[Congressional Bills 110th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 2631 Reported in Senate (RS)]
Calendar No. 1086
110th CONGRESS
2d Session
H. R. 2631
_______________________________________________________________________
IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES
June 19, 2008
Received; read twice and referred to the Committee on Homeland Security
and Governmental Affairs
September 25 (legislative day, September 17), 2008
Reported by Mr. Lieberman (for himself and Ms. Collins), with an
amendment
[Strike out all after the enacting clause and insert the part printed
in italic]
_______________________________________________________________________
AN ACT
To strengthen efforts in the Department of Homeland Security to develop
nuclear forensics capabilities to permit attribution of the source of
nuclear material, and for other purposes.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States of America in Congress assembled,
<DELETED>SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.</DELETED>
<DELETED> This Act may be cited as the ``Nuclear Forensics and
Attribution Act''.</DELETED>
<DELETED>SEC. 2. FINDINGS.</DELETED>
<DELETED> Congress finds the following:</DELETED>
<DELETED> (1) The threat of a nuclear terrorist attack on
American interests, both domestic and abroad, is one of the
most serious threats to the national security of the United
States. In the wake of an attack, attribution of responsibility
would be of utmost importance. Because of the destructive power
of the weapon, there could be little forensic evidence except
the radioactive material in the bomb itself.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (2) Through advanced nuclear forensics, using both
existing techniques and those under development, it may be
possible to identify the source and pathway of a weapon or
material after it is interdicted or detonated. Though
identifying intercepted smuggled material is now possible in
some cases, pre-detonation forensics is a relatively
undeveloped field. The post-detonation nuclear forensics field
is also immature, and the challenges are compounded by the
pressures and time constraints of performing forensics after a
nuclear or radiological attack.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (3) A robust and well-known capability to identify
the source of nuclear or radiological material intended for or
used in an act of terror could also deter prospective
proliferators. Furthermore, the threat of effective attribution
could compel improved security at material storage facilities,
preventing the unwitting transfer of nuclear or radiological
materials.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (4)(A) In order to identify special nuclear
material and other radioactive materials confidently, it is
necessary to have a robust capability to acquire samples in a
timely manner, analyze and characterize samples, and compare
samples against known signatures of nuclear and radiological
material.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (B) Many of the radioisotopes produced in the
detonation of a nuclear device have short half-lives, so the
timely acquisition of samples is of the utmost importance. Over
the past several decades, the ability of the United States to
gather atmospheric samples--often the preferred method of
sample acquisition has diminished. This ability must be
restored and modern techniques that could complement or replace
existing techniques should be pursued.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (C) The discipline of pre-detonation forensics is
a relatively undeveloped field. The radiation associated with a
nuclear or radiological device may affect traditional forensics
techniques in unknown ways. In a post-detonation scenario,
radiochemistry may provide the most useful tools for analysis
and characterization of samples. The number of radiochemistry
programs and radiochemists in United States National
Laboratories and universities has dramatically declined over
the past several decades. The narrowing pipeline of qualified
people into this critical field is a serious impediment to
maintaining a robust and credible nuclear forensics
program.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (5) Once samples have been acquired and
characterized, it is necessary to compare the results against
samples of known material from reactors, weapons, and
enrichment facilities, and from medical, academic, commercial,
and other facilities containing such materials, throughout the
world. Some of these samples are available to the International
Atomic Energy Agency through safeguards agreements, and some
countries maintain internal sample databases. Access to samples
in many countries is limited by national security
concerns.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (6) In order to create a sufficient deterrent, it
is necessary to have the capability to positively identify the
source of nuclear or radiological material, and potential
traffickers in nuclear or radiological material must be aware
of that capability. International cooperation may be essential
to catalogue all existing sources of nuclear or radiological
material.</DELETED>
<DELETED>SEC. 3. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS FOR
FORENSICS COOPERATION.</DELETED>
<DELETED> It is the sense of the Congress that the President
should--</DELETED>
<DELETED> (1) pursue bilateral and multilateral
international agreements to establish, or seek to establish
under the auspices of existing bilateral or multilateral
agreements, an international framework for determining the
source of any confiscated nuclear or radiological material or
weapon, as well as the source of any detonated weapon and the
nuclear or radiological material used in such a
weapon;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (2) develop protocols for the data exchange and
dissemination of sensitive information relating to nuclear or
radiological materials and samples of controlled nuclear or
radiological materials, to the extent required by the
agreements entered into under paragraph (1); and</DELETED>
<DELETED> (3) develop expedited protocols for the data
exchange and dissemination of sensitive information needed to
publicly identify the source of a nuclear detonation.</DELETED>
<DELETED>SEC. 4. RESPONSIBILITIES OF DOMESTIC NUCLEAR DETECTION
OFFICE.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (a) Additional Responsibilities.--Section 1902 of the
Homeland Security Act of 2002 (as redesignated by Public Law 110-53; 6
U.S.C. 592) is amended--</DELETED>
<DELETED> (1) in subsection (a)--</DELETED>
<DELETED> (A) in paragraph (9), by striking ``and''
after the semicolon;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (B) by redesignating paragraph (10) as
paragraph (14); and</DELETED>
<DELETED> (C) by inserting after paragraph (9) the
following:</DELETED>
<DELETED> ``(10) develop and implement, with the approval of
the Secretary and in coordination with the heads of appropriate
departments and agencies, methods and capabilities to support
the attribution of nuclear or radiological material to its
source when such material is intercepted by the United States,
foreign governments, or international bodies or is dispersed in
the course of a terrorist attack or other nuclear or
radiological explosion;</DELETED>
<DELETED> ``(11) establish, within the Domestic Nuclear
Detection Office, the National Technical Nuclear Forensics
Center to provide centralized stewardship, planning,
assessment, gap analysis, exercises, improvement, and
integration for all Federal nuclear forensics activities to
ensure an enduring national technical nuclear forensics
capability to strengthen the collective response of the United
States to nuclear terrorism or other nuclear attacks;</DELETED>
<DELETED> ``(12) establish a National Nuclear Forensics
Expertise Development Program which--</DELETED>
<DELETED> ``(A) is devoted to developing and
maintaining a vibrant and enduring academic pathway
from undergraduate to post-doctorate study in nuclear
and geochemical science specialties directly relevant
to technical nuclear forensics, including
radiochemistry, geochemistry, nuclear physics, nuclear
engineering, materials science, and analytical
chemistry; and</DELETED>
<DELETED> ``(B) shall--</DELETED>
<DELETED> ``(i) make available for
undergraduate study student scholarships, with
a duration of up to four years per student,
which shall include, whenever possible, at
least one summer internship at a national
laboratory or appropriate Federal agency in the
field of technical nuclear forensics during the
course of the student's undergraduate
career;</DELETED>
<DELETED> ``(ii) make available for graduate
study student fellowships, with a duration of
up to five years per student, which--</DELETED>
<DELETED> ``(I) shall include,
whenever possible, at least two summer
internships at a national laboratory or
appropriate Federal agency in the field
of technical nuclear forensics during
the course of the student's graduate
career; and</DELETED>
<DELETED> ``(II) shall require each
recipient to commit to serve for two
years in a post-doctoral position in a
technical nuclear forensics-related
specialty at a national laboratory or
appropriate Federal agency after
graduation;</DELETED>
<DELETED> ``(iii) make available to faculty
awards, with a duration of three to five years
each, to ensure faculty and their graduate
students a sustained funding stream;
and</DELETED>
<DELETED> ``(iv) place a particular emphasis
on reinvigorating technical nuclear forensics
programs, while encouraging the participation
of undergraduate students, graduate students,
and university faculty from historically Black
colleges and universities, Hispanic-serving
institutions, and Tribal Colleges and
Universities;</DELETED>
<DELETED> ``(13) provide an annual report to Congress on the
activities carried out under paragraphs (10), (11), and (12);
and''; and</DELETED>
<DELETED> (2) by adding at the end the following new
subsection:</DELETED>
<DELETED> ``(b) Definitions.--In this section:</DELETED>
<DELETED> ``(1) Historically black college or university.--
The term `historically Black college or university' has the
meaning given the term `part B institution' in section 322(2)
of the Higher Education Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C.
1061(2)).</DELETED>
<DELETED> ``(2) Hispanic-serving institution.--The term
`Hispanic-serving institution' has the meaning given that term
in section 502 of the Higher Education Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C.
1101a).</DELETED>
<DELETED> ``(3) Tribal college or university.--The term
`Tribal College or University' has the meaning given that term
in section 316(b) of the Higher Education Act of 1965 (20
U.S.C. 1059c(b)).''.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (b) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized
to be appropriated the sum of $30,000,000 for each of the fiscal years
2009, 2010, and 2011 to carry out paragraphs (10) through (13) of
section 1902(a) of the Homeland Security Act of 2002, as added by
subsection (a) of this section.</DELETED>
SECTION 1. FINDINGS.
Congress finds the following:
(1) The threat of a nuclear terrorist attack on American
interests, both domestic and abroad, is one of the most serious
threats to the national security of the United States. In the
wake of an attack, attribution of responsibility would be of
utmost importance. Because of the destructive power of the
weapon, there could be little forensic evidence except the
radioactive material in the bomb itself.
(2) Through advanced nuclear forensics, using both existing
techniques and those under development, it may be possible to
identify the source and pathway of a weapon or material after
it is interdicted or detonated. Though identifying intercepted
smuggled material is now possible in some cases, pre-detonation
forensics is a relatively undeveloped field. The post-
detonation nuclear forensics field is also immature, and the
challenges are compounded by the pressures and time constraints
of performing forensics after a nuclear or radiological attack.
(3) A robust and well-known capability to identify the
source of nuclear or radiological material intended for or used
in an act of terror could also deter prospective proliferators.
Furthermore, the threat of effective attribution could compel
improved security at material storage facilities, preventing
the unwitting transfer of nuclear or radiological materials.
(4)(A) In order to identify special nuclear material and
other radioactive materials confidently, it is necessary to
have a robust capability to acquire samples in a timely manner,
analyze and characterize samples, and compare samples against
known signatures of nuclear and radiological material.
(B) Many of the radioisotopes produced in the detonation of
a nuclear device have short half-lives, so the timely
acquisition of samples is of the utmost importance. Over the
past several decades, the ability of the United States to
gather atmospheric samples, often the preferred method of
sample acquisition, has diminished. This ability must be
restored and modern techniques that could complement or replace
existing techniques should be pursued.
(C) The discipline of pre-detonation forensics is a
relatively undeveloped field. The radiation associated with a
nuclear or radiological device may affect traditional forensics
techniques in unknown ways. In a post-detonation scenario,
radiochemistry may provide the most useful tools for analysis
and characterization of samples. The number of radiochemistry
programs and radiochemists in United States National
Laboratories and universities has dramatically declined over
the past several decades. The narrowing pipeline of qualified
people into this critical field is a serious impediment to
maintaining a robust and credible nuclear forensics program.
(5) Once samples have been acquired and characterized, it
is necessary to compare the results against samples of known
material from reactors, weapons, and enrichment facilities, and
from medical, academic, commercial, and other facilities
containing such materials, throughout the world. Some of these
samples are available to the International Atomic Energy Agency
through safeguards agreements, and some countries maintain
internal sample databases. Access to samples in many countries
is limited by national security concerns.
(6) In order to create a sufficient deterrent, it is
necessary to have the capability to positively identify the
source of nuclear or radiological material, and potential
traffickers in nuclear or radiological material must be aware
of that capability. International cooperation may be essential
to catalogue all existing sources of nuclear or radiological
material.
SEC. 2. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS FOR FORENSICS
COOPERATION.
It is the sense of the Congress that the President should--
(1) pursue bilateral and multilateral international
agreements to establish, or seek to establish under the
auspices of existing bilateral or multilateral agreements, an
international framework for determining--
(A) the source of any confiscated nuclear or
radiological material or weapon; and
(B) the source of any detonated weapon and the
nuclear or radiological material used in such a weapon;
(2) develop protocols for the data exchange and
dissemination of sensitive information relating to nuclear or
radiological materials and samples of controlled nuclear or
radiological materials, to the extent required by the
agreements entered into under paragraph (1); and
(3) develop expedited protocols for the data exchange and
dissemination of sensitive information needed to publicly
identify the source of a nuclear detonation.
SEC. 3. RESPONSIBILITIES OF DOMESTIC NUCLEAR DETECTION OFFICE.
(a) Additional Responsibilities.--Section 1902 of the Homeland
Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 592) is amended--
(1) by striking ``(a) Mission'';
(2) in paragraph (9), by striking ``and'' at the end;
(3) by redesignating paragraph (10) as paragraph (14); and
(4) by inserting after paragraph (9) the following:
``(10) develop and implement, with the approval of the
Secretary, and in consultation with the Attorney General, the
Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of Energy, the Secretary of
State, the Director of National Intelligence, and the heads of
appropriate departments and agencies, a `National Strategy and
Five-Year Implementation Plan for Improving the Nuclear
Forensic and Attribution Capabilities of the United States
Government' and the methods, capabilities, and capacity for
nuclear materials forensics and attribution, including--
``(A) an investment plan to support nuclear
materials forensics and attribution;
``(B) the allocation of roles and responsibilities
for pre-detonation, detonation, and post-detonation
activities; and
``(C) the attribution of nuclear or radiological
material to its source when such material is
intercepted by the United States, foreign governments,
or international bodies or is dispersed in the course
of a terrorist attack or other nuclear or radiological
explosion;
``(11) establish, within the Domestic Nuclear Detection
Office, the National Technical Nuclear Forensics Center to
provide centralized stewardship, planning, assessment, gap
analysis, exercises, improvement, and integration for all
Federal nuclear forensics and attribution activities--
``(A) to ensure an enduring national technical
nuclear forensics capability to strengthen the
collective response of the United States to nuclear
terrorism or other nuclear attacks; and
``(B) to coordinate and implement the national
strategic plan and 5-year plan to improve national
forensics and attribution capabilities for all Federal
nuclear and radiological forensics capabilities;
``(12) establish a National Nuclear Forensics Expertise
Development Program, which--
``(A) is devoted to developing and maintaining a
vibrant and enduring academic pathway from
undergraduate to post-doctorate study in nuclear and
geochemical science specialties directly relevant to
technical nuclear forensics, including radiochemistry,
geochemistry, nuclear physics, nuclear engineering,
materials science, and analytical chemistry; and
``(B) shall--
``(i) make available for undergraduate
study student scholarships, with a duration of
up to 4 years per student, which shall include,
if possible, at least 1 summer internship at a
national laboratory or appropriate Federal
agency in the field of technical nuclear
forensics during the course of the student's
undergraduate career;
``(ii) make available for graduate study
student fellowships, with a duration of up to 5
years per student, which shall--
``(I) include, if possible, at
least 2 summer internships at a
national laboratory or appropriate
Federal agency in the field of
technical nuclear forensics during the
course of the student's graduate
career; and
``(II) require each recipient to
commit to serve for 2 years in a post-
doctoral position in a technical
nuclear forensics-related specialty at
a national laboratory or appropriate
Federal agency after graduation;
``(iii) make available to faculty awards,
with a duration of 3 to 5 years each, to ensure
faculty and their graduate students have a
sustained funding stream; and
``(iv) place a particular emphasis on
reinvigorating technical nuclear forensics
programs; and''.
(b) Joint Interagency Annual Reporting Requirement to Congress and
the President.--
(1) In general.--Section 1907(a)(1) of the Homeland
Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 596(a)(1)) is amended--
(A) in subparagraph (A)(ii), by striking ``and'' at
the end;
(B) in subparagraph (B)(iii), by striking the
period at the end and inserting ``; and''; and
(C) by adding at the end the following:
``(C) the Director of the Domestic Nuclear
Detection Office and each of the relevant Departments
that are partners in the National Technical Forensics
Center--
``(i) includes, as part of the assessments,
evaluations, and reviews required under this
paragraph, each relevant agency's activities
and investments in support of nuclear forensics
and attribution activities;
``(ii) attaches, as an appendix to the
Joint Interagency Annual Review, the most
current version of the plan required under
section 1902(a)(10); and
``(iii) after March 31 of each year, funds
allocated for activities authorized under
section 1902 are not spent until the submission
to Congress of the report required under
subsection (b).''.
Calendar No. 1086
110th CONGRESS
2d Session
H. R. 2631
_______________________________________________________________________
AN ACT
To strengthen efforts in the Department of Homeland Security to develop
nuclear forensics capabilities to permit attribution of the source of
nuclear material, and for other purposes.
_______________________________________________________________________
September 25 (legislative day, September 17), 2008
Reported with an amendment