[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 145 (1999), Part 16] [Senate] [Pages 23561-23562] [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]U.S. POLICY TOWARDS NORTH KOREA Mr. AKAKA. Mr. President, I thank the majority leader for the time and also my chairman from Alaska, Senator Murkowski, for permitting me to speak during this time. I rise to address an issue of critical importance to our national security: containing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction by North Korea. As ranking member of the Subcommittee on International Security, Proliferation, and Federal Services, I see this as one of the most pressing security issues facing America. The Clinton administration has been working hard at containing and countering this threat, holding important discussions with the North Koreans, most recently in Berlin. Last Friday, a North Korean spokesman stated that North Korea would ``not launch a missile while the talks are underway with a view to creating an atmosphere more favorable for the talks'' with the United States. This, I believe, is a very positive step. North Korea's development and August 1998 testing of a long-range missile drew America's attention to this emerging threat to our national security. Even more directly, it raised concerns about Hawaii's security. Following this test, the North Koreans began preparing to launch a second missile, which our intelligence analysts believe could deliver a several-hundred kilogram payload to Hawaii and to Alaska. North Korean preparations to test launch a much larger missile prompted the administration to take multilateral efforts to persuade the North Koreans not to launch and to restrict their missile development. Following negotiations in Berlin between the United States and the North Koreans last week, the President announced his decision to ease some sanctions against North Korea administered under the Trading with the Enemy Act, the Defense Production Act, and the Department of Commerce's Export Administration regulations. So far these efforts have been partially successful, and the North Koreans have agreed to a moratorium on missile launches during this series of talks with the United States. The administration is to be congratulated for the intensity with which it has pursued a solution to this dangerous problem. There has been some criticism of the administration's approach, with a few critics arguing that the administration is rewarding bad behavior or giving in to extortion demands. I do not believe this is the case. The formal announcement by the North Korean Government stating there would be no missile tests while talks are underway with the United States is a clear indication that North Koreans have accepted the new approach in relations outlined by Secretary Perry. There is no doubt that the North Koreans have an active missile export program which is dependent upon imports of foreign technology and exports of cruise missiles. Therefore, it is in our national security interest to limit North Korean missile development and especially North Korean missile exports toward which the Berlin agreement takes a firm step. By lifting some economic sanctions, holding out the possibility of lifting additional sanctions, and suggesting to the North Koreans that the United States is willing to normalize relations with North Korea, the North [[Page 23562]] Koreans have been given a powerful incentive towards agreeing to a permanent moratorium on missile development. Reimposing sanctions would send such a strong signal of distrust with North Korean actions that it could well set back North Korean efforts to achieve international respectability to lower levels than those today. This is not a sanctions relief for moratorium deal. It leads, instead, to a normalization of relations for a reduction in threat. Normalization is predicated upon North Korean willingness to change their behavior in terms of terrorism, drug dealing, and proliferation, including a verifiable end to their nuclear warhead and missile programs. We are not looking at an immediate end to the hostile atmosphere that has worsened tensions on the Korean peninsula. We must determine what our long-term objectives are on the Korean peninsula. If our ultimate goal is the peaceful unification of the Koreas as one democratic state, we need to assess more effectively how our current strategy will lead us in that direction. I look forward to the administration's elaborating its next steps towards North Korea. So far, the administration has worked hard and well at containing tensions on the peninsula. It is not a success which must come easily, given the difficulty of dealing with the North Koreans. More hard work and the support of Congress will be needed to make a lasting peace possible. I yield the floor and thank the Senator from Alaska for granting me this time. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Alaska. Mr. MURKOWSKI. Mr. President, I thank the Chair, and I thank my good friend and colleague from Hawaii with whom I have a great rapport. I very much appreciate his statement and the meaningful application of both Hawaii and my State of Alaska, as we look at the potential threat from some of the rogue nations of the world. ____________________