[Congressional Bills 110th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 770 Introduced in House (IH)]
110th CONGRESS
1st Session
H. R. 770
To prohibit the use of funds to carry out any covert action for the
purpose of causing regime change in Iran or to carry out any military
action against Iran in the absence of an imminent threat, in accordance
with international law and constitutional and statutory requirements
for congressional authorization.
_______________________________________________________________________
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
January 31, 2007
Ms. Lee (for herself, Ms. Woolsey, Mr. Kucinich, Mr. Conyers, and Ms.
Waters) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the
Committee on Foreign Affairs, and in addition to the Committees on
Armed Services and Select Intelligence (Permanent Select), for a period
to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for
consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the
committee concerned
_______________________________________________________________________
A BILL
To prohibit the use of funds to carry out any covert action for the
purpose of causing regime change in Iran or to carry out any military
action against Iran in the absence of an imminent threat, in accordance
with international law and constitutional and statutory requirements
for congressional authorization.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the ``Iran Nuclear Nonproliferation Act''.
SEC. 2. FINDINGS.
Congress finds the following:
(1) Numerous bi-partisan commissions and study groups,
including the Iraq Study Group co-chaired by James A. Baker III
and Lee H. Hamilton, a 2004 working group established under the
Council on Foreign Relations and co-chaired by Robert Gates and
Zbigniew Brzezinski, and a 2001 Atlantic Council of the United
States Working Group, co-chaired by Lee H. Hamilton, James
Schlesinger, and Brent Scowcroft have called for various forms
of dialogue and engagement with Iran in order to achieve United
States strategic interests in the Middle East region.
(2) Implementing effective strategies to deflect or deter
Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons, or pursuing the
development of nuclear weapons capabilities, is an important
United States strategic interest.
(3) Establishing a diplomatic dialogue with the Government
of Iran and deepening relationships with the Iranian people
would help foster greater understanding between the people of
Iran and the people of the United States and would enhance the
stability and security of the Persian Gulf region, including by
reducing the threat of the proliferation or use of nuclear
weapons in the region, while advancing other United States
foreign policy objectives in that region.
(4) The Iraq Study Group Report states ``Iran's interests
would not be served by a failure of U.S. policy that led to
chaos and the territorial disintegration of the Iraqi state'',
and therefore, the Government of the United States should build
upon this mutual interest to develop a diplomatic dialogue with
the Government of Iran concerning deteriorating conditions in
Iraq, which can become a basis of broader future United States-
Iranian engagement.
(5) Given the dispersal of Iran's nuclear program at sites
throughout the country and their proximity to urban centers,
the use of military force against Iran would be extraordinarily
difficult and probably ineffective, the immediate consequences
and loss of life would be drastic, and the long-term
instability generated would be against long-term United States
interests in the region.
(6) Any military action designed to eliminate Iran's
capacity to produce nuclear weapons would run the significant
risk of reinforcing and accelerating the desire of the
Government of Iran to acquire a nuclear deterrent and
compounding nationalist passions in defense of that very
course, and would most likely also generate hostile Iranian
initiatives in Iraq and Afghanistan.
(7) Together, the ongoing efforts of the International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) along with corresponding
multilateral sanctions recently adopted by the United Nations
Security Council offer a viable path for steering Iran's
nuclear efforts along peaceful lines, provided that there is
close multilateral coordination and steadfastness in the
adherence to the sanctions and firm United States leadership in
support of the multilateral effort.
(8) According to the most definitive United States
intelligence reports, Iran is likely a decade away from
acquiring the know-how and material to have an option to build
a nuclear weapon, and even the most pessimistic analysis by
outside experts puts the timeline at least three years away,
assuming Iran suffers no setbacks during development, which
would be unprecedented.
SEC. 3. SENSE OF CONGRESS.
It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) full diplomatic, political, and economic relations
between the United States and Iran cannot be normalized unless
and until enforceable safeguards are put in place to prevent
weaponization of Iran's nuclear program and the Government of
Iran ends its support for international terrorist groups, but
the attainment of these policy objectives should not constitute
preconditions for any diplomatic dialogue; and
(2) no congressional authorization for the use of military
force in any Act of Congress enacted before the date of the
enactment of this Act constitutes, either implicitly or
explicitly, an authorization for the use of military force
against Iran or its nuclear program.
SEC. 4. STATEMENT OF POLICY.
It is the policy of the United States not to enter into a
preemptive war against Iran in the absence of an imminent threat, and
then only in accordance with international law and constitutional and
statutory requirements for congressional authorization.
SEC. 5. LIMITATION ON USE OF FUNDS.
No funds appropriated or otherwise made available to the Department
of Defense or any other department or agency of the Government of the
United States may be used to carry out any covert action for the
purpose of causing regime change in Iran or to carry out any military
action against Iran in the absence of an imminent threat, in accordance
with international law and constitutional and statutory requirements
for congressional authorization.
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