[JPRT 106-45]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
106th Congress S. Prt.
2d Session JOINT COMMITTEE PRINT 106-45
_______________________________________________________________________
COUNTRY REPORTS ON ECONOMIC POLICY AND TRADE PRACTICES
__________
R E P O R T
SUBMITTED TO THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
COMMITTEE ON FINANCE
OF THE
U.S. SENATE
AND THE
COMMITTEE ON
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
COMMITTEE ON WAYS AND MEANS
OF THE
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
BY THE
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
IN ACCORDANCE WITH SECTION 2202 OF THE OMNIBUS TRADE AND
COMPETITIVENESS ACT OF 1988
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
63-133 WASHINGTON : 2000
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
JESSE HELMS, North Carolina, Chairman
RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana JOSEPH R. BIDEN, Jr., Delaware
CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska PAUL S. SARBANES, Maryland
GORDON H. SMITH, Oregon CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut
CRAIG THOMAS, Wyoming JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts
ROD GRAMS, Minnesota RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin
JOHN ASHCROFT, Missouri PAUL D. WELLSTONE, Minnesota
BILL FRIST, Tennessee BARBARA BOXER, California
SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas ROBERT G. TORRICELLI, New Jersey
LINCOLN D. CHAFEE, Rhode Island
Stephen E. Biegun, Staff Director
Edwin K. Hall, Minority Staff Director
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COMMITTEE ON FINANCE
WILLIAM V. ROTH, Jr., Delaware, Chairman
CHARLES E. GRASSLEY, Iowa DANIEL PATRICK MOYNIHAN, New York
ORRIN G. HATCH, Utah MAX BAUCUS, Montana
FRANK H. MURKOWSKI, Alaska JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, West
DON NICKLES, Oklahoma Virginia
PHIL GRAMM, Texas JOHN BREAUX, Louisiana
TRENT LOTT, Mississippi KENT CONRAD, North Dakota
JAMES M. JEFFORDS, Vermont BOB GRAHAM, Florida
CONNIE MACK, Florida RICHARD H. BRYAN, Nevada
FRED THOMPSON, Tennessee J. ROBERT KERREY, Nebraska
PAUL COVERDELL, Georgia CHARLES S. ROBB, Virginia
Franklin G. Polk, Staff Director and Chief Counsel
David Podoff, Minority Staff Director and Chief Counsel
COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
BENJAMIN A. GILMAN, New York, Chairman
WILLIAM F. GOODLING, Pennsylvania SAM GEJDENSON, Connecticut
JAMES A. LEACH, Iowa TOM LANTOS, California
HENRY J. HYDE, Illinois HOWARD L. BERMAN, California
DOUG BEREUTER, Nebraska GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York
CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American
DAN BURTON, Indiana Samoa
ELTON GALLEGLY, California MATTHEW G. MARTINEZ, California
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey
CASS BALLENGER, North Carolina ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey
DANA ROHRABACHER, California SHERROD BROWN, Ohio
DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois CYNTHIA A. McKINNEY, Georgia
EDWARD R. ROYCE, California ALCEE L. HASTINGS, Florida
PETER T. KING, New York PAT DANNER, Missouri
STEVE CHABOT, Ohio EARL F. HILLIARD, Alabama
MARSHALL ``MARK'' SANFORD, South BRAD SHERMAN, California
Carolina ROBERT WEXLER, Florida
MATT SALMON, Arizona STEVEN R. ROTHMAN, New Jersey
AMO HOUGHTON, New York JIM DAVIS, Florida
TOM CAMPBELL, California EARL POMEROY, North Dakota
JOHN M. McHUGH, New York WILLIAM D. DELAHUNT, Massachusetts
KEVIN BRADY, Texas GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York
RICHARD BURR, North Carolina BARBARA LEE, California
PAUL E. GILLMOR, Ohio JOSEPH CROWLEY, New York
GEORGE RADANOVICH, California JOSEPH M. HOEFFEL, Pennsylvania
JOHN COOKSEY, Louisiana
THOMAS G. TANCREDO, Colorado
Richard J. Garon, Chief of Staff
Kathleen Bertelsen Moazed, Democratic Chief of Staff
Hillel Weinberg, Senior Professional Staff Member and Counsel
Kimberly Roberts, Staff Associate
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COMMITTEE ON WAYS AND MEANS
BILL ARCHER, Texas, Chairman
PHILIP M. CRANE, Illinois CHARLES B. RANGEL, New York
BILL THOMAS, California FORTNEY PETE STARK, California
E. CLAY SHAW, Jr., Florida ROBERT T. MATSUI, California
NANCY L. JOHNSON, Connecticut WILLIAM J. COYNE, Pennsylvania
AMO HOUGHTON, New York SANDER M. LEVIN, Michigan
WALLY HERGER, California BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland
JIM McCRERY, Louisiana JIM McDERMOTT, Washington
DAVE CAMP, Michigan GERALD D. KLECZKA, Wisconsin
JIM RAMSTAD, Minnesota JOHN LEWIS, Georgia
JIM NUSSLE, Iowa RICHARD E. NEAL, Massachusetts
SAM JOHNSON, Texas MICHAEL R. McNULTY, New York
JENNIFER DUNN, Washington WILLIAM J. JEFFERSON, Louisiana
MAC COLLINS, Georgia JOHN S. TANNER, Tennessee
ROB PORTMAN, Ohio XAVIER BECERRA, California
PHILIP S. ENGLISH, Pennsylvania KAREN L. THURMAN, Florida
WES WATKINS, Oklahoma LLOYD DOGGETT, Texas
J.D. HAYWORTH, Arizona
JERRY WELLER, Illinois
KENNY HULSHOF, Missouri
SCOTT McINNIS, Colorado
RON LEWIS, Kentucky
MARK FOLEY, Florida
A.L. Singleton, Chief of Staff
Janice Mays, Minority Chief Counsel
(iii)
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Foreword......................................................... vii
Letter of Transmittal............................................ ix
Introduction..................................................... xi
Text of Section 2202 of the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act
of 1988........................................................ xiii
Notes on Preparation of the Reports.............................. xv
Some Frequently Used Acronyms.................................... xvii
COUNTRY REPORTS*
Africa:
Ghana........................................................ 1
Nigeria...................................................... 6
South Africa................................................. 12
East Asia and the Pacific:
Australia.................................................... 17
China, People's Republic of.................................. 21
Hong Kong*................................................... 28
Indonesia.................................................... 32
Japan........................................................ 38
Korea, Republic of........................................... 44
Malaysia..................................................... 50
Philippines.................................................. 57
Singapore.................................................... 63
Taiwan*...................................................... 69
Thailand..................................................... 75
Europe:
The European Union........................................... 81
Austria...................................................... 89
Belgium...................................................... 94
Bulgaria..................................................... 99
Czech Republic............................................... 105
Denmark...................................................... 110
Finland...................................................... 116
France....................................................... 121
Germany...................................................... 125
Greece....................................................... 129
Hungary...................................................... 135
Ireland...................................................... 139
Italy........................................................ 146
The Netherlands.............................................. 151
Norway....................................................... 156
Poland....................................................... 160
Portugal..................................................... 165
Romania...................................................... 169
Russia....................................................... 173
Spain........................................................ 180
(v)
Sweden....................................................... 186
Switzerland.................................................. 190
Turkey....................................................... 193
Ukraine...................................................... 198
United Kingdom............................................... 204
The Americas:
Argentina.................................................... 209
Bahamas...................................................... 214
Bolivia...................................................... 219
Brazil....................................................... 224
Canada....................................................... 230
Chile........................................................ 235
Colombia..................................................... 241
Costa Rica................................................... 248
Dominican Republic........................................... 254
Ecuador...................................................... 260
El Salvador.................................................. 265
Guatemala.................................................... 270
Haiti........................................................ 274
Honduras..................................................... 279
Jamaica...................................................... 285
Mexico....................................................... 292
Nicaragua.................................................... 300
Panama....................................................... 304
Paraguay..................................................... 309
Peru......................................................... 314
Trinidad and Tobago.......................................... 319
Uruguay...................................................... 324
Venezuela.................................................... 328
Near East and North Africa:
Algeria...................................................... 337
Bahrain...................................................... 341
Egypt........................................................ 345
Israel....................................................... 352
Jordan....................................................... 358
Kuwait....................................................... 363
Morocco...................................................... 368
Oman......................................................... 372
Saudi Arabia................................................. 378
Tunisia...................................................... 383
United Arab Emirates......................................... 388
South Asia:
Bangladesh................................................... 395
India........................................................ 401
Pakistan..................................................... 406
__________
*Reports also cover the following areas: Hong Kong and Taiwan.
FOREWORD
----------
The reports on individual country economic policy and trade
practices contained herein were prepared by the Department of
State in accordance with section 2202 of the Omnibus Trade and
Competitiveness Act of 1988 (P.L. 100-418).
Modeled on the State Department's annual reports on country
human rights practices, the reports are intended to provide a
single, comparative analysis of the economic policies and trade
practices of countries with which the United States has
significant economic or trade relationships. Because of the
increasing importance of, and interest in, trade and economic
issues, these reports are prepared to assist Members in
considering legislation in the areas of trade and economic
policy.
Jesse Helms,
Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations.
William V. Roth, Jr.,
Chairman, Committee on Finance.
Benjamin A. Gilman,
Chairman, Committee on International Relations.
Bill Archer,
Chairman, Committee on Ways and Means.
(vii)
LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL
----------
U.S. Department of State,
Washington, DC, March 6, 2000.
Hon. Jesse Helms,
Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations.
Hon. William V. Roth, Jr.,
Chairman, Committee on Finance.
Hon. Albert Gore, Jr.,
President, U.S. Senate.
Hon. Dennis Hastert,
Speaker, House of Representatives.
Hon. Benjamin A. Gilman,
Chairman, Committee on International Relations.
Hon. Bill Archer,
Chairman, Committee on Ways and Means.
Dear Sirs: Section 2202 of the Omnibus Trade and
Competitiveness Act of 1988 requires the Department of State to
provide to the appropriate Committees of Congress a detailed
report regarding the economic policy and trade practices of
countries with which the U.S. has significant economic or trade
relationships. In this regard, I am pleased to provide the
enclosed report.
Sincerely,
Barbara Larkin,
Assistant Secretary, Legislative Affairs.
Enclosure.
(ix)
INTRODUCTION
----------
Country Reports on Economic Policy and Trade Practices
The Department of State is submitting to the Congress its
Country Reports on Economic Policy and Trade Practices in
compliance with Section 2202 of the Omnibus Trade and
Competitiveness Act of 1988. As the legislation requires, we
have prepared detailed reports on the economic policy and trade
practices of countries with which the United States has
significant economic or trade relationships. This is the
Department of State's 11th annual report. It now includes
reports on 76 countries, customs territories and customs
unions.
Each report contains nine sections.
Key Economic Indicators: Each report begins with a
table showing data for key economic indicators in the
national income, monetary, and trade accounts.
General Policy Framework: This first narrative
section gives an overview of macroeconomic trends.
Exchange Rate Policies: The second section describes
exchange rate policies and their impact on the price
competitiveness of U.S. exports.
Structural Policies: The third section examines
structural policies, highlighting changes that may
affect U.S. exports to that country.
Debt Management Policies: The fourth section
describes debt management policies and their
implications for trade with the U.S.
Significant Barriers to U.S. Exports and Investment:
The fifth section examines significant barriers, formal
and informal, to U.S. exports and investment.
Export Subsidies Policies: The sixth section focuses
on government actions, policies, and practices that
support exports from that country, including exports by
small businesses.
Protection of U.S. Intellectual Property: The
seventh section discusses the country's laws and
practices with respect to protection of intellectual
property rights.
Worker Rights: The final section has three parts.
--The first (subsections a through e) outlines the
country's laws and practices with respect to
internationally recognized worker rights.
--The second (subsection f) highlights conditions of
worker rights in goods-producing sectors where U.S.
capital is invested.
(xi)
--Finally, a table cites the extent of such investment
by sector where information is available.
The country reports are based on information supplied by
U.S. Embassies, which is analyzed and reviewed by the
Department of State in consultation with other U.S. Government
agencies. The reports are intended to serve as general guides
to economic conditions in specific countries. We have worked to
standardize the reports, but there are unavoidable differences
reflecting large variations in data availability. In some
cases, access to reliable data is limited, particularly in
countries making transitions to market economies. Nonetheless,
each report incorporates the best information currently
available.
Ryan Samuel,
Acting Assistant Secretary of State
for Economic and Business Affairs.
TEXT OF SECTION 2202 OF THE OMNIBUS TRADE AND COMPETITIVENESS ACT OF
1988
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``The Secretary of State shall, not later than January 31
of each year, prepare and transmit to the Committee on
[International Relations]* and the Committee on Ways and Means
of the House of Representatives, to the Committee on Foreign
Relations and the Committee on Finance of the Senate, and to
other appropriate committees of the Congress, a detailed report
regarding the economic policy and trade practices of each
country with which the United States has an economic or trade
relationship. The Secretary may direct the appropriate officers
of the Department of State who are serving overseas, in
consultation with appropriate officers or employees of other
departments and agencies of the United States, including the
Department of Agriculture and the Department of Commerce, to
coordinate the preparation of such information in a country as
is necessary to prepare the report under this section. The
report shall identify and describe, with respect to each
country:
1. The macroeconomic policies of the country and their
impact on the overall growth in demand for United States
exports;
2. The impact of macroeconomic and other policies on the
exchange rate of the country and the resulting impact on price
competitiveness of United States exports;
3. Any change in structural policies [including tax
incentives, regulation governing financial institutions,
production standards, and patterns of industrial ownership]
that may affect the country's growth rate and its demand for
United States exports;
4. The management of the country's external debt and its
implications for trade with the United States;
5. Acts, policies, and practices that constitute
significant trade barriers to United States exports or foreign
direct investment in that country by United States persons, as
identified under section 181(a)(1) of the Trade Act of 1974 (19
U.S.C. 2241(a)(1));
6. Acts, policies, and practices that provide direct or
indirect government support for exports from that country,
including exports by small businesses;
7. The extent to which the country's laws and enforcement
of those laws afford adequate protection to United States
intellectual property, including patents, trademarks,
copyrights, and mask works; and
*In 1995, the Committee on Foreign Affairs changed its name to the
Committee on International Relations.
(xiii)
8. The country's laws, enforcement of those laws, and
practices with respect to internationally recognized worker
rights (as defined in section 502(a)(4) of the Trade Act of
1974), the conditions of worker rights in any sector which
produces goods in which United States capital is invested, and
the extent of such investment.''
NOTES ON PREPARATION OF THE REPORTS
----------
Subsections ``a.'' through ``e.'' of the Worker Rights
section (section 8) are abridged versions of section 6 in the
Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1999, submitted
to the Committees on International Relations of the House of
Representatives and on Foreign Relations of the U.S. Senate in
January 1999. For a comprehensive and authoritative discussion
of worker rights in each country, please refer to that report.
Subsection ``f.'' highlights conditions of worker rights in
goods-producing sectors where U.S. capital is invested. A table
cites the extent of such investment by sector where information
is available. The Bureau of Economic Analysis of the U.S.
Department of Commerce has supplied information on the U.S.
direct investment position at the end of 1997 for all countries
for which foreign direct investment has been reported to it.
Readers should note that ``U.S. Direct Position Abroad'' is
defined as ``the net book value of U.S. parent companies'
equity in, and net outstanding loans to, their foreign
affiliates'' (foreign business enterprises owned 10 percent or
more by U.S. persons or companies). Where a figure is negative,
the U.S. parent owes money to the affiliate. The table does not
necessarily indicate total assets held in each country. In some
instances, the narrative refers to investments for which
figures may not appear in the table.
(xv)
SOME FREQUENTLY USED ACRONYMS
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ADB--Asian Development Bank
BIS--Bank for International Settlements
CACM--Central American Common Market
CARICOM--Caribbean Common Market
CAP--Common Agricultural Policy (of the EU)
CCC--Commodity Credit Corporation (Department of Agriculture)
EBRD--European Bank for Reconstruction and Development
EFTA--European Free Trade Association
EMS--European Monetary System (of the EU)
ERM--Exchange Rate Mechanism (of the EU)
ESAF--Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility
EU--European Union
EXIMBANK--U.S. Export-Import Bank
FOREX--foreign exchange
FY--fiscal year
GATS--General Agreement on Trade in Services
GATT--General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
GDP--gross domestic product
GNP--gross national product
GSP--Generalized System of Preferences
IBRD--International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
(World Bank)
IFIs--international financial institutions (IMF, World Bank and
regional development banks)
ILO--International Labor Organization (of the United Nations)
IMF--International Monetary Fund
IDB--Inter-American Development Bank
IPR--intellectual property rights
LIBOR--London Interbank Offer Rate
MFN--most favored nation
NAFTA--North American Free Trade Agreement
NGOs--non-government organizations
NIS--Newly Independent States (of the former Soviet Union)
OECD--Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
OPIC--U.S. Overseas Private Investment Corporation
PTT--Post, Telegraph and Telephone
SAP--Structural Adjustment Program (of the IMF/World Bank)
SDR--Special Drawing Rights (of the IMF)
STF--Structural Transformation Facility
TRIPs--WTO Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights
(xvii)
UR--Uruguay Round of trade negotiations in the GATT
USD--U.S. Dollar
VAT--value-added tax
WIPO--World Intellectual Property Organization
WTO--World Trade Organization
AFRICA
----------
GHANA
Key Economic Indicators
[Millions of U.S. Dollars unless otherwise indicated]
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1997 1998 \1\ 1999
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Income, Production and Employment:
Nominal GDP \2\......................... 6,884 7,630 N/A
Real GDP Growth (pct) \3\............... 4.2 4.6 4.5
GDP by Sector:
Agriculture........................... 2,574 3,090 N/A
Manufacturing......................... 640 656 N/A
Services.............................. 1,976 2,220 N/A
Government............................ 730 832 N/A
Per Capita GDP (US$).................... 385 415 N/A
Labor Force (000's)..................... 8,240 8,480 8,734
Unemployment Rate (pct)................. 22 20 20
Money and Prices (annual percentage
growth):
Money Supply Growth (M2)................ 40.8 17.6 3.9
Consumer Price Inflation (end-of-period) 20.8 15.7 12.6
Exchange Rate (Cedis/US$ annual average) 2,250 2,346 3,100
Interbank (mid-rate)...................
Balance of Payments and Trade:
Total Exports FOB \4\................... 1,491 1,830 1,880
Exports to U.S. \4\................... 154 144 140
Total Imports CIF \4\................... 2,128 2,213 2,253
Imports from U.S. \4\................. 314 223 253
Trade Balance \4\....................... -637 -383 -373
Balance with U.S...................... -160 -79 -113
External Public Debt.................... 5,651 5,922 5,750
Fiscal Deficit/GDP (pct)................ 2.6 2.3 N/A
Current Account Deficit/GDP (pct)....... 8.5 3.5 N/A
Debt Service Payments/GDP (pct)......... 8.6 8.4 N/A
Gold and Foreign Exchange Reserves...... 508 508 364
Aid from U.S............................ 52 58 60
Aid from All Other Sources.............. N/A N/A N/A
------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ 1999 figures are all estimates based on most recent data available.
\2\ GDP at factor cost.
\3\ Percentage changes calculated in local currency.
\4\ Merchandise trade.
\5\ Data not available.
1. General Policy Framework
Ghana operates in a free market environment under a popularly
elected civilian government. In December, 1996, Ghana had its second
experience in multiparty elections since the inauguration of the 4th
Republic in January, 1993. President Jerry John Rawlings was reelected
for a second four-year term which will expire in December of 2000.
Rawlings headed a ``provisional'' regime from the end of 1981 until
January, 1993, when democratic government under a written constitution
was restored. Unlike the first parliament, the present has an
opposition presence with 67 seats out of 200. An independent judiciary
acts as the final arbiter of Ghanaian laws. The next presidential and
parliamentary elections are scheduled for the year 2000.
Since 1983 Ghana has pursued an economic reform agenda aimed
generally at reducing government involvement in the economy and
encouraging private sector development. Inflationary pressures as a
result of government expenditure overruns prior to 1992 and 1996
presidential and parliamentary elections have been contained to some
extent. However, fiscal performance by government in the third quarter
of 1999 is the basis for concern since government has resorted to heavy
domestic borrowing to make up for shortfalls from mainly non-tax
revenue, leading to rising domestic interest rates.
The Bank of Ghana is currently pursuing a tight monetary policy in
an attempt to absorb excess liquidity in order to sustain the downward
trend in inflation. Inflation, measured at about 71 percent at the end
of 1995, has consistently declined to 9.4 percent at the end of May,
1999, the lowest for 20 years before rising to 12.6 percent in October
of 1999. Following the steady fall in inflation, the Central Bank
cautiously made reductions in the bank rate or rediscount rate from 45
percent in 1995, to 27 percent in April, 1999. Lending rates, which
fell accordingly, have started rising as the Bank intensifies its open
market operation to keep money supply within target. Increases in
domestic prices of petroleum products to make up for corresponding
increases in world crude oil prices, and the rapid depreciation of the
local currency against major foreign currencies, are exerting intense
inflationary pressures.
The government's economic program has focused on the development of
Ghana's private sector, which historically has been weak. Privatization
of state-owned enterprises continues, with about two-thirds of 300
enterprises sold to private owners. Despite the energy crisis in 1998,
Ghana achieved real economic growth of 4.6 percent as against 4.2
percent recorded in 1997. Growth in 1999 is expected to be lower than
the government projection of 5.5 percent due to the effect of terms of
trade shocks in 1999 arising from a decline in world prices of cocoa
and gold and increases in oil prices. Agriculture (which still accounts
for about 41 percent of GDP and employs about 60 percent of the work
force) and manufacturing have recorded much slower growth. Other
reforms adopted under the government's structural adjustment program
include the elimination of exchange rate controls and the lifting of
virtually all restrictions on imports. The establishment of an
Interbank Foreign Exchange Market has greatly expanded access to
foreign exchange. The elimination of virtually all local production
subsidies is further indication of the government's intention to move
toward a market orientation for the economy.
2. Exchange Rate Policy
The foreign exchange value of the Ghanaian cedi is established
independently through the use of Interbank Market and Foreign Exchange
bureaus, and currency conversion is easily obtained. The foreign
exchange auction procedure was abandoned in 1992. Ghana fully accedes
to Article IV of the IMF convention on free current account
convertibility and transfer. Through the Bank of Ghana's intervention,
the cedi depreciated by about 13 percent in 1998 as compared to an
annual average of about 25 percent during 1993 to 1997. Depletion of
the Bank's foreign exchange reserves in 1999, mainly as a result of
higher oil import bills and shortfall in external program assistance,
has resulted in a sharp depreciation of the cedi and a shortage of
major foreign exchange. In general, the exchange rate regime in Ghana
does not have any particular impact on the competitiveness of U.S.
exports. This may change, however, if the euro continues its fall in
relation to the dollar.
3. Structural Policies
Ghana progressively reduced import quotas and surcharges as part of
its structural adjustment program. Tariff structures are being adjusted
in harmony with the ECOWAS Trade Liberalization Program. With the
elimination of import licensing in 1989, importers are now merely
required to sign a declaration that they will comply with Ghanaian tax
and other laws. Imported goods currently enjoy generally unfettered
access to the Ghanaian market.
The government professes strong support for the principle of free
trade. However, it is also committed to the development of competitive
domestic industries with exporting capabilities. The government is
expected to continue to support domestic private enterprise with
various financial incentives. Ghanaian manufacturers seek stronger
protective measures and complain that Ghana's tariff structure places
local producers at a competitive disadvantage relative to imports from
countries enjoying greater production and marketing economies of scale.
High local production costs frequently boost the price of locally
manufactured items above the landed cost of goods imported from Asia
and elsewhere. Reductions in tariffs have increased competition for
local producers and manufacturers while reducing the cost of imported
raw materials.
The government successfully reintroduced value-added tax (VAT) in
December, 1998, at a ten-percent rate. Government has proposed an
increase to 12.5 percent to make up for anticipated revenue shortfalls
in 2000. Additionally, government is expected to broaden the tax base
and enhance compliance. All these, although significant, are not enough
to reduce net domestic borrowings in order to ease pressure on
inflation and domestic interest rates. In 1998, government's domestic
interest payments were about 30 percent of its domestic revenue, more
than the local budget for both health and education.
Despite successful structural reform in other parts of the economy,
one disappointment in Ghana's recent efforts has been that of its
divestiture program. The Divestiture Implementation Committee (DIC)
published an action plan in April 1999 detailing an agenda for the
divestiture of several major enterprises and outlined specific annual
targets for receipts. Since then, the actual implementation has
included only two divestitures, that of the State Transport factory and
that of GHACEM, a cement factory, totaling US$31.5 million.
4. Debt Management Policies
Ghana's total outstanding external debt, including obligations to
the IMF, totaled approximately USD 5.7 billion at the end of the second
quarter of 1999. Outstanding obligations to the IMF under medium-term
facilities stood at USD 305 million at the end of the same period. At
that time, outstanding long-term debt was about USD 5 billion (about 88
percent of total debt), of which USD 1.5 billion and USD 3.5 billion
were owed to bilateral and multilateral institutions, respectively. The
size of external debt as a proportion of GDP continues to decrease from
its 1994 level of 97 percent to 79 percent of GDP in 1998. Ghana's debt
service ratio in 1998 was 31 percent. In 1991 Ghana cleared all
external debt arrears. Ghana is a heavily indebted poor country (HIPC)
but has not asked to be the beneficiary of debt relief or rescheduling
in recent times. To better manage its debt portfolio, since August,
1997, government has applied a moratorium on public and public
guaranteed non-concessional borrowings.
Persistent balance of payments deficits have resulted in a
continuing increase in foreign indebtedness. Swings in commodity
prices, especially gold and cocoa, have a dramatic impact on Ghana's
export revenues. In 1999, Ghana suffered from external shocks not only
from the falling prices of these commodities but also the increase in
the world price of crude oil. These are estimated to cumulatively
affect the balance of payments by about 370 million dollars in 1999.
This deficit is reflected in reduction in imports, lower GDP, and
exchange rate adjustments. The government is expected to sustain its
present level of external program assistance and increase receipts from
the divestiture of state-owned enterprises to moderate the volatility
of the cedi.
5. Significant Barriers to U.S. Exports
Import licenses: Ghana eliminated its import licensing system in
1989 but retains a ban on the importation of a narrow range of products
that do not affect U.S. exports. Ghana is a member of the WTO.
Services Barriers: The Ghanaian investment code prohibits foreign
participation in the following sectors: small-scale wholesale and
retail sales, taxi and car rental services with fleets of fewer than
ten vehicles, lotteries, and barber and beauty shops. Current insurance
law requires at least 40 percent Ghanaian ownership of insurance firms
in Ghana.
Standards, Testing, Labeling, and Certification: Ghana has
promulgated its own standards for food and drugs. The Ghana Standards
Board, the national testing authority, subscribes to accepted
international practices for the testing of imports for purity and
efficacy. Under Ghanaian law, imports must bear markings identifying in
English the type of product being imported, the country of origin, the
ingredients or components, and the expiration date, if any. Non-
complying goods are subject to government seizure. Several highly
publicized seizures of goods (pharmaceuticals and food items) with
expired shelf-life dates are occasionally carried out. The thrust of
this law is to regulate imported food and drugs; however, by its terms
the law applies to non-consumable imports as well. Locally manufactured
goods are subject to comparable testing, labeling, and certification
requirements. Four pre-shipment inspection firms contracted by
government also perform testing and price verification for some
selected imports that are above USD 5,000.
Investment Barriers: The investment code guarantees repatriation of
dividends, loan repayments, licensing fees and repatriation of capital.
It also provides guarantees against expropriation or forced sale and
sets forth dispute arbitration processes. Foreign investors are not
subject to differential treatment on taxes, access to foreign exchange
and credit, or importation of goods and equipment. Separate legislation
covers investments in mining and petroleum and applies equally to
foreign and Ghanaian investors. The investment code no longer requires
project approval from the Ghana Investment Promotion Center (GIPC). The
U.S. Embassy reports growing problems related to government violations
of private sector landowning rights and property rights.
Government Procurement Practices: Government purchases of equipment
and supplies are usually handled by the Ghana Supply Commission (the
official purchasing agency) through international bidding and, at
times, through direct negotiations. Former government import monopolies
have been abolished. However, parastatal entities continue to import
some commodities. The parastatals no longer receive government
subsidies to finance imports.
6. Export Subsidies Policies
The Government of Ghana does not directly subsidize exports.
Exporters are entitled to a 100 percent refund for duty paid on
imported inputs used in the processing of exported goods. Bonded
warehouses have been established which allow importers to avoid duties
on imported inputs used to produce merchandise for export. Firms
involved in exports enjoy some fiscal incentives such as tax holidays
and preferential tax/duty treatment on imported capital equipment.
Firms under the export processing zones all benefit from the same
incentives.
7. Protection of U.S. Intellectual Property
After independence in 1957, Ghana instituted separate legislation
for copyright (1961) and trademark (1965) protection based on British
law. Subsequently, the government passed modified copyright and patent
legislation in 1985 and 1992, respectively. Prior to 1992 the patent
laws of the United Kingdom applied in Ghana. Ghana is a member of the
Universal Copyright Convention, the World Intellectual Property
Organization, and the English-Speaking African Regional Intellectual
Property Organization, and is also a signatory to the WTO Agreement on
TRIPs. IPR holders have access to local courts for redress of
grievances. Few infringement cases have been filed in Ghana in recent
years. Ghana has not been identified as a priority country in
connection with either the ``Special 301'' Watch List or Priority Watch
List.
Patents (Product and Process): Patent registration in Ghana
presents no serious problems for foreign rights holders. Registration
fees vary according to the nature of the patent, but local and foreign
applicants pay the same rate.
Trademarks: Ghana has not yet become a popular location for
imitation designer apparel and watches. In cases where trademarks have
been misappropriated, the price and quality disparity would be apparent
to all but the most unsuspecting buyer.
Copyrights: Enforcement of foreign copyrights may be pursued in the
Ghanaian courts, but few such cases have actually been filed in recent
years. The bootlegging of computer software is an example of copyright
infringement taking place locally. There is no data available to
quantify the commercial impact of this practice. Pirating of videotapes
is another local practice that affects U.S. exports, but the evidence
suggests that this is not being done on a large scale. There is no
evidence of a significant export market for Ghanaian-pirated books,
cassettes, or videotapes.
In summary, infringement of intellectual property rights has not
had a significant impact on U.S. exports to Ghana. Pirated computer
software may become a more significant problem in the future, however,
as computer use grows.
8. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association: Trade unions are governed by the
Industrial Relations Act (IRA) of 1958, as amended in 1965 and 1972.
Organized labor is represented by the Trades Union Congress (TUC),
which was established in 1958. The IRA confers power on government to
refuse to register a trade union, but the current government or the
previous military regime has not exercised this right. No union leaders
have been detained in recent years, nor has the right of workers to
freely associate otherwise been circumscribed.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively: The IRA provides
a framework for collective bargaining and protection against anti-union
discrimination. Law prohibits civil servants from joining or organizing
a trade union. However, in December, 1992, the government enacted
legislation which allows each branch of the civil service to establish
a negotiating committee to engage in collective bargaining for wages
and benefits in the same fashion as trade unions in the private sector.
While the right to strike is recognized in law and in practice, the
government has on occasion taken strong action to end strikes,
especially in cases involving vital government interests or public
order. The IRA provides a mechanism for conciliation and arbitration
before unions can resort to industrial actions or strikes. Over the
past four years there have been several industrial actions involving
salary increase demands, conditions of service, and severance awards.
1999 saw a number of short-lived ``wild cat'' strikes by doctors and
industrial workers.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor: Ghanaian law
prohibits forced labor and it is not known to be practiced. The
International Labor Organization (ILO) continues to urge the government
to revise legislation that permits imprisonment with an obligation to
perform labor for offenses that are not countenanced under ILO
Convention 105, ratified by Ghana in 1958.
d. Minimum Age of Employment of Children: Labor legislation in
Ghana sets a minimum employment age of 15 and prohibits night work and
certain types of hazardous labor for those under 18. The violation of
child labor laws is common and young children of school age can often
be found during the day performing menial tasks in the agricultural
sector or in the markets. Observance of minimum age laws is eroded by
local custom and economic circumstances that compel children to become
wage earners at an early age. Inspectors from the Ministry of Labor and
Social Welfare are responsible for enforcement of child labor laws.
Employers who violate laws prohibiting heavy labor and night work by
children are occasionally prosecuted.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work: In 1991 a Tripartite Commission
composed of representatives from government, organized labor, and
employers established minimum standards for wages and working
conditions. The daily minimum wage combines wages with customary
benefits such as a transportation allowance. The current daily minimum
wage is Cedis 2,900, about 85 cents at the present rate of exchange.
This sum does not permit a single wage earner to support a family and
frequently results in multiple wage earners and other family-based
commercial activity. A much-vaunted, government-commissioned study on
reform of the civil service (including a serious revision of grades and
salary levels) was implemented in June, 1999. By law the maximum
workweek is 45 hours, but collective bargaining has established a 40-
hour week for most unionized workers.
f. Rights in Sectors with U.S. Investment: U.S. investment in Ghana
is concentrated in the primary and fabricated metals sectors (gold
mining and aluminum smelting), food and related products (tuna canning
and beverage bottling), petroleum marketing, and telecommunications.
Labor conditions in these sectors do not differ significantly from the
norm, save that wage scales in the metals and mining sectors are
substantially higher than elsewhere in the Ghanaian economy. U.S. firms
have a good record of compliance with Ghanaian labor laws.
Extent of U.S. Investment in Selected Industries--U.S. Direct Investment Position Abroad on an Historical Cost
Basis--1998
[Millions of U.S. Dollars]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Category Amount
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Petroleum...................... .............. -1
Total Manufacturing............ .............. (\1\)
Food & Kindred Products...... 0 ...............................................................
Chemicals & Allied Products.. 0 ...............................................................
Primary & Fabricated Metals.. (\1\) ...............................................................
Industrial Machinery and 0 ...............................................................
Equipment.
Electric & Electronic 0 ...............................................................
Equipment.
Transportation Equipment..... 0 ...............................................................
Other Manufacturing.......... 0 ...............................................................
Wholesale Trade................ .............. 0
Banking........................ .............. 0
Finance/Insurance/Real Estate.. .............. 0
Services....................... .............. 0
Other Industries............... .............. 0
TOTAL ALL INDUSTRIES........... .............. (\1\)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Suppressed to avoid disclosing data of individual companies.
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis.
______
NIGERIA
Key Economic Indicators
[Billions of U.S. Dollars unless otherwise indicated]
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1997 1998 \1\ 1999
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Income, Production, and Employment:
Nominal GDP \2\......................... 50.1 52.0 N/A
Real GDP Growth (pct) \3\............... 3.2 2.4 N/A
GDP by Sector (pct):
Agriculture........................... 31.5 32.3 N/A
Manufacturing......................... 6.3 6.1 N/A
Services.............................. 9.7 9.6 N/A
Per Capita GDP (US$).................... 250 250 240
Labor Force (millions).................. 43.0 40.0 N/A
Unemployment Rate (pct)................. 2.6 3.9 N/A
Money and Prices (annual percentage
growth):
Money Supply Growth (M2)................ 15.0 15.6 N/A
Consumer Price Inflation................ 8.5 10.0 8.0
Exchange Rate (Naira/US$ annual average)
Official.............................. 22 82 95
Parallel.............................. 55 85 101
Balance of Payments and Trade:
Total Exports FOB \4\................... 15.2 9.0 N/A
Exports to U.S. \5\................... 6.3 4.2 N/A
Total Imports FOB....................... 10.3 9.9 N/A
Imports from U.S. \5\................. 0.8 0.8 N/A
Trade Balance........................... 4.9 -2.0 N/A
Trade Balance with U.S. \5\........... 5.5 3.4 N/A
Current Account Deficit/GDP (pct)....... 1.2 -3.5 N/A
External Public Debt.................... 27.1 28.7 N/A
Debt Service Payments/GDP (pct)......... 1.8 1.4 N/A
Fiscal Deficit/GDP (pct)................ 0.2 4.7 N/A
Gold and Foreign Exchange Reserves...... 7.6 7.1 N/A
Aid from U.S. (US$ millions)............ N/A N/A N/A
Aid from All Other Sources.............. N/A N/A N/A
------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ 1999 figures, except exchange rates, are all estimates based on
available monthly data in November.
\2\ GDP at factor cost. Conversion to U.S. dollars done with official
exchange rate of 82 naira to the dollar for 1998/99.
\3\ Percentage changes calculated in local currency.
\4\ Merchandise trade.
\5\ Source: U.S. Department of Commerce and U.S. Census Bureau; exports
FAS, imports customs basis; 1999 figures are estimates based on data
available through November 1999.
1. General Policy Framework
Nigeria is Africa's most populous nation and the United States'
fifth largest oil supplier. It offers investors a low-cost labor pool,
abundant natural resources, and one of the largest domestic markets in
sub-Saharan Africa. On the other hand, inadequate infrastructure,
corruption, and inconsistent regulations mean that considerable time,
money and managerial effort are needed for a firm to begin operation
and earn profits in Nigeria. Nigeria's basic infrastructure is
extensive but inadequate for a population of over 100 million. Roads
and bridges are crumbling, telephone service is erratic, and there are
recurring shortages of water and electricity. Social unrest in some
areas, widespread unemployment, a stagnant economy depressed by over-
reliance on oil, the lack of effective due process, and serious fraud
and violent crime problems complicate business in Nigeria.
After a period of moderate fiscal austerity in the late 1980s, the
Nigerian government ran budget deficits of up to 12 percent of GDP
beginning in 1990. The deficit decreased to seven percent in 1994 and,
by postponing government spending (including for debt service), in 1995
shrank to negligible proportions. In 1996, the budget had a surplus of
1.6 percent of GDP. For the majority of 1997, the budget ran a reported
surplus. The deficit reduction and ensuing surplus came about primarily
through austerity--e.g., foregoing government projects and
infrastructure maintenance--as well as stronger-than-expected oil
revenue. Recommendations by international financial institutions
include reducing large government fuel price subsidies (the official
price of gasoline is currently about 20 cents per liter), shelving a
number of government projects which are of doubtful economic value, and
reducing leakage from government income due to corruption.
In previous years, monetary policy had been driven by the need to
accommodate the government's budget deficit and a desire to reduce the
inflationary impact of the budget deficit on the economy. Deficits at
the federal level had been financed primarily by borrowing from the
Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN), which held 85.1 percent of the
government's domestic debt at the end of 1997. Since the Central Bank
monetizes much of the deficit, budgetary shortfalls have a direct
impact on the money supply and on price levels, which had risen rapidly
for several years but have since slowed. In 1996, the government also
began releasing money from an extra-budgetary account called the
Petroleum Trust Fund (PTF) for infrastructure and other projects.
President Obasanjo has scrapped the fund and constituted a winding up
committee to look into the activities of the PTF.
In 1999, Nigeria has continued the policy of ``guided
deregulation'' and privatization instituted in the 1995 budget. The
former head of state, General Sani Abacha, had abandoned the 1986
structural adjustment program reforms and instituted tight government
control over key economic variables. In response to the economic
downturn caused by those measures, Abacha's 1995 budget abandoned the
tightly regulated economic policies enacted in 1994. Under the new
policy, the Nigerian government reopened the Autonomous Foreign
Exchange Market (AFEM), loosened controls on foreign investment and
reduced tariffs and bans on some imports. The 1999 budget continued the
trend of fiscal austerity and the slow deregulation of the economy. On
the demise of General Abacha, General Abdulsalami Abubakar, also
reiterated the government's intention to privatize major parastatals,
including telecommunications and electricity (NITEL and NEPA
respectively.) The 1998 budget promised privatization with 40 percent
equity for the government, 20 percent equity for Nigerian citizens, and
unrestricted sale of the remaining 40 percent. Invitations to invest
were to be made to specific investors with relevant expertise. The 1998
budget also targeted the reorganization of the electricity generating
parastatal (NEPA.) In 1999, the government repealed and amended eleven
decrees that inhibited competition or conferred monopoly powers on
public enterprises in the petroleum, telecommunications, power and
mineral sectors. However, the promised privatization exercise has not
occurred and its present prospects are unclear. The Obasanjo government
has declared its conditional support for eventual privatization and
promised a transparent privatization program after evaluating and
rehabilitating the parastatals' assets.
In November 1999, the Obasanjo government released a Year 2000
budget of 500 billion Naira (USD 5 billion). The budget was predicated
on an oil price of $18 per barrel as against the $16.5 used in the 1999
budget. The education sector got the highest allocation of 40.3 billion
Naira. Next in allocation is the Defense Ministry with an allocation of
34.1 billion Naira. Nigeria's external debt servicing is retained at
$1.5 billion and external debt stood at $28.54 billion as at September
30, 1999. External debt arrears currently stand at $18.86 billion,
while the debt service commitment for the year 2000 is expected to be
$1.98 billion.
2. Exchange Rate Policy
In 1999, the autonomous foreign exchange market (AFEM) was fully
deregulated. Dual exchange rates were scrapped and only AFEM rate
prevails. Companies can now hold domiciliary accounts in private banks,
with unfettered use of the funds. Foreign investors may bring capital
into the country without Finance Ministry approval, and may service
foreign loans and remit dividends. Bureau de change offices are
functioning and transactions in the bureau de change offices have been
increased to $10,000 per transaction. In addition, oil companies are
allowed to sell foreign exchange directly to interested banks and
private organizations. The Central Bank has continued to intervene at
the weekly AFEM.
3. Structural Policies
As stated in the December 1986 circular ``Industrial Policy of
Nigeria,'' the Nigerian government maintains a system of incentives to
foster the development of particular industries, to encourage firms to
locate in economically disadvantaged areas, to promote research and
development in Nigeria, and to favor the use of domestic labor and raw
materials. The Industrial Development (Income Tax Relief) Act of 1971
provides incentives to ``pioneer'' industries deemed beneficial to
Nigeria's economic development. Companies given ``pioneer'' status may
enjoy a non-renewable tax holiday of five years, or seven years if the
pioneer industry is located in an economically disadvantaged area.
In 1995, Nigeria promulgated the Nigerian Investment Promotion
Commission Decree to replace the Enterprises Promotion Act. This decree
liberalized the foreign investment regime, allowing 100 percent foreign
ownership of firms outside the petroleum sector. Investment in the
petroleum sector is still limited to the existing joint venture
agreement or production-sharing contracts with the Nigerian government,
though there has been discussion of the Nigerian government selling off
some small parts of its joint venture equity. A foreign enterprise may
now buy shares of any Nigerian firm except those on the ``negative
list'': production of firearms, ammunition and narcotics, military and
paramilitary apparel. The Investment Promotion Decree provides for the
creation of an Investment Promotion Commission that will register
companies for foreigners after incorporation under the Companies and
Allied Matters Decree of 1990. The decree also abolishes the expatriate
quota system (except in the oil sector) and prohibits any
nationalization or expropriation of a foreign enterprise by the
Nigerian government except for such cases determined to be in the
national interest.
Nigeria has partially implemented the 1995 money laundering decree,
which introduced bank reporting procedures designed to inhibit this
practice. There is also a decree against advance-fee fraud (called 419
fraud after the relevant section of the Nigerian criminal code.)
However, as of 1999, there has been only limited success in reducing
financial fraud despite improving law enforcement actions against fraud
perpetrators. The broad scope of business fraud has brought
international notoriety to Nigeria and constitutes a serious
disincentive to exporters.
4. Debt Management Policies
Nigeria's foreign debt ballooned from $13 billion in 1981 to $24
billion in 1986, when sharply lower oil revenues and continued high
import levels escalated balance of payments deficits. Debt service
obligations including payment of arrears, are projected to be over $8
billion annually for the next several years. However, according to the
1998 Central Bank of Nigeria's Annual Report, Nigeria's total external
debt stock at the end of 1998 amounted to $28.774 billion, compared
with $27.09 in 1997. The exact debt figure with multilateral financial
institutions is still in dispute. The 1999 budget allowed only $2
billion for foreign debt payments, thus ensuring continued build-up of
arrears.
In January 1992, in an effort to reduce its external debt, the
Nigerian government concluded an agreement with the London club that
gave commercial banks a menu of options from which to choose in
reducing Nigeria's commercial debt. The menu included debt buy backs
(currently at 45 cents to the dollar), new money bonds, and
collateralized par bonds. As a result of the agreement, Nigeria was
able to reduce its external debt by $3.9 billion since 1992, but the
accumulation of arrears on other debt (especially Paris Club debt),
which currently represent 70 percent of total debt stock, has kept
external debt levels high.
From 1986 to early 1992, on the basis of a comprehensive structural
adjustment program, Nigeria reached three standby agreements with the
IMF. The last one lapsed in 1992. Discussions with the IMF since then
have shown some progress, as evidenced by the 1996 decapping of
interest rates and removal of the mandatory sectoral credit allocations
for banks. In 1999 Nigeria and the IMF resolved most issues standing in
the way of a new standby arrangement. Nigeria's inadequate servicing of
Paris Club debt remains a principal obstacle.
Nigeria's most recent rescheduling agreement with the Paris Club
expired at the same time as its standby agreement with the IMF, and
debt repayment obligations on Paris Club debt have continued to grow.
(Nigeria has kept up to date on its multilateral and London Club debt.)
In 1992 Nigeria made payments of $2.7 billion against interest and
principal payment obligations of $5 billion. However, faced with
similar obligations in the following years, external debt service
payments were only budgeted at $1.6 billion for 1993, $1.8 billion for
1994, and $2 billion yearly from 1995 to 1998. In 1997, actual debt
service payments were $503.5 million (or 25.2 percent) lower than the
$2 billion budgeted. Although discussions with the IMF and World Bank
continued on a medium term economic program, and Nigeria is making some
progress at meeting their criteria, no new rescheduling agreement will
be reached until an IMF program is in place.
5. Significant Barriers to U.S. Exports
Nigeria abolished all export licensing requirements and cut its
list of banned imports in 1986. However, as of November 1999, the
importation of approximately 13 items is still banned. These bans were
initially implemented to restore Nigeria's agricultural sector and to
conserve foreign exchange. Although widespread smuggling compromises
the bans, reduced availability of grains has raised prices for both
banned commodities and locally produced substitutes. The government
discontinued fertilizer subsidies for farmers in 1997, but reintroduced
them in 1999. Widespread fertilizer shortages persist.
In 1995, Nigeria announced a new tariff structure for the next five
years. Revisions aimed to narrow the range of custom duties, increase
rate coverage in line with WTO provisions, and decrease import
prohibitions. In the 1999 budget, Nigeria's 1998 revised higher tariffs
were reduced, but excise duties eliminated in 1998 were restored for
certain goods. Excise duties of 40 percent were restored for
cigarettes, cigars, tobacco, and spirits. Other commodity duty rates
are: rice, 50 percent; day-old chicks and parent stock, 5 percent;
sparkling wines, wine coolers, and champagne, 100 percent; fruits and
fruit juices, reduced from 75 to 55 percent; jute, 10 percent; cotton,
60 percent; fertilizers, 5 percent; textile fabrics 65 percent; and
garments, 75 percent. For 1999, the 25 percent import duty rebate that
was granted importers in late 1997 was abolished. Poultry and eggs,
beer and stout, barley and malt, and mineral and similar waters,
removed from the prohibited import list in 1998, never qualified for
the rebate. However, duty rates for live, chilled or frozen poultry and
eggs were slashed from 150 to 55 percent to reduce smuggling for these
products and the consequent loss of significant duty revenue.
Other import restrictions apply to aircraft and ocean-going
vessels. A government authorized inspection agent must inspect all
imported aircraft and ocean-going vessels. In addition, performance
bonds and offshore guarantees must be arranged before either down
payments or the Ministry of Finance authorizes subsequent payments.
In 1996, to reduce congestion and corruption in Nigerian ports and
following a reported shortfall in customs receipts, the Nigerian
government changed the procedures by which goods enter or leave the
country. All unaccompanied imports and exports regardless of value
require pre-shipment inspection (PSI). Imports must be accompanied by
an import duty report (IDR). The Nigerian government will confiscate
goods arriving without an IDR. The PSI was abandoned temporarily in
early 1999 in favor of destination inspection, but the new scheme was
fraught with problems and was soon shelved for the PSI again. In
addition, all goods are assessed a one-percent surcharge to cover the
cost of inspection. The Obasanjo Administration has made some progress
on its pledge to practice open and competitive contracting. Anti-
corruption is an energetic and central plank of the new government's
policy. Foreign companies incorporated in Nigeria receive national
treatment. Currently, tenders are published in newspapers for
prospective contractors. Approximately five percent of all government
procurement contracts are awarded to U.S. companies.
6. Export Subsidy Policies
In 1976, the government established the Nigerian Export Promotion
Council (NEPC) to promote non-oil exports from Nigeria. The Council
administers incentive programs, including a duty drawback program, the
export development fund, tax relief and capital assets depreciation
allowances, and a foreign currency retention program. The duty drawback
or manufacturing in-bond program is designed to allow the duty free
importation of raw materials to produce goods for export, contingent on
the issuance of a bank guarantee. The performance bond is discharged
upon evidence of exportation and repatriation of foreign exchange.
Though meant to promote industry and exportation, these schemes have
been burdened by inefficient administration, confusion, and corruption,
causing great difficulty and, in some cases, losses to those
manufacturers and exporters who opted to use them.
The NEPC also administers the export expansion grant program, a
fund that provides grants to exporters of manufactured and semi-
manufactured products. Grants are awarded on the basis of the value of
goods exported, and the only requirement for participation is that the
export proceeds be repatriated to Nigeria. Though the grant amounts are
small, ranging from two to five percent of total export value, they may
constitute subsidies as defined by the WTO and raise questions about
compliance with WTO obligations. In the 1999 budget, the government
announced that the incentive schemes will be replaced by a non-cash
incentive scheme termed ``negotiable duty credit certificate'' (NDCS),
under which exporters' claims are credited against future imports. This
measure will save the government from making annual budgetary
allocations to the scheme and is in conformity with the WTO.
7. Protection of U.S. Intellectual Property
Nigeria is a signatory to the Universal Copyright Convention and
the Berne Convention. In 1993, Nigeria became a member of the World
Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), thereby becoming party to
most of the major international agreements on intellectual property
rights. Cases involving infringement of non-Nigerian copyrights have
been successfully prosecuted in Nigeria, but enforcement of existing
laws remains weak, particularly in the patent and trademark areas.
Recently, Nigeria's active participation in international conventions
has yielded positive results. Law enforcement agents occasionally carry
out raids on suspected sites for production and sale of pirated tapes,
videos, computer software and books. Piracy is widespread, but
prosecution under the copyright law is slow. However, since the TRIPS
(Trade Related Intellectual Property Rights) agreement was signed under
the Uruguay round in 1993, the Nigerian Copyright Council has
intensified efforts to combat piracy by organizing workshops for law
enforcement agents on copyright issues.
The Patents and Design Decree of 1970 governs the registration of
patents, and the Standards Organization of Nigeria is responsible for
issuing patents, trademarks, and copyrights. Once conferred, a patent
conveys an exclusive right to make, import, sell, or use the products
or apply the process. The Trademarks Act of 1965 governs the
registration of trademarks. A trademark conveys the exclusive right to
use the registered mark for a particular good or class of goods.
The Copyright Decree of 1988, based on WIPO standards and U.S.
copyright law, criminalizes counterfeiting, exporting, importing,
reproducing, exhibiting, performing, or selling any work without the
permission of the copyright owner. Progress on enforcing the 1988 law
is slow. The expense and time necessary to pursue a copyright
infringement case discourage prosecution of such cases.
Few companies have sought trademark or patent protection in Nigeria
because it is generally perceived as ineffective. Losses from piracy
are substantial, although the exact cost is difficult to estimate. Most
recordings sold in Nigeria are pirated, and the video industry is based
on the sale and rental of pirated tapes. Satellite signal piracy is
also common. Violation of patents on pharmaceuticals is a problem.
8. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association: Nigerian workers may join unions with
the exception of members of the armed forces, police force, or
government employees of the following departments and services:
customs, immigration, prisons, currency printing and minting, central
bank and telecommunications. A worker engaged in an essential service
is required under penalty of law to provide his employer 15 days'
advance notice of his intention to cease work. Essential service
workers include federal and state civilian employees in the armed
services, and public employees engaged in banking, telecommunications,
postal services, transportation and ports, public health, fire
prevention, and the utilities sector. Employees working in an export
processing zone may not join a union for a period of ten years from the
start-up of the enterprise.
Under the law, a worker under a collective bargaining agreement may
not participate in a strike unless his representative has complied with
the requirements of the Trade Disputes Act, which include provisions
for mandatory mediation and for referring the labor dispute to the
government. The Act allows the government in its discretion to refer
the matter to a labor conciliator, arbitration panel, board of inquiry,
or the National Industrial Court. The Act also forbids any employer
from granting a general wage increase to its workers without prior
government approval. In practice, however, the Act does not appear to
be effectively enforced as strikes, including in the public sector, are
widespread, and private sector wage increases are not submitted to the
government for prior approval.
Nigeria has signed and ratified the International Labor
Organization's (ILO) convention on freedom of association, but Nigerian
law authorizes only a single central labor body, the Nigeria Labor
Congress (NLC). Nigerian labor law controls the admission of a union to
the NLC, and requires any union to be formally registered before
commencing operations. Registration is authorized only where the
Registrar of Trade Unions determines that it is expedient in that no
other existing union is sufficiently representative of the interests of
those workers seeking to be registered.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively: Nigerian labor
laws permit the right to organize and bargain collectively. Collective
bargaining is common in many sectors of the economy. Nigerian law
protects workers from retaliation by employers (i.e. lockouts) for
labor activity through an independent arm of the judiciary, the
Nigerian Industrial Court. Trade unionists have complained, however,
that the judicial system's slow handling of labor cases constitutes a
denial of redress. The government retains broad authority over labor
matters, and often intervenes in disputes it feels challenge its key
political or economic objectives. However, the era of government
appointed ``sole administrators'' of unions is now over, and the labor
movement is increasingly active and vocal on issues seen to attest the
plight of the common worker, such as deregulation, privatization, and
the government's failure to advance its poverty alleviation program.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor: Section 34 of the
1999 Constitution, and the 1974 Labor Decree, prohibit forced labor.
Nigeria has also ratified the ILO convention prohibiting forced labor.
However, there are occasional reports of instances of forced labor,
typically involving domestic servants. The government has limited
resources to detect and prevent violations of the forced labor
prohibition.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children: Nigeria's 1974 labor
decree prohibits employment of children under 15 years of age in
commerce and industry and restricts other child labor to home-based
agricultural or domestic work. The law further stipulates that no
person under the age of 16 may be employed for more than eight hours
per day. The decree allows the apprenticeship of youths under specific
conditions. Primary education is compulsory in Nigeria, though rarely
enforced. Actual enrollment is declining due to the continuing
deterioration of public schools. Increasing poverty and the need to
supplement meager family incomes have forced also many children into
the employment market, which is unable to absorb their labor due to
high levels of unemployment. The use children as beggars, hawkers, or
elsewhere in the informal sector is widespread in urban areas.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work: Nigeria's 1974 labor decree
established a 40-hour workweek, prescribed 2 to 4 weeks of annual
leave, set a minimum wage, and stipulated that workers are to be paid
extra for hours worked over the legal limit. The decree states that
workers who work on Sundays and legal holidays must be paid a full
day's pay in addition to their normal wages. There is no law
prohibiting excessive compulsory overtime. In 1998, the federal
government raised for all federal employees the minimum monthly wage
(salary and allowances) to N5, 280.00 (USD 60) from N450 (USD 5.00).
The government later reversed the decision and reduced the minimum wage
to N3,500.00 (USD 35) for federal workers and N3000.00 (USD 30) for
state workers. However, many states are unable, or unwilling to pay the
new minimum wage. Widespread reports of empty state treasuries
inherited by the new civilian government threaten their ability to pay
the new salary. Despite this, the Obasanjo government is considering
plans to further increase the minimum wage. The 1974 decree contains
general health and safety provisions. Employers must compensate injured
workers and dependent survivors of those killed in industrial accidents
but enforcement of these laws by the ministry of labor is largely
ineffective.
f. Rights in Sectors with U.S. Investment: Worker rights in
petroleum, chemicals and related products, primary and fabricated
metals, machinery, electric and electronic equipment, transportation
equipment, and other manufacturing sectors are not significantly
different from those in other major sectors of the economy.
Extent of U.S. Investment in Selected Industries--U.S. Direct Investment Position Abroad on an Historical Cost
Basis--1998
[Millions of U.S. Dollars]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Category Amount
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Petroleum...................... .............. 1,696
Total Manufacturing............ .............. 56
Food & Kindred Products...... (\1\) ...............................................................
Chemicals & Allied Products.. 20 ...............................................................
Primary & Fabricated Metals.. -1 ...............................................................
Industrial Machinery and 0 ...............................................................
Equipment.
Electric & Electronic 0 ...............................................................
Equipment.
Transportation Equipment..... (\1\) ...............................................................
Other Manufacturing.......... 0 ...............................................................
Wholesale Trade................ .............. 1
Banking........................ .............. (\1\)
Finance/Insurance/Real Estate.. .............. (\1\)
Services....................... .............. 0
Other Industries............... .............. 4
TOTAL ALL INDUSTRIES........... .............. 1,925
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Suppressed to avoid disclosing data of individual companies.
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis.
______
SOUTH AFRICA
Key Economic Indicators
[Billions of U.S. Dollars unless otherwise indicated]
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1997 1998 1999 (est)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Income, Production and Employment:
\1\
Nominal GDP (at nominal prices)... 147.9 134.5 146.0
Real GDP Growth (pct)............. 2.5 0.5 0.9
GDP by Sector:
Agriculture..................... 5.2 4.3 4.6
Mining and Quarrying............ 8.9 7.7 8.3
Manufacturing................... 27.5 23.0 25.1
Wholesale/Retail Trade.......... 18.5 15.7 17.1
Financial Services.............. 20.6 18.5 20.1
Government...................... 17.6 15.0 16.3
Per Capita GDP (US$).............. 2,987 N/A
Labor Force (millions)............ 9.8 10 (est) N/A
Unemployment Rate (pct)........... 22.9 23.0 (est) N/A
Money and Prices (annual percentage
growth):
Money Supply Growth (M2).......... 18.7 13.6 10
Consumer Price Index.............. 8.6 6.9 5.5
Exchange Rate (Rand/US$ annual
average) \1\
Unified........................... 4.6 5.5 6.2
Balance of Payments and Trade:
Total Exports FOB \2\............. 25.6 24.6 23.4
Exports to U.S. \3\............. 2.5 3.0 3.0
Total Imports CIF \2\............. 28.9 27.4 23.1
Imports from U.S. \3\........... 3.0 3.6 2.4
Trade Balance \2\................. -3.3 -2.5 0.3
Trade Balance with U.S. \3\..... -0.5 -0.6 0.6
External Public Debt \4\.......... 3.3 2.7 N/A
Fiscal Deficit/GDP (pct).......... 4.2 5.5 N/A
Current Account Deficit/GDP (pct). 1.5 -1.6 -0.5
Debt Service Payments/GDP (pct)... 6.1 6.7 N/A
Gold and Foreign Exchange Reserves 3.7 7.6 6.5
Aid from U.S. (US$ millions) \5\.. 110.5 71.3 53.4
Aid from Other Countries \6\...... N/A N/A N/A
------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The following exchange rates were used in the calculations: $1:R4.61
for 1997, $1:R5.80 for 1998, and an estimated $1:R6.15.
\2\ All South African trade statistics include export and import data
for the five members of the Southern African Customs Union (Botswana,
Lesotho, Namibia, South Africa, and Swaziland) up to December 1997.
\3\ Source: U.S. Department of Commerce and U.S. Census Bureau; exports
FAS, imports customs basis.
\4\ From IMF Yearbook, September 1999.
\5\ The figures represent aid from USAID only.
\6\ SA has received substantial aid from all over the world. However,
there is no comprehensive audit of the total aid given to SA to date.
1. General Policy Framework
South Africa is a middle-income developing country with well-
developed financial, legal, communications, energy, and transport
sectors, a stock exchange which ranks among the 20 largest in the
world, and a modern infrastructure supporting an efficient distribution
of goods to major urban centers throughout the region. More than five
years since the historic election of President Nelson Mandela in the
country's first multi-racial elections, South Africa remains the
largest economy in Africa, and is very important to U.S. trade and
investment.
Decades of apartheid-era policies resulted in the inefficient use
of human resources, under-investment in human capital, labor
rigidities, large budgetary outlays for duplicative layers of
government and facilities, extensive governmental interference in the
economy, and a lack of foreign investment and imported goods resulting
from international sanctions. In the lead up to the 1994 elections, the
South African economy started enjoying a period of recovery after more
than four years of negative real GDP growth from 1988-1992. The economy
has posted real GDP growth rates of 2.5 percent in 1994, 3.1 percent in
1995, 4.2 percent in 1996 and 2.5 percent in 1997. The 1998 growth rate
however came in at 0.5 percent largely due to the financial turmoil
which hit almost all emerging markets. Some recovery is expected in
1999 with many predicting a real GDP growth rate of 0.9 percent.
South Africa faces daunting developmental problems resulting from
apartheid-era policies. The government's objectives today are growth,
jobs, black economic empowerment, promotion of small, medium, and micro
enterprises, and the extension of telecommunications, transportation,
and other infrastructure links to under-served rural and urban areas .
The government demonstrated its commitment to open markets,
privatization, and a favorable investment climate with the release of
its macroeconomic strategy, GEAR, in June 1996. This strategy includes
expansion of infrastructure, restructuring of state assets,
conservative fiscal and monetary targets and continued reduction of
tariffs to promote greater competition and industrial revitalization.
These efforts, together with South Africa's implementation of its World
Trade Organization (WTO) obligations, show that South Africa is moving
steadily towards free market principles.
Over the last decade, quantitative credit controls and
administrative control of deposit and lending rates have largely
disappeared. The South African Reserve Bank (SARB) now operates in much
the same way as western central banks, influencing interest rates and
controlling liquidity through its rates on funds provided to private
sector banks, and to a lesser degree through the placement of
government paper. In the past five years, restrictive monetary policy,
through the maintenance of relatively high central bank lending rates,
has curbed domestic spending on imports and reduced inflation to its
lowest rates in twenty years.
The government primarily finances its debt through the issuance of
government bonds. To a lesser extent, the government has opted to
finance some short-term debt obligations through the sale of foreign
exchange and gold reserves. As a corollary to its restrictive financial
policies, the government has not opted to finance deficit spending
through loans from commercial banks.
2. Exchange Rate Policy
Under South African exchange regulations, the SARB has substantial
control over foreign currency. Exchange controls are administered by
the SARB's Exchange Control Department and through commercial banks
that have been authorized to deal in foreign exchange. All
international commercial transactions must be accounted for through
these ``authorized foreign exchange dealers.'' In addition, the SARB is
a marketing agent for gold, which accounts for roughly 18 percent of
export earnings. This provides the SARB wide latitude for determining
short-term exchange rates. Monetary authorities normally allow the rand
to adjust in an attempt to stabilize external accounts.
While the SARB recognized that the low level of hard currency
reserves necessitated continued inflow of long-term capital, the
government of national unity eliminated the previous dual exchange rate
and established a unified exchange rate on March 20, 1995. Nonetheless,
South Africa still maintains several capital controls to prevent large
capital outflows. The government is more likely to approve foreign
exchange purchases for investment abroad if the foreign partner of the
South African party conducts an asset swap, whereby an equivalent
amount of foreign exchange is invested in South Africa by the foreign
partner. Although domestic as well as foreign business concerns have
lobbied hard for the lifting of the asset swap requirement, it is
unlikely that the government will do so until foreign reserve levels
approach the three-month coverage level. While foreign reserves are
currently at about $6.5 billion, the SARB maintains a large Net Open
Forward Position of $15.6 billion as of the end of September 1999.
3. Structural Policies
Prices are generally market-determined with the exception of some
petroleum products, electricity, transport services and certain
agricultural goods. Purchases by government agencies and major private
buyers are by competitive tender for projects or supply contracts.
Bidders must pre-qualify, with some preferences allowed for local
content.
The main sources of government revenue in South Africa are income
taxes and the Value-Added Tax (VAT). The VAT rate is 14 percent.
The government has undertaken some measures in the past two years
to ease the tax burden on foreign and domestic investors. It has
steadily reduced the corporate primary income tax rate from 40 percent
in 1994 to 30 percent in 1999. In addition, the Secondary Tax on
Corporate Dividends was halved to 12.5 percent in March 1996.
4. Debt Management Policies
At the end of 1998, the SARB reported that total foreign (public
and private) debt amounted to approximately $38.8 billion. The ratio of
total foreign debt to GDP has remained steady at around 26 to 30
percent over the past three years, while interest payments as a
percentage of total export earnings have remained at levels ranging
from 7.3 percent in 1995 to 8.4 percent in 1998.
South Africa is a member of the World Bank and International
Monetary Fund (IMF) and continues Article IV consultations with the
latter on a regular basis. In December 1993, after 27 years of economic
isolation, South Africa obtained an $850 million IMF facility, which
replenished South Africa's strained foreign exchange reserves and
normalized its international financial relations. South Africa is also
obtaining a modest World Bank loan, and is in discussions regarding
other small grants or loans as well as greater use of World Bank
advisory and training assistance to help with its ambitious development
objectives.
5. Aid
There is no comprehensive audit of the total aid given to SA to
date. Besides the aid of $53.4 from USAID noted in the front table, the
U.S. also provides military aid estimated at $1.65 million for FY 1998/
99.
6. Significant Barriers to U.S. Exports
Under the terms of the Import and Export Control Act of 1963, South
Africa's Minister of Trade and Industry may act in the national
interest to prohibit, ration, or otherwise regulate imports. In recent
years, the list of restricted goods requiring import permits has been
reduced, but still includes such goods as certain foodstuffs, clothing,
fabrics, wood and paper products, refined petroleum products and
chemicals.
The government remains committed to the simplification and eventual
reduction of tariffs within the WTO framework, and maintains active
discussions with that body and its major trading partners.
The government is attempting to centralize and standardize the
buying procedures of national, provincial, local, and state-owned
corporate entities. Purchases are by competitive tender for project,
supply and other contracts. As part of the government's policy to
encourage local industry, a price preference schedule, based on the
percent of local content in relation to the tendered price is employed
to compare tenders. To claim preference for local content, tenders must
enclose with their bid a certificate showing classification of supplies
offered in terms of local content.
An additional preference may be claimed if a product bears the mark
of the South African Bureau of Standards. On tenders of less than R2
million ($350,000), the government awards preference points to
enterprises and companies operating in South Africa that demonstrate
significant ownership or employment of previously disadvantaged
individuals.
Since late 1996, the Industrial Participation Program (IPP) has
mandated a countertrade/offset package for all state and parastatal
purchases of goods, services, and lease contracts in excess of $10
million. Under the program, all bidders on government and parastatal
contracts who exceed the imported content threshold must also submit an
industrial participation package worth 30 percent of the imported
content value. The bidder then has 7 years to discharge the industrial
participation obligation. Non-performance of the contract is subject to
a penalty of 5 percent of the outstanding industrial participation
obligation.
7. Export Subsidies Policies
The Export Marketing Assistance Scheme (EMA) offers financial
assistance for the development of new export markets, through financing
for trade missions and market research. The new Export Finance
Guarantee Scheme for small exporters promotes small and medium
exporters through credit guarantees with participating financial
organizations. Provisions of the Income Tax Act also permit accelerated
write-offs of certain buildings and machinery associated with
beneficiation processes carried on for export, and deductions for the
use of an export agent outside South Africa.
8. Protection of U.S. Intellectual Property
Patents may be registered under the Patents Act of 1978 and are
granted for 20 years. Trademarks can be registered under the Trademarks
Act of 1973, and are granted for ten years with a possible renewal of
an additional ten years. New designs may be registered under the
Designs Act of 1967, which grants copyrights for five years. Literary,
musical and artistic works, cinematographic films and sound recordings
are eligible for copyrights under the Copyright Act of 1978. This act
is based on the provisions of the Berne Convention as modified in Paris
in 1971 and was amended in 1992 to include computer software. The
government passed two IPR-related bills in parliament at the end of
1997: the Counterfeit Goods Bill and the Intellectual Property Laws
Amendment Bill, bringing South Africa's laws largely into conformity
with its international trade obligations under the Trade Related
Intellectual Property Agreement of the WTO. The Patents, Trademarks,
Designs, and Copyrights Registrar of the Department of Trade and
Industry administers these acts.
South Africa is a member of the Paris Union and acceded to the
Stockholm Text of the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial
Property. South Africa is also a member of the World Intellectual
Property Organization.
Although South Africa's intellectual property laws and practices
are generally in conformity with those of the industrialized nations,
firms do experience some problems. The trademarks of a number of U.S.
companies were misappropriated under the former government, when local
firms took advantage of inadequate protection for famous marks. In
April 1995, the U.S. Trade Representative placed South Africa on the
``Special 301'' Watch List in an attempt to resolve these cases. South
Africa was removed from the list in 1996 due to progress on several
fronts. In May 1998, however, South Africa was placed back on the Watch
List, in part because of a lack of adequate protection of undisclosed
data and a law, passed in December 1997, which appeared to empower the
Minister of Health to abrogate patent rights for pharmaceuticals. After
extensive consultations, the US and South African governments reached
an understanding on this Act in September 1999. USTR removed South
Africa from the Watch List in December 1999.
Software piracy occurs frequently in South Africa. The Business
Software Alliance (BSA) estimates that as much as 50 percent of South
Africa's business software is pirated, resulting in a loss of over
$74.9 million to computer companies. Piracy in the video and sound
industry is also an issue of concern, with a sound piracy rate of 40
percent and a video piracy rate of 16 percent. Total annual losses due
to audiovisual piracy in South Africa during 1998 are estimated to be
$24.0 million.
9. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association: Freedom of association is guaranteed
by the constitution and given statutory effect by the Labor Relations
Act (LRA). All workers in the private sector and most in the public are
entitled to join a union. Moreover, no employee can be fired or
prejudiced because of membership in or advocacy of a trade union.
Unions in South Africa have an approximate membership of 3.4 million or
35 percent of the economically active population. The right to strike
is guaranteed in the constitution, and is given statutory effect by the
LRA. The International Labor Organization (ILO) readmitted South Africa
in 1994. There is no government restriction against union affiliation
with regional or international labor organizations.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively: South African
law defines and protects the rights to organize and bargain
collectively. The government does not interfere with union organizing
and generally has not interfered in the collective bargaining process.
The new LRA statutorily entrenches ``organizational rights,'' such as
trade union access to work sites, deductions for trade union
subscriptions, and leave for trade union officials.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor: Forced labor is
illegal under the constitution, and is not practiced.
d.Minimum Age for Employment of Children: Employment of minors
under age 15 is prohibited by South African law. The LRA, however,
grants the Minister of Welfare discretionary powers to permit
employment of children under carefully described conditions in certain
types of work, such as in the agricultural sector. Child labor is also
used in the informal economy.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work: There is no legally mandated
national minimum wage in South Africa. Instead, the LRA provides a
mechanism for negotiations between labor and management to set minimum
wage standards industry by industry. In those sectors of the economy
not sufficiently organized to engage in the collective bargaining
processes which establish minimum wages, the Basic Conditions of
Employment Act, which went into effect in December 1998, gives the
Minister of Labor authority to set wages, including for the first time
wages for farm or domestic workers. Occupational health and safety
issues remain a top priority of trade unions, especially in the mining
and heavy manufacturing industries which are still considered hazardous
by international standards.
f. Worker Rights in Sectors with U.S. Investment: The worker rights
conditions described above do not differ from those found in sectors
with U.S. capital investment.
Extent of U.S. Investment in Selected Industries--U.S. Direct Investment Position Abroad on an Historical Cost
Basis--1998
[Millions of U.S. Dollars]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Category Amount
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Petroleum...................... .............. (\1\)
Total Manufacturing............ .............. 864
Food & Kindred Products...... 139 ...............................................................
Chemicals & Allied Products.. 193 ...............................................................
Primary & Fabricated Metals.. (\1\) ...............................................................
Industrial Machinery and 37 ...............................................................
Equipment.
Electric & Electronic 112 ...............................................................
Equipment.
Transportation Equipment..... (\1\) ...............................................................
Other Manufacturing.......... 293 ...............................................................
Wholesale Trade................ .............. 145
Banking........................ .............. (\1\)
Finance/Insurance/Real Estate.. .............. 247
Services....................... .............. 162
Other Industries............... .............. (\1\)
TOTAL ALL INDUSTRIES........... .............. 2,363
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Suppressed to avoid disclosing data of individual companies.
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis.
EAST ASIA AND THE PACIFIC
----------
AUSTRALIA
Key Economic Indicators
[Billions of U.S. Dollars unless otherwise indicated] \1\
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1997 1998 \2\ 1999
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Income, Production and Employment:
Nominal GDP \3\......................... 405.2 364.0 390.7
Real GDP Growth (pct)................... 5.2 4.6 3.0
GDP by Sector: \4\
Agriculture........................... 12.0 10.5 10.7
Manufacturing......................... 96.3 85.0 88.9
Services.............................. 274.7 247.8 269.2
Government............................ 16.7 14.2 14.6
Per Capita GDP (US$).................... 22,500 19,700 20,500
Labor Force (000's)..................... 9,220 9,345 9,461
Unemployment Rate (pct)................. 8.5 8.0 7.3
Money and Prices (annual percentage
growth):
Money Supply (M3)....................... 6.3 7.6 8.8
Consumer Price Inflation................ -0.2 1.6 2.5
Exchange Rate (Aust$/US$ annual average)
Official.............................. N/A N/A N/A
Parallel.............................. 1.36 1.59 1.56
Balance of Payments and Trade:
Total Exports FOB....................... 62.5 55.9 60.4
Exports to U.S........................ 4.6 5.3 7.0
Total Imports CIF....................... 61.5 60.9 64.3
Imports from U.S...................... 13.4 13.6 14.8
Trade Balance........................... 1.0 -4.9 -3.8
Balance with U.S...................... -8.7 -8.3 -7.7
External Public Debt.................... 44.2 33.7 25.7
Fiscal Deficit/GDP (pct)................ -0.2 -0.5 -0.8
Current Account Deficit/GDP (pct)....... 3.1 4.8 5.5
Debt Service Payments/GDP............... 2.2 1.8 1.8
Gold and Foreign Exchange Reserves...... 17.2 15.5 15.9
Aid from U.S............................ 0 0 0
Aid from Other Countries................ 0 0 0
------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Exchange rate fluctuations must be considered when analyzing data.
Percentage changes calculated in Australian Dollars.
\2\ 1999 figures are estimates based on available monthly data in
November.
\3\ Income measure of GDP.
\4\ Production measure of GDP. ``Manufacturing'' includes manufacturing,
mining, utilities, and construction.
1. General Policy Framework
Australia's developed market economy is dominated by its services
sector (65 percent of GDP), yet it is the agricultural and mining
sectors (7 percent of GDP combined) that account for the bulk (58
percent) of Australia's goods and services exports. Australia's
comparative advantage in primary products is a reflection of the
natural wealth of the Australian continent and its small domestic
market: 19 million people occupy a continent the size of the contiguous
United States. The relative size of the manufacturing sector has been
declining for several decades, and now accounts for just under 12
percent of GDP.
The Asian economic downturn has yet to have a significant impact on
economic growth, despite forcing many exporters to target alternative
markets. With inflation well under control (Australia recorded annual
price deflation for the first time in 35 years in 1997), the task for
economic policy makers is to lower the unemployment rate, which remains
stubbornly mired in the 8.0 percent range.
The Liberal/National coalition government continued its program of
fiscal consolidation in its budget for the 1999-2000 fiscal year,
announcing a budget surplus of $3 billion.
2. Exchange Rate Policies
Australian Dollar exchange rates are determined by international
currency markets. There is no official policy to defend any particular
exchange rate level, although the Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA) does
operate in currency markets. The RBA is active in what it describes as
``smoothing and testing'' foreign exchange rates, in order to provide a
generally stable environment for fundamental economic adjustment
policies.
Australia does not have any major foreign exchange controls beyond
requiring RBA approval if more than A$5,000 in cash is to be taken out
of Australia at any one time, or A$50,000 in any form in one year. The
purpose of this regulation is to prevent tax evasion and money
laundering; authorization is usually automatic.
3. Structural Policies
The government is continuing a program of economic reform, begun in
the 1980s, that includes the reduction of import protection and
microeconomic reform. Initially broad in scope, the program now focuses
on industry-by-industry changes and reform of the labor market. The
government is also continuing with the privatization of public assets.
Federal Government ownership in telecommunications carrier Telstra has
been reduced (via two public floats) to 51%.
The General Tariff Reduction Program, begun in March 1991, has
reached its conclusion, with most existing tariffs now at 5 percent.
However, the passenger motor vehicles and textiles, clothing and
footwear industries are still protected by high tariffs (17.5 and 17-28
percent respectively). These tariffs are scheduled to decline to 15 and
25 percent respectively by 2000 (where they will remain, pending
further review, until 2005).
The Liberal/National coalition government recently passed
legislation altering the structure of Australia's income and sales tax
system, and currently has before parliament legislation reforming the
business taxation system.
4. Debt Management Policies
Australia's net foreign debt has averaged between 30 and 45 percent
of GDP for the past decade, and in mid-1998 totaled $145 billion (39
percent of GDP). Australia's net external public debt is $28 billion,
or 7 percent of GDP. The public sector accounts for 19 percent of
Australia's external debt; the remainder is the responsibility of the
private sector. The Federal Government is using its privatization
receipts and budget surpluses to further reduce its debt obligations.
The net debt-service ratio (the ratio of net income payable to export
earnings) has remained at or below 10 pct since 1997, down from 21
percent in 1990.
5. Significant Barriers to U.S. Exports
Australia is a signatory to the WTO, but is not a member of the
plurilateral WTO Agreement on Government Procurement.
Services Barriers: The Australian services market is generally
open, and many U.S. financial services, legal and travel firms are
established there. The banking sector was liberalized in 1992, allowing
foreign banks to be licensed as either branches or subsidiaries.
Broadcast licensing rules were also liberalized in 1992, allowing up to
20 percent of the time used for paid advertisements to be filled with
foreign-sourced material (far greater than the percentage of non-
Australian messages actually broadcast).
Local content regulations also require that 55 percent of a
commercial television station's weekly broadcasts between the hours of
6:00 a.m. and midnight must be dedicated to Australian-produced
programs (The U.S. regrets that this requirement was recently increased
from 50 percent). Regulations governing Australia's pay-TV industry
require that channels carrying drama must devote 10 pct of program
expenditure to new Australian-produced content (though they are not
required to actually screen the programs produced).
Standards: Australia became a signatory to the GATT Technical
Barriers to Trade Agreement in 1992. However, Australia still maintains
restrictive standards requirements and design rules for automobile
parts, electronic and medical equipment, and some machine parts and
equipment. Currently, all Australian standards are being rewritten to
harmonize them where possible to international standards, with the
objective of fulfilling all obligations of the GATT Technical Barriers
to Trade Agreement.
Labeling: Federal law requires that the country of origin be
clearly indicated on the front label of some types of products sold in
Australia. Various other federal and state labeling requirements are
being reconsidered in light of compliance with GATT obligations,
utility and effect on trade. The Federal and State Health Ministries,
working with the Government of New Zealand, are currently reviewing
proposals to label products containing genetically modified organisms
and have agreed to consider issues of consumer information, health,
implementation costs of a labeling regime, and potential impact on
Australian exports.
Commodity Boards: Several national and state commodity boards
control the marketing and export of certain Australian agricultural
products. Activities for these marketing authorities are financed by
the producers, but some boards enjoy export monopoly powers conferred
by the federal or state government. While some of the boards' domestic
activities have been deregulated, the export of wheat and rice remains
under the exclusive control of commodity boards. The government has
indicated that the Australian wheat board (which strictly regulates
wheat marketing abroad) may have its export monopoly reviewed during
2000, though the terms of the review have yet to be announced. The
export of barley from certain states likewise remains strictly
regulated.
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Restrictions: Australia's geographic
isolation has allowed it to remain relatively free of exotic diseases.
Australia imposes extremely stringent animal and plant quarantine
restrictions. The WTO SPS agreement requires, among other things, that
Australia's restrictions undergo a risk assessment to ensure that any
restrictions are science-based, rather than disguised non-tariff
barriers. Concerns remain with Australia's restrictions on chicken
(fresh, cooked and frozen), pork, California table grapes, Florida
citrus, stone fruit, apples, Pacific North-West cherries, timber and
corn.
Investment: The government requires notification of (but normally
raises no objections to) investment proposals by foreign interests
above certain notification thresholds, including: acquisitions of
substantial interests in existing Australian businesses with assets of
A$5 million or more (A$3 million for rural properties); new businesses
involving an investment of A$10 million or more; portfolio investments
in the media sector of 5 percent or more; all non-portfolio investments
irrespective of size; takeovers of Australian companies valued at
either A$20 million or more, or for more than 50 percent of the target
company's total assets; and direct investment of foreign governments
irrespective of size. Investment proposals for entities involving more
than A$50 million in total assets are approved unless found contrary to
the national interest. Special regulations apply to investments in the
banking sector, the media sector, urban real estate and civil aviation.
Divestment cannot be forced without due process of law. There is no
record of forced divestment outside that stemming from investments or
mergers that tend to create market dominance, contravene laws on equity
participation, or result from unfulfilled contractual obligations.
Government Procurement: Since 1991, foreign information technology
companies with annual sales to the Australian Government of A$10-40
million (US$6-24 million) have been required to enter into Fixed Term
Arrangements (FTAs), and those with sales greater than A$40 million
into Partnerships for Development (PFDs). Under an FTA, a foreign
company commits to undertake local industrial development activities
worth 15 percent of its projected amount of government sales over a
four year period. Under a PFD, a foreign firm agrees to invest 5
percent of its annual local turnover on research and development in
Australia; export goods and services worth 50 percent of imports (for
hardware companies) or 20 percent of turnover (for software companies);
and achieve 70 percent local content across all exports within the
seven year life of the PFD.
Recent changes to Australian Government procurement policies have
seen a significant decentralization of purchasing procedures, with the
introduction of Endorsed Supplier Arrangements (ESA). Companies wishing
to supply information technology (IT) products and major office
machines to the Australian government must gain endorsement under the
ESA. The industry development component of the new ESA requires
evidence of product development, investment in capital equipment,
skills development and service support, and sourcing services and
product components, parts and/or input locally. In addition, applicants
must demonstrate performance in either exports, research and
development, development of strategic relationships with Australian or
New Zealand suppliers/customers, or participation in a recognized
industry development program.
The Australian Government maintains its commitment to source at
least 10 percent of its purchases from Australian small to medium size
enterprises. The government will continue to require tenderers to
include industry development objectives in tender documents, with model
guidelines to be developed in consultation with industry.
Motor Vehicles: The import of used vehicles manufactured after 1973
for personal use is banned, except where the car was purchased and used
overseas by the buyer for a minimum of three months. Commercial
importers must apply for a ``compliance plate'' costing A$20,000 for
each make of car imported. Left hand drive cars must be converted to
right hand drive (only by licensed garages) before they may be driven
in Australia.
6. Export Subsidies Policies
Australia is a member of the WTO Agreement on Subsidies and
Countervailing Measures.
The coalition government has severely curtailed assistance schemes
to Australian industry as part of its fiscal consolidation program.
Under the Export Market Development Grants Scheme, the government gives
grants to qualifying firms of up to A$200,000 to assist in offsetting
marketing costs incurred when establishing new export markets. There
are also schemes available for drawbacks of tariffs and sales and
excise taxes paid on the imported components of exported products. Such
schemes are available in the passenger motor vehicle and the textiles,
clothing and footwear industries. Grants schemes and tariff concessions
have also been subject to expenditure reductions. The Research and
Development Tax Concession (available to firms undertaking eligible
R&D) was reduced from 150 percent to 125 percent. The only remaining
bounty (production subsidy) assists shipbuilders, and is due to expire
on December 31, 2000.
The Pharmaceutical Industry Investment Program is designed to
compensate manufacturers of pharmaceutical products for the effects of
the federal government's intervention (through the national health
system) in the market for consumer pharmaceuticals. Under the scheme,
approved producers receive higher prices for selected products in
return for commitments to undertake domestic drug research and
development.
7. Protection of U.S. Intellectual Property
Australia is a member of the World Intellectual Property
Organization (WIPO), and most multilateral IPR agreements, including:
the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property; the
Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works; the
Universal Copyright Convention; the Geneva Phonogram Convention; the
Rome Convention for the Protection of Performers, Producers of
Phonograms, and Broadcasting Organizations; and the Patent Cooperation
Treaty. Australia has yet to take action on the new WIPO Copyright
treaties. USTR has placed Australia on the ``Special 301'' Watch List
because of limitations in its protection of test data and parallel
imports, among other concerns.
Patents: Patents are available for inventions in all fields of
technology (except for human beings and biological processes relating
to artificial human reproduction). They are protected by the Patents
Act (1990), which offers coverage for 20 years subject to renewal.
Trade secrets are protected by common law, such as by contract. Design
features can be protected from imitation by registration under the
Designs Act for up to 16 years (upon application).
Test Data: In 1999, the government passed legislation providing
five years of protection of test data for the evaluation of a new
active constituent for agricultural and veterinary chemical product. No
protection is provided for data submitted in regard to new uses and
formulations.
Trademarks and Copyrights: Australia provides TRIPs compatible
protection for both registered and unregistered well known trademarks
under the Trademark Act of 1995. The term of registration is ten years.
Copyrights are protected under the Copyright Act of 1968 for a term of
the life of the author plus 50 years. Computer programs can receive
copyright protection. The Australian Copyright Act provides protection
regarding public performances in hotels and clubs. In recent years, the
government has passed legislation removing parallel import protection
for sound recordings and for goods whose protection was based on the
copyright of packaging and labeling, and allowing the decompilation of
computer software.
New Technologies: Infringement of new technologies does not appear
to be a significant problem.
8. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association: Workers in Australia fully enjoy and
practice the rights to associate, to organize and to bargain
collectively. In general, industrial disputes are resolved either
through direct employer-union negotiations or under the auspices of the
various state and federal industrial relations commissions. Australia
has ratified most major international labor organization conventions
regarding worker rights.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively: Approximately 32
percent of the Australian workforce belongs to unions. The industrial
relations system operates through independent federal and state
tribunals; unions are currently fully integrated into that process.
Legislation reducing the powers of unions to represent employees and of
the Industrial Relations Commission to arbitrate settlements was passed
by Federal Parliament in November 1996. Further changes in industrial
relations are under consideration in draft legislation currently before
Parliament.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor: Compulsory and forced
labor are prohibited by conventions which Australia has ratified, and
are not practiced in Australia.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children: The minimum age for the
employment of children varies in Australia according to industry
apprenticeship programs, but the enforced requirement in every state
that children attend school until age 15 or 16 maintains an effective
floor on the age at which children may be employed full time.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work: There is no legislatively-
determined minimum wage. An administratively-determined minimum wage
exists, but is now largely outmoded, although some minimum wage clauses
still remain in several federal awards and some state awards. Instead,
various minimum wages in individual industries are specified in
industry ``awards'' approved by state or federal tribunals. Workers in
Australian industries generally enjoy hours, conditions, wages and
health and safety standards that are among the best and highest in the
world.
f. Rights in Sectors with U.S. Investment: Most of Australia's
industrial sectors enjoy some U.S. investment. Worker rights in all
sectors are essentially identical in law and practice and do not
differentiate between domestic and foreign ownership.
Extent of U.S. Investment in Selected Industries--U.S. Direct Investment Position Abroad on an Historical Cost
Basis--1998
[Millions of U.S. Dollars]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Category Amount
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Petroleum...................... .............. 4,344
Total Manufacturing............ .............. 6,387
Food & Kindred Products...... 662 ...............................................................
Chemicals & Allied Products.. 2,749 ...............................................................
Primary & Fabricated Metals.. 359 ...............................................................
Industrial Machinery and 586 ...............................................................
Equipment.
Electric & Electronic 173 ...............................................................
Equipment.
Transportation Equipment..... 581 ...............................................................
Other Manufacturing.......... 1,278 ...............................................................
Wholesale Trade................ .............. 2,057
Banking........................ .............. 2,595
Finance/Insurance/Real Estate.. .............. 8,347
Services....................... .............. 2,198
Other Industries............... .............. 7,748
TOTAL ALL INDUSTRIES........... .............. 33,676
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis.
______
PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA
Key Economic Indicators
[Billions of U.S. Dollars unless otherwise indicated]
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1997 1998 \1\ 1999
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Income, Production and Employment:
Nominal GDP............................. 903.1 960.8 1,016.8
Real GDP Growth (pct) \2\............... 8.8 7.8 6.9
GDP by Sector: \3\
Agriculture........................... 168.7 172.7 176.1
Manufacturing......................... 444.1 472.8 510.7
Services.............................. 267.9 291.0 304.3
Government............................ 22.3 24.3 25.7
Per Capita GDP (US$).................... 734.2 772.0 797.0
Labor Force (millions).................. 697.0 705.0 713.0
Unemployment Rate (pct) \4\............. 3.1 3.1 3.1
Money and Prices (annual percentage
growth):
Money Supply (M2)....................... 19.6 14.8 15.3
Consumer Price Inflation................ 2.8 -0.8 -1.4
Exchange Rate (RMB/US$ annual average).. 8.3 8.3 8.3
Balance of Payments and Trade:
Total Exports FOB \5\................... 182.7 183.7 198.4
Exports to U.S........................ 62.5 71.2 81.9
Total Imports CIF \5\................... 142.4 140.2 156.0
Imports from U.S. FAS................. 12.8 14.3 15.0
Trade Balance........................... 40.3 43.5 42.4
Balance with U.S...................... 49.7 56.9 66.9
External Public Debt.................... 131.0 146.0 149.0
Fiscal Deficit/GDP (pct)................ 1.5 3.5 3.2
Current Account Surplus/GDP (pct)....... 4.5 3.1 0.0
Debt Service Payments/Exports (pct)..... 7.3 10.9 9.0
Payments/GDP (pct)...................... 1.5 2.4 2.4
Gold and Foreign Exchange Reserves...... 139.9 145.0 152.0
Aid from United States.................. 0 0 0
Aid from All Other Sources.............. 0.4 0.6 0.6
------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Estimated from third quarter and end October 1999 data.
\2\ Official growth rate published by State Statistical Bureau based on
constant renminbi (RMB) prices using 1978 weights. All other income
and production figures are converted into dollars at the exchange
rate. Economic experts continue to debate the accuracy of these
figures, with some arguing that real growth may be half or less the
official rate.
\3\ Production and net exports are calculated using different accounting
methods and do not tally to total GDP. Agriculture includes forestry
and fishing; manufacturing includes mining.
\4\ ``Official'' urban unemployment rate; agricultural laborers are
assumed to be totally employed in China's official labor data. Many
economists believe the real rate is much higher.
\5\ U.S. Department of Commerce (U.S.-China bilateral trade data for
U.S. trade; PRC Customs (Chinese global trade data and 1999
estimates.)
Sources: State Statistical Bureau Yearbook, People's Bank of China
quarterly Statistical Bulletin, U.S. Department of Commerce Trade
Data, Embassy estimates.
1. General Policy Framework
China's official GDP growth rate was 7.4 percent for the first
three quarters of 1999, continuing the gradual slowdown from the
double-digit economic growth of the early 1990s. Consumer spending
languished despite a special two-year infrastructure spending program
and a separate social welfare and civil service spending increase in
mid-1999. State-Owned Enterprise (SOE) reform may have slowed,
particularly in terms of shifting employment from the over-invested
state-owned manufacturing sector to the underdeveloped services sector.
Price deflation has persisted in 1999, with the retail price index down
2.6 percent in October from a year earlier (up from a low of -3.5
percent in the second quarter of 1999.) New bank lending grew more
slowly in 1999, perhaps reflecting increased prudence on the part of
the dominant state-owned banks, whose poor financial condition was a
major concern.
Export growth was the one bright spot in the overall economic
picture. Exports grew 2.1 percent in the third quarter after
consecutive declines through the end of June. China has maintained
competitiveness in many of its major export products, although there
are signs of weakness in textiles and steel. Chinese imports increased
by 15.8 percent in the first three quarters, as China implemented an
anti-smuggling campaign announced in late 1998 and official statistics
captured former gray market imports. Real import levels are widely
believed to have remained stable, and may have actually declined in
some sectors. Inflows of foreign direct investment slumped by about ten
percent, year on year, through the end of July. New commitments dropped
even more substantially, by 20.5 percent through the end of July.
Since late 1998, the Chinese government has employed a deficit-
financed fiscal stimulus program to encourage the expansion of the
domestic economy. The stimulus program financed efforts to broaden the
social safety net for retired and laid off workers, salary and pension
increases for government workers, and infrastructure expenditures. In
addition, the government experimented with policies to curb falling
prices, stimulate household consumption, and promote exports and
investment. While the program has had limited impact on economic
expansion so far, the National People's Congress agreed in August of
1999 to have the central government issue an additional RMB 60 billion
in treasury bonds to underwrite more projects.
As part of its effort to increase the profit making capability of
state-owned enterprises, the Chinese government has experimented with
administrative measures to counter falling prices for SOE products. The
Government announced in mid-1999 that it would prosecute enterprises
selling at below cost and limit approvals to build additional capacity
in a range of over-saturated industries. Firms in industries in which
competition has led to excessive price cuts have also been encouraged
to limit production. An anti-smuggling campaign, begun in the fall of
1998, has shut down black and gray market competition for domestically-
produced products such as televisions and home entertainment systems.
China is committed to reforming its financial system in order to
allocate the large amount of savings in the economy more efficiently.
The failure of the Guangdong Trust and Investment Corporation (GITIC)
in late 1998 prompted the Chinese government to rein in the operations
of more than 200 other trust and investment companies and toughen the
supervision of domestic banks, securities, insurance, and other
financial institutions. The huge stock of non-performing loans to SOE's
has complicated attempts to commercialize the state-owned banks. New
lending to non-agricultural SOE's was about $72 billion in 1998, or 64
percent of total lending. This percentage seemed to drop in 1999, a
sign that banks were trying to find other customers. China's four large
state banks also set up asset management companies in 1999, to
liquidate or restructure older, non-performing loans.
Increased access to China's financial markets for foreign
institutions has grown slowly. China now has 165 foreign bank branches
and sub-branches, including 20 U.S. bank branches. These offices are
concentrated in coastal areas and large inland cities such as Beijing
and Chengdu. Chinese authorities have expanded the number of provinces
in which foreign banks are allowed to conduct local currency (Renminbi)
business but severely circumscribe the activities in which foreign
banks may engage. Foreign securities firms have also been barred from
underwriting or trading domestic stocks or bonds. A few insurance firms
have been granted experimental licenses.
2. Exchange Rate Policies
Foreign-invested Enterprises (FIEs) and authorized Chinese firms
have generally enjoyed liberal access to foreign exchange for trade-
related and approved investment-related transactions. FIEs may set up
foreign currency deposits for trade and remittances. Since late 1997,
Chinese firms earning more than 10 million dollars a year in foreign
currency have been allowed to retain in foreign currency up to 15
percent of their receipts. However, the Asia-wide economic slowdown and
the growing evidence of unauthorized capital outflows prompted the
government to tighten documentation requirements in mid-1998. U.S.
firms reported that the extra delays caused by these measures had ended
for the most part by mid-1999. China introduced currency convertibility
for current account (trade) transactions in December 1996 (in accord
with the IMF charter's Article VIII provisions). Capital account
liberalization has been postponed indefinitely.
The current exchange rate is described as a ``managed float'' by
the authorities; it has behaved more like a pegged rate for the past
three years. Since 1996, the renminbi has traded consistently at about
RMB 8.3 per U.S. dollar. China uses the RMB/dollar exchange rate as the
basic rate and sets cross rates against other currencies by referring
to international markets. The central bank sets interest rates on all
deposits and loans. Local interest rates in 1999 were now considerably
lower than in the United States. As a result, ``black market'' trading
is a small albeit regular feature of the Chinese system. Forward rates
are available in the small, off-shore market.
3. Structural Policies
In 1994, China issued a ``Framework Industrial Policy for the
1990s.'' The framework included plans to issue policies for the key
automotive, telecommunications, transportation, machinery, electronics,
high technology, and construction sectors. Of these, only the
automotive industrial policy has been published to date. Evidence
suggests that the government may develop policies for the other
industries that combine local content and other performance
requirements and tax and investment incentives. In addition,
regulations promulgated in July, 1995 established guidelines for
buyer's and seller's credit programs operated by the Export and Import
Bank of China (China EXIM). China EXIM announced in early 1999 that it
would expand its program to finance the export of mechanical and
electrical products, particularly to Africa and South East Asia.
China announced in August of 1999 that it was considering new
measures to attract additional foreign direct investment. The State
Council is currently reviewing new investment stimulus measures that
would provide tax breaks for high-technology industries, incentives to
invest in China's central and western regions, and streamlined
oversight of foreign investor operations. Frequent changes to and poor
publication of investment guidelines contribute to a lack of
transparency and uneven implementation. In the promotion of foreign
investment, the Chinese government puts major emphasis on the so-called
``pillar industries,'' i.e., capital-intensive and technology-intensive
manufacturing industries. Foreign investment is restricted or
prohibited in some areas including agricultural, forestry,
telecommunications, and news media.
The Chinese government, as part of its comprehensive reform of the
economy, is gradually phasing out price controls. It nevertheless
continues to influence prices of certain sensitive goods such as grain.
To curb surplus production in 1999, grain and cotton prices were
allowed to fall by as much as 20 percent, bringing domestic prices much
closer to international levels. China maintains discriminatory pricing
practices with respect to some services and inputs offered to foreign
investors in China. On the other hand, foreign investors benefit from
investment incentives, such as tax holidays and grace periods, which
allow them to reduce substantially their tax burden.
China provides to domestic and foreign investors a comprehensive
program of tax incentives and concessions based primarily on such
considerations as total investment, output, export potential, economic
management and development, technology development, and general
conduciveness to China's economic goals. Both foreign and domestic
enterprises pay either value-added tax (VAT) or business tax depending
on the nature of the their business and the type of products involved.
The VAT of 17 percent applies to enterprises engaged in import-export,
production, distribution or retailing activities. Under current
regulations, different types of VAT refund methods apply to different
enterprises. In an attempt to stimulate exports, the State Tax
Administration increased VAT rebates several times in 1999, up to a
full 17 percent for certain kinds of processed goods.
4. Debt Management Policies
In mid-1999, China's external debt stood at $149 billion, or 78
percent of exports, according to official Chinese data. In the context
of China's export performance, investment inflows, and high foreign
exchange reserve levels (projected at $153 billion by the end of 1999),
the debt burden should remain in acceptable limits, absent external
shocks that could force a devaluation. Still, the debt service ratio
(principal and interest payments as a percentage of foreign exchange
receipts) jumped four percentage points in 1998 to 11 percent.
China's local bond market is in its infancy, with virtually no
secondary market. This prevents the central bank from effectively
regulating the money supply through indirect means. Interest rates on
government bonds are fixed at about one percentage point above the
comparable bank deposit rates, which are also fixed. As the government
has increased its deficit, the percentage of the budget devoted to debt
servicing has increased to about 28 percent of total expenditures.
5. Aid
The United States has provided occasional disaster-relief
assistance to China to help flood relief and other humanitarian efforts
in recent years. In 1999, the U.S. Government donated $500,000 to the
International Federation of the Red Cross to assist in flood relief
efforts in the Yangtze River Valley. In addition, the United States
operates a modest Peace-Corps-affiliated English-language training
program in southwestern China's Sichuan and Guizhou provinces. China is
a major recipient of assistance from other countries and multilateral
donors. China's largest bilateral aid donor is Japan. Multilateral
assistance includes but is not limited to programs operated by the
World Bank; the World Food Program; United Nations Development Program
and other United Nations-affiliated agencies and programs; and the
Asian Development Bank. Non-governmental organizations have also
expanded their presence in recent years, thanks in part to the
promulgation of a new law in 1998 giving them official status.
6. Significant Barriers to U.S. Exports
China concluded a bilateral market access agreement with the United
States on November 15, 1999, but is not yet a member of the WTO. Once
it becomes a member, it must fulfill its commitments to reduce current
substantial barriers to the entry into China of U.S. goods and
services. Meanwhile, China continued in 1999 its own unilateral reform
efforts--a round of tariff cuts, reductions in the number of products
subject to import quotas, a huge increase in the number and type of
firms granted trading rights, an improved system of distribution
rights, and an increase in the number of cities in which foreign bank
branches are allowed to conduct Renminbi banking business. These
measures improved access for U.S. goods and services, but
liberalization of China's import regime still lags far behind that for
exports.
Despite considerable progress in the 1990s, non-tariff barriers to
trade and trade-distorting measures persist. Non-tariff barriers (NTBs)
include quotas, tariff rate quotas, import licensing, import
substitution and local content policies, and unnecessarily restrictive
certification and quarantine standards. Extra-legal trade barriers,
such as export performance requirements, still distort trade. Foreign
Invested Enterprises (FIEs) continue to report being forced to accept
export performance requirements in investment contracts; they say that
failure to meet these requirements can result in loss of licenses for
foreign exchange or contract termination. Similarly, some firms report
being forced to accept contracts mandating increased ``local content;''
government agencies strongly encourage firms under their control to
``buy Chinese.''
China's Customs General Administration announced an anti-smuggling
campaign in the fall of 1998. The campaign has reduced trade through
black and gray market channels and resulted in an increase in imports
through legitimate channels. It has not, however, addressed the tariff
and non-tariff barriers that created an environment conducive to
smuggling in the first place. Further, in an effort to control illegal
foreign exchange transactions and prevent capital flight, the Ministry
of Finance announced regulations in late 1998 that place strict
controls on foreign exchange transactions by foreign-invested firms.
New regulatory initiatives announced in 1999 may also create
significant barriers to the entry of U.S. goods and services into the
Chinese market. Examples of these include:
The Chinese government banned the import of nine generic medicines,
including several varieties of antibiotics, pain relievers, and Vitamin
C, in mid 1999 in an effort to control falling prices in the domestic
market. In addition, in late 1998, it implemented price caps on
pharmaceuticals, claiming it was doing so to contain health care costs.
The regulations may drive some multinationals and bulk pharmaceutical
exporters out of the $12-billion Chinese pharmaceutical market and push
others into the red. The price caps are calculated on each drug's
production costs, ignoring research spending and other shared
overheads.
For manufactured goods, China requires quality licenses before
granting import approval, with testing based on standards and
specifications often unknown or unavailable to foreigners and not
applied equally to domestic products. For example, in mid-1999, the
Ministry of Health imposed strict testing standards on imports of
cosmetic products containing sunscreens, skin lighteners or hair
restorers. Industry sources say the testing requirements create an
effective import barrier as they are both obscure and expensive to
carry out.
Regulations published by the State Statistical Bureau (SSB) in
July, 1999, require all foreign companies conducting market surveys in
China to go through an annual registration process. Furthermore, the
regulations stipulate that all survey activities undertaken by foreign
institutions, or domestic agencies employed by foreigners, must first
be approved by provincial statistical bureaus or the SSB. Finished
survey results must also be cleared with the approving agency. The
regulations are alarming not only because they will be expensive and
time consuming to comply with but also because they have the potential
to limit the freedom of legitimate firms to conduct market research. In
addition, the potential for compromise of confidential business
information is substantial.
Regulations implemented in June 1999 further restrict the
importation of certain commodities related to the processing trade.
These measures are designed to shift the direction of China's
processing trade towards products with higher technological content and
higher value added potential. The regulations prohibit the import of
used garments, certain kinds of used publications, toxic industrial
waste, junk cars, used automobiles or components, seeds, seedlings,
fertilizers, feed, additives, or antibiotics used in the cultivation or
breeding of any export commodity. The regulations also restrict imports
of plastic raw materials, raw materials for chemical fibers, cotton,
cotton yarn, cotton cloth, and some steel products.
7. Export Subsidies
China abolished direct subsidies for exports on January 1, 1991.
Nonetheless, many of China's manufactured exports receive indirect
subsidies through guaranteed provision of energy, raw materials or
labor supplies. Exports of agricultural products, particularly corn and
cotton, currently benefit from direct export subsidies. China has
agreed to stop such subsidies once it becomes a member of the WTO,
however. Other indirect subsidies are also available, for example bank
loans that need not be repaid.
8. Protection of U.S. Intellectual Property
China is a member of the World Intellectual Property Organization
(WIPO) and is a signatory to the Paris Convention for the Protection of
Intellectual Property, the Berne Convention for the Protection of
Literary and Artistic Works, the Universal Copyright Convention, and
the Patent Cooperation Treaty. China has also acceded to the Madrid
Protocol.
Since the signing of a U.S.-China agreement on the protection of
intellectual property rights in February 1995, and the agreement in
June 1996 on procedures for ensuring implementation of the bilateral,
China has made progress in implementing IPR regulations, education, and
enforcement. China was taken off all ``Special 301'' lists in 1996.
However, China's practices continue to be watched under Section 306 of
the Trade Act, which allows the United States to monitor China's
compliance with its obligations.
Although China has revised its laws to provide criminal penalties
for IPR violations, the United States remains concerned that penalties
imposed by Chinese courts do not act as a deterrent. Some U.S.
companies estimate losses from Chinese counterfeiting equal 15 to 20
percent of total sales in China. One U.S. consumer products company
estimates that it loses $150 million annually due to counterfeiting.
The destructive effect of counterfeiting has discouraged additional
direct foreign investment and threatened the long-term viability of
some U.S. business operations in China. The inferior quality of
counterfeit products also creates serious health and safety risks for
consumers.
China's State Council, the highest executive organ of the
government, issued a decree in 1999 admonishing Chinese government
agencies to purchase only legal computer software. Nevertheless, end-
user piracy of computer software continues to cost U.S. companies
millions of dollars each year. Regulations on the use of copyright
agents by foreign companies have not yet been finalized; this
effectively prevents foreign companies from using agents to register
copyrights. A shortage of agents authorized to accept trademark
applications from foreign companies makes it difficult for foreigners
to register trademarks. The lack of clear procedures to protect
unregistered well-known trademarks makes it extremely difficult to
oppose or cancel well-known marks registered by an unauthorized party.
9. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association: China's constitution provides for
``freedom of association,'' but in practice this provision does not
entitle workers to organize freely. The Trade Union Law states that
workers who wish to form a union at any level must receive approval
from a higher-level trade organization. Approved trade unions are
legally required to join the All-China Federation of Trade Unions
(ACFTU), a national umbrella organization controlled by the Communist
Party. Independent trade unions are illegal. Since China's signing of
the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights in
1997, several labor activists have petitioned the Government to
establish free trade unions, as allowed under the covenant. The
Government has not yet ratified the Covenant nor approved any of these
petitions to date.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively: The 1995
National Labor Law permits collective bargaining for workers in all
types of enterprises. The law also provides for workers and employers
to sign individual as well as collective contracts. Collective
contracts are to be worked out between ACFTU or worker representatives
and management and specify such matters as working conditions, wage
distribution, and hours of work. Individual contracts are then to be
drawn up in line with the terms of the collective contract. According
to the ACFTU, 72 million workers in over 310,000 enterprises held
contracts that were negotiated in this fashion as of June, 1999.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor: Forced labor in penal
institutions is a problem. The Chinese government employs judicial
procedures to sentence criminals to prisons and reform-though-labor
facilities. The Government also maintains a network of reeducation-
through-labor camps, to which persons are sentenced, without judicial
review, through administrative procedures. Inmates of reeducation-
through-labor camps generally are required to work. Most reports
conclude that work conditions in the penal system's light manufacturing
facilities are similar to those in ordinary factories, but conditions
on farms and in mines can be harsh.
d. Minimum Age of Employment of Children: China's National Labor
Law forbids employers to hire workers under 16 years of age and
stipulates administrative review, fines, and revocation of licenses for
businesses that hire minors. Good public awareness, a surplus of legal
adult workers, nearly universal primary schooling, and more effective
law enforcement reduce opportunities and incentives to hire child
workers. The ILO and UNICEF maintain that there is not a significant
child labor problem in the formal sector. Some Chinese academics,
however, believe that child labor problems might exist in remote
agricultural and mining areas, where labor law enforcement is sometimes
difficult.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work: The Labor Law codifies many of
the general principles of labor reform, setting out provisions on labor
contracts, working hours, wages, skill development and training,
dispute resolution, legal responsibility, supervision, and inspection.
The law does not set a national minimum wage, but allows local
governments to determine their own minimum wage standards. China has a
40-hour workweek, excluding overtime, and a mandatory 24-hour rest
period per week. The Chinese government claims to have implemented in
over 600 cities a system that ensures disbursement of unemployment
benefits to laid-off workers and basic living stipends for the poorest
urban residents. In September 1999, the Government raised both
unemployment benefits and basic living stipends by thirty percent,
despite reports that some cities had had trouble providing these
entitlements even before the hike.
Every Chinese work unit must designate a health and safety officer,
and the ILO has established a training program for these officers.
China's Trade Union Law recognizes the right of unions to ``suggest
that staff and workers withdraw from sites of danger'' and to
participate in accident investigations. According to statistics
released in 1999 by the Ministry of Labor and Social Security,
industrial accidents declined 16 percent in 1998 to 15,372. Deaths
stemming from such accidents likewise declined 16 percent to 14,660.
The improvement in industrial safety was largely the result of a
national campaign to shut down illegal mines, which have perennially
accounted for more than half of all industrial accidents.
f. Rights in Sectors with U.S. Investment: Worker rights practices
in sectors with U.S. investment do not appear to vary substantially
from those in other sectors of the economy. Unlike their Chinese
counterparts, however, a number of U.S.-invested businesses have
voluntarily adopted codes of conduct that provide for independent
inspections of working conditions in their facilities.
Extent of U.S. Investment in Selected Industries--U.S. Direct Investment Position Abroad on an Historical Cost
Basis--1998
[Millions of U.S. Dollars]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Category Amount
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Petroleum...................... .............. 911
Total Manufacturing............ .............. 3,729
Food & Kindred Products...... 122 ...............................................................
Chemicals & Allied Products.. 325 ...............................................................
Primary & Fabricated Metals.. 167 ...............................................................
Industrial Machinery and 463 ...............................................................
Equipment.
Electric & Electronic 1,472 ...............................................................
Equipment.
Transportation Equipment..... 175 ...............................................................
Other Manufacturing.......... 1,005 ...............................................................
Wholesale Trade................ .............. 372
Banking........................ .............. 127
Finance/Insurance/Real Estate.. .............. 771
Services....................... .............. 31
Other Industries............... .............. 407
TOTAL ALL INDUSTRIES........... .............. 6,348
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis.
______
HONG KONG
Key Economic Indicators
[Billions of U.S. Dollars unless otherwise indicated]
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1997 1998 \1\ 1999
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Income, Production and Employment:
Nominal GDP \2\......................... 171.7 162.6 160.1
Real GDP Growth (pct)................... 5.3 -5.1 0.5
GDP by Sector:
Agriculture........................... 0.2 N/A N/A
Manufacturing......................... 10.3 N/A N/A
Services.............................. 134.8 N/A N/A
Government............................ 14.6 15.1 N/A
Per Capita GDP (US$).................... 26,129 24,310 23,095
Labor Force (000's)..................... 3,216 3,359 3,393
Unemployment Rate (pct)................. 2.2 4.7 6.0
Money and Prices (annual percentage
growth):
Money Supply (M2) \3\................... 8.4 11.8 5.7
Consumer Price Inflation (pct).......... 5.7 2.5 -3.5
Exchange Rate(HK$/US$)
Official.............................. 7.74 7.75 7.75
Balance of Payments and Trade:
Total Exports FOB \4\................... 188.1 172.8 167.6
Exports to U.S. \5\................... 10.3 10.5 11.0
Total Imports CIF....................... 210.9 214.1 176.3
Imports from U.S. \5\................. 15.1 12.9 12.6
Trade Balance........................... -22.8 -10.4 -8.7
Balance with U.S. \5\................. -4.8 -2.4 -1.6
External Public Debt.................... 0 0 0
Fiscal Balance/GDP (pct) \6\............ 0.8 1.8 2.9
Current Account Balance/GDP (pct)....... -3.4 0.5 2.0
Debt Service Payments/GDP (pct)......... 0 0 0
Gold and Foreign Exchange Reserves
(end of period) \7\................... 92.8 89.6 90.5
Aid from U.S............................ 0 0 0
Aid from All Other Sources.............. 0 0 0
------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Estimates based on monthly data through August 1999.
\2\ Expenditure-based GDP estimates.
\3\ Money supply of Hong Kong Dollars and foreign currencies.
\4\ Of which domestic exports (as opposed to re-exports) constituted
14.5 percent (1997), 14.0 percent (1998) and 13.0 percent (1999
estimate based on data through August).
\5\ Source: U.S. Department of Commerce and U.S. Census Bureau; exports
FAS, imports customs basis; 1999 figures are estimates based on data
available through August 1999. Hong Kong merchandise trade includes
substantial re-exports (mainly from China) to the United States, which
are not included in these figures.
\6\ As of Q2 1999.
\7\ As of September 1999; the Land Fund was included in the foreign
exchange reserves effective July 1, 1997.
Source: Census and Statistics Department.
1. General Policy Framework
Since becoming a Special Administrative Region of the People's
Republic of China on July 1, 1997, Hong Kong has continued to manage
its own financial and economic affairs, its own currency, and its
independent role in international economic organizations and
agreements.
The Hong Kong Government generally pursues policies of
noninterference in commercial decisions, low and predictable taxation,
government spending increases within the bounds of real economic
growth, competition subject to transparent laws (albeit without
antitrust legislation) and consistent application of the rule of law.
With few exceptions, the government allows market forces to set wages
and prices, and does not restrict foreign capital flows or investment.
It does not impose export performance or local content requirements,
and allows free repatriation of profits. Hong Kong is a duty-free port,
with few barriers to trade in goods and services.
Until 1998, the government regularly ran budget surpluses and thus
has amassed large fiscal reserves. The corporate profit tax is 16
percent and personal income is taxed at a maximum of 15 percent.
Property is taxed; interest, royalties, dividends, capital gains and
sales are not.
Because monetary policy is tied to maintaining the nominal exchange
rate linked to the U.S. Dollar, Hong Kong's monetary aggregates have
effectively been demand-determined. The Hong Kong Monetary Authority,
responding to market pressures, occasionally adjusts liquidity through
interest rate changes and intervention in the foreign exchange and
money markets.
Financial contagion spreading throughout Asia caused major
downturns in Hong Kong in 1997 and 1998. The government made modest
accommodations in its 1998 budget and halted government property sales
from mid-1998 to mid-1999 to arrest a steady decline in property prices
(which had sparked fears for the banking sector). In August 1998, the
government made a ``one-time'' intervention in the stock, futures, and
currency markets (spending about $15 billion) to defend itself from
market manipulators. In October 1999, the government began to divest
itself of the shares it acquired in this intervention through sales to
the public. By late 1999, the Hong Kong economy had begun a modest
recovery, but unemployment remained high and Hong Kong's services-
dependent market lagged behind some of its neighbors in shaking off the
regional crisis.
2. Exchange Rate Policies
The Hong Kong Dollar is linked to the U.S. Dollar at an exchange
rate of HK$7.8 = US$1.00. The link was established in 1983 to encourage
stability and investor confidence in the run-up to Hong Kong's
reversion to Chinese sovereignty in 1997. PRC officials have supported
Hong Kong's policy of maintaining the link.
There are no foreign exchange controls of any sort. Under the
linked exchange rate, the overall exchange value of the Hong Kong
Dollar is influenced predominantly by the movement of the U.S. Dollar
against other major currencies. The price competitiveness of Hong Kong
exports is therefore affected the value of the U.S. Dollar in relation
to third country currencies.
3. Structural Policies
The government does not have pricing policies, except in a few
sectors such as telecommunications which remain partially regulated.
Even in those areas, the government continues to pursue sector-by-
sector liberalization. Hong Kong's personal and corporate tax rates
remain low and it does not impose import or export taxes. Since 1996,
Hong Kong has deregulated most interest rates, removing the rate cap
for deposits of seven days or more. In July 1999, the Hong Kong
Monetary Authority announced that remaining interest rate caps would be
removed in two stages: the interest rate restrictions on time deposits
with a maturity of less than 7 days in July 2000 and interest rate cap
on savings and current accounts in July 2001. Consumption taxes on
tobacco, alcoholic beverages, and some fuels probably restrict demand
for some U.S. exports. Hong Kong generally adheres to international
product standards.
Hong Kong's lack of antitrust laws has allowed monopolies or
cartels--some of which are government-regulated--to dominate certain
sectors of the economy. These monopolies/cartels can use their market
position to block effective competition indiscriminately but do not
discriminate against U.S. goods or services in particular.
4. Debt Management Policies
The Hong Kong Government has minuscule public debt. Repeated budget
surpluses have meant the government has not had to borrow. To promote
the development of Hong Kong's debt market, the government launched an
exchange fund bills program with the issuance of 91-day bills in 1990.
Since then, maturities have gradually been extended. Five-year notes
were issued in October 1993, followed by 7-year notes in late 1995 and
10-year notes in 1996. In March 1997, the Hong Kong Mortgage
Corporation was set up to promote the development of the secondary
mortgage market. The Corporation is 100 percent owned by the government
through the Exchange Fund. The Corporation purchases residential
mortgage loans for its retained portfolio in the first phase, followed
by packaging mortgages into mortgage-backed securities for sale in the
second phase.
Hong Kong does not receive bilateral or multilateral assistance.
5. Significant Barriers to U.S. Exports
Hong Kong is a member of the World Trade Organization, but does not
belong to the WTO's plurilateral agreement on civil aircraft. As noted
above, Hong Kong is a duty-free port with no quotas or dumping laws,
and few barriers to the import of U.S. goods.
Hong Kong requires import licenses for textiles, rice, meats,
plants, and livestock. The stated rationale for most license
requirements is to ensure that health standards are met. The
requirements do not have a major impact on U.S. exports.
There are several barriers to entry in the services sector:
In 1998, the Hong Kong Government announced it would open
the international voice telecommunications sector to full competition.
The Government decided in May 1999 not to issue any additional licenses
for the local fixed network market, now contested by four companies,
until the end of 2002. Hong Kong is currently adjudicating license
applications for local fixed wireless and external fixed network
services (undersea cable and satellite-based). Hong Kong has eliminated
a regulation that required foreign broadcasters to use the Hong Kong
Telecom satellite uplink and has also promised comprehensive
liberalization of the broadcasting regime.
Our bilateral civil aviation agreement does not permit
code sharing or allow U.S. carriers new fifth freedom passenger rights
to carry passengers beyond Hong Kong. These factors limit expansion of
U.S. passenger carriers in the Hong Kong market.
Foreign law firms are barred from hiring local lawyers to
advise clients on Hong Kong law, even though Hong Kong firms can hire
foreign lawyers to advise clients on foreign law. Foreign law firms can
become ``local law firms'' and hire Hong Kong attorneys, but they must
do so on a 1:1 ratio with foreign lawyers.
Foreign banks established after 1978 are permitted to
maintain only three branches (automated teller machines meet the
definition of a branch). The Hong Kong Monetary Authority has promised
to consider further relaxation of this limit in the first quarter of
2001. Foreign banks, however, can acquire local banks that have
unlimited branching rights.
6. Export Subsidies Policies
The Hong Kong Government neither protects nor directly subsidizes
manufacturers who export. It does not offer exporters preferential
financing, special tax or duty exemptions on imported inputs, resource
discounts, or discounted exchange rates.
The Trade Development Council, a quasi-governmental statutory
organization, engages in export promotion activities and promotes Hong
Kong as a hub for trade services. The Hong Kong Export Credit and
Insurance Corporation sells insurance protection to exporters.
7. Protection of U.S. Intellectual Property
Hong Kong is a member of the WTO. In addition, the Berne Convention
for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, the Paris Convention
on Industrial Property, and the Universal Copyright Convention (Geneva,
Paris) apply to Hong Kong by virtue of China's membership. Hong Kong
passed a new Copyright Law in June 1997. Enforcement of copyright and
trademarks has improved measurably in recent months, but eliminating
optical disc piracy will require sustained effort.
Copyrights: Sale of pirated discs at retail shopping arcades is
less widespread than it used to be but remains a problem. The United
States has urged the government at senior levels to crack down on this
retail trade, and on the distributors and wholesalers behind them. Hong
Kong has responded by doubling Customs' enforcement manpower and
conducting more aggressive raids at the retail level. Recent raids have
closed down some of the most notorious retail arcades and dispersed
this illicit trade. Hong Kong Customs intelligence operations and raids
on underground production facilities have forced pirate retailers to
rely more on smuggled products. Nevertheless, pirated goods remain
available throughout the territory. The judiciary has begun to increase
sentences and fines for copyright piracy and recently handed down Hong
Kong's first conviction for unauthorized dealer hard-disk loading.
Computer end-user piracy remains a significant problem for the business
software industry. In 1999 the government introduced legislation to
reclassify piracy under Hong Kong's Organized and Serious Crimes
Ordinance, which would facilitate interrogations and allow the seizure
of assets. As of November, approval by the Legislative Council is still
pending.
Trademarks: Sale of counterfeit items, particularly handbags and
apparel, is widespread in Hong Kong's outdoor markets. Customs
officials have conducted numerous raids, but these actions have had
little impact on the overall availability of counterfeit goods.
New Technologies: U.S. industry reports that Hong Kong-based web
sites are being used to sell and transmit pirate software and music.
The Government asserts that Hong Kong's 1997 Copyright Ordinance
established civil liability for internet service providers to who host
such pirate web sites, but concedes that this theory has yet to be
tested in court.
The International Intellectual Property Alliance estimated total
losses due to piracy against American copyright holders at $243.5
million in 1998--slightly less than half of which was entertainment
software. The Business Software Alliance reported in early 1999 that
software piracy in Hong Kong had dropped from 67 to 59 percent.
8. Workers Rights
a. The Right of Association: Local law provides for right of
association and the right of workers to establish and join
organizations of their own choosing. Trade unions must be registered
under the Trade Unions Ordinance. The basic precondition for
registration is a minimum of seven persons who serve in the same
occupation. The government does not discourage or impede the formation
of unions.
Workers who allege antiunion discrimination have the right to have
their cases heard by the Labor Relations Tribunal. Violation of
antiunion discrimination provisions is a criminal offense. Although
there is no legislative prohibition of strikes, in practice, most
workers must sign employment contracts that state that walking off the
job is a breach of contract and can lead to summary dismissal.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively: In June 1997,
the Legislative Council passed three laws that greatly expanded the
collective bargaining powers of Hong Kong workers, protected them from
summary dismissal for union activity, and permitted union activity on
company premises and time. However, the Provisional Legislature
repealed these ordinances, removing workers' new statutory protection
against summary dismissal for union activity. New legislation passed in
October 1997 permits the cross-industry affiliation of labor union
federations and confederations, and allows free association with
overseas trade unions (although notification of the Labor Department
within one month of affiliation is required), but removes the legal
stipulation of trade unions' right to engage employers in collective
bargaining and bans the use of union funds for political purposes.
Collective bargaining is not widely practiced.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor: Compulsory labor is
prohibited under the Bill of Rights Ordinance. While this legislation
does not specifically prohibit forced or bonded labor by children,
there are no reports of such practices in Hong Kong.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children: The ``Employment of
Children'' Regulations prohibit employment of children under age 15 in
any industrial establishment. Children ages 13 and 14 may be employed
in certain non-industrial establishments, subject to conditions aimed
at ensuring a minimum of 9 years of education and protecting their
safety, health, and welfare. In 1998, there were ten convictions for
violations of the Employment of Children Regulations.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work: Aside from a small number of
trades and industries in which a uniform wage structure exists, wage
levels are customarily fixed by individual agreement between employer
and employee and are determined by supply and demand. Some employers
provide workers with various kinds of allowances, free medical
treatment and free subsidized transport. There is no statutory minimum
wage except for foreign domestic workers (US$ 500 per month). To comply
with the Sex Discrimination Ordinance, provisions in the Women and
Young Persons (Industry) Regulations that had prohibited women from
joining dangerous industrial trades and limited their working hours
were dropped. Work hours for people aged 15 to 17 in the manufacturing
sector remain limited to 8 per day and 48 per week between 6 a.m. and
11 p.m. Overtime is prohibited for all persons under the age of 18 in
industrial establishments. Employment in dangerous trades is prohibited
for youths, except 16 and 17 year old males.
The Labor Inspectorate conducts workplace inspections to enforce
compliance with these and health and safety regulations. Worker safety
and health has improved, but serious problems remain, particularly in
the construction industry. In 1998, a total of 63,526 occupational
accidents (43,034 of which are classified as industrial accidents) were
reported, of which 68 were fatal. Employers are required under the
Employee's Compensation Ordinance to report any injuries sustained by
their employees in work-related accidents.
f. Rights in Sectors with U.S. Investment: U.S. direct investment
in manufacturing is concentrated in the electronics and electrical
products industries. Aside from hazards common to such operations,
working conditions do not differ materially from those in other sectors
of the economy. Relative labor market tightness and high job turnover
have spurred continuing improvements in working conditions as employers
compete for available workers.
Extent of U.S. Investment in Selected Industries--U.S. Direct Investment Position Abroad on an Historical Cost
Basis--1998
[Millions of U.S. Dollars]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Category Amount
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Petroleum...................... .............. 600
Total Manufacturing............ .............. 3,122
Food & Kindred Products...... 4 ...............................................................
Chemicals & Allied Products.. 348 ...............................................................
Primary & Fabricated Metals.. 282 ...............................................................
Industrial Machinery and 167 ...............................................................
Equipment.
Electric & Electronic 1,230 ...............................................................
Equipment.
Transportation Equipment..... 29 ...............................................................
Other Manufacturing.......... 1,062 ...............................................................
Wholesale Trade................ .............. 5,054
Banking........................ .............. 1,637
Finance/Insurance/Real Estate.. .............. 5,007
Services....................... .............. 1,009
Other Industries............... .............. 4,373
TOTAL ALL INDUSTRIES........... .............. 20,802
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis.
______
INDONESIA
Key Economic Indicators
[Billions of U.S. Dollars unless otherwise indicated]
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1997 1998 \1\ 1999
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Income, Production and Employment: \1\
Nominal GDP............................. 216 94 67
Real GDP Growth (pct)................... 7.6 -13.2 -4.04.0
GDP by Sector:
Agriculture........................... 34.5 18.4 15.0
Manufacturing......................... 54.9 23.4 16.7
Services.............................. 67.5 35.7 26.4
Government............................ 11.5 4.1 3.16
Per Capita GDP (US$).................... 1,116 465 \2\ 550
Labor Force (millions).................. 87.0 92.6 96.6
Unemployment Rate (pct)................. 4.6 10 10
Money and Prices (annual percentage
growth):
Money Supply (M2) (pct)................. 23.2 62.3 \3\ 10.2
Consumer Price Inflation (pct).......... 8.0 75.0 \4\ 0.02
Exchange Rate (Rupiah/US$ annual 2,909 10,014 7948
average)...............................
Balance of Payments and Trade: \1\
Total Exports FOB....................... 56.2 50.4 21.7
Exports to U.S........................ 9.2 9.3 5.3
Total Imports CIF....................... 41.7 27.3 11.5
Imports from U.S...................... 4.5 2.3 1.1
Trade Balance........................... 14.5 23.1 10.2
Balance with U.S...................... 4.7 7.0 4.2
External Public Debt.................... 56.4 71.4 70.7
Debt Service Payments/GDP (pct)......... 3.8 7.6 \5\ 6.7
Current Account Balance/GDP(pct) \6\.... -0.9 3.9 2.7
Fiscal Deficit/GDP (pct) \6\............ 1.1 2.2 5.0
Gold and Foreign Exchange Reserves (end 17.4 23.5 26.7
of period).............................
Aid from U.S. (millions of US$)......... 71 135 \6\ 139
Aid from All Other Sources.............. 5.2 5.2 \7\ 7.8
------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ 1999 GDP and export/import figures are for January-June. (Average Rp/
US$ exchange rates were 8,775 for 1Q CY-1999 and 7,921 for 2Q CY-
1999.)
\2\ 1999 per capita GDP figure is rough estimate. Increase in 1999 over
1998 due to strengthening of Rp/$ exchange rate.
\3\ 1999 figure is for January-August.
\4\ 1999 figure is for January-September.
\5\ 1999 figure as of March 31 (includes debts of state-owned
enterprises).
\6\ Fiscal year.
\7\ 1999 figure is amount pledged.
Sources: Government of Indonesia, U.S. Department of Commerce (for trade
with U.S.), IMF (exchange rates), U.S. Agency for International
Development (for bilateral assistance).
1. General Policy Framework
Much of the cautious optimism toward Indonesia in the second half
of 1999 stems from the political successes Indonesia achieved since
former President Soeharto resigned in May 1998. In that time, Indonesia
has lifted press restrictions, held a peaceful, free and fair multi-
party general election in June 1999 and installed a democratically
elected president in October 1999. The new President, K.H. Aburrahman
Wahid, although a dark horse candidate, is broadly acceptable to all
political groupings. The subsequent selection as Vice President of
Megawati Soekarnoputri, leader of the party which came in first in the
June polls, heralded the selection of a multi-party ``national unity''
cabinet.
Indonesia still faces daunting economic problems. Foreign capital
fled in the early months of the financial crisis and is returning only
slowly. The business sector is struggling to service existing foreign
debts at the weaker exchange rate. The banking sector remains moribund;
banks are making few new loans and debtors are servicing even fewer old
ones. In mid-1999, the Indonesian Bank Restructuring Agency (IBRA),
whose credibility with both the domestic and international business
community is crucial to Indonesia's economic recovery, was caught up in
a campaign finance and corruption scandal involving Bank Bali. The
scandal involved the diversion of funds from a $120 million interbank
loan repayment to Bank Bali from a now-closed government bank whose
assets and liabilities had been transferred to IBRA.
The IMF and its stabilization program have been the overriding
economic fact of life in Indonesia since November 1997. The IMF
suspended payments to Indonesia in September 1999 until the Bank Bali
affair was resolved. The election of a new president and the belated
release of an independent audit of the Bank Bali affair in November led
the IMF to begin negotiations on a new three-year program. The target
is to sign a new letter of intent by mid-January.
Despite the continued financial turmoil, there remain deep
underlying strengths in the Indonesian economy. Indonesia is the
world's fourth largest country and the anchor of Southeast Asia
politically and economically. Although shaken and still cautious, the
emerging middle class is slowly resuming consumer spending and
represents a huge and growing potential market. The country has a
strategic location, a large labor force earning relatively low wages
and abundant natural resources. Once largely dependent on petroleum,
natural gas, and commodities such as coffee, tea, rubber, timber, and
palm oil and shrimp, Indonesia again found those sectors to be a solid
economic foundation when the crisis hit. Regions such as Sumatra and
Sulawesi that have strong, agricultural commodity-based economies
survived the crisis with only minor disruptions. In 1998, Indonesian
agricultural exports rose some 17 percent in U.S. dollar terms, as
farmers rushed to take advantage of the windfall brought about by the
weak rupiah, and fell only slightly in the first half of 1999.
Industrial exports in 1998 fell just over 1 percent. Indonesian exports
to the U.S. have remained steady throughout the crisis at around $9.3
billion a year. Total imports fell by 35 percent in 1998 over 1997.
Imports from the U.S. fell by almost half from 1997 to 1998 and by
another 15 percent in the first half of 1999.
The Indonesian Government has historically maintained a
``balanced'' budget: expenditures were covered by the sum of domestic
revenues and foreign aid and borrowing, without resort to domestic
borrowing. Often the government ended the year with a slight surplus.
This remains the government's long term goal. The new government says
it expects the gap between domestic revenues and expenditures to remain
for several years although some of the budgetary pressure has been
relieved by the rise in oil prices in the latter half of 1999. The
budgetary gap in the 1999/2000 fiscal year, which will need to be
covered by foreign assistance, is expected to be in the range of 4 to 5
percent.
In parallel with its fiscal policy, the Indonesian Government
earned a reputation for prudent monetary policy in recent years that
helped keep consumer price inflation in the single digits. However, the
massive depreciation of the rupiah that began in mid-1997 and huge
liquidity injections into the banking system contributed to significant
inflation. Indonesian monetary authorities dampened inflationary
pressure and reduced pressure on the exchange rate by controlling the
growth of the money supply.
The government has made steady progress in trade and investment
deregulation. Periodic ``deregulation packages'' of liberalization
measures lowered investment barriers and instituted a program of
comprehensive tariff reduction by staged cuts. The goal is to reduce
all tariffs in the 1 to 20 percent range to 5 percent or less by 2000,
and to reduce all tariffs in the 20 percent and higher range to 10
percent or less by 2003. Although the deregulation packages made
comparatively less progress in reducing non-tariff barriers, the
government's collaboration with the International Monetary Fund (IMF)
since November 1997 prompted much bolder measures, ending most import
monopolies and gradually opening Indonesia's closed distribution
system. The program also includes a commitment to eliminate all non-
tariff barriers over the program period.
2. Exchange Rate Policies
In August 1997, the government eliminated the rupiah intervention
band in favor of a floating exchange rate policy.
3. Structural Policies
In October 1997, deteriorating conditions led Indonesia to request
support from the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The government
signed its first Letter of Intent with the IMF on October 31, 1997. The
letter called for a three-year economic stabilization and recovery
program, supported by loans from the IMF ($10 billion), the World Bank,
the Asian Development Bank, and bilateral donors. Apart from financial
support, the international community also offered detailed technical
assistance to the government. Foreign governments and private
organizations also contributed food and other humanitarian assistance.
Indonesia's agreement with the IMF has been revised repeatedly in
response to deteriorating macroeconomic conditions and political
changes. The result is a complex, multi-faceted program to address
macroeconomic imbalances, financial weaknesses, real sector
inefficiencies, and the loss of private sector confidence. In November
1999, the IMF resumed negotiations with the government with the aim of
drafting a new letter of intent to take account of changing
circumstances and the new government's priorities.
4. Debt Management Policies
Indonesia's foreign debt totaled about $145 billion as of September
1999, with about $72 billion owed by the public sector and $73 billion
by the private sector. In 1998, Indonesia signed a Memorandum of
Understanding with its official creditors to reschedule public sector
debt principal contracted before July 1, 1997 and falling due between
August 1998 and the end of March 2000.
In 1999, the government introduced a monitoring system to collect
information on all foreign exchange transactions, including foreign
borrowing. Borrowing in connection with state-owned enterprises has
been regulated since 1991. The government continued to assert that it
would not impose capital controls.
5. Significant Barriers to U.S. Exports
Indonesia had previously maintained a complex and non-transparent
import licensing system that was a significant impediment to trade.
Since the advent of the economic crisis in 1997, the government has
removed numerous licensing requirements and committed in its IMF
agreement to phase out all quantitative import restrictions (other than
those justified for health, safety, and environmental reasons) and
other non-tariff barriers that protect domestic production.
Services Barriers: Despite some loosening of restrictions, services
trade entry barriers remain in many sectors. Commercial presence is
required to offer insurance in Indonesia and foreign firms must form
joint ventures with local companies. As of July 1998, foreign
participation in telecommunications services is no longer limited. PT
Telkom is the state-owned monopoly provider of fixed line services.
Telkom has exclusive rights to provide nationwide fixed line
telecommunications until 2011 and to provide domestic long distance
services until 2006. The government has allowed five foreign
telecommunications companies to partner with local firms and operate
joint ventures to build, maintain, and operate local fixed-line
networks in cooperation with PT Telkom.
Foreign accounting firms must operate through technical assistance
arrangements with local firms, but Indonesian citizenship is no longer
a requirement for licensing as an accountant. Foreign agents and
auditors may act only as consultants and may not sign audit reports.
Foreign law firms are not allowed to establish practices in Indonesia.
Attorneys are admitted to the bar only if they have graduated from an
Indonesian legal faculty or an institution recognized as the
equivalent. Foreign companies incorporated in Indonesia may issue
stocks and bonds through the capital market.
Investment Barriers: The government is committed to reducing
burdensome bureaucratic procedures and substantive requirements for
foreign investors. In 1994, the government dropped initial foreign
equity requirements and sharply reduced divestiture requirements.
Indonesian law provides for both 100 percent direct foreign investment
projects and joint ventures with a minimum Indonesian equity of five
percent. In mid-1998, the government opened several previously
restricted sectors to foreign investment, reducing the number of
sectors restricted for foreign direct investment to 25, 16 of which are
completely closed to investment while the remaining nine allow minority
foreign equity participation. The restricted sectors include taxi and
bus transportation, local shipping, cinema operation, private
broadcasting and newspapers, medical services, and some trade services.
The government also removed foreign ownership limitations on banks and
on firms publicly traded on Indonesian stock markets. The government
hinted throughout much of 1999 that it would reduce the negative list
even further but, as of November 1999, it had not yet done so.
The Capital Investment Coordinating Board (BKPM) must approve most
foreign investment proposals. Investments in the oil and gas, mining,
forestry, and financial services sectors are covered by specific laws
and regulations and handled by the relevant technical ministries.
Government Procurement Practices: In 1994, the government enacted a
procurement law to regulate government procurement practices and
strengthen the procurement oversight process. Most large government
contracts are financed by bilateral or multilateral donors who specify
procurement procedures. For large projects funded by the government,
international competitive bidding practices are to be followed. The
government seeks concessional financing which includes a 3.5 percent
interest rate, a 25-year repayment period and seven-year grace period.
Some projects do proceed on less concessional terms. Foreign firms
bidding on certain government-sponsored construction or procurement
projects may be asked to purchase and export the equivalent in selected
Indonesian products. Government departments and institutes and state
and regional government corporations are expected to utilize domestic
goods and services to the maximum extent feasible, but this is not
mandatory for foreign aid-financed goods and services procurement.
State-owned enterprises that have offered shares to the public through
the stock exchange are exempted from government procurement
regulations.
6. Export Subsidies Policies
Indonesia joined the GATT Subsidies Code and eliminated export
loan-interest subsidies as of April 1, 1990. As part of its drive to
increase non-oil and gas exports, the government permits restitution of
VAT paid by a producing exporter on purchases of materials for use in
manufacturing export products. Exemption from or drawbacks of import
duties are available for goods incorporated into exports. Free trade
zones and industrial estates are combined in several bonded areas. In
the past two years, the government has gradually increased the share of
production that firms located in bonded zones are able to sell
domestically, up to 100 percent in 1998.
7. Protection of U.S. Intellectual Property
Indonesia is a member of the World Intellectual Property
Organization (WIPO) and in 1997 became full party to the Paris
Convention for the Protection of Intellectual Property, the Berne
Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, the
Patent Cooperation Treaty, and the Trademark Law Treaty. Indonesia was
the first country in the world to ratify the WIPO Copyright Treaty, but
has not ratified the companion WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty.
In April 1999, the U.S. Trade Representative renewed Indonesia's place
on the ``Special 301'' Priority Watch List, where it has been since
1996.
Indonesia has serious and continuing deficiencies in its
intellectual property regime: rampant piracy (software, books, and
video), trademark piracy and an inconsistent enforcement and
ineffective legal system. New patent, trademark, and copyright laws
were enacted in May 1997. In order to bring Indonesia's laws into
compliance with the TRIPS Agreement by the mandated deadline of January
1, 2000, Indonesia has drafted (but not enacted as of November 1999)
new laws on protection of trade secrets, industrial design and
integrated circuits. It has also proposed amendments to its laws on
trademark and copyright. Those laws are designed to address the
remaining inadequacies of Indonesia's IPR legal regime, but inadequate
enforcement and a non-transparent judicial system unfamiliar with
intellectual property law still pose daunting problems for U.S.
companies. The government often responds to U.S. companies with
specific complaints about pirated goods and trademark abuse, but the
court system can be frustrating and unpredictable, and effective
punishment of pirates of intellectual property has been rare.
Indonesia's 1997 Patent Law addressed several areas of concern to
U.S. companies, including compulsory licensing provisions, a relatively
short term of protection, and a provision that allowed importation of
50 pharmaceutical products by non-patent holders.
8. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association: Private sector workers, including
those in export processing zones, are by law free to form worker
organizations without prior authorization. In May 1998 and in September
1999 the government issued new regulations on registration of workers'
organizations. The effect of the new regulation was to eliminate
numerical and other requirements that were previously a barrier to
union registration. The government ratified International Labor
Organization (ILO) Convention 87 on Freedom of Association in June
1998. Since the regulation went into effect, at least 20 new or
previously unrecognized unions have formed and notified the Department
of Manpower of their intention to register workplace and branch units.
The government may dissolve a union if it believes the union is acting
against the national ideology, Pancasila, although it has never
actually done so, and there are no laws or regulations specifying
procedures for union dissolution.
The government is considering other legislative and regulatory
changes in regard to trade unions, industrial dispute resolution, and
labor affairs generally. To allow time for new laws and regulations,
the parliament amended a 1997 Basic Law on Manpower Affairs by
postponing its implementation until the year 2000.
Civil servants are no longer required to belong to KORPRI, a
nonunion association whose central development council is chaired by
the Minister of Home Affairs. State enterprise employees, defined to
include those working in enterprises in which the state has a 5-percent
holding or greater, usually were KORPRI members in the past, but a
small number of state enterprises have units of the Federation of All-
Indonesian Trade Unions (SPSI). New unions are now seeking to organize
employees in some state-owned enterprises. Teachers must belong to the
teachers' association (PGRI). All organized workers except civil
servants have the legal right to strike. While state enterprise
employees and teachers rarely exercise this right, private sector
strikes are frequent.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively: Registered
unions can legally engage in collective bargaining and can collect dues
from members through a checkoff system. In companies without unions,
the government discourages workers from utilizing outside assistance,
preferring that workers seek its assistance. By regulation,
negotiations must be concluded within 30 days or be submitted to the
Department of Manpower for mediation and conciliation or arbitration.
Agreements are for two years and can be extended for one year.
According to NGOs involved in labor issues, the provisions of these
agreements rarely go beyond the legal minimum standards established by
the government, and the agreements are often merely presented to worker
representatives for signing rather than being negotiated.
Although government regulations prohibit employers from
discriminating or harassing employees because of union membership,
there are credible reports from union officials of employer retribution
against union organizers, including firing, which is not effectively
prevented or remedied in practice. Administrative tribunals adjudicate
charges of antiunion discrimination. However, because many union
members believe the tribunals generally side with employers, many
workers reject or avoid the procedure and present their grievances
directly to the national human rights commission, parliament and other
agencies. Administrative decisions in favor of dismissed workers tend
to be monetary awards; workers are rarely reinstated. The provisions of
the law make it difficult to fire workers, but the law is often ignored
in practice.
The armed forces, which include the police, continue to involve
themselves in labor issues, despite the Minister of Manpower's
revocation in 1994 of a 1986 regulation allowing the military to
intervene in strikes and other labor actions. A 1990 decree that gives
the Agency for Coordination of National Stability (BAKORSTANAS)
authority to intervene in strikes in the interest of political and
social stability remains in effect.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor: The law forbids
forced labor, and the government generally enforces it. However,
according to credible sources, there are several thousand children
working on fishing platforms off the East Coast of North Sumatra in
conditions of bonded labor. Most are recruited from farming
communities, and once they arrive at the work site, are not permitted
to leave for at least three months and until a replacement worker can
be found. Children receive average monthly wages that are well below
the minimum wage. They live in isolation on the sea, working 12 to 20
hours per day in often dangerous conditions, sleeping in the workspace
with no access to sanitary facilities. There are reports of physical,
verbal and sexual abuse of the children. In 1999 the government
ratified ILO Conventions 105 (Forced Labor) and began removing children
from the fishing platforms.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children: Child labor exists in
both industrial and rural areas, and in both the formal and informal
sectors. According to a 1995 report of the Indonesian Central Bureau of
Statistics, four percent of Indonesian children between the ages of 10
and 14 work full-time, and another four percent work in addition to
going to school. Many observers believe that number to be significantly
understated, because documents verifying age are easily falsified, and
because children under 10 were not included. Indonesia was one of the
first countries to be selected for participation in the ILO's
International Program on the Elimination of Child Labor (IPEC).
Although the ILO has sponsored training of labor inspectors on child
labor matters under the IPEC program, enforcement remains lax. In April
1999 the government ratified ILO Convention, which establishes a
minimum working age of 15.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work: Indonesia does not have a
national minimum wage. Rather, area wage councils working under the
supervision of the national wage council establish minimum wages for
regions and basic needs figures for each province--a monetary amount
considered sufficient to enable a single worker to meet the basic needs
of nutrition, clothing, and shelter. In Jakarta, the minimum wage is
about $33 (Rp. 231,000) per month (at an exchange rate of Rp 7000 to
the dollar). That is 70 percent of the government-determined basic
needs figure. There are no reliable statistics on the number of
employers paying at least the minimum wage. Independent observers'
estimates range between 30 and 60 percent.
Labor law and ministerial regulations provide workers with a
variety of other benefits, such as social security, and workers in more
modern facilities often receive health benefits, free meals, and
transportation. The law establishes 7-hour workdays and 40-hour
workweeks, with one 30-minute rest period for each 4 hours of work. The
law also requires one day of rest weekly. The daily overtime rate is 1-
1/2 times the normal hourly rate for the first hour, and twice the
hourly rate for additional overtime. Observance of laws regulating
benefits and labor standards varies from sector to sector and by
region. Employer violations of legal requirements are fairly common and
often result in strikes and employee protests. The Ministry of Manpower
continues publicly to urge employers to comply with the law. However,
in general, government enforcement and supervision of labor standards
is weak.
Both law and regulations provide for minimum standards of
industrial health and safety. In the largely western-operated oil
sector, safety and health programs function reasonably well. However,
in the country's 100,000 larger registered companies in the non-oil
sector, the quality of occupational health and safety programs varies
greatly. The enforcement of health and safety standards is severely
hampered by the limited number of qualified Department of Manpower
inspectors as well as by the low level of employee appreciation for
sound health and safety practices. Allegations of corruption on the
part of inspectors are common. Workers are obligated to report
hazardous working conditions. Employers are forbidden by law from
retaliating against those who do, but the law is not effectively
enforced.
f. Rights in Sectors with U.S. Investment: Working conditions in
firms with U.S. ownership are widely recognized as better than the norm
for Indonesia. Application of legislation and practice governing worker
rights is largely dependent upon whether a particular business or
investment is characterized as private or public. U.S. investment in
Indonesia is concentrated in the petroleum and related industries,
primary and fabricated metals (mining), and pharmaceutical sectors.
Foreign participation in the petroleum sector is largely in the
form of production sharing contracts between the foreign companies and
the state oil and gas company, Pertamina, which retains control over
all activities. All employees of foreign companies under this
arrangement are considered state employees and thus all legislation and
practice regarding state employees generally applies to them. Employees
of foreign companies operating in the petroleum sector are organized in
KORPRI. Employees of these state enterprises enjoy most of the
protection of Indonesia labor laws but, with some exceptions, they do
not have the right to strike, join labor organizations, or negotiate
collective agreements. Some companies operating under other contractual
arrangements, such as contracts of work and, in the case of the mining
sector, coal contracts of work, do have unions and collective
bargaining agreements.
Regulations pertaining to child labor and child welfare are
applicable to employers in all sectors. Employment of children and
concerns regarding child welfare are not considered major problem areas
in the petroleum and fabricated metals sectors. Legislation regarding
minimum wages, hours of work, overtime, fringe benefits, health and
safety applies to all sectors. The best industrial and safety record in
Indonesia is found in the oil and gas sector.
Extent of U.S. Investment in Selected Industries--U.S. Direct Investment Position Abroad on an Historical Cost
Basis--1998
[Millions of U.S. Dollars]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Category Amount
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Petroleum...................... .............. 4,610
Total Manufacturing............ .............. 197
Food & Kindred Products...... 16 ...............................................................
Chemicals & Allied Products.. 131 ...............................................................
Primary & Fabricated Metals.. 8 ...............................................................
Industrial Machinery and -17 ...............................................................
Equipment.
Electric & Electronic 35 ...............................................................
Equipment.
Transportation Equipment..... (\1\) ...............................................................
Other Manufacturing.......... (\1\) ...............................................................
Wholesale Trade................ .............. (\1\)
Banking........................ .............. 186
Finance/Insurance/Real Estate.. .............. 171
Services....................... .............. 53
Other Industries............... .............. (\1\)
TOTAL ALL INDUSTRIES........... .............. 6,932
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Suppressed to avoid disclosing data of individual companies.
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis.
______
JAPAN
Key Economic Indicators
[Billions of U.S. Dollars unless otherwise indicated]
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1997 1998 \1\ 1999
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Income, Production and Employment:
Nominal GDP............................. 4,192.7 3,783.0 \1\ 4205
.0
Real GDP Growth (pct)................... 1.4 -2.8 \1\ 0.5
GDP by Sector:
Agriculture........................... N/A N/A N/A
Manufacturing......................... N/A N/A N/A
Services.............................. N/A N/A N/A
Government............................ N/A N/A N/A
Per Capita Income (US$)................. 33,249 29,929 \2\ 33,0
00
Labor Force (millions).................. 67.9 68.0 \3\ 67.8
Unemployment Rate (pct)................. 3.4 4.1 \4\ 4.7
Money and Prices (annual percentage
growth):
Money Supply (M2+CD).................... 3.1 4.0 \4\ 3.8
Consumer Price Inflation................ 1.8 0.6 \3\ -0.1
Exchange Rate (Yen/US$)................. 121.0 130.9 \5\ 117.
03
Balance of Payments and Trade:
Total Exports FOB....................... 409.2 374.4 \6\ 394.
1
Exports to U.S. FOB................... 121.3 122.0 \6\ 107.
7
Total Imports CIF....................... 307.8 251.7 \6\ 266.
7
Imports from U.S. CIF................. 65.7 57.9 \6\ 47.1
Trade Balance........................... 101.5 122.7 \6\ 127.
4
Trade Balance with U.S................ 55.6 64.1 \6\ 60.6
Current Account Surplus/GDP (pct)....... 2.3 3.2 N/A
External Public Debt.................... 0 0 0
Debt Service Payments/GDP (pct)......... 0 0 0
Fiscal Deficit/GDP (pct)................ -3.4 -6.0 N/A
Gold and Foreign Exchange Reserves...... 220.8 215.9 \7\ 272.
8
Aid from U.S............................ 0 0 0
Aid from All Other Sources.............. 0 0 0
------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ January-June, seasonally adjusted, annualized; growth relative to
Jan-June 1998.
\2\ Embassy estimate.
\3\ January-September, non-seasonally adjusted average.
\4\ January-September, seasonally-adjusted average.
\5\ January to September average.
\6\ January-September, non-seasonally adjusted, annualized.
\7\ As of end-September 1999.
Sources: Ministry of Finance; exports FOB, imports CIF customs basis;
Economic Planning Agency; Bank of Japan, OECD Economic Outlook.
1. General Policy Framework
Japan's economy, the world's second largest at roughly 4.2 trillion
dollars, is experiencing a significant recession. Most observers are
predicting only meager growth this year, following a nearly 3 percent
contraction in 1998.
Overall economic growth in Japan in the 1990s has been lackluster,
despite occasional strong growth. (Until 1992-3, Japan had never
experienced two consecutive years of less than 3 percent real growth in
the postwar period.) A surge in asset prices to unsustainable levels
and high rates of capital investment in the late 1980s gave way by 1991
to sharply slower growth, the need for corporate restructuring and
balance sheet adjustment by businesses. A substantially weakened Asian
demand for Japanese exports and domestic banking system concerns, also
continue to weigh heavily on the economy.
In recent years, the Japanese Government has used public spending
to offset weak or negative private demand growth. Several fiscal
stimulus packages beginning in August 1992 have boosted public
investment spending substantially, while temporary tax cuts have
supported public demand.
Japan posted a global trade surplus of $123 billion in 1998, with a
$51.5 billion bilateral surplus with the United States. Both of these
numbers are expected to rise significantly in 1999. Through the first
nine months of 1999, import volume was also higher compared with the
same period in 1998.
In order to ease credit conditions to support the economy, the Bank
of Japan lowered the official discount rate nine times between mid-1991
and September 1995, from 6.0 percent per year to 0.5 percent where it
has remained. The Bank of Japan also instituted some temporary programs
to make credit more available to corporations. Recently the overnight
call rate has been left at zero.
2. Exchange Rate Policy
The yen has been volatile against the dollar in 1998-99. The
average exchange rate through the first nine months of 1999 was 117 yen
per dollar, versus 130 yen per dollar in 1998. A new Foreign Exchange
Law in April 1998 significantly decontrolled most remaining barriers to
cross-border capital transactions.
3. Structural Policies
Pricing Policy: Japan has a market economy, with prices generally
set in accordance with supply and demand. However, with very high gross
retail margins (needed to cover high fixed and personnel costs) and a
complex distribution system, Japan's retail prices exhibit a greater
downward stickiness than in other large market economies. Moreover,
some sectors such as construction are susceptible to cartel-like
pricing arrangements, and in many key sectors heavily regulated by the
government (i.e., transport and warehousing), it can still exert some
limited temporary authority over pricing.
Tax Policy: Total tax revenues as a share of GDP in Japan are
comparable to the United States and the UK, and on the low end of OECD
countries. Japan had a relatively high corporate tax rate, but recent
legislation has reduced the (combined central and local government)
effective corporate tax rate from 47 percent to 40.9 percent, bringing
it in line with other OECD countries. The maximum marginal rate for
personal income taxes was also reduced from 65 percent to 50 percent.
There is a general consumption tax (actually a broad value-added tax)
of 5 percent, although small retail outlets are exempted.
Regulatory and Deregulation Policy: Japan's economy is highly
regulated. Although the government and business community recognize
that deregulation is needed to spur growth, opposition to change
remains strong among vested-interest groups, and the economy remains
burdened by numerous national and local government regulations, which
have the effect of impeding market access by foreign firms. Official
regulations also reinforce traditional Japanese business practices that
restrict competition, help block new entrants (domestic or foreign) and
raise costs. Examples of regulations that act as impediments include:
exceedingly high telecommunications interconnection rates, prolonged
approval processes for medical devices and pharmaceuticals, and severe
restrictions on foreign lawyers.
In June 1997, the President and the Japanese Prime Minister agreed
on an Enhanced Initiative on Deregulation and Competition Policy under
the U.S.-Japan Framework Agreement. During its third year, the
Initiative is focusing on achieving concrete deregulation in key
sectoral and structural areas in Japan, such as telecommunications,
housing, energy, financial services, medical devices and
pharmaceuticals, distribution, competition policy, and transparency in
government rule-making.
4. Debt Management Policies
Japan is the world's largest net creditor. The Bank of Japan's
foreign exchange reserves exceed $250 billion. It is an active
participant together with the United States in international
discussions of developing-country indebtedness issues in a variety of
fora.
5. Significant Barriers to U.S. Exports
Japan is the United States' third largest export market, after
Canada and Mexico. The United States is the largest market for Japanese
exports. However, in many sectors U.S. exporters continue to enjoy
incomplete access to the Japanese market. While Japan has reduced its
formal tariff rates on most imports to relatively low levels, it has
maintained non-tariff barriers, such as non-transparency,
discriminatory standards, and exclusionary business practices, and
tolerates a business environment that protects established companies
and restricts the free flow of competitive foreign goods into the
Japanese market.
Transportation: In January 1998, the U.S. and Japan concluded a new
agreement to significantly liberalize the trans-Pacific civil aviation
market. This eliminated restrictions and resolved a dispute over the
rights of longtime carriers to fly through Japan to other international
destinations. It opened doors for carriers that recently entered the
U.S.-Japan market, nearly tripling their access to Japan. The agreement
also allowed code sharing (strategic alliances) between carriers for
the first time, thereby greatly increasing their operational
flexibility. While U.S. carriers have been generally happy with the
results of the 1998 agreement, there is growing concern over the
adequacy of facilities and a scarcity of slots at Japanese airports.
American ocean going ships serving Japanese ports have long
encountered a restrictive, inefficient and discriminatory system of
port transportation services. After the Federal Maritime Commission
(FMC) ruled in early 1997 that Japan maintained unfair shipping
practices and proposed fines against Japanese ocean freight operators,
the Japanese Government pledged to grant foreign carriers port
transport licenses, and, at the same time, to reform the prior
consultation system which allocates work on the waterfront and requires
carriers to obtain approval for any change in their operations. The FMC
imposed fines in September 1997 after Japan failed to carry out the
reforms. Shortly afterwards, however, the government committed itself
to actions that would have provided a solid foundation for reform of
Japanese port practices. However, a final report on deregulation issued
by the Japanese government in mid-1999 was discouraging for its lack of
aggressive proposals for deregulating ports.
Agricultural and Wood Products: Some progress has been achieved
through continued U.S. pressure on Japan to liberalize its markets for
imported agricultural and wood products. However, tariffs on most
processed food products remain relatively high, and other barriers to a
liberalized market remain. For example, Japan continues to restrict,
for phytosanitary reasons, the entry of numerous fruits and vegetables,
such as pears and potatoes. In accordance with its WTO obligations,
Japan opened its rice market to imports under a Tariff Rate Quota.
However, the U.S. continues to press Japan to introduce this rice to
consumers, rather than earmarking it for stockpiles or food aid to
third countries. Tariffs for wood products are being reduced under
Japan's Uruguay Round commitments, but they continue to pose barriers
to market access. Moreover, a number of unresolved market access issues
are being discussed in the U.S.-Japan deregulation dialogue, such as
recognition of foreign testing organizations, approval of Japan
Industrial Standards (JIS) grademark equivalency for U.S. manufacturers
of nails, and food waste disposals.
Telecommunications and Broadcasting: Japan is a signatory of the
WTO Basic Telecommunications Agreement of 1997, which promotes market
access, investment and pro-competitive regulation in the
telecommunications industry. In recent years, Japan has adopted a
series of significant measures to foster a more pro-competitive regime
in the telecommunications sector. However, access to telecommunications
and broadcasting market in Japan remains constrained by both regulatory
and anti-competitive practices. New entrants face much higher costs and
longer waiting periods for connecting to the local dominant carrier's
network than in other advanced countries, deterring competition. In
addition, new carriers' difficulty in gaining access to facilities and
land to build their networks, government restrictions on combining
owned and leased facilities in creating a network, and the lack of
access to discrete portions of the local dominant carriers' network at
reasonable costs have slowed and raised the costs of new carriers'
entrance. Finally, discriminatory and anti-competitive discount pricing
plans by the dominant carriers have put new entrants at a serious
disadvantage in developing Internet services. The U.S. Government has
been applying pressure on Japanese regulators to take steps to address
these issues under the U.S.-Japan Enhanced Initiative.
Foreign telecommunications equipment suppliers continue to have
difficulty selling to the Japanese public sector, having an extremely
low share of this market. In addition, problems remain in selling to
NTT (Nippon Telegraph and Telephone) companies, which collectively are
the largest purchaser of telecommunications equipment in Japan. Foreign
investment restrictions remain on NTT and on Direct-To-Home (DTH)
satellite broadcasting companies.
Standards, Testing, Labeling and Certification: Standards, testing,
labeling and certification problems hamper market access in Japan. In
some cases, advances in technology, products or processing make
Japanese standards outdated and restrictive. Domestic industry often
supports standards that are unique and restrict competition, although
in some areas external pressure has brought about the simplification or
harmonization of standards to comply with international practices.
Fresh agricultural products continue to be subject to extensive
restrictions, including phytosanitary restraints, required overseas
production-site inspections, fumigation requirements for non-quarantine
pests, and tariff rate or minimum access restrictions.
Japan requires repeated testing of established quarantine
treatments each time a new variety of an already approved agricultural
commodity is approved for importation into Japan. For example, Japan
has approved red and golden delicious apples for importation, but
required that the quarantine treatment be retested for other almost
identical varieties. The U.S. challenged this redundant testing
requirement in the WTO, arguing that it has no scientific basis and
serves as a significant trade barrier. Completion of the testing for
each variety takes at least two years and is costly to the U.S.
Government and U.S. producers. In October 1998, a WTO dispute
settlement panel found that Japan's varietal testing requirement for
agricultural products violated its WTO obligations. Japan has agreed to
implement the terms of the WTO decision by the end of 1999.
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI): FDI in Japan has remained
extremely small in scale relative to the size of the economy. In Japan
fiscal year 1998, Japan's annual inward FDI totaled 10.5 billion (up
from $6 billion the previous year) but still only 0.27 percent of its
GDP. (Comparatively, preliminary estimates for the United States FDI in
1998 was $188 billion). Although in Japan, inward foreign investment is
on the rise, Japan continues to host the smallest amount of FDI as a
proportion of total output of any major OECD nation. The low level of
FDI reflects the high cost-structure of doing business (for example,
registration, licenses, land prices and rents), the legacy of former
investment restrictions, and a continuing environment of structural
impediments to greater foreign investment. The challenges facing
foreign investors seeking to establish or enhance a presence in Japan
include: laws and regulations that directly or indirectly restrict the
establishment of business facilities, close ties between government and
industry, informal exclusive buyer-supplier networks and alliances,
high taxation, and a difficult regulatory environment for foreign or
domestic acquisitions of existing Japanese firms.
Recently, the Japanese Government has implemented potentially
useful measures for increasing FDI, including easing restrictions on
foreign capital entry. Additional steps include the implementation by
Japanese enterprises of consolidated accounting by March 31, 2000. This
step will greatly enhance financial transparency and facilitate mergers
and acquisition and other investments. The government in October 1999
introduced legislation modeled on the U.S. Chapter 11 bankruptcy
procedures. The legislation should facilitate corporate restructuring
and buy-outs by foreign and domestic investors.
In October 1998, the U.S. Government proposed to the Japanese
Government 18 new reforms in the areas of mergers and acquisitions,
land, and labor policy to improve Japan's environment for foreign
direct investment. In May 1999, both governments submitted a Joint
report to the President and Prime Minister on the status of Japan's
investment climate and measures under consideration. The bilateral
Investment Working Group held talks in Tokyo in October 1999 that
covered a range of investment issues. The group intends to continue
consultations and the exchange of information as stipulated in the
Joint report.
Government Procurement Practices: Japan is a party to the 1996 WTO
Government Procurement Agreement. While government procurement in Japan
at the national, regional and local levels generally conform to the
letter of the WTO agreement, there are reports that at some procuring
entities, established domestic competitors continue to enjoy
preferential access to tender information. In some sectors, unfair low
pricing remains a problem, preventing companies from winning contracts
based on open and transparent bidding procedures. Moreover, some
entities continue to draw up tender specifications in a way that favors
a preferred vendor, using design-based specifications rather than more
neutral performance-based specifications.
Customs Procedures: The Japanese Customs Authority has made
progress in automating its clearing procedures, and efforts are
underway to integrate the procedures of other government agencies over
the next several years. However, U.S. exporters still face relatively
slow and burdensome processing.
6. Export Subsidies Policies
Japan's official development assistance for Asian countries in 1998
rose 71 percent from the previous year as the government focused on
helping its neighbors recover from the region-wide economic crisis.
Japan remained the world's top aid donor in 1998 for the eighth
consecutive year, disbursing a total of $10.77 billion, up 14.2 percent
from 1997. Although Japan had been moving towards untying its aid,
during the past 2 years this trend has reversed. Both its Environmental
Aid loans and its Special Yen loans are tied to the purchase of
Japanese products. Not only does this limit U.S. firm's ability to
participate in these projects; it also denies recipient countries the
opportunity to use this aid as efficiently as possible. This trend
towards retying has been actively opposed by the U.S. Government. In
addition, the USG continues to address U.S. industry concerns that
feasibility studies funded by Japanese grant aid, and tied to the use
of Japanese firms, results in technical specification that unduly favor
Japanese firms.
7. Protection of U.S. Intellectual Property Rights
Japan is a party to the Berne and Universal Copyright Conventions,
the Paris Convention on Industrial Property, the Patent Cooperation
Treaty, and the WTO Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights (TRIPs). Japan is on the ``Special 301'' Watch List
because of continuing U.S. concerns about the operation of Japan's
patent system and the protection of trade secrets and computer
software.
While Japan's IPR regime affords national treatment to U.S.
entities, the U.S. has long been concerned by the long processing time
for patent examination. Although Japan has reduced patent pendency from
36 to 28 months, this is still longer than in other industrialized
countries. Lengthy patent pendency, coupled with a practice of opening
all patent applications to public inspection 18 months after filing,
exposes applications to lengthy public scrutiny with the potential of
limiting legal protection.
Many Japanese companies use the patent filing system as a tool of
corporate strategy, making many applications to cover slight variations
in technology. However, a February 1998 decision by Japan's Supreme
Court to permit an infringement finding under the ``the doctrine of
equivalence'' may reduce this practice and is a positive step toward
broadening Japanese courts' generally narrow interpretation of patent
rights. The rights of U.S. subscribers in Japan can be circumscribed by
filings of applications for similar inventions or processes. Some small
revisions to Japan's patent and trademark law aimed at improving
protection right holders will take effect early in 2000.
Japan's protection of trade secrets is inadequate. Because Japan's
Constitution prohibits closed trials, the owner of a trade secret
seeking redress for misappropriation of the secret is put in the
difficult position of not being able to protect a trade secret without
disclosing it publicly. While a recent amendment to Japan's Civil
Procedures Act excludes Japanese court records containing trade secrets
from public access, this legislation does not adequately address the
problem. Court proceedings of trade secrets remain open to the public
and neither the parties nor their attorneys have confidentiality
obligations.
Japan's Trademark Law was revised in 1997 to speed the granting of
trademark rights, strengthen protection to well-known trademarks,
address problems related to unused trademarks, simplify registration
procedures, and increase infringement penalties. The effect of the
revisions, however, is not yet clear. Historically, trademark
registration in Japan has been slow, requiring approximately 36 months.
Since trademarks must be registered in Japan to ensure enforcement,
delays make it difficult for foreign parties to enforce their marks. In
addition, concerns have been raised by U.S. firms regarding Japan's re-
exportation of suspected counterfeit merchandise to be re-exported
which is inconsistent with article 59 of the Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs) agreement.
End-user software piracy remains a major concern of U.S. and some
Japanese software developers. An amendment to Japan's Civil Procedures
Law to award punitive damages rather than actual damages would help
increase the deterrent against software piracy.
8. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association: Japan's Constitution and domestic
labor law provide for the right of workers to freely associate in
unions. Approximately 23 percent of Japan's labor force is unionized.
The Japanese Trade Union Confederation (RENGO), which represents 7.8
million workers, is the largest labor organization. Both public and
private sector workers may join a union, although members of the armed
forces, police and firefighters may neither form unions nor strike. The
right to strike, although implicit in the constitution, is seldom
exercised. The law prohibits retribution against strikers and is
effectively enforced.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively: The constitution
provides unions with the right to organize, bargain and act
collectively. These rights are freely exercised, and collective
bargaining is practiced widely, particularly during the annual ``Spring
Wage Offensive'' of nationwide negotiations.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor: Article 18 of the
Japanese Constitution states that ``No person shall be held in bondage
of any kind. Involuntary servitude, except as punishment for crime, is
prohibited.'' This provision applies both to adults and children, and
there are no known cases of forced or bonded labor.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children: By law, children under
the age of 15 may not be employed and those under age 18 may not work
in dangerous or harmful jobs. Child labor is virtually non-existent in
Japan, as societal values and the rigorous enforcement of the Labor
Standards Law protect children from exploitation in the workplace.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work: Minimum wages are set on both a
sectoral and regional (prefectural) level. Minimum wages ranged from
$50 per day in Tokyo to $42 in Okinawa. The Labor Standards Law
provides for a 40-hour work week in most industries and mandates
premium pay for hours worked beyond 40 hours in a week or eight hours
in a day. However, labor unions criticize the Japanese Government for
failing to enforce working hour regulations in smaller firms. The
government effectively administers laws and regulations affecting
workplace safety and health.
f. Worker Rights in Sectors with U.S. Investment: Labor
regulations, working conditions and worker rights in sectors where U.S.
capital is invested do not vary from those in other sectors of the
economy.
Extent of U.S. Investment in Selected Industries--U.S. Direct Investment Position Abroad on an Historical Cost
Basis--1998
[Millions of U.S. Dollars]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Category Amount
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Petroleum...................... .............. 4,496
Total Manufacturing............ .............. 14,224
Food & Kindred Products...... 528 ...............................................................
Chemicals & Allied Products.. 2,608 ...............................................................
Primary & Fabricated Metals.. 365 ...............................................................
Industrial Machinery and 3,588 ...............................................................
Equipment.
Electric & Electronic 2,043 ...............................................................
Equipment.
Transportation Equipment..... 1,724 ...............................................................
Other Manufacturing.......... 3,368 ...............................................................
Wholesale Trade................ .............. 4,948
Banking........................ .............. 539
Finance/Insurance/Real Estate.. .............. 12,318
Services....................... .............. 1,415
Other Industries............... .............. 212
TOTAL ALL INDUSTRIES........... .............. 38,153
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis.
______
REPUBLIC OF KOREA
Key Economic Indicators
[Millions of U.S. Dollars unless otherwise indicated]
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1997 1998 \1\ 1999
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Income, Production and Employment:
GDP (nominal/factor cost)............ 476,600 321,300 408,800
Real GDP Growth (pct) \2\............ 5.0 -5.8 7.0
GDP by Sector:
Agriculture/Fisheries.............. 25,505 15,768 18,750
Manufacturing...................... 137,702 98,521 138,300
Electricity/Gas/Water.............. 10,098 7,519 9,380
Construction....................... 55,510 32,560 35,800
Financial Services................. 91,146 62,886 81,500
Government/Health/Education........ 36,436 25,864 22,000
Other.............................. 120,203 78,182 103,070
Government Expenditure (pct/GDP)..... 22.1 23.4 22.5
Per Capita GDP (US$)................. 10,307 6,823 8,735
Labor Force (000's).................. 21,500 21,800 22,000
Unemployment Rate (pct).............. 2.5 7.4 4.5
Money and Prices (annual percentage
rate):
Money Supply (M2).................... 19.2 24.0 25.0
Corporate Bonds \3\.................. 13.4 15.1 8.5
Personal Savings Rate................ 22.8 25.1 25.5
Retail Inflation..................... 4.5 7.5 2.0
Wholesale Inflation.................. 3.9 12.2 1.0
Consumer Price Index (1995 base)..... 109.6 117.8 120.2
Average Exchange Rate (Won/US$)...... 951.1 1,399 1,200
Balance of Payments and Trade:
Total Exports FOB \4\................ 136,164 132,313 137,000
Exports to U.S. \4\................ 21,625 22,805 24,000
Total Imports CIF \4\................ -144,616 -93,282 -115,000
Imports from U.S. \4\.............. -30,122 -20,403 -25,000
External Debt \5\.................... 159,200 148,700 138,000
Debt Service Payments................ -18,000 -29,800 -24,000
Gold and FOREX Reserves.............. 20,406 52,041 65,000
------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ 1999 figures are estimates based on available monthly data as of
October.
\2\ Growth based on won, the local currency.
\3\ Figures are average annual interest rates.
\4\ Merchandise trade, measured on customs clearance basis; Korean
government data.
\5\ Gross debt; includes non-guaranteed private debt.
1. General Policy Framework
South Korea demonstrated its resilience and its capacity for change
by bouncing back strongly in 1999 from the 1997-98 economic crisis, the
worst in the country's history. After experiencing a 5.8 percent
contraction in 1998, 7 to 8 percent GDP growth is forecast in 1999. Per
capita GNP in dollar terms will be $8,735 in 1999, up from 1998's
$6,823 but still lower than $10,307 in 1997.
The crisis called into question the viability of a growth model
that relied heavily on a protected domestic market and the deep
involvement of the government in determining the allocation of capital.
The crisis also set the scene for the presidential election victory in
December 1997 of opposition figure and economic reform advocate Kim Dae
Jung.
By mid-1998, largely due to the $58 billion IMF program that Korea
entered into in December 1997 and President Kim's commitment to
vigorous financial and corporate sector reform, stability was restored
to the Korean economy. However, problems remain with respect to
implementation of reform and restructuring measures in these two
sectors. Although the Korean government has made progress in inducing
the conglomerates (``chaebols'') to reduce their unsustainable debt/
equity ratios, to improve corporate governance and enhance
transparency, and to restructure their operations, the chaebol have
only partially implemented Republic of Korea (ROK) government-mandated
changes in these areas. In general, Korean business preference for
market share instead of profitability and an unrealistically low Korean
bankruptcy rate encouraged over-capacity and corporate inefficiency,
but discouraged investment in small-to-medium enterprises (SME's). The
SME sector remains underdeveloped in Korea.
In 1999 the chronic de facto bankruptcy of Daewoo, the second-
largest Korean conglomerate, and continued weakness in the financial
sector, especially the over-leveraged investment trust companies
(ITC's), showed the weakness of the past patterns of misallocation of
investment resources, excessive debt, and lack of effective oversight.
The Daewoo crisis became front-page news around the world in July 1999,
as that massive firm with far-flung global interests and investments
came near default on more than $50 billion in debt. That month,
creditors rolled over 12 trillion won in debt that was coming due over
the following 10 days. Meanwhile, the $200-billion-plus ITC industry
faced a loss of investor confidence due to its exposure to Daewoo and
the lack of adequate prudential supervision. The Korean government's
handling of the twin Daewoo and ITC crises will be a litmus test of its
resolve to see through meaningful and sustainable corporate reform and
restructuring, as well as the key to reducing systemic risk in the
economy.
Korea produces and exports advanced electronic components,
automobiles, steel, and a wide variety of mid-level, medium-quality
consumer electronics and other goods. As labor activism in the 1980's
drove up wages faster than productivity growth, Korea lost its low-wage
labor advantage to China and Southeast Asian countries. At the same
time, Korea faced tough competition from Japan in cutting-edge, high-
tech products.
Aided by recovery in other Asian markets and a strong current
account surplus, Korea's usable foreign currency reserves in 1999 grew
to over $60 billion, while the Korean won stabilized at about 1,200/
dollar as of November 1999. (The won stood at 900/dollar in 1996 but by
late 1997 had dropped as low as 1,960/dollar). Korea became a member of
the OECD in December 1996. Inflation dropped to about two percent in
1999.
Facility investment is expected to grow 34 percent in 1999, after
suffering a 38 percent fall in 1998. In 1999, the unemployment rate is
expected to drop to around 4.5 percent with less than one million
unemployed people, a fall from seven percent in 1998 when there were
over 1.4 million jobless. Real income grew eight percent during the
first seven months of 1999 after a nine percent fall in 1998. Private
consumption grew 8.2 percent in 1999. (Expenditures on domestic
consumption accounted for 62 percent of total GDP.)
The United States is Korea's leading trade partner in 1999, taking
20 percent of Korea's exports and providing 21.7 percent of Korea's
imports for the first nine months of 1999. Korea is the eighth largest
overall trade partner of the United States (the sixth biggest market
for U.S. exports and the eighth biggest for U.S. imports) up from ninth
in 1998. U.S. Commerce Department statistics show that, through
September 1999, U.S. exports to Korea increased 52.2 percent to $16.9
billion, and U.S. imports from Korea rose 25.8 percent to $22.2
billion. In 1998 U.S. exports to Korea fell 34 percent while U.S.
imports from Korea rose 3.4 percent.
The public sector's role in the economy is relatively small, with
taxes and expenditures amounting to 24 percent of GDP in 1999. The
government plans to increase nominal budget spending five percent in
2000 (the lowest budget growth since 1992) for economic stimulus, to
improve and expand transportation infrastructure, and to improve the
social safety net for the unemployed. The 2000 fiscal deficit is
expected to be about 3.5 percent of GDP, somewhat less than four
percent in 1999. About 12 percent of 2000 spending will be financed by
government bond sales. In 1998 the government increased the money
supply about 20 percent to fight potential deflation due to the
recession and falling asset values. In consultation with the IMF, the
government allowed the overnight call rate, which is the main policy
interest rate of the Bank of Korea, to fall from a peak of 35 percent
in December 1997 to single digits in 1999. In September 1999, however,
corporate bond rates rose sharply above 10 percent when Daewoo's
financial default destabilized the bond market and investors rushed to
withdraw money from financially weak investment trust companies.
However, the ROK reversed the rise in long-term rates in October with
its bond market stabilization fund. The primary monetary target of the
Bank of Korea is M3, which, in accordance with Korea's IMF program, is
expected to increase by about 11 percent in 1999.
2. Exchange Rate Policy
Since the introduction of the IMF program in December 1997, foreign
exchange and capital controls have been relaxed or abolished. In
conjunction with IMF program requirements that the exchange rate be
allowed to float (with intervention limited to smoothing operations
only.) In December 1997 the exchange rate peg was widened from +/- 2.25
percent to +/- 10 percent, and then abandoned completely.
3. Structural Policies
The Korean economic model has been notable for the high degree of
concentration of capital and industrial output in a small number of
conglomerates known as ``chaebol.'' While this model produced a long
record of high economic growth, the 1997 financial crisis exposed its
weaknesses, which include excessively risky debt levels, industrial
over-capacity, and economically unsustainable investment. President Kim
Dae Jung has pushed for major economic reform and restructuring to
overcome these shortcomings. The government passed laws requiring
greater corporate transparency, strengthened prudential requirements
for banks and other financial institutions, fostered the development of
small and medium-sized industries, and encouraged increased foreign
investment in Korea. The chaebol have also been pressed to restructure
and rationalize their operations, including by reducing their debt/
equity levels to 200 percent and through somewhat controversial ``big
deals'' (i.e. asset/affiliate swaps.) The effective and radical
restructuring of Korea's second-largest chaebol Daewoo should help
accelerate the pace of corporate reform. These reforms are moving
Korea's economy towards a more market-based system, but some important
changes, especially in the financial and corporate sectors, will take
time.
4. Debt Management Policies
Korea's total foreign debt (largely private sector) totaled $144
billion at the end of July 1999, declining from $158 billion at the end
of 1997. Through repayment and rescheduling, Korea's short-term debt as
a percentage of total debt has been reduced from 64 percent at the end
of 1998 to only 24 percent at the end of July 1999. In addition, the
ROK developed an external debt reporting system to enhance debt
management and monitoring. Through September 1999, Korea registered a
current account surplus of $19.2 billion, substantially smaller than
the $32 billion surplus recorded during the comparable period a year
before. The estimated surplus for 1999 is $20 billion, compared to
about $40 billion in 1998.
5. Significant Barriers to U.S. Exports
During the last decade Korea has gradually liberalized its markets
for both goods and services and improved its investment climate for
U.S. and other foreign firms. Through bilateral and multilateral
efforts, many protective tariffs were lowered or phased out. Non-
transparent policies and regulations, which directly or indirectly
inhibited market access for imports, have been revised and reduced. The
ROK has distanced itself from explicit policies that encouraged anti-
import sentiment among Korean consumers, and is slowly addressing
residual anti-import biases among both Korean consumers and
bureaucrats. Rather than tolerating some foreign investment as
necessary, the ROK has introduced a new foreign investment regime and
is actively working to attract foreign investment. Korea and the United
States initiated negotiations in June 1998 to conclude a bilateral
investment treaty. Total commitments of foreign direct investment in
1999 is expected to exceed $15 billion, more than double the level in
1997. Nevertheless, these improvements have not benefited all exporters
to Korea and barriers to exports from the United States and other
countries continue to plague key sectors, especially agriculture,
pharmaceuticals and automobiles.
In general, Korea's tariffs are modest; Korea's average tariff rate
is 7.9 percent. However, Korea still maintains a system of high tariffs
(30 to 100 percent), quotas and tariff rate quotas (TRQ), mostly for
sensitive agricultural and fishery products of interest to U.S.
suppliers, which effectively restrict imports. In addition, Korea's
administration of quotas/TRQs for some products, such as rice and
oranges, limits legitimate market access. Korea also uses adjustment
tariffs to respond to import surges; however, the number of these
tariffs is slowly being reduced. The majority of the remaining 29
adjustment tariffs apply to agricultural products. The government
eliminated its import diversification program, which barred certain
imports from Japan, in June 1999, and has committed to phase out its
eight GATT balance of payments restrictions by year-end 2000.
Nontariff barriers, which often result from non-transparent
regulatory practices, continue to inhibit imports to Korea across a
range of sectors. A lack of regulatory transparency and consistency can
affect licensing, inspections, type approval, marking/labeling
requirements and other standards. To add transparency and due process
to its regulatory system, Korea enacted the Administrative Procedures
Act in 1996, but public notice of new regulations, as well as comment
and transition periods are not always adequate. The regulatory system
has not offered adequate recourse to those adversely affected by
creation of new regulations. Since President Kim initiated a
comprehensive regulatory review in 1998, more than 5,000 regulations/
guidelines have been eliminated or targeted for elimination; review of
the more than 6,000 remaining regulations is ongoing.
Products regulated for health and safety reasons (such as
pharmaceuticals, medical devices, and cosmetics) typically require
additional testing or certification from the relevant ministries before
they can be sold in Korea, resulting in considerable delays and
increasing costs. The foreign pharmaceutical industry faces
discriminatory barriers associated with clinical registration and
reimbursement pricing issues, although a new reimbursement pricing
system is expected to be implemented in late 1999. Registration
requirements for such products as chemicals, processed food, medical
devices and cosmetics hamper entry into the market as well. Korea has
initiated efforts to streamline its complex and burdensome import
clearance procedures, targeting some 54 laws for revision. It has
committed to bring its Food Code, Food Additive Code and labeling
requirements into conformity with international standards. Import
clearance, however, still takes longer than in other Asian countries.
Despite potential conflict of interest problems, the government has
delegated authority to some Korean trade associations to carry out
functions normally administered by the government. Such delegation of
responsibility may include processing import approval documentation
prior to customs clearance (allowing local trade associations to obtain
business confidential information on incoming shipments), advertisement
pre-approvals (providing early warning on the introduction of new
products and on competitors' marketing efforts), and a decision-making
seat on various committees (usually not available to foreign firms).
The Korea Fair Trade Commission increased its efforts in 1999 to reduce
the quasi-legal, trade restrictive powers of a number of associations.
The United States and Korea signed a Memorandum of Understanding
(MOU) in October 1998, in which Korea agreed to take measures to
further open its automobile market and improve market access for U.S.
automobiles. Per the MOU, Korea has lowered some taxes which had a
discriminatory impact on imported cars, bound its auto tariffs at 8
percent, improved consumer financing of autos by expanding the auto
mortgage system and shortening the repossession process, and
streamlined standards and certification. The ROK has also taken steps
to reduce anti-import attitudes, which have an especially strong impact
on foreign automobiles, including by agreeing to co-sponsor an ``Import
Motor Show'' in May 2000. Despite these efforts, imports of U.S. and
other foreign cars will barely exceed 2000 units in 1999.
The government requires theaters to show local movies for a minimum
of 146 days each year, with some flexibility so that this total can be
reduced to 106 days. U.S. industry states that these constraints on
foreign movies and programs are more restrictive than in most other
countries. The Korean government, however, considers this a cultural
rather than a trade issue.
Korea acceded to the WTO Government Procurement Agreement (GPA) on
January 1, 1997 and is co-sponsoring the Transparency in Government
Procurement initiative in the WTO. U.S. firms, however, continue to
raise some concerns about Korean procurement practices, including
discrimination against U.S. firms participating in procurements for
Korea's new international airport conducted by the Korea Airport
Construction Authority. The U.S. government is currently pursuing WTO
dispute settlement resolution on this issue with Korea.
Korea will expand its Uruguay Round minimum import quota for beef
to 225,000 metric tons by the year 2000 and expand the proportion of
the quota imported through the ``simultaneous buy/sell system.'' Korea
has committed to remove all remaining nontariff barriers to beef
imports, including state trading, by January 2001. However, due to a
sharp drop in consumption, Korea has been unable to meet its WTO
minimum import commitment in recent years. In February 1999, the United
States initiated WTO dispute settlement consultations with Korea to
eliminate import barriers and distribution restrictions on foreign
beef.
In response to the 1997 financial crisis, the government has
implemented broad-based reforms of its financial system. These reforms
include substantial liberalization of capital markets, including the
abolition of restrictions on foreign ownership of domestic shares and
bonds, and restrictions on the use of deferred payments to finance
imports. Foreign banks can now establish subsidiaries in Korea and
foreign financial firms can participate in mergers and acquisitions of
domestic Korean financial institutions. Korea, however, requires
foreign branches to be separately capitalized, and other regulations
such as prudential lending limits are based on local branch capital as
opposed to its total capital, while a domestic bank's capital base is
assessed as the entire bank's capital. Foreign banks are also
disadvantaged in access to local currency funding. The government has
also loosened controls over access to currency, such as swap lines used
by banks as a source of local currency, but the government retains
controls and has not committed to maintaining these new lines once the
crisis is over. The new Foreign Exchange Transaction Law that was
implemented in April 1999 significantly liberalized formerly heavily
regulated capital transactions.
Korea's new Foreign Investment Promotion Act, which became
effective in 1998, streamlined foreign investment application
procedures and eased barriers to foreign direct investment across a
range of sectors. Korea now has a much more favorable investment
climate for foreign firms, and in the longer run this should foster
broader market access and more imports. Investment restrictions now
remain on only 21 industrial sectors, of which seven are entirely
closed. Mergers, including hostile mergers, are allowed, and most
restrictions on foreign ownership of local shares have been lifted.
Foreigners are now allowed to purchase real estate and property. Tax
incentives, especially for the high technology sector, have been
increased. Restrictions on access to offshore funding (including
offshore borrowing, intra-company transfers and inter-company loans),
however, continue to be burdensome. Foreign equity participation
limits, licensing requirements and other regulatory restrictions can
limit foreign direct investment in sectors nominally open to
foreigners. Foreign firms also face additional investment restrictions
in many professional services sectors.
6. Export Subsidies Policies
In the past, Korea aggressively promoted exports through a variety
of policy tools, including export subsidies, directed credit and
targeted industrial policy. However, in the WTO, Korea has committed to
phasing out those programs not permitted under the WTO Agreement on
Subsidies and Countervailing Measures. Under the IMF stabilization
package, Korea eliminated four WTO prohibited subsidies. The real
benefit of the few remaining subsidized lines of export credit is
insignificant in a macroeconomic sense. The relative size of direct
grants is small and declining with regard to both the government budget
and growing private investment. The use of tax exemptions, the main
vehicle for export promotion, appears to be declining as well. The
government does expend large amounts of money in research and
development in key industrial sectors targeted for development, such as
telecommunications.
7. Protection of U.S. Intellectual Property
Korea is a participant in the WTO's Agreement on Trade Related
Aspects of Intellectual Property (TRIPs). It is also a signatory to the
World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), the Universal
Copyright Convention, the Budapest Treaty on the International
Recognition of the Deposit of Microorganisms, the Geneva Phonograms
Convention, the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial
Property, and the Patent Cooperation Treaty. Korea joined the Berne
Convention in August 1996.
Korean laws protecting IPR are generally adequate in legal terms,
but problems remain with respect to enforcement. Korea's ``Special
301'' status was downgraded from ``Priority Watch List'' to ``Watch
List'' in April 1997. Korea maintained its ``Watch List'' status in the
U.S. government's 1999 review. Areas of continuing IPR concern include:
counterfeit consumer products, software piracy, and pharmaceutical
patent protection enforcement.
Korean patent law is fairly comprehensive, offering protection to
most products and technologies. A new patent court came into effect
March 1, 1998. However, approved patents of foreign patent holders are
still vulnerable to infringement. Korean law provides for compulsory
licensing of patents when the invention is deemed necessary for the
national defense, for the public interest, or for the protection of a
dependent patent.
The government's protection of trademarks has improved since 1991.
A revised Trademark Law became effective March 1, 1998. The Design Act
was also revised on March 1, 1998, enhancing protection of industrial
designs. The granting of a trademark under Korean law is based on a
``first-to-file'' basis. While preemptive and predatory filings are on
the decline, ``sleeper'' preemptive registrations still surface on
occasion. A new provision now allows the Korean Industrial Property
Office (KIPO) to reject suspected predatory applications based on a
``bad faith'' clause. There has been less success in stemming the
export of Korean counterfeit products globally.
Korea's Copyright Law protects author's rights, but local
prosecutors take no action unless the copyright holder files a formal
complaint. In 1999, Korea amended its Computer Program Protection Act
and is preparing revised copyright legislation so as to better meet its
TRIPs obligations, especially with respect to copyright and trademark
protection for transactions conducted on the internet. Korea, however,
is not in full compliance with provisions of the TRIPs Agreement which
stipulate that preexisting works and sound recordings must enjoy a full
term of protection (i.e., life of the author plus 50 years for works;
50 years for sound recordings). Korea now only provides protection back
to 1957. The Korean government in 1999 has devoted increased resources
and staff to IPR enforcement activities and President Kim himself has
directed cabinet agencies to step-up government efforts to protect
intellectual property. However, IPR violations, especially of computer
software, including in the government sector remain a problem.
8. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association: With the exception of public sector
employees and teachers, Korean workers enjoy the right of free
association. White-collar workers in the government sector cannot join
unions, but blue-collar employees in the postal service, railways, and
telecommunications sectors, and the national medical center have formed
labor organizations. Starting this year, government employees were
allowed to form workplace consultative councils. In July, legislation
went into effect allowing teachers to form unions. Unions may be formed
with as few as two members and without a vote of the full prospective
membership.
Until recently the Trade Union Law specified that only one union
was permitted at a workplace, but labor law changes in 1997 authorize
the formation of competing labor organizations beginning in the year
2002. Workers in government agencies and defense industries do not have
the right to strike. Unions in enterprises determined to be of
``essential public interest,'' including utilities, public health, and
telecommunications, may be ordered to submit to government-ordered
arbitration in lieu of striking. In fact, work stoppages occur even in
these sensitive sectors. The Labor Dispute Adjustment Act requires
unions to notify the Labor Ministry of their intention to strike, and
normally mandates a 10-day ``cooling-off period'' before a work
stoppage may legally begin.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively: The Korean
constitution and the Trade Union Law provide for the right of workers
to bargain collectively and undertake collective action, but does not
grant government employees, school teachers or workers in defense
industries the right to strike. Collective bargaining is practiced
extensively in virtually all sectors of the Korean economy. The central
and local labor commissions form a semi-autonomous agency that
adjudicates disputes in accordance with the Labor Dispute Adjustment
Law. This law empowers workers to file complaints of unfair labor
practices against employers who interfere with union organizing or
practice discrimination against unionists. In 1998 the government
established the Tripartite Commission, with representatives from labor,
management, and the government to deal with labor issues related to the
economic downturn. The work of the Commission both made it legal for
companies to lay off workers due to economic hardship and authorized
temporary manpower agencies. Labor-management antagonism, however,
remains an issue, and some major employers remain strongly antiunion.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor: The constitution
provides that no person shall be punished, placed under preventive
restrictions, or subjected to involuntary labor, except as provided by
law and through lawful procedures. Forced or compulsory labor is not
condoned by the government and rarely occurs.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children: The government prohibits
forced and bonded child labor and enforces this prohibition
effectively. The Labor Standards Law prohibits the employment of
persons under the age of 15 without a special employment certificate
from the Labor Ministry. Because education is compulsory through middle
school (about age 14), few special employment certificates are issued
for full-time employment. Some children are allowed to do part-time
jobs such as selling newspapers. In order to obtain employment,
children under 18 must have written approval from their parents or
guardians. Employers may require minors to work only a limited number
of overtime hours and are prohibited from employing them at night
without special permission from the Labor Ministry.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work: The government implemented a
minimum wage in 1988 that is adjusted annually. The minimum wage in
1998 was set at $1.28/hour (won 1,525/hour). Companies with fewer than
10 employees are exempt from this law. The maximum regular workweek is
44 hours, with provision for overtime to be compensated at a higher
wage, but such rules are sometimes ignored, especially by small-
companies. The law also provides for a maximum 56-hour workweek and a
24-hour rest period each week. Labor laws were revised in 1997 to
establish a flexible hours system that allows employers to ask laborers
to work up to 48 hours during certain weeks without paying overtime so
long as average weekly hours do not exceed 44. The government's health
and safety standards are not always effectively enforced, but the
accident rate continues to decline. The number of work-related deaths
remains high by international standards.
f. Rights in Sectors with U.S. Investment: U.S. investment in Korea
is concentrated in petroleum, chemicals and related products,
transportation equipment, processed food, manufacturing and services.
Workers in these industrial sectors enjoy the same legal rights of
association and collective bargaining as workers in other industries.
Extent of U.S. Investment in Selected Industries--U.S. Direct Investment Position Abroad on an Historical Cost
Basis--1998
[Millions of U.S. Dollars]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Category Amount
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Petroleum...................... .............. (\1\)
Total Manufacturing............ .............. 2,940
Food & Kindred Products...... 380 ...............................................................
Chemicals & Allied Products.. 530 ...............................................................
Primary & Fabricated Metals.. 22 ...............................................................
Industrial Machinery and 288 ...............................................................
Equipment.
Electric & Electronic 558 ...............................................................
Equipment.
Transportation Equipment..... 128 ...............................................................
Other Manufacturing.......... 1,034 ...............................................................
Wholesale Trade................ .............. (\1\)
Banking........................ .............. 2,251
Finance/Insurance/Real Estate.. .............. 38
Services....................... .............. 446
Other Industries............... .............. -38
TOTAL ALL INDUSTRIES........... .............. 7,365
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Suppressed to avoid disclosing data of individual companies.
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis.
______
MALAYSIA
Key Economic Indicators
[Millions of U.S. Dollars unless otherwise indicated]
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1997 1998 \1\ 1999
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Income, Production and Employment:
Nominal GDP............................. 101,236 72,569 \2\ 78,9
28
Real GDP Growth (pct)................... 7.5 -7.5 \3\ 4.3
GDP by Sector (1978 prices):
Agriculture........................... 6,106 4,377 4,723
Manufacturing......................... 20,981 12,984 14,587
Mining And Petroleum.................. 5,144 3,755 3,827
Construction.......................... 3,389 1,871 1,860
Services.............................. 31,729 22,466 23,697
Government Services................... 4,641 3,506 3,616
Per Capita GDP (US$).................... 4,564 3,272 3,475
Labor Force (000's)..................... 9,038 8,880 9,010
Money and Prices (annual percentage
growth):
Money Supply Growth (M2)(pct)........... 22.7 1.5 \4\ 12.4
Consumer Inflation (pct)................ 2.7 5.3 3.0
Exchange Rate (RM/US$ annual average)... 2.81 3.92 3.80
Balance of Payments and Trade:
Total Exports FOB....................... 77,478 71,925 79,189
Exports to U.S........................ 18,017 19,001 \5\ 9,81
6
Total Imports FOB....................... 73,822 54,321 59,682
Imports from U.S...................... 10,828 8,952 \5\ 4,27
0
Trade Balance........................... 3,656 17,604 19,507
Balance with U.S...................... 7,189 10,049 5,546
External Public Debt.................... 23,280 17,387 19,078
Fiscal Surplus/GDP (pct)................ 2.3 -1.9 -4.9
Current Account Surplus/GDP (pct)....... -5.6 12.9 \6\ 14.0
Debt Service Payments/GDP (pct)......... 5.0 6.9 N/A
Gold and Foreign Exchange Reserves...... 21,700 26,196 \7\ 30,2
00
Aid from U.S............................ 0.6 0.9 1.0
Aid from All Other Countries............ N/A N/A N/A
------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Malaysian Government estimates.
\2\ Converted at annual average exchange rates.
\3\ Calculated in ringgit to avoid exchange rate changes.
\4\ July data for 1999.
\5\ U.S. Commerce Department data, January-June for 1999.
\6\ Deficit for 1997.
\7\ End-October data for 1999.
1. General Policy Framework
After nearly a decade of strong economic growth averaging 8.7
percent annually, Malaysia was hard hit by the regional financial and
economic crisis of 1997-98. After contracting 7.5 percent in 1998, the
economy returned to positive growth in the second quarter of 1999.
Analysts predict 5-6 percent growth in 1999 and continued strong growth
in 2000. Growing consumer and investor confidence is reflected in
increased auto sales, consumer credit mortgage approvals, and a three-
fold increase in the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange Composite Index from
its record low of 262.7 in September 1998 to trading levels in the 720-
750 range in November 1999. Malaysia's economic recovery has been
export led, based in part on growing electronics exports to the United
States, Malaysia's principal trade and investment partner, and the
region and also the result of increased government spending.
Foreign direct and portfolio investment has not returned to pre-
crisis levels. Investor concerns are focused on excessive commercial
property investment, high levels of domestic corporate debt, the lack
of transparent policies regarding support for troubled firms, and
continued trade and investment restrictions. To deal with a growing
number of non-performing loans (NPLs) during the financial crisis, in
1998 the government established an asset management corporation,
Danaharta, and a special purpose vehicle, Danamodal, to inject funds
into banks in need of recapitalization. The government also created the
Corporate Debt Restructuring Committee (CDRC) to provide a framework
for creditors and debtors voluntarily to resolve liquidity problems of
viable businesses and serve as an alternative to bankruptcy. Danaharta
has removed about one-third of the NPLs from the banking system. CDRC
has completed the first stages of the debt workout process for a
substantial number of firms and reportedly hopes to complete its
activities by the end of 2000.
The government plays a strong pro-active role in the economy as
investor, economic planner, approver of investment projects, approver
of public and private procurement decisions, author and implementor of
policies and programs to bolster the economic status of the Malay and
indigenous communities (commonly referred to as bumiputras), and
decisionmaker over privatization contracts. The government holds equity
stakes (generally minority shares) in a wide range of domestic
companies, usually large players in key sectors, and can exert
considerable influence over their operations. The economic downturn,
however, slowed the push to privatization and increased emphasis on
government support for sensitive industries, such as automobiles and
steel. The government has said it will consider granting assistance to
troubled corporations on the basis of three criteria: national
interest, strategic interest, and equity considerations under bumiputra
policies.
Tariffs are the main instrument used to regulate the importation of
goods in Malaysia. However, 17 percent of Malaysia's tariff lines
(principally in the construction equipment, forestry, logging,
agricultural mineral, and motor vehicle sectors) are also subject to
non-automatic import licensing designed to protect import-sensitive or
strategic industries. Although the average applied MFN tariff rate of
Malaysia has declined to approximately 8.1 percent, duties for tariff
lines where there is significant local production are often higher. For
example, 15.8 percent of product tariff lines in Malaysia's tariff
schedule have rates over 24 percent, 25.9 percent of tariff lines have
rates over 15 percent, and many lines have rates well over 100 percent.
The level of tariff protection is generally lower on raw materials
and increases for those goods with value-added content or which undergo
further processing. The government urges Malaysians to purchase
domestic products, instead of imports, whenever possible. In addition
to import duties, a sales tax of 10 percent is levied on most imported
goods. Like import duties, however, this sales tax is not applied to
raw material and machinery used in export production. Malaysia has been
an active participant in multilateral and regional trade fora such as
the World Trade Organization (WTO) and APEC (which it chaired in 1998).
Fiscal Policy: The government is pursuing an expansive fiscal
policy in order to stimulate economic growth. The government expects to
run a budget deficit in 2000 of approximately 4.4 percent of GNP,
slightly less than the 1999 deficit. The Malaysian government finances
domestically the bulk of the deficit.
Monetary Policy: The central bank has been progressively loosening
monetary policy to lead the economy out of recession. Statutory reserve
requirements have been reduced steadily from 13.5 percent as of year-
end 1997 to 4 percent in September 1998. The central bank also lowered
the liquid asset requirements for commercial banks, reduced an
administrative margin used to calculate the base lending rate, and cut
its 3 month intervention rate from 8 percent to 5.5 percent. A
significant drop in interest rates has accompanied the loosening of
monetary policy. The base lending rate dropped from 8.04 percent in
early November 1998 to 6.8 percent in November 1999.
2. Exchange Rate Policy
In September and October 1999, the Malaysian government relaxed
capital control measures on foreign portfolio investment instituted on
September 1, 1998, as part of a broad effort to stabilize the currency
while stimulating the economy. On September 2, 1998, the government
fixed the exchange rate of the Ringgit to the U.S. Dollar at RM 3.8/
US$1 and instituted selective capital controls, including a
controversial tax on repatriated principal and profits. At present
foreign portfolio investment is subject to a flat 10 percent exit tax
on repatriated profits.
3. Structural Policies
Pricing Policies: Most prices are market-determined but controls
are maintained on some key goods, such as vegetable oil, fuel, public
utilities, cement, motor vehicles, rice, flour, sugar, tobacco, and
chicken. (Note: no restrictions are placed on wheat imports.)
Tax Policies: Tax policy is geared toward raising government
revenue and discouraging consumption of ``luxury'' items. Income taxes,
both corporate and individual, comprise 40 percent of government
revenue with indirect taxes, export and import duties, excise taxes,
sales taxes, service taxes and other taxes accounting for another 31
percent. The remainder comes largely from dividends generated by state-
owned enterprises and petroleum taxes.
The Year 2000 budget features personal tax reductions, generous
benefits for civil servants and tax incentives to encourage financial
institution mergers. The Government will also lower or abolish duties
on 179 categories of food products (fresh, dried, and processed).
Beginning in 2000, the tax assessment system will base tax collection
on current year income rather than previous year income. High-
technology and information-technology companies which establish in the
Multimedia Super Corridor (a government-established zone designed to
concentrate and stimulate development of high-technology multimedia
industries) are granted attractive tax incentives.
Standards: Malaysia has extensive standards and labeling
requirements, but these appear to be largely implemented in an
objective, nondiscriminatory fashion. Food product labels must provide
ingredients, expiry dates and, if imported, the name of the importer.
Electrical equipment must be approved by the Ministry of International
Trade and Industry, telecommunications equipment must be ``type
approved'' by the Communications and Multimedia Commission.
Telecommunications and aviation equipment must be approved by the
Department of Civil Aviation. Pharmaceuticals must be registered with
the Ministry of Health. In addition, the Standards and Industrial
Research Institute of Malaysia provides quality and other standards
approvals.
4. Debt Management Policies
Malaysia's medium and long-term foreign debt (both public and
private sector) amounted to $34.7 billion at the end of 1998, about 44
percent of GDP. Malaysia's debt service ratio declined from a peak of
18.9 percent of gross export earnings in 1986 to 6.9 percent in 1998.
5. Aid
U.S. government assistance to Malaysia in FY-1999 falls into three
broad categories: the Trade Development Agency (TDA), the International
Military Education Training (IMET) program ($700,000), and the U.S.-
Asia Environment Program (US-AEP.) Although statistics are not
available for assistance provided from other governments, since 1998
the Japanese government has extended financial assistance to help
Malaysia recover from the economic crisis: Japanese Government Office
of Developmental Assistance (ODA) Yen Loan Projects approximately $1.05
billion, Japanese EX-IM Bank approximately $700 million, EX-IM Bank
guaranteed Commercial bank loans approximately $700 million, Japanese
government guaranteed commercial bank loans approximately $560 million,
and a short-term financing facility up to $2.5 billion.
6. Significant Barriers to U.S. Exports
Import Restrictions on Motor Vehicles: Malaysia maintains several
measures to protect the local automobile industry, including high
tariffs and an import quota and licensing system on imported motor
vehicles and motor vehicle parts. Malaysia also maintains local content
requirements of 45 to 60 percent for passenger and commercial vehicles,
and 60 percent for motorcycles. The government maintains that local
content restrictions will be phased out by the year 2000 in accordance
with its WTO commitments (see investment barriers.) However, Malaysia
has requested an extension of its commitments under the ASEAN Free
Trade Area (AFTA) to reduce tariffs in the auto sector by the year
2000. These restrictions have hampered the ability of U.S. firms to
penetrate the Malaysian market. Customs tariffs and excise duties (up
to 50 percent) for motorcycles are also significant barriers for U.S.
companies. Malaysia is also considering new emissions standards for
motorcycles, which could restrict market opportunities for imports.
Products Tariff (pct)
Automobiles (CB)........................................ 140-300
Automobiles (CKD)....................................... 80
Vans (CBU).............................................. 42-140
Van (CKD)............................................... 40
4WD/Multipurpose (CBU).................................. 60-200
4WD/Multipurpose (CKD).................................. 40
Motorcycle (CBU)........................................ 80-120
Motorcycle (CKD)........................................ 30
Restrictions on Construction Equipment: In October 1996, Malaysia
raised duties on construction equipment from 5 to 20 percent. In
addition, the initial capital allowance for imported heavy equipment
will be reduced from 20 to 10 percent in the first year, and the annual
allowance will be reduced from between 12 percent and 20 percent to 10
percent. In October 1997, the government imposed a restrictive
licensing regime on imports of heavy construction equipment and raised
import duties for the second year in a row, as detailed below. In April
1999, another licensing requirement was established for certain iron
and steel products.
Products Tariff (pct)
Heavy Machinery & Equipment............................. 5
Multi-Purpose Vehicles.................................. 50
Special Purpose Vehicles................................ 50
Construction Materials.................................. 10-30
Duties on High Value Food Products: Duties for processed and high
value products, such as canned fruit, snack foods, and many other
processed foods, range between 20 and 30 percent. The applied tariff on
soy protein concentrate is 20 percent.
Duties on Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco Products: High tariffs
(increased 10/23) on tobacco products ($10.5-48/kg) and alcoholic
beverages (e.g., vermouth in retail-sized containers is subject to a
specific tariff of $31.5/dal) hamper U.S. exports.
Plastic Resins: U.S. exports of some plastic resins are hampered by
20 percent tariffs.
Tariff-Rate Quota for Chicken Parts: Although the government
applies a zero import duty on chicken parts, imports are regulated
through licensing and sanitary controls, and import levels remain well
below the minimum access commitments established during the Uruguay
Round.
Float Glass Tariff Differentials: Malaysia levies high duties (65
sen/kilogram or 50-100 percent ad valorem equivalent) on rectangular-
shaped float glass. Nearly all float glass that moves in world trade is
rectangular. To qualify for the lower ad valorem MFN tariff rate of 30
percent levied on non-rectangular float glass, exporters often must
resort to time-consuming, wasteful procedures such as cutting off one
or more corners or cutting one edge in a slanted fashion. This is an
inefficient and expensive process that requires distributors to recut
each piece of glass into a rectangular shape once it has cleared
customs.
Rice Import Policy: The sole authorized importer of rice is a
government corporation with the responsibility of ensuring purchase of
the domestic crop and wide power to regulate imports.
Film and Paper Product Tariff: Malaysia applies a 25 percent tariff
on imported instant print film that is estimated to cause an annual
trade loss of $10 to $25 million for U.S. industry. In August 1994, the
government raised tariffs on several categories of imported kraft
linerboard (used in making corrugated cardboard boxes) to between 20
and 30 percent depending on the category. These tariff increases are to
be phased out after five years and are subject to review every two
years. Malaysia did not change the tariff levels after the 1996 review.
Direct Selling Companies: In May 1999, the Malaysian Government
announced new requirements for the licensing and operation of direct
selling companies. These requirements include a) no more than 30
percent of the locally incorporated company can be foreign owned, b)
local content of products should be no less than 80 percent, c) no new
products would be approved for sale that did not meet local content
requirements, and d) all price increases would be approved by the
Ministry of Domestic Trade and Consumer Affairs. These guidelines also
spell out the conditions under which companies may receive one, two and
three year licenses. The Ministry indicated that the local content
targets are not mandatory, except for adherence to Malaysia's national
equity policy.
Government Procurement: Malaysian Government policy calls for
procurement to be used to support national objectives such as
encouraging greater participation of ethnic Malays (bumiputras) in the
economy, transfer of technology to local industries, reducing the
outflow of foreign exchange, creating opportunities for local companies
in the services sector, and enhancing Malaysia's export capabilities.
As a result, foreign companies do not have the same opportunity as some
local companies to compete for contracts and in most cases foreign
companies are required to take on a local partner before their bid will
be considered. Some U.S. companies have voiced concerns about the
transparency of decisions and decision-making processes. Malaysia is
not a party to the plurilateral WTO Government Procurement Agreement.
Investment Barriers: Malaysia encourages direct foreign investment
particularly in export-oriented manufacturing and high-tech industries,
but retains considerable discretionary authority over individual
investments. Especially in the case of investments aimed at the
domestic market, it has used this authority to restrict foreign equity
(normally to 30 percent) and to require foreign firms to enter into
joint ventures with local partners. To alleviate the effects of the
economic downturn, Malaysia announced relaxation (until December 31,
2000) of foreign-ownership and export requirements in the manufacturing
sector for companies producing goods that do not compete with local
producers. Most foreign firms face restrictions in the number of
expatriate workers they are allowed to employ.
Trade-Related Investment Measures: Malaysia has notified the WTO of
certain measures that are inconsistent with its obligations under the
WTO agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures (TRIMS). The
measures deal with local requirements in the automotive sector. New
projects or companies granted ``pioneer status'' are eligible to
receive a 70 percent income tax exemption. Proper notification allows
developing-county WTO members to maintain such measures for a five-year
transitional period after entry into force of the WTO. Malaysia
therefore must eliminate these measures before January 1, 2000. The
United States is working in the WTO committee on TRIMS to ensure that
WTO members meet these obligations.
Services Barriers: Under the WTO basic telecommunications
agreement, Malaysia made commitments on most basic telecommunications
services and partially adopted the reference paper on regulatory
commitments. Malaysia guaranteed market access and national treatment
for these services only through acquisition of up to 30 percent of the
shares of existing licensed public telecommunications operators, and
limits market access commitments to facilities-based providers. At
least two U.S. firms have investments in basic and enhanced services
sectors.
Professional Services: Foreign professional services providers are
generally not allowed to practice in Malaysia. Foreign law firms may
not operate in Malaysia except as minority partners with local law
firms, and their stake in any partnership is limited to 30 percent.
Foreign lawyers may not practice Malaysian law or operate as foreign
legal consultants. They cannot affiliate with local firms or use their
international firm's name.
Under Malaysia's registration system for architects and engineers,
foreign architects and engineers may seek only temporary registration.
Foreign architectural firms are eligible only for special projects as
agreed between Malaysia and an interested foreign government. Unlike
engineers, Malaysian architectural firms may not have foreign
architectural firms as registered partners. Foreign architecture firms
may only operate as affiliates of Malaysian companies. Foreign
engineering companies must establish joint ventures with Malaysian
firms and receive ``temporary licensing,'' which is granted only on a
project-by-project basis and is subject to an economic needs test and
other criteria imposed by the licensing board. Foreign accounting firms
can provide accounting or taxation services in Malaysia only through a
locally registered partnership with Malaysian accountants or firms, and
aggregate foreign interests are not to exceed 30 percent. A licensed
auditor in Malaysia must authenticate auditing and taxation services.
Residency is required for registration.
Banking: No new licenses are being granted to either local or
foreign banks; foreign banks must operate as locally controlled
subsidiaries. Foreign-controlled companies are required to obtain 60
percent of their local credit from Malaysian banks. Insurance branches
of foreign insurance companies were required to be locally incorporated
by June 30, 1998; however, the government has granted extensions to
that requirement. Foreign shareholding exceeding 49 percent is not
permitted unless the Malaysian Government approves higher shareholding
levels. As part of Malaysia's WTO financial services offer, the
government committed itself to allow existing foreign shareholders of
locally incorporated insurance companies to increase their shareholding
to 51 percent once the WTO Financial Services Agreement goes into
effect in 1999. New entry by foreign insurance companies is limited to
equity participation in locally incorporated insurance companies and
aggregate foreign shareholding in such companies shall not exceed 30
percent.
Securities: Foreigners may hold up to 49 percent of the equity in a
stockbroking firm. Currently there are 11 stockbroking firms that have
foreign ownership and 20 representative offices of foreign brokerage
firms. Fund management companies may be 100 percent foreign-owned if
they provide services only to foreign investors, but they are limited
to 70 percent foreign-ownership if they provide services to both
foreign and local investors.
Advertising: Foreign film footage is restricted to 20 percent per
commercial, and only Malaysian actors may be used. The government has
an informal and vague guideline that commercials cannot ``promote a
foreign lifestyle.'' Advertising of alcohol products is severely
restricted.
Television and Radio Broadcasting: The government maintains
broadcast quotas on both radio and television programming. Sixty
percent of television programming is required to originate from local
production companies owned by ethnic Malays. This share is scheduled to
increase to 80 percent by the year 2000. Sixty percent of radio
programming must be of local origin. The Ministry of Information
announced in January 1998 that it would study the use of the
Broadcasting Act of 1988 as the means of imposing further conditions on
TV stations to provide additional airtime to local programming.
Other Barriers: U.S. companies have indicated that they would
welcome improvements in the transparency of government decision-making
and procedures, and limits on anti-competitive practices. A
considerable proportion of government projects and procurement are
awarded without transparent competitive bidding. The government has
declared that it is committed to fighting corruption and maintains an
Anti-Corruption Agency (a part of the office of the Prime Minister) to
promote that objective. The agency has the independent power to conduct
investigations and is able to prosecute cases with the approval of the
Attorney General.
7. Export Subsidies Policies
Malaysia offers several export allowances. Under the export credit-
refinancing scheme operated by the central bank, commercial banks and
other lenders provide financing to exporters at a preferential interest
rate for both post-shipment and pre-shipment credit. Malaysia also
provides tax incentives to exporters, including double deduction of
expenses for overseas advertising and travel, supply of free samples
abroad, promotion of exports, maintaining sales offices overseas, and
research on export markets. To spur exports, 70 percent of the
increased export earnings by international trading companies has been
exempted from taxes.
8. Protection of U.S. Intellectual Property
Malaysia is a member of the World Intellectual Property
Organization (WIPO), the Berne Convention, and the Paris Convention.
Malaysia provides copyright protection to all works published in Berne
Convention member countries regardless of when the works were first
published in Malaysia. Malaysia is also a member of the WTO and
scheduled to meet its obligations under Trade Related Intellectual
Property Agreement (TRIPS) on January 1, 2000.
As the number of manufacturing licenses for CDs has increased, so
have piracy rates for music and video discs. Malaysia's production
capacity for CDs far exceeds local demand plus legitimate exports, and
pirate products believed to have originated in Malaysia have been
identified throughout the Asia-Pacific region, North America, South
America, and Europe. The Malaysian Government is aware of the problem
and has expressed its determination to move against illegal operations.
In the April 1999 ``Special 301'' report, USTR decided to delay a
decision on including Malaysia on the Watch List until an out-of-cycle
review could be conducted to assess Malaysia's progress toward
substantially reducing pirated optical media production and export.
In March 1998, the government opened an intellectual property
training center to develop and offer programs for government officials,
agencies, attorneys, and the judiciary. In April 1999, the government
created an interagency task force to develop and implement a regulatory
regime for optical media production. Since April, the government has
drafted comprehensive optical media legislation, which was scheduled to
be submitted to Parliament during its fall session. The November 11
dissolution of Parliament by the Prime Minister in anticipation of
elections on November 29 has delayed consideration of the optical disc
legislation and most TRIPS-related amendments to existing legislation
until the first parliament session of the new government, most likely
in Spring 2000.
Suppressing CD-based digital piracy is consistent with the
government's objective to establish the Multimedia Super Corridor as
the preeminent locus of high-technology manufacturing and innovation in
Asia. Police and legal authorities are generally responsive to requests
from U.S. firms for investigation and prosecution of copyright
infringement cases. However, despite over 6,000 raids and inspections
since April 1999, no one has been criminally prosecuted for piracy.
Notwithstanding these efforts of the government, illegal production of
optical disks remains a significant problem in Malaysia, and its
effects have been observed throughout the region.
Trademark infringement and patent protection have not been serious
problem areas in Malaysia for U.S. companies in recent years.
9. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association: By law most workers have the right to
engage in trade union activity, and approximately 10 percent of the
work force are members of trade unions. Exceptions include certain
categories of workers labeled ``confidential'' and ``managerial and
executives,'' as well as police and defense officials. The government
discourages Malaysia's many foreign workers from joining unions and, in
practical terms, foreigners are not able to engage in trade union
activity. Government policy places a de facto ban on the formation of
national unions in the electronics sector, but allows enterprise-level
unions,
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively: Workers have the
legal right to organize and bargain collectively, and collective
bargaining is widespread in those sectors where labor is organized.
However, severe restrictions on the right to strike weaken collective
bargaining rights. The law requires that the parties to a labor dispute
submit to a system of compulsory adjudication. Thus, though
theoretically legal, strikes are extremely rare.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor: The constitution
prohibits forced or compulsory labor, and the government enforces this
prohibition. There is no evidence that forced or compulsory labor
occurs in Malaysia except for rare cases that, when discovered, are
prosecuted vigorously by the government.
d. Minimum Age for the Employment of Children: Malaysian law
prohibits the employment of children younger than the age of 14. The
law permits some exceptions, such as light work in a family enterprise,
work in public entertainment, work performed for the government in a
school or training institutions, or work as an approved apprentice. In
no case may children work more than six hours per day, more than six
days per week, or at night. Child labor occurs, but there is no
reliable recent estimate of the number of child workers. Most child
laborers work in the urban informal sector and the agricultural sector.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work: There is not minimum wage, but
prevailing wages generally provide a decent living. Malaysian law
stipulates working hours, mandatory rest periods, overtime rates,
holidays, and other labor standards. The government enforces these
standards. Working conditions on plantations are worse than in other
areas of the economy. An occupational safety law provides some
protections.
f. Rights in Sectors with U.S. Investment: U.S. companies invest
widely in many sectors of the Malaysian economy. Worker rights in
sectors in which there is U.S. investment generally do not differ from
those in other sectors. U.S. companies invest heavily in the
electronics sector, in which workers' right to organize is limited to
enterprise-level unions.
Extent of U.S. Investment in Selected Industries--U.S. Direct Investment Position Abroad on an Historical Cost
Basis--1998
[Millions of U.S. Dollars]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Category Amount
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Petroleum...................... .............. 1,027
Total Manufacturing............ .............. 4,199
Food & Kindred Products...... 3 ...............................................................
Chemicals & Allied Products.. 306 ...............................................................
Primary & Fabricated Metals.. 5 ...............................................................
Industrial Machinery and 743 ...............................................................
Equipment.
Electric & Electronic 2,669 ...............................................................
Equipment.
Transportation Equipment..... 0 ...............................................................
Other Manufacturing.......... 473 ...............................................................
Wholesale Trade................ .............. 166
Banking........................ .............. 393
Finance/Insurance/Real Estate.. .............. 352
Services....................... .............. 84
Other Industries............... .............. -27
TOTAL ALL INDUSTRIES........... .............. 6,193
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis.
______
PHILIPPINES
Key Economic Indicators
[Billions of U.S. Dollars unless otherwise indicated]
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1997 1998 \1\ 1999
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Income, Production and Employment:
Nominal GDP.......................... 82.2 65.1 74.6
Real GDP Growth (pct) \2\............ 5.2 -0.5 3.0
Nominal GDP by Sector:
Agriculture........................ 15.4 11.0 13.1
Manufacturing...................... 18.3 14.3 16.0
Services........................... 40.4 33.7 39.0
Government \3\..................... 10.0 8.4 9.5
Per Capita GDP (US$)................. 1,145 886 990
Labor Force (000's).................. 30,355 31,056 31,800
Unemployment Rate (pct).............. 8.7 10.0 9.5
Money and Prices (annual percentage
growth):
Money Supply Growth (M2) \4\......... 20.5 8.0 12.0
Consumer Price Inflation (pct)....... 5.9 9.7 7.2
Exchange Rate (Peso/US$ annual 29.47 40.89 39.50
average) Interbank Rate.............
Balance of Payments and Trade:
Total Exports FOB \6\................ 25.2 29.5 33.8
Exports to U.S. \7\................ 10.4 11.9 12.0
Total Imports FOB \6\................ 36.4 29.5 31.3
Imports from U.S. \7\.............. 7.4 6.7 7.2
Trade Balance \6\.................... -11.1 -0.03 2.5
Balance with U.S. \7\.............. 3.0 5.2 4.8
Current Acct. Surplus or Deficit/GDP -5.3 2.0 6.0
(pct)...............................
External Public Sector Debt.......... 27.0 30.3 32.0
Foreign Debt Service Payments/GDP 6.8 7.8 8.8
(pct)...............................
Nat'l Gov. Fiscal Surplus or Deficit/ 0.1 -1.9 -3.0
GDP (pct)...........................
Gold and Foreign Exchange Reserves... 8.8 10.8 15.5
Aid from U.S. (US$ millions) \8\..... 46.0 49.0 \9\ 35.0
Aid from Other Bilateral Sources (US$ 1,588.0 1,465.0 \9\ 1,179
millions) \8\....................... .0
------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ 1999 figures are full-year estimates based on data available as of
October.
\2\ Percentage changes based on local currency.
\3\ Government construction and services gross value added.
\4\ Growth rate of year-end M2 levels.
\5\ 1994 base year starting 1997; 1988 base year for prior years.
\6\ Merchandise trade.
\7\ Source: U.S. Department of Commerce; exports FAS, imports customs
basis; 1999 figures are estimates based on data available through
August 1999.
\8\ Inflows per Philippine government balance of payments data,
excluding inflows from the U.S. Veterans Administration (USVA).
\9\ Actual January-July 1999 figures.
Sources: National Economic and Development Authority, Bangko Sentral ng
Pilipinas, Department of Finance.
1. General Policy Framework
The Philippines has a population of 75 million, growing at 2.3
percent yearly. Agriculture absorbs 40 percent of employment but
contributes only 20 percent of GDP. Electronics, garments, and auto
parts are the leading merchandise exports, but rely heavily on imported
inputs. Overseas workers remittances, estimated at $5-6 billion yearly,
are a major source of foreign exchange. The domestic savings rate is
relatively low, compared to the rest of Asia, estimated at 20 percent
of GNP in 1998.
Public finances has been a long-standing problem. After four
consecutive fiscal surpluses (1994-97), the government is again running
a large budget deficit, in part as a response to the Asian financial
crisis. But revenues perennially suffer from weak tax administration
and collection, and efforts to contain expenditures are hampered by the
large share (over 70%) of ``non-discretionary'' expenditures such as
payroll costs, interest payments and mandated transfers to local
government units. Fiscal difficulties complicate government efforts to
manage domestic interest rates, leading the government to rely more
heavily on foreign borrowings.
The Aquino and Ramos administrations made significant progress in
setting the stage for a higher and more sustainable growth path through
economic liberalization and deregulation. President Joseph Estrada is
trying to continue and expand the program pursued by his predecessors,
but nationalist and vested interests pose obstacles to further reform.
2. Exchange Rate Policy
Current account transactions are fully convertible. There are no
barriers to full and immediate capital repatriation and profit
remittances, foreign debt servicing, and the payment of royalties,
lease payments and similar fees. Foreign exchange rates generally
evolve freely in the interbank market, although the Bangko Sentral ng
Pilipinas (BSP--Central Bank) imposes limits on banks' foreign exchange
positions. The depreciation of the peso during the Asian financial
crisis (from Peso 26/dollar in June 1997 to Peso 40/dollar at present)
has hurt the competitiveness of some U.S. exports.
3. Structural Policies
Prices are generally determined by market forces, although basic
public services (such as transport, water and electricity) are
regulated by the government. Government regulation of prices of
``socially sensitive'' petroleum products (i.e., liquefied petroleum
gas, regular gasoline, and kerosene) ended in July 1998 with the full
deregulation of the oil industry, but the government's National Food
Authority remains a major factor in the market for rice and other
agricultural products.
While progress in investment liberalization has been substantial,
important barriers to foreign entry remain. Two ``negative lists''
outline where investment is restricted. Divestment requirements exist
for firms seeking certain investment incentives. A number of other laws
specify, or have the effect of imposing, local sourcing requirements.
Almost all products, including imports, are subject to a 10 percent
value added tax. Certain products--whether domestically manufactured or
imported--are subject to excise tax. The Philippines' Tariff Reform
Program is gradually lowering applied duty rates on nearly all items,
toward a goal of tariff rates of zero to five percent by 2004 for all
items except sensitive agricultural products.
4. Debt Management Policies
Foreign debt (estimated at $48.1 billion as of June 1999) has been
growing, but debt servicing is not a significant problem. The ratio of
debt service payments to exports of goods and services was 13.2 percent
during period Jan-July 1999, compared to 40 percent in the early 1980s.
Medium and long-term loans comprise over 85 percent of external
liabilities. Concessional credits from multilateral and official
bilateral lenders account for about half of the country's external
debt.
The Philippines had four debt rescheduling rounds with official
bilateral (Paris Club) creditors and did not exercise a fifth Paris
Club debt rescheduling agreement. While the Philippines ``graduated''
from over three decades of International Monetary Fund (IMF)
supervision in March 1998, a two-year IMF standby arrangement was
agreed at the same time. The Government has indicated it may extend the
arrangement. The Philippines has also succeeded in retiring or
exchanging some of its earlier debt for instruments carrying longer
maturities and more favorable terms, the latest being a $1 billion
Brady bond exchange program concluded in October 1999.
The Central Bank requires prior approval of private sector debt
guaranteed by the public sector or covered by forex guarantees issued
by local banks; loans extended by foreign currency deposit units funded
or collateralized by offshore loans and deposits; loans with maturities
of over one year obtained by private banks and financial institutions
for relending; and public sector foreign loans.
5. Significant Barriers to U.S. Exports
Tariffs: Imported items that are not locally produced generally
face low tariffs, while imports that compete with locally-produced
goods face high tariffs, generally up to 30 percent. Imports of
finished automotive vehicles (completely built-up units) face a 40
percent tariff (scheduled to fall to 30 percent in 2000). The non-trade
weighted average nominal tariff rate was 9.98 percent in 1999 and is
scheduled to decline to 8.09 percent in the year 2000. Customs accounts
for over 20 percent of government revenues. In January 1999, President
Estrada signed E.O. 63 raising applied MFN tariff rates on a range of
products including yarns, threads, fabric, apparel, and kraft liner
paper. Rates on these items are scheduled to return to 1997 levels in
2000. Significant trade barriers hamper market access in agriculture.
The Philippines maintains high tariff rates on sensitive agricultural
products, including grains, livestock and meat products, sugar, certain
vegetables, and coffee. Examples include feed grains, particularly corn
(at an in-quota rate of 35 percent, and a 65 percent out-of-quota
rate), sorghum (15 percent) and potatoes (in-quota rate of 45 percent,
60 percent out-of-quota). A number of particularly sensitive
agricultural commodities are subject to tariff-rate quotas (TRQs),
including live animals, fresh and chilled beef, pork, poultry meat,
goat meat, potatoes, coffee, corn, and sugar. Rice is subject to a
quantitative restriction.
Import Licenses: The National Food Authority (NFA), a government
entity, is the sole importer of rice and continues to be involved in
imports of corn. Fisheries Administrative Order (FAO) 195, series of
1999, issued by the Department of Agriculture, requires a license to
import fresh, chilled, and frozen fish when intended for sale in local
retail markets. Certain other items are subject to other import
regulations, including firearms and ammunition, used clothing, sodium
cyanide, chlorofluorocarbon (CFC) and other ozone-depleting substances,
penicillin and derivatives, coal and derivatives, color reproduction
machines, chemicals for the manufacture of explosives, pesticides, used
motor vehicles, and used tires. In addition, as noted above, certain
agricultural commodities are subject to minimum access volume tariff-
rate quotas.
Excise Taxes: U.S. producers of automobiles and distilled spirits
have raised concerns about certain discriminatory aspects of the
Philippines' excise tax system. Excise taxes on distilled spirits
impose a lower tax on products made from materials that are
indigenously available (e.g., coconut, palm, sugar cane). The excise
tax treatment of automotive vehicles is based on engine displacement,
rather than vehicle value.
Services Barriers: Banking--May 1994 banking legislation permitted
10 new foreign banks to open branches in the Philippines. Foreign
equity is limited to 60 percent ownership of either a new local
subsidiary or an existing domestic bank. Regulations require that
majority Filipino-owned domestic banks control at least 70 percent of
total banking system assets.
Securities--Membership in the Philippine stock exchange is open to
foreign-controlled stock brokerage firms that are incorporated under
Philippine laws. Foreign ownership in securities underwriting companies
is limited to 60 percent. Companies not established under Philippine
law are not allowed to underwrite securities for the Philippine market,
but may underwrite Philippine issues for foreign markets.
Insurance--Although foreign entry has been liberalized,
capitalization requirements vary according to the extent of foreign
equity. Only the Philippines' Government Service Insurance System can
provide coverage for government-funded projects and BOT-funded
projects. Regulations require all insurance/professional reinsurance
companies operating in the country to cede to the industry-owned
National Reinsurance Corporation of the Philippines at least 10 percent
of outward reinsurance placements.
Professional Services--The Philippine Constitution reserves the
practice of licensed professions to Philippine citizens. This includes,
inter alia, law, engineering, medicine, accountancy, architecture, and
customs brokerage.
Telecommunications--The Philippine Constitution limits foreign
ownership in public utilities to 40 percent. Telecommunication firms
are considered public utilities.
Shipping--Foreign-flagged vessels are prohibited from the carriage
of domestic trade.
Express Delivery Services--Foreign air express couriers and
airfreight forwarding firms must either contract with a wholly
Philippine-owned business to provide delivery services, or establish a
domestic company, at least 60 percent of which should be Philippine-
owned.
Standards, Testing, Labeling, and Certification: Imports of
products covered by mandatory Philippine national standards must be
cleared by the Bureau of Product Standards (BPS). Labeling requirements
apply to a variety of products, including pharmaceuticals, food,
textiles and certain industrial goods. The Generics Act of 1988,
mandates that the generic name of a particular pharmaceutical product
appear above its brand name on all packaging.
Investment Barriers: The Foreign Investment Act of 1991 contains
two ``negative lists'' that outline areas where foreign investment is
restricted. ``List A'' restricts foreign investment in certain sectors
because of constitutional or legal constraints. No foreign investment
is permitted in mass media (including cable television), retail trade,
processing of corn and rice, small-scale mining and private security
agencies. Varying foreign ownership limitations cover, among others,
advertising (30 percent), recruitment (25 percent), financing (60
percent), securities underwriting (60 percent), public utilities (40
percent), education (40 percent), and the exploration and development
of natural resources (40 percent). Land ownership is reserved to
Philippine citizens and corporations that are at least 60 percent owned
by Philippine citizens. ``List B'' limits foreign ownership (generally
to 40 percent) for reasons of public health, and safety and morals.
This list also restricts foreign ownership to no more than 40 percent
in non-export firms capitalized at less than $200,000.
Export Performance Requirements: Investment incentive regulations
impose a higher export performance requirement for foreign-owned
enterprises (70 percent of production should be exported) than for
Philippine-controlled companies (50 percent). With the exception of
foreign-controlled firms that export 100 percent of their production,
foreign firms that seek incentives from the Board of Investments (BOI)
must commit to divest to 40 percent ownership within 30 years or such
longer period as the BOI may allow. The Philippines has requested an
extension of the January 1, 2000, deadline to eliminate WTO-
inconsistent local-content and foreign exchange requirements under its
motor vehicle development program.
Local Sourcing Requirements: Outside of the investment incentives
regime, investors in certain industries are subject to specific laws
which require local sourcing. Executive Order (E.O.) 776 requires that
pharmaceutical firms purchase semi-synthetic antibiotics from a
specific local company, unless they can demonstrate that the landed
cost of imported semi-synthetic antibiotics is at least 20 percent less
than that produced by the local firm. E.O. 259 bans imports of soap and
detergents containing less than 60 percent coconut-based surface active
agents of Philippine origin, implicitly requiring local sourcing by
soap and detergent manufacturers. Letter of Instruction (LOI) 1387,
issued in 1984, requires mining firms to offer their copper
concentrates to Philippine Associated Smelting and Refining Corp.
(PASAR)--a government-controlled firm until its recent privatization.
Government Procurement Practices: Contracts for government
procurement are awarded by competitive bidding. Preferential treatment
of local suppliers is practiced in government purchases of
pharmaceuticals, rice, corn, and iron/steel materials for use in
government projects, and in locally-funded government consulting
requirements. The Philippines is not a signatory of the WTO Government
Procurement Agreement.
Customs Procedures: The government has contracted a private firm,
Societe Generale de Surveillance, to perform certain customs functions.
Officials have not stated whether the contract will be renewed beyond
December 31, 1999. Most imports valued at over $500 are permitted entry
only when accompanied by a `Clean Report of Findings'' issued by SGS.
Refrigerated products are exempt. Certain goods require preshipment
inspection in the country of export. The preshipment inspection
requirement extends to exports to certain operations in free-trade
zones. Customs valuation for determining dutiable value of imports is
based on ``export value,'' which has resulted in unwarranted uplifts in
the assessed dutiable value of many U.S. exports. The government says
it will implement the ``transaction value'' method of customs valuation
by January 1, 2000, in line with WTO obligations.
6. Export Subsidies Policies
Firms engaged in activities under the government's ``Investment
Priorities Plan'' may register with the Board of Investments (BOI) for
fiscal incentives, including three to six year income tax holidays and
a tax deduction equivalent to 50 percent of the wages of direct-hire
workers for the first five years from registration. BOI-registered
firms that locate in less-developed areas may be eligible to claim a
tax deduction of up to 100 percent of outlays for infrastructure works
and 100 percent of incremental labor expenses also for the first five
years from registration. Export-oriented firms located in government-
designated export zones and industrial estates registered with the
Philippine Economic Zone Authority enjoy basically the same incentives
as BOI-registered firms. Firms which earn at least 50 percent of their
revenues from exports may register for certain tax credits under the
``Export Development Act'' (EDA), including a tax credit for imported
inputs and raw materials not readily available locally (through
December 31, 1999).
7. Protection of U.S. Intellectual Property
The Philippines is a party to the Berne and Paris Conventions, the
WTO Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
(TRIPs), and is a member of the World Intellectual Property
Organization. The Philippines remains on the ``Special 301'' Watch
List.
While substantial progress has been made in recent years,
significant problems remain in ensuring consistent, effective
protection of intellectual property rights (IPR). A new IP law (R.A.
8293), which took effect January 1, 1998, improves the legal framework
for IPR protection. It provides enhanced copyright and trademark
protection; creates a new Intellectual Property Office with original
jurisdiction to resolve IPR infringement complaints; increases
penalties for infringement and counterfeiting; and relaxes provisions
requiring the registration of licensing agreements. Deficiencies in
R.A. 8293 remain a concern. These include the lack of authority for
courts to order the seizure of pirated material as a provisional
measure without notice to the infringer; ambiguous provisions on the
rights of copyright owners over broadcast, rebroadcast, cable
retransmission, or satellite retransmission of their works; and
burdensome requirements concerning licensing contracts. Legislation is
pending to provide IPR protection for plant varieties and layout-
designs of integrated circuits, in line with WTO obligations.
Enforcement: Enforcement agencies generally will not proactively
target infringement unless the copyright owner brings it to their
attention and works with them on surveillance and enforcement actions.
Joint efforts between the private sector and the National Bureau of
Investigation and Philippine Customs have resulted in a series of
successful enforcement actions. While certain courts have been
designated to hear IPR cases, little has been done to streamline
judicial proceedings in this area, as these courts have not received
additional resources and continue to handle a heavy non-IPR workload.
In addition, IPR cases are not considered ``major crimes,'' and take a
lower precedence in court proceedings. Because of the prospect that
court action will be lengthy, many cases are settled out of court.
Patents: R.A. 8293 mandates a first-to-file system, increases the
term of patents from 17 to 20 years from date of filing, provides for
the patentability of micro-organisms and non-biological and
microbiological processes, and gives patent holders the right of
exclusive importation of their inventions.
Trademarks, Service Marks and Trade Names: R.A. 8293 no longer
requires prior use of trademarks in the Philippines as a requirement
for filing a trademark application. Also eliminated was the requirement
that well-known marks be in actual use in Philippine commerce or
registered with the government. Trademark infringement remains a
serious problem in the Philippines.
Copyrights: R.A. 8293 expands IPR protection by clarifying
protection of computer software as a literary work (although it
includes a fair-use provision on decompilation of software),
establishing exclusive rental rights, and providing terms of protection
for sound recordings, audiovisual works, and newspapers and periodicals
that are compatible with the WTO TRIPS Agreement. Software, music and
film piracy remain widespread. The Business Software Alliance estimates
the 78 percent of business software in use in 1998 was unlicensed; the
piracy rate for entertainment software is 90 percent. The Motion
Picture Association of America estimates that two-thirds of motion
pictures on video or optical discs in 1998 were illegal copies. The
illegal retransmission of satellite programming by cable operators is a
growing problem.
The U.S. intellectual property industry estimates 1998 potential
trade losses due to piracy of software at $57 million; of motion
pictures, $18 million; of sound recordings, $4 million; of books, $39
million.
8. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association: All workers (including public
employees) have a right to form and join trade unions, a right which is
exercised without government interference. Trade unions are independent
of the government and generally free of political party control. Unions
have the right to form or join federations or other labor groupings.
Subject to certain procedural restrictions, strikes in the private
sector are legal. Unions are required to provide strike notice, respect
mandatory cooling-off periods, and obtain majority member approval
before calling a strike.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively: The Philippine
Constitution guarantees the right to organize and bargain collectively.
The Labor Code protects and promotes this right for employees in the
private sector and in government-owned or controlled corporations. A
similar but more limited right is afforded to employees in most areas
of government service. Dismissal of a union official or worker trying
to organize a union is considered an unfair labor practice. Labor law
and practice are uniform throughout the country, although there have
been complaints about some local attempts to maintain ``union free/
strike free'' policies in several of the export processing zones. In
the garment industry, the widespread use of short-term, contract
workers is an obstacle to workers forming unions or obtaining medical
and retirement benefits.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor: The Philippine
Constitution prohibits forced labor and the government effectively
enforces this prohibition.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children: Philippine law prohibits
the employment of children below age 15, with some exceptions involving
situations under the direct and sole responsibility of parents or
guardians, or in the cinema, theater, radio and television in cases
where a child's employment is essential. The Labor Code allows
employment for those between the ages of 15 and 18 for such hours and
periods of the day as are determined by the Secretary of Labor, but
forbids employment of persons under 18 years in hazardous work.
Government and international organization estimates indicate that some
three million children under age 18 are employed in the informal sector
of the urban economy, certain fishing practices, port work or as unpaid
family workers in rural areas.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work: A comprehensive set of
occupational safety and health standards exists in law. Statistics on
actual work-related accidents and illnesses are incomplete, as
incidents (especially in regard to agriculture) are underreported.
f. Rights in Sectors with U.S. Investment: U.S. investors in the
Philippines generally apply U.S. standards of worker safety and health,
in order to meet the requirements of their home-based insurance
carriers. Some U.S. firms have resisted efforts by their employees to
form unions, with local government support.
Extent of U.S. Investment in Selected Industries--U.S. Direct Investment Position Abroad on an Historical Cost
Basis--1998
[Millions of U.S. Dollars]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Category Amount
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Petroleum...................... .............. 283
Total Manufacturing............ .............. 1,634
Food & Kindred Products...... 440 ...............................................................
Chemicals & Allied Products.. 477 ...............................................................
Primary & Fabricated Metals.. 33 ...............................................................
Industrial Machinery and 16 ...............................................................
Equipment.
Electric & Electronic 483 ...............................................................
Equipment.
Transportation Equipment..... 0 ...............................................................
Other Manufacturing.......... 184 ...............................................................
Wholesale Trade................ .............. 172
Banking........................ .............. 288
Finance/Insurance/Real Estate.. .............. 627
Services....................... .............. 187
Other Industries............... .............. 2
TOTAL ALL INDUSTRIES........... .............. 3,192
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis.
______
SINGAPORE
Key Economic Indicators
[Millions of U.S. Dollars unless otherwise indicated]
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1997 1998 \1\ 1999
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Income, Production and Employment:
Nominal GDP \2\................... 96,250.7 84,627.5 88,246.4
Real GDP Growth (pct) \2\......... 8.9 0.3 5.0
GDP by Sector: \2\
Agriculture \3\................. 181.1 137.9 176.5
Manufacturing................... 21,968.2 19,499.3 20,296.7
Services........................ 65,531.6 56,931.3 60,007.5
Government expenditure.......... 9,050.7 8,431.0 8,824.6
Per Capita GDP (US$).............. 25,758.2 21,892.5 22,056.7
Labor Force (000's)............... 1,876.0 1,931.8 1,989.8
Unemployment Rate (pct)........... 1.8 3.2 3.2
Money and Prices (annual percentage
growth):
Money Supply Growth (M2).......... 10.3 30.2 36.8
Consumer Price Inflation (pct).... 2.0 --0.3 0.5
Exchange Rate (SGD/US$ annual 1.48 1.67 1.69
average).........................
Balance of Payments and Trade:
Total Exports FOB................. 125,414.2 110,037.7 109,279.2
Exports to U.S. CIF \4\......... 20,368.1 18,654.3 18,206.6
Total Imports CIF................. 132,841.2 101,714.4 106,038.7
Imports from U.S. FAS \4\....... 17,727.4 15,673.5 15,955.6
Trade Balance..................... -7,427.0 8,323.4 3,240.4
Trade Balance with U.S. \4\..... 2,640.7 2,980.8 2,251.0
External Public Debt.............. 0 0 0
Fiscal Surplus/GDP (pct).......... 4.2 -0.3 -3.5
Current Account Surplus/GDP (pct). 15.7 20.9 24.3
Debt Service Payments/GDP (pct)... 0 0 0
Gold and Foreign Exchange Reserves 71,391.7 75,028.2 78,704.5
Aid from U.S...................... 0 0 0
Aid from Other Sources............ 0 0 0
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Note: All percentage changes are calculated based on the local currency.
\1\ 1999 figures are projections based on most recent data available.
\2\ Singapore introduced a methodology to include offshore stockbroking,
investment advisory and insurance services in the output of the
financial services industry, resulting in changes to the GDP and
growth figures computed in previous years. GDP data has also been re-
grouped into eleven industries from the eight previously.
\3\ Includes the agriculture, fishing and quarrying industries.
\4\ Trade data was taken from the U.S. Department of Commerce instead of
Singaporean government sources.
1. General Policy Framework
A city-state with a population of 3.9 million (of which 700,000 or
18 percent are foreigners, mainly migrant workers and professionals)
astride one of the world's major shipping lanes, Singapore has long
pursued economic policies that promote open trade and investment. These
policies have allowed Singapore to overcome its land, labor and
resource constraints, and develop into one of the world's most
successful open trading and investment regimes with an average annual
GDP growth rate of 7 percent in the last decade. Although Singapore's
growth rate decelerated to 0.3 percent in 1998 due to the Asian
economic crisis, it still had the world's fifth highest per capita GNP
in purchasing power parity terms, according to the World Bank in its
1999 World Development Report. Singapore also actively promotes trade
liberalization in the region through APEC and ASEAN; the APEC
Secretariat is located in Singapore. It is a founding member of the
World Trade Organization (WTO), and hosted the first WTO Ministerial in
December of 1996.
Internally, Singapore has a free-market, pro-growth and competitive
business environment characterized by a transparent and corruption-free
regulatory framework. At the same time, it has a sizable public sector
in the form of government-linked companies (GLCs) that account for some
60 percent of GDP. The GLCs generally operate as commercial entities,
and frequently include private local and foreign equity. Many GLCs are
also publicly listed companies. Manufacturing is the single largest
sector in the economy, accounting for 22 percent of total GDP. Foreign
multinational electronics and chemicals companies dominate this sector,
producing primarily for export to the region and the developed markets,
notably the U.S. and Europe. Foreign companies accounted for 67 percent
of the USD 4.7 billion of new manufacturing investment in 1998.
Electronics output accounts for 43 percent of total industrial output
and chemicals (including oil refining) for 22 percent. Besides engaging
in high value-added manufacturing activities, multinational companies
also take advantage of Singapore's modern and pro-business
infrastructure and productive workforce to establish headquarters and
manage their regional operations from the city-state.
Wholesale and retail trade is the second largest sector in the
economy, accounting for 14 percent of GDP, reflecting Singapore's key
role as the gateway for goods and people into and out of the region.
Trade is 2.5 times GDP, with transshipments accounting for 42 percent
of total merchandise exports. Visitor arrivals to Singapore in 1998,
which suffered a 13.3 percent drop due to the recent crisis, still
amounted to 6.2 million, almost twice its indigenous population.
Financial services, which accounts for 13 percent of GDP, is the third
largest economic sector. According to the Bank of International
Settlements, Singapore is the world's fourth largest center for foreign
exchange activities (after London, New York and Tokyo). Its Asian
Dollar Market is also the world's eighth largest offshore lending
center. The government is actively promoting its financial sector,
particularly asset management, and bond and capital market activities
to augment Singapore's role as an international financial center.
The government pursues conservative fiscal policies designed to
encourage high levels of savings and investment. The government also
invests heavily in the country's social and physical infrastructure,
including education and transportation, and provides subsidies for
public housing and sometimes for the purchase of shares in GLCs when
they are initially listed on the stock exchange. For most of the years
since the 1970's, the government has had a budget surplus. However, due
to counter-cyclical measures implemented amid the Asian economic
crisis, the government's budget went into a deficit of USD 243 million
(about 0.3 percent of GDP) in fiscal year 1998. The deficit is forecast
to widen to about USD 3 billion in FY99 (about 3.5 percent of GDP) with
further pump priming of the economy.
The Central Provident Fund (CPF) is a compulsory savings program
that requires 20 percent of an individual's salary be placed in a tax-
exempt account, with employers contributing another 10 percent. The CPF
is the basis for the extraordinarily high gross national saving rate of
over 60 percent of GDP. Employers' contribution amounted originally to
20 percent of an employee's salary prior to the recent crisis, but was
halved to 10 percent since the beginning of 1999 as part of a broad
business cost-reduction package implemented by the government. However,
a partial restoration of employers' contribution is expected by mid-
2000 to ease the build-up of wage pressures emanating from a faster and
stronger-than-expected domestic and regional economic recovery.
Individual CPF accounts may be used, in part, to finance housing
purchases and investment in stocks and other instruments approved under
the CPF investment scheme.
The Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS), the country's central
bank, engages in limited money-market operations to influence interest
rates and ensure adequate liquidity in the banking system. The MAS' key
objective is to maintain price stability, which it achieves largely
through an exchange rate policy. (Note: Inflation has averaged 2
percent annually over the last 10 years, except for 1998 when deflation
of 0.3 percent set in due to the economic recession). There are
virtually no controls on capital movements, thus limiting the scope for
an independent monetary policy to either stimulate or restrain economic
activity. The average prime lending rate among the leading banks is
currently at 5.8 percent, after peaking at about 7.8 percent in the
first half of 1998 amid the Asian financial crisis.
Singapore's sound economic policies and an open and favorable
trading and investment climate have attracted about 1,300 U.S.
companies to Singapore, with cumulative investments of USD 19.8 billion
in 1998. The United States is Singapore's largest trading partner,
accounting for 19.2 percent of Singapore's total trade in 1998. Based
on U.S. Department of Commerce data, U.S. exports to Singapore amounted
to USD 15.7 billion in 1998, while Singapore's exports to the United
States totaled USD 18.4 billion.
2. Exchange Rate Policy
Singapore has no exchange rate controls. Exchange rates are
determined freely by daily cross rates in the international foreign
exchange markets. At the same time, the MAS uses currency swaps and
direct open market operations to keep the Singapore Dollar within a
desired range relative to a basket of currencies of the country's major
trading partners. It seeks to maintain a strong currency to check
inflation, given Singapore's extreme exposure to international trade.
The government also imposes certain restrictions to limit the
internationalization of the Singapore Dollar, including a requirement
for banks to consult the MAS before extending credit in excess of SGD 5
million (about USD 3 million) to non-residents. It has recently opened
up its Singapore Dollar debt market to foreign companies and financial
institutions, however, on condition that the funds are converted to
foreign exchange prior to use abroad.
The Singapore Dollar appreciated nearly 55 percent against the U.S.
Dollar from 1986 to 1996. It has since depreciated, along with but to a
lesser extent than other regional currencies, as a result of the Asian
economic crisis. The Singapore Dollar depreciated by as much as 20
percent between July 1997 and August 1998 when it sank to its lowest
rate of 1.78 to the U.S. Dollar. This has had a major impact on U.S.
exports to Singapore, which fell by 11.6 percent 1998, and are expected
to show flat growth in 1999. The Singapore Dollar has since rebounded
with the region's recovery, and is forecast to post an average rate of
about 1.7 for 1999.
3. Structural Policies
Singapore's prudent economic policies have allowed for steady
economic growth and the development of a reliable market, to the
benefit of U.S. exporters. Singapore was the tenth largest export
market for the U.S. in 1998, slipping from the eighth and ninth
positions which it occupied in 1996 and 1997, respectively. Product
prices are generally determined by market forces. The government
conducts its bids by open tender and encourages price competition
throughout the economy.
The government has gradually reduced corporate income tax levels
from 40 percent in 1986 to the current 26 percent. It aims to bring the
corporate tax rate down further to 25 percent. Foreign firms are taxed
at the same rate as local firms. There is no tax on capital gains
except on residential properties that are sold within three years of
purchase. This was implemented in 1996, together with measures to
impose higher stamp duties and restrict bank credit for property
purchases, in order to curb excessive speculative activities in the
real estate market.
The government implemented a three percent value-added Goods and
Services Tax (GST) in 1994 but reduced corporate (by one percentage
point) and personal (by three percentage points) taxes. It also began
providing rebates of up to SGD 700 on individual income tax in 1994 to
lighten the GST burden on the citizenry. With these changes, it is
estimated that 65 percent of income earners end up not having to pay
personal income taxes, thus increasing the disposable incomes available
to the average consumer. Singapore's personal income tax rates
presently range from 2 percent for the lowest income bracket to 28
percent for those earning annual incomes exceeding SGD 400,000 (about
USD 240,000).
Many of Singapore's public policy measures are tailored to attract
foreign investments and ensure an environment conducive to their
efficient business operation and profitability. Investment policies are
open and transparent. Although the government seeks to develop more
high-tech industries, it does not impose production standards, require
purchases from local sources, or specify a percentage of output for
export.
In view of the city-state's relatively high land and labor costs,
the government has been aggressively implementing relevant manpower
development, industrial restructuring and infrastructure enhancing
measures to upgrade Singapore into a competitive knowledge-based
economy. The plan is to attract multinational companies and service
providers to establish high value-added manufacturing and service
operations in the electronics, chemicals, life sciences, engineering,
education, healthcare, logistics, and communications and media
industries. It has also embarked on financial liberalization and
reforms to develop the retail banking market and, more pertinently,
widen Singapore's international scope to include asset management and
bond market activities. To catalyze Singapore's advancement into a
knowledge-based economy and an international financial center, the
government is pursuing a policy to attract foreign professionals and
qualified individuals to work and live here.
4. Debt Management Policies
Singapore's external public debt was a negligible USD 3.1 million
at the end of 1994 and this was retired completely in 1995. This was
one of the key factors that enabled the country to weather the currency
crisis that engulfed the region in the second half of 1997 and 1998.
Singapore's annual budget surpluses (prior to 1998) and mandatory
savings have also allowed the government wide latitude in devising off-
budget measures to increase funds to support infrastructure, education,
and other programs during the current economic slowdown. Singapore does
not receive financial assistance from foreign governments.
5. Significant Barriers to U.S. Exports
Singapore has one of the world's most liberal and open trade
regimes. Approximately 96 percent of imports are not dutiable. Tariffs
are primarily levied on cigarettes and alcohol to restrict their
consumption. Excise taxes are levied on petroleum products and motor
vehicles primarily to restrict motor vehicle use. There are no
intentional non-tariff barriers to foreign goods. Import licenses are
not required; customs procedures are minimal and highly efficient; the
standards code is reasonable; and the government actively encourages
foreign investment. All major government procurements are by
international tender. The government formally acceded to the WTO
Government Procurement Agreement in September 1997.
To achieve its goal of becoming an international financial center,
the government has begun removing previous foreign access restrictions
in its financial services sector as well. In October 1999, the Monetary
Authority of Singapore (MAS) issued a ``qualifying full bank'' (QFB)
license to four Singapore-based foreign banks which allows each of them
to establish ten locations (branches and off-premise ATM's), to freely
re-locate existing branches, and to share ATM's among themselves. At
the same time, the MAS issued eight additional restricted bank licenses
to bring the total up to 20. These measures significantly expand the
capability of foreign banks to engage in local retail banking. Foreign
banks currently hold 23 of the 35 full (local retail) banking licenses.
Apart from the QFB licensed banks, other foreign full license banks are
still not allowed additional branches or ATM machines, while local
banks are allowed to expand freely. Meanwhile, the MAS continues to
encourage the growth of the offshore banking industry in Singapore. It
recently designated eight new ``qualifying offshore banks'' (QOB) which
will have their Singapore Dollar lending limit raised to SGD 1 billion,
while raising the limit for all other offshore banks from SGD 100 to
SGD 300 million. QOB banks will also be allowed to accept Singapore
Dollar funds from non-bank customers through swap transactions.
There are still restrictions on the extent to which foreign stock
brokerage firms can trade in the equity securities markets for
Singapore resident clients. Current Stock Exchange of Singapore (SES)
regulations restrict foreign equity ownership of SES member companies
to 49 percent, with the exception of two joint ventures approved prior
to 1990 and the special category of ``international members'' which are
permitted to do only wholesale trading for resident clients. The MAS
recently announced, however, that both the stock and futures exchanges
are to be demutualized and merged by 1 December 1999, and that the
combined exchange itself is eventually to be publicly listed. No new
licenses for direct (general) insurers are being issued, although
reinsurance and captive insurance licenses are freely available.
Foreign companies hold about three-quarters of the 59 direct insurance
licenses.
The telecommunications sector has been steadily liberalized since
1989, although the government still imposes limits on the number of
telephone service providers in Singapore. Restrictions on the sale of
telecommunication consumer goods and the provision of value-added
network services (VANS) have been lifted, although the government
prohibits the importation of satellite receivers. Singapore Telecom
(SINGTEL) has been privatized and its regulatory functions assumed by
the Telecommunications Authority of Singapore (TAS). Private investors
now own up to 20 percent of shares in SINGTEL. In April 1996, Mobile
One (a Singapore-foreign joint venture) became the second cellular
phone service provider in Singapore, thus ending SINGTEL's monopoly in
the mobile telephone services market. Three new paging service
providers also entered the market at the same time. In April 1998, TAS
announced that it has issued a license to a new joint venture basic
telephone service provider (``Starhub'') to begin operation in 2000,
and will consider additional ones for 2002. At the same time, it issued
a third cellular phone service license to a foreign joint venture
company.
6. Export Subsidies Policies
Singapore does not directly subsidize exports although it does
actively promote them. The government offers significant incentives to
attract foreign investment, almost all of which are in export-oriented
industries. It also offers tax incentives to exporters and reimburses
firms for certain costs incurred in trade promotion, but it does not
employ multiple exchange rates, preferential financing schemes, import
cost-reduction measures or other trade-distorting policy tools.
7. Protection of U.S. Intellectual Property
Singapore has been on the USTR's ``Special 301'' Watch List since
1997, primarily due to concerns that its intellectual property (IP)
rights regime was not fully consistent with the WTO's trade-related
intellectual property (TRIPS) provisions, and that police enforcement
against retail IP piracy has been inadequate. Other outstanding issues
included the lack of rental rights for sound recordings and software,
inadequate protection against the sale of bootleg copies of musical
performances, the limited scope of copyright protection for
cinematography works and overly broad exemptions from copyright
protection.
Over the past two years, however, the government has taken
significant measures to improve IP rights protection in Singapore. It
is a member of the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), and
has ratified the WTO's Uruguay Round Accord, including TRIPs
provisions. It has enacted a series of laws and amendments to existing
provisions with the aim of rendering its IP regime fully TRIPs
consistent and improving its overall IP protection regime. These
included numerous amendments to its Copyright Law (1998), the Medicines
Act (1998), a new Trade Marks Bill (1998), and a new Geographical
Indications Act and Layout Designs of Integrated Circuits Act (1999).
More recently, the government expanded the Copyright Act to cover
digital and internet piracy as well. In December 1998, Singapore became
a member of the Berne Convention so that works created by Singapore
citizens and residents now enjoy copyright protection in over 100
member countries, and vice versa. Singapore is also a signatory to
three other international copyright agreements--the Paris Convention,
the Patent Co-operation Treaty, and the Budapest Treaty. Singapore is
not a member, however, of the Universal Copyright Convention.
In the area of enforcement, the government's new licensing
requirements for optical disc (OD) manufacturing and import controls on
OD manufacturing equipment came into force in October 1998. These
measures are generally believed to have effectively eliminated the
production of pirated optical discs in Singapore. At the same time, the
government has increased the number and scope of police-initiated raids
against IP pirates at the retail level. According to Singapore's Trade
Development Board, the authorities conducted a total of 682 raids in
1998, which resulted in the seizure of over two million IP-infringing
articles, a significant rise over the previous year. Through the first
nine months of 1999, authorities launched over 1,800 raids, seized more
than 1.1 million IP-infringing articles, and arrested about 330
suspected IP pirates. In December 1998, the government launched a long-
term campaign aimed at educating primary and secondary students as well
as the general public on the IP issue, underscoring the message that
buying pirated goods is wrong, undercuts profits for manufacturers, and
will eventually lead to fewer choices for consumers.
In October 1999, a number of U.S. publishers, in cooperation with
European and local publishers, formed the Copyright Licensing and
Administration Society of Singapore (CLASS). CLASS will utilize a
provision of the Copyright Act to compel local universities and other
educational institutions to pay royalty fees in exchange for the right
to duplicate copyrighted printed works for use in course materials.
Despite government efforts that have brought IP piracy rates down
to among the lowest in Asia, IP owner associations here continue to
press for greater IPR protection. They cite the continued availability
of pirated film, music and software OD's for sale in a number of
downtown shopping malls and at stalls scattered among suburban housing
estates. The IP associations note that nearly all of the pirated OD's
have been smuggled into Singapore from neighboring countries, and urge
greater border enforcement. Meanwhile, they remain frustrated by the
current ``self help'' IP enforcement system that they argue places an
unfair burden on them and makes initiating raids and prosecuting
pirates cumbersome and expensive. IP associations have recommended that
the government create an independent IPR enforcement police force and
called for the mandatory use of Source Identification (SID) codes. They
have also pointed out inadequacies in the August 1999 amendments
extending Copyright Protection to the internet and certain digital
works. They note that internet service providers are not held liable
for allowing sites to sell pirated goods, and that the present law
allows up to 10 percent of the bytes of a digital work to be legally
copied.
According to the International Intellectual Property Alliance
(IIPA), total losses from local IP piracy were estimated at about USD
140 million in 1998, up from USD 125 million in 1997. For business
application software, IIPA estimated 1998 losses at nearly USD 50
million with a 54 percent level of piracy, as compared to USD 46
million in losses and a 56 percent piracy rate in 1997. For computer
entertainment software, it estimated USD 65 million in losses and a 73
percent piracy rate in 1998, up from USD 58 million and a 68 percent
piracy level in 1997. IIPA calculated that the motion picture industry
lost USD 8 million due to a 25 percent piracy level in 1998, up from
USD 3 million lost to 1997's 15 percent level of piracy. The music
industry was reported to have suffered losses of USD 16 million and a
19 percent piracy rate in 1998. This was an improvement over losses of
over USD 17 million and a 30 percent piracy level in 1997. The American
Association of Publishers estimated that publishers lost USD 2 million
to piracy of printed works in 1998, compared to USD 1 million lost in
1997.
8. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association: Article 14 of Singapore's Constitution
gives all citizens the right to form associations, including trade
unions. Parliament may, however, based on security, public order, or
morality grounds impose restrictions. The right of association is
delimited by the Societies Act, and labor and education laws and
regulations. In practice, communist labor unions are not permitted.
Singapore's labor force numbered 1.9 million in 1998, of which 272,769
or 14 percent of the labor force were organized into 80 trade unions.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively: Over ninety
percent of union members in 71 of the 80 trade unions are affiliated
with an umbrella organization, the National Trades Union Congress
(NTUC), which has a symbiotic relationship with the government. The
NTUC's leadership is made up mainly of Members of Parliament belonging
to the ruling People's Action Party (PAP). The Secretary-General of the
NTUC is also an elected Minister without Portfolio in the Prime
Minister's office.
The Trades Union Act authorizes the formation of unions with broad
rights. Collective bargaining is a normal part of labor-management
relations in Singapore, particularly in the manufacturing sector.
Collective bargaining agreements are renewed every two to three years,
although wage increases are negotiated annually.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor: Singapore law
prohibits forced or compulsory labor. Under sections of Singapore's
Destitute Persons Act, however, any indigent person may be required to
reside in a welfare home and engage in suitable work.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children: The government enforces
the Employment Act, which prohibits the employment of children under 12
years and restricts children under 16 from certain categories of work.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work: The Singapore labor market, which
has a low average annual unemployment rate of about 2 percent, offers
relatively high wage rates and working conditions consistent with
international standards. (Note: The average unemployment rate increased
slightly to 3.2 percent during the economic downturn in 1998.) However,
Singapore has no minimum wage or unemployment benefits. The government
enforces comprehensive occupational safety and health laws. Enforcement
procedures, coupled with the promotion of educational and training
programs, have reduced the frequency of industrial accidents (measured
by the number of industrial accidents per million hours worked) to 2.5
in 1998, from 4.2 a decade ago. The average severity of occupational
accidents (defined as the number of industrial workdays lost per
million hours worked) has, however, remained at 416, little changed
from the rate of 418 recorded in 1989.
f. Rights in Sectors with U.S. Investment: U.S. firms have
substantial investments in several industries, notably petroleum,
chemicals and related products, electronic and electronics equipment,
transportation equipment, and other manufacturing areas. Labor
conditions in these sectors are the same as in other sectors of the
economy. Many employers resort to hiring foreign workers to ease
shortages in unskilled and highly-skilled jobs. Since 1997, the
government has been committed to a policy of attracting foreign skilled
individuals and professionals to work in Singapore to supplement its
own limited talent pool and catalyze the city-state's advancement into
a knowledge-based economy and an international financial center. There
are presently about 530,000 foreigners working in Singapore (27 percent
of the workforce), of which about 80,000 are in the skilled category
while the rest are the lower-skilled workers employed mostly as
construction workers or domestic helpers.
Extent of U.S. Investment in Selected Industries--U.S. Direct Investment Position Abroad on an Historical Cost
Basis--1998
[Millions of U.S. Dollars]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Category Amount
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Petroleum...................... .............. 2,920
Total Manufacturing............ .............. 8,438
Food & Kindred Products...... 13 ...............................................................
Chemicals & Allied Products.. 255 ...............................................................
Primary & Fabricated Metals.. 153 ...............................................................
Industrial Machinery and 2,747 ...............................................................
Equipmentd.
Electric & Electronic 4,763 ...............................................................
Equipment.
Transportation Equipment..... 106 ...............................................................
Other Manufacturing.......... 401 ...............................................................
Wholesale Trade................ .............. 3,245
Banking........................ .............. 727
Finance/Insurance/Real Estate.. .............. 3,769
Services....................... .............. 681
Other Industries............... .............. 3
TOTAL ALL INDUSTRIES........... .............. 19,783
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis.
______
TAIWAN
Key Economic Indicators
[Billions of U.S. Dollars unless otherwise indicated]
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1997 1998 \1\ 1999
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Income, Production and Employment:
GDP (at current prices)................. 283.3 260.6 282.9
Real GDP Growth (percent)............... 6.8 4.7 5.3
GDP by Sector:
Agriculture........................... 7.7 7.1 7.6
Manufacturing......................... 78.4 70.6 74.9
Services.............................. 155.8 146.0 166.0
Government............................ 29.5 26.8 29.8
Per Capita GDP (US$).................... 13,130 11,967 12,866
Labor Force (000's)..................... 9,432 9,546 9,690
Unemployment Rate (percent)............. 2.7 2.7 2.9
Money and Prices (annual percentage
growth):
Money Supply (M2)....................... 8.0 8.6 9.5
Consumer Price Inflation................ 0.9 1.7 0.9
Exchange Rate (NT$/US$) \2\
Official.............................. 28.95 33.44 32.24
Balance of Payments and Trade: \3\
Total Exports FOB \4\................... 122.1 110.6 119.5
Exports to U.S. CV \5\................ 32.6 33.1 34.9
Total Imports CIF \4\................... 114.4 104.7 112.1
Imports from U.S. FAS \5\............. 20.4 18.2 18.8
Trade Balance \4\....................... 7.7 5.9 7.4
Trade Balance with U.S. \5\........... 12.2 14.9 16.1
External Public Debt.................... 0.1 .05 0.02
Fiscal Deficit/GDP (pct)................ 3.9 3.3 5.3
Current Account Surplus/GDP (pct)....... 2.5 1.3 2.1
Debt Service Payments/GDP (pct)......... 0.8 1.1 0.7
Gold and Foreign Exchange Reserves...... 88.2 95.1 110.0
Aid from U.S. \6\....................... 0 0 0
Aid from Other Countries................ 0 0 0
------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ 1999 figures are estimated based on data from the Directorate
General of Budget, Accounting and Statistics, or extrapolated from
data available as of September 1999.
\2\ Average of figures at the end of each month.
\3\ Merchandise trade.
\4\ Taiwan Ministry of Finance (MOF) figures for merchandise trade.
\5\ Sources: U.S. Department of Commerce and U.S. Census Bureau; exports
FAS, imports customs basis; 1999 figures are estimates based on data
available through August. Taiwan MOF figures for merchandise exports
(FOB) to and imports (CIF) from the U.S. were (US$ billions): (1996)
26.9/20.0, (1997) 29.5/23.2, (1998) 30.0/19.3.
\6\ Aid disbursements stopped in 1965.
1. General Policy Framework
Taiwan's economy is bouncing back after being hit last year with an
earthquake, a cross strait scare, and a near financial crisis. Despite
these setbacks, the island's growth in 1999 ended up a strong 5.4
percent, well ahead of 1998's 4.8 percent. Taiwan's industrial growth
is now concentrated in capital and technology intensive industries such
as petrochemicals, computers, semiconductors, and electronic
components, as well as consumer goods industries. Services account for
56 percent of GDP in 1998. Merchandise exports accounted for 42 percent
of GDP in 1998.
Taiwan's resilience stems from the strength of its external
finances, the nimbleness of its many small-scale entrepreneurs, and the
dynamism of its information technology industry. Taiwan is poised to
expand its role as catalyst for cross-strait economic integration and
as a global supplier of hardware for the information age.
The Asian financial crisis did lead to falling official savings and
growing public expenditure have caused domestic public debt to increase
steadily. The Taiwan authorities now rely largely on domestic bonds and
bank loans to finance major expenditures. Taiwan has adopted austerity
measures to control the government budget deficit in recent years. As a
result, outstanding public debt declined from 21 percent of GNP in 1997
to 17 percent in 1999. However, debt is on the rise again as the
government spends heavily on earthquake reconstruction efforts. The
central level fiscal deficit through the fiscal year ending in June had
fallen to 1.4 percent of GDP. However, the deficit is expected to be
sharply higher by year-end 1999 and into 2000, again due to earthquake-
related emergency spending. Defense spending still accounts for the
largest share of public expenditures (about one quarter), but is
falling in relative terms. The greatest pressure on the budget now
comes from growing demands for improved infrastructure and social
welfare spending, including a national health insurance plan initiated
in early 1995.
Taiwan wishes to accede to the World Trade Organization (WTO) in
the near future. As part of the accession process, Taiwan and the
United States signed a landmark bilateral WTO agreement in February
1998. The agreement includes both immediate market access and phased-in
commitments, and will provide substantially increased access for U.S.
goods, services, and agricultural exports to Taiwan. Taiwan is also an
active member of the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum.
2. Exchange Rate Policies
Taiwan has a floating exchange rate system in which banks set rates
independently. The Taiwan authorities, however, control the largest
banks authorized to deal in foreign exchange. The Central Bank of China
(CBC) intervenes in the foreign exchange market when it feels that
speculation or ``drastic fluctuations'' in the exchange rate may impair
normal market adjustments. The CBC uses direct foreign exchange trading
by its surrogate banks and public policy statements as its main tools
to influence exchange rates. The CBC still limits the use of derivative
products denominated in New Taiwan Dollars (NTD).
Trade-related funds flow freely into and out of Taiwan. Most
restrictions on capital account flows have been removed since late
1995. Laws restricting repatriation of principal and earnings from
direct investment have been lifted. Despite significant easing of
previous restrictions on foreign portfolio investment, some limits
remain in place.
3. Structural Policies
Fifteen state-owned enterprises have been either totally or
partially privatized in the past three years, including nine in 1999.
State-owned enterprises account for 9.5 percent of GDP, a proportion
that shrinks annually. Taiwan's Fair Trade Commission (FTC) acts to
thwart noncompetitive pricing by state-run monopolies. FTC exemptions
granted five years ago to several state-run monopolies were not renewed
in 1997, making such firms subject to anti-monopoly laws.
Taiwan has been lowering tariffs significantly in recent years as
part of its effort to accede to the WTO. In 1998, Taiwan began
implementing tariff cuts on 1,130 items, many of specific interest to
U.S. industry. Also in 1998, authorities enacted tariff cuts on 245
high-tech products under the Information Technology Agreement. Tariff
reductions on 15 agricultural products, negotiated during the U.S.-
Taiwan bilateral WTO accession negotiations, took effect temporarily in
July 1998, and were extended in July, 1999. In February 1999, Taiwan
waived tariffs on 15 aircraft components as part of plans to accede to
the WTO Agreement on Trade in Civil Aircraft. An additional 777 items
are slated for tariff cuts pending legislative approval. Taiwan's
current average nominal tariff rate is 8.2 percent; the trade-weighted
rate is 3.1 percent, both down slightly from 1998.
High tariffs and pricing structures on some goods--in particular on
some agricultural products--nevertheless hamper U.S. exports. However,
under the bilateral WTO agreement reached in February 1998, Taiwan
began to provide quotas for the importation of previously banned pork,
poultry, and variety meat products, and agreed to phase in tariff cuts
on numerous food products upon accession. The Taiwan Tobacco and Wine
Monopoly Bureau (TTWMB) has a monopoly on domestic production of
cigarettes and alcoholic beverages. As part of its bilateral WTO
commitments to the United States, however, Taiwan has pledged to
convert an existing monopoly tax on these products to a simpler tax and
tariff-based system, and also to open these markets following the
passage and implementation of new legislation now pending in the
Legislative Yuan.
4. Debt Management Policies
Unofficial estimates put Taiwan's outstanding long and short-term
external debt at $22 billion as of early, 1999, equivalent to seven
percent of GDP. Official figures show Taiwan's long term outstanding
external public debt totaled $33 million as of June 1999, compared to
gold and foreign exchange reserves of about $110 billion. Taiwan's debt
service payments in 1998 totaled $2.1 billion, only 1.5 percent of
exports of goods and services.
Foreign loans committed by Taiwan authorities exceed $3.6 billion.
Taiwan offered low-interest loans to the Philippines, Eastern Europe,
Vietnam, South Africa, and Latin America, mostly to build industrial
zones and to foster development of small and medium enterprises. Some
of the loans were provided to several Southeast Asian nations to
address financial crises. Taiwan also contributes to the Asian
Development Bank (ADB), one of the two multilateral development banks
in which it has membership. Taiwan is also a member of the Central
American Bank for Economic Integration (CABEI). The ADB, CABEI, the
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) and a number of
other international organizations have all floated bonds in Taiwan.
5. Significant Barriers to U.S. Exports
Accession to the WTO by Taiwan will open markets for many U.S.
goods and services. Of some 10,200 official import product categories,
nearly 86 percent are completely exempt from any controls. 991
categories are still ``regulated'' and require approval from relevant
authorities based on the qualifications of the importer, the origin of
the good, or other factors. Another 279 require import permits from the
Board of Foreign Trade or pro forma notarization by banks. Imports of
270 categories are ``restricted,'' including ammunition and some
agricultural products. These items can only be imported under special
circumstances, and are thus effectively banned.
Financial: Taiwan continues to steadily liberalize its financial
sector. Taiwan enacted a Futures Exchange Law in March 1997; a futures
market was established in July 1998. The Securities and Exchange Law
was amended in May 1997 to remove restrictions on employment of
foreigners by securities firms, effective upon Taiwan's accession to
the WTO. In early 1999, the limit on foreign ownership in listed
companies was raised from 30 percent to 50 percent. For qualified
foreign institutional investors, restrictions on capital flows have
been removed, although they are still subject to limits on portfolio
investment. Foreign individual investors are subject to some limits on
their portfolio investment and restrictions on their capital flows.
Banking: In June 1997, the annual limit on a company's non-trade
outward (or inward) remittances was raised from $20 million to $50
million. Inward/outward remittances unrelated to trade by individuals
are subject to an annual limit of $5 million. There are no limits on
trade-related remittances. NTD-related derivative contracts may not
exceed one-third of a bank's foreign exchange position. To stabilize
the foreign exchange market in the wake of regional financial turmoil,
the CBC closed the non-deliverable forward (NDF) market to domestic
corporations in May 1998; the NDF market remains open to foreign
companies.
Legal: Foreign lawyers may not operate legal practices in Taiwan
but may set up consulting firms or work with local law firms. Qualified
foreign attorneys may, as consultants to Taiwan law firms, provide
legal advice to their employers only. Legislation was passed in May
1998 to permit the eventual establishment of foreign legal
partnerships. However, last minute changes to the law failed to achieve
this purpose. However, Taiwan authorities subsequently agreed to delay
implementation of the law and to make other commitments which will
permit foreign attorneys to establish partnerships either upon
accession to the WTO, or upon implementation of the new law, whichever
comes first.
Insurance: In May 1997, the financial authorities announced that,
in principle, insurance companies would be allowed to set some premium
rates and policy clauses without prior approval from regulators.
Insurance companies are still required to report such rates and
clauses. In July 1995, Taiwan removed a prohibition against mutual
insurance companies. As of late 1999, however, authorities had not
issued implementing regulations.
Transportation: The United States and Taiwan have had an Open Skies
Agreement in effect since February of 1997. An amendment to the Highway
Law allowing branches of U.S. ocean and air freight carriers to truck
containers and cargo in Taiwan went into effect on November 1, 1997.
Telecommunications: Taiwan will open its fixed line market to
competition in early 2000, when it is expected to issue 2-4 new fixed
line licenses to private consortia. However, the published criteria for
the license tender--including $1.2 billion in up-front paid-in capital,
a minimum one million line final build-out, and a 150,000 line build-
out prior to service roll-out--are considered onerous entry barriers by
some foreign companies. Under the bilateral WTO agreement signed in
February 1998 Chunghwa Telecom, a state-owned corporation, began to
lower excessively high interconnection fees previously imposed on
private mobile service providers. This phased process is ongoing, but
Chunghwa continues to engage in pricing practices which appear designed
to unfairly subsidize its mobile operations with its fixed line
services, in which it continues to enjoy monopoly status. Taiwan
regulators have only recently begun to address such unfair trading
practices. In October, Taiwan's legislature passed a revised Telecom
Law. It will raise the current 20 percent limit on foreign ownership of
a telecom firm to 60 percent through a combination of direct and
indirect ownership. The timing of the law's implementation, however,
remains uncertain.
Pharmaceuticals and Medical Devices: Taiwan's single payer
socialized health care system discriminates against imported drugs by
setting prices for leading brand-name products at artificially low
levels, while providing artificially high reimbursement prices for
locally-made generics. The process by which Taiwan registers and prices
new drugs is also time-consuming and cumbersome. Taiwan authorities are
gradually phasing out a burdensome requirement for clinical trials as
part of the registration process for new drugs. High value-added
imported medical devices are likewise put at a competitive disadvantage
by Taiwan's reimbursement system, which fails to account for
significant quality differences between different brands of medical
devices.
Movies and Cable TV: Taiwan eased import restrictions on foreign
film prints from 38 to 58 per title in late 1997. The number of
theaters in any municipality allowed to show the same foreign film
simultaneously also increased from 11 to 18. Effective August 1997,
multi-screen theaters are allowed to show a film on up to three screens
simultaneously, up from the previous limit of one. Taiwan has pledged
to abolish these restrictions upon accession to the WTO. In the cable
TV market, concerns remain that the island's two dominant Multi-System
Operators (MSOs) occasionally collude to inhibit fair competition.
Control by the two MSOs of upstream program distribution, for example,
has made it difficult for U.S. providers of popular channels to
negotiate reasonable fees for their programs.
Standards, Testing, Labeling, and Certification: Taiwan has agreed
to bring its laws and practices into conformity with the WTO Agreement
on Technical Barriers to Trade as part of its WTO accession. However,
Taiwan is not yet in conformity with WTO norms. U.S. agricultural
exports are often negatively affected because prior notification of
changes to standards, labeling requirements, etc, are not provided with
adequate lead-time, or because changes to standards and other import
requirements are not provided in a WTO language. In addition, concerns
exist that U.S. fresh produce and meat imports do not, in all cases,
receive national treatment. Industrial products such as air
conditioning and refrigeration equipment, electric hand tools, and
synthetic rubber gloves must undergo redundant and unnecessary testing
requirements, which include destructive testing of samples. Imported
autos face stringent noise emissions and fuel efficiency testing
requirements. In March 1999 the U.S. and Taiwan signed a mutual
recognition agreement (MRA) designed to eliminate duplicate testing of
information technology equipment. According to the terms of the MRA,
certain Taiwan exports to the U.S. previously tested for
electromagnetic conformity in labs recognized by Taiwan authorities
will no longer require duplicate inspections in an U.S. lab. Reciprocal
treatment will likewise be accorded similar U.S. products imported into
Taiwan. Relevant U.S. agencies and their Taiwan counterparts are
jointly implementing operating procedures according to the principles
of the MRA, including nominating certified labs for mutual
accreditation.
Investment Barriers: Taiwan continues to relax investment
restrictions in a host of areas, but foreign investment remains
prohibited in key industries such as agriculture, basic wire line
telecommunications, broadcasting, and liquor and cigarette production.
Wire line telecommunications will be gradually liberalized beginning in
1999, and will be completely liberalized by July 2001 under Taiwan's
WTO commitments. Liquor and cigarette production will be fully
liberalized by 2004.
Limits on foreign equity participation in a number of industries
have been progressively relaxed in recent years. For example,
permissible participation in shipping companies was raised from 50 to
100 percent. A 33 percent limit on holdings in air cargo forwarders and
air cargo ground handling was raised to 50 percent in 1998, but remains
unchanged for airlines. However, an amendment to the Civil Aviation Law
that would raise the holding limit to 50 percent is now pending
legislative approval. In August 1997, Taiwan raised the cap on foreign
investment in independent power projects from 30 percent to 49 percent.
Local content requirements in the automobile and motorcycle industries
will be lifted as part of Taiwan's WTO accession.
Procurement Practices: Taiwan has committed to adhere to the WTO
Agreement on Government Procurement as part of its WTO accession. To
prepare for this commitment, a new Government Procurement Law (GPL)
become effective in mid-1999, marking an important first step towards
open, fair competition in Taiwan's multi-billion dollar market for
public procurement projects. However, some initial procurements after
the implementation of the GPL still have one-sided terms and conditions
which may strongly discourage foreign bidders, including inefficient
allocations of risks to the supplier.
6. Export Subsidies Policies
Taiwan provides an array of direct and indirect subsidy programs to
farmers, ranging from financial assistance to guaranteed purchase
prices higher than world prices. It also provides incentives to
industrial firms in export processing zones and to firms in designated
``emerging industries.'' Some of these programs may have the effect of
subsidizing exports. Taiwan is currently in the process of notifying
the WTO of these programs, and as part of its WTO accession, it may be
required to amend or abolish any subsidy programs deemed inconsistent
with WTO principles.
7. Protection of U.S. Intellectual Property
Taiwan is not a party to any major multilateral IPR conventions. In
line with WTO accession efforts, Taiwan has passed laws to protect
integrated circuit layouts, personal data, and trade secrets. Taiwan
currently protects copyrights dating from 1965. Revised Copyright,
Patent, and Trademark Laws were passed in 1997. However, only the
Trademark Law and certain provisions of the Copyright Law have been
implemented. The new Copyright Law, which will be fully implemented
only upon WTO accession, will extend retroactive copyright protection
to 50 years. Taiwan implemented these changes to bring its IPR legal
structure into conformity with the WTO TRIPs agreement.
In its April 1999 decision to keep Taiwan on the ``Special 301''
Watch List, the United States cited continuing concerns about Taiwan's
IPR enforcement generally, and specifically urged Taiwan authorities to
tighten controls on optical media production. In 1998, U.S. Customs
seized $8.6 million of counterfeit goods from Taiwan, making Taiwan the
second largest source of counterfeit goods (after the PRC). Taiwan has
taken steps to address these concerns. In January of 1999, Taiwan
established an Intellectual Property Office to improve coordination of
IPR protection efforts. In February, Taiwan's Executive Yuan issued a
new directive requiring only the use of legal software by Taiwan
authorities. Beginning on July 1, 1999, all optical media products
produced in Taiwan, including CD's, VCD's, CD-ROM's and DVD's, were
required to bear source identification (SID) codes. At the same time,
Bureau of Standards, Metrology and Inspection inspectors were
authorized to perform random factory visits to ensure compliance. Also
on July 1, the Taiwan Semiconductor Industry Association began
implementation of a voluntary computer chip-marking program.
8. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association: Although the right to organize was
reaffirmed by Taiwan's Judicial Yuan in 1995 as a constitutional right,
the Labor Union Law (LUL) forbids civil servants, teachers, and defense
industry workers from organizing trade unions and forbids workers from
forming competing trade unions and confederations. However, as
democratization has continued, workers have established independent
labor unions, either legally or illegally. These independent unions
increasingly are challenging the leadership of the Chinese Federation
of Labor, which is closely tied to the ruling Kuomingtang party, and is
the only island-wide labor union permitted. In February of 1999, a
national teacher's association was established. In July, workers unions
of 18 state-owned enterprises formed an alliance to protect their
rights during privatization. As of June of 1999, 2.9 million workers,
or 30.5 percent of Taiwan's labor force, belonged to 3,766 labor
unions.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively: Except for civil
servants, teachers, and defense industry workers, the LUL, the Law
Governing the Handling of Labor Disputes, and the Collective Agreement
Law offer workers the right to organize and bargain collectively.
However, the law contains restrictions to curb workers' exercise of
these rights. The LUL, for example, stipulates that workers shall not
strike to demand an increase in wages exceeding standard wages.
Collective bargaining agreements exist only in large-scale enterprises.
As of June 1999, there were 298 such collective agreements.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor: The Labor Standards
Law prohibits forced or compulsory labor. The maximum jail sentence for
violation of the law is five years. Except for cases involving
prostitution, there have only been allegations of possible forced or
compulsory labor relating to PRC crewmembers on Taiwan fishing boats.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children: The Labor Standards Law
stipulates age 15, after completion of the 9-year compulsory education
required by law, as the minimum age for employment. County and city
labor bureaus enforce minimum age laws. Child labor is rare in Taiwan.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work: The Labor Standards Law (LSL)
mandates basic labor standards. Pursuant to a 1996 amendment, the LSL
was extended to cover all salaried employees (except teachers, civil
servants, doctors, lawyers and some other specialized professions) as
of the end of 1998. The law now covers over 5.5 million of Taiwan's 6.7
million salaried workers. The Council of Labor Affairs (CLA) has kept
the basic wage at the same level (NT$15,840 per month or about $500)
since 1997. However, the average monthly wage in Taiwan's manufacturing
sector was NT$40,130 (or about $1,300) during the first six months of
1999. The LSL limits the workweek to 48 hours (8 hours per day, 6 days
per week) and requires 1 day off every 7 days. In December of 1996, the
LSL was amended to allow employers to adjust working hours, with
approval by workers. The amendment allows private firms to have five-
day workweeks twice every month, similar to the system implemented for
civil servants in early 1998. Currently, about one third of private
enterprises have adopted an alternating 5-day workweek system. In
addition to wages, employers typically provide workers with additional
payments and benefits, including a portion of national health insurance
and labor insurance premiums, the distribution of labor welfare funds,
meals, and transportation allowances.
f. Rights in Sectors with U.S. Investments: U.S. firms and joint
ventures generally abide by Taiwan's labor law regulations. In terms of
wages and other benefits, worker rights do not vary significantly by
industrial sector.
Extent of U.S. Investment in Selected Industries--U.S. Direct Investment Position Abroad on an Historical Cost
Basis--1998
[Millions of U.S. Dollars]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Category Amount
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Petroleum...................... .............. 49
Total Manufacturing............ .............. 3,258
Food & Kindred Products...... 99 ...............................................................
Chemicals & Allied Products.. 1,372 ...............................................................
Primary & Fabricated Metals.. 45 ...............................................................
Industrial Machinery and 280 ...............................................................
Equipment.
Electric & Electronic 1,191 ...............................................................
Equipment.
Transportation Equipment..... (\1\) ...............................................................
Other Manufacturing.......... (\1\) ...............................................................
Wholesale Trade................ .............. 368
Banking........................ .............. 614
Finance/Insurance/Real Estate.. .............. 337
Services....................... .............. 163
Other Industries............... .............. 148
TOTAL ALL INDUSTRIES........... .............. 4,937
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Data suppressed to avoid disclosure of individual company data.
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis.
______
THAILAND
Key Economic Indicators
[Millions of U.S. Dollars unless otherwise indicated]
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1997 1998 \1\ 1999
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Income, Production, and Employment: \2\
Nominal GDP.......................... 150,593 112,758 121,979
Real GDP Growth (pct) \3\............ -1.8 -10.0 3.5
GDP by Sector
Agriculture........................ 14,814 13,239 \2\ 11,49
6
Manufacturing...................... 44,638 34,660 \2\ 39,12
3
Services........................... 22,990 18,197 \2\ 21,17
7
Government \4\..................... 15,021 12,200 \2\ 14,19
3
Per Capita GDP (US$)................. 2,421 1,765 1,965
Labor Force (000's).................. 32,840 32,800 33,490
Unemployment Rate.................... 1.9 4.0 4.2
Money and Prices (annual percentage
growth):
Money Supply Growth.................. 16.4 9.5 6.4
Consumer Price Inflation............. 5.6 8.1 0.5
Exchange Rate
Official........................... 31.37 41.37 \5\ 37.71
Balance of Payments and Trade:
Total Exports FOB \6\................ 56,721 52,873 54,988
Exports to U.S. \6\................ 11,341 12,167 \7\ 12,06
5
Total Imports CIF \6\................ 61,348 40,641 45,761
Imports from U.S. \6\.............. 8,714 5,963 \7\ 6,352
Trade Balance \6\.................... -4,626 12,232 9,227
Balance with U.S. \6\.............. 2,627 6,204 \7\ 5,713
External Public Debt................. 24,323 31,494 35,500
Fiscal Balance/GDP (pct)............. -2.7 -5.5 \8\ -7.2
Current Account/GDP (pct)............ -2.0 12.8 9.0
Debt Service Payments/GDP (pct)...... 0.8 1.2 N/A
Gold and Foreign Exchange Reserves... 26,968 26,536 34,000
Aid from U.S. \9\.................... 3.6 5.5 N/A
Aid from All Other Sources........... 109.2 105.8 N/A
------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Royal Thai Government projections unless otherwise indicated.
\2\ Estimate based on six-month data.
\3\ Percentage changes calculated in local currency.
\4\ Government expenditure on GDP; for illustrative purposes.
\5\ Estimate based on ten-month data.
\6\ Merchandise trade, balance of payments concept.
\7\ Estimate based on eight-month data.
\8\ Includes imputed interest of financial sector restructuring.
\9\ Fiscal year total (October-September).
Sources: Royal Thai Government and U.S. Department of Commerce.
1. General Policy Framework
The government of current Thai Prime Minister Chuan Leekpai has
been working to stabilize and reinvigorate the Thai economy since it
took office in November 1997. The East Asian economic crisis began in
Thailand when a failed effort to defend the baht (the Thai currency)
depleted Thailand's foreign exchange reserves and forced the Bank of
Thailand to float the currency in July 1997. Over the next six months
the baht lost half of its value, and the crisis spread from the
financial sector to the real sector. The Thai economy, one of the
world's fastest growing up through 1995, tumbled, and real GDP suffered
contractions of 1.8 percent and 10 percent in 1997 and 1998
respectively. The financial contagion spread from Thailand to other
countries in the region, particularly Korea and Indonesia, impairing
Thailand's ability to export its way out of the crisis.
The failed defense of the baht led the government to seek
assistance from the IMF, which in August 1997 put together a package
worth $17.2 billion to provide balance of payments support and begin
restructuring the Thai economy and financial sector. Under the guidance
of Finance Minister Tarrin NimmanhaeMinda, the government has focused
considerable effort on restructuring the financial sector. Insolvent
institutions, including two-thirds of the country's finance companies,
were closed or placed in receivership, and new provisioning
requirements were instituted. The crisis and subsequent restructuring
have opened the way for increased foreign participation in the
financial sector. Foreign banks now own controlling interests in four
Thai commercial banks, and two more banks are scheduled to be sold by
the end of 1999. Thailand has also passed legislation to reform and
streamline the bankruptcy and foreclosure system (including
establishing a new bankruptcy court), and auctioned off assets of the
closed finance companies to the private sector. Reform legislation
still in draft includes a new financial institutions law, a new central
bank law, amendments to the Currency Act, and bills to set up a deposit
insurance scheme and a credit bureau. Throughout, Thailand has favored
a market-oriented private sector-led approach to restructuring the
financial sector.
While the government's efforts stabilized the economy and laid the
macro-economic foundation for a return to growth by late 1998, the real
economy did not respond, and the focus turned to stimulating
consumption. With the support of the IMF, the government ran fiscal
deficits (after years of balanced or surplus budgets) of 3 percent of
GDP in FY 1998 and 6 percent of GDP in FY 1999. An additional stimulus
program of 2.8 percent of GDP announced in March 1999 provided funds to
create jobs for 485,000, expand government purchases of goods and
services by $1 billion, and decrease the tax burden on middle class
income earners and the costs of energy for industrial users. In August
1999 the government announced a further stimulus package of 2.2 percent
of GDP to promote private investment. A new Alien Business Law and new
investment promotion incentives should also increase Thailand's
attractiveness to foreign investors. The economy has responded to these
stimulus programs with consumption, exports and imports, and production
all recording moderate increases for the first nine months of the year
in comparison to 1998 totals. Private investment remains below 1998
activity, but the declines here are slowing. The government is
financing the deficit through domestic bond sales and foreign debt and
grant assistance.
Current Thai monetary policy aims at maintaining adequate system
liquidity and keeping interest rates low in an effort to promote debt
restructuring and new lending. The government uses a standard array of
monetary policy tools but focuses on open market operations,
particularly the repurchase market. Foreign exchange flows have a
moderate effect on exchange rate stability. Current government policy
does not target a specific level for the baht. However, the government
will act to smooth volatility in the exchange rate.
2. Exchange Rate Policy
From 1984 to 1997 the baht was pegged to a basket of currencies of
Thailand's major trading partners, with the dollar representing the
largest share. The exchange rate averaged 25 baht to the dollar during
that period. Following the depletion of Thailand's foreign exchange
reserves in an unsuccessful attempt to defend the peg, the currency was
allowed to float in July 1997. It began to depreciate immediately and
fell to below 50 per dollar in January 1998. As reform measures and IMF
support took hold, the baht stabilized and has traded in the 36 to 41
baht per dollar range since March 1998.
The Thai government began liberalizing the exchange control regime
in 1990 and accepted IMF Article VIII obligations. Commercial banks
received permission to process larger foreign exchange transactions,
and ceilings on money transfers were increased. Since 1991 Thai banks
have offered foreign currency accounts for residents, although they are
limited to $500,000 for individuals and $5 million for corporations
(without conditions).
After the baht was floated on July 2, 1997 the government tightened
conditions on foreign exchange, requiring customers to show evidence of
foreign currency obligations (within three months from date of deposit)
to open foreign currency accounts. Thailand also required exporters to
repatriate and deposit foreign exchange earnings more expeditiously.
More recently, the government has restricted the supply of baht to non-
resident parties (unless there is an underlying transaction requiring
the currency) to cut down on offshore speculation.
3. Structural Policies
The Thai taxation system has undergone significant revision since
1992 when a value added tax (VAT) system was introduced to replace a
multi-tiered business tax system. The VAT rate was raised from 7 to 10
percent in 1997 but lowered temporarily back to 7 percent in March 1999
to stimulate private consumption. Exemptions in place for low revenue
businesses were expanded in March 1999. Exporters are ``zero rated''
under the VAT system but must file returns and apply for rebates.
Parliament is considering tax credits in lieu of the rebate. The
corporate tax rate is currently 30 percent of net profits for all
firms.
Thailand and the United States signed a tax treaty in November
1996, and the treaty entered into force in early 1998. The treaty
eliminates double taxation and gives U.S. firms tax treatment
equivalent to that enjoyed by Thailand's other tax treaty partners.
Heightened awareness in Thailand about ``genetically modified
organisms'' (GMO) issues and concern about increasing barriers to GMO
products in Thailand's European markets have led to a reexamination of
Thai government policy towards imports, production, sales, and exports
of GMO crops, commodities, and processed foods. Current policy allows
imports into Thailand of GMO seeds and plants only for research
purposes, but there are no restrictions on imports of GMO commodities
or products and no compulsory labeling requirements. The result is a
relatively small impact on U.S. exports of GMO products. Although the
debate continues, particularly on labeling, we do not expect major
changes in this policy over the next year.
4. Debt Management Policies
Thailand's financial crisis resulted in part from significant
increases in private sector external debt, but these levels have
declined markedly since the onset of the crisis, falling from $75
billion at the end of June 1997 to $47 billion at the end of June 1999.
Thailand entered the crisis with low levels of public debt, but public
sector external debt has risen significantly as the government
stabilized and sought to stimulate the economy. At the end of 1997,
total public sector external debt (including that of the Bank of
Thailand) stood at $24 billion. By the end of June 1999, the figure had
risen to $34 billion. Public sector debt is predominantly long-term and
divided among direct borrowings and loans to state-owned enterprises
guaranteed by the government, with the latter predominating.
Mounting public sector debt is a concern in Thailand, and the
government is attempting to diversify its sources of funding by
developing a domestic bond market. By the end of June 1999, total
public sector debt, including the non-guaranteed debt of state-owned
enterprises, had climbed to 41 percent of Thailand's GDP. The public
debt service ratio (payments as a percent of the exports of goods and
services) stood at the end of June 1999 at 3.5 percent, down slightly
from the first quarter, but up a full percentage point from the
comparable 1996 figure. By way of contrast, the debt service ratio for
private sector debt at the end of June stood at 15.5 percent.
Thailand has consistently met the targets and performance criteria
elaborated in the $17.2 billion program agreed with the IMF in 1997.
The program will run through May 2000, although Thailand recently
announced that it does not intend to take disbursement of the final
$2.7 billion of the package.
5. Significant Barriers to U.S. Exports
Moving to meet its WTO and ASEAN tariff reduction commitments,
Thailand instituted reductions in January 1995, and tariffs were
reduced on another 4,000 items at the beginning of 1997. However, the
decision to accelerate ASEAN's Free Trade Area (AFTA) preferred tariff
schedules, taken in Manila in October 1998, has not yet translated into
significant liberalization within APEC. Also, the need for revenue in
the aftermath of the financial crisis led to the imposition of higher
duties, surcharges, and excise taxes on ``sin'' items and a range of
luxury imports, including U.S. wine and beer exports.
At the beginning of 1997, the total number of tariff rate
categories was reduced from 39 to six, with the following spread: zero
percent on such goods as medical equipment and fertilizer, one percent
on raw materials, electronics components, and vehicles for
international transport, five percent on primary and capital goods, 10
percent on intermediate goods, 20 percent for finished products, and 30
percent on goods needing ``special protection.'' This last category
includes agricultural products, autos and auto parts, alcoholic
beverages, and a few other ``sensitive'' items. Import tariff quotas
are applied to 23 categories of agricultural products. Further
reductions on a range of capital goods and raw materials were announced
in August of 1999 as an investment incentive measure and a spur to
domestic industries. Tariff exemptions for some items deemed critical
to Thai industrial recovery were also announced.
Thailand is in the process of changing its import licensing
procedures to comply with its WTO obligations. Import licenses are
still required for 26 categories of items, down from 42 categories in
1995-1996. Licenses are required for many raw materials, petroleum,
industrial, textile, and agricultural items. Import licenses can be
used to protect unproductive local industries and to encourage greater
domestic production. Some items that do not require licenses must
nevertheless comply with applicable regulations of concerned agencies,
are subject to extra fees, or must have certificates of origin.
The Thai Food and Drug Administration issues licenses for food and
pharmaceutical imports. This process can be a barrier due to the cost,
the length of the process, and occasional demands for proprietary
information. Licenses cost about $600 and must be renewed every three
years. Pharmaceutical import licenses cost about $480 and must be
renewed every year. There are also fees for laboratory analysis. Costs
of between $40 to $120 per item are usual for sample food products
imported in bulk. Sealed, packaged foods can cost about $200 per item.
Pharmaceuticals must be registered for a fee of about $80, and
inspected and analyzed for another fee of about $80 per item. The
process can take more than three months to complete.
The government is gradually easing import duties in line with WTO
commitments, which may improve market access for some American
products. Rice will continue to be protected, but within WTO schedules.
Corn and fresh potatoes are subject to a Tariff Rate Quota (TRQ) that
limits import levels. The restricted entry period for U.S. corn under
the TRQ, generally February to June, usually ensures that it is not
competitive in the Thai market.
Even though rates are slated to decline between 35 and 50 percent
under WTO rules, duties on many high-value fresh and processed foods
remain high. For most U.S. high-value fresh and value-added processed
foods, entry into Thailand is still expensive. There are no longer
specific duties on most imported agricultural and food products, except
wine and spirits, which continue to have very high rates.
Arbitrary customs valuation procedures sometimes constitute a
serious barrier to U.S. goods. The Customs Department has used the
highest previously declared invoice value as a benchmark for assessing
subsequent shipments from the same country. That allows Customs to
disregard the invoice value of a shipment in favor of the benchmark
amount. This practice has had a particularly damaging effect upon trade
in agricultural products, which often have seasonally fluctuating
values. However, the government is instituting a program of customs
reform that, if adopted successfully, will remedy some of the problems
at the ports of entry. These reforms include adoption of the World
Customs Organization harmonized code and the use of an Electronic Data
Interchange (EDI) system. The pilot program for EDI became operational
early in 1998, but thus far affects only export procedures and only in
the airport, not in the seaports. There have been some significant
improvements in advance of the full installation of EDI. Expedited
procedures for express carriers were instituted during 1998, and
customs procedures in the port areas are reported by private industry
to be faster and smoother during 1998-1999.
Customs duties are sometimes arbitrary in other ways. For example,
import duties on unfinished materials are higher than those on finished
goods in some categories, such as automobiles. This is a burden to
American firms that manufacture or assemble in Thailand.
Restrictions on the activities of foreign banks have eased since
1994, as have limits on foreign ownership of Thai banks. However,
foreign banks' deposits in Thailand still comprise only 4.1 percent of
total bank deposits, and foreign banks are still disadvantaged in a
number of ways. Foreign banks are limited to three branches (of which
two must be outside of Bangkok and adjacent provinces) and there are
limits on expatriate management personnel, although foreign bankers
here say that requests for additional personnel are customarily
approved.
To facilitate recapitalization of the financial sector, the
government has raised limits on foreign ownership of domestic banks. In
June 1997 the Minister of Finance was empowered to raise the old 25
percent ceiling on foreign ownership of domestic banks, and the Bank of
Thailand announced in November 1997 that foreign ownership would be
allowed to exceed 49 percent for a period of 10 years. (Foreign
investors will not be forced to divest shares after 10 years, but will
not be able to purchase additional shares.) The government has also
issued additional foreign bank and Bangkok International Banking
Facility licenses and authorized foreign bank participation in domestic
ATM networks. During the third quarter of 1999 foreign banks purchased
75 percent shares of two domestic banks intervened by the Thai
Government. The Government hopes to sell similar stakes in two more
intervened banks by the end of 1999.
Foreign ownership of finance companies and securities companies had
been limited to 25 percent, but these limits were also raised in the
aftermath of the financial crisis. As of May 1998, foreigners may hold
majority stakes in Thai securities houses, although there are minimum
investment requirements.
The provision of telecommunications services is a government
monopoly in Thailand. Private participation is currently limited to
concessions in both wireless and fixed line sectors. In November 1997,
the government approved a telecommunications master plan that that
provides an outline of a liberalization program. The government plans
to corporatize its two telecom operators, the Telephone Organization of
Thailand and the Communications Authority of Thailand, in preparation
for seeking strategic partners in the next few years. Full market
liberalization will not take place until 2006, as mandated by the WTO.
6. Export Subsidies Policies
Thailand ratified the Uruguay Round agreements in December 1994.
Thailand maintains several programs that benefit exports of
manufactured products or processed agricultural products and which may
constitute export subsidies. These include subsidized credit on some
government-to-government sales of Thai rice (agreed on a case-by-case
basis), preferential financing for exporters in the form of packing
credits, tax certificates for rebates of packing credits, and rebates
of taxes and import duties for products intended for re-export. The
Thai EX-IM bank currently offers an 11 (plus 1.5) percent rate on
export credits, about one point below the prime rate offered by the
large commercial banks.
7. Protection of U.S. Intellectual Property
Improved protection for U.S. copyright, patent, and trademark
holders has been an important bilateral trade issue for several years.
After passage of a revised Copyright Law in 1994 the U.S. moved
Thailand from Priority Watch List to Watch List status. During 1998 the
Thai Parliament passed amendments to the Patent Act, abolishing the
Pharmaceutical Review Board. Trademark application procedures were
streamlined by administrative means.
A specialized intellectual property department in the Ministry of
Commerce has cooperated with U.S. industry associations to coordinate
both legal reforms and enforcement efforts, including raids. In 1997,
the parliament established a separate intellectual property court that
has resulted in a more efficient judicial procedures and higher fines.
The court began operation in December 1997. In mid-1998, the government
produced a letter of intent containing the bilaterally agreed text of
an IPR action plan for the remainder of the year. The plan was
ambitious, and covered most aspects of IPR. Many components of the plan
were implemented during 1998 as the Thai Government showed itself
prepared to install more efficient administrative structures and
procedures for dealing with piracy. Enforcement has always been the
biggest problem. During the first months of 1999 enforcement efforts in
Thailand improved dramatically with several successful raids on pirate
optical media supply and distribution systems. The momentum has been
kept up through the second half of the year. Rights-holders report that
police cooperation is better and the frequency of raids is up across
the board. As requested by the USG and rights holders, these have
included some raids against producers.
Piracy remains a serious problem, however, and it is growing rather
than shrinking as pirates from elsewhere in the region have come to set
up shop in Thailand. The U.S. pharmaceutical, film, and software
industries estimate lost sales at over $200 million annually. Few
persons have served time in jail for copyright infringement.
Irregularities in police and public prosecutor procedures have resulted
in the substitution of insignificant defendants for major ones and the
disappearance of vital evidence from police inventories. Although fewer
raids are compromised by leaks from police sources than during 1997-98,
this is still a problem. Some trademark pirates running ``plush'' item
factories in outlying provinces have thwarted raids with threats of
violence against officials and investigators.
8. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association: The Labor Relations Act of 1975 gives
workers in the private sector most internationally recognized labor
rights, including the freedom to associate. They may form and join
unions and make policy without hindrance from the government and
without reprisal or discrimination for union activity. Unions in
Thailand may have relationships with unions in other countries, and
with international labor organizations. In 1991, following a military
coup, the Thai Government revoked a number of these rights for state
enterprise workers. The Thai Parliament approved a new State Enterprise
Labor Relations (SELRA) bill on October 8, 1998. That bill was
subsequently rejected by the Constitutional Court on a technicality. In
August 1999, after the bill was re-introduced, the House and Senate
could not agree on several key union rights provisions. The House then
invoked constitutional provisions that will allow it to pass SELRA
unilaterally after a six-month waiting period. The Ministry of Labor
expects the bill to pass by February 2000.
b. The right to Organize and Bargain Collectively: Thai workers
have the right to bargain collectively over wages, working conditions,
and benefits. About 900 private sector unions are registered in
Thailand. Civil servants cannot form unions. State enterprise
employees, essential workers (transportation, education, and health
care personnel), and civil servants may not strike. However, they may
be members of employee associations. Collective bargaining is unusual
in Thailand, and industry-wide collective bargaining is all but
unknown. However, representatives of public sector associations and
private sector unions do sit on various government committees dealing
with labor matters, and are influential in setting national labor
policies, such as the minimum wage.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor: The Thai Constitution
prohibits forced or compulsory labor except in cases of national
emergency, war, or martial law. However, Thailand remains the target of
ILO actions under Convention 29 (forced labor) because child
prostitution persists despite recent government moves to step up
enforcement of laws prohibiting it, and to cooperate with ILO programs.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children: The new 1998 Labor
Protection Act went into effect on August 20, 1998. The act raises the
minimum age for employment in Thailand from thirteen to fifteen.
Persons between the ages of 15 to 18 are restricted to light work in
non-hazardous jobs, and must have the permission of the Department of
Labor in order to work. Nighttime and holiday employment of non-adults
is prohibited. The new national education bill passed in August 1999
gives the children the right to free primary education through grade
12. However, compulsory education is only enforced through grade nine.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work: Working conditions vary widely in
Thailand. Large factories generally meet international health and
safety standards, though there have been serious lapses involving loss
of life. The government has increased the number of inspectors and
raised fines for violators, but enforcement is still not rigorous. The
usual workday in industry is eight hours. Wages in profitable export
industries often exceed the legal minimum. However, in the large
informal industrial sector wage, health, and safety standards are low
and regulations are often ignored. Most industries have a legally
mandated 48-hour maximum workweek. The major exceptions are commercial
establishments, where the maximum is 54 hours. Transportation workers
are restricted to 48 hours per week.
f. Rights in Sectors with U.S. Investment: Labor rights are
generally respected in industrial sectors with heavy investment from
U.S. companies. Most U.S. firms in Thailand work with internal workers'
representatives or unions, and relations are constructive. U.S.
companies strictly adhere to Thai labor laws and did not experience
serious labor disruptions in the last year.
Extent of U.S. Investment in Selected Industries--U.S. Direct Investment Position Abroad on an Historical Cost
Basis--1998
[Millions of U.S. Dollars]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Category Amount
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Petroleum...................... .............. 1,579
Total Manufacturing............ .............. 1,633
Food & Kindred Products...... 109 ...............................................................
Chemicals & Allied Products.. 334 ...............................................................
Primary & Fabricated Metals.. 70 ...............................................................
Industrial Machinery and 648 ...............................................................
Equipment.
Electric & Electronic 243 ...............................................................
Equipment.
Transportation Equipment..... 24 ...............................................................
Other Manufacturing.......... 205 ...............................................................
Wholesale Trade................ .............. 1,508
Banking........................ .............. 486
Finance/Insurance/Real Estate.. .............. 351
Services....................... .............. 42
Other Industries............... .............. 122
TOTAL ALL INDUSTRIES........... .............. 5,721
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis.
EUROPE
----------
THE EUROPEAN UNION
Key Economic Indicators
[Billions of U.S. Dollars unless otherwise indicated]
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1997 1998 \1\1999
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Income, Production and Employment:
Nominal GDP............................. 8095.6 8393.9 8182.5
Real GDP Growth (pct)................... 2.7 2.9 2.1
GDP by Sector:
Agriculture........................... N/A N/A N/A
Manufacturing......................... N/A N/A N/A
Services.............................. N/A N/A N/A
Government............................ N/A N/A N/A
Per Capita GDP (Thousands of US$)....... 21.6 22.3 21.8
Labor Force (Millions).................. 166.9 167.7 N/A
Unemployment Rate (pct)................. 10.7 10.0 9.6
Money and Prices (annual percentage
growth):
Money Supply Growth (M2/M3)............. 5.0 N/A N/A
Consumer Price Inflation................ 2.1 1.5 1.3
Exchange Rate (USD/ECU annual average).. 1.13 1.12 1.05
Balance of Payments and Trade:
Total Exports FOB....................... 820.2 816.1 N/A
Exports to U.S........................ 160.8 179.1 N/A
Total Imports CIF....................... 765.2 793.5 N/A
Imports from U.S...................... 156.9 168.7 N/A
Trade Balance........................... 55.0 22.6 N/A
Balance with U.S...................... 3.9 10.4 N/A
External Public Debt (pct of GDP)....... 71.7 69.7 68.6
Fiscal Deficit/GDP (pct)................ 2.3 1.5 1.5
Current Balance/GDP (pct)............... 1.5 1.2 0.9
Debt Service Payments/GDP (pct)......... N/A N/A N/A
Gross Official Reserves................. 518.5 N/A N/A
Aid from U.S............................ N/A N/A N/A
Aid from Other Sources.................. N/A N/A N/A
------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Estimates.
1. General Policy Framework
The European Union (EU), the largest U.S. trade and investment
partner, is a supranational organization comprised of fifteen European
countries: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece,
Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden,
and the United Kingdom. It is unique in that its member states have
ceded to it increasing authority over their domestic and external
policies, especially with the 1987 Single European Act and the 1993
``Maastricht'' and 1999 ``Amsterdam'' amendments to the 1958 Treaty of
Rome. Individual member state policies, however, may still present
problems for U.S. trade, in addition to EU-wide actions.
The EU's authority is clearest in trade-related matters. As a long-
standing customs union, the EU represents the collective external trade
interests of its member states in the World Trade Organization (WTO).
Internally, the free movement of goods, services, capital and people
within the EU is guaranteed by the Single Market program, an effort to
harmonize member state laws in order to eliminate non-tariff barriers
to these flows. Externally, with respect to services investment,
intellectual property rights and food safety issues among others,
competency for policy and negotiations is balanced between member
states, the European Commission and the European Parliament. However,
the European Commission enforces treaty provisions against anti-
competitive practices throughout the EU. The EU is also gaining greater
competence over investment from third countries.
The Maastricht Treaty provides for the creation of an Economic and
Monetary Union (EMU) among the EU member states which went into effect
on January 1, 1999 with the launch of a single currency, the euro. The
11 participating countries (Denmark, Greece, Sweden and the United
Kingdom are not included) now have a single monetary policy conducted
by the European System of Central Banks (ESCB), including the
Frankfurt-based European Central Bank (ECB). Member states were
generally successful in achieving the ``convergence criteria'' for EMU:
maximum deficits of three percent of GDP, maximum gross national debt
of 60 percent of GDP, inflation and interest rate levels no more than
one and a half percentage points above the average of the three lowest
rates among the member states, and two years of relative exchange rate
stability. Since the euro's launch they have adhered to their Stability
and Growth Pact's limit on excessive budget deficits (3 percent of GDP)
by seeking to achieve balanced budgets by 2002.
The Union's budget, consisting mainly of member state contributions
because the EU has no independent taxing authority, is limited to 1.27
percent of the combined GDP of the 15 member states. Expenditures of
roughly $100 billion are divided generally among agricultural support
(40 percent), ``structural'' policies to promote growth in poorer
regions (40 percent), other internal policies (five percent), external
assistance (five percent) and administrative and miscellaneous (five
percent).
2. Exchange Rate Policy
The third and final stage of EMU began on January 1, 1999 when 11
member states irrevocably fixed their exchange rates to the euro.
Financial transactions are now available in euros through commercial
banking institutions. Euro notes and coins will be introduced on
January 1, 2002, fully replacing national currencies by July 1, 2002.
During the transition period, there will be dual circulation between
the euro and the respective national currencies.
The ESCB is responsible for setting monetary policy in the euro
area, while national central banks will continue to conduct money
market operations and foreign exchange intervention under its
direction. Per requirement of the treaty, the ECB policy is focused on
maintaining price stability. The euro follows a floating exchange rate
regime against other currencies, with the exception of the currencies
of Denmark and Greece which participate in the new Exchange Rate
Mechanism (ERM-2) limiting their fluctuation against the euro to +/-
2.25 percent and +/- 15 percent respectively. EMU has provisions to
create additional exchange rate arrangements, if the member states
desire to do so. However, there are no current plans to seek such
arrangements.
3. Structural Policies
Single Market: The legislative program removing barriers to the
free movement of goods, services, capital and people is largely
complete, although there are delays in member state implementation of
Community rules and national differences in the interpretation of those
rules. The net effect of the Single Market program has been freer
movement, fewer member state regulations for products and service
providers to meet, and real consolidation of markets. Nonetheless, some
aspects of the program have created problems for U.S. exporters (as
discussed below). Furthermore, disparate enforcement, inconsistent
application and insufficient monitoring of Single Market measures
within the EU place U.S. exporters at a disadvantage. EU efforts to
remedy these problems are notable in some areas, but resources remain
severely limited.
Tax Policy: Tax policy remains the prerogative of the member
states, which must approve by unanimity any EU legislation in this
domain. EU legislation to date has been aimed at eliminating tax-
induced distortions of competition within the Union. Legislation
focuses on harmonizing value-added and excise taxes, eliminating double
taxation of corporate profits, interest, and dividends and facilitating
cross-border mergers and asset transfers. The EU countries have stated
their commitment to move further toward coordination of their tax
policies, in addition to agreeing to a Code of Conduct to curb
``harmful'' business taxation.
4. Debt Management Policies
The EU raises funds in international capital markets, but does so
largely for cash management purposes and thus does not have any
significant international debt. The European Investment Bank,
reportedly the world's largest multilateral development bank, also
raises funds in international markets. The bank has an extremely
favorable balance sheet and retains the highest credit rating. Finally,
the EU has used its borrowing power to on-lend to key developing
countries, especially in Central Europe and the newly independent
states of the former Soviet Union. It has consistently taken a hard
line on efforts to reschedule their debt.
5. Significant Barriers to U.S. Exports
Import Policies
Import, Sale and Distribution of Bananas: The U.S. has been engaged
for many years in efforts to resolve a long-standing dispute with the
EU over its banana import regime. The WTO found that the EU's current
regime remains WTO-inconsistent. The U.S. currently has WTO-approved
retaliation in place worth 191.4 million dollars per year. The U.S. has
tabled a number of constructive ideas on revised regimes that would be
WTO-consistent. The European Commission is currently developing
proposals for member state consideration. U.S. retaliation will remain
in place until the EU implements a WTO-consistent banana import regime.
Restrictions Affecting U.S. Wine Exports to the EU: Current EU
regulations require imported wines to be produced only by specifically
authorized oenological practices. Since the mid-1980's, U.S. wines have
entered the EU market under a series of ``derogations'' granting EU
regulatory exemptions. Access to the EU wine market is further impeded
by a complicated wine-import certificate documentation process. The
United States is negotiating an agreement with the EU to ensure the EU
market remains open to U.S. wine. The U.S. does not believe EU
legislation on ``traditional expressions'' (terms such as vintage or
tawny) is WTO TRIPs consistent and therefore does not believe this area
is appropriate for bilateral negotiation.
Services Barriers
EU Broadcast Directive: The EU's 1989 Broadcast Directive (revised
in 1997) provides that a majority of entertainment broadcast
transmission time be reserved for European-origin programs ``where
practicable'' and ``by appropriate means.'' Certain measures of the
directive appear to violate WTO rules. The U.S. has reserved its right
to take further action under dispute settlement procedures and will
continue to monitor closely the implementation of these measures.
Computer Reservation Services: U.S. Computer Reservation Services
(CRS) companies have had difficulties in the EU market because some
member state markets tend to be dominated by the CRS owned by that
member state's flag air carrier. Most disputes have been resolved to
the satisfaction of U.S. CRS vendors via U.S. government intervention
or recourse to national administrative and court systems. In 1996 the
U.S. Department of Justice forwarded a Positive Comity referral to the
European Commission (DG Competition) requesting an investigation into
anticompetitive activities in Europe that may have disadvantaged a U.S.
CRS firm. The Commission's investigation resulted in a European CRS
firm being charged with activities that infringed competition rules. As
of November 1999 a final Commission ruling has not been made.
Airport Ground-Handling: In October 1996, the EU issued a directive
to liberalize the market to provide ground-handling services at EU
airports above a certain size by January 1, 1998. U.S. airline
companies and ground-handling service providers welcome this
development. Yet they are concerned with an exemption that allows EU
airports to continue having a monopoly service provider until January
1, 2002, and to limit the number of firms which can provide certain
services on the airport tarmac (ramp, fuel, baggage and mail/freight
handling). These potential barriers are partially offset by more
liberal bilateral air service agreements, which the United States
concluded with individual member states.
Postal Services: U.S. express package services are concerned with
market access restriction and unequal competition caused by state-owned
postal monopolies. Proposals to liberalize postal services and to
constrain the advantages enjoyed by the monopolies have not made
sufficient progress to redress these problems.
Standards, Testing, Labeling and Certification
Despite the Single Market program, the free movement of goods
within the EU is still impeded by widely disparate member state
standards, testing and certification procedures for some products. The
``new approach,'' which streamlines technical harmonization and the
development of standards for certain product groups using essential
health and safety requirements, reflects the trend towards
harmonization of laws, regulations, standards, testing, and quality and
certification procedures in the EU. U.S. firms cannot directly
participate in the European standardization process, but European
standards bodies can be sympathetic to U.S. concerns when approached.
The Transatlantic Business Dialogue's (TABD) adopted goal of
``approved once, accepted everywhere in the transatlantic marketplace''
demonstrates the importance of standardization in U.S.-EU trade
relations. The anticipation that EU standardization legislation will
eventually cover 50 percent of U.S. exports to Europe demonstrates its
significance. Although some progress has been made, U.S. exporters are
still concerned with legislative delays, inconsistent member state
interpretation and application of legislation, the ill-defined scope of
directives and unclear marking and excessive labeling requirements.
These problems can complicate and impede U.S. exports to the EU.
Mutual Recognition Agreements: In addition to implementing a
harmonized approach to testing and certification, the EU is also
providing for the mutual recognition of member state designated
national laboratories to test and certify ``regulated'' products. For
the testing and certification of non-regulated products, the EU
encourages mutual recognition agreements between private sector
parties. U.S. exporters face problems when only ``notified bodies'' in
Europe are empowered to grant final product approvals of regulated
products. There are some U.S. laboratories, under subcontract to
notified bodies, that can test regulated products. Yet these
laboratories must still send test reports to their European affiliates
for final product approval. Since this process can cause delays and
additional costs for U.S. exporters, sufficient access for U.S.
exporters cannot be provided in this fashion.
On May 18, 1998, the United States and the EU signed a package of
Mutual Recognition Agreements (MRAs), allowing for conformity
assessments to be performed in the United States to EU standards and
vice versa. Both governments are committed to advancing joint efforts
to promote mutual recognition, equivalency and harmonization of
standards. The MRA entered into force on December 1, 1998 and is now
being implemented. Under the Transatlantic Economic Partnership (TEP)
established at the May 1998 U.S.-EU Summit, the U.S. set in motion a
process to undertake negotiation of additional MRAs covering other
sectors.
Biotechnology Product Approvals and Labeling: A majority of EU
member states have called for a ``moratorium'' on approvals for
products of biotechnology for the foreseeable future. Calls for
segregation, traceability and labeling have not been well defined. The
result has been an uncertain and ambiguous regulatory environment that
neither instills consumer confidence nor provides clear criteria with
which industry could comply. No biotechnology products have been
approved since 1998. The Commission is currently conducting an internal
review of the EU approach to biotechnology and food safety and expects
to circulate a recommendation paper in early 2000.
Hormone-Treated Beef: The WTO has ruled consistently against the
EU's ban on hormone-treated beef, most recently in early 1998. The EU
did not come into compliance by May 13, 1998, as required, citing a
need to perform additional risk assessments (which the WTO did not say
were needed). Therefore, the U.S. has imposed WTO-approved retaliation
worth 116.8 million dollars per year, pending EU compliance. A large
body of scientific evidence indicates these products are safe as used.
The EU does not expect its studies to be complete before mid-2000 at
the earliest. The U.S. remains open to exploring meaningful
compensation pending EU compliance.
Veterinary Equivalency: The U.S./EU Veterinary Equivalency
Agreement (VEA) was signed on July 20, 1999 and implemented on August
1. The agreement provides a regulatory framework for recognition of
equivalent sanitary measures of both parties of virtually all animals
and animal products. However, recent statements by Commission officials
have indicated that the EU is not prepared to recognize U.S. systems as
equivalent in the near term. A joint management committee meeting of
the VEA is planned for March 2000, when we hope to have ironed out many
of the implementation issues.
Aflatoxin Limits: In July 1998, the EU adopted a regulation
harmonizing maximum levels of aflatoxin in peanuts, tree nuts and dried
fruits, cereals and milk, effective January 1, 1999. At the same time,
a directive specifying sampling methods to be used after December 31,
2000 was adopted. The United States considers the maximum limits
unjustifiably low in relation to consumer exposure and risk. The
sampling procedure will increase handling costs with no appreciable
reduction of aflatoxin contamination in consumer protection.
Specified Risk Materials Ban: In response to growing concern over
the transmission of ``mad cow disease'' or Bovine Spongiform
Encephalopathy (BSE), the EU, in July 1997, passed a Specified Risk
Material (SRM) regulation restricting the use and processing of certain
animal products and by-products. Since tallow, tallow derivatives and
gelatin are widely used in food manufacturing, pharmaceutical, cosmetic
and industrial products, this regulation threatened to significantly
restrict U.S. access to EU markets despite the fact that the United
States is considered to have a negligible BSE-risk. Implementation of
the ban continues to be delayed; a new proposal addressing the overall,
long term problem of TSEs (transmissible spongiform encephalopathies)
is expected to be presented in November 1999.
Hushkits or New Engine Modified and Recertificated Aircraft: In
1997, pressure on EU airport authorities to reduce noise levels
resulted in a Commission effort to develop an EU-wide noise standard.
When it became clear that it would be politically impossible to agree
on such a standard, the Commission and the EU member states developed
an alternative proposal. That proposal effectively passes the costs on
to U.S. and other non-EU air carriers and to U.S. manufacturers of
noise reduction technology (hushkits) and new engines for older U.S.
aircraft. The Commission has provided no scientific analysis
demonstrating that the regulation would reduce noise. The regulation
was approved by the European Parliament in 1999 but, following U.S.
protests, its implementation has been delayed until May 2000. The
prospect of implementation has harmed the market for hushkitted and re-
engined aircraft and negatively affected fleet values of some U.S. air
carriers.
New Aircraft Certification: The United States continues to be
concerned by the possibility that European aircraft certification
standards are being applied so as to impede delivery of qualified
aircraft into Europe. Processes and procedures currently employed by
the European Joint Aviation Authorities (JAA) appear cumbersome and
arbitrary, and in any event cannot be uniformly enforced. For example,
France continues to insist on an exception to the JAA's decision on
certification of Boeing's new model 737 aircraft that limits the seat
density of aircraft sold to carriers in France. The JAA decision itself
took an inordinately long time, during which additional conditions were
imposed progressively on the U.S. firm. The United States desires a
transparent, equitable process for aircraft certification that is
applied consistently on both sides of the Atlantic according to the
relevant bilateral airworthiness agreements.
Metric Labeling: In order to harmonize measurement systems
throughout the EU, the EU adopted a directive in 1980, which mandates
metric-only labeling on most goods entering the EU from January 1,
2000. Both EU and U.S. exporters have complained about the costs of
complying with conflicting EU metric-only and U.S. mandatory dual
labeling requirements. In response to strong industry and USG
opposition, the EU approved a 10-year deferral of its metric-only
directive in December 1999.
Voluntary Ecolabeling Scheme: In 1992, the EU adopted an EU-wide
ecolabeling scheme. This is a voluntary scheme that allows
manufacturers to obtain an ecolabel for a product when its production
and life cycle meets the established criteria for the product category.
Despite ongoing dialogues between the EU, U.S. government and U.S.
interest groups, commitments to enhance transparency and scientific
analysis from previous technical bilateral talks have not been upheld.
To address this problem, a formal EU-U.S. technical working group was
proposed in October 1998. The United States, due to concern that the EU
ecolabeling scheme may become a de facto trade barrier, will continue
to monitor closely the development of the ecolabeling scheme.
Packaging Labeling Requirements: In 1996, the Commission proposed a
directive establishing marking requirements, indicating recyclability
and/or reusability, for packaging. Due to the differences that exist
between EU marking requirements and those used by the United States and
the International Standards Organization (ISO), the United States is
concerned with the additional costs and complications both U.S. and EU
firms will face, in the absence of concomitant environmental benefits.
The United States is also concerned with Article 4 of the proposed
directive, which would prohibit the application of other marks to
indicate recyclable or reusable packaging. This may require some
companies to create new molds solely for use in the European market.
Discussions underway in the ISO may resolve potential problems,
especially since the Commission has indicated a willingness to review
the proposed directive in light of an eventual ISO agreement.
Waste Management: European Commission environment officials are
working on draft proposals for directives on batteries and on waste
from electrical and electronic equipment. The United States supports
the objectives of the drafts to reduce waste and the environmental
impact of discarded products. However, the proposals' approach to
banning certain materials (such as lead, mercury and cadmium) appears
to lack adequate scientific and economic justification and may serve as
unnecessary barriers to trade. Imposing sole responsibility on the
manufacturer for the collection and recycling of used products also is
unnecessarily burdensome. The draft directives are likely to be voted
on by the Commission in early 2000. If adopted, the proposals would
then move to the Council and European Parliament. U.S. and Commission
waste experts have begun an informal dialogue to discuss these and
other waste issues. The United States government will continue to
monitor closely these proposals.
Acceleration of the Phase-Out of HCFCs: The European Commission
adopted a proposal in July 1998 to amend EU Regulation 3093/94 on
substances that deplete the ozone layer. The United States government
actively opposed early drafts, which included phase-outs of some
hydrochlorofluorocarbons (HCFCs) by 2000 or 2001, and would have
disadvantaged U.S. producers while not necessarily benefiting the
environment. The final Commission draft included a January 1, 2003
phase-out date for HCFCs used in refrigerator foam--in line with U.S.
law--thereby protecting the export to the EU of U.S. refrigeration
equipment. The Council agreed to the 2003 date in adopting its Common
Position in late December 1998, but the Parliament sought to accelerate
the date to 2002. In December 1999, Parliament rejected this amendment,
so the 20003 phase-out date for HCFCs used by the air conditioning
industry, while similarly manufactured heat pump systems received a
2004 deadline. The U.S. government will continue to monitor this issue.
Investment Barriers
The European Union and its fifteen member states provide one of the
most open climates for U.S. direct investment in the world, with well-
established traditions concerning the rule of law and private property
rights, transparent regulatory systems, freedom of capital movements
and the like. Traditionally, member state governments have been
responsible for policies governing non-EU investment. However, in the
1993 Maastricht Treaty, partial competence was shifted to the EU.
Member state policies existing on December 31, 1993 remain effective,
but can be superseded by EU law. In general, the EU supports the idea
of national treatment for foreign investors, arguing that any company
established under the laws of one member state must, as a ``Community
company,'' receive national treatment in all member states regardless
of ultimate ownership. However, some restrictions on U.S. investment do
exist under EU law.
Ownership Restrictions: The benefits of EU law in the aviation and
maritime areas are reserved to firms majority-owned by EU nationals.
Reciprocity Provisions: The ``reciprocal'' national treatment
clause found in EU banking, insurance and investment services
directives allows the EU to deny a third-country financial services
firm the right to establish a new business in the EU if it determines
that the investor's home country denies national treatment to EU firms.
This notion of reciprocity may have been taken further in the
Hydrocarbons Directive which requires ``mirror-image'' reciprocal
treatment where an investor is denied a license if its home country
does not permit EU investors to engage in activities under
circumstances ``comparable'' to those in the EU. It should be noted
that, thus far, these reciprocity provisions have not affected U.S.
firms. In fact, the EU reiterated to the WTO in April 1998 that neither
the Commission nor the EU member states would invoke the reciprocity
clause in the EU banking directive with other WTO members in the light
of the specific most-favored-nation commitments made during the WTO
financial services negotiations.
Access to Government Grant Programs: The EU does not preclude U.S.
firms established in Europe from access to EU-funded research and
development grant programs, although in practice, association with a
``European'' firm is helpful in winning grant awards.
Anti-Corruption: In an attempt to coordinate disparate member state
legislation on anti-corruption, the Commission, in 1997, adopted a
discussion document suggesting guidelines for the development of a
coherent EU-level anti-corruption policy. However, there has been
little follow-up to the recommendations, and EU member state
legislation on corruption is presently far from homogeneous. A number
of EU member states have yet to ratify the OECD convention on anti-
bribery.
Government Procurement
Discrimination in the Utilities Sector: The Utilities Directive,
which took effect in January 1993, is an effort to open government
procurement within the EU. It covers purchases in the water,
transportation, energy and telecommunications sectors. The directive
benefits U.S. firms by requiring open and objective bidding procedures,
but still discriminates against non-EU bids unless provided for in an
international or bilateral agreement. This discriminatory provision was
waived for the heavy electrical sector in a 1993 Memorandum of
Understanding (MOU) signed between the EU and the United States. A year
later, in a new agreement, the idea of non-discriminatory treatment was
extended to over $100 billion of goods procurement on each side. Much
of the 1994 agreement is implemented through the 1996 WTO Government
Procurement Agreement.
Telecommunications Market Access: Consistent with the WTO Agreement
on Basic Telecommunications Services and EU legislation requiring
liberalization, there is a general trend toward increased competition
and openness in the European telecommunications services market. Access
of U.S. firms, however, varies considerably from member state to member
state due to uneven implementation of commitments. While not specific
to U.S. firms, high interconnection tariffs in many member states
present a serious barrier. The ability of telecommunications regulatory
bodies to exercise authority quickly and effectively varies among
member states. This has, in some instances, hampered competition. The
European Commission has proposed streamlining the European regulatory
structure and increasing dialogue among regulators and the Commission
to enhance, inter alia, regulatory efficiency.
Procurement policies and practices are becoming more competitive,
but discrimination against non-EU bids for public procurement in the
telecommunications sector remains. In the long run, as privatization in
the sector increases, this barrier will lessen in importance, but
access still may be impeded by standards, standard-setting procedures,
testing, certification and interconnection policies. In this regard,
the U.S. has serious concerns about market access for third generation
(3G) wireless telecommunications. Member states appear to be
formulating licensing rules and procedures that favor a single European
standard. The U.S. has urged the European Commission and member states
to modify their rules, as needed, to ensure market access for providers
of products based on all internationally accepted 3G standards.
Other Barriers
Data Privacy: The EU Data Protection Directive entered into force
in October 1998. It sought to harmonize the treatment of personal data
within the EU to increase protection and facilitate the flow of
information within Europe. The Directive only allows the transfer of
data to third countries if they are deemed to provide ``adequate
protection.'' The U.S. is discussing a Safe Harbor Initiative with the
EU, which would create an interface for our different approaches to
data privacy and ensure that data flows are not interrupted.
6. Export Subsidies Policies
Agricultural Product Subsidies: The EU grants direct export
subsidies (restitutions) on a wide range of agricultural products.
Payments are nominally based on the difference between the EU internal
price and the world price, usually calculated as the lowest offered
price by competing exporters. In addition, the complexities of EU law,
along with the availability of preferential loans and structural funds,
may further support EU agricultural exports. Under the Uruguay Round
agreement, the EU is required to reduce direct export subsidies by 21
percent in volume and 36 percent in value over six years. Whether or
not the EU is abiding by its commitments remains an issue of
contention.
Canned Fruit: The U.S. cling peach industry has complained that the
EU provides excessive support to their canned fruit industry and that
the EU has failed to observe the 1985 U.S.-EU Canned Fruit Agreement.
This allows EU fruit processors to unfairly undercut the domestic and
export prices for EU trading partners. The U.S. Government has
consulted with the EU on this issue several times. Currently, EU data
on subsidy levels to its canned fruit processors is being reviewed, but
effects of EU subsidies on global prices appear significant.
Shipbuilding Subsidies: Responding to pressure from the
shipbuilding industry, the United States, in 1994, successfully
brokered an OECD agreement to eliminate subsidies that were distorting
the world ship market. Following the non-ratification of the agreement
by the U.S. Senate, the EU adopted its own shipbuilding directive in
May 1998. This directive contains the EU's own timeline for phasing out
subsidies, primarily aimed at leveling the playing field within the EU.
Government Support for Airbus: Since the inception of the European
Airbus consortium in 1967, its partner governments (France, Germany,
Spain and the United Kingdom) have provided massive support to their
national company partners in the consortium to aid the development,
production and marketing of large civil aircraft. Since that date, the
Airbus partner governments either have committed, or are in an advanced
stage of consideration of providing, additional funds for derivative
models of current Airbus aircraft. The United States is concerned that
the launch of new Airbus programs and the restructuring of the Airbus
consortium may be used to justify additional government subsidies. The
United States also continues to be concerned that the European Union
and its member states may attempt to influence commercial aircraft
competitions in favor of Airbus aircraft in a manner inconsistent with
its obligations. The United States will continue to monitor EU
involvement in future competitions and its compliance with aircraft
trade agreements.
7. Protection of U.S. Intellectual Property
The EU and its member states support strong protection for
intellectual property rights (IPR). EU member states are participants
of all the relevant WIPO conventions. Along with the EU, they regularly
join with the United States to encourage other countries to adopt and
enforce high IPR standards, including those in the TRIPs Agreement.
However, the United States has challenged several member states on
their failure to fully implement the TRIPs Agreement.
Designs: The EU agreed to compromise language on industrial designs
and models legislation. In general, the directive harmonizes national
rules on design protection, but does not provide for registration and
protection of spare components of complex products (such as visible car
spare parts). A regulation currently under review would designate the
Office for Harmonization in the Internal Market (OHIM, also known as
the Community Trademark Office) in Alicante, Spain as the EU registrar
for designs.
Patents: Patent filing and maintenance fees in the EU and its
member states are expensive relative to other countries. Fees
associated with the filing, issuance and maintenance of a patent over
its life far exceed those in the U.S. In an effort to introduce more
reasonable costs, the European Patent Office (EPO) reduced fees for
filing by 20 percent in 1997.
European Community Patent: Draft legislation to establish a
European Community Patent to harmonize patent issuance in EU member
states, and supplement patents issued by the EPO (with a wider
membership than the EU) is slated for late 1999. However, a stumbling
block to this effort is disagreement among member states on which
official EU languages will be used in patent applications.
Trademarks: Registration of trademarks with the European Community
trademark office (official name: Office for Harmonization in the
Internal Market--OHIM) began in 1996. OHIM, located in Alicante, Spain
issues a single Community trademark with is valid in all 15 EU member
states.
Madrid Protocol: The World Intellectual Property Organization's
(WIPO) Madrid Protocol provides for an international trademark
registration system permitting trademark owners to register in member
countries by filing a standardized application. The U.S. has not
acceded because it objects to voting provisions in the protocol that
would allow the EU a vote upon accession in addition to the votes of
its member states. The U.S. has proposed a voting arrangement to the EU
that would establish voting procedures to address U.S. concerns. The EU
has not yet responded to the U.S. proposal.
Trademark Exhaustion: The trademark exhaustion principle limits a
trademark owner's ability to resort to remedies against importers/
distributors of trademarked goods outside channels authorized by the
trademark owner. The current EU regime supports the principle of
``Community exhaustion,'' which allows resale of trademarked goods
within the fifteen member states once the trademark owner licenses
their sale in any EU country.
In 1998 a European Court of Justice ruling upheld the legality of
Community trademark exhaustion within the EU. The European Commission
has defended the principle by maintaining that Community exhaustion
heightens competition within the internal market. However, member state
opinion remains divided and at the insistence of the U.K. and Sweden,
the Commission began a study into the economic impact of Community
exhaustion in the member states. European discount chains prefer, and
have actively lobbied for, a system of ``international exhaustion,''
which limits the trademark owner's right to control distribution of
goods once he/she licenses them for sale anywhere in the world.
Copyrights: U.S. corporate opinion is divided on proposed
legislation to harmonize copyright law in EU member states and comply
with WIPO treaties. The EU proposed directive is the subject of active
lobbying by U.S. business interests. The U.S. has encouraged the EU to
take all stakeholders into account and develop legislation compatible
with the U.S. Digital Millennium Copyright Act.
8. Worker Rights
Labor legislation still remains largely the domain of individual
member states. Recent decisions taken at the Luxembourg, Cardiff, and
Cologne EU Summit Meetings of the EU have, however, significantly
increased cooperation on employment issues. Specifically, the
Luxembourg Process created a system of goals on employment and annual
reviews of each country's progress toward meeting them. The Cardiff
Process sought to liberalize further the movements of goods, services,
and capital as a means of increasing employment in EU countries. And
the Cologne Process, in the European Employment Strategy signed at the
Summit, brought the EU's coordination in employment and macroeconomic
policies closer together.
Extent of U.S. Investment in Selected Industries--U.S. Direct Investment Position Abroad on an Historical Cost
Basis--1998
[Millions of U.S. Dollars]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Category Amount
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Petroleum...................... .............. 24,953
Total Manufacturing............ .............. 146,007
Food & Kindred Products...... 14,155 ...............................................................
Chemicals & Allied Products.. 49,798 ...............................................................
Primary & Fabricated Metals.. 9,308 ...............................................................
Industrial Machinery and 19,100 ...............................................................
Equipment.
Electric & Electronic 11,841 ...............................................................
Equipment.
Transportation Equipment..... 14,555 ...............................................................
Other Manufacturing.......... 27,250 ...............................................................
Wholesale Trade................ .............. 32,324
Banking........................ .............. 20,190
Finance/Insurance/Real Estate.. .............. 154,733
Services....................... .............. 31,699
Other Industries............... .............. 23,751
TOTAL ALL INDUSTRIES........... .............. 433,658
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis.
______
AUSTRIA
Key Economic Indicators
[Millions of U.S. Dollars unless otherwise indicated]
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1997 1998 \1\ 1999
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Income, Production and Employment:
Nominal GDP \2\.................. 206,739.5 210,897.7 \3\ 210,334
.4
Real GDP Growth (pct)............ 2.5 3.3 2.2
GDP by Sector:
Agriculture.................... 4,662.5 4,584.3 N/A
Manufacturing.................. 44,568.1 45,648.9 N/A
Services....................... 116,647.5 118,315.2 N/A
Government..................... 13,188.3 13,247.7 N/A
Per Capita GDP (US$)............. 25,607 26,046 \3\ 25,964
Labor Force (1,000's)............ 3,657 3,684 3,702
Unemployment Rate (pct) \4\...... 4.4 4.7 4.4
Money and Prices (annual percentage
growth):
Money Supply Growth (M2)......... 1.0 16.5 N/A
Consumer Price Inflation......... 1.3 0.9 0.6
Exchange Rate (AS/US$ annual 12.20 12.38 12.86
average) \5\....................
Balance of Payments and Trade:
Total Exports FOB................ 58,607.9 62,579.8 63,140.0
Exports to U.S................. 2,148.4 2,533.5 2,430.0
Total imports CIF................ 64,774.7 68,023.3 69,230.0
Imports from U.S............... 3,467.9 3,283.0 3,110.0
Trade Balance.................... -6,166.8 -5,443.5 -6,090.0
Balance with U.S............... -1,319.5 -749.5 680.0
External Public Debt............. 24,991.8 31,777.1 31,950.0
Fiscal Deficit/GDP (pct)......... 1.8 2.2 2.0
Current Account Deficit/GDP (pct) 2.5 2.2 2.2
Debt Service Payments/GDP (pct) 2.2 2.4 1.5
\6\.............................
Gold and Foreign Exchange
Reserves
(Year-End)..................... 21,600.0 24,115.1 N/A
Aid from U.S..................... 0 0 0
Aid from All Other Sources....... 0 0 0
------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ 1999 figures are all estimates based on latest available data and
economic forecasts in October 1999.
\2\ GDP at market prices, converted at average annual exchange rate.
\3\ The apparent decline in 1999 figures is a result of exchange rate
fluctuations between the Austrian Shilling (AS) and the US dollar. In
local AS currency, figures show an increase in 1999.
\4\ Unemployment rate according to EU method.
\5\ There is only an official rate, no parallel rates.
\6\ Debt service payments on external public debt.
Sources: Austrian Institute for Economic Research (WIFO), Austrian
Central Statistical Office, Austrian Federal Finance Ministry, and
Austrian National Bank.
1. General Policy Framework
Based on per capita GDP, Austria (tied with Belgium) is the third
richest EU country. Austria has a skilled labor force and a record of
excellent industrial relations. Its economy is dominated by services,
accounting for two thirds of employment followed by the manufacturing
sectors. Small and medium-sized companies are predominant. By 1997, the
government completed a 10-year privatization program. Most of the
formerly state-owned industries are now in private hands. Further
privatizations are underway, including in the banking,
telecommunications and energy sectors.
Exports of Austrian goods and services account for almost 44
percent of GDP. Austria's major export market is the EU, accounting for
64 percent of Austrian exports (36 percent to Germany, 8 percent to
Italy). However, given Austria's traditional expertise in Central and
Eastern European (CEE) markets, exports to that region have soared
since 1989, accounting for 17 percent of Austrian exports by 1998.
Numerous multinationals have established their regional headquarters in
Austria as a ``launching pad'' to the CEE markets. In 1998, Hungary was
equal to Switzerland as Austria's third largest export market.
The government sets economic policy in consultation with the so-
called ``Social Partnership,'' consisting of the representative bodies
of business, farmers, and labor. Designed to minimize social unrest,
this consensual approach has come under criticism for slowing the pace
of economic reforms, particularly in inflexible labor and product
markets. With an increasing number of decisions being made on the EU
level, the influence of the social partner institutions seems to have
declined in past years.
In order to meet the Maastricht criteria for Economic and Monetary
Union (EMU), in 1996-97, the government introduced an austerity
program, under which it reduced its federal budget deficit from 5.1
percent (1995) to 2.5 percent of GDP (1998) and the total public
deficit, which is decisive for the EMU, to 2.2 percent of GDP (1998).
The tax increases included in the austerity program brought the share
of total taxes in GDP to an all-time high of 44.9 percent (1997), since
then it has declined slightly. The 1999 federal budget was designed to
secure the consolidation begun in 1996. The total public sector deficit
is forecast to fall to 2.0 percent in 1999. Social expenditures
currently amount for almost 29 percent of GDP.
Another focus of economic policy is employment creation. Austria
has been one of the foremost supporters of the EU-wide national
employment plans. Its plan places strong emphasis on training and
education, removal of bureaucratic hurdles, more labor flexibility and
a more favorable climate for business start-ups. While some of these
plans have been implemented, the government failed to address the
planned reduction of wage and non-wage costs as part of the 2000-2001
tax reform due to a deadlock of the governing parties and the diverging
interests of social partners, i.e., business and labor representatives.
2. Exchange Rate Policies
As one of the eleven EU member states participating in EMU, Austria
on January 1, 1999 surrendered its sovereign power to formulate
monetary policy to the European Central Bank (ECB). The government
successfully met all EMU convergence criteria due to austerity measures
implemented in 1996-97, and is pursuing a policy of further reducing
the fiscal deficit and the public debt. The ECB's focus on maintaining
price stability in formulating exchange rate and monetary policies is
viewed by the Austrian National Bank (ANB) as a continuation of the
``hard schilling'' policy the ANB pursued since 1981. By pegging the
Austrian schilling (AS) to the German mark (DM), the government has
successfully kept inflation under control and promoted stable economic
growth. On December 31, 1998, the exchange rate for the Euro was
irrevocably fixed at Austrian schillings 13.7603.
In 1998, the Austrian schilling lost little ground against the
dollar. However, in 1999, the dollar continued to rise steadily against
the schilling parallel to its rise against the common Euro currency.
3. Structural Policies
Austria's accession to the EU forced the government to accelerate
structural reforms and to liberalize its economy. Most nontariff
barriers to merchandise trade have been removed and cross-border
capital movements have been fully liberalized.
While the government continues to be a major player in the economy,
the scope of government involvement--a traditional feature of the
Austrian economy--has been significantly reduced in recent years. The
amount of total government spending (federal, provincial and local
governments as well as social security institutions, but not including
government holdings) as percentage of GDP declined to 54.2 percent in
1998 from 57.4 percent in 1995 (Note: the figure for the government
contribution to GDP, as shown in the table, reflects only narrow public
administration functions and does not include social and other
expenditures). The government no longer has majority ownership in
formerly state-controlled companies such as OMV (oil and gas), VOEST
(steel, plant engineering) or ELIN (electrical machinery and
equipment). Subsidy programs have also been scaled back to conform to
EU regulations.
After the passage of a more liberal business code in 1997, plans
for making Austria more attractive for investors were implemented.
While procedures for investors to obtain necessary permits and other
approvals have been streamlined and the time for approvals cut
considerably, plans for implementing ``one-stop-shopping'' for all
necessary permits have not yet been realized. Delays have been caused
by jurisdictional disputes among three federal ministries as well as
differences in opinion between the federal government and business
interest representatives. Approval for larger projects could still be
bothersome and lengthy. Other measures implemented to improve the
business climate and stimulate entrepreneurial activity include the
reorganization of the Austrian stock market (the Vienna Stock Exchange
was fully privatized and linked to the German Stock Exchange in
Frankfurt), a new takeover act, the standardization of international
accounting standards (IAS) or generally accepted accounting principles
(US-GAAP), increased work time flexibility, and initial measures that
have slightly increased wage and labor cost flexibility.
As a result of EU liberalization directives, the government has
also moved ahead with liberalization legislation in the telecom and
energy sectors. The opening of the market for conventional telephones
on January 1, 1998, represented the final phase of Austria's telecom
liberalization. The Austrian telecom services sector now exhibits a
high degree of liberalization, though high interconnection fees still
serve as an impediment to market access. For decades, telecom was a
monopoly in Austria, with the state-owned Post and Telecom Austria
Company (PTA) being the only national supplier of networks and telecom
services. The government also moved ahead with the liberalization of
the highly centralized and virtually closed electricity market. A
relevant Austrian law was adopted in 1998, providing for a progressive
opening of the market by the year 2003. Preparations are also under way
to liberalize the natural gas market.
The outgoing government (general elections took place on October 3,
1999) decided on the implementation of the tax reform it had promised
for 2000. The tax reform for 2000 ended up in marginal tax rate
adjustments and some ``redistribution.'' The reform will, thus,
stimulate economic growth in Austria in 2000, but it failed to meet the
declared goal of a clear reduction of wage and non-wage costs.
Moreover, the reform is likely to result in a higher overall government
budget deficit in 2000, which may go up to as high as 2.5 percent of
GDP, reversing the downward trend since 1995, over which time the
overall government budget deficit declined steadily from 5.1 percent in
1995 to an estimated 2.0 percent in 1999.
4. Debt Management Policies
Austria's external debt management has had no significant impact on
U.S. trade. At the end of 1998, the Austrian federal government's
external debt amounted to $31.8 billion (25 percent of the government's
overall debt) and consisted of 95 percent bonds and 5 percent credits
and loans. Debt service on the federal government's external debt
amounted to $5.0 billion in 1998, or 2.4 percent of GDP and 5.4 percent
of total exports of goods and services. The total public sector
external debt in 1998 was not significantly higher than the federal
government's external debt. Total gross public debt was 63.1 percent of
GDP at the end of 1998, just beyond the 60 percent ceiling set under
the Maastricht convergence criteria. Republic of Austria bonds are
rated AAA by recognized international credit rating agencies.
5. Barriers to U.S. Exports
The U.S. is Austria's largest non-European trading partner with 4.8
percent of Austria's total 1998 imports coming from the U.S. The U.S.
was Austria's fourth largest supplier worldwide after Germany, Italy,
and France. The Austrian government thus has a clear interest in
maintaining close and smooth trade ties. However, there are a number of
obstacles hindering further increases of U.S. exports to Austria:
Pharmaceuticals: Access of U.S. pharmaceutical products to the
Austrian market has been restricted by the Austrian social insurance
holding organization (Hauptverband der Sozialversicherungstrager). The
non-transparent procedures by which the Hauptverband approves drugs for
reimbursement under Austrian health insurance regulations allegedly
perpetuates a closed market favoring established, domestic suppliers.
Pharmaceuticals not approved by the Hauptverband have higher out-of-
pocket costs for Austrian patients and therefore suffer a competitive
disadvantage vis-a-vis approved products.
Government Procurement: Austria is a party to the WTO Government
Procurement Agreement; Austria's Federal Procurement Law was amended in
January 1997 to bring its procurement legislation in line with EU-
guidelines, particularly on services. However, U.S. firms have
experienced a strong pro-EU bias in awarding government tenders. In
defense contracts, offset agreements are common practice. This pro-
European bias also appears to play a role in privatization decisions,
although in some cases the bias is even more narrowly defined with
politicians calling for ``Austrian solutions.''
Beef Hormones: The EU ban on beef imports from cattle treated with
hormones severely restricts U.S. exports of beef to Austria. Despite a
WTO decision that the ban is inconsistent with the rules of
international trade, the EU has not lifted the ban. While decisions on
this policy must be made by all members of the EU, Austrian politicians
have ruled out a lifting of the ban in the foreseeable future.
Poultry: The EU has not approved any U.S. poultry plants, ruling
out the possibility of importing U.S. poultry, or products containing
poultry.
GMOs: As the EU has not approved all genetically modified plants
available in the U.S., imports of these plants or products containing
these plants are not permitted. Austria has gone even further than its
EU partners: Novartis corn and Monsanto BT corn, approved by the
European Commission, are not permitted in Austria. The ban of these
corn types is contrary to EU regulations.
Other Financial Services: Providers of financial services, such as
accountants, tax consultants, and property consultants, must submit
specific proof of their qualifications, such as university education or
number of years of practice. Other service activities also require a
business license, for which one of the preconditions is legal
residence. Under the WTO General Agreement on Trade in Services,
Austrian officials insist that Austria's commitments on trade in
professional services extend only to intra-corporate transfers. U.S.
service companies often form joint ventures with Austrian firms to
circumvent these restrictions.
Foreign Direct Investment: A 1997 U.S. Investor Confidence Survey
compiled by the American Chamber of Commerce cites high labor,
telecommunications and energy costs, the complex Austrian legal
situation, and difficulties in obtaining work permits for key personnel
as major obstacles. A 1998 follow-up survey noted improvements in the
regulatory process and faster permit processing. The reform of the
Residence Law and the Foreign Workers Employment Law enacted in mid-
1997 exempts skilled U.S. labor (e.g. managers and their dependents)
from an increasingly restrictive quota system for residence permits.
Electricity and telecommunications costs, also noted in the survey as
an impediment to business in Austria, have been significantly reduced
through EU-wide liberalization.
6. Export Subsidies Policies
The government provides export promotion loans and guarantees
within the framework of the OECD export credit arrangement and the WTO
Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures. The Austrian
Kontrollbank (AKB), Austria's export financing agency, offers export
financing programs for small and medium-sized companies with annual
export sales of up to $8.2 million. Following Austria's accession to
the EU, the AKB stopped providing economic risk guarantees for short
term financing of exports to OECD countries. A 1995 amendment to
Austria's Export Guarantees Act enables the AKB to guarantee untied
credits. In 1996, the AKB made its export guarantee system more
transparent by publishing conditions and eligible country lists.
7. Protection of U.S. Intellectual Property
Austria is a party to the World Intellectual Property Organization
and several international intellectual property conventions, including
the European Patent Convention, the Patent Cooperation Treaty, the
Madrid Trademark Agreement, the Budapest Treaty on the International
Recognition of the Deposit of Microorganisms for the Purpose of Patent
Procedure, the Universal Copyright Convention, the Brussels Convention
Relating to the Distribution of Program-carrying Signals transmitted by
Satellite, and the Geneva Treaty on the International Registration of
Audiovisual Works. In compliance with the World Trade Organization
Treaty on Intellectual Property (WTO TRIPS) agreement obligations,
Austria extended patent terms; patents on inventions are now valid up
to 20 years after application.
Austrian copyright law grants the author the exclusive right to
publish, distribute, copy, adapt, translate, and broadcast his work.
Infringement proceedings, however, can be time consuming and
complicated. Austria's copyright law is in conformity with the EU
directives on intellectual property rights.
However, under Austrian copyright law ``tourist establishments''
(hotels, inns, bed and breakfast establishments, etc.) may show
cinematographic works or other audiovisual works, including videos, to
their guests. While the license fee to the copyright owners is
mandatory, Austrian law does not require prior authorization by the
copyright holder. The U.S. holds this provision to be inconsistent with
Austria's obligations under the Berne Convention and TRIPS. Following
bilateral U.S.-Austrian talks in 1997, the Austrian Arbitration
Commission determined the rates to be paid for such public showings.
Austria considers this step sufficient compensation for the interests
of the copyright holders and in compliance with both the Berne
Convention and the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights (TRIPS). The U.S. has expressed reservations to this
position.
Austrian copyright law also requires that a license fee be paid on
imports of home video cassettes and broadcasting transmissions. Of
these fees, 51 percent are paid into a fund dedicated to social and
cultural projects. In the U.S.'s view, the copyright owners should
receive the revenues generated from these fees and any deductions for
cultural purposes should be held to a minimum.
Austria is not mentioned in the 1999 ``Special 301'' Watch List or
Priority Watch List and is not identified as a Priority Foreign
Country.
8. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association: Workers in Austria have the
constitutional right to associate freely and the de facto right to
strike. Guarantees in the Austrian Constitution governing freedom of
association cover the rights of workers to join unions and engage in
union activities. Labor participates in the ``social partnership,'' in
which the leaders of Austria's labor, business, and agricultural
institutions jointly develop draft legislation on social and economic
issues, thereby influencing the country's overall economic policy.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively: Austrian unions
enjoy the right to organize and bargain collectively. Some 50 percent
of Austria's 3.2 million-strong labor force is unionized. The Austrian
Trade Union Federation (OGB) is exclusively responsible for collective
bargaining. All workers except civil servants are required to be
members of the Austrian Chamber of Labor. Leaders of the OGB and the
Chamber of Labor are democratically elected. Workers are legally
entitled to elect one-third of the board of major companies.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor: Forced or compulsory
labor is prohibited by law.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children: The minimum legal
working age is 15. The law is enforced by the Ministry for Social
Affairs.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work: There is no legally mandated
minimum wage in Austria. Instead, minimum wage scales are set in annual
collective bargaining agreements between employers and employee
organizations. Workers whose incomes fall below the poverty line are
eligible for social welfare benefits. Over half of the workforce works
a maximum of either 38 or 38.5 hours per week, a result of collective
bargaining agreements. The Labor Inspectorate ensures the effective
protection of workers by requiring companies to meet Austria's
extensive occupational health and safety standards.
f. Rights in Sectors With U.S. Investment: Labor laws tend to be
consistently enforced in all sectors, including the automotive sector,
in which the majority of U.S. capital is invested.
Extent of U.S. Investment in Selected Industries--U.S. Direct Investment Position Abroad on an Historical Cost
Basis--1998
[Millions of U.S. Dollars]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Category Amount
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Petroleum...................... .............. 152
Total Manufacturing............ .............. 1,062
Food & Kindred Products...... 30 ...............................................................
Chemicals & Allied Products.. 45 ...............................................................
Primary & Fabricated Metals.. 2 ...............................................................
Industrial Machinery and 114 ...............................................................
Equipment.
Electric & Electronic (\1\) ...............................................................
Equipment.
Transportation Equipment..... 295 ...............................................................
Other Manufacturing.......... (\1\) ...............................................................
Wholesale Trade................ .............. 515
Banking........................ .............. (\1\)
Finance/Insurance/Real Estate.. .............. (\1\)
Services....................... .............. 200
Other Industries............... .............. -38
TOTAL ALL INDUSTRIES........... .............. 3,838
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Suppressed to avoid disclosing data of individual companies.
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis.
______
BELGIUM
Key Economic Indicators
[Billions of U.S. Dollars unless otherwise indicated]
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1997 1998 \1\ 1999
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Income, Production and Employment:
GDP (at current prices) 2/............ 246.4 252.3 249.1
Real GDP Growth (pct) 3/.............. 3.2 2.9 2.2
GDP by Sector (pct):
Agriculture......................... 1.2 N/A N/A
Construction........................ 6.2 N/A N/A
Energy.............................. 4.4 N/A N/A
Industry............................ 17.8 N/A N/A
Services............................ 52.6 N/A N/A
Nontradable Services................ 17.7 N/A N/A
Real Per Capita GDP (US$) \4\......... 24,204 24,732 24,373
Labor Force (000's)................... 4,320 4,330 4,341
Unemployment Rate (pct)............... 9.3 8.6 8.0
Money and Prices (annual percentage
growth):
Money Supply Growth (M2).............. 6.5 5.5 N/A
Consumer Price Inflation.............. 1.6 1.0 1.0
Exchange Rate (BF/US$)................ 35.78 36.31 37.95
Balance of Payments and Trade:
Total Exports FOB \5\................. 175.3 184.0 187.3
Exports to U.S. \6\................. 7.7 7.1 7.0
Total Imports CIF \5\................. 162.5 170.2 172.8
Imports from U.S. \6\............... 10.8 11.2 12.3
Trade Balance \5\..................... 12.8 13.8 14.5
Balance with U.S. \6\............... -3.1 -4.1 -5.3
Current Account/GDP (pct)............. 5.1 5.3 5.7
External Public Debt.................. 25.1 28.3 N/A
Debt Service Payments/GDP............. N/A N/A N/A
Fiscal Deficit/GDP (pct).............. -1.8 -1.0 -1.1
Gold and Foreign Exchange Reserves.... 19.12 17.66 N/A
Aid from U.S.......................... 0 0 0
Aid for All Other Sources............. 0 0 0
------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ 1999 figures are all estimates based on monthly data available in
November 1999.
\2\ GDP at factor cost.
\3\ Percentage changes calculated in local currency
\4\ At 1985 prices.
\5\ Merchandise trade. Government of Belgium data.
\6\ Source: U.S. Department of Commerce and U.S. Census Bureau; exports
FAS, imports customs basis.
1. General Policy Framework
Major Trends and Outlook
Belgium possesses a highly developed market economy, the tenth
largest among the OECD industrialized democracies. The service sector
generates more than 70 percent of GDP, industry 25 percent and
agriculture two percent. Belgium ranked as the eleventh-largest trading
country in the world in 1998, with exports and imports each equivalent
to about 70 percent of GDP. Eighty percent of Belgium's trade is with
other European Union (EU) members. Seven percent is with the United
States. Belgium imports many basic or intermediate goods, adds value,
and then exports final products. The country derives trade advantages
from its central geographic location, and a highly skilled,
multilingual and industrious workforce. Over the past 30 years, Belgium
has enjoyed the second-highest average annual growth in productivity
among OECD countries (after Japan).
Throughout the late 1970s and the 1980s, Belgium ran chronic budget
deficits, leading to a rapid accumulation of public sector debt. By
1994, debt was equal to 137 percent of GDP; since then, however, the
country has made substantial progress in reducing the debt and
balancing its budget. Belgium has largely financed its budget deficits
from domestic savings. Foreign debt represents less than 10 percent of
the total and Belgium is a net creditor on its external account.
Belgium's macroeconomic policy since 1992 has aimed at reducing the
deficit below 3.0 percent of GDP and reversing the growth of the debt/
GDP ratio in order to meet the criteria for participation in Economic
and Monetary Union (EMU) set out in the EU's Maastricht Treaty. On May
1, 1998, Belgium became a first-tier member of the European Monetary
Union. The government's 2000 budget, presented in October 1999,
projects a 1.1 percent deficit and continues the debt reduction
policies with the aim of achieving a debt/GDP ratio of 112 percent by
the end of the year.
Economic growth in 1998 was 2.9 percent. A comparable rate was
expected in 1999 until an incident involving dioxin-contaminated animal
feed seriously disrupted production and exports of a wide range of
agricultural and food products. Since then, real economic growth is
projected at around 2.2 percent of GDP. At 1 percent, inflation seems
to be under firm control, and no inflationary pressures are apparent,
since weak commodity prices keep imported inflation low. Belgium's
current account surplus of 5.3 percent of GDP is one of the highest
among OECD countries.
Belgium's unemployment situation improved slowly last year.
Standardized EU data put Belgium's unemployment rate at 8.5 percent in
June 1999, 1 percent below the EU's average. However, strong regional
differences in unemployment rates persist, with rates in Wallonia and
Brussels being two to three times higher than in Flanders. A further
reduction in unemployment will probably be difficult to achieve since
many businesses have sought to neutralize high labor costs through
capital-intensive investments and hence increased productivity.
Although wage growth has been very modest since 1994, wage levels
remain among the highest in Europe.
In 1993, Belgium completed its process of regionalization and
became a federal state consisting of three regions: Brussels, Flanders
and Wallonia. Each region was given substantial economic powers,
including trade promotion, investment, industrial development, research
and environmental regulation.
Principal Growth Sectors
Sectoral growth in the Belgian economy reflects macroeconomic
trends. Industry sectors that are oriented towards foreign markets, in
particular those in the semi-finished goods sector such as iron and
steel, non-ferrous metals and chemicals are very sensitive to foreign
business cycle developments. Business investment is expected to
increase by 7 percent in 1999. The capital goods sector in particular
is benefiting from strong investment demand in Belgium. Stronger demand
for consumer products has helped the textiles, wood and food sectors.
Apart from developments specific to the business cycle, there are also
divergent developments impacting other sectors. For example, the paper
and cardboard sector continue to be hit by the ongoing trend towards
the use of less packaging.
Government Role in the Economy
On May 1, 1998, Belgium became a first-tier member of the European
Monetary Union. Belgium will gradually shift from the use of the BF to
the use of the euro as its currency by January 1, 2002. On January 1,
1999, the definitive exchange rate between the euro and the BF was
established at BF 40.33.
Since 1993, the Belgian government has privatized BF 280 billion
worth of public sector entities; in 1998, the federal government raised
approximately BF 45 billion in 1998 against BF 35 billion in 1997.
Further privatization of the last two enterprises with a strong public
sector stake, Sabena and Belgacom, will probably occur under the new
coalition government.
Balance of Payments Situation
Belgium's current account surplus widened in 1998: at 5.3 percent
of GDP, it was well above the EU average of 1.5 percent of GDP, and the
sixth largest in the OECD area. The increase in the surplus largely
reflected a stronger trade balance: exports picked up in response to
more buoyant economic conditions in EU countries, and to a significant
improvement in cost-price competitiveness. The impact of the East Asian
crisis was limited, given that Belgium's exports to these countries--
including Japan--represent only 5 percent of total exports. In 1998,
largely as a result of a decline in energy prices, the terms of trade
improved somewhat. As a consequence, the growing impact of the crisis
in emerging market economies on the volume of Belgium's exports did not
greatly affect the trade surplus.
Infrastructure Situation
Belgium has an excellent transportation network of ports, railroads
and highways, including Europe's second-largest port, Antwerp. Major
U.S. cargo carriers have created at Brussels-Zaventem airport one of
the first European hub-and-spoke operations.
The Belgian government set up a task force to sensitize the public
and private sectors to vulnerabilities of computers and electronic
systems to year 2000 disruptions.
2. Exchange Rate Policy
On May 1, 1998, Belgium became a first-tier member of the European
Monetary Union. Belgium will gradually shift from the use of the BF to
the use of the euro as its currency by January 1, 2002. On January 1,
1999, the definitive exchange rate between the euro and the BF was
established at BF 40.33.
3. Structural Policies
Belgium is a very open economy, as witnessed by its high levels of
exports and imports relative to GDP. Belgium generally discourages
protectionism. The federal and some regional governments actively
encourage foreign investment on a national treatment basis.
Tax policies: Belgium's tax structure was substantially revised in
1989. The top percent in marginal rate on wage and salary income is 55
percent. Corporations (including foreign-owned corporations) pay a
standard income tax rate of 39 percent. Small companies pay a rate
ranging from 29 to 37 percent. Branches and foreign offices pay income
tax at a rate of 43 percent, or at a lower rate in accordance with the
provisions contained in a double taxation treaty. Under the present
bilateral treaty between Belgium and the United States, that rate is 39
percent.
Despite the reforms of the past years, the Belgian tax system is
still characterized by relatively high rates and a fairly narrow base
resulting from numerous exemptions. While indirect taxes as a share of
total government revenues are lower than the EU average, personal
income taxation and social security contributions are particularly
heavy. Total taxes as a percent of GDP are the third highest among OECD
countries. Moreover, pharmaceutical manufacturers are saddled with a
unique turnover tax of 6 percent. Taxes on income from capital are by
comparison quite low; since October 1995, the tax rate on interest
income is 15 percent, and the tax rate on dividends is 25 percent for
residents. There is no tax on capital gains.
Belgium has instituted special corporate tax regimes for
coordination centers, distribution centers and business service centers
(including call centers) in recent years in order to attract foreign
investment. These tax regimes provide for a ``cost-plus'' definition of
income for intragroup activities and have proven very attractive to
U.S. firms, but are now being targeted by the European Commission as
constituting unfair competition with other EU member states.
Regulatory policies: The only areas where price controls are
effectively in place are energy, household leases and pharmaceuticals.
Only in pharmaceuticals does this regime have a serious impact on U.S.
business in Belgium. American pharmaceutical companies present in
Belgium have repeatedly expressed their serious concerns about delays
in product approvals and pricing, as well as social security
reimbursement.
4. Debt Management Policies
Belgium is a member of the G-10 group of leading financial nations,
and participates actively in the IMF, the World Bank, the EBRD and the
Paris Club. Belgium is also a significant donor of development
assistance. It closely follows development and debt issues,
particularly in Central Africa and some other African nations.
Belgium is a net external creditor, thanks to the household
sector's foreign assets, which exceed the external debts of the public
and corporate sectors. Only about 10 percent of the Belgian
government's overall debt is owed to foreign creditors. Moody's top Aa1
rating for the country's bond issues in foreign currency reflects
Belgium's integrated position in the EU, its significant improvements
in fiscal and external balances over the past few years, its economic
union with the financial powerhouse Luxembourg, and the reduction of
its foreign currency debt. The Belgian government has no problems
obtaining new loans on the local credit market.
5. Significant Barriers to U.S. Exports
From the inception of the EU's single market, Belgium has
implemented most, but not all, trade and investment rules necessary to
harmonize with the rules of the other EU member countries. Thus, the
potential for U.S. exporters to take advantage of the vastly expanded
EU market through investments or sales in Belgium has grown
significantly. However, some barriers to services and commodity trade
still exist:
Telecommunications: Although Belgium fully liberalized its
telecommunications services in accordance with the EU directive on
January 1, 1998, some barriers to entry still persist. New entrants to
the Belgian market complain that current legislation is not
transparent, that the interconnect charges they pay to Belgacom (the
former monopolist--51 percent government-owned) remain high and that
BIPT, the Belgian telecoms regulator, is not truly independent. Further
privatization of Belgacom, expected in 2000, may enhance the
increasingly competitive environment and lend more independence to the
regulator.
Ecotaxes: The Belgian government has adopted a series of ecotaxes
in order to redirect consumer buying patterns towards materials seen as
environmentally less damaging. These taxes may raise costs for some
U.S. exporters, since U.S. companies selling into the Belgian market
must adapt worldwide products to various EU member states'
environmental standards.
Retail service sector: Some U.S. retailers, including Toys 'R' Us
and McDonalds, have experienced considerable difficulties in obtaining
permits for outlets in Belgium. Current zoning legislation is designed
to protect small shopkeepers, and its application is not transparent.
Belgian retailers suffer from the same restrictions, but their existing
sites give them strong market share and power in local markets.
Pharmaceutical pricing: As indicated in para 3, pharmaceutical
products are under strict price controls in Belgium. Furthermore, since
1993, procedures to approve new life-saving medicines for reimbursement
by the national health care system have slowed down steadily, to an
average of 410 days, according to the local manufacturers group of
pharmaceutical companies. The EU's legal maximum for issuance of such
approvals remains 180 days. A 6 percent turnover tax is charged on all
sales of pharmaceutical products. There is a price freeze on
reimbursable products and a required price reduction on drugs on the
market for 15 years.
Public procurement: In January 1996, the Belgian government
implemented a new law on government procurement to bring Belgian
legislation into conformity with EU directives. The revision has
incorporated some of the onerous provisions of EU legislation, while
improving certain aspects of government procurement at the various
governmental levels in Belgium. Belgian public procurement still
manifests instances of poor public notification and procedural
enforcement, requirements for offsets in military procurement and
nontransparency in all stages of the procurement process.
Broadcasting and motion pictures: Belgium voted against the EU
broadcasting directive (which requires a high percentage of European
programs ``where practical'') because its provisions were not, in the
country's view, strong enough to protect the fledgling film industry in
Flanders. The Flemish (Dutch-speaking) region and the Francophone
community of Belgium have local content broadcasting requirements for
private television stations operating in those areas. The EU has taken
the Walloon and Flemish communities to the European Court of Justice
concerning these requirements. TNT has experienced considerable
problems in arranging distribution of its signal on Belgian cable,
while NBC and Viacom, which have a majority interest in the British-
based TV 4 channel, face similar problems with broadcasting authorities
in Flanders.
6. Export Subsidies Policies
There are no direct export subsidies offered by the Belgian
government to industrial and commercial entities in the country, but
the government (both at the federal and the regional level) does
conduct an active program of trade promotion, including subsidies for
participation in foreign trade fairs and the compilation of market
research reports. All of these programs are offered to both domestic
and foreign-owned exporters. Also, the United States has raised with
the Belgian government and the EU Commission concerns over subsidies
via an exchange rate program to Belgian firms producing components for
Airbus.
7. Protection of U.S. Intellectual Property
Belgium is party to the major intellectual property agreements,
including the Paris, Berne and Universal Copyright Conventions, and the
Patent Cooperation Treaty. Nevertheless, according to industry sources,
an estimated 20 percent of Belgium's video cassette and compact disc
markets are composed of pirated products, causing a $200 million loss
to the producers. For software, the share of pirated copies has dropped
from 48 to 39 percent in one year, still representing a loss of $570
million to the industry.
Copyright: On June 30, 1994, the Belgian Senate gave its final
approval to the revised Belgian copyright law. National treatment
standards were introduced in the blank tape levy provisions of the new
law. Problems regarding first fixation and non-assignability were also
solved. The final law states that authors will receive national
treatment, and allows for sufficient maneuverability in neighboring
rights. However, if Belgian right holders benefit from less generous
protection in a foreign country, the principle of reciprocity applies
to the citizens of that country. This is the case for the U.S., which
does not grant protection of neighboring rights to Belgian artists and
performers, nor to Belgian producers of records and movies. As a
consequence, U.S. citizens in Belgium are subject to the same
restrictions.
Patents: A Belgian patent can be obtained for a maximum period of
twenty years and is issued only after the performance of a novelty
examination.
Trademarks: The Benelux Convention on Trademarks established a
joint process for the registration of trademarks for Belgium,
Luxembourg and the Netherlands. Product trademarks are available from
the Benelux Trademark Office in The Hague. This trademark protection is
valid for ten years, renewable for successive ten-year periods. The
Benelux Office of Designs and Models will grant registration of
industrial designs for 50 years of protection. International deposit of
industrial designs under the auspices of the World Intellectual
Property Organization (WIPO) is also available.
8. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association: Under the Belgian constitution,
workers have the right to associate freely. This includes freedom to
organize and join unions of their own choosing. The government does not
hamper such activities and Belgian workers in fact fully and freely
exercise their right of association. About 63 percent of Belgian
workers are members of labor unions. This number includes employed,
unemployed and workers on early pension. Unions are independent of the
government, but have important links with major political parties.
Unions have the right to strike and strikes by civil servants and
workers in ``essential'' services are tolerated. Teachers, nurses,
railway workers, air controllers, ground handling and Sabena personnel
have conducted strikes in recent years without government intimidation.
Despite government protests over wildcat strikes by air traffic
controllers, no strikers were prosecuted. Also, Belgian unions are free
to form or join federations or confederations and are free to affiliate
with international labor bodies.
b. The Right to organize and Bargain Collectively: The right to
organize and bargain collectively is recognized, protected and
exercised freely. Every other year, the Belgian business federation and
unions negotiate a nationwide collective bargaining agreement covering
2.4 million private-sector workers, which establishes the framework for
negotiations at plants and branches. Public sector workers also
negotiate collective bargaining agreements. Collective bargaining
agreements apply equally to union and non-union members, and over 90
percent of Belgian workers are covered by collective bargaining
agreements. Under legislation in force, wage increases are limited to a
nominal 5.9 percent for the 1999-2000 period. The law prohibits
discrimination against organizers and members of unions, and protects
against termination of contracts of members of workers' councils,
members of health and safety committees, and shop stewards. Effective
mechanisms such as the labor courts exist for adjudicating disputes
between labor and management. There are no export processing zones.
c. Prohibition of Forced and Compulsory Labor: Forced or compulsory
labor is illegal and does not occur. Domestic workers and all other
workers have the same rights as non-domestic workers. The government
enforces laws against those who seek to employ undocumented foreign
workers.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children: The minimum age for
employment of children is 15, but schooling is compulsory until the age
of 18. Youth between the ages of 15 and 18 may participate in part-time
work/part-time study programs and may work full-time during school
vacations. The labor courts effectively monitor compliance with
national laws and standards. There are no industries where any
significant child labor exists.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work: The current monthly national
minimum wage rate for workers over 21 is BF44,209 ($1,142); 18-year-
olds can be paid 82 percent of the minimum, 19-year-olds 88 percent and
20-year-olds 94 percent. The Ministry of Labor effectively enforces
laws regarding minimum wages, overtime and worker safety. By law, the
standard workweek cannot exceed 40 hours and must include at least one
24-hour rest period. Comprehensive provisions for worker safety are
mandated by law. Collective bargaining agreements can supplement these
laws.
f. Rights in Sectors with U.S. Investment: U.S. capital is invested
in many sectors in Belgium. Worker rights in these sectors do not
differ from those in other areas.
Extent of U.S. Investment in Selected Industries--U.S. Direct Investment Position Abroad on an Historical Cost
Basis--1998
[Millions of U.S. Dollars]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Category Amount
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Petroleum...................... .............. 156
Total Manufacturing............ .............. 8,969
Food & Kindred Products...... 1,012 ...............................................................
Chemicals & Allied Products.. 5,390 ...............................................................
Metals, Primary & Fabricated. 189 ...............................................................
Machinery, except Electrical. 472 ...............................................................
Electric & Electronic 361 ...............................................................
Equipment.
Transportation Equipment..... 538 ...............................................................
Other Manufacturing.......... 1,007 ...............................................................
Wholesale Trade................ .............. 2,716
Banking........................ .............. 321
Finance/Insurance/Real Estate.. .............. 5,262
Services....................... .............. 1,684
Other Industries............... .............. -188
TOTAL ALL INDUSTRIES........... .............. 18,920
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis
______
BULGARIA
Key Economic Indicators
[Billions of U.S. Dollars unless otherwise indicated]
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1997 1998 \1\1999
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Income, Production and Employment:
Nominal GDP............................. 10.2 12.3 12.2
Real GDP Growth (pct)................... -6.9 3.5 1.5
GDP by Sector:
Agriculture........................... 2.4 2.3 N/A
Manufacturing......................... 2.6 3.1 N/A
Services.............................. 4.1 5.5 N/A
Per Capita GDP (US$).................... 1,224 1,484 1,494
Labor Force (000's)..................... 3,735 3,573 3,570
Unemployment Rate (pct) \2\............. 14.0 12.2 14.7
Money and Prices (annual percentage
growth):
Money Supply Growth (M2)................ 362.1 10.1 N/A
Consumer Price Inflation................ 578.6 1.0 3.6
Exchange Rate (Leva/US$ annual average)
\3\
Official.............................. 1,682 1,760 1.8
Parallel.............................. 1,750 N/A N/A
Balance of Payments and Trade:
Total Exports FOB....................... 4.94 4.29 3.72
Exports to U.S. (US$ millions) \4\.... 172 219 N/A
Total Imports CIF....................... 4.93 5.0 4.74
Imports from U.S. (US$ millions) \4\.. 104 115 N/A
Trade Balance \5\....................... 0.01 -0.71 -1.02
Balance with U.S. (US$ millions) \4\.. 68 104 N/A
Current Account Balance/GDP (pct)....... 4.3 -3.1 -5.6
External Public Debt.................... 9.8 10.2 10.3
Debt Service Payments/GDP (pct)......... 8.8 9.7 6.6
Fiscal Deficit/GDP (pct)................ 3.0 (\1\) 1.6
Foreign Exchange Reserves and Gold...... 2.6 2.9 3.3
Aid from U.S. (US$ millions) \6\........ 34.1 45.0 70.4
Aid from All Other Sources.............. N/A N/A N/A
------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ 1999 figures are GOB estimates based on 6 to 9 months of data. GDP
as measured in U.S. dollars declined between 1998 and 1999 due to
changes in the exchange rate. Sectoral GDP data is unavailable, but
gross value added by sector is provided for 1997 and 1998.
\2\ Annual average.
\3\ In July 1999, the currency was redenominated replacing 1000 old leva
with one new lev.
\4\ For January to August 1999, exports (free along ship basis) to the
U.S. were $129 million; imports (customs basis) from the U.S. amounted
to $72 million. Source: U.S. Department of Commerce.
\5\ 1997 trade flows are recorded at the time of border crossing while
1998 and 1999 trade flows are recorded at the date of customs
clearance.
\6\ Both USAID and DOD provided assistance. For FY99, total DOD
assistance totaled $13.35 million ($9.2 million in FY98).
1. General Policy Framework
Since April 1997, Bulgaria has been led by a reform-minded
government, the Union of Democratic Forces (UDF). The UDF has enjoyed a
solid majority in Parliament, which has facilitated implementation of a
far-reaching program of economic reform. Following a severe economic
crisis in 1996 and early 1997, the Bulgarian government and the
International Monetary Fund (IMF) devised a stabilization program
centered on a currency board arrangement.
The program quickly succeeded in stabilizing the economy. The
triple digit inflation of 1996 and early 1997 gave way to a consumer
price increase of only 1 percent for all of 1998. Official reserves
rebounded from $400 million in January 1997 to $2.6 billion at the end
of 1998. Moody's Investors Service upgraded Bulgaria's credit rating to
B2. However, unemployment has stayed high, despite a growing private
sector. The government ran a budget surplus of 1 percent in 1998, but
the budget is projected to shift into deficit in 1999.
Following declines in GDP in both 1996 and 1997, the economy as a
whole grew by 3.5 percent in 1998. However, GDP growth began to slow
down in the second half of 1998, influenced by weak external markets
for traditional industrial exports and lags in restructuring state-
owned industry. With two-way trade in goods and services accounting for
over 90 percent of GDP, Bulgaria is very sensitive to changes in the
world economy and global prices. Over half of Bulgaria's trade is
directed toward Western and Central Europe. The Kosovo crisis has cost
Bulgaria about $90 million in direct economic losses, principally
through disruptions to transport on the Danube River and overland
through Yugoslavia.
Bulgaria's currency board arrangement (CBA) provides that the
Bulgarian National Bank (BNB) must hold sufficient foreign currency
reserves to cover all domestic currency (leva) in circulation,
including the leva reserves of the banking system. BNB can only
refinance commercial banks in the event of systemic risk to the banking
system.
Bulgaria's association agreement with the European Union (EU) took
effect January 1, 1994, and Bulgaria hopes to begin EU accession
negotiations in 2000. A bilateral investment treaty with the United
States took effect in July 1994.
2. Exchange Rate Policy
Bulgaria redenominated the currency on July 5, 1999, replacing 1000
old leva (BGL) with one new lev (BGN). Until January 1, 1999, the CBA
fixed the exchange rate at 1000 old leva to one German mark. Since
then, the lev has been pegged to the euro at the rate of 1,955.83 old
leva (now 1.95583 new leva) per euro. The Bulgarian National Bank (BNB)
sets an indicative daily U.S. dollar rate (based on the dollar/euro
exchange rate) for statistical and customs purposes, but commercial
banks and others licensed to trade on the interbank market are free to
set their own rates.
Only some of the commercial banks are licensed to conduct currency
operations abroad. Companies may freely buy foreign exchange for
imports from the interbank market. Companies are required to
repatriate, but no longer to surrender, earned foreign exchange to the
central bank. Bulgarian citizens and foreign persons may also open
foreign currency accounts with commercial banks. Foreign investors may
repatriate 100 percent of profits and other earnings; however, profits
and dividends derived from privatization transactions in which Brady
bonds were used for half the purchase price may not be repatriated for
four years. Capital gains transfers appear to be protected under the
revised Foreign Investment Law; free and prompt transfers of capital
gains are guaranteed in the Bilateral Investment Treaty. A permit is
required for hard currency payments to foreign persons for direct and
indirect investments and free transfers unconnected with import of
goods or services.
Bulgaria will liberalize its foreign currency laws effective
January 1, 2000. After that date, Bulgarian and foreign citizens may
take up to BGN 5,000 ($2,700) or an equivalent amount of foreign
currency out of the country without declaration. Regulations allow
foreign currency up to BGN 20,000 ($11,110) to be exported upon written
declaration. Transfers exceeding BGN 20,000 must have the prior
approval of the BNB.
3. Structural Policies
The government has implemented legal reforms designed to strengthen
the country's business climate. Bulgaria has adopted legislation on
foreign investment and secured lending, and is also making significant
strides in regulation of the banking sector and the securities market.
However, many businesspersons contend that unnecessary licensing,
administrative inefficiency and corruption continue to hinder private
business development.
In 1998, Bulgaria reached agreement with the IMF on a three-year
program of far-reaching structural reforms, particularly the
privatization of state-owned enterprises (SOEs). In June 1999, the
government satisfied its commitment to privatize or commence
liquidation of a group of 41 of the largest loss-making SOEs, including
the national airline. It also sold the Neftochim refinery to a Russian
oil company and is due to sell a majority stake in the
telecommunications monopoly, the Bulgarian Telecommunications Company,
to a Greek/Dutch consortium. As of September 1999, the GOB had sold
approximately 70 percent of state assets destined for privatization.
Bulgaria taxes value added, profits and income, and maintains
excise and customs duties. In 1999, the GOB reduced the Value Added Tax
by 2 percentage points to 20 percent and the profits tax for large
businesses by 3 percentage points to 27 percent. The draft 2000 budget,
approved by the Council of Ministers, envisions a further 2 percentage
point reduction in the profits tax for large businesses and voluntary
VAT registration for businesses with turnover from BGN 50,000 (USD
28,000) to BGN 75,000 (USD 42,000).
4. Debt Management Policies
Bulgaria's democratically-elected governments inherited an external
debt burden of over $10 billion from the Communist era. In 1994,
Bulgaria concluded agreements rescheduling official (``Paris Club'')
debt for 1993 and 1994, and $8.1 billion of its commercial (``London
Club'') debt. As of July 1999, gross external debt amounted to $9.6
billion, but the Bulgarian government projects that debt will increase
to $10.3 billion by the end of 1999 (84 percent of GDP). Debt service
in 1999 will total approximately 7 percent of GDP and 22 percent of
exports, but will rise after 2000.
Under the three-year Extended Fund Facility (EFF) concluded in
1998, the IMF is providing credits of about $864 million. As of
November 1999, about $360 million was released in five equal tranches
of $72 million. Another 7 tranches will be made available quarterly
through May 2001, subject to IMF reviews of Bulgarian adherence to the
program. The government has sought additional external financing from
the World Bank, the European Union, and other donors. The World Bank
disbursed a Financial and Enterprise Sector Adjustment Loan (FESAL) of
$100 million in 1998 and disbursed a second FESAL of similar value in
December with Bulgaria. In September 1999, the World Bank approved an
Agricultural Structural Adjustment Loan worth $75 million for Bulgaria.
5. Significant Barriers to U.S. Exports
Bulgaria acceded to the World Trade Organization in December 1996.
Bulgaria also acceded to the WTO Plurilateral Agreement on Civil
Aircraft and committed to sign the Agreement on Government Procurement.
Bulgaria ``graduated'' from Jackson-Vanik requirements and was accorded
unconditional MFN treatment by the United States in October 1996.
Bulgaria's association agreement with the European Union phases out
industrial tariffs between Bulgaria and the EU while U.S. exporters
still face duties. This has created a competitive disadvantage for some
U.S. exporters, such as soda ash exporters. The association agreement
improved reciprocal market access to certain farm products. In July
1998, Bulgaria joined the Central European Free Trade Area (CEFTA).
Over the following three years, tariffs on 80 percent of industrial
goods traded between CEFTA countries will be eliminated. A free trade
agreement with Turkey took effect in January 1999. A free trade
agreement with Macedonia will enter into force in January 2000.
In January 1999, average Bulgarian import tariffs were reduced
significantly and a five percent import surcharge was eliminated ahead
of schedule. However, tariffs in areas of concern to U.S. exporters--
including poultry legs and other agricultural goods and distilled
spirits--are still relatively high. Overall, tariffs on industrial
products range from about five to 40 percent and from about five to 70
percent for agricultural goods. In December 1998, Parliament revoked
exemption from value-added tax (VAT) and customs duties for capital
contributions in kind valued at over $100,000. In the past, some
investors have reported that high import tariffs on products needed for
the operation of their establishments in Bulgaria served as a
significant barrier to investment.
The U.S. Embassy has no complaints on record that the import
license regime has negatively affected U.S. exports. Licenses are
required for a specific, limited list of goods including radioactive
elements, rare and precious metals and stones, certain pharmaceutical
products and pesticides. Armaments and military-production technology
and components also require import licenses and can only be imported by
companies licensed by the government to trade in such goods. Trade in
dual-use items is also controlled.
Customs regulations and policies are sometimes reported to be
cumbersome, arbitrary and inconsistent. Problems cited by U.S.
companies include excessive documentation requirements, slow processing
of shipments and corruption. Bulgaria uses the single customs
administrative document used by European Community members. A one
percent customs clearance fee was abolished in January 1998.
The Committee on Standardization & Metrology is the competent
authority for testing and certification of all products except
pharmaceuticals, food and telecommunications equipment. The testing and
certification process requires at least one month. The Committee on
Standardization shares responsibilities for food products with the
Ministries of Agriculture and Health. The responsible authority for
pharmaceuticals is the National Institute for Pharmaceutical Products
in the Ministry of Health, which establishes standards and performs
testing and certification and is also responsible for drug
registration. Approval for any equipment interconnected to Bulgaria's
telecommunications network must be obtained from the State
Telecommunications Commission. The 1999 Law on Protection of Consumers
and Rules of Trade regulates labeling and marking requirements. Labels
must contain the following information in Bulgarian: quality, quantity,
ingredients, certification authorization number (if any), and manner of
storage, transport, use or maintenance.
All imports of goods of plant or animal origin are subject to
phytosanitary and veterinary control, and relevant certificates should
accompany such goods. Under a November 1999 ordinance governing
official Bulgarian veterinary treatment of imported animals, meat, and
animal products, Bulgaria will accept imported meat and poultry
products only from plants approved for export by competent authorities
in the country of origin.
As in other countries aspiring to membership in the European Union,
Bulgaria's 1998 Radio and Television Law requires a ``predominant
portion'' of certain programming to be drawn from European-produced
works and sets quotas for Bulgarian works within that portion. However,
this requirement will only be applied to the extent ``practicable.''
Foreign broadcasters transmitting into Bulgaria must have a local
representative, and broadcasters are prohibited from entering into
barter agreements with television program suppliers.
Foreign persons cannot own land in Bulgaria because of a
constitutional prohibition, but foreign-owned companies registered in
Bulgaria are considered to be Bulgarian persons. Foreign persons may
acquire ownership of buildings and limited property rights, and may
lease land. Local companies where foreign partners have controlling
interests must obtain prior approval (licenses) to engage in certain
activities: production and export of arms/ammunition; banking and
insurance; exploration, development and exploitation of natural
resources; and acquisition of property in certain geographic areas.
There are no specific local content or export-performance
requirements nor specific restrictions on hiring of expatriate
personnel, but residence permits are often difficult to obtain. In its
Bilateral Investment Treaty with the United States, Bulgaria committed
itself to international arbitration in the event of expropriation,
investment, or compensation disputes.
Foreign investors complain that tax evasion by private domestic
firms combined with the failure of the authorities to enforce
collection from large, often financially-precarious, state-owned
enterprises places the foreign investor at a real disadvantage.
In June 1999, Parliament adopted a new law on procurement replacing
the 1997 Law on Assignment of Government and Municipal Contracts. This
legislation defines terms and conditions for public orders and aims for
increased transparency and efficiency in public procurement. However,
bidders still complain that tendering processes are frequently unclear
and/or subject to irregularities, fueling speculation on corruption in
government tenders. U.S. investors have also found that in general
neither remaining state enterprises nor private firms are accustomed to
competitive bidding procedures to supply goods and services to these
investors within Bulgaria. However, tenders organized under projects
financed by international donors have tended to be open and
transparent.
6. Export Subsidies Policies
The government currently applies no export subsidies. However, a
1995 law gave the State Fund for Agriculture the authority to stimulate
the export of agricultural and food products through export subsidies
or guarantees.
7. Protection of U.S. Intellectual Property
Bulgarian intellectual property rights (IPR) legislation is
generally adequate, with modern patent and copyright laws and criminal
penalties for copyright infringement. In September 1999, Parliament
passed a series of laws on trademarks and geographical indications,
industrial designs and integrated circuits. A Law for the Protection of
New Types of Plants and Animal Breeds was adopted in September 1996.
Parliament is expected to approve additional legislation in the near
future extending copyright protection to 70 years, and introducing a
new neighboring right for film producers, provisional measures to
preserve evidence of IPR infringement and special border measures. The
Bulgarian government has also proposed amendments strengthening
protection for pharmaceutical tests. U.S. companies have cited illegal
use of trademarks as a barrier to the Bulgarian market.
Until recently, Bulgaria was the largest source of compact-disk and
CD-ROM piracy in Europe and was one of the world's leading exporters of
pirated goods. For this reason, Bulgaria was placed on the U.S. Trade
Representative's ``Special 301'' Priority Watch List in January 1998.
In 1998, enforcement improved considerably with the introduction of a
CD-production licensing system subject to 24-hour plant surveillance.
CD manufacturers must also submit a copy of an agreement with the
copyright holder before starting production. In recognition of the
significant progress made by the Bulgarian government in this area, the
U.S. Trade Representative removed Bulgaria from all Watch Lists in
April 1999.
Bulgaria is a member of the World Intellectual Property
Organization (WIPO) and a signatory to the following agreements: the
Paris Convention for the Protection of Intellectual Property; the Rome
Convention for the Protection of Performers, Producers of Phonograms
and Broadcast Organizations; the Geneva Phonograms Convention; the
Madrid Agreement for the Repression of False or Deceptive Indications
of Source of Goods; the Madrid Agreement on the International
Classification and Registration of Trademarks; the Patent Cooperation
Treaty; the Universal Copyright Convention; the Berne Convention for
the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works; the Lisbon Agreement for
the Protection of Appellations of Origin and their International
Registration; the Budapest Treaty on the International Recognition of
the Deposit of Microorganisms for the Purpose of Patent Protection; the
Nairobi Treaty on the Protection of the Olympic Symbol; and the
International Convention for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants.
On acceding to the WTO, Bulgaria agreed to implement the Agreement on
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) without a
transitional period.
8. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association: The 1991 Constitution provides for the
right of all workers to form or join trade unions of their choice. This
right has apparently been freely exercised. Estimates of the unionized
share of the work force range from 30 to 50 percent. There are two
large trade union confederations, the Confederation of Independent
Trade Unions of Bulgaria and Podkrepa, which between them represent the
overwhelming majority of unionized workers. The 1992 Labor Code
recognizes the right to strike when other means of conflict resolution
have been exhausted, but ``political strikes'' are forbidden. Workers
in essential services (primarily military and police) are also subject
to a blanket prohibition from striking. However, Podkrepa has
complained that a 1998 law denying workers the right to appeal
government decisions on the legality of strikes is unconstitutional and
violates an ILO convention. The Labor Code's prohibitions against
antiunion discrimination include a 6-month period of protection against
dismissal as a form of retribution. There are no restrictions on
affiliation or contact with international labor organizations, and
unions actively exercise this right.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively: The Labor Code
institutes collective bargaining on the national and local levels. The
legal prohibition against striking by key public sector employees
weakens their bargaining position; however, these groups have been able
to influence negotiations by staging protests and engaging in other
pressure activities without going on strike. Labor unions have
complained that while the legal structure for collective bargaining was
adequate, many employers failed to bargain in good faith or to adhere
to concluded agreements. Labor observers viewed the government's
enforcement of labor contracts as inadequate. The backlog of cases in
the legal system delayed redress of workers' grievances. The same
obligation of collective bargaining and adherence to labor standards
prevails in the export processing zones.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor: The constitution
prohibits forced or compulsory labor. Many observers argue that the
practice of shunting minority and conscientious-objector military
draftees into construction battalions that often carry out commercial
construction and maintenance projects is a form of compulsory labor.
Bulgaria has announced plans to phase out its military construction
battalions under its ongoing Plan 2004 reform and reorganization, but
it is unclear when this will take place. In the meantime, Bulgaria
recently established a conscientious objector program that provides for
alternative civilian national service.
d. Minimum Age of Employment of Children: The Labor Code sets the
minimum age for employment at 16, and 18 for dangerous work. The
Ministry of Labor and Social Welfare (MLSW) is responsible for
enforcing these provisions. Child labor laws are enforced well in the
formal sector, but some observers believe that children are
increasingly exploited in certain industries and by organized crime.
Observers estimate that between 50,000 and 100,000 children under 16
are illegally employed in Bulgaria. Underage employment in the informal
and agricultural sectors is believed to be increasing as collective
farms are broken up and the private sector continues to grow.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work: The national monthly minimum wage
equates to approximately US$40. Delayed payment of wages continues to
be a problem with certain employers in Bulgaria. The constitution
stipulates the right to social security and welfare aid assistance for
the temporarily unemployed, although in practice such assistance is
often late. The Labor Code provides for a standard workweek of 40 hours
with at least one 24-hour rest period per week. The MLSW is responsible
for enforcing both the minimum wage and the standard workweek.
Enforcement has been generally effective in the state sector (although
there are reports that state-run enterprises fall into arrears on
salary payments to their employees if the firms incur losses), but is
weaker in the emerging private sector. The MLSW is responsible for
enforcing the national labor safety program, with standards established
by the Labor Code. The constitution states that employees are entitled
to healthy and non-hazardous working conditions. Under the Labor Code,
employees have the right to remove themselves from work situations that
present a serious or immediate danger to life or health without
jeopardizing their continued employment. In practice, refusal to work
in such situations would result in loss of employment for many workers.
A 1999 law mandated that employers establish joint employer/labor
committees to monitor health and safety issues.
f. Rights in Sectors with U.S. Investment: Conditions do not
significantly differ in the few sectors with a U.S. presence.
Extent of U.S. Investment in Selected Industries--U.S. Direct Investment Position Abroad on an Historical Cost
Basis--1998
[Millions of U.S. Dollars]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Category Amount
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Petroleum...................... .............. 1
Total Manufacturing............ .............. 20
Food & Kindred Products...... (\1\) ...............................................................
Chemicals & Allied Products.. 0 ...............................................................
Primary & Fabricated Metals.. (\1\) ...............................................................
Industrial Machinery and 0 ...............................................................
Equipment.
Electric & Electronic 0 ...............................................................
Equipment.
Transportation Equipment..... 0 ...............................................................
Other Manufacturing.......... 0 ...............................................................
Wholesale Trade................ .............. 0
Banking........................ .............. 0
Finance/Insurance/Real Estate.. .............. 0
Services....................... .............. 0
Other Industries............... .............. 0
TOTAL ALL INDUSTRIES........... .............. 21
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Suppressed to avoid disclosing data of individual companies.
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis
______
CZECH REPUBLIC
Key Economic Indicators
[Millions of U.S. Dollars unless otherwise indicated]
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1997 1998 \1\1999
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Income, Production and Employment:
Nominal GDP (US$ billion) \2\........... 53.0 56.4 54.0
Real GDP Growth (pct)................... 0.3 -2.3 -0.5
GDP by Sector (pct): \2\
Agriculture........................... 4.6 5.1 5.3
Manufacturing......................... 26.6 31.4 31.2
Services.............................. 51.4 51.9 52.1
Government \3\........................ 31.8 31.2 31.9
Per Capita GDP (US$) \2\................ 5,144 5,483 5,196
Labor Force (000's)..................... 5,000 5,170 5,203
Unemployment (pct)...................... 5.2 7.5 10.0
Money and Prices (annual percentage
growth):
Money Supply Growth (M2)................ 10.1 5.2 7.8
Consumer Price Inflation................ 8.5 10.7 2.2
Exchange Rate (CKR/US$)
Official.............................. 31.71 32.27 34.40
Balance of Payments and Trade: \4\
Total Exports FOB (USD bill)............ 22.8 26.3 27.4
Exports to U.S........................ 586 441 650
Total imports CIF (USD bill)............ 27.2 28.8 29.2
Imports from U.S...................... 1,029 786 1,180
Trade Balance (USD bill)................ -4.4 -2.5 -1.8
Balance with U.S...................... -442 -345 -530
Current Account Deficit/GDP (pct)....... -6.1 -1.9 -1.5
External Debt \5\....................... 1.6 24.3 24.3
Debt Service Payments/GDP (pct)......... 10.0 10.0 7.5
Fiscal Deficit (Central)/GDP (pct)...... 0.9 1.6 2.1
Gold and Foreign Exchange Reserves...... 15.0 15.9 13.2
Aid from U.S. \6\....................... 6.0 N/A N/A
Aid from All Other Sources.............. N/A N/A N/A
------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Unless stated otherwise, 1999 figures are based on the latest
estimates of the Czech Statistical Office (CSO) dated October 4, 1999,
of the Ministry of Finance and/or unofficial estimates from the Czech
National Bank.
\2\ GDP at factor cost, percentage changes calculated in local currency.
\3\ Central government spending as pct of GDP.
\4\ Czech imports do not include re-exports of U.S. goods through other
countries.
\5\ In absolute numbers, the figure for external debt does not change,
the growth reflects shifts in DEM vs. US$ exchange rates.
\6\ U.S. assistance was phased out by September 30, 1997.
1. General Policy Framework
The Czech Republic is a small and generally open economy. Having
largely created a free and competitive market, it is currently
struggling with problems stemming from unfinished structural reforms
mainly in the field of bank privatization, industrial restructuring,
legal reform and improvements of financial markets transparency.
Unfinished structural reforms lie at the heart of the Czech Republic's
current severe recession, which led to an economic contraction of 2.3
percent in 1998.
Till 1998, the Czech Republic pursued balanced budgets, incurring
only small deficits on the way. Budget deficits incurred have
traditionally been financed through the issuance of government bonds.
Economic recession, failure to collect taxes satisfactorily and the
Social Democratic government's pledge to support a wide range of social
welfare and investment programs led to the 1999 planned budget deficit
of approximately 1.6 percent of then estimated GDP. The government now
anticipates the final deficit will be larger and the 2000 budget,
currently under discussion, will also be in deficit.
In 1998 the Czech government approved a package of incentives to
attract investments. The incentives are offered to foreign and domestic
firms that make a $10 million manufacturing investment through a newly
registered company. The package includes tax breaks of up to 10 years
offered in two five-year periods; duty-free imports of high-tech
equipment and a 90-day deferral of value-added tax payments (VAT);
potential for creation of special customs zones; job creation benefits;
training grants; opportunities to obtain low-cost land; and the
possibility of additional incentives for secondary investments and
production expansion.
Czech National Bank is by law responsible for monetary policy. The
primary instrument used by the bank to influence monetary policy is the
two-week repo rate. Following sharp and growing current account
imbalances in the spring of 1997, the central bank implemented a series
of austerity measures designed to dampen inflation and reduce external
imbalances. Monetary policy during most of 1998 remained restrictive,
with maintenance of relatively high interest rates designed to reduce
inflation and dampen domestic demand and high compulsory bank reserves
to lower the amount of money in the economy. In 1999, with the current
account well on the way to recovery and the relatively still strong
exchange rate of the crown, the central bank, ahead of its inflation
target for a second year in row, cut interest rates several times.
The Czech Republic enjoyed a strong inflow of foreign direct
investment ($1.3 billion) and portfolio investments ($3.9 billion) to
June 30, 1999. Though much needed for the economy and recognized as
such by the government, the central bank has expressed concern that the
strong inflows are pushing up the exchange rate and hurting overall
economic competitiveness. They are currently exploring measures to
neutralize the impact of these flows.
2. Exchange Rate Policy
The Czech crown is fully convertible for most business
transactions. The Foreign Exchange Act provides a legislative framework
for full current account convertibility, including all trade
transactions and most investment transactions, pending government
action on implementing regulations. As of January 1999 all capital
account restrictions were removed except for the ability of Czechs to
open bank accounts abroad without a permit by the central bank, and the
purchase of real estate in the Czech Republic by foreigners. The permit
requirement will lapse in 2000, and foreign company branches will be
able to acquire real estate as of 2002, in accordance with the Czech
Republic's commitments in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD).
The Czech crown, floating freely since the spring of 1997, has
remained relatively steady, withstanding 1998's Russian financial
turmoil. Having appreciated in value due to high interest rate
differentials between the Czech Republic and its major trading
partners, it has remained strong even after the central bank reduced
the interest rates significantly in 1998 and 1999, as currency traders
bet on EU convergence.
3. Structural Policies
The government sees full membership in the European Union (EU) as
one of its highest foreign policy priorities. Relations between the
Czech Republic and the EU are currently governed by an EU association
agreement signed in 1991. The start of detailed accession negotiations
began in November 1998. Most observers do not anticipate that full EU
membership will be achieved prior to 2003. As part of the EU accession
process, many of the Czech Republic's regulatory policies and practices
are slowly evolving toward EU norms. Through membership in OECD, the
Czech Republic agreed to meet, with relatively few exceptions, OECD
standards for equal treatment of foreign and domestic investors and
restrictions on special investment incentives. The United States has
succeeded in using the OECD membership process to encourage the Czech
Republic to make several improvements to the business climate for U.S.
firms.
Czech tax codes are generally in line with European Union tax
policies. In 1998, the government reduced taxes on corporate profits to
35 percent from 38 percent. The tax rate for the highest tax bracket
for personal income tax stands at 40 percent. Employer and employees
social insurance contributions are respectively 35 percent and 12.5
percent. The government permits tax write-offs of bad debts, although
with less generous treatment of pre-1995 debts. Firms are allowed to
write-off the first year's share of a bad debt without filing suit
against the debtor, though subsequent write-offs must document
unsuccessful efforts to collect past due amounts. U.S. firms have
complained that Czech tax legislation effectively penalizes use of
holding company structures by leveling both corporate tax and dividends
withholding tax on profit flows between group companies, thus creating
double taxation on such profits. Czech law does not permit intra-group
use of losses (i.e., offsetting losses in one group entity against
profits in another), and imposes corporate tax on dividends received
from foreign holding without allowing use of a foreign tax credit for
the underlying tax suffered in the subsidiary's home jurisdiction.
Stricter bankruptcy provisions, an important part of the
government's structural reforms came into effect in April 1998, but the
focus is still on liquidation rather than reorganization. Most
observers believe the slow and uneven courts, and close links between
banks and firms, limit the effectiveness of the measure. Members of
Parliament and others have called for a bankruptcy law closer to the
U.S. Chapter Eleven provision to encourage resuscitation of troubled
firms. There is a three to four year backlog in the bankruptcy courts
and a small secondary market for the liquidation of seized assets.
Recognizing that the lack of economic restructuring caused by
inadequate bankruptcy laws hampers potential economic growth, the
government is preparing another large amendment of the bankruptcy law
for 2000.
4. Debt Management Policies
The Czech Republic maintains a moderate foreign debt and has
received investment grade ratings from the major international credit
agencies. In 1998 gross foreign debt measured $24.3 billion and is not
expected to change much in 1999. To June 30, 1999 gross foreign debt
measured $22.4 billion, most of the amount being the debt of companies
($11.3 billion) and commercial banks ($9.8 billion). Debt service as a
percentage of GDP and debt service to exports stand at 7.5 percent and
13.5 percent, respectively. The Czech Republic repaid its entire debt
with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) ahead of schedule. Under the
Paris Club, the Czech Republic, as member of OECD, rescheduled its
official credits to Russia.
5. Aid
The Czech Republic graduated from U.S. AID assistance on September
30, 1997. In 1998, however, U.S. AID offered the country its program of
Partners for Financial Stability and in 1999 two projects were
launched. The Czech Republic continues to receive assistance from the
European Union's PHARE program and individual EU member states to
assist its transformation during the accession period for EU
membership. According to the European Commission Delegation in Prague,
since 1990 the Czech Republic has received 580 million ECU in PHARE
assistance.
6. Significant Barriers to U.S. Exports
The Czech Republic is committed to a free market and maintains a
generally open economy with few barriers to trade and investment. It is
a member of the World Trade Organization (WTO), and has adopted a WTO
tariff code with a trade-weighted average tariff of 4.8 percent. This
is being reduced gradually to 3.5 percent in accordance with Czech
commitments in the Uruguay Round of trade negotiations. The Czech
Republic is not a signatory to the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade (GATT) civil aircraft code, but is a member of the WTO's
Information Technology Agreement.
The Czech Republic's EU association agreement established
preferential tariffs for non-agricultural, EU-origin products to the
Czech markets, while maintaining higher most-favored-nation rates for
U.S. and other non-EU products. The preferential tariffs for EU goods
are declining on an annual basis and by 2001 most EU industrial
products will enjoy duty-free status. Since 1992, when the trade-
related provisions of the EU association agreement first came into
force, a number of U.S. companies within many industry sectors have
complained that tariff preferences given the EU under the agreement
have diminished their business prospects and ability to compete against
EU-origin products.
Trade in agricultural/food products is generally free of major
trade barriers although technical barriers continue to hamper imports
of certain products. In anticipation of EU membership, the Czech
Republic is rewriting much of its legislation related to standards and
trade in agricultural/food products. During this transition phase, it
is not always clear which rules apply, a situation which has led to
some delays in approval. The harmonization of standards with the EU
should ease the paperwork burden for those exporters already exporting
to the EU. However, the alignment of Czech food legislation with the EU
also means that certain products currently prohibited in the EU will
also be prohibited in the Czech Republic in the future.
The government is in the process of drafting legislation in line
with EU directives to regulate Genetically Modified Organisms (GMOs). A
final bill is expected in 2000. The Czech Republic continues to approve
new GMO varieties for field testing.
U.S. exporters of beef, poultry, pork and horse meat are not yet
able to ship to the Czech Republic due to problems with export
certification. USDA's Food Safety Inspection Service (FSIS) is
currently reviewing certification documents proposed by the Czech State
veterinary Administration.
American business people often cite a convoluted, or in some cases
corrupt, bureaucratic system, both at national and local levels, which
can act as an impediment to market access. Often considerable time is
spent by a potential investor to finalize a deal, or enforce the terms
of a contract. European companies have sought on occasion to use the
Czech Republic's interest in EU membership to gain advantage in
commercial competition.
The government is required by law to hold tenders for major
procurement. The law, introduced in 1994, proved unsatisfactory.
Several revisions aimed at making the law simpler and transparent
failed. Recognizing that no amendment will help, the Czech Republic is
currently working on a brand new procurement law to enter force in
2001. Fully harmonized with EU legislation, it will remove also the
current ten percent price advantage for domestic firms. The Czech
Republic is not a member of the WTO Government Procurement Agreement.
The Czech Ministry of Industry and Trade issues import licenses to
those seeking to import selected goods into the Czech Republic. While
most products and services are exempt from licensing, oil, natural gas,
pyrotechnical products, sporting guns and ammunition require an import
license.
Legally, foreign and domestic investors are treated identically and
both are subject to the same tax codes and other laws. The government
does not screen foreign investment projects other than for a few
sensitive industries, e.g., in the defense sector. The government
evaluates all investment offers for the few state enterprises still
undergoing privatization. As part of OECD membership, the Czech
Republic committed not to discriminate against foreign investors in
privatization sales, with only a few excepted sectors. The government
has overcome political resistance to foreign investment in certain
sensitive sectors, such as petrochemical, telecommunications and
breweries. The ban on foreign ownership of real estate remains another
important exception, although foreign-owned Czech firms may purchase
real estate freely.
U.S. investors interested in starting joint ventures with or
acquiring Czech firms have experienced problems with unclear ownership
and lack of information on company finances. Investors have complained
about the difficulty of protecting their rights through legal means
such as a secured interest. In particular, investors have been
frustrated by the lack of effective recourse to the court system. The
slow pace of court procedures is often compounded by judges' limited
understanding of complex commercial cases. Also the Czech Republic
imposes a Czech language requirement for trade licenses for most forms
of business. This requirement can be fulfilled by a Czech partner, but
this can be burdensome and involves additional risks.
The opaque nature of the stock market puts U.S. investors and
financial services providers at a competitive disadvantage. While stock
market reforms were enacted in 1996 to help protect small shareholders
and increase transparency of transactions, enforcement has been uneven.
A Czech Securities Commission opened in 1998 with a mission of
improving the regulatory framework of the capital market, increasing
capital market transparency, and restoring investor confidence. To the
date, the Commission issued some 2,300 authorized rulings, and in the
re-licensing process revoked 663 licenses. It has, however, been
hampered by budgetary constraints and a lack of rule-making authority.
U.S. firms also complain about the lack of consistency in the
application of customs norms. These problems are primarily due to the
newness of recent regulatory changes and rapid expansion of customs
personnel. Training efforts are underway to correct the situation and
address these concerns.
7. Export Subsidies Policy
The Czech Export Bank provides export guarantees and credits to
Czech exporters. The bank follows OECD consensus on export credits.
Additionally, the government maintains a fund through which it
purchases domestic agricultural surpluses for resale on international
markets. For some commodities, pricing is established at a level that
includes a subsidy to local producers.
8. Protection of U.S. Intellectual Property
The Czech Republic is a member of the Berne and Universal Copyright
Conventions and the Paris Convention on Industrial Property. Czech laws
for the protection of intellectual property rights (IPR) are generally
good, but enforcement has lagged. Existing legislation guarantees
protection of all forms of property rights, including patents,
copyrights, trademarks and semiconductor chip layout design. The Czechs
continue to harmonize with the Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights (TRIPS) agreement and parliamentary approval is
expected on an amendment providing 70 years of copyright protection for
literary works, up from the present 50 years. It is likely that the
Czech Republic will not meet the January 2000 deadline to implement all
of its TRIPs-related obligations, but legislation is pending in
Parliament which should address most or all of its commitments in this
area.
As a result of enforcement weaknesses and delays in indictments and
prosecutions, the U.S. Government placed the Czech Republic on the
Watch List during the 1999 ``Special 301'' cycle. The Embassy continues
to work with U.S. industry and Czech government officials to improve
enforcement of IPR norms. There are also two legislative amendments,
which will expand tools of enforcement of IPR. One, approved to enter
force as of December 1, 1999, boosts the powers of the customs service
to seize counterfeit goods, and the other, albeit still in drafting
stages, would allow the Czech Commercial Inspection (CCI) to act
directly in IPR cases. At present, the CCI can only act in conjunction
with the police.
9. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association: The law provides workers with the
right to form and join unions of their own choice without prior
authorization, and the government respects this right in practice. Most
workers are members of unions affiliated with the Czech-Moravian
Chamber of Trade Unions (CMKOS), a democratically oriented, republic-
wide umbrella organization for branch unions. The unions are not
affiliated with political parties and exercise independence. Workers
have the right to strike, except for those whose role in public order
or public safety is deemed crucial. By law, strikes may take place only
after mediation efforts fail. Unions are free to form or join
federations and confederations and affiliate with and participate in
international bodies. Union membership is on the decline.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively: The law provides
for collective bargaining, which is generally carried out by unions and
employers on a company basis. The scope for collective bargaining is
more limited in the government sector, where wages depend on the
budget.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor: The law prohibits
forced or compulsory labor, including that performed by children, and
it is not practiced.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children: The Labor Code
stipulates a minimum working age of 15 years, although children who
have completed courses at special schools (schools for the mentally
disabled and socially maladjusted) may work at age 14. These
prohibitions are enforced in practice.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work: The government sets minimum wage
standards. The minimum wage is 3,600 Czech Crowns per month
(approximately $100), although the monthly average is 12,766 Czech
Crowns (approximately $365) per month. Average net wages are 2.1 times
as high as official sustenance costs. The minimum wage provides a
sparse standard of living for an individual worker or family, although
allowances are available to families with children. The law mandates a
standard workweek of 42 1/2 hours. It also requires paid rest of at
least 30 minutes during the standard 8 to 8 1/2-hour workday, as well
as annual leave from three or four weeks up to eight weeks depending on
the profession. Overtime ordered by the employer may not exceed 150
hours per year or 8 hours per week as a standard practice. Industrial
accident rates are not unusually high. Workers have the right to refuse
work endangering their life or health without risk of loss of
employment.
f. Rights in Sectors with U.S. Investment: All of the above
observations on worker rights apply to firms with foreign investment.
Rights in these sectors do not differ from those in other sectors of
the economy. Conditions in sectors with U.S. investment do not differ
from those outlined above.
Extent of U.S. Investment in Selected Industries--U.S. Direct Investment Position Abroad on an Historical Cost
Basis--1998
[Millions of U.S. Dollars]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Category Amount
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Petroleum...................... .............. (\1\)
Total Manufacturing............ .............. 170
Food & Kindred Products...... 10 ...............................................................
Chemicals & Allied Products.. 58 ...............................................................
Primary & Fabricated Metals.. 6 ...............................................................
Industrial Machinery and 30 ...............................................................
Equipment.
Electric & Electronic -31 ...............................................................
Equipment.
Transportation Equipment..... 23 ...............................................................
Other Manufacturing.......... 74 ...............................................................
Wholesale Trade................ .............. 68
Banking........................ .............. (\1\)
Finance/Insurance/Real Estate.. .............. 60
Services....................... .............. 30
Other Industries............... .............. 38
TOTAL ALL INDUSTRIES........... .............. 543
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Suppressed to avoid disclosing data of individual companies.
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis.
______
DENMARK
Key Economic Indicators
[Millions of U.S. Dollars unless otherwise indicated)]
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1997 1998 \1\ 1999
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Income, Production and Employment:
Nominal GDP \2\...................... 145,280 148,400 148,800
Real GDP Growth (pct) \2\ \3\........ 3.1 2.7 1.3
GDP by Sector: \2\
Agriculture........................ 4,871 4,146 4,300
Manufacturing...................... 25,174 26,028 25,500
Services........................... 66,899 69,808 69,500
Government......................... 33,434 34,385 34,700
Per Capita GDP (US$) \2\............. 27,493 27,995 28,000
Labor Force (000's).................. 2,849 2,867 2,864
Unemployment Rate (pct).............. 7.7 6.4 5.6
Money and Prices (annual percentage
growth):
Money Supply Growth (pct)............ 5.2 3.0 5.0
Consumer Price Inflation (pct)....... 2.2 1.8 2.5
Exchange Rate (DKK/US$ annual
average)
Official........................... 6.61 6.70 7.00
Balance of Payments and Trade:
Total Exports FOB \4\................ 48,590 48,179 47,000
Exports to U.S. \4\................ 2,260 2,283 2,400
Total Imports CIF \4\................ 44,405 46,092 44,000
Imports from U.S. \4\.............. 2,134 2,185 2,000
Trade Balance \4\.................... 4,185 2,087 3,000
Balance with U.S. \4\.............. 126 98 400
External Public Debt................. 40,544 42,000 40,000
Fiscal Deficit/GDP (pct) \5\......... -0.1 -0.9 -2.9
Current Account Surplus/GDP (pct) \5\ 0.5 -1.4 0.0
Debt Service Payments/GDP (pct) \5\.. 2.0 2.1 1.9
Gold and Foreign Exchange Reserves... 19,620 15,139 24,000
Aid From U.S......................... N/A N/A N/A
Aid From Other Sources............... N/A N/A N/A
------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ 1999 figures are all estimates based on available data as of
November.
\2\ GDP measured as ``Gross Value Added by Industry.''
\3\ Percentage changes calculated in local currency.
\4\ Merchandise trade (excluding European Union agricultural export
subsidies).
\5\ Gross Domestic Product.
1. General Policy Framework
Denmark is a small, highly industrialized ``value-added'' country
with a long tradition of extensive foreign trade, free capital
movement, and political stability. It also has an efficient and well-
educated labor force, and a modern infrastructure effectively linking
Denmark with the rest of Europe. Denmark's natural resources are
concentrated in oil and gas fields in the North Sea which have,
together with renewable energy, made Denmark a net exporter of energy.
The Danish economy remains strong, with a public budget surplus
and, in the first half of 1999, a small surplus on the balance of
payments. However, its extensive foreign trade makes the economy
vulnerable to foreign ``shocks,'' including the 1998 Asian and Russian
financial crises which particularly impacted on Danish agricultural
exports. As a result, the Danish current account turned negative in
1998. As economic growth declined in 1999 with a consequent reduction
in imports, the balance of payments again shifted to a small surplus.
The government pursues a carefully monitored economic policy including
a fiscal policy of small public expenditure increases and a tight
monetary and exchange rate policy.
Developments during the first half of 1999 in some key economic
indicators--reduced private consumption and the surplus, albeit small,
on the current account--suggest that the Government's austerity
measures introduced in the summer of 1998 are now working. The 1998
measures, particularly aimed at curbing private consumption and
restoring a balance of payments surplus, include reduction of tax
credits for debt interest payments in order to discourage new loan
taking. The measures, over the longer run, also aim at increasing the
incentive to work for low income earners by reducing taxation in the
middle bracket of the progressive income tax system. The Government
projects that the surplus in the public budget in 1999 will increase to
almost three percent of GDP, mostly as a result of increased revenues
and reduced expenditures due to increased employment and reduced
unemployment. Focus is now on the inflation rate which, although stable
at about 2.5 percent, has shifted from being one of the lowest in the
European Union (EU) to one of the highest rates. Furthermore, it is
entirely fueled domestically with wage inflation running above four
percent.
Denmark welcomes foreign investment, and is home to roughly 250
subsidiaries of U.S. companies. Denmark also welcomes foreign firms
focused on doing business in the former East Bloc countries. In that
respect, Denmark has a number of preferential joint venture investment
and investment guarantee programs and also makes available Danish and
EU grants for improving the environment in those countries. The
American Chamber of Commerce in Denmark was established in 1999 and a
number of leading Danish and American firms are members of the Danish-
American Business Forum, which aims at promoting direct investment and
exchanges of know-how.
Denmark has opted out of the European Monetary Union's (EMU) third
phase (establishment of a joint EU currency and relinquishment of
jurisdiction over monetary policy), although Denmark's economic
performance is well within the established convergence criteria for EMU
membership.
2. Exchange Rate Policy
Denmark is a member of the European Monetary System (EMS) and its
Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM). Since the early 1980s until 1999, the
government linked the krone closely to the German mark through the ERM
and since January 1, 1999 (through the ERM2) to the common EU currency,
the Euro. In September 1999, the trade-weighted value of the krone was
3.5 percent lower than in September 1998, due mostly to the krone's
depreciation against the yen and the dollar. Since September 1998, the
krone has depreciated some eight percent against the dollar (from DKK
6.49 to DKK 7.08 to $1.00). The increase in the dollar rate is likely
one of several factors behind the 9.5 percent drop in U.S. exports to
Denmark (as measured by the Danish Bureau of Statistics) in the first
eight months of 1999.
3. Structural Policies
Danish price policies are based on market forces. Entities with the
ability to fix prices because of their market dominance are regulated
by the Government's Competition Agency. Denmark during 1997 changed its
competition legislation from the former ``control'' principle to the
internationally recognized ``prohibition'' principle.
The highest marginal individual income tax rate, including the
gross labor market contribution ``tax,'' is about 65 percent, and
applies to all taxpayers with earnings exceeding some $37,200 (1999).
Foreign executives and researchers working in Denmark on a contract may
for a period of up to five years benefit from more lenient income
taxation (a flat 33 percent tax on gross income). Danish employers are
almost alone in the EU in paying virtually no non-wage compensation.
Most sick leave and unemployment insurance costs are paid by the
government. Employees pay their contribution to unemployment insurance
out of their wages, while a major part of unemployment benefits is
financed from general revenues.
The Danish Value Added Tax (VAT), at 25 percent, is the highest in
the EU. As VAT revenues constitute more than one-quarter of total
central government revenues, a reduction would have severe budgetary
consequences. The government therefore has no plans to reduce the VAT,
and hopes that EU VAT rate harmonization will raise the VAT rates of
other EU countries. Environmental taxes are increasingly being imposed
on industry (with some roll-back for anti-pollution efforts) and on
consumers. The corporate tax rate is 32 percent. Favorable depreciation
rules and other deductions exist.
4. Debt Management Policies
Denmark ran a balance of payments surplus from 1990 through 1997.
Consequently, foreign debt gradually fell from over 40 percent of GDP
in 1990 to 25 percent in 1997. With a deficit of about $2 billion on
the balance of payments in 1998 and a similar amount in appreciation of
the value of krone-denominated bonds held abroad, the foreign debt's
share of GDP increased to 26 percent in 1998. Net interest payments on
the foreign debt in 1998 cost Denmark some six percent of its export
earnings. Standard and Poor's and Moody's Investors Service rate
Denmark AA+ and Aa1, respectively.
Denmark's public sector is a net external debtor, while the private
sector is largely in balance. At the end of 1998, the public sector
foreign debt, including foreign exchange reserves and krone-denominated
bonds held by foreigners, totaled some $42 billion and the private
sector foreign debt totaled about $4 billion.
During 1998, central government debt denominated in foreign
currencies dropped about 15 percent to $13 billion. Of the total debt,
77 percent was denominated in German marks, 10 percent in European ECU,
eight percent in French francs, and 1.5 percent in dollars. The Danish
central government debt has an average term of two years.
Denmark's central government deficits are not monetized and the
Danish monetary policy is aimed at maintaining a fixed krone in
relation to the Euro. Monetary policy is pursued through the Central
Bank (Nationalbanken) which sets the day-to-day interest rate on
financial sector entities' current account deposits in the Central Bank
and/or offer 14-day transactions where the entities either borrow in
the Central Bank against collateral in securities or buy Government
deposit certificates. Under normal circumstances, there are no
limitations on the liquidity. Responding to the European Central Bank's
raising of interest rates in early November 1999, the Danish Central
Bank raised the official discount rate and the current account rate by
0.25 percent to 3.0 percent. At the same time, the Central Bank's
lending rate and the rate on deposit certificates was raised by 0.45
percent to 3.3 percent.
5. Significant Barriers to U.S. Exports
Denmark imposes few restrictions on import of goods and services or
on investment. Denmark generally adheres to GATT/WTO codes and EU
legislation that impact on trade and investment. U.S. industrial
product exporters face no special Danish import restrictions or
licensing requirements. Agricultural goods must compete with domestic
production, protected under the EU's Common Agricultural Policy.
Denmark provides national and, in most cases, non-discriminatory
treatment to all foreign investment. Ownership restrictions apply only
in a few sectors: hydrocarbon exploration (which usually requires
limited government participation, but not on a ``carried-interest''
basis); arms production (non-Danes may hold a maximum of 40 percent of
equity and 20 percent of voting rights); aircraft (non-EU citizens or
airlines may not directly own or exercise control over aircraft
registered in Denmark); and ships registered in the Danish
International Ships Register (a Danish legal entity or physical person
must own a significant share--about 20 percent--and exercise
significant control over the ship or the ship must be on bareboat
charter to a Danish firm).
Danish law provides a reciprocity test for foreign direct
investment in the financial sector, but that has not been an obstacle
to U.S. investment. Two U.S. banks--Republic National Bank of New York
and the State Street Bank Trust Company--have representative offices in
Denmark. A number of other U.S. financial entities operate in Denmark
through subsidiaries in other European countries, including Citicorp
(through its UK subsidiary), GE Capital Equipment Finance (through
Sweden), and Ford Credit Europe (through the UK).
The government liberalized Danish telecommunications services in
1997; however, the network--the raw copper--remained controlled by the
former Government-owned Tele Danmark A/S. The large U.S. company
Ameritech took over a controlling interest (42 percent) of Tele Danmark
A/S in October 1997 in the largest foreign investment ever in Denmark,
worth about four billion dollars. Access for other telecom operators to
the raw copper opened in 1999. A number of foreign operators, including
Sweden's Telia and France's Mobilix, are making strong inroads into the
Danish market, which increases competition. Sonofon, a private cellular
mobile telephone network with U.S. Bell South participation, competes
with Tele Danmark A/S in that area.
Danish government procurement practices meet the requirements of
the GATT/WTO Public Procurement Code and EU public procurement
legislation. Denmark has implemented all EU government procurement
directives. A 1993 administrative note advised the Danish central and
local governments of the EU/U.S. agreement on reciprocal access to
certain public procurement.
In compliance with EU rules, the government and its entities apply
environmental and energy criteria on an equal basis with other terms--
price, quality and delivery--in procurement of goods and services. This
may eventually restrict U.S. companies' ability to compete in the
Danish public procurement market. For example, the EU ``Ecolabel'' and
EU ``Ecoaudit'' requirements may be difficult for some U.S. companies
to meet. Offsets are used by the Danish Government only in connection
with military purchases not covered by the GATT/WTO code and EU
legislation. Denmark has no ``Buy Danish'' laws.
There is no record of any U.S. firm complaining about Danish
customs procedures. Denmark has an effective, modern and swift customs
administration.
U.S. firms resident in Denmark generally receive national treatment
regarding access to Danish R&D programs. In some programs, however,
Denmark requires cooperation with a Danish company. There is no record
of any complaints by U.S. companies in this area.
6. Export Subsidies Policies
EU agricultural export subsidies to Denmark totaled $371 million
(some 15 percent of the value of Danish agricultural exports to non-EU
countries) in 1998. Danish government support for agricultural export
promotion programs is insignificant. Denmark has no direct subsidies
for its non-agricultural exports except for shipbuilding. Denmark
welcomed the 1994 OECD agreement to phase out shipbuilding subsidies
internationally and would like this agreement, or eventually an updated
one, to be ratified by the United States.
The Government does not directly subsidize exports by small and
medium size companies. Denmark does, however, have programs that
indirectly assist export promotion, and establishment of export
networks for small and medium sized companies, research and
development, and regional development aimed at increasing exports.
Denmark has one of the EU's lowest rates of state aid to industry (less
than two percent of GDP). Danish subsidization of its shipbuilding
industry is within the ceiling set in the EU Shipbuilding Directive
(nine percent of the contract value) and accounts for about one-third
of total Danish state aid to industry. The shipbuilding subsidies have
not prevented the closure of many of Denmark's shipbuilders in the face
of increased low-priced production in South Korea and elsewhere.
Denmark also has a well-functioning export credit and insurance
system. In its foreign development assistance, Denmark requires that 50
percent of all bilateral assistance be used for Danish-produced goods
and services. These programs apply equally to foreign firms that
produce in and export from Denmark.
7. Protection of U.S. Intellectual Property
Denmark is a party to and enforces a large number of international
conventions and treaties concerning protection of intellectual property
rights, including the WTO Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights (the TRIPS Agreement).
Patents: Denmark is a member of the World Intellectual Property
Organization, and adheres to the Paris Convention for the Protection of
Industrial Property, the Patent Cooperation Treaty, the Strasbourg
Convention and the Budapest Convention. Denmark has ratified the
European Patent Convention and the EU Patent Convention.
Trademarks: Denmark is a party to the 1957 Nice Arrangement and to
this arrangement's 1967 revision. Denmark has implemented the EU
trademark directive aimed at harmonizing EU member countries'
legislation. Denmark strongly supports efforts to establish an EU-wide
trademark system. Following a European Court decision in 1998 that
``regional trademark consumption'' applies within the EU, Denmark is
stopping use of the ``global consumption principle.'' Denmark has
enacted legislation implementing EU regulations for the protection of
the topography of semiconductor products, which also extends protection
to legal U.S. persons.
Copyrights: Denmark is a party to the 1886 Berne Convention and its
subsequent revisions, the 1952 Universal Copyright Convention and its
1971 revision, the 1961 International Convention for the Protection of
Performers, and the 1971 Convention for the Producers of Phonograms.
There is little piracy in Denmark of CDs or audio or video cassettes.
However, computer software piracy is more widespread and estimated at
over $100 million annually.
Piracy of other intellectual property, including books, appears
limited. There is no evidence of Danish import or export of pirated
products.
New Technologies: There are no reports of possible infringement of
new technologies.
Impact on U.S. Trade with Denmark: Denmark is named on the
``Special 301'' Watch List because of its failure to meet its TRIPS
obligations to provide unannounced searches and provisional relief as
required by TRIPS Article 50. The issue is the subject of bilateral
consultations, and the Danish government has created a committee to
determine which legislative changes are needed to meet its TRIPS
obligations. The United States is also concerned about Denmark's
failure to protect, as required by article 39.3 of the TRIPS Agreement,
confidential test data submitted to the Danish Environmental Protection
Agency for approval of certain chemical products.
Finally, U.S. authors do not receive royalties from Denmark for
photocopying of their works used in Danish schools and universities,
because the Danish collecting agency COPYDAN will not accept the
validity of ``en bloc'' powers of attorney issued by U.S. publisher and
author organizations. This issue is being pursued with the Danish
Government.
8. Worker Rights
a. Right of Association: Workers in Denmark have the right to
associate freely, and all (except those in essential services and civil
servants) have the right to strike. Approximately 80 percent of Danish
wage earners belong to unions. Trade unions operate free of government
interference. They are an essential factor in political life and
represent their members effectively. During 1998, 3.2 million workdays
were lost due to labor conflicts in connection with the spring 1998
labor contract negotiations (see below) compared with 101,700 in 1997.
Greenland and the Faroe Islands have the same respect for worker
rights, including full freedom of association, as Denmark.
b. Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively: Workers and
employers acknowledge each others' right to organize. Collective
bargaining is widespread. Danish law prohibits antiunion discrimination
by employers against union members, and there are mechanisms to resolve
disputes. Salaries, benefits, and working conditions are agreed in
biennial or triennial negotiations between the various employers'
associations and their union counterparts. If negotiations fail, a
National Conciliation Board mediates, and its proposal is voted on by
both management and labor. If the proposal is turned down, the
government may force a legislated solution (usually based upon the
mediator's proposal). In 1998, for example, failure to reach agreement
resulted in a conflict in the industry sector, which lasted 11 days
before the government intervened with legislation. Again in 1999, in
connection with public sector contract negotiations, the Government had
to intervene to avoid a strike by nurses. In case of a disagreement
during the life of a contract, the issue may be referred to the Labor
Court. Decisions of that court are binding. Labor contracts that result
from collective bargaining are, as a general rule, also used as
guidelines in the non-union sector.
Labor relations in the non-EU parts of Denmark--Greenland and the
Faroe Islands--are generally conducted in the same manner as in
Denmark.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor: Forced or compulsory
labor is prohibited and does not exist in Denmark.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children: The minimum age for
full-time employment is 15 years. Denmark has implemented EU Council
Directive 94/33/EU, which tightened Danish employment rules for those
under 18 years of age, and set a minimum of 13 years of age for any
type of work. The law is enforced by the Danish Working Environment
Service (DWES), an autonomous arm of the Ministry of Labor. Danish
export industries do not use child labor.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work: There is no legally mandated work
week or national minimum wage. The work week set by labor contracts is
37 hours. The lowest wage in any national labor agreement is equal to
about $11 per hour. Danish law provides for five weeks of paid vacation
each year. However, both private and public sector contract agreements
since 1998 provide for 2 to 3 extra holidays plus up to 3 extra days
off each year for wage earners with children. Danish law also
prescribes conditions of work, including safety and health; duties of
employers, supervisors, and employees; work performance; rest periods
and days off; medical examinations; and maternity leave. The DWES
ensures compliance with work place legislation. Danish law provides for
government-funded parental and educational leave programs.
Similar conditions, except for leave programs, are found in
Greenland and the Faroe Islands, but in these areas the workweek is 40
hours. Unemployment benefits in Greenland are either contained in labor
contract agreements or come from the general social security system. A
general unemployment insurance system in the Faroe Islands has been in
force since 1992. Sick pay and maternity pay, as in Denmark, fall under
the social security system.
f. Rights in Sectors with U.S. Investment: Worker rights in those
goods-producing sectors in which U.S. capital is invested do not differ
from the conditions in other sectors.
Extent of U.S. Investment in Selected Industries--U.S. Direct Investment Position Abroad on an Historical Cost
Basis--1998
[Millions of U.S. Dollars]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Category Amount
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Petroleum...................... .............. 286
Total Manufacturing............ .............. 638
Food & Kindred Products...... 160 ...............................................................
Chemicals & Allied Products.. 60 ...............................................................
Primary & Fabricated Metals.. (\1\) ...............................................................
Industrial Machinery and 5 ...............................................................
Equipment.
Electric & Electronic 216 ...............................................................
Equipment.
Transportation Equipment..... -8 ...............................................................
Other Manufacturing.......... (\1\) ...............................................................
Wholesale Trade................ .............. (\1\)
Banking........................ .............. (\2\)
Finance/Insurance/Real Estate.. .............. (\1\)
Servic......................... .............. 34
Other Industries............... .............. 54
TOTAL ALL INDUSTRIES........... .............. 2,628
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Suppressed to avoid disclosing data of individual companies.
\2\ Less than $500,000 (+/-).
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis.
______
FINLAND
Key Economic Indicators
[Billions of U.S. Dollars unless otherwise indicated)]
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1997 1998 1999
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Income, Production and Employment:
Nominal GDP (at factor cost) \9\..... 105.6 111.8 \1\ 110.2
Real GDP Growth (pct)................ 5.6 5.6 \1\ 3.8
GDP by Sector:
Agriculture, Forestry & Logging.... 4.4 4.2 \1\ 4.2
Manufacturing, Construction, Mining 32.1 35.2 \1\ 35.2
& Quarrying.......................
Electricity, Gas & Water Supply.... 2.6 2.6 \1\ 2.4
Services........................... 69.3 72.8 \1\ 71.7
Imputed Bank Service Charges....... -2.8 -3.0 \1\ -3.3
Per Capita GDP (US$) \9\............. 23,671 25,084 \1\ 24,73
4
Labor Force (000's).................. 2,484 2,507 \1\ 2,548
Unemployment Rate (pct).............. 12.7 11.4 \1\ 10.3
Money and Prices (annual percentage
growth):
Money Supply Growth (M2)............. 1.0 4.4 \2\ 5.7
Consumer Price Inflation............. 1.2 1.4 \1\ 1.0
Exchange Rate (FIM/US$ annual 5.19 5.30 5.6
average)............................
Balance of Payments and Trade:
Total Exports FOB.................... 40.7 43.3 \3\ 25.7
Exports to U.S..................... 2.8 3.2 \3\ 1.7
Total Imports CIF.................... 30.7 32.5 \3\ 19.8
Imports from U.S................... 2.3 2.7 \3\ 1.6
Trade Balance........................ 10.0 10.8 \3\ 5.9
Balance with U.S................... 0.5 0.5 \3\ 0.1
External Public Debt \4\............. -29.8 -21.3 \5\ -25.8
Fiscal Deficit-Surplus/GDP (pct) \6\. -1.2 0.9 \1\ 3.1
Current Account Surplus/GDP (pct).... 5.6 5.9 \1\ 4.9
Debt Service Payments/GDP (pct) \7\.. 5.4 4.9 \1\ 4.6
Gold and Foreign Exchange Reserves... 9.9 9.7 \8\ 9.2
Aid from U.S......................... N/A N/A N/A
Aid from All Other Sources........... N/A N/A N/A
------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Estimate, Ministry of Finance.
\2\ Bank of Finland, April 1999-April 1998.
\3\ January-August 1999, Board of Customs.
\4\ Net international investment position exc. shares and other equity
items.
\5\ Bank of Finland, August 1999.
\6\ Public sector's budget deficit (EMU).
\7\ General government interest expenditures.
\8\ September 1999, Bank of Finland.
\9\ Declines in Nominal and Per Capita GDP (despite positive growth
rates) are due to the depreciating value of the Finnish Markka.
1. General Policy Framework
At the beginning of the 1990's, the Finnish economy encountered a
severe recession, after a period of rapid growth in the 1980's. GDP
growth came to a standstill in 1990 and the following year declined by
7 percent. Industrial output and exports bottomed out in 1991, and
total industrial output did not start to grow again until 1993.
Unemployment has decreased significantly since 1994, but remains above
the European Union (EU) average. EU membership, which took place on
January 1, 1995, helped spur structural change in key economic sectors.
The overall economic outlook in Finland is favorable. Inflation has
been moderate, and employment has grown robustly. In 1999, the volume
of total output is anticipated to grow by 3.8 percent year-on-year. In
1998 GDP growth amounted to 5.6 percent, the same as in 1997.
Unemployment rate estimated to drop to 10.3 percent from 1998's 11.4
percent. The national government's budget is expected to be balanced
this year, and the surplus in overall government finances (including
revenues from state owned corporations) will grow to 3 percent of GDP
The current account surplus reached 40.3 billion FIM in 1998, which
is 5.9 percent of GDP. In 1999 the surplus is expected to contract to
34.9 billion FIM, but should rise again in year 2000. As a percentage
of GDP the current account surplus is forecast to fall from last year's
record level but remain in the range of 5 percent both in 1999 and
2000.
The current account surplus has been export driven during the
1990s. But in 1999, the surplus is expected to dip slightly as the
terms of trade deteriorate by 3 percent. In 2000, the terms of trade
are projected to fall by another one percent, but accelerated growth in
the volume of exports will bring the trade surplus back on a growth
track.
Private consumption was up 4.5 percent in 1998 and is forecasted to
grow by 3.8 percent in 1999, 3.4 percent in 2000, and 3.2 percent in
2001. Consumer confidence remains high overall.
Finland's net foreign debt was FIM 476.5 billion at the end of
1998. Owing to a rise in share prices and an increase in foreign owned
equity, net debt excluding shares and other equity items (the interest
bearing net debt) declined in the course of 1998 and stood at 142.3
billion (20.7 percent of GDP) at the end of 1998.
With central government finances on the mend, general government
finances have also considerably improved; local government finances are
close to balance. The surplus in overall public finances is forecast to
reach about 3 percent of GDP in 1999. With the net asset position
improving and domestic product growing, the overall government debt
ratio (ratio of EMU debt to GDP) is predicted to fall from 49.7 percent
in 1998 to 46.6 percent by the end of 1999.
In 1998 Finland's tax ratio (gross wage-earner taxation, including
compulsory employment pension contributions, relative to GDP) was down
to 46.2 percent from 46.3 percent in 1997. A marginal rise is expected
in 1999 (46.7 percent) and in 2000 (46.8 percent).
Finnish economic policy is determined to a large extent by
consultation and coordination within the EU. EU membership, for
example, has resulted in new competition legislation that could help to
reduce the cartelized nature of many Finnish industries. Legislation
that took effect at the beginning of 1993 liberalizing foreign
investment restrictions has helped spur a sharp increase in foreign
portfolio investment and hence has contributed to the
internationalization of large Finnish companies. The increase in stock
market activity is also due to lower domestic interest rates. Direct
foreign investment, however remains modest due to high production
costs. Finland is hoping to capitalize on its location and expertise to
serve as a gateway for foreign investors in the former Soviet Union and
the Baltic States. This effort had scored some successes as foreign
firms established production and warehousing facilities in eastern
Finland, close to the major Russian markets. The recent Russian
financial crisis has caused a significant slowdown in gateway activity.
EU membership and Finland's budget constraints have brought about
some reform in Finland's highly protected agricultural sector. Finland
is slowly transitioning to the EU agricultural regime. The compromise
outcome of Agenda 2000 negotiated by the European Ministers of
Agriculture in March 1999, contained some favorable elements with
respect to Finland. Of special importance was drying aid for grains and
oilseeds, and aid for grass silage. The delay of the price cut of milk
reform until 2003, makes the situation easier now, although there might
be problems later on if the compensation does not cover losses caused
by the price cuts.
2. Exchange Rate Policy
From June 1991 to September 1992 the Finnmark was pegged to the
European Currency Unit, the ECU. The fluctuation margins and the
midpoint were set so as to correspond to the fluctuation margins and
midpoint of the old currency index. In September 1992, the Bank of
Finland decided to abandon the limits of the fluctuation range and
allow the Finnmark to float. Finland joined the Exchange Rate Mechanism
(ERM) of the European Monetary System in October 1996, at the central
rate of 1 ECU = FIM 5.80661. As a participant in the ERM, Finland takes
part in the mutual intervention arrangements coordinated between the
various central banks, which contribute to economic policy goals by
stabilizing the exchange rate.
The European Commission reported on 25 March 1998, that 11 EU
member countries, one of them Finland, were ready for the economic and
monetary union (EMU) and met the conditions to adopt the single
currency (Euro).
The bank notes and coins of the single currency will be put into
circulation in 2002. As of January 1, 1999, Finland joined the third
stage of the EMU. This third and final stage of EMU commenced with the
irrevocable locking of the exchange rates of the eleven currencies
participating in the Euro area and with the conduct of a single
monetary policy under the responsibility of the ECB. The Finnmark was
pegged to the Euro at 5.9457.
3. Structural Policies
Finland replaced its turnover tax with a Value-Added Tax (VAT) in
June 1994. While the change has had little effect on overall revenues,
several sectors not previously taxed or taxed at a lower rate,
including corporate and consumer services and construction, are now
subject to the new VAT. The government has kept the basic VAT rate at
the same level as the old turnover tax (22 percent). Legislation on VAT
was harmonized with the European Union. Foodstuffs will still be taxed
at a 17 percent rate. Services, including health care, education,
insurance, newspaper & periodical subscriptions, and rentals are not
subject to VAT.
Agricultural and forestry products continue to be subject to
different forms of non-VAT taxation. A uniform tax rate of 28 percent
on capital gains took effect in 1996, which includes dividends, rental
income, insurance, savings, forestry income, and corporate profits. The
sole exception was bank interest, where the tax rate was increased from
20 to 25 percent at the beginning of 1994. The Government's budget
proposal for 2000 includes raising the corporate and capital income tax
rate from current 28 per cent to 29 per cent.
In March 1997, European Union commitments required the
establishment of a tax border between the autonomously governed, but
territorially Finnish, Aland Islands (Ahvenanmaa) and the rest of
Finland. As a result, the trade of goods and services between the rest
of Finland and Aland is now treated as if it were trade with a non-EU
area. The trade effect of this treatment is minimal since the Aland
Islands are part of the EFTA tariff area.
The current Comprehensive Incomes Policy Agreement expires at the
end of January 2000. A new round of wage negotiations is being carried
out. Unlike in the past, the new wage negotiations are been carried out
on a union by union basis as opposed to collective bargaining with all
unions together. There won't be any collective bargaining agreements,
but instead agreements on union levels. All main labor market
organizations are committed to the target of low inflation, and the
government intends to reward a moderate collective wage agreement with
tax cuts.
The sharp decline in interest rates and liberalization of foreign
investment has resulted in a strong revival of the Finnish stock market
and greater corporate use of equity markets. It has also substantially
increased the percentage of foreign ownership of many of Finland's
leading companies, and is the preferred vehicle for privatization or
partial privatization of companies with significant state ownership.
The previous Center-Conservative government initiated a program aimed
at privatizing as much of the state-owned companies as the Finnish
Parliament would permit and the market could absorb. The present
government agrees that state ownership at its present level is no
longer necessary in manufacturing, energy production and
telecommunications-operations. The basic strategy has been to reduce
the government's stake through the issuance of stock, rather than by
selling off companies to individual investors and to treat each company
as an individual case. In its program the government is committed to
using privatization proceeds primarily to reduce government debt and to
research and development activities.
Recent examples include Sonera (former Telecom Finland) and HPY
(Helsinki Telephone Company) and the selling of Enso to Stora. In
virtually every case, however, the Finnish government has retained
significant minority stakes in privatized companies.
As a result of the recession of the early 1990s, industrial
subsidies have increased by about 80 percent of GDP in real terms. The
government has begun, however, to reduce subsidies in line with the
need for greater fiscal discipline and Maastricht Treaty criteria for
monetary union. General horizontal subsidies form the bulk of aid in
Finland, including assistance for research and development,
environmental protection, energy and investment. All companies
registered in Finland have access to government assistance under
special development programs. Foreign-owned companies are eligible for
government incentives on an equal footing with Finnish owned companies.
Government incentive programs are mainly aimed at investment in areas
deemed to be in need of development. The support consists of cash
grants, loans, tax benefits, investments in equity, guarantees and
employee training.
4. Debt Management Policies
Under the government's EMU convergence program, the gross
government debt is projected to drop from 49.7 percent last year to
43.2 percent of GDP by the end of 1999. Finnish corporations, formerly
heavy users of foreign capital, are now reducing foreign obligations.
In August 1999, Moody's announced that it keeps its rating on
Finnish long-term government bonds at their best rating--AAA. Standard
& Poor's rating was upgraded in September 1999 to AA+, which is the
second best. In November 1999, Fitch IBCA confirmed the rating of
Finnish long-term government bonds to AAA.
Finland is an active participant in the Paris Club, the London Club
and the Group of 24, providing assistance to East and Central Europe
and the former Soviet Union. It has been a member of the IMF since
1948. Finland's development cooperation programs channel assistance via
international organizations and bilaterally to a number of African,
Asian, and Latin American countries. In response to budgetary
constraints and changing priorities, Finland has reduced foreign
assistance from 0.78 percent of GDP in 1991 to 0.32 percent of GDP in
1998. The Finnish Government intends to raise foreign assistance to 0.4
percent of GDP by year 2000.
5. Significant Barriers to U.S. Exports
Finland became a member of the EU in 1995, and, as a result, has
had to adopt the EU's tariff schedules. The agricultural sector remains
the most heavily protected area of the Finnish economy, with the bulk
of official subsidies in this sector. The amount of these subsidies is
determined by the difference between intervention and world prices for
agricultural products. Since joining the EU, the difference between
these two prices has decreased for most agricultural items, resulting
in lower, albeit still significant, subsidy levels.
In mid-1996 the Finnish government's inter-ministerial licensing
authority began to oppose within the EU U.S. company applications for
commercialization of genetically modified organisms (GMOs) such as
insect resistant corn. The Environmental Ministry appears to favor
mandatory consumer-oriented labeling of GMOs. Other ministries are more
supportive of GMO commercialization. The government continues to take a
case-by-case approach to GMO-related issues.
The Finnish service sector is undergoing considerable
liberalization in connection with EU membership. Legislation
implementing EU insurance directives have gone into effect. Finland has
exceptions in insurance covering medical and drug malpractice and
nuclear power supply. Restrictions placed on statutory labor pension
funds, which are administered by insurance companies, will in effect
require that companies establish an office in Finland. In most cases
such restrictions will cover workers' compensation as well. Auto
insurance companies will not be required to establish a representative
office, but will have to have a claims representative in Finland.
1995 was the first year of fully open competition in the
telecommunications sector in Finland. The Telecommunication Act of
August 1996 allows both network operators and service operators to use
competitor telecommunication networks in exchange for reasonable
compensation. The Telecommunication Act was replaced by the
Telecommunications Market Act of 1997, which improved the opportunities
of telecommunication operators to profitably lease each other's
telecommunications connections. Entry to the sector was also made
easier, by eliminating a licensing requirement to construct a fixed
telephone network. Only mobile telephone networks are still subject to
license.
Finland was the first country to grant licenses for third
generation mobile phone networks. In March 1999, four
telecommunications companies were granted a license to construct a 3G
mobile network in Finland. The decision did not include a final
position on the technology to be used, since the ITU's international
standardization decision (IMT-2000) had not yet been taken. The 3G
mobile operations will be launched by January 1, 2002 at the latest.
In the next few years, the telecommunications and information
technology sectors will continue to grow rapidly. Finland's
telecommunications environment is one of the most advanced in Europe
and the growth of international business in telecommunications is of
significant importance to the Finnish economy.
The government requires that the Finnish broadcasting company
devote a ``sufficient'' amount of broadcasting time to domestic
production, although in practical terms this has not resulted in
discrimination against foreign produced programs. Finland has adopted
EU broadcasting directives, which recommend a 51 percent European
programming target ``where practicable'' for non-news and sports
programming. Finland does not intend to impose specific quotas and has
voiced its opposition to such measures in the EU.
With the end of the Restriction Act in January 1993, Finland
removed most restrictions on foreign ownership of property in Finland.
Only minor restrictions remain, such as requirements to obtain
permission of the local government in order to purchase a vacation home
in Finland. But even restrictions such as this will be abolished by
January 2000, bringing Finland fully in line with EU norms.
Foreigners residing outside of the EEA who wish to carry on trade
as a private entrepreneur or as a partner in a Finnish limited or
general partnership must get a trade permit from the Ministry of Trade
and Industry (MTI) before starting a business in Finland. Additionally,
at least one-half of the founders of a limited company must reside in
the EEA unless the MTI grants an exemption.
Normally Finland requires that a labor market test be conducted
before allowing a foreigner to work in Finland. The purpose of the test
is to determine whether or not a Finn could undertake the same work.
However, foreign intra-corporate transferees who are business
executives or managers are not subject to the labor market test. This
standard does not apply to company specialists, who must prove that
they possess knowledge at an advanced level of expertise or are
otherwise privy to proprietary company business information.
Finland is a signatory to the WTO Government Procurement Agreement
and has a good record in enforcing its requirements. In excluded
sectors, particularly defense, counter trade is actively practiced.
Finland is purchasing fighter aircraft and associated equipment valued
at $3.35 billion from U.S. suppliers. One hundred percent offsets are
required, as a condition of sale, by the year 2005. As of December
1998, $2.9 billion (or 88 per cent of the total) worth of offsets have
been made.
Finland has in most cases completed the process of harmonizing its
technical standards to EU norms. It has streamlined customs procedures
and harmonized its practices with those of the EU.
6. Export Subsidies Policies
The only significant Finnish direct export subsidies are for
agricultural products, such as grain, meat, butter, cheese and eggs as
well as for some processed agricultural products.
Finland has advocated worldwide elimination of shipbuilding
subsidies through the OECD Shipbuilding Agreement. The EU has decided
that payment of shipyard subsidies will end at the end of year 2000.
7. Protection of U.S. Intellectual Property
The Finnish legal system protects property rights, including
intellectual property, and Finland adheres to numerous international
agreements and organizations concerning intellectual property. In 1996,
Finland joined the European Patent Convention (EPC).
Finland is a member of WIPO, and participates primarily via its
membership in the EU. The idea of protection of intellectual property
is well developed. For example, the incidence of software piracy is
lower than in the U.S., and by some measures (e.g. BSA) is the lowest
in the world.
The Finnish Copyright Act, which traditionally also grants
protection to authors, performing artists, record producers,
broadcasting organizations and catalog producers, is being amended to
comply with EU directives. As part of this harmonization, the period of
copyright protection was extended from 50 years to 70 years. Protection
for data base producers (currently a part of catalog producer rights)
will be defined consistent with EU practice. The Finnish Copyright Act
provides for sanctions ranging from fines to imprisonment for up to two
years. Search and seizure are authorized in the case of criminal
piracy, as is the forfeiture of financial gains. The Copyright Act has
covered computer software since 1991.
Information on copying and copyright infringement is provided by
several copyright holder interest organizations such as the Copyright
Information and Anti-Piracy Center. The Business Software Alliance
(BSA), a worldwide software anti-piracy organization, began operations
in Finland in January 1994. According to a BSA survey, the rate of
software piracy in Finland dropped to 32 percent in 1998, from 53
percent in 1994.
8. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association: The constitution provides for the
rights of trade unions to organize, to assemble peacefully, and to
strike, and the government respects these provisions. Over 80 percent
of the work force are organized. This applies to employers as well. All
unions are independent of the government and political parties. The law
grants public sector employees the right to strike, with some
exceptions for provision of essential services. In the first half of
1999, there were 28 strikes, of which only one, was not a wildcat
strike. Trade unions freely affiliate with international bodies.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively: The law provides
for the right to organize and bargain collectively. Collective
bargaining agreements are usually based on incomes policy agreements
between employee and employer central organizations and the government.
The law protects workers against antiunion discrimination. Complaint
resolution is governed by collective bargaining agreements as well as
labor law, both of which are adequately enforced. There are no export
processing zones.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor: The Constitution
prohibits forced or compulsory labor, and this prohibition is honored
in practice.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children: Youths under 16 years of
age cannot work more than 6 hours a day or at night, and education is
compulsory for children from 7 to 16 years of age. The Labor Ministry
enforces child labor regulations. There are virtually no complaints of
exploitation of children in the work force. In 1998, a proposal to
tighten the law even further has been made. According to a bill
introduced to parliament, comprehensive school student (7-15 years)
should not be allowed to hold employment during two thirds of the their
holidays, but only during one half. This change is prompted by an EU
directive to this effect.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work: There is no legislated minimum
wage, but the law requires all employers, including non-unionized ones,
to meet the minimum wages agreed to in collective bargaining agreements
in the respective industrial sector. These minimum wages generally
provide a decent standard of living for workers and their families. The
legal workweek consists of 5 days not exceeding 40 hours. Employees
working in shifts or during the weekend are entitled to a 24-hour rest
period during the week. The law is effectively enforced as a minimum,
and many workers enjoy even stronger benefits through effectively
enforced collective bargaining agreements. The government sets
occupational health and safety standards, and the Labor Ministry
effectively enforces them. Workers can refuse dangerous work
situations, without risk of penalty.
f. Rights in Sectors with U.S. Investment: There is no difference
in the application of worker rights between sectors with U.S.
investment and those without.
Extent of U.S. Investment in Selected Industries--U.S. Direct Investment Position Abroad on an Historical Cost
Basis--1998
[Millions of U.S. Dollars]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Category Amount
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Petroleum...................... .............. 104
Total Manufacturing............ .............. 1,004
Food & Kindred Products...... 11 ...............................................................
Chemicals & Allied Products.. 308 ...............................................................
Primary & Fabricated Metals.. 14 ...............................................................
Industrial Machinery and (\1\) ...............................................................
Equipment.
Electric & Electronic (\1\) ...............................................................
Equipment.
Transportation Equipment..... (\1\) ...............................................................
Other Manufacturing.......... 48 ...............................................................
Wholesale Trade................ .............. 302
Banking........................ .............. 20
Finance/Insurance/Real Estate.. .............. (\1\)
Services....................... .............. 67
Other Industries............... .............. (\1\)
TOTAL ALL INDUSTRIES........... .............. 1,700
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Suppressed to avoid disclosing data of individual companies.
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis.
______
FRANCE
Key Economic Indicators \1\
[Billions of U.S. Dollars unless otherwise indicated)]
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1997 1998 1999 (est)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Income, Production and Employment:
Nominal GDP........................... 1,409 1,449 1,449
Real GDP Growth....................... 2.0 3.4 2.7
GDP by Sector (previous year prices): 1,264 1,283 N/A
\2\..................................
Agriculture......................... 42 43 N/A
Manufacturing....................... 271 277 N/A
Services............................ 635 647 N/A
Government and Non-Profit Services.. 257 258 N/A
Per Capita GDP (US$).................. 24,043 24,873 24,770
Labor Force (thousands)............... 25,642 25,915 25,995
Unemployment Rate (average)........... 12.5 11.8 11.2
Money and Prices (annual percentage
growth):
Money Supply Growth (M3) \3\.......... 1.7 1.2 5.8
Consumer Price Inflation (average).... 1.2 0.7 0.6
Exchange Rate (FF/US$ annual average). 5.8 5.9 6.1
Balance of Payments and Trade:
Total Exports FOB \4\................. 290 304 293
Exports to U.S.\4\.................. 19 22 21
Total Imports CIF \4\................. 271 288 282
Imports from U.S.\4\................ 23 25 24
Trade Balance CIF/FOB................. 19 16 11
Balance with U.S.\4\................ -4 -3 -2
External Public Debt.................. N/A N/A N/A
Fiscal Deficit/GDP (pct).............. 3.0 2.9 2.3
Current Account \5\................... 39 40 35
Current Account Surplus/GDP (pct)..... 2.8 2.8 2.4
Debt Service Payments (pct of GDP).... N/A N/A N/A
Gold and Foreign Exchange Reserves \6\ 57 69 71
Aid from U.S.......................... N/A N/A N/A
Aid from All Other Sources............ N/A N/A N/A
------------------------------------------------------------------------
N/A = non available/non applicable.
\1\ Embassy estimates based on published French government data unless
otherwise indicated.
\2\ GDP excludes value added tax and other taxes.
\3\ 1999 figure reflects M3 as of August.
\4\ 1999 estimate based on eight months.
\5\ 1999 estimate based on eight months.
\6\ 1999 figure reflects reserves as of October.
1. General Policy Framework
France is the fourth largest industrial economy in the world, with
annual gross domestic product about one-fifth that of the United
States. France is the fourth largest importer and exporter in the
global market, and is a world leader in high technology, defense,
agricultural products, and services. France is the eighth largest
trading partner of the United States and the third largest in Europe
(after Germany and the United Kingdom). According to U.S. Department of
Commerce data, U.S. merchandise exports to France increased by 11.0
percent to $17.7 billion in 1998, while merchandise imports from France
grew 16.3 percent to $24.0 billion, again according to Commerce
Department data. This resulted in a U.S. merchandise trade deficit with
France of about $6 billion. French trade data shown in the table above
account differently for re-exports and transshipments via neighboring
European countries. They thus tell a different story: France believes
that it had a trade deficit of about $3 billion with the U.S. in 1998.
Trade in services is expanding rapidly. In 1998, it added about $2
billion more to the total volume of trade between the U.S. and France.
The U.S. and France are the world's top two exporters in several
important sectors: defense products, agricultural goods, and services.
The annual real GDP growth rate in 1999 should be about 2.7
percent, following 3.4 percent in 1998 and 2.0 percent in 1997. The
main reason for a slowdown in late 1998 and early 1999 was the impact
of the Asian and Russian financial crises. Resilient domestic
consumption and investment have, however, limited this impact. Growth
in the second half of 1999 is strengthening significantly. Most
economists expect annual growth in 2000 to return to the 3.0 percent
level. Growth has also permitted a reduction in the unemployment rate
(from a high of 12.6 percent in June 1997 to 11.1 percent by September
1999) and a continued reduction in the general government budget
deficit as a share of GDP to 2.3 percent in 1999.
Considerable progress has been made over the past decade on
structural reforms. However, additional efforts will be necessary for
France to achieve its full economic potential. Prime areas for reforms
identified by international organizations include continued tax and
government spending reduction, increasing the flexibility of labor
markets, and further deregulation of goods and services sectors.
With exports and imports of goods and services each accounting for
about 25 percent of GDP, France's open external sector is a vital part
of its economy. The government has encouraged the development of new
markets for French products and investors, particularly in Asia and
Latin America. It especially seeks to promote exports by small and
medium-sized firms. Foreign investment, both inward and outward, also
plays a very important role in the French economy, helping generate
employment and growth. With about 20 percent of the total, U.S.
investment accounts for the largest share of foreign direct investment
in France. Restrictions on non-EU investors apply only in sensitive
sectors, such as telecommunications, agriculture, defense, and
aviation, and are generally applied on a reciprocal basis.
France offers a variety of financial incentives to foreign
investors and its investment promotion agency, DATAR, provides
extensive assistance to potential investors in France.
2. Exchange Rate Policies
France adopted the euro currency as of January 1, 1999.
Responsibility for exchange rate policy is shared between national
finance ministries and the European Central Bank.
3. Structural Policies
Over the past decade, the government has made efforts to reduce its
role in economic life through fiscal reform, privatization, and the
implementation of European Union liberalization and deregulation
directives. Yet the government remains deeply involved in the
functioning of the economy through national and local budgets,
remaining state holdings of major corporations, and extensive
regulation of labor, goods, and services markets. This can sometimes
result in a lack of transparency in the making of decisions that affect
U.S. and other firms. While U.S. and foreign companies often cite
concerns about relatively high tax rates on business--particularly
payroll and social security taxes--state action does not discriminate
against foreign firms or investments. There are very few, generally
clearly defined exceptions, such as those notified to the OECD under
its investment codes.
4. Debt Management Policies
The budget deficit is financed through the sale of government bonds
at weekly and monthly auctions. A member of the group of leading
financial nations, France participates actively in the International
Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the Paris Club. France is a leading
donor nation and is actively involved in development issues,
particularly with its former colonies in North and Sub-Saharan Africa.
France has also been a leading proponent of debt reduction and relief
for the highly indebted poor countries.
5. Significant Barriers to U.S. Exports
In general, European Union agreements and practices determine
France's trade policies. These policies include preferential trade
agreements with many countries.
Although in most cases France follows import regulations as
prescribed by the Common Agricultural Policy and various EU directives,
there are a number of agricultural products for which France implements
unilateral restrictions (irrespective of EU policy) that affect U.S.
exports. For instance, French decrees and regulations currently
prohibit the import of the following agricultural products: poultry,
meat and egg products from countries (including the United States) that
use certain feed compounds; products made with enriched flour; and
exotic meats (e.g., ostrich, emu and alligator); and live crawfish
unless authorized by special derogation. Current regulations
discriminate against imports of bovine semen and embryos (from the
United States) by strictly controlling their marketing in France.
France established a new national policy toward Genetically
Modified Organisms (GMOs) in 1998 that has restricted imports and
production of certain types of GMO products.
France's implementation of the EU broadcast directive limits U.S.
and other non-EU audiovisual exports. France strictly applies quotas
mandating local content. Continuation and growth of a strong French A/V
sector is a government priority.
Government efforts to balance the national social security health
care budget continue to target (via price/volume agreements, reduced
reimbursement rates, taxes, and slow approvals) products brought to the
market by research-based pharmaceutical firms and health equipment
firms. The U.S. health equipment and research-based pharmaceutical
industries continue to press the French Government for more
transparency in government regulation.
6. Export Subsidies Policy
France is a party to the OECD guidelines on the arrangement for
export credits, which includes provisions regarding the concessionality
of foreign aid. The French Government has increased its export
promotion efforts, particularly to the emerging markets in East Asia
and Latin America. These efforts include providing information and
other services to potential exporters, particularly small and medium-
sized enterprises.
Support of the agricultural sector is a key government priority.
Government support of agricultural production comes mainly from the
budget of the European Union under the Common Agricultural Policy.
There are virtually no direct French government subsidies to
agricultural production. France strongly supports continued EU export
subsidies The government offers indirect assistance to French farmers
in many forms, such as easy credit terms, start-up funds, and
retirement funds.
7. Protection of U.S. Intellectual Property
As a major innovator, France has a strong stake in defending
intellectual property rights worldwide. Under the French intellectual
property rights regime, industrial property is protected by patents and
trademarks, while literary/artistic property and software are protected
by the French civil law system of ``authors rights'' and ``neighboring
rights.'' France is a party to the Berne Convention on copyrights, the
Paris Convention on industrial property, the Universal Copyright
Convention, the Patent Cooperation Treaty, and the Madrid Convention on
trademarks. U.S. nationals are entitled to receive the same protection
of industrial property rights in France as French nationals. In
addition, U.S. nationals have a ``priority period'' after filing an
application for a U.S. patent during which to file a corresponding
application in France.
8. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association: The French Constitution guarantees the
right of workers to form unions. Although union membership has declined
to less than ten percent of the workforce, the institutional role of
organized labor in France is far greater than its numerical strength.
The government regularly consults labor leaders on economic and social
issues, and joint works councils play an important role even in
industries that are only marginally unionized.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively: The principle of
free collective bargaining was established after World War II, and
subsequent amendments to labor laws encourage collective bargaining at
national, regional, local and plant levels.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor: French law prohibits
antiunion discrimination and forced or compulsory labor.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children: With a few minor
exceptions for those enrolled in apprenticeship programs or working in
the entertainment industry, children under the age of 16 may not be
employed in France.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work: The current minimum wage is FF
40.72 per hour (about $6.67). Legislation lowering the legal work week
from 39 to 35 hours was passed in 1998. A second law on overtime and
other details should be adopted by Parliament before the end of 1999.
The reduced work week takes legal effect starting in 2000. In general
terms, French labor legislation and practice (including occupational
safety and health standards) are fully comparable to those in other
industrialized market economies. France has three small export
processing zones, where regular French labor law and wage scales apply.
f. Rights in Sectors with U.S. Investment: Labor law and practice
are uniform throughout all industries, including those sectors and
industries with significant U.S. investment.
Extent of U.S. Investment in Selected Industries--U.S. Direct Investment Position Abroad on an Historical Cost
Basis--1998
[Millions of U.S. Dollars]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Category Amount
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Petroleum .............. 1,162
Total Manufacturing............ .............. 18,974
Food & Kindred Products...... 3,615 ...............................................................
Chemicals & Allied Products.. 4,227 ...............................................................
Primary & Fabricated Metals.. 4,034 ...............................................................
Industrial Machinery and 2,358 ...............................................................
Equipment.
Electric & Electronic 974 ...............................................................
Equipment.
Transportation Equipment..... 676 ...............................................................
Other Manufacturing.......... 3,089 ...............................................................
Wholesale Trade................ .............. 2,587
Banking........................ .............. 2,388
Finance/Insurance/Real Estate.. .............. 7,778
Services....................... .............. 4,570
Other Industries............... .............. 1,729
TOTAL ALL INDUSTRIES........... .............. 39,188
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis.
______
GERMANY
Key Economic Indicators
[Billions of U.S. Dollars unless otherwise indicated)]
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1997 \1\ 1998 1999
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Income, Production and Employment:
Nominal GDP \2\...................... 2,095 2,109 2,128
GDP Growth (pct) \3\................. 1.8 2.3 1.4
GDP by Sector (pct):
Agriculture........................ 1.3 1.2 N/A
Manufacturing...................... 25.0 25.4 N/A
Services........................... 73.7 73.4 N/A
Per Capita GDP (US$)................. 25,549 25,675 25,920
Labor Force (000's).................. 40,116 40,278 40,220
Unemployment Rate (pct).............. 11.4 11.2 10.7
Money and Prices (annual percentage
growth):
Money Supply Growth (M2) \5\......... 1.1 9.3 7.0
Consumer Price Inflation............. 1.9 1.0 0.6
Exchange Rate (DM/US$ annual average) 1.73 1.76 1.82
Balance of Payments and Trade:
Total Exports FOB \4\................ 513.7 544.7 615.9
Exports to U.S. \4\ \5\............ 44.3 50.4 25.7
Total Imports CIF \4\................ 446.3 463.4 591.3
Imports from U.S. \4\ \5\.......... 33.8 38.219.4
Trade Balance \4\.................... 67.4 81,324.6
Balance with U.S. \4\ \5\.......... 10.5 12.2 6.3
Current Account Balance/GDP (pct).... -0.2 -0.2 -0.1
Public Debt.......................... 1,267 1,284 1,284
Fiscal Deficit/GDP (pct)............. -1.7 -1.5 -1.4
Debt Service Payments/GDP (pct)...... 3.7 3.7 N/A
Gold and Foreign Exchange Reserves... 73.4 76.1 N/A
Aid from U.S......................... N/A N/A N/A
Aid from All Other Sources........... N/A N/A N/A
------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ 1998 Figures are all estimates based on available monthly data in
October and consensus forecasts.
\2\ GDP at factor cost.
\3\ Percentage changes calculated in national currency.
\4\ Merchandise trade.
\5\ 1999 figures for trade with U.S. show first half only.
\6\ For 1999, growth in Euro-11 money supply in August 1999 over August
1998.
1. General Policy Framework
Germany's economy is the world's third largest, with total output
equivalent to just over $2 trillion in 1999 (in nominal terms). Real
GDP growth, which reached 2.2 percent in 1998, dropped to 1.4 percent
in the first three quarters of 1999. Most German public and private
forecasters estimate growth of around 2.5 percent for 2000, with the
acceleration primarily export-led. Germany is highly integrated into
the global economy: just as the slowdown in German growth in late 1998
and early 1999 resulted mainly from adverse international economic
conditions, so the expectation of higher growth is based on the recent
recovery in global conditions. Inflation is extremely low, partly as a
result of deregulation in the electricity and telecommunications
sectors.
The German ``social market'' economy is organized on market
principles and affords its citizenry a secure social safety net
characterized by generous unemployment, health, educational and basic
welfare benefits. At the same time, economic growth in recent years has
been below potential, and unemployment rates have been very high, with
about 4 million people unemployed nationwide. Growth is now faster in
western Germany than in the east, slowing--at least temporarily--
progress toward economic convergence between the two regions, a key
national objective. Unemployment is also about twice as high in eastern
Germany as in the west.
Increased government outlays associated with German unification
have put pressure on fiscal policy during the 1990s. The country's
generous social welfare system was extended as a whole to eastern
Germany, and the government further committed itself to raise eastern
German production potential via public investment and generous
subsidies to attract private investment. However, overall unit labor
costs in eastern Germany are still quite high, as productivity growth
has lagged behind wage increases. This process led to the higher
unemployment in the east and resulted in a sharp increase in federal
unemployment compensation costs. As a result, western Germany continues
to transfer substantial sums to eastern Germany (more than DM 140
billion annually, or roughly four percent of German GDP). These
transfers accounted for the dramatic ballooning of public sector
deficits and borrowing since 1990, and contributed to the need for the
current government's belt-tightening measures.
Top policy priorities of the coalition government elected in
September 1998 are to lower unemployment and reduce the fiscal deficit.
The government has organized an Alliance for Jobs also involving labor
union and employer representatives, with the aim of fostering wage
restraint, job security and training programs. Deficit reduction
efforts have focused on federal spending restraint. The government also
intends to introduce tax reforms over a period of four years, aimed at
reducing corporate income tax rates and closing loopholes, extending
relief to families, and raising energy taxes for environmental reasons.
So far the government has been more successful at reducing the budget
deficit than at tackling unemployment. The labor minister recently
admitted that significant job creation might not occur until late 2000.
2. Exchange Rate Policies
On January 1, 1999, the euro was introduced in Germany and the
Deutsche Mark was fixed at 1.95 to the euro. The euro has become a
transactional currency until the introduction of notes and coins on
January 1, 2002. The DM will be phased out beginning January 1, 2002,
with the euro remaining sole currency as of March 1, 2002. Over the
next two years, the DM will be phased out and the euro will become the
exclusive currency in Germany. All monetary and exchange policies are
now handled by the European Central Bank.
3. Structural Policies
Since the end of the Second World War, German economic policy has
been based on a ``social-market'' model which is characterized by a
substantially higher level of direct government participation in the
production and services sector than in the United States. In addition,
an extensive regulatory framework, which covers most facets of retail
trade, service licensing and employment conditions, has worked to limit
market entry by not only foreign firms, but also German entrepreneurs.
Although the continuation of the ``social market'' model remains
the goal of all mainstream political parties, changes resulting from
the integration of the German economy with those of its European Union
partners, the shock of German unification, pressure from globalization
on traditional manufacturing industries, and record-high unemployment
have forced a rethinking of the German post-war economic consensus. A
number of structural impediments to the growth and diversification of
the German economy have been identified. These can be broadly grouped
as follows:
(1) a rigid labor market;
(2) a regulatory system that discourages new entrants; and
(3) high marginal tax rates and high social charges.
While many Germans value these structural features for their
presumed benefits in terms of social security and relative equality,
the public debate has focused on their suitability to desired economic
growth and employment levels and Germany's competitiveness as a
location for business and investment. The government, as noted, intends
to pursue modest tax reform but has not undertaken structural reform of
the labor market.
In recent years, the government has carried out a reorganization of
the German Federal Railroad and completed transforming most operating
entities of the German Federal Post into stock companies. An initial
public offering for the DeutschePost (DP) is expected in mid-2000 in
conjunction with the liberalization of the telecommunications sector,
the government-owned Deutsche Telekom has been substantially privatized
(34 percent of shares have been made public) in several tranches. The
German Government has largely fulfilled its commitment to open the
telecommunications network monopoly to competition as of January 1,
1998, the date when its new Regulatory Authority for Telecommunications
and Post began operation. However, the USTR continues to monitor
Germany's compliance with the Basic Telecommunications Agreement, after
a U.S. firm filed a complaint in February 1999 under section 1377 of
the Omnibus Trade and Competitions Act of 1988. The federal government
also has sold its remaining stake in the national airline, Lufthansa.
Despite the progress in recent years, lack of competition remains a
problem in many regulated sectors and drives up business costs in
Germany. Services which continue to be subject to excessive regulation
and market access restrictions include communications, utilities,
banking and insurance. The government intends to review existing
legislation that limits price competition between firms, as well as
laws that reduce competition in the insurance and transport sectors.
The Regulatory Authority for Telecommunications and Post has issued new
regulations to encourage competition in the telecom sector. Paralleling
German Government efforts to deregulate the economy, the European
Commission is expected to continue to pressure member states to reduce
barriers to trade in services within the Community. U.S. firms,
especially those with operations located in several European Union
member states, should benefit from such market integration efforts over
the long term.
4. Debt Management Policies
As a condition of its participation in the European Monetary Union,
the government was required to reduce its accumulated public debt and
lower its debt/GDP ratio. Germany is also subject to a constitutional
limitation to hold its new net borrowing, at or below the amount
invested in public sector infrastructure. Current policies seek to
achieve a balanced budget by 2003.
Germany has recorded persistent current account deficits since 1991
due to a drop in the country's traditionally strong trade surplus,
related in part, to strong consumer demand in eastern German demand.
These deficits have been small, however, in relation to GDP. The strong
deterioration of the services balance in recent years, caused
principally by German tourism expenditures abroad, has contributed to
the current account deficits. Nonetheless, Germany continues to
maintain a surplus in the merchandise trade balance.
5. Significant Barriers to U.S. Exports
Germany is the United States' fifth-largest export market and its
fifth-largest source of imports. During the first seven months of 1999,
U.S. exports to Germany totaled $17.68 billion (FOB basis), while U.S.
imports from Germany reached $25.6 billion (FOB basis). Other than EU-
imposed restrictions, there are few formal barriers to U.S. trade and
investment in Germany. Ingrained consumer behavior and strong domestic
players prevailing in German product and services markets often make
gaining market share a difficult challenge, especially for new-to-
market companies.
Import Licenses: Germany has abolished almost all national import
quotas. The country enforces, however, import license requirements
placed on some products by the European Union, such as the tariff quota
on Latin American bananas imposed by the EU's banana import regime. As
a result of this discriminatory marketing arrangement, U.S. fruit
trading companies have lost market share in Germany. The World Trade
Organization's dispute resolution panel and the WTO Appeals body, have
found the EU banana regime to violate both the General Agreement on
Trade in Services and the General Agreement on Trade in Goods,
requiring EU members (including Germany) to reform this trading regime,
which it has yet to do.
Services Barriers: Foreign access to Germany's insurance market is
still limited to some degree. All telecommunications services have been
fully open to competition since January 1998, when the EU's
telecommunications market liberalization came into effect; great
dynamism and intense competition characterize the long-distance, but
not local, market. Liberalization has opened up opportunities for U.S.
telecommunications service providers. Germany has no foreign ownership
restrictions on telecommunications services. An EU data privacy
directive came into force on October 25, 1998. The directive prohibits
businesses from exporting ``personal information'' unless the receiving
country has in place privacy protections that the EU deems adequate.
The U.S. and the EU are engaged in ongoing discussions to establish
``safe harbor'' principles as a way to allow the continued free flow of
data.
Standards, Testing, Labeling, and Certification: Germany's
regulations and bureaucratic procedures are complex and can prove to be
a hurdle for U.S. exporters unfamiliar with the local environment.
Overly complex government regulations offer--intentionally or not--
local producers a degree of protection. EU health and safety standards,
for example, when overzealously applied, can restrict market access for
many U.S. products (e.g., genetically modified organisms and hormone-
treated beef). The European Union's attempts to harmonize the various
product safety requirements of its member states have further
complicated the issue. Existing high German standards will likely form
the basis in a number of cases for eventual EU standards.
Government Procurement: In May 1998, the government passed the
Public Procurement Reform Act. It establishes examining bodies that
have the responsibility to review the awarding of public contracts and
to investigate complaints pertaining to the procurement process. Since
the law went into force January 1, 1999 it has been successfully
applied to one case in September 1999.
Investment Barriers: Under the terms of the 1956 Treaty, U.S.
investors are afforded national treatment. The government and industry
actively encourage foreign investment in Germany. Foreign companies
with investment complaints in Germany generally list the same
investment problems as domestic firms: high tax rates, expensive labor
costs, and burdensome regulatory requirements.
Customs Procedures: Administrative procedures at German ports of
entry do not constitute a problem for U.S. suppliers.
6. Export Subsidies Policies
Germany does not directly subsidize exports outside the European
Union's framework for export subsidies for agricultural goods.
Governmental or quasi-governmental entities do provide export
financing, but Germany subscribes to the OECD guidelines that restrict
the terms and conditions of export finance.
U.S. companies allege that several German parastatal entities or
former monopolies have cross-subsidized portions of their business to
unfairly invest and expand their operations overseas. Several German
enterprises including Deutsche Post and Deutsche Telekom have been
accused of cross subsidization in order to gain market entry and
increase market share, thereby disturbing a competitive market interest
to U.S. companies. The European Commission agreed to accept a complaint
by one U.S. parcel delivery company for charging DP with abuse of a
dominant market position.
7. Protection of U.S. Intellectual Property
Intellectual property is generally well protected in Germany.
Germany is a member of the World Intellectual Property Organization; a
party to the Berne Convention for the Protection of Artistic and
Literary Works, the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial
Property, the Universal Copyright Convention, the Geneva Phonograms
Convention, the Patent Cooperation Treaty, the Brussels Satellite
Convention, and the Treaty of Rome on Neighboring Rights. U.S. citizens
and firms are entitled to national treatment in Germany, with certain
exceptions. Despite Germany's implementation of its commitment under
the intellectual property rights portions (TRIPS) of the Uruguay Round,
some U.S. firms have raised concerns about the level of software piracy
in Germany. Germany's 1993 implementation of the EU's Software
Copyright Directive, as well as an educational campaign by the software
industry have helped improve Germany's performance in this area.
8. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association: Article IX of the German Constitution
guarantees full freedom of association. Workers' rights to strike and
employers' rights to lockout are also legally protected.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively: The constitution
provides for the right to organize and bargain collectively, and this
right is widely exercised. Due to a well-developed system of autonomous
contract negotiations, mediation is uncommon. Basic wages and working
conditions are negotiated at the industry level and then are adapted,
through local collective bargaining, to particular enterprises.
Nonetheless, some firms in Eastern Germany have refused to join
employer associations, or have withdrawn from them, and then bargained
independently with workers. In other cases, associations are turning a
``blind eye'' to firm-level negotiations. Likewise, some large firms in
the west withdrew at least part of their workforce from the
jurisdiction of the employers association, complaining of rigidities in
the centralized negotiating system. They have not, however, refused to
bargain as individual enterprises. The law mandates a system of work
councils and worker membership on supervisory boards, and thus workers
participate in the management of the enterprises in which they work.
The law thoroughly protects workers against antiunion discrimination.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor: The German
Constitution guarantees every German the right to choose his own
occupation and prohibits forced labor, although some prisoners are
required to work.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children: German legislation in
general bars child labor under age 15. There are exemptions for
children employed in family farms, delivering newspapers or magazines,
or involved in theater or sporting events.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work: There is no legislated or
administratively determined minimum wage. Wages and salaries are set
either by collective bargaining agreements between unions and employer
federations, or by individual contracts. Covering about 90 percent of
all wage and salary earners, these agreements set minimum pay rates and
are legally enforceable. These minimums provide an adequate standard of
living for workers and their families.
f. Rights in Sectors with U.S. Investment: The enforcement of
German labor and social legislation is strict, and applies to all firms
and activities, including those in which U.S. capital is invested.
Employers are required to contribute to the various mandatory social
insurance programs and belong to and support chambers of industry and
commerce which organize the dual (school/work) system of vocational
education.
Extent of U.S. Investment in Selected Industries--U.S. Direct Investment Position Abroad on an Historical Cost
Basis--1998
[Millions of U.S. Dollars]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Category Amount
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Petroleum...................... .............. 2,860
Total Manufacturing............ .............. 22,259
Food & Kindred Products...... 922 ...............................................................
Chemicals & Allied Products.. 3,894 ...............................................................
Primary & Fabricated Metals.. 1,848 ...............................................................
Industrial Machinery and 3,887 ...............................................................
Equipment.
Electric & Electronic 565 ...............................................................
Equipment.
Transportation Equipment..... 7,106 ...............................................................
Other Manufacturing.......... 4,038 ...............................................................
Wholesale Trade................ .............. 2,759
Banking........................ .............. 1,510
Finance/Insurance/Real Estate.. .............. 11,022
Services....................... .............. 1,905
Other Industries............... .............. 537
TOTAL ALL INDUSTRIES........... .............. 42,853
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis.
______
GREECE
Key Economic Indicators
[Millions of U.S. Dollars unless otherwise indicated)]
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1997 1998 \1\ 1999
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Income, Production and Employment:
Nominal GDP \2\................... 105,600.0 105,825.0 109,700.0
Real GDP growth (pct) \3\......... 3.0 3.7 3.5
GDP by Sector:
Agriculture..................... 8,960.0 8,800.0 8,740.0
Manufacturing................... 25,130.0 25,400.0 26,300.0
Services........................ 71,510.0 71,625.0 74,660.0
Of which:
Government.................... 10,130.0 9,625.0 9,465.0
Per Capita GDP (US$).............. 11,334.6 11,305.2 11,335.0
Labor Force (000's)............... 4,262.0 4,445.7 4,481.3
Unemployment Rate (pct)........... 9.6 10.8 10.4
Money and Prices (annual percentage
growth):
Money Supply Growth (M3 Dec)...... 9.6 8.9 4.0
Consumer Price Inflation.......... 5.5 4.8 2.5
Exchange Rate (DRS/US$ annual
average)
Official........................ 273.1 295.5 305.0
Parallel........................ N/A N/A N/A
Balance of Payments and Trade:
Total Exports FOB \4\A............ 10,934.0 10,758.0 10,000.0
Total Exports FOB \4\B............ 5,373.3 5,556.0 8,000.0
Exports to U.S. \4\C............ 453.0 467.1 \5\ 350.0
Total Imports CIF \4\A............ 25,560.0 28,587.0 28,000.0
Total Imports CIF \4\B............ 23,644.1 23,246.9 26,000.0
Imports from U.S. \4\C.......... 954.0 1,355.1 \5\ 640.5
Trade Balance \4\A................ -14,626.0 -17,829.0 -18,000.0
Trade Balance \4\B................ -18,271.0 -17,681.0 18,000.0
Balance with U.S................ 496.0 888.0 N/A
External Public Debt.............. 29,167.1 32,000.0 33,000.0
Fiscal Deficit/GDP (General 4.0 1.6 1.2
Government) (pct)................
Current Account Deficit/GDP (pct). 4.9 4.0 2.5
Debt Service (Public Sector) 6.2 6.3 6.0
Payments/GDP (pct)...............
Gold and Foreign Exchange Reserves 13,337.0 18,191.2 20,000.0
Aid from U.S...................... N/A N/A N/A
Aid from All Other Sources........ N/A N/A N/A
------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ 1999 figures are all estimates based on available monthly data in
November.
\2\ GDP at factor cost.
\3\ Percentage changes calculated in local currency.
\4\A Merchandise Trade; National Statistical Service of Greece; Customs
Data.
\4\B Trade; Bank of Greece data; on a settlement basis for 1997 and
1998. The Bank of Greece data, especially those on exports,
underestimate true trade figures since exporters are no longer obliged
to deposit their export receipts in Greece. The Bank of Greece is
preparing a new set of accounts to be in line with other EU central
banks. The 1999 estimates are based on the January-April 1999 data
following the new system (resident/non-resident basis).
\4\C U.S. Department of Commerce. U.S. exports and general imports,
customs value.
\5\ January-July 1999 data.
1. General Policy Framework
Greece has been a member of the European Union (EU) since 1981. Its
economy is segmented into the state sector (estimated at 45 percent of
GDP) and the private sector (55 percent of GDP). It has a population of
10.6 million and a workforce of about 4 million. Some of Greece's
economic activity remains unrecorded. (Estimates of how much of the
economy remains unrecorded vary, due, at least in part, to deficient
data collection). The moderate level of development of Greece's basic
infrastructure--road, rail, telecommunications--reflects its middle-
income status. Per capita GDP is $11,335, the lowest in the EU.
However, with GDP growth well above the EU average, this gap is slowly
closing.
Services make up the largest and fastest growing sector of the
Greek economy, accounting for about 68 percent of GDP (including
government services). Tourism, shipping, trade, banking,
transportation, communications, and construction are the largest
service sub-sectors. Greece is an import-dependent country, importing
substantially more than it exports. In 1998, imports were $28.6 billion
while exports were only $10.75 billion. A relatively small industrial
base and lack of adequate investment in the past have restricted the
export potential of the country. As a general trade profile, Greece
exports primarily light manufactured and agricultural products, and
imports more sophisticated manufactured goods. Tourism receipts,
emigrant remittances, shipping receipts, and transfers from the EU form
the core of Greece's invisible earnings. Substantial funds from the EU
(about $20 billion) have been allocated for major infrastructure
projects (road and rail networks, ports, airports, telecommunications
etc.) over the period 1994-99. Greece will get another EU structural
funds package of about $22 billion for the period 2000-2006. Greece
will undertake a number of infrastructure projects to host the 2004
Summer Olympic games, although some were already underway.
The government is in its sixth year of an austerity program
designed to meet the Maastricht Treaty's convergence criteria for the
European Monetary Union (EMU). Greece failed to meet the criteria in
1997 to enter EMU in 1999; it aims to join the EMU on January 1, 2001,
based on 1999 economic performance. The results of the convergence
program on the economy have been generally positive. The drop of
inflation to 2 percent on an annualized basis in September raised hopes
that they would meet the criteria to join the EMU (presently around 2
percent.) Investment and consumer confidence remains strong and the
growth of GDP in 1999 is projected to be 3.5 percent, slightly lower
than 1998 growth (3.7 percent). Unemployment, which stood at 10.8
percent in1998, is projected to drop to 10.4 percent in 1999. By the
end of 1998, as a result of a fiscal policy focused on expanding
revenue collection, the government budget deficit to GDP ratio had
fallen to 1.6 percent. However, real progress in reducing public
expenditures has been limited due to continued opposition to structural
reforms by labor unions, professional associations, politicians, and
the media.
Greece's huge general government debt (104 percent of GDP or 126.8
billion U.S. dollars in 1999) stems to a great extent from government
acquisition of failing enterprises and a bloated public sector.
Greece's social security program has also been a major drain on public
spending. Deficits are financed primarily through issuance of
government securities.
Monetary policy is implemented by the Bank of Greece (the Central
Bank). The Bank uses the discount and other interest rates in its
transactions with commercial banks as tools to control the money
supply. The government continues to retain privileged access to credit
via the still low-taxed status accorded to government debt obligations
(which includes the right of Greek residents to purchase government
debt obligations without having to declare their source of income to
the tax authorities). Treasury bills and state bonds are issued by the
Ministry of Finance but they are expected to comply with the monetary
targets set by the Bank of Greece.
2. Exchange Rate Policy
Greece's foreign exchange market is in line with EU rules on free
movement of capital. On March 16, 1998, the Greek currency was included
in the European Union's Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM). This was
preceded by a drachma devaluation of 12.3 percent on March 14. The
drachma participates in the ERM-2 as of January 1, 1999. The drachma's
central parity to the euro (which also sets the entry level into EMU on
January 1, 2001) was set at 353.109 drachmas per euro.
3. Structural Policies
Greece's structural policies are largely dictated by the need to
comply with the provisions of the EU Single Market and the Maastricht
Treaty on Economic and Monetary Union. The 1994-99 Convergence Program,
designed to enable Greece to comply with the Maastricht Treaty
criteria, set targets that should encourage significant structural
reforms, including privatizations. Progress in this area, however, has
been limited. The Convergence Program itself has been revised twice.
The Greek Government has a plan stretching until the end of 2000 to
privatize or sell minority stakes in public sector enterprises and
organizations including Hellenic Petroleum (23 percent currently traded
in the market), the Hellenic Duty Free shops, the Public Power
Corporation, the Athens Water Company, the Athens Stock Exchange and
the port operations in Piraeus and Thessaloniki. Restructuring the
operations of the public sector (i.e., elimination of unnecessary
activities/entities, changes in the labor and social insurance regimes)
are also at the top of the Greek Government's agenda.
Pricing Policies. The only remaining price controls are on
pharmaceuticals. The government can also set maximum prices for fuel
and private school tuition fees, and has done so several times in the
last two years.
About one quarter of the goods and services included in the
Consumer Price Index (CPI) are produced by state-controlled companies.
As a result, the government retains considerable indirect control over
pricing. While this distorts resource allocations in the domestic
economy, it does not directly inhibit U.S. imports (with the exception
of pharmaceuticals).
Tax Policies: Businesses complain about frequent changes in tax
policies (there is a new tax law practically every year). More tax
reforms were introduced in October 1999:
--objective tax criteria for small businesses and self-employed are
abolished;
--tax rates on small businesses were reduced from 35 to 30 percent;
--indirect taxes on imported cars and fuel were reduced.
4. Debt Management Policies
Greece's ``General Government Debt'' (the Maastricht Treaty
definition) was 126.8 billion dollars, or 104.0 percent of GDP (market
prices) in 1999. Foreign exchange reserves fluctuated in the first four
months of 1999 between 21.6 and 22.1 billion dollars or about 9 months
of imports.
Servicing of external debt (public sector) in 1998 (interest and
amortization) equaled 70 percent of exports and 6.3 percent of GDP.
About 65 percent of the external debt is denominated in currencies
other than the dollar. Foreign debt does not affect Greece's ability to
import U.S. goods and services.
Greece has regularly serviced its debts and has generally good
relations with commercial banks and international financial
institutions. Greece is not a recipient of World Bank loans or
International Monetary Fund programs. In 1985, and again in 1991,
Greece received a balance of payments loan from the EU.
5. Significant Barriers to U.S. Exports
Greece, which is a WTO member, has both EU-mandated and Greek
Government-initiated trade barriers.
Law: Greece maintains nationality-based restrictions on a number of
professional and business services, including legal advice. These
restrictions have been lifted in the recent years for EU citizens. U.S.
companies can generally circumvent these barriers by employing EU
citizens.
Accounting/Auditing: The transitional period for de-monopolization
of the Greek audit industry officially ended on July 1, 1997. Numerous
attempts to reserve a portion of the market for the former state audit
monopoly during the transition period (1994-97) were blocked by the
European Commission and peer review in the OECD. However, in November
1997, the Greek Government issued a presidential decree that reduced
the competitiveness of the multinational auditing firms. The decree
established minimum fees for audits, and imposed restrictions on
utilization of different types of personnel in audits. It also
prohibited audit firms from doing multiple tasks for a client, thus
raising the cost of audit work. The government has defended these
regulations as necessary to ensure the quality and objectivity of
audits. In practical effect, the decree constitutes a step back from
deregulation of the industry.
Aviation: The Greek flag air carrier, Olympic Airways, used to have
a monopoly in providing ground handling services to other airlines. As
of January 1, 1998, all major airports in the EU had to offer at least
two ground handling options. However, in practice Olympic remains the
only ground handling option for foreign airlines other than self-
handling.
Motion Pictures: Greek film production is subsidized by a 12
percent admissions tax on all motion pictures. Enforcement of Greek
laws protecting audio-visual intellectual property rights has improved
in 1998-99, but rights for software, music, and books remains
problematic.
Agricultural Products: Greek testing methods for Karnal bunt
disease in U.S. wheat have served as a de facto ban on imports and
transshipment of wheat for the last three years due to a high incidence
of false positive results. The Ministry of Agriculture has recently
agreed to procedures that will allow a resumption of transshipments
through Greek ports to neighboring countries.
Generally, Greece has not been responsive to applications for
introduction of bioengineered (genetically modified) seeds for field
tests despite support for such tests by Greek farmers.
Investment Barriers: Both local content and export performance are
elements which are seriously taken into consideration by Greek
authorities in evaluating applications for tax and investment
incentives. However, they are not legally mandatory prerequisites for
approving investments.
Greece, which currently restricts foreign and domestic private
investment in public utilities (with the exception of cellular
telephony and energy from renewable sources, e.g. wind and solar), has
deregulation plans for telecommunications and energy. Greece has been
granted a derogation until January 1, 2001 to open its voice telephony
and the respective networks to other EU competitors. In the energy
field, the Greek energy market will be gradually deregulated, starting
in February 2001.
U.S. and other non-EU investors receive less advantageous treatment
than domestic or other EU investors in the banking, mining, maritime,
and air transport sectors, and in broadcasting (these sectors were
opened to EU citizens due to EU single market rules). There are also
restrictions for non-EU investors on land purchases in border regions
and certain islands (on national security grounds).
Greek laws and regulations concerning government procurement
nominally guarantee nondiscriminatory treatment for foreign suppliers.
Officially, Greece also adheres to EU procurement policy, and Greece
has adhered to the GATT Government Procurement Code since 1992.
Nevertheless, many of the following problems still exist: occasional
sole-sourcing (explained as extensions of previous contracts); loosely
written specifications which are subject to varying interpretations;
and allegiance of tender evaluators to technologies offered by
longtime, traditional suppliers. Firms from other EU member states have
had a better track record than U.S. firms in winning Greek Government
tenders. It has been noted that U.S. companies submitting joint
proposals with European companies are more likely to succeed in winning
a contract. The real impact of Greece's ``buy national'' policy is felt
in the government's offset policy (mostly for purchases of defense
items) where local content, joint ventures, and other technology
transfers are required.
In December 1996, the Greek Parliament passed legislation (Law
2446, article 16) which allows public utilities in the energy, water,
transport, and telecommunications sectors to sign ``term agreements''
with local industry for procurement. ``Term agreements'' are contracts
in which Greek suppliers are given significant preference. The official
explanation for these agreements is the need to support the national
manufacturing base. This was made possible as a result of Greece's
receipt of an extension until January 1, 1998, to implement the EU's
Utilities Directive 93/38. Before expiration of the extension, in
November-December 1997, numerous contracts potentially worth of
billions of dollars were signed by Greek public utilities with Greek
suppliers. Some of these term agreements have no less than 3-5 years
duration, thus effectively excluding foreign suppliers from vital
sectors of government procurement for several years. The European
Commission has been examining the hurried manner in which these
contracts were approved.
6. Export Subsidies Policies
The government does not use national subsidies to support exports.
However, some agricultural products (most notably cotton, olive oil,
tobacco, cereals, canned peaches, and certain other fruits and
vegetables) receive production subsidies from the EU which enhance
their export competitiveness.
7. Protection of U.S. Intellectual Property
Greek laws extend protection of intellectual property rights to
both foreign and Greek nationals. Greece is a party to the Paris
Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, the European
Patent Organization, the World Intellectual Property Organization, the
Washington Patent Cooperation Treaty, and the Berne Copyright
Convention. As a member of the EU, Greece has harmonized its
legislation with EU rules and regulations. The WTO TRIPS agreement was
incorporated into Greek legislation as of February 28, 1995 (Law 2290/
95).
Greece has been on the ``Special 301 Priority Watch List'' since
1994. Just prior to an out-of-cycle review in December 1996, the Greek
Government submitted an ``Action Plan'' laying out the steps it would
take to reduce audio-visual piracy. While some of these steps were
taken, the government lagged behind severely in licensing television
stations in accordance with the provisions of the 1995 media law; the
process, which only got underway after extremely long delays, was less
than half-way through in mid-1999. As a result of slow movement in many
areas of concern to U.S. companies, the U.S. Government launched a WTO
TRIPS non-enforcement challenge and consultations under WTO auspices
were started in June 1998.
To fulfill in part its obligations under Part III of the TRIPS
Agreement, Greece passed legislation on October 13, 1998 (Law 2444/98,
commonly known a the Digital TV Law of 1998), Article 17 of which
provides an additional enforcement remedy for copyright holders whose
works were infringed by television stations that infringe intellectual
property rights. Over the past year, acting on complaints by U.S. right
holders, the Government of Greece has taken action under Article 17 to
close down several television stations that were shown to have
broadcast illegally U.S. copyrighted works.
The United States, Greece and the European Communities observe that
estimated levels of television piracy in Greece have fallen
significantly since the initiation of these consultations, and that the
first criminal convictions for television piracy have also been issued
in Greece during this time. The United States, Greece and the European
Communities also note that Greece's Ministry of Justice has formally
instructed public prosecutors to ensure the timely prosecution of
intellectual property cases and to avoid postponements of court
hearings to ensure that such cases are not subject to unwarranted
delays in the courts. Consultations under WTO auspices are continuing.
Three other significant intellectual property protection problems
are lack of effective protection of copyrighted software, no protection
of trademarked products in the apparel sector and no laws protecting
the use of U.S. copyrighted Internet domain names. Although Greek
trademark legislation is fully harmonized with that of the EU, claims
by U.S. companies of counterfeiting appear to be on the increase. In
addition, a growing problem is the legality in Greece of using an
already copyrighted domain name, if it is succeeded by ``. gr.'' In a
recent court case, however, the Greek judge ruled in favor of a U.S.
company who claimed that a Greek company was intentionally using the
U.S. Internet domain name to misrepresent itself as a Greek subsidiary
of the U.S. company.
Intellectual property appears to be adequately protected in the
field of patents. Patents are available for all areas of technology.
Compulsory licensing is not used. Law protects patents and trade
secrets for a period of twenty years. There is a potential problem
concerning the protection of test data relating to non-patented
products. Violations of trade secrets and semiconductor chip layout
design are not problems in Greece.
8. Worker Rights
The Greek economy is characterized by significant labor-market
rigidities. Greek labor law prohibits laying off more than two percent
per month of total personnel employed by a firm. This restricts the
flexibility of firms and the mobility of Greek labor and contributes to
unemployment. A law, which came into force in November 1999, obliges
public and private firms employing more than 50 persons to hire up to 8
percent of their staff from among the disabled, veterans descendants
and families with more than four children.
a. The Right of Association: Approximately 30 percent of Greek
workers are organized in unions, most of which tend to be highly
politicized. While unions show support for certain political parties,
particularly on issues of direct concern to them, they are not
controlled by political parties or the government in their day-to-day
operations. The courts have the power to declare strikes illegal,
although such decisions are seldom enforced.
Employers are not permitted to lock out workers, or to replace
striking workers (public sector employees under civil mobilization may
be replaced on a temporary basis).
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively: The right to
organize and bargain collectively was guaranteed in legislation passed
in 1955 and amended in February 1990 to provide for mediation and
reconciliation services prior to compulsory arbitration. Antiunion
discrimination is prohibited, and complaints of discrimination against
union members or organizers may be referred to the Labor Inspectorate
or to the courts. However, litigation is lengthy and expensive, and
penalties are seldom severe. There are no restrictions on collective
bargaining for private workers. Social security benefits are legislated
by Parliament and are not won through bargaining. Civil servants
negotiate their demands with the Ministry for Public Administration.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor: Forced or compulsory
labor is strictly prohibited by the Greek Constitution and is not
practiced. However, the government may declare ``civil mobilization''
of workers in case of danger to national security or to social and
economic life of the country.
d. Minimum Age of Employment of Children: The minimum age for work
in industry is 15, with higher limits for certain activities.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work: Minimum standards of occupational
health and safety are provided for by legislation, which the General
Confederation of Greek Workers (GSEE) characterizes as satisfactory. In
1998, GSEE complaints regarding inadequate enforcement of legislation
were met when the Ministry of Labor established a new central
authority, the Labor Inspectors Agency. The agency is accountable to
the Minister of Labor and has extended powers which include the power
to close a factory that does not comply with minimum standards of
health and safety.
Legislation providing for the legalization of illegal immigrants
came into force in January 1998. About 350,000 illegal immigrants were
registered and will be entitled to one to three-year renewable work and
residence permit. Those issued a permit will have the same labor and
social security rights as Greek workers. Non-registered immigrants will
be liable to summary deportation if arrested.
f. Rights in Sectors with U.S. Investment: Although labor/
management relations and overall working conditions within foreign
business enterprises may be among the most progressive in Greece,
worker rights do not vary according to the nationality of the company
or the sector of the economy.
Extent of U.S. Investment in Selected Industries--U.S. Direct Investment Position Abroad on an Historical Cost
Basis--1998
[Millions of U.S. Dollars]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Category Amount
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Petroleum...................... .............. 75
Total Manufacturing .............. 91
Food & Kindred Products...... -9 ...............................................................
Chemicals & Allied Products.. 45 ...............................................................
Primary & Fabricated Metals.. 2 ...............................................................
Industrial Machinery and 0 ...............................................................
Equipment.
Electric & Electronic 9 ...............................................................
Equipment.
Transportation Equipment..... 3 ...............................................................
Other Manufacturing.......... 41 ...............................................................
Wholesale Trade................ .............. 92
Banking........................ .............. 166
Finance/Insurance/Real Estate.. .............. 126
Services....................... .............. 59
Other Industries............... .............. 50
TOTAL ALL INDUSTRIES........... .............. 660
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis.
______
HUNGARY
Key Economic Indicators \1\
[Billions of U.S. Dollars unless otherwise indicated)]
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1997 1998 1999
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Income, Production and Employment:
Nominal GDP............................. 44.7 47.0 \2\ 448.
8
Real GDP Growth (pct)................... 4.6 5.1 3.8
GDP by Sector: \3\
Agriculture........................... 3.1 98.5 N/A
Manufacturing......................... 9.4 111.2 N/A
Construction.......................... 2.0 112.1 N/A
Services.............................. 23.1 105.2 N/A
Government............................ 6.6 N/A N/A
Per Capita GDP (US$).................... 4,415 4,694 4,851
Labor Force (000's)..................... 6,253 6,368 6,200
Unemployment Rate (pct)................. 10.4 9.1 9.2
Money and Prices (annual percentage
growth):
Money Supply Growth..................... 23.2 18.1 \4\ 17.7
Average Consumer Price Inflation........ 18.4 14.3 10.5
Official Exchange Rate (HUF/$ annual 186.8 214.5 237
average)...............................
Balance of Payments and Trade:
Total Exports FOB....................... 19.1 23 23
Exports to U.S. (US$ millions)........ 1,079 1,567 \5\ 1,59
5
Total Imports CIF....................... 21.1 25,7 26
Imports from U.S. (US$ millions)...... 485 482 \5\ 524
Trade Balance........................... -2.6 -2.7 -3
Balance with U.S. (US$ millions)...... -543 -1,085 \5\ -1,0
71
Current Account Deficit/GDP (pct)....... 2.2 4.8 4.9
Net External Public Debt................ 4.6 4,4 \6\ 3.8
Debt Service Payments/GDP (pct)......... 13.8 10.3 11
Fiscal Deficit/GDP (pct)................ 4.6 4.5 5.1
Gold and Foreign Exchange Reserves...... 8.2 9.3 \7\ 10.2
Aid from U.S. (US$ millions)............ 15.0 9.9 4.0
Aid from All Other Sources.............. N/A N/A N/A
------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Source: Central Statistical Office and National Bank data available
through October 1999, except where otherwise noted.
\2\ Apparent inconsistency with the growth figures is due to the ongoing
Hungarian forint devaluation against the U.S. dollar.
\3\ GDP by sectors is higher than total GDP due to double counting.
\4\ July-on-July M1 growth (no M2 data available since 1998).
\5\ Source: U.S. Department of Commerce; 1998 projected from January-
August data. Note that U.S.-source and Hungarian-source bilateral
trade figures differ markedly, due largely to country-of-origin
distinctions in exports whose final assembly occurs in Hungary.
\6\ August 1999.
\7\ October 1999.
1. General Policy Framework
Hungary has been transformed into a middle-income country with a
market economy and a well-elaborated but still developing Western-
oriented legal and regulatory framework. The first post-communist
government (1990-94) began significant economic reform, but was unable
to privatize many state enterprises and implement systemic fiscal
reforms, which led to large imbalances in Hungary's fiscal and external
accounts. A successor government (1994-98) achieved economic
stabilization through an IMF-coordinated austerity program adopted in
March 1995, and accelerated privatization and economic reform. In 1999,
Hungary posted solid increases in industrial output, exports, and
overall output, while continuing to reduce inflation. Continued
economic restructuring under the current government (elected in May
1998) is expected to allow for sustainable growth in the medium term.
Substantial regional disparities exist in Hungary, though they will
likely narrow in the future.
A revised privatization program enacted in 1995 gave new momentum
to sales of government enterprises and assets, largely to Western
companies. Privatization contributed to a rapid transformation of the
energy, telecommunication, and banking sectors. Currently, over 80
percent of the country's GDP is derived from the private sector, and
Hungary has lowered government expenditures as a percentage of GDP.
Other significant reforms include means testing of social-welfare
payments (partially reversed by the current government) and partial
privatization of the pension system (implemented in January 1998). The
unfinished reform agenda includes rationalizing health care and local
government financing.
Privatization revenues have reduced Hungary's foreign debt burden
substantially. The government has an unblemished debt payments record
and its foreign-currency obligations have been rated investment grade
by all major rating agencies since late 1996. Foreign currency reserves
stood at $9.8 billion through July 1999, enough for five months of
imports.
In part reflecting concerns about the Russian financial crisis, the
government has pledged to continue reducing fiscal deficits and
inflationary wage increases. The consolidated budget deficit in 1999
will equal about 5 percent of GDP, down from 8.2 percent in 1994.
Hungary finances its state deficit primarily through foreign and
domestic bond issues. The government projects a $2.3 to 2.5 billion
current account deficit for 1999, almost unchanged from $2.3 billion in
1998. Foreign direct investment will exceed the current account
deficit, preventing an increase in net external debt. Following a
cumulative decline of 17 percent from 1995 to 1996, net real wages
continued to increase by 5.6 percent in 1998 and an estimated 2.7
percent in 1999, matched by large productivity gains over this period.
Hungary is a leader in attracting foreign direct investment, with
an estimated $21 billion in cumulative inflows since 1989. The U.S. is
a leading investor in Hungary with over $8 billion in cumulative FDI
since 1989. Although in the process of being scaled down, tax
incentives and related credits are available for foreign investments,
especially in underdeveloped regions. Hungarian law currently permits
the establishment of companies in customs-free zones, which are also
exempt from indirect taxation tied to the turnover of goods.
A signatory to the Uruguay Round Agreement and a founding member of
the World Trade Organization, Hungary joined the Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) in May 1996 and, as a part
of that process, is further liberalizing capital account transactions.
Hungary has harmonized many laws and regulations with European Union
standards and has oriented economic policy towards earliest possible
accession.
2. Exchange Rate Policy
The revised Foreign Exchange Law, effective January 1, 1996, made
the Hungarian forint essentially convertible for current account
transactions. Foreigners and Hungarians can maintain both hard currency
and forint accounts. The forint exchange rate is managed within a +/-
2.25 percent band (``crawling peg'') against a currency basket composed
of the euro (70 percent) and the dollar (30 percent). As of January 1,
2000, the forint will cease to be pegged against a basket of currencies
and will be pegged 100 percent to the euro. In November 1999, the rate
of devaluation was 0.4 percent a month against the currency basket.
Also in November of 1999, the Hungarian Finance Ministry indicated the
devaluation of the forint could end in 2001 or 2002. Improved
macroeconomic performance has helped slow average annual inflation from
28.3 percent in 1995 to a projected 10 percent for 1999.
The Hungarian National Bank (MNB) carries out monetary policy
through open market operations focusing on an interest rate policy
consistent with price stability and within the constraints of the
foreign exchange regime. Commercial banks can conclude foreign exchange
swap transactions with the MNB.
3. Structural Policies
The market freely sets prices for most products and services. User
prices for pharmaceuticals, public transport, and utilities continue to
be partially set by the state. The government offers a wholesale floor
price for many agricultural products. Public opposition and regulatory
intervention have prevented utility prices from reaching market levels,
causing energy companies to receive less than the cost-plus-eight
percent return stipulated in privatization contracts.
Starting in 1997, successive governments have reduced income tax
rates and employer social contributions in an effort to cut inflation,
spur job growth, and shrink the gray economy. Corporate tax remains low
at 18 percent. Currently, a ten-year corporate tax holiday applies to
investments of at least HUF 10 billion (about $41,000 as of November
1999) or HUF 3 billion in less developed regions, and a five-year 50
percent tax holiday applies to investments of at least HUF 1 billion.
Other incentive programs exist; consult the Country Commercial Guide.
Many municipalities offer local incentives.
Major structural budget reform has been implemented and further
legislation is expected in this area. In January 1998, a new ``three
pillar'' pension system was introduced in which private funds initially
augment and gradually supplant more of the current state-funded, pay-
as-you-go public system. The government is likely to focus on reforming
health care and local government financing, in order to reduce further
state expenditures.
4. Debt Management
Hungary is a moderately indebted country (though high by per capita
standards), with gross foreign debt expected to be $24.9 billion at the
end of 1999. In addition, net foreign debt is projected to be $12
billion at the end of 1999, down from $14 billion in 1996. Net public
domestic debt was $5.0 billion at the end of October 1998, slightly
over half the level at the end of 1996. Hungarian governments have
consistently met external debt service payments. A standby credit
arrangement with the International Monetary Fund ended in February 1998
by mutual agreement. Hungary has prepaid all past borrowings from the
IMF, and received an investment grade rating on sovereign long-term
foreign currency debt from leading U.S. credit rating agencies in late
1996. Hungary is expected to have reserves of $9.5 to $10 billion by
the end of 1999.
5. Significant Barriers to U.S. Exports
On July 1, 1997, Hungary joined the Pan European Free Trade Zone
and Cumulation System. Combined with tariff reductions stipulated in
Hungary's 1993 EU Association Agreement, industrial imports from EU
members and associated states face declining tariffs (to be eliminated
in 2001), while U.S.-origin goods will face Hungary's MFN tariff rates
until Hungary's adoption of the common external tariff upon accession
to the EU. The increasing differential between tariffs on EU industrial
goods and on U.S. industrial goods has disadvantaged many U.S.
exporters. Duty must be paid on imports from outside the Pan-European
Zone, which may then be exported duty-free to other countries within
the Pan European Zone. Duty paid on inputs processed and then exported
within the zone is no longer refunded, a problem the Hungarian
Government has addressed on a case-by-case basis for U.S. firms
exporting from Hungary to European markets.
Although 95 percent of imports (in value terms) no longer require
prior government approval, quota constraints apply to some 20 product
groups, mainly cars, textiles, and precious metals (but quotas did not
restrict imports in most of these areas). Under WTO rules, Hungary will
phase out quotas on textiles and apparel by 2004. As a result of the
WTO Agricultural Agreement, quotas on agricultural products and
processed foods have been progressive replaced by tariff-rate quotas.
In 1997, Hungary eliminated an import surcharge imposed as part of the
March 1995 austerity package.
Importers must file a customs document (VAM 91 form) with a product
declaration and code number, obtained from the Central Statistical
Office. Upon importation, the importer must present Commercial Quality
Control Institute (KERMI) certified documentation to clear customs.
This permit may be replaced by other national certification and testing
agency documents, such as those of the National Institute for Drugs.
Hungary participates in the International Organization for
Standardization (ISC) and the International Electro-Technical
Commission (IEC).
Foreign investment is allowed in every sector open to private
investment. Foreign ownership is restricted to varying degrees in civil
aviation, defense, and broadcasting. Only Hungarian citizens may own
farmland.
Under the November 1995 Law on Government Procurement, public
tenders must be invited for purchases of goods with a value over HUF 10
million ($41,000 as of November 1999), construction projects worth HUF
20 million and designs and services worth over HUF 5 million. Bids
containing more than 50 percent Hungarian content receive a 10 percent
price preference. This process does not apply to military purchases
affecting national security, or to gas, oil, and electricity contracts.
Hungary is not a party to the WTO Government Procurement Code, and some
U.S. firms have taken legal action against non-transparency and
procedural irregularities in government tenders.
6. Export Subsidies Policies
The Export-Import Bank and Export Credit Guarantee Agency, both
founded in 1994, provide credit and/or credit insurance for less than
ten percent of total exports. There are no direct export subsidies on
industrial products, but some agricultural products receive export
subsidies from the state. After 1993, agricultural export subsidies
exceeded Hungary's Uruguay Round commitments in the range and value of
products subsidized; in October 1997, the WTO approved an agreement in
which Hungary committed to phase out excess subsidies and not to expand
exports of subsidized products to new markets. Hungary is sticking to
the terms of that agreement in phasing out subsidies, despite continued
political pressure from domestic constituencies.
7. Protection of U.S. Intellectual Property
In 1993, the United States and Hungary signed a comprehensive
Bilateral Intellectual Property Rights Treaty. Hungary also belongs to
the World Intellectual Property Organization; Paris Convention on
Industrial Property; Hague Agreement on Industrial Designs; Nice
Agreement on Classification and Registration of Trademarks; Madrid
Agreement Concerning Registration and Classification of Trademarks;
Patent Cooperation Treaty; and Berne and Universal Copyright
Conventions. In 1998, Hungary ratified the new WIPO Copyright Treaty
and Performances and Phonograms Treaty.
Legal implementation of intellectual property rights in Hungary is
generally good, but insufficient resources, court delays, and light
penalties hamper enforcement. The Government of Hungary enacted a new
Copyright Law in 1999, which came into effect on September 1, 1999.
This replaced the 1969 Copyright Law and introduced modern copyright
legislation. The 1995 Media Law makes broadcast transmission licenses
conditional on respect for international copyrights. In 1997,
legislation strengthened access to legal injunctions in infringement
cases.
8. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association: The 1992 Labor Code, as amended in
1999, recognizes the right of unions to organize and bargain
collectively and permits trade union pluralism. Workers have the right
to associate freely, choose representatives, publish journals, and
openly promote members' interests and views. With the exception of
military personnel and the police, they also have the right to strike.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively: Labor laws
permit collective bargaining at the enterprise and industry levels. The
Economic Council (formerly the Interest Reconciliation Council), a
forum of representatives from employers, employees, and the government,
sets the minimum and recommended wage levels in the public sector.
Trade unions and management negotiate private wage levels. Special
labor courts enforce labor laws. Affected parties may appeal labor
court decisions in civil court. The 1992 legislation prohibits
employers from discriminating against unions and their organizers.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor: The government
enforces the legal prohibition of compulsory labor.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children: The Labor Code forbids
work by minors under the age of 14, and regulates labor conditions for
minors age 14 to 16 (e.g., in apprenticeship programs).
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work: The Labor Code specifies
conditions of employment, including: working time, termination
procedures, severance pay, maternity leave, trade union consultation
rights in management decisions, annual and sick leave entitlement, and
conflict resolution procedures.
f. Rights in Sectors with U.S. Investment: Conditions in specific
goods-producing sectors in which U.S. capital is invested do not differ
from those in other sectors of the economy.
Extent of U.S. Investment in Selected Industries--U.S. Direct Investment Position Abroad on an Historical Cost
Basis--1998
[Millions of U.S. Dollars]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Category Amount
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Petroleum...................... .............. 3
Total Manufacturing............ .............. 537
Food & Kindred Products...... 52 ...............................................................
Chemicals & Allied Products.. 238 ...............................................................
Primary & Fabricated Metals.. (\1\) ...............................................................
Industrial Machinery and 8 ...............................................................
Equipment.
Electric & Electronic 32 ...............................................................
Equipment.
Transportation Equipment..... (\1\) ...............................................................
Other Manufacturing.......... 122 ...............................................................
Wholesale Trade................ .............. (\1\)
Banking........................ .............. (\1\)
Finance/Insurance/Real Estate.. .............. 17
Services....................... .............. -34
Other Industries............... .............. 715
TOTAL ALL INDUSTRIES........... .............. 1,353
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Suppressed to avoid disclosing data of individual companies.
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis.
______
IRELAND
Key Economic Indicators
[Millions of U.S. Dollars unless otherwise indicated]
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1997 1998 \1\ 1999
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Income, Production and Employment:
Nominal GDP.......................... 78,771 85,050 90,536
Real GDP Growth (pct) \2\............ 10.7 8.9 8.2
GDP By Sector: \3\
Agriculture........................ 4,338 3,990 N/A
Industry........................... 26,624 29,590 N/A
Services........................... 35,677 38,368 N/A
Government......................... 3,099 3,123 N/A
Per Capita GDP (US$)................. 21,519 22,956 24,177
Labor Force (000's).................. 1,538 1,622 1,688
Unemployment Rate (pct) \4\.......... 10.3 7.8 5.7
Money and Prices (annual percentage
growth):
Money Supply Growth (M3e) \5\........ 19.1 18.1 21.0
Consumer Price Inflation............. 1.5 2.4 1.8
Exchange Rate (IP/US$)
Official........................... 0.66 0.70 0.74
Parallel........................... N/A N/A N/A
Balance of Payments and Trade:
Total Exports FOB \6\................ 53,711 64,032 71,584
Exports to U.S..................... 6,045 8,743 10,500
Total Imports CIF \6\................ 39,341 44,468 47,300
Imports from U.S................... 5,893 7,167 7,600
Trade Balance........................ 14,370 19,564 24,284
Balance with U.S................... 152 1,576 2,900
External Public Debt \7\............. 18,886 15,559 13,000
Fiscal Deficit/GDP (Pct) \8\......... 1.1 2.3 3.2
Current Account Balance/GDP (pct).... 2.5 0.9 -0.2
Debt Service Payments/GDP (pct)...... 5.3 4.3 3.8
Gold and Foreign Exchange Reserves... 7,047 9,220 9,000
Aid from U.S.\9\..................... 5 5 5
Aid from Other Sources \10\.......... 1,497 1,574 1,530
------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ U.S. Embassy forecasts.
\2\ GDP at constant market prices (local currency).
\3\ GDP at factor cost.
\4\ ILO definition.
\5\ Broad money. Irish monetary aggregates were redefined as part of
entry into EMU from January 1, 1999.
\6\ Merchandise trade.
\7\ Foreign currency denominated debt plus non-resident holdings of
Irish Pound denominated debt; end year.
\8\ General government.
\9\ Each year the United States contributes 19.6 million dollars to the
International Fund to Ireland (IFI). A quarter of this amount is
estimated to be spent in the Republic of Ireland's border counties.
\10\ These figures include transfers from the EU's European social fund,
regional development fund, cohesion fund and special programme for
Northern Ireland and the border counties of the Republic of Ireland.
Sources: Central Bank Of Ireland (CBI); Central Statistics Office (CSO);
Irish Trade Board (ITB); National Treasury Management Agency (NTMA).
1. General Policy Framework
In 1999, Ireland will have the fastest growing economy in the
industrialized world for the sixth consecutive year. Most commentators
trace the origins of Ireland's ``Celtic Tiger'' economy to the economic
policy mix put in place in the late 1980s and maintained by successive
governments since then. This included:
(1) Tight control of public spending in order to reduce
government borrowing and taxation on corporate and personal
incomes;
(2) A de facto incomes policy, operated through national wage
agreements agreed by the government, employers and trade
unions, in order to limit wage growth and boost employment
creation;
(3) The ten percent corporate tax rate for international
manufacturing and service companies;
(4) High levels of investment in education, training and
physical infrastructure, much of it funded by generous
transfers from the European Union; and
(5) Reform of the tax and welfare system to improve work
incentives. In contrast to the economic policies of the 1970s
and early 1980s, the policy mix in the last decade has centered
on supply-side reforms to the economy, aimed at improving the
attractiveness of Ireland as a location for overseas investment
and increasing competitiveness of Irish-made goods in the
international marketplace.
This policy mix produced impressive economic results in the 1990s.
Real Irish GDP growth has averaged almost nine percent since 1994, and
real Irish incomes have increased by over two-thirds since the
beginning of the decade. In 1998, per capita output overtook both the
EU and the OECD average. Unemployment fell below six percent in 1999,
down from 16 percent in 1993. Traditional migration patterns have been
reversed, as thousands of former Irish emigres, and other nationals,
arrive in Ireland to take up employment. Fast growth has been
accompanied by increasing openness to the world economy. In 1998, total
imports and exports were equivalent to over 157 percent of GDP, making
Ireland one of the most trade-dependent economies in the world. Thanks
in large part to the special 10 percent tax rate for manufacturing
activities, industry accounts for almost 40 percent of total economic
activity, compared with an average of 20 percent in the European Union
(EU). Correspondingly, the share of services in Irish output is small
by the standards of other industrialized countries. This unusual
economic structure in also reflected in Ireland's trade relationship
with the rest of the world. Reflecting the heavy presence of Irish-
based U.S. and other multinational manufacturing firms (mostly in the
high-tech sector), Ireland now enjoys a huge surplus in merchandise
trade (equivalent to 27 percent in GDP in 1998), which is mirrored by
large deficits in services trade.
At the end of the 1990s, Ireland's policy makers face a much-
changed economic landscape. Now that Ireland's traditional economic
ailments--unemployment and emigration--have largely been solved, policy
makers are now faced with the challenges brought about by five years of
exceptional economic growth. Of greatest concern is how to sustain
rapid economic growth in the face of shortages of skilled and unskilled
labor, worsening transport congestion and chronic housing shortages.
Irish policy makers fear that ``excessive'' economic growth in the
short-term could result in a hard landing for the Irish economy down
the road. In a society wedded to the concept of ``social cohesion,''
sharing the benefits of rapid economic growth with those social groups
and regions that have so far been left behind by the ``Celtic tiger''
economy has become another top priority.
Secondly, the economic policy tools available to Irish policy
makers to pursue national economic and social goals has been severely
limited by Irish participation in European economic and monetary (EMU)
from the beginning of 1999. With both monetary and exchange rate policy
now out of the control of national authorities, the government now
depends on more effective use of fiscal, structural and incomes
policies to bring the Irish economy onto a more sustainable growth
path. Since 1987, Irish governments have exchanged cuts in income tax
for pay restraint by trade unions, thereby boosting competitiveness and
employment. In late 1999, the government, trade unions and industry
will attempt to negotiate a new national wage agreement to replace
``partnership 2000,'' which expires next year. As the economy moves
rapidly towards full employment, pay ``flexibility'' rather than pay
restraint has become the new goal of income policy. The government also
believes further income tax cuts for low- and medium-income earners
will increase labor supply, thereby more than offsetting the
stimulative effects of looser fiscal policy. This highly unorthodox
approach to economic policy has been endorsed by the OECD, but not by
the IMF, who have called on Irish authorities to tighten fiscal policy
to combat overheating. In the highly open Irish economy, however,
fiscal policy is of limited use as a tool of demand management.
Since the beginning of 1999, monetary policy in Ireland, as in the
other ten EU states that adopted the single European currency, has been
formulated by the European central bank (ECB) in Frankfurt. The Irish
central bank continues to exist as a constituent member of the European
System of Central Banks (ESCB) and is responsible for implementing a
common European monetary policy in Ireland (i.e. providing and
withdrawing liquidity from the Irish inter-bank market at an interest
rate set by the ECB.) The governor of the Irish central bank (currently
Maurice O'Connell) has, ex officio, one vote in the ECB's 17-member
monetary policy committee, although each national central bank governor
is expected to disregard the individual performances of their own
national economies in formulating a common monetary policy for the Euro
area.
The 1992 treaty on European Union identifies price stability as the
primary objective of monetary policy under EMU. Price stability is
defined by the ECB as a year-on-year increase in the harmonized index
of consumer prices for the Euro area in the range of zero to two
percent. In making its assessment of future consumer price movements,
the ECB will take account of trends in money supply, private sector
credit, and a range of intermediate price indicators. The primary
instrument of monetary policy is refinancing operations by the ECB and
the national central banks (purchases and repurchases of government
securities at a discount rate announced weekly.) Ireland accounts for
just over one percent of total economic activity in the Euro zone, and
less than two percent of the broad money stock. Fast economic and
monetary growth in Ireland alone, therefore, has little impact on
monetary policy formulation at the European level, highlighting the
difficulties that Ireland, and other small Euro nations, may have with
a ``one-size-fits-all'' single European monetary policy.
2. Exchange Rate Policies
At the beginning of 1999, the Irish pound ceased to exist as
Ireland's national currency, and the new single European currency, the
Euro, became the official unit of exchange. Although Irish currency
will continue to circulate until the introduction of Euro notes and
coins in 2002, it will be no more than a ``denomination'' of the Euro,
with an irrevocably fixed exchange rate to the Euro and the nine other
participating currencies. The conversion rate between the Irish pound
and the Euro was Euro 1.2697:ip 1.
The Euro and the pound are freely convertible for both capital and
current account transactions. Under 1992 treaty on European Union, the
European central bank has operational responsibility for the exchange
rate of the Euro and conducts foreign exchange market transactions in
relation to the currency on a day-to-day basis. However, the treaty
provides that the council of ministers may formulate ``general
orientations'' for exchange rate policy in relation to the Euro,
without prejudice to the ECB's primary objective to maintain price
stability. These general orientations will only be agreed in
exceptional circumstances. Unlike any other Euro participant, Ireland's
two largest trading partners, the UK and the United States, are outside
the Euro zone. Ireland's loss of control over its exchange rate with UK
sterling and the dollar makes Irish exports more vulnerable to swings
in the external value of the Euro than any other Euro country, and
places pressure on Irish exporters to increase the flexibility of their
cost base, particularly labor costs. The Irish pound averaged US$ 1:ip
0.70 in 1998, and is likely to average in the region of US$ 1:ip 0.74
in 1999.
3. Structural Policies
In Ireland, as in other EU states, a considerable degree of
structural reform of capital, labor and product markets has been
undertaken in recent years through various ``processes'' coordinated by
the European commission. Irish authorities recognize that fostering
greater competition in product and labor markets will be necessary for
Ireland to sustain a rapid rate of economic growth in a supply-
constrained economy over the coming years. Policy makers also recognize
that flexible and well-functioning markets will be necessary to buffer
the Irish economy from unexpected asymmetric shocks in the context of
EMU without losses of output and employment. Ireland's high degree of
openness to trade means that product markets in Ireland are highly
competitive. EU liberalization in energy and telecommunications markets
has opened up Irish sectors traditionally dominated by state-owned
enterprises to private sector competition. Regulation of Irish labor
markets is light compared with continental European economies. Labor
market reform efforts have concentrated on removing distortions in the
tax and welfare system in order to improve work incentives for the
unemployed and other non-labor force participants. There is little
doubt that effective structural reform of the Irish economy over the
last decade has increased the ability of the Irish economy to sustain
fast rates of economic growth without spurring inflation. Fast Irish
economic growth has in turn fueled Irish demand for U.S. imports. Other
important structural economic policies over the last decade include:
(a) The development of a social consensus on economic policy
through national wage agreements negotiated by the government,
employers and trade unions. The latest agreement, partnership
2000, took effect at the beginning of 1997 and trades off
continued moderation by trade unions in wage demands against
substantial cuts in personal taxation;
(b) The availability of a special ten percent rate of
corporate taxation and generous grants to attract foreign
investment;
(c) A commitment to the single European market and to Irish
participation in EMU;
(d) High levels of investment in education and training--of
all OECD countries only the Japanese workforce has a higher
proportion of trained engineers and scientists;
(e) And improvements in physical infrastructure--structural
investment between 1993 and 1999 are expected to total around
16 billion dollars (almost 4,500 dollars per head). Generous EU
transfers have funded much of this.
The success of the above policies in attracting foreign investors
and raising incomes has also boosted U.S. exports to Ireland. Over 500
U.S. firms are now located in Ireland. These companies import a large
proportion of their capital equipment and operating inputs from parent
companies and other suppliers in the United States. Accordingly, the
largest component of U.S. exports to Ireland is office machinery and
equipment, followed by electrical machinery and organic chemicals.
Furthermore, as U.S. firms in Ireland become increasingly integrated
with the local economy, sales by U.S. parent companies to local Irish
enterprises are believed to have increased dramatically in recent
years, although the data on this remains sketchy. The combination of
the above two effects has helped increase U.S. exports to Ireland by a
factor of six between 1983 to 1998. As a result, the United States has
become Ireland's second largest trading partner, behind only the UK.
4. Debt Management Policies
The National Treasury Management Agency (NTMA) is the state agency
responsible for the management of the government debt. At the end of
1998, Ireland's general government debt amounted to 45.9 billion
dollars (using average 1998 exchange rates), equivalent to 52 percent
of GDP. This is down from 102% of GDP in 1989, reflecting strong fiscal
rectitude in the 1990s and the fast pace of economic growth over this
period. The bulk of the national debt was accumulated in the 1970's and
early 1980's, partly as a result of high oil prices, but more generally
as a result of expanding social welfare programs and public-sector
employment. Foreign currency debt at the end of 1998 made up
approximately 25 percent of the total. This is down from just over 40
percent at the end of 1993, reflecting the government's strong
financial position and Ireland's substantial balance of payments
surplus, and a deliberate policy to reduce foreign currency debt as
much as possible.
Most new government borrowing, generally used to roll-over maturing
debt, is financed through the issuance of Irish pound securities,
although a substantial proportion of these are purchased by non-
resident investors. The total debt servicing cost in 1998 was 3.7
billion dollars, equivalent to 4.3 percent of GDP. Lower interest
rates, falling nominal debt levels and fast Irish income growth have
reduced debt servicing costs as a proportion of total government
revenue significantly in recent years, providing scope for reform of
the personal taxation system, thus increasing consumer demand for U.S.
exports of goods and services. In May 1999 the NTMA completed a re-
denomination of Euro 16 billion ($16.5 billion) worth of Irish
government bonds into four giant issues, whose maturity ranges from
three to 17 years. The re-denomination replaced high-coupon government
debt with a relatively low nominal value, issued over the last decade,
with low coupon debt with a high nominal value and which carries
conditions closer to European norms. The move gives Ireland, the second
smallest borrower in the Euro zone, the largest single Euro bond issue,
with Euro 5.5 billion ($5.7 billion) in its 2010 treasury stock. Irish
authorities hopes that the re-denomination will, over time, increase
the liquidity of the Irish debt market and make holding Irish debt more
attractive to foreign investors, thus lowering yields.
5. Aid
In 1998, the United States contributed 19.6 million dollars to the
international fund for Ireland (IFI), of which around five million is
estimated to have been spent in the border constituencies of the
republic of Ireland, with the balance being spent in the UK province of
northern Ireland. The IFI funds business/community development programs
intended to build cross-border (north-south) trade and economic ties
6. Significant Barriers to U.S. Exports
The United States is Ireland's second largest source of imports,
behind only the UK. Total exports from the United States into Ireland
in 1998 were valued at US$ 7.2 billion (16.1 percent of total Irish
imports), up from just over US$ 3 billion in 1990. Irish exports to the
United States have, however, increased at an even faster rate over the
same period. Total Irish exports to the United States in 1998 were
valued at US$ 8.7 billion (13.7 percent of total Irish exports.)
Accordingly, the trade balance between the two countries in 1998
favored Ireland by almost US$ 1.6 billion. Before 1997, the trade
balance between the two countries favored the United States for several
decades. The changed U.S.-Irish trade relationship in recent years in
large part reflects high levels of direct investment by U.S. companies
in Ireland in recent years, many of which use Ireland as a base for
exporting not only into European markets, but also back into the United
States.
As a member of the EU, Ireland administers tariff and non-tariff
barriers in accordance with applicable EU policies. With regard to
trade in services, Ireland maintains some barriers in the aviation
industry: airlines serving Ireland may provide their own ground
handling services, but are prohibited from providing similar services
to other airlines. The bilateral U.S.-Ireland aviation agreement also
places some restrictions on aviation services between the United States
and Ireland. Under the agreement, any carrier providing North Atlantic
services to Dublin airport, must also provide service to Shannon
airport on Ireland's west coast, which makes additional Dublin service
unprofitable for some U.S. airlines at this time.
Ireland has consistently complied with the provisions of the 1989
EU ``television without frontiers'' broadcasting directive. This
requires that EU member states reserve a majority of television
transmission time for European works. Irish television industry sources
are skeptical, however, whether Irish compliance with the directive has
impacted negatively on U.S. programming exports to Ireland over this
period.
The market for telecommunications services in Ireland was fully
liberalized in December 1998--more than one year ahead of the timetable
agreed with the European commission in 1996. Until then, Eircom, the
former state-owned telecommunications company, was the monopoly
provider of voice telephony services to the general public, although
the market for leased lines, mobile telephony and other data
transmission services was progressively liberalized earlier in the
1990s. Regulatory confusion and legal battles over interconnection
rates between Eircom and new market entrants have, however, hampered
the development of effective competition in this sector, and may prove
a barrier to U.S. service providers.
As a member of the EU, Ireland applies a community-wide product
certification process and community-wide product standards. With only
minor exceptions, there are no requirements for marking imported goods.
Packaged goods must carry labels that conform to Irish labeling
requirements. The information on the labels must include details on
ingredients, net weight, ``best before'' date and general usage
instructions. Unlike many other EU countries, Irish labeling
requirements also require that the name and EU address of the
manufacturer, distributor or packer appear on the label. This has often
caused difficulties for U.S. exporters, although the financial cost has
probably been small.
Although some liberalization has taken place in recent years,
Ireland still maintains some of the strictest animal and plant health
import restrictions in the EU. These together with EU import duties,
effectively exclude many meat-based foods, fresh vegetables and other
agricultural exports from the United States. Restrictions also apply to
foods containing genetically modified organisms, bananas from outside
the Caribbean area, cosmetics containing specified risk materials, and
some wines, although as with other goods, these policies are determined
at EU level.
Ireland has been a member of the world trade organization (WTO)
since it came into effect on January 1, 1995. The WTO agreement was
ratified by the Irish parliament in November 1994. As member of the EU,
however, Ireland participates in a large number of EU regional trade
agreements, which may distort trade away from countries with whom
Ireland trades purely on a MFN, non-preferential WTO basis.
7. Export Subsidies Policies
The government generally does not provide direct or indirect
support for local exports. However, companies located in designated
industrial zones, namely the Shannon Duty Free Processing Zone (SDFPZ)
and Ringaskiddy port, receive exemption from taxes and duties on
imported inputs used in the manufacture of goods destined for non-EU
countries. Furthermore, Ireland applies a special 10 percent rate of
corporation tax (the standard rate is 28 percent) to companies
producing internationally-traded manufactures and services and to
companies operating out of the SDFPZ and the international financial
services center in Dublin. Under pressure from the European commission,
which viewed the tax as a subsidy to industry, the Irish government is
committed to eliminating the special 10 percent rate of tax by
harmonizing the special and standard rates of tax at 12.5 percent by
2003, thereby abolishing the differential treatment.
Other activities that qualify for the special ten percent rate of
corporate of taxation include design and planning services rendered in
Ireland in connection with specified engineering works outside the
European Union. This applied mainly to services provided by engineers,
architects and quantity surveyors. Profits from the provision of
identical services in connection with works inside the EU are taxed at
the standard 28 percent rate.
Since January 1992, the government has provided export credit
insurance for political risk and medium-term commercial risk in
accordance with OECD guidelines. As a participant in the EU's common
agricultural policy, the Irish department of agriculture and food
administers cap export refund and other subsidy programs on behalf of
the EU commission.
8. Protection of U.S. Intellectual Property
Ireland is a member of the world intellectual property organization
and a party to the international convention for the protection of
intellectual property. The Irish government is currently in the process
of enacting new copyright legislation to bring Ireland's laws into line
with its obligations under the WTO TRIPs agreement. Examples of
existing TRIPs inconsistencies in current Irish law, which the
government is committed to addressing, include absence of a rental
right for sound recordings, no ``anti-bootlegging'' provision, and low
criminal penalties which fail to deter piracy, all of which have
contributed to high levels of piracy in Ireland (industry sources
estimate that up to 57 percent of PC software used in Ireland is
pirated.) To address several of the most glaring discrepancies between
Irish law and Dublin's obligations under TRIPs, a ``break-out''
copyright bill was enacted in June 1998, which strengthens the
presumption of copyright ownership and increases penalties for
copyright violation. The Irish Seanad (upper house) passed more
comprehensive copyright legislation in October 1999, and the Irish
government has pledged to complete passage in the Dail (lower house)
before the end of the year. When enacted, the legislation will give
Ireland one of the most comprehensive IPR legal regimes in Europe. In
light of government commitments to enact new copyright legislation,
USTR suspended WTO dispute settlement proceedings against Ireland,
though Ireland remains on the USTR's section 301 ``watchlist'' pending
enactment of this IPR reform legislation.
The comprehensive copyright bill currently before parliament also
addresses non-TRIPs conforming provisions of Irish patent law.
Ireland's patent law, as it currently stands, fails to meet TRIPs
obligations in at least two respects:
(1) The compulsory licensing provisions of the 1992 patent
law are inconsistent with the ``working'' requirement
prohibition of TRIPs articles 27.1 and the general compulsory
licensing provisions of article 31; and
(2) Applications processed after December 20, 1991 do not
conform to the non-discrimination requirement of TRIPs article
27.1.
--Trademarks: in accordance with EU council directive 89/104/
European economic community (the harmonization of trademark laws), and
EU council regulation number 40/94 (community trademark and the
registration of trademarks in services industries), new legislation was
required to replace the trademarks act of 1963. The trademarks act of
1996 was signed into law in July of that year. There appear to be no
problems with the new law.
9. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association: The right to join a union is
guaranteed by law, as is the right to refrain from joining. The
industrial relations act of 1990 prohibits retribution against strikers
and union leaders. Embassy calculates that approximately 45 percent of
workers in the private sector are trade union members. Police and
military personnel are prohibited from joining unions or striking, but
they may form associations to represent them in matters of pay, working
conditions, and general welfare. The right to strike is freely
exercised in both the public and private sectors. The Irish Congress of
Trade Unions (ICTU), which represents unions in both the republic and
Northern Ireland, has 64 member-unions with 699,190 members.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively: Labor unions
have full freedom to organize and to engage in free collective
bargaining. Legislation prohibits anti-union discrimination. In recent
years, most terms and conditions of employment in Ireland have been
determined through collective bargaining in the context of a national
economic pact. Under the current three-year agreement, partnership
2000, which expires in 2000, trade unions traded off moderation in wage
demands for cuts in personal taxation by the government. The Irish
Business and Employers Confederation (IBEC) generally represent
employer interests in labor matters.
The labor relations commission, established by the industrial
relations act of 1990, provides advice and conciliation services in
industrial disputes. The commission may refer unresolved disputes to
the labor court. The labor court, consisting of an employer
representative, a trade union representative, and an independent
chairman, may investigate labor disputes, recommend the terms of
settlement, engage in conciliation and arbitration, and set up joint
committees to regulate conditions of employment and minimum rates of
pay for workers in a given trade or industry.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor: Forced or compulsory
labor is prohibited by law and does not exist in Ireland.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children: New legislation
introduced in 1997 prohibits the full-time employment of children under
the age of 16, although employers may hire 14 or 15 year olds for light
work on school holidays, or on a part-time basis during the school
year. The law also limits the number of hours which children under age
18 may work. These provisions are enforced effectively by the Irish
department of enterprise, trade and employment.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work: After persistent lobbying by
trade unions, in April 1998, the Irish government announced proposals
for the introduction of a national hourly minimum wage of IP 4.40
(around US$ 6.70) beginning in April 2000. Although minimum wages
already exist in certain low-paid industries, such as textiles and
cleaning, these only apply to a relatively small proportion of the
workforce. The full minimum wage will not apply to trainees or workers
under 18 years of age.
The standard workweek is 39 hours. In May 1997, a European
commission directive on working time was transposed into Irish law,
through the ``organization of working time act, 1997.'' The act sets a
maximum of 48 working hours per week, requires that workers be given
breaks after they work certain periods of time, sets limits to shift
work, and mandates four weeks annual holidays for all employees by
1999.
f. Rights in Sectors With U.S. Investment: Worker rights described
above are applicable in all sectors of the economy, including those
with significant U.S. investment.
Extent of U.S. Investment in Selected Industries--U.S. Direct Investment Position Abroad on an Historical Cost
Basis--1998
[Millions of U.S. Dollars]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Category Amount
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Petroleum...................... .............. (\1\)
Total Manufacturing............ .............. 8,090
Food & Kindred Products...... 669 ...............................................................
Chemicals & Allied Products.. 3,184 ...............................................................
Primary & Fabricated Metals.. 177 ...............................................................
Industrial Machinery and 185 ...............................................................
Equipment.
Electric & Electronic 1,529 ...............................................................
Equipment.
Transportation Equipment..... 15 ...............................................................
Other Manufacturing.......... 2,332 ...............................................................
Wholesale Trade................ .............. 332
Banking........................ .............. (\1\)
Finance/Insurance/Real Estate.. .............. 6,638
Services....................... .............. 305
Other Industries............... .............. (\1\)
TOTAL ALL INDUSTRIES........... .............. 15,936
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Suppressed to avoid disclosing data of individual companies.
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis.
______
ITALY
Key Economic Indicators
[Billions of U.S. Dollars unless otherwise indicated]
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1997 1998 \1\ 1999
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Income, Production and Employment:
Real GDP \2\......................... 1,123.1 1,138.1 1,148.6
Real GDP Growth (pct) \3\............ 1.5 1.3 0.9
GDP (at current prices).............. 1,159.5 1,184.8 1,177.1
GDP by Sector:
Agriculture........................ 30.6 30.4 N/A
Manufacturing...................... 291.3 294.3 N/A
Construction....................... 53.4 53.2 N/A
Services........................... 682.2 674.7 N/A
Per Capita GDP (US$)................. 20,839 20,834 20,699
Labor Force (millions)............... 23.0 23.1 23.1
Unemployment Rate (pct).............. 11.7 11.8 11.6
Money and Prices (annual percentage
growth):
Money Supply (M2) \4\................ 9.0 5.6 5.2
Consumer Price Inflation............. 2.0 2.0 1.6
Exchange Rate
(Lira/US$ annual average of market 1703 1737 1800
rate).............................
Balance of Payments and Trade:
Total Exports FOB \4\................ 238.2 242.3 148.6
Exports to U.S.\4\................. 18.9 20.8 N/A
Total Imports CIF \5\................ 208.1 215.5 136.6
Imports from U.S.\5\............... 10.2 10.9 N/A
Trade Balance \5\.................... 30.3 26.8 12.0
Balance with U.S.\5\............... 8.5 9.9 7.6
External Public Debt................. 80.0 78.6 77.8
Fiscal Deficit/GDP................... 2.7 2.6 2.2
Current Account Surplus/GDP (pct).... 3.2 1.9 1.5
Debt Service Payments/GDP (pct) \6\.. 10.7 10.7 6.6
Gold and Foreign Exchange Reserves... 76.0 53.6 43.4
------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ 1999 estimates based on data available through October.
\2\ 1995 prices; GDP at factor cost.
\3\ Percentage changes calculated in local currency.
\4\ 1999 data is the growth rate of the Italian components of M2 in the
Euro area through August.
\5\ Merchandise trade. 1999 data through August
\6\ Represents total debt servicing costs; less than six percent of
total debt is foreign debt.
1. General Policy Framework
Italy has the world's sixth largest economy, having grown into an
industrial power in the last 50 years. Italy maintains an open economy,
and is a member of major multilateral economic organizations such as
the Group of Seven (G-7) industrialized countries, the Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development, the World Trade Organization, the
International Monetary Fund, and the European Union.
Italy is one of the 11 founding members of the European Economic
and Monetary Union (EMU). Beginning in January 1999, EMU member
countries adopted the euro as their currency and the new European
Central Bank as their monetary authority. National currencies are being
phased out and only euros will be used beginning in 2002. Public
opinion polls consistently rank Italy as one of the most ``pro-euro''
countries in Europe.
Italy has a private sector characterized primarily by a large
number of small and medium-sized firms and a few multinational
companies with well-known names such as Fiat and Pirelli. Economic
dynamism is concentrated in northern Italy, resulting in an income
divergence between north and south that remains one of Italy's most
difficult and enduring economic/social problems.
Government has traditionally played a dominant role in the economy
through regulation and through ownership of large industrial and
financial companies. Privatizations and regulatory reform since 1994
have reduced that presence somewhat. However, government retains a
potentially blocking ``golden share'' in all the industrial companies
privatized thus far; government and the Bank of Italy continue to shape
merger and acquisition activity involving Italian financial and non-
financial firms considered ``key'' to the economy and/or employment;
and business surveys continue to cite a heavy bureaucratic burden as
one of the main impediments to investing or doing business in Italy.
For years, government spending has been inflated by generous social
welfare programs, inefficiency and projects designed to achieve
political objectives. The result has been large public sector deficits
financed by debt. Beginning in the early 90's, Italy started to address
a number of macroeconomic problems in order to qualify for first-round
EMU membership. The public sector deficit fell slightly from 2.7
percent in 1997 to 2.6 percent of GDP in 1998, and is expected to be
close to 2.2 percent at end-1999--aided until late 1999 by declining
interest rates which lowered the GOI's debt servicing cost. The level
of public debt, second highest among the EMU countries as a share of
GDP, also started to decline but remains over 100 percent of GDP. The
GOI plans to reduce the debt level gradually to the EMU target level of
60 percent of GDP.
Up to December 31, 1998, price stability was the primary objective
of monetary policy; the Bank of Italy carried out a restrictive
monetary policy in an effort to defeat Italy's long-term inflation
problem. Now all these powers have been transferred to the European
Central Bank, with the Bank of Italy retaining banking supervision
responsibilities. Consumer inflation increased only 2.0 percent in 1998
and a 1.6 percent average is expected for 1999, and producer price
inflation is negligible, despite a recent upturn mostly related to the
increase of prices of utilities and oil and raw materials.
/2. Exchange Rate Policy
On January 1, 1999, Italy relinquished control over exchange rate
policy to the European Central Bank.
3. Structural Policies
Italy has not implemented any structural policies over the last two
years that directly impede U.S. exports. Certain characteristics of the
Italian economy impede growth and reduce import demand. These include
rigid labor markets, underdeveloped financial markets, and a continued
heavy state role in the production sector. There has been some progress
at addressing these structural issues. Privatization is reducing the
government's role in the economy. The 1993 ``Single Banking Law''
removed a number of anachronistic restrictions on banking activity.
Italy's implementation of EU financial service and capital market
directives has injected further competition into the sector.
U.S. financial service firms are no longer subject to an
incorporation requirement to operate in the Italian market, although
they must receive permission to operate from the government's
securities regulatory body.
U.S. financial service firms and banks are active in Italy, in
particular in the wholesale banking and bond markets. In general, U.S.
and foreign firms can invest freely in Italy, subject to restrictions
in sectors determined to be of national interest, or in cases which
create anti-trust concerns.
4. Debt Management Policy
Although the domestic public debt level is high, Italy has not had
problems with external debt or balance of payments since the mid
1970's. Public debt is financed primarily through domestic capital
markets, with securities ranging from three months to thirty years.
Italy's official external debt is relatively low, constituting roughly
5.9 percent of total debt. Italy maintains relatively steady foreign
debt targets, and uses issuance of foreign-denominated debt essentially
as a source of diversification, rather than need.
5. Significant Barriers to U.S. Exports
Import Licensing: With the exception of a small group of largely
agricultural items, practically all goods originating in the U.S. and
most other countries can be imported without import licenses and free
of quantitative restrictions. There are, however, monitoring measures
applied to imports of certain sensitive products. The most important of
these measures is the automatic import license for textiles. This
license is granted to Italian importers when they provide the requisite
forms.
Services Barriers: Italy is one of the world's largest markets for
all forms of telephony and the largest and fastest-growing European
market for mobile telephony. In recent years, the Italian Government
has undertaken a liberalization of this sector, including privatization
of the former parastatal monopoly Telecom Italia (formerly STET);
creation of an independent communications authority; and allowing both
fixed-line and mobile competitors to challenge the former monopoly
(which Olivetti acquired in a hostile takeover in 1999). Following the
EU's January 1, 1998 deadline for full liberalization of its telecoms
sector, Italy issued more than 40 fixed-line licenses, including to new
entrants (with U.S. participation). Omnitel Pronto Italia, which is
partly U.S.-owned, began offering cellular service in December 1995.
In 1998, Italy established an independent regulatory authority for
all communications, including telecoms and broadcasting. Concerns
remain regarding upcoming licensing and frequency allocation for
``third generation'' mobile carriers, regulatory due process,
transparency and even-handedness in general. But the Italian market is
much more open to services exports in this sector than it was prior to
implementation of the EU telecoms directive.
In 1998, the Italian Parliament passed government-sponsored
legislation including a provision to make Italy's national TV broadcast
quota stricter than the EU's 1989 ``Broadcast Without Frontiers''
Directive. The Italian law exceeds the EU Directive by making 51
percent European content mandatory during prime time, and by excluding
talk shows from the programming that may be counted towards fulfilling
the quota. Also in 1998, the government issued a regulation requiring
all multiplex movie theaters of more than 1300 seats to reserve 15-20
percent of their seats, distributed over no fewer than three screens,
to showing EU films on a ``stable'' basis. In 1999, the government
introduced ``antitrust'' legislation to limit concentration in
ownership of movie theaters and in film distribution--including more
lenient treatment for distributors that provide a majority of ``made in
EU'' films to theaters.
Firms incorporated in EU countries may offer investment services in
Italy without establishing a presence. U.S. and other firms that are
from non-EU countries may operate based on authorization from CONSOB,
the securities oversight body. CONSOB may deny such authorization to
firms from countries that discriminate against Italian firms.
Foreign companies are increasingly active in the Italian insurance
market, opening branches or buying shares in Italian firms. Government
authorization is required to offer life and property insurance; this
authorization is usually based on reciprocal treatment for Italian
insurers. Foreign insurance firms must prove that they have been active
in life and property insurance for not less than 10 years and must
appoint a general agent domiciled in Italy.
There are some limits regarding foreign private ownership in banks.
For instance, according to the Banking Law a foreign institution
wanting to increase its stake in a bank above five percent needs
authorization by the Bank of Italy.
Some professional categories (e.g. engineers, architects, lawyers,
accountants) face restrictions that limit their ability to practice in
Italy without either possessing EU/Italian nationality, having received
an Italian university degree, or having been authorized to practice by
government institutions.
Standards: As a member of the EU, Italy applies the product
standards and certification approval process developed by the European
Community. Italy is required by the Treaty of Rome to incorporate
approved EU directives into its national laws. However, there has
frequently been a long lag in implementing these directives at the
national level, although Italy has been improving its performance in
this regard. In addition, in some sectors such as pollution control,
the uniformity in application of standards may vary according to
region, further complicating the certification process. Italy has been
slow in accepting test data from foreign sources, but is expected to
adopt EU standards in this area.
Most standards, labeling requirements, testing and certification
for food products have been harmonized within the European Union.
However, where EU standards do not exist, Italy can set its own
national requirements and some of these have been known to hamper
imports of game meat, processed meat products, frozen foods, alcoholic
beverages, and snack foods/confectionery products. Import regulations
for products containing meat and/or blood products, particularly animal
and pet food, have become more stringent in response to concerns over
transmission of Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE). U.S. exporters
of ``health'' and/or organic foods, weight loss/diet foods, baby foods
and vitamins should work closely with an Italian importer, since
Italy's labeling laws regarding health claims can be particularly
stringent. In the case of food additives, coloring and modified
starches, Italy's laws are considered to be close to current U.S. laws,
albeit sometimes more restrictive.
U.S. exporters should be aware that any food or agricultural
product transshipped through Italian territory must meet Italian
requirements, even if the product is transported in a sealed and bonded
container and is not expected to enter Italian commerce.
Rulings by individual local customs authorities can be arbitrary or
incorrect, resulting in denial or delays of entry of U.S. exports into
the country. Considerable progress has been made in correcting these
deficiencies, but problems do arise on a case-by-case basis.
Investment Barriers: While official Italian policy is to encourage
foreign investment, industrial projects require a multitude of
approvals and permits, and foreign investments often receive close
scrutiny. These lengthy procedures can present extensive difficulties
for the uninitiated foreign investor. There are several industry
sectors which are either closely regulated or prohibited outright to
foreign investors, including domestic air transport and aircraft
manufacturing.
Italian anti-trust law gives the government the right to review
mergers and acquisitions over a certain threshold value. The government
has the authority to block mergers involving foreign firms for
``reasons essential to the national economy'' or if the home government
of the foreign firm does not have a similar anti-trust law or applies
discriminatory measures against Italian firms. A similar provision
requires government approval for foreign entities' purchases of five or
more percent of an Italian credit institution's equity.
Government Procurement: In Italy, fragmented, often non-transparent
government procurement practices and previous problems with corruption
have created obstacles to U.S. firms' participation in Italian
government procurement. Italy has made some progress in making the laws
and regulations on government procurement more transparent, by updating
its government procurement code to implement EU directives. The
pressure to reduce government expenditures while increasing efficiency
is resulting in increased use of competitive procurement procedures and
somewhat greater emphasis on best value rather than automatic reliance
on traditional suppliers.
6. Export Subsidies Policies
Italy subscribes to EU directives and Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD) and World Trade Organization (WTO)
agreements on export subsidies. Through the EU, it is a member of the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) agreements on agriculture
and subsidies, and as a WTO member, is subject to WTO rules. Italy also
provides extensive export refunds under the Common Agricultural Policy
(CAP), as well as a number of export promotion programs. Grants range
from funding of travel for trade fair participation to funding of
export consortia and market penetration programs. Many programs are
aimed at small-to-medium size firms. Italy provides some direct
assistance to industry and business firms, in accordance with EU rules
on support to depressed areas, to improve their international
competitiveness. This assistance includes export insurance through the
state export credit insurance body, as well as interest rate subsidies
under the OECD consensus agreement.
The Italian peach processing sector receives subsidies to
compensate it for having to pay the EU minimum grower price for its raw
product. It is recognized that this grower price is above the world
market price for peaches and a U.S.-EU agreement is in place to monitor
the level of subsidies paid. However, there is concern that the
processors may receive extra benefits from loopholes in the system.
The Italian wheat processing sector (pasta) in the past received
indirect subsidies to build plants and infrastructure. While these
plants are still operating, there are no known programs similar to the
initial subsidies operating at present.
7. Protection of U.S. Intellectual Property
Italy is a member of the World Intellectual Property Organization,
and a party to the Berne and Universal Copyright Conventions, the Paris
Industrial Property and Brussels Satellite conventions, the Patent
Cooperation Treaty, and the Madrid Agreement on International
Registration of Trademarks.
In 1998, the U.S. Trade Representative placed Italy on the
Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) ``Priority Watch List'' under the
``Special 301'' provision of the United States Trade Act of 1988, due
to the aforementioned national TV broadcast quotas in excess of the EU
norm, and to a lengthy delay in passage of national legislation to
address ongoing serious deficiencies in protection of copyright for
sound recordings, computer software and film videos. In October 1996,
the government introduced anti-piracy legislation in parliament that
would impose administrative penalties and increase criminal sanctions.
As of the end of 1999, the bill was still awaiting final parliamentary
approval. The U.S. will continue to closely monitor developments in
this area.
New Technologies: In the spring of 1997, the Italian Minister of
Health signed a decree banning the cultivation of Ciba Geigy's BT Corn
in Italy, despite the fact that no BT seed varieties are currently
included in Italy's National Seed Register. This decision was taken on
the advice of Italy's Interministerial Biotechnology Commission,
ostensibly based on its opinion that there was a lack of a proper
monitoring program regarding BT corn's effect on the ecosystem. After
the Biotech Commission reversed its decision, and following EC pressure
to remove the ban, the Minister of Health signed the legislation
removing the ban in late September.
Italy adopted the EU patent law on biotech inventions in July 1999,
but only after an intense debate.
8. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association: The law provides for the right to
establish trade unions, join unions, and carry out union activities in
any workplace employing more than 15 employees. Trade unions are free
of government controls and no longer have formal ties with political
parties. Workers are protected from discrimination based on union
membership or activity. The right to strike is embodied in the
Constitution, and is frequently exercised. Hiring workers to replace
strikers is prohibited. A 1990 law restricts strikes affecting
essential public services such as transport, sanitation, and health.
The law prohibits discrimination by employers against union members
and organizers. It requires employers who have more than 15 employees
and are found guilty of anti-union discrimination to reinstate the
workers affected. In firms with fewer than 15 workers, an employer must
state the grounds for firing a union employee in writing. If a judge
deems these grounds spurious, he can order the employer to reinstate or
compensate the worker.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively: The constitution
provides for the right of workers to organize and bargain collectively
and these rights are respected in practice. In practice (though not by
law), national collective bargaining agreements apply to all workers
regardless of union affiliation. There are no export processing zones.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor: The law prohibits
forced or compulsory labor, and it does not occur.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children: The law forbids
employment of children under 15 years of age (with some exceptions).
There are also specific restrictions on employment in hazardous or
unhealthy occupations of males under age 18 and females under age 21.
Enforcement of the minimum age laws is effective only outside the
extensive ``underground'' economy, which is mainly in southern Italy.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work: Minimum wages are set not by law
but rather by national collective bargaining agreements. These specify
minimum standards to which individual employment contracts must
conform. In case of disputes, the courts may step in to determine fair
wages on the basis of practice in comparable activities or agreements.
A 1997 law reduced the work week from 48 hours to 40. The regular
work week should not exceed six days, and the regular work day eight
hours, with some exceptions. Most collective agreements provide for a
36- to 38-hour workweek. Overtime may not exceed two hours a day or an
average of 12 hours per week.
The law sets basic health and safety standards and guidelines for
compensation for on-the-job injuries. European Union directives on
health and safety have also been incorporated into domestic law. Labor
inspectors are from local health units or from the Ministry of Labor.
They are few, given the scope of their responsibilities. Courts impose
fines and sometimes prison terms for violation of health and safety
laws. Workers have the right to remove themselves from dangerous work
situations without jeopardy to their continued employment. Women are
usually forbidden to work at night.
f. Rights in Sectors with U.S. Investment: Conditions do not differ
from those in other sectors of the economy.
Extent of U.S. Investment in Selected Industries--U.S. Direct Investment Position Abroad on an Historical Cost
Basis--1998
[Millions of U.S. Dollars]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Category Amount
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Petroleum...................... .............. (\1\)
Total Manufacturing............ .............. 8,559
Food & Kindred Products...... 406 ...............................................................
Chemicals & Allied Products.. 2,267 ...............................................................
Primary & Fabricated Metals.. 137 ...............................................................
Industrial Machinery and 2,201 ...............................................................
Equipment.
Electric & Electronic 928 ...............................................................
Equipment.
Transportation Equipment..... 715 ...............................................................
Other Manufacturing.......... 1,905 ...............................................................
Wholesale Trade................ .............. 2,725
Banking........................ .............. 334
Finance/Insurance/Real Estate.. .............. 774
Services....................... .............. 1,082
Other Industries............... .............. (\1\)
TOTAL ALL INDUSTRIES........... .............. 14,638
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Suppressed to avoid disclosing data of individual companies.
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis.
______
THE NETHERLANDS
Key Economic Indicators \1\
[Billions of U.S. Dollars unless otherwise indicated]
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1997 1998 \2\ 1999
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Income, Production and Employment:
Nominal GDP \3\......................... 337.6 349.7 347.1
Real GDP Growth (pct) \4\............... 3.8 3.0 2.75
GDP by Sector:
Agriculture........................... 11.8 11.0 11.0
Manufacturing......................... 59.9 60.9 60.5
Services.............................. 199.8 211.5 209.9
Government............................ 40.5 41.6 41.2
Per Capita GDP (US$).................... 21,781 22,417 22,108
Labor Force (000's)..................... 7,105 7,206 7,311
Unemployment Rate (percent)............. 6.2 4.8 4.0
Money and Prices (annual percentage
growth):
Money Supply (M2)....................... 7.2 9.9 9.0
Consumer Price Inflation................ 2.2 2.0 2.0
Exchange Rate (guilders/US$ annual
average)
Official.............................. 1.95 1.98 2.05
Balance of Payments and Trade:
Total Exports FOB \5\................... 166.0 197.6 196.7
Exports to U.S.\6\.................... 7.3 7.6 8.0
Total Imports CIF \5\................... 151.8 184.0 185.6
Imports from U.S.\6\.................. 19.8 19.0 20.0
Trade Balance \5\....................... 14.2 13.6 11.1
Balance with U.S.\6\.................. -12.5 -12.4 -12.0
Current Account Surplus/GDP (pct)....... 7.0 6.0 5.25
External Public Debt \6\................ 0 0 0
Debt Service Payments/GDP (pct) \7\..... 6.7 9.4 12.3
Fiscal Deficit/GDP (pct)................ -1.2 -0.8 -0.6
Gold and Foreign Exchange Reserves...... 31.6 26.7 29.9
Aid from U.S............................ 0 0 0
Aid from All Other Sources.............. 0 0 0
------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ All figures have been converted at the average guilder exchange rate
for each year.
\2\ 1999 figures are official forecasts or estimates based on available
monthly data in October.
\3\ GDP at factor costs.
\4\ Percentage changes calculated in local currency.
\5\ Merchandise trade. Government of the Netherlands data.
\6\ Sources: U.S. Department of Commerce and U.S. Census Bureau; exports
FAS, imports customs basis; 1999 figures are estimates based on data
available through October 1999.
\7\ All public debt is domestic and denominated in guilders. Debt
service payments refers to domestic public debt.
Sources: Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS), Netherlands Central Bank
(NB), Central Planning Bureau (CPB).
1. General Policy Framework
The Netherlands is a prosperous and open economy, and depends
heavily on foreign trade. It is noted for stable industrial relations;
a large current account surplus from trade and overseas investments;
net exports of natural gas; and a unique position as a European
transportation hub with excellent ports, and air, road, rail, and
inland waterway transport.
Dutch trade and investment policy is among the most open in the
world. The government has successfully reduced its role in the economy
during the 1990s, and structural and regulatory reforms have been an
integral part of a major reorientation of Dutch economic policy since
the early 1980s. Although telecommunication services have been fully
liberalized since January 1 1998, deregulation and privatization of the
Dutch electricity and gas market will have to wait until 2003. The
government continues to dominate the energy sector, and will play an
important role in public transport and aviation for some time.
Dutch economic policy is geared chiefly towards environmentally
sustainable economic growth and development by way of economic
restructuring, energy conservation, environmental protection, regional
development, and other national goals. Economic policy is guided by a
national environmental action plan.
General elections in May of 1998 resulted in a clear vote of
confidence for the ruling three-party coalition, which returned to
office for another four-year term. Policy intentions of the new
coalition government are articulated in the 1998 coalition accord, with
reductions in the tax burden and the fiscal deficit, as well as further
labor and product market reforms as chief priorities. The government
coalition accord is based on a ``conservative'' 2.25 percent average
annual GDP growth scenario between 1999 and 2002. Average GDP growth so
far has been well in excess of 3 percent.
Only mildly affected by the crisis in emerging markets and
subsequent slowdown in the euro area, the Dutch economy remains strong,
combining sustained GDP growth with falling unemployment and moderate
inflation. The success of the Dutch economy can be attributed to a
combination of a rigorous and stable macro-economic policy with wide-
ranging structural and regulatory reforms. After a period of
exceptional strong (near 4 percent) growth in 1998, the OECD expects
real GDP growth in the Netherlands to weaken to 3 percent in 1999 and
just below 3 percent in 2000. The European Union seems more optimistic
and projects economic growth in 1999 and 2000 to exceed 3 percent.
Expectations are that private consumption may loose some of its
buoyancy and investment will remain sluggish. The deceleration in
domestic demand is likely to be offset to some extent by a stronger
foreign balance as export market growth picks up. The unemployment rate
is forecast to fall to around 3.25 percent in 1999 and in 2000, a level
last seen in the early 1970s. Reflecting continuing pressure on
resource utilization, inflationary pressure remains. Consumer price
inflation in 1999 and 2000 is forecast to edge up to exceed 2 percent.
The OECD sees risks and uncertainties mainly concern domestic
developments. Wide-ranging structural and regulatory reforms make it
difficult to assess the degree of tightness of the labor market and of
the pressure on resource utilization.
The Netherlands was one of the first EU member states to qualify
for Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). Fiscal policy aims to strike a
balance between further reducing public spending, and lowering taxes,
and social security contributions. The fiscal deficit is expected to
narrow to narrow to 0.6 percent of GDP in 1999. This is well below the
three percent of GDP criterion in the EMU's Growth and Stability Pact.
A balanced budget is well within reach in 2000. The stock of public
debt will fall from a high of 69.9 percent in 1997 to 64.3 percent in
1999. Both fiscal deficit and public debt are forecast to converge
below or closer to EMU deficit and debt criteria.
Government bonds largely fund the deficit. Since January 1, 1994
Dutch Treasury Certificates (DTC) have also covered financing. DTCs
replace a standing credit facility for short-term deficit financing
with the central bank which, under the Maastricht Treaty, was abolished
in 1994.
2. Exchange Rate Policies
Since the European Central Bank (ECB) assumed monetary
responsibility on January 1, 1999, monetary conditions are no longer
under the exclusive control of the Dutch authorities but are determined
by the Eurosystem (the European Central Bank and the 11 national
Central Banks in the euro area), and are attuned to the euro area as a
whole. Conversion of the currencies of the euro area on December 31
1998, fixed the exchange rate of the euro vis-a-vis the guilder at
2.20371 guilders to the euro. There are no multiple exchange rate
mechanisms.
3. Structural Policies
Tax Policies: Partly with an eye to further EU integration, the
Dutch recently took the first step towards a fundamental reform of the
tax system. The new tax regime for the 21st century entails a shift
from direct to indirect taxes, a broadening of the tax base and a
reduction of the tax rate on labor. When implemented in 2001, wage and
individual income taxes will be lowered, while excise duties, ``green''
taxes and VAT rates will be raised. The highest marginal tax rate on
wage and salary income will be reduced from 60 percent to 50 percent,
while the top VAT rate will rise from 17.5 percent to 19 percent. The
Dutch corporate income tax rate is among the lowest in the European
Union. Effective January 1, 1998 the standard corporate tax rate paid
by corporations (including foreign-owned corporations) has been reduced
from 36 percent to 35 percent on all taxable profits. Since January 1,
1997 the Dutch have been offering multinationals a more friendly tax
regime on their group finance activities, effectively reducing tax on
internal banking activities from 35 percent (the standard corporate tax
rate) to 7 percent.
Regulatory Policies: Limited, targeted, transparent investment
incentives are used to facilitate economic restructuring and to promote
economic growth throughout the country. Measures blend tax incentives
and subsidies and are available to foreign and domestic firms alike.
There are also subsidies to stimulate R&D and to encourage development
and use of new technology by small and medium sized firms.
Complying with EU competition legislation, new Dutch competition
legislation became effective on January 1, 1998. The new Competition
Law includes a provision for the supervision of company mergers by the
Netherlands Competition Authority (NMA). The law is expected to boost
competition, improve transparency, and provide greater de facto access
to a number of sectors for foreign companies.
4. Debt Management Policies
With a current account surplus of well over five percent of GDP and
no external debt, the Netherlands is a major creditor nation. The Dutch
have run a surplus on current account since the early 1980s. During
that period, gross public sector debt (EMU criterion) grew sharply, to
81.2 percent of GDP by 1993. Since the late 1980s, the Dutch fiscal
balance has drastically improved. Most observers now predict a
significant decline of the debt to GDP ratio towards the EMU 60 percent
criterion over the next three years. Debt servicing and rollover has
fallen to slightly over nine percent of GDP, with interest payments
alone at four percent of GDP. All government debt is domestic and
denominated in guilders. There are no difficulties in tapping the
domestic capital market for loans, and public financing requirements
are generally met before the end of each fiscal year. The Netherlands
is a major foreign assistance donor nation with a bilateral and
multilateral development assistance budget of 1.1 percent of GDP equal
to $4.8 billion in 1999. Official Development Aid (ODA) amounts to 0.8
percent of GDP or $3.4 billion. The Netherlands belongs to, and
strongly supports, the IMF, the World Bank, EBRD, and other
international financial institutions.
5. Significant Barriers to U.S. Exports
The Dutch pride themselves on their open market economy,
nondiscriminatory treatment of foreign investment, and a strong
tradition of free trade. Foreign investors receive full national
treatment, and the Netherlands adheres to the OECD investment codes and
the International Convention for the Settlement of Investment Disputes.
There are no significant Dutch barriers to U.S. exports, and U.S. firms
register relatively few trade complaints. The few trade barriers that
do exist result from common EU policies. The following are areas of
potential concern for U.S. exporters:
Agricultural Trade Barriers: These result from the Common
Agricultural Policy (CAP) and common external tariffs, which severely
limit imports of U.S. agricultural products, e.g., canned fruits (high
tariffs), frozen whole turkeys and parts (high tariffs). Bilateral
import barriers, although usually connected with EU-wide regulations,
do arise in customs duties, grading, inspection and quarantine, e.g.,
fresh beef (hormones) and poultry (phytosanitary). EU rules and
procedures sometimes hinder commodity and product entry. Although only
a few cases have been reported to date, an increasing pattern of
delayed or rejected shipments of agricultural commodities, food and
beverages appears to have developed. Current EU-wide regulations, and
the lack of timely approval processes for agricultural products,
including Genetically Modified Organisms (GMOs), hinder U.S. exports.
Some of these rejections or delays in clearance cause major financial
and logistical problems to Dutch importers and U.S. exporters for
particular products, thus dampening trade prospects and flows.
Offsets for Defense Contracts: All foreign contractors must provide
at least 100 percent offset/compensation for defense procurement over
five million Dutch Guilders (about $2.5 million). The seller must
arrange for the purchase of Dutch goods or permit the Netherlands to
domestically produce components or subsystems of the systems it is
buying. A penalty system for noncompliance with offset obligations is
under consideration. The United States has discussed this issue with
the government of the Netherlands.
Broadcasting and Media Legislation: The Dutch fully comply with the
EU Broadcast Directive, but this has not in any way impeded the
transmission of non-European programs. U.S. television shows and films
are popular and readily available. Commercial broadcasters may apply
for temporary exemptions of the quota requirement on an ad hoc basis.
Cartels: Although the export sector of the Dutch economy is open
and free, cartels have long been a component of the domestic sector of
the economy. A new Cartel Law which took effect in 1996 bans cartels
unless its proponents can conclusively demonstrate a public interest.
Since 1998, the United States received no complaints by U.S. firms of
having been disadvantaged by cartels in the Netherlands.
Public Procurement: Dutch public procurement practices comply with
the requirements of the GATT/WTO Agreement on Public Procurement and
with EU public procurement legislation. The Netherlands has fully
implemented the EU's Supplies Directive 93/36/EEC, Works Directive 93/
37/EEC, and the Utilities Directive 93/38/EEC. Implementation of EU and
GATT public procurement obligations have contributed to greater
transparency of the Dutch public procurement environment at the central
and local government levels. Independent studies show that transparency
and enforcement in this area can be deficient, especially at the local
level, and procurement may be contingent on offset or local content
requirements. As part of its plan to encourage electronic transactions,
the government has declared its intention to begin posting all national
and local government procurement tenders on websites in the near
future. The EU Utilities Directive may force more public notification
and end the effective duopoly in Dutch power generation and
distribution, and the monopoly in production and distribution of
natural gas.
6. Export Subsidies Policies
Under the Export Matching Facility, the government provides
interest subsidies for Dutch export contracts competing with government
subsidized export transactions in third countries. These subsidies
bridge the interest cost gap between Dutch export contracts and foreign
contracts which have benefited from interest subsidies. The government
provides up to 10 million guilders (about $5.5 million) of interest
subsidies per export contract, up to a maximum of 35 percent per export
transaction. An export transaction must have at least 60 percent Dutch
content to be eligible. For defense, aircraft and construction
transactions, the minimum Dutch content is one-third.
There is a local content requirement of 70 percent for exporters
seeking to insure their export transactions through the Netherlands
Export Insurance Company.
The Dutch provide some subsidies for shipping. In conformity with
the OECD understanding on subsidies, the government grants interest
rate subsidies (maximum two percent) to Dutch shipbuilders up to 80
percent of a vessel's cost with a maximum repayment period of 8.5
Years. This subsidy is only available when ``matched'' by similar
offers by non-EU shipyards. Despite termination of the EU shipbuilding
subsidies regime in 1996, the shipbuilding subsidies budget earmarked
70 million guilders ($35 million) annually in 1999 and 2000. As long as
the 1994 OECD agreement to phase out shipbuilding subsidies
internationally has not been ratified by all parties, the Dutch will
continue to support their shipbuilding industry adhering to EU
shipbuilding regulations.
7. Protection of U.S. Intellectual Property
The Netherlands has a generally good record on IPR protection. It
belongs to the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), is a
signatory of the Paris Convention on Industrial Property and the Berne
Copyright Convention, and conforms to accepted international practice
for protection of technology and trademarks. Patents for foreign
investors are granted retroactively to the date of original filing in
the home country, provided the application is made through a Dutch
patent lawyer within one year of the original filing date. Patents are
valid for 20 years. Legal procedures exist for compulsory licensing if
the patent is determined to be inadequately used after a period of
three years, but these procedures have rarely been invoked. Since the
Netherlands and the United States are both parties to the Patent
Cooperation Treaty (PCT) of 1970, patent rights in the Netherlands may
be obtained if PCT application is used.
The Netherlands is a signatory of the European Patent Convention,
which provides for a centralized Europe-wide patent protection system.
This convention has simplified the process for obtaining patent
protection in the member states. Infringement proceedings remain within
the jurisdiction of the national courts, which could result in
divergent interpretations detrimental to U.S. investors and exporters.
The limited scope of resources devoted to enforcement of anti-piracy
laws is of concern to U.S. producers of software, audio and video
tapes, and textbooks. Legislation was enacted in early 1994 to
explicitly include computer software as intellectual property under the
copyright statutes, and the government is working with industry on
enforcement.
8. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association: The right of Dutch workers to
associate freely is well established. One quarter of the employed labor
force belongs to unions, but union-negotiated collective bargaining
agreements are usually extended to cover about three-quarters of the
workforce. Membership in labor unions is open to all workers including
military, police, and civil service employees. Unions are entirely free
of government and political party control and participate in political
life. They also maintain relations with recognized international bodies
and form domestic federations. The Dutch unions are active in promoting
worker rights internationally. All union members, except most civil
servants, have the legal right to strike. Civil servants have other
means of protection and redress. There is no retribution against
striking workers. In the European Union, the Netherlands has one of
lowest percentages of days lost due to labor strikes. In 1998, some 33
labor days per 1000 workers were lost due to industrial disputes
compared with 15 days in 1997.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively: The right to
organize and bargain collectively is recognized and well established.
There are no union shop requirements. Discrimination against workers
because of union membership is illegal and does not exist. Dutch
society has developed a social partnership among the government,
employers' organizations, and trade unions. This tripartite ``Social
Partnership'' involves all three participants in negotiating guidelines
for collective bargaining agreements which, once reached in a sector,
are extended by law to cover the entire sector. Such generally binding
agreements (AVVs) cover most Dutch workers.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor: Forced or compulsory
labor, including that by children, is prohibited by the Constitution
and does not exist.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children: Child labor laws exist
and are enforced. The minimum age for employment of young people is 16.
Even at that age, youths may work full time only if they have completed
the mandatory 10 years of schooling and only after obtaining a work
permit (except for newspaper delivery). Those still in school at age 16
may not work more than eight hours per week. Laws prohibit youths under
the age of 18 from working at night, overtime, or in areas which could
be dangerous to their physical or mental development.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work: Dutch law and practice adequately
protect the safety and health of workers. Although a forty hours
workweek is established by law, the average workweek for adults working
full time currently stands at 37.5 hours. The high level of part-time
work has lowered the estimated actual workweek to 35.8 hours.
Collective bargaining negotiations are heading towards an eventual 36
hours workweek for full-time employees. The gross minimum wage in mid-
1999 amounted to about 2,376 guilders (US$ 1,188) per month. The
legally mandated minimum wage is subject to semiannual cost of living
adjustment. Working conditions are set by law, and regulations are
actively monitored.
f. Rights in Sectors with U.S. Investments: The worker rights
described above hold equally for sectors in which U.S. capital is
invested.
Extent of U.S. Investment in Selected Industries--U.S. Direct Investment Position Abroad on an Historical Cost
Basis--1998
[Millions of U.S. Dollars]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Category Amount
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Petroleum...................... .............. 2,826
Total Manufacturing............ .............. 16,242
Food & Kindred Products...... 1,078 ...............................................................
Chemicals & Allied Products.. 10,212 ...............................................................
Primary & Fabricated Metals.. 224 ...............................................................
Industrial Machinery and 993 ...............................................................
Equipment.
Electric & Electronic 1,860 ...............................................................
Equipment.
Transportation Equipment..... 348 ...............................................................
Other Manufacturing.......... 1,526 ...............................................................
Wholesale Trade................ .............. 9,446
Banking........................ .............. (\1\)
Finance/Insurance/Real Estate.. .............. 42,836
Services....................... .............. 6,985
Other Industries............... .............. (\1\)
TOTAL ALL INDUSTRIES........... .............. 79,386
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Suppressed to avoid disclosing data of individual companies.
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis.
______
NORWAY
Key Economic Indicators
[Millions of U.S. Dollars unless otherwise indicated]
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1997 1998 \1\ 1999
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Income, Production and Employment:
Nominal GDP....................... 153,380 146,636 150,645
Real GDP Growth (pct) \2\......... 4.3 2.1 0.9
Real Mainland GDP Growth (pct).... 4.4 3.3 0.5
Nominal GDP by sector:
Agriculture..................... 3,089 3,161 3,200
Oil and Gas Production.......... 23,491 15,463 18,500
Manufacturing................... 16,932 17,422 17,500
Services........................ 86,470 86,646 86,945
Government...................... 23,398 23,944 24,500
Per capita GDP.................... 34,237 32,586 33,255
Labor force (000's)............... 2,285 2,330 2,340
Unemployment Rate (percent)....... 4.1 3.2 3.3
Money and Prices (annual percentage
growth):
Money supply (M2)................. 4.6 5.6 5.4
Consumer Price Inflation.......... 2.6 2.3 2.2
Exchange rate (NOK/US$ annual 7.10 7.55 7.75
average).........................
Balance of payments and trade:
Total Exports FOB................. 48,228 40,649 43,700
Exports to U.S.\3\.............. 3,735 2,874 3,200
Total Imports CIF................. 35,526 39,656 36,500
Imports from U.S.\3\............ 1,720 1,709 1,500
Trade Balance..................... 12,702 993 7,200
Balance with U.S................ 2,015 1,165 1,700
External Public Debt.............. 3,085 900 2,000
Debt Service Payments............. 3,446 2,185 90
Fiscal Surplus/GDP (pct).......... 5.6 2.9 6.2
Current Account Surplus/ GDP (pct) 5.2 (1.5) 3.0
Foreign Exchange Reserves \4\..... 24,136 18,813 20,400
Aid from U.S...................... 0 0 0
Aid From Other Countries.......... 0 0 0
------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ 1999 figures are all estimates based on monthly data in November.
\2\ Growth figures are based on the basis of the local currency.
\3\ U.S. Department of Commerce trade statistics.
\4\ Includes gold; but excludes assets in the state petroleum fund.
Source: Government of Norway data.
1. General Policy Framework
Exploitation of Norway's major non-renewable energy resources--
crude oil and natural gas--will continue to drive the country's
economic growth for at least the next three decades. Offshore, Norway's
remaining oil reserves (discovered plus undiscovered) will last for
another 30 years at current extraction rates, while the equivalent
figure for natural gas is 131 years. Energy-intensive industries such
as metal processing and fertilizer production will remain prominent on
the mainland due to the availability of abundant hydropower.
Some constraints continue to limit Norway's economic flexibility
and ability to maintain international competitiveness. Labor
availability remains limited by Norway's small population of 4.5
million and a restrictive immigration policy. Norway is also a high-
cost country with a centralized collective wage bargaining process and
government-provided generous social welfare benefits. Norway's small
agricultural sector survives largely through subsidies and protection
from international competition.
State intervention in the economy remains significant. The
government owns just over 50 percent of domestic businesses, including
majority stakes in the two largest oil and industry conglomerates and
the country's biggest commercial bank. While new legislation governing
investment was implemented in 1995 to meet European Economic Area
(``EEA'') and WTO obligations, screening of foreign investment and
restrictions on foreign ownership remains.
The government's dependence on petroleum revenue has increased
substantially since the early 1970's, generating an estimated 15
percent of total government 1999 revenue. Since 1995, Norway has been a
net foreign creditor and has posted budget surpluses. The surpluses are
invested in a petroleum fund for future use.
No general tax incentives exist to promote investment. Tax credits
and government grants are offered, however, to encourage investment in
northern Norway; and tax incentives are granted to encourage the use of
environmentally friendly products such as the electric car think.
Several specialized state banks provide subsidized loans to sectors
including agriculture and fishing. Transportation allowances and
subsidized power are also available to industry. Norway and the EU have
preferential access to each other's markets, except for the
agricultural and fisheries sectors, through the EEA agreement which
entered force in January 1994. Although in a 1994 national referendum
Norwegians rejected a proposal to join the EU, Norway routinely
implements most EU directives as required by the EEA.
The government controls the growth of the money supply through
reserve requirements imposed on banks, open market operations, and
variations in the central bank overnight
Lending rate. The central bank's flexibility in using the money
supply as an independent policy instrument is limited by the
government's priority to maintain a stable rate of exchange.
2. Exchange Rate Policy
The Norwegian krone was un-pegged from the ecu in December 1992.
The government's stated policy since 1994 has been to maintain a stable
krone vis-a-vis European currencies. The central bank uses interest
rate policy and open market operations to keep currency stable in a
managed float that follows a range of values defined in the exchange
rate regulation. With the introduction of the euro January 1, 1999,
Norway currently keeps the krone stable vis-a-vis the euro-zone
currency (euro).
Quantitative restrictions on credit flows from private financial
institutions were abolished in the late 1980's. Norway dismantled most
remaining foreign exchange controls in 1990. U.S. companies operating
within Norway have not reported any problems to the embassy in
remitting payments.
3. Structural Policies
The government's top economic priorities include maintaining high
employment, generous welfare benefits, and rural development. These
economic priorities are part of Norway's regional policy of
discouraging internal migration to urban centers in the south and east
and of maintaining the population in the north and other sparsely
populated regions. Thus, parts of the mainland economy--particularly
agriculture and rural industries--remain protected and cost-inefficient
from a global viewpoint with Norway's agricultural sector remaining the
most heavily subsidized in the OECD. While some progress has been made
in reducing subsidies manufacturing industry, support remains
significant in areas including food processing and shipbuilding.
A revised legal framework for the functioning of the financial
system was adopted in 1988, strengthening competitive forces in the
market and bringing capital adequacy ratios more in line with those
abroad. Further liberalization in the financial services sector
occurred when Norway joined the EEA and accepted the EU's banking
directives. The Norwegian banking industry has returned to
profitability following reforms prompted by the banking crises in the
early 1990's.
Norway has taken some steps to deregulate the non-bank service
sector. Although large parts of the transportation markets (including
railways) remain subject to restrictive regulations, including
statutory barriers to entry, the government telecommunications services
to competition in 1998.
4. Debt Management Policies
The state's exposure in international debt markets remains very
limited because of Norway's prudent budgetary and foreign debt
policies. The government's gross external debt situation significantly
improved in 1990's, declining from about US$10 billion in 1993 to about
US$900 million at the end of 1998. Norway's status changed from a net
debtor to a net creditor country in 1995 largely because of the
contributions from the oil and gas sector.
5. Aid
There are no aid flows between Norway and the U.S.
6. Significant Barriers to U.S. Exports
Norway is a member of the World Trade Organization and supports the
principles of free trade but significant barriers to trade remain in
place. The government maintains high agricultural tariffs that are
administratively adjusted when internal market prices fall outside
certain price limits. These unpredictable administrative tariff
adjustments disrupt advance purchase orders and severely limit
agricultural imports into Norway from the U.S. and other distant
markets.
State ownership in Norwegian industry continues to complicate
competition in a number of sectors including telecommunications,
financial services, oil and gas, and alcohol and pharmaceutical
distribution. Despite some ongoing reforms, Norway still maintains
regulatory practices, certification procedures and standards that limit
market access for U.S. materials and equipment in a variety of sectors,
including telecommunications and oil and gas materials and equipment.
U.S. companies, particularly in the oil and gas sector, operate
profitably in Norway.
While there has been substantial banking reform, competition in
this sector still remains distorted due to government ownership of the
largest commercial bank, and the existence of specialized state banks
that offer subsidized loans in certain sectors and geographic
locations.
Restrictions also remain in the distribution of alcohol, which
historically has been handled through state monopolies, and in the way
pharmaceutical drugs are marketed. Norway is obligated to terminate
these monopolies under the EEA accord but implementation is slow. The
European Free Trade Association (EFTA) surveillance agency (ESA--the
organization responsible for insuring EEA compliance) has been
monitoring Norway's progress in these areas.
7. Export Subsidy Policies
As a general rule the government of Norway does not subsidize
exports, although some heavily subsidized goods, such as dairy
products, may be exported. The government indirectly subsidizes
chemical and metal exports by subsidizing the electricity costs of
manufacturers. In addition, the government provides funds to Norwegian
companies for export promotion purposes. Norway is reducing its
agricultural subsidies in stages over six years in accordance with its
WTO obligations. Norway has also ratified the OECD shipbuilding subsidy
agreement and has indicated it will eliminate shipbuilding subsidies as
soon as the agreement is ratified by other major shipbuilding countries
including the United States and Japan.
8. Protection of U.S. Intellectual Property
Norway is a signatory of the main intellectual property accords,
including the Berne copyright and universal copyright conventions, the
Paris convention for the protection of industrial property, and the
patent cooperation treaty. Any adverse impact of Norwegian IPR
practices on U.S. trade is negligible.
Norwegian officials believe that counterfeiting and piracy are the
most important aspects of intellectual property rights protection. They
complain about the unauthorized reproduction of furniture and appliance
designs and the sale of the resultant goods in other countries, with no
compensation to the Norwegian innovator.
Product patents for pharmaceuticals became available in Norway in
January 1992. Previously, only process patent protection was provided
to pharmaceuticals.
9. Worker Rights
a. Right of Association: Workers have the right to associate freely
and to strike. The government can invoke compulsory arbitration under
certain circumstances with the approval of parliament.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively: All workers,
including government employees and the military, have the right to
organize and to bargain collectively. Labor legislation and practice is
uniform throughout Norway.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor: The GON prohibits
forced and compulsory labor by law.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children: Children are not
permitted to work full time before age 18. However, children 13 to 18
years may be employed part-time in light work that will not adversely
affect their development.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work: Ordinary working hours do not
exceed 37.5 hours per week, and four weeks plus one day of paid leave
are granted per year (31 days for those over 60). There is no minimum
wage in Norway, but wages normally fall within a national wage scale
negotiated by labor, employers, and the government. The workers'
protection and working environment act of 1977 assures all workers safe
and physically acceptable working conditions.
f. Rights in Sectors With U.S. Investment: Norway has a tradition
of protecting worker rights in all industries, and sectors where there
is heavy U.S. investment are no exception.
Extent of U.S. Investment in Selected Industries--U.S. Direct Investment Position Abroad on an Historical Cost
Basis--1998
[Millions of U.S. Dollars]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Category Amount
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Petroleum...................... .............. 4,045
Total Manufacturing............ .............. 831
Food & Kindred Products...... (\1\) ...............................................................
Chemicals & Allied Products.. 17 ...............................................................
Primary & Fabricated Metals.. 3 ...............................................................
Industrial Machinery and 168 ...............................................................
Equipment.
Electric & Electronic 7 ...............................................................
Equipment.
Transportation Equipment..... 15 ...............................................................
Other Manufacturing.......... (1) ...............................................................
Wholesale Trade................ .............. 303
Banking........................ .............. (\1\)
Finance/Insurance/Real Estate.. .............. 1,881
Services....................... .............. 290
Other Industries............... .............. (\1\)
TOTAL ALL INDUSTRIES........... .............. 7,609
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Suppressed to avoid disclosing data of individual companies.
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis.
______
POLAND
Key Economic Indicators
[Millions of U.S. Dollars unless otherwise indicated]
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1997 1998 \1\ 1999
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Income, Production and Employment:
Nominal GDP....................... 135,600 146,031 158,780
Real GDP Growth (pct)............. 6.8 4.8 4.0
GDP by Sector (pct):
Agriculture..................... 4.8 4.2 N/A
Manufacturing................... 20.2 24.4 N/A
Services........................ N/A N/A N/A
Government...................... N/A N/A N/A
Per Capita GDP (US$).............. 3,507 3,800 4,090
Labor Force (000's)............... 17,052 17,162 N/A
Unemployment Rate (pct)........... 10.3 10.4 11.8
Money and Prices (annual percentage
growth):
Money Supply Growth (M2).......... 29.0 25.2 N/A
Consumer Price Inflation.......... 13.2 9.5 8.5
Exchange Rate (PZL/US$ annual
average)
Official........................ 3.28 3.49 3.90
Balance of Payments and Trade:
Total Exports FOB (US$ billions) 27.2 30.1 28.0
\2\..............................
Exports to U.S. (US$ billions) 0.7 0.8 0.5
\3\............................
Total Imports CIF (US$ billions).. 38.5 43.8 42.1
Imports from U.S. (US$ billions) 1.2 0.9 0.5
\3\............................
Trade Balance (US$ billions)...... -11.3 -13.7 -14.1
Balance with U.S. (US$ billions) -0.52 -0.1 0.0
\3\............................
External Public Debt (US$ 38.5 43.0 N/A
billions)........................
Fiscal Deficit/GDP (pct).......... 2.8 2.7 2.8
Current Account Surplus/Deficit/ -3.0 -4.3 -6.8
GDP (pct) \4\....................
Debt Service Payments/GDP (pct) 3.5 3.2 3.4
\5\..............................
Gold and Foreign Exchange Reserves
(US$ billions) \6\.............. 20.7 27.4 27.3
Aid from U.S. (US$ millions) \7\.. 52.7 62.7 26.3
Aid from Other Sources (US$ N/A N/A N/A
millions)........................
------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ 1999 figures are Polish Government estimates as of October 1999,
unless otherwise noted.
\2\ Polish Government trade figures, without transshipments via third
countries.
\3\ U.S. Department of Commerce and U.S. Census Bureau; exports FAS,
imports customs basis.
\4\ Including estimated unrecorded trade.
\5\ Debt service includes paid interest and principal.
\6\ Data available through August 1999.
\7\ U.S. Government estimate; includes economic and military assistance
(USAID and FMF.)
1. General Policy Framework
In the past decade, Poland has transformed its economy with mostly
sound financial policies and commitment to structural reforms (the
government adopted into law reforms on regional government, health
care, pension system, and education in 1998-1999 alone), making it one
of the most successful and open transition economies. After four
consecutive years of growth at about 6 percent or 7 percent per year,
the Polish economy, affected by the Asian and Russian crises, slowed in
1998. By the end of 1999, the Polish economy is expected to see 3.5
percent to 4 percent growth, with 5.2 percent projected for 2000. The
private sector is thriving as a result of privatization and
liberalization, although Poland's large agriculture sector remains
handicapped by surplus labor, inefficient small farms, and lack of
investment. The (shrinking) shadow ``gray economy'' was estimated to
generate around 17 percent of GDP in 1999.
Government Priorities: A member of the WTO, OECD, and NATO, Poland
now considers membership in the European Union (EU) one of its highest
priorities with a self-imposed accession date of January 1, 2003. The
process is exacting a political toll (lack of effective support from
the opposition and declining public support) and affects most economic
policies, from the budget to reforms. By late 1999, Poland had
provisionally closed eight of the 30 chapters. In addition, Poland has
agreed to liberalization of its trade and investment regimes through
international (WTO, OECD), regional (Central European Free Trade
Agreement or ``CEFTA''), and various bilateral agreements, including
one concluded in 1999 with Turkey. Poland also seeks to improve
bilateral economic relations with Russia, Ukraine and Belarus.
Fiscal Policy: The government seeks to reduce the central
government budget deficit to 1.9 percent of GDP in 2000, and to
eliminate it altogether by 2003. Financing comes principally from
privatization revenues and the domestic non-banking private sector
(e.g., insurance companies and pension funds). The constitution
prohibits the National Bank of Poland (NBP) from financing the budget
deficit. Reforms, generous social programs (disability, unemployment
and welfare), and debt service obligations constitute the heaviest
burdens on the budget. The 1998 Act on Public Finances, a framework for
fiscal consolidation to manage public finances, clarifies the
responsibilities of the various budgetary players, sets measures to
improve transparency in public finances, establishes rules for local
governments, and prepares for EU accession. It also establishes
procedures to be followed if total public debt, including state
guarantees, exceeds certain limits.
Monetary Policy: The independent Monetary Policy Council (MPC) sets
monetary policy, implemented by the NBP, using an inflation target. The
MPC's goal for 2000 is to reduce inflation to between 5.4 and 6.8
percent. In the medium-term, the goal is to curb inflation to 4.0
percent or less by 2003. Tight fiscal policy reduced inflation from 600
percent in 1990 to below 10 percent in 1999. As inflation slowed in
1998, the MPC started to cut its intervention rates. However, a
resurgence of inflation in late 1999, coupled with fears that rising
household credit and growing off-budget spending could fuel inflation
in 2000, led the MPC to sharply tighten monetary policy in November,
raising key interest rates by 3.5 points. After a long period of
appreciation, the Polish zloty fell from 3.5 to 4.0 against the dollar
in early 1999, making U.S. exports to Poland less competitive.
2. Exchange Rate Policies
Since 1991, the NBP has managed the exchange rate by a crawling peg
mechanism against a basket of reserve currencies (45 percent U.S.
dollars, 35 percent German marks, and the rest in pounds sterling and
French and Swiss francs). As of 1999, the basket is composed of 55
percent euros and 45 percent dollars. The MPC now depreciates the
central parity rate for the zloty by 0.3 percent per month, but allows
the currency to float within a 15 percent band around that rate. The
NBP plans to float the zloty in 2000 to let it find its equilibrium
level before applying for participation in European Exchange Rate
Mechanism (ERM2) and then EMU.
Poland achieved current account convertibility in 1995, eliminated
the requirement for Polish firms to convert their foreign currency
earnings into zlotys in 1996, removed most limits on capital account
outflows by Polish citizens in 1997, and enforced a new foreign
exchange law in January 1999. Restrictions were removed on foreign
exchange transactions for resident portfolio investments, investment in
OECD issued securities, and operations in negotiable securities,
including collective investment securities, with some exceptions, such
as transactions in debt instruments with a maturity of less than one
year and derivatives. The law authorizes further liberalization
measures, but also contains safeguards to allow the government to
temporarily re-establish restrictions under certain circumstances, such
as extraordinary risk to the stability and integrity of the financial
system. By January 2000, Poland's remaining restrictions on capital
movements, other than foreign direct investment flow and short-term
capital flow, should be limited to real estate investment abroad and in
Poland. The current foreign direct investment restrictions are foreign
acquisitions of certain categories of real estate, indirect ownership
of Polish insurance companies, air and shipping transport,
broadcasting, certain telecommunication services, and gaming.
3. Structural Policies
Prices: Most price subsidies and controls disappeared during
Poland's 1990 economic shock therapy, although those on public
transportation and some pharmaceuticals continue. The government hopes
to eventually eliminate all controls, providing interim support for
coal and some agricultural products, and allowing new regulatory bodies
to play a central role in setting prices in the energy and
telecommunications sectors.
Taxes: A government tax reform package debated in late 1999 aimed
to cut income tax rates, eliminate exemptions, and bring the VAT into
line with EU rules. After weeks of intense debate parliament approved
the reform proposals; the president, however, refused to sign into law
the revisions to personal income taxes. The corporate income tax will
be reduced to 30 percent in 2000 from the 1999 level of 34 percent;
personal income tax rates of 19, 30 and 40 percent will remain in
effect in 2000. Under pressure from the EU, Poland will likely amend
the rules on its special economic zones that provide foreign investors
with tax breaks, resulting in the closure of some zones and no access
for new entrants to others.
Regulatory Policies: Primary concerns are current product
certification standards and the continuing lack of an independent
regulatory commission for telecommunications.
4. Debt Management Policies
Poland's foreign debt situation improved with rescheduled
agreements with the Paris Club (1991) and the London Club (1994),
reducing Poland's debt by nearly half. By end-1999, Poland's total
official foreign debt was $32 billion, including $23 billion to the
Paris Club, $5 billion in Brady bonds (London Club), $2.3 billion to
other institutions (IMF, World Bank, EBRD and BIS), and $0.8 billion in
Rebounds and Yankee bonds. Since 1995, Poland has held investment grade
ratings from various agencies, boosted by a return to international
capital markets with a $250 million Eurobond flotation. In October
1999, Poland received a Moody's rating of Baaa1 and a Standard and
Poor's rating of BBB. Debt servicing remains relatively low both in
relation to government expenditure (12 percent) and GDP (3 percent to 4
percent). Foreign debt servicing represents a sustainable proportion of
exports of goods and services; as of late 1999, the private sector has
an estimated $11 to $12 billion in foreign debt. Having prepaid all
outstanding IMF drawings in 1995, Poland's total state debt (foreign
and domestic) shrank to 44 percent of GDP by the end of 1998.
5. Aid
The U.S. gave Poland $26.3 million in aid in 1999, $20 million of
which was SEED Act funds to help Poland's transition to a free market
democracy. The remaining $6.3 million was military and other aid. 2000
will be the last year for SEED Act assistance to Poland; military aid
will continue.
6. Significant Barriers to U.S. Exports
Tariffs: In 1999, Poland entered a new stage of free trade in
industrial products with the EU, EFTA and CEFTA countries. Currently,
73 percent of all industrial imports from these countries are duty
free, 23 percent fall under MFN tariffs, and about 3 percent are
subject to the GSP system. The exceptions are tariffs on cars (to be
eliminated in 2002), steel products, gasoline and fuel, and heating
oils. As a result of required Uruguay Round implementations, Poland
reduced tariffs in 1999 on many agricultural products, but
simultaneously increased tariffs on others, e.g., pork and malt. While
Poland's EU association agreement established preferential tariffs for
non-agricultural, EU-origin imports into the Polish market, Poland has
maintained its higher MFN tariffs for U.S. and other non-EU products.
All U.S. exporters within a broad range of industry sectors have
complained that the differentials have diminished their business
prospects and ability to compete against EU-origin products which enter
Poland duty-free. The U.S. and Polish governments are currently
discussing possible resolutions to this issue. In late 1999 the Polish
Government announced plans to raise agricultural tariffs from current
applied levels to Poland's WTO bound levels, which in many cases are
much higher.
Import Licenses: Licenses are required for strategic goods on
Wassenaar dual use and munitions lists, as well as for beer, wine,
fuel, tobacco, dairy products, meat, poultry, semen, and embryos. The
plant quarantine inspection service issues a mandatory phytosanitary
import permit for the import of live plants, fresh fruits and
vegetables into Poland. U.S. grain and oilseed exports to Poland have
been hampered by Polish regulations requiring zero tolerance for
several common weed seeds. Certificates from the Veterinary Department
in the Ministry of Agriculture are also required for meat, dairy and
live animal products. Poland intends to implement regulations on
biotechnology and genetically modified organisms, following EU norms.
Import licenses for dairy cattle genetics already have limited U.S.
access to the Polish market.
Services Barriers: Poland has made progress, but many barriers
remain, especially in audio-visuals, legal services, financial
services, and telecommunications. In November 1997, the government
enacted a rigid 50 percent European production quota for all television
broadcasters, raising concerns about certain liberalization commitments
undertaken by Poland upon joining the OECD. However, legislation
introduced into Parliament in late 1999 would require broadcasters to
meet the 50 percent quota only where practical, bring Polish
regulations into line with EU directives. In January 1998, new laws on
banking and the central bank came into force. As a condition of its
accession to the OECD, Poland agreed to allow firms from OECD countries
to open branches and representative offices in the insurance and
banking sector starting in 1999, as well as subsidiaries of foreign
banks. The government began privatizing the state telecommunications
monopoly in October 1998, and agreed to open domestic long-distance
service to competition in 1999 and international services in 2003.
Local telephone service licenses are being awarded, but interconnection
remains the domain of the state monopoly.
Standards, Testing, Labeling, and Certification: One Polish
regulation which may adversely affect U.S. exports is a requirement for
some 1,400 products sold in Poland to obtain a safety ``B'' certificate
from a Polish test center. Enforcement of this regulation has been
postponed each year since 1995, and following an August 1999 amendment,
products fall into two groups: those requiring a B certificate, and
those for which producer conformity declaration is sufficient. Under
the ``B'' rule, the EU ``CE'' mark and ISO 9000 can accelerate the
certification process. Poland wants a mutual recognition agreement with
the EU, but this would require enacting a new law on product liability.
In the past, U.S. companies complained about the complexity and
slowness of the testing process, as well as vague information on fees
and procedures, but recently these complaints have been fewer.
Phytosanitary standards on weed seeds have had a major adverse impact
on the ability of U.S. farmers to export certain grains to Poland.
Investment Barriers: Polish law permits 100 percent foreign
ownership of most corporations, although some obstacles remain for
foreign investment in certain ``strategic sectors'' such as mining,
steel, defense, transport, energy, and telecommunications, and certain
controls remain on other foreign investment. Broadcasting legislation
still restricts foreign ownership to 33 percent (although proposed
legislation would increase this to 49 percent for terrestrial
broadcasting and 100 percent for satellite) and foreign stakes in air
and maritime transport, fisheries, and long-distance telecommunications
are confined to 49 percent. No foreign investment is currently allowed
in international telecommunications or gambling. The government is
working on privatization of telecommunications, steel mills, and
energy, as well as a restructuring plan for the defense industry that
calls for significant foreign investment. As a result of OECD
accession, foreigners in Poland may purchase up to 4000 square meters
of urban land or up to one hectare of agricultural land without a
permit. Larger purchases, or the purchase of a controlling stake in a
Polish company owning real estate, require approval from the Ministry
of Interior and the consent (not always automatic) of both the Defense
and Agriculture Ministries.
Government Procurement Practices: Poland's government procurement
law is modeled on the UN procurement code and is based on competition,
transparency, and public announcement, but does not cover most
purchases by state-owned enterprises. Single source exceptions to the
stated preference for unlimited tender are allowed only for reasons of
state security or national emergency. The domestic performance section
in the law requires 50 percent domestic content and gives domestic
bidders a 20 percent price preference. Companies with foreign
participation organized under the Joint Ventures Act of 1991 may
qualify for ``domestic'' status. There is also a protest/appeals
process for tenders thought to be unfairly awarded. As of September
1997, Poland has the status of an observer to the WTO's Government
Procurement Agreement (GPA).
Customs Procedures: Since signing the GATT customs valuation code
in 1989, Poland has a harmonized tariff system. The customs duty code
has different rates for the same commodities, depending on the point of
export. Poland's Association Agreement with the EU, the CEFTA
agreement, FTAs with Israel, Croatia, Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania
(and Turkey, for implementation in January 2000), as well as GSP for
developing countries, grant firms from these areas certain tariff
preferences over U.S. competitors. Some U.S. companies have criticized
Polish customs' performance, citing long delays, indifference,
corruption, incompetent officials, and inconsistent application of
customs rules. A new customs law took effect January 1998, but some
problems remain, including the amount of paperwork required and the
lack of electronic clearance procedures.
7. Export Subsidies Policies
With its 1995 accession to the WTO, Poland ratified the Uruguay
Round Subsidies Code and eliminated earlier practices of tax incentives
for exporters, but it still offers drawback levies on raw materials
from EU and CEFTA countries which are processed and re-exported as
finished products within 30 days. Some politically powerful state-owned
enterprises continue to receive direct or indirect production subsidies
to lower export prices. Poland's past policy of rolling over unused WTO
sugar subsidy allowances to be used in combination with a given year's
allowances appears to be no longer relevant. Polish industry and
exporters criticize the government for too little export promotion
support. The one existing export insurance scheme has very limited
resources, and rarely guarantees contracts to high-risk countries such
as Russia, placing Polish firms at a disadvantage to most western
counterparts.
8. Protection of U.S. Intellectual Property
Poland has made major strides in improving protection of
intellectual property rights. The U.S.-Polish Bilateral Business and
Economic Treaty contains provisions for the protection of U.S.
intellectual property. It came into force in 1994, once Poland passed a
new Copyright Law that offers strong criminal and civil enforcement
provisions and covers literary, musical, graphical, software, audio-
visual works, and industrial patterns. Amendments to the Copyright Law,
designed to bring it fully into compliance with Poland's obligations
under TRIPS, were pending in Parliament in late 1999. The amendments
would provide full protection of all pre-existing works and sound
recordings. Likewise, Parliament was set to consider new legislation on
patents and trademarks which would bring Poland's industrial property
protection up to TRIPS standards. Poland needs to provide for civil ex
parte searches as required by its TRIPS obligations.
Despite this legal foundation, Poland continues to suffer from high
rates of piracy. Most of the pirated material available--particularly
CDs and CD-ROMs--is imported from factories in the former Soviet Union.
Industry associations estimate 1998 levels of piracy in Poland to be:
40 percent in sound recordings, 25 percent in motion pictures, and 60
percent in software. While enforcement has improved in recent years,
the cumbersome judicial system remains an impediment. Criminal
penalties will increase and procedures for prosecution will be somewhat
simplified when the pending legislation takes effect in 2000. Poland is
currently on the ``Special 301 Watch List'' due to inadequacies in laws
currently on the books and ineffective enforcement.
9. Worker Rights
Poland's 1996 Labor Code sets out the rights and duties of
employers and employees in modern, free-market terms.
a. The Right of Association: Polish law guarantees all civilian
workers, including military employees, police and border guards, the
right to establish and join trade unions of their own choosing, and the
right to join labor organizations and to affiliate with international
labor confederations. The number of unions has remained steady over the
past several years, although membership appears to be declining.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively: The laws on
trade unions and resolution of collective disputes generally create a
favorable environment to conduct trade union activity, although
numerous cases have been reported of employer discrimination against
workers seeking to organize or join unions in the growing private
sector.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor: Compulsory labor does
not exist, except for prisoners convicted of criminal offenses.
d. Child Labor Practices: Polish law strictly prescribes conditions
in which children may work and sets the minimum age at 15. Forced and
bonded child labor is effectively prohibited. The State Labor
Inspectorate reported increasing numbers of working children and
violations by employers who underpay or pay late.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work: Unions agree that the problem is
not in the law, which provides minimum wage and minimum health and
safety standards, but in insufficient enforcement by too few labor
inspectors.
f. Rights in Sectors With U.S. Investment: Firms with U.S.
investment generally meet and can exceed the five worker rights
conditions compared to Polish firms. In the last several years, there
have been only a few cases where Polish unions have charged such
companies with violating Polish labor law, and cases have been largely
resolved. Existing unions usually continue to operate in Polish
enterprises that are bought by American companies, but there tend to be
no unions where U.S. firms build new facilities.
Extent of U.S. Investment in Selected Industries--U.S. Direct Investment Position Abroad on an Historical Cost
Basis--1998
[Millions of U.S. Dollars]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Category Amount
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Petroleum...................... .............. (\1\)
Total Manufacturing............ .............. 797
Food & Kindred Products...... 150 ...............................................................
Chemicals & Allied Products.. 106 ...............................................................
Primary & Fabricated Metals.. 35 ...............................................................
Industrial Machinery and 4 ...............................................................
Equipment.
Electric & Electronic 1 ...............................................................
Equipment.
Transportation Equipment..... -15 ...............................................................
Other Manufacturing.......... 517 ...............................................................
Wholesale Trade................ .............. 247
Banking........................ .............. 423
Finance/Insurance/Real Estate.. .............. (\1\)
Services....................... .............. 85
Other Industries............... .............. 104
TOTAL ALL INDUSTRIES........... .............. 1,698
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Suppressed to avoid disclosing data of individual companies.
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis.
______
PORTUGAL
Key Economic Indicators
[Billions of U.S. Dollars unless otherwise indicated]
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1997 1998 \1\ 1999
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Income, Production and Employment:
Nominal GDP \2\......................... 101.9 106.8 108.6
Real GDP Growth (pct) \3\............... 3.4 3.9 3.0
GDP by Sector:
Agriculture........................... 3.8 3.5 3.6
Industry.............................. 33.4 34.7 35.3
Services.............................. 59.8 64.8 65.9
Per Capita GDP (US$).................... 10,864 10,718 10,879
Labor Force (000's) \4\................. 4635 4992 5057
Unemployment Rate (pct)................. 6.5 4.6 4.5
Money and Prices (annual percentage
growth):
Money Supply (M2)....................... 6.6 6.8 5.9
Consumer Price Inflation................ 2.2 2.8 2.4
Exchange Rate (PTE/US$ annual average).. 175 180 188
Balance of Payments and Trade:
Total Exports FOB \5\................... 24.8 26.0 23.6
Exports to U.S.\5\.................... 1.1 1.2 1.2
Total Imports CIF \5\................... 34.9 38.3 36.2
Imports from U.S.\5\.................. 1.1 1.05 1.0
Trade Balance........................... -10.0 -12.3 -12.7
Balance with U.S...................... 0.0 0.15 0.2
External Public Debt.................... 14.4 13.6 N/A
Fiscal Deficit/GDP (pct)................ 2.7 1.9 1.7
Current Account Deficit/GDP (pct)....... 3.6 5.3 6.6
Debt Service Payments/GDP (pct)......... N/A N/A N/A
Gold and Foreign Exchange Reserves...... 20.3 21.6 13.1
Aid from the U.S........................ 0 0 0
Aid from All Other Sources.............. N/A N/A N/A
------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ 1998 figures are estimates based on available monthly data in
October.
\2\ GDP at factor cost.
\3\ Percentage changes calculated in local currency.
\4\ Reflects a change in the series beginning in 1998.
\5\ Portuguese National Institute of Statistics.
1. General Policy Framework
Prior to the 1974 Portuguese revolution, Portugal was one of the
poorest and most isolated countries in Western Europe. In the twenty-
five years since, however, the country has undergone fundamental
economic and social changes that have resulted in substantial
convergence with its wealthier European neighbors. Joining the European
Union in 1986 was a primary factor in this progress. The country has
not only enjoyed growing trade ties with the rest of Europe, but has
been one of the continent's primary beneficiaries of EU structural
adjustment funds. The last twenty-five years have witnessed not only
economic growth, but also significant structural changes. An economy
that was once rooted in agriculture and fishing has developed into one
driven by manufacturing and, increasingly, by the service sector.
Over the more recent past, the country has experienced a broad-
based economic expansion since 1993 and is forecast to grow at rates
higher than the EU average for the next several years. Much of the
growth since 1993 can be linked with the country's successful efforts
to join European monetary union (EMU), which was formally established
at the beginning of 1999. To qualify for EMU, Portugal took steps to
reduce its fiscal deficit and implement structural reforms. As a
result, the country has benefited from currency stability, a falling
inflation rate and falling interest rates. The falling interest rates,
in turn, have reduced the government's interest expenditures and made
it easier to meet its fiscal targets. The broader economy has been
stimulated by a boom in consumer spending brought on by lower interest
rates and greater availability of credit.
Although the economy is generally healthy, there is some concern
among economists that the current expansion shows signs of overheating.
One manifestation of the growth in consumption has been a rise in
household debt--from less than 20 percent of disposable income in 1990,
to almost 65 percent of disposable income by the end of 1998. Other
manifestations include an inflation rate that is persistently higher
than the Euro-zone average, a growing current account deficit, and a
sharp rise in real estate prices. With monetary union, Portugal no
longer has the ability to craft a monetary response to the situation.
However, the government has not yet employed fiscal restraint. When the
effects of falling interest payments are taken into account, the
government's current expenditures are still growing at a higher rate
than are government revenues. These concerns will be one of the issues
facing the newly re-elected government.
2. Exchange Rate Policy
On January 1, 1999, Portugal and 10 other European countries
entered monetary union; the escudo exchange rate is fixed at 200.482
Portuguese escudos being equal to one Euro. Future exchange rate policy
for the Euro-zone countries will be governed by the European Central
Bank.
3. Structural Policies
Portugal has generally been successful in liberalizing its economy.
The country has used a large proportion of the 20 billion-dollar EU-
backed regional development financing for new infrastructure projects.
These projects have included new highways, urban renewal for the site
of Lisbon-based EXPO 98, rail modernization, subways, dams and water
treatment facilities.
Portugal has also pursued an aggressive privatization plan for
state-owned companies. In 1988, state-owned enterprises accounted for
19.4 percent of GDP and 6.4 percent of total employment. By 1997, these
had fallen to 5.8 percent and 2.2 percent, respectively, and the
country has continued with an aggressive schedule of privatization. By
the end of 1998, total privatization receipts had reached $21.5
billion. Former state-controlled companies now account for the bulk of
the market capitalization of the Lisbon stock exchange and several of
them have taken steps to expand their investments overseas. Notably,
EDP (electricity) and Portugal Telecom (telecommunications) have made
major investments in their respective sectors in Brazil.
4. Debt Management Policies
Following the removal of capital controls in 1992, lower interest
rates abroad led to a shift towards a greater reliance on the use of
foreign public debt, which rose to 15.0 percent of GDP by 1998. That
debt, however, has yielded benefits in the form of longer debt
maturities and lower costs for domestic debt. As a result, interest
expenditure on public debt fell from 6.2 percent of GDP in 1994 to an
estimated 2.8 percent of GDP in 1999.
5. Significant Barriers to U.S. Exports
The EU Customs Code was fully adopted in Portugal as of January 1,
1993. Special tariffs exist for tobacco, alcoholic beverages, petroleum
and automotive vehicles. Portugal is a member of the World Trade
Organization.
Because Portugal is a member of the EU, the majority of imported
products enjoy liberal import procedures. However, import licenses are
required for agricultural products, military/civilian dual use items,
some textile products and industrial products from certain countries
(not including the United States). Imported products must be marked
according to EU directives and Portuguese labels and instructions must
be used for products sold to the public.
Portugal welcomes foreign investment and foreign investors need
only to register their investments, post facto, with the Foreign Trade,
Tourism, and Investment Promotion Agency. However, Portugal limits the
percentage of non-EU ownership in civil aviation, television
operations, and telecommunications. In addition, the creation of new
credit institutions or finance companies, acquisition of a controlling
interest in such financial firms, and establishment of subsidiaries
require authorization by the Bank of Portugal (for EU firms) or by the
Ministry of Finance (for non-EU firms).
With respect to the privatization of state-owned firms, Portuguese
law currently allows the Council of Ministers to specify restrictions
on foreign participation on a case-by-case basis. Portuguese
authorities tend, as a matter of policy, to favor national groups over
foreign investors in order to ``enhance the critical mass of Portuguese
companies in the economy.''
Portuguese law does not discriminate against foreign firms in
bidding on EU-funded projects. Nevertheless, as a practical matter,
foreign firms bidding on EU-funded projects have found that having an
EU or Portuguese partner enhances their prospects. For certain high-
profile direct imports; i.e., aircraft, the Portuguese Government has
shown a political preference for EU products (Airbus).
Companies employing more than five workers must limit foreign
workers to 10 percent of the workforce, but exceptions can be granted
for workers with special expertise. EU and Brazilian workers are not
covered by this restriction.
Portugal maintains no current controls on capital flows. The Bank
of Portugal, however, retains the right to impose temporary
restrictions in exceptional circumstances and the import or export of
gold or large amounts of currency must be declared to customs.
6. Export Subsidies Program
Portugal's export subsidies programs appear to be limited to
political risk coverage for exports to high-risk markets and credit
subsidies for Portuguese firms expanding their international
operations.
7. Protection of U.S. Intellectual Property
Portugal is a member of the International Union for the Protection
of Industrial Property (WIPO) and a party to the Madrid Agreement on
International Registration of Trademarks and Prevention of the Use of
False Origins. Portugal's current Trademark Law entered into force on
June 1, 1995. However, existing Portuguese legislation fails to comply
with a number of specific provisions of the WTO TRIPS Agreement. The
Portuguese government is aware of these deficiencies and has been
engaged in a lengthy review and revision process, but no revisions have
been approved to date. Portugal adopted national legislation in 1996 to
extend patent protection to be consistent with the 20-year term
specified in TRIPS and is considering legislation to protect test data.
Some problems related to intellectual property protection remain.
Software piracy has decreased over the last two years but rates in
Portugal remain among the highest in Europe. Furthermore, Portugal's
perceived weak protection for test data has restricted the introduction
of new drugs into the country. Outside these sectors, however,
Portuguese intellectual property practices do not have a significant
impact on trade with the U.S.
8. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association: Workers in both the private and public
sectors have the right to associate freely and to establish committees
in the workplace to defend their interests. The Constitution provides
for the right to establish unions by profession or industry. Trade
union associations have the right to participate in the preparation of
labor legislation. Strikes are constitutionally permitted for any
reason; including political causes; they are common and are generally
resolved through direct negotiations. The authorities respect all
provisions of the law on labor rights.
Two principal labor federations exist. There are no restrictions on
the formation of additional labor federations. Unions function without
hindrance by the government and are affiliated closely with the
political parties.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively: Unions are free
to organize without interference by the government or by employers.
Collective bargaining is provided for in the Constitution and is
practiced extensively in the public and private sectors.
Collective bargaining disputes are usually resolved through
negotiation. However, should a long strike occur in an essential sector
such as health, energy or transportation, the government may order the
workers back to work for a specific period. The government has rarely
invoked this power, in part because most strikes are limited to 1 to 3
days. The law requires a ``minimum level of service'' to be provided
during strikes in essential sectors, but this requirement has been
applied infrequently. When it has, minimum levels of service have been
established by agreement between the government and the striking
unions, although unions have complained, including to the International
Labor Organization, that the minimum levels have been set too high.
When collective bargaining fails, the government may appoint a mediator
at the request of either management or labor.
The law prohibits antiunion discrimination, and the authorities
enforce this prohibition in practice. The General Directorate of Labor
promptly examines complaints.
There are no export processing zones.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor: Forced labor,
including by children, is prohibited and does not occur.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children: The minimum working age
is 16 years. There are instances of child labor, but the overall
incidence is low and is concentrated geographically and sectorally.
The Government has worked actively to eliminate child labor and
created a multi-agency body, the National Commission to Combat Child
Labor (CNCTI) in 1996, to coordinate those efforts. The Commission is
joined in its efforts by two non-governmental organizations, the
National Confederation of Action on Child Labor (CNASTI) and the
Institute of Support for Children (IAC). With the assistance of
regional commissions, CNCTI works through local intervention teams on
public awareness measures to prevent child labor and, on a case-by-case
basis with school dropouts and with minors found to be working.
The key enforcement mechanisms of labor laws in Portugal fall to
labor inspectors and the number of cases has fallen significantly over
the past several years. Inspectors have been hampered, however, in
investigating case of children working at home or on their parents'
farm, by legal restrictions on inspections of private homes. These
areas may comprise the largest remaining incidence of child labor in
Portugal.
In a first of its kind study, conducted in conjunction with the ILO
in October 1998, the Portuguese Government polled 26,500 families, with
separate questionnaires for parents and children, to try to measure the
incidence of child labor in Portugal. According to this survey, as many
as 20-40,000 Portuguese children, under the age of 16, may be engaged
in some form of labor. The majority of these cases, however, consist of
daily chores on family farms that do not prevent school attendance. The
study estimates, however, that as many as 11,000 children may be
working for non-family employers, a figure which represents 0.2 percent
of the labor force. Additional such studies are planned.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work: Minimum wage legislation covers
full-time workers as well as rural workers and domestic employees ages
18 years and over. For 1999, the monthly minimum wage was raised to
61,300 escudos/month (approximately $331 at current exchange rates) and
generally is enforced. Along with widespread rent controls, basic food
and utility subsidies, and phased implementation of an assured minimum
income, the minimum wage affords a basic standard of living for a
worker and family.
Employees generally receive 14 months pay for 11 months work: the
extra 3 months pay are for a Christmas bonus, a vacation subsidy, and
22 days of annual leave. The maximum legal workday is 8 hours and the
maximum workweek 40 hours. There is a maximum of 2 hours of paid
overtime per day and 200 hours of overtime per year. The Ministry of
Employment and Social Security monitors compliance through its regional
inspectors.
Employers are legally responsible for accidents at work and are
required to carry accident insurance. An existing body of legislation
regulates health and safety, but labor unions continue to argue for
stiffer laws. The General Directorate of Hygiene and Labor Security
develops safety standards in harmony with European Union standards, and
the General Labor Inspectorate is responsible for their enforcement,
but the Inspectorate lacks sufficient funds and inspectors to combat
the problem of work accidents effectively. A relatively large
proportion of accidents occurs in the construction industry. Poor
environmental controls in textile production also cause considerable
concern.
While the ability of workers to remove themselves from situations
where these hazards exist is limited, it is difficult to fire workers
for any reason. Workers injured on the job rarely initiate lawsuits.
f. Worker Rights in Sectors With U.S. Investment: Legally, worker
rights apply equally to all sectors of the economy.
Extent of U.S. Investment in Selected Industries--U.S. Direct Investment Position Abroad on an Historical Cost
Basis--1998
[Millions of U.S. Dollars]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Category Amount
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Petroleum...................... .............. (\1\)
Total Manufacturing............ .............. 335
Food & Kindred Products...... 113 ...............................................................
Chemicals & Allied Products.. 114 ...............................................................
Primary & Fabricated Metals.. -5 ...............................................................
Industrial Machinery and (\1\) ...............................................................
Equipment.
Electric & Electronic (\1\) ...............................................................
Equipment.
Transportation Equipment..... 37 ...............................................................
Other Manufacturing.......... 9 ...............................................................
Wholesale Trade................ .............. 397
Banking........................ .............. 239
Finance/Insurance/Real Estate.. .............. 261
Services....................... .............. 98
Other Industries............... .............. (\1\)
TOTAL ALL INDUSTRIES........... .............. 1,474
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Suppressed to avoid disclosing data of individual companies.
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis.
______
ROMANIA
Key Economic Indicators
[Billions of U.S. Dollars unless otherwise indicated]
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1997 1998 \1\ 1999
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Income, Production and Employment:
Nominal GDP (Billion Current Lei) 250,480.2 338,670.0 487,370.0
\2\..............................
Real Lei GDP Growth (pct) \3\..... -6.6 -7.3 -4.5
GDP by Sector (Million US$):.... 34,944.7 38,157.4 29,900.0
Agriculture..................... 6,324.9 6,067.0 5,900.0
Manufacturing................... 12,405.3 12,057.7 11,515.7
Services........................ 16,214.5 20,032.7 12,484.3
Per Capita GDP (US$).............. 1,549.9 1,695.6 1,328.8
Labor Force (Millions)............ 9.0 8.9 8.7
Unemployment Rate (pct)........... 8.9 10.3 11.6
Money and Prices (annual percentage
growth):
Money Supply Growth (M2).......... 104.8 48.9 29.7
Consumer Price Inflation.......... 151.4 40.6 47.0
Exchange Rate (Lei/US$ annual
average)
Official........................ 7,167.9 8,872.6 16,300.0
Parallel........................ 7,200 9,020 16,315
Balance of Payments and Trade:
Total Exports FOB \4\............. 8,431 8,302 7,654
Exports to U.S.\4\.............. 192.5 319.7 272.7
Total Imports CIF \4\............. 11,279.7 11,821.0 9.813.3
Imports from U.S.\4\............ 461.0 499.0 433.1
Trade Balance FOB/CIF \4\......... -2,848.6 -3,519.0 -2,159.3
Balance with U.S................ -268.5 -179.3 -140.4
External Public Debt.............. 6,853.7 6,954.7 5,833.8
Fiscal Deficit/GDP (pct).......... 3.6 3.1 3.7
Current Account Deficit/GDP (pct). 6.1 7.9 4.9
Debt Service Payments/GDP (pct)... 5.3 5.9 7.4
Gold and Foreign Exchange Reserves 3,397.5 2,586.8 2,330.4
Aid from U.S...................... 25.0 38.0 56.0
Aid from All Other Sources........ 198.7 204.0 172.8
------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ 1999 figures are all estimates based on available monthly data in
October.
\2\ GDP at factor cost.
\3\ Percentage changes calculated in local currency.
\4\ Merchandise trade.
1. General Policy Framework
In 1999, Romania continued to implement market based economic
reforms at a slow pace and to privatize state-owned enterprises. A
lower current account deficit, moderately tight fiscal policy, modest
progress in bank restructuring and privatization and, albeit with
considerable difficulty, full servicing of the country's foreign debt
represented the most significant macro-economic achievements in 1999.
The official economy continued to contract, however, with GDP
expected to fall around five percent in 1999. At the same time, the
informal economy represents about 40 to 50 percent of the formal
economy. The current account deficit narrowed and external public debt
decreased. Improved tax collection and tight public spending caused the
consolidated budget deficit to drop to 4.2 percent of GDP, in line with
the target set by the IMF. Public direct and guaranteed external debt
service is projected to be $1.5 billion in 2000, down from $2.2 billion
in 1999, while gross external financing requirements will be $1.9
billion. Despite higher foreign exchange reserves and new agreements in
progress with the IMF and IBRD, there is still concern that Romania
will be unable to finance these debts, as signaled by the continued low
ratings by Moody's, Standard and Poor's and Fitch-IBCA.
Romania is committed to becoming a member of the European Union
(EU), which is by far its largest trading partner and which invited
Romania to open accession negotiations. Trade with the EU accounts for
64 percent of Romania's merchandise imports and exports. Trade with the
United States accounts for only 3.8 percent of Romania's exports and
4.4 percent of its imports, a proportion which has been consistent for
the past few years. In 1999, U.S. exports to Romania are projected to
drop by 13.0 percent, yet market share may remain constant.
2. Exchange Rate Policy
The foreign exchange market was liberalized in February 1997. The
leu is fully convertible for current account transactions and foreign
investment. The leu depreciated substantially in the first quarter of
1999, but then stabilized in real terms for the remainder of the year.
The central bank is committed to full convertibility in the capital
account, but the necessary conditions for this are not yet in place and
may take a few years.
3. Structural Policies
Economic reform has resulted in the passage of a wide variety of
legislation affecting virtually every sector: commerce, privatization,
intellectual property, banking, labor, foreign investment, environment,
and taxation. While new legislation is necessary to create a basis for
a market economy, rapid regulatory change has slowed the pace of trade
and investment. Implementation has also been a problem.
Romania continues to make significant progress in its agricultural
reform program. (Note: Agriculture accounts for about one-fifth of GDP,
and about 35 percent of formal and informal employment is dependent on
it.) Prices are determined by market forces, and there are no export
quotas. Over the past two years tariffs have been reduced by 66
percent. Modest progress has been made in the agricultural sector
privatization, and further privatization is on track within ASAL
program agreed with the World Bank.
However, deep-seated problems remain in the agricultural sector.
Among them:
--the continued pervasive state presence, including price controls,
state management of a large proportion of arable land, state
ownership of input supply, storage, marketing, and agro-
processing enterprises;
--incomplete land reform which has left many fragmented holdings, for
which property rights are still not well-defined;
--under-developed rural cooperatives and financial services, few
private input suppliers, and no extension services;
--agricultural coupons for Diesel oil that arrive too late to be
helpful for agricultural production and also jeopardize annual
budget discipline.
The pace of reform in heavy industry has been very slow. The state
has retained ownership of 67 percent of the industrial sector. While
the government remains committed to privatizing or liquidating most of
these firms, implementation has proved difficult. Meanwhile, industrial
subsidies are still largely concentrated in loss-making industries such
as mining, instead of in potential growth sectors, such as food
processing.
4. Debt Management Policies
At the end of July 1999, Romania's medium and long-term external
debt dropped to $7.8 billion, from $9.1 billion at the end of 1998. The
National Bank's foreign exchange reserves amounted to $1.47 billion, in
addition to $989.8 million in gold, and the commercial banks' reserves
reached $2.0 billion in July 1999. However, the National Bank's
reserves are down 10 percent since end-1998, due to the high foreign
debt servicing required in 1999: one third of Romania's total public
external debt, which was $3.06 billion. Romania has claims against
foreign countries amounting to $3 billion.
Debt service payments were a major challenge for Romania during the
first half of 1999. However, the GOR succeeded in avoiding default, and
increased foreign exchange reserves beginning in July, though reserve
levels remained below end-1998 levels, while cutting the current
account deficit by more than 50 percent. After long negotiations and
months of delay, the government concluded with the IMF a new standby
loan, the first tranche ($73 million) of which was released in August.
However, at year's end the Romanian government had not yet satisfied
the IMF condition in the FY 2000 budget to allow a second tranche to be
released.
The World Bank concluded at the same time a $300 million PSAL
agreement with Romania. The government received half of the loan in
August, and the World Bank is considering releasing the second tranche
as soon as the IMF board takes a decision. Under the PSAL agreement
with the World Bank, the GOR has pledged to reform the banking sector,
close loss-making firms and improve the business environment. The IMF
has sent a technical team in early December 1999 to review progress in
implementing the two accords and tie them up with the appropriate
budget policies needed for the fiscal year 2000, an election year when
foreign debt servicing (including private sector) will amount to $2.4
billion.
5. Significant Barriers to U.S. Exports
Traditionally defined trade and investment barriers are not a
significant problem in Romania, as there are no laws which directly
prejudice foreign trade or business operations. Tariff preferences
resulting from Romania's Association Agreement with the EU have
disadvantaged US exports in several sectors, including agriculture,
telephonic equipment, computers, and beverages. For example, the duty
on tires is 30.5 percent from the US, and 18.4 percent from the EU and
falling.
Bureaucratic red tape and uncertainties in the legal framework make
doing business in Romania difficult. There is little experience with
Western methods of negotiating contracts and, once concluded,
enforcement is not uniform. In addition, delays in reconciling
conflicting property claims, arising from seizures during the World War
II and Communist eras, have resulted in a situation in which purchasers
are potentially subject to legal challenge by former owners and title
insurance is not available. The absence of clear legal recourse to
recover claims against debtors is a further complication for foreign
investors. Romania's customs regime imposes minimum reference prices,
which is inconsistent with its WTO obligations. This has hindered U.S.
poultry exports to Romania.
The cost of doing business in Romania is high, particularly for
office rentals, transportation and telecommunication services. Lack of
an efficient, modern payment system further delays transactions in
Romania. Capital requirements for foreign investors are not onerous,
but local capital remains very expensive. Also, taxes on both profits
and operations are steep. Investors complain of inconsistency in
Romania's policy on tax incentives for foreign companies. Previously
foreign companies qualified for some tax exemptions, based on the size
of their investment. Given significant fiscal constraints and under IMF
pressure, the GOR rescinded this in 1999, except for the case of the
French car maker, Renault, which purchased the national Romanian car
manufacturing company, Dacia Pitesti.
There are few formal barriers to investment in Romania. The Foreign
Investment Law allows for full foreign ownership of investment projects
(including land, for as long as the investment is in place.) There are
no legal restrictions on the repatriation of profits and equity
capital. The continually changing legal regime for investment and
privatization, however, forms a significant barrier to investment.
Government approval of joint ventures requires extensive documentation.
U.S. investment in Romania totaled $314.1 million by July 1999, putting
the U.S. in fourth place among foreign investors.
Romania is a member of the World Trade Organization, but not a
signatory to the agreement on government procurement.
6. Export Subsidies Policies
The Romanian Government does not provide export subsidies but does
attempt to make exporting attractive to Romanian companies. For
example, the government provides refunds of import duties for goods
that are then processed for export. The Romanian Export-Import Bank
engages in trade promotion activities on behalf of Romanian exporters,
and has lately become more of an analysis bank.
There are no general licensing requirements for exports from
Romania, but the government does prohibit or control the export of
certain strategic goods and technologies. There are also export
controls on imported or domestically produced goods of proliferation
concern.
7. Protection of U.S. Intellectual Property Rights
Romania has enacted significant legislation in intellectual
property protection. Patent, copyright and trademark laws are in place.
In the past year, Romania has adopted pipeline protection for
pharmaceuticals. Enforcement is limited and ineffective.
Pirated copies of audio and video cassettes, CDs, and software are
readily available. In a few cases, pirated films were broadcast on
local cable television channels. There are no known exports of pirated
products from Romania.
Romania is a member of the Bern Convention, the World Intellectual
Property Organization, the Paris Intellectual Property Convention, the
Patents Cooperation Treaty, the Madrid Convention, and the Hague
Convention on Industrial Design, Drawings and Models. As a country in
transition, Romania will implement the WTO agreement on intellectual
property on January 1, 2000. Industrial property law amendments needed
for full compliance with TRIPS have already been drafted, but not
enacted, yet. The TRIPS-consistent Copyright and Neighboring Rights Law
is very inefficiently implemented, mainly due to the lack of
coordination among the government enforcement agencies, police,
prosecutors and judges, as well as due to each of these organizations'
lack of focus. The Business Software Association estimates that
currently, pirated products account for about 80 percent of the
Romanian market, down from 95 percent prior to the law's coming into
force. In order to help solve this problem, the government drafted a
bill regulating the customs right to check on imports from the
intellectual property point of view, a draft that is still in the
Parliament for action.
8. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association: All workers (except public employees)
have the right to associate freely and to form and join labor unions
without prior authorization. Labor unions are free from government or
political party control but may engage in political activity. Labor
unions may join federations and affiliate with international bodies,
and representatives of foreign and international organizations may
freely visit and advise Romanian trade unions.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively: Workers have the
right to bargain collectively. Basic wage scales for employees of
state-owned enterprises are established through collective bargaining
with the state. There are no legal limitations on the right to strike,
except in sectors the government considers critical to the public
interest (e.g. defense, health care, transportation).
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor: The Constitution
prohibits forced or compulsory labor. The Ministry of Labor and Social
Protection effectively enforces this prohibition.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children: The minimum age for
employment is 16. Children over 14 may work with the consent of their
parents, but only ``according to their physical development, aptitude,
and knowledge.'' Working children under 16 have the right to continue
their education, and employers are required to assist in this regard.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work: Minimum wage rates are generally
observed and enforced. The Labor Code provides for a standard work week
of 40 hours with overtime for work in excess of 40 hours, and paid
vacation of 18 to 24 days annually. Employers are required to pay
additional benefits and allowances to workers engaged in dangerous
occupations. The Ministry of Labor and Social Protection has
established safety standards for most industries, but enforcement is
inadequate and employers generally ignore the Ministry's
recommendations. Labor organizations continue to press for healthier,
safer working conditions. On average, women experience a higher rate of
unemployment than men and earn lower wages despite educational
equality.
f. Rights in Sectors with U.S. Investment: Conditions do not appear
to differ in goods producing sectors in which U.S. capital is invested.
Extent of U.S. Investment in Selected Industries--U.S. Direct Investment Position Abroad on an Historical Cost
Basis--1998
[Millions of U.S. Dollars]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Category Amount
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Petroleum...................... .............. -12
Total Manufacturing............ .............. 43
Food & Kindred Products...... (\1\) ...............................................................
Chemicals & Allied Products.. 14 ...............................................................
Primary & Fabricated Metals.. 0 ...............................................................
Industrial Machinery and 1 ...............................................................
Equipment.
Electric & Electronic 0 ...............................................................
Equipment.
Transportation Equipment..... 1 ...............................................................
Other Manufacturing.......... (\1\) ...............................................................
Wholesale Trade................ .............. 11
Banking........................ .............. (\1\)
Finance/Insurance/Real Estate.. .............. (\1\)
Services....................... .............. 0
Other Industries............... .............. (\1\)
TOTAL ALL INDUSTRIES........... .............. 128
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Suppressed to avoid disclosing data of individual companies.
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis
______
RUSSIA
Key Economic Indicators
[Billions of U.S. Dollars unless otherwise noted]
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1997 1998 \1\ 1999
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Income, Production and Employment:
Nominal GDP \2\...................... 2,522 2,685 4,600
Real GDP Growth (pct)................ 0.6 -4.6 1.5
Per Capita Personal Income (US$)..... 922 610 \4\ 466
Labor Force (000's).................. 72,000 72,000 73,700
Unemployment Rate (pct).............. 11.2 13.3 12.4
Money and Prices (annual percent
growth):
Money Supply Growth (M2)............. 30.6 3.2 \4\ 48.8
Consumer Price Index (percent 11 84.3 45.0
increase)...........................
Exchange Rate (Ruble/US$ annual 5.785 9.705 24.429
average)............................
Balance of Payments and Trade:
Total Exports (FOB).................. 85.0 71.3 \5\ 31.1
Exports to U.S..................... 4.5 5.7 \6\ 3.8
Total Imports (CIF).................. 52.9 43.5 \5\ 14.5
Imports from U.S................... 4.1 3.6 \6\ 0.9
Trade Balance........................ 32.1 27.8 \5\ 16.6
Balance with U.S................... 0.4 2.1 \6\ 2.9
Current Account...................... 3.5 2.4 12.6
External Public Debt................. 123.5 147 159.7
Debt Service Payments/GDP (pct)...... 1.4 3.7 \4\ 5.9
Fiscal Deficit/GDP (pct)............. 6.7 3.2 \5\ 3.8
Gold and Foreign Exchange............ 17.8 12.1 \3\ 11.8
Aid from U.S. (US$ millions) \7\..... 492 639.4 1,937.1
Aid from All Other Sources........... N/A N/A N/A
------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ 1999 data has been provided for the last available period (9/99)
unless otherwise noted. The Russian Ruble was re-denominated on
January 1, 1998 by dropping three zeros off the value of the currency.
All data in ruble terms have been adjusted to ``new rubles'' for
comparability.
\2\ Billions of Russian Rubles.
\3\ Data for January-October 1999.
\4\ Data for January-August 1999.
\5\ Data for the period January-June 1999.
\6\ U.S. Commerce Department data for the period January-August 1999.
\7\ USG Assistance (by fiscal year) including food assistance, not
including donated humanitarian commodities shipped by USG. Military
assistance included $389.4 million in Department of Defense funds,
largely for strategic weapons destruction programs, plus IMET and FMF
programs, from which only $228,000 was spent in FY99.
Sources: Russian Statistics Committee (Goskomstat), Russian State
Customs Committee, International Monetary Fund, Department of State S/
NIS/C and embassy estimates.
1. General Policy Framework
The Russian economy rebounded somewhat in 1999 from the economic
and financial crisis of 1998, based on higher oil prices and import
substitution resulting from the devaluation of the ruble. However, in
the absence of substantial progress toward the reforms necessary to
underpin a vigorous market economy and attract domestic and foreign
investment, the Russian economy remains fragile and vulnerable to
external and internal shocks. Industrial production in October was up
10.3 percent from the depressed levels of October 1998. The IMF is
forecasting year on year inflation at end-December of 45 percent,
compared to more than 80 percent in 1998. Unemployment has eased and
the demand for cash transactions continued to rise as barter deals
declined.
Despite estimates for real GDP growth in 1999 ranging from 0 to 3
percent, the economic boost from devaluation of the ruble and increased
revenues from oil exports is unlikely to be repeated in the coming
year. In the near term, sustainable growth in Russia will depend
importantly on domestic demand, consumption and investment, all of
which are running well below last year's levels. The lack of
significant progress on structural reforms and the difficult investment
climate contribute to continued net capital outflow. Surveys suggest
that a main constraint to production is the absence of working capital,
but the banking sector has not stabilized from its collapse in 1998 and
is not in a position to effectively intermediate savings to productive
investments on a large scale.
Fiscal policy for the first half of the year was moderately
disciplined, with an overall deficit of 3.8 percent compared with a
budget target of 2.5 percent for the year. Following low cash
collections in the beginning of the year, revenue collections increased
substantially, topping 13.2 percent of GDP during the first half of the
year, compared with 10.5 percent over the same period in 1998. The GOR
expects revenues of R55l billion for the year, about 16 percent over
budget. Monetary policy was moderately tight. Base money increased 22
percent during the first half of the year, in part due to indirect
central bank financing of the federal deficit, specifically assisting
in servicing the GOR's external debt. The ruble remained relatively
stable between March and August in a more tightly controlled foreign
exchange environment than before. In these conditions, the Central Bank
has sought to avoid exchange rate volatility through selective
interventions to smooth the trend. The Central Bank's reserves have not
significantly increased, partially due to external debt payments,
changes in accounting and unauthorized capital exports.
The cost of Russia's 1998 financial collapse was significant. GDP
measured in USD terms declined from around USD 422 billion in 1997 to
USD 132 billion at the end of 1998, about the level of GDP in 1993.
While nominal ruble revenues have increased this year to date, they are
still about half those of last year, as measured in USD terms.
Similarly in the banking sector, assets in USD fell by 50 percent to
around USD 5O billion. As with other emerging markets that have
suffered sharp setbacks, rebuilding will take time.
Government economic policy has been largely static this year. While
the three successive post-August-1998 governments have not adopted
policies that would have exacerbated an already fragile situation, none
have adopted aggressive policies to address fundamental challenges
faced by the country. With upcoming parliamentary elections in December
and presidential elections in June, the consensus of observers is that
major movement on reforms or major policy changes are unlikely until
the new Duma and new President are in place.
2. Exchange Rate Policy
The objective of the Central Bank of Russia's (CBR) exchange rate
policy is to ensure the stability and predictability of the ruble
exchange rate and prevent abrupt fluctuations, in the context of a
floating exchange rate regime. After slipping at the beginning of the
year, the nominal ruble/dollar rate held steady at around 24.5 from May
through August, then drifted down to about 26.8 in December. High ruble
liquidity, as reflected by the approximately R70 billion in banks'
correspondent accounts at the CBR, supported the decline late in the
year. From September through mid-November, the ruble has depreciated
approximately 4.5 percent in nominal terms.
The ruble's tentative stability can be explained in part by new
market conditions. The CBR has tightened foreign exchange controls by
imposing restrictions on foreign exchange for import contracts,
requiring 75 percent of repatriated export proceeds to be sold on
authorized exchanges, not allowing banks to trade on their own
accounts, limiting the conversion of funds in S-accounts from the GKO
restructuring, and banning the conversion of ruble funds from
nonresident banks' correspondent accounts. The latter was repealed, but
replaced by requiring banks to deposit amounts equivalent to those it
holds in S-accounts of non-residents. These exchange controls are only
marginally effective at controlling capital flight, which reportedly
increased to nearly $3.0 billion per month in late 1999, but they
presumably have helped CBR to manage exchange rate volatility.
3. Structural Policies
The economic crisis of 1998 overshadowed structural issues for the
most part throughout 1999. The share of GDP produced by private
companies reached 74 percent by the end of 1999 according to official
figures. The share of barter in the economy appears to be declining,
although it still accounts for roughly half of all transactions
according to most estimates. External barter trade sharply declined in
1999 as well. Government arrears dropped dramatically as payment of
pensions and salaries in nominal terms became cheaper in light of the
drastic ruble devaluation after August 1998. Even though personal
incomes dropped precipitously over the last year, industrial production
has increased as a result oil import substitution. Without investment,
however, the up-tick in production is not expected to be sustainable,
and little has been done to improve the investment climate. Indeed,
several cases involving foreign investment suggest that many issues
remain to be addressed.
Repeated changes in government have exacerbated the problems of
inadequate structural policies by obscuring economic policy overall.
With three Prime Ministers in the first 8 months of 1999, articulation,
much less implementation of a coherent structural policy has proven
elusive. In addition, the end of the current legislative period carried
forward the effective policy stalemate in the economic sphere that has
plagued the reform process. The election of a new State Duma in
December 1999 will produce a new opportunity for legislative
initiatives. However, economic policy is effectively on hold for now,
and may well remain so until after the presidential election in July
2000.
Meanwhile, privatization continues, with sales of shares of the
government's stakes in oil and gas companies. At the same time, a
debate about the benefits of past privatizations has become an element
in the Duma election campaign with a number of leading politicians
suggesting that de-privatization of some enterprises could be
considered. The privatization of the Lomonosov porcelain factory,
partly owned by U.S. investors, was reversed by a St. Petersburg court.
Court appeals continue. Prime Minister Putin has opposed wholesale
reversal of privatization but has suggested that mistakes made in the
privatization process should be identified and corrected within the
framework of existing legislation.
The government has worked to prevent passage of legislative
initiatives that would inhibit foreign investment, for example in the
insurance sector, but with mixed results. One potentially important
achievement has been the adoption of an ambitious action plan for
reducing the regulatory burden on small business, along with tax
reduction. Overall however, there has been little progress in the
structural policy area over the last year, a development that can only
delay Russia's recovery from its financial crisis.
4. Debt Management Policies
Following the August 1998 financial crisis, the Government of
Russia has sought to restructure much of its internal debt and the
Soviet-era poition of its external debt. The Russian government has
reached a Framework Agreement with its Paris Club official creditors in
July 1999, but final bilateral agreements are not expected until early
in 2000. The Government of Russia is actively negotiating with its
London Club commercial creditors on an agreement to restructure and/or
reduce its commercial debt inherited from the Soviet government.
In March, the Russian government announced its GKO (Russian T-bill)
restructuring proposal, which offered foreign GKO holders a choice
between receiving a basket of securities or having their investments
placed in a frozen account. Funds received in the restructuring,
including from the securities, must be held in investors' S-accounts.
The Central Bank of Russia prohibits conversion of S-account rubles
into foreign currency, although it held six foreign exchange auctions
for S-account holders, of USD 50 million each, all of which were
heavily oversubscribed. Investors also may invest restricted S-account
rubles in certain securities. In November, the Government of Russia
announced it would permit S-account holders to make direct investments
in projects approved by the government, and is reopening its offer to
restructure GKO's to those investors who did not take advantage of the
first offer. On December 15, the Government of Russia allowed a one-
time change in S-account ownership. As of November 15, there were
approximately USD 350-400 million, and another USD 2 billion in OFZ
bonds, in restricted S-accounts.
The Government of Russia is continuing with its IMF program,
although a second tranche release in 1999 has been delayed. The World
Bank's Structural Adjustment Loan (SAL) is on hold due to lack of
progress on structural reform legislation.
5. Significant Barriers to U.S. Exports
At the end of 1999, the most significant impediments to U.S.
exports were not statutory but were instead results of the difficult
economic situation in Russia. The devaluation in August 1998 and the
reduced purchasing power of Russians played the greatest role, as
Russia's overall imports slumped by over 50 percent. U.S. exports to
Russia have decreased by an even larger margin in 1999, although one-
time sales of aircraft in 1998 exaggerated the overall decline
somewhat. Many exporters remain cautious about entering the Russian
market due to reduced availability of trade finance, and bad experience
with payment/clearance problems in the past. These problems have become
less common in 1999, perhaps partially due to the lower volume of
trade.
Since 1995, Russian tariffs have generally ranged from five to
thirty percent, with a trade-weighted average in the 13-15 percent
range. In addition, excise and Value-Added Tax (VAT) is applied to
selected imports. The VAT, which is applied on the import price plus
tariff, is currently 20 percent with the exception of some food
products. Throughout 1999, some revision of tariffs occurred, with in
some cases tariffs dropping for inputs needed by Russian producers in
the electronics and furniture businesses. On the other hand, there have
been sharp hikes in tariffs for sugar and for pharmaceuticals,
including high seasonal tariffs on raw and processed sugar. In
particular, compound duties with minimum levels of tariffs enacted in
1998 on poultry had the effect of increasing percentage duties after
the fall in poultry prices in 1998-99. The Ministry of Trade, supported
by the State Customs Committee, has proposed reducing some of Russia's
higher tariffs, recognizing that very high tariffs only lead to
evasion. However, the government has been reluctant to approve an
across-the-board reduction in tariffs given acute revenue concerns, as
customs duties account for a larger percentage of state revenues than
in most other countries.
Other Russian tariffs that have stood out as particular hindrances
to U.S. exports to Russia include those on autos (where combined
tariffs and engine displacement-weighted excise duties can raise prices
of larger U.S.-made passenger cars and sport utility vehicles by over
70 percent); some semiconductor products; and aircraft and certain
aircraft components (for which tariffs are set at 30 percent). The
Russian government continues to make waivers on aircraft import tariffs
for purchases by Russian airlines contingent on those airlines'
purchases of Russian-made aircraft.
Throughout 1999, Russia introduced a number of export duties (for
exports to non-CIS countries) as a revenue measure. Initially, these
duties were imposed on oil and gas, but have since been expanded to
include many export commodities, including fertilizers, paper and
cardboard, some ferrous and non-ferrous metals, and agricultural
products, including oilseeds raw hides, and hardwoods, all ranging from
5 to 30 percent.
Import licenses are required for importation of various goods,
including ethyl alcohol and vodka, color TVs, sugar, combat and
sporting weapons, self-defense articles, explosives, military and
ciphering equipment, encryption software and related equipment,
radioactive materials and waste including uranium, strong poisons and
narcotics, and precious metals, alloys and stones. In 1999, new import
license requirements were added for raw and processed sugar. Most
import licenses are issued by the Russian Ministry of Trade or its
regional branches, and controlled by the State Customs Committee.
Import licenses for sporting weapons and self-defense articles are
issued by the Ministry of Internal Affairs.
Throughout 1999, the government has continued tight controls on
alcohol production, including import restrictions, export duties, and
increased excise taxes. Many of these controls are in order to increase
budget revenues.
In spring 1998, Russia passed the Law on Protective Trade Measures,
which provides the government authority to undertake antidumping,
countervailing duty and safeguard investigations, under certain
conditions. Although Russian companies have filed several petitions for
protection in 1999 under this new law, no petition has yet been
approved, due to substantive or procedural insufficiencies of the
petitions.
The June 1993 Customs Code standardized Russian customs procedures
generally in accordance with international norms. However, customs
regulations change frequently, (often without sufficient notice), are
subject to arbitrary application, and can be quite burdensome. In
addition, Russia's use of minimum customs values is not consistent with
international norms. In November 1999, the State Customs Committee
imposed a restriction that forced U.S. poultry importers to ship
directly through Russian ports, rather than through warehouses in the
Baltic States, as had been their practice. On the positive side,
Russian customs is implementing the ``ClearPac'' program in the Russian
Far East that facilitates customs clearance from the U.S., and is
considering extending this program to other regions.
U.S. companies continue to report that Russian procedures for
certifying imported products and equipment are non-transparent,
expensive and beset by redundancies. Russian regulatory bodies also
generally refuse to accept foreign testing centers' data or
certificates. U.S. firms active in Russia have complained of limited
opportunity to comment on proposed changes in standards or
certification requirements before the changes are implemented, although
the Russian standards and certifications bodies have begun to work
closely with the American Chamber of Commerce in Russia to provide
additional information. Occasional jurisdictional overlap and disputes
between different government regulatory bodies compound certification
problems.
A January 1998 revision to State Tax Service Instruction #34, now
being enforced, makes it more difficult for expatriate employees of
U.S. entities to benefit from the U.S.-Russia bilateral treaty on
avoidance of double-taxation. A wide range of U.S. companies selling
goods and services in Russia, who formerly could receive advance
exemptions from withholding taxes for salaries, are now required to
apply for a refund of tax withheld.
Although little of Russia's legislation in the services sector is
overtly protectionist, the domestic banking, securities and insurance
industries have secured concessions in the form of Presidential
Decrees, and a draft law before the parliament will soon codify
restrictions and bans on foreign investment in many services sectors.
Foreign participation in banking, for example, is limited to 12 percent
of total paid-in banking capital. As of mid 1998 foreign banks'
capitalization only accounted for around 4 percent of the total.
However, as foreign banks recapitalized following the financial crisis
and Russian banks' capital shrank, the share of foreign banks' grew to
12.8 percent as of September 1. The Central Bank of Russia has
indicated it will seek a higher quota so as not to impede foreign bank
entry. Foreign investment is also limited in other sectors, such as
electricity generation. In October 1999, a new law took effect, which
implicitly allows majority-foreign-owned insurance companies to operate
in Russia for the first time, but restricts their share of total market
capitalization and prohibits them from selling life insurance or
obligatory types of insurance. The law contains a ``grandfather
clause'' exempting the four foreign companies currently licensed in
Russia from these restrictions. In practice, foreign companies are
often disadvantaged vis-a-vis their Russian counterparts in obtaining
contracts, approvals, licenses, registration, and certification, and in
paying taxes and fees.
Despite the passage of a new law regulating foreign investment in
June 1999, Russian foreign investment regulations and notification
requirements can be confusing and contradictory. The Law on Foreign
Investments provides that a single agency (still undesignated) will
register foreign investments, and that all branches of foreign firms
must be registered. The law does codify the principle of national
treatment for foreign investors, including the right to purchase
securities, transfer property rights, protect rights in Russian courts,
repatriate funds abroad after payment of duties, and to receive
compensation for nationalizations or illegal acts of Russian government
bodies. However, the law goes on to state that Federal law may provide
for a number of exceptions, including those necessary for ``the
protection of the constitution, public morals and health, and the
rights and lawful interest of other persons and the defense of the
state.'' The potentially large number of exceptions thus gives
considerable discretion to the Russian government. The law also
provides a ``grandfather clause'' that protects existing ``priority''
foreign investment projects with a foreign participation over 25
percent be protected from unfavorable changes in the tax regime or new
limitations On the foreign investment. The definition of ``priority''
projects is not fully clear, but it appears that projects with a
foreign charter capital of over $4.1 million and with a total
investment of over $41 million will qualify. In addition, foreigners
encounter significant restrictions on ownership of real estate in some
cities and regions in Russia, although the situation has improved over
the past few years.
The government maintains a monopoly on the sale of precious and
several rare-earth metals, conducts centralized sales of diamonds, and
conducts centralized purchases for export of military technology.
Throughout 1999, the government has sharply restricted exports of
platinum group metals, based on new legislation. An August 1997 series
of Presidential Decrees on military exports remain in effect. These
decrees established tighter control over military exports by the state
enterprise Rosvooruzheniye, enabled two additional state firms to sell
military goods and technology, and opened the door to future direct
sales by arms manufacturers, if licensed and approved by the Ministry
of Foreign Economic Relations.
Most of these issues are the subject of discussion, as Russia
continues to negotiate its accession to the World Trade Organization
(WTO). By the end of 1999, the government had completed ten working
party meetings. It tabled its initial market access offer for services
in October 1999 and has conducted negotiations on its goods market
access offer throughout the year. The Russian Ministry of Trade has
stated it plans to revise its goods market access offer early in 2000.
Russia is not yet a signatory of the WTO Government Procurement or
Civil Aircraft codes.
6. Export Subsidies Policies
The government has not instituted export subsidies, although a 1996
executive decree allows for provision of soft credits for exporters and
government guarantees for foreign loans. The government does provide
some subsidies for the production of coal, but coal exports are
minimal. Soft credits are at times provided to small enterprises for
specific projects.
7. Protection of U.S. Intellectual Property
Russia is in the process of accession to the World Trade
Organization (WTO), and as a new member, it will be required to meet
obligations under the WTO's Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs) immediately upon accession. Russia
belongs to the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), and has
acceded to the obligations of the former Soviet Union under the Paris
Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property (patent, trademark
and related industrial property), and the Madrid Agreement Concerning
the International Registration of Marks, and the Patent Cooperation
Treaty. Russia has also become a signatory to the Berne Convention for
the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works (copyright) as well as
the Geneva Phonograms Convention. In 1999, the U.S. Trade
Representative retained Russia on the ``Special 301'' Priority Watch
List for a third year due to a number of concerns over weak enforcement
of intellectual property laws and regulations and lack of retroactive
copyright protection for U.S. works in Russia.
In 1992-93 Russia enacted laws strengthening the protection of
patents, trademarks and appellations of origins, and copyright of
semiconductors, computer programs, literary, artistic and scientific
works, and audio/visual recordings. Legal enforcement of intellectual
property rights (IPR) improved somewhat with a series of raids on
manufacturing facilities, and on wholesale and retail outlets of
pirated goods. A new Criminal Code took effect January 1, 1997, which
contains considerably stronger penalties for IPR infringements.
However, there are still disappointingly few cases in which these
penalties have been applied. Widespread sales of pirated U.S. video
cassettes, recordings, books, computer software, clothes, toys, foods
and beverages continue. The formal abolition of the Russian Patent and
Trademark Agency this year and the assumption of its responsibilities
by the Justice Ministry have raised some concerns, but the practical
effect of this change remains to be seen.
Russia's Patent Law includes a grace period, procedures for
deferred examination, protection for chemical and pharmaceutical
products, and national treatment for foreign patent holders. Inventions
are protected for 20 years, industrial designs for ten years, and
utility models for five years. The Law on Trademarks and Appellation of
Origins introduces for the first time in Russia protection of
appellation of origins. The Law on Copyright and Associated Rights,
enacted in August 1993, protects all forms of artistic creation,
including audio/visual recordings and computer programs as literary
works for the lifetime of the author plus 50 years. The September 1992
Law on Topography of Integrated Microcircuits, which also protects
computer programs, protects semiconductor topographies for 10 years
from the date of registration.
Under the U.S.-Russian Bilateral Investment Treaty (signed in 1992
but waiting ratification by the Russian Parliament), Russia undertook
to protect investors' intellectual property rights. The 1990 U.S.
Russia bilateral trade agreement stipulates protection of the normal
range of literary, scientific and artistic works through legislation
and enforcement. Bilateral consultations on IPR were held in March
1999.
8. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association: The law provides workers with the
right to form and join trade unions, but practical limitations on the
exercise of this right arise from governmental policy and the dominant
position of the formerly governmental Federation of Independent Trade
Unions of Russia (FNPR). As the successor organization to the
governmental trade unions of the Soviet period and claiming to
represent 80 per cent of all workers, the FNPR occupies a privileged
position that inhibits the formation of new unions. In some cases, FNPR
local unions have worked with management to destroy new unions. Recent
court decisions have limited the right of association by mandating that
unions include management as members. Justice Ministry officials have
used new re-registration requirements to deny legal status to
independent unions.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively: Although the law
recognizes collective bargaining, and requires employers to negotiate
with unions, in practice employers often refuse to negotiate and
agreements are not implemented. Court rulings have established the
principle that non-payment of wages--by far the predominant grievance--
is an individual dispute and cannot be addressed collectively by
unions. As a result, a collective action based on non-payment of wages
would not be recognized as a strike, and individuals would not be
protected by the Labor Law's guarantees against being fired for
participation. The right to strike is difficult to exercise. Most
strikes are technically illegal, and courts have the right to order the
confiscation of union property to settle damages and losses to an
employer, resulting from an illegal strike. Reprisals for strikes are
common, although strictly prohibited by law.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor. The Labor Code
prohibits forced or compulsory labor by adults and children. There are
documented cases of soldiers being sent by their superior officers to
perform work for private citizens or organizations. Such labor may
violate military regulations and, if performed by conscripts, would be
an apparent violation of ILO convention 29 on forced labor.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children. The Labor Code prohibits
regular employment for children under the age of 16 and also regulates
the working conditions of children under the age of 18, including
banning dangerous, nighttime and overtime work.
Children may, under certain specific conditions, work in
apprenticeship or internship programs' at the ages of 14 and 15.
Accepted social prohibitions against the employment of children and the
availability of adult workers at low wage rates combine to prevent
widespread abuse of child labor legislation. The government prohibits
forced and bonded labor by children, and there have been no reports
that it occurred.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work: The Labor Code provides for a
standard workweek of 40 hours, with at least one 24-hour rest period.
The law requires premium pay for overtime work or work on holidays.
Workers have complained of being required to work well beyond the
normal week, that is, 10 to 12-hour days, and of forced transfers. As
of June 30, workers were owed roughly 2.5 billion US dollars, for
periods generally between 3 to 9 months. Although this is less than the
$12.5 billion arrears owed in August 1998, workers have lost
significant purchasing power since the devaluation. Workers' freedom to
move in search of new employment is virtually eliminated by the system
of residency permits. The law establishes minimal conditions of
workplace safety and worker health, but these standards are not
effectively enforced.
f. Rights in Sectors with U.S. Investment: Observance of worker
rights in sectors with significant U.S. investment (petroleum,
telecommunications, food, aerospace, construction machinery, and
pharmaceuticals) did not significantly differ from observance in other
sectors. There are no export processing zones. Worker rights in the
special economic zones/free trade zones are fully covered by the Labor
Code.
Extent of U.S. Investment in Selected Industries--U.S. Direct Investment Position Abroad on an Historical Cost
Basis--1998
[Millions of U.S. Dollars]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Category Amount
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Petroleum...................... .............. 513
Total Manufacturing............ .............. 269
Food & Kindred Products...... 243 ...............................................................
Chemicals & Allied Products.. 11 ...............................................................
Primary & Fabricated Metals.. (\1\) ...............................................................
Industrial Machinery and 2 ...............................................................
Equipment.
Electric & Electronic (\1\) ...............................................................
Equipment.
Transportation Equipment..... 0 ...............................................................
Other Manufacturing.......... 1 ...............................................................
Wholesale Trade................ .............. --76
Banking........................ .............. -346
Finance/Insurance/Real Estate.. .............. 653
Services....................... .............. -102
Other Industries............... .............. 190
TOTAL ALL INDUSTRIES........... .............. 1,101
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Suppressed to avoid disclosing data of individual companies.
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis.
______
SPAIN
Key Economic Indicators
[Billions of U.S. Dollars unless otherwise indicated]
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1997 1998 \1\ 1999
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Income, Production and Employment:
Real GDP (1995 Prices) \2\.............. 528.6 538.6 \3\ 531.
6
Real GDP Growth (pct) \4\............... 3.8 4.0 3.6
GDP (At Current Prices)................. 558.5 582.1 589.0
GDP by Sector:
Agriculture........................... 23.7 23.2 23.3
Industry.............................. 118.1 122.2 121.7
Construction.......................... 38.1 40.5 41.1
Services.............................. 331.3 344.3 347.5
Government............................ 47.5 51.9 55.4
Per Capita GDP (US$).................... 14,068 14,626 14,762
Labor Force (000's)..................... 16,121 16,265 16,500
Unemployment Rate (pct)................. 20.8 18.8 16.0
Money and Prices (annual percentage
growth):
Money Supply (M2)....................... 9.1 6.0 7.0
Consumer Price Inflation................ 2.0 1.8 2.5
Exchange Rate (PTA/US$ annual average).. 146.4 149.4 155.0
Balance of Payments and Trade:
Total Exports FOB \5\................... 105.2 109.4 120.0
Exports to U.S.\5\.................... 4.6 4.6 4.6
Total Imports CIF \5\................... 123.5 133.1 150.0
Imports from U.S.\5\.................. 7.8 7.8 8.0
Trade Balance \5\....................... -18.3 -23.7 -3.0
Balance With U.S.\5\.................. -3.2 -3.2 -3.4
Fiscal Deficit/GDP (pct)................ 3.0 1.8 1.6
Public Debt............................. 67.5 65.6 66.4
Debt Service Payments (Paid)............ N/A N/A N/A
Gold and Foreign Exchange Reserves...... 72.5 60.7 34.0
------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ 1999 figures are all estimates based on available monthly data in
July.
\2\ GDP at factor cost.
\3\ Devaluation.
\4\ Percentage changes calculated in local currency.
\5\ Merchandise trade. Spanish National Institute of Statistics.
Note: Estimates for 1999 show lower figures in U.S. Dollars than
previous years due to a rise in the U.S. Dollar/Spanish Peseta
exchange rate.
1. General Policy Framework
Spain's economy is expected to grow by 3.7 percent in 1999. This
growth is expected to continue in 2000. Growth continues to be broadly
based and is supported by the services sector, agriculture,
construction, consumer demand, and capital goods investment.
Throughout the 90s much of Spain's economic policy had focused on
meeting Maastricht targets so that Spain could become one of the
founding members of the EURO. These policies have continued in the
guise of the Stability Pact, which, if anything, has a bias toward even
stricter fiscal policy than the preceding agreement. Together these
policies have provided continuing benefits in the form of lower
interest rates, which in turn have promoted investment, construction,
and consumer demand. This increased economic activity has provided
increased income and higher tax receipts, which have allowed Spain to
handily meet government deficit/GDP targets. Government fiscal
restraint, higher tax receipts, and lower interest on government debt
(courtesy of lower EURO interest rates) should allow the government's
deficit/GDP ratio to fall below 2 percent in 1999. The government's
overall debt/GDP ratio should fall to 68 percent in 1999, moving toward
the 60 percent goal.
Economic growth has decreased unemployment to the lowest levels in
a over a decade. Although high compared to EU averages, Spain's current
unemployment rate of 15.6 percent and increasing evidence of sectoral
labor shortages points to a strongly growing economy. Employment growth
has been underwritten by changes in 1996 and 1997 that provided
flexibility in hiring practices that lessen somewhat the high costs of
permanent new hires. Despite the labor market's rigidities, Spain
creates more jobs than any other EU country.
2. Exchange Rate Policy
The Spanish peseta/EURO rate was fixed on January 1, 1999 at
166.386 pesetas to the EURO. Average dollar/EURO rate to date in 1999
has been 1.076 or 154.808 pesetas to the dollar. The rate at the time
this is being drafted is 1 EURO equals USD 1.0177.
3. Structural Policies
Spain has eliminated tariff barriers for imports from other EU
countries and applies common EU external tariffs to imports from non-EU
countries. Similarly Spain is also bound to the mutual recognition
agreements in its application of certain non-tariff regulations applied
to certain goods from the United States.
In 1989, as part of the investment sector reforms necessary to
comply with EU membership, Spain made stock market rules and operations
more transparent and provided for the licensing of investment banking
services. The reform also eased conditions for obtaining a broker's
license. A 1992 Investment Law removed many administrative requirements
for foreign investments. EU resident companies (i.e. companies deemed
European under article 58 of the Treaty of Rome) are free from almost
all restrictions. Non-EU resident investors must obtain Spanish
Government authorization to invest in broadcasting, gaming, air
transport, or defense. Restrictions on broadcasting and in transport
are facing increasing pressure as the government looks to privatizing
its national airline (perhaps in 1999), and completes the privatization
of its telephone company.
Faced with the loss of the Spanish feed grain market as a result of
Spain's membership in the EU, the United States negotiated an
enlargement agreement with the EU in 1987 which established a 2.3
million ton annual quota for Spanish imports of corn, specified non-
grain feed ingredients and sorghum from non-EU countries. The Uruguay
Round agreement having the effect of extending this agreement
indefinitely. The United States remains interested in maintaining
access to the Spanish feed grain market and will continue to press the
EU on this issue.
As an EU member state, Spain must also abide by EU procedures for
approving the commercialization of products generated with the aid of
biotechnology. The EU's lengthy and non-transparent process for
approving agricultural products produced through modern genetic
engineering methods has negatively impacted U.S. corn exports to Spain.
Due to the EU's failure to approve some U.S. corn varieties, U.S. corn
exports to Spain have virtually been eliminated, costing U.S. exporters
about $150 million per year. Unless the EU takes steps to streamline
its biotechnology product approval process, U.S. exporters will
continue to be unable to ship U.S. corn to Spain.
Under its EU accession agreement, Spain was forced to transform its
structure of formal and informal import restrictions for industrial
products into a formal system of import licenses and quotas. While
Spain does not enforce any quotas on U.S.-origin manufactured products,
it still requires import documents for some goods, which are described
below. Neither of the following documents constitutes a trade barrier
for U.S.-origin goods:
--Import Authorization (autorizacion administrativa de importacion)
is used to control imports which are subject to quotas.
Although there are no quotas against U.S. goods, this document
may still be required if part of the shipment contains products
or goods produced or manufactured in a third country. In
essence, for U.S.-origin goods, the document is used for
statistical purposes only or for national security reasons;
--Prior Notice of Imports (notificacion previa de importacion) is
used for merchandise that circulates in the EU customs union
area, but is documented for statistical purposes only. The
importer must obtain the document and present it to the general
register.
Importers apply for import licenses at the Spanish general register
of Spain's secretariat of commerce or any of its regional offices. The
license application must be accompanied by a commercial invoice that
includes freight and insurance, the C.I.F. price, net and gross weight,
and invoices number. License application has a minimum charge. Customs
accepts commercial invoices by fax. The license, once granted, is
normally valid for six months but may be extended if adequate
justification is provided.
Goods that are shipped to a Spanish customs area without proper
import licenses or declarations are usually subject to considerable
delay and may run up substantial demurrage charges. U.S. exporters
should ensure, prior to making shipments, that the necessary licenses
have been obtained by the importing party. Also, U.S. exporters should
have their importer confirm with Spanish customs whether any product
approvals or other special certificates will be required for the
shipment to pass customs.
The government has signed and ratified the Marrakech Agreement
which concluded the Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations
and established the World Trade Organization.
4. Debt Management Policy
Thirty percent of Spanish medium and long-term debt is held by non-
residents. Approximately twenty one percent of Spanish Government debt
is short-term (less than one year) and seventy nine percent is long-
term (i.e. maturities greater than five years).
At the end of September 1999, international reserves at the Bank of
Spain totaled 35.9 billion euros or 38.6 billion dollars.
5. Significant Barriers to U.S. Exports
Import Restrictions: Under the EU's Common Agricultural Policy
(CAP), Spanish farm incomes are protected by direct payments and
guaranteed farm prices that are higher than world prices. One of the
mechanisms for maintaining this internal support are high external
tariffs that effectively keep lower priced imports from entering the
domestic market to compete with domestic production. However, the
Uruguay Round agreement has required that all import duties on
agricultural products be reduced by an average of 20 percent during the
five year period from 1995 to 2000.
In addition to these mechanisms, the EU employs a variety of strict
animal and plant health standards which act as barriers to trade. These
regulations end up severely restricting or prohibiting Spanish imports
of certain plant and livestock products. One of the most glaring
examples of these policies is the EU ban on imports of hormone treated
beef, imposed in 1989 with the stated objective of protecting consumer
health. Despite a growing and widespread use of illegal hormones in
Spanish beef production, the EU continues to ban U.S. beef originating
from feedlots where growth promoters have been used safely and under
strict regulation for many years. Despite a WTO ruling requiring the EU
to remove the ban, the EU ban on imports of hormone treated beef
remains in effect.
One important aspect of Spain's EU membership is how EU-wide
phytosanitary regulations, and regulations that govern food
ingredients, labeling and packaging impact the Spanish market for
imports of U.S. agricultural products. The majority of these
regulations took effect on January 1, 1993 when EU ``single market''
legislation was fully implemented in Spain. Agricultural and food
product imports into Spain are subject to the same regulations as in
other EU countries.
While many restrictions that had been in operation in Spain before
the transition have now been lifted, for certain products the new
regulations impose additional import requirements. For example, Spain
requires any foodstuff that has been treated with ionizing radiation to
carry an advisory label. In addition, a lot marking is required for any
packaged food items. Spain, in adhering to EU-wide standards, continues
to impose strict requirements on product labeling, composition, and
ingredients. Like the rest of the EU, Spain prohibits imports which do
not meet a variety of unusually strict product standards. Food
producers must conform to these standards, and importers of these
products must register with government health authorities prior to
importation.
Telecommunications: Spain liberalized its telecommunications market
beginning December 1, 1998. Prior to this date, the government phased
in competition in basic telephony through licenses granted to
privatized second operator Retevision and to third operator Lince/Uni2
(France Telecom), in addition to incumbent operator Telefonica. Cable
operators were allowed to provide basic telephony beginning January 1,
1998, but only by using their own networks; that is, they could provide
basic telephony by interconnecting with the Telefonica or Retevision
networks. This, in combination with several other mitigating factors,
such as bureaucratic obstacles at the municipal level, the arrival of
digital satellite television, and problems with new entrants forging
interconnection agreements that are unbundled, transparent, timely and
cost-oriented, has resulted in a slow start for the establishment of
the cable sector in Spain.
Digital television, especially via satellite, has emerged as a
promising industry in the Spanish market. There are two digital
television platforms, Via Digital and Canal Satellite Digital, which
currently offer digital television programming. Onda Digital
(Retevision) has announced plans next year to offer a competing digital
TV package provided over a terrestrial network. Spain's mobile
telephony market has also experienced a very rapid growth in
subscribers. The government will offer six licenses for third
generation wireless telephony in early 2000. New opportunities are
emerging in advanced telecommunications services, including the
internet and high-speed data transmission. Finally, the government has
established the Telecommunications Market Commission (CMT) as an
independent regulatory authority to oversee all activity in this
sector.
Government Procurement: Spain's Uruguay Round government
procurement obligations took effect on January 1, 1996. Under the
bilateral U.S.-EU government procurement agreement, Spain's obligations
took effect also on January 1, 1996, except those for services which
took effect on January 1, 1997. Offset requirements are common in
defense contracts and some large non-defense related and public sector
purchases (e.g. commercial aircraft and satellites).
Television Broadcasting Content Requirements: On May 13, 1999, the
Spanish parliament adopted new legislation that incorporates the
revised EU Television without Frontiers Directive and revises the 1994
Spanish law on television broadcasting. The new law explicitly requires
television operators to reserve 51 percent of their annual broadcast
time to European audiovisual works. It also obliges television channels
to devote 5 percent of their annual earnings to finance European
feature length films and films for European television.
Motion Picture Dubbing Licenses and Screen Quotas: In January 1997,
the government adopted implementing regulations for the 1994 Cinema
Law, which reserved a portion of the theatrical market for EU-produced
films. Thanks to successful industry-government negotiations, the new
regulations eased the impact of the 1994 law on non-EU producers and
distributors in regard to screen quotas and dubbing licenses. The
screen quotas finally adopted required exhibitors to show one day of
EU-produced film for every three days of non-EU-produced film instead
of the original ratio of one to two. The three-tiered system
established for dubbing licenses under the 1994 law ended in June 1999.
New draft film legislation is slated to be sent to the Parliament in
early 2000. It is expected to provide for increased freedom to export
and import films and the gradual liberalization of screen quotas.
Despite remaining protectionist elements, Spain's theatrical film
system has been modified sufficiently in recent years so that it is no
longer a major source of trade friction as it had been earlier.
However, in 1998, the Catalan regional government adopted a decree
under its new law on language policy, which calls for both dubbing and
screen quotas in order to increase the number of films being shown in
the Catalan language. Due to strong industry opposition and the start
of negotiations with film distributors and exhibitors to resolve their
differences, the Catalan government decided to suspend implementation
of this law until July 2000.
Product Standards and Certification Requirements: Product
certification requirements have been liberalized considerably since
Spain's entry into the EU. After several years in which
telecommunications equipment faced difficulties, Spain adapted its
national regulations in this area to conform to EU directives. For
example, now all telecom equipment must carry the CE mark, which
certifies that it complies with all applicable EU directives. This
process may take three to four months after all tests have been
performed and necessary documents are submitted. However, recognition
from other EU countries and an early presentation of all documentation
can speed up the process considerably. There is still some uncertainty
as to whether the earlier exemption from homologation and certification
requirements for equipment imported for military use is still valid.
In general there has been improved transparency of process. For
example, the CE registration for medical equipment from any of the EU
member states is considered valid here. Thus, the product registration
procedure is shortened (to about six months) and no longer must be
initiated by a Spanish distributor. Pharmaceuticals and drugs still
must go through an approval and registration process with the Ministry
of Health requiring several years unless previously registered in an EU
member state or with the London-based EU pharmaceutical agency, in
which case the process is shortened to a few months. Vitamins are
covered under this procedure; however, import of other nutritional
supplements is prohibited, and they are dispensed only at pharmacies.
Spanish authorities have been cooperative in resolving specific trade
problems relating to standards and certifications brought to their
attention. The United States has been negotiating with the EU for
mutual recognition of product standards and acceptance of testing
laboratory results.
6. Export Subsidies Policies
Spain aggressively uses ``tied aid'' credits to promote exports,
especially in Latin America, the Maghreb, and more recently, China.
Such credits reportedly are consistent with the OECD arrangement on
officially supported export credits.
As a member of the EU, Spain benefits from EU export subsidies
which are applied to many agricultural products when exported to
destinations outside the Union. Total EU subsidies of Spanish
agricultural exports amounted to about $197 million in 1998. Spanish
exports of grains, olive oil, other oils, tobacco, wine, sugar, dairy
products, beef, and fruits and vegetables benefited most from these
subsidies in 1998.
7. Protection of U.S. Intellectual Property
Spain adopted new patent, copyright, and trademark laws, as agreed
at the time of its EU accession in 1986. It enacted a new Patent Law in
March of 1986, a new Copyright Law in November 1987, and a new
Trademark Law in November of 1988. All approximate or exceed EU levels
of intellectual property protection. Spain is a party to the Paris,
Berne, and Universal Copyright Conventions and the Madrid Accord on
Trademarks. Government officials have said that their laws reflect
genuine concern for the protection of intellectual property.
In October 1992, Spain enacted a modernized Patent Law which
increases the protection afforded patent holders. At that time, Spain's
pharmaceutical process patent protection regime expired and product
protection took effect. However, given the long (10 to 12 year)
research and development period required to introduce a new medicine
into the market, industry sources point out that the effect of the new
law will not be felt until after the turn of the century. U.S.
pharmaceutical manufacturers in Spain complain that this limits
effective patent protection to approximately eight years and would like
to see the patent term lengthened. Of at least equal concern to the
U.S. industry is the issue of parallel imports, i.e. lower-priced
products manufactured in Spain that are diverted to northern European
markets where they are sold at higher prices. U.S. companies have
suffered significant losses as a result. While the pharmaceutical
sector would like the government to intervene, it looks to the EU
commission and the advent of the euro to resolve this single market
problem.
The Copyright Law is designed to redress historically weak
protection accorded movies, videocassettes, sound recordings and
software. It includes computer software as intellectual property,
unlike the prior law. In December 1993, legislation was enacted which
transposed the EU software directive. It includes provisions that allow
for unannounced searches in civil lawsuits and searches to take place
under these provisions.
According to industry sources, Spain has a relatively high level of
computer software piracy despite estimated decline in the last years.
Industry estimates for 1998 show a drop to 59 percent from 67 percent
in 1996, but no measurable improvement over 1997. Despite the Spanish
government increased enforcement activities, the slow pace of civil and
criminal court proceedings continued to dilute their impact. As a
result, concerned groups have focused increasingly on enforcement, with
industry and government cooperating on a series of problems aimed at
educating the judiciary, police, and customs officials to be more
rigorous in their pursuit of the problem.
Motion picture (i.e. video) and audiocassette piracy also remains a
problem. However, thanks to the government, prohibition on running
cable across public thoroughfares and strict enforcement of the
Copyright Law that stipulates that no motion picture can be shown
without authorization of the copyright holder, the incidence of
community video piracy has declined.
Spain's Trademark Law incorporates by reference the enforcement
procedures of the Patent Law, defines trademark infringements as unfair
competition and creates civil and criminal penalties for violations.
The government has drafted a new Trademark Law which will incorporate
TRIPs, the EU Community Trademark Directive, and the Trademark Law
Treaty, and which will most likely be adopted in 2000. But first, the
Spanish Supreme Court rendered a verdict on July 8, 1999, on case
presented by Catalan and Basque governments against the existing
trademark law, Ley 32/1998. The text of the law and its verdict is
available at the Internet address: www.oepm.es under AVISOS Y NOTICIAS
and LEGISLACION sections; Copy of sentence by fax). National
authorities seem committed to serious enforcement efforts and there
continue to be numerous civil and criminal actions to curb the problem
of trademark infringement. To combat this problem in the textile and
leather goods sector, the government began to promote the creation and
sale of devices to protect trademark goods and to train police and
customs officials to cope more effectively. Despite these efforts,
industry estimates rank Spain as the country with the second highest
incidence of trademark fraud in the clothing sector in Europe.
In September 1999, in a trademark case in which a well-known U.S.
apparel manufacturer complained about infringement of its brand name,
the Spanish Supreme Court handed down a decision denying it the right
to continue marketing its products under its trademark name in Spain.
8. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association: All workers except military personnel,
judges, magistrates and prosecutors are entitled to form or join unions
of their own choosing without previous authorization. Self-employed,
unemployed and retired persons may join but may not form unions of
their own. There are no limitations on the right of association for
workers in special economic zones. Under the constitution, trade unions
are free to choose their own representatives, determine their own
policies, represent their members' interests, and strike. They are not
restricted or harassed by the government and maintain ties with
recognized international organizations.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively: The right to
organize and bargain collectively was established by the workers
statute of 1980. Trade union and collective bargaining rights were
extended to all workers in the public sector, except the military
services, in 1986. Public sector collective bargaining in 1989 was
broadened to include salaries and employment levels. Collective
bargaining is widespread in both the private and public sectors. Sixty
percent of the working population is covered by collective bargaining
agreements although only a minority are actually union members. Labor
regulations in free trade zones and export processing zones are the
same as in the rest of the country. There are no restrictions on the
right to organize or on collective bargaining in such areas.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor: Forced or compulsory
labor is outlawed and is not practiced. Legislation is effectively
enforced.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children: The legal minimum age
for employment as established by the workers statute is 16. The
Ministry of Labor and Social Security is primarily responsible for
enforcement. The minimum age is effectively enforced in major
industries and in the service sector. It is more difficult to control
on small farms and in family-owned businesses. Legislation prohibiting
child labor is effectively enforced in the special economic zones. The
workers statute also prohibits the employment of persons under 18 years
of age at night, for overtime work, or for work in sectors considered
hazardous by the Ministry of Labor and Social Security and the unions.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work: Workers in general have
substantial, well defined rights. A 40 hour workweek is established by
law. Spanish workers enjoy 14 paid holidays a year (12 assigned by
central government +2 by autonomous authorities) and a month's paid
vacation. The employee receives his annual salary in 14 payments--one
paycheck each month and an ``extra'' check in June and in December. The
minimum wage is revised every year in accordance with the consumer
price index. Government mechanisms exist for enforcing working
conditions and occupational health and safety conditions, but
bureaucratic procedures are cumbersome.
f. Rights in Sectors with U.S. Investment: Conditions in sectors
with U.S. investment do not differ from those in other sectors of the
economy.
Extent of U.S. Investment in Selected Industries--U.S. Direct Investment Position Abroad on an Historical Cost
Basis--1998
[Millions of U.S. Dollars]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Category Amount
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Petroleum...................... .............. 199
Total Manufacturing............ .............. 7,435
Food & Kindred Products...... 1,756 ...............................................................
Chemicals & Allied Products.. 1,211 ...............................................................
Primary & Fabricated Metals.. 933 ...............................................................
Industrial Machinery and 90 ...............................................................
Equipment.
Electric & Electronic 863 ...............................................................
Equipment.
Transportation Equipment..... 1,453 ...............................................................
Other Manufacturing.......... 1,128 ...............................................................
Wholesale Trade................ .............. 1,470
Banking........................ .............. 2,124
Finance/Insurance/Real Estate.. .............. 694
Services....................... .............. 475
Other Industries............... .............. 411
TOTAL ALL INDUSTRIES........... .............. 12,807
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis.
______
SWEDEN
Key Economic Indicators
[Billions of U.S. Dollars unless otherwise indicated]
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1997 1998 \1\ 1999
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Income, Production and Employment:
Nominal GDP \2\...................... 236.2 235.6 232.4
Real GDP Growth (pct) \3\............ 1.8 2.9 3.6
GDP by Sector:
Agriculture........................ 1.5 1.5 1.5
Manufacturing...................... 47.5 47.0 47.0
Services........................... 98.4 97.5 98.0
Government......................... 45.0 44.5 44.0
Per Capita GDP (US$) \2\............. 26,701 26,606 26,229
Labor Force (000's).................. 4,264 4,255 4,391
Unemployment Rate (pct).............. 8.0 6.6 5.6
Money and Prices (annual percentage
growth):
Money Supply (M3) \4\................ 1.3 2.1 7.5
Consumer Price Inflation............. 0.9 -0.6 0.5
Exchange Rate (SEK/US$).............. 7.63 7.95 8.30
Balance of Payments and Trade:
Total Exports FOB \5\................ 82.6 84.6 84.0
Exports to U.S.\6\................. 6.8 7.3 7.2
Total Imports CIF \5\................ 65.4 68.2 67.2
Imports from U.S.\6\............... 3.9 4.0 3.9
Trade Balance \5\.................... 17.2 16.4 16.8
Balance with U.S.\6\............... 2.9 3.3 3.3
External Public Debt \7\............. 50.5 46.7 35.9
Fiscal Balance/GDP (pct)............. -1.8 2.3 1.7
Current Account Surplus/GDP (pct).... 2.8 2.3 1.4
Foreign Debt Service Payments/GDP 1.89 3.00 5.70
(pct)...............................
Gold and Foreign Exchange Reserves... 11.8 14.3 18.4
Aid from U.S......................... 0 0 0
Aid from All Other Sources........... 0 0 0
------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ 1999 figures are all estimates based on available monthly data in
October 1999.
\2\ Decrease due to exchange rate fluctuations.
\3\ Percentage changes calculated in local currency.
\4\ Source: The Central Bank. M3 is the measurement used in Sweden, very
close to a potential Swedish M2 figure.
\5\ Merchandise trade.
\6\ Source: U.S. Department of Commerce and U.S. Census Bureau; exports
FAS, imports customs basis; 1999 figures are estimates based on data
available through October.
\7\ Source: Swedish National Debt Office.
1. General Policy Framework
Sweden is an advanced, industrialized country with a high standard
of living, extensive social services, a modern distribution system,
excellent transport and communications links with the world, and a
skilled and educated work force. Sweden exports a third of its Gross
Domestic Product (GDP) and is a strong supporter of liberal trading
practices. Sweden became a member of the European Union (EU) on January
1, 1995, by which point it had already harmonized much of its
legislation and regulation with the EU's as a member of the European
Economic Area.
Sweden uses both monetary and fiscal policy to achieve economic
goals. Active labor market practices also are particularly important.
The Central Bank is by law independent in pursuit of its avowed goal of
price stability. Fiscal policy decisions in the late 1980's to lower
tax rates while maintaining extensive social welfare programs swelled
the government budget deficit and public debt, most of which is
financed domestically. Since the beginning of 1995, however, Sweden has
made impressive strides with its economic convergence program, having
restored macroeconomic stability and created the conditions for
moderate, low-inflation economic growth. The government intends to run
budget surpluses for the foreseeable future in order to assure that the
public pension system and other aspects of the welfare state are
adequately funded in the face of expected demographic changes.
During 1995 and 1996, Sweden pulled out of its worst and longest
recession since the 1930s. (GDP declined by six percent from 1991 to
1993). Unemployment started to come down in 1998, from average figures
as high as 12 to 14 percent in the mid-1990s, now down to around 8 to 9
percent. (Swedes quote two unemployment figures, open and ``hidden.''
``Hidden'' unemployment, those in government training and work
programs, accounts for 3-3.5 percentage points of total unemployment.)
In 1992 the Swedish Krona came under pressure and was floated late that
year; Swedish interest rates soared but have come down rapidly starting
in 1996, and are now around half a percentage point above German rates.
Sweden's export sector is strong, resulting in large trade balance
surpluses and solid current account surpluses since 1994. Domestic
demand started to pick up in 1997 and has contributed to the growth
since that year. It is now driving Sweden's strong growth (the growth
figure for 1999 will be at least 3.6 percent), even though the export
sector has recovered better than expected from the effects of the Asia
crisis. Structural changes in recent years have prepared the way for
future economic growth. The social democratic government at the end of
the 1980's and the conservative coalition government at the beginning
of the 1990's deregulated the credit market; removed foreign exchange
controls; reformed taxes; lifted foreign investment barriers; and began
to privatize government-owned corporations.
2. Exchange Rate Policies
From 1977 to 1991, the krona was pegged to a trade weighted basket
of foreign currencies in which the dollar was double weighted. From
mid-1991, the krona was pegged to the ECU. Sweden floated the currency
in November 1992 after briefly defending the krona during the
turbulence in European financial markets. Although Sweden is an EU
member, it has chosen not to join the European Monetary Union and does
not currently participate in the European Exchange Rate Mechanism.
Sweden dismantled a battery of foreign exchange controls in the
latter half of the 1980's. No capital or exchange controls remain. (The
central bank does track transfers for statistical purposes.)
3. Structural Policies
Sweden's tax burden was 53 percent of GDP for 1999. Central
government expenditure during the recent severe recession was nearly 75
percent of GDP, and in 1999 it will come down to 57.5 percent. The
maximum marginal income tax rate on individuals is 59 percent.
Effective corporate taxes are comparatively low at 28 percent, though
social security contributions add about 40 percent to employers' gross
wage bills. The value-added tax is two-tiered, with a general rate of
25 percent and a lower rate of 12 percent for food, domestic
transportation, and many tourist-related services.
Trade in industrial products between Sweden, other EU countries,
and EFTA countries is not subject to customs duty, nor are a
significant proportion of Sweden's imports from developing countries.
When Sweden joined the EU, its import duties were among the lowest in
the world, averaging less than five percent ad valorem on finished
goods and around three percent on semi-manufactures. Duties were raised
slightly on average to meet the common EU tariff structure. Most raw
materials are imported duty free. There is very little regulation of
exports other than military exports and some dual use products that
have potential military or non-proliferation application.
Sweden began abolishing a complicated system of agricultural price
regulation in 1991. Sweden's EU membership and consequent adherence to
the EU's common agricultural policy has brought some re-regulation of
agriculture.
4. Debt Management Policies
Central government borrowing guidelines require that most of the
national debt be in Swedish crowns; that the borrowing be predictable
in the short term and flexible in the medium term; that the government
(that is, the Cabinet) direct the extent of the borrowing; and that the
government report yearly to the parliament.
Sweden's Central Bank and National Debt Office have borrowed
heavily in foreign currencies since the fall of 1992, increasing the
central government's foreign debt five-fold to about a third of the
public debt. Management of the increased debt level so far poses no
problems to the country, but interest payments on the large national
debt grew rapidly in the early 1990's. Total debt is declining rapidly
from early decade highs as a result of budgetary surpluses and strong
economic growth. Gross government debt is projected to drop below 60
percent of GDP next year.
5. Significant Barriers to U.S. Exports
Sweden is open to imports and foreign investment and campaigns
vigorously for free trade in the World Trade Organization (WTO) and
other fora. Import licenses are not required except for items such as
military material, hazardous substances, certain agricultural
commodities, fiberboard, ferro alloys, some semi-manufactures of iron
and steel. Sweden enjoys licensing benefits under section 5(k) of the
U.S. Export Administration Act. Sweden makes wide use of EU and
international standards, labeling, and customs documents in order to
facilitate exports.
Sweden has harmonized laws and regulations consistent with the EU.
Sweden is now open to virtually all foreign investment and allows 100
percent foreign ownership of businesses and commercial real estate,
except in air and maritime transportation and the manufacture of
military materiel. Foreigners may buy and sell any corporate share
listed on the Stockholm Stock Exchange. Corporate shares may have
different voting strengths.
Sweden does not offer special tax or other inducements to attract
foreign capital. Foreign-owned companies enjoy the same access as
Swedish-owned enterprises to the country's credit market and government
incentives to business such as regional development or worker training
grants.
Public procurement regulations have been harmonized with EU
directives and apply to central and local government purchases. Sweden
is required to publish all government procurement opportunities in the
European Community Official Journal. Sweden participates in all
relevant WTO codes concerned with government procurement, standards,
etc. There are no official counter-trade requirements.
6. Export Subsidies Policies
The government provides basic export promotion support through the
Swedish Trade Council, which it and industry fund jointly. The
government and industry also fund jointly the Swedish Export Credit
Corporation, which grants medium and long-term credits to finance
exports of capital goods and large-scale service projects.
Sweden's agricultural support policies have been adjusted to the
EU's common agricultural policy, including intervention buying,
production quotas, and increased export subsidies.
There are no tax or duty exemptions on imported inputs, no resource
discounts to producers, and no preferential exchange rate schemes.
Sweden is a signatory to the GATT subsidies code.
7. Protection of U.S. Intellectual Property
In most cases, Swedish law strongly protects intellectual property
rights having to do with patents, trademarks, copyrights, and new
technologies. The laws are generally adequate and clear. However,
enforcement is not as strong as it should be, especially in the area of
copyright protection for software. The police and prosecutors need
additional resources, some specialized training to help with acquiring
and preserving evidence, and clear signals from the top of the
government that copyright protection is a real priority, especially
within Swedish public sector organizations. In addition, Swedish law
poses a problem for copyright owners by permitting government
ministries and parliament to provide to the public copies of works that
may be unpublished and protected by copyright law.
The courts are efficient and honest. Sweden supports efforts to
strengthen international protection of intellectual property rights,
often sharing U.S. positions on these questions. Sweden is a member of
the World Intellectual Property Organization and is a party to the
Berne Copyright and Universal Copyright Conventions and to the Paris
Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, as well as to the
Patent Cooperation Treaty. As an EU member, Sweden has undertaken to
adhere to a series of other multilateral conventions dealing with
intellectual property rights.
8. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association: Laws protect the freedom of workers to
associate and to strike, as well as the freedom of employers to
organize and to conduct lock-outs. These laws are fully respected. Some
83 percent of Sweden's work force belongs to trade unions. Unions
operate independently of the government and political parties, though
the largest federation of unions has always been linked with the
largest political party, the Social Democrats.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively: Labor and
management, each represented by a national organization by sector,
negotiate framework agreements every two to three years. More detailed
company agreements are reached locally. The law provides both workers
and employers effective mechanisms, both informal and judicial, for
resolving complaints.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor: The law prohibits
forced or compulsory labor, and the authorities effectively enforce
this ban.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children: Compulsory nine-year
education ends at age 16, and the law permits full-time employment at
that age under supervision of local authorities. Employees under age 18
may work only during daytime and under supervision. Union
representatives, police, and public prosecutors effectively enforce
this restriction.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work: Sweden has no national minimum
wage law. Wages are set by collective bargaining contracts, which non-
union establishments usually observe. The standard legal work week is
40 hours or less. Both overtime and rest periods are regulated. All
employees are guaranteed by law a minimum of five weeks a year of paid
vacation; many labor contracts provide more. Government occupational
health and safety rules are very high and are monitored by trained
union stewards, safety ombudsmen, and, occasionally, government
inspectors.
f. Rights in Sectors with U.S. Investment: The five worker-right
conditions addressed above pertain in all firms, Swedish or foreign,
throughout all sectors of the Swedish economy.
Extent of U.S. Investment in Selected Industries--U.S. Direct Investment Position Abroad on an Historical Cost
Basis--1998
[Millions of U.S. Dollars]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Category Amount
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Petroleum...................... .............. 79
Total Manufacturing............ .............. 3,359
Food & Kindred Products...... 18 ...............................................................
Chemicals & Allied Products.. 1,496 ...............................................................
Primary & Fabricated Metals.. 6 ...............................................................
Industrial Machinery and 316 ...............................................................
Equipment.
Electric & Electronic 52 ...............................................................
Equipment.
Transportation Equipment..... (\1\) ...............................................................
Other Manufacturing.......... (\1\) ...............................................................
Wholesale Trade................ .............. 224
Banking........................ .............. (\1\)
Finance/Insurance/Real Estate.. .............. 782
Services....................... .............. 1,009
Other Industries............... .............. (\1\)
TOTAL ALL INDUSTRIES........... .............. 6,053
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Suppressed to avoid disclosing data of individual companies.
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis.
______
SWITZERLAND
Key Economic Indicators
[Billions of U.S. Dollars unless otherwise indicated]
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1997 1998 \1\ 1999
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Income, Production and Employment:
Nominal GDP.......................... 256.3 262.1 261.4
Real GDP Growth (pct)................ 1.7 2.1 1.9
GDP by Sector:
Agriculture........................ N/A N/A N/A
Manufacturing...................... N/A N/A N/A
Services........................... N/A N/A N/A
Government \2\..................... 38.7 39 39.1
Per Capita GDP (US$)................. 37,415 37,059 39,244
Labor Force (000's) \3\.............. 2,601 2,621 2,610
Unemployment Rate (pct).............. 5.2 3.9 2.7
Money and Prices (annual percentage
growth):
Money Supply (M3).................... 5.1 1.2 1.3
Consumer Price Inflation (pct)....... 0.5 0.0 0.6
Exchange Rate (SFr/US$).............. 1.45 1.45 1.48
Balance of Payments and Trade:
Total Exports \4\.................... 72.5 75.2 82.0
Exports to U.S..................... 7.1 7.6 8.6
Total Imports \4\.................... 71.1 73.7 79.3
Imports from U.S................... 5 4.8 5.5
Trade Balance \4\.................... 1.4 1.5 N/A
Balance with U.S................... 2 3 3.6
External Public Debt \5\............. 66.9 75.6 N/A
Fiscal Deficit/GDP (pct)........... 2.4 0.3 N/A
Current Account Surplus/GDP (pct).... 6.5 5.9 7.8
Debt Service Payments/GDP (pct)...... 1.3 1.3 1.3
Gold and Foreign Exchange Reserves 44.9 44.6 43.3
\6\.................................
Aid from U.S......................... 0 0 0
Aid from All Other Sources........... 0 0 0
------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ All 1999 figures are estimates.
\2\ Including Social Welfare Expenditures.
\3\ Full-time equivalent employment.
\4\ Merchandise trade excluding gold and other precious metals, jewels,
artworks, antiques; Source: Swiss Customs Administration; 1999 figures
are estimates based on figures available through August.
\5\ Federal government only (i.e. excluding cantons and communities).
\6\ s of August 1999.
1. General Policy Framework
Switzerland has a highly developed, internationally oriented, and
open market. The economy is characterized by a sophisticated
manufacturing sector, a highly skilled workforce, a large services
sector and a high savings rate. Per capita GDP is virtually the highest
in Europe while unemployment is practically the lowest.
When Swiss voters decided in December, 1992, to reject the European
Economic Area (EEA) Treaty, Switzerland found itself in the awkward
position of being located in the heart of Europe, without being part of
the EEA or a member of the EU. With some two-thirds of its exports
going to Europe, the government is promoting efforts to maintain
Switzerland's competitiveness in Europe while seeking to diversify its
export markets. The Swiss parliament recently approved the bilateral
agreements concluded with the EU Commission in December of 1998, which
cover seven different sectors. However, before the agreements can take
effect they will have to pass a public referendum in Switzerland and be
ratified by all 15 EU member states.
After strong economic growth during the eighties, the Swiss economy
was Western Europe's weakest between 1990-1996, with growth averaging
around 0.0 percent per year (unemployment, however, did not rise above
5.5 percent). As a result of the economic stagnation, the country ran
up large, unprecedented (for Switzerland) deficits causing a
corresponding accumulation of public debt. A public initiative which
passed in 1998, essentially requires the federal budget to be balanced
and the government will thus have to reduce the deficit to less than
one billion Swiss Francs by 2001 through strictly controlling
expenditures. Modest economic recovery began in 1997 and annual GDP
growth is expected to be 1.9 percent in 1999 and around 2.0 percent in
2000.
While no systematic use is made of fiscal policy to stimulate the
economy, parliament voted in 1997 to spend $379 million over the next
few years on an investment program to help the Swiss economy pull out
recession. Most of the funds are being spent in the construction sector
to renovate public infrastructure.
The Swiss National Bank (SNB) is independent from the Finance
Ministry. The primary objective of the SNB's policy is price stability.
Monetary policy is conducted through open market operations. The
discount rate is used by the SNB only as a signal to the public.
2. Exchange Rate Policies
The Swiss Franc is not pegged to any foreign currency. The SNB
carefully watches for signs of upward pressure on the Franc (the
overvalued Franc was partly to blame for the economic stagnation of the
early/mid 1990's). The SNB has shown its willingness to follow an
accommodating money supply policy, even to exceed money supply growth
targets when necessary, to hold the value of the franc down.
3. Structural Policies
Few structural policies have a significant effect on U. S. exports.
Two exceptions are telecommunications and agriculture. In 1998, a new
law took effect that is bringing liberalization and privatization to
the Swiss telecommunications sector, opening the market to investment
and competition from U.S. and other firms. Since then, one U.S. firm
(and its Swiss partner) has won one of the three licenses to provide
cellular phone service. The same firm will also be building a large
land network with fiber optic cabling.
Agriculture is heavily regulated and supported by the federal
government. Legislation which took effect January 1, 1999, is reducing
direct government intervention in the market to set prices, but the
high level of direct support for Swiss agricultural production will
continue. The goal of the new legislation is to reduce government
regulation of the market while maintaining agricultural production at
current levels through import protection and direct payments linked to
environmental protection.
In early 1996, a new Cartel Law came into effect, introducing the
presumption that horizontal agreements setting prices, production
volume, or territorial distribution diminish effective competition and
are therefore unlawful. For years, Switzerland has had a heavily
cartelized domestic economy. Over time, the effect of this law should
be to improve competition in the domestic economy.
As part of its Uruguay Round commitments, Switzerland enacted
legislation in 1996 providing for nondiscrimination and national
treatment in public procurement at the federal level. A separate law
makes less extensive guarantees at the cantonal and community levels.
4. Debt Management Policies
As a net international creditor, debt management policies are not
relevant to Switzerland.
5. Aid
Switzerland receives no aid.
6. Significant Barriers to U.S. Exports
Import Licenses: Import licenses for many agricultural products are
subject to tariff-rate quotas and tied to an obligation for importers
to take a certain percentage of domestic production. Tariffs remain
quite high for most agricultural products that are also produced in
Switzerland.
Services Barriers: The Swiss services sector features no
significant barriers to U.S. exports. Foreign insurers wishing to do
business in Switzerland are required to establish a subsidiary or a
branch here. Foreign insurers may offer only those types of insurance
for which they are licensed in their home countries. Until recently,
the most serious barriers to U.S. exports existed in the area of
telecommunications. However, with the privatization and liberalization
which became effective in this sector in 1998, this market has been
greatly opened to foreign competitors.
Standards, Testing, Labeling, and Certification: Swiss approval and
labeling requirements for genetically modified food products and
ingredients are among the strictest in the world. Swiss authorities are
currently reviewing their requirement that all food and feed products
containing genetically modified ingredients be labeled. They have
proposed modifying the requirements to require labeling only if the
content is above a set percentage. Separately, a new law will take
effect in January, 2000, which stipulates that fresh meat and eggs from
abroad that are produced in a manner not permitted in Switzerland must
be clearly labeled as such. Methods not allowed in Switzerland include
the use of hormones, antibiotics and other anti-microbial substances in
the raising of beef and pork as well as the production of eggs from
chickens kept in certain types of battery cages. Embassy Bern will be
monitoring developments in this matter for indications of any adverse
influence on U.S. agriculture sales in Switzerland.
Government Procurement Practices: On the federal level, Switzerland
is a signatory of the WTO Government Procurement Agreement and fully
complies with WTO rules concerning public procurement. On the cantonal
and local levels, a law passed by the parliament in 1995 provides for
nondiscriminatory access to public procurement. The United States and
Switzerland reached agreement in 1996 to expand the scope of public
procurement access on a bilateral basis.
With the exception of certain restrictions on agricultural items,
the Swiss market is essentially open for the import of U.S. goods.
7. Export Subsidies Policies
Switzerland's only subsidized exports are in the agricultural
sector, where exports of dairy products (primarily cheese) and
processed food products (chocolate products, grain-based bakery
products, etc.) benefit from state subsidies. Switzerland is gradually
reducing the export subsidies as required under World Trade
Organization (WTO) rules. The government has negotiated, but not yet
ratified, an agreement with the European Union that neither country
will subsidize dairy product exports to the other.
8. Protection of U.S. Intellectual Property
Switzerland has one of the best regimes in the world for the
protection of intellectual property and protection is afforded equally
to foreign and domestic rights holders. Switzerland is a member of all
major international intellectual property rights conventions and was an
active supporter of a strong IPR text on the GATT Uruguay Round
negotiations. Enforcement is generally very good. Switzerland is a
member of both the European Patent Convention and the Patent
Cooperation Treaty (PCT). A new Copyright Law in 1993 improved a regime
that was already quite good. The law explicitly recognizes computer
software as a literary work and establishes a remuneration scheme for
private copying of audio and video works which distributes proceeds on
the basis of national treatment.
Since May of 1998, Switzerland has been in compliance with its
obligation under TRIPS to protect company test data required by
national authorities in order to obtain approval to market
pharmaceuticals. The new regulation enacted by the Swiss Intercantonal
Office for the Control of Medicines mandates a 10-year protection
period for such data. Prior to this regulation taking effect, the lack
of protection in this area negatively impacted one U.S. company.
However, it is now very unlikely that any further problems will arise
for U.S. firms.
According to industry sources, software piracy continues to be a
problem. This appears to be largely due to illegal copying by
individuals and some small and medium-sized establishments. It is
highly unlikely that there are any exports. Industry sources estimate
lost sales due to software piracy at $80 million in 1998. Trade losses
and denied opportunities for sales and investment in all other IPR
sectors are minor in comparison.
Switzerland is not on the U.S. ``Special 301 Watch List'' or
``Priority Watch List.'' Neither is it identified as a ``Priority
Foreign Country.''
9. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association: All workers, including foreign
workers, have freedom to associate freely, to join unions of their
choice, and to select their own representatives.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively: Swiss law gives
workers the right to organize and bargain collectively and protects
them from acts of antiunion discrimination. The right to strike is
legally recognized, but a unique informal agreement between unions and
employers has meant fewer than 10 strikes per year since 1975. There
were no significant strikes thus far during 1999.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor: There is no forced or
compulsory labor, although there is no legal prohibition of it.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children: The minimum age for
employment of children is 15 years. Children over 13 may be employed in
light duties for not more than 9 hours a week during the school year
and 15 hours otherwise. Employment between ages 15 and 20 is strictly
regulated.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work: There is no national minimum
wage. Industrial wages are negotiated during the collective bargaining
process. Such wage agreements are also widely observed by non-union
establishments. The Labor Act establishes a maximum 45-hour workweek
for blue and white collar workers in industry, services, and retail
trades, and a 50-hour workweek for all other workers. The law
prescribes a rest period during the workweek. Overtime is limited by
law to 260 hours annually for these working 45 hours per week and to
220 hours annually for those working 50 hours per week.
The Labor Act and the Federal Code of Obligations contain extensive
regulations to protect worker health and safety. The regulations are
rigorously enforced by the Federal Office of Industry, Trades, and
Labor. There were no allegations of worker rights abuses from domestic
or foreign sources.
f. Rights in Sectors with U.S. Investments: Except for special
situations (e.g. employment in dangerous activities regulated for
occupational, health and safety or environmental reasons), legislation
concerning workers rights does not distinguish among workers by sector,
by nationality, by employer, or in any other manner which would result
in different treatment of workers employed by U.S. firms from those
employed by Swiss or other foreign firms.
Extent of U.S. Investment in Selected Industries--U.S. Direct Investment Position Abroad on an Historical Cost
Basis--1998
[Millions of U.S. Dollars]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Category Amount
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Petroleum...................... .............. 15
Total Manufacturing............ .............. 5,508
Food & Kindred Products...... 47 ...............................................................
Chemicals & Allied Products.. 2,859 ...............................................................
Primary & Fabricated Metals.. 217 ...............................................................
Industrial Machinery & 576 ...............................................................
Equipment.
Electric and Electronic 609 ...............................................................
Equipment.
Transportation Equipment..... 403 ...............................................................
Other Manufacturing.......... 797 ...............................................................
Wholesale Trade................ .............. 7,831
Banking........................ .............. 3,695
Finance/Insurance/Real Estate.. .............. 18,446
Services....................... .............. 1,651
Other Industries............... .............. 469
TOTAL ALL INDUSTRIES........... .............. 37,616
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis.
______
TURKEY
Key Economic Indicators
[Billions of U.S. Dollars unless otherwise indicated]
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1997 1998 1999
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Income, Production and Employment:
Real GDP............................. 190.4 198.7 \1\ 78.0
Real GDP Growth (pct) 7.5 2.8 -5.0
GDP by Sector:
Agriculture........................ 27.6 34.4 6.6
Manufacturing...................... 41.1 39.0 16.6
Services........................... 91.0 93.5 52.1
Government......................... 17.1 18.4 10.6
Per Capita GDP (US$)................. 3,105 3,224
Labor Force (000's).................. 22,359 23,415 \2\ 23,77
9
Unemployment Rate (pct).............. 6.9 6.2 \2\ 7.3
Money and Prices (annual percent
growth):
Money Supply Growth (nominal M2)..... 96 106.2 \3\ 105.3
Consumer Price Inflation............. 99.1 69.7 \4\ 64.6
Exchange Rate (TL/US$ annual average) 151,239 259,815 \4\ 517,7
50
Balance of Payments and Trade (Suitcase
Trade Included):
Total Exports FOB.................... 32.6 31.2 \5\ 14.6
Exports to U.S..................... 2.1 2.5 \6\ 1.6
Total Imports CIF.................... 48.0 45.6 21.8
Imports from U.S................... 3.5 3.5 \6\ 2.2
Trade Balance........................ -15.4 -14.4 -7.2
Balance with U.S................... -2.33 -1.84 -0.5
External Public Debt................. 91.1 102.0 \1\ 105
Fiscal Deficit/GDP (pct)............. -7.8 -7.4 12
Current Account Balance/GDP (pct).... -1.37 0.94 -0.5
Debt Service Payments/GDP (pct)...... 6.5 8.1 8.5
Gold and Foreign Exchange Reserves 27.2 31.6 \3\ 35
\8\.................................
Aid from U.S......................... 0.31 .006 .02
Aid from Other Sources............... N/A N/A N/A
------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Estimate as of November 1999--all GDP figures for previous years are
as of June.
\2\ 96, 97 and 98 figures are as of October; 99 figure is as of April.
\3\ As of October 1999.
\4\ As of November 8, 1999.
\5\ As of July 1999--all 99 trade figures are as of July.
\6\ As of August 99.
\7\ Includes reserves held by central bank and commercial banks.
Source: Turkish State Institute of Statistics, Turkish Treasury
Undersecretariat, Central Bank of Turkey.
1. General Policy Framework
From the establishment of the Republic in 1923 until 1981, Turkey
was an insulated, state-directed economy. In 1981 the country embarked
on a new course. The government abandoned protectionist policies and
opened the economy to foreign trade and investment. The state slowly
began to give up much of its role in directing the economy and to
abolish many outdated restrictions on private business. These reforms
unleashed the country's private sector and have brought impressive
benefits. Since 1981, Turkey's average 5.2 percent real GNP growth rate
has been the highest of any OECD country. Turkey's efforts reached a
new stage in January 1996 in terms of market opening, with the
inauguration of a customs union with the European Union. Turkey has
harmonized nearly all of its trade and industrial policies with those
of the EU and has begun to reap benefits from the customs union,
particularly in terms of improved economic efficiency, which, in turn,
has had a positive impact on overall U.S. exports to and investments in
Turkey. The long-term consequences of the customs union should be very
favorable, particularly in terms of trade creation and investment.
Despite the impressive reforms introduced since 1981, Turkey
continues to suffer from an inefficient public sector and weak
political leadership. These factors, combined with a high domestic debt
interest burden and the private sector's ingrained high inflation
expectations, constrain higher growth rates. Consumer price index
inflation has averaged about 78 percent since 1988, but dropped to 65
percent in 1999. In 1994, government attempts to manipulate interest
rates triggered a financial crisis and forced the government to
introduce a tough austerity program. The sharp 1994 recession was
Turkey's worst since World War II. The economy bounced back strongly,
however, growing by over 8 percent from 1995 through 1997. Strong
export growth sparked a surge in imports of raw materials and
intermediate and capital goods through mid-1998, as did the elimination
of import duties and surcharges for most EU goods, which accompanied
the introduction of the customs union on January 1, 1996.
After declining in 1994 and 1995, the budget deficit and public
sector borrowing requirement both rose significantly from 1996 through
1999, reflecting continued populist economic measures introduced by
successive Turkish governments. The Yilmaz government, in power from
July 1997 to November 1998, undertook significant (if gradualist)
disinflationary reforms and permitted the central bank to continue its
disciplined monetary and exchange rate policies, thus increasing market
confidence. The Ecevit government in place since June 1999, has passed
important structural reforms in banking and social security and passed
constitutional amendments granting foreign concession holders access to
international arbitration and providing the legal underpinning for
privatization of state-owned companies.
Turkey and the IMF concluded a Staff Monitored Program (SMP) in
mid-1998. The government met or exceeded its year-end SMP targets,
including achieving a 54.7 percent year-end WPI inflation rate, its
lowest since 1991. Further progress in implementing structural reforms
will lead to an IMF stand-by at the end of 1999. The government has set
an ambitious year-end 2000 WPI inflation target of 20 percent as well
as a $5 billion target for privatization revenues. The Asian and
Russian financial crises did not seriously affect Turkey's economy. Any
slowdown in the EU or U.S. economies (which take a 65 percent share of
Turkey's exports) will restrict Turkey's ability to attract foreign
capital or to expand its exports at the desired rate.
Building on significant liberalization of the economy in the mid-
1980s, Turkey's private sector has become less dependent on the
government. As a result, it has grown at an even faster pace than the
overall economy, while it also expanded its share of Turkey's GDP.
Turkey's most successful companies are foreign oriented and very
competitive. Since 1992, total bilateral trade volumes have expanded by
45 percent, totaling $6.2 billion at the end of 1998. U.S. exports have
grown by over 36 percent, while Turkish exports have more than doubled
in value. The U.S. retains a substantial trade surplus with Turkey.
Investment levels remain flat, though significant opportunities remain
in the energy and telecommunications sectors for further investments,
should the government pass implementing legislation for access to
international arbitration and for energy and telecom sector regulation.
2. Exchange Rate Policy
The Turkish Lira (TL) is fully convertible and the central bank
follows a crawling peg exchange rate policy aimed at the WPI target of
20 percent by the end of 2000. The system was adopted on January 1,
2000, with a pre-announced rate of crawl over the course of the year.
The central bank has also committed to various monetary targets to
support this new exchange rate mechanism.
Overvaluation of the TL from 1989-93 was a significant factor in
the 1994 financial crisis. As a result, the TL depreciated against the
dollar in real terms in 1994. Since then, the central bank has
maintained a stable real exchange rate measured against a trade-
weighted dollar/Euro basket.
3. Structural Policies
Turkey has made substantial progress in implementing certain
structural reforms and liberalizing its trade, investment, and foreign
exchange regimes. The resulting rapid economic growth and high rate of
private business creation during the 1980s and 1990s has generated
tremendous demand for imported goods, particularly capital and
intermediate goods and raw materials, which together account for over
85 percent of total imports.
Successive governments' failure to complete the structural reform
measures needed to transform Turkey's economy into a liberal, market-
directed economy has limited private sector growth and prevented the
economy from functioning at full efficiency. State-owned enterprises
still account for some 35 percent of manufacturing value added.
Although some of these firms are profitable, transfers to state firms
constitute a substantial drain on the budget. Government control of key
retail prices (especially in the energy and utilities sectors) also
contributes to market distortion, as prices are sometimes manipulated
to meet political objectives (held in check before elections,
accelerating after). The government actively supports the agricultural
sector through both subsidized inputs and crop support payments of up
to twice world price levels.
Turkey and the European Union entered into a customs union on
January 1, 1996. Nearly all industrial goods from EU and EFTA countries
now enter Turkey duty-free. Turkey has adopted the EU's common external
tariff for third countries, which has resulted in significantly lower
tariffs for U.S. products. The government also has abolished various
import surcharges. As part of the customs union agreement, Turkey has
revised its trade, competition, and incentive policies to meet EU
standards. While these EU-related reforms in general help U.S.
exporters, agricultural goods continue to face prohibitive tariffs.
4. Debt Management Policies
As of June 1999, Turkey's gross outstanding external debt was $100
billion, 76.5 percent of which is government debt. Debt service
payments in 1999 will amount to an estimated 8.5 percent of GNP (and 36
percent of current account receipts). Turkey has had no difficulty
servicing its foreign debt in recent years.
In 1999 Turkey has issued almost $4 billion in sovereign debt,
above its $3 billion official target. At the same time, Turkey's
domestic debt stock has increased significantly owing to continuing
high real interest rates.
5. Aid
In 1998, the United States ended its Economic Support Fund and
Foreign Military Financing (market-rate loans) support for Turkey. In
1999, the United States provided Turkey $2 million in assistance under
a USAID-funded family planning program, $1.4 million in International
Military Education and Training funding, and $500,000 in counter-
narcotics assistance. Turkey receives significant grant and loan aid
from the European Union, but much of this is on hold as the result of
political disputes with Greece.
6. Significant Barriers to U.S. Exports
The introduction of Turkey's customs union with the EU in 1996
resulted in reduced import duties for U.S. industrial exports. The
weighted rate of protection for non-EU/EFTA industrial products dropped
from 11 percent to 6 percent. By comparison, the rate of protection for
industrial exports from EU and EFTA countries in 1995 had been 6
percent; nearly all these goods now enter Turkey duty-free. There have
been few complaints from U.S. exporters that the realignment of duty
rates under the customs union has disrupted their trade with Turkey. A
significant number of U.S. companies have reported that the customs
union has benefited them by reducing tariffs on goods they already
exported to Turkey from European subsidiaries. The customs union does
not cover agricultural trade or services e.g. 200,000 tons of wheat and
19,000 tons of rice are allowed duty free entry from the EU. U.S.
exporters have voiced increasing frustration over barriers to
agricultural trade, most notably a ban on the import of livestock.
However, the import ban on livestock and meat was partially lifted for
breeder cattle in 1999, although none had been imported by late 1999.
Import Licenses: While import licenses generally are not required
for industrial products, products which need after-sales service (e.g.
photocopiers, ADP equipment, diesel generators) and agricultural
commodities require licenses. In addition, the government requires
laboratory tests and certification that quality standards are met for
importation of human and veterinary drugs and foodstuffs. While
licenses are generally issued in one to two weeks, occasional delays
can cause problems for U.S. exporters.
Government Procurement Practices: Turkey is not a signatory of the
WTO Government Procurement Agreement. It nominally follows competitive
bidding procedures for tenders. U.S. companies sometimes become
frustrated over lengthy and often complicated bidding and negotiating
processes. Some tenders, especially large projects involving co-
production, are frequently opened, closed, revised, and opened again.
There are often numerous requests for ``best offers;'' in some cases,
years have passed without the selection of a contractor.
The entry into force of a Bilateral Tax Treaty between the U.S. and
Turkey in 1998 eliminated the application of a 15 percent withholding
tax on U.S. bidders for Turkish government contracts.
Investment Barriers: The U.S.-Turkish Bilateral Investment Treaty
(BIT) entered into force in May 1990. Turkey has an open investment
regime. There is a screening process for foreign investments, which the
government applies on an MFN basis; once approved, firms with foreign
capital are treated as local companies. Although Turkey has a BIT with
the United States, and despite its membership in international dispute
settlement bodies, Turkish courts have not recognized investors' rights
to third party arbitration under any contract defined as a concession.
This has been particularly problematic in the energy,
telecommunications and transportation sectors. Passage of
constitutional amendments granting access to international arbitration
to foreign investors should correct this problem; however, the
implementing legislation needed to enforce these new amendments must
still be enacted.
7. Export Subsidies Policies
Turkey employs a number of incentives to promote exports, although
programs have been scaled back in recent years to comply with EU
directives and GATT/WTO standards. Barley, wheat, tobacco and sugar
exports are subsidized heavily. The Turkish Eximbank provides exporters
with credits, guarantees, and insurance programs. Certain tax credits
also are available to exporters.
8. Protection of U.S. Intellectual Property
In 1995, as part of Turkey's harmonization with the EU in advance
of a customs union, the Turkish Parliament approved new patent,
trademark and copyright laws. Turkey also acceded to a number of
multilateral intellectual property rights (IPR) conventions. Although
the new laws provide an improved legal framework for protecting IPR,
they require further amendments to be consistent with the standards
contained in the WTO Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights (TRIPS). The government has declared that intends to
have a TRIPS-compatible IPR regime in place by the end of the year and
has volunteered for a WTO TRIPS review in the second half of 2000.
Draft amendments to the Copyright Law awaited parliamentary approval at
the end of 1999.
Turkey has been on the ``Special 301'' Priority Watch List since
1992. In the 1997 ``Special 301'' review, USTR provided Turkey with a
set of benchmarks necessary in order to improve its status in the 301
process. In April 1998, the U.S. announced that it would not consider
requests to augment Turkey's benefits under the U.S. generalized system
of preferences until further progress is made on the benchmarks. Out of
the six benchmarks, Turkey has made significant progress on four and is
in the process of addressing the problems identified in the fifth and
sixth benchmarks.
Taxes on the showing of foreign and domestic films were equalized
in 1998. The Prime Minister issued a circular in 1998 directing all
government agencies to legalize the software used in their offices. A
public anti-piracy campaign was begun in 1998 and the government has
made efforts to educate businesses, consumers, judges and prosecutors
regarding the implications of its laws. Turkey extended patent
protection to pharmaceutical products in January 1999 in accordance
with Turkey's Customs Union commitments to the EU. Turkey currently is
in the process of amending its copyright legislation. In August 1999,
fines were increased by 800 percent and indexed to inflation. Turkish
police and prosecutors are working closely with trademark, patent and
copyright holders to conduct raids against pirates within Turkey.
Although many seizures have been made (including by Turkish Customs
officials at ports of entry), and several cases have been brought to
conclusion successfully, U.S. industry remains concerned that fines and
penalties levied by the courts are insufficient to serve as a
significant deterrent.
9. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association: All workers except police and military
personnel have the right to associate freely and to form representative
unions. Most workers also have the right to strike, but the
constitution does not permit strikes among workers employed in the
public utilities, petroleum, sanitation, education and national defense
sectors, or by workers responsible for protection of life and property.
Turkish law requires collective bargaining before a strike. Solidarity,
wildcat, and general strikes are illegal. The law on free trade zones
forbids strikes for 10 years following the establishment of a free
trade zone, although union organizing and collective bargaining are
permitted. The high arbitration board settles disputes in all areas
where strikes are forbidden.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively: Apart from the
categories of public employees noted above, Turkish workers have the
right to organize and bargain collectively. The law requires that in
order to become a bargaining agent, a union must represent not only
``50 percent plus one'' of the employees at a given work site, but also
10 percent of all workers in that particular branch of industry
nationwide. After the Ministry of Labor certifies the union as the
bargaining agent, the employer must enter good faith negotiations with
it.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor: The constitution
prohibits forced or compulsory labor, and it is not practiced.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children: The constitution and
labor laws forbid employment of children younger than age 15, with the
exception that those 13 and 14 years of age may engage in light, part-
time work if enrolled in school or vocational training. The
constitution also prohibits children from engaging in physically
demanding jobs such as underground mining and from working at night.
The Ministry of Labor enforces these laws effectively only in the
organized industrial sector.
In practice, many children work because families need the
supplementary income. An informal system provides work for young boys
at low wages, for example, in auto repair shops. Girls are rarely seen
working in public, but many are kept out of school to work in
handicrafts, especially in rural areas. The bulk of child labor occurs
in rural areas and is often associated with traditional family economic
activity, such as farming or animal husbandry. It is common for entire
families to work together to bring in the crop during the harvest. The
government has recognized the growing problem of child labor and has
been working with the ILO to discover its dimension and to determine
solutions. With the passage in 1997 of the eight-year compulsory
education program the number of child workers was reduced
significantly. Children enter school at age 6 or 7 and are required to
attend until age 14 or 15.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work: The Ministry of Labor is legally
obliged, through a tripartite government-union-industry board, to
adjust the minimum wage at least every two years and does so regularly.
Labor law provides for a nominal 45 hour work week and limits the
overtime that an employer may request. Most workers in Turkey receive
nonwage benefits such as transportation and meal allowances, and some
also receive housing or subsidized vacations. In recent years, fringe
benefits have accounted for as much as two-thirds of total remuneration
in the industrial sector. Occupational safety and health regulations
and procedures are mandated by law, but limited resources and lack of
safety awareness often result in inadequate enforcement.
f. Rights in Sectors with U.S. Investment: Conditions do not differ
in sectors with U.S. investment.
Extent of U.S. Investment in Selected Industries--U.S. Direct Investment Position Abroad on an Historical Cost
Basis--1998
[Millions of U.S. Dollars]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Category Amount
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Petroleum...................... .............. 97
Total Manufacturing............ .............. 604
Food & Kindred Products...... 208 ...............................................................
Chemicals & Allied Products.. 53 ...............................................................
Primary & Fabricated Metals.. (\1\) ...............................................................
Industrial Machinery and 0 ...............................................................
Equipment.
Electric & Electronic -9 ...............................................................
Equipment.
Transportation Equipment..... 99 ...............................................................
Other Manufacturing.......... (\1\) ...............................................................
Wholesale Trade................ .............. (\1\)
Banking........................ .............. 224
Finance/Insurance/Real Estate.. .............. 15
Services....................... .............. 46
Other Industries............... .............. (\1\)
TOTAL ALL INDUSTRIES........... .............. 1,069
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Suppressed to avoid disclosing data of individual companies.
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis.
______
UKRAINE
Key Economic Indicators
[Billions of U.S. Dollars unless otherwise indicated]
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1997 1998 \1\ 1999
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Income, Production and Employment:
Nominal GDP............................. 44.00 40.76 31.37
Real GDP Growth (pct) \2\............... -3.2 -1.7 -0.7
GDP by Sector:
Agriculture........................... 5.21 4.48 5.51
Manufacturing......................... 14.46 11.80 12.15
Services.............................. 20.1 16.7 16.9
Government............................ N/A N/A N/A
Per Capita GDP (US$).................... 863 850 629
Labor Force (millions).................. 22.6 22.3 N/A
Unemployment Rate (pct)................. 3.1 3.2 5.95
Money and Prices (annual percentage
growth):
Money Supply Growth (M2)................ 39.3 33.2 27.8
Consumer Price Inflation................ 10.3 29.0 16
Exchange Rate (Hryvnia/US$ annual 1.9 2.7 N/A
average)...............................
Official.............................. 1.85 2.50 4.1
Balance of Payments and Trade:
Total Exports, FOB \3\.................. 15.4 16.4 14.8
Exports to U.S. (US$ millions) \4\.... 414 634 N/A
Total Imports, CIF \3\.................. 19.6 17 13.9
Imports from U.S. (US$ millions) \4\.. 404 887 N/A
Trade Balance \3\....................... -4.2 -0.6 0.9
Balance with U.S. (US$ millions) \4\.. 10 253 N/A
External Public Debt/GDP (pct).......... 23.8 29.0 40
Fiscal Deficit/GDP (pct)................ 5.6 2.5 1.5
Current Account Deficit/GDP (pct)....... -2.6 -2.8 -3.03
Debt Service Payments/GDP (pct)......... 3.3 N/A 5.4
Gold and Foreign Exchange Reserves...... 2.4 1.2 1.2
Aid from U.S. (US$ millions) \5\........ 369 225 195
Aid from All Other Sources.............. N/A N/A N/A
------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ 1999 figures are all estimates based on available monthly data
through September 1999, or are 1999 forecast. Source: Government of
Ukraine. Depreciation of local currency in relation to dollar accounts
for significant portion of annual drop in nominal dollar amounts.
\2\ Percentage changes calculated in local currency, adjusted for
inflation.
\3\ Merchandise trade.
\4\ Source: U.S. Department of Commerce and U.S. Census Bureau; exports
FAS, imports customs basis.
\5\ Figures are actual FY expenditures. Cumulative budgeted assistance
(credits and grants) for FY 92-97 totals approximately $2.46 billion.
1. General Policy Framework
Since achieving independence in August 1991, Ukraine has followed a
course of democratic development and gradual economic reform. After a
period of hyperinflation, it curbed inflation and successfully
introduced a new currency, the ``hryvnia,'' in 1996. A tremendous
amount of work still lies ahead in the area of economic development and
the creation of an economic environment conducive to foreign investment
and governed by market forces. Ukraine's economic inheritance from the
Soviet Union of a large defense sector and energy-intensive heavy
industry has made the transition to a market economy particularly
difficult. Ukraine's principal resources and economic strengths include
rich agricultural land, significant coal and more modest gas and oil
reserves, a strong scientific establishment, and an educated, skilled
workforce. Ukraine is an important emerging market at the crossroads of
Eastern Europe, Russia, Central Asia, and the Middle East, and holds
great potential for becoming an important new market for U.S. trade and
investment. A significant number of both large multinationals and
smaller foreign investors are present, although private investment
(including U.S. investment) is greatly hampered by overregulation, lack
of transparency, high business taxes, and inconsistent application of
local law.
Ukraine still has much progress to make in the areas of large-scale
privatization, tax reform, and contract enforcement. The government has
generally been successful in efforts to achieve macroeconomic
stability. After initially being hard hit by the August 1998 Russian
financial crisis, Ukraine weathered the effects of this crisis
relatively well during 1999. Economic growth in the formal sector
showed signs of a modest recovery after nearly a decade of decline.
Inflation remained relatively low, at slightly more than 10 percent
during the first nine months of 1999. September 1998 saw the first
disbursements to Ukraine from the International Monetary Fund (IMF)
Extended Fund Facility (EFF). The three-year, $2.2 billion EFF program
stipulated that the Ukrainian government take steps towards tax reform,
a lower budget deficit, and further progress in privatization,
deregulation, and other measures to encourage private investment.
Several times during 1999 Ukraine fell out of compliance with IMF
conditionalities, causing the IMF temporarily to hold up EFF
disbursements. In most instances, Ukraine took steps to bring itself
back in line with EFF requirements, and disbursements were resumed.
However, Ukraine fell off track again with the IMF in September, 1999
due to a failure to follow through on communal tariff increases, and as
of late 1999, they had not yet secured IMF funding. Ukrainian foreign
currency reserves increased during the period January-November 1999,
reaching approximately $1.2 billion.
Nevertheless, the Ukrainian government's financial problems
continued. Following the Asian and Russian financial crises, Ukraine's
previously easy access to private foreign financing diminished.
Deterioration of the important Russian market for Ukrainian goods
caused a significant drop in exports. The situation of the private
banking sector, rife with non-performing loans and lacking good lending
opportunities, remained precarious. Despite some progress in
deregulation in 1999, Ukraine still awaited a much-needed surge in new
investment. Domestic and foreign investors remained discouraged by a
confusing and burdensome array of tax, customs and certification
requirements, corruption, and the absence of an effective system of
commercial law.
The exchange rate relative to the U.S. dollar had remained steady
within a narrow band in 1996 and 1997, but between August 1 and
September 30, 1998, the hryvnia depreciated approximately 40 percent
against the dollar before stabilizing. The hryvnia depreciated by
approximately 35 percent during the first ten months of 1999.
Ukraine's budget deficit has largely been the result of excessive
spending on social programs and subsidies to both noncompetitive
industries and private consumers, coupled with inadequate revenue
collection. Financing was achieved through a combination of issuance of
T-Bills to domestic and foreign borrowers, borrowing from the National
Bank of Ukraine (NBU), assistance from international financial
institutions (IFIs), and accumulation of wage and pension arrears. With
the onset of the Russian financial crisis in August 1998, however, the
market for government debt has largely dried up, and the government has
had to rely increasingly upon credits from international financial
institutions (IFIs), especially the IMF and World Bank. Ukraine has
followed a relatively strict monetary policy for the past several years
as part of its effort to control inflation and maintain the value of
the hryvnia. During 1999, it continued efforts to reduce liquidity
through raising bank reserve requirements, although it at the same time
it relaxed somewhat its control of foreign exchange operations.
Domestic arrears for wages and pensions has also been an important
source of funds to finance the deficit.
2. Exchange Rate Policy
In February 1999, the NBU established a new official currency
exchange band range of 3.4 to 4.6 hryvnia per dollar. Although the NBU
lifted most currency transaction restrictions during March through June
(including a ban on advance payment on import contracts) and opened an
interbank market for foreign exchange, some restrictions remain.
Enterprises are still obliged to sell 50 percent of their hard currency
earnings. The NBU also limited deviation of the cash market exchange
rates from the official rate to 10 percent.
Such restrictions have produced hardships for U.S. firms doing
business with Ukraine. U.S. exporters were reluctant to ship goods
without prior payment, while U.S. businesses operating in Ukraine (many
of which are highly dependent on imports) have had difficulties in
obtaining materials necessary for their operations. The NBU has stated
it may give up the currency band in 2000.
3. Structural Policies
There are no pricing requirements for consumer goods in Ukraine.
Stiff import tariffs and VAT taxes, along with the small number of
suppliers of Western products in Ukraine, tend to keep prices of
imported goods high.
Ukraine's burdensome and nontransparent tax structure remains a
major hindrance to foreign investment and business development.
Personal income and social security taxes remain high. Combined payroll
taxes were reduced by Presidential Decree from 48.5 percent to 37.5
percent effective January 1, 1999. Tax filing and collection procedures
do not correspond to practices in Western countries. Import duties and
excise taxes are often changed with little advance notice, giving
foreign investors little time to adjust to new requirements.
The regulatory environment is chaotic and Ukraine's product
certification system is one of the most serious obstacles to trade,
investment, and ongoing business. Although new licensing legislation is
being drafted, procedures for obtaining various licenses remain complex
and unpredictable, significantly raising the cost of doing business in
Ukraine, and encouraging corruption and the development of the shadow
economy.
4. Debt Management Policies
Ukraine's foreign debt stood at $12.4 billion in July 1999, around
40 percent of GDP. The largest amount is owed to Russia and
Turkmenistan, primarily for past trade credits for deliveries of gas,
which have been rescheduled into long-term state credits. Ukraine owed
about $5.07 billion to international financial institutions and
bilateral export credit agencies. External debt service as a percent of
GDP was expected to be 5.4 percent in 1999. This figure for 2000 is
expected to reach ten percent because of large foreign debts that will
become due during that year.
In September 1998 the IMF approved a three-year, $2.2 billion
Extended Fund Facility (EFF) intended to overcome balance of payments
difficulties stemming from macroeconomic imbalances and structural
problems. Monthly disbursements under the EFF are conditioned on
Ukraine pursuing more aggressive economic reform, and maintaining
foreign reserve levels and a low budget deficit. As noted above, in
1999 Ukraine has periodically fallen out of compliance with IMF
conditionalities but then taken steps to bring itself back in accord,
allowing the resumption of EFF disbursements. In August, the government
rescheduled part of an approximately $160 million dollar sovereign debt
due to foreign investors.
5. Aid
Ukraine is one of the leading recipients of U.S. assistance. The FY
99 Foreign Assistance Act set aside $195 million for Ukraine, focused
on economic reform and privatization, business development, energy and
environment (including nuclear safety/Chernobyl), democracy and local
government, legal reform, and health and social development. In
addition, around $100 million in other U.S. funding went for exchange
programs, Peace Corps, transport of humanitarian supplies, and the
Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program.
U.S. assistance also reaches Ukraine indirectly through
international financial institutions. As stated above, in September
1998, the International Monetary Fund approved a three year, $2.2
billion Extended Fund Facility designed to promote fiscal reform,
financial stabilization, and the accelerated development of a market
economy. Disbursements under the EFF amounted to $630 million during
January-November 1999. Major World Bank loans have promoted
agricultural reform, privatization, modernization of the financial
sector, and reform in the energy sector. The only major World Bank
disbursement expected in the near term is for financial sector reform,
although there is the possibility of large new programs in 2000 for
administrative reform and restructuring of privatized enterprises. The
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development is expanding its role
in financing small business development (in conjunction with USAID),
and is considering a major role in the nuclear sector, including in
improvement of safety at Chernobyl and the possible completion of new
nuclear reactors.
6. Significant Barriers to U.S. Exports
The daunting menu of a VAT (20 percent), import duties (ranging
from 5 to 200 percent) and excise taxes (10 to 300 percent) present a
major obstacle to trade with Ukraine. A limited number of goods,
including raw materials, component parts, equipment, machinery, and
energy supplies imported by commercial enterprises for ``production
purposes and their own needs'' are exempted from VAT. Many agricultural
enterprises are also exempt from the VAT. While investors' statutory
funds are exempt from VAT, fixed capital investments, including plant
equipment are often subject to VAT tax. This, coupled with inconsistent
application of the law by customs and tax authorities, leads to
investor uncertainty.
Import duties differ and largely depend upon whether a similar item
to that being imported is produced in Ukraine; if so, the rate may be
higher. Goods subject to excise taxes include alcohol, tobacco, cars,
tires, jewelry, certain electronics, and other luxury items. Excise
duty rates are expressed as a percentage of the declared customs value,
plus customs duties and customs fees paid for importing products. This
often results in duties and fees amounting to over 100 percent of the
declared value of the item.
The significant progress made in the last few years on economic
stabilization and the reduction in inflation have improved conditions
for U.S. companies in Ukraine. However, foreign firms need to develop
cautious and long-term strategies that take into full account the
problematic commercial environment. The weak banking system, poor
communications network, difficult tax and regulatory climate,
prevalence of economic crime and corruption, non-transparent tender
procedures, limited opportunities to participate in privatization, and
lack of a well-functioning legal system, impede U.S. exports to and
investment in Ukraine.
Ukraine's domestic production standards and certification
requirements apply equally to domestically produced and imported
products. Product testing and certification generally relate to
technical, safety and environmental standards, as well as efficacy
standards with regard to pharmaceutical and veterinary products. Such
testing often requires official inspection of the company's production
facility at the company's expense. Testing is often done in sub-
standard facilities and on a unit-by-unit basis rather than ``type''
testing. In cases where Ukrainian standards are not established,
country of origin standards may prevail.
Duties on goods imported for resale are subject to varying ad
valorem rates. Imported goods are not considered legal imports until
they have been processed though the port of entry and cleared by
Ukrainian customs officials. Import licenses are required for very few
goods, primarily medicines, pesticides, and some industrial chemical
products.
7. Export Subsidies Policies
As part of its effort to cut the budget deficit, the government has
significantly reduced the amount of subsidies it provides to state
owned industry over the last several years. Nonetheless, subsidies
remain an important part of Ukraine's economy, particularly in the coal
and agriculture sectors. These subsidies, however, appear not to be
specifically designed to provide direct or indirect support for
exports, but rather to maintain full employment and production during
the transition to a market-based economy. The government does not
target export subsidies specifically to small business. (Ukrainian
exporters, however, now enjoy a number of tax benefits, such as the VAT
applied at a zero rate.) Ukraine's subsidy policy may change in the
context of its negotiations to join the World Trade Organization (WTO).
The country's sixth WTO Working Party meeting was held in the summer of
1998. Ukraine has tabled WTO market access offers for both goods and
services, though its accession process is proceeding slowly.
8. Protection of U.S. Intellectual Property
Since gaining its independence, Ukraine has made significant
progress in enacting legislation and adopting international conventions
to protect intellectual property rights, though much still needs to be
done to reach the level required by TRIPs. Ukraine is a member of the
Universal Copyright Convention, the Convention establishing the World
Intellectual Property Organization--WIPO, the Paris Convention, the
Madrid Agreement, the Patent Cooperation Treaty, the International
Convention for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants, the Berne
Convention, the Trademark Law Treaty, and the Budapest Treaty.
Nonetheless, in 1998 Ukraine was placed on the ``Special 301'' Watch
List because copyright piracy is extensive and enforcement is minimal,
causing substantial losses to U.S. industry. On May 1, 1999 Ukraine was
moved to the Priority Watch List. Ukraine has taken some steps to
improve its Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) regime, in accordance
with its two-year plan to make its IPR legislation TRIPS-compliant,
including ratification by Parliament in June 1999 of the Geneva
Phonogram Convention. The President now must deposit the ratification
with the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) for it to take
effect. Numerous pieces of additional legislation are pending.
Ukrainian legislation has inadequate criminal penalties for
copyright piracy and none for infringement. Enforcement is negligible
or non-existent. Courts do not provide a reliable means to address
copyright infringement. Piracy has become an even more serious problem
as pirate factories displaced from Bulgaria have found a home in
Ukraine. This was one of the contributing factors in the decision to
move Ukraine to the Priority Watch List. To address this problem,
Ukraine announced that it was creating an anti-piracy committee with
authority to conduct unannounced searches and to confiscate pirated
goods, but thus far it has made little progress. The government openly
acknowledges its problems with piracy and actively seeks help from the
U.S. in combating it.
Ukraine is in the process of acceding to the WTO. The U.S.
Government has taken the strong position that Ukraine's IPR regime must
be TRIPs-compliant at the time of accession, with no transition period.
Ukraine has established a working group with the U.S., which has met
twice, the last time in April 1998.
9. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association: The constitution provides for the
right to join trade unions to defend ``professional, social and
economic interests.'' Under the constitution, all trade unions have
equal status, and no government permission is required to establish a
trade union. The 1992 Law on Citizens' Organizations (which includes
trade unions) stipulates noninterference by public authorities in the
activities of these organizations, which have the right to establish
and join federations on a voluntary basis. In principle, all workers
and civil servants (including members of the armed forces) are free to
form unions. In practice, the government discourages certain categories
of workers, for example, nuclear power plant employees, from doing so.
A new trade union law designed to replace Soviet-era legislation was
signed by the President in September 1999. The successor to the Soviet
trade unions, known as the Federation of Trade Unions (FPU), has begun
to work independently of the government and has been vocal in
advocating workers' right to strike. Independent unions now provide an
alternative to the official unions in many sectors of the economy. The
constitution provides for the right to strike ``to defend one's
economic and social interests.'' The constitution also states that
strikes must not jeopardize national security, public health, or the
rights and liberties of others.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively: The Law on
Enterprises states that joint worker-management commissions should
resolve issues concerning wages, working conditions, and the rights and
duties of management at the enterprise level. Overlapping spheres of
responsibility frequently impede the collective bargaining process. The
government, in agreement with trade unions, establishes wages in each
industrial sector and invites all unions to participate in the
negotiations. The Law on Labor Disputes Resolution that came into force
in March 1998 provides for establishment of an arbitration service and
a National Mediation and Reconciliation Service to mediate in labor
disputes. These services, however, have not yet been established. The
manner in which the collective bargaining law is applied prejudices the
bargaining process against the independent unions and favors the
official unions. The collective bargaining law prohibits antiunion
discrimination, but there have been cases in which such disputes have
not been settled in a fair and equitable manner. Independent unions
claim that the new trade union law is more restrictive than the old
Soviet legislation because of difficulty in obtaining national status
and registration, which confer the right to acquire space, property,
maintain bank accounts and enter legally binding agreements. To acquire
national status, a union must have representation in more than half of
the regions of Kiev, or at one third of the enterprises in a
regionally-based sector, or to have a majority of union members in the
sector. These new requirements will make it difficult for miners and
sailors to organize. Another contentious requirement is mandatory
registration by the Justice Ministry. Independent unions are concerned
that the Ministry could deny registration to unions seen as
undesirable.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor: The constitution
prohibits compulsory labor, and it is not known to occur. The
government does not specifically prohibit forced and bonded labor by
children, although the constitution and the Labor Code prohibit forced
labor generally, and such practices are not known to occur. Human
rights groups described as compulsory labor the common use of army
conscripts and youths in the alternative service for refurbishing and
building private houses for army and government officials. Student
groups have protested against a Presidential Decree obliging college
and university graduates, whose studies have been paid for by the
government, to work in the public sector at government-designated jobs
for three years or to repay fully the cost of their education.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children: The government does not
specifically prohibit forced and bonded labor by children. The minimum
employment age is 17 years. In certain non-hazardous industries,
however, enterprises may negotiate with the government to hire
employees between 14 and 17 years of age, with the consent of one
parent.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work: The Labor Code provides for a
maximum 40-hour workweek, a 24-hour day of rest per week, and at least
24 days of paid vacation per year. The law contains occupational safety
and health standards, but these are frequently ignored in practice.
During the first half of 1999, 913 people were killed and over 18,000
injured in accidents at work. In theory, workers have a legal right to
remove themselves from dangerous work situations without jeopardizing
continued employment. Independent trade unionists have reported,
however, that asserting this right would result in retaliation or
perhaps dismissal by management.
f. Rights in Sectors with U.S. Investment: Enterprises with U.S.
investment frequently offer higher salaries and are more observant of
regulations than their domestic counterparts. Otherwise, conditions do
not differ significantly in sectors with U.S. investment from those in
the economy in general.
Extent of U.S. Investment in Selected Industries--U.S. Direct Investment in Ukraine--1998
[Millions of U.S. Dollars]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Category Amount
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Petroleum...................... .............. 0
Total Manufacturing............ .............. (\1\)
Food & Kindred Products...... 5 ...............................................................
Chemicals & Allied Products.. 0 ...............................................................
Primary & Fabricated Metals.. 0 ...............................................................
Industrial Machinery and 0 ...............................................................
Equipment.
Electric & Electronic 0 ...............................................................
Equipment.
Transportation Equipment..... 0 ...............................................................
Other Manufacturing.......... (\1\) ...............................................................
Wholesale Trade................ .............. -26
Banking........................ .............. 0
Finance/Insurance/Real Estate.. .............. (\1\)
Services....................... .............. 0
Other Industries............... .............. (\1\)
TOTAL ALL INDUSTRIES........... .............. 92
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Suppressed to avoid disclosing data of individual companies.
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis.
______
UNITED KINGDOM
Key Economic Indicators
[Billions of U.S. Dollars unless otherwise indicated] \1\
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1997 1998 \2\ 1999
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Income, Production and Employment
Nominal GDP.......................... 1,318.4 1,400.6 1,422.0
Real GDP Growth (Pct)................ 3.3 2.5 1.5
GDP by Sector: \3\
Agriculture........................ 19.8 18.2 N/A
Mining............................. 33.0 23.8 N/A
Manufacturing...................... 274.2 275.9 N/A
Services........................... 821.4 902.2 N/A
Government......................... 72.5 75.4 N/A
Per Capita GDP (U.S. Dollars)........ 22,289 23,483 23,950
Labor Force (Millions)............... 28.8 28.9 29.0
Unemployment Rate (Pct).............. 7.0 6.3 6.0
Money and Prices (Annual Percentage
Growth)
Money Supply Growth \4\.............. 6.5 5.7 6.9
Consumer Price Inflation............. 2.4 3.4 1.5
Exchange Rate (USD/BPS--Annual 1.64 1.66 1.63
Average)............................
Balance of Payments and Trade \5\
Total Exports FOB.................... 281.7 272.5 \6\ 149.9
Exports to U.S..................... 34.4 36.4 \7\ 25.4
Total Imports CIF.................... 301.3 306.9 \6\ 176.6
Imports from U.S................... 41.0 42.6 \7\ 27.5
Trade Balance........................ -19.6 -34.4 \6\ -26.7
Balance with U.S................... -6.6 -6.2 \7\ -2.1
Total Public Debt/GDP (Pct).......... 42.5 40.6 38.3
External Public Debt/GDP (Pct)....... 21.4 22.0 \7\ 17.4
Fiscal Deficit/GDP (Pct)............. -1.8 0.2 0.8
Current Account Deficit/GDP (Pct) \8\ 0.8 0.0 -1.3
Gold and Foreign Exchange Reserves... 38.4 35.3 \9\ 34.2
Aid from U.S......................... 0 0 0
Aid from All Other Sources........... 0 0 0
------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Converted from British Pound Sterling (BPS) at the average exchange
rate for each year.
\2\ All 1999 figures are forecasts, unless otherwise indicated.
\3\ ``Agriculture'' includes hunting, forestry and fishing. ``Services''
includes hotels, catering, distribution, repairs, transport, storage,
communication, business, finance, education, health and social work.
``Government'' reflects only public administration and defense.
\4\ Notes and coins in circulation in the United Kingdom plus banks'
official deposits with the Banking Department.
\5\ Merchandise trade, converted at average exchange rate for the
applicable year.
\6\ Through July 1999.
\7\ Through August 1999.
\8\ Current prices.
\9\ Through June 1999.
Sources: The Oxford Economic Forecasting and London Business School 1999
Economic Outlook, the UK Office for National Statistics, and the Bank
of England.
1. General Policy Framework
The United Kingdom (UK) has the sixth largest economy in the
industrialized world, with a nominal GDP of about $1.4 trillion in
1999. The UK's 59.2 million inhabitants live in an area the size of New
York and Pennsylvania. Per capita income was about $23,950 in 1999.
In May 1997, the Labour Party won an overwhelming parliamentary
majority, ending 17 years of Conservative Government. Prime Minister
Tony Blair inherited an economy showing signs of overheating, after
recovering from the 1990-92 recession. Real GDP grew 2.6 percent in
1996 and 3.5 percent in 1997 (well above the UK's historical trend of
around 2.5 percent). In 1998, tighter monetary and fiscal policy
combined with a stronger pound and faltering global economy to put the
brake on manufacturing exports, slowing GDP growth to 2.2 percent, and
raising concerns that the economy could tip into recession in 1999. In
October 1998, the Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) reacted strongly to
the deteriorating domestic and international conditions by cutting
interest rates. Between October 1998 and June 1999, the MPC cut the
base rate seven times (from 7.5 percent to 5.0 percent).
The MPC's aggressive action averted a serious slowdown in 1999,
sparking a dramatic growth in both business and consumer confidence.
Indeed, the downturn was far briefer and milder than had been
anticipated. With growth bottoming out ahead of predictions in the last
quarter of 1998 at an annual rate of 0.7 percent, the lowest rate since
1992, the economy improved steadily throughout 1999. Real GDP was
forecast to grow by at least 1.7 percent in 1999 and as much as 3.0
percent in 2000.
During 1999 there were signs of recovery even in the depressed
manufacturing and export sectors, with strong advances in sales and
orders. The assumption is that both have now adapted to a highly valued
sterling by reducing their workforces, increasing productivity, and
shaving profit margins to remain competitive. Robust household
consumption and retail sales have particularly buoyed output. Rising
consumer confidence has been sustained by overall job growth, which
continued to advance throughout the slowdown. By August 1999, the
unemployment rate had dropped to a 20-year low of 5.9 percent from a
high of 10.5 percent in 1993.
A deteriorating current account remains a concern. The trade
imbalance has been a result of sluggish demand in Asia and Europe,
exacerbated by the high pound. With the terms of trade moving against
the UK, import growth for 1999 has been strong, more than counteracting
growth in exports. The services balance is still positive but has shown
little change since June 1999. The current account has moved from a
small surplus in 1997 to break even in 1998 to an estimated deficit
equal to about 1.3 percent of GDP in 1999. With more positive prospects
for demand in Asia and Europe next year, the trade and current account
balances should improve somewhat.
Inflation remains under control. Underlying inflation, which had
remained slightly above the MPC's 2.5 percent target rate until the
third quarter of 1998, had fallen below target, to 2.1 percent, by
September 1999. Fearing renewed wage and housing price inflation over
the next two years with a return to robust growth, the MPC raised the
base rate to 5.5 percent in November 1999. Underlying inflation
averaged 2.8 percent in 1997, 2.7 percent in 1998, and was forecast at
2.3 percent in 1999.
Fiscal Policy: The Labour Government has pledged to adhere to a
``Code for Fiscal Stability,'' balancing current government receipts
and expenditures. The government's financial balance has moved from a
deficit of eight percent of GDP in 1993 to a small surplus of 0.2
percent of GDP in 1998. The surplus continues to grow, forecast at 0.8
percent of GDP in 1999 and expected to reach one percent by 2002. The
Blair Government has also committed to continuing to decrease the
public debt, from 41 percent of GDP in 1998, to 37 percent by fiscal
year 2001-02.
Tax Policy: The Labour Government promised before the 1997 election
not to raise the personal income tax rate, now between 20 and 40
percent; the Value Added Tax, now 17.5 percent; or personal
contributions to the UK's social security system. The basic income tax
rate of 23 percent will be reduced to 22 percent in April 2000. The
Labour Government also introduced a new 10 percent starting tax rate
for the first 1,500 pounds of taxable income in April 1999. Labour also
undertook a controversial measure to tax the windfall gains of
privatized utilities. Expected to yield 5.2 billion pounds over three
years, the government plans to use this tax to help finance its new
Welfare-to-Work program. Corporate tax rates were cut as of April 1999
to 30 percent, 20 percent, and 10 percent respectively for
corporations, small companies, and new businesses with incomes under
50,000 pounds per year. To promote enterprise, small and medium
businesses may now write off 40 percent of their research and
development costs for the first two years of operation. Other domestic
tax revenue sources include excise taxes on alcohol, tobacco, retail
motor fuels, and North Sea oil production. Some of these taxes were
raised in 1999, and additional energy taxes are being discussed for
environmental reasons.
Monetary Policy: The government has emphasized its commitment to a
low inflation policy. In one of its first official acts, the Blair
Government established an inflation target of 2.5 percent and granted
the Bank of England independence to set interest rates to achieve this
target. The Bank must explain to the government if inflation varies
from the target by more than one percentage point, in either direction.
While the MPC's sole policy instrument is its ability to change the
base rate at its monthly meetings, the Bank of England manages general
monetary conditions through open market operations by buying and
selling overnight funds and commercial paper. There are no explicit
reserve requirements in the banking system.
2. Exchange Rate Policy
Since the UK's withdrawal from the European Union's (EU) Exchange
Rate Mechanism in January 1993, the pound has floated freely. The
sterling appreciated significantly between the beginning of 1996 and
early-to-mid-1998, with the trade-weighted exchange rate (1990=100)
rising from a low of 83.5 to a high of 107.1 in April 1998. The Asian
financial crisis and relatively high real UK interest rates contributed
to the flight to sterling. Given worsening domestic economic
projections, the pound began to soften once the MPC began to cut the
UK's relatively high short-term interest rates in October 1998. The
sterling index fell to 99.6 in January 1999, but had strengthened to
104.7 by September 1999 as the UK economy began to recover. The pound
is expected to continue to gain ground, against both the U.S. dollar
and the Euro, well into 2000.
The Labour government favors joining the new European common
currency in principle but determined that doing so when the Euro was
launched on January 1, 1999 would not be in the UK's interests. It is
undertaking an active program to prepare the economy for the Euro, but
has muted its commitment to making a decision on joining early in the
next parliament, which must be elected no later than 2002. At present,
the government is concentrating on convincing voters that the UK's
economic future and global leadership role depend on its membership and
strong participation in the EU. The decision to adopt the Euro will be
based on five economic tests, the most important of which is cyclical
convergence, and will be subject to a popular referendum. In addition,
the willingness of continental governments to accept fundamental
structural reform of their economies is also seen as essential to the
success of the new currency and the UK's willingness to participate
fully in Economic and Monetary Union.
3. Structural Policies
The UK economy is characterized by free markets and open
competition, which the government actively promotes within the EU and
international fora. The UK's relatively low labor costs and labor
market flexibility are often credited as major factors influencing the
UK's success in attracting foreign investment. However, relatively low
manufacturing labor productivity remains a concern.
Market forces establish prices for virtually all goods and
services. The government still sets prices for prescription drugs and
services in those few sectors where it is still a direct provider, such
as urban transportation. In addition, government regulatory bodies
monitor prices charged by telecommunications firms and set price
ceilings for electric, natural gas, and water utilities. The UK's
participation in the EU's Common Agricultural Policy significantly
affects the prices for raw and processed food items, but prices in
wholesale and retail markets are not fixed for any of these items.
The Labour Government inherited an economy that underwent
significant structural reforms under the previous administration, which
deregulated the financial services and transportation industries and
sold the government's interests in the automotive, steel, coal mining,
aircraft, and aviation sectors. Electric power, rail transport, and
water supply utilities were also privatized. Subsidies were cut
substantially and capital controls lifted. Employment legislation
significantly increased labor market flexibility, democratized unions,
and increased union accountability for the industrial acts of their
members. The Labour Government modified this approach, including a new
national minimum wage and union recognition rules, but kept significant
parts of previous legislation intact, such as outlawing union shops and
secondary boycotts.
4. Debt Management Policies
The UK has no meaningful external public debt. London is one of the
foremost international financial centers of the world, and British
financial institutions are major intermediaries of credit flows to the
developing countries. The government is an active participant in the
Paris Club and other multilateral debt negotiations.
5. Significant Barriers to U.S. Exports
Structural reforms and open market policies make it relatively easy
for U.S. firms to enter UK markets. The UK does not maintain any
barriers to U.S. exports other than those implemented as a result of EU
policies. (See the report on the European Union for details.)
The U.S.-UK Bilateral Aviation Agreement is highly restrictive,
particularly in limiting the number and access of carriers serving
London Heathrow Airport and the European destinations beyond UK
airports to which U.S. airlines may fly. The U.S. believes the two
sides should conclude an Open Skies Agreement, but the UK Government
has continued to raise objections to this approach. Nonetheless, the UK
government unilaterally provided open ``beyond rights'' to U.S. cargo
carriers at Prestwick Airport, near Glasgow, Scotland in August 1999.
The two sides are continuing to explore the possibility of liberalizing
cargo and passenger services on a bilateral basis.
6. Export Subsidies Policies
The government opposes export subsidies as a general principle, and
UK trade-financing mechanisms do not significantly distort trade. The
Export Credits Guarantee Department (ECGD), an institution similar to
the Export-Import Bank of the United States, was partially privatized
in 1991.
The UK's development assistance program has certain ``tied aid''
characteristics. In 1996, the last year for which figures are
available, some 14 percent of development assistance was tied.
Agricultural and humanitarian assistance are not tied. In addition,
various waivers of tied aid requirements are available to UK officials
administering development assistance.
7. Protection of U.S. Intellectual Property
UK intellectual property laws are strict, comprehensive, and
rigorously enforced. The UK is a signatory to all relevant
international conventions, including the convention establishing the
World Intellectual Property Organization, the Paris Convention for the
Protection of Industrial Property, the Berne Convention for the
Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, the Patent Cooperation
Treaty, the Geneva Phonograms Convention, and the Universal Copyright
Convention.
New copyright legislation simplified the British copyright process
and permitted the UK to join the most recent text of the Berne
Convention. The United Kingdom's positions in international fora are
very similar to those of the United States.
8. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association: Unionization of the work force in the
UK is prohibited only in the armed forces, public sector security
services, and police force.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively: Nearly nine
million workers, about one-third of the work force, are organized.
Employers are barred from discriminating based on union membership. New
legislation passed in July 1999 determines under what conditions an
employer must bargain with a trade union. Employers are no longer
allowed to pay workers who do not join a union higher wages than union
members performing the same work.
The 1990 Employment Act made unions responsible for members'
industrial actions, including unofficial strikes, unless union
officials repudiate the action in writing. Unofficial strikers can be
legally dismissed, and voluntary work stoppage is considered a breach
of contract. Unions do not have immunity from prosecution for secondary
strikes or for actions with suspected political motivations. Actions
against subsidiaries of companies engaged in bargaining disputes are
banned if the subsidiary is not the employer of record. Unions
encouraging such actions are subject to fines and seizure of their
assets.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor: Forced or compulsory
labor is unknown in the UK.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children: Children under the age
of 16 may work in an industrial enterprise only as part of an
educational course. Local education authorities can limit employment of
children under 16 if working will interfere with the child's education.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work: A new national minimum wage,
established in 1998, took effect in April 1999. The initial minimum was
set at 3.60 pounds per hour, based on the recommendations of a tri-
partite commission. Daily and weekly working hours are limited by law,
according to an EU directive outlawing mandatory workweeks longer than
48 hours. Implementing regulations are still being written.
The Health and Safety at Work Act of 1974 banned hazardous working
conditions. A Health and Safety Commission submits regulatory
proposals, appoints investigatory committees, conducts research, and
trains workers. The Health and Safety Executive enforces health and
safety regulations and may initiate criminal proceedings. The system is
efficient and fully involves worker representation.
f. Rights in Sectors with U.S. Investment: U.S. firms operating in
the UK are obliged to obey all worker rights legislation.
Extent of U.S. Investment in Selected Industries--U.S. Direct Investment Position Abroad on an Historical Cost
Basis--1998
[Millions of U.S. Dollars]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Category Amount
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Petroleum...................... .............. 15,603
Total Manufacturing............ .............. 46,436
Food & Kindred Products...... 4,371 ...............................................................
Chemicals & Allied Products.. 17,345 ...............................................................
Primary & Fabricated Metals.. 1,658 ...............................................................
Industrial Machinery and 8,464 ...............................................................
Equipment.
Electric & Electronic 3,509 ...............................................................
Equipment.
Transportation Equipment..... 3,433 ...............................................................
Other Manufacturing.......... 7,655 ...............................................................
Wholesale Trade................ .............. 7,772
Banking........................ .............. 10,365
Finance/Insurance/Real Estate.. .............. 65,846
Services....................... .............. 13,144
Other Industries............... .............. 19,483
TOTAL ALL INDUSTRIES........... .............. 178,648
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis.
THE AMERICAS
----------
ARGENTINA
Key Economic Indicators
[Billions of U.S. Dollars unless otherwise indicated]
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1997 1998 1999
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Income, Production, and Employment:
GDP (At Current Prices) \2\............. 293 298 285
Real GDP Growth (pct)................... 8.1 3.9 -3.5
GDP by Sector (pct):
Agriculture........................... 7.3 7.2 7.2
Manufacturing......................... 24.7 24.8 24.8
Mining................................ 3.0 2.9 2.9
Services.............................. 38 38.1 38.1
Government............................ 10.3 10.8 10.8
Per Capita GDP (US$).................... 8,250 8,300 8,000
Labor Force (Millions).................. 13.8 14.0 14.2
Unemployment Rate (pct)................. 14.9 12.9 14.5
Money and Prices (annual percentage
growth):
Money Supply (M2) \3\................... 26.5 4.0 -3.0
Consumer Price Inflation \3\............ 0.3 0.7 -2.0
Exchange Rate (Peso/US$)................ 1.0 1.0 1.0
Balance of Payments and Trade:
Total Exports FOB....................... 26.2 26.2 22.8
Exports to U.S.\4\.................... 2.2 2.3 2.5
Total Imports CIF....................... 30.4 31.4 24.1
Imports from U.S.\4\.................. 5.8 5.9 4.7
Trade Balance........................... -4.0 -5.0 -1.3
Balance with U.S.\4\.................. -3.6 -3.6 -2.2
External Public Debt.................... 101 112 118
Fiscal Deficit/GDP (pct)................ -1.4 -1.2 -2.0
Current Account Deficit/GDP (pct)....... 4.1 4.9 4.4
Debt Service Payments/GDP (pct)......... 5.7 6.6 6.9
Gold and Foreign Exchange Reserves...... 20.0 25.0 24.0
------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Figures for 1999 are embassy estimates.
\2\ The Argentine peso was tied to the U.S. Dollar at the rate of one to
one in 1991. In 1999, the Argentine government changed its method of
calculating GDP and revised its figures for 1997 and 1998 downward.
\3\ End of period.
\4\ Source: U.S. Department of Commerce and U.S. Census bureau; exports
FAS, imports customs basis; 1999 figures are estimates based on data
available through October.
1. General Policy Framework
President Carlos Menem's far-reaching reform program, which began
in earnest in 1991, has revitalized Argentina's economy. Despite a
sharp recession in 1995 due primarily to the Mexican peso crisis, real
GDP growth averaged over 6 percent a year from 1991-1997. Inflation has
remained very low for the last several years, and consumer prices in
1999 are actually expected to decrease by two percent. A stable
exchange rate and reductions in trade barriers resulted in a boom in
imports from the United States, particularly during 1991-94. The global
financial crisis in 1998 and Brazil's currency devaluation in early
1999 dealt serious blows to the Argentine economy, however. The economy
contracted from the second half of 1998 through late 1999. Some signs
of recovery began to appear in the final quarter of 1999, and most
experts expect a return to solid economic growth by the second half of
2000. Argentina's trade deficit with the United States this year is
projected to be about $3.5 billion. Argentina is expected to incur an
overall trade deficit of $1 billion in 1999, reflecting the economic
downturn.
Argentina's banking sector has consolidated during the last several
years. The number of financial institutions in Argentina dropped from
over 200 in December 1994 to about 120 by October 1999. The country's
financial sector is considered generally sound. Argentina's
consolidated public sector budget is expected to run a deficit in 1999
of about $5.8 billion--equal to approximately 2 percent of GDP. Tax
evasion remains a major problem for the government. Economic growth and
decreases in consumption reduced tax receipts in 1999.
Buenos Aires Mayor Fernando de la Rua, running as the presidential
candidate for an alliance of opposition parties, defeated the ruling
Justicialist party candidate in national elections in October 1999. He
has promised to maintain the main elements of the country's economic
model, including the convertibility of the peso and the U.S. dollar, as
well as relatively open markets for trade. Argentina remains one of the
hemisphere's most promising emerging markets for U.S. trade and
investment.
2. Exchange Rate Policy
The Central Bank of Argentina controls the money supply through the
buying and selling of dollars. Under the Convertibility Law of 1991,
the exchange rate of the Argentine Peso is fixed to the dollar at the
rate of one to one, controlled by a currency board. This rate is
expected to remain unchanged in the medium term. Argentina has no
exchange controls. Customers may freely buy and sell currency from
banks and brokers at market prices.
3. Structural Policies
The Menem administration's reform program has made significant
progress in transforming Argentina from a closed, highly regulated
economy to one based on market forces and international trade. The
government's role in the economy has diminished markedly with the
privatization of most state firms. Argentine authorities also
eliminated price controls on almost all goods and services. The
government abolished the import licensing system in 1989 and in 1990
cut the average tariff from nearly 29 percent to less than 10 percent.
However, MERCOSUR common external tariff rates are slightly higher, so
that Argentina's average tariff is now closer to 14 percent. In August
1996, Argentina raised the tariff on capital goods--which account for
over 40 percent of U.S. exports to Argentina--from 10 to 14 percent to
boost revenues.
Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay established the Southern
Cone Common Market (MERCOSUR) in 1991, and on January 1, 1995, formed a
partial customs union with a Common External Tariff (CET) covering
approximately 85 percent of trade. The CET ranges from zero to 20
percent. In 1998, MERCOSUR members hiked the CET by three points for
most products. The increase is scheduled to expire in on December 31,
1999. Initially, the government exempted some products from the CET,
such as capital goods, information technology and telecommunications,
to help support the modernization of the industrial infrastructure.
However, in August 1996 tariffs on these items were increased to the
MERCOSUR level. As a result, many non-MERCOSUR products entering
Argentina now face higher tariffs. Chile signed a free trade agreement
with MERCOSUR, effective October 1, 1996, but will not participate in
the CET. Bolivia also entered into a similar pact on April 30, 1997.
MERCOSUR is also discussing the prospect of a free trade agreement with
the Andean community.
Argentina signed the Uruguay Round agreements in April 1994,
congress ratified the agreements at the end of 1994, and Argentina
became a founding member of the WTO on January 1, 1995.
4. Debt Management Policies
Argentina's public debt maturities are mostly concentrated in the
longer term. External debt increased in 1998, rising to almost $110
billion. Argentina is expected to make total debt service (principal
and interest) payments of about $15 billion per year through 1999.
Interest payments on public debt in 1999 will represent about three
percent of GDP. The turmoil in international financial markets
triggered by Russia's devaluation in August 1998 complicated Argentine
access to foreign capital. In spite of difficult market conditions,
however, the government was able to meet its term financing needs.
Argentina remains vulnerable to external shocks, but agreements with
the IMF and other international financial institutions have provided an
added degree of confidence to financial markets.
5. Significant Barriers to U.S. Exports
One of the key reforms of the Menem Administration has been to open
the Argentine economy to international trade. Nevertheless, domestic
political pressure, fears the impact of Brazil's currency devaluation
and continued high unemployment in Argentina have led the government to
take some ad hoc protectionist measures
Barriers to U.S. Exports: On October 4, 1996, USTR self-initiated
an investigation under section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 into
Argentina's application of specific duties on textiles, apparel, and
footwear; three percent statistical tax on almost all imports; and
burdensome labeling requirements. In February 1997, Argentina repealed
the existing ``specific'' duties on footwear--only to immediately
replace them with virtually identical safeguard duties. In September
1997, Argentina extended the application of the safeguard duties on
footwear until February, 2000. The United States requested formation of
a WTO panel to review Argentina's footwear and textile regimes, as well
as the three-percent statistical tax in early 1997. After a WTO panel
found that the textile regime and statistical tax violate Argentina's
WTO commitments, Argentina cut the statistical rate tax to 0.5 percent
with appropriate caps, and set a 35 percent ad valorem cap on the
textile duties. The panel had not decided on footwear, stating that it
was unable to afford relief on measures no longer in effect. Believing
that Argentina's application of the footwear safeguard raised serious
questions regarding the WTO obligations of Argentina, the United States
has raised the safeguard bilaterally at high levels on many occasions
and has asserted third party rights in the EU panel on this matter. The
appellate body decision in this case is due in December 1999. In
November 1998, the Argentine government modified the safeguard through
Resolution 1506. The resolution establishes a quantitative restriction
in addition to the already-high safeguard duty, while imposing a TRQ of
3.9 million pairs on imports of footwear falling under the original
safeguard measure (all imports not originating in Mercosur.) This quota
amount represents less that 50 percent of annual footwear imports from
non-Mercosur countries over the last 3 years. Non-Mercosur footwear
imports below the quota limit are subject to the original safeguard
duty according to their HTS classification. Once the quota limit is
filled for each HTS number, imports above the limit are assessed a duty
rate that is double the current safeguard duty. In addition, the
Resolution postpones any liberalization of the original safeguard duty
until November 30, 1999, delaying two tariff reductions that were
scheduled for December 1998 and August 1999. A scheduled May 1998
liberalization had already been delayed in April 1998. On December 1,
1999, the quota was marginally liberalized by a 10 percent increase.
In the December 1998 Third Party Submission of the United States in
the EC's WTO panel on the original footwear safeguard, USTR expressed
the view that the modification of the safeguard appears to be in
violation of article 7.4 of the WTO Agreement on Safeguards. USTR has
requested a panel on this issue.
Argentina protects its automobile assembly industry through a
combination of quotas and heavy tariffs negotiated among MERCOSUR
members. The government is currently negotiating with Brazil rules to
govern trade in autos beginning in January 2000, when a new common
MERCOSUR auto policy is scheduled to take effect.
Standards: Argentina has traditionally recognized both U.S. and
European standards. However, as the government and its MERCOSUR
partners gradually establish a more structured and defined standards
system, the standards requirements are becoming progressively more
complex, particularly for medical products and electronics. In 1999,
Argentina instituted new rules under which imported electronics would
have to carry a local safety certification. Under the WTO agreement on
technical barriers to trade, Argentina established an ``inquiry point''
to address standards-related inquiries. While this inquiry point exists
formally at the Direccion General de Industria, it is not fully
functional at present.
Services Barriers: In January 1994, the authorities abolished the
distinction between foreign and domestic banks. U.S. banks are well
represented in Argentina and are some of the more dynamic players in
the financial market. U.S. insurance companies are active in providing
life, property and casualty, and workers compensation insurance. The
privatization of pension funds has also attracted U.S. firms.
Investment Barriers: There are very few barriers to foreign
investment. Firms need not obtain permission to invest in Argentina.
Foreign investors may wholly own a local company, and investment in
shares on the local stock exchange requires no government approval.
There are no restrictions on repatriation of funds.
An U.S.-Argentina Bilateral Investment Treaty came into force on
October 20, 1994. Under the treaty, U.S. investors enjoy national
treatment in all sectors except shipbuilding, fishing and nuclear power
generation. An amendment to the treaty removed mining, except uranium
production, from the list of exceptions. The treaty allows arbitration
of disputes by the International Center for the Settlement of
Investment Disputes (ICSID) or any other arbitration institution
mutually agreed by the parties. Several U.S. firms have invoked the
treaty's provisions in several on-going disputes with Argentine
national or provincial authorities.
Government Procurement Practices: Argentina is not a signatory to
the WTO Government Procurement Agreement, although ``Buy Argentine''
practices have been virtually abolished. Argentine sources will
normally be chosen only when all other factors (price, quality, etc.)
are equal.
Customs Procedures: Customs procedures are cumbersome and time-
consuming, thus raising the cost for importers. Installation of an
automated system in 1994 has eased the burden somewhat. The government
is resorting more frequently to certificate-of-origin requirements and
reference prices to counter under-invoicing and dumping, primarily from
East Asia. In 1997, the government merged the customs and tax
authorities to boost revenue collection and improve efficiency. It
instituted a pre-shipment inspection system in November 1997 to verify
the price, quality and quantity of imports. Six private firms are
implementing the system.
6. Exports Subsidies Policies
As a WTO member, Argentina adheres to WTO subsidies obligations. It
also has a bilateral agreement with the United States to eliminate
remaining subsidies provided to industrial exports and ports located in
the Patagonia region. Nevertheless, the government retains minimal
supports, such as reimbursement of indirect tax payments to exporters.
The government also maintains an industrial specialization program that
allows certain industries that boost their exports to report a
comparable amount of imports at a reduced tariff. The program will end
in the year 2000.
7. Protection of U.S. Intellectual Property
Argentina belongs to the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the
World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO). Argentina is a
signatory to the Paris Convention, Berne Convention, Rome Convention,
Phonograms Convention, Nairobi Treaty, Film Register Treaty, and the
Universal Copyright Convention. The U.S. Trade Representative has
placed Argentina on the ``Special 301'' Priority Watch List.
Argentina's lack of patent protection for pharmaceutical products has
consistently been a contentious bilateral issue and in 1997 cost
Argentina 50 percent of its benefits under the U.S. Generalized System
of Preferences (GSP).
Patents: After a three-year conflict between the Argentine
Executive and Congress over the issue of patent protection for
pharmaceutical products, the Executive issued a March 1996 decree that
improves earlier Argentine patent legislation, but provides less
protection than that originally proposed. This decree authorizes the
National Institute for Intellectual Property (INPI) to provide
pharmaceutical patent protection starting in November 2000. Legislation
pending in the Argentine Congress, however, would delay implementation
until 2005. (The TRIPS Agreement allows developing country members that
did not offer patent protection before WTO accession for pharmaceutical
and agrochemical products until January 1, 2005 to provide patent
protection). The 1996 decree does not provide patent protection for
products under development, and contains ambiguous language on parallel
imports and compulsory licenses. For example, the decree bans parallel
imports but allows the import of products that have been legally placed
in commerce in a third country. Compulsory licenses can be awarded in
cases of anti-competitive practices or for failure to work a patent.
INPI has also failed in most cases to provide prompt and fair treatment
to applications for exclusive marketing rights (EMRs) for
pharmaceutical rights during Argentina's patent transition period. The
U.S. government is currently engaged in WTO consultations over the
failure to provide EMR to qualifying products and backsliding in the
protection of agro-chemical data.
The 1996 decree also fails to provide adequate protection for
confidential data. While the government has yet to issue the 1996 law's
implementing regulations, it is unlikely that they will address U.S.
concerns about the law, which permits Argentine competitors to rely on
data submitted for product registration in Argentina, the United
States, and other countries.
Copyrights: Argentina's Copyright Law, enacted in 1933, appears to
be adequate by international standards. An executive decree extended
the term of protection for motion pictures from 30 to 50 years after
the death of the copyright holder. As in many countries, video and CD
piracy is a serious problem. Efforts are underway to combat this,
including arrests, seizure of pirated material, and introduction of
security stickers for cassettes. In October 1998, the Argentine
Congress enacted legislation make software piracy a criminal offense.
The law closes an important gap in Argentina's protection of
intellectual property rights. Enforcement efforts are improving.
Trademarks: Trademark laws and regulations in Argentina are
generally good. The key problem is a slow registration process, which
the government has worked to improve.
Trade Secrets: Although Argentina has no trade secret law as such,
laws on contract, labor, and property have recognized and encompassed
the concept. Penalties exist under these statutes for unauthorized
revelation of trade secrets.
Semiconductor Chip Layout Design: Argentina has no law dealing
specifically with the protection of layout designs and semiconductors.
Although existing legislation on patents or copyrights could cover this
technology conceivably, this has not been verified in practice.
Argentina has signed the WIPO treaty on integrated circuits.
8. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association: All Argentine workers except military
personnel are free to form unions. Union membership is estimated at 30-
40 percent of the workforce. Unions are independent of the government
and political parties, although most union leaders have ties with the
Justicialist (Peronist) Party. Unions have the right to strike, and
strikers are protected by law. Argentine unions are members of
international labor associations and secretariats and participate
actively in their programs.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively: Argentine law
prohibits anti-union practices. There is a trend toward bargaining on a
company level, rather than negotiating at the national level on a
sectoral basis, but the adjustment has not been easy for either
management or labor. Both the federal government and a few highly
industrialized provinces are working to create mediation services to
promote more effective collective bargaining and dispute resolution.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor: The constitution
prohibits forced labor, and there were no reports of such incidents
during 1999.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children: The law prohibits
employment of children under 14, except in rare cases where the
Ministry of Education may authorize a child to work as part of a family
unit. Minors aged 14 to 18 may work in a limited number of job
categories, but not more than six hours a day or 35 hours a week. The
law is generally enforced, but there were credible reports in 1999 that
child labor in the informal economy is increasing.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work: The national monthly minimum wage
is $200, though prevailing wages for most unskilled and entry-level
positions are somewhat higher. Federal labor law mandates acceptable
working conditions in the areas of health, safety and hours. The
maximum workday is eight hours, and the workweek is limited to 48
hours. The government is also striving to modernize the system of
workers compensation. Argentina has well-developed health and safety
standards, but the government often lacks sufficient resources to
enforce them.
f. Rights in Sectors with U.S. Investment: Argentine law does not
distinguish between worker rights in nationally owned enterprises and
those in sectors with U.S. investment. The rights enjoyed by Argentine
employees of U.S. owned firms in Argentina equal or surpass Argentine
legal requirements.
Extent of U.S. Investment in Selected Industries--U.S. Direct Investment Position Abroad on an Historical Cost
Basis--1998
[Millions of U.S. Dollars]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Category Amount
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Petroleum...................... .............. 1,565
Total Manufacturing............ .............. 3,654
Food & Kindred Products...... 974 ...............................................................
Chemicals & Allied Products.. 1,130 ...............................................................
Primary & Fabricated Metals.. 349 ...............................................................
Industrial Machinery and 50 ...............................................................
Equipment.
Electric & Electronic (\1\) ...............................................................
Equipment.
Transportation Equipment..... 448 ...............................................................
Other Manufacturing.......... 702 ...............................................................
Wholesale Trade................ .............. 340
Banking........................ .............. 1,801
Finance/Insurance/Real Estate.. .............. 1,945
Services....................... .............. 876
Other Industries............... .............. 1,308
TOTAL ALL INDUSTRIES........... .............. 11,489
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Suppressed to avoid disclosing data of individual companies.
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis.
______
THE BAHAMAS
Key Economic Indicators
[Millions of U.S. Dollars unless otherwise indicated]
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1997 1998 1999
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Income, Production and Employment:
GDP (Current Prices)................. 4,000 \1\ 4,250 \1\ 4,515
Real GDP Growth...................... 3.0 \1\ 4.0 \1\ 4.8
GDP by Sector (Percent of Total):
Tourism............................ 60 60 60
Finance............................ 12 15 15
Manufacturing...................... 3 3 3
Agriculture/Fisheries.............. 3 3 3
Government......................... 12 12 12
Other.............................. 10 7 7
Per Capita GDP (US$)................. N/A 14,267 N/A
Labor Force (000's).................. N/A 156,000 N/A
Unemployment Rate (pct).............. 9.7 7.9 \1\ 7.8
Money and Prices (annual percent
change):
Money Supply (M2) (pct increase)..... 10.7 15.3 \2\ 8.5
Commercial Interest Rate (pct)....... 6.75 6.75 6.00
Personal Savings Rate................ 3.35 3.28 2.97
Retail Price Index................... 0.9 0.8 1.2
Exchange (US$:B$).................... 1.00 1.00 1.00
Balance of Payments and Trade:
Total Exports FOB.................... N/A N/A N/A
Exports to U.S.\3\................. 153.4 143.9 128.8
Total Imports CIF.................... 1331.6 1371.4 N/A
Imports from U.S.\3\............... 789.6 774.5 \3\ 499.5
Trade Balance........................ -1227.8 -1373.1 \2\-572.8
Balance with U.S.\3\............... -644.1 -461.1 -370.7
External Public Debt................. 90.7 89.5 \2\ 100.0
Debt Repayment....................... 68.4 84.0 72.5
Gold Reserves........................ N/A N/A N/A
Foreign Exchange Reserves............ 219.5 \2\ 323.0 476.0
Aid from U.S......................... 0 0 0
Aid from Other Countries............. N/A N/A N/A
------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Finance Ministry projection.
\2\ As of August 1999.
\3\ U.S. Department of Commerce.
1. General Policy Framework
The Bahamas is a politically stable, middle-income developing
country. The economy is based primarily on tourism and financial
services, which account for approximately 60 percent and 15 percent of
GDP respectively. The agricultural and industrial sectors, while small,
continue to be the focus of government efforts to produce new jobs and
diversify the economy.
Hurricane Floyd, the worst storm to hit The Bahamas this century in
terms of financial costs, swept through a number of Bahamian islands on
September 14 leaving a path of destruction. The government estimated
that damages from Hurricane Floyd would cost more than $700 million.
The damages to government utilities alone is over $80 million,
restoration of roads, sea walls, bridges and docks will cost $30
million, and repairs to government buildings will total another $3.5
million. Losses in the tourism industry are calculated at $70 million,
not including the loss of salaries for hundreds of workers in the
Family Islands laid off as a result of damages to tourist facilities.
The farming industry suffered losses totaling $33.3 million, and the
fishing sector $10.5 million. In addition, insurance claims including
those for second homes and tourist-related businesses is expected to
reach $400 million.
The United States remains The Bahamas' major trading partner. U.S.
exports to The Bahamas went from $789.6 million in 1997 to $774.5 in
1998 and account for approximately 65 percent of all imports. Although
certain areas of economic activity are reserved for Bahamian citizens,
the Bahamian government actively encourages foreign investment in
unreserved areas and operates a free trade zone on Grand Bahama.
Capital and profits are freely repatriated, and the Bahamian government
does not tax personal and corporate income. Designation under the
Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI) trade program allows qualified
Bahamian goods to enter the United States duty-free.
The Bahamian government continues to follow the policy implemented
in the 1995-1996 budget in which the annual amount of new borrowings
would be no greater than the amount of debt redemption. The 1999-2000
budget totaled $1.02 billion. Government outlays for education, health,
social benefits and services, housing and other social services
accounted for the majority of the Government's total expenditure. Debt
service accounted for a substantial portion, $113.5 million or 12.6
percent of the recurrent expenditure. Again, the budget emphasized the
government's resolve to expand the delivery of priority services, while
moving closer to eliminating the deficit on recurrent expenditure by
2001. As a result, the government's focus remains on expenditure
restraint, with anticipated revenue increases from economic growth and
more efficient revenue collection rather than tax increases.
Recurrent revenue for 1999-2000 is projected to increase to $914
million, comprising $814.5 million in tax receipts and $81.1 million in
non-tax income. A further $4.0 million is expected in capital revenue
and $1.0 million in grants. The Budget also implements revenue
enhancement measures, which take timely advantage of the buoyancy of
the economy to raise additional revenue of over $30 million.
Before Hurricane Floyd, the Bahamian government predicted a growth
rate of 5 percent for fiscal year 1999/2000. Prime Minister Ingraham
announced that although he expects revenues to decline as a result of
the hurricane, he did not expect the overall growth rate to change.
The 1999-2000 budget contained some new taxes including:
A two-percent increase in the hotel occupancy tax; a large
increase in all immigration fees (for example work permit fees
for top corporate managers would rise from $7,500 to $10,000
per year;
A two-percent increase in the stamp duty on real estate
valued at more than $250,000;
A 10 percent increase in duty on imported cars valued at more
than $25,000 (raising the charge--including stamp tax--to 82
percent);
An increase in excise tax on domestic beer production from $3
to $4 per gallon.
These tax hikes will go a long way to offset increases in spending
and bring down the country's nearly $2 billion debt (almost 60 percent
of the GDP). But higher taxes in the new budget do not close the budget
deficit. The projected $914 million in Government revenues falls short
of the planned expenditures of nearly one billion dollars. The
government levies no income tax relying instead on import duties and
other transaction and consumption fees to finance the vast majority of
government spending.
In 1998, the Bahamian government eliminated customs duties for
computer software, discs and computer tapes, farming pesticides,
jewelry manufacturing items and various medical items, which also
benefited from a reduction in stamp levies from 7 percent to 2 percent.
In addition, the customs tariff was lowered on chicken, combination TV
and radio appliances, combination TV and VCR appliances, and golf
carts. The 1999-2000 budget cut tariff rates on imported video and
audio tapes and discs from 65 to 15 percent. This move, which comes on
the heels of a government decision to begin enforcement of its new
Copyright Law, will help lower the cost of legitimate videos and
encourage local video retailers to evolve away from pirated products.
Since Hurricane Floyd in September, the government waived import duties
on building materials and household supplies for persons who suffered
damages from the storm.
The government believes that the move toward hemispheric free trade
by the year 2005 will involve restructuring its revenue sources. As
part of its overall strategy to simplify and harmonize customs import
duties, the government consolidated the current 123 separate import
duty rates to 29 rates as of July 1, 1997. Rates will also be reduced
or eliminated on a variety of imported goods, ranging from construction
materials (nails, cement, sheet rock, plywood, etc.) to computers and
computer parts, musical instruments and consumer electronic appliances.
The government hopes to recover these lost revenues through increased
collection enforcement, reduced administrative costs, increased
business generation and enhanced local purchasing.
Commercial banks lowered the prime lending rate from 6.75 to 6.00
percent in September.
2. Exchange Rate Policy
The Bahamian dollar is pegged to the U.S. dollar at an exchange
rate of 1:1, and the Bahamian government is committed to maintaining
parity.
3. Structural Policy
Price controls exist on 13 breadbasket items, as well as on
gasoline, utility rates, public transportation, automobiles, and
automobile parts. The rate of inflation is estimated at 1.2 percent as
of June 1999.
The Bahamas is recognized internationally as a tax haven. The
government does not impose personal or corporate income, inheritance or
sales taxes. In addition, the government lowered taxes and reduced the
stamp duty on various tourism related items including: liqueurs and
spirits, jewelry and watches, perfumes, toilet water, table linens,
non-leather designer handbags, and cigarettes. The government hoped
these measures would have increased the country's competitive edge in
the tourism sector. The intended results of these incentives have not
yet been realized because the downtown area was not able to
consistently attract enough tourists, especially cruise ship
passengers. The Ministry of Tourism has recently implemented a
``Bahamian Nights'' program in which stores and restaurants in the
downtown area stay open late three nights a week and offer incentives
to lure tourists downtown. These concessions should safeguard
employment in retail trade catering to tourists and promote price
competitiveness of goods in the Bahamian market.
Certain goods may be imported conditionally on a temporary basis
against a security bond or deposit that is refundable upon re-
exportation. These include: fine jewelry, goods for business meetings
or conventions, traveling salesman samples, automobiles or motorcycles,
photographic and cinematographic equipment, and equipment or tools for
repair work.
In 1993 the Bahamian government repealed the Immovable Property
(Acquisition by Foreign Persons) Act, which required foreigners to
obtain approval from the Foreign Investment Board before purchasing
real property in the country, and replaced it with the Foreign Persons
(Landholding) Act. Under the new law, approval is automatically granted
for non-Bahamians to purchase residential property of less than five
acres on any single island in The Bahamas, except where the property
constitutes over fifty percent of the land area of a cay (small island)
or involves ownership of an airport or marina. The government has now
decided to discontinue sales of islands to foreigners to allay concerns
by locals that too much Bahamian land is sold to foreigners. Prime
Minister Ingraham announced in Parliament on June 16 that during his
government's seven-year term, land sales to foreigners amounted to two
billion dollars. Ingraham said that the treasury's accrued revenue on
residential sales alone was US$ 43 million.
Foreign persons are still eligible for a two-year real property tax
exemption if they acquire undeveloped land in The Bahamas provided that
substantial development occurs during the first two years of the
purchase. The property tax structure for foreign property owners is as
follows:
$1-$3,000--the standard tax is $30.00.
$3,001-$100,000--tax is 1 percent of the assessed value.
Over $100,000--tax is 1\1/2\ percent of the assessed
value.
This has stimulated the second home/vacation home market and
revived the real estate sector. In addition, the government lowered the
rate of stamp duty on real estate transactions in 1995. The stamp duty
reduction ranges from two percent on transactions under $20,000 to
eight percent on transactions over $100,000.
The government also receives revenues from a $15 per person airport
and harbor departure tax.
Although The Bahamas encourages foreign investment, the government
reserves certain businesses exclusively for Bahamians, including
restaurants, most construction projects, most retail outlets, and small
hotels. Other categories of businesses are eligible solely as joint
ventures.
The government has announced plans to privatize and deregulate The
Bahamas Telecommunication Corporation (Batelco) in early 2000 and other
public utilities sometime thereafter. It has published new legislation
outlining the creation of a telecommunications regulatory authority for
public comment and plans to formally introduce the legislation in
Parliament on December 1.
On April 30, 1998 Prime Minister Hubert Ingraham officially
launched the new Bahamas Financial Services (BFS) Board, a joint
private and public sector board dedicated to promoting The Bahamas as a
financial services center. Since its inception, BFS has conducted
promotional trips to the U.S. and Europe.
A Security Industries Bill has passed the legislature and
authorizes a new, privately operated stock market. The legislation
envisions a two-tier exchange with one market for foreign investors and
companies. The Securities Commission, the regulating body for the stock
exchange, is currently in the process of locating experts to provide
the technical expertise and support needed to open the stock exchange.
Two consultant firms will be hired, one to create and assist the stock
exchange and the other to assist the Securities Commission. Although
the government planned to have the stock market running by the end of
the year, Minister of Finance William Allen says that the stock market
will not be operational until the necessary framework is in place.
The Bahamas Investment Authority, a ``one-stop shop'' for foreign
investment, was established in 1992, comprising the Bahamas
Agricultural and Industrial Corporation and the Financial Services
Secretariat. The Authority facilitates and coordinates local and
international investment and provides overall guidance to the
government on all aspects of investment policy.
Other measures providing trade and investment incentives include:
The International Business Companies Act--simplifying
procedures and reducing costs for incorporating companies.
The Industries Encouragement Act--providing duty exemption on
machinery, equipment, and raw materials used for manufacturing.
The Hotel Encouragement Act--granting refunds of duty on
materials, equipment, and furniture required in construction or
furnishing of hotels.
The Agricultural Manufacturers Act--providing exemption for
farmers from duties on agricultural imports and machinery
necessary for food production.
The Spirit and Beer Manufacturers Act--granting duty
exemptions for producers of beer or distilled spirits on
imported raw materials, machinery, tools, equipment, and
supplies used in production.
The Tariff Act--granting one-time relief from duties on
imports of selected products deemed to be of national interest.
The Hawksbill Creek Agreement of 1954 granted certain tax and
duty exemptions on business license fees, real property taxes,
and duties on building materials and supplies in the town of
Freeport on Grand Bahama Island. In July 1993, the government
enacted legislation extending most Hawksbill Creek tax and duty
exemptions through 2054, while withdrawing exemptions on real
property tax for foreign individuals and corporations. The
Prime Minister declared, however, that property tax exemptions
might still be granted to particular investors on a case-by-
case basis.
The Casino Taxation Act was amended in October 1995 to allow
for the establishment of small-scale casinos through the
reduction of the basic tax and winnings tax rates for casinos
of less than 10,000 square feet. The basic tax was reduced from
$200,000 to $50,000 for casinos with floor space of less than
5,000 square feet. The tax rises to $100,000 for casinos of
5,000-10,000 square feet. Unlike the winnings tax rate for
traditional casinos (25 percent of the first $20 million),
small casinos pay a progressive winnings tax rate of 10 percent
on the first $10 million of gross winnings, and 15 percent
thereafter.
4. Debt Management Policies
From the end of 1992 to mid-1999, the total national debt has grown
from $1.3 billion to $1.7 billion. The government's deficit financing
plan included a net borrowing of $69.1 million, with debt amortization
significantly lower by 72.8 percent at $34.4 million. Within this
context, the direct charge on government is likely to rise
correspondingly to an estimated $1.5 billion by end-June 2000, and the
National Debt to settle moderately above $1.8 billion.
5. Significant Barriers to U.S. Exports
The Bahamas is a $700 million plus market for U.S. companies. There
are no significant non-duty barriers to the import of U.S. goods,
although a substantial duty applies to most imports. Deviations from
the average duty rate often reflect policies aimed at import
substitution. Tariffs on items produced locally are at a rate designed
to provide protection to local industries. The Ministry of Agriculture
occasionally issues temporary bans on the import of certain
agricultural products when it determines that a sufficient supply of
locally grown items exits. The government's quality standards for
imported goods are similar to those of the United States.
The Ministry of Agriculture restricted banana imports in October
1995, in trying to create a monopoly for locally grown bananas. The
restrictions have been extended to include other varieties of produce
for which the Ministry determines that demand can be met by local
farmers (e.g. Christmas poinsettias, romaine lettuce, yellow squash,
and zucchini). In June 1996, the Ministry announced a ban on the
importation of fruits, vegetables, flowers, plants or other propagate
materials from Caribbean countries unless the Department of Agriculture
is assured that the country is free of the pink (or hibiscus) mealy
bug. Shipments must be accompanied by a phytosanitary certificate
issued by the Ministry of Agriculture in the country of origin. The
Ministry continues to enforce its ban on imports of citrus plants and
fruit from Florida, instated in 1995 because of reported outbreaks of
canker disease. Imports of citrus plants are permitted from states
other than Florida.
6. Export Subsidies Policies
The Bahamian government does not provide direct subsidies to
export-oriented industries although state-owned companies. The Export
Manufacturing Industries Encouragement Act provides exemptions from
duty for raw materials, machinery, and equipment to approved export
manufacturers. The approved goods are not subject to any export tax.
7. Protection of U.S. Intellectual Property
The Bahamas is a member of the World Intellectual Property
Organization (WIPO) and a party to the Paris Convention on industrial
property and the Berne Convention on copyright (older versions for some
articles of the latter are used). It is also a member of the Universal
Copyright Convention. Parliament has passed a new copyright law, which
is intended to provide better protection to international holders of
copyrights. However, the government has not yet brought this law into
force.
Copyrights: The majority of videos available for rent are the
result of unauthorized copying of videotapes from promotional tapes
provided by movie distributors, U.S. hotel ``pay-for-view'' movies and
shows, or satellite transmissions. It is doubtful that pirated
videotapes are exported. Since video retailers complained that it is
too expensive to import original video tapes, the government reduced
the import duty for imported video and audio tapes and discs to
encourage them to evolve away from pirated products. In May, 1997 the
government passed a bill to amend the Copyright Act to provide for
payment of equitable royalties to copyright owners (particularly
Bahamian musicians) for works broadcast on radio and television. In
September 1997, a local radio station was ordered to pay copyright
damages to The Performing Rights Society of London for failing to enter
a defense in an action accusing the station of breach of copyright
laws.
8. Workers Rights
a. Right of Association: The constitution specifically grants labor
unions the rights of free assembly and association. Unions operate
without restriction or government control, and are guaranteed the right
to strike and to maintain affiliations with international trade union
organizations.
b. Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively: Workers are free to
organize, and collective bargaining is extensive for the estimated 25
percent of the work force that are unionized. Collective bargaining is
protected by law and the Ministry of Labor is responsible for mediating
disputes. In addition, the government established the Industrial
Tribunal in 1997 to handle labor disputes. The Industrial Relations Act
requires employers to recognize trade unions.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor: Forced or compulsory
labor is prohibited by the Constitution and does not exist in practice.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children: While there are no laws
prohibiting the employment of children below a certain age, compulsory
education for children up to the age of 16 years and high unemployment
rates among adult workers effectively discourage child employment.
Nevertheless, some children sell newspapers along major thoroughfares
and work at grocery stores and gasoline stations, generally after
school hours. Children are not employed to do industrial work in The
Bahamas.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work: The Fair Labor Standards Act
limits the regular workweek to 48 hours and provides for at least one
24-hour rest period. The Act requires overtime payment (time and a
half) for hours in excess of the standard. The Act permits the
formation of a wages council to determine a minimum wage. To date no
such council has been established. However, in 1996 the government
instituted a minimum wage of $4.12 an hour for non-salaried public
service employees. The Parliament is considering a new minimum labor
standards act, which will cover employees in both the public and
private sectors. This act contains new guarantees of employees rights
to paid vacations, sick leave, redundancy payments and protection
against unfair dismissal.
The Ministry of Labor is responsible for enforcing labor laws and
has a team of several inspectors who make on-site visits to enforce
occupational health and safety standards and investigate employee
concerns and complaints. The Ministry normally announces these
inspections ahead of time. Employers generally cooperate with the
inspections in implementing safety standards. A 1988 law provides for
maternity leave and the right to re-employment after childbirth.
Workers rights legislation applies equally to all sectors of the
economy.
f. Rights in Sectors with U.S. Investment: Authorities enforce
labor laws and regulations uniformly for all sectors and throughout the
economy, including within the export processing zones.
Extent of U.S. Investment in Selected Industries--U.S. Direct Investment Position Abroad on an Historical Cost
Basis--1998
[Millions of U.S. Dollars]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Category Amount
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Petroleum...................... .............. 58
Total Manufacturing............ .............. 81
Food & Kindred Products...... 0 ...............................................................
Chemicals & Allied Products.. (\1\) ...............................................................
Primary & Fabricated Metals.. 0 ...............................................................
Industrial Machinery and -3 ...............................................................
Equipment.
Electric & Electronic 0 ...............................................................
Equipment.
Transportation Equipment..... 0 ...............................................................
Other Manufacturing.......... (\1\) ...............................................................
Wholesale Trade................ .............. 150
Banking........................ .............. -1,585
Finance/Insurance/Real Estate.. .............. 1,401
Services....................... .............. 131
Other Industries............... .............. 50
TOTAL ALL INDUSTRIES........... .............. 287
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Suppressed to avoid disclosing data of individual companies.
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis.
______
BOLIVIA
Key Economic Indicators
[Millions of U.S. dollars unless otherwise indicated]
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1997 1998 \6\ 1999
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Income, Production and Employment: \1\
Nominal GDP............................. 7,647 8,213 8,550
Real GDP Growth (pct)................... 4.2 4.7 2.0
GDP by Sector (pct share):
Agriculture........................... 14.1 14.0 13.6
Manufacturing......................... 16.8 16.7 16.7
Services.............................. 33.2 33.0 29.8
Government............................ 8.9 8.9 8.0
Per Capita GDP (US$).................... 969 989 1,036
Labor Force (million)................... 2.4 2.5 2.6
Unemployment Rate (pct) \2\............. 4.1 4.3 4.6
Money and Prices (annual percentage
growth):
Money Supply Growth (M2) \3\............ 27.5 12.7 -8.0
Consumer Price Inflation................ 7.0 4.4 3.0
Average Exchange Rate (Bs/US$).......... 5.26 5.51 5.89
Trade and Balance of Payments:
Total Exports FOB....................... 1,166 1,104 1,020
Exports to U.S. FOB \4\............... 264 293 N/A
Total Imports CIF....................... 1,851 1,983 1,600
Imports from U.S. CIF \4\............. 443 626 N/A
Trade Balance........................... -685 -879 -580
Balance with U.S.\4\.................. -179 -333 N/A
Current Account Deficit/GDP............. -9.0 -9.9 -7.0
External Public Debt.................... 4,600 4,800 4,600
Debt Service Payments/GDP (pct)......... 4.1 4.2 3.6
Fiscal Deficit/GDP (pct)................ 3.3 4.2 4.0
Gold and Foreign Exchange Reserves...... 1,189 1,193 1,280
Aid from U.S.\4\........................ 120 112 114
Aid from All Other Sources \5\.......... 530 468 410
------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ UDAPE, National Institute of Statistics (INE), Central Bank of
Bolivia and embassy projection.
\2\ For urban areas; data does not consider underemployment.
\3\ Include National Currency Deposits indexed to U.S Dollar and U.S
Dollar Deposits
\4\ Sources: U.S. Census Bureau and embassy estimates.
\5\ Aid obligated.
\6\ 1999 figures are yearly projections based on eight or nine-month
data.
1. General Policy Framework
Seventeen years after its return to democracy, Bolivia continues to
consolidate a series of structural reforms that further orient the
economy to the demands of the market and encourage greater efficiency
by exposing it to increasing international competition. Parallel
reforms in the judicial system promise to create a more reliable rule
of law in the coming years.
The foundation of this new economic system was the
``capitalization''/privatization of five large state-owned corporations
and the establishment of a regulatory system to monitor the functioning
key sectors. The capitalization program has succeeded in promoting
steady rates of growth of private investment and savings, principally
from the United States and in the hydrocarbons sector. This investment
portends enhanced prospects for economic growth in the coming years.
The government projects that the economy will grow by 2 percent in
1999, with inflation in consumer prices dropping to about 2.5 percent.
Macroeconomic indicators have improved steadily since the
government undertook stabilization and structural reforms in the mid-
1980s. Commercial bank deposits have more than doubled since 1991, to
over $4.4 billion (October 1999). Persistent trade deficits since 1991
have been offset by large inflows of foreign assistance and private
investment, allowing official foreign exchange reserves to grow to a
record $1.1 billion (December 1998), decreasing slightly to $945
million (August 1999). Net reserves are more than seven months of
imports. Despite continuing improvements in tax collection, the budget
deficit for the non-financial public sector increased to 3.3 percent in
1997, and to 4.1 percent in 1998, largely as a result of pension
reform. This figure is expected to remain level through 1999.
The money supply (M1) has grown steadily since 1991, with M1 now
averaging around 11 percent of GDP. Total liquidity represents
approximately 43 percent of the GDP. M2 has decreased significantly
since 1996 reaching negative levels during the first nine months of
1999. The published figures for money in circulation are misleading,
however, since there are billions of U.S. dollars in circulation side-
by-side with the local currency, the Boliviano. Dollars are a legal
means of exchange, and contracts can be written in dollars. Banks offer
dollar accounts and make loans in dollars. In fact, at the end of
August 1999 nearly 94 percent of the $4.4 billion of deposits in the
Bolivian financial system was denominated in dollars.
Low rates of inflation at home and abroad have helped to lower
interest rates. In October 1999 the average rate paid on dollar
deposits was approximately 7.1 percent, and the average rate charged on
dollar loans was 18.5 percent. Increased bank competition and new
foreign investment in the sector will likely cut financial spreads,
making credit still cheaper in the near-term. However, larger financial
spreads during 1999 result from a very restricted monetary policy and
international financial crises.
2. Exchange Rate Policy
There are no restrictions on convertibility or remittances. The
official exchange rate is set by a daily auction of dollars managed by
the central bank. Through this mechanism the central bank has allowed
the Boliviano to depreciate slowly to preserve its purchasing power
parity. The rate in the parallel market closely tracks the official
exchange rate. The official exchange rate fell with respect to the
dollar by 4.8 percent in 1996, 3.3 percent in 1997, 4 percent in 1998,
and by 5.8 percent through the end of October 1999.
3. Structural Policies
A variety of laws have liberalized the economy significantly since
the sea change seen in Bolivia's economic policies in the mid-1980s. In
1990 the government simplified tariffs to 5 percent for capital goods
and 10 percent for all other imports. The government charges a 13
percent value-added tax and 3 percent transaction tax, whether imported
or produced domestically. There are also excise taxes charged on some
consumer products. No import permits are required, except for the
import of arms and pharmaceutical products.
The 1990 Investment Law guarantees inter alia the free remission of
profits, the freedom to set prices and full convertibility of currency.
It essentially guarantees national treatment for foreign investors and
authorizes international arbitration. An Arbitration Law was enacted on
March 11, 1997.
The 1996 Hydrocarbons Law authorized YPFB (the petroleum
parastatal) to enter into joint ventures with private firms and to
contract companies to take over YPFB fields and operations, including
refining and transportation. A subsequent law deregulated hydrocarbon
prices, establishing international prices as their benchmarks. A recent
Mining Law taxed profits and opened up border areas to foreign
investors so long as Bolivian partners hold the mining concession. Most
mining taxes can be credited against U.S. taxes.
Subsequent to the enactment of a new Banking Law, the government
enacted a new financial law in 1998--the Law of Property and Popular
Credit--which changed the institutional set-up of the financial
regulatory bodies. It also provided for improved prudential regulation
for all types of financial institutions and promoted stability in the
financial system while also inducing greater competition and
efficiency.
4. Debt Management Policies
The Bolivian Government owes about $4.2 billion to foreign
creditors (end-August 1999). Two-thirds of this amount is owed to
international financial institutions (principally the Inter-American
Development Bank, the World Bank and the International Development
Agency of the World Bank); almost one-third is owed to foreign
governments, and less than 0.8 percent is owed to private banks.
Bilateral debt payments have been rescheduled six times by the Paris
Club, and several foreign governments have forgiven substantial amounts
of the bilateral debt unilaterally. In 1998 Bolivia entered into the
Highly Indebted Poor Country (HIPC) program, which will reduce this
stock by approximately $460 million in present value terms over the
life of the agreement. The Consultative Group in 1999 approved an
additional $960 million in debt relief for Bolivia. Also, Bolivia is
eligible for further debt relief under HIPC II.
5. Significant Barriers to U.S. Exports
There are no significant barriers to U.S. exports to Bolivia. The
Bolivian Export Law prohibited the import of products that might affect
the preservation of wildlife, particularly nuclear waste. Bolivia
became a member of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in September
1995.
The Investment Law essentially guarantees national treatment for
foreign investors. The one real barrier to direct investment--a
prohibition on foreigners holding mining concessions within 50
kilometers of the border--is applied uniformly to all foreign
investors. Bolivians with mining concessions near the border, however,
may have foreign partners as long as the partners are not from the
country adjacent to that portion of the border, except if authorized by
law. In 1999 the Government of Bolivia enacted a law called LEY
CORAZON, that establishes 11 telecommunications, energy and
transportation corridors within 50 kilometers of the border within
which foreign investors are allowed to develop projects. There are no
limitations on foreign equity participation.
The governments of the United States and Bolivia signed a Bilateral
Investment Treaty during the Summit of the Americas in Santiago in
April 1998. It will come into effect after the U.S. Senate ratifies it.
6. Export Subsidies Policies
The government does not directly subsidize exports. The 1993 Export
Law replaced a former drawback program with one in which the government
grants rebates of all domestic taxes paid on the production of items
later exported.
7. Protection of U.S. Intellectual Property
Bolivia belongs to the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the World
Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO). It is also a signatory to
the Paris Convention, Berne Convention, Rome Convention, and the
Nairobi Treaty. In 1999 the U.S. Trade Representative placed Bolivia on
the ``Special 301'' Watch List.
Weak enforcement of existing laws has done little to discourage
piracy in Bolivia. However, there have been some recent positive
developments: in 1997 the government created the National Intellectual
Property Service that for the first time will unify the administration
of patents, trademarks, copyrights, and other intellectual property.
Earlier, the government enacted a Copyright Law (1992) that, with some
key changes enacted this year in Bolivia's Code of Criminal Procedure
(which will take effect in March 2001), should create the proper legal
environment to promote IPR protection. The government has proposed a
draft Intellectual Property Law that it claims will bring Bolivia's
protection for IPR up to the standards specified in the WTO TRIPs
Agreement. However, there is doubt whether the current draft law is
fully TRIPs compliant. Creating awareness in the judiciary and among
the public of the rights of IPR holders is another formidable challenge
facing the National Intellectual Property Service. According to a 1998
study by the Business Software Alliance and the Software and
Information Industry Association, Bolivia has the highest rate of
software piracy in Latin America with an estimated 87 percent of all
software sold in the country of illegal origin.
8. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association: Workers may form and join
organizations of their choosing. The Labor Code requires prior
governmental authorization to establish a union, permits only one union
per enterprise and allows the government to dissolve unions; the code,
however, has not been strictly enforced in recent years. While the code
denies civil servants the right to organize and bans strikes in public
services, nearly all civilian government workers are unionized. Workers
are not penalized for union activities.
In theory, the Bolivian Labor Federation (COB) represents virtually
the entire work force; in fact, approximately one-half of the workers
in the formal economy--or about 15 percent of all workers--belong to
labor unions. Some members of the informal economy also participate in
labor organizations. Workers in the private sector frequently exercise
the right to strike. Solidarity strikes are illegal, but the government
does not prosecute those responsible, nor does it impose penalties.
The COB's numerous strikes to protest the government's economic
reforms are generally receiving decreased support. The COB
demonstrations that habitually have disrupted public order in major
cities--which decreased during 1997 and 1998--have resurfaced in the
second half of 1999, probably due to the municipal elections in
December. The leadership of the urban teachers' union--the most
aggressive affiliate within the COB--has conducted several strikes
lasting days in opposition to the government's ongoing efforts at
educational reform. A teachers' strike in February 1999 shut down the
public schools for almost the entire month.
Unions are not free from influence by political parties. Most
parties have labor committees that try to sway union activity, causing
fierce political battles within unions. Most unions also have party
activists as members.
The Labor Code allows unions to join international labor
organizations. The COB became an affiliate of the formerly Soviet-
dominated World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU) in 1988.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively: Workers may
organize and bargain collectively. Collective bargaining (voluntary
direct negotiations between unions and employers without participation
of the government) is limited.
The COB contends that it still is the exclusive representative of
all Bolivian workers. Consultations between government representatives
and COB leaders are common but have little effect on wages or working
conditions. Major structural reforms have further eroded the COB's
legitimacy as the sole labor representative. Private employers may use
public sector settlements as guidelines for their own adjustments and
in fact often exceed them. These adjustments, however, usually result
from unilateral management decisions or from talks between management
and employee groups at the local shop level, without regard to the COB.
The law prohibits discrimination against union members and
organizers. Complaints go to the National Labor Court, which can take a
year or more to rule. Union leaders say problems are often moot by the
time the court rules. Labor law and practice in the seven special free
trade zones are the same as in the rest of Bolivia.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor: The law prohibits
forced or compulsory labor. Reported violations were the unregulated
apprenticeship of children, agricultural servitude by indigenous
workers and some individual cases of household workers effectively
imprisoned by their employers.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children: The Code prohibits
employment of persons under 18 years of age in dangerous, unhealthy or
immoral work. It permits apprenticeship for those 12 to 14 years of
age; it is ambiguous, however, on conditions of employment for minors
aged 14 to 17, a practice which has been criticized by the
International Labor Organization. Urban children hawk goods, shine
shoes and assist transport operators; rural children often work with
parents from an early age. Children are not generally employed in
factories or formal businesses; when so employed, however, they often
work the same hours as adults. Responsibility for enforcing child labor
provisions resides in the Labor Ministry, but they generally are not
enforced.
The past two governments attempted to revise the Labor Code but
desisted in the face of COB opposition. The present government is
obliged to legislate reforms to the Code--including greater labor
flexibility--under the terms of the HIPC, but has yet to do so.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work: The law establishes a minimum
wage of Bs 330 per month (approximately $56), bonuses and fringe
benefits. The minimum wage does not provide a decent standard of
living, and most workers earn more. Its economic importance resides in
the fact that certain benefit calculations are pegged to it. The
minimum wage does not cover members of the informal sector who
constitute the majority of the urban workforce, nor does it cover
farmers, some 30 percent of the working population.
Only half the urban labor force enjoys an 8-hour workday and a
workweek of 5 or 5\1/2\ days, because the maximum workweek of
44 hours is not enforced. The Labor Ministry's Bureau of Occupational
Safety has responsibility for protection of workers' health and safety,
but relevant standards are poorly enforced; work conditions in the
mining sector are particularly bad.
f. Rights in Sectors with U.S. Investment: The majority of U.S.
investment is in the sectors of hydrocarbons, power generation and
mining. The rights of workers in these sectors are the same as in other
sectors. Conditions and salaries for workers in the hydrocarbons sector
are generally better than in other industries because of stronger labor
unions in that industry.
Extent of U.S. Investment in Selected Industries--U.S. Direct Investment Position Abroad on an Historical Cost
Basis--1998
[Millions of U.S. Dollars]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Category Amount
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Petroleum...................... .............. 109
Total Manufacturing............ .............. (\2\)
Food & Kindred Products...... 0 ...............................................................
Chemicals & Allied Products.. 0 ...............................................................
Primary & Fabricated Metals.. 0 ...............................................................
Industrial Machinery and 0 ...............................................................
Equipment.
Electric & Electronic 0 ...............................................................
Equipment.
Transportation Equipment..... 0 ...............................................................
Other Manufacturing.......... (\2\) ...............................................................
Wholesale Trade................ .............. (\1\)
Banking........................ .............. (\1\)
Finance/Insurance/Real Estate.. .............. 0
Services....................... .............. (\1\)
Other Industries............... .............. 182
TOTAL ALL INDUSTRIES........... .............. 328
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Suppressed to avoid disclosing data of individual companies.
\2\ Less than $500,000 (+/-).
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis.
______
BRAZIL
Key Economic Indicators
[Billions of U.S. Dollars unless otherwise indicated]
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1997 1998 \1\ 1999
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Income, Production and Employment:
Nominal GDP \2\......................... 802 775 560
Real GDP Growth (pct) \3\............... 3.6 -0.1 0.0
GDP By Sector (pct):
Agriculture........................... -0.2 0.0 N/A
Industry.............................. 3.7 5.5 0.05
Services.............................. 1.9 2.0 0.97
Per Capita GDP (US$) \4\................ 5,000 4,800 3,800
Labor Force (millions).................. 75.6 77.1 78.6
Unemployment Rate (pct)................. 5.7 7.6 8.0
Money and Prices (annual percentage
growth):
Money Supply (M2)....................... 21.4 24.4 23.0
Consumer Price Index \5\................ 4.3 2.5 8.0
Exchange Rate (R/US$ annual average)
Commercial............................ 1.08 1.15 1.85
Balance of Payments and Trade:
Total Exports FOB \6\................... 53.0 51.1 48.0
Exports to U.S.\6\.................... 9.4 9.8 10.8
Total Imports FOB \6\................... 61.4 57.7 49.0
Imports from U.S.\6\.................. 14. 13.7 11.8
Trade Balance \6\....................... -8.4 -6.6 -1.0
Balance with U.S.\6\.................. -4.9 -3.9 -1.0
Fiscal Deficit/GDP (pct)
Nominal............................... 6.1 8.0 11.0
Primary (inflation adjusted).......... 0.9 0.0 3.4
Current Account Deficit/GDP (pct)....... 4.16 4.33 4.2
External Public Debt \7\................ 80.0 90.6 99.3
Debt Service/GDP (pct).................. 1.3 1.5 2.4
Gold and Foreign Exchange
Reserves (int'l liquidity).............. 52.2 44.6 37.6
Aid from U.S. (US$ millions) \8\........ 12.9 10.9 13.9
Aid from Other Countries................ N/A N/A N/A
------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Estimates except where noted.
\2\ GDP at market prices.
\3\ Percentage changes calculated in local currency.
\4\ At current prices.
\5\ Source: INPC (National CPI).
\6\ Merchandise trade; Source: Ministry of Industry, Commerce and
Tourism (MICT). Trade totals are preliminary for entire year. U.S.
totals are extrapolated from January-September data.
\7\ Non-financial public sector (excludes Petrobras and CVRD); 1998
figure is July balance.
\8\ USAID only.
1. General Policy Framework
Brazil's economic stabilization program known as the Real Plan
brought down inflation, dramatically reduced the role of the state in
the economy, initiated market opening, and encouraged greater private
sector investment to achieve sustainable long-term growth. Since the
July 1994 introduction of a new currency, the Real, national consumer
price inflation has dropped from a monthly average of 50 percent in the
first half of 1994 to 2.5 percent in all of 1998. With the rapid
devaluation of the currency in 1999, inflationary pressures
strengthened and consumer prices rose 6 percent in the 12 months to
September 1999. Under the Real Plan, Brazil relied heavily on tight
monetary policy to maintain an overvalued currency while attracting
sufficient foreign capital to finance its growing external imbalance.
The strong currency and market-opening measures increased competition
for domestic firms and encouraged industrial modernization.
The Russian devaluation and default in August 1998 produced a
crisis of confidence in emerging markets in general and Brazil in
particular and set in motion events which culminated in Brazil's abrupt
switch to a floating rate foreign exchange system in January 1999. The
change was marked by initial reliance on extremely high real interest
rates to stem capital outflow and help stabilize the currency. In the
government's view, long term economic stabilization with improved real
growth depends on fiscal stringency, use of monetary policy to fight
inflation, and further progress on structural fiscal reforms. In
particular, Brazil must continue to attain the fiscal and monetary
targets set in consultation with the International Monetary Fund as the
precondition for disbursement of a US$ 41.5 billion assistance package
and to convince the markets that the country is on the right track.
Brazil's privatization program has been the biggest in the world during
the 90's and represented a major accomplishment for the first Cardoso
administration. However, progress on other needed structural reforms
remained slow and the country did not pass its first such reform
measure, the constitutional amendment providing for changes in the
civil service system, until February 1998. Brazil has made further
progress on reform since then including approving part of a needed
massive social security overhaul. However, much remains to be done.
Greater availability of credit, higher real incomes due to price
stabilization, and a May 1995 hike in the minimum wage freed pent-up
consumer demand and ignited a consumption boom in 1994/95 that ended in
mid-1997. Lower trade barriers, pent-up import demand, and a strong
currency prompted an initial surge in imports, which grew almost 150
percent from 1993 to 1997. Imports fell almost 7 percent in 1998 due to
a growth slowdown and declined a further 17 percent in the first nine
months of 1999 as the currency depreciated and domestic demand
stagnated. In contrast, exports were up just over a third from 1994 to
1997 before falling almost 4 percent in 1998. Despite the approximately
40 percent depreciation of the Real against the dollar in 1999, a
combination of factors inhibited export growth and overseas sales fell
11 percent in the first three quarters of the year.
Due to the impact of the global financial crisis and the tight
monetary policy adopted in response to it, the economy shrank by 0.1
percent in 1998 and growth will be flat in 1999. Concerned about a
widening current account deficit, which reached 4.2 percent of GDP in
1997 and 4.3 percent of GDP in 1998, the government began to adopt
measures in 1997 aimed at discouraging imports and encouraging exports.
These included imposing restrictions on short-term import finance and
consumer credit, expanding the official export credit program,
eliminating tariff exemptions for a long list of capital goods,
adoption of a customs valuation table, increasing import documentation
requirements, and tightening standards and enforcement. Even so, access
to Brazilian markets in most sectors is generally good. Most sectors
are characterized by competition and participation by foreign firms
through imports, local production and joint ventures. The import
finance restriction was effectively ended in March 1999 and completely
rescinded in October.
In December 1995 Brazil implemented a complex automotive products
import regime. The regime expires in 1999 and will be replaced by an
as-yet-undefined MERCOSUR regime in the year 2000.
Brazil and its MERCOSUR partners, Argentina, Paraguay and Uruguay,
implemented the MERCOSUR Common External Tariff (CET) on January 1,
1995. The CET currently covers approximately 85 percent of 9,000 tariff
items; the CET will cover most of the remaining 15 percent by 2001, and
all will be covered by 2006. CET levels range between zero and 23
percent. With the exception of tariffs on computers, some capital
goods, and products included on Brazil's national list of exceptions to
the CET (such as shoes, automobiles and consumer electronics), the
maximum Brazilian tariff is now 23 percent; the most commonly applied
tariff is 17 percent. MERCOSUR is now negotiating free trade agreements
with its South American neighbors. Chile and Bolivia became associate
members of Mercosur in October 1996, and negotiations with the Andean
Community began in November 1996. On January 1, 1999, Argentina and
Brazil took further steps towards a common market, by reducing tariffs
on a list of 224 Argentine products and 32 Brazilian products to zero.
The Brazilian Congress ratified the GATT Uruguay Round Agreements
in December 1994 and Brazil became a founding member of the WTO.
2. Exchange Rate Policy
Brazil effectively ended the former dual exchange rate market
(commercial and tourist (or floating) with the switch to a floating
rate foreign exchange regime in early 1999. There is also an informal
parallel market but volumes are small. The Government has signaled its
intention to move to a fully convertible currency, both for current and
capital account transactions, as early as the first half of 2000.
When introduced in July 1994, the real was pegged at parity with
the U.S. Dollar but quickly appreciated. The Central Bank established a
new system of trading bands in March 1995 and subsequently devalued
very gradually, first within the bands and then by adjusting the bands
upward. The bank formerly pursued a so-called ``crawling peg'' policy
of nominal depreciation of the real against the dollar at a rate of
about 7.5 percent per year. With a steady decline in international
reserves following the Russian Crisis, the country was forced to
devalue in January 1999 and switched to a floating rate system with
Central Bank intervention only to contain volatility.
3. Structural Policies
Although some administrative improvements have been made in recent
years, the Brazilian legal and regulatory system is far from
transparent. The government has historically exercised considerable
control over private business through extensive and frequently changing
regulations. As part of its efforts to keep inflation down, the
government has in the past frozen public utility rates.
Brazil accelerated the privatization program initiated in 1990 to
reduce the size of the government and improve public sector fiscal
balances and revenues peaked in 1997-98. Steel companies and most
petrochemical companies owned by the government, the main exception
being Petrobras, have already been privatized. The majority of voting
shares in mining conglomerate Companhia Vale do Rio Doce (CVRD) was
sold to the private sector in May 1997 and Telebras was split into 12
firms and privatized in July 1998. Several electric utilities have been
privatized and so-called ``Band B'' cellular telephone concessions
covering the whole country were sold in 1997 and 1998. The Rio de
Janeiro State bank, Banerj, was sold to the private sector and Sao
Paulo state bank Banespa is scheduled to be sold in 2000. Until July
1999, Brazil realized $71 billion in direct sales revenues and a
further $17 billion in retirement of public sector debt. The power and
telecom sectors have each accounted for a third of total privatization
proceeds to date.
Brazil's tax system is extremely complex, with a wide range of
income, consumption, and payroll taxes levied at the federal, state and
municipal levels. Because of difficulties in passing comprehensive tax
reform through Congress, the government has focused on limited
revisions by executive order. In late 1995, it passed revisions to the
corporate and individual income tax regimes. In 1996, it exempted
exports and capital purchases from the state-collected value added tax
and announced a single tax on the gross receipts of small and medium
enterprises. While the overall objective remains simplification, the
government imposed an additional tax on financial transactions for a
two-year period beginning in 1997 to finance the health system. The
government has announced plans to transform the current system into one
where a value-added tax, state and city sales taxes, and a selective
excise tax would replace the current system of multiple taxation. The
proposal is strongly advocated by Brazil's private sector and made
progress in the Congress in 1999.
4. Debt Management Policies
Brazil's total external debt by the end of 1998 was $235 billion,
of which 38.5 percent was due to the public sector (excluding
Petrobras) and the remainder to the private sector. Total external debt
rose 17 percent in the year. External public sector debt rose
absolutely but fell as a share of the total. Debt service represented
2.0 percent of Brazil's Gross Domestic Product and 30.9 percent of
merchandise exports. Brazil concluded a commercial debt rescheduling
agreement (without an IMF standby program) in April 1994 after twelve
years of negotiations and has fully complied with the commitments made
in this agreement. Until the global financial crisis erupted in mid-
1998, the terms of Brazilian debt obligations had lengthened and
spreads narrowed on both public and private sector external debts. In
November 1998, Brazil negotiated a $41.5 billion assistance program
with the IMF and renegotiated the agreement in March 1999 following the
decision to float the currency. Perceptions of Brazil risk and thus
availability of foreign funding depends on progress on the fiscal
stabilization program announced by the government in October 1998 as
well as on compliance with fiscal and monetary performance targets set
in conjunction with the IMF. In July 1999, Brazil adopted a so-called
inflation targeting policy framework that relies on monetary policy to
achieve target ranges of inflation. As of November 1999, Brazil was in
compliance with all IMF targets and will meet its inflation objective
for this year. In December 1999, Brazil and the IMF concluded an
agreement on revised targets for the year 2000.
5. Significant Barriers to U.S. Exports
Import Licenses: The Secretariat of Foreign Trade implemented a
computerized trade documentation system (SISCOMEX) in early 1997 to
handle import licensing. Licenses for many products were to be issued
automatically. However, an increasing number of products have been
exempt from automatic licensing. In addition, Brazil has placed certain
limitations and requirements on products subject to non-automatic
licenses. Such measures have been characterized by Brazil as a
``deepening'' of the existing import licensing regime and as part of a
larger strategy to prevent under-invoicing. However, the reported use
of minimum price lists raises questions about whether Brazil's regime
is consistent with its obligations under the WTO Agreement on Customs
Valuation. On Friday, December 17, 1999, the U.S. requested WTO dispute
settlement consultations with Brazil over the reference price issue.
Earlier, the United States acted as an interested third party in WTO
dispute settlement negotiations on this issue brought by the European
Union.
Agricultural Barriers: While progress has been made in the area of
fruit and vegetable regulations between the United States and Brazil,
sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) measures remain significant barriers
in many cases as Brazil implements more and more regulations due to
regional harmonization of such regulations. In November 1998, the U.S.
and Brazil agreed on a protocol which allows the U.S. to comply with
Brazilian phytosanitary requirements on Hard Red Winter (HRW) wheat,
resolving a large portion of the largest bilateral phytosanitary issue
with Brazil. However, the U.S. government continues to press for the
entry of other kinds of U.S. wheat into Brazil.
Brazil prohibits the entry of poultry and poultry products from the
United States, alleging lack of reciprocity. Brazil had previously
granted conditional approval for U.S. poultry exports, which was
withdrawn when the United States could not grant Brazil an exception to
the standard U.S. approval process. Following the lead of the European
Union, Brazil prohibits the importation of beef treated with anabolics;
however, beef imports from the United States have been allowed on a
waiver basis since 1991. In October 1995, Brazil prohibited the
importation of live sheep from the United States due to scrapie (a
sheep disease).
Services Barriers: Restrictive investment laws, lack of
administrative transparency, legal and administrative restrictions on
remittances, and arbitrary application of regulations and laws limit
U.S. service exports to Brazil. In some areas, such as construction
engineering, foreign companies are prevented from providing technical
services in government procurement contracts unless Brazilian firms are
unable to perform them. Restrictions exist on the use of foreign
produced advertising materials.
Many service trade possibilities, in particular services in the oil
and mining industries, have been restricted by limitations on foreign
capital under the 1988 Constitution. Unless approved under specific
conditions, foreign financial institutions are restricted from entering
Brazil or expanding pre-1988 operations. The Brazilian Congress
approved five constitutional amendments in 1995 that eliminated the
constitutional distinction between national and foreign capital; opened
the state telecommunications, petroleum and natural gas distribution
monopolies to private (including foreign) participation; and permitted
foreign participation in coastal and inland shipping. However, the
degree to which these sectors are actually opened will depend on
implementing legislation. Legislation permitting the licensing of
private cellular phone networks to compete with existing parastatal
monopolies was passed in May 1996, but it requires majority (51
percent) Brazilian ownership of eligible companies.
Foreign legal, accounting, tax preparation, management consulting,
architectural, engineering, and construction industries are hindered by
various barriers. These include forced local partnerships, limits on
foreign directorships and non-transparent registration procedures.
The U.S. and Brazil signed in early October, 1999, a newly-revised
bilateral Maritime Agreement, effectively ending a period of tension
generated over misunderstandings relating to preferences afforded to
selected classes of cargo. The new agreement must still be ratified by
the Brazilian Congress.
Foreign participation in the insurance industry has responded
positively to market-opening measures adopted in 1996. However,
problems remain with market reserves for Brazilian firms in areas such
as import insurance and the requirement that state enterprises purchase
insurance only from Brazilian-owned firms. In June 1996, the government
legally ended the state's monopoly on reinsurance, but the monopoly has
yet to end in practice and its persistence is keeping costs high for
insurers, both domestic and foreign. The monopoly Brazil Reinsurance
Institute is scheduled for privatization in 2000. U.S. and other
foreign reinsurers have expressed concern with proposed regulations
regarding the reinsurance market following the sale.
Investment Barriers: Various prohibitions restrict foreign
investment in internal transportation, public utilities, media,
shipping, and other ``strategic industries.'' In other sectors, Brazil
limits foreign equity participation, imposes local content requirements
and links incentives to export performance. For example, there are
equity limitations, local content requirements, and incentive-based
export performance requirements in the computer and digital electronics
sector. In the auto sector, local content and incentive-based export
performance requirements were introduced in 1995, but should expire in
December 1999. Brazil is currently engaged in negotiations with its
MERCOSUR partners to develop a common MERCOSUR auto regime by that
date.
Brazil's Congress passed constitutional amendments permitting
foreign majority participation in direct mining operations, but actual
changes will not occur until the 1995 constitutional amendments are
implemented through follow-up legislation. In August 1995, the
government introduced a measure that permits foreign financial
institutions to open new branches or to increase their ownership
participation in Brazilian financial institutions. However, foreign
ownership of land in rural areas and adjacent to national borders
remains prohibited under law number 6634. A 1997 law allows for the
state-owned oil company Petrobras, to take a minority stake in oil
ventures, something previously prohibited. Despite investment
restrictions, U.S. and other foreign firms have major investments in
Brazil, with the U.S. investment stake more than doubling from 1994 to
1998.
Government Procurement: Brazil is not a signatory to the WTO
Government Procurement Agreement. Federal, state and municipal
governments, as well as related agencies and companies, follow a ``buy
national'' policy and rules unfairly permit the government to provide
foreign companies with production facilities in Brazil preferential
treatment in government procurement decisions. However, Brazil permits
foreign companies to compete in any procurement related to multilateral
development bank loans and opens selected procurements to international
tenders. Given the significant influence of the state-controlled
sector, discriminatory procurement policies are a relatively
substantial barrier to U.S. exports in Brazil's market, though the
privatization of Telebras effectively removes the telecommunications
sector from being subject to the procurement laws. To the extent that
the privatization program in Brazil continues and non-discriminatory
policies are adopted, U.S. firms will have greater opportunities in
Brazil.
Law Number 8666 of 1993, covering most government procurement
(except informatics and telecommunications), requires nondiscriminatory
treatment for all bidders, regardless of nationality or origin of
product or service. However, the law's implementing regulations allow
consideration of non-price factors, give preferences to
telecommunications, computer, and digital electronics goods produced in
Brazil, and condition eligibility for fiscal benefits on local content
requirements. In March 1994, the government issued Decree 1070, which
requires federal and parastatal entities to give preference to locally
produced computer and telecommunications products and services based on
a complicated and nontransparent price/technology matrix. Bidders that
meet one or more of the criteria for preferential treatment are allowed
a price differential of up to 12 percent over other bidders.
6. Export Subsidies Policies
In general, the government does not provide direct subsidies to
exporters, but does offer a variety of tax and tariff incentives to
encourage export production and encourage the use of Brazilian inputs
in exported products. Incentives include tax and tariff exemptions for
equipment and materials imported for the production of goods for
export, excise and sales tax exemptions on exported products, and
excise tax rebates on materials used in the manufacture of export
products. Exporters enjoy exemption from withholding tax for
remittances overseas for loan payments and marketing, and from the
financial operations tax for deposit receipts on export products.
Excise and sales tax exemptions have now been extended to agricultural
and semi-manufactured export products as well as to manufactured
products. Exporters are also eligible for a rebate on social
contribution taxes paid on locally acquired production inputs.
An export credit program, known as PROEX, was established in 1991.
PROEX is intended to equalize domestic and international interest rates
for export financing. Revisions to the program were announced in 1998.
In 1998, $1.4 billion was budgeted for PROEX with $903 million slated
for equalization and $500 million for direct financing. However, only
$616 million was actually spend last year on equalization, while $210
million went to financing. Historically, PROEX never used more than 30
percent of its allocated budget, but in 1998 utilized over 50 percent
of its allocated resources for the first time.
7. Protection of U.S. Intellectual Property
Brazil belongs to the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the World
Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO). It is also a signatory to
the Paris Convention, Berne Convention, Madrid Agreement, Rome
Convention, Patent Cooperation Treaty, Strasbourg Agreement, Phonograms
Convention, Nairobi Treaty, Film Register Treaty, and the Universal
Copyright Convention. In 1999, the U.S. Trade Representative placed
Brazil back on the ``Special 301'' Watch List primarily as a result of
serious concerns regarding copyright enforcement. Although Brazil has
made progress toward improved protection for intellectual property
rights, it must take further significant steps to combat piracy.
In the past three years, Brazil has passed revised copyright,
software, patent, and trademark legislation. Brazil's new Industrial
Property Law took effect in May 1997, bringing most respects of
Brazil's patent and trademark regime up to the standards specified in
the WTO TRIPs Agreement. However, the new law also includes compulsory
licensing and local working provisions that appear to be TRIPs-
inconsistent.
Patents: The new Industrial Property Law provides patent protection
for chemical and pharmaceutical substances, chemical compounds, and
processed food products not patentable under Brazil's 1971 law, and
provides patent protection for genetically altered micro-organisms. The
law also extends the term for product patents from 15 to 20 years, and
provides ``pipeline'' protection for pharmaceutical products patented
in other countries but not yet placed on the market. The large backlog
of pipeline patents are being processed, although slowly. In April
1997, a Plant Variety Law was passed that provides protection to
producers of new varieties of seeds.
Trade Secrets: The new Industrial Property Law specifically allows
criminal prosecution for revealing trade secrets of patented items,
with a penalty of imprisonment for three months to a year or a fine.
The regulations as written are narrower than the TRIPs Agreement.
However, the government argues that since it incorporated Article 39 of
the Agreement into law when the Uruguay Round agreements were ratified,
in effect it provides a level of protection consistent with the TRIPs
Agreement.
Trademarks: The new Industrial Property Law improves Brazil's
trademark laws, providing better protection for internationally known
trademarks. Trademark licensing agreements must be registered with the
National Institute of Industrial Property to be enforceable. However,
failure to register licensing agreements will no longer result in
cancellation of trademark registration for non-use.
Copyrights: In February 1998, in an effort to raise Brazil's
copyright protection to the level of the TRIPs Agreement, President
Cardoso signed a new copyright law that generally conforms to
international standards. Enforcement, however, remains a problem.
Semiconductor Chip Layout Design: In April 1996, a bill to protect
layout designs of integrated circuits was introduced.
8. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association: Unions are free to organize in Brazil.
Virtually all workers (except for the military, the military police and
firemen) have the right to representation. The only significant
limitation is unicidade (literally one per
city''), which restricts representation for any professional category
to one union in a given geographical area. Both the government and the
major labor confederations have argued in favor of removing this
restriction, so it may be removed within the next year. Otherwise,
unions remain independent of the government and the political parties.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively: The Constitution
provides for the right to organize, and virtually all enterprises of
any size have unions. With government assistance, businesses and unions
are working to expand and improve mechanisms of collective bargaining.
For now, however, many issues normally resolved by collective
bargaining come under the purview of Brazil's labor courts, which have
the power to intervene in wage bargaining and impose settlements.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor: Although the
Constitution prohibits forced labor, credible sources continue to
report cases of forced labor in Brazil. The Catholic Church's Pastoral
Land Commission (CPT) has documented cases of forced labor in some
states, although the CPT reported that the total number of incidents
has declined per year through 1998. Forced labor continues on farms
producing charcoal for use in the iron and steel industries, and on
sugar plantations. The federal government has created a task force,
comprising five different ministries, to combat forced labor, and the
Ministry of Labor has augmented the task force with mobile inspection
teams. These have efforts have improved the situation considerably,
though all concerned concede that forced labor continues to be a
problem.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children: The Brazilian
Constitution prohibits work by children under the age of 14. Despite
this prohibition, the Ministry of Labor estimates that nearly three
million children in the age category 10 to 14 years work. Sectors that
have child labor include charcoal production, sugar cultivation, citrus
fruit plantations, hemp growing, and mining and logging, among others.
A coalition of government agencies and NGOs have made effective efforts
to limit child labor, notably through the implementation of
``scholarships'' for families who keep their children in school. The
problem, however, persists.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work: Brazil has a minimum wage of
approximately 75 dollars (136 reais) a month. Many workers,
particularly those outside the regulated economy and in the
northeastern part of Brazil, reportedly earn less than the minimum
wage. The 1988 Constitution limits the workweek to 44 hours and
specifies a weekly rest period of 24 consecutive hours, preferably on
Sundays. The Constitution expanded pay and fringe benefits and
established new protections for agricultural and domestic workers,
though not all provisions are enforced. All workers in the formal
sector receive overtime pay for work beyond 44 hours and there are
prohibitions against excessive use of overtime. Unsafe working
conditions exist throughout Brazil, though Brazilian occupational
health and safety standards are consistent with international norms.
The Ministry of Labor, responsible for monitoring working conditions,
has insufficient resources for adequate inspection and enforcement of
these standards.
f. Rights in Sectors with U.S. Investment: U.S. multinationals have
invested in virtually all the productive sectors in Brazil. Nearly all
of the Fortune 500 companies are represented in Brazil. In U.S.-linked
enterprises, conditions usually do not differ significantly from the
best Brazilian companies; at most U.S. multinationals, conditions are
considerably better than the average.
Extent of U.S. Investment in Selected Industries--U.S. Direct Investment Position Abroad on an Historical Cost
Basis--1998
[Millions of U.S. Dollars]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Category Amount
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Petroleum...................... .............. 1,825
Total Manufacturing............ .............. 22,292
Food & Kindred Products...... 2,472 ...............................................................
Chemicals & Allied Products.. 5,524 ...............................................................
Primary & Fabricated Metals.. 1,324 ...............................................................
Industrial Machinery and 1,463 ...............................................................
Equipment.
Electric & Electronic 2,097 ...............................................................
Equipment.
Transportation Equipment..... 3,390 ...............................................................
Other Manufacturing.......... 6,022 ...............................................................
Wholesale Trade................ .............. 508
Banking........................ .............. 1,667
Finance/Insurance/Real Estate.. .............. 4,728
Services....................... .............. 1,664
Other Industries............... .............. 5,118
TOTAL ALL INDUSTRIES........... .............. 37,802
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis.
______
CANADA
Key Economic Indicators
[Billions of U.S. Dollars unless otherwise indicated]
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1997 1998 \1\ 1999
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Income, Production, and Employment:
Nominal GDP \2\......................... 631.3 604.0 617.6
Real Growth Rate (pct).................. 4.0 3.1 3.4
GDP by Sector (pct):
Goods................................. 33 33 33
Services.............................. 67 67 67
Agriculture........................... 2 2 2
Government............................ 20 20 19
Per Capita GDP (US$).................... 20,765 19,673 20,495
Total Labor Force (000's)............... 15,354 15,632 15,346
Unemployment Rate (pct)................. 9.2 8.3 7.8
Money and Prices (annual percentage
growth):
Money Supply Growth (M2) \3\............ -1.4 1.5 1.3
Consumer Price Inflation................ 1.6 0.9 1.7
Exchange Rate: (C$/US$) \4\............. 1.3844 1.4831 1.4885
Balance of Payments and Trade:
Global Merchandise Exports.............. 217.7 217.3 231.1
Exports to U.S........................ 175.1 181.7 194.1
Global Merchandise Imports.............. 200.6 204.6 212.7
Imports from U.S...................... 152.7 157.5 163.8
Global Merchandise Trade Balance........ 17.1 12.7 18.4
Balance with U.S...................... 22.4 24.2 30.3
Current Account Balance/GDP (pct)....... 1.7 1.8 0.6
Net Public Debt \5\..................... 418.7 388.9 421.2
Debt Service/GDP (pct) \5\.............. 4.9 4.6 4.5
Federal Budget Deficit/GDP (pct)........ 0.4 0.3 0.0
Official Int'l Reserves \3\............. 18.0 23.4 26.8
Aid from U.S............................ 0 0 0
Aid from All Other Sources.............. 0 0 0
------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ 1999 data is embassy projection unless otherwise noted.
\2\ Exchange rate conversion causes nominal C$ growth to be reflected as
negative US$ growth.
\3\ Actual as of October 31, 1999.
\4\ January to October 1999 average.
\5\ Canadian Government data.
1. General Policy Framework
Canada has an affluent, high-tech industrial economy that resembles
the United States in its per capita output, market-oriented economic
system, and pattern of production. While production and services are
predominantly privately owned and operated, the federal and provincial
governments provide a broad regulatory framework and redistribute
incomes among individuals and provinces. Federal government economic
policies since the mid-1980s have emphasized the reduction of public
sector intervention in the economy and the promotion of private sector
initiative and competition. Nevertheless, government regulatory regimes
affect foreign investment, most notably U.S. firms operating in
telecommunications, broadcasting, publishing, energy, mining, and
financial services.
A consensus of forecasters has projected the Canadian economy to
grow by 3.6 percent in 1999, easing to 3.0 percent in 2000. These
projections place Canada in line with the United States to lead the
OECD in economic output in both years. In 1999, Canada's important
export sector continued to benefit from the strong U.S. economy and
from Canada's undervalued currency. At the same time, relatively low
interest rates, employment gains and fiscal stimulus from the
government sector fueled consumer spending. In 2000, Canadian economic
growth is forecast to slow in line with the U.S. economy. The impact of
slower U.S. growth will be most evident in Canada's external trade,
since almost 85 percent of Canada's exports go the United States.
Nevertheless, the Canadian economy should benefit from the ``new era''
of federal budget surpluses and improved provincial finances, as well
as the positive turnaround in the Asian economies and rising commodity
prices.
The close proximity and integrated manufacturing sectors of Canada
and the United States has resulted in the largest bilateral merchandise
trade relationship in the world. In 1998, total two-way trade in goods
and services between the U.S. and Canada was US$368 billion, or, over
US$1 billion each day. This was more than U.S. trade with the rest of
the Western Hemisphere, and only US$107 billion less than U.S. goods
and services trade with the entire 15-country European Union. The
United States and Canada also share one of the world's largest
bilateral direct investment relationships. In 1998, the stock of
Canadian foreign direct investment in the U.S. was US$75 billion. At
the same time, U.S. foreign direct investment in Canada was US$104
billion.
The United States and Canada share a 5,500-mile border. Both
governments are committed to making this border a model of cooperation
and efficiency. In 1995, President Clinton and Prime Minister Chretien
announced the Shared Border Accord, a framework for better border
management that seeks an appropriate balance between commercial
facilitation and law enforcement. Since 1997, the U.S. Immigration and
Naturalization Service has worked jointly with Citizenship and
Immigration Canada on a border vision process regarding migration
issues. On October 8, 1999, President Clinton and Prime Minister
Chretien confirmed the following guiding principles for U.S.-Canada
border cooperation: (1) to streamline, harmonize and collaborate on
border policies and management; (2) to expand cooperation to increase
efficiencies in customs, immigration, law enforcement and environmental
protection at and beyond the border; and (3) to collaborate on common
threats from outside Canada and the United States. The Canada-U.S.
Partnership Forum (CUSP), established by Secretary of State Albright
and Foreign Minister Axworthy, will work to facilitate implementation
of these principles.
The U.S.-Canada bilateral civil aviation market is the largest in
the world. As a result of the 1995 U.S.-Canada air transport agreement,
U.S. and Canadian airlines are free to decide routes, ticket prices,
and flight frequencies without government interference. Over a three-
year period, the new agreement essentially removed all restrictions on
U.S.-Canada transborder air services. By all accounts, the economic
benefits of the new agreement have been enormous: total U.S.-Canada
passenger traffic has increased by about 40 percent; fares have
decreased significantly, and over 40 new city-pairs have service for
the first time.
2. Exchange Rate Policy
The Canadian Dollar is a fully convertible currency, and exchange
rates are determined by supply and demand conditions in the exchange
market. There are no exchange control requirements imposed on export
receipts, capital receipts, or payments by residents or non-residents.
The Bank of Canada, which is the country's central bank, operates in
the exchange market on almost a daily basis to maintain orderly trading
conditions.
3. Structural Policies
The market establishes prices for most goods and services. The most
important exceptions are government services, services provided by
regulated public service monopolies, most medical services, and supply-
managed agricultural products (eggs, poultry and dairy products). The
principal sources of federal tax revenue are corporate and personal
income taxes and the goods and services tax (GST), a multi-stage seven
percent value-added tax on consumption. The personal and corporate
income tax burden, combining federal and provincial taxes and
surcharges, is significantly higher than in the United States, although
it varies by province.
4. Debt Management Policies
The Canadian federal government (GOC) recorded its second
consecutive budgetary surplus in FY1998-99 (April 1-March 31), the
first back-to-back surpluses in 47 years. Currently, the GOC projects
that even though it plans to begin multi-year tax cuts in FY2000-2001,
it will still have a cumulative budget surplus of US$65.5 billion by
the end of FY2005. In FY1998-99, Canada's net public debt was reduced
to US$393.7 billion, or 64.4 percent of GDP, an improvement from a peak
of 71.2 percent of GDP in FY1995-96. In the past few years, Canada can
take pride in experiencing a larger decline in its debt-to-GDP ratio
than any other country in the G-7. Nevertheless, Canada's debt burden
is still well above the G-7 average, ranking second highest after
Italy. This is why the federal government remains committed to ongoing
debt reduction initiatives. Such efforts will also serve to reduce
Canada's debt servicing requirements, which currently absorb 27 cents
of every government revenue dollar.
5. Significant Barriers to U.S. Exports
The U.S.-Canada trade relationship is governed by the 1989 U.S.-
Canada Free Trade Agreement (CFTA) and the 1994 North American Free
Trade Agreement (NAFTA.) While many tariffs were eliminated by January
1, 1994, non-tariff barriers at both the federal and provincial levels
continue to impede access of U.S. goods and services to Canada or
retard potential export growth. Canada maintains some restrictions on
foreign investment and content in the so-called ``cultural industries''
and related sectors, including book and magazine publishing,
broadcasting, and telecommunications. The United States objects to some
of these restrictions and closely monitors new laws and regulations
affecting these sectors.
Canada applies various restrictions to imports of supply-managed
products (dairy, eggs and poultry), as well as fresh fruit and
vegetables, potatoes, and processed horticultural products. The United
States continues to pursue these issues bilaterally. With regard to
Canada's policies on milk, the United States maintains that Canada is
providing export subsidies on dairy products without regard to its
export subsidy reduction commitments in the agreement on agriculture
(see also export subsidies policies section). The WTO appellate body
upheld a February 5, 1999 ruling that Canada's dairy export pricing
practices constitute a subsidy on milk used in products for export.
In 1997, a WTO panel supported U.S. complaints against various
Canadian measures that limited U.S. access to the Canadian publications
market. In mid-1999, Canada replaced these measures with the Foreign
Publishers Advertising Services Act, which would have made it a
criminal offense, punishable by fines, for foreign-based publishers to
supply advertising services directed at the Canadian market. Under an
agreement negotiated with the U.S. government, smaller circulation
foreign-based publishers are exempted from the Act, as are foreign-
controlled publications that contain 12 percent or less of advertising
measured by revenue in a given issue, directed primarily at the
Canadian market. Canada committed to increasing this percentage to 15
percent on December 3, 2000 and to 18 percent on June 3, 2002.
Canada is a signatory to the GATS Agreement on Basic
Telecommunications Services. Recent regulatory changes have opened both
long-distance and local telephone services to competition. Canada's WTO
obligations require a monopoly by Teleglobe Inc. on overseas calling to
end in 1999. In September 1998, Canada eliminated third country routing
restrictions for international traffic routed to and from Canada
through the United States. Canada's Telecommunications Act allows the
federal regulator, the Canadian Radio-Television and Telecommunications
Commission, to forbear from regulating competitive segments of the
industry, and exempts resellers from regulation. Canada retains a 46.7
percent limit on foreign ownership and a requirement for Canadian
control of basic telecommunications facilities.
Foreign access to the Canadian financial services sector has
improved as a result of the NAFTA and the GATS. The WTO Agreement
Implementation Act removed long-standing limitations on non-Canadian
ownership of federally regulated financial institutions; lifted a
market share limitation on foreign banks; and extended NAFTA thresholds
for investment review and control to all WTO members. Banking falls
exclusively under federal jurisdiction, while the regulation of
securities companies falls under provincial control.
The banking industry in Canada is governed by the federal Bank Act.
The Bank Act and other financial services laws are mandated for review
every five years. Amendments to the Bank Act in 1992 and 1997 removed
some irritants of doing business in Canada for U.S. and other foreign
banks. Foreign banks can now opt out of Canada Deposit Insurance, and
as of February 1999, can set up branches. Two types of foreign bank
branches are currently permitted: full-service and lending. Full-
service branches are authorized to take non-retail deposits of not less
than C$150,000 (est. US$100,000), while lending branches are not
allowed to take any deposits and can borrow only from other financial
institutions. The purpose of lending branches is to provide new sources
of funds to businesses and credit card users. Full-service branches and
foreign bank subsidiaries are not allowed to own lending branches.
In Canada's insurance market, companies can incorporate under
provincial or federal law. Foreign ownership remains subject to
investment review thresholds, and several provinces continue to subject
foreign investments in existing, provincially incorporated companies to
authorization. Insurance companies may supply their services either
directly, through agents or through brokers. Life insurance companies
are not generally allowed to offer other services (except for health,
accident and sickness insurance), but may be affiliated with, and
distribute the products of, a property and casualty insurer. As in
banking, a commercial presence is required to offer insurance,
reinsurance and retrocession services in Canada. However, insurance
companies may branch from abroad on condition that they maintain
trustees assets equivalent to their liabilities in Canada. Insurance
companies can own deposit-taking financial institutions, investment
dealers, mutual fund dealers and securities firms. In addition,
insurance companies may engage directly in lending activities on an
equal footing with deposit-taking institutions. The car insurance
industry is a publicly owned monopoly in Quebec, British Columbia,
Manitoba and Saskatchewan. All other provinces have regulated premiums.
Provincial legislation and liquor board policies regulate Canadian
importation and retail distribution of alcoholic beverages. U.S.
exporters object to provincial minimum import price requirements, and
cost-of-service and packaging size issues hinder the importation of
U.S. wine.
Canada currently prohibits foreign ownership of land border duty-
free stores and imposes certain business size requirements and one-
shop-per-site encumbrances that effectively limit market access.
Prompted by citizen complaints, Canada initiated a review of
requirements for land duty-free licenses in August 1998, and federal
agencies currently are considering regulatory changes that may
liberalize the industry and create investment opportunities for U.S.
companies. The United States has encouraged the Government of Canada to
give these proposed changes due consideration.
Canadian customs regulations limit the temporary entry of
specialized equipment needed to perform short-term service contracts.
Certain types of equipment are granted duty-free or reduced-duty entry
into Canada only if they are unavailable from Canadian sources.
Although NAFTA has broadened the range of professional equipment
permitted entry, it has not provided unrestricted access.
The Canadian Special Import Measures Act (SIMA) governs the use of
anti-dumping and countervailing duties. Canada operates a partially
bifurcated trade remedies system under SIMA The Deputy Minister of
National Revenue is responsible for initiating investigations and
making preliminary and final determinations respecting dumping/
subsidizing and preliminary determinations of injury. The Canadian
International Trade Tribunal (CITT) is responsible for making final
injury determinations. When the SIMA investigation process has resulted
in levies imposed on U.S. products, these duties become an impediment
to U.S. trade opportunity.
Transboundary environmental issues continue to be a major border
concern to U.S. citizens from Maine to Alaska. Cooperation dates back
to the 1909 Boundary Waters Treaty, and has grown to include
collaboration on watersheds, flooding, air pollution and other common
concerns. Efficient management of this agenda is complicated because of
shared federal, state/provincial and local jurisdiction, and by the
fact that it is carried out not only through bilateral agreements but
by unique institutions such as the International Joint Commission (IJC)
and the still-evolving NAFTA Commission on Environmental Cooperation.
6. Export Subsidies Policies
Export credit guarantees to support bulk and processed agricultural
product exports are available through the Canadian Wheat Board and the
Export Development Corporation, both crown corporations. Due to lack of
transparency, data on the value and/or volume of commodities exported
with credit guarantee support, destination countries, and terms are
very limited.
Canada operates a two-tiered pricing system that enables dairies to
acquire milk at a discount on the condition that the resulting products
are exported or incorporated into certain further processed food
products. By charging a higher price for milk and milk containing
products for domestic consumption, the Canadian Dairy Commission is
able to provide dairy product exporters with access to lower priced
milk. The WTO appellate body upheld a February 5, 1999 ruling that
these practices constitute an export subsidy.
7. Protection of U.S. Intellectual Property
Canada belongs to the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the World
Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO). Canada is a signatory to the
Paris Convention, Bern Convention, Rome Convention, Patent Cooperation
Treaty, Strasbourg Agreement, Budapest Treaty, and the Universal
Copyright Treaty. On December 18, 1997, the Canadian Government
committed itself to sign the WIPO Copyright Treaty and the WIPO
Performances and Phonograms Treaty, which deal with copyright and
protection for performers and phonogram producers.
The most recent amendments to the Canadian Copyright Act were in
1997 and included, inter alia, ``neighboring rights,'' which requires
broadcasters to pay royalties to recording artists and record producers
from countries that are signatories of the Rome Convention, (the United
States is not). The 1997 legislation also establishes a levy on
recordable, blank audio media, payable by manufacturers and importers
of blank tapes to domestic artists and artists from countries with the
same levy in place. The Government of Canada is in the process of
determining how it will implement these amendments and we will continue
to monitor their progress to ensure that implementation is consistent
with national treatment provisions under the NAFTA. In 1998 and again
in 1999, the U.S. Trade Representative maintained Canada on the
``Special 301'' Watch List because it perceives Canada's reciprocity
application of these two provisions as a violation of Canada's national
treatment obligations under NAFTA. The GOC has broad authority to grant
the benefits of the regime to other countries, although it has yet to
announce a determination regarding the U.S.
On April 30, 1999, USTR announced the initiation of WTO dispute
settlement proceedings against Canada regarding its failure to grant a
full 20-year patent term to certain patents as requirement by the TRIPs
Agreement. Under the Agreement, Canada must provide a minimum patent
term of 20 years from the date of filing. The TRIPs Agreement also
requires that Canada extend such protection to all patents in existence
on January 1, 1996. Canada provides a 20-year patent term only to those
patents filed after October 1, 1989; earlier patents receive only 17
years of protection from the date that the patent was granted. At the
WTO Dispute Settlement Body meeting on July 26, Canada blocked the USG
request on the formation of a dispute settlement panel. Canada was not
able to block the USG's second panel request, which took place on
September 22.
8. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association: Except for members of the armed
forces, workers in both the public and private sectors have the right
to associate freely. These rights, protected by both the federal labor
code and provincial labor legislation, are freely exercised.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively: Workers in both
the public and private sectors freely exercise their rights to organize
and bargain collectively. Some essential public sector employees have
limited collective bargaining rights that vary from province to
province. Over 37 percent of Canada's non-agricultural workforce are
unionized.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor: There is no forced or
compulsory labor practiced in Canada.
d. Minimum Age Employment of Children: Generally, workers must be
17 years of age to work in an industry under federal jurisdiction.
Provincial standards (covering more than 90 percent of the national
workforce) vary, but generally require parental consent for workers
under 16 and prohibit young workers in dangerous or nighttime work. In
all jurisdictions, a person cannot be employed in a designated trade
(become an apprentice) before the age of 16. The statutory school-
leaving age in all provinces is 16.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work: Federal and provincial labor
codes establish labor standards governing maximum hours, minimum wages
and safety standards. Those standards are respected in practice.
f. Rights in Sectors with U.S. Investment: Worker rights are the
same in all sectors, including those with U.S. investment.
Extent of U.S. Investment in Selected Industries--U.S. Direct Investment Position Abroad on an Historical Cost
Basis--1998
[Millions of U.S. Dollars]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Category Amount
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Petroleum...................... .............. 12,559
Total Manufacturing............ .............. 46,428
Food & Kindred Products...... 5,143 ...............................................................
Chemicals & Allied Products.. 8,295 ...............................................................
Primary & Fabricated Metals.. 3,231 ...............................................................
Industrial Machinery and 3,046 ...............................................................
Equipment.
Electric & Electronic 2,174 ...............................................................
Equipment.
Transportation Equipment..... 11,179 ...............................................................
Other Manufacturing.......... 13,359 ...............................................................
Wholesale Trade................ .............. 7,265
Banking........................ .............. 1,203
Finance/Insurance/Real Estate.. .............. 22,057
Services....................... .............. 4,598
Other Industries............... .............. 9,799
TOTAL ALL INDUSTRIES........... .............. 103,908
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis, U.S. Department of Commerce.
______
CHILE
Key Economic Indicators
[Billions of U.S. Dollars unless otherwise indicated]
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1997 1998 1999
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Income, Production and Employment:
Nominal GDP \2\......................... 77.1 79.6 79.5
Real GDP Growth (pct) \1\............... 7.1 3.3 -2.7
GDP Growth by Sector (pct) \1\ \2\
Fishing............................... 8.1 5.0 -1.3
Agriculture........................... 2.1 1.4 -0.3
Mining................................ 8.1 3.0 13.3
Manufacturing......................... 9.5 4.0 -3.2
Construction.......................... 8.2 3.0 -10.2
Services.............................. 35.5 18.0 -1.9
Government............................ 5.3 6.0 1.3
Per Capita GDP (US$) \1\................ 5,300 5,100 5,000
Labor Force (000's) \1\................. 5,380 5,851 5,854
Unemployment Rate (pct) \1\............. 5.3 6.0 11.0
Money and Prices (annual percentage
growth):
Money Supply (M2) \2\................... 21.7 10.5 6.0
Consumer Price Inflation (pct) \1\...... 5.6 4.7 2.4
Exchange Rate (Peso/US$) \1\............ 419 465 543
Balance of Payments and Trade:
Total Exports FOB \4\................... 16.9 14.9 8.5
Exports to U.S.\5\.................... 2.7 2.9 1.5
Total Imports CIF \4\................... 18.2 17.4 7.2
Imports from U.S.\5\.................. 4.3 4.0 1.5
Trade Balance \4\....................... -1.3 -2.5 1.1
Balance with U.S.\5\.................. -1.6 -1.1 0.0
Current Account Deficit/GDP (pct)....... 5.2 5.2 0.0
Total External Debt \1\
Private Debt.......................... 21.6 26.0 28.3
Public Debt........................... 5.1 5.7 5.9
Debt Service Payments/Exports (pct) \1\. 20.1 24.9 36.0
Fiscal Deficit/GDP (pct) \1\............ 0.0 0.0 0.5
Gold and Foreign Exchange
Reserves (US$ billions) \1\............. 17.8 15.3 15.0
Aid from U.S. (US$ millions) \5\........ 0.3 0.3 0.3
Aid from All Other Sources.............. N/A N/A N/A
------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Central Bank of Chile, November 1999 Monthly Information Bulletin.
\2\ Central Bank of Chile, August 1999 Monthly Information Bulletin.
\3\ Includes electricity, gas, and water generation.
\4\ DIRECON.
\5\ U.S. Department of Commerce, International Trade Administration
Statistics.
1. General Policy Framework
Chile's economy suffered a sharp recession from November 1998 to
late 1999, following a decade of over 7 percent average growth. A fall
in exports (mainly due to the Asian economic crisis) coupled with a
striking spike in short-term interest rates in the fourth quarter of
1998, pushed Chile into 11 consecutive months of negative growth
between November 1998 and October 1999. Unemployment rose to 11.5
percent in August 1999, marking 16 months of rising unemployment,
before falling to 11 percent in November. Exports of primary products
such as copper remain strong; copper exports have risen an average of
20 percent in value over 1998 figures despite lower prices that
prevailed for much of 1999. Chile's credit rating remains investment
grade, and direct foreign investment has increased to record levels
despite the recession. Growth is projected at approximately 5 percent
in 2000 as domestic demand slowly comes out of a slump and vibrant
exports continue in the context of international economic recovery.
The government of Eduardo Frei (1994 to March 2000) has continued
Chile's policies of macroeconomic stability and export orientation. The
calendar year 1999 budget will register Chile's first deficit in 10
years, but the Finance Ministry insisted upon and won passage of a 2000
budget that features 3.3 percent nominal growth, basically flat when
considered in context of 3-4 percent predicted inflation. While the GOC
has expressed concern over too-rapid, uncontrolled capital inflows
prior to the 1998-99 economic crisis, it has continued to loosen
capital restrictions. Following legislative changes in 1997, foreign
banks have invested heavily in the Chilean market (particularly in
1999). Foreign insurance and finance companies are also dominant in the
health and pension industries, owning most of the market leaders. The
Government of Chile has privatized some ports through concessionary
contracts. Bid documents have been released for the privatization of
water and waste water treatment facilities.
In September of 1999, Chile's independent Central Bank dropped the
exchange-rate band system that governed its exchange rate policy. This
is a major change from previous policy, which sought to keep the peso/
dollar rate within pre-set parameters. The Central Bank maintains its
policy of balancing growth and inflation via short-term interest rate
policy and intervention in the currency markets, but has pledged to use
those tools sparingly.
The 1998-1999 contraction is showing definite signs of abating at
the close of the year, but has left unemployment at 11 percent, nearly
twice the average level seen in the 1990s. Domestic demand is still
depressed, following a contraction of 8.5 percent in the third quarter
of 1999 versus the third quarter of 1998. Chilean exports to Latin
America remain sharply lower. 2000 is expected to bring renewed growth
to the Chilean economy. Private and government economists generally
agree that growth should reach approximately 5 percent annually, with
steam picking up in the 3 rd and 4 th quarters. Commodity prices are
expected to rise internationally, boosting the already strong
performance of the copper and mining sector. Unemployment should
gradually fall from its peak of 11.5 percent to the 8-9 percent range
by mid-2000. Chile's current trade surplus should continue in the mid-
term, as domestic demand recovers from a sharp 13 percent decline and
exports rebound. The small current account surplus will, in all
likelihood, disappear, and Chile will revert to its traditional
deficit; policy-makers are committed to seeing it remain at a much
lower level than seen prior to the recession.
2. Exchange Rate Policies
The Central Bank moved to a freely floating exchange-rate system
from an exchange-rate band in September 1999. The peso promptly
devalued by 5 percent within six weeks before stabilizing and
recovering somewhat. The Central Bank's short-term interest rate is
currently 5 percent, and the Central Bank and Treasury Ministry are
committed to holding it there at least until growth solidifies in 2000.
Over the last several years, the Central Bank has gradually reduced
restrictions on foreign-exchange outflows. In 1995, it lifted the
requirement that exporters remit some of their foreign currency
earnings through the inter-bank market. A legal parallel market
operates with rates almost identical to the inter-bank rate. The value
of the peso versus the U.S. dollar has fallen almost 18 percent in 1999
in real terms (473 pesos to the dollar in December 1998 to 547 in
December 1999), given roughly equivalent rates of inflation.
3. Structural Policies
Pricing policies: The government rarely sets specific prices.
Exceptions are urban public transport and some public utilities and
port charges. State enterprises generally purchase at the lowest
possible price, regardless of the source of the material. U.S. exports
enter Chile and compete freely with other imports and Chilean products.
Chile's trade agreements with Mexico, Canada, Mercosur and Central
America give exporters from those countries significant competitive
advantages--virtually all Mexican and Canadian exports enter the
Chilean market duty free. Import decisions are typically related to
price competitiveness and product availability. (Certain agricultural
products are an exception. See section 5.)
Tax policies: An 18-percent value-added tax (VAT) applies to all
sales transactions and accounts yielding over 40 percent of total tax
revenue. There is a 10 percent tariff on virtually all imports
originating in countries with which Chile does not have a free trade
agreement, down from 11 percent in 1998. Tariffs are programmed to drop
to 9 percent in 2000, and to keep falling by one percentage point per
year through 2003, at which point tariffs will stabilize at 6 percent.
Computers enter Chile duty-free as a result of the Information
Technology Agreement. Personal income taxes are levied only on income
over about $6,000 per year. The top marginal rate is 45 percent on
annual income over about $75,000. Profits are taxed at flat rates of 15
percent for retained earnings and 35 percent for distributed profits,
with incentives for business donations to educational institutions. Tax
evasion is not a serious problem.
Regulatory policies: Regulation of the Chilean economy is limited.
The most heavily regulated areas are utilities, the banking sector,
securities markets, and pension funds. No government regulations
explicitly limit the market for U.S. exports to Chile (although other
government programs, like the price-band system for some agricultural
commodities described below, displace U.S. exports). In recent years,
the government has introduced rules permitting private investment in
the construction and operation of public infrastructure projects such
as toll roads. The ``privatization'' of Chilean state-owned ports,
which consists of granting long-term concessions for the operation and
management of ports, is proceeding as projected. The three most
important state-owned ports have already granted concessions: Puerto
Valparaiso, Puerto San Antonio, and Puerto San Vicente/Talcahuano. The
Ports of Arica and Iquique are undergoing the bidding process. The due
date to present technical offers is January 27, 2000, and concessions
will be awarded by February 2000. These five ports account for
approximately 30 percent of the total cargo transferred in Chilean
ports and almost 80 percent of the cargo transferred at state-owned
ports; much of Chilean exports is accounted for by copper and mineral
exports that leave via private loading facilities. Bid documents have
been released for the privatization of water and waste-treatment
facilities.
4. Debt Management Policies
Due to Chile's vigorous economic growth and careful debt management
over the last decade, the magnitude of foreign debt no longer
constitutes a major structural problem. As of November 1999 Chile's
public and private foreign debt was $34.2 billion, or 43 percent of GDP
(In 1985, the debt-to-GDP ratio was 125 percent.) Public-sector debt
has remained low the past four years, reaching $5.9 billion in 1999, or
7.4 percent of GDP, reflecting 10 years without fiscal deficits. In
1995, the government and the Central Bank prepaid over $1.5 billion in
debt to the International Monetary Fund (IMF).
5. Significant Barriers to U.S. Exports
Chile has a relatively open economy and is a member of the WTO.
However, many agricultural commodities are subject to strict
phytosanitary requirements and restrictions. Beginning in January 2000,
the uniform Chilean tariff rate will decline to 9 percent and will be
reduced by one percentage point per year to reach a rate of six percent
in 2003. The uniform rate applies to all goods except for used goods,
which are subject to a 16.5 percent tariff. Chile has free-trade
agreements that will lead to duty-free trade in most products by the
early 2000's with Canada, Mexico, Venezuela, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru,
Bolivia, the Mercosur bloc, and the Central American nations of El
Salvador, Nicaragua, Honduras, Guatemala and Belize. Chile is also an
active participant in negotiations for the Free Trade Area of the
Americas (FTAA). Tariffs also are lower than 10 percent for certain
products from member countries of the Latin American Integration
Association (ALADI).
The 18 percent VAT is applied to the CIF value of imported products
plus the 10 percent import duty. Duties may be deferred for seven years
for capital goods imports purchased as inputs for products to be
exported. Duties may be waived on capital goods to be used solely for
production of exports. (See section 6.) Automobiles are subject to an
additional tax known as the luxury tax. Legislation was approved in
August 1999 that increased the value of imported vehicles above which
the luxury tax applies from approximately $10,000 to $15,000.
Automobiles that have a CIF value over $15,000 pay an 85 percent tax on
the value of the vehicle over $15,000. This tax discourages sales of
larger and more expensive vehicles, including many U.S.-made
automobiles. Despite these taxes, sales of U.S.-brand vehicles are
rising.
Another tax with the effect of discouraging U.S. exports is a
prejudicial excise tax on distilled liquors that compete with
domestically produced liquors. In late 1997, the legislature passed a
law to gradually modify, but not eliminate, the discriminatory taxation
faced by imported liquors. The European Union won a WTO panel appeal
over Chile's discriminatory liquor taxation, and the Government of
Chile must bring its law regarding taxation of distilled spirits into
compliance with WTO disciplines. The U.S. was a third party observer to
the panels.
Import licenses: According to legislation governing the Central
Bank since 1990, no legal restrictions are imposed on licensing. Import
licenses are granted as a routine procedure for most products. Imports
of used automobiles and most used car parts are prohibited.
Investment barriers: Chile's foreign investment statute, Decree Law
600, sets the standard of treatment of foreign investors to be the same
as that of Chilean investors. Foreign investors using DL 600 sign a
contract with the government's Foreign Investment Committee
guaranteeing the terms and tax treatment of their investments. These
terms include the rights to repatriate profits immediately and capital
after one year, to exchange currency at the official inter-bank
exchange rate, and to choose between either national tax treatment at
35 percent or a guaranteed rate for the first ten years of an
investment at 42 percent. Approval by the Foreign Investment Committee
is generally routine, but the committee has rejected some
``speculative'' investments. In late 1997, the government modified its
DL 600 policy to restrict investment entering under the law's
provisions to projects worth more than $1 million. In addition,
projects of more than $15 million are now routinely vetted with the
Central Bank to identify possible ``speculative'' flows. Associated
external loan financing in excess of the value of direct foreign
investment flows cannot enter under the provisions of DL 600 (i.e., to
enter free of deposit provisions, foreign loan leveraging cannot exceed
a ratio of 1:1).
Investment not entering Chile through DL 600 can enter under
Chapter 14 of the Central Bank Regulations. Under Chapter 14, investors
can be required to deposit a certain percentage of the value of capital
inflows in a non-interest-bearing Central Bank account (known as the
``encaje'') for as long as two years; through mid-1998, the required
deposit was 30 percent for one year. Responding to increasing risk
premiums charged by creditors and a substantial decline in foreign
financial capital flows as a result of the global financial crisis, the
Central Bank reduced the requirement to zero in August 1998, but did
not abolish the policy. The purpose of the policy had been to limit
speculative flows and thus to help stabilize the value of the Chilean
peso. When in effect, the encaje applies to inflows of foreign capital
into stocks, bonds, bank deposits, as well as real estate, none of
which in the view of local authorities increases the Chilean economy's
productive capacity or improves technology. There is no tax treaty
between Chile and the United States (although negotiations are
underway), so profits of U.S. companies operating in Chile are liable
to taxation by both governments. However, U.S. firms generally can
claim credits on their U.S. taxes for taxes paid in Chile.
Firms may invest without using DL 600 or registering with the
foreign investment committee by bringing capital in through foreign
exchange dealers or private banks under Chapter 14. Few firms have used
this means of investment, as it subjects funds to the encaje and lacks
the guarantees provided by the contract with the foreign investment
committee.
There are some deviations, both positive and negative, from the
nondiscrimination standard. Foreign investors receive better than
national treatment on taxation, as they have the option of fixing the
tax rate they will pay at 42 percent for ten years or paying the
prevailing domestic rate, which is at present lower. There are also
examples of less than national treatment.
D.L. 600 allows the Central Bank to restrict the access of foreign
investors to domestic borrowing in an emergency in order to prevent
distortion of local financial markets. The Central Bank has never
exercised this power.
Other examples of less than national treatment are certain sectoral
restrictions on foreign investment. With few exceptions, fishing in the
country's 200-mile Exclusive Economic Zone is reserved for Chilean-flag
vessels with majority Chilean ownership. Such vessels also are the only
ones allowed to transport by river or sea between two points in Chile
(``cabotage'') cargo shipments of less than 900 tons or passengers. The
automobile and light truck industry is the subject of trade-related
investment measures.
Oil and gas deposits are reserved for the state. Private investors
are allowed concessions, however, and foreign and domestic nationals
are accorded equal treatment.
Services barriers: Full foreign ownership of radio and television
stations is allowed, but the principal officers of the firm must be
Chilean. A freeze in force since the early 1980s on the issuance of new
bank licenses means that investors, foreign and domestic, have to
acquire existing banks. The Government of Chile promulgated banking
reform legislation in December 1997 that, inter alia, established
objective criteria for issuing new bank licenses.
Principal non-tariff barriers: The main trade remedies used by the
Chilean government are surcharges, minimum customs values,
countervailing duties, antidumping duties, and import price bands and
safeguards. A significant nontariff barrier is the import price-band
system for wheat, wheat flour, vegetable oils, and sugar. When import
prices are below a set threshold, surtaxes are levied on top of the
across-the-board 10-percent tariff to bring import prices up to an
average of international prices over previous years. Because of low
international wheat and sugar prices this year, the price-band system
imposed import duties well above Chile's WTO bound rate of 31.5
percent. As a consequence, the GOC announced the use of safeguards to
legalize the lack of compliance with its WTO bound tariff rate.
Domestic beverage manufacturers have complained bitterly about the high
duty on sugar. Imports of U.S. wheat, while subject to import duties of
nearly 40 percent will be at near record levels in 1999.
Animal health and phytosanitary requirements: Chile has been slow
to recognize pest-free areas in the United States, delaying the export
approval for many U.S. fruits and vegetables to Chile. Chile has begun
to publish its regulations and allow for a public comment period on
proposed rules changes. Most import permits are issued on a case-by-
case basis, thereby lending to uncertainty and possible discriminatory
treatment. Procedures and tolerances for testing imported chicken for
the presence of salmonella present such a severe commercial risk that
local importers are reluctant to import such products. Chile's unique
beef grading and labeling requirements deter the trade from considering
the importation of beef cuts from the United States.
Government procurement practices: The government buys locally
produced goods only when the conditions of sale (price, delivery times,
etc.) are equal to or better than those for equivalent imports. In
practice, given that many categories of products are not manufactured
in Chile, purchasing decisions by most state-owned companies are made
among competing imports. Requests for public and private bids are
published in the local newspapers and will soon be published on the
Internet.
6. Export Subsidies Policies
Chile offers a few non-market incentives to exporters. For example,
paperwork requirements are simplified for nontraditional exporters. The
government also provides exporters with quicker returns of VAT paid on
inputs than other producers receive. In 1997, Chilean subsidies became
the focus of a countervailing duty investigation by the Department of
Commerce of Chilean salmon exports to the United States; on June 22,
1998, the countervailing duty determination was found to be negative.
The most widely used indirect subsidy for exports is the simplified
duty drawback system for nontraditional exports. This system refunds to
exporters of certain products a percentage of the value of their
exports, rather than refunding the actual duty paid on imported inputs
to production (as is the case in Chile's standard drawback program).
All Chilean exporters may also defer tariff payments on capital imports
for a period of seven years. If the capital goods are used to produce
exported products, deferred duties can be reduced by the ratio of
export sales to total sales. If all production is exported, the
exporter pays no tariff on capital imports.
In 1998, the Chilean congress replaced earlier forestry-sector
subsidy legislation with a new law that will be directed mainly toward
assisting small farmers. Planting costs will be subsidized by as much
as 90 percent for the first 15 hectares and 75 percent for the
remainder in the case of small farmers. A maximum of $15 million
dollars yearly will be destined for this purpose. Special land-tax
exemptions will also be part of the program. Under the previous law,
the combined subsidy costs incurred during 1997 totaled $7.7 million,
down from $15.3 million in 1996.
7. Protection of U.S. Intellectual Property
Chile's intellectual property regime is basically strong. However,
deficiencies in the intellectual property regime have kept Chile on the
USTR Special 301 watch list since 1989. Chile belongs to the World
Intellectual Property Organization. In late 1999 the Chilean Government
submitted draft legislation to the Congress to attempt to bring Chile
into compliance with its WTO TRIPS commitments.
Copyrights: Piracy of video and audio tapes has been subject to
criminal penalties since 1985. Chilean authorities have taken
enforcement measures against video, video game, audio, and computer
software pirates in recent years, and piracy has declined in each of
these areas. In the mid-1980s, the software piracy rate was believed to
be around 90 percent; it is currently estimated at roughly 55 percent,
believed to be the lowest rate in Latin America. The decline is in part
the result of a campaign by the U.S. and international industry, with
the cooperation of Chile's courts and government, to suppress the use
of pirated software. Greater access to authorized dealers and service
has also helped to reduce the rate of piracy. Industry sources say that
penalties remain low relative to the potential earnings from piracy and
that stiffer penalties would help to deter potential pirates. Copyright
protection is generally the life of the author plus 50 years.
Trademarks: Chilean law provides for the protection of registered
trademarks and prioritizes trademark rights according to filing date.
Local use of a trademark is not required for registration. As with the
licensing of other intellectual property privileges, contracting
parties may freely set payment rates for use of trademarks.
8. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association: Most workers have a right to join
unions or to form unions without prior authorization, and around 12
percent of the work force belongs to unions. Government employee
associations benefited from legislation in 1995 that gave them many of
the same rights as unions, although they may not legally strike.
Reforms to the labor code in 1990 removed significant restrictions on
the right to strike. Those reforms require that a labor inspector or
notary be present when union members vote for a strike. In late 1999,
the Government of Chile narrowly failed in pushing through Congress
reforms to Chilean labor laws that encouraged greater collective
bargaining.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively: The climate for
collective bargaining has improved, though unions still face
difficulties. Sector-wide collective bargaining would be permitted
under legislation proposed by the Government of Chile and narrowly
defeated in the Chilean Congress. The process for negotiating a formal
labor contract is heavily regulated, a vestige of the statist labor
policies of the 1960's. However, the law permits (and the Frei
government has encouraged) informal union-management discussions to
reach collective agreements outside the regulated bargaining process.
These agreements have the same force as formal contracts.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor: Forced or compulsory
labor is prohibited in the constitution and the labor code and is not
practiced.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children: Child labor is regulated
by law. Children as young as 14 may be legally employed with permission
of parents or guardians and in restricted types of labor. Some children
are employed in the informal economy, which is more difficult to
regulate. The Chilean government estimates that roughly 50,000 children
between the ages of 6 and 14 work. Most of these children work in the
countryside, and many of them work with their parents.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work: Minimum wages, hours of work, and
occupational safety and health standards are regulated by law. The
legal workweek is 48 hours. The minimum wage, currently around $190.00
per month, is set by government, management, and union representatives
or by the government if the three groups cannot reach agreement. Lower-
paid workers also receive a family subsidy. The minimum wage and wages
as a whole have risen steadily over the last several years. As a
result, poverty rates have declined dramatically in recent years from
46 percent of the population in 1987 to 21.7 percent in 1998. Currently
11 percent of salaried workers earn the minimum wage.
f. Rights in Sectors with U.S. Investment: Labor rights in sectors
with U.S. investment are the same as those specified above. U.S.
companies are involved in virtually every sector of the Chilean economy
and are subject to the same laws that apply to their counterparts from
Chile and other countries. There are no special districts where
different labor laws apply.
Extent of U.S. Investment in Selected Industries--U.S. Direct Investment Position Abroad on an Historical Cost
Basis--1998
[Millions of U.S. Dollars]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Category Amount
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Petroleum...................... .............. 18
Total Manufacturing............ .............. 845
Food & Kindred Products...... 162 ...............................................................
Chemicals & Allied Products.. 294 ...............................................................
Primary & Fabricated Metals.. 39 ...............................................................
Industrial Machinery and 14 ...............................................................
Equipment.
Electric & Electronic (\1\) ...............................................................
Equipment.
Transportation Equipment..... (\1\) ...............................................................
Other Manufacturing.......... 204 ...............................................................
Wholesale Trade................ .............. 342
Banking........................ .............. 627
Finance/Insurance/Real Estate.. .............. 3,429
Services....................... .............. 212
Other Industries............... .............. 3,659
TOTAL ALL INDUSTRIES........... .............. 9,132
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Suppressed to avoid disclosing data of individual companies.
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis.
______
COLOMBIA
Key Economic Indicators
[Billions of U.S. Dollars unless otherwise indicated]
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1997 1998 \1\ 1999
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Income, Production and Employment: \2\
\3\
Nominal GDP.......................... 96.2 89.7 87.9
Real GDP Growth (pct)................ 3.1 0.6 -3.5
GDP by Sector:
Agriculture........................ 17.6 17.4 15.8
Manufacturing...................... 17.3 17.5 15.9
Services (includes financial)...... 30 29.5 26.7
Commerce........................... 11.1 11.2 10.1
Government \4\..................... 27 27.5 26.6
Per Capita GDP (US$)................. 2,440 2,243 2,219
Labor Force (000's) \5\.............. 16,908 17,212 17,521
Unemployment Rate (pct).............. 13.3 15.9 20.0
Money and Prices (annual percentage
growth): \6\
Money Supply Growth (M2)............. 24.6 20.5 18.0
Consumer Price Inflation............. 17.7 16.7 11.0
Exchange Rate (Peso/US$ annual
average)
Official........................... 1,141.1 1,425.9 1,750.0
Balance of Payments and Trade: \7\
Total Exports FOB.................... 11.6 10.8 10.9
Exports to U.S..................... 4.2 4.0 4.6
Total Imports CIF.................... 15.3 14.6 11.1
Imports from U.S................... 5.8 4.6 4.5
Trade Balance........................ -3.7 -3.8 -0.2
Balance with U.S................... -1.6 -0.6 0.1
Current Account Deficit/GDP (pct).... -5.8 -5.9 -2.8
External Public Debt................. 16.1 18.4 20.4
Debt Service Payments/GDP (pct)...... 3.5 3.7 2.6
Fiscal Deficit/GDP (pct)............. -4.4 -4.5 -4.0
Gold and Foreign Exchange Reserves... 9.9 8.7 8.4
Development Aid from U.S. (US$ 0.1 0.1 0.1
millions) \8\.......................
Aid from All Other Sources........... N/A N/A N/A
------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ 1999 figures are estimates based on available monthly data in
October.
\2\ Percentage changes calculated in local currency.
\3\ Sources for all figures in section except government spending are
National Department of Statistics (DANE). For government spending:
Ministry of Finance.
\4\ Approved national budget. Source: Ministry of Finance.
\5\ Economically active population for the whole country.
\6\ Source: Banco de la Republica (BDR).
\7\ Source: Ministry of Foreign Trade.
\8\ Aid reflects U.S. AID program only.
1. General Policy Framework
Colombia is a free-market economy with major commercial and
investment links to the United States. Transition from a highly
regulated economic regime has been underway for a decade. The United
States is Colombia's largest trading partner, receiving 37.2 percent of
Colombia's exports and providing 32 percent of Colombia's imports in
1998. More than 70 percent of Colombian exports to the United States
are primary products such as food (mainly coffee, bananas, flowers,
tuna, shrimp, and sugar), and fuel (petroleum and coal). The United
States also holds the largest country share of foreign direct
investment: $4.3 billion, or 28.1 percent of the estimated total direct
foreign investment of $15.4 billion.
In 1990, the administration of President Cesar Gaviria (1990-94)
initiated economic liberalization, or ``apertura,'' and it has
continued since then. Its start consisted of tariff reductions,
financial deregulation, privatization of state-owned enterprises, and
adoption of a more liberal foreign exchange regime. Almost all sectors
became open to foreign investment although agricultural products
remained protected. A price-band system to determine tariffs for
agricultural products excluded them from the liberalization process.
Import license requirements were eliminated for most products though
some agricultural products still require licenses.
Until 1997, Colombia had enjoyed a fairly stable economy. The first
five years of liberalization were characterized by high economic growth
rates of between four and five percent annually. Subsequently, the GDP
growth rate fell until it was 0.6 percent in 1998, the lowest in the
last fifty years. The National Planning Department (DNP) projects a 3.5
percent contraction in real GDP for 1999. However, private analysts
project a decline of as much as 5.0 percent, which would be the worst
recession of the century. The Samper administration (1994-98) adopted
social welfare policies which targeted Colombia's poor population.
However, these reforms led to higher government spending which
increased the fiscal deficit and public sector debt. Financing the
larger deficits pushed interest rates higher, with contractionary
effects on the private sector. The construction industry, one of the
largest employment sectors in Colombia, was particularly hard-hit by
the tight credit conditions. Unemployment increased dramatically as the
economy slowed, reaching 15.9 percent by year-end of 1998. As of
September 1999 unemployment stood at 20.1 percent.
The government of Andres Pastrana, which came into power in 1998
has attempted to strengthen Colombia's public finances and has sought
an agreement with the International Monetary Fund (IMF). However, the
fiscal deficit continued to widen this year, as the recession has
weakened government revenues, rising to an estimated 6.2 percent of GDP
from 3.9 percent in 1998. However, the fiscal deficit is scheduled to
decline to 3.6 percent of GDP in 2000 under the IMF program, and to 2.5
percent in 2001.
Between 1990 and 1999 the government privatized a number of state-
owned banks, ports, railroads, and mining companies. It also sold
concessions to private providers of telecommunications and broadcasting
services that began using the government-owned spectra. The Pastrana
administration (1998-2002) also has plans to privatize the remaining
profitable public enterprises, including two electricity generating
companies, ISA and ISAGEN, plus 14 electric distributors, and the 50
percent government-owned share of the Carbocol mining company.
Several tax reforms have been implemented over the last years. In
December 1998, the Colombian Congress passed Law 488, which lowered the
value-added tax (VAT) from 16 to 15 percent effective November 1, 1999,
and increased the number of goods and services subject to the VAT. Law
488 established a common tax regime for small taxpayers and increased
the stamp tax paid on all written contracts from one to one-and-a-half
percent.
The Central Bank conducts monetary policy based on targeted growth
rates of monetary aggregates which must be consistent with final
inflation and economic growth expectations. The Central Bank intervenes
in the money market to reduce the volatility of interest rates, and
until September 1999 it had been actively intervening in the foreign
exchange market to maintain the foreign exchange rate within a band
system. In 1998, inflation was 16.7 percent, only 0.7 percent higher
than the expected target but significantly lower than the 21.6 percent
registered in 1996. As of September 1999, inflation reached its lowest
level in decades, 9.8 percent. The official target for 1999 has been
dropped to 12 percent.
2. Exchange Rate Policy
The Colombian peso has floated freely against the dollar and other
currencies since September 25, 1999, when the Central Bank abandoned
the crawling band exchange regime. Under that system, the Bank
intervened in the market by buying or selling dollars to keep the
dollar's price in pesos within the band, which it was forced to adjust
twice in the previous year (September 1998 and June 1999) in response
to exchange market pressure. The exchange rate stabilized soon after
abolition of the band and the peso actually recovered slightly. As of
mid-December 1999, the peso had depreciated 20 percent from the
beginning of the year. The peso's depreciation has reduced the price
competitiveness of U.S. exports to Colombia, while boosting the
competitiveness of Colombian exports to the United States. Currency
depreciation together with import compression due to recession has
brought a dramatic turnaround in Colombia's overall trade balance, as
well as its bilateral balance with the United States. Through September
1999, Colombia's overall trade balance has swung from a $2.7 billion
deficit to a $1.1 billion surplus, while the U.S.-Colombia trade
balance swung from a $292 million U.S. surplus to a $1.8 billion
deficit.
3. Structural Policies
As member of the Andean Community, Colombia has had a Common
External Tariff (CET) in effect since 1995. The CET has different duty
levels that vary from 0 to 20 percent for most non-agricultural
products. A special Andean price-band system (based on domestic and
international prices) is applied to calculate tariffs of agricultural
imports. Tariff rates for agricultural products subject to the price-
band system vary between 78 and 246 percent. Fourteen basic
agricultural commodities including wheat, sorghum, corn, rice, barley,
milk, and chicken parts, and an additional 120 commodities considered
substitute or related products are subject to tariffs calculated under
the price-band system. The government also regulates prices of
electricity, water, sewage, and telephone services, public
transportation, rents, education tuition, and pharmaceuticals.
Colombia's special import-export system for machinery and its free
trade zones constitute export subsidies. Colombia's tax rebate
certificate program (CERT) also contains a subsidy component which the
Colombian government has stated it will replace with an equitable
drawback system, although it has not yet done so.
Rising fiscal deficits forced the authorities to adopt several tax
reforms over the last year. Law 488, approved in December 1998, lowered
the value-added tax (VAT) from 16 to 15 percent while it increased the
number of goods and services subject to the VAT. Colombia also assesses
a discriminatory VAT of 35 percent on whiskey aged for less than 12
years, which is more characteristic of U.S. whiskey, versus a rate of
20 percent for whiskey aged for 12 or more years, most of which comes
from Europe. This tax regime on distilled spirits appears to violate
Colombia's WTO obligation whereby a member cannot provide an advantage
or favor to products of one WTO member without according the same
advantage to ``like products'' of another member. A unified tax regime
for small taxpayers was created to simplify the tax collection process.
In December 1998 the government decreed an economic emergency under
which it instituted a tax on all transactions in the financial system
at a rate of 0.2 percent. The tax on financial transactions commonly
known as the ``two per thousand'' tax was initially to remain in effect
until December 31, 1999. However, on January 25, 1999 an earthquake
devastated Colombia's coffee region. This tragedy frustrated the
government's hope of meeting its lower spending targets and the tax was
extended until 2001. The government is currently studying the
possibility of making the tax permanent in its next tax reform proposal
to Congress. The proposal will also include measures to regulate
regional taxes. Other major taxation issues include the future of the
35 percent income tax, a ``war tax'' on the export value of crude oil,
gas, coal, and nickel (in effect until 2000), and a requirement that
all corporations invest 0.6 percent of their liquid assets in the
seven-year term ``peace bonds'' which are freely negotiable and bear a
return equivalent to inflation plus 10 points.
All foreign investment in petroleum exploration and development in
Colombia must be carried out under a profit-sharing association
contract between the investor and the state petroleum company,
``Ecopetrol.'' U.S. oil companies have voiced interest in increasing
exploration and development in Colombia if contract and tax
requirements are made more flexible. The Pastrana administration has
responded by making the terms of association contracts significantly
more liberal.
Under the current Andean Pact automotive policy, Colombia and
Venezuela impose strict regional content requirements for the
automotive assembly industry.
After a period of lack of interest during the Samper administration
in continuing liberalization, the Pastrana administration has taken a
number of concrete steps to promote trade and investment. These have
included the signing of an agreement in October 1998 with the U.S.
Government establishing periodic Trade and Investment Council meetings
with the Andean Community, efforts to improve oversight of the
television sector and reduce cable and satellite signal piracy, and
issuance of a Presidential Directive in early 1999 requiring all
Colombian public entities to respect international copyrights. The
administration also successfully pressed for an amendment repealing an
article in the 1991 Constitution which allowed expropriation of foreign
investment without compensation.
4. Debt Management Policies
Colombia's history of continuous timely servicing of its
international debt obligations and, at least until recently, modest
external debt burden earned the country one of the few ``investment''
grade credit ratings from the major rating companies. However, in 1999,
Standard & Poors, Moody's, and Duff & Phelps downgraded Colombia's
debt, citing Colombia's faltering peace process, increased security
concerns, and insufficient progress in fiscal consolidation. The rating
downgrades had little impact on the secondary market prices of
Colombian debt, as the move had largely been priced into the market
already. Colombian debt had traded at significantly wider spreads than
would be indicated by its ``investment grade'' rating for some time.
The international financial institutions announced their intention
in September 1999 to provide $6.9 billion to finance the Colombian
government's fiscal adjustment and development programs through 2002:
$2.7 billion from the International Monetary Fund, $1.7 billion from
the Inter-American Development Bank, $1.4 billion from the World Bank,
$600 million from the Andean Development Corporation, and $500 million
from the Latin American Reserve Fund.
In September 1998, the Central Bank reduced its imposed deposit
requirement on foreign borrowing from 25 to 10 percent (the term of the
deposit was also reduced from 12 to 6 months). In January 1999, the
Central Bank completely removed the deposit requirement for import-
related borrowing while maintaining a 10 percent deposit requirement on
export-related foreign borrowing operations.
5. Aid
The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) office in
Bogota coordinates the provision of resources for development programs
in Colombia. Its Operating Year Budget (OYB) for 1999 was $18.3 million
and the estimated OYB for 2000 is $11 million. The USAID/Colombia
current program portfolio totals approximately $103 million.
U.S. aid and assistance to the Colombian National Police and other
counternarcotics programs is coordinated by the Narcotics Affairs
Section (NAS) in Bogota. Total narcotics-related aid is programmed to
amount approximately to $300 million in 1999.
U.S. military training assistance to the Colombian Army, Air Force
and Navy totals $1,590,000 for 1999.
6. Significant Barriers to U.S. Exports
Import Licenses: Prior import licenses are still required for
various commodities, narcotics-precursor chemicals, armaments and
munitions, donations, and some imports by government entities. Though
the government abolished most import licensing requirements in 1991, it
has continued to use prior import licensing to restrict importation of
certain agricultural products such as powdered milk (during Colombia's
high milk production season) and chicken parts. In addition, the
Ministry of Agriculture must approve import licenses for products
which, if imported, would compete with domestic products. Some of these
products, which include important U.S. exports to Colombia, are wheat,
malting barley, corn, rice, sorghum, and wheat flour.
Services Barriers: The provision of legal services is limited to
law firms licensed under Colombian law. Foreign law firms can operate
in Colombia only by forming a joint venture with a Colombian law firm
and operating under the licenses of the Colombian lawyers in the firm.
Insurance companies require a commercial presence in order to sell
policies other than those for international travel or reinsurance.
Colombia permits the establishment of 100 percent-owned subsidiaries,
but not branch offices, of foreign insurance companies. Colombia denies
market access to foreign maritime insurers. A commercial presence is
required to provide information processing services. Colombian
television broadcast laws (Law 182/95 and Law 375/96) impose several
restrictions to foreign investment. For example, foreign investors must
be actively engaged in television operation in their home country.
Their investments are limited to 15 percent of the total capital of
local television production companies and must involve an implicit
transfer of technology. At least 50 percent of programmed advertising
broadcast on television must have local content.
Investment Barriers: Colombian law provides for equal treatment of
foreign and national investors. One-hundred percent foreign ownership
is permitted in most sectors of the Colombian economy. Exceptions
include activities related to national security and the disposal of
hazardous waste. All foreign investors (acting as individuals or
investment funds) must receive prior approval from the Banking
Superintendency to acquire an equity participation of five percent or
more in a Colombian financial entity. As a measure against money
laundering, Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in real estate is
prohibited except in connection with other investment activities.
Colombian law requires that at least 80 percent of employees of
companies in the mining and hydrocarbons sector be Colombian nationals.
It also requires that foreign employees in financial institutions be
limited to managers, legal representatives and technicians. Colombia
limits foreign ownership of telecommunication companies to 70 percent.
An economic needs test determines market access and national treatment
for cellular, PCS, long distance, and international telecommunications
services.
All foreign investment must be registered with the Central Bank's
foreign exchange office within three months in order to insure the
right to repatriate profits and remittances. All foreign investors,
like domestic investors, must obtain a license from the Superintendent
of Companies and register with the local chamber of commerce.
Standards, Testing, Labeling, and Certification: The Colombian
Foreign Trade Institute (INCOMEX) requires specific technical standards
for a variety of products. The particular specifications are
established by the Colombian Institute of Technical Standards
(ICONTEC), or under ISO-9000. Certificates of conformity must be
obtained from the Superintendency of Industry and Commerce before
importing products that are subject to technical standards.
Government Procurement Practices: Law 80 of 1993 is Colombia's
government procurement and contracting law. It affords equal treatment
to foreign companies on a reciprocal basis and eliminates the 20
percent surcharge previously added to foreign bids. In implementing Law
80, the Colombian government established a requirement that foreign
firms without an active local headquarters in Colombia certify that
Colombian companies enjoy reciprocity in similar bids under their
countries' procurement legislation. A local agent or legal
representative is required for all government contracts. When foreign
firms bid under equal conditions, the contract is usually awarded to
the one that incorporates a greater number of domestic workers,
involves more domestic content, or provides better conditions for
transfer of new technology. Some U.S. companies have complained of
corruption and lack of transparency in bidding and contracting
processes. Colombia is not a party to the WTO agreement on government
procurement.
Customs Procedures: Imported merchandise inspection can be
prearranged through preshipment inspection entry, and duties can be
prepaid through commercial banks. For certain items, preshipment
inspection is mandatory.
7. Export Subsidies Policies
Colombia has sharply reduced its export subsidies, and its subsidy
practices are generally compatible with WTO standards. At present, the
government manages only two export subsidy programs. One, the CERT
(Certificado de Reembolso Tributario), refunds a percentage of the Free
on Board (FOB) value of an export. Under a 1990 bilateral agreement,
the CERT does not apply to goods exported to the U.S. The other export
subsidy, known as the ``Plan Vallejo,'' allows for duty exemptions on
the import of capital goods and raw materials used to manufacture goods
that are subsequently exported. Colombia's free-trade zones also
constitute an export subsidy through the mechanism of tax exemptions on
imported inputs. The U.S. and Colombian flower industries, with the
approval of the U.S. Department of Commerce and Justice, finalized a
settlement agreement to terminate the longstanding antidumping duty
orders and to utilize resources spent on dumping duties and direct it
towards promotion of flowers in the U.S. market. However, there are
currently five antidumping reviews still under litigation. The sunset
review of the antidumping orders on Colombian cut flowers will also be
terminated as a result of this agreement.
8. Protection of U.S. Intellectual Property
Despite improvements in 1999, Colombia remains on the ``Watch
List'' under the ``Special 301'' provision of the 1988 Omnibus Trade
Act because of concerns regarding effective protection of intellectual
property rights. It has been on the ``Watch List'' every year since
1991. Colombia has ratified, but not yet fully implemented, the
provisions of the World Trade Organization (WTO) agreement on Trade
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property (TRIPS). A major issue has
been the Colombian Government's failure to license legitimate pay
television operators and to pursue pirate operators. As of November
1999, the Colombian Government completed licensing for 114 cable
television operators. Colombia's Television Broadcast Law increased
legal protection for all copyrighted programming by regulating
satellite dishes, but enforcement has only recently begun through a
licensing process that is scheduled to be completed by the end of 1999.
Colombia has created a Special Investigative Unit within the Prosecutor
General's Office dedicated to intellectual property rights issues. This
unit began functioning in November 1999.
Colombia, which is a WTO member, has ratified its Uruguay Round
implementing legislation. It is a member of the World Intellectual
Property Organization (WIPO) and has negotiated to join the Paris
Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, the Patent
Cooperation Treaty and the Union for the Protection of New Plant
Varieties. Colombia belongs to the Berne and Universal Copyright
Conventions, the Buenos Aires and Washington Conventions, the Rome
Convention on Copyrights, and the Geneva Convention for Phonograms. It
is not a member of the Brussels Convention on Satellite Signals.
Patent and Trademarks: Colombia is a member of the Inter-American
Convention for Trademark and Commercial Protection. Colombia requires
registration and use of a trademark in Colombia to exercise trademark
protection. Trademark registration has a 10-year duration and may be
renewed for successive 10-year periods. Although Colombian law
provides, for example, 20-year protection for patents and reversal of
burden of proof in cases of alleged patent infringement, it is
deficient in the areas of compulsory licensing provisions, working
requirements, biotechnology inventions, transitional (``pipeline'')
protection, and protection from parallel imports. Enforcement of
trademark legislation in Colombia is showing some progress, but
contraband and counterfeiting are widespread. U.S. pharmaceutical firms
continue to press for a range of legislative and administrative
reforms. The Superintendency of Industry and Commerce acts as the local
patent and trademark office in Colombia. This agency suffers greatly
from a backlog of trademark and patent applications exceeding 25,000 as
of June 1999.
Copyrights: Colombia's 1993 Copyright Law increased penalties for
copyright piracy. In April 1999, President Pastrana issued a directive
to all government and educational institutions to respect copyrights
and avoid the use or purchase of pirated printed works, software and
audio/video material. The most recent available data from the
International Intellectual Property Alliance (IIPA) suggests that while
there is less counterfeit merchandise available in the Colombian
market, U.S. industries continue to lose substantial revenue from
piracy--$151 million in 1997. Enforcement problems consistently arise
not only with inadequate police activity, but also in the judicial
system, where there have been complaints about the lack of respect for
preservation of evidence and frequent perjury. The IIPA estimates that
videocassette piracy represents approximately 60 percent of the video
market; sound recording piracy 60 percent of the market; and business
software piracy 73 percent of the market. Satellite programmers
estimate there are about 3.6 million Colombian households that receive
satellite signals, of which only 200,000 are legally subscribed. The
Colombian Government, as mentioned above, has already initiated a
licensing process designed to make illegal operators responsible for
paying copyright fees. The licensing process, if effective, should
reduce the widespread piracy by legitimizing non-royalty paying service
providers.
New Technologies: Colombia has a modern copyright law which gives
protection for computer software for 50 years and defines computer
software as copyrightable subject matter but does not classify it as a
literary work. Semiconductor design layouts are not protected under
Colombian law.
9. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association: Colombian law recognizes the rights of
workers to organize unions and to strike. The labor code provides for
automatic recognition of unions that obtain at least 25 signatures from
potential members and that comply with a simple registration process at
the Labor Ministry. The law penalizes interference with freedom of
association. It allows unions to freely determine internal rules, elect
officials and manage activities, and forbids the dissolution of trade
unions by administrative fiat. Unions are free to join international
confederations without government restrictions.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively: The constitution
protects the right of workers to organize and engage in collective
bargaining. Workers in larger firms and public services have been the
most successful in organizing, but these organized workers represent
only a small portion of the economically active population. According
to the Labor Ministry's Planning Bureau figures, approximately five
percent (926,155 affiliates) of Colombia's total work force is
organized into 5,544 unions. However, the most recent estimate for 1999
by the Colombian Union School (ENS) accounts for 3,560 labor unions
with 872,635 affiliates. Accurate estimates are difficult to obtain due
to the high rate at which new unions are created and old ones
disappear. High unemployment (19.8 percent as of September 1999),
traditional anti-union attitudes, union disorganization and weak
leadership limit workers' bargaining power in all sectors.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor: The constitution
forbids slavery and any form of forced or compulsory labor, and this
prohibition is respected in practice.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children: The constitution bans
the employment of children under the age of 14 in most jobs, and the
labor code prohibits the granting of work permits to youths under the
age of 18. This provision is respected in large enterprises and in
major cities. Nevertheless, Colombia's extensive and expanding informal
economy remains effectively outside government control. Statistics
vary: according to different studies (Labor Ministry and Los Andes
University among the most reliable), there are between 1.5 and 2
million working children between the ages of 12 and 17. According to
ENS, the number of working children in that range of ages is 1.8
million for 1999. These children work--often under substandard
conditions--in agriculture or in the informal sector, as street
vendors, in leather tanning, and in small family-operated mines.
According to these studies, 80 percent of the working children work in
the informal sector, and 90 percent of the working children perform
risky or dangerous activities.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work: The government sets a uniform
minimum wage for workers every January to serve as a benchmark for wage
bargaining. The minimum wage for 1999 is approximately $135 (236,460
pesos) per month. Because the minimum wage is based on the government's
target inflation rate, which has been exceeded in recent years, the
minimum wage has not kept up with inflation. By government estimates,
the price of the low-income family shopping basket (``canasta
familiar'') is 2.4 times the minimum wage. For medium-income families,
the price of the shopping basket is 6.1 times the minimum wage. Seventy
percent of the Colombian workers earn twice the minimum wage or less.
The law provides for a standard 8-hour workday and 48-hour workweek,
but does not specifically require a weekly rest period of at least 24
hours. Legislation provides comprehensive protection for workers'
occupational safety and health, but these standards are difficult to
enforce, in part due to the small number of Labor Ministry inspectors.
f. Rights in Sectors with U.S. Investment: U.S. foreign direct
investment is concentrated principally in the petroleum, coal mining,
chemicals and manufacturing industries. Worker rights conditions in
those sectors tend to be superior to those prevailing elsewhere in the
economy, owing to the large size and high degree of organization of the
enterprises.
Extent of U.S. Investment in Selected Industries--U.S. Direct Investment Position Abroad on an Historical Cost
Basis--1998
[Millions of U.S. Dollars]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Category Amount
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Petroleum...................... .............. 1,159
Total Manufacturing............ .............. 1,094
Food & Kindred Products...... 301 ...............................................................
Chemicals & Allied Products.. 352 ...............................................................
Primary & Fabricated Metals.. (\1\) ...............................................................
Industrial Machinery and (\1\) ...............................................................
Equipment.
Electric & Electronic 25 ...............................................................
Equipment.
Transportation Equipment..... (\1\) ...............................................................
Other Manufacturing.......... 307 ...............................................................
Wholesale Trade................ .............. 168
Banking........................ .............. (\1\)
Finance/Insurance/Real Estate.. .............. 808
Services....................... .............. 87
Other Industries............... .............. (\1\)
TOTAL ALL INDUSTRIES........... .............. 4,317
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Suppressed to avoid disclosing data of individual companies.
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis.
______
COSTA RICA
Key Economic Indicators \1\
[Millions of U.S. Dollars unless otherwise indicated]
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1997 1998 \5\ 1999
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Income, Production and Employment:
Nominal GDP \2\................... 9,727.9 10,482.8 11,000.0
Real GDP Growth (pct) \3\......... 3.8 6.2 8.2
GDP by Sector (pct):
Agriculture..................... 18.0 18.0 16.0
Industry........................ 21.5 21.5 23.0
Services........................ 53.1 53.3 54.0
General Government.............. 7.4 7.2 7.0
Per Capita GDP (US$).............. 2,790.0 2,944.0 3,062
Labor Force (000's)............... 1,330 1,400 1,480
Unemployment Rate (pct)........... 5.7 5.6 5.2
Money and Prices (annual percentage
growth):
Money Supply Growth (M2).......... 21.0 15.0 17.0
Consumer Price Index.............. 12.0 12.4 10.0
Exchange Rate (Colones/US$ annual
average)
Official........................ None None None
Parallel........................ 232.37 257.14 282.00
Balance of Payments and Trade:
Total Exports FOB \4\............. 4,335.0 5,528.0 6,634.0
Exports to U.S.\4\.............. 1,266.0 2,674.0 3,200.0
Total Imports CIF \4\............. 4,953.0 6,230.0 6,541.0
Imports from U.S.\4\............ 1,534.0 1,784.0 2,000.0
Trade Balance \4\................. -618.0 -702.0 93.0
Balance with U.S.\4\............ -268.0 890.0 1,200.0
External Public Debt.............. 2,640.2 2,872.4 3,042.0
Fiscal Deficit of Public Sector/ 3.3 2.7 3.3
GDP (pct)........................
Current Account Deficit/GDP (pct). 2.2 4.4 3.0
Foreign Debt Service Payments/GDP 6.1 5.0 4.9
(pct)............................
Gold and Foreign Exchange Reserves 1,141.3 991.3 1,200.0
Aid from U.S...................... 5.0 18.0 15.0
Aid from All Other Sources........ N/A N/A N/A
------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ 1999 figures are all estimates based on available monthly data in
September.
\2\ GDP at factor cost.
\3\ Percentage changes calculated in local currency.
\4\ Merchandise trade.
\5\ FY 1999 figures estimated.
1. General Policy Framework
The Costa Rican economy is performing moderately well, continuing
to recover from the 1996 contraction caused by anti-inflationary public
sector spending reductions, increased taxation and credit tightening.
The government forecasts GDP growth of 8.2 percent for 1999, not quite
the impressive growth of 6.2 percent in 1998, the highest in Latin
America, but still considerable considering the government's worsening
fiscal picture. The Costa Rican economy is based on a free market
system and relatively open trading regime. There are, however, several
large public sector monopolies in electricity transmission and
distribution, telecommunications, petroleum distillation and
distribution and insurance.
The Rodriguez Administration, inaugurated in May 1998, initially
proposed selling some state monopolies. However, it has been unable to
achieve a political consensus on the appropriate roles of the public
and private sectors in fields such as telecommunications, energy and
insurance. In place of privatization, concessions to build and manage
public works are being pursued by the government. A consortium led by
an U.S. firm recently won the concession to manage the San Jose
international airport in 1999.
The most serious problem facing the Costa Rican economy is the
fiscal deficits of the central government and the combined public
sector. The reduction of these deficits is a prerequisite for improving
the overall fiscal health of the public sector. The fiscal deficit of
the combined public sector was $282 million in 1998, equivalent to 2.7
percent of GDP. It is expected by the Government of Costa Rica to reach
$360 million, about 3.3 percent of GDP, by the end of 1999. The deficit
is financed by issuing bonds, the service of which is not only
impinging on government finances, but is also an important cause of
high interest rates, low investment and continued double digit
inflation. The internal (bond) debt service requires approximately a
third of the Government's ordinary income.
The government has discarded the alternatives of increasing tax
revenue significantly, firing large numbers of public sector employees
and selling state assets to foreign investors. A partial solution has
been the refinancing of internal debt with lower-cost dollar-
denominated foreign debt. This is convenient for the current government
and should help ease upward pressure on domestic interest rates.
However, it increases the risk of balance of payments problems for
future governments.
Impressive growth in export revenues, due in large measure to
exports by Intel Corporation, brought about a merchandise trade surplus
during the first nine months of 1999. This was the first trade surplus
in decades. New tourist facilities continue to be built, and tourist
income continues to grow. Together, new exports and tourist income
allow a reasonable expectation of continued moderate growth.
2. Exchange Rate Policy
The current exchange rate policy, originally devised in 1993, is of
the ``crawling peg'' variety employing small daily changes. The rate of
devaluation, indirectly set by the Central Bank, is driven by the
market and is adjusted by the Central Bank through its sale or purchase
of foreign currency. Virtually all private business is transacted at
the same rate. All foreign transactions by state institutions are
channeled through the Central Bank at that rate. Commercial banks are
free to negotiate foreign exchange prices, but must liquidate their
foreign exchange positions daily with the Central Bank.
The colon-to-US dollar exchange rate varied 10.7 percent during
1998, a rate similar to the change in the aggregate price level. This
maintained a foreign trade-neutral exchange rate. The Government has
projected a devaluation of about 10.8 percent and a CPI increase of 10
percent for 1999. Thus, the rate of exchange of the colon with respect
to the US dollar should not have a significant impact on the
importation of US goods and services.
Freely traded dollars from tourism and capital investment continue
to flow into Costa Rica. The free and sufficient supply of foreign
currency allowed imports to continue to grow during 1998 and 1999.
3. Structural Policies
The elimination of ``consumer protection'' regulations that
controlled prices and prohibited price speculation in January 1995
permitted an increase in the availability of imported goods. Antitrust
legislation and rules protecting consumers against product
misrepresentation and price fixing were enacted at the same time.
Purchases by state institutions must follow detailed laws and
regulations on public bidding. Local suppliers are not subsidized and
enjoy no special advantages over foreign suppliers. U.S. companies
often succeed in supplying pharmaceuticals, machinery, electrical and
transportation equipment to public sector purchasers. There have been
no recent tax modifications that affect the import of U.S. goods and
services. Corruption was a major theme in the last political campaign,
and several important cases are being tried in the courts.
4. Debt Management Policies
Costa Rica's foreign official debt totaled $2.872 billion on
December 31, 1998. This is an amount equivalent to 27.4 percent of GDP,
and an increase of $232 million from year-end 1997. This is also a
reversal in the previous decline in the size and importance of the
foreign official debt with relation to GDP. Costa Rica placed dollar-
denominated bonds for $200 million in April 1998 and another $300
million April 1999, taking advantage of relatively low interest rates
available in the Eurodollar market. The government used the proceeds to
retire equivalent amounts of its more expensive, colon-denominated
debt, thus reducing the cost of servicing the public debt. The Ministry
of Finance plans to place an additional $200 million every two years,
or $1,200 million within the next 12 years. The savings to the
government from using dollar-denominated bonds instead of the internal
capital market are about five percentage points at present rates of
interest.
Costa Rica paid $430 million in foreign official debt service in
1998, equivalent to 4.1 percent of GDP and 7.7 percent of merchandise
exports. Costa Rica paid $268.3 million in debt service during the
first semester of 1999, $189 million for amortization of principal, and
$79.3 million in interest payments. The Central Bank projects that it
will pay $595.5 million during calendar year 2000, including $393.1
million of principal and $202.4 million in interest payments. The more
pressing concern is the size of the large internally-financed public
debt, which amounted to $3.026 billion at the end of 1998. The
government spends a third of central government budget revenues on
interest on outstanding bonds, an amount second only to salaries for
public employees. This problem is compounded by the Central Bank's
anti-inflationary monetary policy, which results in high interest rates
and high debt service costs for the Ministry of Finance.
5. Aid
U.S. Government agencies provided an estimated $18 million of
assistance during fiscal year 1998, of which $13 million was for the
Screworm Eradication Program. Total assistance from U.S. military
programs was $3.2 million. Costa Rica abolished its military forces in
1948, but the United States provides assistance to Costa Rica's
civilian police.
6. Significant Barriers to U.S. Exports
Costa Rica replaced all import licenses or permits with tariffs as
a condition for joining the WTO in 1994. The Central Bank now monitors
imports for statistical purposes only. The current tariff on most goods
is 15 percent of the CIF price, with a few items such as poultry and
automobiles taxed in excess of 40 percent. Solvents and chemical
precursors used in the elaboration of illegal drugs are carefully
regulated. Surgical and dental instruments and machinery can be sold
only to licensed importers and health professionals. All food products,
medicines, toxic substances, chemicals, insecticides, pesticides and
agricultural inputs must be registered and certified by the Ministry of
Health prior to sale.
Foreign companies and persons may legally own equity in Costa Rican
companies, including real estate. However, several activities are
reserved to the state, including telecommunications, insurance, the
transmission and distribution of electricity, hydrocarbon and
radioactive mineral extraction and refining, and the operation of ports
and airports. Representatives or distributors of foreign products must
have resided in Costa Rica for at least ten years. Medical
practitioners, lawyers, certified public accountants, engineers,
architects, teachers and other professionals must be members of local
guilds, which stipulate residency, examination and apprenticeship
requirements that cannot be met by newcomers.
Legislation approved in October 1995 allowed private banks to offer
demand deposits. However, private banks must be incorporated locally;
branches of foreign banks are not permitted. The three state-owned
commercial banks still account for close to 90 percent of country's
demand deposits.
An electricity co-generation law enacted in 1996 allowed some
private-sector participation in the production of electricity, but not
in its transmission. This law has since been modified to permit the
private construction and operation of plants under BOT (build-operate-
transfer) and BLT (build-lease-transfer) mechanisms, but the operator
must have at least 35 percent Costa Rican equity. There are legislative
proposals to open the electricity, telecommunications, and insurance
sectors to foreign investment and competition, but it is difficult to
predict when this legislation might be passed.
Documentation and labeling of U.S. exports to Costa Rica must use
the metric system and contain specific information in Spanish. Car
bumpers are subject to strength requirements. Phytosanitary and
zoosanitary restrictions and high tariffs on certain agricultural
products significantly constrain imports of some products. The Ministry
of Health must approve imports of pharmaceuticals, veterinary drugs and
pesticides, and the same items must be legally available in the
exporting country.
Costa Rican laws encourage the development of tourism and
nontraditional exports, and provides incentives for foreign investment.
The law does not restrict foreign equity participation, with very few
exceptions, as noted above. The Labor Code ordinarily limits the
percentage of foreign workers that can work in an enterprise to 10
percent of the total workforce. Foreigners may account for no more than
15 percent of the total payroll. Permits for foreign participation in
management are routinely granted. No requirements exist for foreign
owners to work in their own companies. There are no restrictions on the
repatriation of profits and capital.
The government and other state institutions procure goods and
services through open public bidding. However, the General Law on
Financial Administration allows private tenders and direct contracting
of goods and services in relatively small quantities or, in case of
emergency, with the consent of the Controller General (General
Accounting Office). Public bidding is complicated and highly regulated,
with the result that foreign bidders are frequently disqualified for
failure to comply exactly with the required procedures. Appeals of
contract awards are common, lengthy and costly, sometimes leading to
losses when market prices change and bid prices remain fixed. No
special requirements apply to foreign suppliers, and U.S. companies
regularly win public contracts. Competition is fierce among foreign
suppliers, and frequently the winner must propose comprehensive
packages that include performance guarantees and financing. Foreign
suppliers must have a legal representative in Costa Rica in order to
sell goods or services to public entities. A 1996 law simplified
government procurement procedures, but the process is still complex.
Customs procedures are often costly and complex, but they do not
discriminate between Costa Ricans and foreign traders. Most large firms
have customs specialists on the payroll, in addition to contracting the
mandatory services of customs brokers. Customs brokers must be Costa
Rican nationals. The government is automating and simplifying the
customs system and has established a one-stop window to speed it up.
The government expropriation policy has created problems for some
U.S. investors. The government has expropriated large amounts of land
for national parks and for ecological and indigenous reserves, but
compensation is rarely, if ever, prompt. Some unpaid expropriation
claims date back over 25 years. It is possible to obtain compensation
through the court system, but the time, effort and costs involved can
greatly diminish the net value of any settlement. Claimants also have
recourse to international arbitration through the International Center
for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) as of 1993.
Submission of the first expropriation case to ICSID continues in a case
involving the government and a prominent group of U.S. investors. Local
arbitration has been employed since 1991. Landowners in Costa Rica also
run the risk of losing their property to squatters, who are often
organized and sometimes violent. A U.S. citizen and long-term resident
of Costa Rica was killed in November 1997 in a dispute over an ocean
front land concession granted by a municipal government. Squatters
enjoy certain rights under Costa Rican land tenure laws and can
eventually receive title to the land they occupy if the occupation is
left unchallenged by the landowners. Police protection of landowners in
rural areas is often inadequate. The government has in some cases
expropriated property taken over by squatters in order to resolve
property conflicts, but it has not always compensated adequately those
from whom the land was originally taken.
7. Export Subsidies Policies
Nontraditional exports to destinations outside of Central America
and Panama qualified for negotiable tax rebate certificates (CATS)
under the Export Promotion Law of 1972. This program is being phased
out and will be completely terminated by December 31, 1999. The Export
Processing Law of 1981 permits companies in designated free trade zones
to be exempted from paying duties on imported inputs that are
incorporated into exported products. It also provides holidays on
income and remittance taxes. The Active Processing Regime of 1997
offers similar duty-free entry for imported inputs, but does not
provide tax holidays.
8. The Protection of U.S. Intellectual Property
Costa Rica belongs to the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the
World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO). Costa Rica is also a
signatory to the Paris Convention, Berne Convention, Lisbon Agreement,
Rome Convention, Phonograms Convention and the Universal Copyright
Convention. The U.S. Trade Representative placed Costa Rica on the
``Special 301'' Watch List in 1995, and each year since then, because
of deficient patent legislation and widespread copyright and trademark
piracy.
Significant weaknesses exist in copyright and trademark enforcement
and in the duration of patent protection. The government has submitted
several bills to the Legislative Assembly in order to implement
required modifications to ensure that the country is in compliance with
its IPR obligations under the WTO TRIPS Agreement by the January 1,
2000 deadline. It is not certain that all the issues will be resolved
in time, but the bills appear to include all the required modifications
and are currently under consideration.
Patents: The new legislation is expected to resolve the following
problems in the area of patents. Patents have been granted for non-
extendible, 12-year terms, less than the 20 years required by the TRIPS
Agreement. Coverage has been for only one year for products deemed ``in
the public interest,'' such as pharmaceuticals, chemicals and
agrochemicals, and all beverage and food products. No patent protection
has been available for plant or animal varieties, or for any biological
or microbiological process or products, but the government is working
on a legislative proposal that would protect such products within the
framework of the Convention for the Protection of New Varieties of
Plants (UPOV). Costa Rica also has had broad compulsory licensing
requirements that force patent owners to license inventions that are
not produced locally.
Trademarks: Trademarks, service marks, trade names and slogans can
be registered in Costa Rica. Registration is renewable for 10-year
periods. However, there are enforcement problems similar to those
encountered with copyrights, particularly in the area of designer
clothing (e.g., jeans). There is also a problem in the registration of
famous marks by speculators, who demand to be bought out when the
legitimate trademark owner comes to Costa Rica. Litigation to establish
trademark ownership can be expensive.
Copyright: Costa Rica's copyright laws are generally adequate, and
market access for legitimate copyrighted goods is not restricted by
anything other than the unfair price advantage enjoyed by pirated
goods. The Government issued regulations that provide better protection
and mandate police participation in developing criminal cases against
pirates on May 24, 1994. The main problem is enforcement, particularly
against videocassette and business software pirates. The cable
television industry now operates almost entirely under agreements with
foreign producers. The major public universities recently contracted to
use copyrighted software. However, some hotels continue to pirate
satellite transmission signals. Pirated videocassettes, usually
duplicated domestically, are widely available and constitute at least
90 percent of the market. An authorized distributor of videocassettes
has successfully begun enforcement efforts to regularize the
videocassette market, and licensed products are becoming more widely
available in rental outlets.
Existing laws protect trade secrets, and Article 24 of the
Constitution protects the confidentiality of communications. A new bill
before the legislature updates existing law in accordance with TRIPS
standards. The penal code stipulates prison sentences for divulging
trade, employment, or other secrets, and doubles the punishment for
public servants. Some existing laws also stipulate criminal and civil
penalties for divulging trade secrets. The burden of proof is on the
affected party.
9. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association: Costa Rican law specifies the right of
workers to join labor unions of their choosing without prior
authorization. Nevertheless, some barriers exist in practice. Unions
operate independently of government control and may form federations
and confederations and affiliate internationally. Many Costa Rican
workers join solidarity associations, under which employers provide
easy access to saving plans, loans, recreation centers, and other
benefits in return for their agreement to employ non-confrontational
methods to settle disputes. Both solidarity associations and labor
unions coexist at some workplaces, primarily in the public sector.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively: The Constitution
protects the right to organize. Reforms to the Labor Code enacted in
1993 provide protection from dismissal for union organizers and members
during union formation and require employers found guilty of
discrimination to reinstate workers fired for union activities. Costa
Rica has no restrictions on the right of private sector employees to
strike or engage in collective bargaining. The constitutionality of
public sector collective bargaining agreements was recent challenged in
the Supreme Court, which will rule on this issue sometime in the year
2000. The Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court ruled in 1998
that public sector workers, except those performing essential services,
have the right to strike.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor: The Constitution
prohibits forced or compulsory labor and requires employers to provide
adequate wages to workers in accordance with minimum wage and salary
standards. Laws prohibit forced and bonded labor by children. The
government enforces this prohibition effectively.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children: The Children's Code
enacted in 1992 prohibits the employment of children under 15 years of
age. The Ministry of Labor issued some waivers to this provision, with
the goal of moving gradually toward the elimination of child labor. The
Constitution provides special employment protection for women and
youth. Children between 15 and 18 can work a maximum of seven hours
daily and 42 hours weekly, while children between 12 and 15 can work a
maximum of five hours daily and 30 hours weekly. The National
Children's Institute, in cooperation with the Ministry of Labor,
enforces these regulations in the formal sector, but child labor
remains an integral part of the informal economy.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work: The Constitution provides for a
minimum wage, and a national wage council sets minimum wage and salary
levels for the private and public sectors every six months. Workers may
work a maximum of eight hours during the day and six at night, up to
weekly totals of 48 and 36 hours, respectively. Industrial,
agricultural and commercial firms with ten or more workers must
establish management-labor committees and allow government workplace
inspections. Workplace enforcement is less effective outside the San
Jose area.
f. Rights in Sectors with U.S. Investment: Labor regulations apply
throughout Costa Rica, including in the country's export processing
zones. Companies in sectors with significant U.S. investment generally
respect worker rights, especially at plants under U.S. ownership and
management. Abuses occur more frequently at plants operated by
investors based outside the United States.
Extent of U.S. Investment in Selected Industries--U.S. Direct Investment Position Abroad on an Historical Cost
Basis--1998
[Millions of U.S. Dollars]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Category Amount
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Petroleum...................... .............. 28
Total Manufacturing............ .............. 371
Food & Kindred Products...... 102 ...............................................................
Chemicals & Allied Products.. 137 ...............................................................
Primary & Fabricated Metals.. 20 ...............................................................
Industrial Machinery and -17 ...............................................................
Equipment.
Electric & Electronic (\1\) ...............................................................
Equipment.
Transportation Equipment..... 0 ...............................................................
Other Manufacturing.......... (\1\) ...............................................................
Wholesale Trade................ .............. (\1\)
Banking........................ .............. 0
Finance/Insurance/Real Estate.. .............. (\1\)
Services....................... .............. (\2\)
Other Industries............... .............. (\1\)
TOTAL ALL INDUSTRIES........... .............. 2,126
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Suppressed to avoid disclosing data of individual companies.
\2\ Less than $500,000 (+/-).
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis.
______
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC
Key Economic Indicators
[Billions of U.S. Dollars unless otherwise indicated]
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1997 1998 \1\ 1999
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Income, Production and Employment:
Nominal GDP \2\......................... 15.0 15.9 18.5
Real GDP Growth (pct) \3\............... 8.2 7.3 7.6
GDP by Sector:
Agriculture........................... 1.9 2.1 2.1
Manufacturing......................... 2.7 2.9 3.1
Services.............................. 4.7 5.2 6.8
Government............................ 1.0 1.1 1.4
Per Capita GDP (US$).................... 1,882 1,942 2,219
Labor Force (000's)..................... 3,614 3,697 N/A
Unemployment Rate (pct)................. 15.7 14.3 N/A
Money and Prices (annual percentage
growth):
Money Supply Growth (M2)................ 24 16 17
Consumer Price Inflation................ 8.3 7.8 7.5
Exchange Rate (DR Peso/US$ annual
average)
Official.............................. 14.01 14.71 15.89
Parallel.............................. 14.27 15.27 16.15
Balance of Payments and Trade:
Total Exports FOB \4\................... 4.8 5.0 5.1
Exports to U.S.\4\.................... 4.4 3.6 3.7
Total Imports CIF \4\................... 6.6 7.6 7.7
Imports from U.S.\4\.................. 3.9 4.0 4.1
Trade Balance (US$ millions) \4\........ -1.8 -2.6 -2.6
Trade Balance with U.S.\4\............ 0.5 -0.4 -0.4
External Public Debt.................... 3.5 3.5 N/A
Fiscal Surplus/GDP (pct)................ 1.6 -1.2 N/A
Current Account Deficit/GDP (pct)....... -1.5 -2.4 -3.1
Debt Service Payments/GDP (pct)......... 1.5 2.3 2.5
Gold and Foreign Exchange Reserves \4\.. 0.5 0.7 0.8
Aid from U.S. (US$ millions) \4\ \5\.... 11.6 60.4 10.4
Aid from All Other Sources \4\.......... N/A 141.0 N/A
------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ 1999 figures are all estimates based on available monthly data
through September.
\2\ GDP at factor cost.
\3\ Percentage changes calculated in local currency.
\4\ Central Bank; exports FAS, imports customs basis; 1999 figures are
estimates based on data available through September.
\5\ Military aid equaled US$ 880,000 in both 1998 and 1999.
Source: Economic Studies Department, Central Bank of the Dominican
Republic, unless otherwise indicated.
1. General Policy Framework
Despite extensive damage to infrastructure and agriculture caused
by Hurricane Georges in September 1998, the economy of the Dominican
Republic continued its excellent rate of growth in the first three
quarters of 1999, with the central bank predicting GDP growth of at
least seven percent for the fourth year in a row. The central bank also
predicts that inflation will again be held to the single digit level.
Because of the Dominican Republic's high propensity to import,
changes in the exchange rate are politically significant. The need to
keep the peso stable forces the central bank to maintain a high
interest rate structure to retain short-term capital. Foreign exchange
operations also play a role in meeting money supply targets since the
central bank's purchase of pesos for dollars tends to reduce the money
in circulation within the country.
According to the central bank, the money supply grew 17 percent
from September 1998 to September 1999. The central bank regulates the
money supply by issuance of new money through the banking system and by
the purchase or issuance of debt instruments of the central bank
itself. Since there is no secondary market for government securities
and no liquid security market, the tools available to the central bank
are limited. The central bank can modify bank reserve requirements but
rarely does so. Banks resort to the discount window of the central bank
only rarely. The Superintendency of Banks has continued its work to
improve banking regulation. Although the Dominican Republic has no
deposit insurance, the central bank guaranteed deposits at Bancomercio,
the country's third largest bank, when it failed in early 1996, and
subsequently supervised its sale to another Dominican bank. There have
been no significant bank failures since then.
Gross foreign exchange reserves were approximately $830 million in
September 1999. The reserve figures include some central bank assets,
which are not actually available for use in payments. The government
continued timely payments of foreign private bank debt and payments on
renegotiated Paris Club debt.
The government continues to compensate the central bank for foreign
debt payments carried out on its behalf. In the past, the central bank
obtained the dollars needed for debt service by monetary expansion and
compensated for this expansion by issuing Certificados de
Participacion, which are short-term debt instruments. While this helps
absorb excess liquidity, interest payments on these certificates may
also be covered by net money creation.
Prior to Hurricane Georges, government cash flows were in surplus
according to the central bank. Relief and reconstruction expenditures
caused the government to run a minor deficit, despite contributions
from the multilateral financial institutions. On an accrual basis,
however, there is probably a significant deficit. The government has
accumulated large arrears to domestic suppliers and contractors,
although the Fernandez administration is moving slowly to repay some
portion of this. For example, in September of 1999, the government
agreed to pay off $125 million in debts of the State Sugar Council in
connection with the privatization of that entity. The central
government continues to provide subsidies to some state enterprises
without regard to efficiency or production targets, but has moved
decisively on privatization of electricity, sugar, flour, and airports.
The exact size of this debt is unknown, but has been variously put at
the peso equivalent of 150 to 600 million dollars. This domestic debt
is owed to foreign firms now or previously operating in the Dominican
Republic, as well as to purely local firms. Current government
financial flows leave substantial doubt about the ability of the
Dominican Government to pay this debt. The government has considered
covering this debt by the issuance of bonds.
The Dominican Republic has ratified the GATT 94 and participates in
WTO meetings. The Dominican Government has yet to determine an
equitable and transparent method of quota distribution to implement its
rectification agreement for eight protected agricultural products. In
addition, the Dominican Republic has a discretionary import permit
requirement for some agricultural products, especially beef and pork.
2. Exchange Rate Policy
The official exchange rate is set by the central bank. On July 2,
1998, the peso was devalued nine percent from 14.02 pesos/dollar to
15.33 pesos/dollar. It has continued to devalue slowly since then with
the most recent official rate (November 1999) set at 15.93 pesos/
dollar. The unofficial rate has also devalued and is currently in the
range of 15.90 pesos to the dollar. An October 1999 increase in the fee
for purchasing foreign currency to 5% (up from 1.75%) has effectively
further devalued the peso. Traditional exporters such as sugar, cocoa,
and coffee producers, credit card companies, and airlines are still
required by law to sell foreign exchange to the Central Bank at the
official rate, but most businesses and individuals are free to carry
out foreign exchange transactions through the commercial bank system.
The market rate is influenced by Central Bank activities such as dollar
sales and the use of its considerable regulatory discretion to
``jawbone'' banks.
3. Structural Policies
Most domestic prices are determined by market forces, although
distortionary government policies sometimes limit the operation of
these forces. High tariff and nontariff barriers also increase the cost
of doing business in the Dominican Republic. Since tariff reform was
enacted by presidential decree in 1990 and modified by law in 1993, no
further reform has affected U.S. exporters. In December 1996, President
Fernandez submitted a proposal to Congress to decrease all tariffs.
This proposal was not acted upon. Following the negotiation of a free
trade pact with Central America, however, the Fernandez administration
submitted a new proposal to the Congress to decrease tariff levels to
Central American levels (i.e. a top tariff of 20 percent). Action is
still pending on this proposal.
The 1990 tariff regime reduced and simplified the tariff schedule
to six categories with seven tariff rates ranging from 3 to 35 percent.
It also replaced some quantitative import restrictions with tariffs and
transformed all tariffs to ad valorem rates. While it marked an
improvement over the previous tariff regime, this reform still left the
Dominican Republic with high trade barriers. Few imports actually enter
at the maximum 35 percent tariff rate, however, since together with
other taxes and fees, it acts as an effective barrier to trade. Since
nearly 40 percent of government revenues come from duties, taxes and
fees collected on imports, the government's flexibility in trade policy
is limited.
The government has continued to implement changes in its tax system
aimed at increasing revenues. The concept of taxable income has been
enlarged, marginal tax rates on individuals and companies reduced and
capital gains are no longer considered exempted income. The government
submitted proposals for changes in the tax system as part of a reform
package in late 1998, but these have yet to be approved by Congress. In
May 1992, a new labor code was promulgated with provisions that
increased a variety of employee benefits. After an increase of 25
percent in 1997, public sector minimum wages have not increased.
Government policy prohibits new foreign investment in a number of
areas including national defense production, forest exploitation and
domestic air, surface and water transportation. Government regulations,
such as the process required to obtain the permits to open new
businesses, choke economic growth and innovation. The difficulties of
protecting intellectual property rights have slowed the use of modern
medicines. Investment in modern agricultural techniques is impeded by a
chaotic land tenure system and the unwillingness of large landowners to
modernize.
4. Debt Management Policies
The total external debt of the government is now approximately $3.5
billion. A significant portion of the official debt was rescheduled
under the terms of Paris Club negotiations concluded in November 1991.
In August 1994, the government successfully concluded debt settlement
negotiations with its commercial bank creditors. The deal involved a
combination of buy-back schemes and U.S. Treasury-backed rescheduling.
Payment to foreign private and public creditors in the financial sector
has generally been current since then, particularly since the agreement
noted above with the CCC. A September 1999 Dominican request to defer
Paris Club debt payments due in the first half of 2000 was denied.
However, an IPP agreement was signed in late November 1999, which is a
credible step towards resolving some of the major outstanding issues.
Government payments to foreign non-financial institutions are
notoriously slow. Some debts are ten years old. The Fernandez
government continues to express its desire to resolve these debts, but
progress has been limited.
5. Significant Barriers to U.S. Exports
Trade Barriers: Tariffs on most products fall within the 5 to 35
percent range. In addition, the government imposes a 5 to 80 percent
selective consumption tax on ``non-essential'' imports such as home
appliances, alcohol, perfumes, jewelry, and automobiles. The government
recently adjusted the formula for determining the base on which to
apply the selective consumption tax to imported liquor following
complaints from importers that the old formula discriminated against
them in violation of WTO commitments.
The Dominican Republic requires a consular invoice and
``legalization'' of documents, which must be performed by a Dominican
Consulate in the U.S. Fees for this service vary by consulate but can
be quite substantial. Some importers now pay the consular invoice fee
in Santo Domingo directly to customs. Moreover, importers are
frequently required to obtain licenses from the Dominican Customs
Service.
There are food and drug testing and certification requirements, but
these are not burdensome.
Customs Procedures: In the past, bringing goods through Dominican
Customs was a slow and arduous process, but there is anecdotal evidence
that this situation has improved. Customs Department interpretation of
exonerated materials being brought into the country still provokes
complaints, however, and businesspersons here sometimes spend
considerable time and money to get items through customs.
Arbitrary customs clearance procedures sometimes cause problems for
business. The use of ``negotiated fee'' practices to gain faster
customs clearance continues to put some U.S. firms at a competitive
disadvantage in the Dominican market. Customs officials routinely
reject invoice prices as a basis for computing duties and customs fees
and use their own assumed value database. This applies to virtually all
non-free trade zone imports.
Government Procurement Practices: The Dominican Republic has a
centralized Government Procurement Office, but the procurement
activities of this office are basically limited to expendable supply
items of the government's general office work. In practice, each public
sector entity has its own procurement office, both for transactions in
the domestic market and for imports. Provisions of the U.S. Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act often put U.S. bidders on government contracts at
a serious disadvantage in what are sometimes non-transparent bidding
procedures.
Prohibitions on Land Ownership: A long-standing requirement that
foreigners wishing to purchase land first obtain permission from the
presidency was lifted in early 1998.
Investment Barriers: Legislation designed to improve the investment
climate passed in November 1995. Its implementing regulations were
issued by the Fernandez administration in September 1996. The
legislation does not contain procedures for settling disputes arising
from Dominican Government actions. The seizures of foreign investors'
property by past governments which are still unresolved, refusal to
honor customs exoneration commitments, and the government's slowness in
resolving claims for payment reduce the attractiveness of the
investment climate, notwithstanding passage of the 1995 legislation.
Foreign investment must receive approval from the Foreign
Investment Directorate of the central bank to qualify for repatriation
of profits (the new law provides for repatriation of 100 percent of
profits and capital and nearly automatic approval of investments). A
new Fiscal and Monetary Code that would have permitted restrictions on
capital flows was vetoed by President Fernandez in November 1999.
The electricity sector is a weak link in the Dominican economy.
Businesses operating in the DR cannot depend on the public electric
utility (CDE) to be a reliable source of electricity. Legislation
governing the privatization/capitalization of CDE as well as of other
state enterprises was passed by the Congress in June 1997. CDE's
distribution units and thermal generation facilities were capitalized
in 1999, and are now under the control of private sector operators.
Foreign employees may not exceed 20 percent of a firm's work force.
This is not applicable when foreign employees perform managerial or
administration functions only.
Dominican expropriation standards (e.g., in the ``public
interest'') do not appear to be consistent with international law
standards; several investors have outstanding disputes concerning
expropriated property. The Fernandez government continues to maintain
that it wishes to resolve these issues although progress has been slow.
The Dominican Republic does not recognize the general right of
investors to binding international arbitration.
All mineral resources belong to the state, which controls all
rights to explore or exploit them. Private investment has been
permitted in selected sites. Currently, foreign investors are exploring
for gold, natural gas, nickel and copper. The process of choosing and
contracting such areas has not always been transparent.
Investors operating in the Dominican Republic's Free Trade Zones
(FTZ's) experience far fewer problems in dealing with the government
than do investors working outside the zones. For example, materials
coming into or being shipped out of the zones are reported to move
quickly, without the kinds of bureaucratic difficulties mentioned
above.
6. Export Subsidies Policies
The Dominican Republic has two sets of legislation for export
promotion: the Free Trade Zone Law (Law no. 8-90, passed in 1990) and
the Export Incentive Law (Law no. 69, passed in 1979). The Free Trade
Zone Law provides 100 percent exemption on all taxes, duties, and
charges affecting the productive and trade operations at free trade
zones. These incentives are provided to specific beneficiaries for up
to 20 years, depending on the location of the zone. This legislation is
managed jointly by the Foreign Trade Zone National Council and the
Dominican Customs Service.
The Export Incentive Law provides for tax and duty free treatment
of inputs from overseas that are to be processed and re-exported as
final products. This legislation is managed by the Dominican Export
Promotion Center and the Customs Service. In practice, use of the
export incentive law to import raw materials for process and re-export
is cumbersome and delays in clearing customs can take anywhere from 20-
60 days. This customs clearance process has made completion of
production contracts with specific deadlines difficult. As a result,
non-free trade zone exporters rarely take advantage of the Export
Incentive Law. Most prefer to import raw materials using the normal
customs procedures which, although more costly, are more rapid and
predictable.
There is no preferential financing for local exporters nor is there
a government fund for export promotion.
7. Protection of U.S. Intellectual Property
The Dominican Republic belongs to the World Trade Organization
(WTO), and is a signatory to the Paris Convention, Berne Convention,
Madrid Agreement, and the Rome Convention. In 1998, and again in 1999,
the U.S. Trade Representative placed the Dominican Republic on the
``Special 301'' Priority Watch List because it continues to have
inadequate enforcement of its existing laws and a legal regime that
does not meet international standards. Piracy of video and audio tapes,
compact discs, and software is widespread. The government has, however,
stepped up efforts to combat such piracy. While larger cable TV systems
generally pay royalties to U.S. right holders, smaller ones continue to
pirate satellite signals, and the government has not responded to
requests from U.S. industry for more effective enforcement. Trademarks,
particularly of apparel and athletic shoes, are commonly counterfeited
and sold locally. The patent law still contains broad exceptions from
patentability, and provides an inadequate term of protection.
Patents: Patents are difficult to receive and enforce against a
determined intellectual property thief. In a local pharmaceutical
market worth approximately $110 million per year, 70 percent of the
total is locally produced or packaged. A significant percentage of that
total is believed to be pirated. Resolutions issued by the government
at year-end 1996 and early 1997 further encourage the violation of
pharmaceutical patents in the Dominican Republic. Last year, however,
the Supreme Court upheld the rights of a foreign patent holder against
a local laboratory. Draft patent legislation, pending in Congress, is
inadequate, raising the prospect that the Dominican Republic will not
be in compliance with its WTO obligations with regard to intellectual
property by the January 1, 2000 deadline.
Trademarks: Apparel and other trademarked products are
counterfeited and sold in the local market. Although the Dominican
Government is taking a more activist stance toward remedying
shortcomings in this area, including seizure of pirated goods,
protection remains problematic.
Copyright: Despite copyright laws that are generally adequate and
improved efforts at enforcement, piracy of copyrighted materials is
still widespread. Video and audio recordings and software are being
counterfeited despite the government's efforts to seize and destroy
pirated goods. Some television and cable operators are re-broadcasting
signals without compensating either the original broadcaster or the
originator of the recording. The Motion Picture Association of America
(MPAA) estimates that losses in the Dominican Republic due to theft of
satellite-carried programming are one million dollars per year. The
International Intellectual Property Alliance has filed a petition
requesting a review of the Dominican Republic's GSP status due to
continued copyright violations.
Impact on U.S. Trade: Infringement of intellectual property rights
is so widespread that quantifying its impact on U.S.-Dominican trade is
virtually impossible. Legislation to enable the Dominican Republic to
comply with the WTO Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights (TRIPS) is pending in the Congress.
8. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association: The Constitution provides for the
freedom to organize labor unions and also for the right of workers to
strike (and for private sector employers to lock out workers). All
workers, except military and police, are free to organize, and workers
in all sectors exercise this right. The government respects association
rights and places no obstacles to union registration, affiliation or
the ability to engage in legal strikes. Organized labor represents
little more than 10 percent of the work force and is divided among
three major confederations, four minor confederations and a number of
independent unions.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively: Collective
bargaining is lawful and may take place in firms in which a union has
gained the support of an absolute majority of the workers. Only a
minority of companies has collective bargaining pacts. The Labor Code
stipulates that workers cannot be dismissed because of their trade
union membership or activities.
The Labor Code applies in the 40 established Free Trade Zones
(FTZs). The FTZ companies, over sixty percent of which are U.S.-owned
or associated, employ approximately 172,000 workers, mostly women. Some
FTZ companies have allegedly discharged workers who attempt to organize
unions, but these allegations have primarily been made against non-U.S.
companies.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor: There were some
reports of forced overtime in factories, mainly those owned by non-U.S.
companies. Employers, particularly in the FTZs, sometimes locked the
exit doors of factories after normal closing time so that workers could
not leave. There have been reports of workers being fired for refusing
to work overtime and both employers and workers state that new hires
are not informed that overtime is optional.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children: The Labor Code prohibits
employment of youth under 14 years of age and places restrictions on
the employment of youth under the age of 16. These restrictions include
a limitation of no more than six hours of daily work, no employment in
dangerous occupations or establishments serving alcohol and limitations
on nighttime work. Dominican law requires six years of formal
education.
The high level of unemployment and lack of a social safety net
create pressures on families to allow children to earn supplemental
income. Tens of thousands of children work selling newspapers, shining
shoes or cleaning cars, often during school hours. The government has
proposed a fine for the parents of truant children.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work: The Constitution provides the
government with legal authority to set minimum wage levels and the
Labor Code assigns this task to a National Salary Committee. Congress
may also enact minimum wage legislation. The Labor Code establishes a
standard work period of eight hours per day and 44 hours per week. The
Code also stipulates that all workers are entitled to 36 hours of
uninterrupted rest each week. The Code grants workers a 35 percent
differential for work over 44 hours up to 68 hours per week and double
time for any hours above 68 hours per week.
The Dominican Social Security Institute (IDSS) sets workplace
safety and health conditions. The existing social security system does
not apply to all workers and is underfunded.
Workplace regulations and their enforcement in the FTZs do not
differ from those in the country at large, although working conditions
are sometimes better. Conditions for agricultural workers are in
general much worse, especially in the sugar industry.
f. Rights in Sectors with U.S. Investments: U.S.-based
multinationals active in the FTZs represent one of the principal
sources of U.S. investment in the Dominican Republic. Some companies in
the FTZs adhere to significantly higher worker safety and health
standards than do non-FTZ companies. In other categories of worker
rights, conditions in sectors with U.S. investment do not differ
significantly from conditions in sectors lacking U.S. investment.
Extent of U.S. Investment in Selected Industries--U.S. Direct Investment Position Abroad on an Historical Cost
Basis--1998
[Millions of U.S. Dollars]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Category Amount
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Petroleum...................... .............. (\1\)
Total Manufacturing............ .............. 390
Food & Kindred Products...... 2 ...............................................................
Chemicals & Allied Products.. 22 ...............................................................
Primary & Fabricated Metals.. 0 ...............................................................
Industrial Machinery and 0 ...............................................................
Equipment.
Electric & Electronic 0 ...............................................................
Equipment.
Transportation Equipment..... 0 ...............................................................
Other Manufacturing.......... 346 ...............................................................
Wholesale Trade................ .............. (\1\)
Banking........................ .............. 58
Finance/Insurance/Real Estate.. .............. (\2\)
Services....................... .............. 20
Other Industries............... .............. (\1\)
TOTAL ALL INDUSTRIES........... .............. 535
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Suppressed to avoid disclosing data of individual companies.
\2\ Less than $500,000 (+/-).
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis.
______
ECUADOR
Key Economic Indicators
[Billions of U.S. Dollars unless otherwise indicated]
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1997 1998 \1\ 1999
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Income, Production and Employment:
Nominal GDP............................. 19.8 19.7 14.5
Real GDP Growth (pct)................... 3.4 0.4 -10.0
GDP by Sector:
Agriculture, Fishing.................. 4.1 -1.4 2.7
Petroleum, Mining..................... 3.5 -3.3 -2.6
Manufacturing......................... 3.5 0.4 -9.2
Commerce, Hotels...................... 3.3 0.9 -11.3
Finance, Business Services............ 1.9 3.5 1.1
Government, Other Services............ 1.3 1.2 -11.9
Per Capita GDP (US$).................... 1,665 1,619 1,164
Labor Force (estimate-000's)............ 3,374 3,441 3,880
Urban Unemployment (pct)................ 9.3 11.5 16.9
Money and Prices (annual percentage
growth):
Money Supply (M2) \2\................... 35.0 43.0 N/A
Consumer Price Inflation................ 30.7 45.0 50.4
Exchange Rate (Sucres/US$ annual
average)
Central Bank.......................... 4,000 5,442 11,165
Market................................ 4,070 5,445 11,182
Balance of Payments and Trade:
Total Exports FOB \3\................... 5.3 4.2 2.8
Exports to U.S.\3\.................... 2.0 1.7 1.1
Total Imports CIF \3\................... 2.2 5.2 1.7
Imports from U.S.\3\.................. 1.5 1.7 0.6
Trade Balance \3\....................... 3.1 -1.0 1.1
Balance with U.S.\3\.................. 0.5 0.0 0.5
External Public Debt.................... 12.6 13.3 13.6
Debt Service Payments/GDP (pct)......... 27.7 22.4 21.0
Current Account Deficit/GDP (pct)....... -3.8 -11.0 2.6
Fiscal Balance/GDP (pct)................ -2.5 -5.9 -4.0
Gold and Foreign Exchange Reserves...... 2.1 1.7 1.3
Aid from U.S. (FY-US$ millions)......... 11.5 12.5 16.4
Aid from Other Sources (US$ millions)... N/A N/A N/A
------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ 1999 figures are estimates based on data available in November 1999.
\2\ 1999 figure is for August 1998-August 1999.
\3\ All 1999 figures are for the period January-August.
Source: Ecuadorian Government and Central Bank of Ecuador data.
1. General Policy Framework
The Ecuadorian economy is based on petroleum production and exports
of bananas, shrimp and other primary agricultural products. Industry is
largely oriented to servicing the domestic market but is becoming more
export-oriented. During the oil boom of the 1970s, the government
borrowed heavily from abroad, subsidized consumers and producers, and
expanded the state's role in economic production. These policies led to
chronic macroeconomic instability in the 1980s. Continued borrowing and
fiscal mismanagement in the 1990s have brought on Ecuador's worst
economic crisis in 70 years.
The 1992-1996 government of Sixto Duran-Ballen sought to stabilize
the economy, modernize the state, and expand the role of the free
market. By 1994, a sound macroeconomic program had resulted in a
balanced budget and reduced inflation. Those accomplishments, however,
were undermined by a series of shocks during 1995, including the
outbreak of fighting on the border with Peru, a corruption scandal and
political crisis involving the then-Vice President, and several months
of electricity rationing. The problems resulted in skyrocketing
interest rates, a growing number of past-due loans, and the failure of
a major financial institution. GDP growth slowed during 1995,
increasing by only 2.3 percent instead of a projected 4 percent. The
uncertainty associated with the 1996 elections, the rise of the
populist Abdala Bucaram to the presidency, poor treatment of foreign
investors, and delays in the announcement of the new government's
economic program helped prevent an economic recovery. Economic reform
stalled under Bucaram's six-month government (August 1996-February
1997) which was characterized by increased corruption and decreased
investment.
The interim government of Fabian Alarcon (February 1997-August
1998) was faced with a number of economic challenges, including
implementing the Duran-Ballen era reforms, falling oil prices, and
coastal devastation from El Nino. Unfortunately, the Alarcon government
was not up to the task, failing to privatize the state-owned telephone
company, reduce the inflation rate to international levels, or improve
the electricity generating sector. The current administration of Jamil
Mahuad, which moved quickly to secure a peace treaty with Peru in the
Fall of 1998, inherited growing economic problems and has been wracked
by a chronic fiscal budget deficit, a collapsing banking system, a
rapidly devaluing currency, severe inflation, and negative economic
growth. The economy is expected to contract by about 10 percent in
1999. As a consequence, imports will drop by almost 50 percent from
1998 levels.
The government estimates that the fiscal deficit for 1999 will
reach between 4.0 and 4.5 percent of GDP. Significant revenue and
expenditure measures will be needed to reduce the deficit to what the
government and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) believe is a
sustainable figure of 2.5 percent of GDP in the year 2000. Public
sector expenditures accounted for 22.4 percent of GDP in 1998. Debt
service is the largest area of government spending (accounting for
about 41 percent of central government expenditures), followed by
education, defense and agriculture. The government remains highly
dependent on revenue from oil exports and customs charges.
The central bank attempts to smooth out fluctuations in liquidity
through weekly bond auctions and interventions in the secondary market,
and has sometimes used bank reserve requirements as a monetary tool.
During periods of capital inflows, the government has compensated for
the inflationary effects of foreign exchange influx by increasing its
sucre deposits at the central bank. Annual M2 percentage growth in 1998
increased from 35 percent to 43 percent. The monetary emission rate
from January to October 1999 was 130 percent, fueling a 140 percent
devaluation of the sucre against the U.S. dollar during this time
period.
The Duran-Ballen policy of depreciating the currency at a rate
slower than inflation helped reduce the annual increase in consumer
prices from 60 percent in 1992 to 23 percent in 1995. However, the
inflation rate rose to 30 percent in 1997, 43 percent in 1998, and will
likely reach at least 55 percent in 1999. In 1999, the collapsing
domestic financial system and a relative lack of U.S. dollars pushed
nominal interbank interest rates as high as 180 percent before falling
to about 55 percent in November.
2. Exchange Rate Policy
The central bank abandoned its crawling peg exchange rate system in
February of 1999. The sucre trades freely against the U.S. dollar and
other currencies. U.S. dollars are readily available on the free
market, trading around 18,000 sucres to one dollar by mid-November
1999. The Sucre has devalued some 140 percent against the U.S. dollar
between January and November 1999, and further depreciation is likely.
By the end of October 1999, foreign exchange reserves amounted to about
$1.3 billion, enough to cover imports for approximately six months.
3. Structural Policies
Recent administrations have enjoyed only partial success in
carrying out structural reforms designed to promote investment and
economic growth. Limited progress has been made on budget reform,
reduction of public employment levels, and elimination of some
unnecessary and market-distorting regulations. With exceptions for
pharmaceuticals, fuels, and some foodstuffs, prices are set by the free
market. Relatively new laws have established a basis for the
development of equity capital markets, modern regulation of financial
institutions, and improvement in the security of agricultural land
tenure for both peasants and agribusiness. In most cases, however,
implementation has lagged behind legislation. The Mahuad government
would like to make structural reforms, including revamping the tax
system and privatizing state-owned enterprises, such as
telecommunications and power generation, but has been hampered by
Ecuador's deep economic crisis and opposition in Congress.
The 1993 State Modernization Law allowed private sector
participation in ``strategic sectors'' of the economy, including
petroleum, electricity and telecommunications, but only on a
concessional basis. The National Modernization Council (CONAM) has
sought to promote privatization, and the state development banks have
sold much of their equity shares in commercial enterprises to the
private sector. In the past, the armed forces have expressed interest
in selling some shares in military-owned companies to private sector
partners, though Ecuador's recent economic problems may delay any such
sales. Soon after entering office, the Mahuad administration put forth
an ambitious plan to privatize much of the state-owned companies by the
year 2000, but has fallen far behind schedule because of the economic
crisis. Of key importance is the scheduled sale of the two state-owned
telephone companies (Andinatel and Pacifictel), which was to have
occurred in the third quarter of 1999. The Mahuad administration has
asked foreign oil companies operating in Ecuador to build a second oil
pipeline from the Amazon jungle to the Pacific Ocean. If the companies
agree, construction could begin in the first half of 2000 and would
last 18 months. Limited steps have been taken toward granting private
concessions for public works, the civil registry, airports, ports, and
postal and railroad services. The government will also need to address
the need for major reform of public education and the social security
system's insolvent pension program.
Investment liberalization measures in 1991 and 1993 provided
foreign investors with full national treatment and eliminated prior
authorization requirements for investment in most industries, including
finance and the media. Specific restrictions, most applicable to
Ecuadorian as well as foreign investors, remain for petroleum, mining,
electricity, telecommunications and fishing investments. A Bilateral
Investment Treaty with the United States that provides for free
transfers and a binding arbitration dispute settlement procedure
entered into force in May 1997. A value-added tax (VAT) of 12 percent
applies to sales of goods and services in the formal sector. An excise
tax on certain ``luxury'' products continues to be applied to imports
in a discriminatory manner. Under this tax system, Ecuadorean Customs
also assesses an arbitrary 25 percent mark-up on the ex-customs value
of alcoholic beverage imports including distilled spirits. This
additional 25 percent mark-up is not applied to like domestic products.
In 1998, Congress passed legislation imposing a one percent tax (since
lowered to 0.8 percent) on financial transactions in the nation's
banking system. Although the Hydrocarbons Law is relatively investor-
friendly, recent administrations have failed to respect many existing
contracts with foreign investors in the oil sector.
4. Debt Management Policies
As of mid-1999, Ecuador's external public debt was $13.6 billion,
or about 95 percent of 1999 estimated GDP. While expressing a desire to
honor the country's debt obligations, President Mahuad stated in August
1999 that Ecuador could no longer afford to service its debt and that
it would not meet a payment on its Discount Brady Bonds. Mahuad's
action sent shock waves through international financial markets since
no country had ever defaulted on its Brady Bonds. In late October,
Ecuador also failed to meet its coupon payments on Eurobonds. As of
November 1999, the Government of Ecuador was negotiating with
bondholders over potential debt restructuring plans to reduce its debt-
servicing burden.
Ecuador concluded bilateral rescheduling agreements with most of
its official creditors, including the United States, under a 1994 Paris
Club agreement but again ran substantial bilateral arrears in 1995-1999
(totaling some $550 million) and has stated its intention to seek
another Paris Club rescheduling. During 1996 Ecuador failed to meet the
targets of the IMF-monitored program that replaced the 1994 standby
arrangement, with which Ecuador had quickly fallen out of compliance.
As of November 1999, Ecuador is seeking another IMF program in order to
reschedule Paris Club debt and unlock conditioned loans from
international financial institutions.
5. Significant Barriers to U.S. Exports
Ecuadorian trade policy was substantially liberalized during the
early 1990's, resulting in a reduction of tariffs, elimination of most
non-tariff surcharges, and enactment of an in-bond processing industry
(maquila) law. The Duran-Ballen administration continued the move
towards open trade by concluding bilateral free trade agreements with
its Andean Pact partners. After two years of negotiations with its
major trading partners, Ecuador joined the World Trade Organization
(WTO) in January 1996.
Duties and fees for most imports into Ecuador fall in the 5 to 20
percent range, though the government plans to impose additional
surcharges through 2000. Ecuador agreed to an Andean Common External
Tariff in February 1995. Special exemptions allow Ecuador to continue
to charge higher rates for about half of the items on the common tariff
schedule.
Customs procedures can be difficult but are not normally used to
discriminate against U.S. products. The Mahuad administration has
expressed its desire to repair damage done to customs services that
occurred under previous administrations by focusing on corruption and
improving efficiency. The government has yet to implement its
commitment not to use sanitary and phytosanitary restrictions to block
the entry of certain imports of consumption products and agricultural
goods from the United States, but has increased the number of
Ecuadorian institutions that are authorized to issue sanitary and
phytosanitary permits. Import bans on used clothing, used cars and used
tires have yet to be eliminated, despite Ecuador's promise in its WTO
accession protocol to do so by July 1996. Andean Pact price bands that
result in high effective tariffs for a variety of agricultural products
are to be phased out. The government no longer sets minimum prices for
assessing customs duties on certain imports.
All importers must obtain a prior import license from the central
bank, obtainable through private banks. Licenses are usually made
available for all goods. A discriminatory 1976 law that prevented U.S.
and other foreign suppliers, but not domestic suppliers, from
terminating existing exclusive distributorship arrangements without
paying compensation was repealed in September 1997. However, the U.S.
Government is concerned that the repealed law will continue to be
applied in pending court cases or against U.S. companies that have
existing contracts that were in force prior to the repeal. Foreigners
may invest in most sectors, other than public services, without prior
government approval. There are no controls or limits on transfers of
profits or capital, and foreign exchange is readily available.
Government procurement practices are not sufficiently transparent
but do not usually discriminate against U.S. or other foreign
suppliers. However, bidding for government contracts can be cumbersome
and time-consuming. Bids for public contracts are often delayed or
canceled. Many bidders object to the requirement for a bank-issued
guarantee to ensure execution of the contract.
6. Export Subsidies Policies
Ecuador does not have any explicit export subsidy programs.
7. Protection of U.S. Intellectual Property
Ecuador belongs to the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the World
Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), and is a signatory to the
Berne Convention, Rome Convention, and the Phonograms Convention. In
1999, the U.S. Trade Representative moved Ecuador from the ``Special
301'' Priority Watch List to the Watch List in recognition of
significant improvements in Ecuador's protection of intellectual
property rights (IPR).
Ecuador's protection of intellectual property is based primarily on
the 1998 Intellectual Property Law, which protect patents, trademarks,
copyrights, and plant varieties. The law generally meets the standards
specified in the WTO TRIPs Agreement. Although a November 1996 Andean
Pact court decision overturned Ecuadorian regulations that provided
transitional or ``pipeline'' protection for previously unpatentable
products, the Alarcon government approved 12 ``pipeline'' patents in
1998. Approximately 37 such patents held by U.S. firms still await
final resolution under the Mahuad government. In 1999, the Andean
Community imposed sanctions on Ecuador for its issuance of ``pipeline''
approvals on the grounds that Ecuador had violated the Community's own
patent regime.
In October 1993, Ecuador and the United States signed a bilateral
Intellectual Property Rights Agreement (IPRA) that guarantees full
protection for copyrights, trademarks, patents, satellite signals,
computer software, integrated circuit layout designs, and trade
secrets. Although the Ecuadorian Congress has not yet ratified the
IPRA, in 1998 it enacted legislation that generally harmonizes local
law with the agreement's provisions (with the notable exception of
``pipeline'' patents). Despite the fact that Ecuador issued and
notified an initial group of pipeline patent applications, consistent
with its bilateral agreement with the United States, it has failed to
issue any of the additional pending applications.
Enforcement of intellectual property rights has improved
significantly in Ecuador, but copyright infringement still occurs, and
there is widespread local trade in pirated audio and video recordings,
as well as computer software. However, companies can seek preliminary
injunctive relief under the 1998 IPR law. Local registration of
unauthorized copies of well-known trademarks has been a problem in the
past, but monitoring and control of such registrations have improved.
Some local pharmaceutical companies produce or import patented drugs
without licenses and have sought to block improvements in patent
protection. Ecuadorian flower growers persuaded a local judge to
suspend the patent and trademark rights of U.S. and other foreign
flower breeders, which could lead to U.S. action to ban imports of
flowers grown in Ecuador. As of November 1999, the case is on appeal
before the Constitutional Tribunal.
8. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association: Under the Ecuadorian Constitution and
labor code, most workers in the parastatal sector and private companies
enjoy the right to form trade unions. Public sector workers in non-
revenue earning entities, as well as security workers and military
officials, are not permitted to form trade unions. Less than 12 percent
of the labor force, mostly skilled workers in parastatal and medium-to-
large sized industries, is organized. Except for some public servants
and workers in some parastatals, workers by law have the right to
strike. Sit-down strikes are allowed, but there are restrictions on
solidarity strikes. Ecuador does not have a high level of labor unrest.
Most strike activity involves public sector employees.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively: Private
employers with more than 30 workers belonging to a union are required
to engage in collective bargaining when requested by the union. The
labor code prohibits discrimination against unions and requires that
employers provide space for union activities. The labor code provides
for resolution of conflicts through a tripartite arbitration and
conciliation board process. Employers are not permitted to dismiss
permanent workers without the express permission of the Ministry of
Labor. The in-bond (maquila) law permits the hiring of temporary
workers in maquila industries, effectively limiting unionization in the
sector. Employers consider the labor code to be unfavorable to their
interests.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor: Compulsory labor is
prohibited by both the constitution and the labor code, and is not
practiced.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children: Persons less than 14
years old are prohibited by law from working, except in special
circumstances such as apprenticeships. Those between the ages of 14 and
18 are required to have the permission of their parents or guardian to
work. In practice, many rural children begin working as farm laborers
at about 10 years of age, while poor urban children under age 14 often
work for their families in the informal sector.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work: The labor code provides for a 40-
hour workweek, two weeks of annual vacation, a minimum wage and other
variable, employer-provided benefits such as uniforms and training
opportunities. The minimum wage is set by the Ministry of Labor every
six months and can be adjusted by Congress. Mandated bonuses bring
total monthly compensation to about $137. The Ministry of Labor also
sets specific minimum wages by job and industry so that the vast
majority of organized workers in state industries and large private
sector enterprises earn substantially more than the general minimum
wage. The labor code also provides for general protection of workers'
health and safety on the job, and occupational health and safety is not
a major problem in the formal sector. However, there are no enforced
safety rules in the agriculture sector and informal mining.
f. Worker Rights in Sectors with U.S. Investment: The economic
sectors with U.S. investment include petroleum, chemicals and related
products, and food and related products. U.S. investors in these
sectors are primarily large, multinational companies, which abide by
the Ecuadorian Labor Code. In 1996 there were no strikes or serious
labor problems in any U.S. subsidiary. U.S. companies are subject to
the same rules and regulations on labor and employment practices
governing basic worker rights as Ecuadorian companies.
Extent of U.S. Investment in Selected Industries--U.S. Direct Investment Position Abroad on an Historical Cost
Basis--1998
[Millions of U.S. Dollars]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Category Amount
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Petroleum...................... .............. 576
Total Manufacturing............ .............. 188
Food & Kindred Products...... 30 ...............................................................
Chemicals & Allied Products.. 70 ...............................................................
Primary & Fabricated Metals.. 1 ...............................................................
Industrial Machinery and 0 ...............................................................
Equipment.
Electric & Electronic (\1\) ...............................................................
Equipment.
Transportation Equipment..... 24 ...............................................................
Other Manufacturing.......... (\1\) ...............................................................
Wholesale Trade................ .............. 68
Banking........................ .............. (\1\)
Finance/Insurance/Real Estate.. .............. 36
Services....................... .............. 4
Other Industries............... .............. (\1\)
TOTAL ALL INDUSTRIES........... .............. 952
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Suppressed to avoid disclosing data of individual companies.
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis.
______
EL SALVADOR
Key Economic Indicators
[Millions of U.S. Dollars unless otherwise indicated]
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1997 1998 \1\ 1999
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Income, Production and Employment:
Nominal GDP....................... 11,305.0 11,870.2 12,368.0
Real GDP Growth (Pct)............. 4.2 3.2 2.5
GDP By Sector:
Agriculture..................... 1,492.0 1,432.2 1,475.0
Manufacturing................... 2,400.0 2,629.4 2,760.0
Services........................ 6,449.0 6,878.0 7,290.0
Government...................... 747.0 800.0 848.0
Per Capita GDP (US$) \2\.......... 1,897.0 1,968.0 2,025.0
Labor Force (000's) \3\........... 2,260.0 2,305.0 2,350.0
Unemployment Rate (Pct) \4\....... 7.6 8.0 8.0
Money and Prices (Annual Percentage
Growth):
Money Supply Growth (M2).......... 20.0 12.0 9.0
Consumer Price Inflation.......... 2.0 4.2 4.0
Exchange Rate (Colon/US$)......... 8.75 8.75 8.75
Balance Of Payments And Trade:
Total Exports Fob \5\............. 2,425.0 2,446.0 2,400.0
Exports To U.S.\5\.............. 1,312.0 1,454.0 1,555.0
Total Imports CIF \5\............. 3,740.0 3,959.0 4,150.0
Imports From U.S.\5\............ 1,975.0 2,028.0 2,150.0
Trade Balance..................... -1,325.0 -1,513.0 -1,750.0
Balance With U.S................ -633.0 -554.0 -595.0
External Public Debt.............. 2,680.0 2,630.0 2,500.0
Fiscal Deficit/GDP (Pct).......... 2.0 2.0 2.5
Current Account Deficit/GDP (Pct). -1.9 -0.7 -0.9
Debt Service Payments/GDP (Pct)... 3.0 3.0 3.0
Gold and Foreign Exchange
Reserves.......................... 1,462.0 1,765.0 1,840.0
Aid From U.S...................... 38.0 38.0 56.8
Aid From All Other Sources \6\.... 38.0 38.0 38.0
------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ 1999 figures are central bank estimates based on August data.
\2\ Per capita growth based on 1992 census data.
\3\ Economically active population, i.e. all those over age 15.
\4\ Figures do not include underemployment.
\5\ Including gross maquila.
\6\ Grants only; figures do not reflect NGO assistance and bilateral
loan programs.
1. General Policy Framework
In 1998, El Salvador's economy grew by 3.2 percent, compared to the
4.2 percent growth posted in 1997. The damage caused by Hurricane Mitch
to infrastructure and to agriculture production reduced 1998 growth by
an estimated 0.5 percent. Growth weakened further in 1999 due to poor
international prices for El Salvador's principal export commodities,
weak exports to Central American neighbors recovering from Hurricane
Mitch, and an investment slow-down caused by the March 1999
presidential elections and delays in legislative approval of a national
budget.
Data from the second and third quarter of 1999 indicates the
economy has started to recover from the evident slow-down observed
during the first quarter of the year. Ministry of economy/central bank
data shows that the GDP has gradually risen from 2.1 percent growth in
the first quarter to 2.4 percent growth in the third quarter. Growth
has been led by the commerce, energy, finance, and manufacturing
sectors. During the January-September 1999 period, exports decreased by
4 percent compared to 1998, while imports increased by 6 percent. Value
added tax (vat) collections increased during the same period by 6
percent. This modest recovery has taken place within the context of a
relatively low inflation rate, which is expected to be 4.0 percent in
1999, compared to 4.2 percent in 1998 and 2.0 percent in 1997. The
official outlook for 2000 is for continued macro economic stability
with 3.5 percent growth, 2.5 percent inflation and a fiscal deficit of
2.4 percent of the GDP. Economic performance may strengthen more next
year if international assistance for Mitch reconstruction projects
arrives in a timely fashion, and if the U.S. congress approves expanded
Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI) benefits.
The central bank tightened monetary policy in 1999. The money
supply is expected to expand 9 percent in 1999 compared to 12 percent
in 1998. Interest rates on loans for less than a year have remained at
15 to 16 percent in 1999, compared to 18 percent two years ago. Medium
and long-term interest rates also went down from 20 to 18 percent in
the same period.
In 1998, the government successfully privatized the state telephone
company, the electricity distribution companies and pension funds. In
1999 the government successfully auctioned the thermal power plants and
plans to sell its remaining shares in the telephone company. The 1999
US$2 billion central budget continues to shift spending from military
to social investments, with about one third of the central budget
dedicated to social development including health, education and public
works. The 1999 budget is likely to result in a fiscal deficit no
greater than 2.5 percent of GDP due to improved tax collection. The
modest deficit has been financed with official domestic and external
bonds. By law, the central bank is not allowed to finance government
deficits. The 2000 budget is expansionary, and its spending is expected
to increase by 6 percent over the 1999 budget.
1998 brought a slight increase in both exports (1 percent) and
imports (5.8 percent). As in previous years, family remittances and
external aid have offset the large structural trade deficit in El
Salvador. Remittances continue to be the second most important source
of foreign exchange after exports and a major factor in El Salvador's
macro economic stability. Remittances are increasing at an annual rate
of 6.5 percent, and an estimated 1.35 billion dollars will enter the
national economy during 1999.
2. Exchange Rate Policy
The colon has been informally pegged at 8.75 per dollar since 1994.
Large inflows of dollars from Salvadorans working in the United States
offset a significant trade deficit. At the end of September 1999, net
international reserves at the central bank were 1.8 billion dollars,
one of the highest levels in history.
3. Structural Policies
The United States is El Salvador's main trade partner. Imports from
the U.S. have increased an average of 16 percent per year since 1993.
Imports from the U.S., which constitute about 50 percent of all El
Salvador's imports, are projected to reach $2.15 billion in 1999, up
from $2.02 billion in 1998. Key to this trend is the multi-year program
(whose last phase concluded in July 1999), to radically lower tariff
barriers. Under this program, tariffs for most capital goods and raw
materials have been reduced to zero or one percent, and tariffs on
intermediate and final goods have been reduced to a maximum rate of 15
percent.
In September 1997, the government launched a new, simplified
customs procedure system that reduces the former cumbersome 20-step
import process to seven steps. A second stage of this customs
modernization program, consisting of processing import/export papers
via computer/satellite from the user's office, was implemented in
November 1998, and a final stage to facilitate electronic payment of
import duties was launched in February 1999. Close to 80 percent of all
Salvadoran imports consist of capital and intermediate products. The
government has an open procurement policy in practice, and U.S.
companies compete actively for contracts.
El Salvador has liberal legislation under which it has privatized
the state owned telephone company (Antel), four electricity
distributors and two thermal generating companies, and pension funds.
All of these projects represent good opportunities for U.S. suppliers
and investors.
Prices, with the exception of bus fares and utilities, which are
moving toward market prices, are unregulated. A commission to monitor
the telecommunications and electric sectors (Siget) has been
established.
The 13 percent value-added tax (vat) is applied to all goods and
services, domestic and imported, with a few limited exceptions for
basics like dairy products, fresh fruits and vegetables, and medicines.
In September 1999, the vat and income tax laws were reformed in order
to expand the country's taxable base and increase government revenues.
At the end of 1994, the government replaced a price band mechanism,
introduced in 1990 to regulate the tariffs on basic grains. The
government policy on basic grain tariffs is set by seasonal supply and
demand conditions in the local market. Currently, yellow corn is
imported duty free; white corn enters duty free from February 1 through
July 31, and is subject to 15 percent ad-valorem rate from August 1 to
January 31. Paddy (rough) rice pays 20 percent ad-valorem, and milled
rice, 35 percent.
4. Debt Management Policies
El Salvador has traditionally pursued a conservative debt policy.
External debt stood at $2.630 billion at December 1998, a 2 percent
below the previous year. The total external debt is expected to fall
slightly to $2.5 billion by the end of 1999. Almost 70 percent of this
debt has been contracted with international financing institutions, and
30 percent with bilateral organizations and other sources. The debt
service in 1999 amounted to $309 million or 2.5 percent of the GDP, and
is considered moderate. El Salvador's prudent debt policies have been
recognized by improved risk ratings on its official debt instruments by
organizations such as Moody's and Standard and Poor's.
El Salvador has succeeded in obtaining significant new credits from
diverse international sources over the last three years. Some $300
million has been contracted from international institutions and
governments (Spain, Germany, Japan) for infrastructure works and social
programs to be undertaken over the next few years. In August 1999, El
Salvador successfully placed US$150 million in Euro-bonds. The debt
profile is expected to increase over the next several years as the
international donor community has pledged 1.26 billion dollars to
finance El Salvador's reconstruction and modernization.
5. Aid
Aid grants from the U.S. totaled $56.8 million in 1999. Bilateral
military assistance (international military and educational training)
from the U.S. totaled $500,000 in 1998 and $500,000 in 1999.
6. Significant Barriers to U.S. Exports
There are no legal barriers to U.S. exports of manufactured goods
or bulk, non-agricultural products to El Salvador. Most U.S. goods face
tariffs from 0 to 15 percent. The range for category is 0 to 5 percent
for capital goods, 5 to 10 percent for intermediate products, and up to
15 percent for final goods. Higher tariffs are applied to automobiles,
alcoholic beverages, textiles and some luxury items, but the Salvadoran
government also plans to gradually reduce these tariffs in the near
future.
Generally, standards have not been a barrier for the importation of
U.S. consumer-ready food products. Poultry is the notable exception;
since 1992, the government has imposed a zero tolerance requirement for
several common avian diseases such as salmonella, effectively blocking
all imports of U.S. poultry. The Ministry of Agriculture (MAG) requires
a salmonella-free certificate showing that the product has been
approved by U.S. health authorities for public sale. Importers may also
be required to deliver samples for laboratory testing, but this
requirement has not been enforced. However, lately MAG is requesting
plant inspections at origin to allow imports of various food products
into the local market. The cost for this procedure has to be paid by
the exporter or the local agent/distributor. A sanitary certificate
must accompany all fresh food, agricultural commodities and live
animals. Basic grains and dairy products also must have import
licenses. Authorities have not enforced the Spanish language-labeling
requirement.
El Salvador is a member of the WTO and expects to implement a full
range of its Uruguay round commitments on schedule. The government is
an active participant in the Summit of the Americas/Free Trade of the
Americas process. The country is a member of the Central American
common market, and together with Guatemala and Honduras, is negotiating
a free trade agreement with Mexico. A free trade agreement is being
negotiated with Chile, and limited scope free trade agreement has been
signed with the Dominican Republic.
El Salvador officially promotes foreign investment in virtually all
sectors of the economy. Foreign investment laws allow unlimited
remittance of net profits, except for services where the law allows 50
percent. No restrictions exist on establishing foreign banks or
branches of foreign banks in El Salvador. Recently, the legislative
assembly approved a new more open and modern investment promotion law,
as well as a new banking law.
7. Export Subsidies Policies
El Salvador does not employ direct export subsidies. It offers a 6
percent rebate to exporters of non-traditional goods based on the fob
value of the export, but some exporters have found it difficult to
collect. Free trade zone operations are not eligible for the rebate but
enjoy a 10-year exemption from income tax as well as duty-free import
privileges.
8. Protection of U.S. Intellectual Property
El Salvador belongs to the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the
World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), and is a signatory to
the Paris Convention, Bern Convention, Rome Convention, Phonograms
Convention, and the Nairobi Treaty.
In 1998 and 1999, the intellectual property office of the attorney
general's office took strong enforcement measures against IPR violators
in a number of areas including, videos and music cassettes, medicines,
and clothing. Starting in 1999, officials began raids on software
pirates.
El Salvador's current law protecting intellectual property rights
took effect in October 1994. This law, along with El Salvador's
acceptance of TRIPS disciplines, addresses several weak areas. Patent
terms were extended to 20 years, and the definition of patentability
was broadened. Compulsory licensing applies only in cases of a national
emergency. Computer software is protected, as are trade secrets.
Trademarks are still regulated by the Central American Convention
for the Protection of Industrial Property. It is an occasional practice
to license a famous trademark and then seek to profit by selling it
when the legitimate owner wants to do business in El Salvador. In
November 1994, El Salvador signed an amended version of the convention,
which, among other things, would address this issue. The revised
convention will take effect upon ratification by three of the
participating Central American governments. According to Salvadoran
government officials, they are working on a draft for a separate
semiconductor chip law.
With international funding, the government is completing a
comprehensive reorganization of its antiquated national registry
office. The registration process has been simplified and computerized,
and significant progress is being made in reducing backlogs and
adjudicating disputes.
9. Worker Rights
a. Right of Association: The constitution prohibits the government
from engaging in antiunion actions against workers trying to organize
and the 1994 labor code streamlined the process required to form a
union in the private sector. Unions and strikes are legal only in the
private sector. Employees of autonomous public agencies may form unions
but not strike. Nevertheless, many workers including those in the
public sector form employee associations that frequently carried out
strikes that, while technically illegal, were treated as legitimate.
Approximately 20 percent of the workforce are members of unions, public
employees associations, or peasant organizations.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively: The constitution
prohibits the government from using nationality, race, sex, creed, or
political philosophy as a means to prevent workers or employees from
organizing themselves into unions or associations. In practice, the
government has generally respected this right. El Salvador has a small
organized labor sector with approximately 150 active unions, public
employee associations, and peasant organizations, representing over
300,000 citizens, or 20 percent of the total work force. By law, only
private sector workers have the right to organize unions and strike.
Some employees of autonomous public agencies may form unions if they
don't deal with essential services. Public employees may form employee
associations, but are prohibited from striking. In fact, some of El
Salvador's most powerful labor groups are public employees
associations, which take on the same responsibility as unions--
including calling technically illegal strikes and collective
bargaining. The government negotiates with these associations and
generally treat strikes as legitimate, although the labor code mandates
arbitration of public sector disputes. The constitution and the labor
code provide for collective bargaining rights, but only to employees in
the private sector and in autonomous government agencies. In fact, both
private sector unions (by law) and public sector employee associations
(in practice) use collective bargaining.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor: The constitution
prohibits forced or compulsory labor, except in the case of calamity
and other instances specified by law. This provision is followed in
practice. Although not specifically prohibited, forced and bonded labor
by children are covered by the general prohibition, and there were no
reports of its use in the formal sector. However, there is strong
evidence that minors are forced into prostitution.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children: The constitution
prohibits the employment of children under the age of fourteen. The
labor code specifically prohibits forced and bonded labor in general,
but does not specifically cover children. Minors fourteen or older may
receive special labor ministry permission to work, but only where such
employment is absolutely indispensable to the sustenance of the minor
and his family. This is most often the case with children of peasant
families who traditionally work during planting and harvesting seasons.
Child labor is not usually found in the industrial sector. Those legal
workers under the age of eighteen have special additional rules
governing conditions of work.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work: The minimum wage was increased by
10 percent in 1998. Effective April 1998, the minimum wage is $4.80 (42
colones) per day, for commercial, industrial, and service employees. It
had remained at $4.40 (38.50 colones) per day since 1995. For
agricultural workers, it was raised to $2.47 from $2.26, plus a food
allowance, per day. Minimum wage for workers at coffee mills was
increased to $3.56 from $3.30 per day, and for sugar mill workers to
$2.60 from $2.26 per day. The law limits the workday to 6 hours for
youths between fourteen and eighteen years of age and 8 hours for
adults, and it mandates premium pay for longer hours. The labor code
sets a maximum normal workweek of 36 hours for youths and 44 hours for
adults.
f. Rights in Sectors with U.S. Investment: U.S. investment in El
Salvador has increased in recent years, especially in the energy and
financial sectors. The labor laws apply equally to all sectors,
including the so-called ``maquilas'' or free trade zones (FTZ). During
the last few years, most FTZ companies have accepted the provisions of
voluntary codes of conduct from their parent corporations or U.S.
purchasers. These codes include worker rights protection clauses. In
April 1997, the Salvadoran Apparel Industry Association (ASIC)
announced an industry wide code of conduct, currently being
implemented, with worker rights protection. The great majority of
workers in the FTZs receive much better salaries and working conditions
than are offered elsewhere in the private sector. Nevertheless, there
were credible reports of factories dismissing union organizers. In
addition, accusations persist of some companies abusing their workers.
This year, the labor ministry increased the number of inspectors and
inspections, improved the professional training of the inspector corps,
and made a better effort to follow up on such complaints.
Extent of U.S. Investment in Selected Industries--U.S. Direct Investment Position Abroad on an Historical Cost
Basis--1998
[Millions of U.S. Dollars]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Category Amount
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Petroleum...................... .............. 194
Total Manufacturing............ .............. 26
Food & Kindred Products...... 10 ...............................................................
Chemicals & Allied Products.. 12 ...............................................................
Primary & Fabricated Metals.. 13 ...............................................................
Industrial Machinery and 0 ...............................................................
Equipment.
Electric & Electronic -15 ...............................................................
Equipment.
Transportation Equipment..... 0 ...............................................................
Other Manufacturing.......... 6 ...............................................................
Wholesale Trade................ .............. (\1\)
Banking........................ .............. 18
Finance/Insurance/Real Estate.. .............. (\1\)
Services....................... .............. 8
Other Industries............... .............. 169
Total All Industries........... .............. 599
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Suppressed to avoid disclosing data of individual companies.
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis.
______
GUATEMALA
Key Economic Indicators \1\
[Millions of U.S. Dollars unless otherwise indicated]
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1997 1998 1999
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Income, Production and Employment:
Nominal GDP \2\......................... 17,427 19,016 17,826
Real GDP Growth (pct)................... 4.3 4.7 3.5
GDP by Sector (pct):
Agriculture........................... 24 24 23
Manufacturing......................... 21 21 21
Services.............................. 47 47 47
Government............................ 8 8 8
Per Capita GDP (US$) \2\................ 1,603 1,793 1,635
Labor Force (000's) \3\................. 3,320 3,416 4,208
Unemployment Rate (pct) \4\............. 5.2 5.2 5.2
Money and Prices (annual percentage
growth):
Money Supply Growth (M2)................ 21.2 14.4 10.0
Consumer Price Inflation \5\............ 7.1 7.4 5.0
Exchange Rate (Quetzal/US$ annual
average)
Financial Market Rate (1999 data is 6.10 6.40 7.50
Unofficial Embassy estimate).........
Balance of Payments and Trade:
Total Exports FOB \6\................... 2,391 2,562 2,262
Exports to U.S........................ 840 837 742
Total Imports CIF \6\................... 3,852 4,651 4,409
Imports from U.S...................... 1,585 1,931 1,767
Trade Balance \6\....................... -1,461 -2,089 -2,147
Balance with U.S.\6\.................. -745 -1,094 -1,025
External Public Debt \7\................ 2,200 2,368 2,600
Fiscal Deficit/GDP (pct) \7\............ 1.0 2.9 3.0
Current Account Deficit/GDP (pct) \7\... 3.6 5.4 5.4
Debt Service Payments/GDP (pct) \7\..... 2.4 3.0 2.4
Gold and Foreign Exchange Reserves
(Millions Net) \7\.................... 1,100 1,400 1,100
Aid from U.S............................ 64 77
Aid from Other Sources.................. N/A N/A N/A
------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ 1999 figures are all estimates based on available data in October.
\2\ Depreciation of local currency results in apparent decline in GDP
expressed in U.S. Dollars.
\3\ 1999 Labor Force Data from 1999 Survey of Family Income and
Expenditures.
\4\ Does not reflect estimated 40 to 50 percent underemployment.
\5\ The official CPI is not regarded as an accurate measure of price
movements.
\6\ Merchandise trade data from Guatemalan customs and central bank.
Trade data does not include approximately $250 million in value added
by the apparel assembly industry.
\7\ Data from the Guatemalan government's preliminary 2000 budget
projection and Guatemala's Central Bank.
1. General Policy Framework
Since assuming office in January 1996, the Arzu administration and
the National Advancement Party (PAN), which has a majority in the
legislature, have worked to implement a program of economic
liberalization and to modernize the state. Signing of the final Peace
Accord in December 1996, which ended Guatemala's 36-year armed internal
conflict, removed a major obstacle to foreign investment. Among the
government's remaining challenges, however, are the need to address the
fiscal deficit, the elimination of bureaucratic inefficiency as well as
private and government corruption, development of physical
infrastructure and human capital, improvement in internal security and
justice, and designing policies that promote sustained macroeconomic
stability.
Guatemala's economy, the largest in Central America, is generally
open, though the lack of transparency and bureaucratic complexity often
make it difficult for foreigners to compete on an equal footing. For
the last three years, real GDP growth has averaged about 4.0 percent,
and population growth about 2.9 percent annually. Insufficient
investment in education, health care, telecommunications, and
transportation constrain the more rapid development of Guatemala's
economy. The telecommunications sector and key elements of the
electricity industry have been privatized and the government has
awarded concessions for operation of the railroad and the postal
service. Concessions to expand and operate the country's two state-
owned sea ports and two international airports will be offered early in
2000. In July 1995, Guatemala became a member of the WTO.
Agriculture and commerce are the dominant economic activities, each
contributing approximately 25 percent of GDP; manufacturing accounts
for 15 percent of GDP. The agricultural sector accounts for two thirds
of exports and about 40 percent of all employment, though there is much
underemployment in all sectors. Activity in the agricultural sector is
concentrated in production of the traditional products of coffee,
sugar, and bananas. Non-traditional agricultural exports, e.g.,
specialty vegetables and fruits, berries, shrimp, and ornamental plants
and flowers, account for an increasing share of export revenues. Other
non-traditional industries that have experienced recent growth and have
favorable prospects are apparel assembly for export and tourism.
Remittances from abroad, which the Guatemalan Government estimates at
between $450-500 million per year, are a significant source of foreign
exchange.
Though tax revenues have historically been less than 8 percent of
GDP, the government is committed to increasing tax revenues to 12
percent of GDP by the year 2002 to fund social and economic development
projects related to the Peace Accords. Tax revenues in 1999 will
nonetheless fall short of 10 percent of GDP. Beginning in 1994, the
central bank (Bank of Guatemala) was prohibited from financing the
government's budget deficit, forcing the government to issue treasury
bonds, most of which were short-term. In 1996, the government began
issuing securities for longer terms (up to 5 and 10 years), including
several dollar-denominated issues placed on the international market at
lower rates of interest than offered on local currency denominated
bonds.
Several placements of dollar-denominated government securities were
issued in 1999 to finance part of the budget deficit. The central bank
and treasury also issued short-term notes to absorb excess liquidity
and reduce consumption demand. The resulting higher interest rates
curtailed capital flight and relieved some of the pressure on the
foreign exchange market, but relatively high commercial bank lending
rates have discouraged productive investment and retarded growth.
However, despite increased reliance upon dollar-denominated instruments
that carry lower coupon rates than notes denominated in local currency,
debt service costs will increase in 2000 as a result of both higher
debt and the depreciation of the local currency.
2. Exchange Rate Policy
Guatemala's trade deficit and capital flight have put pressure on
the foreign exchange market. Though Guatemala sold an additional $400
million in foreign reserves in 1999, the local currency still
depreciated by approximately 13 percent. Access to foreign exchange is
unrestricted and there are no reports of foreign exchange shortages.
Though the government in 1998 passed legislation to permit banks
and financial institutions to offer dollar-denominated accounts,
enabling regulations have not been issued. A number of local banks
currently offer dollar denominated accounts in which the funds are
actually held in offshore accounts.
3. Structural Policies
As part of the Peace Process, the government is committed to
increasing spending on social welfare programs, infrastructure
expansion, and economic development programs. Though much of the
financing for this additional spending will come from grants and loans
provided by the international donor community, Guatemala must generate
significant internal resources to complement foreign grants and lending
to fund these expenditures. The recently created Tax Administration
Superintendency has increased compliance, but it is highly doubtful
that revenue targets can be met without broadening the tax base or
introducing new taxes.
Ninety percent of the government's current income is from taxes.
Indirect taxes, primarily the value-added tax and duties, account for
80 percent of all tax revenues. Personal income taxes account for less
than two percent of all tax revenues. Guatemala received over $500
million from the sale of the state-owned electricity company in 1998
and will receive an additional $500 million over the next three years
from the 1998 sale of the telephone company. Though these funds were
earmarked for retirement of public debt and for investment in
infrastructure, no appropriations or expenditures have been made thus
far.
4. Debt Management Policies
Guatemala's 1999 budget will be in deficit by about 2.9 percent of
GDP. Despite inclusion of extraordinary capital income from the sale of
state-owned assets, the FY 2000 budget projects a deficit of
approximately $511 million, or approximately 3.0 percent of GDP. This
deficit will be financed through a combination of internal borrowing,
foreign borrowing, and loans from foreign governments and international
lending agencies. Guatemala's total public debt at the end of 1999 will
be approximately $3.4 billion, of which $900 million is internally held
and $2.5 billion is foreign debt.
Guatemala has successfully converted some domestic debt from short
term, high-interest instruments to longer-term, lower interest debt,
including dollar-denominated commercial debt. The FY 2000 budget calls
for appropriation of $410 million for debt service. Guatemala is
current in its payments on both U.S. and other foreign debt.
5. Aid
Total foreign donations anticipated in the 2000 budget are
approximately $54 million. However, the budget only includes funds
already pledged and programmed. Actual financial assistance is usually
significantly higher than as stated in the preliminary budget document.
6. Significant Barriers to U.S. Exports
Guatemala applies the common external tariff schedule of the
Central American Common Market, which has a range of from zero to 15
percent for nearly all agricultural and industrial goods. Exceptions
include milk products other than powdered milk, on which tariffs were
sharply increased in 1999, and agricultural commodity imports in excess
of their Tariff Rate Quotas (TRQ).
Guatemala, in compliance with its WTO obligations, created TRQs for
rice, corn, wheat and wheat flour, apples, pears, poultry and beef. The
Ministry of Economy has implemented a new import policy for poultry
that enlarges the TRQ to the level of Guatemala's final WTO commitment
and reduces the in-quota tariff. However, all poultry parts are valued
at a minimum of 56 cents/pound for customs purposes, significantly
increasing the effective tariff rate and the cost of imported poultry
products. Guatemala's current import tariff rates for agricultural
products are below the WTO tariff bindings.
Imported processed foods must be registered with the Ministry of
Health by each individual importer. However, importers have the option
of joining an association of importers and paying a fee for the use of
other members' registrations. Processed foods must also be labeled in
Spanish. Enforcement of this requirement has been lax, though
compliance is increasing. Full enforcement could significantly impact
imports from the United States.
Sanitary and phytosanitary licenses are required for all imports of
animal origin, and plants and vegetables. Inspection of the processing
plant in the country of origin, at the importers' expense, is
technically required for the license; however, implementation has been
uneven, limiting trade disruption.
Importers should be aware that manifests require consular
certification, an administrative process that can be time consuming.
Delays in obtaining certification have resulted in some losses to
shipments of perishables. Guatemala has also contracted with a private
import verification service to assess the value of exports to
Guatemala, a process that will impose additional administrative
procedures on U.S. exporters. Imports are not generally subject to non-
tariff trade barriers, though arbitrary customs valuation and excessive
bureaucracy occasionally create delays and complicate the importation
process.
Some restrictions remain on foreign investment, but foreign
investors generally receive national treatment. Subsurface minerals,
petroleum, and other resources are property of the state and
concessions are typically granted in the form of production-sharing
contracts.
Surface transportation is limited to companies with at least 51
percent Guatemalan ownership. Foreign firms are barred from directly
selling insurance or providing legal, accounting or other licensed
professional services. This hurdle can be overcome by establishing a
locally incorporated subsidiary or through a correspondent relationship
with a local firm. Most of the major U.S. accounting firms, for
example, are represented through one of these methods.
7. Export Subsidies Policies
There are no export subsidies.
8. Protection of U.S. Intellectual Property
Guatemala belongs to the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the
World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO). It is also a signatory
to the Paris Convention, Bern Convention, Rome Convention, Phonograms
Convention, and the Nairobi Treaty. Nevertheless, in 1999, the U.S.
Trade Representative placed Guatemala on the ``Special 301'' Priority
Watch List.
The protection provided to intellectual property rights (IPR)
holders is inadequate. Enforcement mechanisms are generally lacking, a
poorly trained judiciary is slow to provide relief, and penalties are
insufficient to dissuade IPR infringement. Although Guatemala passed a
new Copyright Law in 1998, there have been no prosecutions. Local cable
television companies have reduced their broadcasts of unauthorized
programming considerably, and video piracy has diminished, but U.S.
industry still suffers significant losses. Piracy, reproduction, and
sale of computer software programs are also common.
Patents: Guatemala's Patent Law is outdated. It does not protect
mathematical methods, living organisms, commercial plans, surgical,
therapeutic or diagnostic methods, or chemical compounds or
compositions. Protection is limited to 15 years (10 years for the
production of food, beverages, medicines, and agrochemicals), and is
subject to compulsory licensing provisions and local exploitation
requirements. Patent rights do not extend to any action executed in the
pursuit of education, research, experimentation, or investigation.
Patent rights do not preclude the importation of counterfeit goods
unless the product is being produced in Guatemala. Protection lapses
six years from the date of the patent if the product is not being
produced locally.
Trademarks: Guatemalan law does not provide sufficient protection
against counterfeiting or misuse of trademarks, and the right to
exclusive use is granted to the first to file. There is no requirement
for use, nor any cancellation process for non-use. Firms whose
trademarks have been registered by third parties often complain that
legal remedies are slow and inadequate. Businesses whose trademark has
been registered by another party are often forced either to buy out
that party or pay a fee for use.
The lack of protection of intellectual property rights is a
significant barrier to trade and investment. Industry estimates that 85
percent of all software used in Guatemala, including applications used
by government agencies, are unlicensed or unauthorized copies. The lack
of protection for well-known trademarks denies access to the Guatemalan
market by legitimate rights-holders and is a disincentive to
investment.
9. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association: This right is guaranteed by the
constitution, though less than eight percent of the labor force is
unionized. There are more than 1300 unions, the majority of which are
private sector unions. The Ministry of Labor has significantly
simplified and accelerated the process of obtaining legal authorization
to form a union. This procedure now takes 23 working days. Significant
changes were made in 1993 to modernize the Labor Code. In addition, the
process for resolving ``workplace'' disputes has been decentralized
with the opening of 21 branch offices of labor inspectors.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively: The Labor Code
allows collective bargaining if at least 25 percent of a company's
employees are union members. Anti-union practices, including
discharging workers for attempting to organize a union, are legally
forbidden. However, despite a major increase in the number of labor
inspectors and inspections, enforcement of labor laws depends on an
overloaded and inefficient labor court system. As a result, violations
of worker rights are not always punished. The labor movement remains
fractious. A widespread, historical distrust of unions by both
employers and many workers, as well high rates of unemployment and
underemployment, combine to make organizing and collective bargaining
difficult.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor: The constitution
prohibits forced labor. Labor for prisoners with sentences of more than
two years is obligatory, but this labor may not be used as punishment
for expression of political or other opinions, or as a method of
political reeducation.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children: By law, children under
the age of 14 may work only with written permission of their parents,
certified by the Ministry of Labor. Though there are currently fewer
than 5,000 such permits, tens of thousands of children under 14 work in
both the formal sector, including agriculture, and the informal sector,
generally in family enterprises. The Ministry of Labor, the Guatemalan
Social Security Institute, the U.N. and various non-governmental
organizations conduct programs aimed at reducing illegal child labor
educating minors about their rights as workers.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work: The constitution provides for a
44-hour normal work week and the average number of hours worked is
42.5. Occupational safety and health regulations exist but often are
not strictly enforced. The minimum wage is far below the level
necessary to support an urban family of four, though many urban workers
earn two or three times this amount; however, not all workers are paid
the legally-mandated minimum wage.
f. Rights in Sectors with U.S. Investment: Generally, international
corporations adhere to the labor code and respect worker rights. There
have been some complaints about treatment of workers in garment
assembly factories (maquilas), especially in some of those operated by
Koreans. However, observation of and respect for worker rights has
improved in this sector recently, due both to increased publicity and
also to cooperation between the Ministry of Labor and the Republic of
Korea's Ambassador.
Extent of U.S. Investment in Selected Industries--U.S. Direct Investment Position Abroad on an Historical Cost
Basis--1998
[Millions of U.S. Dollars]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Category Amount
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Petroleum...................... .............. (\1\)
Total Manufacturing............ .............. 191
Food & Kindred Products...... 83 ...............................................................
Chemicals & Allied Products.. 58 ...............................................................
Primary & Fabricated Metals.. 2 ...............................................................
Industrial Machinery and 0 ...............................................................
Equipment.
Electric & Electronic 0 ...............................................................
Equipment.
Transportation Equipment..... 0 ...............................................................
Other Manufacturing.......... 48 ...............................................................
Wholesale Trade................ .............. 26
Banking........................ .............. 5
Finance/Insurance/Real Estate.. .............. (\1\)
Services....................... .............. 5
Other Industries............... .............. (\1\)
TOTAL ALL INDUSTRIES........... .............. 429
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Suppressed to avoid disclosure of data of individual companies.
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis.
______
HAITI
Key Economic Indicators
[Millions of U.S. Dollars unless otherwise indicated]
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1997 1998 \1\ 1999
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Income, Production and Employment:
GDP \2\................................. 3429 3800 4115.4
Real GDP Growth (pct) \3\............... 1.1 2.9 2.26
GDP by Sector:
Agriculture........................... -2.4 0.5 2.5
Manufacturing......................... 0.6 5.5 1.2
Services.............................. 0.5 1.2 2.4
Government............................ -0.2 N/A N/A
Per Capita GDP (US$).................... 458 497 506
Labor Force (000's)..................... 4,100 4,290 4380
Unemployment Rate (pct)................. 65 70 70
Money and Prices (annual percentage
growth):
Money Supply Growth (M2)................ 21.7 7.0 14.7
Consumer Price Inflation................ 17.0 8.2 9.9
Exchange Rate (Gourde/US$ annual
average)
Market................................ 16.9 16.8 16.94
Balance of Payments and Trade: \4\
Total Exports FOB \5\................... 195.5 284.3 353.4
Exports to U.S.\6\.................... 188 210 N/A
Total Imports FOB \5\................... 588.8 -659.8 -772.9
Imports from U.S.\6\.................. 512 515 N/A
Trade Balance \5\....................... -393.3 -375.5 -419.5
Balance with U.S.\6\.................. -324 -305 N/A
Current Account Deficit/GDP (pct)....... 2.9 5.8 6.3
External Public Debt.................... 1025 1086 1140
Debt Service Payments/GDP (pct)......... 0.9 1.2 0.62
Fiscal Deficit/GDP (pct)................ 0.5 1.1 1.7
Gold and Foreign Exchange Reserves (net) 162.5 194.8 218.3
Aid from U.S.\7\........................ 145 N/A N/A
Aid from All Other Sources.............. 428 N/A N/A
------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ 1999 figures are all estimates based on available monthly data in
November. Fiscal year is October-September. Fiscal year data used
because calendar year data is unavailable in many cases.
\2\ GDP at factor cost at 1976 prices.
\3\ Percentage changes calculated in local currency.
\4\ US and Haitian import/export data may vary as a result of different
statistical practices. Data in Haiti are not reliable. Technical
assistance is being provided to the Haitian Government to improve data
collection procedures.
\5\ Merchandise trade for calendar year; does not include U.S. goods
imported for processing and re-exported under the Caribbean Basin
Initiative.
\6\ Source: U.S. Department of Commerce and U.S. Census Bureau; exports
FAS, imports customs basis; 1998 figures are estimates based on data
available through November. Figures include substantial amounts of
U.S. goods imported for processing and re-exported under Caribbean
Basin Initiative.
\7\ New commitments; USAID includes program assistance, budget support,
and support for peacekeeping operations and police.
Sources: Various, including IMF. Where several data sets existed we have
used those numbers provided by USAID.
1. General Policy Framework
Haiti has a predominantly agriculture-based, market-oriented
economy. Historically, Haiti's economic performance has been strongly
influenced by the United States, its principal trading partner and
largest bilateral aid contributor. Following the restoration of
President Jean-Bertrand Aristide on October 15, 1994, Haiti embarked on
an economic program based on macroeconomic stabilization, trade
liberalization, privatization, civil service reform, and
decentralization. The government reduced tariffs to a maximum of 15
percent.
In 1995, the Aristide government began to slip on its commitments
to international financial institutions. Inadequate implementation of
privatization, civil service reform, and other structural reforms tied
to loans from the IMF and World Bank thwarted a scheduled signing of
the Structural Adjustment Credit and the Enhanced Structural Adjustment
Facility, and prompted the resignation of Prime Minister Smarck Michel.
President Rene Preval took office in March 1996 and immediately
moved to implement the structural adjustment program. The government
proceeded to control expenditures and eliminate some 1,500 ``ghost
employees.'' By September, parliament passed civil service reform
legislation and a modernization law to enable the government to proceed
with privatization through the granting of management contracts,
concessions, or ``recapitalizations'' (the forming of joint ventures
with private investors through partial divestitures of state-owned
enterprises). By mid-September of 1998, a total of nearly 2,250
``ghost'' employees had been removed from the government payroll,
saving the Haitian treasury $5.9 million per year. A further 2,000
people have been processed by the government for early retirement or
voluntary departure.
However, by late 1999 the government appeared to have slipped from
its commitments both to privatization and to civil service reform.
Although almost 5000 employees had been removed from government
payrolls by the end of 1998, by July 1999 government expenditures on
salaries had crept back to July 1998 levels, and hiring was on the
rise. Further, only the two least complicated of a planned seven
privatizations had taken place. With legislative elections slated for
March 2000, followed by presidential elections late in the year, the
chance of forward progress on privatization appears remote despite
government promises to the contrary.
The government maintained reasonably strict macroeconomic
discipline during 1999. GDP growth hovered around 3 percent for both
1998 and 1999. Inflation fell from 18 percent in 1997 to 7 percent in
1998. By late 1999, inflation had crept past 9 percent and the
previously stable gourde had begun to slip against the dollar. The
triple pillars of international aid, remittances from the approximately
one million Haitians living abroad and, increasingly, narcotics
trafficking continue to prop up Haiti's economy.
Reserve requirements (which currently stand at 30 percent for
primary reserves) have been the central bank's primary monetary policy
tool. They have been used to control the money supply and to assist in
the financing of the public sector debt. Since November 1996, the
central bank has successfully conducted bond auctions to control
liquidity in the economy, which allow for lower reserve requirements.
The central bank has a rediscount facility and a lending facility for
commercial banks. Use of the rediscount facility has been limited by a
lack of eligible financial paper to rediscount. Use of the lending
facility has been limited by the relatively high interest rate charged
(usually the legal maximum), and low legal limits relative to bank
capital on the amounts commercial banks can borrow. An interbank market
also exists.
2. Exchange Rate Policy
For decades Haiti's currency, the gourde, was officially tied to
the U.S. Dollar at the rate of five to one. A parallel market for
foreign exchange emerged in the early 1980s, but for several years the
official exchange rate continued to hold for some transactions. On
September 16, 1991, the central bank ceased all operations at the
official rate. In April 1995, the central bank abolished the 40 percent
surrender requirement of export earnings. Haiti now has no exchange
controls or restrictions on capital movements. Dollar accounts are
available at local commercial banks. The gourde is allowed to float
freely relative to the dollar and other currencies. The exchange rate
gently declined from 15.5 to 17 gourdes per dollar during FY 97 and
remained between 16 and 17 gourdes per dollar throughout 1998 and most
of 1999. By late 1999, the gourde had slipped to 18 and appeared poised
to slip further. Some critics of tight central bank monetary policy,
particularly in the banking and export sectors, feel the gourde has
become overvalued and might face swifter depreciation in the future.
This and a possible increase in government spending during an election
year may precipitate further exchange rate declines during 2000.
3. Structural Policies
The government's role in Haiti's market-oriented economy has been
sharply reduced since 1994-95. In the few cases where the government
has attempted to control prices or supplies, its efforts were
frequently undercut by contraband or overwhelmed by the sheer number of
small retailers. Consumer prices are governed by supply and demand,
though the small Haitian market is imperfect for determining some
prices. Gasoline pump prices and utility rates are more effectively
regulated, and are probably the only exceptions to market prices.
Haitian law adjusts gasoline pump prices within a pre-determined band
to reflect changes in world petroleum prices and exchange rate
movements. High international market prices in late 1999 are forcing
the GOH to consider raising the band and hence the final pump price.
Prices in late 1999 effectively have the GOH subsidizing the cost of
kerosene.
Haiti's tax system is inefficient. Direct taxes on salary and wages
represent only about 25 percent of receipts. Moreover, tax evasion is
widespread and taxpayers were previously not registered with the tax
bureau, Direction Generale des Impots (DGI). Not surprisingly, the
government has made improved revenue collection a top priority. The DGI
has organized a large taxpayers' unit which focuses on identifying and
collecting the tax liabilities of the 200 largest corporate and
individual taxpayers in the Port au Prince area, which are estimated to
represent over 80 percent of potential income tax revenue. In mid-1999,
the GOH created a State Secretary for Revenue to coordinate and oversee
both Customs and DGI operations with a view toward increasing receipts
from each. Efforts were also made to identify and register all
taxpayers through the issuance of a citizen taxpayer ID card. In
addition, the value added tax has been extended to include sectors
previously exempt (banking services, agribusiness, and the supply of
water and electricity). Both DGI and Customs made revenue collection a
priority in 1999 and have continued to increase revenues. Nevertheless,
in general, collection remains sporadic and inefficient.
4. Debt Management Policies
Following the 1991 coup which ousted President Aristide, Haiti
suspended all payments on its foreign debt. When President Aristide
returned to office in October 1994, Haiti's arrears with the
International Financial Institutions (IFIs) totaled some $84 million.
The international community made it an immediate priority to clear
Haiti's arrears with IFIs so that new lending could begin.
On May 30, 1995, the Paris Club agreed to reschedule all of Haiti's
bilateral debt to Paris Club members. Roughly two-thirds of this debt
($75 million) was forgiven under ``Naples'' terms. The balance was
rescheduled over 26-40 years. An overwhelming percentage (91 percent in
FY 1995, 85 percent in FY 1996) of Haiti's debt is in concessional
loans from IFIs. These loans typically have 10-year grace periods, 40-
year payback periods, and below-market interest rates.
Haiti's external public debt rose to about 28.7 percent of GDP in
FY 98 (from 34 percent at the end of FY 96). Haiti's external debt
service has risen to about 8.4 percent of exports of goods and services
in 1998 from 12 percent a year earlier. Final FY 99 figures are not yet
available. With continued progress on economic reform and a modest debt
service burden, GOH officials believe the country should be able to
meet all its obligations in a timely manner.
5. Significant Barriers to U.S. Exports
With the lifting of all economic sanctions against Haiti, the sharp
reduction in tariffs, and the government's decision to remove all
import licenses and the 40 percent foreign exchange surrender
requirement on export earnings, there are few significant barriers to
U.S. exports. Nevertheless, a number of fees and taxes continue to be
levied on commodities imported into Haiti (i.e. verification fee,
excise tax, etc.) The resumption of normal trade in October 1995
unleashed tremendous pent-up demand for U.S. goods. While the demand
for U.S. goods remained strong in 1999, political and economic
uncertainty significantly constrained growth. The import of firearms
and other weapons into Haiti is controlled for foreign policy reasons.
Haitian importers must obtain a license to purchase such goods from
U.S. suppliers. Haiti's efforts to facilitate inward investment are
insufficient to significantly draw all but the most intrepid foreign
investors. The newly founded, Taiwan-financed Center for Promotion of
Investment hopes to address the problems Haiti has had in promoting
investment and exports.
6. Export Subsidies Policies
Haiti has no export subsidy programs.
7. Protection of U.S. Intellectual Property
While infringement of intellectual property rights occurs in Haiti,
the economy only produces a small variety of products, most of which
are for export to the United States and other countries that do not
tolerate open infringement. Most manufactured goods sold here are
imported. The most recent example of intellectual property rights
infringement was the broadcast of a recently released U.S. film on a
Haitian cable TV station last year. This was taken up with the Haitian
authorities and has not happened again. Pirated video and audio
cassettes are widely available and of poor quality.
Although the legal system affords protection of intellectual
property rights, weak enforcement mechanisms, inefficient courts, and
poor judicial knowledge of commercial law dilute the effectiveness of
this statutory protection. Moreover, injunctive relief is not available
in Haiti, so the only way to force compliance (should it become
necessary) is to jail the offender. Efforts to reform and improve the
Haitian legal system, now being undertaken with the assistance of
international advisors, may prevent more extensive abuse of
intellectual property rights as Haiti's economic recovery progresses.
The Ministry of Commerce is working on legislation to protect
intellectual property rights.
Haiti is signatory to the Buenos Aires Convention of 1910 and the
Paris Convention of 1883 with regard to patents, and to the Madrid
Agreement with regard to trademarks, and is a member of the World
Intellectual Property Organization. However, Haiti is not a signatory
to the Berne Convention.
8. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association: The constitution and the labor code
guarantee the right of association and provide workers, including those
in the public sector, the right to form and join unions without prior
government authorization. The law protects union activities, while
prohibiting closed ``union shops.'' The law also requires unions, which
must have a minimum of ten members, to register with the Ministry of
Social Affairs within 60 days of their formation.
Six principal labor federations represent about five percent of the
total labor force, including about two to three percent of labor in the
industrial sector. Each maintains some fraternal relations with various
international labor organizations.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively: The labor code
protects trade union organizing activities and stipulates fines for
those who interfere with this right. Unions are theoretically free to
pursue their goals, although government efforts to enforce the law are
non-existent. Unions complain that employers do not allow unions access
to workers, and individuals who attempt to join unions risk being
fired. Organized labor activity is concentrated in the Port-au-Prince
area, in state enterprises, the civil service, and the assembly sector.
The high unemployment rate and anti-union sentiment among some factory
workers has limited the success of union organizing efforts. Collective
bargaining is nearly nonexistent, especially in the private sector.
Employers can generally set wages unilaterally, in compliance with
minimum wage (currently approximately $2 per day) and overtime
standards.
Haiti has no export processing zones, and the labor code does not
distinguish between industries producing for the local market and those
producing for export. Employees in the export-oriented assembly sector
enjoy wages and benefits above the legal minimums, largely through
piecework. Wages appear to be somewhat higher in the more capital-
intensive industries producing for the local market.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor: The labor code
prohibits forced or compulsory labor. However, some children continue
to be subjected to unremunerated labor as domestic servants. Rural
families are often too large for the adult members to support, and
children are sometimes sent to work for urban families in exchange for
room, board and schooling. Reports of abuse are common, but the
Ministry of Social Affairs rarely exercises its authority to remove
children from abusive situations.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children: The minimum employment
age in all sectors is 15 years. Fierce adult competition for jobs
ensures that child labor is not a factor in the industrial sector. As
in other developing countries, rural families in Haiti often rely on
their children's contribution of labor in subsistence agriculture.
Children under 15 commonly work at informal sector jobs to supplement
family income.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work: Annually, a minimum wage worker
earns about $670, an income considerably above the per capita gross
domestic product, but sufficient only to permit the family to live in
very poor conditions. The majority of Haitians work in subsistence
agriculture, a sector where minimum wage legislation does not apply.
The labor code governs individual employment contracts. It sets the
standard workday at 8 hours, and the workweek at 48 hours, with 24
hours of rest on Sunday.
The code also establishes minimum health and safety regulations.
The industrial and assembly sectors largely observe these guidelines.
The Ministry of Social Affairs does not, however, effectively enforce
work hours or health and safety regulations.
With more than 50 percent and possibly 75 percent of the active
population unemployed or underemployed, workers are often not able to
exercise the right to remove themselves from dangerous work situations
without jeopardy to continued employment.
f. Rights in Sectors with U.S. Investment: U.S. direct investment
in goods-producing sectors in Haiti is limited, consisting of ownership
of two garment factories and a very few joint ventures. In general,
conditions differ little from other sectors of the economy. Wages paid
in these industries tend to be above the legal minimum, and in the case
of industries producing for the local market, often a multiple of the
legal minimum. Employers in these sectors frequently offer more
benefits than the average Haitian worker receives, including free
medical care and basic medications at cost.
Extent of U.S. Investment in Selected Industries--U.S. Direct Investment Position Abroad on an Historical Cost
Basis--1998
[Millions of U.S. Dollars]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Category Amount
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Petroleum...................... .............. (\1\)
Total Manufacturing............ .............. 0
Food & Kindred Products...... 0 ...............................................................
Chemicals & Allied Products.. 0 ...............................................................
Primary & Fabricated Metals.. 0 ...............................................................
Industrial Machinery and 0 ...............................................................
Equipment.
Electric & Electronic 0 ...............................................................
Equipment.
Transportation Equipment..... 0 ...............................................................
Other Manufacturing.......... 0 ...............................................................
Wholesale Trade................ .............. 0
Banking........................ .............. (\1\)
Finance/Insurance/Real Estate.. .............. (\1\)
Services....................... .............. 1
Other Industries............... .............. 0
TOTAL ALL INDUSTRIES........... .............. 32
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Suppressed to avoid disclosing data of individual companies.
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis.
______
HONDURAS
Key Economic Indicators
[Millions of U.S. Dollars unless otherwise indicated]
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1997 1998 \1\ 1999
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Income, Production and Employment:
Nominal GDP (US$) \2\............. 4,386 5,135.0 4,825.0
Real GDP Growth (pct)............. 4.5 3.0 -3.0
GDP by Sector:
Agriculture..................... 1,667.0 1,555.1 1,430.7
Manufacturing................... 935.0 989.0 1,018.7
Services........................ 459.0 475.0 480.7
Government...................... 298.0 318.0 324.4
Per Capita GDP (US$) \3\.......... 808 880 791
Labor Force (000's)............... 1,955.0 2,040.8 2,299.0
Unemployment Rate (pct) \4\....... 6.3 6.3 12.0
Money and Prices (annual percentage
growth):
Money Supply (M2)................. 39.2 18.4 N/A
Consumer Price Inflation.......... 12.8 15.7 11.6
Exchange Rate (LP/US$ annual
average)
Official........................ 13.14 13.54 14.56
Parallel........................ 13.05 13.41 14.42
Balance of Payments and Trade:
Total Exports FOB................. 1,445.7 1,575.0 1,220.7
Exports to U.S.................. 613.6 590.7 N/A
Total Imports CIF................. 2,148.6 2,499.6 2,828.9
Imports from U.S................ 1,033.0 1,165.8 N/A
Trade Balance..................... -702.9 -924.6 -1,608.2
Trade Balance with U.S.......... -419.4 -575.1 N/A
Current Account Deficit/GDP (pct). 3.3 0.3 9.4
External Public Debt.............. 3,454.5 3,481.8 4,383.0
Debt Service Payments/GDP (pct)... 16.6 17.3 N/A
Fiscal Deficit/GDP (pct).......... 2.6 1.5 N/A
Gold and Foreign Exchange Reserves 606 670 N/A
Aid from U.S...................... 36.1 36.0 \5\ 555.7
Aid from Other Countries.......... 116 N/A 243.8
------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ 1999 figures are estimates based on data available in November.
\2\ GDP at factor cost.
\3\ Percentage changes calculated in local currency.
\4\ Merchandise trade.
\5\ Includes USAID, Department of Defense, and other agencies' disaster
relief and reconstruction assistance in response to Hurricane Mitch.
1. General Policy Framework
Honduras, already one of the poorest countries in the hemisphere,
with low per capita income and relatively low health and education
indicators, was struck a devastating blow by Hurricane Mitch. The late
October 1998 disaster inundated the entire country, resulting in
massive flooding and landslides that killed over 5,000 people, left
tens of thousands homeless, caused over US$ 3 billion in destruction,
seriously damaged the road network, virtually wiped out the important
banana crop (second largest export), and plunged the country into
recession. Heavy rain during the 1999 rainy season exacerbated the
damage.
Massive international assistance--led by the U.S. at over US$ 550
million in FY 99--provided emergency relief and is helping Honduras
rebuild. Many of the homeless have already received new houses in an
effort led by churches and NGO's. Epidemics have been averted, basic
services restored, and temporary repairs made. The overall pace of
reconstruction has been slow due to the Honduran government's lack of
planning and executive capacity, the slow arrival of international aid,
and the need to ensure that assistance is not misused.
Honduras has received significant debt relief in the aftermath of
Hurricane Mitch, including the suspension of bilateral debt service
payments and bilateral debt reduction. Honduras will likely qualify for
multilateral debt reduction as well through the Highly Indebted Poor
Countries (HIPC) Initiative.
Honduras continues to maintain macroeconomic stability. After an
inflationary spike at the end of 1998, inflation is expected to fall to
less than 12 percent for 1999. The currency (lempira) has only
moderately devaluated. A widened balance of payments deficit, worsened
by the Mitch-induced recession with decreased exports (from crop damage
and low world prices in coffee and bananas) and increased imports (for
reconstruction), is being covered by international aid, reinsurance
payments, and increased family remittances. International reserves have
risen.
Since 1990, succeeding governments have embarked on economic reform
programs, dismantling price controls, lowering import tariffs, removing
non tariff barriers to trade, adopting a free market exchange rate
regime, removing interest rate controls, and passing legislation
favorable to foreign investment. Honduras has committed to the
International Monetary Fund to privatize management of the airports,
the telephone system, and electricity distribution. Congress passed
laws in late 1998 to encourage foreign investment in tourism, mining,
and agriculture. The biggest success story of all has been the growth
of the maquila industry (with significant U.S. investment), from
virtually zero in 1989 to over 200 plants in 1999 generating over US$
300 million in foreign exchange and employing 110,000 workers.
Nonetheless, the growth in foreign investment is hampered by a
politicized judiciary subject to influence, insecure property titles,
non-transparent bidding procedures, and cumbersome bureaucratic
procedures.
Honduras became a founding member of the World Trade Organization
(WTO) in 1995 and participates in international trade negotiations,
including those related to the establishment of the Free Trade Area of
the Americas. A Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT) was signed in 1995
and ratified by the Honduran Congress, with ratification pending before
the U.S. Senate. A bilateral Intellectual Property Rights Agreement was
negotiated in March 1999. The Honduran Congress passed legislation in
December 1999 to comply with the WTO's TRIPS agreement.
2. Exchange Rate Policy
The central bank uses an auction system to regulate the allocation
of foreign exchange. Dollar purchases, in which foreigners may
participate, are conducted at 5 to 7 percent above or below the base
price established every 5 days. During recent auctions, the central
bank has been adjudicating an average of US$ 8 million daily. Foreign
exchange demand in 1998 was 96.1 percent covered.
The Foreign Exchange Repatriation Law passed in September 1990
requires all Honduran exporters, except those operating in free-trade
zones and export processing zones, to repatriate 100 percent of their
export earnings through the commercial banking system. Until recently,
commercial banks were allowed to use 70 percent of export earnings to
meet their clients' foreign exchange needs. The other 30 percent had to
be sold to the central bank at the prevailing interbank rate of
exchange. Presently, commercial banks are required to sell 100 percent
of these repatriated earnings to the central bank, which in turn
auctions up to 60 percent in the open market.
3. Structural Policies
Trade Policy: In an effort to increase trade and maintain
competitiveness with its Central American neighbors, in recent years
Honduras has cut its import duties to between zero and 19 percent for
most items. Certain sensitive products, such as automobiles, are
assessed at a higher rate of up to 35 percent. In 1995, Honduras and
other Central American Common Market (CACM) members agreed to work
toward the full implementation of a common external tariff ranging from
zero to 15 percent for most products, but allowed each country to
determine the timing of the changes. In 1997, tariff rates were reduced
to one percent on capital goods, medicines and agricultural inputs, and
on raw materials and inputs produced outside of Central America.
Honduras also intends to reduce its extra-regional tariffs for
intermediate and finished goods over the next several years to between
10 and 17 percent.
Honduras has sought to expand trade by negotiating, together with
Guatemala and El Salvador, free trade agreements with other countries.
Agreements with Mexico and the Dominican Republic are mostly complete
but are still held up on the status of a few sensitive products. The
Central Americans are negotiating free trade agreements with Panama and
Chile and are studying proposals for agreements with the Andean
Community and Taiwan.
Pricing Policy: The only items under price control are coffee and
medicines. The Government of Honduras maintains an informal control
over prices of certain staple products such as milk, sugar, and cement
by maintaining unwritten agreements with producers to limit and justify
increases.
Tax Policies: President Flores' April 1999 Economic Plan decreased
the corporate tax rate from 40 percent to 30 percent in 1998 and to 25
percent in 1999. The sales tax was increased from 7 percent to 12
percent in June 1998, which helped maintain government revenue in the
aftermath of Hurricane Mitch despite a sharp drop in economic activity.
Sales taxes were increased to 15 percent on liquor and tobacco products
and are even higher on new car purchases. Export taxes on bananas are
being reduced in stages from 50 cents to four cents a box by the year
2000. Export taxes on seafood, sugar and live cattle were eliminated in
1998.
4. Debt Management Policies
Debt service on Honduras' approximately US$ 4 billion public
external debt is a major constraint on growth and represented about 35
percent of the government budget in 1998. In the aftermath of Hurricane
Mitch, with the consequent drop in revenue and increase in government
expenditures, the need for debt relief became even more imperative.
Despite Paris Club Debt Rescheduling Agreements in July 1995 and March
1996, and over US$ 500 million in bilateral debt forgiveness (including
US$ 430 million by the U.S. in 1991), Honduras had been unable to
comply with the goals of the Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility
(ESAF) negotiated with the IMF in 1992. Honduras signed a new ESAF in
1999, pledging to maintain responsible monetary policies, strengthen
oversight of the financial sector, overhaul the national pension
system, and accelerate the privatization of international airport
management, the telephone company, and the electric company's
distribution system.
Honduras received significant bilateral debt relief. In 2000, it
should receive even more relief on multilateral debt service in the
years to come through the Highly Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC)
Initiative. Shortly after Mitch, the Paris Club suspended bilateral
debt service payments until 2002. Honduras subsequently signed an
agreement with the Paris Club to reduce the overall bilateral debt
burden by two thirds (Naples terms), saving the country some US$ 430
million over the next three years. The U.S. and Honduras signed a
bilateral debt reduction agreement in August 1999, which should save
Honduras about US$ 65 million. Concerning the multilateral debt, which
encompasses the bulk of the country's total public foreign debt,
Honduras will qualify for significant debt relief under the enhanced
HIPC framework established by the international donor community in
Cologne in June 1999. Receipt of this relief is conditioned on the
formulation of an effective poverty reduction strategy and fulfillment
of the conditions of the 1999 IMF ESAF.
5. Aid
As a result of the devastation caused by Hurricane Mitch, Honduras
has been receiving an unprecedented increase in foreign assistance. At
the May 1999 Stockholm consultative meeting, donors pledged US$ 2.7
billion. As of October 1999, the Honduran government reported receiving
or negotiating US$ 603.8 million in grants and US$ 885 million in
loans, primarily from the Inter-American Development Bank and the World
Bank.
The U.S. has provided the single largest amount of aid to Honduras.
According to Embassy calculations, the U.S. has spent or obligated US$
555 million in FY 99, US$ 55 million of which was spent on immediate
emergency relief and the rest in reconstruction assistance. U.S.
government agencies involved in assistance to Honduras include USAID
(overall coordinator), DOD, USDA, USDOC, DOT, USGS, HUD, OPIC, and Ex-
Im Bank. Other countries have provided significant aid as well,
including Japan, Sweden, Spain, Italy, Canada, and Germany.
6. Significant Barriers to U.S. Exporters
Import Policy: While reforms have gone far to open up Honduras to
U.S. exports and investment, some protectionist policies remain. Import
restrictions are imposed on firearms and ammunitions, toxic chemicals,
pornographic material and narcotics. Other import restrictions are
applied to chicken meat and cosmetics. Import restrictions are mainly
based on phyto-sanitary, public health, public morale, and national
security grounds.
Services Barriers : In certain services industries (e.g., local
transportation, insurance, radio and TV stations, and
distributorships), majority control must be in the hands of Honduran
nationals. Special government authorization must be obtained to invest
in the tourism, hotel and banking service sectors. Foreigners may not
hold a seat in Honduras' two stock exchanges or provide direct
brokerage services in these exchanges. Honduran professional bodies
heavily regulate the licensing of foreigners to practice law, medicine,
engineering, accounting, and other professions.
Labeling and Registration of Processed Foods: Honduran law requires
that all processed food products be labeled in Spanish and registered
with the Ministry of Public Health. The law is usually not enforced for
U.S. products in recognition of U.S. health inspection procedures.
Investment Barriers: The 1992 Investment Law removed foreign
ownership restrictions in most sectors. Companies that wish to take
advantage of the Agrarian Reform Law, or engage in commercial fishing,
forestry, or local transportation, however, must be majority owned by
Hondurans.
In addition, special government authorization is required for
foreign investment in the following sectors: forestry,
telecommunications, basic health, air transport, fishing and
aquaculture, mining, insurance and financial services, private
education, and agricultural and agro-industrial activities exceeding
land tenancy limits established by law.
Foreigners are barred from ownership of small businesses with
equity less than 150,000 lempiras (about US$ 11,000). Foreign ownership
of land within 40 km of the coastlines and national boundaries is
constitutionally prohibited, though tourism investment laws allow for
certain exceptions. A proposed constitutional amendment to modify the
prohibition was dropped due to opposition by minority groups living
along the Caribbean Coast. In all investments, at least 90 percent of a
company's labor force must be Honduran, and at least 80 percent of the
payroll must be paid to Hondurans. Inadequate land titling procedures
have led to numerous investment disputes involving U.S.-citizen
landowners. The U.S. government has worked extensively to assist these
citizens, most of whose case are being litigated in Honduran courts.
On July 1, 1995 Honduras and the U.S. signed the Bilateral
Investment Treaty (BIT) at the Hemispheric Trade Ministerial in Denver,
Colorado. This treaty has been ratified by the Honduran Congress;
ratification by the U.S. senate is still pending.
Government Procurement Practices: Foreign firms are given national
treatment for public bids, although in practice, U.S. firms complain
about the mismanagement and lack of transparency of government bid
processes. To participate in public tenders, foreign firms are required
to act through a local agent. Local agency firms must be at least 51
percent Honduran-owned, unless the procurement is classified as a
national emergency.
Customs Procedures: Customs administrative procedures are
burdensome. There are extensive documentary requirements and other red
tape involving the payment of numerous import duties, customs
surcharges, selective consumption taxes, and warehouse levies. Honduras
agreed in November 1999 to implement eight Free Trade Area of the
Americas customs related business facilitation measures. Honduras is
also committed to implementing the majority of provisions of the World
Trade Organization's Custom Valuation Agreement by January 2000.
7. Export Subsidies Policies
Almost all export subsidies have been eliminated. Under the
Temporary Import Law (RIT), exporters are allowed to introduce raw
materials, parts, and capital equipment into Honduras exempt from
surcharges and customs duties if the product is to be exported outside
Central America. Export Processing Zones (ZIPS) are exempt from paying
import duties and other charges on goods and capital equipment. In
addition, the production and sale of goods within the ZIPS are exempt
from state and municipal taxes. Firms operating in ZIPS are exempt from
income taxes for twenty years, and municipal taxes for ten years.
Foreigners exporting to Honduras are not required by law to sell
through an agent or distributor, except when selling to the government.
8. Protection of U.S. Intellectual Property
In December 1999, the Honduran government passed reforms to its
Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) laws to comply with the World Trade
Organization's Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
(TRIPS) Agreement's January 1, 2000 deadline. The U.S. and Honduras
initialed a Bilateral IPR Agreement in March 1999. Signing of this
agreement is still pending.
Despite the reforms, enforcement of IPR laws remains problematic
due to insufficient resources. Although some progress have been made,
there is still widespread piracy of many forms of copyrighted works,
including books, sound and video recordings, compact discs, computer
software and television programs. The illegitimate registration of
well-known trademarks is still a problem as well.
9. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association: Union officials remain critical of
what they perceive as inadequate enforcement of worker rights by the
Ministry of Labor (MOL), particularly the right to form a union.
Nonetheless, in November 1995, the MOL signed a memorandum of
understanding with the U.S. Trade Representative's Office to implement
11 recommendations for enforcement of the Honduran labor code and the
resolution of disputes. The MOL has made positive changes implementing
several of these recommendations, particularly as they relate to
inspection and monitoring of maquilas (primarily, garment assembly
plants). Through cooperation within the Tripartite Commission (unions,
MOL, maquila association), the number of unannounced and repeat visits
to maquila plants by inspectors from the MOL has increased, improving
the MOL's effectiveness in enforcing worker rights and child labor
laws.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively: The law protects
worker rights to organize and to bargain collectively; collective
bargaining agreements are the norm for companies in which workers are
organized. Three large peasant organizations are affiliated directly
with the labor movement. Only about fourteen percent of the work force
is unionized, therefore, the economic and political influence of
organized labor has diminished in recent years. Although the labor code
prohibits retribution by employers for trade union activity, it is a
common occurrence. Employers actually dismiss relatively few workers
for union activity once a union is recognized; such cases, however,
serve to discourage workers elsewhere from attempting to organize.
Workers in both unionized and non-unionized companies are under the
protection of the labor code, which gives them the right to seek
redress from the Ministry of Labor. Over the past year, the Ministry of
Labor took action in several cases, pressuring employers to observe the
code. Labor or civil courts can require employers to rehire employees
fired for union activity, but such rulings are uncommon. Labor leaders
criticize the Ministry for not enforcing the labor code, for taking too
long to make decisions, and for being timid and indifferent to workers'
needs. The Ministry has increased inspections and the training of its
inspectors; it needs to do more, however, to improve observance of
international labor standards.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor: The constitution and
the law prohibit forced or compulsory labor. Over the past year there
were no official reports of such practices in the area of child labor.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children: According to government
and human rights groups, an estimated 350,000 children work illegally.
The constitution and the labor code prohibit the employment of minors
under the age of sixteen, except that a child who is fifteen years of
age is allowed to work with the permission of his parents and the
Ministry of Labor. The Children's Code prohibits a child of fourteen
years of age or less from working, even with parental permission, and
establishes prison sentences of three to five years for individuals who
allow children to work illegally. An employer who legally hires a
fifteen-year-old must certify that the child has finished or is
finishing his compulsory schooling. The Ministry of Labor grants a
number of work permits to fifteen-year-olds each year. It is common,
however, for younger children to obtain these documents or to purchase
forged permits. The Ministry of Labor cannot effectively enforce child
labor laws, except in the maquila sector, and violations of the labor
code occur frequently in rural areas and in small companies. Many
children work on small family farms, as street vendors, or in small
workshops to supplement the family income. In September 1998, the
government created the National Commission for the Gradual and
Progressive Eradication of Child Labor.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work: In the aftermath of the
disastrous Hurricane Mitch, which struck Honduras in late October 1998,
labor leaders agreed to forego the usual January (1999) pay increase in
return for business leaders' pledge to control price increases for
basic goods and services. When labor and business reached an impasse on
wage negotiations in June 1999, the Catholic Church arbitrated a 25
percent increase in the minimum wage, which was decreed by the
government in July. It was also agreed that as of January 1, 2000, an
increase of 8 percent will be effective for all workers and that the
base for both increases will be the minimum wage effective before the
salary increase in July. There will not be another raise in the minimum
wage throughout 2000, as long as inflation (according to central bank
statistics) does not exceed 12 percent during the first six months of
the year, which it appears unlikely to do.
Daily pay rates vary by geographic zone and the sector of the
economy; urban workers earn slightly more than workers in the
countryside. The lowest minimum wage occurs in the non-export
agricultural sector, where it ranges from US$ 2.27 to US$ 2.89 (33.00
to 42.00 lempiras) per day, depending on whether the employer has more
than 15 employees. The highest minimum wage is US$ 3.79 (55.00
lempiras) per day in the export sector, though most workers typically
earn more. All workers are entitled to an additional month's salary in
June and December of each year. The constitution and the labor code
stipulate that all workers must be paid a minimum wage, but the
Ministry of labor lacks the personnel and other resources for effective
enforcement. The minimum wage is insufficient to provide a standard of
living above the poverty line for a worker and his family.
f. Rights in Sectors with U.S. Investment: The worker rights
enumerated above are respected more fully in sectors with sizable U.S.
investment than in sectors of the economy lacking substantive U.S.
participation. For example, in a number of U.S.-owned maquila plants,
workers have shown little enthusiasm for unionizing, since they
consider their treatment, salary, and working conditions to be as good
as, or better than, those in unionized plants. In establishing new
investments in Honduras, U.S. businesses in recent years consciously
have constructed their plants to meet more stringent U.S. government
laws and regulations.
Extent of U.S. Investment in Selected Industries--U.S. Direct Investment Position Abroad on an Historical Cost
Basis--1998
[Millions of U.S. Dollars]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Category Amount
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Petroleum...................... .............. (\1\)
Total Manufacturing............ .............. 190
Food & Kindred Products...... 184 ...............................................................
Chemicals & Allied Products.. 2 ...............................................................
Primary & Fabricated Metals.. (\2\) ...............................................................
Industrial Machinery and 0 ...............................................................
Equipment.
Electric & Electronic 0 ...............................................................
Equipment.
Transportation Equipment..... 0 ...............................................................
Other Manufacturing.......... 3 ...............................................................
Wholesale Trade................ .............. 2
Banking........................ .............. 5
Finance/Insurance/Real Estate.. .............. 29
Services....................... .............. 0
Other Industries............... .............. (\1\)
TOTAL ALL INDUSTRIES........... .............. 186
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Suppressed to avoid disclosing data of individual companies.
\2\ Less than $500,000 (+/-).
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis.
______
JAMAICA
Key Economic Indicators
[Millions of U.S. Dollars unless otherwise indicated]
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1997 1998 \1\ 1999
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Income, Production and Employment:
Nominal GDP....................... 6,198.9 6,318.9 6332.1
Real GDP Growth Rate \2\.......... -2.1 -0.7 -0.5
GDP (at Current Prices) by Sector:
Agriculture, Forestry, and 495.5 505.3 N/A
Fishing........................
Mining and Quarrying............ 344.7 309.2 N/A
Manufacturing................... 994.2 954.6 N/A
Construction and Installation... 717.2 717.6 N/A
Electricity and Water........... 136.4 145.1 N/A
Transportation, Storage
and Communication............... 687.8 746.7 N/A
Retail Trade.................... 1,418.3 1,454.0 N/A
Real Estate Services............ 314.1 338.2 N/A
Government Services............. 750.5 799.5 N/A
Finance......................... 39.7 29.7 N/A
Other........................... 299.6 319.0 N/A
GDP Per Capita (US$).............. 2,440.2 2,468.4 2,465.0
Labor Force (000's)............... 1,133.8 1,128.6 N/A
Unemployment Rate (pct)........... 16.5 15.5 N/A
Money and Prices (annual percentage
growth):
Money Supply Growth (M2) Dec-Dec.. 12.5 7.2 \3\ 9.0
Consumer Price Inflation.......... 9.2 7.9 5.9
Exchange Rate (J$/US$)............ 35.58 36.68 39.0
Balance of Payments and Trade:
Total Exports FOB................. 1,387.3 1,316.3 1,245.8
Exports to U.S.................. 462.9 520.4 468.5
Total Imports CIF................. 3,127.8 2,991.7 2,728.0
Imports from U.S................ 1,504.4 1,523.3 1,364.0
Trade Balance..................... -1,740.5 -1,675.4 -1,482.2
Balance with U.S................ -1,041.5 -1,002.9 -895.5
External Public Debt \4\.......... 3,277.6 3,306.4 3,030.1
Fiscal Balance/GDP (pct) \5\...... -8.3 -7.5 -4.6
Current Account Deficit/GDP....... 6.0 4.7 N/A
Debt Service Payments/GDP......... 28.7 39.4 N/A
Net Official Reserves \6\......... 540.0 579.4 526.2
Aid from U.S.\7\.................. 24.7 22.0 15.8
Aid from Other Countries \8\...... 149.7 143.0 N/A
------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ 1999 figures are all estimates based on available monthly data as of
October.
\2\ Growth rate is based on Jamaican Dollars, whereas nominal GDP is
shown in U.S. Dollars.
\3\ January-July 1999.
\4\ Figure as of August 1999.
\5\ Jamaican Fiscal Year (April-March) deficit.
\6\ Figure as of August 1999.
\7\ Estimates include Development, Food, and Military Assistance for FY
97, FY 98 and FY 99.
\8\ Estimated commitments for development assistance from Jamaica's
Cooperation Partners.
1. General Policy Framework
Jamaica is an import-oriented economy. Imports of goods and
services totaled USD 3.83 billion or 56 percent of GDP in 1998. Of this
total, raw materials amounted to USD 1,507 million, while consumer
goods and capital goods amounted to USD 924 million and USD 560 million
respectively. Tourism (estimated at 15 Percent of GDP), bauxite/alumina
(10 percent of GDP), and manufacturing exports (such as apparel,
processing of sugar, beverages and tobacco, etc.--17 percent of GDP)
are the major pillars sustaining the economy. In 1998, these three
sectors accounted for 80.5 percent (U.S. dollars 2.35 billion) of the
country's foreign exchange earnings. Remittances from Jamaicans living
abroad are also a significant source of income and bring in over USD
600 million annually. Both GDP and Foreign exchange inflows are
sensitive to changes in the global economy, particularly with respect
to commodity prices and the services/tourism sector.
Jamaica has a work force of 1.13 million, representing 64 percent
of total population (14 years and over). Women account for 46 percent
of the total labor force. Sixty percent of Jamaica's work force is
employed in the services sector, contributing about 77 percent of GDP
(in constant 1986 dollars). Agriculture accounts for 7 percent of GDP
and employs 21 percent of the workforce. The primary products are
sugar, bananas, coffee and cocoa. The small size of the Jamaican
economy, relatively high production costs (e.g., domestic interest
rates) and cheap imports have reduced the contribution of the
manufacturing sector over the last several years to about 17.3 percent
of GDP in 1998. The once fast growing apparel industry (1980's) began
to contract about five years ago. Four factories closed in 1999, five
in 1998, and seven in 1997, following more than a dozen factory
closures in 1996. Consequently, current employment in the apparel
industry is down to approximately 20,000, a decline of 42 percent from
its peak in 1994.
The Jamaican economy suffered its third consecutive year of
negative growth (0.7 percent) in 1998, Following a contraction of 2.1
percent in 1997 and 1.8 percent in 1996. All sectors excepting bauxite/
alumina, energy, and tourism, shrank in 1998. This reduction in
aggregate demand and output is the result of the government's continued
tight macro-economic policies. In part, these policies have been
successful. Inflation has fallen from 25 percent in 1995 to 7.9 percent
in 1998. Through periodic intervention in the market, the central bank
also has prevented any abrupt drop in the exchange rate. The Jamaican
dollar declined from an average of 35.58 in 1997 to 36.68 to the U.S.
dollar in 1998. However, The exchange rate has been slipping since the
beginning of 1999, resulting in an average exchange Rate of Jdols 40.25
to USD 1.00 in November 1999.
Sustained high real-interest rates (commercial interest rates
averaged almost 38 percent in the first nine months of 1999), along
with increasing uncertainty about the stability of the exchange rate,
weakness in the financial sector and lower levels of investment,
continue to erode confidence in the productive sector. Unemployment/
underemployment has been growing as a result of lower exports, falling
domestic demand, and the restructuring of companies. Major cash crops
(e.g. sugar and bananas) have been affected by both the high cost of
production and prolonged, adverse weather conditions.
The economic recession continued into the first three quarters of
1999. Tourism, and certain service sectors such as electricity and
telecommunications are expected to show modest growth, but most other
sectors continue to experience difficulties. The GOJ continues to
encourage a more open economy by privatizing publicly-owned companies
(now including some financial companies and real estate acquired in the
last three years via financial-sector restructuring) and through
slightly lower interest rates. The government continues its efforts to
raise new sovereign debt in international and local financial markets
in order to meet its U.S. dollar debt obligations, to mop up liquidity
to maintain the exchange rate and to help fund the current budget
deficit.
The GOJ hopes to encourage economic activity during 1999/2000
through a combination of privatization, financial sector restructuring,
reduced interest rates, and by boosting tourism and related productive
activities. However, the path to recovery will depend upon external
developments in international markets and the government's ability to
restore confidence that has been severely undermined by recent economic
challenges and by social unrest.
According to the recent Jamaica survey of living conditions, the
poverty rate in Jamaica has been dropping since 1995, from 37.5 percent
of households to 15.9 percent in 1998. This is due primarily to the
decline in inflation from 25.6 percent in 1995 to 7.9 percent in 1998
and the implementation of the National Poverty Eradication Policy and
Program (NPEP). However, despite the drop in poverty rate, access to
opportunities for education and health care remain inequitable.
In March 1996, the government of Jamaica adopted the National
Industrial Policy (NIP), a long term strategy to achieve sustained
economic growth and development. During the first year, the nip's
target was to achieve macro-economic stability by maintaining a stable
exchange rate and reducing inflation and interest rates. These were
substantially achieved. In its second phase, a three-year period
beginning in 1997, the NIP aims at achieving stable growth by
stimulating investment and export diversification. However, in 1998
most of the NIP targeted sector strategies lagged, mainly because of
economic and financial instability in the global economy which dampened
domestic prices, and reduced both the volume of investment funds
available from the domestic financial sector and the level of foreign
direct investment.
The banking and insurance sector is now being restructured by the
GOJ. That sector has experienced serious difficulties since the end of
1995, caused by a mismatch of assets and liabilities. The Financial
Sector Adjustment Company (FINSAC), a government agency established in
February 1997 to provide funding and to reorganize illiquid financial
institutions, is now in the second and third phases of restructuring
and divesting the assets of these institutions. FINSAC's interventions
have amounted to approximately USD 2.3 billion. FINSAC is now in the
process of aggressively marketing the assets it acquired, in order to
lower the burden of debt servicing. Recent reports indicate that the
market value of the assets that FINSAC acquired is now estimated at
less than a quarter of the value that FINSAC originally paid.
The Jamaican fiscal year (JFY) April 1999/March 2000 Budget calls
for Jdols 160.1 billion in outlays. This is a 25.7 percent increase
over the revised 1998/99 Budget. For JFY 1999/00, recurrent expenditure
is Estimated at Jdols 87.2 billion and capital Expenditure at Jdols
72.9 billion. Debt servicing is by far the largest expenditure
category, accounting for 62 percent of the total budget, followed by:
social and community services (17.9 percent); general government
services (7 percent); economic development (5.7 percent); defense
affairs, public order and safety (5.5 percent); and with the balance
applied to unallocated expenditures (2 percent).
The GOJ expects to finance 62 percent of the Jdols 160.1 billion
budget with an expected total revenue of Jdols 88.1 billion which
includes: tax and non-tax recurrent revenue, capital revenue
(royalties, land sales, loan repayments, divestments); and transfers
from the capital development fund (including the bauxite levy). The
government will fund the balance from debt. The government plans to
borrow Jdols 68.2 billion to balance the budget. Of this, 26.3 percent
will be obtained through external loans, including institutional
project loans (multilateral and bilateral, amounting to Jdols 2.6
billion), and through other international capital markets (Jdols 15.4
billion). The balance of Jdols 50.2 billion will be raised from the
domestic market through local registered stock (LRS-Jdols 40 billion)
and other (Jdols 10.2 billion). Although the government pledges to
raise revenue through a rigorous program of enhanced tax compliance,
reduce recurrent expenditure and better manage its fiscal deficit, loss
of investor confidence and high levels of under employment will greatly
hamper its efforts. Recent civil unrest over increases in fuel prices
is tragic testimony to the hardships faced by ordinary Jamaicans and
the government's failure to build popular support for greater
sacrifices.
The government continues to reduce excess liquidity by issuing
``repos'', reverse repurchase of treasury bills, (i.e. sale of
securities with an agreement to buy back on a later date at a given
rate). The Bank of Jamaica's open market operations are one means by
which the Government of Jamaica funds its fiscal Deficit.
The Bank of Jamaica (BOJ) continued its tight monetary policy to
absorb excess liquidity by issuing long term securities (local
registered stock) and short-term treasury bills. In order to stabilize
the Jamaican dollar the GOJ continues to accumulate foreign exchange
reserves resulting in high borrowing, and sustained high real-interest
rates on government securities.
The bank of Jamaica has lowered its cash reserve requirement for
commercial banks from 25 percent in August 1998 to 16 percent in
October 1999. However, commercial banks have not responded by lowering
their lending rates to an appreciable degree. The banks attribute this
failure to the number of nonperforming loans carried on their books.
Unable to float a bond issue in the international money markets,
the GOJ turned to local markets, issuing U.S. dollar-denominated bonds
in August (USD 40 million for five years at 12 percent and USD 10
million for seven years at 11 percent) and in October 1999 (USD 50
million for five years at 11.75 percent). Reportedly, only the USD 40
million issue at 12 percent was fully subscribed.
The bank of Jamaica achieved a positive stock of net international
reserves (NIR) in 1993 for the first time since the mid 1970's. The NIR
has remained positive, peaking at USD 715.6 million in January 1997. As
of September 1999, due to central bank interventions to maintain the
exchange rate, the NIR stands at approximately USD 526.24 million, the
equivalent of 12.1 weeks of imports.
2. Exchange Rate Policy
On September 26, 1991, exchange controls were eliminated to allow
for free competition in the foreign exchange market. The principal
remaining restriction is that foreign exchange transactions must be
done through an authorized dealer. Licenses are regulated. Any company
or person required to make payments to the government by agreement or
law (such as the levy and royalty due on bauxite) will continue to make
such payments directly to the bank of Jamaica. authorized dealers
(commercial banks and cambios) are required to sell five percent of
their foreign exchange purchases directly to the boj. In addition,
under an agreement between the Petroleum Company of Jamaica (Petrojam)
and the commercial banks, a further ten percent of foreign exchange
purchases are sold to Petrojam.
In 1994, cambios were designated as authorized dealers to promote
an increase in the official inflows of foreign exchange. Cambios
account for over a third of total foreign exchange purchases by
authorized dealers. Reportedly, cambio dealers have been lobbying for
increased flexibility in doing business in order to increase their
market share and be viable. In 1998, total foreign exchange inflows
through commercial banks and cambios increased by 2.1 percent to USD
3.6 billion. From January to September 1999, foreign exchange inflows
into the official market declined by 1.6 percent over the corresponding
period in 1998 to U.S. dollars 2.65 billion. The average weighted
selling rate has been slipping. On November 5, 1998, the rate was Jdols
40.42 to USD 1.00. This decline is the result of uncertainty and
speculation arising from unfavorable economic conditions, the
postponement of a bond issue by the GOJ in the international market
which was expected to help fund the current budget deficit and
attractive returns on U.S. dollar bonds issued locally. There is a
broad perception in the market that the present exchange rate is not
sustainable. However, the GOJ is committed to defending the exchange
rate within a targeted band through the bank of Jamaica's intervention.
3. Structural Policies
The fair competition act was adopted in 1993 to create an
environment of free and fair competition and to provide consumer
protection. Free-market forces generally determine prices. However,
certain public utility charges such as bus fares, water, electricity,
and telecommunications remain subject to price controls and can be
changed only with government approval.
Taxation accounts for 87 percent of total recurrent and capital
revenue. Major sources of tax revenue include: personal income tax
(38.1 percent of tax revenue), value added tax (29.7 percent) and
import duties (10.8 percent). The budget continues to stress a tight
monetary policy, intended to curb inflation. The government proposes
covering the growing budget deficit by a combination of increased taxes
(cigarettes), higher fees (on passports, among other items) for
consumers, and by borrowing.
The Common External Tariff (CET) has been gradually reduced over
the years. The rate structure was scheduled to be revised downward in
four phases. In January 1999, the last phase of CET reduction was
implemented in Jamaica with import or customs duty rates reduced for
most items by 5 percentage points to a maximum of 20 percent. This
figure refers to import duties only. In order to protect local
producers, import duties on items such as certain agricultural products
(such as chicken, beef and milk) and certain consumer goods carry
higher duty rates. In addition to import duties, certain items such as
beverages and tobacco, motor vehicles and some agricultural products
carry an additional stamp duty (ranging from 25-56 percent) and special
consumption tax (ranging from 5-39.9 percent). Additionally, most
imported items are subject to the 15 percent general consumption tax
(GCT). Goods originating from CARICOM countries are not subject to
import duties.
All monopoly rights of the Jamaica Commodity Trading Company (JCTC)
ceased December 31, 1991, but it retains responsibility for the
procurement of commodities under government to government agreements
such as the P.L. 480 program. This administrative function is now
transferred to the trade board effective FY 2000. The U.S. embassy is
unaware of any government regulatory policy that would have a
significant discriminatory or adverse impact on U.S. exports.
4. Debt Management Policies
Jamaica's stock of external (foreign) debt grew marginally by one
percent, to Jdols 3.3 billion in 1998. About 45 percent of the external
debt is owed to bilateral donors (the United States is the largest
bilateral creditor), 33 percent to multilateral institutions (down, due
to a policy decision to reduce dependence on the IMF), and 23 percent
to commercial banks and others. In 1998, for the third consecutive
year, no official-bilateral obligations were forgiven, as took place
from 1990-1995. According to the bank of Jamaica, the British
government recently granted debt relief under the UK/Jamaica
commonwealth debt initiative arrangement covering the period April 1,
1999 to march 31, 2000 (amounting to 5.4 million pounds sterling).
External debt is likely to increase only marginally or even decline as
the government continues to raise more debt denominated in foreign
currency on the domestic market. Further, although the bulk of the
external debt consists of flows from multilateral and bilateral
sources, there has been a growing shift to debt owed to private
creditors--largely bond holders.
Actual external debt-servicing during 1998 accounted for 19.86
percent of exports of goods and services. The ratio of total
outstanding external debt to exports of goods and services decreased
from 177.6 percent in 1990, to 100.3 percent in 1996 as a result of
debt reduction efforts and improvements in exports, but has since
climbed to 103.3 percent in 1998. Debt-servicing continues to be a
major burden on the government budget, accounting for some 62 percent
of total outlays. In 1995 Jamaica ended its borrowing relationship with
the IMF, but it continues to repay that institution, in order to reduce
its overall debt burden. In 1995 Jamaica also completed a Multi-Year
Rescheduling Arrangement (MYRA) with the Paris club, negotiated in
1992. The MYRA rescheduled U.S. dollars 281.2 million of principal and
interest for the period October 1992 to September 1995.
Jamaica's internal (domestic) debt has ballooned in recent years,
from Jdols 23.4 billion in 1993 to Jdols 121 billion in 1998. As of
August 1999, the internal debt stood at Jdols 154.4 billion. The main
factors contributing to the increased internal debt were: (a)
neutralizing increased domestic liquidity resulting from the BOJ's
interventions in the foreign exchange market; (b) budgetary financing;
(c) liquidity support to commercial banks; and (d) intervening to
absorb excess liquidity to maintain a stable exchange rate of the
Jamaican dollar. Domestic debt is composed of government securities
such as: t-bills (9.1 percent), local registered stock (76.4 percent),
bonds (9.5 percent), and loans from commercial banks and other entities
(5 percent).
As a part of its debt management strategy, the GOJ plans to borrow
from international capital markets in order to take advantage of
competitive market rates and to substitute lower-cost external debt for
higher-cost domestic debt. However, in mid-1999 as the result of
unfavorable market conditions, the GOJ accepted the advice of its lead
banker and postponed a ten-year bond offering that was expected to
raise as much as USD 300 million in the international market to finance
the budget deficit.
5. Aid
In 1998, Jamaica received USD 165 million of official development
assistance from multilateral agencies and other countries on a
bilateral basis reflecting a decline of 5.4 percent over 1997.
Bilateral sources contributed USD 64.1 million, while multilateral
financial institutions contributed loans and grants valued at USD 97.4
million.
The United States is a major aid donor. In FY 1999, USD 9.9 million
was disbursed as development assistance, USD 5 million was provided
under the P.L. 480 program, and another USD 945,000 as military aid. In
addition, there were 100 Peace Corps personnel who provided technical
assistance in the areas of health, education, environment and small
business development.
6. Significant Barriers to U.S. Exports
Import licenses: although Jamaica has made considerable headway in
trade liberalization, some items still require an import license,
including: milk powder, plants and parts of plants for perfume or
pharmaceutical purposes, gum-resins, vegetable saps and extracts,
certain chemicals, motor vehicles, arms and ammunition, certain toys,
such as water pistols, and gaming machines.
Services barriers: foreign investors are now encouraged to invest
in almost any area of the economy. On September 30, 1999, the GOJ and
cable and wireless of Jamaica, ltd. Signed the `new connections'
agreement that will end the monopoly rights granted until 2013 and will
help phase-out C and W's telecoms monopoly over the course of three
years. All existing telecom licenses are to be terminated and all new
licenses will have to comply with a new telecommunications act, which
parliament is expected to adopt by April 2000. The GOJ has announced
the auction of two cellular phone licenses in 2000. However, there are
still certain restrictions in the communications field: under the new
cable TV policy, licenses are granted preferentially to companies that
are incorporated in Jamaica and in which majority ownership and
controlling interest are held by Jamaican or CARICOM nationals. In most
other areas, there do not appear to be any economic or industrial
strategies that have discriminatory effects on foreign-owned
investments.
Standards, testing, labeling, and certification: the Jamaican
bureau of standards administers the Standards act, the processed food
act and the weights and measures act. Products imported into Jamaica
must meet the requirements of these acts. These include requirements
for labeling. Items sold in Jamaica must conform to recognized
international quality specifications. In most cases, Jamaica follows
U.S. standards. In recent years, the bureau has become increasingly
vigilant in terms of monitoring the quality of products sold on the
local market. The quarantine division inspects and determines standards
in the case of live animals. The ministry of health may inspect meat
imports. In 1995, an amendment to the weights and measures act was
passed aimed at enforcing compliance with the metric system of
measurement. Imported goods are expected to conform to the metric
system.
Investment barriers: the government of Jamaica welcomes foreign
investment and there are no policies or regulations reserving areas
exclusively to Jamaicans. Foreigners are not excluded from
participation in privatization/divestment activities. While each
investment proposal is assessed on its own merits, investments are
preferred in areas which may increase productive output, use domestic
raw materials, earn or save foreign exchange, generate employment, or
introduce new technology. The screening mechanisms are standard and
nondiscriminatory. The main criterion is the credit-worthiness of the
company. Environmental impact assessments are required for new
developments. Although both foreign and domestic companies have
complained that ``red tape'' is a hindrance in doing business, foreign
investors are treated the same as domestic investors before and after
investment.
Government procurement practices: government procurement is
generally done through open tenders. U.S. firms are eligible to bid.
The range of manufactured goods produced locally is relatively small,
so instances of competition between foreign goods and domestic
manufacturers are very few. According to recent reports, a National
Contracts Commission (NCC) was set up on October 8 to oversee the award
and evaluation of government contracts. The NCC, which replaces the
government's Contracts Commission, will be the central body responsible
for awarding government contracts. On November 5 the Corruption
prevention bill was passed in the senate, indicating that the country
was making progress in opening up the government to greater scrutiny.
Customs procedures: the customs department has recently been
computerized. As of September 1999, all customs entries are being
processed electronically in order to facilitate brokers and other
customers. However, some of the local brokers are still finding it
difficult to adjust to the new system. As a result businesses are
likely to face some difficulties until the customs brokers are properly
trained.
Anti-dumping laws: on July 1, 1999, the GOJ implemented the new
upgraded anti-dumping law. Among other things the act provides for the
establishment of an anti-dumping and subsidies commission, the
imposition of anti-dumping and countervailing duties on goods which are
found to have been dumped or subsidized and the exemption of goods from
the application of the act.
7. Export Subsidies Policies
The export industry encouragement act allows approved export
manufacturers access to duty-free imported raw materials and capital
goods for a maximum of ten years. Other benefits are available from the
Jamaican government's export-import bank, including access to
preferential financing through the discounting of export receivables
(up to 80 percent of export value at 12 percent), lines of credit,
medium term modernization fund (at 18-21 percent interest) and export
credit insurance. The export-import bank (EX-IM) and the Jamaica
Exporters Association (JEA) recently introduced a new joint venture
loan program targeting small exporters. The project, called ex-bed, is
being financed by the EX-IM bank to the tune of Jdols 10 million at an
interest rate of 12 percent per annum to be repaid within 90 days, 120
days and 180 days respectively. JEA will provide technical and
financial support through its small business export development
project.
In December 1996, the government of Jamaica launched phase one of a
Special Assistance Program (SAP) for the export apparel industry. The
objective is to improve competitiveness by encouraging companies to
make structural changes and implement operational efficiencies. The sap
targets the reduction of operational costs, specifically in the areas
of rent, security and financing. During phase one of the program, a
grant of Jdols 40 million (USD 1.1 million) was made available to cover
5 percent of the companies' costs. Phase two of the program (August
1997-March 1998), which has now been extended to March 2000, provides
an additional Jdols 160 million (USD 4.4 million) to encourage the
broader development of the industry, particularly in those areas which
will enhance long-term competitiveness. Benefits include loan financing
(working capital) through the Ex-Im bank at 12 percent, debt
restructuring for local companies through the national investment bank
of Jamaica at 18 percent, and finance for the retooling of factories
for expansion through the National Development Bank at 13 percent
(Jdols loans) and 12 percent (USD loans).
8. Protection of U.S. Intellectual Property
Jamaica is a member of the World Intellectual Property Organization
(WIPO) and of the Bern Convention (copyright protection). The Jamaican
constitution guarantees property rights and has enacted legislation to
protect and facilitate the acquisition and disposition of all property
rights, including intellectual property. Jamaica and the United States
signed a bilateral intellectual property rights agreement in March
1994. In addition, a Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT) came into force
in March 1997 that also contains obligations to respect intellectual
property.
Jamaican laws address major areas of intellectual property rights
(IPR) protection. Amendments to laws on copyrights and trademarks were
made recently. Amendments to the copyright act include the conferment
of protection on compilation works such as databases, and would also
grant protection to individuals having rights in encrypted
transmissions or in broadcasting or cable program services, and a right
of action against persons who knowingly infringe those rights for
commercial gain. Works already in the public domain in Jamaica would
not be accorded protection. Remedies available include injunctions,
damages, seizure and disposal/destruction of infringing goods.
Penalties may include fines or imprisonment. Licensing for broadcasts
is required for subscription TV. To date there are 37 subscriber TV
licensees island wide. However, there are reports of unlicensed cable
operators conducting business illegally. The broadcasting commission
states that it has begun taking steps to halt this illegal activity.
All licensees are required to receive permission from program providers
before re-broadcasting.
A draft bill on patents has been reviewed and corrections are being
made in consultation with WIPO. The office of the parliamentary counsel
is completing the revised law, which the government expects to be
passed by the end of this year.
Levels of IPR enforcement are limited by overall demands on police
and overburdened courts. The government is making efforts to raise
public awareness by seminars and publications.
Litigation is a viable option in protecting intellectual property.
In 1997, in individual lawsuits in Jamaican courts, U.S. corporations
McDonald's and k-mart successfully defended their names and service
marks against trademark infringement. In September 1999, the American
company Costco International sued a local trading company for carrying
out business under their name.
9. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association: The Jamaican constitution guarantees
the rights of assembly and association, freedom of speech, and
protection of private property. These rights are widely observed.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively: Article 23 of
the Jamaican constitution guarantees the right to form, join and belong
to trade unions. This right is freely exercised. Collective bargaining
is widely used as a means of settling disputes. Industrial actions
(generally brief strikes) are frequently employed in both private and
public sector disputes. The Labor Relations and Industrial Disputes Act
(LRIDA) codifies regulations on worker rights. About 15 percent of the
work force is unionized, and unions have historically played an
important economic and political role in Jamaican affairs. The public
sector is highly unionized. Throughout 1997, the Ministry of Finance
has been negotiating new two-year agreements covering tens of thousands
of public sector employees. Reduced levels of inflation have enabled
government negotiators to avoid budget-busting public sector salary
increases.
No free zone factory is unionized. Jamaica's largest unions claim
this is because unionization is discouraged in the free zones. The
ongoing contraction of the apparel industry and a lack of alternatives
for its workforce (largely female heads of household, with minimal
qualifications for other employment) are additional disincentives for
unionization at the present time. However, in tourist areas, workers
are often drawn away by more attractive employment opportunities in the
local tourism sector.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor: Forced or compulsory
labor is not practiced. Jamaica is a party to the relevant ILO
conventions.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children: The Juvenile Act
prohibits child labor, defined as the employment of children under the
age of twelve, except by parents or guardians in domestic,
agricultural, or horticultural work. While children are observed
peddling goods and services, child labor is not institutionalized. Both
government and societal views are intolerant of the practice and the
use of child labor in formal industries such as textiles/apparel is
virtually non-existent.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work: A 40-hour week with 8-hour days
is standard, with overtime and holiday pay at time-and-a-half and
double time, respectively. The minimum wage is Jdols 800 for a 40-hour
week or Jdols 20 per hour. There are frequently additional allowances
(e.g. for transportation, meals, clothing, etc.). Unemployment
compensation or ``redundancy pay'' is included in the negotiation of
specific wage and benefit packages. Jamaican law requires all factories
to be registered, inspected and approved by the Ministry of Labor.
Inspections are limited by scarce resources and a narrow legal
definition of ``factory.''
f. Rights in Sectors with U.S. Investment: U.S. investment in
Jamaica is concentrated in the bauxite/alumina industry, petroleum
products marketing, food and related products, light manufacturing
(mainly in-bond apparel assembly), banking, tourism, data processing,
and office machine sales and distribution. Worker rights are respected
in these sectors and most of the firms involved are unionized, with the
important exception of the garment assembly firms. No garment assembly
firms in the free zones are unionized; some outside the free zones are
unionized. There have been no reports of U.S.-related firms abridging
standards of acceptable working conditions. Wages in U.S.-owned
companies generally exceed the industry average.
Extent of U.S. Investment in Selected Industries--U.S. Direct Investment Position Abroad on an Historical Cost
Basis--1998
[Millions of U.S. Dollars]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Category Amount
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Petroleum...................... .............. (\1\)
Total Manufacturing............ .............. 144
Food & Kindred Products...... -5 ...............................................................
Chemicals & Allied Products.. 141 ...............................................................
Primary & Fabricated Metals.. 0 ...............................................................
Industrial Machinery and 0 ...............................................................
Equipment.
Electric & Electronic 0 ...............................................................
Equipment.
Transportation Equipment..... 0 ...............................................................
Other Manufacturing.......... 9 ...............................................................
Wholesale Trade................ .............. (\1\)
Banking........................ .............. 11
Finance/Insurance/Real Estate.. .............. 6
Services....................... .............. 39
Other Industries............... .............. 1,660
TOTAL ALL INDUSTRIES........... .............. 2,105
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Suppressed to avoid disclosing data of individual companies.
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis.
______
MEXICO
Key Economic Indicators
[Billions of U.S. Dollars unless otherwise indicated]
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1997 1998 \1\ 1999
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Income, Production and Employment:
Nominal GDP \2\......................... 402.0 415.0 448.0
Real GDP Growth (pct) \3\............... 7.0 4.8 3.4
GDP by Sector:
Agriculture........................... 21.42 20.51 21.74
Manufacturing......................... 80.20 83.26 89.35
Services.............................. 253.24 258.75 277.95
Per Capita GDP (US$).................... 4,232 4,294 4,565
Labor Force (Millions).................. 36.6 37.5 38.7
Unemployment Rate (pct)................. 3.7 3.2 2.8
Money and Prices (annual percentage
growth):
Money Supply Growth (M2)................ 21.1 23.3 19.0
Consumer Price Inflation................ 15.7 18.6 12.9
Exchange Rate (Peso/US$)................ 7.9 9.1 9.6
Balance of Payments and Trade:
Total Exports FOB \4\................... 110.4 117.5 131.0
Exports to U.S.\4\.................... 94.3 103.1 112.0
Total Imports FOB \4\................... 109.8 125.2 136.0
Imports from U.S.\4\.................. 82.0 93.1 101.0
Trade Balance \4\....................... 0.6 -7.7 -5.0
Balance with U.S.\4\.................. 12.3 10.0 11.0
External Public Debt.................... 88.3 92.3 91.1
Fiscal Deficit/GDP (Pct)................ 1.0 1.4 1.2
Current Account Deficit/GDP (pct)....... 1.8 3.5 2.8
Debt Service Payments/GDP (pct)......... 22.5 23.0 23.0
Gold and Foreign Exchange Reserves...... 28.0 30.1 31.0
Aid from U.S............................ N/A N/A N/A
Aid from All Other Sources.............. N/A N/A N/A
------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ 1999 figures are all estimates based on available monthly data in
November.
\2\ GDP at factor cost.
\3\ Percentage changes calculated in local currency.
\4\ Merchandise trade, Mexican data.
1. General Policy Framework
The strong recovery that the Mexican economy experienced in 1996
and 1997 tapered off in 1998, as the economy experienced a significant
slowdown in the last quarter of the year. Nevertheless, Mexico's Gross
Domestic Product (GDP) grew a healthy 4.8 percent in 1998. GDP
acceleration resumed in the second quarter of 1999, and the economy is
set to grow by about 3.4 percent for the entire year.
Exports, led by the maquiladora industry, have remained the main
engine of economic growth, and could surpass $131 billion in 1999. The
country's aggressive market opening through bilateral and multilateral
trade agreements has continued to create new markets for Mexican
products, while allowing more foreign competition. Since recovering
from the 1994-95 economic crisis, imports have increased at a faster
rate than exports, resulting in a reversal of Mexico's trade surplus of
the previous years. The slowdown that began late 1998 temporarily
reversed that trend, however, and Mexico's trade deficit for 1999--
about $5 billion--will be lower than next year. Two-way trade with the
United States has also continued to grow and (by Mexican figures) could
surpass $210 dollars.
The central bank's tight monetary policy, coupled with quiet
international financial markets, led to a strong real and nominal
appreciation of the peso. The currency appreciation helped the central
bank regain its credibility and attain its inflation target of 13
percent for 1999. The central bank's announced target of 10 percent
inflation for next year portends a tight monetary policy throughout
2000.
2. Exchange Rate Policy
In December 1994, Mexico abandoned its exchange band mechanism,
which had been in place since 1991, in favor of a free-floating
exchange rate. The peso has floated freely since then with only
infrequent interventions by the Bank of Mexico (Mexico's central bank).
After losing more than half its value against the dollar in 1995, the
peso was remarkably stable in 1996 and through most of 1997. The peso
appreciated by roughly 18 percent in real terms from September 1998 to
November 1999. To accumulate foreign reserves and weaken the peso to
support exporters, the bank offered credit institutions monthly options
to sell dollars to the central bank. The Bank of Mexico has purchased
up to $600 to $800 million of these options from banks in a single
month. The amount of these options, however, is still felt to be too
small to have an appreciable impact on the exchange rate.
3. Structural Policies
Mexico has reduced significantly regulation of the Mexican economy
over the past decade. The government introduced legislation in 1993 to
promote greater competition, limit monopolistic behavior, and prohibit
practices that restrain trade. The Mexican Federal Competition
Commission, established in that legislation, now has functioned
successfully for more than four years. A 1993 Foreign Trade Law
eliminated most nontariff trade restrictions and established remedies
for unfair trade practices, such as export subsidies and dumping. The
Mexican Customs Service also was modernized and automated. Customs Law
reforms, implemented in 1996, have greatly assisted in the effort to
weed out corruption. A project to examine all government regulations
and to reduce them continues moving forward, with several federal
ministries and the federal district having completed their work. State
and local deregulation is also planned for the future.
The government rarely publishes draft regulations for comment,
although in most cases it informally circulates draft copies to major
chambers and associations. This allows a few large organizations with a
local presence to influence the regulation-making process. However, it
does not provide the transparency that comes from publication, and can
limit the ability of small and foreign entities to participate in the
consultation process. In addition, final regulations routinely take
effect the day after publication, increasing compliance burdens for
unsuspecting foreign entities and sometimes causing confusion and
delays at border crossing points.
The government has privatized or eliminated more than 1000
parastatal companies since 1986. State enterprises thus far privatized
include commercial banks, the telephone company, a television network,
airlines, steel production, most railroads and ports, warehouses, and
several major industrial facilities. President Zedillo continued the
privatization trend. In 1997 and 1998, multiple contracts were let for
private sector construction of power plants and for distribution of
natural gas to strategically chosen communities. The government
continues working to privatize management and some facilities at the
remaining government-operated ports, and has shed all railroads. A
proposed constitutional amendment that would allow more private sector
participation in the generation and distribution of electricity,
however, has lingered in Congress.
Airport privatization in mid November 1999 continues. Mexico's
airports have been divided into five geographic areas. Each area will
be managed by a group of investors. While some airport groups are fully
operational, Pacifico and SouthEast for example, the privatization
process for the remaining groups should near completion toward the end
of 2000. The Mexican government will maintain control of a limited
number of smaller airports in the interest of the public served by
these regional facilities. The government announced plans to sell up to
49 percent of its secondary petrochemical plants, despite opposition
party resistance. There is now competition in most of Mexico for the
provision of long-distance telephone service. However, legal struggles
between Telmex and the new market entrants have somewhat complicated
the development of competition in this sector.
4. Debt Management Policies
Mexico has largely achieved the objectives laid out in the
emergency economic program developed to cope with the 1995 peso crisis.
During 1997 and the first three quarters of 1998, public sector debt
continued to decline in real terms. The maturity of public debt was
extended, the debt profile was reconfigured, the composition of
external debt altered dramatically, and Mexico successfully returned to
international capital markets. Among the most telling indicators of the
success of Mexicos debt strategy were early repayment to the U.S.
Treasury of all of the economic support funds extended to Mexico during
the 1995 crisis, and Mexico's relative ease in weathering the effects
of other-country financial crises in the fall of 1998.
At the end of the first half of 1998, Mexico's net public sector
external debt was $88.2 billion, a slight decrease from 1997. The Bank
of Mexico auctions $250 million of dollar put options at the end of
each month, which purchasers may exercise any time during the following
month, subject to certain limitations. In 1998 total amortization of
public external debt will be $22.1 billion, compared to $32.3 billion
in 1997.
5. Significant Barriers to U.S. Exports
Import Licenses: The Secretariat of Trade and Industrial
Development (SECOFI) requires import licenses for a number of
commercially sensitive products. In 1998, SECOFI expanded the import
licensing system by establishing an ``automatic'' import license for
certain Asian and European products because of concerns about dumping
and under-invoicing. While NAFTA originated goods are exempt from these
requirements, U.S. companies that obtain goods from covered countries
may be affected by the requirements. The Secretariat of Agriculture
requires a prior import authorization for fresh/chilled and frozen
meat. In 1998, the Secretariat of Health announced new import license
rules for certain food products. These rules call for either an
``advance sanitary import authorization'' or ``notification of sanitary
import'' prior to the product crossing the border. Obtaining these
permits requires extensive documentation and certification by the
exporter. In addition, Mexico maintains import licenses for sensitive
products such as endangered species and weapons.
Insurance: Until 1990, the Mexican insurance market was closed to
foreigners. With the introduction of NAFTA, U.S. and Canadian insurers
that had joint venture operations in Mexico were allowed to increase
their ownership share from 30 percent in 1994 to 51 percent in 1996 and
100 percent by the year 2000. Companies not already in Mexico could set
up joint ventures and obtain majority control during 1998. U.S.
insurers may also establish wholly owned subsidiaries in Mexico,
subject to aggregate market share limits which will be eliminated in
2000. Some third-country firms have entered through affiliates or
subsidiaries in the United States or Canada under the NAFTA
arrangement.
Telecommunications: The main restriction in the telecommunications
sector is a limitation on foreign investment in telephone and value-
added services to a 49 percent equity position. However, in cellular
telephony, foreign investors may participate up to 100 percent, subject
to approval by the national foreign investment commission.
Nevertheless, foreign investors may only participate through a Mexican
corporation. Mexico modified its constitution in 1995 to allow for
private participation and equity in Mexican telecommunication
satellites, including ownership of transponders. The government's
satellite firm was privatized in early 1998. Foreign investment is
limited to a 49 percent equity position.
The Telmex legal monopoly on long distance and international
telephone service ended in August 1996 and competition was introduced
in January 1997. There currently is competition in all major cities and
much of the rest of Mexico. Eight firms are currently authorized to
provide long distance service, five of which have U.S. partners. USTR
cited Mexico in its March 1998 annual ``1377'' review for failure to
meet its WTO Basic Telecom Agreement commitments, including a
discriminatory 58 percent surcharge on inbound international long
distance traffic and failure to allow International Simple Resale
(ISR). In December 1998, the government eliminated the 58 percent
surcharge, but has yet to permit ISR. Local, basic telephone service is
already technically open to competition, but practical competition in
this area has not yet been fully developed.
Since July 1999, Telmex has refused to provide any new private
local lines when they are order by the competitive long distance
carriers, Alestra and Avantel. Customers of Telmex, however, can still
get comparable line orders filled. This raises questions about WTO
commitments by Mexico to assure competitors access to and use of the
Telmex network.
Financial Services: The financial services sector is generally open
and liberalized. Mexico continued during 1995 to promote competition
and diversification in the financial sector by encouraging foreign
investment. New rules adopted in 1995 allow foreign banks to acquire up
to 100 percent ownership in existing banks that have less than six
percent of the total capital in the banking system (effectively
excluding Mexico's three largest banks). Legislation passed in December
1998 removed the six percent cap, allowing 100 percent ownership of any
bank. Foreigners may now own up to 25 percent of the total net capital
of the banking system. Also, a single Mexican or foreign individual may
own up to 20 percent of a given Mexican financial institution. As a
group, foreigners can, in most cases, own up to 49 percent of a bank,
stock brokerage house, or financial group.
Standards, Testing, and Certification: The extensive use of
mandatory standards, testing and labeling has the potential of acting
as a barrier to trade and can raise the cost of exporting to Mexico.
However, the government has displayed an increased willingness to work
with U.S. industry to address U.S. concerns.
The government has been the primary actor in determining product
standards, labeling and certification policy, with input from the
private sector. Mexican law requires that Mexican standards be based on
``international standards,'' but Mexican standards sometimes will
incorporate U.S. and Canadian standards when those differ from the
international benchmark.
With a view to increasing transparency, among other things, the
government of Mexico revised its federal law on metrology and
standardization in May 1997. While these changes provided for the
privatization of its accreditation program and greater transparency,
certain Mexican ministries deem that particular regulations are
executive orders and therefore not required to be published for
comment. In some cases the GOM refused to provide copies of the
regulations for U.S. industry to review as was the case in recently
revised regulations to Mexico's Health Law. U.S. exporters of vitamins
have raised concerns that these revised regulations may impede their
supply to the Mexican market. Low-dosage vitamins will be governed as
medicines or pharmaceuticals which require inspection and approval of
manufacturing facilities by the Mexican Ministry of Health in order to
obtain a sanitary license. Mexican government officials have advised
U.S. industry and government officials that it does not plan to conduct
the inspections and approvals required for factories outside Mexico.
Additionally, while the Federal Law on Metrology and
Standardization provides for the adoption of emergency mandatory
standards to deal with exceptional and unforeseen circumstances which
might result in irreversible situations, the legitimacy of the
emergency nature of some of these mandatory standards remains
questionable. In certain instances, Mexico has been less than diligent
in providing opportunity for comment by its trading partners.
U.S. exporters have complained that since Mexican customs enforces
standards for goods entering the country at the border and domestically
produced products are inspected randomly at the retail level,
enforcement of compliance with mandatory standards appears to be more
stringent in the case of imports. U.S. exporters have also complained
about inconsistencies at different ports of entry.
Only Mexican producers or importers are allowed to obtain a NOM
certificate (official document certifying that a particular good
complies with an applicable standard). This poses a problem for U.S.
exporters, if they use multiple importers. Each importer has to pay to
have the same product tested at a Mexican lab every year, requiring
costly redundant testing. In September, 1999, SECOFI published a
proposal to revise its certification regulations. If adopted, the
proposal would allows companies from countries with which Mexico has a
free trade agreement (e.g., the United States) to obtain a NOM
certificate. This would appear to address many of industry's concerns
regarding the importer problem. However, industry is in the process of
reviewing the revised procedures and is in the process of submitting
comments.
On January 1, 1998, Mexico was obligated to recognize conformity
assessment bodies in the United States and Canada on terms no less
favorable than those granted in Mexico. The requirement that there be a
need for additional certification bodies and verification units before
laboratories can be accredited remains questionable.
Problems remain with restrictions on U.S. beef exports to three
Mexican states that fail to recognize U.S. meat grades. In late 1998,
Mexico suspended testing for heavy metals residues in imported meats
based on national treatment differences between its standards for
domestic and imported products. These standards, among the most
restrictive in the world, were not based on international or NAFTA
consensus, and had questionable scientific basis. Other new standards
for imported grain and poultry, published in late 1998, are
interrupting--or may interrupt--U.S. exports. Again, there are
questions regarding conformity with international standards and sound
scientific justification.
Investment Barriers: The national foreign investment commission
decides questions of foreign investment in Mexico. The country's
constitution and Foreign Investment Law of 1992 reserve certain sectors
to the state, such as oil and gas extraction and the transmission of
electrical power, and a range of activities to Mexican nationals (for
example, forestry exploitation, domestic air and maritime
transportation.) Despite remaining restrictions, the Foreign Investment
Law greatly liberalized foreign investment, eliminating the requirement
for government approval in around 95 percent of foreign investments.
The constitution was amended in 1995 to allow foreign investment in
railroads, telecommunications and satellite transmission. An initiative
to privatize the country's secondary petrochemical complexes did not
succeed because it would have limited foreign investors to only 49
percent ownership of existing facilities. Newly built petrochemical
plants may have up to 100 percent foreign investment.
Provisions contained in NAFTA opened Mexico to greater U.S. and
Canadian investment by assuring U.S. and Canadian companies' national
treatment, the right to international arbitration and the right to
transfer funds without restrictions. NAFTA also eliminated some
barriers to investment in Mexico such as trade balancing and domestic
content requirements. These barriers are also being phased out in some
sectors, such as automobile manufacturing. Mexico additionally has
implemented its commitment under NAFTA to allow the private ownership
and operation of electric generating plants for self-generation, co-
generation, and independent power production. In 1995, Mexico issued
regulations for the first time allowing private sector participation in
the transportation, distribution and storage of natural gas. Contracts
let in 1997 and 1998 under the new regulations constitute one of the
major success stories in Mexico's ongoing infrastructure development.
In 1999, Mexico eliminated a four percent tariff on imports of natural
gas, further liberalizing the sector.
Investment restrictions still prohibit foreigners from acquiring
title to residential real estate within 50 kilometers of the nation's
coasts and 100 kilometers of the borders. However, foreigners may
acquire the effective use of residential property in the restricted
zones via a trust through a Mexican bank. At this time, only Mexican
nationals may own gasoline stations, whose gasoline is supplied by
PEMEX, the state-owned petroleum monopoly. These gasoline stations also
only carry PEMEX lubricants, although other lubricants are manufactured
and sold in Mexico. Both foreigners and Mexican citizens themselves
encounter problems with enforcement of property rights.
Government Procurement Practices: There is no central government
procurement office in Mexico. Government agencies and public
enterprises use their own purchasing offices to buy from qualified
domestic or foreign suppliers, subject to guidelines issued by the
comptroller's secretariat. In 1991, Mexico abandoned the rule that
state-owned enterprises give preference in procurement to national
suppliers. Suppliers from all countries may bid on most government
tenders, and requirements for participation are the same for foreign
and domestic suppliers. Because NAFTA allows some smaller contracts for
goods, services or construction to be let without requiring them to be
open to suppliers from all NAFTA countries, the Procurement Law enacted
in 1994 distinguishes between procurement contests open to national
versus international suppliers. The law, however, acknowledges Mexico's
procurement obligations under NAFTA and other international trade
agreements. Some companies have complained that Mexican government
agencies do not always follow the procedural procurement requirements
established by NAFTA. For example, a number of bid requests require
tender submission in less than the 40 days established by NAFTA.
A specific preferential treatment in public procurement is granted
to domestic drug suppliers (which includes foreign companies
established in Mexico). NAFTA gradually increases U.S. suppliers'
access to the Mexican government procurement market, including PEMEX
and the Federal Electricity Commission (CFE), which are the two largest
purchasing entities in the Mexican Government. Under NAFTA, Mexico
immediately opened 50 percent of PEMEX and CFE bids to competition by
suppliers from NAFTA Parties. Each year, that percentage will increase
until all PEMEX and CFE bids which are above the NAFTA value threshold
will be open to goods and suppliers from NAFTA Parties. PEMEX and CFE
procurement will be open by 2004.
Customs Procedures: In 1996 Mexico enacted a new Customs Law that
simplified a number of procedures. The law transfers a number of
obligations to private sector customs brokers who are subject to
sanctions if they violate customs procedures. As a result, some brokers
have been very restrictive in their interpretation of Mexican
regulations and standards. In an attempt to combat under-invoicing and
other forms of customs fraud, Mexican customs also maintains (and in
some cases has significantly expanded) measures that can impede
legitimate imports, including an industry sector registry and reference
prices. Importers of more than 400 different agricultural, textile,
electronic, automotive, and other products from the United States and
elsewhere currently must demonstrate payment of taxes and formally
register with the Secretariat of Finance every twelve months. The
registration process can be burdensome and time consuming, and no grace
period is granted when new products become subject to the requirement.
Mexico's reference pricing practice obligates importers of many of the
same items to post a bond covering the difference in duties and taxes
if the declared customs value of the good is below an official
``estimated'' or ``reference'' price. Unless the government initiates
an investigation, bonds generally are returned after six months.
Importers can obtain expedited release of their guarantees if the
exporting company provides a certified invoice authenticated by its
local chamber of commerce. Reference prices are set in a non-
transparent and apparently arbitrary manner, and the practice may
increase the cost of shipping certain U.S. products across the border
and effectively restore tariffs on goods that would otherwise enter
duty-free under the NAFTA. The Secretariat of Finance intended to
replace the current bond system with a potentially more onerous cash
deposit requirement in 1999, but has postponed the measure until April
2000. The United States believes this policy is inconsistent with
Mexico's international obligations.
6. Export Subsidies Policies
The government has not had an export subsidy program. Provisions
for promoting exports in the Foreign Trade Law have been limited to
training and assistance in finding foreign sales leads, project
financing (at market rates) for export oriented business ventures, and
special tax treatment for companies that have significant export sales.
7. Protection of U.S. Intellectual Property
Mexico is a member of the major international organizations
regulating the protection of Intellectual Property Rights (IPR): the
World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), the Geneva Convention
for the Protection of Phonograms against Unauthorized Duplication of
their Phonograms; the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary
and Artistic Works (1971); the Paris Convention for the Protection of
Industrial Property (1967); the International Convention for the
Protection of New Varieties of Plants; the Universal Copyright
Convention, and the Brussels Satellite Convention.
Mexico has implemented NAFTA obligations providing for
nondiscriminatory national treatment of IPR matters, establishing
certain minimum standards for protection of sound recordings, computer
programs and proprietary data, and by providing express protection for
trade secrets and proprietary information. The term of patent
protection is 20 years from the date of filing. Trademarks are granted
for 10-year renewable periods. The government continues to strengthen
its domestic legal framework for protecting intellectual property. In
1997 it implemented a new Copyright Law and amended its penal code to
strengthen penalties against copyright piracy. In 1999 it again
modified its penal code for copyright and trademark piracy, classifying
them as felonies and increasing penalties. Mexico passed a law in 1996
providing protection to plant species, and in 1998 provided protection
for integrated circuits.
In spite of the legal protection, the level of piracy and
counterfeiting remains high in Mexico. Although federal authorities
conduct investigations and carry out raids against pirates, there have
been few criminal convictions stemming from these actions. Of the
hundreds of raids carried out on behalf of the motion picture,
recording, and software industries in 1998, the U.S. Government is only
aware of one conviction for piracy. The government launched an anti-
piracy campaign in November 1998, including increased raids, stronger
penalties for piracy, and a public awareness campaign. By classifying
IPR piracy as a felony, individuals indicted for piracy cannot qualify
for bail. As a result, a number of indicted pirates have been
incarcerated while awaiting trail. It remains to be seen whether the
campaign will increase the number of convictions. U.S. industry remains
skeptical of the efforts made by the Mexican Government, particularly
since the Attorney General's office (PGR), which carries out these
criminal investigations, did not receive increased funding in the
legislative package. Mexico has not been in full compliance with NAFTA
or with the TRIPs Agreement in a number of areas, including copyright,
protection of test data, plant varieties, and enforcement. As a result,
Mexico was placed on the ``Special 301'' Watch List in 1999,
particularly because of the high level of piracy.
8. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association: The constitution and the Federal Labor
Law (FLL) give workers the right to form and join trade unions of their
own choosing. Mexican trade unionism is well developed with about 25
percent of the work force members in thousands of unions. Although no
prior approval is required to form unions, they must register with the
Federal Labor Secretariat or state labor boards to gain legal status.
Federal or state authorities reportedly sometimes use this
administrative procedure to withhold registration from groups
considered disruptive to government policies, employers, or unions.
Union registration was the subject of follow-up activities in 1996,
1997, 1998, and 1999, pursuant to a 1995 agreement reached in
ministerial consultations under the North American Agreement on Labor
Cooperation (the NAFTA labor side agreement).
Unions, federations, and labor centrals freely affiliate with
international trade union organizations. The FLL protects labor
organizations from government interference in their internal affairs.
The law permits closed shop and exclusion clauses, allowing union
leaders to vet and veto new hires and force dismissal of individuals
the union expels. Such clauses are common in collective bargaining
agreements. Again in 1998, the committee of experts of the
International Labor Organization (ILO) found that such restrictions
violate freedom of association, and asked the Mexican Government to
amend these provisions. A 1996 Mexican supreme court decision
invalidated similar restrictions in the laws of two states, and in 1999
the same court ruled that public sector entities could not require that
only one union represent workers.
Most labor confederations, federations and separate national unions
are allied with the governing Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI).
Union officers help select, run as, and campaign for PRI candidates in
federal and state elections, and support PRI government policies at
crucial moments. This gives the unions some influence on government
policies, but limits their freedom of action. Rivalries within and
between PRI-allied organizations are strong. A smaller number of labor
federations and independent unions are not allied to the PRI.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively: The FLL strongly
upholds this right. The public sector is almost totally organized.
Industrial areas are also heavily organized. The law protects workers
from antiunion discrimination but enforcement is uneven. Industry or
sectoral agreements carry the weight of law in some sectors and apply
to all sector firms, unionized or not, though this practice is becoming
less common. The FLL guarantees the right to strike. On the basis of
interest by a few employees, or a strike notice by a union, an employer
must negotiate a collective bargaining agreement or request a union
recognition election. In 1995, at union insistence, annual national
pacts negotiated by the government and major trade union, employer and
rural organizations ceased to limit free collective bargaining, which
had been done for the past decade. The government, major employers, and
unions meet periodically to discuss labor relations under the ``new
labor culture'' mechanism. The government remains committed to free
collective bargaining without guidelines or interference.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor: The constitution
prohibits forced labor and none has been reported in many years.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children: The FLL sets 14 as the
minimum age for employment, but those under 16 may work only six hours
a day, with prohibitions against overtime, night labor, and performing
hazardous tasks. Enforcement is reasonably good at large and medium-
sized companies but is inadequate at small companies and in agriculture
and is nearly absent in the informal sector. The ILO reports 18 percent
of children aged 12 to 14 work, often for parents or relatives. Most
child labor takes place in the informal sector (including myriad street
vendors and in thousands of family workshops), and in agriculture.
Although enforcement is spotty, the government formally requires that
children attend a minimum of nine years of school and has the ability
to hold parents legally liable for their children's nonattendance. The
government has a cooperative program with UNICEF to increase
educational opportunities for youth.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work: The FLL provides for a daily
minimum wage set annually, usually effective January 1 by the
tripartite (government/labor/employers) National Minimum Wage
Commission. Any party may ask the commission to reconvene to consider a
special increase. In December 1998 the commission adopted a 14 percent
increase. In Mexico City and nearby industrial areas, Acapulco,
southeast Veracruz state's refining and petrochemical zone and most
border areas, the daily minimum wage has been 34.45 pesos ($4.00 in
early November 1998). However, daily minimum wage earners actually are
paid 39.27 pesos due to a 14 percent supplemental fiscal subsidy (tax
credit to employers). Approximately 47.4 percent of the labor force
earns the daily minimum wage or less. Industrial workers, under
collective bargaining contracts, tend to average three to four times
the daily minimum wage.
The law and collective agreements also provide extensive additional
benefits. Those benefits which are legally required include social
security (IMSS), medical care and pensions, individual worker housing
and retirement accounts, substantial Christmas bonuses, paid vacations,
profit sharing, maternity leave, and generous severance packages.
Employer costs for these benefits run from 27 percent of payroll at
small enterprises to over 100 percent at major firms with strong union
contracts. Eight hours is the legal workday and six days the legal
workweek, with pay for seven. Workers who are asked to exceed three
hours of overtime per day or work overtime on three consecutive days
receive triple the normal wage for that overtime. For most industrial
workers, especially under union contract, the true workweek is 42 hours
with seven day's pay. This is why unions jealously defend the legal ban
on hiring and paying wages by the hour.
Mexico's Occupational Safety and Health (OSH) laws and rules are
relatively advanced. Completely revised regulations were published in
1997. Employers must observe ``general regulations on safety and health
in the work place'' (which reflects close NAFTA consultation and
cooperation) issued jointly by the Labor Secretariat (STPS) and the
Social Security Institute (IMSS). FLL-mandated joint labor-management
OSH committees at each plant and office meet at least monthly to review
workplace safety and health needs. Individual employees or unions may
complain directly to STPS/OSH officials; workers may remove themselves
from hazardous situations without reprisal and bring complaints before
the Federal Labor Board at no cost. STPS and IMSS officials report
compliance is reasonably good at most large companies, though federal
inspectors are stretched too thin for effective comprehensive
enforcement. There are special problems in construction, where
unskilled, untrained, and poorly educated transient labor is common.
f. Rights in Sectors with U.S. Investment: Conditions do not differ
from those in other industrialized sectors of the Mexican economy.
Extent of U.S. Investment in Selected Industries--U.S. Direct Investment Position Abroad on an Historical Cost
Basis--1998
[Millions of U.S. Dollars]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Category Amount
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Petroleum...................... .............. 235
Total Manufacturing............ .............. 14,267
Food & Kindred Products...... 4,744 ...............................................................
Chemicals & Allied Products.. 2,203 ...............................................................
Primary & Fabricated Metals.. 438 ...............................................................
Industrial Machinery and 831 ...............................................................
Equipment.
Electric & Electronic 569 ...............................................................
Equipment.
Transportation Equipment..... 2,066 ...............................................................
Other Manufacturing.......... 3,415 ...............................................................
Wholesale Trade................ .............. 1,092
Banking........................ .............. 591
Finance/Insurance/Real Estate.. .............. 4,206
Services....................... .............. 1,108
Other Industries............... .............. 4,378
TOTAL ALL INDUSTRIES........... .............. 25,877
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Suppressed to avoid disclosing data of individual companies.
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis.
______
NICARAGUA
Key Economic Indicators
[Millions of U.S. Dollars unless otherwise indicated]
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1997 1998 \1\ 1999
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Income, Production and Employment
Nominal GDP \2\...................... 2,018.3 2,099.0 2,231.2
Real GDP Growth (pct) \2\ \3\ \4\.... 5.0 4.0 6.3
GDP by Sector: \2\
Agriculture \4\.................... 575.0 632.5 663.5
Manufacturing...................... 418.9 431.2 479.9
Services \5\....................... 865.6 887.2 941.3
Government......................... 158.2 148.2 145.1
Per Capita GDP (US$)................. 436.0 431 453.7
Labor Force (000's).................. 1,567.5 1,630.1 1,695.4
Unemployment Rate (pct).............. 14.3 12.3 11.0
Money and Prices (annual percentage
growth):
Money Supply Growth (M2)............. 50.1 20.0 21.9
Consumer Price Inflation (pct)D7.3... 18.5 10.5
Exchange Rate (Cordobas/US$-annual
average)
Official........................... 9.5 10.5 11.6
Parallel........................... 9.5 10.6 11.7
Balance of Payments and Trade
Total Exports FOB \6\................ 703.6 573.2 573.7
Exports to U.S.\7\................. 439 453.0 486.0
Total Imports CIF \6\................ -1,371.4 -1,383.6 -1,593.1
Imports from U.S.\7\............... -290 -337.0 -370
Trade Balance \6\.................... -667.8 -810.4 -1,019.4
Balance with U.S.\7\............... 49 16 16
External Public Debt (US$ bns)....... 6.1 6.2 6.5
Fiscal Deficit/GDP (pct)............. 7.5 2.2 3.0
Current Account Deficit/GDP (pct).... 40.3 39.0 38.0
Debt Service Payments/GDP (pct)...... 19.4 15.6 16.0
Gold and Foreign Exchange Reserves... 387.0 356.0 400.0
Aid from U.S.\8\..................... 27.0 70.0 N/A
Aid from All Other Sources........... 292.0 N/A N/A
------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ All 1999 figures are Central Bank projections based on data
available in October 1999.
\2\ 1997 and 1998 GDP data revised by Central Bank in October 1999.
\3\ Percentage changes calculated in local currency.
\4\ Includes livestock, fisheries, and forestry.
\5\ Includes construction and mining.
\6\ Merchandise trade.
\7\ Source: U.S. Department of Commerce; 1999 figures are estimates
based on trade data through August 1999.
\8\ Source: Embassy estimate of assistance from AID, USDA, and U.S.
military for Hurricane Mitch relief.
1. General Policy Framework
Nicaragua has made considerable progress since 1990 in moving from
a centralized to a market-oriented economy. The country has liberalized
its foreign trade regime, brought inflation under control, and
eliminated foreign exchange controls. With the inauguration of
President Arnoldo Aleman in January 1997, Nicaragua began to quicken
the pace of its opening to foreign trade. The economy grew by 4 percent
in 1998. To foster macroeconomic stability, the Aleman administration
signed an Economic Structural Adjustment Facility (ESAF) program with
the IMF in January 1998. Growth in 1999 is projected at 6.3 percent.
At the end of its third year in office, the Aleman administration
faced important economic challenges including: meeting the targets of
an Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility (ESAF) with the
International Monetary Fund; reconstructing infrastructure devastated
by Hurricane Mitch; making progress on the resolution of thousands of
Sandinista-era property confiscation cases; and reducing unemployment
and poverty in the hemisphere's second-poorest nation. Nicaragua's
large current account deficit and fiscal deficit are counterbalanced by
strong inflows of foreign assistance and private capital.
Nicaragua is essentially an agricultural country with a small
manufacturing base. The country is dependent on imports for most
manufactured, processed, and consumer items. A member of the World
Trade Organization, Nicaragua has reduced tariffs sharply and
eliminated most non-tariff barriers. Private investment, from both
domestic and foreign sources, is rising and the private banking sector
continues to expand. Agriculture, construction, and the export sector
have led Nicaragua's recent economic growth. The United States is
Nicaragua's largest trading partner, with both exports and imports
expanding in recent years.
2. Exchange Rate Policy
Since January 1993, the Nicaraguan government has followed a
crawling-peg devaluation schedule. The cordoba to dollar rate is
adjusted daily. The GON reduced the devaluation rate at 9 percent in
July 1999 and planned to reduce it further to 6 percent by the end of
the year. A legal parallel exchange market supplies foreign currency
for all types of exchange transactions. The spread between the official
and parallel markets was under one half-percent in 1999. The government
eliminated all significant restrictions on the foreign exchange system
in 1996.
3. Structural Policies
Pricing Policies: The Nicaraguan government maintains price
controls only on sugar, domestically produced soft drinks, certain
petroleum products, and pharmaceuticals. However, in the past, the
government has negotiated voluntary price restraints with domestic
producers of important consumer goods. During the aftermath of
Hurricane Mitch, the government instructed distributors of basic food
products to maintain stable food prices. However, that control no
longer exists.
Tax Policies: Nicaragua is in the process of implementing
progressive import tax reductions through the year 2002. Since January
1998, Nicaragua has imposed regular import duties (DAI) of 15 percent
on final consumption goods and 10 percent on intermediate goods (there
is no DAI on raw materials and capital goods produced outside of
Central America, but raw materials and capital goods imported form any
Central American country carries a 5 percent DAI). Some 900 items are
levied with a temporary protection tariff (ATP) of 5 to 10 percent. The
maximum rate of the combined DAI and ATP is 25 percent. A luxury tax is
levied through the specific consumption tax (IEC) on 609 items that
generally is lower than 15 percent. DAI, ATP and IEC are based on CIF
value. Nicaragua levies a 15 percent value added tax (IGV) on most
items, except agricultural inputs. Import duties on so-called
``fiscal'' goods (e.g., tobacco, soft drinks, and alcoholic beverages)
are particularly high. Importers of many items face a total import tax
burden of 15 to 45 percent. In November 1999, Nicaragua raised tariffs
on corn, sorghum, and rice in response to low world prices. This
increase was done as a presidential decree, which must be renewed every
thirty days.
Nicaragua's 1997 tax reform law marked an important step by the
Aleman administration towards fostering Nicaragua's insertion into the
global economy. The reform: a) banned almost all non-tariff barriers on
imports; b) eliminated the discretion of government officials to
exonerate tariffs; c) repealed the restrictive Law on Agents,
Representatives or Distributors of Foreign Firms; d) established a
``rebate'' of 1.5 percent of FOB value for all exports; e) eliminated
IGV on several activities; g) reduced municipal taxes from 2 to 1.5
percent in 1998 and to 1 percent in 2000; h) eliminated income tax on
interest and capital gains stemming from transactions on the local
stock exchange; and i) set a schedule of progressive import tax
reductions through the year 2002.
In March 1999, the National Assembly passed a new package of
reforms that situated Nicaragua ahead of the rest of the Central
American countries in lowering tariffs and reducing exemptions. The
reform established: a) tax exemptions for NGOs (non-governmental
organizations) as long as they perform non-profit activities; b)
exemptions on import taxes (DAI), luxury taxes (IEC), and sales taxes
(IGV) for hospital investments; c) simplified taxes on vehicles based
on engine size (this reform helped alleviate the discriminatory tariff
treatment on some U.S. vehicles that have bigger engines than their
Japanese competitors); exemption of DAI, ATP and IGV on crude or
partially-refined petroleum, as well as on liquid gas and other
petroleum derivatives; e) intermediate goods, and raw materials
destined for the agricultural sector, small handicraft industry,
fishing and aquaculture. In December 1999, Nicaragua instituted a 35
percent tariff on all goods from Honduras as a retaliatory measure for
Honduras signing a maritime border delineation agreement with Colombia.
4. Debt Management Policies
The previous administration of Violeta Chamorro inherited a $10.7
billion debt from the Sandinista regime in 1990. Over the next eight
years, Nicaragua negotiated a series of deals that reduced its stock of
debt to $6.2 billion. Despite this progress, Nicaragua's debt, at
almost three times GDP, remains high. Accordingly, the Aleman
government has made debt reduction a top priority. In April 1998, the
Paris Club creditors and the Nicaraguan government reached an agreement
on the terms and conditions for reducing and rescheduling Nicaragua's
official debt. In response to damage caused by Hurricane Mitch, the
Paris Club agreed in December 1998 to defer all debt service payments
through February 2001. Another promising avenue for debt reduction of
multilateral debt is through the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC)
Initiative. Largely because of its strong economic performance,
Nicaragua was admitted in the HIPC program in late 1999. However, the
HIPC decision point (conclusion of negotiations over HIPC progress
indicators) had not been reached by year's end.
5. Aid
Nicaragua is highly dependent on foreign aid to cover its trade and
fiscal deficits. More than half of its assistance is provided by
multilateral financial institutions like the Inter-American Development
Bank and World Bank. European countries, Japan, Taiwan, and the United
States are also major donors. Since 1990, the United States has
provided more than $1 billion in assistance and debt-relief to
Nicaragua. That money has funded such projects as balance of payments
support for economic stabilization, primary education, health care
reform, employment generation, food donations, and the strengthening of
democratic institutions. In May 1999 as part of relief for damage
caused by Hurricane Mitch, donor countries in Stockholm for a
Consultative Group meeting agreed to provide Nicaragua with nearly $3
billion in assistance and concessionary loans; this figure included
funds already disbursed immediately following Hurricane Mitch. The U.S.
commitment totaled nearly $100 million. Nicaragua is not believed to
receive extensive amounts of military equipment from any third country,
although Spain, Mexico, Taiwan, and France, among others, do provide
training.
6. Significant Barriers to U.S. Exports
Import Licenses: In most cases, the issuance of import licenses is
a formality. Permits are required only for the importation of sugar,
firearms and explosives. U.S. exporters of food products must meet some
phytosanitary requirements.
Services Barriers: Although 11 private banks are now operating, no
U.S. bank has yet re-entered the Nicaraguan financial market.
Legislation passed in 1996 opened the insurance industry to private
sector participation and four private insurance companies have been
formed. No U.S. insurance company has entered the Nicaraguan market,
either.
Investment Barriers: Remittance of 100 percent of profits and
original capital three years after investment is guaranteed through the
Central Bank at the official exchange rate for those investments
registered under the Foreign Investment Law. Investors who do not
register their capital may still make remittances through the parallel
market, but the government will not guarantee that foreign exchange
will be available. The U.S. Embassy is aware of no investor who has
encountered remittance difficulties since the inception of the Foreign
Investment Law in 1991. The fishing industry remains protected by
requirements involving the nationality and composition of vessel crews,
and a requirement for domestic processing of the catch. Expropriation
still remains a problem, as the government has failed to set up
property courts as promised to resolve the expropriations that occurred
under the Sandinista government.
Customs Procedures: Importers complain of steep secondary customs
costs, including customs declaration form charges and consular fees. In
addition, importers are required to utilize the services of licensed
customs agents, adding further costs. Nicaragua has committed itself to
implement WTO customs valuation procedures by September 2000, which
will end the use of reference prices to determine import tax
valuations.
Private Property Rights: The need to resolve thousands of cases of
homes, businesses and tracts of land confiscated without compensation
by the Sandinista government during the 1980s remains a divisive issue
in Nicaragua. The Nicaraguan government has made the resolution of
these cases a priority. Nonetheless, potential investors must carefully
verify property titles before purchase.
In 1996, Nicaragua ratified the United States-Nicaragua Bilateral
Investment Treaty that is designed to improve protection for investors.
The treaty has not yet been submitted to the U.S. Senate for
ratification.
7. Export Subsidy Policies
All exporters receive tax benefit certificates equivalent to 1.5
percent of the FOB value of the exported goods. Foreign inputs for
Nicaraguan export goods from the country's free trade zones enter duty-
free and are exempt from value-added tax.
8. Protection of U.S. Intellectual Property
Nicaragua belongs to the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the
World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO). It is signatory to the
Paris Convention, Mexico Convention, Buenos Aires Convention, Inter-
American Copyrights Convention, Universal Copyright Convention, and the
Satellites Convention.
The government has indicated a firm commitment to providing
adequate and effective intellectual property rights protection.
However, current levels of protection still do not meet international
standards. Although unable to dedicate extensive resources to
protecting intellectual property rights, Nicaragua is working to
modernize its intellectual property rights regime. In January 1998,
Nicaragua and the United States signed a bilateral IPR agreement
covering patents, trademarks, copyright, trade secrets, plant
varieties, integrated circuits, and encrypted satellite signals. In
1999, the National Assembly approved a new copyright law, a plant
variety protection law, and a law on the protection of satellite
signals. Draft laws on integrated circuit design and patents still
require a vote in the National Assembly. The Presidency is reviewing
draft laws on trademarks.
Trademarks: Protection of well-known trademarks is a problem area
for Nicaragua. Current procedures allow individuals to register a
trademark without restriction for a renewable 10-year period at a low
fee.
Copyrights: Pirated videos are readily available in video rental
stores nationwide, as are pirated audiocassettes and software. In
addition, cable television operators are known to intercept and
retransmit U.S. satellite signals, a practice that continues despite a
trend of negotiating contracts with U.S. sports and news satellite
programmers. According to estimates by the International Intellectual
Property Alliance (IIPA), U.S. copyright-based industries' losses in
Nicaragua due to piracy were $5.7 million in 1998. On August 21, 1999,
the new copyright law went into effect; however, criminal penalties are
delayed for 6-12 months. The U.S. Government and the industry hope to
work with the Nicaraguan Government to provide training for effective
enforcement.
9. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association: The Constitution provides for the
right of workers to organize voluntarily in unions. The 1996 labor code
reaffirmed this right. Less than half of the formal sector workforce,
including agricultural workers, is unionized, according to labor
leaders. The Constitution recognizes the right to strike. Unions freely
form or join federations or confederations, and affiliate with and
participate in international bodies.
b. The Right to organize and Bargain Collectively: The Constitution
provides for the right to bargain collectively. According to the 1996
labor code, companies engaged in disputes with employees must negotiate
with the employees' union if they are organized.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor: The Constitution
prohibits forced or compulsory labor. There is no evidence that it is
practiced.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children: The Constitution
prohibits child labor that can affect normal childhood development or
interfere with the obligatory school year. The 1996 labor code raised
the age at which children may begin working with parental permission
from 12 to 14. Parental permission is also required for 15 and 16 year-
olds. The law limits the workday for such children to 6 hours and
prohibits work at night. However, because of the economic needs of many
families and lack of effective government enforcement mechanisms, child
labor rules are rarely enforced, except in the small, formal sector of
the economy.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work: The 1996 labor code maintains the
constitutionally mandated 8-hour workday. The standard legal workweek
is a maximum of 48 hours, with one day of rest. The 1996 code
established that severance pay shall be from one to five months'
duration, depending on the length of employment and the circumstances
of termination. The code also seeks to bring the country into
compliance with international standards of workplace hygiene and
safety, but the Ministry of Labor lacks adequate staff and resources to
enforce these provisions. Minimum wage rates were raised in November
1997, but the majority of urban workers earn well above the minimum
rates.
f. Rights in Sectors with U.S. Investment: Labor conditions in
sectors with U.S. investment do not differ from those in other sectors
of the formal economy.
Extent of U.S. Investment in Selected Industries--U.S. Direct Investment Position Abroad on an Historical Cost
Basis--1998
[Millions of U.S. Dollars]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Category Amount
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Petroleum...................... .............. (\1\)
Total Manufacturing:........... .............. 4
Food & Kindred Products...... 0 ...............................................................
Chemicals & Allied Products.. 4 ...............................................................
Metals, Primary & Fabricated. (\2\) ...............................................................
Machinery, except Electrical. 0 ...............................................................
Electric & Electronic........ 0 ...............................................................
Transportation Equipment..... 0 ...............................................................
Other Manufacturing.......... 0 ...............................................................
Wholesale Trade................ .............. (\1\)
Banking........................ .............. 0
Finance/Insurance/Real Estate.. .............. 0
Services....................... .............. 0
Other Industries............... .............. (\1\)
TOTAL ALL INDUSTRIES........... .............. 153
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Suppressed to avoid disclosing data of individual companies.
\2\ Less than US$ 500,000.
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis.
______
PANAMA
Key Economic Indicators
[Millions of U.S. Dollars unless otherwise indicated]
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1997 1998 \1\ 1999
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Income, Production and Employment:
Nominal GDP............................. 8,700 9,143 9,608
Real GDP (1982 prices).................. 6,657 6,932 7,126
Real GDP Growth (pct)................... 4.5 4.1 3.1
Real GDP by Sector (1982 prices):
Agriculture........................... 429 445 457
Manufacturing......................... 1,231 1,290 1,368
Services.............................. 3,964 4,185 3,935
Government............................ 961 970 1,005
Real Per Capita GDP (US$)............... 2,454 2,509 2,545
Labor Force (000's)..................... 1,049 1,083 1,089
Unemployment Rate (pct)................. 13.4 13.6 11.6
Money and Prices (annual percentage
growth):
Money Supply (M2) Growth (pct) \2\...... 0.8 -0.1 N/A
Consumer Price Inflation................ 1.2 0.6 1
Exchange Rate (Balboa/US$ annual 1 1 \3\ 1
average)...............................
Balance of Payments and Trade:
Total Exports FOB \4\................... 648 705 810
Exports to U.S........................ 293 282 296
Total Imports CIF \4\................... 2,992 3,398 3,440
Imports from U.S...................... 1,103 1,350 1,230
Trade Balance \4\....................... -2,344 -2,510 2,630
Balance with U.S...................... -810 1,068 -934
Colon Free Zone \5\
Exports............................... 6,268 6,001 5,160
Imports............................... 5,513 5,318 4,230
External Public Debt.................... 5,051 5,179 \6\ 5,58
0
Fiscal Deficit (-)/GDP (pct)\7\..............................
Current Account Deficit (-)/GDP (pct)... -6.6 13.5 N/A
Debt Service Ratio (pct)................ 12.2 13.4 13.5
Gold and Foreign Exchange Reserves \8\.. 1,148 954 N/A
Aid from U.S............................ 9.3 7.1 5.5
Aid from All Other Sources.............. 226 N/A N/A
------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Figures for 1999 are estimated unless otherwise indicated.
\2\ Figure is based on IMF 9/99 International Financial Statistics. M2 =
Deposit Money + Quasi Money.
\3\ The balboa/dollar exchange rate is fixed at 1:1. The legal tender is
the U.S. Dollar, so there is no parallel exchange rate.
\4\ Trade statistics do not include the Colon Free Zone.
\5\ The Colon Free Zone (CFZ) is the largest free trading area in the
hemisphere.
\6\ External debt balance on 6/30/99.
\7\ Figures indicate deficit of the non-financial public sector as
percent of GDP.
\8\ Figure is based on IMF 9/98 International Financial Statistics.
Panama reports no gold holdings.
1. General Policy Framework
Panama's economy is based on a well-developed services sector that
accounts for well over 50 percent of GDP. Services include the Panama
Canal, container port activities, flagship registry, banking,
insurance, government, and wholesaling and distribution out of the
Colon Free Zone. The industrial sector, which accounts for 19 percent
of GDP, is made up of manufacturing, mining, utilities, and
construction. Agriculture, forestry and fisheries account for 8 percent
of GDP.
The previous Government of Panama (GOP) implemented various
economic policy reforms, including liberalization of Panama's trade
regime, privatization of some state-owned enterprises, and
restructuring of a government pension program. A Banking Reform Law was
enacted in 1998, and in July 1999 a new law regulating securities
markets was approved. Implementing regulations for the Bank Reform and
Securities Laws have yet to be enacted. The incoming administration of
Mireya Moscoso (September 1999) reversed some of the tariff reductions
of the previous government. Until then, Panama, a newcomer to the World
Trade Organization (WTO), had the lowest tariffs in Latin America. The
Moscoso hike took agricultural goods' tariffs to the top limits of
Panama's WTO accession binding, with some levies reaching 300 percent.
It is as yet unclear what the current GOP's plan is to achieve its main
priority of alleviating poverty and improving social services.
Privatization of the few remaining inefficient government enterprises
has been put on hold while the GOP explores options to finance social
spending, possibly with the fund established with the proceeds of
previous privatizations and the sale of properties ceded by the
departure of the U.S. military.
The economy grew 4.1 percent in real terms in 1998, down from 4.5
percent in 1997. The GOP estimates growth in 1999 of slightly above 3
percent. Economic growth has been hindered by the continued slump of
the Colon Free Zone, which has seen a sales decline of over 20 percent
in 1999. The main culprit for this is recession in the economies of the
Free Zone's principal customers Venezuela, Colombia and Ecuador. Severe
rains and flooding hurt Panamanian agricultural production, which had
managed to expand by over 6 percent in the first half of the year.
Construction and consumer spending have maintained a vigorous pace,
fueled mainly by easy bank credit.
The use of the U.S. Dollar as Panama's currency means fiscal policy
is the government's only macroeconomic policy instrument. Therefore,
government spending and investment are strictly bound by tax and non-
tax revenues, as well as by the government's ability to borrow. The
latter may be reaching its upper limits, as Panama's overall debt
exceeds 70% of GDP.
2. Exchange Rate Policy
Panama's official currency, the balboa, is pegged to the dollar at
a 1:1 ratio. The balboa circulates in coins only. All paper currency in
circulation is U.S. currency. The fixed parity means the
competitiveness of U.S. products in Panama depends on transportation
costs as well as tariff and non-tariff barriers to entry. U.S. exports
have no risk of foreign exchange losses on sales in Panama.
3. Structural Policies
The government of President Mireya Moscoso has not yet adequately
articulated an economic plan. In her election campaign, Moscoso
promised to repeal the drastic reduction of agricultural tariffs by her
predecessor, and to improve the lot of Panama's poor, specially the
rural poor. The GOP has not undertaken any further initiatives toward
trade liberalization nor reduction of structural economic distortions.
Privatization of the state-run water and sewage company (IDAAN) is off
the table, and similar plans for the international airport and a
convention center are on hold. Progress to attract investment to the
reverted areas has been stalled due to the government transition and,
subsequently, a personal feud between Moscoso and the head of the
agency in charge of this task. Panama was close to completing a free
trade agreement with Mexico and with Chile, but talks bogged down over
differences in the financial services sector and over Panama's
agricultural tariff hike. Panama recently imposed draconian
restrictions on Nicaraguan meat, prompting Nicaragua to retaliate. Its
seizure of a large shipment of Canadian evaporated milk under a
specious pretext will likely land Panama before a WTO dispute
resolution panel.
Foreign investment, much of it American, flowed into Panama at a
steady pace under the former Perez-Balladarez administration. American
energy, telecommunications and port/cargo companies invested
significant amounts in newly deregulated and/or privatized sectors and
companies. American products and services are widely available in
Panama. However, the current government has done little to court new
investors. Inter-GOP bickering has discouraged investor groups
interested in developing the recently reverted Howard Air Force Base.
And groundbreaking for construction of the $75 million Panama Canal
Railway (a joint venture of two US firms) has been delayed by red tape
and a lack of cooperation by GOP authorities. Several disputes between
the GOP and American companies remain unresolved.
The restrictive Panamanian Labor Code was revised in 1995, though
strong opposition allowed only marginal reform. Unions continue to
oppose reform initiatives, on occasion violently. In 1996, a special
labor regime for export processing zones was created by executive
decree. The constitutionality of the decree was challenged and the
question is presently pending before the Supreme Court. Notwithstanding
several health and housing programs, the government estimates that over
40 percent of Panamanians live in poverty. Considering the relatively
high per capita income level of over $3,550 (current dollars), Panama's
historically skewed income distribution does not appear to be abating.
Panama's Constitution requires that the minimum wage be reviewed every
three years, due in 2000. The new GOP has sought to accelerate the
review, although it has not called forcefully for a specific increase.
4. Debt Management Policies
Panama's public external debt totaled $5.58 billion dollars at mid-
1999 and carried a rating from various independent agencies of
``medium--below investment grade''. Panama's outstanding domestic debt
was $1.7 billion at mid-year. The newly installed government has stated
publicly its reluctance to take on more foreign debt, and its first
government budget seems consistent with this premise. Debt service
(principal and interest) exceeds $1 billion per year. The current GOP
is studying mechanisms for paying down some of its debt, possibly with
proceeds from the sale of the GOP's investment in the private telephone
monopoly run by Cable and Wireless (UK).
5. Aid
Development assistance from the United States through October 1999
totaled $4.8 million. In addition, the United States Department of
Agriculture's Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS)
operates a screw worm eradication program in Panama. In 1999 it spent
approximately $15 million in this effort. APHIS plans to build a
sterile screw worm fly plant in Panama at a cost of roughly $80
million, for entry into service in 2003.
Development aid from other sources came primarily from the Inter
American Development Bank (IDB), with a projected $1 billion loan
program over the next several years, and a standby facility from the
International Monetary Fund (IMF). The World Bank funds various
development and infrastructure projects in Panama.
6. Significant Barriers to U.S. Exports
Panama's accession to the WTO transformed for the better a tariff
regime that just a few years ago was one of the highest in the region.
However, the new Moscoso government's primary trade initiative has been
to dramatically increase tariffs on various agricultural imports. The
period between publication of its decree to that effect and its entry
into force (4 days) was entirely inadequate. Through its Ministry of
Agricultural Development, Panama has adopted a de facto, arbitrary
import licensing regime for goods that are subject to sanitary and
phyto-sanitary permits under Panamanian law. Officials of the Health
Ministry have hinted they may require that all foreign food-processing
plants supplying Panama undergo inspections by Panamanian officials, an
ominous development.
The Panamanian judicial system presents another potential obstacle
to investors and traders. There is a large backlog of criminal and
civil cases, increasing at approximately 20,000 per year. Many
investors have expressed concerns over the potential for corruption in
the judicial process.
The combination of relatively high costs for both utilities and
labor makes unit production costs higher than average for the region.
Also, investors complain of burdensome and excessive product
registration requirements.
As a WTO member, Panama's customs valuation system conforms to
international standards. The processing of customs documents for
imports is reasonably quick, efficient, and reliable. However, some
importers have complained of product misclassification and, in isolated
cases, demands for excessive duties. Importers of agricultural goods
continue to face sudden and arbitrary changes in procedures and
practices.
In the financial services sector, restrictions on foreign ownership
are minimal except in the case of non-bank finance companies. U.S.
banks, insurance companies and brokerages are welcome and in some cases
are leaders in the local market.
7. Export Subsidies Policies
A law enacted in June 1995 allows any company to import raw
materials or semi-processed goods at a duty of 3 percent for domestic
consumption or production, or duty free for export production. The GOP
is considering eliminating this duty altogether in 2000. Companies not
receiving benefits under the ``Special Incentives Law'' of 1986 will be
allowed a tax deduction of up to 10 percent on their profits from
export operations through 2002.
The Tax Credit Certificate (CAT) program, which subsidizes
production of non-traditional exports, is being phased out. Through the
year 2002, the program allows exporters to receive CATs worth 15
percent of value added.
8. Protection of U.S. Intellectual Property
Panama is a member of the World Intellectual Property Organization
(WIPO), the Geneva Phonograms Convention, the Brussels Satellite
Convention, the Universal Copyright Convention, the Bern Convention for
the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, the Paris Convention for
the Protection of Industrial Property, and the International Convention
for the Protection of Plant Varieties. In November 1998, Panama also
ratified the WIPO Copyright Treaty and the WIPO Performances and
Phonograms Treaty.
Protection of intellectual property rights in Panama has improved
significantly over the past several years, but serious concerns remain.
Representatives of some U.S. firms allege that Panama provides
inadequate copyright and trademark protection. For example, Nintendo of
America and associated video game manufacturers petitioned the U.S.
Trade Representative (USTR) in 1995 to remove Panama's benefits under
the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) program. However, in
October 1998, USTR dismissed the petition, citing improvement in
Panama's IPR regime.
In 1998 Panama was placed in the ``Other Observations'' category of
the USTR's ``Special 301'' review of IPR policies and practices, but
was removed following the April 1999 review. USTR remains concerned
about inadequate border measures to combat transshipment of counterfeit
goods through Panama and about enforcement deficiencies in the Colon
Free Zone (CFZ). In March 1998, an Intellectual Property Department was
created in the CFZ. This is a positive step demonstrating Panama's will
to improve enforcement. The new Department has enjoyed some success,
but needs to do more to fully address this problem.
In August 1994, the Legislative Assembly passed a new Copyright Law
(Law 15) to help modernize copyright protection. A new Industrial
Property Law (Law 35) went into force in November 1996. These laws are
generally consistent with the standards specified in the WTO TRIPs
Agreement. They explicitly protect foreign works. Although enforcement
has improved in recent years, piracy and counterfeiting continue,
particularly in the CFZ.
The Government also passed an Anti-Monopoly Law in early 1996
mandating the creation of four commercial courts to hear anti-trust,
patent, trademark, and copyright cases exclusively. Two courts and one
superior tribunal began to operate in mid-1997, but establishment of
the other courts has been delayed. Some U.S. intellectual property
owners have experienced significant delays when they have sought
infringement remedies in the Panamanian judicial system.
Over the past several years, Panamanian authorities have conducted
numerous raids against large video piracy operations, and several cases
are pending in the courts. In a series of raids in September 1998,
authorities seized more than 5 million pirated compact discs being
transshipped through Tocumen International Airport. This is believed to
be the largest seizure ever in Latin America. Over the past year, the
CFZ's new IP Department conducted more than 20 raids against CFZ
companies accused of trafficking in counterfeit trademarked goods. The
operating permits of some CFZ companies have been suspended as a
result, but transshipment of such goods remains a serious problem.
Patents: Panama's Industrial Property law provides 20 years of
patent protection, improving on the former period of 5 to 15 years for
foreigners and 5 to 20 years for Panamanians. The law grants patent
protection from the date of filing. Pharmaceutical patents are granted
for only 15 years, but can be renewed for an additional ten years, if
the patent owner licenses a national company (minimum of 30 percent
Panamanian ownership) to exploit the patent. The Industrial Property
Law provides specific protection for trade secrets.
Trademarks: The Industrial Property Law also provides for
protection of trademarks. It simplifies trademark registration and
gives protection for 10 years, renewable for an unlimited number of
additional 10-year periods. While the law provides adequate protection,
enforcement is another matter. Counterfeit merchandise, particularly
apparel and footwear, watches, perfume, and sunglasses, are available
in Panamanian stores. Trademark-infringing merchandise is also
transshipped through the CFZ for distribution in Latin American
markets. In implementing the Industrial Property Law, the CFZ
administration created an Intellectual Property Department in March
1998. The new IP Department and the CFZ Customs Office conducted
various raids and seizures in 1999.
Copyrights: The National Assembly in 1994 passed a comprehensive
copyright bill, based on a World Intellectual Property Organization
model. The law modernizes copyright protection in Panama, provides for
payment of royalties, facilitates the prosecution of copyright
violators, protects computer software, and makes copyright infringement
a felony.
Although the Attorney General's Office has taken a vigorous
enforcement stance, the Copyright Office has been ineffective, and
Panama's judicial system has not provided speedy and effective remedies
for private civil litigants under the law. Panama is in the process of
modernizing its copyright registration and patent and trademark
registration capabilities. The Government had plans to consolidate
copyright, patent, and trademark functions into a single autonomous
entity, but these plans were delayed by the government transition. An
initiative to create a specialized Prosecutor's Office for IPR was also
delayed due to resource constraints.
9. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association: Private sector workers have the right
to form and join unions of their choice, subject to registration by the
government. The government does not control nor financially support
unions, but most unions are closely affiliated to political parties.
There are over 250 active unions, grouped under 6 confederations and 48
federations, representing approximately 10 percent of the employed
labor force. Civil service workers are permitted to form public
employee associations and federations, though not unions. Union
organizations at every level may and do affiliate with international
bodies.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively: The Labor Code
provides most workers with the right to organize and bargain
collectively. The law protects union workers from anti-union
discrimination and requires employers to reinstate workers fired for
union activities. The Labor Code also establishes a conciliation board
in the Ministry of Labor to resolve complaints and it provides a
procedure for arbitration. The Civil Service Law allows most public
employees to organize and bargain collectively and grants them a
limited right to strike.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor: The Labor Code
prohibits forced or compulsory labor, and neither practice has been
reported.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children: The Labor Code prohibits
the employment of children under 14 years of age as well as those under
15 if the child has not completed primary school. Children under age 16
cannot work overtime; those under 18 cannot work at night. Children
between the ages of 12 and 15 may perform light farm work that does not
interfere with their education. The Ministry of Labor enforces these
provisions in response to complaints and may order the termination of
unauthorized employment. However, it has not enforced child labor
provisions in rural areas due to insufficient staff.
e. Acceptable Conditions at Work: The Labor Code establishes a
standard workweek of 48 hours and provides for at least one 24-hour
rest period weekly. It also establishes minimum wage rates, though in
the relatively high cost urban areas, the minimum wage is not
sufficient to support a worker and family above the poverty level. The
Ministry of Labor does not adequately enforce the minimum wage law due
to insufficient personnel and financial resources. Panamanian
businesses routinely evade Social Security payroll contributions. The
government sets and enforces occupational health and safety standards.
It conducts periodic inspections of particularly hazardous employment
sites as well as doing so in response to complaints. Workers may remove
themselves from situations that present an immediate health or safety
hazard without jeopardizing their employment. Health and safety
standards generally emphasize safety rather than long-term health
hazards, but training and workplace enforcement of safety regulations
or on the use of safety equipment is lax. Complaints of health and
safety problems continue in the construction, banana, cement, and
milling industries.
f. Rights in Sectors with U.S. Investment: Worker rights in sectors
with U.S. investment generally mirror those in other sectors. As
mentioned above, the banana industry, which has significant U.S.
investment, continues to produce complaints of health hazards largely
due to workers' exposure to pesticides. The Panama Canal has operated
under separate labor regulations. It is unclear whether special
arrangements will continue under the Panama Canal Authority post-1999.
Extent of U.S. Investment in Selected Industries--U.S. Direct Investment Position Abroad on an Historical Cost
Basis--1998
[Millions of U.S. Dollars]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Category Amount
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Petroleum...................... .............. 681
Total Manufacturing............ .............. 137
Food & Kindred Products...... 32 ...............................................................
Chemicals & Allied Products.. 28 ...............................................................
Primary & Fabricated Metals.. 10 ...............................................................
Industrial Machinery and 0 ...............................................................
Equipment.
Electric & Electronic 0 ...............................................................
Equipment.
Transportation Equipment..... 0 ...............................................................
Other Manufacturing.......... 68 ...............................................................
Wholesale Trade................ .............. (\1\)
Banking........................ .............. 118
Finance/Insurance/Real Estate.. .............. 25,145
Services....................... .............. 501
Other Industries............... .............. (\1\)
TOTAL ALL INDUSTRIES........... .............. 26,957
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Suppressed to avoid disclosing data of individual companies.
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis.
______
PARAGUAY
Key Economic Indicators
[Millions of U.S. Dollars unless otherwise indicated]
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1997 1998 \1\ 1999
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Income, Production, and Employment:
Nominal GDP \2\......................... 9,607 8,594 7,854
Real GDP Growth (pct)................... 2.6 -0.5 -1.0
GDP by Sector (pct):
Agriculture........................... 27 27 28
Manufacturing......................... 14 14 14
Services.............................. 37 37 36
Government............................ 6.0 6.0 5.0
Per Capita GDP (1982 US$)............... 1,634 1,585 1,553
Labor Force (000's)..................... N/A N/A N/A
Unemployment Rate (pct)................. 6.9 7.2 7.2
Underemployment Rate (pct).............. 18.1 21.4 22
Money and Prices (annual percentage
growth):
Money Supply Growth (M2)................ 7.7 -4.7 12.1
Consumer Price Inflation (pct).......... 6.2 14.6 7.0
Exchange Rate (GS/US$ Year End)......... 2,294 2,830 3,310
Official.............................. N/A N/A N/A
Parallel.............................. N/A N/A N/A
Balance of Payments and Trade:
Total Exports FOB \3\................... 3,980 3,824 2,714
Exports to U.S.\3\.................... 40.6 38.7 (\1\)
Total Imports CIF \3\................... 4,186 3,938 2,801
Imports from U.S.\3\.................. 913 734 (\1\)
Trade Balance \3\....................... -207 -114 -87
Balance with U.S.\3\.................. -872 -695 (\1\)
External Public Debt.................... 1,437 1,475 2,108
Fiscal Deficit/GDP (pct)................ -0.8 -1.2 N/D
Current Account Deficit/GDP (pct)....... -5.0 -2.7 -0.9
Debt Service Payments/GDP (pct)......... 17 19 3.8
Gold and Foreign Exchange Reserves...... 846 875 1,006
Aid from U.S............................ 4.8 2.2 3.0
Aid from All Other Sources.............. 36.2 33.5 44
------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ 1999 figures are central bank preliminary data except for U.S.
imports and exports, which are taken from U.S. Department of Commerce
Trade Statistics.
\2\ Percentage changes calculated in local currency.
\3\ Merchandise trade.
\4\ External and internal public debt only. Private external debt to GDP
share not yet available.
1. General Policy Framework
Over the last decade, Paraguay's economic policy framework has
encouraged the re-export trade to Brazil and Argentina and provided tax
and regulatory advantages as well as soft loans to non-competitive
local industries. In agriculture, the government has continued non-
transparent state-run cotton programs for small farmers and kept hands
off large-scale private sector oil seed production, the leading source
of hard currency from exports. Government investment has shrunk as
spending on debt service and government salaries to provide political
patronage drain government revenue.
Paraguay's economy is currently in recession, and growth has been
weak since 1995. The GDP contracted 0.5 (one half) percent in 1998 and
will likely contract at least an additional one percent in 1999. Until
the mid-1990s, Paraguay largely avoided deficit spending and kept
foreign debt at a manageable level. Government spending as a percentage
of GDP began to increase earlier in the decade, but deficits were
avoided due to revenue windfalls from taxes and tariffs on imports from
the re-export trade. This windfall was not productively invested, but
rather spent to swell already bloated government payrolls.
The Central Bank under the Cubas administration (August 1998-March
1999) kept interest rates high on guarani-based bonds sold to private
banks, limiting liquidity and keeping exchange rate pressures off the
guarani. In an effort to stimulate the economy, the Gonzalez Macchi
government has lowered interest rates from 29 to 13.5 percent between
May and November of 1999. A series of banking failures and political
instability over the last several years has led investors to move to
dollar-based deposits and loans. A higher than expected five percent
increase in guarani-based deposits between August and September of 1999
may indicate that the central bank is printing money as a response to
growing revenue shortfalls, which stem from a deepening recession and a
moribund re-export trade. The Paraguayan government is heavily
dependent on tariff revenue, which will continue to shrink in the near
future as Mercosur adjusts its common external tariff rate down from an
average of 23 percent in 1999 to 15 percent in 2006.
Paraguay's membership in Mercosur offers important opportunities.
Efforts to improve weak infrastructure, especially in power
transmission and distribution, telecommunications, road, river, and
civil aviation systems, potable water, and sewage treatment, provide
potential markets for United States' goods and services.
2. Exchange Rate Policy
All foreign exchange transactions are settled at the daily free
market rate. The central bank practices a dirty float, with periodic
interventions aimed at stabilizing the guarani. These interventions
have become more frequent, with the central bank selling $295 million
in the first seven months of 1999. In the twelve months leading up to
November, the guarani depreciated by 17 percent against the dollar. On
November 15, the market rate stood at 3,330 guaranies to the dollar.
Historically, the central bank accelerates the devaluation of the
guarani in June and July by slowing the sale of dollars or purchasing
dollars on the open market to help trigger the repatriation of foreign
reserves from international sales of the cotton and soybean harvested
in the first half of the year. It is legal to hold savings accounts in
foreign currency, and in October 1994 a decree was promulgated that
legalized contractual obligations in foreign currencies. With a
lingering recession, the failure of many local banks, and exchange rate
uncertainty, the dollar has become the preferred unit for large
purchases, savings, and virtually all international transactions.
Sixty-four percent of all funds in Paraguayan savings accounts are in
dollar-based accounts as of September, 1999.
3. Structural Policies
Consumer prices are generally determined by supply and demand,
except for public sector utility rates (water, electricity, telephone),
petroleum products, pharmaceutical products and public transportation
fares. The Ministry of Finance oversees all tax matters. Under current
law, corporate incomes are subject to a 30 percent tax rate. There is
no personal income tax. As an incentive to investment, the tax rate on
reinvested profits is 10 percent. The existing Investment Promotion Law
(law 60/90) includes complete exemption from start-up taxes and customs
duties on imports of capital goods. There is a 95 percent corporate
income tax exemption for five years on the income generated directly
from the GOP approved investment. The Ministry of Finance, at the
urging of the IMF, is currently studying the elimination a variety of
tax breaks, including law 60/90, to help balance the budget. The
government implemented a value-added tax (IVA) in 1992. Some analysts
have estimated that IVA compliance hovers around 30 percent. Charges of
corruption among tax officials are endemic. Nearly half of all tax
revenues are collected at customs on imported merchandise. Agriculture
makes up nearly 25 percent of GDP, but contributes less than one
percent of government revenue. Even though land taxes are low, chaotic
land title records makes land tax evasion the norm.
4. Debt Management Policies
In 1992, the government reduced external debt with both official
and commercial creditors through a drawdown of foreign reserves. Since
that time, however, increasingly large public deficits have nudged
public debt back upward. Foreign reserves dwindled to $652 million by
the end of June 1999. A $400 million loan from Taiwan in July
temporarily bolstered reserves, which at the end of September stood at
$1.004 billion. The government's debt at the end of September 1999
totaled $2.044 billion. Paraguay owes $1.044 billion to multilateral
lending institutions, $987 million to foreign governments and $13
million to private foreign banks. Last year, a visiting representative
from the World Bank announced that no new World Bank loans would be
available to Paraguay until it allocated and properly accounted for
existing loans. Paraguay continues to meet its obligations to foreign
creditors in a timely fashion.
5. Aid
Direct U.S. aid to Paraguay in fiscal year 1999 included roughly
$918,000 in military assistance administered at post, such as
international military education and training, information exchange
visits and seminars; $228,000 in counter-narcotics assistance; and $6
million in USAID disbursements for democracy, reproductive health and
biodiversity protection. Indirect U.S. contributions via the Inter-
American Development Bank, World Bank and United Nations programs
totaled tens of millions of dollars more.
6. Significant Barriers to U.S. Exports
Paraguay is a member of the World Trade Organization (WTO) and has
a relatively open market that does not require import licenses, except
for used clothing (see below), guns and ammunition. However, the United
States prohibits the export of U.S. guns and ammunition to Paraguay.
U.S. companies have not fared well in non-transparent government
procurement tenders. Paraguayan regulations require country of origin
designation on domestic and imported products. Expiration dates are
required for medical products and some consumer goods. As of January
1998, imported beer is required to display detailed manufacture and
content information, labeled in Spanish at the point of bottling. A
similar regulation was put in place for shoes, clothing, packaged food,
and other consumer products. However, labeling of imported goods at
distribution centers within Paraguay is still commonplace. MERCOSUR-
wide labeling requirements are currently being developed.
Law 194/93 established the legal regime between foreign companies
and their Paraguayan representatives and has been described by
executives of U.S. companies represented by local firms as increasing
the risk of doing business here. This law requires that to break a
contractual relation with its Paraguayan distributor, the foreign
company must prove just cause in a Paraguayan court. If the
relationship is ended without just cause, the foreign company must pay
an indemnity. The rights under this law cannot be waived as part of the
contractual relationship between both parties. Foreign companies have
paid large sums when ending distributor relationships in Paraguay to
avoid lengthy court cases or have maintained relationships with
underperforming representatives to avoid such payments.
Decree 11.459/95 requires importers of used clothing to obtain an
import permit from the Ministry of Industry and Commerce. Importers
must obtain a certification notarized in place of origin showing that
the used clothing has been sanitized. In 1999, the Ministry of Industry
and Commerce had refused to take action on applications to import used
clothing, in effect prohibiting its importation.
Decree 235/98, later modified by decree 2698/99, created a
multiplier increasing the base value on imported cigarettes and beer
prior to calculating excise tax. The same multiplier was not applied to
domestic products. Income tax must be pre-paid on presumed profit
margins of ten percent for imported cigarettes and thirty percent for
imported beer prior to removal from customs. Local manufacturers of
cigarettes and beer pay income taxes only on reported profit margins
and at year-end.
7. Export Subsidies Policies
There are no discriminatory or preferential export policies.
Paraguay does not subsidize its exports. However, Paraguay exports 90
percent of its cotton crop, and government-subsidized credit to small-
scale producers signifies an indirect export subsidy. Government
subsidized financing for the 1997-98 crop was provided to the producers
of 80 percent of the cotton harvest. Due to high default rates,
subsidized credit for the 1998-99 crop was reduced to cover only 30
percent of production. The government will provide small-scale farmers
with subsidized inputs, such as seed and pest control products.
8. Protection of U.S. Intellectual Property
Paraguay belongs to the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the
World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO). It is also a signatory
to the Paris Convention, Bern Convention, Rome Convention, and the
Phonograms Convention. In January 1998, the U.S. Trade Representative
designated Paraguay as a ``Special 301'' Priority Foreign Country. On
February 17, 1998, the U.S. Government initiated a 301 investigation of
Paraguay as a result of its inadequate enforcement of intellectual
property rights, its failure to enact adequate and effective IP
legislation, as well as its status as a distribution and assembly
center for pirate and counterfeit merchandise and the large illicit re-
export trade to other MERCOSUR countries.
On November 17, USTR concluded a bilateral Memorandum of
Understanding (MOU) and Enforcement Action Plan that contain specific
near-term and longer-term obligations to improve the intellectual
property regime in Paraguay. The Agreement contains commitments by
Paraguay to take action against known centers of piracy and
counterfeiting; pursue amendments to its laws to facilitate effective
prosecution of piracy and counterfeiting; coordinate the anti-piracy
efforts of its customs, police, prosecutorial, and tax authorities;
implement institutional reforms to strengthen enforcement at its
borders; and ensure that its government ministries use only authorized
software.
As a result of this agreement, the U.S. Government has revoked
Paraguay's designation as a Priority Foreign Country and terminated the
Special 301 investigation. Implementation of the MOU is being monitored
under Section 306 of the U.S. Trade Act.
Patents: Congress is currently considering comprehensive patent
legislation. Domestic industry has lobbied heavily to weaken the law.
In its IPR MOU with the U.S., Paraguay agreed to do everything possible
to pass TRIPS consistent patent legislation during the first three
months of the 1999 legislative session. Paraguay also has patent
obligations as a member of the WTO.
Trademarks: On August 6, 1998, a new Trademark Law was promulgated
that includes a broader definition of trademarks. The law prohibits the
registration of a trademark by parties with no legitimate interests.
Provisions provide specific protection for well-known trademarks. The
law also includes stronger enforcement measures and penalties for
infractions. In practical terms, trademark violation is still rampant
in Paraguay, and resolution in the courts is slow and non-transparent.
The new law provides an important first step, but must be followed by
increased enforcement and modernization of the judicial system to
become fully effective.
Copyrights: On October 15, 1998, then-President Cubas Grau signed a
new Copyright Law, which follows international conventions to protect
all classes of creative works. Software programs receive the same
treatment as literary works under the law. The law contains norms that
regulate contracts related to copyrights. Law 1444, passed on June 25,
1999, made copyright violations ``public actions,'' allowing public
prosecutors to take legal action without requiring the offended party
to seek redress. Practical application of copyright protection suffers
the same systemic challenges as trademark protection.
9. Worker Rights
In October 1993 the Paraguayan Congress approved a new Labor Code
that met International Labor Organization standards.
a. The Right of Association: The Constitution allows both private
and public sector workers, except the armed forces and police, to form
and join unions without government interference. It also protects the
right to strike and bans binding arbitration. Strikers and leaders are
protected by the Constitution against retribution. Unions are free to
maintain contact with regional and international labor organizations.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively: The law protects
collective bargaining. When wages are not set in free negotiations
between unions and employers, they are made a condition of individual
employment offered to employees. Collective contracts are still the
exception rather than the norm in labor/management relations.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor: The law prohibits
forced labor. Domestics, children, and foreign workers are not forced
to remain in situations amounting to coerced or bonded labor.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children: Minors from 15 to 18
years of age can be employed only with parental authorization and
cannot be employed under dangerous or unhealthy conditions. Children
between 12 and 15 years of age may be employed only in family
enterprises, apprenticeships, or in agriculture. The Labor Code
prohibits work by children under 12 years of age, and all children are
required to attend elementary school. In practice, however, many
thousands of children, many under the age of 12, work in urban streets
in informal employment.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work: The Labor Code allows for a
standard legal work week of 48 hours, 42 hours for night work, with one
day of rest. The law also provides for a minimum wage, an annual bonus
of one month's salary, and a minimum of six vacation days a year. It
also requires overtime payment for hours in excess of the standard.
Conditions of safety, hygiene, and comfort are stipulated.
f. Rights in Sectors with U.S. Investment: Conditions are generally
the same as in other sectors of the economy.
Extent of U.S. Investment in Selected Industries--U.S. Direct Investment Position Abroad on an Historical Cost
Basis--1998
[Millions of U.S. Dollars]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Category Amount
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Petroleum...................... .............. 14
Total Manufacturing............ .............. 22
Food & Kindred Products...... 0 ...............................................................
Chemicals & Allied Products.. 0 ...............................................................
Primary & Fabricated Metals.. 0 ...............................................................
Industrial Machinery and 0 ...............................................................
Equipment.
Electric & Electronic 0 ...............................................................
Equipment.
Transportation Equipment..... 0 ...............................................................
Other Manufacturing.......... 22 ...............................................................
Wholesale Trade................ .............. (\1\)
Banking........................ .............. (\1\)
Finance/Insurance/Real Estate.. .............. 0
Services....................... .............. 0
Other Industries............... .............. 2
TOTAL ALL INDUSTRIES........... .............. 204
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Suppressed to avoid disclosing data of individual companies.
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis.
______
PERU
Key Economic Indicators
[Millions of U.S. Dollars unless otherwise indicated]
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1997 1998 \1\ 1999
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Income, Production, and Employment:
Nominal GDP \2\......................... 65,207 62,968 59,300
Real GDP Growth (pct) \3\............... 6.9 0.3 3.5
GDP Growth by Sector:
Agriculture........................... 4.9 3.6 14.5
Manufacturing......................... 6.6 -2.8 3.0
Services.............................. 6.9 1.0 -0.3
Government [included in ``Services'']
Per Capita GDP (nominal US$) \2\........ 2,675 2,534 2,350
Labor Force (000's)..................... 6,592 7,309 N/A
Unemployment Rate (pct) \4\............. 7.7 7.7 10
Money and Prices (annual percentage
growth):
Money Supply Growth (M2)................ 18.2 10.4 14
Consumer Price Inflation................ 6.5 6.0 5
Average Exchange Rate (Sol/US$)
Inter-bank............................ 2.66 2.93 3.37
Parallel.............................. 2.66 2.93 3.37
Balance of Payments and Trade:
Total Exports FOB....................... 6,832 5,735 6,200
Exports to the U.S.\5\................ 1,579 1,808 1,835
Total Imports FOB....................... 8,553 8,200 7,400
Imports from U.S.\5\.................. 2,001 2,003 1,635
Trade Balance........................... -1,721 -2,645 -1,200
Balance with U.S...................... -422 -195 200
External Public Debt.................... 18,787 19,562 19,200
Fiscal Deficit/GDP...................... 0.1 -0.7 -2.5
Current Account Deficit/GDP............. 5.0 6.0 4.5
Debt Service Payments/GDP............... 1.3 1.4 1.0
Net International Reserves.............. 10,169 9,183 8,700
Aid from U.S............................ 97 105 123
Total Aid............................... 285.1 288.9 626.2
------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ 1999 figures are estimates based on data available as of October.
\2\ GDP data calculated using nominal soles figures at average exchange
rates. The Peruvian Government is well behind its target to release re-
calculated GDP figures, with 1994 as the new base year (which will
replace the current 1979 base year).
\3\ Percentage changes calculated from GDP data in local currency at
1979 prices.
\4\ Urban, at the Third Quarter.
\5\ Estimates based on annualized official data for August 1999.
\6\ Inflation at year-end.
Source: Central Reserve Bank of Peru, National Institute of Statistics,
Ministry of Labor, Presidency of the Council of Ministers, and Embassy
estimates.
1. General Policy Framework
Peru is a free market economy which provides significant trade and
investment opportunities for U.S. companies. Over the past nine years,
the government has implemented a wide-ranging privatization program,
strengthened and simplified its tax system, lowered tariffs, opened the
country to foreign investment, and lifted exchange controls and
restrictions on remittances of profits, dividends and royalties.
Macroeconomic/Fiscal Overview: The economy achieved a modest
recovery in 1999; real GDP will grow an estimated 3.5 percent after a
flat 0.3 percent in 1998. Economic performance in 1998 and 1999 was
affected by several factors, including the ``El Nino'' weather
phenomenon, which led to sharp declines in fish exports; worsening
terms of trade (as prices for minerals--Peru's primary exports--
dropped); and dramatic outflows of short-term capital after the
financial turmoil in Russia. The current account deficit contracted in
1999, to about 4.5 percent of GDP. Inflation remained low by Peru's
historical standards, hitting 5 percent for the year. The government's
overall budget was slightly out of balance in 1999, as a result of
sharply lower than expected revenues. Peru's macroeconomic stability
has reduced underemployment from 74 percent during the 1980's to 43
percent for the 1995-1998 period. The percentage of Peruvians living in
poverty fell from 55.3 percent in 1991 to just under 40 percent in
1997, according to government indicators.
Trade Policy: Peru's economy is largely open to imports. As Peru's
largest trading partner, the U.S. exported about $1.6 billion to Peru
in 1999, well below the level of 1998. Peru's average tariff rate fell
from 66 percent in 1990 to 13 percent in 1998. Some countries (not
including the U.S.), however, avoid tariffs on a number of their
exports to Peru because of preferential trade agreements. As a member
of the Andean Community and of the Latin American Integration
Association (ALADI), Peru grants duty-free access to many products
originating in those countries. In June 1998, Peru signed a Free Trade
Agreement with Chile, which will be phased in over a number of years.
In April 1998, the Andean Community signed a framework agreement with
MERCOSUR to establish a free trade area after the year 2000; further
negotiations in 1999 must still take place on implementation of the
agreement. Peru also plans to complete a Free Trade Agreement with
Mexico by the year 2000. Peru officially became a member of APEC in
November 1998.
Monetary Policy: The central bank manages the money supply and
affects interest and exchange rates through open-market operations,
rediscounts and reserve requirements on foreign currency and local
currency deposits. United States dollars account for two thirds of
total liquidity (the legacy of hyperinflation), which complicates the
government's efforts to manage monetary policy. Net foreign reserves
have grown to about $9 billion (they were negative in mid-1990). Peru
reached an agreement in July 1996 to reschedule its official debt
(Paris Club), and closed a deal with its commercial creditors (Brady
Plan) in March 1997.
2. Exchange Rate Policy
The exchange rate for the Peruvian New Sol is determined by market
forces, with some intervention by the central bank to stabilize
movements. There are no multiple rates. The 1993 constitution
guarantees free access to and disposition of foreign currency. There
are no restrictions on the purchase, use or remittance of foreign
exchange. Exporters conduct transactions freely on the open market and
are not required to channel their foreign exchange transactions through
the central bank. U.S. exports are generally price competitive in Peru.
3. Structural Policies
Peru is a liberal economy largely dominated by the private sector
and market forces. The government dramatically reduced its role in the
economy after it began a privatization program in 1992. Since that
time, most major state-owned businesses, including the telephone
company, electric utilities and mining companies, have been sold. The
government backtracked from its original plan to sell off substantially
all its companies by 1995, and it intends to keep, for the foreseeable
future, the remaining parts of the petroleum company (Petro Peru), some
electrical utilities, and the Lima water company. In early 1997, the
government announced that it would begin a new phase of the
privatization program by selling concessions to build and/or operate
public facilities such as airports, roads, railroads, and ports. U.S.
companies have participated heavily in the privatization program,
particularly in the mining, energy, and petroleum sectors.
Price controls, direct subsidies, and restrictions on foreign
investment have been eliminated. A major revision of the tax code was
enacted at the end of 1992, and the tax authority (SUNAT) was
completely revamped, as was the customs authority. Tax collection has
improved from 4 percent of GDP in 1990 to over 14 percent by late 1998.
Customs collections have more than tripled since the early 1990s,
despite the sharp cut in tariff rates. Although income tax collection
has increased, the government still relies heavily on its 18 percent
Value-Added Tax (VAT). There are also several high excise taxes on
certain items, such as automobiles and fuels.
4. Debt Management
Peru's long and medium-term public external debt at the end of June
1999 totaled about $19.2 billion--less than one third of GDP. Total
service payments due on the debt for 1999 are estimated at $1.0
billion. Peru has reduced the burden of external public debt steadily
since 1993. The ratio of the debt service to exports of goods and
services, which peaked at 76 percent in 1988, fell to 22 percent in
1997. That ratio increased to 25 percent in 1998 and may stay there in
1999. Although the external debt burden appears high when compared with
similar countries, the Peruvian government has practically no domestic
debt. Moreover, in recent years Peru has maintained a high level of
international reserves, while about two thirds of deposits in the
banking system are in dollars.
Peru cleared its arrears with the Inter-American Development Bank
in September 1991. In March 1993 it cleared its $1.8 billion in arrears
to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank, and negotiated
an Extended Fund Facility (EFF) with the IMF for 1993-95. The
government negotiated a follow-on EFF for 1996-1998 and an
unprecedented third EFF for 1999-2001. The Paris Club rescheduled
almost $6 billion of Peru's official bilateral debt in 1991. A second
Paris Club rescheduling in May 1993 lowered payments for the period
March 1993-March 1996 from $1.1 billion to about $400 million. A third
rescheduling was completed on July 20, 1996, under which the Club
creditors agreed to reschedule approximately $1 billion in ``official
debt'' payments coming due between 1996 and 1999, and to reschedule
some debt originally rescheduled in 1991 in order to smooth out Peru's
debt service profile.
Peru closed out a $10.5 billion Brady Plan commercial debt
restructuring in March 1997. The government estimates annual
obligations under the deal at about $300 million. With the Brady
closing and the Paris Club rescheduling, Peru is now current with
nearly all its international creditors.
5. Significant Barriers to U.S. Exports
Almost all non-tariff barriers to U.S. exports and obstacles to
direct investment have been eliminated over the past nine years. Peru
became a founding member of the World Trade Organization in January
1995.
Import licenses have been abolished for all products except
firearms, munitions and explosives; chemical precursors (used in
illegal narcotics production); ammonium nitrate fertilizer (which has
been used as a blast enhancer for terrorist car bombs), wild plant and
animal species, and some radio and communication equipment. The
following imports are banned: several insecticides, fireworks, used
clothing, used shoes, used tires, radioactive waste, and cars over five
years old and trucks over eight years old.
Tariffs apply to virtually all goods exported from the U.S. to
Peru, although rates have been lowered over the past few years. A new
tariff structure that went into effect in April 1997, for example,
lowered the average tariff rate from 16 to 13 percent. At the same
time, the government did raise some tariffs on agricultural products
and imposed an additional ``temporary'' tariff on agricultural goods,
in a move to try to promote domestic investment in the sector. Under
the new system, a 12 percent tariff applies to more than 95 percent (by
value) of the products imported into Peru; a 20 percent tariff applies
to most of the rest, while a few products are assessed rates (because
of the additional ``temporary'' tariffs) of up to 25 percent. Another
set of import surcharges also applies to four basic commodities: rice,
corn, sugar and milk products. (The surcharge on wheat was eliminated
in July 1998). Imports are also assessed an 18 percent value-added tax
on top of any tariffs; domestically-produced goods pay the same tax as
well. Some non-U.S. exporters have preferential access to the Peruvian
market because of Peru's bilateral and multilateral trade agreements.
There are virtually no barriers to investing in Peru, and national
treatment for investors is guaranteed in the 1993 constitution.
However, in an effort to preclude competition from foreign investors in
recent privatizations of electrical utilities, COPRI, the Privatization
Agency, has interpreted that a foreign company or individual is an
investor only when the company or individual has actually invested, not
when it is considering investing. Furthermore, a conflicting provision
of law restricts the majority ownership of broadcast media to Peruvian
citizens. Foreigners are also restricted from owning land within 50
kilometers from a border, but can operate within those areas through
special authorization. There are no prohibitions on the repatriation of
capital or profits. Under current law, foreign employees may not make
up more than 20 percent of the total number of employees of a local
company (whether owned by foreign or national interests) or more than
30 percent of the total company payroll, although some exemptions
apply.
Customs procedures have been simplified and the customs
administration made more efficient in recent years. As part of the
customs service reform, Peru implemented a system of pre-shipment
inspections, through which private inspection firms evaluate most
incoming shipments worth more than $5,000. (Exceptions include cotton
and heavy machinery). The importer must pay up to one percent of the
FOB value of the goods to cover the cost of the inspection. Some U.S.
exporters have complained that the inspection system contributes to
customs delays and conflicts over valuation.
6. Export Subsidies Policies
The Peruvian Government provides no direct export subsidies. The
Andean Development Corporation, of which Peru is a member, provides
limited financing to exporters at rates lower than those available from
Peruvian banks (but higher than those available to U.S. companies).
Exporters can receive rebates of the import duties and a portion of the
value-added tax on their inputs. In June 1995, the government approved
a simplified drawback scheme for small exporters, allowing them to
claim a flat 5-percent rebate, subject to certain restrictions.
Exporters can also import, on a temporary basis and without paying
duty, goods and machinery that will be used to generate exports and
that will themselves be re-exported within 24 months. There are several
small-scale export promotion zones where goods enter duty-free; they
must pay duties if/when they enter the rest of the country.
7. Protection of U.S. Intellectual Property
Peru belongs to the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the World
Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO). It is also a signatory to
the Paris Convention, Bern Convention, Rome Convention, Phonograms
Convention, Satellites Convention, Universal Copyright Convention, and
the Film Register Treaty. In April 1999, the U.S. Trade Representative
placed Peru on the ``Special 301'' Priority Watch List due primarily to
concerns raised by the International Intellectual Property Alliance
(IIPA) about the lack of deterrent-level decisions issued by Peru's
intellectual property rights (IPR) tribunal. This tribunal has more
recently sped up its decision making process and has reversed its
earlier tendency to reduce IPR fines.
IIPA data show that piracy in the software and motion picture
industries has declined sharply over the past four years. Software
piracy fell from 83 percent in 1995 to 60 percent in 1998, while video
piracy fell from 95 percent in 1995 to 50 percent in 1998. During the
same period, piracy of sound recordings increased slightly from 83
percent to 85 percent. Peru's market for sound recordings grew so
rapidly between 1995 and 1998 that estimated trade losses due to piracy
increased from $16 million to $50 million. IIPA's estimates for trade
losses in all other sectors remained the same or fell slightly during
the 1995-98 period.
In April 1996, Peru passed two new laws to improve its intellectual
property rights protection regime and bring its national laws into
conformity with Andean Community decisions and other international
obligations on intellectual property. Although the new laws are an
improvement, they contain several deficiencies, and the government
needs to bring its laws into conformity with the WTO TRIPs Agreement by
the year 2000. Although enforcement efforts have increased, piracy
remains widespread.
Patents and Trademarks: Peru's 1996 Industrial Property Rights Law
provides an effective term of protection for patents and prohibits
devices that decode encrypted satellite signals, along with other
improvements. In June 1997, based on an agreement reached with the U.S.
Government, the Government of Peru resolved several apparent
inconsistencies with the TRIPs Agreement provisions on patent
protection and most-favored nation treatment for patents. Peruvian law
does not provide for pipeline protection for patents or protection from
parallel imports. Although Peruvian law provides for effective
trademark protection, counterfeiting of trademarks and imports of
pirated merchandise are widespread. Peru, along with its Andean
Community partners, has been working toward completion of revisions of
the common Andean Community policy on Industrial Property by January
2000 to bring it into compliance with the TRIPs Agreement.
Copyrights: Peru's Copyright Law is generally consistent with the
TRIPs Agreement. However, textbooks, books on technical subjects,
audiocassettes, motion picture videos and software are widely pirated.
While the government, in coordination with the private sector, has
conducted numerous raids over the last few years on large-scale
distributors and users of pirated goods and has increased other types
of enforcement, piracy continues to be a significant problem for
legitimate owners of copyrights in Peru. Insufficient customs, police,
and judicial action have been a problem in such areas as sound
recordings.
8. Worker Rights
Articles 28 and 42 of the Peruvian Constitution recognize the right
of workers to organize, bargain collectively and strike. Out of an
estimated economically active population of 10 million, only about five
percent belong to unions. Close to one half the work force is employed
in the informal sector, beyond government regulation and supervision.
a. The Right of Association: Peruvian law allows for multiple forms
of unions across company or occupational lines. Workers in probational
status or on short-term contracts are not eligible for union
membership. Union leaders complain that increasing numbers of employers
are hiring workers under temporary personal service contracts to
prevent union affiliation. Labor experts assert that companies prefer
this type of hiring because it affords them the chance to adapt their
total payroll to the business cycle without the hassle of having to
seek government approval to release workers. Public employees
exercising supervisory responsibilities are excluded from the right to
organize and strike, as are the police and military. The amount of time
union officials may devote to union work with pay is limited to 30 days
per year. Membership or non-membership in a union may not be required
as a condition of employment. However, there is no provision in the law
requiring employers to reinstate workers fired for union activities.
Although some unions have been traditionally associated with political
groups, law prohibits unions from engaging in explicitly political,
religious or profit-making activities. The International Labor
Organization (ILO) in June 1996 called on the Peruvian Government to
enhance freedom of association.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively: Bargaining
agreements are considered contractual agreements, valid only for the
life of the contract. Unless there is a pre-existing labor contract
covering an occupation or industry as a whole, unions must negotiate
with each company individually. Strikes may be called only after
approval by a majority of all workers (union and non-union) voting by
secret ballot. Unions in essential public services, as determined by
the government, must provide sufficient workers, as determined by the
employer, to maintain operations during the strike. Companies may
unilaterally suspend collective bargaining agreements for up to 90 days
if required by force majeure or economic conditions, with 15 days
notice to employees. The Peruvian Congress approved legislation in 1995
and 1996 amending the 1992 Employment Promotion Law, which union
leaders claim restricts union freedom and the freedom to bargain
collectively by making it easier to fire workers. The unions filed a
complaint about this law with the ILO, and the ILO noted that the new
legislation failed to effectively guarantee the protection of workers
against acts of anti-union discrimination and to protect workers'
organizations against acts of interference by employers.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor: Forced or compulsory
labor is prohibited, as is imprisonment for debt. In response to a
complaint filed with the ILO, however, the government in 1994
acknowledged the existence of forced labor practices in remote areas of
the country and said it had taken measures to end them. Although the
constitution does not specifically prohibit forced or bonded labor by
children, Peru has ratified ILO Convention 105 on the abolition of
forced labor, including forced or bonded child labor. Nevertheless,
there have been recent reports of forced or bonded child labor in a
handful of small informal gold mining operations in a remote area of
Peru.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children: The minimum legal age
for employment is 12. In certain sectors, higher minimums are in force:
14 in agricultural work; 15 in industrial, commercial or mining work;
and 16 in the fishing industry. Although education through the primary
level is free and compulsory, many school-aged children must work to
support their families. Child labor takes place in the informal economy
out of the reach of government supervision of wages or conditions. In
recent years, government surveys have variously estimated the number of
child and adolescent workers to be anywhere from 500,000 to 1.9
million.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work: The 1993 Constitution provides
for a maximum eight-hour work day, a 48-hour work week, a weekly day of
rest and 30 days annual paid vacation. Workers are promised a ``just
and sufficient wage'' (to be determined by the government in
consultation with labor and business representatives) and ``adequate
protection against arbitrary dismissal''. No labor agreement may
violate or adversely affect the dignity of the worker. These and other
benefits are readily sacrificed by workers in exchange for regular
employment, especially in the informal sector.
f. Rights in Sectors with U.S. Investment: U.S. investment in Peru
is concentrated primarily in the mining and petroleum sectors, and more
recently in electrical generation. Labor conditions in those sectors
compare very favorably with other parts of the Peruvian economy.
Workers are primarily unionized, and wages far exceed the legal
minimum.
Extent of U.S. Investment in Selected Industries--U.S. Direct Investment Position Abroad on an Historical Cost
Basis--1998
[Millions of U.S. Dollars]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Category Amount
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Petroleum...................... .............. 117
Total Manufacturing............ .............. 215
Food & Kindred Products...... 75 ...............................................................
Chemicals & Allied Products.. 83 ...............................................................
Primary & Fabricated Metals.. (\1\) ...............................................................
Industrial Machinery and (\2\) ...............................................................
Equipment.
Electronic & Other Electric 0 ...............................................................
Equipment.
Transportation Equipment..... 0 ...............................................................
Other Manufacturing.......... (\1\) ...............................................................
Wholesale Trade................ .............. 96
Depository Institutions........ .............. (\1\)
Finance/Insurance/Real Estate .............. 322
\3\.
Services....................... .............. 32
Other Industries............... .............. (\1\)
TOTAL ALL INDUSTRIES........... .............. 2,587
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Suppressed to avoid disclosing data of individual companies.
\2\ Less than $500,000 (+/-).
\3\ Finance excludes depository institutions.
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis.
______
TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO
Key Economic Indicators
[Millions of U.S. Dollars unless otherwise indicated]
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1997 1998 \1\ 1999
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Income, Production and Employment:
Nominal GDP............................. 5,780 5,811 6,136
Real GDP Growth (pct)................... 3.4 3.2 5.6
GDP by Sector:
Agriculture........................... 124 119 126
Manufacturing......................... 440 480 507
Services.............................. 3,503 3,841 4,056
Petroleum............................. 1,638 1,242 1,312
Government............................ 477 518 547
Per Capita GDP (US$).................... 4,537 4,531 4,785
Labor Force (000's)..................... 541 559 564
Unemployment Rate (pct)................. 14.5 14.2 14.1
Money and Prices (annual percentage
growth):
Money Supply Growth (M2) \2\............ 11.6 12.3 -1.9
Consumer Price Inflation................ 3.8 5.6 3.7
Exchange Rate (TT$/US$)................. 6.29 6.30 6.30
Balance of Payments and Trade:
Total Exports FOB....................... 2,542 2,264 2,219
Exports to U.S........................ 998 830 681
Total Imports CIF....................... 3,036 3,011 2,167
Imports from U.S...................... 1,563 1,341 1,006
Trade Balance........................... -494 -747 52
Balance with U.S. \3\................. -565 -511 -325
External Public Debt.................... 1,541 1,430 \4\ 1,42
0
Fiscal Deficit/GDP (pct)................ 0.1 -1.1 -1.3
Current Account Deficit/GDP (pct)....... -6.6 -3.5 0.9
Debt Service Payments/GDP (pct)......... 8.0 5.0 4.6
Gold and Foreign Exchange Reserves...... 703 779 \4\ 706
Aid from U.S.\5\........................ 3.0 3.5 3.7
Aid from Other Sources.................. N/A N/A N/A
------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ 1999 figures are all estimates based on 6 months of data, except as
noted. 1997 and 1998 figures have been revised.
\2\ Through July 1999.
\3\ 1999 U.S. trade with Trinidad and Tobago are estimates based on 6
months of data.
\4\ As of July 1999.
\5\ Represents primarily security assistance and counter-narcotics
program funding, training, equipment transfers, and in-kind
contributions. Includes USIA and USDA exchanges.
Source: All statistics compiled by the Central Statistical Office (CSO),
except BOP figures which are compiled by the central bank.
1. General Policy Framework
Trinidad and Tobago's substantial oil and natural gas reserves made
it one of the richest countries in the Western Hemisphere during the
oil booms of the seventies and early eighties. Much of the oil revenue
windfall was used to subsidize state-owned companies and to fund social
and infrastructure projects, which became a drain on government
finances. A dramatic increase in domestic consumption contributed to
overvaluation of the currency with a resulting decline in non-oil
exports. The collapse of oil prices in the mid-1980's, and concurrent
decrease in Trinidadian oil production caused a severe recession from
which Trinidad and Tobago only recovered in 1994. Although structural
reforms have begun to stimulate growth in non-hydrocarbon sectors,
overall economic prospects remain closely tied to oil, gas and
petrochemical prices and production.
Since 1992, the government has successfully turned the state-
controlled economy into a market-driven one. In 1992, it began a large-
scale divestment program and has since partially or fully privatized
the majority of state-owned companies. The government has also
dismantled most trade barriers, with only a small number of products
remaining on a ``negative list'' (requiring import licenses) or subject
to import surcharges.
Trinidad and Tobago aggressively courts foreign investors, and
initialed a bilateral investment treaty with the United States in 1994,
which came into force on December 26, 1996. Total U.S. direct
investment flows have grown from US$475 million in 1995 to over US$1
billion per year in recent years.
The government uses a standard array of fiscal and monetary
policies to influence the economy, including a 15 percent value-added
tax (VAT) and corporate and personal income taxes of up to 35 percent.
Improvements in revenue collection since 1993 have boosted VAT, income
tax and customs duty revenues. This, together with additional revenues
for the sale of offshore leases and tighter controls on spending, has
contributed to slight fiscal surpluses since 1995. Simplification of
the personal income tax regime in 1997, by eliminating many deductions
in favor of a set standard deduction, and restructuring of the Board of
Inland Revenue were designed to further boost revenue collection.
Currently, tax collection systems are being modernized with the help of
U.S. government advisors.
2. Exchange Rate Policy
In April 1993 the government removed exchange controls and floated
the TT dollar. The Central Bank loosely manages the rate through
currency market interventions and consultations with the commercial
banks. In 1996 foreign exchange pressure mounted, and a decision by the
Central Bank to allow a freer float led to a depreciation, which went
as low as TT$6.23 to US$1.00 in December, 1996. Since early November
1997, the rate has hovered around TT$6.29 to US$1.00. Foreign exchange
supply depends heavily on the quarterly tax payments and purchases of
local goods and services by a small number of large multinational
firms, of which the most prominent are U.S. owned. Foreign currency for
imports, profit remittances, and repatriation of capital is freely
available. Only a few reporting requirements have been retained to
deter money laundering and tax evasion.
3. Structural Policies
Pricing Policies: Generally, the market determines prices. The
government maintains domestic price controls only on sugar,
schoolbooks, and pharmaceuticals.
Tax Policies: Imports are subject to the CARICOM Common External
Tariff (CET). Since July 1, 1998, CARICOM tariff levels have been
reduced to a targeted range of 0 to 20 percent. National stamp taxes
and import surcharges on manufactured items were repealed as of January
1, 1995.
By the end of 1994, almost all non-oil manufactured products and
most agricultural commodities were removed from the Import Negative
List, which previously required licenses for certain imports.
Initially, most agricultural products that had benefited from
``negative list'' protection were instead subject to supplementary
import surcharges of 5 to 45 percent. The list of products subject to
import surcharges has now been reduced to two items--poultry and sugar.
The standard rate of Value Added Tax (VAT) is 15 percent; however,
many basic commodities are zero-rated. Excise tax is levied only on
locally produced petroleum products, tobacco and alcoholic beverages.
The corporate tax rate was lowered in 1994 from a maximum of 45 percent
to 38 percent, and again in 1995 to 35 percent. While the tax code does
not favor foreign investors over local investors, profits on sales to
markets outside CARICOM are tax exempt, which benefits firms with non-
CARICOM connections.
Income tax rates are from 28 percent on the first $50,000 of
chargeable income and 35 percent thereafter. The taxpayer is entitled
to an allowance of $20,000. Trinidad and Tobago and the United States
have entered into a double taxation treaty.
Regulatory Policies: All imports of food and drugs must satisfy
prescribed standards. Imports of meat, live animals and plants, many of
which come from the United States, are subject to specific regulations.
The import of firearms, ammunition and narcotics are rigidly controlled
or prohibited.
4. Debt Management Policies
In the second quarter of 1998 Trinidad and Tobago completed
repayment of a US$335 million International Monetary Fund loan and
enjoys excellent relations with the international financial
institutions. Its major lender is the Inter-American Development Bank
(IDB).
Since 1997, Trinidad's external debt has declined each year as has
its debt service ratio. There has, however, been a slight increase in
domestic debt as the GOTT has increasingly looked internally for
financing. The lower total debt burden has allowed the government more
flexibility in lowering import duties and trade barriers, benefiting
U.S. exports.
5. Aid
The majority of U.S. assistance to Trinidad and Tobago is in the
form of support for justice and security and counter-narcotics
programs. The Department of State has provided $400,000 in anti-
narcotics assistance in 1997, $500,000 in 1998, and $700,000 in 19998.
The United States has also transferred to Trinidad and Tobago four
aircraft and two Coast Guard patrol craft to Trinidad and Tobago in the
past year.
6. Significant Barriers to U.S. Exports
Trinidad and Tobago is highly import-dependent, with the United
States supplying about 50 percent of total imports since 1997. Only a
limited number of items remain on the ``negative list'' (requiring
import licenses). These include poultry, fish, oils and fats, motor
vehicles, cigarette papers, small ships and boats, and pesticides.
Foreign ownership of service companies is permitted. Trinidad and
Tobago currently has one wholly U.S.-owned bank, several U.S.-owned air
courier services, and one U.S. majority-owned insurance company.
The Trinidad and Tobago Bureau of Standards (TTBS) is responsible
for all trade standards except those pertaining to food, drugs and
cosmetic items, which the Chemistry, Food and Drug Division of the
Ministry of Health monitors. The TTBS uses the ISO 9000 series of
standards and is a member of ISONET. Standards, labeling, testing and
certification rarely hinder U.S. exports.
Foreign direct investment is actively encouraged by the government,
and there are few if any remaining restrictions. Investment is screened
only for eligibility for government incentives and assessment of its
environmental impact. Both tax and non-tax incentives may be
negotiated. A bilateral investment treaty with the United States,
granting national treatment and other benefits to U.S. investors came
into force on December 26, 1996. The repatriation of capital,
dividends, interest, and other distributions and gains on investment
may be freely transacted. Several foreign firms have alleged that there
are inconsistencies and a lack of clear rules and transparency in the
granting of long-term work permits. These generally fall into two
categories, either that a permit is not granted to an official of a
company which is competing with a local firm, or that the authorities
threaten not to renew a permit because a foreign firm has not done
enough to train and promote a Trinidadian into the position.
Government procurement practices are generally open and fair;
however, both local and foreign investors have called for greater
transparency in the procurement process. Some government entities
request pre-qualification applications from firms, then notify pre-
qualified companies in a selective tender invitation. Trinidad and
Tobago signed the Uruguay Round Final Act on April 15, 1994, and became
a WTO member on April 1, 1995, but is not a party to the WTO Government
Procurement Agreement.
Customs operations are being restructured and streamlined with the
help of U.S. government advisors. UNCTAD's ASYCUDA trade facilitation
system (automated system for customs data) was adopted on January 1,
1995. Customs clearance can be time consuming because of bureaucratic
delays.
7. Export Subsidies Policies
The government does not directly subsidize exports. The state-run
Trinidad and Tobago Export Credit Insurance Company insures up to 85
percent of export financing at competitive rates. The government also
offers incentives to manufacturers operating in free zones (export
processing zones) to encourage foreign and domestic investors. Free
zone manufacturers are exempt from customs duties on capital goods,
spare parts and raw materials, and all corporate taxes on profits from
manufacturing and international sales.
8. Protection of U.S. Intellectual Property
Trinidad and Tobago signed an Intellectual Property Rights
Agreement with the United States in 1994 which, along with Trinidad's
commitments under the WTO TRIPs agreement, necessitated revisions of
most IPR legislation. While the government's awareness of the need for
IPR protection has improved, enforcement of existing regulations
remains lax.
Trinidad and Tobago is a member of the World Intellectual Property
Organization and the International Union for the Protection of
Industrial Property. It is a signatory to the Universal Copyright
Convention, the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and
Artistic Works, the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial
Property, the Patent Cooperation Treaty, the Classification Treaties,
the Budapest Treaty, and the Brussels Convention. It has recently
signed the 1978 UPOV Convention for the Protection of New Varieties of
Plants and the Trademark Law Treaty. The former was proclaimed into law
on January 30, 1998, and the latter came into force on April 18, 1998.
As a member of the Caribbean Basin Initiative, the government is
committed to prohibiting unauthorized broadcasts of U.S. programs.
The 1997 Copyright Act became effective as of October 1, 1997. The
Act was written with the assistance of the World Intellectual Property
Organization, and was forwarded to the United States for comment in
compliance with the U.S./TT Bilateral Memorandum of Understanding on
Intellectual Property Rights. The new Act offers protections equivalent
to those available in the U.S. Enforcement of IPR laws remains a
concern under the new Act. The Copyright Organization of Trinidad and
Tobago has stepped up its enforcement activity since the new law came
into effect, but has primarily targeted unauthorized use of locally
produced music products. Video rental outlets in Trinidad and Tobago
are replete with pirated videos, and pirated audiocassettes are sold
openly in the street and in some stores. Local Cable TV operators feel
that they will have to increase rates or eliminate some channels to
comply with the new law.
The Patents Act of 1996 introduced internationally accepted
criteria for registration of universal novelty, inventive step and
industrial applicability, along with a full search and examination
procedure. The Act extended the period of protection to 20 years with
no possibility of extension.
The new Trademark Amendment Act came into effect in September 1997.
Trademarks can be registered for a period of 10 years, with unlimited
renewals. Counterfeiting of trademarks is not a widespread problem in
Trinidad and Tobago.
New technologies: Larger firms in Trinidad and Tobago generally
obtain legal computer software, but some smaller firms use wholly or
partially pirated software or make multiple copies of legally purchased
software. Licensed cable companies are faced with unlicensed cable
operators and satellite owners who connect neighborhoods to private
satellites for a fee. Licensed cable companies provide customers with
some U.S. cable channels, for which they have not obtained rights,
arguing that since these services are not officially for sale in
Trinidad, they are not stealing them.
Given the popularity of U.S. movies and music, and the dominance of
the United States in the software market, U.S. copyright holders are
the most heavily affected by the lack of copyright enforcement. By
signing the IPR agreement, the government has acknowledged that IPR
infringement is a deterrent to investment and that it is committed to
improving both legislation and enforcement.
9. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association: The 1972 Industrial Relations Act
provides that all workers, including those in state-owned enterprises,
may form or join unions of their own choosing without prior
authorization. Union membership has declined, with an estimated 20 to
28 percent of the work force organized in 14 active unions. Most unions
are independent of the Government or political party control, although
the Prime Minister was formerly president of the Sugar Workers Union.
The Act prohibits anti-union activities before a union is legally
registered, and the Labor Relations Act prohibits retribution against
strikers. Both laws contain grievance procedures.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively: The right of
workers to bargain collectively is established in the Industrial
Relations Act of 1972. Antiunion discrimination is prohibited by law.
The same laws apply in the export processing zones.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor: Forced or compulsory
labor is not explicitly prohibited by law, but there have been no
reports of its practice.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children: The minimum legal age
for workers is 12 years. Children from 12 to 14 years of age may only
work in family businesses. Children under the age of 18 may legally
work only during daylight hours, with the exception of 16 to 18 year
olds, who may work at night in sugar factories. The probation service
in the Ministry of Social Development and Family Services is
responsible for enforcing child labor provisions, but enforcement is
lax. There is no organized exploitation of child labor, but children
are often seen begging or working as street vendors
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work: In June 1998 the government
passed the Minimum Wages Act which established a minimum wage of TT$ 7
(US$ 1.10) per hour, a 40 hour work week, time and a half pay for the
first four hours of overtime on a workday, double pay for the next four
hours, and triple pay thereafter. For Sundays, holidays, and off days
the Act also provides for double pay for the first eight hours and
triple pay thereafter. The Maternity Protection Act of 1998 provides
for maternity benefits. An Occupational Safety and Health Act is
currently before Parliament.
The Factories and Ordinance Bill of 1948 sets occupational health
and safety standards in certain industries and provides for inspections
to monitor and enforce compliance. The Industrial Relations Act
protects workers who file complaints with the Ministry of Labor
regarding illegal or hazardous working conditions. Should it be
determined upon inspection that hazardous conditions exist in the
workplace, the worker is absolved for refusing to comply with an order
that would have placed him or her in danger.
f. Rights in Sectors with U.S. Investment: Employee rights and
labor laws in sectors with U.S. investment do not differ from those in
other sectors.
Extent of U.S. Investment in Selected Industries--U.S. Direct Investment Position Abroad on an Historical Cost
Basis--1998
[Millions of U.S. Dollars]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Category Amount
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Petroleum...................... .............. 697
Total Manufacturing............ .............. 49
Food & Kindred Products...... (\2\) ...............................................................
Chemicals & Allied Products.. 5 ...............................................................
Primary & Fabricated Metals.. (\1\) ...............................................................
Industrial Machinery and 2 ...............................................................
Equipment.
Electric & Electronic 0 ...............................................................
Equipment.
Transportation Equipment..... 0 ...............................................................
Other Manufacturing.......... (\1\) ...............................................................
Wholesale Trade................ .............. 20
Banking........................ .............. (\1\)
Finance/Insurance/Real Estate.. .............. 20
Services....................... .............. 1
Other Industries............... .............. (\1\)
TOTAL ALL INDUSTRIES........... .............. 1,054
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Suppressed to avoid disclosing data of individual companies.
\2\ Less than $500,000 (+/-).
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis.
______
URUGUAY
Key Economic Indicators
[Billions of U.S. Dollars unless otherwise indicated] \1\ \2\
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1997 1998 1999
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Income, Production and Employment:
Nominal GDP \3\...................... 20.0 20.8 19.3
Real GDP Growth (pct)................ 5.1 4.5 -2.5
GDP Growth by Sector (pct):
Agriculture........................ -1.4 5.8 8.0
Manufacturing...................... 5.8 2.4 -5.0
Services........................... 3.8 3.3 0.5-1
Government......................... 2.8 N/A N/A
Per Capita GDP (US$)................. 6,322 6,560 6,000
Labor Force (000's).................. 1,400/5 1,455 1,465
Unemployment Rate (pct).............. 11.5 10.1 10.8
Money and Prices (annual percentage
growth):
Money Supply Growth (M2)............. 21.3 18.4 9.0
Consumer Price Inflation............. 15.2 8.6 4.0
Exchange Rate \4\.................... 9.45 10.47 11.4
Balance of Payments and Trade:
Total Exports FOB \5\................ 2.7 2.8 2.0
Exports to U.S. (US$ millions)..... 162 158 142
Total Imports CIF \5\................ 3.7 3.8 3.2
Imports from U.S. (US$ millions)... 432 460 380
Trade Balance \5\.................... -1.0 -1.0 -1.2
Balance with U.S. (US$ millions)... -270 -301 -238
External Public Debt................. 5.5 6.1 6.3
Fiscal Deficit/GDP (pct)............. 1.4 0.9 2.5-3.0
Current Account Deficit/GDP (pct).... 1.6 1.9 2.5-3.0
Debt Service Payments/GDP (pct)...... 5.2 5.8 6.0
Gold and Foreign Exchange Reserves 2.1 2.4 2.4
(net)...............................
Aid from U.S. (US$ millions)......... 8.45 7.9 2.6
Aid from All Other Sources (US$ 48.4/6 N/A N/A
millions)...........................
------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Data in Uruguayan Pesos was converted into U.S. Dollars at the
average interbank selling rate for each year.
\2\ 1999 figures are all estimates based on available monthly data in
November 1999.
\3\ At producer prices.
\4\ Annual average quotation of Uruguayan Pesos/US$.
\5\ Estimate based on World Bank's World Development Indicators
Sources: Uruguayan Central Bank, Uruguayan National Institute of
Statistics, World Bank, and U.S. Embassy Montevideo.
1. General Policy Framework
The historical basis of the Uruguayan economy has been agriculture,
particularly livestock production. Agriculture remains important both
directly (beef, wool and rice) and indirectly for inputs to other
sectors (textiles, leather and meat). Industry has undergone a strong
reconversion process fostered by MERCOSUR (the Southern Cone Common
Market) integration. Industrial production declined in the early
nineties, but since 1994 it has resumed growth. At present industry
accounts for 18 percent of Uruguay's GDP. The service sector,
particularly tourism and financial services, dominates the economy,
accounting for over 60 percent of GDP. Banking benefits from Uruguay's
open financial system.
1999 per capita income of $6,000, although down from 1998's level,
still puts Uruguay in the World Bank's upper-middle income grouping.
The UNDP Human Development report places it amongst the countries with
high human development.
Overall, the Uruguayan economy has performed relatively well in
recent years with good rates of growth, low budget and current account
deficits and declining inflation rates. The government has given the
private sector access to many activities formerly reserved for the
state.
But 1999 has been a tough economic year for Uruguay as the effects
of the Real devaluation in Brazil, the recession in Argentina, and the
uncertainty of an election year in Uruguay ripple through the economy.
Uruguay's gross domestic product is expected to decline by two-and-a-
half or three percent for the year as a whole. Exports have fallen and
the current account deficit is expected to increase to 2.5 or 3.0
percent of GDP, given the increased foreign trade deficit and a poor
tourist season. Analysts expect Uruguay to resume growth in 2000 under
a strengthened economic environment in Argentina and Brazil.
Uruguay's risk rating for long-term debt issued in foreign currency
improved in 1997 to BBB minus (by Standard & Poor's, Duff & Phelps and
Europe's IBCA and, Baa3 by Moody's), reaching investment grade status
and enabling U.S. Pension funds to invest in Uruguay's sovereign debt.
Uruguay accesses funds in the international financial markets at the
second lowest rate of any Latin American country.
MERCOSUR faced several problems in late 1998 and 1999 that have
affected the trade flows amongst its partners. Problems include the
devaluation of Brazil's Real, the international financial crisis, lack
of effective macroeconomic coordination, and the imposition of trade-
restrictive measures by Argentina and Brazil. But MERCOSUR has had a
positive impact on Uruguay and, at present, trade with other MERCOSUR
members accounts for more than forty percent of Uruguay's overall
trade.
The United States is the fourth largest Uruguayan trading partner,
after Argentina, Brazil and the European Union. Since 1991 the U.S. has
enjoyed a rapidly growing trade surplus with Uruguay. The United States
bought 5.6 percent of Uruguay's exports ($ 158 million) and provided
12.8 percent of the country's imports ($ 460 million) in 1998. Tariff
rates will decline to zero percent for MERCOSUR products on January 1,
2000. A common external tariff (CET) entered into effect on January 1,
1995 for imports from non-MERCOSUR countries, ranging between zero to
20 percent. The 20 percent level was raised to 23 percent in late 1997
and is due to be reduced to 20 percent again in 2000. The MERCOSUR CET
does not yet cover capital, informatic, and telecommunication goods.
2. Exchange Rate Policy
The Uruguayan government allows the peso to float against the
dollar within a three-percent range. The band currently rises by 7.4
percent per year and the Central Bank may buy and sell dollars to keep
the peso's value within the band. Depreciation outpaced inflation by 2
percent in 1998, and by 4 percent in the 12-month period to September
1999.
Uruguay's monetary policy is geared at keeping inflation under
control, using the nominal exchange rate as the main instrument.
Central Bank intervention to defend the currency entails a loss of
control over the money supply, limiting the effectiveness of monetary
policy that is carried out through the issuance of very short-term
paper.
There are no restrictions on the purchase of foreign currency or
remittance of profits abroad. Foreign exchange can be freely obtained.
A vast part of the economy is dollarized.
3. Structural Policies
Uruguay has traditionally been a market-oriented economy. Economic
liberalization is supported by the present administration and was
supported by the previous one. Regional integration (MERCOSUR and
FTAA), reduced deficit spending, downsized government and lowered
inflation enjoy strong support from the two political parties which
make up the ruling coalition.
A mild central administration reform has been implemented during
this administration in order to eliminate redundant functions and
divest non-essential activities. Many activities, formerly restricted
to the state, have been transferred to the private sector under
contract, concession or sale. The government ended its insurance and
mortgage monopolies in 1995.
Social security reform was also implemented, lowering a structural
government deficit in the long run (prior to the reform the social
security deficit amounted to 6 percent of GDP.) The reform changed the
social security program from a defined-benefit system to a defined-
contribution system of individual accounts.
The public sector deficit was 0.9 percent of GDP in 1998, and as of
1999's first half, it was up to 2.4 percent (on a 12-month basis). The
worsening of the deficit is the result of the decline in tax collection
resulting from the slowdown in economic activity. The inflation rate
decreased from 130 percent in 1990 to 8.6 percent in 1998, and the rate
for the twelve-month period ending October 1999 had further decreased
to 3.7 percent, the lowest rate in five decades. Three-percent
inflation is expected for 2000. Price controls are limited to a small
set of products and services for public consumption, such as bread,
milk, passenger transportation, utilities and fuels. The government
relies heavily on consumption taxes (value-added and excise) for its
general revenue. Under a law of investment promotion, the government
gives tax exemptions to investing firms. There are also incentives for
companies which hire young people.
4. Debt Management Policies
As of 1999's first quarter, the Uruguayan net external debt was
$2.9 billion, 92 percent of which is public. Since 1996, Uruguay has
been extending the maturity of its debt. While all the private sector's
debt is short-term (one year or less,) public sector's debt has a
longer maturity (fifty-eight percent of the latter matures after the
year 2002.) Debt service in 1998 was $ 1.2 billion, equivalent to 28
percent of combined merchandise and service exports, and to 5.8 percent
of GDP.
Total net foreign exchange reserves amounted to $2.4 billion as of
September 1999, equivalent to 9.1 months of imports. An IMF stand-by
program is in place and a joint agreement with the IMF and the World
Bank was signed to ensure the availability of funds that would help
Uruguay deal with the regional crisis, or with any expectations
generated by the presidential and parliamentary elections that took
place in 1999.
5. Aid
Uruguay receives little non-military aid from the United States.
During 1998 Uruguay received almost eight million dollars for U.S.
peacekeeping, training and equipment assistance. Bilateral counter
narcotics assistance totaled $ 150,000 in 1998 and will total $ 100,000
in 1999.
A Peace Corps program closed in 1997. Using 6 million dollars from
a debt reduction program, the United States government and the
Uruguayan government jointly manage the Fund of the Americas. This Fund
is designed to use monies (which would otherwise be due to the United
States) for local environmental and child welfare programs. According
to the Uruguayan Presidency's Office of Budget and Planning, total
estimated aid received from all other sources in 1996 and 1997 amounts
to 125 million dollars (the government of Uruguay keeps aid statistics
on a two-year basis).
6. Significant Barriers to U.S. Exports
Certain imports require special licenses or customs documents.
Among these are pharmaceuticals, some types of medical equipment and
chemicals, firearms, radioactive materials, fertilizers, vegetable
products, frozen embryos, livestock, bull semen, anabolics, sugar,
seeds, hormones, meat and vehicles. To protect Uruguay's important
livestock industry, imports of bull semen and embryos also face certain
numerical limitations and must comply with animal health requirements,
a process that can take a long time. Bureaucratic delays also add to
the cost of imports, although importers report that a
``debureaucratization'' commission has improved matters.
Few significant restrictions exist in services. U.S. banks continue
to be very active. Restrictions on professional services such as law,
medicine or accounting are similar to most countries. Persons with non-
Uruguayan credentials who wish to practice their profession in Uruguay
must prove equivalent credentials to those required of locals.
Similarly, travel and ticketing services are unrestricted. A law
allowing foreign companies to offer insurance (except work-related
injury) coverage in Uruguay was passed in October 1993, although the
former monopoly provider still maintains an overwhelming share of the
market and regulation of the insurance sector is weak.
There have been significant limitations on foreign equity
participation in certain sectors of the economy. Investment areas
regarded as strategic require government authorization. These include
electricity, hydrocarbons, banking and finance, railroads, strategic
minerals, telecommunications and the press. Uruguay has long owned and
operated state monopolies in petroleum, rail freight, telephone service
and port administration. However, passage of port reform legislation in
April 1992 allowed for privatization of various port services. The
state-owned natural gas company was privatized in late 1994. Both
private consortia and the state-owned phone company (ANTEL) provide
cellular telecommunications. Legislation to privatize ANTEL was
overturned by referendum in 1992. Several state-owned firms and even
city municipalities however, grant the concession of specific services
to privately-owned companies.
Government procurement practices are well defined, transparent and
closely followed. Bid awards, however, often are drawn out and caught
up in controversy. Tenders are generally open to all bidders, foreign
and domestic. A government decree, however, establishes that local
products or services of equal quality to, and no more than ten percent
more expensive than foreign goods or services, shall be given
preference. Among foreign bidders, preference will also be given to
those who offer to purchase Uruguayan products. Uruguay has not signed
the GATT/WTO government procurement code.
The only exemptions to tariff regulations in the context of anti-
dumping legislation are minimum export prices, fixed in relation to
international levels and in line with commitments assumed under the
WTO. These are applied to neutralize unfair trade practices that
threaten to damage national production activity or delay the
development of such activities, and are primarily directed at Argentina
and Brazil. Minimum export prices have been scheduled to be phased out,
but a number are still in effect (textiles, clothing and sugar).
7. Export Subsidies Policies
The government provides a nine-percent subsidy to wool fabric and
apparel producers using funds from a tax on greasy and washed wool
exports. Uruguay is a signatory of the GATT/WTO subsidies code.
8. Protection of U.S. Intellectual Property
Uruguay's intellectual property (IP) regime does not yet meet
international standards. Certain provisions of the recently-passed
patent law appear to be TRIPs inconsistent and Uruguay's failure to
pass a new copyright law is also a problem. Uruguay's copyright law
dates to 1937; the extent to which it protects computer software is
subject to judicial interpretation each time a case is presented.
Enforcement of copyrights is still weak and piracy of business
application software is estimated at 72 percent. Uruguay is a member of
the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) and a party to the
Bern Convention, the Universal Copyright Convention (UCC) and the Paris
Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property. Registering a
foreign trademark without proving a legal commercial connection with
the trademark is no longer a possibility; enforcement of trademark
rights is excellent. (A trademark law was approved in 1998.) USTR
placed Uruguay on its ``Special 301 Watch List'' in 1999 because of its
failure to meet its international obligations for copyright and patent
protection.
9. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association: The constitution guarantees the right
of workers to organize freely and encourages the formation of unions.
Labor unions are independent of government or political party control.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively: Collective
bargaining takes place on a plant-wide or sector-wide basis, with or
without government mediation, as the parties wish.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor: Forced or compulsory
labor is prohibited by law and in practice.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children: Children as young as 12
may be employed if they have a work permit. Children under the age of
18 may not perform dangerous, fatiguing, or night work, apart from
domestic employment.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work: There is a legislated minimum
wage ($93/month as of September 1998). The standard workweek is 48
hours for six days, with overtime compensation. Workers are protected
by health and safety standards, which appear to be adhered to in
practice.
f. Rights in Sectors with U.S. Investment: Workers in sectors in
which there is U.S. Investment are provided the same protection as
other workers. In many cases, the wages and working conditions for
those in U.S.-affiliated industries appear to be better than average.
Extent of U.S. Investment in Selected Industries--U.S. Direct Investment Position Abroad on an Historical Cost
Basis--1998
[Millions of U.S. Dollars]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Category Amount
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Petroleum...................... .............. (\1\)
Total Manufacturing............ .............. 160
Food & Kindred Products...... 40 ...............................................................
Chemicals & Allied Products.. 43 ...............................................................
Primary & Fabricated Metals.. 0 ...............................................................
Industrial Machinery and (\1\) ...............................................................
Equipment.
Electric & Electronic 0 ...............................................................
Equipment.
Transportation Equipment..... 0 ...............................................................
Other Manufacturing.......... (\1\) ...............................................................
Wholesale Trade................ .............. 51
Banking........................ .............. 203
Finance/Insurance/Real Estate.. .............. 111
Services....................... .............. 12
Other Industries............... .............. (\1\)
TOTAL ALL INDUSTRIES........... .............. 567
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Suppressed to avoid disclosing data of individual companies.
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis.
______
VENEZUELA
Key Economic Indicators
[Billions of U.S. Dollars unless otherwise indicated]
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1997 1998 1999
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Income, Production and Employment:
Nominal GDP \1\........................ 88.4 95.0 95.1
Real GDP Growth (pct) \2\.............. 5.9 -0.7 -5.0
GDP by Sector: \3\
Agriculture.......................... 2.5 -0.7 1.7
Manufacturing........................ 4.5 -4.7 -8.0
Services............................. 3.7 0.5 -4.7
Government........................... -3.4 1.0 3.2
Per Capita GDP (US$) \4\............... 3,882 4,087 4,013
Labor Force (000's) \5\................ 9,507 9,907 10,259
Unemployment Rate (pct) \6\............ 10.6 11.0 18.0
Money and Prices (annual percentage
growth):
Money Supply Growth (M2) \7\........... 62.5 18.6 3.7
Consumer Price Inflation \8\........... 37.6 29.9 20.0
Exchange Rate (BS/US$ annual average)
\9\
Official............................. 488.6 547.6 628.9
Parallel............................. 488.6 547.6 628.9
Balance of Payments and Trade:
Total Exports FOB \10\................. 23.7 17.5 18.5
Exports to United States \11\........ 13.4 9.3 9.8
Total Imports FOB \10\................. 13.7 14.0 11.0
Imports from United States \11\...... 6.6 6.5 5.7
Trade Balance \10\..................... 10.0 3.5 7.5
Balance with United States \11\...... 6.8 2.8 4.1
External Public Debt \12\.............. 23.8 22.9 22.6
Fiscal Surplus (Deficit)/GDP (pct) \12\ 1.7 -4.2 -3.1
Current Account Surplus (Deficit)/GDP 4.4 -1.8 1.7
(pct) \13\............................
Foreign Debt Service Payments/GDP (pct) 11.9 7.8 7.3
\14\..................................
Gold and Foreign Exchange Reserves \15\ 17.8 14.8 15.1
Aid from United States................. N/A N/A N/A
Aid from All Other Sources............. N/A N/A N/A
------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Embassy's estimate based on inflation (20%), GDP Growth (-5%),
Exchange rate (Bs/628.91), and population (23,706,711).
\2\ Embassy's estimate based on average of the official rate and most
private estimates.
\3\ BCV and Veneconomy.
\4\ Calculation based on figures for no. 1 above.
\5\ Central Statistical Office (OCEI) as of the first semester 1999.
\6\ Ministry of Finance.
\7\ BCV as of October 29, 1999.
\8\ Embassy's estimate on the average for January-October, 1999.
\9\ Embassy's estimate based on the monthly depreciation rate of 1.28
percent.
\10\ Veneconomy.
\11\ Department of Commerce, January-July, 1999. Embassy used average
and derived projections therefrom.
\12\ GOV Budget Office (OCEPRE).
\13\ Embassy calculation.
\14\ OCEPRE, BCV, and Embassy calculation.
\15\ BCV as of November 18, 1999.
1. General Policy Framework
Venezuela has undergone significant political and institutional
change in the last year. In December 1998, Hugo Chavez Frias was
elected President of Venezuela in a landslide. Chavez promised
fundamental reforms that would benefit Venezuela's impoverished
majority. Upon assuming office in February, Chavez began work on the
centerpiece of his political project, a National Constituent Assembly
(ANC) that would re-write Venezuela's Constitution. Pro-Chavez
candidates won more than ninety percent of the seats in this Assembly
in the July 1999 elections, and completed their work on a new
Constitution draft on November 19. On December 15, the Venezuelan
public will decide whether they approve in a national referendum vote.
Despite the attention required by the constitutional debate, the
Chavez administration and the Venezuelan Congress have passed numerous
economic sectoral laws over the last year. In April 1999, Congress gave
President Chavez temporary powers to rule by decree in the economic
area with the passage of the ``Enabling Law.'' This ``fast track''
capability resulted in legislation in several areas, including new laws
governing the electric and mining sectors, government procurement,
income taxes, agricultural credit, and soon-to-be expected legislation
covering foreign investment and telecommunications. The Chavez
Administration also raised taxes to help cover the Government's budget
deficit, levying a new financial transactions tax and broadening the
base of the value added tax (VAT) (even as it lowered VAT tax rates to
15.5 percent) soon after taking office. Congress approved a Bilateral
Tax Treaty with the United States in August 1999.
Much of the new legislation represented a welcome updating of old
statutes and the introduction of new legal frameworks. The private
sector generally looked with favor upon the sectoral legislation,
particularly in the area of electric power generation. The new income
tax law established taxation on the incomes of Venezuelan citizens,
regardless of where they reside, a long-overdue reform that puts
Venezuela into closer conformity with U.S. practices and could
facilitate implementation of the Bilateral Tax Treaty, when that enters
into force. Although some new legislation recognizes the importance of
the private sector, other sectoral laws, such as the mining law,
preserve an extensive role for the state. Prior to completing the draft
in November, the constitutional debates had been fast-paced and wide-
ranging. The continued blizzard of political activity has caused
uncertainty that has kept some investors on the sidelines. Nonetheless,
Venezuela remains a country characterized by private enterprise,
although those same enterprises operate under the shadow of potential
heavy government oversight and regulation.
The need for dramatic political reform was highlighted by the sharp
economic downturn caused by a deep recession in Asia in 1997-1998 and a
consequent fall in oil prices in the winter of 1997 and spring of 1998.
When President Chavez assumed office in February 1999, oil had fallen
to USD 8.43 per barrel, official unemployment reached 11 percent and
budget calculations said the Government's budget deficit threatened to
reach 9.5 percent of GDP. Chavez responded with a series of budget
cuts, a .05 percent tax on financial transactions, a broadening of the
15.5 percent VAT tax, and a reported tightening of customs collections.
On the petroleum front, Venezuela joined OPEC and non-OPEC countries in
a new round of production cutbacks in March 1999. Since that time, oil
prices have rebounded strongly, easing the government's once-dire
fiscal emergency. (On October 21, 1999, the price of Venezuela's basket
of crudes and refined products reached a high of USD 20.25 per barrel,
an increase of 140 percent over the low of the previous February.)
Moreover, inflation fell due to restrained increases in public sector
wages, a tight monetary policy, and the economic recession. (The
inflation rate fell from 30 percent in 1998 to an estimated 20 percent
for 1999.) Unemployment increased strongly. The official rate of
unemployment now stands at 15 percent and observers outside the
government say that the real rate is closer to 20 percent. Much foreign
investment remains on hold pending improvement on the economic front
and the outcome of constitutional debates.
Venezuela is rich in petroleum, natural gas, hydroelectric power,
bauxite, iron ore, coal, gold, and diamonds. The petroleum industry
dominates Venezuela's economy. In 1998, it accounted for roughly 27
percent of the country's GDP, 70 percent of export earnings, and 43
percent of central government revenues. It is estimated that in 1999
PDVSA's share of government revenues will increase with the rise in oil
prices. The petroleum, petrochemicals and gas sectors will continue to
play critical roles in the economy as these areas are further opened to
foreign investment.
The government has begun efforts to address the country's economic
emergency through a variety of measures designed to both jump-start and
ultimately to diversify the economy. The Chavez administration merged
the Ministry of Agriculture and the Ministry of Industry and Commerce
in October 1999 in an attempt to consolidate ministries and reduce
government expenditures. The new Ministry of Production and Commerce is
also undertaking programs to promote small and medium-sized businesses.
President Chavez has also created a People's Bank to give loans to
family businesses and micro-enterprises. Finally, the new tax law
contains important incentives for investment, especially in the
agricultural and tourist sectors in an effort to diversify the heavily
petroleum-dominated economy.
Overall, Venezuelan GDP fell 9.5 percent in the first semester of
1999, the worst economic performance in ten years. By the fall of 1999,
there were indications that the recession had bottomed out and some
outside observers predicted that the Venezuelan economy would soon
begin to recover. The Venezuelan stock index responded to this optimism
and rose 35 percent in September 1999. Nonetheless, the Chavez
government still faced difficult challenges in the form of stubbornly
high unemployment, insufficient investment and continuing fiscal
difficulties.
2. Exchange Rate Policy
Since the elimination of exchange controls and the large
devaluation of April 1996, the Central Bank of Venezuela (BCV) has
maintained the bolivar within a gradually devaluing band. During this
period, the bolivar's depreciation has not kept up with the rate of
inflation. The bolivar depreciated 12 percent from January 1 to mid-
November 1999. The inflation rate for the same period ran over 18
percent. Despite the negative impact that a strong bolivar has on
domestic manufactures and non-oil exports, the government is expected
to maintain its band system throughout at least the first quarter of
the year 2000, if not longer. BCV reserves remain sufficient to support
the bolivar, barring some unforeseen economic shock. President Chavez
has spoken of moving to a fixed exchange rate, but as of this writing,
the government has taken no action in this area.
3. Structural Policies
Pricing Policies: The government in recent years has lifted price
controls on basic goods and services. Now only those pharmaceuticals
with less than four competitive products and gasoline remain subject to
price controls. The government eliminated the remaining subsidy on
gasoline in 1997, bringing domestic retail prices up to export prices.
Tax Policies: The Venezuelan House of Deputies approved the U.S.-
Venezuelan Bilateral Tax Treaty in August 1999. The U.S. Senate gave
its advice and consent to the Treaty on November 5, and now the treaty
awaits an exchange of notes and signature by the Chief Executives of
Venezuela and the U.S. This treaty seeks to eliminate double
withholding and to promote information sharing between the tax
authorities of the two countries. Venezuela adopted a globally based
tax system with the passage of a new income tax law in November 1999.
This brings Venezuelan tax law into closer alignment with the U.S. and
should facilitate implementation of the Bilateral Tax Treaty.
In Venezuela, the maximum income tax rate for individuals and
corporations is 34 percent. Venezuelan law does not differentiate
between foreign and Venezuelan-owned companies, except in the petroleum
sector. PDVSA's hydrocarbon revenues are subject to a 67.7 percent
income tax, in addition to a 16.7 percent royalty payment on
production. In 1998, in a move criticized by some PDVSA executives, the
government required PDVSA to pay a one-time ``dividend'' of $1.4
billion to help the Venezuelan government fund its fiscal deficit. The
Chavez administration has indicated that it may seek further PDVSA
revenues to meet budgetary needs.
Most joint ventures with PDVSA are liable to the same level of
income tax, except for those involved in the development and refining
of heavy and extra heavy crudes and off shore natural gas, which are
subject to a reduced rate of 34 percent. (Joint ventures did not have
to pay the 1998 dividend.) The government announced in September 1996
that current and future projects involving extra heavy crude oil would
also be entitled, on a case by case basis, to temporary reductions in
the 16.7 percent royalty payment to as low as 1.5 percent. These
reductions are granted for the construction phase of the projects.
Since 1993, the government has imposed a one-percent corporate
assets tax, assessed on the gross value of assets (with no deduction
for liabilities) after adjustment for depreciation. Venezuela also
applies a luxury tax, at a rate of 10 or 20 percent, on certain items
such as jewelry, yachts, and high-priced automobiles and cable
television.
The Chavez administration began making important changes to the tax
system in an effort to raise revenues under the auspices of the
Enabling Law passed in April 1999. On May 14, 1999, the government
imposed a 0.5 percent bank debit tax. On June 1, 1999, the government
replaced its wholesale tax (ICVSM) with a value-added tax (IVA). The
value-added tax rate is 15.5%, one percent lower than the rate of the
wholesale tax it replaces. The new tax eliminates some exemptions,
however, in an effort to broaden the tax base and raise revenues.
4. Debt Management Policies
Venezuela's public sector's external debt stood at $23.8 billion at
the end of 1997 and is expected to fall slightly to 23 billion by the
end of 1998. External debt represents about 23 percent of GDP.
Venezuela's external debt service totaled about 7.3 percent of GDP in
1999, a fall from the previous year's level of 7.8 percent. Venezuela
continues to carry a heavy domestic debt burden largely incurred during
the 1994-95 banking crisis and as a result of the 1997 labor reforms.
5. Aid
In FY 1999, the U.S. provided an estimated $700,000 in counter-
narcotics assistance to Venezuelan law enforcement agencies and the
military from international narcotics control funds. The U.S. also gave
the government $400,000 in aid under the International Military
Education and Training Program (IMET) to strengthen the country's
counter-narcotics capabilities.
6. Significant Barriers to U.S. Exports
After many years of following an economic policy based on import
substitution, Venezuela began to liberalize its trade regime with its
accession to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in 1990.
Venezuela became a founding member of GATT's successor, the World Trade
Organization (WTO) in 1995 following completion of the Uruguay Round
negotiations. Venezuela implemented the Andean Community's Common
External Tariff (CET) in 1995, along with Colombia and Ecuador. The CET
has a five-tier tariff structure of 0, 5, 10, 15, and 20 percent.
Venezuela's average import tariff on a trade-weighted basis is roughly
10 percent.
Under the Andean Community's Common Automotive Policy (CAP),
assembled passenger vehicles constitute an exception to the 20 percent
maximum tariff and are subject to 35 percent import duties. The knock-
down kits from which such cars are assembled enter Venezuela with only
a three percent duty. Imports of used automobiles, used clothing and
used tires remain prohibited, even though Venezuela agreed to eliminate
all GATT-inconsistent quantitative restrictions by the end of 1993 as
part of its accession to the GATT. The CAP is scheduled for elimination
by January 1, 2000, as part of Venezuela's commitment to conform to the
World Trade Organization's prohibition on Trade Related Industrial
Measures (TRIMS).
Venezuela implemented the Andean Community's price band system in
1995 for certain agricultural products, including feed grains,
oilseeds, oilseed products, sugar, rice, wheat, milk, pork and poultry.
Yellow corn was added to the price band system in 1996. Ad valorem
rates for these products are adjusted according to the relationship
between market commodity reference prices and established floor and
ceiling prices. When the reference price for a particular market
commodity falls below the established floor price, the compensatory
tariff for that commodity and related products is adjusted upward.
Conversely, when the reference price exceeds the established ceiling,
the compensatory tariff is eliminated. Floor and ceiling prices are set
once a year based on average CIF prices during the past five years.
Normally, Venezuela publishes these prices on April 15. However, so far
in 1999 Venezuela has not published its list of prices. This has upset
several of the country's Andean Community (CAN) trading partners and
has led both Colombia and Ecuador to sue Venezuela in the CAN.
Import Licenses: Venezuela requires that importers obtain sanitary
and phytosanitary (SPS) certificates from the Ministries of Health and
Agriculture for most pharmaceutical and agricultural imports. The
government routinely uses this requirement to restrict agricultural and
food imports. For example, Venezuelan authorities banned the import of
U.S. poultry in 1993 because avian influenza (AI) exists in the United
States. The restriction is not based on a scientific risk assessment
indicating that U.S. poultry exports pose a risk to the Venezuelan
poultry industry. The Ministry of Agriculture modified this import
prohibition in its Official Gazette on March 13, 1997, allowing the
import of pathogenic free (SPF) eggs from ``avian influenza countries
and the import of certain processed poultry products from AI
countries.''
In April 1997, the government lifted a ban on U.S. pork and swine
imports imposed because of Porcine Reproductive and Respiratory
Syndrome (PRRS). The Venezuelan Agricultural Health Service (SASA) and
Ministry of Health officials also reviewed the U.S. meat processing
system as overseen by the USDA and approved U.S. facilities for export
to Venezuela. Venezuela now plans to invoke its WTO-negotiated Tariff
Rate Quota (TRQ) for pork imports, again limiting market access below
actual demand. The TRQ is 877 metric tons and is allocated once a year,
mostly to members of the Venezuelan Association of Industrial Meat
Producers (AICAR).
The Ministry of Agriculture implemented a yellow corn import
licensing system in February 1997, under its WTO tariff rate quota for
sorghum and yellow corn. This allowed enforcement of domestic sorghum
absorption requirements. Under this system, feed manufacturers must
purchase a government-assigned amount of domestic sorghum at the
official (i.e. higher than world market) price in order to obtain
import licenses for yellow corn. The Ministry of Agriculture has
announced that it may establish similar import license requirements for
white corn, rice, powdered milk, and oil seeds.
On November 1, 1999, the government established a new requirement
for importers of agricultural goods. Importers must now register with
the Ministry of Production and Commerce (MPC). They must provide the
MPC with a list of their purchases, a list of the clients to whom they
sell and copies of invoices for those sales. Ostensibly, this is to
allow the MPC to investigate charges that imports harm the agricultural
sector. Importers have complained that this practice establishes yet
another bureaucratic barrier to imports.
Services Barriers: Professionals working in disciplines covered by
national licensing legislation (e.g. law, architecture, engineering,
medicine, veterinary practice, economics, business administration/
management, accounting, and security services) must re-validate their
qualifications at a Venezuelan University and pass the Associated
Professional Exam. Foreign journalists who plan to work in the domestic
Spanish language media face similar revalidation requirements.
Standards, Testing, Labeling and Certification: The Venezuelan
Commission of Industrial Standards (COVENIN) requires certification
from COVENIN-approved laboratories for imports of over 300 agricultural
and industrial products. U.S. exporters have experienced difficulties
in complying with the documentary requirements for the issuance of
COVENIN certificates. Some Venezuelan importers of U.S. products have
alleged that COVENIN applies these standards more strictly to imports
than to domestic products.
The government started to require certificates of origin for
imports in March 1996 that are ``similar to goods which currently have
anti-dumping or compensatory measures applied to them.'' Importers have
complained that the new requirement, which primarily affects textiles
and garments, is burdensome and time-consuming to fulfill. Tariff and
non-tariff barriers also inhibit the importation of milk, some cereals
and certain live animals.
Investment Barriers: Foreign investment is restricted in the
petroleum sector, with the exploration, production, refining,
transportation, storage, and foreign and domestic sale of hydrocarbons
reserved to the government and its entities under the 1975 Hydrocarbon
Law. However, private companies may engage in hydrocarbons-related
activities through operating contracts or through equity joint ventures
as long as the following conditions are met: 1) the joint ventures
guarantee state control of the operation; 2) they are of limited
duration; and 3) they have the prior authorization of Congress. PDVSA
has opened the oil sector to increasing amounts of foreign investment
since 1993 through both operating contracts and joint ventures.
During 1999,the GOV passed significant legislation under the
Enabling Law in the mining, electric and gas sectors. It was also
considering new telecommunications legislation. Finally, the
President's Council of Ministers passed a new investment law under the
auspices of the Enabling Law. All of these proposals were generally
pro-investment, assuming good-faith implementation of their provisions
and adequate enforcement legislation and regulation. Consequently, when
they come into force, these laws should reduce barriers to foreign
investment in specific sectors and in the economy as a whole. The
exploitation of iron ore remains reserved to the state and therefore is
not open to foreign investment. (Iron ore is not covered by the new
Mining Law.)
Venezuela limits foreign equity participation (except that from
other Andean Community countries) to 19.9 percent in enterprises
engaged in television and radio broadcasting, in the Spanish-language
press, and in professional services subject to national licensing
legislation.
Venezuelan law incorporates performance requirements and quotas for
certain industries. Under the Andean Community's Common Automotive
Policy (CAP), all car assemblers in Venezuela must incorporate a
minimum amount of regional content in their finished vehicles. The
local content requirement for passenger vehicles was 34 percent in 1999
(though a revised auto regime is currently being developed.) The
government enforces a ``one for one'' policy for performers giving
concerts in Venezuela. This requires foreign artists featured in these
events to give stage time to national performers. There is also an
annual quota regarding the distribution and exhibition of Venezuelan
films. At least half of the television programming must be dedicated to
national programs. Finally, at least half of the FM radio broadcasting
from 7 a.m. to 10 p.m. is dedicated to Venezuelan music.
Venezuela's Organic Labor Law places quantitative and financial
restrictions on the employment decisions made by foreign investors.
Article 20 of the law requires that industrial relations managers,
personnel managers, captains of ships and airplanes, and foremen be
Venezuelan. Article 27 limits foreign employment in companies with ten
or more employees to 10 percent of the work force and restricts
remuneration for foreign workers to 20 percent of the payroll. The
shortage of skilled Venezuelan workers in the oil sector sometimes
makes it difficult for foreign oil companies to meet this requirement.
Article 28 allows temporary exceptions to Article 27 and outlines the
requirements to hire technical experts when equivalent Venezuelan
personnel are not available.
Government Procurement Practices: Venezuela's new Government
Procurement Law, promulgated by the Executive under the auspices of the
Enabling Law and published on October 11, 1999, provides details on
required information for inclusion in an invitation to bid on a
government contract and stipulates that there will be no discrimination
against national bidders. The law grants the President and the
Executive Branch enormous discretionary power in granting contracts.
For example, the President may approve temporary measures to promote
domestic production or offset unfavorable conditions for domestic
industry and may set restrictions, criteria, and guidelines for
preferences to Venezuelan nationals. Finally, in September 1999, the
Ministry of Energy and Mines issued a directive to PDVSA instructing
the company to favor national providers in its purchases of supplies.
Customs Procedures: In the private sector, both Venezuelan and
foreign companies complain that Venezuelan customs is plagued by
corruption and antiquated procedures, which frequently delay the
clearance of incoming goods. The government took the first step in
modernizing customs procedures in October 1996 by initiating a new
computerized operation at La Guaria, one of the country's main ports.
The government passed a new Customs Law at the end of 1998 which
made private customs agents criminally responsible for illegal
shipments or undervalued shipments that enter the country. The
government also instituted measures to assess customs charges for
imported clothes according to minimum prices set by the bulk weight of
a given shipment. Critics charged that the new regulations constitute
an effort to protect manufacturers hard hit by the overvalued currency
and the domestic recession. The government countered that the new
customs regulations are temporary (they are renewable regulations set
to last 180 days), and are designed to be stopgap measures to prevent
the deliberate undervaluing of imports pending implementation of the
new Customs Law. As of the fall of 1999, these temporary measures were
still in effect, having been renewed twice.
7. Export Subsidies Policies
Venezuela has a duty drawback system that provides exporters with a
customs rebate paid on imported inputs. Exporters can also get a rebate
of the 16.5 percent wholesale tax levied on imported inputs. Foreign as
well as domestic companies are eligible for these rebates. Exporters of
selected agricultural products--including coffee, cocoa, some fruits
and certain seafood products--receive a tax credit equal to 10 percent
of the export's FOB value.
8. Protection of U.S. Intellectual Property
Venezuela belongs to the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the
World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO). It is also a signatory
to the Paris Convention, Berne Convention, Rome Convention, Phonograms
Convention, and the Universal Copyright Convention. In 1999, the U.S.
Trade Representative maintained Venezuela on the ``Special 301'' Watch
List because it does not yet provide adequate and effective protection
of intellectual property rights (IPR).
Although Venezuela has improved its protection of intellectual
property rights over the last few years and in the Constitution draft,
U.S. companies continue to express concern about inadequacies in the
enforcement of patents, trademarks, and copyrights. The Venezuelan
court system has been an unreliable means for pursuing IPR claims.
In July 1996, the government took a significant step forward in
improving enforcement by forming a special anti-piracy unit (COMANPI)
to enforce copyright law, including efforts to counter the piracy of
satellite signals and cable television. In 1998, COMANPI expanded its
mandate to include enforcement of patents and trademarks. In March
1997, the government created a new Intellectual Property and Trademark
Office (SAPI) by merging the existing Industrial Property Office
(SARPI) with the National Copyright Office. SAPI became operational on
May 1, 1998. In general, SAPI has been active in enforcing IPR
standards. The organization remains overstretched, however, with
significant technical limitations and a large backlog of cases. SAPI's
most recent Director General, Thaimy Marquez, who was appointed in May
1999, has instituted an ambitious program to modernize the
organization's computer database with a loan from the World Bank.
Patents: Andean Community Decisions 344 and 345, which took effect
in 1994, are comprehensive and offer a significant improvement over the
previous standards of protection for patents and trademarks provided by
Venezuela's 1955 Industrial Property Law. However, the CAN Decisions
are not yet fully TRIPS consistent. For example, they deny
pharmaceutical patent protection for medicines registered on the World
Health Organization's list of essential drugs. Furthermore, they lack
provisions concerning transitional (``pipeline'') protection and
protection from parallel imports. The decisions also do not contain
provisions for enforcing intellectual property rights.
This legislation is now being updated, both in Venezuela and in the
CAN. In the fall of 1999, the Venezuelan Congress was working on a
TRIPS-consistent draft law to replace the 1955 Industrial Property Law.
If all goes according to plan, Congress will complete this work before
the WTO's January 1, 2000, deadline. Venezuela has also been a leader
among the Andean countries in the process to modify Decision 344 to
make it consistent with the WTO TRIPs Agreement.
Trademarks: Decision 344 improves protection for famous trademarks,
prohibits the coexistence of similar marks, and provides for the
cancellation of trademark registrations based on ``bad faith.''
However, problems remain with Venezuela's trademark application
process. Current procedures enable local pirates to produce and sell
counterfeit products even after the genuine owners of those trademarks
have undertaken (often lengthy) legal proceedings against the pirates.
Trademark piracy is common in the clothing, toy, and sporting goods
sectors. Enforcement remains inadequate. U.S. food distributor Sysco
Corporation, Reebok Shoes, and Home Depot are all examples of U.S.
companies now engaged in litigation to gain exclusive rights to the use
of their trademarks in Venezuela.
Copyrights: Andean Community Decision 351 and Venezuela's 1993
Copyright Law are modern and comprehensive and have substantially
improved protection of copyrighted products in Venezuela. The Copyright
Law extended protection to a wide range of creative works, including
computer software, satellite signals, and cable television. Despite
consistent action on the part of COMANPI, computer software and video
piracy are still common.
New Technologies: Decision 351 and Venezuela's Copyright Law
protect an array of creative activities in the computer and
broadcasting fields. Nevertheless, Decision 344 excludes diagnostic
procedures, animals, experiments with genetic material obtained from
humans, and many natural products from patent protection. However, it
does contain provisions for the protection of industrial secrets.
9. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association: Both the 1961 Constitution and local
labor law recognize and encourage the right of unions to organize. The
comprehensive 1990 Labor Code extends to all private sector and public
sector employees (except members of the armed forces) the right to form
and join unions of their choosing. One major union umbrella
organization, the Venezuelan Confederation of Workers (CTV), three
smaller unions affiliated with CTV, and a number of independent unions
all operate freely. About 25 percent of the national labor force is
unionized.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively: The Labor Code
protects and encourages collective bargaining, which is freely
practiced. Employers must negotiate a collective contract with the
union that represents the majority of their workers in a given
enterprise. The labor code also contains a provision stating that wages
may be raised by administrative decree, provided that Congress approves
the decree. The law prohibits employers from interfering with the
formation of unions or with their activities and from stipulating as a
condition of employment that new workers must abstain from union
activity or that they must join a specified union.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor: The Labor Code states
that no one may ``obligate others to work against their will.''
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children: The Labor Code allows
children between the ages of 12 and 14 years to work only if the
National Institute for Minors or the Labor Ministry grants special
permission. However, children between the ages of 14 and 16 need only
the permission of their legal guardians. Minors may not work in mines
or smelters, in occupations ``that risk life or health,'' in jobs that
could damage their intellectual or moral development, or in ``public
spectacles.'' Those under 16 years of age cannot work more than six
hours a day or 30 hours a week. Minors under the age of 18 years may
work only between 6 a.m. and 7 p.m.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work: Effective May 1999, the monthly
minimum wage for the private sector is $190 (BS 120,000) for urban
workers and $170 (BS 108,000) for rural workers. The law excludes only
domestic workers and concierges from coverage under the minimum wage
decrees. The Ministry of Labor enforces minimum wage rates effectively
in the formal sector of the economy, but generally does not enforce
them in the informal sector. The new Constitution (subject to approval
by referendum on December 15, 1999) would reduce the standard workweek
to a maximum of 40 hours and requiring ``two complete days of rest each
week.'' The code also states that employers are obligated to pay
specific amounts (up to a maximum of 25 times the minimum monthly
salary) to workers for accidents or occupational illnesses, regardless
of who is responsible for the injury.
In a statute passed in 1998, employers with fifty or more employees
must now provide workers who earn less than twice the minimum wage
(about $350 a month) with a meal during each work shift. Employers can
do this by providing their own canteen, contracting with a food service
or distributing lunch tickets that workers can redeem at food
establishments.
f. Rights in Sectors with U.S. Investment: People who work in
sectors that receive high levels of U.S. investment receive the same
protection as other workers. The wages and working conditions for those
in U.S.-affiliated industries are better than average in the majority
of cases.
Extent of U.S. Investment in Selected Industries--U.S. Direct Investment Position Abroad on an Historical Cost
Basis--1998
[Millions of U.S. Dollars]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Category Amount
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Petroleum...................... .............. 1,516
Total Manufacturing............ .............. 1,856
Food & Kindred Products...... 536 ...............................................................
Chemicals & Allied Products.. 192 ...............................................................
Primary & Fabricated Metals.. 124 ...............................................................
Industrial Machinery and 26 ...............................................................
Equipment.
Electric & Electronic 81 ...............................................................
Equipment.
Transportation Equipment..... 369 ...............................................................
Other Manufacturing.......... 529 ...............................................................
Wholesale Trade................ .............. 230
Banking........................ .............. (\1\)
Finance/Insurance/Real Estate.. .............. 64
Services....................... .............. 153
Other Industries............... .............. (\1\)
TOTAL ALL INDUSTRIES........... .............. 5,697
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Suppressed to avoid disclosing data of individual companies.
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis.
NEAR EAST AND NORTH AFRICA
----------
ALGERIA
Key Economic Indicators
[Millions of U.S. Dollars unless otherwise indicated]
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1997 1998 \1\ 1999
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Income, Production and Employment:
Nominal GDP \2\......................... 47,100 48,300 51,400
Real GDP Growth \3\..................... 1.1 5.1 4.0
GDP by Sector: \2\
Agriculture........................... 4,497 5,756 6,171
Manufacturing......................... 4,405 4,765 5,129
Construction.......................... 4,616 4,731 5,028
Hydrocarbons.......................... 13,717 10,700 12,042
Services.............................. 10,771 11,794 12,707
Government............................ 8,922 9,670 10,323
Real Per Capita GDP (US$)............... 1,596 1,610 1,620
Labor Force (millions).................. 8.07 8.10 8.3
Unemployment Rate (pct)................. 27.8 28.0 28.0
Fiscal Deficit/GDP (pct)................ 2.4 -3.50 -4.5
Money and Prices (annual percentage
growth):
Money Supply (M2)....................... 18.5 19.0 21.5
Consumer Price Index.................... 5.7 5.0 3.5
Exchange Rate (dinar/US$, annual
average)
Official \4\.......................... 57.7 59.5 65
Parallel \5\.......................... 65.0 70.0 71
Balance of Payments and Trade:
Total Exports........................... 14,640 10,213 12,100
Oil/Gas............................... 13,700 10,100 11,000
Exports to U.S.\6\.................... 2,439 1,656 1,775
Total Imports CIF....................... 10,190 9,403 9,900
Imports from U.S.\6\.................. 695 713 905
Trade Balance........................... 4,450 1,500 1,200
Balance with U.S...................... 1,744 953 870
Current Account Deficit/GDP (pct)....... 6.45 -1.00 -1.6
External Public Debt.................... 31,050 30,261 28,960
Debt Service/GDP (pct).................. 8.9 11.1 11.3
Gold and Foreign Exchange Reserves...... 8,500 8,300 6,510
Aid from U.S.\7\........................ 156 209 325
Aid from All Sources \8\................ 392 N/A N/A
------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Embassy estimates based on partial data furnished by Algeria's
Central Bank.
\2\ GDP at current market price.
\3\ Percentage changes calculated in local currency.
\4\ Bank of Algeria and embassy estimate.
\5\ Embassy estimates.
\6\ 1999 data, based upon 9 month statistics.
\7\ In thousands of dollars, IMET and USIA exchanges.
1. General Policy Framework
The Algerian market offers significant commercial opportunities to
U.S. exporters and investors. Algeria has large proven oil and gas
reserves with the potential for additional discoveries. U.S. technology
and expertise are highly prized as a means to explore and exploit these
resources. The hydrocarbon sector is the largest market for U.S.
exports. However, Algeria is the world's fifth largest importer of
wheat and Algeria is projected to import some $2.4 billion in
foodstuffs in the year 2000. Other sectors where there is a strong
potential demand for U.S. goods and services in Algeria include
housing, consumer products, water projects, and telecommunications.
Total Algerian imports in the year 2000 are expected to reach almost
$10 billion. There are pressures for the government to deregulate the
trade sector. According to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), total
foreign exchange reserves peaked at $8.6 billion in March 1998. Current
estimates are that reserves will fall to $5-6 billion by year-end 1999.
However, with past debt rescheduling completed and steady energy
exports, there is little danger of financial shortcomings. Algeria has
a growing population, its infrastructure needs renovation, and there is
a critical housing shortage. Over the medium and long term, Algeria
should be a large, growing market for U.S. exports.
U.S. exports to Algeria rose about 7 percent in 1999 relative to
the level of the year before. U.S. agricultural exports to will
increase in 1999-2000 due to a drought which will require additional
wheat imports. The Algerians have requested a program of agricultural
credits for 1999-2000. The World Bank plans to offer loans for housing,
water and sewage, and urban transport.
The 1998 government budget was the first one in four years not
subject to the constraints of an IMF structural adjustment program. The
government loosened the tight fiscal policy it has been pursuing in
conjunction with the IMF-backed program. The drop in oil prices in
early 1999 forced a revision of projected revenue and cuts in spending
plans. The rebound of oil prices later in 1999 allowed some leeway in
spending plans.
The instruments of monetary policy in Algeria are limited. The Bank
of Algeria controls monetary growth primarily via bank lending limits.
Interest rates are set weekly by a government board. In late 1999, the
central bank rediscount rate stood at 8.5 percent and commercial bank
lending rates ranged between 8.5 and 10 percent. To finance government
deficit spending, the government sells bonds on the primary market to
Algerian customers. In 1998, for the first time the central bank opened
a secondary market for government debt.
Still, the lack of a modern financial services sector restricts
growth of the private sector and is an impediment to foreign investment
in Algeria. Reform efforts in the state-owned banking sector overall
have progressed slowly. In the emerging private banking sector, private
banks began operations in Algeria during 1998, including one U.S.-based
bank. In late 1999 a major French financial institution announced plans
to open an office in Algiers. The Algerian Government is also backing
development of primary and secondary housing mortgage loan markets.
2. Exchange Rate Policy
With hydrocarbon exports making up well over 90 percent of exports
earnings, the price of oil is the major determinant of the exchange
rate. A government board implements a managed float system for the
dinar, which is convertible for all current account transactions.
Private and public importers may buy foreign exchange from five
commercial banks for commercial transactions provided they can pay for
hard currency in dinars. Although commercial banks may buy foreign
exchange from the Bank of Algeria at regular weekly auctions, at which
they set the dinar's exchange rate, they are no longer required to
surrender to the Bank of Algeria the foreign exchange they acquire and
may trade these resources among themselves. However, since the central
bank buys the foreign hydrocarbon export proceeds of the national oil
company, SONATRACH, the bank plays the dominant role in the foreign
exchange market. The primary objective of its intervention policy is to
avoid sharp fluctuations in the exchange rate.
3. Structural Policy
The government has changed major aspects of its regulatory pricing,
and tax policies as part of its overall structural adjustment program
during the past five years. It has loosened its tight hold on state-
owned company purchase, production, and pricing decisions in order to
give their managers greater autonomy. During the late spring 1997, the
government suspended its program of emergency financing for state-owned
firms that had recourse to such funding to cover overdrafts and
otherwise pay off outstanding debt. The government also pursued its
policy of eliminating subsidies. Presently subsidies exist for basic
food items (milk and wheat products), energy and public transportation.
The government has privatized or liquidated 1000 state enterprises
since 1996. In July, 1999 the Algiers Stock Exchange opened. There are
plans for additional privatization as Algeria moves away from a
socialist, centralized economy to one operating on market principles.
The government ran a budget surplus in 1997 because of increased
revenues from hydrocarbon exports, which accounted for about 60 percent
of fiscal revenues and 95 percent of export earnings during the last
two years. In 1996, the government modified its import duty schedule so
that eight different rates cover all foodstuffs, semi-finished, and
finished products, with the top rate being 45 percent in 1997. The
government reformed its tax code in 1998 to encourage business
development, cutting rates in several categories as part of the 1999
budget. The new law will reduce corporate tax rates from 38 to 30
percent, decreasing again to 18 percent if profits are re-invested in
the company. The law also excludes from taxation profits on stock and
bond sales for five years.
Algeria is not a member of the World Trade Organization, but there
is a movement to re-start stalled accession discussions. Algeria is
hopes to begin formal negotiations in mid-2000 for an association
agreement with the European Union.
4. Debt Management Policies
At the end of 1998 total medium and long-term debt stood at $30.26
billion. From 1994-1998 Algeria rescheduled some $10.48 billion of
external debt. In May 1999, Algeria received a $300-million CCFF
(``Compensatory and Contingency Financing Facility'') credit from the
IMF and balance of payments support from the Arab Monetary Fund to help
offset any negative impact of the fall in oil prices. Payment in 1998
of principal and interest on the debt that had been rescheduled totaled
$5.21 billion. The amounts for 1999-2001 are $5.81 billion, $4.20
billion, and $4.13 billion, respectively. The share of export earnings
spent on debt service payments in 1999 remained around 47 percent, the
same as 1998. The debt service/exports ratio is expected to drop to 42
percent in 2000.
In order to meet debt service and support an increase in the real
output of goods and services, the government is counting both on
hydrocarbon export revenues to recover and on a substantial rise in
non-hydrocarbon export revenues in the coming years. On the former
point, in 1999 the Algerian economy remained sensitive to fluctuations
in oil prices. Exports of non-hydrocarbon exports are expected to rise
in the coming years.
The central bank is estimating that the growth of Algeria's Gross
Domestic Product (GDP) in volume terms will be about 5 percent per
annum during the next three years (2000-2002). Based on the assumption
that the average price of oil being $15 per barrel, the government
assumes that Algeria's balance of payments will be such during this
period that its stock of outstanding debt will decline by more than
$3.82 billion between 1997 and 2003 (from $31.1 billion to $27.28
billion). Under these assumptions, outstanding debt as a proportion of
GDP will decline from 66.4 percent to 45.6 percent by the end of the
period.
5. Significant Barriers to U.S. Exports
Algeria has largely deregulated its merchandise trade regime.
Import licenses are no longer required. The only imports subject to
restrictions are firearms, explosives, narcotics, and pork products,
which are prohibited for security or religious reasons. The government
insists on particular testing, labeling, or certification requirements
being met, however. The Ministry of Health requires distributors to
obtain authorizations to sell imported drugs, which must have been
marketed in their country of origin, as well as in a third country,
before they may be imported. Government regulations stipulate that
imported products, particularly consumer goods, must be labeled in
Arabic. This regulation is enforced. It is helpful to label products in
French. Food products when they arrive in Algeria must have at least 80
percent of their shelf life remaining. Algeria's customs administration
has simplified import clearance procedures, but the process remains
time-consuming and the source of many complaints. The banking system is
inefficient and the telecommunication system is not up to modern
standards and capabilities. Licenses to offer Internet access have been
granted to private firms, but overall access to the Internet and the
use of e-commerce is weak.
The government has deregulated some service sectors, notably
insurance and banking. Air couriers are allowed to operate in Algeria
subject to approval of the Algerian Ministry of Post and
Telecommunications (PTT). DHL offers service in several Algerian
cities. Although the PTT has a monopoly on all telecommunications
services, it permits the local production, importation, and
distribution of telecommunications equipment. A second cellular license
is expected to be offered in 2000.
There are no absolute barriers to or limitations on foreign
investment in Algeria. The 1991 Hydrocarbons Sector Law and the 1991
Mining Law, revised in 1999 to permit majority foreign ownership of
mining enterprises, govern investments in these two local sectors.
Production sharing agreements are routine and comply with international
oil business norms.
The Algerian Government's procurement practices do not adversely
affect U.S. exports. Algeria participates officially in the Arab League
boycott against Israel, but no U.S. firms have been disadvantaged by
Algeria's policy in this regard.
6. Export Subsidies Policies
About 95 percent of Algeria's export revenues are derived from oil
and natural gas exports. The government does not provide direct
subsidies for hydrocarbon or non-hydrocarbon exports. The government
reactivated a non-hydrocarbon exports insurance and guarantee program
in 1996, but it has had little effect. Almost all export restrictions
have been removed, the exceptions being palm seedlings, sheep, and
artifacts of historical and archaeological significance.
7. Protection of U.S. Intellectual Property
Algeria is a member of the Paris Industrial Property Convention and
the 1952 Convention on Copyrights. Algerian legislation protects
intellectual property in principle but its enforcement is less than
complete.
Patents are protected by the law of December 7, 1993 and
administered by the Institut Algerien De Normalisation Et De Propriete
Industrielle (INAPI). Patents are granted for 20 years from the date
the patent request is filed and are available for all areas of
technology.
The laws of March 19, 1966 and of July 16, 1976 afford trademark
protection. In 1986, authority for the granting and enforcement of
trademark protection was transferred from INAPI to the Centre National
Du Registre Du Commerce (CNRC).
A 1973 law provides copyright protection for books, plays, musical
compositions, films, paintings, sculpture, and photographs. The law
also grants the author the right to control the commercial exploitation
or marketing of the above products. The 1973 law is being amended to
include protection for (among other things) videos and radio programs.
Algeria's intellectual property practices have had a minimally
adverse affect on U.S. trade.
8. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association: Workers may form and be represented by
trade unions of their choice. Government approval for the creation of a
union is required. Unions may not affiliate with political parties or
receive funds from abroad, and the government may suspend a union's
activities if it violates the law. Unions may form and join federations
or confederations, and they have affiliations with international labor
bodies.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively: A 1990 law
permits all unions to engage in collective bargaining. This right has
been freely practiced. While the law prohibits discrimination by
employers against union members and organizers, there have been
instances of retaliation against strike organizers. Unions may recruit
members at the workplace.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor: Forced or compulsory
labor has not been practiced in Algeria and is incompatible with the
constitution.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children: The minimum employment
age is 16 years and inspectors can enforce the regulation. In practice,
many children work part or full time in small private workshops and in
informal trade.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work: The 1990 law on work relations
defines the overall framework for acceptable conditions of work. The
law mandates a 40-hour work week. The government has set a guaranteed
monthly minimum wage of 6,000 Algerian Dinars ($100). A decree
regulates occupational and health standards. Work practices that are
not contrary to the regulations regarding hours, salaries, and other
work conditions are left to the discretion of employers in consultation
with employees.
f. Worker Rights in Sectors with U.S. Investment: Nearly all of the
U.S. investment in Algeria is in the hydrocarbon sector. Algerian
workers in this sector enjoy all the rights defined above. These
workers at American firms enjoy better pay and safety than do most
workers elsewhere in the economy.
Extent of U.S. Investment in Selected Industries--U.S. Direct Investment Position Abroad on an Historical Cost
Basis--1998
[Millions of U.S. Dollars]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Category Amount
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Petroleum...................... .............. 2,156
Total Manufacturing............ .............. 0
Food & Kindred Products...... 0 ...............................................................
Chemicals & Allied Products.. 0 ...............................................................
Primary & Fabricated Metals.. 0 ...............................................................
Industrial Machinery and 0 ...............................................................
Equipment.
Electric & Electronic 0 ...............................................................
Equipment.
Transportation Equipment..... 0 ...............................................................
Other Manufacturing.......... 0 ...............................................................
Wholesale Trade................ .............. 0
Banking........................ .............. 0
Finance/Insurance/Real Estate.. .............. 0
Services....................... .............. (\1\)
Other Industries............... .............. (\1\)
TOTAL ALL INDUSTRIES........... .............. 2,372
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Suppressed to avoid disclosing data of individual companies.
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis.
______
BAHRAIN
Key Economic Indicators
[Millions of U.S. Dollars unless otherwise indicated]
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1997 1998 \1\ 1999
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Income, Production and Employment:
GDP (current)........................... 6,326 6,162 6,150
Nominal GDP Growth (pct)................ 4.1 -2.6 0
GDP by Sector:
Agriculture........................... 54 56 57
Manufacturing......................... 1,177 1,035 1,050
Financial............................. 1,337 1,412 1,500
Government............................ 1,082 1,149 1,300
Per Capita GDP (US$) \2\................ 9,806 9,508 9,230
Labor Force (1,000's)................... 235 240 248
Unemployment Rate....................... 15 16 17
Money and Prices (annual percentage
growth):
Money Supply (M2)....................... 8.2 16.6 6.8
Exchange Rate (US$/BD).................. 2.65 2.65 2.65
Balance of Payments and Trade:
Total Exports FOB \3\................... 4,310 3,263 3,450
Exports to U.S........................ 126 170 235
Total Imports CIF....................... 3,857 3,554 3,000
Imports from U.S...................... 266 295 370
Trade Balance........................... 453 -291 450
Trade Balance with U.S.\4\............ -140 -125 -135
External Public Debt.................... N/A N/A N/A
Current Account Deficit/GDP (pct)....... 0 0 0
Debt Service Payments/GDP (pct)......... N/A N/A N/A
Gold and Foreign Exchange Reserves...... 1,035 1,015 1,020
Aid from U.S............................ 0 0 0
Aid from All Other Sources.............. 50.0 50.0 50.0
------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ 1999 figures are all estimates based on data available in October
1999.
\2\ Current prices, based on population projections.
\3\ Exports include transshipment, which accounts for 14 percent of non-
oil exports from Bahrain.
\4\ Figures reflect merchandise trade.
Sources: Bahrain Monetary Agency, U.S. Department of Commerce, and
Embassy estimates.
1. General Policy Framework
Although the Government of Bahrain has controlling interest in many
of the island's major industrial establishments, its overall approach
to economic policy, especially those policies that affect demand for
U.S. exports, can best be described as laissez faire. Except for
certain basic foodstuffs and petroleum products, the price of goods in
Bahrain is determined by market forces, and the importation and
distribution of foreign commodities and manufactured products is
carried out by the private sector. Owing to its historical position as
a regional trading center, Bahrain has a well developed and highly
competitive mercantile sector in which products from the entire world
are represented. Import duties are assessed at a five percent rate for
foodstuffs and non-luxuries, and a ten percent rate on most products.
Duties on automobiles, boats, alcohol, and tobacco products are
considerably higher. The Bahraini Dinar is freely convertible, and
there are no restrictions on the remittance of capital or profits.
Bahrain does not tax either individual or corporate earnings. The only
exception would be for petroleum revenues under a production-sharing
agreement.
Over the past three decades, the government has encouraged economic
diversification by investing directly in such basic industries as
aluminum smelting, petrochemicals, and ship repair, and by creating a
secure regulatory framework that has fostered Bahrain's development as
a regional financial and commercial center. Despite diversification
efforts, the oil and gas sector remains the cornerstone of the economy.
Oil and gas revenues constitute approximately 50 percent of
governmental revenues, and oil and related products account for about
80 percent of the island's exports. Bahrain's oil production amounts to
about 40,000 barrels a day (b/d), and it markets and receives oil
revenues from the 140,000 b/d produced from Saudi Arabia's Abu Sa'fa
offshore oil field.
The budgetary accounts for the central government are prepared on a
biennial basis. The budget for 1999 and 2000 was approved in December
1998. Budgetary revenues consist primarily of receipts from oil, gas,
and refinery products, supplemented by fees and charges for services,
customs duties, and investment income. Bahrain has no income taxes and
thus does not use its tax system to implement social or investment
policies. Although initial budget figures for 1999 projected a $424
million deficit--which was to be financed through the issuance of
three-month and six-month treasury bills to domestic banks--sustained
high global oil prices over the past nine months may help reduce the
deficit, possibly halving it. The government also is considering
financing its deficit through Islamic instruments.
The instruments of monetary policy available to the Bahrain
Monetary Agency (BMA) are limited. Treasury bills are used to regulate
dinar liquidity positions of the commercial banks. Liquidity to the
banks is provided now through secondary operations in treasury bills,
including: (a) discounting treasury bills; and (b) sales by banks of
bills to the BMA with a simultaneous agreement to repurchase at a later
date (``repos''). Starting in 1985, the BMA imposed a reserve
requirement on commercial banks equal to five percent of dinar
liabilities. Although the BMA has legal authority to fix interest
rates, it has not yet exercised the authority. The BMA has, however,
published recommended rates for Bahraini Dinar deposits since 1975. In
1982, the BMA instructed the commercial banks to observe a maximum
margin of one percent over their cost of funds, as determined by the
recommended deposit rates, for loans to prime customers. In August
1988, special interest rate ceilings for consumer loans were
introduced. In May 1989 the maximum prime rate was abolished, and in
February 1990, new guidelines permitting the issuance of dinar
certificates of deposit (CDs) at freely negotiated rates for any
maturity from six months to five years were published.
2. Exchange Rate Policies
Since December 1980, Bahrain has maintained a fixed relationship
between the dinar and the dollar at the rate of one dollar equals 0.377
BD. Bahrain maintains a fully open exchange system free of restrictions
on payments and transfers. There is no black market or parallel
exchange rate.
3. Structural Policies
As a member of the six-nation Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC),
Bahrain participates fully in GCC efforts to achieve greater economic
integration among its member states (Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia,
the United Arab Emirates, and Bahrain). In addition to according duty-
free treatment to imports from other GCC states, Bahrain has adopted
GCC food product labeling and automobile standards. Efforts are
underway within the GCC to enlarge the scope of cooperation in fields
such as product standards and industrial investment coordination. In
recent years, the GCC has focused its attention on negotiating a free
trade agreement with the European Union. If these negotiations are
successfully concluded, such an agreement could have a long-term
adverse impact on the competitiveness of U.S. products within the GCC,
including Bahrain.
Bahrain is an active participant in the ongoing U.S.-GCC economic
dialogue. In addition, Bahrain signed a Bilateral Investment Treaty
(BIT) with the United States in September 1999, the first Gulf state to
do so. The inaugural meeting of the Joint Economic Dialogue (JED)
between Bahrain and the United States also took place in September
1999. For the present, U.S. products and services compete on an equal
footing with those of other non-GCC foreign suppliers. Bahrain still
officially participates in the primary Arab League economic boycott
against Israel, but does not observe secondary and tertiary boycott
policies against third-country firms having economic relationships with
Israel.
With the exception of a few basic foodstuffs and petroleum product
prices, the government does not attempt to control prices on the local
market. Because most manufactured products sold in Bahrain are
imported, prices basically depend upon the source of supply, shipping
costs, and agents' markups. Commissions are capped at five percent and
are due to be phased out by 2003. Since the opening of the Saudi
Arabia-Bahrain causeway in 1985, and the 1998 revision in the Agency
Law that abolished sole agency requirements, local merchants have been
less able to maintain excessive margins and, as a consequence, prices
have tended to fall as competition has heated up somewhat. Consumer
competition is likely to increase further as the full impact of the
1998 Agency Law revision takes effect.
Bahrain is essentially tax-free. The only corporate income tax in
Bahrain potentially would be levied on oil, gas, and petroleum
producers, all of which are state-owned at this time. There is no
individual income tax, nor does the country have any value-added tax,
property tax, production tax or withholding tax. Bahrain has customs
duties and a few indirect and excise taxes, which include a tax on
gasoline, a 10 percent levy on rents paid by residential tenants, a
12.5 percent tax on office rents, and a 15 percent tax on hotel room
rates. Firms with 100 or more employees pay a training levy at the rate
of 3 percent of the payroll for expatriates and one percent for
Bahrainis.
4. Debt Management Policies
The government follows a policy of strictly limiting its official
indebtedness to foreign financial institutions. To date, it has
financed its budget deficit through local banks. In April 1998, Bahrain
launched its first bond issue--worth approximately $107 million--which
was well received. The government has no plans for a second issue at
this time. Bahrain has no International Monetary Fund or World Bank
programs.
5. Aid
Bahrain receives assistance in the form of project grants from
Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the United Arab Emirates. On April 1, 1996,
Bahrain began receiving 100 percent of the revenue from the 140,000 b/d
of oil produced from Saudi Arabia's offshore Abu Sa'fa field. This has
proved to be a major source of funding for the government's budget.
6. Significant Barriers to U.S. Exports
Standards: Processed food items imported into Bahrain are subject
to strict shelf life and labeling requirements. Pharmaceutical products
must be imported directly from a manufacturer that has a research
department and must be licensed in at least two other GCC countries,
one of which must be Saudi Arabia.
Investment: The government actively promotes foreign investment and
permits 100 percent foreign ownership of new industrial enterprises and
the establishment of representative offices or branches of foreign
companies without local sponsors. Other commercial investments are made
in partnership with a Bahraini national controlling 51 percent of the
equity. Except for citizens of Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and the United
Arab Emirates, foreign nationals must lease rather than purchase land
in Bahrain. There is, however, currently legislation under
consideration that would allow all foreigners to own property in
Bahrain. The government encourages the employment of local nationals by
setting local national employment targets in each sector and by
restricting the issuance of expatriate labor permits. Nevertheless, a
sizable expatriate labor force continues to work in Bahrain.
Government Procurement Practices: The government makes major
purchasing decisions through the tendering process. For major projects,
the Ministries of Works and Agriculture, and of Power and Water, extend
invitations to selected, pre-qualified firms. Smaller contracts are
handled by individual ministries and departments and are not subject to
pre-qualification.
Customs Procedures: The customs clearance process is used to
enforce the primary boycott of Israel, insofar as it is enforced. While
goods produced by formerly blacklisted firms may be subjected to minor
delays, the secondary and tertiary boycotts are no longer used as the
basis for denying customs clearance, and the process of removing firms
from the blacklist has become routine, upon application by the subject
firm. In addition, Bahraini customs protects against the import of
pirated goods and enforces the Commercial Agencies Law. Goods
manufactured by a firm with a registered agent in Bahrain may be
imported by that firm's agents or, if by a third party, upon payment of
a commission to the registered agent. This arrangement is being phased
out (see above).
7. Export Subsidies Policies
The government provides indirect export subsidies in the form of
preferential rates for electricity, water, and natural gas to selected
industrial establishments. The government also permits the duty-free
importation of raw material inputs for incorporation into products for
export and the duty-free importation of equipment and machinery for
newly established export industries. The government does not target
subsidies to small businesses.
8. Protection of U.S. Intellectual Property
Bahrain is a signatory of the GATT Uruguay Round and World Trade
Organization (WTO) agreements, including the Agreement on Trade-Related
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs), and is obligated to
bring its laws and enforcement efforts into TRIPs compliance by January
1, 2000. In February 1995, Bahrain joined the World Intellectual
Property Organization (WIPO), and it signed the Berne Convention for
the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, and the Paris Convention
for the Protection of Industrial Property on October 29, 1996.
In April 1999, Bahrain became the first country in the Middle East
to be removed from the U.S. Special 301 ``Watch List'' in recognition
of its significant progress in providing adequate and effective
enforcement of IP laws and regulations relating to copyrighted and
trademarked goods. The government's copyright, patent, and trademark
laws are being amended to become fully TRIPs-compliant by January 1,
2000.
9. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association: The partially suspended 1973
constitution recognizes the right of workers to organize, but western-
style trade unions do not exist in Bahrain, and the government does not
encourage their formation. Article 27 of Bahrain's Constitution states:
``Freedom to form associations and trade unions on national bases and
for lawful objectives and by peaceful means shall be guaranteed in
accordance with the conditions and in the manner prescribed by the law.
No person shall be compelled to join or remain in any association or
union.''
In response to labor unrest in the mid-1950's and in 1965 and 1974,
the government passed a series of labor regulations that, among other
things, allows the formation of elected workers' committees in larger
Bahraini companies. Worker representation in Bahrain today is based on
a system of Joint Labor-Management Committees (JLCs) established by
ministerial decree. Between 1981 and 1984, 12 JLCs were established in
the major state-owned industries. In 1994, four new JLCs were
established in the private sector, including one in a major hotel. In
September 1998, three more JLCs were created, bringing the total number
in Bahrain to nineteen.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively: Bahrain's Labor
Law neither grants nor denies workers the right to organize and bargain
collectively. While the JLCs described above are empowered to discuss
labor disputes, organize workers' services, and discuss wages, working
conditions, and productivity, the workers have no independent,
recognized vehicle for representing their interests on these or other
labor-related issues.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor: Forced or compulsory
labor is prohibited in Bahrain, and the Labor Ministry is charged with
enforcing the law. The press often performs an ombudsman function on
labor problems, reporting instances in which private sector employers
occasionally compelled foreign workers from developing countries to
perform work not specified in their contracts, as well as Labor
Ministry responses. Once a worker has lodged a complaint, the Labor
Ministry opens an investigation and takes action.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children: The minimum age for
employment is 14. Juveniles between the ages of 14 and 16 may not be
employed in hazardous conditions or at night, and may not work over six
hours per day or on a piecework basis. Child labor laws are effectively
enforced by Labor Ministry inspectors in the industrial sector; child
labor outside that sector is less well monitored, but it is not
believed to be significant outside family-operated businesses.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work: Minimum wage scales, set by
government decree, exist for employees and generally afford a decent
standard of living for workers and their families. The current minimum
wage is $398 (150 BD) a month and may be increased, at least in select
sectors such as tourism, to $451 (BD 170) a month. Wages in the private
sector are determined on a contract basis. For foreign workers,
employers consider benefits such as annual trips home, housing, and
education bonuses part of the salary.
Bahrain's Labor Law mandates acceptable working conditions for all
adult workers, including adequate standards regarding hours of work
(maximum 48 hours per week) and occupational safety and health.
Complaints brought before the Labor Ministry that cannot be settled
through arbitration must, by law, be referred to the Fourth High Court
(Labor) within 15 days. In practice, most employers prefer to settle
such disputes through arbitration, particularly since the court and
labor law are generally considered to favor the worker.
f. Rights in Sectors with U.S. Investment: The company law does not
discriminate at all against foreign-owned companies and is in the
process of being liberalized further. Workers at all companies with
U.S. investment enjoy the same rights and conditions as other workers
in Bahrain.
Extent of U.S. Investment in Selected Industries--U.S. Direct Investment Position Abroad on an Historical Cost
Basis--1998
[Millions of U.S. Dollars]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Category Amount
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Petroleum...................... .............. (\1\)
Total Manufacturing............ .............. -5
Food & Kindred Products...... (\1\) ...............................................................
Chemicals & Allied Products.. 0 ...............................................................
Primary & Fabricated Metals.. 0 ...............................................................
Industrial Machinery and (\1\) ...............................................................
Equipment.
Electric & Electronic 0 ...............................................................
Equipment.
Transportation Equipment..... 0 ...............................................................
Other Manufacturing.......... -4 ...............................................................
Wholesale Trade................ .............. (\2\)
Banking........................ .............. -74
Finance/Insurance/Real Estate.. .............. (\1\)
Services....................... .............. (\2\)
Other Industries............... .............. (\2\)
TOTAL ALL INDUSTRIES........... .............. -139
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Suppressed to avoid disclosing data of individual companies.
\2\ Less than $500,000 (+/-).
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis.
______
EGYPT
Key Economic Indicators
[Billions of U.S. Dollars unless otherwise indicated]
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1997 1998 \1\ 1999
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Income, Production and Employment:
GDP (Current Prices)................. 76.2 83.8 89.7
Real GDP Growth (pct) \2\............ 5.3 5.7 6.0
GDP by Sector:
Agriculture........................ 17.6 17.5 17.4
Manufacturing...................... 31.8 32.2 31.5
Services........................... 42.6 42.3 43.3
Government......................... 7.8 7.8 7.9
Per Capita GDP (US$)................. 1,260 1,310 1,406
Labor Force (millions)............... 17.36 17.0 18.3
Unemployment Rate (pct).............. 8.8 8.9 8.3
Money and Prices (annual percentage
growth):
Money Supply Growth (M2)............. 15.1 12.3 11.4
Consumer Price Inflation (period 6.2 4.0 2.9
average)............................
Exchange Rate (LE/US$ annual average)
Market Rate........................ 3.39 3.39 3.396
Balance of Payments and Trade:
Total Exports FOB \3\................ 5.345 5.128 4.445
Exports to U.S.\3\................. 0.694 0.698 \5\ 0.660
Total Imports FOB \3\................ 15.565 16.899 16.969
Imports from U.S.\3\............... 3.840 3.060 \5\ 3.000
Trade Balance\3\..................... -10.2 -11.7 -12.5
Balance with U.S................... -3.146 -2.361 \5\ -2.36
0
External Public Debt................. 28.8 28.1 28.2
Fiscal Balance/GDP (pct)............. -0.9 -1.0 -1.3
Current Account Balance/GDP (pct).... 0.7 -3.4 -1.9
Debt Service Payments Ratio \4\...... 16.0 13.0 11.0
Gold and Foreign Exchange Reserves... 20.2 20.3 18.0
Aid from U.S......................... 2.115 2.115 2.075
------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Statistics are based on Egypt's fiscal year starting July 1 and
ending June 30.
\2\ Percentage changes calculated in local currency.
\3\ Merchandise trade.
\4\ Ratio of external debt service to current account receipts.
\5\ Estimates.
1. General Policy Framework
Egypt, with a population of 67 million and a per capita income of
USD 1,400, is a large developing country. Its market economy is
segmented into the state sector (estimated at 30 percent of GDP), and
the private sector (70 percent of GDP). The Ministry of Finance
estimates the informal sector is equivalent to 25 percent of the GDP.
Foreign assistance has funded a significant portion of Egypt's
infrastructure development. The role of private investment in key
infrastructure areas has increased over the last year.
Egypt's economic stabilization program that started in 1991 has
improved most macroeconomic and trade indicators. Since 1991, real GDP
growth has increased from 2 percent to 5 percent. Inflation decreased
from 20 to 3 percent, foreign currency reserves increased from 7 to 17
billion dollars and the budget deficit decreased from 17 to around 1
percent of GDP. Tariff protection has been reduced with most favored
nation (MFN) duties, which averaged 42 percent in 1991 now averaging 27
percent. Most non-tariff barriers have been removed.
Services make up the largest and fastest growing sector of the
Egyptian economy, accounting for 58 percent of GDP (including
government services). Tourism, the Suez Canal, trade, and banking are
the largest service sub-sectors. Egypt exports primarily petroleum,
light manufactures (textiles) and agricultural products, it imports
machinery, refined oil products, and food products. Since 1995 Egypt's
exports have remained at around 5 billion dollars while imports
increased from 13 to 17 billion dollars.
In 1997 and 1998 Egypt's key sources of foreign exchange (tourism,
Suez Canal receipts, worker remittance and petroleum exports) suffered
external shocks. As a result Egypt's current account went from a small
surplus to a 2.5 billion-dollar deficit. The decline in foreign
exchange earnings may have played a role in the government's decision
to issue a trade decree in November 1998, requiring that consumer goods
be imported directly from the country of origin. In November 1999, the
GOE amended this trade measure thus allowing consumer goods to be
sourced from manufacturers' regional branches or distribution centers
and easing standards for providing the origin of goods. In 1999 some of
the sources of foreign exchange earnings started to recover with
tourist visitor numbers at record levels, Suez Canal receipts
stabilizing and petroleum prices rising.
The GOE's expenditures were around 22 billion dollars in FY 1998/
99, some 29 percent of GDP, with the fiscal deficit around 1 percent of
GDP. The deficit was financed through issuance of government securities
and foreign assistance. Fiscal revenues are mainly comprised of tax
revenue, including income tax receipts and customs tariffs. Egypt has
plans to widen the base of the sales tax by including wholesale and
retail trade, although implementation has been delayed. Delays in
completing tax reform may have wider implications for further
reductions in tariffs, given the importance of customs revenues in
overall government revenue.
The GOE enacted Law 8 in 1997 to facilitate foreign investment by
creating a unified and clear package of guarantees and incentives.
Increasing the transparency of government regulations and strengthening
intellectual property rights protection would encourage further foreign
investment.
The Central Bank of Egypt consults with the ministry of finance and
the ministry of economy and foreign trade, but it is an autonomous body
and bears the ultimate responsibility for defining Egypt's monetary
policy. Historically movements in treasury bill rates have provided a
better indication of central bank policy than the discount rate.
In October 1999 President Mubarak appointed a new cabinet which has
provided new impetus to Egypt's economic reform program. The new Prime
Minister Atef Ebeid, who was previously in charge of the privatization
program, is expected to increase the momentum of privatization. The
merger of the ministry of economy with foreign trade under Youssef
Boutros Ghali is likely to have a similar effect on trade and
investment.
2. Exchange Rate Policy
Law 38 of 1994 and the executive regulations issued under
Ministerial Decree 331 of 1994 regulate foreign exchange operations in
Egypt. Responsibility for exchange rate policy lies with the government
of Egypt and is administered by the Central Bank of Egypt in
consultation with the minister of economy and foreign trade.
Central bank foreign exchange reserves stood at 17.4 billion
dollars in August 1999. The GOE notes officially that the free market
guides the rates of exchange set by the Central Bank of Egypt, other
approved banks, and dealers. However, the central bank appears to
actively monitor the exchange rate in order to assure the Egyptian
pound's stability. According to the Central Bank of Egypt, the value of
the Egyptian pound averaged around le 3.39 per USD in 1999. Rates
offered by major commercial banks reflected only a modest spread over
this average, in the range of 3.4 to 3.41 LE/USD. The rates offered by
bureau of exchange, which account for approximately 6 percent to 10
percent of daily foreign exchange transactions, ranged up to 3 percent
above the standard commercial rate.
The intervention currency is the U.S. dollar. There are no exchange
or currency controls and foreign currency transfers are in principle
unrestricted. In the last year, however, firms reported frequent delays
in the processing of their requests to convert Egyptian pounds to
foreign currency. Exports in recent years may have been affected by the
real appreciation of the Egyptian pound since economic reform was
initiated in 1991.
3. Structural Policies
In general, prices for most products are market based, although the
GOE provides direct and indirect subsidies on key consumer goods to
benefit Egypt's poor (including bread, which stimulates the demand for
U.S. wheat). Pharmaceutical prices are set by the Ministry of Health.
Railway fares, electricity, petroleum products and natural gas prices
are gradually being deregulated to reflect actual costs.
Under its trade liberalization program and in accordance with its
WTO obligations, Egypt has made progress in reducing its tariffs. The
maximum rate for WTO-bound tariffs was recently reduced from 50 percent
to 40 percent. Many cases of high tariffs persist, however, such as
those affecting the import of automobiles, automobile spare parts and
U.S. poultry products. Egypt does not maintain export quotes or require
pre-approval for imports. It is in the process of implementing the
harmonized system of classification. Although the government recognizes
the need to eliminate procedural barriers to trade, businesses report
that red tape and cumbersome bureaucracy remain significant problems.
The GOE instituted a general sales tax (GST) in 1991 and is now
moving towards adoption of a value-added tax. Since 1991 taxes on
certain consumer goods not covered by the GST (alcoholic and soft
drinks, tobacco and petroleum products) were raised and converted to ad
valorem taxes (VAT). Other reforms included lowering marginal tax
rates, simplifying the tax rate structure, and improving administration
of tax policy. Despite such efforts, businesses consistently note the
need for reform and modernization of Egypt's tax system, describing its
current administration as cumbersome and frequently unpredictable.
4. Debt Management Policies
In early 1991, official creditors in the Paris club agreed to
reduce by 50 percent the net present value of Egypt's official debt,
phased in three tranches of 15, 15 and 20 percent. The IMF conditioned
release of the three tranches on successful review of Egypt's reform
program. At about the same time, the United States forgave USD 6.8
billion of high-interest military debt. As a result, Egypt's total
outstanding debt has declined to about USD 28 billion, and the debt
service ratio fell from nearly 50 percent in 1988 to 13 percent in
1997/98.
In 1996, Egypt began a new round of discussions with the IMF. In
October 1996, the two sides agreed to an ambitious package of
structural reform measures through 1998, and the IMF approved a USD 291
million precautionary stand-by agreement for Egypt. This agreement
paved the way for the release of the final USD 4.2 billion tranche of
Paris club relief, reducing Egypt's annual debt servicing burden by USD
350 million. In September 1998, Egypt declared that it would not sign a
third program with the IMF. The relationship with the fund and the GOE
has taken a consultative aspect.
5. Aid
The United States is Egypt's largest provider of foreign
assistance, having committed USD 2.1 billion in FY 2000. The assistance
package is divided into economic support funds (USD 735 million) and
military assistance (USD 1.3 billion). U.S. economic support assistance
levels to Egypt will be gradually reduced over the next several years.
Both governments are committed to working together to maximize the
positive impact assistance has on Egypt's transition to a private-
sector-led, export-oriented economy. A significant portion of the funds
in both assistance categories are used by Egypt to acquire U.S. goods
and services. For example, around USD 200 million of exports were
financed in FY 1999 through USAID's commodity import program. An
additional USD 200 million was used to finance technical assistance and
services. The department of agriculture, in separate programs (GSM
102), allocated in FY 1999 about USD 200 million in U.S. exports to
Egypt.
6. Significant Barriers to U.S. Exports
Egypt became a member of the world trade organization (WTO) in June
1995. Trade would be facilitated by increased transparency and improved
notification to the WTO and major trading partners of changes the GOE
makes to bring Egypt's trade regime into WTO compliance.
Import Barriers: Egypt does not require licenses. For food and non-
food imports with a shelf life, the government mandates that they
should not exceed half the shelf life at time of entry into Egypt. The
importation of commodities manufactured using ozone-depleting chemicals
is prohibited.
Services Barriers: The Egyptian government runs many service
industries. Recent government policies allow private sector involvement
in ports, maritime activities and airports, an opening that has spurred
significant interest and activity in the private sector. Private firms
dominate advertising, services. Egypt modified laws and regulations in
accordance with its WTO financial services commitments.
Banking: Existing foreign bank branches have been permitted to
conduct local currency operations since 1993. Two U.S. bank branches
have licensed to do so. In June 1996, the parliament passed a bill
amending the banking law and allowing foreign ownership in joint
venture banks to exceed 49 percent, thus encouraging greater
competition. In another significant development, Law 155 was passed in
June 1998. It provided the constitutional basis needed to permit the
privatization of the four public sector banks. (Privatizing publicly
held banks will a complex and politically sensitive undertaking; the
government has not yet named a public-sector bank for privatization.)
In a move to eliminate a tax loophole and orient banks' portfolio
managers to more economically productive investments, the government
passed the Income Tax Law 5 of 1998. This law eliminated a loophole
that allowed banks and financial institutions to deduct interest earned
on government securities, as well as to deduct the interest paid on
funds borrowed to purchase such securities.
Securities: International brokers are permitted to operate in the
Egyptian stock market. Several U.S. and European firms have established
operations or purchased stakes in brokerage firms.
Insurance: The passage of a new insurance law in June 1998 marked a
potentially significant milestone for the sector and the national
economy. The law permits foreign insurance companies to own up to 100
percent of Egyptian insurance firms. In 1999 the GOE approved the first
application by a U.S. firm for majority ownership. Previously, foreign
ownership was restricted to a minority stake. The GOE appears more
receptive to applications to establish new operations in the relatively
undeveloped area of life insurance than in the non-life sectors. Four
public-sector companies (one of which is a reinsurance company)
dominate the insurance market. There are five private sector insurance
companies, three of which are joint ventures with U.S. firms. Two of
the joint ventures are operating in the free zones.
Telecommunications: In October 1999 a new ministry of
communications and information technology was created. The government
had previously converted a government authority into Telcom Egypt,
established a regulatory board for telecommunications and spun off
responsibility for internet, cellular telephone and pay telephone to
the private sector. In recent years Egypt's telecommunication
infrastructure has undergone extensive modernization with the addition
of five million lines. Telcom Egypt, the nation's fixed-line monopoly,
announced in November that it would cut its international long distance
rates by 25 percent. The government has indicated that it plans to sell
20 percent of Telcom Egypt in the first quarter of 2000. The mobile
system has expanded significantly in the last four years as the result
of increased GSM capacity. In 1996 a government-owned firm (Arento) was
created with an initial GSM capacity of 90,000 lines. The establishment
of two private sector companies in 1998 (Mobinil and Misrphone) further
boosted the GSM system by 130,000 lines. Some GOE officials have
expressed interest in the WTO basic telecommunications agreement and
the international telecommunications agreement.
Maritime and Air Transportation: Maritime transport lines and
services operated until recently as government monopolies. Law 22 of
1998 opened these areas to the private sector. This law permits the
establishment of specialized ports on a build-own-operated basis. Under
the new business environment created by Law 22, the private sector is
becoming increasingly involved in container handling. In addition,
Egypt Air's monopoly on carrying passengers has been curtailed, and
several privately owned airlines now operate regularly scheduled
domestic flights, although the national carrier remains, by far, the
dominant player in the sector. Private firms have also become active in
airport construction.
Standards, Testing, Labeling and Certification: While Egypt has
decreased tariffs and bans on the importation of many products, other
non-tariff barriers have increased. Items removed from the ban list
were added to a list of commodities requiring inspection for quality
control before customs clearance. This list now comprises 131
categories of items, including meat, fruits, vegetables, spare parts,
construction products, electronic devices, appliances, transformers,
household appliances, and many consumer goods. Agricultural commodities
have been increasingly subject to quarantine inspection, so much so
that some importers have begun arranging inspection visits in the U.S.
to facilitate Egyptian customs clearance. Product specification also
can be a barrier to trade. For example, Egyptian standard number 1522
of 1991 concerning inspection of imported frozen meat set an
unattainable maximum 7 percent content of fat. There is a lack of clear
standards for determining if processing is done according to Islamic
rule, which restricts U.S. poultry parts exports.
Imported goods must be marked and labeled in Arabic with the brand
and type of the product, country of origin, date of production and
expiry date, and any special requirements for transportation and
handling of the product. An Arabic language catalog must accompany
imported tools, machines and equipment. The government mandates that
cars imported for commercial purposes must be accompanied by a
certificate from the manufacturer stating that they are suited for
tropical climates. Many of these standards violate the WTO agreement
which prohibits ``nontechnical barriers to trade'' (NTB). Only bona
fide health and safety standards based on scientific evidence are
mandatory under WTO; all other standards must be voluntary.
Investment Barriers: The General Authority for Free Zones and
Investment (GAFI) which was placed under the Ministry of Economy and
Foreign Trade in October has sole responsibility for regulating foreign
investment. The GOE implemented Law 8 of 1997 to facilitate foreign
investment by creating a unified and clear package of guarantees and
incentives. Egypt signed a bilateral investment treaty with the United
States in an investment guarantee agreement which extends political
risk insurance (via OPIC) for American private investment. In addition,
the GOE is a signatory of the international convention for the
settlement of investment disputes.
Government Procurement: The GOE passed a new government procurement
law this year (Law 89 of 1998) in an effort to increase transparency,
assure equal opportunity among bidders and protect contractor rights.
The law mandates that: a bid may not be transformed into a tender (a
main defect of prior law dating from 1983); decisions on bids are to be
explained in writing; and more weight will be accorded to technical
considerations in awarding contracts. The law also requires the
immediate return of bid bonds and other guarantees once the tender is
awarded. Egypt is not a signatory to the WTO government procurement
agreement.
Customs Procedures: In 1993, Egypt adopted the harmonized system of
customs classification. Tariff valuation is calculated from the so-
called ``Egyptian selling price'' which is based on the commercial
invoice that accompanies a product the first time it is imported.
Customs authorities retain information from the original commercial
invoice and expect subsequent imports of the same product (regardless
of the supplier) to have a value no lower than that noted on the
invoice from the first shipment. As a result of this presumption of
increasing prices and the belief that under-invoicing is widely
practiced, customs officials routinely and arbitrarily increase invoice
values from 10-30 percent for customs valuation purposes.
Multiplication of authorities for commodity clearance and inspection
increases the complexity and costs of exporting to Egypt. As customs
procedures are becoming increasingly automated through the use of
computers, customs officials will no longer be able to exercise such
subjective judgment over valuation of imports. The WTO customs
valuation agreement comes into force for Egypt on July 1, 2000.
7. Export Subsidies
At present Egypt has no direct export subsidies. Certain exporting
industries may benefit from duty exemptions on imported inputs (if
released under the temporary release system) or receive rebates on
duties paid on imported inputs at the time of export of the final
product (if released under the drawback system). Under its commitments
to the World Bank, the Egyptian government has increased energy and
cotton procurement prices and has abolished privileges enjoyed by
public sector enterprises (subsidized inputs, credit facilities,
reduced energy prices and preferential custom rates), thus reducing the
indirect subsidization of exports.
8. Protection of U.S. Intellectual Property
Watch List Designation: Due primarily to exclusion of
pharmaceutical products from patentability the United States Trade
Representative placed Egypt on a ``priority watch list'' in April 1997,
and retained this designation in 1998 and 1999. Egypt is a signatory to
the GATT TRIPs agreement, the Bern Copyright Convention, the Paris
Patent Convention, the Paris Convention for Protection of Industrial
Property of 1883, the Madrid Convention of 1954, and the Nice
Convention for the Classification of Goods and Services. The GOE has
several WTO TRIPs obligations that came into force on January 1, 2000.
Patents: The existing Egyptian patent law (Law 132 of 1949)
provides protection below international standards. It contains overly
broad compulsory licensing provisions and excludes from patentability
substances prepared or produced by chemical processes if such products
are intended for food or medicine. The patent term is 15 years from the
application filing date, compared with the international standards of
20 years. A 5-year renewal may be obtained only if the invention is of
special importance and has not been adequately worked to compensate
patent holders for their efforts and expenses. Compulsory licenses,
which limit the effectiveness of patent protection, are granted if a
patent is not worked in Egypt within three years or is worked
inadequately.
Egypt has drafted, but not passed, legislation designed to improve
patent protection by providing product versus process patents,
increasing the protection period to 20 years, and offering fair
prerequisites for compulsory licensing. However, the government may opt
to delay implementation of the legislation, once passed, to take
advantage of the transition period through 2005 granted to certain
developing countries under the WTO TRIPs agreement.
Copyrights: Egypt has strengthened since 1997 the enforcement of
copyright protection laws already on the books, although enforcement
remains erratic and inadequate. Law 29 of 1994 amended the copyright
law (Law 38 of 1992) to ensure that computer software was afforded
protection as a literary work, allowing it a 50-year protection term.
Law 38 of 1992, an amendment to the out-of-date 1954 copyright law,
increased penalties against piracy and provided specific protection to
computer software. A 1994 decree also clarified rental and public
performance rights, protection for sound recordings, and the definition
of personal use.
Trademarks: Egypt is considering completely revising its laws in
order to enhance significantly legal protection for trademarks and
industrial designs. The current trademark law, Law 57 of 1939, is not
enforced strenuously and the courts have only limited experience in
adjudicating infringement cases. Fines amount to less than USD 100 per
seizure, not per infringement. Judgments and enforcement must be made
separately in each of the 26 governorates.
Trade Secrets: Egypt has no specific trade secrets legislation.
Protection of commercially valuable information is possible through
contractual agreement between parties. Breach of contractual terms of
protection can be remedied in legal proceedings under either the civil
or criminal code, depending on the severity of the damage caused.
Semiconductor Chip Layout Design: There is no separate legislation
protecting semiconductor chip layout design, although Egypt signed the
Washington semiconductor convention.
9. Worker Rights
a. Rights of Association: Egyptian workers may, but are not
required to join trade unions. A union local or worker's committee can
be formed if 50 employees express a desire to organize. Most members
(about 27 percent of the labor force) are employed by state-owned
enterprises. There are 23 industrial unions, all required to belong to
the Egyptian Trade Union Federation (ETUF), the sole legally recognized
labor federation. The ETUF, although semiautonomous, maintains close
ties with the governing National Democratic Party. Despite the ETUF
leadership assertion that it actively promotes worker interests, it
generally avoids public challenges to government policies.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively: The proposed new
labor law which remains pending from the last legislative session
provides statutory authorization for collective bargaining and the
right to strike, rights which are not now adequately guaranteed. Under
the current law, unions may negotiate work contracts with public sector
enterprises if the latter agree to such negotiations, but unions
otherwise lack collective bargaining power in the state sector. Under
current circumstances, collective bargaining does not exist in any
meaningful sense because the government sets wages, benefits, and job
classifications by law, allowing few issues open to negotiation. Larger
firms in the private sector generally adhere to such government-
mandated standards.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor: Forced or compulsory
labor is illegal and not practiced.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children: In March 1996, the
Egyptian parliament adopted a new ``comprehensive child law'' drafted
by the National Council for Childhood and Motherhood. The minimum age
for employment was raised from 12 to 14. Provincial governors may
authorize ``seasonal work'' for children between 12 and 14. Education
is compulsory until age 15. An employee must be at least 15 to join a
labor union. The Labor Law of 1981 states that children 14 to 15 may
work six hours a day, but not after 7 p.m. and not in dangerous
activities or activities requiring heavy work. Child workers must
obtain medical certificates and work permits before they are employed.
Recent estimates by the Egyptian government put the number of child
laborers at 1.5 percent of the total working population of 18.3
million. Local non-governmental organizations put the number of
children working at much higher, although verification is impossible.
The majority of working children (78 percent) are employed on farms.
Children also work as apprentices in auto and craft shops, in
construction, and as domestics. Most are employed in the informal
sector. The government has difficulty enforcing child labor laws due to
a shortage of inspectors. Economic pressures, rural tradition, the
inadequacy of the education system, and lack of government control in
remote areas pose significant, but not insurmountable, barriers to
addressing child labor issues in the near future.
Egypt is signatory to the 1997 Oslo Action Plan calling for the
immediate removal of children from hazardous occupations, a national
action plan to address child labor issues, and the eventual elimination
of child labor.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work: The government and public sector
minimum wage is approximately USD 31 a month for a six-day, 42-hour
workweek. Base pay is supplemented by a complex system of fringe
benefits and bonuses that may double or triple a worker's take-home
pay. The average family can survive on a worker's base pay at the
minimum wage rate. The minimum wage is also legally binding on the
private sector, and larger private companies generally observe the
requirement and pay bonuses as well. The ministry of manpower sets
worker health and safety standards, which also apply in the free trade
zones, but enforcement and inspection are uneven.
Extent of U.S. Investment in Selected Industries--U.S. Direct Investment Position Abroad on an Historical Cost
Basis--1998
[Millions of U.S. Dollars]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Category Amount
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Petroleum...................... .............. 1,423
Total Manufacturing............ .............. 435
Food & Kindred Products...... (\1\) ...............................................................
Chemicals & Allied Products.. 32 ...............................................................
Primary & Fabricated Metals.. 7 ...............................................................
Industrial Machinery and 13 ...............................................................
Equipment.
Electric & Electronic (\2\) ...............................................................
Equipment.
Transportation Equipment..... (\1\) ...............................................................
Other Manufacturing.......... (\2\) ...............................................................
Wholesale Trade................ .............. -48
Banking........................ .............. 163
Finance/Insurance/Real Estate.. .............. 0
Services....................... .............. 43
Other Industries............... .............. -60
TOTAL ALL INDUSTRIES........... .............. 1,955
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Suppressed to avoid disclosing data of individual companies.
\2\ Less than $500,00 (+/-).
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis.
______
ISRAEL
Key Economic Indicators
[Billions of U.S. Dollars unless otherwise indicated]
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1997 1998 \1\ 1999
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Income, Production and Employment:
Nominal GDP............................. 99.0 99.0 96.4
Real GDP Growth......................... 2.9 2.2 2.0
GDP by Sector:
Agriculture........................... 2.0 2.0 2.0
Manufacturing......................... 7.0 16.0 15.0
Construction.......................... 7.0 7.0 6.0
Services.............................. 40.0 43.0 43.0
Public Sector......................... 34.0 33.0 34.0
Per Capita GDP (US$).................... 17,150 16,570 15,775
Labor Force (000's) \2\................. 2,210 2,270 2,320
Unemployment Rate (pct) \2\............. 7.7 8.7 8.7
Money and Prices (annual percentage
growth):
Money Growth (M2) (pct) \3\............. 26 23 30
Consumer Inflation (pct) \3\............ 7.0 8.6 3.2
Exchange Rate (NIS/US$) \2\............. 3.45 3.80 4.20
Balance of Payments and Trade:
Total Exports FOB....................... 20.9 21.2 21.4
Exports to U.S........................ 7.3 8.3 8.5
Total Imports CIF \4\................... 28.7 27.0 29.7
Imports from U.S.\4\.................. 5.4 5.4 6.3
Trade Balance \4\....................... -7.8 -5.8 -8.3
Balance with U.S.\4\.................. 1.9 2.9 2.2
External Public Debt (gross)............ 26.2 27.4 27.5
Fiscal Deficit/GDP (pct)................ 2.8 2.4 3.2
Current Account Deficit/GDP (pct)....... 3.3 2.3 2.5
Debt Service/GDP (pct) \5\.............. 6.5 6.5 6.5
Gold and Foreign Exchange Reserves \6\.. 20.3 22.7 21.9
Aid from U.S............................ 3.1 3.0 2.9
Aid from Other Countries................ 0 0 0
------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ 1999 indicators estimated using partial-year data.
\2\ Annual average.
\3\ December to December.
\4\ Excludes defense imports.
\5\ Includes private sector debt service.
\6\ At end of year.
1. General Policy Framework
Israel is a small open economy, increasingly competitive
internationally in such high technology sectors as telecommunications,
software, pharmaceuticals, and biomedical equipment. Israel's economy
grew rapidly in the first half of the 1990s, with growth averaging six
percent annually. This expansion, during which Israel's economy grew in
real terms by a cumulative 40 percent, was stimulated by a wave of
immigration from the countries of the former Soviet Union and the
erosion of Israel's economic isolation following peace agreements
reached with Jordan and the Palestinians. Rising incomes and the needs
of the immigrants encouraged a strong upsurge in imports, including
from the United States. Merchandise imports almost doubled between 1990
and 1996, rising from $15.1 billion to $29.6 billion; imports from the
United States grew from $2.7 billion to $6.0 billion over the same
period. Export growth, although strong, did not keep pace, and the
current account deficit widened to over five percent of GDP in 1996.
Since the mid-nineties, economic growth has slowed markedly. The
economy grew only 2.2 percent in 1998 while per capita GDP fell. Growth
in 1999 is expected to be about 2 percent. The economic slowdown was
caused by a number of factors, including reduced immigration, the Asian
financial crisis and restrictive monetary and fiscal policy,
implemented to overcome the large budget deficits in the mid-90's. The
government tightened fiscal policy beginning in 1997 in order to avert
a potential crisis in Israel's balance of payments. This tightening cut
Israel's budget deficit by roughly two percent of GDP. Fiscal restraint
continued into the 1998 and 1999 budgets, but slower than expected
growth resulted in an estimated increase of the budget deficit in 1999
from 2.4 to 3.2 percent of GDP. The proposed FY 2000 budget (not yet
passed by the Knesset) calls for a budget deficit of 2.5% in 2000. The
government hopes to reduce the deficit to 1.5 percent of GDP by 2003.
Defense spending remains the largest single component of the Israeli
budget, although defense spending dropped from around 25 percent of GDP
in the early 80s to less than 10 percent of GDP in 1998. In recent
years, the most rapidly growing portions of the budget have been in the
area of social services, such as health care, education, and direct
payments to individuals and institutions. Between 1990 and 1998, for
example, education spending rose 83 percent after inflation, while
transfer payments increased by 76 percent.
Since 1994, the Bank of Israel has maintained high interest rates
in its campaign to slow inflation and to achieve eventual price
stability. Its chief policy instrument is the interest rate charged on
its ``monetary loans'' to the commercial banks; it also adjusts
domestic liquidity through purchases and sales of treasury bills, and
by adjusting the volume of its borrowings from the banks. With imports
of goods and services amounting to some 45 percent of GDP, Israel's
inflation rate is strongly influenced by exchange rate developments.
After the consumer price index had risen only 3.0 percent in the twelve
months ending in July 1998, the lowest rate of price increase recorded
since the 1960s, a sharp decline in the value of the shekel in
subsequent months gave a swift upward boost to inflation. The CPI
finished up more than 8 percent for the year. In 1999, inflation has
remained consistently low, with an inflation rate of around 3 percent
expected at the end of the year. Israel's official inflation target for
2000-2001 is 3-4 percent.
2. Exchange Rate Policy
The shekel floats within a pre-defined target zone against a basket
of currencies: the U.S. Dollar, Yen, Euro, and Pound Sterling. As a
matter of policy, the Bank of Israel does not intervene in the foreign
exchange markets as long as the shekel remains within the target zone,
although it is obligated to do so once the limits of the zone are
reached. During the first half of 1997, for example, large-scale
capital inflows caused the shekel to appreciate to the edge of its
target zone. To keep the shekel within the zone, the central bank was
forced to absorb the inflow of foreign currency and to sterilize the
effect on domestic liquidity of such purchases through increased
borrowings from the public.
Israel ended all foreign exchange controls for current transactions
in 1993. In mid-1998, at the time of its fiftieth anniversary
celebrations, Israel ended almost all of its remaining capital
controls, except for limits on Israeli institutions' foreign
investments and on access by non-Israelis to longer-term derivatives in
the domestic market.
3. Structural Policies
Over the past decade, Israel has gradually reduced the degree of
government involvement in and control over the economy while increasing
the influence of domestic and international competition. Israel signed
a Free Trade Agreement with the United States in 1985 and has similar
agreements with the EU, the EFTA, and seven other countries. Since 1991
Israel has been unilaterally reducing tariffs on imports from countries
with which it does not have trade agreements. This policy of increasing
exposure to international competition has led to a significant
restructuring of Israeli industry, causing job losses in such
traditional light manufacturing sectors as shoes and textiles.
Significant reforms with important commercial implications for U.S.
companies are being undertaken in several sectors. The most significant
progress has been made in the telecommunications sector. In 1997, two
private consortia, each with a U.S. firm as a participant, began
offering international telephone service in competition with the
established government-owned company; prices for international calls
fell by as much as 80 percent almost immediately. Further plans for
liberalization of the telecommunications sector include allowing more
cellular telephone operators (there are now three), and opening up
domestic landline service to competition.
The government raised almost $4 billion from the sale of shares in
government-owned companies and banks in 1997 and 1998. The most
important of these transactions was the sale to a U.S.-Israeli investor
group of a controlling 43-percent stake in Bank Hapoalim. Bank Hapoalim
is Israel's largest bank and has extensive holdings in Israeli
industry. The government has sold off pieces of most other Israeli
banks: it now retains majority ownership in only two of the five
largest banks. The pace of privatization slowed in 1999; receipts for
the first eight months of the year totaled under $300 million, less
than one-third of the target for the year. The next big target for
privatization is probably Bezek, the state domestic phone company.
Efforts to sell all or part of the state airline El Al have stalled; it
is unlikely that El Al will be privatized anytime soon.
The state power company, Israel Electric (IEC), dominates
electricity generation and distribution in Israel. Under current law,
independent producers can generate up to ten percent of Israel's
electricity; another ten percent of Israel's power needs could be met
by imports. Both areas could provide opportunities for U.S. companies.
Progress towards opening up the electricity market to competition,
however, has been very slow. Currently, IPPs or imports are meeting
virtually none of Israel's power needs.
4. Debt Management Policies
The gross foreign debt of the public sector totaled $27.5 billion
as of June 1999, all of it medium to long-term, and much of it
guaranteed by the U.S. Government. Israel borrowed $9.2 billion between
1993 and 1998, for example, in bonds guaranteed by the United States
intended to assist with the absorption of the immigrants from the
former Soviet Union. The external liabilities of the banking system and
non-financial public sector brought Israel's total gross foreign debt
to $56 billion as of mid-1999. After netting out foreign assets of
$44.3 billion, the country's net debt stood at $11.7 billion.
Anticipating the end of the U.S. loan guarantee program, the
government began in 1995 to tap the international bond markets under
its own name. Thus far, it has made successful offerings in the U.S.,
European, and Japanese bond markets.
5. Aid
U.S. assistance to Israel for fiscal year 1999 included $1.92
billion in military aid, of which over $1.4 billion was earmarked for
procurement from the United States. U.S. aid also included economic
assistance of $960 million and various forms of support for military
R&D, notably for missile defense.
6. Significant Barriers to U.S. Exports
With the exception of some categories of agricultural produce and
processed foods, all duties on products from the United States were
eliminated under the 1985 United States-Israel Free Trade Area
Agreement (FTAA) by January 1, 1995. The FTAA liberalized and expanded
the trade of goods between the United States and Israel, and spurred
discussions on freer trade in services, including tourism,
telecommunications, and insurance.
Israel ratified the Uruguay Round Agreement on January 15, 1995.
Israel became a member of the World Trade Organization on April 21,
1995 and implemented the WTO regime on January 1, 1996.
The U.S.-Israel FTAA allows the two countries to protect sensitive
agricultural subsectors with nontariff barriers including import bans,
quotas, and fees. These limitations have been carried forward into the
WTO regime. Most quantitative limits have been translated into Tariff
Rate Quotas (TRQs), while items previously banned now bear
prohibitively high tariffs or fees that make imports of such goods
uncompetitive with domestic production. The principal U.S. goods
affected by these measures include poultry and dairy products, fish,
and most fresh produce.
In late 1996, the United States and Israel agreed on a five-year
program of agricultural market liberalization. The agreement covers all
agricultural products, and provides for increased access during each
year of the agreement via TRQs and tariff reductions. This agreement
will be renegotiated in 2000. Despite an Israeli commitment to issue
all TRQ licenses for a given year no later than October 31 of the
previous year, there continue to be substantial delays in the licensing
of U.S. products. Division of general quotas into impractically small
and non-commercial individual lots deters potential buyers from quota
utilization.
Israel has largely eliminated a unique form of protection for
locally produced goods known as ``Harama,'' meaning, ``uplift.'' This
was a 2-5 percent addition applied at the pre-duty stage to the CIF
value of goods to bring the value of the products to a supposedly
``acceptable'' level for customs valuation. Israel calculates import
value according to the Brussels Definition of Value (BDV), a method
that tolerates uplifts of invoice prices. Israel is not a signatory to
the WTO Valuation Code, although it has expressed its intention to
become one.
A second uniquely Israeli form of protection is called ``TAMA.''
TAMA is a post-duty uplift designed to convert the CIF value plus duty
to an equivalent wholesale price for purposes of imposing purchase tax.
Coefficients for calculation of the TAMA vary from industry to industry
and from product to product.
In addition, purchase taxes from 25 to 95 percent are applied to
goods ranging from automobiles to alcoholic beverages. Israel has
eliminated or reduced purchase taxes on many products, including
consumer electronics, building inputs, and office equipment. Where
remaining, purchases taxes apply to both local and foreign products.
However, when there is no local production, the purchase tax becomes a
duty-equivalent charge.
Israel has reduced the burden of some discriminatory measures
against imports. Although Israel agreed in 1990 to harmonize standards
treatment, either by dropping health and safety standards applied only
to imports or making them mandatory for all products, implementation of
this promise has been slow. Enforcement of mandatory standards on
domestic producers can be spotty, and in some cases (e.g.,
refrigerators, auto headlights, plywood, and carpets) standards are
written so that domestic goods meet requirements more easily than do
imports. In September 1998, Israel amended its packaging and labeling
requirements to allow non-metric packaging as long as information on
pricing in standard metric units is provided. This change has
facilitated the entry of U.S. food products packaged in non-metric
sizes. Israel has agreed to notify the United States of proposed new
mandatory standards to be recorded under the WTO.
The Standards Institute of Israel is proposing a bilateral Mutual
Recognition Agreement of Laboratory Accreditation with the United
States that could result in the acceptance of U.S.-developed test data
in Israel. The proposed program would eliminate the need for redundant
testing of U.S. products in Israel to ensure compliance with mandatory
product requirements. The Israeli cabinet decided in August 1999 that
official Israeli standards could incorporate in their entirety more
than one foreign standard. The government is developing implementing
regulations. Once the regulations go into effect, this has potential to
significantly reduce trade advantages enjoyed by products from the EU
over goods of U.S. origin.
The government actively solicits foreign investment, including in
the form of joint ventures, and especially in industries based on
exports, tourism, and high technology. Foreign firms are accorded
national treatment in terms of taxation and labor relations and are
eligible for incentives for investments in priority development zones
after receiving the approval of the Ministry of Industry and Trade. The
incentive program provides grants of up to twenty percent of the amount
of capital invested and tax benefits for investments in the development
priority regions. There are generally no restrictions on foreign
ownership, but a foreign-owned entity must be registered in Israel.
Profits, dividends, and rents can generally be repatriated without
difficulty through a licensed bank. Over 2000 U.S. companies have
subsidiaries or other representation in Israel, according to the
Israel-American Chamber of Commerce. Investment in regulated sectors,
including banking, insurance, and defense-related industries, requires
prior government approval.
Israel has one free trade zone, in the city of Eilat. In addition,
there are three free ports: Haifa, Ashdod, and the port of Eilat.
Enterprises in these areas may qualify for special tax benefits and are
exempt from indirect taxation.
Israel is a signatory to the Uruguay Round Procurement Code,
intended to enable more open and transparent international tendering
procedures for a wide range of government entities. However, while some
government entities notify the U.S. Government of tenders valued at
over $50,000, many do not, and the notices that are received frequently
carry short deadlines and are often only in Hebrew. Moreover, U.S.
suppliers have been locked out, to date, of Ministry of Defense food
tenders for the army and other security forces. Complex technical
specifications and kosher certification requirements discourage foreign
participation. Recently, however, there have been new efforts to
facilitate purchase of U.S. food products for the Israeli military.
The government frequently seeks offsets (subcontracts to Israeli
firms) of up to 35 percent of total contract value for purchases by
ministries, state-owned enterprises, and municipal authorities. Failure
to enter into or fulfill such industrial cooperation agreements (which
may involve investment, co-development, co-production, subcontracting,
or purchase from Israeli industry) may disadvantage a foreign company
in government awards. Although Israel pledged to relax offset requests
on civilian purchases under the FTAA, Israeli law continues to require
such offsets. Israeli Government agencies and state-owned corporations
not covered by the Uruguay Round Government Procurement Code follow the
``Buy Israel'' policy to promote national manufacturers.
Israeli law provides for a 15 percent cost preference to domestic
suppliers in many public procurement purchases, although the statute
recognizes the primacy of Israel's bilateral and multilateral
procurement commitments. The cost preference for local suppliers can
reach as high as 30 percent for firms located in Israel's priority
development areas.
In addition to its WTO multilateral trade commitments and its FTAA
with the United States, Israel also has free trade agreements with the
European Union, Canada, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Turkey, Hungary,
Poland, Slovenia, and the EFTA states. It also has a preferential trade
agreement with Jordan. With respect to all other countries, Israel has
substituted steep tariffs for nontariff barriers previously applied,
and is gradually reducing those tariffs. Israel's import liberalization
program and negotiation of new free trade agreements have diluted U.S.
advantages under the bilateral FTAA.
As part of the Middle East Peace Process, Israel has granted duty
free access to its market for 50,000 tons of fresh and processed
agricultural products from Jordan. It has also committed itself to
allowing unlimited access for agricultural produce from the Palestinian
Authority.
7. Export Subsidies Policies
The U.S.-Israeli FTAA included an agreement to phase out the
subsidy elements of export enhancement programs and to refrain from new
export subsidies. Israel has already eliminated grants, except in the
case of agricultural export and import substitution crops. In 1993,
Israel eliminated the major remaining export subsidy, an exchange rate
risk insurance scheme which paid exporters five percent on the FOB
value of merchandise. Israel still retains a mechanism to extend long-
term export credits, but the volumes involved are small, roughly $250
million. Israeli export subsidies have resulted in past U.S.
antidumping or countervailing duty cases. Israel has been a member of
the WTO/GATT Subsidies Code since 1985.
Israel's Parliament, the Knesset, passed legislation in 1994
authorizing the creation of Free Processing Zones (FPZs). Under the
terms of the law, qualifying companies operating in the FPZs would be
exempt from direct taxation for a twenty-year period, and imported
inputs would be free from import duties or tariffs. Companies in FPZs
would also be exempt from collective bargaining and minimum wage
requirements, although subject to other labor laws. The legislation was
originally intended to promote investment in export-related industries,
but the wording of the legislation as passed does not limit applicant
companies to exporters or providers of services to overseas clients.
Government ministries continue to discuss details of the FPZ's. As of
November 1999, no FPZ's had yet been established, although one had been
proposed for the Beer Sheva region.
8. Protection of U.S. Intellectual Property
Israel is a member of the World Trade Organization (WTO), and
projects that it will be in compliance with its commitments under the
Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property (TRIPS) Agreement by
January 1, 2000. Israel expects to pass legislation before the end of
1999 that will amend its patent, trademark, copyright, and other
relevant laws to bring it into compliance with TRIPS. The
pharmaceuticals industry, however, has raised questions about whether
the TRIPS implementation law will satisfy the data protection
requirements of TRIPS section 39.3. (More on pharmaceuticals below.)
The GOI is also developing an updated copyright law, which it
expects to bring to the Knesset in 2000. The proposed legislation would
include enhanced rights of distribution in connection with rental
rights and imports of copyrighted materials. Rental rights would
include all protected works, including sound recordings,
cinematographic works, and computer programs. Current Israeli patent
law contains overly broad licensing provisions concerning compulsory
issuance for dependent and nonworking patents. The government is
working on revisions of laws on patents, cable broadcasting, trademarks
and other areas.
Israel is a member of the World Intellectual Property Organization
(WIPO), and is a signatory to the Berne Convention for the Protection
of Literary and Artistic Works, the Universal Copyright Convention, the
Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, and the
Patent Cooperation Treaty. Israel is also a member of the International
Center for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) and the New
York Convention of 1958 on the recognition and enforcement of foreign
arbitral awards.
In February 1998, the Knesset passed a separate amendment to the
Patent Law which will allow non-patent holders to manufacture limited
quantities of patented pharmaceutical products prior to the expiration
of patent rights, in preparation for submitting data necessary to
obtain marketing approval to Israeli and foreign health authorities.
The amendment also provides for a limited extension of the patent term
for pharmaceutical products. The United States unsuccessfully objected
to the amendment and urged that Israel model its law on the comparable
provision of U.S. law.
Israel passed legislation early in 1999 that would weaken patent
protection by permitting parallel importation of patented
pharmaceutical products. The United States has urged Israel not to
enact the proposed legislation due to its potential adverse impact on
the rights of U.S. patent holders.
In April 1998, the U.S. Trade Representative placed Israel on the
``Special 301'' Priority Watch List due in large part to U.S. concern
over an increase in illegal copying and sale of video and audio
recordings. In June 1998, USTR submitted an ``Action Plan'' to the
Government of Israel addressing outstanding U.S. concerns, including
increasing piracy levels of cable television transmissions, audio and
videocassettes, compact disks, and computer software.
In March 1999, the GOI submitted to USTR a report on its IPR
enforcement activities and its progress in fulfilling the Action Plan.
The GOI said its accomplishments included legislation to bring Israel
into compliance with TRIPS obligations by the end of 1999,
establishment of a new police unit dedicated to combat IPR violations,
and establishment of an inter-ministerial committee under the Ministry
of Industry and Trade to monitor progress on IP enforcement.
Nevertheless, on April 30, 1999, USTR announced, based on its
special 301 review, that the GOI had made little progress in
implementing the 1998 Action Plan. As a result, USTR placed Israel on
the priority watch list. In making this announcement, USTR cited
specific concerns about:
--the inadequacy of Israel's copyright law;
--amendments to the pharmacists law that weaken patent
protection for pharmaceuticals;
--high levels of IPR piracy, particularly audio CD's;
--insufficient police and prosecutorial attention to IPR cases.
USTR will conduct a Special 301 out-of-cycle review of Israel's IPR
protection in December 1999.
9. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association: Israeli workers may join freely
established organizations of their choosing. Most unions belong to the
General Federation of Labor (Histadrut) and are independent of the
government. In 1995, Histadrut's membership dropped sharply after the
federation's links with the nation's largest health care fund were
severed. A majority of the workforce remains covered by Histadrut's
collective bargaining agreements. Non-Israeli workers, including
nonresident Palestinians from the West Bank and Gaza who work legally
in Israel, are not members of Israeli trade unions but are entitled to
some protection in organized workplaces. The right to strike is
exercised regularly. Unions freely exercise their right to form
federations and affiliate internationally.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively: Israelis fully
exercise their legal right to organize and bargain collectively. While
there is no law specifically prohibiting antiunion discrimination, the
Basic (i.e., quasi-constitutional) Law against discrimination could be
cited to contest discrimination based on union membership. There are
currently no export processing zones, although the free processing
zones authorized since 1994 would limit workers' collective bargaining
and minimum wage rights.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor: Israeli law prohibits
forced or compulsory labor for both Israeli citizens and noncitizens
working in Israel.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children: Children who have
attained the age of 15 and who remain obligated to attend school may
not be employed, unless they work as apprentices under the terms of the
apprenticeship law. Nonetheless, children who have reached the age of
14 may be employed during official school holidays. The employment of
children aged 16 to 18 is limited to ensure adequate time for rest and
education. Ministry of Labor inspectors are responsible for enforcing
these restrictions, but children's rights advocates contend that
enforcement is unsatisfactory, especially in smaller, unorganized
workplaces. Illegal employment of children does exist, probably
concentrated in urban light industrial areas.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work: The minimum wage is set by law at
47.5 percent of the average national wage, updated periodically for
changes in the average wage and in the consumer price index. Union
officials have expressed concern over enforcement of minimum wage
regulations, particularly with respect to employers of illegal
nonresident workers. Along with union representatives, the Labor
Inspection Service enforces labor, health, and safety standards in the
workplace. By law, the maximum hours of work at regular pay are 47
hours per week (eight hours per day and seven hours before the weekly
rest). The weekly rest must be at least 36 consecutive hours and
include the Sabbath. Palestinians working in Israel are covered by the
law and by collective bargaining agreements that cover Israeli workers.
f. Rights in Sectors with U.S. Investment: Worker rights in sectors
of the economy in which U.S. companies have invested are the same as
described above.
Extent of U.S. Investment in Selected Industries--U.S. Direct Investment Position Abroad on an Historical Cost
Basis--1998
[Millions of U.S. Dollars]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Category Amount
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Petroleum...................... .............. 41
Total Manufacturing............ .............. 2,344
Food & Kindred Products...... 71 ...............................................................
Chemicals & Allied Products.. 65 ...............................................................
Primary & Fabricated Metals.. 15 ...............................................................
Industrial Machinery and -11 ...............................................................
Equipment.
Electric & Electronic 1,709 ...............................................................
Equipment.
Transportation Equipment..... 5 ...............................................................
Other Manufacturing.......... 490 ...............................................................
Wholesale Trade................ .............. 91
Banking........................ .............. 0
Finance/Insurance/Real Estate.. .............. 386
Services....................... .............. (\1\)
Other Industries............... .............. (\1\)
TOTAL ALL INDUSTRIES........... .............. 3,067
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Suppressed to avoid disclosure of data of individual companies.
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis.
______
JORDAN
Key Economic Indicators \1\
[Millions of U.S. Dollars unless otherwise indicated]
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1997 1998 1999
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Income, Production and Employment:
Nominal GDP \2\......................... 6,974 7,384 7,612
Real GDP Growth (pct) \3\............... 1.3 2.2 2.0
GDP by Sector:
Agriculture........................... 208 186 N/A
Manufacturing......................... 835 860 N/A
Services.............................. 1,285 1,354 N/A
Government............................ 1,256 1,331 N/A
Per Capita Nominal GDP (US$) \4\........ 1,516 1,552 1,565
Labor Force (000's) \5\................. 1,024 1,250 N/A
Unemployment Rate (pct) \5\............. 13.2 14.9 N/A
Money and Prices (annual percentage
growth):
Money Supply Growth (M2)................ 7.8 7.6 6.0
Consumer Price Inflation \6\............ 3.0 3.1 2.0
Exchange Rate
Official (JD/US$ annual average)...... 0.709 0.709 0.709
Balance of Payments and Trade:
Total Exports FOB \7\................... 1,835 1,802 1,835
Exports to U.S.\8\.................... 26.0 17.1 30.0
Total Imports CIF\7\........ 4,100 3,827 3,980
Imports from U.S.\8\.................. 402 353.1 270
Trade Balance \7\....................... -2,265 -2,025 -2,145
Balance with U.S.\8\.................. -376 -336 -228
Current Account Deficit/GDP (pct) \9\... -0.42 -0.18 0.7
External Debt Outstanding \10\.......... 6,459 7,054 7,259
Debt Service Payments/GDP (pct)......... 12.3 10.5 N/A
(Commitment Basis)
Debt Service Payments/GDP (pct)......... 7.5 6.9 N/A
(Cash Basis)
Fiscal Deficit/GDP (excluding grants)... -7.7 -10.7 -7.0
Fiscal Deficit/GDP (including grants)... -3.1 -6.8 -3.3
Gold and Foreign Currency Reserves \11\ 2,400 1,954 2,726
\12\...................................
Official Foreign Currency Reserves \12\. 1,693 1,169 1,916
Aid from U.S.\13\ \14\.................. 180 207 262
Aid from All Other Sources \14\......... 259 236 N/A
------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Sources: Central Bank of Jordan's (CBJ) Monthly Bulletin, October
1999; IMF First Review of EFF Arrangements, September 21,1999;
Ministry of Finance's (MOF) Government Finance Bulletin, July 1999;
and Ministry of Labor's Annual Report 1998. FY 1999 estimates are
based on CBJ 1999 projections, in the 1998 Annual Report; MOF
projections, and embassy projections for exports and imports to/from
U.S. are based on 8 months of U.S. Commerce Department statistics.
1998 figures are preliminary as per their sources.
\2\ FY 1999, based on Nominal GDP growth projection of 3.1 percent
(IMF).
\3\ Percentage changes calculated in local currency for real GDP at
constant market prices. Note that data for 1996-1999 has been revised.
\4\ For 1999, population estimate of 4,918,000 and projected nominal GDP
growth rate of 3.1 percent.
\5\ Labor Force: Ministry of Labor Annual Report 1998; Unemployment: FY
1998, official result of the first round of the Employment and
Unemployment Survey conducted by the Department of Statistics
(unofficial estimates are almost twice as high).
\6\ Percentage change in the Cost of Living Index.
\7\ Merchandise trade; exports and imports on customs basis.
\8\ Trade with U.S. based on Department of Commerce statistics. 1999
projections estimated from 8 month trade figures.
\9\ Including grants. Figures for 1997 and 1998 are in surplus.
\10\ FY 1999 estimated from IMF debt growth projections.
\11\ Represents net foreign exchange reserves plus gold.
\12\ FY 1999 figures as at end of August.
\13\ FY 1996 includes $100 million of military equipment transfers;
figures exclude credit guarantees and GSM grain soft loans, but
include soft loan PL 480 (for agricultural commodities). Includes
economic and military assistance. FY 1999 includes Section 416(b)
donation of U.S. agricultural commodities.
\14\ Foreign grants as reported in the General Government Budget (CBJ
reports), including the Iraqi grant. Total FY 1999 foreign grants
going to the budget (including US ones) are expected to total US$ 290
million.
1. General Policy Framework
With a per-capita gross domestic product (GDP) of about $1,550, and
a population of 4.9 million, Jordan has one of the smallest and poorest
economies in the region. Since 1996, Jordan has experienced slow
economic growth, declining per capita income, and high levels of
unemployment. Real gross domestic product (GDP) is expected to grow in
1999 at no more than two per cent, which is below the rate of
population growth. Drought caused agricultural output to decline in
1999.
The government is committed to economic reform, especially in the
area of privatization and in improving the investment climate. Jordan
is in the process of acceding to the world trade organization (WTO),
and is likely to gain membership during the first quarter of 2000. As a
result, it is in the process of passing laws modernizing customs and
phytosanitary regulations, intellectual property protection, the tax
regime, laws regulating services, and many other aspects of its
economy. Recently, after years of inaction, the government privatized
the Aqaba Railway and partially privatized the state-owned cement
company. Significant progress has been made towards privatizing the
Jordan Telecommunications Company and Royal Jordanian, the national
airline.
The government offers significant incentives to foreign businesses
wishing to establish operations in Jordan. The U.S. and Jordan have
signed a Bilateral Investment Treaty, which protects investors and
establishes procedures for resolving investment disputes, and a Trade
and Investment Framework Agreement, which aims to broaden economic ties
between the two countries.
The United States offers unique trade benefits to Jordan through
the designation of five ``Qualifying Industrial Zones'' (QIZs). Goods
manufactured in QIZs, which require input from both Jordan and Israel,
are allowed duty-free entry into the U.S. Thousands of jobs have been
created in the last year due to this initiative. Other potential QIZs
in Aqaba and Mafraq, are in the planning stage.
2. Exchange Rate Policy
The Central Bank of Jordan (CBJ) oversees foreign currency
transactions in Jordan and sets the exchange rate. The dinar-dollar
fixed rate was instituted in 1995 and remains at 0.708 (buy) and 0.710
(sell) dinar to the dollar (approximately $1.41 to the dinar). The
dinar fluctuates against other currencies according to market forces.
All restrictions pertaining to the inflow and outflow of foreign
currency (including gold) were rescinded in 1997. The Jordanian dinar
(JD) was made fully convertible for all commercial and capital related
transactions. Foreign currency is obtainable from licensed banks at the
legal market-clearing rate, which is the CBJ's official rate. Although
there has been deterioration of the real effective exchange rate since
the early 1990s, it is anticipated that the JD will remain pegged to
the dollar at an exchange rate of approximately $1.41 to the JD, in
light of the Central Bank's commitment to maintaining exchange rate
stability.
Moneychangers operate under Central Bank supervision and are free
to set their own currency exchange rates. Moneychangers, unlike banks,
do not pay CBJ commission fees for every exchange transaction, which
gives them a competitive edge over banks.
Banks do not require prior CBJ approval for the incoming and
outgoing transfer of funds from either resident or non-resident
accounts (including investment-related transfers). Banks, however,
ultimately report all foreign currency transactions to the CBJ. Banks
are permitted to open non-resident accounts in JD and/or foreign
currency.
The CBJ requires banks to submit non-resident supportive documents
on behalf of their foreign clients every three years. Otherwise such
accounts will be converted to resident foreign currency accounts. Non-
resident foreign currency accounts are exempted from all transfer-
related commission fees charged by the central bank.
Banks may buy or sell an unlimited amount of foreign currency on a
forward basis. Banks are permitted to engage in reverse operations
involving the selling of foreign currency in exchange for JD on a
forward basis for the purpose of covering the value of imports. There
are no restrictions as to the amount resident account holders may
maintain in foreign currency deposits, and there are no limits on the
amount of funds residents are permitted to transfer abroad.
3. Structural Policies
Although enjoying U.S. Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) and
Normal Trade Relations benefits, Jordan does not provide reciprocal
treatment of goods imported from the United States. Most imports into
Jordan are subject to tariffs and duties, while industrial raw
materials and capital equipment imported by licensed industrial
projects may be exempted. The ceiling on all duties is 35 percent. Most
additional customs taxes, fees and duties on regular imports have been
abolished. However, luxury goods and automobiles are still assessed
additional sales taxes, fees, and duties.
The Kingdom's Income Tax Law imposes a 35 percent maximum marginal
rate. Taxes on individual incomes vary between 5 percent (for annual
incomes less than $3,000) and 30 percent (for annual incomes exceeding
$22,500). Corporate taxes are set at 35 percent for banks and financial
institutions and 25 percent for companies engaged in brokerage and
agency activities. Re-invested profits and profits earned on exports
are exempt from income tax.
Current law imposes an across-the-board 13 percent sales tax.
However, the sales tax is higher on certain items, such as cigarettes,
alcohol and automobiles. The law exempts exports from the sales tax and
empowers the Cabinet to impose additional sales taxes to compensate for
revenue losses from reduced customs duties. After reducing duties on
all imports to no more than 35 percent in mid-1999, the Council of
Ministers lowered the special sales tax on imported automobiles. The
result is that automobiles, although still expensive, are more
affordable for the average Jordanian. Almost all types of professional,
business and legal services are also subject to the 13 percent sales
tax. The government is working to revise the sales tax and expects to
introduce a VAT-like sales tax in mid-2000.
4. Debt Management Policies
Jordan's outstanding external official debt is approximately $7
billion. Jordan rescheduled $400 million in debt to Paris Club
creditors in 1997, and a further $800 million in 1999, easing repayment
pressure. The ratio of debt service to exports of goods and non-factor
services has been decreasing since 1993, dropping from 35.9 percent in
1993 to 21.4 percent in 1998, according to the central bank. More than
25 percent of Jordan's external debt is to multilateral institutions,
while its largest bilateral creditors are Japan, France and the United
Kingdom.
5. Aid
In fiscal year 1999, USAID's economic assistance program to Jordan
totaled $200 million. In addition, the U.S. provided $45 million in
Foreign Military Financing (FMF), and $1.6 million in International
Military Education and Training Program (IMET) funds. Jordan also
utilized $15 million in GSM 103 loan guarantees for grain purchases,
and received 300,000 tons of wheat, worth approximately $40 million,
donated under the Section 416(b) program. USAID's economic assistance
program for FY 2000 is expected to be approximately $200 million.
6. Significant Barriers to U.S. Exports
Import Licenses: Import licenses are generally not required.
Approximately 50 special items do require prior clearance. The license
regime will be modified in accordance with WTO requirements in early
2000.
Services Barriers: At present, market-entry barriers affect almost
all service industries.
Foreign suppliers of services do not receive Normal Trade Relations
or national treatment. However, when Jordan accedes to the WTO in early
2000, many of these barriers will be eased or lifted completely.
Standards, Testing, Labeling, and Certification: Except for
pharmaceuticals, which are handled by the Ministry of Health, the
Jordanian Standards and Measures Department is responsible for most
issues related to standards, measures, technical specifications and ISO
certification. Imported products must comply with labeling and marking
requirements issued by the Standards and Measures Department and
relevant government ministries. Different regulations apply to imported
foodstuffs, medicines, chemicals and other consumer products. Jordanian
importers are responsible for informing foreign suppliers of any
applicable labeling and marking requirements.
Investment Barriers: The United States and Jordan signed a
Bilateral Investment Treaty in 1997. The current Investment Promotion
Law is designed to promote both local and foreign investment and to
encourage the formation of joint ventures and multinational enterprises
in Jordan. Most important to U.S. business, the law provides equal
treatment for foreign and Jordanian investors. Restrictions on foreign
investment remain in four sectors: media, construction, trade and
commercial services, and mining.
Government Procurement Practices: With few exceptions, the General
Supplies Department of the Ministry of Finance makes government
purchases. Foreign bidders are permitted to compete directly with local
counterparts in international tenders financed by the World Bank.
However, local tenders are not directly open to foreign suppliers. By
law, foreign companies must submit bids through agents. While Jordan's
procurement law does not allow non-competitive bidding, it does permit
a government agency to pursue a selective tendering process. The law
gives the tender-issuing department, as well as review committees at
the Central Tenders and General Supplies Departments, the right to
accept or reject any bid while withholding information on its
decisions.
Customs Procedures: Despite donor-supported reform efforts,
cumbersome customs procedures continue to undermine Jordan's business
and investment climate. Overlapping areas of authority and difficult
clearance procedures remain in place. Actual appraisal and tariff
assessment practices are frequently arbitrary and may even differ from
written regulations. Customs officers often make discretionary
decisions about tariff and tax applications when regulations and
instructions conflict or lack specificity. Delays in clearing customs
are common.
7. Export Subsidies Policies
The Central Bank runs a low interest financing facility to support
eligible exports, including all agricultural and manufactured exports
with domestic value-added of not less than 25 percent. The Jordan Loan
Guarantee Corporation offers soft loans to small scale, export-oriented
projects in industry, handicrafts and agriculture. The Export and
Finance Bank, a public shareholding corporation, provides commercial
financing and loan guarantees to Jordanian exporters.
8. Protection of U.S. Intellectual Property
After it accedes to the World Trade Organization, Jordan will be
obligated to meet the requirements of the Trade Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property (TRIPS) agreement. Jordan is a member of the
World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), and is a signatory to
the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property and the
Berne Convention.
In April 1999, the U.S. Trade Representative retained Jordan on the
``Special 301'' Watch List for inadequate protection of intellectual
property, but by the end of 1999, Jordan was taken off this list.
Jordan has passed the appropriate intellectual property laws and is in
compliance on this issue.
In the area of copyrights, amendments to Jordan's Copyright Law
were passed in September 1999 by parliament and provide an improved
framework for protection of foreign copyrights. This law appears to
comply with TRIPS requirements, but fully effective enforcement
mechanisms are not yet in place. Amendments to the existing trademark
law were approved by parliament in late 1999.
A new patent law went into effect in December 1999. This law could
curtail unauthorized copying of pharmaceutical products, which results
in tens of millions of dollars in losses to U.S. and European
pharmaceutical firms. The law appears to fall short of TRIPS data
protection requirements, but this shortcoming will be addressed in
additional legislation to be adopted before accession to the WTO.
Software piracy is common in Jordan. However, the new copyright
law, in conjunction with one high-profile raid on several retailers of
pirate software, has begun to drive the pirate software market
underground. In 1998, Jordan issued a decree requiring government
ministries to use licensed software.
9. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association: Workers in the private sector and some
state-owned companies have the right to establish and join unions. More
than 30 percent of the Jordanian work force is unionized. Unions
represent their membership in dealing with issues such as wages,
working conditions and worker layoffs. Seventeen unions make up the
General Federation of Jordanian Trade Unions (GFJTU). The GFJTU
actively participates in the International Labor Organization.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively: Unions have, and
exercise, the right to bargain collectively. GJFTU member unions
regularly engage in collective bargaining with employers. Negotiations
cover a wide range of issues, including salaries, safety standards,
working conditions and health and life insurance. If a union is unable
to reach agreement with an employer, the dispute is referred to the
Ministry of Labor for arbitration. If the ministry fails to act within
two weeks, the union may strike.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor: Compulsory labor is
forbidden by the Jordanian Constitution, except in a state of emergency
such as war or natural disaster.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children: Children under age 16
are not permitted to work except in the case of professional
apprentices. Under an apprentice program, students may leave the
standard educational track and begin part-time training (up to 6 hours
a day) at age 13. In practice, enforcement of this law often does not
extend to small family businesses that employ underage children.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work: Jordan's workers are protected by
a comprehensive labor code, enforced by Ministry of Labor inspectors. A
minimum wage of 80 JD per month was decreed in October 1999. The
government maintains and periodically adjusts a minimum wage schedule
of various trades, based on recommendations of an advisory panel
consisting of representatives of workers, employers and the government.
Maximum working hours are 48 per week, with the exception of hotel,
bar, restaurant and movie theater employees, who may work up to 54
hours. Jordan has a Workers Compensation Law and a social security
system, which cover companies with more than five employees.
f. Rights in Sectors with U.S. Investment: Worker rights in sectors
with U.S. investment do not differ from those in other sectors of the
Jordanian economy.
Extent of U.S. Investment in Selected Industries--U.S. Direct Investment Position Abroad on an Historical Cost
Basis--1998
[Millions of U.S. Dollars]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Category Amount
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Petroleum...................... .............. -1
Total Manufacturing............ .............. (\1\)
Food & Kindred Products...... (\1\) ...............................................................
Chemicals & Allied Products.. 0 ...............................................................
Primary & Fabricated Metals.. 0 ...............................................................
Industrial Machinery and 0 ...............................................................
Equipment.
Electric & Electronic 0 ...............................................................
Equipment.
Transportation Equipment..... 0 ...............................................................
Other Manufacturing.......... 0 ...............................................................
Wholesale Trade................ .............. 0
Banking........................ .............. (\1\)
Finance/Insurance/Real Estate.. .............. (\1\)
Services....................... .............. 0
Other Industries............... .............. 0
TOTAL ALL INDUSTRIES........... .............. 32
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Suppressed to avoid disclosing data of individual companies.
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis.
______
KUWAIT
Key Economic Indicators
[Millions of U.S. Dollars unless otherwise indicated]
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1997 1998 \1\ 1999
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Income, Production and Employment:
Nominal GDP \2\......................... 30,242 25,151 27,696
GDP Growth (pct) \3\.................... -0.2 -16.3 10.1
GDP by Sector:
Manufacturing......................... 4,033 2,999 3,538
Services.............................. 3,602 3,617 3,655
Government............................ 6,399 6,643 6,842
Petroleum............................. 12,158 7,772 12,062
Per Capita GDP (US$).................... 13,691 11,075 12,089
Labor Force (000's)..................... 1,208 1,243 1,255
Unemployment Rate (pct)................. 1.3 0.7 0.5
Money and Prices (annual percentage
growth):
Money Supply Growth (M2)................ 3.9 -0.8 2.6
Consumer Price Inflation (pct).......... 0.7 0.2 0.3
Exchange Rate (KD/US$ annual average)
Official.............................. 0.303 0.305 0.305
Balance of Payments and Trade:
Total Exports FOB....................... 14,238 9,548 9,977
Exports to U.S.\4\.................... 1,998 1,471 1,344
Total Imports CIF....................... 8,257 8,610 8,963
Imports from U.S.\4\.................. 1,394 1,479 1,212
Trade Balance........................... 5,983 938 1,014
Balance with U.S.\4\.................. 604 -8.7 132
Current Account Surplus/GDP (pct)....... 26.8 10 18.4
External Public Debt \5\................ 1,404 802 451
Debt Service Payments/GDP (pct)......... 3.1 2.3 1.3
Fiscal Deficit/GDP (pct) \6\............ 4 16.2 23.7
Gold and Foreign Exchange Reserves
(US$ billions)........................ 3.3 3.6 3.7
Aid from U.S............................ 0 0 0
Aid from All Other Sources.............. 0 0 0
------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ 1999 figures are projections based on data through August 1999.
\2\ GDP at factor cost.
\3\ Percentage changes calculated in local currency.
\4\ Source: U.S. Department of Commerce and U.S. Census Bureau; exports
FAS, imports customs basis; 1999 Figures are estimates based on data
available through August 1999.
\5\ Based on Kuwaiti Government figures as of January 1999.
\6\ This is a Ministry of Finance projection calculated using an
estimated world crude oil price of US$ 10/barrel; Embassy projects a
lower deficit for FY 1999/2000.
1. General Policy Framework
Kuwait is a politically stable state where the rule of law
prevails. The press is largely free and commercial advertising is
available. Arabic is the official language but English is widely
spoken. Kuwait has a small and relatively open, oil-rich economy which
has created an affluent society.
Kuwait still faces several structural problems in its budget:
excessive dependence on oil revenue, growing government expenditures
due to the need for continued high defense spending, growing social
expenditures resulting from high levels of government employment, and
provision of heavily subsidized social services and utilities.
Primarily because of weak oil revenues during the first half of 1999,
Kuwait's budget was projected to be in deficit for the FY 1999/2000. A
five-year plan to reduce government employment, reduce subsidies and
encourage privatization of services is expected to be presented to
parliament in late 1999 but may meet resistance. However, higher oil
prices in the last half of 1999 should alleviate some of the pressure
on Kuwait's budget and weaken the impetus for economic restructuring.
Domestic investment is encouraged by provision of low cost land,
subsidized utilities and waivers of duties and fees. These are offset
by lengthy bureaucratic procedures, and for foreigners, high tax rates
and complex procedures to secure work visas. The Kuwait Central Bank
uses interest rates as its primary means to control money supply. This
is accomplished through adjustments to the discount rate and through
open market operations of government securities. Kuwait's money supply
(M2) in August 1999 was up by 2.2% over the previous 12 months.
2. Exchange Rate Policy
There are no restrictions on current or capital account
transactions in Kuwait, beyond a requirement that all foreign exchange
purchases be made through a bank or licensed foreign exchange dealer.
Equity, loan capital, interest, dividends, profits, royalties, fees and
personal savings can all be transferred in or out of Kuwait without
hindrance.
The Kuwaiti Dinar itself is freely convertible at an exchange rate
calculated daily on the basis of a basket of currencies which is
weighted to reflect Kuwait's trade and capital flows. Since the dollar
makes up over half of the basket, the Kuwaiti Dinar has closely
followed the exchange rate fluctuations of the U.S. Dollar over the
past year.
3. Structural Policies
Kuwait's government plays a dominant role in the local economy,
which may diminish if moves toward privatization and rationalization of
the economy are implemented. Kuwait's economy is heavily regulated,
which restricts participation and competition in a number of sectors
and strictly controls the roles of foreign capital and expatriate
labor. Policies favor Kuwaiti citizens and Kuwaiti-owned companies.
Income taxes, for instance, are only levied on foreign corporations and
foreign interests in Kuwaiti corporations, at maximum rates of 55
percent of taxable income. Individuals are not subject to income taxes,
but the government is considering possible changes to its current
income tax structure.
Foreign investment is welcome in Kuwait for minority partnership in
select sectors. Foreign nationals, save for the citizens of some GCC
countries, are prohibited from having majority ownership in virtually
every business other than certain small service-oriented businesses,
and may not own property. Non-GCC nationals are forbidden to trade in
Kuwait stocks on the Kuwait stock exchange except through the medium of
unit trusts (mutual funds). Kuwait's parliament is currently reviewing
legislation that would allow majority foreign ownership in selected
sectors and allow direct foreign participation in the Kuwait Stock
Exchange. Approval may occur before the end of 1999.
Government procurement policies specify local products, when
available, and prescribe a 10 percent price advantage for local
companies on government tenders. There is also a blanket agency
requirement for all foreign companies trading in Kuwait to either
engage a Kuwaiti agent or establish a Kuwaiti company with majority
Kuwaiti ownership and management.
4. Debt Management Policies
Prior to the Gulf War, Kuwait was a significant creditor to the
world economy, having amassed a foreign investment portfolio that was
variously valued at $80 to $100 billion. Following liberation, Kuwait
made the final payment on its $5.5 billion jumbo reconstruction loan in
December 1996. The estimated value of the Kuwait Investment Authority's
(KIA) foreign assets, concentrated primarily in the Fund for Future
Generations, is now approximately $60 billion, while other government
foreign assets are estimated at about $22 billion. The government is
authorized by law to borrow up to KD 10 billion ($30.5 billion) or its
equivalent in major convertible currencies. As of the end of August
1999, the total outstanding balance of public debt instruments in KD
issued by the Central Bank of Kuwait was KD 2.37 billion ($7.78
billion), while Kuwait's official external debt was estimated at about
$451 million.
5. Significant Barriers to U.S. Exports
On July 1, 1992, Kuwait began collecting a four-percent tariff on
most imports. This flat rate is applied to the Cost, Insurance and
Freight (CIF) value of imported goods. Where imports compete with
domestic ``infant industries,'' the Ministry of Commerce and Industry
may impose protective tariffs of up to 25 percent. In such cases,
tariff reviews and determinations are done on a case by case basis.
There are no customs duties on food, agricultural items and
essential consumer goods. Imports of some machinery, most spare parts
and all raw materials are exempt from customs duties. Oil companies may
apply for tariff exemptions for drilling equipment and certain other
machinery, including that for new plants.
Kuwait, like other GCC member states, maintains restrictive
standards that impede the marketing of U.S. exports. For example,
shelf-life requirements for processed foods are often far shorter than
necessary to preserve freshness and result in U.S. goods being
noncompetitive with products shipped from countries closer to Kuwait.
Standards for many electrical products are based on those of the UK,
which restrict access of competitive U.S. products. Standards for
medical, telecommunications and computer equipment tend to lag behind
technological developments, with the result that government tenders
often specify the purchase of obsolete, more costly items. Government
procurement policies specify local products when available and
prescribe a 10 percent price advantage for local firms in government
tenders.
The government views its offset program as a major vehicle for
motivating foreign investment in Kuwait. The U.S. Government opposes
this type of program and has recommended that Kuwait carefully weigh
all the potential costs to itself of an offset program. Interested U.S.
firms should familiarize themselves with the terms of this program to
ensure that the offset program does not become an undue obstacle to
their business.
In June 1993, Kuwait announced that it would no longer apply the
secondary boycott to firms that do business with Israel and the
tertiary boycott with firms that do business with firms subject to the
secondary boycott, but would continue to apply the primary boycott to
goods and services produced in Israel itself. Kuwait has also taken
steps to revise its commercial documentation to eliminate all direct
references to the boycott of Israel. Should U.S. firms receive requests
for boycott-related information from private Kuwaiti firms or Kuwaiti
public officials, they should advise the embassy of the request, report
the request as required by law to the U.S. Department of Commerce, and
take care to comply with all other requirements of the U.S. anti-
boycott laws. Kuwait, along with many other Middle East countries,
continues to enjoy a waiver of the 1996 ``Brown Amendment''
requirements. The ``Brown Amendment'' prohibits defense sales to those
countries that have not eliminated all vestiges of the enforcement of
the secondary and tertiary boycott of Israel, unless waived by the
President.
For perishable imports arriving via air, land or sea, customs
clearance is prompt and takes about three hours. To complete clearance,
the importer presents its import license and quality test certificate.
Recurring perishable imports can be cleared and taken to the importer's
premises after a sample has been submitted to the municipality for
quality testing.
Usually, customs assesses duty on imported goods based on
commercial invoices. If the customs officials believe the declared
value unrealistic, they may make their own assessment.
Importers do not need a separate import license for each product or
each shipment. An importer does, however, need an annual import license
issued by the Ministry of Commerce and Industry. To be eligible, the
company must be registered both in the Commercial Register at the
Ministry of Commerce and Industry, as well as at the Kuwait Chamber of
Commerce and Industry. Kuwaiti shareholding in the capital of the
company must be at least 51 percent.
A special import license is required to import certain kinds of
goods, such as firearms, explosives, drugs and wild animals. Some drugs
require a special import license from the Ministry of Public Health.
Imports of firearms and explosives require a special import license
form the Ministry of Interior.
6. Export Subsidies Policies
Kuwait does not directly subsidize any of its exports, which
consist almost exclusively of crude oil, petroleum products and
fertilizer. Almost 98 percent of Kuwait's food is imported. Farmers
receiving government subsidies grow small amounts of local vegetables,
and small amounts of these vegetables are sold to neighboring
countries. However, not enough of these vegetables are grown or sold to
make any significant impact on local or foreign agricultural markets.
Periodically, Kuwait cracks down on the re-export of subsidized imports
such as food and medicine.
7. Protection of U.S. Intellectual Property
Kuwait is a member of the World Trade Organization (WTO) and hopes
to have in place necessary legislation that will put it in compliance
with its obligations under the Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property (TRIPS) Agreement by January 1, 2000. Kuwait joined the World
Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) in April of 1998, but has not
yet signed the Berne Convention for the protection of literary and
artistic works (copyright) or the Paris Convention for the protection
of industrial property (patent and trademark). The U.S. Trade
Representative listed Kuwait in 1999 on the ``Special 301'' Priority
Watch List for lack of progress in passing copyright legislation,
absence of patent coverage for pharmaceuticals, and Intellectual
Property (IP) enforcement problems.
Patents: Kuwait's 1961 Patent Law was never implemented and
contained a number of deficiencies. The draft patent law being
considered by its Parliament represents a significant improvement.
While meeting basic requirements of the WTO Accord on Trade Related
Aspects of Intellectual Property (TRIPS), questions remain regarding
when coverage for pharmaceuticals will begin and how compulsory
licensing provisions will be interpreted.
Copyrights: In 1995, the Ministry of Information issued ministerial
decrees protecting U.S. and British-copyrighted material. In April
1998, Kuwait's Ministry of Planning issued a decree barring the use of
pirated software on government computers. A draft Copyright Law,
currently with the Kuwait Parliament, is expected to be acted on before
the end of 1999. The draft is essentially TRIPS-consistent, but there
are questions regarding its protection of sound recordings and rental
rights (both TRIPS requirements). Kuwait's Ministry of Information has
begun a program to educate its officials, and the Kuwait public, on
implementation of the new law.
Video piracy, in particular, remains a major concern despite
efforts by the Ministry of Information to enforce the 1995 Ministerial
Decree. Lack of staff and Kuwaiti officials' reluctance to publicize
the names and locations where pirated products are seized have been two
major obstacles. Uncertain and slow judicial action is also a hurdle.
It is hoped that these problems will be addressed following passage of
the copyright law.
8. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association: Both Kuwaiti and non-Kuwaiti workers
have the right to establish and join unions; latest figures indicate
50,000 workers are union members. The government restricts the free
establishment of trade unions: workers may establish only one union in
any occupational trade, and unions may establish only one federation.
New unions must have at least 100 members, 15 of whom must be Kuwaiti.
Expatriate workers, about 80 percent of the labor force, may join
unions after five years residence, but only as nonvoting members. In
practice, the Kuwait Trade Union Federation claims that this
restriction is not enforced and that foreigners may join unions
regardless of their length of stay.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively: While unions are
legally independent organizations, 90 percent of their budgets derive
from government subsidies and the government oversees their financial
records. This extends to prescription of internal rules and
constitutions, including prohibition of involvement in domestic
political, religious or sectarian issues; unions nevertheless engage in
a wide range of activities. Unions can be dissolved by court ruling or
Amiri decree, although this has never happened. Were this to happen,
union assets would revert to the Ministry of Social Affairs and Labor.
Kuwaiti citizen, but not foreign, union members have the right within
the union to vote and be elected. The law limits the right to strike;
all labor disputes must be referred to compulsory arbitration if labor
and management cannot reach a solution, and strikers are not guaranteed
immunity from state legal or administrative action against them.
Foreign workers, regardless of union status, may submit any grievance
to the Kuwait Trade Union Federation, which is authorized to
investigate their complaints and offer free legal advice.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor: The Constitution
prohibits forced labor ``except in the cases specified by law for
national emergencies and with just remuneration.'' Foreign nationals
must obtain a Kuwaiti sponsor to obtain a residence permit, and cannot
change employment without permission of the original sponsors. Domestic
servants, not protected by Kuwait's Labor Law, are vulnerable to abuses
of this rule. Sponsors frequently hesitate to grant permission to
change employment because of the various expenses they covered to bring
the servants into the country, often ranging from $700 to $1,000.
``Runaway'' maids can be treated as criminals under the law for
violations of their work and residence permits, especially if they
attempt to work for someone else without the required permits. Despite
government protections, some sponsors continue to hold their servants'
passports as a means of controlling their movement.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children: Minimum legal age is 18
years for all forms of work, both full and part-time. Employers may
obtain permits to employ juveniles between the ages of 14 and 18 in
certain trades, for a maximum of six hours per day, on condition that
they work no more than four consecutive hours followed by a rest period
of at least one hour. Compulsory education laws exist for children
between the ages of 6 and 15. Some small businessmen employ their
children on a part-time basis, and there have been unconfirmed reports
of some South Asian domestic servants under 18 who falsified their age
in order to enter Kuwait.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work: In the public sector, the
effective minimum monthly wage is approximately $742 for Kuwaiti
citizens and $296 for non-Kuwaitis; there is no private sector minimum
wage. Labor law sets general conditions of work for both public and
private sectors, with the oil industry treated separately. The Civil
Service Law, which also pertains to the public sector, limits the
standard workweek to 48 hours with one full day of rest per week, and
provides for a minimum of 14 workdays of leave per year and a
compensation schedule for industrial accidents. The law also provides
for employer-provided medical care, periodic medical exams to workers
exposed to environmental hazards on the job, and compensation to
workers disabled by injury or disease due to job-related causes. Legal
protections exist for workers who file complaints about dangerous work
situations. Laws establishing work conditions are not always applied
uniformly to foreign workers, and foreign laborers frequently face
contractual disputes, poor working conditions and, in some cases,
physical abuse.
f. Rights in Sectors with U.S. Investment: Two significant U.S.
investments in Kuwait in the oil industry, one in the partitioned
neutral zone shared by Kuwait and Saudi Arabia and the other in Kuwait
proper, operate under and in full compliance with the Kuwaiti labor
law.
Extent of U.S. Investment in Selected Industries--U.S. Direct Investment Position Abroad on an Historical Cost
Basis--1998
[Millions of U.S. Dollars]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Category Amount
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Petroleum...................... .............. (\1\)
Total Manufacturing............ .............. (\1\)
Food & Kindred Products...... 0 ...............................................................
Chemicals & Allied Products.. (\1\) ...............................................................
Primary & Fabricated Metals.. 0 ...............................................................
Industrial Machinery and (\1\) ...............................................................
Equipment.
Electric & Electronic 0 ...............................................................
Equipment.
Transportation Equipment..... (\2\) ...............................................................
Other Manufacturing.......... 0 ...............................................................
Wholesale Trade................ .............. 0
Banking........................ .............. 0
Finance/Insurance/Real Estate.. .............. (\1\)
Services....................... .............. 17
Other Industries............... .............. (\1\)
TOTAL ALL INDUSTRIES........... .............. (\1\)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Suppressed to avoid disclosing data of individual companies.
\2\ Less than $500,000 (+/-).
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis.
______
MOROCCO
Key Economic Indicators
[Millions of U.S. Dollars unless otherwise indicated]
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1997 1998 \1\ 1999
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Income, Production and Employment:
Nominal GDP \2\......................... 33,160 36,179 35,573
Real GDP Growth (pct) \3\............... -2.2 6.3 0.2
GDP by Sector:
Agriculture........................... 5,093 5,911 N/A
Manufacturing......................... 5,857 6,040 N/A
Services.............................. 6,451 6,833 N/A
Government............................ 4,428 4,378 N/A
Per Capita GDP (US$).................... 1,218 1,303 1,250
Labor Force (urban 000's)............... 5,068 5,137 5,160
Urban Unemployment Rate (pct)........... 16.9 19.1 21.5
Money and Prices (annual percentage
growth):
Money Supply Growth (M2)................ 9.2 7.7 9.5
Consumer Price Inflation................ 1.0 2.7 1.3
Exchange Rate (DH/US$ annual average)
Official.............................. 9.60 9.59 9.90
Parallel.............................. N/A N/A N/A
Balance of Payments and Trade:
Total Exports FOB \4\................... 6,985 7,279 7,060
Exports to U.S.\4\.................... 164 198 220
Total Imports CIF \4\................... 9,449 10,255 10,717
Imports from U.S.\4\.................. 509 643 740
Trade Balance \4\....................... -2,464 -2,974 -3,657
Balance with U.S.\4\.................. -345 -445 -520
External Public Debt (US$ billions)..... 19.1 19.3 18.0
Fiscal Deficit/GDP (pct) \5\............ 3.3 3.5 2.3
Current Account Deficit/GDP (pct)....... 1.1 3.1 2.5
Debt Service Payments/GDP (pct)......... 8.5 8.3 8.1
Gold and Foreign Exchange Reserves...... 4,234 4,450 6,130
Aid from U.S.\5\........................ 13.5 17.6 16.4
Aid from All Other Sources.............. 1,750 N/A N/A
------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ 1999 figures are all estimates based on available monthly data in
November.
\2\ GDP at factor cost.
\3\ Percentage changes calculated in local currency.
\4\ Merchandise trade.
\5\ Fiscal Year Basis.
1. General Policy Framework
Morocco boasts the largest phosphate reserves in the world, a
diverse agricultural and fisheries sector, a high-potential tourism
industry, a growing manufacturing sector, and a considerable inflow of
funds from Moroccans working abroad. Most of Morocco's trade is with
Europe, with France alone accounting for about a quarter of Morocco's
imports and a third of its exports.
The government has pursued market-oriented economic reforms since
the early 1980s. It has restrained spending, revised the tax system,
reformed the banking system, pursued appropriate monetary policies,
eased import restrictions, lowered tariffs, launched a privatization
program and liberalized foreign exchange controls. Monetary policy
serves primarily to maintain Morocco's exchange rate. These reforms
have helped restore macroeconomic equilibria: the current account
deficit, fiscal deficit and inflation rates are well below their early
1980s levels. Economic growth has been modest, with wide year-to-year
fluctuations due to heavy dependence on agriculture and vulnerability
to cyclical droughts.
With the passing of power from the late King Hassan II to King
Mohamed VI, Morocco has signaled its determination to intensify the
economic reform process, and among other things, to streamline foreign
and domestic investment procedures and devolve more power to regional
governments. Morocco launched a privatization program in 1992 and since
then 60 out of 114 state enterprises have been sold, raising $1.7
billion. Among the companies currently slated for privatization are
sugar plants, hotels, and banks. The national monopoly
telecommunications firm Maroc Telecom and the national airline Royal
Air Maroc are also scheduled for partial privatization in 2000, either
through the Casablanca Stock Exchange or through strategic
partnerships. The Moroccan Government has embraced private financing
for the construction and operation of some highways, a new port for
Tangier and other large infrastructure projects, including a $1.5
billion electric power project awarded to a joint venture between an
American and a European firm. American firms are currently competing
for a concession to provide water and electricity distribution services
to two cities in northern Morocco.
Real GDP grew 6.3 percent in 1998 following a good harvest.
Agricultural GDP increased by 16 percent in 1998. Following poor rains
during the 1998-99 growing season, real GDP growth is expected to
remain stagnant in 1999. A good start to the current rainy season has
raised hopes for increased grain production for 2000. Morocco has a
comfortable level of foreign exchange reserves, thanks in part to the
recent sale for $1.1 billion of a second license to provide cellular
phone services. This large influx of money has also resulted in the
recent cancellation of new government debt issues. The government has
been implementing incremental liberalization of exchange controls for
Moroccan residents, most recently relaxing the amount of foreign
currency Moroccan citizens can purchase in order to obtain medical
treatment abroad. Morocco's chronic merchandise trade deficit grew in
1998 as imports increased by 7.9 percent while exports remained
stagnant. Receipts from remittances and tourism have increased steadily
over the past three years, with tourism receipts up 19.3 percent thus
far in 1999. Foreign investment for 1998 fell by 63.2 percent over the
record 1997 levels, but appears to be recovering in 1999.
2. Exchange Rate Policies
The Moroccan Dirham is convertible for all current transactions (as
defined by the International Monetary Fund's Article VIII) as well as
for some capital transactions, notably capital repatriation by foreign
investors. Foreign exchange is routinely available through commercial
banks for such transactions on presentation of documents. Moroccan
companies may borrow abroad without prior government approval.
Investment abroad by Moroccan individuals or corporations is subject to
approval by the Foreign Exchange Board. Approval is routinely denied
for projects that do not directly benefit Morocco. Private Moroccans
continue to face several foreign exchange restrictions, notably against
use of international credit cards. This makes it nearly impossible for
Moroccans to use e-commerce to purchase goods internationally.
The central bank sets the exchange rate for the dirham against a
basket of currencies of its principal trading partners, particularly
the French Franc and other European currencies. The rate against the
basket has remained steady since a nine percent devaluation in May
1990, with changes in the rates of individual currencies reflecting
changes in cross rates. Since Morocco's average inflation rate
throughout the 1990s has been greater than the other currencies, many
economists believe that the dirham is now overvalued. The government
argues consistently against devaluation. The large weight given to
European currencies in the basket results in a greater volatility of
the dollar than the European currencies against the dirham. This
increases the foreign exchange risk of importing from the United States
as compared to importing from Europe. The IMF has urged to GOM to
introduce greater flexibility into its exchange rate regime, to help
boost exports and promote growth.
3. Structural Policies
The 1992 Foreign Trade Law committed Morocco to the principles of
free trade, reversing the legal presumption of import protection. It
replaced quantitative restrictions with tariffs (both ad valorem and
variable) on the importation of politically sensitive items such as
flour, sugar, tea and cooking oil.
Interest rate policy has also changed in recent years. In 1994, the
government revised the interest rate ceilings on bank loans. The new
ceiling is set at a three to four percent markup over the rate received
on deposits, including the below-market rates on required deposits. The
effect of the change is to lower the interest rate ceilings, although
real rates remain high.
Morocco has a three-part tax structure consisting of a value-added
tax, a corporate income tax, and an individual income tax. The
investment code passed by the parliament in October 1995 reduced
corporate and individual income taxes, as well as many import duties.
The code also eliminated the value-added tax on certain capital goods
and equipment. A plethora of minor taxes can significantly raise the
cost of certain imported goods.
4. Debt Management Policies
Morocco's foreign debt burden has declined steadily as a result of
prudent borrowing and active debt management in recent years. Foreign
debt fell from 128 percent of GDP in 1985 to about 53 percent of GDP in
1998. Similarly, debt service payments before rescheduling, as a share
of goods and services exports, fell from over 58 percent in 1985 to
about 25 percent in 1998. The last Paris Club rescheduling took place
in 1992. The government does not foresee the need for further Paris
Club rescheduling, although it is pursuing other forms of debt relief
with major official creditors. Since 1996, France and Spain have
authorized debt-equity swaps covering 20 percent of eligible Paris Club
debt. In October 1999, the Paris Club endorsed an increase to 30
percent in the debt-swap ceiling.
5. Aid
Less than 10 percent of the U.S. aid listed in the economic
indicators section for 1997 or 1998 was military assistance. In 1999,
approximately 25 percent of the aid was in the form of military
assistance. In addition to the direct assistance listed, the United
States leveraged $15 million in housing guaranty funds in 1997, and
$11.5 million in 1999.
6. Significant Barriers to U.S. Exports
Import Licenses: Morocco has eliminated import-licensing
requirements on a number of items in recent years. Licensing
requirements remain for firearms, used clothing, used tires and
explosives.
Tariffs: Tariffs have been gradually reduced in recent years. The
maximum tariff for most goods is 35 percent, although the range of
tariffs is 2.5 percent to 300 percent, with the highest tariffs applied
to cereals. Despite the downward trend, tariffs on some products have
increased as quantitative restrictions were replaced with higher
tariffs. For example, following the elimination of licensing
requirements, tariffs on dairy products, cereals, vegetable oils and
sugar have increased. There is also a 10 to 15 percent surtax on
imports of most goods as well as a value added tax ranging from 0 to 20
percent. Tariffs on most industrial products imported from the European
Union will be gradually eliminated once the Association Agreement is
implemented, with a target date of 2010 for complete elimination.
Services Barriers: Barriers in the services sector have been
falling as Morocco conforms to its WTO engagements. In November 1989,
parliament abrogated a 1973 law requiring majority Moroccan ownership
of firms in a wide range of industries, thus eliminating what had been
a barrier to U.S. investment in Morocco. In 1993, the Moroccan
Government repealed a 1974 decree limiting foreign ownership in the
petroleum refining and distribution sector, which allowed Mobil Oil to
buy back the government's 50 percent share of Mobil's Moroccan
subsidiary in 1994. Foreign companies cannot acquire a majority stake
in firms in the insurance sector.
Standards, Testing, Labeling and Certification: Morocco applies
approximately 500 industrial standards based on international norms.
These apply primarily to packaging, metallurgy and construction.
Sanitary regulations apply to virtually all food imports. Meat should
be slaughtered according to Islamic law. The government does not
require locally registered firms to apply ISO 9000 usage. The use of
the metric system is mandatory.
Investment Barriers: The government actively encourages foreign
investment. The parliament passed a new investment code in 1995 which
applies equally to foreign and Moroccan investors, except for the
foreign exchange provisions which favor foreign investors. Unlike the
previous sectoral investment codes, the advantages offered under the
new code are to be granted automatically. There are no foreign investor
performance requirements, although the new code provides income tax
breaks for investments in certain regions, and in crafts and export
industries. Foreign investment is prohibited in certain sectors of the
economy, including the purchase of agricultural land and investment in
the phosphate sector.
Government Procurement Practices: While government procurement
regulations allow for preferences for Moroccan bidders, the effect of
the preference on U.S. companies is limited. The Moroccan government
has placed an increasing emphasis on transparency. Virtually all of the
government procurement contracts that interest U.S. companies are large
projects for which the competition is non-Moroccan (mainly European)
companies. Many of these projects are financed by multilateral
development banks, which impose their own nondiscriminatory procurement
regulations. U.S. companies sometimes have difficulty with the
requirement that bids for government procurement be in French.
Customs Procedures: In principle, customs procedures are simple and
straightforward, but in practice they are sometimes marked by delays.
The Customs Administration has launched a program to speed up the
customs clearance process. Average processing time has fallen from
several days to several hours. A commercial invoice is required, but no
special invoice form is necessary. Certification as to country of
origin of the goods is required.
7. Export Subsidies Policies
There are no direct export subsidies, although the 1995 investment
code provides a five-year corporate income tax holiday for export
industries. Morocco has a temporary admission scheme that allows for
suspension of duties and licensing requirements on imported inputs for
export production. This scheme includes indirect exporters (local
suppliers to exporters). In addition, a ``prior export'' program
exists, whereby exporters can claim a refund on duties paid on imports
that were subsequently transformed and exported.
8. Protection of U.S. Intellectual Property
Morocco has a relatively complete regulatory and legislative system
for the protection of intellectual property, but strong enforcement is
lacking. Morocco is not on the Special 301 Watch List or Priority Watch
List. Morocco is a member of the World Trade Organization (WTO) and is
expected to be in compliance with its obligations under the Trade
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property (TRIPs) Agreement by early
2000. Morocco is also a member of the World Intellectual Property
Organization and is a party to the Berne Convention for the protection
of literary and artistic works (copyright), The Universal Copyright
Convention, the Paris Convention for the protection of industrial
property (patent and trademark), the Brussels Satellite Convention, and
the Madrid Agreement Concerning the International Registration of Marks
(as revised at Nice, 1957).
Copyright: The Moroccan Parliament is considering legislation that
will increase protection for computer software. Morocco's new
commercial courts recently ruled in Microsoft's favor in two cases
against software pirates.
Patents: A quirk dating from the era of the French and Spanish
protectorates requires patent applications for industrial property to
be filed in both Casablanca and Tangier for complete protection. The
proposed 1996 industrial property code, expected to be implemented by
2000, will amend this provision and require that applications be filed
only in Casablanca.
Trademarks: Counterfeiting of clothing, luggage, and other consumer
goods is illegal, but not uncommon. Counterfeiting is primarily for
local sales rather than for export. Trademarks must be filed in both
Casablanca and Tangier, although this too will be amended in the new
law.
9. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association: Workers are free to form and join
unions throughout the country. The right is exercised widely but not
universally. About six percent of Morocco's nine million workers are
unionized, mostly in the public sector. The unions are not completely
free from government interference. Narrowly focused strikes continue to
occur. Work stoppages are normally intended to advertise grievances and
last 48-72 hours. Unions maintain ties to international trade
secretariats.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively: The protection
of the right to organize and bargain collectively is implied in the
Constitution and Labor Law. The government protections are generally
not enforced in the informal sector. Observance of labor laws in larger
companies and in the public sector is more consistent. The laws
governing collective bargaining are inadequate. Collective bargaining
has been a long-standing tradition in some parts of the economy,
notably heavy industry, and is becoming more prevalent in the service
sector.
There is no law specifically prohibiting anti-union discrimination.
Employers commonly dismiss workers for union activities regarded as
threatening to employer interest. The courts have the authority to
reinstate such workers, but are unable to enforce rulings that compel
employers to pay damages and back pay.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor: Forced or compulsory
labor is prohibited in Morocco.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children: The law prohibits the
employment of any child under 12 years of age. Special regulations
cover the employment of children between the ages of 12 and 16. In
practice, however, children are often apprenticed before age 12,
particularly in the handicraft industry. The use of minors is common in
this informal sector of the economy, which includes rug making,
ceramics, wood working, and leather goods. Children are also employed
informally as domestics and usually receive little remuneration. Child
labor laws are generally well observed in the industrialized, unionized
sector of the economy but not in the informal sector. In September
1998, the Government of Morocco adopted the International Labor
Organization's Convention 138 on the prohibition of child labor.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work: The minimum wage is about $180 a
month and is not considered adequate to provide a decent standard of
living for a worker and his or her family. However, this figure is
above the per capita income. The minimum wage is not enforced
effectively in the informal sector of the economy. It is enforced
fairly well throughout the industrialized, unionized sectors where most
workers earn more than the minimum wage. They are generally paid
between 13 and 16 months salary, including bonuses, each year.
The law provides for a 48-hour maximum workweek with not more than
10 hours any single day, premium pay for overtime, paid public and
annual holidays, and minimum conditions for health and safety,
including the prohibition of night work for women and minors. As with
other regulations and laws, these are not universally observed in the
informal sector.
f. Rights in Sectors with U.S. Investment: Worker rights in sectors
with U.S. investment, all of which is in the formal, industrial sector
of the Moroccan economy, do not differ from those described above.
Extent of U.S. Investment in Selected Industries--U.S. Direct Investment Position Abroad on an Historical Cost
Basis--1998
[Millions of U.S. Dollars]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Category Amount
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Petroleum...................... .............. 16
Total Manufacturing............ .............. 52
Food & Kindred Products...... 30 ...............................................................
Chemicals & Allied Products.. 21 ...............................................................
Primary & Fabricated Metals.. 2 ...............................................................
Industrial Machinery and 0 ...............................................................
Equipment.
Electric & Electronic 0 ...............................................................
Equipment.
Transportation Equipment..... (\2\) ...............................................................
Other Manufacturing.......... -2 ...............................................................
Wholesale Trade................ .............. (\1\)
Banking........................ .............. (\1\)
Finance/Insurance/Real Estate.. .............. 0
Services....................... .............. 0
Other Industries............... .............. 0
TOTAL ALL INDUSTRIES........... .............. 86
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Suppressed to avoid disclosing data of individual companies.
\2\ Less than $500,000 (+/-).
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis.
______
OMAN
Key Economic Indicators
[Billions of U.S. Dollars unless otherwise indicated]
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1997 \1\ 1998 \2\ 1999
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Income, Production and Employment:
Nominal GDP \3\...................... 15.8 14.1 14.2
Real GDP Growth (pct) \3\............ 3.6 -10.6 0.7
GDP by Sector:
Agriculture & Fisheries............ 0.4 0.4 0.4
Petroleum.......................... 6.3 4.4 4.5
Manufacturing...................... 0.6 0.6 0.6
Services \4\....................... 6.2 6.5 6.4
(total services less public
services sector)
Government Services \4\............ 1.8 1.7 1.6
Per Capita GDP (US$)................. 7,006 6,165 6,122
Labor Force (000's).................. 630.9 634.8 624.0
Unemployment Rate (pct).............. N/A N/A N/A
Money and Prices (annual percentage
growth):
Money Supply Growth (M2 Jan-Dec) \5\. 24.5 4.8 0.3
Consumer Price Inflation \6\......... 0.4 -0.5 -0.5
Exchange Rate (Omani Rial/US$)....... 2.6 2.6 2.6
Balance of Payments and Trade:\7\
Total Exports FOB.................... 7.6 5.5 5.9
Exports to U.S. (US$ millions) \8\. 260.9 230.4 227.7
Total Imports CIF.................... 5.2 5.8 4.6
Imports from U.S. (US$ millions) 342.0 302.7 175.5
\8\...............................
Trade Balance........................ 2.4 -0.3 1.3
Balance with U.S. (US$ millions)... -81.1 -72.2 52.2
External Public Debt................. 3.0 N/A N/A
Fiscal Deficit/GDP (pct) \9\......... 0.2 6.9 10.8
Current Account Deficit/GDP (pct) 7.0 20.8 12
\10\................................
Debt Service Payments/GDP (pct)...... 2.0 N/A N/A
Gold and Foreign Exchange Reserves 2.1 2.0 2.5
\11\................................
Aid from U.S. (US$ millions) \12\.... 0.2 0.2 0.2
Aid from Other Sources............... N/A N/A N/A
------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ All 1998 GDP data is provisional.
\2\ 1999 estimates are annualized based on January-June data from the
Central Bank of Oman and the September 30, 1999 Ministry of National
Economy statistical bulletin unless otherwise indicated.
\3\ The 1999 GDP growth rate was determined by annualizing the January-
June 1999 GDP, using September 1999 statistics published by the
Ministry of National Economy.
\4\ Health and Education are included in services, although most
government-provided services shown are current (not capital)
expenditures for public administration and defense.
\5\ 1999 money supply data is based on January through June 1999.
Source: Central Bank of Oman.
\6\ Muscat Governate CPI.
\7\ The trade balance with the U.S. does not include Omani oil purchased
by the United States on the spot market. Trade data does not
necessarily include all U.S. exports subsequently reexported to Oman
from Dubai, UAE, primary entrance point for most U.S. goods to the
southern Arabian Peninsula.
\8\ 1999 trade data is annualized using January-September 1999 figures
from the U.S. Department of Commerce. 1997-1999 trade data is from the
U.S. Department of Commerce, which has lower figures for U.S. exports
to Oman than Omani customs data, presumably due to the large numbers
of U.S. products re-exported to Oman from the United Arab Emirates.
\9\ Fiscal deficit as a percentage of GDP was annualized using the
August 31, 1999 figures.
\10\ Current account deficit for 1999 is based on the Standard and
Poor's projection for the year.
\11\ Data represent Central Bank assets. 1999 data is June 30, 1999
balance. The State General Reserve Fund does not publish its holdings.
\12\ Funding for International Military Education and Training (IMET)
program.
Sources: Central Bank of Oman, Ministry of National Economy. Bilateral
trade data is from U.S. Department of Commerce.
1. General Policy Framework
The Sultanate of Oman is a nation of 2.3 million people (including
as many as 600,000 expatriates) living in the arid mountains and desert
plain of the southeastern Arabian Peninsula. Oman's nominal GDP in 1998
was $14.1 billion, a decline of 10.6 percent from 1997. Oman is a small
oil producer and ranks 18th in the world for overall oil production. In
1998, Oman cut oil production to about 820,000 barrels per day in line
with OPEC production cuts although Oman is not a member of OPEC. This
was in response to declining oil prices in 1998, which saw a 29 percent
drop in Omani oil revenue in 1998. This production cut was maintained
in 1999 even after the oil price recovery which began during the second
quarter of 1999. Oil revenue accounted for 61 percent of government
revenues in the first eight months of 1999. Oman's estimated per capita
GDP dropped from about $ 7,000 in 1997 to about $ 6,100 in 1998.
Preliminary figures released by the Ministry of National Economy
indicate no GDP growth during the first six months of 1999. However,
the recovery in oil prices witnessed during the second quarter of 1999
will most likely bring about a positive GDP growth of about one percent
and a corresponding increase in per capita income. Oil revenues
increased by 12.4 percent during the period January through July 1999
compared to the same period in 1998. Preliminary 1999 figures also
indicate a decrease in total imports of about 15 percent and an
increase in exports of about 6.7 percent during the first seven months
of 1999. This should result in a $1.3 billion trade surplus at the end
of 1999.
A significant proportion of Oman's rural population lives near the
poverty line. The annual population growth, as estimated by the
government, is around 2 percent. This presents an ever-increasing
demand on infrastructure. It is estimated that 46 percent of the Omani
population is under the age of 15 and 70 percent of the population is
under the age of 25. Therefore job creation and ``Omanization,'' i.e.,
transfer of expatriate jobs to Omanis, are major government priorities.
The Omani Government links developmental priorities and budgetary
plans in five-year planning cycles. Oman's Fifth Five Year Plan, 1996-
2000, laid out a program designed to shift economic development from
governmental to private initiative; diversify the national economy from
dependence on crude oil revenue, primarily through future natural gas
sales and light industry; and educate a productive national work force
for private employment. Aiming at a zero deficit by the year 2000,
stringent annual budgets were planned on the basis of revenue of $15
per barrel of petroleum. While the 1997 budget deficit was just $47
million, the sharp drop in oil prices in 1998 left Oman with a budget
deficit of nearly $975 million in 1998, or approximately 6.9 percent of
GDP. Despite fiscal tightening, there is no personal income tax in
Oman, and with the exception of the recent introduction of modest fees
for medical visits, Omanis continue to enjoy free medical care and free
education, including post-secondary school, vocational and higher
education. With oil prices around $ 10 a barrel by the end of 1998, the
1999 State General Budget reduced expenditures by about 6 percent
(compared to the 1998 budget) without affecting spending on such
services as health, education, and electricity. The Omani government
also took measures to increase non oil revenue in 1999 by increasing
customs duties to 15 percent on a wide range of goods including
automobiles and increasing the corporate income tax from 7.5 percent to
12 percent. Preliminary figures issued by the Ministry of National
Economy for the first eight months of 1999 revealed a fiscal deficit of
around $ 1 billion.
Among major public expenditure categories in 1998, defense and
security accounted for 38 percent of current expenditures (military
capital expenditures are not published). Current and capital
expenditures for the national oil company Petroleum Development Oman
(PDO) accounted for 15.2 percent of total public expenditures. This
trend continued in 1999, as defense and security current expenditures
accounted for 39 percent and PDO current and capital expenditure
accounted for 13.9 percent of total public expenditures through the end
of August 1999.
Oman's economy is too small to require a complicated monetary
policy. The Central Bank of Oman directly regulates the flow of
currency into the economy. The most important instruments which the
bank uses are reserve requirements, loan to deposit ratios, treasury
bills, rediscount policies, currency swaps and interest rate ceilings
on deposits and loans. Such tools are used to regulate the commercial
banks, provide foreign exchange and raise revenue, not as a means to
control the money supply. The large amounts of money repatriated from
Oman by foreign workers and by foreign companies in Oman help ease
monetary pressures but also contributes to current account deficits.
Outward workers' remittances decreased by 13 percent in 1997 to $1.5
billion, or 9.5 percent of GDP. Though outward workers remittance was
further reduced to $ 1.4 billion in 1998, it increased as a percentage
of GDP.
2. Exchange Rate Policies
The rial has been pegged to the dollar since 1973. Since a 10.2
percent devaluation in 1986, it has remained steady at about $2.60 to 1
rial.
3. Structural Policies
Oman operates a free market economy, but the government is at
present the most important economic actor, both as an employer and as a
purchaser of goods and services. Contracts for goods and services for
the government, including the two largest purchasers, Petroleum
Development Oman and the Defense Ministry, are done on the basis of
tenders overseen by a Tender Board. Oman promotes private investment
through a variety of soft loans (currently through the Ministry of
Commerce and Industry and, for projects under 250,000 R.O., the Oman
Development Bank, reorganized in 1997), tax incentives, modest
procurement preferences, and subsidies, mostly to industrial and
agricultural ventures. The government grants five-year tax holidays to
newly established industries or expansion projects; a one time renewal
is possible. Oman has fairly rigorous health, safety and environmental
standards, and is attempting to upgrade its enforcement capabilities.
Oman revised its corporate tax structure in 1999 to increase its
non-oil revenue and make it easier for minority foreign-owned joint
ventures to benefit from the national tax rate. A 12 percent maximum
rate of corporate income tax is now applicable to wholly Omani-owned
firms and companies with no more than 49 percent direct foreign
ownership and majority Omani ownership. A graduated system of taxes,
with a ceiling of 25 percent, applies to Omani/foreign joint venture
companies with up to 99 percent direct foreign ownership. 100 percent
foreign owned companies are subject to a corporate taxation rate of up
to 50 percent, however, the tax rate for foreign petroleum companies is
set in concession agreements. Import duties were hiked early in 1999
and are currently between five percent and fifteen percent. There are
no personal income taxes or property taxes. Employers pay 7 percent of
a foreign worker's basic salary to a vocational training fund for
Omanis, and 8 percent of an Omani's basic salary to a social security
fund. The government imposes substantial fees for labor cards, and
companies are liable for fines if they do not reach government-
specified levels of ``Omanization'' by the end of target deadlines.
The Omani government continues to emphasize privatization of the
telecommunications, power, and transport sectors as a national
priority. In 1996, Oman became the first Gulf nation to turn
exclusively to the private sector to finance, build and operate a power
plant, a 90 MW plant in Manah. Title for the Manah plant will revert to
the government after 20 years and the project is undergoing an
expansion to reach 270MW. In 1999, the government awarded a tender for
a 200 MW power plant in Salalah and selected international financial
advisors for planned privatizations in the telecommunications, power,
and aviation sectors. The government has been involved in a number of
joint-ventures with private sector firms in major infrastructure
projects. November 1998 saw the opening of a world-class container
transshipment port at Salalah, owned and operated by Salalah Port
Services (SPS) a joint venture between the Omani Government, Sea-Land
(U.S.), Maersk Lines (Denmark), and Omani investors operating under the
name Salalah Port Services. In mid-1999, Maersk purchased many of Sea-
Land's overseas operations, including Sea-Land's participation in the
Port Salalah project. The container port, already one of the 20 largest
ports in the world is in close proximity to major East-West shipping
lanes and is expected to spur industrial growth in the Salalah area.
In 1999 the government announced plans to establish an industrial
free zone at Port Salalah, under the management of Salalah Port
Services. As of October 1999, construction on the $2 billion Oman
Liquefied Natural Gas (OLNG) plant at Sur was over 90 percent complete.
A joint venture between the Omani Government, Royal Dutch Shell, Total,
and Korea Gas, OLNG is expected to begin deliveries in April 2000. The
entire 6.6 million ton/year LNG output of OLNG has been sold in long
term contracts to Korea, India (an affiliate owned by the U.S. firm
Enron), and Japan. Financing on the downstream plant is on a limited
recourse basis, with upstream facilities and a 360 km pipeline financed
through the corporate developers, principally Royal Dutch Shell. The
future of the proposed Sur fertilizer plant, a joint venture between
the Omani Government and Indian state investors, is not clear at this
stage. The government is also planning gas-driven projects in the
northern Omani port city of Sohar, including a $3 billion aluminum
smelter complex (still seeking technical partners). However, government
plans for a $900 million polyethylene plant in Sohar have stalled as
the originial joint-venture partner, BP/Amoco, withdrew from the
project in 1999. In 1999, the government proceeded with the planned
$250 million expansion of Sohar port, awarding the tender for
breakwater construction to Daewoo, and announced plans to build gas
pipelines to Sohar and Salalah by 2001.
4. Debt Management Policies
Oman's sovereign debt is estimated at $3 billion. In October 1999
the government withdrew plans for a $400 million Eurobond issue, citing
the improved performance of the economy in the wake of increased oil
prices. Although Oman maintains a solid reputation for credit
worthiness, in March 1999, Standard and Poors revised Oman's credit
rating from stable to negative (BBB-). There are no International
Monetary Fund or World Bank adjustment programs. The government gives
little publicity to the occasional modest foreign aid that it donates.
Sultan Qaboos also makes occasional personal donations to Arab causes,
Muslim institutions, or worthy foreign organizations. Oman does not
publish figures on the level of its external debt or its fund to meet
future contingencies, the State General Reserve Fund (SGRF). The 1998
budget crunch required a draw down of $704 million from the SGRF in
1998 and $1.17 billion through August 1999, an increase of 200 percent
over the corresponding period in 1998.
5. Significant Barriers to U.S. Exports
A license is required for all imports. Special licenses are
required to import pharmaceuticals, liquor and defense equipment. Some
foreign suppliers have previously complained that exclusive agency
agreements are difficult to break. In September 1996, Oman amended its
agency law to allow non-exclusive representational agreements. Although
currently not a member of the WTO, Oman is actively seeking to accede
to the WTO and will need to introduce new legislation in order to
comply with WTO requirements on market access for goods and services,
intellectual property protection, and customs valuation.
Services barriers consist of simple prohibitions on entering the
market. For example, entry by new foreign firms in the areas of
banking, accountancy, law and insurance is not permitted (except as
contracted for specialized services required by the government),
although joint ventures for professional services are encouraged
between Omanis and foreign firms. The central bank seeks the
strengthening and further consolidation of existing banks. It has
placed limits on the percentage of the consumer loan portfolio and is
pressing for the BIS 12 percent capital adequacy standard. Citibank has
a wholly-owned branch in Muscat. Major U.S. engineering and accounting
firms are well represented. Omani firms appear quite open to
affiliation with U.S. firms. The U.S. firm Curtiss, Mallet-Prevost,
Colt & Mosle is the only U.S. law firm with an office in Muscat and
serves as legal counsel to the Ministry of Electricity of Water for the
Salalah power privatization project.
Tax policy discourages wholly foreign-owned firms. Oman attempts to
attract foreign firms and investors to participate in joint ventures
with Omani majority ownership. It has a case-by-case approach towards
major projects by wholly or largely foreign owned firms. For very large
strategic projects, Oman may offer foreign investors control
commensurate with their investment and risk.
Oman uses a mix of standards and specifications systems. Generally,
GCC standards are adopted and used. However, because of the long
history of trade relations with the UK, British standards have also
been adopted for many items, including electrical specifications. Oman
is a member of the International Standards Organization and applies
standards recommended by that organization. U.S. exporters sometimes
run afoul of dual language labeling requirements or, because of long
shipping periods, have trouble complying with shelf-life requirements.
U.S. export brokers and Omani trading firms are prone to trade
difficulties when deliveries are not made within demanding government
tender delivery dates.
Despite requirements to ``Omanize'' the work force, the private
sector depends on a high number of expatriates for managerial,
technical, and physical labor. Government statistics indicate that over
90 percent of workers in the private sector are expatriates.
Oman continues to promote ``Buy Omani'' laws; this is a slow
process as very few locally made goods meeting international standards
are available. The Tender Board evaluates the bids of Omani companies
for products and services at 10 percent less than the actual bid price,
but imported goods and services bid by Omani agents are said to receive
the same national preference. Because of short lead times on open
tenders, it is often difficult to notify U.S. firms of trade and
investment possibilities, and thereafter difficult for those firms to
obtain a local agent and prepare tender documents. Foreign firms
seeking to compete for open and unpublished tenders find it
advantageous to develop relationships with local firms.
Oman's customs procedures are complex. There are complaints of
sudden changes in the enforcement of regulations. As part of
``Omanization,'' only Omani nationals are permitted to clear shipments.
Processing of shipments at Omani ports and airports can add
significantly to the amount of time that it takes to get goods to the
market or inputs to a project. Overland shipments from the UAE seldom
encounter problems.
Oman substantially eased visa requirements in 1999 by offering a 72
hour visa for U.S. and European tourists and businessmen arriving at
Muscat's Seeb Airport. However, this visa is non-extendable and the
airline carrying the passenger is responsible for ensuring that the
visitor departs on time, which in turn has discouraged use of this
visa. Two-year multiple entry visas can be issued to American tourists
and business representatives. In general, these visas are only issued
at Oman's Washington embassy, although U.S. professionals residing in
GCC countries can receive multiple-entry visas at the port of entry.
Visa denials are not unusual for unaccompanied women tourists and young
adult males. In late 1996, the Royal Oman Police reduced non-resident
stays from two months to one month per entry, thereby hampering
business visits of longer duration by U.S. and by non-U.S. citizen
employees of U.S. firms. These visas can only be extended outside Oman,
so visitors whose activities keep them here longer than a month face
the added expense of a trip, usually to Dubai, for a visa renewal.
6. Export Subsidies Policies
Oman's policies on development of light industry, fisheries, and
agriculture aim to make those sectors competitive internationally.
Investors in these three sectors receive a full range of tax
exemptions, utility discounts, soft loans and, in some cases, tariff
protection. The government has also set up an export guarantee program
which both subsidizes the cost of export loans and offers a discounted
factoring service.
7. Protection of U.S. Intellectual Property
Oman's record on intellectual property protection has improved
dramatically in recent years, in tandem with its efforts to accede to
the World Trade Organization (WTO). Oman will have to meet its
obligations under the WTO's Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property (TRIPS) Agreement immediately upon WTO accession. Oman is a
member of the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), and in
1998 declared its accession to the Paris Convention for the Protection
of Industrial Property (patents, trademarks and related industrial
property) and Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and
Artistic Works. In 1998 and 1999, the Omani government implemented a
ban on sales of pirated video and audiocassettes and pirated computer
software, which once had dominated the local market. Since government
enforcement of these bans began, sales of pirated tapes and computer
software has virtually disappeared.
Oman has a trademark law which it enforces. It does not, however,
protect well-known marks unless they are registered in Oman.
Application for trademark protection also requires a local agent. Oman
affords little or no patent protection in critical areas such as
pharmaceutical products. Oman has said it would recognize patents
issued by the GCC patent office, but that offer will be of little value
until the GCC patent office, which opened in November 1998, is running
effectively.
8. Worker Rights
Sultan Qaboos issued a Basic Law November 6, 1996 that serves as
Oman's first written basic framework, akin to a constitution but
consistent with Islamic Shari'a Law. In theory, the Sultanate should
have issued legislation implementing the Basic Law's provisions within
two years of its issuance. It is unclear whether or how any of the
expected implementing measures will affect worker rights.
a. The Right of Association: Articles 33 and 34 of the Basic Law
establish the right to assemble and freedom of association when
consistent with legal limitations and objectives. Currently, Omanis and
resident foreigners alike are free to join only the relatively few
officially sanctioned associations.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively: Since 1994, the
Sultanate has indicated that it is reviewing a new labor law drafted by
the Ministry of Social Affairs and Labor. Sultanate officials have
characterized its provisions as consistent with international labor
standards. It will reportedly contain a provision for the establishment
of worker committees in the work place and remove the current
prohibition against strikes. Oman is a member of the International
Labor Organization.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor: Compulsory or forced
labor is illegal. That said, foreign workers are typically unaware of
their right to take disputes over contract enforcement to the Labor
Welfare Board or are afraid that questions regarding their employment
status will result in deportation.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children: The Ministry of Social
Affairs and Labor enforces 13 as the minimum employment age. Employers
require the Ministry's approval to engage children between 13 and 16
years of age in overtime, night, weekend or holiday, or strenuous work.
Nonetheless, small family businesses in practice may employ underage
children, particularly in the agricultural and fisheries sectors.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work: The minimum wage for
nonprofessional expatriate workers is about $156 month, less any
charges by Omani sponsors for the workers' visas, but does not cover
domestic workers, farm hands, government employees, and workers in
small businesses. Omani nationals tend to be well protected. Most
employed Omanis work for the government, with a 35 hour work week and
generous leave of between 42 to 60 days annually plus 9 days emergency
leave and Omani holidays. Skilled foreign workers predominate in
private sector employment and enjoy regionally competitive wages and
benefits. Whether covered by the law or not, many unskilled foreign
workers work for less than the minimum wage and for hours exceeding the
40 to 45 hour private sector work week. The temperature during Oman's
hot summer has never been officially recorded at the 50 degree
(Celsius) mark, which, adhering to an International Labor Organization
standard, would mandate the stoppage of outside labor. Non-Muslim
workers are expected to respect the Ramadan month of daytime fasting by
not publicly drinking or eating. Foreign workers find Oman very
attractive for its employment opportunities and general living
conditions.
f. Rights in Sectors with U.S. Investment: To date, U.S. firms have
little direct investment in Oman. U.S. petroleum firms operating in
Oman comply fully with Omani labor law.
Extent of U.S. Investment in Selected Industries--U.S. Direct Investment Position Abroad on an Historical Cost
Basis--1998
[Millions of U.S. Dollars]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Category Amount
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Petroleum...................... .............. 59
Total Manufacturing............ .............. 0
Food & Kindred Products...... 0 ...............................................................
Chemicals & Allied Products.. 0 ...............................................................
Primary & Fabricated Metals.. 0 ...............................................................
Industrial Machinery and 0 ...............................................................
Equipment.
Electric & Electronic 0 ...............................................................
Equipment.
Transportation Equipment..... 0 ...............................................................
Other Manufacturing.......... 0 ...............................................................
Wholesale Trade................ .............. 0
Banking........................ .............. (\1\)
Finance/Insurance/Real Estate.. .............. (\1\)
Services....................... .............. 0
Other Industries............... .............. 0
TOTAL ALL INDUSTRIES........... .............. 84
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Suppressed to avoid disclosing data of individual companies.
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis.
______
SAUDI ARABIA
Key Economic Indicators
[Billions of U.S. Dollars unless otherwise indicated]
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1997 1998 \1\ \2\ 1999
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Income, Production and Employment:
Nominal GDP......................... 146.3 128.9 140.0
Real GDP Growth (pct)............... 1.9 1.6 1.0
GDP by Sector:
Agriculture....................... 8.9 9.1 N/A
Manufacturing (including oil)..... 13.5 12.6 N/A
Services.......................... 56.2 57.5 N/A
Government........................ 36.7 34.2 N/A
Per Capita GDP (US$)................ 6,836 6,190 6,543
Labor Force (millions).............. 6.7 6.5 N/A
Unemployment Rate (pct)............. N/A N/A N/A
Money and Prices (annual percentage
growth):
Money Supply Growth (M2)............ 6.6 2.4 N/A
Consumer Price Inflation............ -0.4 -0.2 1.0
Exchange Rate (SR/US$ annual
average)
Official.......................... 3.745 3.745 3.745
Balance of Payments and Trade:
Total Exports FOB................... 60.7 39.7 37.5
Exports to U.S.................... 9.4 5.1 N/A
Total Imports FOB................... -26.4 -27.5 -27.4
Imports from U.S.................. 5.9 5.9 N/A
Trade Balance....................... 34.2 12.1 10.0
Balance with U.S.................. N/A N/A N/A
Current Account Deficit/GDP (pct)... 0.3 -13 -5
External Public Debt................ N/A N/A N/A
Debt Service Payments/GDP (pct)..... 4.7 5.3 5.1
Fiscal Deficit/GDP (pct)............ 1.1 8.8 N/A
Gold and Foreign Exchange Reserves.. 17.8 17.8 N/A
Aid from U.S........................ 0 0 0
Aid from All Other Sources.......... 0 0 0
------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ 1999 figures are projections.
\2\ Sources: IMF International Statistics Yearbook 1999; Saudi-American
Bank Economic and Market Update; U.S. Embassy Riyadh 1999 Saudi
Economic Trends Report; IMF Saudi Arabia Statistical Index.
1. General Policy Framework
Saudi Arabia generally sets a framework for a free market economy,
but with parastatals dominating economic output. Government policies
generally encourage commercial enterprise, but a strict interpretation
of Islamic mores limits the range of policy options as well as that of
commercial endeavors. Since about 1970, Saudi Arabia has published a
series of five-year development plans, focusing on infrastructure and
industrialization. Development plans, however, are presented as
planning tools, not as centralized controls, and the government
emphasizes that its development plans rely on significant private
sector involvement.
The oil and government sectors are the engines of the economy.
Parastatal enterprises, including Saudi ARAMCO (oil), Saudi Basic
Industries Corporation (SABIC), and utilities, among others, tend to
dominate the economy. Spending decisions taken by the few large state
companies reverberate throughout the economy. Concerned with the
security challenges posed by its neighbors, Saudi Arabia seeks
sufficient military and security resources to protect its territory.
The Saudis also protect the pilgrims who visit the two Islamic holy
cities of Mecca and Medina. The kingdom is also a large buyer of
advanced military technology.
In 1998, oil sector revenues comprised an estimated 37 percent of
GDP, and an estimated 70 percent of budget revenues. Other government
revenues, including items such as customs duties, investment income,
and fees for services, are to a large degree indirectly tied to oil, as
capital available for consumption and investment is generally derived
from oil receipts. In addition, the manufacturing and services sectors
are largely dependent on petroleum and petrochemical activities.
Starting with the oil boom dating from 1973, Saudi Arabia
maintained annual budget surpluses until 1982, when the decline in oil
prices led to a renewed deficit. These deficits have continued for the
past 17 years. Initially, the deficits were financed by a drawdown of
foreign exchange reserves. Starting in 1987, the government began
financing deficits by issuing government bonds, and taking loans from
domestic banks. The government has also accrued substantial arrearages
to the private sector over the past decade, though these were paid down
substantially in 1996 and 1997 with unanticipated oil revenues from
these years.
Spending in 1996 exceeded the budgeted target by $12 billion, but
because of high oil revenues, the government achieved its deficit
target of $4.5 billion. Oil revenues were higher than anticipated for
1997 as well, allowing the government to end the year with a small $1.6
billion deficit. However, the collapse in oil prices in late November
1997 brought this favorable fiscal trend to an end. Saudi oil revenues
dropped by 35 percent in 1998, leading to a deficit of $12.3 billion,
or almost 10 percent of GDP. Oil prices have rebounded in 1999 and,
coupled with increased fiscal discipline, have lowered the projected
deficit to the $4-6 billion range. The government's hopes of achieving
a balanced budget by 2000 depend mostly on what oil prices will be in
that year.
Money supply is regulated through the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency
(SAMA), which has statutory authority to set monetary reserve
requirements for Saudi Arabian banks, impose limits on their total loan
portfolio, and regulate the minimum ratio of domestic assets to their
total assets. It also manages the bond market, and can repurchase
development bonds and treasury bills as required. There is a limit to
the amount of bonds that can be repurchased. SAMA oversees a financial
sector consisting of 10 commercial banks. All 10 banks have majority
private ownership, with the exception of National Commercial Bank,
where state institutions purchased 50 percent of total shares in 1999.
The Ministry of Finance oversees five specialized credit institutions.
2. Exchange Rate Policy
The exchange rate for the Saudi Arabian Riyal is SR 3.745 =
US$1.00. This rate has been consistent since 1986. Officially, the
Riyal is pegged to the IMF's Special Drawing Rights (SDR) at SR 4.28255
= SDR 1. There are no taxes on the purchase or sale of foreign
exchange.
Generally speaking, there are few foreign exchange controls for
either residents or nonresidents, in keeping with the government policy
to encourage an open economy. Of the few restrictions, the most
noteworthy are: direct commercial transactions with Israel and Israeli-
registered corporations are prohibited, as are most transactions with
Iraq; and, local banks are prohibited from inviting foreign banks to
participate in riyal-denominated transactions without prior SAMA
approval.
3. Structural Policies
The government maintains price controls for basic utilities,
energy, and many agricultural products. Water and electricity, for most
consumers, are subsidized, with consumer prices often well below the
cost of production, especially for potable water. Petroleum products
and feedstocks for petrochemical industries are provided at below world
market pricing, presumably reflecting discounts for lower costs in
production and transport. The government maintains that local petroleum
prices that are below world market averages (e.g., a gallon of gasoline
sells for $.90 at the pump) reflect the low costs of production.
Nonetheless, the effect of these low prices is that petroleum products,
including many petrochemicals, are sold in Saudi Arabia at prices that
effectively eliminate competing imports. Agricultural subsidies were
dramatically curtailed in the early 1990s and have been reduced in
recent budgets, in line with the government's deficit reduction plans
and its goal to reduce water consumption.
The Saudi Arabian Government imposes few taxes, relying on oil
revenues, customs duties, and licensing fees for most government
revenue. Saudi Arabian nationals pay no income tax, but are obliged to
pay ``zakat,'' a 2.5 percent Islamic assessment based on net wealth
(not income). Zakat is designed to support the Islamic community (e.g.,
to pay for hospitals, schools, support for the indigent). Saudi-owned
businesses do not pay corporate tax beyond the ``zakat.'' Foreign
companies and self-employed foreigners pay an income tax, but do not
pay zakat. Business income tax rates range from 25 percent on annual
profits of less than $26,667 to a maximum rate of 45 percent for
profits of more than $266,667. Some foreign investors avoid taxation
either in part or totally, by taking advantage of various investment
incentives, such as 10-year tax holidays for investments in approved
projects meeting specified requirements. Import tariffs are generally
12 percent ad valorem (CIF), except on products imported from other
member states of the Gulf Cooperation Council. Certain specified
essential commodities (e.g., defense purchases) are not subject to
custom duties. Saudi Arabia also levies a maximum 20 percent tariff on
products that compete with local ``infant'' industries.
The Saudi Arabian Government is currently considering changes to
the Foreign Investment Code and related foreign corporate taxation
laws, which may result in significant reductions in the amount foreign
corporations are taxed. Changes to Saudi Arabia's tariff structure are
also being considered in the context of Saudi Arabia's effort to gain
membership in the World Trade Organization.
4. Debt Management Policies
Saudi Arabia is a net creditor in world financial markets. SAMA
manages foreign assets of roughly $54 billion in its issues and banking
departments, and an estimated $29 billion for autonomous government
institutions, including the Saudi Pension Fund, the Saudi Fund for
Development, and the General Organization for Social Insurance. Under
SAMA's rules, $17.8 billion of the roughly $54 billion in foreign
assets is designated to guarantee the Saudi Riyal. In addition to
overseas assets managed by SAMA, the commercial banking system has an
estimated net foreign asset position of $11.4 billion.
Public sector foreign debt, which stood at a level of $1.8 billion
at the beginning of 1995, was retired in May of that year. Domestic
banks, Saudi ARAMCO, Saudi Arabian Airlines, and other state-owned
enterprises, however, have overseas liabilities.
Government domestic borrowing has a short history in Saudi Arabia.
The government began borrowing to finance budget deficits in 1987 by
selling government development bonds having two-to-five year
maturities. After the massive defense expenditures of the 1991 Gulf
War, the government expanded its borrowing by signing loan syndications
with international and domestic banks, and by introducing treasury
bills. This debt, owed almost entirely to domestic creditors, such as
autonomous government institutions, commercial banks, and individuals,
ballooned to about $130 billion by the end of 1998, or over the GDP
level. In addition, the government issued a series of bonds to farmers
and some other private sector creditors (mainly contractors) for past
due amounts. Paying down this debt is now a focus of government
concern.
Non-governmental external debt stood at $28 billion in 1998, up
from $16 billion in 1996. This debt is serviceable, especially in light
of improved oil revenues.
5. Significant Barriers to U.S. Exports
Saudi Arabia is currently in the process of negotiating accession
to the World Trade Organization (WTO). This may result in changes to a
number of current regulations that have the potential to restrict entry
of U.S. exports and investments.
Import licensing requirements protect Saudi Arabian industries or
enhance Saudi Arabian businesses. In most cases, foreign companies must
operate through a Saudi Arabian agent. Contractors for public projects
must purchase equipment and most supplies through Saudi agents. (This
agency requirement does not apply to defense-related imports.) Saudi
Arabia requires licenses to import agricultural products.
Saudi Arabia's preshipment inspection regime, known as the
International Conformity Certification Program (ICCP), is designed to
protect Saudi Arabian consumers from inferior foreign products. The
ICCP has elements that can be viewed as barriers to free trade--such as
an ad valorem-based fee schedule--and remains controversial. It adds
inspection costs to imported civilian products, may delay shipments to
Saudi Arabia, and can increase exporter overhead.
Restrictions on shelf life labeling standards in Saudi Arabia may
make it difficult for some U.S. food producers to compete in the Saudi
market.
Saudi Arabia gives preference to imports from other members of the
Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) in government purchasing, with a 10
percent price preference over non-GCC products for government
procurement.
Saudi Arabia requires foreign civilian contractors to subcontract
30 percent of the value of government non-military contracts, including
support services, to firms having Saudi-majority ownership. Many firms
have reported that this has not been enforced consistently. Some U.S.
businessmen have complained that this is a barrier to the export of
U.S. engineering and construction services. Other service industries
are restricted to government-owned companies, e.g., certain insurance
and transportation services.
The ``Investment of Foreign Capital Regulation'' establishes the
following conditions for a non-Saudi national to obtain a license for a
business and for investment of foreign capital (considerable revisions
to the Regulation are nearing completion):
a. Foreign capital must be invested in a development project, or in
projects within the framework of the development plan in effect at the
time of the investment. Investments in oil and mineral sectors are
subject to special regulations of the Ministry of Petroleum and Mineral
Resources.
b. Foreign capital investment must be accompanied by foreign
technical expertise. In addition, the ``foreign capital investment
committee,'' established by the ``investment of foreign capital
regulation,'' reviews license applications. The committee's screening
of foreign investments is general; the criteria for screening, other
than the two conditions listed above, appear to be limited to:
--Ensuring that an investment does not violate the social or
religious mores of Saudi Arabia.
--Regulating the number of establishments in any one sector,
to the level that the market will sustain.
There is no requirement that a non-Saudi investor have a Saudi
partner. At the same time, businesses having a minimum of 25 percent
Saudi ownership are eligible for soft government loans, which are
generally unavailable to firms lacking Saudi ownership. The government
is currently reviewing foreign investment and agency regulations.
Saudi labor law requires companies to employ Saudi nationals, but
foreigners account for at least 90 percent of the private sector labor
force. Large companies are required to increase their percentage of
Saudi employees by a certain percentage annually or face restrictions.
This emphasis on ``Saudiization'' is increasing as the number of
unemployed/underemployed Saudis increases.
6. Export Subsidies Policies
Saudi Arabian planners say that there are no export subsidy
programs for industrial projects. Because feedstock prices are
relatively low in Saudi Arabia, industrial production of petroleum and
related downstream products is comparatively attractive. The government
argues that this is simply a reflection of the low cost of domestic oil
production. On January 1, 1998, the Saudi Government announced a 50
percent across-the-board increase in natural gas prices from $.50/
million btu to $.75/million btu. The government has reduced subsidies
to agriculture, which has resulted in reduced agricultural production
available for export.
7. Protection of U.S. Intellectual Property
Saudi Arabia has applied to join the World Trade Organization
(WTO). As part of its accession effort, Saudi Arabia is revising all of
its intellectual property laws to make them conform with the WTO's
Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property (TRIPs) standards. Saudi
Arabia remains on the USTR's ``Special 301 Watch List,'' having moved
up in 1996 from the program's ``Priority Watch List'' in recognition of
progress made in intellectual property rights protection. Saudi Arabia
has joined the Universal Copyright Convention, and is a member of the
World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), though not a
contracting party to any of the treaties administered by WIPO. Efforts
to protect intellectual property rights are uneven, and audio, video
and software companies want greater protection of their product content
in the Kingdom.
Saudi Arabia has enacted a patent regulation and established a
patent office. The regulation was patterned along the lines of the U.S.
patent law, but does not reproduce it. The terms of patent protection
are generally adequate, but the period of protection is 15 years, five
years less than the international TRIPs standard. The regulation
permits compulsory licensing if the patent holder refuses to use the
patent, or for other public policy reasons, on a wider basis than
permitted under TRIPs. Further, the Saudi Patent Office is functionally
slow. The office has received several thousand patent applications
since 1989, but has completed action on only a relative handful. The
patent office lacks sufficient manpower to process the backlog of
applications. The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) established a parallel
patent office in October 1998, but that office is not yet issuing
patents.
Registration of trademarks is relatively uncomplicated, although
some companies have complained that registration and search fees are
high. Although legal remedies for infringement of a trademark exist,
enforcement of trademark protection is inconsistent.
The embassy has received no verifiable reports of book piracy, and
only one report of the unlicensed use of a published photograph. Piracy
of U.S.-produced audio and videocassettes has decreased due to
government enforcement polices but remains a problem. Estimates of
losses to computer software companies due to illegal copying vary
widely, but are generally considered high.
8. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association: Saudi regulations prohibit labor
associations.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively: Expatriates
perform much skilled and almost all unskilled labor. Non-Saudi workers
who seek to organize may be deported.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor: Forced labor is
prohibited. However, as most unskilled labor is performed by
expatriates, and as Saudi employers have legal authority over the
movement of their contracted laborers, low paying labor may occur,
especially in the case of domestic servants and in remote areas. During
the past three years, the government has expelled many workers without
proper work permits. One result of this may be to reduce the potential
for abuse.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children: The labor law states
that ``a juvenile who has not completed 13 years of age shall not be
employed.'' This restriction may be waived by application to the
Ministry of Labor with the consent of the juvenile's parent or
guardian. Children under 18 and women may not be employed in hazardous
or unhealthy occupations. Wholly-owned family businesses and family-run
farms are exempt from these rules.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work: Saudi Arabian authorities
consider that provisions of Islamic Law (the Shariah) provide more than
adequate protection for laborers, and therefore additional regulation
is unnecessary. Conditions of labor, while far from perfect, may in
some cases be better than those found in countries from which most
poorer expatriates come. Although Saudi Arabia has no minimum wage,
generally speaking, expatriate laborers come to Saudi Arabia because
they can earn more than they could at home. They receive time-and-one-
half for hours (up to 12) over the 44 hours normally worked per week.
The labor law requires employers to provide health insurance and to
protect workers from job-related hazards and diseases.
f. Rights in Sectors with U.S. Investment: Worker rights in sectors
with U.S. investment do not differ from those elsewhere. Conditions of
work at major U.S. firms and joint-venture enterprises are generally
better than elsewhere in the Saudi economy. Workers in U.S. firms
normally work a five to five-and-one-half day week (i.e., 44 hours)
with paid overtime. Overall compensation tends to be at levels that
make employment with U.S. firms attractive.
Extent of U.S. Investment in Selected Industries--U.S. Direct Investment in Saudi Arabia on a Historical Cost
Basis--1998. Generally it is assumed that the true value of U.S. direct investment in Saudi Arabia is in the
range of $7-8 billion with the large majority in the petrochemical field. Antitrust concerns and general
difficulties in gathering statistics make the exact aggregation of data impossible.
[Millions of U.S. Dollars]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Category Amount
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Petroleum...................... .............. 270
Total Manufacturing............ .............. 149
Food & Kindred Products...... 14 ...............................................................
Chemicals & Allied Products.. (\1\) ...............................................................
Primary & Fabricated Metals.. 20 ...............................................................
Industrial Machinery and (\1\) ...............................................................
Equipment.
Electric & Electronic 1 ...............................................................
Equipment.
Transportation Equipment..... 5 ...............................................................
Other Manufacturing.......... 51 ...............................................................
Wholesale Trade................ .............. 105
Banking........................ .............. (\1\)
Finance/Insurance/Real Estate.. .............. 1,533
Services....................... .............. 280
Other Industries............... .............. (\1\)
TOTAL ALL INDUSTRIES........... .............. 4,209
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Suppressed to avoid disclosing data of individual companies.
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis.
______
TUNISIA
Key Economic Indicators
[Millions of U.S. Dollars unless otherwise indicated]
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1997 1998 \1\ 1999
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Income, Production and Employment:
Nominal GDP \2\................... 16,594.7 17,3463.3 18,733.7
Real GDP Growth (pct) \3\......... 5.4 5.0 6.2
GDP by Sector:
Agriculture..................... 2,533.4 2,4812 2,732.1
Manufacturing................... 3,496.7 3,636.8 3,924.7
Services........................ 6,514.0 6,919.9 7,535.2
Government...................... 2,565.0 2,680.4 2,797.1
Per Capita GDP (US$).............. 1,953.4 2,098.2 2,238.2
Labor Force (000's)............... 2,850 2,920 2,990
Unemployment Rate (pct)........... 16 16 15.6
Money and Prices (annual percentage
growth):
Money Supply Growth (M2).......... 16 6 9
Consumer Price Inflation.......... 3.7 3.1 3.0
Exchange Rate (TD/US$ annual
average)
Official........................ 1.1 1.1 1.2
Parallel........................ N/A N/A N/A
Balance of Payments and Trade:
Total Exports FOB \4\............. 5,589.0 5,717.8 5,878.2
Exports to U.S.\4\.............. 37.6 28.3 49.5
Total Imports CIF \4\............. 7,994.1 8,324.1 8,373.0
Imports from U.S.\4\............ 343.4 287.7 411.3
Trade Balance \4\................. -2,405.1 -2,606.3 -2,494.8
Balance with U.S................ -305.7 -259.4 -361.8
External Public Debt.............. 9,836.4 9,409.6 10,265.0
Fiscal Deficit/GDP (pct).......... 4.2 3.0 2.8
Current Account Deficit/GDP (pct). 3.3 3.4 2.0
Debt Service Payment/GDP (pct).... 8.2 7.6 7.9
Gold and Foreign Exchange Reserves 2,100 1,750 2,100
Aid from U.S...................... 0.9 0.9 8.4
Aid from All Other Sources \5\.... N/A N/A N/A
------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ 1999 figures are all estimates based on available monthly data in
November.
\2\ GDP at factor cost.
\3\ Percentage changes calculated in local currency.
\4\ Merchandise trade.
\5\ Tunisia does not publish official aid figures.
Source: Tunisian Central Bank and other government sources.
1. General Policy Framework
Tunisia has made significant progress toward establishing a market
economy over the past decade. The European Union (EU)-Tunisian Free
Trade Accord was signed in 1995 and formally came into effect on March
1, 1998. Tunisia, having started implementing significant reforms in
1996, is on schedule in reforming its economy as required by the
Accord. Over a 12-year period, the terms of the Accord require the
Tunisian Government to eliminate import tariffs and open the market to
business competition. Although tariff revenues decreased from $732
million in 1997 to $620 million in 1998, they reached $741 million in
1999 due to increased levels of imports. Initially, the government
expects significant economic turmoil as state owned firms are
privatized, jobs are eliminated and companies are forced to become more
efficient. This should adversely affect unemployment which is
officially 15.6 percent, but is widely believed to be higher, with some
regions registering 30 percent. However, in the long run, the accord
should help the country by attracting foreign investment and creating
an export-oriented economy based increasingly on manufactured products.
The government's fiscal policy is socially oriented, designed to
raise living standards and reduce poverty while maintaining economic
and political stability. Approximately 58 percent of the government's
budget is allocated for social programs, providing subsidies for
education, basic foodstuffs and support for the poorest sectors of
society. Since 1996, annual minimum wage increases have kept pace with
the official inflation rate, which has averaged less than four percent
annually for the period. The government has been commended by the IMF
for prudent fiscal monetary measures in 1997, including trimming
government expenditures while implementing food and energy price
increases, as well as lowering tariff and nontariff barriers to trade.
These trends continued in 1998 and 1999.
Tunisia needed to raise $614 million in 1999 to finance its budget
deficit which is equal to 2.8 percent of the 1999 projected Gross
Domestic Product (GDP) of over $21.5 billion. Tunisia's economic
performance and low perceived commercial and political risk have been
recognized in international financial markets, permitting the
government to successfully float loans in the bond market. In 1997, the
government tapped the U.S. market for the first time with the
successful issuance of $400 million of ``Yankee'' bonds. In 1999,
Tunisia became the first African country to tap the Euro denominated
bond market with a successful $209 million bond offering.
The government predicts GDP growth of 6.2 percent for 1999, after
posting 5.0 percent GDP growth in 1998. Tunisia maintains significant
trade barriers to control the growth of imports and contain its trade
deficit, which decreased over four percent from 1998 to 1999. Imports
of goods and agricultural products rose during the last three years
despite increased domestic agricultural production. Imports of consumer
goods increased enough in 1997 that the government unofficially began
restricting some imports, but this was not the case in 1998 or 1999.
Customs duties and other import taxes will remain in place. In 1999,
U.S. goods represented only 4.1 percent of total goods and services
imported, but the U.S. held an eight to one trade surplus (according to
Tunisian statistics) with Tunisia, primarily due to agricultural
products. Trade with the U.S. experienced a strong rebound in 1999
after a down turn in 1998, and the U.S.-North Africa Economic
Partnership, proposed in 1998 and officially launched in March 1999,
has the potential to bring about a significant increase in U.S.
investment and trade with Tunisia. Opportunities for U.S. exports
include electrical power generation systems, construction and
engineering services, telecommunications and computer equipment, and
agricultural products and equipment.
The government, which exercises considerable control over the
central bank, the stock market and other financial institutions, has
kept tight control of the money supply. During the three year span from
1997 to 1999, foreign exchange reserves have averaged about $2 billion,
which represents between two and three months of imports. The
government has continued its policy of not allowing the Tunisian Dinar
to be traded on international markets. Government exchange controls for
Tunisians traveling abroad were recently loosened to allow them to take
up to $855 (1,000 dinars) per year out of the country, doubling the
previous limit of 500 dinars per year.
2. Exchange Rate Policy
While the dinar is not traded internationally on the world market,
it is commercially convertible for most trade and investment
operations, though some restrictions apply. Central bank authorization
is needed for large-scale foreign exchange operations.
The value of the dinar is tied to a basket of foreign currencies,
primarily those of Tunisia's major trading partners, such as Germany,
France, Italy, Japan and the United States. All exchange rate
transactions are done internally, and the Tunisian Central Bank allows
the rate to float within a narrow band fixed by the Bank. There is no
``parallel'' or black market for currency exchanges within Tunisia,
although such markets for the dinar exist in Libya and Algeria. In
1999, the value of the dinar varied considerably versus the dollar. In
January the dollar bought 1.09 dinars, and by July this reached 1.22.
However, by November the rate had fallen to 1.18, giving the dollar an
eight percent appreciation relative to the dinar year-to-date.
3. Structural Policies
To meet the terms of the EU-Tunisian Free Trade Accord, the
government is continuing to introduce structural economic reforms
initiated in 1987 with the IMF and IBRD. As customs duties are
eliminated over a 12-year period for a wide range of imports, Tunisian
companies will have to become more competitive or risk going out of
business. In conjunction with the Accord and in response to World Bank
suggestions, the government has vowed to accelerate its privatization
program. The government privatized approximately 60 companies between
1987 and 1997 raising approximately $400 million. In 1998 alone,
proceeds from privatization surpassed $400 million with the sale of
approximately 20 additional companies. The sale of two cement plants
accounted for $380 million of this amount. In 1999, the rate of
privatization slowed considerably as the planned sale of three
additional cement plants, with the reported value of $500 million, was
rescheduled for 2000. Total receipts from privatization efforts in 1999
were well below $100 million.
Tax and customs policies favor ``offshore'' Tunisian-based foreign
companies which manufacture locally and export 80 percent or more of
their production, enjoying 10-year tax-free status and other benefits.
Foreign companies that import materials for use or sale in the Tunisian
market, however, have continued to see customs duties rise, where
permitted by World Trade Organization (WTO) rules. This has adversely
affected Tunisian-based U.S. companies which depend on materials
produced in the United States for their products. Tunisia has three
Value-Added Tax (VAT) rates (6, 18 and 29 percent) based on the
category of good sold (i.e., luxury or staple products). In order to
make up for the decline in import duties, the government raised its
middle VAT rate in 1997 from 17 to 18 percent, and made greater efforts
to enforce compliance on retailers, causing price increases on a wide
range of domestic and foreign products. In 1999, receipts from VAT were
34 percent above the 1997 level due to an increase in the volume of
imports.
As the government has continued to modernize its power generation
utilities and industrial infrastructure, its official policy has been
to make contract bidding transparent and open to foreign companies.
U.S. firms have been actively encouraged to bid on a number of
procurement contracts. Unfortunately, between 1996 and 1999, official
tender policies were not always strictly adhered to and factors other
than price and quality of technology offered appear to have played a
role in the awarding of contracts. Examples, involving competing U.S.
and foreign firms, include contracts in the electronics and
agricultural sectors of the economy. Such occurrences could deter U.S.
companies from bidding on future public contracts. However, private
sector sources gave the government high marks for its transparency and
fairness in handling the bidding for the Rades II independent power
plant. This project was won by a U.S.-led consortium and is worth
between $400 and $450 million. The contract for this project was signed
in April 1999.
4. Debt Management Policies
According to recent reports by the World Bank and the IMF, the
government has managed its external debt portfolio well and has never
had to reschedule its debt payments. Tunisia has won high investment
grade ratings from a number of international rating agencies, such as
Standard and Poor's, which assigned its triple b minus long-term rating
in 1999 to a $209 million Euro bond issue. In 1997, Tunisia tapped the
U.S. bond market for the first time and raised $400 million. In
addition, several Tunisian commercial banks worked with U.S. investment
firms in 1998 to raise money in U.S. commercial markets.
In 1999, the government projected its foreign financing
requirements to be approximately $762 million. In 1998, Tunisia's
outstanding foreign debt increased by $860 million to $10.27 billion,
representing approximately 47.8 percent of gross available domestic
revenue. Debt service payments on foreign debt in 1998 are projected to
be $1.7 billion. As mentioned above, the October 1998 privatization of
two cement factories brought nearly $400 million to the Tunisian
treasury, a timely infusion to address the budget deficit which saved
the government from tapping the foreign debt market to meet that
shortfall.
5. Aid
Tunisia's USAID program was terminated in 1998 due to the country's
progress on economic growth and development. In 1999, U.S. aid to
Tunisia amounted to $8.4 million in military aid. These funds were used
for the following programs: $5 million of Draw Down Authority to
procure existing U.S. military goods and services, $2 million of
Foreign Military Financing to purchase U.S. military goods and
services, $900,000 in International Military and Educational Training
and $400,000 in Humanitarian Assistance. The government does not
publish foreign aid figures, therefore, the amount of aid from other
sources is unavailable.
6. Significant Barriers to U.S. Exports
Significant barriers do exist to U.S. exports to Tunisia. While
Tunisia allows over 90 percent of goods to be imported without a
license, import duties range from 10 to 230 percent (cheese 133
percent, milk 200 percent). In addition, certain luxury consumer items
and durable goods can be assessed a consumption tax that can be as high
as 500 percent (small engine automobiles 50 percent, large engine
automobiles 295 percent, champagne 500 percent). The consumption tax is
used to offset the gradual elimination of tariffs, and is levied
predominately on luxury goods regardless of whether they are imported
or produced in Tunisia. At the retail level, the VAT can be applied to
certain categories of goods.
Import licenses are sometimes required for goods that compete
against those produced by developing Tunisian industries, such as
textiles. Licenses are also required for expensive consumer goods, such
as automobiles, payment for which could adversely affect the short-term
balance of payments. The stated purpose of the licenses is to allow
nascent local industries to grow, and U.S. exports have been limited or
prevented when they are seen to compete with them.
Tunisia is moving to embrace ISO 9000 standards and testing. The
Tunisian Consumer Protection Law of 1992 established standard labeling
and marking requirements, and goods not specified under existing
Tunisian regulations must meet international standards.
While foreign investment is welcomed, investment barriers exist.
For on-shore companies within the services sector (defined as those
with more than 20 percent of output destined for the Tunisian market),
the government must authorize a foreign capital share of more than 49
percent. Foreign investors are denied treatment on par with Tunisians
in the agricultural sector, and although land may be secured for long-
term leases (40 years), foreign ownership of agricultural land is
prohibited. For foreign companies producing for the Tunisian market,
local content provisions may apply, and hiring of foreign personnel is
subject to regulation and usually limited to senior management.
Normally, foreign companies cannot distribute products locally without
a Tunisian distributor. The government does not allow the establishment
of foreign franchise operations except in special circumstances. There
is no limit on the amount of foreign currency which can be brought into
the country, but any amount over TD 1,000 must be declared at the port
of entry and only the unused dinar balance of declared foreign currency
may be reconverted and taken out of the country.
Laws concerning government procurement practices are nominally
designed to make contract bidding objective, competitive, and
transparent. However, in several recent cases, factors other than those
specified in the tender offer appear to have played a role in
determining who won the contract. This has caused some concern that the
government will allow factors other than price, competitiveness and
quality of technology or services offered to be the determining factors
in awarding government contracts.
Customs administrative procedures are often complex and burdensome,
requiring time and patience to complete necessary paperwork demanded by
the authorities. Problems that arise are addressed on a case by case
basis, and business or political connections can greatly affect the
rate at which products are cleared. Most foreign companies choose to
work with private customs agents to expedite the processing of their
imports.
7. Export Subsidies Policies
The government does not provide export subsidies to Tunisian
companies.
8. Protection of U.S. Intellectual Property
Tunisia is a member of the World Trade Organization (WTO), but is
availing itself of a transitional period provided to developing
countries to phase in obligations under the WTO Trade Related Aspects
of Intellectual Property (TRIPS) Agreement. Tunisia belongs to the
World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), and is a signatory to
the Berne Convention for the protection of literary and artistic works
(copyright) and the Paris Convention for the protection of industrial
property (patent, trademark and related industrial property). As a
member of the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) and as a
signatory to the UNCTAD agreement on the protection of patents and
trademarks, Tunisia has pledged to protect foreign property rights.
In 1998, the U.S. Trade Representative named Tunisia to the
``Special 301'' Other Observations List (the lowest level of inclusion)
because of concerns over an absence of patent protection for
pharmaceutical products that allows dozens of top-selling medicines to
be sold in the local market. Once a medicine is manufactured in
Tunisia, its importation is restricted, hindering access to the market
for U.S. firms. In 1999, Tunisia did not appear on the ``Special 301''
list, because the ``other'' category was eliminated and it was
determined that Tunisian IPR violations did not warrant inclusion in a
higher category. Recent complaints of trademark pirating, largely in
the field of apparel, and copyright infringement, such as software,
recordings, and movies also indicate that IPR violation is a growing
problem in Tunisia.
Registration of foreign patents and trademarks is required with the
national institute for standardization and industrial policy. However,
Tunisia's patent and trademark laws are designed to protect only duly
registered owners. In the area of patents, U.S. businesses are
guaranteed treatment equal to that afforded to Tunisian nationals.
Copyright protection is the responsibility of a separate government
agency, which also represents foreign copyright organizations. Tunisian
Copyright Law has been updated, but its application and enforcement
have not been consistent with foreign commercial expectations. Print
and video media are considered particularly susceptible to copyright
infringement.
9. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association: The Constitution and the Labor Code
stipulate the right of workers to form unions and this right is
generally observed in practice. The Tunisian General Federation of
Labor (UGTT) is Tunisia's only labor federation. About 15 percent of
the country's work force are members, but a greater number are covered
by UGTT negotiated contracts. The UGTT is independent of the government
but certain laws restrict its freedom of action. The current UGTT
leadership has tried to cooperate with the government and support its
economic reform programs, in return for regular wage increases and
protection for workers.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively: This right is
protected by law and observed in practice. Wages and working conditions
are set in triennial negotiations between the UGTT member unions and
employers, and anti-union discrimination by employers is prohibited.
Though the government does not participate in the negotiations, it must
approve, but cannot modify, the agreements decided upon.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor: Tunisia abolished
compulsory labor in 1989, and ended the practice of sentencing convicts
to ``rehabilitation through work'' in 1995.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children: In August 1996, the
Labor Code raised the minimum age for employment in manufacturing from
15 to 16 years, while the minimum age for light work in agriculture and
nonindustrial sectors is 13 years. The government requires children to
attend school until age 16 and employers must observe certain rules to
insure children obtain adequate rest and attend school. The UGTT has
expressed concern that child labor continues to exist disguised as
apprenticeship.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work: The Labor Code provides for a
range of minimum wages, which are set by a commission of government,
UGTT and employers' representatives. Most business sectors observe a
48-hour workweek, with one 24-hour rest period. The government often
has difficulty enforcing the minimum wage law, especially in
nonunionized sectors of the economy. Workplace health and safety
standards are enforced by the government.
f. Rights in Sectors with U.S. Investment: Working conditions tend
to be better in export-oriented firms than in those producing
exclusively for the domestic market.
Extent of U.S. Investment in Selected Industries--U.S. Direct Investment Position Abroad on an Historical Cost
Basis--1998
[Millions of U.S. Dollars]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Category Amount
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Petroleum...................... .............. 102
Total Manufacturing............ .............. 27
Food & Kindred Products...... 27 ...............................................................
Chemicals & Allied Products.. 0 ...............................................................
Primary & Fabricated Metals.. 0 ...............................................................
Industrial Machinery and 0 ...............................................................
Equipment.
Electric & Electronic 0 ...............................................................
Equipment.
Transportation Equipment..... 0 ...............................................................
Other Manufacturing.......... 0 ...............................................................
Wholesale Trade................ .............. 0
Banking........................ .............. 1
Finance/Insurance/Real Estate.. .............. 0
Services....................... .............. 22
Other Industries............... .............. 0
TOTAL ALL INDUSTRIES........... .............. 153
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Source: Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis.
______
UNITED ARAB EMIRATES
Key Economic Indicators
[Billions of U.S. Dollars unless otherwise indicated]
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1997 1998 \1\ 1999
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Income, Production and Employment:
Nominal GDP \2\......................... 49.2 46.3 48.0
Real GDP Growth (pct)................... 0.8 -8.1 2.5
GDP by Sector: \3\
Agriculture........................... 1.5 1.6 1.6
Manufacturing......................... 5.5 5.5 5.5
Services.............................. 22.2 23.4 24.0
Government............................ 5.1 5.4 5.4
Per Capita GDP (US$).................... 18,741 16,780 17,500
Labor Force (000's)..................... 1,330 1,380 1,400
Unemployment Rate (pct)................. 2.6 2.6 2.6
Money and Prices (annual percentage
growth):
Money Supply (M2)....................... 9.0 4.2 4.0
Consumer Price Inflation (pct).......... 2.8 1.5-2 3.0
Exchange Rate(Dirham/US$)
Official.............................. 3.67 3.67 3.67
Balance of Payments and Trade:
Total Exports FOB \4\................... 34.0 30.4 33.5
Exports to U.S.\5\.................... 1.0 0.7 0.7
Total Imports CIF \4\................... 26.6 27.2 29.0
Imports from U.S.\5\.................. 2.6 2.4 2.3
Trade Balance \4\....................... 7.4 3.2 4.5
Balance with U.S.\5\.................. -1.6 -1.7 -1.6
Current Account Surplus/GDP (pct)....... 12.8 3.9 6.0
External Public Debt.................... 0.0 0.0 0.0
Debt Service Payments/GDP (pct)......... 0.0 0.0 0.0
Fiscal Deficit/GDP (pct)................ 5.1 17.0 10.0
Gold and Foreign Exchange Reserves (end 8.2 8.9 9.5
of period).............................
Aid from U.S............................ 0 0 0
Aid from All Other Sources.............. 0 0 0
------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Estimates based on available monthly data in November 1999.
\2\ GDP at current prices.
\3\ GDP at factor costs.
\4\ Merchandise trade; includes re-exports.
\5\ Source: U.S. Department of Commerce and U.S. Census Bureau; exports
FAS, imports customs basis; 1999 figures are estimates based on data
available through August.
Sources: Ministry of Planning, Central Bank, Ministry of Economy and
Commerce.
1. General Policy Framework
The United Arab Emirates (UAE) is a federation of seven emirates.
The individual emirates retain considerable power over legal and
economic matters, most significantly over ownership and disposition of
oil resources. Each emirate has its own Customs Service, as well as its
own Civil Aviation Authority. The federal budget is largely derived
from transfers from the individual emirates. Abu Dhabi and Dubai, the
most prosperous emirates, contribute the largest shares.
Oil production and revenues from the sale of oil constitute the
largest single component of GDP, accounting in 1998 for 22 percent of
GDP and equaling roughly 33 percent of export and 86 percent of
government revenue. Rising or declining oil prices have a direct effect
on GDP statistics and an indirect impact on government spending but
may, nevertheless, be less obvious in terms of overall economic
activity. GDP declined by 5.8 percent in 1998, a decline attributable
to sustained low oil prices. The great majority of the UAE's oil export
income comes from Abu Dhabi Emirate, though Dubai and Sharjah also
produce and export a modest amount of oil and gas products. The
scarcity of oil and gas reserves in the UAE's northern emirates has led
to continued--and successful--attempts at economic diversification.
While the sharp drop in the oil sector's share of GDP in 1998 was due
in large part to declining oil revenues, data over time indicates that
the UAE has made significant progress in diversifying its economy away
from oil. Important sectors under development include tourism,
manufacturing, air travel and cargo services.
Government fiscal policies aim to distribute oil wealth to UAE
nationals by a variety of means. Support from the wealthier emirates of
Abu Dhabi and Dubai to less wealthy emirates is provided through the
federal budget, largely funded by Abu Dhabi and Dubai, and by direct
grants from the governments of Abu Dhabi and Dubai.
Federal commercial laws promote national ownership of business
throughout the country. Foreign businesses, except those seeking to
sell to the UAE Armed Forces, must have a UAE national sponsor. Agency
and distributorship laws require that a business engaged in importing
and distributing a foreign-made product must be owned 100 percent by a
UAE national. Other businesses must be at least 51 percent owned by
nationals. Companies located within the UAE's nine free zones are
exempted from agency/distributorship, sponsorship, and national
ownership requirements. However, if they lack 51 percent national
ownership, they are treated as foreign firms and subjected to these
requirements if they market products in the UAE.
The central bank seeks to maintain the dirham/dollar exchange rate,
which has not changed since 1980, and to keep interest rates close to
those in the United States. Given these goals, the bank does not have
the scope to engage in independent monetary policy. Trends in domestic
liquidity continue to be primarily influenced by residents' demand for
UAE Dirhams relative to foreign exchange. Banks convert dirham deposits
to foreign assets and back again in search of higher rates of return
and in response to fluctuations in lending opportunities in the
domestic market. To a limited extent, domestic liquidity can be
influenced by the central bank through its sale and purchase of foreign
exchange, use of its swap facility, and transactions in its
certificates of deposit.
In recent years the UAE has run budget deficits. In 1994, the UAE
budget deficit as a percentage of GDP was 7.9 percent; in 1998 that
figure grew to 17.0 percent, largely attributable to a 34 percent drop
in oil revenues that year. Assuming current policies remain unchanged,
fiscal deficits will persist. Deficits are financed by domestic
borrowing, principally by overdrafts from banks in which government
entities have an ownership share, and by liquidation of or interest
from overseas assets.
2. Exchange Rate Policies
There are no restrictions on the import or export of either the UAE
Dirham or foreign currencies by foreigners or UAE nationals, with the
exception of Israeli currency and the currencies of those countries
subject to United Nations sanctions. Since November 1980, the dirham,
though formally pegged to the IMF's Special Drawing Rights (SDR) at the
rate of 4.76190 dirhams per SDR, with a margin of fluctuation set
initially at 2.25 percent and widened in August 1987 to 7.25 percent,
has been kept in a fixed relationship with the U.S. Dollar. The
exchange rate is 3.67 UAE Dirhams per 1 U.S. Dollar.
3. Structural Policies
Foreign workers make up approximately 90 percent of the UAE labor
force; in some areas of the private sector, 99 percent of workers are
non-UAE nationals. In an effort to stem the problem of illegal
immigration and employment, better regulate the labor market and
improve its efficiency of administration, a new Labor Law came into
effect on 1 October 1996 which dramatically increased the severity of
penalties applicable to immigration offenses. As a result of the new
immigration rules, nearly 10 percent of the UAE's population (roughly
20 percent of its work force) left the country between the beginning of
August and the end of October 1996, although most returned in
subsequent months once their immigration status was clarified.
Employment of UAE citizens--known as ``Emiratization''--is a stated
national objective. In addition to persuasion and encouragement, the
UAE Government has begun to employ legislation as a tool for promoting
job opportunities for UAE nationals. Beginning in January 1999,
employment of UAE nationals in the banking sector must increase by 4
percent per year, with UAE nationals required to comprise 40 percent of
total banking sector work force in 2009. Additional measures, such as a
ban on unskilled labor from certain countries, are also being employed
in an effort to manage the labor force.
There is no income tax in the UAE. Foreign banks pay a 20 percent
tax on their profits. Foreign oil companies with equity in concessions
pay taxes and royalties on their proceeds. There are no consumption
taxes, and the highest customs duty is 4 percent. More than 75 percent
of imports still enter duty free. Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states
continue to be engaged in discussions on unifying customs tariffs. Some
progress has been made on this issue; the UAE, with its dependence on
trade and its commitment to the free flow of goods, continues to push
for lower rates than its GCC neighbors. Reaching agreement on a common
GCC external tariff will represent a step forward in longstanding
efforts to form a regional customs union.
Prices for most items are determined by market forces. Exceptions
include utilities, educational services, medical care and agricultural
products, which are subsidized for UAE nationals.
A passport and visa are required for entry into the UAE. Multiple
entry visas for business or tourism and valid for up to ten years are
available to U.S. passport holders from UAE embassies. Sponsors are not
required, but applicants may be asked to provide an invitational letter
to confirm the purpose of travel. These visas do not permit employment
in the UAE. Visa applicants are now required to pay a 170 Dirham
consular services fee when they apply.
4. Debt Management Policies
The UAE Federal Government has no official or commercial foreign
debt. Some individual emirates have foreign commercial debts, and there
is private external debt. There are no reliable statistics on either,
but the amounts involved are not large. The foreign assets of the Abu
Dhabi and Dubai governments and their official agencies are believed to
be significantly larger than the reserves of the central bank. It is
conservatively estimated that assets of the Abu Dhabi Investment
Authority (ADIA) total more than $125 billion.
5. Significant Barriers to U.S. Exports
The UAE maintains non-tariff barriers to trade and investment in
the form of restrictive agency, sponsorship, and distributorship
requirements. In order to do business in the UAE outside of one of the
free zones, a foreign business in most cases must have a UAE national
sponsor, agent or distributor. Once chosen, sponsors, agents, or
distributors have exclusive rights. They cannot be replaced without
their agreement. Government tendering is not conducted according to
generally accepted international standards. Re-tendering is the norm.
To bid on federal projects, a supplier or contractor must be either a
UAE national or a company in which at least 51 percent of the share
capital is owned by UAE nationals. Federal tenders are required to be
accompanied by a bid bond in the form of an unconditional bank
guarantee for 5 percent of the value of the bid.
Except for companies located in one of the free zones, at least 51
percent of a business establishment must be owned by a UAE national. A
business engaged in importing and distributing a product must be either
a 100 percent UAE owned agency/distributorship or a 51 percent UAE/49
percent foreign Limited Liability Company (LLC). Subsidies for
manufacturing firms are only available to those with at least 51
percent local ownership.
The laws and regulations governing foreign investment in the UAE
are evolving. There is no national treatment for investors in the UAE.
Non-GCC nationals cannot own land or buy stocks, although limited
participation by foreigners in some mutual funds is permitted. There
have been no significant investment disputes over the past few years
involving U.S. or other foreign investors. Claims resolution is
generally not a problem, because foreign companies tend not to press
claims, believing that to do so might jeopardize future business
activity in the UAE.
6. Export Subsidies Policies
The government does not employ subsidies to provide direct or
indirect support for exports.
7. Protection of U.S. Intellectual Property
The UAE is a member of the World Trade Organization (WTO) and
should be in compliance with its obligations under the Trade Related
Aspects of Intellectual Property (TRIPs) Agreement by January 1, 2000.
The UAE is also a contracting party to the World Intellectual Property
Organization (WIPO), and has signed the Paris Convention for the
Protection of Industrial Property (patent, trademark and related
industrial property). The UAE remains on USTR's ``Special 301'' Watch
List because of deficiencies in protection of Intellectual Property
Rights (IPR). In April 1999, the USTR cited inadequate protection of
pharmaceutical patents as the primary reason for maintaining the UAE on
the Watch List.
In 1992 the UAE passed three laws pertaining to intellectual
property: a Copyright Law, a Trademark Law, and a Patent Law.
Enforcement efforts did not begin in earnest until 1994. As a result of
these efforts, the UAE is largely clean of pirated sound recordings and
films. While the government has also undertaken enforcement actions
against local companies selling pirated computer software, U.S.
industry remains concerned about reports of large-scale copying of
business computer software by corporate end-users. Efforts to combat
computer software and video piracy in the UAE have been successful;
according to industry estimates, the rate of software piracy in 1998
declined by 6 percentage points to 54 percent, a 10 percent decline
compared to the previous year. The UAE is recognized as a regional
leader in fighting computer software and video piracy.
UAE patent law provides process, not product, patent protection for
pharmaceutical products. The Ministry of Finance and Industry is
currently in the process of amending the Patent Law; the amended
version is expected to provide explicit product patent protection to
pharmaceuticals, and should be in place before the WTO's 2000 deadline.
A local pharmaceutical manufacturer continues to produce patent
protected products. The Ministry of Information is currently amending
the Copyright Law to bring it up to international standards.
According to the International Intellectual Property Alliance,
estimated 1998 losses to U.S. copyright-based industries were $22.4
million in the UAE, a 19 percent decrease from the prior year.
8. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association: There are no unions and no strikes.
The law does not grant workers the right to organize unions or to
strike. Foreign workers, who make up the bulk of the work force, risk
deportation if they attempt to organize unions or to strike. Since July
1995, the UAE has been suspended from U.S. Overseas Private Investment
Corporation programs because of the government's lack of compliance
with internationally recognized worker rights standards.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively: The law does not
grant workers the right to engage in collective bargaining, which is
not practiced. Workers in the industrial and service sectors are
normally employed under contracts that are subject to review by the
Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs. The Ministry of Interior
Naturalization and Immigration Administration is responsible for
reviewing the contracts of domestic employees as part of residency
permit processing. The purpose of the review is to ensure that the pay
will satisfy the employee's basic needs and secure a means of living.
For the resolution of work-related disputes, workers must rely on
conciliation committees organized by the Ministry of Labor and Social
Affairs or on special labor courts. Labor laws do not cover government
employees, domestic servants, and agricultural workers. The latter two
groups face considerable difficulty in obtaining assistance to resolve
disputes with employers. While any worker may seek redress through the
courts, this puts a heavy financial burden on those in lower income
brackets. In Dubai's Jebel Ali Free Zone, the same labor laws apply as
in the rest of the country.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor: Forced or compulsory
labor is illegal and not practiced. However, some unscrupulous
employment agents bring foreign workers to the UAE under conditions
approaching indenture. The government prohibits forced and bonded child
labor and enforces this prohibition effectively. In 1996, the UAE
ratified the International Labor Organization's 1957 Abolition of
Forced Labor Convention.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children: Labor regulations
prohibit employment of persons under age 15 and have special provisions
for employing those aged 15 to 18. The Department of Labor enforces the
regulations. Other regulations permit employers to engage only adult
foreign workers. In 1996, the UAE ratified the International Labor
Organization's 1973 Minimum Age Convention. In 1993, the government
prohibited the employment of children under the age of 15 as camel
jockeys and of jockeys who do not weigh more than 45 kilograms. The
Camel Racing Association is responsible for enforcing these rules.
Children under the age of 15 working as camel jockeys have still been
observed. Several newspaper articles have appeared in 1999 detailing
instances--some including abuse--of children as young as two years old
being smuggled into the UAE to work as camel jockeys. The government
prohibits forced and bonded child labor and enforces this prohibition
effectively (see section 11c'' above). The government does not issue
visas for foreign workers under the age of 16 years. Education is
compulsory through the intermediate stage, approximately the age of 13
or 14 years.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work: There is no legislated or
administrative minimum wage. Supply and demand determine compensation.
However, according to the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs, there
is an unofficial, unwritten minimum wage rate which would afford a
worker and family a minimal standard of living. As noted above, the
Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs reviews labor contracts and does
not approve any contract that stipulates a clearly unacceptable wage.
The standard workday and workweek are eight hours a day, six days
per week, but these standards are not strictly enforced. Certain types
of workers, notably domestic servants, may be obliged to work longer
than the mandated standard hours. The law also provides for a minimum
of 24 days per year of annual leave plus 10 national and religious
holidays. In addition, manual workers are not required to do outdoor
work when the temperature exceeds 112 degrees Fahrenheit. Most foreign
workers receive either employer-provided housing or housing allowances,
medical care, and homeward passage from their employers. Most foreign
workers do not earn the minimum salary of $1,090 per month required to
obtain residency permits for their families. Employers have the option
to petition for a 6-month ban from the work force against any foreign
employee who leaves his job without fulfilling the terms of his
contract.
The Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs,
municipalities and civil defense units enforce health and safety
standards. The government requires every large industrial concern to
employ a certified occupational safety officer. An injured worker is
entitled to fair compensation. Health standards are not uniformly
observed in the housing camps provided for foreign workers. Workers'
jobs are not protected if they remove themselves from what they
consider to be unsafe working conditions. However, the Ministry of
Labor and Social Affairs may require employers to reinstate workers
dismissed for not performing unsafe work. All workers have the right to
lodge grievances with Ministry officials, who make an effort to
investigate all complaints. However, the Ministry is understaffed and
under-budgeted; complaints and compensation claims are backlogged.
Rulings on complaints may be appealed within the Ministry and
ultimately to the courts. However, many workers choose not to protest
for fear of reprisals or deportation. The press periodically carries
reports of abuses suffered by domestic servants, particularly women, at
the hands of some employers. Allegations have included excessive work
hours, nonpayment of wages, and verbal and physical abuse.
f. Rights in Sectors with U.S. Investments: There is no difference
in the application of the five worker rights discussed above between
the sectors of the UAE economy in which U.S. capital is invested and
other sectors of the economy. If anything, sectors containing
significant U.S. investment, such as the petroleum sector, tend to have
better working conditions, including higher safety standards, better
pay, and better access to medical care.
Extent of U.S. Investment in Selected Industries--U.S. Direct Investment Position Abroad on an Historical Cost
Basis--1998
[Millions of U.S. Dollars]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Category Amount
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Petroleum...................... .............. 284
Total Manufacturing............ .............. 83
Food & Kindred Products...... 0 ...............................................................
Chemicals & Allied Products.. 8 ...............................................................
Primary & Fabricated Metals.. 16 ...............................................................
Industrial Machinery and 3 ...............................................................
Equipment.
Electric & Electronic 0 ...............................................................
Equipment.
Transportation Equipment..... 0 ...............................................................
Other Manufacturing.......... 55 ...............................................................
Wholesale Trade................ .............. 122
Banking........................ .............. (\1\)
Finance/Insurance/Real Estate.. .............. (\1\)
Services....................... .............. 137
Other Industries............... .............. (\1\)
TOTAL ALL INDUSTRIES........... .............. 710
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Suppressed to avoid disclosing data of individual companies.
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis.
SOUTH ASIA
----------
BANGLADESH
Key Economic Indicators
[Millions of U.S. Dollars unless otherwise noted]
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1997 1998 \1\ 1999
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Income, Production and Employment:
Nominal GDP.......................... 33,012 34,104 36,482
Real GDP Growth (pct) \2\............ 5.9 5.7 5.2
GDP by Sector:
Agriculture........................ 9,618 9,770 10,927
Manufacturing...................... 3,049 3,275 3,262
Services........................... 17,462 18,307 19,379
Government......................... N/A N/A N/A
Per Capita GDP (US$)................. 263 270 284
Labor Force (000's).................. N/A N/A N/A
Unemployment Rate (pct).............. N/A N/A N/A
Money and Prices (annual percentage
growth):
Money Supply Growth (M2)............. 10.8 10.1 13.1
Consumer Price Inflation............. 2.6 7.0 9.0
Exchange Rate (Taka/US$ annual
average)
Official........................... 42.8 45.4 47.95
Parallel........................... N/A N/A N/A
Balance of Payments and Trade:
Total Exports FOB.................... 4,406 5,161 5,313
Exports to U.S.\3\................. 1.679 1,846 N/A
Total Imports CIF.................... 7,162 7,524 7,515
Imports from U.S.\3\............... 259 318 N/A
Trade Balance........................ -2,756 -2,363 -2,202
Balance with U.S.\3\............... 1,420 1,528 N/A
External Public Debt \4\............. 15,025 15,855 16,234
Fiscal Deficit/GDP (pct)............. 4.5 4.2 5.3
Current Account Deficit/GDP (pct).... 2.4 3.6 4.2
Debt Service Payments/GDP (pct)...... 1.0 1.0 1.0
Gold and Foreign Exchange Reserves... 1,719 1,751 1,522
Aid from U.S.\5\..................... 73.6 77.0 153.0
Aid from All Sources \6\............. 1,481 1,419 1,502
------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The Bangladesh fiscal year is July 1 to June 30.
\2\ Percentage change calculated in local currency.
\3\ Figures are for the calendar year.
\4\ Medium and long-term.
\5\ Figures are for the U.S. fiscal year (October 1-September 30).
\6\ Disbursements.
1. General Policy Framework
Bangladesh is one of the world's poorest, most densely populated,
and least developed countries; its per capita income for fiscal year
1999 (July 1, 1998 to June 30, 1999) is estimated at $285. A large
proportion of its population of approximately 128 million is tied
directly or indirectly to agriculture, which accounts for 30 percent of
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and about 70 percent of the labor force.
Economic growth in fiscal year 1998-99 (FY 99) dropped one half a
percentage point to 5.2 percent, primarily due to the disruptions cause
by severe floods in 1998; nevertheless, it remained above the average
annual growth rate of 4.0 to 4.5 percent over the last ten years. Even
a 5-6 percent GDP growth rate, however, is inadequate to relieve the
poverty faced by over half the population.
GDP growth has been dampened over the years by a number of factors:
low productivity growth in the agricultural sector, political and
policy instability, poor infrastructure, corruption, and low domestic
savings and investment. The state's presence in the economy continues
to be large, and money-losing state enterprises have been a chronic
drain on the treasury. Nonetheless, during the 1990's Bangladesh
liberalized its economy, and the private sector assumed a more
prominent role as the climate improved for free markets and trade. The
Awami League government, which came to power in June 1996, has largely
continued the market-based policies of its predecessor, the Bangladesh
Nationalist Party, and made some regulatory and policy changes toward
that end. However, implementation of new policy directives by the
bureaucracy has been slow and uneven.
Bangladesh suffered its worst flood in history during the summer
and fall of 1998. The economic damage is difficult to estimate, but
could have reached $1 billion. A large proportion of the winter rice
crop could not be planted, which increased the food import bill
dramatically despite the assistance of donor nations. The United States
donated 700,000 metric tons of wheat. The World Bank and the
International Monetary Fund (IMF) provided emergency balance of payment
relief of about $320 million. For over two years, the IMF and
Bangladesh have held inconclusive Enhanced Structural Adjustment
Facility discussions, and an agreement is still not in sight. As of
November 8, 1999, Bangladesh's foreign exchange reserves stood at about
$1.6 billion, which is less than three months of import cover, but is
considered normal for Bangladesh. These reserves have remained
generally stable between $1.5 to $1.9 billion since November 1996.
Inflation increased to nine percent in FY99, up from seven percent
in FY98, reflecting flood-induced food price hikes in the first half of
the fiscal year; in the second half of FY99, and into FY2000, inflation
has continued to decline as good harvests have driven down food grain
prices. Since Bangladesh has limited trade and investment links
overseas, the economy was not greatly affected by either the Asian
financial crisis, nor has it benefited much from the ongoing recovery
in the Asian economies. However, to respond to a continuing
overvaluation of the taka relative to its competitors, Bangladesh
devalued its currency by three percent in FY99, and an additional 2.1
percent to date in FY2000. Bangladesh's export performance, heavily
concentrated in garments, slowed down to six percent growth in FY99,
after several years of over 15 percent growth. Several factors,
including flood-related supply disruptions, relative overvaluation of
the taka, and some shift in U.S. apparel sourcing to Mexico, the
Caribbean Basin, and southeast Asia contributed to this slowdown. The
Bangladesh trade surplus with the U.S. continues to increase; it
reached $1.5 billion in calendar year 1998.
The FY99 government deficit increased to 5.3 percent in FY99
compared to 4.2 percent in FY 98, largely due to the economic
consequences of the floods in the summer of 1998. Revenue collections
suffered due to both tax administration disruptions and a slowdown in
economic activity during and after the floods. Tax revenues as a
proportion of GDP fell to 7.3 percent in FY99, compared to 7.7 percent
in FY98 and 7.6 percent in FY97. Government expenditures increased in
response to the flood rehabilitation needs of the country, with
expenditures as a proportion of GDP increasing to 14.3 percent in FY99
from 13.9 percent in FY98. Although previous years' Annual Development
Plan (ADP)--consisting largely of capital investment--typically fell
short of target, ADP expenditures in FY99 actually exceeded the target
as a result of increased flood-induced outlays. As in prior years,
about 60 percent of the fiscal deficit was financed through external
sources (e.g., aid) while domestic sources (e.g., government borrowing)
accounted for about 40 percent.
The government's primary monetary policy tools are the discount
rate and the sale of Bangladesh Bank bills, though central bank
influence over bank lending practices also plays an important role.
Broad money growth (M2) increased to 13.1 percent in FY99 from 10.1
percent in FY98, due largely to the government's increased borrowing
needs in the wake of the 1998 floods. This increased government
borrowing tended to crowd out private borrowing in the first half of
FY99. Due to a continuing decline in inflationary pressures during
1999, the central bank lowered its discount rate by one percentage
point to seven percent in August 1999.
Although the government has taken some liberal investment measures
to foster private sector involvement in the energy, power, and
telecommunications sectors, poor infrastructure (e.g., power shortages,
port bottlenecks), bureaucratic inertia, corruption, labor militancy, a
weak financial system which keeps the cost of capital high, political
unrest, and a deteriorating law and order situation continued to
discourage domestic and foreign investors in FY99.
2. Exchange Rate Policies
At present, the central bank follows a semi-flexible exchange rate
policy, revaluing the currency on the basis of the real effective
exchange rate, taking account of the nominal exchange rates and
inflation rates of major trading partners. A level of reserves equal to
about 2.5 months of imports and a black market rate slightly above the
official rate suggests that the currency is still somewhat overvalued.
Foreign reserves have stabilized between $1.5 to 1.9 billion through
1997-1999. Although this level is considered ``normal'' for Bangladesh,
the country's foreign exchange position remains fragile. The taka
remains under pressure, but its market value is bolstered by annual aid
receipts and by remittances from overseas workers. The taka is nearly
fully convertible on the current account. The official exchange rate on
December 20, 1999 was Taka 51.0 to $1.
Foreign firms are able to repatriate profits, dividends, royalty
payments and technical fees without difficulty, provided appropriate
documentation is presented to the Bangladesh Bank, the country's
central bank. Outbound foreign investment by Bangladeshi nationals
requires government approval and must support export activities.
Bangladeshi travelers are limited by law to taking no more than $3,000
out of the country per year. Dollars are bought and sold in the black
market, fueled by the informal economy. U.S. exports do not appear to
have been negatively affected by the taka devaluations in 1998 and
1999.
3. Structural Policies
In 1993, Bangladesh successfully completed a three-year ESAF
program, meeting all the IMF fiscal and monetary targets. During the
flood-induced economic crisis in 1998, Bangladesh signaled a
willingness to enter into another ESAF program; however, as the
Bangladeshi economy recovered smartly from the disruptions caused by
the floods, Bangladesh's enthusiasm for a new ESAF program waned.
Although there is little disagreement between the IMF and Bangladesh on
the substance of the economic reforms that need to implemented (i.e.,
tax reform with better tax administration and a broadening of the tax
base; financial sector reform with stronger oversight and supervision
by the central bank, improvement in the operation of state-owned
commercial banks, and improvement of loan portfolios; and, public
sector reform with an acceleration in privatization of state-owned
enterprises), negotiations have stalled.
Bangladesh has managed to maintain a laudable measure of
macroeconomic stability since 1993, but its macroeconomic position at
the end of 1999 remains vulnerable, with slowing export growth, a
stagnant industrial sector, inadequate infrastructure, a banking sector
in need of comprehensive reforms, and an inefficient public sector that
continues to drain the treasury. Progress on important economic reforms
has been halting, though the government has instituted reforms of the
capital market and taken some market-friendly decisions to encourage
foreign investment. Overall, however, efforts at reform often are
successfully opposed by vested interest groups, such as the
bureaucracy, public sector labor unions or highly protected domestic
producers. The public sector still exercises a dominant influence on
industry and the economy; non-financial state-owned enterprises (SOEs)
lost an estimated $281 million in FY99. Most public sector industries,
including textiles, jute processing, and sugar refining, are chronic
money losers. Their militant unions have succeeded in setting
relatively high wages which their private sector counterparts often
feel compelled to meet out of fear of union action.
Private sector productivity is further stunted by the state's poor
management of crucial infrastructure (power, railroads, ports,
telecommunications, and the national airline), most of which are
government monopolies. Recognizing this shortcoming, and in order to
increase foreign investment in the power sector, the government
formalized in October 1996 its private power policy, which grants tax
holidays and duty-free imports of plant and equipment for private
sector power producers. As of November 1999, the government was
purchasing power from three international power producers, and was
negotiating or had signed contracts with others. Private investment is
also allowed in the telecommunications sector for cellular
communications, and in the hydrocarbons sectors, where international
companies initially expressed a high level of interest in a second
round of bidding for remaining exploration rights. The difficulties and
the high cost of doing business in Bangladesh, combined with weakness
in the world oil market, have forced some companies to reconsider or
limit their exposure in Bangladesh. Two international companies now
deliver natural gas to the government, contributing 15-20 percent of
daily supply. The government practically gave up trying to attract
foreign portfolio investment in domestic capital markets after a stock
market crash in late 1996 and turbulence in other financial markets
around the world in 1997 and 1998. Long an easy source of funds for
loss-making government corporations and preferred private sector
borrowers who did not feel obliged to repay loans, the dysfunctional
banking sector continues to be the subject of reform programs. The
banking sector is dominated by four large nationalized commercial
banks. However, entry of foreign and domestic private banks has been
permitted; numerous new private domestic and foreign banks have
established a foothold in the market since 1996.
4. Debt Management Policies
Assessed on the basis of disbursed outstanding principal,
Bangladesh's external public debt was $16.2 billion in FY99, up
slightly from 15.9 billion in FY98. Because virtually all of the debt
was provided on highly concessional terms by bilateral and multilateral
donors (i.e. one or two percent interest, 30-year maturity, 20-year
grace period), the net present value of the total outstanding debt is
significantly lower than its face value. The external debt burden has
eased during the 1990's with the external public debt as a percentage
of GDP falling steadily from 45.8 percent in FY94 to 36.5 percent in
FY98. Debt service as a percentage of current receipts has also
declined, from 20 percent in FY91 to an estimated 8 percent in FY98.
Bangladesh maintains good relationships with the World Bank, Asian
Development Bank, the International Monetary Fund and the donor
community. There has been no rescheduling of the external debt during
FY99. Bangladesh has never defaulted on its external public debt,
except in one instance where it deliberately missed a payment to make
its point in a commercial dispute involving a loss-making fertilizer
factory in which the Bangladesh government was the guarantor of the
factory's debts.
5. Aid
No military aid is included in the figures in the tables.
6. Significant Barriers to U.S. Exports
Since 1991, the Government has made significant progress in
liberalizing what had been one of the most restrictive trade regimes in
Asia. Even so, Bangladesh continues to raise a relatively high share of
its government revenues--nearly 60 percent--from import-based taxes,
custom duties, VAT and supplementary duties on imports. Tariff reform,
which began in 1994, has continued to date. The FY 2000 budget
accelerated Bangladesh's efforts to shift from a tariff-based revenue
system to an income-based one. Some of the more significant FY2000
changes to the tariff regime included: reduction in customs duty
brackets from five to four, lowering of the top duty rate from 40
percent to 37.5 percent, and a unification of duty rates for different
products within the broad HS code or product category, and a targeted
reduction of duties to benefit certain sectors. The budget reduces the
average tariff for capital goods from 12.6 percent in FY 99 to 8.9
percent in FY2000, for intermediate goods from 19.1 percent to 15.5
percent, and for consumer goods from 31.8 percent to 29.2 percent.
Other reforms announced in the FY2000 budget include broadening
coverage of the value added tax (VAT); measures designed to increase
transparency, reduce corruption, and limit the discretion of the
bureaucracy in adjudicating tax/tariff cases; introduction of a
mandatory pre-shipment inspection (PSI) system of customs valuation,
and; reduction in the number of personal income tax brackets and
simplification of tax administration procedures.
Bangladesh, a founding member of the World Trade Organization
(WTO), is subject to all the disciplines of the WTO. Some barriers to
U.S. exports or direct investment exist. Policy instability, when
policies are altered at the behest of special interests, creates
difficulties for foreign companies. A government monopoly controls
basic services and long-distance service in the telecommunications
market, although the government has allowed private companies to enter
the wireless communication market. Nontariff barriers also exist in the
pharmaceutical sector, where manufacturing and import controls imposed
by the national drug policy and the Drugs (Control) Ordinance of 1982
discriminate against foreign drug companies. Bangladesh is not a
signatory to the WTO plurilateral agreements on government procurement
or civil aircraft. Government procurement generally takes place through
a tendering process, which is not always transparent. Customs
procedures are lengthy and burdensome, and sometimes complicated by
corruption. Introduction of the PSI system of customs valuation is
expected to simplify customs procedures, make valuation less arbitrary,
and reduce corruption.
Other drawbacks to investment in Bangladesh include low labor
productivity, poor infrastructure, excessive regulations, a slow and
risk-averse bureaucracy, and uncertain law and order. The lack of
effective commercial laws makes enforcement of business contracts
difficult. Officially, private industrial investment, whether domestic
or foreign, is fully deregulated, and the government has significantly
streamlined the investment registration process. Although the
government has simplified the registration processes for investors,
domestic and foreign investors typically must obtain a series of
approvals from various government agencies to implement their projects.
Bureaucratic red tape, compounded by corruption, slows and distorts
decision-making and procurement. Existing export processing zones have
successfully facilitated investment and export growth, but are too
small to alter significantly the overall investment picture in the
country.
Three years ago, the U.S. investment stock in Bangladesh was very
small, totaling around $25 million, primarily in the assets of service
companies and a few manufacturing operations. As work began in late
1997 and 1998 based on agreements between the government and U.S.
companies in gas exploration and production, lubricants and energy
production, the amount of U.S. investment rose significantly, to about
$700 million. Other opportunities for significant investment in gas
exploration and production, power generation and private port
construction/operation could further swell U.S. investment and trade.
7. Export Subsidies Policies
The government encourages export growth through measures such as
duty-free status for some imported inputs, including capital machinery
and cotton, and easy access to financing for exporters. Ready-made
garment producers are assisted by bonded warehousing and back-to-back
letter of credit facilities for imported cloth and accessories. The
central bank offers a 25 percent rebate to domestic manufacturers of
fabric for ready-made garment exports. Exporters are allowed to
exchange 100 percent of their foreign currency earnings through any
authorized dealer. Government-financed interest rate subsidies to
exporters have been reduced in stages over five years. Bangladesh has
established Export Processing Zones (EPZs) in Chittagong and Dhaka, and
has plans to open four more. Korean investors are undertaking to build
and operate a private EPZ in Chittagong.
8. Protection of U.S. Intellectual Property
Bangladesh is a signatory of the Uruguay Round agreements,
including the WTO's Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights (TRIPS), and is obligated to bring its laws and
enforcement efforts into TRIPS compliance by January 1, 2006.
Bangladesh has also been a member of the World Intellectual Property
Organization (WIPO) in Geneva since 1985.Bangladesh has never been
cited in the U.S. Trade Representative's ``Special 301'' Watch List,
which identifies countries that deny adequate and effective protection
for intellectual property rights or deny fair and equitable market
access for persons that rely on intellectual property protection. Even
though Bangladesh has not been placed on the ``Special 301'' Watch
List, it has outdated Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) laws, an
unwieldy system of registering intellectual property rights, and a weak
enforcement mechanism. Intellectual property infringement is common,
particularly of computer software, motion pictures, pharmaceutical
products and audio and video cassettes. Despite the difficulties, U.S.
firms have successfully pursued their IPR rights in Bangladeshi courts.
A draft new Copyright Law to update Bangladesh's copyright system and
bring it in compliance with TRIPS is before the cabinet for approval;
the government expects to enact new legislation in the year 2000 to
update its laws concerning trademarks, patents and industrial design.
9. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association: Bangladesh's Constitution guarantees
freedom of association, the right to join unions, and, with government
approval, the right to form a union.
With the exception of workers in the railway, postal, telegraph,
and telephone sectors, government civil servants are forbidden to join
unions. However, some workers covered by this ban have formed
unregistered unions. The ban also applies to security-related
government employees, such as in the military and police. Civil
servants forbidden to join unions, such as teachers and nurses, have
joined associations that perform functions similar to labor unions.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively: Many unions in
Bangladesh are highly politicized. Virtually all the National Trade
Union centers are affiliated with political parties, including one with
the ruling party. Pitched battles between members of rival labor unions
occur regularly. Some unions are militant and allegedly engage in
intimidation and vandalism. Unions do use their rights to call labor
strikes.
The Essential Services Ordinance permits the government to bar
strikes for three months in any sector deemed ``essential.'' Mechanisms
for conciliation, arbitration and labor court dispute resolution were
established under the Industrial Relations Ordinance of 1969. There
have been numerous complaints of garment workers being harassed and
fired in some factories for trying to organize workers. Workers in
Bangladesh's EPZs are prohibited from forming unions, and the
government has not fulfilled promises that restrictions on freedom of
association and formation of unions in the EPZs would be lifted in
stages between 1995 and 2000. The AFL-CIO has petitioned the U.S. Trade
Representative to revoke General System of Preference benefits for
Bangladesh for its failure to keep its commitment to restore full labor
rights in the EPZs.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor: The constitution
prohibits forced or compulsory labor. The Factories Act and the Shops
and Establishments Act, both passed in 1965, set up inspection
mechanisms to guard against forced labor, but resources for enforcement
are scarce. There is no evidence of forced labor, though conditions for
some domestic servants resemble servitude, and some trafficked women
and children work as prostitutes.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children: Bangladesh has laws that
prohibit labor by children. The Factories Act bars children under the
age of 14 from working in factories. In reality, enforcement of these
rules is inadequate. According to United Nations estimates, about one
third of Bangladesh's population under the age of 18 is working. In a
society as poor as Bangladesh's, the extra income obtained by children,
however meager, is sought by many families. In July 1995, Bangladesh
garment exporters signed a memorandum of understanding that has
virtually eliminated child labor in the garment export sector. Under
the MOU, schools and a stipend program were established for displaced
child workers. A monitoring system managed by the ILO enforces the MOU.
As a result of the MOU, child labor has been virtually eliminated from
the garment export sector.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work: Regulations regarding minimum
wages, hours of work, and occupational safety and health are not
strictly enforced. The legal minimum wage varies depending on
occupation and industry. It is generally not enforced. The law sets a
standard 48-hour workweek with one mandated day off. A 60-hour
workweek, inclusive of a maximum 12 hours of overtime, is allowed.
Relative to the average standard of living in Bangladesh, the average
monthly wage could be described as sufficient for minimal, basic needs.
The Factories Act of 1965 nominally sets occupational health and safety
standards. The law is comprehensive, but is largely ignored by many
Bangladeshi employers.
f. Rights in Sectors with U.S. Investment: There are few
manufacturing firms with U.S. investment. As far as can be determined,
firms with U.S. capital investment abide by the labor laws. Similarly,
these firms respect the minimum age for the employment of children.
According to both the government and representatives of the firms,
workers in firms with U.S. capital investment generally earn a much
higher salary than the minimum wage set for each specific industry, and
enjoy better working conditions.
Extent of U.S. Investment in Selected Industries--U.S. Direct Investment Position Abroad on an Historical Cost
Basis--1998
[Millions of U.S. Dollars]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Category Amount
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Petroleum...................... .............. (\1\)
Total Manufacturing............ .............. 0
Food & Kindred Products...... 0 ...............................................................
Chemicals & Allied Products.. 0 ...............................................................
Primary & Fabricated Metals.. 0 ...............................................................
Industrial Machinery and 0 ...............................................................
Equipment.
Electric & Electronic 0 ...............................................................
Equipment.
Transportation Equipment..... 0 ...............................................................
Other Manufacturing.......... 0 ...............................................................
Wholesale Trade................ .............. (\1\)
Banking........................ .............. (\1\)
Finance/Insurance/Real Estate.. .............. -4
Services....................... .............. 0
Other Industries............... .............. -2
TOTAL ALL INDUSTRIES........... .............. 172
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Suppressed to avoid disclosing data of individual companies.
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis.
______
INDIA
Key Economic Indicators
[Billions of U.S. Dollars unless otherwise noted]
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1997 1998 \1\ 1999
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Income, Production and Employment:
Nominal GDP \2\......................... 383.0 412.0 430.0
Real GDP Growth (pct) \3\............... 5.1 6 -6.5
GDP by Sector (pct estimated):
Agriculture........................... 27.5 26.7 26.0
Manufacturing......................... 23.9 25.3 24.5
Services.............................. 48.6 48.0 49.5
Government............................ N/A N/A N/A
Per Capita GDP (US$).................... 396.0 418.0 440.0
Labor Force (millions).................. 396.0 410.0 420.0
Unemployment Rate (pct)................. 22.5 22.5 22.5
Money and Prices (annual percentage
growth):
Money Supply Growth (M3)................ 18.0 18.4 18.0
Consumer Price Inflation................ 6.8 13.1 7.0
Exchange Rate (Rupee/US$ annual average)
Official.............................. 37.12 42.08 43.5
Parallel.............................. 37.16 42.10 43.6
Balance of Payments and Trade:
Total Exports FOB \4\................... 35.0 33.7 36.0
Exports to U.S.\5\.................... 6.7 7.0 8.0
Total Imports CIF \4\................... 41.5 41.8 46.3
Imports from U.S.\5\.................. 3.6 3.5 3.6
Trade Balance \4\....................... -6.5 -8.1 -10.3
Balance with U.S.\5\.................. 3.1 3.5 4.4
Current Account Deficit/GDP (pct)....... 1.7 1.5 2.0
External Public Debt \6\................ 94.3 98.2 99.0
Debt Service Payments/GDP (pct)......... 2.7 2.5 2.2
Fiscal Deficit/GDP (pct)................ 5.7 6.3 5.5
Gold and Foreign Exchange Reserves...... 29.5 32.0 33.0
Aid from U.S. (US$ million)............. 121.8 156.0 129.0
Aid from Other Countries................ 3.2d2.7 N/A
------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Data are for Indian fiscal year (April 1 to March 31) unless
otherwise noted. 1999 figures are all embassy estimates based on data
available in October 1999.
\2\ GDP at factor cost.
\3\ Percentage changes calculated in local currency.
\4\ Merchandise trade.
\5\ Source: U.S. Department of Commerce and ITC; calendar year, exports
FAS, imports customs basis; 1999 figures are estimates based on data
available through October 1999.
\6\ Includes rupee debt of $10 billion to the former USSR.
Sources: Indian Government economic survey, Indian Government budgets,
Reserve Bank of India bulletins, World Bank, USAID, and private
research agencies.
1. General Policy Framework
Economic reforms since 1991 have helped India achieve a large
measure of macroeconomic stability and a moderate degree of
liberalization of its trade, investment and financial sectors. These
reforms boosted annual economic growth to around seven percent in the
1994-1997 period. In Indian Fiscal Year (IFY) 1997-98, growth slowed to
5.1 percent in the wake of the Asian financial crisis but increased to
6 percent in IFY 1998-99. For IFY 1999-2000, the U.S. Embassy projects
GDP growth of about 6 to 6.5 percent and industrial growth of about 6
percent. The U.S. continues to be the largest investor in India and its
biggest trading partner. The Indian economy has the potential to
perform well, and the long-term prospects remain encouraging. There are
continuing concerns, though, about inadequate infrastructure and
chronic large budget deficits. The central government deficit has
hovered around 5.5 to 6.5 percent of GDP with the consolidated public
sector deficit (including states) remaining at a level of 9-10 percent
of GDP.
During the first six months of FY 1999-2000, money supply (M3) rose
by an estimated 18 percent. The Reserve Bank of India (RBI) target for
M3 growth is 15 to 15.5 percent for the year. Credit policies for 1999-
2000 announced in April and October 1999 have been aimed at
accelerating industrial investment and output, and reducing interest
rates while improving credit availability to business. Inflation has
dropped considerably. Government and private forecasters now predict an
average inflation rate (as measured by the Consumer Price Index) of 7
percent during FY 1999-2000, following inflation of 13 percent in the
previous year.
2. Exchange Rate Policy
India has used exchange rate policy to improve its export
competitiveness. On March 1, 1993, the exchange rate was unified and
the rupee was made fully convertible on the trade account. On August
20, 1994, the rupee was made fully convertible on the current account.
Controls remain on capital account transactions, with the exception of
Non-Resident Indians (NRIs) and Foreign Institutional Investors (FIIs),
but their gradual removal is expected as foreign exchange reserves grow
and India makes progress in merging its capital markets with
international financial markets. In June 1997, the Tarapore Committee
on Capital Account Convertibility recommended a three year (1998-2000)
period for complete capital account convertibility of the rupee. The
government has stated however, that India is in no hurry to complete
full convertibility, especially given the recent crisis in East Asian
economies and the need to strengthen the banking sector further.
The RBI intervenes in the foreign exchange market to maintain a
stable rupee. The rupee is tied to a basket of currencies with the U.S.
Dollar playing a predominant role. In IFY 1998-99, the exchange rate
moved in the range of rupees 42.00-42.70 per dollar. From April to
September 1999, the rupee depreciated by about 2 percent and is
currently trading in the range of 43.2-43.50 per dollar. India was
shielded from the East Asian currency crisis due to a staged approach
to liberalization and its relatively low degree of exposure to global
markets. In addition, India's short term foreign borrowing is low and
Indian banks and financial institutions have very little exposure to
the real estate sector.
3. Structural Policies
Pricing Policies: Central and state governments still regulate the
prices of many essential products, including food-grains, sugar, edible
oils, basic medicines, energy, fertilizers, water, and many industrial
inputs. Agricultural commodity procurement prices have risen
substantially during the past seven years, while prices for nitrogenous
fertilizer, rural electricity and irrigation are subsidized. Acute
power shortages are forcing several states to arrest the financial
decline of state electricity boards by moving to market pricing. The
federal government has also begun to scrutinize more carefully the cost
of its subsidies. The government in 1997 announced a plan to reduce
subsidy rates on food, and fertilizers from the existing 90 percent to
25 percent over the next five years. In September 1997, the government
increased the prices of several petroleum products and committed to
dismantling the Administered Price Mechanism for petroleum products
over the next two years. However, progress has been slow.
Many basic food products are under a dual pricing system: some
output is supplied at fixed prices through government distribution
outlets (``fair price shops''), with the remainder sold by producers on
the free market. Prices in government outlets usually are regulated
according to a cost-plus formula; some formulas have not been adjusted
in more than a decade. Regulation of basic drug prices has been a
particular problem for U.S. pharmaceutical firms operating in India,
although changes in national drug policy have sharply reduced the
number of price-controlled formulations from 142 in 1994 to 72 at
present.
Tax Policies: Public finances remain highly dependent on indirect
taxes, particularly import tariffs. Between 1991 and 1998, indirect
taxes accounted for about 70 percent of central government tax revenue.
India's direct tax base is very narrow, with only 20 million taxpayers
out of a total population of about one billion. Marginal corporate
rates are high by international standards, although the FY 1996-97
budget lowered the corporate income tax rate for foreign companies from
55 percent to 48 percent. Tax evasion is widespread, and the government
has stated that future rate cuts will depend on the success of efforts
to improve tax compliance. Over the last seven years the government has
been streamlining the nation's tax regime along the lines recommended
by a government-appointed committee: increasing the revenue share from
direct taxes; introducing a Value-Added Tax (VAT); and replacing
India's complex tax code with one that is simple and transparent. The
government also provides tax incentives for specific sectors, such as a
10-year tax holiday for infrastructure projects.
Regulatory Policies: The ``new industrial policy'' announced in
July 1991 considerably relaxed government's regulatory hold on
investment and production decisions. Under the new policies, industrial
licenses are only required for 6 areas, defined as strategic. Some
restrictions remain for manufacturing in certain sectors reserved for
the public sector or small-scale industry. Additionally, the government
announced in 1994 and 1995 liberal policies for the pharmaceutical and
telecommunications industries. Most plant location strictures have been
removed. Nevertheless, Indian industry remains highly regulated by a
powerful bureaucracy armed with excessive rules and broad discretion.
Government approval of foreign business investment projects often takes
three to five years. As economic reforms take root at the federal
level, the focus of liberalization is gradually shifting to state
governments, which, under India's federal system of government, enjoy
broad regulatory powers. The speed and quality of regulatory decisions
governing important issues such as zoning, land-use and environment can
vary dramatically from one state to another. Political opposition has
slowed or halted important regulatory reforms governing areas like
labor, bankruptcy, and company law that would enhance the efficiency of
domestic and foreign investment.
4. Debt Management Policies
External Debt Management: India's reliance during the 1980's on
debt-financed deficit spending to boost economic growth meant that
commercial debt and Non-Resident Indian (NRI) deposits provided a
growing share of the financing for India's mounting trade deficit. The
result was a hefty increase in external debt, compounded by rising real
interest rates and a declining term structure that reflected India's
falling creditworthiness. Total external debt rose from $20 billion in
FY 1980-81 to about $84 billion in FY 1990-91. Fueled by rising debt
service payments, foreign exchange reserves fell to $1.1 billion
(excluding gold and SDRs) during the FY 1990-91 balance of payments
crisis, the equivalent of only two weeks of imports. By October 1999,
India's reform program had succeeded in boosting reserves to $33
billion (excluding gold and SDRs).
External Debt Structure: India's total external debt reached $98.2
billion by March 1999. Debt service payments were estimated at $ 4.3
billion in 1998-99. Roughly two-thirds of the country's foreign
currency debt is composed of multilateral and bilateral debt, much of
it on highly-concessional terms. The share of concessional debt in
total debt is about 42 percent. The addition of new debt has slowed
substantially, as the government has maintained a tight rein on foreign
commercial borrowing and defense-related debt and has encouraged
foreign equity investment rather than debt financing. As a result, the
ratio of total external debt to GDP fell from 39.8 percent in FY 1992-
93 to 23.5 percent in FY 1998-99.
Relationship with Creditors: India has an excellent debt servicing
record. However, Standard and Poor's (S&P) in October 1998 downgraded
India's foreign currency debt from BB+ to BB, one notch below the
highest speculative grade. On the other hand, S&P at the same time
upgraded its outlook on India from negative to stable. In October 1999,
Moody's upgraded India's foreign currency rating outlook from stable to
positive while maintaining an unchanged speculative grade rating of
Ba2. Citing its growing foreign exchange reserves and ample food
stocks, India chose not to negotiate an extended financing facility
with the IMF when its standby arrangement expired in May 1993.
5. Significant Barriers to U.S. Exports
Import Licensing: U.S. exports have benefited from significant
reductions in India's import-licensing requirements. Since 1992, the
government has eliminated the licensing system for imports of
intermediates and capital goods, and has steadily reduced the import-
weighted tariff from 87 percent to 23 percent at present. U.S. exports
to India increased from $2.0 billion in 1991 to $3.6 billion in 1998-
99. India currently maintains import restrictions (QRs) on more than
1,400 tariff line items justified by India on balance of payments (BOP)
grounds. For this reason, the U.S. requested the establishment of a
World Trade Organization (WTO) dispute settlement panel in November
1997 to resolve the issue. The panel's final report issued in April
1999 ruled against India's claims that its BOP situation justified
import restrictions. In August 1999, the WTO Appellate Body rejected
India's appeal and confirmed the panel's ruling. India and the U.S. are
currently working out an agreement regarding the phase-out period for
QRs.
Some commodity imports must be channeled (``canalized'') through
public enterprises, although many ``canalized'' items are now
decontrolled. The main canalized items currently are petroleum
products, bulk agricultural products such as grains and vegetable oils,
and some pharmaceutical products. U.S. exporters face a negative list
of items which cannot be imported, affecting roughly one-fourth of all
tariff lines, and tariff protection that is still very high by
international standards. Import licenses are still required for
pesticides and insecticides, fruits, vegetables and processed consumer
food products, breeding stock, most pharmaceuticals and chemicals, and
products reserved in India for small-scale industry. This licensing
requirement serves in many cases as an effective ban on importation.
The new Export Import Policy effective April 1, 1999, allowed import of
several additional consumer products.
Services Barriers: The government runs many major service
industries either partially or entirely, but private sector
participants are increasingly being allowed to compete in the market.
Entry of foreign banks remains highly regulated, but approval has so
far been granted for the operation of 25 new foreign banks or bank
branches since June 1993, when the RBI issued guidelines under which
new private banks may be established. Furthermore, financial
authorities have permitted sweeping changes in non-bank financial
services since then. India does not allow foreign nationals to practice
law in its courts, but some foreign law firms maintain liaison offices
in India. The government is now reviewing its monopoly on life and
general insurance with a view to future liberalization and reform of
the industry. Foreign and domestic joint ventures participate in
telecommunications, advertising, accounting, and a wide range of
consultancy services. There is a growing awareness of India's potential
as a major services exporter and increasing demand for a more open
services market.
Standards, Testing, Labeling and Certification: Indian standards
generally follow international norms and do not constitute a
significant barrier to trade. However, India's food safety laws are
often outdated or more stringent than international norms. Where
differences exist, India is seeking to harmonize national standards
with international norms. No distinctions are made between imported and
domestic goods, except in the case of some bulk grains.
Investment Barriers: The industrial policy introduced in July 1991
achieved a dramatic overhaul of regulations restricting foreign
investment. The requirement for government approval for equity
investments of up to 51 percent in 48 industries covering the bulk of
manufacturing activities has been entirely eliminated, although the
government reserves the right to deny requests for increased equity
stakes. Automatic approval up to 74 percent of FDI is permissible in
eight categories including mining, storage, warehousing, and transport.
In addition 100 percent of FDI is automatically approved in two
sectors--electricity generation and transmission, and construction/
maintenance of roads. However, government approval of foreign
infrastructure projects is frequently stalled for lengthy periods of
time.
Most sectors of the Indian economy are now open to foreign
investors, except those that raise security concerns such as defense,
railways and atomic energy. The U.S. and India have not negotiated a
Bilateral Investment Treaty, although an agreement covering the
operations of the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) was
updated in 1997. OPIC operations resumed in December 1998, following
the partial lifting of sanctions imposed on India after its nuclear
tests in May 1998. In 1994, India became a member of the Multilateral
Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA), an agency of the World Bank. The
Indian Government ratified the Uruguay Round GATT agreement on January
1, 1995 and is a member of the WTO.
Government Procurement Practices: Indian Government procurement
practices are not transparent and occasionally discriminate against
foreign suppliers, but they are improving under the influence of fiscal
stringency. Price and quality preferences for local suppliers were
largely abolished in June 1992. Recipients of preferential treatment
are now concentrated in the small-scale industrial and handicrafts
sectors, which represent a very small share of total government
procurement. Defense procurement through agents is not permitted,
forcing U.S. firms to maintain resident representation. When foreign
financing is involved, procurement agencies generally comply with
multilateral development bank requirements for international tenders.
Customs Procedures: Liberalization of India's trade regime has
reduced tariff and non-tariff barriers, but it has not eased some of
the worst aspects of customs procedures. Documentation requirements,
including ex-factory bills of sale, are extensive and delays frequent.
In 1996, the government switched to the harmonized system of commodity
classification, removing ambiguities and providing more transparency to
its export-import policy.
6. Export Subsidies Policies
The 1991 budget phased out most direct export subsidies, but a
tangle of indirect subsidies remains. Export promotion measures include
exemptions or concessional tariffs on raw materials and capital inputs,
and access to Special Import Licenses (SIL) for restricted inputs.
Concessional income tax provisions apply to exports (export earnings
are tax-exempt). Commercial banks provide export financing on
concessional terms.
7. Protection of U.S. Intellectual Property
India is a signatory of the GATT Uruguay Round and World Trade
Organization (WTO) agreements, including the Agreement on Trade-Related
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), and is obligated to
bring its laws and enforcement efforts into TRIPS compliance by January
1, 2000. The government has announced its intention to take full
advantage of the 2005 transition period permitted to developing
countries under TRIPS before implementing full patent protection. India
is a member of the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and
Artistic Works, and in August 1998, it became a member of the Paris
Convention and the Patent Cooperation Treaty.
In April 1998, the U.S. and India reached an agreement to resolve a
long-running dispute over India's failure to implement its WTO TRIPs
mailbox requirements for the filing of pharmaceutical and agricultural
chemical product patent applications, and failure to implement a system
for the granting of exclusive marketing rights. In April 1999, the
Indian Parliament passed a patent bill establishing a ``mailbox''
system and allowing exclusive marketing rights, putting India in
compliance with its TRIPS obligations.
Over the past decade, USTR has targeted India as a Priority Foreign
Country in the ``Special 301'' process, and despite some improvements,
India is still included in the ``Special 301'' Priority Watch List.
Based on past practices, India was identified in April 1991 as a
``Priority Foreign Country'' under the ``Special 301'' provision of the
1988 Trade Act, and a Section 301 investigation was initiated on May
26, 1991. In February 1992, following a nine-month Special 301
investigation, the USTR determined that India's denial of adequate and
effective intellectual property protection was unreasonable and burdens
or restricts U.S. commerce, especially in the area of patent
protection. As a result, in April 1992, the President suspended duty-
free privileges under the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) for
$60 million in trade from India. In June 1992, additional GSP benefits
were withdrawn, increasing the trade for which GSP is suspended to
approximately $80 million.
India's patent protection is weak and has especially adverse
effects on U.S. pharmaceutical and chemical firms. Estimated annual
losses to the pharmaceutical industry due to piracy are $450 million.
India's Patent Act prohibits patents for any invention intended for use
or capable of being used as a food, medicine, or drug or relating to
substances prepared or produced by chemical processes. Many U.S.-
invented drugs are widely reproduced since product patent protection is
not available. Processes for making drugs are patentable, but the
patent term is limited to the shorter of five years from the grant of
patent or seven years from the filing date of the patent application.
Product patents in other areas are granted for 14 years from the date
of filing.
India continues to have high piracy rates for all types of
copyrighted works. Strong criminal penalties are available on paper,
and the classification of copyright infringements as ``cognizable
offenses'' theoretically expands police search and seizure authority.
However, the severe backlogs in the court system and excessive
procedural requirements result in very few cases being brought to
conclusion.
Trademark protection is considered good, and will be raised to
international standards with the passage of a new Trademark Bill that
codifies existing court decisions on the use and protection of foreign
trademarks, including service marks. The bill was first introduced in
1995 but failed to win parliamentary approval. Passage of the bill is
expected in 2000. Enforcement of trademark owner rights has been
indifferent in the past, but is steadily improving as the courts and
police respond to domestic concerns about the high cost of piracy to
Indian rights' holders.
8. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association: India's Constitution gives workers the
right of association. Workers may form and join trade unions of their
choice; work actions are protected by law. Unions represent roughly 2
percent of the total workforce, and about 25 percent of industrial and
service workers in the organized sector.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively: Indian law
recognizes the right to organize and bargain collectively. Procedural
mechanisms exist to adjudicate labor disputes that cannot be resolved
through collective bargaining. State and local authorities occasionally
use their power to declare strikes ``illegal'' and force adjudication.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor: Forced labor is
prohibited by the constitution; a 1976 law specifically prohibits the
formerly common practice of ``bonded labor.'' Despite implementation of
the 1976 law, bonded labor continues in many rural areas. Efforts to
eradicate the practice are complicated by extreme poverty and
jurisdictional disputes between the central and state governments;
legislation is a central government function, while enforcement is the
responsibility of the states.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children: Poor social and economic
conditions and lack of compulsory education make child labor a major
problem in India. The government's 1991 census estimated that 11.3
million Indian children from ages 5 to 15 are working. Non-governmental
organizations estimate that there may be more than 55 million child
laborers. A 1986 law bans employment of children under age 14 in
hazardous occupations and strictly regulates child employment in other
fields. Nevertheless, hundreds of thousands of children are employed in
the glass, pottery, carpet and fireworks industries, among others.
Resource constraints and the sheer magnitude of the problem limit
ability to enforce child-labor legislation.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work: India has a maximum eight-hour
workday and 48-hour workweek. This maximum is generally, observed by
employers in the formal sector. Occupational safety and health measures
vary widely from state to state and among industries, as does the
minimum wage.
f. Rights in Sectors with U.S. Investment: U.S. investment exists
largely in manufacturing and service sectors where organized labor is
predominant and working conditions are well above the average for
India. U.S. investors generally offer better than prevailing wages,
benefits and work conditions. Intense government and press scrutiny of
all foreign activities ensures that any violation of acceptable
standards under the five worker-rights criteria mentioned above would
receive immediate attention.
Extent of U.S. Investment in Selected Industries--U.S. Direct Investment Position Abroad on an Historical Cost
Basis--1998
[Millions of U.S. Dollars]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Category Amount
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Petroleum...................... .............. 190
Total Manufacturing............ .............. 256
Food & Kindred Products...... -40 ...............................................................
Chemicals & Allied Products.. 128 ...............................................................
Primary & Fabricated Metals.. -110 ...............................................................
Industrial Machinery and 227 ...............................................................
Equipment.
Electric & Electronic 78 ...............................................................
Equipment.
Transportation Equipment..... -61 ...............................................................
Other Manufacturing.......... 35 ...............................................................
Wholesale Trade................ .............. 54
Banking........................ .............. 500
Finance/Insurance/Real Estate.. .............. 356
Services....................... .............. 40
Other Industries............... .............. 83
TOTAL ALL INDUSTRIES........... .............. 1,480
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis.
______
PAKISTAN
Key Economic Indicators
[Billions of U.S. Dollars unless otherwise noted]
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1997 1998 \1\ 1999
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Income, Production and Employment:
Nominal GDP \2\......................... 63.2 63.3 60.3
Real GDP Growth (pct)................... 1.9 4.3 3.1
GDP by sector (pct):
Agriculture........................... 25.3 25.2 24.5
Manufacturing......................... 17.7 18.3 18.6
Services.............................. 8.5 9.7 8.9
Government............................ 6.2 6.1 6.1
Real Per Capita GDP (US$)............... 493 483 483
Labor Force (Millions).................. 36.8 37.7 38.6
Unemployment Rate (pct)................. 6.1 6.1 6.1
Money and Prices (annual percentage
growth):
Money Supply Growth (M2)................ 12.2 14.2 3.5
Consumer Price Inflation................ 11.8 7.8 6.1
Exchange Rate (Rupees/US$)
Official.............................. 40.5 46.0 51.4
Parallel.............................. 41.6 52.2 54.2
Balance of Payments and Trade:
Total Exports FOB \3\................... 8.1 8.4 7.7
Exports to U.S........................ 1.4 1.7 1.7
Total Imports CIF \3\................... 11.2 10.3 9.3
Imports from U.S...................... 1.4 1.1 0.7
Trade Balance \3\....................... -3.1 -1.9 -1.6
Balance with U.S...................... 0.0 0.6 1.0
External Public Debt.................... 27.9 29.7 28.6
Fiscal Deficit/GDP (pct)................ 6.5 5.5 4.5
Current Account Deficit/GDP(pct)........ 6.2 3.2 3.0
Debt Service Payments/GDP (pct)......... 5.9 5.0 6.3
Gold & Foreign Exchange Reserves........ 1.9 1.54 2.3
Aid from U.S. (U.S.$ millions).......... 1.9 1.9 1.0
Aid from All Other Sources \4\.......... 154 97.1 221.1
------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Data are for the corresponding Fiscal Years ending June 30. Rupee
exchange rates used to convert to dollars are 38.9 for 1997, 43.2 for
1998, and 50.2 for 1999.
\2\ GDP at factor cost.
\3\ Merchandise trade.Gf\4\ No military aid is believed to be included
in these figures. Figures are for grant assistance.
Sources: Various government, including State Bank of Pakistan and
Ministry of Finance.
1. General Policy Framework
In late 1999, Pakistan's economy continued in financial crisis.
Following a difficult 1998 due to nuclear tests, the economy stabilized
due to debt rescheduling and placing back on track the International
Monetary Fund's (IMF) Enhanced Structural Adjustment Fund/Extended Fund
Financing (ESAF/EFF) program in January 1999. Foreign exchange reserves
climbed back up and stabilized to around $1.6 billion in late 1999.
Foreign investment in FY 1998-99 plunged to $376 million, due to the
poor investment climate and unresolved disputes with independent power
producers. The government projects a growth rate in FY 1999-2000 of 4
to 5 percent, up from 3.1 percent in 1998-99. Inflation remains under
control due to slow monetary growth, lower international prices and the
relatively stable rupee; it is projected to be around 6 percent.
Pakistan's economic performance has been handicapped in recent
years largely because of ineffective governance and weak policy
implementation. Pakistan has the potential to achieve higher growth
levels if the Government of Pakistan takes effective measures to
achieve macro-economic stabilization and increase economic efficiency
by restructuring its power sector and introducing financial sector
reforms. The biggest challenge facing American firms in Pakistan is
inconsistent, sometimes contradictory policies, and a recent record of
not adhering to agreements reached with foreign investors. There is
also a lack of transparency in government decision-making, coupled with
allegations of systemic corruption. The new military government, which
took over on October 12, 1999, has targeted economic revival as a main
priority. Its stated goals are restoring investor confidence through
stability and consistency in economic policies, increasing domestic
savings, carrying out tax reforms, turning around state enterprises,
boosting agriculture, and reviving industry.
Monetary Policy: Recent monetary policy has been aimed at
encouraging growth in the context of price stability. The government
and the State Bank of Pakistan (SBP) are attempting structural reforms
in an effort to move toward more indirect, market-based methods of
monetary control along with greater autonomy for the SBP. Other
government monetary reforms include efforts to reduce concessionary and
government-directed credit schemes, enhance competition in the banking
sector, and improve prudential regulation and supervision. Prior to the
coup, however, state-owned development finance institutions, had
continued to make politically influenced lending decisions and, partly
as a result, have weak balance sheets. The trade deficit has been
reduced from about $3.1 to 1.6 billion between 96/97 and 98/99,
although in late 1999 it appears that imports are increasing. The
current account deficit has also been halved, falling from $4.3 to 1.9
billion. The money supply (M2) has also fallen sharply.
Fiscal Policy: A central element of Pakistan's economic reforms has
been the effort to reduce persistent government budget deficits. The
budget deficit as a percent of GDP has shrunk from 6.3 to about 3.5
percent, achieved not by improved tax collection and revenue
generation, but largely by cutting expenditures, especially those
budgeted for development. Defense spending and debt repayments absorb
67 percent (80 percent of current expenditures) of total federal
spending, leaving little for other basic government functions and
improving the long-neglected social sectors. Meanwhile, the country has
a very narrow tax base; perhaps one in one hundred Pakistanis pays
income tax. The country has had to rely on import and excise taxes for
a very high share of revenues, thus protecting inefficient industries
and encouraging smuggling, and on official transfers from external
creditors. The new military government has targeted loan defaulters and
tax evaders and threatened severe punishment for those who do not pay
back loans and taxes. It is too early, however, to assess whether it
has the political will to implement the policy.
The Government of Pakistan's medium-term adjustment program has
aimed to broaden the tax base through extension of under-taxed sectors
and reduction of exemptions; to shift from taxation of international
trade to taxation of consumption; to move to market determination of
administered prices; and to improve the productivity of public
spending. Progress has been mixed. Agriculture remains very lightly
taxed. In August 1999, a 15 percent General Sales Tax (GST) was levied
on petroleum products, electricity, gas, and fertilizers through a
revenue-neutral basis by reduction in development or additional
surcharges. GST was also imposed on branded food products, selected
medicines and imported fruits. The previous government faced strong
resistance against bringing small businesses into the sales tax net,
although the military government appears committed to carrying out the
GST program. Maximum import tariffs have been reduced from 70 percent
in 1994-95 to 35 percent in March 1999, as part of Pakistan's trade
reform program.
2. Exchange Rate Policy
Pakistan continued a managed floating exchange rate system until
July 21, 1998. From July 22, 1998 the government introduced a multiple
exchange rate system comprising an official rate, a floating interbank
rate (FIBR), and a composite rate. On May 19, 1999 the government
unified the exchange rate after a year long period of gradual
transition. The exchange rate is stable at around rupees 51.50 per U.S.
dollar, with less than a 5 percent kerb rate premium. The government
does not allow authorized money changers a margin of greater than half
a rupee per U.S. dollar between the buying and selling prices.
In years previous to the foreign exchange crisis of 1998, Pakistan
significantly liberalized foreign exchange controls. The rupee is fully
convertible on current account. Foreign firms investing in Pakistan
(other than banks and insurance companies) may remit profits and
capital without prior approval. In response to the foreign exchange
crisis of 1998, however, the government froze existing foreign currency
accounts and denied access to official reserves. Subsequently, foreign
currency accounts could be opened in commercial banks, but the State
Bank does not provide forward cover for such accounts.
3. Structural Policies
Under the three-year IMF ESAF/EFF program of October 1997, the
government has continued to carry out its commitments to structural
adjustment policies and macroeconomic objectives, including (a) to
reduce the external current accounts deficit (strengthen external
reserves); (b) to raise the annual growth rate of real GDP; and, (C) to
progressively reduce inflation. In principle, the Government of
Pakistan has been pursuing a long-term strategy of deregulation,
reduction of the public sector role in the economy, and opening the
economy to international competition. While progress has been made, the
state remains an important player in the Pakistani economy, especially
in the financial sector.
Pricing and Tax Policies: Pakistani government agencies and public
sector companies allow only exclusive agents to submit bids for tenders
as an assurance that they receive only one quotation from each
supplier. In the market, pricing is often complicated by the country's
complex tax structure, which often includes a number of taxes and
customs duties that marketers must build into their final sales prices.
These include landing charges, customs duty, bank charges, insurance,
and the recently introduced GST. The Government has recently done away
with the ``octroi'' tax (a municipal toll tax). Exemptions or relief
from import duties have been allowed on imported machinery. Tax relief
has also been provided for expansion and balancing, modernization and
replacement in existing industries.
Regulatory Policies: As part of an integrated investment promotion
strategy, Pakistan has undertaken a comprehensive program to bring the
economy into a fully market-oriented system. In a new policy, announced
April 1999, foreign investment on a repatriable basis has now been
allowed in manufacturing, infrastructure, hotel/tourism, agriculture,
services, and social sectors. Key features of Pakistan's investment
climate include a general policy of permitting foreign investors to
participate in local projects on an up to 100 percent equity basis,
easing of work permit and remittance restrictions on expatriate
managers and technical personnel, no requirement of government approval
to set up an industry with a few very limited exceptions, statutory
protection against expropriation, and no restrictions on borrowing by
foreign entities.
4. Debt Management Policies
Pakistan remains dependent on foreign donors and creditors to meet
its financing needs. Even with IFI assistance, Pakistan has run a
current account deficit in recent years. Both annual debt servicing
requirements and the current account deficit have hovered around 3
percent of GDP in recent years, while gross external public debt is
over 50 percent of GDP.
Until 1998, Pakistan had an excellent record of honoring external
debt obligations. However, during the foreign exchange crisis of 1998,
foreign exchange reserves declined to less than $450 million in
November 1998. Arrears accumulated to over $1.5 billion. Pakistan came
to the brink of a general payments default. The 1998 foreign exchange
crisis led to IFI rescheduling late in the year and rescheduling with
Paris and London club creditors. Pakistan still awaits an IMF tranche
originally due for disbursement in July 1999. The disbursement was
delayed by failure of the late Sharif government to implement IMF
conditionality regarding fuel prices and continuing World Bank concern
over the independent power project (IPP) dispute. With the recent coup,
continued IFI support remains uncertain.
5. Significant Barriers to U.S. Exports
Pakistan is a member of the World Trade Organization (WTO).
Import Licenses: In recent years Pakistan has significantly
reformed its previously restrictive import regime. Import licenses,
formerly common, have been abolished on all ``freely importable''
goods, i.e. on all items not on the negative list (68 items banned
mostly for religious, health or security reasons). All importing firms
in the private sector must register as importers with the Government of
Pakistan's Export Promotion Bureau and must have valid registration at
the time of the import. Certain detrimental import restrictions, mostly
questionable fees, have continued, including for soda ash. U.S.
pharmaceutical manufacturers have faced discriminatory application of
the internal sales tax between imported pharmaceutical raw materials
and the same domestically produced raw materials. The imported raw
materials also usually receive preferential tariff rates only if the
same materials are not manufactured locally. The Pakistan government
has also adopted a discriminatory policy against transnational
pharmaceutical manufacturers by insisting that they can only register
products that are on sale in the country of incorporation of the
respective company, while local companies are not held to such a
standard.
Services Barriers: The new 1997 investment policy promised
liberalization in services. Pakistan's offer in the WTO financial
service negotiations in December 1997 included the right of
establishment for banks, and grandfathered acquired rights of foreign
banks and foreign securities firms. In the past foreign banks generally
have been restricted to a few branches, faced higher withholding taxes
than domestic banks, and experienced restrictions on doing business
with state-owned corporations. New foreign entrants to the general
insurance market are virtually barred. Foreign firms wishing to compete
in the life insurance market face sever obstacles. Those few foreign
insurance companies operating in Pakistan faced various tax problems
and long delays in remitting profits. Under the WTO Agreement on Basic
Telecommunications Services, Pakistan made commitments to provide
market access and national treatment for all local, domestic long
distance and international basic voice telecommunications services and
private leased circuit services as of January 1, 2004. Packet-switched,
e-mail, Internet, circuit-switched data services, and trunked radio
services can be provided only through the network facilities of
Pakistan Telecommunications Corp. until 2003. Up to 100 percent foreign
investment on licensed services may be permitted; there will be no
foreign ownership restrictions as of January 1, 2004. Pakistan also
adopted some pro-competitive regulatory principles regarding
transparency of regulations, interconnection and numbering, and
competitive safeguards. Motion pictures face high tax rates, especially
the practice of including the royalty value in the dutiable value of
films imported for showing in theatres, which have sharply cut their
export into Pakistan. Theater owners also lack the authority to set
admission prices according to market conditions.
Standards: The Pakistan Standards Institution (PSI) has so far
established about 4,000 national standards for agriculture and food,
chemicals, civil and mechanical engineering, electronics, weights and
measures, and textile products. Testing facilities for agricultural
goods are inadequate, and standards are inconsistently applied,
resulting in occasional discrimination against U.S. farm products.
Sometimes a U.S. exporter will encounter difficult with ``quality''
standards, usually in the context of protecting some domestically
manufactured product.
Investment Barriers: Pakistan has liberalized its foreign
investment regime and officially encourages investment. Investors often
face unstable policy conditions, however, particularly on large
infrastructure projects. The Government of Pakistan has refused to
recognize its contractual commitments to independent power producers,
and has harassed these producers. These actions have severely damaged
Pakistan's climate for foreign investment. Security concerns can also
be disruptive factors influencing company choice of location of
facilities and areas of operation. Local content requirements occur in
the automobile, electronics, electrical products, and engineering
industries under Pakistan's ``deletion program,'' but these will have
to be phased out before January 1, 2000 in order for Pakistan to comply
with the WTO Agreement on Trade Related Investment Measures (TRIMS).
Government Procurement: The government, along with its numerous
state-run corporations, is Pakistan's largest importer. Work performed
for government agencies, including purchase of imported equipment and
services, is often awarded through tenders that are publicly announced
or issued to registered suppliers. Lack of transparency, however, has
been a recurrent and substantial problem. The Government of Pakistan
nominally subscribes to principles of international competitive
bidding, but political influence on procurement decisions has been
common, and decisions have not always been made on the basis of price
and technical quality alone.
Customs Procedures: Investors sometimes complain that the
incentives advertised at the policy level are not implemented on-the-
ground, particularly with respect to customs. Pakistan has replaced its
controversial pre-shipment inspection valuation system with an import
trade price system run by the Pakistan customs agency. This change,
however, has not eliminated complaints. In numerous disputes importers
have asserted that import trade prices are arbitrarily set by customs
officials. Investors also cite frequent changes in rates, and charge
that customs officers often demand bribes. In July, Pakistan passed
legislation to comply with the WTO Customs Valuation Agreement. Customs
authorities are presently transitioning to the new system with plans
for full compliance by January 1, 2000.
6. Export Subsidies Policies
Pakistan actively promotes the export of Pakistani goods with
measures such as government financing and tariff concessions on
imported inputs, and income and sales tax concessions. These policies
appear to be equally applied to both foreign and domestic firms
producing goods for export. Pakistan has established export processing
zones with benefits such as tax holidays, indefinite carry forward of
losses, exemption of imports from taxes and duties, and exemption from
labor laws and various other regulatory regimes.
7. Protection of U.S. Intellectual Property
Pakistan is party to the WTO's Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects
of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), and is currently revising its
laws to become TRIPS compliant by January 1, 2000, as required by
TRIPS. Pakistan is a member of the Berne Convention for the Protection
of Literary and Artistic Works, the Universal Copyright Convention, and
the World Intellectual Property Organization, but is not a member of
the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property.
Pakistan has been on the U.S. Trade Representative's ``Special 301''
Watch List since 1989 due to widespread piracy, especially of
copyrighted materials and slow efforts to implement its patent mailbox
obligations under the TRIPS agreement. Present U.S. concerns include
continuing high piracy levels; a TRIPS inconsistent copyright law;
nominal fines for infringers; lack of patent protection for
pharmaceutical products; a TRIPS inconsistent term of patent
protection; and trademark infringement.
Patents: Current law protects only process patents, though the
government has stated its commitment to eventually offering product
patents in accordance with WTO obligations.
Trademarks: Since 1994, Pakistan has required that pharmaceutical
firms label the generic name on all products with at least equal
prominence as that of the brand name. This trademark labeling
requirement serves to dilute in the minds of consumers the differences
in quality, efficacy and safety among different products. There also
have been occasional instances of infringement, including trading for
toys and industrial machinery.
Copyrights: The markets for imported computer software and, until
recently, film videos, are nearly 100 percent pirated. Piracy of
copyrighted textile designs is also a serious problem. Some counterfeit
products made in Pakistan are exported to other markets. At least one
local firm, however, is now distributing legitimate, copyrighted
videotapes produced by U.S. film studios. As a result of strengthened
law enforcement, some other pirate outlets are taking steps to offer
legitimate products. Sustained stronger enforcement needs to be paired
with action by the courts to prosecute and sentence violators.
New Technologies: The impact on U.S. exports of weak IPR protection
in Pakistan is substantial, though difficult to quantify. In the area
of copyright infringement alone, the International Intellectual
Property Alliance estimated that piracy of films, sound recordings,
computer programs, and books resulted in trade losses of $80 million in
1998.
8. Worker Rights
a. Right of Association: The Industrial Relations Ordinance of 1969
(IRO) gives industrial workers the right to form trade unions. A
presidential ordinance in December 1998 banned all union activity in
the Water and Power Development Authority (employing 130,000 workers)
for two years. The Essential Services Maintenance Act of 1952 (ESMA)
restricts union activity in sectors associated with state
administration, meaning government services and state enterprises. The
IRO prohibits anti-union discrimination by employers. Under the law,
private employers are required to reinstate workers fired for union
activities. However, workers usually do not pursue redress through the
courts because they view the legal system as slow, prohibitively
expensive, and corrupt.
b. Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively: The right of
industrial workers to organize and to freely elect representatives to
act as collective bargaining agents is established in law. Legally
required conciliation proceedings and cooling-off periods constrain the
right to strike, as does the government's authority to ban any strike
that may cause ``serious hardship to the community'' or prejudice the
national interest. The government also may ban a strike that has
continued for 30 days. The government regards as illegal any strike
conducted by workers who are not members of a legally registered union.
Police do not hesitate to crack down on worker demonstrations. The law
prohibits employers from seeking retribution against leaders of a legal
strike and stipulates criminal penalties for offenders. The law does
not protect leaders of illegal strikes.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor: The Constitution and
the law prohibit forced labor and slavery, including forced labor by
children. The 1992 Bonded Labor System (Abolition) Act outlawed bonded
labor, canceled all existing bonded debts, and forbade lawsuits for the
recovery of existing debts. However, provincial governments, which are
responsible for enforcing the law, have failed to establish enforcement
mechanisms. The Government of Punjab, has now reportedly enhanced its
activities, particularly in regard to bonded and child labor. Illegal
bonded labor is widespread. It is common in the brick, glass, and
fishing industries and is found among agricultural and construction
workers in rural areas.
d. Minimum Age of Employment of Children: Child labor is common and
there are insufficient resources and inconsistent commitment to stop
it. The Constitution prohibits employing children aged 14 years and
under in factories, mines, and hazardous occupations. The 1991
Employment of Children Act prohibits employing children under age 14 in
certain occupations and regulates working conditions. Under this law,
no child can work overtime or at night. According to a 1996 survey by
the government and the ILO, 8.3 percent (over 3.6 million) of children
between ages of 5 and 14 work. Few regard this survey as accurate,
however, believing it understates the true dimensions of the problem.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work: The federal minimum wage for
unskilled workers is rupees 1,950 ($38) per month, but it applies only
to industrial and commercial establishments employing 50 or more
workers. Federal law provides for a maximum workweek of 48 hours (54
hours for seasonal factories) with rest periods during the workday and
paid annual holidays. These regulations do not apply to agricultural
workers, workers in factories with fewer than 10 employees, and
contractors. In general, health and safety standards are poor.
Provinces have been ineffective in enforcing labor regulations, because
of limited resources, corruption, and inadequate regulatory structures.
f. Rights in Sectors with U.S. Investment: Significant investment
by U.S. companies has occurred in the power, petroleum, food, and
chemicals sectors. U.S. investors in industrial sectors are all large
enough to be subject to the full provisions of Pakistani law for worker
protection and entitlements. In general, multinational employers do
better than most employers in fulfilling their legal obligations,
providing good benefits and conditions, and dealing responsibly with
unions. The only significant area of U.S. investment in which worker
rights are legally restricted is the petroleum sector, where the oil
and gas industry is subject to the Essential Services Maintenance Act.
That Act bans strikes and collective bargaining, limits a worker's
right to change employment, and affords little recourse to a fired
worker.
Extent of U.S. Investment in Selected Industries--U.S. Direct Investment Position Abroad on an Historical Cost
Basis--1998
[Millions of U.S. Dollars]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Category Amount
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Petroleum...................... .............. 50
Total Manufacturing............ .............. (\1\)
Food & Kindred Products...... 22 ...............................................................
Chemicals & Allied Products.. (\1\) ...............................................................
Primary & Fabricated Metals.. 2 ...............................................................
Industrial Machinery and 0 ...............................................................
Equipment.
Electric & Electronic 0 ...............................................................
Equipment.
Transportation Equipment..... 0 ...............................................................
Other Manufacturing.......... (\1\) ...............................................................
Wholesale Trade................ .............. 31
Banking........................ .............. 143
Finance/Insurance/Real Estate.. .............. 107
Services....................... .............. (\1\)
Other Industries............... .............. (\1\)
TOTAL ALL INDUSTRIES........... .............. 416
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Suppressed to avoid disclosing data of individual companies.
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis.
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