[Constitution, Jefferson's Manual, and the Rules of the House of Representatives, 113th Congress] [113rd Congress] [House Document 112-161] [The United States Constitution] [Pages 4-66] [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov] [[Page 4]] ARTICLE I.
Sec. 3. Legislative powers vested in Congress. | Section 1. All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate and House of Representatives. |
Sec. 4. Power to investigate. | The power to legislate includes the power to conduct inquiries and investigations. See Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168 (1880); McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135 (1927); Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178 (1957); Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109 (1959). For the power of the House to punish for contempt in the course of investigations, see Sec. 293, infra. |
Sec. 6. Term of a Congress. | The term of a Congress, before the ratification of the 20th amendment to the Constitution, began on the 4th of March of the odd numbered years and extended through two years. This resulted from the action of the Continental Congress on September 13, 1788, in declaring, on authority conferred by the Federal Convention, ``the first Wednesday in March next'' to be ``the time for commencing proceedings under the said Constitution.'' This date was March 4, 1789. Soon after the first Congress assembled a joint committee determined that the terms of Representatives and Senators of the first class commenced on that day, and must necessarily terminate with the 3d of March, 1791 (I, 3). Under the 20th amendment to the Constitution the terms of Representatives and Senators begin on the 3d of January of the odd-numbered years, regardless of when Congress actually convenes. By a practice having the force of common law, the House meets at noon when no other hour is fixed (I, 4, 210). In the later practice a resolution |
Sec. 8. Decisions of the Court. | The power of the States to set qualifications for electors is not unlimited, being subject to the 15th, 19th, 24th, and 26th amendments, and to the equal protection clause of the United States Constitution. Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89 (1965); Kramer v. Union Free School District, 395 U.S. 621 (1969). |
Sec. 12. Qualifications other than those specified by the Constitution. | Whether Congress may by law establish qualifications other than those prescribed by the Constitution has been the subject of much discussion (I, 449, 451, 457, 458, 478); but in a case wherein a statute declared a Senator convicted of a certain offense ``forever thereafter incapable of holding any office of honor, trust, or profit under the Government of the United States,'' the Supreme Court expressed the opinion that the final judgment of conviction did not operate, ipso facto, to vacate the seat or compel the Senate to expel or regard the Senator as expelled by force alone of the judgment (II, 1282). Whether the House or Senate alone may set up qualifications other than those of the Constitution has also been a subject often discussed (I, 414, 415, 443, 457, 458, 469, 481, 484). The Senate has always declined to act on the supposition that it had such a power (I, 443, 483), and during the stress of civil war the House of Representatives declined to exercise the power, even under circumstances of great provocation (I, 449, 465). But later, in one instance, the House excluded a Member-elect on the principal argument that it might itself prescribe a qualification not specified in the Constitution (I, 477). The matter was extensively debated in the 90th Congress in connection with the consideration of resolutions relating to the seating of Representative-elect Adam C. Powell of New York (H. Res. 1, Jan. 10, 1967, p. 14; H. Res. 278, Mar. 1, 1967, p. 4997). In Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969), the Supreme Court found that the power of Congress to judge the qualifications of its Members was limited to an examination of the express qualifications stated in the Constitution. |
Sec. 13. Minority candidate not seated when returned Member is disqualified. | Both Houses of Congress have decided, when a Member- elect is found to be disqualified, that the person receiving the next highest number of votes is not entitled to the seat (I, 323, 326, 450, 463, 469; VI, 58, 59), even in a case wherein reasonable notice of the disqualification was given to the electors (I, 460). In the event of the death of a Member-elect, the candidate receiving the next highest number of votes is not entitled to the seat (VI, 152). |
Sec. 14. The old provision for apportionment of Representatives and direct taxes. | \3\ [Representatives and direct Taxes shall be apportioned among the several States which may be included within this Union, according to their respective Numbers, which shall be determined by adding to the whole Number of free Persons, including those bound to Service for a Term of Years, and excluding Indians not taxed, three fifths of all other Persons.] * * * |
Sec. 16. Decisions of the Court. | Decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States: Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857); Veazie Bank v. Fenno, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 533 (1869); Scholey v. Rew, 90 U.S. (23 Wall.) 331 (1874); De Treville v. Smalls, 98 U.S. 517 (1878); Gibbons v. District of Columbia, 116 U.S. 404 (1886); Pollock v. Farmers Loan & Trust Co. (Income Tax case), 157 U.S. 429 (1895); Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. (Rehearing), 158 U.S. 601 (1895); Thomas v. United States, 192 U.S. 363 (1904); Flint v. Stone Tracy Co. (Corporation Tax cases), 220 U.S. 107 (1911); Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189 (1920); New York Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 U.S. 345 (1921); Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788 (1992); Utah v. Evans, 536 U.S. 452 (2002). |
Sec. 17. Writs for elections to vacancies in representation. | \4\ When vacancies happen in the Representation from any State, the Executive Authority thereof shall issue Writs of Election to fill such Vacancies. |
Sec. 18. Vacancy from death. | It was long the practice to notify the executive of the State when a vacancy was caused by the death of a Member during a session (II, 1198-1202); but it is now the practice for State authorities to take cognizance of the vacancies without notice. When a Member dies while not in attendance in the House or during a recess, the House is sufficiently informed of the vacancy by the credentials of the successor, when they set forth the fact of the death (I, 568). The death of a Member-elect creates a vacancy, although no certificate may have been awarded (I, 323), and in such a case the candidate having the next highest number of votes may not receive the credentials (I, 323; VI 152). A Member whose seat was contested having died, the House did not admit a claimant with credentials until contestant's claim was settled (I, 326); where a contestant died after a report in his favor, the House unseated the returned Member and declared the seat vacant (II, 965), and in a later case the contestant having died, the committee did not recommend to the House a resolution it had agreed to declaring he had not been elected (VI, 112). In the 93d Congress, when two Members-elect were passengers on a missing aircraft and were presumed dead, the Speaker laid before the House documentary evidence of the presumptive death of one Member-elect and the declaration of a vacancy by the Governor, as well as evidence that the status of the other Member-elect had not been officially determined by State authority. The House then adopted a privileged resolution declaring vacant the seat of the latter Member-elect to enable the Governor of that State to call a special election (Jan. 3, 1973, p. 15). For further discussion, see Sec. 23, infra. |
Sec. 19. Vacancy from resignation. | In recent practice the Member informs the House by letter that a resignation has been sent to the State executive (II, 1167-1176) and this is satisfactory evidence of the resignation (I, 567). Both a letter to the Speaker and a copy of the letter to the State executive are laid before the House. However, Members have resigned by letter to the House alone, it being presumed that the Member would also notify the Governor (VI, 226). Where a Member resigned by letter to the House the Speaker was authorized to notify the Governor (Nov. 27, 1944, p. 8450; July 12, 1957, p. 11536; Sept. 1, 1976, p. 28887). If a Member does not inform the House, the State executive may do so (II, 1193, 1194; VI, 232). The House has learned of a Member's resignation by means of the credentials of the successor (II, 1195, 1356). Where the fact of a Member's resignation has not appeared either from the credentials of the successor or otherwise, the Clerk has been ordered to make inquiry (II, 1209) or the House has ascertained the vacancy from information given by other Members (II, 1208). |
Sec. 20. Vacancy from declination. | A Member who has been elected to a seat may decline to accept it, and in such a case the House informed the executive of the State of the vacancy (II, 1234). The House has decided an election contest against a returned Member who had not appeared to claim the seat (I, 638). In one instance a Member-elect who had been convicted in the courts did not appear during the term (IV, 4484, footnote). On November 7, 1998, less than a week after his re- election as Representative from Georgia, Speaker Gingrich announced that he would not be a candidate for Speaker in the 106th Congress and that he would resign his seat as a Member of the 106th Congress. Although the letter of ``withdrawal'' was tendered on November 22, the Governor did not attempt to call a special election until after the term began on January 3, 1999 (Jan. 6, 1999, p. 42). A Member has notified the Speaker and the Governor in one Congress of an intention not to take a seat in the next Congress (Jan. 6, 2009, pp. 2, 3; Jan. 3, 2013, p. _; Jan. 3, 2013, p. _). |
Sec. 21. Vacancy by withdrawal. | At the time of the secession of several States, Members of the House from those States withdrew (II, 1218). In the Senate, in cases of such withdrawals, the Secretary was directed to omit the names of the Senators from the roll (II, 1219), and the act of withdrawal was held to create a vacancy that the legislature might recognize (I, 383). |
Sec. 22. Vacancy by action of the House. | If the House, by its action in a question of election or otherwise, creates a vacancy, the Speaker is directed to notify the Executive of the State (I, 502, 709, 824; II, 1203-1205; Mar. 1, 1967, p. 5038; Jan. 3, 1973, p. 15; Feb. 24, 1981, pp. 2916-18). A resolution as to such notification is presented as a question of privilege (III, 2589), as is a resolution declaring a vacancy in which a Member-elect was unable to take the oath of office or to decline the office because of an incapacitating illness (Feb. 24, 1981, pp. 2916-18). |
Sec. 23. Questions as to the existence of a vacancy. | The House declines to give prima facie effect to credentials, even though they be regular in form, until it has ascertained whether or not the seat is vacant (I, 322, 518, 565, 569), and a person returned as elected at a second election was unseated on ascertainment that another person had actually been chosen at the first election (I, 646). Where a Member was reelected to the House, although at the time of the election he had been unaccounted for for several weeks following the disappearance of the plane on which he was a passenger, the Governor of the State from which he was elected transmitted his certificate to the House in the regular fashion. When the Member-elect was still missing at the time the new Congress convened, and circumstances were such that other passengers on the missing plane had been presumed dead following judicial inquiries in the State where the plane was lost, the House declared the seat vacant (H. Res. 1, 93d Cong., Jan. 3, 1973, p. 15). In the 108th Congress the House codified in clause 5 of rule XX its practice of accounting for vacancies (sec. 2(l), H. Res. 5, Jan. 7, 2003, p. 7). |
Sec. 24. Functions of the State executive in filling vacancies. |
The term ``vacancy'' as occurring in this paragraph of the
Constitution has been examined in relation to the functions of the State
executive (I, 312, 518). A Federal law empowers the States and
Territories to provide by law the times of elections to fill vacancies
(I, 516; 2 U.S.C. 8); but an election called by a governor in pursuance
of constitutional authority was held valid although no State law
prescribed the time, place, or manner of such election (I, 517). Where
two candidates had an equal number of votes, the governor did not issue
credentials to either, but ordered a new election after they had waived
their respective claims (I, 555). A candidate elected for the 104th
Congress was appointed by the Governor to fill a vacancy for the
remainder of the 103d Congress pursuant to a State law requiring the
Governor to appoint the candidate who won the election to the 104th
Congress. In that case the House authorized the Speaker to administer
the oath to the Member-elect and referred the question of his final
right to the seat in the 103d Congress to the Committee on House
Administration (Nov. 29, 1994, pp. 29585, 29586). For a discussion of a
State election to fill a prospective vacancy of the House, see Sec. 19,
supra.
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Sec. 27. Election of a Speaker. | The Speaker, who was at first elected by ballot, has been chosen viva voce by surname in response to a call of the roll since 1839 (I, 187). The Speaker is elected by a majority of Members-elect voting by surname, a quorum being present (I, 216; VI, 24; Jan. 7, 1997, p. 117). The Clerk appoints tellers for this election (I, 217). Ultimately, the House, and not the Clerk, decides |
Sec. 28. Vacancies in the Office of Speaker. | A proposition to elect a Speaker is in order at any time a vacancy exists and presents a question of the highest privilege (VIII, 3383). Upon a vacancy in the Office of Speaker, the House elects a new Speaker either viva voce following nominations (in the case in which a Speaker has died between sessions of Congress or resigned) or by resolution (in the case in which a Speaker has died during a session of Congress). For example, in the case in which the Speaker had died between sessions of Congress, the Clerk at the next session called the House to order, ascertained the presence of a quorum, and then the House proceeded to elect a successor viva voce following nominations (I, 234; Jan. 10, 1962, p. 5). In a case in which the Speaker died during a session of Congress, but not while the House was sitting, the Clerk on the following day called the House to order and the Speaker's successor was elected by resolution (June 4, 1936, p. 9016; Sept. 16, 1940, p. 12231). In a case in which the Speaker resigned ``on the election of my successor'' (May 31, 1989, p. 10440), he entertained nominations for Speaker and, following the roll call, declared the winner of the election ``duly elected Speaker'' (June 6, 1989, p. 10801). In one instance a Speaker resigned on the last day of the Congress, and the House unanimously adopted a motion to elect a successor for the day (I, 225). |
Sec. 30. Election of Clerk in relation to business. | It has been held that the Act of June 1, 1789 (2 U.S.C. 25) binds the House to elect a Clerk before proceeding to business (I, 237, 241; contrast, I, 242, 244). When a vacancy arises in the Office of Clerk during a session, business has intervened before the election of a new Clerk (I, 239). |
Sec. 32. Numbers, terms, and votes of Senators. | Section 3. \1\ [The Senate of the United States shall be composed of two Senators from each State, chosen by the Legislature thereof, for six Years; and each Senator shall have one Vote.] |
Sec. 33. Division of the Senate into classes. |
\2\ Immediately after they shall be assembled in Consequence of the first
Election, they shall be divided as equally as may be into three Classes.
The Seats of the Senators of the first Class shall be vacated at the
Expiration of the second Year, of the second Class at the Expiration of
the fourth Year, and of the third Class at the Expiration of
the < |
Sec. 35. Qualifications of Senators. | \3\ No Person shall be a Senator who shall not have attained to the Age of thirty Years, and been nine Years a Citizen of the United States, and who shall not, when elected, be an Inhabitant of that State for which he shall be chosen. |
Sec. 36. The Vice President; voting. | \4\ The Vice President of the United States shall be President of the Senate, but shall have no Vote, unless they be equally divided. |
Sec. 41. Judgment in cases of impeachment. | \7\ Judgment in Cases of Impeachment shall not extend further than to removal from Office, and disqualification to hold and enjoy any Office of honor, Trust or Profit under the United States: but the Party convicted shall nevertheless be liable and subject to Indictment, Trial, Judgment and Punishment, according to Law. |
Sec. 42. Times, places, and manner of elections of Representatives and Senators. | Section 4. \1\ The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof; but the Congress may at |
Sec. 43. Functions of a State legislature in fixing time, etc., of elections. | The meaning of the word ``legislature'' in this clause of the Constitution has been the subject of discussion (II, 856), as to whether or not it means a constitutional convention as well as a legislature in the commonly accepted meaning of the word (I, 524). The House has sworn in Members chosen at an election the time, etc., of which was fixed by the schedule of a constitution adopted on that election day (I, 519, 520, 522). But the House held that where a legislature has been in existence a constitutional convention might not exercise the power (I, 363, 367). It has been argued generally that the legislature derives the power herein discussed from the Federal and not the State Constitution (II, 856, 947), and therefore that the State constitution might not in this respect control the State legislature (II, 1133). The House has sustained this view by its action (I, 525). But where the State constitution fixed a date for an election and the legislature had not acted, although it had the opportunity, the House held the election valid (II, 846). Title III of the Legislative Branch Appropriations Act, 2006, amended Federal election law to require States to hold special elections for the House within 49 days after a vacancy is announced by the Speaker in the extraordinary circumstance that vacancies in representation from the States exceed 100 (P.L. 109-55; 2 U.S.C. 8). |
Sec. 44. Decisions of the Court. | Decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States: Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371 (1880); Ex parte Clark, 100 U.S. 399 (1880); Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651 (1884); In re Coy, 127 U.S. 731 (1888); Ohio v. Hildebrant, 241 U.S. 565 (1916); United States v. Mosley, 238 U.S. 383 (1915); United States v. Gradwell, 243 U.S. 476 (1917); Newberry v. United States, 256 |
Sec. 45. Annual meeting of Congress. | \2\ [The Congress shall assemble at least once in every Year, and such Meeting shall be on the first Monday in December, unless they shall by Law appoint a different Day.] |
Sec. 46. House the judge of elections, returns, and qualifications. | Section 5. \1\ Each House shall be the Judge of the Elections, Returns and Qualifications of its own Members, * * *. |
Sec. 47. Power of judging as related to State laws as to returns. | As nearly all the laws governing the elections of Representatives in Congress are State laws, questions have often arisen as to the relation of this power of judging to those laws (I, 637). The House decided very early that the certificate of a State executive issued in strict accordance with State law does not prevent examination of the votes by the House and a reversal of the return (I, 637). The House has also held that it is not confined to the conclusions of returns made up in strict conformity to State law, but may examine the votes and correct the returns (I, 774); and the fact that a State law gives canvassers the right to reject votes for fraud and irregularities does not preclude the House from going behind the returns (II, 887). The highest court in one State (Colorado) has ruled that it lacked jurisdiction to pass upon a candidate's allegations of irregularities in a primary election and that the House had exclusive jurisdiction to decide such questions and to declare the rightful nominee (Sept. 23, 1970, p. 33320). |
Sec. 48. Power of judging as related to State laws as to acts of the voter. | When the question concerns not the acts of returning officers, but the act of the voter in voting, the House has found more difficulty in determining the proper exercise of its constitutional power. Although the House has always acted on the principle of giving expression to the intent of the voter (I, 575, 639, 641; II, 1090), it has held that a mandatory State law, even though arbitrary, may cause the rejection of a ballot on which the intent of the voter is plain (II, 1009, 1056, 1077, 1078, 1091). See Deschler, ch. 8, Sec. 8.11, for discussion of distinction between directory State laws governing the conduct of election officials as to ballots, and mandatory laws regulating the conduct of voters. |
Sec. 49. Power of House as related to constitutionality of State laws. | Where the State courts have upheld a State election law as constitutional the House does not ordinarily question the law (II, 856, 1071). But if there has been no such decision the House, in determining its election cases, has passed on the validity of State laws under State constitutions (II, 1011, 1134), and has acted on its decision that they were unconstitutional (II, 1075, 1126), but it is not the policy of the House to pass upon the validity of State election laws alleged to be in conflict with the State constitution (VI, 151). |
Sec. 50. Effect of interpretation of State election laws by State courts. | The courts of a State do not have a direct role in judging the elections, qualifications, and returns of Representatives in Congress (II, 959), but where the highest State court has interpreted the State law the House has concluded that it should generally be governed by this interpretation (I, 645, 731; II, 1041, 1048), but does not consider itself bound by such interpretations (VI, 58). The House is not bound, however, by a decision on an analogous but not the identical question in issue (II, 909); and where the alleged fraud of election judges was in issue, the acquittal of those judges in the courts was held not to be an adjudication binding on the House (II, 1019). For a recent illustration of a protracted election dispute lasting four months see House Report 99-58, culminating in House Resolution 146 of the 99th Congress (May 1, 1985, p. 9998). |
Sec. 51. Laws of Congress not binding on the House in its function of judging its elections. | The statutes of the United States provide specific methods for institution of a contest as to the title to a seat in the House (I, 678, 697-706) (2 U.S.C. 381-396), which the House regards as not of absolute binding force, but rather a prudent rule not to be departed from except for cause (I, 597, 719, 825, 833). It sometimes by resolution modifies the procedure prescribed by the law (I, 449, 600). |
Sec. 51a. Decisions of the Court. | Decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States: In re Loney, 134 U.S. 317 (1890); Reed v. County Commissioners, 277 U.S. 376 (1928); Barry v. United States ex rel. Cunningham, 279 U.S. 597 (1929); Roudebush v. Hartke, 405 U.S. 15 (1972). |
Sec. 52. The quorum. | * * * and a Majority of each [House] shall constitute a Quorum to do Business; but a smaller Number may adjourn from day to day, and may be authorized to compel the Attendance of absent Members, in such Manner, and under such Penalties as each House may provide. |
Sec. 53. Interpretation of the Constitution as to number constituting a quorum. | Out of conditions arising between 1861 and 1891 the rule was established that a majority of the Members chosen and living constituted the quorum required by the Constitution (IV, 2885-2888); but later examination has resulted in a decision confirming in the House of Representatives the construction established in the Senate that a quorum consists of a majority of Senators duly chosen and sworn (I, 630; IV, 2891-2894). So the decision of the House now is that after the House is once organized the quorum consists of a majority of those Members chosen, sworn, and living whose membership has not been terminated by resignation or by the action of the House (IV, 2889, 2890; VI, 638). Under clause |
Sec. 54. The theory of the quorum present; and the count by the Speaker. | For many years a quorum was determined only by noting the number of Members voting (IV, 2896, 2897), with the result that Members by refusing to vote could often break a quorum and obstruct the public business (II, 1034; IV, 2895, footnote; V, 5744). However, in 1890 Speaker Reed directed the Clerk to enter on the Journal as part of the record of a yea-and-nay vote names of Members present but not voting, thereby establishing a quorum of record (IV, 2895). This decision, which was upheld by the Supreme Court (IV, 2904; United States v. Ballin, 144 U.S. 1 (1892)), established the principle that a quorum present made valid any action by the House, although an actual quorum might not vote (I, 216, footnote; IV, 2932). Thenceforth the point of order as to a quorum was required to be that no quorum was present and not that no quorum had voted (IV, 2917). At the time of the establishment of this principle the Speaker revived the count by the Chair as a method of determining the presence of a quorum at a time when no record vote was ordered (IV, 2909). The Speaker has permitted his count of a quorum to be verified by tellers (IV, 2888), but has not conceded it as a right of the House to have tellers under the circumstances (IV, 2916; VI, 647- 651; VIII, 2369, 2436), claiming that the Chair might determine the presence of a quorum in such manner as he should deem accurate and suitable (IV, 2932). The Chair counts all Members in sight, whether in the cloak rooms, or within the bar (IV, 2970; VIII, 3120). Later, as the complement to the new view of the quorum, the early theory that the presence of a quorum was as necessary during debate or other business as on a vote was revived (IV, 2935-2949). Also, a line of rulings made under the old theory was overruled; and it was established that the point of no quorum might be made after the House had declined to verify a division by tellers or the yeas and nays (IV, 2918-2926). For a discussion of the Ballin decision and the Chair's count to determine a quorum, see House Practice, ch. 43, Sec. 5. |
Sec. 55. Relations of the quorum to acts of the House. | The absence of a quorum having been disclosed, there must be a quorum of record before the House may proceed to business (IV, 2952, 2953; VI, 624, 660, 662), and the point of no quorum may not be withdrawn even by unanimous consent after the absence of a quorum has been ascertained and announced by the Chair (IV, 2928-2931; VI, 657; Apr. 13, 1978, p. 10119; Sept. 25, 1984, p. 26778). But when an action has been completed, it is too late to make the point of order that a quorum was not present when it was done (IV, 2927; VI, 655). But where action requiring a quorum was taken in the ascertained absence of a quorum by ruling of a Speaker |
Sec. 56. Relations of the quorum to organization of the House. | At the time of organization the two Houses inform one another of the appearance of the quorum in each, and the two Houses jointly inform the President (I, 198-203). A message from one House that its quorum has appeared is not delivered in the other until a quorum has appeared there also (I, 126). But at the beginning of a second session of a Congress the House proceeded to business, although a quorum had not appeared in the Senate (I, 126). At the beginning of a second session of a Congress unsworn Members-elect were taken into account in ascertaining the presence of a quorum (I, 175); however, at the beginning of the second session of the 87th Congress, the Clerk called the House to order, announced the death of Speaker Rayburn during the adjournment sine die, and did not call unsworn Members-elect or Members who had resigned during the hiatus to establish a quorum or elect a new Speaker (Jan. 10, 1962, p. 5). In both Houses the oath has been administered to Members- elect in the absence of a quorum (I, 174, 181, 182; VI, 22), although in one case the Speaker objected to such proceedings (II, 875). Prayer by the Chaplain is not business requiring the presence of a quorum and the Speaker declines to entertain a point of no quorum before prayer is offered (VI, 663; clause 7 of rule XX). |
Sec. 57. Decisions of the Court. | Decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States: Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 190 (1880); United States v. Ballin, 144 U.S. 1 (1892); Burton v. United States, 202 U.S. 344 (1906). |
Sec. 59. Power to make rules not impaired by rules or law. | The power of each House of Representatives to make its own rules may not be impaired or controlled by the rules of a preceding House (I, 187, 210; V, 6002, 6743-6747), or by a law passed by a prior Congress (I, 82, 245; IV, 3298, 3579; V, 6765, 6766). The House in adopting its rules may, however, incorporate by reference as a part thereof all applicable provisions of law that constituted the Rules of the House at the end of the preceding Congress (e.g., H. Res. 5, 95th Cong., Jan. 4, 1977, pp. 53-70) and has also incorporated provisions of concurrent resolutions that were intended to remain applicable under the Budget Act (e.g., H. Res. 5, 107th Cong., Jan. 3, 2001, p. 25). The House twice reaffirmed free-standing directives to the Committee on Standards of Official Conduct (now Ethics) contained in a simple House resolution (H. Res. 168, 105th Cong., p. 19317, reaffirmed for the 106th Congress by sec. 2(c), H. Res. 5, Jan. 6, 1999, p. 47, and reaffirmed for the 107th Congress with an exception by sec. 3(a), H. Res. 5, Jan. 3, 2001, p. 24; see Sec. 806, infra). In the 108th Congress those free-standing directives were codified in clause 3 of rule XI (sec. 2(h), H. Res. |
Sec. 60. Procedure in the House before the adoption of rules. | Before the adoption of rules the House is governed by general parliamentary law, but Speakers have been inclined to give weight to the rules and precedents of the House in modifying the usual constructions of that law (V, 5604, 6758-6760; VIII, 3384; Jan. 3, 1953, p. 24; Jan. 10, 1967, p. 14). The general parliamentary law as understood in the House is founded on Jefferson's Manual as modified by the practice of American legislative assemblies, especially of the House of Representatives (V, 6761-6763; Jan. 3, 1953, p. 24), but the provisions of the House's accustomed rules are not necessarily followed (V, 5509). Before the adoption of rules, the statutory enactments incorporated into the rules of the prior Congress as an exercise of the rulemaking power do not control the proceedings of the new House until it adopts rules incorporating those provisions (Jan. 22, 1971, p. 132). |
Sec. 61. Joint rules. | The two Houses of Congress adopted in the early years of the Government joint rules to govern their procedure in matters requiring concurrent action; but in 1876 these joint rules were abrogated (IV, 3430; V, 6782-6787). The most useful of their provision continued to be observed in practice, however (IV, 3430; V, 6592). |
Sec. 61a. Decisions of the Court. | Decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States: United States v. Smith, 286 U.S. 6 (1932); Christoffel v. United States, 338 U.S. 84 (1949); United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323 (1950); Yellin v. United States, 374 U.S. 109 (1963); Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969). |
Sec. 62. Punishment and expulsion of Members. | * * * [Each House may] punish its Members for disorderly Behaviour, and, with the Concurrence of two thirds, expel a Member. |
Sec. 63. Punishment and expulsion, generally. | Among the punishments that the House may impose under this provision, the rules of the Committee on Ethics outline the following: (1) expulsion from the House; (2) censure; (3) reprimand; (4) fine; (5) denial or limitation of any right, power, privilege, or immunity of the Member if not in violation of the Constitution; or (6) any other sanction determined by the Committee to be appropriate (rule 24, Committee on Ethics, 113th Cong.). Under rule 10 of the rules of that committee, a statement of alleged violation must be proven by clear and convincing evidence. |
Sec. 64. Punishment by reprimand. | In the 94th Congress the House by adopting a report from the Committee on Standards of Official Conduct (now Ethics) reprimanded a Member for failing to report certain financial holdings in violation of rule XXVI (formerly rule XLIV) and for investing in stock in a Navy bank the establishment of which he was promoting, in violation of the Code of Ethics for Government Service (H. Res. 1421, July 29, 1976, pp. 24379-82). (For the Code of Ethics for Government Service, see H. Con. Res. 175, 85th Cong., 72 Stat. B12.) In the 95th Congress following an investigation by the Committee on Standards of Official Conduct (now Ethics) into whether Members or employees had improperly accepted things of value from the Republic of Korea or representatives thereof, the House reprimanded three Members, one for falsely answering an unsworn questionnaire relative to such gifts and violating the Code of Official Conduct, one for failing to report as required by law the receipt of a campaign contribution and violating the Code of Official Conduct, and one for failing to report a campaign contribution, converting a campaign contribution to personal use, testifying falsely to the committee under oath, and violating the Code of Official Conduct (Oct. 13, 1978, pp. 36984, 37009, 37017). In the 100th Congress the House adopted a resolution reprimanding a Member for ``ghost voting,'' improperly diverting government resources, and maintaining a ``ghost employee'' on his staff (Dec. 18, 1987, p. 36266). In the 101st Congress another was reprimanded for seeking dismissal of parking tickets received by a person with whom he had a personal relationship and not related to official business and for misstatements of fact in a memorandum relating to the criminal probation record of that person (July 26, 1990, p. 19717). In the 105th |
Sec. 65. Punishment by censure. | Censure is inflicted by the Speaker (II, 1259) and the words are entered in the Journal (II, 1251, 1656; VI 236), but the Speaker may not pronounce censure except by order of the House (VI, 237). When Members have resigned pending proceedings for censure, the House has nevertheless adopted the resolutions of censure (II, 1239, 1273, 1275, 1656). Members have been censured for personalities and other disorder in debate (II, 1251, 1253, 1254, 1259), assaults on the floor (II, 1665), for presenting a resolution alleged to be insulting to the House (II, 1246), and for corrupt acts (II, 1274, 1286). For abuse of the leave to print, the House censured a Member after a motion to expel him had failed (VI, 236). In one instance Members were censured for acts before the election of the then existing House (II, 1286). In the 96th Congress two Members were censured by the House as follows: (1) A Member who during a prior Congress both knowingly increased an office employee's salary for repayment of that Member's personal expenses and who was unjustly enriched by clerk-hire employees' payments of personal expenses later compensated by salary increases, was censured and ordered to repay the amount of the unjust enrichment with interest (July 31, 1979, p. 21592); (2) a Member was censured for receiving over a period of time sums of money from a person with a direct interest in legislation in violation of clause 3 of rule XXIII (formerly clause 4 of rule XLIII), and for transferring campaign funds into office and personal accounts (June 10, 1980, pp. 13801-20)). In the 98th Congress the House adopted two resolutions (as amended in the House), each censuring a Member for an improper relationship with a House page in a prior Congress (July 20, 1983, p. 20020 and p. 20030). In the 111th Congress, after the House defeated an amendment to instead punish by reprimand, a Member was censured for using official resources to solicit funds for an educational center, failing to file complete financial disclosure forms, accepting the benefits of a rent-stabilized residence in a manner creating an appearance of impropriety, and failing to pay taxes on certain property, and was ordered to pay restitution for such unpaid taxes (Dec. 2, 2010, p. _). |
Sec. 66. Punishment by expulsion. | Five Members have been expelled in the history of the House. Among those, three were expelled for various offenses related to their service for the Confederacy in the Civil War: John B. Clark of Missouri (a Member-elect) (II, 1262, July 13, 1861); Henry C. Burnett of Kentucky (II, 1261, Dec. 3, 1861); and John W. Reid of Missouri (II, 1261, Dec. 6, 1861). Michael J. Myers of Pennsylvania was expelled after being convicted in a Federal court of |
Sec. 67. Decisions of the Court. | Decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States: Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 204 (1821); Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168 (1881); United States v. Ballin, 144 U.S. 1 (1892); In re Chapman, 166 U.S. 661 (1897); Burton v. United States, 202 U.S. 344 (1906); Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969). |
Sec. 68. Each House to keep a journal. | \3\ Each House shall keep a Journal of its Proceedings, and from time to time publish the same, excepting such |
Sec. 69. The Journal the official record. | The Journal and not the Congressional Record is the official record of the proceedings of the House (IV, 2727). Its nature and functions have been the subject of extended discussions (IV, 2730, footnote). The House has fixed its title (IV, 2728). Although it ought to be a correct transcript of proceedings, the House has not insisted on a strict chronological order of entries (IV, 2815). The Journal is dated as of the legislative and not the calendar day (IV, 2746). |
Sec. 70. Journal a record of proceedings and not of reasons. | The Journal records proceedings but not the reasons therefor (IV, 2811) or the circumstances attending (IV, 2812), or the statements or opinions of Members (IV, 2817-2820). Exceptions to this rule are rare (IV, 2808, 2825). Protests have on rare occasions been admitted by the action of the House (IV, 2806, 2807), but the entry of a protest on the Journal may not be demanded by a Member as a matter of right (IV, 2798) and such demand does not present a question of privilege (IV, 2799). A motion not entertained is not entered on the Journal (IV, 2813, 2844- 2846). |
Sec. 71. House's absolute control of entries in the Journal. | The House controls the Journal and may decide what are proceedings, even to the extent of omitting things actually done or recording things not done (IV, 2784; VI, 634). Although the Speaker has entertained motions to amend the Journal so as to cause it to state what was not the fact, leaving it for the House to decide on the propriety of such act (IV, 2785), and holding that he could not prevent a majority of the House from so amending the Journal as to undo an actual transaction (IV, 3091-3093), in none of those rulings was an amendment permitted to correct the Journal that had the effect of collaterally changing the tabling of a motion to reconsider. In fact, under the precedents cited in Sec. 902, infra, under clause 1 of rule XVI it has been held not in order to amend or strike a Journal entry setting forth a motion exactly as made (IV, 2783, 2789), and thus it was held not in order to amend the Journal by striking a resolution actually offered (IV, 2789), but on one occasion the House vacated the Speaker's referral of an executive communication by amending the Journal of the preceding day (Mar. 19, 1990, p. 4488). Only on rare occasions has the House nullified proceedings by rescinding the records of them in the Journal (IV, 2787), the House and Senate usually insisting on the accuracy of its Journal (IV, 2783, 2786). In rare instances the House and Senate have rescinded or expunged entries in Journals of preceding Congresses (IV, 2730, footnote, 2792, 2793). |
Sec. 72. Record of votes in the Journal. | The Journal should record the result of every vote and state in general terms the subject of it (IV, 2804); but the result of a vote is recorded in figures only when the yeas and nays are taken (IV, 2827), when the vote is recorded by electronic device or by clerks, or when a vote is taken by ballot, it having |
Sec. 73. Approval of the Journal. | It is the uniform practice of the House to approve its Journal for each legislative day (IV, 2731). If Journals of more than one session remain unapproved, they are taken up for approval in chronological order (IV, 2771-2773; Nov. 3, 1987, p. 30592). |
Sec. 74. Motions to amend the Journal. | Under the practice before clause 1 of rule I was adopted in its present form, the motion to amend the Journal took precedence over the motion to approve it (IV, 2760; VI, 633); but the motion to amend may not be admitted after the previous question is demanded on a motion to approve (IV, 2770; VI, 633; VIII, 2684). An expression of opinion as to a decision of the Chair was held not in order as an amendment to the Journal (IV, 2848). A proposed amendment to the Journal being tabled does not carry the Journal with it (V, 5435, 5436). Although a proposed correction of the Journal may be recorded in the Journal, it is not in order to insert in full in this indirect way what has been denied insertion in the first instance (IV, 2782, 2804, 2805). The earlier practice was otherwise, however (IV, 2801-2803). The |
Sec. 74a. Decisions of the Court. | Decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States: Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649 (1892); United States v. Ballin, 144 U.S. 1 (1892). |
Sec. 75. Yeas and Nays entered on the Journal. | * * * and the Yeas and Nays of the Members of either House on any question shall, at the Desire of one fifth of those Present, be entered on the Journal. |
Sec. 76. Conditions of ordering yeas and nays. | The yeas and nays may be ordered before the organization of the House (I, 91; V, 6012, 6013), but are not taken in Committee of the Whole (IV, 4722, 4723). They are not necessarily taken on the passage of a resolution proposing an amendment to the Constitution (V, 7038, 7039; VIII, 3506), but are required to pass a bill over a veto (Sec. 104; VII, 1110). In the earlier practice of the House it was held that less than a quorum might not order the yeas and nays, but for many years the decisions have been uniformly the other way (V, 6016-6028). Neither is a quorum necessary on a motion to reconsider the vote whereby the yeas and nays are ordered (V, 5693). When a quorum fails on a yea and nay vote it is the duty of the Speaker and the House to take notice of that fact (IV, 2953, 2963, 2988). If the House adjourns, the order for the yeas and nays remains effective whenever the bill again comes before the House (V, 6014, 6015; VI, 740; VIII, 3108), and it has been held that the question of consideration might not intervene on a succeeding day before the second calling of the yeas and nays (V, 4949). However, when the call of the House is automatic, the Speaker directs the roll to be called or the vote to be taken by electronic device without motion from the floor (VI, 678, 679, 694, 695); and should a quorum fail to vote and the House adjourn, proceedings under the automatic call are vacated and the question recurs de novo when the bill again comes before the House (Oct. 10, 1940, pp. 13534, 13535; Oct. 13, 1962, p. 23474; Oct. 19, 1966, p. 27641). Although the Constitution and the Rules of the House guarantee that votes taken by the yeas and nays be spread upon the Journal, neither requires that a Member's vote be announced to the public immediately during the vote (Sept. 19, 1985, p. 24245). |
Sec. 77. Demanding the yeas and nays. | The yeas and nays may be demanded while the Speaker is announcing the result of a division (V, 6039), while a vote by tellers is being taken (V, 6038), and even after the announcement of the vote if the House has not passed to other business (V, 6040, 6041; VIII, 3110) and if the Member seeking the yeas and nays is on his feet and seeking recognition for that purpose when the Chair announces the result of the voice vote (Nov. 22, 1991, p. 34075; Sept. 21, 2005, p. 20856). But after the Speaker has announced the result of a division on a motion and is in the act of putting the question on another motion it is too late to demand the yeas and nays on the first motion (V, 6042). And it is not in order during the various processes of a division to repeat a demand for the yeas and nays that has once been refused by the House (V, 6029, 6030, 6031). The constitutional right of a Member to demand the yeas and nays may not be overruled as dilatory (V, 5737; VIII, 3107); but this constitutional right does not exist as to a vote to second a motion when such second is required by the rules (V, 6032-6036; VIII, 3109). The right to demand yeas and nays is not waived by the fact that the Member demanding them has just made the point of no quorum and caused the Chair to count the House (V, 6044).- |
Sec. 78. Yeas and nays ordered by onefifth. | In passing on a demand for the yeas and nays the Speaker need determine only whether one-fifth of those present sustain the demand (V, 6043; VIII, 3112, 3115). In ascertaining whether one-fifth of those present support a demand for the yeas and nays the Speaker counts the entire number present and not merely those who rise to be counted (VIII, 3111, 3120). Such count is not subject to verification by appeal (Sept. 12, 1978, p. 28984; Mar. 8, 2006, p. 2954; Aug. 3, 2007, p. 22745; Mar. 18, 2010, p. _), and a request for a rising vote of those opposed to the demand is not in order (VIII, 3112-3114), and the Speaker may refuse to entertain a parliamentary inquiry regarding the number of Members counted by the Chair (Aug. 3, 2007, p. 22745). If the Chair prolongs the count of the House in determining whether one-fifth have supported the demand for yeas and nays, the Speaker counts latecomers in support of the demand as well as for the number present (Sept. 24, 1990, p. 25521). After the House, on a vote by tellers, has refused to order the yeas and nays it is too late to demand the count of the negative on an original vote (V, 6045). |
Sec. 79. Reconsideration of the vote ordering the yeas and nays. | A motion to reconsider the vote ordering the yeas and nays is in order (V, 6029; VIII, 2790), and the vote may be reconsidered by a majority. If the House votes to reconsider the yeas and nays may again be ordered by one-fifth (V, 5689-5691). But when the House, having reconsidered, again orders the yeas and nays, a second motion to reconsider may not be made (V, 6037). In one instance it was held that the yeas and nays might be demanded on a motion to reconsider the vote whereby the yeas and nays were ordered (V, 5689), but evidently there must be a limit to this process. |
Sec. 80. Effect of an order of the yeas and nays. | A motion to adjourn may be admitted after the yeas and nays are ordered and before the roll call has begun (V, 5366); and a motion to suspend the rules has been entertained after the yeas and nays have been demanded on another matter (V, 6835). Consideration of a conference report (V, 6457), and a motion to reconsider the vote by which the yeas and nays were ordered (V, 6029; VIII, 2790) may be admitted. A demand for tellers or for a division is not precluded or set aside by the fact that the yeas and nays are demanded and refused (V, 5998; VIII, 3103). |
Sec. 81. Decisions of the Court. | Decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States: Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649 (1892); United States v. Ballin, 144 U.S. 1 (1892); Twin City Bank v. Nebeker, 167 U.S. 196 (1897); Wilkes County v. Coler, 180 U.S. 506 (1901); Marshall v. Gordon, 243 U.S. 521 (1917). |
Sec. 82. Adjournment for more than three days or to another place. | \4\ Neither House, during the Session of Congress shall, without the Consent of the other, adjourn for more than three days, nor to any other Place than that in which the two Houses shall be sitting. |
Sec. 82a. Adjournment to another place. | The word ``Place'' in the above paragraph was construed to mean the seat of Government, and consent of the Senate is not required if the House orders its meetings to be held in another structure at the seat of Government (Speaker Rayburn, Aug. 17, 1949, pp. 11651, 11683). Under clause 12(d) of rule I, the Speaker may convene the House in a place within the District of Columbia, other than the Hall of the House, whenever, in the opinion of the Speaker, the public interest shall warrant it (Sec. 639, infra). The two Houses once granted joint leadership (or their designees) authority for an entire Congress to assemble the Congress at a place outside the District of Columbia whenever the public interest warranted it (H. Con. Res. 1, Feb. 13, 2003, p. 4080). The Speaker executed by letter his designation under that authority (Mar. 13, 2003, p. 6123). The House, but not the Senate, re-adopted similar concurrent resolutions in succeeding Congresses (H. Con. Res. 1, Jan. 4, 2005, p. 68; H. Con. Res. 1, Jan. 4, 2007, p. 42; H. Con. Res. 1, Jan. 6, 2009, p. 22); H. Con. Res. 1, Jan. 5, 2011, p. _); H. Con. Res. 1, Jan. 3, 2013, p. _). After September 11, 2001, recall authority carried in adjournment resolutions has allowed reassembly at such place as may be designated (see Sec. 84, infra). The President may convene Congress at places outside the seat of Government during hazardous circumstances (2 U.S.C. 27; Deschler, ch. 1, Sec. 4). |
Sec. 83. Adjournment of the House within the threeday limit. | The House of Representatives in adjourning for not more than three days must take into the count either the day of adjourning or the day of the meeting, but not Sundays (V, 6673, 6674). The House may provide for a session of the House on a Sunday, traditionally a ``dies non'' under the precedents of the House (e.g., Dec. 17, 1982, p. 31946; Nov. 17, 1989, p. 30029; Aug. 20, 1994, p. 23367). The House has by standing order provided that it should meet on two days only of each week instead of daily (V, 6675). Before the election of Speaker, the House has adjourned for more than one day (I, 89, 221). The House has by unanimous consent agreed to an adjournment for less than three days but specified that it would continue in adjournment for 10 days pursuant to a concurrent resolution already adopted by the House if the Senate adopted the concurrent resolution before the third day of the House's adjournment (Nov. 20, 1987, p. 33054). The Committee on Rules has reported a rule authorizing the Speaker to declare the House in recesses subject to calls of the Chair during five discrete periods, each consistent with the constitutional constraint that neither House adjourn (or recess) for more than three days without consent of the other House (Dec. 21, 1995, p. 38141; Jan. 5, 1996, p. 357). Clause 12(c) of rule I provides certain authorities for reconvening or postponing the time for reconvening during any recess or adjournment of not more than three days (see Sec. 639, infra). |
Sec. 84. Resolutions for adjournment of the two Houses. | Congress enables an adjournment for more than three days by a concurrent resolution (IV, 4031, footnote). When it adjourns in this way, but not to or beyond the day fixed by Constitution or law for the next regular session to begin, the session is not thereby necessarily terminated (V, 6676, 6677). At the close of the first session of the 66th Congress, the two Houses adjourned sine die under authority granted each House by simple resolutions consenting to such adjournment sine die at any time before a specified date (Nov. 19, 1919, p. 8810). |
Sec. 85. Compensation of Members. | Section 6. \1\ The Senators and Representatives shall receive a Compensation for their Services, to be ascertained by Law, and paid out of the Treasury of the United States. |
Sec. 86. Salary and deductions. | Under the Federal Salary Act of 1967 (2 U.S.C. 351-362), the Citizens' Commission on Public Service and Compensation (formerly the Commission on Executive, Legislative and Judicial Salaries) is authorized and directed to conduct quadrennial reviews of the rates of pay of specified government officials, including Members of Congress, and to report to the President the results of each review and its recommendations for adjustments in such rates. The enactment of those recommendations is governed by the Federal Salary Act (see Sec. 1130(12), infra). |
Sec. 87. Questions as to compensation. | Questions have arisen frequently as to compensation of Members especially in cases of Members elected to fill vacancies (I, 500; II, 1155) and in which there have been questions as to incompatible offices (I, 500) or claims to a seat (II, 1206). The Supreme Court has held that a Member chosen to fill a vacancy is entitled to salary only from the time that the compensation of the predecessor has ceased. Page v. United States, 127 U.S. 67 (1888); see also 2 U.S.C. 37. |
Sec. 88. Travel and Members' representational allowances. | In the 92d Congress, the provisions of H. Res. 457 of that Congress, authorizing the Committee on House Administration to adjust allowances of Members and committees without further action by the House, were enacted into permanent law (2 U.S.C. 57), but the 94th Congress enacted into permanent law H. Res. 1372 of that Congress, stripping the committee of that authority and requiring House approval of the committee's recommendations, except in cases made necessary by price changes in materials and supplies, technological advances in office equipment, and cost of living increases (2 U.S.C. 57a). The Committee on House Administration retains authority under 2 U.S.C. 57 to independently adjust amounts under certain conditions outlined in 2 U.S.C. 57a (Mar. 21, 1977, p. 8227; Apr. 21, 1983, p. 9339). The text of those statutes follow: |
Sec. 88a. Ban on Legislative Service Organizations. | At its organization the 104th Congress prohibited the establishment or continuation of any legislative service organization (as that term had been understood in the 103d Congress) and directed the Committee on House Administration to take such steps as were necessary to ensure an orderly termination and accounting for funds of any legislative service organization in existence on January 3, 1995 (sec. 222, H. Res. 6, Jan. 4, 1995, p. 477). |
Sec. 89. Leadership staff allowances. | Separate from the MRA specified above, the leaders of the House (the Speaker, Majority Leader, Minority Leader, Majority Whip, and Minority Whip) are entitled to office staffing allowances consisting of certain statutory positions as well as lump-sum appropriations authorized by section 473 of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970 (84 Stat. 1140). The portion of these allowances for leadership office personnel may be adjusted by the Clerk of the House in certain situations when the President effects a pay adjustment for certain classes of Federal employees under the Federal Pay Comparability Act of 1970 (P.L. 91-656; 84 Stat. 1946). |
Sec. 89a. Speaker's ``pay orders.'' | Under section 311(d) of the Legislative Branch Appropriations Act, 1988 [2 U.S.C. 60a-2a], the Speaker may issue ``pay orders'' that adjust pay levels for officers and employees of the House to maintain certain relationships with comparable levels in the Senate and in the other branches of government. For the text of section 311(d), see Sec. 1130(12), infra. |
Sec. 90. Privilege of Members from arrest. | * * * They [the Senators and Representatives] shall in all Cases, except Treason, Felony, and Breach of the Peace, be privileged from Arrest during their attendance at the Session of their respective Houses, and in going to and returning from the same; * * * |
Sec. 91. Assertions of privilege of Members by the House. | The word ``felony'' in this provision has been interpreted not to refer to a delinquency in a matter of debt (III, 2676), and ``treason, felony, and breach of the peace'' have been construed to mean all indictable crimes (III, 2673). The Supreme Court has held that the privilege does not apply to arrest in any criminal case. Williamson v. United States, 207 U.S. 425 (1908). The courts have discussed and sustained the privilege of the Member in going to and returning from the session (III, 2674); and where a person assaulted a Member on his way to the House, although |
Sec. 93. Scope of the privilege. | This privilege as to ``any speech or debate'' applies generally to ``things done in a session of the House by one of its Members in relation to the business before it.'' Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168 (1880), cited at III, 2675. See also II, 1655 and Sec. Sec. 301, 302, infra, for provisions in Jefferson's Manual on the privilege; and Deschler, ch. 7. Moreover, it applies to all acts within the ``legislative sphere,'' which includes matters that are ``an integral part of the deliberative and communicative processes by which Members participate in committee and House proceedings with respect to the consideration or passage or rejection of proposed legislation or with respect to other matters which the Constitution places within the jurisdiction of either House.'' Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 624, 625 (1972). The clause precludes judicial inquiry into the motivation, preparation, or content of a Member's speech on the floor and prevents such a speech from being made the basis for a criminal conspiracy charge against the Member. United States v. Johnson, 383 U.S. 169 (1966). The Supreme Court held in United States v. Helstoski, 442 U.S. 447 (1979), that under the Speech or Debate Clause, neither evidence of nor references to legislative acts of a Member of Congress may be introduced by the Government in a prosecution under the official bribery statute. But the Supreme Court has limited the scope of legislative activity that is protected under the clause by upholding grand jury inquiry into the possession and nonlegislative use of classified documents by a Member. Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606 (1972). The Court has also sustained the validity of an indictment of a Member for |
Sec. 94. Action by the House. | For assaulting a Member for words spoken in debate, Samuel Houston, not a Member, was arrested, tried, and censured by the House (II, 1616-1619). Where Members have assaulted other Members for words spoken in debate (II, 1656), or proceeded by duel (II, 1644), or demanded explanation in a hostile manner (II, 1644), the House has considered the cases as of privilege. A communication addressed to the House by an official in an Executive Department calling in question words uttered by a Member in debate was criticized as a breach of privilege and withdrawn (III, 2684). An explanation having been demanded of a Member by a person not a Member for a question asked of the latter when a witness before the House, the matter was considered but not pressed as a breach of privilege (III, 2681). A letter |
Sec. 95. Decisions of the Court. | Decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States: Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168 (1880); Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367 (1951); United States v. Johnson, 383 U.S. 169 (1966); Dombrowski v. Eastland, 387 U.S. 82 (1967); Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969); Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606 (1972); United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501 (1972); Doe v. McMillan, 412 U.S. 306 (1973); Eastland v. United States Serviceman's Fund, 421 U.S. 491 (1975); United States v. Helstoski, 442 U.S. 477 (1979); Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111 (1979); Helstoski v. Meanor, 442 U.S. 500 (1979). |
Sec. 96. Restriction on appointment of Members to office. | \2\ No Senator or Representative shall, during the Time for which he was elected, be appointed to any Civil Office under the Authority of the United States, which shall have been created, or the Emoluments whereof shall have been encreased during such time; * * *. |
Sec. 98. As to what are incompatible offices. | The Committee on the Judiciary has concluded that members of commissions created by law to investigate and report, but having no legislative, executive, or judicial powers, and visitors to academies, regents, directors, and trustees of public institutions, appointed under the law by the Speaker, are not officers within the meaning of the Constitution (I, 493). Membership on joint committees created by statute is not an office in the contemplation of the constitutional provision prohibiting Members of Congress from holding simultaneously other offices under the United States (VII, 2164). A Member of either House is eligible to appointment to any office not forbidden him by law, the duties of which are not incompatible with those of a Member (VI, 63) and the question as to whether a Member may be appointed to the Board of Managers of the Soldiers' Home and become local manager of one of the homes, is a matter for the decision of Congress itself (VI, 63). The House has also distinguished between the performance of paid services for the Executive (I, 495), like temporary service as assistant United States attorney (II, 993), and the acceptance of an incompatible office. The House has declined to hold that a contractor under the Government is constitutionally disqualified to serve as a Member (I, 496). But the House, or its committees, have found disqualified a Member who was appointed a militia officer in the District of Columbia (I, 486) and in various States (VI, 60), and Members who have accepted commissions in the Army (I, 491, 492, 494). But the Committee on the Judiciary has expressed the opinion that persons on the retired list of the Army do not hold office under the United States in the constitutional sense (I, 494). A Member-elect has continued to act as governor of a State after the assembling of the Congress to which he was elected (I, 503), but the duties of a Member of the House and the Governor of a State are absolutely inconsistent and may not be simultaneously discharged by the same Member (VI, 65).- |
Sec. 99. Appointment of Memberselect to offices under the United States. | The House decided that the status of a Member-elect was not affected by the constitutional requirement (I, 499), the theory being advanced that the status of the Member-elect is distinguished from the status of the Member who has qualified (I, 184). A Member-elect, who continued in an office after his election but resigned before taking his seat, was held entitled to the seat (I, 497, 498). However, when a Member-elect held an incompatible office after the meeting of Congress and his taking of the oath, he was held to have disqualified himself (I, 492). In other words, the Member-elect may defer until the meeting of Congress and his taking of the oath, his choice between the seat and an incompatible office (I, 492). As early as 1874 the Attorney General opined that a Member-elect is not officially a Member of the House, and thus may hold any office until sworn (14 Op. Att'y Gen. 408 (1874)). |
Sec. 100. Relation of contestants to incompatible offices. | The House has manifestly subscribed to the idea that a contestant holding an incompatible office need not make an election until the House has declared the contestant entitled to the seat (I, 505). Although a contestant had accepted and held a State office in violation of the State constitution, if he were really elected a Member, the House did not treat his contest as abated (II, 1003). Where a Member had been appointed to an incompatible office a contestant not found to be elected was not admitted to fill the vacancy (I, 807). |
Sec. 101. Procedure of the House when incompatible offices are accepted. | Where a Member has accepted an incompatible office, the House has assumed or declared the seat vacant (I, 501, 502; VI, 65). In the cases of Baker and Yell, the Elections Committee concluded that the acceptance of a commission as an officer of volunteers in the national army vacated the seat of a Member (I, 488), and in another similar case the Member was held to have forfeited his right to a seat (I, 490). The House has seated a person bearing regular credentials on ascertaining that his predecessor in the same Congress had accepted a military office (I, 572). But usually the House by resolution formally declares the seat vacant (I, 488, 492). A Member- elect may defer until the meeting of Congress and the taking of the oath of office the choice between the seat and an incompatible office (I, 492). But when he retains the incompatible office and does not qualify, a vacancy has been held to exist (I, 500). A resolution excluding a Member who has accepted an incompatible office may be agreed to by a majority vote (I, 490). A Member charged with acceptance of an incompatible office was heard in his own behalf during the debate (I, 486). |
Sec. 102. Bills raising revenue to originate in the House. | Section 7. \1\ All Bills for raising Revenue shall originate in the House of Representatives; but the Senate may propose or concur with Amendments as on other Bills. |
Sec. 103. Decisions of the Court. | Decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States: Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649 (1892); Twin City Bank v. Nebeker, 167 U.S. 196 (1897); Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., 220 U.S. 107 (1911); Millard v. Roberts, 202 U.S. 429 (1906); Rainey v. United States, 232 U.S. 310 (1914); United States v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385 (1990). |
Sec. 104. Approval and disapproval of bills by the President. | \2\ Every Bill which shall have passed the House of Representatives and the Senate, shall, before it become a Law, be presented to the President of the United States; If he approve he shall sign it, but if not he shall return it, with his Objections to that House in which it shall have originated, who shall enter the Objections at large on their Journal, and proceed to reconsider it. If after such Reconsideration two thirds of that House shall agree to pass the Bill, it shall be sent, together with the Objections, to the other House, by which it shall likewise be reconsidered, and if approved by two thirds of that House, it shall become a Law. But in all such Cases the Votes of both Houses shall be determined by Yeas and Nays, and the Names of the Persons voting for and against the Bill shall be entered on the Journal of each House respectively. * * *. |
Sec. 105. The act of approval. | Under the usual practice, bills are considered to have been presented to the President at the time they are delivered to the White House. In 1959, bills delivered to the White House while the President was abroad were held for presentation to the President upon his return to the United States by the White House. The United States Court of Claims held, in Eber Bros. Wine and Liquor Corp. v. United States, 337 F.2d 624 (1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 950 (1965), that where the President had determined, with the informal acquiescence of leaders of Congress, that bills from the Congress were to be received at the White House only for presentation to him upon his return to the United States and the bill delivered to the White House |
Sec. 106. Notice of approval sent by message. | Notice of the signature of a bill by the President is sent by message to the House in which it originated (VII, 1089) and that House informs the other (IV, 3429). But this notice is not necessary to the validity of the act (IV, 3495). Sometimes, at the close of a Congress the President informs the House of such bills as have been approved and of such as have been allowed to fail (IV, 3499-3502). In one instance he communicated his omission to sign a bill through the committee appointed to notify him that Congress was about to adjourn (IV, 3504). A bill that had not actually passed having been signed by the President, he disregarded it and a new bill was passed (IV, 3498). Messages of the President giving notice of bills approved are entered in the Journal and published in the Congressional Record (V, 6593). |
Sec. 107. Disapproval (or veto) of bills. | A message withholding approval of a bill, called a veto message, is sent to the House in which the bill originated; but it has been held that such a message may not be returned to the President on his request after it has been laid before the Senate (IV, 3521). In one instance a veto message that had not been laid before the House was returned to the President on his request (Aug. 1, 1946, p. 10651). A vetoed bill received in the House by way of the Senate is considered as if received directly from the President and |
Sec. 108. Consideration of a vetoed bill in the House. | It is possible, although not invariable, that a bill returned with the objections of the President shall be voted on at once (IV, 3534-3536) and when laid before the House the question on the passage is considered as pending and no motion from the floor is required (VII, 1097-1099), but it has been held that the constitutional mandate that the House shall ``proceed to reconsider'' means that the House shall immediately proceed to consider it under the Rules of the House, such that the ordinary motions under the Rules of the House (e.g., to refer or to postpone to a day certain) are in order (IV, 3542-3550; VII, 1100, 1105, 1113; Speaker Wright, Aug. 3, 1988, p. 20280) and (for the stated examples) debatable under the hour rule (VIII, 2740). When consideration of a veto message is postponed to a date certain it has the status of unfinished business on that day, such that the House may proceed to its consideration without motion from the floor (e.g., May 9, 1996, p. 10807; Nov. 6, 2007, pp. 29822, 29823). Although under clause 4 of rule XVI, and under the precedents the motion for the previous question takes precedence over motions to postpone or to refer when a question is under debate, if the Speaker has laid before the House a veto message from the President but has not yet stated the question to be on overriding the veto, that question is not ``under debate'' and the motion for the previous question does not take precedence (Speaker Wright, Aug. 3, 1988; Procedure, ch. 24, Sec. 15.8). A resolution asserting that to recognize for a motion to refer a veto message before stating the question on overriding the veto would interfere with the constitutional prerogative of the House to proceed to that question, and directing the Speaker to state the question on overriding the veto as pending before recognizing for a motion to refer, did not give rise to a question of the privileges of the House (Speaker Wright, Aug. 3, 1988, p. 20281). A motion to refer a vetoed bill, either with or without the message, has been held allowable within the constitutional mandate that the House shall ``proceed to reconsider'' (IV, 3550; VII, 1104, 1105, 1108, 1114), and in the 101st Congress, a veto pending as unfinished business was referred with instructions to consider and report promptly (Jan. 24, 1990, p. 421). But although the ordinary motion to refer may be applied to a vetoed bill, it is not in order to move to recommit it pending the demand for the previous question or after it is ordered (IV, 3551; VII, 1102). When a veto message is before the House for consideration de novo or as unfinished business, a motion to refer the |
Sec. 109. Action on a vetoed bill. | If two-thirds of the House to which a bill is returned with the President's objections agree to pass it, and then two-thirds of the other House also agree, it becomes a law (IV, 3520). The yeas and nays are required to pass a bill over the President's veto (art. I, sec. 7; IV, 2726, 3520; VII, 1110). The two-thirds vote required to pass the bill is two-thirds of the Members present and voting and not two-thirds of the total membership of the House (IV, 3537, 3538; Missouri Pac. Ry. Co. v. Kansas, 248 U.S. 276 (1919)). Only Members voting should be considered in determining whether two-thirds voted in the affirmative (VII, 1111). The motion to reconsider may not be applied to the vote on reconsideration of a bill returned with the objections of the President (V, 5644; VIII, 2778). |
Sec. 110. Errors in bills sent to the President. | A bill incorrectly enrolled has been recalled from the President, who erased his signature (IV, 3506). Bills sent to the President but not yet signed by him are sometimes recalled by concurrent resolution of the two Houses (IV, 3507-3509; VII, 1091; Sept. 4, 1962, p. 18405; May 6, 1974, p. 13076), and amended; but this proceeding is regarded as irregular (IV, 3510-3518). When the two Houses of Congress request the President by concurrent resolution to return an enrolled bill and the President honors the request, the ten-day period under this clause runs anew from the time the bill is re-enrolled and is again presented to the President. Thus, in the 93d Congress the |
Sec. 110a. Decisions of the Court. | Decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States: Matthews v. Zane, 20 U.S. (7 Wheat.) 164 (1822); Gardner v. Collector, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 499 (1868); Lapeyre v. United States, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 191 (1873); La Abra Silver Mining Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 423 (1899); Missouri Pacific Railway Co. v. Kansas, 248 U.S. 276 (1919); Edwards v. United States, 286 U.S. 482 (1932); Wright v. United States, 302 U.S. 583 (1938); Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417 (1998). |
Sec. 111. Bills that become laws without the President's approval. | * * * If any Bill shall not be returned by the President within ten Days (Sundays excepted) after it shall have been presented to him, the Same shall be a Law, in like Manner as if he had signed it, unless the Congress by their Adjournment prevent its Return, in which Case it shall not be a Law. |
Sec. 112. The pocket veto. | A bill that is passed by both Houses of Congress during the first regular session of a Congress and presented to the President less than 10 days (Sundays excepted) before the adjournment sine die of that session, but is neither signed by the President, nor returned to the House in which it originated, does not become a law (``The Pocket Veto Case,'' 279 U.S. 655 (1929); VII, 1115). The Supreme Court has held that the adjournment of the House of origin for not exceeding three days while the other branch of the Congress remained in session did not prevent a return of the vetoed bill to the House of origin. Wright v. United States, 302 U.S. 583 (1938). President Truman during an adjournment to a day certain pocket vetoed several bills passed by the 81st Congress and also, after the convening of the 82d Congress, pocket vetoed one bill passed in the 81st Congress. |
Sec. 113. Effect of adjournment to a day certain. | Doubt has existed as to whether a bill that remains with the President 10 days without his signature, Congress meanwhile before the tenth day having adjourned to a day certain, becomes a law (IV, 3483, 3496; VII, 1115); an opinion of the Attorney General in 1943 stated that under such circumstances a bill not signed by the President did not become a law (40 Op. Att'y Gen. 274 (1943)). However, more recently, where a Member of the Senate challenged in Federal court the effectiveness of such a pocket veto, a United States Court of Appeals held that a Senate bill could not be pocket-vetoed by the President during an ``intrasession'' adjournment of Congress to a day certain for more than three days, where the Secretary of the Senate had been authorized to receive Presidential messages during such adjournment. Kennedy v. Sampson, 511 F.2d 430 (D.C. Cir., 1974). See also Kennedy v. Jones, 412 F. Supp. 353 (D.D.C. 1976). Following a consent decree in this case, it was announced that President Ford would utilize a ``return'' veto, subject to override, in intersession and intrasession adjournments where authority exists for the appropriate House to receive such messages notwithstanding the adjournment. |
Sec. 114. Decisions of the Court. | Decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States: La Abra Silver Mining Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 423 (1899); Wilkes County v. Coler, 180 U.S. 506 (1901); the Pocket Veto Case, 279 U.S. 655 (1929); Edwards v. United States, 286 U.S. 482 (1932); Wright v. United States, 302 U.S. 583 (1938); Burke v. Barnes, 479 U.S. 361 (1987) (vacating and remanding as moot the decision sub nom. Barnes v. Kline, 759 F.2d 21 (D.C. Cir. 1984)). |
Sec. 115. As to presentation of orders and resolutions for approval. | \3\ Every Order, Resolution, or Vote to which the Concurrence of the Senate and House of Representatives may be necessary (except on a question of Adjournment) shall be presented to the President of the United States; and before the Same shall take Effect, shall be approved by him, or being disapproved by him, shall be repassed by two thirds of the Senate and House of Representatives, according to the Rules and Limitations prescribed in the Case of a Bill. |
Sec. 116. Decisions of the Court. | Decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States: Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649 (1892); United States v. Ballin, 144 U.S. 1 (1892); Fourteen Diamond Rings v. United States, 183 U.S. 176 (1901); INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983); Process Gas Consumer's Group v. Consumer Energy Council of America 463 U.S. 1216 (1983). |
Sec. 117. The revenue power. |
Section 8. The Congress shall
have Power \1\ To lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to
pay the Debts and provide for the common Defence and general Welfare of
the United States; but all Duties, Imposts and Excises shall be uniform
throughout the United States;
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Sec. 119. Power over commerce. | \3\ To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes; |
Sec. 120. Naturalization and bankruptcy. |
\4\ To establish an
uniform Rule of Naturalization, and uniform Laws on the subject of
Bankruptcies throughout the United States;
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Sec. 122. Counterfeiting. |
\6\ To provide for the Punishment
of counterfeiting the Securities and current Coin of the United States;-
-
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Sec. 124. Patents and copyrights. |
\8\ To promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to
Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings
and Discoveries;
< |
Sec. 128. War powers of Congress and the President. | The 93d Congress passed over the President's veto Public Law 93- 148, relating to the power of Congress to declare war under this clause and the power of the President as Commander in Chief under article II, section 2, clause 1. The law requires that the President report to Congress on the introduction of United States Armed Forces in the absence of a declaration of war. The President must terminate use of the Armed Forces unless Congress, within 60 calendar days after a report is submitted or is required to be submitted, (1) declares war or authorizes use of the Armed Forces; (2) extends by law the 60-day period; or (3) is physically unable to meet as result of armed attack. The Act also provided that Congress could adopt a concurrent resolution requiring the removal of Armed Forces engaged in foreign hostilities, a provision that should be read in light of INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983). Sections 6 and 7 of the Act provide congressional procedures for joint resolutions, bills, and concurrent resolutions introduced pursuant to the provisions of the Act (see Sec. 1130(2), infra). For further discussion of that Act, and war powers generally, see Deschler, ch. 13. |
Sec. 129. Raising and support of armies. |
\12\ To raise and
support Armies, but no Appropriation of Money to that Use shall be for a
longer Term than two Years;
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Sec. 132. Calling out the militia. | \15\ To provide for calling forth the Militia to execute the Laws of the Union, suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions; |
Sec. 133. Power over militia. | \16\ To provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining, the Militia, and for governing such Part of them as may be employed in the Service of the United States, reserving to the States respectively, the Appointment of the Officers, and the Authority of training the Militia according to the discipline prescribed by Congress; |
Sec. 134. Power over territory of the United States. | \17\ To exercise exclusive Legislation in all Cases whatsoever, over such District (not exceeding ten Miles square) as may, by Cession of particular States, and the Acceptance of Congress, become the Seat of the Government of the United States, and to exercise like Authority over all Places purchased by the Consent of the Legislature of the State in which the Same shall be, for the Erection of Forts, Magazines, Arsenals, dock-Yards, and other needful Buildings;--And |
Sec. 135. Congressional authority over the District of Columbia. | Congress has provided by law that ``all that part of the territory of the United States included within the present limits of the District of Columbia shall be the permanent seat of government of the United States'' (4 U.S.C. 71). Pursuant to its authority under this clause, Congress provided in 1970 for the people of the District of Columbia to be represented in the House of Representatives by a Delegate and for a Commission to report to the Congress on the organization of the government of the District of Columbia (P.L. 91-405; 84 Stat. 845). For the powers and duties of the Delegate from the District of Columbia, see rule III (Sec. 675, infra) and Deschler, ch. 7, Sec. 3. In 1973, Congress passed the District of Columbia Self-Government and Governmental Reorganization Act, which reorganized the |
Sec. 135a. Decisions of the Court. | Decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States: Hepburn v. Ellzey, 6 U.S. 445 (1805); National Mutual Insurance Co. of D.C. v. Tidewater Transfer Co, 337 U.S. 582 (1945). |
Sec. 137. Migration or importation of persons. | Section 9. \1\ The Migration or Importation of such Persons as any of the States now existing shall think proper to admit, shall not be prohibited by the Congress prior to the Year one thousand eight hundred and eight, but a Tax or duty may be imposed on such Importation, not exceeding ten dollars for each Person. |
Sec. 138. Writ of habeas corpus. |
\2\ The Privilege of the
Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of
Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it.
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Sec. 140. Capitation and direct taxes. | \4\ [No Capitation, or other direct, tax shall be laid, unless in Proportion to the Census or Enumeration herein before directed to be taken.] |
Sec. 141. Export duties. | This provision was changed in 1913 by the 16th amendment. \5\ No Tax or Duty shall be laid on Articles exported from any State. |
Sec. 142. Freedom of commerce. | \6\ No Preference shall be given by any Regulation of Commerce or Revenue to the Ports of one State over those of another: nor shall Vessels bound to, or from, one State, be obliged to enter, clear, or pay Duties in another. |
Sec. 143. Appropriations and accounting of public money. | \7\ No Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence of Appropriations made by Law; and a regular Statement and Account of the Receipts and Expenditures of all public Money shall be published from time to time. |
Sec. 144. Titles of nobility and gifts from foreign states. | \8\ No Title of Nobility shall be granted by the United States: And no Person holding any Office of Profit or Trust under them, shall, without the Consent of the Congress, accept of any present, Emolument, Office, or Title, of any kind whatever, from any King, Prince, or foreign State. |
Sec. 145. Foreign gifts and decorations. | Consent has been granted to officers and employees of the government, under enumerated conditions, to accept certain gifts and decorations from foreign governments (see 5 U.S.C. 7342). The adoption of this act largely has obviated the practice of passing private bills to permit the officer or employee to retain the award. However, where the Speaker (who was one of the officers empowered by an earlier law to approve retention of decorations by Members of the House) was himself tendered an award from a foreign government, a private law (Private Law 91-244) was enacted to permit him to accept |
Sec. 146. States not to make treaties, coin money, pass ex post facto laws, impair contracts, etc. | Section 10. \1\ No State shall enter into any Treaty, Alliance, or Confederation; grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal; coin Money; emit Bills of Credit; make any Thing but gold and silver Coin a Tender in Payment of Debts; pass any Bill of Attainder, ex post facto Law, or Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts, or grant any Title of Nobility. |
Sec. 147. States not to lay imposts or duties. | \2\ No State shall, without the Consent of the Congress, lay any Imposts or Duties on Imports or Exports, except what may be absolutely necessary for executing it's inspection Laws: and the net Produce of all Duties and Imposts, laid by any State on Imports or Exports, shall be for the Use of the Treasury of the United States; and all such Laws shall be subject to the Revision and Controul of the Congress. |
Sec. 148. States not to lay tonnage taxes, make compacts, or go to war. | \3\ No State shall, without the Consent of Congress, lay any Duty of Tonnage, keep Troops, or Ships of War in time of Peace, enter into any Agree |