[Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: William J. Clinton (1999, Book I)]
[March 3, 1999]
[Pages 291-299]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office www.gpo.gov]
[[Page 291]]
Letter to Congressional Leaders Reporting on Iraq's Compliance With
United Nations Security Council Resolutions
March 3, 1999
Dear Mr. Speaker: (Dear Mr. President:)
Consistent with the Authorization for Use of Military Force Against
Iraq Resolution (Public Law 102-1) and as part of my effort to keep the
Congress fully informed, I am reporting on the status of efforts to
obtain Iraq's compliance with the resolutions adopted by the United
Nations Security Council (UNSC). My last report, consistent with Public
Law 102-1, was transmitted on December 18, 1998.
Overview
As stated in my December 18 report, on December 16, United States
and British forces launched military strikes on Iraq (Operation Desert
Fox) to degrade Iraq's capacity to develop and deliver weapons of mass
destruction (WMD) and to degrade its ability to threaten its neighbors.
The decision to use force was made after U.N. Special Commission
(UNSCOM) Executive Chairman Richard Butler
reported to the U.N. Secretary General on
December 14, that Iraq was not cooperating fully with the Commission and
that it was ``not able to conduct the substantive disarmament work
mandated to it by the Security Council.''
The build-up to the current crisis began on August 5 when the Iraqi
government suspended cooperation with UNSCOM and the International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), except on a limited-range of monitoring
activities. On October 31, Iraq announced that it was ceasing all
cooperation with UNSCOM. In response to this decision, the Security
Council on November 5 unanimously adopted Resolution 1205, which
condemned Iraq's decision as a ``flagrant violation'' of the Gulf War
cease-fire Resolution 687 and other relevant resolutions. Resolution
1205 also demanded that Iraq immediately rescind both its October 31
decision and its decision of August 5. This came after the passage on
March 3, 1998, of Resolution 1154, warning Iraq that the ``severest
consequences'' would result from Iraq's failure to cooperate with the
implementation of Resolution 687.
Iraq ignored the Security Council's demands until November 14, when
U.S. and British forces prepared to launch air strikes on Iraq. Baghdad
initially tried to impose unacceptable conditions on its offer of
resumption of cooperation; however, the United States and Great Britain
insisted on strict compliance with all relevant Security Council
resolutions.
Subsequently, Iraq agreed in writing in letters to the U.N.
Secretary General to rescind its August 5 and October 31 decisions and
to resume full cooperation with UNSCOM and the IAEA in accordance with
Security Council resolutions. Iraq informed the Security Council on
November 14 that it was the ``clear and unconditional decision of the
Iraqi government to resume cooperation with UNSCOM and the IAEA.''
On November 15, the Security Council issued a statement in which it
stressed that Iraq's commitment ``needs to be established by
unconditional and sustained cooperation with the Special Commission and
the IAEA in exercising the full range of their activities provided for
in their mandates.''
UNSCOM and the IAEA resumed their full range of activities on
November 17, but Iraq repeatedly violated its commitment of cooperation.
As Chairman Butler's report of December 14
details, Iraq has, over the course of the last 8 years, refused to
provide the key documents and critical explanations about its prohibited
weapons programs in response to UNSCOM's outstanding requests. It
refused to allow removal of missile engine components, denied access to
missile test data, restricted photography of bombs, and endangered the
safety of inspectors by aggressively maneuvering a helicopter near them.
Iraq failed to provide requested access to archives and effectively
blocked UNSCOM from visiting a site on November 25.
On December 4 and again on December 11, Iraq further restricted
UNSCOM's activities by asserting that certain teams could not inspect on
Fridays, the Muslim sabbath, despite 7 years of doing so and the fact
that other inspection teams' activities were not restricted on Fridays.
Iraq blocked access to offices of the ruling Ba'ath Party on December 9,
which UNSCOM held ``solid evidence'' contained prohibited materials.
Iraq routinely removed documents from
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facilities prior to inspection, and initiated new forms of restrictions
on UNSCOM's work. We also have information that Iraq ordered the
military to destroy WMD-related documents in anticipation of the UNSCOM
inspections.
Iraq's actions were a material breach of the Gulf War cease-fire
resolution (UNSC Resolution 687), the February 23, 1998, Annan-Aziz
Memorandum of Understanding, and Iraq's November 14 commitment to the
Security Council. The threat to the region posed by Iraq's refusal to
cooperate unconditionally with UNSCOM, and the consequent inability of
UNSCOM to carry out the responsibilities the Security Council entrusted
to it, could not be tolerated. These circumstances led the United States
and the United Kingdom to use military force to degrade Iraq's capacity
to threaten its neighbors through the development of WMD and long-range
delivery systems. During Desert Fox, key WMD sites and the facilities of
the organizations that conceal them, as well as important missile repair
facilities and surface-to-air missile sites, were attacked. Operation
Desert Fox degraded Saddam's ability to threaten his neighbors
militarily.
UNSCOM and IAEA inspectors withdrew from Iraq on December 15 when
Chairman Butler reported that inspectors were not able to conduct the
substantive disarmament work required of UNSCOM by the Security Council.
The United States continues to support UNSCOM and the IAEA as the agreed
mechanisms for Iraq to demonstrate its compliance with UNSC resolutions
concerning disarmament.
Since December 18, the Security Council has discussed next steps on
Iraq. It decided on January 30 to establish three assessment panels to
address disarmament issues, humanitarian issues, and Kuwait-related
issues. The panels, under the chairmanship of the Brazilian Ambassador
to the United Nations, are due to complete
their reviews by April 15.
The United States also continues to support the international
community's efforts to provide for the humanitarian needs of the Iraqi
people through the ``oil-for-food'' program. On November 24, 1998, the
Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 1210 establishing a new
6-month phase (phase five) of the oil-for-food program (phase four ended
November 25). In January, the United States announced its support for
lifting the ceiling on oil sales under the oil-for-food program so that
Iraqi civilian humanitarian needs can better be met.
As long as Saddam Hussein remains in
power, he represents a threat to the well-being of his people, the peace
of the region, and the security of the world. We will continue to
contain the threat he poses, but over the long term the best way to
address that threat is through a new government in Baghdad. To that end,
we--working with the Congress--are deepening our engagement with the
forces for change in Iraq to help make the opposition a more effective
voice for the aspirations of the Iraqi people. Our efforts are discussed
in more detail below.
U.S. and Coalition Force Levels in the Gulf Region
Saddam's record of aggressive behavior
compels us to retain a highly capable force in the region in order to
deter Iraq and deal with any threat it might pose to its neighbors, the
reconstitution of its WMD program, or movement against the Kurds in
northern Iraq. We demonstrated our resolve in mid-December when forces
in the region carried out Operation Desert Fox to degrade Iraq's ability
to develop and deliver weapons of mass destruction and its ability to
threaten its neighbors. We will continue to maintain a robust posture
and have established a rapid reinforcement capability to supplement our
forces in the Gulf, if needed.
Our forces in the region include land and carrier-based aircraft,
surface warships, a Marine Expeditionary unit, a Patriot missile
battalion, a mechanized battalion task force, and a mix of special
operations forces deployed in support of U.S. Central Command. To
enhance force protection throughout the region, additional military
security personnel are also deployed. Because of the increased air-
defense threat to coalition aircraft, we have also added a robust
personnel recovery capability.
Operation Northern Watch and Operation Southern Watch
The United States and coalition partners continue to enforce the no-
fly zones over Iraq through Operation Northern Watch and Operation
Southern Watch. Since December 23, following the conclusion of Desert
Fox, we have seen a significant increase in the frequency, intensity,
and coordination of the Iraqi air defense system to counter enforcement
of the no-fly zones. Since that date, U.S. and coalition aircraft
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enforcing the no-fly zones have been subject to multiple anti-aircraft
artillery (AAA) firings, radar illuminations, and over 20 surface-to-air
missile attacks. Subsequent to Desert Fox, Iraq significantly increased
its air defense presence in both the north and south, but it has since
returned to pre-Desert Fox levels. Despite the decrease, however, Iraq
has not ceased threatening coalition aircraft.
In response to Iraq's increased and repeated no-fly zone violations,
and in coordination with the Secretary of Defense's advice, our aircrews have been authorized by me to respond
to the increased Iraqi threat. United States and coalition forces can
defend themselves against any Iraqi threat in carrying out their no-fly
zone enforcement mission. On over 50 occasions since December, U.S. and
coalition forces have engaged the Iraqi integrated air defense system.
As a consequence, the Iraqi air defense system has been degraded
substantially further since December.
The Maritime Interception Force
The multinational Maritime Interception Force (MIF), operating in
accordance with Resolution 665 and other relevant resolutions, enforces
U.N. sanctions in the Gulf. The U.S. Navy is the single largest
component of the MIF, but it is frequently augmented by ships, aircraft,
and other support from Australia, Belgium, Canada, Kuwait, The
Netherlands, New Zealand, the UAE, and the United Kingdom. Member states
of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) provide logistical support and
shipriders to the MIF and accept vessels diverted for violating U.N.
sanctions against Iraq. Kuwait was especially helpful providing
significant naval and coast guard assistance. Additionally, they
accepted over 15 diverted sanctions violators.
Although refined petroleum products leaving Iraq comprise most of
the prohibited traffic, the MIF has intercepted a growing number of
ships smuggling prohibited items into Iraq in violation of U.N.
sanctions and outside the parameters of the humanitarian oil-for-food
program. In early December, the MIF conducted the latest in a series of
periodic surge operations in the far northern Gulf near the major Iraqi
waterways. These operations disrupted smuggling in the region. Kuwait
and the UAE have stepped up their own enforcement efforts. Although
partially repaired and back on line, damage to the Basra refinery
inflicted during Desert Fox had a significant impact on Iraq's gas and
oil smuggling operations in the Gulf.
In December 1998, Iraq relocated surface-to-surface missile
batteries to the coastal area of the Al Faw Peninsula. The missiles in
question, with a range of nearly 60 nautical miles, could reach far into
the North Arabian Gulf and posed a serious threat to the MIF. The
deployment of these missiles to a position from which they could engage
coalition naval forces was carried out in concert with the increased
attempts to shoot down aircraft enforcing the no-fly zones and
constituted an enhancement of Iraq's military capability in southern
Iraq. Coalition aircraft responded with air strikes to the threat posed
by these missiles and are authorized to continue to do so as necessary.
Chemical Weapons
After Iraq's November 15, 1998, pledge of unconditional cooperation
with weapons inspectors, UNSCOM began to test the Iraqi promise. In a
November 25 letter, Iraq continued to deny that it ever weaponized VX
nerve agent or produced stabilized VX, despite UNSCOM's publicly stated
confidence in the Edgewood Arsenal Laboratory finding of stabilized VX
components in fragments of Iraqi SCUD missile warheads. Iraq alleges
that the presence of VX was a deliberate act of tampering with the
samples examined in the United States.
On November 26, Iraq agreed to cooperate with UNSCOM efforts to
determine the disposition of 155mm shells filled with mustard chemical
agent, and UNSCOM agreed to proceed with such an effort when
logistically possible. Iraq also agreed to cooperate in verifying the
tail assemblies of R-400 bombs, and in determining the precise locations
of pits that had been used for the field storage of special warheads at
Fallujah Forest and the Tigris Canal.
On November 30, the Iraqis failed to meet a deadline to provide
various documents Chairman Butler requested
pertaining to Iraq's chemical weapons program. Included in this request
was the Iraqi Air Force file of documents found previously by UNSCOM
inspectors that details chemical weapons expended during the Iran-Iraq
war. We understand that UNSCOM believes the file indicates that Iraq's
official declarations to UNSCOM have greatly overstated the quantities
of chemical weapons expended, which means that at least 6,000 chemical
weapons are unaccounted.
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In a January 25, 1999, report to the U.N. Security Council
President, UNSCOM identified as a priority chemical weapons disarmament
issues: VX, the 155mm mustard shells; the Iraqi Air Force file of
chemical weapons documents; R-400 bombs filled with CBW (field
inspections needed); and chemical weapons production equipment (field
verification is needed for 18 of 20 shipping containers UNSCOM knows
were moved together). On monitoring, the report identified as priorities
the ability to verify Iraqi compliance at listed facilities and to
detect construction of new dual-use facilities.
Biological Weapons
Iraq has failed to provide a credible explanation for UNSCOM tests
that found anthrax in fragments of seven SCUD missile warheads. Iraq has
been claiming since 1995 that it put anthrax in only five such warheads,
and had previously denied weaponizing anthrax at all. Iraq's
explanations to date are far from satisfactory, although it now
acknowledges putting both anthrax and botulinum toxin into some number
of warheads.
Iraq's biological weapons (BW) program--including SCUD missile BW
warheads, R-400 BW bombs, drop-tanks to be filled with BW, spray devices
for BW, production of BW agents (anthrax, botulinum toxin, aflatoxin,
and wheat cover smut), and BW agent growth media--remains the ``black
hole'' described by Chairman Butler. Iraq has
consistently failed to provide a credible account of its efforts to
produce and weaponize its BW agents.
During the period November 17 to December 2, 1998, an undeclared
Class II Biosafety Cabinet and some filter presses were discovered;
these items are subject to declarations by Iraq and biological
monitoring.
On November 18 and 20, Chairman Butler
again asked Iraq's Deputy Prime Minister for information concerning
Iraq's biological weapons programs. Iraq has supplied none of the
information requested.
In the January 25, 1999, report to the U.N. Security Council
President, UNSCOM identified as a priority biological weapons
disarmament issue Iraq's incomplete declarations on ``the whole scope of
the BW program.'' The declarations are important because ``Iraq
possesses an industrial capability and knowledge base, through which
biological warfare agents could be produced quickly and in volume.'' The
report also identified the importance of monitoring dual-use biological
items, equipment, facilities, research, and acquisition at 250 listed
sites. The effectiveness of monitoring is ``proportional to Iraq's
cooperation and transparency, to the number of monitored sites, and to
the number of inspectors.''
Long-Range Missiles
Iraq's past practices of (1) refusing to discuss further its system
for concealment of longer range missiles and their components, (2)
refusing to provide credible evidence of its disposition of large
quantities of the unique fuel required for the long-range SCUD missile,
and (3) continuing to test modifications to SA-2 VOLGA surface-to-air
missile components appear intended to enhance Iraq's capability to
produce a surface-to-surface missile of range greater than its permitted
range of 150 km.
While UNSCOM believes it can account for 817 of 819 imported Soviet-
made SCUD missiles, Iraq has refused to give UNSCOM a credible
accounting of the indigenous program that produced complete SCUD
missiles that were both successfully test-flown and delivered to the
Iraqi Army.
In its January 25, 1999, report to the U.N. Security Council
President, UNSCOM identified the following as priority missile
disarmament issues: 50 unaccounted SCUD conventional warheads; 500 tons
of SCUD propellants, the destruction of which has not been verified; 7
Iraqi-produced SCUDs given to the army, the destruction of which cannot
be verified; truckloads of major components for SCUD production that are
missing; the concealment of BW warheads; and the lack of accounting for
VX-filled war-heads. The report identified as priorities the capability
to monitor declared activities, leaps in missile technology, and changes
to declared operational missiles. There are 80 listed missile sites.
Nuclear Weapons
After Iraq unconditionally rescinded its declarations of
noncooperation on November 15, the IAEA began to test the Iraqi pledge
of full cooperation. The IAEA Director General Mohammed El-Baradei's December 14 report on Iraqi cooperation
stated: ``The Iraqi counterpart has provided the necessary level of
cooperation to enable the above-enumerated activities [ongoing
monitoring] to be completed efficiently
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and effectively.'' In its 6-month report to the Security Council on
October 7, the IAEA stated that it had a ``technically coherent'' view
of the Iraqi nuclear program. At that time, the IAEA also stated its
remaining questions about Iraq's nuclear program can be dealt with
within IAEA's ongoing monitoring and verification (OMV) effort. In the
IAEA's February 8 report to the U.N. Security Council it reiterated this
position.
Nonetheless, Iraq has not yet supplied information in response to
the Security Council's May 14 Presidential Statement. This statement
noted that the IAEA continues to have questions and concerns regarding
foreign assistance, abandonment of the program, and the extent of Iraqi
progress in weapons design. Iraq has also not passed penal legislation
prohibiting nuclear-related activities contrary to Resolution 687.
In a February 8, 1999, report to the U.N. Secretary Council
President, IAEA Director General Mohammed El-Baradei summarized previous IAEA assessments of Iraq's compliance
with its nuclear disarmament and monitoring obligations. The report
restates that ``Iraq has not fulfilled its obligation to adopt measures
and enact penal laws, to implement and enforce compliance with Iraq's
obligations under Resolutions 687 and 707, other relevant Security
Council resolutions and the IAEA OMV plan, as required under paragraph
34 of that plan.'' The IAEA states that the three areas where questions
on Iraq's nuclear disarmament remain (lack of technical documentation,
lack of information on external assistance to Iraq's clandestine nuclear
weapons program, and lack of information on Iraq's abandonment of its
nuclear weapons program) would not prevent the full implementation of
its OMV plan.
The IAEA continues to plan for long-term monitoring and verification
under Resolution 715. In its February 8 report, the IAEA restated that
monitoring must be ``intrusive'' and estimated annual monitoring costs
would total nearly $10 million.
Dual-Use Imports
Resolution 1051 established a joint UNSCOM/IAEA unit to monitor
Iraq's imports of allowed dual-use items. Iraq must notify the unit
before it imports specific items that can be used in both weapons of
mass destruction and civilian applications. Similarly, U.N. members must
provide timely notification of exports to Iraq of such dual-use items.
Following the withdrawal of UNSCOM and IAEA monitors, there is no
monitoring of dual-use items inside Iraq. This factor has presented new
challenges for the U.N. Sanctions Committee and is taken into
consideration in the approval process.
The U.N.'s ``Oil-for-Food'' Program
We continue to support the international community's efforts to
provide for the humanitarian needs of the Iraqi people through the oil-
for-food program. Transition from phase four to phase five (authorized
by U.N. Security Council Resolution 1210) was smooth. As in phase four,
Iraq is again authorized to sell up to $5.2 billion worth of oil every
180 days. However, because of a drop in world oil prices, Iraq was only
able to pump and sell approximately $3.1 billion worth of oil during
phase four. Since the first deliveries under oil-for-food began in March
1997, food worth $2.75 billion, and over $497 million worth of medicine
and health supplies have been delivered to Iraq.
As of January 19, under phase four of the oil-for-food program,
contracts for the purchase of over $2.3 billion worth of humanitarian
goods for the Iraqi people have been presented to the U.N. Office of the
Iraq Program for review by the Sanctions Committee; of these, contracts
worth over $1.6 billion have been approved; most of the remaining
contracts are being processed by the Office of the Iraq Program. As of
February 4, the United States had approved 584 contracts in phase four
and had placed 28 on hold pending clarification of questions about the
proposed contracts.
With regard to funds set aside for imports of parts and equipment to
increase oil exports, as of February 4, 333 contracts with a total value
of nearly $178 million have been approved; 94 contracts are on hold. In
January, the United States released a number of holds on oil spare parts
contracts. Up to $300 million had been set aside in phase four of the
oil-for-food program to pay for spare parts and equipment to increase
Iraqi oil exports and thus increase available humanitarian funding. The
United States had requested holds on contracts that did not directly
boost oil exports. As the current phase of oil-for-food again sets aside
$300 million for this purpose, the United States decided to remove holds
on lower priority contracts.
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The Security Council met in January to discuss the humanitarian
situation in Iraq. The United States supported an examination of the
current situation and exploration of ways to improve the humanitarian
situation, particularly with regard to vulnerable groups such as
children under age five, and pregnant and nursing women. The United
States has expressed its support for lifting the cap on Iraqi oil
exports under the oil-for-food program, and has suggested some
streamlining of approval of food and medicine contracts in the U.N.
Sanctions Committee.
Three assessment panels are being formed to look at Iraqi
disarmament, the humanitarian situation in Iraq, and Iraq's obligations
regarding Kuwait. The panels are expected to complete their work by the
middle of April.
Resolution 1210 maintains a separate oil-for-food program for
northern Iraq, administered directly by the United Nations in
consultation with the local population. This program, which the United
States strongly supports, receives 13 to 15 percent of the funds
generated under the oil-for-food program. The separate northern program
was established because of the Baghdad regime's proven disregard for the
humanitarian needs of the Kurdish, Assyrian, and Turkomen minorities of
northern Iraq, and its readiness to apply the most brutal forms of
repression against them. In northern Iraq, where Baghdad does not
exercise control, the oil-for-food program has been able to operate
relatively effectively. The Kurdish factions are setting aside their
differences to work together so that Resolution 1210 is implemented as
efficiently as possible.
The United Nations is required to monitor carefully implementation
of all aspects of the oil-for-food program. The current phase marked by
Resolution 1210 anticipates infrastructure repairs in areas such as oil
export capacity, generation of electricity, and water purification. The
U.N. monitoring regime is presented with increasing challenges, as
UNSCOM monitors are no longer in Iraq.
Humanitarian programs such as oil-for-food have steadily improved
the life of the average Iraqi living under sanctions (who, for example,
now receives a ration basket providing over 2,000 calories per day, a
significant improvement in nutrition since the program began) while
denying Saddam Hussein control over oil
revenues. We will continue to work with the U.N. Secretariat, the
Security Council, and others in the international community to ensure
that the humanitarian needs of the Iraqi people are met while denying
any political or economic benefits to the Baghdad regime.
Northern Iraq: Kurdish Reconciliation
Since their ground-breaking meeting with Secretary
Albright in September, Massoud
Barzani, President of the Kurdistan
Democratic Party (KDP), and Jalal Talabani,
Chairman of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), have met three times
to continue their work towards full reconciliation. Both parties have
condemned internal fighting, pledged to refrain from violence in
settling their differences, and resolved to eliminate terrorism by
establishing stronger safeguards for Iraq's borders. Our deep concern
for the safety, security, and economic well-being of Iraqi Kurds, Shias,
Sunnis, and others who have been subject to brutal attacks by the
Baghdad regime remains a primary focus of our Iraq policy.
On November 4, the Governments of Turkey and the United Kingdom
joined us in recognizing and welcoming the cooperative achievement of
Mr. Barzani and Mr. Talabani. The three states reiterated the importance of
preserving the unity and territorial integrity of Iraq and noted, with
pleasure, the prominence the KDP and PUK have accorded this principle.
We also welcomed the commitment by the KDP and PUK to deny sanctuary to
the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), to eliminate all PKK bases from the
region, and to safeguard the Turkish border. The parties believe that
key decisions on Iraq's future should be made by all the Iraqi people
together at an appropriate time and in a regular political process.
Their work to achieve the principles embodied in the Ankara Statements
are thus meant to implement a framework of regional administration until
a united, pluralistic, and democratic Iraq is achieved.
On January 8, the two leaders met without recourse to U.S., U.K., or Turkish
interlocutors, in Salahidin in northern Iraq. They reiterated their
determination to implement the September agreement, made concrete
progress on key issues of revenue sharing and closing down PKK bases,
and agreed to stay in close contact.
The United States is committed to ensuring that international aid
continues to reach the north, that the human rights of the Kurds and
northern Iraq minority groups, such as the
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Turkomen, Assyrians, Yezedis, and others are respected, and that the no-
fly-zone enforced by Operation Northern Watch is observed. The United
States will decide how and when to respond should Baghdad's actions pose
an increased threat to Iraq's neighbors, to regional security, to vital
U.S. interests, and to the Iraqi people, including those in the north.
The Human Rights Situation in Iraq
The human rights situation throughout Iraq continues to be a cause
for grave concern. As I reported November 5, the Iraqi army has stepped
up repressive operations against the Shia in the south. In mid-November,
we received unconfirmed reports from the Iraqi opposition that 150
persons had been executed at Amara, with three bodies left hanging on
the city's main bridge over the Tigris River as a warning to those who
oppose the regime. An additional 172 persons, some detained since 1991,
were reported to have been summarily executed in Abu Gharaib and
Radwaniya prisons; as in prior waives of summary prison killings, bodies
showing clear signs of torture were reportedly returned to their
families. Reports reached us in December that a mass grave containing at
least 25 bodies was found near the Khoraisan River in Diyala province,
east of Baghdad.
The Iraqi government continues to work toward the destruction of the
Marsh Arabs' way of life and the unique ecology of the southern marshes.
In the past 2 months, 7 more villages were reportedly destroyed on the
margins of the marshes, with irrigation water cut off and the vegetation
cut down and burned. Those who could not flee to the interior of the
marshes--particularly the old, infirm, women, and children--were said to
have been taken hostage by regime forces.
On February 19, the Shia Grand Ayatollah Mohammed al-Sadr was murdered in Iraq along with several of
his relatives. Opposition sources indicate this murder was the work of
the Saddam regime. The regime also violently suppressed demonstrations
that followed in Baghdad and other cities opposing the murder.
In the north, outside the Kurdish-controlled areas, the government
continues the forced expulsion of ethnic Kurds and Turkomen from Kirkuk
and other cities. In recent months, hundreds of families have reportedly
been expelled from Kirkuk with seven new Arab settlements created on
land seized from the Kurds. Reports from the Kurdish-controlled areas
where the displaced persons are received indicate that they are forced
to leave behind almost all of their personal property. Due to a shortage
of housing, they are still living in temporary shelters.
A conference on the research and treatment of victims of chemical
and biological weapons attacks in northern Iraq, organized by the
Washington Kurdish Institute and sponsored by the Department of State
was held on November 18-19, 1998. The conference focused on the long-
range effects of the Iraqi chemical attack on the village of Halabja,
where nearly 5,000 persons were killed in 1988. According to panelists,
the hideous combination of mustard gas, tabun, sarin, VX, tear gas, and
possibly aflatoxin that the Iraqi military used in the attack has
resulted in dramatically increased rates of cancer, respiratory
problems, heart failure, infertility, miscarriages, and possibly genetic
damage in the surviving population.
On December 1, the London-based INDICT organization announced that
12 senior Iraqi officials--including Saddam Hussein, his sons Uday and
Qusay, his half-brother Barzan al-Tikriti, Vice President Taha Yasin
Ramadan, and Deputy Prime Minister Tariq Aziz--would be the focus of its
campaign for prosecution by an international tribunal.
The Iraqi government continues to stall and obfuscate attempts to
account for more than 600 Kuwaitis and third-country nationals who
disappeared at the hands of Iraqi authorities during or after the
occupation of Kuwait, despite a Security Council resolution requiring it
to do so. Baghdad still refuses to allow independent human rights
monitors to enter Iraq, despite repeated requests by U.N. Special
Rapporteur for Iraq, Max Van der Stoel.
The U.N. Human Rights Commission has issued a strong condemnation of the
``all-pervasive repression and oppression'' of the Iraqi government.
The Iraqi Opposition
We are deepening our engagement with the forces of change in Iraq,
helping Iraqis inside and outside Iraq become a more effective voice for
the aspirations of the people. We will work toward the day when Iraq has
a government worthy of its people--a government prepared to live in
peace with its neighbors, a government that respects the rights of its
citizens, rather than represses them. On October 31, I signed
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into law the Iraq Liberation Act of 1998. It provides significant new
discretionary authorities to assist the opposition in its struggle
against the regime. On January 19, I submitted to the Congress a
notification of my intent to designate certain groups under the Act; I
designated those groups on February 4. The assessment of additional
groups that may qualify for assistance under the Act is progressing.
Also on October 31, Radio Free Iraq began operations. Its broadcasts are
being heard in Iraq and its message profoundly displeases the regime.
On November 17, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern
Affairs, Martin Indyk, met with 17 London-
based representatives of the Iraqi opposition. He heard the full range
of views of the parties present, and outlined the new U.S. policy toward
the opposition. Indyk urged them to work together toward the common
purpose of a new government in Baghdad; the United States will help, but
the opposition itself must take the lead. He urged them to do all they
could to get a message to the people of Iraq that there is an
alternative to Saddam Hussein, adding that
the United States will support the campaign to indict Saddam as a war
criminal.
Former Iraqi Foreign Minister Adnan Pachachi outlined a number of agreed points to Indyk. The group:
1) welcomed the new U.S. policy toward the opposition; 2) will work to
create a democratic government in Iraq; 3) will redouble efforts to get
all groups to work together; 4) wants the opposition to serve as an
interlocutor for the Iraqi people with the international community; and
5) expressed thanks for the U.S. role in the recent Kurdish
reconciliation.
On January 21, Secretary of State Albright announced the appointment of Frank
Ricciardone as Special Representative
for Transition in Iraq (SRTI). He will abbreviate his current tour as
Deputy Chief of Mission in Ankara, and take up his new responsibilities
in early March. He traveled with the Secretary of State to London,
Riyadh, and Cairo in late January to discuss U.S. policy on this issue.
He outlined U.S. intentions to help Iraq resume its rightful place in
the region--a goal the United States believes can only be achieved under
new Iraqi leadership. He emphasized U.S. desire to work with Iraqis--who
alone can make this happen--inside Iraq and outside Iraq, as well as
with Iraq's neighbors who share the same objectives.
There are, of course, other important elements of U.S. policy. These
include the maintenance of Security Council support for efforts to
eliminate Iraq's prohibited weapons and missile programs, and economic
sanctions that continue to deny the regime the means to reconstitute
those threats to international peace and security. United States support
for the Iraqi opposition will be carried out consistent with those
policy objectives as well. Similarly, U.S. support must be attuned to
what Iraqis can effectively make use of as it develops over time.
The United Nations Compensation Commission
The United Nations Compensation Commission (UNCC), established
pursuant to Resolutions 687, 692, and 1210, continues to resolve claims
against Iraq arising from Iraq's unlawful invasion and occupation of
Kuwait. The UNCC has issued over 1.3 million awards worth approximately
$7 billion. Thirty percent of the proceeds from the oil sales permitted
by Security Council resolutions have been allocated to the Compensation
Fund to pay awards and to finance operations of the UNCC. Pursuant to
decisions of the UNCC Governing Council, certain small claims are to
receive initial payments of $2,500 toward the amounts approved on those
claims before large claims of individuals and claims of corporations and
governments may share in the funds available for claims payments. As
money from Iraqi oil sales is deposited in the Compensation Fund the
UNCC makes these initial $2,500 payments on eligible claims in the order
in which those claims were approved by the UNCC. To date, the United
States Government has received funds from the UNCC for initial
installment payments on approximately 1435 claims of U.S. claimants.
Conclusion
Iraq remains a serious threat to international peace and security. I
remain determined to see Iraq comply fully with all of its obligations
under Security Council resolutions. The United States looks forward to
the day when Iraq rejoins the family of nations as a responsible and
law-abiding member. I appreciate the support of the Congress for our
efforts and shall continue to keep the Congress informed about this
important issue.
[[Page 299]]
Sincerely,
William J. Clinton
Note: Identical letters were sent to J. Dennis Hastert, Speaker of the
House of Representatives, and Strom Thurmond, President pro tempore of
the Senate.