[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 145 (1999), Part 6] [House] [Page 8636] [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]PROCEED WITH CAUTION BEFORE BANNING SCIENTIFIC TIES WITH INDIA The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a previous order of the House, the gentleman from New Jersey (Mr. Pallone) is recognized for 5 minutes. Mr. PALLONE. Madam Speaker, I rise today to draw my colleagues' attention to legislation that has been introduced in the other body that could have the potentially destructive effects of cutting off important exchanges between American scientists and their counterparts from other countries. The legislation in question, offered by Senator Shelby, would impose a moratorium on visiting scientists from so-called sensitive countries in American nuclear labs. The Senator's proposal comes on the heels of recent reports of compromises to our national security with regard to the Peoples' Republic of China. While I agree that Chinese espionage activities should cause us to be more vigilant with regard to that country, I am concerned that this proposed legislation casts a wide net and would give too much discretion to officials at the Department of Energy. The result could be a cutting off of positive scientific exchanges that do not affect our national security, depriving all of us of valuable knowledge and disrupting the types of scientific contacts that actually promote security and cooperation. One country, Madam Speaker, that could be affected by this legislation is India. While the Senate legislation does not mention any countries by name, a recent report in the newspaper India Abroad quotes an Energy Department official that the list of seven sensitive countries includes, in addition to China and Russia, India and Pakistan. The official indicated that different criteria were used for putting countries on the list, and that India and Pakistan were included because they are not signatories to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. Madam Speaker, I, too, am deeply concerned about the persistent pattern of China's theft of our nuclear secrets. I have come to this floor on several occasions to call for more safeguards against Chinese espionage, as well as to focus more attention on China's documented actions with regard to nuclear proliferation, which include providing nuclear and missile technology to unstable countries like Pakistan. But in the case of India, we clearly do not have the facts to support the conclusion that India is involved in the same types of activities as China. Thus, I would urge Members of the Senate and the House, as well as the administration, not to jump to any conclusions about India without the facts. What we know, Madam Speaker, is that U.S.-India relations have suffered in the past year because of the nuclear tests conducted by India last May. But one key fact that is often overlooked is that India's nuclear program is essentially indigenous, developed by India's own scientists. Export controls on supercomputers and other dual use technology have been in effect against India for years, forcing India to develop its own highly advanced R&D infrastructure. Another very important point, Madam Speaker, is that India has kept its nuclear technology to itself, out of the hands of rogue regimes and international sponsors of terrorism. This is in marked contrast to China, which has not only stolen our technology, but has shared very sensitive information with unstable countries in Asia and the Middle East. Madam Speaker, I fully agree that we need to be more wary of China. This is an authoritarian country, a one-party state, the Communist party, with a terrible record on human rights and a record of intimidation and aggression against its neighbors. Indeed, Madam Speaker, some of India's recent actions, including the nuclear tests and the test-firing of the Agni intermediate-range missile, which have caused diplomatic problems with the U.S., have to be seen in the context of China. India shares a long border with China, the two countries have fought a border war started by China, and India is directly threatened by China's provision of weapons technology to Pakistan. The bottom line, Madam Speaker, is that India is not China. India is a democracy with multiple political parties. So we need to be careful before we go on a witch hunt against countries, particularly India, which do not pose the same type of security risk posed by China. The legislation introduced in the Senate is too open-ended, in my mind, allowing the Department of Energy overly broad discretion. At a time when there is an emerging bipartisan consensus that we should lift the sanctions that have been imposed on India, this legislation could end up imposing another punitive sanction that will further set back our relations, to the detriment, in my opinion, of both countries. The question, should we protect our sensitive nuclear secrets from potentially hostile countries, like China, that have already been shown to have stolen those secrets, I think the answer is absolutely yes, Madam Speaker. But let us not cut off cooperation and scientific exchanges with countries, like India, that have not been stealing our secrets and which could be partners for a more stable and secure world. ____________________