[House Hearing, 106 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
POST-1999 U.S. SECURITY AND COUNTER-DRUG INTERESTS IN PANAMA
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED SIXTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
THURSDAY, JULY 29, 1999
__________
Serial No. 106-73
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on International Relations
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
62-716 CC WASHINGTON : 2000
COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
BENJAMIN A. GILMAN, New York, Chairman
WILLIAM F. GOODLING, Pennsylvania SAM GEJDENSON, Connecticut
JAMES A. LEACH, Iowa TOM LANTOS, California
HENRY J. HYDE, Illinois HOWARD L. BERMAN, California
DOUG BEREUTER, Nebraska GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York
CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American
DAN BURTON, Indiana Samoa
ELTON GALLEGLY, California MATTHEW G. MARTINEZ, California
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey
CASS BALLENGER, North Carolina ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey
DANA ROHRABACHER, California SHERROD BROWN, Ohio
DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois CYNTHIA A. McKINNEY, Georgia
EDWARD R. ROYCE, California ALCEE L. HASTINGS, Florida
PETER T. KING, New York PAT DANNER, Missouri
STEVE CHABOT, Ohio EARL F. HILLIARD, Alabama
MARSHALL ``MARK'' SANFORD, South BRAD SHERMAN, California
Carolina ROBERT WEXLER, Florida
MATT SALMON, Arizona STEVEN R. ROTHMAN, New Jersey
AMO HOUGHTON, New York JIM DAVIS, Florida
TOM CAMPBELL, California EARL POMEROY, North Dakota
JOHN M. McHUGH, New York WILLIAM D. DELAHUNT, Massachusetts
KEVIN BRADY, Texas GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York
RICHARD BURR, North Carolina BARBARA LEE, California
PAUL E. GILLMOR, Ohio JOSEPH CROWLEY, New York
GEORGE RADANOVICH, California JOSEPH M. HOEFFEL, Pennsylvania
JOHN COOKSEY, Louisiana
THOMAS G. TANCREDO, Colorado
Richard J. Garon, Chief of Staff
Kathleen Bertelsen Moazed, Democratic Chief of Staff
Caleb McCarry, Professional Staff Member
Jill N. Quinn, Staff Associate
C O N T E N T S
----------
WITNESSES
Page
General George A. Joulwan, Former Supreme Allied Commander in
Europe, Former Commander in Chief, U.S. Southern Command... 5
The Honorable Thomas E. McNamara, President, Americas
Society, Former U.S. Chief Negotiator in Panama............ 8
APPENDIX
Prepared Statements:
The Honorable Benjamin A. Gilman, a Member of Congress from
New York and Chairman, Committee on International Relations 30
The Honorable Dana Rohrabacher, a Member of Congress from
California................................................. 32
The Honorable Thomas E. McNamara, Former U.S. Special
Negotiator for Panama...................................... 36
POST-1999 U.S. SECURITY AND COUNTER-DRUG INTERESTS IN PANAMA
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Thursday, July 29, 1999
House of Representatives,
Committee on International Relations,
Washington, D.C.
The Committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:40 a.m., in Room
2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Benjamin A. Gilman
(Chairman of the Committee) presiding.
Chairman Gilman. The Committee will come to order. This
morning we will be examining post-1999 U.S. security and
counter-drug interests in Panama. I will be brief as we have
two excellent witnesses who have been able to join us this
morning.
At the end of this year, there will be no American troops
in Panama for the first time since 1903. Yet, our own drug
czar, General Barry McCaffrey, has called the narco-guerrilla
crisis next door in Colombia a ``serious and growing
emergency''. The United States military is turning over our
facilities, valued at some $5 billion, to Panama on schedule.
The Panama Canal Treaties will be implemented to the letter,
and that is appropriate.
What is not appropriate, however, is for the U.S.
Government to turn our backs on Panama. Just as Panama is about
to exercise full sovereignty over its territory, that country
finds itself in a very dangerous neighborhood. The framers of
the 1977 treaties could not have foreseen neighboring
Colombia's drug-fueled agony; nor the sophistication of the
drug cartels' corrupting, criminal reach. Nonetheless, under
the treaties, our Nation will still protect the Panama Canal.
Although the treaties provide that the United States and
Panama can extend the U.S. military presence in Panama beyond
1999, no agreement has been reached.
Howard Air Force Base was the crown jewel in our fight
against narcotics. Panama is a critical choke point in a region
that produces all of the world's cocaine and three quarters of
the heroin sold in our Nation. Sitting on the drug-producing
nation's doorstep, Howard's 8,500-foot runway saw 15,000
flights annually. That base could handle up to 30 helicopters
and over 50 planes. Our Nation should not have put itself in a
position of closing down Howard on May 1st. Our Government is
now scrambling to conclude hasty agreements with the
Netherlands Antilles and Ecuador for forward bases from which
to deploy military and civilian antidrug forces. Quite simply,
those plans cannot replace our strategic infrastructure in
Panama.
I closely followed former Ambassador Ted McNamara's
considerable efforts to conclude an agreement for a continued
U.S. presence in Panama. Regrettably, those efforts did not
result in the promised Multilateral Counter-narcotics Center,
the MCC. Those negotiations became entangled in Panama's
internal electoral politics. We even met with the Foreign
Minister about a year ago, who assured us that he was
supportive of trying to bring the MCC into Panama.
However, the Department of Defense, and in particular our
Air Force, did not provide the support, the flexibility, and
the creative diplomacy that were needed to secure this vitally
important continued U.S. presence in Panama.
Last October, I introduced H.R. 4858, the United States-
Panama Partnership Act of 1998, offering Panama the opportunity
to join Canada and Mexico in forging a new, mature, mutually
beneficial relationship with our Nation. In exchange, this
legislation asked Panama to remain our partner in the war on
drugs by continuing to be a host of our U.S. military presence
after 1999.
I note it is not too late. We can and we should extend
America's hand to forge a new partnership in Panama in the 21st
century.
[The statement of Chairman Gilman appears in the appendix.]
Chairman Gilman. Today we will be joined by two
distinguished panelists, who we will introduce in just a
moment. I ask our Ranking Minority Member, Mr. Gejdenson if he
has any opening remarks.
Mr. Gejdenson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is a pleasure to
have Ambassador McNamara here, and General Joulwan. It is clear
that there has been a change in the region; Panama is regaining
its control of the canal and the assets in the region. I am
with Senator Helms on this one. It is better to sign no
agreement than to sign a bad agreement. I think that some of
what you are seeing in Panama today is that they are figuring
out maybe they should have been a little more accommodating in
their negotiations.
I also understand that as we look at the options before us,
that we will be able to handle in the plan that is presently
before us between 110 and 120 percent of the operations that we
previously had in Panama. So, I think that at the end of the
day, we actually strengthen ourselves by broadening our
positioning in the region, and by having the Panamanians
recognize that they may have missed an opportunity here; that
our ability to do drug interdiction will be just as strong;
that we will, in future negotiations with the Panamanians, have
Panamanians who recognize much more realistically the value of
their assets. I think they thought we would pay any price and
do anything they demanded in some kind of psychological panic
over no longer controlling the area around the canal and having
those assets.
I think that the kinds of decisions you made in this
process are the ones that will strengthen us in long-term
negotiations, and inevitably will give us a much better
agreement and relationship with the Panamanians. Their new
authority gives them the right to say no to us, but that also
means that American military personnel will not be there
spending the dollars that keep their economy moving, and they
are going to miss that.
I look forward to hearing from our colleagues here and
commend them on the work they have both done today.
Chairman Gilman. Mr. Rohrabacher.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. The Panama Canal
is still one of the world's key strategic waterways, and Panama
itself is in a strategic position, and important to the United
States of America in terms of our national security. However,
the canal, for all practical purposes, is now, from what I can
see, falling into the hands of Communist China through the Hong
Kong-based Hutchison--and I think it is Whampoa--and I guess
probably our witnesses will give me a good pronunciation of
that company, which has close ties to the People's Liberation
Army.
In a controversial under-the-table deal with the Chinese,
they were granted a 25 year lease with an additional 25 year
option for control of the canal's Atlantic and Pacific Ocean
ports and other facilities. The Chinese are currently
conducting major construction and port facility expansion in
Panama. In addition, Chinese companies tied to the People's
Liberation Army are becoming alarmingly active in Panama.
China's flagship commercial shipping fleet, the China Ocean
Shipping Company, COSCO, is directly connected to the People's
Liberation Army and the Chinese Communist Government. COSCO
ships have served as carriers for massive smuggling operations
around the world, including to the United States, where we have
found weapons, automatic weapons, being smuggled into the
United States by COSCO, drugs, even illegal aliens. This
organization, COSCO, is deeply involved in the strategy in
Panama.
The war in neighboring Colombia, in terms of Panama,
against well-armed narco-terrorist forces with ties to Cuba is
escalating, threatening to spread throughout the region. This
makes Panama's role even more important. Panama does not have
an army or a navy or an air force. The Panamanian Government
doesn't have the military, but it does have an ongoing
reputation for corruption and mismanagement. Chinese organized
crime organizations are active, and there is all kinds of
evidence of drugs and gun smuggling and, as I said, even large-
scale illegal alien smuggling going through China. We also are
aware that the Russian Mafia now is active in Panama, supplying
weapons to Colombian narco-terrorists.
This is not a pretty picture, Mr. Chairman. What was an
inspiring story in Panama of enterprise and achievement for the
United States is very slowly but surely turning into a horror
story of peril and danger for the United States of America. Mr.
Chairman, when there is a vacuum left by the United States, it
seems that Communist Chinese and other very active elements in
this world are ever more ready and willing to fill that vacuum,
and as we move out of the Panama Canal, and out of Panama, we
cannot let forces that are hostile to United States, who would
do us damage, fill that vacuum.
We can't even close our eyes to the fact that the corrupt
nature of some of the deals that have been made down in Panama,
that some people supposedly representing the Panamanian
Government may actually be making deals that are contrary to
the interests of the people of Panama itself, and especially
contrary to the national security interests of the United
States and Panama.
We have had a very long history with the Panamanian people,
and certainly I think that we have to consider the Panamanian
people our friends. The alarm bells that I am sounding today
are aimed as much at our security, but also at the security of
the Panamanian people to control their own destiny. There are
only a couple million Panamanians, and in trying to deal with
forces as powerful and as wealthy as those within Communist
China, and these narcotics terrorists down in Colombia, this is
something that we should be very concerned about.
We are facing this peril now, not only from Cuba, where the
Communist Chinese are involved with building communications and
intelligence facilities right adjacent to the Russian massive
electronic spy center in Lourdes, Cuba, but now here in Panama
as well. So this is a long-term danger to the United States,
and it is right here on our doorstep. I applaud you, Mr.
Chairman, for holding this hearing and calling America's
attention to the situation in Panama.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Rohrabacher appears in the
appendix.]
Chairman Gilman. Ms. Danner.
Ms. Danner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would very much like
to associate myself with the remarks just made by Congressman
Rohrabacher. I certainly agree with his comments. I question
whether we have had, as a Nation, the forward-planning that
some of the other nations have made with regard to their
futures, not looking just at the present, but at the decades to
come, and that is a concern that I have. So I am very pleased
that we are going to be addressing that issue, and hope that we
can find a solution that benefits not only those of us who
reside here in the United States, but the global family as
well. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Gilman. Mr. Burr.
Mr. Burr. I thank the Chairman. I thank my colleagues for
their comments. Mr. Chairman, I thank you for this hearing.
Welcome, General and Ambassador. I think the need for this
hearing is evidenced from the comments of the Members of
Congress and by your presence here today. Clearly this
reversion of bases and the leaving of a military presence there
is a challenge for us as it relates to our future in that
region and how we handle the challenges that we know are
present before us today, and those that are unforeseen today.
Clearly, Congressman Rohrabacher has raised a concern that
I think most of us share about the Chinese presence in the
canal. But I think that our long-term interest is with, in
fact, the canal's use and the access that we and others have to
it for commerce and for other issues. Clearly, if the Chinese
intent is for something else, we need to look at that and
follow that extremely close.
The comments, as they relate to the drug trafficking, are
an issue that every American is concerned with. If, in fact,
the Panamanian people would like to see U.S. military presence
back in the region, I am hopeful that we can find something to
accommodate that will of the Panamanian people. In the
meantime, I know that we have not left any stone unturned where
our presence can be felt in the region for the purposes of
preparedness and stabilization.
I hope that this will not be the last of the hearings that
deal with Panama's participation or possible future
participation in the trafficking of illegal drugs. There are
many efforts--certainly General McCaffrey has spoken on them
numerous times--but most importantly there is a will of the
American people now to stop the use and the trafficking of
illegal drugs. I hope, General and Ambassador, that you will
use this Committee in any way that you feel is useful in the
future to make sure that the U.S. presence in that region, and
the U.S. interest in that region are, in fact, furthered
through the use of this Committee and this Congress.
I thank the Chairman once again for his willingness to hold
this hearing to bring this issue into the forefront of people's
minds. I yield back.
Chairman Gilman. Thank you, Mr. Burr.
Chairman Gilman. As I indicated, we are joined by two
distinguished panelists. Our first witness is General George
Joulwan, who is a 1961 West Point graduate, a decorated two-
tour Vietnam combat veteran, the former Supreme Allied
Commander in Europe, and from 1990 to 1993 was the Commander in
Chief of our U.S. Southern Command in Panama. When he retired
from active duty, then Secretary of Defense William Perry
called General Joulwan a warrior diplomat in the best
traditions of General George C. Marshall. General Joulwan was
instrumental in designing and implementing our Nation's Panama-
based counter-drug strategy. We welcome his testimony before
our Committee this morning. Please proceed.
STATEMENT OF GENERAL GEORGE A. JOULWAN (RET.), FORMER SUPREME
ALLIED COMMANDER IN EUROPE, FORMER COMMANDER IN CHIEF, U.S.
SOUTHERN COMMAND
General Joulwan. Mr. Chairman, thank you for the
opportunity to appear before the Committee on International
Relations to discuss Panama's importance both to U.S. national
security and U.S. counter-drug operations. Although it has been
6 years since I commanded U.S. forces in Panama, I will
endeavor to give you my frank, candid and best views.
But first, Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you for your
constant, consistent and tireless efforts in our Nation's fight
against the flow of illegal drugs into our country. There is no
greater threat to our national security, and you have been on
the front lines of this war for many years. I urge you, and all
on your Committee, to continue your fight not only here in the
United States, but also throughout the entire drug zone at the
source, in transit, and along our borders.
Mr. Chairman, as you know, over 14,000 drug-induced deaths
were reported in the United States for 1996. Illegal drugs cost
our society $110 billion last year. Illegal drugs are addicting
our young, terrorizing our neighborhoods, and threatening our
potential as a nation. Unfortunately, I said those same words 7
years ago when I testified before congressional committees as a
Commander in Chief of the U.S. Southern Command. At that time,
10,000 Americans a year were being killed by illegal drugs.
In 1992, I reported to Congress that the narco-traffickers
were penetrating the fragile democracies of Central America,
and paying those assisting them in the transit zone not in
dollars, but in cocaine. I warned of crack babies, corruption,
and crime, imposed on fragile democracies ill-equipped to
handle these threats. Today, unfortunately, our southern
neighbors are experiencing the hard realities of an ever-
increasing narco-trafficking threat.
There is no easy way, Mr. Chairman, to reduce this clear
threat to our people, our national security, and, more
importantly, to the stability of the Americas, North, Central
and South. It will take a comprehensive strategy by the United
States in order to reduce the American casualties caused by the
illegal transit of drugs such as cocaine and heroin. It will
take political will and bipartisanship. It will require
partnership with our friends and allies. Most of all, it will
take U.S. leadership and perseverance to prevail against the
narco-traffickers.
It is against this backdrop of the counter-narcotic threat
to our Nation that I want to address the issues before this
Committee.
In my opinion, Panama has been, and still is, critical, not
only to counter-drug efforts, but also vital to the global
strategy of the United States.
Let me be more specific. I have already mentioned that
Panama occupies a strategic location. It not only sits astride
the transit routes used by the narcotics traffickers and other
illegal drugs that come from the producing countries of the
Andean Ridge in South America, in addition, Panama assists the
United States in its global responsibilities by providing a
water route for rapid reinforcement of most stable assets from
either east or west coast facilities. During my 3 years as
CINCSOUTH, I developed in Panama a very robust command and
control capability at Howard Air Force Base in Panama. I would
agree, Mr. Chairman, it is the crown jewel in our counter-drug
efforts.
As I mentioned, Panama sits astride the transit routes used
by the narcotics traffickers. Panama is also ideally suited to
launch aircraft and other assistance to those source countries
of the Andean Ridge--Colombia, Peru, Bolivia and Ecuador. No
other country provides the same degree of location and
infrastructure as Panama. My concern at CINCSOUTH was for both
the mission and for the safety of our troops, and the base at
Panama was the best option for supporting both.
During my time as CINCSOUTH, Mr. Chairman, it was clear to
me that we had to attack the narco-trafficker simultaneously at
the source, in transit, and along our borders. Concurrent with
this simultaneous engagement, demand reduction, education
rehabilitation and law enforcement had to be emphasized in the
cities and streets of the United States, and the forward-
deployed base in Panama was key in implementing this
comprehensive engagement strategy. Early on in my tenure as
CINCSOUTH, I concluded that success in the counter-drug fight
would require cooperation among numerous U.S. organizations and
agencies as well as the willing support from the host nations
of Central and South America. The challenge was to recognize
that the counter-drug fight was primarily a law enforcement
effort. Law enforcement was the lead agency, not the military,
but military support was vital for success. Having a forward-
deployed base in Panama played a key role.
I came up with the slogan, ``One team, one fight,'' to
emphasize the teamwork required if we were to be successful
against the very robust, determined, well-resourced and brutal
narco-trafficking organization. My intent was to facilitate
cooperation among the disparate U.S. organizations; to focus
the efforts in the region on the narco-traffickers, not on
needless turf squabbles among U.S. agencies. Policy directives
would come from the ONDCP and the departments in Washington,
but execution and implementation would be coordinated,
harmonized and directed from the forward base in Panama. Mr.
Chairman, it worked. The DEA, CIA, State, Customs and numerous
other organizations came together in Panama as we built the
team, and it was impressive and effective.
Our first operation was called ``Support Justice,'' and it
exceeded all our expectations. We pooled our assets--DOD, CIA,
Customs, DEA, State, and others--and we developed a clear
footprint of narco air activity between the coca growing fields
of Peru and Bolivia and the refining of cocaine in Colombia.
Chairman Gilman. If I could interrupt you a minute. We will
continue our hearing right through the votes. If our Members
would go and come right back.
General Joulwan. Working with our Ambassadors--and we
briefed with maps and charts this narco air bridge to the
political and military leadership of the Andean Ridge
countries--the host nations then joined us in our efforts.
Customs forward-deployed their aircraft in Panama and invited
host nation militaries and representatives on board, as we did
with our airborne reconnaissance aircraft, the ARL. U.S. radar
teams were positioned in Colombia, Peru and Ecuador.
Information was downlinked in Panama and provided to all
participants in the drug fight. We shared intelligence through
tactical analysis teams. In a short period of time that narco
bridge was interdicted, the Andean Ridge countries participated
in the end games, and the kingpins of the narco organizations
came under attack.
The point I came to make is that this was a joint combined
action, and that forward-deployed base in Panama was critical
for its success. Not having that base, in my opinion, will
reduce our effectiveness against the narco-traffickers. We also
use the base for what we call fuertas caminos, our nation-
building exercises where our reservists would come to Panama
and Central America in order to train and build roads and
bridges and clinics. These exercises built goodwill and allowed
us to interact with the militaries in promoting democratic
institutions and ideals.
I also, Mr. Chairman, worked with the Panamanians in
developing a turnover of facilities. We respected their
sovereignty, and it paid off. We gave every indication that the
United States would comply with the Panama Canal Treaties. A 10
year timetable for reverting of the canal zone properties was
provided to the Panamanians. This timetable included the
turnover of key facilities such as Fort Amador and the
headquarters on Quarry Heights. We also made it clear in the
early days of this decade that the United States was willing to
remain, if the Panamanians agreed, at a much reduced level to
carry on the fight against the narco-traffickers. Every
indication at that time was that the Panamanian people
overwhelmingly supported a continued United States presence
beyond the year 2000.
Mr. Chairman, I am sure other alternatives will be found to
offset the loss of the Panama base. Indeed, the fight against
the narcotics trafficker must continue. But to be clear, losing
the infrastructure and operating base at Howard Air Force Base
in Panama will effect the prosecution of this country's war on
drugs. Therefore, I urge, as you have stated, continued efforts
to build the strategic relationship between Panama and the
United States. It is in Panamanian and Latin America's
interest, as well as the United States, to eliminate this
insidious threat to the democracies and their hope for the
future.
Mr. Chairman, Panama and the United States share common
values and ideals, and in many respects a common history.
Panama was, is, and will remain a strategic location for the
United States. As such, it will be subject to threats from the
border it shares with an unstable Colombia, from terrorism,
from crime, corruption, and money laundering. Panama, as was
mentioned, has no military and a fragile evolving police force.
We, the United States, have every reason to do all we can to
ensure not only the implementation of the Panama Canal
Treaties, but the reforging of a strategic partnership with
Panama based on mutual trust and respect for their sovereignty
and their people.
Again, Mr. Chairman, I thank you for your leadership in the
war on drugs, and I am prepared to answer your questions. Thank
you.
Mr. Rohrabacher. [Presiding.] As you have seen, we have
changed chairmen temporarily. When you have a vote on, you have
to make these accommodations.
Ambassador McNamara, you may proceed. For the record, our
Members will be coming back from the vote as you testify.
STATEMENT OF THOMAS E. McNAMARA, PRESIDENT, AMERICAS SOCIETY,
FORMER U.S. CHIEF NEGOTIATOR IN PANAMA
Mr. McNamara. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I also want to thank
the Committee for the invitation to testify today. I hope I can
assist you in some way in understanding the evolution of the
negotiation in 1997 and 1998 that attempted to reach agreement
with Panama for continued United States presence in Panama
beyond the year 2000. This is a possibility that was envisioned
in the 1979 treaties, but only provided that both countries
negotiate an agreement for that continued presence.
My own role was a limited one at the time, both in time and
scope. I was the last of several U.S. negotiators, and I took
over late in the process, in what can accurately, I think, be
portrayed as the final months before circumstances would
preclude an agreement.
I came to the negotiations with the background of having
participated in the first State Department study of the post-
2000 presence in the early 1980's, and throughout the 1980's I
worked on Panamanian and Central American political and
military issues and counter-narcotics and counter-terrorism
here in the hemisphere. I finished out the decade as the
Ambassador to Colombia from 1988 to 1991, and I also served on
the National Security Council and as Assistant Secretary of
State before leaving government late last year. In those
positions I also was involved in hemispheric political,
military, counter-narcotics and counter-terrorism affairs.
Let me say, by way of introduction, that my understanding
of the situation we faced in these negotiations begins with an
understanding of a century of U.S. involvement in Panama. While
the United States has solidly favorable remembrances of that
involvement, Panamanians have very mixed feelings about it.
Most Panamanians have friendly and favorable attitudes about
Americans, and they realize that Panama owes much to the
American involvement in the country. But many, even among those
so favorably disposed, have strong unfavorable memories of
times when a sovereign zone split their nation in half, and
when Americans lived among them in a separate, privileged, and
culturally segregated society. There is, therefore, a certain
ambiguity and resentment about the American role in Panama,
particularly among the educated elite of the country, and it is
unfortunately true that Panama is a country where the political
elite determine the outcome of important issues. In short, we
cannot discount the century of intense, emotional, and complex
history that is a part of any negotiation that we may undertake
with Panama, in the past or in the future.
Hence, my first observation on the negotiation is that the
Panamanian Government approached the table with a very
ambiguous attitude about a continued United States presence in
Panama after the year 2000. The political parties in the
government coalition were divided. In particular, the lead
party of the coalition, the Democratic Revolutionary Party, the
PRD, was divided. Any attempt to negotiate a continued United
States presence was bound to create powerful strains and
conflicts within the party and within the government.
As for the public in general, despite years of unrelenting
negative press coverage of the counter-narcotics center and
similarly unrelenting negative coverage of the negotiations,
despite the few and unenthusiastic statements of support made
by the government during the course of the negotiations,
despite all that, there was a very strong, stable majority of
public opinion in favor of a continued American presence in
Panama. The polls consistently showed from 65 to 80 percent of
the public wanted a Multinational counter-narcotics center, an
MCC, and a U.S. military presence that would be a part of that
MCC.
This difference in attitude between the educated elite and
the average Panamanian is not surprising. First, the average
Panamanian saw the counter-narcotics center as a source of jobs
and commerce which would provide substantial, reliable economic
benefits for many years to come. Second, the average Panamanian
distrusts Panamanian politicians, and a continued United States
presence was thought to be, therefore, a hedge against the
instability, conflict, corruption, and authoritarianism that
have marked Panamanian political life, and which is resented
and feared by the average citizen.
Opinion here in the United States was also divided, and
there were different opinions about whether a continued
presence in Panama was necessary or desirable. Outside the
government, those who opined on this issue were divided. Some
saw little strategic interest to the United States and were
willing to see the special relationship end. Others were
supportive of a counter-narcotics center because of the
importance of the counter-drug fight and the value of military
monitoring and interception of drug flights.
Within the executive branch, the White House, the
Department of State, and the Office of National Drug Control
Policy were strong supporters of a counter-narcotics center and
of the negotiations. The law enforcement agencies were
agnostic. The attitudes in the military were more complex.
In large measure the attitude of the U.S. military, it
seemed to me, was a result of the heavy focus in the
negotiation on creating a drug center rather than a traditional
military facility for the conduct of traditional military
operations. SOUTHCOM, the operational command in the region,
was strongly supportive because it saw the MCC as a very
powerful tool in carrying out its mission in drug monitoring
and drug interdiction, and, as General Joulwan mentioned, he
was a very powerful and strong advocate of the position that we
should have the drug center, as were his successors. Other
elements of the military considered that they could accomplish
the counter-drug mission without remaining in Panama. Still
others wanted a wide range of missions performed from the
center in Panama, or if that were not possible, then no
presence in Panama. In the end, the U.S. military position was
that they could fulfill their mission for less money by relying
on U.S. bases and forward operating locations in the region as
substitutes. It remains to be seen if this is a correct
calculation.
Let me turn to the negotiating strategy briefly. In the
summer of 1997, when I was asked to lead the negotiations, I
concluded that time was short, but that it would be possible to
negotiate an agreement. To be successful we would have to have
very intensive talks that would finish before the end of the
year 1997. There were two reasons for this: First, Panama was
quickly approaching a referendum campaign that would determine
whether President Perez Balladares could run for a second term
of office. This national referendum was to be initiated by a
vote in the Congress early in 1998. I believed that unless the
Multinational counter-narcotics center was settled quickly, it
would be interjected into that domestic political debate. The
longer the negotiations continued, the greater danger of this
happening.
The second reason for speed was that the United States had
to make decisions on drawing down personnel and activities from
Panama to comply with the 1979 treaties. Recall that no
agreement meant that we must leave. That withdrawal would
involve expenditures to build and modify facilities in the
United States as well as other expenses, and the military
wanted to move quickly on alternatives to Panama if it was to
prove necessary to withdraw completely. I felt certain that as
substantial funds were expended to withdraw, we would lose
support for the Multinational Counter-Narcotics Center. We
needed, by the end of 1997, a negotiated text demonstrating
that a concrete solution that did not involve complete
withdrawal was possible.
I therefore spoke with my counterpart, and we agreed that
both sides would benefit if a successful agreement could be
concluded before the end of 1997. We then outlined to each
other the major issues which would have to be settled, and we
agreed to a schedule of meetings and negotiation that would
allow time to reach a conclusion.
Without going into the details of those negotiations, I can
say that between early September and late December 1997, we had
successfully negotiated all of the essential points of the
agreement. When we broke for Christmas, on December 23, 1997,
there were a few details that needed to be addressed, as well
as some technical issues remaining. The largest issue
unresolved was to decide how to transform a bilateral text into
a multilateral agreement. Hence, there was no reason in
December to think that the remaining details could not be
settled. It was, in fact, on the basis of that December 23rd
text that President Perez Balladares announced the following
day that an agreement had been reached.
During the Christmas holiday period we understood that the
negotiated text had been shown to government and other leaders
in Panama, and that the reaction of some of them was strongly
negative. By late January the government appeared deeply
divided. Foreign Minister Ricardo Arias assured us that we
should come to Panama nonetheless to initial the text and
discuss it with other Latin American states he had invited to a
meeting in Panama. Despite this assurance, at that meeting, on
January 20th, the Foreign Minister refused to confirm the
essential agreement or to initial the text.
In subsequent weeks, Panama suggested major changes that
amounted to a renegotiation of the December text. The United
States' position was that we were willing to consider small
changes that would make the agreement acceptable to Panama, but
we were not, at that late date, able to renegotiate a text that
had been all but finally agreed. Indeed, we were all in the
situation that I tried to avoid. The referendum campaign was in
full swing by May, and the matter, it seemed to me, could not
be successfully settled in the atmosphere that prevailed in
Panama.
Let me mention a few miscalculations and some contradictory
attitudes that had an influence on the negotiations. There were
several. The Panamanian miscalculation was a virtually
universal belief in Panama that the United States would never
leave our facilities in Panama. Panamanians believed that we
would pay an extremely high price to remain because we were
totally committed to having a base in Panama. This led them, I
think, to overestimate the leverage available to them to gain
concessions from the United States. On the United States side
there was a miscalculation prevalent, particularly among the
military, that the Panamanians would, in the end, accept a
large U.S. military presence despite the intense opposition
within the ruling elite of Panama. Both of these
miscalculations made negotiations more difficult.
The contradictory attitudes are also interesting because
they tended to mislead the other side. Let me mention two.
Initially there was a substantial amount of posturing in Panama
to the effect that the United States must leave, that it was a
matter of national pride and sovereignty that Panama have back
the bases, and that all foreign forces, all U.S. forces, be out
of Panama by the year 2000. Yet later, Panamanians took the
position that the United States could remain, and some form of
bases might be possible if the United States paid rent.
Then, in June 1996 Panama suggested a multilateral counter-
drug center to avoid the base and the rent issue. But, in fact,
the residue of this inconsistency remained throughout the
talks, and it caused some on the United States side to discount
the seriousness of the opposition in Panama, and to think that
Panama would go further than, in fact, it could.
The U.S. military also had a paradoxical position in the
negotiations. They insisted that we must have a facility at the
MCC that would be capable of a wide range of counter-drug and
nondrug-related operations; that is, that we needed a large
facility. We also told Panama and others that we could dispense
with the facilities in Panama and operate from relatively small
forward locations and from substitute facilities in the United
States. This convinced the Panamanians that we could, in fact,
do our drug-related operations from a small facility, but that
we were driving them toward a base disguised as a counter-
narcotics center so that we could conduct other missions and
yet not have to pay rent.
There are several reasons, some of which I have outlined
above, that caused these negotiations to fail. I want to
emphasize the history of the relationship and the resentment
that it left among a small but vocal minority of Panamanians
that caused them to adamantly oppose any U.S. military
presence. Additionally, as I have suggested, there was an
unwillingness on the part of the Panamanian Government to
support publicly and to explain to their public the course of
the negotiations, the issues, the elements that were being
discussed, and the ultimate outcome that could result. This
left the field wide open to the opponents of an MCC, and it
resulted in a correct perception of a lukewarm support by the
Panamanian Government for an agreement. This was matched, of
course, by the lukewarm support of the U.S. military for a
continued military presence in Panama.
The bottom line, I think, is that maintaining an MCC in
Panama was too difficult a political step for the Government of
Panama to take. For the U.S. Government it was one of only
several alternative ways of conducting military missions in the
region.
Now, a suggestion. Having failed to reach agreement, I
strongly recommend that both countries adopt a cooling-off
period of several years before addressing again the issue of
whether Panama would agree to the presence of U.S. military in
the country. Both countries tried hard, came close, but failed.
The political and military value of the presence was not strong
enough to overcome the alternative of doing without it.
In that regard, I believe that the negotiations reflected
the real world has evolved since the end of the Cold War. A
continued United States presence in Panama would have been a
beneficial outcome for both countries, but it was not essential
to either. I see no value and much danger in one side or the
other pressing, in the next few years, for another agreement.
The Panamanians need to see that we will fully implement the
1979 treaties, that we will completely leave the country
without any intention of returning. On the other hand, the
United States must learn to function in the region in a very
different way than in the past. Conditions have changed. Having
spent the money to move out of Panama, I think now we should do
just that, leave. We must then commit whatever resources are
necessary for the conduct of equally effective counter-
narcotics missions from bases in the United States and from
forward-operating locations in the region. As I said earlier in
my remarks, it remains to be seen if we can.
That, Mr. Chairman, concludes my prepared statement.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Mr. McNamara appears in the
appendix]
Mr. Rohrabacher. I will just assume--as I am the Chairman
temporarily--I will just proceed as the Chairman until Chairman
Gilman returns.
Mr. Ambassador, it sounds like what you are saying is that
when you mentioned the lukewarm support of that, and the
contradictory signals here and there that we were giving and
the other side was giving as well, it sounded like this
Administration wasn't paying much attention to this very
serious negotiation.
Mr. McNamara. I wouldn't say that. I got, as I said in my
statement, very strong support from the White House, the State
Department, from the Office of National Drug Control Policy. I
also got support from the Office of the Secretary of Defense,
very strong support.
Mr. Rohrabacher. When you say strong support, do you mean
strong support, or did you get guidance, the type of guidance
you need and policy direction from these people, or did they
just take you out to lunch at the White House mess?
Mr. McNamara. No, I got very strong support in the sense of
policy guidance and instructions. In fact, it was strong enough
for us to reach a conclusion to actually negotiate an essential
agreement with the Panamanians. I do not think the essential
problem was the inability of the Administration to formulate a
policy or to implement the policy. The critical element that
caused this agreement to fail was internal Panamanian politics.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Your suggestion that 70 percent--and
actually I am not sure exactly what--what was your specific----
Mr. McNamara. It ran from 65 to 80 percent. The public
polling that was done supported a continued United States
presence, yes.
Mr. Rohrabacher. So we have a situation where 70 to 80
percent of the people of a country are supporting basically a
position that would be positive toward the United States, but
we were not able to handle the diplomacy of the situation with
the powers that be to get a more favorable result.
Mr. McNamara. I would contest whether it was diplomacy that
failed, but rather it was internal politics within the
Panamanian Government.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Let's focus on the internal politics for a
moment. Do you think that--most politicians in the United
States, when they see a poll and it says 70 to 80 percent of
the people are on one side of an issue, they would generally
tend to go in that direction. Now, I know you described the
cultural manifestation of, I guess, the need to demonstrate
one's independence from the United States in Panama. Do you
think that bribery played a role in this or other negotiations
dealing with the facilities or bases, or the agreement with the
United States? Was there any foreign bribery or domestic
bribery going on with the Panamanian officials?
Mr. McNamara. Not that I am aware of in these negotiations.
I can't talk about other negotiations or other situations, but
in this one I do not believe there was any indication of either
domestic or foreign bribery playing a role.
Mr. Rohrabacher. General, do you know, are you--do you
calculate that there was some type of skullduggery going on
behind the scenes that might have played an outcome and what we
are now having as a total withdrawal of American presence in
Panama?
General Joulwan. Chairman, I am not privileged to that sort
of information. I will tell you that, as you have stated, the
vast majority of Panamanian people--and that did not include
just those who wanted to have us there for money--there was a
genuine, I think, desire by both the elites and the people to
continue to have a strategic relationship with the United
States. Somehow, that desire was not able to manifest itself in
an agreement. But that support is there, still there, today.
Mr. Rohrabacher. I certainly understand people's
willingness, or unwillingness I should say, to cast aspersions
on the motives of people you have been negotiating with. But
this seems to me to be a very alarming situation. But it is a
fairly alarming result when you have the support of the
population in a country like Panama, that--and we have a
country that is strategically so important, both the canal and
the location of the country as a choke point between the
Americas--that we have a result that seems to be detrimental to
the United States and our ability to exercise influence in that
part of the world. Somewhere there seems to be a breakdown.
Please feel free to comment.
Mr. McNamara. Mr. Chairman, yes, I don't refrain from being
critical of those I negotiated with. In fact, if I have a
criticism, it is that the Government of Panama did not
undertake to build the support for the policy that it was
following with respect to the negotiations; that is, a policy
of attempting to construct a counter-narcotics center. As I
said in my remarks, by not trying to build that national
consensus and understanding about what it was doing in the
negotiations, it left the field open to the naysayers and the
negative.
To the extent----
Mr. Rohrabacher. On that point, let's just look at it. We
are talking about an anti-narcotics center that would also
serve as a United States presence in terms of our military
presence, something that was considered vital by many people
fighting the drug threat here in the United States. We have
billions of dollars of money being made in profits from drugs
with the terrorists right next door in Colombia. We have got
what I pointed out in my opening statement as what seems to be
a demonstrable Chinese influence going on down there. You don't
think that these forces played a role in the outcome of these
negotiations as well as other agreements that were made that
determine the future of the Panama Canal and the Panamanian
Government?
Mr. McNamara. I don't mean to discount a whole range of
influences that played a role in this, including the ones you
are mentioning. I think the overwhelming influence, the
overwhelming factor that in the end caused these negotiations
to fail, was the split within the government on grounds,
essentially, of nationalism, that is whether or not Panama
needed to, as some of them referred to it, ``cut the umbilical
cord'', establish its own identity, separate itself from the
United States in order to demonstrate that it was capable of
functioning without a United States presence.
There were a whole series of attitudes in Panama. They were
generally referred to, or sometimes referred to, as the
dependency syndrome and that there needed to be a break. Even
some of the opponents were willing to see, after a lapse of
unspecified length, a return to examine the possibility of the
United States coming back into Panama. But among the very hard-
core opposition within the government, within the parties that
made up the government coalition and, above all, among that
political elite that was the vocal minority, there was a
powerful, very, very powerful national sentiment that said we
must break, we must comply with the 1979 treaties. When one
examines the situation, I think that was the overwhelming
factor that led to the situation we are now in.
Mr. Rohrabacher. With the indulgence of the Chairman, who
has just returned, I have two more questions to ask. General,
what do you believe would be the minimal useful U.S. security
and counter-narcotics presence in Panama, and do you believe
that we should continue to seek a United States presence at
Howard Air Force Base, Rodman Port, and Fort Sherman?
General Joulwan. What I described back in 1990, in this 10-
year plan we developed, was a location around Howard and an
estimate between 2,000 and 2,500 personnel. This would operate
the air field and be able to coordinate the activities of all
the other agencies. Remember, we had Customs, DEA, and other
agencies that were involved in the drug fight. The coordination
of these organizations is what needs to be understood as to why
Howard Air Force Base was so important. But about 2,000 to
2,500 military personnel.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Let me just state for the record, when you
have a situation where 70 to 80 percent of a population is
supportive of a United States presence, and we have an outcome
that has been so abysmal to our country and abysmal in the
sense that we no longer will have a presence in what was
considered one of the most strategic important areas of our
country--for our country, this area that ties both the Pacific
and the Atlantic together, this area that--it is the choke
point between North and South America. The fact that we had the
support of 70 percent of the population and now we are not
going to have that presence, I would suggest that the outcome
was not just based on some sort of historical anomaly of ego. I
would suggest that what we are talking about here is the
corruption of a small number of elite politicians in that
country and the determination by narcotics traffickers and
terrorists from Colombia and elsewhere, as well as the
Communist Chinese, to influence what was going to happen in
that country, and we were paying much more attention to it than
our own Administration.
So with that rather hefty statement, I will return the
Chair to the Chairman.
Mr. Gejdenson. Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Gilman. [Presiding.] Mr. Gejdenson.
Mr. Gejdenson. I would hope that our colleague from
California, if he has evidence of these allegations, would
share them with Members of the Committee and the
Administration. Others may have this evidence. Lots of people
may have these suspicions, but it seems to me that when you are
a Member and you make these kinds of allegations that are very
serious, and if you have the evidence, you ought to make it
available.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Would the gentlemen yield? I would be very
happy to share this evidence, and I would suggest that people
who are deeply involved in that part of the world know what is
going on, and they just will not state in public hearings what
is happening. So I would share that evidence.
Mr. Gejdenson. If the gentleman would get that to this
Member in a timely manner.
I think we have this syndrome in America, trying to figure
out who lost China and trying to figure out who to blame for
losing China. I am not sure China was ours. I am not sure
Panama was ours. I think it is not surprising that the
political structure in Panama may have some resistance or some
desire, frankly, to have that separation that you talked about,
to kind of have a concrete expression of their separation. I am
hopeful, as there is popular support by most people's estimates
for an American presence there, that the leadership, once they
have exercised their independence, will feel less threatened by
an American presence, and we will return there.
I guess my question is that so much of what we do here
deals with interdiction. Interdiction is an important part, but
the demand is what keeps these folks running drugs in our
direction, and the paths that they deliver the drugs here are
so variable in a sense, should we be simply putting more of our
effort into trying to reduce demand? Are we adequate in the
interdiction effort, recognizing that in an open society like
ours it is easy to get stuff in here, sadly to say, especially
when there is this kind of demand? Are there things that we
should do on interdiction that we are not doing? Are there
goals we ought to be seeking, are there activities that we
could undertake, whether it is from Panama or elsewhere, that
would give us an ability to be more effective in interdiction?
Gentlemen, I ask both of you.
General Joulwan. I can take a try at that, Congressman. I
looked very hard at that question when I went to Panama in
1990, and I am looking very hard at it again today. As I said
in my statement, I truly believe you need a comprehensive
strategy. Demand reduction alone is not going to work. The
figures tell us that despite interdiction, 700 metric tons are
unaccounted for. That is a hell of a lot of cocaine that is
getting into the United States.
In the analysis I did in trying to come up with this
strategy I used a very simple analogy. What happens when the
coca paste goes from Peru and Bolivia to Colombia and is
refined into cocaine. The drug cocaine is then distributed many
different ways, as you say, to come into the United States and
elsewhere. I asked, do you go after the bees or the beehive? I
think you need to do both, but just going after the bees is not
going to solve the problem. We have to attack the beehive--and
we know where the beehive is. It is very limited in area and
scope. We need to get the affected nations--Colombia, Peru,
Bolivia, Equador--to join us in this fight, and it is tough
work to do so.
We have had very good success in Peru. They are working
well with us, but we have seen some back-sliding now. I am not
sure whether that is linked to the lack of command and control
out of Panama or not, but it needs to be looked at. But if you
don't have a comprehensive strategy at the source, in transit,
and interdiction, and on-demand reduction, I really don't think
you are going to attack the problem.
Mr. McNamara. I concur quite heartily with what General
Joulwan has just said. It is, as we all know, the law of supply
and demand. It is not the law of supply, and it is not just the
law of demand. The demand element is a major factor in the drug
trade. If we can't reduce the demand, if we can't, ourselves as
a country and as a Nation, and our citizens individually and
collectively, exercise some self-control and bring that demand
under control, then the supply will always be there.
As you noted, we are an open society. We can't close the
borders, but that doesn't mean that, in fact, we shouldn't go
after the supply, because, in fact, if we don't go after the
supply, one of the most--as I have observed over the last 15 to
20 years of deep involvement in the counter-narcotics effort--
that the single most important element in whether or not a drug
is used, any drug, whether it is aspirin or cigarettes or
cocaine, is availability.
Mr. Gejdenson. Let me just ask you, my time is running out,
General McCaffrey has suggested $1 billion for Colombia to try
to wipe out the source of some of this. $1 billion, is that
realistic? Does it take that kind of money? If we wipe it out
in Colombia, will we just end up destabilizing the next country
where they move to or----
Mr. McNamara. Congressman, I think that $1 billion in
assistance for Colombia, if properly distributed to a number of
programs in a number of ways, is a realistic amount, if the
Congress can find that within the budget parameters that it has
to work with. But it is not just Colombia. It is also Mexico
and the other Andean countries besides Colombia. It is a plague
that is affecting those countries. It happens at the present
time, as a result of an unfortunate 4 year period in Colombia
when they had a President of, at the very best, third-rate
capabilities in this regard, that Colombia is suffering more
than some of the other countries. I think President Pastrana is
fully committed to working to end, to the best of his ability,
the narco-trafficking in Colombia. I think we ought to join him
in that effort.
General Joulwan. If I could just comment briefly, again, I
think putting money into Colombia is important. But--and I am a
soldier--however so, I will say that diplomatic, economic,
political, as well as military elements of this strategy need
to be developed. When you look at how the narco-trafficker
operates, you need a comprehensive strategy. You need all the
nations in the region to come together to understand that this
is a clear threat to their security, to their children, as well
as to the United States. That is why you need, I think, all the
nations to understand that, because if you put the heat on in
Colombia or Peru, and they slip out through Brazil, illegal
drugs are still getting out.
So it is that comprehensive approach, Congressman, that I
think is needed, and we need it for the long haul, not for 1
year or one President's term. It needs to be a constant effort,
and that is why I applaud what Congressman Gilman has been
trying to do in keeping the pressure on. Because it is going to
take perseverance and persistence as well as money in order to
end this threat. It is a fight.
Chairman Gilman. Thank you, Mr. Gejdenson.
Mr. Ballenger.
Mr. Ballenger. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And, General Joulwan, I am with you 100 percent, as the
Chairman here.
The one thing I would like to ask each of you, you were
there, obviously the problem was still there--I mean, it was, I
guess, just before Samper that you were there, General, or, Mr.
Ambassador, and somewhere along the line were we doing anything
to fight it except being organized, as you said, General,
before Samper came in? Just a question.
Mr. McNamara. Let me address the Colombia aspect of that.
The answer is yes. In fact, Chairman Gilman and I met for the
first time in Bogota, Colombia, in 1989, when he came with a
congressional delegation and witnessed the terrible devastation
that the mafia was wreaking on the country of Colombia. I think
President Barco and President Gaviria, the two predecessors of
President Samper in Colombia, did an extraordinary job and, in
fact, turned around the country psychologically, and in many
other ways during the period I was there to confront the
problem of narco-trafficking.
When I arrived in Colombia, in fact, when I left the United
States to go to Colombia, both in the United States and in
Colombia the general attitude was finger-pointing. The
Colombians were saying, it is your fault up in the United
States because you people are consuming these drugs; and the
people in the United States were turning to the Colombians and
saying, it is your fault because you are supplying them. By the
time I left 3 years later, the Colombians had come to recognize
that the drug supply operations that were going on in Colombia
were destroying their society, and I think that, thanks to Mrs.
Reagan starting with her very simple but effective ``just say
no'' campaign which followed in succeeding Administrations, the
United States recognized that, in fact, the consumption of
drugs is part of the problem, and we have to face up to that.
I thought the turning point was probably just about 1990,
more or less the time that Chairman Gilman was in Colombia.
Mr. Ballenger. You were building an effort at that time. I
don't know, it sounds like both you all did a terrific job, and
all of a sudden we just cut out and forgot the whole damn
thing.
General Joulwan. What was impressive to me is what I
mentioned in my opening remarks. To attack this we had all
these different U.S. agencies working together. We brought them
together, and Howard was the key point, Howard Air Force Base.
When I went to Colombia with Ambassador McNamara, we went in to
see the President, and I rolled out this map that showed what
our AWACs had picked up of narco aircraft tracks that went back
and forth from Colombia, Peru, and Bolivia. I would say: Mr.
President, it is not the Americans that are violating your
sovereignty, it is being violated every day by these narco-
traffickers. These narco-plans have no flight plans, and they
are bringing paste back into your country that is made into
cocaine.
I did that with President Fujimori, with the President of
Ecuador, Venezuela, et cetera, and they started to see the
problem. I made it clear that it was in their interest to
protect their sovereignty, and we started to get very good
cooperation, particularly with the Peruvians. The Peruvians
really started to attack the narco planes, and it had a
dramatic impact on this air bridge. Therefore, the coca leaf
and paste in Peru started to stack up, and it couldn't get
through, and the price, therefore, went down, and therefore the
price of cocaine in the United States started to go up. So we
started to have that effect.
But it takes perseverance. But in my view our military is
not enamored with this mission. It never has been. That is part
of the challenge in the post-Cold War period. I think we need
to get military support for this as a clear mission that
affects 14,000 deaths every year in this country caused by a
chemical called cocaine.
Mr. Ballenger. The reason I was asking this point of both
of you--because you were there--obviously there was an effort
on your part and our Government's part to do something about
the trafficking, the drug problem and in protecting the Panama
Canal and so forth, but it appears it didn't take about a year,
and Samper gets elected, and the whole kit and caboodle got
thrown out. This is no longer our problem. We are not going to
take care of it.
Our Administration, I wouldn't say they cut and run, but
they just decided that we aren't going to be involved down
there. Sadly, General Joulwan, you had a great effort on our
part, on the part of our Government in Bosnia, at the same time
we are making no effort in Panama or Colombia. It is just a sad
situation to be able to say I wish somebody somewhere had cared
a little bit.
The one thing I noticed differently, Congressman Gilman and
I have been working on this thing for 2 or 3 years, but I have
never seen anything in the news media anywhere that showed that
the situation was going on until last week on Washington Week
in Review they finally brought a reporter in that said Panama
is a disaster; we have got to do something about it. I only
wish that somewhere along the line the two of you all had
stayed in office and we had backed you up. It is water over the
dam now, but we are going to have to go back from where we
started from with you guys.
I was down and met President Pastrana, and maybe he made a
mistake in trying to do something with his land giveaway. Maybe
it was an effort on his part to buy some time. But somewhere
along the line we are going to have another war, and whether it
involves Panama or Colombia or both of them or us, we have a
very sad, as far as I can tell, something to look forward to as
far as that area of the world is concerned. I don't know if
that strikes you all. I think my time has run out.
Chairman Gilman. Thank you, Mr. Ballenger.
Dr. Cooksey.
Mr. Cooksey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Ambassador McNamara, I would like to pose two questions to
you and then one to you, General Joulwan. Would you clarify for
me the legal entity or commercial entity or government entity
from China that is going to have a presence in the Panama Canal
zone; and supposedly for shipping purposes, and since the PRC,
the People's Republic of China still has a Communist political
model and a Socialist economic model, convince me that this
Chinese shipping entity is not a part of the Chinese Government
or the Chinese Army.
First, General Joulwan, and you can space this time
accordingly, how can we know that our commercial and military
shipping will have access to the Panama Canal for purposes of
transit? And how important is the Panama Canal to the U.S.
military from a global strategic standpoint with today's means
of transportation in terms of aviation and shipping? Ambassador
McNamara.
Mr. McNamara. I am afraid I am not quite the one to ask the
question about the legal and commercial structure of the
Hutchison-Whampoa organization and the relationship between it
and the Chinese Government, except that I know enough to know
that there is such a relationship and that it is a--if you
will, a parastatal type organization, that is to say a
commercial organization in which the Government of China has a
major and possibly a controlling interest. But I am not expert
enough to be able to go beyond that rather general statement.
Mr. Cooksey. Who is Hutchinson? Who are they as players?
Are they just Chinese with English names?
Mr. McNamara. If I am not mistaken, there is a Hong Kong
connection, and I believe Hutchison--I would have to refresh my
memory, but I believe it is a Hong Kong corporation or a Hong
Kong entity with that name, and that is where the English name
comes from, but I am not 100 percent certain.
Mr. Cooksey. If you, as the Ambassador, if you are not the
source of that knowledge, who would be able to get this
information?
Mr. McNamara. I was not the Ambassador in Panama, I was
simply the Ambassador for the negotiations. I had other duties
and responsibilities here in Washington at the time. I would
say that either our Ambassador in Panama or possibly someone in
the Department of Commerce, Department of Treasury, or
Department of State that is now intimately involved in looking
at Chinese commercial operations around the world.
Mr. Cooksey. Thank you, General.
General Joulwan. I will try to answer, Congressman: I think
the essence of your question is how do we assure that
commercial and military shipping will have safe transit through
the canal. I believe that the Panamanians for some time have
been working on the management of the canal. I don't know the
exact number of the work force now that is Panamanian, but over
the last, I would say, 7 or 8 years, it has been becoming more
Panamanian. The leadership of the canal is Panamian. I have
every confidence that the running of the canal by the
Panamanians will be in accordance with the right standards.
Military passage is still very important for our global
strategy, not just some of the larger aircraft carriers that
can't get through. But primarily most of the shipping of our
logistics and submarines and other ships such as cruisers and
destroyers use the canal. The canal allows us to have two swing
capability from predominant naval ports, one in San Diego and
one in Norfolk. They are on each coast. If you have to
reenforce, the canal still is extremely important. We need to
take a hard look at the security of our ships passing through
there. Though I hesitate to mention it, we should always
understand that it is a terrorist target in the canal, and I
think adequate measures must be taken to ensure that it is
protected from those sorts of threats. But it is still very
important in our military strategy, the use of the Panama
Canal.
Mr. Cooksey. Let me ask you this question. If we--and I
don't have this China phobia that some of my colleagues on this
side have, and I have been to China, some years ago--but let's
say we bombed a couple more of the Chinese embassies or did
some more dumb things, we were at war with China, and I don't
want to be at war with the Chinese. I am convinced the Chinese
people are warm, wonderful people, just with questionable
government. But let's say, worst case scenario, we are at war
with China. Would you feel safe riding on a ship--and I know
you are in the Army, and I am ex-Air Force--through the Panama
Canal while we were at war with China? Or would you rather fly
over in an Air Force plane?
General Joulwan. I think we will have no choice but to use
the canal. I think there are provisions in the 1977 treaties
that still make the United States responsible, in a strategic
way, for the canal. So without getting into any sort of
contingency planning, I would assume that contingency planning
does exist to ensure that we can use the canal; not just us,
but world traffic as well. That is already in the 1977 treaties
that the United States, even after the year 2000, would have
that strategic responsibility.
Mr. Cooksey. If I could throw in one bit of history. I am
sure I don't know if you ever had occasion to visit the Garber
Museum, which houses 80 percent of the Air and Space Museum's
airplanes. There is a Japanese airplane that was designed to be
carried in a submarine. There was a submarine en route from
Japan to the Panama Canal when we bombed Hiroshima and
Nagasaki. Those planes were going to be launched from a
submarine, believe it or not--the plane is over there, you
ought to see it--those planes were intended to obstruct the
Panama Canal so our troops in Europe who had a victory in
Europe could not get to Asia. So, 50 years ago, the other
Asians thought it was important strategically, and there is one
surviving airplane. The submarine pushed those planes off from
the Pacific and headed back to Japan. But the Garber Museum has
one. It is an interesting bit of history.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Gilman. Thank you, Dr. Cooksey.
Again, I want to thank our panelists who have done such an
outstanding job today in reviewing the issues. I have just a
few questions, and I regret we were interrupted by the voting
that took place.
Ambassador McNamara, a couple of quick, brief questions.
Isn't it true that in late 1995, Ambassador Bill Hughes and
Panamanian Foreign Minister Gabriel Lewis Galindo virtually
reached a consensual agreement on a deal in which the United
States would be able to retain seven of our military bases in
Panama, including Howard, and keep about 7,000 of our U.S.
military personnel in Panama in exchange for a modest
compensation package? Did that occur?
Mr. McNamara. I would prefer that Ambassador Hughes or
somebody else answer that question. I was not intimately
involved in that in 1995. I do know, however, that there was an
in-principle agreement to discuss the modalities for setting up
an arrangement, in fact, for an agreement that would include up
to seven facilities. I do not know whether Gabriel Lewis
Galindo, the Foreign Minister, was speaking with complete
authority for his government at the time, but it was certainly
an in-principle understanding that that would be the basis for
discussions. That changed subsequently.
Chairman Gilman. Mr. Ambassador, we understand that deal
fell apart after our Administration categorically rejected any
form of compensation to the Panamanians for letting us stay
after 1999. Is that your information?
Mr. McNamara. What was categorically rejected was the idea
of paying rent for staying behind. Indeed, in December 1995, I
believe it was the President of Panama, President Ernesto Perez
Valladares, who suggested to us as a solution to the problem
that there be instead a counter-narcotics center established,
and that that counter-narcotics center, because it would not be
a base, and because it would be there to conduct essentially
counter-narcotics operations (but there would have been a
possibility of some other ancillary operations also) that that
would not require rent. We got by the problem by redefining
what it was that would remain behind after 1999.
Chairman Gilman. It was, I think, part of that concept that
there would be some U.S. military presence in absence of any
compensation and relationship to that.
So it was the Panamanians' proposal for this United
States--for this Multilateral Counter-narcotics Center, is that
correct?
Mr. McNamara. That is correct, it was a Panamanian idea.
Chairman Gilman. Then in retrospect, isn't it clear that we
did make a serious mistake in not trying to conclude that kind
of an arrangement with the Panamanians before their Foreign
Minister, Gabriel Lewis, passed away in 1996? It seemed to me
we made a serious mistake in not taking advantage of that
proposal. What are your thoughts about that?
Mr. McNamara. My thoughts are that, quite frankly, I think
Gabriel Lewis Galindo was ahead of his government and ahead of
the Panamanian public. He was a visionary man, an individual
for whom I have the very highest respect and regard. Whether or
not had he remained healthy and in office, neither of which
happened unfortunately, for Panama and for the United States,
whether we would have been able to take this in-principle
understanding and turn it into a concrete, definitive,
negotiated agreement remains--and will remain, I think--one of
the mysteries of the process. The fact is that he became
seriously ill, left office, and subsequently died, and his
influence, his vision, was lost to the Panamanian Government.
Chairman Gilman. General Joulwan, would you like to comment
about the kind of a negotiation that was going on?
General Joulwan. Before I left command in 1993 I suggested
that we shrink back into Howard Air Force Base as a minimalist
sort of position and establish a counter-drug center. I also
urged that the Panamanians take credit for the role they were
playing in the counter-drug fight. Panamanians were suffering
also from crack babies and addiction, as were other countries
in Central and South America, so this was to be their
initiative that the Panamanians should get credit for what they
are doing. Illegal drugs were not just going to be a concern of
the United States. So what I started back in the early 1990's
perhaps can help us followup even today to get the Panamanians
to be part of the solution to this very difficult threat that
faces all Americas, North, Central and South.
Chairman Gilman. Thank you.
Ambassador McNamara, the compensation package along the
lines that we proposed in our U.S.-Panama partnership probably
would have been enough to clinch the deal if we had offered it
back in 1995 or 1996; is that correct?
Mr. McNamara. You are referring to the trade benefits?
Chairman Gilman. Yes.
Mr. McNamara. The NAFTA equivalency, that certainly would
have made the negotiations a lot easier had that been part of
the package. Whether it would have clinched it or not is very
difficult to say. It is history in the conditional, what if.
Chairman Gilman. Mr. Ambassador, tell us, even after
Gabriel Lewis died and you had taken over the negotiations for
our Nation, would a compensation package like we had proposed
in our bill, would that have been helpful to you in reaching an
agreement for a post-1999 United States presence in Panama?
Mr. McNamara. Since it was something the Panamanians were
asking for, usually if a negotiator can give somebody what they
are asking for, that helps.
Chairman Gilman. Helps a great deal, I should imagine.
General Joulwan, we have lost several Americans,
regrettably, in a plane crashed in the FARC-infested zone of
Colombia in the last few days. The search and rescue mission
was delayed for several days due to bad weather. I understand
we had to rely heavily on the Colombian National Police and
Colombian military to provide air assets for this search and
rescue. Our own supporting assets had to be flown into Colombia
from the continental United States How long would it have taken
us to deploy proper search and rescue equipment, had we been
able to able to operate out of Howard Air Force Base?
General Joulwan. It would have taken hours, Mr. Chairman.
Search and rescue was part of the mission every time we flew
into source regions. We always had that contingency.
Chairman Gilman. General Joulwan, General Serrano, the
highly respected Colombian drug warrior in Colombia who is
leading the front line and has lost so many of his own police--
over 4,000 police--has warned that after we leave Panama we
will see even more drugs moving north and more arms being
shipped south to destabilize the region. Do you share his
opinion?
General Joulwan. Yes.
Chairman Gilman. Earlier this week our Drug Czar, General
Barry McCaffrey, who also served as SOUTHCOM Commander--I
guess, after you left office--it was good seeing you over in
Bosnia when we got over there--said the situation in Colombia
is, and I quote, ``a serious and growing emergency in the
region''. So with all of that, is it time for us to be leaving
Panama?
General Joulwan. Absolutely not, Mr. Chairman. But we are
faced with the situation that the mission must continue, and
until we have an alternative--or until we have some settlement
with Panama beyond what we have today, I think we need to find
ways to continue. I hope we can someday get back into Panama,
because I think it is very important.
Chairman Gilman. Ambassador McNamara, the electoral season
in Panama that bedeviled your own good efforts, and a new
President has now been elected. We are hearing some sounds that
he would be interested in further negotiations, and a strong
majority of Panamanians apparently favor a continued United
States presence. If you were given a task of negotiating a
presence now, and I hope you would, do you believe conditions
are favorable for a successful mission of that nature?
Mr. McNamara. As I said in my opening statement, I think it
is time for a bit of a cooling-off period. I would say that if
the Panamanians came to us, then that would be one set of
circumstances. But for us to take an initiative at this
juncture I think would simply open up many of the debates and
the wounds there--and there were wounds in Panama. There
weren't that many up here in Washington, but in Panama there
were. They became apparent in late--in early 1998 and later in
1998. It is difficult to say absolutely yes, but if the
Panamanians came to the United States and said that they wished
this to happen, or that they wished to begin to discuss that
possibility, I certainly think that we ought to respond
positively.
Chairman Gilman. General Joulwan, what is your impression;
do you think the environment, the atmosphere is appropriate now
to renegotiate?
General Joulwan. Mr. Chairman, yes. I think that what must
happen in Panama is what I have tried to do during my 3 years
as CINSOUTH. We must make it clear that what we are trying to
do in Panama, as the United States, is in Panama's interest. I
believe Panama will find and is finding out that there are
threats to its stability, sovereignty, and to its people. These
threats come from the FARC on its border in Colombia, and
transiting of drugs and through the Darien and San Blas. To
combat there threats is in Panama's interest as well as the
United States. Indeed it is in the interest of all of Central
and South America. So I think we have to demonstrate these
threats and the Panamanians have to realize that it is in their
interest, and therefore we need a strategic partnership. We
don't want to dominate Panama, we don't want to occupy Panama.
What we want to do is work with Panama. I think if we approach
it in that way, the leadership of not only Panama, but all of
Central and South America will have this strategic relationship
with the United States based on mutual trust and confidence and
shared interests.
Mr. McNamara. If I may add--.
Chairman Gilman. Yes.
Mr. McNamara [continuing]. That General Joulwan has put it
very, very well. That is precisely what the Panamanian
Government has to decide. If it decides that, then I would
suggest that the next thing, the next step, is to convince and
to educate--I suppose you would have to say to educate the
educated elite in that respect, because the general population
in Panama is very strongly in favor of seeing the counter-
narcotics center and the United States presence. So there is an
education effort that would have to be undertaken by the new
Panamanian Government to ensure that they don't fall into the
problems that the preceding government fell into.
Chairman Gilman. General Joulwan.
General Joulwan. Mr. Chairman, just briefly, the fight
continues. The narco-trafficker is not going to take a pause in
this fight. He is going to take advantage of what is happening
now. I think we have to understand that that is going to equate
to more crack babies, to more Americans dying, to more Central
and South Americans being corrupted and addicted. So I think we
have to look at it from the threat side of it. It will
continue. It will accelerate. We need to be able to handle this
threat every bit as well as we are doing elsewhere in the
world. This is a threat to the American people, to our way of
life, to our children, and we have got to address it.
Panama is part of that equation, but it is a much larger
issue. Panama is central to it, but it is a much larger threat
we have to face.
Chairman Gilman. It is an emergency to the national
security interests of our Nation as well.
I would like to recommend that both of you be made part of
a new team to go down and negotiate, and as a matter of fact, I
probably will make that recommendation to the Administration.
Ambassador McNamara, in your judgment was it only the
Panamanian side that was inflexible in the negotiations, or did
we have something to do with the inflexibility of the
negotiations?
Mr. McNamara. As I said in my statement, there were
miscalculations on the part, I believe, of the Department of
Defense, in just how far the Panamanians would go to meet what
the Department of Defense felt was its minimum requirements.
The minimum requirements were for a larger presence than, in
fact, was politically acceptable in, at least in 1997 and 1998
in Panama. Whenever negotiations fail, then it means that the
necessary flexibility on both sides was not there, because if
it were there, we would have had a successful outcome.
Chairman Gilman. Mr. Ambassador, who back in the State
Department was supervising the negotiation? Who was overseeing
it?
Mr. McNamara. I was overseeing it in its day-to-day phases.
The Secretary of State, the Deputy Secretary of State, and the
Assistant Secretary of State for Latin American Affairs, or now
Hemispheric Affairs, were deeply involved. I saw them
frequently, as well as the Undersecretary of State for
Political Affairs. I saw all of them.
Chairman Gilman. Who were they, Mr. Ambassador?
Mr. McNamara. During my time as negotiator that was
Secretary of State Albright, Deputy Secretary of State Talbott,
Undersecretary of State Pickering, and Assistant Secretary of
State Jeffery Davidson, and then subsequently Acting Assistant
Secretary Romero.
Chairman Gilman. Ambassador McNamara, when the State
Department was negotiating a Multilateral Counter-narcotics
Center with the Panamanian Government we understand that the
Defense Department set forth a series of red-line threshold
negotiating positions, including quality of life assurance for
our personnel, full United States legal jurisdiction over our
soldiers, and among other requirements, multiple missions
beyond counter-narcotics operations. Can you tell us which of
those red lines were met in your temporary agreements with
Curacao and Ecuador?
Mr. McNamara. I left government service before we began
those arrangements with Curacao and Ecuador, and I am not
privy, therefore, to whatever agreements were reached. I would
note that in the negotiations I conducted that reached
essential agreement in December 1997 all of those red lines
were met.
Chairman Gilman. In your opinion, Ambassador, are
negotiations with Panama ever given a priority position by the
Administration? Do you get a sense that the senior U.S.
officials cared whether or not you succeeded or failed in your
negotiations?
Mr. McNamara. I think we were given priority, and yes,
senior officials in the White House and the other agencies were
fully involved. I think the failure was not one of lack of
attention within the Administration. As I said earlier, both in
my statement and in answer to other questions, I think the
Panamanian Government simply could not take the political heat
that it would have had to take in order to stand by what was
negotiated in December 1997. When you sort of strip away the
many and complex influences in the negotiation the core problem
was a particular problem in Panama, a domestic political
problem in Panama.
Chairman Gilman. Both of our panelists have pointed out the
priority of the issues involved here and focused attention for
this Committee on what we should be doing and what we should
have been doing, and we look forward to continuing in our
efforts. I might note for you that this Committee has conducted
some eight hearings on the problems of narcotics policy in and
around this region, particularly with regard to Colombia. I
remember full well when we went and we took a look at the
burned-out Supreme Court in the Plaza, Bogota, that left a
long-burning impression on our minds of what can happen to a
country that virtually becomes a hostage to the drug
traffickers. We don't want to see that happen anymore,
anyplace.
Just one more question of General Joulwan: With regard to
the bad weather, did that stall our effort to try to get that
downed plane? Were there assets at Howard that could have
gotten around those hurdles, the bad weather and the inability
to reach these people?
General Joulwan. I am not really sure what would have been
there today, Chairman. Weather is always a problem,
particularly in that area. It has always been a problem. I am
not sure we would have had the assets that could have gone
there in what I would call all weather. The response time,
though, would have been much faster from a forward-operating
base like Howard.
Chairman Gilman. Again, I want to thank our panelists. You
have given us a great deal of food for thought, and we hope to
continue in our efforts to persevere and make sure we have a
good multilateral drug center in that part of the world. Thank
you very much. Our Committee stands adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12:20 p.m., the Committee was adjourned.]
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