[Congressional Record (Bound Edition), Volume 145 (1999), Part 6]
[Issue]
[Pages 8040-8168]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]
[[Page 8040]]
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD
United States
of America
May 3, 1999
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES--Monday, May 3, 1999
The House met at 2 p.m. and was called to order by the Speaker pro
tempore (Mrs. Biggert).
____________________
DESIGNATION OF THE SPEAKER PRO TEMPORE
The SPEAKER pro tempore laid before the House the following
communication from the Speaker:
Washington, DC,
May 3, 1999.
I hereby appoint the Honorable Judy Biggert to act as
Speaker pro tempore on this day.
J. Dennis Hastert,
Speaker of the House of Representatives.
____________________
PRAYER
The Chaplain, Reverend James David Ford, D.D., offered the following
prayer:
With gratefulness and praise, O gracious God, we laud Your name for
the strength You provide for us in all the seasons of life. In times of
great anxiety and sorrow, Your spirit comforts and sustains our very
souls; in times of great joy and acclaim, Your spirit encourages us in
our celebration of life. Whether in tears or laughter, whether in
illness or health, Your presence in our lives gives meaning and purpose
and confidence for this day. For all Your gifts to us and to all people
we offer this our earnest prayer. Amen.
____________________
THE JOURNAL
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The Chair has examined the Journal of the
last day's proceedings and announces to the House his approval thereof.
Pursuant to clause 1, rule I, the Journal stands approved.
____________________
PLEDGE OF ALLEGIANCE
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Will the gentleman from Nevada (Mr. Gibbons)
come forward and lead the House in the Pledge of Allegiance.
Mr. GIBBONS led the Pledge of Allegiance as follows:
I pledge allegiance to the Flag of the United States of
America, and to the Republic for which it stands, one nation
under God, indivisible, with liberty and justice for all.
____________________
SUNDRY MESSAGES FROM THE PRESIDENT
Sundry messages in writing from the President of the United States
were communicated to the House by Mr. Sherman Williams, one of his
secretaries.
____________________
MESSAGE FROM THE SENATE
A message from the Senate by Mr. Lundregan, one of its clerks,
announced that the Senate had passed without amendment a concurrent
resolution of the House of the following title:
H. Con. Res. 49. Concurrent resolution authorizing the use
of the Capitol Grounds for a bike rodeo to be conducted by
the Earth Force Youth Bike Summit.
The message also announced that the Senate had passed a bill of the
following title, in which the concurrence of the House is requested:
S. 609. An act to amend the Safe and Drug-Free Schools and
Communities Act of 1994 to prevent the abuse of inhalants
through programs under that Act, and for other purposes.
____________________
COMMUNICATION FROM CHAIRMAN, HOUSE REPUBLICAN CONFERENCE
The SPEAKER pro tempore laid before the House a communication from
the Honorable J.C. Watts, Jr., Chairman, House Republican Conference:
House Republican Conference,
House of Representatives,
Washington, DC, April 30, 1999.
Hon. J. Dennis Hastert,
Speaker, House of Representatives,
Washington, DC.
Dear Mr. Speaker: I write to notify you pursuant to L.
Deschler, 3 Deschler's Precedents of the United States House
of Representatives ch. 11, Sec. 14.8 (1963), that I have been
served with an administrative agency subpoena (in my capacity
as Chairman of the House Republican Conference) issued by the
Federal Election Commission. The subpoena seeks information
and documents relating to Conference activity from 1996.
Sincerely,
J.C. Watts, Jr.,
Chairman.
____________________
COMMUNICATION FROM THE HONORABLE JOHN A. BOEHNER, MEMBER OF CONGRESS
The SPEAKER pro tempore laid before the House the following
communication from the Honorable John A. Boehner, Member of Congress:
Congress of the United States,
House of Representatives,
April 30, 1999.
Hon. J. Dennis Hastert,
Speaker, House of Representatives,
Washington, DC.
Dear Mr. Speaker: This is to notify you pursuant to L.
Deschler, 3 Deschler's Precedents of the United States House
of Representatives ch. 11 Sec. 14.8 (1963), that I have been
served with an administrative agency subpoena issued by the
Federal Election Commission.
Sincerely,
John A. Boehner.
____________________
COMMUNICATION FROM STAFF MEMBER OF THE HONORABLE JOHN A. BOEHNER,
MEMBER OF CONGRESS
The SPEAKER pro tempore laid before the House the following
communication from Barry Jackson, Chief of Staff to the Honorable John
A. Boehner, Member of Congress:
Congress of the United States,
House of Representatives,
April 30, 1999.
Hon. J. Dennis Hastert,
Speaker, U.S. House of Representatives,
Washington, DC.
Dear Mr. Speaker: This is to notify you pursuant to L.
Deschler, 3 Deschler's Precedents of the United States House
of Representatives ch. 11, Sec. 14.8 (1963), that I have been
served with an administrative agency subpoena issued by the
Federal Election Commission.
Sincerely,
Barry Jackson,
Chief of Staff.
____________________
OUR COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES ARE THE FOUNDATIONS OF AMERICAN INTELLECT
(Mr. GIBBONS asked and was given permission to address the House for
1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks.)
Mr. GIBBONS. Madam Speaker, today I rise in recognition of our
colleges and universities for they are the foundations of America's
intellect as they prepare our young men and women for their futures.
The University of Nevada-Reno has strengthened that foundation and is
receiving national recognition for a program that helps student
athletes complete their degrees after their sports eligibility expires.
The National Consortium for Academics and Sports based in Orlando,
Florida, recently honored the University of Nevada-Reno's program as a
model for more than 100 colleges and universities that utilize the
consortium's services.
Member schools invite former scholarship student athletes back to
campus in order to complete degree requirements. In exchange, the
former student athletes participate in community service and youth
outreach. This is a
[[Page 8041]]
winning approach for the students, the university and the surrounding
communities.
I applaud the University of Nevada-Reno and its continued excellence
in education.
____________________
NATIONAL EMERGENCY WITH RESPECT TO NARCOTICS TRAFFICKERS--MESSAGE FROM
THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES (H. DOC. NO. 106-56)
The SPEAKER pro tempore laid before the House the following message
from the President of the United States; which was read and, together
with the accompanying papers, without objection, referred to the
Committee on International Relations and ordered to be printed:
To the Congress of the United States:
As required by section 401(c) of the National Emergencies Act, 50
U.S.C. 1641(c), and section 204(c) of the International Emergency
Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), 50 U.S.C. 1703(c), I transmit herewith a
6-month periodic report on the national emergency with respect to
significant narcotics traffickers centered in Colombia that was
declared in Executive Order 12978 of October 21, 1995.
William J. Clinton.
The White House, May 3, 1999.
____________________
ECONOMIC SANCTIONS REGARDING REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA--MESSAGE FROM THE
PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES (H. DOC. NO. 106-51)
The SPEAKER pro tempore laid before the House the following message
from the President of the United States; which was read and, together
with the accompanying papers, without objection, referred to the
Committee on International Relations and ordered to be printed:
To the Congress of the United States:
In response to the brutal ethnic cleansing campaign in Kosovo carried
out by the military, police, and paramilitary forces of the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), the NATO allies have
agreed to buttress NATO's military actions by tightening economic
sanctions against the Milosevic regime. Pursuant to section 204(b) of
the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) (50 U.S.C.
1703(b)), I hereby report to the Congress that, in order to implement
the measures called for by NATO, I have exercised my statutory
authority to take additional steps with respect to the continuing human
rights and humanitarian crisis in Kosovo and the national emergency
described and declared in Executive Order 13088 of June 9, 1998.
Pusuant to this authority, I have issued a new Executive order that:
--expands the assets freeze previously imposed on the assets of the
Governments of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and
Montenegro), the Republic of Serbia, and the Republic of Montenegro
subject to U.S. jurisdiction, by removing the exemption in
Executive Order 13088 for financial transactions by United States
persons conducted exclusively through the domestic banking system
within the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)
or using bank notes or barter;
--prohibits exports or reexports, directly or indirectly, from the
United States or by a United States person, wherever located, of
goods, software, technology, or services to the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) or the Governments of the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), the
Republic of Serbia, or the Republic of Montenegro;
--prohibits imports, directly or indirectly, into the United States
of goods, software, technology, or services from the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) or owned or
controlled by the Governments of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
(Serbia and Montenegro), the Republic of Serbia, or the Republic of
Montenegro;
--prohibits any transaction or dealing, including approving,
financing, or facilitating, by a United States person, wherever
located, related to trade with or to the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) or the Governments of the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), the
Republic of Serbia, or the Republic of Montenegro.
The trade-related prohibitions apply to any goods (including
petroleum and petroleum products), software, technology (including
technical data), or services, except to the extent excluded by section
203(b) of IEEPA (50 U.S.C. 1702(b)).
The ban on new investment by United States persons in the territory
of Serbia--imposed by Executive Order 13088--continues in effect.
The Executive order provides that the Secretary of the Treasury, in
consultation with the Secretary of State, shall give special
consideration to the circumstances of the Government of the Republic of
Montenegro. As with Executive Order 13088, an exemption from the new
sanctions has been granted to Montenegro. In implementing this order,
special consideration is also to be given to the humanitarian needs of
refugees from Kosovo and other civilians within the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro).
In keeping with my Administration's new policy to exempt commercial
sales of food and medicine from sanctions regimes, the Executive order
directs the Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the
Secretary of State, to authorize commercial sales of agricultural
commodities and products, medicine, and medical equipment for civilian
end use in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro).
Such sales are to be subject to appropriate safeguards to prevent
diversion to military, paramilitary, or political use by the
Governments of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and
Montenegro), the Republic of Serbia, or the Republic of Montenegro.
William J. Clinton.
The White House, April 30, 1999.
____________________
CONTINUING NATIONAL EMERGENCY WITH RESPECT TO SUDAN--MESSAGE FROM THE
PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES (H. DOC. NO. 106-58)
The SPEAKER pro tempore laid before the House the following message
from the President of the United States; which was read and, together
with the accompanying papers, without objection, referred to the
Committee on International Relations and ordered to be printed:
To The Congress of the United States:
As required by section 401(c) of the National Emergencies Act, 50
U.S.C. 1641(c) and section 204(c) of the International Emergency
Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), 50 U.S.C. 1703(c), I transmit herewith a
6-month periodic report on the national emergency with respect to Sudan
that was declared in Executive Order 13067 of November 3, 1997.
William J. Clinton.
The White House, May 3, 1999.
____________________
SPECIAL ORDERS
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under the Speaker's announced policy of
January 6, 1999, and under a previous order of the House, the following
Members will be recognized for 5 minutes each.
____________________
EVERYONE IS WORSE OFF BY STARTING THIS WAR
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a previous order of the House, the
gentleman from Tennessee (Mr. Duncan) is recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. DUNCAN. Madam Speaker, I read this weekend an article from The
Washington Post that said our bombs have done $50 billion worth of
damage to Yugoslavia. Also, the article said that this was more bombing
than that country had sustained during all of World War II when it was
bombed by both sides, and that unemployment there is now over 50
percent.
Yugoslavia is a relatively small country geographically, with a
population about equal to that of Tennessee and North Carolina
combined. It is obvious that Yugoslavia and especially
[[Page 8042]]
an economically devastated Yugoslavia cannot hold out much longer
against the massive firepower we have unleashed. Then the President
will be able to declare a great victory. But what will we have
accomplished, really?
As I have said before and many syndicated columnists from liberal to
conservative have written, we made the situation and especially the
refugee crisis many times worse by everything we have done there. I
read Friday in the Washington Post that one of our bombs missed and hit
a house where 11 children were killed. Also, we hit a bus where even
more children were killed.
We are making enemies out of friends, creating a reputation around
the world for the U.S. as a bully state or, as one person said, the
largest rogue nation.
All of this at tremendous expense of many billions to the American
taxpayer thus far and many billions more to resettle and reconstruct
the country after the bombing stops.
All of this in a vain and hopeless attempt to stop a civil war where
ethnic and religious fighting has gone on for centuries and will come
back once again unless we stay there forever at a tremendous cost to
our children and grandchildren.
I do not agree with Reverend Jessie Jackson on very much, but I
commend him for getting our prisoners released, and I join him in
urging our leaders to show a little at least humility and attempt to
settle this mess and get us out of there, the sooner the better.
Madam Speaker, one of the best summaries of this situation came not
from a syndicated columnist but from a letter to the editor of the
Washington Times by a man named Steven Costello of Lake Jackson, Texas.
Mr. Costello wrote, ``it concerns me that the President has ordered
U.S. war planes to bomb a sovereign country where we have no national
security interest. It concerns me that the President has involved
America in a civil war that has lasted for centuries over religious and
national disagreements that a few cruise missiles cannot possibly
resolve. It concerns me that this bombing is being conducted under the
auspices of NATO, even though no member country of the NATO alliance
has been attacked. It concerns me that Russia has condemned the NATO
attacks against Yugoslavia.
``But what concerns me the most,'' Mr. Costello continued, ``is the
real possibility that President Clinton, by misusing his authority as
commander in chief in an apparent effort to manipulate media attention
away from his shortcomings, is cultivating a generation of America-
haters across the globe. By his indiscriminate bombing of Iraq,
Afghanistan, the Sudan and Yugoslavia, is there a growing generation of
disgruntled fathers, sons and brothers of those killed by our cruise
missiles who are vowing to extract vengeance some day by shedding
American blood?
Are our innocent sons, being raised today on Main Street USA, the
future private Ryans who some day will face the disgruntled generation
on the battlefield, all because of Mr. Clinton's present and past
indiscretions?''
These are good questions and serious questions that need to be asked
for as long as we continue to fund and carry out this very unjust war.
In a column in last Thursday's USA's Today, Charles Colson gave
several reasons why this war could not be called a just war, among
which he wrote, quote, the damage inflicted by a just war must be
proportionate to the objectives of the war. So far, Mr. Colson said, we
are not preventing suffering in proportion to what we are causing. As
anyone should have reasonably expected, our attacks only emboldened
Milosevic, resulting in more suffering and more ethnic Albanians being
driven from their homes, unquote.
Mr. Colson is right. No one is defending Milosevic, the Communist
dictator, but he never threatened us or any other country in any way.
We made everyone worse off by starting this war.
If our President and Secretary of State were attempting to improve
their legacies as great world leaders, they have not only failed, they
have failed miserably.
____________________
SPECIAL ORDERS GRANTED
By unanimous consent, permission to address the House, following the
legislative program and any special orders heretofore entered, was
granted to:
(The following Members (at the request of Mr. Duncan) to revise and
extend their remarks and include extraneous material:)
Mr. Burton of Indiana, for 5 minutes each, on May 4 and 5.
Mr. Ryan of Wisconsin, for 5 minutes, on May 4.
Mr. Duncan, for 5 minutes, today.
Mr. Hulshof, for 5 mintues, on May 4.
Mr. Souder, for 5 minutes each, on May 4 and 5.
Mr. Toomey, for 5 minutes, on May 4.
____________________
SENATE BILL REFERRED
A bill of the Senate of the following title was taken from the
Speaker's table and, under the rule, referred as follows:
S. 609. An act to amend the Safe and Drug-Free Schools and
Communities Act of 1994 to prevent the abuse of inhalants
through programs under that Act, and for other purposes; to
the Committee on Education and the Workforce.
____________________
ADJOURNMENT
Mr. DUNCAN. Madame Speaker, I move that the House do now adjourn.
The motion was agreed to; accordingly (at 2 o'clock and 15 minutes
p.m.), under its previous order, the House adjourned until tomorrow,
Tuesday, May 4, 1999, at 12:30 p.m., for morning hour debates.
____________________
EXECUTIVE COMMUNICATIONS, ETC.
Under clause 8 of rule XII, executive communications were taken from
the Speaker's table and referred as follows:
1791. A letter from the Director, Office of Regulatory
Management and Information, Environmental Protection Agency,
transmitting the Agency's final rule--Cyprodinil; Pesticide
Tolerance for Emergency Exemption [OPP-300833; FRL-6073-3]
(RIN: 2070-AB-78) received April 9, 1999, pursuant to 5
U.S.C. 801(a)(1)(A); to the Committee on Agriculture.
1792. A letter from the Director, Office of Regulatory
Management and Information, Environmental Protection Agency,
transmitting the Agency's final rule--Cyromazine; Extension
of Tolerance for Emergency Exemptions [OPP-300831; FRL-6072-
3] (RIN: 2070-AB78) received April 9, 1999, pursuant to 5
U.S.C. 801(a)(1)(A); to the Committee on Agriculture.
1793. A letter from the Director, Office of Regulatory
Management and Information, Environmental Protection Agency,
transmitting the Agency's final rule--Fluthiacet-methyl;
Pesticide Tolerance [OPP-300829; FRL 6072-2] (RIN: 2070-AB78)
received April 9, 1999, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 801(a)(1)(A); to
the Committee on Agriculture.
1794. A letter from the Director, Office of Regulatory
Management and Information, Environmental Protection Agency,
transmitting the Agency's final rule--Imidacloprid; Pesticide
Tolerances for Emergency Exemptions; Correction [OPP-300771A;
FRL-6071-6] (RIN: 2070-AB78) received April 9, 1999, pursuant
to 5 U.S.C. 801(a)(1)(A); to the Committee on Agriculture.
1795. A letter from the Director, Office of Regulatory
Management and Information, Environmental Protection Agency,
transmitting the Agency's final rule--Pyriproxyfen (2-[1-
methyl-2- (4-phenoxyphenoxy) ethoxy]pyridine; Pesticide
Tolerance [OPP-300830; FRL-6071-3] (RIN: 2070-AB78) received
April 9, 1999, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 801(a)(1)(A); to the
Committee on Agriculture.
1796. A letter from the Director, Office of Regulatory
Management and Information, Environmental Protection Agency,
transmitting the Agency's final rule--Tebufenozide; Benzoic
Acid, 3,5-dimethyl-1- (1,1-dimethylethyl)-2- (4-ethylbenzoyl)
hyrazide; Pesticide Tolerances [OPP-300839; FRL-6073-9] (RIN:
2070-AB78) received April 9, 1999, pursuant to 5 U.S.C.
801(a)(1)(A); to the Committee on Agriculture.
1797. A letter from the Director, Office of Regulatory
Management and Information, Environmental Protection Agency,
transmitting the Agency's final rule--Approval and
Promulgation of Air Quality Implementation Plans; District of
Columbia; Withdrawal of Final Rule [DC017-2013a; FRL-6323-5]
received April 9, 1999, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 801(a)(1)(A); to
the Committee on Commerce.
1798. A letter from the Director, Office of Regulatory
Management and Information, Environmental Protection Agency,
transmitting the Agency's final rule--Approval and
Promulgation of Air Quality State Implementation Plans (SIP);
Texas: Motor Vehicle
[[Page 8043]]
Inspection and Maintenance (I/M) Program [TX-84-1-7341a; FRL-
6324-2] received April 9, 1999, pursuant to 5 U.S.C.
801(a)(1)(A); to the Committee on Commerce.
1799. A communication from the President of the United
States, transmitting a report on developments concerning the
national emergency with respect to significant narcotics
traffickers centered in Colombia that was declared in
Executive Order No. 12978 of October 21, 1995, pursuant to 50
U.S.C. 1703(c); (H. Doc. No. 106-56); to the Committee on
International Relations and ordered to be printed.
1800. A communication from the President of the United
States, transmitting a report on developments concerning the
national emergency with regards to Kosovo as described and
declared in Executive Order 13088 of June 9, 1998, pursuant
to 50 U.S.C. 1703(c); (H. Doc. No. 106-57); to the Committee
on International Relations and ordered to be printed.
1801. A communication from the President of the United
States, transmitting a report on developments concerning the
national emergency with respect to Sudan that was declared in
Executive Order 13067 of November 3, 1997, and matters
relating to the measures in that order, pursuant to 50 U.S.C.
1641(c); (H. Doc. No. 106-58); to the Committee on
International Relations and ordered to be printed.
1802. A communication from the President of the United
States, transmitting Progress toward a negotiated settlement
of the Cyprus question covering the period December 1, 1998,
to January 31, 1999, pursuant to 22 U.S.C. 2373(c); to the
Committee on International Relations.
1803. A letter from the Assistant Secretary for Legislative
Affairs, Department of State, transmitting the Department's
annual report on international terrorism entitled ``Patterns
of Global Terrorism: 1998,'' pursuant to 22 U.S.C. 2656f; to
the Committee on International Relations.
1804. A letter from the Assistant Legal Adviser for Treaty
Affairs, Department of State, transmitting Copies of
international agreements, other than treaties, entered into
by the United States, pursuant to 1 U.S.C. 112b(a); to the
Committee on International Relations.
1805. A letter from the Assistant Secretary for Legislative
Affairs, Department of State, transmitting notification that
effective March 28, 1999, the 25% danger pay allowance for
the United Nations Transitional Administration for Eastern
Slavonia in Vukovar, Croatia was eliminated, pursuant to 5
U.S.C. 5928; to the Committee on International Relations.
1806. A letter from the Assistant Secretary for Legislative
Affairs, Department of State, transmitting notification that
effective March 19, 1999, the danger pay rate for Kampala,
Uganda is designated at the 15% level, pursuant to 5 U.S.C.
5928; to the Committee on International Relations.
1807. A letter from the General Counsel, Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency, transmitting copies of the English and
Russian texts of Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission
Joint Statement 31, negotiated and concluded during the
Nineteenth Session of the JCIC; to the Committee on
International Relations.
1808. A letter from the Chairman, Broadcasting Board of
Governors, transmitting a draft of proposed legislation to
authorize appropriations for U.S. international broadcasting,
and to amend the United States International Broadcasting Act
of 1994, as amended; to the Committee on International
Relations.
1809. A letter from the Assistant Secretary for Legislative
Affairs, Department of State, transmitting a Report
Concerning Minorities and the Foreign Service Officer Corps;
to the Committee on International Relations.
1810. A communication from the President of the United
States, transmitting a report to the Congress on Chemical and
Biological Weapons Defense, submitted pursuant to Condition
11(F) of the resolution of advice and consent to ratification
of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development,
Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on
Their Destruction, adopted by the United States Senate on
April 24, 1997; to the Committee on International Relations.
1811. A letter from the Secretary of State, transmitting a
modification to the reorganization plan submitted by the
President on December 30, 1998; to the Committee on
International Relations.
1812. A letter from the Administrator and Chief Executive
Officer, Bonneville Power Administration, Department of
Energy, transmitting the 1998 Annual Report of the Bonneville
Power Administration, pursuant to 31 U.S.C. 9106; to the
Committee on Government Reform.
1813. A letter from the Chief Financial Officer, Export-
Import Bank, transmitting the Bank's Annual Management Report
for the year ended September 30, 1998, pursuant to 31 U.S.C.
9106; to the Committee on Government Reform.
1814. A letter from the Vice President, Federal Financing
Bank, transmitting the Annual Management Report of the
Federal Financing Bank for fiscal year 1998, pursuant to 31
U.S.C. 9106; to the Committee on Government Reform.
1815. A letter from the Managing Director, Federal Housing
Finance Board, transmitting the Board's annual Sunshine Act
report covering calendar year 1998, pursuant to 5 U.S.C.
552b(j); to the Committee on Government Reform.
1816. A letter from the Director, Financial Management,
General Accounting Office, transmitting the FY 1998 annual
report of the Comptrollers' General Retirement System,
pursuant to 31 U.S.C. 9503(a)(1)(B); to the Committee on
Government Reform.
1817. A letter from the President and Chief Executive
Officer, Overseas Private Investment Corporation,
transmitting the Corporation's annual management report,
pursuant to 31 U.S.C. 9106; to the Committee on Government
Reform.
1818. A letter from the Assistant Secretary for Fish and
Wildlife and Parks, Department of the Interior, transmitting
a draft of proposed legislation to amend the National Trails
System Act to designate El Camino Real de Tierra Adentro as a
National Historic Trail; to the Committee on Resources.
1819. A letter from the Acting Assistant Attorney General,
Civil Rights Division, Department of Justice, transmitting
the Department's final rule--Architectural and Transportation
Barriers Compliance Board [A.G. Order No. 2191-98] received
April 6, 1999, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 801(a)(1)(A); to the
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure.
1820. A letter from the Vice President, Communications,
Tennessee Valley Authority, transmitting the Statistical
Summary for Fiscal Year 1998, pursuant to 16 U.S.C. 831h(a);
to the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure.
1821. A letter from the Principal Deputy Assistant
Secretary for Congressional Affairs, Department of Veterans
Affairs, transmitting a draft of proposed legislation to
amend title 38, United States Code, to authorize VA to
furnish the Department of Defense with drug and alcohol
treatment resources; jointly to the Committees on Veterans'
Affairs and Armed Services.
____________________
PUBLIC BILLS AND RESOLUTIONS
Under clause 2 of rule XII, public bills and resolutions were
introduced and severally referred, as follows:
By Mr. ROHRABACHER:
H.R. 1654. A bill to authorize appropriations for the
National Aeronautics and Space Administration for fiscal
years 2000, 2001, and 2002, and for other purposes; to the
Committee on Science.
By Mr. CALVERT:
H.R. 1655. A bill to authorize appropriations for fiscal
years 2000 and 2001 for the civilian energy and scientific
research, development, and demonstration and related
commercial application of energy technology programs,
projects, and activities of the Department of Energy, and for
other purposes; to the Committee on Science.
H.R. 1656. A bill to authorize appropriations for fiscal
years 2000 and 2001 for the commercial application of energy
technology and related civilian energy and scientific
programs, projects, and activities of the Department of
Energy, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Science,
and in addition to the Committees on Commerce, and Education
and the Workforce, for a period to be subsequently determined
by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such
provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee
concerned.
By Mr. WAXMAN (for himself, Mr. Saxton, Mr. Pallone,
Mr. Bonior, Mr. Blumenauer, Mr. DeFazio, Ms. Pelosi,
Mr. Gutierrez, Mr. Gejdenson, Mr. Abercrombie, Mr.
Smith of New Jersey, Mr. Hastings of Florida, Mr.
Markey, Mr. Nadler, Mr. Clyburn, Mr. Evans, Mr. Brown
of Ohio, Mrs. Meek of Florida, Mr. Delahunt, Mr.
Berman, Mr. Goss, Ms. DeGette, Ms. Kilpatrick, Mr.
Borski, Mr. Underwood, Mr. Green of Texas, Mr.
Meehan, Mr. Hinchey, Mrs. Maloney of New York, Ms.
Eshoo, Mr. Leach, Mr. Cook, Mrs. Roukema, Ms.
McCarthy of Missouri, Mr. Rush, Mr. Pascrell, Mr.
Rothman, Mr. Levin, Mr. Allen, Mr. Clay, Mr. Metcalf,
Mr. McDermott, Mr. Olver, Mr. LaFalce, Mr. Lantos,
Mr. Kucinich, Mr. Lewis of Georgia, Ms. Brown of
Florida, Mr. Andrews, Mr. Kennedy of Rhode Island,
Mr. Forbes, Mr. Blagojevich, Ms. Norton, Mr. Kildee,
Mr. Oberstar, Mr. Ackerman, Mr. Udall of Colorado,
Mr. George Miller of California, Mr. Filner, Ms.
Millender-McDonald, Ms. Stabenow, Mr. Tierney, Mr.
Wexler, Mr. Coyne, Mrs. Lowey, Mr. Maloney of
Connecticut, Mr. Holt, Mr. Smith of Washington, Mr.
Vento, Mr. McNulty, Mr. Barrett of Wisconsin, Mr.
Dixon, Ms. DeLauro, Ms. Roybal-Allard, Mr. Shays, Mr.
Sanders, Mr. Wynn, Mr. Serrano, Mr. Capuano, Mr.
McGovern, Mr. Stark, Ms. Waters, Mr. Cummings, Mr.
Dicks, Mrs. Johnson of Connecticut, Mr. Udall of New
Mexico, Mr. Jackson of Illinois, Mr. Davis of
Illinois, Mr. Sabo, Ms. Woolsey, Mr.
[[Page 8044]]
Farr of California, Ms. McKinney, Mr. Payne, Mr.
Sherman, Mr. Cardin, Mr. Moakley, Ms. Hooley of
Oregon, Mr. Brown of California, Mr. Neal of
Massachusetts, Ms. Jackson-Lee of Texas, Ms.
Slaughter, Mrs. Morella, Mrs. Clayton, Mr. Towns, Mr.
Menendez, Ms. Schakowsky, Ms. Lee, Mr. Baldacci, Mr.
Pastor, Ms. Lofgren, Mr. Frelinghuysen, Mr.
Faleomavaega, Ms. Sanchez, Ms. Eddie Bernice Johnson
of Texas, Mrs. Mink of Hawaii, Mr. Matsui, Mr. Kind,
Mr. Frank of Massachusetts, Mr. Moran of Virginia,
Mr. Engel, Mr. Martinez, and Mrs. Tauscher):
H.R. 1657. A bill to disclose environmental risks to
children's health and expand the public's right to know about
toxic chemical use and release, and for other purposes; to
the Committee on Commerce.
By Mrs. MEEK of Florida:
H. Res. 156. A resolution commending the Reverend Jesse L.
Jackson, Sr. on securing the release of Specialist Steven
Gonzales of Huntsville, Texas, Staff Sergeant Andrew Ramirez
of Los Angeles, California, and Staff Sergeant Christopher
Stone of Smiths Creek, Michigan, from captivity in Belgrade,
Yugoslavia; to the Committee on International Relations.
____________________
MEMORIALS
Under clause 3 of rule XII, memorials were presented and referred as
follows:
43. The SPEAKER presented a memorial of the House of
Delegates of the Commonwealth of Virginia, relative to House
Joint Resolution No. 245 memorializing the Congress of the
United States to place the Preamble of the Constitution of
the United States and the Bill of Rights on the one-dollar
bill; to the Committee on Banking and Financial Services.
44. Also, a memorial of the Senate of the State of Maine,
relative to Senate Paper #531 memorializing the Congress of
the United States to direct the Department of Housing and
Urban Development to release an amount of funds commensurate
with the extent of the devastation incurred by the State's
electric utilities and their customers from the funds
appropriated by Public Law 105-174; to the Committee on
Banking and Financial Services.
45. Also, a memorial of the House of Delegates of the
Commonwealth of Virginia, relative to House Joint Resolution
No. 499 memorializing the General Assembly of Virginia to
reaffirm its notice to the federal government that the
Commonwealth strongly opposes any effort to weaken the powers
reserved to the states and the people by the 10th Amendment
of the Constitution of the United States; to the Committee on
the Judiciary.
46. Also, a memorial of the Legislature of the State of
Nebraska, relative to Legislative Resolution No. 10
memorializing the Congress of the United States to propose to
the states an amendment to Article I, section 2, of the
United States Constitution that would increase the length of
the terms of office for members of the House of
Representatives from two years to four years with one-half of
the members' terms expiring every two years; to the Committee
on the Judiciary.
____________________
ADDITIONAL SPONSORS
Under clause 7 of rule XII, sponsors were added to public bills and
resolutions as follows:
H.R. 72: Mr. Pallone.
H.R. 274: Mr. Oberstar.
H.R. 413: Mr. Farr of California, Mr. Inslee, Mr. Lewis of
Georgia, Mr. Smith of New Jersey, Mrs. Morella, Mr. Mica, and
Mr. Gutierrez.
H.R. 637: Mr. Moore, Mr. Allen, and Mr. English.
H.R. 775: Mr. Forbes.
H.R. 852: Mr. Smith of Washington.
H.R. 921: Mrs. Emerson.
H.R. 958: Ms. Carson and Mr. Davis of Illinois.
H.R. 974: Mr. Shays.
H.R. 1144: Ms. Woolsey and Mr. McInnis.
H.R. 1170: Ms. Slaughter and Mr. Underwood.
H.R. 1245: Mr. Waxman, Mr. Meehan, Mr. Weiner, Mrs. Jones
of Ohio, and Mr. Nadler.
H.R. 1247: Ms. Lofgren.
H.R. 1256: Mr. McIntosh, Ms. Pryce of Ohio, Mr. Coburn, and
Mr. Foley.
H.R. 1334: Mr. Nethercutt, Mr. McCrery, and Mr. Chambliss.
H.R. 1358: Mr. Pallone.
H.R. 1413: Mr. Canady of Florida and Mr. Stearns.
H.R. 1443: Ms. McKinney, Mr. Jackson of Illinois, and Mr.
Pastor.
H.R. 1491: Mr. Thompson of Mississippi.
H.R. 1496: Mr. Deal of Georgia, Mr. Manzullo, Mr. English,
and Ms. Millender-McDonald.
H.R. 1519: Mr. English.
H.J. Res. 34: Mr. Kolbe.
[[Page 8045]]
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD
United States
of America
This ``bullet'' symbol identifies statements or insertions
which are not spoken by a member of the Senate on the floor.
May 3, 1999
May 3, 1999
SENATE--Monday, May 3, 1999
The Senate met at 12 noon and was called to order by the President
pro tempore [Mr. Thurmond].
______
prayer
The Chaplain, Dr. Lloyd John Ogilvie, offered the following prayer:
Almighty God, who hears and answers prayer, we praise You for the
answer to our prayers for the release of the three American soldiers
imprisoned in Yugoslavia. A week ago today, we joined with millions of
people in prayer for them. Today we praise You for the release of Staff
Sergeants Christopher J. Stone and Andrew Ramirez and Specialist Steven
M. Gonzales. Thank You for the strategic part Jesse Jackson played in
the negotiations for their release.
Now, Father, with the same intercessory intensity we pray for the
debate here in the Senate on the next steps in the NATO strategy for
ending the ethnic cleansing in Kosovo and a safe return of all refugees
to their homes. Be with the Senators as they search for an answer. Give
them open minds to listen to You and to one another.
The days of this busy week stretch out before us. We commit them to
You. Make them productive. We yield our minds to discern Your divine
solutions to our problems. Only You have the true perspective, and by
Your Spirit You can help us to see through Your eyes. We trust You, for
You are faithful. Through our Lord and Saviour. Amen.
____________________
RECOGNITION OF THE ACTING MAJORITY LEADER
The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The acting majority leader is recognized.
Mr. HAGEL. I thank the Chair.
____________________
SCHEDULE
Mr. HAGEL. Mr. President, the Senate will be in a period of morning
business until 1 p.m. today. Following morning business, the Senate
will immediately begin consideration of the McCain resolution, Senate
Joint Resolution 20, pursuant to provisions of the War Powers Act. A
rollcall vote on or in relation to Senate Joint Resolution 20
concerning the deployment of U.S. Armed Forces to the Kosovo region in
Yugoslavia is expected to take place at 5:30 p.m. today.
For the information of all Senators, consideration of the financial
modernization bill is expected to begin on Tuesday and hopefully
conclude on Thursday evening.
Mr. President, I note the absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The clerk will call the roll.
The legislative assistant proceeded to call the roll.
Mr. VOINOVICH. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order
for the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Hagel). Without objection, it is so
ordered.
The Senator from Ohio is recognized.
Mr. VOINOVICH. I thank the Chair.
____________________
MORNING BUSINESS
______
McCAIN RESOLUTION REGARDING KOSOVO
Mr. VOINOVICH. Mr. President. I rise today to oppose the McCain
Resolution.
First, I congratulate Reverend Jesse Jackson, Congressman Rod
Blagojevich, Joan Brown Campbell and religious leaders for the release
of our three servicemen. I am particularly proud that Joan Campbell,
the Secretary General of the National Council of Churches and the
mother of County Commissioner Jane Campbell, and Father Irinej
Dobrijevic, a Serbian-American Priest from St. Sava Orthodox Cathedral
in Cleveland, were major participants in the release.
I pray that the letter from Jesse Jackson to President Clinton and
other diplomatic moves this weekend with President Yeltsin of Russia
will bring all parties to the table so we can end the bombing, death
and destruction that is going on in Serbia and Kosovo.
Mr. President, I am astonished at the negative reaction. In fact,
Elizabeth Sullivan in today's Cleveland Plain Dealer pointed out that
``the alliance sneers at Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic's latest
offer, to accept a lightly armed U.N. peace force, refusing to treat it
as the basis for further talks.''
In my opinion, our State Department, President and NATO are allowing
their egos to get in the way of their common sense and good judgment.
It was this hubris--which is defined as ``excessive pride or self-
confidence; arrogance''--and their miscalculation of the importance of
Kosovo to the Serbian people and Milosevic that got us into this mess.
It appears that they are ``hell bent'' to get us into a major war
that will have catastrophic impact on our domestic and international
responsibilities for years to come and may well ignite destabilization
of southeast Europe, a new cold war with Russia and the creation of new
alliances by this country's adversaries who we have been working to
bring into the international community.
I believe it is time to stop the bombing, reduce hostilities on both
sides and resume negotiations to bring about peace and restore
stability to the region.
I agree with the sentiments expressed yesterday by Majority Leader
Trent Lott who said ``let's see if we can't find a way to get the
bombing stopped, get Milosevic to pull back his troops, find a way to
get the Kosovars to go back in a secure way. Short of that, I see a
quagmire that is going to go on. It's going to get bloodier.''
So, before we vote on this resolution and continue down the path to a
further escalation and a greater involvement, there are three things
that we have to ask ourselves: (1) What is the price? (2) What is the
risk? (3) What is the prize?
The main price that will be paid will be done so in human lives.
There will be casualties--American and NATO troops, Kosovar civilians
and refugees, Serb civilians as well as civilians in neighboring
countries where we've already mistakenly dropped bombs.
We have to remember the experience of World War II, where 700,000
German troops were held-off by 150,000 Serb guerrillas. Are we willing
to make such a commitment?
We also have to consider the financial impact of this war so far.
Thus far, it is being paid for by Social Security. If the war escalates
to include ground forces and if we're totally honest with the American
people, we have to tell them that one of three things will happen to
pay for this war--
(1) we'll continue to use Social Security to pay for it and the
deficit will go up;
(2) we'll reduce spending for domestic programs; or
(3) we'll increase taxes.
In addition, each passing day further diminishes the readiness of our
armed forces. We already have a terrible readiness problem--this
campaign is only making it worse.
Indeed, comments made by General Richard Hawley, head of the U.S. Air
Combat Command indicate that we could run out of the state-of-the-art
satellite-guided Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM) for our B-2
Stealth bombers sometime this month.
He is quoted as saying ``it's going to be really touch-and-go as to
whether we'll go Winchester on JDAM's.'' That's pilot jargon for
``running out of bullets.'' He also indicated that because more crews
are being called up
[[Page 8046]]
for this campaign, fewer crews are available should another crisis
appear elsewhere in the world (North Korea, Iraq, etc.)
Our main military goal should be to ensure our readiness to the
extent that our adversaries know we are prepared.
There are projections indicate that it will take at least $30 billion
to address readiness effectively.
The longer we continue our current efforts, the greater the
opportunity that one or more of our NATO allies may decide enough is
enough. This could leave the U.S. holding the bag! We could also stir
regional resentment among Serbia's neighbors, leading to further
political instability and the possibility of a wider war. There are
already groups promoting a greater Albania that would include parts of
Montenegro, Macedonia, and Greece.
This war could also undermine U.S. and NATO credibility and erode our
ability to deter aggression globally.
If we suffer significant casualties, equipment failures, morale loss,
etc. potential adversaries in North Korea, China, Iran and Iraq will
take note and could react;
Our experience in the Persian Gulf bolstered our credibility but this
situation is very different--different terrain, there was an
international consensus that Iraqi aggression against a sovereign
nation must be reversed, threat of weapons of mass destruction.
And finally--the Prize
When we win--and I am confident we would win--what do we get?
First there is the need to put in a long-term occupation force to
oversee the peace. I am concerned that such a force could be subject to
continual guerrilla attacks which would incur casualties.
Then we would have to rebuild the infrastructure and economy of
Kosovo and Serbia and that could cost as much as $100 billion.
We would also have to build a new, Western-oriented and democratic
state with whatever existing civic institutions there are available.
This could lead to a period of ``growing pains'' where there is
considerable political uncertainty for a number of years.
Mr. President, as our colleague from Kansas, Senator Roberts, has
pointed out, there would be a precedent for U.S. to intervene
militarily when there are widespread humanitarian abuses.
We have a lot of questions to answer before we find ourselves in a
war from which we cannot extricate ourselves.
Fundamentally, what Senator McCain's resolution does is give our
President carte blanche, and when you look at the price and the risk
and the prize, you can understand why I am opposed to this resolution.
We should not give the President blanket authority to get us into
another Viet Nam that could very well have much greater negative impact
nationally and internationally than Viet Nam.
Two weekends ago I visited Arlington Cemetery, the Vietnam and Korean
memorials and I'm going to do everything in my power to make sure that
we do not have a Kosovo Memorial here in Washington.
If the Senate passes anything, it ought to be what the House did this
last weekend when they had the courage to stand up and be counted.
Congress must exert its Constitutional authority in foreign policy
matters and demand that the President seek a declaration of war or
formal authorization before he deploys ground troops.
Again, should the Senate decide to offer alternative legislation to
the McCain measure, it should include such considerations.
The way we have conducted ourselves with NATO in regard to Kosovo has
created an environment that has allowed Slobodan Milosevic and the
Serbs to do exactly what those responsible for bombing did not want to
happen regarding human rights and ethnic cleansing in Kosovo.
It has resulted in the destruction of the infrastructure in Kosovo to
the extent that thousands of Kosavars will never return to their
destroyed homeland.
The decision also has resulted in death and destruction in Serbia
that is also unconscionable when one realizes that the alleged purpose
is to force Slobodan Milosevic to sign an agreement which is tantamount
to the Serbs and giving up their sovereignty.
Think about it, Mr. President. If we had not engaged in ``sign-or-
bomb'' diplomacy, we could still be at the negotiating table with 1,600
observers in Kosovo.
The time has come, Mr. President, where NATO needs to get off its
high horse, restrain its ego and instead of trying to save face over a
major foreign policy blunder and start thinking about saving lives.
It's time to stop the bombing and put everyone's efforts into finding
a diplomatic solution that will quickly result in the removal of
Serbian troops from Kosovo, end the ethnic cleansing, return the
Kosavars to Kosovo and commit to rebuilding both physical and political
infrastructure of Kosovo.
We need to fully protect all minority rights including the Serbs and
other minorities who live in Kosovo and full participation of all in
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia including the Serbian Parliament.
Last but not least an international force to guarantee in the
beginning that the agreement provisions are fully implemented and
abided by all parties.
Mr. President, let's get to the peace table. Let's all of us get down
on our knees and pray that the Holy Spirit will inspire us to remember
Jesus' exultation to us--``Bless are the peacemakers for they shall be
called the children of God.''
This nightmare has to end now.
Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
The legislative assistant proceeded to call the roll.
Mr. DeWINE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for
the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. DeWINE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to proceed for the
next 12 minutes as in morning business.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
____________________
REACHING OUT TO PREVENT TRAGEDY
Mr. DeWINE. Mr. President, I rise today to make a few comments
regarding the tragic shootings in Littleton, CO.
Thirteen days after this tragedy occurred, our Nation is still really
in shock. The hearts of my own family and all Ohio families, and, of
course, all Americans families, go out to the families who have lost
loved ones. There is nothing that you can say that can take the pain
away. Anyone who has lost a child understands that. The loss these
families have suffered cannot be repaired. But it is important that
these families know that there are people--many of us far away from
Colorado--whose thoughts and prayers are with them at this terrible
time.
What went wrong? Could the shootings have been prevented? What should
we do to prevent other tragedies such as this from occurring in the
future?
These are all very difficult questions--difficult issues for a public
official to talk about, because when you do, people will think that you
are claiming to have ``the answer.'' Let me say flat out that I don't
claim to have ``the answer.''
What happened in Littleton will always to some extent remain a
mystery, and why it happened. Evil is a mystery that exists deep in the
human heart. But that brutal fact of human existence that we can't come
up with ``the answer'' does not excuse us from our moral
responsibilities--our responsibilities, as legislators, as parents, as
citizens. In fact, it increases our responsibilities. If we don't have
``the answer,'' we have to work harder to find answers--things we can
do to make a difference child by child by child. Some of the things we
have to do may not be glamorous, but they will all be helpful. They
will save lives.
Fred Hiatt pointed out in a powerful Washington Post article recently
that 13 children a day--13 children a day--
[[Page 8047]]
are killed by guns in this country--in effect, the Littleton massacre
every day. Statistically, of these 13 children who die every day, 8 are
murdered every day; 4 tragically commit suicide every day, and 1 dies
accidentally every day.
Mr. President, maybe we can't prevent a massacre such as the one in
Colorado, but we can work on initiatives that would save some of the 13
children a day who are dying in gun-related deaths.
What I would like to do this afternoon is talk briefly about a few of
those initiatives that I believe would save lives. We don't know whose
lives they would save, but I have had, I think, enough experience in
this area to say that they would save some lives, and, therefore, we
should do this.
No. 1, I have a bill, which is now included in the juvenile justice
bill, that we will be considering in just a few days.
This provision provides incentives to local governments to coordinate
the services they offer to the kids who are the most at risk in their
county, or their area. I am referring, for example, to the children who
have been duly diagnosed as having both maybe a psychiatric disorder
and a substance abuse problem, or some other combination of problems.
For too long, kids have been falling between the cracks of the court
system, the children's services system, the mental health system, and
the substance abuse system. Other kids are misdiagnosed or don't get
access to all the services that they need. My proposal would promote an
approach that has been successful in Hamilton County, OH--in the
Cincinnati area--an approach that gives our most problematic kids the
multiple services they need, under the overall coordination of the
juvenile court system. These kids should not fall victim of
bureaucratic turf conflicts. All of them are our kids.
No. 2, parents, teachers and local service agencies need to explore
ways to reach out and provide appropriate services to at-risk youth
before they end up--before they end up--in the juvenile court system.
That is the essence of prevention--to find ways to keep children from
ever coming in contact with a juvenile court. That is why a renewed
investment in mental health diagnosis and treatment is so vitally
important with our children.
We have to as a country, as a people, make a more serious investment
in diagnosing and treating these kids with psychological problems.
Throughout the whole system, everybody--teachers, probation officers,
everyone--will tell you that we do not now have enough resources.
I have talked to so many juvenile court judges who look at these kids
they have in front of them, and who know they have mental health
problems, and yet who do not have the resources, and try to reach these
kids and turn them around, to cure them before it becomes too late. We
need to get these kids early.
A third suggestion of things that are, I think, practical and that we
could very easily do is keep closer track of kids who have been
convicted of violent crimes. The tracking provisions I, along with
Senator Sessions, have written into the juvenile crime bill we will be
considering in just a matter of a few days will help do that.
When a young person commits a crime, and then, let us say, moves to
another State and commits another crime, local law enforcement
officials and judges many times do not have the available information.
They do not know this person has committed a violent crime, and the
reason they don't is because we don't have a good nationwide tracking
system for juveniles, and we should. We should do it with juveniles who
have already demonstrated that they will commit and can commit and may
in the future commit a violent crime.
When it comes to making key decisions about juvenile offenders,
judges and probation officers need to make judgments based on the best
possible information. That is what my provision would give them.
No. 4, we need to get serious about background checks on gun
purchases. Everybody talks about the Brady bill. But very few people
realize that the Brady background checks are only as effective as the
information that goes into them. That is why I have been fighting for
almost 15 years for improved law enforcement information systems. That
means good criminal records, knowing who has done what.
Last year, I wrote a bill on crime technology. Senators Gregg and
Hollings were very helpful in the appropriations process in getting the
money for that.
The fact is that 60 percent of the States have criminal records that
are less than 80 percent complete. In other words, our criminal record
system isn't as good as it should be. The Brady bill will only work as
well as the underlying criminal justice system it is based on. We need
to fix it and do a better job.
No. 5, we need to get serious about confronting our cultural
problems. I thank our colleagues, Senators McCain and Lieberman. I
think they were right when they encouraged the President to call a
summit meeting of the leaders in the media community--TV, radio,
movies, video games and the recording industry--to talk about the
responsibility in shaping the messages that we are sending kids.
We can't force them not to air trash that is harmful to people. The
first amendment doesn't allow that. I hope the President's summit is a
success. The fact is, the President does have, as Theodore Roosevelt
said, a bully pulpit, and he needs to use it on this issue. We need to
be upfront about the costs of excessive violence in the media--the
price paid not just in lives lost in tragic events such as the shooting
in Littleton, but also in the day-to-day harm that occurs in the
emotional lives of children.
Many have blamed the toxic culture for the shootings in Littleton. I
personally have no doubt that if the culture were not as coarsened as
it is today, those kids very well may not have committed this crime. We
will never be able to prove it or know for sure. It is too simplistic
to say the culture caused the shootings; but to deny a connection would
also be simplistic, and, I believe, naive. The culture that thrives on
cruelty and hatred did not create these killers, but it offered them an
outlet, a particular way of self-expression, that ended up devastating
a whole community.
We need to work on creating and promoting the alternative to a
culture based on death and violence, a culture based, rather, on the
value of life, on the principle that every human life is unique,
priceless, and worth defending.
We can't ban movie and video games we don't like. But there are
things that we can do. I think there are positive steps the media could
take to improve our culture and protect children to some extent.
The most important measure of all is parental involvement. Parents
are the most important teachers for their kids. They should be their
most important influence.
We need to reach out to our children. We need to listen to them. We
need to pay attention. It is not a cliche to say that tragic events are
a cry for help. It is the simple truth.
In conclusion, there is no bill we can pass to make any of this
happen. For this we have to look inside ourselves. In the meantime,
those who are in public life need to do everything they can to make
this task just a little bit easier. I mentioned five ideas that I have.
I look forward to working with my colleagues in the Senate and
concerned people at the local community level in Ohio and across our
Nation to make sure we are doing all that we can.
I yield the floor.
____________________
DEPLOYMENT OF U.S. ARMED FORCES TO THE KOSOVO REGION IN YUGOSLAVIA
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Crapo). Under the previous order, the
Senate will now resume consideration of Senate Joint Resolution 20,
which the clerk will report.
The legislative assistant read as follows:
A resolution (S.J. Res. 20) concerning the deployment of
United States Armed Forces to the Kosovo region in
Yugoslavia.
[[Page 8048]]
Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, on behalf of the leader, I ask unanimous
consent the time today for consideration of S.J. Res. 20 be for debate
only.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. WELLSTONE. Will the Senator yield?
Mr. McCAIN. I am happy to yield to the Senator.
Mr. WELLSTONE. I know Senator Byrd wants to speak. I wonder whether I
could ask unanimous consent that after the Senator from Arizona and the
Senator from West Virginia speak, I be allowed to speak.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. McCAIN. Today, Mr. President, the Senate should begin a
constructive, long overdue, and thorough debate on America's war with
Serbia. But we will not. We will not because the Senate leadership,
both Republican and Democrat, with the passive cooperation of the
President of the United States, has determined that we will limit
debate on war and peace to a few hours this afternoon. Apparently, the
hard facts of war need not inconvenience the Senate at this time, and
the solemn duties that war imposes on those of us privileged to lead
this nation can be avoided indefinitely.
I heard my friend, the Democratic Leader, say the other day that now
is not the time for this debate. When is the right time, Mr. President?
After the war ends? Shall we wait to declare ourselves until the
outcome is known? Shall those who oppose NATO's attack on Serbia wait
until NATO's defeat is certain before voting their conscience? Shall
those of us who believe American interests and values are now so at
risk in the Balkans that they must be protected by all necessary force
wait until victory is certain before voting our conscience?
I would hope not, Mr. President. For that would mean that we have
allowed American pilots and, possibly, American soldiers to risk their
lives for a cause that we will not risk our careers for. I think we are
better people than that. I think we are a better institution than that.
And I think we should use this debate to prove it.
All Senators should, for a start, use the opportunity provided by
debate on this resolution to declare unequivocally their support or
opposition for the war. Having declared their support or opposition,
Senators should then endorse that course of action allowed Congress
that logically and ethically corresponds to their views on the war. If
Senators believe this war is worth fighting, then recognize that the
President should exercise the authority vested in his office to use the
power of the United States effectively to achieve victory as quickly as
possible.
If Senators believe that this war is not worth the cost in blood and
treasure necessary to win it, then take the only course open to you to
prevent further bloodshed. Vote to refuse the funds necessary to
prosecute it. Senators cannot say that they oppose the war, but support
our pilots, and then allow our pilots to continue fighting a war that
they believe cannot justify their loss. If the war is not worth
fighting for, then it is not worth letting Americans die for it.
Last week, a majority in the other body sent just such a message to
our servicemen and women, to the American public and to the world. They
voted against the war and against withdrawing our forces. Such a
contradictory position does little credit to Congress. Can we in the
Senate not see our duty a little clearer? Can we not match our deeds to
our words?
Should we meet our responsibilities honorably, we will not only have
acted more forthrightly than the other body, we will have acted more
forthrightly than has the President. The supporters of this resolution
find ourselves defending the authority of the Presidency without the
support of the President, a curious, but sadly, not unexpected
position.
Opponents have observed that the resolution gives the President
authority he has not asked for. They are correct. The President has not
asked for this resolution. Indeed, it is quite evident that he shares
the leadership's preference that the Senate not address this matter.
But, in truth, he need not ask for this authority. He possesses it
already, whether he wants it or not.
I cannot join my Republican friends in the other body by supporting
the unconstitutional presumptions of the War Powers Act. Every Congress
and every President since the act's inception has ignored it with good
reason until now. We should have repealed the Act long ago, but that
would have required us to surrender a little of the ambiguity that we
find so useful in this city. Only Congress can declare war. But
Congress cannot deny the President the ability to use force unless we
refuse him the funds to do so. By taking neither aciton, Congress
leaves the President free to prosecute this war to whatever extent he
deems necessary.
Although I can speak only for myself, I believe the sponsors of this
resolution offered it to encourage the President to do what almost
every experienced statesmen has said he should do--prepare for the use
of ground troops in Kosovo if they are necessary to achieve victory.
Regrettably, the President owuld rather not be encouraged. But his
irresponsibility does not excuse Congress'. I beleive it is now
imperative that we pass this resolution to distinguish the powers of
the Presidency from the muddled claim made upon them by the House of
Representatives.
During the Foreign Relations Committee's consideration of this
resolution, my friend, the Senator from Missouri, Senator Ashcroft,
criticized the wording as too broad a grant of authority to the
President, and an infringement of congressional authority. How, Mr.
President, can Congress claim authority that it neither possesses
constitutionally nor, as we see, cares to exercise even if we did
possess it? No, Mr. President, the authority belongs to the President
unless we deny it to him by means expressly identified in the
Constitution. In short, and I welcome arguments to the contrary, only
Congress can declare war but the President can wage one unless we
deprive him of the means to do so.
Therefore, I feel it is urgent that the Senate contradict the actions
of the other body and clarify to the public, and to America's allies
and our enemies that the President may, indeed, wage this war. And,
with our encouragement, he might wage this war more effectively than he
has done thus far. If he does not, the shame is on him and not on us.
I regret to say that I have on more than one occasion suspected, as I
suspect today, that the President and some of us among the loyal
opposition suffer from the same failing. It seems to me that the
President, in his poll driven approach to his every responsibility,
fails to distinguish the office he holds from himself. And some of us
in Congress are so distrustful of the President that we feel obliged to
damage the office in order to restrain the current occupant. Both sides
have lost the ability to tell the office from the man.
Publicly and repeatedly ruling out ground troops may be smart
politics according to the President's pollster, but it is inexcusably
irresponsible leadership. In this determination to put politics over
national security, the President even acquiesced to the other body's
attempt to deprive him of his office's authority. He sent a letter
promising that he would seek Congress' permission to introduce ground
troops in the unlikely event he ever discovers the will to use them.
My Republican colleagues in the House, who sought to uphold a law
that I doubt any of them believed in before last week, should take
greater care with an office that will prove vital to our security in
the years ahead. President Clinton will not stand for re-election
again. Twenty months from now we will have a new President. And whoever
he or she is will need all the powers of the office to begin to repair
the terrible damage that this President has done to the national
security interests of the United States.
It is to avoid further damage to those interests and to the office of
the President that I ask my colleagues to consider voting for this
resolution. The irony that this resolution is being considered only
because of a statute I oppose is not lost on me. But bad laws
[[Page 8049]]
often produce unexpected irony along with their other, more damaging
effects. So we have made what good use of it we can.
We are here beginning a debate that many did not want, and few will
mind seeing disposed of quickly. In my opening comments, I know I have
spoken provocatively. Although I believe my points are correct, I could
have been a little more restrained in offering them. I was not because
I hope it will encourage, perhaps incite is a better word, greater
debate today than is contemplated by our leaders. I meant to offend no
one, but if any took offense, I hope they will come to the floor to
make their case. Let us have the kind of debate today that the matter
we are considering surely deserves.
Mr. President, we are debating war. Not Bill Clinton's war. Not
Madeleine Albright's war. America's war. It became America's war the
moment the first American flew into harm's way to fight it. Nothing
anyone can do will change that. If we lose this war, the entire
country, and the world will suffer the consequences. Yes, the President
would leave office with yet another mark against him. But he will not
suffer this indignity alone. We will all be less secure. We will all be
dishonored.
This is America's war, and we are America's elected leaders. As we
speak, tens of thousands of Americans are ready to die if they must to
win it. They risk their lives for us, and for the values that define
our good Nation. Can we not risk our political fortunes for them? Don't
they deserve more than a few hours of perfunctory and sparsely attended
debate? They do, Mr. President, they deserve much better than that.
We might lose those vote and we might lose it badly. That would be a
tragedy. But I would rather fight and lose, than not fight at all. I
hope that an extended debate might persuade more Members to support the
resolution. The resolution does not instruct the President to begin a
ground war in Yugoslavia. Nor does it grant the President authority he
does not already possess. Nor does it require the President to pursue
additional objectives in the Balkans. But if Members would be more
comfortable if those objectives and realities were expressed in the
resolution than I am sure the sponsors would welcome amendments to that
effect.
But even if a majority of Members can never be persuaded to support
this resolution, let us all agree that a debate--an honest, extensive,
responsible debate--is appropriate in these circumstances. Surely, our
consciences are agreed on that.
Mr. President, I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from West Virginia.
Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, how is the time controlled?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time is equally divided between the
proponents and the opponents.
Mr. BYRD. Who has control of the time in opposition to the
resolution?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. No individual Senator has control.
Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, there is no division of time here. This is
a unanimous consent agreement, that time today for consideration of
S.J. Res. 20 be for debate only.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. I am advised that the time control is written
in the War Powers Act.
Mr. McCAIN. Thank you. I stand corrected. I appreciate the
outstanding work of the Parliamentarian.
On behalf of the other side, I ask unanimous consent to allow Senator
Byrd to speak for as long as he may deem necessary.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
The Senator from West Virginia.
Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, I thank the distinguished Senator from
Arizona. I thank him for his courtesy. I thank him for his leadership
on this resolution and for his leadership on many of the great issues
that we have debated in this Senate from time to time. There are
occasions when I vote with Mr. McCain. There are occasions when I feel
that we do not see eye to eye. That is not to say that I do not have
the greatest respect for his position, for his viewpoint. I do have.
Mr. President, I commend Senator McCain, and I commend the other
Senators, Senator Biden and the others, who have cosponsored this
resolution, for having the courage of their convictions and for
standing up for that in which they believe. I am sorry that I cannot
agree on this occasion, but there may be a time down the road when we
will be working together and I can agree and they can agree with me.
I shall not use more than 5 minutes, Mr. President.
The course of action that they are advocating--giving the President
blanket authority to use whatever force he deems necessary to resolve
the Kosovo conflict--is a bold and possibly risky stroke. But whatever
the outcome, they are forcing the Senate to confront the Kosovo crisis
head-on, and that in itself is noteworthy.
Unfortunately, this resolution troubles me for a number of reasons.
First, in my judgment, it is premature. In response to a request from
the President, the Senate authorized air strikes against Yugoslavia in
March. To date, the President has not requested any expansion of that
authority. In fact, he has specifically stated on numerous occasions
that the use of ground troops is not being contemplated.
I think that has been a mistake from the very beginning, virtually
saying to the Yugoslavian leader that we have no intention whatsoever
of confronting you with ground troops. That loosens whatever bonds or
chains Mr. Milosevic may otherwise feel constrain him. But the
President has not announced that.
Now it is deep into our spring, and by the time we put ground troops
on the ground, I assume it will be nearing winter in the Balkans. I
think that the President has made a mistake from the very beginning in
saying we have no intent. I would prefer to let Mr. Milosevic guess as
to our intent than tell him we have no intent of doing thus and so.
If the intent of this resolution is to send a message to Slobodan
Milosevic that the United States is serious about its commitment to the
NATO operation in Kosovo, there are better ways to accomplish that
objective. Swift action on the emergency supplemental appropriations
bill to pay for the Kosovo operation would be a good first step.
Second, this resolution has the practical effect of releasing the
President from any obligation to consult with Congress over future
action in Kosovo. With this language, the Senate is effectively bowing
out of the Kosovo debate and ceding all authority to the executive
branch.
My friends may say that the Senate is not entertaining any debate
anyhow, but at least it might do so. I do not think this is in the best
interest of the Nation. The President needs to consult Congress, but
nobody can seem to agree on just exactly what ``consultation'' means.
The President has had a few of us down to the White House upon
several occasions. I have gone upon three occasions, and I have
declined to go upon one, I believe, but those consultations, while they
are probably beneficial and should be had, are really not enough. But
the President does need to consult with Congress, and if he determines
ground troops are needed in Kosovo, he needs to make that case to the
American people.
He has to make the case. Nobody can make that case for him. The
Secretary of State, Madeleine Albright, cannot make the case. The Vice
President cannot make the case. Who is going to listen to Sandy Berger?
I am not going to listen very much. So who can make the case? Nobody
but the President can really make the case. We in the Senate will do
the President no favor by giving him the means to short circuit the
process.
Third, this resolution goes beyond policy and infringes on the power
of Congress to control the purse. If the Senate gives the President
blanket authorization to ``use all necessary force and other means'' to
accomplish the goals and objectives set by NATO for the Kosovo
operation, the Senate has no choice but to back that up with a blank
check to pay for it.
[[Page 8050]]
I think I have to agree with the distinguished Senator from Arizona
in most of what he said. Practically speaking, he is exactly right. He
is precisely correct when he says that the only real check that the
Congress has upon the President is the power over the purse. Money
talks. That is the raw power. Congress alone has that power.
If we were to adopt this resolution, we would be essentially
committing the United States to pay an undetermined amount of money for
an unknown period of time to finance an uncertain and open-ended
military offensive. Mr. President, that, by any standard, is not sound
policy.
I believe there are better ways for the Senate to address the
conflict in Kosovo, ways in which we can encourage the administration
to work with Congress and to listen to the views of the American people
as expressed through their representatives in Congress. I have
repeatedly urged the President to provide Congress--and the American
people--with more details on the Kosovo strategy, including the
projected level of U.S. involvement in terms of personnel and
equipment, the estimated cost and source of funding, the expected
duration and exit strategy, and the anticipated impact on military
readiness and morale.
Of course, we heard the promises made in connection with Bosnia: We
were only going to be there a year. Repeatedly, we put that question to
the administration people and they assured us, ``It will only take
about a year.''
We have heard those promises before. We do not pay much attention to
them anymore. Those assurances do not mean anything.
The President has certainly made a good faith effort to date to
consult on this matter, with Members of Congress, but we are only in
the opening stages of this operation, and the path ahead is very
unclear. The President would be well served to continue consulting
closely with Congress and to seek Congressional support for any
decision that he contemplates involving ground forces. For its part,
the Senate should not take any action that would jeopardize this
dialog, as I believe this resolution would do.
Mr. President, again I commend Senator McCain and Senator Biden, and
the other Senators who are cosponsors, for seeking a straightforward
determination of the role that Congress will play in the Kosovo
conflict.
There is no question where the Senator from Arizona stands. He steps
up to the plate, takes hold of the bat, says, here is how I stand, this
is what I believe in. He is willing to have the Senate vote. I admire
him for that. I admire his patriotism. I admire his determination to
have the Senate speak. But I do not believe that this resolution is the
appropriate action to take at this time. I urge my colleagues to table
it.
I yield the floor.
Mr. McCAIN addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, the Senator from
Minnesota is to be recognized.
Mr. McCAIN. May I ask, for planning purposes, how long the Senator
from Minnesota plans to speak?
Mr. WELLSTONE. I will try to keep this under 20 minutes.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Minnesota is recognized.
Mr. WELLSTONE. Mr. President, I say to Senator McCain, I believe
silence equals betrayal, and I think we should be debating this
question. Besides having a great deal of respect for him, I appreciate
his efforts. We may be in disagreement, but I thank the Senator from
Arizona for his important efforts.
It was with this deep belief in my soul that I voted 6 weeks ago to
authorize the participation of the United States in the NATO bombing of
Yugoslavia. I did so with a heavy heart and not without foreboding,
because I knew once unleashed, a bombing campaign led by the world's
greatest superpower to put a stop to violence would likely lead to more
violence. Violence begets violence, and yet there are those extremely
rare occasions when our moral judgment dictates that it is the only
remaining course available to us.
I did so because it was my judgment that we had exhausted every
diplomatic possibility and that our best and most credible information
was that without military action by the United States, a humanitarian
disaster was about to occur.
Just as the Senate was about to conduct a rollcall vote on the
subject, I sought to make sure that the Record reflected the rightness
of our course of action.
I was assured that our purpose was to prevent the imminent slaughter
of thousands, if not tens of thousands, of innocent civilians living in
the Yugoslav province of Kosovo by Serb security forces.
I had no doubt about the wisdom and correctness of our decision, and
today I harbor no second thoughts about the morality of the initial
course. Others may question the reasoning of some who embarked upon the
bombing campaign. History will judge whether there were other
rationales involved: the significance of prior threats we had made and
how our credibility was on the line; the geopolitical factors that
required that we act; the continued viability of NATO as a force to be
reckoned with throughout the world.
Whatever the importance these factors may have played in the
decisions of others to authorize the bombing, my own was a simple one:
Inaction in the face of unspeakable, imminent, and preventable violence
is absolutely unacceptable. In short, the slaughter must be stopped.
I have no regrets about that decision. The violence perpetrated
against the innocents of Kosovo has been, indeed, unspeakable. My only
regret is that our actions have been less effective than I had hoped:
over a million humans, mostly women and children, uprooted from their
homes; hundreds of thousands expelled from their country, and their
homes and villages burned; women raped, thousands of the residents
killed, and children separated from their families.
The catalog of these atrocities expands every single day.
Just last week, the Serb paramilitaries in southern Kosovo reportedly
forced between 100 and 200 young men from a convoy of refugees heading
for the border, took them into a nearby field, made them drop to their
knees, and summarily executed them, leaving their bodies there as a
warning to their fellow refugees.
The catalog of horror goes on and on and on.
I met a woman from Kosovo in my office on Friday with a businessman.
They told me of four little children they had met in a refugee camp.
The children had bandages over their eyes. They thought perhaps they
had been near an explosion. That was not the case. The Serbs had raped
their mother. They had witnessed the rape, and the Serbs cut their eyes
out--they cut their eyes out. I do not understand this level of hatred.
I do not understand this frame of reference. I have no way of knowing
how people can do this.
We have witnessed the destabilization of neighboring countries who
cannot possibly handle the new masses of humanity heaped on their
doorstep. Hundreds of thousands are homeless, without shelter and food,
wandering throughout the mountains of Kosovo, frightened and in hiding.
Certainly war crime prosecutions await the perpetrators. And we cry out
for justice to be done.
We watch the humanitarian relief efforts underway by our own
Government, by our European friends, by the offices of the United
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, and by countless
nongovernmental humanitarian relief organizations, and we weep at the
abundant good that exists in the world in the face of the unspeakable
horror.
As I said, legitimate questions remain. There will undoubtedly be
hearings relating to the wisdom and timing of our decision to enter
this conflict. But that time is not now. So long as our military forces
are engaged in this mission, they deserve our full support.
I began my statement with the phrase ``silence is betrayal.'' I
believe it is time to speak out once again, this time about where we
are and where we are headed.
First, I want to express my strongest possible support for diplomatic
efforts
[[Page 8051]]
to resolve this crisis, especially the shuttle diplomacy undertaken by
Deputy Secretary Strobe Talbott, and the response of the Yeltsin
government in sending Mr. Chernomyrdin to speak with President Clinton
here today about his latest concrete proposals for resolving this
crisis.
As the NATO bombing campaign enters its sixth week, I think it is
imperative that we put as much energy into pushing and pursuing a
diplomatic solution to the Kosovo crisis as we are putting into the
military campaign. We see exhaustive daily briefings on our success in
hitting military targets. I would like to see an equal emphasis on
evaluating our success in achieving our diplomatic goals.
I have the greatest respect for Strobe Talbott, and I think he is
representing us ably in our efforts to engage the Russians in helping
to forge a negotiated settlement in Kosovo. I have told him recently
how important I believe it is that we not simply try to get the
Russians to agree to NATO's view on how a settlement should be reached.
I support the basic military, political, and humanitarian goals which
NATO has outlined: the safe return of refugees to their homes; the
withdrawal of Serb security forces--or at least to halt the bombing, a
start on their withdrawal, with a commitment to a concrete timetable;
the presence of an armed international force to protect refugees and
monitor Serb compliance; full access to Kosovo for nongovernmental
organizations aiding the refugees; and Serb willingness to participate
in meaningful negotiations on Kosovo's status.
But there are different ways to meet these goals. We need to be open
to new Russian ideas on how to proceed, including the key issue of the
composition of an international military presence--and it must be a
military presence--to establish and then keep the peace there.
We should welcome imaginative Russian initiatives. I think the
Russians have shown once again--by President Yeltsin's engagement on
this issue and by his appointment as envoy of a former Prime Minister--
a sincere willingness to try to come up with a reasonable settlement.
Let's encourage them to put together the best proposals they can and
assure them that NATO will be responsible and flexible in its response.
I am heartened by the former Prime Minister's visit today to the
United States, and that United States-Russian diplomatic channels are
open and are being used continuously. These channels should be used
continuously to keep the Russian mediation efforts on track, if
possible.
I think it is imperative that we not sit back and hope that more
bombing, or expanding the list of targets, will eventually work. We
really need to put all the effort we can into our diplomacy. I think,
as I have said, the Russians may have a key role to play.
Second, we must keep uppermost in our mind that a humanitarian
disaster of historic proportions is unfolding in refugee camps
throughout the region.
The American people have been horrified by the situation in Kosovo
and are anxious to help. Now is not the time for the U.S. Government to
be parsimonious about our humanitarian assistance. The lives and well-
being of the Kosovars was at the crux of why we entered this crisis in
the first place. I believe we may need to bolster the current funding
request by several hundred million dollars to provide the aid that will
be needed by international aid organizations, the religious community,
and others deeply involved in the refugee effort.
If it turns out that it is not necessary, we can return the funds to
the Treasury. But we should authorize more now, anticipating that we
and other NATO allies who will share this burden will be called upon to
do much more in the coming months. Medical supplies, food, basic
shelter, blankets, skilled physicians and trauma specialists to aid the
refugees, longer-term economic development, and relocation aid all will
be critical to relieving this crisis.
Third, on the conduct of the military campaign, we must remember that
NATO forces undertook this bombing campaign to stop the slaughter and
protect those living in Kosovo. Let me repeat that. The most immediate
and important goals of our bombing campaign, from my perspective, were
to stop the slaughter and mass displacement of millions of innocent
civilians throughout Kosovo and deter further Serb aggression against
them.
So far that goal has gone unmet, with terrible results and a very
high human cost. Some NATO military officers have been quoted as saying
the bombing campaign alone will not and cannot stop the ethnic
cleansing.
While it is clear that we made progress in weakening the Serb
military machine, including its air defenses, supply lines to Kosovo,
oil and munitions sites, other military sites, the hard truth is that
while the bombing campaign has gone on, Kosovo is being looted,
emptied, and burned.
Now that the Apache attack helicopters and accompanying antimissile
systems have arrived in the region, we should be pressing forward with
these airstrikes against these paramilitary forces in Kosovo most
responsible for the most brutal attacks on civilians. There can be no
excuse for further delays.
Mr. President, it is clear that we have not stopped the slaughter.
Ethnic cleansing, which we sought to stop, goes on and on and on.
Our response has been to intensify the bombing, especially in Serbia,
and to expand the targets to include economic and industrial sites
there. Some of these were originally chosen because they were said to
be ``dual use.'' I understand that rationale. But now some seemingly
nonmilitary targets appear to be selected--including the radio and TV
network, Milosevic party headquarters, the civilian electricity grid,
and other seeming civilian targets--to put pressure on the people of
Serbia who, it is hoped, will in turn put political pressure on the
Milosevic regime to back down. I think this reasoning is pure folly and
cannot be used to justify the expansion of civilian targets to be
bombed. True military targets are legitimate. Certain dual-use targets,
especially those directly related to the Serb war effort, may be. But I
know of no rules of war which allow for the targeting of civilian
targets like some of those we have targeted. We should rethink this
strategy, not the least because it undermines the legitimate moral and
political claims we have made to justify our military efforts to
protect innocent civilians in Kosovo.
Expanding the target list in this way is wrong. Not only does the
expansion of civilian, industrial and economic sites greatly increase
the risk of civilian casualties, but it is morally questionable if the
primary purpose is to do economic harm to the civilian population--
people who have nothing to do with the violent ethnic cleansing
campaign being conducted by the Serbian military machine.
What are the future military plans being discussed? These now
apparently include an embargo against future shipments of oil to
Yugoslavia. Russia is the Serbs' major oil supplier. What if oil
shipments continue to come from Russia? Will Russian transports be the
next targets of NATO forces?
Mr. President, this resolution, as open-ended as it is, is not the
right way to proceed on this complex and difficult question. It reminds
me in some ways of the now infamous Gulf of Tonkin resolution which
helped trigger the Vietnam war. It is too open-ended, too vague, and I
will not vote for it. NATO military commanders have not asked for
ground troops. The President of the United States has not asked
Congress to authorize them. We should promptly table this resolution
later today. Even one of its principal sponsors, Senator Biden, has
observed that they did not intend for this resolution to be brought to
the Senate floor now under the expedited procedures of the War Powers
Act. But even though we will likely table it, we must continue to move
forward in our efforts to achieve a prompt, just and peaceful end to
this conflict. And we should have the debate.
Once again, I cannot be silent. In short, I think it is time for all
the parties to consider a brief and verifiable
[[Page 8052]]
timeout. Yes, a timeout before we proceed further down the risky and
slippery slope of further military action, before it is too late to
turn back.
There are negotiations underway. There are pivotal efforts being
undertaken by the Russian leaders. There are discussions. There are
proposals and counterproposals being discussed. Some are being
interpreted in different ways by different parties. Ideas are being
explored.
Some of our friends in and out of NATO are discussing various ways to
end this nightmare. The continued evolution of these plans must be
given a chance. There is no ``light at the end of the tunnel'' unless
renewed diplomacy is given a chance to work.
With the former Prime Minister and the President talking today, what
I am proposing on the floor of the Senate for consideration, if it can
be worked out in a way which would protect NATO troops and would not
risk Serb resupply of the war machine, is a brief and verifiable halt
in the bombing, a cessation of what seems to be the slide toward the
bombing of a broader array of nonmilitary targets, a potential oil
embargo directed at other countries, and toward deeper involvement in a
wider war that I believe we could come to regret.
I am not naive about whether we can trust Milosevic; we have seen him
break his word too many times for that. Nor am I proposing an open-
ended halt in our effort; but a temporary pause of 48 hours or so,
offered on condition that Milosevic not be allowed to use the period to
resupply troops or to repair his air defenses and that he immediately
orders his forces in Kosovo to halt their attacks and begin to actually
withdraw. It would not require his formal prior assent to each of these
conditions, but if our intelligence and other means of verification
concludes that he is taking military advantage of such a pause by doing
any of these things, then we should resume the bombing. .I believe that
we may need to take the first step, a gesture, in the effort to bring
these horrors to an end.
Such a pause may well be worthwhile, if it works to prompt the
cessation of the ethnic cleansing and a return of Serb forces to their
garrisons. .It may create the conditions for the possibility of further
talks on the conditions under which NATO's larger term goals, which I
support, can be met. .A brief cessation might also enable
nongovernmental organizations and other ``true neutrals'' in the
conflict to airlift or truck in and then distribute relief supplies to
the internally displaced Kosovars who are homeless and starving in the
mountains of Kosovo, without the threat of this humanitarian mission
being halted by the Serbian military.
A Serb guarantee of their safe conduct would be an important
reciprocal gesture on the part of Milosevic. .These people must be
rescued, and my hope is that a temporary bombing pause might help to
enable aid organizations to get to them. .I hope that President Clinton
and Mr. Chernomyrdin will consider this idea and other similar
proposals in their discussion today. .I intend to explore and refine
these ideas further with administration officials in the coming days to
see if it might hold any promise to bring this awful war to a peaceful
close.
I am not naive. .I understand that the safety of our NATO forces must
be held paramount in any such exploration. .But it is, it seems to me,
worth exploring further. .One thing that is clear is that the situation
on the ground in Kosovo today and in those countries which border it is
unacceptable and likely to worsen considerably in the coming weeks.
I am not just talking about a geographical or geopolitical
abstraction, the stability of the region. .I am talking about the human
cost of a wider Balkan conflict. .For 50 years, we have spent the blood
and treasure of Americans and Europeans to help provide for a stable,
peaceful Europe. .I believe we must again work with the Europeans, and
now with the Russians and others, who have historic ties to the Serbs
to try to resolve this crisis before the flames of war in Kosovo and
the refugee exodus which it has prompted consume the region. .Stepped
up diplomacy, a possible pause in the airstrikes, and other similar
efforts to bring a peaceful and just end to this crisis should be
pursued right now.
Silence equals betrayal.
It was with that belief deep in my soul that I voted, six weeks ago,
to authorize the United States participation in the NATO bombing of
Yugoslavia.
I did so with a heavy heart, and not without foreboding, because I
knew that, once unleashed, a bombing campaign led by the world's
greatest superpower to put a stop to violence will likely lead to more
violence. Violence begets violence. And yet, there are those extremely
rare occasions when our moral judgment dictates that that is the only
remaining course available to us.
I did so because it was my judgment that we had exhausted every
diplomatic possibility, and that our best and most credible information
was that without military action by the United States, a humanitarian
disaster was beginning to occur.
Just as the Senate was about to conduct a roll call vote on this
subject, I sought to make sure that the record reflected the rightness
of our course of action. I was assured that our purpose was to prevent
the imminent slaughter of thousands, if not tens of thousands of
innocent civilians living in the Yugoslav province of Kosovo by Serb
security forces.
I had no doubt about the wisdom and correctness of our decision. And
today, I harbor no second thoughts about the morality of that initial
course.
Others may question the reasoning of some who embarked upon the
bombing campaign. History will judge whether there were other
rationales involved:
The significance of prior threats we had made and how our credibility
was on the line; the geopolitical factors that required that we act;
the continued viability of NATO as a force to be reckoned with
throughout the world.
Whatever importance these factors may have played in the decisions of
others to authorize the bombing, my own was a simple one--inaction in
the face of unspeakable, imminent, and preventable violence was
absolutely unacceptable. In short, the slaughter must be stopped.
I have no regrets about that decision. The violence perpetrated
against the innocents of Kosovo has indeed been unspeakable. My only
regret is that our actions have been less effective than I had hoped.
Over a million humans, mostly women and children, uprooted from their
homes.
Hundreds of thousands expelled from their country, their homes and
villages burned.
Women raped, thousands of the residents killed, children separated
from their families.
The catalog of these atrocities expands every single day. From
Acareva to Zim, villages in Kosovo have been burned by Serb forces. In
Cirez, as many as 20,000 Albanian refugees were reportedly recently
used as human shields against NATO bombings. In Djakovica, over 100
ethnic Albanians were reportedly summarily executed by Serb forces. In
Goden, the Serbs reportedly executed over 20 men, including
schoolteachers, before burning the village to the ground. In Kuraz, 21
schoolteachers were reported by refugees to have been executed in this
village near Srbica, with hundreds more being held there by Serb
paramilitary forces. In Pastasel, the bodies of over 70 ethnic
Albanians, ranging in age from 14 to 50, were discovered by refugees on
April 1. In Podujevo, Serb forces may have executed over 200 military-
age Kosovar men, removing some from their cars and shooting them on the
spot, at point-blank range.
In Pristina, the Serbs appear to have completed their military
operations in the city and have been ethnically cleansing the entire
city. Approximately 25,000 Kosovars were forcibly expelled from the
city last month, shipped to Macedonia by rail cars in scenes eerily
reminiscent of the holocaust trains, and approximately 200,000 more may
be detained there, awaiting their forced expulsion. In Prizren, Serb
forces reportedly executed between 20 and 30 civilians. In Srbica,
after
[[Page 8053]]
emptying the town of its Kosovar inhabitants, Serb forces are believed
to have executed 115 ethnic Albanian males over the age of 18. Over
twenty thousand prisoners are reportedly still being housed in an
ammunition factory near the town, under Serbian guard. Just last week,
Serb paramilitaries in southern Kosovo reportedly forced between 100
and 200 young men from a convoy of refugees heading for the border,
took them into a nearby field, made them drop to their knees, and
summarily executed them, leaving their bodies there as a warning to
their fellow refugees. The catalog of horrors goes on and on.
We have witnessed the destabilization of neighboring countries who
cannot possibly handle the new masses of humanity heaped on their
doorstep.
Hundreds of thousands homeless, without shelter and without food,
wandering throughout the mountains of Kosovo, frightened and in hiding.
Certainly war crime prosecutions await the perpetrators and we cry
out for justice to be done.
We watch the humanitarian relief efforts underway, by our own
government, by our European friends, by the offices of the United
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, and by countless non-
governmental humanitarian relief organizations and we weep at the
abundant good that exists in the world in the face of this unspeakable
horror.
As I said, legitimate questions remain, and there will undoubtedly be
hearings relating to the wisdom and timing of our decision to enter
this conflict. But that time is not now, and so long as our military
forces are engaged in this mission they deserve our full support.
I began my statement with the phrase ``silence is betrayal.'' And I
believe it is time to speak out once again, this time about where we
are, and where we are headed.
First, I want to express my strongest possible support for diplomatic
efforts to resolve this crisis, especially the shuttle diplomacy
undertaken by Deputy Secretary Strobe Talbott, and the response of the
Yeltsin government in sending Mr. Chernomyrdin to speak with President
Clinton here today about his latest concrete proposals for resolving
this crisis. As the NATO bombing campaign enters its sixth week I think
it is imperative that we put as much energy into pursuing a diplomatic
solution to the Kosovo crisis as we are putting into the military
campaign. We see exhaustive daily briefings on our success in hitting
military targets--I would like to see equal emphasis on evaluating our
success in achieving our diplomatic goals. I have the greatest respect
for Strobe Talbott and I think he is representing us ably in our
efforts to engage the Russians in helping to forge a negotiated
settlement in Kosovo. I have told him recently how important I believe
it is that we not simply try to get the Russians to agree to NATO's
views on how a settlement should be reached.
I support the basic military, political and humanitarian goals which
NATO has outlined: the safe return of refugees to their homes; the
withdrawal of Serb Security forces--or at least, to halt the bombing, a
start on their withdrawal, with a commitment to a concrete timetable;
the presence of an armed international force to protect refugees and
monitor Serb compliance; full access to Kosovo for non-governmental
organizations aiding the refugees; and Serb willingness to participate
in meaningful negotiations on Kosovo's status. But there are different
ways to meet these goals. And we need to be open to new Russian ideas
on how to proceed, including on the key issue of the composition of an
international military presence to establish and then keep the peace
there.
We should welcome imaginative Russian initiatives. I think the
Russians have shown once again--by President Yeltsin's engagement on
this issue and by his appointment as envoy of a former Prime Minister--
a sincere willingness to try to come up with a reasonable settlement.
Let's encourage them to put together the best proposals they can and
assure them that NATO will be flexible in its response. I am heartened
by the former Prime Minister's visit today to the U.S., and that US-
Russian diplomatic channels are open and are being used continuously.
These channels should be used continuously to keep the Russian
mediation efforts on track, if possible.
I think it is imperative that we not sit back and hope that more
bombing, or expanding the list of targets, will eventually work. We
need to really put all the effort we can into our diplomacy. And I
think, as I've said, the Russians may have a key role to play.
Second, we must keep uppermost in our mind that a humanitarian
disaster of historic proportions is unfolding in refugee camps
throughout the region. The situation is so tense that it is being
reported there have been near-riots in some camps over the desperate
conditions there, and the situation in camps near Blace in Macedonia
and at Kukes in northern Albania are especially grim. Shortly, we will
consider an emergency supplemental package to fund the military and
humanitarian costs for the Kosovo crisis. I am deeply concerned that
the amount requested for refugee assistance may not be enough to meet
the overwhelming needs of this emergency--the largest refugee crisis
since World War II.
We are meeting the military challenge by spending millions a day to
assist NATO in its war against Serb aggression. The humanitarian
challenge we face is just as great. If we have learned anything in
recent weeks, it is that we must prepare for the worst of the worst-
case scenarios.
Hundreds of thousands of refugees are still trapped inside Kosovo,
waiting for an opportunity to escape. A further massive exodus seems
likely. We must be prepared to meet their needs. Extensive medical
supplies and possibly another field hospital will also be needed, since
more and more new arrivals are requiring medical attention. Our
experience in Bosnia has taught us that these refugees will not be
going home anytime soon. Long-term assistance is required. Further, we
must support Albania and Macedonia who are struggling to meet basic
needs of their own people, let alone those of the Kosovar refugees.
The American people have been horrified by the situation in Kosovo,
and are anxious to help. Now is not the time for the US government to
be parsimonious about our humanitarian assistance. The lives and well-
being of the Kosovars was at the crux of why we entered this crisis in
the first place. I believe we may need to bolster the current funding
request by several hundred million to provide the aid that will be
needed by international aid organizations, the religious community, and
others deeply involved in the refugee effort. If it turns out that it
is not necessary, we can return the funds to the Treasury. But we
should authorize more now, anticipating that we and our other NATO
allies who share this burden will be called upon do much more in the
coming months. Medical supplies, food, basic shelter, blankets, skilled
physicians and trauma specialists to aid the refugees, longer-term
economic development and relocation aid--all will be critical to
relieving this crisis.
Third, on the conduct of the military campaign, we must remember that
NATO forces undertook this bombing campaign to stop the slaughter and
protect those living in Kosovo. Let me repeat that. The most immediate
and important goals of our bombing campaign, from my perspective, were
to stop the slaughter and mass displacement of innocent civilians
throughout Kosovo, and to deter further Serb aggression against them.
So far that goal has gone unmet, with terrible results and very high
human costs. Some NATO military officers have been quoted as saying
that the bombing campaign alone will not and cannot stop the ethnic
cleansing.
While it is clear we have made progress in weakening the Serb
military machine, including its air defenses, supply lines to Kosovo,
oil and munitions sites, and other military sites, the hard truth is
that while the bombing campaign has gone on, Kosovo is being looted,
emptied and burned. Now that the Apache attack helicopters and
accompanying anti-missile
[[Page 8054]]
systems have arrived in the region, we should be pressing forward our
air strikes against those paramilitary forces in Kosovo most
responsible for the most brutal attacks against civilians. There can be
no excuse for further delays.
There will be time to determine whether our bombing accelerated, or
whether it increased, the slaughter. In any case, it now seems clear,
from detailed and credible reports in the media and elsewhere, that the
Serb ethnic cleansing campaign, labeled the other day by the Washington
Post as ``one of the most ambitiously ruthless military campaigns in
Europe in half a century,'' was carefully and meticulously planned for
months before the bombing. The attacks have reportedly seriously
damaged over 250 villages, with well over 50 being completely burned to
the ground. Systematically integrating Interior Ministry (MUP) forces,
regular Yugoslav army forces, police units and paramilitary gangs for
the first time, this effort was clearly coldly calculated to terrorize
the populace, and ultimately to rid the entire province of its ethnic
Albanian majority. It is clear that we have not stopped the slaughter.
Ethnic cleansing, which we sought to stop, goes on, and on, and on.
Our response has been to intensify the bombing, especially in Serbia,
and to expand the targets to include economic and industrial sites
there. Some of these were originally chosen because they were said to
be ``dual use.'' I understand that rationale. But now some seemingly
non-military targets appear to be selected--including the radio and tv
network, the Milosevic Party headquarters, the civilian electricity
grid, and other seeming civilian targets--to put pressure on the people
of Serbia who, it is hoped, will in turn put political pressure on the
Milosevic regime to back down.
I think this reasoning is pure folly and cannot be used to justify
the expansion of civilian targets to be bombed. True military targets
are legitimate. Certain dual use targets, especially those directly
related to the Serb War effort, may be. But I know of no rules of war
which allow for the targeting of civilian targets like some of those we
have targeted. We should rethink this strategy, not least because it
undermines the legitimate moral and political claims we have made to
justify our military efforts to protect innocent civilians in Kosovo.
Expanding the target lists in this way is wrong. Not only does the
expansion to civilian industrial and economic sites greatly increase
the risk of civilian casualties, but it is morally questionable if the
primary purpose is to do economic harm to the civilian population--
people who have nothing to do with the violent ethnic cleansing
campaign being conducted by the Serbian military machine.
I am also very concerned about reports from the NATO summit that
future targeting decisions will likely be placed in the hands of NATO
military officials, without careful review of elected civilian
representatives--a policy that I think is at odds with our
constitutional insistence upon civilian control.
And what other future military plans are being discussed? These now
apparently include an embargo against future shipments of oil to
Yugoslavia. Russia is the Serbs' major oil supplier. What if oil
shipments continue to come from Russia? Will Russian transports be the
next targets of NATO forces?
While I recognize the legitimate concern of NATO military officials
that we must not put pilots' lives at risk to hit oil production and
distribution facilities servicing the Serb armies, while allowing oil
to pour in to them through ports in Montenegro or through other means,
we must be very careful as we proceed here.
And then there is the question of the introduction of ground troops.
After the NATO summit last weekend, plans are being ``taken off the
shelf and updated.'' Propositioning of ground troops is being advocated
by some within our own government. It doesn't take clairvoyance to see
where some seem to be headed.
This resolution, as open-ended as it is, is not the right way to
proceed on this complex and difficult question. It reminds me, in some
ways, of the now infamous Gulf of Tonkin resolution which helped
trigger the Vietnam War. It is too open-ended, too vague, and I will
not vote for it. NATO military commanders have not asked for ground
troops, the President of the U.S. has not asked Congress to authorize
them; we should promptly table this resolution later today. Even one of
its principal sponsors, Senator Biden, has observed that they did not
intend for this resolution to be brought to the Senate floor now, under
the expedited procedures of the War Powers Act. But even though we will
likely table it, we must continue to move forward in our efforts to
achieve a prompt, just and peaceful end to this conflict.
And so, once again, I cannot be silent. In short, I think it's time
for all the parties to consider a brief and verifiable time-out. Yes, a
time-out, before we proceed further down the risky and slippery slope
of further military action, before it's too late to turn back.
There are negotiations underway. There are pivotal efforts being
undertaken by the Russian leaders. There are discussions. There are
proposals and counter proposals being discussed. Some are being
interpreted in different ways by different parties. Ideas are being
explored. Some of our friends, in and out of NATO, are discussing
various ways to end this nightmare. The continued evolution of these
plans must be given a chance. There is no ``light at the end of the
tunnel'' unless renewed diplomacy is given a chance to work.
With the former Prime Minister and the President talking today, what
I am proposing for consideration--if it can be worked out in a way
which would protect NATO troops, and would not risk Serb resupply of
their war machine--is a brief and verifiable halt in the bombing, a
cessation of what seems to be a slide toward the bombing of a broader
array of non-military targets, a potential oil embargo directed at
other countries, and toward deeper involvement in a wider war that I
believe we could come to regret.
I am not naive about whether we can trust Milosevic; we have seen him
break his word too many times for that. Nor am I proposing an open-
ended halt in our effort. But a temporary pause of 48 hours or so,
offered on condition that Milosevic not be allowed to use the period to
resupply troops or to repair his air defenses, and that he immediately
orders his forces in Kosovo to halt their attacks and begin to actually
withdraw. It would not require his formal prior assent to each of these
conditions, but if our intelligence and other means of verification
concludes that he is taking military advantage of such a pause by doing
any of these things, then we should resume the bombing. I believe that
we may need to take the first step, a gesture, in the effort to bring
these horrors to an end.
I know there are risks and costs associated with such an even
temporary halt in the airstrikes. I am not yet sure, for example, that
we could develop a verifiable time-out plan which would prevent Serb
forces from quickly repairing their air defense systems such that they
would pose new risks to NATO pilots; that cannot be allowed. I know
there would be real problems in verifying that Serb attacks on the
ground in Kosovo had stopped, and military and paramilitary units were
actually pulling back, during any bombing pause. I am no military
expert, but I am posing those and other questions to US military
officials and others, to see if there is not room for such an
initiative.
Such a pause may well be worthwhile; if it works to prompt a
cessation of the ethnic cleansing and a return of Serb forces to their
garrisons, it may create the conditions for the possibility of further
talks on the conditions under which NATO's longer-term goals, which I
support, can be met.
A brief cessation might also enable non-governmental organizations
and other ``true neutrals'' in the conflict to airlift or truck in, and
then distribute, relief supplies to the internally-displaced Kosovars
who are homeless and starving in the mountains of Kosovo,
[[Page 8055]]
without the threat of this humanitarian mission being halted by the
Serbian military. A Serb guarantee of their safe conduct would be an
important reciprocal gesture on the part of Milosevic. These people
must be rescued, and my hope is that a temporary bombing pause might
help to enable aid organizations to get to them.
I hope that President Clinton and Mr. Chernomyrdin will consider this
idea, and other similar proposals, in their discussion today. I intend
to explore and refine this idea further with Administration officials
in the coming days, to see if it might hold any promise to bring this
awful war to a peaceful close. I am not naive, and I understand that
the safety of our NATO forces must be held paramount in any such
exploration. But it is, it seems to me, worth exploring further.
One thing that is clear is that the situation on the ground in Kosovo
today and in those countries which border it is unacceptable and likely
to worsen considerably in the coming weeks.
It has been argued by the Administration and others that an intense
and sustained conflict in Kosovo, which has sent hundreds of thousands
of refugees across borders and could potentially draw Albania,
Macedonia, Greece and Turkey into a wider war would be disastrous. That
is true. We may not be able to contain a wider Balkan war without far
greater risk and cost than has been contemplated. And we could well
face an even greater humanitarian catastrophe than we face now in the
weeks and months to come.
I am not just talking about a geopolitical abstraction, the stability
of the region. I am talking about the human cost of a wider Balkan
conflict. For fifty years, we have spent the blood and treasure of
Americans and Europeans to help provide for a stable, peaceful Europe.
I believe we must again work with the Europeans--and now with the
Russians and others who have historic ties to the Serbs--to try to
resolve this crisis before the flames of war in Kosovo and of the
refugee exodus which it has prompted consume the region. Stepped-up
diplomacy, a possible pause in the airstrikes, and other similar
efforts to bring a peaceful and just end to this crisis should be
pursued right now.
Mr. President, I yield the floor.
Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I yield such time to the Senator from
Arkansas as he may consume.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arkansas is recognized.
Mr. HUTCHINSON. Mr. President, I thank the Senator from Arizona. I
especially thank him for his strong leadership on this issue and for
pushing this issue to the point that we are having this debate on the
floor of the Senate.
I have believed for some time that this debate has been sorely needed
and greatly lacking. Senator McCain is truly an American hero. He is
one that I respect immensely, along with Senator Hagel and the other
cosponsors of this resolution.
Though I disagree with them and though I rise in opposition to the
resolution, I believe they have taken a principled position, a
principled stand that is justifiable and behind which there are
rational arguments. I believe they reciprocate that respect for the
principled position and belief that we do not have a vital national
interest in the Balkans and that we have made a policy mistake and that
given where we are, the placement of ground troops is not the next step
that we should be taking.
I regret the silence that has characterized Congress to this point,
particularly the Senate. I applaud those who have pushed that we might
have this time today.
As I read the resolution, I read that it authorizes the use of all
necessary force and other means. That, I do believe, is a blank check.
I believe it grants blanket authority, and it does take us out of what
is a very, very important role for the Congress. I read also that all
necessary force and other means is granted to accomplish NATO's
objectives in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Serbia and
Montenegro.
One of the questions I have is, what are our objectives? I do not
believe those objectives have been clearly outlined. Does the
resolution refer to military objectives, which we have been told means
to degrade the military capability of Milosevic--whatever that term
``degrade'' may mean, subjective as it is--or does this reference to
the objectives of NATO refer to political objectives, which have been
defined in a much broader sense in reference to the withdrawal of
Milosevic, the incorporation of an international peacekeeping force,
humanitarian aid and a number of things?
So I am not certain what objectives are in mind in the resolution or
how one would determine whether or not they have been achieved.
When I made reference to the silence that I think has been
embarrassing for the Senate, I think Members of the Senate have been
reluctant to speak on this for a couple of reasons. We have been
reticent to speak out because nobody wants to be portrayed as not being
in support of American troops.
I went to Aviano. We have the bravest young men and women imaginable
involved in this. They are willing and have been risking their lives
daily in pursuit of this policy and the orders they have been given. I
support them and I believe in them. I believe in their effectiveness
and I believe in their courage. But I think that is one reason people
have been hesitant to get into this debate, because they are afraid of
being portrayed as not being supportive of the military, and also
because of the horrible atrocities that have been committed by the
Serbs and the Milosevic war machine.
Nobody wants to be portrayed as being uncaring or not having a
humanitarian concern for the ethnic cleansing and for the killing and
massacres that have gone on, which truly are deplorable and ought to be
condemned by all right-thinking people. I care about that just as I
care about the 1.3 million-plus civilians who have died in the Sudan in
the Sudanese civil war, and just as I care about those who died in the
Ethiopian civil war, and just as I care about those who died in Rwanda,
and just as I care about the oppression that goes on today in China. I
care about those tragedies that are going on all over the world, not
just in the Balkans.
I have agonized a great deal about what is the right position not
only on this resolution but on this, what I believe is a misguided
conflict. The war in Kosovo reveals the extent to which we have
overstretched our armed services. They are overdeployed and
underfunded. For example, over the last 3 fiscal years, the Congress
has added $21 billion to the President's meager defense requests.
Unfortunately, even these increases have not kept pace with the
military's increased tempo of operations. The President has committed
United States forces to Haiti, Somalia, Iraq, Bosnia, Macedonia, the
Taiwan Strait, and now Kosovo. Each of these much-needed congressional
plus-ups was passed over the administration's objections, and the
administration simply said the Pentagon hadn't asked for the additional
money.
Between the years 1945 and 1990, the U.S. Army was deployed only 10
times, Mr. President. But since 1991, the U.S. Army has been deployed
32 times. That is an increase in deployments of over 300 percent.
Simultaneous with our 300-percent increase in deployments around the
world, we have cut funding for the U.S. armed services by one-third.
That is a simple calculation that, if you ask the armed services to do
300 percent more and you give them one-third less, you are inviting a
disaster and you are creating a crisis, and that is what we face today.
This overuse of America's limited military might threatens our
ability to execute our national security strategy to be able to fight--
and this is our stated strategy--and win two near-simultaneous, medium,
regional conflicts. This past Friday in the Washington Post, Bradley
Graham authored an important article on this very point. In the
article, General Richard Hawley, who heads the Air Combat Command, told
reporters--and General Hawley is retiring in June and therefore he
spoke with particular candor--that 5 weeks of bombing Yugoslavia have
left United
[[Page 8056]]
States munitions critically short, not just of air-launched cruise
missiles, as previously reported, but also of another precision weapon,
the joint direct attack munition dropped by B-2 bombers. So low is the
inventory of the new satellite-guided weapons, Hawley said, that as the
bombing campaign accelerates, the Air Force risks exhausting its prewar
supply of JDAMs before the next scheduled delivery sometime in May.
In the past 8 years, the U.S. military has been weakened appreciably.
While we are occupied in Kosovo, United States intelligence assets are
necessarily focused on military operations there. If another country
conducts a ballistic missile test while the bulk of United States
intelligence assets are focused in Kosovo, and if that country only
needs one test before deployment, like North Korea, for instance, then
we will not have missed simply the one test, but we will have missed
all the tests necessary to know what they are deploying and when they
will deploy it.
There is a great deal going on in our world, including a
deteriorating relationship with Japan, with the People's Republic of
China, with Russia; a dangerous situation in North Korea; Iraq is busy
again on their ballistic missile and weapons of mass destruction
programs, with no U.N. inspections to inhibit them; India and Pakistan
launching ballistic missiles and testing nuclear weapons; Iran, and
other surprises yet to come. The United States needs to be sure it has
the resources to focus on more than one troubled spot at a time. We
need to decide what is important and see that we have the necessary
capabilities.
As reported in this most recent edition of National Review:
General Henry Shelton, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, told Congress, ``Anecdotal and now measurable evidence
indicates that our current readiness is fraying and that the
long-term health of the total force is in jeopardy.''
Today's military is 36 percent smaller than it was during
the Gulf War. Last year, the Pentagon determined that there
was a high risk of being unable to [fight and] win two [near]
simultaneous wars, a capability that current U.S. strategic
doctrine demands. And even though [the Pentagon doesn't
consider] the Kosovo assaults . . . as one of these major
engagements, they have led to fewer patrols being flown over
Iraq, and a [substantial] gap in naval forces in the Pacific.
President Clinton responded to the readiness alert sounded by his
military chiefs by proposing an additional $12 billion for next year's
defense budget. But $8 billion of this ``increase'' represents savings
from lower fuel costs and inflation rates that would be going to the
military anyway. A good portion of the remaining $4 billion is
dedicated to items like commissary operations and renovation of the
Pentagon, which leaves precious little to meet our crying readiness
demands.
I believe that since we started what I believe is a misguided war in
the Balkans, it has been flawed since its implementation. President
Clinton and his national security team have mismanaged this operation
from the very beginning.
The U.S. and NATO should stop saying what the allies will or will not
do. For example: We will hit only these targets. Why should we tell
them that?
We will only hit those targets at 2 a.m. when nobody will be hurt. We
are running out of cruise missiles. Why should we tell them that? We
are bringing in A-10 aircraft, or Apache helicopters, in four weeks.
Why do we say that? Once again, such statements only help the enemy.
It would also seem that the President did not learn many lessons from
a war that he so forcefully and vocally opposed. A ``graduated
response'' didn't work in Vietnam for President Johnson; it won't work
for NATO in Kosovo. It will cost lives. If the United States is going
to get into a fight, if we are going to place America's sons and
daughters in harm's way, then it is worth winning, and we should hit
hard and hit hard up front. Hoping for a measured antiseptic war--
``immaculate coercion''--to be successful, without deaths on either
side, is the only hope of the unschooled.
The present practice of ``war by committee'' is another area ripe for
scrutiny. There are too many lives at risk for NATO to continue to
operate as it has for the first 6 weeks of the air war, with delays for
the approval of each of the targets and delays on the dispatching of
various weapons systems, such as the Apaches. If a ``war by committee''
is difficult to implement in an air campaign, I believe it would be
virtually impossible to execute in a ground campaign.
Even Margaret Thatcher, who herself advocates ground troops, has
harbored doubts about Operation Allied Force and its implementation.
During a speech delivered last week, the former British Prime Minister
stated:
So here we are now, fighting a war . . . on treacherous
terrain, so far without much effective local support, with
imperfect intelligence, and with war aims that some find
unclear and unpersuasive.
The key question that confronts the Senate and the Congress and the
country is, What will guide our national security policy? Will it truly
be our vital national security interests, or will it be that guided by
understandable humanitarian concerns? Is Kosovo in our national
security interest?
Another excellent article that appeared recently that I would like to
quote from, I think, speaks eloquently about this issue of our vital
national interest. Ultimately, it says our vital interests must somehow
be involved.
Sometimes, as with President Clinton's attempts to relate
America's interest to Kosovo with the outbreak of two world
wars in the Balkans, it takes the form of bad history. Apart
from the fact that the beginning of World War II had nothing
to do with the Balkans, World War I began at a time when the
interests of three vast empires collided in the region,
making it one of extraordinary geopolitical sensitivity. That
is no longer the case. Now, properly considered, it should be
an insignificant backwater, and it has taken a good deal of
determined and sustainable political effort to make it
otherwise.
The article goes on to conclude with an interview with Lawrence
Eagleburger, whom the article rightly describes as ``one of the few
Americans who both understands foreign policy and has a close firsthand
knowledge of Yugoslavia''. Mr. Eagleburger is quoted as saying:
Serb nationalism is the real ruler here. Whoever would
follow Mr. Milosevic would certainly be just as bad. Or he
might even be worse--a true believer in the nationalist
cause.
Mr. Harries continues:
But if Serb nationalism is the real ruler, it doesn't make
a great deal of difference whether the ostensible ruler is or
is not a true believer, for in either case he is riding a
tiger.
Mark Helprin, writing recently, raised similar points. He rightly
asks if it is the policy of the United States to support separatism and
secession wherever they may be close to ignition and war?
He goes on:
The Administration's answer is that the Balkans are ``in
the heart of Europe.'' The Balkans, of course, are not in the
heart of Europe. They are a backwater separated from the
European heartland by mountain ranges and salt water. They
are entirely unastride the major routes of communication and/
or axis of invasion, and they are strategically and
economically unessential. In citing them as the origins of
the First and, incorrectly, Second World Wars, and therefore
as justification for his policy of internationalizing their
conflicts, President Clinton seems not to comprehend that one
of the reasons for the First World War was that the great
powers of the time stupidly, mistakenly and fatally
internationalized the conflicts there.
May I say, Mr. President, that is what we are doing. We are taking
the conflict in the Balkans and we are ratcheting it up. We are
internationalizing the conflicts in the Balkans.
What is the proper role of Congress in all of this? I have applauded
Senator McCain for ensuring that debate took place. There has been too
much congressional silence--perhaps afraid of the political
repercussions, perhaps wanting to make this a political winner for one
party or the other.
But at the Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia, one of our
Nation's Founding Fathers, James Wilson, a signatory of the
Constitution, not only implicitly equated declaring war and entering
war, but also explicitly foreclosed exercise of the power by the
President acting alone. And he emphasizes the role of our national
interests in entering a war.
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He said:
This [new] system will not hurry us into war; it is
calculated to guard against it. It will not be in the power
of a single man, or a single body of men, to involve us in
such distress; for the important power of declaring war is
vested in the legislature at large; this declaration must be
made with the concurrence of the House of Representatives;
from this circumstance we may draw a certain conclusion that
nothing but our national interest can draw us into a war.
So it was envisioned by our Founding Fathers that nothing but our
national interest can draw us into a war. It has yet to be adequately
demonstrated to Congress or the American people that it is our vital
national interest that has drawn us into this conflict. In fact, I
would say we have stumbled into this conflict. We have slipped into
this war.
I want to take just a moment, Mr. President, to talk about the
difficulties of a ground war.
Escalating the conflict in Kosovo to include U.S. ground forces would
require broad and deep public support, which is presently lacking.
Deploying a NATO-led force of any consequence, would require the
broad consensus of NATO's nineteen member states. Judging by the
limited commitment of forces made by some of our NATO allies to the
present operation, I strongly doubt that a consensus could be reached
on deploying 200,000 or more soldiers into Kosovo.
In fact, as important as this exercise is today, as important as this
debate is today, it may truly be a moot point, because the likelihood
of receiving consensus among our NATO allies is remote.
Deploying a NATO-led force large enough to expel the Serbian Army and
any paramilitary forces would take several months, by which time
Slobodan Milosevic may have succeeding in expelling all of Kosovo's
ethnic Albanian population. If anyone doubts this point, I would
encourage them to re-examine just how long it took the Army to deploy
just 24 Apache helicopters and their supporting equipment from Germany
to Albania. That deployment alone took over one full month.
Any ground operation in Kosovo, however it ends, would require an
armed NATO-led presence in Kosovo for decades to come. While the
American people have focused--focused well and focused appropriately--
on the humanitarian disaster in the Balkans, they have not yet focused
on the length and cost of the commitment that this resolution would be
asking us to make--truly a decade-long commitment. One need only look
at the Korean peninsula where American troops have been deployed for
over 45 years.
Remember the first time I mentioned the decade-long commitment to the
press, and the eyebrows went up and a look of skepticism. No one is
skeptical about tenure with experts in foreign policy now saying 20,
30, 40 years, or a generation for sure. That is the kind of commitment
that we are talking about. Americans must also keep in mind, as Andrew
Bagevich wrote recently:
. . . success will not come without cost, in blood as well
as treasure. Once achieved, it will impose new burdens that
few Americans will welcome: the U.S. will inevitably bear the
chief responsibility for rebuilding and rehabilitating a
post-Milosevic Yugoslavia (Estimates for rebuilding the
Balkans already stands at over $30 billion.). Clinton,
Albright, Berger, et al., will retire to write their memoirs.
The rest of us will end up taking care of the broken
crockery.
It will be an enormous cost. It is a major commitment. We must ensure
before we take that step that, in fact, this is a vital national
interest to us, and therefore worth it and we can do it. Nor should we
pull back, nor should we become isolationists. We do have a burden to
bear as the leading democracy in the world and the remaining superpower
in the world, but we must choose our fight well.
The other great question as to what would happen with the
introduction of American ground troops in Kosovo is the Russian
question. I don't know the answer to that, but I know that we bet a lot
that they are bluffing; that we bet a lot when we say they will back
down; that they are more concerned about IMF loans than they are in
being a major world power or player. But I do know this: They have
20,000 nuclear warheads still, which cannot only be used but can be
sold, and that threat is a serious one and I think arguably a more
serious one than a bully boy in Serbia.
The issue of NATO's credibility comes up repeatedly in the United
States, and the argument is that it may have been unwise to go in.
Maybe we shouldn't have taken this step. But we did. And now that we
are in it, we have to win it because otherwise we lose credibility. How
many times have we heard advocates of escalation put forth the argument
that NATO's credibility is at stake?
At this time the near consensus among the foreign policy elite in
Washington is that whatever the flaws of the original case for waging
war over Kosovo, there is no alternative to pressing on, even if it
means sending in ground troops. The cost of not doing so, it is
insisted, would be prohibitive. But while it is certainly true that it
would be very high, that there would be a high cost of not winning it,
that in itself, in my estimation, is not a conclusive argument. The
real question is whether it would be higher than the cost of the
alternatives. There will be a high cost if we exit the Balkans without
a clear and unambiguous victory, but we must weigh that against what
the cost will be if we go down that road and we then do not have a
clear and unequivocal victory. That question is not as easy, and I
suggest to those who sincerely offer this resolution that is a serious
issue for us to debate.
For ordinary Americans, the strongest argument for continuing is
likely to be to alleviate the condition of the Kosovar refugees. If you
ask most Americans why, that is their justification for being there. It
is graphically demonstrated on television screens every night. The
American people are compassionate people and it is understandable and
commendable that they react to those scenes that way.
Senator Wellstone spoke earlier. It was the humanitarian disaster
that became the primary justification. When President Clinton speaks
about this war, it is primarily the humanitarian disaster that becomes
the rationale for our involvement. Yet, if that is our rationale, where
do we not go--because humanitarian disasters are occurring around the
world, oftentimes as a result of bitter ethnic civil wars. Can we ask
the American people to bear that burden and to introduce American
troops in all of those places?
In contrast to the reaction of the American people, for the foreign
policy establishment the overriding argument turns on the necessity to
protect America's and NATO's future credibility. If, having started the
thing, we do not now prevail, the future costs all over the world in
terms of emboldened thugs and rogue states will be steep.
While those arguments are both serious and valid, those arguments
were equally valid in 1965 when the question of how to proceed with
respect to Vietnam was the issue, and in the end the policy they gave
rise to turned out to be not such a great idea.
This administration, I believe, needs to remember the ``Rule of
Holes.'' If you find yourself in one, stop digging. To simply say that
because we are there, we stumbled in or slipped in, because we are
there, we must now stay regardless of the cost, I think, is misguided
thinking.
An infantry campaign in the Balkans will forever alter the unstable
politics of Russia, may well provide it with the organizing principle
for rearmament, and will most assuredly play into the hands of the
ultra nationalists. When we think about the cost in American
credibility, in NATO credibility, this alone will more than cancel out
the benefits of impressing potential enemies with our resolve, the fact
that we upset that balance of power in Russia. Anyone seriously
planning to challenge American interests will be unimpressed if America
itself cannot clearly define where those interests are, and thus we
indiscriminately squander our military assets.
It has been said nothing is more comforting to a soldier than to see
the enemy fire wildly and waste ammunition. We need to ensure that when
we go in, we go in with full force and that
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we have adequate justification from a national interest standpoint and
that we have marshalled the support of the American people.
I fear this resolution provides a carte blanche to the
administration. It is a blank check. It takes Congress out of the
process too early. This would be a wrong step to take. If we should go
in pursuit of a misguided policy and, if, then, NATO fractures, the
consensus is lost, and if at some future point we bail out of what we
have escalated to the point of ground troops, I suggest to my
colleagues that our long-term credibility would be damaged far more in
that circumstance than making the prudent decisions denying this
conflict now.
I reluctantly, and with enormous respect for those whom I regard as
American heroes who are sponsoring this resolution, take exception to
their principal position and will vote against the resolution before
the Senate today.
I yield the floor.
Mr. McCAIN. I yield myself 30 seconds to thank Senator Hutchinson for
his principled stand and his articulation on his views.
I point out that former Secretary of State Eagleburger, who the
Senator talked about in his remarks, has written a letter strongly
supporting this resolution and urging the vote on it. I hope that he
and other opponents of this resolution recognize that every former
Secretary of State, every former Secretary of Defense, every former
National Security Adviser, in both parties, support this resolution and
support a strong vote on it.
I yield to the Senator from Nebraska such time as he may consume.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Voinovich). The Senator from Nebraska.
Mr. HAGEL. Mr. President, thank you. I wish to strongly endorse and
support the McCain-Biden resolution. Mr. President, I'm an original
cosponsor. I have listened this afternoon to my colleagues, who have
all made significant contributions to this issue.
There are many complicating currents coursing through this very
complicated issue. There are no good answers. But surely one of the
answers is not to not deal with this issue. We cannot escape our
responsibility in this body to debate this issue. We should have had
this debate weeks ago.
There are very significant consequences attached to what we're doing.
We've heard some of those stated directly and very well from our
colleagues this afternoon. First, let's be clear on the making of war.
It is not risk-free. It is not antiseptic. It is not without
uncertainty.
One not need read an awful lot of history to understand that. General
Eisenhower's comments and what he wrote and put in his pocket hours
before the D-Day invasion in case D-Day failed. And he wrote out in
longhand a paragraph that said essentially, I take full responsibility
for the failure. So you see, as we look back even 50 years ago, we
understand that war is uncertain.
But we also understand there are things worth going to war for, and
there are things worth dying for. Questions raised today will be
continued to be raised about national interests of our country: Should
we be at war? All fair questions. Legitimate questions. But first we
need to talk about it, debate it, and ask the serious questions.
I've heard today, I've heard over the weeks all the reasons for
failure, all the complications, all the problems. Yet I hear at the
same time over here, well, we have to stop the slaughter and the ethnic
cleansing. If we could just come together. But sometimes we just can't
come together. Sometimes there is no more talk. When people are being
slaughtered at a rather considerable rate, and genocide is occurring,
and ethnic cleansing is occurring, and people are being driven from
their homes and their countries at an unprecedented rate, and the other
side that we're trying to deal with continues to lie and cheat and
kill--then we must face reality. What do we do now? The geopolitical
consequences, the humanitarian consequences involved in this are great.
They are deep. And they are serious.
I've heard some conversation today about this resolution taking the
Congress out of play. This doesn't take the Congress out of play. The
power of the purse still resides in the Congress of the United States.
And no President surely would go forward unilaterally, arbitrarily,
without confiding in, without reaching out to, without wanting the
support of the Congress, and the American people. Why would you do
that? And certainly not this President.
I don't disagree with many of my colleagues, what they've said
today--the Senator from West Virginia, Senator Byrd, Senator Hutchinson
from Arkansas, Senator Wellstone from Minnesota,--about how this war
initially was conducted. How irresponsible it was to take off the table
certain of our military's abilities to wage this war. So what does that
do? Well, I think it's rather obvious what it's done. It's allowed this
tyrant, this butcher, Milosevic, to go completely unimpeded and
slaughter people and drive people out of Kosovo--without any pressure
on him other than withstanding the air war. And that's been antiseptic
and that's been timid. So there's no question the conduct of this war
from the beginning has been questionable.
There will be much time to debate the miscalculations and the
mistakes and the problems. But the fact is we are in the middle of
this. Our actions will have consequences. There are other Milosevics
out there.
If the word of this Nation, if the word of America--the most powerful
nation on Earth, the most powerful nation for good--cannot be trusted,
and NATO--the most effective peacekeeping organization in the history
of man--if the word of that organization cannot be trusted, then what
kind of a world are we going to be dealing with as we now move into
this dangerous new century?
We should think through this very carefully. All the problems that
surround this. We are forcing the President to lead. That's what this
resolution's about. This resolution is not about abdicating our
responsibility in the Congress. Although some I suspect wish it be the
case.
We're asking the United States Senate to take a stand. What does this
country come to--to ask a United States Senator to stand up and take
some responsibility for the Nation being at war?
This resolution is about getting the Congress involved in it. This
resolution is about forcing the President to take some leadership and
responsibility.
Now, we're not going to pass this resolution. Senator McCain and I
and others know the reality of that. But if we can make it a little
uncomfortable for some people around here to have to deal with an
uncomfortable issue, then that's worth it. I've never asked one of my
colleagues to support this resolution, nor has Senator McCain, nor has
Senator Biden, or any of the other cosponsors. But we have asked them
to take a look and debate it, and take a position and take a stand.
There are consequences to our actions, and there are consequences to
our inactions. If we do not see this through the right way, we will
leave the world more dangerous than it is today.
I happen to believe that the Balkans are in the national security
interest of this country for many reasons, aside from the humanitarian
dynamics of this.
Do we really believe that the greatest, most noble, most free nation
on earth can stand aside and watch this butchering and act like it's
not there?
History has surely taught us that when you defer the tough decisions,
when you let the butchers continue and the tyrants and dictators
continue, it gets worse. And it has gotten worse with Milosevic. For
ten years we've dealt with him. Four wars he's started. He's lied and
cheated and slaughtered all through those ten years. Don't we have some
responsibility to deal with this, as imperfect as all the options are?
Again I go back to my first point. As my friend, the sponsor of this
resolution, John McCain, said earlier--and said it very well--we must
understand something very clearly. Whatever you think of this
President, this President is out of office in a year and a half. But
[[Page 8059]]
the Presidency remains. The vitalness of this Presidency, this
Executive branch that a new leader will inherit, must remain strong and
must be able to deal with an international crisis. So we must be very
careful not to take advantage of this weakened President.
And if that would ever happen--ladies and gentlemen, the world will
not be safer and it will not be better. When you weaken the United
States of America, you weaken all of freedom everywhere.
So it is, Mr. President, for those reasons that I will support this
resolution. I think it is in the best interest of our country, and I
yield the floor.
Mr. FEINGOLD addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Wisconsin.
Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I yield such time as the Senator from
Wisconsin may consume.
Mr. FEINGOLD. I thank my good friend from Arizona.
Mr. President, let me first express my feelings and those of the
Senate and every American that we are so pleased that the three
soldiers are freed from their captivity in Yugoslavia. But I do
reiterate what the administration and others have said. Mr. Milosevic
and his cohorts should get absolutely no benefit out of those incidents
that led to the capture and then the release of these soldiers.
I hope no step we take or no comments we make today or at any point
in the next few days suggest in any way that Mr. Milosevic deserves any
kind of reward for undoing something that should not have been done in
the first place. We are terribly pleased that the soldiers are free.
That does not change what Mr. Milosevic has done, which is
unforgivable.
I, of course, praise the main authors of this resolution, my friend
from Arizona, Mr. McCain, and another good friend, Senator Hagel from
Nebraska. These are two of the best people to work with in this entire
body. I know that their goal and the goal of the other cosponsors is a
very worthy one, an important one, and that is to bring clarity with
regard to our policy and our military action concerning Kosovo.
I rise today to make what I believe are two important points
regarding S.J. Res. 20, the McCain-Biden resolution authorizing the use
of force in the current conflict in Yugoslavia.
First, on the one hand, I oppose this resolution because I cannot at
this point wholly endorse the current means being employed by the
President to carry out a still murky policy with regard to Kosovo, and
I cannot, in light of that, expand the authority of the President
through congressional action beyond our current vision and information
and understanding, even of the facts today, let alone what the facts
may be tomorrow or in a couple of weeks. This is why I cannot support
the resolution today.
On the other hand--and I think this is very important as well--I
believe it is very important that the Senate debate this resolution
now, as we are doing, because whatever our divergent views on the
current crisis may be, we in Congress share a common set of duties
under the Constitution and under the War Powers Resolution to do what
we are attempting to do this afternoon. I begin by talking a little bit
about the process.
Our minds are primarily on the current intervention and involvement,
and that is appropriate. We also have to take a moment at a time like
this to realize how this fits into the overall context of the role of
Congress, the role of the Senate, with regard to the waging of war.
In certain respects, the process so far has established, or at least
reiterated, important precedents. In some other ways, I regret that the
Senate has at least partially ducked its weighty responsibilities in
this regard. There are precedents being set by the consideration of
S.J. Res. 20.
Although it was apparently not the intent of the sponsors, S.J. Res.
20 has been determined to be privileged under the terms of section 6 of
the War Powers Resolution. That is an important moment, because
sometimes Presidents and others have attempted to not take the War
Powers Resolution seriously. Not only must it be taken seriously, but
because of the appropriate ruling of the Parliamentarian with regard to
the meaning of the War Powers Resolution, it is being taken seriously.
I would like to make note of the Parliamentarian's comments at
Friday's meeting of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, on which I
serve. Even Chairman Helms thought it was legally important enough to
have the Parliamentarian's opinion be made part of the record of that
meeting, and I thought it was as well.
So, Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the
Record a memo from Mr. Dove at the conclusion of my remarks. This is a
memo that I asked to be sent to me summarizing what the Parliamentarian
concluded on Friday. I ask that it be printed in the Record.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
(See exhibit 1.)
Mr. FEINGOLD. I thank the Chair.
Let me just read to the Senate one sentence. The memo is dated April
30.
The War Powers Resolution . . . controls the consideration
of any such joint resolution.
He was referring to the specific language of and the date of
introduction of the joint resolution that is before us.
Mr. President, that is important in terms of the history of the War
Powers Resolution.
So while this resolution does not actually make a specific reference
to the War Powers Resolution, the very fact that it triggered the
provisions of this law demonstrates the vitality--the vitality--of the
War Powers Resolution to a degree that I think is often forgotten or
ignored when we are between crises of this kind.
The determination by the Parliamentarian leaves no doubt that the
debate the Senate is engaged in today is an explicit and required
exercise in war powers under the law of this country.
I am pleased about that. But I do have a few concerns about other
aspects of the process that we have undertaken.
First, I am concerned about the President's action. I remain
concerned that although the President did send a letter to the Congress
acknowledging that hostilities had broken out, he did not submit the
report required under section 4(a) of the War Powers Resolution.
Now, nonetheless, as the Parliamentarian has ruled, the language of
the resolution still triggered the War Powers Resolution on its own.
But I believe it required, in a situation like this, the President to
specifically refer to the War Powers Resolution. As a number of people
have said, obviously, we are at war, or certainly we are in a situation
that involves hostilities or imminent hostilities insofar as the War
Powers Resolution applies.
Second, I am concerned about the way the Senate has handled this
matter. The resolution, of course, has been hurriedly considered. That
is in part because I do not think the authors intended, and many people
did not realize for a while, that the War Powers Resolution and its
clock were ticking. So it was understandable that there had to be some
hurry. But there was enough time, in my view, for a more thorough
consideration of this matter before the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee.
A business meeting on this was hastily scheduled. There really was no
time to consider the matter except for a brief hour, hour and a half
discussion. There was not really a proper markup. We did not have a
chance to offer any amendments or modifications to the language of the
resolution, which the distinguished chairman himself properly called
one of the most important matters that had ever been taken up by the
committee in his tenure on the committee--which is a lengthy tenure.
And then, after all of that, the committee reported out the resolution
without recommendation, without taking a stand for or against the
resolution. Then, finally, it was reported out to the full Senate
without a written report.
I do not understand what the Senate Foreign Relations Committee is
for if it is not the committee which would take a real look at and
amend and mark up and consider, in some detail, a matter of this
importance. Again,
[[Page 8060]]
given the tremendous courtesy and skill of the members of the
committee, this is not said out of any disrespect. We were put in a
very difficult time constraint, but it seems somehow we should have had
a process that was more in keeping with the importance of the
resolution and its role within the War Powers Resolution law.
Mr. President, I also was concerned last week that some Members were
discussing propounding a unanimous consent agreement that threatened to
weaken the force of the War Powers Resolution, or at least I was
concerned about the fact that it might do that, by making it easier to
eliminate the privileged status of future Senate actions related to war
powers.
I want it noted in the record that the proposed unanimous consent
agreement did not prevail. It was apparently not even propounded
because of concerns. And I am pleased, because I do not think we should
take it upon ourselves to make exceptions or weaken the importance and
binding character of the War Powers Resolution. That has been attempted
far too many times in the past.
We need this law that was passed to give some real content and
meaning to the constitutional role of Congress under article I and
throughout the Constitution with regard to the conduct of war or
hostilities by the United States of America.
Mr. President, I also want to agree with some comments I at least
read by the Senator from Arizona, Senator McCain, who, of course, is
doing a very, very brave job of leading this whole issue. He did
comment that this problem--and correct me if I am wrong, Senator--that
this is not really a long enough debate for a matter of this
importance. Four hours, split between the two sides, 2 hours each, is
not in keeping with the magnitude of this situation or the magnitude of
this resolution.
In fact, although I am certainly sometimes guilty of not always being
out here on the Senate floor, the fact that I have only seen five or
six Senators on the floor for what is soon to be over half of the
entire debate on this matter does not remind me of the effort and the
care and the listening that went into a similar debate when it came to
the Iraq intervention some 8 years ago.
So the debate surely should be longer. And as Senators start arriving
and hope to find time to speak before 5:30, I think there may be some
frustration. In any event, we certainly should all be listening to each
other when it comes to a matter of this importance, as much as we were
during the impeachment trial.
Mr. President, finally, I also am a little troubled about the idea of
the tabling of this resolution. A motion to table can be interpreted--
often is interpreted--as a procedural vote. On something this
important, we should be voting on the merits of the language. I do not
understand why at 5:30 tonight we are not going to just vote up or down
on this resolution.
A tabling motion seems, to me, to be not in keeping with the
significance of this. Mr. President, as I have indicated, in the past
the War Powers Resolution has sometimes been ignored, but sometimes we
have come very close to getting it right.
Two examples where we came close were the Lebanon intervention and
the 1990-1991 Iraqi situation. In the Lebanon case, Congress actually
authorized continued participation of Marines in the multinational
peacekeeping force. Although the 18-month duration of the authorization
represented a compromise to get the administration to agree to it, the
congressional authorization represented the first time since the War
Powers Resolution had become law where Congress obtained a signature by
the President on legislation that actually invoked the War Powers
Resolution, and also, as I just alluded to a moment ago, with regard to
Iraq and the Persian Gulf.
In the case of that war, President Bush actually requested
congressional support, which ended up being granted. There was a
problem in that case. That request, of course, came significantly after
President Bush had already deployed thousands of troops to the area,
but at least the President of the United States, in that situation,
explicitly acknowledged the applicability of the law in that case.
So despite my concerns--that I did think were important to put in the
record for future reference in situations like this--in the end,
consideration of this resolution remains an appropriate exercise of the
Senate's responsibilities under the War Powers Resolution. We have
begun to do our duty, and the vitality of the War Powers Resolution has
again been affirmed and respected.
President, as I said, although I would have preferred to vote up or
down on the merits of the Senate joint resolution, I will support the
motion to table this resolution because I do not support the scope of
the resolution and I have real doubts about the policy which it seeks
to endorse. Especially given the breadth of the authority that is given
under the resolution I am concerned. But I have concerns about the
policy in Kosovo in any event.
First, Mr. President, I do not understand how this decision to
intervene in Kosovo and to continue and broaden the intervention really
fits in with an overall post-cold war American foreign policy strategy.
I do not see how this fits in with our long-term goals.
Obviously, the tragedies and the horrors that are being perpetrated
in Kosovo demand a response. That response must include the United
States. But I do not think the question has been well answered why in
Kosovo and not in other places. I give the Senator from Nebraska credit
for just attempting to address the issue. He spoke a little bit about
his belief that it would be difficult for us to act in some of the
places in Africa and other places where there are similar tragedies. I
am not sure I agree with that. We are not limited in our ability to act
only in Europe or only near our own boundaries, especially in light of
the actions that were taken with regard to the Middle East and Iraq. We
have shown our ability to act throughout the world. The fact is, in my
mind we could have acted in Rwanda. In fact, we apologized to Rwanda
for having not taken the action that we could have taken to stop the
genocide in that place.
In Rwanda, in Sierra Leone, in East Timor, in Sudan, there are
atrocities that are comparable, in some cases arguably worse, if that
is possible, than what is going on in Kosovo. Why is it that--it at
least appears to some--an accident of geography is sufficient to allow
inaction while Kosovo requires a huge commitment? This question needs
to be answered not so much for me but for the American people, because
they do not understand, and I do not understand exactly why one tragedy
demands our attention and our action and another one simply does not,
especially when it comes to the use of significant military force.
Another concern, the Senator from Nebraska was suggesting, in effect,
is that we must take a stand. He is right, but he assumes this is the
only option when he says we must support this resolution. Otherwise, he
seems to say, we would have to be accused of taking no action, or we
would be accused of being unconcerned or not moved by what is happening
in Kosovo.
I am not sure all the other options have truly been explored. What
about the possibility of arming the Albanian Kosovars so they have a
better and legitimate chance at their own self-defense? The Secretary
of State said to me at a hearing recently that they wouldn't be able to
do much with the arms anyway. I question that. I bet the Kosovar
Albanians would question that. I even remember a briefing the other day
by some of the NATO officials indicating that resistance from some of
the Kosovar Albanians had had a negative impact on the Serbian troops.
This is something that we should encourage rather than simply allow
people to be herded around and tortured. They have a right to self-
defense like anyone else.
What about support for democratic elements in Serbia, as has been
suggested by some of our colleagues in the recently introduced Serbian
Democracy Act? Are there further diplomatic efforts that could be
taken? What
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about the United Nations? Have we fully explored all of the options
available working with Russia?
It is not so clear to me that the only way to proceed is to give a
broad, open-ended blank check to the President with regard to this
situation. I don't think it is the only option.
I am also concerned how this fits in with our overall policy just
with respect to the Balkans. I am amazed at how infrequently in this
debate people even refer to the fact that we are still stuck in the
Bosnia intervention. We were promised at the time of the Bosnia
intervention that it would be 1 year, that the troops would be home by
December 1996, that it would cost no more than $2 billion. But here we
are, in 1999, it has cost, I am told, over $9 billion. We no longer
even hear any talk about when the troops will come home. It is
Christmas after Christmas after Christmas after the time when all of
our troops were supposed to be out of Bosnia.
How does this policy in Kosovo connect with the policy in Bosnia?
What is the strategy for getting in and for getting out? Sometimes I
believe with respect to what we are doing in Bosnia, the
administration's policy is sort of a ``less said the better'' attitude.
If you don't mention it, nobody is going to remind you that we have
been there for an awfully long time and have not been able to get out.
I am also concerned, and I say this carefully, about what I consider
to be a somewhat inconsistent application of international law by the
administration with regard to this action. Again, I have no sympathy
for Mr. Milosevic and his regime. But the fact is, our country
recognizes Kosovo as being part of Yugoslavia, and yet we proceed with
this action without a real explanation of how this comports with the
rules of international law. I can tell you, most experts in
international don't have a good explanation of how we can go about
doing this.
It would be one thing if we were talking about recognizing an
independent Kosovo, but we have not taken that position. I asked the
Secretary of State the other day whether that might be in the offing,
and she indicated that was not a likely scenario. In the same
conversation, I asked her, what about lifting the arms embargo on the
Albanian Kosovars? She said we couldn't do that because of
international law. Well, this is sort of a cavalier attitude, where we
rely on international law as an excuse to not do something we should do
in one case, the case of lifting the arms embargo, but we disregard
international law or suggest that it is a technicality when it comes to
the idea of not recognizing an area separate from Serbia and then going
ahead and proceeding to take military action with what our own policy
apparently regards as, in effect, a province of Serbia. This troubles
me.
I ask unanimous consent that Secretary Albright's comments in this
regard from an April 20, 1999, hearing of the Senate Committee on
Foreign Relations be printed in the Record.
There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in
the Record, as follows:
Excerpts From Hearing, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, April 20,
1999
Senator Russell Feingold. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Madame
Secretary, I've been critical of some of the decisions that
have been made getting into this policy, so let me take his
opportunity to publicly thank you for your devotion and
effort with regard to this. I'm sure it's incredibly
difficult, and I thank you for it.
In light of what's happened, are there any circumstances
under which the administration would support an independent
Kosovo?
Secretary Albright. I think that we do not consider it a
useful end to this because of the additional problems that it
would cause within the region, where the--we see it as
potentially destabilizing Albania and Macedonia, then if
Macedonia were to fall apart, there's a whole--I don't want
to predict all the dire things, but I think it basically is a
destabilizing effect for the region, and it is not our
position to support independence.
Senator Feingold. Well, I'm still thinking it through as
well, but I do hope the administration will at least keep an
open mind with regard to whether that is not the way things
should end up. And this relates as well to Senator Dodd's
comments. I take a little different tack, at least
potentially, with regard to the issue of arming the Kosovar
Albanians. I think one of the reasons that we ended up having
to send ground troops to Bosnia was the failure of the United
States to lift the arms embargo for the Bosnian Muslims when
we could have. And I notice that we are there many years and
many dollars more than we intended to be.
I recognize your comment about the arms embargo that's in
place.
At the same time, I wonder about our legal status in terms
of bombing a nation with regard to a question having to do
with an area that we consider part of that nation, in terms
of international law. I'm wondering why in the one instance
we are so concerned about an international arms embargo, but
we are not particularly concerned about the issues of
international law that apply to a situation where we regard
Kosovo as part of Serbia.
So, what I'm interested in is what would be the practical
effect, on the ground, of arming the Kosovar Albanians?
Secretary Albright. Well, the practical effect is that they
still--their numbers are not sufficient so that they can
defend themselves. Two, and this goes to why are we nice
about one legal regime and not another, it's a practical
issue, which is that in both the Bosnia case and here the
minute that you break an arms embargo it means that the other
side is entitled to be also supplied, and I think that we
have great concern about the Serb--breaking the arms embargo
because the Serbs would definitely be supplied.
I think there is also the effect that we are part of an
alliance and this is in Europe, and the Europeans are very
much opposed, as are we, to the arming of the KLA and to the
independence.
Senator Feingold. Madame Secretary, with regard to Bosnia,
I believe that at least one of the factors that helped us
leading up to Dayton was the ability of the Bosnian Muslims,
through different means, to get greater arms, and I am not at
all convinced that this situation wouldn't be assisted. In
fact, in listening to one of the NATO briefings the other
day, I think there was a specific reference to some of the
resistance that the Kosovar Albanians were able to put up as
helpful with regard to fighting the Serbian troops. So I
would ask that that be kept on the table.
And finally, I notice that Congressman Campbell in the
house has introduced two separate resolutions, one to declare
war and the other to demand an immediate retreat. I am glad
that the senators who have talked earlier today have
introduced a resolution in the Senate with regard to our
involvement. And I'm wondering, in light of your answer to
Senator Hagel's question, whether we're really at war. You
seem to have indicated that we are not, at this point. What
criteria would need to be met in order for you to agree with
those who believe that our action in Kosovo amounts to a war
or could amount to a war in the near future?
Secretary Albright. I think that a lot of those are legal
questions. I think that politically, though, there are a
number of reasons why a declaration of war is not helpful in
terms of how we operate in the region and with our allies,
and so we are opposed to a declaration of war.
Senator Feingold. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. FEINGOLD. I would like to make just a couple other points
regarding my concern about supporting this resolution with respect to
the substance of it, with respect to the intervention itself.
This is almost a cliche--almost every Member of the Congress has said
it--but it is still correct; that is, that our strategy is unclear. I
don't believe the administration has fully articulated the policy which
the airstrikes were intended to support.
I did oppose the airstrikes. I recognize the Senate voted for them.
But I didn't see the policy at the time. The goals need to be explained
more fully and a better case needs to be made for our continued
military involvement. Certainly, if we are going to pass a resolution
of this scope, we need a far clearer understanding. I don't think the
President has adequately explained the national interest and objectives
and cost estimates and exit strategy in this situation.
Finally, with regard to concerns in terms of whether this is a course
we should follow, I have to share the view of the Senator from
Arkansas, who indicated that this argument, that maybe we made a
mistake in the first place but we have to finish it now that we are
there, is really a terrible argument. It is a dangerous situation--we
have been there before--to suggest that simply because we have gotten
into a situation that we have to go full bore into it without really
being sure of how far it will go or what the ultimate consequences
would be. The mere fact that we started it does not mean we have to
take every possible step in pursuit of a policy that had flaws from the
beginning.
In any event, after having listed five or six concerns about the
substance of
[[Page 8062]]
this intervention, let me conclude by making just a couple of comments
about the fact that the resolution itself is too broad, even if it did
support what we are doing exactly in Kosovo at this time. I am pleased
the Senate is considering a resolution that would authorize the use of
military force, but the resolution before us today does not define
parameters of what that military involvement would be. The phrase
``blank check'' is appropriate. That is what this resolution provides.
I think it would be irresponsible, very similar to what happened with
regard to the Gulf of Tonkin in the Vietnam situation, if we go down
this road.
As we think about taking this very extensive measure, let us remember
that there is a lack of consensus among the American people and the
Congress about the policy to pursue with regard to Kosovo. Even under
the current facts and circumstances that the American people know and
that we know, this resolution is too broad. But given its breadth and
the implications, we have no idea what the position will be in a few
weeks, and this resolution gives a blank check.
We do have to take a stand. This Senate did take a stand in favor of
the bombing a few weeks ago, even though I voted no. But the fact is,
only this body supported the airstrikes. Last week the other body, on a
tie vote, 213 to 213, voted not to support the airstrikes, after having
watched the impact and the effects of the airstrikes for the last
month. So there is no joint resolution by this Congress at any point in
support of even the airstrikes. There is no resolution of the kind that
went through the House and the Senate in the Iraq intervention. Yes,
that was a close vote in the Senate with regard to Iraq, but the
difference is, both Houses sent that up to the President as a
reflection of the will of Congress.
I share some of the concerns with regard to some of the votes in the
other body. I do recognize that it is very hard to understand how some
people can vote not to go forward with this action and then in the next
minute vote to put additional funding in for the action. That is very
confusing as well.
What I am afraid it reflects is that there is no consensus in the
Congress or in the country with regard to what we have already done in
Kosovo, let alone a consensus that would justify the sweeping language
that we find before us today.
Let me conclude by saying that I will vote to table the resolution
because we should not rush into further steps in this matter, including
deployment of forces, without a consensus in Congress, without a plan
from the administration, and without some sense of how this decision to
intervene in this tragedy fits into the broader question of what our
foreign policy should be in the post-cold-war era, when we are
confronted with human tragedy around the world.
Let me finally say that I thank the sponsors because they have
triggered events that have allowed us today to exercise our roles to
reaffirm the vitality and continuing need for the War Powers Resolution
and the obligations of Congress and the President to comply with them.
I thank the Chair.
(Ms. COLLINS assumed the chair.)
Exhibit No. 1
memorandum
To: Senator Feingold
From: Bob Dove
Re: War Powers
Date: April 30, 1999
The Foreign Relations Committee met today on S. J. Res.
20--106th Cong., introduced by Senator McCain.
The War Powers Resolution (P.L. 93-148) controls the
consideration of any such joint resolution.
Questions raised at Committee Meeting 4/30
1. Is a privileged joint resolution under the War Powers
Resolution subject to a motion to table? Yes, and such a
motion would carry with it any amendment then pending.
2. Would adoption of an amendment that stated that ``this
resolution shall not be privileged under the War Powers
Resolution'' kill the privilege. No. That language is not
effective until enactment (no bootstrapping). What about
language that cuts off funds, text of H.R. 1569 as passed by
House on April 28, 1999? Yes it would. That language is as
follows:
PROHIBITION ON USE OF DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE FUNDS FOR
DEPLOYMENT OF UNITED STATES GROUND FORCES TO
THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA WITHOUT
SPECIFIC AUTHORIZATION BY LAW.
(a) In General.--None of the funds appropriated or
otherwise available to the Department of Defense may be
obligated or expended for the deployment of ground elements
of the United States Armed Forces in the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia unless such deployment is specifically authorized
by a law enacted after the enactment of this Act.
(b) Rule of Construction.--The prohibition in subsection
(a) shall not apply with respect to the initiation of
missions specifically limited to rescuing United States
military personnel or United States citizens in the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia or rescuing military personnel of
another member nation of the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia as a
result of operations as a member of an air crew.
3. What is the meaning of subsections 6(a), and (b)?
(Section 6 is codified at 50 U.S.C. 1545). Subsection 6(a)
requires referral to the Foreign Relations Committee, and
requires the committee to report ``one such joint resolution
or bill'' by day 36 after the report of the President (or
after President should have reported); section 6(b) provides
that such joint resolution or bill ``so reported shall become
the pending business of the House in question . . . and shall
be voted on within three calendar days thereafter . . .''
Mr. McCAIN. Madam President, I yield myself 60 seconds.
Madam President, I will next yield to Senator Lugar for such time as
he may consume. I tell my colleagues that the list I have after him is
Senator Boxer for 10 minutes, Senator Specter for 15 minutes, Senator
Hutchison of Texas for 30 minutes, Senator Gorton for 10 minutes. We
also have requests from Senators Shelby, Inhofe, Domenici, Lieberman,
Biden and Kerry of Massachusetts. I ask my colleagues to come over and
get in the queue as they can.
Clearly, with that number of speakers, I think it would be both
inappropriate and unfortunate if we had a tabling motion before every
Senator who wishes to speak would be allowed to speak on this issue. I
will strongly resist an effort to table before every Senator who wants
to speak on this very important issue can do so. I remind my colleagues
that in the case of the Persian Gulf resolution, there were two
opposing resolutions, with two up-or-down votes, and a full day of
debate. On Bosnia, there were opposing measures by Senators Dole and
Hutchison of Texas, with separate up-and-down votes, and a full day of
debate on final passage. We are not giving this resolution nearly the
attention the previous resolutions got.
I yield such time as he may consume to the Senator from Indiana,
Senator Lugar.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Indiana is recognized.
Mr. LUGAR. Madam President, I thank the distinguished sponsor of this
legislation, Senator McCain, for yielding to me. I congratulate him on
the resolution. I will advocate that the Senate should affirm the
McCain resolution. Certainly, we should not table the resolution.
Madam President, a week after the war began, I wrote in the
Washington Post:
We are losing the war in Kosovo. President Slobodan
Milosevic and his Serbian Armed Forces are killing Kosovar
political leaders, expelling Kosovars from their homes, and
causing a flow of refugees into countries with few resources
to care for them. The United States and NATO have the
capacity to reverse this situation, but this will require
presidential leadership and a commitment to taking the hard
steps necessary to win.
I wrote, additionally, in the same column:
President Clinton still has the chance, as our Commander in
Chief, to produce victory, even if what he advocated was
based on a hopelessly incomplete vision of the end game and a
dubious strategy to reach even severely limited aims.
Madam President, I wrote that on April 1--a month ago--and the
situation is identical to that which I described then. We have an
opportunity to win the war. We have an opportunity to come to the
limited objective the President has listed, but this will require very,
very substantial Presidential leadership, hard decisions on the part of
our President, and support of those decisions by the American people,
as represented by this Congress.
[[Page 8063]]
I come today not to argue procedure. I regret, as others do, that we
are in a predicament of a 4-hour debate, and a tabling motion was
announced in the national press. The leadership of both parties will
advocate tabling and disposing of this resolution, thus ending the
chapter until, presumably, a more appropriate time to discuss Kosovo.
But I come not to lament that fact. It is part of our circumstances,
and we shall have the vote in due course and I will vote ``no'' on the
motion to table.
I come today not to argue whether we should specifically authorize
the President to use air power, as they have done in the House by a
213-213 vote, to temporize on that issue, not on the issue of ground
forces, nor whether we have to be consulted before there are ground
forces, or any other forces.
We are presently talking about a situation in which the President has
set forth some very limited objectives. In my judgment, we have very
little hope of meeting those limited objectives, and that translates
into defeat for the United States of America, and for NATO. People talk
about whether this is the right war, the war we were preparing for,
whoever that may have been. We are in a war. It is a big war. It is the
only war NATO ever had. It is an occasion for the North Atlantic treaty
alliance to work, or for it to fail.
While we can fault our President and others while putting NATO at
stake, and we can fault the President for failing to have the resources
prepared; for a faulty diplomacy that produced one threat after
another, which required some follow-through for credibility; for
failure to say from the beginning we have to plan for every potential
use of our resources, and we are doing so because we are intent upon
coming to the right result.
All of that might have occurred. But, it did not. As I pointed out on
April 1, it had not happened then, and it hasn't occurred since. But
what has occurred is a very clear statement of objectives, and they
are: the retreat, the withdrawal, the end of Serbian forces in Kosovo--
out, all 43,000 of them, whether they are police, special police,
regular armed forces, or paramilitary forces--these are the people,
these particular Serbians, who, in fact, are killing people in Kosovo
and expelling those they do not kill from their homes and their
country. So, the first objective is all of these forces must leave
Kosovo.
The second objective is the Kosovars must be allowed back in. There
must be a condition in which people who have lost their loved ones, who
have watched atrocities, who have suffered grievously and lost their
identities, their bank accounts, their houses, to go back into their
country where there has to be an international security force in which
they believe--not in which we believe or that we temporize with others,
and say a little bit of this or that country, a little balance here and
there. The question will be: Do the Kosovars believe in it? Will they
go back? If they do not, they are going to be in Macedonia, Albania,
and increasingly in Italy, Germany, everywhere, spilling out all over
Europe, hundreds of thousands of souls who require support--expensive
people, people who could destabilize the economies and the governments
of the host countries that have been so generous.
We have barely a month of humanitarian relief, and we understand how
tragic it is for those people, how expensive and dangerous it is for
the countries in the surrounding area. That has already happened. You
cannot walk away from that. We can take a resolution today and say this
wasn't our war and we are tired of it or that we are bored with it or,
as a matter of fact, we don't even want to participate anymore. But for
the suffering people that are a consequence of this conflict, there is
no walking away, and the consequences for us, for Europe, for NATO, for
our Armed Forces morale, for civilian leadership intersecting with the
Armed Forces, are very great.
So I am saying that you have to have an international force that
gives confidence enough to the people who have lost almost everything
to go back. There has to be money to pay for the houses they go back
to, for the lights and the water, and the possibilities of making a
living, and of some safety net of economic support while all that is
happening.
Who will pay for that? Congressional leaders asked the President. He
said the Europeans will take the preponderant share of that. I hope
that is true. I hope the President has worked that out, or has broached
that, or at least has some assurance of exactly how burdensharing will
go--for humanitarian purposes or military purposes. This is terribly
important and very expensive, and lying directly ahead, either in
Kosovo, in Macedonia, Albania, or other countries.
Madam President, after these expelled people get back and the money
is spent--and we hope to do much of this before the cold weather
comes--as the President has pointed out with regard to the bombing
raids in September and October--then at this point, negotiations
proceed on the tortuous path on what kind of democracy in Kosovo,
within the constraints of an autonomous province of Serbia but
protected by an international force sufficiently strong, armed, and
credible to the Kosovars so that they will come back and try to rebuild
their country. That will be a very difficult negotiation.
If you were a Kosovar who had gone through all of this--and there are
people advocating independence--the siren song of independence is
pretty strong. Yet European countries all around are advocating no
independence; that is not on the table. As the President has outlined
our objective, independence is not on the table. It is autonomy, where
people think about self-government within constraints.
Those are the objectives, narrow as they may be. Madam President, we
had all better be giving a lot of thought as to how they might be met.
I believe that the McCain resolution is important because it says to
the President, ``Mr. President, take all necessary ways and means to
win, to find your objective, the objectives now shared by 18 other NATO
allies.'' It is important that the President do that.
Normally, there might be a situation in which the President had
planned for several months before the war in Kosovo to preposition
equipment, to consider ground troops in Europe in addition to air
resources, and other provisions, including provisions for humanitarian
fallout that might occur. Ideally, all of that might have happened. But
it didn't happen. As a matter of fact, the nation's attention was not
on Kosovo, except from time to time throughout this period of time. And
certainly there were no Presidential messages to the American people
indicating the gravity of the situation, and very little debate here on
the floor of the Senate. So that planning might have happened. But it
did not.
We are now in a predicament where we are in a very large war, where
the consequences are very great. We have limited objectives, but, in my
judgment--I have expressed this candidly and personally to the
President--we do not have the means to achieve those objectives. We
have not had the means from the very beginning of the operation.
In his defense, the President stoutly affirms that the bombing
campaign will do it, that you can get to those objectives with the
bombing campaign alone. He would also add, some helpful information
getting into a Serbia--some better control of that situation will be
helpful. So would help by the Russians--and help by anybody, for that
matter. But, nevertheless, the President from the beginning said no
ground forces. He has followed up and said, ``I am not even planning
for ground forces.'' He has almost taken pride in saying there will be
no planning for ground forces; it is the bombing campaign.
I have said to the President respectfully, ``Mr. President, you have
to have at least plan B. There has to be a safety net. We cannot suffer
failure. You cannot suffer failure.'' There may be some Members of
Congress--we read about these people in the paper who say, ``This is
President Clinton's war, and when he falls flat on his face, that is
his problem. He deserves it, having
[[Page 8064]]
ill prepared for this, having very little strategy that seems to be
relevant to getting the job done.''
Madam President, we got over that very rapidly. This is not the
President falling on his face. It is not a personal failure of the
President. We are in a war. The United States is at war--not President
Clinton.
I think what Senator McCain, Senator Hagel, Senator Biden, and others
have been saying in essence is, ``Mr. President, we need a much broader
strategy. We need more options.''
I have said specifically we need, at a minimum, a public declaration
that we are planning ground options--lots of them. We don't know what
the situation will be on the ground 5 months from now, but we had
better have some options, and it had been better be apparent we are
doing that, for our own credibility.
Furthermore, we could preposition supplies and equipment
conspicuously so forces can get there, as opposed to constantly saying
it will be weeks or months before we can do anything as an excuse for
not doing so.
I am advised that the American people in various polls have a low
tolerance for casualties. Some people have crassly suggested: What if
100 Americans lost their lives? Would you still be in favor of the war?
Would you be in favor of ground forces? How about 200 or 500? At what
point do you say, after America loses, we leave; that is an
unacceptable set of circumstances?
In polls, however, it may test the political courage of the
President, or any of us. If the President is failing even to say, ``I
will think about planning for the ground option,'' because he is
reading polls that say that is very unpopular, very unacceptable, then
the President needs to get over that too, as we do here on the floor of
the Senate.
We are talking now about the fate of our country--our credibility
with regard to foreign policy and the Armed Forces. We can say,
regardless of Kosovo, we are ready for the real war, or the big war, or
whatever war comes along. But, Madam President, with what? What kind of
political will? What kind of ability to pull this country together, and
Congress, and the people? What kind of ability to keep the alliance
together with some credibility that we are for real, and that when we
go to war, we go to win? And having set the objectives, knowing very
clearly what they are, we have to get to the point of winning.
The McCain resolution is tremendously important, because it simply
says, ``Mr. President, you have got to do more--a lot more. You have to
lead. You have to have a strategy that finally says to whomever--
President Milosevic and anybody else--we are going to win, we are going
to prevail, the United States means it.''
If we are not prepared to give the President that support, if our
debate degenerates into the fact that: ``Mr. President, we would like
for you to win. We would like for the alliance to be credible. But do
we think everything doesn't really work? We certainly don't want to do
the ground forces option. We are not really sure about the money, the
humanitarian relief, if the Europeans don't do their share. And we
haven't worked it out with them. As a matter of fact, we don't know why
we are there and why we got there, and we don't really want to know. We
are tired of hearing about the history of this part of the world over
the past thousand years. What we really want to know now is
specifically, how do we get out of a bad dream?''
As Senators, we are not movie critics. We are not taking a look at a
scenario which is a bad dream. We have a responsibility, and the
responsibility today is to vote no. The responsibility is to say that
it is not simply the President who is responsible--the President's war,
the President's plan, the President's request that, if somehow he is
inadequate, we simply affirm that and say how sad that he is
inadequate.
Madam President, if we lose the war, the fact is, the Congress is
inadequate. We also are elected by the people. We also have a
constitutional responsibility and, when it comes to war, a
responsibility to win. If the President needs shoring up, that may be
our job. If the President needs concerted advice and support, we ought
to provide it.
There could be other resolutions today, but we have in front of us a
big one.
It does not come as a surprise that Senator McCain's resolution has
been well debated throughout the country, even if not here. What will
be a surprise today, Madam President, is if Senators, Members of this
body, are prepared to take some responsibility as opposed to arguing,
as I have already heard, that the resolution is too broad, too
sweeping, a blank check for a President in whom many Senators are not
certain they have confidence to prosecute the war.
These are useful rationalizations before a war but not in the middle
of one. It is a war, not just an exercise; however divorced it may be
from our lives, that is not the case for those who are involved.
I am hopeful we will vote no on the tabling motion. I propose that we
leave the options open to the President. I propose that as opposed to
proscriptive motions--that, in the future we offer advice as to how we
can help the President and we try to affirm that certain things should
be done, as opposed to taking off the table the necessary means that he
may need.
In response to my colleague from Pennsylvania, I am happy to yield
for a question.
Mr. SPECTER. I thank my colleague from Indiana. I passed a note to
the Senator because I did not want to interrupt the chain of thought.
I think there is no one in this Chamber who carries greater respect
than Senator Lugar on issues of foreign policy. I noted your comments
earlier calling for Presidential leadership and referring to your op-ed
piece which appeared in the Washington Post. I think it not
inappropriate to comment at this time that the President noted your op-
ed piece in the Washington Post at a meeting with you, Senator Warner,
and myself in attendance. We were the last three to meet with the
President in a very extraordinary meeting that lasted a little over 2
hours. At the very end of the meeting, Senator Warner, Senator Lugar,
and myself stayed and he commented about your op-ed piece.
The Senator made a comment, again referring to your op-ed piece, that
the President has a dubious strategy to meet a limited goal.
The problem that I have, which leads to my question, is the
President's leadership. He has initiated the airstrikes along with NATO
without a clear-cut strategy, and an overused word, the so-called end
game. The Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of State, and the
National Security Advisor speculated that Milosevic might relent after
the first wave; that there might be a pause; that they might have a
different attitude after there was some substantial damage done.
Absent a relenting on the part of Milosevic, where do we go from
here? In lengthy meetings--the President has now had four with
Members--the President has not asked for troops nor has he asked for
the authority which is present in the pending resolution to allow him
to use whatever force is necessary.
The question I have for my distinguished colleague: In light of the
absence of any request by the President and in the absence of any
showing of leadership by the President and acknowledging the
correctness of Senator Lugar's assertion that the situation calls for
Presidential leadership, why is it sensible to, in effect, give the
President a blank check when he has not asked for the resources and has
not demonstrated any capability to exercise leadership to effectively
carry out that broad guarantee of authority?
Mr. LUGAR. I respond briefly to my colleague that I believe the
President must begin to offer that leadership, that he must begin to
offer the strategy. I find it unacceptable if we were, as critics of
the President, simply to note that he has failed to do so.
In other words, it seems to me there is about this war a sense of
unreality. Clearly, if we had been in the so-called cold war period and
we were at war with another country at that point, and the President
apparently did not have an adequate strategy and we were
[[Page 8065]]
losing, it would not be a useful question to ask why the President
hasn't asked for what he needs. We have to say at that point that the
President needs to ask.
We respectfully request the President to accept some advice and to
accept some strategy that we have a responsibility to offer.
Simply left to an inadequate President, history would condemn him,
but we would lose and the country would suffer grievous harm. That is
our predicament in this situation. The President clearly hasn't asked
for the authority, the arms, or whatever he needs. We are saying he
needs to ask, and he needs to do so rapidly. We cannot sit around and
simply wish that he did so and then lament that he failed to ask. We
have a responsibility to act along with him. I hope and pray that he
will do that.
I think the President, in this conversation the Senator cited,
indicated he could ask General Shelton and General Shelton could
produce a plan. In fact, allied armed services could be over there
about 5 months and the President felt that might win the war.
We need to define very carefully, if that is the case, what the
ground forces' objectives are, where they come in, and include all the
options. In other words, that was a rather sweeping statement, but it
has gone through the President's mind and what we are suggesting might
have some impact.
I hope this debate pushes that forward.
I thank the Senator for his question.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arizona.
Mr. McCAIN. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent I be allowed to
control the time until such time as an opponent of the resolution
arrives. At that time, I will control the time for the proponents of
the resolution, and at a later time a designee of the opponents of the
resolution will be designated.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. McCAIN. I yield 15 minutes to the Senator from California.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from California is recognized.
Mrs. BOXER. Madam President, I thank the Senator from Arizona for his
indulgence. He has been very patient as Members have debated--many
speaking against his resolution. He has been very generous in his
attitude toward all Members. I greatly appreciate it.
I rise this afternoon to debate the resolution that is before the
Senate and to also join with all Americans in rejoicing that the three
prisoners of war have been released and have been united with their
families.
One of these young men, Sgt. Andrew Ramirez, is a constituent of mine
from Los Angeles. I spoke with his mother a few days ago before we knew
his release was a possibility. I know how she felt. I heard in her
voice the terror of the situation. We are all relieved.
I say today to all the families, you did the right thing by coming
forward, by continuing to look into the cameras when it was difficult
for you; yet because you did that, you put the human face on these
young men. That was very, very helpful. I thank Jesse Jackson for
working to secure the release of these brave soldiers.
The irony of the situation is that Milosevic wrongfully abducted
these soldiers. Now he allows them to return home, while at the same
time he refuses to allow the million Kosovar Albanians who were
wrongfully displaced to safely return home.
Yes, the three soldiers come home and now we see no move by Milosevic
at all, at all, to allow so many decent families to return to their
homes.
Mr. Milosevic could end this war today. I know some have said, let's
take a pause in the bombing, and that may be something that NATO wants
to do. It is going to be up to them as they go about deciding the best
strategy. But I say to Mr. Milosevic that he can end this war today. He
has to agree to do three things. They are very simple.
No. 1, pull your army and your special forces out of Kosovo;
No. 2, allow for the safe return of Kosovar refugees to what is left
of their homes;
No. 3, allow for an international peacekeeping force, which includes
NATO's participation, to ensure the safe return of the refugees.
That is very straightforward. It is very simple in many ways. It
takes us back to the days when Kosovo had its autonomy and those people
could live in peace. So, yes, we welcome the POWs home with our open
arms and open hearts, and we long for the day that Mr. Milosevic will
stop this war by allowing the refugees to return home, ensuring a
stable situation by allowing an international peacekeeping force into
Kosovo.
I know the McCain-Biden resolution was written with the aim of
achieving those three goals that I outlined, the three steps that
Milosevic must take. However I do not support that resolution for the
following reasons. I stated this in the Foreign Relations Committee,
but I wanted to expand my remarks a little bit today. No. 1, the
resolution is too broad and it is too open ended. Specifically, I am
very concerned about the clause that says, ``all necessary force and
other means.'' I do not believe it was the intention of the Senators to
open the door to every weapon known to mankind. But when you read the
resolution, there is no clarity on that point. I think it opens the
door for Congress to underwrite the use of chemical weapons, biological
weapons, and nuclear weapons.
In the committee, Senator Smith entered into a colloquy with Senator
Biden and he said: Senator, I am worried about this being so all-
encompassing that it could include biological, chemical, and nuclear
weapons. Senator Biden said that was not the intent. We can have a
colloquy on the floor to say that is not what we meant; we meant
conventional weapons. But a colloquy is not enough for Senators to
have, it seems to me, when you are voting on a measure so important. It
ought to be clear what we are talking about, and this resolution says,
in essence, any and all weapons. That is the first reason I oppose it.
It is open ended and too broad.
Second, the resolution takes Congress out of the decisionmaking
process. In other words, once you pass this sweeping resolution, our
job is essentially done; you are handing this over to the President.
By the way, I think this President has shown tremendous leadership on
this issue. I disagree with my friend from Pennsylvania and my friend
from Indiana on their colloquy. If you think it is easy to keep 19 NATO
nations together on one track, think again. This is not easy. Some of
these nations have an inclination not to go along. I give tremendous
credit to President Clinton and to Prime Minister Tony Blair on this
matter, because I think they are the ones who have kept NATO focused.
I am very pleased with the fact that the President has done something
here, but I do not want to take the Congress out of this debate. I
think this resolution does that. I think my constituents want me to be
included in this every inch of the way. If the President asks us for
ground troops, we need to vote on that. If he asks us for other means,
we should be able to vote on that. I do not see it as others do, that
the Congress really should just say: Any and all force.
I support what we are doing. I want to be clear. I want to respond to
Senator Hagel who said those of you who do not support this,
essentially you are not courageous and you are not--I don't want to put
words in his mouth, but he basically said we are not standing up with
courage. I just want to put that into context, because when I voted to
support the NATO bombing, I was taking a very strong stand. This is not
easy, to see these bombs falling. This is tough. I believe they will
bring Milosevic to the table. I do really believe that. So I do not
view that vote as just some easy vote. It was a hard vote for me to say
use force in this circumstance. So I hope colleagues would not think
those of us who do not support them on this want us to leave the scene,
to run away.
There are three points of view here that are all very legitimate. One
that I have heard represented by several of our colleagues is: Do
nothing. Do nothing. This is not in the national interest of the United
States of America. Do
[[Page 8066]]
nothing. I do not agree with that. If it is not in the national
interest to stop the most god-awful ethnic cleansing since Hitler--if
that is not in our national interest, I do not know what is. We are
human beings first and foremost. We cannot allow that to stand. So I do
not subscribe to those who say: Do nothing, in terms of military force.
I just do not think we have the choice here. Milosevic was engaging in
this ethnic cleansing. The only difference now is the light is on it
and we see it.
I also do not agree with those who back this resolution, which is:
Any and all necessary force, all kinds of weapons, the President has
the ability to do that. I think it goes too far, takes us out.
So I am in the middle here. I support the current policy. I do think
it is working. I do think we need to be patient. I do know there has
been bad weather. I do have faith that the conduct of this war will
lead to what we want, an end of the ethnic cleansing.
The President has not asked us for this additional language. I am
sure any President would welcome it, by the way. But he has not asked
us. As a matter of fact, he sent us a letter.
I ask unanimous consent to have this letter printed in the Record,
Madam President.
There being no objection, the letter was ordered to be printed in the
Record, as follows:
The White House,
Washington, April 28, 1999.
Hon: Trent Lott,
Majority Leader, U.S. Senate,
Washington, DC.
Dear Mr. Leader: I appreciate the opportunity to continue
to consult closely with the Congress regarding events in
Kovoso.
The unprecedented unity of the NATO Members is reflected in
our agreement at the recent summit to continue and intensify
the air campaign. Milosevic must not doubt the resolve of the
NATO alliance to prevail. I am confident we will do so
through use of air power.
However, were I to change my policy with regard to the
introduction of ground forces, I can assure you that I would
fully consult with the Congress. Indeed, without regard to
our differing constitutional views on the use of force, I
would ask for Congressional support before introducing U.S.
ground forces into Kosovo into a non-permissive environment.
Milosevic can have no doubt about the resolve of the United
States to address the security threat to the Balkans and the
humanitarian crisis in Kosovo. The refugees must be allowed
to go home to a safe and secure environment.
Sincerely,
Bill Clinton.
Mrs. BOXER. What the President said is he is confident we will
prevail through airpower, and he says, ``I can assure you that'' if we
needed ground forces he would ``fully consult with the Congress''
before he would introduce ground forces into what he called a
nonpermissive environment.
So, I support what we are doing now. I also want to comment on the
remarks of one of our colleagues, who said, why don't we stop horrible
things from happening in other parts of the world? I do not subscribe
to the theory that if you cannot stop all evil stop no evil. I think
you stop it where you can. In this case, because of the President's
leadership, there are 19 nations united. This is a mission of NATO. We
can stop this evil and we should stop this evil.
Let me remark on some of the human rights abuses that are being
reported by Human Rights Watch. They conducted 19 separate interviews,
which showed that 100 men were summarily executed in the town of Meja
on April 27. According to the witnesses, these men were pulled out of
convoys headed towards Albania, and executed. Witnesses reported the
dead bodies covered an area of ground about 12 feet by 20 feet and were
stacked 4 feet high.
I ask people to imagine, what does that remind you of; after World
War II, when we saw those bodies piled one on top of the other? How my
colleagues can say it is not in our national interest to stop this is
beyond my capability to understand.
Another witness said he fled his town of Sojevo, leaving behind his
paralyzed father and elderly mother in their home because they could
not get out, and he believed the Serb paramilitary forces would not
harm the disabled and the elderly and the helpless. He returned home
hours later to find his father shot dead and his mother's body
mutilated. How can people say it is not in our national interest to
stop that?
Violence against women in Kosovo has been reported widely. One woman
interviewed by Human Rights Watch reported police held a knife to her
3-year-old son, saying he would be killed if she did not produce money
or gold.
We know there are several accounts of women being raped by Serb
forces in front of their children. I heard a quote on CNN that
Milosevic said: ``There are bad things happening in Kosovo, but it's
not the military, it's the paramilitary.''
I say to Milosevic: Stop it; you can stop it. The paramilitary, the
military, the special police, you control it; you can stop it. You can
send three POWs home to us. You never should have taken them in the
first place. They were on a peacekeeping mission. You can send three
POWs home to us. Let the good people who want nothing more than to live
in their homes in Kosovo go home and stop the rape and the torture and
the mutilation of old people and sick people. Yes, you admit bad things
are happening in Kosovo. You can stop them from happening.
I support NATO, and I support the administration. I believe the best
way to show that support for the current policy is to table the
resolution. If we are asked to do more, I will consider it. I stand on
my vote of March 23 when Congress approved that resolution authorizing
the President to conduct airstrikes against Milosevic. I believe the
Senate should stand behind that vote and continue to support NATO's
effort to end the nightmare in Kosovo.
Last point. I say to my friend, Joe Biden, and to my friend, John
McCain, Madam President, they are showing leadership in this
resolution. They are putting forward their point of view. It is quite a
legitimate point of view. I think the other points of view being
expressed are legitimate as well. When the House voted, they sent a
very chaotic message to the world: Yes, we will keep sending the money;
no, we won't bring home the troops; no, we don't like the bombing; no,
we don't want ground forces. It was extremely confusing.
The best signal we can send today is a signal that we support NATO.
If we table this resolution, that will be my interpretation, that we
support NATO today, that we reaffirm our support that was given to NATO
in a bipartisan way on March 23.
I thank you very much, Madam President, and I yield the floor.
Mr. SPECTER addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Pennsylvania is recognized.
Mr. McCAIN. I yield 15 minutes to the Senator from Pennsylvania.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Pennsylvania.
Mr. SPECTER. Madam President, I thank my distinguished colleague from
Arizona.
I am opposed to the pending resolution for constitutional policy
reasons and for pragmatic reasons.
With respect to the constitutional issue, we have seen a significant
erosion of congressional authority, as mandated in the Constitution, to
declare war--the President having assumed the authority to declare war
under his powers as Commander in Chief. Korea was a war without a
declaration by the Congress. Vietnam was a war without a declaration by
the Congress, except for the ill-advised Gulf of Tonkin Resolution. The
missile strikes against Iraq in December constitute acts of war without
authorization by Congress. The airstrikes against the Federal Republic
of Yugoslavia constitute acts of war without congressional
authorization. There was a resolution authorizing airstrikes which
passed the Senate 58-41, but under our bicameral form of Government,
the House of Representatives did not concur in authorizing that use of
force.
The broad sweeping authority contained within the pending resolution
really is, in effect, tantamount to a delegation of Congress'
authority.
The President has had a series of four meetings with Members of
Congress which I believe have been very constructive and are very much
to the President's credit. When he met with
[[Page 8067]]
Members of Congress last Wednesday, on April 28, he publicly
acknowledged this. The President said that he would not order ground
troops without prior authorization by the Congress of the United
States. He wanted to reserve his constitutional authority to do so
without prior congressional approval, but he said as a practical
matter, he would get congressional authorization as a good-faith matter
because of the sequence of events which have transpired and which he
anticipates will transpire before any such move.
If we are to authorize the President, in the language of this
resolution, ``to use all necessary force and other means, in concert
with United States allies, to accomplish United States and North
Atlantic Treaty Organization objectives in the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro),'' the Congress of the United States
would be taking itself out of the picture with respect to being a party
to whatever action the executive branch, the President, our Armed
Forces might take.
I suggest, Madam President, that there is substantial collective
wisdom in the House and in the Senate which ought to be consulted,
which ought to be a party to the takeoff, as well as the landing, which
ought to be a party to advising what our rules should be, reserving, of
course, the military function to the generals and to the admirals and
to the executive branch. But the Congress has a very, very significant
role to play in deciding what course we ought to take. As a matter of
policy, it seems to me important that the Congress reserve its rights
and not become involved in such a broad delegation of congressional
authority.
As a pragmatic matter, we have seen the ill-advised Gulf of Tonkin
Resolution, and I quote from that resolution in part:
. . . The United States is therefore prepared, as the
President determines, to take all necessary steps, including
the use of armed force, to assist any member . . . of the
Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty . . .
The language, ``to take all necessary steps including the
use of armed force,'' is strikingly similar to the language
of the present resolution to authorize the use of all
necessary force. I suggest that the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution
was very, very ill-advised.
Madam President, I supported the resolution passed by the Senate 58-
41 to authorize airstrikes, expressly reserving that there should be no
ground forces. I am prepared to consider whatever the President may
request, providing that very, very important questions are answered.
I believe we need to know to what extent the airstrikes have degraded
the military forces of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. We need to
know what the prospective resistance would be, what the plan of attack
would be, what resources would be necessary to implement the plan, what
of those resources would come from the United States, what of those
resources would come from our NATO allies, and what would be the cost
to be borne by our NATO allies as well as the United States?
We are currently looking at a request from the President for some $6
billion, and we are looking at an add-on from the House of
Representatives which may bring the total bill to $12 billion, or to
$13 billion. Before any such appropriation is authorized, it seems to
me that we are going to have to take a very hard look at precisely what
is involved and what our obligations are and what our NATO allies have
contributed.
Now that there is a surplus and there has been a public declaration
backed by consensus that the surplus ought to be used for Social
Security, it has been noted that these appropriations are going to come
out of the Social Security fund. That puts a political coloration on
the matter which is going to require a lot of analysis to be sure that
we are doing absolutely the right thing before we deplete funds which
might be directed toward Social Security.
There is another aspect in the consideration of this resolution, and
that is the high improbability, really impossibility, of an acceptance
of this resolution by the House of Representatives, in light of their
votes last Wednesday, April 28.
The House of Representatives turned down a resolution on a tie vote,
213-213, for the President to conduct air operations, so that the House
is saying, by that tie vote, that they do not approve of what the
President is doing at the present time. And in not approving even the
limited air operations, with the specific reservation prohibiting the
use of ground forces, what is there to support the belief that the
House of Representatives will be prepared to grant even broader
authority to the President?
The vote by the House of Representatives on another resolution
appears directly inconsistent with their refusal to authorize the
President to continue the air operations. The House of Representatives
rejected a resolution, 290-139, directing the President, under the War
Powers Resolution, to withdraw troops from operations against the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Now, there may be some ambiguity or
difference between the withdrawal of troops compared to a cessation of
air operations, but they amount to about the same thing.
So here you have the House of Representatives saying, ``We will not
authorize the President to carry out the air operations,'' and at the
same time, ``We do not call for the withdrawal of troops,'' or,
realistically viewed, whatever it is that the United States is doing in
a military context at the present time.
I believe it is important to consider negotiations, as has been urged
by some Members, although I would not suspend the bombing operations.
The return of the three U.S. soldiers by President Milosevic was,
indeed, welcome news yesterday. I congratulate Reverend Jackson for his
initiatives and his courage in undertaking that daring mission, and in
succeeding at it. But I would not reward President Milosevic for doing
something, in returning the three GIs, which he should have done weeks
ago. I do think that we need to stay the course on the authorization of
the resolution that the Senate passed on airstrikes. But I do also
believe we ought to be cooperative with the efforts of Russia, and with
any other efforts to have a negotiated settlement, providing we do not
give up the standing to prosecute President Milosevic as a war criminal
if the evidence so bears out.
We know that as long ago as late 1992 then-Secretary of State
Eagleburger, in effect, declared Milosevic a war criminal. And I
believe that it is very important that the War Crimes Tribunal proceed
to gather evidence. I think you will have a very salutary, a very
deterrent effect if the evidence is present to proceed with an
indictment against Milosevic.
A bipartisan group of Senators met with Justice Louise Arbour last
Friday, and she made a very strong plea for the IFOR, for the allied
forces, to take Karadzic into custody. And that would be an occasion to
take many other high ranking military and political figures into
custody: war criminals, for the violation of human rights in Bosnia.
And that could have a very, very profound effect on Milosevic's
immediate subordinates.
So we ought to be working in a number of directions--at a negotiated
settlement, if it can be obtained, consistent with the NATO conditions,
to pursue the issue of treating Milosevic and his subordinates as war
criminals, and to continue with our airstrikes.
But I do believe that at opposite ends of the poles, it is
unsatisfactory, really counterproductive, for the House to reject the
current military operations and the airstrikes by the tie vote; and I
think it would be counterproductive at the other end of the spectrum to
have a broad sweeping authorization of authority for the President to
take whatever action he deems appropriate as a blank check.
And in taking that position, I acknowledge the leadership of the
distinguished Senator from Arizona, Senator McCain, who speaks with
great authority on military matters, and the leadership of his
principal cosponsor, Senator Biden, the ranking member of the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee. But for constitutional policy and
pragmatic reasons, I urge my colleagues to vote against the pending
resolution.
[[Page 8068]]
I thank the Chair and yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arizona.
Mr. McCAIN. Madam President, I yield 30 minutes to the Senator from
Texas, Senator Hutchison.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Texas is recognized for 30
minutes.
Mrs. HUTCHISON. Thank you, Madam President. I, too, thank my
colleagues, Senator McCain and Senator Biden, for having principle, for
stating their principle very forcefully, even though I disagree with
what they are trying to do with the resolution that is before us today.
I think every Member of this body has the responsibility to address
this issue, to say what we think, and to back that up with action. In
fact, I have to say that I was stunned, after the House action last
week, that some Members came forward and said, ``Oh, this is
partisan.''
Madam President, this is not partisan. There are Members from both
sides of the aisle who have very differing views on this. I would never
say that someone who does not vote with me is partisan or is coming to
this debate with anything other than their own conscience.
So I am going to speak from my conscience and my heart. I am against
this resolution. I am not against it procedurally; I am against it on
the merits. I respect everyone who is on either side of this issue, and
I think we need to have the debate. I think we need to take an action
that would turn us in a different direction from the course we are on
in Kosovo today.
Madam President, I have to take a moment of personal privilege and
say that I was stunned to pick up my paper on Saturday and read that
one of my constituents, Larry Joyce, had died on Friday. Friday night,
when I was speaking to a group, I was talking about Larry Joyce--not
knowing that he had passed away--because Larry Joyce is one of my
heroes. He has had an indelible impression on me.
He was watching this debate and this issue very closely, because
Larry Joyce was a decorated Vietnam veteran who lost his son in
Somalia. Sergeant Casey Joyce was one of the great Army Rangers who
lost his life in his first mission as an Army Ranger. When Larry Joyce
told me his story, I invited him to come and testify before the Senate
Armed Services Committee. I have to say, he gave the most compelling
testimony that I have heard in all of my time on that wonderful
committee.
Larry Joyce was a hero. He was a patriot. He was very concerned about
this Kosovo issue. I wish he were alive to see this issue all the way
through, because he certainly had a lot to say that was important.
This resolution is wrong for a lot of reasons. It is the wrong time--
through no fault of the authors of the resolution because they could
not have known, when they introduced this resolution in the Senate,
that we would have the release of our American prisoners over the
weekend. Of course, all of us were so thrilled when on Saturday we
heard that President Milosevic had agreed to release the prisoners, and
then on Sunday, when many of us were waking up, we heard the news that
they had already been released.
I was proud to meet with Mr. and Mrs. Gonzales in my home State of
Texas on their way to Frankfurt yesterday, and there weren't two more
relieved people in the whole United States of America than they were.
This release does give us a narrow window of opportunity for a
diplomatic solution. I think it is wrong to pass a resolution on the
floor of the Senate saying escalate the intensity of this campaign.
That is the wrong message. Instead, I call on President Clinton to take
bold action, open a door for discussion with President Milosevic, set a
timetable, require that there be immediate cessation of any hostilities
toward Kosovars of Albanian extraction, and ask Mr. Milosevic if he
will agree to come to the table and talk about a peace.
This is a window. If it fails, what have we lost? Set a timetable, 5
days. Do you think we could lose 5 days in bombing to save maybe
hundreds of lives, maybe thousands of lives, maybe years of conflict? I
think it is worth a try. I call on the President today to do just that,
take a bold step. This is the opportunity for President Clinton to see
if President Milosevic is serious. If he is, talking does not hurt, and
it just may help.
The resolution is wrong for other reasons. Those who offer this
resolution believe it is necessary because Congress has a
responsibility to act. I don't think this resolution is an exercise of
responsibility. I think it is an abdication of responsibility. It tells
the President, in so many words, don't bother us anymore with this war.
Congress doesn't want to know what your plan is. We don't want to know
what it is going to cost. We don't want to know from you what the exit
strategy is. Congress doesn't want to authorize the use of ground
forces. In short, we are saying, President Clinton, go fix it and don't
bother us, send us the bill.
I reject that view of taking responsibility for Congress. I think we
do have a responsibility to say what we think. If we have learned one
lesson from Vietnam, it should be that Congress must take the
responsibility that is given it by the Constitution and not let
something go on and on and on, when we know we are going in the wrong
direction.
In 1964, the Senate passed what became known as the Gulf of Tonkin
resolution. That resolution urged President Johnson to take all
necessary measures to prevent further aggression in Southeast Asia. The
debate on the Gulf of Tonkin resolution was much of the same debate we
are hearing today--concern about whether our allies were dragging us
into a war that wasn't ours; concern about whether they would accept
enough of their responsibility; concern about cost; concern about
whether we were actually declaring war, but being too timid to do it;
and there was concern about escalation.
We know what happened. Over the next 10 years, every one of us can
tell what happened. Congress abdicated its responsibility. They let the
war go on and on and on, and we lost 59,000 Americans because Congress
did not stand up and say, wait a minute, we are going in the wrong
direction, let's do something about it.
I am not going to abdicate my responsibility. If I were the only vote
in this body, I would vote against this resolution on the merits right
now. That is not to say that I would not welcome the President coming
to Congress and telling us what he wants, but he has not asked for more
force. He has not submitted a plan. He has not stated goals with which
I could agree.
Why would we take an action that would give him more authority to use
more force at exactly the wrong time? The President had not submitted a
plan when the Senate voted to authorize the air operation, and that is
why I voted no. At the time, we were told the operation would deter
President Milosevic from hurting the Kosovar Albanians. When the
bombing began, we all know that he escalated the atrocities against
those poor people. That is not our fault. I would never blame us for
that. But it is our fault that we didn't have a contingency plan.
I would never compound that problem by giving the President more
authority to send our troops in on the ground and put them in harm's
way with no contingency plan. He has not come to Congress; he has not
asked for more authority. The last thing we ought to do is give a
blanket authority when we do not know the plans. It would be an
abdication of our responsibility to do that.
I think the administration has been all over the lot on the policy
that we say that we want to solve this problem. Do we want an
independent Kosovo? The administration says no. Do we want to drive Mr.
Milosevic from power? The administration says no. Do we want to
encourage European democracies who are very strong and stable right now
to assume more responsibility for European security? The administration
says yes, but the crisis is demonstrating the opposite.
Do we want a strong NATO with a clear sense of purpose and the
ability
[[Page 8069]]
to defend a united Europe? The administration says yes, but I think
this Balkan policy is going to tear the alliance apart. It goes far
beyond what 19 countries can agree to in a consensus.
We are learning that you cannot fight an offensive war by committee.
What we want in Yugoslavia, according to the administration, is a
multiethnic, multiparty democracy. We seem to be prepared to impose it
on both sides, neither of whom are ready to accept our terms.
We have tried an experimental Balkan policy in Bosnia. It is not
workable. Thousands of American troops are there with no end in sight.
The head of the international observer group has fired elected
officials and canceled sessions of parliament because opposition
parties oppose what we are doing in Kosovo. People vote in elections
and then cannot stay and serve where they are elected.
I do not think that is an example of a democracy. I think it is a
collection of countries trying to force their will on the people of
another country.
I certainly do not think we should try to do this in Kosovo with
Bosnia as an example. Are we going to require the Kosovar Albanians to
live under Milosevic? Surely no one could seriously take that as a
goal, but that is the goal stated by the administration-- an autonomous
region within Serbia that is protected by a NATO force with no end in
sight.
So, Madam President, I think it is time for us to look for a
responsible force that has a chance to succeed. With the glimmer of
hope that we have with the release of our prisoners, I urge the
President to seize the opportunity to seek a diplomatic solution, try
to bring Mr. Milosevic to the table, bring in the other parties, and
look for a region-wide solution.
I think the United States should go back to its role in the region of
being a friend to all and an enemy to none. As the world's greatest
superpower, we do not have to take sides in ethnic conflicts if we are
going to be the neutral party that can bring them together. We should
be able to bring the powers together to work out a solution that would
have a long-term chance to succeed, one that recognizes the open,
gaping wounds of all the parties in the Balkans. It would require much
more energy than was put into Rambouillet. It would require President
Clinton to take a personal interest and an investment in the solution.
And he can do that. The effort would be worth it. We should bring
Russia back to the brink to forge an alliance with the West, not push
them further away from us. We should provide people in the region self-
determination so they can create countries that have a chance for
longevity.
It would keep the United States from devoting incredible resources
for its open-ended commitment in the Balkans, because our ability to
fight elsewhere in the world is being jeopardized by this operation. We
are now talking about blockading Yugoslavia. That will take more ships
than we now have allocated to this mission. It will hamper our ability
to operate in the Persian Gulf. We have already seen that it is
diverting military resources from as far as the Asian theater.
Madam President, as much time as we have put in on this Balkans
issue, I think we need to come out with a solution that is not a
``Band-Aid'' for Kosovo, but something that will settle down the
Balkans for a longer term and give them a chance to live as neighbors,
side by side, to have stable economies, to get their people back in
their respective countries, to be able to live and have self-
determination; and then, hopefully, they could become trading partners
and friends.
Madam President, I don't think that any strategic planner in the
world ever thought, as the cold war ended, that we would propose a new
strategic concept for America that would include tens of thousands of
troops dedicated to the Balkans in perpetuity, but that is exactly what
is happening. I have listened to the arguments that are being made. The
basic argument seems to be: I don't really like how we got here, but
now that we are here, we have to win. We are in it, so we must win it.
I keep hearing that over and over again. That is like saying when you
are going in the wrong direction, keep going and speed up.
I don't think the Senate ought to say that. I think we ought to be a
partner with the President in trying to say, wait a minute, Mr.
President, we don't agree with what you have done, so let's try to take
a different course. I am suggesting tonight that that course be that
glimmer of hope that we can have a diplomatic solution, which would be
much bigger than just a ``Band-Aid'' on Kosovo.
I have heard the argument that the credibility of NATO is at stake.
Now, that is a good argument. I want the credibility of NATO to remain
intact. But what kind of alliance, with a mistake staring them in the
face, would keep going down the same road and say that, in order to
remain credible, we have to go down the same road, at any cost in
lives, at the cost of any treasure of any of our countries, and we are
going to gut it out even though everyone who has any little bit of
awareness of what has been going on is bound to say this isn't working
very well?
Is there any doubt in anyone's mind that, if NATO were under attack,
we could win a war? No, there is no doubt, because if one of our
countries was under siege, we would go all out and we would win. We
might use nuclear weapons if we had to, but we would win if one of us
had a security threat. But the fact of the matter is, Madam President,
we don't have a security risk. We have a humanitarian tragedy. So we
are not in this full force. It is a ``gentlemen's war.'' We are doing
strategic bombing. We are trying to be careful not to kill civilians,
thank Heaven. We aren't going to put in ground troops. The President
has said that.
This is not a war on which you can judge the credibility of NATO. If
we wanted to win, we would win. We have the force to win, make no
mistake about it. Nobody in their right mind would doubt it. But the
problem here is the same as we had in Vietnam; we are not prepared to
use full force to win, because it isn't a security threat.
To keep NATO strong, I submit that we don't keep going forward on a
mission that doesn't appear to be very positive. To keep NATO strong,
we should have a clear principle, a clear mission, and not an immediate
reaction, but be slow to get into action. And when you go, by God, you
go to win. That is what was wrong with Vietnam, and it is what is wrong
today in Kosovo. It is not the credibility of NATO that we don't win a
``gentlemen's war.'' The credibility of NATO would be tested if we had
a real security threat to one of our countries, and we would go in and
we would win.
So I think the resolution today is meaningless, because we know we
are not going to use full force. We are not going to use weapons of
mass destruction, and we are not going to use ground troops. The
President has said that. He hasn't even asked for it. And this
operation should show us, and it should be a lesson for NATO, that if
we are not prepared to go for a win, we should not take the first step.
That is the lesson to keep the credibility of NATO.
If we are not prepared to go for a win and declare war on Serbia we
shouldn't have started the bombing, and we shouldn't continue in this
direction. That is why the resolution is wrong.
I am not ready to declare war on Serbia. I think they have a despot
as a leader. But I don't think the American people are ready to declare
war on a country that is not a security threat to the United States. I
don't think we should start bombing another country if we are not ready
to declare war.
Madam President, I don't think it is right for Congress to say go
full force in the same direction you have been going. I think it is my
responsibility as a Senator to say: I think we are going in the wrong
direction, Mr. President. Let's take stock of the situation, and let's
try to do something that would be a positive turn.
I was reading in the New York Times this morning a column by William
Safire about the price of trust. The central question is, Do we trust
the President to use all force necessary to establish the principle
that no nation
[[Page 8070]]
can drive out an unwanted people? And the answer is no. The distrust is
palpable. Give him the tools and he will not finish the job.
Madam President, I don't want to give him the tools in that kind of
atmosphere. It would be an abdication of my responsibility as a Member
of the Senate to do that. The only responsible action for the Senate is
to ask the President to come to Congress if you want to escalate this
conflict. Come to Congress, and tell us why and tell us what your plan
is. Tell us what the cost is. Tell us how many troops you need, and for
how long. Tell us what the mission is. And what is victory?
How could we say that passing this resolution is an act of
responsibility? I don't doubt for one minute that everyone who votes
for this resolution is doing it because they believe it is right--
because they believe in the Presidency. So many of the war heroes in
this Senate believe in the Presidency. I think that is why they are
standing so tall.
But, Madam President, I am a Member of the Senate. I believe in the
Presidency. But I believe that when the President is doing something
that is wrong--that I should stand up and say so. That is what I was
elected to do. That is what the people of Texas sent me here to do.
I hope that we can have an influence on the President. I hope he will
take bold action. I hope he will sit down tonight and decide that there
is a glimmer of hope with the release of the American prisoners and it
is worth a chance.
That is why I hope we will table this resolution--that we will take
our responsibility seriously as Members of the Senate, and say: Mr.
President, what we are doing isn't working, and I am not going to
escalate it. I am not going to put our troops into harm's way, most
assuredly, when you don't ask us to do it. And when you don't give us a
plan, and when you don't give us a policy that we can decide if we
support or not. The people who elected me to take the tough vote trust
me to do what I think is right in my heart. I would never abdicate my
conscience by giving a blank check to put our troops into harm's way in
support of a policy that I haven't seen, and what I have seen I
disagree with. No way.
Madam President, I yield the floor.
Mr. McCAIN. Madam President, I ask that the Chair recognize the
Senator from Washington for 10 minutes.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Washington is recognized.
Mr. GORTON. Madam President, should the Congress, in the words of the
McCain resolution, authorize the President ``to use all necessary
force'' to accomplish U.S. objectives in Yugoslavia? That is the
question upon which we will be voting shortly.
In order to answer that question, however, we must, it seems to me,
first deal with two prerequisites and vital questions.
First, what are our American objectives in Yugoslavia? And are they
so vital to our national interest as to warrant a full-scale war?
Second, do we have a sufficient degree of confidence in the quality
of our Presidential leadership to give the President unlimited and
unrequested authority to pursue those objectives?
In connection with that first question, our American objectives, we
are now engaged in an experiment, a venture, that is an entirely new
function for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization--not defensive in
nature, but reaching outside of its own borders to attempt to settle
one among many ethnic and religious conflicts around the world.
In my view, at the time at which we began this adventure, it was
clearly not a vital interest to the United States of America. In
addition to the absence of any vital national interest was the
appalling lack of contingency plans on the part of the administration,
as explained to Members of the Senate of both parties in the days
leading up to the beginning of the bombing--no contingency plans as to
what took place if the first two stages of bombing in a week or 10 days
or 2 weeks was unsuccessful; no recognition of the high possibility or
probability of extensive Serb atrocities in Kosovo aimed at the very
people our actions were designed to protect.
In summary, Madam President, I believe that the administration's
position at the beginning of this conflict ranked somewhere between
frivolity and folly and, therefore, I was one of 41 Senators to vote
against ratifying what we all knew the administration was going to do
whatever the vote in the Senate.
On the other hand, as critical as I am of both the inception of this
conflict and of its conduct, it is very difficult, I think impossible,
to avoid the conclusion that what was not a vital national interest in
the first place now involves a far greater national interest resulting
from a flawed concept and a worse execution.
We now do implicate the very survival of the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization. And our actions have precipitated a refugee crisis
unmatched in Europe since the end of World War II. Well over a million
Kosovars are homeless, many of them refugees outside of the boundaries
of the Republic of Yugoslavia, all of them far worse off when they are
not dead than they were before our intervention began.
Having recognized this, however, what are the possible outcomes? All
of them, it seems to me, are bad.
The first is that we quit and come home. And some advocate that. I no
longer honestly can do so as much as I opposed the beginning of this
conflict.
The other and perhaps best possibility is that our air attacks may
still be successful, that Milosevic and the Serbs may still give up, in
which case we get to occupy an absolutely devastated and destroyed
Kosovo for perhaps a quarter of a century, and receive a bill to
rebuild Kosovo, and maybe Serbia as well, some of which we may attempt
with greater or lesser success to pass over on our allies, and will now
have to support the independence of that country. Its residents can no
longer live with Serbia at all. That independence and that occupation,
in my view, are the only way we will persuade Kosovar Albanians to
return to their homes.
The next alternative, of course, is the Russian compromise --defeat,
disguised as a form of compromise. The Kosovars under those
circumstances, without an American occupation, with a Russian
occupation, will almost certainly by the hundreds of thousands be
rightly frightened to return to their homes. Such a compromise is
likely to end up in a partition, in which Serbia ends up with far more
of Kosovo than it deserves, given its actions.
However, that is now a course of action advocated by the previous
speaker and by many others--defeat disguised as compromise.
Finally, we have the McCain resolution, a ground war led by this
administration, which has already shown itself incompetent to run even
an air war, and a 19-member steering committee--a prescription for
total disaster.
What about the second question, the inevitable question of the
quality of our national leadership? By its own criteria, the
administration has been a total failure. It has not protected the
Kosovars; it has not prevented a spread of the war. Its leadership is
all spin, no recognition of its own difficulties, no willingness to
explain to the people of the United States what it is all about or
where we are going. We can have no confidence in either the preparation
of this administration or the conduct of its operations.
We get to the ultimate question. We are asked by this resolution to
grant unlimited authority to wage war in Yugoslavia to an
administration unwilling to use that authority and incompetent to carry
it out if it were willing.
I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the Record a Time magazine
column by Charles Krauthammer last week stating that position more
eloquently than I can.
There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in
the Record, as follows:
[From Time magazine, May 3, 1999]
No to a Ground War
(By Charles Krauthammer)
What in God's name do we do now? There are three schools of
thought: (1) now that we're in it, we've got to win it--
meaning ground troops; (2) cut our losses before it's too
late; (3) keep on bombing until we have a better idea.
[[Page 8071]]
Option 3, air war on autopilot, is the current policy of
the Clinton Administration. It is a hope and a prayer. It is
not a policy. At some point the choice will come down to (1)
fight on the ground or (2) retreat under some Russian-
brokered deal.
What should it be? There is a powerful groundswell to win.
Even those who before the bombing thought Bismarck was right
when he said the Balkans were ``not worth the healthy bones
of a single Pomeranian grenadier'' are having second
thoughts. Many who, like Henry Kissenger, opposed the war,
have come to the view that now that we are committed, we must
win.
Their case is powerful. Whereas we had no compelling
national interest in Kosovo before March 24, we do now. Our
actions have created interests. Two in particular. First, a
moral obligation to the Kosovars, whom we said we were going
in to save and who are now shivering, starving, terrorized
and homeless. We owe them--as we did the Kurds, whom we
encouraged to rise up against Saddam after the Gulf War--at
least safety, if not victory.
Second, the war on Serbia has become a test of NATO
credibility. The Administration foolishly staked the
credibility--and perhaps the existence--of the most
successful defensive alliance in history on the outcome of a
civil war in a backwater of minimal strategic significance.
But now that we're there, it is minimal no more.
The case seems open and shut. The U.S. should go in and, in
the words of John McCain, use all necessary force to finish
the job.
Alas, the real question is not Should the U.S. (and its
allies) go in on the ground? The real question facing us
today is Do you really want this foreign policy team--Clinton
and Albright and Cohen and Berger--running a Balkan ground
war?
They launched an air war of half-measures, expecting
Milosevic to fold at the first sight of Bill Clinton coming
over the horizon on a Tomahawk. They had no contingency plan
when Milosevic didn't. They had no contingency plan--indeed,
they were shocked--when the man they called Hitler countered
with a savage campaign of ethnic cleansing. They responded
with the feeblest of aerial escalation, recapitulating the
disastrous gradualism of Vietnam.
By every one of their criteria--protecting the Kosovars,
preventing the crisis from spreading to neighboring
countries, keeping the conflict from internationalizing--this
campaign has been a disaster. Do we want to entrust a ground
war, a far more dangerous and risky enterprise, to a team
that has demonstrated a jaw-dropping inability to plan ahead,
to adapt to contingencies, to act forcefully?
Even if your answer is yes, consider this: the Clinton team
is so viscerally opposed to ground troops that Clinton ruled
them out from the very beginning, thus immeasurably
emboldening and strengthening Milosevic. Clinton was willing
to sacrifice the military advantages of leaving the ground-
war question ambiguous in order to rid himself--he thought--
of the issue. He is terrified of becoming Lyndon Johnson,
stuck in a ground war with no exit. He confessed as much to
Dan Rather: ``The thing that bothers me about introducing
ground troops . . . is the prospect of never being able to
get them out.''
It is one thing to urge a ground war on leaders simply
incompetent to carry it out. It is another to urge it on
leaders unwilling to carry it out. What kind of ground
campaign can we expect from an Administration that has been
pressured into mounting one?
And finally, consider Clinton's co-commanders. One of the
reasons the air war has been such an abject failure is that
every move must be approved by all 19 NATO members.
Luxembourg, say, has veto power over targets. France has
raised objections to the very minor step of blockading
Yugoslav ports. The committee of 19 had to approve the
deployment--the agonizingly slow deployment--of Apache
gunships. Imagine a ground war run by this hydra-headed body,
in which every rule of engagement, every change in strategy,
every new operation would have to go before and through the
committee of 19.
If we had a serious President (say, John McCain) and a
serious Secretary of State (say, Jeanne Kirkpatrick) and a
serious NATO commander (say, Colin Powell), it might make
sense to go in on the ground to win. But we don't. Which is
why we are where we are. Better a face-saving deal that
alleviates some of the suffering of the Albanians than a
charge up Kosovo hills, led by a reluctant, uncertain
Clinton.
A pessimist, says Israeli humorist Yaakov Kirschen, is a
person who thinks things have hit rock bottom. ``I am an
optimist,'' says Kirschen. ``I believe that things can get
much worse.''
And so they can. Especially in the Balkans.
Mr. GORTON. As a consequence, what might be an appropriate response
to an administration that sought it, that expressed its goals
coherently enough to define what winning was, and competent to reach
its goals, is totally inappropriate to grant to this administration--
unasked, unwilling, and unable to carry on a war of this importance.
The inevitable vote on this resolution is to vote to table.
Mr. McCAIN. Madam President, for the information of my colleagues,
Senator Chafee will be next for 10 minutes; Senator Inhofe for 30
minutes; Senator Robb for 20 minutes; Senator Leahy for 10 minutes;
Senator Bunning for 10 minutes; Senator Domenici for 10 minutes;
Senator Landrieu for 5 minutes; Senator Dorgan for 10 minutes; Senator
Biden for 30 minutes; Senator Durbin for 10 minutes; Senator Warner for
10 minutes; Senator Nickles for 20 minutes; Senator Kerry of
Massachusetts for 30 minutes; and Senator Dodd for 15 minutes.
I make one additional comment. This resolution does not call for
ground operations. This resolution calls for use of whatever force is
necessary to bring this war to a conclusion. Those who portray this as
a resolution that calls for ground operations simply mischaracterizes
the resolution, and I believe I am owed, along with Senator Biden, the
intellectual honesty to at least portray this resolution for what it
is, which is a resolution to use whatever force is necessary, which is
exactly the same resolution as the Persian Gulf war.
I yield 10 minutes to the Senator from Rhode Island, Mr. Chafee.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Rhode Island is recognized.
Mr. CHAFEE. I thank the manager of the bill.
Madam President, I will support the motion to table, not because I am
opposed to properly carrying out this military campaign but because I
believe that setting this resolution aside today will give NATO a
better chance to achieve our military objectives in Kosovo.
Since the early days of this military campaign, I have argued that
the President ought not have ruled out the use of ground troops as a
military option in NATO's campaign against Yugoslav forces in Kosovo.
Sending this signal gives President Milosevic some comfort, knowing
that his army and Serb para-military forces would not have to confront
a NATO ground campaign. That gives Milosevic a freer hand in carrying
out his brutal campaign of ethnic cleansing against ethnic Albanians.
Today, the Senate must decide whether to give the President authority
to use ``all necessary force and other means'' to accomplish U.S. and
NATO objectives in Yugoslavia. Passage would certainly permit the
Administration to send U.S. ground forces into Yugoslavia. I commend
the efforts of Senator McCain and the other sponsors of this
resolution, who I know have only our national interests in mind in
bringing this measure forward today.
My instinct is to support this resolution. However, I must oppose
considering it at this time for two reasons.
First, it should be clear to anyone following this debate that a
majority of Senators needed to pass this resolution simply does not
exist today. An acrimonious debate, followed by a vote against granting
the President enhanced authority to conduct this military campaign,
would weaken significantly NATO's hand in carrying out its mission.
Such a vote would give Slobodan Milosevic and his band of marauders in
Kosovo aid and comfort in fighting an alliance led by a divided U.S.
government. So, in the interests of taking on Milosevic with as unified
a front as possible, I think a vote today to table this resolution is
prudent.
Second, it is not entirely clear to me whether the timing for passage
of this resolution is appropriate. Although many are frustrated at the
progress of the six-week air campaign, I think it deserves a chance to
succeed. No one ever said that this military campaign would be quick
and tidy--as wars rearely are--and it is wrong to demand an immeidate
result.
However, if, in the coming days and weeks, the President and our NATO
allies decide that ground forces are, in fact, needed to carry out our
campaign against Yugoslav forces, I believe that consideration of this
resolution would be appropriate and I would vote for it.
Madam President, while my instinct is to support this resolution
today, I
[[Page 8072]]
believe it is premature. Thus I shall vote to table the resolution.
Mr. McCAIN. I yield 30 minutes to the Senator from Oklahoma, Mr.
Inhofe.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Oklahoma is recognized for 30
minutes.
Mr. INHOFE. I thank the Senator from Arizona particularly for the way
he has conducted himself in this debate in spite of the fact that there
are many who do not agree with him and the resolution.
Let me first share some ideas that perhaps have not been discussed. I
have done a lot of crossing off as I have listened today, taking off
items I was going to discuss, and I have shortened my remarks and
probably won't use all of my time.
First of all, months ago I went to Kosovo when I saw the handwriting
on the wall, when I felt that ultimately this President was going to
send ground troops into Kosovo. In spite of the fact he continuously
said he was not going to, I felt very strongly that he was. I went over
to find out as much as I could before all of the bombing started, what
it was really like in Kosovo. Truly, Milosevic is just as bad a person
as everybody says he is. I do not question that. But one of the things
I came back with is a knowledge of a little bit of the history of the
area and that some of the people over there are bad, too.
For example, you are talking about Kosovo, which is very small. It is
about 75 miles in diameter, surrounded by mountains and for 600 years
has been an area that has strived unsuccessfully for autonomy. There
have been times when the Albanians have been the bad guys and the Serbs
have been the good guys, and vice versa. It was about 12 years ago we
were all so concerned because the KLA was doing all the raping and
looting and burning, and not the Serbs.
Also, I noticed only two dead people in the road going across Kosovo.
I turned them over. They ended up being Serbs. They were killed by the
KLA. They were executed at point-blank range.
Rounding a corner about 10 minutes later, I saw someone--I found
myself in the sights of a rifle-propelled grenade, an RPG-7, a very
lethal weapon. After they put it down, we walked over, and it was the
KLA, it wasn't the Serbs.
I went on and we saw on the map a place called the ``no-go zone.'' I
asked what it was. They said that is where you do not go. They do not
care whether you are a United States Senator or whether you are a Serb
or an Albanian; if you go in there, you are going to be shot. It was
controlled by the KLA.
I guess what I am saying, Madam President, is there are bad guys on
both sides.
I would like to just mention one thing about the China scandal,
because I see a connection here. I hate to say this, but a couple of
months ago on this floor I told the history of what had happened in the
China scandal and the fact that back in the 1980s the technology known
as the WA-8 technology was stolen and nobody knew about it until about
1995. The administration--the President and the administration found
out about it and they withheld that from Congress for quite a number of
years--not months but years. So in Senator Warner's committee we
started having some hearings to find out what the truth was.
Sometimes I remember that Winston Churchill said:
Truth is incontrovertible. Panic may rescind it, ignorance
may deride it, malice may destroy it, but there it is.
Ultimately you get to that truth. That is what we are trying to get.
And Notra Trulock, who was in charge of the intelligence for the
Department of Energy--he said it became very serious a year ago--said
we are going to have to tell Congress about this. So he wanted to come.
He had to go to his superior, who was the Acting Director of the
Department of Energy, Betsy Moler. And she said: No, you can't do that.
You can't do that because it might be detrimental to the President's
China policy.
Here we are talking about the theft of the most significant nuclear
device in our arsenal, the WA-8 warhead. To give you an idea what it
is, Madam President, this is something that has 10 times the explosive
power of the bomb that was dropped on Hiroshima. It is a fraction of
the size. The Chinese actually had missiles that were aimed at us at
that time, at the time the President was running around the country,
133 times, saying: For the first time in the nuclear age there is not
one missile aimed at American children--when in fact we had some 28
cities that were being targeted at that time. He signed the waiver to
allow the Chinese to have a guidance technology to make those missiles
more accurate, and he had knowledge of the fact they had, now, the
warhead, the WA-8 warhead, that could be fitted on one of these. As a
matter of fact, more than one could be fitted on one of their multiple-
stage rockets.
I say that there is a connection. There is always talk about the
President, every time he gets in trouble, something big happens, like
sending cruise missiles into Sudan or Afghanistan or Iraq. In this
case, we started a war. But I will say this--I do not want to dwell on
this because that is not the subject at hand today--I see a connection.
I believe there is a connection. I think we may very well have a ``Wag
The Dog'' situation here. I think everyone knows what I am talking
about. They do not say it, but they know what I am talking about.
But I did ask, in the committee meeting, since we had two
diametrically opposed testimonies coming from Mr. Trulock and Ms.
Moler, if they would submit to a lie detector test. Mr. Trulock
immediately said he would; Ms. Moler vacillated. And then, in response
to a letter, I found he is willing and she said she is not. So I think
I know who is telling the truth. Nonetheless, we are going to have to
address that in a little bit different way.
We have learned since then, by the way, in the last 6 years,
virtually everything in our nuclear arsenal is now in the hands of the
Chinese.
What I would like to do is cover this in four areas that have not
been discussed by previous speakers. I think they are significant.
First of all, some of the things this President has said that led us to
where we are today. The President does have an insatiable propensity to
say things that are not true, and he does it with such conviction that
people start nodding and agreeing with him. I am not going into the
details on that; everybody knows about that.
But one of the things that I think had the greatest impact on the
American people in supporting the President to send our assets in there
and get involved in a war of a sovereign nation, in a civil war--the
first time we have done that, certainly the first time in 50 years that
NATO has done that--was when he started talking about the history of
World War I and World War II. He gave a very persuasive story of how
World War I and World War II started. The only trouble is, he was not
telling the truth. I am not a historian and neither is the President,
but I will tell you who is: Henry Kissinger. He said he got quite upset
with the thing. I am quoting now. He said:
The Second World War did not start in the Balkans, much
less as a result of its ethnic conflicts.
Then he said:
World War I started in the Balkans not as a result of
ethnic conflicts but for precisely the opposite reason:
because outside powers intervened in a local conflict.
He said:
Russia backed Serbia and France backed Russia . . ..
And then Germany jumped in on Austria's side. So we had the same
situation as is happening today. We had the great powers dividing up
and getting on both sides of this, a civil war. It was a civil war,
just like it is today. If that started World War I, certainly that
could start World War III.
So what he said to the American people just simply was not true,
Madam President. I think we need to talk about that.
The Senator from Washington just a few minutes ago talked about the
article by Charles Krauthammer. I think that was very significant, when
he talked about the Russians. It is already submitted for the Record so
I will not
[[Page 8073]]
resubmit it, but I will read a few things out of it. He said:
Prime Minister Yevgeny Primakov turned his U.S.-bound plane
around in mid-transit to protest the bombing.
* * * * *
Russia kicked NATO's representatives out of Moscow. It sent
a spy ship into the Adriatic to shadow the U.S. fleet. It
threatened to send military supplies to Belgrade. It
boycotted NATO's 50th-year summit in Washington.
I don't know what we could have done that could have precipitated
more of a problem between us and Russia than has already been done by
this President in getting involved in war.
The last paragraph reads:
Most important, Primakov will have proved to the world--and
to pro-Western Russians--that an anti-American foreign policy
puts Russia back on the stage and gives it diplomatic clout,
while the pro-American policy followed since the Gulf War
yielded Russia nothing but a ticket to oblivion.
We will have vindicated Primakov's vision of Russia as
leader of the opposition, friend and broker of rogue regimes
[like] Serbia and Iraq [and] balancer of American power. This
might even get him elected president next year when Yeltsin's
term expires.
Clinton will finally have his legacy.
I would like to make one comment also to clarify the Record. I know
Senator McCain said this does not authorize ground troops. But it does
authorize whatever force necessary, and some of us could interpret it
that way. But in my opinion, the President has always known that there
were going to have to be ground troops. I know he said he is opposed to
ground troops, but he wasn't telling the truth. I offer as evidence of
that what, long before we sent bombers in there, General Wesley Clark
said.
We never thought air power alone could stop the
paramilitary tragedy. . . everyone understood it.
When he said that, he was with the President of the United States.
We had Secretary Bill Cohen, a man I have a great deal of respect for
and served with here in this body, in the Senate, but I asked him the
same question about this, and he elaborated a little bit on it, but he
said we understood that Milosevic:
. . . could take action very quickly and that an air
campaign could do little, if anything, to stop him.
So when people talk about this resolution doing that, I think this is
what the President had in mind all the time anyway.
The second thing I wanted to talk about is the cost of this thing. A
lot of people have not realized, they do not stop and think about, the
cost in terms of both money and our capability of defending America. I
do not think there is anyone who is not going to stand up here and
agree with me in this Senate that the President, through his veto
power, has decimated the military budget so we right now, today, are at
one-half the force strength that we were in 1991, back during the
Persian Gulf days. That is very significant. I think people need to
hear this and understand it: One-half the force strength. I am talking
about one-half the Army divisions, one-half the tactical air wings,
one-half the ships, from 600 down to 300.
We are one-half the force strength that we were because of this
President. Add to that the deployments. We have had more deployments in
the last 6 years than the previous 20 years to areas where we do not
have any national security interests. We need to look at that. For Joe
Lockhart, the Press Secretary of the President, to stand up last week
and say that Inhofe is wrong, we are as strong today as we were in
1991, that is just an outrageous lie, and it is quantified in force
strength. Anyone who is working on the committees understands this.
We have the deployments, we have the problems, and we are paying the
price. Yet, we do not have the national security interests. I was so
proud of Colin Powell this weekend to come out and admit that America
does not have national strategic interests in Kosovo, the same as Henry
Kissinger said. I have quoted both of them extensively. Yet, here we
are making the commitment.
I came back from my last trip to Kosovo just to hear Tony Blair stand
up and make his very eloquent statement: We want to escalate the war,
escalate the airstrikes. Here is a guy standing up who does have
national security interests. He is over there; we are halfway around
the world. We do not have strategic interests there, but he does. He
stood up and said we need to escalate the airstrikes when, at the time
he said this, we had 365 airplanes over there and they had 20. That is
easy for him to say. I say he is a better negotiator than we are.
I was very much concerned with what I saw over there. I see several
members of the committee here. I have to say that sometimes the NATO
interests do not necessarily coincide with our interests. I wonder
sometimes what has happened to sovereignty in the United States of
America, why we have to take on all these other obligations at the
expense of our ability to defend ourselves.
Can we defend ourselves? Again, General Hawley was very brave when
he, this weekend, said--keep in mind he is the air combat commander,
the top guy, a four-star general. It takes a lot of courage for one of
these generals to stand up against the Commander in Chief, President
Clinton.
He said that 5 weeks of bombing in Yugoslavia has left U.S. munitions
stocks critically short, not just of air-launched cruise missiles, as
previously reported, but also of another precision weapon, the joint
direct attack munition--that is JDAM--dropped, used by these beautiful
B-2s that are performing very well. Now we are short of them.
He went on to say we would be hard pressed to handle a second war in
the Middle East or Korea. Let's stop and think about that a little bit.
Our national military strategy has always been to be able to defend
America on two regional fronts. I do not think there is anyone in here
who believes we can simultaneously defend America on two regional
fronts.
What General Hawley is saying on the commitments we have made to
Bosnia and Kosovo and with the deployments we have made there is we
would have a very difficult time. And he questions whether we could
defend America if something happened in either North Korea or in Iraq.
That is very serious.
I went back to the 21st TACOM, and I know people are tired of hearing
me talk about that, but any time we do a ground operation anywhere in
that theater, it has to be logistically supported and run and operated
by the 21st TACOM in Germany, down the road from Ramstein Air Force
Base.
A year or so ago, I was over there. They said just with what we are
doing in Bosnia, we are at 100 percent capacity; we cannot do anymore.
And now they are doing more.
As I watched the deployments take place and they were cranking these
troops through--5,000 were there a few days ago --as they were taken
through, I said: What are you going to do if there is any contingency
like in Iraq?
They said: We would be 100 percent dependent on Guard and Reserve.
We know the President's intentions are to activate the Guard and
Reserve. He has already called up units. He has notified units.
Anyway, we do not have the capacity. I went over, Madam President, to
Tirana, where our troops are, in a C-17. I found some things out there
that were really kind of scary. The C-17 I went in was carrying two
MLRSs, that is the mobile launch capability, and one humvee, and all
the rest filled up with troops. We were at gross weight. We could not
hold another pound in that C-17.
We have now done 300 sorties with C-17s. That is the beautiful high-
lift vehicle that is going to replace a lot of the others of which we
don't have enough and need more. Nonetheless, we are tying those things
up. Four hundred of them are going in and out, taking things into
Albania.
Then we have our scenarios as to what the cost is going to be. I will
only say this. I came back convinced that the paper that was written by
the Heritage Foundation was true, because from the officers over there,
I learned three scenarios, which are: The most
[[Page 8074]]
conservative scenario, go in and take over Kosovo, as if you can do
that and nothing else is going to happen; second, take over Belgrade;
third, take over Yugoslavia.
The first scenario would take 30,000 American troops; the second
scenario, 100,000 American troops; the third scenario, 250,000 American
troops. While they do not like to think in terms of casualties,
casualties under the most conservative scenario would be somewhere
between 500 and 2,000 American casualties; the Belgrade option would be
somewhere between 5,000 and 10,000 casualties; and the Yugoslavia total
effort would be somewhere between 15,000 and 20,000 American
casualties. That is very, very serious.
Before I quit, I have two other things I want to share. I have heard
many Senators stand on this floor and talk about the horrible
atrocities that are going on, and they are. Anytime anyone is killed,
anytime there are refugees, anytime there is any degree of ethnic
cleansing, it is a tragedy.
For the junior Senator from California to stand up and say, ``the
most God-awful ethnic cleansing since Hitler,'' just is not true. I am
sure she believes it is true or she would not say it.
We keep hearing these horrible stories. We heard the President walk
out into the Rose Garden last week and talk about what Brian Atwood,
the AID Administrator, told him about the groups of men that were lined
up and doused with gasoline and lighted on fire. I was with Brian
Atwood over there a few days before that. Apparently, this allegedly
happened before that time. He did not tell me about it.
I don't know what is true and is not true. I will say this. I know
despite what you hear to the contrary--and this is most significant--
the atrocities that have been committed on the Kosovar Albanians are
minor when compared to other places.
I am involved in mission work. I go to west Africa with some
regularity. I was in west Africa less than a month ago. This does not
have anything to do with being a Senator. It is doing the Lord's work
in some of these places. I am talking about Benin, Cote d'Ivoire,
Angola, Nigeria, Sierra Leone. For every one person who has been
killed, ethnically cleansed, killed in the Kosovar Albanians, for every
one, there have been 80 killed in just the two countries of Angola and
Sierra Leone.
Are they as brutal? Yes. They went into Sierra Leone and took whole
tribes of people, lined up the children and cut their hands off. Entire
tribes, the most brutal killing. For every one killed in Kosovo, 80
were killed there. Why aren't we concerned about that? We have now come
to the conclusion that it is humanitarian reasons that are motivating
us. What is wrong with the 80-to-1 ratio in west Africa?
What about Rwanda? For every one that has been killed in Kosovo,
there have been 300 killed in the one country of Rwanda. You can go
throughout Africa and see much greater atrocities.
I don't know why people sit back and act like there is no problem
anywhere in the world except there. I have to come to the same
conclusion that some of the others have come to. There was an article
written in the Minneapolis-St. Paul newspaper that I will submit for
the Record at the conclusion of my remarks that is very specific as to
why it might be we are not concerned about this many Africans when just
a handful are killed in Kosovo.
You have to also ask why are so many killed in Kosovo. We know it is
a tragic thing. I have come to the conclusion that it is because of the
bombing. I know that George Tenet, who is Director of Central
Intelligence for the United States, said long before the bombing
started, and this is from the Washington Post of March 31:
For weeks before NATO's air campaign against Yugoslavia,
CIA Director Tenet had been forecasting Serb-led Yugo forces
might respond by accelerating the ethnic cleansing.
I asked the Secretary of Defense, Bill Cohen, before our committee
if, in fact, that was true. He said:
With respect to General Tenet testifying that bombing
could, in fact, accelerate Milosevic's plans, we also knew
that.
So we did know that. So I am wondering how many of the Kosovar
Albanians are dead today who would be alive if we had not gone in there
and bombed.
I have to say also that when I was in Tirana with witnesses, with
newspapers, with the media from America--who did not repeat this, by
the way--I interviewed everyone I could in that refugee camp outside of
Tirana. They were doing all right. They were well fed. They were taken
care of. I think they were as well taken care of as you would expect
refugees to be. There was not one who said they had any problems until
the bombing began.
Then I was interviewed by a Tirana Albanian TV station, and they
said, ``When are you and the United States going to come out and take
care of all these refugees?'' I said, ``Why us?'' They said, ``Because
if it weren't for you, they wouldn't be here.'' That is the way they
are thinking there.
I am running out of time. I want to say one thing about the troops.
One of the reasons I went over to be there when the troops arrived is
because I saw a New York Times article on April 13 that said, ``We're
going into Albania, the middle of nowhere, with no infrastructure,
naked and exposed.'' And this was an official who gave this quote. So I
went over to see if, in fact, that was what I would find. And you know
what? That is exactly what I found.
I went over with the troops. As we unloaded, we went down, and the
troops were over there building the tent cities. And, bless their
hearts, they are doing a great job. Their spirits are high. They are
ready to do whatever their commanding officer tells them to do, which
is what they said they would do when they joined the military. They are
knee deep in mud, and they are exposed.
I will tell you a little bit about Albania that not many people know
about Albania. First of all, it is the poorest country in Europe.
Secondly, it is one of the three most dangerous countries anywhere in
the world. Thirdly, back during the Hoxha regime, they actually
declared it as an atheist nation. So it is the only declared atheist
nation out there. And fourth, the pyramid scheme that took place in the
middle 1990s was one that actually took over, from the military, all of
their weaponry. I am talking about RPG-7s; that is the rifle-propelled
grenade, a very lethal weapon; the AK-47s--we know what that is--the
SA-7s--that is the shoulder-launched surface-to-air missiles; it can
knock down our helicopters over there, and every other kind of thing--
mortars, other kinds of equipment--and yet our troops are over there
standing in the mud without any infrastructure, without any protection,
no troop protection. I am very, very concerned about that. If I ever
saw a place more ripe for a gradual escalation in mission creep, like
Vietnam, this is it.
Some people say, ``Where do you go from here?'' That always bothers
me, when people say, ``What are you going to do now?'' If it weren't
for us, we would not be where we are today. ``This is something where
we were pushed into it. We had no control over it.'' We have a
President who decided he was going to declare war, and joined NATO in
declaring war, on a sovereign nation.
So there is where we are. But people say, ``If you try something
else, our reputation is on the line.'' How is our reputation on the
line, if we have tucked our tail between our legs and run from Saddam
Hussein in Iraq? Do we have any weapons inspectors there in Iraq
anymore? No, we do not. He kicked us out and laughed at us. In the
Middle East we are the laughingstock, and our foreign policy. So we
cannot do worse than we did before.
I really believe there is no way out, that the only way to keep our
President from sending American ground troops in--then it becomes
irreversible. Then we are in for the long haul, when that happens. The
only way to stop it is, No. 1, today--or tomorrow morning, whenever
this comes up for a vote--to join the House with the votes that they
voted last week and not give the permission to use any type of force
that is necessary; and, secondly, inform the American people.
Let's face it, this administration is poll driven. This
administration does what the polls say most people are going to find
acceptable. I will repeat
[[Page 8075]]
and quote General Hawley one more time: ``I would argue we cannot
continue to accumulate contingencies,'' he said. ``At some point you
have to figure out how to get out of something.''
You see, it is easy to get into something. We learned that in Bosnia,
when the President promised it would be 12 months, and then here it is
several years later and we are still in there. So this is what we are
facing at this time.
So, anyway, I just think we are going to have to reject the McCain
resolution. I anticipate we will do that. I think we need to inform the
American people what the real threat is, inform the American people as
to what our ability to defend America is, where our vital national
security interests are, what it really is. If we do that, I think we
are going to have the American people behind us.
I think also we have to keep in mind that if we end up saying, ``All
right, those of you in Europe who have national security interests at
stake, if you want to go ahead and take care of those national security
interests, you fight the battle,'' we will go back and we will regroup
and we will start rebuilding our military so we can defend America on
two regional fronts, and, ``We will protect you against Iraq and
against North Korea.'' I think that is probably the greatest thing we
could do for our NATO allies.
Whatever the indication, we need to be out of there. This isn't our
war, and whatever it takes to get out we should do.
Mr. McCAIN. Madam President, I understand the distinguished chairman
of the Foreign Relations Committee, Senator Helms, is to be recognized
for 5 minutes.
Mr. HELMS. Madam President, I thank my distinguished friend and great
American, Senator McCain.
Madam President, before commenting on the substance of the resolution
before us today, I think I ought to make it clear that I take exception
to the circumstances that would have been dictated by the War Powers
Act had the Foreign Relations Committee not acted voluntarily this past
Friday morning to take an action. In my judgment, the War Powers Act is
ill considered and fundamentally unconstitutional, as such
distinguished Senators of years gone by have declared it to be--along
with near unanimity of sitting conservative Senators today.
In any case, Madam President, including the distinguished Presiding
Officer at the moment, this past Friday, April 30, the Foreign
Relations Committee met formally and officially reported S.J. Res. 20
without recommendation in order to avoid setting a precedent in support
of the War Powers Act. Let me repeat, had we not met and had we not
reported the type of legislation that we did report, we would have set
a precedent in support of the War Powers Act. And I would resign from
the Senate before I would have done that voluntarily. The committee
reported S.J. Res. 20 without recommendation by a vote of 14-4.
While I do support the underlying sentiment of the resolution offered
by my friend, John McCain, to win the war against Serbia, I do not--and
I cannot--support S.J. Res. 20.
In times of armed conflict between the United States and a hostile
power, it is the duty of the President of the United States, in his
role as Commander in Chief, to provide leadership in seeking to achieve
our political and military objectives.
The Senate cannot and must not force the President to take measures
that he is unwilling or unprepared to take. So I am not prepared to
sign off prematurely on measures and methods on which I do not yet have
details.
Approval of this resolution would mistakenly--even dangerously
perhaps--authorize the President to use force in a manner far exceeding
anything that he has thus far publicly or privately indicated to the
Congress.
Now, approval of this resolution would also provide the President
with prior congressional approval--prior congressional approval--for
any and all action he may want to subsequently undertake in prosecuting
the war--and that is what it is--against Serbia. And that would have
the effect of preventing Congress from exercising its responsibilities
in authorizing, or limiting, options as circumstances may change.
Now let me be clear: I detest the unspeakably cruel acts committed by
the Milosevic forces, and I certainly pray for that evil man's early
and speedy defeat in this war. But that, however, is not what this
resolution is about, despite what are, without doubt, the good
intentions by the author.
I worry that a negative vote by the Senate on S.J. Res. 20 will
provide comfort to Mr. Milosevic, and lead him to assume falsely that
the United States is not resolute in its determination to prevail in
this conflict. Yet I am more concerned about what may be unintended
effects of this resolution.
This resolution would simply give the President a blank check. It
would provide the President with prior Congressional approval for
anything and everything the President may decide to undertake in
prosecuting the war against Serbia.
S.J. Res. 20 puts the cart before the horse. Giving the President
carte blanche to do whatever he wants in Kosovo without first coming to
Congress to explain his mission and ask for authorization, is not a
solution for the President's failure to follow the Constitution.
I thank the Chair, and I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Frist). The majority leader is recognized.
Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that during today's
debate no motions be in order and at 9:30 a.m. on Tuesday, the majority
leader be recognized to make a motion to table S.J. Res. 20.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is ordered.
Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, just one moment to explain what has
transpired. We have a number of Senators who wish to be heard on this
issue. I view this as a procedural vote by moving to table it. We have
this issue before us at this time because of the War Powers Act. There
was a lot of feeling that we should have postponed this debate and vote
until a later time, but under our rules we couldn't get that done. That
is why Senator Daschle and I felt at this time that a procedural motion
to table was appropriate and that that vote should occur at 5:30.
Senator Daschle is on the way back, but I understand he has agreed to
this request. You cannot cut Senators off who are asking to speak on a
matter of this magnitude. We have worked out an arrangement. We have
gone into the night. There are probably an hour or two more of speeches
left, and that way we will have a vote in the morning. Even if Senators
had to come back for a 9:30 vote, they would have to be here tonight
anyway. So I apologize for any inconvenience that may be caused by this
delay of the vote for Senators who did come back for the 5:30 vote, but
it seems it is the fair thing to do at this time.
I appreciate the cooperation of Senators on both sides of the aisle.
Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?
Mr. LOTT. I yield to the Senator from Delaware.
Mr. BIDEN. It is true, Senator Daschle does agree with this. I thank
the leader for this accommodation. There are a number of people who do
wish to speak. I think it is wise not to cut them off. I thank you and
the Democratic leader.
Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, I yield the floor.
Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I thank the majority leader. We have a
different view of the meaning of this vote, but I do appreciate his
allowing numerous Senators who wish to speak on this issue to speak
this evening before the vote tomorrow.
I recognize Senator Robb for 20 minutes.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Virginia.
Mr. ROBB. Mr. President, I rise to endorse emphatically granting to
the Commander in Chief the authority he needs to achieve our military
objectives and the objectives of our NATO alliance against the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia. Rather than considering limitations to the
President's powers, as they are interpreted through the
[[Page 8076]]
War Powers Act, we ought to be singularly focused on aiding his ability
to prosecute and end this war as quickly as possible. That is why I am
an original cosponsor of this resolution permitting the use of all
necessary force and other means to accomplish our goals in the Kosovo
region of Yugoslavia.
We are now weeks into an air campaign that may last months. Americans
need to prepare themselves now, psychologically at least, for war. War
is not risk free. We have to accept the fact and the responsibility
that goes with it that we may well lose significant numbers of American
lives, and we can't wait to see how it turns out before we risk taking
a stand for which we will be and should be held accountable.
The longer we exhibit a lack of resolve to see this through to
conclusion, the longer it is going to last, the more it is going to
cost, and the greater the risk that the U.S. and alliances' casualties
will mount. In effect, Mr. President, we are exacerbating everything we
purport to worry about--time, money, and, most importantly, lives--and
we protract the suffering of those we are trying to save.
We cannot and should not tolerate defeat or compromise simply because
we lack the will and conviction to win. Doing so would injure the
credibility we fought so hard to rebuild in Operation Desert Storm. It
is simply inconceivable to me that we would allow the confidence
restored in American military power in Iraq to be frittered away in the
Balkans. Given the importance of this military campaign, I was stunned
by last week's House vote on support for current operations, and remain
deeply concerned that individual feelings about our Commander in Chief
seem to be influencing votes that have consequences that are so much
more important than any Commander in Chief.
At the same time, I am deeply concerned about our unwillingness to
accept responsibility for our position of world leadership. I regret
that fewer and fewer of our citizens are willing to take necessary
risks. There are beliefs and principles that our founders were willing
to die for, and we cannot shrink from the challenge that we face today.
This resolution simply gives the Commander in Chief the options
necessary to implement our military objectives, and it is consistent
with my belief that winning the conflict is of paramount importance.
I commend Senators McCain and Biden for their efforts today and urge
support for the resolution and opposition to the tabling motion.
With that, Mr. President, I thank the Chair and yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arizona.
Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I yield 10 minutes to the Senator from
Kentucky. Excuse me. I am sorry. I apologize to the Senator from
Kentucky. The Senator from Vermont is next. I apologize to the Senator
from Vermont.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Vermont.
Mr. LEAHY. Mr. President, the Senator from Arizona has been doing a
good job of running the traffic here today. I commend the Senator from
Arizona for helping make the arrangements, and the Senator from
Delaware for putting this vote off until tomorrow. I think there are a
number of Senators who do wish to speak on both sides of this issue and
should have a chance to speak. The Senator from Arizona and the Senator
from Delaware and other sponsors of this amendment, the Senator from
Connecticut, Mr. Dodd, and others are right in saying, give us a chance
to speak before voting.
Mr. President, I intend to vote against tabling this resolution. I
want other Senators to be very clear why I will not join the
distinguished majority leader and the distinguished Democratic leader
in their motion to table and why, like what I might normally do in a
case like this, I will vote against such a leadership motion.
The United States, as the leader of NATO, is engaged in a costly and
dangerous war in Kosovo that has immense importance for the people of
Kosovo, for NATO, and for humanity. Horrendous war crimes are being
perpetrated by President Milosevic's forces, and I believe that NATO
has no alternative but to try to stop them.
We could debate how and why we got into this. We could debate,
obviously, whether we are pursuing the best strategy to achieve our
goals. We could debate the rationale for the $6 billion in supplemental
funds the President has asked for to continue the war and care for the
1.5 million refugees and displaced people who are struggling to
survive, many in a life-and-death struggle, but so far we have not had
that debate.
Now, I support the supplemental funding. In fact, I believe the
request for humanitarian assistance is too little. I believe we are not
facing up to the reality that these refugees are not going to go back
this year, and we are going to come very quickly to the fall months in
that part of the world and into the winter. I know the weather; it is
not unlike the weather in my own State of Vermont. They are going to be
there--hundreds of thousands, if not well over a million refugees--
throughout next winter. We are not looking at what those costs are
going to be. I also will oppose this motion to table because I believe
it is time for the Senate to debate our policy in Kosovo and take a
stand on it one way or the other.
I want to be clear that by voting against tabling, I am not voting on
the merits of this resolution. I am voting only to have a debate. The
President has not sought such broad, open-ended authorization in the
resolution. But even if he had, it is possible that the resolution may
be too broadly worded. That is the sort of thing we would find in a
debate, and I believe that the proponents of the resolution have done a
service to the Senate by bringing it before us for a debate. If we
think it should be different, then we can amend it and vote on it.
As my distinguished friend from West Virginia, the senior Senator,
has noted, this resolution, if approved, would prematurely write the
Congress out of any future debate on Kosovo. He raises a good issue,
but one that should be debated. For example, the resolution would
authorize the President to deploy ground troops even though he has not
expressed an intention to do so, nor provided an assessment of what the
costs and benefits of such a deployment would be.
But we need to debate this resolution. We saw what happened last week
in the House--a partisan, muddled exercise that sent conflicting
messages and solved nothing. For too long, we have seen a policy in
Kosovo that is guided more by polls than by a policy with clearly
defined, achievable goals and a credible strategy for achieving them.
The Senate can be the conscience of the Nation, and I believe, after
my years here, the Senate should be the conscience of the Nation, and
sometimes it is--but only when we rise to the occasion and debate an
issue, as difficult as it may be. Issues of war and going to war and
committing our men and women to war is as difficult an issue as we
could ever debate here. It is an issue of the utmost gravity. It cries
out for a thorough debate, and we should not shrink from it. We need
the Senate to speak with substance, not sound bites, and we need the
administration to do the same. The world's attention is on Kosovo. Many
American lives are at stake, and so are billions of dollars of
taxpayers' money.
So let us debate the resolution. The war is in its second month, and
there is no end in sight. I must say again that I disagree with our
leadership in saying that we should table this motion. I don't believe
that. I don't believe the Senator from Arizona wishes this resolution
to be tabled either. Let us debate. We will either vote for or against
it. We will either vote to amend it or not. But 100 Senators will stand
up and vote one way or another on this issue. Frankly, I think the
American people would like to see that because they would like that
kind of guidance.
Mr. President, I will not shrink from that responsibility. I will
vote tomorrow against tabling this resolution. The resolution will
probably be tabled. I hope that it will not be and that the
[[Page 8077]]
Senate will stop all hearings, all other matters, and stay here and
debate this resolution. We could do it. We have the people here to do
it. We have the expertise here. I think we can come out with a very
clear statement of American policy--perhaps a clearer one than we have
heard to date.
Mr. President, I thank the distinguished Senator from Arizona for his
usual courtesy. I see my distinguished colleague from Kentucky on the
floor awaiting recognition.
I yield the floor.
Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I thank the Senator from Vermont and
apologize for almost putting him out of order. The Senator from
Kentucky wishes to speak for 10 minutes. I yield to him for that
purpose.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Kentucky is recognized.
Mr. BUNNING. Mr. President, I rise in opposition to Senate Joint
Resolution 20 for a number of reasons, and in favor of tabling.
First of all, we have no national security interest to intervene in
this civil war. I have not heard one compelling reason from President
Clinton, the Pentagon, the Secretary of State, my colleagues, or anyone
else as to why America needs to send her troops halfway around the
globe and into the middle of another nation's civil war.
I am dismayed to see on television every night the images of refugees
fleeing their destroyed homes and villages, and everybody should be
disheartened by this horrific tragedy. But if there should be any
immediate intervention into this civil war, let it come directly from
those European neighbors where this tragedy is occurring. This is
happening in Europe's backyard, and it has been happening there for
century upon century.
We need to force Europe to deal with this and let them take the lead.
Are we going to intervene wherever we see these images and similar ones
on our television every night? If so, then America will be everywhere
at all times and our military will be spread throughout the corners of
the world, into different regional, civil, ethnic, and tribal
conflicts, and our military will be stretched to the point of breaking.
Second, by using whatever force necessary by the United States in
this region, we will be pulling our troops and weapons out of regions
where we truly have an interest.
Are we ready to stop the no-fly zone around Iraq and send our troops
into a ground war in Kosovo? This could entice Saddam Hussein to invade
other Middle Eastern countries, much like he did Kuwait. Are we ready
to dive into a war in Kosovo by pulling our military forces out and
away from our presence on the border of North Korea?
Iraq and North Korea are the two most dangerous hot spots in the
world. Can we justify scaling back our efforts in those two regions to
play referee in a civil war in Kosovo?
Are we prepared to let Saddam Hussein out of the cage and pull away
from North Korea, which has a nuclear missile capability? These two
areas hold our national security interests. I don't believe Kosovo is
even close by comparison.
Third, because of Kosovo, our military readiness is suffering. The
Clinton administration believes our military is ready for a variety of
missions. Yet, President Clinton has required more of our soldiers with
less money and support.
In the past 10 years, the national defense budget has been cut by
approximately $120 billion. The U.S. military force structure has been
reduced by more than 30 percent. The Department of Defense operations
and maintenance accounts have been reduced by 40 percent.
The Department of Defense procurement funding has declined by more
than 50 percent. Operational commitments for the U.S. military have
increased fourfold.
The Army has reduced its ranks by over 630,000 soldiers and
civilians, closed over 700 installations at home and overseas, and cut
10 divisions from its force structure.
The Army has reduced its presence in Europe from 215,000 to 65,000
personnel.
The Army has averaged 14 major deployments every four years,
increased significantly from the cold war trend of one deployment every
four years.
The Air Force has been downsized by nearly 40 percent, while at the
same time experiencing a fourfold increase in operational commitments.
And I could go on and on as to how we are decreasing the power and
force of our military while asking them to do more and more.
And just last week the President called up 33,000 reservists to
answer his call to Kosovo.
Why? It is most likely because recruitment is at the lowest it has
ever been and because our soldiers are leaving the Armed Forces in
droves.
Here are a couple quotes I found that are very timely to this debate
and even more disturbing.
The high level of operations over the past several years is
beginning to wear on both our people and our systems and is
stressing our readiness.
That was what Air Force Vice Chief of Staff, General Ralph Eberhart
said in the Air Force Times.
Here's another quote. This is from General Gordon Sullivan, former
Army Chief of Staff.
With our national budget now allocating only 3 percent of
the gross domestic product to defense, I see our future
national security in peril.
And finally a quote from the chief sponsor of this Senate joint
resolution who is also a member of the Senate Armed Services Committee.
He said in 1998 in the July issue of Defense Daily, that he currently
sees, and I quote, ``very serious echoes of the 1970s when we had a
hollow army.''
He said, ``I think that we have failed to modernize the force.''
And he adds, ``We're losing qualified men and women. We've having to
lower our recruiting standards.''
Mr. President, with this information, how can we vote and pass a
resolution knowing that our military is not ready to carry out a
mission which authorizes President Clinton to use all force necessary
to accomplish United States and NATO objectives in the Federal Republic
of Yugoslavia?
And how can we expect our military to fully enter into this war
without being told what their mission is, how long they will be
deployed there, and what their exit strategy is.
The military does not know, the American people do not know, the
Congress does not know, and I doubt President Clinton knows what those
answers are that many of my colleagues in Congress have been asking for
months.
Will there be more troops deployed if our goals and mission are not
met?
What are the rules of engagement?
How will this mission be paid for and will valuable dollars be pulled
from military readiness accounts to pay for this deployment?
What, if any, is our exit strategy?
We need to reject this resolution for the sake of our military and
for the sake of the stature of the United States in the world.
We have no national security interests to throw our soldiers into a
war in Kosovo.
And we have had no answers from this administration who would dare
throw our country into a war as to why this is a national security
interest to the United States.
If rejecting this resolution undermines NATO, then so be it and let
it undermine NATO.
This administration has already warped NATO by turning it into an
offensive force instead of its original nature of being a defensive
force against Soviet threats.
Let us not throw our sons and daughters into war to preserve an
international organization.
Please let us reject this resolution, and if necessary table it
tomorrow.
Thank you. I thank the President.
Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I grant myself 3 minutes.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arizona is recognized.
Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I am grateful to those of my colleagues
who have come to the floor this afternoon to speak on our war with
Serbia, and even those who have spoken in opposition to the pending
resolution.
The role of the United States in the Balkans is obviously a matter of
life
[[Page 8078]]
and death, and surely deserves serious discussion in the Senate of the
United States. So I thank those Senators who have recognized the
importance of having this debate.
I want to respond briefly to a few of the points made in opposition
to the resolution. First, the resolution gives too broad a grant of
authority to the President.
As I observed earlier, the Presidency already has its authority. The
Constitution gives Congress the sole right to declare war. It does not
give us the right to declare peace unless we are asked to ratify a
peace treaty, or if we refuse to appropriate money for the conduct of
the war. That is the only peacemaking authority that we possess.
If this Senate does nothing, and it seems at the moment to be the
Senate's preferred course of action, the President has the power to
commit all armies to the conflict in Yugoslavia tomorrow, if he should
suddenly decide to seek victory there. Unless we cut off the money,
nothing but his own lack of resolve can stop him from doing whatever is
necessary to win the war.
I offered the resolution not because I felt the President needed the
authority but to encourage him to fight this war in a manner most
likely to achieve our goals in Kosovo.
So, please, Mr. President, let us hear no more criticism that the
sponsors have given too much power to the President. The Constitution
wisely gave him that power long before any of us arrived on the scene.
If the opponents want to prevent the President from exercising the full
power of his office, and fighting this war as if the stakes are as high
as he claims they are, then they should not vote for the supplemental
appropriations bill that will soon be on the floor. Any Senator who
supports the troops but opposes this war as unjust, unnecessary,
unwise, and not in our interest should also vote against the
supplemental bill.
Mr. President, you can't support the troops and permit them to be
sent into a conflict that doesn't justify their sacrifice. Trust me.
The troops would rather be spared that kind of support.
If you believe this war is worth fighting, or if you believe that,
once begun, America's vital interests and most treasured values are
imperiled in this war, then vote to encourage the President to do the
right thing by our service men and women. Vote to implore him to fight
to win this war as soon as possible so that what losses we do incur
will not be in vain. Have no fear that our troops won't appreciate it.
They will do their duty, and they will expect us to do ours. They will
win this war for us, the alliance we led, the people of Kosovo and for
the values of the distinguished America for all of our history. They
will win this war if only their elected leaders allow them to.
Mr. President, I ask that the Senator from New Mexico be recognized
for up to 10 minutes.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from New Mexico.
Mr. DOMENICI. Mr. President, first, let me thank the distinguished
Senator from Arizona and those who have joined him in this cause.
While I disagree, it certainly should not be taken as any diminution
of the great respect I have for John McCain and a number of Senators
who are here on the floor to support this issue.
But, Mr. President, I believe what we should do is to prepare a
letter to the President of the United States. I think we should say to
the President something like this: ``Mr. President, you are the
Commander in Chief. Mr. President, we are engaged in a limited military
undertaking joined by our NATO allies in the Kosovo-Yugoslavia area.
You, Mr. President, have decided that we should do this; you have
decided the limitation and the scope of our involvement.''
When the appropriations bill comes along we will make sure our
military men and women get everything they need to protect themselves
adequately and in the most safe manner possible, so we are going to
support them with all the money they need.
Mr. President, we anxiously await further requests from you. If, as a
matter of fact, you believe we should proceed beyond the current
limited involvement to a broader involvement. If you desire to have our
military men and women on the ground trying to take part in operations
in Kosovo and Yugoslavia so that what you, Mr. President, say the goal
is might be accomplished, you request that of the Senate. We should
sign this letter and say that we await the President's request, and it
will be dealt with immediately.
Frankly, the reason I start my comments that way is I don't believe
we should say to a President of the United States and his military
commanders, who apparently agree with him, how to conduct his military
operations. They don't want to even plan for a land war--the President
has said that many times. He has said, If you gave me authority I
wouldn't use it. He has made up his mind that this is the kind of war
he wants to conduct.
We are not privy as Senators to what relationship exists between the
NATO countries and the United States of America regarding what is going
on over there. What will change some people's minds about their unity
of people is if America acts unilaterally or in some way inconsistent
with their understandings and agreement. That is not for the Congress;
we don't know about those relationships. We don't know about the
negotiations taking place now to try to bring this to a conclusion. God
willing, it will be brought to a conclusion sooner rather than later.
Why should we take unilateral action when he does not ask Congress
for it. Regardless of what the Senate may tell him, he alone has the
authority to conduct this war.
My friend from Arizona almost makes my case by saying whether we do
this or not, he has the authority. I think that is what I heard him
say--whether we do this or not he has the authority. What are we up to?
Mr. McCAIN. Same thing we were up to in the Persian Gulf resolution.
Mr. DOMENICI. He is not asking for it. That is the big difference
with the Persian Gulf resolution. President Bush asked us in writing
and stated what it was about.
My other observation--in fact, if the President of the United States
and our military commander serving our Nation want to go beyond what we
are doing now, I would think he would at least tell us what it means.
If they sought from us what President Bush sought, to go into a land
war for some reason over there--and it may be necessary--then he should
request our approval.
As a matter of fact, I wonder from time to time why the President
isn't asking for it. The point is, if we asked for it, he would specify
his objectives. He wouldn't just send something up here and say he
wants to have our men and women go in and do this. We would have some
briefings and we would understand what the end game is. We might even
understand the risks involved in his plans. Even in expeditiously
treating a request, we would get some answers we don't have today. I
think we should expect those answers.
I don't believe we should involve ourselves in a military venture
into the great unknown of that area because we want to in some way tell
the President of the United States and the generals and Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, we want to give you more authority than you
think you need; we want to tell you we are giving you more authority
than you think you need.
We are not offering them any authority that they don't have already
under the commander and chief powers of the Constitution.
I want to make it absolutely clear that I don't agree with my friend,
John McCain, that in order to support the men and women engaged over
there in a military event that the President has ordered, that we
should not vote for money to protect them and give them what they need
unless we are for this resolution. Those just don't follow. As a matter
of fact, I want to assure those who are wondering, this is one Senator
who will give them as much money as I can justify, to make sure our
military is better prepared when we come out of
[[Page 8079]]
this skirmish than we were when we went in. I do that without any
concern that I have not voted to give the President authority to do
more because they are already there; I believe I am neglectful in my
duty if I did not give them emergency money.
First of all, it wouldn't bring them home because they could go on
for a long time under the President's Commander in Chief authority. By
not doing a supplemental, we wouldn't be getting them out of there. We
wouldn't be ending it precipitously.
From my standpoint, the Members of the Senate who don't vote for this
resolution ought to join in a letter to the President and tell him
unequivocally, Mr. President, we understand you are the Commander in
Chief, we understand you put us there. Some of us didn't agree but they
are there and now here is a letter from us saying if you need more
authority from us to engage in a ground war, would you send us a
request and brief us adequately on why you need it and we will vote
quickly and decide what are our concerted feelings about that event.
I think that is a far better way to do it. I will have a letter, in
case any Senators would like to join me in sending that kind of letter
to the President. I ask unanimous consent that this letter be printed
in the Record.
There being no objection, the letter was ordered to be printed in the
Record, as follows:
May 3, 1999.
Dear President Clinton: As a representative of our
country's citizens and strong supporter of our military men
and women, I feel obliged to convey my position with you
regarding the U.S. involvement in hostilities in Kosovo. As
you well know, several legislative packages already exist
which would propose to preempt, further define, or curtail
your authority and responsibilities as President. I believe
that these options are neither prudent at this particular
time, nor do they necessarily conform with desired consensus
in an effort that involves the active engagement of our
military in a hostile situation.
I fully acknowledge you as Commander-in-Chief of the U.S.
forces. I recognize that this Office gives you broad
authorities and grave responsibilities in decisions of
national security and foreign policy. As Commander-in-Chief
you have chosen to take the lead in this air war. As before,
I continue to look to you and your military advisors to
determine what objectives our military seeks and determine
what means may be necessary to attain such objectives. As you
well know, these are decisions that directly impact the daily
lives of citizens throughout this country and will have long-
term implications for the security and prosperity of the
American people.
If you should decide that this operation requires means
beyond the current air campaign, I respectfully ask that you
send us your request.
Upon receiving any such request, I offer you my commitment
to bring the matter before the Senate for deliberation and a
decision as expeditiously as possible.
Sincerely,
Mr. DOMENICI. Mr. President, I yield the floor and thank the Senator
for yielding me the time.
Mr. McCAIN. I am intrigued at the prospect of exercising our
constitutional responsibility through a letter to the President.
I yield 15 minutes to the Senator from Connecticut.
Mr. DODD. To my colleague from Utah, Mr. Hatch, I yield 1 or 2
minutes for some observations.
Mr. HATCH. I thank my colleague.
Mr. President, today I stand in support of this resolution offered by
the Senator from Arizona. I think we all must acknowledge his
experience in military issues. And, few of us in the Senate can speak
with the authority that his personal experience in war has given him.
I do not believe that we should be debating this today because of the
War Powers Act, which I have always believed to be unconstitutional.
But, Mr. President, if the War Powers Act is unconstitutional, it is
unconstitutional under President Clinton as much as it was under
President Nixon. I, for one, will not reverse my legal assessment of
the act just because of the current officeholder in the White House.
I confess that I do not have a great deal of confidence in the
foreign policy of the Clinton Administration, Mr. President. I have
been outspoken about this President's failures, particularly in dealing
with this ongoing crisis in the Balkans.
But, I do not think we should shape analysis, shade history, or
ignore facts to serve our profound discomfort with this
Administration's foreign policy.
For example, I would not join some members of the other body when
they argue that Operation Allied Force caused the genocidal campaign
now being perpetrated by Milosevic's troops and thugs in Kosovo. That
is a deplorable abandonment of analytic thinking, an egregious failure
to recognize cause and effect.
We know, Mr. President, that the Serbs were planning this program of
ethnic uprooting, of civilian massacres and worse. We know that the
Serbs were preparing this for nearly a year. We know that, for many
years, the official Serbian regime practiced a form of apartheid toward
the Kosovar Albanians. And we know that genocide and ethnic cleansing
are what Slobodan Milosevic does. It's on his resume.
This is Milosevic's fourth war. This is not a manipulation of
reality. In 1991, Milosevic's Yugoslav military attacked Slovenia and
Croatia. In 1992, he began a war in Bosnia that led to the deaths of
over 250,000 people, most of whom were civilians.
And, let us not forget Vukovar, Mr. President, the Croatian city
besieged and demolished by Serb forces, who, upon the fall of the city,
entered and massacred residents, including patients trapped in
hospitals.
Let us not forget Srebrenica, Mr. President, when Milosevic's
general, Ratko Mladic, captured the Muslim town, marched 7,000 men and
boys into open fields outside of town and massacred them in open
graves. This is what Milosevic does.
His reward for these wars was to be a negotiating partner at Dayton,
Ohio. He survived because the Clinton administration operates under
naive notions of peace and a feckless obeisance to polls. When it
leads, it follows chimeras of the Vietnam protester generation; most of
the time it follows.
For the Clinton Administration, Mr. President, the pursuit of peace
is the pursuit of a childish notion: The notion that peace is the
absence of conflict. Such a simplistic view of peace explains why they
have committed so many mistakes in the Balkans. The absence of
conflict, Richard Nixon once wrote, exists only in two places: in the
grave and at the typewriter. The point is not the absence of conflict,
but the management of conflict so that it does not erupt into violence.
And, Mr. President, to continue to negotiate with Slobodan Milosevic,
as we did until last month, and as I suspect the Administration would
do if it could, is a guarantee of greater, future violence. The
evidence is plenty and irrefutable, in my opinion, that the
ultranationalist regime Milosevic must have war to survive. That is
why, Mr. President, we are seeing the brutal effects of Milosevic's
fourth war today.
Many are very uncomfortable in giving this President the kind of
support stated in this resolution. Columnist William Safire in Monday's
New York Times called it ``The Price of Distrust,'' and stated that
``Clinton has so few followers in Congress because he is himself the
world's leading follower.''
Recall how candidate Clinton advocated bombing Slobodan Milosevic in
1992 as part of the ``lift and strike'' strategy (lift the embargo on
the Bosnians and strike the Serbs) to aid the Bosnians, who were
desperately holding off Milosevic's forces. I promoted ``lift and
strike'' in 1992. But when candidate Clinton became President Clinton,
he lost his desire to attack Milosevic and adopted a policy of leading
the Europeans, whose mismanagement of the conflict ultimately required
American leadership in 1995.
I have a vivid and bitter memory of a dramatic discussion I had with
then Bosnian Prime Minister Haris Siladzic in the summer of 1995, when
he had come to the U.S. to plead for us to lift our arms embargo
against his forces besieged by the well-armed Serbs. He met with me
moments after pleading, unsuccessfully, with Vice President Gore.
President Clinton had refused to meet with him. When I asked the Prime
Minister what was the Vice President's reasoning, I was told that the
Administration believed that lifting the arms embargo would cause the
Serbs to attack the eastern enclaves of Zepa, Gorazde and Srebrenica.
[[Page 8080]]
This is, of course, what the Serbs did anyway, weeks later. Over
8,000 unarmed men and boys were herded out of town and massacred. In
retrospect, I do not know what is more astounding: The Administration's
completely fallacious logic then, or the fact that, with the graves of
Srebrenica as a glaring lesson, they were unprepared for Milosevic's
campaign of genocide unleashed in the last month.
In spite of these criticisms, I believe there are essential American
national interests at stake in the Balkans. Europe has always been
important to the United States, both politically and economically. We
cannot stand by and watch while this region is continually disrupted.
We cannot accept instability in a region that is a geopolitical
crossroads and an economic thoroughfare benefitting U.S. security and
trade.
Therefore, Mr. President, I rise in support of this resolution. Its
purpose is to indicate a congressional stand on a war that is going
into its second month. Countries in the region are being destabilized.
Albanian and Croatian borders have been crossed by Serbian military
forces, and the slaughter going on in Kosovo has seen nothing like it
in Europe since the Holocaust.
In the wake of these events, I believe the United States must lead.
If we wish our own interests to be secure, we cannot afford to ignore
instability in other key regions. We cannot look the other way and
imagine that such conflict will not have an impact on us.
And, we cannot abdicate our role in NATO, perhaps the most successful
military alliance of the post-war era. If NATO, comprised of
democratic, freedom-loving nations of Europe, fails, we face untold
political and military tests in the future.
Yes, Mr. President, there have been egregious mistakes conducted in
the prosecution of this war. No mistake has been greater than the
repeated assertion that we would not even plan for the possibility of
ground forces.
This is not political leadership, Mr. President, it is leadership
paralysis. It will lead, I fear, to a defeat for NATO, to a diminution
of the symbolic power of the U.S. military, and an increase in the
insecurity this country will face in the very near future.
Other NATO leaders such as British Prime Minister Tony Blair--who,
never once in his political career has been referred to as a ``hawk''--
have at least the sensibility to recommend planning for the possibility
of ground forces.
The most critical error made by this Administration has been to
reiterate our refusal to consider ground forces. This self-limiting
rhetoric--which the public doesn't even believe--has compromised our
military campaign so far.
By declaring to Milosevic what we will not do, we have prolonged the
air campaign, and thereby increased the risks to the pilots and their
support. We have undermined out political goals, which, one must
presume, can only be achieved by meeting our military goals. In short,
we have given Milosevic the incentive to ``wait NATO out.''
And this is what leads us to this debate today, Mr. President. I
believe that NATO, as the alliance led by this country for half a
century, embodies both the symbolic and real military strength of this
country. If it is to engage in war, as it is now, it should not limit
its planning so that we increase the chance of failure. That is what is
happening right now.
Some fear that we give this President a blank check with this
resolution. We should also consider that such reticence by the Senate
position can be interpreted as a lack of resolve by Milosevic and his
gang of killers.
It could also be read by this President as an excuse to conclude this
war in a way that does not meet even the scant NATO objectives
articulated so far.
One thing we have witnessed over the past decade in the Balkans, Mr.
President, is that the longer we wait, the lousier the options. Fear of
incrementalism can become incrementalism. We have seen this in years of
ignoring the situation each time until it escalates and then meeting
that escalation with stop-gap measures.
Had we used airpower to degrade or destroy Milosevic's regime in the
early part of this decade, we would most likely have seen the rise of a
Serbian alternative to his regime. By allowing him to stay in power, he
has eviscerated the legitimate democratic opposition in Serbia, and he
has coalesced his power by bringing in the worst of the
ultranationalists. So today, at the end of a decade of genocidal wars
led by Milosevic, we appear feckless in the face of yet another war.
Mr. President, let me predict now that if Milosevic's military is not
destroyed--whether by air, by land, or by sea--this will not be the
last war. Ask the leaders of Albania and Macedonia if they feel secure
having a strong Serb military led by Milosevic camped on their borders.
Ask the Hungarian leadership.
Let me be clear about this: This is not an instruction to the
President to send in ground forces. I do not believe we should
micromanage wars. To the extent that air power can get the job done, I
would be very happy not to send American troops into this theater.
But, this resolution indicates that we accept no self-limiting
conditions on our military options. The leader of the United States has
hamstrung the most modern, effective military operation in history.
But, this resolution puts him on notice: If he fails to achieve the
objectives, he will not turn to the supporters of this resolution and
declare we were responsible for the failure.
Some insist that this is primarily a ``civil war,'' and that there is
the matter of Serbian sovereignty to respect. I would make three brief
remarks regarding this view.
One, the rapid depopulation of hundreds of thousands of people and
their forced movement across borders is an aggressive act, with
destabilizing consequences for the region. If, for example, the Chinese
were to unleash a million refugees across the Pacific to our shores, we
would consider that an aggressive act.
Second, international law is by no means clear in protecting the
right of a brutal regime to slaughter its citizens.
And, third, Mr. President, while we can debate the level of national
interest in Kosovo, I do not believe that we, in this body, Republican
or Democrat, advocate for the sovereign rights of genocidal dictators.
Mr. President, I greatly fear the consequences of failing in our war
against Milosevic. Yes, it is complicated, as are most matters of
foreign policy. Yes, we do not have excellent options, although rarely
in our history have we had them.
But we cannot deny the reality of an aggressive dictator waging war
after war in Europe, in a Europe this country has recognized is in our
national interest, a Europe over which we fought two hot wars and one
Cold War.
The result of our victory in that Cold War was the liberation of
eastern Europe. One dictator remaining in southeastern Europe has
inflamed the region, and if he continues undefeated, others will rise
in Europe and elsewhere. Among them will be some who believe they are
destined to challenge America.
Some of these dictators have already shown themselves, such as Saddam
Hussein. And, he's taking notes. Seeing the survival of Slobodan
Milosevic, he and others will challenge us again and again. I predict,
Mr. President, that with the survival of Slobodan Milosevic, the
security of this country will be increasingly challenged.
Mr. President, the point of this resolution is to indicate that the
Senate of the United States will support whatever it takes to achieve
the NATO objectives. If NATO fails--and there is no objective reason
that it should--it will be because of a failure of political will.
The supporters of this resolution, every one of them, indicate today
that we have the political will. I expect that we will have the
opportunity in the near future when members who support tabling the
resolution will be able to revisit the debate and demonstrate their
resolve as well.
Discomfort and disappointment with the Administration's conduct of
this war is not an excuse for us to hedge our political will, Mr.
President. That is why I will support the McCain resolution. At the end
of the day, history
[[Page 8081]]
does not wait for a heroic administration.
As I stand to address this debate, I recall the Boland amendment
debates in the 1980s, and the constant interference with the
President's right to resolve foreign policy issues. I argued that this
violated the Constitution at that time, and I tend to disagree today
with some Republicans who are reluctant to support the President simply
because the tables have turned.
I support the McCain resolution. I think it is the right thing. All
we do is give the President the authorization to use all necessary
force to support our objectives. It seems to me that is a pretty
reasonable thing for which to ask.
Three years ago we met with Milosevic in Belgrade. This is a man who
has put himself in power and kept himself in power through ethnic
conflict. If NATO and this President don't do what is right here, this
man will continue that ethnic conflict and it will lead to more wars.
In 1992, I recommended a lift-and-strike strategy--lift the embargo
and strike Milosevic's army that was committing genocidal war. Had we
done that then, we wouldn't be in this problem today.
The President has done what is right in going after this regime and
in stopping them from further genocidal conduct and letting them know
that enough is enough. But I fear the President has begun something
that he is unsure of completing. His goals remain vague and, worse, he
has limited the means he declares he will employ.
I commend those who have supported this particular resolution, and I
thank my dear friend from Connecticut for allowing me this time.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the Record
``The Price of Distrust,'' by William Safire.
There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in
the Record, as follows:
``The Price of Distrust''
(By William Safire)
Washington.--Congress is not only ambivalent about buying
into ``Clinton's War,'' it is also of two minds about being
ambivalent.
That is because the war to make Kosovo safe for Kosovars is
a war without an entrance strategy. By its unwillingness to
enter Serbian territory to stop the killing at the start,
NATO conceded defeat. The bombing is simply intended to
coerce the Serbian leader to give up at the negotiating table
all he has won on the killing field. He won't.
He will make a deal. By urging that Russia be the broker,
Clinton knows he can do no better than compromise with
criminality. That means we are not fighting to win but are
merely punishing to settle.
Small wonder that no majority has formed in Congress to
adopt the McCain-Biden resolution giving the President
authority to use ``all necessary force'' to achieve a clear
victory. Few want to go out on a limb for Clinton knowing
that he is preparing to saw that limb off behind them.
Clinton has so few followers in Congress because he is
himself the world's leading follower. He steers not by the
compass but by the telltale, driven by polls that dictate
both how far he can go and how little he can get away with.
The real debate, then, is not intervention vs. isolation,
not sanctity of borders vs. self-determination of nations,
not Munich vs. Vietnam, not NATO credibility vs. America the
globocop. The central question is: Do we trust this President
to use all force necessary to establish the principle that no
nation can drive out an unwanted people?
The answer is no. The distrust is palpable. Give him the
tools and he will not finish the job.
Proof that such distrust is well founded is in the erosion
of NATO's key goal: muscular protection of refugees trusting
enough to return to Kosovo.
At first, that was to be done by ``a NATO force,'' rather
than U.N. peacekeepers. The fallback was to ``a NATO-led
force,'' including Russians. Now the formulation is ``ready
to lead,'' if anybody asks, or ``a force with NATO at its
core,'' which means Serb-favoring Russians, Ukrainians and
Argentinians, with Hungarians and Czechs to give the illusion
of ``a NATO core.''
If you were an ethnic-Albanian woman whose husband had been
massacred, sister raped, children scattered and house burned
down on orders from Belgrade--would you go back home under
such featherweight protection?
Only a fool would trust an observer group so rotten to its
``core.'' And yet that is the concession NATO has made even
before formal negotiations begin.
What can we expect next? After a few more weeks of feckless
bombing while Milosevic completes his dirty work in Kosovo,
Viktor Chernomyrdin or Jimmy Carter or somebody will
intercede to arrange a cease-fire. Film will be shot of
Serbian tanks (only 30 were hit in a month of really smart
bombing) rolling back from Kosovo as bombardment halts and
the embargo is lifted.
Sergei Rogov, the Moscow Arbatovnik, laid out the Russian
deal in yesterday's Washington Post: (1) autonomy for Kosovo
but no independence or partition; (2) Milosevic troops out
but Serbian ``border guards'' to remain in Kosovo, and (3)
peace ``enforcers'' under not NATO but U.N. and Helsinki Pact
bureaucrats. As a grand concession, NATO would be allowed to
care for refugees in Albania and Macedonia.
That, of course, would be a triumph for mass murderers
everywhere, and Clinton will insist on face-savers: war-
crimes trials for sergeants and below, a Brit and a Frenchman
in command of a NATO platoon of Pomeranian grenadiers, no
wearing of blue helmets and absolutely no reparations to
Serbia to rebuild bridges in the first year.
Perhaps Britain's Tony Blair will prod Clinton to do
better, and all Serbian troops and paramilitary thugs will be
invited out of Kosovo. But the returning K.L.A. will find
mass graves and will likely lash out at Serbs; after an
indecent interval Belgrade will assert sovereignty with
troops in police uniforms.
And what will happen to the principle of no reward for
internal aggression? It will be left for resolution to our
next President, who, in another test, will have the strength
of the people's trust.
Mr. DODD. Mr. President, I want to begin by commending our colleague
from Arizona, Senator McCain, our colleague from Delaware, Senator
Biden, and others who are responsible for drafting this resolution of
which I am a cosponsor.
As the Senator from Utah has indicated, this resolution gives our
President the means to respond to this crisis, utilizing whatever force
may be necessary in concert with our allies. Obviously the best
resolution to the crisis in Kosovo would be a political and diplomatic
agreement which does not put any more lives in harm's way.
Unfortunately, such a resolution depends on Slobodan Milosevic halting
his campaign of genocide and agreeing to the reasonable conditions set
forth by the United States and our allies. So far, however, he has
indicated that force is the only language he understands.
Clearly, this is not a unilateral effort on behalf of the United
States. There are 18 other nations that make up the NATO strategic
alliance. As a result, it is essential that we act in concert with
them.
The resolution before us is fair, balanced, and deserves the support
of our colleagues.
As my colleague from Arizona said earlier, it is unfortunate that we
are placed under the pressure of casting a yea or nay vote or a tabling
motion, if one is made, after such a short period of debate. Ideally,
we might have waited a few more days for consideration of this
resolution. It was not the desire of the distinguished Senator from
Arizona nor the distinguished Senator from Delaware to force this vote.
It is one that is being forced upon us by a procedural requirement
under the law.
Never the less, the resolution before us is both sound and important.
I urge my colleagues to join me in supporting it.
Before I proceed to the matter before us today, let me just take a
moment to join my colleagues in expressing how pleased I am that
Servicemen Ramirez, Gonzales and Stone have finally been freed from
their prison cells and have now been reunited with their families.
Reverend Jackson, who led the delegation and secured their release,
certainly deserves our commendation.
While we rejoice at the freedom of three brave Americans, however, we
must also keep in mind that on the very same day they were released,
some 7,000 Kosovars were forced to flee for their lives and seek refuge
in neighboring countries. Today, they have joined the ranks of more
than one million Kosovar Albanians who have watched their homes
disappear behind clouds of acrid smoke, who now know the pain of
missing or murdered family members, or who know the personal pain of
torture or rape.
These atrocities are not isolated incidents. Rather, they represent a
calculated and methodical effort to commit genocide, designed and
executed by Slobodan Milosevic and his soldiers
[[Page 8082]]
and policemen. Mr. Milosevic has left his bloody hand print on more
than just Kosovo. Several years ago, we saw his willingness to use
murder, torture and rape as tools of a ethnic-cleansing in Bosnia and
Herzegovina. Months before NATO dropped the first bomb on Yugoslavia he
had already forced 400,000 Kosovars from their homes in spite of the
Herculean efforts by the United States and our allies to find a
diplomatic or political resolution.
Thus, the notion that NATO forces have contributed or caused the
Kosovars to be displaced or put in harm's way is entirely without
merit. This tragedy has resulted from the actions of one individual and
those of his supporters who have allowed this policy to go forward.
The messages we send, both by the words we utter and by the votes we
cast, often travel far beyond the walls of this chamber. Rarely,
however, do they travel as far or as widely as will the messages we
send during this debate.
Firstly, our service men and women are listening at their posts
around the world. They want to know where they stand when it comes to
the Senate. They ought to know, in performance of their duties, they
have the backing and the support of their elected representatives. It
ought to be abundantly clear that we stand shoulder to shoulder with
them when they fight under the American flag. It was not their decision
to be engaged in combat. Yet, the jobs they do are monumentally
important. We must not take any action here in the Senate which will
send the signal that they have anything but the highest level of
support we can muster.
The innocent men, women and children of Kosovo are also listening
tonight. More than 665,000 are in refugee camps in Macedonia or Albania
living under tremendously difficult conditions. While they are safe,
they desperately want to be able to return to what is left of their
homes and villages and begin the difficult process of rebuilding.
Hundreds of thousands of others are hiding in the hills of Kosovo
without adequate food or shelter, praying that Serb forces will not
find them. They too are listening to the message we send here today,
wondering when they will be able to come out of the hills without a
fear of death or torture.
They are also listening in Belgrade tonight. President Milosevic is
listening for a crack in the United States' resolve to oppose his reign
of terror in Kosovo. I hope there is no debate in this Chamber that his
actions should be ignored. Similarly, I hope that the Senate will not
stand silent instead of expressing our sense of outrage over what this
man has done to so many innocent people simply because of their
ethnicity. We must never stand silent in the face of Mr. Milosevic's
genocide.
All across Europe, our NATO allies are listening. It has not been
easy for the 19 member nations to come together in a common purpose. I
hope that, as our allies watch these proceedings tonight and tomorrow,
they understand how highly we regard this alliance. I have heard some
of our colleagues say it does not make any difference to them whether
or not NATO is damaged as a result of our votes or action. I cannot
disagree more vigorously. It would be a grave mistake to damage this
important alliance. Yet, we could do just damage by the votes we cast
and statements we make over the next several hours.
Finally, the governments and citizens of the front-line states are
listening. It is critically important that we demonstrate our support
to Albania, which has borne the greatest burden, and Macedonia, which
despite its complicated political situation, has taken in large numbers
of refugees. The province of Montenegro also deserves commendation for,
despite is status as a province of Yugoslavia, it has refused to
subjugate its police forces to Yugoslav control and has taken in tens
of thousands of Kosovar refugees. Bulgaria, Romania, Slovenia, Croatia,
Hungary and Bosnia also deserve international commendation. With the
exception of Hungary, none of those is a NATO ally, yet they are
standing with us. Yet, in contrast to their steadfast support, in a
little more than 12 hours, the United States Senate may decide that
this crisis is not worthy of our vote to give the President and NATO
the backing they need to deal with this issue.
I want to point out to my colleagues, that the world--from a newly
orphaned child in a Macedonian refugee camp to our allies to Slobodan
Milosevic--does listen to the messages we send. Mr. President, 60 years
ago next week a ship called the ``St. Louis'' sailed from Hamburg,
Germany. Aboard were 937 passengers with one-way tickets. Nine-hundred
six of the passengers were Jewish refugees who, having lived through
Kristallnacht six months earlier, already feared for their lives.
Holding what they believed to be valid entry permits for Cuba, they
left their homes and lives behind, hoping to find safety on the far
side of the Atlantic Ocean. When they arrived in Havana two weeks
later, however, only 28 were permitted, to go ashore. After lying at
anchor for a full week under the oppressive sun, the St. Louis left
Havanna and tried to enter American waters, but they were told that
they were not welcome in this country, that we could not take 900 more
people into the United States.
That ship and its passengers returned to Europe more than a month
after it left. The United States Holocaust Memorial Museum just a few
blocks from here has traced the lives of the St. Louis' passengers. The
fates of the more than one third of the St. Louis' passengers who later
perished in the Holocaust should stand as a stark warning to us here
today.
There are no ships at sea tonight, but I make the case that there is
indeed a ``St. Louis.'' It is called Albania; it is called Montenegro;
it is called Macedonia. And there are many more thousands inside Kosovo
who are now watching and listening to what we, the leader of the free
world, the leader of the effort to try to bring some order to the chaos
which has been visited in the Balkans, are saying.
To all of the different parties listening to our debate tonight and
to our votes tomorrow, we must send the same message and we must send
that message with a clear and convincing voice. We should support the
McCain resolution in order to demonstrate that we will give NATO the
backing and support it needs politically, diplomatically, and, yes, if
need be, militarily, to respond to this situation. If we fail to
respond, we may well place not only Kosovo but the rest of Europe in
harm's way
The lessons of history are before us. We have been told by George
Santayana that ``Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to
repeat it.''
I hope that in the next 12 hours or so, before we vote on this
matter, our colleagues think long and hard about this resolution. I
hope we will find the strength to overlook the personalities. Whether
or not we like this President or voted for him or agree with him on
every issue, there is an organization called NATO which we will place
in jeopardy if we fail to act properly and prudently. There are
people's lives who are in jeopardy at this very hour as we debate this
issue on the floor of the Senate. And there is the future precedent
being set by how we act here.
If we do not approve this resolution, history will judge us. Let the
words of the Nobel Peace Prize Laureate Elie Wiesel be a warning to us
here tonight: ``Rejected by mankind, the condemned to not go so far as
to reject it in turn. Their faith remains unshaken, and one may well
wonder why. They do not despair. The proof: they persist in surviving
not only to survive, but to testify. The victims elect to become
witnesses.''
So, Mr. President, I urge the support and adoption of the McCain-
Biden resolution. I believe it is the right thing to do. History will
judge us properly and well if we support this important resolution. Our
future, our children and generations to come, both here in America and
around the world, will applaud the action of a Congress that has not
lost sight of the lessons of history.
Mr. President, I see the arrival of the majority leader and I yield
the floor.
Mr. LOTT. I thank the Senator from Connecticut for yielding. Mr.
President, I do have a unanimous consent
[[Page 8083]]
request to propound momentarily. This is on the financial services
modernization bill.
While I am waiting, I commend Senator Daschle for his leadership,
helping to get us to a position where we could move to that legislation
tomorrow; and Senator Gramm and Senator Sarbanes have been working
together. I think this is a good agreement, a fair one, and allows us
to get to a substitute that could be offered.
____________________
UNANIMOUS CONSENT AGREEMENT--S. 900
Mr. LOTT. I ask unanimous consent that following the vote relative to
S.J. Res. 20, if tabled, the Senate move to proceed and agree to the
motion to proceed to S. 900--that is, the financial services
modernization bill--and, following opening statements, Senator Sarbanes
be recognized to offer an amendment in the nature of a substitute, the
text of which is S. 753, and no amendments or motions to commit or
recommit be in order during the pendency of the substitute, and, if the
amendment is agreed to, it be considered as original text for the
purpose of further amendment.
I further ask that, following disposition of the Sarbanes substitute,
the next two amendments in order be first-degree amendments to be
offered by the chairman or his designee.
I also ask that following the disposition of two Republican
amendments, Senator Sarbanes or his designee be recognized to offer an
amendment, the text of which is the CRA provisions of S. 753
substituting for the CRA provisions of S. 900 and no amendments or
motions to commit or recommit be in order during the pendency of the
Sarbanes/CRA amendment.
Finally, I ask that all amendments in order to S. 900 be relevant to
the financial services legislation.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. LOTT. I thank my colleagues and yield the floor.
____________________
DEPLOYMENT OF UNITED STATES ARMED FORCES TO THE KOSOVO REGION IN
YUGOSLAVIA
The Senate continued with the consideration of the resolution.
Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I yield 30 minutes to the Senator from
Delaware, Senator Biden.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Delaware.
Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, may I make a parliamentary inquiry? Is
Senator Durbin next on the list after me? The reason I ask is, Senator
Durbin apparently agreed to switch spots with Senator Kerry.
Mr. McCAIN. After Senator Biden is Senator Kerry, Senator Warner,
Senator Nickles, Senator Durbin, then Senator Dorgan, Senator
Lieberman, Senator Cleland, Senator Levin, Senator Hollings, and
Senator Brownback.
Mr. BIDEN. I thank the Senator. I know the Senator has a very
important appointment he has to make. I am prepared, if it is all right
with the Senator from Arizona, to switch with him and follow him. In
other words, then the Senator from Massachusetts will be next and then
I will speak.
Mr. McCAIN. I ask unanimous consent that the Senator from
Massachusetts, Mr. Kerry, be recognized for 15 minutes, followed by
Senator Biden for 30 minutes, and the Record will show the incredible
generosity of the Senator from Delaware, Mr. Biden, having allowed
two--not one, but two--Senators to precede him.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I ask that Senator Kerry be recognized for
up to 30 minutes.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Massachusetts.
Mr. KERRY. I thank the Chair, and I particularly thank Senator Biden
for his courtesy. I appreciate this enormously. I also thank Senator
Durbin, who is not here, but will be here shortly, for his courtesy.
Mr. President, I join with the Senator from Arizona, the Senator from
Connecticut, Senator Dodd, Senator Biden and others in support of this
resolution. I understand the sensitivities of a great many of our
colleagues and the administration to where we find ourselves. But I
think that a fair analysis of what the Senate has before it and what
the country has before it really mandates that the Senate be prepared
to back up its own steps, the steps that we took when we supported the
bombing itself.
I heard a number of my colleagues in the course of the debate over
this afternoon, most recently the Senator from New Mexico, say, ``Well,
we need to recognize that the President made a decision and the
President, having made a decision, we now need to know from the
President what the strategy is; we need to know from the President what
the exit strategy is; we need to know from the President what is called
for.''
Frankly, I say to my colleagues, there is not a small measure of
contradiction in those statements today. There may even be some
measure, I think, of confusion about the road that we have traveled.
The fact is that the President made it clear to us at the outset what
our goal was. The goal has always been the capacity of the Kosovars to
live in peace within Kosovo. The goal has been a return to the status
quo before Mr. Milosevic withdrew autonomy which had been enjoyed by
the ethnic Albanians in Kosovo for years, in the wake of his sudden
discovery that playing the nationalist card, in fact, was a road to
power, as it was also the road to some four wars and to an
extraordinary amount of killing in Bosnia, in Slovenia, Herzegovina and
Croatia.
Now, Mr. President, we find ourselves in the situation where the
Senator from Arizona and some of us are suggesting that the course that
we chose in the beginning is, in fact, a correct course, and the course
that we ought to follow. The truth is that it was not just the
President of the United States who made a decision. So did the Senate
of the United States. A majority of the Senators in this body voted to
approve the bombing, and having approved the bombing and having decided
to send American forces into harm's way, they embraced the goals that
were then stated.
One component of those goals did change, obviously, dramatically. The
effort initially was to prevent the ethnic cleansing from taking place
and to hope we could sufficiently degrade the military machine to
prevent that from happening. That, obviously, did not occur, and the
ethnic cleansing continued. We now find ourselves with more than half
the population dislocated outside of Kosovo, a significant portion
displaced within Kosovo, and as to how many that may be is imprecise.
It seems to me that this is not a time for the Senate to engage in
covering its own posterior, not a time for the Senate to engage in a
wholesale set of contradictions. It is rather the time for the Senate
to declare, as unequivocally as it declared 40 days ago, that we are
prepared to move forward with the bombing, that the same goals and the
same objectives are viable today.
It is interesting. I know that some have hearkened back to the Tonkin
Gulf resolution and have hearkened back to some of the lessons of the
Vietnam war. There is no small irony, however, in the fact that we are
beyond, in a way, the Gulf of Tonkin resolution. There was a time for
people to question why we were bombing, what the motives were of
bombing, what we hoped to achieve through the bombing and whether or
not it was appropriate to start bombing and then suddenly stop, short
of achieving those objectives. That, I think, would have been
appropriate.
Having decided that you were going to bomb, I think most people
accepted the notion that the reason for bombing was legitimate enough,
that the reason for putting American forces in harm's way was
legitimate enough, that the goals that we were trying to achieve were
legitimate enough, and that if you were prepared to take the risks of
putting those people in harm's way, you were also accepting the
responsibility for achieving the goal that was set out.
Back in the 1960s, when the Gulf of Tonkin resolution came to the
floor,
[[Page 8084]]
there were two Senators who stood up and, as a matter of conscience,
said: I disagree with this, and voted against. One was Wayne Morse; the
other was Ernest Gruening. It took a long time for history to prove
those lone Senators correct. It may well be that those Senators who
voted against the resolution supporting air strikes against Yugoslavia
and who might choose to vote against those things necessary to achieve
the goals may be proven correct by history. I do not know. At least
that opposition is consistent, and at least that opposition is devoid
of the disingenuity that we seem to see in those who voted to start
bombing, those who have been saying for a year and a half or 2 years or
more, you have to stop Mr. Milosevic, those who were crying for the
United States to take a stand only a year ago, and then once the
President does take a stand--the only stand that most people in the
world thought he could take--all of a sudden they begin to vanish and
run for the sidelines and take cover. I find that rather extraordinary,
not to mention that it is, in fact, a contradiction of enormous
proportions.
I understand how some in this Chamber have reservations about
bombing. I understand full well about how some, given the history of
the Balkans, may have inherent reservations about the United States,
through NATO, even being involved there. Some of those people reflected
those deep-rooted beliefs and fears in their original vote.
But the majority of the Senate voted by a greater margin than the
majority who sent this Nation to war in Desert Storm--a greater
majority. After Desert Storm, all those who had voted against it came
together to suggest that the stated goals of the United States were
such that we ought to guarantee the outcome. And we were committed to
do what was necessary in order to achieve that, and we would support
any efforts in order to achieve that.
Mr. President, I think one of the great lessons of the Vietnam
period--and I think Senator Hagel feels it very strongly, Senator
McCain feels it very strongly, Senator Robb, myself, and others--is
that if you are going to commit American forces, you make the decisions
at the outset about what you are trying to achieve, and you make
decisions at the outset that if you are going to send those soldiers--
airmen, seamen, all of them--into battle, you do so with the
understanding that you are committed to achieving the goals that you
have set out.
I think it would be astonishing, in the face of the reality that the
goals are achievable here, that this is so distinctly different from a
Vietnam or even a Desert Storm in some ways--that we should ourselves
provide these ingredients of doubt and reservation that seem to back
off the original commitment that we made.
I have heard many people questioning, not only today, some of the
rationale for why we are there or how the war is proceeding. But some
seek a reservation in the notion that the President has not asked for
this authorization of force or the Joint Chiefs of Staff have not asked
for it. But those same people are always quick to come to the floor and
assert the powers and prerogatives of the U.S. Congress in the conduct
of foreign policy.
They are often the first to come to the floor to suggest some
alternative policy to the President. They have often come to the floor
with amendments to change Presidential policy in foreign policy, to
amend it, to strengthen it. I think there is an irony that all of a
sudden they are suggesting so much power to the President, so much
prerogative away from the Congress, when they have spent an awful long
time here asserting the very opposite.
In addition to that, I have heard colleagues deeply disturbed--as
anybody should be appropriately--about collateral damage and what
happens in the bombing. I do not think there is an American, in good
conscience, who does not feel pangs or deep reservations about any
errant missile or errant bomb and what the effects are. But there is no
moral equivalency whatsoever between those errant impacts and what we
are trying to achieve and what Mr. Milosevic has been achieving. There
is simply no moral equivalency.
Let us not get confused between collateral damage and the murder,
rape, organized rape, pillage, plunder, decimation of ethnicity,
robbing of identities, the wholesale destruction of villages, the
killing of teachers and parents in front of their children, the
remarkable--remarkable--dismemberment of the people that Mr. Milosevic
is engaged in and not for the first time. Having seen the record of
what he did in Bosnia, to allow that kind of moral equivocation to
enter into our thinking in this is, to me, to miss the point
altogether.
The fact is that Senator Dodd from Connecticut pointed out, and
others have pointed out, that what we do here can have a profound,
long-lasting, deep impact on our capacity to negotiate, to pressure,
and to speak about and stand for morality and for a standard of
behavior that is different from the kind of killing and marauding that
has governed so much of this century.
Now, some will say, ``Well, the Balkans are different.'' Some will
say, ``Well, we can't always affect the outcome of these things.'' The
fact is, we can affect this outcome. We can affect this result. We do
have the power and the ability to be able to do this.
I have heard some of my colleagues come to the floor and say this is
going to affect our capacity to fight some other war somewhere. What
war? Where? What are they talking about? I mean, are we planning
suddenly some other war of which we are not aware?
This is staring us in the face. It is here. It is now. We are at war.
The question we must ask ourselves is whether or not we are prepared to
win or whether we are going to put obstacle after obstacle in front of
ourselves to deprive ourselves of the capacity to achieve the goals
that are achievable.
I hear some refer to Vietnam a lot, but other kinds of conflicts as
well. I suggest that this is not a Vietnam--unless we make it a
Vietnam, unless it is our own lack of resolve and pursuit.
Some have said, well, if it is a mistake in the first place, you do
not want to go down the road pursuing a mistake. I support that notion.
I recall coming back from Vietnam and saying, ``it is pretty hard to
ask somebody to be the person to die for a mistake or especially the
last person to die for it.''
I am sensitive to that. But the original question is, Is this a
mistake? When 58 of us voted on the floor of the Senate to send people
into harm's way in order to achieve our stated goals, we were making a
judgment about whether or not we thought it was a mistake to intervene.
And now that we have decided to intervene, let us at least have the
courage to persevere.
Why did we intervene? Well, I believe that the imperatives of
intervention outweigh the alternatives so far that it is hard to really
measure the counterarguments. Any one of us in the Senate can hear this
well of the Senate ringing out with the voices of those who would have
come to the floor if the images of CNN night after night had been of
Milosevic running unstopped over the people of Kosovo, unstopped, and
no effort whatsoever to try to prevent him. I could hear people coming
to the floor and saying, ``Where is a President with the courage of
Ronald Reagan or George Bush who's willing to draw the line as they
did?'' You can hear those speeches now. They would have been spoken.
President George Bush, in fact, had the same policy that President
Clinton has. George Bush, before he left office, said we would draw the
line in Kosovo and told Mr. Milosevic, in no uncertain terms, ``Don't
monkey around with this one.'' And because he had the credibility of
what he had done in Kuwait, you can bet that that made a difference.
That is why we are here on the floor with this resolution, to give
our effort the kind of credibility that it deserves, to back up our
soldiers who are running those risks on a daily basis, with the
understanding that there is a rationale for our having asked them to do
what they are doing. I do not, by any sense of the imagination, believe
that we have exhausted the air campaign in this.
It astonishes me, in some ways, that so many people are so
questioning of
[[Page 8085]]
an air campaign that--knock on wood--has not yet cost us the life of
one of those pilots. I am astonished, as a former serviceperson, at the
quality and care with which this has been prosecuted. We lose more
people every week in the military of this country in normal training
exercises and operations. The fact that this has been carried on now
for 40 days, melding Dutch, British, Germans, Americans, French,
Greeks, 19 different countries together, melding all of these airplanes
and those multiple sorties, and bringing that together, is really a
remarkable accomplishment.
At the same time, day by day by day, albeit some Members of the
Yugoslav Army may feel better and think, gee, we have been given a
purpose in life, the fact is that on a daily basis their capacity to
wage the war is being stripped away. Who in their right mind would
choose Mr. Milosevic's hand to play in this versus the hand of NATO?
The question before the Senate and this country is, Will we have the
capacity to stay and play out the hand that we have?
This is not Vietnam. This is not a country that stretches from the
equivalent of New England all the way down to the tip of Florida with a
Laos and a Cambodia on its borders, with a superpower, the former
Soviet Union, and China sitting in the background supplying, pushing
down the Ho Chi Minh Trail, ready to come in when we threaten to use
whatever force may be available to us. This is not the United States
essentially acting alone.
Taken together, Serbia and Montenegro are slightly smaller than
Kentucky and are essentially surrounded by friendly people. Kosovo is
approximately the size of Los Angeles county. Unlike North Vietnam and
South Vietnam at the time, unlike that country, where we became
involved on the side of one of the combatants, where we chose to carry
on years of colonial effort that had been misconstrued by the
population and outright opposed and reviled for years, unlike the
inadvisability of having been embroiled, we have been very careful here
to suggest we are not for independence for Kosovo, we are not for the
KLA ravaging their countryside any more than we are for Mr. Milosevic
and the Serbs doing so.
We are fighting for the standards of internationally accepted,
universally accepted behavior that country after country has signed on
to through United Nations conventions and other instruments of
international law and through their own standards of behavior.
I can't think of anything more right than taking a position against
this kind of thuggery and this kind of effrontery to those standards as
we leave the end of this century.
Some people say to me, ``well, Senator, we are going to have some
people there for a long time.'' My answer is, So what? If that is what
it takes in order to try to begin to establish a principle that is more
long lasting, so be it.
What is the difference between 4,000 troops who have been asked to be
part of a peaceful effort to change the standards of behavior in Kosovo
as part of southern Europe--what is the difference between that and the
500,000 troops we had at a high point in Europe after World War II?
Don't forget the way in which most Americans were skeptical of Harry
Truman and the Marshall plan. How on Earth could the United States of
America, having fought the Germans, turn around and put money back into
their country? How on Earth could we try to bring the Germans into
NATO?
Well, where are we today? A united Germany, the Berlin Wall gone,
Berlin about to be the united capital of Germany, and the result,
Germans participating with us in standing up against the very kinds of
things that stained the history of this century and of their country
during World War II. Is there a more beautiful circle in terms of
understanding what is at stake? I do not think so.
It seems to me, Mr. President, that an investment of some 5,000,
6,000, 7,000 troops in southern Europe to guarantee that Greece,
Macedonia, Montenegro, and Albania can remain stable and not be dragged
into this, that is worthwhile.
Some would say, Senator, we heard that old domino argument before;
that is the one they gave us in Vietnam.
Once again, the facts on the ground are proving the reality. Can
anyone here tell me with a straight face that Montenegro, without our
current efforts and involvement, could possibly withstand the strains
of what is happening? Can anybody tell me that if the entire population
of Kosovo were driven out into Albania, you wouldn't somehow see
Macedonia, Greece, Albania dragged into this? Ultimately, there isn't a
person in the Senate who doesn't understand that we would have been
dragged into it, too. There was an inevitability that NATO would be
called on to take a stand.
How astonishing it is that people find some kind of moral equivalency
here between some of the difficulties of waging a fairly carefully
prosecuted--not fairly, a very carefully prosecuted war, and what we
are trying to achieve. How astonishing that people are so concerned
about finding that equivalency measured against what Mr. Milosevic has
done.
I believe if we will stand our ground and be steady and show the
resolve that we need to show as a great country and the leader of the
free world, that we have the ability, through this air campaign, to
achieve ultimately the diplomatic outcome that we would like to
achieve.
But we have also learned through all of history--Henry Kissinger and
Richard Nixon will tell you this, in dealing with the North Vietnamese
in the Christmas bombing, and I hated it back then, but I have come to
understand that there are, in fact, sometimes some things that do speak
and make a difference to certain people. Like it or not, as I have been
deeply involved in that part of the world in the last years, I have
learned that that did help make a difference to people's decisions to
try to come to some kind of resolution.
The fact is that we are now backing up diplomacy with force. I have
heard some people call for a stay in that force, that somehow it would
be diplomatically nice if we were to turn around and have a bombing
pause.
My response to that is very simple: Do not let the politicians
decide, after sending the military personnel in to risk their lives,
when you are going to have a bombing pause, without adequately passing
it by the military to ensure that you are not going to put your people
at greater risk if you don't achieve your goals at the back side of it.
I can't go into all the reasons for that, but people understand that
there are a great many repercussions to a bombing halt which could have
greater jeopardy to our pilots and greater jeopardy to the use of
whatever force we need to use down the road. I am perfectly committed
to having that happen at the right moment, but I want that to be driven
by the military needs of achieving our goals and not simply the
political imperatives at the time.
Finally, Mr. President, let me say that I hear colleagues say: Well,
we want to know what the end game is; we want to know what the strategy
is. We have even heard mention of the Boland amendment and other
things. Are we in this to win?
There are only three or so choices in this, Mr. President. That is
about it. Anybody ought to be able to figure them out. Stop the bombing
and fail to achieve your goals. And if you stop the bombing; NATO would
be irreparably damaged, if not simply finished. Mr. Milosevic can
declare victory, do what he wants, and you will have no force in there.
That is one choice.
Another choice is that you continue to prosecute the air war as you
press the diplomatic effort, with a guarantee that you are going to
press that until you get that effort.
The third is--and it is the best end game, best exit strategy of
all--you win. That is the exit strategy. You achieve the simple stated
goal of returning the Kosovars into Kosovo, allowing them to live in a
protected structure where people won't be killing them, and at the same
time have a force that has the capacity to prevent the UCK/KLA from
also engaging in killing. It is called peace. I think that is an end
game worth fighting for.
[[Page 8086]]
If the impact of the air war is substantial enough to force Mr.
Milosevic to yield and accept NATO's terms for ending the war, then we
will have won. However, if bombing alone is not enough, then winning
will require that we have the determination and resolve to do whatever
is necessary on the ground to achieve these objectives--to win.
I think when you measure the history of Europe and the importance of
southern Europe, and the success of the integration process in Europe,
you cannot question the need to achieve our stated goals in Kosovo.
NATO has played an important role in the integration process--just talk
to the officials in Spain or in other parts of Europe about the impact
of NATO as an organizing principal, as a means of having brought
countries together around democracy. They will tell you unequivocally
of the degree to which the process of meeting, of coming together, of
having mutual responsibilities, of needing to work together have had a
profound impact on the capacity of Europe to develop so that they now
have a common market and are working on the last efforts of
integration, with more power in Brussels and more capacity as a
European entity to speak to the world and to stand for these
principles.
Are we going to deny that to southeastern Europe? Are we going to
ignore the lesson that we would sent to Baghdad or Pyongyang or Tripoli
or to other parts of the world if we fail to do what is necessary to
win in Kosovo? I hope the answer of the Senate would be unequivocally
no. The lessons of history are such that they taught us that this is
the right thing to be doing for the right reasons. They are, I think,
efforts that are worthy of our commitment in order to see it through to
the end.
I am confident that if the Senate and the country were to speak with
a single voice on this, in a short period of time we would see this
resolved and, most likely, Mr. President, without recourse to ground
troops or to prolonged war.
I yield the floor.
Mr. BIDEN addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Delaware.
Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I have been authorized, since nobody else
is on the floor, to go down the list here. I believe I am to be yielded
30 minutes at this point. I ask that I be able to proceed.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Delaware is recognized for 30
minutes.
Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, there are few issues that this body debates
which are of consequence equal to what we are debating today. We are
literally talking about the life and death of thousands of people,
including possibly American personnel, American soldiers.
I have been here for 27 years, and on those occasions when I have
been put in the position of having to vote on matters that relate to
whether or not someone will live or die, I have tried my level best to
be as intellectually honest and rigorous with myself as I possibly can.
I have listened to the debate on the floor today with great interest
and with some disappointment. It comes as no surprise to my colleagues
that have served with me in the last 10 years or so, or even those in
the last year or so, how strongly I feel about the Balkans. I am given
blame, or credit, depending on the place from which you come, for
getting us as involved in Bosnia as we are. I came back in the early
nineties from a long, several-hour meeting late in the night in the
office of Slobodan Milosevic, the President of Yugoslavia, and I came
away convinced that this was a man with an agenda that was anathema to
our interests and was literally genocidal.
I wrote a report years ago, referred to as ``lift and strike,''
whereby I urged us to change our policy. And so I don't want to attempt
to hide in any way the intensity of my feelings about what the
appropriate action for the United States, NATO, and the world is
relative to Mr. Milosevic. But when I recently got back from Macedonia
late at night on a Sunday, I got home. After flying, I guess, for 12 or
so hours--whatever the timeframe was--I did what most people do after a
long trip. I took a shower and brushed my teeth and tried as quietly as
I could to climb into bed and not disturb my wife, who was asleep.
After I got settled, thinking I had accomplished not awakening her,
she leaned over and said, ``Welcome home.'' Then she asked me a
question, which I suspect the American people are asking. You are going
to ask every one of us. My constituents are going to ask me. It was
absolutely sincere. She said, in the dark of the night--and I could not
even see her face--``Joe, are you sure you're correct?''
That sort of cut right to the quick of things. I had been so
outspoken on this issue, and that took me aback for a moment. I
answered her with complete honesty and candor. I said, ``I don't know.
I am not positive. I can't guarantee it, but I feel so strongly that
I'm right, that I'm going to continue to pursue pushing us in the
direction of doing what I think is right.''
If my wife is asking me if I'm sure I'm right, and she is privy to my
thoughts, concerns, and serious contemplations about whether or not I
should be a party to causing some Americans to die, then I wonder what
the majority of the American people must think. They must be moved by,
or find appealing, the arguments of some of my colleagues today on the
floor: It is not our fight. We should not be there. We are doing it the
wrong way. The President of the United States is not worthy of our
trust as Commander in Chief. We should bring the boys home. We have no
vital interests.
You know, I sit in a seat now that men such as Vandenberg sat in. I
am a senior Senator. There is only one person on the Foreign Relations
Committee that has been there as long as I have been there. When I was
the age of these pages--this is the truth--I used to wonder, when I was
in high school and college, as we studied about Hitler and Germany, why
nobody did anything in 1934 or 1935 or 1937 or 1938 when the price
would have been incredibly lower. You look back now and just think what
would have happened had the world united and gone in and taken Hitler
out. Just think how different it would have been.
By the way, I note parenthetically that I am not equating Milosevic
to Hitler in terms of his capacity, ability, or his danger. As the
Senator from Massachusetts pointed out, he does not represent a country
of 50 million people, an industrial giant. He does not have the
military power of a country as great as Germany. He does not present
the same threat.
But it is analogous in the following way: In a closed meeting of the
Foreign Relations Committee, with senior Members of the Senate in
attendance from the Committee on Appropriations and, I believe, Armed
Services, I was making a case several months ago about why we had to be
involved.
One of my colleagues, for whom I have an overwhelming amount of
respect, a veteran who put his life on the line for this country, a
very promilitary guy, looked at me and asked the following question,
which answered for me that question I could never answer as a young
man, Why did we not act? After listening to my case as to why we should
be involved with NATO, he said, ``But, Joe, can you guarantee me no
American will be killed?'' It was as if somebody took one of those
little hammers that the doctors use to test your reflexes, those little
rubber hammers, and went bing, and hit me right in the head. The light
went on, and all of a sudden I realized why the Vandenbergs of the
world didn't do anything.
It is difficult to explain to the American people how you would risk
even one American life, or more than that, how you would be able to say
I can assure you that Americans will die for something that hasn't
happened yet. How do you do that? I am sure somebody said, in 1935: If
we go in after Hitler, it is going to cost 100 or 1,000 or 2,000
American lives to get the job done.
I am sure Senators like the Presiding Officer and me sat there and
said, ``How am I going to go home and explain that to my folks? How can
I go
[[Page 8087]]
home and explain we are going to lose several thousand American lives
to take out a guy they do not know anything about, who is no immediate
threat to them now, and all he is doing is beating up Jews and
gypsies?'' Hard sell. That is where we are now. We have a guy who is
doing more than beating up Jews and gypsies. We have a guy who, if you
turn on your television, is loading thousands of people into railroad
cars in the heart of Europe. He has corralled them like cattle, putting
them in railroad cars. I looked at it, and I thought to myself: This is
almost like a video game, or something. Is this real? This is 1999.
They are loading people on railroad cars because of their ethnicity and
religion.
The Senator from Oklahoma, Mr. Inhofe, said he was recently in the
camps in Macedonia. So was I in the same camps. We came away with two
different impressions. We agreed they were happy to be there. We agreed
they were getting fed well. But do you know what struck me? As a
Senator, I have been in refugee camps all over the world. It was the
following. I was standing there talking to people. And there was
thousands of people in line--like a long movie line. They were about
six or eight wide, snaked all through this camp. I was standing there
answering questions for people, and asking questions of refugees. All
of a sudden it struck me. I was standing next to a guy who had on a
sport coat that must have cost $750. Another guy--I looked down at his
shoes. They had been to be $300 Italian-made leather shoes. In between
them was an old lady in a babushka with her teeth missing. All of a
sudden it came to me. This is the enormity of the cleansing. It had
nothing to do with their economic station. It had nothing to do with
the specific territory they lived in. It had to do with their religion
and their ethnicity.
It is as if someone marched into an office building in downtown
Washington and took out the $400,000 lawyers along with the cleaning
lady because they were both Moslem.
People say ``no vital interest.'' Let me ask my colleagues who are
listening and the staff of my colleagues who are monitoring this
debate. Ask yourself the following question: Can anyone say that they
will be leaving their children and grandchildren a more secure future
if NATO and the United States do nothing to stop the ethnic cleansing
in the heart of Europe? Forget for a moment whether or not I and others
are right, that if we do not act, it will result in an open war and the
split between Greece and Turkey, a division within Europe that is
reminiscent of 1910 and 1915, although the Hapsburg, Ottoman, German,
and Russian Empires were still in existence. Forget that. Assume we are
wrong about that. Tell me, anybody explain to me, how my child and
granddaughters are going to be more secure if, in fact, you have a
million people displaced, you have thousands of people--at least now
documented hundreds of people --brought out in the backyards of their
homes and knelt down and had their heads blown off.
There are 11 million ethnic Russians living in Ukraine. There are
thousands, tens of thousands of Hungarians living in Romania. There are
hundreds of thousands of Turks living in Bulgaria. Tell me how this
works. Someone explain to me. And then, even if they can explain that,
explain to me how the United States of America can be prevent itself
from being dragged into a war in Europe.
Look, I am not saying to you all that if we don't act right now,
within the next 5 years our future is doomed. But tell me what Europe
looks like in 20 years. Tell me how it is possible that the United
States can conduct its foreign policy anywhere in the world without a
stable and secure Europe, not because we are ``Europhile'' and we only
think Europe is important or more important than Asia. But tell me how
with our economic, political, cultural, and military ties there can be
a Europe divided and our interests not be affected. I find it
absolutely astounding that anyone in this Chamber could say we have no
vital interest.
I also find this moral relativism very fascinating. It kind of goes
like this. If there is an injustice anywhere in the world and we can't
deal with every injustice, then we should deal with no injustice. If in
Rwanda African tribes are killing one another and the carnage is
greater there, or in Cambodia where 2 million people were killed--and
the list goes on--if we didn't get involved there, how did we get
involved now?
Well, I point out two little facts:
One, we have the means in Europe that do not exist in those other
parts of the world; two, we have the ability with the means available
to us if we are willing to execute an outcome that we desire; and,
three, if Europe begins to disintegrate, we are in trouble, because we
are a European power.
I said that I would try my best to be as honest with myself as I
could because, by the way, I tell you we are political. I am not
suggesting those who oppose our involvement in Kosovo do it for this
reason. But I can tell you that it is a lot easier for me in my State
to be for noninvolvement. That is a sacred place to be, Mr. President.
That is the easier place to be. I didn't look for this fight. This is
not why I came to the Senate at age 30 saying I want to be for pushing
us to go to war. That is why I examine these arguments the best I can,
because if there is a better way that doesn't include war, I am for it.
I listened to all the arguments today. The only one, with all due
respect, that I think made sense was Pete Domenici's. He is in
opposition to the McCain-Biden resolution. What he said, from my
perspective at least, adds up, and it makes sense. He said, ``Hey,
look. The President didn't ask for this authority. Why are you forcing
it on him? He doesn't want it yet. So don't give it to him.'' And we
should send him a letter that says, ``If you want it, Mr. President,
ask us and we will act on it quickly.''
When the Senator from Arizona and I introduced this resolution, that
was basically our intention. We didn't--at least I didn't--contemplate
that the Parliamentarian would rule correctly--I am not challenging the
ruling--that the War Powers Act was implicated and that we must vote on
this resolution. That was not what we anticipated. We anticipated, when
we introduced this, for it to be here on the floor ready and able to be
brought up when it was needed, because we--at least I--concluded that
we should give the air campaign a full opportunity to succeed--I
haven't given up on that yet--but that Milosevic and the rest of the
world should know we were prepared to do whatever it took to win.
Here we are, voting on it because of the procedural rules not of the
Senate, but of the statute, and thereby by the Senate rule.
I understand Senator Domenici's argument. By the way, I believe,
notwithstanding all the speeches today, if the President of the United
States asks for ground troops with NATO, that this body will vote for
it; that there are over 51 votes for it. When the rubber meets the road
and Members have to vote yes or no, I predict we will see a lot of
opinions change.
Now, I heard today time and again the Gulf of Tonkin analogy. With
all due respect, it is not at all analogous. In the Gulf of Tonkin
resolution, the U.S. Congress said to the President, and I am
paraphrasing, Mr. President, use whatever means at your disposal. It
didn't say what the McCain-Biden resolution says; it didn't say use
whatever means is at your disposal--assuming 18 other nations sign on
with you. You do not, if McCain-Biden passes, Mr. President, have the
authority to use force unilaterally. It is in conjunction with NATO;
not alone, in conjunction with NATO.
At the time of Vietnam and the Gulf of Tonkin resolution, we were
essentially alone in the world in concluding that force need be used.
With regard to Kosovo, we are in the majority. The entire civilized
world, including the Russians, acknowledge that Milosevic is engaged in
behavior that violates every notion of civilized conduct. They disagree
on the means we should use to deal with that.
I was in Macedonia. I went into a tent city about which my friend
from Oklahoma talked. He is right, these are courageous young men and
women. I
[[Page 8088]]
sat in a tent that housed about 20 military folks. I walked in and
said, They make the analogy back home about Vietnam; what do you guys
think of that? There were two women, as well. What do you think of
that? A sergeant looked at me, he was 23, 24 years old, and he said the
following:
Senator, when you were 23 years old, if they had sent you
here, would you have any doubt about the morality of what you
were undertaking?
The answer is no. It is not analogous to Vietnam. I was a student
during Vietnam. We were told there was a monolithic communism that was
going to roll out of Moscow and Beijing, roll down through Southeast
Asia. Our history professors would say, Wait a minute, the Chinese and
the Russians aren't getting along together. And, wait, the Chinese and
the Vietnamese have been fighting each other for 300 years. So explain
to me how this domino is going to fall.
Did anybody notice fleets of Russians in Cam Ranh Bay? Not because of
us, the Chinese weren't going to let them be there. This monolithic
communism didn't exist.
I don't want to relitigate Vietnam but it is not analogous, not only
for the reasons my friend from Massachusetts stated--the size of the
territory, the population, the availability of the arms materiel, the
allies. Sure, China and Russia cooperated because it suited their
interest to keep the Vietnamese fighting us but not because of the
rationale we were given.
I respectfully suggest there is nothing analogous. The Tonkin Gulf
resolution is not analogous because it is not giving the President
authority on his own in the McCain-Biden resolution as Tonkin Gulf did.
It is a different continent, it is a different population, it is a
different rationale. There is no doubt on the part of anyone about the
morality of the undertaking.
That old joke, and I am paraphrasing, Can 18 European countries that
don't have a lot in common be wrong, all at once? Can they all be
wrong?
Listening to this debate, one would think the President of the United
States just woke up one morning and said: ``You know, I need a war. I
would like to have a war. I would like to test our new smart bombs. I
would like to figure out if they work better than they did in Desert
Storm. We put a lot of money and time into it, and I have just the guy
to look to. Eighteen other nations said what this guy is doing is
bad.''
Some of my colleagues will say they have been fighting for thousands
of years; all those people are the same. There are a lot of bad guys on
all sides, but I don't see the Moslems loading up Serbs on cars and
sending them off. I don't see this happening anywhere else in Europe.
There is one remaining dictator in the region. His name is Slobodan
Milosevic. He is a bad guy. He is a smart bad guy. He is doing very bad
things. The idea that the United States of America, when all of Europe
has stood up and said this must stop, will walk away, I think is
absolutely bizarre.
Does anybody here truly believe we could stand aside, let this
happen, and it not affect our vital interests in the year 2010 and 2012
and 2020 when my granddaughters and their husbands will be sent off?
It seems to me we are making a gigantic mistake here to try to hide
behind a lot of arguments. I raise this question with my friend. We use
that phrase all the time--``my friend.'' This guy really is my friend.
We have been friends for 27 years. We were back in the Cloakroom
talking. I said, what the heck is going on here? I think we both came
to a similar conclusion, at least in part. On both sides of the aisle
people are using code words because they don't want to be isolationist.
This is about isolationism or internationalism. That is what this is
about.
A lot of Republicans don't trust this President. I am not suggesting
they trust him, but just sort of take that nickel when you do the cards
at McDonald's for your kids and see whether you won a cup or something.
Scrape it off a little bit and right below is the real link--
isolationism.
On my side are a lot of the old antiwar Members. By the way,
decorated veterans such as Senator McCain and Senator Kerry say we
should be doing this.
Look, folks, I don't know how to run an antiseptic foreign policy. I
don't know how you can be President of the United States and make every
decision you make based upon the following formula: If an American will
lose their life, we can't get involved.
Look, if there is any man in this Chamber, or woman, who understands
the loss of life in war and the brutality of war, it is my colleague
here, Senator McCain. I am not being gratuitous here. He may be the
next President of the United States of America. Guys like him, and
women like him, may have to say, ``I am going to have to do something
that is going to cost American lives.''
People who disagree with us, I say to my friend, act like we are
cavalier about it. I don't understand it like my friend understands it,
but I think I understand loss of life a little bit. It is not about
that. It is about the recognition that this is a mean damn world out
there.
So I listen to my colleagues make the strangest arguments. I hear a
Democrat stand up and say: You know, we should not be involved in this
at all. This is a terrible thing. I voted against the bombing. And, by
the way, we have to save the refugees. We are going to save the
refugees.
Where the heck are you going to save them?
Mr. McCAIN. Will my colleague yield for a question?
Mr. BIDEN. Sure, I am happy to yield.
Mr. McCAIN. What does my friend from Delaware make of the argument
that this is not the right time, this is not the right time to vote on
this? So we are going to table this motion tomorrow and a whole bunch
of our colleagues are going to say--including, by the way, my dear
friend from Virginia: Yes, this is a problem. It has only been going on
for 5 weeks now. Hundreds of thousands of people have been moved from
their homes, thousands have been killed, massacres every day--but this
is not the right time to vote on this particular issue. So we will vote
tomorrow to table it and cut off debate and cut off discussion and
abrogate the responsibilities that we have as Senators.
Frankly, does my friend think that maybe they know better?
Mr. BIDEN. I say to my friend from Arizona, and I spoke to this very
briefly in his absence, it is the only argument that has any substance,
in my view. I disagree with it. I disagree with it for a lot of reasons
I have spoken to. I am going to vote and urge my colleagues not vote to
table. We will do it the right way. But at least they have an argument
that the President has not asked for it. I think we should be telling
the President he has it.
We are not demanding, the Senator from Arizona and I, that he use
ground troops. We are saying to him: We want to make sure you
understand that you have to win this and you can't come back to us and
say you didn't do it because you didn't have the means. At least that
is why this Senator is pushing this.
The arguments I find totally disingenuous, though, are the ones that
go like this. I heard today: You know, I voted against the bombing, but
I tell you what, I am going to vote to table this use of the available
ground troops to the President because I don't trust the President. But
I tell you what, if this President were a leader, he would do whatever
it took to stop this. But I am going to vote against giving him the
authority it would take to stop it because I don't trust this
President.
How? I don't understand.
Mr. McCAIN. Will the Senator yield for one more question?
Mr. BIDEN. I sure will.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I do not want to interrupt this important
colloquy, but I believe I am up next.
Mr. BIDEN. You are, but I don't believe my time is up yet. If it is--
apparently my time is up.
Mr. WARNER. I would like to ask a question of you.
[[Page 8089]]
Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I believe I was asking a question. I do
not believe the Senator from Virginia has the floor.
Mr. WARNER. I did not mean to interrupt, Mr. President.
Mr. McCAIN. I ask unanimous consent for 2 additional minutes for
Senator Biden--excuse me--I grant Senator Biden 3 additional minutes.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. McCAIN. The White House, the National Security Adviser, the
Secretary of Defense and Secretary of State are now frantically
lobbying against this resolution, who are saying vote to table. Has my
colleague ever heard of a time where the White House and the
administration lobbied actively against obtaining more authority?
Mr. BIDEN. Only on one occasion. The point the Senator is making I
understand. But only on one occasion. Two other occasions I can think
of where Presidents have asked not to have more authority--when they
thought they were going to lose.
I have personally spoken to the President. I have spoken to the
National Security Adviser. The National Security Adviser would like to
have this authority. But what he does not want to have is a vote that
says he cannot have the authority. They are worried if there is a vote
that is a straight up-and-down vote and it loses, that it will mean, in
conjunction with the House vote last week, that the Congress is on
record against ground troops.
My argument to them is it does not mean that. It means they concluded
they were not prepared to do it now without the White House asking for
it. But I believe there have been circumstances in the past where
Presidents have affirmatively suggested they not ask for authority and
table something when they thought they did not have the votes.
My colleagues on this side have told them they do not have the votes,
as have your colleagues. I think my colleagues on this side are wrong,
and I think the colleagues on the other side are wrong about the votes.
Because I find an interesting thing, Senator. On very, very important
matters--and everyone knows how important this is--Congress likes to
avoid responsibility.
I will take us back very briefly to the Persian Gulf. On the Persian
Gulf we had great disagreement, and during that time I remember going
to my caucus and saying: We must demand a vote. And my colleagues on my
side, whose names I will not mention, but I give you my word to this,
who were against the action in the Persian Gulf, said: No, no, don't
ask for a vote, because they wanted to be in line. Because if it
succeeded, they wanted to be able to say, ``Great job, Mr. President,''
and if it failed, they wanted to be able to say, ``Not me.'' I think
that is at work here, I say to my friend from Arizona.
But the bottom line of it is that the Senator from Arizona, in my
opinion, is dead right. I think the amendment is dead right on. I think
we do more to bring a successful conclusion to this war by giving that
authority whether or not it is used. I think we would make a tragic
mistake being apologists for a policy that in fact makes no civilized
sense, when we make moral equivalence about the people in the region,
when we argue that a bombing pause would not affect anything, when we
argue--my time is up. Ten seconds.
I compliment Reverend Jackson on bringing these folks home. But with
all due respect, I can think of a lot of people with his standing who
could have gone and probably gotten the same result, if in fact they
were willing, and believed as he does, that we should stop the bombing.
I think it is a mistake. It is a little bit like saying: Give me
three people back and I will not do anything about the 300 you
massacred--which they did, by the way, just 4 days earlier.
I think it is a tragic mistake. I wish we would get our act together.
I think the President is going to have to take the case to the Nation
more forcefully than he has. I hope we do not table the McCain-Biden
resolution, but it appears we are going to do that. As you can tell, I
have spoken too long. But I think this is something in our vital
interest with the capacity to affect the outcome that would be
beneficial to all people, and the idea that it would be a failure if we
had to have forces there in order to maintain the peace, who were not
being killed, and the genocide stopped--I would consider that victory,
not failure.
Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, with apologies and respect to my colleague
from Virginia for going over time, I yield 15 minutes to the Senator
from Virginia, Senator Warner.
Mr. WARNER. I thank my friend. Before he leaves the floor, I think a
colloquy here--and I am very much interested in following the one you
and Senator Biden had--might be helpful. This Senator intends to vote
to table. I do so with a heavy conscience, because I have no better
friend, nor a man I respect more, than my good friend, the Senator from
Arizona. We sort of served in the Navy together. He had more rank than
I did; at one point I had a little more authority than he did. And my
good friend from Delaware, you do recall who was your cosponsor. It was
Biden-Warner. So I think that points out there are differences of
conscience, clear conscience now and then, where we differ.
I want to ask both of you, on the condition you answer on your time,
on such time you have, a very simple question: What does this
resolution give the President of the United States that the
Constitution has not clearly reposed in this President and in every
other President since the beginning of this great Republic?
I ask that question because to vote otherwise would possibly, if this
were to carry, in my judgment, send a hollow message not only to the
United States but across the world. He has the authority under the
Constitution to do precisely what you state in here.
I ask simply: What does this confer on the President that the
Constitution has not already conferred?
Mr. McCAIN. I will be brief in my response.
Mr. WARNER. We have the understanding it is on their time, Mr.
President.
Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I yield myself 1 minute to respond to the
question from Senator Warner.
This is exactly the same as the authority that was granted to the
President in the case of Bosnia, in the case of the Persian Gulf war,
in the case of going all the way back to Beirut, exactly the same
thing: Telling the President of the United States that Congress does
play a role.
We ignore the War Powers Act. We all know that. This is not a war in
the classic sense, and we do not declare wars. This is a role for the
Congress of the United States to play, endorsing the President's
ability to use whatever force is necessary in order to bring the
conflict to a conclusion. It is no different than that of the Persian
Gulf war resolution, the Bosnia resolution, the Lebanon resolution, the
Grenada resolution--there has been literally one in every conflict in
which we have engaged.
Finally, may I say that it is also an effort, frankly, to get the
President of the United States to do the right thing.
I yield my time.
Mr. BIDEN. May I have 1 minute to respond?
Mr. McCAIN. I yield 2 minutes to the Senator from Delaware to
respond.
Mr. BIDEN. I thank the Senator.
I say to my friend from Virginia, I think it is constitutionally
required. I am in the minority in that view. I do not think the
President has the authority to commit ground troops without the consent
of the Congress, but I think it is politically necessary. I think it is
politically necessary because it is of great value to any President to
have the Congress on the line with him as he prosecutes a war. I think
it is constitutionally necessary and politically wise.
I realize that there are those who disagree with me, that the war
clause--not the War Powers Act, the war clause--of the Constitution I
believe requires the consent of the Congress for the use of this force
now, but it----
Mr. WARNER. By ``this force,'' the Senator means what?
[[Page 8090]]
Mr. BIDEN. I am sorry. If he were to use ground forces. But I
acknowledge there is a constitutional argument that says that if the
Congress had voted and the House did not, but if they had voted, as we
had, for the use of air power, that he would not need that additional
authority.
I do think there is a constitutional requirement for the Congress to
assent to this action. I understand I am in the minority. Beyond that,
I think there is a political necessity that we be united.
My friend and I have talked about this privately before. We can all
disagree about the lessons from Vietnam, but I think we both agree that
one of the lessons out of Vietnam was that no matter how smart, no
matter how brilliant a foreign policy is, it cannot be sustained
without the informed consent of the American people and their elected
representatives being signed on to it.
That is my primary motivation. The place my friend from Arizona and I
disagree is, I am not doing this to embolden the President to do the
right thing. The reason I signed on to it is to make sure the Congress
goes on record saying that we will back whatever action the President
takes to meet the four goals that he has stated. There is legitimate
constitutional disagreement, but I fall down on the side that I think
it is necessary.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I will simply reply to my good friend,
only four times in the history of the United States of America has
Congress used that phrase, ``declare war.'' World War II is the last;
am I not correct?
Mr. BIDEN. You are.
Mr. WARNER. How many times did we send out our troops? Are we
suggesting each time, whether it was Vietnam in particular or Korea,
that that wasn't the proper authority exercised by the President of the
United States? You suggest that, I say to the Senator, when you say----
Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, yes, I am. In the one case in Vietnam, it
was given through the Tonkin Gulf. In Korea, I don't think it is
constitutionally--by the way, I am not alone in this. I happen to
teach--it does not make me an expert, but I happen to teach
constitutional law and separation of powers now in law school. I can
assure you one thing: The vast majority of constitutional scholars
agree with me.
The point being, you do not need to declare war. As Louis Henkin, who
wrote the Restatement of International Law, pointed out, it does not
require a declaration of war; it requires a consent of the Congress,
which is equivalent to the authority required, just like what we did in
the Persian Gulf. When the Congress went on record granting the
authority to the President to use the force in the resolution, that is
the equivalent of a declaration of war. All constitutional scholars
agree on that point.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, the resolution of the gulf in 1991 is one
I remember, may I say with a lack of modesty.
Mr. BIDEN. I think you drafted it.
Mr. WARNER. I was the author of that resolution. I say to the Senator
from Delaware and the Senator from Arizona, there is a clear
distinction in that case. There the President of the United States
asked the Congress; am I not correct? Did he not ask the Congress?
Mr. BIDEN. He is correct, Mr. President. I am sounding too much like
a lawyer now. From a constitutional standpoint, whether they are asked
or not is irrelevant. The only relevant constitutional point--and this
is getting us off the point here, but the only relevant constitutional
point is whether or not the Congress granted authority, asked for or
not. That is the only relevant constitutional point.
With the Senator's permission, I would like to ask unanimous consent
to print in the Record a legal brief which I have written on this point
relative to the war powers clause and whether or not it is required and
on the issue of whether or not there is the equivalency of a
declaration of war by the consent of the Congress for the action
specified.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, may that request be granted in such a way
that it can appear after our colloquy and at the conclusion of my
remarks?
Mr. BIDEN. With the permission of the Senator, I will put it in
tomorrow so there is no question that it is not interrupting his
remarks.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, while I have the Senator's attention,
though, he said--very interesting--I don't want to breach confidences,
but he and I have been present at three very important consultations
with the President of the United States.
Mr. BIDEN. Yes.
Mr. WARNER. My recollection is, the first one was an hour and a half;
the second, almost 2; and the third, I think I was the last to leave
after 2 hours.
Mr. BIDEN. Long time.
Mr. WARNER. I know my colleague from Oklahoma, who will next speak,
was there throughout the 2 hours. I recall the Senator from Delaware
was engaged in a very interesting colloquy with the President about the
issue of asking and not asking. Does the Senator remember that
colloquy?
Mr. BIDEN. I do.
Mr. WARNER. I thought he was quite accurate. My recollection is, did
you not solicit?
Mr. BIDEN. I did. Mr. President, again, I am sounding too much like a
constitutional lawyer here. I don't want to mix apples and oranges.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, let's talk like a Senator. We are all
Senators here.
Mr. BIDEN. If I may, the Senator makes a valid point. I will not tell
you what the President said, because that will be inappropriate. I will
tell you what I said. I am allowed to do that.
Mr. WARNER. I remember it very well.
Mr. BIDEN. There was an issue, and all the Senate and House Members
were assembled, and they were about to vote on the floor of the House
of Representatives on a resolution relating to whether or not the
President would ask for consent to use ground troops. Let me be
precise.
A resolution was submitted characterized by the Speaker, as we sat
there, as one that would say the following, and eventually was voted
on. It said: Mr. President, before you introduce ground troops into
Kosovo, you must come to us under the Constitution and ask for our
permission.
And the President--I can say this because he said it publicly. The
President said, ``I didn't want to do something no President has
acknowledged that he has to do in a debate with Congress.'' And I stood
up, and I said, ``Mr. President, let me respectfully suggest you send
the following letter to the House,'' because I didn't want the vote to
turn into the debacle it did. And I suggested the President say the
following: ``Notwithstanding the fact that I am not required to ask
permission, I assure you that I will, in fact, ask the permission of
the Congress before I use ground troops, if I make that decision.''
That is exactly what I said. And then we got a letter from the
President which said essentially that. My purpose was not relating to
the Constitution. My purpose was trying to keep the House from doing
the thing I found to be imprudent, because I was worried that if they
passed the resolution, which in fact they have the authority to do--the
Congress--it would send a message to Milosevic and others that we were
unwilling to use ground troops if need be.
The President was saying, ``I don't want ground troops now.'' So I
said, ``The way to settle this, Mr. President, you don't have to give
up what you think you're''--you may remember--I said, ``Mr. President,
I think you do need authority from the Congress if you're going to send
ground troops. But you don't have to give that up. You don't have to
give up that legal argument. Say, `Notwithstanding the fact I, the
President, don't think I need that, I promise you I will not introduce
ground troops before I ask for your permission.' ''
That is not a constitutional commitment he is making. It is a
personal commitment he is making, as President.
And my purpose, I say to my friend from Virginia, was to keep the
House
[[Page 8091]]
from voting on that inappropriate resolution ahead of time, the very
inappropriate resolution that the Congress introduced and passed. That
is why.
Mr. WARNER. To move this along, I want to pick up on a few words. You
said, ``Mr. President, the way to settle this is to send a letter.''
Mr. BIDEN. That is right.
Mr. WARNER. Here is the letter.
I ask unanimous consent to have it printed in the Record.
There being no objection, the letter was ordered to be printed in the
Record, as follows:
The White House,
Washington, April 28, 1999.
Hon. J. Dennis Hastert,
Speaker, House of Representatives,
Washington, DC.
Dear Mr. Speaker: I appreciate the opportunity to continue
to consult closely with the Congress regarding events in
Kosovo.
The unprecedented unity of the NATO Members is reflected in
our agreement at the recent summit to continue and intensify
the air campaign. Milosevic must not doubt the resolve of the
NATO alliance to prevail. I am confident we will do so
through use of air power.
However, were I to change my policy with regard to the
introduction of ground forces, I can assure you that I would
fully consult with the Congress. Indeed, without regard to
our differing constitutional views on the use of force, I
would ask for Congressional support before introducing U.S.
ground forces into Kosovo into a non-permissive environment.
Milosevic can have no doubt about the resolve of the United
States to address the security threat to the Balkans and the
humanitarian crisis in Kosovo. The refugees must be allowed
to go home to a safe and secure environment.
Sincerely,
Bill Clinton.
Mr. WARNER. He sent the letter. Why is that, then, the way to settle
this as opposed----
Mr. McCAIN. I have to call for the regular order here. The Senator
from Virginia has 10 minutes, and the Senator from Oklahoma and others
are waiting. So we have to proceed with the regular order.
Mr. WARNER. Well, this is a time to do that, Senator. I think I am
within my time.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arizona declines to yield
further to the Senator from Delaware?
Mr. McCAIN. I decline to yield.
Mr. BIDEN. I am not seeking recognition.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Virginia has the floor.
Mr. WARNER. I will try and summarize.
Mr. President, how much time do I have?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator still has 11 minutes of the
original 15 minutes remaining.
Mr. WARNER. As a courtesy to the managers and the whip, I will not
use all that time, but I would like to just finish our colloquy.
Because I thought we were making a point, at least I felt very
strongly, the President gave the assurances. And you said the way to
settle this--and you wanted it for the House, the letter was sufficient
for the House--why wouldn't this letter continue to be sufficient for
the Senate? If it is sufficient for one body, it is sufficient for the
other body. That is my point.
Mr. BIDEN. Would the Senator like me to answer? I will try to do it
quickly.
Mr. WARNER. Put it on my time, Mr. President, so we do not interrupt
the distinguished manager from Arizona.
Mr. BIDEN. The House was trying to stop an action. The Senator from
Arizona and I are trying to start an action. We are not asking for the
President's permission. We are trying to encourage the President to use
all the persuasion available to him with our NATO allies to let him,
the President, know and our NATO allies know----
Mr. WARNER. You are encroaching beyond the minute or two.
Mr. BIDEN. That is my answer. They are trying to stop; we are trying
to start. It is a different issue.
Mr. WARNER. I simply say, with great respect to both you and Senator
McCain, this does not grant the President of the United States one
single bit of authority that he does not possess at this moment and
that every President of the United States has possessed from the
beginning of this great Republic. And, therefore, I fear that this
could be a hollow message. It could be misunderstood, not only in the
United States, but in the other 18 nations that are allied with us; my
point being, the success thus far has been the ability--and, indeed,
this President has been active, as have other heads of state--in
keeping 19 nations solidly together to pursue this military action.
And my concern is, if the Senate were to take a resolution like this,
does that not say to the other nations, the 18, ``Well, go to your
legislatures. And similarly, don't you have a responsibility comparable
to what we have in the United States of America?''
And, Senator, I say this respectfully to my colleague form Delaware,
that other nations of that 18 group, their legislatures might well not
act favorably on such a piece of legislation, and begin to start a
fracturing of the solidarity of the NATO group.
That is my great concern, Mr. President. Therefore, I feel that it is
just most unwise. And I shall vote against it. I really salute the
Senator from Arizona, as well as my colleague from Delaware, because I
believe their steadfast stance on this gave backbone to NATO to begin
to at least dust off the plans to look at the introduction of ground
forces, both under a permissive and nonpermissive situation.
I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the Record remarks that I
made as chairman of the Armed Services Committee when the Secretary of
Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs were before our committee,
urging them to do just that.
That was weeks ago, before and during the course of the summit the
Secretary General announced they would take that step.
There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in
the Record, as follows:
Statement of Senator Warner--Kosovo Hearing--April 15, 1999
I start this morning by expressing my deepest regret for
the loss of innocent civilian lives--both Kosovar Albanian
and Serbian--in this conflict. I know our forces have done
their best to avoid such collatoral damage.
I welcome our witnesses this morning and note that this is
the first public hearing before the Congress on the situation
in Kosovo since NATO began its military operation on March
24. I thank you, Secretary Cohen and General Shelton, for
your willingness to testify on this crucial issue.
Since military operations began, the Armed Services
Committee has convened 5 closed briefings for Senators on
developments in Kosovo. I thank our witnesses for providing
officials to testify at those sessions. Today, the American
public will witness the first real public debate between
Administration officials and Members of Congress on this
issue. It is important that the American people have an
opportunity to see such an exchange of views. We have a duty
to keep our citizens well informed as our men and women in
uniform are in harms way.
As we meet this morning, the NATO air operation against the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia--Operation Allied Force--is
entering its fourth week. I was, and continue to be, a
supporter of air strikes against Milosevic's military
machine. We must see this air campaign through.
However, I have always believed that all options should
have been left on the table, including the planning necessary
to keep in place a ground option. By taking it off the table,
the wrong signal could have been sent to Milosevic.
In the meantime, I believe that positioning NATO ground
forces in key locations on Yugoslavia's Serbian border--as is
being done now on a small scale--could limit Milosevic's
freedom in the disposition of his ground forces and, together
with the air campaign, force him to prepare for a possible
ground attack by NATO forces. NATO should begin now to move
heavy equipment into the region, within striking distance of
Yugoslavia, both to threaten Milosevic and to lend protection
to countries such as Albania which are now threatened by
Milosevic's troops. The decision to use NATO forces to attack
Yugoslav troops on the ground in Kosovo could be made later--
but the deterrent effect of placing these forces in the
region would be, I believe, substantial.
Since last September when I traveled to Kosovo and
Macedonia, I have advocated the use of U.S. ground troops in
Kosovo as a stabilizing force to allow the various
humanitarian organizations to assist the Kosovar Albanians
who, at that time, had been forced into the hills by the
brutal actions of Milosevic. And I supported the use of U.S.
ground troops to implement the peace agreement which was
under consideration at Rambouillet.
[[Page 8092]]
There have been calls in Congress for a vote on legislation
authorizing the President to use ``all necessary means'' to
accomplish our objectives in Kosovo. The leadership of both
the Senate and the House have decided that such legislation
should not be considered this week. That gives all Members
the time to gather the necessary information on what it would
take to engage in a ground war against Yugoslavia. We need
the facts. What would be the basic parameters of such a
ground force--the size, type of forces and equipment
required, duration of the mission and exit strategy for such
an operation? A NATO assessment last summer estimated that it
might require 200,000 troops for NATO to fight its way into
Kosovo--and win. Is that estimate still valid, or has it
changed since the air strikes and Milosevic's intensive
military operations in Kosovo began? It is imperative for
Senators to have this information before we are called upon
to vote to authorize the use of ground troops against
Yugoslavia.
It is my hope that we will continue to gather that vital
information today, for the Senate, for the American people.
This hearing will also address future NATO strategy as we
approach the 50th anniversary Summit. In my view, the most
important issue to be discussed at that Summit is a revised
Strategic Concept for NATO--the document that spells out the
future Strategy and mission of the Alliance. I have recently
written to the President urging him NOT to adopt a final
version of a new Strategic Concept at the upcoming Summit in
Washington, given the uncertainty of events in Kosovo.
The United States and our NATO allies will have many
``lessons learned'' to assess from the Kosovo operation--
lessons which will be a pivotal part of any future Strategic
Concept for NATO. If NATO is to continue to conduct such
``out of area'' military operations in defense of ``common
interests'' in the future, we had better take the time to
carefully evaluate the Kosovo experience and incorporate the
``lessons learned'' into any future strategy and doctrine for
the Alliance. NATO is simply too important for us to proceed
in haste on this key issue.
Mr. WARNER. I am likewise concerned about consultation. The Senate
and the House--the Congress--work very hard with this President, as
they have with other Presidents, to get consultation on these key
questions of our national security and foreign policy.
Were we to pass this, coupled with what I predict will be a strong
vote for the emergency supplemental, indeed, the President's advisers
might say, ``We've got whatever we need now. Let's go about this. And
we need not have the consultation.''
We have had extensive consultation in the course of this very
difficult military action, and that consultation has enabled this
Senator--sometimes there were 30 other Members of Congress up with the
President working in consultation for not just 15 or 20 minutes or a
half-hour but hours on end.
I commend the President for sitting there very patiently and entering
into a strong colloquy and exchange of views throughout that
consultation.
We might well lose consultation. We will send out a message that
could be misinterpreted. And, indeed, we could cast an affirmative
responsibility on other legislatures which could cause a fracture and a
breakdown of the 19 NATO nations standing together.
So, Mr. President, I commend my two colleagues. This has been a good
debate. It is going to go on for a while. We owe a great deal to both
of you and others who wanted to have this debate. I think it has been a
good one. I am pleased to have been a part of it.
I yield the floor.
Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I thank Senator Warner for his always
insightful and well-thought-out debate and discussion. We appreciate
his outstanding work as chairman of the Senate Armed Services
Committee.
The Senator from Oklahoma is recognized for 20 minutes.
Mr. NICKLES addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Oklahoma.
Mr. NICKLES. I thank my friend and colleague, Senator McCain, for
recognizing me, and I also compliment him for his leadership, although
I oppose the resolution that is before us. I also wish to compliment
Senator Warner for his comments. And I agree with his comments. I think
we have had some good debate. I think it is an important debate.
I have heard many things on both sides of the issues. I happen to
concur with a lot of the statements that some of the proponents have
made on this resolution. I just disagree with its conclusion. I think
it is going to be interpreted, this resolution, as a blank check for
the President to do whatever is necessary to win in Kosovo, whatever
that means.
``If you win, you are going to own Kosovo.'' Are you going to occupy
Kosovo? Maybe Kosovo is second prize; first prize will be Serbia. And
then we get to run Serbia. I do not think we want to do that. I think
it would be a mistake.
I stated on the floor, prior to the bombing resolution, that I
thought it was a mistake. And I think it really kind of resulted as a
failure in diplomatic effort.
As a matter of fact, I think the diplomatic mission in this area has
been a disaster. Unfortunately, it has resulted in a humanitarian
disaster.
Mr. President, could we have order?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senate will be in order.
Mr. NICKLES. I thank the Chair.
I want to go through a little bit of the chronology to show, at least
in my opinion, how we got into the bombing campaign, because what this
resolution is kind of implying is, well, the bombing campaign is not
working. And we call it a campaign because the polls don't like the
word ``war.''
It is interesting, I was with some of our colleagues, and we went to
the Kosovo region into the Balkans. We talked to our military planners.
They use the word ``war.'' But the politicians do not use the word
``war.'' It doesn't poll very well. People don't like war. So this is
called an air campaign. This is a mission.
I disagree with that terminology. How did we get into the air
campaign? How did we get into this air war?
I want to go through several statements, because, as I mentioned in
my opening comment, I think this has been a diplomatic disaster that
has led to a humanitarian disaster. It is not working, and some people
are saying, let's double the ante again. Let's throw in troops now and
then maybe we can win.
I do not think that would be the result. I want to win, but I
question, what is winning? Are we going to have a NATO presence, a U.S.
presence in Kosovo forever? Are we going to go all the way into Serbia
and occupy Belgrade and take Milosevic out and have him tried as a war
criminal? He is a criminal. He is a thug. I have met with him. He
doesn't tell the truth. He is responsible for a lot of serious
atrocities, and he should be punished. But something tells me this body
is not going to say, let's mount up 250,000 or 300,000 troops so we can
invade Serbia and occupy Serbia and go door to door at the expense of
that. So I just mention that.
Let me go through a little chronology of how we got into the bombing
campaign as classified by the State Department. Just to put this in
context, we started bombing on March 24. The Senate voted on March 23.
This is from the New York Times on February 19:
As the deadline neared for a settlement in the Kosovo peace
talks, the military and diplomatic pressure mounted today on
President Slobodan Milosevic of Yugoslavia to choose between
tolerating NATO-led peacekeepers in Kosovo or suffering NATO
air strikes for refusing them.
Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright said she had again
spelled out the choice in a telephone call to the Yugoslav
leader and that she would return Saturday to the talks, which
she visited last week.
That was on February 19th. February 20th:
President Clinton warned President Slobodan Milosevic of
Yugoslavia today not to ``stonewall'' a peace settlement in
Kosovo and threatened to bomb Serbia if Mr. Milosevic missed
the Saturday deadline for an end to the peace talks.
So we are threatening bombing. ``Mr. Clinton said the two NATO
allies''--in this case, he is talking about President Chirac of
France--stood ``united in our determination to use force if Serbia
fails to meet its previous commitment to withdraw forces from Kosovo
and if it fails to accept the peace agreement.''
I will talk about the peace agreement in a moment.
He also says, this is President Clinton, ``I don't think there is an
option other than NATO airstrikes.'' This was in the New York Times,
February 20th.
[[Page 8093]]
Also February 20th, Secretary of State Madeleine Albright says, at a
press conference:
Let me stress that we expect nothing less than a complete
interim agreement, including Belgrade's acceptance of a NATO-
led force and a civilian mission building on OSCE's Kosovo
Verification Mission. Until the parties have accepted all
provisions of the agreement, preparations for NATO military
action will continue and if that agreement is not confirmed
by Tuesday, Secretary General Solana will draw the
appropriate conclusions.
i.e., the bombing will begin. It is also interesting that on February
21 she says, according to the New York Times, ``If this fails because
both sides say `no,' there will be no bombing of Serbia.'' Mrs.
Albright said that on February 21, as Rambouillet talks were winding
down.
It is also interesting to note that 2 days after Rambouillet ended,
the European Union envoy to the talks, Mr. Petritsch, said, ``the
Yugoslav President decided he was not going to accept NATO troops--and
mustered his own forces and propaganda to prepare for this military
showdown.''
It is also interesting to note in this same article, it says, In a
meeting with Italy's new Prime Minister in the Oval Office with the
President on March 5, Mr. Clinton said Mr. Milosevic had ``accepted
almost everything,'' according to Italian officials, except for the
international peacekeeping force. I added that comment. That wasn't in
the quote, but that is what he had not accepted.
This individual was skeptical. He asked the President, what was the
plan if there was no deal and NATO airstrikes failed to subdue the
Serbian leader. The result, he said, would be 300,000 to 400,000
refugees passing into Albania and crossing the Adriatic into Italy.
``What will happen then,'' Mr. D'Alema wanted to know, according to
the Italian officials. Mr. Clinton looked at Mr. Berger for guidance;
that is, Sandy Berger. ``NATO will keep bombing,'' Mr. Berger replied.
After Rambouillet fell apart, a follow-up conference was called in
Paris 3 weeks later. While the world waited, Mr. Milosevic continued to
build up his forces in and around Kosovo.
A defining moment came on March 18 at the International
Conference Center on the Avenue Kleber in Paris. To polite
applause, four ethnic Albanian delegates signed the peace
plan that would give their people broad autonomy for a three-
year interim period. The Serbs did not sign. That paved the
way to airstrikes.
Ms. Albright said that setting up a deal signed only by one
side was a crucial step forward. ``Signing Rambouillet was
crucial in getting Europeans two things,'' she said.
``Getting them to agree to the use of force and getting the
Albanians on the side of this kind of a settlement.''
February 23, this is, again, Secretary Albright talking about
Rambouillet.
Rambouillet talks to a close. The Kosovo Albanians have
requested two weeks for consideration. Belgrade must be ready
to move by then as well, or prepare to face the consequences.
This period of reflection should not be taken by either side
as an excuse for military activities on the ground. We're
particularly concerned by recent movements of Serb forces and
harassment of members of the Kosovo Verification Mission. The
mission's security must be assured, and there should be no
doubt that NATO's January 30th decision permitting Secretary
Solana to authorize airstrikes remains in force. We also call
on the Kosovo Liberation Army to refrain from provocations.
So there is a 2- or 3-week period for the Kosovo representative to
consider this negotiation.
March 15, this is in the New York Times:
A massacre in the Kosovo village of Racak of more than 40
ethnic Albanians by Serbian forces in January spurred the
current efforts of Ms. Albright to persuade NATO to authorize
air strikes against the Serbs if they reject a settlement.
So there was a massacre, according to this press report, of 40 people
who were killed in January. That led to this effort to use military
force in a bombing campaign.
March 18, again, this is Secretary Albright, State Department:
So the situation is as clear as it could be. The Albanians
have said yes to the accords and the Serbs are saying no. At
the same time, Belgrade's security forces are stepping up
their unjustified and aggressive actions in Kosovo and if
Belgrade doesn't reverse course, the Serbs alone will be
responsible for the consequences.
The war drums are rattling. This is March 19, a few days before the
bombing commences. This is also in the New York Times.
With the Kosovo talks at a dead end, and the Yugoslav
leader more recalcitrant than ever, the Clinton
Administration was publicly pushing the threat of airstrikes
today, but officials said they have no option but diplomacy,
at least for another week.
Instead of responding to the threats, Mr. Milosevic has
moved in the opposite direction, building up his troops in
Kosovo to such an extent there are now deep concerns over
whether the 1,400 international monitors in Kosovo can leave
safely before his troops trap them by sealing their exit
route.
Also in the same article it says, ``American military is warning that
airstrikes may not be easy.''
March 22, a couple of days before the bombing campaign begins.
Secretary of State Madeleine Albright said that Holbrooke
would warn Milosevic that the NATO allies are preparing
comprehensive missile and bombing strikes that could
devastate much of his military infrastructure. ``He will make
clear that Milosevic faces a stark choice: to halt aggression
against the Kosovar Albanians and accept an interim agreement
with a NATO-led implementation force, or bear the full
responsibility for NATO military action.''
This is just a couple days before, the night before bombing began, on
March 23, on Larry King's program. Mr. King asked Secretary Albright:
Is there a timeframe here, Madam Secretary? Like you are
going to keep this up for 3, 4 days, let us know by Saturday?
Is there a plan?
Secretary Albright:
Well, again I am not going to reveal the operation time
line, this is a very well-thought-out military mission. I
think it would be a mistake. You wouldn't want me to give the
details here so that President Milosevic could hear
everything that is going on. But it is going to be a
sustained attack, and it is not going to go on for an overly
long time.
Then she continues and says: ``No, I mean what we have said.
Ambassador Holbrooke said to him''--talking about Milosevic--``he had
an opportunity to accept accords signed by the Kosovar Albanians in
Paris and have a peace agreement. He had an opportunity also to stop
the fighting. Ambassador Holbrooke told him that if he did not do that,
there would be very serious consequences. He has not accepted those two
threshold objectives and, therefore, he knows there are now serious
consequences.''
The next day the bombing began. I might mention that Secretary
Albright said, ``We are very well prepared. This is a well-thought-out
campaign.'' I just take issue with that.
I am not going to say I told you so, but on the debate we had on
March 23, the day before the bombing campaign commenced, I made a
speech. On the floor of the Senate, I urged colleagues to vote no
because I said I was afraid it would be a mistake. I said--and history
has proven--that bombing alone doesn't work. The President has said we
are only going to bomb and not use ground troops. Then, I also said
that I was afraid it might make things worse. Instead of stopping
atrocities, it may turn a guerrilla war into an all-out war. I am
afraid that is what has happened. I think we had a diplomatic failure
and, as a result, now we have a humanitarian disaster, a catastrophe.
I was in Kosovo a week or so ago with some colleagues and I saw some
of these refugee camps. There are 600,000-plus people who are now
outside of Kosovo, driven away from their homes--in my opinion, because
of a diplomatic disaster. We turned a guerrilla war into a real war. We
started the bombing campaign, and I stated this on the floor of the
Senate before the bombing started. I said:
Mr. Milosevic, instead of his response being to move back
into greater Serbia away from Kosovo, moving his forces out,
he may be more assertive and aggressive, and he may want to
strike out against the U.S. airplanes that are flying. He
might find that unsuccessful. He might have no success
against our pilots and our planes, but if he is not
successful against our planes, what can he be successful
against? Maybe the KLA, or maybe he would be more aggressive
in striking out where he can have results on the ground. So
by initiating the bombing instead of bringing stability, we
may bring instability. We may be igniting a tinderbox that
has been very, very explosive for a long time.
[[Page 8094]]
I am afraid that is what happened. The bombing campaign has made
things worse. I am afraid if we go in and say let's use all necessary
force, send in 300,000 troops, we may make things worse. I don't want
to compound a past mistake that was a mistake, in my opinion,
diplomatically as well as a mistake now through the air campaign, and
certainly has turned into a humanitarian disaster. I don't want to
further compound that.
Again, when I read the resolution it says to accomplish NATO
objectives--we are going to use all necessary force and other means to
accomplish United States and North Atlantic treaty objectives with the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.
I have the Rambouillet agreement. I wonder how many colleagues have
read this thing. I urge you to do it. It is 44 pages.
I am looking at some of the comments or statements made in this
Rambouillet accord. They said, ``We negotiated and Mr. Milosevic would
not sign this accord.'' I will read one paragraph. I brought this to
the President's attention last week, and Secretary Albright said: Mr.
Milosevic would not even talk to us about an international peacekeeping
force. In one paragraph, we were insisting that if he didn't comply, we
were going to bomb him. On page 41, paragraph 8 of the appendix B, it
says this, talking about the NATO force--and some people say let's give
NATO all necessary force. This is one of the things about which we said
we are going to bomb you if you don't sign:
NATO personnel shall enjoy, together with their vehicles,
vessels, aircraft, and equipment, free and unrestricted
passage and unimpeded access throughout the Federal Republic
of Yugoslavia, including associated airspace and territorial
waters. This shall include, but not be limited to, the right
of bivouac maneuver, billet, and utilization of any areas or
facilities as required for support, training, and operations.
Basically, it says NATO gets to occupy not only Kosovo but Serbia as
well. Isn't that interesting? I brought that to the President's
attention. I don't know if he knew that was in there. I kind of doubt
it. Secretary Albright almost acted taken aback. ``What are you doing
reading the Rambouillet agreement?'' This is what we were saying he has
to sign, or else ``we are going to bomb you.'' I think that is
diplomacy failure. It has led to a bombing campaign. We threatened that
we were going to bomb and now our credibility is at stake. I have heard
that time and time again.
I want NATO to be credible, but for crying out loud, when you are so
arrogant to say here is our wisdom, here is this accord, we determined
this is in your best interest and you must sign it or else we are going
to bomb you--I stated in my speech on the bombing resolution that I
don't think you can bomb a country into submission or into signing an
agreement. I doubted then that Mr. Milosevic, after the bombs were
going to fall, was going to raise the white flag and say: Now I see the
wisdom. That didn't happen in Bosnia. It got his attention in Bosnia.
In fact, the Croatian army was ethnically cleansing their own, and he
was losing the war. He decided to be more interested in a peace
agreement.
I think Rambouillet was a diplomatic disaster and a failure and to
say, OK, well, we tried to bomb them into agreeing to this, but I don't
think that is going to work; maybe now we should use ground forces so
they can sign onto NATO objectives. I think it is a mistake. What
should we do? I don't want to just complain, but I think this is a
disaster. If you had seen the refugee camps, you would know it is a
disaster. There were several hundred thousand people. Senator McCain
pointed out that it is not just the several hundred thousand people who
are outside of Kosovo and Albania and Macedonia, but the hundreds of
thousands who are displaced inside of Kosovo. What should we do? I have
heard several people in the administration say that he must withdraw
forces and accept this international peacekeeping force, and if he
stops all the aggression, then we will stop the bombing.
Mr. President, I think we need to have two or three things happen
simultaneously. He needs to get his aggressive forces out. We need to
have an international peacekeeping force to protect the returning
refugees allowed back in. And simultaneously with that, we need to stop
the bombing. We need to do all of them simultaneously.
The big difference I can see going on now is the negotiation of who
should compose the international peacekeeping force. I heard Secretary
Cohen say, and I have read time and time again, that it must be NATO-
led or a NATO corps. They are talking about U.S. participation. I think
our objective should not be so much just what is the composition of the
peacekeepers; it should be to keep the Kosovars safe and sound and
return them back to their homes. Those people are living in terrible
conditions, living in tents. They have absolutely nothing to do. They
are waiting hours to pick up food. They have to wait for a long time to
use the restroom facilities--latrines would be a more accurate
description. It is not a pretty sight.
In the first place, I want to compliment many of the international
relief agencies that are doing a miraculous job. They have a very
difficult, if not impossible, job.
Mr. President, I think we need a very aggressive diplomatic effort. I
don't think this is a situation where one says, ``Well, let's just
double up our military forces; well, if the bombing sorties''--and we
are running so many thousands of these bombing sorties--``that is not
working; let's throw in another three or four hundred planes, double up
the bombing; let's get ready to have ground troop invasion into Kosovo,
into Serbia.'' I don't think that is the solution. I think we need a
diplomatic solution.
I believe I heard Strobe Talbott, Under Secretary of State, yesterday
say we are not negotiating. I almost fell off my chair when he said
that. Obviously, Jesse Jackson did some negotiation. I want this
administration to be negotiating. They need to be negotiating
aggressively to save lives, to minimize the human disaster, the
humanitarian disaster, the diplomatic disaster. Let's do everything we
can to allow the Kosovars to return safely as soon as possible--
hopefully as soon as possible under the guise of an international
peacekeeping force. And it can be with NATO participation. It can be
U.N. led. It can be the Organization for Security and Cooperation in
Europe. But let's make it happen, and make it happen soon.
Mr. President, I urge my colleagues to vote ``no'' on this resolution
tomorrow.
Again, my compliments to the sponsor of the resolution. I think this
debate is important. He was requesting the debate, and I think we have
had an excellent debate as well.
I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the Congressional Record
the text of the Rambouillet Agreement. It is 44 pages long.
Consistent with the Standing Rules of the Senate, I ask unanimous
consent that the text be printed in the Congressional Record. The cost
of printing the text will total $3,758.
There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in
the Record, as follows:
Rambouillet Agreement--Interim Agreement for Peace and Self-Government
in Kosovo
The Parties of the present Agreement,
Convinced of the need for a peaceful and political solution
in Kosovo as a prerequisite for stability and democracy,
Determined to establish a peaceful environment in Kosovo,
Reaffirming their commitment to the Purposes and Principles
of the United Nations, as well as to OSCE principles,
including the Helsinki Final Act and the Charter of Paris for
a new Europe,
Recalling the commitment of the international community to
the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia,
Recalling the basic Clements/principles adopted by the
Contact Group at its ministerial meeting in London on January
29, 1999,
Recognizing the need for democratic self-government in
Kosovo, including full participation of the members of all
national communities in political decision-making,
Desiring to ensure the protection of the human rights of
all persons in Kosovo, as well as the rights of the members
of all national communities, Recognizing the ongoing
contribution of the OSCE to peace and stability in Kosovo,
[[Page 8095]]
Noting that the present Agreement has been concluded under
the auspices of the members of the Contact Group and the
European Union and undertaking with respect to these members
and the European Union to abide by this Agreement,
Aware that full respect for the present Agreement will be
central for the development of relations with European
institutions,
Have agreed as follows:
Framework
Article I: Principles
1. All citizens in Kosovo shall enjoy, without
discrimination, the equal rights and freedoms set forth in
this Agreement.
2. National communities and their members shall have
additional rights specified in Chapter 1. Kosovo, Federal,
and Republic authorities shall not interfere with the
exercise of these additional rights. The national communities
shall be legally equal as specified herein, and shall not use
their additional rights to endanger the rights of other
national communities or the rights of citizens, the
sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal Republic
of Yugoslavia, or the functioning of representative
democratic government in Kosovo.
3. All authorities in Kosovo shall fully respect human
rights, democracy, and the equality of citizens and national
communities.
4. Citizens in Kosovo shall have the right to democratic
self-government through legislative, executive, judicial, and
other institutions established in accordance with this
Agreement. They shall have the opportunity to be represented
in all institutions in Kosovo. The right to democratic self-
government shall include the right to participate in free and
fair elections.
5. Every person in Kosovo may have access to international
institutions for the protection of their rights in accordance
with the procedures of such institutions.
6. The Parties accept that they will act only within their
powers and responsibilities in Kosovo as specified by this
Agreement. Acts outside those powers and responsibilities
shall be null and void. Kosovo shall have all rights and
powers set forth herein, including in particular as specified
in the Constitution at Chapter 1. This Agreement shall
prevail over any other legal provisions of the Parties and
shall be directly applicable. The Parties shall harmonize
their governing practices and documents with this Agreement.
7. The Parties agree to cooperate fully with all
international organizations working in Kosovo on the
implementation of this Agreement.
Article II: Confidence-Building Measures
End of Use of Force
1. Use of force in Kosovo shall cease immediately. In
accordance with this Agreement, alleged violations of the
cease-fire shall be reported to international observers and
shall not be used to justify use of force in response.
2. The status of police and security forces in Kosovo,
including withdrawal of forces, shall be governed by the
items of this Agreement. Paramilitary and irregular forces in
Kosovo are incompatible with the terms of this Agreement.
Return
3. The Parties recognize that all persons have the right to
return to their homes. Appropriate authorities shall take all
measures necessary to facilitate the safe return of persons,
including issuing necessary documents. All persons shall have
the right to reoccupy their real property, asset their
occupancy rights in state-owned property, and recover their
other property and personal possessions. The Parties shall
take all measures necessary to readmit returning persons to
Kosovo.
4. The Parties shall cooperate fully with all efforts by
the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and
other international and non-governmental organizations
concerning the repatriation and return of persons, including
those organizations monitoring of the treatment of persons
following their return.
Access for International Assistance
5. There shall be no impediments to the normal flow of
goods into Kosovo, including materials for the reconstruction
of homes and structures. The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
shall not require visas, customs, or licensing for persons or
things for the Implementation Mission (IM), the UNHCR, and
other international organizations, as well as for non-
governmental organizations working in Kosovo as determined by
the Chief of the Implementation Mission (CIM).
6. All staff, whether national or international, working
with international or non-governmental organizations
including with the Yugoslav Red Cross, shall be allowed
unrestricted access to the Kosovo population for purposes of
international assistance. All persons in Kosovo shall
similarly have safe, unhindered, and direct access to the
staff of such organizations.
other issues
7. Federal organs shall not take any decisions that have a
differential, disproportionate, injurious, or discriminatory
effect on Kosovo. Such decisions, if any, shall be void with
regard to Kosovo.
8. Martial law shall not be declared in Kosovo.
9. The Parties shall immediately comply with all requests
for support from the Implementation Mission (IM). The IM
shall have its own broadcast frequencies for radio and
television programming in Kosovo. The Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia shall provide all necessary facilities, including
frequencies for radio communications, to all humanitarian
organizations responsible for delivering aid to Kosovo.
detention of combatants and justice issues
10. All abducted persons or other persons held without
charge shall be released. The Parties shall also release and
transfer in accordance with this Agreement all persons held
in connection with the conflict. The Parties shall cooperate
fully with the International Committee of the Red Cross
(ICRC) to facilitate its work in accordance with its mandate,
including ensuring full access to all such persons,
irrespective of their status, wherever they might be held,
for visits in accordance with the ICRC's standard operating
procedures.
11. The Parties shall provide information, through tracing
mechanisms of the ICRC, to families of all persons who are
unaccounted for. The Parties shall cooperate fully with the
ICRC and the International Commission on Missing Persons in
their efforts to determine the identity, whereabouts, and
fate of those unaccounted for.
12. Each Party:
(a) shall not prosecute anyone for crimes related to the
conflict in Kosovo, except for persons accused of having
committed serious violations of international humanitarian
law. In order to facilitate transparency, the Parties shall
grant access to foreign experts (including forensics experts)
along with state investigators;
(b) shall grant a general amnesty for all persons already
convicted of committing politically motivated crimes related
to the conflict in Kosovo. This amnesty shall not apply to
those properly convicted of committing serious violations of
international humanitarian law at a fair and open trial
conducted pursuant to international standards.
13. All Parties shall comply with their obligation to
cooperate in the investigation and prosecution of serious
violations of international humanitarian law.
(a) As required by United Nations Security Council
resolution 827 (1993) and subsequent resolutions, the Parties
shall fully cooperate with the International Criminal
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia in its investigations and
prosecutions, including complying with its requests for
assistance and its orders.
(b) The Parties shall also allow complete, unimpeded, and
unfettered access to international experts--including
forensics experts and investigators to investigate
allegations of serious violations of international
humanitarian law.
independent media
14. Recognizing the importance of free and independent
media for the development of a democratic political climate
necessary for the reconstruction and development of Kosovo,
the Parties shall ensure the widest possible press freedoms
in Kosovo in all media, public and private, including print,
television, radio, and Internet.
CHAPTER 1
Constitution
Affirming their belief in a peaceful society, justice,
tolerance, and reconciliation,
Resolved to ensure respect for human rights and the quality
of all citizens and national communities,
Recognizing that the preservation and promotion of the
national, cultural, and linguistic identity of each national
community in Kosovo are necessary for the harmonious
development of a peaceful society,
Desiring through this interim Constitution to establish
institutions of democratic self-government in Kosovo grounded
in respect for the territorial integrity and sovereignty of
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and from this Agreement,
from which the authorities of governance set forth herein
originate,
Recognizing that the institutions of Kosovo should fairly
represent the national communities in Kosovo and foster the
exercise of their rights and those of their members,
Recalling and endorsing the principles/basic elements
adopted by the Contact Group at its ministerial meeting in
London on January 29, 1999,
Article I: Principles of Democratic Self-Government in Kosovo
1. Kosovo shall govern itself democratically through the
legislative, executive, judicial, and other organs and
institutions specified herein. Organs and institutions of
Kosovo shall exercise their authorities consistent with the
terms of this Agreement.
2. All authorities in Kosovo shall fully respect human
rights, democracy, and the equality of citizens and national
communities.
3. The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia has competence in
Kosovo over the following areas, except as specified
elsewhere in this Agreement: (a) territorial integrity, (b)
maintaining a common market within the
[[Page 8096]]
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, which power shall be
exercised in a manner tat does not discriminate against
Kosovo, (c) monetary policy, (d) defense, (e) foreign policy,
(f) customs services, (g) federal taxation, (h) federal
elections, and (i) other areas specified in this Agreement.
4. The Republic of Serbia shall have competence in Kosovo
as specified in this Agreement, including in relation to
Republic elections.
5. Citizens in Kosovo may continue to participate in areas
in which the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Republic
of Serbia have competence through their representation in
relevant institutions, without prejudice to the exercise of
competence by Kosovo authorities set forth in this Agreement.
6. With respect to Kosovo:
(a) There shall be no changes to the borders of Kosovo;
(b) Deployment and use of police and security forces shall
be governed by Chapters 2 and 7 of this Agreement; and
(c) Kosovo shall have authority to conduct foreign
relations within its areas of responsibility equivalent to
the power provided to Republics under Article 7 of the
Constitution of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.
7. There shall be no interference with the right of
citizens and national communities in Kosovo to call upon
appropriate institutions of the Republic of Serbia for the
following purposes:
(a) assistance in designing school curricula and standards;
(b) participation in social benefits programs, such as care
for war veterans, pensioners, and disabled persons; and
(c) other voluntarily received services, provided that
these services are not related to police and security matters
governed by Chapters 2 and 7 of this Agreement, and that any
Republic personnel serving in Kosovo pursuant to this
paragraph shall be unarmed service providers acting at the
invitation of a national community in Kosovo.
The Republic shall have the authority to levy taxes or
charges on those citizens requesting services pursuant to
this paragraph, as necessary to support the provision of such
services.
8. The basic territorial unit of local self-government in
Kosovo shall be the commune. All responsibilities in Kosovo
not expressly assigned elsewhere shall be the responsibility
of the communes.
9. To preserve and promote democratic self-government in
Kosovo, all candidates for appointed, elective, or other
public office, and all office holders, shall meet the
following criteria:
(a) No person who is serving a sentence imposed by the
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia,
and no person who is under indictment by the Tribunal and who
has failed to comply with an order to appear before the
Tribunal, may stand as a candidate or hold any office; and
(b) All candidates and office holders shall renounce
violence as a mechanism for achieving political goals; past
political or resistance activities shall not be a bar to
holding office in Kosovo.
Article II; The Assembly
General
1. Kosovo shall have an Assembly, which shall be comprised
of 120 Members.
(a) Eighty Members shall be directly elected.
(b) A further 40 Members shall be elected by the members of
qualifying national communities.
(i) Communities whose members constitute more than 0.5 per
cent of the Kosovo population but less than 5 per cent shall
have ten of these seats, to be divided among them in
accordance with their proportion of the overall population.
(ii) Communities whose members constitute more than 5 per
cent of the Kosovo population shall divide the remaining
thirty seat equally. The Serb and Albanian national
communities shall be presumed to meet the 5 per cent
population threshold.
Other Provisions
2. Elections for all Members shall be conducted
democratically, consistent with the provisions of Chapter 3
of this Agreement. Members shall be elected for a term of
three years.
3. Allocation of seats in the Assembly shall be based on
data gathered in the census referred to in Chapter 5 of this
Agreement. Prior to the completion of the census, for
purposes of this Article declarations of national community
membership made during voter registration shall be used to
determine the percentage of the Kosovo population that each
national community represents.
4. Members of the Assembly shall be immune from all civil
or criminal proceedings on the basis of words expressed or
other acts performed in their capacity as Members of the
Assembly.
Powers of the Assembly
5. The Assembly shall be responsible for enacting laws of
Kosovo, including in political, security, economic, social,
educational, scientific, and cultural areas as set out below
and elsewhere in this Agreement. This Constitution and the
laws of the Kosovo Assembly shall not be subject to change or
modification by authorities of the Republic or the
Federation.
(a) The Assembly shall be responsible for:
(i) Financing activities of Kosovo institutions, including
by levying taxes and duties on sources within Kosovo;
(ii) Adopting budgets of the Administrative organs and
other institutions of Kosovo, with the exception of communal
and national community institutions unless otherwise
specified herein;
(iii) Adopting regulations concerning the organization and
procedures of the Administrative Organs of Kosovo;
(iv) Approving the list of Ministers of the Government,
including the Prime Minister;
(v) Coordinating educational arrangements in Kosovo, with
respect for the authorities of national communities and
Communes;
(vi) Electing candidates for judicial office put forward by
the President of Kosovo;
(vii) Enacting laws ensuring free movement of goods,
services, and persons in Kosovo consistent with this
Agreement;
(viii) Approving agreements concluded by the President
within the areas of responsibility of Kosovo;
(ix) Cooperating with the Federal Assembly, and with the
Assemblies of the Republics, and conducting relations with
foreign legislative bodies;
(x) Establishing a framework for local self-government;
(xi) Enacting laws concerning inter-communal issues and
relations between national communities, when necessary;
(xii) Enacting laws regulating the work of medical
institutions and hospitals;
(xiii) Protecting the environment, where inter-communal
issues are involved;
(xiv) Adopting programs of economic, scientific,
technological, demographic, regional, and social development,
as well as urban planning;
(xv) Adopting programs for the development of agriculture
and of rural areas;
(xvi) Regulating elections consistent with Chapters 3 and
5;
(xvii) Regulating Kosovo-owned property; and
(xviii) Regulating land registries.
(b) The Assembly shall also have authority to enact laws in
areas within the responsibility of the Communes if the matter
cannot be effectively regulated by the Communes or if
regulation by individual Communes might prejudice the rights
of other Communes. In the absence of a law enacted by the
Assembly under this subparagraph that preempts communal
action, the Communes shall retain their authority.
procedure
6. Laws and other decisions of the Assembly shall be
adopted by majority of Members present and voting.
7. A majority of the Members of a single national community
elected to the Assembly pursuant to paragraph 1(b) may adopt
a motion that a law or other decision adversely affects the
vital interests of their national community. The challenged
law or decision shall be suspended with regard to that
national community until the dispute settlement procedure in
paragraph 8 is completed.
8. The following procedure shall be used in the event of a
motion under paragraph 7:
(a) The Members making the vital interest motion shall give
reasons for their motion. The proposers of the legislation
shall be given an opportunity to respond.
(b) The Members making the motion shall appoint within one
day a mediator of their choice to assist in reaching an
agreement with those proposing the legislation.
(c) If mediation does not produce an agreement within seven
days, the matter may be submitted for a binding ruling. The
decision shall be rendered by a panel comprising three
Members of the Assembly: one Albanian and one Serb, each
appointed by his or her national community delegation; and a
third Member, who will be of a third nationality and will be
selected within two days by consensus of the Presidency of
the Assembly.
(i) A vital interest motion shall be upheld if the
legislation challenged adversely affects the community's
fundamental constitutional rights, additional rights as set
forth in Article VII, or the principle of fair treatment.
(ii) If the motion is not upheld, the challenged
legislation shall enter into force for that community.
(d) Paragraph (c) shall not apply to the selection of
Assembly officials.
(e) The Assembly may exclude other decisions from this
procedure by means of a law enacted by a majority that
includes a majority of each national community elected
pursuant to paragraph 1(b).
9. A majority of the Members shall constitute a quorum. the
Assembly shall otherwise decide its own rules of procedure.
leadership
10. The Assembly shall elect from among its Members a
Presidency, which shall consist of a President, two Vice-
Presidents, and other leaders in accordance with the
Assembly's rules of procedure. Each national community
meeting the threshold specified in paragraph 1(b)(ii) shall
be represented in the leadership. the President of the
Assembly shall not be from the same national community as the
President of Kosovo.
The President of the Assembly shall represent it, call its
sessions to order, chair its meetings, coordinate the work of
any committees it may establish, and perform other tasks
prescribed by the rules of procedure of the Assembly.
[[Page 8097]]
Article III: President of Kosovo
1. There shall be a President of Kosovo, who shall be
elected by the Assembly by vote of a majority of its Members.
The President of Kosovo shall serve for a three-year term. No
person may serve more than two terms as President of Kosovo.
2. The President of Kosovo shall be responsible for:
(i) Representing Kosovo, including before any international
or Federal body or any body of the Republics;
(ii) Proposing to the Assembly candidates for Prime
Minister, the Constitutional Court, the Supreme Court, and
other Kosovo judicial offices;
(iii) Meeting regularly with the democratically elected
representatives of the national communities;
(iv) Conducting foreign relations and concluding agreements
within this power consistent with the authorities of Kosovo
institutions under this Agreement. Such agreements shall only
enter into force upon approval by the Assembly;
(v) Designating a representative to serve on the Joint
Commission established by Article 1.2 of Chapter 5 of this
Agreement;
(vi) Meeting regularly with the Federal and Republic
Presidents; and
(vii) Other functions specified herein or by law.
Article IV: Government and Administrative Organs
1. Executive power shall be exercised by the Government.
The Government shall be responsible for implementing the laws
of Kosovo, and of other government authorities when such
responsibilities are devolved by those authorities. The
Government shall also have competence to propose laws to the
Assembly.
(a) The Government shall consist of a Prime Minister and
Ministers, including at least one person from each national
community meeting the threshold specified in paragraph
1(b)(ii) of Article II. Ministers shall head the
Administrative Organs of Kosovo.
(b) The candidate for Prime Minister proposed by the
President shall put forward a list of Ministers to the
Assembly. The Prime Minister, together with the list of
Ministers, shall be approved by the majority of those present
and voting in the Assembly. In the event that the Prime
Minister is not able to obtain a majority for the Government,
the President shall propose a new candidate for Prime
Minister within ten days.
(c) The Government shall resign if a no confidence motion
is adopted by a vote of a majority of the members of the
Assembly. If the Prime Minster or the Government resigns, the
President shall select a new candidate for Prime Minister who
shall seek to form a Government.
(d) The Prime Minister shall call meetings of the
Government, represent it as appropriate, and coordinate its
work. Decisions of the Government shall require a majority of
Ministers present and voting. The Prime Minister shall cast
the deciding vote in the event Ministers are equally divided.
The Government shall otherwise decide its own rules of
procedure.
2. Administrative Organs shall be responsible for assisting
the Government in carrying out its duties.
(a) National communities shall be fairly represented at all
levels in the Administrative Organs.
(b) Any citizen in Kosovo claiming to have been directly
and adversely affected by the decision of an executive or
administrative body shall have the right to judicial review
of the legality of that decision that exhausting all avenues
for administrative review. The Assembly shall enact a law to
regulate this review.
3. There shall be a Chief Prosecutor who shall be
responsible for prosecuting individuals who violate the
criminal laws of Kosovo. He shall head an Office of the
Prosecutor, which shall at all levels have staff
representative of the population of Kosovo.
Article V: Judiciary
General
1. Kosovo shall have a Constitutional Court, a Supreme
Court, District Courts, and Communal Courts.
2. The Kosovo courts shall have juridiction over all
matters arising under this Constitution or the laws of Kosovo
except as specified in paragraph 3. The Kosovo courts shall
also have jurisdiction over questions of federal law, subject
to appeal to the Federal courts on these questions after all
appeals available under the Kosovo system have been
exhausted.
3. Citizens in Kosovo may opt to have civil disputes to
which they are party adjudicated by other courts in the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, which shall apply the law
applicable in Kosovo.
4. The following rules will apply to criminal cases:
(a) At the start of criminal proceedings, the defendant is
entitled to have his or her trial transferred to another
Kosovo court that he or she designates.
(b) In criminal cases in which all defendants and victims
are members of the same national community, all members of
the judicial council will be from a national community of
their choice if any party so requests.
(c) A defendant in a criminal case tried in Kosovo courts
is entitled to have at least one member of the judicial
council hearing the case to be from his or her national
community. Kosovo authorities will consider and allow judges
of other courts in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to
serve as Kosovo judges for these purposes.
Constitutional Court
5. The Constitutional Court shall consist of nine judges.
There shall be at least one Constitutional Court judge from
each national community meeting the threshold specified in
paragraph 1(b)(ii) of Article II. Until such time as the
Parties agree to discontinue this arrangement, 5 judges of
the Constitutional Court shall be selected from a list drawn
up by the President of the European Court of Human Rights.
6. The Constitutional Court shall have authority to resolve
disputes relating to the meaning of this Constitution. That
authority shall include, but is not limited to, determining
whether laws applicable in Kosovo, decisions or acts of the
President, the Assembly, the Government, the Communes, and
the national communities are compatible with this
Constitution.
(a) Matters may be referred to the Constitutional Court by
the President of Kosovo, the President or Vice-Presidents of
the Assembly, the Ombudsman, the communal assemblies and
councils, and any national community acting according to the
democratic procedures.
(b) Any court which finds in the course of adjudicating a
matter that the dispute depends on the answer to a question
within the Constitutional Court's jurisdiction shall refer
the issue to the Constitutional Court for a preliminary
decision.
7. Following the exhaustion of other legal remedies, the
Constitutional Court shall at the request of any person
claiming to be victim have jurisdiction over complaints that
human rights and fundamental freedoms and the rights of
members of national communities set forth in this
Constitution have been violated by a public authority.
8. The Constitutional Court shall have such other
jurisdiction as may be specified elsewhere in this Agreement
or by law.
Supreme Court
9. The Supreme Court shall consist of nine judges. There
shall be at least one Suprme Court judge from each national
community meeting the threshold specified in paragraph
1(b)(ii) of Article II.
10. The Supreme Court shall hear appeals from the District
Courts and the Communal Courts. Except as otherwise provided
in this Constitution, The Supreme Court shall be the court of
final appeal for all cases arising under law applicable in
Kosovo. Its decisions shall be recognized and executed by all
authorities in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.
functioning of the courts
11. The Assembly shall determine the number of District and
Communal Court judges necessary to meet current needs.
12. Judges of all courts in Kosovo shall be distinguished
jurists of the highest moral character. They shall be broadly
representative of the national communities of Kosovo.
13. Removal of a Kosovo judge shall require the consensus
of the judges of the Constitutional Court. A Constitutional
Court judge whose removal is in question shall not
participate in the decision on his case.
14. The Constitutional Court shall adopt rules for itself
and for other courts in Kosovo. The Constitutional and
Supreme Courts shall each adopt decisions by majority vote of
their members.
15. Except as otherwise specified in their rules, all
Kosovo courts shall hold public proceedings. They shall issue
published opinions setting forth the reasons for their
decisions.
Article VI: Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms
1. All authorities in Kosovo shall ensure internationally
recognized human rights and fundamental freedoms.
2. The right and freedoms set forth in the European
Convention for the Protection of Human Right and Fundamental
Freedoms and its Protocols shall apply directly in Kosovo.
Other internationally recognized human rights instruments
enacted into law by the Kosovo Assembly shall also apply.
These rights and freedoms shall have priority over all other
law.
3. All courts, agencies, governmental institutions, and
other pubic institutions of Kosovo or operating in relation
to Kosovo shall conform to these human rights and fundamental
freedoms.
Article VII: National Communities
1. National communities and their members shall have
additional rights as set forth below in order to preserve and
express their national, cultural, religious, and linguistic
identities in accordance with international standards and the
Helsinki Final Act. Such rights shall be exercised in
conformity with human rights and fundamental freedoms.
2. Each national community may elect, through democratic
means and in a manner consistent with the principles of
Chapter 3 of this Agreement, institutions to administer its
affairs in Kosovo.
[[Page 8098]]
3. The national communities shall be subject to the laws
applicable in Kosovo, provided that any act or decision
concerning national communities must be non-discriminatory.
The Assembly shall decide upon a procedure for resolving
disputes between national communities.
4. The additional rights of the national communities,
acting through their democratically elected institutions, are
to:
(a) preserve and protect their national, cultural,
religious, and linguistic identities, including by:
(i) inscribing local names of towns and villages, of
squares and streets, and of other topographic names in the
language and alphabet of the national community in addition
to signs in Albanian and Serbia, consistent with decisions
about style made by the communal institutions;
(ii) providing information in the language and alphabet of
the national community;
(iii) providing for education and establishing educational
institutions, in particular for schooling in their own
language and alphabet and in national culture and history,
for which relevant authorities will provide financial
assistance; curricula shall reflect a spirit of tolerance
between national communities and respect for the rights of
members of all national communities in accordance with
international standards;
(iv) enjoying unhindered contacts with representatives of
their respective national communities, within the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia and abroad;
(v) using and displaying national symbols, including
symbols of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the
Republic of Serbia;
(vi) protecting national traditions on family law by, if
the community decides, arranging rules in the field of
inheritance; family and matrimonial relations; tutorship; and
adoption;
(vii) the preservation of sites of religious, historical,
or cultural importance to the national community in
cooperation with other authorities;
(viii) implementing public health and social services on a
non-discriminatory basis as to citizens and national
communities;
(ix) operating religious institutions in cooperation with
religious authorities; and
(x) participating in regional and international non-
governmental organizations in accordance with procedures of
these organizations;
(b) be guaranteed access to, and representation in, public
broadcast media, including provisions for separate
programming in relevant languages under the direction of
those nominated by the respective national community on a
fair and equitable basis; and
(c) finance their activities by collecting contributions
the national communities may decided to levy on members of
their own communities.
5. Members of national communities shall also be
individually guaranteed:
(a) the right to enjoy unhindered contacts with members of
their respective national communities elsewhere in the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and abroad;
(b) equal access to employment in public services at all
levels;
(c) the right to use their languages and alphabets;
(d) the right to use and display national community
symbols;
(e) the right to participate in democratic institutions
that will determine the national community's exercise of the
collective rights set forth in this Article; and
(f) the right to establish cultural and religious
association, for which relevant authorities will provide
financial assistance.
(6) Each national community and, where appropriate, their
members acting individually may exercise these additional
rights through Federal institutions and institutions of the
Republics, in accordance with the procedures of those
institutions and without prejudice to the ability of Kosovo
institutions to carry out their responsibilities.
7. Every person shall have the right freely to choose to be
treated or not to be treated as belonging to a national
community, and no disadvantage shall result from that choice
or from the exercise of the rights connected to that choice.
Article VIII: Communes
1. Kosovo shall have the existing communes. Changes may be
made to communal boundaries by act of the Kosovo Assembly
after consultation with the authorities of the communes
concerned.
2. Communes may develop relationships among themselves for
their mutual benefit.
3. Each commune shall have an Assembly, and Executive
Council, and such administrative bodies as the commune may
establish.
(a) Each national community whose membership constitutes at
least three percent of the population of the commune shall be
represented on the Council in proportion to its share of the
communal population or by one member, whichever is greater.
(b) Prior to the completion of a census, disputes over
communal population percentages for purposes of this
paragraph shall be resolved by reference to declarations of
national community membership in the voter registry.
4. The communes shall have responsibility for:
(a) law enforcement, as specified in Chapter 2 of this
Agreement;
(b) regulating and, when appropriate, providing child care;
(c) providing education, consistent with the rights and
duties of national communities, and in a spirit of tolerance
between national communities and respect for the rights of
the members of all national communities in accordance with
international standards;
(d) protecting the communal environment;
(e) regulating commerce and privately-owned stores;
(f) regulating hunting and fishing;
(g) planning and carrying out public works of communal
importance, including roads and water supplies, and
participating in the planning and carrying out of Kosovo-wide
public works projects in coordination with other communes and
Kosovo authorities;
(h) regulating land use, town planning, building
regulations, and housing construction;
(i) developing programs for tourism, the hotel industry,
catering, and sport;
(j) organizing fairs and local markets;
(k) organizing public services of communal importance,
including fire, emergency response, and police consistent
with Chapter 2 of this Agreement; and
(l) financing the work of communal institutions, including
raising revenues, taxes and preparing budgets.
5. The communes shall also have responsibility for all
other areas within Kosovo's authority not expressly assigned
elsewhere herein, subject to the provisions of Article
II.5(b) of this Constitution.
6. Each commune shall conduct its business in public and
shall maintain publicly available records of its
deliberations and decisions.
Article IX: Representation
1. Citizens in Kosovo shall have the right to participate
in the election of:
(a) At least 10 deputies in the House of Citizens of the
Federal Assembly; and
(b) At least 20 deputies in the National Assembly of the
Republic of Serbia.
2. The modalities of elections for the deputies specified
in paragraph 1 shall be determined by the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia and the Republic of Serbia respectively, under
procedures to be agreed with the Chief of the Implementation
Mission.
3. The Assembly shall have the opportunity to present to
the appropriate authorities a list of candidates from which
shall be drawn:
(a) At least one citizen in Kosovo to serve in the Federal
Government, and at least one citizen in Kosovo to serve in
the Government of the Republic of Serbia; and
(b) At least one judge on the Federal Constitutional Court,
one judge on the Federal Court, and three judges on the
Supreme Court of Serbia.
Article X: Amendment
1. The Assembly may by a majority of two-thirds of its
Members, which majority must include a majority of the
Members elected from each national community pursuant to
Article II.1(b)(ii), adopt amendments to this Constitution.
2. There shall, however, be no amendments to Article I.3-8
or to this Article, nor shall any amendment diminish the
rights granted by Articles VI and VII.
Article XI: Entry into Force
This Constitution shall enter into force upon signature of
this Agreement.
CHAPTER 2
Police and Civil Public Security
Article I: general Principles
1. All law enforcement agencies, organizations and
personnel of the Parties, which for purposes of this Chapter
will include customs and border police operating in Kosovo,
shall act in compliance with this Agreement and shall observe
internationally recognized standards of human rights and due
process. In exercising their functions, law enforcement
personnel shall not discriminate on any ground, such as sex,
race, color, language, religion, political or other opinion,
national or social origin, association with a national
community, property, birth or other status.
2. The Parties invite the Organization for Security and
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) through its Implementation
Mission (IM) to monitor and supervise implementation of this
Chapter and related provisions of this Agreement. The Chief
of the Implementation Mission (CIM) or his designee shall
have the authority to issue binding directives to the Parties
and subsidiary bodies on police and civil public security
matters to obtain compliance by the Parties with the terms of
this Chapter. The Parties agree to cooperate fully with the
IM and to comply with its directives. Personnel assigned to
police-related duties within the IM shall be permitted to
wear a uniform while serving in this part of the mission.
3. In carrying out his responsibilities, the CIM will
inform and consult KFOR as appropriate.
4. The IM shall have the authority to:
(a) Monitor, observe, and inspect law enforcement
activities, personnel, and facilities, including border
police and customs units, as well as associated judicial
organizations, structures, and proceedings;
(b) Advise law enforcement personnel and forces, including
border police and customs units, and, when necessary to bring
them
[[Page 8099]]
into compliance with this Agreement, including this Chapter,
issue appropriate binding directions in coordination with
KFOR;
(c) Participate in and guide the training of law
enforcement personnel;
(d) In coordination with KFOR, assess threats to public
order;
(e) Advise and provide guidance to governmental authorities
on how to deal with threats to public order and on the
organization of effective civilian law enforcement agencies;
(f) Accompany the Parties' law enforcement personnel as
they carry out their responsibilities, as the IM deems
appropriate;
(g) Dismiss or discipline public security personnel of the
Parties for cause; and
(h) Request appropriate law enforcement support from the
international community to enable IM to carry out the duties
assigned in this Chapter.
5. All Kosovo, Republic and Federal law enforcement and
Federal military authorities shall be obligated, in their
respective areas of authority, to ensure freedom of movement
and safe passage for all persons, vehicles and goods. This
obligation includes a duty to permit the unobstructed passage
into Kosovo of police equipment which has been approved by
the CIM and COMKFOR for use by Kosovo police, and of any
other support provided under subparagraph 4(h) above.
6. The Parties undertake to provide one another mutual
assistance, when requested, in the surrender of those accused
of committing criminal acts within a Party's jurisdiction,
and in the investigation and prosecution of offenses across
the boundary of Kosovo with other parts of the FRY. The
Parties shall develop agreed procedures and mechanisms for
responding to these requests. The CIM or his designee shall
resolve disputes on these matters.
7. The IM shall aim to transfer law enforcement
responsibilities described in Article II below to the law
enforcement officials and organizations described in Article
II at the earliest practical time consistent with civil
public security.
Article II: Communal Police
1. As they build up, communal police units, organized and
stationed at the communal and municipal levels, shall assume
primary responsibility for law enforcement in Kosovo. The
specific responsibilities of the communal police will include
police patrols and crime prevention, criminal investigations,
arrest and detention of criminal suspects, crowd control, and
traffic control.
2. Number and Composition. The total number of communal
police established by this Agreement operating within Kosovo
shall not exceed 3,000 active duty law enforcement officers.
However, the CIM shall have the authority to increase or
decrease this personnel ceiling if he determines such action
is necessary to meet operational needs. Prior to taking any
such action, the CIM shall consult with the Criminal Justice
Administration and other officials as appropriate. The
national communities in each commune shall be fairly
represented in the communal police unit.
3. Criminal Justice Administration.
a. A Criminal Justice Administration (CJA) shall be
established. It shall be an Administrative Organ of Kosovo,
reporting to an appropriate member of the Government of
Kosovo as determined by the Government. The CJA shall provide
general coordination of law enforcement operations in Kosovo.
Specific functions of the CJA shall include general
supervision over, and providing guidance to, communal police
forces through their commanders, assisting in the
coordination between separate communal police forces, and
oversight of the operations of the police academy. In
carrying out these responsibilities, the CJA may issue
directives, which shall be binding on communal police
commanders and personnel. In the exercise of its functions,
the CJA shall be subject to any directions given by CIM.
b. Within twelve months of the establishment of the CJA,
the CJA shall submit for review by the CIM a plan for the
coordination and development of law enforcement bodies and
personnel in Kosovo within its jurisdiction. This plan shall
serve as the framework for law enforcement coordination and
development in Kosovo and be subject to modification by the
CIM.
c. The IM will endeavor to develop the capacities of the
CJA as quickly as possible. Prior to the point when the CJA
is able to properly carry out the functions described in the
preceding paragraph, as determined by the CIM, the IM shall
carry out these functions.
4. Communal Commanders. Subject to review by the CIM, each
commune will appoint, and may remove for cause, by majority
vote of the communal council, a communal police commander
with responsibility for police operations within the commune.
5. Service in Police.
(a) Recruitment for public security personnel will be
conducted primarily at the local level. Local and communal
governments, upon consultation with communal Criminal Justice
Commissions, will nominate officer candidates to attend the
Kosovo Police Academy. Offers of employment will be made by
communal police commanders, with the concurrence of the
academy director, only after the candidate has successfully
completed the academy basic recruit course.
(b) Recruitment, selection and training of communal police
officers shall be conducted under the direction of the IM
during the period of its operation.
(c) There shall be no bar to service in the communal police
based on prior political activities. Members of the police
shall not, however, be permitted while they hold this public
office to participate in party political activities other
than membership in such a party.
(d) Continued service in the police is dependent upon
behavior consistent with the terms of this Agreement,
including this Chapter. The IM shall supervise regular
reviews of officer performance, which shall be conducted in
accordance with international due process norms.
6. Uniforms and Equipment.
(a) All communal police officers, with the exception of
officers participating in crowd control functions, shall wear
a standard uniform. Uniforms shall include a badge, picture
identification, and name tag.
(b) Communal police officers may be equipped with a
sidearm, handcuffs, a baton, and a radio.
(c) Subject to authorization or modification by the CIM,
each commune may maintain, either at the communal
headquarters or at municipal stations, no more than one long-
barreled weapon not to exceed 7.62 mm for every fifteen
police officers assigned to the commune. Each such weapon
must be approved by and registered with the IM and KFOR
pursuant to procedures established by the CIM and COMKFOR.
When not in use, all such weapons will be securely stored and
each commune will keep a registry of these weapons.
(i) In the event of a serious law enforcement threat that
would justify the use of these weapons, the communal police
commander shall obtain IM approval before employing these
weapons.
(ii) The communal police commander may authorize the use of
these weapons without prior approval of the IM for the sole
purpose of self-defense. In such cases, he must report the
incident no later than one hour after it occurs to the IM and
KFOR.
(iii) If the CIM determines that a weapon has been used by
a member of a communal police force in a manner contrary to
this Chapter, he may take appropriate corrective measures;
such measures may include reducing the number of such weapons
that the communal police force is allowed to possess or
dismissing or disciplining the law enforcement personnel
involved.
(d) Communal police officers engaged in crowd control
functions will receive equipment appropriate to their task,
including batons, helmets and shields, subject to IM
approval.
Article III: Interim Police Academy
1. Under the supervision of the IM, the CJA shall establish
an interim Police Academy that will offer mandatory and
professional development training for all public security
personnel, including border police. Until the interim police
academy is established, IM will oversee a temporary training
program for public security personnel including border
police.
2. All public security personnel shall be required to
complete a course of police studies successfully before
serving as communal police officers.
3. The Academy shall be headed by a Director appointed and
removed by the CJA in consultation with the Kosovo Criminal
Justice Commission and the IM. The Director shall consult
closely with the IM and comply fully with its recommendations
and guidance.
4. All Republic and Federal police training facilities in
Kosovo, including the academy at Vucitrn, will cease
operations within 6 months of the entry into force of this
Agreement.
Article IV: Criminal Justice Commissions
1. The parties shall establish a Kosovo Criminal Justice
Commission and Communal Criminal Justice Commissions. The CIM
or his designee shall chair meetings of these Commissions.
They shall be forums for cooperation, coordination and the
resolution of disputes concerning law enforcement and civil
public security in Kosovo.
2. The functions of the Commissions shall include the
following:
(a) Monitor, review, and make recommendations regarding the
operation of law enforcement personnel and policies in
Kosovo, including communal police units;
(b) Review, and make recommendations regarding the
recruitment, selection and training of communal police
officers and commanders;
(c) Consider complaints regarding police practices filed by
individuals or national communities, and provided information
and recommendations to communal police commanders and the CIM
for consideration in their reviews of officer performance;
and
(d) In the Kosovo Criminal Justice Commission only: In
consultation with designated local, Republic and Federal
police liaisons, monitor jurisdiction sharing in cases of
overlapping criminal jurisdiction between Kosovo, Republic
and Federal authorities.
3. The membership of the Kosovo Criminal Justice Commission
and each Communal Criminal Justice Commission shall be
representative of the population and shall include:
[[Page 8100]]
(a) In the Kosovo Criminal Justice Commission:
(i) a representative of each commune;
(ii) the head of the Kosovo CJA;
(iii) a representative of each Republic and Federal law
enforcement component operating in Kosovo (for example,
Customs police and Border police);
(iv) a representative of each national community;
(v) a representative of the IM, during its period of
operation in Kosovo;
(vi) a representative of the VJ border guard, as
appropriate;
(vii) a representative of the MUP, as appropriate, while
present in Kosovo; and
(viii) a representative of KFOR, as appropriate.
(b) In the Communal Criminal Justice Commissions:
(i) the communal police commander;
(ii) a representative of any Republic and Federal law
enforcement component operating in the commune;
(iii) a representative of each national community;
(iv) a civilian representative of the communal government;
(v) a representative of the IM, during its period of
operation in Kosovo;
(vi) a representative of the VJ border guard, who shall
have observer status, as appropriate; and
(viii) A representative of KFOR, as appropriate.
4. Each Criminal Justice Commission shall meet at least
monthly, or at the request of any Commission member.
Article V: Police Operations in Kosovo
1. The communal police established by this Agreement shall
have exclusive law enforcement authority and jurisdiction and
shall be the only police presence in Kosovo following the
reduction and eventual withdrawal from Kosovo by the MUP,
with the exception of border police as specified in Article
VI and any support provided pursuant to Article I(3)(h).
(a) During the transition to communal police, the remaining
MUP shall carry out only normal policing duties, and shall
draw down, pursuant to the schedule described in Chapter 7.
(b) During the period of the phased drawdown of the MUP,
the MUP in Kosovo shall have authority to conduct only civil
police functions and shall be under the supervision and
control of the CIM. The IM may dismiss from service, or take
other appropriate disciplinary action against, MUP personnel
who obstruct implementation of this Agreement.
2. Concurrent Law Enforcement in Kosovo.
(a) Except as provided in Article V.1 and Article VI,
Federal and Republic law enforcement officials may only act
within Kosovo in cases of hot pursuit of a person suspected
of committing a serious criminal offense.
(i) Federal and Republic authorities shall as soon as
practicable, but in no event later than one hour after their
entry into Kosovo while engaged in a hot pursuit, notify the
nearest Kosovo law enforcement officials that the pursuit has
crossed into Kosovo. Once notification has been made, further
pursuit and apprehension shall be coordinated with Kosovo law
enforcement. Following apprehension, suspects shall be placed
into the custody of the authorities originating the pursuit.
If the suspect has not been apprehended within four hours,
the original pursuing authorities shall cease their pursuit
and immediately depart Kosovo unless invited to continue
their pursuit by the CJA or the CIM.
(ii) In the event the pursuit is of such short duration as
to preclude notification, Kosovo law enforcement officials
shall be notified that an apprehension has been made and
shall be given access to the detainee prior to his removal
from Kosovo.
(iii) Personnel engaged in hot pursuit under the provisions
of this Article may only be civilian police, may only carry
weapons appropriate for normal civilian police duties
(sidearms, and long-barreled weapons not to exceed 7.62mm),
may only travel in officially marked police vehicles, and may
not exceed a total of eight personnel at any one time. Travel
in armored personnel carriers by police engaged in hot
pursuit is strictly prohibited.
(iv) The same rules shall apply to hot pursuit of suspects
by Kosovo law enforcement authorities to Federal territory
outside of Kosovo.
(b) All Parties shall provide the highest degree of mutual
assistance in law enforcement matters in response to
reasonable requests.
Article VI: Security on International Borders
1. The Government of the FRY will maintain official border
crossings on its international borders (Albania and FYROM).
2. Personnel from the organizations listed below may be
present along Kosovo's international borders and at
international border crossings, and may not act outside the
scope of the authorities specified in this Chapter.
(a) Republic of Serbia Border Police.
(i) The Border Police shall continue to exercise authority
to Kosovo's international border crossings and in connection
with the enforcement of Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
immigration laws. The total number of border police shall be
drawn down to 75 within 14 days of entry into force of this
Agreement.
(ii) While maintaining the personnel threshold specified in
subparagraph (i), the ranks of the existing Border Police
units operating in Kosovo shall be supplemented by new
recruits so that they are representative of the Kosovo
population.
(iii) All Border Police stationed in Kosovo must attend
police training at the Kosovo police academy within 18 months
of the entry into force of this Agreement.
(b) Customs Officers.
(i) The FRY Customs Service will continue to exercise
customs jurisdiction at Kosovo's official international
border crossings and in such customs warehouses as may be
necessary within Kosovo. The total number of customs
personnel shall be drawn down to 50 within 14 days of the
entry into force of this Agreement.
(ii) Kosovar Albanian officers of the Customs Service shall
be trained and compensated by the FRY.
(c) The CIM shall conduct a periodic review of customs and
border police requirements and shall have the authority to
increase or decrease the personnel ceilings described in
paragraphs (a)(i) and (b)(i) above to reflect operational
needs and to adjust the composition of individual customs
units.
Article VII: Arrest and Detention
1. Except pursuant to Article V, Article I(3)(h), and
sections (a)-(b) of this paragraph, only officers of the
communal police shall have authority to arrest and detain
individuals in Kosovo. (a) Border Police officers shall have
authority within Kosovo to arrest and detain individuals who
have violated criminal provisions of the immigration laws.
(b) Officers of the Customs Service shall have authority
within Kosovo to arrest and detain individuals for criminal
violations of the customs laws.
2. Immediately upon making an arrest, the arresting officer
shall notify the nearest Communal Criminal Justice Commission
of the detention and the location of the detainee. He
subsequently shall transfer the detainee to the nearest
appropriate jail in Kosovo at the earliest opportunity.
3. Officers may use reasonable and necessary force
proportionate to the circumstances to effect arrests and keep
suspects in custody.
4. Kosovo and its constituent communes shall establish
jails and prisons to accommodate the detention of criminal
suspects and the imprisonment of individuals convicted of
violating the laws applicable in Kosovo. Prisons shall be
operated consistent with international standards. Access
shall be provided to international personnel, including
representatives of the International Committee of the Red
Cross.
Article VIII: Administration of Justice
1. Criminal Jurisdiction over Persons Arrested within
Kosovo.
(a) Except in accordance with Article V and subparagraph
(b) of this paragraph, any person arrested within Kosovo
shall be subject to the jurisdiction of the Kosovo courts.
(b) Any person arrested within Kosovo, in accordance with
the law and with this Agreement, by the Border Police or
Customs Police shall be subject to be jurisdiction of the FRY
courts. If there is no applicable court of the FRY to hear
the case, the Kosovo courts shall have jurisdiction.
2. Prosecution of Crimes.
(a) The CJA shall, in consultation with the CIM, appoint
and have the authority to remove the Chief Prosecutor.
(b) The IM shall have the authority to monitor, observe,
inspect, and when necessary, direct the operations of the
Office of the Prosecutor and any and all related staff.
Article IX: Final Authority To Interpret
The CIM is the final authority regarding interpretation of
this Chapter and his determinations are binding on all
Parties and persons.
CHAPTER 3
Conduct and Supervision of Elections
Article I: Conditions for Elections
1. The Parties shall ensure that conditions exist for the
organization of free and fair elections, which include but
are not limited to:
(a) freedom of movement for all citizens;
(b) an open and free political environment;
(c) an environment conducive to the return of displaced
persons;
(d) a safe and secure environment that ensures freedom of
assembly, association, and expression;
(e) an electoral legal framework of rules and regulations
complying with OSCE commitments, which will be implemented by
a Central Election Commission, as set forth in Article III,
which is representative of the population of Kosovo in terms
of national communities and political parties; and
(f) free media, effectively accessible to registered
political parties and candidates, and available to voters
throughout Kosovo.
2. The Parties request the OSCE to certify when elections
will be effective under current conditions in Kosovo, and to
provide assistance to the Parties to create conditions for
free and fair elections.
3. The Parties shall comply fully with Paragraphs 7 and 8
of the OSCE Copenhagen Document, which are attached to this
Chapter.
[[Page 8101]]
Article II: Role of the OSCE
1. The Parties request the OSCE to adopt and put in place
an elections program for Kosovo and supervise elections as
set forth in this Agreement.
2. The Parties request the OSCE to supervise, in a manner
to be determined by the OSCE and in cooperation with other
international organizations the OSCE deems necessary, the
preparation and conduct of elections for:
(a) Members of the Kosovo Assembly;
(b) Members of Communal Assemblies;
(c) other officials popularly elected in Kosovo under this
Agreement and the laws and Constitution of Kosovo at the
discretion of the OSCE.
3. The Parties request the OSCE to establish a Central
Election Commission in Kosovo (``the Commission'').
4. Consistent with Article IV of Chapter 5, the first
elections shall be held within nine months of the entry into
force of this Agreement. The President of the Commission
shall decide, in consultation with the Parties, the exact
timing and order of elections for Kosovo political offices.
Article III: Central Election Commission
1. The Commission shall adopt electoral Rules and
Regulations on all matters necessary for the conduct of free
and fair elections in Kosovo, including rules relating to:
the eligibility and registration of candidates, parties, and
voters, including displaced persons and refugees; ensuring a
free and fair elections campaign; administrative and
technical preparation for elections including the
establishment, publication, and certification of election
results; and the role of international and domestic election
observers.
2. The responsibilities of the Commission, as provided in
the electoral Rules and Regulations, shall include:
(a) the preparation, conduct, and supervision of all
aspects of the electoral process, including development and
supervision of political party and voter registration, and
creation of secure and transparent procedures for production
and dissemination of ballots and sensitive election
materials, vote counts, tabulations, and publication of
elections results;
(b) ensuring compliance with the electoral Rules and
Regulations established pursuant to this Agreement, including
establishing auxiliary bodies for this purpose as necessary;
(c) ensuring that action is taken to remedy any violation
of any provision of this Agreement, including imposing
penalties such as removal from candidate or party lists,
against any person, candidate, political party, or body that
violates such provisions; and
(d) accrediting observers, including personnel from
international organizations and foreign and domestic non-
governmental organizations, and ensuring that the Parties
grant the accredited observers unimpeded access and movement.
3. The Commission shall consist of a person appointed by
the Chairman-in-Office (CIO) of the OSCE, representatives of
all national communities, and representatives of political
parties in Kosovo selected by criteria to be determined by
the Commission. The person appointed by the CIO shall act as
the President of the Commission. The rules of procedure of
the Commission shall provide that in the exceptional
circumstance of an unresolved dispute within the Commission,
the decision of the President shall be final and binding.
4. The Commission shall enjoy the right to establish
communication facilities, and to engage local and
administrative staff.
CHAPTER 4
Economic Issues
Article I
1. The economy of Kosovo shall function in accordance with
free market principles.
2. The authorities established to levy and collect taxes
and other charges are set forth in this Agreement. Except as
otherwise expressly provided, all authorities have the right
to keep all revenues from their own taxes or other charges
consistent with this Agreement.
3. Certain revenue from Kosovo taxes and duties shall
accrue to the Communes, taking into account the need for an
equalization of revenues between the Communes based on
objective criteria. The Assembly of Kosovo shall enact
appropriate non-discriminatory legislation for this purpose.
The Communes may also levy local taxes in accordance with
this Agreement.
4. The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia shall be responsible
for the collection of all customs duties at international
borders in Kosovo. There shall be no impediments to the free
movement of persons, goods, services, and capital to and from
Kosovo.
5. Federal authorities shall ensure that Kosovo receives a
proportionate and equitable share of benefits that may be
derived from international agreements concluded by the
Federal Republic and of Federal resources.
6. Federal and other authorities shall within their
respective powers and responsibilities ensure the free
movement of persons, goods, services, and capital to Kosovo,
including from international sources. They shall in
particular allow access to Kosovo without discrimination for
person delivering such goods and services.
7. If expressly required by an international donor or
lender, international contracts for reconstruction projects
shall be concluded by the authorities of the Federal Republic
of Yugoslavia, which shall establish appropriate mechanisms
to make such funds available to Kosovo authorities. Unless
precluded by the terms of contracts, all reconstruction
projects that exclusively concern Kosovo shall be managed and
implemented by the appropriate Kosovo authority.
Article II
1. The Parties agree to reallocate ownership and resources
in accordance insofar as possible with the distribution of
powers and responsibilities set forth in this Agreement, in
the following areas:
(a) government-owned assets (including educational
institutions, hospitals, natural resources, and production
facilities);
(b) pension and social insurance contributions;
(c) revenues to be distributed under Article 1.5; and
(d) any other matters relating to economic relations
between the Parties not covered by this Agreement.
2. The Parties agree to the creation of a Claim Settlement
Commission (CSC) to resolve all disputes between them on
matters referred to in paragraph 1.
(a) The CSC shall consist of three experts designated by
Kosovo, three experts designated jointly by the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia and the Republic of Serbia, and three
independent experts designated by the CIM.
(b) The decisions of the CSC, which shall be taken by
majority vote, shall be final and binding. The Parties shall
implement them without delay.
3. Authorities receiving ownership of public facilities
shall have the power to operate such facilities.
CHAPTER 4A
Humanitarian Assistance, Reconstruction and Economic Development
1. In parallel with the continuing full implementation of
this Agreement, urgent attention must be focused on meeting
the real humanitarian and economic needs of Kosovo in order
to help create the conditions for reconstruction and lasting
economic recovery. International assistance will be provided
without discrimination between national communities.
2. The Parties welcome the willingness of the European
Commission working with the international community to co-
ordinate international support for the parties' efforts.
Specifically, the European Commission will organize an
international donors' conference within one month of entry
into force of this Agreement.
3. The international community will provide immediate and
unconditional humanitarian assistance, focusing primarily on
refugees and internally displaced persons returning to their
former homes. The Parties welcome and endorse the UNHCR's
lead role in co-ordination of this effort, and endorse its
intention, in close co-operation with the Implementation
Mission, to plan an early, peaceful, orderly and phased
return of refugees and displaced persons in conditions of
safety and dignity.
4. The international community will provide the means for
the rapid improvement of living conditions for the population
of Kosovo through the reconstruction and rehabilitation of
housing and local infrastructure (including water, energy,
health and local education infrastructure) based on damage
assessment surveys.
5. Assistance will also be provided to support the
establishment and development of the institutional and
legislative framework laid down in this Agreement, including
local governance and tax settlement, and to reinforce civil
society, culture and education. Social welfare will also be
addressed, with priority given to the protection of
vulnerable social groups.
6. It will also be vital to lay the foundations for
sustained development, based on a revival of the local
economy. This must take account of the need to address
unemployment, and to stimulate the economy by a range of
mechanisms. The European Commission will be giving urgent
attention to this.
7. International assistance, with the exception of
humanitarian aid, will be subject to full compliance with
this Agreement as well as other conditions defined in advance
by the donors and the absorptive capacity of Kosovo.
CHAPTER 5
Implementation I
Article I: Institutions
Implementation Mission
1. The Parties invite the OSCE, in cooperation with the
European Union, to constitute an Implementation Mission in
Kosovo. All responsibilities and powers previously vested in
the Kosovo Verification Mission and its Head by prior
agreements shall be continued in the Implementation Mission
and its Chief.
Joint Commission
2. A Joint Commission shall serve as the central mechanism
for monitoring and coordinating the civilian implementation
of this Agreement. It shall consist of the Chief of the
Implementation Mission (CIM), one Federal and one Republic
representative, one representative of each national community
[[Page 8102]]
in Kosovo, the President of the Assembly, and a
representative of the President of Kosovo. Meetings of the
Joint Commission may be attended by other representatives of
organizations specified in this Agreement or needed for its
implementation.
3. The CIM shall serve as the Chair of the Joint
Commission. The Chair shall coordinate and organize the work
of the Joint Commission and decide the time and place of its
meetings. The Parties shall abide by and fully implement the
decisions of the Joint Commission. The Joint Commission shall
operate on the basis of consensus, but in the event consensus
cannot be reached, the Chair's decision shall be final.
4. The Chair shall have full and unimpeded access to all
places, persons, and information (including documents and
other records) within Kosovo that in his judgment are
necessary to his responsibilities with regard to the civilian
aspects of this Agreement.
joint council and local councils
5. The CIM may, as necessary, establish a Kosovo Joint
Council and Local Councils, for informal dispute resolution
and cooperation. The Kosovo Joint Council would consist of
one member from each of the national communities in Kosovo.
Local Councils would consist of representatives of each
national community living in the locality where the Local
Council is established.
Article II: Responsibilities and Powers
1. The CIM shall:
(a) supervise and direct the implementation of the civilian
aspects of this Agreement pursuant to a schedule that he
shall specify;
(b) maintain close contact with the Parties to promote full
compliance with those aspects of this Agreement;
(c) facilitate, as he deems necessary, the resolution of
difficulties arising in connection with such implementation;
(d) participate in meetings of donor organizations,
including on issues of rehabilitation and reconstruction, in
particular by putting forward proposals and identifying
priorities for their consideration as appropriate;
(e) coordinate the activities of civilian organizations and
agencies in Kosovo assisting in the implementation of the
civilian aspects of this Agreement, respecting fully their
specific organizational procedures;
(f) report periodically to the bodies responsible for
constituting the Mission on progress in the implementation of
the civilian aspects of this Agreement; and
(g) carry out the functions specified in this Agreement
pertaining to police and security forces.
2. The CIM shall also carry out other responsibilities set
forth in this Agreement or as may be later agreed.
Article III: Status of Implementation Mission
1. Implementation Mission personnel shall be allowed
unrestricted movement and access into and throughout Kosovo
at any time.
2. The Parties shall facilitate the operations of the
Implementation Mission, including by the provision of
assistance as requested with regard to transportation,
subsistence, accommodation, communication, and other
facilities.
3. The Implementation Mission shall enjoy such legal
capacity as may be necessary for the exercise of its
functions under the laws and regulations of Kosovo, the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and the Republic of Serbia.
Such legal capacity shall include the capacity to contract,
and to acquire and dispose of real and personal property.
4. Privileges and immunities are hereby accorded as follows
to the Implementation Mission and associated personnel:
(a) the Implementation Mission and its premises, archives,
and other property shall enjoy the same privileges and
immunities as a diplomatic mission under the Vienna
Convention on Diplomatic Relations;
(b) the CIM and professional members of his staff and their
families shall enjoy the same privileges and immunities as
are enjoyed by diplomatic agents and their families under the
Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations; and
(c) other members of the Implementation Mission staff and
their families shall enjoy the same privileges and immunities
as are enjoyed by members of the administrative and technical
staff and their families under the Vienna Convention on
Diplomatic Relations.
Article IV: Process of Implementation
General
1. The Parties acknowledge that complete implementation
will require political acts and measures, and the election
and establishment of institutions and bodies set forth in
this Agreement. The Parties agree to proceed expeditiously
with these tasks on a schedule set by the Joint Commission.
The Parties shall provide active support, cooperation, and
participation for the successful implementation of this
Agreement.
election and census
2. Within nine months of the entry into force of this
Agreement, there shall be elections in accordance with and
pursuant to procedures specified in Chapter 3 of this
Agreement for authorities established herein, according to a
voter list prepared to international standards by the Central
Election Commission. The Organization for Security and
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) shall supervise those elections
to ensure that they are free and fair.
3. Under the supervision of the OSCE and with the
participation of Kosovo authorities and experts nominated by
and belonging to the national communities of Kosovo, Federal
authorities shall conduct an objective and free census of the
population in Kosovo under rules and regulations agreed with
the OSCE in accordance with international standards. The
census shall be carried out when the OSCE determines that
conditions allow an objective and accurate enumeration.
(a) The first census shall be limited to name, place of
birth, place of usual residence and address, gender, age,
citizenship, national community, and religion.
(b) The authorities of the Parties shall provide each other
and the OSCE with all records necessary to conduct the
census, including data about places of residence,
citizenship, voters' lists, and other information.
transitional provisions
4. All laws and regulations in effect in Kosovo when this
Agreement enters into force shall remain in effect unless and
until replaced by laws or regulations adopted by a competent
body. All laws and regulations applicable in Kosovo that are
incompatible with this Agreement shall be presumed to have
been harmonized with this Agreement. In particular, martial
law in Kosovo is hereby revoked.
5. Institutions currently in place in Kosovo shall remain
until superseded by bodies created by or in accordance with
this Agreement. The CIM may recommend to the appropriate
authorities the removal and appointment of officials and the
curtailment of operations of existing institutions in Kosovo
if he deems it necessary for the effective implementation of
this Agreement. If the action recommended is not taken in the
time requested, the Joint Commission may decide to take the
recommended action.
6. Prior to the election of Kosovo officials pursuant to
this Agreement, the CIM shall take the measures necessary to
ensure the development and functioning of independent media
in keeping with international standards, including allocation
of radio and television frequencies.
Article V: Authority To Interpret
The CIM shall be the final authority in theater regarding
interpretation of the civilian aspects of this Agreement, and
the Parties agree to abide by his determinations as binding
on all Parties and persons.
CHAPTER 6
The Ombudsman
Article I: General
1. There shall be an Ombudsman, who shall monitor the
realization of the rights of members of national communities
and the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms
in Kosovo. The Ombudsman shall have unimpeded access to any
person or place and shall have the right to appear and
intervene before any domestic, Federal, or (consistent with
the rules of such bodies) international authority upon his or
her request. No person, institution, or entity of the Parties
may interfere with the functions of the Ombudsman.
2. The Ombudsman shall be an eminent person of high moral
standing who possesses a demonstrated commitment to human
rights and the rights of members of national communities. He
or she shall be nominated by the President of Kosovo and
shall be elected by the Assembly from a list of candidates
prepared by the President of the European Court of Human
Rights for a non-renewable three-year term. The Ombudsman
shall not be a citizen of any State or entity that was a part
of the former Yugoslavia, or of any neighboring State.
Pending the election of the President and the Assembly, the
CIM shall designate a person to serve as Ombudsman on an
interim basis who shall be succeeded by a person selected
pursuant to the procedure set forth in this paragraph.
3. The Ombudsman shall be independently responsible for
choosing his or her own staff. He or she shall have two
Deputies. The Deputies shall each be drawn from different
national communities.
(a) The salaries and expenses of the Ombudsman and his or
her staff shall be determined and paid the Kosovo Assembly.
The salaries and expenses shall be fully adequate to
implement the Ombudsman's mandate.
(b) The Ombudsman and members of his or her staff shall not
be held criminally or civilly liable for any acts carried out
within the scope of their duties.
Article II: Jurisdiction
1. The Ombudsman shall consider:
(a) alleged or apparent violations of human rights and
fundamental freedoms in Kosovo, as provided in the
Constitutions of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the
Republic of Serbia, and the European Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and the
Protocols thereto; and
(b) alleged or apparent violations of the rights of members
of national communities specified in this Agreement.
2. All persons in Kosovo shall have the right to submit the
complaints to the Ombudsman. The Parties agree not to take
any
[[Page 8103]]
measures to punish persons who intend to submit or who have
submitted such allegations, or in any other way to deter the
exercise of this right.
Article III: Powers and Duties
1. The Ombudsman shall investigate alleged violations
falling within the jurisdiction set forth in Article II.1. He
or she may act either on his or her own initiative or in
response to an allegation presented by any Party or person,
non-governmental organization, or group of individuals
claiming to be the victim of a violation or acting on behalf
of alleged victims who are deceased or missing. The work of
the Ombudsman shall be free of charge to the person
concerned.
2. The Ombudsman shall have complete, unimpeded, and
immediate access to any person, place, or information upon
his or her request.
(a) The Ombudsman shall have access to and may examine all
official documents, and he or she can require any person,
including officials of Kosovo, to cooperate by providing
relevant information, documents, and files.
(b) The Ombudsman may attend administrative hearings and
meetings of other Kosovo institutions in order to gather
information.
(c) The Ombudsman may examine facilities and places where
persons deprived of their liberty are detained, work, or are
otherwise located.
(d) The Ombudsman and staff shall maintain the
confidentiality of all confidential information obtained by
them, unless the Ombudsman determines that such information
is evidence of a violation of rights falling within his or
her jurisdiction, in which case that information may be
revealed in public reports or appropriate legal proceedings.
(e) The Parties undertake to ensure cooperation with the
Ombudsman's investigations. Willful and knowing failure to
comply shall be criminal offense prosecutable in any
jurisdiction of the Parties. Where an official impedes an
investigation by refusing to provide necessary information,
the Ombudsman shall contact that official's superior or the
public prosecutor for appropriate penal action to be taken in
accordance with the law.
3. The Ombudsman shall issue findings and conclusions in
the form of a published report promptly after concluding an
investigation.
(a) A Party, institution, or official identified by the
Ombudsman as a violator shall, within a period specified by
the Ombudsman, explain in writing how it will comply with any
prescriptions the Ombudsman may put forth for remedial
measures.
(b) In the event that a person or entity does not comply
with the conclusions and recommendations of the Ombudsman,
the report shall be forwarded for further action to the Joint
Commission established by Chapter 5 of this Agreement, to the
President of the appropriate Party, and to any other
officials or institutions that the Ombudsman deems proper.
CHAPTER 7
Implementation II
Article I: General Obligations
1. The Parties undertake to recreate, as quickly as
possible, normal conditions of life in Kosovo and to co-
operate fully with each other and with all international
organizations, agencies, and non-governmental organizations
involved in the implementation of this Agreement. They
welcome the willingness of the international community to
send to the region a force to assist in the implementation of
this Agreement.
a. The United Nations Security Council is invited to pass a
resolution under Chapter VII of the Charter endorsing and
adopting the arrangements set forth in this Chapter,
including the establishment of a multinational military
implementation force in Kosovo. The Parties invite NATO to
constitute and lead a military force to help ensure
compliance with the provisions of this Chapter. They also
reaffirm the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY).
b. The Parties agree that NATO will establish and deploy a
force (hereinafter ``KFOR'') which may be composed of ground,
air, and maritime units from NATO and non-NATO nations,
operating under the authority and subject to the direction
and the political control of the North Atlantic Council (NAC)
through the NATO chain of command. The Parties agree to
facilitate the deployment and operations of this force and
agree also to comply fully with all the obligations of this
Chapter.
c. It is agreed that other States may assist in
implementing this Chapter. The Parties agree that the
modalities of those States' participation will be the subject
of Agreement between such participating States and NATO.
2. The purposes of these obligations are as follows:
a. to establish a durable cessation of hostilities. Other
than those Forces provided for in this Chapter, under no
circumstances shall any armed Forces enter, reenter, or
remain within Kosovo without the prior express consent of the
KFOR Commander (COMKFOR). For the purposes of this Chapter,
the term ``Forces'' includes all personnel and organizations
with military capability, including regular army, armed
civilian groups, paramilitary groups, air forces, national
guards, border police, army reserves, military police,
intelligence services, Ministry of Internal Affairs, Local,
Special, Riot and Anti-Terrorist Police, and any other groups
or individuals so designated by COMKFOR. The only exception
to the provisions of this paragraph is for civilian police
engaged in hot pursuit of a person suspected of committing a
serious criminal offense, as provided for in Chapter 2;
b. to provide for the support and authorization of the KFOR
and in particular to authorize the KFOR to take such actions
as are required, including the use of necessary force, to
ensure compliance with this Chapter and the protection of the
KFOR, Implementation Mission (IM), and other international
organizations, agencies, and non-governmental organizations
involved in the implementation of this Agreement, and to
contribute to a secure environment;
c. to provide, at no cost, the use of all facilities and
services required for the deployment, operations and support
of the KFOR.
3. The Parties understand and agree that the obligations
undertaken in this Chapter shall apply equally to each Party.
Each Party shall be held individually responsible for
compliance with its obligations, and each agrees that delay
or failure to comply by one Party shall not constitute cause
for any other Party to fail to carry out its own obligations.
All Parties shall be equally subject to such enforcement
action by the KFOR as may be necessary to ensure
implementation of this Chapter in Kosovo and the protection
of the KFOR, IM, and other international organizations,
agencies, and non-governmental organizations involved in the
implementation of this Agreement.
Article II: Cessation of Hostilities
1. The Parties shall, immediately upon entry into force of
this Agreement (EIF), refrain from committing any hostile or
provocative acts of any type against each other or against
any person in Kosovo. They shall not encourage or organize
hostile or provocative demonstrations.
2. In carrying out the obligations set forth in paragraph
1, the Parties undertake in particular to cease the firing of
all weapons and explosive devices except as authorized by
COMKFOR. They shall not place any mines, barriers,
unauthorized checkpoints, observation posts (with the
exception of COMKFOR-approved border observation posts and
crossing points), or protective obstacles. Except as provided
in Chapter 2, the Parties shall not engage in any military,
security, or training-related activities, including ground,
air, or air defense operations, in or over Kosovo, without
the prior express approval of COMKFOR.
3. Except for Border Guard forces (as provided for in
Article IV), no Party shall have Forces present within a 5
kilometer zone inward from the international border of the
FRY that is also the border of Kosovo (hereinafter ``the
Border Zone''). The Border Zone will be marked on the ground
by EIF + 14 days by VJ Border Guard personnel in accordance
with direction from IM. COMKFOR may determine small scale
reconfigurations for operational reasons.
4. a. With the exception of civilian police performing
normal police duties as determined by the CIM, no Party shall
have Forces present within 5 kilometers of the Kosovo side of
the boundary of Kosovo with other parts of the FRY.
b. The presence of any Forces within 5 kilometers of the
other side of that boundary shall be notified to COMKFOR; if,
in the judgment of COMKFOR, such presence threatens or would
threaten implementation of this Chapter in Kosovo, he shall
contact the authorities responsible for the Forces in
question and may require those Forces to withdraw from or
remain outside the area.
5. No party shall conduct any reprisals, counter-attacks,
or any unilateral actions in response to violations of this
Chapter by another Party. The Parties shall respond to
alleged violations of this Chapter through the procedures
provided in Article XI.
Article III: Redeployment, Withdrawal, and Demilitarization of Forces
In order to disengage their Forces and to avoid any further
conflict, the Parties shall immediately upon EIF begin to re-
deploy, withdraw, or demilitarize their Forces in accordance
with Articles IV, V, and VI.
Article IV: VJ Forces
I. VJ Army Units
a. By K-Day + 5 days, all VJ Army units in Kosovo (with the
exception of those Forces specified in paragraph 2 of this
Article) shall have completed redeployment to the approved
cantonment sites listed at Appendix A to this Chapter. This
senior VJ commander in Kosovo shall confirm in writing to
COMKFOR by K-Day + 5 days that the VJ is in compliance and
provide the information required in Article VII below to take
account of withdrawals or other changes made during the
redeployment. This information shall be updated weekly.
b. By K-Day + 30 days, the Chief of the VJ General Staff,
through the senior VJ commander in Kosovo, shall provide for
approval by COMKFOR a detailed plan for the phased withdrawal
of VJ Forces from Kosovo to other locations in Serbia to
ensure the following timelines are met:
[[Page 8104]]
(1) By K-Day + 90 days, VJ authorities must, to the
satisfaction of COMKFOR, withdraw from Kosovo to other
locations in Serbia 50% of men and materiel and all
designated offensive assets. Such assets are taken to be:
main battle tanks; all other armored vehicles mounting
weapons greater than 12.7mm; and, all heavy weapons (vehicle
mounted or not) of over 82mm.
(2) By K-Day + 180 days, all VJ Army personnel and
equipment (with the exception of those Forces specified in
paragraph 2 of this Article) shall be withdrawn from Kosovo
to other locations in Serbia.
2. VJ Border Guard Forces
a. VJ Border Guard forces shall be permitted but limited to
a structure of 1500 members at pre-February 1998 Border Guard
Battalion facilities located in Djakovica, Prizren, and
Urosevac and subordinate facilities within the 5 kilometer
Border Zone, or at a limited number of existing facilities in
the immediate proximity of the Border Zone subject to the
prior approval of COMKFOR, with that number to be reached by
K-Day + 14 days. An additional number of VJ personnel--
totaling no more than 1000 C2 and logistics forces--will be
permitted to remain in the approved cantonment sites listed
at Appendix A to fulfill brigade-level functions related only
to border security. After an initial 90 day period from K-
Day, COMKFOR may at any time review the deployments of VJ
personnel and may require further adjustments to force level,
with the objective of reaching the minimum force structure
required for legitimate border security, as the security
situation and the conduct of Parties warrant.
b. VJ elements in Kosovo shall be limited to weapons of
82mm and below. They shall possess neither armored vehicles
(other than wheeled vehicles mounting weapons of 12.7mm or
less) nor air defense weapons.
c. VJ Border Guard units shall be permitted to patrol in
Kosovo only within the Border Zone and solely for purpose of
defending the border against external attack and maintaining
its integrity by preventing illicit border crossings.
Geographic terrain considerations may require Border Guard
maneuver inward of the Border Zone; any such maneuver shall
be coordinated with and approved by COMKFOR.
d. With the exception of the Border Zone, VJ units may
travel through Kosovo only to reach duty stations and
garrisons in the Border Zone or approved cantonment sites.
Such travel may only be along routes and in accordance with
procedures that have been determined by COMKFOR after
consultation with the CIM, VJ unit commanders, communal
government authorities, and police commanders. These routes
and procedures will be determined by K-Day + 14 days, subject
to re-determination by COMKFOR at any time. VJ forces in
Kosovo but outside the Border Zone shall be permitted to act
only in self-defense in response to a hostile act pursuant to
Rules of Engagement (ROE) which will be approved by COMKFOR
in consultation with the CIM. When deployed in the Border
Zone, they will act in accordance with ROE established under
control of COMKFOR.
e. VJ Border Guard forces may conduct training activities
only within the 5 kilometer Border Zone, and only with the
prior express approved of COMKFOR.
3. Yugoslav air and air defense forces (yaadf)
All aircraft, radars, surface-to-air missiles (including
man-portable air defense systems {MANPADS ) and anti-aircraft
artillery in Kosovo shall immediately upon EIF begin
withdrawing from Kosovo to other locations in Serbia outside
the 25 kilometer Mutual Safety Zone as defined in Article X.
This withdrawal shall be completed and reported by the senior
VJ commander in Kosovo to the appropriate NATO commander not
more than 10 days after EIF. The appropriate NATO commander
shall control and coordinate use of airspace over Kosovo
commencing at EIF as further specified in Article X. No air
defense systems, target tracking radars, or anti-aircraft
artillery shall be positioned or operated within Kosovo or
the 25 kilometer Mutual Safety Zone without the prior express
approval of the appropriate NATO commander.
Article V: Other Forces
1. The actions of Forces in Kosovo other than KFOR, VJ,
MUP, or local police forces provided for in Chapter 2
(hereinafter referred to as ``Other Forces'') shall be in
accordance with this Article. Upon EIF, all Other Forces in
Kosovo must immediately observe the provisions of Article I,
paragraph 2, Article II, paragraph 1, and Article III and in
addition refrain from all hostile intent, military training
and formations, organization of demonstrations, and any
movement in either direction or smuggling across
international borders or the boundary between Kosovo and
other parts of the FRY. Furthermore, upon EIF, all Other
Forces in Kosovo must publicly commit themselves to
demilitarize on terms to be determined by COMKFOR, renounce
violence, guarantee security of international personnel, and
respect the international borders of the FRY and all terms of
this Chapter.
2. Except as approved by COMKFOR, from K-Day, all Other
Forces in Kosovo must not carry weapons:
a. within 1 kilometer of VJ and MUP cantonments listed at
Appendix A;
b. within 1 kilometer of the main roads as follows:
(1) Pec--Lapusnik--Pristina.
(2) border--Djakovica--Klina.
(3) border--Prizren--Suva Rika--Pristina.
(4) Djakovica--Orahovac--Lapusnik--Pristina.
(5) Pec--Djakovica--Prizren--Urosevac--border.
(6) border--Urosevac--Pristina--Podujevo--border.
(7) Pristina--Kosovska Mitrovica--border.
(8) Kosovka Mitrovica--(Rakos)--Pec.
(9) Pec--Border with Montenegro (through Pozaj).
(10) Pristina--Lisica--border with Serbia.
(11) Pristina--Gnjilane--Urosevac.
(12) Gnjilane--Veliki Trnovac--border with Serbia.
(13) Prizren--Doganovic.
c. within 1 kilometer of the Border Zone;
d. in any other areas designated by COMKFOR.
3. By K-Day+5 days, all Other Forces must abandon and close
all fighting positions, entrenchments, and checkpoints.
4. By K-Day+5 days, all Other Forces' commanders designated
by COMKFOR shall report completion of the above requirements
in the format at Article VII to COMKFOR and continue to
provide weekly detailed status reports until demilitarization
is complete.
5. COMKFOR will establish procedures for demilitarization
and monitoring of Other Forces in Kosovo and for the further
regulation of their activities. These procedures will be
established to facilitate a phased demilitarization program
as follows:
a. By K-Day+5 days, all Other Forces shall establish secure
weapons storage sites, which shall be registered with and
verified by the KFOR;
b. By K-Day+30 days, all Other Forces shall store all
prohibited weapons (any weapon 12.7mm or larger, any anti-
tank or anti-aircraft weapons, grenades, mines or explosives)
and automatic weapons in the registered weapons storage
sites. Other Forces commanders shall confirm completion of
weapons storage to COMKFOR no later than K-Day+30 days;
c. By K-Day+30 days, all Other Forces shall cease wearing
military uniforms and insignia, and cease carrying prohibited
weapons and automatic weapons;
d. By K-Day+90 days, authority for storage sites shall pass
to the KFOR. After this date, it shall be illegal for Other
Forces to possess prohibited weapons and automatic weapons,
and such weapons shall be subject to confiscation by the
KFOR;
e. By K-Day+120 days, demilitarization of all Other Forces
shall be completed.
6. By EIF+30 days, subject to arrangements by COMKFOR is
necessary, all Other Forces personnel who are not of local
origin, whether or not they are legally within Kosovo,
including individual advisors, freedom fighters, trainers,
volunteers, and personnel from neighboring and other States,
shall be withdrawn from Kosovo.
Article VI: MUP
1. Ministry of Interior Police (MUP) is defined as all
police and public security units and personnel under the
control of Federal or Republic authorities except for the
border police referred to in Chapter 2 and police academy
students and personnel at the training school in Vucitrn
referred to in Chapter 2. The CIM, in consultation with
COMKFOR, shall have the discretion to exempt any public
security units from this definition if he determines that it
is in the public interest (e.g. firefighters).
a. By K-Day+5 days, all MUP units in Kosovo (with the
exception of the border police referred to in Chapter 2)
shall have completed redeployment to the approved cantonment
sites listed at Appendix A to this Chapter or to garrisons
outside Kosovo. The senior MUP commander in Kosovo or his
representatives shall confirm in writing by K-Day+5 days to
COMKFOR and the CIM that the MUP is in compliance and update
the information required in Article VII to take account of
withdrawals or other changes made during the redeployment.
This information shall be updated weekly. Resumption of
normal communal police patrolling will be permitted under the
supervision and control of the IM and as specifically
approved by the CIM in consultation with COMKFOR, and will be
contingent on compliance with the terms of this Agreement.
b. Immediately upon EIF, the following withdrawals shall
begin:
(1) By K-Day+5 days, those MUP units not assigned to Kosovo
to 1 February 1998 shall withdraw all personnel and equipment
from Kosovo to other locations in Serbia.
(2) By K-Day+20 days, all Special Police, including PJP,
SAJ, and JSO forces, and their equipment shall be withdrawn
from their cantonment sites out of Kosovo to other locations
in Serbia. Additionally, all MUP offensive assets (designated
as armored vehicles mounting weapons 12.7mm or larger, and
all heavy weapons {vehicle mounted or not of over 82mm)
shall be withdrawn.
c. By K-Day+30 days, the senior MUP commander shall provide
for approval by COMKFOR, in consultation with the CIM, a
detailed plan for the phased drawdown of the remainder of MUP
forces. In the event that
[[Page 8105]]
COMKFOR, in consultation with the CIM, does not approve the
plan, he has the authority to issue his own binding plan for
further MUP drawdowns. The CIM will decide at the same time
when the remaining MUP units will wear new insignia. In any
case, the following time-table must be met:
(1) by K-Day+60 days, 50% drawdown of the remaining MUP
units including reservists. The CIM after consultations with
COMKFOR shall have the discretion to extend this deadline for
up to K-Day+90 days if he judges there to be a risk of a law
enforcement vacuum;
(2) by K-Day+120 days, further drawdown to 2500 MUP. The
CIM after consultations with COMKFOR shall have the
discretion to extend this deadline for up to K-Day+180 days
to meet operational needs;
(3) transition to communal police force shall begin as
Kosovar police are trained and able to assume their duties.
The CIM shall organize this transition between MUP and
communal police;
(4) in any event, by EIF+one year, all Ministry, of
Interior Civil Police shall be drawn down to zero. The CIM
shall have the discretion to extend this deadline for up to
an additional 12 months to meet operational needs.
d. The 2500 MUP allowed by this Chapter and referred to in
Article V.1(a) of Chapter 2 shall have authority only for
civil police functions and be under the supervision and
control of the CIM.
Article VII: Notifications
1. By K-Day+5 days, the Parties shall furnish the following
specific information regarding the status of all conventional
military; all police, including military police, Department
of Public Security Police, special police; paramilitary; and
all Other Forces in Kosovo, and shall update the COMKFOR
weekly on changes in this information:
a. location, disposition, and strengths of all military and
special police units referred to above;
b. quantity and type of weaponry of 12.7mm and above, and
ammunition for such weaponry, including location of
cantonments and supply depots and storage sites;
c. positions and descriptions of any surface-to-air
missiles/launchers, including mobile systems, anti-aircraft
artillery, supporting radars, and associated command and
control systems;
d. positions and descriptions of all miners, unexploded
ordnance, explosive devices, demolitions, obstacles, booby
traps, wire entanglements, physical or military hazards to
the safe movement of any personnel in Kosovo, weapons
systems, vehicles, or any other military equipment; and
e. any further information of a military or security nature
requested by the COMKFOR.
Article VIII: Operations and Authority of the KFOR
1. Consistent with the general obligations of Article I,
the Parties understand and agree that the KFOR will deploy
and operate without hindrance and with the authority to take
all necessary action to help ensure compliance with this
Chapter.
2. The Parties understand and agree that the KFOR shall
have the right:
a. to monitor and help ensure compliance by all Parties
with this Chapter and to respond promptly to any violations
and restore compliance, using military force if required.
This includes necessary action to:
1) enforce VJ and MUP reductions; 2) enforce
demilitarization of Other Forces; 3) enforce restrictions of
all VJ, MUP and Other Forces' activities, movement and
training in Kosovo;
b. to establish liaison arrangements with IM, and support
IM as appropriate;
c. to establish liaison arrangements with local Kosovo
authorities, with Other Forces, and with FRY and Serbian
civil and military authorities;
d. to observe, monitor, and inspect any and all facilities
or activities in Kosovo, including within the Border Zone,
that the COMKFOR believes has or may have military
capability, or are or may be associated with the employment
of military or police capabilities, or are otherwise relevant
to compliance with this Chapter;
e. to require the Parties to mark and clear minefields and
obstacles and to monitor their performance;
f. to require the Parties to participate in the Joint
Military Commission and its subordinate military commissions
as described in Article XI.
3. The Parties understand and agree that the KFOR shall
have the right to fulfill its supporting tasks, within the
limits of its assigned principal tasks, its capabilities, and
available resources, and as directed by the NAC, which
include the following:
a. to help create secure conditions for the conduct by
others of other tasks associated with this Agreement,
including free and fair elections;
b. to assist the movement of organizations in the
accomplishment of humanitarian missions;
c. to assist international agencies in fulfilling their
responsibilities in Kosovo;
d. to observe and prevent interference with the movement of
civilian populations, refugees, and displaced persons, and to
respond appropriately to deliberate threat to life and
person.
4. The Parties understand and agree that further directives
from the NAC may establish additional duties and
responsibilities for the KFOR in implementing this Chapter.
5. KFOR operations shall be governed by the following
provisions:
a. KFOR and its personnel shall have the legal status,
rights, and obligations specified in Appendix B to this
Chapter;
b. the KFOR shall have the right to use all necessary means
to ensure its full ability to communicate and shall have the
right to the unrestricted use of the entire electromagnetic
spectrum. In implementing this right, the KFOR shall make
reasonable efforts to coordinate with the appropriate
authorities of the Parties;
c. The KFOR shall have the right to control and regulate
surface traffic throughout Kosovo including the movement of
the Forces of the Parties. All military training activities
and movements in Kosovo must be authorized in advance by
COMKFOR;
d. The KFOR shall have complete and unimpeded freedom of
movement by ground, air, and water into and throughout
Kosovo. It shall in Kosovo have the right to bivouac,
maneuver, billet, and utilize any areas or facilities to
carry out its responsibilities as required for its support,
training, and operations, with such advance notice as may be
practicable. Neither the KFOR nor any of its personnel shall
be liable for any damages to public or private property that
they may cause in the course of duties related to the
implementation of this Chapter. Roadblocks, checkpoints, or
other impediments to KFOR freedom of movement shall
constitute a breach of this Chapter and the violating Party
shall be subject to military action by the KFOR, including
the use of necessary force to ensure compliance with its
Chapter.
6. The Parties understand and agree that COMKFOR shall have
the authority, without interference or permission of any
Party, to do all that he judges necessary and proper,
including the use of military force, to protect the KFOR and
the IM, and to carry out the responsibilities listed in this
Chapter. The Parties shall comply in all respects with KFOR
instructions and requirements.
7. Notwithstanding any other provision of this Chapter, the
Parties understand and agree that COMKFOR has the right and
is authorized to compel the removal, withdrawal, or
relocation of specific Forces and weapons, and to order the
cessation of any activities whenever the COMKFOR determines
such Forces, weapons, or activities to constitute a threat or
potential threat to either the KFOR or its mission, or to
another Party. Forces failing to redeploy, withdraw,
relocate, or to cease threatening or potentially threatening
activities following such a demand by the KFOR shall be
subject to military action by the KFOR, including the use of
necessary force, to ensure compliance, consistent with the
terms set forth in Article I, paragraph 3.
Article IX: Border Control
The Parties understand and agree that, until other
arrangements are established, and subject to provisions of
this Chapter and Chapter 2, controls along the international
border of the FRY that is also the border of Kosovo will be
maintained by the existing institutions normally assigned to
such tasks, subject to supervision by the KFOR and the IM,
which shall have the right to review and approve all
personnel and units, to monitor their performance, and to
remove and replace any personnel for behavior inconsistent
with this Chapter.
Article X: Control of Air Movements
The appropriate NATO commander shall have sole authority to
establish rules and procedures governing command and control
of the airspace over Kosovo as well as within a 25 kilometer
Mutual Safety Zone (MSZ). This MSZ shall consist of FRY
airspace within 25 kilometers outward from the boundary of
Kosovo with other parts of the FRY. This Chapter supersedes
the NATO Kosovo Verification Mission Agreement of October 12,
1998 on any matter or area in which they may contradict each
other. No military air traffic, fixed or rotary wing, of any
Party shall be permitted to fly over Kosovo or in the MSZ
without the prior express approval of the appropriate NATO
commander. Violations of any of the provisions above,
including the appropriate NATO commander's rules and
procedures governing the airspace over Kosovo, as well as
unauthorized flight or activation of FRY Integrated Air
Defense (IADS) within the MSZ, shall be subject to military
action by the KFOR, including the use of necessary force. The
KFOR shall have a liaison team at the FRY Air Force HQ and a
YAADF liaison shall be established with the KFOR. The Parties
understand and agree that the appropriate NATO commander may
delegate control of normal civilian air activities to
appropriate FRY institutions to monitor operations,
deconflict KFOR air traffic movements, and ensure smooth and
safe operation of the air traffic system.
Article XI: Establishment of a Joint Military Commission
1. A Joint Military Commission (JMC) shall be established
with the deployment of the KFOR to Kosovo.
[[Page 8106]]
2. The JMC shall be chaired by COMKFOR or his
representative and consist of the following members:
a. the senior Yugoslav military commander of the Forces of
the FRY or his representative;
b. the Ministers of Interior of the FRY and Republic of
Serbia or their representatives;
c. a senior military representative of all Other Forces;
d. a representative of the IM;
e. other persons as COMKFOR shall determine, including one
or more representatives of the Kosovo civilian leadership.
3. The JMC shall:
a. serve as the central body for all Parties to address any
military complaints, questions, or problems that require
resolution by the COMKFOR, such as allegations of cease-fire
violations or other allegations of non-compliance with this
Chapter;
b. receive reports and make recommendations for specific
actions to COMKFOR to ensure compliance by the Parties with
the provisions of this Chapter;
c. assist COMKFOR in determining and implementing local
transparency measures between the Parties.
4. The JMC shall not include any persons publicly indicted
by the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia.
5. The JMC shall function as a consultative body to advise
COMKFOR. However, all final decisions shall be made by
COMKFOR and shall be binding on the Parties.
6. The JMC shall meet at the call of COMKFOR. Any Party may
request COMKFOR to convene a meeting.
7. The JMC shall establish subordinate military commissions
for the purpose of providing assistance in carrying out the
functions described above. Such commissions shall be at an
appropriate level, as COMKFOR shall direct. Composition of
such commissions shall be determined by COMKFOR.
Article XII: Prisoner Release
1. By EIF + 21 days, the Parties shall release and
transfer, in accordance with international humanitarian
standards, all persons held in connection with the conflict
(hereinafter ``prisoners''). In addition, the Parties shall
cooperate fully with the International Committee of the Red
Cross (ICRC) to facilitate its work, in accordance with its
mandate, to implement and monitor a plan for the release and
transfer of prisoners in accordance with the above deadline.
In preparation for compliance with this requirement, the
Parties shall:
a. grant the ICRC full access to all persons, irrespective
of their status, who are being held by them in connection
with the conflict, for visits in accordance with the ICRC's
standard operating procedures;
b. provide to the ICRC any and all information concerning
prisoners, as requested by the ICRC, by EIF + 14 days.
2. The Parties shall provide information, through the
tracing mechanisms of the ICRC, to the families of all
persons who are unaccounted for. The Parties shall cooperate
fully with the ICRC in its efforts to determine the identity,
whereabouts, and fate of those unaccounted for.
Article XIII: Cooperation
The Parties shall cooperate fully with all entities
involved in implementation of this settlement, as described
in the Framework Agreement, or which are otherwise authorized
by the United Nations Security Council, including the
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia.
Article XIV: Notification to Military Commands
Each Party shall ensure that the terms of this Chapter and
written orders requiring compliance are immediately
communicated to all of its Forces.
Article XV: Final Authority To Interpret
1. Subject to paragraph 2, the KFOR Commander is the final
authority in theater regarding interpretation of this Chapter
and his determinations are binding on all Parties and
persons.
2. The CIM is the final authority in theater regarding
interpretation of the references in this Chapter to his
functions (directing the VJ Border Guards under Article II,
paragraph 3; his functions concerning the MUP under Article
VI) and his determinations are binding on all Parties and
persons.
Article XVI: K-Day
The date of activation of KFOR--to be known as K-Day--shall
be determined by NATO.
Appendices
A. Approved VJ/MUP Cantonment Sites
B. Status of Multi-National Military Implementation Force
Appendix A: Approved VJ/MUP Cantonment Sites
1. There are 13 approved cantonment sites in Kosovo for all
VJ units, weapons, equipment, and ammunition. Movement to
cantonment sites, and subsequent withdrawal from Kosovo, will
occur in accordance with this Chapter. As the phased
withdrawal of VJ units progresses along the timeline as
specified in this Chapter, COMKFOR will close selected
cantonment sites.
2. Initial approved VJ cantonment sites:
(a) Pristina SW 423913NO210819E.
(b) Pristina Airfield 423412NO210040E
(c) Vuctrin North 424936NO205227E.
(d) Kosovska Mitrovica 425315NO205227E.
(e) Gnjilane NE 422807NO212845E.
(f) Urosevac 422233NO210753E.
(g) Prizren 421315NO204504E.
(h) Djakovica SW 422212NO202530E.
(i) Pec 423910NO201728E.
(j) Pristina Explosive Storage Fac 423636NO211225E.
(k) Pristina Ammo Depot SW 423518NO205923E.
(l) Pristina Ammo Depot 510 424211NO211056E.
(m) Pristina Headquarters facility 423938NO210934E.
3. Within each cantonment site, VJ units are required to
canton all heavy weapons and vehicles outside of storage
facilities.
4. After EIF + 180 days, the remaining 2500 VJ forces
dedicated to border security functions provided for this
Agreement will be garrisoned and cantoned at the following
locations: Djakovica, Prizren, and Ursoevac; subordinate
border posts within the Border Zone; a limited number of
existing facilities in the immediate proximity of the Border
Zone subject to the prior approval of COMKFOR; and
headquarters/C2 and logistic support facilities in Pristina.
5. There are 37 approved cantonment sites for all MUP and
Special Police force units in Kosovo. There are seven (7)
approved regional SUP's. Each of the 37 approved cantonment
sites will fall under the administrative control of one of
the regional SUPs. Movement to cantonment sites, and
subsequent withdrawal of MUP from Kosovo, will occur in
accordance with this Chapter.
6. Approved MUP regional SUPs and cantonment sites:
(a) Kosovska Mitrovica SUP 425300NO205200E.
(1) Kosovska Mitrovica (2 locations)
(2) Leprosavic
(3) Srbica
(4) Vucitrin
(5) Zubin Potok
(b) Pristina SUP 424000NO211000E.
(1) Pristina (6 locations)
(2) Glogovac
(3) Kosovo Polje
(4) Lipjan
(5) Obilic
(6) Podujevo
(c) Pec SUP 423900NO201800E.
(1) Pec (2 locations)
(2) Klina
(3) Istok
(4) Malisevo
(d) Djakovica SUP 422300NO202600E.
(1) Djakovica (2 locations)
(2) Decani
(e) Urosevac SUP 422200NO2111000E.
(1) Urosevac (2 locations)
(2) Stimlje
(3) Strpce
(4) Kacanik
(f) Gnjilane SUP 422800NO212900E.
(1) Gnjilane (2 locations)
(2) Kamenica
(3) Vitina
(4) Kosovska
(5) Novo Brdo
(g) Prizren SUP 421300NO204500E.
(1) Prizxen (2 locations)
(2) Orahovac
(3) Suva Reka
(4) Gora
7. Within each cantonment site, MUP units are required to
canton all vehicles above 6 tons, including APCs and BOVs,
and all heavy weapons outside of storage facilities.
8. KFOR will have the exclusive right to inspect any
cantonment site or any other location, at any time, without
interference from any Party.
Appendix B: Status of Multi-National Military Implementation Force
1. For the purposes of this Appendix, the following
expressions shall have the meetings hereunder assigned to
them
a. ``NATO'' means the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO), its subsidiary bodies, its military Headquarters, the
NATO-led KFOR, and any elements/units forming any part of
KFOR or supporting KFOR, whether or not they are from a NATO
member country and whether or not they are under NATO or
national command and control, when acting in furtherance of
this Agreement.
b. ``Authorities in the FRY'' means appropriate
authorities, whether Federal, Republic, Kosovo or other.
c. ``NATO personnel'' means the military, civilian, and
contractor personnel assigned or attached to or employed by
NATO, including the mililtary, civilian, and contractor
personnel from non-NATO states participating in the
Operation, with the exception of personnel locally hired.
d. ``the Operation'' means the support, implementation,
preparation, and participation by NATO and NATO personnel in
furtherance of this Chapter.
e. ``Military Headquarters'' means any entity, whatever its
denomination, consisting of or constituted in part by NATO
military personnel established in order to fulfill the
Operation.
f. ``Authorities'' means the appropriate responsible
individual, agency, or organization of the Parties.
g. ``Contractor personnel'' means the technical experts or
functional specialists whose services are required by NATO
and who are in the territory of the FRY exclusively to
[[Page 8107]]
serve NATO either in an advisory capacity in technical
matters, or for the setting up, operation, or maintenance of
equipment, unless they are:
(1) nationals of the FRY; or
(2) persons ordinarily resident in the FRY.
h. ``Official use'' means any use of goods purchased, or of
the services received and intended for the performance of any
function as required by the operation of the Headquarters.
i. ``Facilities'' means all buildings, structures,
premises, and land required for conducting the operational,
training, and administrative activities by NATO for the
Operation as well as for accommodation of NATO personnel.
2. Without prejudice to their privileges and immunities
under this Appendix, all NATO personnel shall respect the
laws applicable in the FRY, whether Federal, Republic,
Kosovo, or other, insofar as compliance with those laws is
compatible with the entrusted tasks/mandate and shall refrain
from activities not compatible with the nature of the
Operation.
3. The Parties recognize the need for expeditious departure
and entry procedures for NATO personnel. Such personnel shall
be exempt from passport and visa regulations and the
registration requirements applicable to aliens. At all entry
and exit points to/from the FRY, NATO personnel shall be
permitted to enter/exit the FRY on production of a national
identification (ID) card. NATO personnel shall carry
identification which they may be requested to produce for the
authorities in the FRY, but operations, training, and
movement shall not be allowed to be impeded or delayed by
such requests.
4. NATO military personnel shall normally wear uniforms,
and NATO personnel may posses and carry arms if authorized to
do so by their orders. The Parties shall accept as valid,
without tax or fee, drivers' licenses and permits issued to
NATO personnel by their respective national authorities.
5. NATO shall be permitted to display the NATO flag and/or
national flags of its constituent national elements/units on
any NATO uniform, means of transport, or facility.
6. a. NATO shall be immune from all legal process, whether
civil, administrative, or criminal.
b. NATO personnel, under all circumstances and at all
times, shall be immune from the Parties' jurisdiction in
respect of any civil, administrative, criminal, or
disciplinary offenses which may be committed by them in the
FRY. The Parties shall assist States participating in the
Operation in the exercise of their jurisdiction over their
own nationals.
c. Notwithstanding the above, and with the NATO Commander's
express agreement in each case, the authorities in the FRY
may exceptionally exercise jurisdiction in such matters, but
only in respect of Contractor personnel who are not subject
to the jurisdiction of their nation of citizenship.
7. NATO personnel shall be immune from any form of arrest,
investigation, or detention by the authorities in the FRY.
NATO personnel erroneously arrested or detained shall
immediately be turned over to NATO authorities.
8. NATO personnel shall enjoy, together with their
vehicles, vessels, aircraft, and equipment, free and
unrestricted passage and unimpeded access throughout the FRY
including associated airspace and territorial waters. This
shall include, but not be limited to, the right of bivouac,
maneuver, billet, and utilization of any areas or facilities
as required for support, training, and operations.
9. NATO shall be exempt from duties, taxes, and other
charges and inspections and custom regulations including
providing inventories or other routine customs documentation,
for personnel, vehicles, vessels, aircraft, equipment,
supplies, and provisions entering, exiting, or transiting the
territory of the FRY in support of the Operation.
10. The authorities in the FRY shall facilitate, on a
priority basis and with all appropriate means, all movement
of personnel, vehicles, vessels, aircraft, equipment, or
supplies, through or in the airspace, ports, airports, or
roads used. No charges may be assessed against NATO for air
navigation, landing, or takeoff of aircraft, whether
government-owned or chartered. Similarly, no duties, dues,
tolls or charges may be assessed against NATO ships, whether
government-owned or chartered, for the mere entry and exit of
ports. Vehicles, vessels, and aircraft used in support of the
Operation shall not be subject to licensing or registration
requirements, nor commercial insurance.
11. NATO is granted the use of airports, roads, rails, and
ports without payment of fees, duties, dues, tolls, or
charges occasioned by mere use. NATO shall not, however,
claim exemption from reasonable charges for specific services
requested and received, but operations/movement and access
shall not be allowed to be impeded pending payment for such
services.
12. NATO personnel shall be exempt from taxation by the
Parties on the salaries and emoluments received from NATO and
on any income received from outside the FRY.
13. NATO personnel and their tangible moveable property
imported into, acquired in, or exported from the FRY shall be
exempt from all duties, taxes, and other charges and
inspections and custom regulations.
14. NATO shall be allowed to import and to export, free of
duty, taxes and other charges, such equipment, provisions,
and supplies as NATO shall require for the Operation,
provided such goods are for the official use of NATO or for
sale to NATO personnel. Goods sold shall be solely for the
use of NATO personnel and not transferable to unauthorized
persons.
15. The Parties recognize that the use of communications
channels is necessary for the Operation. NATO shall be
allowed to operate its own internal mail services. The
Parties shall, upon simple request, grant all
telecommunications services, including broadcast services,
needed for the Operation, as determined by NATO. This shall
include the right to utilize such means and services as
required to assure full ability to communicate, and the right
to use all of the electro-magnetic spectrum for this purpose,
free of cost. In implementing this right, NATO shall make
every reasonable effort to coordinate with and take into
account the needs and requirements of appropriate authorities
in the FRY.
16. The Parties shall provide, free of cost, such public
facilities as NATO shall require to prepare for and execute
the Operation. The Parties shall assist NATO in obtaining, at
the lowest rate, the necessary utilities, such as
electricity, water, gas and other resources, as NATO shall
require for the Operation.
17. NATO and NATO personnel shall be immune from claims of
any sort which arise out of activities in pursuance of the
Operation; however, NATO will entertain claims on an ex
gratia basis.
18. NATO shall be allowed to contract directly for the
acquisition of goods, services, and construction from any
source within and outside the FRY. Such contracts, goods,
services, and construction shall be subject to the payment of
duties, taxes, or other charges. NATO may also carry out
construction works with their own personnel.
19. Commercial undertakings operating in the FRY only in
the service of NATO shall be exempt from local laws and
regulations with respect to the terms and conditions of their
employment and licensing and registration of employees,
businesses, and corporations.
20. NATO may hire local personnel who on an individual
basis shall remain subject to local laws and regulations with
the exception of labor/employment laws. However, local
personnel hired by NATO shall:
a. be immune from legal process in respect of words spoken
or written and all acts performed by them in their official
capacity;
b. be immune from national services and/or national
military service obligations;
c. be subject only to employment terms and conditions
established by NATO; and
d. be exempt from taxation on the salaries and emoluments
paid to them by NATO.
21. In carrying out its authorities under this Chapter,
NATO is authorized to detain individuals and, as quickly as
possible, turn them over to appropriate officials.
22. NATO may, in the conduct of the Operation, have need to
make improvements or modifications to certain infrastructure
in the FRY, such as roads, bridges, tunnels, buildings, and
utility systems. Any such improvements or modifications of a
non-temporary nature shall become part of and in the same
ownership as that infrastructure. Temporary improvements or
modifications may be removed at the discretion of the NATO
Commander, and the infrastructure returned to as near its
original condition as possible, fair wear and tear excepted.
23. Failing any prior settlement, disputes with the regard
to the interpretation or application of this Appendix shall
be settled between NATO and the appropriate authorities in
the FRY.
24. Supplementary arrangements with any of the Parties may
be concluded to facilitate any details connected with the
Operation.
25. The provisions of this Appendix shall remain in force
until completion of the Operation or as the Parties and NATO
otherwise agree.
CHAPTER 8
Amendment, Comprehensive Assessment, and Final Clauses
Article I: Amendment and Comprehensive Assessment
1. Amendments to this Agreement shall be adopted by
agreement of all the Parties, except as otherwise provided by
Article X of Chapter 1.
2. Each Party may propose amendments at any time and will
consider and consult with the other Parties with regard to
proposed amendments.
3. Three years after the entry into force of this
Agreement, an international meeting shall be convened to
determine a mechanism for a final settlement for Kosovo, on
the basis of the will of the people, opinions of relevant
authorities, each Party's efforts regarding the
implementation of this Agreement, and the Helsinki Final Act,
and to undertake a comprehensive assessment of the
implementation of this Agreement and to consider proposals by
any Party for additional measures.
Article II: Final Clauses
1. This Agreement is signed in the English language. After
signature of this Agreement,
[[Page 8108]]
translations will be made into Serbian, Albanian, and other
languages of the national communities of Kosovo, and attached
to the English text.
2. This Agreement shall enter into force upon signature.
Mr. NICKLES. I yield the floor.
Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I thank the Senator from Oklahoma. I
appreciate his involvement, and deep involvement, in this issue. I
respect his views.
I yield 10 minutes to the Senator from Illinois, Senator Durbin.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Illinois.
Mr. DURBIN. I thank the Senator from Arizona and ask if I may enlarge
that time to 20 minutes.
Mr. McCAIN. I have no objection.
Mr. DURBIN. I thank the Senator.
Mr. President, I am joining today in this discussion and debate on
what is a critically important issue not just for the current challenge
facing America in the Balkans but also, frankly, in terms of the
history of Congress and this Nation.
I feel very strongly about that provision of the Constitution which
gives to Congress, and Congress alone, the authority to declare war. It
is, unfortunately, a power allotted to Congress which for the past 50
years has been largely ignored.
One day after the bombing of Pearl Harbor, President Franklin
Roosevelt hobbled to the podium of the House of Representatives and
gave his memorable speech referring to a day which would ``live in
infamy.'' He then asked from a joint session of Congress for a
declaration of war, first against Japan and then later against Germany
and Italy.
That was literally the last time a President came before Congress and
recognized the authority of Congress to declare war. Every subsequent
President--Democrat and Republican alike--found an excuse not to come
before Congress and to wage wars of varying magnitude.
It is curious, when you look back after World War II, at the debate
on the formation of NATO and of the United Nations, how careful the
Members of Congress from both political parties were to preserve the
authority of Congress to declare war, to make certain that we would not
delegate that authority to any international institution or any treaty
organization. Time and time again during the course of that debate we
were reminded that even as members of the United Nations, even as
members of NATO, we were not ceding the power of Congress under the
Constitution to declare war.
The steady decline of congressional involvement in the war-making
process resulted, of course, in our participation in Korea, in Vietnam,
in a dozen other military undertakings without the express approval of
Congress.
Last year, I stood on the floor of this institution and asked my
colleagues--Democrats and Republicans alike--to join me in reasserting
the principle that Congress, and Congress alone, has the authority to
declare war and to engage in any offensive military action. Yes, the
President is Commander in Chief and defends American personnel,
American territory, and does it without coming to Congress waiting for
a quorum and a debate and a final vote before he acts. No one would
ever demand that a President restrain that authority to defend this
country or its people. But in the case of an offensive military action,
one where we were not defending Americans, or our territory, or engaged
in some peacekeeping permissive activity, I felt the Constitution was
clear. I offered that amendment to the defense appropriations bill last
year.
For those who are keeping score at home, they might be interested to
know that 15 of the 100 Senators voted in favor of my resolution, and
84 in opposition.
It will be interesting to take the debate on this resolution and the
statements made by so many of my colleagues and put them next to that
vote and ask them if there has been a change of heart. I think to some
extent there has been. I think it is unfortunate that we are
considering this particular resolution and that we will have little
chance to amend it.
I strongly agree with my colleagues who drafted the resolution that
Congress must vote to authorize any escalation of this conflict to
include ground troops. I filed an amendment that would prohibit the use
of ground troops to invade Yugoslavia unless specifically authorized by
Congress. The President said he doesn't intend to use ground troops. He
has promised in a letter to congressional leaders that he will ask for
a vote of Congress before introducing United States ground forces into
Kosovo in a nonpermissive environment.
I think the President must come to Congress before committing us to
any ground war. I think it would better for us to vote on that
specifically. But I understand that a motion to table Senate Joint
Resolution 20 will be made and that it is not likely that I will be
able to offer this amendment.
I did vote for Senate Concurrent Resolution 21 on March 23 that
supported airstrikes against Yugoslavia. It passed by a vote of 58 to
41. I commend the President and this administration for giving the
Senate at least an opportunity to vote before any action was taken.
That is a concession that has rarely been made by any President. Most
Presidents moved forward as if the Constitution did not exist in terms
of congressional authority.
I support the President and NATO's policy. I think we need to have
patience and resolve to see the air campaign through. Many have
questioned the strategy of conducting an air campaign without
committing ground troops.
This is an important debate. But I believe we had no choice but to
start the bombing campaign in an attempt to respond to ethnic
cleansing, the genocide in Kosovo. We could not stand idly by and watch
it happen.
I have listened to the speeches on the floor from some of my
colleagues who take exception to the premise that the United States
should even be involved in this conflict. I do not agree with that.
Frankly, having been there, having seen literally thousands of people
in a refugee camp in Brazda in Macedonia, it is clear to me what is
going on. The policies of Milosevic in Yugoslavia are directed toward
innocent people.
Time and time again I asked these innocent Kosovars why they left
Kosovo--an open-ended question. Time and time again the response was
exactly the same. In the middle of the night a knock on the door,
people in black ski masks, or otherwise concealed identity, gave them
literally minutes to leave: Pick up your babies, pick up your
grandparents and whatever you can hold, and leave, because we are going
to burn down or blow up your home. If they were lucky, they got out.
They got out with a family intact. But many were not so fortunate. They
were victims of ethnic cleansing--not just displacement but murder. So
many times over and over we hear these stories of murder, of genocide
against people, not because they have done anything wrong but because
they are of the wrong ethnic persuasion, the wrong culture, the wrong
religious belief.
I am not sure what the word ``genocide'' means technically. But what
I have seen is the closest I may come to it in my lifetime in that
refugee camp in Macedonia--victims of murder, rape, displacement,
genocide, suffering. These are the people forced out of Kosovo.
Some of my colleagues will come to the floor and say that is none of
our business, we can't be the policeman to the world; the United States
has limited capability, limited responsibility. That is a point of view
that I would disagree with but I understand. We certainly cannot police
the world. But the fact is, we are part of a NATO alliance which is
being tested in terms of its existence and its future. If NATO does not
come forward at this moment in time unified and determined to rid
Milosevic of his killing fields in Kosovo, the NATO alliance is all but
moribund and dead and pointless.
For the 20th century, we have invested so much in American treasures,
in American lives to preserve Europe: World War I, World War II, and
the cold war--thousands and thousands of Americans fighting and dying
for the
[[Page 8109]]
stability and safety and security of Europe.
Now in the closing moments of this century are we to walk away from
this corner of the world which has been so important in our alliance in
the past? Are we to ignore the barbarism being practiced by Slobodan
Milosevic? Are we to say that a man who has initiated four wars in 10
years can now start another war if he cares to, find more innocent
victims for his policy of ethnic cleansing? Should we, as the United
States, step back as the lead nation in this important alliance and
declare it is over? I hope not.
I think President Clinton is right. Fighting this war at this moment
in time is critically important because it will validate the future of
NATO. I hope for a generation, perhaps even a century of peace in a
Europe that has been torn with warfare too many times.
The critical question in Senate Joint Resolution 20 is how far do we
go. I voted for airstrikes, I mentioned earlier. But this resolution
goes further. I read it in its entirety in the resolution clause:
That the President is authorized to use all necessary force
and other means in concert with United States allies to
accomplish United States and North Atlantic Treaty
Organization objectives in the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia, Serbia and Montenegro.
I cannot support that. As much as I support the current air war, as
much as I support our efforts to stop ethnic cleansing by Slobodan
Milosevic, I cannot support committing ground troops. I think that is a
mistake.
I made a point during my recent visit to ask military experts how it
would be accomplished. How can we send troops in the field and
accomplish this goal? Time and time again the answer came back: With
great difficulty. We don't have the port facility that we can rely on.
Frankly, we can't look at the nations surrounding Yugoslavia and find a
ready entry strategy. What we would have to do would be elaborate,
costly, expensive, time consuming, and dangerous.
That is why, though I support the air war, I don't support the
concept of sending ground troops. I don't believe it is necessary nor
practical, and I don't think we should do it. This resolution is open
ended and gives the President authority for ground troops and beyond.
Just last week, the House of Representatives considered this issue. I
am sorry to say, about an institution where I served for 14 years and
one which I hold in the highest regard, that it was not one of their
finer moments. It was an aimless, pointless, confusing debate. At a
time when the American people needed clarity and leadership from the
Congress, they received neither. They voted not to expand the war; they
voted not to pull out; and then by a tie vote they failed to pass a
resolution even supporting the current air war in place in Kosovo and
in Yugoslavia.
I am not sure what message was sent. We spend a lot of time here on
Capitol Hill talking about sending messages as if we are some sort of
e-mail source or Western Union. But that was a very confused day for
America, and I am sure the confusion was felt around the world.
I hope our vote here does not lead to the same misunderstanding. I
think it is likely that this resolution, because it is so broad and
open ended, will be tabled. The decision made by that, I believe, that
we will continue the Senate approval of the air war, we will not give
to this President something he has not asked for--the authority to
commit ground troops or whatever other power is in his hands.
How did we reach this point where we have to debate whether Congress
will exercise its constitutional authority? I think there are several
reasons. By attrition we have given back to the executive branch the
conduct not only of foreign policy but of the military as well, without
any real reference for the language of the Constitution. We have said
fundamentally, Mr. President, it is your decision to make.
I think it reflects many things. I think it reflects historical
attrition. I think it also reflects a timidity on the part of Congress
in terms of getting its hands dirty, involved in a military struggle
that might result in American casualties. That is a sad commentary
because the American people count on us to come forward during the
course of debate and with as much clarity as possible to explain the
choices and to make the call in terms of our military and foreign
policy.
I think, unfortunately, this resolution by Senators McCain, Biden,
and others, does not express the feelings of Congress today. I think if
there were a resolution in the Senate as to whether or not we should
continue this air war, as the President has proposed, it again will
pass as it did on March 23. This idea of expanding beyond goes too far.
I listened to the Senator from Virginia argue earlier that Congress
has a very limited, if any, role, when it comes to the declaration of
war. I disagree with him on that score. I believe there is an important
element here that must be remembered. The words of James Madison aptly
summarize the founders of this country and their thinking on this point
when he said:
In no part of the constitution is more wisdom to be found, than in
the clause which confides the question of war or peace to the
legislature, and not to the executive department. . .[T]he trust and
the temptation would be too great for any one man. . ..Hence it has
grown into an axiom that the executive is the department of power most
distinguished by its propensity to war; hence it is the practice of all
states, in proportion as they are free, to disarm this propensity of
its influence.
It is hard to imagine a clearer situation for acting on the Congress'
war power than the situation we face with Yugoslavia and Kosovo today.
I have offered a resolution which states that if the President seeks
to expand this war beyond the current air war approved earlier by
Senate resolution, it would require Senate approval. I think with that
type of resolution we would continue to assert our constitutional
authority to authorize military activity and to draw clear, bright
lines as to the extent that the President can go.
I understand the Senator from Arizona, and I have heard him speak
many times on the floor and in the press about his belief that we
should give to this President all power necessary to complete the war.
I appreciate his point of view, though I respectfully disagree with
him. I think that involvement in a ground war could be costly and,
frankly, not the result for which the American people are looking.
I hope during the course of this debate several things come through
loudly and clearly. First, regardless of your point of view on this
resolution, we support the men and women in uniform. Regardless of
party preference, we are here in support of their actions. I am proud
of what I have seen and what I am sure will continue in their service
to this country.
Second, we condemn the ethnic cleansing policy of Slobodan Milosevic.
He has picked on innocent victims time and time again, and this type of
genocide must come to an end.
Third, any expansion of this war beyond the current military
undertaking must be with the consent of the American people through
their elected Representatives in Congress. I hope, regardless of what
the vote may be on this resolution tomorrow, that that will be a
principle which the President will continuing to abide by.
I believe NATO has a future. I certainly believe that America has a
future in its leadership in the world. We are being tested in the
Balkans. I want to pass that test so the 21st century is a century of
peace.
I yield back the remainder of my time.
Mr. LAUTENBERG. Mr. President, I rise today as a cosponsor of the
pending resolution authorizing the use of ``all necessary force and
other means'' to address the crisis in Kosovo. I know our vote will be
a procedural one, and that the Senate may well vote to table the
resolution.
I would therefore urge my colleagues to demonstrate their support for
the resolution by joining the distinguished senior Senator from
Arizona, Senator McCain, and the Ranking Member of
[[Page 8110]]
the Foreign Relations Committee, Senator Biden, and others who have
cosponsored this legislation.
I am heartened by this bipartisan support for President Clinton's
leadership of NATO efforts to stop the killing in Kosovo and allow
ethnic Albanians to return and rebuild their homes under the protection
of a NATO-led peacekeeping force.
Mr. President, we are not debating whether our values and interests
merit the engagement of our armed forces.
President Bush first issued the so-called Christmas warning in 1992,
threatening the use of force if Yugoslav forces moved against Kosovo.
President Clinton renewed that pledge soon after taking the oath of
office for the first time. Unlike our colleagues in the other body, the
Senate clearly voted to authorize the President to conduct air
operations and missile strikes against Yugoslavia.
Why did we do so? Why does the fate of ethnic Albanians in a province
of what remains of Yugoslavia matter to the American people?
Because fundamental United States interests and values are at stake.
The first is the credibility of the United States as a moral leader
in establishing rules of civilized behavior among countries, to take a
stand against mass killings and mass rapes and mass expulsions of
innocent civilians wherever they occur.
The second is the promise of developed nations banding together to
enforce these standards of conduct, as members of NATO are doing
through joint military action against Belgrade.
At the fiftieth anniversary Summit, the leaders of nineteen
democracies strengthened the Euro-Atlantic partnership so we can more
often act--particularly in Europe--in concert with allies who generally
share our interests and values and who have the capability to undertake
fully integrated military operations alongside U.S. armed forces.
Those nineteen heads of state and government were joined by the
leaders of many other nations in the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council
expressing solidarity to address the threat to European security from
the Milosevic regime in Belgrade.
Third is the credibility of United States threatening the use of
force when appropriate.
We have followed through on declarations made by President Bush and
President Clinton. Now we must prevail. Otherwise, our leadership
around the world will not be taken seriously, and we may find our
interests threatened more in the future.
Fourth, we must stop conflicts early, before a small but intense fire
becomes a widespread conflagration.
We must help neighboring states, particularly Albania and Macedonia
and Montenegro, confront the challenge of helping hundreds of thousands
of ethnic Albanians driven out of their native Kosovo. We have already
seen the pressure which Belgrade has brought to bear by flooding these
countries with refugees.
One cannot fully predict what will happen if we do not prevail,
stopping these crimes against humanity, this genocide in the Balkans,
rather than permitting this abhorrent behavior to become an ordinary
means of controlling events.
Finally, I would remind my colleagues, Mr. President, that Milosevic
and his police and military forces are killing people and raping women
and driving families from their homes based on their ethnicity--they
are committing unacceptable acts. We have an obligation and a
responsibility to act to stop genocide.
We cannot stand by and allow these massacres to continue and claim to
stand for what is right in this world?
Mr. President, the United States Senate has already decided that our
national interests and values justify the engagement of our armed
forces. NATO air power has struck targets in Yugoslavia for more than a
month now.
There are signs Belgrade's will to resist may be faltering.
Therefore, we should not be showing weakness, because civilized values
will certainly be under assault.
We must have history reflect that such appalling behavior will
trigger sharp rebuff by democratic, life-respecting nations.
Milosevic cannot seriously question the military superiority of NATO.
Despite some losses, we have managed to sustain a serious air campaign
with relative impunity. We have overwhelming force on our side.
Milosevic is instead pinning his hopes on NATO lacking the unity and
political will to use the necessary force to prevail.
The time has come to disabuse him of these delusions. This resolution
will tell Milosevic that we are prepared to do whatever it takes to
halt and reverse his campaign of terror against the people of Kosovo.
Let me address some of the questions raised by my colleagues who may
not support the pending legislation: Does this Resolution mean the
United States and our NATO allies will fight their way into Kosovo on
the ground? Should we not give air power more time to be effective? Why
not negotiate an end to the conflict?
The resolution would authorize the President ``to use all necessary
force and other means, in concert with United States allies. . . .''
That would authorize use of resources if the President determines this
is necessary. The President has asked us to be patient, to give air
power time to achieve Belgrade's acceptance of NATO conditions.
While I am reluctant to wait while the killing and the rapes and the
expulsions continue, as a practical matter it will take some time--
perhaps months--to plan and mount a ground campaign. NATO Secretary
General Solana has rightly decided to update plans for the use of
ground forces to liberate Kosovo and escort more than a million
displaced Kosovars back to their homes.
By signaling our readiness to commit ground forces if necessary, we
can actually improve prospects for Belgrade's capitulation. In any
case, the United States should participate in an international force to
maintain stability and protect the civilian population of Kosovo,
though our European partners will appropriately take the lead in such
an effort.
Negotiations are taking place. Former Russian Prime Minister Victor
Chernomyrdin, United Nations Secretary General Kofi Annan, and others
are trying to mediate a solution. This is all well and good, so long as
these mediators understand that we will not negotiate away the
principles NATO has set out as conditions for an end to the bombing.
We all appreciate Reverend Jesse Jackson's courageous intervention to
secure the release of the three American soldiers captured on the
Yugoslav/Macedonian border. However, we cannot accept the ostensibly
humane act of their release as a license for Milosevic's forces to
continue the mayhem, rape, and killing they are committing even as we
speak.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the Record
a description from the New York Times of a singular atrocity.
There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in
the Record, as follows:
[From the New York Times, May 3, 1999]
Survivor Tells of Massacre at Kosovo Village
(By Anthony DePalma)
Kukes, Albania, May 2--It lasted no more than three
minutes, three minutes of savagery unleashed without even a
word. ``They just started shooting and I got hit in the
shoulder. the dead bodies behind me pushed me over the cliff
and into the stream. I was lucky because all of the dead
bodies fell on top of me.''
Isuf Zheniqi, who said he survived when 58 men died in a
massacre near Bela Crkva in southwestern Kosovo more than a
month ago, speaks out hesitantly, fearing Serbian forces
might take revenge on members of his family still in Kosovo.
But after crawling out from under the bodies of his
relatives, neighbors and friends, with a bullet from a
Serbian automatic rifle embedded in his right shoulder and
horrors filling his head, he has carried around the names of
almost all the men who died that day.
In crimped handwriting he puts them down on the pages of an
address book, name after name of old men, young boys,
teenagers and men, like himself, who were suspected by the
Serbs of belonging to the Kosovo Liberation Army, which is
fighting to make Kosovo independent from Serbia.
He remembers the names of all but one. But he knows there
were 58 because he
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helped bury them, each one with a written name.
As refugees from Kosovo continue to flee across the border,
the accounts of atrocities committed by Serbian forces in
Kosovo multiply: a killing spree in the village of Velika
Krusa, the rampage of troops through the streets of
Djakovica, the slaughter of up to 100 men in the village of
Meja.
Accounts from different refugees are consistent enough to
lend a great deal of credibility to some. But eyewitness
accounts by survivors like Mr. Zheniqi are rare, either
because the killing was done efficiently enough to prevent
survivors, or because the sheer terror of minutes like those
on the embankment at Bela Crkva prevents survivors from
recounting their ordeals.
Mr. Zheniqi said that when he was brought across the border
by relatives he told human rights investigators what had
happened at Bela Crkva. But until now, he has not given
journalists a full account of his experience.
Human Rights Watch separately interviewed Mr. Zheniqi and
four other witnesses, who corroborated parts of his account.
Mr. Zheniqi was the only one who testified that he saw the
actual killing, Human Rights Watch officials said. Four women
who were separated from the men at Bela Crkva heard the shots
as they were walking to Zrze and later returned to see the
bodies.
And other refugees told Human Rights Watch that they were
among the group of 20 or so people who returned the day after
the killings to bury the bodies.
``All the witnesses gave us highly credible and unusually
consistent accounts of what happened at Bela Crkva,'' said
Fred Abrahams of Human Rights Watch. ``They corroborated what
the eyewitness told us.''
The other witnesses appear to have left Kukes since they
were interviewed. It was impossible to confirm the killings
independently, beyond the refugee accounts, since reporters
and independent investigators have been unable to visit that
area of Kosovo since the bombing started.
Today Mr. Zheniqi lives in a Kukes pool hall, with his
daughter and her family. He cannot use his right arm because
of the bullet wound, and during the days he can often be seen
dozing in the sun outside the pool hall, trying to steal some
moments of the rest that eludes him every night because of
his terrible dreams.
``My daughter tells me `Father, sleep, why don't you
sleep?' '' Mr. Zheniqi said. ``But I can't. All those dead
bodies on top of mine. When I meet someone from Kosovo and
they ask me what happened, I cry. I'm embarrassed, because
I'm 39 years old and I'm crying.''
The slightly built farmer, who worked for eight years in
Switzerland before returning to the fertile soil of
southwestern Kosovo, said that before the turmoil in Kosovo
began over a year ago, he had almost no contact with Serbs
living nearby.
But the area was a known stronghold of the Kosovo
Liberation Army, and the Serbs were advancing ruthlessly on
rebel positions, including the area of Bela Crkva. Mr.
Zheniqi said that he was not a member of the rebel force and
that none of those killed had any connection to the Kosovo
Liberation Army.
At 9:30 in the morning, Mr. Zheniqi said, 16 special
policemen appeared, shooting their automatic weapons in the
air. Two families had strayed from the group and Mr. Zheniqi
said the Serbs opened fire, killing every member of both
except for a 2-year-old boy who had been protected by his
mother.
``She hid the baby in front of her and saved him,'' Zheniqi
said, His lips quivered and he could not talk. When he
continued, he said, ``I saw this with my own eyes, maybe 150
feet from me.
The Serbs then shot their rifles in the air again and
shouted, in Albanian, ``Get up and come here.''
The villagers climbed up the banks of the stream with their
hands over their heads. When they reached the train trestle,
the men were separated from the women and children, and
ordered to strip down to their undershorts.
About 3:30 A.M. on March 25, on the First night of NATO
bombings in Yugoslavia, Serbian forces started their
operation, Mr. Zheniqi said. He said he saw about a dozen
Serbian tanks take positions in Bela Crkva. ``One was in
front of my house,'' he said. Anticipating violence, he took
his family and his brother's family--17 people in all--and
ran to the nearby mountains to hide.
When the streets again fell silent, they returned, thinking
the tanks has moved on. But they hadn't. Smoke soon rose from
the houses of Bela Crkva that were closest to the road from
Prizren to Rahovec. Mr. Zheniqi and his family fled again,
this time scrambling down the deep banks of a large nearby
stream. It was about 4:30 A.M.
``The people from the whole village started to collect
there in the stream,'' he said. They went to a place he
called Ura e Bellase, where a train trestle crossed the
stream. About 800 villagers tried to hide beneath the bridge.
After daybreak, the villagers tried to move toward Zrze and
Rogovo, two nearby hamlets they thought would be safe. But
Serbian snipers followed their movements.
The police then went through their belongings, Mr. Zheniqi
said, taking anything of value. A local doctor trainee, Nesim
Popaj, tried to talk to the police in Serbian because his
nephew, Shendet Popaj, 17, had been thrown on the ground and
was under a policeman's boot.
``The Serb looked at the doctor, said just two or three
words, and told him to move over a bit,'' Mr. Zheniqi said.
``Then he shot him. We were shocked. The man was a captain
using an automatic rifle. He wore a green camouflage uniform,
and on his shoulders were stars. I don't know his name, but
he was tall and he had a scrunched-up mouth. I could
recognize his picture easily.''
The women and children were sent to Zrze. The men were
allowed to get dressed and then were forced to move over to
the high ground above the stream. Mr. Zheniqi was in the
first line, at the edge of the stream bank, with many men
behind him.
``We tried to say something to the Serbs but they didn't
let us,'' Mr. Zheniqi said. ``If we tried they just said,
`Shut up.' We all cried. Sahid Popaj cried from the moment we
were forced to take off our clothes to the moment he died. He
just cried.''
The shooting started without a word from the policemen.
Several of them standing just behind the villagers opened
fire with automatic weapons. Being farthest away from the
gunmen provided Mr. Zheniqi with some cover, but he was
struck by a bullet in his right shoulder. The shooting lasted
about three minutes, he said. The weight of the men falling
behind him pushed him over into the stream.
He fell about six feet, landing in the water. ``At that
moment, I was just thinking of getting to one stone and from
there holding my head above the water. I stayed there like a
dead man for a total of maybe 20 minutes.''
The terror has not ended. The policemen lowered themselves
down the embankment.
``I heard someone telling a guy in the stream: `He's
breathing, shoot him; he's breathing, shoot him,' '' Mr.
Zheniqi said. They found nine men who had hidden themselves
in the bushes, and killed them.
He waited another 15 minutes, and when all was quiet he
pull himself out from under the weight of his dead friends
and relatives. That was when he saw the extent of what had
happened in Bela Crkva. ``There in the stream, I saw terrible
things: men without eyes, men with half their heads blown
off.''
He staggered to Zrze, where he found some of his family and
told them about the killing. He said the men organized a
group to go back to the stream, but Mr. Zheniqi was not among
them. He said they found four other survivors, and piled them
into the wagon behind their tractor, dodging sniper fire. On
the way back, two of the survivors died.
The following day, about 20 villagers from Bela Crkva
returned to the stream to bury the dead. Already, they were
thinking of justice and the memory of those who had been
mowed down in three minutes.
``We wrote the names of all the dead on separate pieces of
paper,'' Mr. Zheniqi said. Then we put the papers inside
plastic soda bottles. There was one name in each bottle. We
put the bottle inside the grave, not on top. And we buried
them, not far from the stream.''
Mr. LAUTENBERG. Mr. President, our cause is just. Our objectives are
reasonable. President Clinton has thus far insisted that Kosovo be
granted substantial autonomy within the borders of Yugoslavia.
We should be prepared to do whatever is necessary to prevail, to stop
the killing and the rapes and the expulsions, to reverse ethnic
cleansing.
We must stand up for what is right. I hope my colleagues will agree
and will join me in supporting this legislation.
Mr. President, I plan to vote against the motion to table the
Resolution. I believe the Senate has the right and the responsibility
to clearly address this issue.
And I hope that this Senate, given the opportunity to vote on the
Resolution, will rise to the occasion and clearly authorize the
President to do what it takes, together with our NATO allies, to
prevail over the Milosevic regime, to stop the killing in Kosovo and
help bring peace and stability to a troubled region of Europe.
I yield the floor.
Mr. THOMPSON. Mr. President, on its face, this resolution is hard to
challenge. Of course, we want to do whatever it takes to win a conflict
we are engaged in. However, voting for this Resolution, while appealing
to my instincts, would go against what I believe to be my obligation.
This Resolution is essentially a Declaration of War--a Declaration of
War that the President hasn't even requested. It would give to the
President a blank check for an indefinite period of time, regardless of
any changes in circumstances. It does not even require that we act in
concert with our NATO allies.
Congress's Constitutional authority to declare war presupposes that
the
[[Page 8112]]
President will support such action. In each of the five wars for which
Congress has passed Declarations of War, none have come without a
specific presidential request. This resolution today, however, would
grant the President authority he has not sought, based on the War
Powers Resolution he does not recognize, to fight a ground war he has
promised he will not undertake.
If the Commander in Chief decides that we need ground troops in
Yugoslavia, then he should come to the Congress and request them. At
that time, the Congress would have the opportunity to ask certain
questions, such as:
What are our vital national interests here?
What are our military and political objectives?
Do we propose to take Belgrade or parts or all of Kosovo?
How do we propose to get our troops into the battle area?
How many troops will it take?
How many casualties do we expect?
What will be the make up of the NATO ground forces?
e.g., how many U.S. troops?
How long will it take us to achieve our objectives?
How thinly spread will we be left in other places in the world where
we have military commitments?
What is the overall commitment level of our NATO allies, both with
regard to such an operation and with regard to its aftermath?
When and if that time comes, I will ask these questions and others
and listen carefully to the answers. I will give it careful
consideration and cast my vote depending upon the circumstances that
exist at that time. If we pass this Resolution now, however, I fear
that these important questions will never be answered.
When Congress was first consulted with regard to the air campaign in
Yugoslavia, it was done almost as an afterthought, after the
Administration had already made its decision to begin bombing. Many of
us felt at the time what we should all now know with certainty--that
Administration officials had not adequately considered all of the
ramifications of what they were doing. On the heels of that experience,
should Congress now, when the stakes have been raised much higher,
authorize and even pressure the Administration to fight a ground war
that they are clearly not prepared to fight? Does the Senate not want
answers to why and how a ground campaign would work--the kind of
answers that we should have demanded before the Senate voted to approve
the air campaign?
And with regard to the timing of this resolution, some now suggest
that more time should be devoted to debating this issue and I agree.
However, this argument is being made a little late. It would have been
more helpful if we had had a more extended discussion of this issue at
a time when it might have had more relevance--before the final decision
for the bombing campaign was made. At that time, the President should
have explained to the Congress and the American people why going to war
in the Balkans was in our national interest. We should have demanded
it. However, he didn't and the Senate, after a debate under a 30 minute
time agreement, gave pro forma approval to a decision that had already
been made.
And now in the middle of a bombing campaign that the President still
says will achieve our objectives, we are asked to cast another vote
that will have no effect. So be it. But I would hope that in the future
we would take up these matters earlier in the process and not let the
President present them to us as a fait accompli. Perhaps then the two
branches of government could come together with some unity of purpose
and we could all go to the American people with a clear message about
our intent and about our interests. What we are witnessing now in the
disunity of the Congress and among the American people is the result of
our failure to do that.
Mr. KOHL. Mr. President, I will be voting to table S.J. Res. 20,
which would authorize the President to use all necessary force against
Yugoslavia.
On March 23, I voted along with 58 of my colleagues to authorize the
use of air strikes against Yugoslavia. I deplore the actions of
Slobodan Milosevic, a dictator who has caused pain and suffering for
all the peace-loving people of the region. The decision to launch
airstrikes was made only after the Administration and NATO worked
diligently to bring a peaceful resolution to the conflict in Kosovo.
There was, and continues to be, an international consensus that
Milosevic's actions demand our continued use of air power. I continue
to hope that air strikes will pave the way for an end to hostilities in
the region, a return of refugees to Kosovo, and an autonomy arrangement
that can be supported by all. The possibility of a diplomatic
resolution to this conflict is very much alive.
Thus, the resolution before us today is premature. The President has
not indicated that he intends to expand the use of force here, he has
not indicated any immediate plans to use ground troops, nor has he
asked us to fund such an expansion of the conflict in Kosovo. Thus, I
must vote to table this resolution.
Mr. GRASSLEY. Mr. President, I rise today with deep concern over the
Clinton Administration's policy regarding Yugoslavia and Kosovo.
I have observed, over the past year, an Administration policy
characterized by a lack of vision regarding events in the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia. In recent months, the American public has seen
the conflict in Kosovo explode onto the front pages of newspapers and
dominate primetime television news. This conflict, however, is not new.
It stems from centuries of tension and a decade of deteriorating
relations between Serbs and Albanians in Kosovo, made worse because of
Slobodan Milosevic's rule over the country.
I do not want to downplay the seriousness of Milosevic's action in
Kosovo. Milosevic has treated the Kosovar Alabnians in a barbarous
manner. But, have NATO airstrikes solved this problem? No. And the sad
fact is: United States policy has--if nothing else--unfortunately
speeded up Milosevic's campaign of terror in Kosovo.
And now, with our men and women risking their lives over the skies
and on the ground in the Balkan region--we must take time to evaluate
past policy and determine how best to move forward toward peace while
making wise use of limited military resources.
Military intervention should be the method of last resort in any
conflict. Once all efforts have been made to resolve a conflict
peaceably--the only way to conduct military operations is with a clear
vision of goals to be achieved--goals backed up by sound military
advice, common-sense wisdom with maximum objectivity based upon factual
evidence.
I follow the Colin Powell doctrine on military operations--you should
not get into a military situation you don't know how to exit. In other
words, have plans on how you're going to get out of the situation. And,
if you do initiate a military operation--you should go in at the
beginning with enough force to ensure victory.
A critical miscalculation in Clinton's Kosovo policy was the
president's outright statement that ground troops would not be
introduced into the region. It was an impassioned, emphatic statement.
And it signaled to the world that--right out of the gate--the United
States was not serious about this mission. Not only were the military
goals vague, but the means to achieve those goals were laid out clearly
for Slobodan Milosevic to see. Milosevic knew he had time to further
his own twisted goals in Kosovo and has succeeded in wreaking havoc on
the region while dodging NATO missiles.
Therefore, we are in a situation where ``gradualism'' is being
practiced. This was Clinton's only way of his misstatement regarding
ground troops. I say ``gradualism'' because the Administration has
already set the stage for troops to be on the ground--regardless of
what Congress says about it. First, United States ground forces were
sent to surrounding countries to aid in humanitarian efforts. They were
followed up by support troops for air divisions--
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troops to support the Apache helicopter division--troops to support
artillery to support the Apache helicopters. Soon, we will need troops
on the ground to protect troops already on the ground. I think it's
fair to say we are in a ground war even though we don't have United
States military forces on the ground within the geographical confines
of Kosovo.
Today we are debating a resolution to give President Clinton the
authority to use ``all necessary force'' to achieve Clinton
Administration goals in Kosovo. I understand this resolution
inadvertently triggered the War Powers Act, which requires a vote. But,
the president not only hasn't asked for this broad-ranging authority,
he still maintains it isn't needed. Some of my colleagues wish to
affirm the president's authority regarding our involvement in Kosovo. I
cannot support such a resolution.
I cannot support a policy lacking common sense. I cannot--with a
clear conscience--provide limitless authority to an Administration
which has failed to demonstrate an understanding of the consequences of
its policies. We must have a defined goal--and I'm talking more defined
than the United States diminishing Slobodan Milosevic's ``capacity to
maintain his grip and impose his control on Kosovo.''
What is our goal? To destroy all Yugoslav military forces and control
the entire Federal Republic of Yugoslavia? To occupy Belgrade? To expel
Milosevic's forces from Kosovo?
This resolution will not move us closer to a clear goal--a clear
strategy.
I support our men and women who are risking their lives--even at this
moment--for the sake of NATO's reputation and Clinton's military
policy. I condemn Slobodan Milosevic's reprehensible actions in the
Kosovo region.
I seek clear military goals and concise, appropriate communication
from our nation's commander-in-chief. Congress and the people of the
United States are waiting.
Mr. ASHCROFT. Mr. President, I rise in opposition to S.J. Res. 20 to
authorize the use of all necessary force in the NATO operation against
Yugoslavia. Taking such a step at this time is imprudent, particularly
in light of the poor management of the ongoing air campaign against
President Milosevic. Nothing in the operation to date indicates we have
defined strategic goals in Kosovo or summoned the political will to
achieve those goals. Clearly, this is not the time to authorize the
Administration to escalate a strategically flawed and poorly managed
campaign in the Balkans.
A lack of foresight and planning has defined both the air war and the
refugee relief effort, allowing Milosevic to seize and keep the
initiative. The air war has been waged in a classic Vietnam-style
fashion of escalation. Two principle elements of war, surprise and
overwhelming force, have been sacrificed to the political whims of our
European allies. The first three weeks of bombing in Allied Force were
comparable to one day of bombing in the Gulf War. NATO has waited a
full month before targeting Yugoslavia's electrical and television
networks. In the Gulf War, such assets were destroyed in the first two
days of the conflict.
Even as the President sends additional planes and personnel to
enhance NATO's firepower, a lack of leadership continues to undermine
our efforts to punish Milosevic. According to statements by NATO
Military Committee Chairman, General Klaus Naumann, Apache helicopters
will not be sent into Kosovo, but fire into the province from Albania.
NATO Commander General Wesley Clark is requesting additional planes,
but NATO is running out of basing areas in the Balkans. A lack of
preparatory work to have these facilities ready has delayed 400 planes
being deployed to the region. NATO has an oil embargo on Yugoslavia but
will not use force to stop shipments into the country.
The refugee crisis has been compounded by poor planning for the
relief effort. Before the air campaign began on March 24, the
Administration had enough food in the region to feed 500,000 people for
five months. Almost two-thirds of that amount was stationed in
Yugoslavia, however. For relief supplies such as tents and blankets,
Belgrade was the only staging area for the U.S. Office of Foreign
Disaster Assistance.
Clearly, the Administration's record to date on Kosovo is not a basis
upon which to authorize the use of ``all necessary force.'' The
Administration misjudged the enemy and started this war with inadequate
means. Now that we are engaged, we need to deploy overwhelming air
power to accomplish our objectives. I want to see an aggressive air
campaign waged before we take the next step of deploying thousands of
ground troops to the Balkans.
We should be patient and allow an aggressive air campaign to take its
toll, but the air war must be combined with better political leadership
if our objectives are to be achieved. An inability to explain why the
United States is engaged in Kosovo has plagued this operation from the
beginning. Until the Administration has demonstrated the political
leadership to define and achieve clear objectives in Kosovo,
authorizing the use of ground forces is ill-advised.
Mr. GRAMS. Mr. President, as a strong critic of the Administration's
policy in the Balkans, I am uncomfortable expressing my reservations
now that we are in a state of war. The U.S. forces conducting air
strikes against Serbia have my full support as they go into battle even
though I do not support what I believe to be an ill-defined mission.
Mr. President, I opposed the resolution authorizing the President to
bomb Serbia, because I did not see how bombing Serbia would end the
atrocities being committed, bring about stability in the region, or
lead to greater political autonomy for Kosovo. And I am going to oppose
this resolution as well. The Senate should not be moving to authorize
the President ``to use all necessary force''--when the President has
not asked us for that authority--and when the President has given every
indication that he has no intention of moving in that direction. I know
that the authors of this resolution have the best intentions, but I do
not think that it is prudent to push the Commander-in-Chief towards
putting U.S. troops on the ground. If the President believes that
ground troops are necessary, the President should come to the Congress,
clearly explain his objectives and how the use of force can achieve
those specific goals. Then, and only then, should the President ask
Congress for authorization to use ground troops. That is the way to
proceed.
Mr. President, the only lasting solution to this conflict in the
Balkans is a negotiated agreement where both sides agree to live with
the results. It is inevitable that Russia, and other traditional Serb
allies, will play a role in this process. But given the record of the
UN in Bosnia, the peacekeeping force would be more credible if it was
under a different organization's control. OSCE member nations who did
not participate in the NATO bombing campaign could provide a credible
force. The conflict between the Serbs and the Kosovars will not end
with a NATO defeat of the Serbs, just as it didn't end with the defeat
of the Serbs by the Turks in Kosovo in 1389. The conflict will continue
to flare unless a political solution is found to this intractable
problem, so I urge the Administration to actively engage in finding a
negotiated settlement to this conflict which will lead to a sustainable
peace in the Balkan region.
Mr. FRIST. Mr. President, for a deliberative democracy, going to war
is an agonizing task. It is a slow, cumbersome, sometimes combative
process itself. It is discomforting to all.
With regards to Kosovo, I understand the President's vision of what
our world should be and what the United States' role in such a world
should be. I believe I also understand the foundations of his vision of
the role of the United States in a Europe fundamentally different than
the one into which NATO was born--where barbarians are not allowed to
butcher, and where long term stability on the continent must be
defended to maintain the standard
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of living we have fought so hard to achieve.
I also understand the intent of the authors and sponsors of this
resolution. For our Nation to prevail in war, both the citizenry and
the Congress must be united behind the Commander in Chief during times
of war. I commend my colleague from Arizona for his intent.
As Members of the Senate, we must make no mistake about the
importance of this vote, but we must also keep in mind the three
critical interpretations this vote represents, regardless of the
specific wording of the resolution:
First, this vote will be interpreted as a vote on whether we approve
of the President's strategy so far--a strategy which seems to have
initially failed to achieve at least one of our primary goals: to stop
ethnic cleansing in Kosovo.
Second, this vote will be interpreted as a vote on what we believe
the role of the Congress should be in the future prosecution of this
unfolding war.
Third, and most important, this vote will be interpreted as a
statement on whether we are willing to commit ground troops to invade
Yugoslavia, and whether we are willing to risk a considerable sum in
blood and treasure to meet those goals.
On all three accounts, the vote on this resolution is premature. The
wisdom or failure of the President's strategy cannot yet be fully
determined. More important, at the current time in our military
campaign, with the decision of what means will be employed to achieve
our ends still undetermined, it is premature for Congress to relinquish
any future authority to say how this war will or will not be conducted.
While I said that I fully appreciate the importance of an
unencumbered Commander in Chief, I also believe it is necessary for
Congress to retain its limited but critical Constitutional role in
declaring war. Such a vote, where that limited authority would be
relinquished now at a time prior to the President specifically seeking
it from the Congress, is tantamount to approval of the deployment of
ground troops to invade Kosovo or other parts of Yugoslavia. That is a
blessing I am not willing to give at this time--when the Commander in
Chief has not even sought that approval.
Because the resolution is premature, I will not support it now. If
the Commander in Chief believes this war must be expanded beyond the
air campaign, he will have every opportunity to seek that authority. I
will listen thoroughly and fulfill my Constitutional duties at that
time.
For now, I will vote to table this resolution because such a vote
does not tie the President's hands more that he has already. I
certainly will not give aid and comfort to our enemies by voting
against the possibility of using ground troops. My vote allows the
President full range of options but does underscore my insistence that
he more adequately address his rationale before the U.S. Congress and
the American people before committing ground troops to battle.
Mr. McCAIN. I yield 15 minutes to the Senator from Connecticut,
Senator Lieberman.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Connecticut.
Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, I have been privileged to join with the
Senator from Arizona, the Senator from Delaware and others, in
cosponsoring this resolution. So I have listened with considerable
personal interest as one after another of our colleagues have expressed
their points of view. I joined with Senator McCain and Senator Biden
and the others in cosponsoring this resolution as a way to express my
personal support, and hopefully on a bipartisan basis--and the
cosponsors of this resolution are a broad and bipartisan group--to give
the Senate an opportunity to express our support for the objectives
that NATO has adopted in entering the conflict in the Balkans and that
the United States and this administration have, of course, subscribed
to. Let me read what those objectives are:
That the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, (Serbia and
Montenegro) . . . withdraw its military, paramilitary and
security forces from the province of Kosovo, [that the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia] allow the return of ethnic
Albanian refugees to their homes, and [that Serbia] permit
the establishment of a NATO-led peacekeeping force in Kosovo.
In light of all the blood that has been spilled, in light of the
horrific scenes that we have all not just heard about, not just heard
rumored, not heard speculated about, but seen with our own eyes on
television, heard the eye-witness reports on television; of all the
horrors that we have been forced to witness again that have occurred in
Kosovo--when we think of all of those objectives of the NATO campaign,
the NATO effort, the NATO war in the Balkans, they are extremely
reasonable and extremely just.
So I joined with my colleagues in offering this resolution as a way
to restate clearly and simply what our objectives are here and to say
that we want to support the President of the United States. We want to
support the President of the United States in the decision he has made
to join with our allies in NATO to carry out this cause. We want to say
by this resolution, so strongly do we believe in this cause, that we
are prepared to give this President, as the resolution says,
authorization ``to use all necessary force and other means, in concert
with the United States allies, to accomplish United States and NATO
objectives,'' that I have just described.
To me, it is an opportunity, broad-based, simple, fair, direct, not
just to stand together on a bipartisan basis in this Senate, but to
stand together in support of the policy that this administration has
adopted in support of our NATO allies and, in doing so, to send a
message to the enemy, to Mr. Milosevic--who we are reliably informed
began this invasion of Kosovo, this massacre, this massive expulsion,
as others have said before me tonight and earlier today, based on the
ethnic history, identity and religion of the people being expelled--to
say to Mr. Milosevic, who, again, we are reliably informed, began his
evil deeds in Kosovo with the hope and the belief that the NATO allies
would soon break their cohesiveness, would not hold in the face of this
onslaught and his clever diplomatic moves, he was wrong.
The NATO allies were here just a week ago. They spoke with unity.
They strengthened their ranks. They came together. They agreed to
intensify the effort against Milosevic and they have done so in the
ensuing week. Those of us who have brought this resolution before the
Senate have done so with the hope that we might also make clear to
Milosevic that the other belief he had, that he could divide the
American people and their Representatives here in Congress, was false.
It was in vain. It was folly.
That is the spirit in which this resolution was offered. I have
listened to my colleagues speak, and, as others who have spoken before
me, it seems clear to me the motion to table this resolution will be
agreed to tomorrow. I have heard three or four different reasons given
for that. I would say the majority of reasons are procedural, and I
understand those. They are not substantive. They do not go to the heart
of the policy that we, the sponsors of this resolution, have intended
to convey. Some of my colleagues have said the resolution is not
needed; it is premature.
What NATO is doing now is carrying out the aerial bombardment of
Serbia and military sites in Kosovo. The Senate has already authorized
that, to our great credit, on a bipartisan basis. Almost 60 percent of
the Senate voted almost a month ago, as the air campaign began, to
authorize and support, if you will, the President and NATO in that
effort--that valiant effort, that effort that has been conducted by the
men and women in uniform for all the NATO countries and for ourselves.
I am proud to cite the tremendous courage and skill with which our
military personnel have carried out that effort. The Senate
distinguished itself in support of that effort. Unfortunately, the
House did not do so last week and sent a mixed signal. But I understand
some of my colleagues have said tonight the Senate has already spoken
on the military effort that is part of this battle against Milosevic,
so we need not speak now in more width or depth.
[[Page 8115]]
What others have said--the second reason I can hear--is that the
President is not asking for this authorization. In fact, since we
introduced this resolution, S.J. Res. 20, the President has indicated
both at meetings in the White House with a broad, bipartisan group of
Senators, and publicly, if it came to a point, which he hopes and
believes we will not reach--and of course we all hope we will not
reach--when it became clear, tragically, that the Milosevic leadership
in Serbia was remaining what I would describe as insanely intransigent
in the face of a devastating air campaign against that country--which
some experts say, analysts say has already set back the Serbian economy
a decade, some say even more--if Milosevic remained intransigent, the
President has said, and he was forced to reconsider the statement he
has made that he does not believe we need to employ ground forces
there, that he would come to Congress and ask for our consent. So I
understand some of our colleagues have said, therefore, that this
resolution is premature.
There are others, and I hope and believe, as I will say a little bit
later on, that they are in the minority here, who do not support this
effort at all, who want to see us negotiate a settlement or, worse,
negotiate a settlement with a regime that has blood on its hands, that
has violated the values that we hold dear, the humanitarian values, as
we have all seen. We know what is happening. This is a regime in
Belgrade that has carried out aggression, that has aimed at
destabilizing Europe; a regime that, over the last decade, successively
has invaded Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia, and now Kosovo.
This is a regime that, evidence leads us to conclude, by its policies
has brought about the death of hundreds of thousands of people. That is
what this is about: Destabilization, aggression, ethnic cleansing and
genocide in Europe at the end of this century, challenging the premise
that brought about the creation of NATO 50 years ago, which was not
just to defend against a Soviet invasion of Western Europe, but was to
uphold the principles for which the then recently completed Second
World War was fought, which were freedom, human dignity, democracy.
Sometimes, as I watch the slaughter continuing, the expulsions
continuing in Kosovo, as I think of the history of Serbia and Milosevic
for these last 10 years, I just say to myself: Have we not learned the
lessons of this century, of the last 60 years of this century?
Why did we fight the Second World War and the cold war if not to
establish the principle that it was in America's security interest and,
of course, even more intensely and intimately in the security interest
and the principal interest of our allies in Europe not to allow
tyranny, brutality, communism to exist in Europe? It threatened the
stability of that great region with which we have historic ties, with
which we have extraordinary economic ties, which contains the heart of
our alliance, the strength of the partners we would turn to, not just
when in crisis in Europe, but when in crisis anywhere in the world, as
we did in the gulf war. Whom did we ask to stand by our fight, to fight
by our side? Our allies in Europe, first and most significantly.
Will we allow this century to end having fought the Second World War,
made vivid in the Spielberg movie, ``Saving Private Ryan''--did those
Americans fight that extraordinary fight with that unbelievable
courage, lose their lives, so that a dictator, bent on the same kind of
aggression and ethnic genocide at the end of the century, would be
allowed to work his evil will in Europe?
Did we spend billions of dollars and stand face to face with
Communist tyranny for the long years of the cold war, did President
Reagan lead us to the great final victories in the cold war, so less
than a decade later we would allow a Communist--what is Milosevic? He
is an unreconstructed Communist dictator--that we would allow a
Communist dictator to work his will in the heart of Europe and in the
backyard of NATO, that we would stand by and do nothing? I hope not.
I take issue respectfully on the merits, as I see them, with those
who oppose this resolution because they do not think we should be
involved. But I understand those who say, as my colleague from Illinois
said a moment ago, that the Senate is not ready to make the statement
contained in this resolution.
As a cosponsor of this resolution, as one who worked with Senator
McCain, Senator Biden, and others to fashion this resolution, I have
already made the statement, I have already come to the conclusion, so I
will stand with all of my colleagues who have cosponsored this
resolution and whom I heard speak up to now on this debate, who say
they will oppose the motion to table.
We are ready to vote, and we will vote tomorrow morning against the
tabling of this resolution. We will vote against the tabling of the
resolution with the confidence that if the President is wrong and the
air campaign does not bring this war to an end, not on any weakened
terms, but on the terms we clearly state in this resolution--the Serbs
out, the Kosovars back in to live in peace, and an international
peacekeeping force there--then we will return.
Those who have said that they are not prepared now to vote for this
resolution, those who have said this is merely a procedural vote--and I
understand that--those who are essentially voting to table not because
they are against, as I hear them speak, the substance of this
resolution----
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator's time has expired.
Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I yield 3 additional minutes to the
Senator.
Mr. LIEBERMAN. I thank the Senator.
I am confident if that day comes--and, of course, I hope it does not
come. But if we are not able to achieve the victory we must have here,
that NATO must have to remain credible, the United States must have to
remain credible, that we must achieve so that all the bullies, the
thugs and the dictators, wherever they may be--in Asia, the Middle East
or anywhere else--will not see an opportunity to take advantage of us,
if we return at that point to the Senate and ask for support for the
next necessary means to achieve our objectives, I am confident that on
that day a bipartisan majority in the Senate will not walk away from
the field of battle with the enemy having achieved the victory, will
not yield to the forces of ethnic cleansing and ethnic slaughter and
ethnic expulsion but will stand together, united across party lines, to
support our soldiers in uniform, yes, indeed, our NATO allies, of
course, to support the principles upon which this country was founded,
which are at stake in Kosovo today, and to support the administration
in the full conduct of this effort.
This is one of those defining moments. Tomorrow's vote is not the
defining moment. Tomorrow's vote is, if you will, an early round in the
debate in which a majority of Members are not prepared to vote for this
resolution. If necessary, I am convinced on another day that they will,
and I am convinced that that is very much in the national security
interest and in the national moral interest of the United States of
America.
I thank the Chair, and I yield the floor.
Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I continue to be pleased and proud of the
Senator from Connecticut for his intellect, his insight, and his
courage. I thank him for his remarks tonight, but also his steadfast
adherence to lessons of history. May I point out that he is joined in
his views by former Secretary of State Eagleburger, former National
Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft, former Secretary of Defense
Weinberger, former Secretary of State Warren Christopher, and a broad
array of other leaders who have led this country throughout the last
three decades. I am proud Senator Lieberman is one of those as well.
I yield 10 minutes to my dear and beloved friend from Georgia,
Senator Cleland.
Mr. CLELAND. Mr. President, I thank the distinguished Senator from
Arizona, my dear colleague and friend and fellow Vietnam veteran, for
pushing to make sure that this issue of war in Kosovo, war in
Yugoslavia, war in
[[Page 8116]]
the Balkans receives the time and attention from this great and august
body that I think it truly deserves.
I am struck by the fact that in the earlier weeks of this year, all
of my colleagues in the Senate gathered on a question of serious
constitutional gravity: impeachment of the President of the United
States. This is a serious matter equivalent to that, Mr. President,
that is, sending young Americans into harm's way. It is a
constitutional matter, one that I personally feel strongly about and
one on which I am personally conflicted.
As the distinguished Senator from Arizona, I served in Vietnam. I
cannot help but think back, on the presentation of this resolution, to
the fact that some 35 years ago the Senate voted 88-2 in favor of the
Tonkin Gulf resolution which authorized the President to ``take all
necessary steps, including the use of armed forces,'' in Vietnam. The
House approved that resolution unanimously, 416-0.
It is fascinating that my colleague, my friend, my mentor, Senator
Russell, in those days chairman of the Armed Services Committee, and a
great student of history, actually succeeded in attaching language
which gave Congress the right to terminate the authorization of the
Tonkin Gulf resolution at any time by concurrent resolution.
Senator Russell, in those days, certainly spoke against open-ended
conflict where the Congress gave wide open authority to the President.
He tried to rein in the Executive and preserve the ability of the
Senate, particularly, to exercise its constitutional authority and
exercise its constitutional role.
But this vote on the Tonkin Gulf resolution served as an unchallenged
congressional authorization of war until 1970, by which time, of
course, we were deeply involved in the conflict, but no closer,
unfortunately, to our political objectives. The way out was long and
difficult.
The near unanimous votes in favor of war against North Vietnam in the
mid-1960s reflected an apparent certainty of purpose and clarity of
message to the President, our adversaries, the American people, and our
service men and women. However, future events, as they unraveled, were
to show that this hasty congressional action, done for the best of
intentions, to display national unity, eventually produced exactly the
opposite result--national disunity. And we gave an uncertain reaction
to the service men and women--and I was one of those servicemen--who
carried out the Government's policies and came back to a divided nation
and a nation on its way out of war, not in it. But that process took 10
years, Mr. President.
Growing out of our Vietnam experiences, the Senator from Arizona and
I have taken the Kosovo issue very seriously. For us, it is not an
issue--it is a war, a war in which young men and women's lives are at
stake. And we come to very different conclusions about what should be
done in that war in terms of further military conflict. But we both
believe the same thing in one sense, and that is, above all, the Senate
must speak, the Senate must debate, the Senate must stand up and be
counted in terms of the policy that we are to follow in the Balkans.
For that reason, Mr. President, I urge that the motion to table this
resolution be defeated. I shall be voting against the motion to table.
We cannot just table a war. We cannot just shunt aside the future lives
of young men and women as they are risked at this hour.
It is fascinating how the resolution reads, the last sentence of
which says that the President is authorized to ``use all necessary
force and other means in concert with United States allies to
accomplish United States and North Atlantic Treaty Organization
objectives in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.'' ``All necessary
force and other means.''
Mr. President, to me, that is an echo, a strange ominous echo of the
language in the Gulf of Tonkin resolution that passed this body
overwhelmingly in the mid-1960s. This got us into deep trouble in
Southeast Asia. I see too many similarities between that experience
then and the war in the Balkans now. I see a similarity in an open-
ended conflict--one with no real military solution in sight, a conflict
with no real military strategy to win, and certainly a conflict in
which we have no exit strategy from which to disengage ourselves from
the war in the Balkans.
Instead, I see a greater Americanized war. I see a doubling of the
warplanes--almost to 1,000 now--with the heavy majority of those
airplanes being from the United States. I see 5,000 muddy boots on the
ground in Albania, all of them American forces, up cheek to jowl, right
across the line, with Serbian forces in tanks and dug into the
mountains with armored personnel carriers and hand-held missiles, and a
tremendous capability of ground fire. God forbid if we launch the
Apache helicopters into that forbidden zone.
I say to you, Mr. President, I support further debate. I will oppose
the tabling motion, but I will also oppose this resolution on its
merits.
I thank the President, and I thank the distinguished Senator from
Arizona for the time to speak on this important matter.
Mr. President, I yield back the remainder of my time.
Mr. McCAIN addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arizona.
Mr. McCAIN. I thank the Senator from Georgia for his always very
perceptive and enlightening debates.
I yield the Senator from Michigan, Mr. Levin, 10 minutes.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Michigan.
Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, first, I thank my good friend from Arizona.
Always, he puts his finger on an issue--in this case, on an issue of
war and an issue of conscience. And this is an issue of both.
There is nobody who more eloquently or doggedly pursues both issues--
war and conscience--and the implications of both. And the experience
that he brings--as does our good friend from Georgia, and others--to
this body is absolutely indispensable in trying to work its way towards
the right conclusion in many of these issues. And I just, again, add my
gratitude to what he adds to this body, to this Nation.
Mr. President, while I favor the thrust of the resolution before us,
I do not favor its timing, and I will vote to table. I want to just
take a few moments this evening to explain this.
The stakes are tremendously high in Kosovo. We simply must not fail.
We cannot fail to succeed in Kosovo. NATO must not fail to succeed in
Kosovo.
Even before I visited the refugee camps a week or so ago, I felt
strongly about this. But meeting with the refugees, of course,
reinforces my conclusion about the nature of Mr. Milosevic's ethnic
cleansing.
This century of ours began with a genocide against Armenians; it is
ending with an ethnic cleansing against the Kosovars; and there was a
holocaust in between.
If we want the next century to be freer of the slaughter that this
century has seen in so many wars, we simply must support the united
action of a united Europe to stop the success of Milosevic in his goals
in Kosovo.
Of course, when you read about what the refugees have gone through,
and you talk to refugees, it reinforces that determination--the stories
of mass executions, mass rapes, the burning of 400 villages by forces
that presumably should be protecting those villages, since Milosevic
claims sovereignty in Kosovo. But instead of pursuing what sovereigns
historically have done, which is to protect people they claim
sovereignty over, this particular dictator is trying to destroy the
very people of Kosovo.
NATO made a statement last week which is of critical importance. It
restates a decision on the part of NATO to prevail. And the only way--
the best way, but perhaps the only way--that we are going to have a
century next which is more peaceful in Europe and elsewhere than the
current century, is if NATO succeeds in its unified determination, as
stated in Washington just about a week ago.
Two sentences kind of say it all. And those two sentences are these:
``We will not allow Milosevic's campaign of terror to succeed. NATO is
determined to prevail.''
[[Page 8117]]
This has rarely been true in Europe. I am not sure it has ever been
true where we have 19 nations, including the United States and Canada,
that have come together to try to stop a genocide from succeeding in
their backyard.
Europe has been divided before now--France, England on one side,
sometimes Germany on another, countries divided into blocs against each
other. But now what we have in Europe is the coming together of all of
the European nations, making one joint statement about what they will
not permit in their own land. ``We will not allow Milosevic's campaign
of terror to succeed. NATO is determined to prevail.''
But that unity which is so critical to the success of the mission, I
believe, will be negatively impacted if the Senate adopts this
resolution that is before us, because this resolution would put this
Senate and this Nation ahead of NATO. And we have to work in harmony
with NATO, in unity with NATO, in harness with 18 other democracies
that have taken a position. And that position is that we are going to
pursue, relentlessly, doggedly the success of the military mission and
air campaign, the purpose of which is to significantly diminish
Milosevic's military capability.
That is the current mission.
It is hoped the success of that mission will achieve the broader
policy objective of being able to return refugees, now over 1 million,
to their homes in Kosovo. If that military mission and its success in
reducing Milosevic's capability to keep a stranglehold on Kosovo does
not achieve the broader mission of being able to return these refugees,
at that point we can consider changing the military mission. At that
point we can consider the use of ground troops by NATO.
Is it prudent to plan for that? Yes, it is. In my judgment, it is
prudent to plan for it. Would it be prudent, in fact, to carry it out
once the groundwork has been laid and Milosevic's military capability
has been significantly weakened? Yes, in my judgment it would be. Most
important to the success of this mission, broad and narrow, is NATO's
unity. It is my fear that the adoption of this resolution will put us
in a significantly different position than the rest of NATO, in advance
of a need to do so.
NATO is unified on an air campaign. It is not yet unified on a ground
campaign. The Apaches alone, after their employment begins, will take
30 to 60 days before they have a significant impact on the ground. That
is what General Clark, the commander, has told us. That may not be the
common wisdom, common understanding, common media message, but that is
the truth, as General Clark believes it--that it will take 30 to 60
days for the Apaches to have an effect after they begin to be employed.
So the debate over authorizing ground forces is a premature debate. I
believe it will distract us from a current unified mission while we are
in the middle of an air campaign.
It is for that reason that, with some reluctance, I am going to vote
to table the resolution, the general direction of which I support,
because it is so critically important that we be unified and united
with NATO allies, that we stay together in planning and in execution of
a mission which must succeed. We must not be distracted by a premature
debate about ground forces. Prudence and common sense would indicate
that we plan for such a contingency, but there is no need for us to
authorize it at this time. It seems to me, if anything, it will divide
and distract, rather than protect that critical unity which is so
essential to the success of this mission.
Again, I commend my good friend from Arizona and Senator Biden,
Senator Lieberman, and the other cosponsors for their support of a very
important position, which is that we now must win. That is the thrust
of this resolution. Again, while I support that thrust, I will vote to
table for the reasons indicated.
I thank the Chair and, again, thank my good friend from Arizona.
Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I thank my friend, the Senator from
Michigan. May I just point out, he made the point that it took a month
or two to get the Apaches there. The reason I am urging that
preparations be made in case we have to exercise the option is exactly
the reason he stated concerning the Apaches. It would take 6 to 8 weeks
now for us to assemble ground forces if we decide to use the option.
I am told by some military experts that we now have to worry about
the onset of bad weather in the fall, but I do appreciate the remarks
of the Senator from Michigan, and I appreciate the results of his trip
that he made and the information that he brought back, which I think
was very helpful to the entire Senate.
Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I thank my good friend. Again, I happen to
concur that the planning is prudent and should be underway. It is the
commitment to the utilization that I think might divide and distract.
Again, I thank him.
Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I note the belated appearance of my dear
friend from Kansas. I yield him however much time he may consume.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Kansas.
Mr. BROWNBACK. Mr. President, thank you very much for allowing me to
speak tonight. I recognize my distinguished colleague from Arizona for
all he has done on this issue but, more than that, for what he has
given to his country. He chairs the Commerce Committee, which I serve
on with him, but I have enormous respect for what he has already given
to his Nation, the sacrifice where he put his life on the line in a
previous war. Actions speak louder than words, and he spoke with his
actions many times. I am enormously proud to know and be associated
with him in this body.
Mr. President, the situation in Kosovo is clearly a very serious one
deserving of our deliberation and vigorous debate. To this point in
time, though, the administration, for my satisfaction, has certainly
not provided the Members of the full Senate body with the information
needed to make an informed decision on this matter. Therefore, I will
vote to table the resolution.
One month ago, I wrote to the President asking that he respond to
certain fundamental questions regarding the objectives and the
implementation of the NATO mission in Kosovo. To date, I have not
received a response to those questions.
What is the objective, I put forward? They have been responding and
defining some of that as we have gone along, but more specifically, how
do we define success? Is there a coherent and achievable plan of action
in place? What price would we pay for this in terms of potential loss
of lives? What about the monetary cost? Is escalation in the true
national interest of the United States? Those simple, basic questions
that I have put forward have not been answered.
Not until we understand the objective of NATO and how that objective
will be attained can we make an informed determination with respect to
S.J. Res. 20. The administration must provide the answers to these
questions, with clarity, with satisfaction, and to the satisfaction of
all Members of the Senate. Until that happens, I cannot give my support
to the administration in this broad, open resolution.
At such time that it is shown how granting the President the
authority to use all necessary force and other means will bring us to a
resolution more quickly, or at less expense or other means, then we
would be able to consider this proposal in some context.
I note, Mr. President, that I fully support our troops. I appreciate
the sacrifices that they are being asked to make to stop Milosevic and
the atrocities he has perpetrated against the people of Kosovo. It was
several weeks ago that I was in Wichita at the McConnell Air Base
meeting with some of the troops and their families before they were
shipping off. You could see in their eyes their willingness, their
commitment to see this action on through. They asked a number of the
same questions that I continue to ask of the President, that I continue
not to get satisfactory answers.
Until those are answered, I cannot give my support to this type of
authority. It is appreciation for these troops
[[Page 8118]]
that makes it impossible for me to support this resolution, until we
understand the full plan. Once we know it, then we can debate its
merits and determine how best to support the President and our troops.
Without that and in clarity of what that plan is, we are making a
decision in a vacuum. The situation merits more attention than that.
Again, I note, as I did at the outset, my enormous respect for my
colleague from Arizona who has put forward this resolution and his
wisdom. His support of this makes me give much more pause to my
statement. But these questions have not been answered to my
satisfaction. While I respect that and I respect enormously the Senator
from Arizona, I cannot in good conscience vote for this resolution at
this time.
Mr. President, I yield the floor.
Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, may I say to my dear young friend, who I
see as one of the rising stars in this Senate--and I can say that with
confidence because I have watched very closely, as a member of the
Commerce Committee, his involvement with a number of issues--I respect
his dissatisfaction with the failure to get an answer to certain
fundamental questions that he and, frankly, the people of Kansas and of
this country have a right to get the answers to. I understand his
position on this issue, and I am in deep sympathy with it.
He makes a compelling case that we should be better informed before
we embark on a ground war or consider the likelihood of a ground war. I
appreciate his views. The realities on the battlefield, I say to my
friend from Kansas, are that it requires a minimum of 6 to 8 weeks to
get some forces assembled. So if we don't begin preparations--and I am
not saying we would have to use them, but it is of the utmost
importance that we do that; otherwise, we will lose the opportunity.
A person that Senator Brownback and I respect enormously, Henry
Kissinger, the former Secretary of State, testified before the Senate
Armed Services Committee last week. I quote him saying:
On the issue of ground forces, my view is as follows: I
have no way of judging what will ultimately be necessary.
That is a military decision. But first, it is a mistake to
preclude any category of forces and to turn the conflict into
an endurance contest.
Secondly, even if one believes that air power will
ultimately succeed, which it well may, we nevertheless should
make clear not only that we are planning to use ground
forces; we should assemble the ground forces that will be
needed. This will put a safety net under the bombing campaign
because under present circumstances, it is a question of
endurance. Thus, Milosevic and the Serbian leadership believe
that they can simply outlast us.
If they know that at the end--not even at the end, at some
stage in this process--we will insist on using ground forces,
I think it will shorten the air campaign.
That was the testimony last week of Dr. Kissinger before the Armed
Services Committee. I know of no wiser man than Henry Kissinger, a
person who has a great appreciation for history and its challenges.
Because of our failure to even plan, much less prepare ground forces,
as Dr. Kissinger, Larry Eagleburger, Brent Scowcroft, et cetera, seek
us to do, this gives rise to articles such as were in the New York
Times this morning by William Safire. William Safire, who I think is
one of the most thoughtful and informed columnists in America, states:
Congress is not only ambivalent about buying into
``Clinton's War,'' it is also of two minds about being
ambivalent.
That is because the war to make Kosovo safe for Kosovars is
a war without an entrance strategy. By its unwillingness to
enter Serbian territory to stop the killing at the start,
NATO conceded defeat. The bombing is simply intended to
coerce the Serbian leader to give up at the negotiating table
all he has won on the killing field. He won't.
He will make a deal. By urging that Russia be the broker,
Clinton knows he can do no better than compromise with
criminality. That means we are not fighting to win, but are
merely punishing to settle.
* * * Clinton has so few followers in Congress because he
is himself the world's leading follower. He steers not by the
compass but by the telltale, driven by polls that dictate
both how far he can go and how little he can get away with.
The real debate, then, is not intervention vs. isolation,
not sanctity of borders vs. self-determination of nations,
not Munich vs. Vietnam, not NATO credibility vs. America the
globocop. The central question is: Do we trust this President
to use all force necessary to establish the principle that no
nation can drive out an unwanted people?
It goes on, Mr. President, in this article to describe exactly the
deal that will be cut over time.
* * * Perhaps Britain's Tony Blair will prod Clinton to do
better, and all Serbian troops and paramilitary thugs will be
invited out of Kosovo. But the returning K.L.A will find mass
graves and will likely lash out at Serbs; after an indecent
interval, Belgrade will assert sovereignty with troops in
police uniforms.
And what will happen to the principle of no reward for
internal aggression? It will be left for resolution to our
next President, who, in another test, will have the strength
of the people's trust.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that this entire article,
along with these other documents, be printed in the Record.
There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in
the Record, as follows:
[From the New York Times, May 3, 1999]
The Price of Distrust
(By William Safire)
Washington.--Congress is not only ambivalent about buying
into ``Clinton's War,'' it is also of two minds about being
ambivalent.
That is because the war to make Kosovo safe for Kosovars is
a war without an entrance strategy. By its unwillingness to
enter Serbian territory to stop the killing at the start,
NATO conceded defeat. The bombing is simply intended to
coerce the Serbian leader to give up at the negotiating table
all he has won on the killing field. He won't.
He will make a deal. By urging that Russia be the broker,
Clinton knows he can do no better than compromise with
criminality. That means we are not fighting to win but are
merely punishing to settle.
Small wonder that no majority has formed in Congress to
adopt the McCain-Biden resolution giving the President
authority to use ``all necessary force'' to achieve a clear
victory. Few want to go out on a limb for Clinton knowing
that he is preparing to saw that limb off behind them.
Clinton has so few followers in Congress because he is
himself the world's leading follower. He steers not by the
compass but by the telltale, driven by polls that dictate
both how far he can go and how little he can get away with.
The real debate, then, is not intervention vs. isolation,
not sanctity of borders vs. self-determination of nations,
not Munich vs. Vietnam, not NATO credibility vs. America the
globocop. The central question is: Do we trust this President
to use all force necessary to establish the principle that no
nation can drive out an unwanted people?
The answer is no. The distrust is palpable. Give him the
tools and he will not finish the job.
Proof that such distrust is well founded is in the erosion
of NATO's key goal: muscular protection of refugees trusting
enough to return to Kosovo.
At first, that was to be done by ``a NATO force,'' rather
than U.N. peacekeepers. The fallback was to ``a NATO-led
force,'' including Russians. Now the formulation is ``ready
to lead,'' if anybody asks, or ``a force with NATO at its
core,'' which means Serb-favoring Russians, Ukrainians and
Argentinians, with Hungarians and Czechs to give the illusion
of ``a NATO core.''
If you were an ethnic-Albanian woman whose husband had been
massacred, sister raped, children scattered and house burned
down on orders from Belgrade--would you go back home under
such featherweight protection?
Only a fool would trust an observer group so rotten to its
``core.'' And yet that is the concession NATO has made even
before formal negotiations begin.
What can we expect next? After a few more weeks of feckless
bombing while Milosevic completes his dirty work in Kosovo,
Viktor Chernomyrdin or Jimmy Carter or somebody will
intercede to arrange a cease-fire. Film will be shot of
Serbian tanks (only 30 were hit in a month of really smart
bombing) rolling back from Kosovo as bombardment halts and
the embargo is lifted.
Sergei Rogov, the Moscow Arbatovnik, laid out the Russian
deal in yesterday's Washington Post: (1) autonomy for Kosovo
but no independence or partition; (2) Milosevic troops out
but Serbian ``border guards'' to remain in Kosovo, and (3)
peace ``enforcers'' under not NATO but U.N. and Helsinki Pact
bureaucrats. As a grand concession, NATO would be allowed to
care for refugees in Albania and Macedonia.
That, of course, would be a triumph for mass murderers
everywhere, and Clinton will insist on face-savers: war-
crimes trials for sergeants and below, a Brit and a Frenchman
in command of a NATO platoon of Pomeranian grenadiers, no
wearing of blue helmets and absolutely no reparations to
Serbia to rebuild bridges in the first year.
Perhaps Britain's Tony Blair will prod Clinton to do
better, and all Serbian troops
[[Page 8119]]
and paramilitary thugs will be invited out of Kosovo. But the
returning K.L.A. will find mass graves and will likely lash
out at Serbs; after an indecent interval Belgrade will assert
sovereignty with troops in police uniforms.
And what will happen to the principle of no reward for
internal aggression?
It will be left for resolution to our next President, who,
in another test, will have the strength of the people's
trust.
____
Dear Senator McCain: If the 21st Century is to be a
peaceful and stable time, only the steadiness and power of
the United States will make it so. That steadiness and power
is now being tested; we must not fail. If ground forces are
essential to assuring our success, then we must use them.
Sincerely,
Lawrence S. Eagleburger.
____
I strongly support Senate Joint Resolution 20. Its passage
will be a strong message of our determination to Milosevic--
who may be doubting our resolve. It will also encourage the
President to do what is necessary to prevail.
Brent Scowcroft.
Mr. McCAIN. Finally, Mr. President, a person that I know the Senator
from Kansas and I and the Senator from Illinois have enjoyed and
appreciated over many years, Margaret Thatcher, who once counseled
during the Persian Gulf war for President Bush not to ``go wobbly''--I
believe she said, ``Don't go wobbly now, George''--made a speech the
other night for ``Project for the New American Century.''
I ask unanimous consent that her statement be printed in the Record.
There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in
the Record, as follows:
Margaret Thatcher: Last September I went to Vukovar, a city
destroyed and its inhabitants butchered by the soldiers of
Slobodan Milosevic. The place still smells of death, the
windows weep, and the ruins gape. Around Srebrenica, where
neither I nor many other Westerners have gone, the bodies of
thousands of slaughtered victims still lie in unmarked
graves. In Kosovo, we can only imagine what depravities of
human wickedness, what depths of human degradation, those
endless columns of refugees have fled. Mass rape, mass
graves, death camps, historic communities wiped out by ethnic
cleansing--these are the monuments to Milosevic's triumphs.
They are also, let's remember and admit, the result of
eight long years of Western weakness. When will they ever
learn?
Appeasement has failed in the 90s, as it failed in the 30s.
Then, there were always politicians to argue that the madness
of Nazism could be contained and that a reckoning could
somehow be avoided. In our own day too there has never been a
lack of politicians and diplomats willing to collaborate with
Milosevic's Serbia. At each stage, both in the thirties and
in the nineties, the tyrant carefully laid his snares, and
naive negotiators obligingly fell into them.
For eight years I have called for Serbia to be stopped.
Even after the massacre of Srebrenica I was told that my
calls for military action were mere ``emotional nonsense,''
words which, I think, only a man could have uttered.
But there were also good reasons for taking action early.
The West could have stopped Milosevic in Slovenia or Croatia
in 1991, or in Bosnia in 1992. But instead we deprived his
opponents of the means to arm themselves, thus allowing his
aggression to prosper.
Even in 1995, when at last a combination of airstrikes and
well-armed Croat and Muslin ground forces broke the power of
the Bosnian-Serb aggressors, we intervened to halt their
advance onto Banja Luka, and so avoid anything that might
threaten Milosevic. Even then, Western political leaders
believed that the butcher of Belgrade could be a force for
stability. So here we are now, fighting a war eight years too
late, on treacherous terrain, so far without much effective
local support, with imperfect intelligence, and with war aims
that some find unclear and unpersuasive.
But with all that said--and it must be said, so that the
lessons are well and truly learned--let there be no doubt:
this is a war that must be won.
I understand the unease that many feel about the way in
which this operation began. But those who agonize over
whether what is happening in Kosovo today is really of
sufficient importance to justify our military intervention,
gravely underestimate the consequences of doing nothing.
There is always method in Milosevic's madness. He is a master
at using human tides of refugees to destabilize his neighbors
and weaken his opponents. And that we simply cannot now
allow. The surrounding countries just can't absorb two
million Albanian refugees without provoking a new spiral of
violent disintegration, possibly involving NATO members.
But the over-riding justification for military action is
quite simply the nature of the enemy we face. We are not
dealing with some minor thug whose local brutalities may
offend our sensibilities from time to time. Milosevic's
regime and the genocidal ideology that sustains it represent
something altogether different--a truly monstrous evil; one
which cannot with safety be merely checked or contained; one
which must be totally defeated and be seen by the Serbs
themselves to be defeated.
When that has been done, we need to learn the lessons of
what has happened and of the warnings that were given but
ignored. But this is not the time. There has already been too
much media speculation about targets and tactics, and some
shameful and demoralizing commentary which can only help the
enemy. So I shall say nothing of detailed tactics here
tonight.
But two things more I must say.
First, about our fundamental aims. It would be both cruel
and stupid to expect the Albanian Kosovans now to return to
live under any form of Serbian rule. Kosovo must be given
independence, initially under international protection. And
there must be no partition, a plan that predictable siren
voices are already advancing. Partition would only serve to
reward violence and ethnic cleansing. It would be to concede
defeat. And I am unmoved by Serb pleas to retain their grasp
on most of Kosovo because it contains their holy places.
Coming from those who systematically leveled Catholic
churches and Muslim mosques wherever they went, such an
argument is cynical almost to the point of blasphemy.
Second, about the general conduct of the war. There are, in
the end, no humanitarian wars. War is serious and it is
deadly. In wars risk is inevitable and casualties, including
alas civilian casualties, are to be expected. Trying to fight
a war with one hand tied behind your back is the way to lose
it. We always regret the loss of the lives. But we should
have no doubt that it is not our troops or pilots, but the
men of evil, who bear the guilt.
The goal of war is victory. And the only victory worth
having now is one that prevents Serbia ever again having the
means to attack its neighbors and terrorize its non-Serb
inhabitants. That will require the destruction of Serbia's
political will, the destruction of its war machine and all
the infrastructure on which these depend. We must be prepared
to cope with all the changing demands of war--including, if
that is what is required, the deployment of ground troops.
And we must expect a long haul until the job is done.
Mr. McCAIN. Those are Margaret Thatcher's remarks. They were
delivered at the Institute for Free Enterprise on the 20th anniversary
of her becoming Great Britain's Prime Minister.
I hope that all of my colleagues before voting tomorrow will read her
remarks--Brent Scowcroft, Lawrence Eagleburger, and virtually every
person who has held a position of authority on national security
matters, both Republican and Democrat, for more than two decades.
Mr. President, the hour is late. I will move to the closing remarks
in just a moment.
We have had a good debate today. I wish it had been longer. I think
it should go on for several more days. But it won't.
Tomorrow we will have a tabling motion which may be one of the more
bizarre scenarios that I have seen in my 13 years here in the Senate,
with an administration lobbying feverishly to defeat a resolution which
gives it more authority. I have never seen that before in my years in
the Senate.
I believe we could have carried this resolution if the administration
had supported it. I can only conclude that the reason for it is that
the President of the United States is more interested in his own
Presidency than the institution of the Presidency. Mr. President, that
is indeed a shame.
____________________
THE VERY BAD DEBT BOXSCORE
Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, at the close of business, Friday, April 30,
1999, the federal debt stood at $5,585,839,850,171.61 (Five trillion,
five hundred eighty-five billion, eight hundred thirty-nine million,
eight hundred fifty thousand, one hundred seventy-one dollars and
sixty-one cents).
One year ago, April 30, 1998, the federal debt stood at
$5,499,895,000,000 (Five trillion, four hundred ninety-nine billion,
eight hundred ninety-five million).
Fifteen years ago, April 30, 1984, the federal debt stood at
$1,486,116,000,000 (One trillion, four hundred eighty-six billion, one
hundred sixteen million).
Twenty-five years ago, April 30, 1974, the federal debt stood at
$472,852,000,000 (Four hundred seventy-two billion, eight hundred
fifty-two million) which
[[Page 8120]]
reflects a debt increase of more than $5 trillion--
$5,112,987,850,171.61 (Five trillion, one hundred twelve billion, nine
hundred eighty-seven million, eight hundred fifty thousand, one hundred
seventy-one dollars and sixty-one cents) during the past 25 years.
____________________
GENERAL HAWLEY'S COMMENTS ON READINESS
Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, last week the Air Force General in charge
of the Air Combat Command provided some valuable observations for the
Senate to consider as we contemplate funding another protracted
military operation.
General Richard Hawley observed that the current build up in Europe
has weakened our ability to meet our other global commitments. General
Hawley added that the air operation in Kosovo would require a
reconstitution period of up to five months.
The General will be retiring in June, and has spoken out on how this
war in Kosovo will weaken the readiness of the Air Force. I hope
Senators will consider his concerns, and I ask unanimous consent that
the General's remarks on military readiness reported in the April 30th
Washington Post be printed in the Record.
There being no objection, the remarks were ordered to be printed in
the Record, as follows:
[From the Washington Post, Apr. 30, 1999]
General Says U.S. Readiness Is Ailing
(By Bradley Graham)
The general who oversees U.S. combat aircraft said
yesterday the Air Force has been sorely strained by the
Kosovo conflict and would be hard-pressed to handle a second
war in the Middle East or Korea.
Gen. Richard Hawley, who heads the Air Combat Command, told
reporters that five weeks of bombing Yugoslavia have left
U.S. munition stocks critically short, not just of air-
launched cruise missiles as previously reported, but also of
another precision weapon, the Joint Direct Attack Munition
(JDAM) dropped by B-2 bombers. So low is the inventory of the
new satellite-guided weapons, Hawley said, that as the
bombing campaign accelerates, the Air Force risks exhausting
its prewar supply of more than 900 JDAMs before the next
scheduled delivery in May.
``It's going to be really touch-and-go as to whether we'll
go Winchester on JDAMs,'' the four-star general said, using a
pilot's term for running out of bullets.
On a day the Pentagon announced deployment of an additional
10 giant B-52 bombers to NATO's air battle, Hawley said the
continuing buildup of U.S. aircraft means more air crew
shortages in the United States. And because the Air Force
tends to send its most experienced crews, Hawley said, the
experience level of units left behind also is falling. With
NATO's latest request for another 300 U.S. aircraft--on top
of 600 already committed--Hawley said the readiness rating of
the remaining fleet will drop quickly and significantly.
His grim assessment underscored questions about the U.S.
military's ability to manage a conflict such as the assault
on Yugoslavia after reducing and reshaping forces since the
Cold War. U.S. military strategy no longer calls for battling
another superpower, but it does require the Pentagon to be
prepared to fight two major regional wars at about the same
time.
As the number of U.S. planes involved in the conflict over
Kosovo approaches the level of a major regional war, the
operation is exposing weaknesses in the availability and
structure of Air Force as well as Army units, engendering
fresh doubts about the military's overall preparedness for
the world it now confronts. If another military crisis were
to erupt in the Middle East or Asia, Hawley said
reinforcements are still available, but he added: ``I'd be
hard-pressed to give them everything that they would probably
ask for. There would be some compromises made.''
The Army's ability to respond nimbly to foreign hot spots
also has been put in question by the month it has taken to
deploy two dozen AH-64A Apache helicopters to Albania. While
Army officials insist the helicopter taskforce moved faster
than any other country could have managed, the experience
appeared to highlight a gap between the Pentagon's talk about
becoming a more expeditionary force and the reality of
deploying soldiers.
Massing forces for a ground invasion of Yugoslavia,
officials said, would require two or three months. Because
U.S. military planners never figured on fighting a ground war
in Europe following the Soviet Union's demise, little Army
heavy equipment is prepositioned near the Balkans. Nor are
there Army units that would seem especially designed for the
job of getting to the Balkans quickly with enough firepower
and armor to attack dug-in Yugoslav forces over mountainous
terrain.
``What we need is something between our light and heavy
forces, that can get somewhere fast but with more punch,'' a
senior Army official said.
Yugoslav forces have shown themselves more of a match for
U.S. and allied air power than NATO commanders had
anticipated. The Serb-led Yugoslav army has adopted a duck-
and-hide strategy, husbanding air defense radars and
squirreling away tanks, confounding NATO's attempts to gain
the freedom for low-level attacks to whittle down field
units. Yugoslav units also have shown considerable
resourcefulness, reconstituting damaged communication links
and finding alternative routes around destroyed bridges,
roads and rail links.
``They've employed a rope-a-dope strategy,'' said Barry
Posen, a political science professor at the Massachusetts
Institute of Technology. ``Conserve assets, hang back, take
the punches and hope over time that NATO makes some kind of
mistake that can be exploited.''
Hawley disputed suggestions that the assault on Yugoslavia
has represented an air power failure, saying the full
potential of airstrikes has been constrained by political
limits on targeting.
``In our Air Force doctrine, air power works best when it
is used decisively,'' the general said. ``Clearly, because of
the constraints, we haven't been able to see that at this
point.''
NATO's decision not to employ ground forces, he added, also
has served to undercut the air campaign. He noted that combat
planes such as the A-10 Warthog tank killer often rely on
forward ground controllers to call in strikes.
``When you don't have that synergy, things take longer and
they're harder, and that's what you're seeing in this
conflict,'' the general said.
At the same time, Hawley, who is due to retire in June,
insisted the course of the battle so far has not prompted any
rethinking about U.S. military doctrine or tactics, nor has
it caused any second thoughts about plans for the costly
development of two new fighter jets, the F-22 and Joint
Strike Fighter. Despite the apparent success U.S. planes have
demonstrated in overcoming Yugoslavia's air defense network,
Hawley said the next generation of warplanes is necessary
because future adversaries would be equipped with more
advanced anti-aircraft missiles and combat aircraft than the
Yugoslavs.
If the air operation has highlighted any weaknesses in U.S.
combat strength, Hawley said, it has been in what he termed a
desperate shortage of aircraft for intelligence-gathering,
radar suppression and search-and-rescue missions. While
additional planes and unmanned aircraft to meet this
shortfall are on order or under development, Hawley said it
will take ``a long time'' to field them.
In the meantime, he argued, the United States must start
reducing overseas military commitments. He suggested some
foreign operations have been allowed to go on too long,
noting that the U.S. military presence in Korea has lasted
more than 50 years, and U.S. warplanes have remained
stationed in Saudi Arabia and Turkey, flying patrols over
Iraq, for more than eight years.
``I would argue we cannot continue to accumulate
contingencies,'' he said.'' At some point you've got to
figure out how to get out of something.''
The Air Force blames a four-fold jump in overseas
operations this decade, coming after years of budget cuts and
troop reductions, for contributing to an erosion of military
morale, equipment and training. The Air Force has tried
various fixes in recent years to stanch an exodus of pilots
and other airmen in some critical specialties.
It has boosted bonuses, cut back on time-consuming training
exercises and tried to limit deployment periods. It also has
requested and received hundreds of millions of dollars in
extra funds for spare parts.
Additionally, it announced plans last August to reorganize
more than 2,000 warplanes and support aircraft into 10
``expeditionary'' groups that would rotate responsibility for
deployments to such longstanding trouble zones as Iraq and
Bosnia.
But Hawley's remarks suggested that the growing scale and
uncertain duration of the air operation against Yugoslavia
threaten to undo whatever progress the Air Force has made in
shoring up readiness. Whenever the airstrikes end, he said,
the Air Force will require ``a reconstitution period'' to put
many of its units back in order.
``We are going to be in desperate need, in my command, of a
significant retrenchment in commitments for a significant
period of time,'' he said. ``I think we have a real problem
facing us three, four, five months down the road in the
readiness of the stateside units.''
____________________
ON NATO INTERVENTION IN KOSOVO
Mr. MOYNIHAN. Mr. President, a month ago, April 7, as the war in
Yugoslavia began to assume its present form, President Clinton spoke to
the U.S. Institute for Peace. It was an important statement about the
nature of conflict in the years to come. ``Clearly,'' he stated, ``our
first challenge is
[[Page 8121]]
to build a more peaceful world, one that will apparently be dominated
by ethnic and religious conflicts we once thought of primitive, but
which Senator Moynihan, for example, has referred to now as post-
modern.'' I am scarcely alone in this; it has become, I believe, a
widely held view. A recent article in The Wall Street Journal began by
asking: ``Does Kosovo represent the future or the past.'' The
distinguished Dean of the John F. Kennedy School had an emphatic
answer.
. . . Joseph Nye, a Clinton Pentagon alumnus, forecasts a
brave new world dominated by ethnic conflicts. There are
thousands of ethnic groups that could plausibly argue they
deserve independence, he estimates, making it imperative for
the U.S. to decide where it should intervene. ``There's
potential for enormous violence,'' he says.
In this spirit, just yesterday, The Times spoke of ``The Logic of
Kosovo.''
With the cold war over, the country needs to devise a new
calculus for determining when its security is threatened and
the use of force is warranted. Kosovo is a test case. If the
United States and its NATO allies are prepared to let a
tyrant in the Balkans slaughter his countrymen and overrun
his neighbors with hundreds of thousands of refugees, other
combustible regions of Europe may face similar upheavals.
Almost a decade ago the eminent scientist E. O. Wilson offered a
perspective from the field of sociobiology. Once ``the overwhelmingly
suppressive force of supranational ideology was lifted,'' ethnicity
would strike. ``It was the unintended experiment in the natural science
mode: cancel one factor at a time, and see what happens.'' For ``coiled
and ready ethnicity is to be expected from a consideration of
biological evolutionary theory.''
Throw in television and the like, and surely we are in a new
situation. Just as surely, it is time to think anew.
The first matter has to do with the number of such potential
conflicts. Here it is perhaps the case that the United States bears a
special responsibility. For it is we, in the person of President
Woodrow Wilson, and the setting of the Versailles Peace Conference who
brought to world politics the term ``self-determination.'' It is not
sufficiently known that Wilson's Secretary of State, Robert Lansing, of
Jefferson County, New York, had the greatest foreboding. Hence this
entry in his diary written in Paris on December 30, 1918.
``Self-Determination'' and the Dangers
December 30, 1918
The more I think about the President's declaration as to
the right of ``self-determination'', the more convinced I am
of the danger of putting such ideas into the minds of certain
races. It is bound to be the basis of impossible demands on
the Peace Congress, and create trouble in many lands . . . .
The phrase is simply loaded with dynamite. It will raise
hopes which can never be realized. It will, I fear, cost
thousands of lives. In the end it is bound to be discredited,
to be called the dream of an idealist who failed to realize
the danger until too late to check those who attempt to put
the principle into force. What a calamity that the phrase was
ever uttered! What misery it will cause! Think of the
feelings of the author when he counts the dead who dies
because he coined a phrase! A man, who is a leader of public
thought, should beware of intemperate or undigested
declarations. He is responsible for the consequences.
There have to be limits, and it should be a task of American
statecraft to seek to define them. It is not that 185 members of the
United Nations are enough. There is room for more. But surely there
needs to be a limit to the horrors we have witnessed in the Balkans in
this decade, and in Kosovo this past month. From the Caucuses to the
Punjab, from Palestine to the Pyrenees, violence beckons. It is not
difficult to get started. At least one American diplomat holds a direct
view of the origin of the present horror. I cannot speak for every
detail of his account, but some are well known, and his view is not, to
my knowledge, contested.
The current phase of the Kosovo crisis can be traced back
to 1996, when financial collapse in Albania (small investors
lost their meager life savings in a classic Ponzi scheme
condoned by the then government) led to political and social
chaos. President Berisha (a Geg from the misnamed Democratic
Party) was forced out amidst massive rioting in which the
army disappeared as its armories were emptied. Arms found
their way into the armed gangs and eventually to an incipient
Kosovo Albanian guerrilla movement that called itself the
Kosovo Liberation Army. The new government of Socialist Fatos
Nan (a Southerner, a Tosk, and a former Communist) was unable
to establish effective control over the north and Berisha
made a conspicuous point of not only supporting the KLA, but
actually turning his personal property in the north over to
the KLA as a training base. Supporting fellow Gegs apparently
makes for good politics among the northerners.
The KLA's strategy was very simple: Target Serbian
policemen and thus provoke the inevitable brutal Serb
retaliation against Kosovo Albanian civilians, all in the
hopes of bringing NATO into the conflict. They have succeeded
brilliantly in this goal, but have not proved to be much a
fighting force themselves.
These are not arguments new to the Senate. A year ago, April 30,
1998, my eminent colleague John W. Warner and I offered cautionary
amendments concerning NATO expansion eastward. I went first with a
proposal that new NATO members should first belong to the European
Union. I received, as I recall, 17 votes. My colleague then proposed to
postpone any further enlargement of NATO for a period of at least three
years. That proposal, again if I recall, received 41 votes. We felt, on
the whole, somewhat lonely. Now, however, we learn that Defense
Secretary William Perry and his top arms-control aide, Ashton Carter,
as related by Thomas L. Friedman in The Times of March 16, 1999.
Mr. Perry and Mr. Carter reveal that when they were running
the Pentagon they argued to Mr. Clinton that NATO expansion
``should be deferred until later in the decade.'' Mr. Perry
details how he insisted at a top-level meeting with the
President, on December 21, 1994, that ``early expansion was a
mistake,'' because it would provoke ``distrust'' in Russia
and undermine cooperation on arms control and other issues,
and because ``prematurely adding untried militaries'' at a
time when NATO itself was reassessing its role would not be
helpful.
The Secretary of Defense lost the argument; in Friedman's view
domestic politics overrode strategic concerns. But who won? The various
pronouncements that issued from the recent NATO summit come close to a
telephone directory of prospective new NATO members. Before we get
carried away, might we ask just how many of them have the kind of
internal ethnic tension so easily turned on? Which will be invaded by
neighbors siding with the insurgents? Must NATO then go to war in the
Caucuses?
The second matter of which I would speak is that of international
law. The United States and its NATO allies have gone to war, put their
men and women in harm's way for the clearest of humanitarian purposes.
They have even so attacked a sovereign state in what would seem a clear
avoidance of the terms of the U.N. Charter, specifically Article 2(4).
The State Department has issued no statement as to the legality of our
actions. An undated internal State Department document cites Security
Council Resolution 1199 affirming that the situation in Kosovo
constitutes a threat to the peace in the region, and demanding that the
parties cease hostilities and maintain peace in Kosovo. The Department
paper concludes: ``FRY actions in Kosovo cannot be deemed an internal
matter, as the Council has condemned Serbian action in Kosovo as a
threat to regional peace and security.''
A valid point. But of course the point is weakened, at very least, by
the fact of our not having gone back to the Security Council to get
authorization to act as we have done. We have not done this, of course,
because the Russians and/or the Chinese would block any such
resolution. Even so, it remains the case that the present state of
international law is in significant ways a limitation on our freedom to
pursue humanitarian purposes. Again, a matter that calls for attention,
indeed, demands attention.
In sum, limits and law.
____________________
CLINTON HIGH SCHOOL'S ATTACHE SHOW CHOIR
Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, today I want to honor the premiere high
school show choir in the Nation--Mississippi's own Clinton High
School's Attache. Forty-two singers/dancers, sixteen instrumentalists,
and seventeen crew members make up the outstanding group of young
adults from a high
[[Page 8122]]
school with an enrollment of 11 hundred.
For the past decade, the members of Attache have proven to be
goodwill ambassadors for their high school, their community, and the
great State of Mississippi. They have traveled to competitions all
across America--Indiana, Illinois, Alabama, Florida, New York, and
California. During this time, Attache has not only competed in, but won
every major show choir competition in the United States. They are the
only high school show choir to ever win the grand championship in each
venue of the Showstopper's International Invitational Competitions--an
accomplishment of which Mississippians should truly be proud. While
competing with other American high school students, they have
demonstrated to the nation Mississippi's culture and excellence in the
arts.
Mr. President, I want to point out that all of these accomplishments
have been made while balancing practice and performance schedules with
academics. These students serve as role models for the Nation. They
demonstrate the tremendous achievements which are possible through
dedication and hard work.
Since 1992, David and Mary Fehr have led Attache. David serves as the
group's director. He arranges all numbers, directs the vocals and
serves as the pianist during the show choir's performances. Mary
designs the sets and costumes for the performers and personally sews
the girls' outfits. This husband and wife team illustrates the value of
teamwork. Discipline, self-reliance, and hard work are each of their
charges. They are the epitome of what a public school educator should
be. The Clinton Public Schools are blessed to have them on board.
This outstanding group of young adults and their dedicated leaders
are shining examples of what positive energy can produce. It is
refreshing to know that there are still teenagers out there with
dedication and determination. Being a part of this show choir requires
long hours and hard-work. Clinton and the whole state of Mississippi
should be truly proud of the accomplishments of Attache.
____________________
JOHN HUME'S 30 OUTSTANDING YEARS IN NORTHERN IRELAND
Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, John Hume's career is surely one of the
most distinguished in Irish history, or in any nation's history, and
all of us in America who care about Ireland are greatly in his debt.
Last week, this distinguished leader of the Social Democratic and
Labour Party celebrated 30 years of public service. His accomplishments
are many, as was recognized last year when he shared the Nobel Peace
Prize for extraordinary leadership in producing the Good Friday Peace
Agreement. One detail about that prize speaks volumes about John Hume--
he donated the entire cash prize to charities in Northern Ireland.
I welcome this opportunity to extend my warmest congratulations to
John Hume on his 30 years of service to peace and the people of
Northern Ireland, and I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the
Record an article from the Irish Times of April 29 on the celebration
in Belfast last week of his brilliant service.
There being no objection; the article was ordered to be printed in
the Record, as follows:
[From The Irish Times, Apr. 29, 1999]
Hume's 30-year Career Honoured
(By Gerry Moriarty)
The SDLP faithful turned out in strength in Belfast last
night to celebrate the 30-year political career of party
leader and Nobel laureate Mr. John Hume. The Europa Hotel was
the venue for what was described as a gala ``bash''.
The emphasis was on ``nostalgia and crack'' rather than the
often depressing stuff of Northern politics as colleagues and
friends of Mr. Hume gathered to reminisce on his career and
the SDLP's 29 year history.
Founder members of the party were present, including Mr.
Ivan Cooper, Fine Gael TD Mr. Austin Currie and Mr. Paddy
O'Hanlon. Apologies were received from Mr. Paddy Devlin and
former SDLP leader Lord Fitt.
More than 400 people attended the reception and dinner
including the Minister for Social, Community and Family
Affairs, Mr. Ahern, and the Minister of State for Foreign
Affairs, Ms. Liz O'Donnell.
Ms. O'Donnell praised Mr. Hume's political ingenuity in
devising a political plan that brought Sinn Fein into the
political equation and ultimately led to the Belfast
Agreement. She said Mr. Hume had won respect right across the
``political board''. His analysis had proved correct and she
was delighted to be attending the gala in his honour.
Music was supplied by the McCafferty singers from Derry and
Belfast vocalist Brian Kennedy.
Ms. Gerry Cosgrove, the SDLP general secretary, said the
party wanted to celebrate and honour Mr. Hume's achievements.
``The 30-year career of John Hume has been characterised by
courage, conviction and vision,'' she said.
``He has been instrumental in perhaps every positive
development in the long and difficult history of the
Troubles, and is widely regarded as the principal architect
of the Good Friday agreement,'' she said. ``This function was
to say thank you for that courage and vision.''
The Northern Secretary, Dr. Mo Mowlam, apologised for being
unable to attend. In a message she praised Mr. Hume for his
singleminded determination in pursuing the ``goal of peace''.
Among the speakers were Mr. Cooper, the SDLP deputy leader
and Deputy First Minister, Mr. Seamus Mallon, and Mr. Ahern.
Mr. Hume was accompanied by his wife, Pat.
____________________
MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT
A message from the President of the United States was communicated to
the Senate by Mr. Williams, one of his secretaries.
EXECUTIVE MESSAGE REFERRED
As in executive session the Presiding Officer laid before the Senate
a message from the President of the United States submitting a
nomination which was referred to the Committee on the Judiciary.
(The nomination received today is printed at the end of the Senate
proceedings.)
____________________
REPORT ON EMERGENCY IN SUDAN--MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT--PM 21
The PRESIDING OFFICER laid before the Senate the following message
from the President of the United States, together with an accompanying
report; which was referred to the Committee on Banking, Housing, and
Urban Affairs.
To the Congress of the United States:
As required by section 401(c) of the National Emergencies Act, 50
U.S.C. 1641(c) and section 204(c) of the International Emergency
Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), 50 U.S.C. 1703(c), I transmit herewith a
6-month periodic report on the national emergency with respect to Sudan
that was declared in Executive Order 13067 of November 3, 1997.
William J. Clinton.
The White House, May 3, 1999.
____________________
REPORT ON BLOCKING PROPERTY AND PROHIBITING TRADE INVOLVING
YUGOSLAVIA--MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT--PM 22
The PRESIDING OFFICER laid before the Senate the following message
from the President of the United States, together with an accompanying
report; which was referred to the Committee on Banking, Housing, and
Urban Affairs.
To the Congress of the United States:
In response to the brutal ethnic cleansing campaign in Kosovo carried
out by the military, police, and paramilitary forces of the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), the NATO allies have
agreed to buttress NATO's military actions by tightening economic
sanctions against the Milosevic regime. Pursuant to section 204(b) of
the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) (50 U.S.C.
1703(b), I hereby report to the Congress that, in order to implement
the measures called for by NATO, I have exercised my statutory
authority to take additional steps with respect to the continuing human
rights and humanitarian crisis in Kosovo and the national emergency
described and declared in Executive Order 13088 of June 9, 1998.
Pursuant to this authority, I have issued a new Executive order that:
--expands the assets freeze previously imposed on the assets of
[[Page 8123]]
the Governments of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and
Montenegro), the Republic of Serbia, and the Republic of Montenegro
subject to U.S. jurisdiction, by removing the exemption in
Executive Order 13088 for financial transactions by United States
persons conducted exclusively through the domestic banking system
within the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)
or using bank notes or barter;
--prohibits exports or reexports, directly or indirectly, from the
United States or by a United States person, wherever located, of
goods, software, technology, or services to the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) or the Governments of the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), the
Republic of Serbia, or the Republic of Montenegro;
--prohibits imports, directly or indirectly, into the United States
of goods, software, technology, or services from the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) or owned or
controlled by the Governments of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
(Serbia and Montenegro), the Republic of Serbia, or the Republic of
Montenegro;
--prohibits any transaction or dealing, including approving,
financing, or facilitating, by a United States person, wherever
located, related to trade with or to the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) or the Governments of the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), the
Republic of Serbia, or the Republic of Montenegro.
The trade-related prohibitions apply to any goods (including
petroleum and petroleum products), software, technology (including
technical data), or services, except to the extent excluded by section
203(b) of IEEPA (50 U.S.C. 1702(b)).
The ban on new investment by United States persons in the territory
of Serbia--imposed by Executive Order 13088--continues in effect.
The Executive order provides that the Secretary of the Treasury, in
consultation with the Secretary of State, shall give special
consideration to the circumstances of the Government of the Republic of
Montenegro. As with Executive Order 13088, an exemption from the new
sanctions has been granted to Montenegro. In implementing this order,
special consideration is also to be given to the humanitarian needs of
refugees from Kosovo and other civilians within the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro).
In keeping with my Administration's new policy to exempt commercial
sales of food and medicine from sanctions regimes, the Executive order
directs the Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the
Secretary of State, to authorize commercial sales of agricultural
commodities and products, medicine, and medical equipment for civilian
end use in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro).
Such sales are to be subject to appropriate safeguards to prevent
diversion to military, paramilitary, or political use by the
Governments of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and
Montenegro), the Republic of Serbia, or the Republic of Montenegro),
the Republic of Serbia, or the Republic of Montenegro.
William J. Clinton.
The White House, April 30, 1999.
____________________
REPORT ON NARCOTICS TRAFFICKERS IN COLOMBIA--MESSAGE FROM THE
PRESIDENT--PM 23
The PRESIDING OFFICER laid before the Senate the following message
from the President of the United States, together with an accompanying
report; which was referred to the Committee on Banking, Housing, and
Urban Affairs.
To the Congress of the United States:
As required by section 401(c) of the National Emergencies Act, 50
U.S.C. 1641(c), and section 204(c) of the International Emergency
Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), 50 U.S.C. 1703(c), I transmit herewith a
6-month periodic report on the national emergency with respect to
significant narcotics traffickers centered in Colombia that was
declared in Executive Order 12978 of October 21, 1995.
William J. Clinton.
The White House, May 3, 1999.
____________________
EXECUTIVE AND OTHER COMMUNICATIONS
The following communications were laid before the Senate, together
with accompanying papers, reports, and documents, which were referred
as indicated:
EC-2792. A communication from the Secretary of Agriculture,
transmitting, a draft of proposed legislation entitled
``Department of Agriculture Livestock Price Reporting Act of
1999''; to the Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and
Forestry.
EC-2793. A communication from the Administrator, Farm
Service Agency, Farm and Foreign Agricultural Services,
Department of Agriculture, transmitting, pursuant to law, the
report of a rule relative to 1998 Marketing Quotas and Price
Support Levels for various types of tobacco (RIN0560-AF2066),
received April 13, 1999; to the Committee on Agriculture,
Nutrition, and Forestry.
EC-2794. A communication from the Administrator, Farm
Service Agency, Farm and Foreign Agricultural Services,
Department of Agriculture, transmitting, pursuant to law, the
report of a rule entitled ``Dairy Indemnity Payment Program''
(RIN0560-AF66), received April 2, 1999; to the Committee on
Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry.
EC-2795. A communication from the Administrator, Farm
Service Agency, Farm and Foreign Agricultural Services,
Department of Agriculture, transmitting, pursuant to law, the
report of two rules entitled ``End-Use Certificate Program''
(RIN0560-AF64) and ``Livestock Assistance Program'' (RIN0560-
AF58), received April 2, 1999; to the Committee on
Agriculture, Nutrition and Forestry.
EC-2796. A communication from the Administrator, Farm
Service Agency, Farm and Foreign Agricultural Services,
Department of Agriculture, transmitting, pursuant to law, the
report of a rule entitled ``Noninsured Crop Disaster
Assistance Program'' (RIN0560-AF46), received April 13, 1999;
to the Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry.
EC-2797. A communication from the Administrator, Farm
Service Agency, Farm and Foreign Agricultural Services,
Department of Agriculture, transmitting, pursuant to law, the
report of a rule entitled ``Suspension of Collection of
Recapture Amount for Borrowers with Certain Shared
Appreciation Agreements'' (RIN0560-AF80), received April 27,
1999; to the Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and
Forestry.
EC-2798. A communication from the Administrator,
Agricultural Marketing Service, Department of Agriculture,
transmitting, pursuant to law, the report of a rule entitled
``Milk in the New England and Other Marketing Areas; Decision
on Proposed Amendments to Marketing Agreements and to Orders-
DA-97-12'' (RIN0581-AB49), received April 2, 1999; to the
Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry.
EC-2799. A communication from the Administrator,
Agricultural Marketing Service, Marketing and Regulatory
Programs, Department of Agriculture, transmitting, pursuant
to law, the report of a rule entitled ``Almonds Grown in
California; Revision of Reporting Requirements'' (Docket No.
FV99-981-1-FR), received April 22, 1999; to the Committee on
Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry.
EC-2800. A communication from the Administrator,
Agricultural Marketing Service, Marketing and Regulatory
Programs, Department of Agriculture, transmitting, pursuant
to law, the report of a rule entitled ``Nectarines and
Peaches Grown in California; Revision of Handling
Requirements for Fresh Nectarines and Peaches'' (Docket No.
FV-99-916-2-FR), received April 22, 1999; to the Committee on
Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry.
EC-2801. A communication from the Administrator,
Agricultural Marketing Service, Marketing and Regulatory
Programs, Department of Agriculture, transmitting, pursuant
to law, the report of a rule entitled ``Olives Grown in
California; Increased Assessment Rate'' (Docket No. FV99-932-
1-FR), received April 2, 1999; to the Committee on
Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry.
EC-2802. A communication from the Administrator,
Agricultural Marketing Service, Marketing and Regulatory
Programs, Department of Agriculture, transmitting, pursuant
to law, the report of a rule entitled ``Oranges, Grapefruit,
Tangerines and Tangelos Grown in Florida and Imported
Grapefruit; Relaxation of the Minimum Size Requirement for
Red Seedless Grapefruit'' (Docket No. FV99-905-1-FIR),
received April 2, 1999; to the Committee on Agriculture,
Nutrition, and Forestry.
EC-2803. A communication from the Inspector General,
Department of Agriculture, transmitting, the report of an
audit of the
[[Page 8124]]
settlements of complaints of discrimination; to the Committee
on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry.
EC-2804. A communication from the Administrator, Grain
Inspection, Packers and Stockyards Administration, Department
of Agriculture, transmitting, pursuant to law, the report of
a rule entitled ``7 CFR Part 801, Official Testing Service
for Corn Oil, Protein and Starch'' (RIN0580-AA62), received
April 12, 1999; to the Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition,
and Forestry.
EC-2805. A communication from the Congressional Review
Coordinator, Animal and Plant Health Inspection Services,
Department of Agriculture, transmitting, pursuant to law, the
report of a rule entitled ``Karnal Bunt; Reclassification of
Regulated Areas'' (RIN0579-AA83), received April 29, 1999; to
the Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry.
EC-2806. A communication from the Administrator, Food and
Consumer Service, Department of Agriculture, Transmitting,
pursuant to law, the report of a rule entitled ``WIC/Food
Stamp Program (FSP) Vendor Disqualifications'' (RIN0584-
AC50), received April 1, 1999; to the Committee on
Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry.
EC-2807. A communication from the Under Secretary, Rural
Development, Department of Agriculture, transmitting,
pursuant to law, the report of a entitled ``Processing
Requests for Farm Labor Housing (LH) Loans and Grants''
(RIN0575-AC19), received April 30, 1999; to the Committee on
Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry.
EC-2808. A communication from the Director, Office of
Regulatory Management and Information, Environmental
Protection Agency, transmitting, pursuant to law, the report
of six rules relative to the Small Business Regulatory
Enforcement and Fairness Act of 1996, received April 9, 1999;
to the Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry.
EC-2809. A communication from the Director, Office of
Regulatory Management and Information, Environmental
Protection Agency, transmitting, pursuant to law, the report
of three rules relative to the Small Business Regulatory
Enforcement and Fairness Act of 1996, received April 12,
1999; to the Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and
Forestry.
EC-2810. A communication from the Director, Office of
Regulatory Management and Information, Environmental
Protection Agency, transmitting, pursuant to law, the report
of three rules relative to the Small Business Regulatory
Enforcement and Fairness Act of 1996, received April 14,
1999; to the Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and
Forestry.
EC-2811. A communication from the Director, Office of
Regulatory Management and Information, Environmental
Protection Agency, transmitting, pursuant to law, the report
of three rules relative to the Small Business Regulatory
Enforcement and Fairness Act of 1996, received March 31,
1999; to the Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and
Forestry.
EC-2812. A communication from the Director, Office of
Regulatory Management and Information, Environmental
Protection Agency, transmitting, pursuant to law, the report
of two rules relative to the Small Business Regulatory
Enforcement and Fairness Act of 1996, received April 16,
1999; to the Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and
Forestry.
EC-2813. A communication from the Director, Office of
Regulatory Management and Information, Environmental
Protection Agency, transmitting, pursuant to law, the report
of three rules and the withdrawal of a rule relative to the
Small Business Regulatory Enforcement and Fairness Act of
1996, received April 22, 1999; to the Committee on
Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry.
EC-2814. A communication from the Director, Office of
Government Relations, Smithsonian Institution, transmitting,
pursuant to law, a report entitled ``Annual Proceedings of
the One Hundred and Seventh Continental Congress'' of the
National Society of the Daughters of the American Revolution;
to the Committee on Rules and Administration.
EC-2815. A communication from the Director, Office of
Regulatory Management and Information, Office of Policy,
Planning and Evaluation, Environmental Protection Agency,
transmitting, pursuant to law, the report of a rule entitled
``Trichoderma Harzianum KRL-AG2 (ATCC #20947) or Strain T-22;
Revision of Exemption from the Requirement of a Tolerence''
(RIN2070-AB78), received on April 19, 1999; to the Committee
on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry.
EC-2816. A communication from the Director, Office of
Regulatory Management and Information, Office of Policy,
Planning and Evaluation, Environmental Protection Agency,
transmitting, pursuant to law, the report of a rule entitled
``Beauveria bassiana (ATC #74949); Exemption from the
Requirement of a Tolerence'' (RIN2070-AB78), received on
April 19, 1999; to the Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition,
and Forestry.
EC-2817. A communication from the Director, Office of
Regulatory Management and Information, Office of Policy,
Planning and Evaluation, Environmental Protection Agency,
transmitting, pursuant to law, the report of a rule entitled
``Clopyralid; extension of Tolerance for Emergency
Exemptions'' (RIN2070-AB78), received on April 6, 1999; to
the Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry.
EC-2818. A communication from the Director, Committee for
Purchase From People Who Are Blind or Severely Disabled,
transmitting, pursuant to law, the report of a rule relative
to additions to the procurement list, received April 26,
1999; to the Committee on Governmental Affairs.
EC-2819. A communication from the Director, Committee for
Purchase From People Who Are Blind or Severely Disabled,
transmitting, pursuant to law, the report of a rule relative
to additions and deletions to the procurement list, received
April 30, 1999; to the Committee on Governmental Affairs.
EC-2820. A communication from the Auditor, District of
Columbia transmitting, pursuant to law, a report entitled
``Evaluation of the Department of Public Works' Monitoring
and Oversight of the Ticket Processing and Delinquent Ticket
Debt Collection Contracts''; to the Committee on Governmental
Affairs.
EC-2821. A communication from the Independent Counsel
transmitting, pursuant to law, a report relative to the
investigations and prosecutions of former Secretary of
Agriculture Espy; to the Committee on Governmental Affairs.
EC-2822. A communication from the Director Designee,
Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service transmitting a
report relative to the Inspector General Act; to the
Committee on Governmental Affairs.
____________________
PETITIONS AND MEMORIALS
The following petitions and memorials were laid before the Senate and
were referred or ordered to lie on the table as indicated:
POM-70. A resolution adopted by the Senate of the
Legislature of the State of New Hampshire; to the Committee
on Energy and Natural Resources.
Senate Resolution No. 5
Whereas, in 1993, Congress passed legislation authorizing
the building of a national World War II Memorial in
Washington, D.C., or its immediate environs; and
Whereas, under the provisions of the Commemorative Works
Act, a construction permit must be obtained from the
Secretary of the Interior within 7 years of the legislation
authorizing the construction of the World War II Memorial,
that is, by May 2000; and
Whereas the World War II Memorial shall be funded by
private contributions, as specified in federal law, including
corporate and foundation giving, veterans groups,
associations, and individual donations; and
Whereas the capital campaign goal of the World War II
Memorial project is $100 million, of which approximately $38
million has been received thus far; and
Whereas, before a construction permit will be issued, the
final design must be approved and all funds for construction
of the World War II Memorial must be on hand; and
Whereas, in consideration of the approaching May 2000
deadline, the honor, courage, and memory of every veteran who
served in World War II shall be more appropriately served,
and the gratitude of a nation more fully expressed, by
expediting the construction process to permit construction of
the World War II Memorial to begin immediately; now,
therefore, be it
Resolved by the Senate:
That the honor and achievements of all World War II
veterans shall be best served by allowing for the
construction of the World War II Memorial to begin
immediately; and
That Congress undertake any and all appropriate action,
legislative or otherwise, to permit the construction process
for the World War II Memorial to begin immediately; and
That copies of this resolution, signed by the president of
the senate, be forwarded by the senate clerk to the President
of the United States, the Speaker of the United States House
of Representatives, the President of the United States
Senate, and to each member of the New Hampshire congressional
delegation.
____
POM-71. A concurrent resolution adopted by the Legislature
of the State of Kansas; to the Committee on Appropriations.
House Concurrent Resolution No. 5021
Whereas, Nearly 700,000 United States troops, including
7,500 Kansans, deployed to the Persian Gulf region in
Operation Desert Shield and Operation Desert Storm to
liberate Kuwait; and
Whereas, Federal research efforts have not yet identified
the prevalence, patterns, causes or treatments for illnesses
by Gulf War veterans; and
Whereas, Nationwide, very few Gulf War veterans who have
applied for disability compensation for undiagnosed illnesses
from the United States Department of Veterans Affairs have
received compensation; and
Whereas, The Kansas Persian Gulf War Veterans Health
Initiative has surveyed 2031 Kansas Gulf War-era veterans;
and
Whereas, The Kansas Gulf War Veterans Health Study
preliminary results indicate that 30% of deployed veterans
suffer from a complex of symptoms characterized by fatigue,
joint and muscle pain, cognitive and
[[Page 8125]]
mood disturbances, and a variable array of respiratory,
gastrointestinal, neurological, skin, and auditory problems,
collectively identified as Gulf War illness; and
Whereas, The Kansas Gulf War Veterans Health Study
indicates that Gulf War illness occurs in identifiable
patterns, including differences by areas of deployment; and
Whereas, The Kansas Gulf War Veterans Health Study
indicates that among veterans who did not deploy to the Gulf
War, Gulf War illness occurs at a significantly higher rate
among veterans who received vaccines during that period than
those who did not receive vaccines; and
Whereas, The Kansas Gulf War Veterans Health Study
indicates that children of Gulf War veterans born since the
war were significantly more likely to have been born with
health problems, including birth defects, than children born
to nondeployed veterans during the same period; and
Whereas, The Kansas Gulf War Veterans Health Study
indicates that most deployed veterans with Gulf War illness
continue to be employed, but 79% say their health affects
their ability to work; and
Whereas, The Kansas Gulf War Veterans Health Study
indicates that Kansas veterans who deployed to the Gulf War
are significantly less likely to receive disability
compensation from the United States Department of Veterans
Affairs than nondeployed veterans of the same era; and
Whereas, Kansas has thousands of deployable troops at
facilities such as Fort Riley, Fort Leavenworth, McConnell
Air Base, as well as reservists and members of our Kansas
National Guard; and
Whereas, The results of the Kansas Persian Gulf War
Veterans Health Initiative are very troubling, we must do all
we can to prevent a repeat of ``Gulf War illness'' in any
future conflict that affects our Kansas military men and
women: Now, therefore, be it
Resolved by the House of Representatives of the State of
Kansas, the Senate concurring therein, That we, the Kansas
Legislature, believe that Gulf War illness has had a severe
negative impact on the physical and emotional well-being of
Gulf War veterans who honorably served Kansas and the United
States; and be it further
Resolved, That we memorialize the President and the
Congress of the United States to provide funding for Gulf War
illness research independent of that administered by the
United States Departments of Defense and Veterans Affairs;
and to establish a process of independent review of federal
policies and programs associated with Gulf War illness
research, benefits, and health care; and be it further
Resolved, That we urge the Governor of Kansas, the
Secretary of Health and Environment, the Kansas Commission on
Veterans Affairs, and other appropriate state agency heads to
take action to continue to investigate Gulf War illness and
promote programs to inform and assist Kansas Gulf War
veterans and family members suffering from Gulf War illness;
and be it further
Resolved, That we urge our Kansas Congressional Delegation
to coordinate acquisition of federal grants from the National
Institute of Health (N.I.H.) or other federal sources to seek
causes and cures for Gulf War illness; and be it further
Resolved, That we urge our Kansas Congressional Delegation
to build coalitions with other states to call on Congress and
the administration for action in investigating and finding
answers to Gulf War illness; and be it further
Resolved, That we encourage our Kansas Congressional
Delegation to meet with members of the Kansas Persian Gulf
War Veterans Initiative to coordinate efforts on the federal
level; and be it further
Resolved, That the Secretary of State be directed to
provide an enrolled copy of this resolution to the President
of the United States, the Vice-President of the United
States, the Speaker of the United States House of
Representatives, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of
Veterans Affairs, and to each member of the Kansas
Congressional delegation; to the Governor of the State of
Kansas, the Secretary of Health and Environment, the
Secretary of Human Resources, and the Chairman of the Kansas
Commission on Veterans Affairs; and to the National and State
Commanders of the American Legion, the Veterans of Foreign
Wars and the Disabled American Veterans.
____
POM-72. A joint resolution adopted by the Legislature of
the State of Nevada; to the Committee on Finance.
Joint Resolution No. 10
Whereas, the Constitution of the United States assigns
certain powers and responsibilities to the Federal Government
and reserves the balance of those powers and responsibilities
to the individual states; and
Whereas, beginning in the 1930s when the Social Security
System was established, public employees were excluded from
participation; and
Whereas, many pension plans of state and local governments
have elected to complement their own pension programs through
coverage under the Social Security System; and
Whereas, other public pension plans, including the Pubic
Employees' Retirement System of Nevada, decided not to
participate in the national Social Security System, but
rather to provide their own independent and excellent
programs of retirement benefits; and
Whereas, mandatory Social Security coverage of newly hired
state and local governmental employees in the State of Nevada
will seriously disrupt our well-founded Public Employees'
Retirement System; and
Whereas, there is no evidence to support the idea that
mandatory Social Security coverage of newly hired public
employees will solve the funding problems of the national
Social Security System; and
Whereas, there are serious constitutional and
administrative problems with the extension of mandatory
Social Security coverage to newly hired public employees; now
therefore, be it
Resolved by the Assembly and Senate of the State of Nevada,
Jointly, That the members of the Legislature of the State of
Nevada hereby express their strong opposition to the
extension of mandatory Social Security coverage to newly
hired state and local governmental employees; and be it
further
Resolved, That the Nevada Legislature hereby urges Congress
to oppose all efforts to extend mandatory Social Security
coverage to newly hired state and local governmental
employees; and be it further
Resolved, That the Chief of the Assembly prepare and
transmit a copy of this resolution to the Vice President of
the United States as the presiding officer of the Senate, the
Speaker of the House of Representatives and each member of
the Nevada Congressional Delegation; and be it further
Resolved, That this resolution becomes effective upon
passage and approval.
____
POM-73. A resolution adopted by the House of the
Legislature of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania; to the
Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs.
House Resolution No. 130
Whereas, Senior citizen housing was originally designed to
provide adequate and safe housing for older citizens in an
environment where residents' interests and needs were held in
common; and
Whereas, Many senior citizens choose senior citizen housing
in order to live in a community setting around individuals of
common interest and common experiences while maintaining
independent living quarters; and
Whereas, Senior citizen housing was designed to provide our
older residents with affordable housing while ensuring them a
quality-of-life standard; and
Whereas, The Department of Housing and Urban Development
has begun placing nonsenior citizens in buildings originally
designed to house senior citizens; and
Whereas, These young individuals, while meeting certain
eligibility requirements for placement within these housing
complexes, do not maintain a lifestyle conductive to that of
the older residents in those same complexes; and
Whereas, Increased crime, noise and dangerous traffic
conditions are among the serious problems now seen in those
complexes where young tenants are being placed; therefore be
it
Resolved, That the House of Representatives of the
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania memorialize the Congress of the
United States to urge the Department of Housing and Urban
Development to carefully consider the needs of all residents
of a complex or building with respect to placing new tenants
in areas previously considered to be senior citizen housing;
and be it further
Resolved, That copies of this resolution be transmitted to
the presiding officers of each house of Congress and to each
member of Congress from Pennsylvania.
____
POM-74. A joint resolution adopted by the Legislature of
the State of Maine; to the Committee on Appropriations.
Joint Resolution
Whereas, the people of Maine believe that every student
should receive an adequate public education; and
Whereas, it costs on average more than twice as much to
educate a student with a disability as to educate a student
without a disability; and
Whereas, the issue of funding special education in our
schools is one of the people of Maine's foremost concerns;
and
Whereas, when the Individuals with Disabilities Education
Act was first enacted, Congress committed to covering 40% of
the cost of special education in the United States; and
Whereas, according to the Maine Department of Education, in
fiscal year 1998, the Federal Government covered only 8.15%
of the cost of special education in the State of Maine; and
Whereas, special education costs paid with local and state
taxes have more than doubled in the past 10 years from
$52,697,027 in the 1987-1988 school year to $139,008,607 in
the 1997-1998 school year; and
Whereas, special education costs in some Maine communities
consume a large percentage of local education dollars
including:
1. An amount of $4,595,769 constituting 19.7% of total
education expenditures in the City of Auburn;
2. An amount of $1,324,791 constituting 13.2% of total
education expenditures in the Town of Wiscasset;
[[Page 8126]]
3. An amount of $5,758,750 constituting 21.5% of total
education expenditures in the City of Lewiston;
4. An amount of $2,941,301 constituting 11.7% of total
education expenditures in the City of Bangor;
5. An amount of $14,860 constituting 21.7% of total
education expenditures in Monhegan Plantation; and
6. An amount of $6,357,742 constituting 12.4% of total
education expenditures in the City of Portland; and
Whereas, the cost of special education has increased
dramatically in recent years, causing property taxes in the
State of Maine to rise and school districts around the State
to cut activities such as art and music programs, field trips
and extracurricular activities to maintain balanced budgets;
now therefore, be it
Resolved, That We, your Memorialists, respectfully urge and
request that the United States Congress increase funding to
support special education at a level originally envisioned in
the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act; and be it
further
Resolved, That suitable copies of this resolution, duly
authenticated by the Secretary of State, be transmitted to
the Honorable William J. Clinton, President of the United
States, the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the
House of Representatives of the Congress of the United States
and each member of the Maine Congressional Delegation.
____
POM-75. A resolution adopted by the Senate of the
Legislature of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania; to the
Committee on Environment and Public Works.
Senate Resolution No. 53
Whereas, the United States Supreme Court has issued a
series of decisions holding that the Commerce Clause of the
Constitution of the United States prohibits states from
restricting the importation of solid waste from other states;
and
Whereas, over the past ten years owners and operators of
solid waste landfills located in this Commonwealth have
significantly increased the amount of municipal waste that
they accept from other states; and
Whereas, New York City released a long-term waste
management plan on December 2, 1998, that will allow New York
City to close the Fresh Hills Landfill as planned on December
31, 2001, resulting in the export of approximately 13,000
tons of solid waste a day now disposed at the Fresh Hills
Landfill to Pennsylvania and other states; and
Whereas, the states of Pennsylvania, West Virginia,
Virginia, New Jersey and Maryland notified the Mayor of New
York City that the recently released waste plan to manage
waste displaced by the closure of Fresh Hills Landfill did
not adequately address limiting the exportation of the waste
as well as other viable waste management alternatives; and
Whereas, the present and projected future levels of
municipal waste that owners and operators of landfills and
incinerators located in this Commonwealth import from other
states pose environmental, aesthetic and traffic problems and
is unfair to citizens of this Commonwealth, particularly
citizens living in areas where landfills and incinerators are
located; and
Whereas, Pennsylvania has met its recycling goal of 25% and
has established a new goal of 35% by the year 2003; and
Whereas, it is within the power of the Congress of the
United States to delegate authority to the states to restrict
the amount of municipal waste imported from other states; and
Whereas, legislation has been introduced in Congress which
will regulate and restrict the amount of municipal waste
imported from other states; and
Whereas, Governor Thomas J. Ridge and the governors of the
Great Lakes states of Ohio, Michigan and Indiana wrote to
Congress expressing their desire to reach an accord on
authorizing states to place reasonable limits on the
importation of solid waste; and
Whereas, the failure of Congress to act will harm this
Commonwealth by allowing the continued unrestricted flow of
solid waste generated in other states to landfills and
incinerators located in this Commonwealth; therefore be it
Resolved, That the Senate of the Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania memorialize the President of the United States
and Congress and the states to support legislation
authorizing states to restrict the amount of solid waste
being imported from other states and creating a rational
solid waste management strategy that is equitable among the
states and environmentally sound; and be it further
Resolved, That the Senate memorialize the President of the
United States and Congress to support legislation that gives
communities hosting landfills and incinerators the right to
decide by agreement whether to accept waste from other states
and that creates a rational municipal waste management
strategy that is equitable among the states and
environmentally sound; and be it further
Resolved, that copies of this resolution be transmitted to
the President of the United States, the presiding officers of
each house of Congress and to each member of Congress from
Pennsylvania.
____
POM-76. A joint resolution adopted by the Legislature of
the State of Nevada; to the Committee on Foreign Relations.
Senate Joint Resolution No. 13
Whereas, good health is a basic right for every citizen of
the world and access to the highest standards of health
information and services is necessary to help guarantee this
right; and
Whereas, participation in international health programs is
crucial to world health as the potential for the spread of
various infectious diseases increases proportionately with
the increase in world trade and travel; and
Whereas, the World Health Organization set forth in the
first chapter of its charter the objective of attaining the
highest possible level of health for all people; and
Whereas, in 1977, the World Health Organization established
``Health for all by the year 2000'' as its overriding
priority and reaffirmed that commitment in 1995 with the
initiation of its ``Health for All'' renewal process; and
Whereas, this country's population of 21 million is larger
than three-quarters of the member states already in the World
Health Organization and Taiwan shares the noble goals of the
organization; and
Whereas, the achievements of Taiwan in the field of health
are substantial, including one of the highest life expectancy
levels in Asia, maternal and infant mortality rates
comparable to those of western countries, the eradication of
such infectious diseases as cholera, smallpox and the plague
and the first country in the world to provide children with
free hepatitis B vaccinations; and
Whereas, before its loss of membership in the World Health
Organization in 1972, Taiwan sent specialists to serve in
other member countries on countless health projects and its
health experts held key positions in the organization, all to
the benefit of the entire Pacific region; and
Whereas, presently, this remarkable country is not allowed
to participate in any forums and workshops organized by the
World Health Organization concerning the latest technologies
in the diagnosis, monitoring and control of diseases; and
Whereas, in recent years, the government and the expert
scientists and doctors in the field of medicine of Taiwan
have expressed a willingness to assist financially or
technically in international aid and health activities
supported by the World Health Organization, but these offers
have ultimately been refused; and
Whereas, according to the constitution of the World Health
Organization, Taiwan does not fulfill the criteria for
membership; and
Whereas, because the World Health Organization does not
allow observers to participate in the activities of the
organization and considering all of the benefits that such
participation would bring, it is in the best interests of all
persons in this World that Taiwan be admitted to the World
Health Organization, now, therefore, be it
Resolved by the Senate and Assembly of the State of Nevada,
Jointly, That the members of the 70th session of the Nevada
Legislature do hereby urge President Clinton and the Congress
of the United States to support all efforts made by Taiwan of
the Republic of China to gain meaningful participation in the
World Health Organization; and be it further
Resolved, That the policy of the United States should
include the pursuit of an initiative in the World Health
Organization that would ensure such participation; and be it
further
Resolved, That the Secretary of the Senate prepare and
transmit a copy of this resolution to the President of the
United States, the Vice President of the United States as the
presiding officer of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of
Representatives, the Secretary of Health, Education and
Welfare, the World Health Organization, the Director General
of the Taipei Economic and Cultural Office in San Francisco
and each member of the Nevada Congressional Delegation; and
be it further
Resolved, That this resolution becomes effective upon
passage and approval.
____
POM-77. A resolution adopted by the House of the
Legislature of the State of New Hampshire to the Committee on
Appropriations.
Whereas, the White Mountain National Forest consists of
720,000 acres in 35 different communities and 14
unincorporated places in New Hampshire; and
Whereas, the presence of national forest land provides both
economic benefits and burdens to these communities; and
Whereas, adequate funding by Congress of the Land and
Resource Management Plan ensures that the full economic,
social and conservation benefits of proper management are
received by these communities; and
Whereas, full payment in lieu of taxes by the federal
government ensures that these communities receive revenues
comparable to revenues these lands would generate in property
taxes were they in private ownership; and
Whereas, full funding of the forest plan and full payment
in lieu of taxes constitute a fiscal relationship between the
federal government and the White Mountain National Forest
communities that is essential to maintaining public trust and
support for continued management of these lands by the
federal government; now, therefore, be it
[[Page 8127]]
Resolved by the House of Representatives:
That an annual report be issued by the United States
Department of Agriculture Forest Service for public view and
distribution, containing National Forest contributions to
local towns in lieu of property taxes, statistics on revenues
from timber sales, information regarding road construction,
and approximate numbers of those who use the White Mountain
National Forest for recreation and the economic impact on
area business; and
That the federal government should make full funding of the
Land and Resource Management Plan its highest priority in
relation to its ownership and management of the White
Mountain National Forest; and
That the federal government fully fund its statutory
obligation to make payment in lieu of taxes to New Hampshire
communities which contain land within the White Mountain
National Forest; and
That copies of this resolution be forwarded by the house
clerk to the President of the United States, the Speaker of
the United States House of Representatives, the President of
the United States Senate, and the member of the New Hampshire
congressional delegation.
POM-78. A resolution adopted by the Senate of the
Legislature of the State of Hawaii; to the Committee on
Appropriations.
Senate Resolution No. 25
Whereas, during World War II, the United States forcibly
removed and interned over 120,000 United States citizens and
legal permanent residents of Japanese ancestry from their
homes and relocated them to government internment camps; and
Whereas, in addition, the United States arranged the
deportation of over 2,264 men, women, and children of
Japanese ancestry from thirteen Latin American countries to
the United States to be interned and used in prisoner of war
exchanges with Japan; and
Whereas, in 1988, the United States Congress passed, and
President Reagan signed, the Civil Liberties Act of 1988 (the
Act), which acknowledged the fundamental injustice of that
evacuation, relocation, and internment, and to apologize on
behalf of the people of the United States for the wrongs done
to United States citizens and legal permanent residents of
Japanese ancestry; and
Whereas, that Act further sought to make restitution to
those individuals of Japanese ancestry who were interned by
authorizing a $20,000 redress payment to each citizen and
legal permanent resident of Japanese ancestry who was
deprived of liberty or property as a result of government
action; and
Whereas, the Act directed the United States Treasury to
distribute these payments, to which Congress appropriated
$1,650,000,000 between October 1990 and October 1993; and
Whereas, in a subsequent settlement of a class action suit,
the United States agreed to send a letter of apology and to
pay a $5,000 redress payment from the same fund to each
formerly interned Japanese Latin American; and
Whereas, to fulfill its educational purpose of informing
the public about the internment so as to prevent the
recurrence of similar events, the Act also created the Civil
Liberties Public Education Fund to make disbursements for
research and educational activities up to a total of
$50,000,000; and
Whereas, Congress specified in the Act that the principal
of $1,650,000,000 was to be invested in government
obligations and earn interest at an annual rate of at least
five per cent; and
Whereas, in 1998, a Japanese Peruvian former internee and
the National Coalition for Redress/Reparations filed a class
action suit alleging that the Treasury Department breached
its fiduciary duty by failing to invest the funds mandated by
Congress, and seeking to recover the lost interest which is
estimated to be between $50,000,000 and $200,000,000; and
Whereas, while the reparations fund has made payments to
approximately eighty-two thousand claimants, there will not
be sufficient money in the trust fund established by Congress
to pay all of the remaining claims by Japanese Americans and
Japanese Latin Americans or to meet the goal of $50,000,000
in educational grants; and
Whereas, a United States Justice Department official has
apparently acknowledged that the funds were not invested as
originally mandated by Congress, and that the $1,650,000,000
has all been spent, although claims are still pending; and
Whereas, the Legislature finds that while nothing can
replace the loss of civil liberties suffered by those who
were forced to evacuate their homes and relocate to
internment camps on the basis of their ancestry, a formal
apology and token redress payment to these individuals of
Japanese ancestry is the least that can be done to compensate
them for the loss of their rights; now, therefore, be it
Resolved by the Senate of the Twentieth Legislature of the
State of Hawaii, Regular Session of 1999, That the United
States government is urged to restore redress funds to pay
all outstanding Japanese American and Japanese Latin American
redress claims and to fulfill the educational mandate of the
act; and be it further
Resolved, That certified copies of this Resolution be
transmitted to the President of the United States, the
President of the United States Senate, the Speaker of the
United States House of Representatives, Hawaii's
congressional delegation, and the Governor of Hawaii.
____
POM-79. A resolution adopted by the Legislature of the
State of Minnesota; to the Committee on Finance.
Resolution No. 2
Whereas, the State of Minnesota entered into a settlement
agreement on May 8, 1998, ending the lawsuit brought by the
state against the tobacco industry; and
Whereas, the federal government has not brought its own
lawsuit against the tobacco industry; and
Whereas, the federal government, through the Health Care
Financing Administration, has asserted that it is entitled to
a share of the state settlement on the basis that it
allegedly represents the federal share of Medicaid costs; and
Whereas, the federal government asserts that it is
authorized and obligated, under the third-party recovery
provisions of the Social Security Act, to collect its share
of any settlement funds attributable to Medicaid; and
Whereas, the state lawsuit was brought in state court under
state law theories of consumer fraud, unlawful trade
practices, deceptive trade practices, false advertising,
unreasonable restraints of trade, and the use of monopoly
power to affect competition in violation of the laws of the
State of Minnesota; and
Whereas, the state initiated the lawsuit without any
financial, technical, or other assistance from any branch or
agency of the federal government, and settled without any
assistance from the federal government; and
Whereas, the state is entitled to all of the funds
negotiated in the tobacco settlement agreement entered into
on May 8, 1998, without any federal claim; now, therefore, be
it
Resolved by the Legislature of the State of Minnesota, That
it urges the Congress and the Administration to support
legislation that would explicitly prohibit the federal
government from claiming or recouplng any state tobacco
settlement recoveries. Be it further
Resolved, That the United States Senators elected from
Minnesota are requested to become cosponsors of S346
introduced in the Senate on February 3, 1999, by Senators
Hutchison and Graham, and the United States Representatives
elected from Minnesota are requested to become cosponsors of
HR351 introduced in the House of Representatives on January
19, 1999, by Representative Bilirakis and Franks. Be it
further,
Resolved, That the Secretary of State of the State of
Minnesota is directed to prepare copies of this memorial and
transmit them to the President of the United States, the
President and the Secretary of the United States Senate, the
Speaker and Clerk of the United States House of
Representatives, and Minnesota's Senators and Representatives
in Congress.
____
POM-80. A resolution adopted by the Board of County
Commissioners, Collier County, Florida relative to English as
the Official Language of Collier County; to the Committee on
Governmental Affairs.
____________________
INTRODUCTION OF BILLS AND JOINT RESOLUTIONS
The following bills and joint resolutions were introduced, read the
first and second time by unanimous consent, and referred as indicated:
By Mr. DURBIN (for himself, Mr. Chafee, Mr. Kennedy,
Mr. Schumer, Mr. Lautenberg, Mrs. Boxer, and Mr.
Reed):
S. 936. A bill to prevent children from having access to
firearms; to the Committee on the Judiciary.
By Mrs. HUTCHISON (for herself, Mr. McCain, Mr.
Hollings, and Mr. Inouye):
S. 937. A bill to authorize appropriations for fiscal years
2000 and 2001 for certain maritime programs of the Department
of Transportation, and for other purposes; to the Committee
on Commerce, Science, and Transportation.
By Mr. AKAKA (for himself and Mr. Inouye):
S. 938. A bill to eliminate restrictions on the acquisition
of certain land contiguous to Hawaii Volcanoes National Park,
and for other purposes; to the Committee on Energy and
Natural Resources.
S. 939. A bill to correct spelling errors in the statutory
designations of Hawaiian National Parks; to the Committee on
Energy and Natural Resources.
By Mr. SPECTER (by request):
S. 940. A bill to provide a temporary authority for the use
of voluntary separation incentives by the Department of
Veterans Affairs to reduce employment levels, restructure
staff, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Veterans'
Affairs.
By Mr. WYDEN (for himself, Mr. Mack, Mr. Rockefeller,
and Mr. Smith of Oregon):
S. 941. A bill to amend the Public Health Service Act to
provide for a public response
[[Page 8128]]
to the public health crisis of pain, and for other purposes;
to the Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions.
By Mr. SCHUMER:
S. 942. A bill to amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986
to require the Secretary of the Treasury to develop an
Internet site where a taxpayer may generate a receipt for an
income tax payment which itemizes the portion of the payment
which is allocable to various Government spending categories;
to the Committee on Finance.
By Mrs. HUTCHISON:
S. 943. A bill to authorize the Administrator of General
Services to restore, preserve, and operate the LBJ
Presidential Office Suite in Austin, Texas; to the Committee
on Governmental Affairs.
By Mr. INHOFE:
S. 944. A bill to amend Public Law 105-188 to provide for
the mineral leasing of certain Indian lands in Oklahoma; to
the Committee on Indian Affairs.
By Mr. DURBIN (for himself, Mr. Leahy, Mr. Kennedy, Mr.
Feingold, and Mr. Sarbanes):
S. 945. A bill to amend title 11, United States Code, and
for other purposes; to the Committee on the Judiciary.
By Mr. MOYNIHAN (for himself and Mr. Schumer):
S. 946. A bill to authorize the Secretary of the Interior
to transfer administrative jurisdiction over land within the
boundaries of the Home of Franklin D. Roosevelt National
Historic Site to the Archivist of the United States for the
construction of a visitor center; to the Committee on Energy
and Natural Resources.
By Mr. HOLLINGS (for himself and Mr. McCain):
S. 947. A bill to amend federal law regarding the tolling
of the Interstate Highway System; to the Committee on
Environment and Public Works.
____________________
SUBMISSION OF CONCURRENT AND SENATE RESOLUTIONS
The following concurrent resolutions and Senate resolutions were
read, and referred (or acted upon), as indicated:
By Mr. SANTORUM:
S. Res. 91. A resolution expressing the sense of the Senate
that Jim Thorpe should be recognized as the ``Athlete of the
Century''; to the Committee on Commerce, Science, and
Transportation.
By Mrs. BOXER (for herself, Mr. Lautenberg, Mr. Reid,
Mr. Jeffords, Mr. Schumer, Mr. Ashcroft, Mr. Mack,
Mr. Coverdell, and Mr. Helms):
S. Res. 92. A resolution expressing the sense of the Senate
that funding for prostate cancer research should be increased
substantially; to the Committee on Health, Education, Labor,
and Pensions.
____________________
STATEMENTS ON INTRODUCED BILLS AND JOINT RESOLUTIONS
By Mr. DURBIN (for himself, Mr. Chafee, Mr. Kennedy, Mr. Schumer,
Mr. Lautenberg, Mrs. Boxer, and Mr. Reed):
S. 936. A bill to prevent children from having access to firearms; to
the Committee on the Judiciary.
children's firearm access prevention act
Mr. DURBIN. Mr. President, I rise today with my colleagues Senator
Chafee, Senator Kennedy, Senator Schumer, Senator Lautenberg, Senator
Boxer, and Senator Reed to introduce the Child Firearm Access
Prevention Act of 1999.
Following the tragedy in Littleton, Colorado, it is natural to ask
``why'', but we also need to ask ``how?''
How do two teenagers enter their high school armed with a Tec 9,
semi-automatic assault rifle, two sawed off 12 gauge shotguns, a 9
millimeter semi-automatic pistol, 30 explosive devices and kill 13
innocent people?
There are those who say you can't pass laws to stop this behavior
because those inclined to do it will simply ignore the law. I guess the
message of this logic is if you can't solve the entire problem, you
shouldn't even try.
I think that logic is wrong. We have to act and we have to act now.
Everyday in America, 13 children die as a result of gun violence.
In the last two years our schools have been shattered by gun
violence.
October 1, 1997, Pearl, Mississippi: A sixteen year old boy killed
his mother then went to his high school and shot nine students, two
fatally.
December 1, 1997, West Paducah, Kentucky: Three students were killed
and five were wounded in a hallway at Heath High School by a 14 year
old classmate.
March 24, 1998, Jonesboro, Arkansas: Four girls and a teacher were
shot to death and 10 people were wounded during a false fire alarm at a
middle school when two boys 11 and 13 opened fire from the woods.
April 24, 1998, Edinboro, Pennsylvania: A science teacher was shot to
death in front of students at an eighth grade dance by a 14 year old
student.
May 19, 1998, Fayetteville, Tennessee: Three days before his
graduation, an 18 year old honor student allegedly opened fire in a
parking lot at a high school killing a classmate who was dating his ex-
girlfriend.
May 21, 1998, Springfield, Oregon: Two teen-agers were killed and
more than 20 people were hurt when a 15 year old boy allegedly opened
fire at a high school. The boy's parents were killed at their home.
There is something we can do to protect our children. Seventeen
states have already recognized the problem and passed a child firearm
access prevention law, which is known as a CAP law. These laws say to
those who purchase and own guns, it is not enough for you to follow the
law in purchasing them and to use the guns safely; you have another
responsibility. If you are going to own a firearm in your home, you
have to keep it safely and securely so that children do not have access
to it.
These laws are effective. Florida was the first State to pass a CAP
law in 1989. The following year, unintentional shooting deaths of
children dropped 50%. Moreover, a study published in the Journal of the
American Medical Association (JAMA) in October of 1997 found a 23%
decrease in unintentional firearm related deaths among children younger
than 15 in those States that had implemented CAP laws. According to the
JAMA article, if all 50 states had CAP laws during the period of 1990-
94, 216 children might have lived.
Should we consider these state laws as a national model? I think the
obvious answer is yes. Unfortunately, the Littleton tragedy is no
longer unique.
Mr. President, what I propose today is Federal legislation that will
apply to every State, not just 17, but every State. And this is what it
says. If you want to own a handgun, a rifle or shotgun, and it is legal
to do so, you can; but if you own it, you have a responsibility to make
certain that it is kept securely and safely.
What does the bill do? The bill imposes criminal penalties for gun
owners who know or should know that a juvenile could gain access to the
gun, and a juvenile does gain access & thereby causes death or injury
or exhibits the gun in a public place. The gun owner is subject to a
prison sentence of up to 1 year and/or fined $10,000 (a misdemeanor
penalty). The bill also provides a felony provision for a reckless
violation.
The bill has 5 common sense exceptions. (1) The adult uses a trigger
lock, secure storage box, or other secure storage technique; (2) The
juvenile used the gun in a lawful act of self-defense; (3) The juvenile
takes the gun off the person of a law enforcement official; (4) The
owner has no reasonable expectation that juveniles will be on the
premises; and (5) The juvenile got the gun as a result of a burglary.
States which have passed CAP laws include: Florida, Connecticut,
Iowa, California, Nevada, New Jersey, Virginia, Wisconsin, Hawaii,
Maryland, Minnesota, North Carolina, Delaware, Rhode Island, Texas,
Massachusetts and Illinois. An examination of this list does not reveal
the most liberal states in America. The first State to pass this
legislation in 1989 was Florida and in 1995, Texas, certainly no
bleeding heart state by any political definition, passed a CAP law.
I ask my Senate colleagues to join me in this bipartisan effort to
protect children from the dangers of gun violence. Children and easy
access to guns are a recipe for tragedy.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that a copy of the legislation
be printed in the Record.
There being no objection, the bill was order to be printed in the
Record, as follows:
S. 936
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the ``Children's Firearm Access
Prevention Act''.
[[Page 8129]]
SEC. 2. CHILDREN AND FIREARMS SAFETY.
(a) Definition.--Section 921(a)(34)(A) of title 18, United
States Code, is amended by inserting ``or removing'' after
``deactivating''.
(b) Prohibition.--Section 922 of title 18, United States
Code, is amended by inserting after subsection (y) the
following:
``(z) Prohibition Against Giving Juveniles Access to
Certain Firearms.--
``(1) Definition of juvenile.--In this subsection, the term
`juvenile' means an individual who has not attained the age
of 18 years.
``(2) Prohibition.--Except as provided in paragraph (3), it
shall be unlawful for any person to keep a loaded firearm, or
an unloaded firearm and ammunition for the firearm, any of
which has been shipped or transported in interstate or
foreign commerce or otherwise substantially affects
interstate or foreign commerce, within any premise that is
under the custody or control of that person if that person
knows, or reasonably should know, that a juvenile is capable
of gaining access to the firearm without the permission of
the parent or legal guardian of the juvenile.
``(3) Exceptions.--Paragraph (2) does not apply if--
``(A) the person uses a secure gun storage or safety device
for the firearm;
``(B) the person is a peace officer, a member of the Armed
Forces, or a member of the National Guard, and the juvenile
obtains the firearm during, or incidental to, the performance
of the official duties of the person in that capacity;
``(C) the juvenile obtains, or obtains and discharges, the
firearm in a lawful act of self-defense or defense of 1 or
more other persons;
``(D) the person has no reasonable expectation, based on
objective facts and circumstances, that a juvenile is likely
to be present on the premises on which the firearm is kept;
or
``(E) the juvenile obtains the firearm as a result of an
unlawful entry by any person.''.
(c) Penalties.--Section 924(a) of title 18, United States
Code, is amended by adding at the end the following:
``(7) Whoever violates section 922(z), if a juvenile (as
defined in section 922(z)) obtains access to the firearm and
thereby causes death or bodily injury to the juvenile or to
any other person, or exhibits the firearm either in a public
place, or in violation of section 922(q)--
``(A) shall be fined not more than $10,000, imprisoned not
more than 1 year, or both; or
``(B) if such violation is reckless, shall be fined in
accordance with this title, imprisoned not more than 5 years,
or both.''.
(d) Role of Licensed Firearms Dealers.--Section 926 of
title 18, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end
the following:
``(d) Contents of Form.--The Secretary shall ensure that a
copy of section 922(z) appears on the form required to be
obtained by a licensed dealer from a prospective transferee
of a firearm.''.
(e) No Effect on State Law.--Nothing in this section or the
amendments made by this section shall be construed to preempt
any provision of the law of any State, the purpose of which
is to prevent juveniles from injuring themselves or others
with firearms.
______
By Mrs. HUTCHISON (for herself, Mr. McCain, Mr. Hollings, and Mr.
Inouye):
S. 937. A bill to authorize appropriations for fiscal years 2000 and
2001 for certain maritime programs of the Department of Transportation,
and for other purposes; to the Committee on Commerce, Science, and
Transportation.
maritime administration authorization act for fiscal years 2000 and
2001
Mrs. HUTCHISON. Mr. President, today I rise to introduce
legislation on behalf of myself, Senator McCain, chairman of the Senate
Commerce Committee, Senator Hollings, the ranking member of the
Commerce Committee and Senator Inouye, Surface Transportation and
Merchant Marine Subcommittee ranking member. This legislation
authorizes appropriations for fiscal year 2000 for the Maritime
Administration.
The introduction of this bill demonstrates our firm commitment to our
nation's maritime industry and our willingness to work with the
Maritime Administration to provide effective leadership on a wide range
of maritime issues. The bill was developed along with Administration
officials and provides a base to build upon in coming weeks.
There are several aspects of this measure that will require
interested members of the Senate to work together to come to a
consensus. Therefore, this bill can be viewed as a starting point for
reauthorizing the agency and making changes to U.S. maritime policy. I
look forward to working with members of the Committee and the
administration to find common ground for a final legislation.
The bill authorizes appropriations for the Maritime Administration
[MarAd] for fiscal year 2000 and covers two appropriated accounts: (1)
operations and training and (2) the shipbuilding loan guarantee program
authorized by Title XI of the Merchant Marine Act, 1936.
MarAd oversees the operations of U.S. Government-supported maritime
promotion programs, such as the Maritime Security Program, the state
maritime academies and the U.S. Merchant Marine Academy. I am a strong
supporter of the state maritime academies, in particular, and want to
ensure that they are adequately funded.
Title XI shipbuilding loan guarantee program is important to ensuring
critical shipbuilding capacity in the United States. This legislation
provides $6 million in loan guarantee funds for Title XI in FY2000.
However, this program has received substantially more in previous
years, and I look forward to working with the Administration to
determine the appropriate level of funding.
This bill codifies the administrative process associated with Title
XI. The measure provides the Secretary the authority to hold all bond
proceeds generated under Title XI during the construction period in
escrow. Currently, the Secretary must administratively establish a
separate construction fund with a private bond agent for a portion of
the bond proceeds not captured in escrow. This will eliminate the cost
associated with the establishment of the separate construction fund and
better protect the government's interest.
Futher, the measure provides the Secretary authority under Title XI
to collect and hold cash collateral in the U.S. Treasury, under certain
circumstances associated with a guaranteed transaction. This will
relieve the obligors and the agency from spending the time and money
associated with negotiating depository agreements and legal opinions in
Title XI transactions.
Additionally, the bill amends Title IX to provide a waiver of the
three year period bulk and breakbulk vessels newly registered under the
U.S. flag must wait in order to carry government-impelled cargo. The
waiver would be in effect for one year beginning on the date of
enactment.
Finally, the bill would reauthorize the War Risk Insurance Program
through June 30, 2005, change the requirement for an annual report to
Congress by the Maritime Administration detailing its's activities to a
biennial report, and make clear the ownership status of the vessel
named the Jeremiah O'Brien.
I look forward to working on this important legislation and hope my
colleagues will join me and the other sponsors in expeditiously moving
this authorization through the legislative process.
Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I am pleased to join Senator
Hutchison, Chairman of the Surface Transportation and Merchant Marine
Subcommittee in the introducing the Maritime Administration
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000.
The bill was developed along with administration officials and
provides a firm base to build on in coming weeks. While I do not fully
agree with all aspects of this measure. I look forward to an open
debate in formulating final legislation.
The bill authorizes appropriations for the Maritime
Administration[MarAd] for fiscal year 2000 covering operations and
training along with the loan guarantee program authorized by title XI
of the Merchant Marine Act, 1936. MarAd's oversight of the operations
of U.S. Government-suppored maritime promotion programs are as
important toady as ever. With increasing pressure on our nation's
military resources, MarAd's administration of the Martime Security
Program provides an important link in insuring that our troops world
wide receive essential supplies in a timely and efficient manor.
This bill will streamline several administrative processes associated
with the Title XI Loan Guarantee Program. The measure provides the
Secretary of Transportation with additional authority to secure loan
guaranteed by allowing collateral collected to be held in
[[Page 8130]]
the U.S. Treasury. This will not only save time and money associated
with negotiating depository agreements but will provide greater
security for tax payers funds appropriated for this program.
Further, the bill amends Title IX of the Merchant Marine At of 1936
to provide a waiver for eliminating the three year period bulk and
breakbulk vessels newly registered under the U.S. flag must wait in
order to carry government-impelled cargo; reauthorize the War Risk
Insurance Program through June 30, 2005; reduces the requirement for an
annual report to Congress by the Maritime Administration detailing
its's activities to be a biennial report; and makes clear the ownership
status of the vessel names the Jeremian O'Brien.
I am pleased that the Subcommittee is taking this action today and
will join Senator Hutchison and the other sponsors in expeditiously
moving this authorization through the legislative proceeds.
______
By Mr. SPECTER (by request):
S. 940. A bill to provide a temporary authority for the use of
voluntary separation incentives by the Department of Veterans Affairs
to reduce employment levels, restructure staff, and for other purposes;
to the Committee on Veterans' Affairs.
department of veterans affairs employment reduction assistance act of
1999
Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, as chairman of the Committee on Veterans'
Affairs, I have today introduced, at the request of the Department of
Veterans Affairs, S. 940, the proposed Department of Veterans Affairs
Employment Reduction Assistance Act of 1999. The Department of Veterans
Affairs submitted this legislation to the President of the Senate by an
undated letter received by the President of the Senate on April 13,
1999.
My introduction of this measure is in keeping with the policy which I
have adopted of generally introducing--so that there will be specific
bills to which my colleagues and others may direct their attention and
comments--all Administration-proposed draft legislation referred to the
Committee on Veterans' Affairs. Thus, I reserve the right to support or
oppose the provisions of, as well as any amendment to, this
legislation.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the text of the bill be
printed in the Record, together with the transmittal letter and the
enclosed analysis of the draft legislation which accompanied it.
There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in
the Record, as follows:
S. 940
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the ``Department of Veterans
Affairs Employment Reduction Assistance Act of 1999.''
SEC. 2. DEFINITIONS.
For the purpose of this Act--
(a) ``Department'' means the Department of Veterans
Affairs.
(b) ``Employee'' means an employee (as defined by section
2105 of title 5, United States Code) of the Department of
Veterans Affairs, who is serving under an appointment without
time limitation, and has been currently employed by such
Department for a continuous period of at least 3 years, but
does not include--
(1) a reemployed annuitant under subchapter III of chapter
83 or chapter 84 of title 5, United States Code, or another
retirement system for employees of the Federal Government;
(2) an employee having a disability on the basis of which
such employee is eligible for disability retirement under
subchapter III of chapter 83 or chapter 84 of title 5, United
States Code, or another retirement system for employees of
the Federal Government;
(3) an employee who is in receipt of a specific notice of
involuntary separation for misconduct or unacceptable
performance;
(4) an employee who previously has received any voluntary
separation incentive payment by the Federal Government under
this Act or any other authority;
(5) an employee covered by statutory reemployment rights
who is on transfer to another organization; or
(6) any employee who, during the twenty-four month period
preceding the date of separation, has received a recruitment
or relocation bonus under section 5753 of title 5, United
States Code, or a recruitment bonus under section 7458 of
title 38, United States Code;
(7) any employee who, during the twelve-month period
preceding the date of separation, received a retention
allowance under section 5754 of title 5, United States Code,
or a retention bonus under section 7458 of title 38, United
States Code.
(c) ``Secretary'' means the Secretary of Veterans Affairs.
SEC. 3. DEPARTMENT PLANS; APPROVAL.
(a) In General.--The Secretary, before obligating any
resources for voluntary separation incentive payments, shall
submit to the Director of the Office of Management and Budget
a strategic plan outlining the use of such incentive payments
and a proposed organizational chart for the Department once
such incentive payments have been completed.
(b) Contents.--The plan shall specify--
(1) the positions and functions to be reduced or
eliminated, identified by organizational unit, geographic
location, occupational category and grade level; the proposed
coverage may be based on--
(A) any component of the Department;
(B) any occupation, level or type of position;
(C) any geographic location;
(D) other non-personal factors; or
(E) any appropriate combination of the factors in
paragraphs (A), (B), (C) and (D);
(2) the manner in which such reductions will improve
operating efficiency or meet actual or anticipated levels of
budget or staffing resources;
(3) the period of time during which incentives may be paid;
and
(4) a description of how the affected component(s) of the
Department will operate without the eliminated functions and
positions.
(c) Approval.--The Director of the Office of Management and
Budget shall approve or disapprove each plan submitted under
subsection (a), and may make appropriate modifications to the
plan with respect to the time period in which voluntary
separation incentives may be paid, with respect to the number
and amounts of incentive payments, or with respect to the
coverage of incentives on the basis of the factors in
subsection (b)(1).
SEC. 4. VOLUNTARY SEPARATION INCENTIVE PAYMENTS.
(a) Authority To Provide Voluntary Separation Incentive
Payments.--
(1) In General.--The Secretary may pay a voluntary
separation incentive payment to an employee only to the
extent necessary to reduce or eliminate the positions and
functions identified by the strategic plan;
(2) Employees who may receive incentives.--In order to
receive a voluntary separation incentive payment, an employee
must separate from service with the Department voluntarily
(whether by retirement or resignation) under the provisions
of this Act;
(b) Amount and Treatment of Payments.--A voluntary
separation incentive payment--
(1) shall be paid in a lump sum after the employee's
separation;
(2) shall be equal to the lesser of--
(A) an amount equal to the amount the employee would be
entitled to receive under section 5595(c) of title 5, United
States Code, if the employee were entitled to payment under
such section (without adjustment for any previous payment
made under that section); or
(B) an amount determined by the Secretary, not to exceed
$25,000;
(3) shall not be a basis for payment, and shall not be
included in the computation, of any other type of Government
benefit;
(4) shall not be taken into account in determining the
amount of severance pay to which an employee may be entitled
under section 5595 of title 5, United States Code, based on
any other separation; and
(5) shall be paid from the appropriations or funds
available for payment of the basic pay of the employee.
SEC. 5. EFFECT OF SUBSEQUENT EMPLOYMENT WITH THE GOVERNMENT.
(a) An individual who has received a voluntary separation
incentive payment under this Act and accepts any employment
with the Government of the United States, or who works for
any agency of the United States Government through a personal
services contract, within 5 years after the date of the
separation on which the payment is based shall be required to
repay, prior to the individual's first day of employment, the
entire amount of the incentive payment to the Department.
(b)(1) If the employment under subsection (a) is with an
Executive agency (as defined by section 105 of title 5,
United States Code), the United States Postal Service, or the
Postal Rate Commission, the Director of the Office of
Personnel Management may, at the request of the head of the
agency, waive the repayment if the individual involved
possesses unique abilities and is the only qualified
applicant available for the position.
(2) If the employment under subsection (a) is with an
entity in the legislative branch, the head of the entity or
the appointing official may waive the repayment if the
individual involved possesses unique abilities and is the
only qualified applicant available for the position.
(3) If the employment under subsection (a) is with the
judicial branch, the Director of the Administrative Office of
the United States Courts may waive the repayment if the
individual involved possesses unique
[[Page 8131]]
abilities and is the only qualified applicant available for
the position.
(c) For the purpose of this section, the term
``employment'' includes--
(1) for the purposes of subsections (a) and (b), employment
of any length or under any type of appointment, but does not
include employment that is without compensation; and
(2) for the purpose of subsection (a), employment with any
agency of the United States Government through a personal
services contract.
SEC. 6. ADDITIONAL AGENCY CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE RETIREMENT
FUND.
(a) In addition to any other payments which it is required
to make under subchapter III of chapter 83 or chapter 84 of
title 5, United States Code, the Department shall remit to
the Office of Personnel Management for deposit in the
Treasury of the United States to the credit of the Civil
Service Retirement and Disability Fund an amount equal to 15
percent of the final basic pay of each employee of the
Department who is covered under subchapter III of chapter 83
or chapter 84 of title 5 to whom a voluntary separation
incentive has been paid under this Act.
(b) For the purpose of this section, the term `final basic
pay', with respect to an employee, means the total amount of
basic pay that would be payable for a year of service by that
employee, computed using the employee's final rate of basic
pay, and, if last serving on other than a full-time basis,
with appropriate adjustment therefor.
SEC. 7. REDUCTION OF AGENCY EMPLOYMENT LEVELS.
(a) In General.--The total full-time equivalent employment
in the Department shall be reduced by one for each separation
of an employee who receives a voluntary separation incentive
payment under this Act. The reduction will be calculated by
comparing the Department's full-time equivalent employment
for the fiscal year in which the voluntary separation
payments are made with the actual full-time equivalent
employment for the prior fiscal year.
(b) Enforcement.--The President, through the Office of
Management and Budget, shall monitor the Department and take
any action necessary to ensure that the requirements of this
section are met.
(c) Subsection (a) of this section may be waived upon a
determination by the President that--
(1) the existence of a state of war or other national
emergency so requires; or
(2) the existence of an extraordinary emergency which
threatens life, health, safety, property, or the environment,
so requires.
SEC. 8. CONTINUED HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE.
Section 8905a(d)(4) of title 5, United States Code, is
amended--
(1) in subparagraph (A) by inserting after force ``, or an
involuntary separation from a position in or under the
Department of Veterans Affairs due to a reduction in force or
a title 38 staffing adjustment'';
(2) in subparagraph (B) by inserting at the beginning
thereof ``With respect to the Department of Defense,'';
(3) by redesignating subparagraph (C) as subparagraph (D);
(4) by adding a new subparagraph (C) as follows:
(C) With respect to the Department of Veterans Affairs,
this paragraph shall apply with respect to any individual
whose continued coverage is based on a separation occurring
on or after the date of enactment of this paragraph and
before--
(i) October 1, 2004; or
(ii) February 1, 2005, if specific notice of such
separation was given to such individual before October 1,
2004.
SEC. 9. REGULATIONS.
The Director of the Office of Personnel Management may
prescribe any regulations necessary to administer the
provisions of this Act.
SEC. 10. LIMITATION; SAVINGS CLAUSE.
(a) No voluntary separation incentive under this Act may be
paid based on the separation of an employee after September
30, 2004;
(b) This Act supplements and does not supersede other
authority of the Secretary.
SEC. 11. EFFECTIVE DATE.
(a) This Act shall take effect on the date of enactment.
____
Analysis of Draft Bill
The first section provides a title for the bill,
``Department Of Veterans Affairs Employment Reduction
Assistance Act of 1999.''
Section 2 provides definitions of ``Department'',
employee'', and ``Secretary.'' Among the provisions, an
employee who has received any previous voluntary separation
incentive from the Federal Government is excluded from any
incentives under this Act.
Section 3 requires the VA Secretary to submit to the
Director of the Office of Management and Budget a strategic
plan outlining the use of voluntary separation incentive
payments to Department employees, and a proposed
organizational chart for the Department once such incentive
payments have been completed. The Secretary must submit the
plan before obligating any resources for such incentive
payments.
The plan must include the proposed coverage for offers of
incentives to Department employees, specifying the positions
and functions to be reduced or eliminated, identified by
organizational unit, geographic location, occupational
category and grade level. Coverage may be on the basis of any
component of the Department of Veterans Affairs, any
occupation, levels of an occupation or type of position, any
geographic location, other non-personal factors, or any
appropriate combination of these factors. The plan must also
specify the manner in which the planned employment reductions
will improve efficiency or meet budget or staffing levels.
The plan must also include a proposed time period for payment
of separation incentives, and a description of how the
affected component of the Department will operate without the
eliminated functions and positions.
The Director of the Office of Management and Budget shall
approve or disapprove each plan submitted, and may modify the
plan with respect to the time period of incentives, with
respect to the number and amounts of incentive payments, or
the coverage of incentive offers.
Section 4 authorizes the Secretary to pay a voluntary
separation incentive payment to an employee only to the
extent necessary to reduce or eliminate the positions and
functions identified by the strategic plan. It also requires
that an employee must separate from service with the
Department (whether by retirement or resignation) under the
Act in order to receive a voluntary separation incentive.
The voluntary separation incentive is to be paid in a lump
sum after the employee's separation. The incentive payment
would be for an amount equal to the lesser of the amount of
severance pay that the employee would be entitled to receive
under section 5595 of title 5, United States Code, if so
entitled, (without adjustment for any previous severance
pay), or an amount determined by the Secretary, not to exceed
$25,000. The incentive payment is not to be a basis for the
computation of any other type of Government benefit, and is
not be taken into account in determining the amount of
severance pay to which an employee may be entitled based on
any other separation. Appropriations for employee basic pay
are to be used to pay the incentive payments.
Section 5 provides that any employee who receives a
voluntary separation incentive under this Act and then
accepts any employment with the Government within 5 years
after separating must, prior to the first day of such
employment, repay the entire amount of the incentive to the
agency that paid the incentive. If the subsequent employment
is with the Executive branch, including the United States
Postal Service, the Director of the Office of Personnel
Management may waive the repayment at the request of the
agency head if the individual possesses unique ability and is
the only qualified applicant available for the position. For
subsequent employment in the legislative branch, the head of
the entity or the appointing official may waive repayment on
the same criteria. If the subsequent employment is in the
judicial branch, the Director of the Administrative Office of
the United States Courts may waive repayment on the same
criteria. For the purpose of the repayment provisions, but
not the waiver provisions, employment includes employment
under a personal service contract. For the purpose of the
repayment and waiver provisions, employment does not include
without compensation employment.
Section 6 requires additional agency contributions to the
Civil Service Retirement and Disability Fund in amounts equal
to 15 percent of the final basic pay of each employee of the
Department who is covered by the Civil Service Retirement
System, or the Federal Employees' Retirement System, to whom
a voluntary separation incentive is paid under this Act. It
also defines ``final basic pay''.
Section 7 requires the reduction of full-time equivalent
employment (FTEE) in the Department of Veterans Affairs by
one FTEE for each separation of an employee who receives a
voluntary separation incentive under this Act. Also it
directs the Office of Management and Budget to take any
action necessary to ensure compliance. Reductions will be
calculated on a FTEE basis. For example, if the Department's
FTEE usage in FY 1998 was 1050 FTEEs, and 50 FTEE separate
during FY 1999 using voluntary separation incentive payments
provided under this Act, then the Department's staffing
levels at the end of FY 1999 shall not exceed 1000 FTEEs. The
President may waive the reduction in FTEE in the event of war
or emergency.
Section 8 amends section 8905a(d)(4) of title 5 to provide
that VA employees who are involuntarily separated in a
reduction in force or staffing adjustment, can continue
health benefits coverage for 18 months and be required to pay
only the employee's share of the premium. Section 8 also
extends the section 8905a sunset provisions for VA employees
for FY 1999 through FY2004.
Section 9 provides that the Director of OPM may prescribe
any regulations necessary to administer the provisions of the
Act.
Section 10 provides that no voluntary separation incentive
under the Act may be paid
[[Page 8132]]
based on the separation of an employee after September 30,
2004, and that the Act supplements and does not supersede
other authority of the Secretary.
Section 11 provides that the Act is effective on the date
of enactment.
____
Department of Veterans Affairs,
Washington, DC.
Hon. Albert Gore, Jr.
President of the Senate,
Washington, DC.
Dear Mr. President: On behalf of the Department of Veterans
Affairs (VA), I am submitting a draft bill ``To provide a
temporary authority for the use of voluntary separation
incentives by the Department of Veterans Affairs to reduce
employment levels, restructure staff, and for other
purposes.'' The Department requests that it be referred to
the appropriate committee for prompt consideration and
enactment.
In the next several years, VA will undergo significant
changes. VA believes that separation incentives can be an
appropriate tool for those VA components that are redesigning
their employment mix, when the use of incentives is properly
related to the specific changes that are needed. Separation
incentives can also be an invaluable tool for components that
are restructuring and reengineering, such as the Veterans
Health Administration (VHA) and the Veterans Benefits
Administration (VBA), as they move towards primary care and
new methods of delivering services to veterans. Other VA
components also are engaged in reengineering and
restructuring, and would benefit from this authority. Under
the draft bill, the use of the incentives would be related to
the specific changes that are needed for reshaping VA for the
future. Further, the draft bill would appropriately limit the
time period for the incentive offers over the next five
fiscal years, when VA will accomplish these changes.
This initiative is based on VA's previous experience with
voluntary separation incentives under the Federal Workforce
Restructuring Act of 1994, and the Treasury, Postal Service,
and General Government Appropriations Act of 1997. We believe
that VA used these previous authorities conservatively,
responsibly, and effectively. As an example, VHA required
that elements allowing a buyout must abolish the position of
the employee receiving the buyout. VA has implemented a total
of 9,392 buyouts under both statutes, which is significantly
fewer than the total number authorized. VA's previous use of
buyouts significantly assisted VA in restructuring its
workforce, and enabled it to achieve downsizing and
streamlining goals while minimizing adverse impact on
employees, through such actions as involuntary separations.
* * * * *
The Office of Financial Management would like to offer
approximately 60 buyouts over the next five fiscal years to
support its plans to reduce and adjust the staffing mix in
its Franchise Fund and Supply Fund activities. Over this
period, these activities will undergo changes in program and
product lines, as well as new technologies. These changes
will require fewer employees and employees with different
skill sets the current employees. The Office of Financial
Management will target any incentive payments to specific
organizations, locations, occupations and grade levels.
Under the proposed bill, before obligating any resources
for any incentive payments, the VA Secretary must submit to
the Director of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) a
strategic plan outlining the use of such incentive payments.
The plan must specify the positions and functions to be
reduced or eliminated, identified by organizational unit,
geographic location, occupational category and grade level.
Coverage may be on the basis of any component of VA, any
occupation, levels of an occupation or type of position, any
geographic location, other non-personal factors, or any
appropriate combination of these factors. The plan must also
specify the manner in which the planned employment reductions
would improve efficiency or meet budget or staffing levels.
The plan must also include a proposed time period for payment
of separation incentives, and a description of how the
affected VA component would operate without the eliminated
functions and positions. The Director of the OMB would
approve or disapprove each plan submitted, and would have
authority to modify the time period for payment of
incentives, the number and amounts of incentive payments, or
coverage of incentive offers. We believe that these
provisions for plan approval would ensure that separation
incentives are appropriately targeted within VA in view of
the specific cuts that are needed, and are offered on a
timely basis. Although VA would reduce full-time equivalent
employment by one for each employee receiving an incentive
payment who separates, we believe that service to veterans
would improve as a result of the reengineering that is
happening simultaneously within the system.
The authority for separation incentives would be in effect
for the period starting with the enactment of this Act and
ending September 30, 2004. The amount of an employee's
incentive would be the lesser of the amount that the
employee's severance pay would be, or an amount determined by
the Secretary, not to exceed $25,000.
Any employee who receives an incentive and then accepts any
employment with the Government within 5 years after
separating must, prior to the first day of employment, repay
the entire amount of the incentive. The repayment requirement
could be waived only under very stringent circumstances of
agency need.
This proposal would provide a very useful tool to assist in
reorganizing VA and reengineering services quickly,
effectively, and humanely, to provide higher quality service
to more veterans. We also believe that it is a tool that
would allow significant cost savings. The buyout would be
funded within the base in the President's FY 1999 Budget. If
VA receives authority before June 30, 1999, it could
implement buyouts in VBA with modest costs of $4.7 million in
FY 1999 and estimated savings of $13.3 million annually in
subsequent years. It also could implement buyouts in the
Office of Financial Management with savings of $320,000 in FY
1999 and estimated savings of approximately $1 million
annually in subsequent years. VHA would implement buyouts at
the beginning of FY 2000, with expected discretionary savings
of $103 million in FY 2000 and estimated savings of $220.1
million annually in subsequent years. VBA's savings for
buyouts authorized for FY 2000 would be $2.7 million, with
estimated savings of $15.5 million annually in subsequent
years. The Office of Financial Management savings for FY 2000
would be $992,000, with estimated savings of approximately $1
million annually in subsequent years. In addition, each
subsequent year's buyouts during the five-year period would
yield additional discretionary savings.
The Office of Management and Budget advises that there is
no objection to the submission of this draft bill from the
standpoint of the Administration's program.
Sincerely yours,
Sheila Clarke McCready,
Principal Deputy Assistant
Secretary for Congressional Affairs.
______
By Mr. INHOFE:
S. 944. A bill to amend Public Law 105-188 to provide for the mineral
leasing of certain Indian lands in Oklahoma; to the Committee on Indian
Affairs.
mineral leasing of certain indian lands in oklahoma
Mr. INHOFE. Mr. President, for too long, economic development in
Indian country has been hindered by antiquated rules and regulations,
many dating back to before the turn of the century. Many American
Indians continue to struggle, denied by bureaucracy the opportunity to
take steps to improve their position. I am proposing legislation today
that would reverse one of these situations.
Under current law, Indian lands owned by more than one person require
the consent of 100 percent of the owners before mineral development can
go forward. Oftentimes, this fractionated property is owned by over one
hundred people; it is difficult, if not impossible, to locate all the
owners. Once found, developers must obtain their unanimous consent. As
you can imagine, this creates a significant and often insurmountable
obstacle for leasing or other development. Last year, Congress lowered
this requirement for the Three Affiliated Tribes of the Fort Berthold
Indian Reservation to a majority, which more closely resembles
regulations for non-Indian land. By loosening the consent requirements,
these tribes have found the right balance between economic progress and
protection of landowners' rights.
I am proposing to extend last year's legislation to seven Oklahoma
tribes: the Comanche, Kiowa, Apache, Fort Sill Apache, Delaware, and
the Wichita and Affiliated Tribes. Oil and gas are the cornerstone of
Oklahoma's economy, but these tribes have by and large been left out of
this industry because of the stringent consent statutes. Increased
access to their own land would greatly facilitate mineral development,
bringing increased economic opportunity. These tribes and their members
will now be able to undertake oil and gas exploration which was
previously not possible. This will represent a significant advance
toward greater economic empowerment, breaking out of the constraints
now imposed on these tribes.
Common sense dictates that the first step of self-sufficiency is
being allowed to use the resources you already own. This proposal will
be equitable and beneficial to all parties involved. I look forward to
working with my colleagues
[[Page 8133]]
on this and other such legislation that would help American Indians
achieve greater economic independence.
______
By Mr. DURBIN (for himself, Mr. Leahy, Mr. Kennedy, Mr. Feingold,
and Mr. Sarbanes):
S. 945. A bill to amend title 11, United States Code, and for other
purposes; to the Committee on the Judiciary.
consumer bankruptcy reform act of 1999
Mr. DURBIN. Mr. President, today, joined by colleagues, Senator
Leahy, Senator Kennedy, Senator Feingold and Senator Sarbanes, I am
introducing the bankruptcy reform bill that passed the Senate last year
by a vote of 97-1.
A constant theme that has guided me throughout the consideration of
bankruptcy legislation is balanced reform. You cannot have meaningful
bankruptcy reform without addressing both sides of the problem--
irresponsible debtors and irresponsible creditors.
Unfortunately, the bill we worked so hard to develop, was decimated
in conference and the result was a one-sided bill designed to reward
the credit industry and penalize American consumers. I could not
support it. I hope this year will be different.
The bankruptcy code is delicate balance. When you push one thing,
almost invariably something else will give. For that reason, it is
crucial for bankruptcy reform to be thoughtful and for the changes to
be targeted and not create more problems than they attempt to solve.
This year, Senator Grassley has introduced S.625, the bankruptcy
reform bill of 1999. This bill has more similarities to last year's
conference report than the bipartisan measure that passed the Senate
last year by an overwhelming margin.
The Durbin-Leahy bill is fairer. S.625 uses a means test adopted from
IRS collection allowances. The test would require every debtor,
regardless of income, who files for Chapter 7 bankruptcy to be
scrutinized by the U.S. trustee to determine whether the filling is
abusive. The bill creates a presumption that a case is abusive if a
debtor can pay the lesser of 25% of unsecured nonpriority claims or
$15,000 over 5 years. The IRS means test was designed for use on a case
by case basis, not as an automatic template.
In my home state, the average annual income for bankruptcy filers in
the Central District of Illinois for 1998 was $20,448, yet the average
amount of unsecured debt was $22,900. This figure shows that many
filers were hopelessly insolvent. They owed more money on debt that had
no collateral than their total income for the entire year. These
debtors don't even come close to meeting the standards that would
require them to convert their case to a chapter 13 case, but they will
be forced to go through additional scrutiny at extra costs to everyone
involved.
In contrast, the Durbin-Leahy bill gives courts discretion to dismiss
or convert a Chapter 7 bankruptcy case if the debtor can fund a Chapter
13 repayment plan. One of the factors for the court to consider in
making the decision is whether the debtor is capable of paying 30% of
unsecured claims under a 3 year plan. This reform can address abuses
without the complexity of certifying ability to pay in every case as
required by S.625.
The Durbin-Leahy bill is cheaper because every case does not go
through means testing. By requiring the trustee to submit reports on
all filers the cost to trustees is dramatically increased with little
reward.
The means test in S. 625 looks a lot like the means test in the House
bill. We now know that the means test in the House bill would only
apply to far less than 10% of Chapter 7 filings. A study released by
the American Bankruptcy Institute found that by using the test from the
House bill, 97% of sample Chapter 7 debtors had too little income to
repay even 20% of their unsecured debts over five years. As a result,
only 3% of the sample Chapter 7 filers had sufficient repayment
capacity to be barred from Chapter 7 under the rigid means test. This
means 100% of the filers would have to go through a process that would
only apply to 3% of the cases.
Beyond the administrative costs, there is the unneeded stress on poor
families. According to the National Conference on Bankruptcy Judges, a
review of surveys of Chapter 7 cases from 46 judicial districts in 33
states reveals that the median gross annual income for the 3151 cases
in 1998 was $21,540, some $15,000 lower than the 1997 national median
income for all families in the United States. Yet, the median amount of
unsecured nonpriority debt for these same debtors was $23,411. These
people are insolvent, and forcing them to go through unnecessary hoops
for little reward is unfair and ineffective.
The Durbin-Leahy bill is more balanced. The Durbin-Leahy bill
includes credit disclosures designed to help families understand their
debt and prevent them from incurring debt which makes them financially
vulnerable. Many families file for bankruptcy after a health crisis or
some other catastrophic event that prevents them from paying their
debts. For example, the survey conducted by the bankruptcy judges shows
that on average over 25% of bankruptcy cases involve debtors with
medical debts over $1000. By requiring more complete information for
debtors, they can make better credit decisions and avoid bankruptcy
altogether.
The Durbin-Leahy bill addresses abusive creditor practices. The
Durbin-Leahy bill protects the elderly from predatory lending
practices. Much of our discussion concerning reform of the nation's
bankruptcy laws has focused upon perceived abuses of the bankruptcy
system by consumer debtors. Far less discussion has occurred with
regard to abuses by creditors that help usher the nation's consumers
into bankruptcy. I believe that abuses exist on both sides of the
debtor-creditor relationship and that bankruptcy reform is incomplete
if it fails to address documented abuses among creditors.
Last year, I worked to protect elderly Americans by prohibiting a
high-cost mortgage lender who extended credit in violation of the
provisions of the Truth-In-Lending Act from collecting its claim in
bankruptcy. If the lender has failed to comply with the requirements of
the Truth-in-Lending Act for high-cost second mortgages, the lender
will have absolutely no claim against the bankruptcy estate. This
provision is not aimed at all lenders or at all second mortgages.
Indeed, it is aimed only at the worst, most predatory, of these by and
large worthy lenders. It is aimed only at practices that are already
illegal and it does not deal with technical or immaterial violations of
the Truth in Lending Act.
Disallowing the claims of predatory lenders in bankruptcy cases will
not end these predatory practices altogether. Yet it is one step we can
take to curb creditor abuse in a situation where the lender bears
primary responsibility for the deterioration of a consumer's financial
situation.
I encourage my Senate colleagues to join Senator Leahy and me in this
effort. Bankruptcy reform must be balanced and must not create a nation
of financial outlaws.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that a copy of the bill be
printed in the Record.
There being no objection, the bill was ordered to be printed in the
Record, as follows:
S. 945
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.
(a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the ``Consumer
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1999''.
(b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents for this Act
is as follows:
Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.
TITLE I--NEEDS-BASED BANKRUPTCY
Sec. 101. Conversion.
Sec. 102. Dismissal or conversion.
TITLE II--ENHANCED PROCEDURAL PROTECTIONS FOR CONSUMERS
Sec. 201. Allowance of claims or interests.
Sec. 202. Exceptions to discharge.
Sec. 203. Effect of discharge.
Sec. 204. Automatic stay.
Sec. 205. Discharge.
Sec. 206. Discouraging predatory lending practices.
Sec. 207. Enhanced disclosure for credit extensions secured by
dwelling.
[[Page 8134]]
Sec. 208. Dual-use debit card.
Sec. 209. Enhanced disclosures under an open end credit plan.
Sec. 210. Violations of the automatic stay.
Sec. 211. Discouraging abusive reaffirmation practices.
Sec. 212. Sense of Congress regarding the homestead exemption.
Sec. 213. Encouraging creditworthiness.
Sec. 214. Treasury Department study regarding security interests under
an open end credit plan.
TITLE III--IMPROVED PROCEDURES FOR EFFICIENT ADMINISTRATION OF THE
BANKRUPTCY SYSTEM
Sec. 301. Notice of alternatives.
Sec. 302. Fair treatment of secured creditors under chapter 13.
Sec. 303. Discouragement of bad faith repeat filings.
Sec. 304. Timely filing and confirmation of plans under chapter 13.
Sec. 305. Application of the codebtor stay only when the stay protects
the debtor.
Sec. 306. Improved bankruptcy statistics.
Sec. 307. Audit procedures.
Sec. 308. Creditor representation at first meeting of creditors.
Sec. 309. Fair notice for creditors in chapter 7 and 13 cases.
Sec. 310. Stopping abusive conversions from chapter 13.
Sec. 311. Prompt relief from stay in individual cases.
Sec. 312. Dismissal for failure to timely file schedules or provide
required information.
Sec. 313. Adequate time for preparation for a hearing on confirmation
of the plan.
Sec. 314. Discharge under chapter 13.
Sec. 315. Nondischargeable debts.
Sec. 316. Credit extensions on the eve of bankruptcy presumed
nondischargeable.
Sec. 317. Definition of household goods and antiques.
Sec. 318. Relief from stay when the debtor does not complete intended
surrender of consumer debt collateral.
Sec. 319. Adequate protection of lessors and purchase money secured
creditors.
Sec. 320. Limitation.
Sec. 321. Miscellaneous improvements.
Sec. 322. Bankruptcy judgeships.
Sec. 323. Definition of domestic support obligation.
Sec. 324. Priorities for claims for domestic support obligations.
Sec. 325. Requirements to obtain confirmation and discharge in cases
involving domestic support obligations.
Sec. 326. Exceptions to automatic stay in domestic support obligation
proceedings.
Sec. 327. Nondischargeability of certain debts for alimony,
maintenance, and support.
Sec. 328. Continued liability of property.
Sec. 329. Protection of domestic support claims against preferential
transfer motions.
Sec. 330. Protection of retirement savings in bankruptcy.
Sec. 331. Additional amendments to title 11, United States Code.
Sec. 332. Debt limit increase.
Sec. 333. Elimination of requirement that family farmer and spouse
receive over 50 percent of income from farming operation
in year prior to bankruptcy.
Sec. 334. Prohibition of retroactive assessment of disposable income.
Sec. 335. Amendment to section 1325 of title 11, United States Code.
Sec. 336. Protection of savings earmarked for the postsecondary
education of children.
TITLE IV--FINANCIAL INSTRUMENTS
Sec. 401. Bankruptcy Code amendments.
Sec. 402. Damage measure.
Sec. 403. Asset-backed securitizations.
Sec. 404. Prohibition on certain actions for failure to incur finance
charges.
Sec. 405. Fees arising from certain ownership interests.
Sec. 406. Bankruptcy fees.
Sec. 407. Applicability.
TITLE V--ANCILLARY AND OTHER CROSS-BORDER CASES
Sec. 501. Amendment to add chapter 6 to title 11, United States Code.
Sec. 502. Amendments to other chapters in title 11, United States Code.
TITLE VI--MISCELLANEOUS
Sec. 601. Executory contracts and unexpired leases.
Sec. 602. Expedited appeals of bankruptcy cases to courts of appeals.
Sec. 603. Creditors and equity security holders committees.
Sec. 604. Repeal of sunset provision.
Sec. 605. Cases ancillary to foreign proceedings.
Sec. 606. Limitation.
Sec. 607. Amendment to section 546 of title 11, United States Code.
Sec. 608. Amendment to section 330(a) of title 11, United States Code.
TITLE VII--TECHNICAL CORRECTIONS
Sec. 701. Adjustment of dollar amounts.
Sec. 702. Extension of time.
Sec. 703. Who may be a debtor.
Sec. 704. Penalty for persons who negligently or fraudulently prepare
bankruptcy petitions.
Sec. 705. Limitation on compensation of professional persons.
Sec. 706. Special tax provisions.
Sec. 707. Effect of conversion.
Sec. 708. Automatic stay.
Sec. 709. Allowance of administrative expenses.
Sec. 710. Priorities.
Sec. 711. Exemptions.
Sec. 712. Exceptions to discharge.
Sec. 713. Effect of discharge.
Sec. 714. Protection against discriminatory treatment.
Sec. 715. Property of the estate.
Sec. 716. Preferences.
Sec. 717. Postpetition transactions.
Sec. 718. Technical amendment.
Sec. 719. Disposition of property of the estate.
Sec. 720. General provisions.
Sec. 721. Appointment of elected trustee.
Sec. 722. Abandonment of railroad line.
Sec. 723. Contents of plan.
Sec. 724. Discharge under chapter 12.
Sec. 725. Extensions.
Sec. 726. Bankruptcy cases and proceedings.
Sec. 727. Knowing disregard of bankruptcy law or rule.
Sec. 728. Rolling stock equipment.
Sec. 729. Curbing abusive filings.
Sec. 730. Study of operation of title 11 of the United States Code with
respect to small businesses.
Sec. 731. Transfers made by nonprofit charitable corporations.
Sec. 732. Effective date; application of amendments.
TITLE I--NEEDS-BASED BANKRUPTCY
SEC. 101. CONVERSION.
Section 706(c) of title 11, United States Code, is amended
by inserting ``or consents to'' after ``requests''.
SEC. 102. DISMISSAL OR CONVERSION.
(a) In General.--Section 707 of title 11, United States
Code, is amended--
(1) by striking the section heading and inserting the
following:
``Sec. 707. Dismissal of a case or conversion to a case under
chapter 13'';
and
(2) in subsection (b)--
(A) by inserting ``(1)'' after ``(b)'';
(B) in paragraph (1), as redesignated by subparagraph (A)
of this paragraph--
(i) in the first sentence--
(I) by striking ``but not'' and inserting ``or'';
(II) by inserting ``, or, with the debtor's consent,
convert such a case to a case under chapter 13,'' after
``consumer debts''; and
(III) by striking ``substantial abuse'' and inserting
``abuse''; and
(ii) by striking ``There shall be a presumption in favor of
granting the relief requested by the debtor.''; and
(C) by adding at the end the following:
``(2) In considering under paragraph (1) whether the
granting of relief would be an abuse of the provisions of
this chapter, the court shall consider whether--
``(A) under section 1325(b)(1), on the basis of the current
income of the debtor, the debtor could pay an amount greater
than or equal to 30 percent of unsecured claims that are not
considered to be priority claims (as determined under
subchapter I of chapter 5); or
``(B) the debtor filed a petition for the relief in bad
faith.
``(3)(A) If a panel trustee appointed under section
586(a)(1) of title 28 brings a motion for dismissal or
conversion under this subsection and the court grants that
motion and finds that the action of the counsel for the
debtor in filing under this chapter was not substantially
justified, the court shall order the counsel for the debtor
to reimburse the trustee for all reasonable costs in
prosecuting the motion, including reasonable attorneys' fees.
``(B) If the court finds that the attorney for the debtor
violated Rule 9011, at a minimum, the court shall order--
``(i) the assessment of an appropriate civil penalty
against the counsel for the debtor; and
``(ii) the payment of the civil penalty to the panel
trustee or the United States trustee.
``(C) In the case of a petition referred to in subparagraph
(B), the signature of an attorney shall constitute a
certificate that the attorney has--
``(i) performed a reasonable investigation into the
circumstances that gave rise to the petition; and
``(ii) determined that the petition--
``(I) is well grounded in fact; and
``(II) is warranted by existing law or a good faith
argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of
existing law and does not constitute an abuse under paragraph
(1).
``(4)(A) Except as provided in subparagraph (B) and
paragraph (5), the court may award a debtor all reasonable
costs in contesting a motion brought by a party in interest
(other than a panel trustee or United States trustee) under
this subsection (including reasonable attorneys' fees) if--
``(i) the court does not grant the motion; and
[[Page 8135]]
``(ii) the court finds that--
``(I) the position of the party that brought the motion was
not substantially justified; or
``(II) the party brought the motion solely for the purpose
of coercing a debtor into waiving a right guaranteed to the
debtor under this title.
``(B) A party in interest that has a claim of an aggregate
amount less than $1,000 shall not be subject to subparagraph
(A).
``(5)(A) Only the judge, United States trustee, bankruptcy
administrator, or panel trustee may bring a motion under this
subsection if the debtor and the debtor's spouse combined, as
of the date of the order for relief, have current monthly
total income equal to or less than the national median
household monthly income calculated on a monthly basis for a
household of equal size.
``(B) For purposes of subparagraph (A), for a household of
more than 4 individuals, the median monthly income for that
household shall be--
``(1) the median monthly income of a household of 4
individuals; plus
``(2) $583 for each additional member of that household.''.
(b) Clerical Amendment.--The table of sections for chapter
7 of title 11, United States Code, is amended by striking the
item relating to section 707 and inserting the following:
``707. Dismissal of a case or conversion to a case under chapter 13.''.
TITLE II--ENHANCED PROCEDURAL PROTECTIONS FOR CONSUMERS
SEC. 201. ALLOWANCE OF CLAIMS OR INTERESTS.
Section 502 of title 11, United States Code, is amended by
adding at the end the following:
``(k)(1) The court may award the debtor reasonable
attorneys' fees and costs if, after an objection is filed by
a debtor, the court--
``(A)(i) disallows the claim; or
``(ii) reduces the claim by an amount greater than 20
percent of the amount of the initial claim filed by a party
in interest; and
``(B) finds the position of the party filing the claim is
not substantially justified.
``(2) If the court finds that the position of a claimant
under this section is not substantially justified, the court
may, in addition to awarding a debtor reasonable attorneys'
fees and costs under paragraph (1), award such damages as may
be required by the equities of the case.''.
SEC. 202. EXCEPTIONS TO DISCHARGE.
Section 523 of title 11, United States Code, is amended--
(1) in subsection (a)(2)(A), by striking ``a false
representation'' and inserting ``a material false
representation upon which the defrauded person justifiably
relied''; and
(2) by striking subsection (d) and inserting the following:
``(d)(1) Subject to paragraph (3), if a creditor requests a
determination of dischargeability of a consumer debt under
this section and that debt is discharged, the court shall
award the debtor reasonable attorneys' fees and costs.
``(2) In addition to making an award to a debtor under
paragraph (1), if the court finds that the position of a
creditor in a proceeding covered under this section is not
substantially justified, the court may award reasonable
attorneys' fees and costs under paragraph (1) and such
damages as may be required by the equities of the case.
``(3)(A) A creditor may not request a determination of
dischargeability of a consumer debt under subsection (a)(2)
if--
``(i) before the filing of the petition, the debtor made a
good faith effort to negotiate a reasonable alternative
repayment schedule (including making an offer of a reasonable
alternative repayment schedule); and
``(ii) that creditor refused to negotiate an alternative
payment schedule, and that refusal was not reasonable.
``(B) For purposes of this paragraph, the debtor shall have
the burden of proof of establishing that--
``(i) an offer made by that debtor under subparagraph
(A)(i) was reasonable; and
``(ii) the refusal to negotiate by the creditor involved to
was not reasonable.''.
SEC. 203. EFFECT OF DISCHARGE.
Section 524 of title 11, United States Code, is amended by
adding at the end the following:
``(i) The willful failure of a creditor to credit payments
received under a plan confirmed under this title (including a
plan of reorganization confirmed under chapter 11) in the
manner required by the plan (including crediting the amounts
required under the plan) shall constitute a violation of an
injunction under subsection (a)(2).
``(j) An individual who is injured by the failure of a
creditor to comply with the requirements for a reaffirmation
agreement under subsections (c) and (d), or by any willful
violation of the injunction under subsection (a)(2), shall be
entitled to recover--
``(1) the greater of--
``(A)(i) the amount of actual damages; multiplied by
``(ii) 3; or
``(B) $5,000; and
``(2) costs and attorneys' fees.''.
SEC. 204. AUTOMATIC STAY.
Section 362(h) of title 11, United States Code, is amended
to read as follows:
``(h)(1) An individual who is injured by any willful
violation of a stay provided in this section shall be
entitled to recover--
``(A) actual damages; and
``(B) reasonable costs, including attorneys' fees.
``(2) In addition to recovering actual damages, costs, and
attorneys' fees under paragraph (1), an individual described
in paragraph (1) may recover punitive damages in appropriate
circumstances.''.
SEC. 205. DISCHARGE.
Section 727 of title 11, United States Code, is amended--
(1) in subsection (c), by adding at the end the following:
``(3)(A) A creditor may not request a determination of
dischargeability of a consumer debt under subsection (a) if--
``(i) before the filing of the petition, the debtor made a
good faith effort to negotiate a reasonable alternative
repayment schedule (including making an offer of a reasonable
alternative repayment schedule); and
``(ii) that creditor refused to negotiate an alternative
payment schedule, and that refusal was not reasonable.
``(B) For purposes of this paragraph, the debtor shall have
the burden of proof of establishing that--
``(i) an offer made by that debtor under subparagraph
(A)(i) was reasonable; and
``(ii) the refusal to negotiate by the creditor involved to
was not reasonable.''; and
(2) by adding at the end the following:
``(f)(1) The court may award the debtor reasonable
attorneys' fees and costs in any case in which a creditor
files a motion to deny relief to a debtor under this section
and that motion--
``(A) is denied; or
``(B) is withdrawn after the debtor has replied.
``(2) If the court finds that the position of a party
filing a motion under this section is not substantially
justified, the court may assess against the creditor such
damages as may be required by the equities of the case.''.
SEC. 206. DISCOURAGING PREDATORY LENDING PRACTICES.
Section 502(b) of title 11, United States Code, is
amended--
(1) in paragraph (8), by striking ``or'' at the end;
(2) in paragraph (9), by striking the period at the end and
inserting ``; or''; and
(3) by adding at the end the following:
``(10) the claim is based on a secured debt if the creditor
has failed to comply with the requirements of subsection (a),
(b), (c), (d), (e), (f), (g), (h), or (i) of section 129 of
the Truth in Lending Act (15 U.S.C. 1639).''.
SEC. 207. ENHANCED DISCLOSURE FOR CREDIT EXTENSIONS SECURED
BY DWELLING.
(a) Open-End Credit Extensions.--
(1) Credit applications.--Section 127A(a)(13) of the Truth
in Lending Act (15 U.S.C. 1637a(a)(13)) is amended--
(A) by striking ``consultation of tax advisor.--A statement
that the'' and inserting the following: ``tax
deductibility.--A statement that--
``(A) the''; and
(B) by striking the period at the end and inserting the
following: ``; and
``(B) in any case in which the extension of credit exceeds
the fair market value of the dwelling, the interest on the
portion of the credit extension that is greater than the fair
market value of the dwelling is not tax deductible for
Federal income tax purposes.''.
(2) Credit advertisements.--Section 147(b) of the Truth in
Lending Act (15 U.S.C. 1665b(b)) is amended--
(A) by striking ``If any'' and inserting the following:
``(1) In general.--If any''; and
(B) by adding at the end the following:
``(2) Credit in excess of fair market value.--Each
advertisement described in subsection (a) that relates to an
extension of credit that may exceed the fair market value of
the dwelling shall include a clear and conspicuous statement
that--
``(A) the interest on the portion of the credit extension
that is greater than the fair market value of the dwelling is
not tax deductible for Federal income tax purposes; and
``(B) the consumer may want to consult a tax advisor for
further information regarding the deductibility of interest
and charges.''.
(b) Non-Open End Credit Extensions.--
(1) Credit applications.--Section 128 of the Truth in
Lending Act (15 U.S.C. 1638) is amended--
(A) in subsection (a), by adding at the end the following:
``(15) In the case of a consumer credit transaction that is
secured by the principal dwelling of the consumer, in which
the extension of credit may exceed the fair market value of
the dwelling, a clear and conspicuous statement that--
``(A) the interest on the portion of the credit extension
that is greater than the fair market value of the dwelling is
not tax deductible for Federal income tax purposes; and
``(B) the consumer should consult a tax advisor for further
information regarding the deductibility of interest and
charges.''; and
(B) in subsection (b), by adding at the end the following:
``(3) In the case of a credit transaction described in
paragraph (15) of subsection (a),
[[Page 8136]]
disclosures required by that paragraph shall be made to the
consumer at the time of application for such extension of
credit.''.
(2) Credit advertisements.--Section 144 of the Truth in
Lending Act (15 U.S.C. 1664) is amended by adding at the end
the following:
``(e) Each advertisement to which this section applies that
relates to a consumer credit transaction that is secured by
the principal dwelling of a consumer in which the extension
of credit may exceed the fair market value of the dwelling
shall clearly and conspicuously state that--
``(1) the interest on the portion of the credit extension
that is greater than the fair market value of the dwelling is
not tax deductible for Federal income tax purposes; and
``(2) the consumer may want to consult a tax advisor for
further information regarding the deductibility of interest
and charges.''.
(c) Effective Date.--This section and the amendments made
by this section shall take effect 1 year after the date of
enactment of this Act.
SEC. 208. DUAL-USE DEBIT CARD.
(a) Consumer Liability.--
(1) In general.--Section 909 of the Electronic Fund
Transfer Act (15 U.S.C. 1693g) is amended--
(A) by redesignating subsections (b) through (e) as
subsections (d) through (g), respectively;
(B) in subsection (a)--
(i) by redesignating paragraphs (1) and (2) as
subparagraphs (A) and (B), respectively, and indenting
appropriately;
(ii) by inserting ``Cards Necessitating Unique
Identifier.--
``(1) In general.--'' after ``(a)'';
(iii) by striking ``other means of access can be identified
as the person authorized to use it, such as by signature,
photograph,'' and inserting ``other means of access can be
identified as the person authorized to use it by a unique
identifier, such as a photograph, retina scan,''; and
(iv) by striking ``Notwithstanding the foregoing,'' and
inserting the following:
``(2) Notification.--Notwithstanding paragraph (1),''; and
(C) by inserting after subsection (a) the following new
subsections:
``(b) Cards Not Necessitating Unique Identifier.--A
consumer shall be liable for an unauthorized electronic fund
transfer only if--
``(1) the liability is not in excess of $50;
``(2) the unauthorized electronic fund transfer is
initiated by the use of a card that has been properly issued
to a consumer other than the person making the unauthorized
transfer as a means of access to the account of that consumer
for the purpose of initiating an electronic fund transfer;
``(3) the unauthorized electronic fund transfer occurs
before the card issuer has been notified that an unauthorized
use of the card has occurred or may occur as the result of
loss, theft, or otherwise; and
``(4) such unauthorized electronic fund transfer did not
require the use of a code or other unique identifier (other
than a signature), such as a photograph, fingerprint, or
retina scan.
``(c) Notice of Liability and Responsibility To Report Loss
of Card, Code, or Other Means of Access.--No consumer shall
be liable under this title for any unauthorized electronic
fund transfer unless the consumer has received in a timely
manner the notice required under section 905(a)(1), and any
subsequent notice required under section 905(b) with regard
to any change in the information which is the subject of the
notice required under section 905(a)(1).''.
(2) Conforming amendment.--Section 905(a)(1) of the
Electronic Fund Transfer Act (15 U.S.C. 1693c(a)(1)) is
amended to read as follows:
``(1) the liability of the consumer for any unauthorized
electronic fund transfer and the requirement for promptly
reporting any loss, theft, or unauthorized use of a card,
code, or other means of access in order to limit the
liability of the consumer for any such unauthorized
transfer;''.
(b) Validation Requirement for Dual-Use Debit Cards.--
(1) In general.--Section 911 of the Electronic Fund
Transfer Act (15 U.S.C. 1693i) is amended--
(A) by redesignating subsection (c) as subsection (d); and
(B) by inserting after subsection (b) the following new
subsection:
``(c) Validation Requirement.--No person may issue a card
described in subsection (a), the use of which to initiate an
electronic fund transfer does not require the use of a code
or other unique identifier other than a signature (such as a
fingerprint or retina scan), unless--
``(1) the requirements of paragraphs (1) through (4) of
subsection (b) are met; and
``(2) the issuer has provided to the consumer a clear and
conspicuous disclosure that use of the card may not require
the use of such code or other unique identifier.''.
(2) Technical and conforming amendment.--Section 911(d) of
the Electronic Fund Transfer Act (15 U.S.C. 1993i(d)) (as
redesignated by subsection (a)(1) of this section) is amended
by striking ``For the purpose of subsection (b)'' and
inserting ``For purposes of subsections (b) and (c)''.
SEC. 209. ENHANCED DISCLOSURES UNDER AN OPEN END CREDIT PLAN.
(a) Amendments to the Truth in Lending Act.--
(1) Enhanced disclosure of repayment terms.--
(A) In general.--Section 127(b) of the Truth in Lending Act
(15 U.S.C. 1637(b)) is amended by adding at the end the
following:
``(11)(A) In a clear and conspicuous manner, repayment
information that would apply to the outstanding balance of
the consumer under the credit plan, including--
``(i) the required minimum monthly payment on that balance,
represented as both a dollar figure and a percentage of that
balance;
``(ii) the number of months (rounded to the nearest month)
that it would take to pay the entire amount of that current
balance if the consumer pays only the required minimum
monthly payments and if no further advances are made;
``(iii) the total cost to the consumer, including interest
and principal payments, of paying that balance in full if the
consumer pays only the required minimum monthly payments and
if no further advances are made; and
``(iv) the following statement: `If your current rate is a
temporary introductory rate, your total costs may be
higher.'.
``(B) In making the disclosures under subparagraph (A) the
creditor shall apply the annual interest rate that applies to
that balance with respect to the current billing cycle for
that consumer in effect on the date on which the disclosure
is made.''.
(B) Publication of model forms.--Not later than 180 days
after the date of enactment of this Act, the Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System shall publish model
disclosure forms in accordance with section 105 of the Truth
in Lending Act for the purpose of compliance with section
127(b)(11) of the Truth in Lending Act, as added by this
paragraph.
(C) Civil liability.--Section 130(a) of the Truth in
Lending Act (15 U.S.C. 1640(a)) is amended, in the
undesignated paragraph following paragraph (4), by striking
the second sentence and inserting the following: ``In
connection with the disclosures referred to in subsections
(a) and (b) of section 127, a creditor shall have a liability
determined under paragraph (2) of this subsection only for
failing to comply with the requirements of section 125,
127(a), or of paragraph (4), (5), (6), (7), (8), (9), (10),
or (11) of section 127(b), or for failing to comply with
disclosure requirements under State law for any term or item
that the Board has determined to be substantially the same in
meaning under section 111(a)(2) as any of the terms or items
referred to in section 127(a), or paragraph (4), (5), (6),
(7), (8), (9), (10), or (11) of section 127(b).''.
(2) Disclosures in connection with solicitations.--
(A) In general.--Section 127(c)(1)(B) of the Truth in
Lending Act (15 U.S.C. 1637(c)(1)(B)) is amended by adding at
the end the following:
``(iv) Credit worksheet.--An easily understandable credit
worksheet designed to aid consumers in determining their
ability to assume more debt, including consideration of the
personal expenses of the consumer and a simple formula for
the consumer to determine whether the assumption of
additional debt is advisable.
``(v) Basis of preapproval.--In any case in which the
application or solicitation states that the consumer has been
preapproved for an account under an open end consumer credit
plan, the following statement must appear in a clear and
conspicuous manner: `Your preapproval for this credit card
does not mean that we have reviewed your individual financial
circumstances. You should review your own budget before
accepting this offer of credit.'.
``(vi) Availability of credit report.--That the consumer is
entitled to a copy of his or her credit report in accordance
with the Fair Credit Reporting Act.''.
(B) Publication of model forms.--Not later than 180 days
after the date of enactment of this Act, the Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System shall publish model
disclosure forms in accordance with section 105 of the Truth
in Lending Act for the purpose of compliance with section
127(c)(1)(B) of the Truth in Lending Act, as amended by this
paragraph.
(b) Effective Date.--This section and the amendments made
by this section shall take effect on January 1, 2001.
SEC. 210. VIOLATIONS OF THE AUTOMATIC STAY.
Section 362(a) of title 11, United States Code, is
amended--
(1) in paragraph (7), by striking ``and'' at the end;
(2) in paragraph (8), by striking the period and inserting
``; and'';
(3) by adding at the end the following:
``(9) any communication threatening a debtor, at any time
after the commencement and before the granting of a discharge
in a case under this title, of an intention--
``(A) to file a motion to determine the dischargeability of
a debt;
``(B) to file a motion under section 707(b) to dismiss or
convert the case; or
``(C) to repossess collateral from the debtor to which the
stay applies.''.
[[Page 8137]]
SEC. 211. DISCOURAGING ABUSIVE REAFFIRMATION PRACTICES.
Section 524 of title 11, United States Code, is amended--
(1) in subsection (c)--
(A) in paragraph (2)--
(i) in subparagraph (A), by striking ``and'' at the end;
(ii) in subparagraph (B), by adding ``and'' after the
semicolon; and
(iii) by adding at the end the following:
``(C) such agreement contains a clear and conspicuous
statement that advises the debtor which portion of the debt
to be reaffirmed is attributable to--
``(i) principal;
``(ii) interest;
``(iii) late fees;
``(iv) creditor's attorneys fees; or
``(v) expenses or other costs relating to the collection of
the debt;'';
(B) in paragraph (5), by striking ``and'' after the
semicolon;
(C) in paragraph (6)--
(i) in subparagraph (A), by striking the period and
inserting `` ; except that''; and
(ii) by striking subparagraph (B) and inserting the
following:
``(B) to the extent that the debt is a consumer debt
secured by real property or is a debt described in paragraph
(7), subparagraph (A) shall not apply; and'';
(E) by adding at the end the following:
``(7) in a case concerning an individual--
``(A)(i) if the consideration for such agreement is based
in whole or in part--
``(I) on an unsecured consumer debt; or
``(II) on a debt for an item of personalty with a value of
$250 or less at the point of purchase; and
``(ii) in which the creditor asserts a purchase money
security interest; and
``(B) if the court, approves such agreement as--
``(i) in the best interest of the debtor in light of the
debtor's income and expenses;
``(ii) not imposing an undue hardship on the future ability
of the debtor to pay for the needs of children and other
dependents (including court ordered support);
``(iii) not requiring the debtor to pay the creditor's
attorney's fees, expenses or other costs relating to the
collection of the debt;
``(iv) not entered into to protect property that is
necessary for the care and maintenance of children or other
dependents that would have nominal value on repossession;
``(v) not entered into after coercive threats or actions by
the creditor in the creditor's course of dealings with the
debtor; and
``(vi) not unfair because excessive in amount based upon
the value of the collateral.''; and
(2) in subsection (d)(2), by striking ``requirements of
subsection (c)(6) of this section if the consideration for
such agreement is based in whole or in part on a consumer
debt that is not secured by real property of the debtor'' and
inserting ``applicable requirements of paragraphs (6) and (7)
of subsection (c)''.
SEC. 212. SENSE OF CONGRESS REGARDING THE HOMESTEAD
EXEMPTION.
(a) Findings.--The Congress finds that--
(1) one of the most flagrant abuses of the bankruptcy
system involves misuse of the homestead exemption under
section 522 of title 11, United States Code, which allows a
debtor to exempt the debtor's home, up to a certain value, as
established by State law, from being sold off to satisfy
debts;
(2) while the vast majority of States responsibly cap the
exemption at not more than $40,000, 5 States exempt homes
regardless of their value;
(3) in the few States with unlimited homestead exemptions,
debtors can shield their assets in luxury homes, while
legitimate creditors receive little or nothing;
(4) beneficiaries of the homestead exemption include
convicted insider traders and savings and loan criminals,
while shortchanged creditors include children, spouses,
governments, and banks; and
(5) the homestead exemption should be capped at $100,000 to
prevent such high-profile abuses.
(b) Sense of the Congress.--It is the sense of the
Congress that--
(1) meaningful bankruptcy reform cannot be achieved without
capping the homestead exemption; and
(2) bankruptcy reform legislation should include a cap of
$100,000 on the homestead exemption under title 11, United
States Code.
SEC. 213. ENCOURAGING CREDITWORTHINESS.
(a) Sense of the Congress.--It is the sense of the Congress
that--
(1) certain lenders may sometimes offer credit to consumers
indiscriminately, without taking steps to ensure that
consumers are capable of repaying the resulting debt, and in
a manner which may encourage certain consumers to accumulate
additional debt; and
(2) resulting consumer debt may increasingly be a major
contributing factor to consumer insolvency.
(b) Study Required.--The Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System (referred to in this section as the ``Board'')
shall conduct a study of--
(1) consumer credit industry practices of soliciting and
extending credit--
(A) indiscriminately;
(B) without taking steps to ensure that consumers are
capable of repaying the resulting debt; and
(C) in a manner that encourages consumers to accumulate
additional debt; and
(2) the effects of such practices on consumer debt and
insolvency.
(c) Report and Regulations.--Not later than 24 months after
the date of enactment of this Act, the Board--
(1) shall make public a report on its findings with respect
to the indiscriminate solicitation and extension of credit by
the credit industry;
(2) may issue regulations that would require additional
disclosures to consumers in connection with extensions of
credit; and
(3) may take any other actions, consistent with its
existing statutory authority, that the Board finds necessary
to ensure responsible industrywide practices and to prevent
resulting consumer debt and insolvency.
SEC. 214. TREASURY DEPARTMENT STUDY REGARDING SECURITY
INTERESTS UNDER AN OPEN END CREDIT PLAN.
(a) Study.--The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System (hereafter in this section referred to as the
``Board''), in consultation with the Secretary of the
Treasury, the general credit industry, and consumer groups,
shall conduct a study of the adequacy of information received
by consumers regarding the creation of security interests
under open end credit plans (as defined in the Truth in
Lending Act).
(b) Findings.--The study required under subsection (a)
shall include the findings of the Board regarding--
(1) whether consumers understand at the time of purchase of
property under an open end credit plan that such property may
serve as collateral under that credit plan;
(2) whether consumers understand at the time of purchase
the legal consequences of disposing of property that is
purchased under an open end credit plan and is subject to a
security interest under that plan; and
(3) whether creditors holding security interests in
property purchased under an open end credit plan use such
security interests to coerce reaffirmations of existing debts
under section 524 of title 11, United States Code.
(c) Considerations.--In formulating the findings under
subsection (b), the Board shall consider, among other factors
the Board determines relevant, prevailing industry practices
in this area.
(d) Disclosure Recommendations.--The study required under
subsection (a) shall include the recommendations of the Board
regarding the utility and practicality of additional
disclosures by credit card issuers at the time of purchase
regarding security interests under open end credit plans,
including--
(1) disclosures of the specific property in which the
creditor will receive a security interest;
(2) disclosures of the consequences of nonpayment of the
credit card balance, including how the security interest may
be enforced; and
(3) disclosures of the process by which payments made under
the plan will be credited with respect to the lien created by
the security contract and other debts under the plan.
(e) Submission of Report.--Not later than 180 days after
the date of enactment of this Act, the Board shall submit a
report of its findings under the study required by this
section to the Committee on the Judiciary of the Senate, the
Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs of the
Senate, the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of
Representatives, and the Committee on Banking and Financial
Services of the House of Representatives.
TITLE III--IMPROVED PROCEDURES FOR EFFICIENT ADMINISTRATION OF THE
BANKRUPTCY SYSTEM
SEC. 301. NOTICE OF ALTERNATIVES.
(a) In General.--Section 342 of title 11, United States
Code, is amended by striking subsection (b) and inserting the
following:
``(b) Before the commencement of a case under this title by
an individual whose debts are primarily consumer debts, that
individual shall be given or obtain (as required in section
521(a)(1), as part of the certification process under
subchapter 1 of chapter 5) a written notice prescribed by the
United States trustee for the district in which the petition
is filed under section 586 of title 28. The notice shall
contain the following:
``(1) A brief description of chapters 7, 11, 12, and 13 and
the general purpose, benefits, and costs of proceeding under
each of those chapters.
``(2) A brief description of services that may be available
to that individual from a credit counseling service that is
approved by the United States trustee or the bankruptcy
administrator for that district.''.
(b) Debtor's Duties.--Section 521 of title 11, United
States Code, is amended--
(1) by inserting ``(a)'' before ``The debtor
shall--'';
(2) by striking paragraph (1) and inserting the following:
``(1) file--
``(A) a list of creditors; and
``(B) unless the court orders otherwise--
``(i) a schedule of assets and liabilities;
``(ii) a schedule of current income and current
expenditures;
``(iii) a statement of the debtor's financial affairs and,
if applicable, a certificate--
``(I) of an attorney whose name is on the petition as the
attorney for the debtor or
[[Page 8138]]
any bankruptcy petition preparer signing the petition under
section 110(b)(1) indicating that such attorney or bankruptcy
petition preparer delivered to the debtor any notice required
by section 342(b); or
``(II) if no attorney for the debtor is indicated and no
bankruptcy petition preparer signed the petition, of the
debtor that such notice was obtained and read by the debtor;
``(iv) copies of any Federal tax returns, including any
schedules or attachments, filed by the debtor for the 3-year
period preceding the order for relief;
``(v) copies of all payment advices or other evidence of
payment, if any, received by the debtor from any employer of
the debtor in the period 60 days prior to the filing of the
petition;
``(vi) a statement of the amount of projected monthly net
income, itemized to show how calculated; and
``(vii) a statement disclosing any reasonably anticipated
increase in income or expenditures over the 12-month period
following the date of filing;''; and
(3) by adding at the end the following:
``(b)(1) At any time, a creditor, in the case of an
individual under chapter 7 or 13, may file with the court
notice that the creditor requests the petition, schedules,
and a statement of affairs filed by the debtor in the case
and the court shall make those documents available to the
creditor who requests those documents.
``(2) At any time, a creditor, in a case under chapter 13,
may file with the court notice that the creditor requests the
plan filed by the debtor in the case and the court shall make
that plan available to the creditor who requests that plan.
``(c) An individual debtor in a case under chapter 7 or 13
shall file with the court--
``(1) at the time filed with the taxing authority, all tax
returns, including any schedules or attachments, with respect
to the period from the commencement of the case until such
time as the case is closed;
``(2) at the time filed with the taxing authority, all tax
returns, including any schedules or attachments, that were
not filed with the taxing authority when the schedules under
subsection (a)(1) were filed with respect to the period that
is 3 years before the order for relief;
``(3) any amendments to any of the tax returns, including
schedules or attachments, described in paragraph (1) or (2);
and
``(4) in a case under chapter 13, a statement subject to
the penalties of perjury by the debtor of the debtor's income
and expenditures in the preceding tax year and monthly
income, that shows how the amounts are calculated--
``(A) beginning on the date that is the later of 90 days
after the close of the debtor's tax year or 1 year after the
order for relief, unless a plan has been confirmed; and
``(B) thereafter, on or before the date that is 45 days
before each anniversary of the confirmation of the plan until
the case is closed.
``(d)(1) A statement referred to in subsection (c)(4) shall
disclose--
``(A) the amount and sources of income of the debtor;
``(B) the identity of any persons responsible with the
debtor for the support of any dependents of the debtor; and
``(C) the identity of any persons who contributed, and the
amount contributed, to the household in which the debtor
resides.
``(2) The tax returns, amendments, and statement of income
and expenditures described in paragraph (1) shall be
available to the United States trustee, any bankruptcy
administrator, any trustee, and any party in interest for
inspection and copying, subject to the requirements of
subsection (e).
``(e)(1) Not later than 30 days after the date of enactment
of the Consumer Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1999, the Director
of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts
shall establish procedures for safeguarding the
confidentiality of any tax information required to be
provided under this section.
``(2) The procedures under paragraph (1) shall include
restrictions on creditor access to tax information that is
required to be provided under this section.
``(3) Not later than 1 year after the date of enactment of
the Consumer Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1999, the Director of
the Administrative Office of the United States Courts shall
prepare, and submit to Congress a report that--
``(A) assesses the effectiveness of the procedures under
paragraph (1); and
``(B) if appropriate, includes proposed legislation--
``(i) to further protect the confidentiality of tax
information; and
``(ii) to provide penalties for the improper use by any
person of the tax information required to be provided under
this section.
``(f) If requested by the United States trustee or a
trustee serving in the case, the debtor provides a document
that establishes the identity of the debtor, including a
driver's license, passport, or other document that contains a
photograph of the debtor and such other personal identifying
information relating to the debtor that establishes the
identity of the debtor.''.
(c) Title 28.--Section 586(a) of title 28, United States
Code, is amended--
(1) in paragraph (5), by striking ``and'' at the end;
(2) in paragraph (6), by striking the period at the end and
inserting ``; and''; and
(3) by adding at the end the following:
``(7) on or before January 1 of each calendar year, and
also not later than 30 days after any change in the nonprofit
debt counseling services registered with the bankruptcy
court, prescribe and make available on request the notice
described in section 342(b)(3) of title 11 for each district
included in the region.''.
SEC. 302. FAIR TREATMENT OF SECURED CREDITORS UNDER CHAPTER
13.
(a) Restoring the Foundation for Secured Credit.--Section
1325(a) of title 11, United States Code, is amended--
(1) in paragraph (5), by striking the matter preceding
subparagraph (A) and inserting the following:
``(5) with respect to an allowed claim provided for by the
plan that is secured under applicable nonbankruptcy law by
reason of a lien on property in which the estate has an
interest or is subject to a setoff under section 553--''; and
(2) by adding at the end of the subsection the following
flush sentence:
``For purposes of paragraph (5), section 506 shall not apply
to a claim described in that paragraph.''.
(b) Payment of Holders of Claims Secured by Liens.--Section
1325(a)(5)(B)(i) of title 11, United States Code, is amended
to read as follows:
``(B)(i) the plan provides that the holder of such claim
retain the lien securing such claim until the debt that is
the subject of the claim is fully paid for, as provided under
the plan; and''.
(c) Determination of Secured Status.--Section 506 of title
11, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the
following:
``(e) Subsection (a) shall not apply to an allowed claim to
the extent attributable in whole or in part to the purchase
price of personal property acquired by the debtor during the
90-day period preceding the date of filing of the
petition.''.
SEC. 303. DISCOURAGEMENT OF BAD FAITH REPEAT FILINGS.
Section 362(c) of title 11, United States Code, is
amended--
(1) by inserting ``(1)'' before ``Except as'';
(2) by striking ``(1) the stay'' and inserting ``(A) the
stay'';
(3) by striking ``(2) the stay'' and inserting ``(B) the
stay'';
(4) by striking ``(A) the time'' and inserting ``(i) the
time'';
(5) by striking ``(B) the time'' and inserting ``(ii) the
time''; and
(6) by adding at the end the following:
``(2) Except as provided in subsections (d) through (f),
the stay under subsection (a) with respect to any action
taken with respect to a debt or property securing such debt
or with respect to any lease shall terminate with respect to
the debtor on the 30th day after the filing of the later case
if--
``(A) a single or joint case is filed by or against an
individual debtor under chapter 7, 11, or 13; and
``(B) a single or joint case of that debtor (other than a
case refiled under a chapter other than chapter 7 after
dismissal under section 707(b)) was pending during the
preceding year but was dismissed.
``(3) If a party in interest so requests, the court may
extend the stay in a particular case with respect to 1 or
more creditors (subject to such conditions or limitations as
the court may impose) after providing notice and a hearing
completed before the expiration of the 30-day period
described in paragraph (2) only if the party in interest
demonstrates that the filing of the later case is in good
faith with respect to the creditors to be stayed.
``(4) A case shall be presumed to have not been filed in
good faith (except that such presumption may be rebutted by
clear and convincing evidence to the contrary)--
``(A) with respect to the creditors involved, if--
``(i) more than 1 previous case under any of chapters 7,
11, or 13 in which the individual was a debtor was pending
during the 1-year period described in paragraph (1);
``(ii) a previous case under any of chapters 7, 11, or 13
in which the individual was a debtor was dismissed within the
period specified in paragraph (2) after--
``(I) the debtor, after having received from the court a
request to do so, failed to file or amend the petition or
other documents as required by this title; or
``(II) the debtor, without substantial excuse, failed to
perform the terms of a plan that was confirmed by the court;
or
``(iii)(I) during the period commencing with the dismissal
of the next most previous case under chapter 7, 11, or 13
there has not been a substantial change in the financial or
personal affairs of the debtor;
``(II) if the case is a chapter 7 case, there is no other
reason to conclude that the later case will be concluded with
a discharge; or
``(III) if the case is a chapter 11 or 13 case, there is
not a confirmed plan that will be fully performed; and
``(B) with respect to any creditor that commenced an action
under subsection (d) in a previous case in which the
individual was a debtor, if, as of the date of dismissal of
that case, that action was still pending or had been resolved
by terminating, conditioning,
[[Page 8139]]
or limiting the stay with respect to actions of that
creditor.
``(5)(A) If a request is made for relief from the stay
under subsection (a) with respect to real or personal
property of any kind, and the request is granted in whole or
in part, the court may, in addition to making any other order
under this subsection, order that the relief so granted shall
be in rem either--
``(i) for a definite period of not less than 1 year; or
``(ii) indefinitely.
``(B)(i) After an order is issued under subparagraph (A),
the stay under subsection (a) shall not apply to any property
subject to such an in rem order in any case of the debtor.
``(ii) If an in rem order issued under subparagraph (A) so
provides, the stay shall, in addition to being inapplicable
to the debtor involved, not apply with respect to an entity
under this title if--
``(I) the entity had reason to know of the order at the
time that the entity obtained an interest in the property
affected; or
``(II) the entity was notified of the commencement of the
proceeding for relief from the stay, and at the time of the
notification, no case in which the entity was a debtor was
pending.
``(6) For purposes of this section, a case is pending
during the period beginning with the issuance of the order
for relief and ending at such time as the case involved is
closed.''.
SEC. 304. TIMELY FILING AND CONFIRMATION OF PLANS UNDER
CHAPTER 13.
(a) Filing of Plan.--Section 1321 of title 11, United
States Code, is amended to read as follows:
``Sec. 1321. Filing of plan
``The debtor shall file a plan not later than 90 days after
the order for relief under this chapter, except that the
court may extend such period if the need for an extension is
attributable to circumstances for which the debtor should not
justly be held accountable.''.
(b) Confirmation of Hearing.--Section 1324 of title 11,
United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the
following: ``That hearing shall be held not later than 45
days after the filing of the plan, unless the court, after
providing notice and a hearing, orders otherwise.''.
SEC. 305. APPLICATION OF THE CODEBTOR STAY ONLY WHEN THE STAY
PROTECTS THE DEBTOR.
Section 1301(b) of title 11, United States Code, is
amended--
(1) by inserting ``(1)'' after ``(b)''; and
(2) by adding at the end the following:
``(2)(A) Notwithstanding subsection (c) and except as
provided in subparagraph (B), in any case in which the debtor
did not receive the consideration for the claim held by a
creditor, the stay provided by subsection (a) shall apply to
that creditor for a period not to exceed 30 days beginning on
the date of the order for relief, to the extent the creditor
proceeds against--
``(i) the individual that received that consideration; or
``(ii) property not in the possession of the debtor that
secures that claim.
``(B) Notwithstanding subparagraph (A), the stay provided
by subsection (a) shall apply in any case in which the debtor
is primarily obligated to pay the creditor in whole or in
part with respect to a claim described in subparagraph (A)
under a legally binding separation or property settlement
agreement or divorce or dissolution decree with respect to--
``(i) an individual described in subparagraph (A)(i); or
``(ii) property described in subparagraph (A)(ii).
``(3) Notwithstanding subsection (c), the stay provided by
subsection (a) shall terminate as of the date of confirmation
of the plan, in any case in which the plan of the debtor
provides that the debtor's interest in personal property
subject to a lease with respect to which the debtor is the
lessee will be surrendered or abandoned or no payments will
be made under the plan on account of the debtor's obligations
under the lease.''.
SEC. 306. IMPROVED BANKRUPTCY STATISTICS.
(a) Amendment.--Chapter 6 of part I of title 28, United
States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following:
``Sec. 159. Bankruptcy statistics
``(a) The clerk of each district shall compile statistics
regarding individual debtors with primarily consumer debts
seeking relief under chapters 7, 11, and 13 of title 11.
Those statistics shall be in a form prescribed by the
Director of the Administrative Office of the United States
Courts (referred to in this section as the `Office').
``(b) The Director shall--
``(1) compile the statistics referred to in subsection (a);
``(2) make the statistics available to the public; and
``(3) not later than October 31, 1999, and annually
thereafter, prepare, and submit to Congress a report
concerning the information collected under subsection (a)
that contains an analysis of the information.
``(c) The compilation required under subsection (b) shall--
``(1) be itemized, by chapter, with respect to title 11;
``(2) be presented in the aggregate and for each district;
and
``(3) include information concerning--
``(A) the total assets and total liabilities of the debtors
described in subsection (a), and in each category of assets
and liabilities, as reported in the schedules prescribed
under section 2075 of this title and filed by those debtors;
``(B) the current total monthly income, projected monthly
net income, and average income and average expenses of those
debtors as reported on the schedules and statements that each
such debtor files under sections 111, 521, and 1322 of title
11;
``(C) the aggregate amount of debt discharged in the
reporting period, determined as the difference between the
total amount of debt and obligations of a debtor reported on
the schedules and the amount of such debt reported in
categories which are predominantly nondischargeable;
``(D) the average period of time between the filing of the
petition and the closing of the case;
``(E) for the reporting period--
``(i) the number of cases in which a reaffirmation was
filed; and
``(ii)(I) the total number of reaffirmations filed;
``(II) of those cases in which a reaffirmation was filed,
the number in which the debtor was not represented by an
attorney; and
``(III) of those cases, the number of cases in which the
reaffirmation was approved by the court;
``(F) with respect to cases filed under chapter 13 of title
11, for the reporting period--
``(i)(I) the number of cases in which a final order was
entered determining the value of property securing a claim in
an amount less than the amount of the claim; and
``(II) the number of final orders determining the value of
property securing a claim issued;
``(ii) the number of cases dismissed for failure to make
payments under the plan; and
``(iii) the number of cases in which the debtor filed
another case within the 6 years previous to the filing; and
``(G) the extent of creditor misconduct and any amount of
punitive damages awarded by the court for creditor
misconduct.''.
(b) Clerical Amendment.--The table of sections for chapter
6 of title 28, United States Code, is amended by adding at
the end the following:
``159. Bankruptcy statistics.''.
(c) Effective Date.--The amendments made by this section
shall take effect 18 months after the date of enactment of
this Act.
SEC. 307. AUDIT PROCEDURES.
(a) Amendments.--Section 586 of title 28, United States
Code, is amended--
(1) in subsection (a), as amended by section 301 of this
Act, by striking paragraph (6) and inserting the following:
``(6) make such reports as the Attorney General directs,
including the results of audits performed under subsection
(f); and''; and
(2) by adding at the end the following:
``(f)(1)(A) The Attorney General shall establish procedures
to determine the accuracy and completeness of petitions,
schedules, and other information which the debtor is required
to provide under sections 521 and 1322 of title 11, and, if
applicable, section 111 of title 11, in individual cases
filed under chapter 7 or 13 of such title.
``(B) Those procedures shall--
``(i) establish a method of selecting appropriate qualified
persons to contract to perform those audits;
``(ii) establish a method of randomly selecting cases to be
audited, except that not less than 1 out of every 500 cases
in each Federal judicial district shall be selected for
audit;
``(iii) require audits for schedules of income and expenses
which reflect greater than average variances from the
statistical norm of the district in which the schedules were
filed; and
``(iv) establish procedures for providing, not less
frequently than annually, public information concerning the
aggregate results of such audits including the percentage of
cases, by district, in which a material misstatement of
income or expenditures is reported.
``(2) The United States trustee for each district is
authorized to contract with auditors to perform audits in
cases designated by the United States trustee according to
the procedures established under paragraph (1).
``(3)(A) The report of each audit conducted under this
subsection shall be filed with the court and transmitted to
the United States trustee. Each report shall clearly and
conspicuously specify any material misstatement of income or
expenditures or of assets identified by the person performing
the audit. In any case where a material misstatement of
income or expenditures or of assets has been reported, the
clerk of the bankruptcy court shall give notice of the
misstatement to the creditors in the case.
``(B) If a material misstatement of income or expenditures
or of assets is reported the United States trustee shall--
``(i) report the material misstatement, if appropriate, to
the United States Attorney under section 3057 of title 18;
and
``(ii) if advisable, take appropriate action, including but
not limited to commencing an adversary proceeding to revoke
the debtor's discharge under section 727(d) of title 11.''.
[[Page 8140]]
(b) Amendments to Section 521 of Title 11, United States
Code.--Section 521(a) of title 11, United States Code, as
amended by section 301(b) of this Act, is amended in
paragraphs (3) and (4) by inserting ``or an auditor appointed
under section 586 of title 28'' after ``serving in the case''
each place it appears.
(c) Amendments to Section 727 of Title 11, United States
Code.--Section 727(d) of title 11, United States Code, is
amended--
(1) in paragraph (2), by striking ``or'' at the end;
(2) in paragraph (3), by striking the period and inserting
``; or''; and
(3) by adding at the end the following:
``(4) the debtor has failed to explain satisfactorily--
``(A) a material misstatement in an audit performed under
section 586(f) of title 28; or
``(B) a failure to make available for inspection all
necessary accounts, papers, documents, financial records,
files and all other papers, things, or property belonging to
the debtor that are requested for an audit conducted under
section 586(f) of title 28.''.
(d) Effective Date.--The amendments made by this section
shall take effect 18 months after the date of enactment of
this Act.
SEC. 308. CREDITOR REPRESENTATION AT FIRST MEETING OF
CREDITORS.
Section 341(c) of title 11, United States Code, is
amended--
(1) by inserting ``(1)'' after ``(c)''; and
(2) by adding at the end the following:
``(2) Notwithstanding any local court rule, provision of a
State constitution, any other Federal or State law that is
not a bankruptcy law, or other requirement that
representation at the meeting of creditors under subsection
(a) be by an attorney, a creditor holding a consumer debt or
any representative of the creditor (which may include an
entity or an employee of an entity and may be a
representative for more than 1 creditor) shall be permitted
to appear at and participate in the meeting of creditors in a
case under chapter 7 or 13, either alone or in conjunction
with an attorney for the creditor.
``(3) Nothing in this subsection shall be construed to
require any creditor to be represented by an attorney at any
meeting of creditors.''.
SEC. 309. FAIR NOTICE FOR CREDITORS IN CHAPTER 7 AND 13
CASES.
Section 342 of title 11, United States Code, is amended--
(1) in subsection (c), by striking ``, but the failure of
such notice to contain such information shall not invalidate
the legal effect of such notice''; and
(2) by adding at the end the following:
``(d)(1) If the credit agreement between the debtor and the
creditor or the last communication before the filing of the
petition in a voluntary case from the creditor to a debtor
who is an individual states an account number of the debtor
that is the current account number of the debtor with respect
to any debt held by the creditor against the debtor, the
debtor shall include that account number in any notice to the
creditor required to be given under this title.
``(2) If the creditor has specified to the debtor, in the
last communication before the filing of the petition, an
address at which the creditor wishes to receive
correspondence regarding the debtor's account, any notice to
the creditor required to be given by the debtor under this
title shall be given at such address.
``(3) For purposes of this section, the term `notice'
includes--
``(A) any correspondence from the debtor to the creditor
after the commencement of the case;
``(B) any statement of the debtor's intention under section
521(a)(2);
``(C) notice of the commencement of any proceeding in the
case to which the creditor is a party; and
``(D) any notice of a hearing under section 1324.
``(e)(1) At any time, a creditor, in a case of an
individual under chapter 7 or 13, may file with the court and
serve on the debtor a notice of the address to be used to
notify the creditor in that case.
``(2) If the court or the debtor is required to give the
creditor notice, not later than 5 days after receipt of the
notice under paragraph (1), that notice shall be given at
that address.
``(f) An entity may file with the court a notice stating
its address for notice in cases under chapter 7 or 13. After
the date that is 30 days following the filing of that notice,
any notice in any case filed under chapter 7 or 13 given by
the court shall be to that address unless specific notice is
given under subsection (e) with respect to a particular case.
``(g)(1) Notice given to a creditor other than as provided
in this section shall not be effective notice until that
notice has been brought to the attention of the creditor.
``(2) If the creditor has designated a person or department
to be responsible for receiving notices concerning bankruptcy
cases and has established reasonable procedures so that
bankruptcy notices received by the creditor will be delivered
to that department or person, notice shall not be brought to
the attention of the creditor until that notice is received
by that person or department.''.
SEC. 310. STOPPING ABUSIVE CONVERSIONS FROM CHAPTER 13.
Section 348(f)(1) of title 11, United States Code, is
amended--
(1) in subparagraph (A), by striking ``and'' at the end;
(2) in subparagraph (B)--
(A) by striking ``in the converted case, with allowed
secured claims'' and inserting ``only in a case converted to
chapter 11 or 12 but not in a case converted to chapter 7,
with allowed secured claims in cases under chapters 11 and
12''; and
(B) by striking the period and inserting ``; and''; and
(3) by adding at the end the following:
``(C) with respect to cases converted from chapter 13, the
claim of any creditor holding security as of the date of the
petition shall continue to be secured by that security unless
the full amount of that claim determined under applicable
nonbankruptcy law has been paid in full as of the date of
conversion, notwithstanding any valuation or determination of
the amount of an allowed secured claim made for the purposes
of the chapter 13 proceeding.''.
SEC. 311. PROMPT RELIEF FROM STAY IN INDIVIDUAL CASES.
Section 362(e) of title 11, United States Code, is
amended--
(1) by inserting ``(1)'' after ``(e)''; and
(2) by adding at the end the following:
``(2) Notwithstanding paragraph (1), in the case of an
individual filing under chapter 7, 11, or 13, the stay under
subsection (a) shall terminate on the date that is 60 days
after a request is made by a party in interest under
subsection (d), unless--
``(A) a final decision is rendered by the court during the
60-day period beginning on the date of the request; or
``(B) that 60-day period is extended--
``(i) by agreement of all parties in interest; or
``(ii) by the court for such specific period of time as the
court finds is required for good cause.''.
SEC. 312. DISMISSAL FOR FAILURE TO TIMELY FILE SCHEDULES OR
PROVIDE REQUIRED INFORMATION.
Section 707 of title 11, United States Code, as amended by
section 102 of this Act, is amended by adding at the end the
following:
``(c)(1) Notwithstanding subsection (a), and subject to
paragraph (2), if an individual debtor in a voluntary case
under chapter 7 or 13 fails to file all of the information
required under section 521(a)(1) within 45 days after the
filing of the petition commencing the case, the case shall be
automatically dismissed effective on the 46th day after the
filing of the petition.
``(2) With respect to a case described in paragraph (1),
any party in interest may request the court to enter an order
dismissing the case. The court shall, if so requested, enter
an order of dismissal not later than 5 days after that
request.
``(3) Upon request of the debtor made within 45 days after
the filing of the petition commencing a case described in
paragraph (1), the court may allow the debtor an additional
period of not to exceed 50 days to file the information
required under section 521(a)(1) if the court finds
justification for extending the period for the filing.''.
SEC. 313. ADEQUATE TIME FOR PREPARATION FOR A HEARING ON
CONFIRMATION OF THE PLAN.
Section 1324 of title 11, United States Code, as amended by
section 304 of this Act, is amended--
(1) by striking ``After'' and inserting the following:
``(a) Except as provided in subsection (b) and after''; and
(2) by adding at the end the following:
``(b) If not later than 5 days after receiving notice of a
hearing on confirmation of the plan, a creditor objects to
the confirmation of the plan, the hearing on confirmation of
the plan may be held no earlier than 20 days after the first
meeting of creditors under section 341(a).''.
SEC. 314. DISCHARGE UNDER CHAPTER 13.
Section 1328(a) of title 11, United States Code, is amended
by striking paragraphs (1) through (3) and inserting the
following:
``(1) provided for under section 1322(b)(5);
``(2) of the kind specified in paragraph (2), (4), (5),
(8), or (9) of section 523(a);
``(3) for restitution, or a criminal fine, included in a
sentence on the debtor's conviction of a crime; or
``(4) for restitution, or damages, awarded in a civil
action against the debtor as a result of willful or malicious
injury by the debtor that caused personal injury to an
individual or the death of an individual.''.
SEC. 315. NONDISCHARGEABLE DEBTS.
Section 523(a) of title 11, United States Code, is amended
by inserting after paragraph (14) the following:
``(14A) incurred to pay a debt that is nondischargeable by
reason of section 727, 1141, 1228 (a) or (b), or 1328(b), or
any other provision of this subsection, if the debtor
incurred the debt to pay such a nondischargeable debt with
the intent to discharge in bankruptcy the newly created
debt.''.
SEC. 316. CREDIT EXTENSIONS ON THE EVE OF BANKRUPTCY PRESUMED
NONDISCHARGEABLE.
Section 523(a)(2) of title 11, United States Code, as
amended by section 202 of this Act, is amended--
[[Page 8141]]
(1) in subparagraph (A), by striking the semicolon at the
end and inserting the following: ``(and, for purposes of this
subparagraph, consumer debts owed in an aggregate amount
greater than or equal to $400 incurred for goods or services
not reasonably necessary for the maintenance or support of
the debtor or a dependent child of the debtor to a single
creditor that are incurred during the 90-day period preceding
the date of the order for relief shall be presumed to be
nondischargeable under this subparagraph); or'';
(2) in subparagraph (B), by striking ``or'' at the end; and
(3) by striking subparagraph (C).
SEC. 317. DEFINITION OF HOUSEHOLD GOODS AND ANTIQUES.
(a) In General.--Not later than 180 days after the date of
enactment of this Act, the Federal Trade Commission shall
promulgate regulations defining the term ``household goods'',
to be applied to section 522(d)(3) of title 11, United States
Code, in a manner suitable and appropriate for cases under
that title.
(b) Absence of Final Regulations.--If final regulations are
not promulgated under subsection (a) and in effect by the
date that is 180 days after the date enactment of this Act,
then, for purposes of section 522(d)(3) of title 11, United
States Code, the term ``household goods'' shall have the
meaning given that term in section 444.1(i) of title 16, Code
of Federal Regulations, except that the term shall also
include any tangible personal property reasonably necessary
for the maintenance or support of a dependent child.
SEC. 318. RELIEF FROM STAY WHEN THE DEBTOR DOES NOT COMPLETE
INTENDED SURRENDER OF CONSUMER DEBT COLLATERAL.
(a) Automatic Stay.--Section 362 of title 11, United States
Code, as amended by section 303 of this Act, is amended--
(1) in subsection (c)(1), in the matter preceding
subparagraph (A), by striking ``(e) and (f)'' and inserting
``(e), (f), and (h)'';
(2) by redesignating subsection (h) as subsection (i); and
(3) by inserting after subsection (g) the following:
``(h) In an individual case under chapter 7, 11, or 13 the
stay provided by subsection (a) is terminated with respect to
property of the estate securing in whole or in part a claim
that is in an amount greater than $3,000, or subject to an
unexpired lease with a remaining term of at least 1 year (in
any case in which the debtor owes at least $3,000 for a 1-
year period), if within 30 days after the expiration of the
applicable period under section 521(a)(2)--
``(1)(A) the debtor fails to timely file a statement of
intention to surrender or retain the property; or
``(B) if the debtor indicates in the filing that the debtor
will retain the property, the debtor fails to meet an
applicable requirement to--
``(i) either--
``(I) redeem the property pursuant to section 722; or
``(II) reaffirm the debt the property secures pursuant to
section 524(c); or
``(ii) assume the unexpired lease pursuant to section
365(d) if the trustee does not do so; or
``(2) the debtor fails to timely take the action specified
in a statement of intention referred to in paragraph (1)(A)
(as amended, if that statement is amended before expiration
of the period for taking action), unless--
``(A) the statement of intention specifies reaffirmation;
and
``(B) the creditor refuses to reaffirm the debt on the
original contract terms for the debt.''.
(b) Debtor's Duties.--Section 521(a)(2) of title 11, United
States Code, as redesignated by section 301(b) of this Act,
is amended--
(1) in the matter preceding subparagraph (A), by striking
``consumer'';
(2) in subparagraph (B)--
(A) by striking ``forty-five days after the filing of a
notice of intent under this section'' and inserting ``30 days
after the first meeting of creditors under section 341(a)'';
and
(B) by striking ``forty-five-day period'' and inserting
``30-day period''; and
(3) in subparagraph (C), by inserting ``, except as
provided in section 362(h)'' before the semicolon.
SEC. 319. ADEQUATE PROTECTION OF LESSORS AND PURCHASE MONEY
SECURED CREDITORS.
(a) In General.--Chapter 13 of title 11, United States
Code, is amended by adding after section 1307 the following:
``Sec. 1307A. Adequate protection in chapter 13 cases
``(a)(1)(A) On or before the date that is 30 days after the
filing of a case under this chapter, the debtor shall make
cash payments in an amount determined under paragraph (2)(A),
to--
``(i) any lessor of personal property; and
``(ii) any creditor holding a claim secured by personal
property to the extent that the claim is attributable to the
purchase of that property by the debtor.
``(B) The debtor or the plan shall continue making the
adequate protection payments until the earlier of the date on
which--
``(i) the creditor begins to receive actual payments under
the plan; or
``(ii) the debtor relinquishes possession of the property
referred to in subparagraph (A) to--
``(I) the lessor or creditor; or
``(II) any third party acting under claim of right, as
applicable.
``(2) The payments referred to in paragraph (1)(A) shall be
determined by the court.
``(b)(1) Subject to the limitations under paragraph (2),
the court may, after notice and hearing, change the amount
and timing of the dates of payment of payments made under
subsection (a).
``(2)(A) The payments referred to in paragraph (1) shall be
payable not less frequently than monthly.
``(B) The amount of a payment referred to in paragraph (1)
shall not be less than the reasonable depreciation of the
personal property described in subsection (a)(1), determined
on a month-to-month basis.
``(c) Notwithstanding section 1326(b), the payments
referred to in subsection (a)(1)(A) shall be continued in
addition to plan payments under a confirmed plan until actual
payments to the creditor begin under that plan, if the
confirmed plan provides--
``(1) for payments to a creditor or lessor described in
subsection (a)(1); and
``(2) for the deferral of payments to such creditor or
lessor under the plan until the payment of amounts described
in section 1326(b).
``(d) Notwithstanding sections 362, 542, and 543, a lessor
or creditor described in subsection (a) may retain possession
of property described in that subsection that was obtained in
accordance with applicable law before the date of filing of
the petition until the first payment under subsection
(a)(1)(A) is received by the lessor or creditor.''.
(b) Clerical Amendment.--The table of sections for chapter
13 of title 11, United States Code, is amended by inserting
after the item relating to section 1307 the following:
``1307A. Adequate protection in chapter 13 cases.''.
SEC. 320. LIMITATION.
Section 522 of title 11, United States Code, is amended--
(1) in subsection (b)(2)(A), by inserting ``subject to
subsection (n),'' before ``any property''; and
(2) by adding at the end the following new subsection:
``(n)(1) Except as provided in paragraph (2), as a result
of electing under subsection (b)(2)(A) to exempt property
under State or local law, a debtor may not exempt any amount
of interest that exceeds in the aggregate $100,000 in value
in--
``(A) real or personal property that the debtor or a
dependent of the debtor uses as a residence;
``(B) a cooperative that owns property that the debtor or a
dependent of the debtor uses as a residence; or
``(C) a burial plot for the debtor or a dependent of the
debtor.
``(2) The limitation under paragraph (1) shall not apply to
an exemption claimed under subsection (b)(2)(A) by a family
farmer for the principal residence of that farmer.''.
SEC. 321. MISCELLANEOUS IMPROVEMENTS.
(a) Who May Be a Debtor.--Section 109 of title 11, United
States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following:
``(h)(1) Subject to paragraphs (2) and (3) and
notwithstanding any other provision of this section, an
individual may not be a debtor under this title unless that
individual has, during the 90-day period preceding the date
of filing of the petition of that individual, received credit
counseling, including, at a minimum, participation in an
individual or group briefing that outlined the opportunities
for available credit counseling and assisted that individual
in performing an initial budget analysis, through a credit
counseling program (offered through an approved credit
counseling service described in section 111(a)) that has been
approved by--
``(A) the United States trustee; or
``(B) the bankruptcy administrator for the district in
which the petition is filed.''.
``(2)(A) Paragraph (1) shall not apply with respect to a
debtor who resides in a district for which the United States
trustee or bankruptcy administrator of the bankruptcy court
of that district determines that the approved credit
counseling services for that district are not reasonably able
to provide adequate services to the additional individuals
who would otherwise seek credit counseling from those
programs by reason of the requirements of paragraph (1).
``(B) Each United States trustee or bankruptcy
administrator that makes a determination under subparagraph
(A) shall review that determination not later than 1 year
after the date of that determination, and not less frequently
than annually thereafter.
``(3)(A) Subject to subparagraph (B), the requirements of
paragraph (1) shall not apply with respect to a debtor who
submits to the court a certification that--
``(i) describes exigent circumstances that merit a waiver
of the requirements of paragraph (1);
``(ii) states that the debtor requested credit counseling
services from an approved credit counseling service, but was
unable to obtain the services referred to in paragraph (1)
during the 5-day period beginning on the date on which the
debtor made that request; and
[[Page 8142]]
``(iii) is satisfactory to the court.
``(B) With respect to a debtor, an exemption under
subparagraph (A) shall cease to apply to that debtor on the
date on which the debtor meets the requirements of paragraph
(1), but in no case may the exemption apply to that debtor
after the date that is 30 days after the debtor files a
petition.''.
(b) Chapter 7 Discharge.--Section 727(a) of title 11,
United States Code, is amended--
(1) in paragraph (9), by striking ``or'' at the end;
(2) in paragraph (10), by striking the period and inserting
``; or''; and
(3) by adding at the end the following:
``(11) after the filing of the petition, the debtor failed
to complete an instructional course concerning personal
financial management described in section 111 that was
administered or approved by--
``(A) the United States trustee; or
``(B) the bankruptcy administrator for the district in
which the petition is filed.''.
(c) Chapter 13 Discharge.--Section 1328 of title 11, United
States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following:
``(f) The court shall not grant a discharge under this
section to a debtor, unless after filing a petition the
debtor has completed an instructional course concerning
personal financial management described in section 111 that
was administered or approved by--
``(1) the United States trustee; or
``(2) the bankruptcy administrator for the district in
which the petition is filed.''.
(d) Debtor's Duties.--Section 521 of title 11, United
States Code, as amended by section 318(b) of this Act, is
amended by adding at the end the following:
``(e) In addition to the requirements under subsection (a),
an individual debtor shall file with the court--
``(1) a certificate from the credit counseling service that
provided the debtor services under section 109(h); and
``(2) a copy of the debt repayment plan, if any, developed
under section 109(h) through the credit counseling service
referred to in paragraph (1).''.
(e) Exceptions to Discharge.--Section 523(d) of title 11,
United States Code, as amended by section 202 of this Act, is
amended by striking paragraph (3)(A)(i) and inserting the
following:
``(i) within the applicable period of time prescribed under
section 109(h), the debtor received credit counseling through
a credit counseling program in accordance with section
109(h); and''.
(f) General Provisions.--
(1) In general.--Chapter 1 of title 11, United States Code,
is amended by adding at the end the following:
``Sec. 111. Credit counseling services; financial management
instructional courses
``(a) The clerk of each district shall maintain a list of
credit counseling services that provide 1 or more programs
described in section 109(h) and that have been approved by--
``(1) the United States trustee; or
``(2) the bankruptcy administrator for the district.
``(b) The United States trustee or each bankruptcy
administrator referred to in subsection (a)(1) shall--
``(1) make available to debtors who are individuals an
instructional course concerning personal financial
management, under the direction of the bankruptcy court; and
``(2) maintain a list of instructional courses concerning
personal financial management that are operated by a private
entity and that have been approved by the United States
trustee or that bankruptcy administrator.''.
(2) Clerical amendment.--The table of sections for chapter
1 of title 11, United States Code, is amended by adding at
the end the following:
``111. Credit counseling services; financial management instructional
courses.''.
(g) Definitions.--Section 101 of title 11, United States
Code, is amended--
(3) by inserting after paragraph (13) the following:
``(13A) `debtor's principal residence'--
``(A) means a residential structure, including incidental
property, without regard to whether that structure is
attached to real property; and
``(B) includes an individual condominium or co-operative
unit;''; and
(2) by inserting after paragraph (27), the following:
``(27A) `incidental property' means, with respect to a
debtor's principal residence--
``(A) property commonly conveyed with a principal residence
in the area where the real estate is located;
``(B) all easements, rights, appurtenances, fixtures,
rents, royalties, mineral rights, oil or gas rights or
profits, water rights, escrow funds, or insurance proceeds;
and
``(C) all replacements or additions;''.
SEC. 322. BANKRUPTCY JUDGESHIPS.
(a) Short Title.--This section may be cited as the
``Bankruptcy Judgeship Act of 1999''.
(b) Temporary Judgeships.--
(1) Appointments.--The following judgeship positions shall
be filled in the manner prescribed in section 152(a)(1) of
title 28, United States Code, for the appointment of
bankruptcy judges provided for in section 152(a)(2) of such
title:
(A) One additional bankruptcy judgeship for the eastern
district of California.
(B) Four additional bankruptcy judgeships for the central
district of California.
(C) One additional bankruptcy judgeship for the southern
district of Florida.
(D) Two additional bankruptcy judgeships for the district
of Maryland.
(E) One additional bankruptcy judgeship for the eastern
district of Michigan.
(F) One additional bankruptcy judgeship for the southern
district of Mississippi.
(G) One additional bankruptcy judgeship for the district of
New Jersey.
(H) One additional bankruptcy judgeship for the eastern
district of New York.
(I) One additional bankruptcy judgeship for the northern
district of New York.
(J) One additional bankruptcy judgeship for the southern
district of New York.
(K) One additional bankruptcy judgeship for the eastern
district of Pennsylvania.
(L) One additional bankruptcy judgeship for the middle
district of Pennsylvania.
(M) One additional bankruptcy judgeship for the western
district of Tennessee.
(N) One additional bankruptcy judgeship for the eastern
district of Virginia.
(2) Vacancies.--The first vacancy occurring in the office
of a bankruptcy judge in each of the judicial districts set
forth in paragraph (1) that--
(A) results from the death, retirement, resignation, or
removal of a bankruptcy judge; and
(B) occurs 5 years or more after the appointment date of a
bankruptcy judge appointed under paragraph (1);
shall not be filled.
(c) Extensions.--
(1) In general.--The temporary bankruptcy judgeship
positions authorized for the northern district of Alabama,
the district of Delaware, the district of Puerto Rico, the
district of South Carolina, and the eastern district of
Tennessee under section 3(a) (1), (3), (7), (8), and (9) of
the Bankruptcy Judgeship Act of 1992 (28 U.S.C. 152 note) are
extended until the first vacancy occurring in the office of a
bankruptcy judge in the applicable district resulting from
the death, retirement, resignation, or removal of a
bankruptcy judge and occurring--
(A) 8 years or more after November 8, 1993, with respect to
the northern district of Alabama;
(B) 10 years or more after October 28, 1993, with respect
to the district of Delaware;
(C) 8 years or more after August 29, 1994, with respect to
the district of Puerto Rico;
(D) 8 years or more after June 27, 1994, with respect to
the district of South Carolina; and
(E) 8 years or more after November 23, 1993, with respect
to the eastern district of Tennessee.
(2) Applicability of other provisions.--All other
provisions of section 3 of the Bankruptcy Judgeship Act of
1992 remain applicable to such temporary judgeship position.
(d) Technical Amendment.--The first sentence of section
152(a)(1) of title 28, United States Code, is amended to read
as follows: ``Each bankruptcy judge to be appointed for a
judicial district as provided in paragraph (2) shall be
appointed by the United States court of appeals for the
circuit in which such district is located.''.
(e) Travel Expenses of Bankruptcy Judges.--Section 156 of
title 28, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end
the following new subsection:
``(g)(1) In this subsection, the term `travel expenses'--
``(A) means the expenses incurred by a bankruptcy judge for
travel that is not directly related to any case assigned to
such bankruptcy judge; and
``(B) shall not include the travel expenses of a bankruptcy
judge if--
``(i) the payment for the travel expenses is paid by such
bankruptcy judge from the personal funds of such bankruptcy
judge; and
``(ii) such bankruptcy judge does not receive funds
(including reimbursement) from the United States or any other
person or entity for the payment of such travel expenses.
``(2) Each bankruptcy judge shall annually submit the
information required under paragraph (3) to the chief
bankruptcy judge for the district in which the bankruptcy
judge is assigned.
``(3)(A) Each chief bankruptcy judge shall submit an annual
report to the Director of the Administrative Office of the
United States Courts on the travel expenses of each
bankruptcy judge assigned to the applicable district
(including the travel expenses of the chief bankruptcy judge
of such district).
``(B) The annual report under this paragraph shall
include--
``(i) the travel expenses of each bankruptcy judge, with
the name of the bankruptcy judge to whom the travel expenses
apply;
``(ii) a description of the subject matter and purpose of
the travel relating to each travel expense identified under
clause (i), with the name of the bankruptcy judge to whom the
travel applies; and
``(iii) the number of days of each travel described under
clause (ii), with the name of the bankruptcy judge to whom
the travel applies.
``(4)(A) The Director of the Administrative Office of the
United States Courts shall--
``(i) consolidate the reports submitted under paragraph (3)
into a single report; and
``(ii) annually submit such consolidated report to
Congress.
[[Page 8143]]
``(B) The consolidated report submitted under this
paragraph shall include the specific information required
under paragraph (3)(B), including the name of each bankruptcy
judge with respect to clauses (i), (ii), and (iii) of
paragraph (3)(B).''.
SEC. 323. DEFINITION OF DOMESTIC SUPPORT OBLIGATION.
Section 101 of title 11, United States Code, as amended by
section 321(g) of this Act, is amended--
(1) by striking paragraph (12A); and
(2) by inserting after paragraph (14) the following:
``(14A) `domestic support obligation' means a debt that
accrues before or after the entry of an order for relief
under this title that is--
``(A) owed to or recoverable by--
``(i) a spouse, former spouse, or child of the debtor or
that child's legal guardian; or
``(ii) a governmental unit;
``(B) in the nature of alimony, maintenance, or support
(including assistance provided by a governmental unit) of
such spouse, former spouse, or child, without regard to
whether such debt is expressly so designated;
``(C) established or subject to establishment before or
after entry of an order for relief under this title, by
reason of applicable provisions of--
``(i) a separation agreement, divorce decree, or property
settlement agreement;
``(ii) an order of a court of record; or
``(iii) a determination made in accordance with applicable
nonbankruptcy law by a governmental unit; and
``(D) not assigned to a nongovernmental entity, unless that
obligation is assigned voluntarily by the spouse, former
spouse, child, or parent solely for the purpose of collecting
the debt.''.
SEC. 324. PRIORITIES FOR CLAIMS FOR DOMESTIC SUPPORT
OBLIGATIONS.
Section 507(a) of title 11, United States Code, is
amended--
(1) by striking paragraph (7);
(2) by redesignating paragraphs (1) through (6) as
paragraphs (2) through (7), respectively;
(3) in paragraph (2), as redesignated, by striking
``First'' and inserting ``Second'';
(4) in paragraph (3), as redesignated, by striking
``Second'' and inserting ``Third'';
(5) in paragraph (4), as redesignated, by striking
``Third'' and inserting ``Fourth'';
(6) in paragraph (5), as redesignated, by striking
``Fourth'' and inserting ``Fifth'';
(7) in paragraph (6), as redesignated, by striking
``Fifth'' and inserting ``Sixth'';
(8) in paragraph (7), as redesignated, by striking
``Sixth'' and inserting ``Seventh''; and
(9) by inserting before paragraph (2), as redesignated, the
following:
``(1) First, allowed claims for domestic support
obligations to be paid in the following order on the
condition that funds received under this paragraph by a
governmental unit in a case under this title be applied:
``(A) Claims that, as of the date of entry of the order for
relief, are owed directly to a spouse, former spouse, or
child of the debtor, or the parent of such child, without
regard to whether the claim is filed by the spouse, former
spouse, child, or parent, or is filed by a governmental unit
on behalf of that person.
``(B) Claims that, as of the date of entry of the order for
relief, are assigned by a spouse, former spouse, child of the
debtor, or the parent of that child to a governmental unit or
are owed directly to a governmental unit under applicable
nonbankruptcy law.''.
SEC. 325. REQUIREMENTS TO OBTAIN CONFIRMATION AND DISCHARGE
IN CASES INVOLVING DOMESTIC SUPPORT
OBLIGATIONS.
Title 11, United States Code, is amended--
(1) in section 1129(a), by adding at the end the following:
``(14) If the debtor is required by a judicial or
administrative order or statute to pay a domestic support
obligation, the debtor has paid all amounts payable under
such order or statute for such obligation that become payable
after the date on which the petition is filed.'';
(2) in section 1325(a)--
(A) in paragraph (5), by striking ``and'' at the end;
(B) in paragraph (6), by striking the period at the end and
inserting ``; and''; and
(C) by adding at the end the following:
``(7) if the debtor is required by a judicial or
administrative order or statute to pay a domestic support
obligation, the debtor has paid all amounts payable under
such order for such obligation that become payable after the
date on which the petition is filed.''; and
(3) in section 1328(a), as amended by section 314 of this
Act, in the matter preceding paragraph (1), by inserting ``,
and with respect to a debtor who is required by a judicial or
administrative order to pay a domestic support obligation,
certifies that all amounts payable under such order or
statute that are due on or before the date of the
certification (including amounts due before or after the
petition was filed) have been paid'' after ``completion by
the debtor of all payments under the plan''.
SEC. 326. EXCEPTIONS TO AUTOMATIC STAY IN DOMESTIC SUPPORT
OBLIGATION PROCEEDINGS.
Section 362(b) of title 11, United States Code, is
amended--
(1) by striking paragraph (2) and inserting the following:
``(2) under subsection (a)--
``(A) of the commencement or continuation of an action or
proceeding for--
``(i) the establishment of paternity as a part of an effort
to collect domestic support obligations; or
``(ii) the establishment or modification of an order for
domestic support obligations; or
``(B) the collection of a domestic support obligation from
property that is not property of the estate;'';
(2) by inserting after paragraph (4) the following:
``(5) under subsection (a) with respect to the withholding
of income pursuant to an order as specified in section 466(b)
of the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. 666(b));
(3) in paragraph (17), by striking ``or'' at the end;
(4) in paragraph (18), by striking the period and inserting
``; or''; and
(5) by inserting after paragraph (18) the following:
``(19) under subsection (a) with respect to--
``(A) the withholding, suspension, or restriction of
drivers' licenses, professional and occupational licenses,
and recreational licenses pursuant to State law, as specified
in section 466(a)(16) of the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C.
666(a)(16)) or with respect to the reporting of overdue
support owed by an absent parent to any consumer reporting
agency as specified in section 466(a)(7) of the Social
Security Act (42 U.S.C. 666(a)(7));
``(B) the interception of tax refunds, as specified in
sections 464 and 466(a)(3) of the Social Security Act (42
U.S.C. 664 and 666(a)(3)); or
``(C) the enforcement of medical obligations as specified
under title IV of the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. 601 et
seq.).''.
SEC. 327. NONDISCHARGEABILITY OF CERTAIN DEBTS FOR ALIMONY,
MAINTENANCE, AND SUPPORT.
Section 523 of title 11, United States Code, as amended by
section 202 of this Act, is amended--
(1) in subsection (a), by striking paragraph (5) and
inserting the following:
``(5) for a domestic support obligation;'';
(2) in subsection (c), by striking ``(6), or (15)'' and
inserting ``or (6)''; and
(3) in paragraph (15), by striking ``governmental unit''
and all through the end of the paragraph and inserting a
semicolon.
SEC. 328. CONTINUED LIABILITY OF PROPERTY.
Section 522 of title 11, United States Code, as amended by
section 320 of this Act, is amended--
(1) in subsection (c), by striking paragraph (1) and
inserting the following:
``(1) a debt of a kind specified in paragraph (1) or (5) of
section 523(a) (in which case, notwithstanding any provision
of applicable nonbankruptcy law to the contrary, such
property shall be liable for a debt of a kind specified in
section 523(a)(5));''; and
(2) in subsection (f)(1)(A), by striking the dash and all
that follows through the end of the subparagraph and
inserting ``of a kind that is specified in section 523(a)(5);
or''.
SEC. 329. PROTECTION OF DOMESTIC SUPPORT CLAIMS AGAINST
PREFERENTIAL TRANSFER MOTIONS.
Section 547(c) of title 11, United States Code, is amended
by striking paragraph (7) and inserting the following:
``(7) to the extent such transfer was a bona fide payment
of a debt for a domestic support obligation; or''.
SEC. 330. PROTECTION OF RETIREMENT SAVINGS IN BANKRUPTCY.
(a) In General.--Section 522 of title 11, United States
Code, as amended by section 328 of this Act, is amended--
(1) in subsection (b)--
(A) in paragraph (2)--
(i) by striking ``(2)(A) subject to subsection (n), any
property'' and inserting:
``(3) Subject to subsection (n), property listed in this
paragraph is--
``(A) any property'';
(ii) in subparagraph (A), by striking ``and'' at the end;
(iii) in subparagraph (B), by striking the period at the
end and inserting ``; and''; and
(iv) by adding at the end the following:
``(C) retirement funds to the extent that those funds are
in a fund or account that is exempt from taxation under
section 401, 403, 408, 408A, 414, 457, or 501(a) of the
Internal Revenue Code of 1986 and which has not been pledged
or promised to any person in connection with any extension of
credit.'';
(B) by striking paragraph (1) and inserting:
``(2) Property listed in this paragraph is property that is
specified under subsection (d) of this section, unless the
State law that is applicable to the debtor under paragraph
(3)(A) of this subsection specifically does not so
authorize.'';
(C) in the matter preceding paragraph (2)--
(i) by striking ``(b)'' and inserting ``(b)(1)'';
(ii) by striking ``paragraph (2)'' both places it appears
and inserting ``paragraph (3)'';
(iii) by striking ``paragraph (1)'' each place it appears
and inserting ``paragraph (2)''; and
(iv) by striking ``Such property is--''; and
(D) by adding at the end of the subsection the following:
``(4) For purposes of paragraph (3)(C), the following shall
apply:
[[Page 8144]]
``(A) If the retirement funds are in a retirement fund that
has received a favorable determination pursuant to section
7805 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, and that
determination is in effect as of the date of the commencement
of the case under section 301, 302, or 303, those funds shall
be presumed to be exempt from the estate.
``(B) If the retirement funds are in a retirement fund that
has not received a favorable determination pursuant to such
section 7805, those funds are exempt from the estate if the
debtor demonstrates that--
``(i) no prior determination to the contrary has been made
by a court or the Internal Revenue Service; and
``(ii)(I) the retirement fund is in substantial compliance
with the applicable requirements of the Internal Revenue Code
of 1986; or
``(II) the retirement fund fails to be in substantial
compliance with such applicable requirements, the debtor is
not materially responsible for that failure.
``(C) A direct transfer of retirement funds from 1 fund or
account that is exempt from taxation under section 401, 403,
408, 408A, 414, 457, or 501(a) of the Internal Revenue Code
of 1986, pursuant to section 401(a)(31) of the Internal
Revenue Code of 1986, or otherwise, shall not cease to
qualify for exemption under paragraph (3)(C) by reason of
that direct transfer.
``(D)(i) Any distribution that qualifies as an eligible
rollover distribution within the meaning of section 402(c) of
the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 or that is described in
clause (ii) shall not cease to qualify for exemption under
paragraph (3)(C) by reason of that distribution.
``(ii) A distribution described in this clause is an amount
that--
``(I) has been distributed from a fund or account that is
exempt from taxation under section 401, 403, 408, 408A, 414,
457, or 501(a) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986; and
``(II) to the extent allowed by law, is deposited in such a
fund or account not later than 60 days after the distribution
of that amount.''; and
(2) in subsection (d)--
(A) in the matter preceding paragraph (1), by striking
``subsection (b)(1)'' and inserting ``subsection (b)(2)'';
and
(B) by adding at the end the following:
``(12) Retirement funds to the extent that those funds are
in a fund or account that is exempt from taxation under
section 401, 403, 408, 408A, 414, 457, or 501(a) of the
Internal Revenue Code of 1986.''.
(b) Automatic Stay.--Section 362(b) of title 11, United
States Code, as amended by section 326 of this Act, is
amended--
(1) in paragraph (18), by striking ``or'' at the end;
(2) in paragraph (19), by striking the period and inserting
``; or'';
(3) by inserting after paragraph (19) the following:
``(20) under subsection (a), of withholding of income from
a debtor's wages and collection of amounts withheld, pursuant
to the debtor's agreement authorizing that withholding and
collection for the benefit of a pension, profit-sharing,
stock bonus, or other plan established under section 401,
403, 408, 408A, 414, 457, or 501(a) of the Internal Revenue
Code of 1986 that is sponsored by the employer of the debtor,
or an affiliate, successor, or predecessor of such employer--
``(A) to the extent that the amounts withheld and collected
are used solely for payments relating to a loan from a plan
that satisfies the requirements of section 408(b)(1) of the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (29 U.S.C.
1108(b)(1)); or
``(B) in the case of a loan from a thrift savings plan
described in subchapter III of title 5, that satisfies the
requirements of section 8433(g) of that title.''; and
(4) by adding at the end of the flush material following
paragraph (20) the following: ``Paragraph (20) does not apply
to any amount owed to a plan referred to in that paragraph
that is incurred under a loan made during the 1-year period
preceding the filing of a petition. Nothing in paragraph (20)
may be construed to provide that any loan made under a
governmental plan under section 414(d) of the Internal
Revenue Code of 1986 constitutes a claim or a debt under this
title.''.
(c) Exceptions To Discharge.--Section 523(a) of title 11,
United States Code, as amended by section 202 of this Act, is
amended--
(1) by striking ``or'' at the end of paragraph (17);
(2) by striking the period at the end of paragraph (18) and
inserting ``; or''; and
(3) by adding at the end the following:
``(19) owed to a pension, profit-sharing, stock bonus, or
other plan established under section 401, 403, 408, 408A,
414, 457, or 501(c) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986,
pursuant to--
``(A) a loan permitted under section 408(b)(1) of the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (29 U.S.C.
1108(b)(1)); or
``(B) a loan from the thrift savings plan described in
subchapter III of title 5, that satisfies the requirements of
section 8433(g) of that title.
Paragraph (19) does not apply to any amount owed to a plan
referred to in that paragraph that is incurred under a loan
made during the 1-year period preceding the filing of a
petition. Nothing in paragraph (19) may be construed to
provide that any loan made under a governmental plan under
section 414(d) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986
constitutes a claim or a debt under this title.''.
(d) Plan Contents.--Section 1322 of title 11, United States
Code, is amended by adding at the end the following:
``(f) A plan may not materially alter the terms of a loan
described in section 362(b)(20).''.
SEC. 331. ADDITIONAL AMENDMENTS TO TITLE 11, UNITED STATES
CODE.
(a) Section 507(a) of title 11, United States Code, is
amended by inserting after paragraph (7) the following:
``(8) Eighth, allowed claims for death or personal injuries
resulting from the operation of a motor vehicle or vessel if
such operation was unlawful because the debtor was
intoxicated from using alcohol, a drug or another
substance.''.
(b) Section 523(a)(9) of title 11, United States Code, is
amended by inserting ``or vessel'' after ``vehicle''.
SEC. 332. DEBT LIMIT INCREASE.
Section 104(b) of title 11, United States Code, is amended
by adding at the end the following:
``(4) The dollar amount in section 101(18) shall be
adjusted at the same times and in the same manner as the
dollar amounts in paragraph (1) of this subsection, beginning
with the adjustment to be made on April 1, 2001.''.
SEC. 333. ELIMINATION OF REQUIREMENT THAT FAMILY FARMER AND
SPOUSE RECEIVE OVER 50 PERCENT OF INCOME FROM
FARMING OPERATION IN YEAR PRIOR TO BANKRUPTCY.
Section 101(18)(A) of title 11, United States Code, is
amended by striking ``the taxable year preceding the taxable
year'' and inserting ``at least 1 of the 3 calendar years
preceding the year''.
SEC. 334. PROHIBITION OF RETROACTIVE ASSESSMENT OF DISPOSABLE
INCOME.
(a) In General.--Section 1225(b) of title 11, United States
Code, is amended--
(1) by redesignating paragraph (2) as paragraph (3) and by
inserting after paragraph (1) the following:
``(2) The plan shall be confirmed if--
``(A) the plan provides for specific amounts of property to
be distributed on account of allowed unsecured claims as
required by paragraph (1)(B);
``(B) the amounts under subparagraph (A) equal or exceed
the debtor's projected disposable income for the applicable
period; and
``(C) the plan meets the requirements for confirmation
other than those of this subsection, the plan shall be
confirmed.''.
(b) Modification of Plan.--Section 1229 of title 11, United
States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following:
``(d)(1) A modification of the plan under this section may
not increase the amount of payments that were due prior to
the date of the order modifying the plan.
``(2) A modification of the plan under this section to
increase payments based on an increase in the debtor's
disposable income may not require payments to unsecured
creditors in any particular month greater than the debtor's
disposable income for that month unless the debtor proposes
such a modification.
``(3) A modification of the plan in the last year of the
plan shall not require payments that would leave the debtor
with insufficient funds to carry on the farming operation
after the plan is completed unless the debtor proposes such a
modification.''.
SEC. 335. AMENDMENT TO SECTION 1325 OF TITLE 11, UNITED
STATES CODE.
Section 1325(b)(2) of title 11, United States Code, is
amended by inserting ``(other than child support payments,
foster care payments, or disability payments for a dependent
child made in accordance with applicable nonbankruptcy law
and which is reasonably necessary to be expended)'' after
``received by the debtor''.
SEC. 336. PROTECTION OF SAVINGS EARMARKED FOR THE
POSTSECONDARY EDUCATION OF CHILDREN.
Section 541(b) of title 11, United States Code, is
amended--
(1) in paragraph (5), by striking ``or'' at the end;
(2) by redesignating paragraph (5) as paragraph (7); and
(2) by inserting after paragraph (4) the following:
``(5) except as otherwise provided under applicable State
law, any funds placed in a qualified State tuition program
(as described in section 529(b) of the Internal Revenue Code
of 1986) at least 180 days before the date of entry of the
order for relief;
``(6) any funds placed in an education individual
retirement account (as defined in section 530(b)(1) of the
Internal Revenue Code of 1986) at least 180 days before the
date of entry of the order for relief; or''.
TITLE IV--FINANCIAL INSTRUMENTS
SEC. 401. BANKRUPTCY CODE AMENDMENTS.
(a) Definitions of Forward Contract, Repurchase Agreement,
Securities Clearing Agency, Swap Agreement, Commodity
Contract, and Securities Contract.--Title 11, United States
Code, is amended--
(1) in section 101--
(A) in paragraph (25)--
(i) by striking ``means a contract'' and inserting
``means--
[[Page 8145]]
``(A) a contract'';
(ii) by striking ``, or any combination thereof or option
thereon;'' and inserting ``, or any other similar
agreement;''; and
(iii) by adding at the end the following:
``(B) a combination of agreements or transactions referred
to in subparagraphs (A) and (C);
``(C) an option to enter into an agreement or transaction
referred to in subparagraph (A) or (B);
``(D) a master netting agreement that provides for an
agreement or transaction referred to in subparagraph (A),
(B), or (C), together with all supplements to such master
netting agreement, without regard to whether such master
netting agreement provides for an agreement or transaction
that is not a forward contract under this paragraph, except
that such master netting agreement shall be considered to be
a forward contract under this paragraph only with respect to
each agreement or transaction under such master netting
agreement that is referred to in subparagraph (A), (B), or
(C); or
``(E) a security agreement or arrangement, or other credit
enhancement, related to any agreement, a contract, option, or
transaction referred to in subparagraph (A), (B), (C), or
(D);'';
(B) by striking paragraph (47) and inserting the following:
``(47) `repurchase agreement' and `reverse repurchase
agreement'--
``(A) mean--
``(i) an agreement, including related terms, that provides
for the transfer of--
``(I) a certificate of deposit, mortgage related security
(as defined in section 3 of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934), mortgage loan, interest in a mortgage related security
or mortgage loan, eligible bankers' acceptance, or qualified
foreign government security (defined for purposes of this
paragraph to mean a security that is a direct obligation of,
or that is fully guaranteed by, the central government of a
member of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development); or
``(II) a security that is a direct obligation of, or that
is fully guaranteed by, the United States or an agency of the
United States against the transfer of funds by the transferee
of such certificate of deposit, eligible bankers' acceptance,
security, loan, or interest;
with a simultaneous agreement by such transferee to transfer
to the transferor thereof a certificate of deposit, eligible
bankers' acceptance, security, loan, or interest of the kind
described in subclause (I) or (II), at a date certain that is
not later than 1 year after the date of the transferor's
transfer or on demand, against the transfer of funds;
``(ii) a combination of agreements or transactions referred
to in clauses (i) and (iii);
``(iii) an option to enter into an agreement or transaction
referred to in clause (i) or (ii);
``(iv) a master netting agreement that provides for an
agreement or transaction referred to in clause (i), (ii), or
(iii), together with all supplements to such master netting
agreement, without regard to whether such master netting
agreement provides for an agreement or transaction that is
not a repurchase agreement under this subparagraph, except
that such master netting agreement shall be considered to be
a repurchase agreement under this subparagraph only with
respect to each agreement or transaction under such master
netting agreement that is referred to in clause (i), (ii), or
(iii); or
``(v) a security agreement or arrangement, or other credit
enhancement, directly pertaining to a contract referred to in
clause (i), (ii), (iii), or (iv); and
``(B) do not include a repurchase obligation under a
participation in a commercial mortgage loan;''; and
(C) by striking paragraph (53B) and inserting the
following:
``(53B) `swap agreement'--
``(A) means--
``(i) an agreement, including the terms and conditions
incorporated by reference in such agreement, that is--
``(I) an interest rate swap, option, future, or forward
agreement, including a rate floor, rate cap, rate collar,
cross-currency rate swap, and basis swap;
``(II) a spot, same day-tomorrow, tomorrow-next, forward,
or other foreign exchange or precious metals agreement;
``(III) a currency swap, option, future, or forward
agreement;
``(IV) an equity index or an equity swap, option, future,
or forward agreement;
``(V) a debt index or a debt swap, option, future, or
forward agreement;
``(VI) a credit spread or a credit swap, option, future, or
forward agreement; or
``(VII) a commodity index or a commodity swap, option,
future, or forward agreement;
``(ii) an agreement or transaction that is similar to an
agreement or transaction referred to in clause (i) that--
``(I) is currently, or in the future becomes, regularly
entered into in the swap market (including terms and
conditions incorporated by reference therein); and
``(II) is a forward, swap, future, or option on a rate,
currency, commodity, equity security, or other equity
instrument, on a debt security or other debt instrument, or
on an economic index or measure of economic risk or value;
``(iii) a combination of agreements or transactions
referred to in clauses (i) and (ii);
``(iv) an option to enter into an agreement or transaction
referred to in this subparagraph; or
``(v) a master netting agreement that provides for an
agreement or transaction referred to in clause (i), (ii),
(iii), or (iv), together with all supplements to such master
netting agreement and without regard to whether such master
netting agreement contains an agreement or transaction
described in any such clause, but only with respect to each
agreement or transaction referred to in any such clause that
is under such master netting agreement; except that
``(B) the definition under subparagraph (A) is applicable
for purposes of this title only, and shall not be construed
or applied so as to challenge or affect the characterization,
definition, or treatment of any swap agreement under any
other statute, regulation, or rule, including the Securities
Act of 1933, the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, the Public
Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, the Trust Indenture Act
of 1939, the Investment Company Act of 1940, the Investment
Advisers Act of 1940, the Securities Investor Protection Act
of 1970, the Commodity Exchange Act, and the regulations
prescribed by the Securities and Exchange Commission or the
Commodity Futures Trading Commission.'';
(2) in section 741, by striking paragraph (7) and inserting
the following:
``(7) `securities contract'--
``(A) means--
``(i) a contract for the purchase, sale, or loan of a
security, a certificate of deposit, a mortgage loan or an
interest in a mortgage loan, a group or index of securities,
certificates of deposit, or mortgage loans or interests
therein (including an interest therein or based on the value
thereof), or option on any of the foregoing, including an
option to purchase or sell any of the foregoing;
``(ii) an option entered into on a national securities
exchange relating to foreign currencies;
``(iii) the guarantee by or to a securities clearing agency
of a settlement of cash, securities, certificates of deposit,
mortgage loans or interests therein, group or index of
securities, or mortgage loans or interests therein (including
any interest therein or based on the value thereof), or
option on any of the foregoing, including an option to
purchase or sell any of the foregoing;
``(iv) a margin loan;
``(v) any other agreement or transaction that is similar to
an agreement or transaction referred to in this subparagraph;
``(vi) a combination of the agreements or transactions
referred to in this subparagraph;
``(vii) an option to enter into an agreement or transaction
referred to in this subparagraph;
``(viii) a master netting agreement that provides for an
agreement or transaction referred to in clause (i), (ii),
(iii), (iv), (v), (vi), or (vii), together with all
supplements to such master netting agreement, without regard
to whether such master netting agreement provides for an
agreement or transaction that is not a securities contract
under this subparagraph, except that such master netting
agreement shall be considered to be a securities contract
under this subparagraph only with respect to each agreement
or transaction under such master netting agreement that is
referred to in clause (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi), or
(vii); or
``(ix) a security agreement or arrangement, or other credit
enhancement, related to any agreement or transaction referred
to in this subparagraph; and
``(B) does not include a purchase, sale, or repurchase
obligation under a participation in, or servicing agreement
for, a commercial mortgage loan;''; and
(3) in section 761(4)--
(A) by striking ``or'' at the end of subparagraph (D); and
(B) by adding at the end the following:
``(F) any other agreement or transaction that is similar to
an agreement or transaction referred to in this paragraph;
``(G) a combination of the agreements or transactions
referred to in this paragraph;
``(H) an option to enter into an agreement or transaction
referred to in this paragraph;
``(I) a master netting agreement that provides for an
agreement or transaction referred to in subparagraph (A),
(B), (C), (D), (E), (F), (G), or (H), together with all
supplements to such master netting agreement, without regard
to whether such master netting agreement provides for an
agreement or transaction that is not a commodity contract
under this paragraph, except that such master netting
agreement shall be considered to be a commodity contract
under this paragraph only with respect to each agreement or
transaction under such master netting agreement that is
referred to in subparagraph (A), (B), (C), (D), (E), (F),
(G), or (H); or
``(J) a security agreement or arrangement, or other credit
enhancement, related to any agreement or transaction referred
to in this paragraph.''.
[[Page 8146]]
(b) Definitions of Financial Institution, Financial
Participant, and Forward Contract Merchant.--Section 101 of
title 11, United States Code, is amended--
(1) by striking paragraph (22) and inserting the following:
``(22) `financial institution' means--
``(A) a Federal reserve bank, or an entity that is a
commercial or savings bank, industrial savings bank, savings
and loan association, trust company, or receiver or
conservator for such entity; and
``(B) if such Federal reserve bank, receiver, or
conservator or entity is acting as agent or custodian for a
customer in connection with a securities contract, as defined
in section 741, such customer;'';
(2) by inserting after paragraph (22) the following:
``(22A) `financial participant' means an entity that--
``(A) is a party to a securities contract, commodity
contract or forward contract;
``(B) on the date of the filing of the petition, has 1 or
more agreements or transactions under section 561(a)(2)with
the debtor or any other entity (other than an affiliate) of a
total gross dollar value of not less than $1,000,000,000 in
notional or actual principal amount outstanding on any date
during the previous 15-month period; or
``(C) has gross mark-to-market positions of not less than
$100,000,000 (aggregated across counterparties) in an
agreement or transaction under subparagraph (A) with the
debtor or any other entity (other than an affiliate) on any
date during the previous 15-month period;''; and
(3) by striking paragraph (26) and inserting the following:
``(26) `forward contract merchant' means a Federal reserve
bank, or an entity, the business of which consists in whole
or in part of entering into forward contracts as or with
merchants or in a commodity, as defined or in section 761, or
any similar good, article, service, right, or interest that
is presently or in the future becomes the subject of dealing
or in the forward contract trade;''.
(c) Definition of Master Netting Agreement and Master
Netting Agreement Participant.--Section 101 of title 11,
United States Code, is amended by inserting after paragraph
(38) the following new paragraphs:
``(38A) the term `master netting agreement'--
``(A) means an agreement providing for the exercise of
rights, including rights of netting, setoff, liquidation,
termination, acceleration, or closeout, under or in
connection with 1 or more contracts that are described in any
1 or more of paragraphs (1) through (5) of section 561(a), or
any security agreement or arrangement or other credit
enhancement related to 1 or more of the foregoing; except
that
``(B) if a master netting agreement contains provisions
relating to agreements or transactions that are not contracts
described in paragraphs (1) through (5) of section 561(a),
the master netting agreement shall be deemed to be a master
netting agreement only with respect to those agreements or
transactions that are described in any 1 or more of
paragraphs (1) through (5) of section 561(a); and
``(38B) the term `master netting agreement participant'
means an entity that, at any time before the filing of the
petition, is a party to an outstanding master netting
agreement with the debtor;''.
(d) Swap Agreements, Securities Contracts, Commodity
Contracts, Forward Contracts, Repurchase Agreements, and
Master Netting Agreements Under the Automatic Stay.--
(1) In general.--Section 362(b) of title 11, United States
Code, as amended by section 330 of this Act, is amended--
(A) in paragraph (6), by inserting ``, pledged to, and
under the control of,'' after ``held by'';
(B) in paragraph (7), by inserting ``, pledged to, and
under the control of,'' after ``held by'';
(C) by striking paragraph (17) and inserting the following:
``(17) under subsection (a), of the setoff by a swap
participant of a mutual debt and claim under or in connection
with a swap agreement that constitutes the setoff of a claim
against the debtor for a payment or transfer due from the
debtor under or in connection with a swap agreement against a
payment due to the debtor from the swap participant under or
in connection with a swap agreement or against cash,
securities, or other property held by, pledged to, and under
the control of, or due from such swap participant to
guarantee, secure, or settle a swap agreement;'';
(D) in paragraph (19), by striking ``or'' at the end;
(E) in paragraph (20), by striking the period at the end
and inserting ``; or''; and
(F) by inserting after paragraph (20) the following:
``(21) under subsection (a), of the setoff by a master
netting agreement participant of a mutual debt and claim, to
the extent such participant is eligible to exercise such
offset rights under paragraph (6), (7), or (17) for each
individual contract covered by the master netting agreement
in issue.''.
(2) Limitation.--Section 362 of title 11, United States
Code, as amended by section 432(2) of this Act, is amended by
adding at the end the following:
``(i) The exercise of rights not subject to the stay
arising under subsection (a) pursuant to paragraph (6), (7),
or (17) of subsection (b) shall not be stayed by an order of
a court or administrative agency in any proceeding under this
title.''.
(e) Limitation of Avoidance Powers Under Master Netting
Agreement.--Section 546 of title 11, United States Code, is
amended--
(1) in subsection (g), (as added by section 103 of Public
Law 101-311 (104 Stat. 267 et seq.))--
(A) by striking ``under a swap agreement''; and
(B) by striking ``in connection with a swap agreement'' and
inserting ``under or in connection with any swap agreement'';
and
(2) by inserting before subsection (i) (as redesignated by
section 407 of this Act) the following new subsection:
``(h) Notwithstanding sections 544, 545, 547, 548(a)(2)(B),
and 548(b), the trustee may not avoid a transfer made by or
to a master netting agreement participant under or in
connection with any master netting agreement or any
individual contract covered thereby that is made before the
commencement of the case, and except to the extent that the
trustee could otherwise avoid such a transfer made under an
individual contract covered by such master netting agreement
(except under section 548(a)(1)(A)).''.
(f) Fraudulent Transfers of Master Netting Agreements.--
Section 548(d)(2) of title 11, United States Code, is
amended--
(1) in subparagraph (C), by striking ``and'';
(2) in subparagraph (D), by striking the period at the end
and inserting ``; and''; and
(3) by adding at the end the following new subparagraph:
``(E) a master netting agreement participant that receives
a transfer in connection with a master netting agreement or
any individual contract covered thereby takes for value to
the extent of such transfer, except, with respect to a
transfer under any individual contract covered thereby, to
the extent that such master netting agreement participant
otherwise did not take (or is otherwise not deemed to have
taken) such transfer for value.''.
(g) Termination or Acceleration of Securities Contracts.--
Section 555 of title 11, United States Code, is amended--
(1) by striking the section heading and inserting the
following:
``Sec. 555. Contractual right to liquidate, terminate, or
accelerate a securities contract'';
and
(2) in the first sentence, by striking ``liquidation'' and
inserting ``liquidation, termination, or acceleration''.
(h) Termination or Acceleration of Commodities or Forward
Contracts.--Section 556 of title 11, United States Code, is
amended--
(1) by striking the section heading and inserting the
following:
``Sec. 556. Contractual right to liquidate, terminate, or
accelerate a commodities contract or forward contract'';
and
(2) in the first sentence, by striking ``liquidation'' and
inserting ``liquidation, termination, or acceleration''.
(i) Termination or Acceleration of Repurchase Agreements.--
Section 559 of title 11, United States Code, is amended--
(1) by striking the section heading and inserting the
following:
``Sec. 559. Contractual right to liquidate, terminate, or
accelerate a repurchase agreement'';
and
(2) in the first sentence, by striking ``liquidation'' and
inserting ``liquidation, termination, or acceleration''.
(j) Liquidation, Termination, or Acceleration of Swap
Agreements.--Section 560 of title 11, United States Code, is
amended--
(1) by striking the section heading and inserting the
following:
``Sec. 560. Contractual right to liquidate, terminate, or
accelerate a swap agreement'';
(2) in the first sentence, by striking ``termination of a
swap agreement'' and inserting ``liquidation, termination, or
acceleration of a swap agreement''; and
(3) by striking ``in connection with any swap agreement''
and inserting ``in connection with the termination,
liquidation, or acceleration of a swap agreement''.
(k) Liquidation, Termination, Acceleration, or Offset Under
a Master Netting Agreement and Across Contracts.--Title 11,
United States Code, is amended by inserting after section 560
the following new section:
``Sec. 561. Contractual right to terminate, liquidate,
accelerate, or offset under a master netting agreement and
across contracts
``(a) Subject to subsection (b), the exercise of any
contractual right, because of a condition of the kind
specified in section 365(e)(1), to cause the termination,
liquidation, or acceleration of or to offset or net
termination values, payment amounts or other transfer
obligations arising under or in connection with 1 or more (or
the termination, liquidation, or acceleration of 1 or more)--
``(1) securities contracts, as defined in section 741(7);
[[Page 8147]]
``(2) commodity contracts, as defined in section 761(4);
``(3) forward contracts;
``(4) repurchase agreements;
``(5) swap agreements; or
``(6) master netting agreements,
shall not be stayed, avoided, or otherwise limited by
operation of any provision of this title or by any order of a
court or administrative agency in any proceeding under this
title.
``(b)(1) A party may exercise a contractual right described
in subsection (a) to terminate, liquidate, or accelerate only
to the extent that such party could exercise such a right
under section 555, 556, 559, or 560 for each individual
contract covered by the master netting agreement in issue.
``(2)(A) A party may not exercise a contractual right
described in subsection (a) to offset or to net obligations
arising under, or in connection with, a commodity contract
against obligations arising under, or in connection with, any
instrument listed in subsection (a), if the obligations are
not mutual.
``(B) If a debtor is a commodity broker subject to
subchapter IV of chapter 7,a party may not net or offset an
obligation to the debtor arising under, or in connection
with, a commodity contract against any claim arising under,
or in connection with, other instruments if that party has no
positive net equity in the commodity account of the debtor,
as calculated under subchapter IV.
``(c) As used in this section, the term `contractual right'
includes a right set forth in a rule or bylaw of a national
securities exchange, a national securities association, or a
securities clearing agency, a right set forth in a bylaw of a
clearing organization or contract market or in a resolution
of the governing board thereof, and a right, whether or not
evidenced in writing, arising under common law, under law
merchant, or by reason of normal business practice.''.
(l) Municipal Bankruptcies.--Section 901 of title 11,
United States Code, is amended--
(1) by inserting ``, 555, 556'' after ``553''; and
(2) by inserting ``, 559, 560, 561, 562,'' after ``557''.
(m) Ancillary Proceedings.--Section 304 of title 11, United
States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following:
``(d) Any provisions of this title relating to securities
contracts, commodity contracts, forward contracts, repurchase
agreements, swap agreements, or master netting agreements
shall apply in a case ancillary to a foreign proceeding under
this section or any other section of this title, so that
enforcement of contractual provisions of such contracts and
agreements in accordance with their terms--
``(1) shall not be stayed or otherwise limited by--
``(A) operation of any provision of this title; or
``(B) order of a court in any case under this title;
``(2) shall limit avoidance powers to the same extent as in
a proceeding under chapter 7 or 11; and
``(3) shall not be limited based on the presence or absence
of assets of the debtor in the United States.''.
(n) Commodity Broker Liquidations.--Title 11, United States
Code, is amended by inserting after section 766 the
following:
``Sec. 767. Commodity broker liquidation and forward contract
merchants, commodity brokers, stockbrokers, financial
institutions, securities clearing agencies, swap
participants, repo participants, and master netting
agreement participants
``Notwithstanding any other provision of this title, the
exercise of rights by a forward contract merchant, commodity
broker, stockbroker, financial institution, securities
clearing agency, swap participant, repo participant, or
master netting agreement participant under this title shall
not affect the priority of any unsecured claim it may have
after the exercise of such rights or affect any provision of
this subchapter relating to customer property or
distributions.''.
(o) Stockbroker Liquidations.--Title 11, United States
Code, is amended by inserting after section 752 the
following:
``Sec. 753. Stockbroker liquidation and forward contract
merchants, commodity brokers, stockbrokers, financial
institutions, securities clearing agencies, swap
participants, repo participants, and master netting
agreement participants
``Notwithstanding any other provision of this title, the
exercise of rights by a forward contract merchant, commodity
broker, stockbroker, financial institution, securities
clearing agency, swap participant, repo participant, or
master netting agreement participant under this title shall
not affect the priority of any unsecured claim it may have
after the exercise of rights or affect any provision of this
subchapter relating to customer property or distributions.''.
(p) Setoff.--Section 553 of title 11, United States Code,
is amended--
(1) in subsection (a)(3)(C), by inserting ``(except for a
setoff of a kind described in section 362(b)(6), 362(b)(7),
362(b)(17), 362(b)(21), 555, 556, 559, 560, or 561)'' before
the period; and
(2) in subsection (b)(1), by striking ``362(b)(14),'' and
inserting ``362(b)(17), 362(b)(21), 555, 556, 559, 560,''.
(q) Securities Contracts, Commodity Contracts, and Forward
Contracts.--Title 11, United States Code, is amended--
(1) in section 362(b)(6), by striking ``financial
institutions,'' each place such term appears and inserting
``financial institution, financial participant'';
(2) in section 546(e), by inserting ``financial
participant'' after ``financial institution,'';
(3) in section 548(d)(2)(B), by inserting ``financial
participant'' after ``financial institution,'';
(4) in section 555--
(A) by inserting ``financial participant'' after
``financial institution,''; and
(B) by inserting before the period ``, a right set forth in
a bylaw of a clearing organization or contract market or in a
resolution of the governing board thereof, and a right,
whether or not in writing, arising under common law, under
law merchant, or by reason of normal business practice''; and
(5) in section 556, by inserting ``, financial
participant'' after ``commodity broker''.
(r) Technical and Conforming Amendment.--Section 104 of
title 11, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end
the following:
``(c) Exception for Certain Defined Terms.--No adjustments
shall be made under this section to the dollar amounts set
forth in the definition of the term `financial participant'
in section 101 (22A).''.
(s) Conforming Amendments.--Title 11 of the United States
Code is amended--
(1) in the table of sections for chapter 5--
(A) by striking the items relating to sections 555 and 556
and inserting the following:
``555. Contractual right to liquidate, terminate, or accelerate a
securities contract.
``556. Contractual right to liquidate, terminate, or accelerate a
commodities contract or forward contract.'';
(B) by striking the items relating to sections 559 and 560
and inserting the following:
``559. Contractual right to liquidate, terminate, or accelerate a
repurchase agreement.
``560. Contractual right to liquidate, terminate, or accelerate a swap
agreement.'';
and
(C) by adding after the item relating to section 560 the
following:
``561. Contractual right to terminate, liquidate, accelerate, or offset
under a master netting agreement and across contracts.'';
and
(2) in the table of sections for chapter 7--
(A) by inserting after the item relating to section 766 the
following:
``767. Commodity broker liquidation and forward contract merchants,
commodity brokers, stockbrokers, financial institutions,
securities clearing agencies, swap participants, repo
participants, and master netting agreement
participants.'';
and
(B) by inserting after the item relating to section 752 the
following:
``753. Stockbroker liquidation and forward contract merchants,
commodity brokers, stockbrokers, financial institutions,
securities clearing agencies, swap participants, repo
participants, and master netting agreement
participants.''.
SEC. 402. DAMAGE MEASURE.
(a) In General.--Title 11, United States Code, is amended
by inserting after section 561 (as added by section 401(b))
the following:
``Sec. 562. Damage measure in connection with swap
agreements, securities contracts, forward contracts,
commodity contracts, repurchase agreements, or master
netting agreements
``If the trustee rejects a swap agreement, securities
contract as defined in section 741, forward contract,
repurchase agreement, or master netting agreement pursuant to
section 365(a), or if a forward contract merchant,
stockbroker, financial institution, securities clearing
agency, repo participant, master netting agreement
participant, or swap participant liquidates, terminates, or
accelerates any such contract or agreement, damages shall be
measured as of the earlier of--
``(1) the date of such rejection; or
``(2) the date of such liquidation, termination, or
acceleration.''.
(b) Claims Arising From Rejection.--Section 502(g) of title
11, United States Code, is amended--
(1) by designating the existing text as paragraph (1); and
(2) by adding at the end the following new paragraph:
``(2) A claim for damages calculated in accordance with
section 562 shall be allowed under subsection (a), (b), or
(c) of this section or disallowed under subsection (d) or (e)
of this section as if such claim had arisen before the date
of the filing of the petition.''.
SEC. 403. ASSET-BACKED SECURITIZATIONS.
Section 541 of title 11, United States Code, as amended by
section 336 of this Act, is amended--
(1) in subsection (b)--
(A) by striking ``or'' at the end of paragraph (6); and
[[Page 8148]]
(B) by redesignating paragraph (7) as paragraph (8);
(2) by inserting after paragraph (6) the following:
``(7) any eligible asset (or proceeds thereof), to the
extent that such eligible asset was transferred by the
debtor, before the date of commencement of the case, to an
eligible entity in connection with an asset-backed
securitization, except to the extent such asset (or proceeds
or value thereof) may be recovered by the trustee under
section 550 by reason of avoidance under section 548(a);
or''; and
(3) by adding at the end the following new subsection:
``(e) In this section:
``(1) The term `asset-backed securitization' means a
transaction in which eligible assets transferred to an
eligible entity are used as the source of payment on
securities, the most senior of which are rated investment
grade by 1 or more nationally recognized securities rating
organizations, issued by an issuer.
``(2) The term `eligible asset' means--
``(A) financial assets (including interests therein and
proceeds thereof), either fixed or revolving, including
residential and commercial mortgage loans, consumer
receivables, trade receivables, and lease receivables, that,
by their terms, convert into cash within a finite time
period, plus any rights or other assets designed to assure
the servicing or timely distribution of proceeds to security
holders;
``(B) cash; and
``(C) securities.
``(3) The term `eligible entity' means--
``(A) an issuer; or
``(B) a trust, corporation, partnership, or other entity
engaged exclusively in the business of acquiring and
transferring eligible assets directly or indirectly to an
issuer and taking actions ancillary thereto.
``(4) The term `issuer' means a trust, corporation,
partnership, or other entity engaged exclusively in the
business of acquiring and holding eligible assets, issuing
securities backed by eligible assets, and taking actions
ancillary thereto.
``(5) The term `transferred' means, with respect to a
debtor, that the debtor, under a written agreement,
represented and warranted that eligible assets were sold,
contributed, or otherwise conveyed with the intention of
removing them from the estate of the debtor pursuant to
subsection (b)(5), without regard to--
``(A) whether the debtor directly or indirectly obtained or
held an interest in the issuer or in any securities issued by
the issuer;
``(B) whether the debtor had an obligation to repurchase or
to service or supervise the servicing of all or any portion
of such eligible assets; or
``(C) the characterization of such sale, contribution, or
other conveyance for tax, accounting, regulatory reporting,
or other purposes.''.
SEC. 404. PROHIBITION ON CERTAIN ACTIONS FOR FAILURE TO INCUR
FINANCE CHARGES.
Section 106 of the Truth in Lending Act (15 U.S.C. 1605) is
amended by adding at the end the following:
``(g) Prohibition on Certain Actions for Failure To Incur
Finance Charges.--A creditor may not, solely because a
consumer has not incurred finance charges in connection with
an extension of credit--
``(1) refuse to renew or continue to offer the extension of
credit to that consumer; or
``(2) charge a fee to that consumer in lieu of a finance
charge.''.
SEC. 405. FEES ARISING FROM CERTAIN OWNERSHIP INTERESTS.
Section 523(a)(16) of title 11, United States Code, is
amended--
(1) by striking ``dwelling'' the first place it appears;
(2) by striking ``ownership or'' and inserting
``ownership,'';
(3) by striking ``housing'' the first place it appears; and
(4) by striking ``but only'' and all that follows through
``such period,'', and inserting ``or a lot in a homeowners
association, for as long as the debtor or the trustee has a
legal, equitable, or possessory ownership interest in such
unit, such corporation, or such lot,''.
SEC. 406. BANKRUPTCY FEES.
Section 1930 of title 28, United States Code, is amended--
(1) in subsection (a), by striking ``Notwithstanding
section 1915, the parties'' and inserting ``Subject to
subsection (f), the parties''; and
(2) by adding at the end the following:
``(f)(1) The Judicial Conference of the United States shall
prescribe procedures for waiving fees under this subsection.
``(2) Under the procedures described in paragraph (1), the
district court or the bankruptcy court may waive a filing fee
described in paragraph (3) for a case commenced under chapter
7 of title 11 if the court determines that an individual
debtor is unable to pay that fee in installments.
``(3) A filing fee referred to in paragraph (2) is--
``(A) a filing fee under subsection (a)(1); or
``(B) any other fee prescribed by the Judicial Conference
of the United States under subsection (b) that is payable to
the clerk of the district court or the clerk of the
bankruptcy court upon the commencement of a case under
chapter 7 of title 11.
``(4) In addition to waiving a fee described in paragraph
(3) under paragraph (2), the district court or the bankruptcy
court may waive any other fee prescribed under subsection (b)
or (c) if the court determines that the individual is unable
to pay that fee in installments.''.
SEC. 407. APPLICABILITY.
The amendments made by this title shall apply with respect
to cases commenced or appointments made under any Federal or
State law after the date of enactment of this Act.
TITLE V--ANCILLARY AND OTHER CROSS-BORDER CASES
SEC. 501. AMENDMENT TO ADD CHAPTER 6 TO TITLE 11, UNITED
STATES CODE.
(a) In General.--Title 11, United States Code, is amended
by inserting after chapter 5 the following:
``CHAPTER 6--ANCILLARY AND OTHER CROSS-BORDER CASES
``Sec.
``601. Purpose and scope of application.
``SUBCHAPTER I--GENERAL PROVISIONS
``602. Definitions.
``603. International obligations of the United States.
``604. Commencement of ancillary case.
``605. Authorization to act in a foreign country.
``606. Public policy exception.
``607. Additional assistance.
``608. Interpretation.
``SUBCHAPTER II--ACCESS OF FOREIGN REPRESENTATIVES AND CREDITORS TO THE
COURT
``609. Right of direct access.
``610. Limited jurisdiction.
``611. Commencement of case under section 301 or 303.
``612. Participation of a foreign representative in a case under this
title.
``613. Access of foreign creditors to a case under this title.
``614. Notification to foreign creditors concerning a case under this
title.
``SUBCHAPTER III--RECOGNITION OF A FOREIGN PROCEEDING AND RELIEF
``615. Application for recognition of a foreign proceeding.
``616. Presumptions concerning recognition.
``617. Order recognizing a foreign proceeding.
``618. Subsequent information.
``619. Relief that may be granted upon petition for recognition of a
foreign proceeding.
``620. Effects of recognition of a foreign main proceeding.
``621. Relief that may be granted upon recognition of a foreign
proceeding.
``622. Protection of creditors and other interested persons.
``623. Actions to avoid acts detrimental to creditors.
``624. Intervention by a foreign representative.
``SUBCHAPTER IV--COOPERATION WITH FOREIGN COURTS AND FOREIGN
REPRESENTATIVES
``625. Cooperation and direct communication between the court and
foreign courts or foreign representatives.
``626. Cooperation and direct communication between the trustee and
foreign courts or foreign representatives.
``627. Forms of cooperation.
``SUBCHAPTER V--CONCURRENT PROCEEDINGS
``628. Commencement of a case under this title after recognition of a
foreign main proceeding.
``629. Coordination of a case under this title and a foreign
proceeding.
``630. Coordination of more than 1 foreign proceeding.
``631. Presumption of insolvency based on recognition of a foreign main
proceeding.
``632. Rule of payment in concurrent proceedings.
``Sec. 601. Purpose and scope of application
``(a) The purpose of this chapter is to incorporate the
Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency so as to provide
effective mechanisms for dealing with cases of cross-border
insolvency with the objectives of--
``(1) cooperation between--
``(A) United States courts, United States trustees,
trustees, examiners, debtors, and debtors in possession; and
``(B) the courts and other competent authorities of foreign
countries involved in cross-border insolvency cases;
``(2) greater legal certainty for trade and investment;
``(3) fair and efficient administration of cross-border
insolvencies that protects the interests of all creditors,
and other interested entities, including the debtor;
``(4) protection and maximization of the value of the
debtor's assets; and
``(5) facilitation of the rescue of financially troubled
businesses, thereby protecting investment and preserving
employment.
``(b) This chapter applies if--
``(1) assistance is sought in the United States by a
foreign court or a foreign representative in connection with
a foreign proceeding;
[[Page 8149]]
``(2) assistance is sought in a foreign country in
connection with a case under this title;
``(3) a foreign proceeding and a case under this title with
respect to the same debtor are taking place concurrently; or
``(4) creditors or other interested persons in a foreign
country have an interest in requesting the commencement of,
or participating in, a case or proceeding under this title.
``(c) This chapter does not apply to--
``(1) a proceeding concerning an entity identified by
exclusion in subsection 109(b); or
``(2) an individual, or to an individual and such
individual's spouse, who have debts within the limits
specified in section 109(e) and who are citizens of the
United States or aliens lawfully admitted for permanent
residence in the United States.
``SUBCHAPTER I--GENERAL PROVISIONS
``Sec. 602. Definitions
``For purposes of this chapter, the term--
``(1) `debtor' means an entity that is the subject of a
foreign proceeding;
``(2) `establishment' means any place of operations where
the debtor carries out a nontransitory economic activity;
``(3) `foreign court' means a judicial or other authority
competent to control or supervise a foreign proceeding;
``(4) `foreign main proceeding' means a foreign proceeding
taking place in the country where the debtor has the center
of its main interests;
``(5) `foreign nonmain proceeding' means a foreign
proceeding, other than a foreign main proceeding, taking
place in a country where the debtor has an establishment;
``(6) `trustee' includes a trustee, a debtor in possession
in a case under any chapter of this title, or a debtor under
chapter 9 or 13 of this title; and
``(7) `within the territorial jurisdiction of the United
States' when used with reference to property of a debtor
refers to tangible property located within the territory of
the United States and intangible property deemed to be
located within that territory, including any property that
may properly be seized or garnished by an action in a Federal
or State court in the United States.
``Sec. 603. International obligations of the United States
``To the extent that this chapter conflicts with an
obligation of the United States arising out of any treaty or
other form of agreement to which it is a party with 1 or more
other countries, the requirements of the treaty or agreement
prevail.
``Sec. 604. Commencement of ancillary case
``A case under this chapter is commenced by the filing of a
petition for recognition of a foreign proceeding under
section 615.
``Sec. 605. Authorization to act in a foreign country
``A trustee or another entity designated by the court, may
be authorized by the court to act in a foreign country on
behalf of an estate created under section 541. An entity
authorized to act under this section may act in any way
permitted by the applicable foreign law.
``Sec. 606. Public policy exception
``Nothing in this chapter prevents the court from refusing
to take an action governed by this chapter if the action
would be manifestly contrary to the public policy of the
United States.
``Sec. 607. Additional assistance
``(a) Nothing in this chapter limits the power of the
court, upon recognition of a foreign proceeding, to provide
additional assistance to a foreign representative under this
title or under other laws of the United States.
``(b) In determining whether to provide additional
assistance under this title or under other laws of the United
States, the court shall consider whether such additional
assistance, consistent with the principles of comity, will
reasonably assure--
``(1) just treatment of all holders of claims against or
interests in the debtor's property;
``(2) protection of claim holders in the United States
against prejudice and inconvenience in the processing of
claims in such foreign proceeding;
``(3) prevention of preferential or fraudulent dispositions
of property of the debtor;
``(4) distribution of proceeds of the debtor's property
substantially in accordance with the order prescribed by this
title; and
``(5) if appropriate, the provision of an opportunity for a
fresh start for the individual that such foreign proceeding
concerns.
``Sec. 608. Interpretation
``In interpreting this chapter, the court shall consider
its international origin, and the need to promote an
application of this chapter that is consistent with the
application of similar statutes adopted by foreign
jurisdictions.
``SUBCHAPTER II--ACCESS OF FOREIGN REPRESENTATIVES AND CREDITORS TO THE
COURT
``Sec. 609. Right of direct access
``(a) A foreign representative is entitled to commence a
case under section 604 by filing a petition for recognition
under section 615, and upon recognition, to apply directly to
other Federal and State courts for appropriate relief in
those courts.
``(b) Upon recognition, and subject to section 610, a
foreign representative shall have the capacity to sue and be
sued.
``(c) Recognition under this chapter is prerequisite to the
granting of comity or cooperation to a foreign representative
in any Federal or State court in the United States. Any
request for comity or cooperation by a foreign representative
in any court shall be accompanied by a sworn statement
setting forth whether recognition under section 615 has been
sought and the status of any such petition.
``(d) Upon denial of recognition under this chapter, the
court may issue appropriate orders necessary to prevent an
attempt to obtain comity or cooperation from courts in the
United States without such recognition.
``Sec. 610. Limited jurisdiction
``The sole fact that a foreign representative files a
petition under sections 604 and 615 does not subject the
foreign representative to the jurisdiction of any court in
the United States for any other purpose.
``Sec. 611. Commencement of case under section 301 or 303
``(a) Upon filing a petition for recognition, a foreign
representative may commence--
``(1) an involuntary case under section 303; or
``(2) a voluntary case under section 301 or 302, if the
foreign proceeding is a foreign main proceeding.
``(b) The petition commencing a case under subsection (a)
must be accompanied by a statement describing the petition
for recognition and its current status. The court where the
petition for recognition has been filed must be advised of
the foreign representative's intent to commence a case under
subsection (a) prior to such commencement.
``(c) A case under subsection (a) shall be dismissed unless
recognition is granted.
``Sec. 612. Participation of a foreign representative in a
case under this title
``Upon recognition of a foreign proceeding, the foreign
representative in that proceeding is entitled to participate
as a party in interest in a case regarding the debtor under
this title.
``Sec. 613. Access of foreign creditors to a case under this
title
``(a) Foreign creditors have the same rights regarding the
commencement of, and participation in, a case under this
title as domestic creditors.
``(b)(1) Subsection (a) does not change or codify law in
effect on the date of enactment of this chapter as to the
priority of claims under section 507 or 726, except that the
claim of a foreign creditor under section 507 or 726 shall
not be given a lower priority than that of general unsecured
claims without priority solely because the holder of such
claim is a foreign creditor.
``(2)(A) Subsection (a) and paragraph (1) do not change or
codify law in effect on the date of enactment of this chapter
as to the allowability of foreign revenue claims or other
foreign public law claims in a proceeding under this title.
``(B) Allowance and priority as to a foreign tax claim or
other foreign public law claim shall be governed by any
applicable tax treaty of the United States, under the
conditions and circumstances specified therein.
``Sec. 614. Notification to foreign creditors concerning a
case under this title
``(a) Whenever in a case under this title notice is to be
given to creditors generally or to any class or category of
creditors, such notice shall also be given to the known
creditors generally, or to creditors in the notified class or
category, that do not have addresses in the United States.
The court may order that appropriate steps be taken with a
view to notifying any creditor whose address is not yet
known.
``(b) The notification to creditors with foreign addresses
described in subsection (a) shall be given individually,
unless the court considers that, under the circumstances,
some other form of notification would be more appropriate. No
letters rogatory or other similar formality is required.
``(c) When a notification of commencement of a case is to
be given to foreign creditors, the notification shall--
``(1) indicate the time period for filing proofs of claim
and specify the place for their filing;
``(2) indicate whether secured creditors need to file their
proofs of claim; and
``(3) contain any other information required to be included
in such a notification to creditors pursuant to this title
and the orders of the court.
``(d) Any rule of procedure or order of the court as to
notice or the filing of a claim shall provide such additional
time to creditors with foreign addresses as is reasonable
under the circumstances.
``SUBCHAPTER III--RECOGNITION OF A FOREIGN PROCEEDING AND RELIEF
``Sec. 615. Application for recognition of a foreign
proceeding
``(a) A foreign representative applies to the court for
recognition of the foreign proceeding in which the foreign
representative has been appointed by filing a petition for
recognition.
``(b) A petition for recognition shall be accompanied by--
[[Page 8150]]
``(1) a certified copy of the decision commencing the
foreign proceeding and appointing the foreign representative;
``(2) a certificate from the foreign court affirming the
existence of the foreign proceeding and of the appointment of
the foreign representative; or
``(3) in the absence of evidence referred to in paragraphs
(1) and (2), any other evidence acceptable to the court of
the existence of the foreign proceeding and of the
appointment of the foreign representative.
``(c) A petition for recognition shall also be accompanied
by a statement identifying all foreign proceedings with
respect to the debtor that are known to the foreign
representative.
``(d) The documents referred to in paragraphs (1) and (2)
of subsection (b) must be translated into English. The court
may require a translation into English of additional
documents.
``Sec. 616. Presumptions concerning recognition
``(a) If the decision or certificate referred to in section
615(b) indicates that the foreign proceeding is a foreign
proceeding, within the meaning of section 101(23) and that
the person or body is a foreign representative, within the
meaning of section 101(24), the court is entitled to so
presume.
``(b) The court is entitled to presume that documents
submitted in support of the petition for recognition are
authentic, whether or not the documents have been subjected
to legal processing under applicable law.
``(c) In the absence of evidence to the contrary, the
debtor's registered office, or habitual residence in the case
of an individual, is presumed to be the center of the
debtor's main interests.
``Sec. 617. Order recognizing a foreign proceeding
``(a) Subject to section 606, an order recognizing a
foreign proceeding shall be entered if--
``(1) the foreign proceeding is a foreign main proceeding
or foreign nonmain proceeding within the meaning of section
602 and is a foreign proceeding within the meaning of section
101(23);
``(2) the person or body applying for recognition is a
foreign representative within the meaning of section 101(24);
and
``(3) the petition meets the requirements of section 615.
``(b) The foreign proceeding shall be recognized--
``(1) as a foreign main proceeding if it is taking place in
the country where the debtor has the center of its main
interests; or
``(2) as a foreign nonmain proceeding if the debtor has an
establishment within the meaning of section 602 in the
foreign country where the proceeding is pending.
``(c) A petition for recognition of a foreign proceeding
shall be decided upon at the earliest possible time. Entry of
an order recognizing a foreign proceeding shall constitute
recognition under this chapter.
``(d) The provisions of this subchapter do not prevent
modification or termination of recognition if it is shown
that the grounds for granting it were fully or partially
lacking or have ceased to exist, but in considering such
action the court shall give due weight to possible prejudice
to parties that have relied upon the granting of recognition.
The case under this chapter may be closed in the manner
prescribed for a case under section 350.
``Sec. 618. Subsequent information
``After the petition for recognition of the foreign
proceeding is filed, the foreign representative shall file
with the court promptly a notice of change of status
concerning--
``(1) any substantial change in the status of the foreign
proceeding or the status of the foreign representative's
appointment; and
``(2) any other foreign proceeding regarding the debtor
that becomes known to the foreign representative.
``Sec. 619. Relief that may be granted upon petition for
recognition of a foreign proceeding
``(a) Beginning on the date on which a petition for
recognition is filed and ending on the date on which the
petition is decided upon, the court may, at the request of
the foreign representative, if relief is urgently needed to
protect the assets of the debtor or the interests of the
creditors, grant relief of a provisional nature, including--
``(1) staying execution against the debtor's assets;
``(2) entrusting the administration or realization of all
or part of the debtor's assets located in the United States
to the foreign representative or another person, including an
examiner, designated by the court, including an examiner, in
order to protect and preserve the value of assets that, by
their nature or because of other circumstances, are
perishable, susceptible to devaluation, or otherwise in
jeopardy; and
``(3) any relief referred to in paragraph (3), (4), or (7)
of section 621(a).
``(b) Unless extended under section 621(a)(6), the relief
granted under this section terminates when the petition for
recognition is decided upon.
``(c) It is a ground for denial of relief under this
section that such relief would interfere with the
administration of a foreign main proceeding.
``(d) The court may not enjoin a police or regulatory act
of a governmental unit, including a criminal action or
proceeding, under this section.
``(e) The standards, procedures, and limitations applicable
to an injunction shall apply to relief under this section.
``Sec. 620. Effects of recognition of a foreign main
proceeding
``(a)(1) Upon recognition of a foreign proceeding that is a
foreign main proceeding--
``(A) section 362 applies with respect to the debtor and
that property of the debtor that is within the territorial
jurisdiction of the United States; and
``(B) a transfer, an encumbrance, or any other disposition
of an interest of the debtor in property within the
territorial jurisdiction of the United States is restrained
as and to the extent that is provided for property of an
estate under sections 363, 549, and 552.
``(2) Unless the court orders otherwise, the foreign
representative may operate the debtor's business and may
exercise the powers of a trustee under section 549, subject
to sections 363 and 552.
``(b) The scope, and the modification or termination, of
the stay and restraints referred to in subsection (a) are
subject to the exceptions and limitations provided in
subsections (b), (c), and (d) of section 362, subsections (b)
and (c) of section 363, and sections 552, 555 through 557,
559, and 560.
``(c) Subsection (a) does not affect the right to commence
individual actions or proceedings in a foreign country to the
extent necessary to preserve a claim against the debtor.
``(d) Subsection (a) does not affect the right of a foreign
representative or an entity to file a petition commencing a
case under this title or the right of any party to file
claims or take other proper actions in such a case.
``Sec. 621. Relief that may be granted upon recognition of a
foreign proceeding
``(a) Upon recognition of a foreign proceeding, whether
main or nonmain, if necessary to effectuate the purpose of
this chapter and to protect the assets of the debtor or the
interests of the creditors, the court may, at the request of
the foreign representative, grant any appropriate relief,
including--
``(1) staying the commencement or continuation of
individual actions or individual proceedings concerning the
debtor's assets, rights, obligations, or liabilities to the
extent the actions or proceedings have not been stayed under
section 620(a);
``(2) staying execution against the debtor's assets to the
extent the execution has not been stayed under section
620(a);
``(3) suspending the right to transfer, encumber, or
otherwise dispose of any assets of the debtor to the extent
that right has not been suspended under section 620(a);
``(4) providing for the examination of witnesses, the
taking of evidence, or the delivery of information concerning
the debtor's assets, affairs, rights, obligations, or
liabilities;
``(5) entrusting the administration or realization of all
or part of the debtor's assets within the territorial
jurisdiction of the United States to the foreign
representative or another person, including an examiner,
designated by the court;
``(6) extending relief granted under section 619(a); and
``(7) granting any additional relief that may be available
to a trustee, except for relief available under sections 522,
544, 545, 547, 548, 550, and 724(a).
``(b) Upon recognition of a foreign proceeding, whether
main or nonmain, the court may, at the request of the foreign
representative, entrust the distribution of all or part of
the debtor's assets located in the United States to the
foreign representative or another person, including an
examiner, designated by the court, if the court is satisfied
that the interests of creditors in the United States are
sufficiently protected.
``(c) In granting relief under this section to a
representative of a foreign nonmain proceeding, the court
must be satisfied that the relief relates to assets that,
under the laws of the United States, should be administered
in the foreign nonmain proceeding or concerns information
required in that proceeding.
``(d) The court may not enjoin a police or regulatory act
of a governmental unit, including a criminal action or
proceeding, under this section.
``Sec. 622. Protection of creditors and other interested
persons
``(a) The court may grant relief under section 619 or 621,
or may modify or terminate relief under subsection (c), only
if the court finds that the interests of the creditors and
other interested entities, including the debtor, are
sufficiently protected.
``(b) The court may subject relief granted under section
619 or 621 to conditions that the court considers to be
appropriate.
``(c) The court may, at the request of the foreign
representative or an entity affected by relief granted under
section 619 or 621, or at its own motion, modify or terminate
the relief.
``Sec. 623. Actions to avoid acts detrimental to creditors
``(a) Upon recognition of a foreign proceeding, the foreign
representative has standing in a case concerning the debtor
pending under another chapter of this title
[[Page 8151]]
to initiate actions under sections 522, 544, 545, 547, 548,
550, and 724(a).
``(b) In any case in which the foreign proceeding is a
foreign nonmain proceeding, the court must be satisfied that
an action under subsection (a) relates to assets that, under
United States law, should be administered in the foreign
nonmain proceeding.
``Sec. 624. Intervention by a foreign representative
``Upon recognition of a foreign proceeding, the foreign
representative may intervene in any proceedings in a Federal
or State court in the United States in which the debtor is a
party.
``SUBCHAPTER IV--COOPERATION WITH FOREIGN COURTS AND FOREIGN
REPRESENTATIVES
``Sec. 625. Cooperation and direct communication between the
court and foreign courts or foreign representatives
``(a) In all matters included within section 601, the court
shall cooperate to the maximum extent possible with foreign
courts or foreign representatives, either directly or through
the trustee.
``(b) The court is entitled to communicate directly with,
or to request information or assistance directly from,
foreign courts or foreign representatives, subject to the
rights of parties in interest to notice and participation.
``Sec. 626. Cooperation and direct communication between the
trustee and foreign courts or foreign representatives
``(a) In all matters included within section 601, the
trustee or other person, including an examiner, designated by
the court, shall, subject to the supervision of the court,
cooperate to the maximum extent possible with foreign courts
or foreign representatives.
``(b) The trustee or other person, including an examiner,
designated by the court is entitled, subject to the
supervision of the court, to communicate directly with
foreign courts or foreign representatives.
``(c) Section 1104(d) shall apply to the appointment of an
examiner under this chapter. Any such examiner shall comply
with the qualifications requirements imposed on a trustee
under section 322(a).
``Sec. 627. Forms of cooperation
``Cooperation referred to in sections 625 and 626 may be
implemented by any appropriate means, including--
``(1) appointment of a person or body, including an
examiner, to act at the direction of the court;
``(2) communication of information by any means considered
appropriate by the court;
``(3) coordination of the administration and supervision of
the debtor's assets and affairs;
``(4) approval or implementation of agreements concerning
the coordination of proceedings; and
``(5) coordination of concurrent proceedings regarding the
same debtor.
``SUBCHAPTER V--CONCURRENT PROCEEDINGS
``Sec. 628. Commencement of a case under this title after
recognition of a foreign main proceeding
``After recognition of a foreign main proceeding, a case
under another chapter of this title may be commenced only if
the debtor has assets in the United States. The effects of
such case shall be restricted to the assets of the debtor
that are within the territorial jurisdiction of the United
States and, to the extent necessary to implement cooperation
and coordination under sections 625, 626, and 627, to other
assets of the debtor that are within the jurisdiction of the
court under sections 541(a) and 1334(e) of title 28, to the
extent that such other assets are not subject to the
jurisdiction and control of a foreign proceeding that has
been recognized under this chapter.
``Sec. 629. Coordination of a case under this title and a
foreign proceeding
``In any case in which a foreign proceeding and a case
under another chapter of this title are taking place
concurrently regarding the same debtor, the court shall seek
cooperation and coordination under sections 625, 626, and
627, and the following shall apply:
``(1) If the case in the United States is taking place at
the time the petition for recognition of the foreign
proceeding is filed--
``(A) any relief granted under section 619 or 621 shall be
consistent with the relief granted in the case in the United
States; and
``(B) even if the foreign proceeding is recognized as a
foreign main proceeding, section 620 does not apply.
``(2) If a case in the United States under this title
commences after recognition, or after the filing of the
petition for recognition, of the foreign proceeding--
``(A) any relief in effect under section 619 or 621 shall
be reviewed by the court and shall be modified or terminated
if inconsistent with the case in the United States; and
``(B) if the foreign proceeding is a foreign main
proceeding, the stay and suspension referred to in section
620(a) shall be modified or terminated if inconsistent with
the relief granted in the case in the United States.
``(3) In granting, extending, or modifying relief granted
to a representative of a foreign nonmain proceeding, the
court shall be satisfied that the relief relates to assets
that, under the law of the United States, should be
administered in the foreign nonmain proceeding or concerns
information required in that proceeding.
``(4) In achieving cooperation and coordination under
sections 628 and 629, the court may grant any of the relief
authorized under section 305.
``Sec. 630. Coordination of more than 1 foreign proceeding
``In matters referred to in section 601, with respect to
more than 1 foreign proceeding regarding the debtor, the
court shall seek cooperation and coordination under sections
625, 626, and 627, and the following shall apply:
``(1) Any relief granted under section 619 or 621 to a
representative of a foreign nonmain proceeding after
recognition of a foreign main proceeding shall be consistent
with the foreign main proceeding.
``(2) If a foreign main proceeding is recognized after
recognition, or after the filing of a petition for
recognition, of a foreign nonmain proceeding, any relief in
effect under section 619 or 621 shall be reviewed by the
court and shall be modified or terminated if inconsistent
with the foreign main proceeding.
``(3) If, after recognition of a foreign nonmain
proceeding, another foreign nonmain proceeding is recognized,
the court shall grant, modify, or terminate relief for the
purpose of facilitating coordination of the proceedings.
``Sec. 631. Presumption of insolvency based on recognition of
a foreign main proceeding
``In the absence of evidence to the contrary, recognition
of a foreign main proceeding is for the purpose of commencing
a proceeding under section 303, proof that the debtor is
generally not paying its debts as such debts become due.
``Sec. 632. Rule of payment in concurrent proceedings
``Without prejudice to secured claims or rights in rem, a
creditor who has received payment with respect to its claim
in a foreign proceeding pursuant to a law relating to
insolvency may not receive a payment for the same claim in a
case under any other chapter of this title regarding the
debtor, so long as the payment to other creditors of the same
class is proportionately less than the payment the creditor
has already received.''.
(b) Clerical Amendment.--The table of chapters for title
11, United States Code, is amended by inserting after the
item relating to chapter 5 the following:
``6. Ancillary and Other Cross-Border Cases..................601''.....
SEC. 502. AMENDMENTS TO OTHER CHAPTERS IN TITLE 11, UNITED
STATES CODE.
(a) Applicability of Chapters.--Section 103 of title 11,
United States Code, is amended--
(1) in subsection (a), by inserting before the period the
following: ``, and this chapter, sections 307, 304, 555
through 557, 559, and 560 apply in a case under chapter 6'';
and
(2) by adding at the end the following:
``(j) Chapter 6 applies only in a case under such chapter,
except that section 605 applies to trustees and to any other
entity, including an examiner, designated by the court under
chapter 7, 11, or 12, to debtors in possession under chapter
11 or 12, and to debtors under chapters 9 and 13 who are
authorized to act under section 605.''.
(b) Definitions.--Paragraphs (23) and (24) of section 101
of title 11, United States Code, are amended to read as
follows:
``(23) `foreign proceeding' means a collective judicial or
administrative proceeding in a foreign state, including an
interim proceeding, pursuant to a law relating to insolvency
in which proceeding the assets and affairs of the debtor are
subject to control or supervision by a foreign court, for the
purpose of reorganization or liquidation;
``(24) `foreign representative' means a person or body,
including a person or body appointed on an interim basis,
authorized in a foreign proceeding to administer the
reorganization or the liquidation of the debtor's assets or
affairs or to act as a representative of the foreign
proceeding;''.
(c) Amendments to Title 28, United States Code.--
(1) Procedures.--Section 157(b)(2) of title 28, United
States Code, is amended--
(A) in subparagraph (N), by striking ``and'' at the end;
(B) in subparagraph (O), by striking the period at the end
and inserting ``; and''; and
(C) by adding at the end the following:
``(P) recognition of foreign proceedings and other matters
under chapter 6 of title 11.''.
(2) Bankruptcy cases and proceedings.--Section 1334(c)(1)
of title 28, United States Code, is amended by striking
``Nothing in'' and inserting ``Except with respect to a case
under chapter 6 of title 11, nothing in''.
(3) Duties of trustees.--Section 586(a)(3) of title 28,
United States Code, is amended by inserting ``6,'' after
``chapter''.
TITLE VI--MISCELLANEOUS
SEC. 601. EXECUTORY CONTRACTS AND UNEXPIRED LEASES.
Section 365(d) of title 11, United States Code, is amended
by striking paragraph (4) and inserting the following:
``(4)(A) Subject to subparagraph (B), in any case under any
chapter of this title, an unexpired lease of nonresidential
real property
[[Page 8152]]
under which the debtor is the lessee shall be deemed rejected
and the trustee shall immediately surrender that
nonresidential real property to the lessor if the trustee
does not assume or reject the unexpired lease by the earlier
of--
``(i) the date that is 120 days after the date of the order
for relief; or
``(ii) the date of the entry of an order confirming a plan.
``(B) The court may extend the period determined under
subparagraph (A) only upon a motion of the lessor.''.
SEC. 602. EXPEDITED APPEALS OF BANKRUPTCY CASES TO COURTS OF
APPEALS.
(a) In General.--Section 158 of title 28, United States
Code, is amended--
(1) by redesignating subsection (d) as subsection (e);
(2) by inserting after subsection (c) the following:
``(d)(1) Any final judgment, decision, order, or decree of
a bankruptcy judge entered for a case in accordance with
section 157 may be appealed by any party in such case to the
appropriate court of appeals if--
``(A) an appeal from such judgment, decision, order, or
decree is first filed with the appropriate district court of
the United States; and
``(B) the decision on the appeal described under
subparagraph (A) is not filed by a district court judge
within 30 days after the date such appeal is filed with the
district court.
``(2) On the date that an appeal is filed with a court of
appeals under paragraph (1), the chief judge for such court
of appeals shall issue an order to the clerk for the district
court from which the appeal is filed. Such order shall direct
the clerk to enter the final judgment, decision, order, or
decree of the bankruptcy judge as the final judgment,
decision, order, or decree of the district court.''; and
(3) in subsection (e), (as redesignated by paragraph (1) of
this section) by striking ``subsections (a) and (b)'' and
inserting ``subsections (a), (b), and (d)''.
(b) Technical and Conforming Amendments.--
(1) Section 305(c) of title 11, United States Code, is
amended by striking ``section 158(d)'' and inserting
``section 158(e)''.
(2) Section 1334(d) of title 28, United States Code, is
amended by striking ``section 158(d)'' and inserting
``section 158(e)''.
(3) Section 1452(b) of title 28, United States Code, is
amended by striking ``section 158(d)'' and inserting
``section 158(e)''.
SEC. 603. CREDITORS AND EQUITY SECURITY HOLDERS COMMITTEES.
Section 1102(a)(2) of title 11, United States Code, is
amended by inserting before the first sentence the following:
``On its own motion or on request of a party in interest, and
after notice and hearing, the court may order a change in the
membership of a committee appointed under this subsection, if
the court determines that the change is necessary to ensure
adequate representation of creditors or equity security
holders.''.
SEC. 604. REPEAL OF SUNSET PROVISION.
Section 302 of the Bankruptcy Judges, United States
Trustees, and Family Farmer Bankruptcy Act of 1986 (28 U.S.C.
581 note) is amended by striking subsection (f).
SEC. 605. CASES ANCILLARY TO FOREIGN PROCEEDINGS.
Section 304 of title 11, United States Code, as amended by
section 410 of this Act, is amended by adding at the end the
following:
``(e)(1) In this subsection--
``(A) the term `domestic insurance company' means a
domestic insurance company, as that term is used in section
109(b)(2);
``(B) the term `foreign insurance company' means a foreign
insurance company, as that term is used in section 109(b)(3);
``(C) the term `United States claimant' means a beneficiary
of any deposit referred to in paragraph (2)(A) or any
multibeneficiary trust referred to in subparagraph (B) or (C)
of paragraph (2);
``(D) the term `United States creditor' means, with respect
to a foreign insurance company--
``(i) a United States claimant; or
``(ii) any business entity that operates in the United
States and that is a creditor; and
``(E) the term `United States policyholder' means a holder
of an insurance policy issued in the United States.
``(2) Notwithstanding subsections (b) and (c), the court
may not grant relief under subsection (b) to a foreign
insurance company that is not engaged in the business of
insurance or reinsurance in the United States with respect to
any claim made by a United States creditor against--
``(A) a deposit required by an applicable State insurance
law;
``(B) a multibeneficiary trust required by an applicable
State insurance law to protect United States policyholders or
claimants against a foreign insurance company; or
``(C) a multibeneficiary trust authorized under an
applicable State insurance law to allow a domestic insurance
company that cedes reinsurance to the debtor to reflect the
reinsurance as an asset or deduction from liability in the
ceding insurer's financial statements.''.
SEC. 606. LIMITATION.
Section 546(c)(1)(B) of title 11, United States Code, is
amended by striking ``20'' and inserting ``45''.
SEC. 607. AMENDMENT TO SECTION 546 OF TITLE 11, UNITED STATES
CODE.
Section 546 of title 11, United States Code, as amended by
section 401 of this Act, is amended by adding at the end the
following:
``(i) Notwithstanding paragraphs (2) and (3) of section
545, the trustee may not avoid a warehouseman's lien for
storage, transportation, or other costs incidental to the
storage and handling of goods, as provided by an applicable
State law that is similar to section 7-209 of the Uniform
Commercial Code.''.
SEC. 608. AMENDMENT TO SECTION 330(A) OF TITLE 11, UNITED
STATES CODE.
Section 330(a)(3)(A) of title 11, United States Code, is
amended--
(1) by inserting ``In determining the amount of reasonable
compensation to be awarded a trustee, the court shall treat
such compensation as a commission based on the results
achieved.'' after ``(3)(A)''; and
(2) by inserting ``to an examiner, chapter 11 trustee, or
professional person'' after ``awarded''.
TITLE VII--TECHNICAL CORRECTIONS
SEC. 701. ADJUSTMENT OF DOLLAR AMOUNTS.
Section 104 of title 11, United States Code, is amended by
inserting ``522(f)(3), 707(b)(5),'' after ``522(d),'' each
place it appears.
SEC. 702. EXTENSION OF TIME.
Section 108(c)(2) of title 11, United States Code, is
amended by striking ``922'' and all that follows through
``or'', and inserting ``922, 1201, or''.
SEC. 703. WHO MAY BE A DEBTOR.
Section 109(b)(2) of title 11, United States Code, is
amended by striking ``subsection (c) or (d) of''.
SEC. 704. PENALTY FOR PERSONS WHO NEGLIGENTLY OR FRAUDULENTLY
PREPARE BANKRUPTCY PETITIONS.
Section 110(j)(3) of title 11, United States Code, is
amended by striking ``attorney's'' and inserting ``attorneys'
''.
SEC. 705. LIMITATION ON COMPENSATION OF PROFESSIONAL PERSONS.
Section 328(a) of title 11, United States Code, is amended
by inserting ``on a fixed or percentage fee basis,'' after
``hourly basis,''.
SEC. 706. SPECIAL TAX PROVISIONS.
Section 346(g)(1)(C) of title 11, United States Code, is
amended by striking ``, except'' and all that follows through
``1986''.
SEC. 707. EFFECT OF CONVERSION.
Section 348(f)(2) of title 11, United States Code, is
amended by inserting ``of the estate'' after ``property'' the
first place it appears.
SEC. 708. AUTOMATIC STAY.
Section 362(b) of title 11, United States Code, as amended
by section 401 of this Act, is amended--
(1) in paragraph (20), by striking ``or'' at the end;
(2) in paragraph (21), by striking the period at the end
and inserting a semicolon; and
(3) by inserting after paragraph (21) the following:
``(22) under subsection (a) of this section of any transfer
that is not avoidable under section 544 and that is not
avoidable under section 549;
``(23) under subsection (a)(3) of this section, of the
continuation of any eviction, unlawful detainer action, or
similar proceeding by a lessor against a debtor involving
residential real property in which the debtor resides as a
tenant under a rental agreement and the debtor has not paid
rent to the lessor under the terms of the lease agreement or
applicable State law after the commencement and during the
course of the case;
``(24) under subsection (a)(3) of this section, of the
commencement or continuation of any eviction, unlawful
detainer action, or similar proceeding by a lessor against a
debtor involving residential real property in which the
debtor resides as a tenant under a rental agreement that has
terminated pursuant to the lease agreement or applicable
State law;
``(25) under subsection (a)(3), of any eviction, unlawful
detainer action, or similar proceeding, if the debtor has
previously filed within the preceding year and failed to pay
post-petition rent during the course of that case; or
``(26) under subsection (a)(3), of eviction actions based
on endangerment to property or person or the use of illegal
drugs.''.
SEC. 709. ALLOWANCE OF ADMINISTRATIVE EXPENSES.
Section 503(b)(4) of title 11, United States Code, is
amended by inserting ``subparagraph (A), (B), (C), (D), or
(E) of'' before ``paragraph (3)''.
SEC. 710. PRIORITIES.
Section 507(a) of title 11, United States Code, as amended
by section 323 of this Act, is amended--
(1) in paragraph (3)(B), by striking the semicolon at the
end and inserting a period; and
(2) in paragraph (7), by inserting ``unsecured'' after
``allowed''.
SEC. 711. EXEMPTIONS.
Section 522 of title 11, United States Code, as amended by
section 320 of this Act, is amended--
(1) in subsection (f)(1)(A)(ii)(II)--
(A) by striking ``includes a liability designated as'' and
inserting ``is for a liability
[[Page 8153]]
that is designated as, and is actually in the nature of,'';
and
(B) by striking ``, unless'' and all that follows through
``support''; and
(2) in subsection (g)(2), by striking ``subsection (f)(2)''
and inserting ``subsection (f)(1)(B)''.
SEC. 712. EXCEPTIONS TO DISCHARGE.
Section 523 of title 11, United States Code, as amended by
section 315 of this Act, is amended--
(1) in subsection (a)(3), by striking ``or (6)'' each place
it appears and inserting ``(6), or (15)'';
(2) as amended by section 304(e) of Public Law 103-394 (108
Stat. 4133), in paragraph (15), by transferring such
paragraph so as to insert it after paragraph (14A) of
subsection (a);
(3) in subsection (a)(9), by inserting ``, watercraft, or
aircraft'' after ``motor vehicle'';
(4) in subsection (a)(15), as so redesignated by paragraph
(2) of this subsection, by inserting ``to a spouse, former
spouse, or child of the debtor and'' after ``(15)'';
(5) in subsection (a)(17)--
(A) by striking ``by a court'' and inserting ``on a
prisoner by any court'';
(B) by striking ``section 1915 (b) or (f)'' and inserting
``subsection (b) or (f)(2) of section 1915''; and
(C) by inserting ``(or a similar non-Federal law)'' after
``title 28'' each place it appears; and
(6) in subsection (e), by striking ``a insured'' and
inserting ``an insured''.
SEC. 713. EFFECT OF DISCHARGE.
Section 524(a)(3) of title 11, United States Code, is
amended by striking ``section 523'' and all that follows
through ``or that'' and inserting ``section 523, 1228(a)(1),
or 1328(a)(1) of this title, or that''.
SEC. 714. PROTECTION AGAINST DISCRIMINATORY TREATMENT.
Section 525(c) of title 11, United States Code, is
amended--
(1) in paragraph (1), by inserting ``student'' before
``grant'' the second place it appears; and
(2) in paragraph (2), by striking ``the program operated
under part B, D, or E of'' and inserting ``any program
operated under''.
SEC. 715. PROPERTY OF THE ESTATE.
Section 541(b)(4)(B)(ii) of title 11, United States Code,
is amended by inserting ``365 or'' before ``542''.
SEC. 716. PREFERENCES.
Section 547 of title 11, United States Code, is amended--
(1) in subsection (b), by striking ``subsection (c)'' and
inserting ``subsections (c) and (h)''; and
(2) by adding at the end the following:
``(h) If the trustee avoids under subsection (b) a security
interest given between 90 days and 1 year before the date of
the filing of the petition, by the debtor to an entity that
is not an insider for the benefit of a creditor that is an
insider, such security interest shall be considered to be
avoided under this section only with respect to the creditor
that is an insider.''.
SEC. 717. POSTPETITION TRANSACTIONS.
Section 549(c) of title 11, United States Code, is
amended--
(1) by inserting ``an interest in'' after ``transfer of'';
(2) by striking ``such property'' and inserting ``such real
property''; and
(3) by striking ``the interest'' and inserting ``such
interest''.
SEC. 718. TECHNICAL AMENDMENT.
Section 552(b)(1) of title 11, United States Code, is
amended by striking ``product'' each place it appears and
inserting ``products''.
SEC. 719. DISPOSITION OF PROPERTY OF THE ESTATE.
Section 726(b) of title 11, United States Code, is amended
by striking ``1009,''.
SEC. 720. GENERAL PROVISIONS.
Section 901(a) of title 11, United States Code, as amended
by section 401 of this Act, is amended by inserting
``1123(d),'' after ``1123(b),''.
SEC. 721. APPOINTMENT OF ELECTED TRUSTEE.
Section 1104(b) of title 11, United States Code, is
amended--
(1) by inserting ``(1)'' after ``(b)''; and
(2) by adding at the end the following:
``(2)(A) If an eligible, disinterested trustee is elected
at a meeting of creditors under paragraph (1), the United
States trustee shall file a report certifying that election.
Upon the filing of a report under the preceding sentence--
``(i) the trustee elected under paragraph (1) shall be
considered to have been selected and appointed for purposes
of this section; and
``(ii) the service of any trustee appointed under
subsection (d) shall terminate.
``(B) In the case of any dispute arising out of an election
under subparagraph (A), the court shall resolve the
dispute.''.
SEC. 722. ABANDONMENT OF RAILROAD LINE.
Section 1170(e)(1) of title 11, United States Code, is
amended by striking ``section 11347'' and inserting ``section
11326(a)''.
SEC. 723. CONTENTS OF PLAN.
Section 1172(c)(1) of title 11, United States Code, is
amended by striking ``section 11347'' and inserting ``section
11326(a)''.
SEC. 724. DISCHARGE UNDER CHAPTER 12.
Subsections (a) and (c) of section 1228 of title 11, United
States Code, are amended by striking ``1222(b)(10)'' each
place it appears and inserting ``1222(b)(9)''.
SEC. 725. EXTENSIONS.
Section 302(d)(3) of the Bankruptcy, Judges, United States
Trustees, and Family Farmer Bankruptcy Act of 1986 (28 U.S.C.
581 note) is amended--
(1) in subparagraph (A), in the matter following clause
(ii), by striking ``or October 1, 2002, whichever occurs
first''; and
(2) in subparagraph (F)--
(A) in clause (i)--
(i) in subclause (II), by striking ``or October 1, 2002,
whichever occurs first''; and
(ii) in the matter following subclause (II), by striking
``October 1, 2003, or''; and
(B) in clause (ii), in the matter following subclause
(II)--
(i) by striking ``before October 1, 2003, or''; and
(ii) by striking ``, whichever occurs first''.
SEC. 726. BANKRUPTCY CASES AND PROCEEDINGS.
Section 1334(d) of title 28, United States Code, is
amended--
(1) by striking ``made under this subsection'' and
inserting ``made under subsection (c)''; and
(2) by striking ``This subsection'' and inserting
``Subsection (c) and this subsection''.
SEC. 727. KNOWING DISREGARD OF BANKRUPTCY LAW OR RULE.
Section 156(a) of title 18, United States Code, is
amended--
(1) in the first undesignated paragraph--
(A) by inserting ``(1) the term'' before `` `bankruptcy'';
and
(B) by striking the period at the end and inserting ``;
and''; and
(2) in the second undesignated paragraph--
(A) by inserting ``(2) the term'' before `` `document'';
and
(B) by striking ``this title'' and inserting ``title 11''.
SEC. 728. ROLLING STOCK EQUIPMENT.
(a) In General.--Section 1168 of title 11, United States
Code, is amended to read as follows:
``Sec. 1168. Rolling stock equipment
``(a)(1) The right of a secured party with a security
interest in or of a lessor or conditional vendor of equipment
described in paragraph (2) to take possession of such
equipment in compliance with an equipment security agreement,
lease, or conditional sale contract, and to enforce any of
its other rights or remedies under such security agreement,
lease, or conditional sale contract, to sell, lease, or
otherwise retain or dispose of such equipment, is not limited
or otherwise affected by any other provision of this title or
by any power of the court, except that the right to take
possession and enforce those other rights and remedies shall
be subject to section 362, if--
``(A) before the date that is 60 days after the date of
commencement of a case under this chapter, the trustee,
subject to the court's approval, agrees to perform all
obligations of the debtor under such security agreement,
lease, or conditional sale contract; and
``(B) any default, other than a default of a kind described
in section 365(b)(2), under such security agreement, lease,
or conditional sale contract that--
``(i) occurs before the date of commencement of the case
and is an event of default therewith is cured before the
expiration of such 60-day period;
``(ii) occurs or becomes an event of default after the date
of commencement of the case and before the expiration of such
60-day period is cured before the later of--
``(I) the date that is 30 days after the date of the
default or event of the default; or
``(II) the expiration of such 60-day period; and
``(iii) occurs on or after the expiration of such 60-day
period is cured in accordance with the terms of such security
agreement, lease, or conditional sale contract, if cure is
permitted under that agreement, lease, or conditional sale
contract.
``(2) The equipment described in this paragraph--
``(A) is rolling stock equipment or accessories used on
rolling stock equipment, including superstructures or racks,
that is subject to a security interest granted by, leased to,
or conditionally sold to a debtor; and
``(B) includes all records and documents relating to such
equipment that are required, under the terms of the security
agreement, lease, or conditional sale contract, to be
surrendered or returned by the debtor in connection with the
surrender or return of such equipment.
``(3) Paragraph (1) applies to a secured party, lessor, or
conditional vendor acting in its own behalf or acting as
trustee or otherwise in behalf of another party.
``(b) The trustee and the secured party, lessor, or
conditional vendor whose right to take possession is
protected under subsection (a) may agree, subject to the
court's approval, to extend the 60-day period specified in
subsection (a)(1).
``(c)(1) In any case under this chapter, the trustee shall
immediately surrender and return to a secured party, lessor,
or conditional vendor, described in subsection (a)(1),
equipment described in subsection (a)(2), if at any time
after the date of commencement
[[Page 8154]]
of the case under this chapter such secured party, lessor, or
conditional vendor is entitled under subsection (a)(1) to
take possession of such equipment and makes a written demand
for such possession of the trustee.
``(2) At such time as the trustee is required under
paragraph (1) to surrender and return equipment described in
subsection (a)(2), any lease of such equipment, and any
security agreement or conditional sale contract relating to
such equipment, if such security agreement or conditional
sale contract is an executory contract, shall be deemed
rejected.
``(d) With respect to equipment first placed in service on
or before October 22, 1994, for purposes of this section--
``(1) the term `lease' includes any written agreement with
respect to which the lessor and the debtor, as lessee, have
expressed in the agreement or in a substantially
contemporaneous writing that the agreement is to be treated
as a lease for Federal income tax purposes; and
``(2) the term `security interest' means a purchase-money
equipment security interest.
``(e) With respect to equipment first placed in service
after October 22, 1994, for purposes of this section, the
term `rolling stock equipment' includes rolling stock
equipment that is substantially rebuilt and accessories used
on such equipment.''.
(b) Aircraft Equipment and Vessels.--Section 1110 of title
11, United States Code, is amended to read as follows:
``Sec. 1110. Aircraft equipment and vessels
``(a)(1) Except as provided in paragraph (2) and subject to
subsection (b), the right of a secured party with a security
interest in equipment described in paragraph (3), or of a
lessor or conditional vendor of such equipment, to take
possession of such equipment in compliance with a security
agreement, lease, or conditional sale contract, and to
enforce any of its other rights or remedies, under such
security agreement, lease, or conditional sale contract, to
sell, lease, or otherwise retain or dispose of such
equipment, is not limited or otherwise affected by any other
provision of this title or by any power of the court.
``(2) The right to take possession and to enforce the other
rights and remedies described in paragraph (1) shall be
subject to section 362 if--
``(A) before the date that is 60 days after the date of the
order for relief under this chapter, the trustee, subject to
the approval of the court, agrees to perform all obligations
of the debtor under such security agreement, lease, or
conditional sale contract; and
``(B) any default, other than a default of a kind specified
in section 365(b)(2), under such security agreement, lease,
or conditional sale contract that occurs--
``(i) before the date of the order is cured before the
expiration of such 60-day period;
``(ii) after the date of the order and before the
expiration of such 60-day period is cured before the later
of--
``(I) the date that is 30 days after the date of the
default; or
``(II) the expiration of such 60-day period; and
``(iii) on or after the expiration of such 60-day period is
cured in compliance with the terms of such security
agreement, lease, or conditional sale contract, if a cure is
permitted under that agreement, lease, or contract.
``(3) The equipment described in this paragraph--
``(A) is--
``(i) an aircraft, aircraft engine, propeller, appliance,
or spare part (as defined in section 40102 of title 49) that
is subject to a security interest granted by, leased to, or
conditionally sold to a debtor that, at the time such
transaction is entered into, holds an air carrier operating
certificate issued under chapter 447 of title 49 for aircraft
capable of carrying 10 or more individuals or 6,000 pounds or
more of cargo; or
``(ii) a documented vessel (as defined in section 30101(1)
of title 46) that is subject to a security interest granted
by, leased to, or conditionally sold to a debtor that is a
water carrier that, at the time such transaction is entered
into, holds a certificate of public convenience and necessity
or permit issued by the Department of Transportation; and
``(B) includes all records and documents relating to such
equipment that are required, under the terms of the security
agreement, lease, or conditional sale contract, to be
surrendered or returned by the debtor in connection with the
surrender or return of such equipment.
``(4) Paragraph (1) applies to a secured party, lessor, or
conditional vendor acting in its own behalf or acting as
trustee or otherwise in behalf of another party.
``(b) The trustee and the secured party, lessor, or
conditional vendor whose right to take possession is
protected under subsection (a) may agree, subject to the
approval of the court, to extend the 60-day period specified
in subsection (a)(1).
``(c)(1) In any case under this chapter, the trustee shall
immediately surrender and return to a secured party, lessor,
or conditional vendor, described in subsection (a)(1),
equipment described in subsection (a)(3), if at any time
after the date of the order for relief under this chapter
such secured party, lessor, or conditional vendor is entitled
under subsection (a)(1) to take possession of such equipment
and makes a written demand for such possession to the
trustee.
``(2) At such time as the trustee is required under
paragraph (1) to surrender and return equipment described in
subsection (a)(3), any lease of such equipment, and any
security agreement or conditional sale contract relating to
such equipment, if such security agreement or conditional
sale contract is an executory contract, shall be deemed
rejected.
``(d) With respect to equipment first placed in service on
or before October 22, 1994, for purposes of this section--
``(1) the term `lease' includes any written agreement with
respect to which the lessor and the debtor, as lessee, have
expressed in the agreement or in a substantially
contemporaneous writing that the agreement is to be treated
as a lease for Federal income tax purposes; and
``(2) the term `security interest' means a purchase-money
equipment security interest.''.
SEC. 729. CURBING ABUSIVE FILINGS.
(a) In General.--Section 362(d) of title 11, United States
Code, is amended--
(1) in paragraph (2), by striking ``or'' at the end;
(2) in paragraph (3), by striking the period at the end and
inserting ``; or''; and
(3) by adding at the end the following:
``(4) with respect to a stay of an act against real
property under subsection (a), by a creditor whose claim is
secured by an interest in such real estate, if the court
finds that the filing of the bankruptcy petition was part of
a scheme to delay, hinder, and defraud creditors that
involved either--
``(A) transfer of all or part ownership of, or other
interest in, the real property without the consent of the
secured creditor or court approval; or
``(B) multiple bankruptcy filings affecting the real
property.
If recorded in compliance with applicable State laws
governing notices of interests or liens in real property, an
order entered pursuant to this subsection shall be binding in
any other case under this title purporting to affect the real
property filed not later than 2 years after that recording,
except that a debtor in a subsequent case may move for relief
from such order based upon changed circumstances or for good
cause shown, after notice and a hearing.''.
(b) Automatic Stay.--Section 362(b) of title 11, United
States Code, as amended by section 708 of this Act, is
amended--
(1) in paragraph (25), by striking ``or'' at the end;
(2) in paragraph (26), by striking the period at the end
and inserting a semicolon; and
(3) by inserting after paragraph (26) the following:
``(27) under subsection (a) of this section, of any act to
enforce any lien against or security interest in real
property following the entry of an order under section
362(d)(4) as to that property in any prior bankruptcy case
for a period of 2 years after entry of such an order, except
that, the debtor in a subsequent case of the debtor, may move
the court for relief from such order based upon changed
circumstances or for other good cause shown, after notice and
a hearing; or
``(28) under subsection (a) of this section, of any act to
enforce any lien against or security interest in real
property--
``(A) if the debtor is ineligible under section 109(g) to
be a debtor in a bankruptcy case; or
``(B) if the bankruptcy case was filed in violation of a
bankruptcy court order in a prior bankruptcy case prohibiting
the debtor from being a debtor in another bankruptcy case.''.
SEC. 730. STUDY OF OPERATION OF TITLE 11 OF THE UNITED STATES
CODE WITH RESPECT TO SMALL BUSINESSES.
Not later than 2 years after the date of enactment of this
Act, the Administrator of the Small Business Administration,
in consultation with the Attorney General, the Director of
the Administrative Office of United States Trustees, and the
Director of the Administrative Office of the United States
Courts, shall--
(1) conduct a study to determine--
(A) the internal and external factors that cause small
businesses, especially sole proprietorships, to become
debtors in cases under title 11 of the United States Code and
that cause certain small businesses to successfully complete
cases under chapter 11 of such title; and
(B) how Federal laws relating to bankruptcy may be made
more effective and efficient in assisting small businesses to
remain viable; and
(2) submit to the President pro tempore of the Senate and
the Speaker of the House of Representatives a report
summarizing that study.
SEC. 731. TRANSFERS MADE BY NONPROFIT CHARITABLE
CORPORATIONS.
(a) Sale of Property of Estate.--Section 363(d) of title
11, United States Code, is amended--
(1) by striking ``only'' and all that follows through the
end of the subsection and inserting ``only--
``(1) in accordance with applicable nonbankruptcy law that
governs the transfer of
[[Page 8155]]
property by a corporation or trust that is not a moneyed,
business, or commercial corporation or trust; and
``(2) to the extent not inconsistent with any relief
granted under subsection (c), (d), (e), or (f) of section
362.''.
(b) Confirmation of Plan for Reorganization.--Section
1129(a) of title 11, United States Code, is amended by adding
at the end the following:
``(14) All transfers of property of the plan shall be made
in accordance with any applicable provisions of nonbankruptcy
law that govern the transfer of property by a corporation or
trust that is not a moneyed, business, or commercial
corporation or trust.''.
(c) Transfer of Property.--Section 541 of title 11, United
States Code, as amended by section 403 of this Act, is
amended by adding at the end the following:
``(e) Notwithstanding any other provision of this title,
property that is held by a debtor that is a corporation
described in section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code
of 1986 and exempt from tax under section 501(a) of such Code
may be transferred to an entity that is not such a
corporation, but only under the same conditions as would
apply if the debtor had not filed a case under this title.''.
(d) Applicability.--The amendments made by this section
shall apply to a case pending under title 11, United States
Code, on the date of enactment of this Act, except that the
court shall not confirm a plan under chapter 11 of this title
without considering whether this section would substantially
affect the rights of a party in interest who first acquired
rights with respect to the debtor after the date of the
petition. The parties who may appear and be heard in a
proceeding under this section include the attorney general of
the State in which the debtor is incorporated, was formed, or
does business.
SEC. 732. EFFECTIVE DATE; APPLICATION OF AMENDMENTS.
(a) Effective Date.--Except as provided in subsection (b),
this title and the amendments made by this title shall take
effect on the date of enactment of this Act.
(b) Application of Amendments.--The amendments made by this
title shall apply only with respect to cases commenced under
title 11, United States Code, on or after the date of
enactment of this Act.
______
By Mr. MOYNIHAN (for himself and Mr. Schumer):
S. 946. A bill to authorize the Secretary of the Interior to transfer
administrative jurisdiction over land within the boundaries of the Home
of Franklin D. Roosevelt National Historic Site to the Archivist of the
United States for the construction of a visitor center; to the
Committee on Energy and Natural Resources.
fdr national historic site and presidential library visitor center
construction legislation
Mr. MOYNIHAN. Mr. President, I rise with my colleague and fellow New
Yorker, Senator Schumer, to introduce this bill to transfer
administrative jurisdiction of less than an acre of land at the Home of
Franklin Delano Roosevelt National Historic Site from the National Park
Service to the National Archives and Records Administration. This
legislation would remove the last remaining obstacle to the
construction of the National Archives' planned FDR Presidential Library
Visitor Center and requires no Federal funds.
For the past several years, the National Archives has worked closely
with the National Park Service, the New York State Historic
Preservation Office, the Franklin and Eleanor Roosevelt Institute, and
the General Services Administration, to determine the appropriate site
for a visitor center. In order to serve the greatest number of
visitors, the optimum location was found to be property currently
controlled by the National Park Service. Since the National Archives
will administer the visitor center, administrative jurisdiction of the
property must be transferred from the National Park Service, which the
National Park Service supports.
To date, $8,200,000 in Federal funds have been appropriated for this
project and the Franklin and Eleanor Roosevelt Institute has
contributed an additional $3,400,000. Design work is scheduled to be
completed in September of 1999, and construction could begin after
jurisdiction is transferred.
Last year, the House passed H.R. 4829 to accomplish this same goal.
Unfortunately, time expired on the 106th Congress before we could take
it up in the Senate. This year, Congressman John E. Sweeney has
reintroduced the bill, now H.R. 1104, which has a strong chance of
passing. We would be most fortunate, indeed, if the Senate would agree
to our noncontroversial bill.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the text of the bill be
printed in the Record.
There being no objection, the bill was ordered to be printed in the
Record, as follows:
S. 946
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. VISITOR CENTER FOR HOME OF FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT
NATIONAL HISTORIC SITE.
(a) Transfer of Administrative Jurisdiction.--The Secretary
of the Interior may transfer to the Archivist of the United
States administrative jurisdiction over land located in the
Home of Franklin D. Roosevelt National Historic Site in Hyde
Park, New York.
(b) Visitor Center.--On the land transferred under
subsection (a), the Archivist shall construct a visitor
center facility to serve the Home of Franklin D. Roosevelt
National Historic Site and the Franklin D. Roosevelt
Presidential Library.
(c) Conditions of Transfer.--
(1) Protection of the site.--Any transfer under subsection
(a) shall be subject to an agreement between the Secretary
and the Archivist that includes provisions for the protection
of the Home of Franklin D. Roosevelt National Historic Site
and for the joint use of the visitor center facility by the
Secretary and the Archivist.
(2) Discontinuance of use by the archivist.--If the
Archivist determines to discontinue use of land transferred
under subsection (a), the Archivist shall retransfer
administrative jurisdiction over the land to the Secretary.
(d) Land Description.--The land referred to in subsection
(a) shall consist of not more than 1 acre of land, as agreed
to by the Secretary and the Archivist and more particularly
described in the agreement under subsection (c)(1).
______
By Mr. HOLLINGS (for himself and Mr. McCain):
S. 947. A bill to amend federal law regarding the tolling of the
Interstate Highway System; to the Committee on Environment and Public
Works.
interstate tolls relief act of 1999
Mr. HOLLINGS. Mr. President, I rise to bring to your attention an
issue of great national concern. We all remember the great debate that
this chamber had last year during reauthorization of the federal
highway bill, TEA-21. We all negotiated to get more funds for our
states because we know that more investment in our highways means
better, safer, and more efficient transportation for those who rely on
roads for making deliveries, going to work or school, or just doing the
grocery shopping. Transportation is the lynchpin for economic
development, and those states that have good, efficient transportation
systems attract business development, ultimately raising standards of
living. However, I think that we may have gone too far in authorizing
states additional means to raise revenue for highway improvements.
These means to raise revenue are not productive and hurt our system of
transportation.
Specifically, I am concerned that states have too much flexibility to
establish tolls on our Interstate highway system. For many states, the
large increases in TEA-21 funding have satisfied the need to invest in
infrastructure. Other states have found that they need to raise more
money, and so they have raised their state fuel taxes or taken other
actions to raise the needed revenue. These increases may be difficult
to implement politically, because frankly most people don't support any
tax increase. However, I believe that highway tolls are a non-
productive and overly intrusive means of raising revenue causing more
harm to commerce than can be justified.
Congress, mistakenly in my opinion, increased the authority of states
to put tolls on their Interstate highways in TEA-21. I am introducing
the Interstate Tolls Relief Act of 1999 to restrict Interstate toll
authority. The debate over highway tolls goes back to the genesis of
our Republic, and contributed to our movement away from the Articles of
Confederation to a more uniform system of governance under the U.S.
Constitution. Toll roads were the bane of commerce, in the early years
of the Republic, as each state would attempt to toll the interstate
[[Page 8156]]
traveling public to finance state public improvements. Ultimately,
frustration with delay and uneven costs helped contribute to the
adoption of Commerce Clause powers to help facilitate interstate and
foreign trade. Those same concerns hold true today, and I think that we
in Congress must take a national perspective and promote interstate
commerce.
I think that if one were to ask the citizens of the United States
about tolls, they would ultimately conclude that Interstate tolls would
reduce the efficiency of our Interstate highways, increase shipping
costs, and make interstate travel more expensive and less convenient.
Not to mention the safety problems associated with erecting toll booths
and operating them to collect revenues.
Now, I recognize that tolls under certain circumstances may be a good
idea, and my bill does not prevent states from tolling non-Interstate
highways. My bill also does not affect tolls on highways where they are
already in use, and states will continue to be able to rely on existing
tolls for revenues. Furthermore, my bill recognizes that when funds
must be found for a major Interstate bridge or tunnel project, states
may have no other option but to use tolls to finance the project. They
may continue to do so under my bill. I believe this is consistent with
the original intent of authority granted for Interstate tolls. What my
bill does is to prevent the proliferation of Interstate tolls, and
restrict tolling authority for major bridges and tunnels.
Mr. President, this bill is essential if we are to continue to have
an Interstate Highway System that is safe and facilitates the efficient
movement of Interstate commerce and personal travel. I urge the support
of my colleagues.
I ask unanimous consent that the full text of the bill be printed in
the Record.
There being no objection, the bill was ordered to be printed in the
Record, as follows:
S. 947
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the ``Interstate Tolls Relief Act
of 1999''.
SEC. 2. INTERSTATE SYSTEM RECONSTRUCTION AND REHABILITATION
PILOT PROGRAM REPEALED.
Section 1215(b) of the Transportation Equity Act for the
21st Century (112 Stat. 212-214) is repealed.
SEC. 3. TOLLS ON BRIDGES AND TUNNELS.
Section 129(a)(1)(C) of title 23, United States Code, is
amended by striking ``toll-free bridge or tunnel,'' and
inserting ``toll-free major bridge or tunnel. For purposes of
this section, a `major bridge' is one that has a deck area
which exceeds 125,000 square feet.''.
SEC. 4. LIMITATION ON USE OF TOLL REVENUES.
Section 129(a)(3) of title 23, United States Code, is
amended by--
(1) striking ``first'' in the first sentence and inserting
``only''; and
(2) striking ``If the State certifies annually that the
tolled facility is being adequately maintained, the State may
use any toll revenues in excess of amounts required under the
preceding sentence for any purpose for which Federal funds
may be obligated by a State under this title.''.
____________________
ADDITIONAL COSPONSORS
S. 51
At the request of Mr. Biden, the names of the Senator from Louisiana
(Mr. Breaux), the Senator from Nebraska (Mr. Kerrey), and the Senator
from Iowa (Mr. Harkin) were added as cosponsors of S. 51, a bill to
reauthorize the Federal programs to prevent violence against women, and
for other purposes.
S. 296
At the request of Mr. Frist, the name of the Senator from New York
(Mr. Schumer) was added as a cosponsor of S. 296, a bill to provide for
continuation of the Federal research investment in a fiscally
sustainable way, and for other purposes.
S. 345
At the request of Mr. Allard, the names of the Senator from Maine
(Ms. Collins) and the Senator from Massachusetts (Mr. Kennedy) were
added as cosponsors of S. 345, a bill to amend the Animal Welfare Act
to remove the limitation that permits interstate movement of live
birds, for the purpose of fighting, to States in which animal fighting
is lawful.
S. 391
At the request of Mr. Kerrey, the names of the Senator from Kansas
(Mr. Roberts), the Senator from Michigan (Mr. Levin), the Senator from
Connecticut (Mr. Lieberman), the Senator from Utah (Mr. Bennett), and
the Senator from Massachusetts (Mr. Kerry) were added as cosponsors of
S. 391, a bill to provide for payments to children's hospitals that
operate graduate medical education programs.
S. 434
At the request of Mr. Breaux, the name of the Senator from
Connecticut (Mr. Lieberman) was added as a cosponsor of S. 434, a bill
to amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to simplify the method of
payment of taxes on distilled spirits.
S. 443
At the request of Mr. Lautenberg, the name of the Senator from
Connecticut (Mr. Dodd) was added as a cosponsor of S. 443, a bill to
regulate the sale of firearms at gun shows.
S. 514
At the request of Mr. Cochran, the name of the Senator from Alabama
(Mr. Shelby) was added as a cosponsor of S. 514, a bill to improve the
National Writing Project.
S. 534
At the request of Mr. Torricelli, the name of the Senator from
Massachusetts (Mr. Kennedy) was added as a cosponsor of S. 534, a bill
to expand the powers of the Secretary of the Treasury to regulate the
manufacture, distribution, and sale of firearms and ammunition, and to
expand the jurisdiction of the Secretary to include firearm products
and nonpowder firearms.
S. 595
At the request of Mr. Domenici, the name of the Senator from Utah
(Mr. Bennett) was added as a cosponsor of S. 595, a bill to amend the
Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to establish a graduated response to
shrinking domestic oil and gas production and surging foreign oil
imports, and for other purposes.
S. 625
At the request of Mr. Grassley, the name of the Senator from Nebraska
(Mr. Kerrey) was added as a cosponsor of S. 625, a bill to amend title
11, United States Code, and for other purposes.
S. 632
At the request of Mr. DeWine, the names of the Senator from
Massachusetts (Mr. Kerry), the Senator from Oregon (Mr. Wyden), the
Senator from Georgia (Mr. Coverdell), the Senator from Alabama (Mr.
Sessions), and the Senator from Pennsylvania (Mr. Santorum) were added
as cosponsors of S. 632, a bill to provide assistance for poison
prevention and to stabilize the funding of regional poison control
centers.
S. 661
At the request of Mr. Abraham, the name of the Senator from Ohio (Mr.
Voinovich) was added as a cosponsor of S. 661, a bill to amend title
18, United States Code, to prohibit taking minors across State lines in
circumvention of laws requiring the involvement of parents in abortion
decisions.
S. 663
At the request of Mr. Santorum, his name was added as a cosponsor of
S. 663, a bill to impose certain limitations on the receipt of out-of-
State municipal solid waste, to authorize State and local controls over
the flow of municipal solid waste, and for other purposes.
S. 678
At the request of Mrs. Feinstein, the name of the Senator from
California (Mrs. Boxer) was added as a cosponsor of S. 678, a bill to
establish certain safeguards for the protection of purchasers in the
sale of motor vehicles that are salvage or have been damaged, to
require certain safeguards concerning the handling of salvage and
nonrebuildable vehicles, to support the flow of important vehicle
information to the National Motor Vehicle Title Information System, and
for other purposes.
S. 692
At the request of Mr. Kyl, the names of the Senator from Ohio (Mr.
DeWine),
[[Page 8157]]
the Senator from Kansas (Mr. Brownback), and the Senator from Kentucky
(Mr. Bunning) were added as cosponsors of S. 692, a bill to prohibit
Internet gambling, and for other purposes.
S. 763
At the request of Mr. Thurmond, the names of the Senator from
Mississippi (Mr. Lott) and the Senator from Louisiana (Ms. Landrieu)
were added as cosponsors of S. 763, a bill to amend title 10, United
States Code, to increase the minimum Survivor Benefit Plan basic
annuity for surviving spouses age 62 and older, and for other purposes.
S. 796
At the request of Mr. Wellstone, the name of the Senator from
Massachusetts (Mr. Kerry) was added as a cosponsor of S. 796, a bill to
provide for full parity with respect to health insurance coverage for
certain severe biologically-based mental illnesses and to prohibit
limits on the number of mental illness-related hospital days and
outpatient visits that are covered for all mental illnesses.
S. 817
At the request of Mrs. Boxer, the name of the Senator from New Mexico
(Mr. Bingaman) was added as a cosponsor of S. 817, a bill to improve
academic and social outcomes for students and reduce both juvenile
crime and the risk that youth will become victims of crime by providing
productive activities during after school hours.
S. 873
At the request of Mr. Durbin, the names of the Senator from Louisiana
(Mr. Breaux) and the Senator from Massachusetts (Mr. Kennedy) were
added as cosponsors of S. 873, a bill to close the United States Army
School of the Americas.
S. 906
At the request of Mr. Abraham, the name of the Senator from Alabama
(Mr. Sessions) was added as a cosponsor of S. 906, a bill to establish
a grant program to enable States to establish and maintain pilot drug
testing and drug treatment programs for welfare recipients engaging in
illegal drug use, and for other purposes.
S. 918
At the request of Mr. Kerry, the name of the Senator from North
Carolina (Mr. Helms) was added as a cosponsor of S. 918, a bill to
authorize the Small Business Administration to provide financial and
business development assistance to military reservists' small business,
and for other purposes.
S. 920
At the request of Mrs. Hutchison, the name of the Senator from
Mississippi (Mr. Lott) was added as a cosponsor of S. 920, a bill to
authorize appropriations for the Federal Maritime Commission for fiscal
years 2000 and 2001.
S. 928
At the request of Mr. Santorum, the name of the Senator from Georgia
(Mr. Coverdell) was added as a cosponsor of S. 928, a bill to amend
title 18, United States Code, to ban partial-birth abortions.
Senate Joint Resolution 21
At the request of Ms. Snowe, the names of the Senator from
Pennsylvania (Mr. Specter), the Senator from South Carolina (Mr.
Thurmond), and the Senator from Delaware (Mr. Roth) were added as
cosponsors of Senate Joint Resolution 21, a joint resolution to
designate September 29, 1999, as ``Veterans of Foreign Wars of the
United States Day.''
Senate Resolution 59
At the request of Mr. Lautenberg, the name of the Senator from Hawaii
(Mr. Akaka) was added as a cosponsor of Senate Resolution 59, a
resolution designating both July 2, 1999, and July 2, 2000, as
``National Literacy Day.''
____________________
SENATE RESOLUTION 91--EXPRESSING THE SENSE OF THE SENATE THAT JIM
THORPE SHOULD BE RECOGNIZED AS THE ``ATHLETE OF THE CENTURY''
Mr. SANTORUM submitted the following resolution; which was referred
to the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation:
S. Res. 91
SECTION 1. SENSE OF THE SENATE THAT JIM THORPE SHOULD BE
RECOGNIZED AS THE ``ATHLETE OF THE CENTURY''.
(a) Findings.--The Senate finds the following:
(1) Jim Thorpe is the only athlete ever to excel as an
amateur and a professional in 3 major sports--track and
field, football, and baseball.
(2) Prior to the 1912 Olympic Games, Jim Thorpe won the
pentathlon and the decathlon at the Amateur Athletic Union
National Championship Trials in Boston, Massachusetts.
(3) Jim Thorpe represented the United States and the Sac
and Fox Nation in the 1912 Olympic Games in Stockholm,
Sweden, where he won a gold medal in the pentathlon, became
the first American athlete to win a gold medal in the
decathlon, in which he set a world record, and became the
only athlete in Olympic history to win both the pentathlon
and the decathlon during the same year.
(4) The athletic feats of Jim Thorpe resulted in worldwide
publicity that helped to ensure the viability of the Olympic
Games.
(5) During his major league baseball career, Jim Thorpe
played with the New York Giants, the Cincinnati Reds, and the
Boston Braves, and ended the 1919 baseball season with a .327
batting average.
(6) Jim Thorpe established his amateur football record
playing halfback, defender, punter, and place-kicker while he
was a student at the Carlisle Indian School in Pennsylvania,
and was chosen as Walter Camp's First Team All-American Half-
Back in 1911 and 1912.
(7) Jim Thorpe was a founding father of professional
football, playing with the Canton Bulldogs, which was the
team recognized as world champion in 1916, 1917, and 1919,
the Cleveland Indians, the Oorang Indians, the Rock Island
Independent, the New York Giants, and the Chicago Cardinals.
(8) In 1920, Jim Thorpe was named the first president of
the American Professional Football Association, now known as
the National Football League.
(9) Jim Thorpe was voted America's Greatest All-Around Male
Athlete and chosen as the greatest football player of the
half-century in 1950 by an Associated Press poll of
sportswriters.
(10) Jim Thorpe was named the Greatest American Football
Player in History in a 1977 national poll conducted by Sport
Magazine.
(11) Because of his outstanding achievements, Jim Thorpe
was inducted into the National Track and Field Hall of Fame,
the Professional Football Hall of Fame, the Helms
Professional Football Hall of Fame, the National Indian Hall
of Fame, the Pennsylvania Hall of Fame, and the Oklahoma Hall
of Fame.
(12) The immeasurable sports achievements of Jim Thorpe
have long been an inspiration to the youth in Pennsylvania
and throughout the United States.
(b) Sense of the Senate.--It is the sense of the Senate
that Jim Thorpe should be recognized as the ``Athlete of the
Century''.
Mr. SANTORUM. Mr. President, I rise today to submit a
resolution recognizing Jim Thorpe as the Athlete of the Century.
Born to an impoverished family on Sac-and-Fox Indian land, Jim Thorpe
overcame adverse circumstances to excel as an amateur and as a
professional in three sports; track and field, football and baseball.
Thorpe, who was voted ``Athlete of the First Half of the Century'' by
the Associated Press almost fifty years ago, is the only American
athlete ever to excel at this level in three major sports.
As a student at Carlisle Indian School in Pennsylvania, Thorpe
prooved his athletic ability early on. One anecdote recalls how the 5-
foot-9\1/2\ inch, 144-pound Thorpe almost single-handedly overcame the
entire Lafayette track team at a meeting in Easton, Pennsylvania,
winning six events. Also while attending the Carlisle Indian School,
Jim Thorpe established his amateur football record playing halfback,
defender, punter, and place-kicker. In 1911, he was named an All
American.
In 1912, he represented the United States and the Sac-and-Fox Nation
in the Olympic Games in Stockholm, Sweden. To this day, Thorpe is the
only athlete to win gold medals in the pentathlon and decathlon. After
his Olympic feats in Sweden, Thorpe retured to Carlisle's football team
and was named an All-American again.
In 1913, Thorpe left amateur athletics and signed a $5,000 contract
to play baseball with the New York Giants. As an outfielder with the
Giants, and later with the Cincinnati Reds and Boston Braves, his best
season was his last one, when he batted .327 in 60 games for Boston.
In 1915, Thorpe agreed to play professional football for the Canton
Bulldogs.
[[Page 8158]]
Thorpe went on to become a key part of this team as it was recognized
as the ``world champion'' in 1916, 1917, and 1919. Thorpe's
professional football career later included stints with Cleveland, Rock
Island, the New York Giants, and the Chicago Cardinals. In 1920, Thorpe
became the first president of the American Football Association, which
was later to become the National Football League. Today, he is
recognized as a founding father of professional football.
Recently, I had the privilege of attending a luncheon honoring Jim
Thorpe's daughter, Grace, at the Jim Thorpe Memorial Hall in the Carbon
County, Pennsylvania, a town named for the great athlete. Grace Thorpe
has traveled around the country asking people to sign petitions
declaring her father athlete of the century. She plans to send the
petition to cable sports networks and national sportswriters. As Jim
Thorpe Area Sports Hall of Fame president, Jack Kmetz has noted, Thorpe
unfortunately missed out on the modern-day media blitz that surrounds
popular athletes today. Nonetheless, I promised Ms. Thorpe and the
people of Jim Thorpe, Pennsylvania that I would introduce this
resolution which I hope will raise awareness of this true legend's
achievements and give him the recongnition he deserves.
____________________
SENATE RESOLUTION 92--TO EXPRESS THE SENSE OF THE SENATE THAT FUNDING
FOR PROSTATE CANCER RESEARCH SHOULD BE INCREASED SUBSTANTIALLY
Mrs. BOXER (for herself, Mr. Lautenberg, Mr. Reid, Mr. Jeffords, Mr.
Schumer, Mr. Ashcroft, Mr. Mack, Mr. Coverdell, and Mr. Helms)
submitted the following resolution; which was referred to the Committee
on Health, Education, Labor, and Pension:
S. Res. 92
Whereas in 1999, prostate cancer is expected to kill more
than 37,000 men in the United States and be diagnosed in over
180,000 new cases;
Whereas prostate cancer is the most diagnosed nonskin
cancer in the United States;
Whereas African Americans have the highest incidence of
prostate cancer in the world;
Whereas considering the devastating impact of the disease
among men and their families, prostate cancer research
remains underfunded;
Whereas more resources devoted to clinical and
translational research at the National Institutes of Health
will be highly determinative of whether rapid advances can be
attained in treatment and ultimately a cure for prostate
cancer;
Whereas the Congressionally Directed Department of Defense
Prostate Cancer Research Program is making important strides
in innovative prostate cancer research, and this Program
presented to Congress in April of 1998 a full investment
strategy for prostate cancer research at the Department of
Defense; and
Whereas the Senate expressed itself unanimously in 1998
that the Federal commitment to biomedical research should be
doubled over the next 5 years: Now, therefore, be it
Resolved,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This resolution may be cited as the ``Prostate Cancer
Research Commitment Resolution of 1999''.
SEC. 2. SENSE OF THE SENATE.
It is the sense of the Senate that--
(1) finding treatment breakthroughs and a cure for prostate
cancer should be made a national health priority;
(2) significant increases in prostate cancer research
funding, commensurate with the impact of the disease, should
be made available at the National Institutes of Health and to
the Department of Defense Prostate Cancer Research Program;
and
(3) these agencies should prioritize prostate cancer
research that is directed toward innovative clinical and
translational research projects in order that treatment
breakthroughs can be more rapidly offered to patients.
Mrs. BOXER. Mr. President, I submit today the Prostate Cancer
Research Commitment Resolution Act of 1999 along with several of my
colleagues, Senators Lautenberg, Reid, Jeffords, Schumer, Ashcroft,
Mack, Coverdell, and Helms.
Prostate cancer is the most diagnosed nonskin cancer in the United
States. More than 40 percent of all male cancers and 14 percent of all
male cancer-related deaths are due to complications from prostate
cancer. In 1998, over 40,000 American men died from prostate cancer,
and in 1999, it is expected that this deadly disease will strike
another 37,000 men in the United States.
I, along with my colleagues, am deeply committed to aiding our
medical community in their research efforts to find preventive measures
to stem--and eventually eradicate--this disease.
Our resolution expresses the sense of the Senate that funding for
prostate cancer research should be increased substantially,
commensurate with the impact of the disease. Funds should be made
available at the National Institutes of Health and at the Department of
Defense Prostate Cancer Research Program. We are also encouraging these
agencies to prioritize prostate cancer research that is directed toward
innovative research projects in order that treatment breakthroughs can
be more rapidly offered to patients.
Mr. President, this is an important step on behalf of men in the
United States who have suffered from prostate cancer. Increasing funds
for research would assist the medical community in its efforts to
identify preventive measures men can take through prostate cancer
screening procedures.
I am pleased to offer this resolution today and I urge my colleagues
to support this legislation.
____________________
AMENDMENTS SUBMITTED
______
DEPLOYMENT OF THE UNITED STATES ARMED FORCES TO THE KOSOVO REGION IN
YUGOSLAVIA
______
DURBIN AMENDMENT NO. 300
(Ordered to lie on the table.)
Mr. DURBIN submitted an amendment intended to be proposed by him to
the preamble to the joint resolution (S.J. Res. 20) concerning the
deployment of the United States Armed Forces to the Kosovo region in
Yugoslavia; as follows:
Strike the preamble and insert the following:
Whereas the United States and its allies in the North
Alantic Treaty Organization are conducting large-scale
military operations against the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro);
Whereas the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and
Montenegro) has refused to comply with NATO demands that it
withdraw its military, paramilitary and security forces from
the province of Kosovo, allow the return of ethnic Albanian
refugees to their homes, and permit the establishment of a
NATO-led peacekeeping force in Kosovo;
Whereas Article 11 of the North Atlantic Treaty states that
``its provisions [shall be] carried out by the Parties in
accordance with their respective constitutional processes'';
Whereas Article 1, Section 8, of the Constitution vests in
Congress the power to declare war; and
Whereas, on March 23, 1999, the Senate passed Senate
Concurrent Resolution 21, relating to authorizing the
President of the United States to conduct military air
operations and missile strikes against the Federal Republic
of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro): Now, therefore, be it
______
DURBIN AMENDMENT NO. 301
(Ordered to lie on the table.)
Mr. DURBIN submitted an amendment intended to be proposed by him to
the joint resolution, S.J. Res. 20, as follows:
Strike all after the resolving clause and insert the
following:
SECTION 1. REQUIREMENT OF SPECIFIC STATUTORY AUTHORIZATION
PRIOR TO USE OF UNITED STATES GROUND FORCES
AGAINST YUGOSLAVIA.
No ground forces of the Armed Forces of the United States
may be used to invade the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
(Serbia and Montenegro) unless specifically authorized by
statute.
____________________
NOTICES OF HEARINGS
committee on agriculture, nutrition, and forestry
Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, I would like to announce that the Senate
Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry, will meet on May 5,
1999 in SR-328A at 9:00 a.m. The purpose of this meeting will be: (1)
To consider the nomination of Thomas J. Erickson to be a Commissioner
of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission
[[Page 8159]]
and (2) To discuss agricultural trade options.
committee on agriculture, nutrition, and forestry
Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, I would like to announce that the Senate
Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry, Subcommittee on
Forestry, Conservation, and Rural Revitalization will meet on May 8,
1999 in Nampa, ID starting at 9 a.m. at the City Council Chambers. The
purpose of this hearing will be to examine the noxious weeds and plant
pest problems.
committee on energy and natural resources
Mr. CRAIG. Mr. President, I would like to announce for the public
that a hearing has been scheduled before the Subcommittee on Forests
and Public Land Management of the Senate Committee on Energy and
Natural Resources.
The hearing will take place on Thursday, May 13, at 2:30 p.m. in room
SD-366 of the Dirksen Senate Office Building in Washington, D.C.
The purpose of this hearing is to receive testimony on fire
preparedness on Federal lands. Specifically, what actions the Bureau of
Land Management and the Forest Service are taking to prepare for the
fire season; whether the agencies are informing the public about these
plans; and ongoing research related to wildfire and fire suppression
activities.
Those who wish to submit written statements should write to the
Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, U.S. Senate, Washington,
D.C. 20510. For further information, please call Amie Brown or Mike
Menge (202) 224-6170.
committee on energy and natural resources
Mr. SMITH. Mr. President, I would like to announce for the
information of the State and the public that a hearing has been
scheduled before the Subcommittee on Water and Power.
The hearing will take place on Thursday, May 27, 1999 at 2:00 p.m. in
room SD-366 of the Dirksen Senate Office Building in Washington, DC.
The purpose of this hearing is to receive testimony on S. 244, To
authorize the construction of the Lewis and Clark Rural Water System
and to authorize assistance to the Lewis and Clark Rural Water System,
Inc., a nonprofit corporation, for the planning and construction of the
water supply system, and for other purposes; S. 623, To amend Public
Law 89-108 to increase authorization levels for State and Indian
tribal, municipal, rural, and industrial water supplies, to meet
current and future water quantity and quality needs of the Red River
Valley, to deauthorize certain project features and irrigation service
areas, to enhance natural resources and fish and wildlife habitat, and
for other purposes; and S. 769, To provide a final settlement on
certain debt owed by the city of Dickinson, North Dakota, for
construction of the bascule gates on the Dickinson Dam.
Because of the limited time available for the hearing, witnesses may
testify by invitation only. However, those wishing to submit written
testimony for the hearing record should send two copies of their
testimony to the Subcommittee on Water and Power, Committee on Energy
and Natural Resources, United States Senate, 364 Dirksen Senate Office
Building, Washington, DC, 20510-6150.
For further information, please call Colleen Deegan, Counsel, or
Julia McCaul, Staff Assistant at (202) 224-8115.
____________________
AUTHORITY FOR COMMITTEE TO MEET
committee on governmental affairs
Mr. HUTCHISON. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the
Governmental Affairs Committee Subcommittee on Oversight of Government
Management, Restructuring and the District of Columbia be permitted to
meet on Monday, May 3, 1999, at 3:30 p.m. for a hearing on Management
Reform in the District of Columbia.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
____________________
ADDITIONAL STATEMENTS
______
OUTSTANDING VOLUNTEER PERFORMANCE BY BROWARD COUNTY SENIORS
Mr. GRAHAM. Mr, President, today I am delighted to have the
opportunity to salute the 1999 honorees of the Dr. Nan S. Hutchison
Broward Senior Hall of Fame Award. These outstanding volunteers have
contributed time, talents and love toward benefitting the residents of
Broward County.
On May 6, 1999, eleven new members selected for this prestigious
honor will be at ceremonies celebrating their selection, and their
names will be added to a commemorative plaque housed in the Broward
County Government Building.
This year's honorees are: Panchitta Chishom, Estelle Ernstoff,
Commissioner Sam Goldsmith, Max Klein, Bill Kling, Ella Anderson
Lawrence, Madolyn Markham, Hyman Moskowitz, Hattie Robinson, Marvin
Simon and John Washburn.
Panchitta Chishom has dedicated her life to serving the community as
a teacher for 38 years in the Broward County School system and as a
volunteer. She devotes her wisdom, generosity and tireless efforts to
various groups including the Northwest Federated Woman's Club, Broward
General Medical Center and the NAACP.
Estelle Ernstoff has a passion for volunteer work that has enriched
the lives of those in her community. Among the work she has done for
various causes, she has faithfully arranged bi-annual blood drives
while supporting the Cancer Association and the Memorial Manor Nursing
Home Auxiliary. Her devotion to improving the lives of others has made
her a role model for her community.
Commissioner Sam Goldsmith has patiently and steadfastly tended to
the needs and concerns of the citizens of Coconut Creek. Besides
serving as a former mayor and current city commissioner, Sam has
devoted additional precious time to volunteer for several organizations
including the Florida Council of Aging, American Legion Post #170 and
Board of Trustees of Northwest Regional Hospital.
Max Klein has been a determined and energetic activist for the
citizens of Broward County, and in particular, the City of Lauderhill.
His participation in journalism and the political process has brought
attention to the issues and concerns of elderly. His compassion extends
to all residents, young and old, of Broward County.
Bill Kling has spent his adult life campaigning for the rights and
benefits of war veterans. He was instrumental in establishing the
Veterans Administration outpatient clinic in Oakland Park. His
compassion and perseverance have served the community in numerous ways.
Ella Anderson Lawrence has dedicated her life to others through her
generous community service. From distributing lap robes to local
nursing homes to preparing and serving meals for her church, Bethlehem
Lutheran, she has contributed her time, energy and kindness to her
entire neighborhood and its residents.
Madolyn Markham has made a pledge over many years and across various
interests to help all those in need in her community. As President and
Director of C. Robert Markham Foundation, she has supported numerous
causes, including The Twelve Step House, United Way and Kids in
Distress. Her charity and grace have touched the lives of many people,
young and old.
Hyman Moskowitz has a strong sense of community that is evident
through his many accomplishments and volunteer work. His efforts have
led to the establishment of the Northwest Focal Point Senior Center and
a monthly award honoring ``Students of the Month'' by the Margate City
Commission. His dedication to volunteering enriches the lives of
everyone around him.
Hattie Robinson shows her compassion for humanity through her
generous good deeds to her church, the 15th Street Baptist Church of
Christ, and throughout her neighborhood. She has fed the hungry,
distributed clothing to the needy and been an active member of the
Broward County Foster
[[Page 8160]]
Grandparent Program. Her kindness and charity are not limited by
boundaries, but instead touch the lives of all whom she meets.
Marvin Simon has been a dedicated and enthusiastic supporter of
Broward County's senior population. His perseverance resulted in the
establishment of an Emergency Medical Services base on the Pine Island
Ridge Condominium grounds. His devotion extends past his neighbors
through his active participation in various organizations including the
Gilda's Club and the Jewish War Veterans, Post 730.
John Washburn has a gift of giving that has enhanced the lives of all
those who have been touched by his generosity. He volunteers for
numerous organizations including the Cooperative Feeding Program, Manna
Share a Meal program and Optimist Club of West Broward/Lauderhill. His
commitment to the community has benefitted all, especially the needy
and the sick, the young and the elderly.
Florida and Broward County are fortunate to have these inspiring
senior citizens who have given so much to their communities. I
congratulate them today and wish for them many more productive and
healthy years.
____________________
HONORING THE ALASKA NATIVE HERITAGE CENTER
Mr. MURKOWSKI. Mr. President, I rise to honor the opening of
the Alaska Native Heritage Center in Anchorage, Alaska.
The Heritage Center, the first of its kind in Alaska, is a twenty-six
acre campus that offers a unique opportunity to learn and explore the
traditional ways of Alaska Native cultures. The Center will be a
``gathering place'' where local residents and visitors to Alaska can
meet Native Tradition Bearers, artists and performers. While visiting,
they can learn about the Native traditional lifestyle by participating
in workshops and guided tours of the five traditional village settings
that have been built around a lake on the campus.
In 1994, I was privileged to add the Stevens/Murkowski Alaska Native
Culture and Arts Development Act as an amendment to the School-to-Work
Opportunities Act. This amendment paved the way for authorizing federal
funding for the Alaska Native Heritage Center. Congressman Don Young
was instrumental in winning House approval for the measure. Over the
past six years, Senator Stevens has been successful in securing
matching federal funds for the Center--I am proud to say the Center
isn't just a federal project, but a statewide project funded by
individuals, private companies, Native Corporations and friends from
outside the State who were united in a common dream.
Finally, I would like to commend the vision and relentless dedication
of the Chairman of the Alaska Native Heritage Center, Mr. Roy Huhndorf.
The Heritage Center is a tribute to his leadership and determination to
ensure a vibrant and continuing celebration of Alaska Native traditions
and cultures for years to come.
____________________
TRIBUTE TO DR. PATRICIA CLEMENTS
Mr. GRAHAM. Mr. President, today I rise to offer a tribute to
Dr. Patricia L. Clements for her years of work on behalf of historical
preservation in Florida.
As we prepare for a new millennium, with its promise of inventions
and technical advances beyond our comprehension, we are reminded of the
importance of preserving and understanding our past.
Toward that end, Dr. Clements has helped lead the historical
preservation effort in Florida, particularly in preserving and
intrepreting women's history.
Women helped build and lead Florida, and their roles have been
preserved in myriad ways by Dr. Clements and her colleagues.
She has been a pioneer in producing audio biographies of prominent
Florida women. Dr. Clements is the founder of the Inaugural Gown
Collection, housed at the Museum of Florida History, including textiles
dating to 1901, nearly a century ago.
Meanwhile, she has collected more than 100 artifacts for the First
Families exhibit at the Museum of Florida History. Strong public
interest prompted the museum to extend the exhibit by three months.
Florida has many ways of recognizing the contributions of outstanding
women, one of which is through the Florida Women's Hall of Fame. Dr.
Clements is the audiobiographer of women inducted into this elite
group, and is a member of the Florida Women's Hall of Fame selection
committee.
Mr. President, we live in a fast-paced world, and can expect mobility
and the pace of the flow of information to increase in the next
century. As we embrace the future, we salute those who preserve the
past and help us to understand our heritage.
____________________
RECOGNITION OF NATIONAL CHARTER SCHOOLS DAY
Mr. ABRAHAM. Mr. President, I rise this morning to recognize
the contribution of charter schools to the education of our nation's
children. Today, on Charter Schools Day, we celebrate the hard labor
and accomplishments of charter school teachers, parents, and students.
In 1993, Michigan became the ninth state to grant citizens the
freedom to establish charter schools. Many public school educators had
found that the complex labyrinth of federal and state regulations
prevented them from providing their students the best education
possible. The Michigan State Legislature passed charter school
legislation to provide regulatory relief for educators, ensure school
accountability, and encourage educators to innovate. The following
year, Congress established the public Charter Schools program which
authorized $15 million for the Department of Education to support the
development, initial implementation, and evaluation of charter schools.
During the 105th Congress, I voted for the Charter School Expansion Act
of 1998 which increased federal charter school funding to $100 million.
Mr. President, charter schools are integral to our nation's education
system because they empower citizens to develop schools which meet the
needs of their local communities. One fine example of charter school
innovation may be found in Michigan's Saginaw County. Four year ago,
the Saginaw County Intermediate School District opened their
Transitional Academy. This school was designed to educate juvenile
offenders and provide them with an individualized education that would
allow them to return to their regular schools and graduate with their
classmates. Today, I am pleased to report that the Saginaw County
Transitional Academy has not only graduated a majority of their
students, but that these students have remained crime free.
Charter schools are also successful because they empower parents to
send their children to the public school of their choice. Last year,
Michigan parents sent 30,000 children to charter schools, an increase
from 21,000 in 1997. Throughout the nation, charter school
organizations report that most, if not all, schools have large waiting
lists. These lists symbolize the healthy competition that charter
schools have created within the public school system.
However, a charter school's primary mission is to educate its
students. Standardized testing has revealed that a charter school
education has a dramatic impact on its students. All public schools in
Michigan, including charter schools, administer the Michigan Education
Assessment Program test. Between 1997 and 1998, Michigan charter
schools exam results kept pace or surpassed those of traditional public
schools. In fact, half of all charter schools in 1998 doubled or
tripled the number of students receiving satisfactory scores in one or
more subjects. These results indicate that charter schools are truly
improving education.
In closing, I wish to honor charter school students, who work day
after day to develop their skills and gifts. These students are the
future of our nation and contribute to the vibrant life found
throughout the countryside and cities of America. I applaud them for
their efforts and congratulate them
[[Page 8161]]
on this important day, Charter Schools Day.
____________________
ORDERS FOR TUESDAY, MAY 4, 1999
Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that when the
Senate completes its business today, it stand in adjournment until 9:30
a.m. on Tuesday, May 4. I further ask that on Tuesday, immediately
following the prayer, the Journal of proceedings be approved to date,
the morning hour be deemed to have expired, and the time for the two
leaders be reserved for their use later in the day. I further ask that,
following the prayer, Senator McCain be recognized for 5 minutes for a
closing statement, with the majority leader recognized immediately
following Senator McCain.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. McCAIN. I ask unanimous consent that on Tuesday the Senate recess
from 12:30 p.m. until 2:15 p.m. so that the weekly party caucus
luncheons may take place.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
____________________
PROGRAM
Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, for the information of all Senators, the
Senate will convene on Tuesday at 9:30 a.m. Following a brief statement
by Senator McCain, the majority leader will make a motion to table S.J.
Res. 20. Therefore, Senators can expect the first rollcall vote of the
day at approximately 9:35 a.m. If S.J. Res. 20 is tabled, the Senate
will immediately begin debate on S. 900, the financial modernization
bill, under the provisions agreed to this evening by unanimous consent.
It is hoped that significant progress will be made on the banking bill.
Therefore, Senators can expect further rollcall votes throughout
Tuesday's session of the Senate. The Senate will recess for the weekly
party caucus luncheons from 12:30 p.m. until 2:15 p.m.
____________________
ADJOURNMENT UNTIL 9:30 A.M. TOMORROW
Mr. McCAIN. If there is no further business to come before the
Senate, I now ask unanimous consent that the Senate stand in
adjournment under the previous order.
There being no objection, the Senate, at 9:06 p.m., adjourned until
Tuesday, May 4, 1999, at 9:30 a.m.
____________________
NOMINATIONS
Executive nominations received by the Senate May 3, 1999:
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
ROBERT RABEN, OF FLORIDA, TO BE AN ASSISTANT ATTORNEY
GENERAL, VICE ANDREW FOIS, RESIGNED.
[[Page 8162]]
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD
United States
of America
May 3, 1999
EXTENSIONS OF REMARKS
HIGH-TECH INDUSTRY EXPORT LAWS
______
HON. DARLENE HOOLEY
of oregon
in the house of representatives
Monday, May 3, 1999
Ms. HOOLEY of Oregon. Mr. Speaker, I rise today to stress the
importance of assuring that our export control laws do not
unnecessarily hinder the development of the U.S. high-technology
industry.
Mr. Speaker, in districts like mine in Oregon, where constituents
have suffered the consequences of economic shifts in the logging,
fishing, and agricultural sectors, the high-tech industry presents
itself as a growth sector and an anchor for future employment. I see
the high tech industry as vital for economic development in my district
and in the State of Oregon.
The rest of the country should be looking to this sector for
employment growth as well. According to the Department of Commerce,
between 1995 and 1997 the high tech sector has been responsible for 35%
of economic growth in the United States. If things continue at that
rate, this industry will almost double its employment numbers over the
next six years.
If we saddle this industry with unreasonable unilateral export
restrictions, that type of job growth, so badly needed in my district,
will go to other nations.
While there are often legitimate national security reasons to
restrict high-tech exports, much of our export laws do not keep pace
with actual advances in technology.
Mr. Speaker, let me give you an example of how high-tech exports can
be unreasonably restricted. The application and approval process to
ship a computer--no bigger than the server in many Congressional
offices--to Tier III nations can take as along as 30 days.
If we were the only country offering high-speed and powerful personal
computers, this might not be a problem. But Mr. Speaker we are not the
only nation that can build and sell these machines. By placing
unilateral export controls we cede the sales of these computers to our
foreign competitors. Let me raise another example of how our export
control policy just doesn't make sense. Right now the U.S. government
places restrictions on the export of encryption technology. While 128
bit encryption technology is widely available on the Internet and can
be easily bought in countries like Canada and Germany, the United
States prevents our companies from exporting 128 bit encryption.
This puts U.S. high tech firms at a severe competitive disadvantage.
It is for this reason that I have become a co-sponsor of the SAFE act
which will bring our trade policy in line with the current state of
encryption technology. Our National Security does not depend on these
types of unilateral economic sanctions. Our National Security relies on
the development of U.S. based high technology companies--who currently
supply the United States military with 75% of its high tech national
security apparatus. If our U.S. based technology companies are
weakened, Mr. Speaker, our own national security is weakened. I would
like to thank all of the members of my party who have been working to
bring these issues to the forefront. Through their support of bills
like the SAFE act we can assure that U.S. trade policies allow U.S.
technology firms to grow, while enhancing our own national security.
____________________
IN HONOR OF EILEEN THORNTON FOR HER DEDICATION AND SERVICE TO THE
WOMEN'S POLITICAL CAUCUS OF NEW JERSEY AND FOR RECEIVING THE ``WOMAN OF
ACHIEVEMENT'' AWARD
______
HON. ROBERT MENENDEZ
of new jersey
in the house of representatives
Monday, May 3, 1999
Mr. MENENDEZ. Mr. Speaker, I rise today to recognize Ms. Eileen
Thornton for her hard work and dedication to the women of New Jersey
and for being presented with the Women's Political Caucus of New Jersey
``Woman of Achievement'' award.
Ms. Thornton has long believed that women play a vital role in our
government--that they make an important and significant difference in
politics and government. In addition, she believes that women should
support women for public office and various positions of governmental
authority. Ms. Thornton's commitment to this philosophy has prompted
her to be proactive on the national, state, and county levels as a long
time supporter and promoter of women's roles in politics.
Ms. Thornton has provided years of service and leadership to the WPC-
NJ. Serving as President of WPC-NJ for five of its twenty-seven years,
Ms. Thornton has made numerous contributions to the women's political
equality movement by participating in campaigns, fundraising
activities, strategy and issue development, public relations and news
publicity work. She has also organized women's vote drives, emphasizing
the necessity for women to exercise their voting power.
In addition, Ms. Thornton has served as President of the National
Women's Equity Action League and NJ WEAL, an advocacy organization for
women's equality in education, sports, and economy. She is also active
in the Business and Professional Women's Federation.
Ms. Thornton exemplifies leadership and dedication to women and the
political process. For these tremendous contributions to New Jersey and
her incredible example as a public servant, I am very happy to honor
Ms. Thornton for her achievements. I salute and congratulate her on
these extraordinary accomplishments and for winning the WPC-NJ ``Woman
of Achievement'' award.
____________________
IN MEMORY OF DANIEL JOSEPH McTIGHE
______
HON. CARRIE P. MEEK
of florida
in the house of representatives
Monday, May 3, 1999
Mrs. MEEK of Florida. Mr. Speaker, I rise today in memory of the late
Daniel Joseph McTighe on the fifth anniversary of his death, which
occurred in the Spring of 1994, on Friday, May 20. Mr. McTighe was a
popular Thoroughbred groom who spent many triumphant moments in the
winner's circle at Florida's Hialeah Race Course and in winner's
circles along the Eastern Seaboard. An athletic equestrian, Mr. McTighe
owned and rode the most temperamental of Thoroughbreds with empathetic
strength and grace.
Known for his compassion and extraordinary wit, Danny McTighe, 35,
was a vibrant employee of the Florida Thoroughbred industry in the late
1970's. Dedicated to his family, friends, church, and community of
Bowie, Maryland, Mr. McTighe usually could be found working outdoors,
busy with painting, gardening, carpentry, and photography. Habitually
sunburned and lithe, he was quick to give of his talents whenever
needed. When the old cemetery of his church was in dire need of repair,
Mr. McTighe laughingly exhorted his friend, the kind priest, to take
action, saying, ``I'll help however I can! Our cemetery looks like the
backdrop of a Halloween movie!''
Danny McTighe was immensely popular with children, and he encouraged
them to live their dreams. He joked, ``Show me a man who keeps his two
feet on the ground, and I'll show you a man who can't get his pants
off!'' A blond with hazel eyes, Mr. McTighe also loved Florida, where
he had planned to vacation with his beloved mother, Jane, the week he
passed away.
Mr. McTighe was devoted to his brothers and sisters: Shaun, Rory,
Katie, Brian, and Bridget. He revered his sisters-in-law, Gayle, Dixie,
and Kay, and brother-in-law, Michael Hoyt. And he dearly loved his
nieces and nephews: Molly, Kevin, Kim, Adam, and Connor. His eldest
sister, Molly, and his father, Jack, preceded him in death, and his
nephew, Kellan, was born after his death. Another nephew will be born
into the loving McTighe family later this year.
Daniel Joseph McTighe lived the ethos of dedication to God, family,
and country. The memory of his easy laughter and constant courage in
physical adversity has left an indelible impression on those who knew
him.
____________________
[[Page 8163]]
KAREN MIKOLASY: WASHINGTON STATE'S TEACHER OF THE YEAR
______
HON. JAY INSLEE
of washington
in the house of representatives
Monday, May 3, 1999
Mr. INSLEE. Mr. Speaker, I am honored to announce that Karen Mikolasy
has been chosen Washington State's Teacher of the Year.
Ms. Mikolasy teaches English at Shorecrest High School, located in
Washington's 1st congressional district. During her 28 years, she has
become famous for being not only a remarkable teacher, but also a
tireless champion of her students' talents. She never fails to help
them strive for excellence. She has devoted countless hours of selfless
service to the most valuable resource in this country--our children.
Her gift of teaching gives her students the intellectual tools to
become successful and productive members of society.
Mr. Speaker, there is nothing that impacts America's social, economic
and political future more than the quality of learning that happens in
our schools. I do not believe educators are given nearly the amount of
accolades they deserve, so I appreciate the chance to simply say: thank
you for the important and meaningful work you do.
With teachers like Karen Mikolasy, I am confident that today's
students will become tomorrow's leaders.
Thank you, Karen Mikolasy, for your commitment to education and
congratulations, again, on becoming Washington State's Teacher of the
Year.
____________________
TRIBUTE TO FLORETTE POTKIN
______
HON. BRAD SHERMAN
of california
in the house of representatives
Monday, May 3, 1999
Mr. SHERMAN. Mr. Speaker, I rise to pay tribute to Florette Potkin,
who is being honored for her dedicated service to the community.
Florette and her family are residents of Northridge, California, and
have been extremely generous to Temple Ner Maarav, our community, and
many charitable causes.
President Kennedy once said, ``For those to whom much is given, much
is required.'' Temple Ner Maarav has recognized Florette for
exemplifying leadership, volunteerism, and dedication. For over three
decades, Florette has worked tirelessly to better the community as a
whole.
Through her love for the arts, Florette found her way to Temple Ner
Tamid through her participation in a musical play. Thereafter, she
became active through a variety of programs within the temple. While
serving as Sisterhood President in 1974, she also helped to pave the
way for women in religious functions when she became a Bat Mitzvah that
same year.
Florette and her husband, Perry, have served in leadership positions
in both Temple Ner Tamid and Temple Maarev. Florette has also
encouraged her four children to become active in the Jewish community.
Florette has been unwavering in her efforts to work with members of the
community through her generous contributions.
Mr. Speaker, distinguished colleagues, please join me in paying
tribute to Florette Potkin, who is truly a role model for the citizens
of Los Angeles.
____________________
IN HONOR OF THE BAYONNE CHAPTER OF UNICO NATIONAL ON THEIR 50TH YEAR
ANNIVERSARY
______
HON. ROBERT MENENDEZ
of new jersey
in the house of representatives
Monday, May 3, 1999
Mr. MENENDEZ. Mr. Speaker, I rise today to recognize the Bayonne
Chapter of UNICO National on their 50th Anniversary of dedicated
service to the community.
UNICO, an Italian-American organization, has been committed to
serving the community through grassroots work and the building of
partnerships with other community activist and advocacy groups while
maintaining its identity as Italian-American. In order to fulfill this
goal, UNICO National has supported five basic principals: maintain
Unity; serve one's Neighbor; maintain Integrity of character; be
motivated by Charity; and open Opportunity to the underprivileged.
Since its inception in 1949, the Bayonne Chapter of UNICO National
has contributed more than $300,000 to more than 200 charities,
scholarship programs, youth programs, schools, senior organizations, as
well as others in the community at need. Because of members' tireless
efforts, the Bayonne Chapter has also been successful in facilitating a
$25,000 donation for the building of a Child Care Facility at the YMCA,
at $20,000 donation to the Bayonne Hospital, and a college scholarship
program which has awarded more than $50,000 in scholarships to local
students.
The Bayonne Chapter of UNICO exemplifies leadership and dedication to
both the Italian-American community and to Bayonne. For these
tremendous contributions to New Jersey, I am very happy to honor the
Bayonne Chapter for its achievements on its 50th Anniversary. I salute
and congratulate UNICO National on these extraordinary accomplishments.
____________________
ADMINISTRATION CERTIFICATION OF RUSSIA REGARDING RELIGIOUS FREEDOM
______
HON. CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH
of new jersey
in the house of representatives
Monday, May 3, 1999
Mr. SMITH of New Jersey. Mr. Speaker, through Public Law 105-292, the
International Religious Freedom Act, Congress is on record as standing
for religious liberty throughout the world.
Furthermore, Public Law 105-177, the foreign appropriations
legislation passed in the 105th Congress, mandates that no foreign aid
money be appropriated to the Government of the Russian Federation if
the President determines that the Russian government has implemented
legislation or regulations that discriminate, or cause discrimination,
against religious groups or religious communities in Russia in
violation of accepted international agreements on human rights and
religious freedoms to which the Russian Federation is a party. This
provision was in response to the 1997 Russian Law on Freedom of
Conscience and Religious Associations, which many feared would lead to
limitations on religious worship and a retreat from the standards of
religious freedom that had been achieved in Russia following the
dissolution of the Soviet Union.
This year, for the second year in a row, the President has made the
determination that the Government of the Russian Federation has not
implemented legislation or regulations that cause such discrimination
against religious groups. The Presidential Determination states
``During the period under review, the Government of the Russian
Federation has applied the 1997 Law on Religion in a manner that is not
in conflict with its international obligations on religious freedom.
However, this issue requires continued and close monitoring as the Law
on Religion furnishes regional officials with an instrument that has
been interpreted and used by officials at the local level to restrict
the activities of religious minorities.'' Furthermore, the Presidential
Determination states, ``To the extent that restrictions on the rights
of religious minorities have occurred, they have been the consequence
of actions taken by regional or local officials and do not appear to be
a manifestation of federal government policy. Such incidents, while
they must be taken seriously, represent a relatively small number of
problems when viewed against the size of the country and the number of
religious organizations.''
Mr. Speaker, I believe that the above statements are a reasonably
accurate representation of the religious liberty situation in Russia
and that the Presidential Determination is probably a fair one, given
the lack of firm legal structure and the geopolitical situation in the
present-day Russian Federation. Moreover, some of the most egregious
instances of restrictions against religious groups in Russia have been
corrected through court action.
And to be fair, Russia is hardly the worst offender in the former
Soviet Union. In Turkmenistan, for instance, religious groups are
required to have five-hundred members before they can be legally
registered with the government to operate openly. It is a ridiculously
high number and has resulted in harassment of unregistered religious
groups. Of course, unlike Russia, the Government of Turkmenistan
doesn't claim to be much of a democracy or go out of its way to adhere
to international standards of human rights.
In Uzbekistan, the 1998 law imposes severe criminal penalties for
meeting without registering and for engaging in free religious
expression with the intent to persuade the listener to another point of
view, in violation of OSCE religious liberty commitments. Since
February 1999, several pastors in Uzbekistan have been detained and
jailed on charges of drug possession eerily reminiscent of charges
brought in years past against Soviet religious dissidents.
[[Page 8164]]
These comparisons, however, do not change the fact that there are
still several problems in the area of religious liberty in Russia that
should be noted and corrected, especially if a considerable sum of U.S.
taxpayer money still continues to go to Russia. In the East-West Church
& Ministry Report of Winter 1999, Mark Elliot and Sharyl Corrado of the
Institute for East-West Christian Studies write:
Implementation of the 1997 law to date has been uneven. At
least in the short run, a number of factors appear to have
worked against consistently harsh application . . . . Still
life since the passage of the law has not been easy for many
who wish to worship outside the folds of the Moscow [Russian
Orthodox] Patriarchate. The first 15 months of the new law
included at least 69 specific instances of state harassment,
restriction or threat of restriction against non-Moscow
Patriarchate religious communities in the Russian Republic.
For instance, I wonder if it was a coincidence that a few days after
the Presidential Determination, the Russian Federation Ministry of
Justice rejected the application of the Society of Jesuits for official
registration. For that matter, most of the property seized by the
Communists from the Roman Catholic Church in Russia has not been
restored.
In the city of Moscow, which is considered a liberal jurisdiction,
the Jehovah's Witnesses have been subjected to a protracted trial that
threatens to return them to ``underground'' status.
In Stavropol, the local Moslem community has not only been refused
the return of a mosque that had been seized by the Communists, but also
been prevented from holding worship services in other quarters. A
provincial official justified this policy by saying that Moslems only
make up 10 percent of the population in the city.
These are only a few of the most prominent cases of concern. In rural
areas, local officials attempt to hinder worship activities by a number
of subterfuges, ranging from the refusal to rent city property to
religious groups without their own premises to outright threats and
eviction of missionaries.
Therefore, while I believe the Presidential Determination is, by and
large, acceptable at this time, I would emphasize the reference to
``continued and close monitoring'' of the situation. In my opinion, the
Administration has done a good job of monitoring the Russian religious
liberty situation, and I trust these efforts will continue. As Chairman
of the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, I urge the
Russian government to take every appropriate step to see that religious
freedom is a reality for all in Russia, and I know the Congress will
continue to follow this issue closely.
____________________
IN MEMORY OF THE REVEREND SEAMUS O'SHAUGHNESSY
______
HON. CARRIE P. MEEK
of florida
in the house of representatives
Monday, May 3, 1999
Mrs. MEEK of Florida. Mr. Speaker, I rise today in memory of the late
Reverend Seamus O'Shaughnessy, a well known champion of civil rights,
peace activist, and 29-year Archdiocese of Miami priest who died
earlier this month at Little Flower Catholic Church in Hollywood.
Father O'Shaughnessy will be remembered as an outspoken and passionate
advocate for minority rights.
Born in 1940 in Limerick City, Ireland, Father O'Shaughnessy learned
about the Archdiocese of Miami through a recruitment offer, came to our
city, and was assigned as the assistant pastor of Our Lady of the Holy
Rosary in Perrine. Subsequently, he served in other parishes, and he
helped to organize the First National Black Catholic Congress in 1987.
Reverend O'Shaughnessy formed a local chapter of Orita Rite, a group
that recognizes the rites of passage into adulthood of young people of
color. This active priest often wore kente cloth when speaking at his
Catholic Church.
Mr. Speaker, it is a privilege for me to pay tribute to a priest who
was so vigorous in advancing minority rights. Father O'Shaughnessy will
be missed by his congregation and his many friends in the community.
____________________
ARSON AWARENESS WEEK
______
HON. ROBERT E. WISE, JR.
of west virginia
in the house of representatives
Monday, May 3, 1999
Mr. WISE. Mr. Speaker, I rise to remind all Americans and especially
West Virginians that this week is Arson Awareness Week. As a member of
the Congressional Fire Service Caucus, I support the efforts of the
International Association of Arson Investigators and their West
Virginia Chapter who will celebrate the IAAI's 50th Anniversary this
year.
The IAAI in cooperation with the United States Fire Administration
educates the public about the hundreds of innocent people who die each
year and the millions of dollars of property damage caused by the
arsonist's match. I am proud of what the West Virginia Chapter of the
IAAI has done to control arson. The Chapter provides advanced training
for police, fire and insurance personnel. They also work to educate
West Virginians about how arson affects their lives.
The intentional burning of homes, businesses and cars has long been a
problem. Even more outrageous was when our places of worship came under
attack. I proudly worked with my colleagues in a bipartisan effort to
prevent more church burnings. Through the efforts of the Congressional
Fire Services Institute, an educational program was presented
nationwide for church leaders. The West Virginia Chapter of the
International Association of Arson Investigators conducted many of
these programs.
I am proud of my long relationship with the West Virginia Fire
Service. I know that many of our firefighters risk their lives
extinguishing these intentionally set blazes. That is why I will
continue to work to prevent arson so our fire fighters won't be
endangered. Mr. Speaker, I join with all members of Congress in
reminding Americans that we must work together to prevent arson.
____________________
IN RECOGNITION OF CABERNET SAUVIGNON
______
HON. MIKE THOMPSON
of california
in the house of representatives
Monday, May 3, 1999
Mr. THOMPSON of California. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased today to
recognize the Cabernet Sauvignon winegrape, indisputably the grape that
put California and the United States on the international wine map.
Cabernet Sauvignon will be celebrated in my hometown St. Helena,
California from May 10 to May 16 by the California Cabernet Society,
the Culinary Institute of America, and the Wine Spectator Greystone
Restaurant, and it's fitting that we honor the ``king'' of red wines.
Each year the California Cabernet Society stages a Spring Barrel
Tasting to showcase the most recent vintage. This year's tasting will,
for the first time, kick off an entire week, Cabernet Week,
highlighting this varietal and offering consumers the opportunity to
taste rare and older offerings of America's most treasured grape.
Cabernet Sauvignon, Mr. Speaker, has a long and distinguished history
in California and the United States dating back to the late 1800's. It
is a remarkably steady and consistent performer throughout much of the
state. In certain areas, it is capable of rendering wines of uncommon
depth, richness, concentration and longevity. It rises to the greatest
heights in Napa Valley and its smaller appellations such as Calistoga,
Oakville, Rutherford, and the Stags Leap District. It also performs
exceptionally well in the mountains on both sides of the valley, and in
select vineyards in Alexander Valley, Dry Creek Valley, Sonoma Valley,
Sonoma Mountain, Paso Robles, and in the Santa Cruz Mountains.
I need not remind my colleagues that the renowned 1976 Paris tasting
rocked the international wine world by placing California Cabernet
Sauvignon on the same playing field with Bordeaux. Indeed, a few of
California's offerings were judged as superior wines. A 1973 Stag's
Leap Wine Cellars' Cabernet Sauvignon scored highest when matched
against French Bordeaux, which is also made from the Cabernet Sauvignon
grape. In fact, American wines made a very strong showing throughout
the competition. The Paris tasting gave international recognition and
much-needed momentum to American vintners, American wines, and American
methods of grape growing and wine production.
Cabernet Sauvignon has come a long way since 1976 and has become a
model inspiring vintners in France, Italy, Spain, South Africa, Chile,
Australia and New Zealand to adopt our New World technology and
technique. Cabernet produces wines of great intensity and depth of
flavor. A $1.5 billion business in California, Cabernet Sauvignon is
the most regal of all wines and is second only to Zinfandel in total
red-wine acreage. Because of the high esteem of Cabernet and the way it
compliments a meal, a huge proportion of the varietal wines are sold in
the best restaurants worldwide.
Mr. Speaker, I believe it is fitting and appropriate at this time to
honor Cabernet
[[Page 8165]]
Sauvignon, the king of red wine. I raise my glass to the California
Cabernet Society, the Culinary Institute of America and the Wine
Spectator Greystone Restaurant for their tremendous generosity to the
community and their meritorious service, and I wish them well this
coming Cabernet Week.
____________________
TRIBUTE TO JUSTIN BLAKE HORNE
______
HON. JIM KOLBE
of arizona
in the house of representatives
Monday, May 3, 1999
Mr. KOLBE. Mr. Speaker, I rise today to pay tribute to one of
Arizona's finest young people, sixth-grader Justin Blake Horne of
Booth-Fickett Math/Science Magnet School in Tucson. We all too often
complain that today's young people don't care about their communities
or their schools. I think the following articles from The Arizona Daily
Star and The Tucson Citizen show just how committed to others in their
community some of our young people truly are.
[From the Arizona Daily Star, Mar. 19, 1999]
Kodak Likes Tucson Kid's Crime Deterrent Idea
(By Sarah Tully Tapia)
Sixth-grader Justin Blake Horne knew exactly how to push
the buttons of Kodak's CEO.
The 12-year-old invoked company tradition in asking George
Fisher to bankroll his idea: Give school monitors cameras so
they can take pictures of suspicious activity such as last
fall's string of attempted child abductions in Tucson-area
schools.
``I have heard it said, `A picture is worth a thousand
words,' '' Justin wrote to Fisher, chief executive officer of
the Eastman Kodak Co. ``Of course, my idea would be totally
experimental, however, where would Kodak be if George Eastman
did not undertake to perform experiments.''
Fisher accepted the challenge, donating 50 cameras and
sending Justin a handwritten note. ``Your idea seems
interesting and we are always experimenting with new
thoughts,'' Fisher wrote, adding that he wants progress
reports.
Yesterday, Justin delivered 10 cameras to Kellond
Elementary School. He plans to give 10 each to four more
schools, including his own, Booth-Fickett Magnet School.
In his letter, Justin explains that in one of the attempted
kidnappings, a monitor spotted someone approaching a child,
but the man drove off before the monitor could get a good
look at the man, car or license plate.
If Kodak donated cameras--worth $15 to $17 each--monitors
could snap pictures of the vehicles and suspects for
evidence, Justin wrote.
At Kellond, Justin gave Principal Marcia Baab explicit
instructions for his ``deterrent program,'' saying the
cameras must be used only for security purposes and must be
turned in to the police immediately. He plans to write
instructions for all the schools.
``He'd got it so organized, I can't even mess up,'' Baab
said.
The school had four instances of suspicious behavior in the
fall, but no one could provide police a good description of
the perpetrator.
The school resource officer said the cameras could help.
``It's good to see someone else being pro-active besides
us,'' said Officer Judy Augustine.
Justin said he hopes the mere presence of cameras will keep
criminals away from the schools.
``I actually am not expecting pictures. It's kind of odd,''
Justin said. If it works, he said he's like to see the
program go national.
This isn't the first time Justin has taken such an
initiative.
In second grade, he wrote to a stapler company for parts to
repair his teacher's broken stapler, which she was going to
throw out. They sent him parts, staples and other goodies.
At Booth-Fickett, he arranged for police to bring a
helicopter to the school. He convinced Iceoplex to donate 130
passes for students with improved grades and behavior.
A science whiz, Justin is already planning to put these
activities on his application for MIT.
Justin's latest endeavor is attracting a lot of attention,
including an interview on a Denver radio station and a
planned visit from Congressman Jim Kolbe. Justin's ready for
the spotlight to dim, as his classmates have ribbed him a
bit.
But he has no intention of stopping.
``I want to help people and I don't want to be a slumball
in life,'' Justin said.
____
[From The Tucson Citizen, Mar. 1, 1999]
Can-Do Kid's Ideas Turn Into Solutions
(By Marty Bustamante)
Many people write to their congressman when they want
something done.
Not Justin Blake Horne, who even at 12 years old is
anything but like most people.
When the sixth-grader at Booth-Fickett Math/Science Magnet
School identifies a problem, he goes right to the top in
seeking a solution.
His most recent missive was addressed to George Fisher,
chief executive officer of Eastman Kodak Co.
The problem: a rash of attempted abductions of Tucson
schoolchildren.
His solution: 50 cameras for adult monitors to help catch
the creeps.
``Even though there are after-school monitors . . . on the
playground, the children are still in danger,'' Justin wrote
Fisher.
``In one incident the monitor saw a stranger approaching a
child and when he saw the monitor he ran quickly to his car
and drove off. The monitor saw both the abductor and his car,
however, she was unable to identify the individual, his
automobile or the license plate.''
His letter continued: ``I have heard it said, `A picture is
worth a thousand words.' Of course, my idea would be totally
experimental, however, where would Kodak be if George Eastman
did not undertake . . . experiments?''
How could a big-time CEO turn down a request like that?
It turns out he couldn't.
Fisher, in a handwritten note to Justin, concurred that
``we are always experimenting with new thoughts.''
Fifty cameras soon followed the note, in which Fisher asked
that Justin give him a progress report on the idea.
And Fisher offered a little advice: ``It would seem you
need to make it generally known that the monitors have
cameras to fend off potential troublemakers.''
Indeed, the cameras--which will be in the hands of 50
monitors soon, according to Booth-Fickett Principal John
Michel--can also be used as a deterrent.
Michel, along with Justin's parents, Michelle and Howard
Horne, is helping Justin make his plan work.
Justin is trying to make arrangements to get the film
developed free, should a monitor catch a snapshot of a
potential abductor.
Start-up of Justin's plan is being accelerated after a
teen-age girl walking home from school was raped a few weeks
ago and, in another case, some teen-age boys apparently tried
to abduct another girl near a school.
Going right to the top to solve a problem is not new to
Justin.
As a second-grader at Borton Magnet Primary, he found a
nearly brand-new, but broken, stapler in his teacher's
wastebasket.
Outraged, he told his teacher she shouldn't be throwing
away Tucson Unified School District property.
She assured him she had bought the $20-plus stapler with
her own money.
Justin then persuaded her to give him a shot at fixing it.
He wrote a letter to ``Mr. Stanley Bostitch,'' believing
the two last names on the stapler were the first and last
names of the owner.
In his letter, he explained that the stapler needed for the
class-room was broken, but that his teacher did not have
money to again buy one out of her own pocket.
He told ``Mr. Bostitch'' that he would attempt to fix it
himself if the company would just send him a replacement
spring.
Justin received not only a spring--and safety glasses--for
the repair job but also two new staplers, a staple remover
and a box of 5,000 staples.
He fixed the broken stapler, by the way.
Granted, a broken stapler is hardly a life-or-death
situation. But Justin has been involved in those cases, too,
as a second-grader.
During an escape drill from a portable classroom, which had
only one door, he noticed his teacher's aide could not get
out of the window as an escape alternative, as the limber
youngsters could.
He came home shaking his head. ``Would you believe one of
my teachers got burned up today?'' he asked his parents.
They asked him what he meant, and he explained.
Portable classrooms are 2 feet off the ground. The windows
are 4 feet up the wall inside, making it a 6-foot drop.
The teacher's aide helped students get out, but nobody was
there to help her.
A videotape of the drill was shown to Principal Robert
Wortman, who called Robert O'Toole, TUSD director of fiscal
and operational support, for help with the problem.
Justin's father said O'Toole explained he had $700,000 in
requests for repairs and $70,000 to spend.
``He said there was no way it could get done, at least for
now,'' the father recalled. Justin piped in:
``Have you seen what we're talking about?''
``Not really,'' O'Toole reportedly replied.
``Come out and I'll show you,'' Justin said.
And so the young boy and O'Toole went out to the portable,
followed by Justin's father and the principal.
``You see, this is where we have to jump, and my teacher
couldn't get out. She would have gotten burned,'' Justin told
O'Toole.
``What if it was your mother. Would you want her to jump or
burn up?''
O'Toole nodded in understanding, praising the boy.
Give days later, the Hornes got a call from the principal.
[[Page 8166]]
``He said, `You won't believe this, but they're out here
installing (second) doors on all the portables,' '' Justin's
father recalled.
And it wasn't just at Borton.
TUSD installed additional doors--found in storage--for all
205 portable classrooms in the district.
Over the following years, Justin also spearheaded an effort
to get the Tucson Police Department helicopter support group
and the SWAT team to visit Borton and Booth Fickett.
In the fourth grade, he persuaded the president of Ice-O-
Plex skating arena to donate 260 passes for Justin's program
to reward students who made individual improvements in their
classwork.
Justin spread word of his program with fliers and
certificates printed from his home computer, which he built.
``You have to try,'' Justin said, summing up his philosophy
for getting things done. ``If you try, you probably will
succeed. It's better to try and get rejected than not to try
at all.''
____________________
ROSA SUGRANES--THE SMALL BUSINESS PERSON OF THE YEAR FOR 1999
______
HON. ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN
of florida
in the house of representatives
Monday, May 3, 1999
Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to congratulate my
constituent, Mrs. Rosa Sugranes, who was recognized recently in
ceremonies at the U.S. Capitol by the Small Business Council of America
as the Small Business Person of the Year for 1999.
Rosa has built Iberia Tiles into one of our nation's largest
independently owned distributors of ceramic tiles, marble and stone.
Starting out as a 22-year-old college student with just a $100,000
investment, she opened a tile warehouse in 1980. Her hard work and
dedication helped create today's major corporation which has annual
revenues of over $24 million and offices throughout South Florida and
the Atlanta area. Miami's Bayside Marketplace, Joe's Stone Crabs and
the World Trade Center in Panama are among the many famous buildings
which have used Iberia tiles.
Among the many roles she is being honored for by the council include
her commitment to the vital cause of multilingual education, as well as
her many civic and charitable contributions which have greatly
benefited our community and nation. She heads the Greater Miami Chamber
of Commerce's multilingual task force and is chairwoman of the
Multilingual Development Committee of the Miami-Dade Public Schools.
Rosa also serves on the board of trustees of Florida International
University and the United Way, and has played a major role in Miami-
Dade County' Efficiency & Competition Committee and Cultural Affairs
Council.
This is definitely a fitting tribute for Rosa Sugranes who, over the
past twenty years, has very ably served as an entrepreneur, civic
leader, education crusader and mother of two children.
____________________
IN HONOR OF THE BAYONNE ELKS LODGE NO. 434 FOR ITS WORK WITH ELKS
NATIONAL YOUTH WEEK
______
HON. ROBERT MENENDEZ
of new jersey
in the house of representatives
Monday, May 3, 1999
Mr. MENENDEZ. Mr. Speaker, I rise today to recognize the Bayonne Elks
Lodge No. 434 for all of its efforts with the Elks National Youth Week.
The Bayonne Elks Lodge has been committed to reaching out to our
youth, shining a light on the contributions and accomplishments of
young people in the community. Every year during the first week of May,
selected area high school seniors are honored by the Elks Lodge for
National Youth Week.
This year thirty outstanding students are scheduled to be honored on
Youth Day, set to take place on May 4, 1999. Pictures and biographies
of the selected students can be found in local newspapers as the Elks
Outstanding Students.
As part of the Elks Lodge National Youth Week program, students get
the opportunity to gain first hand experience of government. They are
assigned positions within the city government, are sworn into these
positions, and tour City Hall. This opportunity not only promotes work
in government as a positive and honorable career choice, but it also
opens students to the possibilities that public service has to offer.
Bayonne Elks Lodge No. 434 exemplifies leadership and dedication to
young people and to the Bayonne community. For these tremendous
contributions to New Jersey, I am very happy to honor the Bayonne Elks
Lodge for its achievements with the Elks National Youth Week program. I
salute and congratulate the Bayonne Elks Lodge on these extraordinary
accomplishments.
____________________
SENATE COMMITTEE MEETINGS
Title IV of Senate Resolution 4, agreed to by the Senate on February
4, 1977, calls for establishment of a system for a computerized
schedule of all meetings and hearings of Senate committees,
subcommittees, joint committees, and committees of conference. This
title requires all such committees to notify the Office of the Senate
Daily Digest--designated by the Rules committee--of the time, place,
and purpose of the meetings, when scheduled, and any cancellations or
changes in the meetings as they occur.
As an additional procedure along with the computerization of this
information, the Office of the Senate Daily Digest will prepare this
information for printing in the Extensions of Remarks section of the
Congressional Record on Monday and Wednesday of each week.
Meetings scheduled for Tuesday, May 4, 1999 may be found in the Daily
Digest of today's Record.
MEETINGS SCHEDULED
MAY 5
9 a.m.
Environment and Public Works
To hold hearings on the nomination of Timothy Fields,
Jr., of Virginia, to be Assistant Administrator, Office
of Solid Waste, Environmental Protection Agency.
SD-406
Governmental Affairs
To hold hearings on the current state of Federal and
State relations.
SD-342
Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry
To hold hearings on proposed legislation authorizing
funds for programs of the Commodity Exchange Act.
SR-328A
9:30 a.m.
Indian Affairs
To hold oversight hearings on Tribal Priority Allocations
and Contract Support Costs Report.
SR-485
Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs
Financial Institutions Subcommittee
To hold hearings on the proposed Financial Institutions
Insolvency Improvement Act of 1999.
SD-538
Energy and Natural Resources
To resume hearings to examine damage to the national
security from alleged Chinese espionage at the
Department of Energy nuclear weapons laboratories.
(Hearings may go into a closed session).
SH-216
Appropriations
Defense Subcommittee
To hold closed hearings on certain intelligence programs.
S-407, Capitol
Commerce, Science, and Transportation
Business meeting to markup S.305, to reform unfair and
anticompetitive practices in the professional boxing
industry; S.795, to amend the Fastener Quality Act to
strengthen the protection against the sale of
mismarked, misrepresented, and counterfeit fasteners
and eliminate unnecessary requirements; S.296, to
provide for continuation of the Federal research
investment in a fiscally sustainable way; S.342, to
authorize appropriations for the National Aeronautics
and Space Administration for fiscal years 2000, 2001,
and 2002; and S.376, to amend the Communications
Satellite Act of 1962 to promote competition and
privatization in satellite communications.
SR-253
10 a.m.
Finance
To resume hearings on Medicare reform issues, focusing on
financial obligations of taxpayers and beneficiaries.
SD-215
Foreign Relations
To hold hearings on issues relating to the ABM Treaty,
focusing on United States strategic and arms control
objectives.
SD-562
Judiciary
To hold oversight hearings on the programs of the
Department of Justice.
SD-226
[[Page 8167]]
3 p.m.
Intelligence
Closed business meeting to markup proposed legislation
authorizing funds for fiscal year 2000 for intelligence
related programs.
SH-219
MAY 6
9 a.m.
Appropriations
Labor, Health and Human Services, and Education
Subcommittee
To hold hearings on proposed budget estimates for fiscal
year 2000 for National Institutes of Health, Department
of Health and Human Services, focusing on disease
research.
SD-124
9:30 a.m.
Energy and Natural Resources
To hold hearings to examine the results of the December
1998 plebiscite on Puerto Rico.
SH-216
Governmental Affairs
To hold hearings on Federalism and crime control,
focusing on the increasing Federalization of criminal
law and its impact on crime control and the criminal
justice system.
SD-342
Environment and Public Works
Business meeting to consider pending calendar business.
SD-406
10 a.m.
Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe
To hold joint hearings on the state of democratization
and human rights in Kazakstan.
SR-485
Foreign Relations
Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs Subcommittee
To hold hearings on United States and Iran relations.
SD-562
Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions
To resume hearings on proposed legislation authorizing
funds for programs of the Elementary Secondary
Education Act, focusing on safety programs.
SD-628
11 a.m.
Veterans Affairs
To hold hearings to examine Veteran Affairs strategies in
restructuring health care, including potential facility
closures and proposed legislation relating to voluntary
seperation incentive bonuses for Veteran Affairs
employees.
SR-418
2 p.m.
Foreign Relations
To hold closed hearings to examine the growing threat of
biological weapons.
SH-219
Judiciary
Antitrust, Business Rights, and Competition Subcommittee
Business meeting to consider S.467, to establish time
limits on Federal Communications Commission review of
telecommunications mergers.
SD-226
2:30 p.m.
Commerce, Science, and Transportation
Oceans and Fisheries Subcommittee
To hold hearings to examine coastal zone management.
SR-253
MAY 10
1 p.m.
Judiciary
Administrative Oversight and the Courts Subcommittee
To hold oversight hearings on the investigation of TWA
Flight #800.
SD-226
MAY 11
10 a.m.
Judiciary
To hold hearings on how to promote a responsive and
responsible role for the Federal Government on
combatting hate crimes.
SD-226
10:30 a.m.
Governmental Affairs
Oversight of Government Management, Restructuring and the
District of Columbia Subcommittee
To hold hearings on multiple program coordination in
early childhood education.
SD-342
MAY 12
9:30 a.m.
Indian Affairs
To hold oversight hearings on HUBzones implementation.
SR-485
Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions
To resume hearings on proposed legislation authorizing
funds for programs of the Elementary and Secondary
Education Act, focusing on Title I provisions.
SD-628
Energy and Natural Resources
Business meeting to consider pending calendar business.
SD-366
2 p.m.
Judiciary
Technology, Terrorism, and Government Information
Subcommittee
Business meeting to consider pending calendar business.
SD-226
MAY 13
9:30 a.m.
Energy and Natural Resources
To hold hearings on S.698, to review the suitability and
feasibility of recovering costs of high altitude
rescues at Denali National Park and Preserve in the
state of Alaska; S.711, to allow for the investment of
joint Federal and State funds from the civil settlement
of damages from the Exxon Valdez oil spill; and S.748,
to improve Native hiring and contracting by the Federal
Government within the State of Alaska.
SD-366
10 a.m.
Environment and Public Works
To hold hearings on issues relating to the Clean Water
Action Plan.
SD-406
Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions
To hold hearings on the nomination of Richard M. McGahey,
of the District of Columbia, to be an Assistant
Secretary of Labor.
SD-628
2:30 p.m.
Energy and Natural Resources
Forests and Public Land Management Subcommittee
To hold hearings to examine fire preparedness on Federal
lands.
SD-366
MAY 19
9:30 a.m.
Indian Affairs
To hold hearings on S.614, to provide for regulatory
reform in order to encourage investment, business, and
economic development with respect to activities
conducted on Indian lands; and S.613, to encourage
Indian economic development, to provide for the
disclosure of Indian tribal sovereign immunity in
contracts involving Indian tribes, and for other
purposes.
SR-485
MAY 20
2 p.m.
Energy and Natural Resources
Energy Research and Development, Production and Regulation
Subcommittee
To hold hearings on S.348, to authorize and facilitate a
program to enhance training, research and development,
energy conservation and efficiency, and consumer
education in the oilheat industry for the benefit of
oilheat consumers and the public.
SD-366
2:30 p.m.
Energy and Natural Resources
Energy Research and Development, Production and Regulation
Subcommittee
To hold joint oversight hearings with the House Committee
on Government Reform's Subcommittee on National
Economic Growth, Natural Resources and Regulatory
Affairs, on the Administration's fiscal year 2000
budget request for climate change programs and
compliance with various statutory provisions in fiscal
year 1999 appropriations acts requiring detailed
accounting of climate change spending and performance
measures for each requested increase in funding.
SD-366
MAY 27
2 p.m.
Energy and Natural Resources
Water and Power Subcommittee
To hold hearings on S.244, to authorize the construction
of the Lewis and Clark Rural Water System and to
authorize assistance to the Lewis and Clark Rural Water
System, Inc., a nonprofit corporation, for the planning
and construction of the water supply system; S.623, to
amend Public Law 89-108 to increase authorization
levels for State and Indian tribal, municipal, rural,
and industrial water supplies, to meet current and
future water quantity and quality needs of the Red
River Valley, to deauthorize certain project features
and irrigation service areas, to enhance natural
resources and fish and wildlife habitat; and S.769, to
provide a final settlement on certain debt owed by the
city of Dickinson, North Dakota, for the construction
of the bascule gates on the Dickinson Dam.
SD-366
[[Page 8168]]
SEPTEMBER 28
9:30 a.m.
Veterans Affairs
To hold joint hearings with the House Committee on
Veterans Affairs to review the legislative
recommendations of the American Legion.
345 Cannon Building
CANCELLATIONS
MAY 5
2 p.m.
Judiciary
Youth Violence Subcommittee
To hold hearings on youth violence issues.
SD-226
2:30 p.m.
Commerce, Science, and Transportation
Business meeting to markup S.761, to regulate interstate
commerce by electronic means by permitting and
encouraging the continued expansion of electronic
commerce through the operation of free market forces.
SR-253