[Congressional Bills 115th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 4747 Introduced in House (IH)]
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115th CONGRESS
2d Session
H. R. 4747
To prohibit the Government from using or contracting with an entity
that uses certain telecommunications services or equipment, and for
other purposes.
_______________________________________________________________________
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
January 9, 2018
Mr. Conaway (for himself and Ms. Cheney) introduced the following bill;
which was referred to the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform
_______________________________________________________________________
A BILL
To prohibit the Government from using or contracting with an entity
that uses certain telecommunications services or equipment, and for
other purposes.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the ``Defending U.S. Government
Communications Act''.
SEC. 2. FINDINGS.
The Congress finds the following:
(1) In its 2011 ``Annual Report to Congress on Military and
Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of
China'', the Department of Defense stated that, ``China's
defense industry has benefited from integration with a rapidly
expanding civilian economy and science and technology sector,
particularly elements that have access to foreign technology.
Progress within individual defense sectors appears linked to
the relative integration of each, through China's civilian
economy, into the global production and R&D chain . . .
Information technology companies in particular, including
Huawei, Datang, and Zhongxing, maintain close ties to the
PLA.''.
(2) In a 2011 report titled ``The National Security
Implications of Investments and Products from the People's
Republic of China in the Telecommunications Sector'', the
United States China Commission stated that ``[n]ational
security concerns have accompanied the dramatic growth of
China's telecom sector. . . . Additionally, large Chinese
companies - particularly those `national champions' prominent
in China's `going out' strategy of overseas expansion - are
directly subject to direction by the Chinese Communist Party,
to include support for PRC state policies and goals.''.
(3) The Commission further stated in its report that
``[f]rom this point of view, the clear economic benefits of
foreign investment in the U.S. must be weighed against the
potential security concerns related to infrastructure
components coming under the control of foreign entities. This
seems particularly applicable in the telecommunications
industry, as Chinese companies continue systematically to
acquire significant holdings in prominent global and U.S.
telecommunications and information technology companies.''.
(4) In its 2011 Annual Report to Congress, the United
States China Commission stated that ``[t]he extent of the
state's control of the Chinese economy is difficult to quantify
. . . There is also a category of companies that, though
claiming to be private, are subject to state influence. Such
companies are often in new markets with no established SOE
leaders and enjoy favorable government policies that support
their development while posing obstacles to foreign
competition. Examples include Chinese telecoms giant Huawei and
such automotive companies as battery maker BYD and vehicle
manufacturers Geely and Chery.''.
(5) General Michael Hayden, who served as Director of the
Central Intelligence Agency and Director of the National
Security Agency, stated in July 2013 that Huawei had ``shared
with the Chinese state intimate and extensive knowledge of
foreign telecommunications systems it is involved with.''.
(6) The Federal Bureau of Investigation, in a February 2015
Counterintelligence Strategy Partnership Intelligence Note
stated that, ``[w]ith the expanded use of Huawei Technologies
Inc. equipment and services in U.S. telecommunications service
provider networks, the Chinese Government's potential access to
U.S. business communications is dramatically increasing.
Chinese Government-supported telecommunications equipment on
U.S. networks may be exploited through Chinese cyber activity,
with China's intelligence services operating as an advanced
persistent threat to U.S. networks.''.
(7) The FBI further stated in its February 2015
counterintelligence note that, ``China makes no secret that its
cyber warfare strategy is predicated on controlling global
communications network infrastructure.''.
(8) At a hearing before the Committee on Armed Services of
the House of Representatives on September 30, 2015, Deputy
Secretary of Defense Robert Work, responding to a question
about the use of Huawei telecommunications equipment, stated,
``In the Office of the Secretary of Defense, absolutely not.
And I know of no other--I don't believe we operate in the
Pentagon, any [Huawei] systems in the Pentagon.''.
(9) At such hearing, the Commander of the United States
Cyber Command, Admiral Mike Rogers, responding to a question
about why such Huawei telecommunications equipment is not used,
stated, ``as we look at supply chain and we look at potential
vulnerabilities within the system, that it is a risk we felt
was unacceptable.''.
(10) In March 2017, ZTE Corporation pled guilty to
conspiring to violate the International Emergency Economic
Powers Act by illegally shipping U.S.-origin items to Iran,
paying the United States Government a penalty of $892,360,064
dollars for activity between January 2010 and January 2016.
(11) The Treasury Department's Office of Foreign Assets
Control issued a subpoena to Huawei as part of a Federal
investigation of alleged violations of trade restrictions on
Cuba, Iran, Sudan, and Syria.
(12) In the bipartisan House Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence ``Investigative Report on the United States
National Security Issues Posed by Chinese Telecommunication
Companies Huawei and ZTE'' released in 2012, it was recommended
that ``U.S. government systems, particularly sensitive systems,
should not include Huawei or ZTE equipment, including in
component parts. Similarly, government contractors -
particularly those working on contracts for sensitive U.S.
programs - should exclude ZTE or Huawei equipment in their
systems.''.
SEC. 3. PROHIBITION ON CERTAIN TELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICES OR
EQUIPMENT.
(a) Prohibition on Agency Use or Procurement.--The head of an
agency may not procure or obtain, may not extend or renew a contract to
procure or obtain, and may not enter into a contract (or extend or
renew a contract) with an entity that uses any equipment, system, or
service that uses covered telecommunications equipment or services as a
substantial or essential component of any system, or as critical
technology as part of any system.
(b) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) Agency.--The term ``agency'' has the meaning given that
term in section 551 of title 5, United States Code.
(2) Covered foreign country.--The term ``covered foreign
country'' means the People's Republic of China.
(3) Covered telecommunications equipment or services.--The
term ``covered telecommunications equipment or services'' means
any of the following:
(A) Telecommunications equipment produced by Huawei
Technologies Company or ZTE Corporation (or any
subsidiary or affiliate of such entities).
(B) Telecommunications services provided by such
entities or using such equipment.
(C) Telecommunications equipment or services
produced or provided by an entity that the head of the
relevant agency reasonably believes to be an entity
owned or controlled by, or otherwise connected to, the
government of a covered foreign country.
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