[Congressional Bills 114th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. Res. 414 Introduced in Senate (IS)]
<DOC>
114th CONGRESS
2d Session
S. RES. 414
Expressing the sense of the Senate on the actions, including the
reapplication of waived nuclear-related sanctions, that the United
States should undertake in the event of an Iranian violation of the
Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action.
_______________________________________________________________________
IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES
April 6, 2016
Mr. Lankford submitted the following resolution; which was referred to
the Committee on Foreign Relations
_______________________________________________________________________
RESOLUTION
Expressing the sense of the Senate on the actions, including the
reapplication of waived nuclear-related sanctions, that the United
States should undertake in the event of an Iranian violation of the
Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action.
Whereas national security is a fundamental and primary responsibility of both
Congress and the President;
Whereas, on July 14, 2015, President Barack Obama reached an agreement with Iran
known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, a political agreement
among the United States, France, the Russian Federation, the People's
Republic of China, the United Kingdom, and Germany (commonly referred to
as the ``P5+1 countries'') and Iran that does not carry the force or
effect of United States law;
Whereas President Obama lifted nuclear-related sanctions imposed by the United
States with respect to Iran on January 16, 2016;
Whereas, on July 14, 2015, President Obama stated, ``If Iran violates the deal,
all of these sanctions will snap back into place.'';
Whereas Congress intends to work with the President to ensure that the
President's commitment to snapping back sanctions in response to any
violation by Iran of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action is fully
enforced;
Whereas Iran has been the beneficiary of financial assets and international
engagement while its commitment to fulfilling its obligations under the
Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action has yet to be proven; and
Whereas, given the historic and dramatic shift in longstanding United States
foreign policy represented by the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action,
the obligations and commitments Iran agreed to as part of the Joint
Comprehensive Plan of Action must be clarified by the Senate: Now,
therefore, be it
Resolved,
SECTION 1. SENSE OF THE SENATE ON IRANIAN VIOLATIONS OF THE JOINT
COMPREHENSIVE PLAN OF ACTION.
(a) In General.--It is the sense of the Senate--
(1) that the United States should take the actions
specified in subsection (b) if--
(A) Iran ever seeks, develops, manufactures, or
acquires nuclear weapons;
(B) Iran ever engages in plutonium reprocessing or
plutonium-related research and development;
(C) Iran violates--
(i) the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of
Nuclear Weapons, done at Washington, London,
and Moscow July 1, 1968 (21 UST 483) (commonly
referred to as the ``Nuclear Nonproliferation
Treaty'' or the ``NPT'');
(ii) the Agreement between Iran and the
International Atomic Energy Agency for the
Application of Safeguards in Connection with
the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons, done at Vienna June 19, 1973 (commonly
referred to as the ``Comprehensive Safeguards
Agreement'');
(iii) its commitment to ratify by October
18, 2023, the Additional Protocol to the
Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement; or
(iv) the Iranian-ratified Additional
Protocol to the Comprehensive Safeguards
Agreement and modified Code 3.1 of the
Subsidiary Arrangements to the Comprehensive
Safeguards Agreement;
(D) Iran installs a new natural uranium core or the
original core in the Arak reactor;
(E) the power of Iran's redesigned heavy water
reactor exceeds 20 MWth;
(F) Iran produces any amount of weapons grade
uranium or plutonium;
(G) Iran pursues construction at the existing
unfinished Arak heavy water reactor based on its
original design;
(H) Iran produces or tests natural uranium pellets,
fuel pins, or fuel assemblies that are specifically
designed for the support of the originally designed
Arak heavy water reactor, designated by the
International Atomic Energy Agency as IR-40;
(I) Iran does not store all existing natural
uranium pellets and IR-40 fuel assemblies under the
continuous monitoring of the International Atomic
Energy Agency until the modernized Arak reactor becomes
operable;
(J) once the Arak reactor becomes operable, Iran
does not take the IR-40 fuel assemblies and natural
uranium pellets and convert them to uranyl nitrate or
exchange them with an equivalent quantity of natural
uranium;
(K) Iran does not make the necessary technical
modifications to the natural uranium fuel production
process line that was intended to supply fuel for the
IR-40 reactor design, such that it can be used for the
fabrication of the fuel reloads for the modernized Arak
reactor;
(L) all spent fuel from the redesigned Arak
reactor, regardless of its origin, for the lifetime of
the reactor, is not shipped out of Iran;
(M) Iran operates the Fuel Manufacturing Plant to
produce anything other than fuel assemblies for light
water reactors or reloads for the modernized Arak
reactor;
(N) Iran does not inform the International Atomic
Energy Agency about the inventory and production of the
Heavy Water Production Plant or does not allow the
International Atomic Energy Agency to monitor the
quantities of the heavy water stocks and the amount of
heavy water produced, including through visits by the
International Atomic Energy Agency, as requested, to
the Heavy Water Production Plant;
(O) Iran does not ship out all spent fuel for all
future and present nuclear power and research reactors;
(P) Iran does not remove and keep stored at Natanz
in Hall B of the fuel enrichment plant under continuous
monitoring by the International Atomic Energy Agency--
(i) all excess centrifuge machines,
including IR-2m centrifuges (during the 10-year
prohibition period under the Joint
Comprehensive Plan of Action); and
(ii) UF6 pipework including sub headers,
valves and pressure transducers at cascade
level, and frequency inverters, and UF6
withdrawal equipment from one of the withdrawal
stations, which is currently not in service,
including its vacuum pumps and chemical traps
(during the 10-year prohibition period under
the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action);
(Q) the 164-machine IR-2m cascade does not remain
stored at Natanz in Hall B of the fuel enrichment plan
under the continuous monitoring of the International
Atomic Energy Agency;
(R) the 164-machine IR-4 cascade does not remain
stored at Natanz in Hall B of the fuel enrichment plan
under the continuous monitoring of the International
Atomic Energy Agency;
(S) Iran enriches, obtains, or otherwise stockpiles
any uranium, including in oxide form, enriched to
greater than 3.67 percent;
(T) all future uranium oxide, scrap oxide, or other
material not in fuel plates enriched to between 5 and
20 percent is not transferred out of Iran or diluted to
a level of 3.67 percent or less within 6 months of
production;
(U) Iran does not abide by its voluntary
commitments as expressed in its own long-term
enrichment and enrichment research and development plan
submitted as part of the initial declaration described
in Article 2 of the Additional Protocol to the
Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement;
(V) Iran engages in production of centrifuges,
including centrifuge rotors suitable for isotope
separation or any other centrifuge components, which
exceeds the enrichment and enrichment research and
development requirements outlined in Annex I of the
Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action;
(W) Iran does not permit the International Atomic
Energy Agency the use of online enrichment measurement
and electronic seals, as well as other International
Atomic Energy Agency-approved and certified modern
technologies in line with internationally accepted
practices of the International Atomic Energy Agency;
(X) Iran does not facilitate automated collection
of International Atomic Energy Agency measurement
recordings registered by installed measurement devices
and sent to the International Atomic Energy Agency
working space at individual nuclear sites;
(Y) Iran does not make the necessary arrangements
to allow for a long-term presence of the International
Atomic Energy Agency, including issuing long-term
visas, as well as providing proper working space at
nuclear sites and, to the best of its effort, at
locations near nuclear sites in Iran for the designated
International Atomic Energy Agency inspectors for
working and keeping necessary equipment;
(Z) Iran does not increase the number of designated
International Atomic Energy Agency inspectors to at
least 130 by October 16, 2016, which is the date that
is 9 months after implementation day, or does not allow
the designation of inspectors from countries that have
diplomatic relations with Iran;
(AA) Iran does not apply nuclear export policies
and practices in line with the internationally
established standards for the export of nuclear
material, equipment, and technology;
(BB) Iran does not permit the International Atomic
Energy Agency access to verify that uranium isotope
separation production and research and development
activities are consistent with Annex I of the Joint
Comprehensive Plan of Action;
(CC) Iran engages in--
(i) designing, developing, acquiring, or
using computer models to simulate nuclear
explosive devices;
(ii) designing, developing, fabricating,
acquiring, or using multi-point explosive
detonation systems suitable for a nuclear
explosive device, unless approved by the Joint
Commission for non-nuclear purposes and subject
to monitoring;
(iii) designing, developing, fabricating,
acquiring, or using explosive diagnostic
systems (streak cameras, framing cameras and
flash x-ray cameras) suitable for the
development of a nuclear explosive device,
unless approved by the Joint Commission for
non-nuclear purposes and subject to monitoring;
or
(iv) designing, developing, fabricating,
acquiring, or using explosively driven neutron
sources or specialized materials for
explosively driven neutron sources;
(DD) during the 10-year period beginning on
implementation day and ending on January 16, 2026--
(i) Iran operates, for the purpose of
enriching uranium, more than 5,060 IR-1
centrifuges;
(ii) Iran's enrichment capacity exceeds
5,060 IR-1 centrifuge machines in 30 cascades
in their current configurations in currently
operating units at the Natanz Fuel Enrichment
Plant;
(iii) consistent with Iran's enrichment
research and development plan, Iran's
enrichment research and development with
uranium includes any centrifuges other than IR-
4, IR-5, IR-6, and IR-8 centrifuges;
(iv) Iran conducts testing of more than a
single IR-4 centrifuge machine and IR-4
centrifuge cascade of up to 10 centrifuge
machines;
(v) Iran tests more than a single IR-5
centrifuge machine;
(vi) Iran does not recombine the enriched
and depleted streams from the IR-6 and IR-8
cascades through the use of welded pipework on
withdrawal main headers in a manner that
precludes the withdrawal of enriched and
depleted uranium materials and verified by the
International Atomic Energy Agency;
(vii) research and development with uranium
is not strictly limited to IR-4, IR-5, IR-6,
and IR-8 centrifuges;
(viii) Iran's uranium isotope separation-
related research and development or production
activities are not exclusively based on gaseous
centrifuge technology;
(ix) Iran engages in nuclear direct-use or
nuclear dual-use procurements of commodities
without using the procurement channel mandated
by the United Nations under United Nations
Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015);
(x) research and development is carried out
in the IR-4, IR-5, IR-6, or IR-8 centrifuges in
a manner that accumulates enriched uranium, or
Iran installs or tests those centrifuges beyond
the enrichment and enrichment research and
development requirements outlined in Annex I of
the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action;
(xi) except as otherwise provided in
subparagraph (LL), mechanical testing on up to
2 single centrifuges for each type is carried
out on any centrifuge other than the IR-2m, IR-
4, IR-5, IR-6, IR-6s, IR-7, or IR-8; or
(xii) Iran builds or tests any new
centrifuge without approval of the Joint
Commission;
(EE) during the 15-year period beginning on
implementation day and ending on January 16, 2031--
(i) Iran conducts uranium enrichment-
related activities at Fordow;
(ii) Iran's stockpile of enriched uranium
hexafluoride, or the equivalent in other
chemical forms, exceeds 300 kg enriched to 3.67
percent;
(iii) Iran reprocesses spent fuel except
for irradiated enriched uranium targets for
production of radioisotopes for medical and
peaceful industrial purposes;
(iv) Iran develops, acquires, or builds
facilities capable of separation of plutonium,
uranium, or neptunium from spent fuel or from
fertile targets, other than for production of
radioisotopes for medical and peaceful
industrial purposes;
(v) Iran develops, acquires, builds, or
operates hot cells (containing a cell or
interconnected cells), shielded cells, or
shielded glove boxes with dimensions not less
than 6 cubic meters in volume compatible with
the specifications set out in Annex I of the
Additional Protocol to the Comprehensive
Safeguards Agreement, unless approved by the
Joint Commission established by the Joint
Comprehensive Plan of Action;
(vi) Iran undertakes destructive post
irradiation examination of fuel pins, fuel
assembly prototypes, and structural materials,
unless the P5+1 countries make available their
facilities to conduct destructive testing with
Iranian specialists, as agreed pursuant to the
Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action;
(vii) Iran engages in producing or
acquiring plutonium or uranium metals or their
alloys, or conducts research and development on
plutonium or uranium (or their alloys)
metallurgy, or casting, forming, or machining
plutonium or uranium metal;
(viii) Iran produces, seeks, or acquires
separated plutonium, highly enriched uranium,
uranium-233, or neptunium-237 (except for use
for laboratory standards or in instruments
using neptunium-237);
(ix) Iran installs gas centrifuge machines,
or enrichment-related infrastructure, whether
suitable for uranium enrichment, research and
development, or stable isotope enrichment, at
any location other than a location exclusively
specified under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of
Action;
(x) Iran conducts all testing of
centrifuges with uranium anywhere other than at
the Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant or Iran
conducts mechanical testing of centrifuges
anywhere other than at the Pilot Fuel
Enrichment Plant and the Tehran Research
Centre;
(xi) Iran maintains more than 1044 IR-1
centrifuge machines at one wing of the Fordow
Fuel Enrichment Plant;
(xii) Iran does not limit its stable
isotope production activities with gas
centrifuges to the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant
or uses more than 348 IR-1 centrifuges for such
activities;
(xiii) Iran exceeds the limitations on its
activities at the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant
as described in Annex I of the Joint
Comprehensive Plan of Action;
(xiv) Iran does not permit the
International Atomic Energy Agency regular
access, including daily as requested by the
International Atomic Energy Agency, access to
the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant;
(xv) Iran builds or has a heavy water
reactor;
(xvi) Iran does not permit the
International Atomic Energy Agency to implement
continuous monitoring, including through
containment and surveillance measures, as
necessary, to verify that stored centrifuges
and infrastructure remain in storage;
(xvii) Iran does not permit the
International Atomic Energy Agency regular
access, including daily access as requested by
the International Atomic Energy Agency, to
relevant buildings at Natanz, including parts
of the fuel enrichment plan and the Pilot Fuel
Enrichment Plant;
(xviii) any uranium enrichment activity in
Iran, including safeguarded research and
development, occurs anywhere but the Natanz
enrichment site;
(xix) Iran engages, including through
export of any enrichment or enrichment related
equipment and technology, with any other
country, or with any foreign entity in
enrichment or enrichment related activities,
including related research and development
activities, without approval by the Joint
Commission;
(xx) the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant does
not remain strictly a research facility, Iran
conducts enrichment or research and
development-related activities, or Iran holds
nuclear material at that Plant;
(xxi) excess heavy water that is beyond
Iran's needs for the modernized Arak research
reactor or the zero power heavy water reactor,
quantities needed for medical research and
production of the deuterated solutions, and
chemical compounds including, where
appropriate, contingency stocks, is not made
available for export to the international
market based on international prices and
delivered to an international buyer;
(xxii) all enriched uranium hexafluoride in
excess of 300 kg of up to 3.57 percent enriched
UF6 (or the equivalent in different chemical
forms) is not immediately down-blended to
natural uranium level or sold on the
international market and delivered to an
international buyer;
(xxiii) Iran does not rely on only light
water for its future nuclear power and research
reactors;
(xxiv) Iran conducts enrichment research
and development in a manner that accumulates
enriched uranium; or
(xxv) Iran enriches uranium to a level
exceeding 3.67 percent;
(FF) during the 25-year period beginning on
implementation day and ending on January 16, 2041--
(i) Iran does not permit the International
Atomic Energy Agency to monitor that all
uranium ore concentrate produced in Iran or
obtained from any other source is transferred
to the uranium conversion facility in Esfahan
or to any other future uranium conversion
facility that Iran might decide to build in
Iran within this period; or
(ii) Iran does not provide the
International Atomic Energy Agency with all
necessary information so that the International
Atomic Energy Agency will be able to verify the
production of the uranium ore concentrate and
the inventory of uranium ore concentrate
produced in Iran or obtained from any other
source;
(GG) on or after January 16, 2024, which is the
date that is 8 years after implementation day, Iran
commences manufacturing IR-6 and IR-8 centrifuges with
rotors, or commences manufacturing IR-6 and IR-8
centrifuges without rotors at a rate of more than 200
centrifuges per year for each type;
(HH) on or after January 16, 2026, which is the
date that is 10 years after implementation day, Iran
commences manufacturing on more than 200 complete
centrifuges per year for each type;
(II) Iran does not present its plan to, and seek
approval by, the Joint Commission if Iran seeks to
initiate research and development on a uranium metal-
based fuel for the Tehran Research Reactor in small
agreed quantities after January 16, 2026, and before
January 15, 2031, which are 10 and 15 years after
implementation day, respectively; or
(JJ) during the 8\1/2\ year period beginning on
implementation day and ending on July 16, 2024--
(i) Iran conducts testing on more than a
single IR-6 centrifuge machine and intermediate
cascades for such machines and commences
testing on more than 30 centrifuge machines; or
(ii) Iran conducts testing on more than a
single IR-8 centrifuge machine and intermediate
cascades for such machines or commences testing
on more than 30 centrifuge machines; and
(2) that--
(A) Iran's uranium enrichment and research and
development plans should be made public;
(B) the reports of the Joint Commission and
procurement requests made to the United Nations
Security Council and to the Joint Commission, and
whether or not such requests were approved, should be
made available to the public; and
(C) countries should verify the end-use of items,
materials, equipment, goods, and technologies that
require import authorization by the Joint Commission
but are not verified by the International Atomic Energy
Agency.
(b) Actions Specified.--The actions specified in this subsection
are the following:
(1) Seeking immediate reinstitution and application of
United Nations Security Council Resolutions 1696 (2006), 1737
(2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008), 1835 (2008), 1929 (2010), and
2224 (2015).
(2) Seeking the immediate adoption of a United Nations
Security Council resolution that directs all United Nations
member states to prevent the direct or indirect supply, sale,
or transfer to Iran of all items listed in subsection (a)(i) of
United Nations Security Council Resolution 1718 (2006) in order
to prevent Iran from arming itself while its commitment to
international law is still in question.
(3) Working with international partners of the United
States to seek the immediate reapplication of the regulations
of the Council of the European Union concerning restrictive
measures against Iran, as in effect on October 17, 2015.
(4) The immediate reapplication of the nuclear-related
sanctions waived by the United States.
(5) Seeking the imposition of additional punitive sanctions
with respect to Iran.
(c) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) Highly enriched uranium.--The term ``highly enriched
uranium'' means uranium with a 20 percent or higher
concentration of the isotope uranium-235.
(2) Implementation day.--The term ``implementation day''
means January 16, 2016.
(3) Joint comprehensive plan of action.--The term ``Joint
Comprehensive Plan of Action'' means the Joint Comprehensive
Plan of Action, agreed to at Vienna on July 14, 2015, by Iran
and by the People's Republic of China, France, Germany, the
Russian Federation, the United Kingdom, and the United States,
with the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign
Affairs and Security Policy, and all implementing materials and
agreements related to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action.
(4) P5+1 countries.--The term ``P5+1 countries'' means the
United States, France, the Russian Federation, the People's
Republic of China, the United Kingdom, and Germany.
(5) Spent fuel.--The term ``spent fuel'' includes all types
of irradiated fuel.
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