (citing Nolan Brothers, Inc. v.
   United States, supra; Alta Construction Co., PSBCA No. 1463,
   92-2 BCA  24,824; Celesco Industries, Inc., ASBCA No. 22460,
   84-2 BCA  17,295; Pioneer Recovery Systems, Inc., supra; Okaw
   Industries, Inc., ASBCA Nos. 17863, 17864, 77-2 BCA  12,793;
   Chamberlain Manufacturing Corp., supra).  Basically, the
   "total contract price" establishes the value of the contract
   (cost plus profit) for the purpose of compensating the
   terminated contractor.  See R.C. Swanson, supra, Supplemental
   Decision, slip. op. at 20.  GPO's "Termination for
   Convenience" clause provides that the convenience termination
   settlement may not generally exceed the "total contract price"
   as reduced by: (1) the amount of payments previously made; and
   (2) the contract price of work not terminated.  See GPO
   Contract Terms, Contract Clauses,  19(d).
     Finally, a significant number of contract appeals forums
     stress that the Government must not ignore the underlying
     philosophy of the procedure when compensating a terminated
     contractor.  In that regard, contracting officers are
     instructed that "fairness," rather than strict adherence to
     principles of cost accounting, should guide their settlement
     calculations.  See Richerson Construction, Inc., supra;
     Youngstrand Surveying, supra; Industrial Refrigeration
     Service Corp., VABCA 2532, 91-3 BCA  24,093, at 120,595;
     Arctic Corner, Inc., VABCA No. 2393, 86-3 BCA  19,278;
     American Electric, Inc., ASBCA 16635, 76-2 BCA  12,151.
     Thus, the General Services Administration Board of Contract
     Appeals GSBCA) recently explained:
      Under applicable Federal Acquisition Regulations (FAR), the
      objective of a termination for convenience settlement is to
      provide the contractor with "fair compensation" both for
      the work that has been completed prior to termination and
      for preparations made for terminated portions of the
      contract, including a reasonable allowance for profit.  FAR
      49.201. . . . To this end, the cost standards of the FAR,
      in part 31, are applied in accordance with principles of
      business judgment and fairness, Codex Corp. v. United
      States, 226 Ct. Cl. 693, 699 (1981), with the ultimate
      objective of making the contractor "whole."  See Industrial
      Refrigeration Service Corp., VABCA 2532, 91-3 BCA  24,093,
      at 120,595; American Electric, Inc., ASBCA 16635, 76-2 BCA
       12,151.

See Richerson Construction, Inc., supra, 93-1 BCA at 125,704.
See also General Electric Co., ASBCA No. 24111, 82-1 BCA 
15,725, reconsid. denied 83-1 BCA  16,207.  Furthermore, several
years ago, in Arctic Corner, Inc., the Veterans Administration
Board of Contract Appeals (VABCA), gave its view of the
"fairness" concept in extensive detail:
      The FPR, in Subpart 1-8.3, also contained, "Additional
      Principles" to be applied in settling fixed-price contracts
      which had been terminated for the convenience of the
      Government.  The following Section, because of its
      significance, is herein set forth in its entirety:

                1-8.301 General.

               (a) A settlement should compensate the contractor
               fairly for the work done and the preparations made
               for the terminated portions of the contract,
               including an allowance for profit thereon which is
               reasonable under the circumstances.  Fair
               compensation is a matter of judgment and cannot be
               measured exactly.  In a given case, various
               methods may be equally appropriate for arriving at
               fair compensation.  The application of standards
               of business judgment, as distinguished from strict
               accounting principles, is the heart of a
               settlement.

               (b) The primary objective is to negotiate a
               settlement by agreement. The parties may agree
               upon a total amount to be paid the contractor
               without agreeing on or segregating the particular
               elements of costs or profit comprising this
               amount.

               (c) Cost and account data may provide guides, but
               are not rigid measures, for ascertaining
               compensation.  In appropriate cases, costs may be
               estimated, differences compromised, and doubtful
               questions settled by agreement.  Other types of
               data, criteria, or standards may furnish equally
               reliable guides to fair compensation.  The amount
               of recordkeeping, reporting, and accounting, in
               connection with the settlement of termination
               claims, shall be kept to the minimum compatible
               with the reasonable protection of the public
               interest.

      Section 1-15.104 of the FPR, makes it clear that the cost
      principles and procedures set out in Subpart 1-15.4
      "Construction and Architect-Engineer Contracts" are
      mandatory and are incorporated by reference to such
      contracts as the basis for, among other things, negotiating
      or determining costs under terminated fixed-price
      contracts.  Subpart 1-15.4(b)(3) cross references the
      following provision:

                1-8.213 Cost principles.

               The cost principles and procedures set forth in
               the applicable subpart of Part 1-15 shall, subject
               to the general policies set forth in  1-8.301(a),
               be used in claiming, negotiating, or determining
               costs relevant to termination settlements under
               fixed-price and cost-reimbursement type contracts
               with other than educational institutions; . . .

      In a situation involving an identical Section 1-8.301 of
      the Armed Services Procurement Regulation, the Court of
      Claims, in Codex Corporation v. United States, 226 Ct. Cl.
      693 at 698-699 (1981), issued its Order, while stating the
      following:

               The proper reconciliation of the strict standard
               of allowable costs in section 15.205-30 and the
               fairness concept in section 8.301 is a matter
               primarily within the discretion of the Board of
               Contract Appeals.  The Board did not decide the
               question.  In its opinion on reconsideration, it
               stated that it "expresses no opinion as to whether
               the disputed costs concerned in this appeal would
               or would not be allowable as a part of the
               termination settlement if allowability were to be
               governed by paragraph 8.301." 75-2 B.C.A. 
               11,554, pp. 55,149-50.  Our holding is not that
               section 8.301 governs the plaintiff's claim for
               the field case costs, but that the application of
               the cost principles in part 2 of section 15 to
               that claim must be made "subject to the general
               policies set forth" in section 8.301.

      We will likewise approach the various disputed cost
      elements in this appeal with an eye toward fair
      compensation rather than imposing strict accounting
      principles upon the Appellant. . . .

See 86-3 BCA at 97,456-57.  [Original emphasis.]  See also
Industrial Refrigeration Service Corp., supra, 91-3 BCA  24,093,
at 120,594-95.
   Although a convenience termination settlement should
   compensate a contractor fairly, this is not to say that the
   concept has no boundaries.  Certainly, a contractor may not
   use "fairness" as a "sword to dispense with its obligation to
   prove its monetary claim," whether a termination claim, or an
   equitable adjustment claim for that matter.  See J.W. Cook &
   Sons, Inc., supra, 92-3 BCA at 124,863.  Moreover, in contrast
   to the opinions expressed by other contract appeals boards,
   the ASBCA takes a narrower view of "fairness" as a concept in
   termination settlements:
      . . . It is not our province to fashion equitable or
      extracontractual relief on the grounds of fairness, or
      otherwise.  In this context, "fairness" to the parties is
      the realization of the benefit of each party's bargain
      through the contractual instrument they signed.  We
      exercise "fairness" through the reasonable interpretation
      of that contractual instrument and the related regulations,
      with due regard to all relevant circumstances.

Id., 92-3 BCA at 124,865.58
   While the few convenience termination decisions issued by the
   Board and the ad hoc panels have mentioned that a termination
   settlement should compensate the contractor fairly, see e.g.,
   R.C. Swanson, supra, Supplemental Decision, slip. op. at 19;
   Bay Ridge Press, supra, slip op. at 3, none of them has
   discussed the "fairness" concept, or given any indication as
   to how it should be applied to terminations for convenience
   taken by this agency.  However, the Board notes that the GPO
   Cost Directive provides the following guidance:
          3. Fixed-price contracts.

      The applicable paragraphs of this instruction shall be used
      in the pricing of fixed-price contracts, subcontracts, and
      modifications to contracts and subcontracts whenever (a)
      costs analysis is performed, or (b) a fixed-price contract
      clause requires the determination or negotiation of costs.
      However, application of cost principles and subcontracts
      shall not be construed as a requirement to negotiate
      agreements on individual elements of cost in arriving at
      agreement on the total price.  The final price accepted by
      the parties reflects agreement only on the total price.
      Further, notwithstanding the mandatory use of cost
      principles, the objective will continue to be to negotiate
      prices that are fair and reasonable, cost and other factors
      considered.

See GPO Cost Directive, Sec. 2,  3, p. 6.  [Emphasis added.]
The underscored sentence is also found in the "Contract
Financing" chapter in GPO's printing procurement regulation:
      3. Applicability

      a. Fixed-prices contracts. Cost principles shall be used
      (1) in pricing negotiated fixed-price contracts,
      subcontracts, and modifications to contracts and
      subcontracts for supplies or services whenever cost
      analysis is performed, or (2) when a fixed-price contract
      clause requires the determination or negotiation of costs.
      However, application of cost principles to fix-priced
      contracts and subcontracts shall not be construed as a
      requirement to negotiate agreement on individual elements
      of cost in arriving at agreement on the total price.  The
      final price accepted by the parties reflects agreement only
      on the total price.  Further, notwithstanding the mandatory
      use of cost principles, the objective will continue to be
      to negotiated prices that are fair and reasonable, cost and
      other factors considered.

See PPR, Chap. VIII, Sec. 1,  3.a., p. 83.  Indeed, except for
minor word differences in the first sentence in each of the
above-quoted paragraphs, they are identical.59
   Furthermore, insofar as is relevant here, the GPO Cost
   Directive states:
      4. Contracts with commercial and other organizations.

   * * * * * * * * * *

            (b) In addition, the contracting officer shall
            incorporate the cost principles and procedures in
            section 3 [of the GPO Cost Directive] by reference in
            contracts with organizations as the basis for-

   * * * * * * * * * *

            (3) Proposing, negotiating, or determining costs
            under terminated contracts;

See GPO Cost Directive, Sec. 2,  4(b)(3), p. 6.  Again, although
much briefer, the PPR tells Contracting Officers the same thing:

         b. Additional. The Contracting Officer shall also use
         the cost principles as a basis for:

               (1) Proposing, negotiating, or determining costs
               under terminated    contracts; . . ."

See PPR, Chap. VIII, Sec. 1,  3.b., p. 83.60  See also R.C.
Swanson, supra, Supplemental Decision, slip. op. at 5, fn. 5.
Suffice it to say, that the last ingredient in the cost principle
mix for GPO contracts which are terminated for convenience, are
the implementing provisions in GPO Contract Terms, which
incorporate the GPO Cost Directive by reference.  See GPO
Contract Terms, Contract Clauses,  19(g), 45.
   As the Board reads the GPO scheme for using cost principles in
   convenience termination cases, the overall philosophy appears
   to be similar to and in harmony with the approach taken by the
   Court of Claims in Codex Corp. v. United States, and adopted
   by the GSBCA in Richerson Construction, Inc., and the VABCA in
   Industrial Refrigeration Service Corp., and Arctic Corner,
   Inc.  In that regard, the above-quoted paragraphs from the GPO
   Cost Directive and the PPR appear to be simply condensed
   versions of the regulatory provisions at issue in Arctic
   Corner, Inc., supra, 86-3 BCA at 97,456.  The Board has said
   several times in the past, that where GPO adopts the
   regulatory language followed by other agencies as its own, in
   this case the cost principal rules governing contracts which
   are terminated for convenience, we must presume that the
   uniform interpretation given to those words has also been
   accepted.  See Sterling Printing, Inc., GPO BCA 20-89,
   Decision Denying Second Motion for Consideration (August 12,
   1994), slip op. at 3 (procedural rules); Banta Co., GPO BCA
   03-91 (November 15, 1993), slip op. at 34, 1993 WL 526843
   ("Changes" clause); McDonald & Eudy Printers, Inc., supra,
   slip op. at 11-12 ("Requirements" clause); Shepard Printing,
   supra, slip op. at 21-22 ("Requirements" clause).
   Consequently, the Board will administer the cost principles in
   the relevant regulations of this agency-the GPO Cost
   Directive, the PPR, and the implementing provisions of GPO
   Contract Terms-consistent with the meaning and philosophy of
   the parallel provisions in the FAR, as interpreted by the
   Claims Court, the GSBCA and the VABCA in the above cited
   cases.  Accordingly, the Board ". . . will likewise approach
   the various disputed cost elements in this appeal with an eye
   toward fair compensation rather than imposing strict
   accounting principles upon the Appellant."61  See Industrial
   Refrigeration Service Corp., supra, 91-3 at 120,594; Arctic
   Corner, Inc., supra, 86-3 BCA at 97,457.
   The Board has thoroughly examined the record, including the
   testimony and exhibits presented at the hearing and the
   parties' briefs, and has carefully weighed the evidence
   against the termination for convenience principles set forth
   above.  From that review, it has reached the following
   conclusions regarding the issues in this appeal:
      A. Neither the Appellant's use of its standard stripping
      and blueline charges, nor the Contracting Officer's
      reliance on GPO Program A814-M to develop a new page rate
      for such costs, was the appropriate method for calculating
      those incurred and allowable direct costs.  Therefore, the
      Board shall determine the amount of recovery by use of the
      "jury verdict" method.
   The Contractor submitted two separate monetary claims
   following the termination of its contract-one on January 30,
   1991, in the amount of $4,697.37, for direct costs on work
   actually performed on Print Order 40000 before the contract
   was terminated, and the other on February 4, 1991, in the
   amount of $24,670.13 (subsequently reduced to $14,460.04 at
   the hearing) for indirect costs accounted for as unabsorbed
   (idle time) following termination (R4 File, Tabs M, N and O).
   The Board will address each claim seriatim.
   It should be noted at the outset that since the propriety of
   the termination for convenience is not an issue in this case,
   the Appellant's recovery is limited to that available under
   the contract's "Termination for Convenience" clause.  See
   Plaza 70 Interiors, Ltd., supra, 95-2 BCA at 137,939 (citing
   Manuals, Inc., ASBCA No. 24123, 80-2 BCA  14,579).  That
   clause, as previously noted, entitles a terminated contractor
   to recover its incurred costs plus a reasonable profit,
   subject, of course, to the overall limitation of the contract
   price. See GPO Contract Terms, Contract Clauses,  19(d); PPR,
   Chap. XIV, Sec. 2,  3.n.  See also R.C. Swanson Printing Co.,
   supra, Supplemental Decision, slip. op. at 17-18; Graphic
   Litho Co., Inc., supra, slip. op. at 10.  Here, the Appellant
   is asking only for costs, omitting any profit figure from its
   claims.  It seems apparent that the Contractor would not be
   entitled to a profit allowance in any event, because, by its
   own admission, it was in a loss position on Print Order 40000
   by nearly $20,000.00 (R4 File, Tab F, Attachment, Tab O, Cost
   Analysis; Complaint,  14, Exhibit A).  See GPO Contract
   Terms, Contract Clauses,  19(e)(2)(iii); PPR, Chap. XIV, Sec.
   2,  3.o.  Cf. Banta Co., supra, slip. op. at 26-28 (an
   equitable adjustment cannot be used to convert a loss contract
   into one for profit).  Accord Maitland Bros. Co., supra.
   That the Appellant incurred some costs under the contract is
   not in dispute.  Still, as previously mentioned, the
   Contractor has a dual burden in this case.  First, the
   Appellant is responsible for showing the total amount of its
   costs.  See R.C. Swanson Printing Co., supra, Supplemental
   Decision, slip. op. at 19.  Accord Lisbon Contractors, Inc. v.
   United States, supra, 828 F.2d at 767; J. W. Cook & Sons,
   Inc., supra, 92-3 BCA at 124,863; Youngstrand Surveying,
   supra, 92-2 BCA at 124,694.  Also cf. Banta Co., supra, slip
   op. at 43, fn. 53 (citing Lawrence D. Krause, AGBCA No.
   76-118-4, 82-2 BCA  16,129, at 80,073; Onetta Boat Works,
   Inc., ENGBCA No. 3733, 81-2 BCA  15,869; Click Co., Inc.,
   GSBCA No. 3007, 70-1 BCA  8335; Campbell Co., General
   Contractor, Inc., IBCA No. 722, 69-1 BCA  7574).  Second, the
   Contractor must demonstrate that its costs were reasonable.
   Cf. Banta Co., supra, slip op. at 43 (citing Celesco
   Industries, ASBCA No. 22251, 79-1 BCA  13,604; Triple "A"
   Machine Shop, Inc., ASBCA No. 21561, 78-1 BCA  13,065 (1978);
   Cal Constructors, ASBCA No. 21179, 78-1 BCA  12,992 (1977)).
   See also Universal Printing Co., supra, slip op. at 40 (citing
   Michael-Mark, Ltd., IBCA Nos. 2697, 2890, 2891, 2892, 2893,
   2894, 2895, 94-1 BCA  26,453; Lemar Construction Co., ASBCA
   Nos. 31161, 31719, 88-1 BCA  20,429; Lawrence D. Krause,
   supra; Onetta Boat Works, Inc., supra; Globe Construction Co.,
   ASBCA No. 21069, 78-2 BCA  13,337).  Whether a contractor's
   costs are reasonable is a question of fact depending on the
   circumstances.  See Universal Printing Co., supra, slip op. at
   42 (citing Nager Electric Co., Inc. and Keystone Engineering
   Corp. v. United States, 194 Ct. Cl. 835, 442 F.2d 936 (1971)
   (hereinafter Nager Electric) ).  In that regard, the
   "reasonable cost" concept:
      . . . includes both `objective' and `subjective' elements .
      . . The objective focus is on the costs that would have
      been incurred by a prudent businessman placed in a similar
      overall competitive situation . . . However, unless it also
      takes into account the subjective situation of the
      contractor, a test of `reasonable cost' is incomplete.

See Nager Electric, supra, 194 Ct. Cl. at 851-53, 442 F.2d at
945-46.
   The Appellant's direct cost claim is comprised of six (6) line
   items-film costs, stripping charges, blueline costs, Federal
   Express charges for receipt of original documents, and another
   for the return of the originals, and UPS charges for sending
   the blueline proofs to the NIH (R4 File, Tabs M and O; App.
   Exh. No. 2, p. 1).  Only two of those items-stripping and
   blueline costs-are at issue here, since the Contracting
   Officer has allowed the other charges in full.62  Furthermore,
   the parties agree that the source of the problem is the fact
   that stripping and blueline production costs were not separate
   line items in the contract's schedule of prices, but rather
   were part of the contract's line item for the makeready and/or
   setup charges (Tr. 88, 117, 124; R4 File, Tab S, p. 1).  Since
   makeready and setup also included plate-making and setting up
   the press, which were never performed, the conundrum facing
   the parties when the contract was terminated was to figure out
   how to isolate the costs of stripping and bluelines from the
   price bid by the Appellant for makeready and/or setup ($11.82
   per page) (R4 File, Tabs B, p. 3, and S, p. 1).  The
   Contractor's solution was simple-it merely applied its
   standard charges for stripping ($9.50 per flat) and bluelines
   ($3.50 per page), to the operations in question, which
   resulted in a bill for stripping costs of $798.12 and blueline
   costs of $2,002.00, respectively, or a total claim of
   $2,800.12 for these tasks ((Tr. 18-21, 24-25).  The
   Respondent, on the other hand, believing that the Appellant's
   stripping and blueline charges were unreasonably high when
   compared with the rates of other commercial printers,
   calculated a wholly new price per page of $1.49 for both tasks
   by averaging the bids of 38 printing contractors on an
   unrelated GPO general use program-Program A814-M-in which
   almost all prices were separate line items (Tr. 117-19, 122,
   124, 126-28, 130, 134; R4 File, Tabs R, Attachment D, fns. 2
   and 3 and S).  The Government's price of $1.49 per page, when
   multiplied by a total page count of 572 pages for both books,
   yielded a recovery for the Appellant of $852.28 for these
   items (Tr. 117, 124; R4 File, Tab S, p. 2).  Thus, the amount
   in controversy regarding stripping and blueline costs is only
   $1,947.84 ($2,800.12 (Appellant's claim) [-] $852.28
   (Government's settlement offer)).  Since both parties believe
   their respective approaches were reasonable under the
   circumstances, while the other's was either unreasonable or
   patently unfair, the Board is left to untie their Gordian
   knot.  In the Board's view, neither party's solution is
   satisfactory.
   On the one hand, the Appellant's simple expedient of merely
   applying its standard charges for stripping and bluelines to
   the operations in question, is analogous to figuring the costs
   for those tasks on the basis of some arbitrary formula.  The
   Board has previously noted that claims prepared on such a
   basis are uniformly rejected by boards of contract appeals.
   See Universal Printing Co., supra, slip op. at 36 (citing
   Ordnance Materials, Inc., ASBCA No. 32371, 88-3 BCA  20,910).
   Rather, in order to avoid a windfall for either party, what is
   usually required of a contractor is a showing of its actual
   costs.  See Universal Printing Co., supra, slip op. at 41
   (citing Dawco Construction, Inc. v. United  States, 930 F.2d
   872, 882 (Fed. Cir. 1991), rev'g 18 Cl. Ct. 682 (1990); Cen-
   Vi-Ro of Texas v. United States, 210 Ct. Cl. 684 (1976); Buck
   Brown Contracting Co., IBCA No. 1119-7-76, 78-2 BCA  13,360;
   Engineered Systems, Inc., DOTCAB No. 75-5, 76-2 BCA  12,211;
   Bregman Construction Corp., ASBCA No. 15020, 72-1 BCA 
   9,411).  As a rule, actual costs are proved through the
   introduction of the contractor's accounting records, which
   will be accepted if they have been audited by the Government
   and are unrebutted.63  Celesco Industries, supra, 79-1 BCA 
   13,604.  In this case, the OIG auditors found the Appellant's
   records inadequate to support its stripping and blueline claim
   (R4 File, Tab R, Attachment D, fns. 2 and 3).  However, the
   Board believes that for termination settlements, the
   "reasonable cost" concept's subjective elements are merged
   into the basic thrust of the "fairness concept," and the
   contractor is not required to document each and every cost
   item, so long as some credible evidence (whether documentary,
   testimonial, or both) is presented to establish the validity
   of the claimed costs, as well as assure that the Government is
   not being charged for services or products which were not
   provided.  See Industrial Refrigeration Service Corp., supra,
   91-3 BCA at 120,595.
   On the other hand, the Board finds itself in agreement with
   the Appellant's objection to the Respondent's use of the line
   item structure of Program A814-M to establish the prices for
   stripping and bluelines.  The Government does not refute the
   Contractor's contention that because Program A814-M
   contemplates a high volume of work, averaging line item costs
   for stripping and bluelines in that contract results in an
   artificially low per page rate for such work in the context of
   this agreement (App. Brf., p. 3).64  More importantly, Program
   A814-M involves many contractors (at least 38), and there is
   no proof that the Appellant is one of them.  Without such
   privity of contract, the Contractor cannot be bound by the
   range of prices in Program A814-M.65  See Universal Printing
   Co., supra, slip op. at 26, fn. 27 (citing Atlantic Electric
   Co., GSBCA No. 6016, 83-1 BCA  16,484); Sterling Printing,
   Inc., supra, slip op. at 8, 47, fns. 13, 35.  See also RD
   Printing Associates, Inc., supra, slip op. at 13, fn. 15
   (revised pricing specification from the succeeding contract);
   Merchant's Service Co., [No GPOCAB Docket Number] (February
   11, 1980), slip. op. at 18-20, 1980 WL 81262.  Certainly, if
   the Board had been asked in the first instance to factor
   Program A814-M into its decision in this case, it would not
   have done so because its jurisdictional mandate bars
   consideration of matters pertaining to contracts unrelated to
   the one under review.  See e.g., Universal Printing Co.,
   supra, slip op. at 2, fn. 3; Shepard Printing, supra, slip.
   op. at 9, fn. 8; RD Printing Associates, Inc., supra, slip op.
   at 9, 13, fns. 9, 15; The Wessel Co., Inc., GPO BCA 8-90
   (February 28, 1992), slip. op. at 32, 1992 WL 487877;
   Automated Datatron, Inc., GPO BCA 20-87 (March 31, 1989), slip
   op. at 4-5, 1989 WL 384973; Bay Printing, Inc., GPO BCA 16-85
   (January 30, 1987) slip op. at 9, 1987 WL 228975; Peak
   Printers, Inc., GPO BCA 12-85 (November 16, 1986), Sl. op. at
   6, 1986 WL 181453.  See generally Matthew S. Foss, U.S.
   Government Printing Office Board of Contract Appeals: the
   First Decade, 24 Pub. Cont. L. J. 579 (1995), at 584-86.
   Under GPO Contract Terms, the GPO Cost Directive, and the PPR,
   the Respondent's contracting officers have more latitude in
   cases of this sort, except that their decisions are expected
   to be fair and reasonable under the circumstances.  In the
   Board's view, the employment of Program A814-M as the
   settlement baseline for stripping and blueline costs was
   neither fair or reasonable.
   Where, as here, the Board finds itself without a bench mark by
   which to determine the reasonableness of the Contractor's
   costs for performing the work, but nonetheless knows that some
   cost impact is involved, it will resort to the "jury verdict"
   method in order to arrive at a fair reimbursement.  See
   Universal Printing Co., supra, slip op. at 49; Banta Co.,
   supra, slip. op. at 46-47.  See also Maryland Composition, [No
   GPOCAB Docket Number] (December 30, 1974), slip op. at 6
   (citing, Johnson, Drake & Piper, Inc., ASBCA Nos. 9824, 10199,
   65-2 BCA  4,868).  Accord Industrial Refrigeration Service
   Corp., supra, 91-3 BCA at 120,595.  Under the "jury verdict"
   technique, where a board or court finds entitlement to some
   recovery clear but the evidence is incomplete, or the amount
   cannot be determined with any degree of mathematical
   precision, it may exercise its discretion to resolve
   conflicting evidence concerning the claim and arrive at a fair
   amount of compensation.66  See Assurance Co. v. United States,
   813 F.2d 1202, 1205 (Fed. Cir. 1987); S.W. Electronics &
   Manufacturing Corp. v. United States, 228 Ct. Cl. 333, 655
   F.2d 1078 (1981); Electronic & Missile Facilities, Inc. v.
   United States, 189 Ct. Cl. 237, 416 F.2d 1345, 1358 (1969).
   See also Dawco Construction, Inc., ASBCA No. 42120, 92-2 BCA 
   24,915; Gricoski Detective Agency, GSBCA Nos. 8901(7823),
   8922(7824), 8923(7825), 8924(7826), 8925(7827), 8926(7828),
   90-3 BCA  23,131; E.W. Eldridge, Inc., ENGBCA No. 5269, 90-3
   BCA   23,080; Harvey C. Jones, Inc., IBCA Nos. 2070, 2150,
   2151, 2152, 2153, 2467, 90-2 BCA  22,762.  The key to the use
   of the "jury verdict" method is the presence of sufficient
   evidence to permit the determination of a fair and reasonable
   approximation of damages.67  See J.E.T.S., Inc., ASBCA No.
   28083, 88-2 BCA  20,540, at 103,859 (citing, Schuster
   Engineering, Inc. ASBCA Nos. 28760, 29306, 30683, 87-3 BCA 
   20,105).  Thus, a trier of fact may allow recovery if it
   determines that: (1) clear proof of injury exists; (2) there
   is no more reliable method for computing damages; and (3)
   there is sufficient evidence to make a fair and reasonable
   approximation of damages.  See Dawco Construction, Inc. v.
   United States, supra, 930 F.2d at 880 (citing, WRB Corp. v.
   United States, 183 Ct. Cl. 409, 425 (1968)).  See also
   Gricoski Detective Agency, supra; Harvey C. Jones, Inc.,
   supra; J.E.T.S. Incorporated, supra; Lawrence D. Krause,
   supra.  In the Board's judgment, all of the elements necessary
   for a "jury verdict" award are present with respect to the
   Appellant's claim for direct costs on work actually performed
   on Print Order 40000.  Consequently, that approach is the
   appropriate method for resolving this dispute.  Universal
   Printing Co., supra; Banta Co., supra; Maryland Composition,
   supra.  Accord Industrial Refrigeration Service Corp., supra.
   While there are many "jury verdict" techniques, one well-
   accepted device is simply to "split the difference" between
   the amount claimed by each party.  See Sentry Insurance, A
   Mutual Company, VABCA No. 2617, 91-3 BCA  24,094 (50 percent
   of the contractor's invoiced costs, plus 15 percent for
   markup); Gricoski Detective Agency, supra (amount which was
   midway between the contractor's original demand and the final
   bargaining position of the agency); Parkdale Building
   Maintenance, ENGBCA No. 5232, 90-1 BCA  22,319 (average of
   the contractor's and Government's estimates); Second Growth
   Forest Management, Inc., AGBCA No. 88-153-3, 89-1 BCA  21,569
   (average of the contractor's and Governments production
   rates); Delfour, Inc., VABCA Nos. 2049, 2215, 2539, 2540, 89-1
   BCA  21,394 (50 percent of the amount claimed by the
   contractor); The Morrison Co., ASBCA Nos. 26746, 26920, 26921,
   83-1 BCA  16,417 (equitable adjustment was midway between the
   amount which each party claimed).  It seems to the Board that
   a "jury verdict" which sets the Appellant's recovery for
   stripping and bluelines midway between its claim for that work
   and the amount offered by the Respondent for those tasks is
   the best way to break the deadlock between the parties and
   resolve this aspect of the termination dispute reasonably and
   fairly.  See Universal Printing Co., supra, slip op. at 53.
   Accord Gricoski Detective Agency, supra, 90-3 BCA at
   116,138-39; Parkdale Building Maintenance, supra, 90-1 BCA at
   112,094; The Morrison Co., supra, 83-1 BCA at 81,675.
   Therefore, the Board will allow the Appellant's claim for
   stripping and bluelines to the extent of $1,826.20, calculated
   as follows:
      Appellant's total claim for stripping
         and blueline costs            $2,800.12

      Government's settlement offer                  852.28
      $852.28

      Difference between claim and offer        1,947.84

      50 percent of difference            $  973.92
      973.92

      Total allowance for stripping and bluelines
      $1,826.20

Thus, the overall recovery of the Appellant for the work actually
performed on Print Order 40000 before it was terminated is
$3,723.45, figured as follows:
      Film costs                    $1,754.00
      Federal Express and UPS charges            143.25
      Stripping and bluelines               1,826.20
      Total recovery                $3,723.45
   Although this compromise verdict awards the Appellant somewhat
   less for its direct costs than the $4,697.37 claimed, but
   somewhat more than the Respondent's offer of $2,749.28, see R4
   File, Tabs M, O, S and T, the Board has no doubt that the
   result is one which best satisfies its goal of approaching ".
   . . the various disputed cost elements in this appeal with an
   eye toward fair compensation rather than imposing strict
   accounting principles upon the Appellant."  See Industrial
   Refrigeration Service Corp., supra, 91-3 at 120,594; Arctic
   Corner, Inc., supra, 86-3 BCA at 97,457.
      B. The Contracting Officer mistakenly denied the
      Appellant's unabsorbed overhead claim based, in part, on
      the OIG's erroneous interpretation of GPO Cost Directive,
      Sec. 3,  25(c).  The cost principles applicable in
      convenience termination cases allow the recovery of certain
      continuing costs following termination, including costs
      resulting from idle capacity of tangible capital assets
      such as plant machinery.  Furthermore, where, as here, a
      "requirements" contract is terminated for convenience, a
      contractor is entitled to be reimbursed for certain costs
      which cannot reasonably be discontinued immediately after
      termination.  See GPO Cost Directive, Sec. 3,  49(b).

   The principal dispute in this case involves the Contractor's
   claim for idle time costs following termination of the
   contract, and nearly all of the evidence presented at the
   hearing concerned this claim (R4 File, Tabs M, N and O).  To
   recapitulate, the Contractor is asking to be reimbursed for
   the following idle time costs: (1) makeready and running costs
   for the Miller Press (112 hours); (2) labor costs for the
   press helper (112 hours); (3) folding charges (46.88 hours);
   (4) collating costs (machine time only) (30.5 hours); (5)
   perfect binding charges (76 hours); and (6) trimming costs (63
   hours) (Tr. 60-63, 74-75; App. Exh. No. 6).  These idle hours
   were accumulated over 18 workdays in the month of February
   1991 (App. Exh. No. 5).68  Furthermore, the Appellant's claim
   only covers the performance period for Print Order 40000,
   despite the fact that this "requirements" contract was not due
   to expire until October 1991 (Tr. 66, 70, 72; R4 File, Tabs C,
   D and L; App. Exh. No. 8).  In that regard, the Contractor's
   financial losses resulting from the termination of the
   contract were confined to February 1991-its records show that
   by March 1991, it had booked enough work for the Miller Press
   to completely replace the NIH job and was once again operating
   at a profit, thus mitigating the Government's potential
   liability (Tr. 60-61, 66-68, 70-71; App. Exh. No. 9).
   In disallowing the Appellant's claim for lost production time,
   the Contracting Officer essentially concurred in the OIG's
   findings that: (1) the claim was governed by GPO Cost
   Directive,  Sec. 3,  25(c) (Idle facilities and idle capacity
   costs); and (2) that cost principle barred the claim on the
   ground that the idle time in question was not peculiar to the
   contract, but resulted from normal periodic fluctuations in
   usage of equipment, and hence was simply a cost of doing
   business which should be included in the Contractor's overhead
   from prior years (Tr. 129, 133-34; R4 File, Tab R, Attachment
   E, fn. 1, citing GPO Cost Directive, Sec. 3,  25(c)).
   Furthermore, by obtaining the Contractor's admission at the
   hearing that the Miller Press-the principal press set aside
   for the NIH job-was about three years old when termination
   occurred and was not acquired specifically for work on the
   contract, Counsel for GPO was tacitly suggesting that recovery
   for idle time was also barred because the Appellant's
   machinery were "common items" and such costs are generally not
   allowable under the termination accounting rules (Tr. 78-79,
   107-08).  See GPO Cost Directive, Sec. 3,  49(a).  The Board
   disagrees.  In our view, the temporary downtime of the
   Appellant's equipment following termination is more properly
   seen as a continuing cost which could not be discontinued
   immediately, and as such is allowable.  See GPO Cost
   Directive, Sec. 3,  49(b).
   The Board has previously considered the "idle facilities and
   idle capacity costs" provisions of the GPO Cost Directive in
   equitable adjustment cases.  See e.g., New South Press, GPO
   BCA 45-92 (November 4, 1994), 1994 WL 837425; Banta Co.,
   supra.  See also Editors Press, Inc., GPO BCA 3-90 (September
   4, 1991), 1991 WL 439271.  This appeal represents the first
   time that the Board has been asked to consider those
   provisions in the context of a termination for convenience.
   The Board's research, however, indicates that the Appellant is
   entitled to recover certain downtime costs in this situation.
   The Board begins its analysis by rejecting any suggestion that
   the Appellant's press and other plant machinery should somehow
   be deemed "common items" for the purposes of this contract.
   In that regard, the relevant provision of the GPO Cost
   Directive states:
      (a)   Common items. The costs of items reasonably usable on
      the contractor's other work shall not be allowable unless
      the contractor submits evidence that the items could not be
      retained at cost without sustaining a loss.  The
      contracting officer should consider the contractor's plans
      and orders for current and planned production when
      determining if items can reasonably be used on other work
      of the contractor.  Contemporaneous purchases of common
      items by the contractor shall be regarded as evidence that
      such items are reasonably usable on the contractor's other
      work.  Any acceptance of common items as allocable to the
      terminated portion of the contract should be limited to the
      extent that the quantities of such items on hand, in
      transit, and on order are in excess of the reasonable
      quantitative requirements of other work.
See GPO Cost Directive, Sec. 3,  49(a).69  However, the
customary interpretation of "common items" for the purposes of
this provision is limited to supplies and other inventory items
associated with production which can be utilized by the
contractor in its other work.  See Fiesta Leasing and Sales, Inc,
supra, 87-1 BCA at 99,286.  Here, on the other hand, the
Appellant's production machinery are tangible capital assets and
not the kind of inventory to which the provision most
appropriately applies.70  See Anderson,  13.03[4], p. 13-6.
   Since the equipment in question are tangible capital assets,
   post-termination costs associated with them are treated as
   idle capacity costs.71  See GPO Cost Directive, Sec. 3, 
   25(c).  See also Fiesta Leasing and Sales, Inc, supra, 87-1
   BCA at 99,287-88.  Such costs include, inter alia, repair,
   rent, property taxes, insurance, and depreciation, see GPO
   Cost Directive, Sec. 3,  25(a)-all of which are cost factors
   used by the Appellant in formulating the BHR for each piece of
   machinery in its plant.72  While the Contracting Officer
   rejected the Appellant's claim in reliance on the general rule
   which considers idle capacity costs a normal cost of doing
   business, the Board also observes that the relevant cost
   principle also provides that such costs are allowable ". . .
   provided the capacity is necessary or was originally
   reasonable and is not subject to reduction or elimination by
   subletting, renting, or sale, in accordance with sound
   business, economics, or security practices."  See GPO Cost
   Directive, Sec. 3,  25(c).  There is no dispute that the
   Appellant had dedicated the Miller Press and its other
   production machinery to the contract, and that the equipment
   was clearly necessary for performance.  Therefore, in the
   Board's view, the Contractor's inability, despite its best
   efforts, to completely eliminate the downtime which resulted
   when the contract was terminated, entitles it to a recovery
   for idle capacity costs for that portion of the time that the
   machinery went unused.  See Fiesta Leasing and Sales, Inc,
   supra, 87-1 BCA at 99,288.
   The Board believes that the result would be the same if the
   downtime of the Appellant's tangible capital assets was
   considered idle facilities costs.  See GPO Cost Directive,
   Sec. 3,  25(b).  In that regard, the costs of idle
   facilities, like idle capacity costs, are generally
   unallowable.  Id.  However, such costs are allowable if the
   tangible capital assets were necessary when acquired and are
   now idle because of, inter alia, a ". . . termination,"
   although only for a "reasonable period" (ordinarily not
   exceeding one year, depending upon efforts taken by the
   contractor to use, lease, or dispose of the idle facilities).
   See GPO Cost Directive, Sec. 3,  25(b)(2).  Nothing in the
   language of this cost principle requires the contractor to
   show that the equipment was purchased solely for performance
   of the terminated contract; all that is needed is a showing
   that the machinery was set aside especially for use in
   performance.  See Fiesta Leasing and Sales, Inc, supra, 87-1
   BCA at 99,289.  If the latter is the case, then certain costs
   such as depreciation, insurance, repair, etc., are not
   considered indirect costs or overhead items, and recovery is
   allowed based on a finding that a clear connection exists
   between the costs claimed and the terminated contract, and
   that those costs, as will be discussed infra, could not be
   reasonably immediately discontinued upon termination.  Id
   (citing, Metered Laundry Services, Inc., ASBCA No. 21573, 78-1
   BCA  13,206; Bailfield Industries, Division of A-T-O, Inc.,
   ASBCA No. 20006, 76-2 BCA  12,096).
   Even more importantly in the context of this case, as the
   Board has already observed, is the implication in the
   Contracting Officer's rejection of the Contractor's idle time
   claim that the regulations only entitled the Appellant to
   reimbursement for work actually performed under Print Order
   40000 (Tr. 119, 121; R4 File, Tab T, p. 1).  Stated otherwise,
   the Respondent's theory is tantamount to an argument that the
   convenience termination of the Appellant's requirements
   contract in effect converted it into a fixed price contract
   (Print Order 40000) for termination settlement purposes.  Such
   a viewpoint, however, has already been rejected by the Board
   because it deprives the parties of the benefit of their
   bargain.  See R.C. Swanson, supra, Supplemental Decision,
   slip. op. at 21, 26.  Accord Tom Shaw, Inc., supra, 93-2 BCA
   at 128,073.  Furthermore, the cases indicate that certain
   features of a "requirements" contract can comprise the special
   circumstances in convenience termination situations which the
   Appellant says can overcome the general rule barring recovery
   of unabsorbed overhead as a continuing cost (App. Brf., pp.
   3-5).  See Cloverleaf Enterprises, Inc., supra, slip op. at
   16-17.73  Accord Albano Cleaners, Inc. v. United States, 197
   Ct. Cl. 450, 455 F.2d 556 (1972); Aviation Specialists, Inc.,
   supra.  See also Henry Angelo & Co., ASBCA No. 43669, 94-1 BCA
    26,484 (although not a termination for convenience case, the
   board ruled that the Government's failure to order within 15
   percent of estimated quantities under requirements contract
   can lead to increased costs, entitling contractor to recover
   both direct and indirect costs, including unabsorbed overhead.
   Citing Les Killgore's Excavating, ASBCA No. 32261, 86-3 BCA 
   19,117).  See generally Cibinic & Nash, pp. 1130-31.
   In R.C. Swanson, the Board adopted the reasoning of the DOTBCA
   in Aviation Specialists, Inc., supra, in ruling that the
   "total contract price" under GPO Contract Terms, Contract
   Clauses,  19(d) for a terminated requirements contract is the
   "estimated contract price," as established by the Government's
   pre-award estimates of its requirements in the solicitation.
   See R.C. Swanson, supra, Supplemental Decision, slip op. at
   21-25 (citing, Aviation Specialists, Inc., supra, 91-1 BCA at
   117,994).  The proper formula for measuring "total contract
   price" is not an issue in this appeal.  However, the Board's
   opinion also accepted the DOTBCA's rationale that the very
   nature of a requirements contract authorizes recovery of
   certain post-termination costs, including depreciation,
   overhead and profit (where applicable), which is at the heart
   of the Appellant's idle time claim.74  See R.C. Swanson,
   supra, Supplemental Decision, slip op. at 26-27, fn. 22.  See
   Aviation Specialists, Inc., supra, 91-1 BCA at 117,992,
   117,994.
   Aviation Specialists, Inc. involved a one-year requirements
   contract for use of a particular aircraft which was terminated
   for convenience by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)
   with six months remaining in the contract term.  In ruling
   that the contractor was entitled to recover its costs of
   depreciation, insurance, maintenance, facilities capital,
   advertising and overhead, as well as a measure of profit, for
   the remainder of the contract period, the DOTBCA held that the
   FAA's decision not to allow the contract to expire without any
   further use of the aircraft or expense to the Government, but
   to terminate it for convenience instead, changed the
   relationship between the parties and triggered the provisions
   of the "Termination for Convenience" clause.75  See Aviation
   Specialists, Inc., supra, 91-1 BCA at 117,992.  As explained
   by the DOTBCA, depreciation, insurance, maintenance, overhead,
   etc., continued to be incurred by the contractor despite its
   reasonable efforts to sell the aircraft or otherwise mitigate
   its costs, and the termination regulations clearly provide
   that costs which cannot reasonably be immediately discontinued
   upon termination of the contract are recoverable.  See
   Aviation Specialists, Inc., supra, 91-1 BCA at 117,992-93.
   The DOTBCA reasoned, in pertinent part:
      Upon termination of the contract [by means of the
      "Termination for Convenience" clause] the rights and
      obligations of both parties were altered.  The parties
      specifically provided by contract that in such an
      eventuality appellant would receive payment for certain
      costs, notwithstanding whether these costs would have been
      reimbursed if the contract was fully performed.  It is this
      agreement of the parties which controls the payment, if
      any, to be made to appellant, irrespective of the rights
      and obligations of the parties prior to such termination.

   * * * * * * * * * *

      The provisions of the "Termination for Convenience" clause
      are to be enforced in these circumstances even if the
      resulting payments to Aviation Specialists are greater than
      they might have been if the contract were not terminated.
      See Albano Cleaners, Inc. v. United States [17 CCF 
      81,144], 455 F.2d 556, 197 Ct. Cl. 450 (1972).

   * * * * * * * * * *

       . . The contract specified the type and amount of costs
       which appellant could recover in the event of a
       termination for convenience.  Appellant has claimed its
       continuing costs, those that it incurred subsequent to
       termination. . . .

      The "Termination for Convenience" clause of the contract
      provided that the cost principles of Part 31 of the Federal
      Acquisition Regulation would govern all costs claimed in
      the event of such a termination.  Part 31 provides that
      costs which cannot be discontinued immediately after
      termination are allowable.  After termination, appellant
      made reasonable, though unsuccessful, efforts to promptly
      dispose of the plane.  Aviation Specialists also acted
      reasonably in attempting to mitigate damages.  It was able
      to lease the plane during some of the period and apply the
      profits received from these operations against its
      continuing costs.  Thus, under the contract provisions,
      Aviation Specialists is entitled to be reimbursed for its
      continuing costs after termination.

   * * * * * * * * * *

      . . . We find that, . . . , Aviation Specialists is
      entitled to recover its costs relating to the aircraft
      which continued after the date of termination.  These costs
      are recoverable, pursuant to the plain language of the
      contract including Part 31 of the Federal Acquisition
      Regulation.  The costs which appellant had claimed were
      incurred as a direct result of obligation Aviation
      Specialists undertook to perform the contract.  These costs
      could not reasonably be discontinued during the remaining
      contract term. . . .

   * * * * * * * * * *

      In this case we find that appellant incurred expenses of
      depreciation, insurance, maintenance, facilities capital,
      overhead, and advertising following termination.  These
      costs are recoverable as continuing costs under the Federal
      Acquisition Regulations since, as we have found, they could
      not be reasonably discontinued immediately. . . .

   * * * * * * * * * *

See Aviation Specialists, Inc., supra, 91-1 BCA at 117,991-93.76
   The Board believes that the teachings of Aviation Specialists,
   Inc. are as applicable to this appeal as they were in R.C.
   Swanson.  Like the FAA in Aviation Specialists, Inc., GPO did
   not simply allow the contract to expire on its own.  Nor did
   the Respondent default the contract, as it apparently once
   contemplated doing and discussed with the Appellant (Tr.
   83-84; R4 File, Tabs G, H and O; Complaint,  21).  See GPO
   Contract Terms, Contract Terms,  20 (Default).  Instead, the
   Government invoked the "Termination for Convenience" clause,
   which effectively changed the relationship between the
   parties.  See Aviation Specialists, Inc., supra, 91-1 BCA at
   117,991.  The Respondent is bound by that decision, and it is
   the convenience termination clause which ". . . controls the
   payment, if any, to be made to appellant, irrespective of the
   rights and obligations of the parties prior to such
   termination."  Id.  Furthermore, in our view, the DOTBCA's
   comment that the cost principles of Part 31 of the FAR are
   part and parcel of the convenience termination clause, see
   Aviation Specialists, Inc., supra, 91-1 BCA at 117,992, is no
   different from the Board's own observation that the standard
   cost principles applicable to Government contracts apply to
   GPO contracts which are also terminated for convenience, see
   R.C. Swanson, supra, Supplemental Decision, slip op. at 5, 23,
   fns. 5, 18.  Stated otherwise, as the Respondent suggests, the
   GPO Cost Directive and FAR Part 31 are mirror images of one
   another, and they have the same purpose and effect (R. Brf.,
   p. 3).77  Accordingly, the Board will look to the relevant
   provisions of the GPO Cost Directive for a solution to this
   dispute.
   The key cost principles applicable to this case are not hidden
   or ambiguous.  They are contained in the GPO Cost Directive,
   especially the provisions expressly denominated "Termination
   costs."  See GPO Cost Directive, Sec. 3,  49.  Like Part 31
   of the FAR, the GPO Cost Directive also allows the recovery of
   costs which cannot be discontinued immediately after
   termination despite all reasonable efforts by the contractor.
   See GPO Cost Directive, Sec. 3,  49(b).  Furthermore, it is
   significant in the context of this dispute that the very first
   paragraph of the provisions relating to termination costs
   states that the "cost principles peculiar to termination
   situations are to be used in conjunction with the other cost
   principles in [Section 3][.]"  See GPO Cost Directive, Sec. 3,
    49.  Thus, even though the Board has said that an
   independent basis exists to support the Appellant's recovery
   of certain post-termination costs under the "idle facilities
   and idle capacity costs" provisions of the GPO Cost Directive,
   this language, at the very least, is broad enough to encompass
   some of those idle time precepts by reference, including,
   inter alia, the rules that: (1) idle capacity costs are
   allowable if the original capacity was necessary or reasonable
   and not subject to reduction or elimination by following sound
   business, economic or security practices; and (2) idle
   facilities costs are allowable if they were incurred, inter
   alia, by changes in requirements, termination, or other causes
   which could not have been reasonably foreseen, see GPO Cost
   Directive, Sec. 3,  25(b)(2),(c).78
   It is uncontroverted that following termination the Appellant
   bid on other Government and private sector work in an effort
   to reduce its downtime claim, and indeed, succeeded in
   mitigating its losses by 30 percent (of the 160 hours press
   hours available in February 1991, the Contractor was able to
   fill 48 hours with other work) (Tr. 45, 50, 54, 61, 66, 110,
   114; App. Exh. No. 5).  Furthermore, as previously mentioned,
   by its efforts the Appellant was not only able to reduce the
   amount of idle time, but also limit the extent; i.e., the time
   period over which its downtime costs were incurred is confined
   to 18 workdays in February 1991-by March 1991, the Appellant
   had completely replaced the terminated job with enough other
   work to again be running at a profit (Tr. 60-61, 66-68, 70-72;
   App. Exh. Nos. 5, 8 and 9).  Thus, in the Board's view, the
   record amply supports the conclusion that after termination,
   the Contractor acted reasonably in attempting to mitigate
   damages.  Consequently, under the plain language of the
   contract including GPO Cost Directive, Sec. 3,  49(b), the
   Appellant is entitled to be reimbursed for its indirect costs
   which continued after termination through the end of February
   1991.79  See Aviation Specialists, Inc., supra, 91-1 BCA at
   117,992.  Also cf. J.W. Cook & Sons, Inc., supra, 92-3 BCA at
   124,863 (the Government was not liable for the terminated
   contractor's fixed general and administrative (G&A) expenses
   where the contractor admitted that it could have bid on other
   jobs, but failed to do so, because it is well settled that a
   contractor must show that the fixed G&A expenses could not
   have been reasonably absorbed by other work.  Citing CBC
   Enterprises, Inc. v. United States, 24 Cl. Ct. 187 (1991);
   Charles G. Williams Construction, Inc., ASBCA No. 42592, 92-1
   BCA  24,635).  Specifically, such costs as maintenance,
   repair, rent, and other related costs, such as property taxes,
   insurance, and depreciation are recoverable as continuing
   costs under the GPO Cost Directive, since it seems clear that
   they could not have been totally discontinued immediately upon
   termination.  Id., 91-1 BCA at 117,993.
   Finally, although the Respondent will probably disagree, the
   Board believes that its entitlement decision in this case is
   not inconsistent with the general rule that unabsorbed
   overhead expenses are considered a "cost of doing business"
   and are not recoverable under a termination settlement.  See
   Nolan Brothers v. United States, supra; J.W. Cook & Sons,
   Inc., supra; Chamberlain Manufacturing Corp., supra;
   Technology, Inc., supra.  In the first place, construction
   contracts aside (Nolan Brothers, Inc. v. United States, supra;
   William Green Construction Co., Inc. et al. v. United States,
   supra; Hewitt Contracting Co., supra), all of the cases cited
   to the Board by the Respondent in support of its position
   involve some variation of a fixed price contract, see
   Chamberlain Manufacturing Corp., supra (fixed price incentive
   manufacturing contract); Pioneer Recovery Systems, supra
   (fixed price supply contract); Technology, Inc., supra (cost
   plus fixed fee contract); Fairchild Stratos Corp., supra
   (fixed price supply contract).  A "requirements" contract was
   not involved in any of the cases.  Secondly, one of the
   principal reasons given by the ASBCA in Chamberlain
   Manufacturing for the general rule, namely that if unabsorbed
   overhead claims were allowed "the Government would be
   guaranteeing a contractor's overhead costs, without receiving
   any benefit therefore, as a `penalty' for exercising its
   contractual rights," see Chamberlain Manufacturing Corp.,
   supra, 73-2 BCA at 47,679, was expressly rejected by the
   DOTBCA in Aviation Specialists, see Aviation Specialists,
   Inc., supra, 91-1 BCA at 117,991 ("The FAA alleges that it
   should not be penalized for terminating the contract for
   convenience.  [] While this argument has initial appeal, the
   argument also has flaws. . . .").  To the extent that Aviation
   Specialists represents a difference in philosophy with the
   ASBCA's ruling in Chamberlain Manufacturing Corp., the Board
   favors the DOTBCA's thinking because it better harmonizes with
   the "fairness" concept in termination cases involving
   requirements contracts.  Accord Industrial Refrigeration
   Service Corp., supra, 91-3 at 120,594; Arctic Corner, Inc.,
   supra, 86-3 BCA at 97,457.  Third, even in Chamberlain
   Manufacturing, the ASBCA recognized that despite the general
   rule, certain specific indirect costs might be allowable in
   termination cases, see Chamberlain Manufacturing Corp., supra,
   73-2 BCA at 47,679, and indeed, in Fairchild Stratos, the case
   which foreshadowed its holding in Technology, Inc., the ASBCA
   indicated that ". . . there may be instances where allowance
   of unearned or unabsorbed dollar overhead would be
   appropriate[,]" especially unabsorbed overhead directly
   related to the performance of the contract; e.g., involving
   the specific plant and equipment set aside for performance of
   the contract, see Fairchild Stratos Corp., supra, 67-1 BCA at
   28,798.  In short, it seems clear the real problem with
   unabsorbed overhead concerns its allocability and difficulties
   in separating risks of a business continuing to obtain
   business or fill a void when the Government exercises its
   contractual right to terminate a contract for convenience.
   See  Southland Manufacturing Corp., supra, 75-1 BCA at 52,360.
   However, such matters are appropriate for resolution in this
   case by applying the general principles set forth in GPO
   Contract Terms and the GPO Cost Directive to the facts, while
   being mindful that the goal is fair compensation rather than
   the imposition of strict accounting rules.  See Industrial
   Refrigeration Service Corp., supra, 91-3 at 120,594; Arctic
   Corner, Inc., supra, 86-3 BCA at 97,457.
   Accordingly, for all of these reasons, the Board concludes
   that the Appellant's termination claim for idle time costs was
   erroneously denied by the Contracting Officer, who relied, in
   part, on the OIG's incorrect interpretation of GPO Cost
   Directive, Sec. 3,  25(c).  Furthermore, the Board finds,
   contrary to the Respondent's view, that the applicable cost
   principles allow the Appellant to recover certain of its
   continuing costs which cannot reasonably be immediately
   discontinued for a limited period of time following the
   termination.  See GPO Cost Directive, Sec. 3,  25(c), 49(b).
      C. Applying the "jury verdict" method to the Appellant's
      idle time claim, the Board concludes that the Contractor is
      entitled to recover post-termination costs of $7,683.62 as
      fair compensation under the circumstances of this case.

   The Board has found that the Appellant is entitled to be
   reimbursed for its post-termination idle time costs through
   the end of February 1991.  That the Contractor temporarily
   incurred such costs as a result of the termination of its
   contract is not in dispute.  Therefore, the last task
   confronting the Board is to decide what amount of recovery
   will fairly compensate the Contractor under the circumstances
   of this case.
   Looking at the six parts of the Appellant's claim for post-
   termination costs, it is apparent that only one-the press
   helper claim-involves personnel costs, while the remaining
   five concern machinery downtime.  There is no doubt that the
   Miller Press was temporarily shut down because the Respondent
   terminated the NIH contract, and as a result the press helper,
   Larson, was idled (Tr. 80-81, 99).  Therefore, the Contractor
   now seeks compensation of $1,058.40, calculated at a labor
   rate of $9.45 an hour multiplied by 112 hours of unfilled time
   for the Miller Press.  This claim is easily disposed of.  As a
   rule, employee idle time charged to a termination claim is
   generally allowable.  See Hugo Auchter GmbH, ASBCA No. 39642,
   91-1 BCA  23,645 at 118,443 (citing Edward v. Campbell, LBCA
   No. 82-BCA-4, 84-3 BCA  17,657 at 88,011; American Electric,
   Inc., ASBCA No. 16635, 76-2 BCA  12,151).  The theory is that
   the wages and salaries of idle employees are considered in the
   nature of preparatory costs which are allocable, inter alia,
   to terminated work.  See Hugo Auchter GmbH, supra, 91-1 BCA at
   118,443 (citing Teague Industries & Technical Services Co.,
   ASBCA Nos. 29230, 29642, 86-2 BCA  18,790).  See also Arctic
   Corner, Inc., supra, 86-3 BCA at 97,458-59.  The only problem
   with the Appellant's labor claim in this instance is a minor
   one-during the hearing doubts were raised about whether or not
   the press helper was in fact idle and unpaid on February 1,
   1991, the first day of downtime for the Miller Press following
   the termination of the contract, or whether he was gainfully
   employed elsewhere in the plant (Tr. 82-83, 100-01).
   Consequently, since the Contractor has failed to show that it
   actually incurred idle time labor costs for that one day, the
   Board will deduct eight (8) hours, or $75.60 from the
   Appellant's press helper claim.  Accordingly, the Appellant's
   press helper claim is allowed to the extent of 104 hours at
   the labor rate of $9.45 an hour, or a total of $982.80.
   Considered as a whole, the remaining five items predicated on
   machinery downtime-makeready and running costs for the Miller
   Press; (3) folding charges; (4) collating costs; (5) perfect
   binding charges; and (6) trimming costs-which amount to
   $13,401.64 of the $14,460.04 claim, present an entirely
   different problem.  Each of those claims is based on the
   number of unfilled machine hours times the Appellant's
   standard charges, or BHR, for the machine involved (Miller
   Press, MBO Folder, Collator, Perfect Binder, Wollenberg
   Cutter).  However, the Board has already rejected the BHR as a
   basis for resolving the Appellant's direct cost claim in this
   case on the ground that it would tantamount to applying an
   arbitrary formula.  See Universal Printing Co., supra, slip
   op. at 36 (citing Ordnance Materials, Inc., ASBCA No. 32371,
   88-3 BCA  20,910).  Likewise, the BHR is not a valid basis
   for resolving the Contractor's claim for indirect costs.
   Although the Board could remand the matter to the Contracting
   Officer for reconsideration in light of the rule of Aviation
   Specialists, Inc., which the Board has adopts for this forum,
   see R.C. Swanson, supra, slip op. at 25-26,80 it believes that
   it has a responsibility to put an end to this controversy, see
   Universal Printing Co., supra, slip op. at 37; Banta Co.,
   supra, slip op. at 24.  See also Lawrence D. Krause, supra,
   82-2 BCA at 80,073; Johnson, Drake & Piper, Inc., supra, 65-2
   BCA at 23,073.  Therefore, the Board will also apply the "jury
   verdict" technique to determine a fair and reasonable recovery
   for the Contractor's post-termination idle time costs since
   all of the elements necessary for such an award are present.
   See Universal Printing Co., supra, slip op. at 49; Banta Co.,
   supra, slip. op. at 46-47.  Accord Industrial Refrigeration
   Service Corp., supra, 91-3 BCA at 120,595.  Furthermore, for
   the sake of consistency, the amount of reimbursement will be
   determined on the same "split the difference" basis used to
   calculate the Appellant's reimbursement for the work it
   performed on Print Order 40000 prior to termination.  See
   Universal Printing Co., supra, slip op. at 53.  Accord
   Gricoski Detective Agency, supra, 90-3 BCA at 116,138-39;
   Parkdale Building Maintenance, supra, 90-1 BCA at 112,094;
   Delfour, Inc., supra, 89-1 BCA at 107,862; The Morrison Co.,
   supra, 83-1 BCA at 81,675.  Accordingly, the Board will allow
   the Appellant's claim for machinery downtime to the extent of
   $6,700.82, calculated as follows:

      Appellant's claim for machinery
      downtime                  $13,401.64

      Government's settlement offer               -0-

      Difference between claim and offer       13,401.64

      50 percent of difference            $ 6,700.82

   Consequently, the Appellant is due a total recovery for its
   post-termination costs of $7,683.62; i.e., press helper claim
   of $982.80 and machinery downtime of $6,700.82.  Overall, the
   Contractor is entitled to a total reimbursement of $11,407.07
   (pre-termination costs of $3,723.45 plus post-termination
   costs of $7,683.62).  Again, the Board is firmly convinced
   that this compromise verdict best satisfies its goal of
   awarding fair compensation rather than imposing strict
   accounting principles.  See Industrial Refrigeration Service
   Corp., supra, 91-3 at 120,594; Arctic Corner, Inc., supra,
   86-3 BCA at 97,457.

   V. CONCLUSION
   For the above reasons, the Board finds and concludes that: (1)
   both the Appellant and the Respondent used erroneous methods
   for calculating the appropriate recovery due the Contractor
   for work performed under the contract prior to its
   termination; (2) both the OIG and the Contracting Officer
   misinterpreted GPO Cost Directive, Sec. 3,  25(c) in
   disallowing the Appellant's claim for post-termination idle
   time costs; (3) properly applying the relevant cost principles
   in this case, the Appellant is entitled to reimbursement for
   certain costs, such as depreciation and overhead, which cannot
   reasonably be discontinued after termination, see GPO Cost
   Directive, Sec. 3,  25(c), 49(b); (4) the "jury verdict"
   technique is the best method for determining fair compensation
   for the Contractor's costs resulting from the Government's
   convenience termination of the contract; (5) applying the
   "jury verdict" method to the Appellant's claim for work
   performed under the contract before it was terminated, the
   Contractor is entitled to an additional $973.92 above the
   Contracting Officer's offer of $852.28 for stripping and
   blueline costs, for a total recovery on those items of
   $1,826.20-all other elements of the pre-termination claim are
   approved as determined by the Contracting Officer, so that
   Appellant's pre-termination claim is allowed in the amount of
   $3,723.45; (6) applying the "jury verdict" technique to the
   Contractor's claim for post-termination costs, the Appellant
   is entitled to reimbursement in the amount of $982.80 in press
   helper costs and $6,700.82 in machinery downtime costs, for a
   total recovery of $7,683.62; and (7) overall, the Contractor
   is entitled recover costs in the amount of $11,407.07 as fair
   and reasonable compensation for the convenience termination of
   its contract by the Government.  THEREFORE, the Board MODIFIES
   the Contracting Officer's decision and REMANDS the case with
   instructions that appropriate arrangements be made to pay the
   Contractor in accordance with this opinion.  See Universal
   Printing Co., supra, slip op. at 56; Banta Co., supra, slip.
   op. at 62.

It is so Ordered.

January 31, 1996                  STUART M. FOSS
                                 Administrative Judge
_______________

     1 The Contracting Officer's appeal file, assembled pursuant
     to Rule 4 of the Board's Rules of Practice and Procedure,
     was delivered to the Board on May 21, 1992.  GPO Instruction
     110.12, Subject: Board of Contract Appeals Rules of Practice
     and Procedure, dated September 17, 1984, Rule 4(a) (Board
     Rules).  It will be referred to hereafter as the R4 File,
     with an appropriate tab letter also indicated.  The R4 File,
     consists of twenty-one (21) documents identified as Tabs A
     through T, including a tab labeled "Mc."
     2 The court reporter's transcript shall be referred to
     hereinafter as "Tr." with an appropriate page number
     thereafter.  The Respondent's brief will be referred to
     hereinafter as "R. Brf.," with an appropriate page citation
     thereafter.  The Appellant's brief will be cited as "App.
     Brf." with an appropriate page number thereafter.
     Furthermore, at the hearing
the Contractor introduced additional documentary evidence.  The
Appellant's exhibits shall be referred to as "App. Exh. No.,"
with an appropriate number thereafter.  In addition, the Board
introduced an exhibit which shall be referred to as "GPOBCA Exh.
No. 1."
     3 The contract identifies two types of Directories, one with
     a "Yellow Pages" section (an Item 2 book) and one without
     (an Item 1 book) (R4 File, Tab A, p. 6).
     4 Article 45 simply provides: "When required, contracts
     shall be subject to section 3 of Procurement Directive
     306.2, Contract Cost Principles and Procedures, dated April
     1, 1988."  See GPO Contract Terms, Contract Clauses,  45
     (Contract Cost Principles and Procedures).  Procurement
     Directive 306.2 shall hereinafter be referred to as the GPO
     Cost Directive.
     5 Unlike the FAR, GPO Contract Clauses does not contain a
     "short-form" convenience termination clause.  See FAR
     52.249-4.  The "short-form" clause limits recovery in
     convenience terminations to the costs of services rendered
     before the date of termination.  See Laboratory Systems
     Services, Inc., ASBCA No. 47901, 95-1 BCA  27,527; Arrow,
     Inc., ASBCA Nos. 41330, 41338, 94-2 BCA  26,353.  Before
     using the "short-form" clause as a contract provision for
     termination for convenience, the contracting officer must
     first determine that, because of the nature of the contract,
     the contractor would not incur substantial start-up costs,
     and that a convenience termination will not result in a
     claim for other than services rendered.  See Carrier Corp.,
     GSBCA No. 8516, 90-1 BCA  22,409, at 112,557.  Improper use
     of the clause is subject to reversal on the grounds that the
     contracting officer abused his discretion, in which case the
     "long-form" "Termination for Convenience" clause will be
     substituted by operation of law.  See DWS, Inc., Debtor-in-
     Possession, ASBCA Nos. 29742, 29865, 90-2 BCA  22,696, at
     113,987; Carrier Corp., supra, 90-1 BCA at 112,557-58;
     Guard-All of America, ASBCA No. 22,167, 80-2 BCA  14,462,
     at 71,300.
     6 Accordingly, one question which surfaced at the prehearing
     conference on November 23, 1993, namely, whether or not the
     GPO Cost Directive applied to the contract in dispute, see
     Report of Prehearing Telephone Conference, dated February 2,
     1994, pp. 2, 4 (hereinafter RPTC-2), is really not an issue
     at all.  Clearly, the GPO Cost Directive applies to this
     case because the "Termination for Convenience" clause
     expressly requires it, and the "Contract Cost Principles and
     Procedures" clause mandates the use of the GPO Cost
     Directive "when required," as here.  Rather, the real issue
     in this appeal is which of two competing cost principles-GPO
     Cost Directive, Sec. 3,  25 (Idle facilities and idle
     capacity costs) or GPO Cost Directive, Sec. 3,  49
     (Termination costs)-or both, governs the parties' dispute
     over the Appellant's unabsorbed indirect costs.
     7 The record indicates that approximately 80 percent of the
     Contractor's income is derived from Government work (Tr.
     106).  Furthermore, the Appellant testified that its typical
     markup for Government work is 20 percent (Tr. 28).
     8 As indicated on the Print Order, the 19,000 copies
     consisted of 16,000 with yellow pages (Item 2 Directory),
     and 3,000 without yellow pages (Item 1 Directory) (Tr. 11;
     R4 File, Tab E).  Attached to the Print Order, and part of
     it, were the detailed specifications for both books,
     including the sequence of colored pages for each book, the
     number of quality assurance samples (32), and distribution
     instructions (Tr. 13, 14; App. Exh. No. 1).
     9 The Contractor computed the total cost of this job at
     $49,811.65 based on the following estimates: (a) $2,152.92
     for pre-press (stripping and platting); (b) $18,736.91 for
     paper stock; (c) $15,076.92 in total press charges
     (makeready, ink, and running charges); (d) $13,844.90 for
     bindery work (folding, collating, binding, trimming, and
     shipping).  Adding a ten (10) percent profit to these costs
     brought the value of the contract to $54,792.81.  See R4
     File, Tab O, Cost Analysis.  The Appellant continued to use
     its original estimates in pursuing its termination claim
     (Tr. 32).
     10 The Respondent disagrees with this assessment.  See
     Answer,  4.
     11 In its Complaint, the Appellant also asserted that the
     large variance between the "Determination of Award" figures
     and the scope of anticipated orders in the contract, showed
     that the Government estimates were negligently prepared.
     See Complaint,  5.  Furthermore, the Contractor said that
     it (and all other offerors) relied to its detriment on the
     Respondent's estimates in calculating and submitting its
     bid.  See Complaint,   6, 7, and 8.  GPO denies these
     allegations.  See Answer,  5, 6, 7, 8, and 9.  Negligent
     Government estimates can furnish the basis for a
     contractor's recovery on a claim under a "requirements"
     contract.  See McDonald & Eudy Printers, Inc., GPO BCA 40-92
     (January 31, 1994), slip op. at 18-19, 1994 WL 275096;
     Shepard Printing, GPO BCA 37-92 (January 28, 1994), slip op.
     at 26,
1994 WL 275077.  Accord Crown Laundry & Dry Cleaners, Inc. v.
United States, 29 Fed. Cl. 506 (1993); Pruitt Energy Sources,
Inc., ENG BCA No. 6134, 95-2 BCA  27,840; Dynamic Science, Inc.,
ASBCA No. 29510, 85-1 BCA  17,710; Huff's Janitorial Service,
ASBCA No. 26860, 83-1 BCA  16,518)).  Also cf. Medart, Inc. v.
Austin, 957 F.2d 579, 581 (Fed. Cir. 1992) ("Where a contractor
can show by preponderant evidence that estimates were
`inadequately or negligently prepared, not in good faith, or
grossly or unreasonably inadequate at the time the estimate was
made[,]' the government could be liable for appropriate damages
resulting."  Citing Clearwater Forest Industries, Inc. v. United
States, 227 Ct. Cl. 386, 650 F.2d 233, 239 (1981).); Operational
Service Corp., ASBCA Nos. 37059, 37466, 38461, 38703, 93-3 BCA 
26,190, at 130,381 (". . . where the estimate is negligently
prepared so that it misleads the bidder, an equitable adjustment
can be made to the contract because it is relied upon to the
bidder's detriment.").  Here, apart from the above-referenced
paragraphs in its detailed Complaint, the "negligent estimates"
issue was not discussed during the prehearing conference on
January 5, 1993, or the meeting on November 23, 1993, was not
litigated at the hearing on March 1, 1994, and was not argued in
the parties briefs.  Instead, throughout the entire litigation
history of this appeal, the parties have been focused on the
"unabsorbed overhead" issue.  See e.g., RPTC-2, pp. 2-4; RPTC-1,
pp. 6-7; Tr. 26-27, 92-93 (Goldstein); 119-20, 128-29 (Weiss);
133-34 (Office of the Inspector General (OIG) Supervisory
Auditor, Joseph Verch); R. Brf., pp. 3-7; App. Brf., pp. 3-7.
Therefore, it is clear that the Appellant has abandoned its
"negligent estimates" claim, and that matter is not before the
Board in this proceeding.  See Shepard Printing, supra, slip op.
at 23, fn. 26.
     12 The evidence of record says that the Appellant first
     discussed the problem with the Respondent by telephone on
     January 21, 1991.  See RPTC-1, p. 3; R4 File, Tab F (first
     paragraph, first sentence); Complaint,  13.  However, the
     NIH did not issue Print Order No. 40000 until January 23,
     1991, which is the date on which the Contractor says it
     "first learned of the error."  See R4 File, Tab E;
     Complaint,  9.  Therefore, the Board assumes that the
     Appellant is simply confused about January 21, 1991, as
     being the date on which the Contractor first informed GPO of
     the mistake in the contract specifications.  Instead, the
     Board believes that the earliest possible date on which such
     a conversation could have taken place was January 23, 1991.
     13 The Appellant's message contained two lines-"Confirm
     Above" and "Not Confirmed"-as well as a signature line at
     the bottom.  Although the Contracting Officer was asked to
     check the appropriate line, sign the message, and return a
     copy to the Contractor, there is nothing in the record to
     indicate that he did so.
     14 Bluelines are proofs which are prepared to look exactly
     like the book or publication being ordered, including being
     trimmed and bound the same way (Tr. 24-25).
     15 The order was held at Weiss' direction since January 24,
     1991 (R4 File, Tab G).  At that point, however, the
     Appellant had already begun the pre-press work under the
     contract-e.g., filming, stripping, blueline editing and
     proofing-while awaiting word from GPO on resolution of the
     problem concerning its bid (Tr. 15).
     16 The Appellant had originally planned to start running the
     job by February 1, 1991 (Tr. 45).
     17 The type of termination was a critical part of the
     discussion between the parties on January 28, 1991.  In that
     regard, while the Respondent raised the specter of a default
     termination, the record shows that the Appellant agreed to
     produce Print Order 40000, but expected the remainder of the
     contract to be terminated for convenience (R4 File, Tab G).
     See Complaint,  21.
     18 The record indicates that the parties also had a
     discussion earlier in the morning, and that in response to a
     question from the Contracting Officer, the Appellant told
     Weiss that no paper stock for the job had been received
     because the Contractor had canceled the order with its
     supplier (R4 File, Tab I, p. 3).  This information was
     confirmed by the Appellant in their second conversation, as
     well (R4 File, Tab I, p. 4).
     19 As explained by the Appellant at the hearing, this charge
     was $9.50 per flat, not 84 flats for $9.50 (Tr. 24).
     20 Each of these charges was explained in detail by
     Goldstein at the hearing (Tr. 17-25).  Among other things,
     he briefly testified that: (a) the film work included the
     blanks and covers for a 328 page book (Tr. 17); (b) the
     $1,754.00 charge for the films was based on normal charges
     for that work (Tr. 23); (c) stripping is a manual operation
     requiring a very skilled operator (Tr. 18-19); (d) the
     stripping charge of $9.50 per flat is the average charge for
     such work (Tr. 24); (e) except for differing media, blueline
     proofs are made by the same process as plates (Tr. 19-21);
     (f) the blueline charge of $3.50 per page is also standard
     (Tr. 24-25); and (g) the costs of UPS and Federal Express
     shown on the claim were amounts actually incurred for those
     shipping services (Tr. 21).
     21 At the hearing, Goldstein testified that he canceled the
     paper stock sometime between January 24, 1991, and January
     31, 1991, although could not remember the exact date (Tr.
     78).  Furthermore, he said that the 25 percent restocking
     fee is the standard practice within the industry (Tr. 22).
     22 The record indicates that on February 5, 1991, but before
     it received this letter, the Respondent made a follow up
     inquiry regarding the Appellant's initial claim of January
     30, 1991 (R4 File, Tab Mc).  Specifically, GPO wanted to
     know if there would be any more charges, because the
     Government wanted to take only one action on the canceled
     contract.  The Appellant advised the Respondent that the
     additional claim had already been mailed.
     23 The Appellant utilizes a computerized cost estimating
     system, which it applies to both Government and private
     procurements (Tr. 30, 33-34, 39, 84; App. Exh. No. 3).  The
     system was originally developed by McIntosh Press of Newman,
     Georgia, and was adopted by the Contractor (Tr. 34).  The
     key concept in the system is the BHR-a cost figure which is
     derived for each piece of machinery in the plant by
     totalling actual fixed costs (rent, depreciation, property
     taxes, insurance, and the square footage allocation of the
     machine), variable costs (direct and indirect wages, and
     electricity), other labor and miscellaneous costs (supplies,
     social security taxes, workman's compensation and
     unemployment insurance, other employee insurance, repairs),
     general factory expense, and selling overhead (Tr. 35-37,
     114-15; App. Exh. No. 4).  When those items are added
     together and factored with the total number of hours the
     machine can be expected to be in use during the year, the
     result is the BHR for that particular machine (Tr. 38, 41,
     66; App. Exh. No. 4).  It should also be noted that the BHR
     is a mixture of both allowable and unallowable costs.  For
     example, while some BHR components such as rent,
     depreciation, repairs and insurance are normally be
     allowable, see GPO Cost Directive, Sec. 3,  19(c), 27(a),
     32(a), other elements such as selling overhead (to extent it
     includes indirect selling efforts) and property taxes, are
     not, see GPO Cost Directive, Sec. 3, 11(f) 48(b)(5).
     Furthermore, in a convenience termination situation, such as
     here, common items such as supplies and other materials in
     the contractor's inventory are not allowable if they can be
     used in the contractor's other work.  See GPO Cost
     Directive, Sec. 3,  49(a).  However, it is clear that the
     BHR reflects an accepted method of accounting for indirect
     costs, and under GPO's cost principles it may not be
     fragmented by removing its individual elements.  See GPO
     Cost Directive, Sec. 3,  9(c).
     24 At the hearing, Goldstein testified that although the
     Miller Press was purchased either in 1987 or 1988, and thus
     was not especially acquired for this contract, it
     nonetheless was scheduled to be the primary press for the
     NIH job (Tr. 42, 44, 78-79, 108-09).  Furthermore, Goldstein
     said that there are basically two rates for the Miller
     Press-the BHR and the actual cost of running the machine
     (Tr. 112).  The Appellant's February 4, 1991, claim appears
     to use the actual rate-$90.04-for the Miller Press (Tr.
     112).  On the other hand, Goldstein also expressed his
     belief that it was reasonable to expect the machine to run
     70 percent of the time; i.e., based on a maximum usage of
     2,008 hours, the Contractor thought the Miller Press would
     be in use for 1,406 hours during the year because allowances
     had to be made for breakdowns, holidays, etc. (Tr. 37-38,
     64, 90; App. Exh. No. 4).  Thus, the BHR for the Miller
     Press at a 70 percent usage rate is calculated by dividing
     those 1,406 hours into the total annual center cost for the
     machine, which results in a BHR for the machine of $56.68,
     the figure it used in its estimate of the NIH job (Tr. 38,
     42, 44, 64, 67; App. Exhs. No. 4 and 6).  Similar BHR
     estimates were made for the MBO Folder, the Perfect Binder,
     Wollenberg Cutter, the other machines which would be needed
     to perform the contract (Tr. 34, 41, 74-75).  Goldstein also
     testified that the procedure followed by the Contractor,
     which is based on Appellant's actual cost figures as
     compiled with the assistance of an accountant, is the
     standard acceptable accounting practice for establishing
     BHR's in the industry, and is necessary wherever a
     computerized estimating system is used (Tr. 38-39, 40, 66).
     Finally, he believed that the Appellant's charges based on
     this system were reasonable, and should mirror the costs of
     other printing plants in the southeastern United States
     using similar estimating systems (Tr. 39, 40, 113).
     25 When the Appellant's separate claims of January 30, 1991,
     and February 4, 1991, are considered together, it is clear
     that two different types of recovery are involved in this
     proceeding; i.e., (a) reimbursement for work actually
     performed prior to termination; and (b) compensation for
     post-termination indirect costs (idle time) (Tr. 26-27, 92;
     R4 File, Tabs M and N).  Indeed, the parties stipulated that
     there are no post-termination direct costs because the
     Contractor performed no work on the contract after it was
     terminated (Tr. 92-93).
     26 Most of the 18 documents submitted on March 12, 1991, are
     duplicates of other documents elsewhere in the appeal file.
     See e.g., R4 File, Tabs E, F, G, H, and M; Complaint,
     Exhibit A.
     27 In the audit report, the OIG agreed with the Contracting
     Officer that the film and GFM return costs were reasonable
     (Tr. 136; R4 File, Tab R, Attachment D, fns. 1 and 4).
     However, the OIG found no support for the entire blueline
     claim (although the bluelines were in fact received by the
     NIH), and nearly all of the claim for stripping charges, and
     recommended that they be disallowed (Tr. 134; R4 File, Tab
     R, Attachment D, fns. 2 and 3).
     28 At the hearing, Weiss testified that even though he
     thought the Contractor's film charges were high ($5.10), he
     had no problem with them, and also found the shipping costs
     to be fair and reasonable (Tr. 117, 124, 126).  However, an
     analysis of the Appellant's claim for stripping and blueline
     production costs was difficult because, as the parties
     agree, those tasks were not separate line items in the
     contract's schedule of prices, but rather were part of
     either the makeready and/or setup charges (Tr. 88, 117, 124;
     R4 File, Tab S, p. 1).  Since plating and setup were not
     performed before the contract was terminated, the Weiss
     believed that only a portion of the Contractor's price for
     this line item ($11.82 per page) was reimbursable (R4 File,
     Tabs B, p. 3, and S, p. 1).  Accordingly, the Contracting
     Officer looked to another GPO general usage program-Program
     A814-M-in which almost all prices were separate line items,
     to develop a new per page rate for stripping and blueline
     costs (Tr. 117-18, 124, 126; R4 File, Tab S, p. 1).  The
     result was a charge of
$1.49 per page, which when multiplied by a total page count of
572 pages for both books, yielded a recovery for the Appellant of
$852.28 for these items (Tr. 118, 124; R4 File, Tab S, p. 1).
     29 In Weiss' view, the Appellant's claim was actually higher
     than the contract price; i.e., the Appellant was asking for
     more money on termination than it would have been entitled
     to if the work had been performed with or without the use of
     paper (Tr. 119-20).  However, as previously noted, paper
     costs are not involved in this claim because the Contractor
     was able to cancel the order from its supplier before it was
     delivered (Tr. 22; R4 File, Tabs M and O).
     30 The Contracting Officer's reference to Program A814-S
     appears to be an inadvertent typographical error.
     Throughout these proceedings the parties have referred to
     the program in question as  A814-M.  See Tr. 118, 124, 126;
     App. Brf., pp. 2-3; Res. Brf., p. 8.  See note 29 supra.
     31 In a way, this should not be surprising since the
     Contracting Officer had offered to settle the Appellant's
     initial claim for the pre-press work actually performed on
     the contract prior to termination for 58 percent of the
     amount billed (Tr. 16, 17, 27, 117, 124; R4 File, Tabs M, O
     and S; App. Exh. No. 2).  That is, Weiss had agreed that all
     of the Contractor's charges for film and shipping, and 34
     percent of its stripping and blueline costs ($852.28 of the
     $2,800.12 claimed), were justified.  This meant that only
     $1,948.09 ($4,697.37-2749.28) remained in dispute between
     the parties on the first claim-a figure which was less than
     8 percent of the idle time claim submitted on February 4,
     1991 ($24,670.13) (R4 File, Tab N).
     32 The Appellant's original idle press claim (R4 File, Tab
     N) was based on the 151 hours it had estimated would be
     required to produce the job (Tr. 47, 48, 49, 60).  However,
     the Contractor was subsequently advised by its Counsel that
     downtime could only be claimed for press hours which were
     not actually filled during the established contract
     performance period, in this case February 1991 (Tr. 60).
     The record shows that while the Appellant attempted to
     reduce its downtime claim by bidding for other Government
     and private sector work during February 1991, and in fact
     was partially successful (the Miller Press was completely
     shutdown on just seven (7) of the 20 workdays that month;
     i.e., February 1, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, and 12, 1991), it
     nonetheless was unable to find press work for 112 hours of
     scheduled time, and bases its idle time claim on that figure
     (Tr. 45, 50, 54, 61, 66, 110, 114; App. Exh. No. 5).
     33 The Appellant testified that this summary analysis was
     based principally on the information in its downtime
     listing, and represented the costs directly attributable to
     the termination action (Tr. 60-61, 93; App. Exh. Nos. 5 and
     6).  However, at the hearing the Contractor also said that
     the summary listing's 80 percent utilization was inaccurate,
     and 70 percent should be used instead since that figure was
     more realistic (Tr. 64-65, 74, 90; App. Exh. No. 6).
     Indeed, the Appellant indicated that it was no longer
     willing to accept the 80 percent rate (Tr. 75).  A 70
     percent utilization rate assumes that the machinery will be
     idle 30 percent of the time (Tr. 90-91).
     34 The Appellant testified that the termination action which
     left it with 112 hours of unfilled press time was directly
     responsible for the financial loss it experienced in
     February 1991 (Tr. 66, 72).  In that regard, although
     somewhat inflated because shipments made around Christmas
     and New Year's are normally not billed until early January,
     the Contractor's income statement for January 1991 shows
     that it made a $60,343.30 profit (52 percent) for that month
     (Tr. 67-70; App. Exh. No. 7).  Similarly, the Appellant also
     showed a profit in March 1991 ($28,549.88 or 14.52 percent)
     (Tr. 71; App. Exh. No. 9).  However, in contrast, its
     financial statement for February 1991-the month during which
     contract performance was to occur-indicates that the
     Appellant suffered a net loss of $18,991.67 (26.97 percent)
     that month (Tr. 70; App. Exh. No. 8).
     35 As the Board reads the record, the total of the
     Appellant's revised unabsorbed overhead claim is $15,464.12,
     not $14,460.04.  Nonetheless, even the Board's figures
     represent a reduction of approximately 37 percent from the
     claim submitted by the Contractor in February 1991.  The
     difference between the Board's computations and the
     Contractor's is only $1,004.08, a 6 percent variation, which
     in the context of this case is de minimis.
     36 The record shows that the Contractor prepared its revised
     claim-App. Exh. No. 6-using BHR figures for 80 percent
     utilization.  However, Goldstein testified at the hearing
     that he was no longer willing to accept an 80 percent BHR,
     but rather now based his claim on a 70 percent figure (Tr.
     74-75).  The effect of this revision is to change the BHR
     amounts on App. Exh. No. 6 as follows: (a) on the Miller
     Press from $49.62 to $56.68; (b) on the MBO Folder from
     $40.03 to $45.72; (c) on the Perfect Binder from $29.94 to
     $34.20; (d) on the Wollenberg Cutter $27.21 to $31.09; and
     (e) the Collator from $38.93 to $44.47 (Tr. 74-75).
     37 The handwritten figure of $56.78 in App. Exh. No. 6 is an
     obvious inadvertent error.  The evidence of record shows
     that the BHR for the Miller Press at a 70 percent usage rate
     is $56.68 (Tr. 38, 74; App. Exh. No. 4).  See note 23 supra.
     Indeed, $6,348.00 is the result of 112 hours multiplied by
     $56.68.
     38 Although it is not entirely clear, the Board assumes that
     the press helper in question is Douglas Larson, who
     Goldstein testified is the employee assigned to the Miller
     Press (Tr. 54, 80).  Larson, an hourly paid worker, was
     idled when the Miller Press was shut down because of the
     cancellation of the NIH job (Tr. 80-81, 99).  Furthermore,
     Goldstein was not sure if Larson was paid for February 1,
     1991, the first day the Miller Press went unused because of
     GPO's termination action, of if he performed other plant
     tasks like sweeping the floor (Tr. 82-83, 100-01).
     39 The reason for this revision is that the Appellant did
     not incur any hand collating expense; i.e., the three (3)
     temporary employees who were hired to do the collating were
     terminated when the contract was canceled before any such
     work was performed (Tr. 61-62, 64, 91-92).
     40 Indeed, during the prehearing telephone conference on
     January 5, 1993, the Appellant stated that in past
     convenience termination cases GPO itself has paid for
     unabsorbed overhead costs; e.g., where a contractor made
     reasonable efforts to utilize the idle capacity but was
     unable to do so despite best efforts, or where it could not
     absorb the overhead costs because they were legitimately
     allocable to specific contracts.  RPTC-1, p. 6.  However,
     the Contractor also said that the Respondent had recently
     begun disallowing unabsorbed overhead costs on the ground
     that the contractor was unable to meet one or more of the
     requirements prescribed in the GPO Cost Directive.  RPTC-1,
     pp. 6-7.  Consequently, the Appellant wanted to know if
     there had been any change in language of the GPO Cost
     Directive or its application, which precluded recovery of
     unabsorbed overhead costs by contractors as a blanket rule.
     RPTC-1, p. 7.  The Contractor's question was never answered,
     and no evidence on the matter was introduced at the hearing.
     Thus, there is nothing in the record to show if the
     Respondent had interpreted the relevant provisions of the
     GPO Cost Directive differently in the past, or whether there
     was agency precedent for paying the sort of unabsorbed
     overhead costs submitted by the Appellant.
     41 The Appellant advances several arguments advanced by
     Joseph & O'Donnell for allowing unabsorbed overhead costs,
     "particularly where the terminated contract represents a
     substantial portion of the contractor's work, or where the
     obtaining of contracts in the industry requires substantial
     lead time," including: (a) recovery is not prohibited by
     regulation or law; (b) the regulatory objective of fairly
     compensating the contractor is thwarted when denial of the
     unabsorbed overhead results in a substantial loss to the
     contractor; (c) recovery of unabsorbed overhead is permitted
     by the government in analogous contexts such as partial
     terminations and delay; and (d) recovery of unabsorbed
     overhead incurred after contract termination is permitted in
     all commercial practices, including those governed by the
     Uniformed Commercial Code (UCC 2-708-2) (App. Brf., pp. 5-6,
     citing Joseph & O'Donnell, at X-36).  Similarly, the
     Contractor says that Trueger holds that idle facilities and
     idle capacity costs should be compensable for at least "a
     reasonable period" after the termination because: (a) a
     contractor, who deployed people, space and facilities in
     order to complete a government contract, may not be able to
     "swing into new business on the day after the abrupt
     government action;" and (b) from an accounting standpoint,
     there is simply no basis to charge these costs to any cost
     objective other than the terminated contract (App. Brf., p.
     6, Trueger, at 745-60, 805-06).
     42 The Appellant also asks the Board to award it interest at
     the statutory rate from the date it certified its claim
     (App. Brf., p. 3).  See 50 U.S.C. App.  1215(b)(2).  The
     Contractor candidly admits that nothing in the contract
     authorizes the requested interest payment, although it notes
     that there is a specific provision in the "Termination for
     the Convenience of the Government" clause requiring a
     contractor receiving partial payments to repay the
     Government the amount in excess of the actual value of the
     work performed, with interest, upon termination of the
     contract (App. Brf., p. 3, citing GPO Contract Terms,
     Contract Clauses,  19(k)(2)).  The crux of the Appellant's
     argument is that since there is no explicit prohibition
     against the payment of interest on its claim, the Board, by
     administrative fiat, should add interest to any recovery
     because: (a) the claim has been pending for a long time; and
     (b) interest awards operating as "a one-way street" from
     contractors to the Government are patently unfair, and cry
     out for a balancing of the equities by the creation of an
     entitlement flowing the other way; i.e., what's "sauce for
     the goose" should be "sauce for the gander" (App. Brf., p.
     3).  While the Contractor's contention has a certain surface
     appeal, the simple fact is that the Board has no authority
     to award interest under GPO regulations.  See Universal
     Printing Co., GPO BCA 9-90 (June 22, 1994), slip. op. at 55,
     fn. 54, 1994 WL 377586.  See also Chavis and Chavis
     Printing, GPO BCA 20-90 (February 6, 1991), slip. op. at 7,
     n. 7, 1991 WL 439270 (Prompt Payment Act of 1982, 31 U.S.C.
      3901 et seq. (1988)).  It is well-settled that a
     contractor cannot recover interest on a claim against the
     United States unless there is an express provision in the
     contract or a relevant statute permitting such payment.  See
     Maitland Brothers Co., ASBCA No. 40388, 93-3 BCA  26,007,
     at 129,305, motion for reconsid. denied 94-1 BCA  26,285.
     See also Fidelity Construction Co. v. United States, 700
     F.2d 1379 (Fed. Cir. 1983), cert. denied 464 U.S. 826
     (1984); Reese Industries, ASBCA No. 36077, 89-1 BCA 
     21,255.  Accordingly, the Appellant's request for interest
     on any recovery awarded by this decision, at the statutory
     rate from the date it certified its claim, must be denied.
     43 See note 28 supra.
     44 The Board bases its decision on the following record: (a)
     the Appellant's Notice of Appeal, dated April 6, 1992; (b)
     the R4 File (Tabs A-T); (c) the Complaint, dated June 17,
     1992; (d) the Answer, dated July 17, 1992; (e) the Report of
     Prehearing Telephone Conference, dated March 26, 1993; (f)
     the Report of Prehearing Telephone Conference, dated
     February 2, 1994; (g) the transcript of the hearing held on
     March 1, 1994, including App. Exh. Nos. 1-9, and GPOBCA Exh.
     No. 1; (h) the brief submitted by the Respondent on April 4,
     1994; and (i) the brief submitted by the Appellant on April
     7, 1994.
     45 Prior to the establishment of the Board in 1984, see GPO
     Instruction 110.10C, Subject: Establishment of the Board of
     Contract Appeals, appeals from decisions of GPO Contracting
     Officers were considered by ad hoc contract appeals boards.
     Decision of these ad hoc boards are hereinafter cited as
     GPOCAB.  While the Board is not bound by their decisions,
     its policy is to follow the rulings of the ad hoc panels
     where applicable and appropriate.  See e.g., Shepard
     Printing, GPO BCA 23-91 (April 29, 1993), slip op. at 14,
     fn. 19, 1993 WL 526848; Stephenson, Inc., GPO BCA 2-88
     (December 20, 1991), slip op. at 18, fn. 20, 1991 WL 439274;
     Chavis and Chavis Printing, supra, slip op. at 9, fn. 9.
     46 Of the 235 published appeals decisions issued by the
     Board and the ad hoc panels since 1974, only four (4)
     involved "pure" termination for convenience issues.  See
     R.C. Swanson Printing and Typesetting Co., supra,
     Supplemental Decision; Graphic Litho Co., Inc., GPO BCA
     17-85 (February 23, 1988), 1988 WL 363329; The Standard
     Register Co., GPO BCA 4-86 (October 28, 1987), 1987 WL
     228972;  Cloverleaf Enterprises, Inc., [No GPOCAB No.] (May
     9, 1980), 1980 WL 81267.  In one other case, the termination
     for convenience question was merely a disguise for the
     contractor's breach of contract claim, and hence there was
     no jurisdiction.  See Microform Data Systems, Inc., GPOCAB
     3-79 (February 1, 1980), 1980 WL 81258.  Excluded from this
     count are those cases which were converted to convenience
     terminations pursuant to GPO Contract Terms, Contract
     Clauses,  20(g) (Default), when the original
defaults were found improper and overturned.  See e.g., Graphics
Image, Inc., GPO BCA 13-92 (August 31, 1992), 1992 WL 487875;
Pennsylvania Printed Products, GPO BCA 29-87 (January 22, 1990),
1990 WL 454977; American Drafting and Laminating Co., GPO BCA
6-85 (April 15, 1986), 1986 WL 181459; Graphic Litho, GPOCAB
11-83 (May 25, 1984), 1984 WL 148105; Bay Ridge Press, GPOCAB
4-82 (January 12, 1983), 1983 WL 135369, Supplemental Decision
(September 15, 1983), 1983 WL 135370; Norm Hodges and Associates,
Inc., GPOCAB 2-82 (April 12, 1982), 1982 WL 122517.
     47 It should be noted that the Board's final decision in
     R.C. Swanson Printing Co. has been appealed by the
     contractor to the United States Court of Federal Claims,
     where it is now pending.  See Richard C. Swanson and Larry
     A. Ford, d.b.a. Swanson Printing & Typesetting Co. v. United
     States, Civil Action No. 94-185(C).  In that regard, after
     the Board explicated and applied the principles relating to
     the recovery of costs where "requirements" contracts are
     terminated for convenience, see R.C. Swanson Printing and
     Typesetting Co., supra, Supplemental Decision, GPO asked for
reconsideration on the ground that the contract in question was
not a true "requirements" contract because it was a multiple-
award type of agreement, which did not create an exclusive
relationship between the contractor and the Government-an
essential element for a "requirements" contract, see R.C. Swanson
Printing and Typesetting Co., GPO BCA 15-90, Decision on Motion
for Reconsideration and Order (December 20, 1993), slip op. at 6,
1993 WL 668317.  GPO's position was based on a prior decision of
the United States Claims Court which expressly held that this
agency's multiple-award agreements were not requirements
contracts, as that concept is understood in the law of Government
contracts.  See Media Press, Inc. v. United States, 215 Ct. Cl.
985, 986 (1977).  After reviewing that court decision, the Board
agreed with the Government, and granted the motion for
reconsideration.  See R.C. Swanson Printing and Typesetting Co.,
supra, Decision on Motion for Reconsideration and Order, slip op.
at 15.  The contractor's appeal essentially challenges the Claims
Court's holding in Media Press, Inc.  However, the issues in the
Claims Court are not relevant in this case.  Here, the agreement
in question, unlike the one in R.C. Swanson Printing and
Typesetting Co., is a single-award "requirements" contract, which
clearly establishes the necessary exclusive relationship between
the parties.
     48 Historically, the power of the Government to terminate
     its contracts in the absence of a breach by the non-
     governmental party arose in order to limit the Government's
     liability during the unpredictable circumstances of war, and
     to shift some of the risk of changing conditions to the non-
     governmental party.  See Plaza 70 Interiors, Ltd., HUD BCA
     No. 94-C-150-C9, 95-2 BCA  27,668, at 137,938 (citing G.L.
     Christian & Associates v. United States, 160 Ct. Cl. 1, 312
     F.2d 418, cert. denied 375 U.S. 954 (1963)).  See also
     Cibinic & Nash, pp. 1073-74.  The right to terminate
     contracts for the convenience of the Government was later
     expanded to civilian and peacetime contracts.  See Torncello
     v. United States, 231 Ct. Cl. 20, 681 F.2d 756, 764-6
     (1982).
     49 Application of the "best interests of the Government"
     standard is a sine qua non in convenience termination cases.
     Thus, even if a termination might be beneficial to the
     contractor because, for example, it is performing at a loss,
     the Government has no duty to terminate for convenience just
     for the contractor's sake.  See Contract Management, Inc.,
     ASBCA No. 44885, 95-2 BCA  27,886; Rotair Industries, Inc.,
     ASBCA No. 27571, 84-2 BCA  17,417.
     50 For example, where a fixed-price indefinite quantities
     contract is involved, the Government may not retroactively
     terminate a fully performed contract in an effort to limit
     its liability for failing to order the contract's minimum
     amount of services.  See PHP Healthcare Corporation, ASBCA
     No. 39207, 91-1 BCA  23,647.  See also Montana Refining
     Company, ASBCA No. 44250, 94-2 BCA  26,656 (a convenience
     termination did not relieve the Government of its obligation
     to pay for the portion of the guaranteed minimum quantity of
     jet fuel that it failed to purchase because the clear
     language of the contract's "Termination for Convenience"
     clause, which was an approved deviation from the standard
     clause, did not permit the Government to terminate any
     portion of the guaranteed minimum quantity.  Citing PHP
     Healthcare Corporation, supra).
     51 In Torncello v. United States, note 48 supra, the United
     States Court of Federal Claims crafted a stricter standard
     for invoking the "Termination for Convenience" clause,
     saying that there must have been a change in circumstances
     in order to properly invoke the clause.  See 681 F.2d at
     771-72.  However, subsequent decisions clearly show that the
     Torncello holding has been restricted in its application,
     see e.g. Operational Services Corp., ASBCA No. 37959, 93-3
     BCA  26,190; Fiesta Leasing and Sales, Inc., ASBCA No.
     29311, 86-3 BCA  19,045, mot. for reconsid. denied 87-1 BCA
      19,622; Drain-A-Way Systems, GSBCA No. 7022, 84-1 BCA 
     16,929 (citing Adams Manufacturing Co. v. United States,
     Appeal Nos. 49[-]82, 51-82 (Fed. Cir. May 12, 1983)
     (Unpublished)), and the traditional "bad faith or a clear
     abuse of discretion" test continues to dominate, see
     Caldwell & Santmyer, Inc. v. Secretary of Agriculture, 55
     F.3d 1578 (Fed. Cir. 1995), aff'g 94-2 BCA  26,854, 1994 WL
     45000; Salisbury Industries v. United States, supra, 905
     F.2d 1518, 1521 (Fed. Cir. 1990); C.F.S. Air Cargo, Inc.,
     ASBCA No. 36113, 91-3 BCA  23,583.  See generally Cibinic &
     Nash, pp. 1079-80.
     52 The key to such evidence is that there must be a showing
     of a specific intent on the part of the Government to injure
     the contractor.  See Stephenson, Inc., supra, slip op. at
     54.  Accord Kalvar Corp. v. United States, 543 F.2d 1298,
     1302 (Ct. Cl. 1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 830 (1977).  See
     also Solar Turbines, Inc. V. United States, 23 Cl. Ct. 142
     (1991).
     53 The Appellant does not contest the termination of its
     contract by the Respondent or allege bad faith or abuse of
     discretion on the part of GPO.  See Plaza 70 Interiors,
     Ltd., supra, 95-2 BCA at 137,938.  Indeed, the record shows
     that the Contractor desired such a termination for
     convenience.  See note 17 supra.  Moreover, the Board sees
     nothing in the record before it which would amount to
     "irrefragable" proof of bad faith.
     54 Although the Appellant challenged the Government's
     estimates as unrealistic, see Special Waste, Inc., supra,
     this case appears to be a Caldwell & Santmyer, Inc.
     situation.  In Caldwell & Santmyer, Inc., an improper award
     involving ambiguous specifications was terminated for
     convenience by the contracting officer who acknowledged the
     Government's error.  Likewise, the Contracting Officer here
     exercised his discretion to terminate the contract for
     convenience because of the erroneous "Determination of
     Award" figures regarding the running rate and paper (R4
     File, Tab K).
     55 On the other hand, the rule is that in determining the
     amount due a contractor as a convenience termination
     settlement, the Government may not deduct for defective work
     because that would be tantamount to treating the termination
     as one for default.  See Richerson Construction, Inc., GSBCA
     Nos. 11161, 11263(11045)-REIN, 11430, 93-1 BCA  25,239;
     Youngstrand Surveying, supra, 92-2 BCA at 124,694 (". . .
     Absent information establishing that the unsatisfactory work
     results from the contractor's fault or folly, . . . the
     general rule is that contractors are compensated as part of
     a convenience termination even for effort resulting in
     defective work."  Citing Morton-Thiokol, Inc., ASBCA No.
     32629, 90-3 BCA  23,207; Caskel Forge, Inc., ASBCA No.
     7638, 1962 BCA  3318.).
     56 In the past, the Board has referred to this theory as "an
     accepted fiction."  See Graphic Litho Co., Inc., supra,
     slip. op. at 9.
     57 The bulk of termination for convenience cases that are
     reported in court and board decisions do not involve
     questions of the contract price as a ceiling on recovery, or
     loss contracts.  See Tom Shaw, Inc., supra, 93-2 BCA at
     128,073.  Indeed, we are told that in routine cases not
     involving such issues, unrecognized or unresolved changes or
     similar matters that may, or may not, justify a contract
     price increase can be ignored, since the costs of such
     alleged changes or other events are automatically recovered
     as part of the total costs.  Id.
     58 If the Board is reading the above-quoted passage from J.
     W. Cook & Sons, Inc. correctly, it seems that the ASBCA is
     respectfully disagreeing with the interpretation of the
     "fairness" concept enunciated by the Court of Claims in
     Codex Corp. v. United States, the ASBCA decision cited with
     approval by the GSBCA in Richerson Construction, Inc. and
     the VABCA in Arctic Corner, Inc.
     59 Those slight differences are purely cosmetic and
     inconsequential.  The GPO Cost Directive refers to "[t]he
     applicable paragraphs of this instruction], while the PPR
     substitutes the words "[c]ost principles."  In addition, the
     PPR inserts the words "for supplies or services" between the
     words "subcontracts" and "whenever" in the sentence.  Other
     than those changes, the two paragraphs are mirror images of
     each other.
     60 As the Government indicated in its brief, the above-
     quoted cost principles simply adopt FAR Part 31, 48 C.F.R.
     31.000 et seq. (1994).  R. Brf., p. 3.  Specifically, in
     that regard, GPO Cost Directive, Sec. 2,  3 is the
     equivalent of FAR 31.102, while GPO Cost Directive, Sec. 2,
      4(b)(3) is the same as FAR 31.103(b)(3).
     61 The Board is doing so in full recognition that some other
     contract appeals boards, such as the ASBCA, have different
     ideas about the choice between "fairness" and strict
     adherence to accounting rules than the Claims Court, the
     GSBCA and the VABCA.  See J.W. Cook & Sons, Inc., supra,
     92-3 BCA at 124,865.  However, in the Board's view, the
     philosophy espoused by those three forums is more in harmony
     with the underlying purposes of a convenience termination
     settlement.
     62 Thus, as of this moment the Appellant is clearly entitled
     to reimbursement for its film costs ($1,754.00) and for the
     Federal Express and UPS charges ($143.25).  However, the
     record indicates that the Contractor has not been paid the
     undisputed amount as yet, most likely because it has not
     invoked the partial payment procedures of the "Termination
     for Convenience" clause and the Respondent's printing
     procurement regulation.  See GPO Contract Terms, Contract
     Clauses,  19(k)(1); PPR, Chap. XIV, Sec. 2,  3.m.(1)(a).
     On the other hand, the Board also notes that the chapter on
     "Contract Claims and Litigation" in the regulation provides:
     "In the event of an appeal, the amount, if any, determined
     to be payable in the decision of the Contracting Officer,
     less any portion previously paid, should be paid in advance
     of any decision by the board without prejudice to the rights
     of either party or the appeal.  [Emphasis added.]"  See PPR,
     Chap. X, Sec. 1,  5.g.
     63 If the accounting records are not available due to no
     fault of the contractor, the costs may be established on the
     basis of estimates, if they are supported by detailed,
     substantiating data.  See e.g., R. G. Robbins & Co., ASBCA
     No. 27516, 83-1 BCA  16,420; Leopold Construction Co.,
     ASBCA No. 23705, 81-2 BCA  15,277; Bailey Specialized
     Buildings, Inc., ASBCA No. 10576, 71-1 BCA  8,699.
     However, the use of estimates does not change the burden of
     proof.  Cf. Lagarelli Brothers Construction Co., Inc., ASBCA
     No. 34793, 88-1 BCA  20,363; Clary Corp., ASBCA No. 19274,
     74-2 BCA  10,927.
     64 To the extent that the Contractor also argues that GPO's
     interpretation could bar recovery of pre-press production
     costs by terminated contractors who bid those tasks at "no
     charge" and include the work elsewhere in the job, see App.
     Brf., p. 3, the Board declines to engage in such
     speculation.  See Univex International, GPO BCA 23-90 (July
     31, 1995), slip. op. at 35, 1995 WL 488438; Sterling
     Printing, Inc., supra, slip op. at 82.
     65 Indeed, even if the Contractor was a participant in
     Program A814-M, that contract would be inapposite here.  The
     substantial differences between the type of work under
     Program A814-M and the agreement in dispute would preclude
     finding a commonality or course of dealing between the
     parties with respect to stripping and blueline costs.  Cf.
     RD Printing Associates, Inc., GPO BCA 02-92 (December 16,
     1992), slip op. at 35-36, fn. 33, 1992 WL 516088.  Accord
     Gresham & Co., Inc. v. United States, 200 Ct. Cl. 97, 470
     F.2d 542 (1972).
     66 The reason the "jury verdict" technique is usually viewed
     as an evidentiary tool, rather than as a method of proof of
     the amount itself, is simple enough.  As explained by the
     ASBCA: "There is neither a single nor a precise method of
     arriving at the dollar amount of an equitable adjustment.
     In general we seek to reach a figure as an equitable
     adjustment which represents the cost to a reasonably
     efficient contract[or] of performing the changed work under
     his contract.  Evidence of this amount may be found in the
     actual costs of the particular contract, to the extent that
     those costs are not shown to be other than reasonable, and
     in engineering estimates of reasonable cost made by experts
     who bring into play their experience and knowledge to
     attempt to visualize the price at which that reasonably
     efficient contractor could perform.  Neither estimating nor
     accounting are such exact arts that either can produce
     figures which will be agreed to by all parties without
     legitimate argument.  We recognize that often, despite
     protestations to the contrary, extreme positions on monetary
     entitlement are taken during litigation. . . . [We must
     determine] . . . a figure as the amount of an equitable
     adjustment . . . [which] . . . ordinarily is . . . some
     place between the amount contended for by each party to the
     litigation. . . . This is a figure which in the view of the
     trier of the facts is fair in light of all the facts of the
     case, or, put another way, is supported by consideration of
     the entire record."  Johnson, Drake & Piper, Inc., supra,
     65-2 BCA at 23,073.  Similarly, the Department of
     Agriculture Board of Contract Appeals has observed that: "It
     is not essential that the amount be ascertainable with
     absolute exactness or mathematical precision.  [Citations
     omitted.]  It is enough if the testimony and evidence
     adduced is sufficient to enable the court or board (acting
     as the jury) to make a fair and reasonable approximation of
     the amount recoverable.  [Citations omitted.]"  Lawrence D.
     Krause, supra, 82-2 BCA at 80,073.  See also Greenwood
     Construction Corp., Inc., AGBCA No. 75-127, 78-1 BCA 
     12,893.
See generally Cibinic & Nash, pp. 716-23.
     67 In essence, notwithstanding the requirement for proof of
     costs, the cases disclose a hesitancy to completely deny
     recovery where it is reasonably certain that an injury did,
     in fact, occur.  See Meva Corp. v. United States, 206 Ct.
     Cl. 203, 220-21, 511 F.2d 548 (1975) (where the court
     allowed a "jury verdict" recovery because it was "equally
     clear" that the contractor suffered substantial monetary
     damage in direct consequence of the Government's breach of
     contract).  See also Harold Benson, AGBCA No. 384, 77-1 BCA
      12,490 (where the evidence did not support the amount
     claimed by the contractor but did indicate that the amount
     allowed by the contracting officer was too low); Custom
     Roofing Co., ASBCA No. 19164, 74-2 BCA  10,925 (where the
     board granted a "jury verdict" recovery based on "rough
     estimates"); and Rocky Mountain Construction Co., IBCA No.
     1091-12-75, 77-2 BCA  12,692 (where the board applied the
     "jury verdict" method to an item whose cost was "totally
     unclear").  Indeed, under the "jury verdict" technique, a
     board may even go so far as to make its own calculations of
     an equitable adjustment if it is not satisfied with the
     computations of either the contractor or the Government.
     See Steve P. Rados, Inc., AGBCA No. 77-130-4, 82-1 BCA 
     15.624; Varo,
Inc., ASBCA No. 15000, 72-2 BCA  9,717.  In short, the teaching
of the cases is that it is an error for a trier of fact to
totally deny a contractor's claim when entitlement is clear and
there is some evidence upon which to base a "jury verdict"
recovery.  See Assurance Co. v. United States, supra; S.W.
Electronics & Manufacturing Corp. v. United States, supra;
Electronic & Missile Facilities, Inc. v. United States, supra.
See also Eagle Paving, AGBCA No. 75-156, 78-1 BCA  13,107.
Thus, the "jury verdict" method works in harmony with two
purposes of the equitable adjustment procedure in general, namely
to recognize and give appropriate consideration to the special
circumstances of each case, and to avoid blind computations of
additional costs or cost savings.  See G.M. Company Manufacturing
Inc., ASBCA No. 2883, 57-2 BCA  1,505, at 5,234.
     68 Of the 20 workdays in February 1991, the record shows
     that the Appellant procured other work which fully occupied
     the Miller Press on February 15, 1991, and February 18,
     1991, respectively, and hence there is no claim for those
     days (App. Exh. No. 5).  Indeed, as previously noted, the
     Miller Press was completely shutdown on just seven (7) of
     the 20 workdays that month; i.e., February 1, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8,
     and 12, 1991.  See note 32 supra.
     69 It should be noted that this provision, by its terms,
     does not preclude recovery merely because a "common item" is
     "reasonably usable on the contractor's other work."  To be
     unrecoverable, the item must be both "reasonably usable" and
     capable of being retained without loss to the contractor.
     Furthermore, the provision clearly apportions the burden
     each party bears with respect to establishing the proper
     classification of residual equipment.  Thus, the contractor
     is responsible for initially coming forward with evidence to
     demonstrate it could not retain the equipment at cost for
     use on other work without sustaining a loss.  Once this is
     done, the burden shifts to the Government to show that there
     has been an evaluation of the contractor's current and
     planned production to determine if such residual equipment
     is in fact reasonably usable by the contractor or in excess
     of the latter's reasonable needs.  The extent to which these
     requirements are met determines the proper classification of
     residual equipment.  See Fiesta Leasing and Sales, Inc,
     supra, 87-1 BCA at 99,287 (citing Essex Electro Engineers,
     Inc., DOTCAB Nos. 1025, 1119, 81-1 BCA  14,838 at 73,250,
     reconsid. denied 81-1 BCA  15,109, aff'd 702 F.2d 998 (Fed.
     Cir. 1983)).
     70 By definition, a tangible capital asset has three
     essential characteristics: (a) it is acquired for use in
     operations and not for resale; (b) it is long-term in
     nature, yielding services over a number of years; (c) it has
     physical substance.  See Lane K. Anderson, Accounting for
     Government Contracts: Cost Accounting Standards, Matthew
     Bender Accounting Series, 1981,  13.03[4], pp. 13-6, 13-7
     (hereinafter Anderson).
     71 "Tangible capital assets" are expressly included within
     the definition of "facilities" in the cost accounting rules
     relating to "idle facilities and idle capacity costs."  See
     GPO Cost Directive, Sec. 3,  25(a).  "Idle capacity," is
     simply defined as "the unused capacity of partially used
     facilities."  Id.
     72 See note 23 supra.
     73 In Cloverleaf Enterprises, Inc., the ad hoc contract
     appeals panel affirmed the contracting officer's award of
     depreciation and administrative costs pursuant to the
     Government's convenience termination of the contract.  See
     Cloverleaf Enterprises, Inc., supra, slip op. 18.  In doing
     so, the ad hoc panel relied on the decision of the ASBCA in
     Ted J. Grimsrud and Claude Carr, ASBCA No. 7971, 1962 BCA 
     3562.  Similarly, in Aviation Specialists, Inc., the
     Department of Transportation Board of Contract Appeals
     (DOTBCA) awarded the terminated contractor a small profit
     (1.3 percent) on its continuing costs because of the special
     circumstances of that case, despite the general rule
     prohibiting anticipatory profits in convenience
     terminations.  See Aviation Specialists, Inc., DOT BCA No.
     1967, 91-1 BCA  23,534, at 117,993.  Both Cloverleaf
     Enterprises, Inc. and Aviation Specialists, Inc. are "pure"
     convenience termination cases.  In cases where the
     convenience termination of a "requirements" contract is the
     result of a default being overturned, recovery seems to be
     strictly limited to unreimbursed costs of the actual work
     performed on the contract before termination.  See e.g., Bay
     Ridge Press, supra, Supplemental Decision, slip op. at 3.
     74 As a matter of contract law, a requirements contract is:
     ". . . a contract by which one party, the seller, agrees to
     satisfy all of the buyer's requirements for services and/or
     items for a specified period of time.  That contract is
     violated if either the buyer does not purchase all of its
     requirements from the seller, or, if the seller fails to
     satisfy all of the buyer's needs.  The consideration that
     makes such a contract binding is the buyer's promise to
     purchase all of its requirements from the seller and the
     seller's promise to satisfy those requirements."  See R.C.
     Swanson, supra, Supplemental Decision, slip op. at 22
     (quoting Aviation Specialists, Inc., supra, 91-1 BCA at
     117,991).
     75 The termination clause in question was FAR 52.249-2,
     "Termination for Convenience of the Government (Fixed-Price)
     (April 1984)," which was incorporated by reference in the
     contract.  See Aviation Specialists, Inc., supra, 91-1 BCA
     at 117,989.  As previously indicated, GPO's convenience
     termination clause, GPO Contract Terms, Contract Clauses, 
     19, is essentially a verbatim adoption of FAR 52.249-2.  See
     R.C. Swanson, supra, Supplemental Decision,
slip op. at 18.
     76 In reaching the conclusion that the terminated contractor
     was entitled to recover its continuing costs relating to the
     aircraft after the date of termination, the DOTBCA relied on
     two earlier cases decided by the ASBCA-Fiesta Leasing and
     Sales, Inc., supra and Ted J. Grimsrud and Claude Carr,
     supra.  See Aviation Specialists, Inc., supra, 91-1 BCA at
     117,992.  In Fiesta Leasing and Sales, Inc., which the Board
     has cited with approval in this case, an Air Force fixed
     price definite quantities contract for the lease of buses
     was terminated for convenience.  After termination, the
     contractor
attempted but was unable to lease the buses elsewhere.  The ASBCA
found that under the "Termination for Convenience" clause the
contractor was entitled to its depreciation expense and to its
insurance and other continuing costs on certain buses following
the termination.  Ted J. Grimsrud and Claude Carr, which was
cited in the ad hoc panel's ruling in Cloverleaf Enterprises,
Inc., see note 73 supra, involved a requirements contract under
which the Air Force agreed to purchase all of its snow removal
needs for approximately six months from the contractor.  In order
to fulfill the contract, the contractor purchased a snow plow.
After about two and a half months, the contract was terminated
for convenience when the military base involved ceased to be an
active installation.  The contractor claimed entitlement to fuel
and insurance costs and sought reimbursement for the original
cost of the snow plow.  The ASBCA found that the contractor was
entitled to depreciation expenses on the plow and the insurance
costs for the two and one-half month period of contract
performance.  There was no indication whether the contract
contained a clause providing for continuing costs, and the ASBCA
made no allowance for the period following termination.  Fuel
costs were not allowed since there was no proof that these costs
were associated with the contract.
     77 See note 60 supra.
     78 Indeed, GPO Cost Directive, Sec. 3,  25(b)(2) cross-
     references GPO Cost Directive, Sec. 3,  49.
     79 In the Board's view, the 18 workdays affected by this
     ruling is analogous to a reasonable wind-up period following
     the convenience termination of the Appellant's contract.
     See Southland Manufacturing Corp., supra, 75-1 BCA at
     52,361.
     80 As the Board indicated in remanding the claim in R.C.
     Swanson, it expected that recomputing the terminated
     contractor's allowances under the rule of Aviation
     Specialists, Inc. would have the greatest impact on
     overhead, capital acquisition, and G & A expenses.  However,
     the record in that case did not provide the Board with a
     sufficient factual record to resolve the claim de novo.  See
     R.C. Swanson, supra, slip op, at 26-27, fn.22.