110 HR 1234 IH: To end the United States occupation of Iraq
U.S. House of Representatives
2007-02-28
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EN
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1.Congress finds the following:
(1)The insurgency in Iraq has been fueled by
the United States occupation and the prospect of a long-term presence as
indicated by the building of permanent United States military bases.
(2)A United States declaration of an intention
to withdraw United States troops and close military bases will help dampen the
insurgency which has been inspired to resist colonization and fight aggressors
and those who have supported United States policy.
(3)A United States declaration of an intention
to withdraw United States troops and close military bases will provide an
opening in which parties within Iraq and in the region can set the stage for
negotiations toward a peaceful settlement in Iraq.
(4)The cost of withdrawing United States
troops from Iraq could be as low as $10 billion according to the Congressional
Budget Office.
(5)A United States shift in policy away from
unilateralism and toward cooperation will provide new opportunities for
exploring common concerns about the situation in Iraq.
(6)The United Nations is best equipped to
build a political consensus in Iraq through the crafting of a political
agreement.
(7)The end of the occupation of Iraq creates a
political environment that enables the world community to assist the United
States in an orderly transition.
(8)The United Nations is the only
international organization with the ability to mobilize and the legitimacy to
authorize peacekeeping troops.
(9)The United Nations can implement the basis
of an agreement that will end the occupation of Iraq and begin the transition
to international peacekeepers.
(10)The United Nations can field an
international security and peacekeeping mission, but such a mission cannot take
shape unless there is a peace to keep, and that will be dependent upon a
political process which reaches agreement between all the Iraqi parties.
(11)Reconstruction activities must be
reorganized and closely monitored in Iraq by the Iraqi Government, with the
assistance of the international community.
(12)Any attempt to sell Iraqi oil assets during
the United States occupation will be a significant stumbling block to peaceful
resolution.
(13)There must be fairness in the distribution
of oil resources in Iraq.
(14)A reconciliation process that brings people
together is the only way to overcome their fears and reconcile their
differences.
(15)It is essential to create a minimum of
understanding and mutual confidence between the Shiites, Sunnis, and
Kurds.
(16)The process of reconciliation must begin
with a national conference, organized with the assistance of the United Nations
and with the participation of parties that can create, participate in, and
affect the process of reconciliation, defined as an airing of all grievances
and the creation of pathways toward open, transparent talks producing truth and
resolution of grievances.
(17)The only sure path toward reconciliation is
through the political process.
(18)All factions and all insurgents not
associated with al-Qaeda must be brought together in a relentless process which
involves Saudis, Turks, Syrians, and Iranians.
(19)Achieving peace requires a process of
international truth and reconciliation between the people of the United States
and the people of Iraq.
(20)A reparations program to assist Iraqis is
essential to enable reconciliation.
2.It is the policy of the
United States that—
(1)the United States
should end the occupation of Iraq immediately, simultaneously with the
introduction of a United Nations-led international peacekeeping force pursuant
to an agreement with nations within the region and which incorporates the terms
and conditions specified in section 1;
(2)the Department of
Defense should use readily available existing funds to bring all United States
troops and necessary equipment home while a political settlement is being
negotiated and preparations are made for a transition to an international
security and peacekeeping force;
(3)the Department of
Defense should order a simultaneous return of all United States contractors and
subcontractors and turn over all contracting work to the Iraqi
Government;
(4)the United Nations
should be encouraged to prepare an international security and peacekeeping
force to be deployed to Iraq, replacing United States troops who then return
home;
(5)the United States
should provide funding for a United Nations peacekeeping mission, in which 50
percent of the peacekeeping troops should come from nations with large Muslim
populations;
(6)the international
security force, under United Nations direction, should remain in place until
the Iraqi Government is capable of handling its own security;
(7)the Iraqi
Government, with assistance from the United Nations, should immediately restart
the failed reconstruction program in Iraq and rebuild roads, bridges, schools,
hospitals, and other public facilities, houses, and factories with jobs and job
training going to local Iraqis;
(8)the Iraqi
Government, in an act of political sovereignty, should set aside initiatives to
privatize Iraqi oil interests or other national assets and abandon all efforts,
whether at the behest of the United States or otherwise, to change Iraqi
national law to facilitate privatization;
(9)the Iraq
Government, in an act of political sovereignty, should set forth a plan to
stabilize Iraq’s cost for food and energy, on par to what the prices were
before the United States invasion and occupation;
(10)the Iraqi
Government, in an act of political sovereignty, should strive for economic
sovereignty for Iraq by working with the world community to restore Iraq’s
fiscal integrity without structural readjustment measures of the International
Monetary Funds or the World Bank;
(11)the United States
should initiate a reparations program for the loss of Iraqi lives, physical and
emotional injuries, and damage to property, which should include an effort to
rescue the tens of thousands of Iraqi orphans from lives of destitution;
and
(12)the United States
should refrain from any covert operations in Iraq and any attempts to
destabilize the Iraqi Government.
3.Disengagement of
United States Armed Forces from Iraq
(a)Withdrawal of
Armed ForcesNot later than the end of the 3-month period
beginning on the date of the enactment of this Act, all United States Armed
Forces serving in Iraq shall be completely withdrawn from Iraq and returned to
the United States or redeployed outside of the Middle East.
(b)Prohibition on
Use of Funds To Continue Deployment of Armed Forces in Iraq
(1)Funds
appropriated or otherwise made available under any provision of law may not be
obligated or expended to deploy or continue to deploy members or units of the
United States Armed Forces to Iraq as part of Operation Iraqi Freedom.
(2)Paragraph
(1) does not apply to the use of funds—
(A)to provide for the
safe and orderly withdrawal of the Armed Forces from Iraq pursuant to
subsection (a);
(B)to ensure the
security of Iraq by carrying out consultations with the Government of Iraq,
other foreign governments, the United Nations, and other international
organizations; or
(C)to ensure the
security of Iraq by funding the United Nations-led peacekeeping mission.
(c)In this section, the term Armed Forces
has
the meaning given the term in section 101(a)(4) of title 10, United States
Code.