[Congressional Bills 103th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H. Con. Res. 111 Introduced in House (IH)]
103d CONGRESS
1st Session
H. CON. RES. 111
Concerning the establishment of a South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone.
_______________________________________________________________________
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
June 10, 1993
Mr. Faleomavaega (for himself, Mr. Ackerman, Mr. Berman, Mr. Dellums,
Mrs. Morella, Mr. McDermott, Mr. Kopetski, Mr. Stark, Mr. Martinez, Mr.
Abercrombie, and Mrs. Mink) submitted the following concurrent
resolution; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs
_______________________________________________________________________
CONCURRENT RESOLUTION
Concerning the establishment of a South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone.
Whereas the nations of the South Pacific, which share with the United States a
strong interest in nuclear nonproliferation, have negotiated and signed
the Treaty of Rarotonga, establishing a South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone;
Whereas the Treaty of Rarotonga came into force on December 11, 1986, and has
been ratified by 11 nations;
Whereas the Treaty of Rarotonga prohibits the testing, manufacture, acquisition,
and stationing of nuclear weapons in the territory of parties to the
treaty and the dumping of radioactive wastes at sea;
Whereas 3 protocols to that treaty, which are open for ratification by nuclear-
weapon states, require that those nuclear weapon states that ratify
those protocols abide by the treaty's provisions in their territories in
the region, not contribute to violations of the treaty or threaten to
use nuclear weapons against its parties, and refrain from testing
nuclear devices in the zone;
Whereas the Treaty of Rarotonga does not prejudice or in any way affect the
rights of all nations to freedom of the seas under international law and
leaves to each party policy decisions on visits or passage through its
territory by foreign ships and aircraft;
Whereas the establishment of verified nuclear-weapon-free zones can reinforce
the international norm of nuclear nonproliferation and build consensus
for long-term extension of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT)
when reviewed for extension by its members in 1995;
Whereas the United States leadership to extend the Nuclear Nonproliferation
Treaty would be further enhanced if United States signature and
ratification of the protocols were part of an overall nonproliferation
policy that included negotiations on a comprehensive nuclear test ban;
Whereas Article VII of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty affirms ``the right
of any group of States to conclude regional treaties in order to assure
the total absence of nuclear weapons in their respective territories,''
and the state parties to the Treaty of Rarotonga have implemented a
safeguards agreement for the region with the International Atomic Energy
Agency;
Whereas it has been the policy of the United States to favor the establishment
of effective nuclear-weapon-free zones in regions of nonproliferation
concern and where such zones would enhance international stability and
security;
Whereas the United States has set forth 7 criteria whereby the effectiveness of
proposed nuclear-weapon-free zones will be judged, as follows: (1) the
initiative is from the nations in the region, (2) all nations whose
participation is deemed important participate, (3) adequate verification
of compliance is provided, (4) it does not disturb existing security
arrangements to the detriment of regional and international security,
(5) all parties are barred from developing or possessing any nuclear
device for any purpose, (6) it imposes no restrictions on international
legal maritime and serial navigation rights and freedoms, and (7) it
does not affect the international legal rights of parties to grant or
deny others transit privileges, including port calls and overflights;
Whereas the United States has signed and ratified the protocols to the Treaty
for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (the Treaty of
Tlatelolco), establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Latin America,
whereby the United States committed itself not to test, manufacture,
acquire, or store nuclear weapons in its territories in the region
(namely Puerto Rico and the United States Virgin Islands), not to
contribute to any violation of the treaty, and not to threaten to use
nuclear weapons against the parties;
Whereas the United States is also a party to the Antarctic Treaty, the Seabed
Arms Control Treaty, the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities
of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon
and Other Celestial Bodies, which preclude nuclear weapons from these
regions;
Whereas support for these nuclear-weapon-free zones does not prejudge United
States policy with respect to other proposed nuclear-weapon-free zones,
each of which must be judged on its individual merits in accordance with
United States national interests;
Whereas in order to maintain the security of United States military forces and
their ability to contribute to nuclear deterrence, the United States
must preserve the principle of neither confirming nor denying whether
particular United States naval vessels or other military forces possess
nuclear weapons;
Whereas the protocols to the Treaty of Rarotonga do not conflict with the United
States policy of neither confirming nor denying the presence of nuclear
weapons on United States vessels or aircraft and do not prohibit any
current or anticipated activities in United States territories in the
South Pacific or elsewhere in the region; and
Whereas past administrations have stated that while the United States could not,
under circumstances prior to the cessation of the Cold War, sign the
protocols to the Treaty of Rarotonga, United States practices and
activities in the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone region, then and now,
are consistent with the treaty and its protocols: Now, therefore, be it
Resolved by the House of Representatives (the Senate concurring),
That (a) it is the sense of the Congress that--
(1) the Treaty of Rarotonga is consistent with United
States security commitments in the South Pacific since it does
not prohibit port calls by naval vessels which are nuclear
powered or may be carrying nuclear weapons and does not create
other impediments to United States military operations in
support of the Security Treaty between Australia, New Zealand
and the United States (ANZUS Treaty);
(2) the Treaty of Rarotonga satisfies the 7 criteria, set
forth in the preamble of this resolution, which have been
established by the United States Government for judging the
effectiveness of proposed nuclear-weapon-free zones;
(3) signature and ratification of the protocols to that
treaty would be in the national interest of the United States
by contributing to a comprehensive United States
nonproliferation policy that would enhance prospects for
extending the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty in 1995,
particularly if such a policy were to include negotiations on a
comprehensive nuclear test ban agreement; and
(4) signature and ratification of the protocols would not
prejudge United States policy with respect to proposals for
nuclear-weapon-free zones in other regions, such as those in
which the presence of an effective nuclear deterrent has
contributed to United States national security by enhancing
stability.
(b) Noting that the executive branch has indicated that United
States practices and activities in the region are consistent with the
Treaty of Rarotonga and its protocols, it is therefore the sense of the
Congress that the United States should sign and ratify the protocols to
that treaty<plus-minus>.
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