U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
   BOARD OF CONTRACT APPEALS
   WASHINGTON, D.C.  20401

In the Matter of           )
                           )
The Appeal of              )
                           )
UNIVEX INTERNATIONAL       )   Docket No. GPO BCA 23-90
Jacket No. 606-648         )
Purchase Order B-9708      )

   DECISION AND ORDER

   By letter dated June 14, 1990, Univex International (Appellant
   or Contractor), 7325 Imperial Drive, Waco, Texas 76712, filed
   a timely appeal from the March 16, 1990, final decision of
   Contracting Officer Annamarie T. Mierson of the U.S.
   Government Printing Office's (Respondent or GPO or Government)
   Philadelphia Regional Printing Procurement Office (PRPPO),
   Southampton Office Park, Suite A-190, 928 Jaymore Road,
   Southampton, Pennsylvania 18966, terminating the Appellant's
   contract identified as Jacket No. 606-648, Purchase Order
   B-9708, for default because of the Appellant's failure to
   print an acceptable product meeting the requirements for a
   Quality Level IV job as specified in GPO's Quality Assurance
   Through Attributes Program, GPO Publication 310.1 (QATAP),
   which was incorporated by reference in the contract (R4 File,
   Tabs A and U).1  For the reasons which follow, the decision of
   the Contracting Officer defaulting the contract is hereby
   AFFIRMED, and that portion of the appeal is DENIED.2  However,
   insofar as the Contractor challenges the extent of its
   liability, if any, for excess reprocurement costs, that matter
   is REMANDED to the Contracting Officer for the submission of
   additional evidence.

   I. FINDINGS OF FACT3

      1.     On August 23, 1989, the Respondent awarded a
      contract (Purchase Order B-9708, Jacket No. 606-648) to the
      Appellant for the production of 605 copies of a 698-page
      loose-leaf book with covers, and one complete set of films,
      for the Department of the Navy (Navy) at a contract price
      of $14,418.00 (R4 File, Tabs A and B).4  Among other
      things, the contract specifications required: (a) the text
      of the book was to be printed in black ink on white latex-
      saturated paper (JCP O-40) trimmed to 5" x 8"; (b) the
      publication was to have 24 die-cut laminated tabbed
      dividers on white index paper (JCP K-10) trimmed to 5-3/4"
      x 8-1/2"; (c) the book was to have light blue tenite covers
      on both front and back, also trimmed to 5-3/4" x 8-1/2",
      with a die-cut a window on the front cover; and (d) in
      addition to trimming on four sides, the Contractor was to
      drill three round holes, and collate the two pieces of
      cover (R4 File, Tab A).  The Purchase Order also indicates
      that apart from mailing labels, the Government was to
      furnish the Contractor with 8-1/2" x 11" camera copy for
      the text and 8-1/2" x 14" copy for the dividers, which
      would be available for pick-up by August 25, 1989 (R4 File,
      Tab A).  However, the Appellant was told that in order to
      fit the textual material on a 5" x 8" page, the camera copy
      would have to be reduced by 65 percent and 61 percent,
      respectively (R4 File, Tab A).  The specifications also
      provided that each book was to be shrink-wrapped, and
      delivery was to be completed by September 12, 1989 (R4
      File, Tab A).5  As previously indicated, the job had to
      meet the Quality Level IV standards of QATAP.6

      2.   The record discloses that the Appellant's paper
      supplier, Olmsted-Kirk Paper Company, initially ordered the
      necessary paper stock from Georgia-Pacific Company, but was
      subsequently notified by the manufacturer that the grade of
      paper required for the contract was no longer going to be
      produced (R4 File, Tabs C, D and E).   Although the paper
      was eventually purchased from an alternate source, Appleton
      Paper Company, because of the delay the stock was not
      delivered to the Contractor until September 29, 1989 (R4
      File, Tab E). Consequently, the Appellant was unable to
      meet the original delivery date, and October 25, 1989, was
      established as a new shipping date (R4 File, Tab F).7  See
      Mierson Declaration,  5.

      3.   The Contractor failed to deliver the books by October
      25, 1989.  See Mierson Declaration,  6.  Consequently, on
      November 2, 1989, the Respondent sent a "Show Cause Notice"
      to the Appellant, informing it, inter alia, that: (a) GPO
      was considering terminating the contract for default; (b)
      before a final decision was rendered, it would be necessary
      to determine if the failure to perform arose out of causes
      beyond the Appellant's control and without its fault or
      negligence; and (c) it was being afforded an opportunity to
      present, in writing, any extenuating facts bearing on the
      matter to the Contracting Officer within five (5) days
      after receipt of the notice (R4 File, Tab G).  See Mierson
      Declaration,  6.  The following day, the Appellant
      telephoned the PRPPO and spoke to Compliance Officer
      Dougherty.  The Contractor informed Dougherty that it could
      not meet the October 25, 1989, delivery date, and asked for
      GPO's "help to get . . . out of it."  See R4 File, Tab H;
      Mierson Declaration,  6.  After consulting with the Navy's
      representative, Lisa Gallagher, the Contractor was given an
      extension until November 8, 1989, to ship the complete
      order (R4 File, Tab H).  Mierson Declaration,  6.  By
      letter dated November 6, 1989, the Appellant confirmed the
      new delivery date, and stated that it "presume[d] this
      letter will cover the show cause letter . . ." (R4 File,
      Tab I).  Although the Appellant gave the completed books to
      its shipper on November 8, 1989, as a "hot rush" shipment,
      for some reason not disclosed in the record the Navy did
      not receive them until November 27, 1989 (R4 File, Tab K).
      See Mierson Declaration,  6.8

      4.   After delivery, the Navy selected a random sample of
      the books and inspected them.  See Dougherty Declaration, 
      3.  By "Notice of Quality Defects (Notice)" dated December
      20, 1989, the Navy informed GPO that the books were
      unacceptable because they contained numerous printing and
      finishing defects, and were improperly packaged.  See
      Dougherty Declaration,  3; Attachment 1.  While noting
      that the defects varied with each book, the Navy said that
      its inspection disclosed the following defects: (a)
      printing which faded from light to dark across the page;
      (b) image areas that bled off the page; (c) shadowed
      images; (d) images that had been drilled through; (e)
      smudges; (f) "chocolate" marks on pages; (g) marks on all
      pages caused by not letting the ink dry; (h) missing pages;
      (i) upside down pages; (j) wrong paper stock; and (k)
      shrink-wrap torn to the extent that the books were
      intermingled.  Id.

Because of these defects, the Navy concluded that the books did
not meet specifications and were unusable, and it asked for a
reprinting of the entire order.  Id.

      5.   The Notice was accompanied by three random samples of
      the book for GPO's inspection.  See Dougherty Declaration,
       3; Attachment 1.  On receiving the Navy's complaint,
      Dougherty personally examined the samples provided, and
      also concluded that the job was rejectable under QATAP
      standards.  See Dougherty Declaration,  4.  In his view,
      "the major defects were poor type quality and uniformity as
      well as missing information. . . . ," and the problem with
      the image was "consistent with that which results when
      produced on a press which has a dented blanket."  Id.
      Accordingly, on January 8, 1990, Dougherty telephoned the
      Appellant and spoke to Don Franklin.9  Id.  In their
      conversation, Dougherty informed Franklin of the results of
      his inspection, and asked the Contractor to think about
      reprinting the job (R4 File, Tab L).  See Dougherty
      Declaration,  4.

      6.   By letter dated January 17, 1990, Franklin wrote to
      Dougherty and, in effect, challenged his inspection
      findings (R4 File, Tab M).  See Dougherty Declaration,  5.
      Specifically, the Appellant said, in pertinent part:

            After our telephone conversation . . ., I have [sic]
            called some of our ink and equipment vendors to
            discuss the problem of the alleged variation of
            thickness of ink placed on the sheets.  I was assured
            by three different people that the only way to
            accurately read a denseometer [sic] is on a solid
            block of ink.  There is no way to take an accurate
            reading on type only.

            If the type on the art varies from light to dark,
            then the thickness of the letters on the negative
            would also vary.  This would cause the letters to
            appear lighter or darker on the sheet.  Reducing the
            original art to 65% the density of the original copy
            would be very critical.  If we had known this was
            going to be a critical point of this job we would
            have asked for the art to be re-set [sic].

See R4 File, Tab M.

      7.   Because the above letter did not suggest a reprint
      date, on January 23, 1990, the Compliance Officer wrote to
      Franklin and directed the Contractor to reprint the job and
      ship the new books no later than February 16, 1990 (R4
      File, Tab N).  See Dougherty Declaration,  5; Mierson
      Declaration,  7.  As stated in his letter, Dougherty told
      Franklin that a reprint was necessary because:

            Examination of the product your firm has produced for
            the order referenced above reveals the following
            defects based on Quality Assurance Through Attributes
            Program standards:

               P-7-Type Quality and Uniformity.  Density of the
               image varies to the extent of an average demerit
               level of 22.34.

               F-17-Information missing.  Information is missing
               from different pages on various books.

            Both defects are major.  Based on these test results,
            this product is rejected and must be reprinted in
            strict accordance with the specifications at no
            additional cost to the Government.

See R4 File, Tab N.  In addition to establishing a reprint date,
Dougherty advised the Appellant that failure to complete the
reprint on time could result in the contract being defaulted (R4
File, Tab N).  See GPO Contract Terms, Contract Clauses,  20
(Default).

      8.   The Contractor did not reprint and deliver the books
      to the Navy by February 16, 1990, as directed by the
      Respondent.  See Dougherty Declaration,  6; Mierson
      Declaration,  8.  Accordingly, on February 21, 1990, the
      Respondent sent a second "Show Cause Notice" to the
      Appellant, directing it to respond within five days (or by
      February 26, 1990), or risk default of its contract (R4
      File, Tab O).  See Dougherty Declaration,  6; Mierson
      Declaration,  8.

      9.   The Appellant did not answer the "Show Cause Notice"
      within five days.  However, on February 28, 1990, another
      representative of the Appellant, Douglas Miller, telephoned
      Dougherty and stated that the Contractor could not reprint
      the books because it was unable to retrieve the rejected
      publications from the Navy.  See Dougherty Declaration, 
      6; Mierson Declaration,  9.  As Miller explained in a
      letter he sent to Dougherty later that day:

            We have not yet seen examples of the stated defects.
            As outlined to us, they are alleged in the printed
            contents only and not the plastic binder covers and
            plastic tab Index Dividers, which are part of the set
            and also manufactured by us.

            We have attempted to pick up and return the completed
            books, 51 cartons, 1348 lbs., via Yellow Motor
            Freight, but cannot get them from the agency.

            If these are released to us, we will correct any
            defeciencies [sic] in a timely manner.

See R4 File, Tab P.  See also, Dougherty Declaration,  7; R4
File, Tab W.

   10.   Since Dougherty had discussed retrieval of the initial
   shipment with the Navy as part of the rejection process, he
   telephoned Gallagher and inquired whether, in fact, there had
   been any attempt to pick-up the materials.  See Dougherty
   Declaration,  7; Mierson Declaration,  9.  Gallagher checked
   and then told Dougherty that there was no record of such a try
   by anyone.10  See Dougherty Declaration,  7; Mierson
   Declaration,  9.  She also talked with the Data Manager,
   Stock Control Clerk, and Receipt Control Clerk at the base,
   who stated that no one had come for the rejected materials (R4
   File, Tabs Q and W).11  Id.  In addition, the record discloses
   that the Appellant never contacted the PRPPO at any time about
   problems it might be having in retrieving the books, or to
   arrange for the pick-up of the rejected product.  See
   Dougherty Declaration,  8; Mierson Declaration,  9.

   11.   On March 1, 1990, the Contracting Officer sought the
   approval of the Respondent's Contract Review Board (CRB) to
   terminate the contract for default (R4 File, Tab R).12  See
   Mierson Declaration,  10.  Termination was requested because
   of the Appellant's "failure to reprint a rejected product" (R4
   File, Tab R).  CRB approval was received by the PRPPO on March
   5, 1990 (R4 File, Tab R).

   12.   Before defaulting the contract, however, the Contracting
   Officer sought a second inspection of the books from GPO's
   QAS.  See Mierson Declaration,  10.  That QAS reexamination,
   which was conducted on March 8, 1990, confirmed that the books
   were rejectable, specifically for printing attribute, P-7,
   Type Quality and Uniformity (R4 File, Tab T).13  See MacAfee
   Declaration,  4; Mierson Declaration,  10.

   13.   Accordingly, by letter dated March 16, 1990, expressly
   titled "Notice of Termination," the Contracting Officer
   terminated the Appellant's contract for default because of its
   "failure to print an acceptable product [according to QATAP
   specifications]."  See R4 File, Tab U.  See also Mierson
   Declaration,  10.  The Contracting Officer based her decision
   on several factors, including those listed in the relevant
   chapter of the PPR.14  See Mierson Declaration,  11.
   Specifically, she terminated the contract because:

            I did not believe that the contractor had adequately
            responded to our show cause notice within the time
            required, had performed any action to reprint the
            order within the time required, or taken any other
            significant steps to perform the contract in
            accordance with the specifications.

See Mierson Declaration,  11.

   14.   The "Notice of Termination" also informed the Appellant
   that it was potentially liable for any excess reprocurement
   costs (R4 File, Tab U).  In fact, after the contract was
   defaulted, the Respondent immediately resolicited the job
   under the same small purchase procedures, and terms and
   conditions, including the time allotted for performance, as
   the original contract.  See Mierson Declaration,  13.  Two
   offers were received-one from GMC ($24,372.00) and another
   from Quadra Graphics ($20,514.00).  See Mierson Declaration, 
   13; Attachment 2.  Since Quadra Graphics was the low bidder,
   on April 3, 1990, less than three weeks after the termination
   of the Appellant's contract, that company was awarded the
   repurchase.  See Mierson Declaration,  13; Attachment 3.

   15.   By letter dated June 14, 1990, the Appellant timely
   appealed the Contracting Officer's default termination
   decision (R4 File, Tab V).  Among other things, the
   Contractor's appeal letter stated, in pertinent part:

            The furnished artwork was incorrect.  It was
            necessary for us to make corrections. . . . We were
            refused samples of the job illustrating the alleged
            defects.

            We noticed [to] you on February 28, 1990 that your
            complaint concerned a fraction of the complete job
            and in no way could have been the entirety since the
            binders and indexes were never faulted, but rather
            only the portion of the order that was produced from
            your incorrect artwork.

            Two attempts were made by us through Yellow Freight
            to pick up this material for return to us to effect
            inspection and possible replacement.  Both times our
            carrier was refused, even after notification to your
            office February 28, 1990.

See R4 File, Tab V.  With regard to the inability of its carrier
to pick-up the rejected material from the Navy, the Appellant
subsequently submitted to the Board, pursuant to Rule 4(b) of the
Board Rules, a letter from Irven Atkinson, Branch Manager, Yellow
Freight System, Waco, Texas, to the Contractor, dated August 15,
1990, which said:

            This is a letter following up our earlier phone
            conversations regarding a pickup that you had
            requested we make in Philadelphia, Pa.  You initially
            called me on February 23 and asked that Yellow
            Freight schedule a pickup in Philadelphia with the
            [Receiving] Officer, Navy Publishing & Forms Center,
            5801 Tabor Ave[.], Philadelphia, P[A] 19120.  After
            our conversation I called our city dispatcher in
            Philadelphia and gave him the same information.  He
            informed me that he would make arrangements to have
            the freight picked up on February 23rd or the 26th.

            On Monday the 26th, the city dispatcher called me
            back and said he could not make the pickup without
            additional information as to where the freight could
            be located.  He said he would need more information
            or someones [sic] name at the facility so they could
            contact them for pickup.  You called me back later
            that day and gave me this additional info; M/F Stock
            Replenishment, NAVAIR STOCK.  After you gave me this
            info, I called the city dispatcher back and passed it
            on to him.  On February 28th the dispatcher called me
            back and said they had gone back to the facility and
            that no one could locate this shipment.  On that same
            day I called you and advised you of the same.  I am
            sorry for any inconvenience this might have caused,
            but we did try to make the pickup on 2 separate
            occasions.


See App. Exh. A.
   II. ISSUES PRESENTED

   At the close of the prehearing conference held on April 16,
   1993, the Board identified three questions as being presented
   by the facts in this case.  See RPTC, p. 6.  Those issues can
   be succinctly stated as follows:

            1. Was it error for the Contracting Officer to
            default the Appellant's contract for nondelivery of
            the reprinted books, and reprocure them from another
            source, without providing the Contractor with an
            opportunity to cure the defects?  Stated otherwise,
            was the default action somehow procedurally
            defective?

            2. Was the Appellant's failure to retrieve the
            rejected product from the Navy prior to, and for the
            purpose of, reprinting the publication, due to causes
            beyond its control and without its fault or
            negligence, so that it should be excused from
            liability for excess reprocurement costs?  See GPO
            Contract Terms, Contract Clauses,  20(c) (Default).
            Stated otherwise, can it be said that the reason for
            the Contractor's inability to retrieve the rejected
            product was the Respondent's lack of cooperation in a
            making arrangements for the pick-up?

            3. Assuming that the Appellant is responsible for
            excess reprocurement costs, is it entitled to have
            its liability reduced by an amount equivalent to the
            cost of the plastic binding covers and tab dividers-
            the parts of the book which allegedly conformed to
            the contract specifications?  Stated otherwise, what
            is the extent of the Contractor's excess cost
            liability in this case?

   III. POSITION OF THE PARTIES

   The Appellant asserts that while it was willing to reprint the
   books, the Government failed to cooperate with it toward that
   end.  Specifically, the Contractor believes that the
   Respondent's refusal to supply examples of the alleged defects
   to the Appellant, or otherwise offer it assistance in
   isolating the source of problem, deprived it of any meaningful
   opportunity to fix the defective product.  See RPTC, p. 5;
   Complaint.  Furthermore, the Appellant contends that GPO never
   offered or gave it proper instructions for picking up the
   rejected books from the Navy, and as a consequence, they could
   not be retrieved for correction and redelivery.15  See RPTC,
   p. 5; Complaint.  This was a major obstacle to reprinting the
   books because the Contractor wished to use the conforming
   binder covers and rings, and the clear plastic die-cut
   laminated index tab dividers, for the new copies.  See
   Complaint.  In other words, the Appellant wanted to minimize
   its potential losses by saving the good components and
   limiting the cure process to just reprinting the defective
   text pages, which would then be recollated, along with the
   nondefective index dividers, into the binders.  Moreover, the
   Contractor thought that the reprint date established by the
   Respondent was coercive and unrealistic because GPO knew that
   it would by difficult for the Appellant to obtain the special
   paper stock needed for the text pages in time.  See Complaint.
   Finally, the Appellant states that by repurchasing the
   defaulted book in its entirety, without making an attempt to
   use the conforming binders and index dividers, GPO failed to
   mitigate the Contractor's damages-a requirement where the
   Government seeks excess reprocurement costs.  See RPTC, p. 5;
   Complaint.  Accordingly, for these reasons, the Contractor
   submits that the default termination is in error, and should
   be reversed.

   The Respondent, on the other hand, believes that the
   Appellant's contract was properly terminated because the books
   it delivered failed to conform to the QATAP standards in all
   respects, including the printed text.16  See RPTC, pp. 4-5.
   Although the Appellant said that it had offered to correct any
   deficiencies "in a timely manner" and for this purpose had
   attempted to retrieve the books, the Navy has "categorically
   denied" that any one representing the Contractor contacted it
   about removing the rejected material from stock.  See RPTC, p.
   5.  As for the Contractor's claim that GPO failed to mitigate
   its damages by utilizing the conforming binders and index
   dividers on the reprinted book, the Government says that it
   would have been too impractical and too expensive for it to
   expend considerable time and effort to decollate all 605
   copies, extract 24 tabs from each book, and then reverse the
   process.  See Mierson Declaration,  14.  Even though this was
   what the Appellant probably would have done if it had
   reprinted the product, the cost of performing these manual
   tasks would have exceeded the cost of the relatively
   inexpensive binders and tabs, and hence was not a practical
   option for the Government.  Id.  Finally, the Contracting
   Officer based her decision to terminate the contract, in part,
   on the relevant factors listed in the PPR.  See Mierson
   Declaration,  11.  Accordingly, for these reasons, GPO
   asserts that the default decision was not in error, and the
   Contracting Officer's action should be affirmed.

   IV. DISCUSSION

   In this appeal, the Board is asked to decide whether or not
   the Appellant's contract was erroneously defaulted, and if the
   termination was proper, is the Contractor nonetheless excused
   from liability for excess reprocurement costs?  At the outset,
   therefore, it is worthwhile to repeat the legal principles
   which apply to these issues.

   First, GPO's "Default" clause provides that a contracting
   officer may, upon written notice of default to the contractor,
   terminate a contract, in whole or in part, if the contractor
   fails to: (1) deliver the supplies or perform the required
   services within the time specified or any extension which may
   have been granted; (2) make progress on the work, so as to
   endanger performance of the contract; or (3) perform any of
   the other provisions of the contract.  See GPO Contract Terms,
   Contract Clauses,  20(a)(1)(i),(ii),(iii).  Further, where a
   contract is terminated for default and the work must be
   reprocured, the contractor will be held responsible for excess
   procurement costs and possible liquidated damages.  GPO
   Contract Terms, Contract Clauses,  20(b), 22(d).  However,
   the contractor is excused from paying such reprocurement costs
   or damages if the failure to perform or to deliver on time
   results from causes beyond its control and without its fault
   or negligence.17  GPO Contract Terms, Contract Clauses, 
   20(c), 22(e), 23.  Such causes include, but are not limited
   to, acts of God or of the public enemy, acts of the Government
   in either its sovereign or contractual capacity, fires,
   floods, epidemics, quarantine restrictions, strikes, freight
   embargoes, and unusually severe weather-but in each case, the
   failure to perform must be beyond the control and without the
   fault or negligence of the contractor.  GPO Contract Terms,
   Contract Clauses,  20(c).  See K.C. Printing Co., GPO BCA
   02-91 (February 22, 1995), Slip op. at 9; Printing Unlimited,
   GPO BCA No. 21-90 (November 30, 1993), Slip op. at 16, 1993 WL
   516844; Chavis and Chavis Printing, GPO BCA 20-90 (February 6,
   1991), Slip. op. at 11, 1991 WL 439270.  Where the failure to
   perform is caused by the default of a supplier or
   subcontractor, the cause of the default must be beyond the
   control of both the contractor and subcontractor, and without
   the fault or negligence of either, in order for the contractor
   not to be liable for any excess costs for failure to perform,
   unless the subcontracted supplies or services could have been
   secured from other sources in sufficient time to meet the
   required delivery schedule.  GPO Contract Terms, Contract
   Clauses,  20(d).  See K.C. Printing Co., supra, Slip op. at
   10; Chavis and Chavis Printing, supra, Slip op. at 11.

   Second, a default termination is a drastic action which may
   only be taken for good cause and on the basis of solid
   evidence.18  See K.C. Printing Co., supra, Slip op. at 10;
   Shepard Printing, supra, Slip op. at 10-11; R.C. Swanson
   Printing and Typesetting Co., GPO BCA 31-90 (February 6,
   1992), Slip op. at 25, 1992 WL 487874, aff'd, Civil Action No.
   92-128C (U.S. Claims Court, October 2, 1992);19 Stephenson,
   Inc., supra, Slip op. at 20 (citing, Mary Rogers Manley d/b/a
   Mary Rogers Real Estate, HUDBCA No. 76-27, 78-2 BCA  13,519;
   Decatur Realty Sales, HUDBCA No. 75-26, 77-2 BCA  12,567).
   Consequently, the Government has the burden of proving the
   basis for the default, while the contractor has the burden of
   showing that its failure to perform was excusable.  See K.C.
   Printing Co., supra, Slip op. at 10; Shepard Printing, supra,
   Slip op. at 11; R.C. Swanson Printing and Typesetting Co.,
   supra, Slip op. at 28; Chavis and Chavis Printing, supra, Slip
   op. at 11.  Accord, Lisbon Contractors v. United States, 828
   F.2d 759 (Fed. Cir. 1987)); Switlik Parachute Co. v. United
   States, 216 Ct. Cl. 362 (1978); J.F. Whalen and Co., AGBCA
   Nos. 83-160-1, 83-281-1, 88-3 BCA  21,066; B. M. Harrison
   Electrosonics, Inc., ASBCA No. 7684, 1963 BCA  3,736.  If the
   Government fails to meet its burden of proof, then the
   termination is converted into one of convenience and the
   contractor is allowed to recover for the work performed.  GPO
   Contract Terms, Contract Clauses,  20(g).  Cf. K.C. Printing
   Co., supra, Slip op. at 11; Stephenson, Inc., supra, Slip op.
   at 17-18; Chavis and Chavis Printing, supra, Slip op. at 9.

   Third, where the default termination is based on untimely
   performance, as in this case the failure to deliver the
   corrected books by the established reprint date, the
   contractor's burden of proof is four-fold: (1) to prove
   affirmatively that the delay was caused by or arose out of a
   situation which was beyond the contractor's control and that
   it was not at fault or negligent; (2) to show that performance
   would have been timely but for the occurrence of the event
   which is claimed to excuse the delay; (3) to show that it took
   every reasonable precaution to avoid foreseeable causes for
   delay and to minimize their effect; and (4) to establish a
   precise period of time that performance was delayed by the
   causes alleged.  See  K.C. Printing Co., supra, Slip op. at
   11; Chavis and Chavis Printing, supra, Slip op. at 12 (and
   cases cited therein).  This burden must be carried by
   substantial evidence-unsupported reasons by way of explanation
   are not enough-and the contractor must also show that the
   delay in contract performance was due to unforeseeable causes
   beyond its control and without any contributory negligence on
   its part.  See K.C. Printing Co., supra, Slip op. at 11;
   Chavis and Chavis Printing, supra, Slip op. at 12-13 (and
   cases cited therein).

   Finally, a default termination is a discretionary act which
   can be challenged on an abuse of discretion standard.  See
   K.C. Printing Co., supra, Slip op. at 12; Graphics Image,
   Inc., supra, Slip op. at 24-28; Shepard Printing, supra, Slip
   op. at 12.  Accord,  Darwin Construction Co., Inc. v. United
   States, 811 F.2d 593 (Fed. Cir. 1987); Quality Environment
   Systems v. United States, 7 Cl. Ct. 428 (1985); Jamco
   Constructors, Inc., VABCA Nos. 3271, 3516T, 94-1 BCA  26,405,
   reconsid. denied, 94-2 BCA  26,792; Walsky Construction Co.,
   ASBCA No. 41541, 94-1 BCA  26.264, reconsid. denied, 94-2 BCA
    26,698.  The burden is on the contractor to prove abuse of
   discretion.  See K.C. Printing Co., supra, Slip op. at 12;
   Shepard Printing, supra, Slip op. at 12.  Accord, Kit Pack
   Co., Inc., ASBCA No. 33135, 89-3 BCA  22,151; Lafayette Coal
   Co., ASBCA No. 32174, 89-3 BCA  21,963.

   Applying these principles to the facts in the record, the
   Board reaches the following conclusions:

            A. Although not required to, the Contracting Officer
            did provide the Appellant with an opportunity to cure
            the defects before defaulting the contract; i.e., by
            directing it to reprint the books.  When the
            Contractor failed to deliver the corrected books by
            the established delivery date for the reprints, the
            Contracting Officer could, without more, default the
            Appellant's contract, and reprocure the product from
            another source.  In short, the default action is not
            procedurally defective.

      1.   When the Contracting Officer terminated the contract
      for a "failure to print an acceptable product [according to
      QATAP specifications]" (R4 File, Tab U), she was clearly
      defaulting the Appellant for a failure to "[d]eliver the
      supplies or to perform the services within the time
      specified or any extension, thereof;. . .".  GPO Contract
      Terms, Contract Clauses,  20(a)(1)(i).20  The Contracting
      Officer expressly said so in her affidavit.  See Mierson
      Declaration,  11 ("I did not believe that the contractor .
      . . had performed any action to reprint the order within
      the time required, . . .".).  The Appellant does not
      dispute the Contracting Officer's finding in that regard.
      Rather, the Contractor contends that the Contracting
      Officer's termination action was procedurally defective
      because she failed to issue a "Cure Notice" or otherwise
      afford it an opportunity to correct the performance problem
      before the contract was defaulted.  See RPTC, p. 5;
      Complaint.  The Appellant is mistaken.  As a general rule,
      no "cure notice" is required where a contract is to be
      terminated because of the contractor's failure to timely
      deliver or perform.  See K.C. Printing Co., supra, Slip op.
      at 13; B. P. Printing and Office Supplies, GPO BCA 22-91
      (February 5, 1993), Slip op. at 12; Shepard Printing,
      supra, Slip op. at 13; Stephenson, Inc., supra, Slip op. at
      19-20.  Accord, Chambers-Thompson Moving and Storage, Inc.,
      ASBCA No. 43260, 93-3 BCA  26,033, at 129,408; Sonico,
      Inc., ASBCA Nos. 31110, 34269, 89-2 BCA  21,611.

      2.   A limited exception to the general rule exists when a
      contractor has timely shipped nonconforming goods which
      deviate from the specifications in only minor respects.
      See, Radiation Technology, Inc. v. United States, supra.
      Under the so-called "substantial compliance" doctrine, a
      defaulting contractor is afforded an opportunity, by
      operation of law, to correct minor defects in shipments to
      the Government.21  Cf. Hurt's Printing Co., Inc., supra,
      Slip op. at 17, 1994 WL 275098; B. P. Printing and Office
      Supplies, supra, Slip op. at 12; Stephenson, Inc., supra,
      Slip op. at 24, 48-54.  Also cf. Air, Inc., supra, 91-1 BCA
      at 117,112.  However, the "substantial compliance" doctrine
      clearly does not apply here.

      3.   First, we are not dealing with a situation involving
      timely delivery of supplies which are subsequently found to
      be nonconforming; indeed, untimeliness has been the mark of
      this Contractor throughout the contract.22  Instead, the
      Contracting Officer only resorted to default when there was
      no delivery at all of the reprinted books by February 16,
      1990, the date established by the Respondent in a final
      effort to secure a satisfactory product for the Navy (R4
      File, Tab N).  See GPO Contract Terms, Contract Clauses, 
      14(h) (Inspections and Tests) ("If the contractor fails to
      promptly remove, replace, or correct rejected supplies that
      are required to be removed or to be replaced or corrected,
      the Government may . . . (2) terminate for default as
      provided in article 20 "Default".  [Emphasis added.]).

      4.   Second, the two defects found in the Appellant's
      books-variation in the density of the image and missing
      information-are major, not minor, discrepancies under QATAP
      (R4 File, Tab N).23  Under the PPR, the Contracting Officer
      is the only person authorized to make final determinations
      on whether products submitted by a contractor conform to
      contract specifications.24  See PPR, Chap. XIII, Sec. 1, 
      4.f.  See Sterling Printing, Inc., GPO BCA 20-89 (March 28,
      1994), Slip op. at 34-35, fn. 46, 1994 WL 275104, reconsid.
      denied, GPO BCA 20-89 (July 5, 1994), 1994 WL 377592,
      second motion for reconsid. denied, GPO BCA 20-89 (August
      12, 1994); Hurt's Printing Co., Inc., supra, Slip op. at
      21-22.  Here, the Contracting Officer's initial conclusion
      that the books contained major defects was confirmed by the
      results of a second inspection performed by the QAS (R4
      File, Tab T).  See Mierson Declaration,  10; MacAfee
      Declaration,  4.  There is no credible evidence in the
      record which would indicate that the Contracting Officer's
      judgment was somehow erroneous or flawed.  Accordingly,
      there is no basis to disturb her decision, and the Board
      will let it stand.  See Printing Unlimited, supra, Slip op.
      at 21-22; Stabbe Senter Press, GPO BCA 13-85 and 19-85 (May
      12, 1989), Slip op. at 53, 1989 WL 384977.

      5.   Finally, the Board cannot ignore the facts in this
      case which show that despite the general rule, the
      Appellant was offered an opportunity to cure the defects by
      reprinting the order (R4 File, Tab N).  See Hurt's Printing
      Co., Inc., supra, Slip op. at 21-22; Shepard Printing,
      supra, Slip op. at 14.  Where, as here, a contractor has
      already been given a reasonable opportunity to correct the
      discrepancies in its product, it may not later be heard to
      say that the "substantial compliance" rule entitles it to a
      second chance.  See Hurt's Printing Co., Inc., supra, Slip
      op. at 22 (citing, Electro-Neutronics, Inc., ASBCA No.
      12947, 71-2 BCA  8,961); Shepard Printing, supra, Slip op.
      at 14.  Accordingly, even if Radiation Technology applied
      in this case, when GPO gave the Appellant an opportunity to
      cure the defects by reprinting the books, it was relieved
      of any further responsibility under the "substantial
      compliance" doctrine.
      6.   In summary, the record evidence shows that: (a) the
      Appellant's original shipment of books was found to contain
      major defects as defined by QATAP; (b) the Respondent
      afforded the Contractor an opportunity to correct the
      problem by directing it to reprint the publication; (c) the
      Contractor did not reprint and ship the books by the date
      established by the Contracting Officer; (d) the Appellant
      was given a chance to explain its failure to perform by the
      PRPPO's issuance of a "Show Cause Notice";25 and (e) the
      contract was not terminated until the Contractor's "show
      cause" response was received and considered by the
      Contracting Officer.  On these facts, the Board concludes
      that the Contracting Officer met all of her
      responsibilities under the law and GPO's regulations prior
      to defaulting the contract, and thus there is no procedural
      error in this case.  Accordingly, the Appellant's
      contentions to the contrary are without merit.  See K.C.
      Printing Co., supra, Slip op. at 14; Shepard Printing,
      supra, Slip op.

at 14; B. P. Printing and Office Supplies, supra, Slip op. at 15;
Chavis and Chavis Printing, supra, Slip op. at 13.

            B. The Respondent's failure to make arrangements for
            the Appellant to retrieve the rejected product from
            the Navy was not such conduct which would amount to a
            breach of its implied duty to cooperate with the
            Contractor in the performance of the contract.  Thus,
            the Appellant has not shown that its failure to
            perform arose from causes beyond its control and
            without its fault or negligence.

      1.   The nub of the Appellant's position on the merits is
      that it should be excused from responsibility for
      nonperformance because: (a) the Respondent refused to
      supply examples of the alleged defects or otherwise offer
      help in isolating the source of the problem, despite the
      Contractor's request; and (b) GPO never gave the Appellant
      proper instructions for picking up the rejected books from
      the Navy.  See RPTC, p. 5; Complaint.  The Contractor
      argues that the Government's lack of assistance in the
      latter regard was a particular hinderance since it wished
      to reuse the original binder covers, rings and clear
      plastic die-cut laminated index tab dividers for the
      reprints.  These assertions of the Appellant's amount to an
      allegation that the Government failed to cooperate with it
      in the performance of the contract.

      2.   A well-settled principle states that in every public
      contract there is an implied affirmative obligation on the
      part of the Government that it will do whatever is
      necessary to enable the contractor to perform.26  See
      Hurt's Printing Co., Inc., supra, Slip op. at 24;
      Stephenson, Inc., supra, Slip op. at 38-39 (citing
      Nanofast, Inc., supra; The Kehm Corp. v. United States, 119
      Ct. Cl. 454, 93 F.Supp. 620 (1950); United States v. Speed,
      75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 77 (1868)).  Under this doctrine, the
      Government will be held liable for breaching its implied
      duty to cooperate if it wrongfully fails or refuses to take
      some action, within its control, which is essential for the
      contractor's performance.  See Hurt's Printing Co., Inc.,
      supra, Slip op. at 24; Stephenson, Inc., supra, Slip op. at
      39.  Where such a breach occurs, the contractor has a legal
      right to avoid the contract, is discharged from its duty to
      perform, and is relieved of the default termination and its
      consequences.  See Malone v. United States, 849 F.2d. 1441,
      1446 (Fed. Cir. 1988).  In most cases applying this
      principle, there is a clear nexus between the Government's
      breaching conduct and the performance period itself.  See
      e.g., Maitland Brothers Co. and Maitland Brothers Co. and
      St. Paul Fire and Marine Insurance Co., ASBCA Nos. 30,089,
      30,764, 31,032, 32,071, 32,605, 34,659, 90-1 BCA  22,367;
      Singleton Contracting Corp., GSBCA No. 8,552, 90-1 BCA 
      22,298; G. W. Galloway Co., ASBCA Nos. 17,436, 17,723,
      17,836, 17,911, 18,324, 77-2 BCA  12,640.  Moreover, the
      Government's liability also depends on the reasonableness
      of its conduct under the circumstances, see, PBI Electrical
      Corp. v. United States, 17 Cl. Ct. 128 (1989); Ben C.
      Gerwick, Inc. v. United States, 152 Ct. Cl. 69, 285 F.2d
      432 (1961); John McCabe, ASBCA No. 36958, 90-2 BCA 
      22,785; Tolis Cain Corp., DOTCAB No. 72-2, 76-2 BCA 
      11,954, and whether that conduct has harmed the contractor,
      see Commerce International Co. v. United States, 167 Ct.
      Cl. 529, 338 F.2d 81 (1964); Toombs & Co., ASBCA No. 34590,
      91-1 BCA  23,403.

      3.   No detailed survey of the cases involving the
      Government's duty to cooperate with a contractor is
      necessary here.  However, it should be noted that a
      violation of the duty to cooperate can occur if an agency
      fails to help solve a problem which has arisen during
      contract performance, see e.g., Hardrives, Inc., IBCA No.
      2319, 94-1 BCA  26,267; James R. Lowe, Inc., ASBCA No.
      42026, 92-2 BCA  24,835, reconsid. denied, 93-1 BCA 
      25,516; Robert R. Marquis, Inc., ASBCA No. 38438, 92-1 BCA
       24,692; Pittsburgh-Des Moines Corp., EBCA No. 314-3-84,
      89-2 BCA  21,525, or provide the contractor with pertinent
      information, see e.g., Spectrum Leasing Corp., GSBCA Nos.
      7,347, 7,379, 7,425-27, 90-3 BCA  22,984; Ballenger Corp.,
      DOTCAB No. 74-32, 84-1 BCA  16,973, modified on other
      grounds, 84-2 BCA  17,277; Hardie-Tynes Manufacturing Co.,
      ASBCA No. 20,582, 76-2 BCA  11,972.  On the other hand, as
      this Board has held, the Government has no obligation to
      provide assistance where the contractor could have resolved
      the problem on its own.  See Professional Printing of
      Kansas, Inc., GPO BCA 02-93 (May 19, 1995), Slip op. at 81,
      fn. 83.  Accord Moore Mill & Lumber Co., AGBCA 87-172-1,
      90-3 BCA  23,111; John S. Vayanos Contracting Co., PSBCA
      No. 2317, 89-1 BCA  21,494.  Applying these principles in
      this case, the Board finds no basis for holding that the
      Respondent breached its implied duty of cooperation with
      the Appellant's performance.

      4.   First, as already discussed, before defaulting the
      contract, the Respondent tested the product twice in order
      to confirm the Navy's complaint that the books contained
      major defects under QATAP, notified the Appellant of the
      deficiencies involved (poor type quality and missing
      information) as well as the probable source of the problem
      (a press with a dented blanket), and afforded the
      Contractor ample opportunity to correct the defects by
      reprinting the books.27  See Stephenson, Inc., supra, Slip
      op. at 42-44 (the Board rejected the contractor's breach
      claim where the record showed that the defects were
      "critical," not "minor," and the contractor was, in fact,
      given a chance to repair the books, but was unable to do so
      within a reasonable time).  Cf. Nanofast, Inc., supra, 69-1
      BCA at 35,049 (a default for defects in delivered equipment
      was improper because there was no evidence that the
      Government actually tested the equipment, and moreover, the
      Government refused to discuss the defects with the
      contractor and prohibited any correction or replacement).28
      The fact that the books were not delivered by February 16,
      1990, the reprint date established by the Respondent, is
      the fault of the Appellant, whose posture throughout has
      been one of delay and circumvention.  Instead of complying
      with the Government's reprint request, the Appellant first
      challenged the Government's inspection findings, and then
      conditioned curing the problem on the recovery of the
      rejected materials (R4 File, Tabs M, N and P).  Indeed,
      even its indefinite promise to reprint the books "in a
      timely manner" was not conveyed to the Respondent until
      February 28, 1990, nearly two weeks after the date
      established for completion of performance (R4 File, Tab P).
      Whatever the Appellant's intention, its conduct clearly
      conveys the impression that even if the defects had been
      minor it was not prepared to cure the problem within in a
      reasonable time.  See Stephenson, Inc., supra, Slip op. at
      46-47 (the contractor's offer to reprint the defective
      books was made too late to meet the needs of the customer-
      agency).  Furthermore, while the Contractor's conduct may
      not amount to an anticipatory breach of the contract,29 it
      can hardly be said that it was acting with the "diligence"
      required to meet its obligations under the "Disputes"
      clause.  GPO Contract Terms, Contract Clauses,  5(d)
      (Disputes) ("Pending final decision a dispute hereunder,
      the contractor shall proceed diligently with performance in
      accordance with the Contracting Officer's decision.").  See
      Sterling Printing, Inc., supra, Slip op. at 36, 44, fn. 51;
      Nor Cal Trade School of Offset Printing, GPO BCA 1-85
      (September 12, 1986), Slip op. 8-9, 1986 WL 181455.  Accord
      Twigg Corp, supra, 93-1 BCA at 126,157-58.  Contrary to
      what the Appellant might believe, the duties and
      responsibilities set forth in a Government contract are
      mutual; they are not a "one-way street" flowing only from
      the Government to the Contractor.  See Malone v. United
      States, supra, 849 F.2d. at 1445 (obligation of good faith
      and fair dealing); John S. Vayanos Contracting Co., supra,
      89-1 BCA at 108,294.

      5.   Second, there is no merit to the Appellant's
      contention that GPO's failure to give it proper
      instructions for retrieving the rejected books from the
      Navy somehow also breached the Government's implied duty of
      cooperation.  The principal reason the Contractor wanted to
      recover the original shipment was so that it could reuse
      the nondefective plastic binder covers and index tabs to
      reduce its reprint costs.  See R4 File, Tab P; Complaint.
      However, such a purpose was clearly for the convenience of
      the Appellant and was not essential for performance of the
      reprint.  See Hurt's Printing Co., Inc., supra, Slip op. at
      24 (Government action or inaction constituting breach must
      be essential for the contractor to perform); Stephenson,
      Inc., supra, Slip op. at 39.  Furthermore, while the Navy
      had a procedure governing the removal of material from the
      base,30 there is absolutely no evidence that GPO knew of
      that procedure, nor has the Appellant attempted to present
      such proof.  In order to find a cooperation breach based on
      a failure to pass along instructions for picking up the
      rejected material, some evidence of knowledge of the proper
      procedure by the Respondent is required; anything less is
      pure speculation.  Regardless, the Appellant's own evidence
      undermines its position on this issue because Yellow
      Freight's letter shows that the Contractor first made
      arrangements with its carrier to retrieve the rejected
      material on February 23, 1990, seven days after the
      reprints were required to be shipped to the Navy.31  See
      App. Exh. A.  See also Joseph J. Bonavire Co., GSBCA No.
      4819, 78-1 BCA  12,877 (default was proper because the
      contractor's failure to clarify the delivery instructions
      with his supplier resulted in the required materials being
      delivered to the wrong location and caused a delay which
      jeopardized performance).  Thus, even if the Appellant had
      recovered the rejected books, it is clear that timely
      performance of the contract was no longer possible.  See
      John S. Vayanos Contracting Co., supra, 89-1 BCA at 108,294
      (no evidence that the contractor would have performed the
      contract on time even if it had received a requested
      contract modification and express ruling from the
      Government).

      6.   Finally, it has not escaped the Board's notice that
      the Appellant missed at least three other delivery dates
      prior to February 16, 1990-i.e., September 12, 1989,
      October 25, 1989, and November 8, 1989-and was technically
      in default of the contract on those occasions.
      Consequently, the Respondent could have exercised its right
      to terminate the contract at any one of those points, but
      it withheld such a drastic action and allowed continued
      performance by the Contractor.  Thus, all of the evidence
      of record compels the conclusion that the Respondent,
      instead of failing to cooperate, as the Appellant alleges,
      "bent over backwards" to provide the Contractor with every
      fair and reasonable opportunity to complete the contract.
      See Stephenson, Inc., supra, Slip op. at 47.  Cf. Freeway
      Ford Truck Sales, Inc., GSBCA No. 10662, 93-3 BCA  26,019;
      S.T. Research Corp., ASBCA No. 36000, 92-2 BCA  24,838.
      That the Appellant was not successful cannot be attributed
      to the Government.  See Hurt's Printing Co., Inc., supra,
      Slip op. at 28; Stephenson, Inc., supra, Slip op. at 47.

      7.   Taking all of the evidence into consideration, the
      Board concludes that the Appellant has not met its burden
      of proof with respect to excusing its failure to make a
      timely shipment of the reprinted books.  See K.C. Printing
      Co., supra, Slip op. at 18; Hurt's Printing Co., Inc.,
      supra, Slip op. at 29; Chavis and Chavis Printing, supra,
      Slip op. at 15.  Accord Johnson Textile and Plastics Co.,
      ASBCA No. 25985, 84-2 BCA  17,467; Affiliated Metal
      Products Co., ASBCA No. 15567, 71-2 BCA  8,947.  On this
      record, the Contractor's case is essentially a collection
      of unverified assertions amounting to little more than
      argument, which standing alone cannot substitute for proof.
      Cf. Reese Manufacturing, Inc., ASBCA No. 35144, 88-1 BCA 
      20,358.  Indeed, the Board has never allowed such
      unsubstantiated contentions to form the basis for recovery.
      See B & B Reproductions, GPO BCA 09-89 (June 30, 1995),
      Slip op. at 39; Hurt's Printing Co., Inc., supra, Slip op.
      at 29; Printing Unlimited, supra, Slip op. at 12;
      Stephenson, Inc., supra, Slip op. at 57.  Accord Singleton
      Contracting Corp., GSBCA No. 8548, 90-2 BCA  22,748; Tri-
      State Services of Texas, Inc., ASBCA No. 38019, 89-3 BCA 
      22,064)); Gemini Services, Inc., ASBCA No. 30247, 86-1 BCA
       18,736.  Accordingly, the Board concludes that under the
      circumstances of this case, the Contracting Officer was
      justified in terminating the contract for default, and her
      decision is affirmed.

            C. Although the Appellant is potentially liable for
            excess reprocurement costs, the Board is unable to
            determine the extent of that liability on the state
            of this record.

      1.   The last issue concerns the scope of the Appellant's
      liability for excess reprocurement costs, if any, and its
      claim that by reprocuring the rejected book in toto-plastic
      binding covers, tab dividers, and all-GPO failed to
      mitigate the Contractor's damages, as required by law.  See
      RPTC, p. 5; Complaint.  The Respondent believes that
      repurchasing the publication without recovery of the covers
      and tabs was entirely proper under the circumstances.  See
      Mierson Declaration,  14.  However, for the reasons which
      follow, the state of this record prevents the Board from
      resolving the parties' dispute.

      2.   Recently, in K.C. Printing, Co., the Board summarized
      the legal principles governing questions concerning excess
      reprocurement costs:

            The assessment of excess reprocurement costs is
            considered a Government claim.  See Sterling
            Printing, Inc., supra, [Slip op.] at 50-51 (and cases
            cited therein).  Consequently, the Government has the
            burden of demonstrating the propriety of the
            repurchase and proving its entitlement to the amount
            of excess costs it claims.  Id., [Slip op.] at 51
            (and cases cited therein).  In doing so, the
            Government must satisfy five criteria to establish an
            entitlement to recovery against a defaulting
            contractor, namely, it must show that: (a) the
            reprocurement contract was performed under
            substantially the same terms and conditions as the
            original contract; (b) it acted within a reasonable
            time following default to repurchase the supplies;
            (c) it employed a reprocurement method which would
            maximize competition under the circumstances; (d) it
            obtained the lowest reasonable price; and (e) the
            work has been completed and final payment made so
            that the excess costs assessment is based upon
            liability for a sum certain.  [Footnote omitted.]
            Id., [Slip op.] at 52-53 (and cases cited therein).
            Furthermore, the Government claim must be supported
            by evidence in the record as to each element of the
            claim.  Id., [Slip op.] at 53 (and cases cited
            therein).  Failure to satisfy even one criterion may
            result in a reduction of the excess costs claimed.
            Id., [Slip op.] at 53-54 (and cases cited therein).

See K.C. Printing, Co., supra, Slip op. at 18-19.  [Original
emphasis.]  Whether the Government's repurchase was improper, and
if so, what is the amount of reasonable excess costs under the
circumstances, are questions of fact.  See K.C. Printing Co.,
supra, Slip op. at 19, fn. 20; Sterling Printing, Inc., supra,
Slip op. at 50 (citing, Cable Systems and Assembly Company, ASBCA
No. 17844, 73-2 BCA  10,172, at 47,892).

      3.   However, before the Board will apply these rules to
      the specific facts of a particular case, it must be
      satisfied that the controversy is justiciable.  As
      explained in Sterling Printing, Inc., the Board's lead case
      on the matter of excess costs:

            Thus, the usual practice when a defaulted contractor
            appeals from the termination decision is for the
            Board to look at the excess reprocurement cost issue
            as well, provided that question is ripe for
            consideration; i.e., such costs have been assessed.

See Sterling Printing, Inc., supra, Slip op. at 48.  [Original
emphasis.]  Typically, evidence of assessment in the appeal
record consists of something in writing, either a memorandum or a
letter, from the Contracting Officer to GPO's Financial
Management Service (FMS) asking it to recover the amount of
excess costs, see e.g., K.C. Printing, Co., supra, Slip op. at 3,
5, or to the defaulted contractor notifying it that excess
reprocurement costs would be deducted from its account, see e.g.,
Sterling Printing, Inc., supra, Slip op. at 17-18.32

      4.   An examination of the record here discloses no such
      proof of assessment.  The only evidence presented by the
      Respondent in the case file which pertains to the
      reprocurement is: (a) a statement from the Contracting
      Officer that she immediately resolicited the job under the
      same terms, conditions and small purchase procedures, as
      the original contract; (b) the bid abstract for the
      repurchase showing offers from GMC and Quadra Graphics; and
      (c) a copy of the reprocurement purchase order.  See
      Mierson Declaration,  13; Attachments 2 and 3.  There is
      nothing in the record to indicate that the FMS was informed
      of the default and asked to recover the amount of excess
      reprocurement costs, or that the Contractor was notified it
      that such excess costs would be deducted from its account.
      Indeed, the record is even devoid of any affirmative
      evidence showing that the Appellant was notified that the
      contract had been reawarded, and that it was liable for the
      excess reprocurement costs.  Although the Contractor's
      allusion to such costs in its Complaint, where they are
      referred to as a "fine,"33 leads the Board to suspect this
      was so, "it cannot substitute that presumption for the hard
      evidence which the Government was required to produce in
      this litigation."  See Sterling Printing, Inc., supra, Slip
      op. at 82.  Without proof that excess reprocurement costs
      were assessed, and in what amount, that issue is not "ripe
      for consideration."  Id., Slip op. at 48.  Therefore, the
      Board will remand the case to the Contracting Officer for
      the submission of further evidence on the question of
      excess costs in accordance with the Order below.34  See
      R.C. Swanson Printing and Typesetting Company, supra, Slip
      op. at 52-53, fn. 28.

      ORDER

   Considering the record as a whole, the Board finds and
   concludes: (1) the Appellant was offered an opportunity to
   cure the defects before the contract was terminated and the
   default was not  procedurally defective; and (b) the
   Respondent did not breach its implied duty to cooperate with
   the Contractor in the performance of the contract in this
   case.  Thus, the Appellant has not shown that its failure to
   perform arose from causes beyond its control and without its
   fault or negligence.  THEREFORE, the Contracting Officer's
   decision terminating the Appellant's contract for default is
   hereby AFFIRMED, and the appeal is DENIED.

   With respect to the issue of excess reprocurement costs, the
   Board is unable to determine the extent of the Appellant's
   liability on the state of this record.  THEREFORE, the appeal
   is REMANDED to the Contracting Officer for the submission of
   additional evidence on that question, including, inter alia,
   proof that such costs were assessed against the Appellant.
   FURTHERMORE, the Contracting Officer shall submit such proof
   to the Board within 30 days from the date of receipt of this
   Decision and Order.

It is so Ordered.

July 31, 1995                     STUART M. FOSS
                                 Administrative Judge

_______________

    1 The Contracting Officer's appeal file, assembled pursuant
    to Rule 4 of the Board's Rules of Practice and Procedure, was
    submitted to the Board on July 18, 1990.  GPO Instruction
    110.12, Subject: Board of Contract Appeals Rules of Practice
    and Procedure, dated September 17, 1984, Rule 4(a) (Board
    Rules).  It will be referred to herein as the R4 File, with
    an appropriate Tab letter also indicated.  The R4 File
    contains 23 documents identified as Tab A through Tab W.
    2 By letter dated July 24, 1990, the Appellant advised the
    Board that it had selected the optional Accelerated
    Procedure, and desired a hearing on its appeal.  Board Rules,
    Rules 8, 12.1(b), 12.3, and 17 though 25.  However, numerous
    delays have characterized this case from the beginning.  For
    example, although the Board docketed the Contractor's appeal
    letter on June 15, 1990, an agency reorganization soon
    afterward resulted in the reassignment of the Board's only
    Administrative Judge to another senior position within GPO,
    and a change in the composition of the Board.  Consequently,
    for administrative reasons the matter was held in abeyance
    for nearly two years.  Furthermore, there were four
    postponements in the dates set by the Board for a prehearing
    telephone conference before one was finally conducted on
    April 16, 1993.  See Report of Prehearing Telephone
    Conference, dated June 4, 1993, p. 1 (RPTC).  During the
    conference, the Appellant withdrew its Accelerated Procedure
    election because it was no longer feasible to resolve the
    dispute within the time limits established for that optional
    procedure under the Board Rules.  See RPTC, p. 2, fn. 1.
    Moreover, while the Board scheduled this matter for a
    hearing, as requested by the Contractor, because the
    prehearing conference disclosed material disputes of fact,
    see RPTC, p. 6, the parties subsequently filed a joint
    motion, which the Board granted, asking it to decide the
    appeal without a hearing on the basis of the existing record
    and any supplemental affidavits, documents, and briefs which
    they might file.  See Order Granting Joint Motion For
    Submission Without a Hearing, dated July 16, 1993.
    Accordingly, even though the Appellant initially elected the
    optional Accelerated Procedure, this matter has been
    processed under the Board's regular procedure for handling
    cases submitted on the record without a hearing.  Board
    Rules, Rule 11.  See, Universal Printing Co., GPO BCA 09-90
    (June 22, 1994), Slip op. at 2, fn. 3, 1994 WL 377586;
    McDonald & Eudy Printers, Inc., GPO BCA 06-91 (May 6, 1994),
    Slip op. at 1, fn. 2, 1994 WL 377581.
    3 The record on which this decision is based consists of: (a)
    the Appellant's Notice of Appeal, dated June 14, 1990; (b)
    the R4 File; (c) the Appellant's Complaint, dated July 24,
    1990; (d) the Appellant's letter, dated August 15, 1991,
    submitting additional information in accordance with Rule
    4(b) of the Board Rules, namely correspondence from Yellow
    Freight System, Inc. to the Contractor, dated August 15, 1990
    (hereinafter App. Exh. A); (e) the Respondent's Answer, dated
    August 27, 1990; (f) the Report of Prehearing Telephone
    Conference, dated June 4, 1993; (f) the Appellant's letter,
    dated June 15, 1993, clarifying a statement made at the
    prehearing conference; and (g) the Respondent's letter, dated
    July 12, 1993, enclosing declarations from Contracting
    Officer Mierson, the PRPPO Compliance Officer, Arthur
    Dougherty, and Printing Specialist Jeff D. MacAfee of GPO's
    central office Quality Assurance Section (QAS) (hereinafter
    referred to as the Mierson, Dougherty, and MacAfee
    Declarations, respectively).  Board Rules, Rule 13(a).  The
    facts, which are essentially undisputed, are recited here
    only to the extent necessary for this decision.
    4 The record discloses that the Appellant was one of five (5)
    contractors submitting bids on the contract (R4 File, Tab B).
    The second low offeror was Quadra Graphics with a bid of
    $16,736.00 (R4 File, Tab B).
    5 The record shows that the Contractor was to ship 411 copies
    to the Navy in Philadelphia, and 192 copies to 41 different
    Navy addresses (R4 File, Tab A).  The remaining two copies
    were samples which were to be sent to the Navy in Warminster,
    Pennsylvania, along with the original negatives (R4 File, Tab
    A).
    6 In addition to QATAP, the contract was also governed by
    applicable articles of GPO Contract Terms, Solicitation
    Provisions, Supplemental Specifications, and Contract
    Clauses, GPO Publication 310.2, effective December 1, 1987
    (Rev. 9-88) (GPO Contract Terms) (R4 File, Tab A).
    7 The Government agreed to the new delivery date as part of a
    bilateral resolution of another problem involving the
    contract.  As indicated, the Purchase Order called for
    reductions in the differing camera copy provided to the
    Contractor of 65 percent and 61 percent, respectively (R4
    File, Tab A).  However, the record shows that the Appellant
    received some copy marked with instructions for a 75 percent
    reduction instead, which it discovered could not be
    accommodated on the page (a further reduction to 65 percent
    was required to fit the sheet perfectly) (R4 File, Tabs D and
    E).  See Mierson Declaration,  5.  To offset its failure to
    meet the contract due date caused by the delay in the receipt
    of the paper stock, and by way of consideration to establish
    a new delivery date, the Appellant offered to produce the new
    films at its own expense (R4 File, Tab D).  The Government
    accepted this offer.  See Mierson Declaration,  5.
    8 The record also shows that on or about November 20, 1989,
    nearly two weeks after the revised delivery date had passed,
    the Navy asked the PRPPO to find out what had happened to the
    shipment (R4 File, Tab J).  Accordingly, the Compliance
    Officer called the Appellant, who placed a tracer with its
    shipper, and reported back that the books were in
    Philadelphia and should be delivered on November 21, 1989 (R4
    File, Tab J).  Despite the fact that the Appellant missed all
    three due dates established under the contract in this case
    (September 12, 1989, October 25, 1989, and November 8, 1989),
    the Respondent, in effect, waived its right to default the
    Contractor on those occasions, which could have been done
    without a "Cure Notice."  See Shepard Printing, GPO BCA 23-92
    (April 29, 1993), Slip op. at 13, 1993 WL 526848; Stephenson,
    Inc., GPO BCA 2-88 (December 20, 1991), Slip op. at 19-20,
    1991 WL 439274; GPO Contract Terms, Contract Clauses,  20(a)
    (2).
    9 The Appellant recalls this conversation as taking place on
    January 9, 1990 (R4 File, Tab M).
    10 The record indicates that the Navy facility in question is
    a tightly secured area, and any persons attempting to gain
    entry are required to sign-in at the guard posts.  See
    Mierson Declaration,  9.
    11 The record shows that the Navy has a specific procedure
    which must be followed before materials can be removed from
    the facility.  In this case, the correct procedure was: (a)
    the Contractor notifies GPO when it is ready to pick-up the
    books from the Navy; (b) GPO then telephones its Navy contact
    to make arrangements for the pick-up; (c) the Navy contact in
    turn telephones the activity Data Manager; (d) the Data
    Manager sends a letter to Stock Control requesting a release
    of the books from stock; (e) the Stock Control Clerk notifies
    Receipt Control Clerk that the Appellant would be picking up
    the rejected order and to have it ready; and (f) the
    Contractor picks up the rejected books from the Receipt
    Control Clerk.  See R4 File, Tab W.  These steps were never
    followed.  Id.
    12 Under the Respondent's printing procurement regulation,
    the Contracting Officer must submit a proposal to terminate a
    contract for default to the CRB for its review and
    concurrence.  See, Printing Procurement Regulation, GPO
    Publication 305.3 (September 1, 1988), Chap. I, Sec. 10, 
    4.b.(i) (PPR).  See also, Hurt's Printing Co., Inc., GPO BCA
    27-91 (January 24, 1994), Slip op. at 7, fn. 10, 1994 WL
    275098; Graphics Image, Inc., GPO BCA 13-92 (August 31,
    1992), Slip. op. at 9, fn. 10, 1992 WL 487875.
    13 The inspection was conducted by MacAfee, who stated that
    he proceeded as follows: "Prior to starting the inspection, I
    consulted MIL-STD-105D (Military Standard Sampling Procedures
    and Tables for Inspection by Attributes).  According to MIL-
    STD-105D, since the size of the printing was 605 [copies], I
    would have to inspect from a sample size of 16.  From the 16
    copies sent by the Philadelphia Regional Office, I randomly
    pulled books and began measuring the type and quality with a
    Print Contrast Meter (PCM).  I would take three measurements
    with the PCM, mark the results on the page, and average the
    three results.  [Citation omitted.]  I also had the original
    camera copy which had been furnished by the Government to the
    contractor.  Under MIL-STD-105D, only five defects are
    required to reject the product.  After finding five defects,
    I discontinued [the] inspection and concluded that the
    product was rejectable under QATAP for attribute, P-7, Type
    Quality and Uniformity.  [Citation omitted.]"  See MacAfee
    Declaration,  4.
    14 In that regard, the PPR lists eight factors which "[t]he
    Contracting Officer shall consider" in determining whether to
    terminate a contract for default: (i) the provisions of the
    contract and applicable laws and regulations; (ii) the
    specific failure of the contractor and the excuses, if any,
    made by the contractor for such failure; (iii) the
    availability of the supplies or services from other sources;
    (iv) the urgency of the need for the supplies or services and
    the period of time which would be required to obtain sources
    as compared with the time in which delivery could be obtained
    from the delinquent contractor; (v) the effect of a
    termination for default upon the contractor's capability as a
    supplier under other contracts; (vi) the effect of a
    termination for default on the ability of the contractor to
    liquidate progress payments; (vii) the availability of funds
    to finance repurchase costs which may prove uncollectible
    from the defaulted contractor, and the availability of funds
    to finance termination costs if the default is determined to
    be excusable; and (viii) any other pertinent facts and
    circumstances.  See PPR, Chap. XIV, Sec. 1,  3.c.(3).  See
    also Shepard Printing, supra, Slip op. at 26, fn. 31;
    Graphics Image, Inc., supra, Slip. op. at 26, fn. 31.  The
    PPR essential repeats the requirements contained in the
    Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR).  See FAR  49.402-3(f)
    (1)-(7).
    15 At the prehearing conference, the Appellant stated that it
    did not know what happened to the books after their rejection
    by the Government.  See RPTC, p. 5.  In that regard, on
    August 15, 1990, when App. Exh. A was submitted to the Board,
    the rejected product was apparently still being stored by the
    Navy.  Gallagher's memorandum of June 28, 1990, says that the
    Navy would continue to hold the rejected stock until the
    default is resolved (R4 File, Tab W).  However, the
    Contracting Officer states in her declaration: "I
    subsequently learned that the [Navy] retained the materials
    for 6 months, and when the contractor did not pick them up
    after that time period, the [Navy] discarded the materials
    because of lack of storage space."  See Mierson Declaration,
     12.  Therefore, since the Contractor was defaulted on March
    16, 1990, the Navy probably kept the rejected books until
    they were disposed of sometime in September 1990.
    16 During the prehearing conference, Counsel for GPO
    construed the Appellant's stated understanding in its letter
    of February 28, 1990, that the books were rejected based on
    "printed contents only and not the plastic binder covers and
    plastic tab Index Dividers which are part of the set and also
    manufactured by us," see R4 File, Tab P, as not saying the
    that the product was improperly rejected by the Respondent.
    See RPTC, p. 4.  After reviewing the prehearing conference
    report, Counsel for the Appellant noted his disagreement with
    that conclusion.  See Letter from Frederic G. Antoun, Jr.,
    Esq. to Hon. Stuart M. Foss, GPO Board of Contract Appeals,
    dated June 15, 1993.  In his view, the Contractor's February
    28, 1990, statement "does not constitute an admission that
    the printed contents were rejectable."  Id., p. 1.  Instead,
    he thought the Appellant was merely accepting as true and
    accurate GPO's own statements about the defects in the books
    until it had a chance to confirm them, after which it would
    correct any deficiencies "in a timely manner."  Id.  Since
    the Respondent failed to provide the Contractor with samples
    of the defects, and as the original order could not be picked
    up, whether or not the product was actually rejectable was
    still open to question.  Id., p. 2.
    17 While the excusable events listed in the "Default" clause,
    all of which must be beyond the control and without the fault
    or negligence of the contractor, are set forth in the context
    of relieving the contractor from responsibility for excess
    reprocurement costs, it is well-settled that the same
    occurrences extend the time available for performance and
    make termination prior to that time improper.  See e.g., FKC
    Engineering Co., ASBCA No. 14856, 70-1 BCA  8,312.
    18 Default terminations-as a species of forfeiture-are
    strictly construed.  See D. Joseph DeVito v. United States,
    188 Ct. Cl. 979, 413 F.2d 1147, 1153 (1969).  See also
    Murphy, et al. v. United States, 164 Ct. Cl. 332 (1964); J.
    D. Hedin Construction Co. v. United States, 187 Ct. Cl. 45,
    408 F.2d 424 (1969); Foremost Mechanical Systems, Inc., GSBCA
    Nos. 12335, 12384, 95-1 BCA  27,382.
    19 The United States Claims Court was renamed the United
    States Court of Federal Claims on October 29, 1992, pursuant
    to Title IX of the Federal Courts Administration Act of 1992,
    Pub. L. No. 102-572, 106 Stat. 4506 (1992).
    20 Clauses such as  20(a)(1)(i) have uniformly been held to
    apply not only to late deliveries of the contracted goods,
    Stephenson, Inc., supra, Slip op. at 19 (citing, Chavis and
    Chavis Printing, supra, Slip op. at 12-15; Jomar Enterprises,
    Inc., GPO BCA 13-86 (May 25, 1989), Slip op. at 3-5), but
    also to the timely delivery of nonconforming supplies.  Id.
    (citing, KOPA Kopier Produckte, ASBCA No. 29,471, 85-3 BCA 
    18,367; Meyer Labs, Inc., ASBCA No. 18,347, 77-1 BCA 
    12,539).  See also, Delta Industries, Inc., DOT BCA No. 2601,
    94-1 BCA  26, 318; Industrial Data Link Corp., ASBCA No.
    315, 91-1 BCA  23,382.  The rationale for this dual
    application of the default clause is simple.  As explained in
    a leading text on the subject of public contracts: "While
    these clauses explicitly make untimely performance the basis
    for the default action, it is important to recognize that
    nearly every Government contract spells out the contractor's
    required performance in terms of the nature of the product or
    service which is to be delivered or performed as well as the
    time by which this performance is to be completed.  Thus, in
    order for the contractor to render `timely performance,' two
    basic requirements must be satisfied: (1) the product,
    service or construction work must conform to the required
    design/performance specifications, and (2) the product must
    be delivered or the work completed by the specified due date.
    Citing, Radiation Technology, Inc. v. United States, 177 Ct.
    Cl. 227, 366 F.2d 1003 (1966); Nash Metalware Co., GSBCA No.
    11951, 94-2 BCA  26,780; Air, Inc., GSBCA No. 8847, 91-1 BCA
     23,352."  [Emphasis added.]  John Cibinic, Jr. & Ralph C.
    Nash, Jr., Administration of Government Contracts 3d ed.,
    (The George Washington University, 1995), p. 908 (hereinafter
    Cibinic & Nash).
    21 For the "substantial compliance" rule to apply to a
    particular shipment of nonconforming goods, the contractor
    must show that: (a) a timely delivery of goods was made; (b)
    he/she reasonably believed, in good faith, that the supplies
    conformed to the contract when shipped and that they would be
    acceptable; and (c) the defects are minor in nature and
    capable of correction within a reasonable period of time.
    Radiation Technology, Inc. v. United States, supra.  See
    generally Cibinic & Nash, pp. 912-17.  The Radiation
    Technology doctrine is clearly an encroachment on the
    Government's right to terminate.  However, it is also
    apparent that the rule merely stays for a reasonable period
    the Government's right to terminate, and not its right to
    insist on 100 percent conforming goods; i.e., the doctrine
    concerns time, not the supplies themselves.  Furthermore, the
    "substantial compliance" rule is used to prevent surprise
    rejections by the buyer after a contractor's timely shipment
    in situations where performance departs in only minor
    respects from that which has been promised.  See Stephenson,
    Inc., supra, Slip op. at 50-51, fn. 54 (citing Environmental
    Tectonics Corp., ASBCA No. 20340, 76-2 BCA  12,134).  A
    contractor who ships nonconforming goods is only protected by
    the Radiation Technology rule to the extent that he/she can
    satisfy all elements of the test. In most cases involving the
    "substantial compliance" doctrine, the timeliness of the
    contractor's shipment is generally not an issue.  Rather, the
    dispute usually involves the resolution of questions of
    "reasonable belief" and the seriousness of the defects.
    Absent such a "reasonable belief" by the contractor and proof
    that only minor defects are involved, the supplier is not
    entitled to the protection of the "substantial compliance"
    principle.  See Stephenson, Inc., supra, Slip op. at 51, fn.
    55 (citing Norwood Precision Products, Textron, Inc., ASBCA
    Nos. 38095, 38196, 90-3 BCA  23,200; Introl Corp., ASBCA No.
    27,610, 85-2 BCA  18,044 at 90,578; Environmental Tectonics
    Corp., supra, 76-2 BCA  12,134).
    22 As indicated in note 8 supra, the Appellant missed all
    three contract due dates for the original shipment in this
    case (September 12, 1989, October 25, 1989, and November 8,
    1989).  Nonetheless, it was not defaulted for a failure to
    make a timely delivery.  Even so, however, the Appellant's
    poor "track record" with regard to timeliness is not without
    its secondary consequences under the Radiation Technology
    rule.  That is, in light of this persistent untimeliness,
    there is a strong inference that the Contractor could not
    have given the Government what it wanted within a "reasonable
    time."  See Hurt's Printing Co., Inc., supra, Slip op. at 21;
    Shepard Printing, supra, Slip op. at 22.
    23 Whether a defect is minor is a question of fact, based
    upon a consideration of: (a) whether the items are usable;
    (b) the nature of the product; (c) the urgency of the
    Government's needs; and (d) the extent of repair and
    adjustment necessary to produce a fully conforming product.
    See Cibinic & Nash, p. 915 (citing Kain Cattle Co., ASBCA No.
    17124, 73-1 BCA  9,999).  Numerous minor defects, when
    considered together, can constitute a major nonconformity.
    See Astro Science Corp. v. United States, 200 Ct. Cl. 354,
    471 F.2d 624 (1973); Environmental Tectonics Corp., supra;
    Kain Cattle Co., supra.  Furthermore, even if a defect is
    minor, if it is not readily correctable the "substantial
    compliance" doctrine will not apply.  See Inforex, Inc.,
    GSBCA No. 3859, 76-1 BCA  11,679; Levelator Corp., VACAB No.
    1069, 74-2 BCA  10,763; Nuclear Equipment Corp., NASABCA No.
    1170-18, 73-1 BCA  9,815.
    24 Indeed, the general view is that the Contracting Officer's
    discretion to decide whether a product is conforming or
    nonconforming is inherent in his/her administration of the
    contract.  See Vogard Printing, GPOCAB 7-84 (January 7, 1986)
    Slip op. at 6 (citing Thomas W. Yoder Co., Inc., VACAB No.
    997, 74-1 BCA  10,424).  It should be noted that Vogard
    Printing was decided by one of the ad hoc contract appeals
    panels which considered appeals from final decisions of GPO
    Contracting Officers prior to the establishment of the Board
    in 1984.  GPO Instruction 110.10C, Subject: Establishment of
    the Board of Contract Appeals, dated September 17, 1984.
    Decisions of these ad hoc panels are cited by the Board in
    its decisions as "GPOCAB."  While the Board is not bound by
    the decisions of the ad hoc panels, its policy is to follow
    their rulings where applicable and appropriate.  See,
    Universal Printing Co., supra, Slip op. at 11, fn. 9; Shepard
    Printing, supra, Slip op. at 14, fn. 19; Stephenson, Inc.,
    supra, Slip op. at 18, fn. 20; Chavis and Chavis Printing,
    supra, Slip op. at 9, fn. 9.
    25 GPO's printing procurement regulation, like the
    procurement rules of other Federal agencies, recommends the
    issuance of a show cause letter, "where practicable," prior
    to the default termination of a contract for failure to make
    timely deliveries or perform services within the time
    required by the contract.  See PPR, Chap. XIV, Sec. 1,  3(c)
    (1).  Cf. Lewis B. Udis v. United States, 7 Cl. Ct. 379,
    385-86 (1985).  However, the omission of a "show cause
    notice" by the Government is not generally a procedural
    defect to a termination based on the contractor's failure to
    make timely deliveries or perform timely services.  See
    Shepard Printing, supra, Slip op. at 14, fn. 20; Stephenson,
    Inc., supra, Slip op. at 20, fn. 22.  Accord Kit Pack Co.,
    Inc., supra, 89-3 BCA at 111,486-87 (citing H. N. Bailey &
    Associates, ASBCA No. 21,300, 77-2 BCA  12,681).
    26 See Cibinic & Nash, pp. 295-300. There is also an implied
    negative obligation on the part of the Government that it
    will not do that which will interfere with the contractor in
    the performance of the contract.  Id., at pp. 300-05.  See
    e.g., Nanofast, Inc., ASBCA No. 12,545, 69-1 BCA  7,566
    (citing Fern E. Chalender d/b/a Chalender Construction Co. of
    Springfield, Missouri v. United States, 127 Ct. Cl. 557
    (1954); George A. Fuller Co. v. United States, 108 Ct. Cl.
    70, 69 F.Supp. 409 (1947); Restatement, Contracts,  295,
    315).  Both implied duties are part of every Government
    contract.  See George A. Fuller Co. v. United States, supra.
    27 Thus, the record shows that while the time for performance
    of the original order was 18 days (August 25, 1989, to
    September 12, 1989), there were 39 days between the date GPO
    notified the Appellant of the defects and the need to reprint
    the product (January 8, 1990), and the date established for
    shipment of the reprints (February 16, 1990); i.e., more than
    double the amount of time (R4 File, Tabs A, L and N).
    28 The appeals board's rationale in Nanofast was based on the
    standard inspection clause in the Armed Services Procurement
    Regulation (ASPR) which gave the contractor specified rights
    to replace or correct nonconforming supplies.  ASPR 7-103.5.
    Indeed, for years the ASBCA applied the cooperation rule only
    in cases where the Government had an affirmative obligation
    under the contract, such as performing inspections.  See,
    Quality Controlled Stamping, Inc., ASBCA No. 19,074, 74-2 BCA
     10,757, at 51,149 (citing, Nanofast, Inc., supra).
    However, an examination of more recent cases warrants the
    conclusion that apart from the express language of the
    contract, the Government's duty to cooperate can be imputed
    from responsibilities inherent in the contractual
    relationship itself.  See, e.g., Spectrum Leasing Corp.,
    supra, 90-3 BCA at 115,437.
    29 An anticipatory breech occurs when there is a "positive,
    definite, unconditional, and unequivocal manifestion of
    intent . . . on the part of the contractor . . . not to
    render the promised performance . . .".  See United States v.
    DeKonty Corp., 922 F.2d 826, 828 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (citing
    Cascade Pacific International v. United States, 773 F.2d 287,
    293 (Fed. Cir. 1985)).  See also Sterling Printing, Inc.,
    supra, Slip op. at 39.  Accord Altina Trucking, PSBCA No.
    3341, 93-3 BCA  26,256; Twigg Corp., NASA BCA No. 62-0192,
    93-1 BCA  25,318; A. N. Xepapas, AIA, VABCA No. 3087, 91-2
    BCA  23,799.  Such clear and affirmative proof of the
    Contractor's intent is not present in this case.
    30 See note 11 supra.
    31 Moreover, there is nothing in Yellow Freight's letter
    which would tend to show any wrongful interference by the
    Government with the carrier's attempt to pick up the rejected
    books.  Cf. Kellner Equipment, Inc., ASBCA No. 26006, 82-2
    BCA  16.077 (evidence that military policemen checked the
    identification of the contractor's employees before allowing
    them on the job site did not excuse the delay which resulted
    in default termination for failure to complete performance by
    the due date, since it is anticipated that policemen will
    take such action).  Rather, it is clear that the carrier's
    failure to retrieve the rejected shipment was due to
    insufficient information about where the publications were
    located, instead of any lack of cooperation by Navy
    employees.  See App. Exh. A.
    32 The Respondent's procedure for recovering of excess
    reprocurement costs is set forth in the PPR, which states:
    "If repurchase is effected at a price in excess of the
    supplies terminated, the Contracting Officer shall: (i)
    advise the Financial Management Service, Voucher Examination
    Branch (Stop FMCE) that such a repurchase has been made; (ii)
    provide the jacket number, the purchase order number and the
    contractor's name for both the terminated and new contracts;
    and, (iii) request that excess costs be computed and the
    Contracting Officer advised.  When advised by the Voucher
    Examination Branch, the Contracting Officer shall make a
    written demand (with a copy to the Voucher Examination
    Branch) on the defaulted contractor for the total amount of
    such excess including increases or decreases in other costs
    such as transportation and discounts.  If the contractor
    fails to make payment, the Voucher Examination Branch shall
    take appropriate action to collect the amount due."  See PPR,
    Chap. XIV, Sec. 1,  3.f.(3).
    33 The Contractor thinks that it is responsible for the
    entire $20,103.72 due Quadra Graphics on the reprocurement
    contract (the $20,514.00 repurchase price less the 2 percent
    prompt payment discount, see Mierson Declaration, Attachment
    2 (Payment Terms).  See Complaint.  However, this
    understanding is clearly in error.  By the express terms of
    the "Default" clause, which merely states the existing law, a
    defaulted contractor is only responsible for the excess costs
    of the reprocured supplies or services.  See GPO Contract
    Terms, Contract Clauses,  20(b).  Thus, the maximum extent
    of the Contractor's liability here is $5,685.72, which
    represents the difference between the Appellant's bid
    ($14,418.00) and Quadra Graphics's repurchase offer
    ($20,103.72).  See e.g., K.C. Printing, supra, Slip op. at 4
    (excess costs computed as the difference between original bid
    of defaulted contractor and the offer of the fourth lowest
    bidder, who happened to be the next lowest responsible
    offeror).  Also see Sterling Printing, Inc., supra, Slip op.
    18, fn. 27 (liability figured as the repurchase price minus
    the total of the original contract price plus the price of a
    contract modification).  As the Board observed in Sterling:
    "Generally, excess reprocurement costs are figured on the
    basis of the reasonable reprocurement price less the original
    contract price.  [Citations omitted.]  Where, as here, there
    is not enough evidence to determine if the winning
    reprocurement bid was reasonable, the most common method used
    for recalculating excess costs is simply to take the
    difference between the original contract price and the second
    low bid on the original contract.  [Citations omitted.]"
    Sterling Printing, Inc., supra, Slip op. at 84.
    34 In addition to proof of assessment, the record is also
    silent with regard to the exact steps taken by the
    Contracting Officer to recover excess costs, and there is
    nothing to show if Quadra Graphics was paid.  Such evidence
    is essential to sustain the Government's claim for excess
    reprocurement costs.  See K.C. Printing, Co., supra, Slip op.
    at 20-26.