[Constitution of the United States of America:  Analysis, and Interpretation - 1992 Edition ]
[State Constitutional and Statutory Provisions and Municipal Ordinances Held Unconstitutional on their Face or as Administered]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office, www.gpo.gov]


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                   STATE CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY
                   PROVISIONS AND MUNICIPAL ORDINANCES
                     HELD UNCONSTITUTIONAL ON THEIR
                         FACE OR AS ADMINISTERED
                               (1789-1992)

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                    STATE ACTS HELD UNCONSTITUTIONAL

  Hereinafter presented are brief summaries of Supreme Court decisions 
in which provisions of state constitutions, statutes, and municipal 
ordinances were found to be unconstitutional either in substance or as 
enforced, including provisions which conflicted with federal legislative 
acts and were therefore void because of the supremacy clause. Appended 
thereto are the names of the Justices who concurred in, and dissented 
from, such rulings. The names of the Justices have not been set forth 
when their decisions were unanimous.

 
             I. STATE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES

1. United States v. Peters, 9 U.S. (5 Cr.) 115 (1809)
        A Pennsylvania statute prohibiting the execution of any process 
issued to enforce a certain sentence of a federal court, on the ground 
that the federal court lacked jurisdiction in the cause, could not oust 
the federal court of jurisdiction. A state statute purporting to annul 
the judgment of a court of the United States and to destroy rights 
acquired thereunder is without legal foundation.

2. Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cr.) 87 (1810)
        A Georgia statute annulling conveyance of public lands 
authorized by a prior enactment was violative of the obligation of 
contracts clause (Art. I, Sec. 10) of the Constitution.

    Justices Concurring: Marshall, C.J., Washington, Livingston, Todd.

    Justice Dissenting: Johnson (in part).

3. New Jersey v. Wilson, 11 U.S. (7 Cr.) 164 (1812).
        A New Jersey law purporting to repeal an exemption from taxation 
contained in a prior enactment conveying certain lands was violative of 
the obligation of contracts clause (Art. I, Sec. 10).

4. Terrett v. Taylor, 13 U.S. (9 Cr.) 43 (1815).
        Although subsequently cited as a contract clause case (Piqua 
Branch Bank v. Knoop, 16 How. (57 U.S.) 369, 389 (1853)), the Court in 
the instant decision, without referring to the obligation of contracts 
clause (Art. I, Sec. 10), voided, as contrary to the principles of 
natural justice, two Virginia acts which purported to divest the 
Episcopal Church of title to property ``acquired under the faith of 
previous laws.''

5. Sturges v. Crowninshield, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 122 (1819).
        Retroactive operation of a New York insolvency law to discharge 
the obligation of a debtor on a promissory note negotiated prior to its 
adoption violated the obligation of contracts clause (Art. I, Sec. 10).


[[Page 2036]]

6. McMillan v. McNeil, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 209 (1819).
        A Louisiana insolvency law had no extraterritorial operation, 
and although adopted in 1808, its invocation to relieve a debtor of an 
obligation contracted by him in 1811, while a resident of South 
Carolina, offended the obligation of contracts clause (Art. I, Sec. 10).

7. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
        Under the principle of national supremacy (Art. VI) whereunder 
instrumentalities of the Federal Government are immune for state 
taxation, a Maryland law imposing a tax on notes issued by a branch of 
the Bank of United States was held unconstitutional.

8. Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819).
        A New Hampshire law which altered a charter granted to a private 
eleemosynary corporation by the British Crown prior to the Revolution 
was deemed violative of the obligation of contracts clause (Art. I, 
Sec. 10).

    Justices Concurring: Marshall, C.J., Washington, Johnson, 
Livingston, Story.

    Justice Dissenting: Duvall.

9. Farmers' and Mechanics' Bank v. Smith, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 131 (1821).
        A state insolvency law, insofar as it purported to discharge a 
debtor from obligations contracted prior to its passage, was violative 
of the obligation of contracts clause (Art. I, Sec. 10).

10. Green v. Biddle, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 1 (1823).
        Inasmuch as the compact between Virginia and Kentucky negotiated 
on the occasion of the separation of the latter from the former 
stipulated that rights in lands within the ceded area should remain 
valid and secure under the laws of Kentucky, and should be determined by 
Virginia law as of the time of separation, a subsequent Kentucky law 
which diminished the rights of a lawful owner by reducing the scope of 
his remedies against an adverse possessor violated the obligation of 
contracts clause (Art. I, Sec. 10)

    Justice Concurring: Johnson (separately).

11. Society for the Propagation of the Gospel v. New Haven, 21 U.S. (8 
        Wheat.) 464 (1823).
        The property of a charitable corporation chartered by the Crown, 
being specifically protected by the treaty of peace of 1783, an act of 
Vermont adopted in 1794 and purporting to convey such property to local 
subdivisions was void.

12. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
        By reason of conflict with the federal licensing act of 1793 
authorizing vessels to navigate coastal waters, a New York statute 
granting to certain persons an exclusive right to navigate New York 
waters was void.


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13. Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824).
        An Ohio statute levying a tax on the Bank of the United States, 
a federal instrumentality, was unenforceable (Art VI).

    Justices Concurring: Marshall, C.J., Washington, Todd, Duvall, 
Story, Thompson.

    Justice Dissenting: Johnson.

14. Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213 (1827).
        (1) Although a state insolvency law may be applied to discharge 
a debt contracted subsequently to the passage of such law, (2) the 
statute could not be accorded extraterritorial enforcement to the extent 
of discharging a claim sought to be collected by a citizen of another 
State either in a federal court or in the courts of other States.

    Justices Concurring: Johnson, Marshall, C.J., Duvall, Story.

    Justices Dissenting: Washington, Thompson, Trimble.

15. Brown v. Maryland, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 419 (1827).
        A Maryland statute which required an importer to obtain a 
license before reselling in the original package articles imported from 
abroad was in conflict with the federal power to regulate foreign 
commerce (Art. I, Sec. 8, cl. 3) and with the constitutional provision 
(Art. I, Sec. 10, cl. 2) prohibiting States from levying import duties.

    Justices Concurring: Marshall, C.J., Washington, Johnson, Duvall, 
Story, Trimble.

    Justice Dissenting: Thompson.

16. Craig v. Missouri, 29 U.S. (4 Pet.) 410 (1830).
        A Missouri act, under the authority of which certificates in 
denominations of 50 to $10 were issued, payable in discharge of taxes or 
debts owned to the State and of salaries due public officers violated 
the constitutional prohibition (Art. I, Sec. 10, cl. 10) against 
emission of ``bills of credit'' by States. Justices Concurring: 
Marshall, C.J., Duvall, Story, Baldwin.

    Justices Dissenting: Johnson, Thompson, McLean.

17. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
        A Georgia law which imposed penalties on white persons who, 
without first obtaining a license therefor, established a residence 
within the limits of the Cherokee Nation, was unenforceable by reason of 
conflict with treaties negotiated by the United States with such Indian 
tribes and by virtue of extending to an area beyond the jurisdiction of 
the State.

18. Boyle v. Zacharie, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 635 (1832).
        Consistently with the principle of Ogden v. Saunders, a Maryland 
insolvency law could not be invoked to effect discharge of an obligation 
contracted in Louisiana subsequently to its passage.


[[Page 2038]]

19. Dobbins v. Commissioners of Erie County, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 435 
        (1842).
        A Pennsylvania law which diminished the compensation of a 
federal officer by subjecting him to county taxes imposed an invalid 
burden on a federal instrumentality (Art. VI).

20. Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539 (1842).
        A Pennsylvania statute (1826) which penalized an owner's 
recovery of a runaway slave was violative of Art. IV, Sec. 2, cl. 3, and 
federal legislation implementing the latter provision.

    Justices Concurring: Story, Catron, McKinley, Taney, C.J. 
(separately), Thompson (separately), Baldwin (separately), Wayne 
(separately), Daniel (separately), McLean (separately).

21. Bronson v. Kinzie, 42 U.S. (1 How.) 311 (1843).
        Illinois mortgage moratorium law which, when applied to a 
mortgage negotiated prior to its passage, reduced the remedies of the 
mortgage lender by conferring a new right of redemption upon a 
defaulting borrower, impaired an obligation of contract contrary to Art. 
I, Sec. 10, of the Constitution.

    Justices Concurring: Taney, C.J., Baldwin, Wayne, Catron, Daniel.

    Justice Dissenting: McLean.

22. McCracken v. Hayward, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 608 (1844).
        Illinois mortgage moratorium law, which, when applied to a 
mortgage executed prior to its passage, diminished remedies of the 
mortgage lender by prohibiting consummation of a foreclosure unless the 
foreclosure price equaled two-thirds of the value of the mortgaged 
property, impaired the lender's obligation of contract contrary to Art. 
I, Sec. 10, of the Constitution.

23. Gordon v. Appeal Tax Court, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 133 (1845).
        As to stockholders of Maryland state banks afforded an exemption 
under prior act of 1821, Maryland statute of 1841 taxing these 
stockholders impaired the obligation of contract.

24. Searight v. Stokes, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 151 (1845).
        Inasmuch as under federal acts ceding to Pennsylvania that part 
of the Cumberland Road within its limits, and Pennsylvania laws 
accepting the same, the carriage of mail over said road was to be free 
from toll, later Pennsylvania law imposing tolls on coaches transporting 
passengers could not extend to the mail carried therein.

    Justices Concurring: Taney, C.J., Story, Wayne, Catron, McKinley, 
Nelson.

    Justices Dissenting: McLean, Daniel.

25. Neil, Moore & Co. v. Ohio, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 720 (1845).
        Ohio toll levied on passengers transported on mail coaches 
traversing Cumberland Road in that State, but which exempted pas

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sengers traveling on other coaches, was void by reason of conflict with 
the terms of federal and Ohio acts adopted in relation to transfer and 
acceptance of said part of the road by Ohio.

    Justices Concurring: Taney, C.J., Story, McLean, Wayne, Catron, 
McKinley, Nelson.

    Justice Dissenting: Daniel. 2

26. Planters' Bank v. Sharp, 47 U.S. (6 How.) 301 (1848).
        Mississippi law which nullified the power of a bank under a 
previously issued charter to discount bills of exchange and promissory 
notes and to institute actions for collection of the same was void by 
reason of imparing an obligation of contract (Art. I, Sec. 10).

    Justices Concurring: McLean, Wayne, Catron, Nelson, Woodbury, Grier.

    Justices Dissenting: Taney, C.J., Daniel.

27. Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283 (1849).
        Collection by New York and Massachusetts of per capita taxes on 
alien and domestic passengers arriving in the ports of these States was 
violative of the federal power to regulate foreign and interstate 
commerce (Art. I, Sec. 8, cl. 3).

    Justices Concurring: McLean (separately), Wayne (separately), Catron 
(separately), McKinley (separately), Grier (separately).

    Justices Dissenting: Taney, C.J. (separately), Daniel (separately), 
Woodbury (separately), Nelson.

28. Woodruff v. Trapnall, 51 U.S. (10 How.) 190 (1851).
        A judgment debtor of the State of Arkansas tendered, in 
satisfaction of the judgment, banknotes in circulation at the time of 
the repeal by the State of that section of the said bank's charter 
providing that such notes should be received in discharge of public 
debts. By reason of the inhibition of the contract clause of the 
Constitution, the legislative repeal could neither affect such notes nor 
abrogate the pledge of the State to receive them in payment of debts.

    Justices Concurring: Taney, C.J., McLean, Wayne, McKinley, Woodbury.

    Justices Dissenting: Catron, Daniel, Nelson, Grier.

29. Achison v. Huddleson, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 293 (1852).
        Inasmuch as by the terms of a Maryland statute, assented to by 
Congress, no toll was to be levied by that State on passenger coaches 
carrying mails over the Cumberland Road, later Maryland law imposing 
tolls on passengers in such coaches was void by reason of conflict with 
an earlier compact between Maryland and the Federal Government and also 
by virtue of imposing a burden on federal carriage of the mails (Art. 
VI).


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30. Trustees for Vincennes University v. Indiana, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 268 
        (1853).
        Inasmuch as the incorporation by the territorial legislature of 
the University in 1806 operated to vest in the latter certain federal 
lands reserved for educational purposes, subsequent enactment by Indiana 
ordering the sale of such lands and use of the proceeds for other 
purposes was invalid because of impairment of the contractual rights of 
the University.

    Justices Concurring: McLean, Wayne, Nelson, Grier, Curtis.

    Justices Dissenting: Taney, C.J., Catron, Daniel.

31. Curran v. Arkansas, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 304 (1854).
        Retroactive laws which vested all property of the state bank in 
Arkansas and thereby prevented it from honoring its outstanding bills 
payable on demand to the holders thereof impaired the contractual rights 
of the latter and were void.

    Justices Concurring: Taney, C.J., McLean, Wayne, Grier, Curtis, 
Campbell.

    Justices Dissenting: Catron, Daniel, Nelson.

32. State Bank of Ohio v. Knoop, 57 U.S. (16 How.) 369 (1854).
        Inasmuch as state banks, on acceptance of a charter under the 
Ohio banking law of 1845, were directed, in lieu of all taxes, to pay 
six percent of annual dividends to the States, a later statute which 
exposed these banks to higher taxes effected an invalid impairment of 
the obligation of contract.

    Justices Concurring: Taney, C.J., McLean, Wayne, Nelson, Grier, 
Curtis.

    Justices Dissenting: Catron, Daniel, Campbell.

33. Hays v. The Pacific Mail Steamship Co., 58 U.S. (17 How.) 596 
        (1855).
        California lacked jurisdiction to impose property taxes on 
vessels owned by a New York company and registered in New York as their 
home port which engaged in the coastwise trade entailing calls at 
California ports which were too brief to establish a tax situs.

    Justices Concurring: Taney, C.J., McLean, Wayne, Catron, Nelson, 
Grier, Curtis, Campbell.

    Justices Dissenting: Daniel.

34. Dodge v. Woolsey, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 331 (1856).
        Levy under an 1851 Ohio law of a bank tax at a higher rate than 
that specified in the bank's charter in 1845 was invalid by reason of 
impairment of the obligation of contract.

    Justices Concurring: Taney, C.J., McLean, Wayne, Nelson, Grier, 
Curtis.

    Justices Dissenting: Catron, Daniel, Campbell.

35. Sinnot v. Davenport, 63 U.S. (22 How.) 227 (1860).
        An Alabama statute requiring owners of steamboats navigating the 
waters of that State to register under the penalty of a $500 fine

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for each offense was in conflict with the act of Congress providing for 
the enrollment and license of vessels engaged in the coastwise trade and 
therefore inoperative.
        Accord: Foster v. Davenport, 63 U.S. (22 How.) 244 (1860), which 
held that this statute also was inoperative when applied to a lighter 
and a towboat assisting the movement wholly within Alabama territorial 
waters of vessels engaged in foreign and interstate commerce.

36. Almy v. California, 65 U.S. (24 How.) 169 (1861).
        A California stamp tax imposed on bills of lading for gold or 
silver transported from California to any place outside the State was 
void as a tax on exports forbidden by Art. I, Sec. 10, cl. 2 of the 
Constitution.

37. Howard v. Bugbee, 65 U.S. (24 How.) 461 (1861).
        An Alabama statute authorizing redemption of mortgaged property 
in two years after sale under a foreclosure decree, by bona fide 
creditors of the mortgagor could not be applied to sales under mortgages 
executed prior to the enactment without invalid impairment of the 
obligation of contracts (Art. I, Sec. 10).

38. Bank of Commerce v. New York City, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 620 (1863).
        Securities of the United States being exempt from state 
taxation, inclusion of the value thereof in the capital of a bank 
subjected to taxation by the terms of a New York law rendered the latter 
void.

    Accord: Bank Tax Case, 69 U.S. (2 Wall.) 200 (1865).

39. Hawthorne v. Calef, 69 U.S. (2 Wall.) 10 (1865).
        A Maine statute terminating the liability of corporate stock for 
the debts of the corporation impaired the obligation of contracts as 
respects claims of creditors outstanding at the time of such 
termination.

40. The Binghamton Bridge, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 51 (1866).
        An obligation of contract was impaired when a state legislature, 
after having issued a charter to a bridge company containing assurances 
that erection of other bridges within two miles of said bridge would not 
be authorized, subsequently chartered a second company to construct a 
bridge within a few rods of the first.

41. Van Allen v. The Assessors, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 573 (1866).
        A New York law authorizing localities to tax as personal 
property national bank stock held by residents, but which imposed no 
comparable tax on shares of state banks, was violative of federal 
legislation authorizing state taxation of national bank stock at rates 
no higher than those imposed on state bank shares. Taxation of the 
capital of state banks did not provide such equality, for that part of 
the capital of state banks invested in federal securities was exempt.


[[Page 2042]]


    Justices Concurring: Grier, Davis, Nelson, Clifford, Miller, Field.

    Justices Dissenting: Chase, C.J., Wayne, Swayne.

42. Accord: Bradley v. Illinois, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 459 (1867), voiding a 
        similar Illinois tax law on the ground that a tax on the capital 
        of state banks was not the equivalent of the state tax on shares 
        of national banks and accordingly the tax on the latter was in 
        conflict with federal law consenting to taxation of national 
        bank shares at rates not in excess of those imposed on shares of 
        state banks.

43. McGee v. Mathis, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 143 (1867).
        Arkansas statute of 1855 repealing an 1851 grant of tax 
exemption applicable to swamp lands, paid for either before or after 
repeal with scrip issued before the repeal, impaired a contract of the 
State with holders of such scrip (Art. I, Sec. 10).

44. Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277 (1867).
        Missouri constitutional provisions which required clergymen, as 
a prerequisite to the practice of their profession, to take an oath that 
they had never been guilty of hostility to the United States, or of 
certain other acts which were lawful when committed, was void as a bill 
of attainder and as an ex post facto law.

    Justices Concurring: Wayne, Grier, Nelson, Clifford, Field.

    Justices Dissenting: Swayne, Davis, Miller.

45. The Moses Taylor, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 411 (1867).
        A California statute vesting state courts with in rem 
jurisdiction over vessels for causes of action cognizable in admiralty 
invalidly infringed the admiralty jurisdiction exclusively conferred 
upon federal courts by Sec. 9 of the Judiciary Act.

46. Von Hoffman v. Quincy, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 535 (1867).
        Illinois law limiting taxing powers granted to a municipality 
under a prior law authorizing it to issue bonds and amortize the same by 
levy of taxes impaired the obligation of contract (Art. I, Sec. 10).

47. The Hine v. Trevor, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 555 (1867).
        Iowa statute providing an in rem remedy in state courts for 
maritime causes of action was void by reason of conflict with Sec. 9 of 
the Judiciary Act of 1789 which vested admiralty jurisdiction 
exclusively in the federal courts.

48. Christmas v. Russell, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 290 (1867).
        A Mississippi statute which prohibited enforcement of a judgment 
of a sister State against a resident of Mississippi whenever barred by 
the Mississippi statute of limitations was violative of the full faith 
and credit clause of Art. IV.


[[Page 2043]]

49. The Kansas Indians, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 737 (1867).
        When a treaty with Indian tribes exempted their lands from levy, 
sale, and forefeiture, a State could not validly collect its tax on 
lands held in severalty by members of such tribes under patents issued 
them pursuant to such treaty. Tribal Indians thus recognized by the 
National Government are exempt from the jurisdiction of the State.

50. The New York Indians, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 761 (1867).
        A New York statute imposing a tax on lands reserved to an Indian 
tribe by treaty was void, notwithstanding provision therein that sale of 
land for nonpayment of the tax would not affect the right of occupancy 
by the Indians.

51. Steamship Company v. Portwardens, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 31 (1867).
        A Louisiana statute which provided that port wardens might 
collect, in addition to other fees, a tax of five dollars from every 
ship entering the port of New Orleans, whether any service was performed 
or not, was in conflict with the commerce clause of the Constitution 
(Art. I, Sec. 8, cl. 3).

52. Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35 (1868).
        A Nevada tax collected from every person leaving the State by 
rail or stage coach abridged the privileges of United States citizens to 
move freely across state lines in fulfillment of their relations with 
the National Government.

53. Bank v. Supervisors, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 26 (1868).
        New York tax could not be collected on United States notes 
expressly exempted from state taxation by federal law authorizing their 
issuance as legal tender.

54. Northern Central Ry. v. Jackson, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 262 (1869).
        Pennsylvania was without jurisdiction to enforce its law taxing 
interest on railway bonds secured by a mortgage applicable to railway 
property part of which was located in another State.

    Justices Concurring: Chase, C.J., Nelson, Davis, Field, Miller, 
Grier.

    Justices Dissenting: Clifford, Swayne.

55. The Belfast, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 624 (1869).
        Inasmuch as a shipper's lien under a contract of carriage 
between ports within the same State is a maritime lien enforceable by in 
rem proceedings exclusively within the admiralty jurisdiction of federal 
court, an Alabama law creating a maritime lien enforceable by in rem 
proceedings in its own courts was void.

56. Furman v. Nichol, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 44 (1869).
        Tennessee statute repealing prior law making notes of the Banks 
of Tennessee receivable in payment of taxes impaired the obligation of 
contract as to the notes already in circulation (Art. I, Sec. 10).


[[Page 2044]]

57. Home of the Friendless v. Rouse, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 430 (1869); The 
        Washington University v. Rouse, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 439 (1869).
        Missouri statute taxing corporations afforded tax exemption by 
their charter impaired the obligation of contract (Art. I, Sec. 10).

    Justices Concurring: Nelson, Clifford, Grier, Swayne, Davis.

    Justices Dissenting: Chase, C.J., Miller, Field.

58. State Tonnage Tax Cases, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 204 (1871).
        Alabama taxes levied on vessels owned by its citizens and 
employed in intrastate commerce ``at so much per ton of the registered 
tonnage'' were violative of the constitutional prohibition against the 
levy of tonnage duties by States.

59. Ward v. Maryland, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 418 (1871).
        Maryland law which exacted a traders' license from nonresidents 
at a higher rate than was collected from residents was violative of the 
privileges and immunities clause of Art. IV, Sec. 2.

60. Gibson v. Chouteau, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 92 (1872).
        State legislation cannot interfere with the disposition of the 
public domain by Congress, and therefore a Missouri statute of 
limitations, which was inapplicable to the United States, could not be 
applied so as to accord title to an adverse possessor as against a 
grantee from the United States, notwithstanding that the adverse 
possession preceded the federal conveyance.

    Justices Concurring: Field, Nelson, Swayne, Clifford, Miller, 
Bradley, Chase, C.J.

    Justices Dissenting: Davis, Strong.

61. Wilmington R.R. v. Reid, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 264 (1872).
        North Carolina statute which levied a tax on the franchise and 
property of a railroad which had been accorded tax exemption by the 
terms of its charter impaired the obligation of contract.

62. White v. Hart, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 646 (1872).
        Obligations of contracts clause (Art. I, Sec. 10) precluded 
reliance on a Georgia constitutional provision of 1868, prohibiting 
enforcement of any contract, the consideration for which was a slave, to 
defeat enforcement of a note based on such consideration and negotiated 
prior to adoption of said provision.

    Justices Concurring: Swayne, Nelson, Davis, Strong, Clifford, 
Miller, Field, Bradley.

    Justice Dissenting: Chase, C.J.

63. Accord: Osborne v. Nicholson, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 654 (1872), 
        invalidating a similar Arkansas constitutional provision adopted 
        in 1868.

    Justices Concurring: Swayne, Nelson, Davis, Strong, Clifford, 
Miller, Field, Bradley.

[[Page 2045]]


    Justice Dissenting: Chase, C.J.

64. Delmas v. Insurance Company, 81 U.S. (14 Wall.) 661 (1872).
        A Louisiana constitutional provision rendering unenforceable 
contracts, the consideration for which was Confederate money, was 
inapplicable, by reason of the obligation of contracts clause of the 
Federal Constitution (Art. I, Sec. 10) to contracts consummated before 
adoption of the former provision.

65. Case of the State Freight Tax, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 232 (1873).
        A Pennsylvania law which imposed a tax on freight transported 
interstate, into and out of Pennsylvania, was an invalid regulation of 
interstate commerce.

    Justices Concurring: Story, Chase, C.J., Clifford, Miller, Field, 
Bradley, Hunt.

    Justices Dissenting: Swayne, Davis.

66. State Tax on Foreign-Held Bonds, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 300 (1873).
        Pennsylvania law, so far as it directed domestic corporations to 
withhold on behalf of the State a portion of interest due on bonds owned 
by nonresidents, impaired the obligation of contract and denied due 
process by taxing property beyond its jurisdiction.

    Justices Concurring: Field, Chase, C.J., Bradley, Swayne, Strong.

    Justices Dissenting: Davis, Clifford, Miller, Hunt.

67. Gunn v. Barry, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 610 (1873).
        Georgia constitutional provision increasing amount of homestead 
exemption impaired the obligation of contract, insofar as it applied to 
a judgment obtained under a less liberal exemption provision.

68. Pierce v. Carskadon, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 234 (1873).
        A West Virginia Act of 1865, depriving defendants of right to 
rehearing on a judgment obtained under an earlier law unless they made 
oath that they had not committed certain offenses, constituted an 
invalid bill of attainder and ex post facto law.

    Justices Concurring: Field, Chase, C.J., Clifford, Miller, Swayne, 
Davis, Strong, Hunt.

    Justice Dissenting: Bradley.

69. Humphrey v. Pegues, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 244 (1873).
        South Carolina taxing laws, as applied to a railroad whose 
charter exempted it from taxation, impaired the obligation of contract.

70. Walker v. Whitehead, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 314 (1873).
        Georgia law restricting remedies for obtaining a judgment, so 
far as it affected prior contracts, impaired the obligation of contract.

71. Barings v. Dabney, 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) 1 (1873).
        South Carolina act appropriating for payment of state debts the 
assets of an insolvent bank, in which the State owned all the stock,

[[Page 2046]]
disadvantaged private creditors of the bank and thereby impaired the 
obligation of contract.

72. Peete v. Morgan, 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) 581 (1874).
        Texas act of 1870 imposing a tonnage tax on foreign vessels to 
defray quarantine expenses held violative of Art I, Sec. 10, prohibiting 
levy without consent of Congress.

73. Pacific R.R. v. Maguire, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 36 (1874).
        Missouri law which levied a tax on railroad prior to expiration 
of a grant of exemption impaired obligation of contract.

    Justices Concurring: Waite, C.J., Field, Bradley, Swayne, Davis, 
Hunt.

    Justices Dissenting: Clifford, Miller.

74. Insurance Co. v. Morse, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 445 (1874).
        Wisconsin act admitting foreign insurance companies to transact 
business within the State, upon their agreement not to remove suits to 
federal courts, exacted an unconstitutional condition.

    Justices Concurring: Clifford, Miller, Field, Bradley, Swayne, 
Strong, Hunt.

    Justices Dissenting: Waite, C.J., Davis.

75. Loan Association v. Topeka, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 655 (1875).
        Kansas act of 1872, authorizing municipalities to issue bonds 
repayable out of tax revenues in support of private enterprise, amounted 
to collection of money in aid of a private, rather than public purpose, 
and was violative of due process.

    Justices Concurring: Strong, Swayne, Davis, Waite, C.J., Miller, 
Field, Bradley.

    Justice Dissenting: Clifford.

76. Wilmington & Weldon R.R. v. King, 91 U.S. 3 (1875).
        North Carolina statute, insofar as it authorized a jury in suits 
on contracts--negotiated previously during the Civil War--to place their 
own estimates upon the value of the contract instead of taking the value 
stipulated by the parties, impaired the obligation of such contracts.

    Justices Concurring: Waite, C.J., Clifford, Miller, Field, Swayne, 
Davis, Strong, Hunt.

    Justice Dissenting: Bradley.

77. Welton v. Missouri, 91 U.S. 275 (1876).
        Missouri act which required payment of a license fee by peddlers 
of merchandise produced outside the State, but exempted peddlers of 
State-produced merchandise, imposed an unconstitutional burden on 
interstate commerce.

78. Morrill v. Wisconsin, 154 U.S. 626 (1877).
        Wisconsin statute void on basis of Welton v. Missouri.


[[Page 2047]]

79. Henderson v. Mayor of New York, 92 U.S. 259 (1876).
        New York act of 1849, which required owner of ocean-going 
passenger vessel to post bond of $300 for each passenger as surety 
against their becoming public charges, or, in lieu thereof, to pay a tax 
of $1.50 for each, contravened exclusive federal power to regulate 
foreign commerce.

80. Chy Lung v. Freeman, 92 U.S. 275 (1876).
        California law, which required master of vessel to post $500 
bond for each alien ``lewd and debauched female'' passenger landed, 
contravened the federal power to regulate foreign commerce.

81. Inman Steamship Co. v. Tinker, 94 U.S. 238 (1877).
        New York act of 1865, providing for collection from docking 
vessels of a fee measured by tonnage, imposed tonnage duty in violation 
of Art. I, Sec. 10.

82. Foster v. Masters of New Orleans, 94 U.S. 246 (1877).
        Louisiana statute requiring survey of hatches of every sea-going 
vessel arriving at New Orleans, contravened the federal power to 
regulate foreign and interstate commerce.

83. New Jersey v. Yard, 95 U.S. 104 (1877).
        Statute increasing tax above rate stipulated in State's contract 
with railroad corporations impaired the obligation of contract.

84. Railroad Co.v. Husen, 95 U.S. 465 (1878).
        Missouri act prohibiting the bringing of cattle into the State 
between March and November contravened the power of Congress over 
interstate commerce.

85. Hall v. DeCuir, 95 U.S. 485 (1878).
        Louisiana Reconstruction Act, prohibiting interstate common 
carriers of passengers from making any discrimination on the basis of 
race or color, held invalid as a regulation of interstate commerce.

86. Farrington v. Tennessee, 95 U.S. 679 (1878).
        Tennessee law increasing the tax on a bank above the rate 
specified in its charter, held to impair the obligation of that 
contract.

    Concurring: Justices Swayne, Miller, Hunt, Bradley, Harlan, and 
Chief Justice Waite.

    Dissenting: Justices Strong, Clifford, and Field.

87. Pensacola Tel. Co. v. Western Union Tel. Co., 96 U.S. 1 (1878).
        Florida legislative grant of a telegraphic monopoly held 
``inoperative'' as in conflict with a congressional act dealing with the 
construction of telegraph lines and based on its commerce and postal 
power.


[[Page 2048]]


    Concurring: Chief Justice Waite, Justices Clifford, Strong, Bradley, 
Swayne, and Miller.

    Dissenting: Justices Field, Hunt.

88. Edwards v. Kearzey, 96 U.S. 595 (1878).
        North Carolina constitutional provision increasing amount of 
debtor's property exempt from sale under execution of a judgment 
impaired the obligation of contracts negotiated prior to its adoption.

    Concurring: Chief Justice Waite, Justices Swayne, Bradley, Strong, 
Miller.

    Concurring specially: Justices Field, Hunt.

    Dissenting: Justice Harlan.

89. Keith v. Clark, 97 U.S. 454 (1878).
        Provision of the Tennessee Constitution of 1865, forbidding the 
receipt for taxes of the bills of the Bank of Tennessee and declaring 
the issues of the bank during the insurrectionary period void, held to 
impair the obligation of contract.

    Concurring: Justices Miller, Clifford, Strong, Hunt, Swayne, Field.

    Dissenting: Chief Justice Waite, Justices Bradley, Harlan.

90. Cook v. Pennsylvania, 97 U.S. 566 (1878).
        Pennsylvania act taxing auction sales, when applied to sales of 
imported goods in the original packages, was void as a duty on imports 
and a regulation of foreign commerce.

91. Northwestern University v. Illinois ex rel. Miller, 99 U.S. 309 
        (1878).
        Revenue law of Illinois, so far as it modified tax exemptions 
granted to Northwestern University by an earlier statute, impaired the 
obligation of contract.

92. Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880).
        West Virginia law barring Negroes from jury service violated the 
equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

    Concurring: Justices Strong, Miller, Hunt, Swayne, Bradley, Harlan, 
Chief Justice Waite.

    Dissenting: Justices Field, Clifford.

93. Guy v. Baltimore, 100 U.S. 434 (1880).
        Maryland statute and Baltimore ordinance, levying tax solely on 
products of other States, held to impose an invalid burden upon foreign 
and interstate commerce.

    Concurring: Justices Harlan, Hunt, Clifford, Strong, Miller, Swayne, 
Field, Bradley.

    Dissenting: Chief Justice Waite.

94. Tiernan v. Rinker, 102 U.S. 123 (1880).
        Texas statute, insofar as it levied occupational tax only upon 
sale of out-of-state beer and wine, was violative of the federal power 
to regulate foreign and interstate commerce.


[[Page 2049]]

95. Hartman v. Greenhow, 102 U.S. 672 (1880).
        Virginia act, adopted subsequently to law providing for issuance 
of bonds and acceptance of interest coupons thereon in full payment of 
taxes, which levied a new property tax collectible by way of deduction 
from such interest coupons, impaired the obligation of contract.

    Concurring: Justices Field, Clifford, Harlan, Strong, Hunt, Swayne, 
Bradley, Chief Justice Waite.

    Dissenting: Justice Miller.

96. Hall v. Wisconsin, 103 U.S. 5 (1880).
        Wisconsin act which repealed prior statute authorizing payment 
of fixed sum for performance of a contract to complete a geological 
survey, impaired the obligation of contract, notwithstanding that the 
second act was enacted prior to total fulfillment of the contract.

97. Webber v. Virginia, 103 U.S. 344 (1881).
        Virginia license acts, requiring a license for sale of goods 
made outside the State but not within the State, held in conflict with 
the commerce clause.

98. United States ex rel. Wolff v. New Orleans, 103 U.S. 358 (1881).
        Louisiana act withdrawing from New Orleans the power to levy 
taxes adequate to amortize previously issued bonds impaired the 
obligation of contract.

    Accord: Louisiana v. Pilsbury, 105 U.S. 278 (1881).

99. Asylum v. New Orleans, 105 U.S. 362 (1881).
        The general taxing laws for New Orleans when applied to the 
property of an asylum, whose charter exempted it from taxation, impaired 
the obligation of contract.

    Justices Concurring: Bradley, Waite, C.J., Woods, Gray, Harlan, 
Matthews, Blatchford.

    Justices Dissenting: Miller, Field.

100. Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Texas, 105 U.S. 460 (1882).
        Texas tax collected on private telegraph messages sent out of 
the State imposed an invalid burden on foreign and interstate commerce; 
and insofar as it was imposed on official messages sent by federal 
officers amounted to an unconstitutional burden on a federal 
instrumentality.

101. Ralls County Court v. United States, 105 U.S. 733 (1881).
        Missouri law which deprived a county of the taxing power 
requisite to meet interest payments on previously issued bonds impaired 
the obligation of contract.

102. Parkersburg v. Brown, 106 U.S. 487 (1882).
        West Virginia law authorizing a city to issue its bonds in aid 
of manufacturers was void by reason of sanctioning an expenditure of

[[Page 2050]]
public funds for a private purpose contrary to the requirements of due 
process.

103. New York v. Compagnie Gen. Transatlantique, 107 U.S. 59 (1882).
        New York law imposing a tax on every alien arriving from a 
foreign country, and holding the vessel liable for payment of the tax 
was an invalid regulation of foreign commerce.

104. Kring v. Missouri, 107 U.S. 221 (1883).
        A Missouri law which abolished a rule existing at the time the 
crime was committed, whereunder subsequent prosecution for first degree 
murder was precluded after conviction for second degree murder has been 
set aside on appeal, was void as an ex post facto law.

    Concurring: Justices Miller, Harlan, Field, Blatchford, Woods.

    Dissenting: Justices Matthews, Bradley, Gray, Chief Justice Waite.

105. Nelson v. St. Martin's Parish, 111 U.S. 716 (1884).
        Louisiana act repealing taxing authority of a municipality to 
pay judgments hitherto rendered against it impaired the obligation of 
contract.

106. Cole v. La Grange, 113 U.S. 1 (1885).
        Missouri act authorizing city to issue bonds in aid of 
manufacturing corporations was void by reason of sanctioning defrayment 
of public moneys for other than public purpose and depriving taxpayers 
of property without due process.

107. Gloucester Ferry Co. v. Pennsylvania, 114 U.S. 196 (1885).
        Pennsylvania taxing laws, when applied to the capital stock of a 
New Jersey ferry corporation carrying on no business in the State except 
the landing and receiving of passengers and freight, was void as a tax 
on interstate commerce.

108. Virginia Coupon Cases, 114 U.S. 269 (1885).
        Virginia act which terminated privilege accorded bondholders 
under prior law of tendering coupons from said bonds in payment of taxes 
impaired the obligation of contract (Art. I, Sec. 10).

    Concurring: Justices Matthews, Field, Harlan, Woods, Blatchford.

    Dissenting: Justices Bradley, Miller, Gray, Chief Justice Waite.

109. Effinger v. Kenney, 115 U.S. 566 (1885).
        Virginia Act of 1867, which provided that in suits to enforce 
contracts for the sale of property negotiated during the Civil War and 
payable in Confederate notes, the measure of recovery was to be the 
value of the land at the time of sale rather than the value of such 
notes at that time, impaired the obligation of contracts (Art. I, 
Sec. 10).


[[Page 2051]]

110. Louisville Gas Co. v. Citizens' Gas Co., 115 U.S. 683 (1885).
        Act of 1872 chartering and authorizing a corporation to supply 
gas in Louisville, Kentucky, impaired the obligation of contract 
resulting from the grant of an exclusive privilege to an older company 
in 1869.

111. Fisk v. Jefferson Police Jury, 116 U.S. 131 (1885).
        When a public officer has completed services (1871-1874), for 
which the compensation was fixed by law, an implied obligation to pay 
him at such rate arises, and such contract was impaired by a Louisiana 
constitutional provision of 1880 which reduced the taxing power of a 
parish to such extent as to deprive the officer of any effective means 
of collecting the sum due him.

112. Mobile v. Watson, 116 U.S. 289 (1886).
        Alabama law which deprived Mobile and its successor of the power 
to levy taxes sufficient to amortize previously issued bonds impaired 
the obligation of contracts.

113. Walling v. Michigan, 116 U.S. 446 (1886).
        Michigan law taxing nonresidents soliciting sale of foreign 
liquors to be shipped into the State imposed an invalid restraint on 
interstate commerce.

114. Royall v. Virginia, 116 U.S. 572 (1886).
        When a Virginia law provided that coupons on state bonds were 
acceptable in payment of state fees, subsequent law requiring legal 
tender in payment of a professional license fee impaired the obligation 
of contract between the coupon holder and the State and also voided 
invocation of another law imposing penalty for practice without a 
license (refused for want of payment in legal tender).

115. Pickard v. Pullman Southern Car Co., 117 U.S. 34 (1886).
        Tennessee privilege tax on railway sleeping cars was void 
insofar as it applied to cars moving in interstate commerce.

116. Van Brocklin v. Tennessee, 117 U.S. 151 (1886).
        A State cannot validly sell for taxes lands which the United 
States owned at the time the taxes were levied, but in which it ceased 
to have an interest at the time of sale (Art. VI).

117. Sprague v. Thompson, 118 U.S. 90 (1886).
        Georgia law requiring out-of-state coastal vessels, subject to 
certain discriminating exemptions, to take on a pilot upon entering 
Georgia ports, was void by reason of conflict with federal pilotage law.


[[Page 2052]]

118. Wabash, St. L. & P. Ry. v. Illinois, 118 U.S. 557 (1886).
        Illinois law, prohibiting long-short haul rate discrimination, 
when applied to interstate transportation, encroached upon the federal 
commerce power.

    Concurring: Justices Miller, Field, Harlan, Woods, Matthews, 
Blatchford.

    Dissenting: Justices Bradley, Gray, Chief Justice Waite.

119. Robbins v. Shelby Taxing District, 120 U.S. 489 (1887).
        Tennessee law taxing drummers not operating from a domestic 
licensed place of business, insofar as it applied to drummers soliciting 
sales of goods on behalf of out-of-state business firms, was an invalid 
regulation of interstate commerce.

    Concurring: Justices Bradley, Miller, Harlan, Woods, Matthews, 
Blatchford.

    Dissenting: Chief Justice Waite, Justices Gray, Field.

120. Corson v. Maryland, 120 U.S. 502 (1887).
        Maryland law licensing salesmen, insofar as it was applied to a 
New York resident soliciting orders on behalf of a New York firm, was an 
invalid regulation of interstate commerce.

121. Barron v. Burnside, 121 U.S. 186 (1887).
        Iowa law, conditioning admission of a foreign corporation to do 
local business on surrender of right to invoke the diversity of 
citizenship jurisdiction of federal courts exacted an invalid forfeiture 
of a constitutional right.

122. Fargo v. Michigan, 121 U.S. 230 (1887).
        Michigan act, insofar as it taxed the gross receipts of 
companies and corporations engaged in interstate commerce, was held to 
be in conflict with the commerce powers of Congress.

123. Seibert v. Lewis, 122 U.S. 284 (1887).
        Missouri law requiring certain petitions, not exacted when 
county bonds were issued, before taxes could be levied to amortize said 
bonds, impaired the obligation of contracts.

124. Philadelphia Steamship Co. v. Pennsylvania, 122 U.S. 326 (1887).
        Pennsylvania gross receipts tax on public utilities, insofar as 
it was applied to the gross receipts of a domestic corporation derived 
from transportation of persons and property on the high seas, was in 
conflict with the exclusive federal power to regulate foreign and 
interstate commerce.

125. Western Union Tel. Co. v. Pendleton, 122 U.S. 347 (1887).
        Indiana statute concerning the delivery of telegrams, so far as 
applied to deliveries sent from Indiana to other States, was an invalid 
regulation of commerce.


[[Page 2053]]

126. Bowman v. Chicago & Nw. Ry., 125 U.S. 465 (1888).
        Iowa liquor statute requiring interstate carriers to procure a 
certificate from the auditor of the county of destination before 
bringing liquor into the State, was violative of the commerce clause.

    Concurring: Justices Matthews, Field (separately), Miller, Bradley, 
Blatchford.

    Dissenting: Justices Harlan, Gray, Chief Justice Waite.

127. Western Union Tel. Co. v. Massachusetts, 125 U.S. 530 (1888).
        Massachusetts law, authorizing an injunction to restrain tax 
delinquents from doing business until payments are made, could not be 
validly invoked to restrain a telegraph company operating lines over 
United States military and post roads pursuant to federal authorization.

128. California v. Pacific R.R., 127 U.S. 1 (1888).
        Unless Congress consents, a state tax, levied on the franchise 
of interstate railway corporations chartered by Congress pursuant to its 
commerce power, is void.

129. Ratterman v. Western Union Tel. Co., 127 U.S. 411 (1888).
        An Ohio law which levied a tax on the receipts of a telegraph 
company was invalid to the extent that part of such receipts levied on 
were derived from interstate commerce.

130. Asher v. Texas, 128 U.S. 129 (1888).
        By reason of conflict with the federal power to regulate 
interstate commerce, a Texas law which imposed a license tax on drummers 
could not validly be enforced against one who solicited orders for the 
purchase of merchandise from out-of-state sellers.

131. Stoutenburgh v. Hennick, 129 U.S. 141 (1889).
        Clause of the District act requiring commercial agents selling 
by sample to pay a license tax, held a regulation of interstate commerce 
when applied to agents soliciting purchases on behalf of principals 
outside of the District of Columbia.

    Concurring: Chief Justice Fuller, Justices Field, Bradley, Harlan, 
Matthews, Gray, Blatchford, Lamar.

    Dissenting: Justice Miller.

132. Western Union Tel. Co. v. Alabama, 132 U.S. 472 (1889).
        Alabama tax law, as applied to revenue of telegraph company made 
by sending messages outside the State, was held to be an invalid 
regulation of commerce.

133. Medley, Petitioner, 134 U.S. 160 (1890).
        Colorado law, when applied to a person convicted of a murder 
committed prior to the enactment and which increased the penalty to be 
imposed, was void as an ex post facto law.


[[Page 2054]]


    Concurring: Justices Miller, Field, Harlan, Gray, Blatchford, Lamar, 
Chief Justice Fuller.

    Dissenting: Justices Brewer, Bradley.

134. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. v. Minnesota, 134 U.S. 418 (1890).
        State rate regulatory law which empowered a commission to 
establish rate schedules that were final and not subject to judicial 
review as to their reasonableness was violative of the due process and 
equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment.

    Concurring: Justices Blatchford, Miller, Field, Harlan, Brewer, 
Chief Justice Fuller.

    Dissenting: Justices Bradley, Gray, Lamar.

135. Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U.S. 100 (1890).
        Iowa prohibition law, enforced as to an interstate shipment of 
liquor in the original packages or kegs, was violative of the federal 
power to regulate interstate commerce.

    Concurring: Chief Justice Fuller, Justices Miller, Field, Bradley, 
Blatchford, Lamar.

    Dissenting: Justices Gray, Harlan, Brewer.

136. Lyng v. Michigan, 135 U.S. 161 (1890).
        Michigan statute taxing sale of imported liquor in original 
package, held invalid regulation of interstate commerce.

    Concurring: Chief Justice Fuller, Justices Miller, Field, Bradley, 
Blatchford, Lamar.

    Dissenting: Justices Gray, Harlan, Brewer.

137. McGahey v. Virginia, 135 U.S. 662 (1890).
        Virginia acts which stipulated that if the genuineness of 
coupons tendered in payment of taxes was in issue, the bond from which 
the coupon was cut must be produced, which precluded use of expert 
testimony to establish the genuineness of the coupons, and which, in 
suits for payment of taxes, imposed on the defendant tendering coupons 
as payment the burden of establishing the validity of said coupons, were 
deemed to abridge the remedies available to the bondholders so 
materially as to impair the obligation of contract.

138. Norfolk & Western R.R. v. Pennsylvania, 136 U.S. 114 (1890).
        Pennsylvania act, imposing a license tax on foreign corporation 
common carrier doing business in the State, was held to be invalid as a 
tax on interstate commerce.

    Concurring: Justices Lamar, Miller, Field, Bradley, Harlan, 
Blatchford.

    Dissenting: Chief Justice Fuller, Justices Gray, Brewer.

139. Minnesota v. Barber, 136 U.S. 313 (1890).
        Minnesota statute, which made it illegal to offer for sale any 
meat other than that taken from animals passed by state inspectors,

[[Page 2055]]
held to discriminate against meat producers from other States and to 
place an undue burden upon interstate commerce.

140. Brimmer v. Rebman, 138 U.S. 78 (1891).
        Virginia statute prohibiting sale of meat killed 100 miles or 
more from place of sale, unless it was first inspected in Virginia, held 
void as interference with interstate commerce and imposing a 
discriminatory tax.

141. Pennoyer v. McConnaughy, 140 U.S. 1 (1891).
        Oregon act of 1887 which voided all certificates for the sale of 
public land unless 20% of the purchase price had been paid prior to 1879 
altered the terms of purchase provided under preexisting law and 
therefore impaired the obligations of the contract.

142. Crutcher v. Kentucky, 141 U.S. 47 (1891).
        Kentucky law, which required license from foreign express 
corporation agents before doing business in the State, was held invalid 
under the commerce clause.

    Concurring: Justices Bradley, Field, Harlan, Blatchford, Lamar, 
Brewer.

    Dissenting: Chief Justice Fuller, Justice Gray.

143. Voight v. Wright, 141 U.S. 62 (1891).
        Virginia statute which required state inspection of all but 
domestic flour held invalid under commerce clause.

144. Mobile & Ohio R.R. v. Tennessee, 153 U.S. 486 (1894).
        Tennessee statutes which levied taxes on a railroad company 
enjoying tax exemption under an earlier charter impaired the obligation 
of contract.

    Concurring: Justices Jackson, Field, Harlan, Brown, White.

    Dissenting: Chief Justice Fuller, Justices Gray, Brewer, Shiras.

145. New York, L. E. & W. R.R. v. Pennsylvania, 153 U.S. 628 (1894).
        Pennsylvania act of 1885 which required a New York corporation, 
when paying interest in New York City on its outstanding securities, to 
withhold a Pennsylvania tax levied on resident owners of such securities 
was violative of due process by reason of its application to property 
beyond the jurisdiction of Pennsylvania. The act also impaired the 
obligation of contracts by increasing the conditions originally exacted 
of the railroad in return for permission to construct and operate over 
trackage in Pennsylvania.

146. Covington & Cincinnati Bridge Co. v. Kentucky, 154 U.S. 204 (1894).
        Kentucky act regulating toll rates on bridge across the Ohio 
River held unconstitutional regulation of interstate commerce.

    Concurring: Justices Brown, Harlan, Brewer, Shiras, Jackson.
    
[[Page 2056]]


    Dissenting: Chief Justice Fuller, Justices Field, Gray, White.

147. Gulf, C. & S. F. Ry. v. Hefley, 158 U.S. 98 (1895).
        Texas statute regulating railroad rates, when applied to 
interstate freight transportation, was held to conflict with Interstate 
Commerce Act.

148. Bank of Commerce v. Tennessee, 161 U.S. 134 (1896).
        Tennessee revenue laws which imposed a tax on stock beyond that 
stipulated under the provision of a state charter held to impair the 
obligation of contracts.

149. Barnitz v. Beverly, 163 U.S. 118 (1896).
        Kansas law granting to mortgagor a right, not existent when the 
mortgage was negotiated, namely, a right to redeem foreclosed property, 
impaired the obligation of contracts.

150. Illinois Central R.R. v. Illinois, 163 U.S. 142 (1896).
        Illinois statute required railroad to run New Orleans train into 
Cairo and back to mail line, although there was already adequate service 
to Cairo. This requirement was held to be an unconstitutional 
obstruction of interstate commerce and of passage of United States 
mails.

151. Missouri Pacific Ry. v. Nebraska, 164 U.S. 403 (1896).
        A railroad was deprived of property without due process of law 
by a Nebraska statute which compelled it to permit a third party to 
erect a grain elevator on its right of way.

152. Scott v. Donald, 165 U.S. 58 (1897).
        South Carolina act regulating sale of alcoholic beverages 
exclusively at state dispensaries, when enforced against a resident 
importing out-of-state liquor, constituted an invalid discriminatory 
regulation of interstate commerce.

    Concurring: Justices Shiras, Field, Harlan, Gray, White, Peckham, 
Fuller.

    Dissenting: Justice Brown.

153. Gulf, C. & S. F. Ry. v. Ellis, 165 U.S. 150 (1897).
        Texas law which required railroads to pay court costs and 
attorneys' fees to litigants successfully prosecuting claims against 
them deprived the railroads of due process and equal protection of the 
law.

    Concurring: Justices Brewer, Field, Harlan, Brown, Shiras, Peckham.

    Dissenting: Justices Gray, White, Chief Juxtice Fuller.

154. Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578 (1897).
        Louisiana law imposing penalty for soliciting contract of 
insurance on behalf of insurers which have not complied with Louisiana 
law effected a denial of liberty of contract contrary to due process

[[Page 2057]]
when applied to an insurance contract negotiated in New York with a New 
York company and with premiums and losses to be paid in New York.

155. Smyth v. Ames, 169 U.S. 466 (1898).
        Nebraska statute setting intrastate freight rates held to impose 
rates so low as to be unreasonable and to amount to a deprivation of 
property without due process of law.

156. Houston & Texas Central Ry. v. Texas, 170 U.S. 243 (1898).
        Texas constitutional provision, as enforced to recover certain 
sections of land held by a railroad company under a previous legislative 
grant, judged an impairment of obligation of contract.

157. Thompson v. Utah, 170 U.S. 343 (1898).
        Provision in Utah constitution, providing for the trial of non-
capital criminal cases in courts of general jurisdiction by a jury of 
eight persons, held an ex post facto law applied to felonies committed 
before the territory became a State.

    Concurring: Justices Harlan, Gray, Brown, Shiras, White, McKenna, 
Chief Juxtice Fuller.

    Dissenting: Justices Brewer, Peckham.

158. Schollenberger v. Pennsylvania, 171 U.S. 1 (1898).
        Pennsylvania law which prohibited the manufacture and sale of 
oleomargarine was invalid to the extent that it prohibited interstate 
importation and resale of oleomargarine in original packages.

    Concurring: Chief Justice Fuller, Justices Brewer, Brown, Shiras, 
White, Peckham, McKenna.

    Dissenting: Justices Gray, Harlan.

159. Collins v. New Hampshire, 171 U.S. 30 (1898).
        New Hampshire law which prohibited the sale of oleomargarine 
unless it was pink in color, was invalid as an arbitrary means of 
rendering the product unmarketable and also could not be enforced to 
prevent the interstate transportation and resale of oleomargarine 
produced in another State and not colored pink.

    Concurring: Chief Justice Fuller, Justices Brewer, Brown, Shiras, 
White, Peckham, McKenna.

    Dissenting: Justices Harlan, Gray.

160. Blake v. McClung, 172 U.S. 239 (1898).
        Tennessee acts which granted Tennessee creditors priority over 
non-resident creditors having claims against foreign corporations 
admitted to do local business infringed the privileges and immunities 
clause of Art. IV, Sec. 2.

    Concurring: Justices Harlan, Gray, Brown, Shiras, White, McKenna, 
Peckham.

[[Page 2058]]


    Dissenting: Justice Brewer, Chief Justice Fuller.

161. Norwood v. Baker, 172 U.S. 269 (1898).
        The exaction, as authorized by Ohio law, from the owner of 
property, via special assessment, of the cost of a public improvement in 
substantial excess of the benefits accruing to him amounted to a taking 
of property for public use without compensation and was violative of due 
process.

    Concurring: Justices Harlan, Brown, White, Peckham, McKenna, Chief 
Justice Fuller.

    Dissenting: Justices Brewer, Gray, Shiras.

162. Dewey v. Des Moines, 173 U.S. 193 (1899).
        Nonresident owner of property in Iowa was deprived of property 
without due process when the State, without having acquired personal 
jurisdiction via service of process, subjected him to a personal 
liability to pay a special assessment in conformity with a statute 
invalidly authorizing imposition of liability in such manner.

163. Ohio v. Thomas, 173 U.S. 276 (1899).
        Ohio statute which regulated the use of oleomargarine in the 
State held void as applied to a soldiers' home in Ohio created by 
Congress and administered as a federal institution.

164. Lake Shore & Mich. So. Ry. v. Smith, 173 U.S. 684 (1899).
        Michigan act which required railroads to sell 1,000-mile tickets 
at a fixed price in favor of the purchaser, his wife, and children, with 
provisions for forfeiture if presented by any other person in payment of 
fare, and for expiration within two years, subject to redemption of 
unused portion and collection of 3 cents per mile already traveled, 
effected a taking of property without due process and a denial of equal 
protection.

    Concurring: Justices Peckham, Harlan, Brewer, Brown, Shiras, White.

    Dissenting: Chief Justice Fuller, Justices Gray, McKenna.

165. Houston & Texas Central R.R. v. Texas, 177 U.S. 66 (1900).
        Subsequent repeal of a Texas statute which permitted treasury 
warrants to be given to the State for payment of interest on bonds 
issued by a railroad and held by the State, with accompanying endeavor 
to hold the railroad liable for back interest paid on the warrants, was 
invalid by reason of impairment of the obligation of contract.

166. Cleveland, C. C. & St. L. Ry. v. Illinois, 177 U.S. 514 (1900).
        Illinois law which required all regular passenger trains to stop 
at county seats for receipt and discharge of passengers imposed an 
invalid burden on interstate commerce when applied to an express train 
serving only through passengers between New York and St. Louis.


[[Page 2059]]

167. Stearns v. Minnesota, 179 U.S. 223 (1900).
        State statute repealing all former tax exemption laws and 
providing for the taxation of lands granted to railroads held to impair 
the obligation of contracts.

   Duluth & I. R.R. v. St. Louis County, 179 U.S. 302 (1900).
        Act of Minnesota legislature providing ways in which railroad 
corporations could discharge property taxes held void under the ruling 
in Stearns v. Minnesota.

168. Cotting v. Kansas City Stock Yards Co., 183 U.S. 79 (1901).
        Kansas statute, regulating public stock yards, violates the 
equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment in that it applied 
only to one stockyard company in the State.

169. Louisville & Nashville R.R. v. Eubank, 184 U.S. 27 (1902).
        Section of Kentucky constitution on long and short haul railroad 
rates held invalid where interstate shipments were involved.

    Concurring: Justices Peckham, Harlan, Brown, Shiras, White, McKenna, 
Chief Justice Fuller.

    Dissenting: Justices Brewer, Gray.

170. Connolly v. Union Sewer Pipe Co., 184 U.S. 540 (1902).
        Act of Illinois, which regulated monopolies but exempted 
agricultural products and livestock in the hands of the producer from 
the operation of the law, held to deny the equal protection of the laws.

    Concurring: Justices Harlan, Brewer, Brown, Shiras, White, Peckham, 
Chief Justice Fuller.

    Dissenting: Justice McKenna.

171. Stockard v. Morgan, 185 U.S. 27 (1902).
        Tennessee license tax on agent soliciting and selling by sample 
for company in another State held invalid regulation of commerce.

172. Louisville & J. Ferry Co. v. Kentucky, 188 U.S. 385 (1903).
        An Indiana franchise granted to a Kentucky corporation for 
operating a ferry from the Indiana to the Kentucky shore had its tax 
situs in Indiana; and, accordingly, Kentucky lacked jurisdiction with 
the result that its law which authorized a levy thereon effected a 
deprivation of property without due process of law.

    Concurring: Justices Harlan, Brewer, Brown, White, Peckham, McKenna, 
Holmes.

    Dissenting: Justice Shiras, Chief Justice Fuller.

173. The Roanoke, 189 U.S. 185 (1903).
        Washington law which accorded contractor or subcontractor a lien 
on a foreign vessel for work done and which made no provision for 
protection of owner in event contractor was fully paid before notice of

[[Page 2060]]
subcontractor's lien was received deprived the owner of normal defenses 
and constituted an invalid interference with admiralty jurisdiction 
exclusively vested in federal courts by Art. III.

174. The Robert W. Parsons, 191 U.S. 17 (1903).
        New York statutes giving a lien for repairs upon vessels and 
providing for the enforcement of such liens by proceedings in rem, held 
void as in conflict with the exclusive admiralty and maritime 
jurisdiction of the federal courts.

    Concurring: Justices Brown, White, McKenna, Holmes, Day.

    Dissenting: Justices Brewer, Peckham, Harlan, Chief Justice Fuller.

175. Allen v. Pullman Company, 191 U.S. 171 (1903).
        Tennessee tax of $500 per year per pullman car, when applied to 
cars moving in interstate as well as intrastate commerce, imposed an 
invalid burden on interstate commerce.

176. Bradley v. Lightcap, 195 U.S. 1 (1904).
        Illinois law, passed after a mortgage was executed, which 
provided that if a mortgagee did not obtain a deed within five years 
after the period of redemption had lapsed, he lost the estate (whereas 
under the law existing when the mortgage was executed, failure by the 
mortgagee to take out a deed had no effect on the title of the mortgagee 
against the mortgagor) was held void as impairing the obligation of 
contract and depriving the mortgagee of property rights without due 
process.

177. Central of Georgia Ry. v. Murphey, 196 U.S. 194 (1905).
        Sections of Georgia code, imposing the duty on common carriers 
of reporting on the shipment of freight to the shipper, held void when 
applied to interstate shipments.

178. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
        New York law establishing 10-hour day in bakeries was violative 
of due process by reason of interfering with the employees' freedom to 
contract in relation to their labor.

    Concurring: Justices Peckham, Brewer, Brown, McKenna, Fuller.

    Dissenting: Justices Harlan, White, Day, Holmes (separately).

179. Union Transit Co. v. Kentucky, 199 U.S. 194 (1905).
        Inasmuch as tangible personal property acquires a tax situs in 
the State where it is permanently located, attempt by Kentucky, in which 
the owner was domiciled, to tax railway cars located in Indiana, was 
void and amounted to a deprivation of property without due process.

    Concurring: Justices Brown, Harlan, Brewer, Peckham, McKenna, Day.

    Dissenting: Justices Holmes, White, Chief Justice Fuller.


[[Page 2061]]


180. Houston & Texas Central R.R. v. Mayes, 201 U.S. 321 (1906).
        Texas statute exacting of an interstate railroad an absolute 
requirement that it furnish a certain number of cars on a given day to 
transport merchandise to another State imposed an invalid, unreasonable 
burden on interstate commerce.

    Concurring: Justices Brewer, Brown, Peckham, Holmes, Day.

    Dissenting: Justices Harlan, McKenna, Chief Justice Fuller.

181. Powers v. Detroit & Grand Haven Ry., 201 U.S. 543 (1906).
        When a railroad is reorganized under a special act but no new 
corporation is chartered, tax concession granted by such act amounted to 
a contract which could not be impaired by subsequent enactment which 
purported to alter the rate of the tax.

    Concurring: Justices Brewer, Harlan, Brown, Peckham, McKenna, 
Holmes, Day, Chief Justice Fuller.

    Dissenting: Justice White.

182. Vicksburg v. Vicksburg Waterworks Co., 202 U.S. 453 (1906).
        A water company owning an exclusive franchise to supply a city 
with water was entitled to an injunction restraining impairment of such 
contract by attempted erection by city of its own water system pursuant 
to Mississippi statutory authorization.

    Concurring: Justices Day, Brewer, Brown, White, Peckham, McKenna, 
Holmes, Chiwf Justice Fuller.

    Dissenting: Justice Harlan.

183. American Smelting Co. v. Colorado, 204 U.S. 103 (1907).
        A statute stipulating that foreign corporations, as a condition 
for admission to do business, pay a fee based on their capital stock 
whereupon they would be subjected to all the liabilities and 
restrictions imposed upon domestic corporations amounted to a contract, 
the obligation of which was invalidly impaired by a later statute which 
imposed higher annual license fees on foreign corporations admitted 
under the preceding terms than were levied on domestic corporations, 
whose corporate existence had not expired.

    Concurring: Justices Peckham, Brewer, White, McKenna, Day.

    Dissenting: Justices Harlan, Holmes, Moody, Chief Justice Fuller.

184. Home Savings Bank v. Des Moines, 205 U.S. 503 (1907).
        A state law levying a tax on a state bank, assessed on its 
shares measured by the value of its capital, surplus, and individual 
earnings, was void insofar as the assessment embraced federal bonds 
owned by the bank and was in conflict with a federal enactment exempting 
such bonds from state taxes.

    Concurring: Justices Moody, Brewer, White, McKenna, Holmes, Day.

    Dissenting: Chief Justice Fuller, Justices Harlan, Peckham.


[[Page 2062]]


185. Adams Express Co. v. Kentucky, 206 U.S. 129 (1907).
        Kentucky law proscribing C.O.D. shipments of liquor, providing 
that the place where the money is paid or the goods delivered shall be 
deemed to be the place of sale, and making the carrier jointly liable 
with the vendor was, as applied to interstate shipments, an invalid 
regulation of interstate commerce.

    Concurring: Justices Brewer, Holmes, Peckham, Moody, White, Day, 
McKenna, Chief Justice Fuller.

    Dissenting: Justice Harlan.

        Accord: American Express Co. v. Kentucky, 206 U.S. 139 (1907).

186. Central of Georgia Ry. v. Wright, 207 U.S. 127 (1907).
        Georgia statutory assessment procedure which afforded taxpayer 
no opportunity to be heard as to valuation of property not returned by 
him under honest belief that it was not taxable and which permitted him 
to challenge the assessment only for fraud and corruption was violative 
of the due process requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment.

187. Darnell & Son v. Memphis, 208 U.S. 113 (1908).
        Tennessee tax law which exempted domestic crops and manufactured 
products while extending the levy to like products of out-of-state 
origin imposed an invalid burden on interstate commerce.

188. Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
        Minnesota railroad rate statute which imposed such excessive 
penalties that parties affected were deterred from testing its validity 
in the courts denied a railroad the equal protection of the laws.

189. Galveston, H. & S.A. Ry. v. Texas, 210 U.S. 217 (1908).
        Texas gross receipts tax insofar as it was levied on railroad 
receipts which included income derived from interstate commerce was 
invalid by reason of imposing a burden on interstate commerce.

    Concurring: Justices Holmes, Brewer, Peckham, Day, Moody.

    Dissenting: Justices Harlan, White, McKenna, Chief Justice Fuller.

190. Willcox v. Consolidated Gas Co., 212 U.S. 19 (1909).
        New York law which required a public utility to perform its 
service in such a manner that its entire plant would have to be rebuilt 
at a cost on which no return could be obtained under the rates fixed 
unconstitutionally deprived the utility of its property without due 
process.

191. Louisville & Nashville R.R. v. Stock Yards Co., 212 U.S. 132 
        (1909).
        Kentucky constitutional provision which required a carrier to 
deliver its cars to connecting carriers without providing adequate 
protection for their return or compensation for their use effected an 
invalid taking of property without due process of law.


[[Page 2063]]


    Concurring: Justices Holmes, Brewer, White, Peckham, Day, Chief 
Justice Fuller.

    Dissenting: Justices McKenna, Harlan, Moody.

192. Nielson v. Oregon, 212 U.S. 315 (1909).
        For want of jurisdiction, Oregon could not validly prosecute as 
a violator of its law prohibiting the use of purse nets one who, 
pursuant to a license from Washington, used such a net on the Washington 
side of the Columbia River.

193. Adams Express Co. v. Kentucky, 214 U.S. 218 (1909).
        Kentucky law proscribing the sale of liquor to an inebriate, as 
applied to a carrier delivering liquor to such person from another 
State, was void by reason of conflict with the commerce clause.

    Concurring: Justices Brewer, Holmes, Peckham, Moody, White, Day, 
McKenna, Chief Justice Fuller.

    Dissenting: Justice Harlan.

194. Louisiana ex rel. Hubert v. Orleans, 215 U.S. 170 (1909).
        Louisiana act of 1870 providing for registration and collection 
of judgments against New Orleans, so far as it delayed payment, or 
collection of taxes for payment, of contract claims existing before its 
passage, effected an invalid impairment of the obligation of such 
contracts.

195. North Dakota ex rel. Flaherty v. Hanson, 215 U.S. 515 (1910).
        North Dakota statute which required the recipient of a federal 
retail liquor license, solely because of payment therefor and without 
reference to the doing of any act within North Dakota, to publish 
official notices of the terms of such license and of the place where it 
is posted, to display on his premises an affidavit confirming such 
publication, and to file an authenticated copy of such federal license 
together with a $10 fee was void for imposing a burden on the federal 
taxing power.

    Concurring: Justices White, Harlan, Brewer, Day.

    Dissenting: Chief Justice Fuller, Justices McKenna, Holmes.

196. Western Union Tel. Co. v. Kansas, 216 U.S. 1 (1910).
        Kansas statute imposing a charter fee, computed as a percentage 
of authorized capital stock, on corporations for the privilege of doing 
business in Kansas could not validly be collected from a foreign 
corporation engaged in interstate commerce, and also was violative of 
due process insofar as it was imposed on property, part of which was 
located beyond the limits of that State.

    Concurring: Justices Harlan, Brewer, White (separately), Day, Moody.

    Dissenting: Justices Holmes, McKenna, Peckham, Chief Justice Fuller.


[[Page 2064]]


197. Ludwig v. Western Union Tel. Co., 216 U.S. 146 (1910).
        Arkansas law which required a foreign corporation engaged in 
interstate commerce to pay, as a license fee for doing an intrastate 
business, a given amount of its entire capital stock, whether employed 
in Arkansas or elsewhere, was void by reason of imposing a burden on 
interstate commerce and embracing property outside the jurisdiction of 
the State.

    Concurring: Justices Harlan, Moody, Lurton, White, Day, Brewer.

    Dissenting: Chief Justice Fuller, Justices McKenna, Holmes.

198. Southern Ry. v. Greene, 216 U.S. 400 (1910).
        Alabama law which imposed on foreign corporations already 
admitted to do business an additional franchise or privilege tax not 
levied on domestic corporations exposed the foreign corporations to 
denial of equal protection of the laws.

    Concurring: Justices Day, Harlan, Brewer, White.

    Dissenting: Chief Justice Fuller, Justices McKenna, Holmes.

199. International Textbook Co. v. Pigg, 217 U.S. 91 (1910).
        Kansas, which by law exacted of foreign corporations engaged in 
interstate commerce the following conditions for admission and retention 
of the right to do business in that State, namely, procurement of a 
license, submission of an annual financial statement, and which 
prohibited them from filing actions in Kansas courts unless such 
conditions were met, imposed an unconstitutional burden on interstate 
commerce.

    Concurring: Justices Harlan, White, Holmes, Day, Lurton.

    Dissenting: Chief Justice, Fuller, Justice McKenna.

200. St. Louis S.W. Ry. v. Arkansas, 217 U.S. 136 (1910).
        Arkansas law, and commission order issued under the authority 
thereof, which required an interstate carrier, upon application of a 
local shipper, to deliver promptly the number of freight cars requested 
for loading purposes and which, without regard to the effect of such 
demand on its interstate traffic, exposed it to severe penalties for 
noncompliance, imposed an invalid, unreasonable burden on interstate 
commerce. The rules of the American Railway Association as to 
availability of a member carrier's cars for interstate shipments being a 
matter of federal regulation, it was beyond the power of a state court 
to pass on their sufficiency.

    Concurring: Justices White, Harlan, McKenna, Holmes, Day, Lurton.

    Dissenting: Chief Justice Fuller.

201. Missouri Pacific Ry. v. Nebraska, 217 U.S. 196 (1910).
        Nebraska law compelling railroad, at its own expense, and upon 
request of grain elevator operators, to install switches connecting

[[Page 2065]]
such elevators with its right of way deprived the carrier of property 
without due process of law.

    Concurring: Justices Holmes, White, Day, Lurton, Chief Justice 
Fuller.

    Dissenting: Justices Harlan, McKenna.

202. Dozier v. Alabama, 218 U.S. 124 (1910).
        Alabama law which imposed license tax on agents, not having a 
permanent place of business in that State and soliciting orders for the 
purchase and delivery of pictures and frames manufactured in, and 
delivered from, another State, with the title remaining in the vendor 
until the agent collected the purchase price, imposed an invalid burden 
on interstate commercial transactions.

203. Herndon v. Chicago, R.I. & P. Ry., 218 U.S. 135 (1910).
        When a railroad already has provided adequate accommodations at 
any point, a Missouri regulation which required interstate trains to 
stop at such point imposed an invalid, unreasonable burden on interstate 
commerce. Also, a Missouri law which forfeited the right of an admitted 
foreign carrier to do a local business upon its instituting a right of 
action in a federal court extracted an unconstitutional condition.

204. Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 219 (1911).
        Alabama law which made a refusal to perform labor contracted 
for, without return of money or property advanced under the contract, 
prima facie evidence of fraud and which was enforced under local rules 
of evidence which precluded one accused thereof from testifying as to 
uncommunicated motives was an invalid peonage law proscribed by the 
Thirteenth Amendment.

    Concurring: Justices Hughes, Lamar, Harlan, Day, Van Devanter, 
McKenna, Chief Justice White.

    Dissenting: Justices Holmes, Lurton.

205. Oklahoma v. Kansas Nat. Gas. Co., 221 U.S. 229 (1911).
        Oklahoma law which withheld from foreign corporations engaged in 
interstate commerce a privilege afforded domestic corporations engaged 
in local commerce, namely, of building pipe lines across its highways 
and transporting to points outside its boundaries natural gas extracted 
and reduced to possession therein, was invalid as a restraint on 
interstate commerce and as a deprivation of property without due process 
of law.

    Concurring: Justices McKenna, Harlan, Day, Van Devanter, Lamar, 
Chief Justice White.

    Dissenting: Justices Holmes, Lurton, Hughes.

206. Berryman v. Whitman College, 222 U.S. 334 (1912).
        Although the federal organic act of 1867 forbade the Washington 
territorial legislature from granting tax exemption privileges to pri

[[Page 2066]]
vate corporations, the territorial acts of 1859, as amended by an act of 
1883 which accorded a tax exemption to Whitman College, gave rise to a 
contract which was impaired by the act of the state legislature, enacted 
in 1905, subjecting the college to taxation.

207. Northern Pacific Ry. v. Washington, 222 U.S. 370 (1912).
        Consistent with doctrine of national supremacy and preemption, 
state laws, including one of the State of Washington, regulating hours 
of service embracing employees of interstate carriers, became 
inoperative immediately upon the adoption of the Federal Hours of 
Service Law notwithstanding that the latter did not go into effect until 
a year after its passage.

208. Southern Ry. v. Reid, 222 U.S. 424 (1912).
        Inasmuch as it conflicted with Sec. 2 of the Hepburn Act of 1906 
(34 Stat. 584) forbidding interstate railway carriers to make shipments 
until rates had been fixed and published by the Interstate Commerce 
Commission, which in this matter had not yet acted, a North Carolina 
statute requiring carriers, under penalty for refusal, to transport 
interstate freight as soon as it was received was unenforceable.

    Concurring: Justices McKenna, Holmes, Hughes, Van Devanter, Lamar, 
Chief Justice White.

    Dissenting: Justice Lurton.

        Accord: Southern Ry. v. Reid & Beam, 222 U.S. 444 (1912).
        Accord: Southern Ry. v. Burlington Lumber Co., 225 U.S. 99 
(1912).

209. Louisville & Nashville R.R. v. Cook Brewing Co., 223 U.S. 70 
        (1912).
        Kentucky statute prohibiting common carriers from transporting 
intoxicating liquors to ``dry'' points in Kentucky was constitutionally 
inapplicable to interstate shipments of such liquor to consignees in 
Kentucky.

210. Atchison T. & S. F. Ry. v. O'Connor, 223 U.S. 280 (1912).
        Colorado law levying tax of 2 cents on each $1,000 of a 
corporation's capital stock could not constitutionally be collected from 
a Kansas corporation engaged in interstate commerce, the greater part of 
whose property and business were located and conducted outside Colorado.

211. Oklahoma v. Wells, Fargo & Co., 223 U.S. 298 (1912).
        Oklahoma law which purported to be an ad valorem tax on the 
property of corporations, levied in the form of a three per cent gross 
receipts tax, and computed, in the case of express companies doing an 
interstate business, as a percentage of gross receipts from all sources, 
interstate as well as intrastate, which is equal to the proportion which 
its business in Oklahoma bears to its total business was void as applied 
to such express companies; the tax burdened interstate

[[Page 2067]]
commerce and was levied, contrary to due process, on property in the 
form of income from investments and bonds located outside the State.

212. Haskell v. Kansas Natural Gas Co., 224 U.S. 217 (1912).
        Oklahoma conservation law, insofar as it withheld from foreign 
corporations the right to lay pipe lines across highways for purposes of 
transporting natural gas in interstate commerce, imposed an invalid 
burden on interstate commerce.

213. St. Louis, I. M. & S. Ry. v. Wynne, 224 U.S. 354 (1912).
        Arkansas law compelling railroads to pay claimants within 30 
days after notice of injury to livestock caused by their trains, and, 
upon default thereof, authorizing claimants to recover double the 
damages awarded by a jury plus an attorney's fee, notwithstanding that 
the amount sued for was less than the amount originally claimed, in 
effect penalized the railroads for their refusal to pay excessive 
claims, and accordingly effected an arbitrary deprivation of property 
without due process of law.

214. Bucks Stove Co. v. Vickers, 226 U.S. 205 (1912).
        Kansas law which exacted certain requirements, such as obtaining 
permission of the State Charter Board, paying filing and license fees, 
and submitting annual statements listing all stockholders, as a 
condition prerequisite to doing business in Kansas and suing in its 
courts could not constitutionally be applied to foreign corporations 
engaged in interstate commerce; a State cannot exact a franchise for the 
privilege of engaging in such commerce.

215. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. v. Hardwick Elevator Co., 226 U.S. 426 
        (1913).
        Congress, by enactment of the Hepburn Act (34 Stat. 584 (1906)) 
having preempted the field of regulation pertaining to the duty of 
carriers to deliver cars in interstate commerce, a Minnesota Reciprocal 
Demurrage Law imposing like regulations was void.

216. Accord: St. Louis, I. Mt. & S. Ry. v. Edwards, 227 U.S. 265 (1913).
        Arkansas Demurrage Law of 1907 penalizing carriers for failure 
to notify consignees of arrival of shipments was similarly held void.

217. Adams Express Co. v. Croninger, 226 U.S. 491 (1913).
        Congress through adoption of the Carmack Amendment having 
preempted the field of regulation pertaining to the liability of 
interstate carriers for loss and damage to interstate shipments, a 
Kentucky law in conflict therewith which precluded an interstate carrier 
from contracting to limit its liability to an agreed or declared value 
was void.

218. Accord: Chicago, B. & Q. Ry. v. Miller, 226 U.S. 513 (1913).
        An Iowa law and a provision of the Nebraska Constitution were 
held to have been superseded by the Carmack Amendment.


[[Page 2068]]

219. Accord: Chicago, St. P., M. & O. Ry. v. Latta, 226 U.S. 519 (1913).
        Nebraska constitutional provision was held to have been 
superseded.

220. Crenshaw v. Arkansas, 227 U.S. 389 (1913).
        Arkansas statute, exacting license and fee from peddlers of 
lightning rods and other articles, as applied to representatives of a 
Missouri corporation soliciting orders for the sale and subsequent 
delivery of stoves by said corporation, imposed an invalid burden on 
interstate commerce.

        Accord: Rogers v. Arkansas, 227 U.S. 401 (1913).

221. Accord: Stewart v. Michigan, 232 U.S. 665 (1914), voiding 
        application of a similar Michigan law.

222. McDermott v. Wisconsin, 228 U.S. 115 (1913).
        Wisconsin food labeling law, insofar as it exacted labelling 
requirements as to articles in interstate commerce which were in 
conflict with those required under the Federal Pure Food and Drug Act, 
imposed an invalid burden on interstate commerce.

223. Missouri, K. & T. Ry. v. Harriman Bros., 227 U.S. 657 (1913).
        Inasmuch as the federal Carmack Amendment preempted the field of 
regulation pertaining to determination of an interstate railroad's 
liability for loss or damages to goods in transit, Texas law outlawing 
contractual stipulations specifying a period of limitations for filing 
of claims by a shipper which was briefer than that sanctioned by the 
federal law was unenforceable.

    Concurring: Justices Lurton, McKenna, Holmes, Hughes (separately), 
Day, Van Devanter, Lamar, Chief Justice White.

    Dissenting: Justice Pitney.

224. Ettor v. Tacoma, 228 U.S. 148 (1913).
        Washington statute of 1907 repealing a prior act of 1893 with 
the result that rights to consequential damages for a change of street 
grade that had already accrued under the earlier act were destroyed 
amounted to an invalid deprivation of property without due process of 
law.

225. St. Louis, S. F. & T. Ry. v. Seale, 229 U.S. 156 (1913).
        When the Federal Employers' Liability Act was applicable, by 
reason that the injured employee was engaged in interstate commerce, a 
Texas law affording a remedy for said injuries was superseded by reason 
of the supremacy of the former.

    Concurring: Justices Van Devanter, McKenna, Holmes, Day, Lurton, 
Hughes, Pitney, Chief Justice White.

    Dissenting: Justice Lamar.


[[Page 2069]]


226. Chicago, B. & Q. R.R. v. Hall, 229 U.S. 511 (1913).
        Iowa law pertaining to attachment of wages of a railroad worker 
adjudicated bankrupt within less than four months thereafter was in 
conflict with federal bankruptcy law nullifying liens obtained within 
four months prior to the filing of a petition in bankruptcy and hence 
was not entitled to full faith and credit in Nebraska courts.

227. Missouri Pacific Ry. v. Tucker, 230 U.S. 340 (1913).
        Kansas statute which did not permit a carrier to have the 
sufficiency of rates established thereunder determined by judicial 
review and which exposed the carrier, when sued for charging rates in 
excess thereof, to a liability for liquidated damages in the sum of 
$500, which was unrelated to actual damages, effected an 
unconstitutional deprivation of property without due process of law.

228. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. v. Polt, 232 U.S. 165 (1914).
        North Dakota law which made railroads liable for double damages 
in case of failure to pay a claim, within 60 days after notice, or to 
offer to pay a sum equal to what a jury found the claimant entitled to 
was arbitrary and deprived the carriers of property without due process 
of law.
        Accord: Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. v. Kennedy, 232 U.S. 626 
(1914).

229. Harrison v. St. Louis, S. F. & T. R.R., 232 U.S. 318 (1914).
        Oklahoma law which prohibited foreign corporations, upon penalty 
of forfeiting their license to do business in that State, from invoking 
the diversity of citizenship jurisdiction of federal courts and 
instituting actions therein exacted an unconstitutional condition.

230. Foote v. Maryland, 232 U.S. 495 (1914).
        Maryland Oyster Inspection tax of 1910, levied on oysters coming 
from other States, the proceeds from which were used partly for 
inspection and partly for other purposes, such as the policing of state 
waters, was void as imposing a burden on interstate commerce in excess 
of the expenses absolutely necessary for inspection.

231. Farmers Bank v. Minnesota, 232 U.S. 516 (1914).
        Minnesota tax on bonds issued by a municipality of the Territory 
of Oklahoma and held by Minnesota corporations was void as a tax on a 
federal instrumentality (Art. VI).

232. Russell v. Sebastian, 233 U.S. 195 (1914).
        Amendment in 1911 of California constitution of 1879, and 
municipal ordinances of Los Angeles adopted in pursuance of the 
amendment were ineffectual by reason of the prohibition against 
impairment of contracts contained in Art. I, Sec. 10, of the Federal 
Constitution, to deprive a utility of rights acquired before said 
amendment,

[[Page 2070]]
which embraced the privilege of laying gas pipes under the streets of 
Los Angeles.

233. Singer Sewing Machine Co. v. Brickell, 233 U.S. 304 (1914).
        Alabama sewing machine license tax could not be collected from 
those agencies of a foreign corporation engaged wholly in an interstate 
business, that is, in soliciting orders for machines to be accepted and 
fulfilled at the Georgia office of the seller.

234. Tennessee Coal Co. v. George, 233 U.S. 354 (1914).
        Since venue is not part of a transitory cause of action, Alabama 
law which created such cause of action by making the employer liable to 
the employee for injuries attributable to defective machinery was 
inoperative insofar as it sought to withhold from such employee the 
right to sue on such action in courts of any State other than Alabama; 
the full faith and credit clause of Art. IV does not preclude a court in 
another State which acquired jurisdiction from enforcing such right of 
action.

235. Carondelet Canal Co. v. Louisiana, 233 U.S. 362 (1914).
        Louisiana act of 1906 repealing prior act of 1858 and 
sequestering with compensation certain property acquired by a canal 
company under the repealed enactment impaired an obligation of contact.

236. Smith v. Texas, 233 U.S. 630 (1914).
        Texas act of 1914 stipulating that only those who have 
previously served two years as freight train conductors or brakemen 
shall be eligible to serve as railroad train conductors was arbitrary 
and effected a denial of the equal protection of the laws.

237. Erie R.R. v. New York, 233 U.S. 671 (1914).
        Congress having completely preempted the field by its Hours of 
Service Act of 1907, notwithstanding that it did not take effect until 
1908, a New York labor law of 1907 regulating hours of service of 
railroad telegraph operators engaged in interstate commerce effected an 
invalid regulation of such commerce.

238. International Harvester Co. v. Kentucky, 234 U.S. 216 (1914).
        Kentucky criminal and antitrust provisions, both constitutional 
and statutory, were void for vagueness and hence violative of due 
process because a prohibition of combinations which establish prices 
that are greater or lower than the ``real market value'' of an article 
as established by ``fair competition'' and ``under normal market 
conditions'' afforded no standard that was possible to know in advance 
and to obey.

    Concurring: Justices Holmes, Hughes, Lamar, Day, Lurton, Van 
Devanter, Chief Justice White.

[[Page 2071]]


    Dissenting: Justices McKenna, Pitney.

        Accord: International Harvester Co. v. Kentucky, 234 U.S. 579 
(1914); Collins v. Kentucky, 234 U.S. 634 (1914); American Machine Co. 
v. Kentucky, 236 U.S. 660 (1915).

239. Missouri Pacific Ry. v. Larabee, 234 U.S. 459 (1914).
        Kansas statute empowering a Kansas court to award against a 
litigant attorney's fees attributable to the presentation before the 
United States Supreme Court of an appeal in a mandamus proceeding was 
inoperative consistently with the principle of national supremacy, for a 
state court cannot be empowered by state law to assess fees for services 
rendered in a federal court when such assessment is sanctioned neither 
by federal law nor by the rules of the Supreme Court.

240. Western Union Tel. Co. v. Brown, 234 U.S. 542 (1914).
        South Carolina law making mental anguish resulting from 
negligent non-delivery of a telegram a cause of action could not be 
invoked to support an action for negligent non-delivery in the District 
of Columbia, an area beyond the jurisdiction of South Carolina and, 
consistent with due process, removed from the scope of its legislative 
power. The statute, as applied to messages sent from South Carolina to 
another jurisdiction, also was an invalid regulation of interstate 
commerce.

241. United States v. Reynolds, 235 U.S. 133 (1914).
        Alabama law which permitted person convicted of an offense to 
contract with another whereby, in consideration of the latter becoming 
surety for the convicted person's fine, the convicted person agreed to 
perform certain services, and which further stipulated that if such 
contract was breached, the convicted person would become subject to a 
fine equal to the damages sustained by the other contracting party and 
payment of which would be remitted to said contracting party imposed a 
form of peonage proscribed by the Thirteenth Amendment.

    Concurring: Justice Holmes (separately).

242. McCabe v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry., 235 U.S. 151 (1914).
        Oklahoma Separate Coach Law violated the equal protection clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment by permitting carriers to provide sleeping, 
dining, and chair cars for whites but not for Negroes.

    Concurring: Chief Justice White (separately), Justices Holmes 
(separately), Lamar (separately), McReynolds (separately).

243. Sioux Remedy Co. v. Cope, 235 U.S. 197 (1914).
        South Dakota law which required a foreign corporation to appoint 
a local agent to accept service of process as a condition precedent to 
suing in state courts to collect a claim arising out of interstate 
commerce imposed an invalid burden on said commerce.


[[Page 2072]]

244. Choctaw & Gulf R.R. v. Harrison, 235 U.S. 292 (1914).
        Oklahoma privilege tax, insofar as it was levied on sale of coal 
extracted from lands owned by Indian tribes and leased on their behalf 
by the Federal Government was invalid as a tax on federal 
instrumentality.

245. Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1 (1915).
        Kansas law proscribing ``yellow dog'' contracts whereby the 
employer exacted of employees an agreement not to join or remain a 
member of a union as a condition of acquiring and retaining employment 
deprived employees of liberty of contract contrary to due process.

    Concurring: Justices Pitney, McKenna, Van Devanter, Lamar, 
McReynolds, Chief Justice White.

    Dissenting: Justices Day, Hughes, Holmes (separately).

246. Heyman v. Hays, 236 U.S. 178 (1915).
        Tennessee county privilege tax law, insofar as it was enforced 
as to a liquor dealer doing a strictly mail-order business confined to 
shipments to out-of-state destinations was void as a burden on 
interstate commerce.
        Accord: Southern Operating Co. v. Hayes, 236 U.S. 188 (1915).

247. Globe Bank v. Martin, 236 U.S. 288 (1915).
        Consistently with the principle of national supremacy, 
attachments and liens on real estate of a bankrupt, acquired pursuant to 
Kentucky laws within four months prior to the filing of a petition in 
bankruptcy under federal law, were null and void, and distribution of 
the proceeds from the sale of such real estate was governed by federal 
rather than by state law.

248. Southern Ry. v. Railroad Comm'n, 236 U.S. 439 (1915).
        An Indiana statute requiring railway companies to place grab-
irons and hand-holds on the sides and ends of every car having been 
superseded by the Federal Safety Appliance Act, penalties imposed under 
the former could not be recovered as to cars operated on interstate 
railroads, although engaged only in intrastate traffic.

249. Kirmeyer v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 568 (1915).
        Kansas prohibition law could not be validly enforced to prevent 
Kansas dealer from accepting orders for alcoholic beverages which were 
to be completed by interstate delivery to Kansas purchasers from a point 
in Missouri; under the federal Wilson Act the interstate transportation 
did not end until delivery to the consignee was completed.


[[Page 2073]]

250. Northern Pacific Ry. v. North Dakota ex rel. McCue, 236 U.S. 585 
        (1915).
        North Dakota law compelling carriers to haul certain commodities 
at less than compensatory rates deprived them of property without due 
process.

    Concurring: Justices Hughes, McKenna, Holmes, Day, Van Devanter, 
Lamar, McReynolds, Chief Justice White.

    Dissenting: Justice Pitney.

251. Norfolk & Western Ry. v. Conley, 236 U.S. 605 (1915).
        West Virginia law which compelled carriers to haul passengers at 
noncompensatory rates deprived them of property without due process.

    Concurring: Justices Hughes, McKenna, Holmes, Day, Van Devanter, 
Lamar, McReynolds, Chief Justice White.

    Dissenting: Justice Pitney.

252. Wright v. Central of Georgia Ry., 236 U.S. 674 (1915).
        Since the lessee of two railroads, built under special charters 
containing irrepealable contracts exempting the railway property from 
taxation in excess of a given rate was to be viewed as in the same 
position as the owners, levy of an ad valorem tax on the lessee in 
excess of the charter rate impaired the obligation of contract (Art. I, 
Sec. 10).

    Concurring: Justices Holmes, McKenna, Day, Van Devanter, Chief 
Justice White.

    Dissenting: Justices Hughes, Pitney, McReynolds.

        Accord: Wright v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 236 U.S. 687 
(1915).

    Concurring: Justices Holmes, McKenna, Day, Van Devanter, Chief 
Justice White.

    Dissenting: Justices Hughes, Pitney, McReynolds.

253. Davis v. Virginia, 236 U.S. 697 (1915).
        Solicitation by a peddler in Virginia of orders for portraits 
made in another State, with an option to the purchaser to select frames 
upon delivery of the portrait by the peddler, amounted to a single 
transaction in interstate commerce, and Virginia therefore could not 
validly impose a peddler's license tax on the solicitor of such orders.

242. Chicago, B. & Q. Ry. v. Wisconsin R.R. Comm'n, 237 U.S. 220 (1915).
        Wisconsin statute requiring interstate trains to stop at 
villages of a specified number of inhabitants, without regard to the 
volume of business done there, was void as imposing an unreasonable 
burden on interstate commerce.


[[Page 2074]]

255. Coe v. Armour Fertilizer Works, 237 U.S. 413 (1915).
        Florida statute denied due process insofar as it provided, after 
execution against a corporation had been returned ``no property,'' a 
second execution to issue against a stockholder for the same debt to be 
enforced against his property to the extent of any unpaid subscription 
owing on his stock and without notice to such stockholder.

256. Charleston & W. C. Ry. v. Varnville Co., 237 U.S. 597 (1915).
        South Carolina law which imposed a penalty on carriers for their 
failure to adjust claims within 40 days imposed an invalid burden on 
interstate commerce and also was in conflict with the federal Carmack 
Amendment.

257. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. v. Vosburg, 238 U.S. 56 (1915).
        Kansas Reciprocal Demurrage Law of 1905 which allowed recovery 
of an attorney's fee by the shipper in case of delinquency by the 
carrier but which accorded the carrier no like privilege in case of 
delinquency on the part of the shipper denied the carrier equal 
protection of the law.

258. Rossi v. Pennsylvania, 238 U.S. 62 (1915).
        Pennsylvania liquor law could not be enforced against one who 
solicited orders for the delivery of alcoholic beverages to be shipped 
to the consignee from another State; under the federal Wilson Act of 
1890 liquor shipped in interstate commerce did not become subject to 
State regulation until after delivery to the consignee.

259. Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S. 347 (1915).
        Oklahoma grandfather clause, in its 1910 constitution, exempting 
from a literacy requirement and automatically enfranchising all entitled 
to vote as of January 1, 1866, or who were descendants of those entitled 
to vote on the latter date, was violative of the Fifteenth Amendment 
protecting Negroes from discriminatory denial of the right to vote based 
on race.

260. Accord: Mayers v. Anderson, 238 U.S. 368 (1915) wherein a similar 
        Maryland grandfather clause was voided.

261. Southwestern Tel. Co. v. Danaher, 238 U.S. 482 (1915).
        Arkansas statute was held to be unreasonable and violative of 
due process for the reason that, as enforced, it subjected a telephone 
company to a $6300 penalty for discriminatory refusal to serve when, 
pursuant to company regulations known to the State and uniformly 
enforced for economical collection of its approved rates, it suspended 
services to a delinquent and refused to resume services, while the 
delinquency remained unpaid, at the reduced rate afforded to those who 
paid the monthly service charge in advance.


[[Page 2075]]

262. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. v. Wisconsin, 238 U.S. 491 (1915).
        Wisconsin statute which compelled sleeping car companies, if 
upper berth was not sold, to accord use of the space thereof to 
purchaser of a lower berth took salable property from the owner without 
compensation and therefore effected a deprivation of property without 
due process of law.

    Concurring: Justices Lamar, Day, Hughes, Van Devanter, Pitney, 
McReynolds, Chief Justice White.

    Dissenting: Justices McKenna, Holmes.

263. Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33 (1915).
        Arizona statute which compelled establishments hiring five or 
more workers to reserve 80 per cent of the employment opportunities to 
citizens denied aliens the equal protection of the laws.

    Concurring: Justices Hughes, Holmes, Pitney, Lamar, Day, Van 
Devanter, McKenna, Chief Justice White.

    Dissenting: Justice McReynolds.

264. Provident Savings Ass'n v. Kentucky, 239 U.S. 103 (1915).
        Kentucky statute levying tax, in the nature of a license tax for 
the doing of local business, on premiums collected in New York by a 
foreign insurance company after it had ceased to do business in that 
State was violative of due process by reason of affecting activities 
beyond the jurisdiction of the State.

265. Indian Oil Co. v. Oklahoma, 240 U.S. 522 (1916).
        Oklahoma tax on lessee's interest in Indian lands, acquired 
pursuant to federal statutory authorization, was void as a tax on a 
federal instrumentality.

266. Rosenberger v. Pacific Express Co., 241 U.S. 48 (1916).
        Texas statute imposing special licenses on express companies 
maintaining offices for C.O.D. delivery of interstate shipments of 
alcoholic beverages imposed an invalid burden on interstate commerce 
under the terms of the Wilson Act of 1890 (26 Stat. 313).

267. McFarland v. American Sugar Co., 241 U.S. 79 (1916).
        Louisiana law which established a rebuttable presumption that 
any person systematically purchasing sugar in Louisiana at a price below 
that which he paid in any other State was a party to a monopoly or 
conspiracy in restraint of trade was violative of both the due process 
and equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment in that it 
declared an individual presumptively guilty of a crime and exempted 
countless others paying the same price.


[[Page 2076]]

268. Wisconsin v. Philadelphia & Reading Coal Co., 241 U.S. 329 (1916).
        Wisconsin law which revoked the license of any foreign 
corporation which removed to a federal court a suit instituted against 
it by a Wisconsin citizen imposed an unconstitutional condition.

269. Detroit United Ry. v. Michigan, 242 U.S. 238 (1916).
        Construction of acts of 1905 and 1907 as compelling a Detroit 
City Railway to extend its lines to suburban areas annexed by Detroit 
only on the same terms as were contained in its initial franchise as 
authorized by the Detroit ordinance of 1889, wherein its fare was fixed, 
operated to impair the obligation of contract.

    Concurring: Justices Pitney, Holmes, Day, Van Devanter, McReynolds, 
Chief Justice White.

    Dissenting: Justices Clarke, Brandeis.

270. Rowland v. Boyle, 244 U.S. 106 (1917).
        The two-cent passenger rate fixed by act of the Arkansas 
legislature was confiscatory and accordingly deprived the railroad of 
its property without due process.

271. New York Central R.R. v. Winfield, 244 U.S. 147 (1917).
        Congress, by enactment of the Federal Employees' Liability Act, 
having preempted the field as to determination of the liability of 
interstate railroad carriers to compensate employees for injuries 
sustained while engaged in interstate commerce, award under New York 
Workmen's Compensation Act for injuries sustained in interstate commerce 
by railway employee could not be upheld.

    Concurring: Justices Van Devanter, Holmes, Pitney, McReynolds, Day, 
McKenna, Chief Justice White.

    Dissenting: Justices Brandeis, Clarke.

272. Accord: Erie R.R. v. Winfield, 244 U.S. 170 (1917).
        For the same reason, a New Jersey Workmen's Compensation Act was 
held inapplicable to a railway worker injured while engaged in 
interstate commerce.

    Concurring: Justices Van Devanter, Holmes, Day, Pitney, McKenna, 
McReynolds, Chief Justice White.

    Dissenting: Justices Brandeis, Clarke.

273. Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205 (1917).
        New York Workmen's Compensation Act was unconstitutional as 
applied to employees engaged in maritime work, for it afforded a remedy 
unknown to common law, and hence was not among the common law remedies 
saved to suitors from exclusive federal admiralty jurisdiction by the 
Judiciary Act of 1789.

    Concurring: Justices McReynolds, Day, Van Devanter, McKenna, Chief 
Justice White.

[[Page 2077]]


    Dissenting: Justices Holmes (separately), Pitney (separately), 
Brandeis, Clarke.

        Accord: Clyde S.S. Co. v. Walker, 244 U.S. 255 (1917).

    Concurring: Justices McReynolds, Day, Van Devanter, McKenna, Chief 
Justice White.

    Dissenting: Justices Holmes, Pitney, Brandeis, Clarke.

274. Accord: Steamship Bowdoin Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm'n of 
        California, 246 U.S. 648 (1918), as to the inoperative effect of 
        a California Workmen's Compensation Act.

275. Seaboard Air Line Ry. v. Blackwell, 244 U.S. 310 (1917).
        Georgia ``Blow-Post'' law imposed an unconstitutional burden on 
interstate commerce insofar as compliance with it would have required an 
interstate train to come practically to a stop at each of 124 ordinary 
grade crossings within a distance of 123 miles in Georgia and would have 
added more than six hours to the running time of the train.

    Concurring: Justices McKenna, Holmes, McReynolds, Day, Clarke, Van 
Devanter.

    Dissenting: Chief Justice White, Justices Pitney, Brandeis.

276. Western Oil Ref. Co. v. Lipscomb, 244 U.S. 346 (1917).
        Tennessee privilege tax could not validly be imposed on 
interstate sales consummated at either destination in Tennessee by an 
Indiana corporation which, for the purpose of filling orders taken by 
its salesmen in Tennessee, shipped thereto a tank car of oil and a 
carload of barrels and filled the orders through an agent who drew the 
oil from the tank car into the barrels, or into barrels furnished by 
customers, and then made delivery and collected the agreed price, and 
thereafter moved the two cars to another point in Tennessee for 
effecting like deliveries.

    Concurring: Justices Van Devanter, Holmes, Brandeis, Pitney, 
McReynolds, Day, Clarke, McKenna.

    Dissenting: Chief Justice White.

277. Adams v. Tanner, 244 U.S. 590 (1917).
        Washington law which proscribed private employment agencies by 
prohibiting them from collecting fees for their services deprived 
individuals of the liberty to pursue a lawful calling contrary to due 
process of law.

    Concurring: Justices McReynolds, Pitney, Van Devanter, Chief Justice 
White.

    Dissenting: Justices McKenna, Brandeis, Holmes, Clarke.

278. American Express Company v. Caldwell, 244 U.S. 617 (1917).
        Consistent with natural supremacy, South Dakota law regulating 
advance of interstate rates could not be applied to changes in intra

[[Page 2078]]
state rates which a carrier put into effect pursuant to an order of the 
Interstate Commerce Commission to abate discrimination against 
interstate traffic.

    Concurring: Justices Brandeis, Holmes, Pitney, McReynolds, Day, 
Clarke, Van Devanter, Chief Justice White.

    Dissenting: Justice McKenna.

279. Hendrickson v. Apperson, 245 U.S. 105 (1917).
        Kentucky act of 1906, amending act of 1894 and construed in such 
manner as to enable a county to avoid collection of taxes to repay 
judgment on unpaid bonds impaired the obligation of contract.
        Accord: Hendrickson v. Creager, 245 U.S. 115 (1917).

280. Looney v. Crane Co., 245 U.S. 178 (1917).
        Texas law, which, under the guise of taxing the privilege of 
doing an intrastate business, imposed on an Illinois corporation a 
license tax based on its authorized capital stock, was void not only as 
imposing a burden on interstate commerce, but also as contravening the 
due process clause by affecting property outside the jurisdiction of 
Texas.

281. Crew Levick v. Pennsylvania, 245 U.S. 292 (1917).
        Pennsylvania gross receipts tax on wholesalers, as applied to a 
merchant who sold part of his merchandise to customers in foreign 
countries either as the result of the receipt directly of orders from 
them or as the result of orders solicited by agents abroad was void as a 
regulation of foreign commerce and as a duty on exports.

282. Paper Co. v. Massachusetts, 246 U.S. 135 (1918).
        License fee or excise of a given per cent of the par value of 
the entire authorized capital stock of a foreign corporation doing both 
a local and interstate business and owning property in several States 
was a tax on the entire business and property of the corporation and was 
void both as an illegal burden on interstate commerce and as a violation 
of due process by reason of affecting property beyond the borders of the 
taxing State.
        Accord: Locomobile Co. v. Massachusetts, 246 U.S. 146 (1918).

283. Cheney Bros. v. Massachusetts, 246 U.S. 147 (1918).
        When a Connecticut corporation maintains and employs a 
Massachusetts office with a stock of samples and an office force and 
traveling salesmen merely to obtain local orders subject to confirmation 
at the Connecticut office and with deliveries to be made directly from 
the latter, its business was interstate commerce and a Massachusetts 
annual excise could not be validly applied thereto.


[[Page 2079]]

284. New York Life Ins. Co. v. Dodge, 246 U.S. 357 (1918).
        Liberty of contract, as protected by the due process clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment, precluded enforcement of the Missouri 
nonforfeiture statute, prescribing how net value of a life insurance 
policy is to be applied to avert a forfeiture in the event the annual 
premium is not paid, so as to prevent a Missouri resident from executing 
in the New York office of the insurer a different agreement sanctioned 
by New York law whereby the policy was pledged as security for a loan 
and later canceled in satisfaction of the indebtedness.

    Concurring: Justices McReynolds, McKenna, Holmes, Van Devanter, 
Chief Justice White.

    Dissenting: Justices Brandeis, Day, Pitney, Clarke.

285. Georgia v. Cincinnati So. Ry., 248 U.S. 26 (1918).
        Georgia act of 1916 revoking a grant in 1879 of a perpetual 
right of way to a railroad impaired the obligation of contract (Art. I, 
Sec. 10).

286. Union Pac. R.R. v. Public Service Comm'n, 248 U.S. 67 (1918).
        Missouri act, insofar as it authorized the Missouri Public 
Service Commission to exact a fee of $10,000 for a certificate of 
authority for issuance by an interstate railroad, doing no intrastate 
business in Missouri, of a $30,000,000 mortgage bond issue to meet 
expenditures incurred but in small part in that State, imposed an 
invalid burden on interstate commerce.

287. Flexner v. Farson, 248 U.S. 289 (1919).
        Kentucky law, insofar as it authorized a judgment against 
nonresident individuals based on service against their Kentucky agent 
after his appointment had expired, was violative of due process.

288. Central of Georgia Ry. v. Wright, 248 U.S. 525 (1919).
        Tax exemptions in charters granted to certain railroads inured 
to their lessee, and, accordingly, a Georgia tax authorized by a 
constitutional provision postdating such charters and imposed on the 
leasehold interest of the lessee impaired the obligation of contract.

289. Union Tank Line Co. v. Wright, 249 U.S. 275 (1919).
        Georgia law under which a New Jersey company's tank cars 
operating in and out of that State were assessed upon a track-mileage 
basis, i.e., in an amount bearing the same ratio to the value of all its 
cars and other personal property as the ratio of the miles of railroad 
over which the cars were run in Georgia to the total miles over which 
they were run in all States, was invalid for the reason that the rule 
bore no necessary relation to the real value in Georgia and hence 
conflicted with due process.

    Concurring: Justices McReynolds, McKenna, Holmes, Day, Van Devanter, 
Chief Justice White.

[[Page 2080]]


    Dissenting: Justices Pitney, Brandeis, Clarke.

290. Standard Oil Co. v. Graves, 249 U.S. 389 (1919).
        Washington law under which, in a ten-year period, inspection 
fees collected on oil products brought into the State for use or 
consumption amounted to $335,000, of which only $80,000 was disbursed 
for expenses, was deemed to impose an excessive charge and accordingly 
an invalid burden on interstate commerce.

291. Chalker v. Birmingham & N.W. Ry., 249 U.S. 522 (1919).
        Tennessee act which made the annual tax for the privilege of 
doing railway construction work dependent on whether the person taxed 
had his chief office in Tennessee, i.e. $25 if he had and $100 if he did 
not, was violative of the privilege and immunities clause of Art. IV, 
Sec. 2.

292. New Orleans & N.E.R.R. v. Scarlet, 249 U.S. 528 (1919).
        Mississippi ``Prima Facie'' act, relieving plaintiff of burden 
of proof to establish negligence, could not constitutionally be applied 
by a state court in suits under the Federal Employees' Liability Act.
        Accord: Yazoo & M.V.R.R. v. Mullins, 249 U.S. 531 (1919).

293. Pennsylvania R.R. v. Public Service Comm'n, 250 U.S. 566 (1919).
        Pennsylvania law, as applied to an interstate train terminated 
by a mail car, forbidding operation of any train consisting of United 
States mail, or express, cars without rear end of car being equipped 
with a platform with guard rails and steps was inoperative by reason of 
conflict with federal legislation and regulations which preempted the 
field.

    Concurring: Justices Holmes, McKenna, Day, Van Devanter, Pitney, 
McReynolds, Brandeis, Chief Justice White.

    Dissenting: Justice Clarke.

294. Postal Telegraph-Cable Co. v. Warren-Godwin Co., 251 U.S. 27 
        (1919).
        By virtue of federal legislation preempting the field, 
Mississippi law could not be applied to determine validity of a contract 
by telegraph company limiting its responsibility when its lower rate is 
paid for unrepeated interstate messages.

    Concurring: Justices Holmes, McKenna, Day, Van Devanter, McReynolds, 
Brandeis, Clarke, Chief Justice White.

    Dissenting: Justice Pitney.

295. Western Union Tel. Co. v. Boegli, 251 U.S. 315 (1920).
        Federal legislation having preempted the field, Indiana law no 
longer was operative to subject a telegraph company to a penalty for 
failure to deliver promptly in Indiana a message sent from a point in 
Illinois.


[[Page 2081]]

296. Travis v. Yale & Towne Mfg. Co., 252 U.S. 60 (1920).
        New York income tax law which allowed exemptions to residents, 
with increases for married persons and dependents but which allowed no 
equivalent exemptions to nonresidents abridged the privileges and 
immunities clause of Art. IV, Sec. 2.

297. Okahoma Operating Co. v. Love, 252 U.S. 331 (1920).
        Oklahoma constitution and laws, under which an order of the 
State Corporation Commission declaring a laundry a monopoly and limiting 
its rates was not judicially reviewable, and which compelled litigant, 
for purposes of obtaining a judicial test of rates, to disobey the order 
and invite serious penalty for each day of refusal pending completion of 
judicial appeal, were violative of due process insofar as rates were 
enforced by penalties.

298. Accord: Oklahoma Gin Co. v. Oklahoma, 252 U.S. 339 (1920).
        Illinois law denying Illinois courts jurisdiction in actions for 
wrongful death occurring in another State which was construed as barring 
jurisdiction of actions on a sister State judgment founded upon a like 
cause was, as so applied, violative of the full faith and credit clause.

299. Askren v. Continental Oil Co., 252 U.S. 444 (1920).
        New Mexico law levying annual license on distributors of 
gasoline plus 2 per gallon on all gasoline sold was a privilege tax, 
and, as applied to parties who bring gasoline from without and sell it 
in New Mexico, imposed an invalid burden on interstate commerce insofar 
as it related to their business of selling in tank car lots and in 
barrels or packages as originally imported.

300. Wallace v. Hines, 253 U.S. 66 (1920).
        North Dakota act, as administered, imposed invalid burden on 
interstate commerce and took property without due process by reason of 
taxing an interstate railroad by assessing the value of its property in 
the State at that proportion of the total value of its stock and bonds 
that the main track mileage within the State bore to the main track 
mileage of the entire line; this formula was indefensible inasmuch as 
the cost of construction per mile was within than without the taxing 
State, and the large and valuable terminals of the railroad were located 
elsewhere.

301. Hawke v. Smith (No. 1), 253 U.S. 221 (1920).
        Action of Ohio legislature ratifying proposed Eighteenth 
Amendment could not be referred to the voters, and the provisions of the 
Ohio constitution requiring such referendum were inconsistent with 
Article V of the Federal Constitution.

[[Page 2082]]

        Accord: Hawke v. Smith (No. 2), 253 U.S. 231 (1920), applicable 
to proposed Nineteenth Amendment.

302. Ohio Valley Co. v. Ben Avon Borough, 253 U.S. 287 (1920).
        Since Pennsylvania Public Service Commission Law failed to 
provide opportunity by way of appeal to the courts or by injunctive 
proceedings to test issue as to whether rates fixed by Commission are 
confiscatory, order of Commission establishing maximum future rates 
violated due process of law.

    Concurring: Justices McReynolds, Day, Van Devanter, Pitney, McKenna, 
Chief Justice White.

    Dissenting: Justices Brandeis, Holmes, Clarke.

303. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412 (1920).
        Virginia law which taxed all income of local corporation derived 
from business within and without Virginia, while exempting entirely 
income derived outside of Virginia by local corporations which did no 
local business violated the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.

    Concurring: Justices Pitney, McReynolds, McKenna, Day, Van Devanter, 
Clarke, Chief Justice White.

    Dissenting: Justices Brandeis, Holmes.

304. Johnson v. Maryland, 254 U.S. 51 (1920).
        Maryland law requiring operator's license of drivers of motor 
trucks could not constitutionally be applied to a Postal Department 
employee operating a federal mail truck in the performance of official 
duty.

    Concurring: Justices Holmes, McKenna, Day, Van Devanter, Brandeis, 
Clarke, Chief Justice White.

    Dissenting: Justices Pitney, McReynolds.

305. Turner v. Wade, 254 U.S. 64 (1920).
        Georgia Tax Equalization Act denied due process insofar as it 
authorized an increase in the assessed valuation of the taxpayer's 
property without notice and hearing and accorded him an abortive remedy 
of arbitration which was nullified by the inability of the arbitrators 
to agree on a lower assessment before the expiration of the time when 
the assessment became final and binding.

306. Bank of Minden v. Clement, 256 U.S. 126 (1921).
        Louisiana law which exempted proceeds of insurance policy, 
payable upon death of insured to his executor, from the claims of 
insured's creditors impaired the obligation of contract as enforced 
against a debt on a promissory note antedating such laws and also as 
enforced against policies which antedated the law.

    Concurring: Justices McReynolds, McKenna, Holmes, Day, Van Devanter, 
Pitney, Brandeis, Chief Justice White.

[[Page 2083]]


    Dissenting: Justice Clarke.

307. Bethlehem Motors Co. v. Flynt, 256 U.S. 421 (1921).
        North Carolina statute which exacted a $500 license fee of every 
automobile manufacturer as a condition precedent to selling cars in the 
State and which imposed a like requirement on any firm selling cars of a 
manufacturer who had not paid the tax, but which reduced the fee to $100 
in the event that the manufacturer had invested three-fourths of his 
assets in North Carolina state and municipal securities or properties, 
was invalid as violative of the commerce clause and of the equal 
protection clause when enforced against nonresident manufacturers 
selling cars in North Carolina directly or through local dealers.

    Concurring: Justices McKenna, Holmes, Day, Van Devanter, McReynolds, 
Clarke.

    Dissenting: Justices Pitney, Brandeis

308. Merchant's Nat'l Bank v. Richmond, 256 U.S. 635 (1921).
        Richmond, Virginia, ordinance and Virginia statute which, as 
construed, levied a tax on state and national bank shares at the 
aggregate rate of $1.75 per $100 of valuation and upon intangibles at 
the aggregate rate of 85 per $100 valuation, a substantial proportion of 
which property was in the hands of individual taxpayers, were void as in 
conflict with federal law prohibiting discriminatory taxation of 
national bank shares for the reason that the tax was imposed on the 
national bank stocks to the aggregate value of more than $8,000,000 
whereas the value of state bank stocks taxed was only $6,000,000.

309. Bowman v. Continental Oil Co., 256 U.S. 642 (1921).
        New Mexico statute which imposed a tax of 2 cents per gallon 
sold on distributors of gasoline was void insofar as it embraced 
interstate transactions, but the annual license fee of $5 imposed 
thereby on each gasoline station was totally void insofar as interstate 
sales threat could not be separated out from the intrastate sales.

310. Kansas City So. Ry. v. Road Improv. Dist. No. 6, 256 U.S. 658 
        (1921).
        Arkansas statute which authorized local assessments for road 
improvements denied equal protection of the laws insofar as railroad 
property was burdened for local improvement on a basis totally different 
from that used for measuring the contribution demanded of individual 
owners.

311. Eureka Pipe Line Co. v. Hallanan, 257 U.S. 265 (1921).
        West Virginia statute which forbade engaging in the business of 
transporting petroleum in pipe lines without the payment of a tax of 
2 cents for each barrel of oil transported imposed an invalid burden on 
interstate commerce as applied to company's volume of oil produced in, 
but moving out of, West Virginia to extra-state destinations.


[[Page 2084]]


    Concurring: Justices Holmes, McKenna, Day, Van Devanter, McReynolds, 
Chief Justice Taft.

    Dissenting: Justices Clarke, Pitney, Brandeis.

        Accord: United Fuel Gas Co. v. Hallanan, 257 U.S. 277 (1921), 
voiding like application of the West Virginia tax on the interstate 
movement of natural gas.

    Concurring: Justices Holmes, Pitney, McReynolds, Day, Van Devanter, 
McKenna, Chief Justice Taft.

    Dissenting: Justices Brandeis, Clarke.

312. Dahnke-Walker Co. v. Bondurant, 257 U.S. 282 (1921).
        Kentucky law prescribing conditions under which foreign 
corporations could do business in that State and which precluded 
enforcement in Kentucky courts of contracts made by foreign corporations 
not complying with said conditions could not be enforced against 
Tennessee corporation which sued in a Kentucky court for breach of a 
contract consummated in that State for the purchase of grain to be 
delivered to and used in Tennessee; such transaction was in interstate 
commerce, notwithstanding that the Tennessee purchaser might change its 
mind after delivery to a carrier in Kentucky and sell the grain in 
Kentucky or consign it to some other place in Kentucky.

    Concurring: Justices Van Devanter, Holmes, Pitney, Day, McKenna, 
McReynolds, Chief Justice Taft.

    Dissenting: Justices Brandeis, Clarke.

313. Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312 (1921).
        Arizona statute, regulating injunctions in labor disputes which 
exempted ex-employees, when committing tortious injury to the business 
of their former employer in the form of mass picketing, libelous 
utterances, and inducement of customers to withhold patronage, while 
leaving subject to injunctive restraint all other tort-feasors engaged 
in like wrong-doing, deprived the employer of property without due 
process and denied him equal protection of the law.

    Concurring: Justices Van Devanter, Day, McKenna, McReynolds, Chief 
Justice Taft.

    Dissenting: Justices Holmes, Pitney, Clarke, Brandeis.

314. Gillespie v. Oklahoma, 257 U.S. 501 (1922).
        Oklahoma income tax law could not validly be enforced as to net 
income of lessee derived from the sales of his share of oil and gas 
received under leases of restricted Indian lands which constituted him 
in effect an instrumentality used by the United States in fulfilling its 
duties to the Indians.

    Concurring: Justices Holmes, Day, Van Devanter, McKenna, McReynolds, 
Chief Justice Taft.

    Dissenting: Justices Pitney, Brandeis, Clarke.


[[Page 2085]]


315. Terral v. Burke Constr. Co., 257 U.S. 529 (1922).
        Arkansas law which revoked the license of a foreign corporation 
to do business in that State whenever it resorted to the federal courts 
sitting in that State exacted an unconstitutional condition.

316. Lemke v. Farmers Grain Co., 258 U.S. 50 (1922).
        North Dakota statute which required purchasers of grain to 
obtain a license to act under a defined system of grading, inspection, 
and weighing, and to abide by regulations as to prices and profits 
imposed an invalid burden on interstate commerce insofar as it was 
applied to a North Dakota association which bought grain in the State 
and loaded it promptly on cars for shipment to other States for sale, 
notwithstanding occasional diversion of the grain for local sales.

    Concurring: Justices Day, McKenna, McReynolds, Van Devanter, Pitney, 
Chief Justice Taft.

    Dissenting: Justices Brandeis, Holmes, Clarke.

        Accord: Lemke v. Homer Farmers Elevator Co., 258 U.S. 65 (1922).

    Justices Concurring: Day, McKenna, McReynolds, Pitney, Van Devanter, 
Chief Justice Taft.

    Dissenting: Justices Holmes, Brandeis, Clarke.

317. Newton v. Consolidated Gas Co., 258 U.S. 165 (1922).
        Rates fixed for the sale of gas by New York statute were 
confiscatory and deprived the utility of its property without due 
process of law.
        Accord: Newton v. New York Gas Co., 258 U.S. 178 (1922); Newton 
v. Kings County Lighting Co., 258 U.S. 180 (1922); Newton v. Brooklyn 
Union Gas Co., 258 U.S. 604 (1922); Newton v. Consolidated Gas Co., 259 
U.S. 101 (1922).

318. Forbes Pioneer Boat Line v. Everglades Drainage Dist., 258 U.S. 338 
        (1922).
        Florida law retroactively validating collection of fee for 
passage through a canal, the use of which was then free by law, was 
ineffective; a legislature could not retroactively approve what it could 
not lawfully do.

319. Texas Co. v. Brown, 258 U.S. 466 (1922).
        Georgia law levying inspection fees and providing for inspection 
of oil and gasoline was unconstitutional as applied to gasoline and oil 
in interstate commerce; for the fees clearly exceeded the cost of 
inspection and amounted to a tariff levied without the consent of 
Congress.


[[Page 2086]]

320. Chicago & N.W. Ry. v. Nye Schneider Fowler Co., 260 U.S. 35 (1922).
        Nebraska law, as construed, which authorized imposition against 
carrier, in favor of claimant, of an additional attorney's fee of $100, 
upon the basis of the service rendered, time and labor bestowed, and 
recovery secured by claimant's attorney in resisting appeal by which the 
carrier obtained a large reduction of an excessive judgment was 
unreasonable in that it deterred carrier from vindicating its rights by 
appeal and therefore was violative of due process.

321. St. Louis Compress Co. v. Arkansas, 260 U.S. 346 (1922).
        Arkansas law exacting of persons insuring property in Arkansas a 
five percent tax on amounts paid on premiums to insurers not authorized 
to do business in Arkansas was violative of due process insofar as it 
was applied to insurance contracted and paid for outside Arkansas by a 
foreign corporation doing a local business.

322. Champlain Co. v. Brattleboro, 260 U.S. 366 (1922).
        Logs under control of the owner which, in the course of their 
interstate journey, were being temporarily detained by a boom to await 
subsidence of high waters and for the sole purpose of saving them from 
loss were in interstate commerce and, accordingly, a Vermont levy of a 
property tax thereon was void.

323. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
        Pennsylvania law which forbade mining in such a way as to cause 
subsidence of any human habitation or public street or building and 
which thereby made commercially impracticable the removal of valuable 
coal deposits was deemed arbitrary and amounted to a deprivation of 
property without due process. As applied to an owner of land who, prior 
to this enactment, had validly deeded the surface with express 
reservation of right to remove coal underneath and subject to waiver by 
grantee of damage claims resulting from such mining, said law also 
impaired the obligation of contract.

    Concurring: Justices Holmes, McKenna, Day, Van Devanter, Pitney, 
McReynolds, Sutherland, Chief Justice Taft.

    Dissenting: Justice Brandeis.

324. Columbia Ry., Gas & Electric Co. v. South Carolina, 261 U.S. 236 
        (1923).
        South Carolina statute, as construed, which sought to convert a 
covenant in a prior legislative contract into a condition subsequent, 
and to impose as a penalty for its violation the forfeiture of valuable 
property, impaired the obligation of contract.

325. Federal Land Bank v. Crosland, 261 U.S. 374 (1923).
        A first mortgage executed to a Federal Land Bank is a federal 
instrumentality and cannot be subjected to an Alabama recording tax.


[[Page 2087]]

326. Phipps v. Cleveland Refg. Co., 261 U.S. 449 (1923).
        Ohio law, which was applicable to interstate and intrastate 
commerce and which exacted fees for inspection of petroleum products in 
excess of the legitimate cost of inspection, imposed an invalid import 
tax to the extent that the excess could not be separated and assigned 
solely to intrastate commerce.

327. Thomas v. Kansas City So. Ry., 261 U.S. 481 (1923).
        Insofar as drainage district tax authorized under Arkansas law 
imposed upon a railroad a levy disproportionate to the value of the 
benefits derived from said improvement, the tax was violative of the 
equal protection clause.

328. Davis v. Farmers Co-operative Co., 262 U.S. 313 (1923).
        Minnesota law which provided that interstate railroads which had 
an agent in Minnesota to solicit traffic over lines outside Minnesota 
may be served with summons by delivery of copy thereof to the agent 
imposed an invalid burden on interstate commerce as applied to a carrier 
which owned and operated no facilities in Minnesota and which was sued 
by a plaintiff who did not reside therein on a cause of action arising 
outside the State.

329. First Nat'l Bank v. California, 262 U.S. 366 (1923).
        California law which escheated to state bank deposits unclaimed 
for 20 years, notwithstanding that no notice of residence has been filed 
with the bank by the depositor or any claimant, was invalid, as to 
deposits in national banks by reason of conflict with applicable federal 
law.

330. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
        Nebraska law which forbade the teaching of any language other 
than English in any school, private, denominational, or public, 
maintaining classes for the first eight grades affected a denial of 
liberty without due process of law.

331-332. Accord: Bartels v. Iowa, 262 U.S. 404 (1923), and Bohning v. 
        Ohio, 262 U.S. 404 (1923), voiding similar Iowa and Ohio laws.

    Concurring (in each of the above cases): Justices McReynolds, 
Brandeis, Butler, Sanford, Van Devanter, McKenna, Chief Justice Taft.

    Dissenting (in each of the above cases): Justices Holmes, 
Sutherland.

333. Georgia Ry. & Power Co. v. Decatur, 262 U.S. 432 (1923).
        Georgia law which extended corporate limits of a town and which, 
as judicially construed, had the effect of rendering applicable to the 
added territory street railway rates fixed by an earlier contract 
between the town and the railway impaired the obligation of that 
contract by adding to its burden.

    Accord: Georgia Ry. v. College Park, 262 U.S. 441 (1923).


[[Page 2088]]


334. Wolff Packing Co. v. Industrial Court, 262 U.S. 522 (1923).
        Kansas law which compelled business engaged in manufacturing and 
in the processing of food to continue operation in the event of a labor 
dispute, to submit the controversy to an arbitration board, and to abide 
by the latter's recommendations pertaining to the payment of minimum 
wages subjected both employers and employees to a denial of liberty 
without due process of law.
        Accord: Dorchy v. Kansas, 264 U.S. 286 (1924), same Kansas law 
voided when applied to labor disputes affecting coal mines; Wolff 
Packing Co. v. Industrial Court, 267 U.S. 552 (1925), voiding other 
provisions of this Kansas law which authorized arbitration tribunal in 
the course of compulsory arbitration, to fix the hours of labor to be 
observed by an employer involved in a labor dispute.

335. Kentucky Co. v. Paramount Exch., 262 U.S. 544 (1923).
        Wisconsin law which required a foreign corporation not doing 
business in Wisconsin, or having property there, other than that sought 
to be recovered in a suit, to send, as a condition precedent to 
maintaining such action, its officer with corporate records pertinent to 
the matter in controversy, and to submit to an adversary examination 
before answer, but which did not subject nonresident individuals to such 
examination, except when served with notice and subpoena within 
Wisconsin, and then only in the court where the service was had, and 
which limited such examinations, in the case of residents of Wisconsin, 
individual or corporate, to the county of their residence violated the 
equal protection clause.

    Concurring: Justices Van Devanter, Sanford, Butler, McKenna, 
McReynolds, Sutherland, Chief Justice Taft.

    Dissenting: Justices Brandeis, Holmes.

336. Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553 (1923).
        West Virginia law which required pipe line companies to fill all 
local needs before endeavoring to export any natural gas extracted in 
West Virginia was void as a prohibited interference with interstate 
commerce.

    Concurring: Justices Van Devanter, Sutherland, Butler, McKenna, 
Chief Justice Taft.

    Dissenting: Justices Holmes, McReynolds, Brandeis, Sanford.

337. Bunch v. Cole, 263 U.S. 250 (1923).
        When lease of an Indian allotment, made by the allottee in 
excess of the powers of alienation granted by federal law, is declared 
null and void by federal law, Oklahoma statute, as judicially applied, 
which gave the lease the effect of a tenancy at will and as controlling 
the amount of compensation which the allottee may recover for use

[[Page 2089]]
and occupation by the lessees also was void, consistently with the 
principle of national supremacy.

338. Clallam County v. United States, 263 U.S. 341 (1923).
        Washington state and county property taxes cannot be levied on 
the property of a corporation which, though formed under Washington law, 
was a federal instrumentality created and operated by the United States 
as an instrument of war.

339. Tampa Interocean Steamship Co. v. Louisiana, 266 U.S. 594 (1925).
        Louisiana license tax law could not validly be enforced as to 
the business of companies employed as agents by owners of vessels 
engaged exclusively in interstate and foreign commerce when the services 
performed by the agents consisted of the soliciting and engaging of 
cargo, and the nomination of vessels to carry it, etc. (See Texas 
Transp. Co. v. New Orleans, 264 U.S. 150 (1924), voiding like 
application of a similar New Orleans ordinance.)

340. Sperry Oil Co. v. Chisholm, 264 U.S. 488 (1924).
        Oklahoma law which required that the execution of a lease on the 
family homestead also must be executed by the wife was inoperative, 
consistently with the principle of national supremacy, to the extent 
that under federal law Congress had empowered a Cherokee Indian to make 
an oil or gas lease on his restricted ``homestead'' allotment subject 
only to the approval of the Secretary of the Interior.

341. Burns Baking Co. v. Bryan, 264 U.S. 504 (1924).
        Nebraska law which prescribed the minimum weights of loaves of 
bread to be made and sold and which, in order to prevent the palming off 
of smaller for larger sizes, fixed a maximum for each class and allowed 
a ``tolerance'' of only two ounces per pound in excess of the minimum 
was found to be unreasonable, to be unnecessary to protect purchasers 
against the imposition of fraud by short weights, and therefore to 
deprive bakers and sellers of bread of their liberty without due process 
of law.

    Concurring: Justices Butler, Sanford, McReynolds, Sutherland, 
McKenna, Van Devanter, Chief Justice Taft.

    Dissenting: Justices Brandeis, Holmes.

342. Missouri ex rel. Burnes Nat'l Bank v. Duncan, 265 U.S. 17 (1924).
        Inasmuch as under the Federal Reserve Act national banks were 
authorized to act as executors, a Missouri law was ineffective, under 
the principle of national supremacy, to withhold such powers from such 
banks.

    Concurring: Justices Holmes, Sanford, Brandeis, McKenna, Van 
Devanter, Butler, Chief Justice Taft.

    Dissenting: Justices Sutherland, McReynolds.


[[Page 2090]]


343. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. v. Wells, 265 U.S. 101 (1924).
        Texas law which permitted a nonresident to prosecute a case 
which arose outside of Texas against a railroad corporation of another 
State which was engaged in interstate commerce and neither owned nor 
operated facilities in Texas was inoperative by reason of imposing a 
burden on interstate commerce.

344. Air-Way Corp. v. Day, 266 U.S. 71 (1924).
        Ohio law which levied an annual fee on foreign corporations for 
the privilege of exercising their franchise in the State, which was 
computed at the rate of 5 cents per share upon the proportion of the 
number of shares of authorized common stock represented by property 
owned and used and business transacted in Ohio was void as imposing a 
burden on interstate commerce when applied to a foreign corporation all 
of whose business, intrastate and interstate, and all of whose property 
were represented by the shares outstanding; application of the rate to 
all shares authorized, or even to a greater number than the total 
outstanding, amounted to a burden on all property and business including 
interstate commerce. As imposed, the tax also violated the equal 
protection clause.

345. Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Dunken, 266 U.S. 389 (1924).
        Policy of insurance originally issued to insurer in Tennessee 
and converted by him in Texas from term insurance to 20 year payment 
life was deemed to be a mere continuation of the original policy, and 
upon suit on the policy in Texas, a Texas law imposing a penalty and 
allowing an attorney's fee could not constitutionally be applied against 
the insurer for the reason that Texas could not regulate contracts 
consummated outside its limits in conformity with the laws of the place 
where the contract was made without violating full faith and credit 
clause.

346. Ozark Pipe Line Corp. v. Monier, 266 U.S. 555 (1925).
        Missouri law which required foreign corporations doing business 
therein to pay an annual franchise tax of 1/10 of 1% of the par value of 
capital stock and surplus employed in business in the State could not 
constitutionally be exacted of a pipe line company for the privilege of 
doing in Missouri what was exclusively an interstate business.

    Concurring: Justices Sutherland, Holmes, Van Devanter, McReynolds, 
Butler, Sanford, McKenna, Chief Justice Taft.

    Justice Dissenting: Brandeis.

347. Michigan Commission v. Duke, 266 U.S. 570 (1925).
        Michigan law which converted an interstate contract motor 
carrier into a public utility by legislative fiat in effect took 
property for public use without compensation in violation of the due 
process

[[Page 2091]]
clause, and also imposed unreasonable conditions on the right to carry 
on interstate commerce.

348. Flanagan v. Federal Coal Co., 267 U.S. 222 (1925).
        In a suit for breach of contract, plaintiff's right to maintain 
suit could not be barred by his failure to pay a Tennessee license tax 
for the reason that the state law levying the same could not be applied 
to a contract for the purchase of coal to be delivered to customers in 
other States, that is, in interstate commerce.

349. Buck v. Kuykendall, 267 U.S. 307 (1925).
        Washington law which prohibited motor vehicle common carriers 
for hire from using its highways without obtaining a certificate of 
convenience could not validly be exacted of an interstate motor carrier; 
the law was not a regulation designed to promote public safety but a 
prohibition of competition and, accordingly, burdened interstate 
commerce.

    Concurring: Justices Brandeis, Sanford, Sutherland, Van Devanter, 
Butler, Holmes, Chief Justice Taft.

    Dissenting: Justice McReynolds.

350. Accord: Bush Co. v. Maloy, 267 U.S. 317 (1925), voiding like 
        application of a similar Maryland law.

    Concurring: Justices Brandeis, Sutherland, Van Devanter, Holmes, 
Sanford, Butler, Chief Justice Taft.

    Justice Dissenting: McReynolds.

351. Accord: Allen v. Galveston Truck Line Corp., 289 U.S. 708 (1933), 
        voiding like application of a Texas law.

352. Missouri Pacific R.R. v. Stroud, 267 U.S. 404 (1925).
        When carrier had two routes by which freight might move between 
two points in a State, the second of which was partly interstate, a suit 
against the carrier for discrimination in the furnishing of cars which 
arose out of use of the interstate route in conformity with the 
carrier's practice was governed by the Interstate Commerce Act, and the 
Missouri law governing such discrimination was superseded and 
inapplicable (Art. VI).

353. Lancaster v. McCarty, 267 U.S. 427 (1925).
        Federal law (39 Stat. 441 (1916)) which authorized carriers to 
limit liability upon property received for transportation to value 
declared by shipper, where the rates were based on such value pursuant 
to authority of Interstate Commerce Commission, superseded Texas law in 
respect to a claim for damage to goods shipped intrastate between Texas 
points for the reason that the tariff and classification had been 
adopted by the carrier pursuant to an order of the Commis

[[Page 2092]]
sion requiring it to remove discrimination against interstate commerce 
which had resulted from lower Texas intrastate rates.

354. Shafer v. Farmers Grain Co., 268 U.S. 189 (1925).
        North Dakota Grain Grading Act which required locally grown 
wheat, 90% of which was for interstate shipment, to be graded by 
licensed inspectors and imposed various requirements, such as the 
keeping of records of quantity purchased and price paid and the exaction 
of bonds from purchasers maintaining grain elevators was not supportable 
as an inspection law and was void by reason of imposing undue burdens on 
interstate commerce.

    Concurring: Justices Van Devanter, Holmes, Butler, McReynolds, 
Sutherland, Sanford, Stone, Chief Justice Taft.

    Justice Dissenting: Brandeis.

355. Alpha Cement Co. v. Massachusetts, 268 U.S. 203 (1925).
        Massachusetts law which imposed excise tax on foreign 
corporations doing business therein, measured by a combination of the 
total value of capital shares attributable to transactions therein and 
the proportion of net income attributable to such transactions, could 
not validly be applied to a foreign corporation which transacted only as 
interstate business therein. The tax as here imposed also violated the 
due process clause by affecting property beyond Massachusetts borders.

    Concurring: Justices McReynolds, Holmes, Van Devanter, Butler, 
Sutherland, Stone, Sanford, Chief Justice Taft.

    Dissenting: Justice Brandeis.

356. Frick v. Pennsylvania, 268 U.S. 473 (1925).
        Pennsylvania estate tax law, insofar as it measured the tax on 
the transfer of that part of the decedent's estate located within 
Pennsylvania by taking the whole of the decedent's estate which included 
tangible personal property located outside Pennsylvania, was violative 
of due process.

357. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
        Oregon Compulsory Education Law which required every parent to 
send his child to a public school was an unconstitutional interference 
with the liberty of parents and guardians to direct the upbringing of 
children and was violative of due process.

358. Davis v. Cohen, 268 U.S. 638 (1925).
        When the Federal Transportation Act of 1920 provided that suits 
on claims arising out of federal wartime control of the railroads might 
be brought against a federal agent, if instituted within two years after 
federal control had ended, Massachusetts law allowing amendments of 
proceedings prior to judgment, could not be invoked to sub

[[Page 2093]]
stitute the Agent as defendant more than two years after federal control 
had ended; the suit in which the substitution was attempted had 
erroneously been filed against the railroad rather than against the 
Federal Director General during the period of federal control, and since 
the substitution amounted to filing a new action, invocation of the 
Massachusetts law was repugnant to the Federal Transportation Act's 
provisions as to limitations.

359. Lee v. Osceola Imp. Dist., 268 U.S. 643 (1925).
        Arkansas statute which imposed special assessment on lands 
acquired by private owners from the United States on account of benefits 
resulting from road improvements completed before the United States 
parted with title effected a taking of property without due process of 
law.

360. First Nat'l Bank v. Anderson, 269 U.S. 341 (1926).
        As applied to national banks, Iowa tax law providing for a levy 
on shares of such banks at rates less favorable than the rates applied 
to moneyed capital invested in competition with such banks was repugnant 
to federal law prohibiting such discrimination (Art. VI).

361. Connally v. General Const. Co., 269 U.S. 385 (1926).
        Iowa law which imposed severe, cumulative punishments upon 
contractors with the State who paid their workers less than ``the 
current rate of per diem wages in the locality where the work is 
performed'' was void for vagueness and violative of due process.

    Concurring: Justices Brandeis, Holmes.

362. Browning v. Hooper, 269 U.S. 396 (1926).
        Texas statute which permitted property taxpaying voters to 
originate an election approving creation of a road improvement district 
with power to float bond issue and to levy taxes to amortize the same, 
with provision for establishment of the district if approved by two-
thirds of those voting in the election, was procedurally defective in 
that each taxpayer to be assessed for the improvement was not accorded a 
notice and opportunity to be heard on the question of the benefits and 
hence denied due process.

363. Rhode Island Trust Co. v. Doughton, 270 U.S. 69 (1926).
        North Carolina law purporting to tax inheritance of shares owned 
by nonresident in a foreign corporation having 50% or more of its 
property in North Carolina was violative of due process inasmuch as the 
property of a corporation is not owned by a shareholder and presence of 
corporate property in the State did not give it jurisdiction over his 
shares for tax purposes.


[[Page 2094]]

364. Oregon-Washington Co. v. Washington, 270 U.S. 87 (1926).
        Federal legislation having preempted the field, a Washington law 
which established a quarantine against importation of hay and alfalfa 
meal, except in sealed containers, coming from areas in other States 
harboring the alfalfa weevil was inoperative.

    Concurring: Chief Justice Taft, Justices Holmes, Van Devanter, 
Brandeis, Butler, Sanford, Stone.

    Justices Dissenting: McReynolds, Sutherland.

365. Schlesinger v. Wisconsin, 270 U.S. 230 (1926).
        Wisconsin law which established a conclusive presumption that 
all gifts of a material part of a decedent's estate made by him within 
six years of his death were made in contemplation of death and therefore 
subject to the graduated inheritance tax created an arbitrary 
classification violative of the due process and equal protection 
clauses.

    Concurring: Justices McReynolds, Butler, Sutherland, Sanford, Van 
Devanter, Chief Justice Taft.

    Dissenting: Justices Holmes, Brandeis, Stone.

        Accord: Uihlein v. Wisconsin, 273 U.S. 642 (1926).

366. Weaver v. Palmer Bros., 270 U.S. 402 (1926).
        Pennsylvania law which prohibited the use of shoddy, even when 
sterilized, in the manufacture of bedding materials, was so arbitrary 
and unreasonable as to be violative of due process.

    Concurring: Butler, Van Devanter, Sutherland, Sanford, McReynolds, 
Chief Justice Taft.

    Dissenting: Justices Holmes, Brandeis, Stone.

367. Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. Tafoya, 270 U.S. 426 (1926).
        New Mexico law which forbade insurance companies authorized to 
do business in that State to pay any nonresident any fee for the 
obtaining or placing of any policies covering risks in New Mexico was 
violative of due process by reason of attempting to control conduct 
beyond the jurisdiction of New Mexico.

    Concurring: Justices Holmes, Van Devanter, Sutherland, Stone, 
Butler, Chief Justice Taft.

    Dissenting: Justices McReynolds, Brandeis, Sanford.

368. Childers v. Beaver, 270 U.S. 555 (1926).
        Oklahoma inheritance tax law, applied to inheritance by Indians 
of Indian lands as determined by federal law, was void as a tax on a 
federal instrumentality.

369. Appleby v. City of New York, 271 U.S. 365 (1926).
        Acts of New York of 1857 and 1871 authorizing New York City to 
erect piers over submerged lots impaired the obligation of contract as 
embraced in deeds to such submerged lots conveyed to private

[[Page 2095]]
owners for valuable consideration through deeds executed by New York 
City in 1852.

370. Appleby v. Delaney, 271 U.S. 403 (1926).
        Act of New York of 1871 whereby New York City was authorized to 
construct certain harbor improvements impaired the obligation of 
contract embraced in prior deeds to grantees whereunder the latter were 
accorded the privilege of filling in their underwater lots and 
constructing piers thereover.

371. Frost Trucking Co. v. Railroad Comm'n, 271 U.S. 583 (1926).
        California law whereunder private carriers by automobile for 
hire could not operate over California highways between fixed points in 
the State without obtaining a certificate of convenience and submitting 
to regulation as common carriers exacted an unconstitutional condition 
and effected a denial of due process.

    Concurring: Justices Sutherland, McReynolds (separately), Chief 
Justice Taft, Sanford, Stone, Butler, Van Devanter.

    Dissenting: Justices Holmes, Brandeis.

372. Jaybird Mining Co. v. Wier, 271 U.S. 609 (1926).
        Oklahoma law which levied an ad valorem tax on ores mined and in 
bins on the land was void as a tax on federal instrumentality when 
applied to a lessee of Indian land leased with the approval of the 
Secretary of the Interior.

    Justices Concurring: Butler, Stone, Holmes, Sanford, Sutherland, Van 
Devanter, Chief Justice Taft.

    Dissenting: Justices McReynolds, Brandeis.

373. Hughes Bros. v. Minnesota, 272 U.S. 469 (1926).
        Minnesota law levying personal property tax could not be 
collected on logs cut in Minnesota pursuant to a contract of sale for 
delivery in Michigan while they were in transit in interstate commerce 
by a route from Minnesota to Michigan.

374. Hanover Ins. Co. v. Harding, 272 U.S. 494 (1926).
        When an Illinois tax law originally is construed as a personal 
property tax whereby the local net receipts of foreign insurance 
companies were subjected to assessment at only 30% of full value, but at 
a later date is construed as a privilege tax with the result that all 
the local net income of such foreign companies was taxed at the rate 
applicable to personal property while domestic companies continued to 
pay the tax on their personal property assessed at the reduced 
valuation, the resulting discrimination denied the foreign companies the 
equal protection of the laws.


[[Page 2096]]

375. Wachovia Trust Co. v. Doughton, 272 U.S. 567 (1926).
        North Carolina inheritance tax law could not validly be applied 
to property constituting a trust fund in Massachusetts established under 
the will of a Massachusetts resident and bestowing a power of 
appointment upon a North Carolina resident who exercised that power 
through a will made in North Carolina; the levy by a State of the tax on 
property beyond its jurisdiction was violative of due process.

    Concurring: Justices Holmes, Brandeis, Stone.

376. Ottinger v. Consolidated Gas Co., 272 U.S. 576 (1926).
        Act of New York prescribing a gas rate of $1 per thousand feet 
was confiscatory and deprived the utility of its property without due 
process of law.
        Accord: Ottinger v. Brooklyn Union Co., 272 U.S. 579 (1926).

377. Napier v. Atlantic Coast Line Ry., 272 U.S. 605 (1926).
        The Federal Boiler Inspection Act having occupied the field of 
regulation pertaining to locomotive equipment on interstate highways, a 
Georgia law requiring cab curtains and automatic fire box doors was 
deemed to have been superseded and therefore inoperative.

378. Miller v. Milwaukee, 272 U.S. 713 (1927).
        Wisconsin law which exempted income of corporation derived from 
interest received from tax exempt federal bonds owned by said 
corporation, but which attempted to tax such income indirectly by taxing 
only so much of the stockholder's dividends as corresponded to the 
corporate income not assessed, was invalid.

    Concurring: Justices Brandeis, Stone.

379. Di Santo v. Pennsylvania, 273 U.S. 34 (1927).
        Pennsylvania law exacting a license from persons engaged in the 
State in the sale of steamship tickets and orders for transportation to 
or from foreign countries was void as imposing an undue burden on 
foreign commerce.

    Concurring: Justices Butler, McReynolds, Van Devanter, Sutherland, 
Sanford, Chief Justice Taft.

    Dissenting: Justices Brandeis, Holmes, Stone.

380. Missouri Pacific R.R. v. Porter, 273 U.S. 341 (1927).
        Congress having occupied the field by its own legislation, an 
Arkansas law which prohibited carriers from incorporating into their 
bills of lading stipulations exempting the carriers from liability for 
loss of shipments by fire not due to the carriers' negligence was deemed 
to have been superseded and therefore inoperative.


[[Page 2097]]

381. Tyson & Bro. v. Banton, 273 U.S. 418 (1927).
        New York law which prohibited ticket agencies for selling 
theatre tickets at prices in excess of 50 cents over the price printed 
on the ticket was void by reason of regulating a business not affected 
with the public interest and depriving such business of due process.

    Concurring: Justices Sutherland, Van Devanter, Butler, McReynolds, 
Chief Justice Taft.

    Dissenting: Justices Holmes, Brandeis, Stone, Sanford.

382. Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927).
        Ohio law which compensated mayors serving as judges in minor 
prohibition offenses solely out of the fees and costs collected from 
defendants who were convicted was violative of due process.

383. Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927).
        Texas White Primary Law which barred Negroes from participation 
in Democratic party primary elections denied them the equal protection 
of the laws.

384. First Nat'l Bank v. Hartford, 273 U.S. 548 (1927).
        Wisconsin tax law, as imposed on shares of a national bank, was 
in conflict with federal law prohibiting state taxation of such shares 
at rates in excess of those levied on moneyed capital employed in 
competition with the business of such banks and was therefore 
inoperative as to the shares of said banks.

385. Accord: Minnesota v. First Nat'l Bank, 273 U.S. 561 (1927), holding 
        inoperative for the same reason a Minnesota law taxing national 
        bank shares.

386. Accord: Commercial Nat'l Bank v. Custer County, 275 U.S. 502 
        (1927), holding inoperative a similar Montana tax law.

387. Accord: Keating v. Public Nat'l Bank, 284 U.S. 587 (1932), holding 
        inoperative for the same reason a New York tax law.

388. Fairmont Co. v. Minnesota, 274 U.S. 1 (1927).
        Minnesota law which punished anyone who discriminated between 
different localities of that State by buying dairy products in one 
locality at a higher price than was paid for the same commodities in 
another locality infringed liberty of contract as protected by the due 
process clause.

    Concurring: Justices McReynolds, Butler, Van Devanter, Sanford, 
Sutherland, Chief Justice Taft.

    Dissenting: Justices Holmes, Brandeis, Stone.


[[Page 2098]]


389. Ohio Pub. Serv. Co. v. Ohio ex rel. Fritz, 274 U.S. 12 (1927).
        Ohio law which destroyed assignability of a franchise previously 
granted to an electric company by a municipal ordinance impaired the 
obligation of contract.

    Concurring: Justices McReynolds, Sutherland, Stone, Sanford, Butler, 
Van Devanter, Chief Justice Taft.

    Dissenting: Justices Holmes, Brandeis.

390. Southern Ry. v. Kentucky, 274 U.S. 76 (1927).
        Kentucky law which imposed a franchise tax on railroad 
corporations was constitutionally defective and violative of due process 
insofar as it was computed by including mileage outside the State which 
did not in any plain and intelligible way add to the value of the road 
and the rights exercised in Kentucky.

    Concurring: Justices Butler, Holmes, Sutherland, Stone, McReynolds, 
Van Devanter, Sanford, Chief Justice Taft.

    Dissenting: Justice Brandeis.

391. Road Improv. Dist. v. Missouri Pacific R.R., 274 U.S. 188 (1927).
        Special assessments levied against a railroad by a road district 
pursuant to an Arkansas statute and based on real property and rolling 
stock and other personalty were unreasonably discriminatory and 
excessive and deprived the railroad of property without due process by 
reason of the fact that other assessments for the same improvement were 
based solely on real property.

392. Fiske v. Kansas, 274 U.S. 380 (1927).
        As construed and applied to an organization not shown to have 
advocated any crime, violence, or other unlawful acts, the Kansas 
criminal syndicalism law was violative of due process.

393. Cline v. Frink Dairy Co., 274 U.S. 445 (1927).
        By reason of the exception contained therein, whereby its 
prohibitions were not to apply to conduct engaged in by participants 
whenever necessary to obtain a reasonable profit from products traded 
in, the Colorado Antitrust Law was void for want of a fixed standard for 
determining guilt and violative of due process.

394. Power Mfg. Co. v. Saunders, 274 U.S. 490 (1927).
        As applied to a foreign corporation having a fixed place of 
business and an agent in one county, but no property, debts or anything 
also in the county in which it was sued, Arkansas law which authorized 
actions to be brought against a foreign corporation in any county in the 
State, while restricting actions against domestic corporations to the 
county where it had a place of business or where its chief officer 
resided, deprived the foreign corporation of equal protection of the 
laws.


[[Page 2099]]


    Concurring: Justices Van Devanter, McReynolds, Sutherland, Stone, 
Sanford, Butler, Chief Justice Taft.

    Dissenting: Justices Holmes, Brandeis.

395. Northwestern Ins. Co. v. Wisconsin, 275 U.S. 136 (1927).
        Wisconsin law levying a tax on the gross income of domestic 
insurance companies was void where the income was derived in part as 
interest on United States bonds.

396. Wuchter v. Pizzutti, 276 U.S. 13 (1928).
        New Jersey statute which provided that in suits by residents 
against nonresidents for injuries resulting from operation of motor 
vehicles by the latter, service might be made on the Secretary of State 
as their agent, but which failed to provide any assurance that notice of 
such service would be communicated to the nonresidents, was violative of 
due process.

    Concurring: Chief Justice Taft, Justices Van Devanter, Butler, 
Sutherland, Sanford, McReynolds.

    Dissenting: Justices Brandeis, Holmes, Stone.

397. Accord: Consolidated Flour Mills Co. v. Muegge, 278 U.S. 559 
        (1928), voiding similar service as authorized by an Oklahoma 
        law.

398. Missouri ex rel. Robertson v. Miller, 276 U.S. 174 (1928).
        Mississippi statute which terminated right of retired revenue 
agent to prosecute suits for unpaid taxes in the name of his successor 
by requiring that the successor approve and join in such suits, and 
which further stipulated that the successor share equally in the 
commissions hitherto accruing solely to the retired agent, was held to 
impair the latter's rights under the contract clause insofar as it was 
enforced retroactively to accord a share to the successor in suits 
instituted by the retired agent before this legislative alteration.

399. Montana Nat'l Bank v. Yellowstone County, 276 U.S. 479 (1928).
        Montana law which levied tax on national bank shares was 
violative of federal law prohibiting levy on such shares as rates higher 
than those assessed on moneyed capital in hands of individual citizens.

400. New Brunswick v. United States, 276 U.S. 547 (1928).
        Property taxes assessed under New Jersey law on land acquired 
from the United States Housing Corporation by private purchasers subject 
to retention of mortgage by the federal agency could not be collected by 
sale of the land unless the federal liens were excluded and preserved as 
prior liens.

    Concurring: Justices Sanford, Stone, Sutherland, Butler, Brandeis, 
Holmes, Van Devanter, Chief Justice Taft.

    Dissenting: Justice McReynolds.


[[Page 2100]]


401. Brooke v. Norfolk, 277 U.S. 27 (1928).
        State and city taxes authorized under laws of Virginia may not 
be levied on the corpus of a trust located in Maryland, the income from 
which accrued to a beneficiary resident in Virginia; the corpus was 
beyond the jurisdiction of Virginia and accordingly the assessments were 
violative of due process.

402. Louisville Gas Co. v. Coleman, 277 U.S. 32 (1928).
        Kentucky law which conditioned the recording of mortgages not 
maturing within five years upon the payment of a tax of 20 cents for 
each $100 of value secured, but which exempted mortgages maturing within 
that period was void as denying equal protection of the laws.

    Concurring: Justices Sutherland, Butler, Van Devanter, McReynolds, 
Chief Justice Taft.

    Dissenting: Justices Holmes, Brandeis, Sanford, Stone.

403. Long v. Rockwood, 277 U.S. 142 (1928).
        Massachusetts income tax law could not validly be imposed on 
income received by a citizen as royalties for the use of patents issued 
by the United States.

    Concurring: Justices McReynolds, Butler, Van Devanter, Sanford, 
Chief Justice Taft.

    Dissenting: Justices Holmes, Brandeis, Sutherland, Stone.

404. Standard Pipe Line v. Highway Dist., 277 U.S. 160 (1928).
        Arkansas law which purported to validate assessments by the 
district was ineffective to sustain an arbitrary assessment against the 
pipe line at the rate of $5,000 per mile in view of the fact that the 
pipe line originally was constructed in 1909-1915 at a cost under $9,000 
per mile, and the benefit, if any, which accrued to the pipe line was 
small.

405. Panhandle Oil Co. v. Mississippi ex rel. Knox, 277 U.S. 218 (1928).
        Mississippi law imposing tax on the sale of gasoline was void as 
applied to sales to federal instrumentalities such as the Coast Guard or 
a Veterans' Hospital.

    Concurring: Justices Butler, Sutherland, Van Devanter, Sanford, 
Chief Justice Taft.

    Dissenting: Justices Holmes, Brandeis, Stone, McReynolds.

406. Accord: Graysburg Oil Co. v. Texas, 278 U.S. 582 (1929), voiding 
        application of Texas gasoline tax statute to gasoline sold to 
        the United States.

407. Ribnik v. McBride, 277 U.S. 350 (1928).
        New Jersey law empowering Secretary of Labor to fix the fees 
charged by employment agencies was violative of due process inas

[[Page 2101]]
much as the regulation was not imposed on a business affected with a 
public interest.

    Concurring: Justices Sutherland, Chief Justice Taft, Sanford, 
Butler, McReynolds, Van Devanter.

    Dissenting: Justices Stone, Holmes, Brandeis.

408. Quaker City Cab Co. v. Pennsylvania, 277 U.S. 389 (1928).
        Pennsylvania law which taxed gross receipts of foreign and 
domestic corporations derived from intrastate operation of taxicabs, but 
exempted like receipts derived by individuals and partnerships, denied 
equal protection of the laws.

    Concurring: Justices Butler, Sutherland, Sanford, Van Devanter, 
McReynolds, Chief Justice Taft.

    Dissenting: Justices Holmes, Brandeis, Stone.

409. Foster-Fountain Packing Co. v. Haydel, 278 U.S. 1 (1928).
        Louisiana Shrimp Act which permitted shipment of shrimp taken in 
Louisiana tidal waters only if the heads and hulls had previously been 
removed, and which was designed to favor the canning in Louisiana of 
shrimp destined for the interstate market, was unconstitutional; those 
taking the shrimp immediately became entitled to ship them in interstate 
commerce.

    Concurring: Justices Butler, Sutherland, Sanford, Stone, Van 
Devanter, Holmes, Brandeis, Chief Justice Taft.

    Dissenting: Justice McReynolds.

410. Accord: Johnson v. Haydel, 278 U.S. 16 (1928), voiding the 
        Louisiana Oyster Act for like reasons.

411. Hunt v. United States, 278 U.S. 96 (1928).
        Arizona game laws were not enforceable in a national game 
preserve and could not be invoked to prevent the killing of wild deer 
therein as ordered by federal officers.

412. Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Baldridge, 278 U.S. 105 (1928).
        Pennsylvania law which prohibited corporate ownership of a drug 
store unless all of the stockholders were licensed pharmacists had no 
reasonable relationship to public health and therefore was violative of 
due process.

    Concurring: Justices Sutherland, Butler, Van Devanter, Stone, 
Sanford, McReynolds, Chief Justice Taft.

    Dissenting: Justices Holmes, Brandeis.

413. Williams v. Standard Oil Co., 278 U.S. 235 (1929).
        Tennessee law which fixed the prices at which gasoline may be 
sold violated the due process clause inasmuch as the business sought to 
be regulated was not affected with a public interest.


[[Page 2102]]


    Concurring: Justices Sutherland, Stone (separately), Sanford, 
McReynolds, Butler, Brandeis (separately), Van Devanter, Chief Justice 
Taft.

    Dissenting: Justice Holmes.

414. International Shoe Co. v. Pinkus, 278 U.S. 261 (1929).
        Arkansas insolvency law was superseded by the Federal Bankruptcy 
Act to the extent that a creditor of one who invoked the state laws was 
entitled to have his claim paid by the state receiver in conformity with 
the order of distribution sanctioned by the federal law.

    Concurring: Justices Butler, Holmes, Stone, Sanford, Van Devanter, 
Chief Justice Taft.

    Dissenting: Justices McReynolds, Brandeis, Sutherland.

415. Cudahy Co. v. Hinkle, 278 U.S. 460 (1929).
        Where the local property of a foreign corporation and the part 
of its business transacted in the State, less than half of which was 
intrastate, were but small fractions of its entire property and its 
nationwide business, Washington law which imposed a tax on such company 
in the form of a filing fee and a license tax, both reckoned upon its 
authorized capital stock, was inoperative by reason of burdening 
interstate commerce and reaching property beyond the State contrary to 
due process.

    Concurring: Justices McReynolds, Sutherland, Stone, Sanford, Butler, 
Van Devanter, Chief Justice Taft.

    Dissenting: Justices Brandeis, Holmes.

416. Frost v. Corporation Comm'n, 278 U.S. 515 (1929).
        Oklahoma law which permitted an individual to engage in the 
business of ginning cotton only upon a showing of public necessity, but 
allowed a corporation to engage in said business in the same locality 
without such showing denied the individual equal protection of the law.

    Concurring: Justices Sutherland, Butler, Van Devanter, McReynolds, 
Sanford, Chief Justice Taft.

    Dissenting: Justices Brandeis, Holmes, Stone.

417. Manley v. Georgia, 279 U.S. 1 (1929).
        Georgia banking law which declared every insolvency of a bank 
shall be deemed to have been fraudulent, with provision for rebutting 
said presumption, was arbitrary and unreasonable and violative of due 
process.

418. Nielsen v. Johnson, 279 U.S. 47 (1929).
        Iowa inheritance tax law discriminating against nonresident 
alien heirs was violative of a treaty with Denmark.

419. Carson Petroleum Co. v. Vial, 279 U.S. 95 (1929).
        Louisiana tax law could not be enforced against oil purchased at 
interior points for export in foreign commerce for the oil did not lose

[[Page 2103]]
its character as goods in foreign commerce merely because, after 
shipment to the exporter at a Louisiana port, the oil was temporarily 
stored there preparatory to loading on vessels of foreign consignees.

    Concurring: Chief Justice Taft, Justices Holmes, Brandeis, Stone, 
Sanford, Van Devanter, Butler.

    Dissenting: Justices McReynolds, Sutherland.

420. London Guarantee & Accident Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 279 U.S. 109 
        (1929).
        California workmen's compensation act could not be applied in 
settlement of a claim for the death of a seaman in a case that was 
subject to the exclusive maritime jurisdiction of federal courts.

    Concurring: Chief Justice Taft, Justices Holmes, Stone, Sanford, 
Sutherland, McReynolds, Butler, Van Devanter.

    Dissenting: Justice Brandeis.

421. Helson v. Kentucky, 279 U.S. 245 (1929).
        Kentucky law imposing a tax on the sale of gasoline could not be 
applied to gasoline purchased outside Kentucky for use in a ferry 
engaged as an instrumentality of interstate commerce, that is, in 
operation on the Ohio River between Kentucky and Illinois.

    Concurring: Justices Sutherland, Butler, Van Devanter, Sanford, 
Stone (separately), Brandeis (separately), Holmes (separately), Chief 
Justice Taft.

    Dissenting: Justice McReynolds.

422. Macallen Co. v. Massachusetts, 279 U.S. 620 (1929).
        Massachusetts law imposing an excise on domestic business 
corporations was in reality a statute imposing a tax on income rather 
than a tax on the corporate privilege and, as an income tax law, could 
not be imposed on income derived from United States bonds nor, by reason 
of impairment of the obligation of contract on income from local county 
and municipal bonds exempt by statutory contract.

    Concurring: Justices Sutherland, Sanford, Butler, Van Devanter, 
McReynolds, Chief Justice Taft.

    Dissenting: Justices Stone, Holmes, Brandeis.

423. Western & Atlantic R.R. v. Henderson, 279 U.S. 639 (1929).
        Georgia law which viewed a fatal collision between railroad and 
motor car at grade crossing as raising a presumption of negligence on 
the part of the railroad and as the proximate cause of death and which 
permitted the jury to weigh the presumption as evidence against the 
testimony of the railroad's witnesses tending to prove due care was 
unreasonable and violative of due process.

424. Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. Virginia, 280 U.S. 83 (1929).
        Virginia law which levied a property tax on corpus of a trust 
consisting of securities managed by a Maryland trustee which paid over

[[Page 2104]]
to children of settlor, all of whom resided in Virginia, the income 
therefrom, was violative of due process in that it taxed intangibles 
with a taxable situs in Maryland, where the trustee and owner of the 
legal title was located.

    Concurring: Justices McReynolds, Van Devanter, Butler, Sutherland, 
Sanford, Stone (separately), Brandeis (separately), Holmes (separately), 
Chief Justice Taft.

425. Farmers Loan Co. v. Minnesota, 280 U.S. 204 (1930).
        Minnesota inheritance tax law, insofar as it was applied to 
Minnesota securities kept in New York by the decedent who died domiciled 
in New York was violative of due process.

    Concurring: Justices McReynolds, Van Devanter, Butler, Sutherland, 
Sanford, Stone (separately), Chief Justice Taft.

426. New Jersey Tel. Co. v. Tax Board, 280 U.S. 338 (1930).
        New Jersey franchise tax law, levied at the rate of 5% of gross 
receipts of a telephone company engaged in interstate and foreign 
commerce, was a direct tax on foreign and interstate commerce and void.

    Concurring: Justices Butler, Sutherland, Sanford, Van Devanter, 
McReynolds.

    Dissenting: Justices Holmes, Brandeis.

427. Carpenter v. Shaw, 280 U.S. 363 (1930).
        Oklahoma law which imposed a 3% tax on the gross value of 
royalties from oil and gas was void as a tax on the right reserved to 
Indians as owners and lessors of the fee when applied to Indians who had 
received allotments exempted under the Atoka agreement and leased by 
them for production of oil and gas (Art. VI).

428. Moore v. Mitchell, 281 U.S. 18 (1930).
        Indiana was powerless to give any force or effect beyond her 
borders to its law of 1927 purporting to authorize a county treasurer to 
institute suits for unpaid taxes owed by a nonresident; such officer 
derived no authority in New York from this Indiana law and hence had no 
legal capacity to institute the suit in a federal court in the latter 
State.

429. Lindgren v. United States, 281 U.S. 38 (1930).
        The right of action given under the Federal Merchant Marine Act 
to the personal representative to recover damages on behalf of 
beneficiaries for the death of a seaman resulting from negligence was 
exclusive and precluded a right of recovery by reason of unseaworthiness 
predicated upon the death statute of Virginia where the injury was 
sustained.


[[Page 2105]]

430. Baizley Iron Works v. Span, 281 U.S. 222 (1930).
        Pennsylvania Workmen's Compensation Act could not be invoked to 
obtain recovery for injuries sustained by a workman while painting angle 
irons in the engine room of a ship tied to a pier in navigable waters; 
recovery was controlled exclusively by federal maritime law.

    Concurring: Justices McReynolds, Sutherland, Butler, Van Devanter.

    Dissenting: Justices Stone, Holmes, Brandeis.

431. Accord: Employers' Liability Assurance Co. v. Cook, 281 U.S. 233 
        (1930).
        Texas workman's compensation law inapplicable for the same 
reason.

    Justices Concurring: McReynolds, Butler, Sutherland, Van Devanter, 
Stone (separately), Holmes (separately), Brandeis (separately).

432. Missouri ex rel. Missouri Ins. Co. v. Gehner, 281 U.S. 313 (1930).
        Missouri law which provided that, in taxing assets of insurance 
companies, the amounts of their legal reserves and unpaid policy claims 
should first be deducted was invalid as applied to a company owning 
nontaxable United States bonds insofar as the law was construed to 
require that the deduction should be reduced by the proportion that the 
value which such bonds bore to total assets; the company thus was 
saddled with a heavier tax burden than would have been imposed had it 
not owned such bonds.

    Concurring: Justices Butler, Van Devanter, McReynolds, Sutherland, 
Chief Justice Hughes (separately).

    Dissenting: Justices Stone, Holmes, Brandeis.

433. Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397 (1930).
        Texas law, which forbade insurance stipulations limiting the 
time for suit on a claim for a period less than two years, could not 
constitutionally be applied, consistently with due process, to permit 
recovery contrary to the terms of a fire insurance policy executed in 
Mexico by a Mexican insurer and covered in part by reinsurance effected 
in Mexico and New York by New York insurers licensed to do business in 
Texas who defended against a Texas claimant to whom the policy was 
assigned while he was a resident of Mexico and where he resided when the 
loss was sustained.

434. Baldwin v. Missouri, 281 U.S. 586 (1930).
        Missouri not having jurisdiction for tax purposes of various 
intangibles, such as bank accounts and federal securities held in banks 
therein and owned by a decedent domiciled in Illinois, its transfer tax 
law could not be applied, consistently with due process, to the transfer 
thereof, under a will probated in Illinois, to the decedent's son who 
also was domiciled in Illinois.


[[Page 2106]]


    Concurring: Justices McReynolds, Van Devanter, Sutherland, Butler.

    Dissenting: Justices Holmes, Brandeis, Stone (separately).

435. Surplus Trading Co. v. Cook, 281 U.S. 647 (1930).
        Arkansas personal property tax laws could not be enforced 
against the purchaser of army blankets situate within an army cantonment 
in that State, as to which exclusive federal jurisdiction attached under 
Art. I, Sec. 8, cl. 17.

436. Beidler v. South Carolina Tax Comm'n, 282 U.S. 1 (1930).
        South Carolina inheritance tax law could not be applied, 
consistently with due process, to affect the transfer by will of shares 
in a South Carolina corporation and debts owed by the latter belonging 
to a decedent who died domiciled in Illinois; such intangibles were not 
shown to have acquired any taxable business situs in South Carolina.

    Concurring: Chief Justice Hughes, Justices Holmes (separately), 
Brandeis (separately), Van Devanter, McReynolds, Sutherland, Butler, 
Stone, Roberts.

437. Chicago, St. P., M.&P. Ry. v. Holmberg, 282 U.S. 162 (1930).
        Nebraska law, as construed, which required a railroad to provide 
an underground cattle-pass across its right of way partly at its own 
expense for the purpose, not of advancing safety, but merely for the 
convenience of a farmer owning land on both sides of the railroad, 
deprived the latter of property without due process.

438. Furst v. Brewster, 282 U.S. 493 (1931).
        Arkansas law which withheld from a foreign corporation the right 
to sue in state courts unless it had filed a copy of its charter and a 
financial statement and had designated a local office and an agent to 
accept service of process could not constitutionally be enforced to 
prevent suit by a non-complying foreign corporation to collect a debt 
which arose out of an interstate transaction for the sale of goods.

439. Coolidge v. Long, 282 U.S. 582 (1931).
        Massachusetts law which imposed succession taxes on all property 
within Massachusetts transferred by deed or gift intended to take effect 
in possession or enjoyment after the death of the grantor, or 
transferred to any person absolutely or in trust, could not, 
consistently with due process and the contract clause, be enforced with 
reference to rights of succession or rights effected by gift which 
vested under trust agreements created prior to passage of said act, 
notwithstanding that the settlor died after its passage.

    Concurring: Justices Butler, Van Devanter, McReynolds, Sutherland, 
Chief Justice Hughes.

    Dissenting: Justices Roberts, Holmes, Brandeis, Stone.


[[Page 2107]]


440. Hans Rees' Sons v. North Carolina ex rel. Maxwell, 283 U.S. 123 
        (1931).
        North Carolina income tax law, as applied to income of New York 
corporation which manufactured leather goods in North Carolina for sale 
in New York, was violative of due process by reason of the fact that the 
formula for allocating income to that State, namely, that part of the 
corporation's net income which bears the same ratio to entire net income 
as the value of its tangible property in North Carolina bears to the 
value of all its tangible property, attributed to North Carolina a 
portion of total income which was out of all appropriate proportion to 
the business of the corporation conducted in North Carolina.

441. Interstate Transit, Inc. v. Lindsey, 283 U.S. 183 (1931).
        Tennessee law which imposed a privilege tax graduated to 
carrying capacity on motor buses, the proceeds from which were not 
segregated for application to highway maintenance, was void insofar as 
the privilege tax was imposed on a bus carrier engaged exclusively in 
interstate commerce.

    Concurring: Justices Brandeis, Van Devanter, Butler, Sutherland, 
Roberts, Stone, Holmes, Chief Justice Hughes.

    Dissenting: Justice McReynolds.

442. Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359 (1931).
        California law which prohibited the display of a red flag in a 
public or meeting place as a symbol of opposition to organized 
government or as a stimulus to anarchistic action or as an aid to 
seditious propaganda was so vague and indefinite as to permit punishment 
of the fair use of opportunity for free political discussion and 
therefore, as enforced, effected a denial of liberty without due 
process.

    Concurring: Chief Justice Hughes, Justices Holmes, Stone, Brandeis, 
Roberts, Van Devanter, Sutherland.

    Dissenting: Justices Butler, McReynolds.

443. Smith v. Cahoon, 283 U.S. 553 (1931).
        Florida law which required motor carriers to furnish bond or an 
insurance policy for the protection of the public against injuries but 
which exempted vehicles used exclusively in delivering dairy products 
and carriers engaged exclusively in transporting fish, agricultural, and 
dairy products between production to shipping points en route to primary 
market denied the equal protection of the laws; and insofar as it 
subjected carriers for hire to the same requirements as to procurement 
of a certificate of convenience and necessity and rate regulation as 
were exacted of common carriers the law was violative of due process.


[[Page 2108]]

444. Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
        Minnesota law which authorized the enjoinder of one engaged 
regularly in the business of publishing a malicious, scandalous, and 
defamatory newspaper or magazine, as applied to publications charging 
neglect of duty and corruption on the part of state law enforcement 
officers, effected an unconstitutional infringement of freedom of the 
press as safeguarded by the due process clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.

    Concurring: Chief Justice Hughes, Justices Brandeis, Holmes, Stone, 
Roberts.

    Dissenting: Justices Butler, Van Devanter, McReynolds, Sutherland.

445. Santovincenzo v. Egan, 284 U.S. 30 (1931).
        New York law pertaining to the descent of property of an alien 
decedent was inoperative as to the property of an alien by reason of the 
conflicting provisions of a treaty negotiated with the nation to which 
the decedent owed allegiance.

446. State Tax Comm'n v. Interstate Natural Gas Co., 284 U.S. 41 (1931).
        Mississippi privilege tax could not be enforced as to an 
interstate pipe line company which sold gas wholesale to local, 
independent distributors from a supply which passed into and through the 
State in interstate commerce; fact that pipe line company, in order to 
make delivery, used a thermometer and reduced pressure, did not convert 
the sale into an intrastate transaction.

447. Hoeper v. Tax Commission, 284 U.S. 206 (1931).
        Wisconsin income tax law which authorized an assessment against 
a husband of a tax computed on the combined total of his and his wife's 
incomes, augmented by surtaxes resulting from the combination, 
notwithstanding that under the laws of Wisconsin the husband had no 
interest in, or control over, the property or income of his wife, was 
violative of the due process and equal protection clauses of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.

    Concurring: Justices Roberts, Butler, Van Devanter, McReynolds, 
Sutherland, Chief Justice Hughes.

    Dissenting: Justices Holmes, Brandeis, Stone.

448. Van Huffel v. Harkelrode, 284 U.S. 225 (1931).
        Federal bankruptcy courts are empowered to sell the real estate 
of bankrupts free from liens for state taxes; lien laws of Ohio 
stipulating that the liens were to attach to the property were 
ineffective to prevent the federal court from transferring the liens 
from the property to the proceeds of the sale.

449. First Nat'l Bank v. Maine, 284 U.S. 312 (1932).
        Maine transfer tax law could not be applied, consistently with 
due process, to the inheritance of shares in a Maine corporation pass

[[Page 2109]]
ing under the will of a Massachusetts testator who died a resident of 
Massachusetts and owning the shares.

    Concurring: Justices Sutherland, Butler, Van Devanter, Roberts, 
McReynolds, Chief Justice Hughes.

    Dissenting: Justices Stone, Holmes, Brandeis.

450. Henkel v. Chicago, St. P., M. & O. Ry., 284 U.S. 444 (1932).
        Minnesota statute fixing amounts to be paid as compensation or 
in fees to expert witnesses could not be applied to determine costs in a 
federal court proceeding inasmuch as the statute was superseded by a 
federal enactment determining the fees to be paid witnesses.

451. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262 (1932).
        Oklahoma law which prohibited anyone from engaging in the 
manufacture, sale, or distribution of ice without a state license, to be 
issued only on proof of public necessity and capacity to meet public 
demand, effected an invalid regulation of a business not affected with a 
public interest and a denial of liberty to pursue a lawful calling 
contrary to the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

    Concurring: Justices Sutherland, Van Devanter, McReynolds, Butler, 
Roberts, Chief Justice Hughes.

    Dissenting: Justices Brandeis, Stone.

452. Coombes v. Getz, 285 U.S. 434 (1932).
        Repeal of California constitutional provision making directors 
of corporations liable to creditors for all moneys misappropriated or 
embezzled impaired the obligation of contract as to creditors who dealt 
with corporations during the period when such constitutional provision 
was in force, and inclusion in the state constitution of another 
provision whereunder the State reserved the power to alter or repeal all 
existing or future laws concerning corporations could not be invoked to 
destroy vested rights contrary to due process.

    Justices Concurring: Sutherland, Roberts, Butler, McReynolds, Van 
Devanter, Chief Justice Hughes.

    Dissenting: Justices Cardozo, Brandeis, Stone.

453. Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73 (1932).
        Texas White Primary Law which empowered the state executive 
committee of a political party to prescribe the qualifications of 
members of the party and thereby to exclude Negroes from voting in 
primaries conducted by the party amounted to state action violative of 
the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

    Concurring: Justices Cardozo, Brandeis, Stone, Roberts, Chief 
Justice Hughes.

    Dissenting: Justices McReynolds, Van Devanter, Butler, Sutherland.

454. Champlin Rfg. Co. v. Corporation Comm'n, 286 U.S. 210 (1932).
        Section of Oklahoma law which provided that any person violating 
the statute shall be subject to have his oil producing property

[[Page 2110]]
placed in the hands of a receiver by a court at the instance of a suit 
filed by the state Attorney General but which restricted such 
receivership to the operation of producing wells and the marketing of 
the production thereof in conformity with this law was a penal provision 
and as such was void under the due process clause for the reason that it 
punished violations of regulatory provisions of the statute that were 
too vague to afford a standard of conduct.

455. Anglo-Chilean Corp. v. Alabama, 288 U.S. 218 (1933).
        Alabama law which subjected foreign corporations to an annual 
franchise tax for the doing of business, levied at the rate of $2 for 
each $1,000 of capital employed in the State, violated both Art. I, 
Sec. 10, cl. 2, prohibiting state import duties and the commerce clause 
when enforced against a foreign corporation, whose sole business in 
Alabama consisted of the landing, storing, and the selling in original 
packages of goods imported from abroad.

    Concurring: Justices Butler, McReynolds, Van Devanter, Roberts, 
Sutherland, Chief Justice Hughes.

    Dissenting: Justices Cardozo, Brandeis, Stone.

456. Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517 (1933).
        Florida Chain Store Tax Law which levied a heavier privilege tax 
per store on the owner whose stores were in different counties than on 
the owner whose stores were all in the same county effected an arbitrary 
discrimination amounting to a denial of equal protection of the laws.

    Concurring: Justices Roberts, McReynolds, Sutherland, Butler, Van 
Devanter, Chief Justice Hughes.

    Dissenting: Justices Brandeis, Cardozo, Stone.

457. Consolidated Textile Co. v. Gregory, 289 U.S. 85 (1933).
        Wisconsin law, insofar as it authorized service of process on a 
foreign corporation which sold goods in Wisconsin through a controlled 
subsidiary and hence was not carrying on any business in the State at 
the time of the attempted service was violative of due process, 
notwithstanding that the summons was served on an officer of the 
corporation temporarily in Wisconsin for the purpose of negotiating a 
controversy with a local attorney.

458. Johnson Oil Co. v. Oklahoma ex rel. Mitchell, 290 U.S. 158 (1933).
        Oklahoma property tax law, consistently with due process, could 
not validly be enforced against the entire fleet of tank cars of an 
Illinois corporation which were used in transporting oil from its 
refinery in Oklahama to other States; instead, the State may base its 
tax on the number of cars which on the average were physically present 
within its boundaries.


[[Page 2111]]

459. Southern Ry. v. Virginia, 290 U.S. 190 (1933).
        Virginia law which authorized an administrative officer to 
require railroads to eliminate grade crossing whenever, in his opinion, 
such alterations were necessary to promote public safety and convenience 
and afforded the railroads no notice or hearing on the existence of such 
necessity and no means of reviewing the officer's decision was violative 
of due process.

    Concurring: Justices McReynolds, Roberts, Butler, Van Devanter, 
Sutherland, Brandeis.

    Dissenting: Chief Justice Hughes, Justices Stone, Cardozo.

460. Morrison v. California, 291 U.S. 82 (1934).
        Section of California Alien Land Law which stipulated that when 
the State, in a prosecution for violation thereof, proved use or 
occupancy by an alien lessee, alleged in the indictment to be an alien 
ineligible for naturalization, the onus of proving citizenship shall 
devolve upon the defense, was arbitrary and violative of due process as 
applied to the lessee for the reason that a lease of land conveys no 
hint of criminality and there is no practical necessity for relieving 
the prosecution of the obligation of proving Japanese race.

461. Standard Oil Co. v. California, 291 U.S. 242 (1934).
        California law which levied a license upon every distributor for 
each gallon of motor vehicle fuel sold and delivered by him in the State 
could not constitutionally be applied to the sale and delivery of 
gasoline to a military reservation as to which the United States had 
acquired exclusive jurisdiction.

462. Murray v. Gerrick & Co., 291 U.S. 315 (1934).
        Washington Workman's Compensation Act, adopted after the United 
States had acquired exclusive jurisdiction over a tract which became 
Puget Sound Navy Yard, could not be invoked by the widow and child of a 
worker fatally injured while working for a contractor in said Yard for 
the reason that Congress by law had consented only to the institution of 
suits by a personal representative under the Washington Wrongful Death 
Statute.

463. Hartford Accident & Ins. Co. v. Delta Pine Land Co., 292 U.S. 143 
        (1934).
        As judicially applied, Mississippi statutes which deemed all 
contracts of insurance and surety covering its citizens to have been 
made therein and which were enforced to facilitate recovery under an 
indemnity contract, consummated in Tennessee in conformity with the law 
of the latter where the insured, a Mississippi corporation, also 
conducted its business, and to nullify as contrary to Mississippi law 
nonobservance of a contractual stipulation as to the time for filing

[[Page 2112]]
claims, were violative of due process in that the Mississippi laws were 
accorded effect beyond the territorial limits of Mississippi.

464. McKnett v. St. Louis & S. F. Ry., 292 U.S. 230 (1934).
        Alabama law, as judicially construed, which precluded Alabama 
courts from entertaining actions against foreign corporations arising in 
other States under federal law, while permitting entertainment of like 
actions arising in other States under state law, was violative of the 
Constitution.

465. W. B. Worthen Co. v. Thomas, 292 U.S. 426 (1934).
        Arkansas law which exempted life insurance proceeds from 
judicial process, when applied to prevent recovery by a creditor of the 
insured who had garnished the insurer prior to passage of the law, 
impaired the obligation of contract.

    Concurring: Chief Justice Hughes, Justices Cardozo, Brandeis, 
Roberts, Stone, Sutherland (separately), Van Devanter (separately), 
McReynolds (separately), Butler (separately).

466. Concordia Ins. Co. v. Illinois, 292 U.S. 535 (1934).
        Illinois tax laws were discriminatory and violative of the equal 
protection clause for the reason that they (1) subjected foreign 
insurance companies selling fire, marine, inland marine, and casualty 
insurance to two property taxes, one on tangible property and a second, 
on net receipts, including net receipts from their casualty business, 
while subjecting competing foreign insurance companies selling only 
casualty insurance to the single tax on tangible property; and (2) 
insofar as the net receipts were assessed at full value while other 
personal property in general was assessed at only 60% of value.

    Concurring: Justices Van Devanter, Sutherland, Butler, McReynolds, 
Roberts.

    Dissenting: Justices Cardozo, Brandeis, Stone.

467. Jennings v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 294 U.S. 216 
        (1935).
        Section of Indiana Bank Collection Code which purported to make 
the owners of paper which a bank had collected, but which it had not 
satisfied, preferred claimants in the event of the bank's failure, 
irrespective of whether the funds representing such paper could be 
traced or identified as part of the bank's assets or intermingled with 
or converted into other assets of the bank was inoperative as to a 
national bank by reason of conflict with applicable federal law.

468. Accord: Old Company's Lehigh v. Meeker, 294 U.S. 227 (1935), 
        embracing a comparable New York statutory provision.

469. Cooney v. Mountain States Tel. Co., 294 U.S. 384 (1935).
        Montana laws which imposed an occupation tax on every telephone 
company providing service in the State imposed an invalid bur

[[Page 2113]]
den on interstate commerce when applied to a company which used the same 
facilities to furnish both interstate as well as intrastate services.

470. Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, 294 U.S. 511 (1935).
        New York Milk Control Act, insofar as it prohibited the sale of 
milk imported from another State unless the price paid to the producer 
in the other State equalled the minimum prescribed for purchases from 
local producers, imposed an invalid burden on interstate commerce 
irrespective of resale of such milk in the original or other containers.

471. Stewart Dry Goods Co. v. Lewis, 294 U.S. 550 (1935).
        Kentucky law which taxed the sales of retailers at the rate of 
1/20 of 1% on the first $400,000 of gross sales, and which imposed 
increasing rates on each additional $100,000 of gross sales up to 
$1,000,000, with a maximum rate of 1% on sales over $1,000,000, was 
arbitrary and violative of the equal protection clause for the reason 
that there existed no reasonable relation between the amount of the tax 
and the value of the privilege of merchandising or between gross sales, 
the measure of the tax, and net profits.

    Concurring: Justices Roberts, Sutherland, Van Devanter, Butler, 
McReynolds, Chief Justice Hughes.

    Dissenting: Justices Cardozo, Brandeis, Stone.

472. Accord: Valentine v. A. & P. Tea Co., 299 U.S. 32 (1936), voiding a 
        similar Iowa Chain Store Tax Act.

    Concurring: Justices Roberts, Sutherland, Butler, McReynolds, Van 
Devanter, Chief Justice Hughes.

    Dissenting: Justices Brandeis, Cardozo.

473. Panhandle Co. v. Highway Comm'n, 294 U.S. 613 (1935).
        Kansas law which, as judicially construed, empowered the state 
highway commission to order a pipe line company, at its own expense, to 
relocate its pipe and telephone lines, then located on a private right 
of way, in order to conform to plans adopted for new highways across the 
right of way, deprived the company of property without due process of 
law.

    Concurring: Justices McReynolds, Butler, Van Devanter, Sutherland, 
Brandeis, Roberts, Stone (separately), Cardozo (separately), Chief 
Justice Hughes.

474. Broderick v. Rosner, 294 U.S. 629 (1935).
        New Jersey law, which prohibited institution of suits in New 
Jersey courts to enforce a stockholder's statutory personal liability 
arising under the laws of another State and which was invoked to bar a 
suit by the New York Superintendent of Banks to recover assess

[[Page 2114]]
ments levied on New Jersey residents holding stock in a New York bank, 
was ineffective to prevent New Jersey courts from entertaining said 
action consistently with the full faith and credit clause.

    Concurring: Justices Brandeis, Sutherland, Butler, Van Devanter, 
Stone, Roberts, McReynolds, Chief Justice Hughes.

    Dissenting: Justice Cardozo.

475. Worthen Co. v. Kavanaugh, 295 U.S. 56 (1935).
        Arkansas law which reduced the remedies available to mortgagees 
in the event of a default on mortgage bonds issued by an improvement 
district, with the result that they were deprived of effective means of 
recovery for 6 1/2 years, impaired the obligation of contract.

476. Georgia Ry. & Elec. Co. v. Decatur, 295 U.S. 165 (1935).
        Insofar as a Georgia law, which authorized a municipality to 
effect certain street improvements and to assess railways having tracks 
on such streets with the cost of such improvement, supported a 
presumption that a benefit accrued to the railway from said improvements 
which could not be rebutted by contrary proof offered in a court of law, 
the effect of the statute was to deny the railway a hearing essential to 
due process of law.

    Concurring: Justices Sutherland, Butler, Van Devanter, McReynolds, 
Roberts, Chief Justice Hughes.

    Dissenting: Justices Stone, Brandeis, Cardozo.

477. Senior v. Braden, 295 U.S. 422 (1935).
        Insofar as trust certificates held by a resident represented 
interests in various parcels of land located in, and outside of, Ohio, 
which afforded the holder no voice in the management of such property 
but only a right to share in the net income therefrom and in the 
proceeds from the sale thereof, such interests could be taxed only by a 
uniform rule according to value, and Ohio law which levied an intangible 
property tax thereon measured by income was violative of the equal 
protection and due process clauses.

    Justices Concurring: McReynolds, Butler, Van Devanter, Sutherland, 
Roberts, Chief Justice Hughes

    Justices Dissenting: Stone, Brandeis, Cardozo.

478. Schuylkill Trust Co. v. Pennsylvania, 296 U.S. 113 (1935).
        Pennsylvania law which levied a tax on trust companies was in 
conflict with provisions of federal law proscribing discriminatory 
taxation of national bank shares by virtue of deductions allowed trust 
company for amounts represented by shares owned in Pennsylvania 
corporations already taxed or exempted, without any corresponding 
deduction on account of nontaxable federal securities owned or on 
account of national bank shares already taxed.


[[Page 2115]]


    Justices Concurring: Roberts, Chief Justice Hughes, Van Devanter, 
Butler, McReynolds, Sutherland.

    Justices Dissenting: Cardozo, Brandeis, Stone.

479. Colgate v. Harvey, 296 U.S. 404 (1935).
        Vermont law which levied a 4% tax on income derived from loans 
made outside the State but which exempted entirely like income derived 
from money loaned within Vermont at interest not exceeding 5% per year 
embodied an arbitrary discrimination and abridged the privileges and 
immunities of United States citizens contrary to the Fourteenth 
Amendment.

    Justices Concurring: Sutherland, Van Devanter, Butler, McReynolds, 
Roberts, Chief Justice Hughes

    Justices Dissenting: Stone, Brandeis, Cardozo.

480. Oklahoma v. Barnsdall Corp., 296 U.S. 521 (1936).
        Oklahoma law which levied a tax on the gross production of oil, 
as applied to oil produced by lessees of lands of Indian tribes, was in 
conflict with federal law consenting to levy of a different tax and 
hence inoperative as a tax on a federal instrumentality.

481. Treigle v. Acme Homestead Ass'n, 297 U.S. 189 (1936).
        Louisiana law which abolished prior requirement that building 
and loan associations, when income was insufficient to pay all demands 
of withdrawing stockholders within 60 days, to set apart 50% of receipts 
to pay such withdrawals and provided, instead, that the directors be 
vested with sole discretion as to the amount to be allocated for such 
withdrawals, impaired the obligation of contract as to a stockholder 
who, prior to such amending statute, gave notice of withdrawal and whose 
demand had not been paid.

482. Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233 (1936).
        Louisiana law which imposed a tax on the gross receipts derived 
from the sale of advertisements by newspapers enjoying a circulation of 
more than 20,000 copies per week unconstitutionally restricted freedom 
of the press contrary to the due process clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.

483. Accord: Arizona Publishing Co. v. O'Neil, 304 U.S. 543 (1938).

484. Mayflower Farms v. Ten Eyck, 297 U.S. 266 (1936).
        New York Milk Control Act which permitted milk dealers without 
well advertised trade names, who were in business before April 10, 1933, 
to sell milk in New York City at a price one cent below the minimum 
binding on competitors with well advertised trade names subjected 
dealers without well advertised names who established their business 
after that date to a denial of equal protection of the law.


[[Page 2116]]


    Justices Concurring: Roberts, Chief Justice Hughes, Van Devanter, 
Sutherland, Butler, McReynolds.

    Justices Dissenting: Cardozo, Brandeis, Stone.

485. Bingaman v. Golden Eagle Lines, 297 U.S. 626 (1936).
        New Mexico law which imposed an excise tax on the sale and use 
of gasoline and motor fuel and collected a license tax of $25 from users 
who import for use in New Mexico gasoline purchased in another State 
could not validly be imposed on a motor vehicle carrier engaged 
exclusively in interstate commerce which imported out-of-state gasoline 
for use in New Mexico; for the tax was levied, not as compensation for 
the use of that State's highways, but on the use of an instrumentality 
of interstate commerce.

486. Fisher's Blend Station v. State Tax Comm'n, 297 U.S. 650 (1936).
        Washington law which levied an occupation tax measured by gross 
receipts of radio broadcasting stations within that State whose programs 
were received by listeners in other States imposed an unconstitutional 
burden on interstate commerce.

487. International Steel & I. Co. v. National Surety Co., 297 U.S. 657 
        (1936).
        Tennessee law relative to settlement of public construction 
contracts which retroactively released the surety on a bond given by a 
contractor as required by prior law for the security of claims of 
materialmen and substituted therefor, without the latter's consent, the 
obligation of another bond impaired the obligation of contract.

488. Graves v. Texas Company, 298 U.S. 393 (1936).
        Alabama law which imposed an excise tax on the sale of gasoline 
could not be enforced as to sales of gasoline to the United States.

    Justices Concurring: Butler, Sutherland, Van Devanter, Roberts, 
Chief Justice Hughes, McReynolds.

    Justices Dissenting: Cardozo, Brandeis.

489. Morehead v. New York ex rel. Tipaldo, 298 U.S. 587 (1936).
        New York law which required employers to pay women minimum wages 
that would be not only equal to the fair and reasonable value of the 
services rendered but also sufficient to meet the minimum cost of living 
necessary for health deprived employers and employees of their freedom 
of contract without due process of law.

    Justices Concurring: Butler, Van Devanter, McReynolds, Sutherland, 
Roberts.

    Justices Dissenting: Chief Justice Hughes, Brandeis, Stone, Cardozo.

490. Binney v. Long, 299 U.S. 280 (1936).
        Massachusetts succession tax law whereunder succession to 
property through failure of an intestate to exercise a power of 
appointment under a non-testamentary conveyance of the property by deed 
or trust made after September 1, 1907, was not taxed, whereas if the

[[Page 2117]]
conveyance was made before that date, the succession was not only 
taxable but the rate might be substantially increased by aggregating the 
value of that succession with other interests derived by the transferee 
by inheritance from the donee of the power, was discriminatory and 
violative of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

    Justices Concurring: Roberts, Chief Justice Hughes, Van Devanter, 
Butler, Sutherland, McReynolds.

    Justices Dissenting: Cardozo, Brandeis.

491. De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1937).
        Oregon Criminal Syndicalism Law, invoked to punish participation 
in the conduct of a public meeting devoted to a lawful purpose merely 
because the meeting had been held under the auspices of an organization 
which taught or advocated the forcible overthrow of government but which 
did not engage in such advocacy during the meeting, was violative of 
freedom of assembly and freedom of speech guaranteed by the due process 
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

492. New York ex rel. Rogers v. Graves, 299 U.S. 401 (1937).
        New York income tax law could not be extended to salaries of 
employees of the Panama Railroad Company by reason of the fact that the 
latter together with its employees was a federal instrumentality (Art. 
VI).

493. Lawrence v. Shaw, 300 U.S. 345 (1937).
        North Carolina property tax law could not be enforced so as to 
levy a tax on bank deposits made by petitioner as guardian of an 
incompetent veteran of World War I; by the terms of applicable federal 
law bank deposits which resulted from the receipt of federal veterans 
benefits payments were exempted from local taxation.

494. Ingels v. Morf, 300 U.S. 290 (1937).
        California Caravan Act which imposed a $15 fee on each motor 
vehicle transported from another State into California for the purposes 
of sale therein imposed an unconstitutional burden on interstate 
commerce inasmuch as the proceeds from such fees were used, not to meet 
the cost of highway construction or maintenance, but to reimburse the 
State for the added expense of policing caravaning traffic and for such 
purposes the fee was excessive.

495. Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U.S. 242 (1937).
        Georgia insurrection statute which punished as a crime the acts 
of soliciting members for a political party and conducting meetings of a 
local unit of that party, where one of the doctrines of the party, 
established by reference to a document not shown to have been exhibited 
by any one, may be said to embrace ultimate resort in the indefi

[[Page 2118]]
nite future to violence against government invaded freedom of speech as 
guaranteed by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

    Justices Concurring: Roberts, Brandeis, Stone, Chief Justice Hughes, 
Cardozo.

    Justices Dissenting: Van Devanter, McReynolds, Butler, Sutherland.

496. Lindsey v. Washington, 301 U.S. 397 (1937).
        Washington statute which increased the severity of a penalty for 
a specific offense by mandating a sentence of 15 years and thereby 
removing the discretion of the judge to sentence for less than the 
maximum of 15 years, when applied retroactively to a crime committed 
before its enactment, was invalid as an ex post facto law.

497. Hartford Ins. Co. v. Harrison, 301 U.S. 459 (1937).
        Georgia law which prohibited stock insurance companies writing 
fire and casualty insurance from acting through agents who were their 
salaried employees, but which permitted mutual companies writing such 
insurance to do so, violated the equal protection clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.

    Justices Concurring: McReynolds, Sutherland, Van Devanter, Butler, 
Chief Justice Hughes

    Justices Dissenting: Roberts, Brandeis, Stone, Cardozo.

498. Puget Sound Co. v. Tax Commission, 302 U.S. 90 (1937).
        Washington gross receipts tax law could not validly be enforced 
as to receipts accruing to a stevedoring corporation acting as an 
independent contractor in loading and unloading cargoes of vessels 
engaged in interstate or foreign commerce by longshoremen subject to its 
own direction and control; such business was a form of interstate and 
foreign commerce.

499. James v. Dravo Contracting Co., 302 U.S. 134 (1937).
        West Virginia gross receipts tax law could not validly be 
enforced to sustain levy on that part of gross receipts of a federal 
contractor working on a federal installation in West Virginia which was 
derived from the fabrication of equipment at its Pennsylvania plant for 
which the contractor received payment prior to installation of such 
equipment on the West Virginia site owned by the Federal Government; for 
such compensable activities were completed beyond the jurisdiction of 
West Virginia.

500. Connecticut General Life Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 303 U.S. 77 (1938).
        California law which levied a privilege tax on admitted foreign 
insurers, measured by gross premiums received, was violative of due 
process insofar as it affected premiums received in Connecticut on 
contracts of reinsurance consummated in the latter State and covering 
policies of life insurance issued by other insurers to residents of

[[Page 2119]]
California; California was without power to tax activities conducted 
beyond its borders.

    Justices Concurring: Stone, Chief Justice Hughes, McReynolds, 
Brandeis, Butler, Roberts.

    Justice Dissenting: Black.

501. Indiana ex rel. Anderson v. Brand, 303 U.S. 95 (1938).
        Indiana law of 1933 which repealed tenure rights of certain 
teachers accorded under a Tenure Act of 1927 impaired the obligation of 
contract.

    Justices Concurring: Roberts, Chief Justice Hughes, McReynolds, 
Brandeis, Butler, Stone.

    Justice Dissenting: Black.

        Accord: Indiana ex rel. Valentine v. Marker, 303 U.S. 628 
(1938).

502. Adams Mfg. Co. v. Storen, 304 U.S. 307 (1938).
        Indiana gross receipts tax law could not constitutionally be 
applied to gross receipts derived by an Indiana corporation from sales 
in other States of goods manufactured in Indiana; as thus applied the 
law burdened interstate commerce.

    Justices Concurring: Roberts, Chief Justice Hughes, Brandeis, 
Butler, Stone, Reed.

    Justices Dissenting: Black (in part), McReynolds (in part).

 Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U.S. 239 (1946).
        The tax imposes an unconstitutional burden on interstate 
commerce when applied to the receipt by one domiciled in the State of 
the proceeds of a sale of securities sent out of the State to be sold.

    Justices Concurring: Vinson, C.J., Reed, Frankfurter, Jackson, 
Rutledge, Burton.

    Justices Dissenting: Black, Douglas, Murphy.

 Indiana Dep't of Revenue v. Nebeker, 348 U.S. 933 (1955).
        This gross receipts tax law also could not be levied on receipts 
from the purchase and sale on margin of securities by resident owners 
through a nonresident broker engaged in interstate commerce.

    Justices Concurring: Warren, C.J., Reed, Frankfurter, Burton, Clark, 
Minton.

    Justices Dissenting: Black, Douglas.

503. Collins v. Yosemite Park Co., 304 U.S. 518 (1938).
        California Alcoholic Beverages Control Act, as to its regulatory 
provisions which embraced a fee for a license to import alcoholic 
beverages and control over importation of such beverages, could not be 
enforced, consistently with the Twenty-first Amendment, against a retail 
dealer doing business in a National Park as to which California retained 
no jurisdiction.


[[Page 2120]]

504. Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337 (1938).
        A Missouri statute which accorded Negro residents financial aid 
to enable them to obtain instruction at out-of-state universities 
equivalent to that afforded exclusively to white students at the 
University of Missouri denies such Negroes the equal protection of the 
laws. The obligation of a State to give equal protection of the laws can 
be performed only where its laws operate, that is, within its own 
jurisdiction.

    Justices Concurring: Chief Justice Hughes, Brandeis, Stone, Roberts, 
Black, Reed.

    Justices Dissenting: McReynolds, Butler.

505. Gwin, White & Prince, Inc. v. Henneford, 305 U.S. 434 (1939).
        A Washington gross receipts tax levied on the privilege of 
engaging in business in the State cannot constitutionally be imposed on 
the gross receipts of a marketing agent for a federation of fruit 
growers whose business consists of the marketing of fruit shipped from 
Washington to places of sale in other States and foreign countries. Such 
a tax burdens interstate and foreign commerce contrary to Art. I, 
Sec. 8, cl. 3.

    Justices Concurring: Butler, McReynolds, Chief Justice Hughes, 
Brandeis, Stone, Roberts, Reed.

    Justice Dissenting: Black.

506. Hale v. Bimco Trading Co., 306 U.S. 375 (1939).
        Florida statute imposing an inspection fee of 15 cents per cwt. 
(60 times the cost of the inspection) on cement imported from abroad is 
invalid under the commerce clause (Art. I, Sec. 8, cl. 3).

507. Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451 (1939).
        A New Jersey statute which stipulated that ``any person not 
engaged in a lawful occupation, known to be a member of a gang of two or 
more persons, who had been convicted at least three times of being a 
disorderly person, or who has been convicted of any crime in New Jersey 
or any other State, is declared to be a gangster'' and punishable upon 
conviction, is repugnant to the due process clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment because of vagueness and uncertainty.

508. Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S. 268 (1939).
        An Oklahoma statute which provided that all persons, other than 
those who voted in 1914, qualified to vote in 1916 but who failed to 
register between April 30 and May 11, 1916, should be perpetually 
disenfranchised was found to be repugnant to the Fifteenth Amendment.

    Justices Concurring: Chief Justice Hughes, Roberts, Black, Reed, 
Frankfurter.

    Justices Dissenting: McReynolds, Butler.


[[Page 2121]]


509. Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940).
        A statute which forbids the publicizing of facts concerning a 
labor dispute, whether by printed sign, pamphlet, by word of mouth, or 
otherwise in the vicinity of the business involved, and without regard 
to the number of persons engaged in such activity, the peaceful 
character of their conduct, the nature of the dispute, or the accuracy 
or restraint of the language used in imparting information, is violative 
of freedom of speech and press guaranteed by the due process clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment.

    Justices Concurring: Chief Justice Hughes, Stone, Roberts, Black, 
Reed, Frankfurter, Douglas, Murphy.

    Justice Dissenting: McReynolds.

510. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
        A statute which forbids any person to solict money or valuables 
for any alleged religious cause, unless a license has first been 
procured from an official who is required to determine whether such 
cause is a religious one and who may deny issuance if he determines that 
the cause is not, imposes a previous restraint of the free exercise of 
religion and effects a deprivation of liberty without due process of law 
in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.

511. McCarroll v. Dixie Lines, 309 U.S. 176 (1940).
        Gasoline carried by interstate motor busses through Arkansas for 
use as fuel in interstate transportation beyond the Arkansas line cannot 
be subject to an Arkansas tax imposed from maintenance of state highways 
and collected on every gallon of gasoline above 20 brought into the 
State in any motor vehicle for use in operating the same. The statute 
levying this tax imposes an unconstitutional burden on interstate 
commerce.

    Justices Concurring: McReynolds, Stone, Chief Justice Hughes, 
Roberts, Reed (separately).

    Justices Dissenting: Black, Frankfurter, Douglas.

512. Best v. Maxwell, 311 U.S. 454 (1940).
        A North Carolina statute which levies an annual privilege tax of 
$250 on every person or corporation, not a regular retail merchant in 
the State, who displays samples in any hotel room or house rented for 
the purpose of securing retail orders, cannot be applied to a 
nonresident merchant who took orders in the State and shipped interstate 
directly to customers. In view of the imposition of a one dollar per 
year license tax collected from regular retail merchants, the 
enforcement of the statute as to nonresidents effects an 
unconstitutional discrimination in favor of intrastate commerce contrary 
to Art. I, Sec. 8, cl. 3.


[[Page 2122]]

513. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941).
        A Pennsylvania alien registration statute, imposing requirements 
at variance with those set forth in the Federal Alien Registration Act 
of 1940 containing a comprehensive scheme for the regulation of aliens, 
is rendered unenforceable by reason of conflict with federal legislative 
and treaty-making powers.

    Justices Concurring: Roberts, Black, Reed, Frankfurter, Douglas, 
Murphy.

    Justices Dissenting: Stone, Chief Justice Hughes, McReynolds.

514. Wood v. Lovett, 313 U.S. 362 (1941).
        When a State, with the help of a statute curing irregularities 
in a tax proceeding, sells land under a tax title which is valid, 
subsequent repeal of such curative statute is unconstitutional by reason 
of effecting an impairment of the obligation of contract (Art. I, 
Sec. 10, cl. 1).

    Justices Concurring: Chief Justice Hughes, Stone, Roberts, Reed, 
Frankfurter.

    Justices Dissenting: Black, Douglas, Murphy.

515. Federal Land Bank v. Bismarck Lumber Co., 314 U.S. 95 (1941).
        Inasmuch as the Federal Farm Loan Act exempts federal land banks 
from state taxes, other than those on property acquired in the course of 
dealings, the North Dakota sales tax cannot validly be collected on the 
sale of materials to a federal land bank to be used in improving real 
estate (Art. VI, cl. 2).

516. Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160 (1941).
        A California statute making it a misdemeanor for any one 
knowingly to bring, or assist in bringing, into the State a nonresident, 
indigent person is invalid by reason of imposing an unconstitutional 
burden on interstate commerce.

    Justices Concurring: Stone, C.J., Roberts, Reed, Frankfurter, 
Byrnes. Justices Douglas, Black, Murphy and Jackson would have rested 
the invalidity on Sec. 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment.

517. Taylor v. Georgia, 315 U.S. 25 (1942).
        A state statute making it a crime for any person to contract 
with another to perform services of any kind, and thereupon obtain in 
advance money or other thing of value, with intent not to perform such 
service, and providing further that failure to perform the service or to 
return the money, without good and sufficient cause, shall amount to 
presumptive evidence of intent, at the time of making the contract, not 
to perform such service, is violative of the Thirteenth Amendment.

518. Cloverleaf Butter Co. v. Patterson, 315 U.S. 148 (1942).
        Consistently with the national supremacy clause, federal laws 
and regulations relating to the entire process of manufacture of ren

[[Page 2123]]
ovated butter supersede state laws whereunder Alabama officials 
inspected and seized packing stock butter acquired by a manufacturer of 
renovated butter for interstate commerce.

    Justices Concurring: Roberts, Black, Reed, Douglas, Jackson.

    Justices Dissenting: Stone, C.J., Frankfurter, Murphy, Byrnes.

519. Tulee v. Washington, 315 U.S. 681 (1942).
        Being repugnant to the terms of a treaty concluded with the 
Yakima Indians reserving to the members of the latter tribe the right to 
take fish at all usual places in common with the citizens of Washington 
Territory, a state law requiring such Indians to pay license fees for 
the exercise of such privilege cannot be enforced.

520. Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
        As applied to one convicted once of stealing chickens, and twice 
of robbery, an Oklahoma statute providing for the sterilization of 
habitual criminals, other than those convicted of embezzlement, or 
violation of prohibition and revenue laws, violates the equal protection 
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

    Justices concurring specially: Stone, C.J., Jackson.

521. Pacific Coast Dairy v. Department of Agriculture, 318 U.S. 285 
        (1943).
        Calif. Agric. Code provided that the selling and delivery of 
milk ``at less than the minimum wholesale, retail prices effective in a 
marketing area'' was an unfair practice warranting revocation of license 
or prosecution. Sales and deliveries of milk to the War Department on a 
federal enclave within a State over which the United States has acquired 
exclusive jurisdiction are not subject to regulation under a state milk 
stabilization law.

    Justices Concurring: Stone, C.J., Roberts, Black, Reed, Douglas, 
Jackson.

    Justices Dissenting: Frankfurter, Murphy.

522. Mayo v. United States, 319 U.S. 441 (1943).
        Florida Commercial Fertilizer Law constituted a comprehensive 
regulation of sale or distribution of commercial fertilizer and required 
a label or stamp on each bag evidencing the payment of an inspection 
fee. Held: a State is without constitutional power to exact an 
inspection fee, although the design of the inspection service was to 
protect consumer from fraud, as to fertilizer which the United States 
owns and is distributing within the State pursuant to provision of the 
Soil Conservation and Domestic Allotment Act.

523. Taylor v. Mississippi, 319 U.S. 583 (1943).
        General Laws of Mississippi, 1943, ch. 178, provided, in part, 
that the teaching and dissemination of printed matter designed to 
encourage disloyalty to the national and state governments, and the 
distribution of printed matter reasonably tending ``to create an 
attitude

[[Page 2124]]
of stubborn refusal to salute, honor, or respect the flag or Government 
of the United States, or of the State of Mississippi'' was a felony.
        The Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution prohibits the 
imposition of punishment for: (1) urging and advising on religious 
grounds that citizens refrain from saluting the flag; and (2) the 
communication of beliefs and opinion concerning domestic measures and 
trends in national and world affairs, when this is without sinister 
purpose and not in advocacy of, or incitement to, subversive action 
against the Nation or State and does not involve any clear and present 
danger to our institutions or our Government. Conviction under the 
statute for disseminating literature reasonably tending to create an 
attitude of stubborn refusal to salute, honor or respect the national 
and state flags and governments denies the liberty guaranteed by the 
Fourteenth Amendment.

524. Pollock v. Williams, 322 U.S. 4 (1944).
        Florida Statute of 1941, sec. 817.09 and sec. 817.10, made it a 
misdemeanor to induce advances with intent to defraud by a promise to 
perform labor, and further made failure to perform labor for which money 
had been obtained prima facie evidence of intent to defraud. The statute 
is violative of the Thirteenth Amendment and the Federal Antipeonage Act 
for it cannot be said that a plea of guilty is uninfluenced by the 
statute's threat to convict by its prima facie evidence section.

    Justices Concurring: Roberts, Black, Frankfurter, Douglas, Murphy, 
Jackson, Rutledge.

    Justices Dissenting: Stone, C.J., Reed.

525. United States v. Allegheny County, 322 U.S. 174 (1944).
        Pennsylvania law provided in part that ``The following subjects 
and property shall be valued and assessed, and subject to taxation, 
``and that taxes are declared ``to be a first lien on said property.'' 
The effect of an ad valorem property tax is to increase the valuation of 
the land and buildings of a manufacturer by the value of machinery 
leased to him by the United States and is therefore a tax on property 
owned by the United States and is violative of the Constitution.

    Justices Concurring: Stone, C.J., Black, Reed, Douglas, Murphy, 
Jackson, Rutledge.

    Justices Dissenting: Roberts, Frankfurter.

526. McLeod v. Dilworth Co., 322 U.S. 327 (1944).
        The commerce clause prohibits the imposition of an Arkansas 
sales tax on sales to residents of the State which are consummated by 
acceptance of orders in, and the shipments of goods from, another State, 
in which title passes upon delivery to the carrier.

    Justices Concurring: Stone, C.J., Roberts, Reed, Frankfurter, 
Jackson.

[[Page 2125]]


    Justices Dissenting: Black, Douglas, Murphy, Rutledge.

527. Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516 (1945).
        A Texas statute required union organizers, before soliciting 
members, to obtain an organizer's card from the Secretary of State. As 
applied in this case, the statute is violative of the First and 
Fourteenth Amendments in that it imposes a previous restraint upon the 
rights of free speech and free assembly. The First Amendment's 
safeguards are not inapplicable to business or economic activity and 
restrictions of these activities can be justified only by clear and 
present danger to the public welfare.

    Justices Concurring: Black, Douglas, Murphy, Jackson, Rutledge.

    Justices Dissenting: Stone, C.J., Roberts, Reed, Frankfurter.

528. Hooven & Allison Co. v. Evatt, 324 U.S. 652 (1945).
        An Ohio ad valorem tax on Philippine importations was violative 
of the constitutional prohibition of state taxation of imports for the 
reason that the place from which the imported articles are brought is 
not a part of the United States in the constitutional sense.

    Justices Concurring: Stone, C.J., Roberts, Reed (dissenting in 
part), Frankfurter, Douglas (concurring in part), Murphy (concurring in 
part), Jackson, Rutledge (concurring in part).

    Justice Dissenting: Black.

529. Hill v. Florida ex rel. Watson, 325 U.S. 538 (1945).
        Florida law provided that no one shall be licensed as a 
``business agent'' of a labor union without meeting certain specified 
standards and that all labor unions in the State must file annual 
reports disclosing certain information and pay an annual fee therefor. 
The statute circumscribes the ``full freedom'' to choose collective 
bargaining agents secured to employees by the National Labor Relations 
Act. The reporting requirement and fee levied on labor unions does not 
conflict with the Act but is the sanction imposed by injunction against 
the labor union from functioning as such that is inconsistent with the 
federally protected processes of collective bargaining.

    Justices Concurring: Stone, C.J., Black, Reed, Douglas, Murphy, 
Jackson, Rutledge.

    Justices Dissenting: Roberts, Frankfurter.

530. Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761 (1945).
        The Arizona Train Limit Law makes it unlawful to operate a train 
of more than fourteen passenger or seventy freight cars. As applied to 
interstate trains, this law contravenes the commerce clause of the 
Constitution. The state regulation passes beyond what is plainly 
essential for safety, since it does not appear that it will lessen, 
rather than increase, the danger of accident.


[[Page 2126]]


    Justices Concurring: Stone, C.J., Roberts, Reed, Frankfurter, 
Murphy, Jackson, Rutledge.

    Justices Dissenting: Black, Douglas.

531. Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
        Alabama law makes it a crime to enter or remain on the premises 
of another after having been warned not to do so. A State, consistently 
with the freedom of religion and the press guaranteed by the First and 
Fourteenth Amendments, cannot impose criminal punishment on a person for 
distributing religious literature on the sidewalk of a company-owned 
town contrary to regulations of the town's management, where the town 
and its shopping district are freely accessible to and freely used by 
the public in general.

    Justices Concurring: Black, Frankfurter, Douglas, Murphy, Rutledge.

    Justices Dissenting: Stone, C.J., Reed, Burton.

532. Tucker v. Texas, 326 U.S. 517 (1946).
        Texas Penal Code makes it an offense for any ``peddler or hawker 
of goods or merchandise'' willfully to refuse to leave premises after 
having been notified to do so by the owner or possessor thereof. A 
State, consistently with the freedom of religion and the press 
guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments, cannot impose 
criminal punishment upon a person engaged in religious activities and 
distributing religious literature in a village owned by the United 
States under a congressional program designed to provide housing for 
workers engaged in national defense activities, where the village is 
freely accessible and open to the public.

    Justices Concurring: Black, Frankfurter, Douglas, Murphy, Rutledge.

    Justices Dissenting: Stone, C.J., Reed, Burton.

533. Republic Pictures Corp. v. Kappler, 327 U.S. 757 (1946).
        Iowa statute, insofar as it required actions on claims arising 
under a federal statute not continuing any period of limitations, to be 
commenced within six months, effected a denial of equal protection of 
law when enforced as to one seeking to recover under the Federal Fair 
Labor Standards Act; a State may not discriminate against rights 
accruing under federal laws by imposing as to the former a special 
period of limitations not applicable to other claims.

534. First Iowa Hydro-Electric Coop. v. FPC, 328 U.S. 152 (1946).
        Iowa Code provided that no dam shall be constructed, operated or 
maintained in any navigable or meandered stream unless a permit has been 
granted by the executive council. Where sec. 9(b) of the Federal Power 
Act requires an applicant to submit satisfactory evidence of compliance 
with state laws with respect to the use of water for power purposes but 
petitioner made no attempt to comply with law requiring permit, the 
Court held that compliance with the Iowa law

[[Page 2127]]
requiring a state permit is not a condition precedent to securing a 
federal license since it is the Federal Power Commission rather than the 
Iowa Executive Council that must pass upon issues affecting the use of 
navigable waters on the commerce clause of the Constitution.

    Justices Concurring: Burton, Stone, C.J., Black, Reed, Douglas, 
Murphy, Rutledge.

    Justice Dissenting: Frankfurter.

535. Morgan v. Virginia, 328 U.S. 373 (1946).
        Virginia Code required motor carriers, both interstate and 
intrastate, to separate without discrimination white and colored 
passengers in their motor buses so that contiguous seats would not be 
occupied by persons of different races at the same time. Even though 
Congess has enacted no legislation on the subject, the state provisions 
are invalid as applied to passengers in vehicles moving interstate 
because they burden interstate commerce.

    Justices Concurring: Black (separately), Reed, Frankfurter 
(separately), Douglas, Murphy, Rutledge.

    Justice Dissenting: Burton.

536. Richfield Oil Corp. v. State Board, 329 U.S. 69 (1946).
        The California Retail Sales Tax, measured by gross receipts, 
cannot constitutionally be collected on exports in the form of oil 
delivered from appellant's dockside tanks to a New Zealand vessel in a 
California port for transportation to Auckland pursuant to a contract of 
sale with the New Zealand Government.

    Justices Concurring: Vinson, C.J., Reed, Frankfurter, Douglas, 
Jackson, Rutledge, Burton.

    Justice Dissenting: Black.

537. Bethlehem Steel Co. v. New York Employment Relations Bd., 330 U.S. 
        767 (1947).
        Where the National Labor Relations Board has asserted general 
jurisdiction over unions of foreman employed by industries subject to 
the National Labor Relations Act but had refused to certify such unions 
as collective bargaining representatives on the ground that to do so at 
the time would obstruct rather than further effectuation of the purposes 
of the Act, certification of such unions by the New York Employment 
Relations Board under a state act is invalid as in conflict with the 
National Labor Relations Act and the commerce clause of the 
Constitution.

538. Accord: Plankington Packing Co. v. WERB, 338 U.S. 953 (1950).

539. Rice v. Sante Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218 (1947).
        By reason of amendments of the United States Warehouse Act, 
Congress terminated the dual system of regulation and substituted an

[[Page 2128]]
exclusive system of federal regulations of warehouses licensed under the 
federal act. Such warehouses therefore no longer need to obtain Illinois 
licenses or comply with Illinois laws regulating those phases of the 
warehouse business which have been regulated under the federal act. 
Compliance with Illinois law is limited to those phases of the business 
which the federal act expressly subjects to state law.

    Justices Concurring: Vinson, C.J., Black, Reed, Douglas, Murphy, 
Jackson, Burton.

    Justices Dissenting: Frankfurter, Rutledge.

540. Order of Travelers v. Wolfe, 331 U.S. 586 (1947).
        South Dakota Law provided that the time for commencing action on 
contracts was within six years and declared void every stipulation in a 
contract which reduces the time within which a party thereto may enforce 
his rights by legal proceedings. A claimant bringing an action in South 
Dakota for benefits arising under the constitution of a fraternal 
benefit society incorporated in Ohio and licensed to do business in 
South Dakota is bound by the limitation prescribed in the society's 
constitution barring actions on claims six months after disallowance by 
the society. South Dakota is required under the Federal Constitution to 
give full faith and credit to the public acts of Ohio.

    Justices Concurring: Vinson, C.J., Frankfurter, Reed, Jackson, 
Burton.

    Justices Dissenting: Black, Douglas, Murphy, Rutledge.

541. United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19 (1947).
        California claimed that it owned the resources of the soil under 
the three-mile marginal belt as an incident to those elements of 
sovereignty which it exercised in that area, and therefore might grant 
permits to California residents to prospect far out and on the ocean 
floor within said limits. Held: California is not the owner of the 
three-mile marginal belt along its coast; the Federal Government rather 
than the State has paramount rights in and power over that belt, and 
full dominion over the resources of the soil under that water area. The 
United States is therefore, entitled to a decree enjoining California 
and all persons claiming under it from continuing to trespass upon the 
area in violation of the rights of the United States.

    Justices Concurring: Vinson, C.J., Black, Douglas, Murphy, Rutledge, 
Burton.

    Justices Dissenting: Reed, Frankfurter.

542. Sipuel v. Board of Regents, 332 U.S. 631 (1948).
        Oklahoma constitutional and statutory provisions barring Negroes 
from the University of Oklahoma Law School are violative of the equal 
protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by reason of the fact that 
the University Law School is the only institution for legal education 
maintained by the State.


[[Page 2129]]

543. Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633 (1948).
        California Alien Land Law forbade aliens ineligible for American 
citizenship to acquire, own, occupy, lease or transfer agricultural land 
and provided that any property acquired in violation of the statutes 
shall escheat as of the date of acquisition and that the same result 
shall follow any transfer made with ``intent to prevent, evade, or 
avoid'' escheat. Such intent is presumed prima facie, wherever an 
ineligible alien pays the consideration for a transfer to a citizen or 
eligible alien.
        Applied to effect an escheat of agricultural lands acquired in 
the name of a minor American citizen with funds contributed by a father, 
a Japanese alien ineligible for naturalization, the statute deprived the 
son of the equal protection of the laws and of his privileges as an 
American citizen contrary to the Fourteenth Amendment.

    Justices Concurring: Vinson, C.J., Black, Frankfurter, Douglas, 
Murphy, Rutledge.

    Justices Dissenting: Reed, Jackson, Burton.

544. Seaboard Air Line R.R. v. Daniel, 333 U.S. 118 (1948).
        South Carolina provided that a railroad line within the State 
can be owned and operated only by state-created corporations. A railroad 
corporation chartered under the laws of another State is forbidden under 
heavy penalties to exercise such powers within South Carolina. However, 
under South Carolina law, a foreign railroad corporation may organize a 
South Carolina subsidiary and may consolidate that corporation with 
itself. In that event, the consolidated corporation would be a 
corporation both of South Carolina and of another State.
        A Virginia corporation authorized by the Interstate Commerce 
Commission under Sec. 5 of the Interstate Commerce Act to own and 
operate an entire railway system with mileage in South Carolina is 
exempt from compliance with South Carolina's laws forbidding foreign 
corporations to own or operate railroads in the State.

545. Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507 (1948).
        New York Penal Law provided that a person was guilty of a 
misdemeanor who ``prints, utters, publishes, sells, lends, gives away, 
distributes, shows, or has in his possession with intent to sell, lend, 
give away, distribute or show or otherwise offer for sale, loan, gift or 
distribution, any book, pamphlet, magazine, newspaper or other printed 
matter devoted to the publication, and principally made up of criminal 
laws, police reports, or accounts of criminal deeds, or pictures, or 
stories of deeds of bloodshed, lust or crime. . . .''
        Subsection 2 was construed by the state Court of Appeals to 
prohibit distribution of a magazine principally made up of news or 
stories of criminal deeds of bloodshed or lust so massed as to become a 
vehicle for inciting violent and depraved crimes against the person.

[[Page 2130]]
As thus construed this provision is so vague and indefinite as to 
violate the Fourteenth Amendment by prohibiting acts within the 
protection of the guaranty of free speech and press.

    Justices Concurring: Vinson, C.J., Black, Reed, Douglas, Murphy, 
Rutledge.

    Justices Dissenting: Frankfurter, Jackson, Burton.

546. Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385 (1948).
        South Carolina law required a license of shrimp boat owners, the 
fee for which was $25 per boat for residents and $2,500 per boat for 
nonresidents. The law also required all boats licensed to trawl for 
shrimp in South Carolina waters to dock in the State and to unload their 
catch, pack, and properly stamp the catch before shipping or 
transporting it to another State. The differential license fees plainly 
discriminated against nonresidents and violated the privileges and 
immunities clause of Art. IV, Sec. 2. The latter requirement burdened 
interstate commerce in violation of the commerce clause.

    Justices Concurring: Vinson, C.J., Reed, Douglas, Murphy, Rutledge, 
Burton, Black (dissenting in part), Frankfurter (dissenting in part), 
Jackson (dissenting in part).

547. Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 334 U.S. 410 (1948).
        California required a commercial fishing license of every person 
bringing fish ashore in the State to sell but denied such a license to 
any person ineligible for citizenship. The statute precluded a resident 
Japanese alien from earning his living as a commercial fisherman in the 
ocean waters off the State and was held invalid under the equal 
protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and under federal 
statutory law (42 U.S.C. Sec. 1981).

    Justices Concurring: Vinson, C.J., Black, Frankfurter, Douglas, 
Murphy, Rutledge, Burton.

    Justices Dissenting: Reed, Jackson.

548. Greyhound Lines v. Mealey, 334 U.S. 653 (1948).
        New York constitutionally may tax gross receipts of a common 
carrier from the transportation apportioned as to mileage within the 
State, but collection of the tax on gross receipts from that portion of 
the mileage outside the State unduly burdens interstate commerce in 
violation of the commerce clause of the Constitution.

    Justices Concurring: Vinson, C.J., Reed, Frankfurter, Jackson, 
Rutledge, Burton.

    Justices Dissenting: Black, Douglas, Murphy.

549. La Crosse Tel. Corp. v. WERB, 336 U.S. 18 (1949).
        Certification by a state employment relations board under a 
state labor relations act of a union as the collective bargaining 
representative of employees engaged in interstate commerce is invalid as 
in con

[[Page 2131]]
flict with the National Labor Relations Act; the employer is one over 
which the NLRB consistently has exercised jurisdiction.

550. H. P. Hood & Sons v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525 (1949).
        Agricultural and Market Law of New York provided in part that 
the Commissioner in issuing licenses to milk dealers must be satisfied 
``that the issuance of the license will not tend to destructive 
competition in a market already adequately served, and that the issuance 
of the license is in the public interest.''
        Denial of a license under this provision violates the commerce 
clause of the Constitution and the Federal Agricultural Marketing Act 
where petitioner, a distributor of milk in Massachusetts and operating 
three receiving plants licensed under the New York Agricultural and 
Market Law, was denied a license to operate an additional plant on 
grounds that the expanded facilities would reduce the supply of milk for 
local markets and result in destructive competition in a market already 
adequately served.

    Justices Concurring: Vinson, C.J., Reed, Douglas, Jackson, Burton.

    Justices Dissenting: Black, Frankfurter, Murphy, Rutledge.

551. Schnell v. Davis, 336 U.S. 933 (1949).
        The Boswell Amendment to the Alabama constitution which vested 
unlimited authority in electoral officials to determine whether 
prospective voters satisfied the literacy requirement was violative of 
the Fifteenth Amendment and the equal protection clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.

552. Union Nat'l Bank v. Lamb, 337 U.S. 38 (1949).
        Missouri law, whereunder a judgment could not be revived after 
ten years from its rendition, could not be invoked, consistently with 
the full faith and credit clause, to prevent enforcement in a Missouri 
court of a Colorado judgment obtained in 1927 and revived in Colorado in 
1946.

    Justices Concurring: Vinson, C.J., Reed, Douglas, Murphy, Jackson, 
Burton.

    Justices Dissenting: Black, Frankfurter, Rutledge.

553. Wheeling Steel Corp. v. Glander, 337 U.S. 562 (1949).
        The Ohio ad valorem tax levied on accounts receivable of foreign 
corporations derived from sales of goods manufactured within the State, 
but exempting receivables owned by residents and domestic corporations, 
denied foreign corporations equal protection of the laws in violation of 
the Fourteenth Amendment. The tax was not saved from invalidity by the 
``reciprocity'' provision of the statute imposing it, since this plan is 
not one which, by credit or otherwise, protects the nonresident or 
foreign corporation against discrimination.

    Justices Concurring: Vinson, C.J., Reed, Frankfurter, Murphy, 
Jackson, Rutledge, Burton.

[[Page 2132]]


    Justices Dissenting: Black, Douglas.

554. Treichler v. Wisconsin, 338 U.S. 251 (1949).
        Insofar as the Wisconsin emergency tax on inheritances is 
measured by tangible property located outside the State, the tax 
violates the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

    Justices Concurring: Vinson, C.J., Reed, Frankfurter, Douglas, 
Burton, Clark, Minton.

    Justice Dissenting: Black.

555. Wissner v. Wissner, 338 U.S. 655 (1950).
        Consistently with the principle of national supremacy, the 
California community property law could not be invoked to sustain an 
award to a deceased soldier's widow of one-half of the proceeds of an 
insurance policy issued under the National Life Insurance Act; by the 
terms of the latter insured soldier is accorded the right to designate 
his beneficiary, in this instance, his mother, and his widow, not having 
been designated, is expressly precluded from acquiring a vested right to 
these proceeds.

556. New Jersey Ins. Co. v. Division of Tax Appeals, 338 U.S. 665 
        (1950).
        Collection by a New Jersey taxing district of a tax on 
intangible property of a stock insurance company, computed without 
deducting the principal amount of certain United States bonds and 
accrued interest thereon was invalid by reason of conflict with federal 
law exempting federal obligations from state and local taxation.

    Justices Concurring: Vinson, C.J., Reed, Frankfurter, Jackson, 
Burton, Clark, Minton.

    Justice Dissenting: Black.

557. Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
        Notice by publication, as authorized by the New York Banking Law 
for purposes of enabling banks managing common trust funds to obtain a 
judicial settlement of accounts binding on all having an interest in 
such funds, is not sufficient under the due process clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment for determining property rights of persons whose 
whereabouts are known.

    Justices Concurring: Vinson, C.J., Black, Reed, Jackson, Clark, 
Minton, Frankfurter.

    Justice Dissenting: Burton.

558. United Automobile Workers v. O'Brien, 339 U.S. 454 (1950).
        The strike vote provision of the Michigan Mediation Law, which 
prohibits the calling of a strike unless a state-prescribed procedure 
for mediation is followed and unless a majority of the employees in a 
state-defined bargaining unit authorizes the strike, conflicts with the 
National Labor Relations Act and is invalid under the commerce clause of 
the Constitution.


[[Page 2133]]

559. Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950).
        Texas constitutional and statutory provisions restricting 
admission to the University of Texas Law School to white students are 
violative of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by 
reason of the fact that Negro students, denied admission thereto, are 
afforded educational facilities inferior to those available at the 
University.

560. United States v. Louisiana, 339 U.S. 699 (1950).
        The Louisiana constitution provides that the Louisiana boundary 
includes all islands within three leagues of the coast; and Louisiana 
statutes provide that the State's southern boundary is 27 marine miles 
from the shore line.
        Since the three-mile belt off the shore is in the domain of the 
Nation rather than that of the States, it follows that the area claimed 
by Louisiana extending 24 miles seaward beyond the three-mile belt is 
also in the domain of the Nation rather than Louisiana. The marginal sea 
is a national, not a state, concern and national rights are paramount in 
that area. The United States, therefore, is entitled to a decree 
upholding such paramount rights and enjoining Louisiana and all persons 
claiming under it from trespassing upon the area in violation of the 
rights of the United States, and requiring Louisiana to account for the 
money derived by it from the area after June 23, 1947.

    Justices Concurring: Vinson, C.J., Black, Frankfurter, Douglas, 
Burton.

    Justices Dissenting: Reed, Minton.

561. United States v. Texas, 339 U.S. 707 (1950).
        Notwithstanding provisions in Texas laws whereby that State 
extended its boundary to a line in the Gulf of Mexico 24 marine miles 
beyond the three-mile limit and asserted ownership of the bed within 
that area and to the outer edge of the continental shelf, the United 
States is entitled to a decree sustaining its paramount rights to 
dominion of natural resources in said area, beyond the low-water mark on 
the coast of Texas and outside inland waters. Any claim which Texas may 
have asserted over the marginal belt when she existed as an independent 
Republic was relinquished upon her admission into the Union on an equal 
footing with the existing States.

    Justices Concurring: Vinson, C.J., Black, Frankfurter, Douglas, 
Burton.

    Justices Dissenting: Reed, Minton.

562. McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents, 339 U.S. 637 (1950).
        Oklahoma law required segregation in educational facilities at 
institutions of higher learnings. As applied to assign an African 
American student to a special row in the classroom, to a special table 
in the library, and to a special table in the cafeteria, the law 
impaired

[[Page 2134]]
and inhibited the student's ability to study, engage in discussion, 
exchange views with other students, and in general to learn his 
profession. The conditions under which the student was required to 
receive his education deprived him of his personal and present right to 
the equal protection of the laws and were contrary to the command of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.

563. Bus Employees v. WERB, 340 U.S. 383 (1951).
        Wisconsin Public Utility Anti-Strike Law substituted arbitration 
upon order of the Wisconsin Employment Relations Board for collective 
bargaining whenever an impasse is reached in the bargaining process. To 
insure conformity with this statutory scheme, Wisconsin denied to 
utility employees the right to strike.
        As applied, this law conflicts with the National Labor Relations 
Act and is invalid under the supremacy clause.

    Justices Concurring: Vinson, C.J., Black, Reed, Douglas, Jackson, 
Clark.

    Justices Dissenting: Frankfurter, Burton, Minton.

564. Norton Co. v. Department of Revenue, 340 U.S. 534 (1951).
        The Illinois occupation tax, levied on gross receipts from sales 
of tangible personal property, cannot be collected on orders sent 
directly by the customer to the head officer of a corporation in 
Massachusetts and shipped directly to the customers from that office. 
These sales are interstate in nature and are immune from state taxation 
by virtue of the commerce clause.

    Justices Concurring: Vinson, C.J., Black (dissenting in part), Reed 
(dissenting in part), Frankfurter, Douglas (dissenting in part), 
Jackson, Burton, Clark (dissenting in part), Minton.

565. Spector Motor Serv. v. O'Connor, 340 U.S. 602 (1951).
        A state franchise tax for the privilege of doing business in a 
State, computed at a nondiscriminatory rate on that part of a foreign 
corporation's net income which is reasonably attributed to its business 
activities within the States and not levied as compensation for the use 
of highways, or collected in lieu of an ad valorem property tax, or 
imposed as a fee for inspection, or as a tax on sales or use, cannot 
constitutionally be applied to a foreign motor carrier engaged 
exclusively in interstate trucking. A State cannot exact a franchise tax 
for the privilege of engaging in interstate commerce.

    Justices Concurring: Vinson, C.J., Reed, Frankfurter, Jackson, 
Burton, Minton.

    Justices Dissenting: Black, Douglas, Clark.

566. Hughes v. Fetter, 341 U.S. 609 (1951).
        The Wisconsin Wrongful Death Act provided that ``. . . actions 
thereunder shall be brought only for a death caused in this State.''

[[Page 2135]]

        Wisconsin's policy against entertaining suits under the wrongful 
death acts of other States must give way to the strong unifying 
principle embodied in the full faith and credit clause looking toward 
maximum enforcement in each State of the obligations or rights created 
or recognized by the statutes of sister states.

    Justices Concurring: Vinson, C.J., Black, Douglas, Burton, Clark.

    Justices Dissenting: Reed, Frankfurter, Jackson, Minton.

567. Carson v. Roane-Anderson Co., 342 U.S. 232 (1952).
        Tennessee Retailers' Sales Tax Act could not be enforced as to 
sales of commodities to a contractor employed by the Atomic Energy 
Commission; the contractor's activities were those of the Commission and 
exempt under federal law.

568. Accord: General Electric Co. v. Washington, 347 U.S. 909 (1954), 
        embracing exemption of a similar contractor from Washington 
        business and occupation tax law.

569. Standard Oil Co. v. Peck, 342 U.S. 382 (1952).
        When boats and barges of an Ohio corporation used in 
transporting oil along the Mississippi River do not pick up or discharge 
oil in Ohio, and, apart from stopping therein occasionally for fuel and 
repairs, are almost continuously outside Ohio and are subject, on an 
apportionment basis, to taxation by other States, an Ohio tax on their 
full value violates the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

    Justices Concurring: Vinson, C.J., Reed, Clark, Frankfurter, 
Douglas, Jackson, Burton.

    Justices Dissenting: Black, Minton.

570. Memphis Steam Laundry v. Stone, 342 U.S. 389 (1952).
        A Mississippi privilege tax, levied on the privilege of 
soliciting business for a laundry not licensed in the State and 
collected at the rate of $50 on each vehicle used in the business cannot 
validly be imposed on a foreign corporation operating an establishment 
in Tennessee and doing no business in Mississippi other than sending 
trucks thereto to solicit business, and pick up, deliver, and collect 
for laundry. A tax so administered burdens interstate commerce.

    Justices Concurring: Vinson, C.J., Reed, Frankfurter, Douglas, 
Jackson, Burton, Clark, Minton.

    Justice Dissenting: Black.

571. First Nat'l Bank v. United Air Lines, 342 U.S. 396 (1952).
        Illinois law provided that ``no action shall be brought or 
prosecuted in this state to recover damages for a death occurring 
outside of this state where a right of action for such death exists 
under the

[[Page 2136]]
laws of the place where such death occurred and services of process in 
such suit may be had upon the defendant in such place.''
        In a suit brought in a federal district court in Illinois on 
grounds of diversity of citizenship to recover under the Utah death 
statute for a death occurring in Utah, the Illinois statute was held to 
be violative of the full faith and credit clause.

    Justices Concurring: Vinson, C.J., Black, Douglas, Jackson, Burton, 
Clark, Minton.

    Justices Dissenting: Reed, Frankfurter.

572. Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 (1952).
        Insofar as the New York Education Law forbids the commercial 
showing of any motion picture without a license and authorizes denial of 
a license on a censor's conclusion that a film is ``sacrilegious,'' it 
is void as a prior restraint on freedom of speech and of the press under 
the First Amendment made applicable to the States by the due process 
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The statute authorized designated 
officers to refuse to license the showing of any film which is obscene, 
indecent, immoral, inhuman, sacrilegious, or the exhibition of which 
would tend to corrupt morals or incite to crime.

573. Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94 (1952).
        As construed and applied, Art. 5-C of the New York Religious 
Corporations Laws, which authorized transfer of administrative control 
of the Russian Orthodox churches of North America from the Supreme 
Church Authority in Moscow to the authorities selected by a convention 
of the North American churches is invalid. Legislation which determines, 
in a hierarchical church, ecclesiastical administration or the 
appointment of the clergy, or transfers control of churches from one 
group to another, interferes with the free exercise of religion contrary 
to the Constitution.

    Justices Concurring: Black, Douglas, Frankfurter, Vinson, C.J., 
Reed, Burton, Clark, Minton.

    Justice Dissenting: Jackson.

574. Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952).
        Oklahoma law requires each state officer and employee, as a 
condition of his employment, to take a ``loyalty oath,'' that he is not, 
and has not been for the preceding five years, a member of any 
organization listed by the Attorney General of the United States as 
``communist front'' or ``subversive.''
        As construed, this statute excludes persons from state 
employment on the basis of membership in an organization, regardless of 
their knowledge concerning the activities and purposes of the 
organization and therefore violates the due process clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.


[[Page 2137]]

575. Dameron v. Brodhead, 345 U.S. 322 (1953).
        Where a serviceman domiciled in one State is assigned to 
military duty in another State, the latter is barred by Sec. 514 of the 
Soldiers and Sailor's Civil Relief Act of 1940 from imposing a tax on 
his tangible personal property temporarily located within its borders, 
even when the State of his domicile has not taxed such property.

    Justices Concurring: Vinson, C.J., Reed, Frankfurter, Jackson, 
Burton, Clark, Minton.

    Justices Dissenting: Black, Douglas.

576. Kern-Limerick, Inc. v. Scurlock, 347 U.S. 110 (1954).
        The Arkansas Gross Receipts Tax, levied on the gross receipts of 
sales within the State, cannot be applied to transactions whereby 
private contractors procured in Arkansas two tractors for use in 
constructing a naval ammunition depot for the United States under a 
cost-plus-fixed-fee contract. Applicable federal laws provide that in 
procuring articles required for accomplishment of the agreement, the 
contractor shall act as purchasing agent for the Government and that the 
Government not only acquires title but shall be directly liable to the 
vendor for the purchase price. The tax is void as a levy on the Federal 
Government.

    Justices Concurring: Reed, Frankfurter, Jackson, Burton, Clark, 
Minton.

    Justices Dissenting: Warren, C.J., Black, Douglas.

577. Michigan-Wisconsin Pipe Line Co. v. Calvert, 347 U.S. 157 (1954).
        A Texas tax on the occupation of ``gathering gas'' measured by 
the entire volume of gas ``taken,'' as applied to an interstate natural 
gas pipeline company, where the taxable incidence is the taking of gas 
from the outlet of an independent gasoline plant within the State for 
the purpose of immediate interstate transmission, is violative of the 
commerce clause. As here applied, the State delayed the incidence of the 
tax beyond the step where production and processing have ceased and 
transmission in interstate commerce has begun; to that the tax is not 
levied on the capture or production of the gas, but on its taking into 
interstate commerce after production, gathering and processing.

578. Miller Bros. v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 340 (1954).
        Where residents of nearby Maryland make purchase from appellant 
in Delaware, some deliveries being made in Maryland by common carrier 
and some by appellant's truck, seizure of the appellant's truck in 
Maryland and holding it liable for the Maryland use tax on all goods 
sold in Delaware to Maryland customers is a denial of due process; the 
Delaware corporation has not subjected itself to the taxing power of 
Maryland and has not afforded Maryland a jurisdiction or power to impose 
upon it a liability for collections of the Maryland use tax.


[[Page 2138]]


    Justices Concurring: Reed, Frankfurter, Jackson, Burton, Minton.

    Justices Dissenting: Warren, C.J., Black, Douglas, Clark.

579. Railway Express Agency v. Virginia, 347 U.S. 359 (1954).
        In addition to ``taxes on property of express companies,'' 
Virginia provided that ``for the privilege of doing business in the 
State,'' express companies shall pay an ``annual license tax'' upon 
gross receipts earned in the State ``on business passing through, into, 
or out of, this State.''
        The gross-receipts tax is in fact and effect a privilege tax, 
and its application to a foreign corporation doing an exclusively 
interstate business violated the commerce clause of the Constitution.

    Justices Concurring: Reed, Frankfurter, Jackson, Burton, Minton.

    Justices Dissenting: Warren, C.J., Black, Douglas, Clark.

580. Franklin Nat'l Bank v. New York, 347 U.S. 373 (1954).
        Insofar as the New York Banking Law forbids national banks to 
use the word ``saving'' or ``savings in their business or advertising,'' 
it conflicts with federal laws expressly authorizing national banks to 
receive deposits and to exercise incidental powers and is void.

    Justices Concurring: Warren, C.J., Black, Frankfurter, Douglas, 
Jackson, Burton, Clark, Minton.

    Justice Dissenting: Reed.

581. Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
        State constitutional and statutory provisions requiring 
segregation of white and Negro children in public schools on the basis 
of race denies to such Negro children the equal protection of the laws 
guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment and are void.

582. Castle v. Hayes Freight Lines, 348 U.S. 61 (1954).
        Illinois law provides for a 90-day suspension upon a finding of 
10 or more violations of regulations calling for a balanced distribution 
of freight loads in relation to the truck's axles. If thereafter the 
same carrier is found to have been guilty of 10 or more later 
violations, the suspension is for one year.
        Where an interstate motor carrier holds a certificate of 
convenience and necessity issued by the Interstate Commerce Commission 
under the Federal Motor Carrier Act, a State may not suspend the 
carrier's rights to use the State's highways in its interstate 
operations. The Illinois law, as applied to such carrier, is violative 
of the commerce clause.

583. Society for Savings v. Bowers, 349 U.S. 143 (1955).
        When a state property tax is levied against a mutual saving bank 
and a federal savings and loan association in their own names and is 
measured by the amount of each bank's capital, surplus, or reserve

[[Page 2139]]
and undivided profits, without deduction of the value of federal 
securities owned by each or provision for reimbursement of each bank by 
its depositors for the tax, the latter is void as a tax upon obligations 
of the Federal Government (Art. VI, cl. 2).

584. Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497 (1956).
        The Smith Act, as amended, 18 U.S.C. Sec. 2385, which prohibits 
the knowing advocacy of the overthrow of the Government of the United 
States by force and violence, supersedes the enforceability of the 
Pennsylvania Sedition Act, which proscribes the same conduct. The scheme 
of federal regulation is so pervasive as to make reasonable the 
inference that the Congress left no room for the States to supplement 
it--enforcement of state sedition acts presents a serious danger of 
conflict with the administration of the federal program. The decision of 
the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania holding that the Smith Act superseded 
the Pennsylvania statute is affirmed.

    Justices Concurring: Warren, C.J., Black, Frankfurter, Douglas, 
Clark, Harlan.

    Justices Dissenting: Reed, Burton, Minton.

585. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
        Illinois statutes provide that a writ of error may be prosecuted 
on a ``mandatory record'' kept by the court clerk and consisting of the 
indictment, arraignment, plea, verdict, and sentence. The ``mandatory 
record'' can be obtained free of charge by an indigent defendant. In 
such instances review is limited to errors on the face of the mandatory 
record, and there is no review of trial errors such as an erroneous 
ruling on admission of evidence. No provision was made whereby a 
convicted person in a non-capital case can obtain a bill of exceptions 
or report of the trial proceedings, which by statute is furnished free 
only to indigent defendants sentenced to death. Griffin, an indigent 
defendant convicted of robbery, accordingly was refused a free certified 
copy of the entire record, including a stenographic transcript of the 
proceedings, and therefore was unable to perfect his appeal founded upon 
nonconstitutional errors of the trial court. Petitioner was held to have 
been denied due process of law and the equal protection of the laws 
guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.

    Justices Concurring: Warren, C.J., Black, Frankfurter, Douglas, 
Clark.

    Justices Dissenting: Reed, Burton, Minton, Harlan.

586. Covey v. Town of Somers, 351 U.S. 141 (1956).
        New York statutory procedure which sanctioned notice by mail 
together with the posting of a copy of said notice at a local post 
office and the publication thereof in two local newspapers of 
proceedings to foreclose a lien for delinquent real estate taxes, was 
constitutionally inadequate and effected a taking of property without 
due process

[[Page 2140]]
when employed in the foreclosure of the property of a mentally 
incompetent woman resident in the taxing jurisdiction and known by the 
officials thereof to be financially responsible but incapable of 
handling her affairs.

    Justice Concurring: Frankfurter (separately).

587. Railway Employees' Dep't v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225 (1956).
        A ``right to work'' provision of the Nebraska constitution, by 
virtue of the supremacy clause of Art. VI of the Constitution, cannot be 
invoked to invalidate a ``union shop'' agreement between an interstate 
railroad and unions of its employees for the reason that such ``union 
shop'' agreement is expressly authorized by Sec. 2(11) of the Railway 
Labor Act. By reason of such authorization, such ``union shop'' 
agreements cannot be invalidated by any state law.

    Justice Concurring: Frankfurter (separately).

588. Walker v. Hutchinson City, 352 U.S. 112 (1956).
        Kansas statutes permitted condemnation proceedings for the 
taking of private property for public use to be instituted by notice 
either in writing or by publication in an official city paper.
        Where the commissioners, appointed to determine compensation in 
condemnation of appellant's land for public use, gave no notice of a 
hearing except by publication in the official city newspaper, though 
appellant was a resident of Kansas and his name was known to the city 
and on its official records, and there was no reason why direct notice 
could not be given, the newspaper publication alone did not measure up 
to the quality of notice the due process clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment requires as a prerequisite to this type of proceeding.

    Justices Concurring: Warren, C.J., Black, Reed, Douglas, Clark, 
Harlan.

    Justices Dissenting: Frankfurter, Burton.

589. Leslie Miller, Inc. v. Arkansas, 352 U.S. 187 (1956).
        Arkansas statute licensing contractors cannot be applied to a 
federal contractor operating pursuant to an award issued pursuant to the 
Armed Services Procurement Act of 1947. The state statute, being in 
conflict with the federal law, cannot validly be enforced.

590. Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380 (1957).
        The Michigan Penal Code proscribed the sale to the general 
reading public of any book containing obscene language ``tending to the 
corruption of the morals of youth.'' When invoked to convict a 
proprietor who sold a book having such a potential effect on youth to an 
adult police officer, the statute violated the due process clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. Thus enforced, the statute would permit the adult 
population of Michigan to read only what is fit for children.


[[Page 2141]]

591. Gayle v. Browder, 352 U.S. 903 (1956).
        Alabama statutes and Montgomery City ordinances which required 
segregation of ``white'' and ``colored'' races on motor buses in the 
City were violative of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.

592. Guss v. Utah Labor Bd., 353 U.S. 1 (1957).
        By vesting in the NLRB jurisdiction over labor relations 
affecting interstate commerce, Congress has completely displaced state 
legislative power to deal with such matters. When the Board declines to 
exercise its jurisdiction and has not ceded jurisdiction to a state 
labor relations agency pursuant to Sec. 10(a) of the National Labor 
Relations Act, a state labor relations board, acting pursuant to state 
enactment, is precluded by the national supremacy clause from exercising 
jurisdiction over a labor dispute involving an employer engaged in 
interstate commerce.

    Justices Concurring: Warren, C.J., Black, Frankfurter, Douglas, 
Harlan, Brennan.

    Justices Dissenting: Burton, Clark.

593. Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S. 457 (1957).
        Illinois Community Currency Exchange Act exempted money orders 
of the American Express Company from the requirements that any firm 
selling or issuing money orders in the State must secure a license and 
submit to State regulation.
        Application of the Act to appellees denies them the equal 
protection of the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. Although 
the equal protection clause does not require that every state regulation 
apply to all in the same business, a statutory discrimination must be 
based on differences that are reasonably related to the purposes of the 
statute. The effect of the discrimination was to create a closed class 
by singling out American Express money orders for exemption and thereby 
to afford that company important economic and competitive advantages 
over the appellees.

    Justices Concurring: Warren, C.J., Douglas, Burton, Clark, Brennan, 
Whittaker.

    Justices Dissenting: Black, Frankfurter, Harlan.

594. Public Util. Comm'n v. United States, 355 U.S. 534 (1958).
        A California statute making contingent upon prior approval by 
its Public Utilities Commission of the Federal Government's practice, 
sanctioned by federal law, of negotiating special rates with carriers 
for the transportation of federal property in California is 
unconstitutional by reason of conflict with the national supremacy 
clause.

    Justices Concurring: Black, Frankfurter, Douglas, Clark, Brennan, 
Whittaker.

    Justices Dissenting: Warren, C.J., Burton, Harlan.


[[Page 2142]]


595. Eskridge v. Washington Prison Bd., 357 U.S. 214 (1958).
        A Washington state law authorizes furnishing a stenographic 
transcript of trial proceedings to an indigent defendant in conjunction 
with his appeal of a conviction whenever, in the trial judge's opinion, 
``justice thereby will be promoted.'' Denial of a free transcript to the 
defendant, sustained by the state appellate court, as well as refusal of 
a petition for habeas corpus based on such denial, deprived the 
defendant of rights guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.

    Justices Concurring: Warren, C.J., Douglas, Clark, Black, Burton, 
Brennan.

    Justices Dissenting: Harlan, Whittaker.

596. Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958).
        The California statutory provisions exacting as a prerequisite 
for property tax exemption that applicants therefor swear that they do 
not advocate the forcible overthrow of federal or state governments or 
the support of a foreign government against the United States during 
hostilities are unconstitutional insofar as they are enforced by 
procedures placing upon the taxpayer the burden of proving that he is 
not guilty of advocating that which is forbidden. Such procedures 
deprive the taxpayer of freedom of speech without the procedural 
safeguards required by the due process clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.

    Justices Concurring: Black, Frankfurter, Douglas, Burton, Harlan, 
Brennan, Whittaker.

    Justice Dissenting: Clark.

   First Unitarian Church v. Los Angeles, 357 U.S. 545 (1958).
        Solely because of their refusal to subscribe oaths that they do 
not advocate the forcible overthrow of government, or support of a 
foreign government against the United States during hostilities, 
petitioners were denied tax exemptions authorized by the California 
constitution and statutes. Enforcement of the oath requirement through 
statutory procedures which place upon taxpayers the burden of proving 
nonadvocacy violates the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

    Justices Concurring: Black, Frankfurter, Douglas, Burton, Harlan, 
Brennan, Whittaker.

    Justice Dissenting: Clark.

597. Teamsters Union v. Oliver, 358 U.S. 283 (1959).
        An Ohio antitrust law cannot be invoked to prohibit enforcement 
of a collective bargaining agreement between a group of interstate motor 
carriers and local labor unions, which agreement stipulates that truck 
drivers owning and driving their own vehicles shall be paid the 
prescribed wages plus at least a prescribed minimum rental for the use 
of their vehicles. The state antitrust law, insofar as it is applied to 
prevent contracting parties from enforcing agreement upon a

[[Page 2143]]
subject matter as to which the National Labor Relations Act directs them 
to bargain, is invalid.

    Justices Concurring: Black, Douglas, Clark, Harlan, Brennan.

    Justice Dissenting: Whittaker.

598. Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, 359 U.S. 520 (1959).
        Illinois statute which requires trucks and trailers operating on 
state highways to be equipped with specified type of rear fender 
mudguard, which is different from those permitted in at least 45 other 
States, and which would seriously interfere with ``interline 
operations'' of motor carriers cannot validly be applied to interstate 
motor carriers certified by the Interstate Commerce Commission for the 
reason that interstate commerce is unreasonably burdened thereby.

    Justices Concurring: Harlan (separately), Stewart (separately).

599. San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959).
        The failure of the NLRB to assume jurisdiction does not leave 
California free to apply its laws defining torts and regulating labor 
relations for purposes of awarding damages to an employer for economic 
injuries resulting from the picketing of his plant by labor unions not 
selected by his employees as their bargaining agent. Since the employer 
is engaged in interstate commerce, California laws cannot be applied to 
matters falling within compass of the National Labor Relations Act.

    Justices Concurring: Harlan, Clark, Whittaker, Stewart (separately).

600. Accord: DeVries v. Baumgartner's Electric Co., 359 U.S. 498 (1959), 
        as to a South Dakota law.

    Justices Concurring: Frankfurter, Brennan, Warren, C.J., Black, 
Douglas.

    Justices Dissenting: Clark, Harlan, Whittaker, Stewart.


[[Page 2144]]


601. Accord: Superior Court v. Washington ex rel. Yellow Cab, 361 U.S. 
        373 (1960), as to a Washington law.

602. Accord: Bogle v. Jakes Foundry Co., 362 U.S. 401 (1960), as to a 
        Tennessee law.

603. Accord: McMahon v. Milam Mfg. Co., 368 U.S. 7 (1961), as to a 
        Mississippi law.

604. Accord: Marine Engineers v. Interlake Co., 370 U.S. 173 (1962), as 
        to a Minnesota law.

605. Accord: Waxman v. Virginia, 371 U.S. 4 (1962), as to a Virginia law 
        prohibiting picketing by non-employees.

606. Accord: Construction Laborers v. Curry, 371 U.S. 542 (1963), 
        involving enjoinder of picketing as violative of Georgia right-
        to-work law.

    Justice Concurring: Harlan (separately).

607. Accord: Journeymen & Plumbers' Union v. Borden, 373 U.S. 690 
        (1962), as to a Texas law.

    Justices Concurring: Harlan, Warren, C.J., Brennan, Black, Stewart, 
White.

    Justices Dissenting: Douglas, Clark.

608. Accord: Iron Workers v. Perko, 373 U.S. 701 (1963), as to an Ohio 
        law.

    Justices Concurring: Harlan, Warren, C.J., White, Brennan, Stewart, 
Black.

    Justices Dissenting: Douglas, Clark.

609. State Athletic Comm'n v. Dorsey, 359 U.S. 533 (1959).
        Louisiana statute prohibiting athletic contests between Negroes 
and white persons was violative of the equal protection clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.

610. Kingsley Pictures Corp. v. Regents, 360 U.S. 684 (1959).
        As construed and applied, the New York Education Law which 
requires denial of a license to show a motion picture ``presenting 
adultery as being right and desirable for certain people under certain 
circumstances'' is unconstitutional. Refusal thereunder of a license to 
show a motion picture found to portray adultery alluringly as proper 
behavior violates the freedom to advocate ideas guaranteed by the First 
Amendment and protected by the Fourteenth Amendment from infringement by 
the States.

    Justices Concurring: Black (separately), Frankfurter (separately), 
Douglas (separately), Clark (separately), Harlan (separately).

611. Faubus v. Aaron, 361 U.S. 197 (1959).
        Arkansas statutes which empowered the Governor to close the 
public schools and to hold an election as to whether or not the schools 
were to be integrated as well as to withhold public moneys, hitherto

[[Page 2145]]
allocated to such schools, on the occasion of their closing and to make 
such funds available to other public schools or nonprofit private 
schools to which pupils from a closed school might transfer were 
violative of the due process and equal protection clauses of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.

612. Phillips Co. v. Dumas School Dist., 361 U.S. 376 (1960).
        As applied to the United States and its lessee, a Texas statute 
which levied a tax on any portion of federally owned land and 
improvements used and occupied by a firm in its private capacity or in 
the conduct of a business enterprise discriminated against the Federal 
Government unconstitutionally contrary to Art. VI, cl. 2. This 
discrimination resulted from the fact that art. 7173 of the Texas 
Revised Civil Statutes imposed a distinctly lesser burden on similarly 
situated lessees of exempt property owned by Texas and its subdivisions. 
Under art. 7173 the measure of the tax was not the full value of the 
leased premises, as under art. 5248, but only the price the taxable 
leasehold would bring at a sale. Also, art. 7153 imposed no tax on a 
lessee whose lease is for a term of less than three years. In addition, 
under art. 7173, a lease for three years or longer, but subject, as was 
the appellant's lease with the United States, to terminate at the 
lessor's option, was not a lease for a term of three years or more.

    Justices Concurring: Brennan, Clark, Black, Douglas, Stewart, 
Warren, C.J., Whittaker, Harlan, Frankfurter (separately).

613. Rohr Aircraft Corp. v. San Diego County, 362 U.S. 628 (1960).
        Property taxes assessed under California law could not be levied 
on real estate owned by the Reconstruction Finance Corporation after the 
latter had declared the property to be surplus and surrendered it to the 
War Assets Administration for disposal; this exemption arose even before 
execution of a quitclaim deed transferring title from the RFC to the 
United States and even though a property had been leased to a private 
lessee in the name of both the RFC and the United States.

    Justices Concurring: Clark, Warren, C.J., Harlan, Stewart, 
Frankfurter, Brennan, Whittaker.

    Justices Dissenting: Douglas, Black.

614. Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960).
        Alabama statute which altered the boundaries of the City of 
Tuskegee in such manner as to eliminate all but four or five of its 400 
African American voters without eliminating any white voter was 
violative of the Fifteenth Amendment.

    Justice Concurring: Whittaker (separately).


[[Page 2146]]


615. Boynton v. Virginia, 364 U.S. 454 (1960).
        Virginia statute making it a misdemeanor for any person to 
remain on premises of another after having been forbidden to do so could 
not be enforced against a Negro for refusing to leave the section 
reserved for white people in a restaurant in a bus terminal by reason of 
conflict with provision of Interstate Commerce Act forbidding interstate 
motor vehicle bus carriers from subjecting persons to unjust 
discrimination.

    Justices Concurring: Black, Douglas, Warren, C.J., Brennan, Stewart, 
Frankfurter, Harlan.

    Justices Dissenting: Whittaker, Clark.

616. Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960).
        Arkansas statute which required every school teacher, as a 
condition of employment in state-supported schools and colleges, to file 
an affidavit listing every organization to which he had belonged or 
contributed within the preceding five years deprived teachers of 
associational freedom guaranteed by the due process clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.

    Justices Concurring: Stewart, Warren, C.J., Brennan, Douglas, Black.

    Justices Dissenting: Frankfurter, Clark, Harlan, Whittaker.

617. Bush v. Orleans Parish School Bd., 364 U.S. 500 (1961).
        Louisiana interposition statute which averred that the decision 
in the school segregation case (Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 
483 (1954)) constituted usurpation of state power and which interposed 
the sovereignty of the State against enforcement of that decision did 
not assert ``a constitutional doctrine,'' and if taken seriously, it is 
legal defiance of constitutional authority.

618. Orleans Parish School Bd. v. Bush, 365 U.S. 569 (1961).
        Louisiana statutes which (1) provided for segregation of races 
in public schools and the withholding of funds from integrated schools; 
(2) conferred on the Governor the right to close all schools upon the 
integration of any one of them; and (3) directed the Governor to 
supersede a school board under a court order to desegregate and take 
over management of public schools were unconstitutional and denial of 
equal protection of the laws.

619. Ferguson v. Georgia, 365 U.S. 570 (1961).
        When, by reason of a Georgia law which granted defendant in a 
criminal trial the right to make an unsworn statement to the jury 
without subjecting himself to cross-examination, defendant's counsel was 
denied the right to ask him any question when he took the stand to make 
his unsworn statement, such application of the Georgia law deprived the 
defendant of the effective assistance of counsel without due process of 
law.


[[Page 2147]]


    Justices Concurring: Frankfurter (separately), Clark (separately).

620. Louisiana v. NAACP ex rel. Gremillion, 366 U.S. 293 (1961).
        Louisiana statute which prohibited any ``non-trading'' 
association from doing business in Louisiana if it is affiliated with 
any ``foreign or out of state non-trading'' association, any of the 
officers or directors of which are members of subversive organizations 
as cited by a House committee or by the United States Attorney General, 
and which required every non-trading association with an out of state 
affiliate to file annually an affidavit that none of the officers of the 
affiliate is a member of such organizations was void for vagueness and 
violative of due process.

    Justices Concurring: Harlan (separately), Stewart (separately), 
Frankfurter (separately), Clark (separately).

621. United States v. Oregon, 366 U.S. 643 (1961).
        Oregon escheat law could not be applied to support claim of 
State to property of a resident who died without a will or heirs in a 
Veterans' Hospital in Oregon; the United States has asserted title 
thereto under a superseding federal law.

    Justices Concurring: Black, Warren, C.J., Brennan, Stewart, 
Frankfurter, Harlan, Clark.

    Justices Dissenting: Douglas, Whittaker.

622. United States v. Shimer, 367 U.S. 374 (1961).
        Pennsylvania Deficiency Judgment Act had been displaced by 
applicable provisions of the Federal Servicemen's Readjustment Act of 
1944, and regulations issued thereunder, and could not be invoked to bar 
suit by the Veterans' Administration against a veteran to recover the 
indemnity for a defaulted home loan which it had guaranteed and which 
had been foreclosed by the lender.

    Justices Concurring: Harlan, Brennan, Stewart, Warren, C.J., Clark, 
Whittaker, Frankfurter.

    Justices Dissenting: Black, Douglas.

623. Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961).
        Maryland constitutional provision under which an appointed 
notary public who would not declare his belief in God was denied his 
commission imposed an invalid test for public office violative of 
freedom of belief and religion as guaranteed by the due process clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment.

    Justices Concurring: Frankfurter (separately), Harlan (separately).

624. Marcus v. Search Warrant, 367 U.S. 717 (1961).
        Missouri statutory procedure which enabled a city policy 
officer, in an ex parte proceeding, to obtain from a trial judge search 
warrants authorizing seizure of all ``obscene'' material possessed by

[[Page 2148]]
wholesale and retail distributors without granting the latter a hearing 
or even seeing any of such materials in question and without specifying 
any particular publications, sanctioned search and seizure tactics 
violative of due process.

    Justices Concurring: Black (separately), Douglas (separately).

625. Tugwell v. Bush, 367 U.S. 907 (1961).
        Louisiana statute which punished the giving to or acceptance by 
any parent of anything of value as an inducement to sending his child to 
a school operated in violation of Louisiana law was void for vagueness 
and was designed to scuttle a desegregation program.

626. Legislature of Louisiana v. United States, 367 U.S. 908 (1961).
        Louisiana statutes which purported to remove New Orleans school 
board and replace it with a new group appointed by the legislature, 
which deprived the board of its attorney and substituted the Louisiana 
Attorney General, and a resolution addressing out of office the school 
superintendent chosen by the board, were unconstitutional and violative 
of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

627. Federal Land Bank v. Kiowa County, 368 U.S. 146 (1961).
        Kansas statute which declared that oil and gas leases and the 
royalties derived therefrom were taxable as personal property could not 
be applied so as to subject to local taxation an oil and gas lease and 
income therefrom derived by a Federal Land Bank from property acquired 
in satisfaction of a debt; under supervening federal law such Land Banks 
were exempted from all ``except taxes on real estate.''

    Justice Concurring: Black (separately).

628. Cramp v. Board of Pub. Instruction, 368 U.S. 278 (1961).
        Florida statute which required state and local public employees 
to swear that they had never lent their ``aid, support, advice, counsel, 
or influence to the Communist Party,'' and which subjected them to 
discharge for refusal was void for vagueness and violative of due 
process.

    Justices Concurring: Black (separately), Douglas (separately).

629. United States v. Union Central Life Ins. Co., 368 U.S. 291 (1961).
        Michigan law regulating the manner in which a federal tax lien 
must be recorded was in conflict with applicable provisions of the 
Internal Revenue Code and therefore was ineffective for purposes of 
withholding priority to the Government's lien.

    Justices Concurring: Black, Frankfurter, Brennan, Warren, C.J., 
Clark, Stewart, Whittaker, Harlan.

    Justice Dissenting: Douglas.


[[Page 2149]]


630. Campbell v. Hussey, 368 U.S. 297 (1961).
        Congress having preempted the field by enactment of the Federal 
Tobacco Inspection Act pertaining to the establishment of uniform 
standards for classification of tobacco, a Georgia law which required 
Type 14 tobacco grown in Georgia to be identified with a white tag could 
not be enforced.

    Justices Concurring: Douglas, Whittaker (separately), Warren, C.J., 
Brennan, Stewart, Clark.

    Justices Dissenting: Black, Frankfurter, Harlan.

631. St. Helena Parish School Bd. v. Hall, 368 U.S. 515 (1962).
        Louisiana statute which authorized the school board of a 
municipally operated school system to close the schools upon a vote of 
the electors and which provided that the board might then lease or sell 
any school building, but which subjected to extensive state control and 
financial aid the private schools which might acquire such buildings was 
violative of the equal protection of the laws in that it was intended to 
continue segregation in schools.

632. Bailey v. Patterson, 369 U.S. 31 (1962).
        Mississippi statutes which required racial segregation at 
interstate and intrastate transportation facilities denied equal 
protection of the law.

633. Turner v. City of Memphis, 369 U.S. 350 (1962).
        Tennessee statute, and administrative regulation issued under 
the authority thereof, insofar as they sanctioned racial segregation in 
a private restaurant operated on premises leased from a city at its 
municipal airport denied equal protection of the law.

634. Free v. Bland, 369 U.S. 663 (1962).
        By virtue of the supremacy clause of the Constitution, Treasury 
regulations creating a right of survivorship in United States Savings 
Bonds preempted appplication of any conflicting provisions of Texas 
Community Property Law which prohibited a married couple from taking 
advantage of such survivorship regulations whenever the purchase price 
of said bonds was paid out of community property.

635. State Bd. of Ins. v. Todd Shipyards, 370 U.S. 451 (1962).
        Texas law imposing a premium tax on insured parties who 
purchased insurance from insurers not licensed to sell insurance in 
Texas could not be collected, consistently with the Federal McCarran-
Ferguson Act, on insurance contracts purchased in New York from a London 
insurer by the terms of which premiums thereon and claims thereunder 
were payable in New York.

    Justices Concurring: Douglas, Brennan, Warren, C.J., Stewart, 
Harlan, Clark.

    Justice Dissenting: Black.


[[Page 2150]]


636. Central R.R. v. Pennsylvania, 370 U.S. 607 (1962).
        Pennsylvania law which levied a capital stock tax, in the nature 
of a property tax, could not be collected on that portion of a 
railroad's cars (158 out of 3074) which represented the daily average of 
its cars located on a New Jersey railroad's lines during a taxable year; 
as to the latter portion of its cars the tax was violative of the 
commerce clause and the due process clause.

    Justice Concurring: Black (separately).

637. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
        California statute which, as construed, made the ``status'' of 
narcotics addiction a criminal offense, even though the accused had 
never used narcotics in California and had not been guilty of antisocial 
behavior in California, was void as inflicting cruel and unjust 
punishment proscribed by the due process clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.

    Justices Concurring: Stewart, Warren, C.J., Brennan, Douglas 
(separately), Harlan (separately), Black.

    Justices Dissenting: Clark, White.

638. Lassiter v. United States, 371 U.S. 10 (1962).
        Louisiana laws which segregated passengers in terminal 
facilities of common carriers were unconstitutional by reason of 
conflict with federal law and the equal protection clause.

639. United States v. Buffalo Savings Bank, 371 U.S. 228 (1963).
        New York law which provided that payments out of proceeds of a 
foreclosure of property to discharge state tax liens should be deemed 
``expenses'' of the mortgage foreclosure sale was ineffective to defeat 
priority accorded by federal law to federal tax liens antedating liens 
for state and local real property taxes and assessments.

    Justices Concurring: Warren, C.J., Black, Brennan, Stewart, 
Goldberg, Harlan, Clark, White.

    Justice Dissenting: Douglas.

640. Paul v. United States, 371 U.S. 245 (1963).
        California statute which authorized the fixing of minimum 
wholesale and retail prices for milk could not be enforced as to 
purchases of milk for strictly military consumption (mess-hall) or for 
resale at commissaries at federal military installations in California; 
conflicting federal statutes and regulations governing procurement with 
appropriated funds of goods for the Armed Forces required competitive 
bidding or negotiation reflecting active competition which would be 
nullified by minimum prices determined by factors not specified in 
federal law.

    Justices Concurring: Douglas, Black, Warren, C.J., White, Brennan, 
Clark.

[[Page 2151]]


    Justices Dissenting: Stewart, Harlan, Goldberg.

641. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
        Virginia law which expanded malpractice by attorneys to include 
acceptance of employment or compensation from any person or organization 
not a party to a judicial proceeding and having no pecuniary right or 
liability in it and which made it an offense for such person or 
organization to solicit business for an attorney was violative of 
freedom of expression and association, as guaranteed by the due process 
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment when enforced against a corporation, 
including its attorneys and litigants, whose major purpose is the 
elimination of racial segregation through litigation which it solicits, 
institutes, and finances.

    Justices Concurring: Brennan, Warren, C.J., Goldberg, Douglas 
(separately), Black.

    Justices Dissenting: White (in part), Harlan, Clark, Stewart.

642. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
        Florida statutory provision which did not accord indigent 
defendants the protection of court appointed counsel in noncapital 
felony offenses deprived such defendants of due process of law.

    Justices Concurring: Douglas (separately), Clark (separately), 
Harlan (separately).

643. Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368 (1963).
        Georgia county unit system for nominating candidates in 
primaries for state-wide offices, including United States Senators, as 
set forth in statutory provisions, violated the principle of ``one-
person, one vote'' as required by the equal protection clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.

    Justices Concurring: Douglas, Stewart (separately), Clark 
(separately), Warren, C.J., Brennan, White, Goldberg, Black.

    Justice Dissenting: Harlan.

644. Lane v. Brown, 372 U.S. 477 (1963).
        Indiana Public Defender Act, insofar as it empowered the Public 
Defender to refuse to perfect an appeal for an indigent defendant 
whenever the former believed such an appeal would be unsuccessful and 
which, independently of such intervention by the Defender, afforded such 
defendant no alternative means of obtaining a transcript of a coram 
nobis hearing requisite to perfect an appeal from a trial court's denial 
of a writ of error coram nobis, effected a discriminatory denial of a 
privilege available as of right to a defendant with the requisite funds 
and was violative of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.

    Justices Concurring: Harlan (separately), Clark (separately).


[[Page 2152]]

645. Michigan Nat'l Bank v. Robertson, 372 U.S. 591 (1963).
        Suability of an out-of-state national bank in courts of Nebraska 
is determined by applicable provisions of the federal banking laws and 
not by recourse to Nebraska statute defining the venue of local actions 
involving liability under the Nebraska Installment Loan Act.

    Justices Concurring: Black (separately), Douglas (separately).

646. Accord: Mercantile Nat'l Bank v. Langdeau, 371 U.S. 555 (1963), as 
        to venue in Texas.

    Justices Concurring: White, Stewart, Brennan, Warren, C.J., 
Goldberg.

    Justices Dissenting: Harlan, Douglas, Black.

647. Halliburton Oil Well Co. v. Reily, 373 U.S. 64 (1963).
        Louisiana use tax, as herein enforced, effected an invalid 
discrimination against interstate commerce in that the isolated purchase 
of an item of used equipment in Louisiana was not subject to its sales 
tax whereas an Oklahoma contractor was subjected to the Louisiana use 
tax on an item of used equipment employed in servicing wells in 
Louisiana which had been acquired in Oklahoma; and further that the 
Louisiana sales or use tax was computed on the cost of components 
purchased in Louisiana or purchased out of state for assembly and use in 
Louisiana whereas here the contractor paid a use tax on equipment 
assembled in Oklahoma which reflected not only the purchase price of the 
components but also the cost of labor and shop overhead incurred in 
assembling the components into a usable item of equipment.

    Justices Concurring: Warren, C.J., Douglas, Goldberg, Stewart, 
White, Harlan, Brennan (separately).

    Justices Dissenting: Clark, Black.

648. Willner v. Committee on Character, 373 U.S. 96 (1963).
        New York statutory procedure governing admission to practice 
law, insofar as it failed to make provision, in cases of denial of 
admission, for a hearing on the grounds for rejection to be accorded the 
applicant, either before the Committee on Character on Fitness 
established by the Appellate Division of its Supreme Court, or before 
the Appellate Division itself was defective and amounted to a denial of 
due process.

    Justices Concurring: Douglas, Black, White, Warren, C.J., Goldberg, 
Brennan, Stewart (separately).

    Justices Dissenting: Harlan, Clark.

649. Peterson v. City of Greenville, 373 U.S. 244 (1963).
        When a city ordinance required separation of the races in 
restaurants, South Carolina trespass statute, when enforced against 
African Americans who refused to leave a lunch counter in a retail 
store, amounted to a denial of equal protection of the laws.

[[Page 2153]]


    Justice Concurring: Harlan (separately).

650. Accord: Gober v. City of Birmingham, 373 U.S. 374 (1963), as to an 
        Alabama law on trespass.

    Justices Concurring: Warren, C.J., Black, Douglas, Goldberg, White, 
Clark, Brennan, Stewart.

    Justice Dissenting: Harlan.

651. Lombard v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 267 (1963).
        When local community policy, as administered by municipal law 
enforcement officers, proscribed ``sit-in demonstrations'' protesting 
refusal of store proprietors to serve African Americans at lunch 
counters reserved for white patrons, the Louisiana Criminal Mischief 
Statute could not be invoked, without violation of the equal protection 
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, to punish African Americans who 
engaged in such demonstrations.

    Justices Concurring: Warren, C.J., Douglas (separately), Black, 
Brennan, White, Stewart, Goldberg, Clark.

    Justice Dissenting: Harlan.

652. Wright v. Georgia, 373 U.S. 284 (1963).
        Georgia unlawful assemblies act which rendered persons open to 
conviction for a breach of the peace upon their refusal to disperse upon 
command of police officers was void for vagueness and violative of due 
process in that it did not give adequate warning to African Americans 
that peaceable playing of basketball in a municipal park would expose 
them to prosecution for violation of said statute.

    Justice Concurring: Harlan (separately).

653. Sperry v. Florida ex rel. Florida Bar, 373 U.S. 379 (1963).
        Florida law regulating admission to the Bar could not be 
enforced, consistently with the principle of national supremacy, to 
prevent one, admitted to practice before the United States Patent Office 
as a Patent Attorney, from serving clients in the latter capacity in 
Florida.

654. Bus Employees v. Missouri, 374 U.S. 74 (1963).
        Missouri King-Thompson Act, which authorized the governor to 
seize and operate a public utility when the public welfare was 
jeopardized by a strike threat, was violative of 29 U.S.C. Sec. 157 of 
the National Labor Relations Act defining the rights of employees as to 
collective bargaining and, consistently with national supremacy, could 
not be enforced.

655. Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
        Pennsylvania law which required the reading, without comment, of 
verses from the Holy Bible at the opening of each public school day was 
violative of the prohibition against the enactment of any law re

[[Page 2154]]
specting an establishment of religion as embraced within the due process 
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

    Justices Concurring: Clark, Douglas (separately), Brennan 
(separately), Goldberg (separately), Harlan (concurs with latter), 
Warren, C.J., White, Black.

    Justice Dissenting: Stewart.

656. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
        South Carolina Unemployment Compensation Act, which withheld 
benefits and deemed ineligible for the receipt thereof a person who has 
failed without good cause to accept available work when offered to him, 
if construed as barring a Seventh-Day Adventist from relief because of 
religious scruples against working on Saturday, abridged the latter's 
right to the free exercise of religion contrary to the due process 
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

    Justices Concurring: Brennan, Clark, Warren, C.J., Goldberg, Black, 
Douglas, Stewart (separately).

    Justices Dissenting: Harlan, White.

657. Polar Ice Cream & Creamery Co. v. Andrews, 375 U.S. 361 (1964).
        Florida statute and regulations implementing it which required 
milk distributor to purchase its total supply of fluid milk from area 
producers at a fixed price and to take all milk which these producers 
offered was invalid under the commerce clause since they interfered with 
distributor's purchases of milk from out-of-state producers.

658. Anderson v. Martin, 375 U.S. 399 (1964).
        Louisiana statute requiring that in all primary, general, or 
special elections, the nomination papers and ballots shall designate the 
race of the candidates violated the equal protection clause.

659. Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964).
        Georgia statute establishing congressional districts of grossly 
unequal populations violates Article I, Sec. 2, of the Constitution.

    Concurring: Justices Black, Douglas, Brennan, White, Goldberg, and 
Chief Justice Warren.

    Concurring in part and dissenting in part: Justice Clark.

    Dissenting: Justices Harlan and Stewart.

660. Accord: Martin v. Bush, 376 U.S. 222 (1964).
        Texas statute establishing congressional districts of grossly 
unequal populations unconstitutional on authority of Wesberry v. 
Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964).

    Same division of Justices as in Wesberry.

661. City of New Orleans v. Barthe, 376 U.S. 189 (1964).
        District court decision holding unconstitutional Louisiana 
statute requiring segregation of races in public facilities is affirmed.


[[Page 2155]]

662. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225 (1964).
        Illinois unfair competition law cannot be applied to bar or 
penalize the copying of a product which does not qualify for a federal 
patent inasmuch as this use of the state law conflicts with the 
exclusive power of the Federal Government to grant patents only to true 
inventions and then only for a limited time.

663. Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360 (1964).
        Washington statutes requiring state employees to swear that they 
are not subversive persons and requiring teachers to swear to promote by 
precept and example respect for flag and institutions of United States 
and Washington, reverence for law and order, and undivided allegiance to 
Federal Government are void for vagueness.

    Concurring: Justices White, Black, Douglas, Brennan, Stewart, 
Goldberg, and Chief Justice Warren.

    Dissenting: Justices Clark and Harlan.

664. Hostetter v. Idlewild Bon Voyage Liquor Corp., 377 U.S. 324 (1964).
        New York law regulating sale of alcoholic beverages could not 
constitutionally be applied to dealer who sold bottled wines and liquors 
to departing international airline travelers at JFK airport in New York.

    Concurring: Justices Stewart, Douglas, Clark, White, and Chief 
Justice Warren.

    Dissenting: Justices Black and Goldberg.

665. Accord: Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control v. Ammex Warehouse 
        Co., 378 U.S. 124 (1964).
        State court voiding of state law affirmed on authority of 
Hostetter.

    Same division of Justices.

666. Department of Revenue v. James B. Beam Distilling Co., 377 U.S. 341 
        (1964).
        Kentucky statute providing for a tax of ten cents per gallon on 
the importation of whiskey into the State, which was collected while the 
whiskey was in unbroken packages in importer's possession was 
unconstitutionally applied to the importer of Scotch whiskey from abroad 
under Art. I, Sec. 10, cl. 2.

    Concurring: Justices Stewart, Douglas, Clark, White, and Chief 
Justice Warren.

    Dissenting: Justices Black and Goldberg.

667. Chamberlin v. Dade County Bd. of Public Instruction, 377 U.S. 402 
        (1964).
        Florida statute providing for prayer and devotional reading in 
public schools is unconstitutional.


[[Page 2156]]

668. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
        Alabama constitutional and statutory provisions which do not 
apportion seats in both houses of legislature on a population basis 
violated the equal protection clause.

    Concurring: Chief Justice Warren and Justices Black, Douglas, 
Brennan, Goldberg, and White.

    Concurring specially: Justices Clark and Stewart.

    Dissenting: Justice Harlan.

669. Accord: WMCA, Inc. v. Lomenzo, 377 U.S. 633 (1964).
        New York constitutional and statutory provisions which do not 
apportion seats in both houses of legislature on population basis is 
unconstitutional.

    Concurring: Chief Justice Warren and Justices Black, Douglas, 
Brennan, Goldberg, and White.

    Concurring specially: Justice Clark.

    Dissenting: Justices Harlan and Stewart.

670. Accord: Maryland Comm. for Fair Representation v. Tawes, 377 U.S. 
        656 (1964).

    Division of Justices as in 669.

671. Accord: Davis v. Mann, 377 U.S. 678 (1964). Virginia.

    Division of Justices as in 669.

672. Accord: Roman v. Sincock, 377 U.S. 695 (1964). Delaware.

    Division of Justices as in 669, except Justice Stewart concurring 
specially.

673. Accord: Lucas v. Forty-Fourth General Assembly of Colorado, 377 
        U.S. 713 (1964).
        Apportionment formula written into state constitution invalid 
under equal protection clause even though approved by electorate in 
referendum.

    Concurring: Chief Justice Warren and Justices Black, Douglas, 
Brennan, Goldberg, and White.

    Dissenting: Justices Clark, Harlan, and Stewart.

674. Accord: Meyers v. Thigpen, 378 U.S. 554 (1964). Washington 
        Legislature.

    Division of Justices as in 669, except Justice Stewart favored 
limited remand.

675. Accord: Williams v. Moss, 378 U.S. 558 (1964). Oklahoma 
        Legislature.

    Division of Justices as in 668.

676. Accord: Pinney v. Butterworth, 378 U.S. 564 (1964). Connecticut 
        Legislature.

    Division of Justices as in 668.


[[Page 2157]]


677. Accord: Hill v. Davis, 378 U.S. 565 (1964). Iowa Legislature.

    Division of Justices as in 668.

678. A Quantity of Copies of Books v. Kansas, 378 U.S. 205 (1964).
        Statute authorizing issuance of ex parte warrant for seizure of 
allegedly obscene materials prior to a hearing on the issue of obscenity 
is invalid under First and Fourteenth Amendments.

    Concurring: Justices Brennan, White, and Goldberg, and Chief Justice 
Warren.

    Concurring specially: Justices Black and Douglas; Stewart.

    Dissenting: Justices Harlan and Clark.

679. Tancil v. Woolls and Virginia Bd. of Elections v. Hamm, 379 U.S. 19 
        (1964).
        District court decisions holding unconstitutional Virginia 
statutes requiring notation of race in divorce decrees and separation by 
race of names on registration, poll tax, and residence certificate 
lists, and on assessment rolls are affirmed.

680. Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64 (1964).
        Criminal Defamation Statute is unconstitutional as applied to 
criticism of official conduct of public officials because it 
incorporates standards of malice and truthfulness at variance with New 
York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).

681. McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964)
        Criminal statute prohibiting an unmarried interracial couple 
from habitually living in and occupying the same room in the nighttime 
violates equal protection clause.

682. Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476 (1965).
        Section of law providing for suppression of Communist Party 
which authorizes issuance of search warrants for subversive books and 
other materials is constitutionally defective because it does not 
require a description with particularity of the things to be seized.

683. Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965).
        Breach of the peace statute is unconstitutionally vague.

684. Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51 (1965).
        Censorship statute requiring prior submission of films for 
review is invalid in absence of procedural safeguards eliminating 
dangers of censorship.

685. Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89 (1965).
        Texas constitutional provision prohibiting any member of Armed 
Forces who moves into the State from ever voting in Texas while a member 
of the Armed Forces violates the equal protection clause.


[[Page 2158]]


    Concurring: Justices Stewart, Black, Douglas, Clark, Brennan, White, 
and Goldberg.

    Dissenting: Justice Harlan.

686. Louisiana v. United States, 380 U.S. 145 (1965).
        Constitutional and statutory provisions requiring prospective 
voters to satisfy registrars of their ability to understand and give 
reasonable interpretation of any section of United States or Louisiana 
Constitutions violate Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments.

687. Reserve Life Ins. Co. v. Bowers, 380 U.S. 258 (1965).
        Ohio statute imposing personal property tax upon furniture and 
fixtures used by foreign insurance company in doing business in Ohio but 
not imposing similar tax upon furniture and fixtures used by domestic 
insurance companies violates equal protection clause.

688. American Oil Co. v. Neill, 380 U.S. 451 (1965).
        Idaho tax statute applied to levy an excise tax on licensed 
Idaho motor fuel dealer's sale and transfer of gasoline in Utah for 
importation into Idaho by purchaser violated due process clause of 
Fourteenth Amendment.

    Concurring: Chief Justice Warren and Justices, Douglas, Clark, 
Harlan, Brennan, Stewart, White, and Goldberg.

    Dissenting: Justice Black.

689. Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479 (1965).
        Louisiana Subversive Activities and Communist Control Law is 
unconstitutional because of overbreadth of its coverage, violating First 
Amendment, and because of its lack of procedural due process.

    Concurring: Justices Brennan, Douglas, White, and Goldberg, and 
Chief Justice Warren.

    Dissenting: Justices Harlan and Clark.

690. Harman v. Forssenius, 380 U.S. 528 (1965).
        Virginia statute requiring voters in federal election who do not 
qualify by paying poll tax to file a certificate of residence six months 
in advance of election is contrary to Twenty-fourth Amendment which 
absolutely abolished payment of poll tax as a qualification for voting 
in federal elections.

691. Corbett v. Stergios, 381 U.S. 124 (1965).
        Iowa reciprocal inheritance law conditioning right of 
nonresident aliens to take Iowa real property by intestate succession 
upon existence of reciprocal right to United States citizens to take 
real property upon same terms and conditions in alien's country could 
not under United States-Greece treaty and supremacy clause bar Greek 
national from taking.


[[Page 2159]]

692. Jordan v. Silver, 381 U.S. 415 (1965).
        District court decision holding unconstitutional California 
constitutional provisions on apportionment of state senate is affirmed.

    Concurring: Chief Justice Warren and Justices Black, Douglas, 
Brennan, White, and Goldberg.

    Dissenting: Justices Harlan, Clark, and Stewart.

693. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
        Statute making it a crime for any person to use any drug or 
article to prevent conception is unconstitutional invasion of privacy of 
married couples.

    Concurring: Justices Douglas and Clark.

    Concurring specially: Justices Goldberg, Brennan, and Chief Justice 
Warren; Justice Harlan, Justice White.

    Dissenting: Justices Black and Stewart.

694. Giaccio v. Pennsylvania, 382 U.S. 399 (1966).
        Statute permitting jurors to determine whether an acquitted 
defendant should pay the costs of the trial was void under the due 
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because of vagueness and the 
absence of any standard that would prevent arbitrary imposition of 
costs.

695. Baxstrom v. Herold, 383 U.S. 107 (1966).
        New York statutory procedure for civil commitment of persons at 
the expiration of a prison sentence without the jury review available to 
all others civilly committed in New York and for commitment to an 
institution maintained by the Department of Correction beyond the 
expiration of their terms without a judicial determination of dangerous 
mental illness such as that afforded to all others violates the equal 
protection clause.

696. Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
        Constitutional provisions making payment of poll taxes a 
qualification of eligibility to vote violate equal protection clause.

    Concurring: Justices Douglas, Clark, Brennan, White, Fortas, and 
Chief Justice Warren.

    Dissenting: Justices Black, Harlan, and Stewart.

697. Accord: Texas v. United States, 384 U.S. 155 (1966).

698. Elfbrandt v. Russell, 384 U.S. 11 (1966).
        Arizona loyalty oath is unconstitutionally overbroad and 
inclusive.

    Concurring: Justices Douglas, Black, Brennan, Fortas, and Chief 
Justice Warren.

    Dissenting: Justices White, Clark, Harlan, and Stewart.


[[Page 2160]]


699. Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214 (1966).
        Statute making it a criminal offense to electioneer or solicit 
votes on election day as applied to newpaper editor who published 
editorial on election day urging people to vote a certain way on a 
referendum issue violated First and Fourteenth Amendments.

700. Rinaldi v. Yeager, 384 U.S. 305 (1966).
        Statute requiring an unsuccessful appellant to repay the cost of 
a transcript used in preparing his appeal out of his institutional 
earning when he is jailed but which does not apply to unsuccessful 
appellants given suspended sentences, placed on probation, or fined 
violates equal protection clause.

    Concurring: Justices Stewart, Black, Douglas, Brennan, Clark, White, 
Fortas and Chief Justice Warren.

    Dissenting: Justice Harlan.

701. Alton v. Tawes, 384 U.S. 315 (1966).
        District court decision holding unconstitutional congressional 
districting is affirmed.

702. Carr v. City of Altus, 385 U.S. 35 (1966).
        District court decision holding unconstitutional Texas statute 
forbidding anyone to withdraw water from any underground sources in 
State without authorization of legislature on a commerce clause basis is 
affirmed.

703. Swann v. Adams, 385 U.S. 440 (1967).
        Florida statute apportioning legislative seats falls short of 
required population equality.

    Concurring: Justices White, Black, Douglas, Clark, Brennan, Fortas 
and Chief Justice Warren.

    Dissenting: Justices Harlan and Stewart.

704. Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 385 U.S. 450 (1967).
        Missouri congressional districts fail to achieve required 
population equality.

705. Short v. Ness Produce Co., 385 U.S. 537 (1967).
        District court decision holding unconstitutional as violating 
commerce clause Oregon statute requiring sellers of imported meat to 
label it with country of origin, post notices in their establishment 
that it is being sold, and keep record of transactions involving it is 
affirmed.

706. Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967).
        New York statute requiring removal of teachers for ``treasonable 
or seditious'' utterances or acts is unconstitutionally vague since it 
apparently bans mere advocacy of abstract doctrine, and statute which

[[Page 2161]]
makes Communist Party membership prima facie evidence of 
disqualification for teaching in public schools is unconstitutionally 
broad.

    Concurring: Justices Brennan, Black, Douglas, Fortas and Chief 
Justice Warren.

    Dissenting: Justices Clark, Harlan, Stewart, and White.

707. National Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Department of Revenue, 386 U.S. 753 
        (1967).
        Commerce clause forbids application of use tax statute to a 
seller whose only connection with customers in the State is by common 
carrier or by mail.

    Concurring: Justices Stewart, Brennan, Harlan, Clark, White, and 
Chief Justice Warren.

    Dissenting: Justices Fortas, Black, and Douglas.

708. Holding v. Blankenship, 387 U.S. 94 (1967).
        Oklahoma obscenity statute empowering commission to investigate 
and to recommend prosecutions of offending parties is unconstitutional 
on authority of Bantam Books v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58 (1963).

709. Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967).
        California constitutional provision adopted on referendum 
repealing ``open housing'' law and prohibiting state abridgement of 
realty owner's right to sell and lease, or to refuse to sell and lease, 
as he pleases violates the equal protection clause.

    Concurring: Justices White, Douglas, Brennan, Fortas, and Chief 
Justice Warren.

    Dissenting: Justices Harlan, Black, Clark, and Stewart.

710. Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967).
        Eavesdrop statute that does not require particularity with 
respect to crime suspected and conversations sought, sufficiently limit 
period of order's effectiveness, terminate order once desired 
conversation is overheard, or require notice or showing of exigent 
circumstances to justify dispensing with notice, violates Fourth and 
Fourteenth Amendments.

    Concurring: Justices Clark, Douglas, Brennan, Fortas, and Chief 
Justice Warren.

    Dissenting: Justices Black, Harlan, and White.

711. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
        Statute prohibiting interracial marriage violates equal 
protection clause.


[[Page 2162]]

712. Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14 (1967).
        Statute prohibiting persons charged as co-participants in the 
same crime from testifying for one another violated Sixth and Fourteenth 
Amendments.

713. Whitehill v. Elkins, 389 U.S. 54 (1967).
        Maryland loyalty oath is unconstitutionally vague when read with 
surrounding authorization and supplementary statutes which infringe on 
rights of association.

    Concurring: Justices Douglas, Black, Brennan, Fortas, Marshall, and 
Chief Justice Warren.

    Dissenting: Justices Harlan, Stewart, and White.

714. Lucas v. Rhodes, 389 U.S. 212 (1967).
        Ohio congressional districting statute does not comport with 
Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964).

    Concurring: Chief Justice Warren and Justices Black, Douglas, 
Brennan, White, and Fortas.

    Dissenting: Justices Harlan and Stewart.

715. Nash v. Florida Industrial Comm'n, 389 U.S. 235 (1967).
        Unemployment compensation law disqualifying for benefits any 
person unemployed as a result of a labor dispute when applied to 
disqualify a person who has filed an unfair labor practice charge 
against her employer because of her discharge conflicts with federal 
labor law and is void under supremacy clause.

716. Rockefeller v. Wells, 389 U.S. 421 (1967).
        District court decision holding unconstitutional New York's 
congressional districting statute is affirmed.

    Concurring: Chief Justice Warren and Justices Black, Douglas, 
Brennan, Stewart, White, Fortas, and Marshall.

    Dissenting: Justice Harlan.

717. Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429 (1968).
        Oregon statute which barred alien from taking personal property 
intestate unless American citizens had reciprocal rights with alien's 
country, unless American citizens had right to receive payment within 
United States from estates of decedents dying in that foreign country, 
and unless Oregon courts were presented proof that alien heir would 
receive benefit, use, and control of inheritance without confiscation, 
was void as an intrusion by State into field of foreign affairs reserved 
to Federal Government.

    Concurring: Justices Douglas, Black, Brennan, Stewart, Fortas, and 
Chief Justice Warren.

    Concurring specially: Justice Harlan.

    Dissenting: Justice White.


[[Page 2163]]


718. Dinis v. Volpe, 389 U.S. 570 (1968).
        District court decision holding Massachusetts congressional 
districting statute unconstitutional is affirmed.

719. Louisiana Financial Assistance Comm'n v. Poindexter, 389 U.S. 571 
        (1968).
        District court decision holding unconstitutional tuition grant 
statute authorizing payments to children attending private schools as 
part of an anti-desegregation program is affirmed.

720. Kirk v. Gong, 389 U.S. 574 (1968).
        District court decision holding unconstitutional Florida 
congressional districting statute is affirmed.

721. James v. Gilmore, 389 U.S. 572 (1968).
        District court decision holding unconstitutional Texas loyalty 
oath statute is affirmed.

722. Lee v. Washington, 390 U.S. 333 (1968).
        Alabama statutes requiring racial segregation in prisons and 
jails violate equal protection clause.

723. Scafati v. Greenfield, 390 U.S. 713 (1968).
        District court decision holding unconstitutional as applied to a 
prisoner who had been sentenced prior to enactment of statute but 
paroled after its enactment a statute which forbade a prisoner from 
earning good conduct deductions for the first six months after his 
reincarceration following violation of parole is affirmed.

724. Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968).
        Wrongful death statute creating right of action in surviving 
child or children as interpreted to mean only legitimate child or 
children denies illegitimate children equal protection of the laws.

    Concurring: Justices Douglas, Brennan, White, Fortas, Marshall, and 
Chief Justice Warren.

    Dissenting: Justices Harlan, Black, and Stewart.

725. Accord: Glona v. American Guar. & Liab. Ins. Co., 391 U.S. 73 
        (1968).

726. Rabeck v. New York, 391 U.S. 462 (1968).
        Provision of obsenity law is unconstitutionally vague.

    Concurring: Chief Justice Warren and Justices Black, Douglas, 
Brennan, Stewart, White, Fortas, and Marshall.

    Dissenting: Justice Harlan.

727. Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 (1968).
        Statute, itself no longer in code but held to be incorporated in 
general juror challenge statute, which authorizes automatic challenge 
for cause of any potential juror scrupled against capital punishment in 
capital cases is invalid.


[[Page 2164]]


    Concurring: Justices Stewart, Brennan, Fortas, Marshall and Chief 
Justice Warren.

    Concurring specially: Justice Douglas.

    Dissenting: Justices Black, Harlan, and White.

728. Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968).
        Series of Ohio election statutes which imposed insurmountable 
obstacles to success of independent parties and candidates obtaining a 
place on the ballot violate the equal protection clause.

    Concurring: Justices Black, Douglas, Brennan, Fortas, and Marshall.

    Concurring specially: Justice Harlan.

    Dissenting: Chief Justice Warren and Justices Stewart and White.

729. Louisiana Educ. Comm'n for Needy Children v. Poindexter, 393 U.S. 
        17 (1968).
        District court decision holding unconstitutional tuition grant 
statute as part of antidesegregation program is affirmed.

730. Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968).
        Statute prohibiting the teaching of evolution in public schools 
of State violates First and Fourteenth Amendments.

731. WHYY, Inc. v. Borough of Glassboro, 393 U.S. 117 (1968).
        New Jersey statute providing for exemption from property taxes 
only of those nonprofit corporations chartered in New Jersey denies 
equal protection to Pennsylvania corporation qualified to do business in 
New Jersey.

    Concurring: Chief Justice Warren and Justices Douglas, Harlan, 
Brennan, Stewart, White, Fortas, and Marshall.

    Dissenting: Justice Black.

732. South Carolina State Bd. of Educ. v. Brown, 393 U.S. 222 (1968).
        District court decision holding unconstitutional statute 
providing for scholarship grants for children attending private schools 
as part of antidesegregation program is affirmed.

733. Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U.S. 526 (1968).
        Missouri congressional districting statute is unconstitutional 
because the population deviations from precise mathematical equality 
among districts were not unavoidable.

    Concurring: Justices Brennan, Black, Douglas, Marshall, and Chief 
Justice Warren.

    Concurring specially: Justice Fortas.

    Dissenting: Justices Harlan, Stewart, and White.


[[Page 2165]]


734. Accord: Wells v. Rockefeller, 394 U.S. 542 (1969).

735. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
        Statute construed to prohibit possession in the home of obscene 
materials for one's own private and personal use violates First and 
Fourteenth Amendments.

736. Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576 (1969).
        Statute insofar as it punishes verbal abuse of the flag violates 
First and Fourteenth Amendments.

    Five-to-four division of Court not on this issue.

737. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
        Connecticut and Pennsylvania statutory provision of one-year 
durational residency requirement on eligibility for welfare assistance 
infringes right to travel and violates equal protection clause.

    Concurring: Justices Brennan, Douglas, Fortas, Stewart, White, and 
Marshall.

    Dissenting: Chief Justice Warren and Justices Black and Harlan.

738. Moore v. Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 814 (1969).
        Illinois statute requiring independent candidates to present 
25,000 signatures, including 200 signatures from each of at least 50 of 
the State's 200 counties, violates the equal protection clause.

    Concurring: Justices Douglas, Black, Brennan, White, Fortas, 
Marshall, and Chief Justice Warren.

    Dissenting: Justices Stewart and Harlan.

739. Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
        Wisconsin prejudgment garnishment statute which authorizes 
freezing of defendant's wages in interim between garnishment and 
culmination of suit without affording defendant a hearing violates due 
process clause.

    Concurring: Justices Douglas, Brennan, Stewart, White, and Marshall 
and Chief Justice Warren.

    Concurring specially: Justice Harlan.

    Dissenting: Justice Black.

740. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
        Criminal Syndicalism Statute which proscribes advocacy of use of 
force in absence of requirement that such advocacy be directed to 
inciting or producing imminent lawless action and be likely to incite or 
produce such action violates First and Fourteenth Amendments.

741. Kramer v. Union Free School Dist., 395 U.S. 621 (1969).
        New York statute limiting eligibility to vote in school district 
elections to persons who own taxable real property in district or who 
are parents of children enrolled in the local public schools violates 
equal protection clause.


[[Page 2166]]


    Concurring: Chief Justice Warren and Justices Douglas, Brennan, 
White, and Marshall.

    Dissenting: Justices Stewart, Black, and Harlan.

742. Cipriano v. City of Houma, 395 U.S. 701 (1969).
        Louisiana statute limiting eligibility to vote on issuance of 
municipal utility revenue bonds to property owners violates equal 
protection clause.

    Concurring: Chief Justice Warren and Justices Douglas, Brennan, 
White, and Marshall.

    Concurring specially: Justices Black, Stewart, and Harlan.

743. Turner v. Fouche, 396 U.S. 346 (1969).
        Georgia statute limiting eligibility to school board membership 
to property holders violates the equal protection clause.

744. Wyman v. Bowens, 397 U.S. 49 (1970).
        District court decision holding unconstitutional statute denying 
welfare assistance to persons coming into State with intent to obtain 
such assistance is affirmed.

745. Hadley v. Junior College Dist., 397 U.S. 50 (1970).
        Statutory scheme for election of trustees of junior college 
district which allocated trustees to lesser populated districts rather 
than those of greater populations violated equal protection clause.

    Concurring: Justices Black, Douglas, Brennan, White, and Marshall.

    Dissenting: Chief Justice Burger and Justices Harlan and Stewart.

746. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
        New York statute providing that proof of acts establishing 
delinquency of a minor must be by a preponderance of the evidence 
violates due process clause which requires proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt.

    Concurring: Justices Brennan, Douglas, Harlan, White, and Marshall.

    Dissenting: Chief Justice Burger and Justices Black and Stewart.

747. Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397 (1970).
        New York statute changing levels of benefits and deleting items 
to be included in levels of benefit which reduced moneys to recipients 
conflicted with federal law which required States to adjust upward in 
terms of increases costs of living amounts deemed necessary for 
subsistence and the state law must yield.

    Concurring: Justices Harlan, Douglas, Brennan, Stewart, White, and 
Marshall.

    Dissenting: Justice Black and Chief Justice Burger.

748. Lewis v. Martin, 397 U.S. 552 (1970).
        California statute reducing amount of dependent children funds 
going to any household by amount of funds imputed to presence of a

[[Page 2167]]
``man-in-the-house'' who was not legally obligated to support the child 
or children conflicts with federal law as interpreted by valid HEW 
regulations and must yield.

    Concurring: Justices Douglas, Harlan, Brennan, Stewart, White, and 
Marshall.

    Dissenting: Chief Justice Burger and Justice Black.

749. Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66 (1970).
        Statute providing for trial without jury in New York City of 
misdemeanors punishable upon conviction with sentences of up to one year 
violates Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments, which require jury trials when 
possible sentence is six months or more.

    Concurring: Justices White, Brennan, and Marshall.

    Concurring specially: Justices Black and Douglas.

    Dissenting: Chief Justice Burger and Justices Harlan and Stewart.

750. City of Phoenix v. Kolodziejski, 399 U.S. 204 (1970).
        Arizona constitutional and statutory provisions which limit 
eligibility to vote in referendum on issuance of general obligation 
bonds to property owners violate equal protection clause.

    Concurring: Justices White, Black, Douglas, Brennan, and Marshall.

    Dissenting: Justices Stewart and Harlan and Chief Justice Burger.

751. Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235 (1970).
        Statute providing for extension of jail sentence to work off 
unpaid fine at $5 a day violates equal protection clause as applied to 
an indigent convict thus unable to pay his fine.

752. Rockefeller v. Socialist Workers Party, 400 U.S. 806 (1970).
        District court decision holding unconstitutional New York 
statutory provisions for geographic dispersion of signatures on 
candidates' petitions and discriminating against independent candidates' 
ability to obtain signatures in ways absent from major party candidates 
is affirmed.

753. Parish School Bd. v. Stewart, 400 U.S. 884 (1970).
        District court decision holding unconstitutional Louisiana 
constitutional and statutory provisions limiting eligibility to vote in 
general obligation bond authorization elections is affirmed.

754. Bower v. Vaughan, 400 U.S. 884 (1970).
        District court decision holding unconstitutional Arizona's one-
year residency requirement for treatment in state hospital is affirmed.

755. Rafferty v. McKay, 400 U.S. 954 (1970).
        District court decision holding unconstitutional California 
loyalty oath similar to that condemned in Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 
360 (1964) is affirmed.


[[Page 2168]]

756. Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433 (1971).
        Statute providing for ``posting'' of ``excessive'' drinkers to 
bar them from taverns and similar places denies procedural due process 
by not requiring notice and opportunity to be heard.

757. Groppi v. Wisconsin, 400 U.S. 505 (1971).
        Statute which categorically precludes a change of venue for 
trial of misdemeanor cases violates Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments.

    Concurring: Justices Stewart, Douglas, Harlan, Brennan, White, and 
Marshall.

    Concurring specially: Justice Blackmun and Chief Justice Burger.

    Dissenting: Justice Black.

758. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971).
        Statutory imposition of fees as prerequisite to obtain judicial 
dissolution of marriage violates due process as applied to persons 
unable to pay the fees.

    Concurring: Justices Harlan, Stewart, White, Marshall, and Blackmun.

    Concurring specially: Justices Douglas and Brennan.

    Dissenting: Justice Black.

759. Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395 (1971).
        Texas statute (and ordinance of City of Houston) which provide 
for imprisonment of person unable to pay a fine for period calculated at 
$5 a day violate equal protection clause.

760. North Carolina State Bd. of Educ. v. Swann, 402 U.S. 43 (1971).
        Anti-Busing Law which flatly forbids assignment of any student 
on account of race and prohibits busing for such purpose is 
unconstitutional.

761. California Dep't of Human Resources Dev. v. Java, 402 U.S. 121 
        (1971).
        Statute providing for suspension of unemployment compensation if 
former employer appeals eligibility decision of departmental examiner, 
the suspension to last until decision of the appeal, conflicts with 
federal act's requirement that compensation must be paid when due, and 
the state law must yield under the supremacy clause.

762. Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971).
        Georgia statute providing for automatic suspension of driver's 
license upon involvement in auto accident unless security for amount of 
damages is posted violates due process in not first affording driver a 
hearing to establish a reasonable possibility that judgment may be 
rendered against him as result of accident.

763. Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637 (1971).
        Arizona statute providing that a discharge in bankruptcy shall 
not operate to relieve a judgment creditor under the Motor Vehicle

[[Page 2169]]
Safety Responsibility Act of any obligation under the Act conflicts with 
the provision of the federal bankruptcy law which discharges a debtor of 
all but specified judgments and is invalid under the supremacy clause.

764. Nyquist v. Lee, 402 U.S. 935 (1971).
        District court decision holding unconstitutional New York 
antibusing law is affirmed.

765. Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124 (1971).
        Legislative apportionment and districting statute of Indiana, 
though its multimember features are not unconstitutional, provides for 
too much population inequality and is void.

    Concurring: Justices White, Black, Douglas, Brennan, Marshall, 
Blackmun and Chief Justice Burger.

    Dissenting: Justices Harlan and Stewart.

766. Connell v. Higginbotham, 403 U.S. 207 (1971).
        Florida loyalty oath provision which requires public employee to 
swear he does not believe in violent overthrow of government or be 
dismissed violates due process by not providing for an inquiry into his 
reasons for refusing to take the oath.

    Concurring: Chief Justice Burger and Justices Black, Harlan, White, 
and Blackmun.

    Concurring specially: Justices Marshall, Douglas, and Brennan.

    Dissenting: Justice Stewart.

767. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971).
        Arizona statute limiting eligibility for welfare assistance to 
aliens who have resided in State at least 15 years and Pennsylvania 
statute barring such assistance to persons who are not citizens violate 
equal protection clause and intrude into Federal Government's exclusive 
powers over admission of aliens.

768. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
        Pennsylvania statute providing for reimbursement of sectarian 
schools for expenses of providing certain secular educational services 
and Rhode Island statute providing for salary supplements to be paid 
teachers in sectarian schools violate the establishment clause of the 
First Amendment as applied to the States through the Fourteenth.

    Concurring: Chief Justice Burger and Justices Harlan, Stewart, and 
Blackmun.

    Concurring specially: Justices Black, Douglas, Brennan, and 
Marshall.

    Dissenting: Justice White.

769. Accord: Sanders v. Johnson, 403 U.S. 955 (1971).
        District court decision holding unconstitutional state aid to 
sectarian schools is affirmed.


[[Page 2170]]

770. Pease v. Hansen, 404 U.S. 70 (1971).
        State durational residency requirement as condition on 
eligibility to state-financed public assistance is unconstitutional 
under Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).

771. Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
        Idaho statutory provision giving preference to males over 
females for appointment as administrator of decedent's estate violates 
equal protection clause.

772. Townsend v. Swank, 404 U.S. 282 (1971).
        Illinois statute and implementing regulations which made needy 
dependent children 18 through 20 years old eligible for welfare benefits 
if they were attending high school or vocational training school but not 
if they were attending college or university conflicts with federal 
social security law and must yield under supremacy clause.

773. Dunn v. Rivera, 404 U.S. 1054 (1972).
        District court decision holding unconstitutional Connecticut 
one-year durational residency requirement for eligibility to welfare 
assistance is affirmed.

774. Wyman v. Lopez, 404 U.S. 1055 (1972).
        District court decision holding unconstitutional New York one-
year durational residency requirement for eligibility to welfare 
assistance is affirmed.

775. Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (1972).
        Oregon statutory provision requiring tenants who wish to appeal 
housing eviction order to file bond in twice the amount of rent expected 
to accrue during pendency of appeal violates equal protection clause.

776. Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134 (1972).
        Texas' filing fee system which imposes on candidates the costs 
of the primary election operation and affords no alternative opportunity 
for candidates unable to pay the fees to obtain access to the ballot 
violates the equal protection clause.

777. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972).
        Tennessee durational residency requirement of one year as a 
condition of registration to vote burdens right to travel and violates 
equal protection clause.

    Concurring: Justices Marshall, Douglas, Brennan, Stewart, and White.

    Concurring specially: Justice Blackmun.

    Dissenting: Chief Justice Burger.


[[Page 2171]]


778. Accord: Caniffe v. Burg, 405 U.S. 1034 (1972).
        District court decision holding six and three months durational 
residency requirements unconstitutional is affirmed.

779. Accord: Davis v. Kohn, 405 U.S. 1034 (1972).

780. Accord: Cody v. Andrews, 405 U.S. 1034 (1972).

781. Accord: Donovan v. Keppel, 405 U.S. 1034 (1972).

782. Accord: Whitcomb v. Affeldt, 405 U.S. 1034 (1972).

783. Accord: Amos v. Hadnott, 405 U.S. 1035 (1972).

784. Accord: Virginia State Bd. of Elections v. Bufford, 405 U.S. 1035 
        (1972).

785. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
        Massachusetts statute making it a crime to dispense any 
contraceptive article to an unmarried person, except to prevent disease, 
is unconstitutional.

    Concurring: Justices Brennan, Douglas, Stewart, and Marshall.

    Concurring specially: Justices White and Blackmun.

    Dissenting: Chief Justice Burger.

786. Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518 (1972).
        Georgia statute making it criminal offense to use language of or 
to another tending to cause a breach of the peace, which is not limited 
to ``fighting words,'' is unconstitutionally vague and overbroad.

    Concurring: Justices Brennan, Douglas, Stewart, White, and Marshall.

    Dissenting: Justice Blackmun and Chief Justice Burger.

787. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
        Statute which presumes without a hearing on issue unfitness of 
father of illegitimate children to have custody upon death or 
disqualification of mother denies him due process and equal protection.

    Concurring: Justices White, Douglas, Brennan, Stewart, and Marshall.

    Dissenting: Chief Justice Burger and Justice Blackmun.

788. Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972).
        Louisiana workmen's compensation statute which relegates 
unacknowledged illegitimate children to a status inferior to legitimate 
and acknowledged illegitimate children violates equal protection clause.

    Concurring: Justice Powell, Douglas, Brennan, Stewart, White, and 
Marshall, and Chief Justice Burger.

    Concurring specially: Justice Blackmun.

    Dissenting: Justice Rehnquist.

789. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
        Compulsory school attendance law, insofar as it does not exempt 
Amish children from coverage following completion of eighth grade,

[[Page 2172]]
violates the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment, applicable via 
the Fourteenth Amendment.

    Concurring: Chief Justice Burger, and Justices Brennan, Stewart, 
White, Marshall, Blackmun, and (in part) Douglas.

    Dissenting (in part): Justice Douglas.

790. Brooks v. Tennessee, 406 U.S. 605 (1972).
        Statute which requires defendant if he is going to testify to do 
so before any other witness for him violates Fifth, Sixth, and 
Fourteenth Amendments.

    Concurring: Justices Brennan, Douglas, White, Marshall, and Powell.

    Concurring specially: Justice Stewart.

    Dissenting: Chief Justice Burger and Justices Blackmun and 
Rehnquist.

791. Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972).
        Pretrial commitment procedure for allegedly incompetent 
defendants which provides more lenient standards for commitment than 
procedure for those persons not charged with any offense, and more 
stringent standards of release, violates both due process and equal 
protection.

792. James v. Strange, 407 U.S. 128 (1972).
        Kansas statute enabling State to recover in subsequent civil 
proceedings legal defense fees for indigent defendants violates equal 
protection clause because it dispenses with the protective exemptions 
state law has erected for other civil judgment debtors.

793. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
        Replevin statutes of Florida and Pennsylania which permit 
installment sellers or other persons alleging entitlement to property to 
cause the seizure of the property without any notice or opportunity to 
be heard on the issues violate due process clause.

    Concurring: Justices Stewart, Douglas, Brennan, and Marshall.

    Dissenting: Justices White and Blackmun and Chief Justice Burger.

794. State Dep't of Health and Rehabilitative Servs. v. Zarate, 407 U.S. 
        918 (1972).
        District court decision holding unconstitutional under equal 
protection clause Florida's denial of welfare assistance to noncitizens 
is affirmed.

795. United States v. Scotland Neck City Bd. of Educ., 407 U.S. 484 
        (1972).
        North Carolina statute which authorized creation of a new school 
district in a city that was part of a larger county school system is 
void inasmuch as its effect would be to impede the dismantling of the 
dual school system by affording a refuge to white students fleeing 
desegregation.


[[Page 2173]]

796. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
        Statutory imposition of capital punishment upon criminal 
conviction either at discretion of jury or of the trial judge may not be 
carried out. Such statutes in the view of two Justices are 
unconstitutional because the death penalty is cruel and unusual 
punishment per se in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, 
while in the view of three Justices the statutes are unconstitutional as 
applied because of the discriminatory or arbitrary manner in which death 
is imposed upon convicted defendants in violation of the Eighth and 
Fourteenth Amendments.

    Concurring specially: Justices Douglas, Brennan, Stewart, White, and 
Marshall.

    Dissenting: Chief Justice Burger and Justices Blackmun, Powell, and 
Rehnquist.

797. Texas Bd. of Barber Examiners v. Bolton, 409 U.S. 807 (1972).
        District court decision holding invalid under equal protection 
clause Texas statutes prohibiting licensed cosmetologists from working 
with male customers and prohibiting licensed barbers from working with 
female customers is summarily affirmed.

798. Essex v. Wolman, 409 U.S. 808 (1972).
        District court decision holding void under the establishment 
clause of the First Amendment an Ohio statute providing a reimbursement 
grant to parents of children attending nonpublic schools is summarily 
affirmed.

799. Sterrett v. Mothers' & Children's Rights Org., 409 U.S. 809 (1972).
        District court decision holding invalid as in conflict with 
federal Social Security Act an Indiana statute denying benefits to 
persons aged 16 to 18 who are eligible but for the fact that they are 
not regularly attending school is summarily affirmed.

800. Robinson v. Hanrahan, 409 U.S. 38 (1972).
        Illinois statute providing for mailing of vehicle forfeiture 
proceeding notification to home address of vehicle owner is 
unconstitutional as applied to person known to the State to be 
incarcerated and not at home.

801. Amos v. Sims, 409 U.S. 942 (1972).
        District court decision holding unconstitutional Alabama 
legislative apportionment law is summarily affirmed.

802. Fugate v. Potomac Electric Power Co., 409 U.S. 942 (1972).
        District court decision holding invalid under equal protection 
clause Virginia statute allowing reimbursement to utilities required by 
interstate highway construction to relocate their lines in cities and 
towns but denying reimbursement to utilities required by interstate

[[Page 2174]]
highway construction to relocate lines in counties is summarily 
affirmed.

803. Ward v. Village of Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57 (1972).
        Ohio statute authorizing trial for certain ordinance violations 
and traffic offenses before mayor responsible for village finances when 
the fines, forfeitures, costs, and fees imposed in the mayor's courts 
provided a substantial portion of village funds denied defendants 
opportunity for trial before an impartial and disinterested tribunal.

    Justices Concurring: Brennan, Douglas, Stewart, Marshall, Blackmun 
and Powell, and Chief Justice Burger.

    Justices Dissenting: White and Rehnquist.

804. Evco v. Jones, 409 U.S. 91 (1972).
        New Mexico's gross receipts tax is unconstitutionally applied to 
proceeds from transactions whereby material is produced in State under 
contract for delivery to out-of-state clients because it impermissibly 
burdens interstate commerce.

805. Philpott v. Welfare Board, 409 U.S. 413 (1973).
        New Jersey statute providing for recovery by State of 
reimbursement for financial assistance when recipient subsequently 
obtains funds cannot be applied to obtain reimbursement out of federal 
disability insurance benefits inasmuch as federal law bars subjecting 
such funds to any legal process.

806. Georges v. McClellan, 409 U.S. 1120 (1973).
        District court decision holding unconstitutional under due 
process clause Rhode Island prejudgment attachment statute is summarily 
affirmed.

807. Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535 (1973).
        Texas law denying right of enforced paternal support to 
illegitimate children while granting it to legitimate children violates 
equal protection clause.

808. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
        Texas statute making it a crime to procure or to attempt to 
procure an abortion except on medical advice to save the life of the 
mother infringes upon a woman's right of privacy protected by the due 
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

    Justices Concurring: Blackmun, Douglas, Brennan, Stewart, Marshall, 
Powell, and Chief Justice Burger.

    Justices Dissenting: White and Rehnquist.

809. Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
        Georgia statute permitting abortions under prescribed 
circumstances nevertheless invalidly imposed a number of procedural

[[Page 2175]]
limitations: that the abortion be performed in an accredited hospital, 
be approved by a staff committee and two licensed physicians other than 
woman's own doctor, and be available only to residents.

    Justices Concurring: Blackmun, Douglas, Brennan, Stewart, Marshall, 
Powell, and Chief Justice Burger.

    Justices Dissenting: White and Rehnquist.

810. Mahan v. Howell, 410 U.S. 315 (1973).
        Portion of Virginia apportionment statute assigning large 
numbers of naval personnel to actual location of station when evidence 
showed substantial numbers resided in surrounding areas distorted 
population balance of districts within the one county and was void.

811. Whitcomb v. Communist Party of Indiana, 410 U.S. 976 (1973).
        District court decision holding invalid under First and 
Fourteenth Amendments Indiana statute requiring political party to 
submit oath that party has no relationship to a foreign government as a 
condition of ballot access is summarily affirmed.

812. Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145 (1973).
        New Mexcio use tax may not constitutionally be applied on 
personal property that Indian tribe purchased out-of-state and installed 
as permanent improvement on off-reservation ski resort owned and 
operated by tribe.

813. McClanahan v. Arizona Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164 (1973).
        Arizona income tax is invalidly applied to Navajo Indian 
residing on reservation and whose income is wholly derived from 
reservation sources.

814. New Jersey Welfare Rights Org. v. Cahill, 411 U.S. 619 (1973).
        New Jersey statute denying assistance to families in which 
parents are not ceremonially married denies equal protection to children 
in such families.

    Justices Concurring: Douglas, Brennan, Stewart, White, Marshall, 
Blackmun, Powell, and Chief Justice Burger.

    Justice Dissenting: Rehnquist.

815. Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973).
        Wisconsin statute as interpreted to permit revocation of parole 
without a hearing denies due process of law.

816. Parker v. Levy, 411 U.S. 978 (1973).
        District court decision voiding as arbitrary denial of equal 
protection Louisiana's constitutional provision and statute distributing 
among political subdivisions property relief fund is summarily affirmed.


[[Page 2176]]

817. Miller v. Gomez, 412 U.S. 914 (1973).
        District court decision holding a denial of equal protection New 
York statute denying jury trial on issue of dangerousness to persons 
being committed to hospitals for criminally insane after felony 
indictment but before trial is summarily affirmed.

818. Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441 (1973).
        Connecticut statute creating irrebuttable presumption that 
student from out-of-state at time of application to state college 
remained nonresident for tuition purposes for entire student career 
violated due process clause.

    Justices Concurring: Stewart, Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, and 
Powell.

    Justice Concurring Specially: White.

    Justices Dissenting: Chief Justice Burger and Rehnquist and Douglas.

819. Wardius v. Oregon, 412 U.S. 470 (1973).
        Oregon statute requiring defendant to give pretrial notice of 
alibi defense and names of supporting witnesses but denying defendant 
any reciprocal right of discovery of rebuttal evidence denies him due 
process of law.

820. White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755 (1973).
        Establishment of multimember legislative districts in certain 
Texas urban areas in context of pervasive electoral discrimination 
against blacks and Mexican-Americans denied equal protection of laws.

821. White v. Weiser, 412 U.S. 783 (1973).
        Texas congressional districting law creates districts with too 
great a population disparity and is void under equal protection clause.

822. Levitt v. Committee for Pub. Educ. and Religious Liberty, 413 U.S. 
        472 (1973).
        New York statute to reimburse nonpublic schools for 
administrative expenses incurred in carrying out state mandated 
examination and record keeping requirements but requiring no accounting 
and separating of religious and nonreligious uses violates establishment 
clause.

    Justices Concurring: Chief Justice Burger and Stewart, Blackmun, 
Powell, and Rehnquist.

    Justices Concurring Specially: Douglas, Brennan, and Marshall.

    Justice Dissenting: White.

823. Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634 (1973).
        New York statute providing that only United States citizens may 
hold permanent positions in competitive civil service violates equal 
protection clause.


[[Page 2177]]


    Justices Concurring: Blackmun, Douglas, Brennan, Stewart, White, 
Marshall, Powell, and Chief Justice Burger.

    Justice Dissenting: Rehnquist.

824. Committee for Pub. Educ. and Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 
        756 (1973).
        New York education and tax laws providing grants to nonpublic 
schools for maintenance and repairs of facilities and providing tuition 
reimbursements and income tax benefits to parents of children attending 
nonpublic schools violate the establishment clause.

    Justices Concurring: Powell, Douglas, Brennan, Stewart, Marshall, 
and Blackmun.

    Justices Concurring and Dissenting: Chief Justice Burger and 
Rehnquist.

    Justice Dissenting: White.

825. Sloan v. Lemon, 413 U.S. 825 (1973).
        Pennsylvania statute providing for reimbursement of parents for 
portion of tuition expenses in sending children to nonpublic schools 
violates establishment clause.

    Justices Concurring: Powell, Douglas, Brennan, Stewart, Marshall, 
and Blackmun.

    Justices Dissenting: White, Rehnquist, and Chief Justice Burger.

826. Accord: Grit v. Wolman, 413 U.S. 901 (1973).

827. Stevenson v. West, 413 U.S. 902 (1973).
        South Carolina legislative apportionment statute is invalid.

828. Nelson v. Miranda, 413 U.S. 902 (1973).
        Arizona constitutional and statutory provisions denying public 
employment to aliens violates equal protection clause.

829. Texas v. Pruett, 414 U.S. 802 (1973).
        Federal court decision that Texas statutory system that denies 
good time credit to convicted felons in jail pending appeal while 
allowing good time credit to incarcerated nonappealing felons 
unconstitutionally burdens right of appeal is summarily affirmed.

830. Department of Game v. Puyallup Tribe, 414 U.S. 44 (1973).
        Washington State statute construed to prohibit net fishing by 
Indians is invalid.

831. Kusper v. Pontikes, 414 U.S. 51 (1973).
        Illinois statute prohibiting one who has voted in one party's 
primary election from voting in another party's primary election for at 
least 23 months violates the First and Fourteenth Amendments.

    Justices Concurring: Stewart, Douglas, White, Marshall, and Powell.

    Justice Concurring Specially: Chief Justice Burger.

    Justices Dissenting: Blackmun and Rehnquist.


[[Page 2178]]


832. Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70 (1973).
        New York statute providing for cancellation of public contracts 
and disqualification of contractors from doing business with the State 
for refusal to waive immunity from prosecution and to testify concerning 
state contracts violates the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination.

833. Danforth v. Rodgers, 414 U.S. 1035 (1973).
        District court decision invalidating Missouri abortion statute 
is summarily affirmed.

834. Communist Party of Indiana v. Whitcomb, 414 U.S. 441 (1974).
        Indiana statute prescribing loyalty oath as qualification for 
access to ballot violates First and Fourteenth Amendments.

835. O'Brien v. Skinner, 414 U.S. 524 (1974).
        New York election law provisions that permit persons 
incarcerated outside county of residence while awaiting trial to 
register and vote absentee while denying absentee privilege to persons 
incarcerated in county of residence denies equal protection.

    Justices Concurring: Chief Justice Burger and Douglas, Brennan, 
Stewart, White, Marshall, and Powell.

    Justices Dissenting: Blackmun and Rehnquist.

836. Wallace v. Sims, 415 U.S. 902 (1974).
        District court decision holding invalid Alabama apportionment 
statute is summarily affirmed.

837. Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250 (1974).
        Arizona statute imposing one-year county residency requirement 
for indigents' eligibility for nonemergency medical care at state 
expense infringes upon right to travel and violates equal protection 
clause.

    Justices Concurring: Marshall, Brennan, Stewart, White, and Powell.

    Justices Concurring Specially: Douglas, Blackmun, and Chief Justice 
Burger.

    Justice Dissenting: Rehnquist.

838. Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308 (1974).
        Alaska statute protecting anonymity of juvenile offenders was 
unconstitutionally applied to prohibit cross-examination of prosecution 
witness for possible bias in violation of confrontation clause.

    Justices Concurring: Chief Justice Burger and Douglas, Brennan, 
Stewart, Marshall, Blackmun, and Powell.

    Justices Dissenting: White and Rehnquist.

839. Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566 (1974).
        Massachusetts statute punishing anyone who treats the flag 
``contemptuously'' without anchoring proscription to specified conduct 
and modes is unconstitutionally vague.


[[Page 2179]]


    Justices Concurring: Powell, Douglas, Brennan, Stewart, and 
Marshall.

    Justice Concurring Specially: White.

    Justices Dissenting: Blackmun, Rehnquist, and Chief Justice Burger.

840. Lubin v. Panish, 415 U.S. 709 (1974).
        California statute imposing a filing fee as the only means of 
getting on the ballot denied indigents equal protection.

841. Schwegmann Bros. Giant Super Markets v. Louisiana Milk Comm'n, 416 
        U.S. 922 (1974).
        District court decision holding invalid as burden on interstate 
commerce Louisiana statute construed to permit commission to regulate 
prices at which dairy products are sold outside the State to Louisiana 
retailers is affirmed.

842. Beasley v. Food Fair, 416 U.S. 653 (1974).
        North Carolina right-to-work law giving employees discharged by 
reason of union membership cause of action against employer cannot be 
applied to supervisors in view of 29 U.S.C. Sec. 164(a), which provides 
that no law should compel an employer to treat a supervisor as an 
employee.

843. Indiana Real Estate Comm'n v. Satoskar, 417 U.S. 938 (1974).
        District court decision invalidating Indiana statute limiting 
real estate dealer licenses to citizens is summarily affirmed.

844. Marburger v. Public Funds for Public Schools, 417 U.S. (1974).
        District court decisions invalidating under establishment clause 
New Jersey laws providing reimbursement for parents of nonpublic school 
children for textbooks and other materials are summarily affirmed.

845. Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
        Florida statute compelling newspapers to publish free replies by 
political candidates criticized by newspapers violates First Amendment.

846. Letter Carriers v. Austin, 418 U.S. 264 (1974).
        Virginia statute creating cause of action for ``insulting 
words'' as construed to permit recovery for use in labor dispute of 
words ``scab'' and similar words is preempted by federal labor law.

    Justices Concurring: Marshall, Brennan, Stewart, White, and 
Blackmun.

    Justice Concurring Specially: Douglas.

    Justices Dissenting: Powell, Rehnquist, and Chief Justice Burger.

847. Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405 (1974).
        Washington State statute prohibiting ``improper use'' of flag or 
display of the flag with any emblem superimposed on it was invalidly 
applied to a person who taped a peace symbol on the flag in a way

[[Page 2180]]
as not to damage it and who then displayed it upside down from his own 
property.

    Justices Concurring: Brennan, Stewart, Marshall, and Powell.

    Justices Concurring Specially: Douglas and Blackmun.

    Justices Dissenting: Rehnquist, White, and Chief Justice Burger.

848. Accord: Cahn v. Long Island Vietnam Moratorium Comm., 418 U.S. 906 
        (1974).

849. Franchise Tax Board v. United Americans, 419 U.S. 890 (1974).
        District court decision striking down under First Amendment a 
California statute providing state income-tax reductions for taxpayers 
sending their children to nonpublic schools is summarily affirmed.

    Justices Concurring: Brennan, Douglas, Stewart, Marshall, Blackmun, 
and Powell.

    Justices Dissenting: White and Rehnquist and Chief Justice Burger.

850. Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975).
        Constitutional and statutory provisions that a woman should not 
be selected for jury service unless she had previously filed a written 
declaration of her desire to be subject to jury service violates Sixth 
Amendment right of defendants to be tried before juries composed of a 
representative cross section of the community.

    Justices Concurring: White, Douglas, Brennan, Stewart, Marshall, 
Blackmun, and Powell.

    Justice Concurring Specially: Chief Justice Burger.

    Justice Dissenting: Rehnquist.

851. North Georgia Finishing v. Di-Chem, 419 U.S. 601 (1975).
        Georgia statutes permitting writ of garnishment to be issued in 
pending suits on conclusory affidavit of plaintiff, prescribing filing 
of bond as the only method of dissolving the writ, which deprives 
defendant of the use of the property pending the litigation, and making 
no provision for an early hearing violates Fourteenth Amendment's due 
process clause.

    Justices Concurring: White, Douglas, Brennan, Stewart, and Marshall.

    Justice Concurring Specially: Powell.

    Justices Dissenting: Blackmun, Rehnquist, and Chief Justice Burger.

852. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975).
        Ohio statute authorizing suspension of public school students 
for up to 10 days for misconduct without a hearing denies students 
procedural due process in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.

    Justices Concurring: White, Douglas, Brennan, Stewart, and Marshall.

    Justices Dissenting: Powell, Blackmun, Rehnquist, and Chief Justice 
Burger.

853. Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975).
        Georgia statute making it a misdemeanor to publish or broadcast 
the name of a rape victim may not be applied to such publishing or

[[Page 2181]]
broadcasting when the name is part of a public record; consistent with 
the First Amendment, publication of such public record information is 
absolutely privileged.

854. Austin v. New Hampshire, 420 U.S. 656 (1975).
        State commuters income tax imposed on nonresidents violates the 
privileges and immunities clause, Art. V. Sec. 2, cl. 1, inasmuch as the 
State imposed no income tax on its residents' domestic income and 
exempted from tax income earned by its residents outside the State, 
since the tax falls exclusively on nonresidents and is not offset even 
approximately by other taxes imposed upon residents alone.

    Justices Concurring: Marshall, Brennan, Stewart, White, Powell, 
Rehnquist, and Chief Justice Burger.

    Justice Dissenting: Blackmun.

855. Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7 (1975).
        Utah age of majority statute applied in the context of child 
support requirements obligating parental support of son to age 21 but 
daugther only to age 18 is an invalid gender classification under the 
equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

856. Hill v. Stone, 421 U.S. 289 (1975).
        Texas constitution and statutes and city charter limiting the 
right to vote in city bond issue elections to persons who have listed 
property for taxation in the election district in the year of the 
election is void under the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.

    Justices Concurring: Marshall, Brennan, White, Blackmun, and Powell.

    Justices Dissenting: Rehnquist, Stewart, and Chief Justice Burger.

857. Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975).
        Pennsylvania laws authorizing direct provision to nonpublic 
school children of ``auxiliary services'', i.e., counseling, testing, 
speech and hearing therapy, etc., and loans to the nonpublic schools for 
instructional material and equipment constitute unlawful assistance to 
religion and are invalid under First Amendment.

    Justices Concurring: Stewart, Douglas, Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, 
and Powell.

    Justices Dissenting: Chief Justice Burger and Rehnquist.

858. Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975).
        State statute making it a misdemeanor, by sale or circulation of 
any publication, to encourage or prompt the procuring of an abortion, as 
applied to the editor of a weekly newspaper who published an 
advertisement of an out-of-state abortion, is in violation of the First 
Amendment.


[[Page 2182]]


    Justices Concurring: Blackmun, Douglas, Brennan, Stewart, Marshall, 
Powell, and Chief Justice Burger.

    Justices Dissenting: Rehnquist and White.

859. Herring v. New York, 422 U.S. 853 (1975).
        Statute granting trial judge in a nonjury criminal case the 
power to deny counsel the opportunity to make a summation of the 
evidence before the rendition of judgment violates the Sixth Amendment.

    Justices Concurring: Stewart, Douglas, Brennan, White, Marshall, and 
Powell.

    Justices Dissenting: Rehnquist, Blackmun, and Chief Justice Burger.

860. Turner v. Department of Employment Security, 423 U.S. 44 (1975).
        Utah statute making pregnant women ineligible for unemployment 
compensation for a period extending from 12 weeks before expected 
childbirth until six weeks following violates Fourteenth Amendment due 
process clause.

    Justices Concurring: Brennan, Stewart, White, Marshall, and Powell.

    Justices Dissenting: Rehnquist and Blackmun and Chief Justice Burger 
(from summary action only).

861. Schwartz v. Vanasco, 423 U.S. 1041 (1976).
        District court decision invalidating as overbroad under the 
First Amendment New York law prohibiting attacks on candidate based on 
race, sex, religion, or ethnic background and prohibiting 
misrepresentations of candidate's qualifications, positions, or 
political affiliation is summarily affirmed.

862. Tucker v. Salera, 424 U.S. 959 (1976).
        District court decision voiding Pennsylvania election law 
provision requiring that candidates of ``political bodies'' collect 
nominating petition signatures between 10th and 7th Wednesdays prior to 
primary election and file them no later than 7th Wednesday prior to 
primary insofar as it disqualifies papers signed after 7th Wednesday, is 
affirmed summarily.

863. Moe v. Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes, 425 U.S. 463 
        (1976).
        Montana laws imposing personal property taxes, vendor license 
fees, and a cigarette sales tax may not constitutionally be applied to 
reservation Indians under supremacy clause because federal statutory law 
precludes such application.

864. Virginia Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 
        U.S. 748 (1976).
        State statute declaring it unprofessional conduct for a licensed 
pharmacist to advertise the price of prescription drugs violates the 
First Amendment right of citizens to receive the information thus 
suppressed.


[[Page 2183]]


    Justices Concurring: Blackmun, Brennan, Stewart, White, Marshall, 
and Powell.

    Justice Concurring Specially: Chief Justice Burger.

    Justice Dissenting: Rehnquist.

865. Accord: California State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Terry, 426 U.S. 913 
        (1976).

866. Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373 (1976).
        Minnesota laws imposing personal property taxes cannot under the 
supremacy clause be constitutionally applied to an Indian's mobile home 
located on the reservation.

867. Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529 (1976).
        State law providing for the rounding up and sale by a state 
agency of ``estrays'' cannot under the supremacy clause be 
constitutionally applied to unbranded and unclaimed horses and burros on 
public lands of the United States that are protected by federal law.

868. Machinists & Aerospace Workers v. WERC, 427 U.S. 132 (1976).
        Wisconsin statute proscribing concerted efforts by employees to 
interfere with production, except through actual strikes, cannot under 
the supremacy clause be constitutionally applied to union members' 
concerted refusal to work overtime during negotiations for renewal of an 
expired contract since such conduct was intended by Congress to be 
regulable by neither the States nor the NLRB.

    Justices Concurring: Brennan, White, Marshall, Blackmun, Power, and 
Chief Justice Burger.

    Justices Dissenting: Stevens, Stewart, Rehnquist.

869. Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
        Missouri abortion law that required, inter alia, spousal and 
parental consent before abortion could be performed in appropriate 
circumstances, and that proscribed the saline amniocentesis abortion 
procedure after the first 12 weeks of pregnancy was an unconstitutional 
infringement upon the liberty of pregnant women who wished to terminate 
their pregnancies.

    Justices Concurring: Blackmun, Brennan, Stewart, Marshall, and 
Powell.

    Justice Dissenting: Stevens (on parental consent).

    Justices Dissenting: White, Rehnquist, and Chief Justice Burger.

870. Accord: Gerstein v. Coe, 428 U.S. 901 (1976).

871. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976).
        State statute making death penalty mandatory upon conviction of 
first-degree murder violates Eighth Amendment, since determination to 
impose death must be individualized.

    Justices Concurring: Stewart, Powell, and Stevens.

    Justices Concurring Specially: Brennan, and Marshall.

    Justices Dissenting: Rehnquist, Blackmun, White, and Chief Justice 
Burger.


[[Page 2184]]


872. Accord: Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976).

873. Accord: Williams v. Oklahoma, 428 U.S. 907 (1976).

874. Sendak v. Arnold, 429 U.S. 968 (1976).
        Statute requiring all abortions, including those during first 
trimester of pregnancy, to be performed in hospital or licensed health 
facility was held unconstitutional by district court and decision is 
summarily affirmed.

    Justices Concurring: Brennan, Stewart, Marshall, Blackmun, Powell, 
and Stevens.

    Justices Dissenting: White, Rehnquist, and Chief Justice Burger.

875. Exon v. McCarthy, 429 U.S. 972 (1976).
        District court holding that statutory scheme that fails to 
provide method by which independent candidate for President may appear 
on ballot other than through certification by political party violates 
First and Fourteenth Amendments is summarily affirmed.

876. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
        Statutory prohibition of sale of ``nonintoxicating'' 3.2% beer 
to males under 21 and to females under 18 constituted an impermissible 
gender-based classification that denied to males 18-20 equal protection.

    Justices Concurring: Brennan, White, Marshall, Blackmun, Powell, and 
Stevens.

    Justice Concurring Specially: Stewart.

    Justices Dissenting: Chief Justice Burger and Rehnquist.

877. Lefkowitz v. C.D.R. Enterprises, 429 U.S. 1031 (1977).
        District court decision holding invalid as a discrimination 
against aliens a law granting public works employment preference to 
citizens who have resided in State for at least 12 months is summarily 
affirmed.

878. Boston Stock Exchange v. State Tax Comm'n, 429 U.S. 318 (1977).
        Transfer tax on securities transactions structured so that 
transactions involving an out-of-state sale are taxed more heavily than 
most transactions involving a sale within the State discriminates 
against interstate commerce in violation of the commerce clause.

879. Guste v. Weeks, 429 U.S. 1056 (1977).
        District court decision voiding statute that effectively forbade 
abortions, that prohibited publicizing availability of abortion 
services, that required spousal or parental consent, and that forbade 
state employees to recommend abortions is summarily affirmed.


[[Page 2185]]

880. Bowen v. Women's Services, 429 U.S. 1067 (1977).
        District court decision invalidating parental consent 
requirement for abortion upon minor during first 12 weeks of pregnancy 
is summarily affirmed.

881. Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519 (1977).
        Statutory imposition of weight requirements in packaging for 
sale of bacon and flour which did not allow for loss of weight resulting 
from moisture loss during distribution while the applicable federal law 
does is invalid (1) as to bacon because of express federal law and (2) 
as to flour because adherence to state law would defeat a purpose of the 
federal law and hence supremacy clause requires that both state laws 
yield to federal.

    Justices Concurring: Marshall, Brennan, White, Blackmun, Powell, 
Stevens, and Chief Justice Burger.

    Justices Dissenting: Rehnquist and Stewart as to flour.

882. Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977).
        Requirement that state license plates bear motto ``Live Free or 
Die'' and making it a misdemeanor to obscure the motto coerces 
dissemination of ideological message by person on his own property and 
violates First Amendment.

    Justices Concurring: Chief Justice Burger and Brennan, Stewart, 
White, Marshall, Powell, and Stevens.

    Justices Dissenting: Rehnquist and Blackmun.

883. Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977).
        Law allowing illegitimate children to inherit by intestate 
succession only from their mothers while legitimate children may take 
from both parents denies illegitimates the equal protection of the laws.

    Justices Concurring: Powell, Brennan, White, Marshall, and Stevens.

    Justices Dissenting: Chief Justice Burger and Stewart, Blackmun, and 
Rehnquist.

884. United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1 (1977).
        Retroactive repeal of a statutory covenant under which bonds had 
been sold by Port Authority, covenant limiting the authority's ability 
to subsidize rail passenger transportation from revenues and reserves 
pledged as security for the bonds, impaired the obligations of the 
contract and violated Article I, Sec. 10, cl. 1

    Justices Concurring: Blackmun, Rehnquist, Stevens, and Chief Justice 
Burger.

    Justices Dissenting: Brennan, White, and Marshall.

885. Chappelle v. Greater Baton Rouge Airport Dist., 431 U.S. 159 
        (1977).
        Statutory qualification of ownership of assessed property in 
jurisdiction in which airport is located as condition of appointment to 
airport commission is invalid.


[[Page 2186]]


    Justices Concurring: Chief Justice Burger and Brennan, Stewart, 
White, Marshall, Blackmun, Powell, and Stevens.

    Justice Dissenting: Rehnquist.

886. Douglas v. Seacoast Products, 431 U.S. 265 (1977).
        Statute prohibiting nonresidents from carrying on fishing within 
certain state waters is preempted by federal enrollment and licensing 
laws that grant affirmative right to fish in coastal waters and is 
invalid under supremacy clause.

887. Roberts v. Louisiana, 431 U.S. 633 (1977).
        Statute imposing mandatory death sentence upon one convicted of 
first-degree murder of police officer engaged in performance of his 
duties violates Eighth Amendment.

    Justices Concurring: Stewart, Powell and Stevens.

    Justices Concurring Specially: Brennan and Marshall.

    Justices Dissenting: Chief Justice Burger and Blackmun, White, and 
Rehnquist.

888. Carey v. Population Services Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977).
        Law making it a crime (1) for any person to sell or distribute 
contraceptives to minors under 16, (2) for anyone other than a licensed 
pharmacist to distribute contraceptives to persons 16 or over, and (3) 
for anyone to advertise or display contraceptives violates First and 
Fourteenth Amendments.

    Justices Concurring: Brennan, Stewart, Marshall, and Blackmun.

    Justices Concurring Specially: White, Powell, and Stevens.

    Justices Dissenting: Chief Justice Burger and Rehnquist.

889. Lefkowitz v. Cunningham, 431 U.S. 801 (1977).
        Statute automatically removing from office and disqualifying 
from any office for next five years any political party officer who 
refuses to testify or to waive immunity against subsequent criminal 
prosecution when subpoenaed before an authorized tribunal violates Fifth 
Amendment self-incrimination clause.

    Justices Concurring: Chief Justice Burger, Stewart, White, Blackmun, 
and Powell.

    Justices Concurring Specially: Brennan and Marshall.

    Justice Dissenting: Stevens.

890. Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U.S. 1 (1977).
        Statutory provision barring from access to state financial 
assistance for higher education aliens who have not either applied for 
citizenship or affirmed the intent to apply when they qualify violates 
equal protection clause.

    Justices Concurring: Blackmun, Brennan, White, Marshall, and 
Stevens.

    Justices Dissenting: Chief Justice Burger, Powell, Stewart, 
Rehnquist.


[[Page 2187]]

891. Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333 
        (1977).
        Statute requiring that all apples sold or shipped into State in 
closed containers be identified by no grade on containers other than 
applicable federal grade or a designation that apples are ungraded 
violates commerce clause by burdening and discriminating against 
interstate sale of Washington apples.

892. Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977).
        Provision of loan of instructional material and equipment to 
nonpublic religious schools and transportation and services for field 
trips for nonpublic school pupils violates First Amendment religion 
clauses.

    Justices Concurring: Blackmun, Brennan, Stewart, Marshall, and 
Stevens.

    Justices Dissenting: Chief Justice Burger, White, Rehnquist; Powell 
(as to field trips only).

893. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
        Statute authorizing a court of the State to take jurisdiction of 
a lawsuit by sequestering property of defendant that happens to be 
located in State violates due process clause because it permits state 
courts to exercise jurisdiction in the absence of sufficient contacts 
among defendant, litigation, and State.

894. Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977).
        Statutory height and weight requirements for prison guards have 
impermissible discriminatory effect upon women and under supremacy 
clause must yield to federal fair employment law.

    Justices Concurring: Stewart, Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, Powell, 
Rehnquist, Stevens, and Chief Justice Burger.

    Justice Dissenting: White.

895. Jernigan v. Lendall, 433 U.S. 901 (1977).
        District court decision invalidating law that requires 
independent candidate for office to file for office no later than first 
Tuesday in April is summarily affirmed.

896. Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977).
        Statute authorizing death penalty as punishment for rape 
violates Eighth Amendment.

    Justices Concurring: White, Stewart, Blackmun, and Stevens.

    Justices Concurring Specially: Brennan, Marshall, and Powell.

    Justices Dissenting: Chief Justice Burger and Rehnquist.

897. Maher v. Buckner, 434 U.S. 898 (1977).
        Statutory rule rendering ineligible for welfare benefits 
individuals who have transferred assets within seven years of applying 
for benefits unless they can prove the transfer was made for 
``reasonable con

[[Page 2188]]
sideration'' is inconsistent with Social Security Act and therefore 
falls under supremacy clause.

898. New York v. Cathedral Academy, 434 U.S. 125 (1977).
        Authorization for reimbursement to nonpublic schools for 
performance of certain state-mandated services for remainder of school 
year to replace reimbursement program declared unconstitutional also 
violates First Amendment religion clause.

    Justices Concurring: Stewart, Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, Powell, 
and Stevens.

    Justices Dissenting: White, Rehnquist, and Chief Justice Burger.

899. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978).
        Statute that requires court permission to marry of any resident 
having minor children and in his custody and who is under a court order 
to support and that conditions permission on showing that support 
obligation has been met and that the children are not and are not likely 
to become public charges violates equal protection clause.

    Justices Concurring: Marshall, Brennan, White, Blackmun, and Chief 
Justice Burger.

    Justices Concurring Specially: Stewart, Powell, and Stevens.

    Justice Dissenting: Rehnquist.

900. Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151 (1978).
        Certain provisions of statute imposing design or safety 
standards on oil tankers using state waters and banning operation in 
those waters of tankers exceeding certain weights, as well as certain 
pilotage requirements, are invalid under the supremacy clause as 
conflicting with federal law.

    Justices Concurring: White, Stewart, Blackmun, Powell, and Stevens, 
and Chief Justice Burger.

    Justices Dissenting (in part): Marshall, Brennan, and Rehnquist.

901. Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223 (1978).
        Provisions of state law directing certain trials in criminal 
cases to be before five-person juries unconstitutionally impair the 
right to trial by jury.

902. McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618 (1978).
        Statutory qualification of convention delegates by incorporating 
state constitutional ban on ministers or priests violates the 
Constitution.

903. First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
        Criminal statute that banned banks and business corporations 
from making expenditures to influence referendum votes on any questions 
not affecting the property, business, or assets of the corporation 
violated the First Amendment.


[[Page 2189]]


    Justices Concurring: Powell, Stewart, Blackmun, Stevens, and Chief 
Justice Burger.

    Justices Dissenting: White, Brennan, Marshall, and Rehnquist.

904. Landmark Communications v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829 (1978).
        Statute making it a misdemeanor to divulge information regarding 
proceedings before a state judicial review commission cannot 
constitutionally be applied to persons who are not parties before the 
commission.

905. Hicklin v. Orbeck, 437 U.S. 518 (1978).
        Law mandating that state residents be preferred to nonresidents 
in employment on oil and gas pipeline work violates Article IV, Sec. 2, 
the privileges and immunities clause.

906. City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978).
        Law prohibiting importation into State for disposal at landfills 
of solid or liquid waste violates commerce clause.

    Justices Concurring: Stewart, Brennan, White, Marshall, Blackmun, 
Powell, and Stevens.

    Justices Dissenting: Rehnquist and Chief Justice Burger.

907. Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234 (1978).
        Statutory imposition on existing negotiated collective 
bargaining agreements of different terms respecting pensions impaired 
the employer's rights under the obligation of contracts clause.

    Justices Concurring: Stewart, Powell, Rehnquist, Stevens, and Chief 
Justice Burger.

    Justices Dissenting: Brennan, White, and Marshall.

908. Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978).
        Statute authorizing imposition of death penalty upon conviction 
of first-degree murder unconstitutionally restricted consideration of 
mitigating factors by the sentencing party.

    Justices Concurring: Chief Justice Burger and Stewart, Powell, and 
Stevens.

    Justices Concurring Specially: White, Marshall, and Blackmun.

    Justices Dissenting: Rehnquist.

909. Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357 (1979).
        Statute, implementing a constitutional provision, which provides 
for the excusal of any women requesting exemption from jury service, 
operates to violate the fair cross section requirement of Sixth and 
Fourteenth Amendments because of the underrepresentation of women jurors 
that results.

    Justices Concurring: White, Brennan, Stewart, Marshall, Blackmun, 
Powell, Stevens, and Chief Justice Burger.

    Justice Dissenting: Rehnquist.


[[Page 2190]]


910. Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. 572 (1979).
        California community property statute under which property 
acquired during the marriage by either spouse belongs to both may not be 
applied to award a divorced spouse an interest in the other spouse's 
pension benefits under Railroad Retirement Act, because Act precludes 
subjecting benefits to any legal process to deprive recipient of it.

    Justices Concurring: Blackmun, Brennan, White, Marshall, Powell, 
Stevens, and Chief Justice Burger.

    Justices Dissenting: Stewart and Rehnquist.

911. Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379 (1979).
        Provisions of abortion law that require the physician to make a 
determination that the fetus is not viable and if it is viable to 
exercise the same care to preserve the fetus' life and health as would 
be required in the case of a fetus intended to be born alive are void 
for vagueness under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

    Justices Concurring: Blackmun, Brennan, Stewart, Marshall, Powell, 
and Stevens.

    Justices Dissenting: White, Rehnquist, and Chief Justice Burger.

912. Miller v. Youakim, 440 U.S. 125 (1979).
        Provision of state law differentiating between children who 
reside in foster homes with relatives and those who do not reside with 
relatives and giving the latter greater benefits than the former 
conflicts with federal law which requires the same benefits be provided 
regardless of whether the foster home is operated by a relative, and 
thus must yield under the supremacy clause of Article VI.

913. Illinois State Bd. of Elections v. Socialist Workers Party, 440 
        U.S. 173 (1979).
        Law requiring new political parties and independent candidates 
to obtain signatures of 5% of the number of persons who voted at the 
previous election for such office in order to get on the ballot in 
political subdivisions of the State, insofar as it applies to mandate 
the obtaining of a greater number and proportion of signatures than is 
required to get on the ballot for statewide office, lacks a rational 
basis and violates the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.

    Justices Concurring: Marshall, Brennan, Stewart, White, and Powell.

    Justices Concurring Specially: Blackmun, Stevens, Rehnquist, and 
Chief Justice Burger.


[[Page 2191]]


914. Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268 (1979).
        Alabama statute which imposes alimony obligations on husbands 
but not wives violates the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.

    Justices Concurring: Brennan, Stewart, White, Marshall, Blackmun, 
and Stevens.

    Justices Dissenting (on other grounds): Powell, Rehnquist, and Chief 
Justice Burger.

915. Ashcroft v. Freiman, 440 U.S. 941 (1979).
        Federal court decision invalidating under the Fourteenth 
Amendment's due process clause a Missouri statute requiring a doctor to 
verbally inform any woman seeking abortion that, if live born infant 
results, woman will lose her parental rights, is summarily affirmed.

916. Quern v. Hernandez, 440 U.S. 951 (1979).
        District court decision voiding as denial of due process under 
Fourteenth Amendment Illinois attachment law because it permits 
attachment prior to filing of complaint and prior to notice to debtor is 
summarily affirmed.

917. Burch v. Louisiana, 441 U.S. 130 (1979).
        State statutory implementation of constitutional provision 
permitting conviction for a nonpetty offense by five out of six jurors 
violates the right to trial by jury guaranteed by the Sixth and 
Fourteenth Amendments.

918. Arizona Pub. Serv. Co. v. Snead, 441 U.S. 141 (1979).
        Imposition of tax upon electricity produced in State and sold 
outside State which is not offset against other taxes as is the case 
with electricity sold within State violates federal statute prohibiting 
any State from taxing the generation or transmission of electricity in a 
manner that discriminates against out-of-state consumers and thus is 
unenforceable under the supremacy clause.

919. Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322 (1979).
        Statute prohibiting transportation or shipment for sale outside 
the State of natural minnows seined or procured from waters within the 
State violates the commerce clause.

    Justices Concurring: Brennan, Stewart, White, Marshall, Blackmun, 
Powell, and Stevens.

    Justices Dissenting: Rehnquist and Chief Justice Burger.

920. Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979).
        New York law permitting an unwed mother but not an unwed father 
to block the adoption of their child by withholding consent is an 
impermissible gender distinction violative of the equal protection 
clause of the fourteenth Amendment.


[[Page 2192]]


    Justices Concurring: Powell, Brennan, White, Marshall, Blackmun.

    Justices Dissenting; Stewart, Stevens, Rehnquist, and Chief Justice 
Burger.

921. Japan Line v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434 (1979).
        Imposition of California ad valorem property tax upon cargo 
containers which are based, registered, and subjected to property tax in 
Japan results in multiple taxation of instrumentalities of foreign 
commerce and violates the commerce clause.

    Justices Concurring: Blackmun, Brennan, Stewart, White, Marshall, 
Powell, Stevens, and Chief Justice Burger.

    Justice Dissenting: Rehnquist.

922. Beggans v. Public Funds for Public Schools, 442 U.S. 907 (1979).
        Federal court decision invalidating New Jersey statute that 
allowed taxpayers personal deduction from gross income for each of their 
dependent children attending nonpublic elementary or secondary schools 
as a violation of the First Amendment's religion clause is summarily 
affirmed.

923. Torres v. Puerto Rico, 442 U.S. 465 (1979).
        Statute authorizing police to search the luggage of any person 
arriving in Puerto Rico from the United States without a warrant or 
probable cause violates the Fourth Amendment.

924. Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co., 443 U.S. 97 (1979).
        West Virginia statute that makes it a crime for a newspaper to 
publish, without the written approval of the juvenile court, the name of 
any youth charged as a juvenile offender violates the First and 
Fourteenth Amendments.

925. Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979).
        Massachusetts law requiring parental consent for an abortion for 
a woman under age 18 and providing for a court order permitting abortion 
for good cause if parental consent is refused violates the due process 
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

    Justices Concurring: Powell, Stewart, Rehnquist, and Chief Justice 
Burger.

    Justices Concurring Specially: Stevens, Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun.

    Justice Dissenting: White.

926. California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, 445 U.S. 
        97 (1980).
        California statute requiring all wine producers and wholesalers 
to file fair trade contracts or price schedules with the State and to 
follow the price lists is a resale price maintenance scheme in violation 
of the Sherman Act and cannot stand under the supremacy clause.

927. Vance v. Universal Amusement Co., 445 U.S. 308 (1980).
        Texas public nuisance statute authorizing state judges, on the 
basis of a showing that a theater exhibited obscene films in the past,

[[Page 2193]]
to enjoin its future exhibition of films not yet found to be obscene is 
an invalid prior restraint violative of the First and Fourteenth 
Amendments.

    Justices Concurring: Brennan, Stewart, Marshall, Blackmun, Stevens.

    Justices Dissenting (on other grounds): Powell and Chief Justice 
Burger.

    Justices Dissenting: White and Rehnquist.

928. Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480 (1980).
        Nebraska statute which authorizes the authorities to summarily 
transfer a prison inmate from jail to another institution if a physician 
find he suffers from a mental disease or defect and cannot be given 
proper treatment in jail violates the liberty guaranteed by the due 
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment unless the transfer is 
accompanied by adequate procedural protections.

    Justices Concurring: White, Brennan, Marshall, Powell, Stevens.

    Justices Dissenting (on other grounds): Stewart, Blackmun, 
Rehnquist, and Chief Justice Burger.

929. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980).
        Statute authorizing police officers to enter a private residence 
without a warrant and without necessarily exigent circumstances to 
effectuate a felony arrest violates the Fourth and Fourteenth 
Amendments.

    Justices Concurring: Stevens, Brennan, Stewart, Marshall, Blackmun, 
Powell.

    Justices Dissenting: White, Rehnquist, Chief Justice Burger.

930. Wengler v. Druggists Mutual Ins. Co., 446 U.S. 142 (1980).
        Missouri workers' compensation law denying a widower benefits on 
his wife's work-related death unless he either is mentally or physically 
incapacitated or proves dependence on her earnings, but granting a widow 
death benefits regardless of her dependency, is a gender discrimination 
violative of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

    Justices Concurring: White, Brennan, Stewart, Marshall, Blackmun, 
Powell, and Chief Justice Burger.

    Justice Dissenting: Rehnquist.

931. Lewis v. BT Investment Managers, 447 U.S. 27 (1980).
        Florida statute prohibiting out-of-state banks, bank holding 
companies, and trust companies from owning or controlling a business 
within the State that sells investment advisory services violates the 
commerce clause.

932. Washington v. Confederated Tribes, 447 U.S. 134 (1980).
        Imposition of state motor vehicle excise tax and mobile home, 
camper, and trailer taxes to vehicles owned by the Tribe or its members 
and used both on and off the reservation violates federal law and cannot 
stand under the supremacy clause.


[[Page 2194]]


    Justices Concurring: White, Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, Powell, 
Stevens, and Chief Justice Burger.

    Justices Dissenting: Stewart and Rehnquist.

933. Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455 (1980).
        Illinois statute that prohibits picketing of residences or 
dwellings, but exempts peaceful picketing of such buildings that are 
places of employment in which there is a labor dispute, violates the 
equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

    Justices Concurring: Brennan, Stewart, White, Marshall, Powell, 
Stevens.

    Justices Dissenting: Rehnquist, Blackmun, Chief Justice Burger.

934. Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625 (1980).
        Capital punishment statute which forbids giving the jury the 
option of convicting a defendant of a lesser included offense but 
requires it to convict on the capital offense or acquit violates the 
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.

935. White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136 (1980).
        Imposition of Arizona motor carrier license tax and use fuel tax 
to non-Indian enterprise authorized to do business in Arizona but 
operating entirely on reservation conflicts with federal law and cannot 
stand under the supremacy clause.

    Justices Concurring: Marshall, Brennan, White, Blackmun, Powell, and 
Chief Justice Burger.

    Justices Dissenting: Stevens, Stewart, Rehnquist.

936. Central Machinery Co. v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 448 U.S. 160 
        (1980).
        Imposition of tax upon on-reservation sale of farm machinery to 
Indian tribe by non-Indian, off-reservation enterprise conflicts with 
federal law and is invalid under the supremacy clause.

    Justices Concurring: Marshall, Brennan, White, Blackmun, and Chief 
Justice Burger.

    Justices Dissenting: Stewart, Powell, Rehnquist, Stevens.

937. Minnesota v. Planned Parenthood, 448 U.S. 901 (1980).
        Federal court decision holding that statute authorizing grants 
for prepregnancy family planning to hospitals and health maintenance 
organizations but prohibiting such grants to other nonprofit 
organizations if they perform abortions violates equal protection clause 
is summarily affirmed.

938. Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980).
        Statute requiring copy of Ten Commandments, purchased with 
private contributions, to be posted on the wall of each public classroom 
in the State violates the establishment clause of the First Amendment.


[[Page 2195]]


    Justices Concurring: Brennan, White, Marshall, Powell, Stevens.

    Justices Dissenting: Chief Justice Burger and Blackmun, Stewart, 
Rehnquist.

939. Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155 (1980).
        Statutory authorization for county to retain as its own interest 
accruing on interpleader fund deposited in registry of county court was 
a taking violating the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.

940. Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24 (1981).
        Statute repealing an earlier law and reducing the amount of 
``gain time'' for good conduct and obedience to prison rules deducted 
from a convicted prisoner's sentence is an invalid ex post facto law as 
applied to one whose crime was committed prior to the statute's 
enactment.

941. Jefferson County v. United States, 450 U.S. 901 (1981).
        Court of Appeals decision holding invalid a state statute that 
imposed use tax on government-owned, contractor operated facility as 
constituting ad valorem general property tax on federal government 
property and thus contravening the supremacy clause is summarily 
affirmed.

942. Democratic Party v. Wisconsin ex rel. La Follette, 450 U.S. 107 
        (1981).
        State law mandating national convention delegates chosen at 
party's state convention to vote at the national convention for the 
candidate prevailing in the State's preference primary, in which voters 
may participate without regard to party affiliation, violates the First 
Amendment right of association of the national party, whose rules 
preclude seating of delegates who were not selected in accordance with 
national party rules, including the limiting of the selection process to 
those voters affiliated with the party.

    Justices Concurring: Stewart, Brennan, White, Marshall, Stevens, and 
Chief Justice Burger.

    Justices Dissenting: Powell, Blackmun, Rehnquist.

943. Chicago & North Western Transp. Co. v. Kalo Brick & Tile Co., 450 
        U.S. 311 (1981).
        State statute subjecting to damages a common carrier who 
abandons service and thereby injures shippers is preempted by the 
Interstate Commerce Act, which empowers ICC to approve cessation of 
service on branch lines upon carrier petitions, and is void under the 
supremacy clause.

944. Kirchberg v. Feenstra, 450 U.S. 455 (1981).
        Statute giving husband unilateral right to dispose of jointly-
owned community property without wife's consent is an impermissible sex 
classification and violates equal protection clause.


[[Page 2196]]

945. Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662 (1981).
        Statute barring 65-foot double-trailer trucks on State's 
highways, while all neighboring States permit them, violates the 
commerce clause.

    Justices Concurring: Powell, White, Blackmun, Stevens.

    Justices Concurring Specially: Brennan and Marshall.

    Justices Dissenting: Rehnquist, Stewart, Chief Justice Burger.

946. Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 451 U.S. 504 (1981).
        Workmen's compensation provision denying employers right to 
reduce retiree's pension benefits by amount of compensation award under 
act is preempted by federal pension regulation law and is invalid under 
the supremacy clause.

947. Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725 (1981).
        State first-use tax statute which, because of exceptions and 
credits, imposes a tax only on natural gas moving out-of-state 
impermissibly discriminates against interstate commerce, and another 
provision that required pipeline companies to allocate cost of tax to 
ultimate consumer is preempted by federal law.

948. Little v. Streater, 452 U.S. 1 (1981).
        Provision requiring person in paternity action who requests 
blood grouping tests to bear cost of tests denies due process in 
violation of Fourteenth Amendment to an indigent against whom State has 
required institution of paternity action.

949. McCarty v. McCarty, 453 U.S. 210 (1981).
        Community property statute to the extent it treated retired pay 
of Army officer as property divisible between spouses on divorce is 
preempted by federal law and cannot be applied under supremacy clause.

    Justices Concurring: Blackmun, White, Marshall, Powell, Stevens, 
Chief Justice Burger.

    Justices Dissenting: Rehnquist, Brennan, Stewart.

950. Campbell v. John Donnelly & Sons, 453 U.S. 916 (1981).
        Court of Appeals decision holding violative of First Amendment a 
statute prohibiting roadside billboards, except for signs announcing 
place and time of religious or civic events, election campaign signs, 
and signs erected by historic and cultural institutions, is summarily 
affirmed.

951. Agsalud v. Standard Oil Co., 454 U.S. 801 (1981).
        Court of Appeals decision holding preempted by federal pension 
law state law requiring employers to provide their employees with 
comprehensive prepaid health care plan is summarily affirmed.


[[Page 2197]]

952. Louisiana Dairy Stabilization Bd. v. Dairy Fresh Corp., 454 U.S. 
        884 (1981).
        Court of Appeals decision holding violative of the commerce 
clause a milk industry regulatory statute, which required all dairy 
product processors, including out-of-state processors, who sell dairy 
products to retailer or distributor for resale in State to pay 
assessment per unit of milk for use in administration and enforcement of 
statute, is summarily affirmed.

953. Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, 454 U.S. 1022 (1981).
        Court of Appeals decision holding violative of First Amendment a 
statute which authorized courts to issue temporary and permanent 
injunctions, without providing prompt trial on merits, against any 
business that regularly sells or exhibits ``lewd matter'' is summarily 
affirmed.

954. Firestone v. Let's Help Florida, 454 U.S. 1130 (1982).
        Court of Appeals decision holding violative of the First 
Amendment a statute that restricts size of contributions to political 
committees organized to support or oppose referenda is summarily 
affirmed.

955. Treen v. Karen B., 455 U.S. 912 (1982).
        Court of Appeals decision holding violative of First Amendment 
establishment clause statute authorizing school boards to permit 
students to participate in one-minute prayer period at start of school 
day, upon parental consent, is summarily affirmed.

956. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982).
        Provision of state law authorizing termination of parental 
rights upon proof by only a fair preponderance of the evidence violates 
the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

    Justices Concurring: Blackmun, Brennan, Marshall, Powell, Stevens.

    Justices Dissenting: Rehnquist, White, O'Connor, Chief Justice 
Burger.

957. California State Bd. of Equalization v. United States, 456 U.S. 901 
        (1982).
        Court of Appeals decision invalidating as an impermissible 
infringement of the immunity of the United States from state taxation a 
sales tax based on gross rentals paid by United States to lessors of 
data processing and other equipment, which permitted lessor to maximize 
profit only by separately stating and collecting tax from lessee, is 
summarily affirmed.

958. Brown v. Hartlage, 456 U.S. 45 (1982).
        Statute prohibiting candidate from offering material benefits to 
voters in consideration for their votes violates First Amendment speech 
clause as applied to a candidate's promise to lower salary of his office 
if elected.


[[Page 2198]]

959. Mills v. Habluetzel, 456 U.S. 91 (1982).
        Statute imposing one-year period from date of birth to bring 
action to establish paternity of illegitimate child, paternity being 
necessary for child to obtain support from father at any time during his 
minority, denies equal protection of the laws.

960. Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228 (1982).
        Provision of charitable solicitations law exempting from 
registration and reporting only those religious organizations that 
receive more than half of their total contributions from members or 
affiliated organizations is an impermissible denominational preference 
and violates First Amendment establishment clause.

    Justices Concurring: Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, Powell, Stevens.

    Justices Dissenting: White, Rehnquist (on merits); O'Connor and 
Chief Justice Burger (on standing).

961. Greene v. Lindsey, 456 U.S. 444 (1982).
        Statute authorizing service of process in forcible entry and 
detainer action by posting summons in a conspicuous place if no one 
could be found on premises denies due process on showing that notices 
are often removed before defendants find them.

    Justices Concurring: Brennan, White, Marshall, Blackmun, Powell, 
Stevens.

    Justices Dissenting: O'Connor, Rehnquist, Chief Justice Burger.

962. Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55 (1982).
        State law providing a dividend distribution to all State's adult 
residents from earnings on oil and mineral development in State denies 
equal protection of the laws by determining amount of dividend for each 
person by the length of residency in State.

    Justices Concurring: Chief Justice Burger, Brennan, White, Marshall, 
Blackmun, Powell, Stevens.

    Justice Concurring Specially: O'Connor.

    Justice Dissenting: Rehnquist.

963. Blum v. Bacon, 457 U.S. 132 (1982).
        Provision of emergency assistance program precluding assistance 
to persons receiving AFDC to replace a lost or stolen AFDC grant is 
contrary to valid federal regulations proscribing inequitable treatment 
under the emergency assistance program.

964. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
        Statute withholding state funds from local school districts for 
the education of any children not legally admitted into United States 
and authorizing boards to deny enrollment to such children denies the 
equal protection of the laws.

    Justices Concurring: Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, Powell, Stevens.

    Justices Dissenting: Chief Justice Burger, White, Rehnquist, 
O'Connor.


[[Page 2199]]


965. Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596 (1982).
        Statute requiring, under all circumstances, exclusion of press 
and public during testimony of minor victim of a sex offense violates 
the First Amendment.

    Justices Concurring: Brennan, White, Marshall, Blackmun, Powell.

    Justice Concurring Specially: O'Connor.

    Justices Dissenting: Chief Justice Burger, Rehnquist, Stevens.

966. Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624 (1982).
        Take-over statute which extensively regulates tender offerors 
and imposes registration and reporting requirements, because it directly 
regulates and prevents interstate tender offers and because the burdens 
on interstate commerce are excessive compared with local interests 
served, violates the commerce clause.

    Justices Concurring: White, Blackmun, Powell, Stevens, O'Connor, 
Chief Justice Burger.

    Justices Dissenting: Marshall, Brennan, Rehnquist (all on mootness 
grounds).

967. Fidelity Fed. S. & L. v. De la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141 (1982).
        Statutory provision barring unreasonable restraints on 
alienation, construed to prohibit ``due-on-sale'' clauses in mortgage 
contracts, is preempted by Federal Home Loan Bank Board regulations 
permitting federal savings and loan associations to include such clauses 
in their contracts.

    Justices Concurring: Blackmun, Brennan, White, Marshall, O'Connor, 
Chief Justice Burger.

    Justices Dissenting: Rehnquist, Stevens.

968. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
        Statute requiring landlords to permit installation of cable 
television wiring on their property and limiting fee charged to that 
determined to be reasonable by a commission (which set a one-time $1 
fee) constituted a taking of property in violation of the Fifth and 
Fourteenth Amendments.

969. Washington v. Seattle School Dist., 458 U.S. 457 (1982).
        Statutory provision, enacted by initiative vote of the 
electorate, barring school boards from busing students for racially 
integrative purposes denies the equal protection of the laws.

    Justices Concurring: Blackmun, Brennan, Marshall, White, Stevens.

    Justices Dissenting: Powell, Rehnquist, O'Connor, Chief Justice 
Burger.

970. Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982).
        Statute authorizing death penalty solely for participation in a 
robbery in which another robber kills someone violates the Eighth 
Amendment.

    Justices Concurring: White, Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, Stevens.
    
[[Page 2200]]


    Justices Dissenting: O'Connor, Powell, Rehnquist, Chief Justice 
Burger.

971. Ramah Navajo School Bd. v. Bureau of Revenue, 458 U.S. 832 (1982).
        State tax imposed on the gross receipts that non-Indian 
construction company received from tribal school board for construction 
of school for Indian children on reservation is preempted by federal 
law.

    Justices Concurring: Marshall, Brennan, Blackmun, Powell, O'Connor, 
Chief Justice Burger.

    Justices Dissenting: Rehnquist, White, Stevens.

972. Sporhase v. Nebraska ex rel. Douglas, 458 U.S. 941 (1982).
        State statute requiring a permit before anyone withdraws ground 
water from any well located in the State and transports it across state 
line and providing for denial of permit unless the State to which the 
water will be transported grants reciprocal rights to withdraw and 
transport water into this State violates the commerce clause.

    Justices Concurring: Stevens, Brennan, White, Marshall, Blackmun, 
Powell, Chief Justice Burger.

    Justices Dissenting: Rehnquist, O'Connor.

974. Brown v. Socialist Workers '74 Campaign Comm., 459 U.S. 87 (1982).
        Ohio statute requiring candidates to disclose the names and 
addresses of campaign contributors and the recipients of campaign 
expenditures is invalid, under the First Amendment, as applied to a 
minor political party whose members and supporters may be subjected to 
harassment or reprisals.

    Justices concurring: Marshall, Brennan, White, Powell, and Chief 
Justice Burger.

    Justice concurring specially: Blackmun.

    Justices concurring in part and dissenting in part: O'Connor, 
Rehnquist, and Stevens.

975. Larkin v. Grendel's Den, 459 U.S. 116 (1982).
        Massachusetts statute permitting any church to block issuance of 
a liquor license to any establishment to be located within 500 feet of 
the church violates the Establishment Clause by delegating governmental 
decisionmaking to a church.

    Justices concurring: Chief Justice Burger, and Brennan, White, 
Marshall, Blackmun, Powell, and Stevens.

    Justice dissenting: Rehnquist.

976. King v. Sanchez, 459 U.S. 801 (1982).
        Federal district court's decision invalidating New Mexico 
legislative reapportionment as violating the one person, one vote 
requirement of the Equal Protection Clause because the ``votes cast'' 
formula resulted in substantial population variances among districts, is 
summarily affirmed.


[[Page 2201]]

977. Memphis Bank & Trust Co. v. Garner, 459 U.S. 392 (1983).
        Tennessee tax on the net earnings of banks, applied to interest 
earned on obligations of the United States, is void under the Supremacy 
Clause as conflicting with 31 U.S.C. Sec. 3124.

978. Busbee v. Georgia, 459 U.S. 1166 (1983).
        Federal district court decision that Georgia congressional 
redistricting plan is invalid as having a racially discriminatory 
purpose in conflict with the Voting Rights Act is summarily affirmed.

979. Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Comm'r of Revenue, 460 
        U.S. 575 (1983).
        Minnesota ink and paper use tax violates the First Amendment by 
providing ``differential treatment'' for the press.

    Justices concurring: O'Connor, Brennan, Marshall, Powell, Stevens, 
and Chief Justice Burger.

    Justices concurring specially: White and Blackmun.

    Justice dissenting: Rehnquist.

980. Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780 (1983).
        Ohio statute requiring independent candidates for President and 
Vice-President to file nominating petitions by March 20 in order to 
qualify for the November ballot is unconstitutional as substantially 
burdening the associational rights of the candidates and their 
supporters.

    Justices concurring: Stevens, Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, and Chief 
Justice Burger.

    Justices dissenting: Rehnquist, White, Powell, and O'Connor.

981. Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352 (1983).
        California statute requiring that a person detained in a valid 
Terry stop provide ``credible and reliable'' identification is 
unconstitutionally vague in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment Due 
Process Clause.

    Justices concurring: O'Connor, Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, Powell, 
and Stevens.

    Justices dissenting: White and Rehnquist.

982. Pennsylvania Public Utility Comm'n v. CONRAIL, 461 U.S. 912 (1983).
        Federal district court decision holding that federal statutes 
(the Federal Railroad Safety Act and the locomotive boiler inspection 
laws) preempt a Pennsylvania law requiring locomotives to maintain speed 
records and indicators, summarily affirmed by an appeals court, is 
summarily affirmed.

983. Pickett v. Brown, 462 U.S. 1 (1983).
        Tennessee's two-year statute of limitations for paternity and 
child support actions violates the equal protection rights of 
illegitimates.


[[Page 2202]]

984. Exxon Corp. v. Eagerton, 462 U.S. 176 (1983).
        Prohibition on pass-through to consumers of increase in Alabama 
oil and gas severance tax is invalid as conflicting with the Natural Gas 
Act to the extent that it applies to sales of gas in interstate 
commerce.

985. Philco Aviation v. Shacket, 462 U.S. 406 (1983).
        Illinois statute recognizing the validity of an unrecorded, oral 
sale of an aircraft is preempted by the Federal Aviation Act's provision 
that unrecorded ``instruments'' of transfer are invalid.

986. Planned Parenthood Ass'n v. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 476 (1983).
        Missouri statute requiring that all abortions performed after 
the first trimester of pregnancy be performed in a hospital unreasonably 
infringes upon the right of a woman to have an abortion.

    Justices concurring (on this issue only): Powell, Brennan, Marshall, 
Blackmun, Stevens, and Chief Justice Burger.

    Justices dissenting: O'Connor, White, and Rehnquist.

987. Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725 (1983).
        New Jersey congressional districting statute creating districts 
in which the deviation between largest and smallest districts was 0.7%, 
or 3,674 persons, violates Art. I, Sec. 2's ``equal representation'' 
requirement as not resulting from a good-faith effort to achieve 
population equality.

    Justices concurring: Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, Stevens, and 
O'Connor.

    Justices dissenting: White, Powell, Rehnquist, and Chief Justice 
Burger.

988. Mennonite Bd. of Missions v. Adams, 462 U.S. 791 (1983).
        Indiana statute providing for constructive notice to mortgagee 
of tax sale of real property violates the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment; instead, personal service or notice by mail is 
required.

    Justices concurring: Marshall, Brennan, White, Blackmun, Stevens, 
and Chief Justice Burger.

    Justices dissenting: O'Connor, Powell, and Rehnquist.

989. Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, 463 U.S. 85 (1983).
        The New York Human Rights Law is preempted by ERISA to the 
extent that it prohibits practices that are lawful under the federal 
law.

990. American Bank & Trust Co. v. Dallas County, 463 U.S. 855 (1983).
        Texas property tax on bank shares, computed on the basis of a 
bank's net assets without any deduction for the value of United States 
obligations held by the bank, is invalid as conflicting with Rev. Stat. 
Sec. 3701 (31 U.S.C. Sec. 3124).


[[Page 2203]]


    Justices concurring: Blackmun, Brennan, White, Marshall, Powell, and 
Chief Justice Burger.

    Justices dissenting: Rehnquist and Stevens.

991. Arcudi v. Stone & Webster Engineering, 463 U.S. 1220 (1983).
        Appeals court holding that Connecticut statute requiring 
employers to provide health and life insurance to former employees is 
preempted by ERISA as related to an employee benefit plan, is summarily 
affirmed.

992. Aloha Airlines v. Director of Taxation, 464 U.S. 7 (1983).
        Hawaii ``property tax'' on the gross income of airlines 
operating within the State is preempted by a federal prohibition on 
state taxes on carriage of air passengers ``or on the gross receipts 
derived therefrom.''

993. Healy v. United States Brewers Ass'n, 464 U.S. 909 (1983).
        Appeals court decision invalidating as an undue burden on 
interstate commerce the beer price ``affirmation'' provisions of 
Connecticut's liquor control laws, which restrict out-of-state sales to 
prices set for in-state sales, is summarily affirmed.

994. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984).
        California franchise law, requiring judicial resolution of 
certain claims, is preempted by the United States Arbitration Act, which 
precludes judicial resolution in state or federal courts of claims that 
contracting parties agree to submit to arbitration.

    Justices concurring: Chief Justice Burger, and Brennan, Marshall, 
Blackmun, and Powell.

    Justice concurring in part and dissenting in part: Stevens.

    Justices dissenting: O'Connor and Rehnquist.

995. Texas v. KVUE-TV, 465 U.S. 1092 (1984).
        Appeals court holding that Texas statute regulating broadcast of 
political advertisements is preempted by the Federal Election Campaign 
Act of 1971 to the extent that it imposes sponsorship identification 
requirements on advertising for candidates for federal office, and to 
the extent that it conflicts with federal regulation of political 
advertising rates, is summarily affirmed.

996. Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Tully, 466 U.S. 388 (1984).
        New York corporate franchise tax unconstitutionally 
discriminates against interstate commerce by allowing an offsetting 
credit for receipts from products shipped from an in-state place of 
business.

997. Wallace v. Jaffree, 466 U.S. 924 (1984).
        Appeals court decision holding invalid under the Establishment 
Clause an Alabama statute authorizing the recitation in public schools 
of a government-composed prayer is summarily affirmed.


[[Page 2204]]

998. Bernal v. Fainter, 467 U.S. 216 (1984).
        Texas requirement that a notary public be a United States 
citizen furthers no compelling state interest and denies equal 
protection of the laws to resident aliens.

    Justices concurring: Marshall, Brennan, White, Blackmun, Powell, 
Stevens, O'Connor, and Chief Justice Burger.

    Justice dissenting: Rehnquist.

999. Michigan Canners & Freezers Ass'n v. Agricultural Marketing and 
        Bargaining Bd., 467 U.S. 461 (1984).
        Michigan statute making agricultural producers' associations the 
exclusive bargaining agents and requiring payment of service fees by 
non-member producers is preempted as conflicting with federal policy of 
the Agricultural Fair Practices Act of 1967, protecting the right of 
farmers to join or not join such associations.

1000. Armco, Inc. v. Hardesty, 467 U.S. 638 (1984).
        West Virginia gross receipts tax on businesses selling tangible 
property at wholesale unconstitutionally discriminates against 
interstate commerce due to exemption granted local manufacturers.

    Justices concurring: Powell, Brennan, White, Marshall, Blackmun, 
Stevens, O'Connor, and Chief Justice Burger.

    Justice dissenting: Rehnquist.

1001. Capital Cities Cable v. Crisp, 467 U.S. 691 (1984).
        Oklahoma Constitution's general ban on advertising of alcoholic 
beverages, as applied to out-of-state cable television signals carried 
by in-state operators, is preempted by federal regulations implementing 
the Communications Act.

1002. Secretary of State of Maryland v. Joseph H. Munson Co., 467 U.S. 
        947 (1984).
        Maryland prohibition on charitable organizations paying more 
than 25% of solicited funds for expenses of fundraising violates the 
Fourteenth Amendment by creating an unnecessary risk of chilling 
protected First Amendment activity.

    Justices concurring: Blackmun, Brennan, White, Marshall, and 
Stevens.

    Justices dissenting: Rehnquist, Powell, O'Connor, and Chief Justice 
Burger.

1003. Brown v. Brandon, 467 U.S. 1223 (1984).
        Federal district court decision that Ohio congressional 
districting plan is invalid because population variances were shown to 
be not unavoidable and were not justified by legitimate state interest 
is summarily affirmed.


[[Page 2205]]

1004. Bacchus Imports v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263 (1984).
        Hawaii excise tax on wholesale liquor sales, exempting sales of 
specified local products, violates Commerce Clause by discriminating in 
favor of local commerce.

    Justices concurring: White, Marshall, Blackmun, Powell, and Chief 
Justice Burger.

    Justices dissenting: Stevens, Rehnquist, and O'Connor.

1005. Lawrence County v. Lead-Deadwood School Dist., 469 U.S. 256 
        (1985).
        South Dakota statute requiring local governments to distribute 
federal payments in lieu of taxes in the same manner that they 
distribute general tax revenues conflicts with the Payment in Lieu of 
Taxes Act, which provides that the recipient local government may use 
the payment for any governmental purpose.

    Justices concurring: White, Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, Powell, 
O'Connor, and Chief Justice Burger.

    Justices dissenting: Rehnquist and Stevens.

1006. Deukmejian v. National Meat Ass'n, 469 U.S. 1100 (1985).
        Appeals court holding that California tax on sales by out-of-
state beef processors discriminates against interstate commerce in 
violation of the Commerce Clause, there being no corresponding and 
comparable tax on in-state processors, is summarily affirmed.

1007. Westhafer v. Worrell Newspapers, 469 U.S. 1200 (1985).
        Appeals court decision holding invalid under the First Amendment 
an Indiana statute punishing as contempt the publication of the name of 
an individual against whom a sealed indictment or information has been 
filed is summarily affirmed.

1008. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Ward, 470 U.S. 869 (1985).
        Alabama's domestic preference tax, imposing a substantially 
lower gross premiums tax rate on domestic insurance companies than on 
out-of-state insurance companies, violates the Equal Protection Clause.

    Justices concurring: Powell, White, Blackmun, Stevens, and Chief 
Justice Burger.

    Justices dissenting: O'Connor, Brennan, Marshall, and Rehnquist.

1009. Board of Educ. v. National Gay Task Force, 470 U.S. 903 (1985).
        Court of appeals decision holding unconstitutionally overbroad 
in violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments an Oklahoma statute 
prohibiting advocating, encouraging, or promoting homosexual conduct is 
affirmed by equally divided vote.


[[Page 2206]]

1010. Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222 (1985).
        Provision of Alabama Constitution requiring disenfranchisement 
for crimes involving moral turpitude, adopted in 1901 for the purpose of 
racial discrimination, violates the Equal Protection Clause.

1011. Williams v. Vermont, 472 U.S. 14 (1985).
        Vermont use tax discriminating between residents and 
nonresidents in application of a credit for automobile sales taxes paid 
to another state violates the Equal Protection Clause.

    Justices concurring: White, Brennan, Marshall, Stevens, and Chief 
Justice Burger.

    Justices dissenting: Blackmun, Rehnquist, and O'Connor.

1012. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985).
        Alabama statute authorizing a one-minute period of silence in 
public schools ``for meditation or voluntary prayer'' violates the 
Establishment Clause, the record indicating that the sole legislative 
purpose in amending the statute to add ``or voluntary prayer'' was to 
return voluntary prayer to the public schools.

    Justices concurring: Stevens, Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, and 
Powell.

    Justice concurring specially: O'Connor.

    Justices dissenting: White, Rehnquist, and Chief Justice Burger.

1013. Jensen v. Quaring, 472 U.S. 478 (1985).
        Appeals court decision holding invalid Nebraska's driver's 
licensing requirement that applicant be photographed, and that photo be 
affixed to license, as burdening the free exercise of sincerely held 
religious beliefs against submitting to being photographed, is affirmed 
by equally divided vote.

1014. Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, 472 U.S. 491 (1985).
        Washington ``moral nuisance'' statute is invalid under the First 
Amendment to the extent that it proscribes exhibition of films or sale 
of publications inciting ``lust,'' defined as referring to normal sexual 
desires.

    Justices concurring: White, Blackmun, Rehnquist, Stevens, O'Connor, 
and Chief Justice Burger.

    Justices dissenting on other grounds: Brennan and Marshall.

1015. Hooper v. Bernalillo County Assessor, 472 U.S. 612 (1985).
        New Mexico property tax exemption for Vietnam War veterans who 
became residents before May 8, 1976, violates the Equal Protection 
Clause as not meeting the rational basis test.

    Justices concurring: Chief Justice Burger and Brennan, White, 
Marshall, and Blackmun.

    Justices dissenting: Stevens, Rehnquist, and O'Connor.


[[Page 2207]]


1016. Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 472 U.S. 703 (1985).
        Connecticut statute requiring employers to honor the Sabbath day 
of the employee's choice violates the Establishment Clause.

    Justices concurring: Chief Justice Burger and Brennan, White, 
Marshall, Blackmun, Powell, Stevens, and O'Connor.

    Justice dissenting: Rehnquist.

1017. Gerace v. Grocery Mfrs. of America, 474 U.S. 801 (1985).
        Appeals court decision holding that federal laws (the Food, 
Drug, and Cosmetic Act; the Meat Inspection Act; and the Poultry 
Products Act) preempt a New York requirement that cheese alternatives be 
labeled ``imitation'' is summarily affirmed.

1018. Wisconsin Dep't of Industry v. Gould, Inc., 475 U.S. 282 (1986).
        Wisconsin statute debarring from doing business with the state 
persons or firms guilty of repeat violations of the National Labor 
Relations Act is preempted by that Act.

1019. Exxon Corp. v. Hunt, 475 U.S. 355 (1986).
        New Jersey statute creating an oil spill compensation fund is 
preempted in part by the Comprehensive Environmental Response, 
Compensation, and Liability Act to the extent that the state fund is 
used to finance cleanup activities at sites listed in the National 
Contingency Plan.

    Justices concurring: Marshall, Brennan, White, Blackmun, Rehnquist, 
O'Connor, and Chief Justice Burger.

    Justice dissenting: Stevens.

1020. Philadelphia Newspapers v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767 (1986).
        Pennsylvania statute incorporating the common law rule that 
defamatory statements are presumptively false violates the First 
Amendment as applied to a libel action brought by a private figure 
against a media defendant; instead, the plaintiff must bear the burden 
of establishing falsity.

    Justices concurring: O'Connor, Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, and 
Powell.

    Justices dissenting: Stevens, White, Rehnquist, and Chief Justice 
Burger.

1021. Brown-Forman Distillers v. New York State Liquor Auth., 476 U.S. 
        573 (1986).
        New York affirmation law, having the practical effect of 
controlling liquor prices in other states, violates the Commerce Clause.

    Justices concurring: Marshall, Powell, O'Connor, and Chief Justice 
Burger.

    Justice concurring specially: Blackmun.

    Justices dissenting: Stevens, White, and Rehnquist.


[[Page 2208]]


1022. Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 
        476 U.S. 747 (1986).
        Pennsylvania statute prescribing a variety of requirements for 
performance of an abortion, including informed consent, reporting of 
various information concerning the mother's history and condition, and 
standard-of-care and second-physician requirements after viability, 
infringes a woman's Roe v. Wade right to have an abortion.

    Justices concurring: Blackmun, Brennan, Marshall, Powell, and 
Stevens.

    Justices dissenting: Chief Justice Burger, and White, Rehnquist, and 
O'Connor.

1023. Three Affiliated Tribes v. Wold Engineering, 476 U.S. 877 (1986).
        North Dakota statute disclaiming jurisdiction over actions 
brought by tribal Indians suing non-Indians in state courts over claims 
arising in Indian country is preempted by federal Indian law (Pub. L. 
280).

    Justices concurring: O'Connor, White, Marshall, Blackmun, Powell, 
and Chief Justice Burger.

    Justices dissenting: Rehnquist, Brennan, and Stevens.

1024. Attorney General of New York v. Soto-Lopez, 476 U.S. 898 (1986).
        New York Civil Service Law employment preference for New York 
residents who are honorably discharged veterans and were New York 
residents when they entered military service violates the Equal 
Protection Clause.

    Justices concurring: Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, and Powell.

    Justices concurring specially: White and Chief Justice Burger.

    Justices dissenting: Stevens, O'Connor, and Rehnquist.

1025. Offshore Logistics v. Tallentire, 477 U.S. 207 (1986).
        Louisiana's wrongful death statute is preempted by the Death on 
the High Seas Act as applied to helicopter crash 35 miles off shore.

    Justices concurring: O'Connor, White, Blackmun, Rehnquist, and Chief 
Justice Burger.

    Justices dissenting: Powell, Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens.

1026. Roberts v. Burlington Industries, 477 U.S. 901 (1986).
        Appeals court holding that New York severance pay requirements 
were preempted by ERISA is summarily affirmed.

1027. Brooks v. Burlington Industries, 477 U.S. 901 (1986).
        Appeals court holding that North Carolina severance pay 
requirements were preempted by ERISA is summarily affirmed.

1028. Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986).
        North Carolina legislative redistricting plan, creating 
multimember districts having the effect of impairing the opportunity

[[Page 2209]]
of black voters to participate in the political process, is invalid 
under Sec. 2 of the Voting Rights Act.

    Justices concurring: Brennan, White, Marshall, Blackmun, and 
Stevens.

    Justices concurring specially: O'Connor, Powell, Rehnquist, and 
Chief Justice Burger.

    Justices concurring in part and dissenting in part: Stevens, 
Marshall, and Blackmun.

1029. Rose v. Arkansas State Police, 479 U.S. 1 (1986).
        A provision of Arkansas' workers' compensation act requiring 
that death benefits be reduced by the amount of any federal benefits 
paid is preempted by federal requirement that federal benefits be ``in 
addition to any other benefit due''; a contrary ruling by an Arizona 
appeals court is summarily reversed.

1030. Tashjian v. Republican Party of Connecticut, 479 U.S. 208 (1986).
        Connecticut statute imposing a ``closed primary'' under which 
persons not registered with a political party may not vote in its 
primaries violates the First and Fourteenth Amendments by preventing 
political parties from entering into political association with 
individuals of their own choosing.

    Justices concurring: Marshall, Brennan, White, Blackmun, and Powell.

    Justices dissenting: Stevens, Scalia, O'Connor, and Chief Justice 
Rehnquist.

1031. 324 Liquor Corp. v. Duffy, 479 U.S. 335 (1987).
        Section of New York's alcoholic beverage control law 
establishing retail price maintenance violates section 1 of the Sherman 
Act, and is not saved by the Twenty First Amendment.

    Justices concurring: Powell, Brennan, White, Marshall, Blackmun, 
Stevens, and Scalia.

    Justices dissenting: O'Connor, and Chief Justice Rehnquist.

1032. Babbitt v. Planned Parenthood, 479 U.S. 925 (1986).
        Appeals court decision invalidating Arizona statute prohibiting 
grant of public funds to any organization performing abortion-related 
services is summarily affirmed.

1033. California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202 
        (1987).
        California statute governing the operation of bingo games is 
preempted as applied to Indian tribes conducting on-reservation games.

    Justices concurring: White, Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, Powell, and 
Chief Justice Rehnquist.

    Justices dissenting: Stevens, O'Connor, and Scalia.

1034. Wilkinson v. Jones, 480 U.S. 926 (1987).
        Appeals court decision holding unconstitutionally vague and 
overbroad Utah statute barring cable television systems from showing 
``indecent material'' is summarily affirmed.


[[Page 2210]]

1035. Arkansas Writers' Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221 (1987).
        Arkansas sales tax exemption for newspapers and for ``religious, 
professional, trade, and sports journals'' published within the state 
violates the First and Fourteenth Amendments as a content-based 
regulation of the press.

    Justices concurring: Marshall, Brennan, White, Blackmun, Powell, and 
O'Connor.

    Justice concurring specially: Stevens.

    Justices dissenting: Scalia, and Chief Justice Rehnquist.

1036. Miller v. Florida, 482 U.S. 423 (1987).
        Florida's revised sentencing guidelines law, under which the 
presumptive sentence for certain offenses was raised, contravenes the ex 
post facto clause of Article I as applied to someone who committed those 
offenses before the revision.

1037. Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483 (1987).
        Federal Arbitration Act preempts section of California Labor 
Code providing that actions for collection of wages may be maintained 
``without regard to the existence of any private agreement to 
arbitrate.''

    Justices concurring: Marshall, Brennan, White, Blackmun, Powell, 
Scalia, and Chief Justice Rehnquist.

    Justices dissenting: Stevens and O'Connor.

1038. Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496 (1987).
        Maryland statute requiring preparation of a ``victim impact 
statement'' describing the effect of a crime on a victim and his family 
violates the Eighth Amendment to the extent that it requires 
introduction of the statement at the sentencing phase of a capital 
murder trial.

    Justices concurring: Powell, Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, and 
Stevens.

    Justices dissenting: White, O'Connor, Scalia, and Chief Justice 
Rehnquist.

1039. Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987).
        Louisiana statute mandating balanced treatment of ``creation-
science'' and ``evolution-science'' in the public schools is an invalid 
establishment of religion in violation of the First Amendment.

    Justices concurring: Brennan, Marshall, Powell, Stevens, and 
O'Connor.

    Justice concurring specially: White.

    Justices dissenting: Scalia and Chief Justice Rehnquist.

1040. Sumner v. Shuman, 483 U.S. 66 (1987).
        Nevada statute under which a prison inmate convicted of murder 
while serving a life sentence without possibility of parole is 
automatically sentenced to death is invalid under the Eighth Amendment 
as preventing the sentencing authority from considering as mitigating 
factors aspects of a defendant's character or record.


[[Page 2211]]


    Justices concurring: Blackmun, Brennan, Marshall, Powell, Stevens, 
and O'Connor.

    Justices dissenting: White, Scalia, and Chief Justice Rehnquist.

1041. Tyler Pipe Indus. v. Washington State Dep't of Revenue, 483 U.S. 
        232 (1987).
        Washington manufacturing tax, applicable to products 
manufactured in-state and sold out-of-state, but containing an exemption 
for products manufactured and sold in-state, discriminates against 
interstate commerce in violation of the Commerce Clause.

    Justices concurring: Stevens, Brennan, White, Marshall, Blackmun, 
O'Connor.

    Justices dissenting: Scalia, Chief Justice Rehnquist.

1042. American Trucking Ass'ns v. Scheiner, 483 U.S. 266 (1987).
        Pennsylvania statutes imposing lump-sum annual taxes on 
operation of trucks on state's roads violate the Commerce Clause as 
discriminating against interstate commerce.

    Justices concurring: Stevens, Brennan, White, Marshall, Blackmun.

    Justices dissenting: O'Connor, Powell, Chief Justice Rehnquist, and 
Scalia.

1043. Hartigan v. Zbaraz, 484 U.S. 171 (1987).
        Federal appeals court ruling holding unconstitutional a 
provision of the Illinois Parental Notice Abortion Act requiring that 
minors wait 24 hours after informing parents before having an abortion 
is affirmed by equally divided vote.

1044. Montana v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 484 U.S. 997 (1988).
        Federal appeals court decision that Montana coal severance and 
gross proceeds taxes, as applied to Indian-owned coal produced by non-
Indians, are preempted by federal Indian policies underlying the Mineral 
Leasing Act of 1938, is summarily affirmed.

1045. Schneidewind v. ANR Pipeline Co., 485 U.S. 293 (1988).
        Michigan statute requiring approval of Michigan Public Service 
Commission before a natural gas company may issue long-term securities 
is preempted as applied to companies subject to FERC regulation under 
the Natural Gas Act.

1046. Bennett v. Arkansas, 485 U.S. 395 (1988).
        Arkansas statute authorizing seizure of prisoners' property in 
order to defray costs of incarceration is invalid as applied to Social 
Security benefits, exempted from legal process by 42 U.S.C. Sec. 407(a).

1047. City of Manassas v. United States, 485 U.S. 1017 (1988).
        Federal appeals court decision invalidating as discriminatory 
against the United States a Virginia statute that imposes a personal 
property tax on property leased from the United States, but not on 
property leased from the Virginia Port Authority or from local 
transportation districts, is summarily affirmed.


[[Page 2212]]

1048. New Energy Co. of Indiana v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269 (1988).
        Ohio statute granting a tax credit for ethanol fuel if the 
ethanol was produced in Ohio, or if produced in another state which 
grants a similar credit to Ohio-produced ethanol fuel, discriminates 
against interstate commerce in violation of the Commerce Clause.

1049. Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356 (1988).
        Oklahoma statutory aggravating circumstances, permitting 
imposition of capital punishment upon a jury's finding that a murder was 
``especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel,'' are unconstitutionally 
vague in violation of the Eighth Amendment.

1050. Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414 (1988).
        Colorado law punishing as felony the payment of persons who 
circulate petitions for ballot initiative abridges the right to engage 
in political speech, hence violates First and Fourteenth Amendments.

1051. Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456 (1988).
        Pennsylvania 6-year statute of limitations for paternity actions 
violates the Equal Protection Clause as insufficiently justified under 
heightened scrutiny review.

1052. Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Ass'n, 486 U.S. 466 (1988).
        Kentucky Supreme Court's rule containing categorical prohibition 
of attorney direct mail advertising targeted at persons known to face 
particular legal problems violates First and Fourteenth Amendments.

    Justices concurring: Brennan, White, Marshall, Blackmun, Stevens, 
and Kennedy.

    Justices dissenting: O'Connor, Scalia, and Chief Justice Rehnquist.

1053. Mackey v. Lanier Collection Agency & Service, Inc., 486 U.S. 825 
        (1988).
        Georgia statute barring garnishment of funds or benefits of 
employee benefit plans subject to ERISA is preempted by ERISA 
Sec. 514(a) as a state law that ``relates to'' covered plans.

    Justices concurring: White, Brennan, Marshall, Stevens, and Chief 
Justice Rehnquist.

    Justices dissenting: Kennedy, Blackmun, O'Connor, and Scalia.

1054. Bendix Autolite Corp. v. Midwesco Enterprises, Inc., 486 U.S. 888 
        (1988).
        Ohio statute tolling its 4-year limitations period for breach of 
contract and fraud actions brought against out-of-state corporations 
that do not appoint an agent for service of process within the state--
and thereby subject themselves to the general jurisdiction of Ohio 
courts--violates the Commerce Clause.

    Justices concurring: Kennedy, Brennan, White, Marshall, Blackmun, 
Stevens, and O'Connor.

[[Page 2213]]


    Justice concurring specially: Scalia.

    Justice dissenting: Chief Justice Rehnquist.

1055. Supreme Court of Virginia v. Friedman, 487 U.S. 59 (1988).
        Virginia Supreme Court rule imposing residency requirement for 
admission to the bar on motion, without taking the bar exam, by persons 
licensed to practice law in other jurisdictions, violates the Privileges 
and Immunities Clause of Article IV, Sec. 2.

    Justices concurring: Kennedy, Brennan, White, Marshall, Blackmun, 
Stevens, and O'Connor.

    Justices dissenting: Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia.

1056. Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131 (1988).
        Wisconsin's notice-of-claim statute, requiring that persons 
suing state or local governments or officials in state court must give 
notice and then refrain from filing suit for an additional period, is 
preempted as applied to civil rights actions brought in state court 
under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983.

    Justices concurring: Brennan, White, Marshall, Blackmun, Stevens, 
Scalia, and Kennedy.

    Justices dissenting: O'Connor and Chief Justice Rehnquist.

1057. Boyle v. United Technologies Corp., 487 U.S. 500 (1988).
        Virginia tort law governing product design defects is preempted 
by federal common law as applied to suits against government contractors 
for damages resulting from design defects in military equipment if the 
equipment conformed to reasonably precise specifications and if the 
contractor warned the government of known dangers.

    Justices concurring: Scalia, White, O'Connor, Kennedy, and Chief 
Justice Rehnquist.

    Justices dissenting: Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens.

1058. Riley v. National Federation of the Blind, 487 U.S. 781 (1988).
        Three different aspects of North Carolina's Charitable 
Solicitations Act unconstitutionally infringe freedom of speech. These 
aspects are: limitations on reasonable fees that professional 
fundraisers may charge; a requirement that professional fundraisers 
disclose to potential donors the percentage of donated funds previously 
used for charity; and a requirement that professional fundraisers be 
licensed.

    Justices concurring: Brennan, White, Marshall, Blackmun, Scalia, and 
Kennedy.

    Justice concurring in part and dissenting in part: Stevens.

    Justices dissenting: Chief Justice Rehnquist, and O'Connor.

1059. Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988).
        Oklahoma statutory scheme, setting no minimum age for capital 
punishment, and separately providing that juveniles may be tried as 
adults, violates Eighth Amendment by permitting capital punishment to be 
imposed for crimes committed before age 16.


[[Page 2214]]


    Justices concurring: Stevens, Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun.

    Justice concurring specially: O'Connor.

    Justices dissenting: Scalia, White, and Chief Justice Rehnquist.

1060. Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012 (1988).
        Iowa procedure, authorized by statute, placing a one-way screen 
between defendant and complaining child witnesses in sex abuse cases, 
thereby sparing witnesses from viewing defendant, violates the 
Confrontation Clause right to face-to-face confrontation with one's 
accusers.

    Justices concurring: Scalia, Brennan, White, Marshall, Stevens, and 
O'Connor.

    Justices dissenting: Blackmun, and Chief Justice Rehnquist.

1061. Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. Webster County Comm'n, 488 U.S. 
        336 (1989).
        West Virginia county's tax assessments denied equal protection 
to property owners whose assessments, based on recent purchase price, 
ranged from 8 to 35 times higher than comparable neighboring property 
for which the assessor failed over a 10-year period to readjust 
appraisals.

1062. Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1 (1989).
        A Texas sales tax exemption for publications published or 
distributed by a religious faith and consisting of teachings of that 
faith or writings sacred to that faith violates the Establishment Clause 
of the First Amendment.

    Justices concurring: Brennan, Marshall, Stevens.

    Justices concurring specially: White, Blackmun, O'Connor.

    Justices dissenting: Scalia, Kennedy, and Chief Justice Rehnquist.

1063. Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141 
        (1989).
        A Florida statute prohibiting the use of the direct molding 
process to duplicate unpatented boat hulls, and creating a cause of 
action in favor of the original manufacturer, is preempted by federal 
patent law as conflicting with the balance Congress has struck between 
patent protection and free trade in industrial design.

1064. Eu v. San Francisco County Democratic Central Comm., 489 U.S. 214 
        (1989).
        Provisions of California Elections Code forbidding the official 
governing bodies of political parties from endorsing or opposing 
candidates in primary elections, and imposing other requirements on the 
organization and composition of the governing bodies, are invalid under 
the First Amendment. The ban on endorsements violates free speech and 
associational rights; the organizational restrictions violate 
associational rights.


[[Page 2215]]

1065. Barnard v. Thorstenn, 489 U.S. 546 (1989).
        Virgin Islands' rule requiring one year's residency prior to 
admission to the bar violates the Privileges and Immunities Clause of 
Art. IV, Sec. 2. Justifications for the rule do not constitute 
``substantial'' reasons for discriminating against nonresidents, nor 
does the discrimination bear a ``substantial relation'' to legitimate 
objectives.

    Justices concurring: Kennedy, Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, Stevens, 
and Scalia.

    Justices dissenting: Chief Justice Rehnquist and White and O'Connor.

1066. Davis v. Michigan Dep't of Treasury, 489 U.S. 803 (1989).
        Michigan's income tax law, by providing exemption for retirement 
benefits of state employees but not for retirement benefits of Federal 
employees, discriminates against federal employees in violation of 4 
U.S.C. Sec. 111 and in violation of the constitutional doctrine of 
intergovernmental tax immunity.

    Justices concurring: Kennedy, Brennan, White, Marshall, Blackmun, 
O'Connor, Scalia, and Chief Justice Rehnquist.

    Justice dissenting: Stevens.

1067. Quinn v. Millsap, 491 U.S. 95 (1989).
        A provision of the Missouri Constitution, interpreted by the 
Missouri Supreme Court as requiring property ownership as a 
qualification for appointment to a ``board of freeholders'' charged with 
making recommendations for reorganization of St. Louis city and county 
governments, violates the Equal Protection Clause.

1068. Healy v. Beer Institute, 491 U.S. 324 (1989).
        Connecticut's beer price affirmation law, requiring out-of-state 
shippers to affirm that prices charged in-state wholesalers are no 
higher than prices charged contemporaneously in three bordering states, 
violates the Commerce Clause.

    Justices concurring: Blackmun, Brennan, White, Marshall, and 
Kennedy.

    Justice concurring specially: Scalia.

    Justices dissenting: Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Stevens O'Connor.

1069. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989).
        Texas' flag desecration statute, prohibiting any physical 
mistreatment of the American flag that the actor knows would seriously 
offend other persons, is inconsistent with the First Amendment as 
applied to an individual who burned an American flag as part of a 
political protest.

    Justices concurring: Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, Scalia, and 
Kennedy.

    Justices dissenting: Chief Justice Rehnquist and White, O'Connor, 
and Stevens.


[[Page 2216]]


1070. The Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524 (1989).
        A Florida statute making it unlawful to print the name of a 
sexual assault victim is invalid under the First Amendment as applied to 
uphold an award of damages against a newspaper for publishing a sexual 
assault victim's name when the information was truthful, was lawfully 
obtained, and was otherwise publicly available as a result of a botched 
press release from the sheriff's department.

    Justices concurring: Marshall, Brennan, Blackmun, Stevens, and 
Kennedy.

    Justice concurring specially: Scalia.

    Justices dissenting: White, O'Connor, and Chief Justice Rehnquist.

1071. McKoy v. North Carolina, 494 U.S. 433 (1990).
        North Carolina's capital sentencing statute, interpreted to 
prevent a jury from considering any mitigating factor that the jury does 
not unanimously find, violates the Eighth Amendment. Instead, each juror 
must be allowed to consider and give effect to what he or she believes 
to be established mitigating evidence.

    Justices concurring: Marshall, Brennan, White, Blackmun, and 
Stevens.

    Justice concurring specially: Kennedy.

    Justices dissenting: Scalia, O'Connor, and Chief Justice Rehnquist.

1072. Butterworth v. Smith, 494 U.S. 624 (1990).
        A Florida statute prohibiting the disclosure of grand jury 
testimony violates the First Amendment insofar as it prohibits a grand 
jury witness from disclosing, after the term of the grand jury has 
ended, information covered by his own testimony.

1073. Peel v. Illinois Attorney Disciplinary Comm'n, 496 U.S. 91 (1990).
        An Illinois rule of professional responsibility violates the 
First Amendment by completely prohibiting an attorney from holding 
himself out as a civil trial specialist certified by the National Board 
of Trial Advocacy.

    Justices concurring: Stevens, Brennan, Blackmun, and Kennedy.

    Justice concurring specially: Marshall.

    Justices dissenting: White, O'Connor, Scalia, and Chief Justice 
Rehnquist.

1074. Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417 (1990).
        Minnesota's requirement that a woman under 18 years of age 
notify both her parents before having an abortion is invalid as a denial 
of due process because ``it does not reasonably further any legitimate 
state interest.'' However, an alternative judicial bypass system saves 
the statute as a whole.

    Justices concurring: Stevens, Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, and 
O'Connor.

    Justices dissenting: Kennedy, White, Scalia, and Chief Justice 
Rehnquist.

1075. FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 498 U.S. 52 (1990).
        A provision of Pennsylvania's motor vehicle financial 
responsibility law prohibiting subrogation and reimbursement from a 
claimant's

[[Page 2217]]
tort recovery for benefits received from a self-insured health care plan 
is preempted by ERISA as ``relat[ing] to [an] employee benefit plan.''

    Justices concurring: O'Connor, White, Marshall, Blackmun, Scalia, 
Kennedy, and Chief Justice Rehnquist.

    Justice dissenting: Stevens.

1076. Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133 (1990).
        A Texas common law claim that an employee was wrongfully 
discharged to prevent his attainment of benefits under a plan covered by 
ERISA is preempted as a ``State law'' that ``relates to'' a covered 
benefit plan. The state cause of action also ``conflicts directly'' with 
an exclusive ERISA cause of action.

1077. Connecticut v. Doehr, 501 U.S. 1 (1991).
        A Connecticut statute authorizing a private party to obtain 
prejudgment attachment of real estate without prior notice to the owner, 
and without a showing of extraordinary circumstances, violates the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as applied in conjunction 
with a civil action for assault and battery.

1078. Simon & Schuster v. New York Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105 
        (1991).
        New York State's ``Son of Sam'' law, under which a criminal's 
income from works describing his crime is placed in escrow and made 
available to victims of the crime, violates the First Amendment. The law 
establishes a financial disincentive to create or publish works with a 
particular content, and is not narrowly tailored to serve the state's 
compelling interests in ensuring that criminals do not profit from their 
crimes, and that crime victims are compensated.

    Justices concurring: O'Connor, White, Stevens, Scalia, Souter, and 
Chief Justice Rehnquist.

    Justices concurring specially: Blackmun and Kennedy.

1079. Norman v. Reed, 112 S. Ct. 698 (1992).
        Two provisions of Illinois' election law unconstitutionally 
infringe on the right of ballot access guaranteed under the First and 
Fourteenth Amendments. The first provision, as interpreted by the 
Illinois Supreme Court, prevented a ``new political party'' in Cook 
County from using the name of a party already ``established'' in the 
city of Chicago. The second required that new political parties qualify 
for the ballot by submitting petitions signed by 25,000 voters from each 
voting district to be represented in a multi-district political 
subdivision.

    Justices concurring: Souter, White, Blackmun, Stevens, O'Connor, 
Kennedy, and Chief Justice Rehnquist.

    Justice dissenting: Scalia.


[[Page 2218]]


1080. Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 112 S. Ct. 789 (1992).
        An Oklahoma statute requiring that all coal-fired Oklahoma 
utilities burn a mixture containing at least 10% Oklahoma-mined coal 
discriminates against interstate commerce in violation of the implied 
``negative'' component of the Commerce Clause.

    Justices concurring: White, Blackmun, Stevens, O'Connor, Kennedy, 
Souter.

    Justices dissenting: Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and 
Thomas.

1081. Barker v. Kansas, 112 S. Ct. 1619 (1992).
        A Kansas tax on military retirement benefits is inconsistent 
with 4 U.S.C. Sec. 111, which allows states to tax federal employees' 
compensation if the tax does not discriminate ``because of the source'' 
of the compensation. No similar tax is applied to state and local 
government retirees, and there are no significant differences between 
the two classes of taxpayers that justify the different tax treatment.

1082. Foucha v. Louisiana, 112 S. Ct. 1780 (1992).
        A Louisiana statute allowing an insanity acquittee no longer 
suffering from mental illness to be confined indefinitely in a mental 
institution until he is able to demonstrate that he is not dangerous to 
himself or to others violates due process.

    Justices concurring: White, Blackmun, Stevens, O'Connor, Souter.

    Justices dissenting: Kennedy, Thomas, Scalia, and Chief Justice 
Rehnquist.

1083. Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 112 S. Ct. 1904 (1992).
        Application of the State's use tax to mail order sales by an 
out-of-state company with neither outlets nor sales representatives in 
the State places an undue burden on interstate commerce in violation of 
the ``negative'' or ``dormant'' Commerce Clause. A physical presence 
within the taxing state is necessary in order to meet the ``substantial 
nexus'' requirement of the Commerce Clause.

1084. Chemical Waste Management, Inc. v. Hunt, 112 S. Ct. 2009 (1992).
        Alabama's fee for in-state disposal of hazardous wastes 
generated out-of-state is invalid as a direct discrimination against 
interstate commerce. Alabama failed to establish that the discrimination 
against interstate commerce is justified by any factor other than 
economic protectionism, and failed to show that its valid interests 
(e.g., protection of health, safety, and the environment) can not be 
served by less discriminatory alternatives. The fee is not supportable 
by analogy to quarantine laws, since the state permits importation of 
hazardous wastes if the fee is paid.

1085. Fort Gratiot Sanitary Landfill v. Michigan Nat. Res. Dep't, 112 S. 
        Ct. 2019 (1992).
        Waste import restrictions of Michigan's Solid Waste Management 
Act violate the Commerce Clause. The restrictions, which prohibit

[[Page 2219]]
landfills from accepting out-of-county waste unless explicitly 
authorized by the county's solid waste management plan, directly 
discriminate against interstate commerce and are not justified as 
serving any valid health and safety purposes that can not be served 
adequately by nondiscriminatory alternatives.

1086. Kraft Gen. Foods v. Iowa Dep't of Revenue, 112 S. Ct. 2365 (1992).
        An Iowa statute imposing a business tax on corporations facially 
discriminates against foreign commerce in violation of the Commerce 
Clause by allowing corporations to take a deduction for dividends 
received from domestic, but not foreign, subsidiaries.

1087. Gade v. National Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass'n, 112 S. Ct. 2374 (1992).
        Illinois ``dual impact'' laws designed to protect both employees 
and the general public by requiring training and licensing of hazardous 
waste equipment operators are preempted by Sec. 18(b) of the 
Occupational Safety and Health Act, 29 U.S.C. Sec. 667(b), which 
requires states to obtain federal approval before enforcing occupational 
safety and health standards relating to issues governed by federal 
standards.

1088. Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 2608 (1992).
        Two claims, based on New Jersey law and brought against 
cigarette companies for damages for lung cancer allegedly resulting from 
smoking, are preempted under the Federal Cigarette Labeling and 
Advertising Act: failure-to-warn claims requiring a showing that the 
tobacco companies' post-1969 advertising should have included additional 
warnings, and fraudulent misrepresentation claims predicated on state 
law restrictions on advertising.

1089. Planned Parenthood of S.E. Pennsylvania v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791 
        (1992).
        One aspect of the Pennsylvania Abortion Control Act of 1982--a 
requirement for spousal notification--is invalid as an undue 
interference with a woman's right to an abortion.




[[Page 2220]]


                   STATE CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY
                   PROVISIONS AND MUNICIPAL ORDINANCES
                     HELD UNCONSTITUTIONAL ON THEIR
                         FACE OR AS ADMINISTERED
                               (1789-1992)

 
 
                             II. ORDINANCES

1. Weston v. City Council of Charleston, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 449 (1829).
        City ordinance which levied a tax on stock issued by the United 
States impaired the federal borrowing power and was void (Art. VI).

    Justices Concurring: Marshall, C.J., Washington, Duvall, Story.

    Justices Dissenting: Johnson, Thompson.

2. Cannon v. New Orleans, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 577 (1874).
        New Orleans ordinance of 1852, imposing a charge for use of 
piers measured by tonnage of vessel, levied an invalid tonnage duty.

3. Murray v. Charleston, 96 U.S. 432 (1878).
        Charleston, South Carolina, tax ordinance which withheld from 
interest payments on municipal bonds a tax levied after issuance of such 
bonds at a fixed rate of interest impaired the obligation of contract 
(Art. I, Sec. 10).

    Justices Concurring: Strong, Waite, C.J., Clifford, Bradley, Swayne, 
Harlan, Field.

    Justices Dissenting: Miller, Hunt.

4. Moran v. New Orleans, 112 U.S. 69 (1884).
        Ordinance of New Orleans, so far as it imposed license tax upon 
persons owning and running towboats to and from the Gulf of Mexico, was 
an invalid regulation of commerce.

5. New Orleans Gas Co. v. Louisiana Light Co., 115 U.S. 650 (1885).
        Municipal ordinance granting to a public utility an exclusive 
right to supply the city with gas, and state constitutional provision 
abolishing outstanding monopolistic grants, impaired the obligation of 
contract when enforced against a previously chartered utility which, 
through consolidation, had inherited the monopolistic, exclusive 
privileges of two utility corporations chartered prior to the 
constitutional proviso and ordinance.

6. New Orleans Water-Works Co. v. Rivers, 115 U.S. 674 (1885).
        When a utility is chartered with an exclusive privilege of 
supplying a city with water, a subsequently enacted ordinance 
authorizing an individual to supply water to a hotel impaired the 
obligation of contract.

7. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
        San Francisco ordinance regulating certain phases of the laundry 
business, as arbitrarily enforced against Chinese, held to violate the 
equal protection of the laws.


[[Page 2221]]

8. Leloup v. Port of Mobile, 127 U.S. 640 (1888).
        A Mobile, Alabama, ordinance which levied an occupational 
license tax on a telegraph company doing an interstate business was 
void.

9. McCall v. California, 136 U.S. 104 (1890).
        Municipal ordinance which imposed a license tax on a soliciting 
agent for a foreign corporation was void as levying a tax on interstate 
commerce.

    Justices Concurring: Lamar, Miller, Field, Bradley, Harlan, 
Blatchford.

    Justices Dissenting: Fuller, C.J., Gray, Brewer.

10. Harman v. Chicago, 147 U.S. 396 (1893).
        Chicago ordinance imposing a license tax on tug boats licensed 
under federal authority and engaged in interstate commerce held invalid.

11. Brennan v. Titusville, 153 U.S. 289 (1894).
        Ordinance of Pennsylvania city requiring license tax of 
soliciting agent for manufacturer in another State was held invalid as 
imposing a tax upon interstate commerce.

12. Walla Walla v. Walla Walla Water Co., 172 U.S. 1 (1898).
        Washington city ordinance which authorized construction of a 
municipal water works impaired the obligation of a contract previously 
negotiated with a private utility providing the same service.

13. Los Angeles v. Los Angeles City Water Co., 177 U.S. 558 (1900).
        Ordinance expanding city limits beyond those to be served by a 
utility leasing a municipality's water works and effecting diminution of 
the rates stipulated in the original agreement without any equivalent 
compensation impaired the obligation of contract between the utility and 
the city.

14. Detroit v. Detroit Citizens' St. Ry., 184 U.S. 368 (1902).
        City ordinances, which adjusted the rate of fare stipulated in 
agreements made with a street railway company, held to impair the 
obligation of contract.

15. Caldwell v. North Carolina, 187 U.S. 622 (1903).
        City ordinance imposing a license on photographic business, as 
applied to an agent of an out-of-state corporation, was held an invalid 
regulation of commerce.

16. Postal Telegraph-Cable Co. v. Taylor, 192 U.S. 64 (1904).
        Pennsylvania municipal ordinance authorizing an inspection fee 
on telegraph companies doing an interstate business held to be an 
unreasonable and invalid regulation of commerce.


[[Page 2222]]


    Justices Concurring: Peckham, Fuller, C.J., Brown, White, McKenna, 
Holmes, Day.

    Justices Dissenting: Harlan, Brewer.

17. Cleveland v. Cleveland City Ry., 194 U.S. 517 (1904).
        Ordinance reducing the rate of fares to be charged by railway 
companies lower than cited in previous ordinances held to impair the 
obligation of contract.

18. Dobbins v. Los Angeles, 195 U.S. 223 (1904).
        No change in the neighborhood having occurred between passage of 
two zoning ordinances, the second of which excluded a gas company from 
erecting a plant within the area authorized by the first ordinance was 
held to effect an arbitrary deprivation of property without due process 
of law.

19. Cleveland v. Cleveland Electric Ry., 201 U.S. 529 (1906).
        Ordinance according to a consolidated municipal railway an 
extension of the duration date of franchises issued to its predecessors, 
in consideration of which substantial sums were expended on 
improvements, gave rise to a new contract, which was impaired by later 
attempt on the part of the city to reduce the rate stipulated in the 
franchises thus extended.

20. Rearick v. Pennsylvania, 203 U.S. 507 (1906).
        An ordinance imposing a license fee for the solicitation of 
orders for the sale of merchandise not of the parties own manufacture 
imposed an invalid burden on interstate commerce when applied to a 
Pennsylvania agent of an Ohio company who solicited orders for the 
latter's products and upon receipt of the latter, consigned to a 
designated purchaser, consummated the sale by delivering the merchandise 
to such purchaser and, upon the latter's approval of the parcel 
delivered, collected the purchase price for transmission to the Ohio 
employer.

21. Vicksburg v. Vicksburg Waterworks Co., 206 U.S. 496 (1907).
        Municipal contract with utility fixing the maximum rate to be 
charged for supplying water to inhabitants was invalidly impaired by 
subsequent ordinances altering said rates.

22. Londoner v. Denver, 210 U.S. 373 (1908).
        The due process requirements of notice and hearing in connection 
with the assessment of taxes were violated by a municipal assessment 
ordinance which afforded the taxpayer the privilege merely of filing 
objections but no opportunity to support his objections by argument and 
proof in open hearing.

    Justices Concurring: Moody, Harlan, Brewer, White, Peckham, McKenna, 
Day.

    Justices Dissenting: Fuller, C.J., Holmes.


[[Page 2223]]


23. Minneapolis v. Street Ry., 215 U.S. 417 (1910).
        Minneapolis ordinance of 1907, directing the sale of six tickets 
for 25 cents, was void as impairing the contract which arose from 
passage of the ordinance of 1875 granting to a railway a franchise 
expiring in 1923 and establishing a fare of not less than 5 cents.

24. Eubank v. Richmond, 226 U.S. 137 (1912).
        Municipal ordinance requiring authorities to establish building 
lines on separate blocks back of the public streets and across private 
property upon the request of less than all the owners of the property 
affected invalidly authorized the taking of property, not for public 
welfare but, for the convenience of other property owners; and therefore 
was violative of due process.

25. Williams v. Talladega, 226 U.S. 404 (1912).
        A $100 license fee imposed by ordinance of an Alabama city on a 
foreign telegraph company, part of whose business income was derived 
from the transmission of messages for the Federal Government was void as 
a tax on a federal instrumentality (Art. VI).

26. New York Central R.R. v. Hudson County, 227 U.S. 248 (1913).
        Congress, having expressly included ferries used in connection 
with interstate railroads in its legislation regulating interstate 
commerce, two New Jersey municipal ordinances fixing passenger rates for 
travel on ferries between New Jersey and New York points were superseded 
thereby and therefore invalid.

27. Grand Trunk Western Ry. v. South Bend, 227 U.S. 544 (1913).
        South Bend, Indiana, ordinance of 1901 repealing so much of an 
ordinance of 1866 authorizing a railroad to lay double tracks on one of 
its streets impaired the obligation of contract contrary to Art. I, 
Sec. 10.

    Justices Concurring: Lamar, Holmes, White, C.J., Lurton, Van 
Devanter, McKenna, Day (separately).

    Justices Dissenting: Hughes, Pitney.

28. Owensboro v. Cumberland Telephone Co., 230 U.S. 58 (1913).
        An ordinance of a Kentucky muncipality which required a 
telephone company to remove from the streets poles and wires installed 
under a prior ordinance granting permission to do so, without 
restriction as to the duration of such privilege, or, in the 
alternative, pay a rental not prescribed in the original ordinance 
impaired an obligation of contract contrary to Art. I, Sec. 10.

    Justices Concurring: Lurton, White, C.J., Holmes, Van Devanter, 
Lamar.

    Justices Dissenting: Day, McKenna, Hughes, Pitney.


[[Page 2224]]


29. Boise Water Co. v. Boise City, 230 U.S. 84 (1913).
        An ordinance of an Idaho municipality adopted in 1906 which 
subjected a water company to monthly rental fees for the use of its 
streets invalidly impaired the obligation of contract arising under an 
ordinance of 1889 which granted a predecessor company the privilege of 
laying water pipes under the city streets without payment of any charge 
for the exercise of such right.

30. Old Colony Trust Co. v. Omaha, 230 U.S. 100 (1913).
        An ordinance of a Nebraska municipality adopted in 1908 
requiring, without any showing of the necessity therefor, a utility to 
remove its poles and wires from the city streets invalidly impaired an 
obligation of contract arising from an ordinance of 1884 granting in 
perpetuity the privilege of erecting and maintaining poles and wires for 
the transmission of power.

31. Adams Express Co. v. New York, 232 U.S. 14 (1914).
        New York city ordinances requiring an express company to obtain 
a local license, exacting license fees for express wagons and drivers, 
and requiring drivers to be citizens, to the extent that they extended 
to interstate commerce, imposed invalid burdens on such commerce.
        Accord: U.S. Express Co. v. New York, 232 U.S. 35 (1914).

32. Sault Ste. Marie v. International Transit Co., 234 U.S. 333 (1914).
        Michigan city municipal ordinance which compelled operator of a 
ferry between Canadian and Michigan points to take out a license imposed 
an invalid burden on the privilege of engaging in foreign commerce.

33. South Covington Ry. v. Covington, 235 U.S. 537 (1915).
        Kentucky municipal ordinance, insofar as it sought to regulate 
the number of street cars to be run, and the number of passengers 
allowed in each car, between interstate points imposed an unreasonable 
burden on interstate commerce. Also, the requirement that temperature in 
the cars never be permitted to be below 50 deg. was unreasonable and 
violative of due process.

34. Gast Realty Co. v. Schneider Granite Co., 240 U.S. 55 (1916).
        St. Louis ordinance which levied one-fourth of the cost of 
paving on property fronting on the street and the remaining three-
fourths upon all property in the taxing district according to area and 
without equality as to depth denied equal protection of the laws.

35. Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917).
        A Louisville, Kentucky, ordinance which forbade ``colored'' 
persons to occupy houses in blocks where the majority of the houses were 
occupied by whites was deemed to prevent sales of lots in such blocks

[[Page 2225]]
to African Americans and to deprive the latter of property without due 
process of law.

36. Accord: Harmon v. Tyler, 273 U.S. 668 (1927), voiding a similar New 
        Orleans ordinance.

37. Accord: City of Richmond v. Deans, 281 U.S. 704 (1930), voiding a 
        similar Richmond, Virginia, ordinance.

38. Northern Ohio Traction & Light Co. v. Ohio ex rel. Pontius, 245 U.S. 
        574 (1918).
        Resolution of county commissioners in 1912 purporting to revoke 
an electric railway franchise previously granted in perpetuity by 
appropriate county authorities in 1892 amounted to state action 
impairing the obligation of contract.

    Justices Concurring: McReynolds, White, C.J., McKenna, Holmes, Van 
Devanter, Pitney.

    Justices Dissenting: Clarke, Brandeis.

39. Denver v. Denver Union Water Co., 246 U.S. 178 (1918).
        Rates fixed by a Denver ordinance pertaining to the charges to 
be collected for services by a water company deprived the latter of its 
property without due process of law by reason of yielding a return of 
4.3% compared with prevailing rates in the city of 6% and higher 
obtained on secured and unsecured loans.

    Justices Concurring: Pitney, White, C.J., McReynolds, Day, Van 
Devanter, McKenna.

    Justices Dissenting: Holmes, Brandeis, Clarke.

40. Covington v. South Covington St. Ry., 246 U.S. 413 (1918).
        Kentucky city ordinance of 1913 purporting to grant a 25-year 
franchise for a street railway over certain streets to the best bidder 
impaired the obligation of contract of an older street railway accorded 
a perpetual franchise over the same street.

    Justices Concurring: Holmes, Pitney, White, C.J., McReynolds, Day, 
Van Devanter, McKenna.

    Justices Dissenting: Clark, Brandeis.

41. Detroit United Ry. v. Detroit, 248 U.S. 429 (1919).
        Detroit ordinance which compelled street railway company to 
carry passengers on continuous trips over franchise lines to and over 
nonfranchise lines, and vice versa, for a fare no greater than its 
franchises entitled it to charge upon the former alone impaired the 
obligation of the franchise contracts; and insofar as its enforcement 
would result in a deficit, also deprived the company of its property 
without due process.

    Justices Concurring: Day, Pitney, White, C.J., McReynolds, Van 
Devanter, McKenna.

[[Page 2226]]


    Justices Dissenting: Clarke, Holmes, Brandeis.

42. Los Angeles v. Los Angeles Gas Corp., 251 U.S. 32 (1919).
        Los Angeles ordinance authorizing city to establish lighting 
system of its own could not effect removal of fixtures of a lighting 
company occupying streets pursuant to rights granted by a prior 
franchise without paying compensation required by due process clause.

    Justices Concurring: McKenna, White, C.J., Holmes, Day, Van 
Devanter, McReynolds, Brandeis.

    Justices Dissenting: Pitney, Clarke.

43. Houston v. Southwestern Tel. Co., 259 U.S. 318 (1922).
        Houston ordinance was void inasmuch as the rates fixed 
thereunder were confiscatory and deprived the utility of its property 
without due process of law.

44. Paducah v. Paducah Ry., 261 U.S. 267 (1923).
        Fares prescribed by ordinance of Kentucky city were confiscatory 
and deprived the utility of property without due process of law.

45. Texas Transp. Co. v. New Orleans, 264 U.S. 150 (1924).
        New Orleans license tax ordinance could not be validly enforced 
as to the business of a corporation employed as agent by owners of 
vessels engaged exclusively in interstate and foreign commerce, where 
its business was a necessary adjunct of said commerce and consisted of 
the soliciting and engaging of cargo, the nomination of vessels to carry 
it, arranging for delivery on wharf and for stevedores, payment of 
ships' disbursements, issuing bills of lading, and collecting freight 
charges.

    Justices Concurring: Sutherland, Taft, C.J., Sanford, McReynolds, 
Butler, McKenna, Van Devanter.

    Justices Dissenting: Brandeis, Holmes.

46. Asakura v. Seattle, 265 U.S. 332 (1924).
        Seattle ordinance which confined to citizens the pawnbroking 
business was void as applied to a Japanese alien lawfully admitted into 
the United States and protected by a treaty with Japan according to 
nationals of the latter country the right to carry on a ``trade'' (Art. 
VI).

47. Real Silk Mills v. Portland, 268 U.S. 325 (1925).
        Portland, Oregon, ordinance which exacted a license fee and a 
bond for insuring delivery from solicitors who go from place to place 
taking orders for goods for future delivery and receiving deposits in 
advance was invalid as unduly burdening interstate commerce when 
enforced against solicitors taking orders for an out-of-state 
corporation which confirmed the orders, shipped the merchandise directly 
to

[[Page 2227]]
the customers, and permitted the solicitors to retain the deposited 
portion of the purchase as compensation.

48. Mayor of Vidalia v. McNeely, 274 U.S. 676 (1927).
        Ordinance of Louisiana municipality which exacted license as a 
condition precedent for operation of a ferry across boundary waters 
separating two States imposed an invalid burden on interstate commerce.

49. Delaware, L. & W.R.R. v. Morristown, 276 U.S. 182 (1928).
        New Jersey municipal ordinance which compelled use of railroad 
station grounds for a public hackstand without compensation deprived the 
railroad of property without due process.

    Justices Concurring: Brandeis, Holmes (separately).

50. Sprout v. South Bend, 277 U.S. 163 (1928).
        Indiana municipal ordinance which exacted from motor bus 
operators a license fee adjusted to the seating capacity of a bus could 
not be validly enforced against an interstate carrier, for the fee was 
not exacted to defray expenses of regulating traffic in the interest of 
safety, or to defray the cost of road maintenance or as an occupation 
tax imposed solely on account of intrastate business.

51. Nectow v. Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183 (1928).
        Massachusetts municipal zoning ordinance which placed owner's 
land in a residential district with resulting inhibition of use for 
commercial purposes deprived the owner of property without due process 
because the requirement did not promote health, safety, morals, or 
general welfare.

52. Washington ex rel. Seattle Trust Co. v. Roberge, 278 U.S. 116 
        (1928).
        Municipal (Washington) zoning ordinance which conditioned 
issuance of a permit to enlarge a home for the aged in a residential 
area upon the approval of the owners of two-thirds of the property 
within 400 feet of the proposed building was unconstitutional and 
violative of due process because the condition bore no relationship to 
public health, safety, and morals and entailed an improper delegation of 
legislative power to private citizens.

53. Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938).
        Griffin, Georgia, ordinance which exacted a permit for the 
distribution of literature by hand or otherwise was violative of freedom 
of press as guaranteed by the due process clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment by imposing censorship in advance of publication.

54. Hague v. C.I.O., 307 U.S. 496 (1939).
        A Jersey City ordinance forbidding distribution of printed 
matter and the holding, without permits, of public meetings in streets 
and

[[Page 2228]]
other public places withheld freedom of speech and assembly contrary to 
the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

    Justices Concurring: Roberts, Black, Frankfurter, Douglas, Stone, 
Reed, Hughes, C.J. (concurred with opinions of Roberts and Stone).

    Justices Dissenting: McReynolds, Butler.

55-58. Schneider v. City of Irvington, 308 U.S. 147 (1939).
        A municipal ordinance prohibiting solicitation and distribution 
of circulars by canvassing from house to house, unless licensed by the 
police, is void as applied to one who delivered literature and solicited 
contributions from house to house in the name of religion. Ordinances 
forbidding distribution of printed matter are not made valid by limiting 
their operation to streets and alleys and leaving other public places 
free. Any burden imposed upon cities in cleaning and maintaining streets 
as an indirect consequence of such distribution results from the 
constitutional protection of freedom of speech, press, and religion 
guaranteed by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Ordinances of Los Angeles, Milwaukee, Worcester (Massachusetts), and 
Irvington (New Jersey) were held unconstitutional by reason of conflict 
with such provision.

    Justices Concurring: Hughes, C.J., Butler, Stone, Roberts, Reed, 
Frankfurter, Douglas, Black.

    Justice Dissenting: McReynolds.

59. McGoldrick v. Gulf Oil Corp., 309 U.S. 414 (1940).
        The New York City sales tax cannot be collected on sales to 
vessels engaged in foreign commerce of fuel oil manufactured from 
imported crude petroleum in bond. Thus enforced, the city ordinance is 
invalid as an infringement of congressional regulations of foreign and 
interstate commerce (Art. I, Sec. 8, cl. 3).

60. Carlson v. California, 310 U.S. 106 (1940).
        A Shasta County, California, ordinance making it unlawful for 
any person to carry or display any sign or badge in the vicinity of any 
place of business for the purpose of inducing others to refrain from 
buying or working there, or for any person to loiter or picket in the 
vicinity of any place of business for such purpose, is unconstitutional 
and is violative of freedom of speech and press guaranteed by the due 
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

    Justices Concurring: Hughes, C.J., Stone, Roberts, Black, Reed, 
Frankfurter, Douglas, Murphy.

    Justice Dissenting: McReynolds.

61. Jamison v. Texas, 318 U.S. 413 (1943).
        A Dallas ordinance made it unlawful to throw any handbills, 
circulars, cards, newspapers or any advertising material upon any street 
or sidewalk in the city. As applied, the ordinance prohibited the dis

[[Page 2229]]
semination of information, a denial of the freedom of the press, and 
where the handbills contained an invitation to participate in a 
religious activity, a denial of freedom of religion, in violation of the 
First and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution.

62. Largent v. Texas, 318 U.S. 418 (1943).
        A Paris City ordinance which made it unlawful for any person to 
solicit orders or to sell books, wares or merchandise within the 
residential portion of Paris without a permit is invalid as applied. The 
ordinance abridges the freedom of religion, speech and press guaranteed 
by the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution in that it forbids the 
distribution of religious publications without a permit, the issuance of 
which is in the discretion of a municipal officer.

63. Jones v. Opelika, 319 U.S. 103 (1943).
        An Opelika, Alabama, ordinance imposing licenses and taxes on 
various businesses cannot constitutionally be applied to the business of 
selling books and pamphlets on the streets or from house to house. As 
applied the ordinance infringes liberties of speech and press and 
religion guaranteed by the due process clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.

    Justices Concurring: Stone, C.J., Black, Douglas, Murphy, Rutledge.

    Justices Dissenting: Reed, Roberts, Frankfurter, Jackson.

64. Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943).
        An ordinance of the City of Jeanette stated that all persons 
soliciting therein orders for merchandise of any kind, or persons 
delivering such articles under orders so obtained must procure a license 
and pay a prescribed fee therefor in an amount measured by the time for 
which the license is granted. When applied to religious colporteurs 
engaged in dissemination of their religious beliefs through the sale of 
books and pamphlets from house to house, the ordinance invades freedom 
of religion, speech and press contrary to the First and Fourteenth 
Amendments of the Constitution.

    Justices Concurring: Stone, C.J., Black, Douglas, Murphy, Rutledge.

    Justices Dissenting: Roberts, Reed, Frankfurter, Jackson.

65. Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943).
        An ordinance of Struthers, Ohio, made it unlawful for any person 
distributing handbills, circulars, or other advertisements to ring the 
door bell, sound the door knocker, or otherwise summon occupants of any 
residence to the door for the purpose of receiving such handbills, etc. 
The ordinance, as applied to one distributing leaflets advertising a 
religious meeting, interfered with the rights of freedom of speech and 
press guaranteed by the First Amendment. The ordinance, by failing to 
distinguish between householders who are willing to receive

[[Page 2230]]
the literature and those who are not, extended further than was 
necessary for protection of the community.

    Justices Concurring: Stone, C.J., Black, Frankfurter, Douglas, 
Murphy, Rutledge.

    Justices Dissenting: Roberts, Reed, Jackson.

66. Follett v. McCormick, 321 U.S. 573 (1944).
        A McCormick, South Carolina, ordinance required agents selling 
books to pay a license fee of $1.00 per day or $15.00 per year. The 
constitutional guaranty of religious freedom under the First and 
Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution precludes exacting a book 
agent's license fee from a distributor of religious literature 
notwithstanding that his activities are confined to his hometown and his 
livelihood is derived from contributions requested for the literature 
distributed.

    Justices Concurring: Stone, C.J., Black, Reed, Douglas, Murphy, 
Rutledge.

    Justices Dissenting: Roberts, Frankfurter, Jackson.

67. Nippert v. Richmond, 327 U.S. 416 (1946).
        Richmond, Va., City Code imposed upon persons ``engaged in 
business as solicitors an annual license tax of $50.00 plus one-half of 
one per centum of their gross receipts or commissions for the preceding 
license year in excess of $1,000.00.'' Permit of Director of Public 
Safety was required before issuance of the license. The ordinance 
violated the commerce clause in that it discriminated against out-of-
state merchants in favor of local ones and operated as a barrier to the 
introduction of out-of-state merchandise.

    Justices Concurring: Stone, C.J., Reed, Frankfurter, Rutledge, 
Burton.

    Justices Dissenting: Black, Douglas, Murphy.

68. Joseph v. Carter & Weekes Co., 330 U.S. 422 (1947).
        A New York City law provided that for the privilege of carrying 
on within the city any trade, business, or profession, every person 
shall pay a tax of one-tenth of one per centum upon all receipts 
received in and/or allocable to the city during the year. The excise tax 
levied on the gross receipts of a stevedoring corporation is invalid 
since it would burden interstate and foreign commerce in violation of 
the commerce clause of the Constitution.

    Justices Concurring: Vinson, C.J., Reed, Frankfurter, Douglas 
(dissenting in part), Murphy (dissenting in part), Jackson, Rutledge 
(dissenting in part), Burton.

    Justice Dissenting: Black.

69. Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558 (1948).
        A Lockport ordinance forbidding use of sound amplification 
excepted public dissemination, through loudspeakers, of news, matters

[[Page 2231]]
of public concern, and athletic activities, provided that the latter be 
done under permission obtained from the Chief of Police. The ordinance 
is unconstitutional on its face as a previous restraint on the right of 
free speech in violation of the First Amendment of the Constitution, 
made applicable to the States by the Fourteenth Amendment. No standards 
were prescribed for the excercise of discretion by the Chief of Police.

    Justices Concurring: Vinson, C.J., Black, Douglas, Murphy, Rutledge.

    Justices Dissenting: Reed, Frankfurter, Jackson, Burton.

70. Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949).
        A Chicago ordinance proscribed the making of improper noises or 
other conduct contributing to a breach of the peace. Petitioner was 
convicted of violating said ordinance by reason of the fact that he had 
addressed a large audience in an auditorium where he had vigorously 
criticized various political and racial groups as well as the 
disturbances produced by an angry and turbulent crowd protesting his 
appearance. At this trial, the judge instructed the jury that any 
behavior which stirs the public to anger, invites dispute, brings about 
a condition of unrest, or creates a disturbance, violates the ordinance.
        As construed and applied by the trial court the ordinance 
violates the right of free speech guaranteed by the First Amendment and 
made applicable to the States by the Fourteenth Amendment.

    Justices Concurring: Black, Reed, Douglas, Murphy, Rutledge.

    Justices Dissenting: Vinson, C.J., Frankfurter, Jackson, Burton.

71. Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290 (1951).
        Because of prior denunciation of other religious beliefs, 
appellant's license to conduct religious meetings on New York City 
streets was revoked. A local ordinance forbade the holding of such 
meetings without a license but contained no provisions for revocation of 
such licenses and no standard to guide administrative action in granting 
or denying permits. Appellant was convicted for holding religious 
meetings without a permit.
        The ordinance was held to grant discretionary power to control 
in advance the right of citizens to speak on religious issues and to 
impose a prior restraint on the exercise of freedom of speech and 
religion.

    Justices Concurring: Vinson, C.J., Black, Reed, Frankfurter, 
Douglas, Burton, Clark, Minton.

    Justices Dissenting: Jackson.

72. Dean Milk Co. v. Madison, 340 U.S. 349 (1951).
        A Madison, Wisconsin, ordinance prohibited the sale of milk as 
pasteurized unless it had been processed and bottled at an approved 
plant within a radius of five miles from the central square of Madi

[[Page 2232]]
son. An Illinois corporation, engaged in gathering and distributing milk 
from farms in Illinois and Wisconsin was denied a license to sell milk 
within the City solely because its pasteurization plants were more than 
five miles away. The ordinance unjustifiably discriminated against 
interstate commerce in violation of the commerce clause of the 
Constitution.

    Justices Concurring: Vinson, C.J., Reed, Frankfurter, Jackson, 
Burton, Clark.

    Justices Dissenting: Black, Douglas, Minton.

73. Gelling v. Texas, 343 U.S. 960 (1952).
        Marshall City, Texas, motion picture censorship ordinance, as 
enforced, was unconstitutional as denying freedom of speech and press 
protected by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

74. Fowler v. Rhode Island, 345 U.S. 67 (1953).
        A Pawtucket ordinance read as follows: ``No person shall address 
any political or religious meeting in any public park, but this section 
shall not be construed to prohibit any political or religious club or 
society from visiting any public park in a body, provided that no public 
address shall be made under the auspices of such club or society in such 
park.'' Because services of a Jehovah's Witnesses sect differed from 
those conducted by other religious groups, in that the former were 
marked by lectures rather than confined to orthodox rituals, that sect 
was prevented from holding religious meetings in parks. Thus applied, 
the ordinance was held to violate the First and Fourteenth Amendments of 
the Federal Constitution, including the equal protection clause of the 
latter.

75. Slochower v. Board of Education, 350 U.S. 551 (1956).
        Section 903 of the New York City Charter provides that whenever 
a city employee invokes the privilege against self-incrimination to 
avoid answering inquiries into his official conduct by a legislative 
committee, his employment shall terminate. The summary dismissal 
thereunder, without notice and hearing, of a teacher at City College who 
was entitled to tenure and could be discharged only for cause and after 
notice, hearing and appeal, violated the due process clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. Invocation of the privilege to justify refusal to 
answer questions of a congressional committee concerning membership in 
the Communist Party in 1948-1949 cannot be viewed as the equivalent 
either to a confession of guilt or a conclusive presumption of perjury.

    Justices Concurring: Black (concurring specially), Douglas 
(concurring specially), Warren, C.J., Frankfurter, Clark.

    Justices Dissenting: Reed, Burton, Minton, Harlan.


[[Page 2233]]


76. Holmes v. City of Atlanta, 350 U.S. 879 (1955).
        Atlanta ordinance which reserved certain public parks and golf 
courses for white persons only was violative of the equal protection 
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

77. West Point Grocery Co. v. Opelika, 354 U.S. 390 (1957).
        Ordinance of Opelika, Alabama, provided that a wholesale grocery 
business which delivers groceries in the City from points without the 
City must pay an annual privilege tax of $250. As applied to a Georgia 
corporation which solicits orders in the City and consummates purchases 
by deliveries originating in Georgia, the tax is invalid under the 
commerce clause of the Constitution.

    Justices Concurring: Warren, C.J., Frankfurter, Douglas, Burton, 
Clark, Harlan, Brennan, Whittaker.

    Justice Dissenting: Black.

78. Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225 (1957).
        Los Angeles Municipal Code made it unlawful for a person who has 
been convicted of a crime punishable in California as a felony to remain 
in the city longer than five days without registering with the Chief of 
Police. Applied to a person who is not shown to have had actual 
knowledge of his duty to register, this ordinance violates the due 
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution.

    Justices Concurring: Warren, C.J., Black, Douglas, Clark, Brennan.

    Justices Dissenting: Frankfurter, Burton, Harlan, Whittaker.

79. Staub v. City of Baxley, 355 U.S. 313 (1958).
        Baxley, Georgia, made it an offense to ``solicit'' membership in 
any ``organization, union or society'' requiring the payment of ``fees 
[or] dues'' without first receiving a permit from the Mayor and Council. 
Issuance or refusal may occur after the character of the applicant, the 
nature of the organization in which memberships are to be solicited, and 
its effect upon the general welfare of the City have been considered. 
Appellant had been convicted for soliciting memberships in a labor union 
without a license.
        The ordinance is void on its face because it makes enjoyment of 
freedom of speech contingent upon the will of the Mayor and City Council 
and thereby constitutes a prior restraint upon that freedom contrary to 
the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution.

    Justices Concurring: Warren, C.J., Douglas, Black, Burton, Harlan, 
Brennan, Whittaker.

    Justices Dissenting: Frankfurter, Clark.

80. Chicago v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry., 357 U.S. 77 (1958).
        As applied to a newly organized motor carrier hired by 
interstate railroads operating in and out of Chicago to transfer 
interstate pas

[[Page 2234]]
sengers and their baggage between different railway terminals in that 
City, the provision in the Chicago Municipal Code requiring any new 
transfer service to obtain a certificate of convenience and necessity 
plus approval of the City Council is unconstitutional. Chicago has no 
power to decide whether the new motor carrier can operate a service 
which is an integral part of interstate railway transportation subject 
to regulations under the Federal Interstate Commerce Act.

    Justices Concurring: Warren, C.J., Black, Douglas, Clark, Brennan, 
Whittaker.

    Justices Dissenting: Frankfurter, Burton, Harlan.

81. Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147 (1959).
        A Los Angeles City ordinance making it unlawful for any 
bookseller to possess any obscene publication denies him freedom of 
press, as guaranteed by the due process clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, when it is judicially construed to make him absolutely liable 
criminally for mere possession of a book, later adjudged to be obscene, 
notwithstanding that he had no knowledge of the contents thereof. Such 
construction would tend to restrict the books he sells to those he has 
inspected and thereby to limit the public's access to constitutionally 
protected publications.

    Justices Concurring: Clark, Warren, C.J., Whittaker, Brennan, 
Stewart, Black (separately), Frankfurter (separately), Douglas 
(separately), Harlan (dissenting in part; separately).

82. Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516 (1960).
        Little Rock and North Little Rock, Arkansas, ordinances which, 
as a condition of exempting charitable organizations from an annual 
business license tax, required the disclosure of the identity of the 
officers and members of said organizations, as enforced against the 
N.A.A.C.P., denied members of the latter freedom of association, press, 
and speech as guaranteed by the due process clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.

    Justices Concurring: Brennan, Clark, Frankfurter, Stewart, Warren, 
C.J., Whittaker, Harlan, Black (separately), Douglas (separately).

83. Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60 (1960).
        Los Angeles ordinance which forbade distribution under any 
circumstance of any handbill which did not have printed thereon the name 
and address of the person who prepared, distributed, or sponsored it was 
void on its face as abridging freedom of speech and press guaranteed by 
the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Such ordinance is 
not limited to identifying those responsible for fraud, false 
advertising, libel, disorder, or littering.

    Justices Concurring: Warren, C.J., Stewart, Harlan (separately), 
Douglas, Black.

[[Page 2235]]


    Justices Dissenting: Clark, Frankfurter, Whittaker.

84. Schroeder v. City of New York, 371 U.S. 208 (1962).
        New York City Water Supply Act, insofar as it authorized 
notification of land owners, whose summer resort property would be 
adversely affected by city's diversion of water, by publication of 
notices in January in New York City official newspaper and in newspapers 
in the county where the resort property was located as well as by 
notices posted on trees and poles along the waterway adjacent to such 
property, did not afford the quality of notice, i.e., to the owners' 
permanent home address, required by the due process clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.

85. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
        Ordinance authorizing warrantless entry of residential property 
to inspect for housing code violations violates Fourth and Fourteenth 
Amendments.

86. See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541 (1967).
        Ordinance authorizing warrantless entry of commercial property 
to inspect for fire code violations violates Fourth and Fourteenth 
Amendments.

87. Teitel Film Corp. v. Cusack, 390 U.S. 139 (1968).
        Chicago motion picture censorship ordinance is unconstitutional 
in several procedural aspects.

88. Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S. 474 (1968).
        Enactment of county commissioners court drawing boundaries for 
districts of election of members does not comply with required ``one-
man, one-vote'' standard.

    Concurring: Justices White, Black, Douglas, Brennan, and Chief 
Justice Warren.

    Dissenting: Justices Harlan, Fortas, and Stewart.

89. Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 390 U.S. 676 (1968).
        Ordinance providing for classification of motion pictures as not 
suitable for viewing by young persons does not provide adequate 
standards and is void for vagueness.

    Concurring: Justices Marshall, Black, Douglas, Brennan, Stewart, 
White, Fortas, and Chief Justice Warren.

    Dissenting: Justice Harlan.

90. Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385 (1969).
        Amendment to city charter providing that any ordinance enacted 
by council dealing with discrimination in housing was not to be 
effective until approved by referendum whereas no other enactment had to 
be so submitted violated equal protection clause.


[[Page 2236]]


    Concurring: Justices White, Douglas, Brennan, Fortas, Marshall and 
Chief Justice Warren.

    Concurring specially: Justices Harlan and Stewart.

    Dissenting: Justice Black.

91. Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611 (1971).
        Ordinance making it unlawful for three or more persons to 
assemble on a sidewalk and conduct themselves in a manner annoying to 
passers-by is unconstitutionally vague and violates rights to assembly 
and association.

    Concurring: Justices Stewart, Douglas, Harlan, Brennan, and 
Marshall.

    Concurring specially: Justice Black.

    Dissenting: Justices White and Blackmun and Chief Justice Burger.

92. Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 (1972).
        Vagrancy ordinance is void for vagueness because it fails to 
give a person fair notice that his contemplated conduct is forbidden, 
because it encourages arbitrary and erratic enforcement of the law, 
because it makes criminal activities which by modern standards are 
normally innocent, and because it vests unfettered discretion in police.

93. Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972).
        Ordinance prohibiting all picketing within certain distance of 
any school except labor picketing violates equal protection clause by 
impermissibly distinguishing between types of peaceful picketing.

94. Cason v. City of Columbia, 409 U.S. 1053 (1972).
        Ordinance prohibiting use of abusive language toward another as 
applied by court below without limitation to fighting words cannot 
sustain conviction.

95. City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, 411 U.S. 624 (1973).
        Ordinance placing an 11 p.m. to 7 a.m. curfew on jet take-offs 
from local airport is invalid as in conflict with the regulatory scheme 
of federal statutory control.

    Justices Concurring: Douglas, Brennan, Blackmun, Powell, and Chief 
Justice Burger.

    Justices Dissenting: Rehnquist, Stewart, White, and Marshall.

96. Lewis v. City of New Orleans, 415 U.S. 130 (1974).
        Ordinance interpreted by state courts to punish the use of 
opprobrious words to police officer without limitation of offense to 
uttering of fighting words is invalid.

    Justices Concurring: Brennan, Douglas, Stewart, White, and Marshall.

    Justice Concurring Specially: Powell.

    Justices Dissenting: Blackmun, Rehnquist, and Chief Justice Burger.


[[Page 2237]]


97. Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205 (1975).
        A municipal ordinance making it a public nuisance and a 
punishable offense for a drive-in movie theater to exhibit films 
containing nudity, when the screen is visible from a public street or 
place, is facially invalid as an infringement of First Amendment rights.

    Justices Concurring: Powell, Douglas, Brennan, Stewart, Marshall, 
Blackmun.

    Justices Dissenting: White, Rehnquist, Chief Justice Burger.

98. Hynes v. Mayor of Oradell, 425 U.S. 610 (1976).
        Municipal ordinance requiring that advance written notice be 
given to local police by any person desiring to canvass, solicit, or 
call from house to house for a charitable or political purpose held void 
for vagueness.

    Justices Concurring: Chief Justice Burger and Brennan, Stewart, 
White, Marshall, Blackmun, and Powell.

    Justice Dissenting: Rehnquist.

99. Linmark Associates v. Township of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85 (1977).
        Ordinance prohibiting posting of real estate ``For Sale'' and 
``Sold'' signs for the purpose of stemming what the township perceived 
as flight of white homeowners violated the First Amendment.

100. Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
        Zoning ordinance that limited housing occupancy to members of 
single family and restrictively defined family so as to prevent an 
extended family, i.e., two grandchildren by different children residing 
with grandmother, violated due process clause.

    Justices Concurring: Powell, Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun.

    Justice Concurring Specially: Stevens.

    Justices Dissenting: Stewart, Rehnquist, and White; Burger (on other 
grounds).

101. Carter v. Miller, 434 U.S. 356 (1978).
        Lower court's invalidation on equal protection grounds of 
ordinance that permanently denies public chauffeur's license to 
applicants previously convicted of certain crimes while making 
revocation of previously licensed persons convicted of same offenses 
discretionary is affirmed by an equally divided Court.

102. Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 444 
        U.S. 620 (1980).
        Ordinance prohibiting door-to-door or on-the-street solicitation 
of contributions by charitable organizations that do not use at least 75 
percent of their receipts for ``charitable purposes'' violates First and 
Fourteenth Amendment speech protections.

    Justices Concurring: White, Brennan, Stewart, Marshall, Blackmun, 
Powell, Stevens, and Chief Justice Burger.

[[Page 2238]]


    Justice Dissenting: Rehnquist.

103. Ventura County v. Gulf Oil Corp., 445 U.S. 947 (1980).
        County zoning ordinances governing oil exploration and 
extraction activities cannot be applied to company which holds lease 
from United States Government because federal law preempts the field.

104. Edwards v. Service Machine & Shipbuilding Corp., 449 U.S. 913 
        (1980).
        Court of Appeals decision voiding on commerce clause grounds an 
ordinance requiring non-local job seekers and local workers seeking new 
jobs to obtain identification card and to provide fingerprints, 
photograph, and pay fee is summarily affirmed.

105. Town of Southampton v. Troyer, 449 U.S. 988 (1980).
        Court of Appeals decision invalidating on First Amendment 
grounds an ordinance barring door-to-door solicitation without prior 
consent of occupant, but excepting canvassers who have lived in the 
municipality at least six months, is affirmed.

106. Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61 (1981).
        Zoning ordinance construed to bar the offering of live 
entertainment within the township violated the First Amendment.

    Justices Concurring: White, Brennan, Stewart, Marshall, Blackmun, 
Powell.

    Justice Concurring Specially: Stevens.

    Justices Dissenting: Chief Justice Burger, Rehnquist.

107. Metromedia v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490 (1981).
        Complex ban on billboard displays within the City, excepting 
certain onsite signs and 12 categories of particular signs, violates 
First Amendment.

    Justices Concurring: White, Stewart, Marshall, Powell.

    Justices Concurring Specially: Brennan, Blackmun; Stevens (in part).

    Justices Dissenting: Chief Justice Burger, Rehnquist.

108. Citizens Against Rent Control v. City of Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290 
        (1981).
        Ordinance limiting to $250 any contributions to committees 
formed to support or oppose ballot measures submitted to popular vote 
violates First Amendment.

    Justices Concurring: Chief Justice Burger, Brennan, Powell, 
Rehnquist, Stevens.

    Justices Concurring Specially: Marshall, Blackmun, O'Connor.

    Justice Dissenting: White.

109. Rusk v. Espinosa, 456 U.S. 951 (1982).
        Court of Appeals decision holding violative of the First 
Amendment ordinance regulating solicitation by charitable organizations 
but exempting solicitation by religious groups for ``evangelical, 
missionary or religious'' but not secular purposes is summarily 
affirmed.


[[Page 2239]]

110. Giacobbe v. Andrews, 459 U.S. 801 (1982).
        Federal district court decision holding that New York City's 
plan for apportioning 10 at-large seats for the City Council among the 
City's five boroughs violates the one person, one vote requirements of 
the Equal Protection Clause, summarily affirmed by the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Second Circuit, is summarily affirmed.

111. City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 462 U.S. 416 
        (1983).
        Ordinance regulating the circumstances of abortions is 
unconstitutional in the following respects: by requiring all abortions 
performed after the first trimester to be performed in a hospital, by 
requiring parental consent or court order for abortions performed on 
minors under age 15, by requiring the attending physician to provide 
detailed information on which ``informed consent'' may be premised, by 
requiring a 24-hour waiting period, and by requiring disposal of fetal 
remains in a ``humane and sanitary manner.''

    Justices concurring: Powell, Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun,

    Stevens, and Chief Justice Burger.

    Justices dissenting: O'Connor, White, Rehnquist.

112. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
        City zoning requirement of a special use permit for operation of 
a home for the mentally retarded in an area where boarding homes, 
nursing and convalescent homes, and fraternity or sorority houses are 
permitted without such special use permits is a denial of equal 
protection as applied, the record containing no rational basis for the 
distinction.

    Justices concurring: White, Powell, Rehnquist, Stevens, O'Connor, 
and Chief Justice Burger.

    Justices concurring specially: Marshall, Brennan, and Blackmun.

113. Hudnut v. American Booksellers Ass'n, 475 U.S. 1001 (1986).
        Appeals court decision holding invalid under the First Amendment 
an ordinance prohibiting as pornography ``graphic sexually explicit 
subordination of women'' without regard to appeal to prurient interests 
or offensiveness to community standards is summarily affirmed.

114. California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202 (1987).
        County ordinance regulating the operation of bingo and various 
card games is preempted as applied to Indian tribes conducting on-
reservation games.

    Justices concurring: White, Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, Powell, and 
Chief Justice Rehnquist.

    Justices dissenting: Stevens, O'Connor, and Scalia.


[[Page 2240]]


115. City of Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451 (1987).
        Ordinance making it unlawful to ``oppose, molest, abuse, or 
interrupt'' police officer in performance of duty is facially overbroad 
in violation of the First Amendment.

    Justices concurring: Brennan, White, Marshall, Blackmun, and 
Stevens.

    Justices concurring specially: Powell, O'Connor, and Scalia.

    Justice dissenting: Chief Justice Rehnquist.

116. Board of Airport Comm'rs v. Jews for Jesus, 482 U.S. 569 (1987).
        Los Angeles Board of Airport Commissioners resolution banning 
all ``First Amendment activities'' at airport is facially overbroad in 
violation of the First Amendment.

117. City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publishing Co., 486 U.S. 750 
        (1988).
        City ordinance vesting in the mayor unbridled discretion to 
grant or deny a permit for location of newsracks on public property 
violates the First Amendment.

    Justices concurring: Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, and Scalia.

    Justices dissenting: White, Stevens, and O'Connor.

118. City of Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
        City's requirement that contractors awarded city construction 
contracts must subcontract at least 30% of the dollar amount to 
``minority business enterprises'' violates the Equal Protection Clause.

    Justices concurring: O'Connor, White, Stevens, Kennedy, and Chief 
Justice Rehnquist.

    Justice concurring specially: Scalia.

    Justices dissenting: Marshall, Brennan, Blackmun.

119. New York City Bd. of Estimate v. Morris, 489 U.S. 688 (1989).
        New York City Charter procedures for electing City's Board of 
Estimate, consisting of three members elected citywide (the Mayor, the 
comptroller, and the president of the City Council) and the elected 
presidents of the city's five boroughs, violate the one-person, one-vote 
requirements derived from the Equal Protection Clause.

    Justices concurring: White, Marshall, O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and 
Chief Justice Rehnquist.

    Justices concurring specially: Blackmun, Brennan, and Stevens.

120. FW/PBS, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 493 U.S. 215 (1990).
        City's licensing scheme for ``sexually oriented'' businesses, as 
applied to businesses that engage in protected First Amendment activity, 
constitutes an invalid prior restraint on protected activity. The 
ordinance fails to place a time limit within which the licensing 
authority must act, and fails to provide a prompt avenue for judicial 
review.

    Justices concurring: O'Connor, Stevens, and Kennedy.

    Justices concurring specially: Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun.
    
[[Page 2241]]


    Justices dissenting: White, Scalia, and Chief Justice Rehnquist.

121. County of Yakima v. Yakima Indian Nation, 112 S. Ct. 683 (1992).
        The county's excise tax on sales of allotted Indian land does 
not constitute permissible ``taxation of land'' within the meaning of 
Sec. 6 of the General Allotment Act, and is invalid.

122. R. A. V. v. City of St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538 (1992).
        St. Paul, Minnesota's Bias-Motivated Crime Ordinance, which 
punishes the display of a symbol which one knows will arouse anger, 
alarm, or resentment in others on the basis of race, color, creed, 
religion, or gender, is facially invalid under the First Amendment 
because it discriminates solely on the basis of the subjects that speech 
addresses.

    Justices concurring: Scalia, Kennedy, Souter, Thomas, and Chief 
Justice Rehnquist.

    Justices concurring specially: White, Blackmun, O'Connor, Stevens.

123. Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649 (1992).
        Providence, Rhode Island's use of members of the clergy to offer 
prayers at official public secondary school graduation ceremonies 
violates the First Amendment's Establishment Clause. The involvement of 
public school officials with religious activity was ``pervasive,'' to 
the point of creating a state-sponsored and state-directed religious 
exercise in a public school; officials not only determined that an 
invocation and benediction should be given, but also selected the 
religious participant and provided him with guidelines for the content 
of nonsectarian prayers.

    Justices concurring: Kennedy, Blackmun, Stevens, O'Connor, and 
Souter.

    Justices dissenting: Scalia, White, Thomas, and Chief Justice 
Rehnquist.

124. Lee v. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, 112 S. Ct. 
        2709 (1992).
        A regulation of the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey 
banning leafletting (``the sale or distribution of . . . printed or 
written material'' to passers-by) within the airport terminals operated 
by the facility is invalid under the First Amendment.

    Per Curiam.

    Justices dissenting: Chief Justice Rehnquist, and White, Scalia, and 
Thomas.